Security Cooperation
in Central Europe:
Polish views

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submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

as recommended by the Department of War Studies, King's College London

June 1995
ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to present cautious evaluations of the viability of multilateral subregional security frameworks in post-Cold War Central Europe. It uses the case of Polish official and contending views of subregional security frameworks in Central Europe. The time frame of the discussion extends from the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the spring of 1991 to the winter 1993/1994 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Partnership for Peace initiative to study Central European approaches to this foreign and security policy option. The central argument of this thesis is that subregional cooperation in Central Europe is proving difficult because there are few realistic common goals and no common historical base acceptable to all potential member countries.

The collapse of the Eastern bloc freed tensions and problems among the region's countries, but also resulted in renaissance of old and development of new concepts of subregional cooperation. However, this thesis argues that concepts of post-Cold War subregional structures fail to provide clearly defined, pragmatic, and realistic sets of short- and medium-term goals, which could bring these countries together, and if accomplished, could consolidate this form of cooperation.

A distinction is made between new concepts of cooperation frameworks, aimed at managing links with the West (Visegrad Group, Central European Initiative), and concepts reflecting historical proposals, in general aimed at addressing the country's relations with its Eastern neighbours (NATO-bis, Miedzymorze). It is argued that while the former are backed by reform forces, the latter are advanced by relatively small sections of the right, but occasionally also the left of the Polish political spectrum. These proposals are of a populistic character, appealing to the Polish sense of the country's mission and role in East Central Europe, and based on historically controversial and potentially destabilizing ideas. As the feeling of mission is interpreted by Poland's neighbours as expression of imperialist tendencies, subregional cooperation has little in terms of common historical experiences that create feelings of solidarity, institutional continuity and precedents for cooperation on which to build.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 2

Acknowledgements 6

Glossary of Acronyms 7

Chapter One: Introduction 9
   1. Methodology
   2. Literature
   3. Outline of study
   4. Findings

Chapter Two: Subregional multilateral security cooperation in theory 23
   1. Introduction
   2. Power considerations and external threats
   3. Ideology and internal predisposition
   4. Internal politics: economic and political benefits
   5. Assessment of foreign policy options
   6. Conclusion

Chapter Three: Historical setting - Poland’s past until the collapse of the Eastern bloc 42
   1. Introduction
   2. The rise and fall of the Polish state until the end of World War II
   3. Communist period
   4. Collapse of communist structures
   5. Summary and conclusion
Chapter Four: Historical images in Polish political culture
1. Introduction
2. Historical images and political culture: a brief discussion
3. Origins of Polish historical images
4. Historical images and nationalism in Poland
5. Assessment and conclusion

Chapter Five: Poland’s relations with its neighbours in the post-Cold War era
1. Introduction
2. Poland’s post-Cold War international environment
3. Poland’s relations with its Western neighbour: Germany
4. Relations with Eastern neighbours
5. Poland’s relations with Southern neighbours: Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Republics
6. Summary and conclusion

Chapter Six: Polish threat perceptions in the post-Cold War era
1. Introduction
2. Notions of security threats
3. External threats
4. ‘Home-made’ threats
5. Summary and conclusion

Chapter Seven: Polish foreign policy options after the disintegration of the Eastern bloc
1. Introduction
2. Russian option
3. Neutrality
4. Collective pan-European security
5. Membership in alliances
6. Summary and conclusion

Chapter Eight: Existing subregional cooperation frameworks
1. Introduction
2. Potential benefits of subregional security cooperation
3. Brief history of CEI and Visegrad
4. Problems of existing subregional cooperation frameworks
5. Polish perceptions of existing subregional groupings
6. Prospects of existing subregional groupings
7. Conclusion
Chapter Nine: Proposals for subregional security cooperation frameworks in East Central Europe

1. Introduction
2. Brief history of subregional proposals in the 1980s and 90s
3. Spiritual Foundations of Miedzymorze and NATO-bis
4. Miedzymorze and NATO-bis as tools for links with West and East
5. Problems of the concepts
6. Summary and conclusion

Chapter Ten: Summary and Conclusion

Appendix A: Maps documenting changes of Polish borders over time

Appendix B: Map of Miedzymorze area

Bibliography
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could not have been written without the support, help and encouragement of my supervisor, Dr. DGB Heuser, and the Head of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, Prof. Lawrence Freedman.

I am grateful to a number of organizations and trusts which have helped to fund my two years of studies in London. I would like to acknowledge the support of the British Academy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the MacKenzie King Trust, the British Federation of Women Graduates, the BASSEES Research and Development Committee, and the British Chamber of Commerce in Germany Foundation.

A great many people have contributed ideas and assisted me in various ways in the process of writing this thesis. Most important of all were my Polish interview partners, the residents of the London House Trust, and the faculty of the Department of War Studies.
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBC SWB</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Cooperation Summary of World Broadcasts</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPF</td>
<td>Belorussian Popular Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBWR</td>
<td>Bezpartyjni Blok Wspolpracy z Rzadem (Non-party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government) or Bezpartyjni Blok Wsparcia Reformy (Non-party Bloc For Support of Reform)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEFTA</td>
<td>Central European Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>CEI</td>
<td>Central European Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CJTFs</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>COMCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Multilateral Export Controls</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comecon</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and Security-Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
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<td>JPRSS</td>
<td>Joint Publication Research Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>KO</td>
<td>Kaliningrad Oblast</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej (Confederation for Independent Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSWTO</td>
<td>Non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PISM</td>
<td>Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych (Polish Institute of International Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Republika Polska (Republic of Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VG</td>
<td>Visegrad Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organization</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:
METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

1. Methodology
This is a study of security and subregional cooperation. Its focus is multilateral subregional security cooperation in Central Europe after the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989-1990. In particular, the work analyzes Polish views of such forms of cooperation. The central argument of this thesis is that subregional cooperation in Central Europe is proving difficult in the post-Cold War era because there are no uncontroversial common historical experiences, and few well-defined and realistic common goals.

This thesis focuses on the case of one particular country in the Central European region because a discussion of security policies in the entire region runs the risk of generalizing where few common features are to be found except for the common post-Communist past of these countries and their post-Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) legacy.

Poland\(^1\) has been selected for this study because it is both geopolitically significant, and internationally active. Poland is the largest (312,690 square kilometres) and the most populous (38.6 million inhabitants) of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization (NSWTO) countries. It occupies a pivotal position on the great plain that covers the northern part of continental Europe and that reaches from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains. There are no natural boundaries for nation-states occupying the plain.\(^2\)

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\(^{1}\) Poland was officially known as the Polish People’s Republic until 30 December 1989, and thereafter as the Republic of Poland (RP).

\(^{2}\) Adrian Hyde-Price, 'East Central European Security After the Cold War', paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference, Lancaster, 15-17 April 1991, p. 4-5.
Halford MacKinder described the plains on which Poland finds itself as an 'open gateway', 1,000 miles wide.³ Through history, people and states have moved across this plain in an eastward or westward direction. The Poles themselves developed in the Middle Ages a Drang nach Osten which has been compared to the early eastward expansion by the Germans. However, following the collapse of the powerful Polish state in the 17th and 18th century, the Poles' geographical position exposed them to expansionist shifts on the part of its powerful neighbours.⁴

Located on the geostrategical East-West axis, and being geographically open to access from both directions, Poland (and occasionally also its neighbours) has historically performed the role of a buffer zone between Russia and Germany. Poland is thus part of an area that has been considered a 'shatter belt', 'marchland'⁵, or 'crush zone'.⁶ A Polish publicist used the term ventre mou - the soft underbelly of Europe⁷ - to describe the position of his country.

In the WTO, Poland was part of the geostrategically significant northern tier of states⁸ - the so-called Iron Triangle which included also the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and which performed a dual role for the Soviet Union, 'offensively, as a springboard for

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³ Early in the 20th century, MacKinder, a Scottish geographer, advanced geopolitical ideas which are considered to be among the most eminent contributions to classical geopolitical theory. Halford J. MacKinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', Geographical Journal 23 (1904); idem, Britain and the British Seas. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1969); idem, Democratic Ideals and Reality. (New York: Norton, 1962); idem, 'The Round World and the Winning Peace', Foreign Affairs Vol 21, No. 4 (July 1943).


⁵ 'Shatter belt' is defined by David Turnock as an area with conflicting state or great-power interests. He also calls the region a 'marchland' between the gates leading to the Baltic and Black Seas, and between the sea power of the West and the land power of the East. See David Turnock, Eastern Europe: An Historical Geography 1815-1945. (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 1-13.


⁷ Tadeusz Lubienski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At the foot of Europe’s door], Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993).

attack; and defensively, as a buffer zone'. The Soviet policy after 1989 of non-interference in the region ultimately meant that the Soviet Union was willing to give up its offensive military position in the heart of Europe. However, even after the collapse of the WTO, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, continued to perceive Central Europe as a strategic buffer zone.

Poland is also active internationally. Its prominence on the international scene is a reflection of its endeavours to overcome the condition which is described in Poland as belonging to a 'grey' security zone. Some consider the country to inhabit a 'security vacuum' following the collapse of the Eastern bloc. More recently, Poland was one of the main proponents of the creation and institutionalization of multilateral cooperation structures, and advocated the formulation of common Central European approaches to a number of international issues. Simultaneously, Poland was careful to indicate that existing subregional security cooperation frameworks must not develop into alliances or replace the option of membership in Western security organizations.

For theoretical purposes, this thesis treats Poland as a small state. According to Heinz Gärtner, small states are states that can be described as militarily relatively weak. Rothstein defines small powers as feeling 'threatened in some significant and immediate sense, by the play of Great Power politics'. Trygve Mathisen actually argues that countries such as Poland should be qualified as a 'lower class of middle powers'. However, Poland is located in a cluster of small states, and has security problems of the nature that are encountered by small states (such as inability to defend its borders against most potential forms of aggression against it). Thus, Poland largely

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conforms to the definition of a small state.¹⁴

It needs to be said here that some political forces in Poland believe the country to be a regional power with aspirations to a leading role among neighbouring countries, but these claims are based on historical references rather than a clear analysis of its capabilities and power. As this thesis suggests, these attitudes create uneasy feelings among Poland's neighbours.

The period examined here begins with the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the spring of 1991 and concludes with the winter of 1993/1994, when cooperation with Western security organizations gained a new dimension as a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) *Partnership for Peace* initiative. The two events marked two turning points which had a significant impact on the course of Polish foreign and defence policy. Information concerning events which have taken place in 1990 or 1995 is included where necessary or otherwise relevant.

Since the events in Eastern and Central Europe have taken place at a dazzling rate, this thesis does not aim to recount the myriad changes that this part of the world has seen. Most of its metamorphoses lie well beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the focus here is on the approaches Poland has been debating towards one particular aspect of its foreign policy. Many sections of the thesis do not deal directly with subregional cooperation, but rather with the political and historical context within which such forms of cooperation must be placed.

The case of subregional multilateral security cooperation in Central Europe after the end of the Cold War is better understood in the context of a careful case analysis of the motivations and approaches of an individual state towards such structures, than through general theories. The aim of the thesis is thus not to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for the understanding of security cooperation structures, but to contribute cautious evaluations of the relevance of such forms of cooperation in the post-Cold War era. However, for a discussion of the theoretical issues, see Chapter Two.

The central task of this thesis, then, is to explain why there is currently so little subregional security cooperation in Central and East Central Europe. This study is intended to make the following contributions:

1. Firstly, it documents and analyzes the Central European discussions of the security

advantages of subregional frameworks. This aspect is important both in its own right and for the light it may shed on past and future subregional cooperation efforts in the Central European region.

2. Secondly, this project contributes to a theoretical understanding of the purpose and value of multilateral subregional security cooperation outside of frameworks that involve the participation of great powers. The argument adds to our understanding of what can and cannot be expected from subregional security arrangements in Central Europe.

It is necessary to define the central terms and concepts used in this thesis, beginning with the very notion of security. Generally speaking, security can be defined as the ability of states 'to maintain the independence of their life and their identity'.

In the post-Cold War era, however, there are two differing interpretations of this general definition. The traditional, narrow definition of security, also described by some as 'mainstream', has as its core the analysis of military threat and the use and control of military force as a tool of defence and diplomacy by state actors. This approach is usually associated with the 'realist' tradition in international relations theory. In the 1970s and 1980s, the security studies community began to question the traditional notion of security. New definitions of security take into consideration, in addition to military threats, political, economic, social and environmental concerns, which are seen as affecting both states and non-state actors. The new definition is thus both wider - by incorporating non-state actors, and deeper - by embracing non-territorial considerations. Initially, this debate about the definition of security took place almost exclusively among a largely Western academic community. With the end of the Cold War this debate has spread further into the policy-making community on the one hand, and into Eastern and Central Europe on the other.

Traditional definitions of security based on calculations of military strength continue to be of significance for the region's policy-makers. In light of events such as

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17 Buzan, European Security Order, p. 4.

the wars in the former Yugoslavia, these concerns will not disappear from the Central European security agenda in the near future.\(^{19}\) Many elements of the ways Poles have traditionally defined security in the past persist and Polish decision-makers continue to perceive dangers which in their opinion can only be alleviated by membership in military organizations. A number of authors explain this anxiety at least partly by the fact that national security policies reflect long-standing cultural factors.\(^{20}\) Indisputably, in the Polish political-military culture, military power continues to be associated with the notion of an independent Polish state and nationhood.\(^{21}\) In addition, the country’s security policies are still characterized by the lasting effects of the militarization of security within the Warsaw Treaty Organization (see Chapter Three).

Nevertheless, Poles perceive that the direct military threat has lessened in the post-Cold War era. The 'comprehensive' definition of security is spreading in Poland.\(^{22}\) In fact consideration of national security now encompass aspects of both the traditional and the 'comprehensive' concepts of security. Consequently, the Polish government associates two potential sources of security threats, or risks, with the end of the Cold War - namely the 'extraneous' and the 'home-made'.

The widening and deepening of the definition of security, however, carries its own problems. It has been noted that with the end of the Cold War security acquired an all-embracing meaning for the former Communist countries.\(^{23}\) Consequently, as Nelson indicates, although it faces few direct military dangers, Central Europe’s post-Cold War

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19 See Monika Wohlfeld, 'Implications for Relations between Western and Central Europe', Chaillot Papers (The Implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations) 17 (October 1994).


23 Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around', p. 15.
perception of insecurity has intensified and simultaneously widened.\textsuperscript{24} In fact, the \textbf{Security for Europe Project} warns that the presence of both the 'mainstream' and the 'comprehensive' definitions of security in Central Europe causes problems for the policy-making process, as they 'are based on different assumptions, lead in different directions, and create different policy agendas'.\textsuperscript{25}

This thesis understands 'security cooperation' as multilateral attempts to work with other states for the common end of achieving security. It focuses on cooperation at a subregional level, that is, on links between small and mid-size states in the immediate geographical proximity. The thesis does not consider cooperation taking place on a sub-governmental level, such as the so called Euroregions, which include a number of border areas. This form of cooperation contributes only indirectly to the sense of security of a country.\textsuperscript{26}

The kind of security cooperation that is of interest to this work is that which reflects common concerns and interests in the sphere of security. It is multilateral, potentially but not necessarily institutionalized, and aimed at providing security benefits or guarantees. It is not necessarily based on a binding alliance treaty. These forms of cooperation could in fact be understood as alliances in the loose sense of this term.

There are many definitions of the term 'alliance'.\textsuperscript{27} Alliances have been conceived of as loose affiliations, connections, or cooperation frameworks, or as more formal and institutionalized unions, coalitions, blocs, confederations or federations. Stephen M. Walt defines alliance inclusively as 'a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states'.\textsuperscript{28} Ken Booth, however, states that there are two factors that characterize alliances: the formality of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Daniel N. Nelson, 'Democracy, Markets and Security in Eastern Europe', \textit{Survival} Vol. 35 No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 166.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} \textbf{Security for Europe Project: Final Report}. Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University (December 1993), pp. 36-37.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} See Andrzej Kepinski, 'Piata kolumna czy fundament' [Fifth column or foundation], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (14 December 1994).
\end{itemize}
relationship, and the military focus of the association. Following Booth’s more discerning approach, this thesis defines an alliance as a collaboration among three or more states, aimed at dealing with issues of national and international security. Thus the term 'alliance' will be used to characterize only formal treaty-based arrangements such as NATO.

The term 'Central Europe' (and to some degree also 'East Central Europe') describes an area flanked by German and Russian territories, which lies between the Baltic, the Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Seas. Recently, the term has been applied simply to Poland, Czech and Slovak republics and Hungary (today often referred to as the Visegrad countries). This thesis follows the latter, more precise, definition of Central Europe. It uses the notion of East Central Europe to describe these four Central European countries (Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, and Hungary) and their immediate neighbours to the East - the newly independent former Soviet republics, in particular Ukraine, Belorus, and Lithuania.

The concept of Central Europe has a brief but telling history. The Polish historian Piotr Wandycz observes that the East-West dichotomy is a recent phenomenon, stemming from the 19th-century Russian debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles. What is understood to be Central Europe today was certainly mapped differently in the past. As Tony Judt states, 'Western imagination mapped its cultures with Germany through the first half of the century, and with the Soviet Union more recently.' After the Second World War, the entire Soviet bloc has been defined as Eastern Europe by Western analysts and policy-makers. It was not until the 1980s that the definition of non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization (NSWTO) countries as Eastern Europe has been questioned in the West, despite the fact that there were many voices from the region proposing alternative ways of naming it. The preferred term was Central Europe 'because the


"eastern" appellation involved a recognition of the region’s forcible separation from Europe."33

Following the end of the Cold War, the West has 'rediscovered' the region as separable from the former Soviet Union. The United States Department of State, for example, announced that it will be using the term Central Europe rather than Eastern Europe to describe the former NSWTO countries.34 The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office adopted a similar terminology.

Central Europe today is not what Karl Deutsch or Barry Buzan define as a regional security complex.35 Such a complex is comprised of states in which the possibility of an outbreak of interstate violence has practically disappeared, and which have interconnecting security perceptions and concerns. Even prior to 1989, Central European national interests varied, although such differences were more or less kept in check by membership in the bloc.36 Since the collapse of the WTO, the differences have become more pronounced. While there are some similarities, for example their common WTO and communist heritage (discussed further in Chapter Three), their approaches to matters of defence and security vary considerably.

In fact, today, many Central European authors consider the notion of Central Europe as a politically, historically and culturally distinct unit a myth.37 They point out the lack of willingness to pursue common objectives without competition. Others are wary of attempts to name and classify regions, since this necessarily implies assessing their 'proximity to Europe'. Some accept the definition but reject the pessimistic Milan

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33 Wandycz, Price of Freedom, p. 3.

34 Tadeusz Zachurski, 'Europa Srodkowa zamiast wschodniej: Słowa maja znaczenie' [Central Europe in place of Eastern: Words have significance], Rzeczpospolit (22 September 1994).


Kundera-tradition of interpreting Central Europe as an innocent victim. 38

This thesis focuses on 'Polish views'. Polish views are taken to mean both official policies and contending views which are discussed where relevant and necessary. This thesis is therefore concerned with studying the patterns of motivations, goals, and strategies which condition Polish attitudes towards, and ideas of, multilateral subregional security cooperation in Central Europe after the end of the Cold War. 39 As Kal Holsti reasons, 'attitudes can be conceived as general evaluative propositions about some subject, fact or condition'. 40 They affect how policy makers respond to the realities of the international environment. Attitudes reflect the values by which actions are judged, and beliefs which include national 'myths' and ideologies.

2. Literature

Chapters Two and Three, and parts of this chapter function also as the literature review of the thesis. At its most specific, the literature used in this study includes factual accounts of the post-Cold War changes in foreign and security policies of Central Europe in general and in Poland in particular. This body of literature is generally devoid of theoretical content, but provides the necessary background information. A separate chapter (Chapter Three) describes the historical and political background of the analyzed case.

The research conducted for this thesis included a survey of literature on Central European foreign policies after 1989, published in English and Polish. Some German-language publications are also included. Only a limited number of relevant books and monographs has been published to date on this particular topic. Official exposes, speeches, and documents, news articles and occasional journal articles have been used extensively. Western primary sources, mainly from NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, renamed in December 1994 as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE),

38 Tadeusz Lubienski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At the foot of Europe's door], Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993). For an example of Kundera's writing, see Kundera, 'Tragedy of Central Europe'.

39 Stephen M. Walt suggests that 'when examining the historical record, we should focus not only on what states did, but even more important, on what they preferred to do.' Stephen M. Walt, 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power', International Security Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), p. 55. See also Holsti, International Politics, p. 271.

40 Ibid., p. 272.
as well as analyzes published in the aftermath of the collapse of the Eastern bloc have been used. Regular updates on events in East and Central Europe such as the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS) translations, *Radio Free Europe*, and *BBC SWB* (Survey of World Broadcasts) publications, have proven to be invaluable sources of information.

Information and ideas have also been provided by interview partners from within the Polish government, as well as other observers of the country’s foreign and security policies. Much of the information gathered in this way has not appeared so far in secondary sources. The section on Polish attitudes towards various proposals for subregional security cooperation in particular is to a large degree based on Polish newspaper reports and on interviews, since little has been published on this topic to date either in Poland or in the West. The thesis’ footnotes do not reflect the number of discussions and interviews conducted, as some have functioned mainly as guides to available literature, and a way of corroborating facts.

*Rzeczpospolita*, a newspaper co-owned by the Polish government, was scanned carefully for information about Polish attitudes towards various security issues. *Polska Zbrojna*, the newspaper of the armed forces, and *Gazeta Wyborcza*, which emerged as a voice of the opposition, were also of great use. Other newspapers contributed occasional articles.

In addition, theoretical literature has been scrutinised for possible explanations of Polish attitudes towards subregional security cooperation frameworks. The results are summarized in the following chapter, which discusses potentially relevant realist theoretical frameworks, such as literature on alliances and on geopolitics, as well as a body of literature focusing on the role of political culture and historical images in the formulation of foreign and security policies.

### 3. Outline of Study

The thesis is organized as an introduction and eight chapters of analysis followed by a brief conclusion. After the methodological introduction, Chapter Two provides a discussion of subregional multilateral security cooperation in theory. It describes a number of factors which can be seen as either contributing to, or preventing the creation of subregional security arrangements: the presence of an external purpose, such as dealing with exogenous security risks, threats or constraints; the existence of an internally generated predisposition, for example a sense of community based on common notions
of security among a region's states; and the promise of economic or political benefits.

Chapter Three provides a discussion of the historical and political background of the particular case. Firstly, it outlines the fortunes of the Polish state over time. Secondly, it describes the common legacy of the communist bloc in Central Europe.

Chapter Four, entitled 'Prospects for Subregional Security Cooperation: Analysis of Historical Images in Polish Political Culture' examines the images of history of Poles as they have recast their willingness to follow certain foreign policy choices. As such, the chapter has a particular focus - its purpose is not to present a full and balanced survey of Polish affairs over the last millennium. Instead, this chapter first briefly assesses the general significance of historical images as part of the political culture of a country. Secondly, the chapter develops the notion of Polish patriotism, basing it on historically predominant themes which, this author believes, have a direct or indirect impact on Polish political culture today (nationalism, in particular as it affects relations with Poland's neighbours; the significance of Christianity; and an identification with the West).

The subsequent chapter deals with Polish perceptions of geopolitical realities in the post-Cold War era. It focuses on Polish relations with the country's immediate neighbours. It discusses positive developments as well as existing and potential problems in Poland's relations with countries with which it shares borders. This discussion is not intended to provide a chronological account of bilateral relations, but rather to assess selected contemporary events as they relate to the topic of security cooperation. The chapter is subdivided on a geographical basis, dealing with relations with the country's Western, Eastern and Southern neighbours separately.

Chapter Six considers Polish perceptions of potential threats in the post-Cold War era. Like other Central European governments, Poland associates sources of threats or risks with the end of the Cold War - 'extraneous', and 'home-made'. Domestic security challenges include economic, political and military reforms and their effects on society. Extraneous security threats discussed in this chapter include tensions with other Central European countries, the effects of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the consequences and perceptions of German reunification, and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

The seventh chapter analyzes the Polish governments' responses to perceived security threats after the disintegration of the WTO. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Central European countries have had, hypothetically at least, a
number of foreign policy options open to them. This chapter focuses on a number of different policies the newly democratic Central European governments have advocated in order to enhance their security. It discusses the Polish views of the options of neutrality, collective security, NATO membership, and finally EC (later EU) and/or WEU membership.

Chapter Eight focuses on the most important existing subregional cooperation frameworks that involve Polish participation, the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative. Neither of these two organizations has taken on a meaningful security dimension, and their economic achievements so far can only be described as marginal. This chapter first provides a brief description of the potential benefits for Central European countries of taking part in such subregional frameworks. It then focuses on the history of both organizations. In the following section, it discusses issues which hinder the development of both the Visegrad Group and the CEI into viable subregional cooperation structures. It concentrates on three kinds of constraints: limitations originating within the region; restrictions stemming from the approaches of Western organizations; and, finally, pressures generated by Eastern European countries that are not members of the frameworks in question. Polish attitudes towards subregional cooperation frameworks are discussed in the final section of this chapter.

The Ninth Chapter scrutinizes Polish attitudes towards a number of proposals for subregional security cooperation structures put forward in the past few years by various political forces. It details factors which have hindered the creation of proposed security cooperation frameworks in Central Europe, and addresses prospects for initiatives of this kind. This chapter centres around initiatives which, generally speaking, have never been elaborated in any substantial detail and often have only been outlined in speeches or newspaper interviews. It is for this reason that Chapter Nine is mainly based on newspaper reports and interviews. This chapter provides a hitherto unique account and analysis of the Central European debate surrounding concepts of subregional multilateral security cooperation. Finally, a brief concluding chapter provides final thoughts on the contribution made by this study.

4. Findings

All serious changes in the international system raise issues concerning the positions of individual states in it. Confronted with the changes, Poland, like other
Central European countries, was compelled to assess threats to its security; develop relations with neighbouring countries; transform economically, politically and militarily; and last but not least, develop foreign policy concepts and seek security guarantees.

Initially, it seemed that Poland had a number of foreign and security policy options available. One of them was subregional cooperation. In fact, such frameworks (Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative) have been created in the post-Cold war era, and Poland has been very supportive of such cooperation attempts. However, security cooperation on subregional level in Central Europe turned out to be laborious and intricate because there is little in terms of a common historical base acceptable to all potential member countries.

True, some of Poland’s political forces continue to discuss the creation of subregional multilateral security cooperation based on concepts from the past, but the memory of such events is not equally dear to all of the countries concerned. The shared history in fact implied past subordination for some and glorious days of expansion, domination or influence for others.

In Poland, subregional cooperation concepts often reveal aspects of Polish admiration for the interwar period and for the Jagellonian period of the Polish-Lithuanian empire (14-17th century). They tend to reflect historically controversial ideas of a special role for Poland in areas which today belong to the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. These proposals must be understood as but one voice in the Polish debate, which is still unresolved, about how to structure security relations with the country’s neighbours. Subregional concepts based on the historical idea of Central European security community have never been implemented, but continue to have supporters in the political spectrum of Poland and in some other East Central European countries.

In short, all existing and proposed post-Cold War subregional structures lack clearly defined, pragmatic and realistic sets of short-term and mid-term goals which, if accomplished, could cement this form of cooperation. Moreover, existing cooperation structures have exhausted their initial shared interests, which included the common task of shaking off Soviet domination, and proving to the West that the region was indeed capable of cooperation.
CHAPTER TWO

SUBREGIONAL MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THEORY

1. Introduction

There is no 'theory of subregional security cooperation'. Consequently, there have been no rigorous theoretical attempts to analyze the prospects of Central European subregional security cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Nonetheless, there are hypotheses in international relations theory which provide insight into the broadly defined notions of alignment or alliance formation. These hypotheses help to explain the theoretical assumptions behind the claims, put forward by many observers, that subregional cooperation would be advantageous to the Central European countries.¹

This chapter presents these hypotheses in a manner that seeks to enhance our understanding of subregional security cooperation. It also provides an extensive review of scholarly literature concerned with alliance formation.

As the introductory chapter specified, for reasons of precision, this thesis does not

see multilateral subregional security cooperation as 'alliances', which are defined as formal treaty-based arrangements. However, theoretical approaches often follow a loose definition of alliances. It is for this reason that this chapter discusses alliance literature where it is relevant to the case. Of particular interest to this work are the questions why and when multilateral security cooperation is pursued by a particular government, and with what type of countries governments seek these kinds of arrangements.

This chapter’s purpose is to shed light on the intellectual background for post-Cold War subregional security cooperation, and to inform the structure and argument of the thesis. At its most general, international relations theory suggests that the decision to enter or form alliances reflects the presence of external considerations, and is based on internal predispositions and the perception of domestic benefits. Following this theoretical discussion, the thesis will analyze the influence of two conditions - external considerations and internal constraints, and then will concentrate on actual foreign and security policy choices pursued by Poland.

The structure of this chapter is sufficiently inclusive to capture most of the theoretical hypotheses that have considered the utility of multilateral security cooperation. The chapter is divided into three sections which represent three general ways of thinking about alignment and multilateral security cooperation. The first section appraises theoretical considerations of the distribution of power in the international system. It includes hypotheses concerning balancing, bandwagoning, responses to external threats, alliances as tools for management of member countries and as a means of overcoming geopolitical constraints. The second section considers internal matters of ideology and internal predisposition. It discusses ideological affinities among states, similar domestic orders, cultural perceptions of a 'common fate', traditions of cooperation, and national (ethnic) similarities. The third part focuses on internal politics, particularly the role of alliances as providers of economic and political benefits. It discusses hypotheses which see alignment as a function of domestic considerations including the requirements of legitimacy, stability, and the provision of resources. Finally, the chapter assesses the contribution of theoretical literature to our understanding of multilateral subregional security cooperation.

The conclusion reached in this chapter is that is impossible to make a strong a

priori argument for or against the existence of such frameworks for cooperation. It is therefore difficult or even impossible in theory to understand or to predict the willingness or unwillingness of states to form or to enter such cooperation frameworks.

2. Power considerations and external threats

This section considers countries’ decisions to enter or form subregional security cooperation frameworks as a response to external forces, such exogenous security threats and geopolitical constraints. The dominant theoretical paradigm for considering this form of security cooperation developed in the Cold War era and sees it in general as another form of alliance behaviour.

Most versions of alliance theory follow the realist approach that explains alignment as the result of an externally motivated purpose. It sees security threats or constraints as direct causes of foreign and security policy behaviour. Indeed, Realists assume, generally speaking, that states form and break alliances acting on perceptions of national interests, and of the power of other states. There is a continual shifting of alliances. Threats result from the structure of the competitive international system. Geographical factors are part of 'the power equation'. Within this school of thought, there are varying approaches to alliance behaviour.

Balancing

Alliances have long been associated by realist scholars with the balancing of power. Balance of power can be defined as 'a combination of the powers of two or more states to counter the perceived superiority of a third power'. The most elegant presentations of this theory are Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, and Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics. For these authors alliances function

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5 See Saperstein, 'Alliance Building', p. 518.


7 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
as an indispensable part of the balance of power in a system composed of multiple states.

The applicability of this theory to the given case is limited. Heinz Gätter argues that small states, attempting to develop a balance against strong powers, turn to another strong state rather than to neighbouring small states. Thus, it has been suggested that balance of power is 'a theory primarily about the behaviour of great powers', and does not necessarily explain the behaviour of lesser states. In addition, it is not in the interest of small states to pursue balance of power because, it has been argued, their survival in such a system is intrinsically uncertain. Rothstein concludes by saying that 'to describe the policy of a Small Power in terms of the balance of power is not very illuminating.'

**Bandwagoning**

Although the traditional alliance literature almost always falls within the scope of balancing, other hypotheses appear as well. Schweller suggests that while theorists focus on balancing, practitioners are more likely to think of bandwagoning as typical behaviour. In this view, states, confronted with power imbalances, align with the stronger and/or the threatening side.

To the detriment of realist theory, some of the most convincing support for the concept of bandwagoning comes from authors who go beyond the systemic theoretical framework and see bandwagoning not as a result of systemic power considerations, but of domestic concerns. Steven David suggests that fragile Third World elites often bandwagon in order to balance dangerous domestic threats. Deborah Larson suggests

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12 Ibid., p. 36.


that bandwagoning is used by weak regimes to undermine domestic rivals, provide economic benefits, and offer 'an aura of invincibility by association with the great power’s victories'. These motivational factors are discussed in section four of this chapter.

Some authors argue that unlike balancing, bandwagoning does not require the presence of an external threat. If balancing intends to avoid losses, bandwagoning may imply that there is an opportunistic chance and desire for gain. Schweller presents the common-sense argument that 'states may bandwagon with the stronger side because they believe it represents the "wave of the future"', rather than because they see power imbalances. Thus, bandwagoning, as well, may imply behaviour that cannot be accounted for by the realist school of thought. The notion of alliances providing domestic gains is analyzed in section four of this chapter.

In addition, it is doubtful that bandwagoning can work with a group of small states in immediate geographical proximity. It appears that bandwagoning as a concept is centred around the notion of a Great Power. Gartner suggests that small states tend to ally with strong partners. Some authors go as far as to suggest that subregional alliances can erode the support or responsibility that Great Powers feel for a region. In short, small states are not likely to bandwagon with other small states.

Response to external threats

A number of authors suggest that alliances are formed to oppose an external threat. Stephen Walt in his seminal work on alliances explains alliance formation by

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16 Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit', p. 74.

17 Ibid., p. 96.

18 Gärtner, 'Small States', p. 190.


the notion of the 'balance of threat'. This is a revised version of the balance-of-power theory. Walt concludes that states typically balance and seldom bandwagon. However, he does not believe that states align as a result of perceptions of systemic power distribution. Rather, they do so due to imbalances of threats, which are based on considerations of aggregate power, geographic distance, offensive capability, and the perceived intentions of other states.

The balance of threat theory has been questioned by a number of scholars. One of the most obvious and significant faults of this school of thought is that 'perceived threats are very hard to either substantiate or to refute'. Of course, the same applies to the previous two approaches, balancing and bandwagoning, since they too are based on states' perceptions which, by definition, cannot be disproved. Fedder and Robinson believe that alliances formed in response to such inferred threats must by nature be very fragile.

Additionally, most literature disregards the significant difference between military alliances and political alliances. Rothstein suggests that a military alliance is based on the perception of a threat which a state cannot respond to with only its own resources. A political alliance is based on the perceptions of a situation on which an alliance can capitalize. Thus, the absence of a threat may not mean that states are not entering or forming security cooperation frameworks. In fact, some authors argue that small states may choose to cooperate with a combination of lesser states for political reasons, if they do not perceive a Great Power threat.

Finally, as a response to an external threat, subregional security cooperation frameworks may be futile. Commentators usually see subregional security frameworks as militarily ineffectual, if not hazardous. Alfred Cobban has noted that combinations of weak states do not improve their individual standing. Annette Baker Fox concluded

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24 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 52.

25 Ibid., p. 61.

that Small Power alliances failed 'for the sum of their power was weakness and the combinations were too insubstantial'\textsuperscript{27}. Some authors go as far as to say that they may be militarily 'pernicious'\textsuperscript{28}. Thus, these frameworks are not likely to be the response of states faced with an external threat.

\textit{Tools of management over member countries}

Alliances can also function as tools of management over member countries, or to put this differently, tools for restraining rogue members. Paul Schroeder argues that alliances are formed, among other reasons, 'to accommodate a threat through a "pact of restraint"' and can 'provide the great powers with a "tool of management" over weaker states'\textsuperscript{29}. Harvey Starr and Randolph M. Siverson assert that states join alliances in order to control some of their allies.\textsuperscript{30} Significantly, unlike Schroeder, Rothstein suggests that it is not only alliances that include the participation of a Great Power but also subregional alliances, which can exercise this role. He states that 'they may very well be extremely useful instruments if the goal involved maintaining the status quo and controlling or removing local grievances without Great Power intervention.'\textsuperscript{31} Thus subregional security cooperation, it has been suggested, can play the role of a regional policeman.\textsuperscript{32} However, it has been suggested that this function of alliances tends to become more important when alliances have existed for some time and when the perception of an external threat is lessened.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, it is questionable whether subregional frameworks are constructed as tools for management over member countries.


\textsuperscript{28} Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small States}, p. 170-171.

\textsuperscript{29} Schroeder, 'Alliances, 1815-1945'.

\textsuperscript{30} Harvey Starr and Randolph M. Siverson, 'Alliances and Geopolitics'. \textit{Political Geography Quarterly} Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 1990), p. 246.

\textsuperscript{31} Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}, p. 175.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 174.

Means for overcoming geopolitical constraints

Little of the existing alliance literature explicitly takes geopolitical theories into account, and little geopolitics literature explicitly deals with the phenomenon of alliances. However, the environmental possibilists Starr and Siverson see alliances as an important means of overcoming perceived geopolitical problems. 'Environmental possibilism', unlike realist theories, which are based on the assumption of environmental determinism, hold that the environment offers a configuration of possibilities which allow policy-makers to make certain policy choices. Thus, these authors see alliances as part of the international system’s structure of possibilities and constraints, and as the means by which states deal with the geopolitical framework. These theorists assert that the environment affects policy-makers only as it is perceived by them. Alliances are then used by the decision-makers to adapt to the perceived geopolitical environment.

Possibilists acknowledge the importance of both the geographic setting and the 'human factor'. However, the result of their failure to address the exact relation between the environment and the perceptions of environmental factors is that this approach is all-inclusive and inexact.

More specifically, while small states in difficult geopolitical situations appear likely to perceive alliances as ways of overcoming geopolitical constraints, they do not seem likely to choose a subregional alliance to perform this role. A certain amount of strength is necessary in order to accomplish this task, and it cannot be provided by security links with other small states in immediate geographical proximity. It appears more or less irrelevant then that these neighbouring states may be equally interested in overcoming given geopolitical constraints. The only viable policy in such a situation appears to be an alignment with Great Powers.

34 For the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to define geopolitics as the study of the geographical setting in relation to power. However, the use of the term 'geopolitics' is heterogeneous and controversial at best. Over time, the term has evolved to mean different aspects of the study of geography and politics. The term ‘geopolitical’ was first introduced by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1917. The label was applied by him to the study of development and configuration of states. His usage of the term reflected contemporary ideas of Social Darwinism and the communications revolution. However, this original definition of geopolitics did not become popular. Oyvind Osterud, 'The Uses and Abuses of Geopolitics, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1988), pp. 191-192; Peter J. Taylor, Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality (2nd ed). (New York: Longmann, 1989), p. 56; Geoffrey Parker, 'Continuity and change in Western geopolitcal thought during the twentieth century'. International Social Science Journal, Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (February 1991), p. 22; Dieter Weiser, "Geopolitics" - Renaissance of a Controversial Concept', Aussenpolitik (Engl. edition) Vol. 45, No. 4 (1994), p. 403.

3. Ideology and internal predisposition

Another body of literature, focusing on issues of political culture and historical images, suggests that an important factor in the process of security cooperation is the influence of an internally generated predisposition. A number of scholars have put forward the idea that social, political, and cultural similarities among states pattern similar foreign and security positions, including views on the issue of forming or entering alliances.\(^{36}\)

Domestic predispositions reflect perceptions and therefore also political culture. Issues of common history and a tradition of cooperation are therefore relevant. The underlying assumption is that common history and a tradition of links facilitates alignment.

*Ideological affinities*

A number of authors make a strong claim for the relevance of ideological factors to policy choices. Herbert Dinerstein states that ideology became a principal determinant in international relations after 1945.\(^{37}\) This theoretical approach was shaped by the Cold War situation. Today, the function of ideology is less clear, although one could surely consider the Western free market/pluralist democracy as a successful ideology which attracts countries to certain alignment frameworks.

Other authors outright reject the claim that ideology informs foreign and security policy choices. Fedder argues, however, that ideological considerations may be pronounced as the main determinant of an alliance. Yet, 'ideology is at best inadequate in explicating why or how an alliance comes into existence.'\(^{38}\) Ideology itself is not a cause of alignment. It may consolidate existing alliances, but it does not bring them about.

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\(^{38}\) Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', p. 86.
There is clearly a domestic dimension to the process of policy-making. In the case of a country’s attitudes towards security cooperation mechanisms an internally generated predisposition, or a sense of community among states is important. Ward points out that where alignment is concerned, cultural perceptions of a 'common fate' constitute one motivational factor. That sense is based purely on perceptions, and therefore on the predominant political or strategic culture of the country.

The issue is a difficult one: Robert Jervis suggests that the process of perceiving is complicated, since individual perceptual predispositions are based on experience. This learning process implies that views of the future are based on past experiences, and are therefore often flawed. This means, for example, that the neighbouring countries of a frequently aggressive state learn to take equivocal indications as evidence of renewed threat, although other explanations are possible. Thus, data are usually fit into a pre-existing framework of beliefs. Learning from key events in international history shapes the images that are used to interpret new information. This learning process, however, is 'not entirely conscious'. Gaps exist between perceptions and reality. Thus, although perceptions play an important role, it is not possible to specify how images actually relate to the changing environment.

Perceptions of the international environment are also conditioned by the predominant political culture of a country. The term 'political culture' was developed by political scientists in the 1950s and 60s. Political culture has been defined in various ways, but it implies subjective orientations, and perceptions of history and politics. It is also seen as a product of the distinctive historical experiences of groups such as nations.

Another relevant concept is that of 'strategic culture’. Yitzak Klein mentions in passing that 'the formation of strategic culture has interesting sociological and historical

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aspects. It is these historical perceptions in the political or strategic culture that appear to offer one potentially viable framework for explaining policy-makers' attitudes towards subregional security cooperation, that is, cooperation among what could be called immediate neighbours, where multiple historical links among states exist. It appears, however, contrary to popular assumption, that common history may alienate countries rather than bring about close links. This is a relevant issue particularly in Central Europe.

Yet, most authors question the assumption that the cultural perception of a common fate shapes security policies. Fedder writes that alliances are based 'only incidentally (if at all)' on a sense of community among countries. Others put forward that once an alliance has been formed, it may be consolidated by a sense of community. However, alliances are rarely formed due to such considerations, because 'when community feeling is sufficiently strong, it commonly seeks other institutional forms of expression.'

**Domestic and national (ethnic) similarities among states**

Theory suggests that states with similar domestic characteristics and orders may form alliances. This hypothesis was extremely controversial during the initial western Cold-War debates concerning the values of containment. Nevertheless, some authors argue that alliances presuppose affinities. Walt finds that there is a modest association between domestic ideology and alignment. However, he discovers this to be the case in relations between a Great Power and its small allies, rather than in a subregional security framework. Again, domestic orders, like ideology, do not themselves bring about alliances.

Liska also suggests that the decision to build alliances may express ethnic

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44 Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', p. 78.


similarity's. He says that 'there is least opportunism in such trans-national alignments when they involve ethnic groups.'50 This theme is rarely treated in theoretical writings and case studies are sadly lacking. It appears relevant to cases of subregional security frameworks among neighbouring states. Yet, theoretical literature fails to specify what kind of significance ethnic similarities play for countries in their decision to form or enter alliances. It appears that ethnic similarities may be indirect causes of alignment or security cooperation for states which pursue nationalist ideologies. It is questionable whether this factor plays a role in any other circumstances.

4. Internal Politics: Economic or political benefits

Another interesting theoretical approach suggests that alliance behaviour is informed and guided by the desire for economic or political benefits. Liska, who sees the external need for security as determining alignment choices, includes the caveat that 'requirements of external security are often hypothetical; requirements of stability of the country and of status for the regime seem to be immediate and manageable.'51 A recent contribution by Randall L. Schweller52 suggests that the concept of a balance of interests provides a tool for explaining alliance behaviour. He cautions that alliance choices are not only a product of perceptions of danger but also of potential gains. Thus, governments and leaders pursue alignment in order to improve the economic situation, thereby strengthening their political standing. Another version of the same argument submits that policy-makers pursue alliance choices to strengthen their domestic political standing by achieving a success in international policy.

Starr and Siverson argue that governments may pursue certain alignment choices for domestic reasons - to legitimize the regime or certain actions such as intervention.53 Authors studying alliance choices of Third World countries emphasize the importance of domestic factors, suggesting that illegitimate governments often see a link between their

50 Ibid., p. 22.
51 Ibid., p. 39.
52 Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit'.
53 Starr and Siverson, 'Alliances and Geopolitics', p. 246.
survival and their foreign policy choices.\textsuperscript{54}

Jack Levy and Michael Barnett stress the resource-providing role of alliances. They see a link between domestic political economies and Third World alignments and conclude that Third World leaders form or enter alliances to obtain economic and/or military resources, and thus to improve their domestic positions.\textsuperscript{55}

Some authors argue that the provision of economic and military aid is not a powerful cause of alignment.\textsuperscript{56} Others imply that alliances can be costly and burdensome rather than economically advantageous. Many of them are characterized by ruthless economic competition. Also, some, guided by the concept that alliances are only as strong as their weakest member, point out that the economic collapse of any single partner affects the whole alliance.\textsuperscript{57} In cases of small and economically weak countries, their economies are not sufficiently specialized and large to provide the expected economic advantages.\textsuperscript{58} This approach is therefore problematic since there is little political prestige or economic gain in pursuing alignment with small and poor countries. Gärtner, overlooking the existence of a number of small yet wealthy countries, argues that 'small states need capital, technology, and general expertise. They are attracted by economic and political strength.'\textsuperscript{59} Most authors agree that the resource providing function can be fulfilled by strong states only.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, this function appears irrelevant to subregional alliances among small Central European countries without sufficient resources.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Walt, \textit{The Origins of Alliances}. p. 4.
\item Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}. p. 175.
\item Gärtner, 'Small States', p. 190.
\end{enumerate}
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5. Assessment of foreign and security policy options

Theoretically, a small state can choose among several types of foreign and security policy: it can remain neutral and/or non-aligned; it can rely on collective security frameworks; it can integrate itself into an alliance with a great power; or, finally, it can form a subregional system with other small states. This section reviews the theoretical contributions discussed above, and applies them directly to these four foreign and security policy choices.

Neutrality and non-alignment

Some authors suggest that non-alignment is a realistic policy for weak nations. Neutrality and non-alignment do have a number of political advantages. To be precise, this policy option avoids many of the costs involved in aligning, such as restrictions in sovereignty and flexibility, and adverse reactions on the part of outsider countries. This argument, however, is informed by Cold War stability. Particularly following the collapse of the Cold War order, alignment implies a number of potential advantages which neutrality lacks. These include military benefits (deterring an enemy), a more effective fighting force, the right to be consulted by other members on issues of relevance, and possibly also a restraining effect on other members.

Being part of an alliance is a more viable option than de facto non-alignment or neutrality, many authors suggest. Alvin M. Saperstein, for example, states that the formation of an alliance prevents the occurrence of disturbances in the relationship among the competing member states. Not constrained by alliance frameworks disturbances can build up to 'strong chaos and presumably war.' Although it has been noted that neutrality and non-alignment are appealing for small countries, most authors agree that to be able to pursue this type of foreign and security policy, 'the Small Power must be


64 Saperstein, 'Alliance Building'. p. 518.

strategically irrelevant and politically non-provocative'.\textsuperscript{66} When they are exposed to Great Power interests, however, neutrality or non-alignment is a dangerous security policy option.\textsuperscript{67}

**Collective security**

The basic principle of collective security is that an aggression against one state will be considered an aggression against all states in the international system. Theoretically, 'the international community would act as one to deter and, if necessary to stamp out aggression.'\textsuperscript{68} Collective security is thus based on the notion of a system designed to reform the international system and to replace alliances and balances of power.\textsuperscript{69}

Much has been written on the problems of this concept.\textsuperscript{70} Suffice it to say here that, for small states, one of the main faults of collective security and one of relevance to small states is that it provides no guarantees against the Great Power guarantors.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, collective security does not present a viable option for states such as Poland.

**Alliances with great powers**

Starr and Siverson argue that one of the determinants of alignment choices is proximity. They maintain, however, that states enter or form alliances because they seek to augment their security. The states that have the greatest potential to offer security benefits are the major powers\textsuperscript{72}, and they may not be in close proximity.

Mathisen goes even further and argues that for many small states the problem of

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\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 34.


\textsuperscript{69} See Mark W. Zacher, *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-1977*. (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 3. Over time, the notion of collective security has lost its clarity is came to be used to describe military alliances. This thesis uses the term in its original meaning.


\textsuperscript{71} Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{72} Starr and Siverson, 'Alliances and Geopolitics', p. 244.
defence can only be solved in cooperation with great powers.⁷³ Thus, most authors suggest that small states tend to join alliances with strong partners.⁷⁴ Particularly where the perceived security problems are caused by strong states, small states choose to align with great powers, rather than small states in close proximity. The questions that arise concern the costs of such an option, and the results of a situation in which great powers are not available to form an alliance.

Subregional cooperation

Mathisen writes about the fourth foreign policy possibility, which he calls 'regionalism'. He assumes that small states should be interested in this form of organization, and states that this has been the case in the past. He does not explain whether he bases this statement on a historical review or on case studies. He admits that subregional security organizations have not always fulfilled expectations placed on them, particularly in matters of defence.⁷⁵ Similarly, Rothstein points out that although in theory subregional frameworks have been castigated, in reality they continue to be pursued. He says that while this kind of alliance offers little in terms of military advantages, it has some limited political relevance, particularly in relations with other small states.⁷⁶

However, since small states aim to maximize their security benefits and political influence, their policy choices ought to involve entering or forming multilateral alliances with the participation of Great Powers. Only if such an option is unavailable will they choose a subregional alliance.⁷⁷

6. Conclusions

The review of theoretical approaches indicates that existing scholarship on the underlying reasons for the creation of security cooperation frameworks is far from satisfactory. The multiplicity of competing hypotheses concerning the utility of forming

⁷⁴ Gättner, 'Small States', p. 190.
⁷⁶ Rothstein, Alliances and Small States, p. 170-172.
⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 177.
or entering alliances indicates that their universal applicability is questionable. There are also problems specific to particular approaches. This section does not aim to review the problems, but attempts to paint a broad picture of the relevance of theory to this study.

Of interest to this thesis is why certain alignment options are pursued by states. Alliance literature offers a limited potential for providing clear answers to this question. Walt, who analyzes a number of theories as they apply to alliance politics, concludes that the main problem of existing alliance theories is that they have only a limited promise of predicting when states may seek to build alliances with other states, but cannot foretell who will ally with whom. Some scholars have thus suggested that the literature on alliances is valuable only as a source of hypotheses.

One of the problems of alliance literature is the difficulty of defining the central concept. As a result many authors fail to differentiate between alliances and alignment, and further between wartime and peacetime alliances, offensive and defensive, bi- and multilateral arrangements, and political and military alliances. That such distinctions exist is suggested by authors like Michael Don Ward. Fedder cautions also that one has to distinguish alliances from collective security arrangements.

A second problem is that most literature focuses on alliance behaviour that is centred around great power. Many of the systemic approaches overlook the different requirements of weak and strong states. This distinction is a significant one, given that all of the policy alternatives available to small states are imperfect. None of

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80 'A defensive alliance presupposes only a common interest in opposing threats from specific states or groups outside the alliance and does not necessarily or usually entail provisions for settling disputes among its members. An offensive alliance aims at forcibly changing the international states quo, territorially or otherwise, to increase the assets of its members.' See Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, p. 18. Liska cautions that offensive alliances are rare and uncommonly fragile. See Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 39.

81 Ward says that 'as yet, there is no work which seeks to untangle the differences between multilateral and bilateral interaction patterns. One may not necessarily be a subset of the other.' See Ward, 'Research Gaps', p. 60.

82 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 52.


84 Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', p. 69.
them assures complete security.\textsuperscript{85} The policy of alliance, particularly on a subregional level, is not without its problems, either. For most, if not all, small states, the various foreign and security choices exist only in theory. In practice, in fact, there is often only one viable policy. Occasionally, a weak state has no option whatsoever. The result is a loss of independence and sovereignty for the country.\textsuperscript{86} Most theoretical approaches see states acting as 'free agents'. Alliance behaviour, however, is not only a function of willingness but also of opportunity. This is particularly true for weak states. However, the possibility that Great Powers and small states are different has been overlooked by most traditional literature of international relations.\textsuperscript{87}

This difference is of great importance to this thesis since the focus here defies the common emphasis on alliances centred around great powers. Thus, in place of the often conducted analysis of Central European NATO policies, this work attempts to provide a tool for explaining the Polish government's considerations of post-Cold War security cooperation without the participation of any country that could be described as a global or even a regional power. As such, theory appears to be of particularly limited utility.

A further problem which becomes particularly significant in the post-Cold era is that realist theories provide frameworks that are informed by the traditional, narrow definition of security. As the notion of security changes in Central Europe following the collapse of the bipolar order, it is difficult to support the claim that this body of literature provides a viable framework for the interpretation of contemporary subregional security cooperation.

Most importantly, systemic analyzes tend to overlook important cultural, social and economic factors in international relations. The difficulty is that, as Ward says, 'little work has probed the black boxes of decision making within either states or alliances, despite a wealth of historical scholarship.'\textsuperscript{88} Realist theories assume that states act in a rational way. Realists consider foreign policies to be autonomous phenomena.\textsuperscript{89} To put it in simple terms, realist theories concentrate almost exclusively on the level of systems,

\textsuperscript{85} Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{86} Herczegh, 'History of the International Relations of Small States', p. 24.

\textsuperscript{87} Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{89} Robert L. Rothstein, 'On the Costs of Realism', \textit{Political Science Quarterly} Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1972), p. 360.
and negate the importance of the unit level of analysis by assuming that it is constant. They cannot take into account domestically-inspired foreign policy behaviour.

Yet, theories that concentrate on the unit level are beset by problems, as well. Domestic predisposition or domestic interests can only occasionally and in specific cases explain countries’ alliance choices. Few alliances are formed in the interests of internal considerations alone. Ideology and domestic similarities do not appear to be of great relevance to the formation of subregional alliances in any case, since small countries guided by domestic requirements are most likely to turn to powerful states as resource-providers. There is little political and economic advantage in aligning with weak states.

The approaches presented in section two (Ideology and Internal Predisposition) and three (Internal Politics: Economic or Political Benefits) do not explain alliance behaviour in themselves, but may become important in conjunction with systemic approaches. Robert Rothstein says that alliances are 'involved in a confusing and complex matrix of domestic and external policy' \(^90\), and arguably this is also true of other forms of multilateral security cooperation. It becomes necessary to address both the presence of external threats and the particularities of the Polish circumstances such as political culture in this thesis.

The judgement reached in this chapter is that it is impossible to make a strong a priori argument for or against the existence of such frameworks or to predict correctly the policies likely to emerge in particular cases. Theory presents us with a confusing array of motivations, interests and perceptions. It gives little in terms of a clear guiding framework. It is therefore difficult or even impossible to understand or predict countries’ willingness or unwillingness to form or enter such cooperation frameworks. Nevertheless, it is impossible to dismiss the potential contribution made by alliance literature entirely. Alliance literature therefore informs the analysis in this thesis, although the particularities of the Polish case cannot be adequately or exhaustively explained through it alone.

\(^{90}\) Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 57.
CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL SETTING: POLAND'S PAST
UNTIL THE COLLAPSE OF THE EASTERN BLOC

1. Introduction

This chapter presents the historical and political context in which Poland has developed its views of subregional security cooperation. Such long-term factors must be taken into account: 'the search for the "best" ally and the "best" kind of alliance can hardly be carried on without examining the nature of the environment in which the choice has to be made'.\(^1\) This chapter forms the background for a discussion of Poland’s investments in certain historical images, its relations with neighbouring countries, threat perceptions, and concepts of subregional cooperation presented in later chapters. The observations here are confined to a discussion of aspects of the country’s history and the legacy of its membership in the Soviet-led alliance and trade pact. As such, the chapter does not claim to present a full and balanced survey of Polish affairs over the last millennium but rather some of the elements of Poland’s past which appear relevant to this study.

The first section of this chapter focuses on the rise and fall of the Polish state up to the end of World War II. It discusses the so-called Jagellonian period, when Poland was an empire, and the partitions which marked the end of the existence of a powerful Polish state in the 18th century. The creation of the \textit{II Rzeczpospolita} (Second Republic), and the foreign policy of interwar Poland are then described. The subsequent section examines the communist period and discusses borders and ethnicity in Poland after World

War II, as well as Poland’s position in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON). Finally, the chapter considers the 1989 revolution, and the perceptual, political and military implications of the collapse of the Eastern military bloc.²

In this chapter, Poland’s past is discussed with particular attention to ethnic relations, and links with neighbouring countries. The chapter aims to present the wealth of literature available concerning both the history of Central Europe in general and Poland in particular, as well as works that specifically consider Poland’s recent communist past. Although one cannot avoid drawing some obvious implications for today’s Polish foreign and security policies, this chapter does not attempt to do more than to present a brief overview of historical memories which play a role in the country’s security policy-making. Conclusions from this chapter will be drawn in following relevant sections of the thesis.

2. The rise and fall of the Polish state up to the end of World War II

The Jagellonian period and Polish partitions (14th - 18th century)

Polish history of the pre-partition era is the story of a vast, multinational and at times expansionist state pursuing an aggressive Drang nach Osten policy.³ The Polish-Lithuanian personal union consolidated Poland as a powerful European state in the 14th century. The Commonwealth that was thus brought to existence gave Poland a leading role in an empire that included areas now part of Lithuania, Ukraine and Belorus. It also ensured it a powerful influence on the affairs of the entire region, particularly those of Hungary, Bohemia, the Baltic and the Danubian countries. In the 15th and 16th centuries, during the so-called Jagellonian period (named after the Lithuanian dynasty that ruled the Commonwealth from 1386 to 1572), the Polish Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) prospered, political liberty flourished, and the arts and literature developed.⁴ The

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² See Appendix A for a documentation of changes of Polish borders over time.
³ Tomasz Lubienski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At Europe’s door], Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993).
commonwealth had a political rather than a national identity. For Poles, the duration of the Polish-Lithuanian empire remains the country’s Golden Period, and this phase of Polish greatness left behind for them a feeling of the country’s mission in the region (see Chapter Four).

Until the final collapse of the Polish state at the end of the 18th century, a succession of foreign elected kings involved Poland in a series of wars which drained the resources of the country. Domestically, the ruling aristocracy (szlachta) was preoccupied with various internal power struggles, preventing the development of a centralized state that was capable of defending itself against pressures from the outside. The growing weakness of the Polish state did not go unnoticed among its centralized and powerful neighbours. Both Prussia and Russia took the opportunity to dominate Polish affairs. Russian interference caused a series of uprisings which began in 1768. Four years later, in 1772, Poland’s powerful neighbours, Russia, Prussia and Austria partitioned the country. Nevertheless, during this first partition, a part of Poland retained its independence.

Challenged by political developments in the sovereign part of Poland, Russia and Prussia declared war in 1792 and partitioned Poland once more, this time leaving only a small, nominally independent section. An unsuccessful national uprising led by General Kosciuszko followed in 1794. In the aftermath of the uprising, a third partition was agreed by Russia, Prussia and Austria. This partition signalled the end of the once powerful commonwealth and of Polish independence until the creation of a Polish state in 1918.

After the third partition, Poles undertook numerous attempts to regain independence, preferably within the borders of the old Commonwealth. Often, they attempted to interest Western powers in supporting the recreation of a Polish state. High hopes were placed in Napoleon. Yet, although Polish participation in the war effort was

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5 See Janusz Tazbir, 'Ilu bylo Polakow w Polsce?' [How many Poles were there in Poland?]. *Polityka* (19 June 1993).


7 Olszer, 'Historical Background 1370-1795', p. 13.

welcomed, Napoleon did little for Polish independence.\(^9\)

In 1815, the Congress of Vienna created the Polish Congress Kingdom. The Kingdom’s sovereignty was severely limited, as it could not take part in international affairs. In effect, Poland became a state within the Russian Empire. An insurrection of cadets and intelligentsia in 1830 actually succeeded in removing Russian troops from Poland. However, the uprising had a bitter aftermath: the Czar declared war and Russian troops occupied Poland.\(^10\) Any signs of Polish autonomy were stamped out. In 1863 the Czar subjected Poland’s young men to compulsory military service in the Russian army. Another insurrection followed, only to be defeated once more.

A long period of oppression and emigration followed the uprisings.\(^11\) It must be said, however, that by this time, the modern concept of nation had evolved to the point that, although national consciousness had spread only among the gentry, there was no threat of the disappearance of the Polish people as a nation.\(^12\) The development of Polish nationalism was accompanied by first debates of the concepts of federalism and pan-Slavism. Federalist approaches aspired to consolidate the various ethnic groups of the old Commonwealth and, for some, also other East Central European nations, within the framework of a Polish state. They aimed, within the Polish context, at recreating a large and strong independent state.\(^13\) Pan-Slavism was a movement which, as Hans Kohn argues, 'proclaimed the affinity of various peoples, in spite of differences of political citizenship and historical background, of civilization and religion, solely on the strength of an affinity of language.'\(^14\) Unlike in Russia, where it originated, Pan-Slavism came, generally speaking, to imply in Poland the cooperation of Slavic nations without the

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\(^9\) Napoleon formed the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807 which was administered by Poles and had a Polish army, and French legal institutions. After Napoleon’s defeat, parts of the Duchy were returned to Prussia. Ibid., p. 215.

\(^10\) Olszer, 'Historical Background 1795-1863', p. 57; Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 216.

\(^11\) Olszer, 'Historical Background 1795-1863', p. 58.


participation of Russia, or even directed against Russia.\footnote{15}

When in 1905 the First Russian Revolution was put down in the part of Poland controlled by Russia, Polish independence forces, led by the military and political leader Marshall Jozef Pilsudski, were forced underground. Pilsudski fled to Galicia, the section of Poland occupied by Austria, and pursued the aim of creating a Polish army capable of taking on the Russian military.\footnote{16}

_The creation of the II Rzeczpospolita (Second Republic)_

The military collapse of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the First World War opened up the possibility of Polish independence. In the German and Austrian occupied areas of Poland, uprisings removed the rudiments of foreign control; in the Russian section Pilsudski’s army, which had been awaiting this moment, eliminated all elements of Russian domination. The Second Polish Republic (II Rzeczpospolitai) was created, but its nature and extent remained unclear.\footnote{17} The process of establishing Poland’s borders and institutions lasted another three years and involved local wars against Germany, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, the Western Ukraine, and Soviet Russia, instigated by Poland in defiance of the Paris Peace Conference decisions.

In the aftermath of the Paris Peace Settlements of 1919-1920, three of Poland’s five neighbours at the time - Germany, Russia, and Lithuania - hoped for border revisions.\footnote{18} The Peace Settlements granted Poland access to the sea through a narrow passageway, the Polish Corridor, which separated East Prussia from Germany proper. The area around the Baltic city of Danzig/Gdansk was given the status of a Free City with a League of Nations High Commissioner, a largely German self-government and Polish control over foreign relations. Germany challenged this arrangement. Problems also arose in Silesia, an area populated by a large number of Germans, which had been awarded to Poland. The southern parts of East Prussia and Upper Silesia reverted to Germany after plebiscites in 1920-21. However, Poland retained the very section of

\footnote{15}{Ibid., p. 29-30.}

\footnote{16}{Antoni Czubinski, _Dzieje najnowsze Polski do roku 1945_ [Contemporary Polish History until 1945]. (Poznan: Wielkopolska Agencja Wydawnicza, 1994), pp. 33-40.}

\footnote{17}{Norman Davies, _Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland_. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984), p. 115.}

\footnote{18}{Heymann, _Poland & Czechoslovakia_, p. 148.
Upper Silesia which contained the coal basin and most of the heavy industries.

In the south, the Polish state found itself in conflict with the Czechs over the city of Cesin (Cieszyn in Polish, Teschen in German). The city and surrounding area which contained a Polish, Czech and German population and a wealth of natural resources, was given to the Czechoslovak state. Polish troops were sent into the area in 1918; Czech troops regained Cesin in 1919. Eventually, the outcome of the Cesin conflict was dictated in 1920 by the Entente powers. Poland acquired a large eastern part of the duchy including the town of Cesin itself. Czechoslovakia gained the main part of the Teschen coal basin. Some 80,000 Poles were now under Czechoslovak rule. A Polish opposition, supported by Poland, was thus created and contributed further to damaging relations between the two states.

In the aftermath of the Russo-Polish War (April - October 1920), the Peace of Riga (March 1921) granted Poland a borderline far to the east of the Curzon Line, the frontier based on ethnic considerations envisaged by the Paris Settlements. The Second Republic was not given all the territories that the country’s political leadership, looking to the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth as an inspiration, hoped to acquire. However, once its borders had been established, the Polish state in the inter-war period was about twice as large as originally foreseen by Western powers.

As a result of this 'enlargement', only approximately two-thirds of the population of the Second Republic were Polish by language. The remaining third consisted mainly of Ukrainians (15 per cent), Jews (9 per cent), Byelorussians (5 per cent), and Germans (2 per cent). A Lithuanian minority, although not particularly large, created a special problem for Poland. Although the new Poland saw itself as the heir to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, most of the Lithuanians in Poland did not share the fond memories of times gone by, and felt closer to the newly created Lithuanian national state. In 1920, Poles seized the ancient Lithuanian capital Vilnius (in German Vilna, in Polish Wilno), which was populated by a mixture of Jews, Poles, and Lithuaniens.

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21 Davies, *Heart of Europe*. p. 120.

responded by closing borders and breaking off political and economic relations.

In the new Polish state, the large Ukrainian minority was concentrated in Poland’s east and southeast. Despite the provisions of the Peace of Riga, the Ukrainian minority was not granted the promised political influence nor cultural and economic self-determination by the Polish state. The policy of polonization can be seen as one of the factors leading to the formation of Ukrainian nationalist and autonomist movements in Galicia. After 1930, these retorted to terrorism. This development in turn provoked austere measures of suppression by the Polish government. 23

The 800,000 Germans in Poland did not reconcile themselves to the new borders, particularly to the existence of the Polish Corridor. It played an important role in relations between Poland and Germany in the years 1918-1939. Both countries attempted to exploit the existence of this group: while Germany used Polish ill-treatment of the minority to justify demands for revisions of the common border, the Polish government accused the group of a lack of loyalty towards the Polish state, and criticized it for its separatist tendencies and links with the German state. After 1933, particularly the young generations of the German minority turned to nationalistic and anti-Polish propaganda. 24 The Polish government unilaterally repealed the minority treaty with Germany in 1937, further aggravating the difficult situation. 25

The foreign policy of interwar Poland

Internationally, the new Poland was isolated. It was clear that the new Polish state, which included areas claimed by Germans and Russians, would be faced with territorial pressure from both sides as soon as its neighbours recovered economically and politically. Pilsudski, the independent Poland’s head of state, found himself faced with the rise of Stalinist Russia in the East, and with Nazi Germany in the West. The foreign policy concept he pursued when faced with these developments has been characterized as ‘the Doctrine of Two Enemies’, or ‘equal distance’ concerning both East and West, and federalist plans in Central Europe itself. The concept reflected Pilsudski’s attitude to

23 Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia, p. 138.


politics which was based on Romanticism combined with 'a hard-boiled pragmatic approach'.

According to this policy, Poland was to pursue relations with both neighbours, but not to rely on friendship with either. Thus Pilsudski, trying to manoeuvre between the two, signed a ten-year pact of non-aggression with the USSR on 25 January 1932 and with Nazi Germany on 26 January 1934, and succeeded in alienating both the Germans and the Russians alike. Poland also estranged Western public opinion by participating in the division of Czechoslovakia with Germany in 1938. After the German annexation of parts of Czechoslovakia, Poland's government refused a Czechoslovak offer of negotiations, and in September 1938 demanded a part of Czechoslovakia for Poland, gaining an area with 80,000 Poles and more than 100,000 Czechs.

Squeezed between Germany and Russia, two countries which had territorial disputes with Poland, the Polish government had little room to manoeuvre in its foreign and security policy. Polish leadership aspired to a strong Poland, combined with territorial guarantees by France and Britain, and some form of subregional federation or alliance in Central and East Central Europe (also called the Miedzymorze region - the region between the Black, Baltic and Aegean Seas), which would also create a north-south axis in Europe. The latter task was a difficult one, since the countries in question had few common interests. In addition, 'undertakings to act together, to consult and to cooperate, were restricted in scope by the desire to avoid general obligations and risks remote from home'. Moreover, ethnic and historical grievances marked relations among Central European states.

Nevertheless, Poles pursued the concept of a subregional security structure throughout the interwar period, and during World War II as well. Following the end of the war, when concepts of this kind could not be openly advocated in Poland, the Polish


27 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 216.


29 Wandycz, Polish Diplomacy, p. 18. See also Appendix B for a map of the Miedzymorze area.

30 Davis, Heart of Europe, p. xii-xiii.
government in exile in London continued to advance the idea.\textsuperscript{31} 

The Polish political spectrum was divided over the issue of subregional security arrangements. The two political personalities who shaped the first phase of II Rzeczpospolita's foreign policy during the struggle for borders (1919-1921) were Roman Dmowski and Jozef Pilsudski. Dmowski (1864-1939) is often called the father of modern Polish nationalism. Dmowski chaired the Polish National Committee in Paris which had played a significant role in the creation of the Second Republic. Furthermore, he was the inter-war period leader of the Polish National Democrats (\textit{Endecja}). Marshall Pilsudski (1867-1935), on the other hand, is described as the champion of modern Polish independence. Of the two, Pilsudski is better known.\textsuperscript{32} He was the first head of state of free Poland, and Poland's leading soldier. Later, Pilsudski became a highly respected strongman of Polish politics.\textsuperscript{33}

Crucial to the political movements which formed around these two leaders was the assumption that a small, weak and isolated Poland would not survive as a sovereign state.\textsuperscript{34} In addition to such pragmatic power considerations, both camps believed that Poland had a mission in East Central Europe. Pilsudski's 'federalist' concept or the so-called Jagellonian tradition particularly reflected this consideration.\textsuperscript{35}

The group surrounding Pilsudski developed the idea of creating nation-states in the East which would be linked with Poland by means of an alliance or a federal system. This option is usually described as 'Pilsudskiite' and 'federalist', although it was supported among other parts of the political spectrum and only at times insisted on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} See for example Marek K. Kaminski and Michal J. Zacharias, \textit{W Cieniu Zagrozenia: Polityka zagraniczna RP 1918-1939} [In the shadow of threat: The foreign policy of the Polish Republic 1918-1939]. (Warsaw: Gryf, 1993). The government-in-exile approaches are discussed below.
\item \textsuperscript{33} For a discussion of domestic issues, see for example Piotr S. Wandycz, \textit{Cena Wolnosci} [The Price of Freedom]. (Krakow: ZNAK, 1995), pp. 306-313.
\end{itemize}
federal structures. Its aim, at its most ambitious, was to reestablish a large federal state under Polish leadership. This program was sharply opposed by Endecja (Dmowski’s National Democrats), which in keeping with their concept of nation-state did not believe in the viability of a supra-national federation. Dmowski certainly planned to include in a single state many if not all of the areas which Pilsudski hoped to link in a federal union, but he was not prepared to grant national minorities in those areas any special rights. Dmowski also opposed the idea of detaching Ukraine from Russia, and all other actions which could exacerbate conflict with Russia, since he saw the Russians as future allies of Poland.

Polish eastern policy in this period was largely shaped by Pilsudski. The idea of a federated structure was supported by the foreign minister of the first government of the Second Polish Republic, Leon Wasilewski, and later by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ignacy Paderewski. Piludskiites condemned the plans crafted by Dmowski as nationalistic and imperialistic. Formally, Pilsudskiites claimed to stand for the principle of national self-determination, but this masked the prevailing motive of weakening and dismembering Russia. The federalist concept, historians argue, was used to conceal this design.

Pilsudski was particularly interested in wrestling Lithuania, Belorus and Ukraine

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38 Ignacy Paderewski, a composer, pianist and politician, was member of Polish National Committee (KPN), which had Roman Dmowski as president. See ibid., p. 270. In 1919, Paderewski became Prime Minister. See Witold Sienkiewicz, *Mały Słownik historii Polski* [Small dictionary of Polish history]. (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1991), p. 121.

Masaryk and Paderewski, the Czechoslovak and Polish leaders, in the United States since 1915, together with other representatives of the Central European region, created a Mid-European Democratic Union in the U.S. in Sept. 1918. It had as its goal the demonstration of cooperation among the newly sovereign countries. Paderewski, although a Dmowskiite, supported the concept of the creation of a bloc of countries between the Baltic and the Adriatic and while in the U.S. advocated the creation of a multi-ethnic United States of Poland. Accordingly, he was vehemently criticized by his Endecja colleagues, particularly by Dmowski, but also occasionally by Pilsudski himself who did not see this idea as realistic. See Marian Marek Drozdowski, *Ignacy Jan Paderewski: zarys biografii politycznej* (3rd ed.) [Ignacy Jan Paderewski: outline of a political biography]. (Warsaw: Interpress, 1986), pp. 130-131; Czubinski, *Dzieje Najnowsze*, p. 144; Piotr Wandycz, ‘O probach integracji Europy Środkowo-wschodniej: Długi marsz’ [About attempts to integrate East-Central Europe: Long march’]. *Rzeczpospolita* (6 November 1994); Wandycz, *Polish diplomacy*, p. 13.

from Russia. He wanted to link Poland and Lithuania in a structure similar to the old Polish-Lithuanian empire.\textsuperscript{40} His plans regarding the two other states were less clear. His attempts to win Lithuania over to an alliance with Poland began in 1918, but had little success. Lithuanians were afraid of Polish domination, and had a negative image of the common history. Pilsudski then began short and fruitless discussions about establishing a Belorussian state linked to Poland.\textsuperscript{41}

In the spring of 1920, perceiving weakness in Russia, Pilsudski sensed that it was time to carry out plans for a Central European federation. The Ukrainian government, headed by Semen Petlura, and almost entirely defeated by the Bolsheviks, was ready to negotiate with Poland. On 21 April 1920, Pilsudski signed an agreement with the Ukraine, and in keeping with it, a Polish offensive was mounted in the Ukraine four days later. Polish forces reached Kiev in two weeks, but the Red Army began a counteroffensive. In the beginning of July, Polish troops were forced to withdraw to the so called Curzon line, which was designated by the coalition countries as a line separating Polish territories from areas which were considered to be only under temporary Polish administration. When a settlement was reached in March 1921, federal dreams were no longer considered: Poland was weak, and neighbouring countries were not interested.\textsuperscript{42}

In fact, antagonisms between Poland and its neighbours became more pronounced. In Poland, the Dmowski concept of incorporation of other ethnic areas became more popular in Polish political circles. Thus, during this phase of defining the country's borders, Polish politicians in both camps demanded a return to borders in the East as they had been in 1772. Simultaneously, they argued that the Western border should be drawn according to ethnic criteria to include all ethnically Polish areas. These plans of course met with considerable opposition from neighbouring countries. Eventually, the country's borders were defined largely by force, and Poland faced accusations of neo-imperialist tendencies.\textsuperscript{43} The federalists believed that because of common history, the peoples concerned would accept Polish government as long as administrative autonomy was granted to them. This

\textsuperscript{40} Stanislaw Krukowski, 'Wielkie KsieÅ'twie Litewskie a obecna Republica Litwy' [The Great Duchy of Lithuania and the current Lithuanian Republic], Rzeczpospolita (30 July 1993).

\textsuperscript{41} Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{42} Tymowski, Historia Polski, pp. 279-281.

\textsuperscript{43} Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 164.
assumption, however, overlooked the significance and nature of modern nationalism in the region.44

The second phase of debate concerning subregional cooperation took place during the period of Polish parliamentary democracy (1921-1926), and was marked by attempts to create subregional alliances. The country’s eastern border, established in 1921, corresponded neither to Pilsudski’s nor to Dmowski’s plans. A number of political forces continued to advocate a closer union of the countries in Central and East Central Europe in a security framework. The Jagellonian federal idea, albeit in a new disguise, began to be discussed again. Following the Rappallo agreements of 1922 between the Soviet Union and Germany, Pilsudski inspired the so called 'prometeistic' programme, which aimed to coordinate independence movements in various Soviet nations.45 This programme has been championed by Polish federalists since mid-19th century.46

During this period, as well, relations with Czechoslovakia were normalized, but the two countries did not cooperate closely. While the United States did not support concepts of regional cooperation and integration in Central Europe, the Soviet Union actively protested against such plans, seeing them as 'reactionary', and as directed against Moscow. Faced with vehement Soviet opposition to the plan, Czechoslovak President Benes, who saw East-Central European integration as possible only with Soviet support, decided not to pursue closer links with Poland.47

The third phase of Polish interwar thinking about subregional security cooperation was marked by Pilsudski’s death in 1935 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Colonel Jozef Beck (1894-1944) took over Polish foreign policy. Beck made efforts to fortify Poland’s position by arranging a 'region of security' with Warsaw as its centre, which he called a 'third Europe'. His concept of a bloc of Central European countries left out Czechoslovakia, which he considered doomed, and concentrated on Baltic, Balkan

44 Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia, p. 130.
45 Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 226.
46 See for example Grunberg, Polskie koncepcje, p. 47.
and Danubian countries. His plans were destined to fail because of the outbreak of II World War.

The subregional concept continued to find supporters after the outbreak of the war. The most prominent one was Władysław Sikorski, a general and politician, and from 1939, the Prime Minister of Poland’s exile government. Sikorski, unlike Beck, aimed to create a bloc of countries reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Aegean around Poland and Czechoslovakia (Miedzynarod region). For this reason, he attempted to maintain good relations with Benes, the President of Czechoslovakia. He also intended to tighten links between the two countries, with the goal of a close alliance and federation between the two countries. The idea of a federation was supported by almost all the exiled Polish political forces except for the communist groups. The expansion of Polish culture and the development of Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian cultures and identities were considered tools for curtailing Russian influence. Sikorski saw himself as a self-appointed spokesman for small Central European states.

The proposal, though seriously debated, withered due to a number of problems, particularly Soviet rejection of the plan. Today most authors argue that the concepts advanced by Sikorski and other Polish leaders never had a reasonable chance of realization, mainly because they were opposed by Soviet leaders, but also because Poland’s southern and eastern neighbours feared Polish influence.

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49 Sikorski was also known as one of the founders of Polish Armed forces in the West and in the Soviet Union. See Sienkiewicz, Maly Słownik, p. 167.

50 Wandycz, Polish diplomacy, p. 37.


52 Kisielewski, Federacja Środkowo-Europejska, p. 231.

53 Wandycz, Polish Diplomacy, p. 39.

54 Ibid., p. 41.

55 Kisielewski, Federacja Środkowo-Europejska, pp. 247-249.
Poland in World War II

In 1939, when the Germans and the Russians invaded Poland, the country had nothing but fragile French and British guarantees to rely upon. In August 1939 Germany succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union, named the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, after the ministers who signed it. It included secret protocols concerning the partition of Central Europe. Hitler’s Germany moved into Poland on 1 September 1939. The invasion was assisted by members of the German minority in Poland. While not all members of the German ethnic group can be considered part of a 'fifth column', many committed acts of sabotage and violence against Polish civilians and soldiers. For this reason, after the war, the minority was considered as a threat to the state’s security.

Frederick G. Heymann speculates that even an exemplary treatment of the German minority would not have altered its pro-German and anti-Polish behaviour. It must be said, however, that the treatment of minorities in the Second Republic was by no means praiseworthy. The nationalism of ethnic minorities in Poland, particularly of the Ukrainians, during the inter-war period and World War II has been described as 'a philosophy of desperation, an ideology of self-defense' and thus a response to the country’s minorities policy which was based on the principles of polonization and grave restrictions.

While the Polish Army fought the Germans, Soviet troops marched into Polish territory on 17 September and stopped along the line agreed between the USSR and Germany. Thus, the fourth partition of Poland was accomplished. Polish armed resistance to the German armies came to an end just a few days after the invasion, in

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56 Andrew Michta, East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 24-26. Some authors reason that the inability to forge a regional alliance was an indirect cause of the events in 1939. Most agree, however, that ultimately, the fact that the German forces could bring Central Europe under their control so quickly was a result of the frailty of Western security guarantees to the region.

57 East, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, p. 109.

58 Dobrosielski, 'Mniejszosc niemiecka ... ', pp. 55; Pawel Lisicki, 'Kontrowersyjny obraz przeszlosci' [Controversial picture of the past], Rzeczpospolita (11-12 September 1993).

59 Heymann, Poland and Czechoslovakia, p. 138.

60 Stefan Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy i Dialogi', Polska w Europie Nr. 10 (January 1993), p. 54.

61 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 217.
mid-September 1939, although the underground opposition to the occupation continued, culminating in the tragic uprisings of the Warsaw Ghetto in April 1943, and of the city of Warsaw in August-September 1944.\(^{62}\)

The Polish situation did not improve when Hitler launched an attack on Russia in mid-1941. Although, with British intervention, relations between the USSR and Poland had been officially restored, the Soviet Union began to express increasing displeasure over the determination of the Polish government-in-exile to recreate its country according to its prewar boundaries, and over subregional plans.\(^{63}\)

As Poland was conquered once more, the Polish government-in-exile in London proceeded to organize a Polish army, navy, and air force in exile which fought alongside the Western allies in the war. Consequently, other groups claiming leadership were formed both within Poland and in the Soviet Union. These groups pursued the same goal of the liberation of Poland, but their political views diverged on the issue of the territorial and political future of the country.\(^{64}\)

During the war and its aftermath, the Polish government-in-exile in London concentrated its activities on creating a Central European federation. In the process, the leaders focused on previous proposals, particularly the concept of a *Miedzymorze* federation. The creation was to include 16 countries between five seas (Albania, Belorus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech lands, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Hungary). A legislative body, the *Miedzymorze* Interparliamentary Union, was to be created. The government leaders also proposed the formation of an exile parliament composed of representatives of the countries in question. The idea reached back to the 'prometeistic' concept of weakening the Soviet Union. A variation of the federation idea also had supporters among exile leaders in the United States.\(^{65}\)

The London government-in-exile was eventually 'derecognized' by the victorious

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\(^{62}\) Olszer, 'Historical Background 1939-1945', p. 258; Adam Krzeminski, 'Einst verlassen, bald versöhnt?', Die Zeit (22 July 1994).

\(^{63}\) Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 217.

\(^{64}\) Olszer, 'Historical Background 1039-1945', p. 257.

powers seeking a compromise position with the USSR. A government of ‘national unity’, built around a Soviet-supported group of Polish Communists, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (with the addition of a few non-communist leaders, who soon were forced to leave the country) was created.

The end of Second World War saw East Central Europe in the hands of the USSR. In 1944, despite the existence of the Atlantic Charter, which promised Eastern Europe self-government, Churchill and Stalin negotiated the establishment of spheres of influence in the region. The Soviet Union established Communist rule and defined the region as its sphere of influence, creating a buffer zone against the West in general and particularly against Germany.

3. Communist period

Borders and ethnicity in Poland after World War II

The end of the war did not bring about the restoration of Poland’s pre-War borders. The Yalta Agreement of February 1945 fixed the Soviet-Polish border at the Curzon line. This arrangement gave almost half of the country’s prewar eastern territory to the Soviet Union. At Potsdam, Poland’s western frontier was moved westwards by 250 kilometres to the Oder-Neisse line. The southern part of East Prussia became Polish while the Soviet Union took the north around Königsberg (Kaliningrad).

The country’s shift to the west meant that Poland henceforth felt vulnerable to

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66 It nevertheless continued to exist until the first free elections in Poland following the collapse of the Pax Sovietica.

67 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 217.


70 East, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, p. 110.
German irredentism, and this vulnerability was translated into an intricate dependence on Moscow. The Polish communist authorities presented the USSR as a guarantor of Poland's western territories against West German claims. Thus, the communists emphasized not only ideological bonds, but geopolitical needs. In this way, Moscow guaranteed a lengthy term of Poland's reliance on the Soviet Union in the realm of security.

Simultaneously, Poland was prevented from raising any claims to its former territories in the East which now belonged to the Soviet Union, even though the shift of the Eastern frontier to the West left sizable Polish minorities beyond the country's borders.

The killing of a large number of Poland's inhabitants during World War II and the postwar territorial changes and population movements left Poland relatively uniform both ethnically and religiously. Moreover, Poland's post-World War II policy towards minorities was characterized by forced cultural and linguistic assimilation. In the east of its territory, Poland conducted a protracted battle with Ukrainian partisans. Meanwhile, the Polish army was executing a plan which aimed to destroy the culture and social and religious structures of the Ukrainian minority. Some Polish analysts conclude that the ultimate goal was the 'liquidation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland as a separate ethnic

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71 Irridentism means territorial claims made by one state to lands of another. The claims are usually based on historical or ethnic arguments, but often reflect pragmatic considerations of domestic political or geopolitical nature. See James Mayall, Nationalism and international society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 57-61.


74 For specific numbers of Polish minorities in the Soviet Union, see section on migration in Chapter Six.

75 In 1773, at the First Partition, Polish Catholics formed some 50 per cent of the population of the country. In 1921 they formed 66 per cent. By 1946, Catholics accounted for 96 per cent of the population. See Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 11.

André Liebich compiles a number of different estimates of the size of ethnic minority groups in Poland. He numbers the minority populations in Poland as follows: Belorussians 200,000 to 400,000; Ukrainians 150,000 to 400,000; and Germans 4,000 to 2,000,000. See André Liebich, 'Minorities in Eastern Europe: Obstacles to Reliable Count', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 20 (15 May 1992), p. 38. In 1989-1990, when the first reliable statistics concerning numbers of other ethnic groups in Poland were published, Poland reported having 200,000 to 250,000 Belorussians, 300,00 to 400,000 Ukrainians, 300,000 to 400,000 Germans, 12,000 to 20,000 Lithuanians, 9,000-17,000 Slovaks, and finally 2,000-3,000 Czechs. See Andrzej Sakson, 'Die Deutsche Minderheit im heutigen Poland', Deutsche Studien Vol. 24, No. 115 (September 1991), p. 227.
The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army was finally trapped in an offensive by Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovak forces and destroyed.  

The German minority experienced mass expulsions and persecution. Some were evacuated by Germany as the Soviet armies approached. Most of Poland’s Germans were forced to leave the country in the years 1945-50. A large number were expelled by Poland under the Potsdam Agreement and according to the decision taken by Allied Control Council for Germany on 20 November 1945. Members of the German minority who chose to stay in Poland were accused of complicity with Nazi crimes. Acts of violence on the part of the Polish population followed, especially against Germans expelled from Silesia. Expulsions of Germans from Poland were motivated by the failure of the interwar system of protection for minorities as well as by the conduct of the German minority during the war and German occupation of Poland.

After the World War II, the repressive ethnic policy pursued by the Polish government had a regressive effect on the sense of Polish identity among national minorities. In Upper Silesia, after the war, anyone wishing to remain in the region was required to provide evidence of Polish background. The area was resettled by repatriates from other parts of Poland. The danger of deportation resulted in mass declarations of Polish loyalties and ethnic ties by members of the German minority. Yet, the policy of enforcing Polishness resulted in the reinforcement of a sense of difference, or even Germanness among the German population. The authorities proceeded to implement the policy of assimilation and to eliminate any traces of Silesian autonomy, thus forcing...

76 Maciej Kozlowski quoted in Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy', p. 53.
77 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 80.
78 Some 3.2 million Germans were expelled. Another 3.5 million fled to Germany before 1950. Further waves of migration followed. Dobrosielski, 'Mniejszosc niemiecka', pp. 57-60; Bugajski, Ethnic Politics, p. 363.
81 Ibid., p. 53. See also Cezary Trosiak, 'Mniejszosc Niemiecka w Polsce: pomost czy szaniec?' [German Minority in Poland: bridge or entrenchment], in Mniejszosc Niemiecka w Polsce: Historia i Terazniejszosc [German Minority in Poland: History and the present], (Warsaw: Elipsa, 1995), pp. 123-125; Gerhard Bartodziej, 'Niemcy w Polsce - Slask ongis i dzisiaj' [Germans in Poland - Silesia then and today], in Mniejszosc Niemiecka w Polsce: Historia i Terazniejszosc, p. 12.
waves of emigration to West Germany.\textsuperscript{82}

Poland in WTO and CMEA

The successful post-war creation of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe served a number of different Soviet objectives. The Soviet Union had economic ambitions in the region, such as reparations, and political and ideological interests. However, according to Charles Gati, it is clear that 'geopolitical interests - concerns about security - topped Stalin’s list.'\textsuperscript{83} Russia, the predecessor of the Soviet Union, always felt vulnerable to military pressure as a result of its relative lack of natural defences. Historically, Russia had found itself attacked by Poles, Swedes, French and Germans from the Western direction.\textsuperscript{84} The experience of aggression from the West meant that the conquest of Eastern and Central Europe, which served as a gateway between East and West had long been an aspiration of Russian rulers.\textsuperscript{85}

Strategically, Eastern and Central Europe performed two functions for the USSR during the Cold War. The first function was a defensive one. The countries provided the Soviet Union’s armed forces with a space for deployment and manoeuvre west of the Soviet border and a space for the location and training of ground and air forces. Secondly, the buffer zone had the role of a potential spring-boards to the West. Soviet troops were positioned on territories west of the Soviet borders, assuming an offensive defence posture towards NATO countries.\textsuperscript{86} This double function persisted almost unchanged throughout the post-World War II, pre-1989 period, despite changes in Soviet emphasis on nuclear and conventional capabilities.\textsuperscript{87}

The sphere of influence was enforced by the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-dominated alliance, and the centralized economic organization, the Council for Mutual Economic

\textsuperscript{82} Kosiarski, 'The German Minority', p. 54.


\textsuperscript{85} Gati, \textit{The Bloc That Failed}, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{86} Mackintosh, 'Military Considerations', p. 137.

Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon). The CMEA was established in January 1949, as a counterweight to the Marshall Plan aid for Western Europe, in which Poland was prevented from participating. The CMEA’s goals were to promote economic development in the form of forced industrialization, and to serve as an instrument of Soviet control over Eastern and Central Europe. Within the CMEA the Soviet Union focused primarily on bilateral economic ties with its satellites.88

The WTO officially came into being on 14 May 1955 as a response to the inclusion of Germany into the Western military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).89 The establishment of the WTO was based on a treaty of friendship and collaboration among eight governments (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR).90 Albania ceased to participate in 1961 and withdrew from the alliance in 1968. There were six WTO member states after the unification of Germany in October 1990. On 31 March 1991 the military organs and structures of the WTO were dismantled.91

The WTO was not an alliance in the Western sense of the word, which implies maintaining some form of sovereignty.92 Although the alliance provided the Eastern and Central European states with various military and economic advantages, it also enabled the Soviet Union ‘to determine both the political context of the domestic environment and the limits of change’ in member states.93 In other words, the WTO functioned as a vehicle for Soviet intervention into the domestic affairs of Central and Eastern European states. In situations of political crisis in Poland, the Soviet government demonstrated its understanding of the function of the Pact by deploying its forces along the country’s borders. Strikes and demonstrations by workers, students and the intelligentsia broke out in Poland in 1953, 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976, often in response to similar events in

92 Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe. p. 311.
93 Ibid., p. 321.
Hungary or Czechoslovakia. While WTO forces participated in 'fraternal interventions', crushing uprisings in these two Central European countries, Poland was spared.  

Despite certain benefits stemming from membership in the alliance, being part of the WTO was a liability because membership made it difficult, some would argue even close to impossible, for Central and Eastern European countries to create independent foreign and security policies based on national interests. A Soviet conducted socialization process and coercive control mechanisms ensured the participation of Central European countries in the WTO. Coercive factors were ways of putting pressure on non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization (NSWTO) countries to follow Soviet orders 'by limiting the possibility of alternatives'. These included the subordination of both security planning and the military to the Communist Party; a dependence on Soviet weapons systems (with the USSR controlling the rate of military modernization in NSWTO armies); Soviet physical presence on or near the territory of these states, ready to contain any domestic challenges to the political order; and the imposition until 1987 of a standard WTO military doctrine upon member states, which shaped force structures in a direction necessary to Moscow. Socialization control mechanisms included the officer selection process; ideological indoctrination, particularly aimed at eradicating nationalist sentiment; military education concentrated in Moscow; and a system of rewards for the officer corps.

Polish coalition doctrine centred around the task of rapid offensive operations on NATO territory by Warsaw Pact forces. According to this doctrine, regular Polish military forces were to fight on this 'external front'. Thus, the organisation, weaponry, and training of the Polish armed forces were all focused on this task. In wartime, the Polish armed forces were to be combined with Soviet forces, and subordinated to the Soviet High Command. A 'Polish flavour' was added with the creation of a territorial defence force. The coalition doctrine was also based on the assumption that Poland, as

94 Marek Tarniewski, 'Poland's Struggle for Democracy Under Communist Rule', in Olszer (ed.), For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 311.


97 Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power, pp. 6-10.
a small state, could not provide for its own defence from NATO. 98

Soviet policy towards Central Europe was purely exploitative during the immediate postwar (Stalinist) years. Many authors note however that the WTO came to look more like a traditional alliance in later years. 99 During the Stalinist period, the USSR decreed organizational changes in the Polish army, training patterns, doctrines, tactics and uniforms. It placed Soviet officers and advisors. In 1965, a 'renationalization' took place, and a formal status-of-force agreement was signed between Poland and the USSR. 100 Following this change, Polish nationalism was used consciously by the Polish communist regime to 'sell' the armed forces to the population. 101 Despite the use of the army for the regime's needs, the military commanded the respect of the Polish population. 102 Because in the Polish political-military culture military power continued to be associated with the notion of an independent state and Polish nationhood, there was 'an astonishing amount of support of the army.' 103

Particularly during the Stalinist period, the WTO and CMEA emphasised bilateral relations over multilateral cooperation. The non-Soviet member states were barred from developing meaningful ties with one another. As Karen Dawisha argues, Stalin's 'divide and rule' policies destroyed hope of cooperation among the non-Soviet bloc states. 104

In the summer of 1980, a new wave of strikes caused by price increases spread throughout Poland. The principal victory of the movement was the government's


100 Johnson, East European Military.


102 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone argues that prior to the end of the Cold War, 'the population simply refuses to believe that the "Polish Army" could be used against them. The fact that it was used is explained away by assuming that it was not the army's fault and that the military personnel did not really want to be involved.' Ibid., p. 202. On this issue see also Bronislaw Komorowski (Deputy Defense Minister), 'Ostoja demokratycznego państwa i suwerennego narodu może być tylko demokratyczną armią' [Mainstay of a democratic state and sovereign nation can only be a democratic army], Polska Zbrojna (27 October 1993).


concession to allow the creation of independent trade unions, which adopted the name 'Solidarity'. But towards the end of the same year, the threat of armed Soviet intervention appeared in official propaganda and on 13 December 1981, General Jaruzelski, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, declared martial law and ordered the arrest of activists and dissidents. The decision to introduce martial law and the regime's references to imminent Soviet intervention in 1981 are to this day subject of a controversy in Poland. As in 1956 or 1968, the Soviet leadership was planning and preparing for the possibility of an intervention in Poland, but their preference was to find a domestic solution, possibly in the expectation that the Polish army and population would have joined forces to resist a Warsaw Pact military intervention.

From 1985, the Soviet Communist Party's new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev moved to establish better relations with the West. The offensive military doctrine was amended to emphasize defense and sufficiency. This change had ramification for the role of Central Europe as Soviet war operations zone, and was followed by a redefinition of the role of Eastern Europe in the protection of Soviet territory.

4. Collapse of Communist structures

The 1989 revolution

In 1989, the annus mirabilis, Mikhail Gorbachev moved to apply his domestic reform policies to the allied states in Eastern and Central Europe, giving them a certain degree of freedom in both their domestic affairs and their foreign policies. The 'Brezhnev doctrine' which reserved for the Soviet Union the right to intervene in the

105 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 223.
108 The question of why the Soviet Union decided to relinquished the buffer zone in East-Central Europe cannot be answered in depth within the scope of this thesis. Charles Z. Jokay provides a short synopsis of the reasons: 'Numerous global and environmental factors governed the change in Soviet attitudes toward East-Central Europe. The information revolution, USSR technological backwardness, the failure of the Soviet economy, among others, acted to alter the general world view dominating the foreign policy machinery. In addition, autonomous actions by elites and masses in the East-Central European countries themselves were factors completely beyond USSR control.' See: Charles Jokay, 'Hungarian-Soviet relations in the 1990s: Stability through Constant Change', in R.F. Staar (ed.), East-Central Europe and the USSR. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 176.
policies of any Bloc state if the Soviet Communist party elite perceived that 'the interests of socialism' were endangered was replaced in 1989 by a policy of non-interference, which some observers called 'the Gorbachev doctrine'. The Soviet Union's decision-makers seemed to believe that a sphere of influence could in this way be preserved.

In response to this new Soviet policy, however, communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe came tumbling down, giving way to multiparty structures. In Poland, Solidarity trade unions were legalized again in January 1989. Roundtable talks between the government and the trade union opened in February. The first truly free elections were held in October 1991.

The process of unravelling the Cold War order continued. The Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989 and was followed by the celebration of German unification on 3 October 1990. On 1 April 1991, the WTO military structures were officially disbanded. The pact's political structures were abolished on 1 July 1991. CMEA was laid to rest on 28 June 1991. Following the progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union after the failure of the August 1991 coup, the USSR collapsed by the end of 1991, and was replaced by 15 successor states. The inherently unstable Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991, and brought together eleven of the fifteen former republics in a federal structure. Finally, the Czechoslovak state dissolved in what was called 'the velvet divorce' on 1 January 1993. The metamorphosis of the


110 Staar, 'East-Central Europe ...', p. 2; Janusz Rolicki, 'Odsunac sie ofWschodu' [To pull back from the East], Rzeczpospolita (11-12 June 1994).

international structure left Poland in a 'grey' security zone, but gave it the opportunity to participate in the process of defining a new position for Poland in the international system. In framing the country’s new foreign policy directions, Polish elites often drew on Poland’s historical experiences.

Most discussions of Polish post-Cold War defence policy are part of a larger debate about whether security is divisible or indivisible. Accounts of that debate concentrate on Central Europe’s links with existing European security organizations. Nevertheless, since the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe, numerous attempts to institutionalize the existing subregional cooperation frameworks, and proposals to create new ones in the former NSWTO region have been made both by analysts and policymakers attempting to deal with Central European security problems. Little attention has been paid to these proposals in the West. Nevertheless, the debate surrounding security and defence orientations in Central Europe is far from finished. Thus, Central European concepts of subregional multilateral security cooperation deserve a closer look.

Implications of the collapse of the Eastern bloc

The collapse of the Eastern bloc left in its wake a region in transition. Chapter Six (Threat Perceptions) discusses specific endeavours undertaken by the democratically elected Polish governments to overcome the legacy of the country’s membership in the WTO. This section gives a general overview of the effects of membership in the Eastern alliance. Thus it briefly discusses the context in which Poles began to reform and adapt their security policies and defence structures, and to develop a foreign and security policy identity.

During the existence of the WTO, armed forces in Central Europe functioned as instruments of the communist regimes. They were more or less directly subject to Soviet

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control and influence. 'Within this context, the East European armed forces can be viewed as archaic vestiges of the ancient regime - political institutions long subject to direct Soviet/Party controls, presumably thoroughly communized', says Gitz\textsuperscript{115}. In Poland, however, the situation may not have been as critical as it was in other states, since the Polish armed forces were not entirely discredited during the communist period, and a modicum of national control was maintained. Nevertheless, the armed forces were to a large degree communized and one of the primary tasks involved depoliticizing them. The armed forces were required to develop new loyalties, and new ways of thinking.\textsuperscript{116}

The Polish armed forces were not democratically accountable. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact left Central European countries with militaries which had almost complete - and secretive - control over military issues. The military lacked civilian control. Without a body of civilian expertise, the Central European countries were forced to reform defence ministries, create parliamentary commissions, decide upon budgets, and begin a public debate on issues of defence and defence spending.

Central European countries were left with Pact doctrines which did not correspond to the demands of the new environment. The process of elaborating new doctrines was bound to be difficult, as it could not be seen as a review, but rather as a completely new procedure. The tasks were formidable: Poland was left with a large, conscript-based military force with an offensive posture. Indeed, forces were concentrated almost exclusively in the western sections of the territories. In addition, the collapse of Warsaw Pact integrated structures meant for example that former member countries experienced problems finding spare parts for their equipment. More significantly, some elements of the defence frameworks, such as air defence, became practically non-functional as the various national components left the integrated structures.

A second issue was that during the existence of the Eastern bloc, national differences among its members were kept in check. Thus, non-Soviet member countries were not able to express their national interests adequately, which by necessity differed not only from Soviet interests, but also from the interests of other Central European states. The process of defining and expressing national interests and national differences was bound to be difficult, and had the potential to create tensions in the Central European region. The regional fluidity which followed the collapse of the WTO was seen as threatening.

\textsuperscript{115} Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 3.
by Polish leaders. An additional difficulty was that debates about security needs were by

Nevertheless, many authors point to the fact that Central European countries were
bound together by their common experience. Regina Cowen Karp writes that 'Central
and East European states share a historical experience of communist rule and its
authoritarian political and economic structures.'\footnote{Ibid., p. 4.} Yet, it occasionally appears that
Western observers put more emphasis on these commonalities than Central Europeans
themselves.

A Polish commentator observed recently that since 1989, for the first time since the
creation of a Polish state a millennium ago, Poland finds itself not facing any enemies
along its borders.\footnote{Ernest Skalski, 'Obradowal KOK: Doktryna Odlozona' [National Defense Committee deliberated: doctrine postponed], Gazeta Wyborcza (3 November 1992).} Today the country’s interests may not necessarily coincide with
those of its neighbours, but these differences do not constitute a direct threat to Polish
about their foreign and defence policies. Whether or not they opt for cooperation with
countries in their immediate geographic proximity is one of the issues which will have
an impact on their security in the future.\footnote{Michta, East Central Europe, p. 9.}

There have also been domestic changes which changed the quality of relations with
neighbouring countries. One of the most significant changes was the change in Polish
policy towards national minorities. It was not until 1989/1990 that minority questions
began to be discussed again in the Polish parliament. A new parliamentary commission
and a special commission in the Ministry of Culture and Arts were created. New
legislation pertaining to minority rights, education and representation was created. The
regulation of relations with countries such as Belorus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Germany and
Israel strengthened the position of minority groups further. Moreover, Polish hopes
of joining Western organizations improved the minorities’ situation further, since they
forced the country’s government to adhere to European standards on the issue of protection of minorities.

However, the Polish minority policy is frustrated by financial constraints. There are also problems for example regarding decisions which force members of minorities to use in official matters Polish versions of their names. A further important matter is the difficulties regarding representation of minorities on the national level. The Polish election law, which limits participation of small splinter parties, effectively restricts participation of minority parties, particularly if the groups are small or geographically diluted. Most importantly, however, little has been done to prepare the Polish society to accept the changes in the social and political standing of minorities. As a report presented to the Polish parliament indicates, the historical ballast continues to affect relations between the Polish population and the national minorities. This ballast continues to affect Poland’s relations with its neighbours.

5. Summary and Conclusion

This discussion of Polish history points to a number of phenomena potentially relevant to contemporary Polish views of subregional cooperation. First, the period of Polish greatness reaches back to the late middle ages. This Golden Period saw Poland as an expansionist and multinational state controlling territories now to the East of its borders. Second, following the collapse of the Polish empire, the country faced a number of acute challenges to its independence, which threatened its very survival as a state. Poland’s proximity to Germany and to Russia, the two largest and historically most aggressive neighbours, has thus been a continuous source of dangers. Historically, as the influence of either Germany or Russia has increased, that of the other has declined; cooperation between the two big powers has historically been lethal to the smaller states trapped between them, as the four partitions of Poland attest. Various geopolitical pictures of Eastern and Central Europe have thus seen Poland as instrumental to the interests of another power. Third, with its smaller neighbours, Poland was involved in ethno-national rivalries that prevented them from cooperating. Small state cooperation in this situation has been both rare and ineffective. The common membership in the WTO has further

contributed to separating Central European countries from each other.

Fourth, the recreation of a large and strong Polish state continued to be the aim of most sections of the Polish political spectrum throughout the era of partitions and in the interwar period. The borders of the post-World War II Polish state did not satisfy Polish irredentist hopes. Moreover, the country’s territorial shift to the West exposed the country to the danger of German irredentism. Poland, now part of the Eastern bloc, paid with its sovereignty in foreign and security policy for protection of its Western border.

Finally, following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, Poland found itself incapable of assuring its own defence, and was faced with a number of difficult and lengthy processes such as the restructuring of command structures and defence posture. Simultaneously, all of Central Europe was subjected to the processes of transition which were not always peaceful. It is in this context that Poland, for the first time since 1945, needed to make sovereign foreign policy choices. One of the foreign policy options available to Poland was subregional security cooperation.

However, Poland was disliked by its small neighbours because of the imperialist aspects of Poland’s historical images, and was suspicious of its big neighbours since it has learnt to distrust great power guarantees. Historically, Polish concepts of subregional cooperation reflected claims to regional dominance and were hardly attractive to Poland’s neighbours, small or large, yet after the Cold War and the failures associated with other policy options, they appear attractive precedents for some modern Polish politicians to draw on.
CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL IMAGES IN POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE

1. Introduction

This chapter examines contemporary Polish Bilder der Vergangenheit - images of the country’s history. The chapter first briefly defines the relevant concepts. It then assesses the general significance of historical images as a part of the political culture of a country, and relates these images to the concept of nationalism. It interprets historical images as aspects of political debates and thus as components of political cultures, and also explores the theoretical relationship between historical awareness and nationalism. There is not space to highlight differing aspects of political cultures and nationalisms, but for the sake of the argument generalization is chosen over detailed description.

The second section is devoted to a discussion of the origins of Poland’s historical images. It examines the sources of Poland’s images of its history, looking at various periods of Polish history and discussing elements of contemporary Polish political culture which these images have helped to shape. Arguably, because of a keen historical consciousness in Poland, the study of durable components of political culture becomes particularly important in this case. This section argues that the origins of Polish historical images are not only to be found in recent history but are of long standing. The late middle ages, and the era of partitions and Romanticism provide the most significant ingredients informing modern Polish political culture and Polish nationalism, and are the source of the most influential historical images. Later periods largely contributed to the reinforcement of existing historical images. Despite the changes in political culture which are taking place in the post-communist period, historical images continue to play an important role in Polish political life.

In the third section, the chapter focuses on the notion of nationalism, since the
crucial images informing Polish political culture are necessarily intertwined with notions of national struggle. Since Poland's historical images have been used as 'protective shields' against external pressures on the state and the nation, this section analyzes how Polish nationalist forces have used history in the service of the national survival. It focuses on external and internal aspects of Polish nationalism. In conclusion, the chapter assesses the problems and benefits of Poland's reliance on historical images in the current political debate surrounding issues of foreign and security policy.

2. Historical Images, Political Culture, and Nationalism: A Brief Theoretical Discussion

Historical images are prevalent ideas about a common past, and factors integrating a community. They usually have the conscious or unconscious mission of achieving or resisting assimilation. Historical images have thus been used in the process of nation-building. Consequently, historical images are collective rather than individual memories of the past. Which historical phenomena are remembered and in what way depends to a large extent on the realities of the present, and on the perspective from which they are viewed.

Accordingly, historical images must be interpreted as important aspects of the political debate taking place in a given society. They address issues that are relevant to the 'here and now', rather than the 'somewhere and sometime'. As such, historical images are closely related to the concept of perceptions, as this is understood by political scientists. The assumption from which this study proceeds is that the environment affects policy-makers only as it is perceived by them and that perceptions are in turn affected by historical images.

The idea that images of history can be components of political cultures and can shape political attitudes and behaviours is hardly new. Many authors have in the past concluded that evaluations of historical experiences can affect political cultures, that is,

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2 Peter Alter, Nationalismus. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), p. 68.

3 Szpocinski, Przemiany Obrazu, p. 12.
the totality of all opinions, values and attitudes which are predominant in a society and which play a role in the process of public decision-making. Political culture provides guiding principles for the processing of information and decision-making. The concept is a difficult one, since political cultures change over time and there is no single political culture at any one time in any single country. Nevertheless, generalizing somewhat, it is possible to say that political cultures have semi-permanent and generally prevalent elements.

Historical images may not be an exclusive motivating factor in the process of decision-making, but they have the potential to overshadow pragmatic considerations. Thus, it is possible to say that Central Europe’s security concerns are linked not only to social, economic, and political developments, but also to more permanent components of political culture, particularly to historical images held by each society.  

While durable components of political culture and historical images in particular have had a significant impact on political scenes in most if not all European countries, most authors argue that a focus on such elements becomes especially important in the case of Central and Eastern Europe in general and of Poland in particular. Karen Dawisha argues that the region is characterized by a 'keen historical consciousness' in the population as a whole as well as among political leaders. Adam Bromke, speaking of Poland, calls this phenomenon 'strong historicism'.

This historical consciousness is closely related to the notion of Polish nationalism. Nationalism has meant various things to different people at different times. The classical approach to nationalism sees it as a state of mind involving individual loyalty to the nation-state. Woodrow J. Kuhns describes it as 'a psychological phenomenon'

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4. The development of nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries was accompanied by the development of national historiographies which sought to establish the legitimacy of nation-states by searching for their roots in Medieval and occasionally even earlier history. History began to be used as a framework of reference for national policies in European cultures. For descriptions of this phenomenon in Poland, see Rudolf Jaworski and Nora Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ in der politischen Kultur Polens', in Gerd Meyer and Franciszek Ryszka (eds), *Die Politische Kultur Polens* (Tuebingen: Francke, 1989), p. 56; Hans-Georg Heinrich and Slawomir Wiatr, *Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 10; Kloskowska, 'Kultury Narodowe'.


characterized by both rational and emotional concerns. Rational considerations include for him 'objective indicators of nationality' - linguistic, cultural, and historical ties. However, these components are frequently supplanted by 'mythology and mysticism'. Other authors suggest that there is a link between nationalism and a group's interpretation of its history. Anthony D. Smith in his work on The Ethnic Origins of Nations proposes that ethnie are communities founded upon shared memories. It follows that although nationalism does not 'write its history as it pleases', it 'prunes' history for its own purposes, thus creating historical images.

In the Polish language, 'nationalism' is understood as one of the main political ideologies, one that gives priority to the interests of the nation over all other considerations, sees international relations as a struggle for survival, and often has racist undertones. In languages such as French and English 'nationalism' has a wider meaning and includes what Poles understand as 'patriotism'. Unlike nationalism, which is motivated by a devotion to the interests of a national community, patriotism means devotion to the interests of a particular state, understood as a political community.

While Poles make a distinction between patriotic and nationalist movements, in the English language the difference is not immediately clear. It is, however, possible to think of the difference as reflecting what Western scholars see as two different kinds of nationalism. Western literature suggests that, in principle, there are two types of nationalism - civic and ethnic, shaped respectively by the Roman/French tradition and

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10 Ibid., p. 176.


the German ethnic counter-tradition of the 19th century. Civic nationalism is based on the idea that a nation is not a function of race or ethnicity but of the existence of a political community. Thus, the presence of a state structure and a system of law is regarded as vital to the definition of the nation. Cultural and historical considerations are usually secondary. Ethnic nationalism underscores the nation's shared racial and/or historical roots as determinants of the national character, although it must be acknowledged that the use of history for *Identitätsbildung* - the construction of identity - is common to both civic and ethnic kinds of nationalism. By contrast, ethnic nationalism is based on the concept of the subordination of the individual to the interests of the ethnic group. For this reason, it often expresses itself in restrictions of the rights of minorities. Ethnic nationalism is also occasionally linked to notions of *Realpolitik* and narrowly defined national interest.

Many authors make a distinction between Western and Eastern nationalism, arguing that while in the West the state created the nation, in the East the nation struggled to create the state. While there is some truth to these arguments, they should not be accepted uncritically. While the process of spreading national consciousness was quite clearly different in East and West, in reality, modern nationalism in most countries, including those of East Central Europe, is an elusive blend of both ethnic and civic types.

The concepts of historical images, political culture and nationalism are necessarily interconnected: the images informing Polish political culture are intertwined with notions of national struggle. For this reason, this chapter studies the Polish context by considering all of these concurrently.

### 3. Origins of Polish Historical Images

Many Polish sociologists, historians, and political scientists refer back to the Jagiellonian period of Poland's greatness, and the 19th-century struggle for an

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independent state to explain contemporary phenomena.\textsuperscript{17} This far-reaching historical awareness is in itself not a new occurrence in Poland or in other countries.\textsuperscript{18} In Poland, however, this attitude must be viewed in combination with the notion of the \textit{Primat der Aussenpolitik}.

The beginnings of this focus on foreign and security policies can be traced to the 17th century, to the Poland of the Jagiellonians, and even earlier, to medieval times. Yet, it may have been the 19th century, and particularly the Romantic period, which provided 'the largest single ingredient of modern Polish culture'.\textsuperscript{19} Most European countries experienced Romanticism. However, the influence of the period in Poland was greater than anywhere else because it coincided with the struggle to regain national independence and with a series of heroic yet tragic Polish uprisings. The historical experiences of partitions and foreign rule made Polish traditions and history into a legitimizing device for the often externally questioned existence of the Polish state.\textsuperscript{20} Romanticism shaped programmes for Polish independence, directed mainly against Russian domination, and centred on the notion of subregional security cooperation (see Chapter Three).

Significantly, the birth of Polish nationalism took place at the time of the country's demise and during the cultural period of Romanticism. Similar to other states during this period before the partitions, the Polish nation was identical with its elite - the szlachta. The spread of national awareness to other sections of the population then coincided with the disappearance of the Polish state from maps.\textsuperscript{21} During the partitions of Poland, the occupying powers banned all displays of Polish patriotism and nationalism, forcing them underground, and defining these as an expression of opposition. As a consequence, Polish patriotism became enveloped in mysticism and an irrational sense


\textsuperscript{18} See for example works of Jacques Le Goff and Emmanuel La Roi Ladurie in France, and Doris Mary and Frank Merry Stenton in Britain.


\textsuperscript{20} Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 60.

\textsuperscript{21} Tymowski, \textit{Historia Polski}, p. 9.
of destiny. This 'Romantic patriotic religion' evolved out of the country’s Catholicism. Scholars describe Polish nationalism of this period as taking on the character of 'a coherent sect'. This mystic, romantic nationalism was championed by 19th-century writers, among others Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Slowacki and August Cieszkowski.

Romantic nationalism is the basis of the philosophy of messianism which will be described further below. The destiny of Poland was believed to be unique in the pattern of the world’s history. This spiritual concept of the Polish nation was based on the conviction that struggle and suffering would bring universal deliverance. Many nations believed themselves to be 'the chosen people', but Polish nationalism was unique in its messianic vision.

Historical images which are relevant to Poland’s modern political culture and date back to the 19th century or earlier include the idea of Poland as a 'Bulwark of Christianity' which is understood to be identical with the European civilization, as well as what Polish authors call the 'myth of the West', both of which will be discussed in this chapter. There is in fact a link between these two images: the concept of Poland as the vanguard of Christianity and therefore also of Western civilization in the East became a factor that was pointed out to the West, which was then expected to support the Polish drive for independence.

A school of political thought that developed slightly later than Romanticism was Positivism. It also constitutes an ingredient of Poland’s modern political culture, though less influential than Romanticism. Positivism’s primary inspiration was a disenchantment with the Romantic notion of 'insurrectionary politics'. Rejecting the unrealistic and often catastrophic Romantic approaches, it called for a pragmatic and constructive approach to the country’s problems, and for accommodation with larger neighbours. Positivism or Realism is the inspiration behind political programmes aimed at seeking Russian support.

22 Davies, Heart of Europe, pp. 269-270.
25 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 205.
26 Bromke, Poland’s Politics, p. 3.
In the inter-war period, the political culture of the country crystallized further under the influence of two political personalities. The ideas championed by the architects of modern Polish nationhood, Jozef Pilsudski, an independence politician and patriot in the Polish sense of the term, and Roman Dmowski, a nationalist and positivist, are worth discussing within the context of this question, because they highlight the debate surrounding the orientation of Polish foreign policy. Jerzy Giedroyc, the prominent editor of Kultura, probably the most significant emigre publication, laments that even today the Polish state is ruled from the tombs of these two men²⁷. The II Rzeczpospolita continues to be greatly admired in contemporary Poland.²⁸ In fact, Pilsudski and Dmowski had a lasting effect on Polish political culture. To this day, the two continue to provoke controversy as well as veneration. They clearly influenced the attitudes of the communist elites, opposition movements and Polish society at large.²⁹

While serving common goals, Dmowski and Pilsudski represented the contradictory elements of Polish political culture as it was shaped by the period of partitions. Although arguably on opposite sides of the political spectrum, Dmowski and Pilsudski did have characteristics in common. In short, both had little respect for democratic procedures, and transcended party politics.³⁰ Both also aimed to make Poland a strong and territorially large state.

Over a period of some forty years these two contemporaries and rivals carried out passionate debates on all aspects of domestic and international politics. Pilsudski maintained that the nation was created by a common history rather than by a shared ethnicity. Thus, if different ethnic groups chose to be loyal to a multinational society, Pilsudski would accept them as part of the Polish nation. This model of a nation came close to the civic paradigm of nationhood and citizenship, but reflected more closely


²⁸ Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 151.


³⁰ Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 133.
Pilsudski’s admiration of the multinational and powerful Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. Dmowski, on the other hand, subscribed to the ethnic nationalist view that a nation was a distinct entity with a separate language, territory, and history. He believed in the 'once and forever' nation. This implied that a nation would exist irrespective of political circumstances, and had the corporate right to control its own land and people. Dmowski was not prepared to allow minority groups to participate in the decision-making process in the large, unitary Polish state he envisaged, unless they became assimilated.

The two diverged also on the issue of religion. Dmowski saw Roman Catholicism as a factor that defined Polish identity. For Pilsudski, who followed the secular notion of a civic nation, religion was not of such great importance and Polish nationhood was not for him based on religious affiliations.

Another issue which divided Pilsudski and Dmowski was the feasibility of Polish national independence. For Pilsudski, independence was a priority. Dmowski thought of Poland’s independence as a goal, but not as a way of reforming Polish society. He did not see independence in itself as providing for a nation’s success. Consequently, their preferred political methods diverged. Pilsudski believed in the use of violence and military force. Dmowski saw risings as problematic because they diverted attention and energy from what he considered effective approaches to the country’s problems.

In the ideas of both of these men, history and historical symbols played a dominant role. Dmowski based his ideas of Poland on the Piast period of the early Middle Ages. Pilsudski looked back to the Republic of Poland-Lithuania, and Poland’s Jagellonian period. According to Polish historical images, the Piast perspective is linked

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33 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 143.

34 Ibid., p. 139.

35 Sliwa, 'Idee Polityczne', pp. 27-37, 13-26; Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 140; Wandycz, Cena Wolności, p. 328.

36 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 140.
with a preoccupation with the country’s western borders, whereas the Jagellonian perspective implies interest in eastern expansion.37

The main difference between Dmowski and Pilsudski consequently lay in the orientation they believed best for Polish foreign policy. Dmowski saw Germany as the main threat to Poland; Pilsudski perceived Russia as most dangerous. The latter’s goal was the creation of an anti-Russian federation of independent states between the Black and the Baltic Seas (see Chapter Three and Nine). Variations of their views of Poland’s position and role in Central and East Central Europe are still voiced by Polish political forces.

The Poles’ experiences in the Second World War reinforced many of the historical images formed earlier. The ordeal bolstered their fears of Germany. Even prior to 1939, Germans were seen as ‘century-old enemies of Slavs’.38 However, the losses Poland endured under German (and Soviet) occupation were unlike anything the country had undergone even in the most tragic periods of its history. The Soviet attack on Poland, Soviet behaviour during the Warsaw uprising39, and finally, the imposition of a communist regime strengthened Polish Russophobia. In addition, the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact became for the Poles a symbol of the ill-wishing intentions of their western and eastern neighbours alike. Poles felt abandoned by their Western allies in both 1939 and after the war, when Western powers conceded a compromise with the Soviet Union concerning Poland.40 Finally, the war confirmed the romantic notion of a Polish nation with a tradition of resistance.

Post-war Polish political culture was shaped by communism as well as in opposition to it.41 The political programme of the official Polish communist regime borrowed heavily from the tradition of Dmowski’s National Democrats. It linked their

37 See Jerzy Topolski, ‘Narod, społeczeństwo i państwo jako czynniki twórcze w dziejach Polski’ [Nation, society and state as creative factors in Polish history], in Kloskowska (ed.), Oblicza Polskosci, p. 43.


39 Poles interpret the events surrounding the Warsaw uprising as proof of Soviet treachery. The Red Army stopped its advance and calmly watched the atrocities committed by Germans against the Poles participating in the rebellion. Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 124.


concepts of realistic patriotism to the ideology of socialism, by arguing that the country's position in the Eastern bloc allowed it to accomplish the necessary social reforms. It emphasized that the Polish-Soviet alliance created conditions for the continued existence of the Polish state. Władysław Gomułka, the First Secretary of the Communist Party for a brief period after the Second World War and again from 1956 to 1970, summed up the arguments as follows:

The enemies of the People's Poland would like to push our country into an abyss of chaos and anarchy ... They are well aware that only socialist Poland can remain on the map of Europe as an independent and sovereign state. They are well aware that the Polish United Workers' Party is the guarantor of her independence ... the guarantor of fraternal neighbourly Polish-Soviet relations, which are in line with the most vital interest of the Polish nation. To [turn against] the candidates of the Polish Workers' Party is tantamount to destroying socialism in Poland ... destroying the independence of our country, erasing Poland from the map of Europe.42

The opposition groups that evolved in Poland before 1989 embraced political doctrines based on the teachings of the Catholic Church, and 'sanitized' versions of Dmowski's ideas. In the early 1980s, the Solidarity movement officially recognized Christian ethics as part of its programme. Indeed, 'Christ's suffering on the cross became a symbol of workers' strikes and national manifestations'.43

The absence of political forces expressing neo-Pilsudskiite ideas in the pre-1989 period can be at least partly attributed to the fact that under the circumstances nationalist ideas could not be pursued openly.44 In the 1980s, a number of political groupings emerged that did adhere to the nationalist, Pilsudski-inspired ideas (such as the concept of Miedzymorze, a Central European community of states). The main one was the patriotic-fundamentalist Confederation for Independent Poland, an opposition party which subsequently held 49 seats in the Parliament under Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka (see Chapter Nine).

Today, both the post-endeks, named after Dmowski's National Democrats (Endecja), and the 'neo-Pilsudskiites' take part in the country's political debates. The Endecja-inspired part of the political spectrum currently encompasses some twenty

42 Władysław Gomułka quoted in Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 120.

43 Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 35.

44 Sliwa, 'Idee Polityczne', p. 36.
organizations. None of them have succeeded in creating a solid political structure. The most influential of them is the Christian-National Union (ZchN), lead by Wieslaw Chrzanowski.⁴⁵

In general, the fall of communism has resulted in the revival of suppressed national identities and nationalism in Central and East Central Europe. While sections of the Polish population have rejected the notion of ethnic nationalism, there are nonetheless political forces relying on aggressive nationalist political platforms.⁴⁶

Poland's modern political culture, like that of every other European country, is based on an elusive mix of two diametrically opposed schools of thought, Romanticism and Positivism, or more generally, political idealism and political realism. Yet unlike other cultures, Poland's political culture is dominated by Romantic concepts.

It is beyond dispute that Polish historical awareness manifests itself in a Geschichtskanon. In the past, the historical images on which this canon relies were an ideal source of strength for the Polish nation, a mode of cultural and political survival. Jaworski and Koestler describe it as a Schild kollektiver Selbstbehauptung - a shield of collective self-assertion.⁴⁷ Arguably, historical images continue to play a valuable role in three respects. Marcin Krol suggests that they are indispensable elements of the political discourse in contemporary Poland. The 'language of ideology' has never played a great role in Polish politics, even under communist rule. Significantly, too, after the demise of the Eastern bloc, the 'legal-constitutional language' of Western European politics has not become the language of Polish politics. In this situation only the use of the historical discourse allows, according to a number of Polish observers, an involvement by citizens in the political life of the country.⁴⁸ No other language of politics would allow the population to participate in the political process. Secondly, for the heavily fragmented political spectrum, the historical narrative provides a minimum of the necessary unifying force. Thirdly, for Polish society, the shared image of Polish history furnishes a source of motivation and identification in a difficult period of

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 24.
⁴⁶ Roszkowski, 'Nationalism in East Central Europe', p. 21.
⁴⁷ Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 67.
However, a number of scholars suggest that in addition to these constructive aspects, there are dangers inherent in the reliance on historical images in political discourse. Marcin Krol speaks in this context of the Poles’ ‘fatal propensity’ to treat their history as collective inheritance. Jaworski and Koestler point out that history is a component of Polish political culture which no political or societal force believes it can do without, or rather, which no politically aware Pole can safely step back from. Poles do not easily tolerate deviation from accepted images. Individuals who choose to point out the less glorious aspects of Polish history and issues of historical interpretation in too explicit a way, are faced with a widespread lack of acceptance or interest in their work. Bromke claims that many Polish historians are reluctant to challenge the traditionalist notion of the country’s history because of its political function. If deviation from an accepted way of thinking and a canonical version of historical events is sanctioned, the political discourse cannot be either innovative or constructive. Indeed, Jaworski and Koestler suggest that this aspect of Polish historical awareness could hinder national development.

The escape into history also results in the danger that the people and the elites may not distinguish between the present and the past, thus creating an illusory world in which contemporary political discourse takes place. References to the country’s history can be conceived of as ways to avoid confronting today’s difficult problems. Moreover, although the use of historical images can open up the political discourse to a wider public, it can also prevent the creation of a necessary legal-constitutional framework. Finally, the use of historical images in political discourse may affect relations with neighbouring countries which experienced what Poles call the Golden Age as a

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49 Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 60.

50 Ibid., p. 67.

51 Marcin Krol, 'Przedmowa', p. 5; idem, 'Patriotyczna myśl i patriotyczny stereotyp' [Patriotic thought and patriotic stereotype], in Tazbir (ed.), Mity i Stereotypy w Dziejach Polski.


53 Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 67.

54 Krol, 'Przedmowa', p. 5.

period of oppression and Polish imperialism.

4. Historical Images and Nationalism in Poland

External aspects of Polish nationalism

Polish nationalism is 'popularly defined as being intrinsically Western in orientation'. Although geographically Poland finds itself between the East and the West as these are usually defined, the Western connection has always been of paramount importance to the cultural self-definition of the Polish nation.

Arguably, Poland’s westward gaze is a function of its Catholicism. During the Jagellonian period, Poland claimed to constitute the Antemurale Christianitatis, or in other words, the 'Bulwark of Christendom'. Poland’s elected kings came from the West, rather than the East, because they were required to be Catholic. For the same reason, most of the country’s cultural, economic and political links connected Poland to the Western world. Thus Poles’ sympathies lay with the peoples of the West rather than with the country’s eastern neighbours. Indeed, Poland’s geographical isolation from the West, and the failures of the West to come to Poland’s assistance have not discouraged the Polish enthusiasm for Western ties. Simultaneously, Poland’s geographical proximity to the East has only increased its hostility, particularly towards Russia.

The deep-seated Russophobia in Poland stems from a number of historical differences and conflicts between the two countries, both religious and territorial in nature. It is worth recalling that Russians (or Soviets) marched into Poland in 1632, 1655, 1706, 1710, 1768-72, 1791-2, 1794, 1813, 1831, 1863, 1919-20, 1939-41, and 1944-5. Accordingly, anti-Russian emotions date back to the Jagellonian period of Polish history, but were reinforced throughout following centuries. As mentioned above, the Second World War and its aftermath further intensified the historically motivated Polish fears of both Germans and Russians. Heinrich and Wiatr, in their empirical study of Polish political culture in the 1980s, detected continued 'fierce anti-Sovietism

56 Dawisha, Eastern Europe, p. 73.
57 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 342.
58 Ibid., p. 376.
59 Dawisha, Eastern Europe, p. 58.
and anti-Communism'. 60 Suspicion and mistrust towards the USSR existed even among the communist leadership. 61 Nevertheless, in the post-communist era, Polish sociologists discovered a change in attitudes towards Russians. While the expectation was that Polish Russophobia would continue or even intensify with the end of the Cold War, the Polish population appears suspicious of the Russian state, but not of the Russian people. 62

The myth of the West as it has been held by Polish elites since the 16th century sees Poland as part of Western Europe, culturally related to countries such as Italy, France and later also the Netherlands and England, but not Germany (see Chapter Five). The traditional fear of Germany among Poles originated from the German Drang nach Osten accompanied by religious and territorial disputes and clashes with Poland. Feelings caused by German participation in the partitions of Poland, accompanied by ruthless policies of Germanization were further enforced by the atrocities committed against Poles during the World Wars. The tense relations between the two countries following 1945 were marked by Polish fears of German revisionism.

Current attitudes of Poles toward Germans and Germany are divided. Woycicki suggests that there is a mixture of great and historically rooted fears, combined with hopes for a more positive future. 63 On the one hand, scholars agree that anti-German sentiments remain an important factor in Polish public opinion. 64 The possibility that Germany might attempt to exploit the fact that there is a German minority in Poland in

60 Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 82.

61 It is reported that a section of the Polish Foreign ministry was responsible in the 1970s for relatively clear and unbiased assessments of Soviet purposes and aims in its relations with Poland, and the threat stemming from Soviet links with East Germany. There are also reports of conversation that took place between Wladyslaw Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, and Leonid Brezhnev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, in 1969, during which Gomulka accused the Soviet Union of negotiating a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany ‘behind Poland’s back’. Andrzej Wilk, ‘Podejrzany sojusznik’ [Suspicious ally], Rzeczpospolita (15-15 January 1994).

62 ‘Miedzy Polakami. Rozmowa z Dr. Hab. Ireneuszem Krzeminskim, Pracownikiem Naukowym Instytutu Sociologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego’ [Among Poles. Conversation with Dr. Ireneusz Krzeminski, researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Warsaw University], Rzeczpospolita (16 March 1995).


order to change present borders is often mentioned as potentially destabilizing for Poland.\textsuperscript{65} German economic initiatives are viewed with suspicion. On the other hand, Poles favour Poland’s return to Europe accomplished with German political and economic help.

Poland traditionally saw its actual neighbours as less civilized than Western European states. Furthermore, Poland was constantly involved in armed conflict with one or several of the surrounding states. Thus, help was always sought somewhere else: in Paris, Rome or London.\textsuperscript{66} Belief in the West’s forthcoming help, together with the conviction that it had the duty to assist Poland, became a persistent theme in Polish politics. This myth of the West expressed itself, for example, in a recurring trust in French and/or English military commitment to Poland.\textsuperscript{67} Since this trust has been disappointed so often, Poles’ attitudes to the West are now divided. On the one hand, there is a perception of a perpetual link, on the other, the opinion that the West has not lived up to its responsibilities.

The underground opposition of the pre-1989 era and most Polish political forces today refuse to accept the current division of Eastern and Western Europe. This attitude is linked to the Western orientation of Polish nationalism. ‘Poland belongs to Europe’ and ‘Europe must include all nations that cultivate the European historical heritage’ - are the repeated cries. Demands for Poland (and other Central European states) to ‘return to Europe’ can be found in any official speech. For example, Poland’s Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka stated recently that ‘the family of democratic Western European countries, …, is what we aim at. Not because we need some umbrella, but because we all share the same values and objectives.’\textsuperscript{68} President Lech Walesa said that ‘in the divided Europe we have always been standing on the side of the same values. … The sovereign 3rd Republic being created today resumes its place in Europe for the sake of these values.’\textsuperscript{69} But the sentiment is best expressed by Andrzej Olechowski, an adviser.


\textsuperscript{66} Tazbir, 'Stereotypow', p. 25.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 21.

\textsuperscript{68} From 'Address of her Excellency the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Hanna Suchocka, at Chatham House on March 3, 1993'. London (March 1993).

\textsuperscript{69} 'President Lech Walesa Visits NATO Headquarters 3 July 1991', \textit{NATO Review} Vol. 39, No. 4.
to the Polish President, who in 1992 said that 'like a majority of Poles, I identify with the West and always disliked to be qualified as an Eastern European.'

Nevertheless, despite the fact that most Western observers conclude that in Poland, 'the dominant Westernizers have hardly any native opponents with whom to contend', there are admittedly weaker political forces advocating Slavophile or even pan-Slavist approaches inspired by a mixture of aggressive ethnic nationalism and some elements of the Positivist tradition. Pan-Slavism as a term is usually used loosely to describe a number of expressions of affinity, sometimes mutually hostile, among some or all Slavic peoples. As Michael Boro Petrovich argues, 'by Pan-Slavism is meant the historic tendency of the Slavic people to manifest in some tangible way, whether cultural or political, the consciousness of ethnic kinship'.

Pan-Slavism, which first developed in mid-19th century, during the Romantic period, is based on corporate principles, glorifying the nation rather than the individual. At its extreme it advocates territorial and cultural expansion at the expense of other peoples. This statement may appear contradictory: after all, pan-Slavism pleads for the supra-national unity of the Slav peoples as opposed to national preferences. However, this supra-national cause did not preclude pan-Slavists from believing in national egoism - the sacro egoism.

The aspirations and hopes of the various Slavic people were often at odds, and thus it is not surprising that Polish pan-Slavism evolved to mean something quite different than Russian or Soviet pan-Slavism. Following the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian empire, Polish nationalists continued to see their nation as having a civilizing mission in the East. As Kohn says, 'romantic nationalism based on the veneration of the past without foundation in the present, and the consciousness of grave threats by power pressure from without and centrifugal pressures from within, prepared the soil for the Polish messianic

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70 Andrzej Olechowski, 'Polacy i Niemcy w procesie integracji europejskiej' [Poles and Germans in the process of European integration], Studia i Materialy 54 (February 1993), p. 25.

71 Davies, Heart of Europe, pp. 342-345.


73 Kuhns, 'Political Nationalism', p. 82.

Slavism.⁷⁵ Although some Polish pan-Slavists were prepared to seek Russian help, others pursued closer links among the West Slavs - the nations of what is today defined as Central Europe - directed against Russian imperialism.

Polish pan-Slavism has waxed and waned like all nationalist concepts. Today, it is supported by a small number of relatively insignificant political groupings. Nevertheless, it continues to play a role in Polish political culture and Polish nationalism.

Significantly, Polish federalist concepts have never been linked with pan-Slavist ideas. The geographical field of interest of both pan-Slavists and federalists did to a great extent coincide. But Polish federalist forces, such as Pilsudskiites and neo-Pilsudskiites, advocated, unlike the pan-Slavists, the notion of civic nationalism, or in the Polish usage, patriotism. The Polish endecja with its programme based on ethnic nationalist concepts was closer to pan-Slavism.⁷⁶

**Polish nationalism and Domestic Policy**

Nationalism affected not only external orientations, but also domestic policies. Aspects of such internal developments have for example affected the treatment of national minorities within the country, and thus also relations with neighbouring countries. It is therefore necessary to discuss Polish nationalism and domestic policy.

Polish history included periods of tolerance, for example during the Jagellonian period, when Poland may have been the most open-minded state in Europe. The Polish-Lithuanian federation (14-17th century) was multi-religious and multi-lingual. These times of tolerance figure prominently in Polish historical awareness as the country’s Golden Period. However, although during this period Polish national consciousness emphasized the diverse cultural background of the country, it was frequently characterized by a narrow ethnocentricity. From its beginnings Poland’s history was marked by territorial pressures from both east and west and by efforts to establish or maintain an independent national state despite an unfavourable geopolitical location.⁷⁷ It is not surprising that already in the 18th century, Poles 'had a reputation for exaggerated pride in their

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⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 30.
country. During this period, Polish nobility, the szlachta, adhered to so-called 'Sarmatism', the conviction that Polish traditions were superior to those of their neighbours.

With the development of nationalist ideas during the period of Romanticism, which coincided with the collapse of the Polish state, the various national communities began to drift apart, considering themselves parts of separate and distinctive nations. In the Poland of the partition era, it was not only the extreme right that believed that the country should be reconstructed in its old territorial grandeur. The national aspirations of Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belorussians caused bitterness among Poles, and the desires of these minorities were seen as fuelled by foreign interests. This viewpoint was revived during the interwar period.

Significantly, Heinrich and Wiatr suggest that the concept of tolerance has survived in one particular political context - that of the creation of a Central European federation. This statement indicates that proposals for subregional cooperation formed after the interwar idea of a Central European federation, discussed in Chapter Nine, are founded upon the notion of tolerance towards other ethnic groups. That such a view is a simplification and to some degree a distortion of the notion is suggested in Chapter Three and Chapter Nine. The findings of these two chapters indicate that many of the Polish subregional concepts actually reflect elements of ethnic nationalism. They occasionally reflect references to the past of the Polish state as an empire, and implicitly or explicitly advocate the policy of cultural expansionism.

Polish nationalism has been shaped by both the Positivist tradition of accommodation and the Romantic notion of contestation. These conflicting attitudes continue to be evident. The Church in the Solidarity era cultivated a romantic tradition of nationalism. Cardinal Wyszynski propagated the 'cult of national suffering and patriotic heroism'. As in many other political cultures, the test of patriotism was the

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78 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 269.

79 Lepkowski, 'Historyczne Kryteria', p. 91.

80 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 152.

81 Tazbir, 'Stereotypow', p. 18.

82 Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 84.

willingness to give one’s life for the country.\textsuperscript{84} However, for the Church, romantic veneration of ‘Polish historical destiny and of national spirit of Polish souls’ went hand in hand with compromises with the communist government.\textsuperscript{85} Surprisingly, the Polish Church also significantly contributed to a relative normalization of Polish-German relations by conducting a dialogue with its German counterpart.\textsuperscript{86}

The Solidarity movement, which had its beginnings in 1980, while deeply patriotic, also pursued positivist reform rather than revolution. Although not actively following a philosophy of non-violence, it distanced itself from acts of violence and, like the Church, pursued a strategy of dialogue and compromise with communist authorities.\textsuperscript{87}

Yet, in a discussion of the historical idea of a revolutionary Polish nation with a tradition of risings and resistance, Heinrich and Wiatr point out that the influence of the past on the minds of the younger generation continues to be immense. The authors detect ‘unspecified readiness to fight for Poland’s freedom, to sacrifice oneself for the nation.’\textsuperscript{88} In the 1980s, Poland’s youth, particularly the more highly educated sections, were prepared to fight, which often reflected ‘unfounded romanticism’ or an escape from realities.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{84} Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p. 59. See also Norbert Zmijewski, ‘Between Cooperation and Opposition - the Church in Poland since 1945’, in R.F. Miller and T. H. Rigby (eds), Religion and Politics in Communist States. (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1986).


\textsuperscript{87} Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{88} Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 173.
An important aspect of Polish nationalism has been its close link to religion. Polish culture defined itself through Roman Catholicism, belonging to the Latin West, and at a distance from Byzantium and the orthodox East. Significantly, the Latin alphabet of the Roman Catholic Church had the effect of contrasting Poland with other eastern or southern Slav nations, which used Cyrillic. The Poles cultivated the notion that they were a frontier of Catholicism and thus of Western culture, a belief that somewhat clashed with reality (after all, some of the countries west of Poland’s borders were Protestant). The combination of conflicting political claims and spiritual values caused hostility and friction between Poles and Russians.

In the era of the partitions, Catholic religion became interwoven with nationalism. From religious mysticism emerged Polish messianism, a belief in a supranational mission of the Polish nation. Thus Poland was seen as a 'Christ of nations', a collective Messiah, whose crucifixion would save the world. Messianic romantic nationalism had a powerful impact on Polish political culture until 1918 and later.

After the Second World War the position of the Church in Poland grew stronger than ever. The distress and misery of the war years prompted people to turn to religion for solace. The new communist authorities’ attempts to weaken the influence of the Church only seemed to increase people’s allegiance to the Church. Most importantly, with the ethnic changes in Polish society caused by the killings and

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91 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 213.

92 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 203.

93 For a discussion of Polish Messianism, see: Wojciech Dzeduszycki, Messyanizm Polski a Prawda Dziejow [The Polish Messianism and the Truth of History]. (Krakow: Czas, 1901); See also Meyer, 'Einleitung: Die Politische Kultur'. Messianism is a conservative concept which reaches back to the times of struggle for Polish nationhood. It was further developed at the turn of the century, when Poland was not on the map of Europe. See Sliwa, Idee Polityczne, pp. 6-13; Andrew Targowski, Chwilowy Koniec Historii [Momentary end of history]. (Krakow: Nowe Wydawnictwo Polskie, 1991), p. 8.

94 Gomulka and Polonsky, 'Introduction', p. 5.

95 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 11.

repatriations during and after World War II, Poland was for the first time in its history almost homogeneously ethnically Polish and Catholic.

During the communist era, the Catholic Church played an important role in fostering Polish culture and historical heritage. Various personal and institutional links existed between the Church and the opposition, particularly with Solidarity. Writing before the systemic changes of 1989, Heinrich and Wiatr assert that the identification of the Church with national struggle was so strong that Poles who could not be described as religious attended religious services to parade their patriotism.

After 1980, but especially after 1989, religion and the Church began to be less important. In 1980, 53 per cent of respondents supported the idea of increasing the Catholic church's role in public life. In 1984, only 21 per cent greeted this idea. According to a poll published in May 1992, the confidence rating of the Polish Catholic Church showed a significant drop (from 81% in 1990 to 55% in 1992). Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the continued importance of the Church in Polish political culture.

5. Assessment and Conclusion

This chapter proceeds from the assumption that images of history are elements of the political debate, generally inspired by nationalism, of which there are two kinds: civic and ethnic (or in the Polish usage patriotism and nationalism). The civic tradition is based on the idea of nation as a function of the existence of a political community, state structure, and system of law. The ethnic concept emphasises shared racial and/or historical roots, subordinates the interests of the individual to the interests of the nation, and restricts the rights of minorities. The discussion concluded that Polish nationalism is a blend of both theoretical types.

Contemporary Polish political debate refers back to the Golden Period of Poland as a powerful and expansionist state, and 'Bulwark of Christianity' in the East. But the debate also alludes to periods of national struggle and severe external threats to the existence of the state. Poles thus see Poland both as a country with a great-power

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97 Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 3.

98 Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 82.

99 Ibid., p. 90.

heritage, and a weak victim. As Poland had to cope with severe external pressures from the 17th century on, the Primat der Aussenpolitik resulted in the creation of a 'protective shield' of historical images, ensuring the cultural and physical survival of the Polish nation. Grünberg says that Poles envisage two Polands: one strong, large and aristocratic: the other one weak, uneducated and victimized for centuries.\textsuperscript{101}

Polish historical images reflect predominantly romantic, but also positivist elements, as well as pro-Western but also pan-Slavist ingredients. Romanticism provides the single most significant component in modern Polish political culture. The strong link between nationalism and the Church in the Polish case further reinforced its Romantic character. The powerful influence of religion meant that Poles identified themselves as Western Europeans. However, it also signified strong historicism and a belief in common historical roots as basis for the nation. Moreover, religion can be held responsible for many irrational beliefs and historical myths in the country's political culture.

In Poland, historical images provide a Geschichtskanon which limits a critical evaluation of the country's past. As a result, nationalist and expansionist programmes (today mostly limited to the notion of a cultural mission in the East), although not represented by strong political organizations, continue to attract followers. Such programmes reflect a belief that Poland is a regional power, and are expressed in a lack of tolerance towards national minorities in the country. They rely heavily on images of history as a legitimizing factor.

Nationalist programmes of this kind create antagonisms with neighbouring countries, particularly in the East. This danger is recognized by some parts of the Polish political spectrum.\textsuperscript{102} It is thus pointed out that in today's changed environment, a


\textsuperscript{102} Maciej Rosalik argues that the 'polonocentric' myth of Poland as a bulwark of the Western civilization played its role in times of foreign rule as it allowed Poland to maintain a national identity and some form of dignity. Today, it is only a myth, which obscures the reality. Maciej Rosalik, 'Wiatr z Zachodu' [Wind from the West], Rzeczpospolita (18-19 February 1995). The publicists Stefan Bratkowski and Stefan Kozak argue that a focus on past Polish-Ukrainian relations does not lead anywhere. They sum up their argument by saying that 'during the past few centuries we have been pushing eastward, not they westward'. Stefan Bratkowski, 'Z czym na Zachod' [With what to the West], Gazeta Wyborcza (13-14 January 1990); Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukraińskie Dylematy', p. 49.

continued reliance on historical images can be interpreted as an escape into history: these images become a substitute for dealing with modern challenges. While nationalism is useful as a means for mobilizing the population, there is a shortage of other values and impulses which could move Poles to accept the political and economic system in a difficult period of transition. At the same time, Polish nationalism is dangerous to the country’s efforts to achieve a new position in the region and in the international system.

The reliance on history as a source of political wisdom testifies to a limitation in Polish political thought. The future of Poland’s relations with its neighbours will depend on whether this whole region will be able to overcome the historical sources of resentment without entirely forgetting their past. The prospects for subregional cooperation will hinge on this outcome.
CHAPTER FIVE

POLAND’S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on contemporary relations between Poland and its immediate neighbours. It discusses current conditions which have the potential either hinder or to favour the development of close subregional ties, such as those required for states to establish subregional security cooperation frameworks. Moreover, it charts positive developments as well as existing and potential problems in Poland’s relations with adjacent countries. This aspect of the study is crucial background information for the following chapters. It is not intended to provide a historical chronology of developments in the region. Rather, selected contemporary events are discussed as they relate to Poland’s relations with its neighbours. Thus the argument presented here does not seek to provide general information e.g. about German unification or the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but aims to describe how these events have affected bilateral relations with Poland.

The first section of the chapter considers Poland’s place in the post-Cold War international environment. The following section focuses on Polish perceptions of changes to the West of its borders. This section deals with German unification and considers how this development was received in Poland. The third section discusses Polish reactions to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the country’s relations with the post-Soviet republics Ukraine, Belorus, and Lithuania, as well as with Russia. Finally, the fourth
section analyzes Polish relations with its neighbours to the South. At its focus is the Czechoslovak 'velvet divorce' and Poland’s relations with the successor countries.

Poland’s relations with the Soviet successor states, particularly with countries which at various times in the country’s history have been part of the Polish state (called by the Poles kresy - Eastern borderlands), are proving to be complicated and somewhat unpredictable. This section aims to present the factors that are at the heart of this instability. This is not to say that Poland’s relations with its Western and Southern neighbours are of a less complex nature, but simply that Poland’s Ostpolitik is proving to be the most difficult task for the Polish policy-makers.

This chapter thus deals primarily with the geopolitical perceptions that Poles hold of their region. These perceptions are important for two reasons: firstly, because Poles pay a great deal of attention to geopolitics; and secondly, because many of their geopolitical perceptions are connected to the historical images they share. The formation of new states as neighbours makes the search for a post-communist identity difficult and often results in problematic decisions because the search is guided by historical aversions and biases.¹

For Polish policy-makers, the quality of bilateral relations with neighbouring countries is an indication of the viability of potential subregional security cooperation frameworks. Thus they must answer questions ranging from whether neighbouring countries are sources of threats or security problems (discussed in depth in Chapter Six) to whether a subregional arrangement would function as an instrument for managing member countries, that is, a question of the influence the government could exercise on its partners in such structures. In addition, bilateral relations show whether or not there are commonalities among the countries in question, and whether economic benefits can be derived from cooperating with the countries in question. Many of the considerations are related to historical images, since these function as ways of evaluating current and future experiences. Many Polish attitudes towards neighbouring countries arise from objective motives, but others must be understood as potentially subjective interpretations, based, for example on images of the past rather than on dispassionate assessments of the present situation.

¹ Werner Adam, 'Lauter neue Nachbarn'. Frankfurter Allgemeine (30 June 1993).
2. Poland's post-Cold War International Environment

In the communist era, official relations between peoples and states in Central Europe were rooted in the 'centrally decreed principle of "fraternal friendship"'. In fact, their interaction remained heavily influenced by a long history of resentments and conflicting ambitions. The Central European revolutions of 1989 marked the first stage in the disintegration of the entire European post-World War II order. Elements of fragile Cold War stability collapsed at a breath-taking place, particularly the partition of Europe into East and West, and the balance of the two competing blocs. Geopolitical settlements established in Yalta and Potsdam, but also by treaties concluded in the aftermath of World War I, became meaningless, as multinational creations such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, when freed from external pressures, disintegrated. The division of Germany was erased, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) disappeared from the international scene, having been integrated into West German federal structures. Whereas some of the processes were peaceful (German unification, and the Czechoslovak 'velvet divorce'), others brought with them conflicts and violence (as in the former Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia). These changes have wrecked the structures that characterized the European security order for most of this century.

For Poland, itself ethnically fairly homogeneous, and thus relatively stable, the fall of the Pax Sovietica did not entail any risk of ethnic disintegration. But it did create the need to adjust its domestic policies, and an urgent need to devise foreign and security policies able to address the creation of new states all around its borders. Poland, which before 1989 bordered on the German Democratic Republic in the West, Czechoslovakia in the South, and the Soviet Union in the East, now shares borders with seven states: the united Federal Republic of Germany, the Czech and the Slovak Republics, Ukraine, Belorus, Lithuania, and finally Russia through the enclave of Kaliningrad.

In this situation, the Central European states' decision to dismember the Warsaw Treaty Organization provided them with the freedom to pursue independent foreign and defence policies, but robbed them of security guarantees provided by defence pacts. Moreover, years of economic mismanagement and central military planning left these countries struggling to carry out a reform of their militaries. Not surprisingly, after a

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short period of euphoria over gained independence, and despite the pressing need to undertake difficult domestic political and economic reforms, geopolitical issues quickly became paramount.  

3. Poland's Relations with its Western Neighbour: Germany

For centuries, Poles perceived Germany as the greatest threat to their state- and nationhood. Not surprisingly, the process of German unification has intensified these feelings in Poland, which was awarded some of the German territories in the aftermath of World War II. The traditional fear of German expansionism has been fuelled by the speed of the unification of Germany and its initial refusal to guarantee the German adherence to existing borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In response to these events, Polish leaders argued that continued ambiguities concerning the Western border made the presence of Soviet troops on Polish soil necessary until a treaty could be signed. A Polish parliamentary leader and Solidarity strategist, Bronislaw Geremek, even argued that any attempt to alter the border would precipitate war.

On 28 November 1989, Federal Republic's Chancellor Helmut Kohl introduced the first official vision of German unification. Yet, the 10-Point Plan which he presented to the Bundestag did not address Polish concerns. On the one hand, such reassurances were, legally speaking, unnecessary. After all, the Polish-German border was the subject of binding bilateral treaties. Furthermore, in the same month, Chancellor Kohl had

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signed a declaration proclaiming West German acceptance of the post-1945 Polish frontiers. On the other hand, as Polish voices argued, the Kohl declaration was not legally binding, and the previous treaties had never been accepted by significant sectors of the German political spectrum and were considered provisional agreements in view of possible future unification of Germany. 10

Polish decision-makers had attempted to deal with the situation by calling upon the two German countries to sign a bilateral treaty with Poland re-affirming the inviolability of borders even before unification had taken place. The Bonn government claimed, however, that a territorial settlement could only be approved by an all-German government. 11 Under pressure from the Polish government, in March and April 1990 the West German and East German parliaments passed declarations pledging to respect the Oder-Neisse border. Yet, these declarations did not entirely satisfy Polish requirements because they did not have the legal force of an internationally binding treaty.

In February 1990, Poland made two demands: it asked to be included in the 'Two-plus-Four' conference, where issues related to Polish security, and particularly the problem of its borders, were to be discussed; and, secondly, it again proposed to codify the existing border in a bilateral treaty with Germany. 12 In May, Poland was assured that it would be invited to participate in the round of talks dealing with border and security issues. Subsequently, the 'Two-plus-Four' meeting in Paris on 17 July confirmed the existing border and stipulated that a Polish-German border treaty be initialled before unification and ratified as soon as possible thereafter. During the final 12 September session of the 'Two-plus-Four' conference the two German governments agreed to delete Article 23 of the Federal Republic's constitution, which kept open the possibility of new

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12 In the framework of the 'Two-plus-Four' conference, the two German states and the four allied powers were to decide upon 'external aspects' of German unification. See Barcz and Tomala, Polska Niemcy. p. 6.
Lands (federal units) acceding to the German Federation.\footnote{For texts of relevant documents and evaluation of the process, see Barcz, \textit{Udzial Polski w konferencji "2+4"}.}

Nonetheless, the German government appeared disinclined to proceed with the border treaty both before and immediately after the unification on 3 October. Chancellor Kohl, speaking in Paris in mid-October, proposed that there should be only one general friendship and cooperation treaty with Poland which would also include stipulations concerning addressing the border issue. This proposal was considered unacceptable by the Poles and the German government was ultimately forced to give in to the Polish demand for separate treaties. The first round of formal negotiations concerning both treaties was held in Warsaw on 30 and 31 October.\footnote{Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Signing', p. 18.} The border treaty was finally signed on 14 November 1990.\footnote{The treaty was signed in Warsaw, 14 November 1990. See 'Traktat Miedzy Rzeczpostpolita Polska a Republika Federalna Niemiec o Potwierdzeniu Istniejacej Miedzy Nimi Granicy' [Treaty between the Polish Republic and Federal Republic of Germany on Verification of the border existing between them], in Barcz and Tomala, \textit{Polska Niemcy}, pp. 19-20.} It differed legally from both the 1970 Polish-German treaty and the 1990 declaration by specifying that the united Germany does not have any territorial claims and will not bring such forward in the future.\footnote{Barcz, \textit{Udzial Polski w konferencji "2+4"}, p. 87.}

A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation followed on 17 June 1991.\footnote{17 'Traktat Miedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Republika Federalna Niemiec o Dobrym Sasiedztwie i Przyjaznej Wspolpracy' [Treaty between the Polish Republic and Federal Republic of Germany on Good-neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation], in Jacobsen and Tomala, \textit{Warszawa-Bonn 1945-1991}, pp. 399-409.} Provisions in the Treaty include the delicate issue of the protection of minorities, and stipulate that Germany will support Poland’s efforts to enter the EC. Furthermore, it commits Germany to aid Polish economic development.\footnote{Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'The Polish-German Reconciliation', \textit{RFE Report on Eastern Europe} Vol. 2, No. 27 (5 July 1991), pp. 19-20.} In fact, Germany has indeed proven to be the most eloquent supporter of Polish membership in Western organizations and institutions\footnote{Anna Wolff-Poweska, 'Polacy i Niemcy po otwarciu granicy' [Poles and Germans after opening of the border], \textit{Studia i Materiały} 71 (December 1993), p. 22; 'Konferencja Olechowskiego: Połownicznie spełniony postulat' [Olechowski's conference: partially fulfilled demand], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (4 January 1994).}, and has also become Poland’s most important economic partner.\footnote{18 In fact, Germany has indeed proven to be the most eloquent supporter of Polish membership in Western organizations and institutions, and has also become Poland’s most important economic partner.}
On the one hand, then, unification created the appropriate climate for resolving a number of issues important to Poles. It gave the Warsaw government the chance to settle finally the question of Germany’s borders; and it established the opportunity for Poland to come closer to Western Europe by moving closer to its German neighbour. On the other hand, Polish policy-makers still seemed to be preoccupied with perceived potential security threats resulting from German unification. Even the bilateral treaty officially recognizing the border could not entirely lay to rest Polish fear of German revanchism. The resurgence of historical animosities was therefore caused by a number of unresolved issues, including differences over the ownership of property in Poland that was once held by German citizens, conflicting claims about rights in the Baltic, and disputes regarding the future status of German minorities.

The possibility that Germany will attempt to exploit the presence of the German minority in Poland in order to change present borders is often mentioned as potentially destabilizing. The links between the revisionist West German Expellee Union and the German minority in Poland are considered potentially dangerous. In this context, Germany’s rapid recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence was interpreted by some Poles as a prelude to German demands for self-determination by the former German territories which are today part of Poland.

Ethnic Germans in Poland have much to gain by demanding revisions. Many insist on a special status for Silesia (for example EU supervision) and for Silesians (for example dual citizenship, which is not permitted by German law). In Zielonka’s words, 'this subsequently makes many Poles very nervous, if not obsessive, in their dealings with the

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20 On this issue, see Ewa Sadowska-Cieslak, ‘Zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w Polsce’ [Foreign direct investments in Poland], Studia i Materialy 71 (December 1993). Germans have formed four times as many joint ventures in Poland and invested nearly three times as much in it as investors from any other country. Jeffrey Simpson, ‘Knocking on the West’s door’, Globe and Mail (5 March 1992).


24 ‘Hupka za “polubowna” zmianę granicy z Polska’ [Hupka for an ‘amiable’ change of border with Poland], Rzeczpospolita (12 July 1993).

German minority there.

In reality, the ethnic conflict in Upper Silesia is not an acute one. Nevertheless, the situation in Silesia continues to be potentially destabilizing.

Perhaps the best indication of latent Polish fears of Germany have been references to the possibility of a second Rapallo or a second Yalta - a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany at the expense of Poland. Kazimierz Wojcicki, for example, argued that just the mere existence of a centre of power in Moscow and the preservation of the Russian empire, no matter how meagre it might be, constitutes a temptation for Germans to develop 'special relations' with it - over the heads of Poles and at their expense. The achievement of German unification was characterized by close consultations between German and Soviet leaders. As a result, there were fears about a new German-Soviet deal on Eastern and Central Europe.

A further problem was German economic penetration into the region. Central Europe saw in Germany an economic giant interested in exploiting its superior economic position over the states of Central Europe. Polish officials feared that the country's economy would be moulded to fit the needs of German industry, and that its political and cultural identity would be compromised. German economic initiatives were thus received coolly.

Even after the conclusions of a border treaty, anti-German sentiments and fears of Germany remain an important factor in Polish public opinion and are rooted in Polish

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31 In July 1991 Manfred Stolpe, Minister-President of Germany's Land of Brandenburg, presented Polish Prime Minister Bielecki with a proposal to create a Polish-German economic border region. As a response to the plan, several Polish newspapers suggested that this border region could be seen as a German attempt to revise the Polish-German border agreement. For Polish reactions see for example: Piotr Cegielski, 'Zamieszanie wokol Oder' [Confusion surrounding Oder], Gazeta Wyborcza (14 November 1991). See also Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'German Plan for Border Region Stirs Interest in Poland', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 7 (14 February 1992), p. 39; Wolff-Poweska, 'Polacy i Niemcy ... ', p. 24; Mieczyslaw Tomała, Polacy - Niemcy: Wzajemne postrzeganie [Poles - Germans: Mutual perceptions]. (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, 1994), p. 37-38.
nationalism. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Poland in the talks regarding the process of German unification, the signing of the border treaty, and the German commitment to limit the size of the federal armed forces lessened these fears and normalized conditions between Central European and German policy-makers. Further reassurances were provided by the membership of the united Germany in European security organizations. The unification of Germany has brought Poland closer to Western Europe and its economic and political organizations. And finally, Germany speaks in favour of subregional cooperation in Central Europe, particularly in the Visegrad Group.

4. Poland’s Relations with its Eastern Neighbours

Before the Collapse of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the WTO left the Soviet Union without allies, forward deployment possibilities, or a strategic buffer in Central Europe. The 'loss' of Central and Eastern Europe was felt in Moscow and contributed to a polarization of the leadership into reformers and conservative hard-liners. Moscow's belated grief over the lost Pax Sovietica caused Central European, and particularly Polish fears of a restoration of a hard-line regime in the Soviet Union.

These fears culminated in the autumn and winter of 1990-1991. The turn towards conservatism in the Soviet Union was best illustrated in early 1991 by the violent crackdown in the Baltics. The most pessimistic scenario was presented by President Lech Walesa of Poland, who considered it possible that the Soviet intervention in the Baltics was only the first step in the USSR's attempt to reclaim Eastern and Central Europe.

The hard-liners' coup of August 1991 in the USSR seemed to justify Polish fears. However, the coup collapsed and subsequently there was a subsequent leadership change. Confronted with the imminent collapse of the Soviet empire, Poland had mixed feelings.

32 Katarzyna Kołodziejczyk, 'Jak budować wspólnotę interesów' [How to build a community of interests], Rzeczpospolita (10 February 1994).

33 Krystyna Grzybowska, 'Bilans słowa i bilans czynów' [Balance of words and balance of deeds], Rzeczpospolita (20 December 1994); Marek Jedrys, 'Czego obawiają się Polacy' [What are Poles afraid of], Rzeczpospolita (13 September 1994).


On the one hand, following the change, however, Poland felt that the chances of resolving a number of outstanding issues between Poland and the Soviet Union, such as the signing of bilateral treaties and military agreements, and the settlement of claims relating to troop withdrawal, had improved. Furthermore, the emergence of a number of new states as Poland’s neighbours to the East would create a new cordon sanitaire, separating Russia from Eastern and Central Europe. Many saw the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a means of weakening the Russian heartland and a chance for a more balanced and reliable relationship between Eastern and Central Europe and the newly independent republics. There was an expectation that the relations of all Central European countries with the post-Soviet republics would be better than they had been with the Soviet Union, because such relations would be based on realistic discussions of their needs and expectations, rather than founded, as in the past, on ideological factors and the unilateral imposition of policies by Moscow.

Yet, there were also worries about the effects of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. More cautious Poles feared a migration of people who were either displaced under Stalin or might feel attracted by the comparatively higher living standards in Central Europe. The threat of mass migration has not in fact materialized so far. (For an in-depth discussion of the phenomenon of migration as a security threat, see Chapter Six.)

The second question which frustrated efforts to establish good bilateral relations was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe. After a series of difficult negotiations, Soviet soldiers left Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1991. As a consequence of concerns about the Western border, the Polish government officially asked the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the withdrawal of troops only in September 1990. The complicated and repeatedly delayed talks ended in May 1992, when Russia and Poland signed a final agreement and a financial protocol attached to a treaty on friendship and cooperation. Since in the meantime the Soviet Union had ceased


to exist, the Russian government accepted and took over Soviet obligations with regard to the presence of Soviet forces in Poland in January 1992. On 28 October 1992 the withdrawal of the last former Soviet combat troops from Poland was completed. Support troops were withdrawn in the autumn of 1993.

A third source of tension was the completion of new bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation between the Central European countries and the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal for the text of these treaties submitted to its former allies included a clause which stipulated that the Central European states could not take part 'in any military alliance which could be directed against the USSR and that they would consult with the Soviet Union if a situation arose whereby the security of either side was affected.' The clause was finally withdrawn, but only in the aftermath of the failure of the August coup.

Furthermore, disagreements pertaining to economic issues threatened new bilateral relations. When in January 1991 trade between the Soviet Union and Central European countries was changed to hard currency accounting, the quantity of goods exchanged decreased sharply. Although diplomatic efforts were undertaken on both sides to improve the situation, trade volume did not rise. Efforts to deal with the situation failed, partly because there was no effective central authority in the Soviet Union, and partly because both sides now chose to look for trade partners in the West.

Other issues of concern to Central Europeans included finding a reliable custodian for the Soviet nuclear arsenal and resolving issues relating to arms control treaties. Post-Soviet republics' challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) agreements, and most recently, to the Conventional

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41 Ibid., pp. 38-40.

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement\textsuperscript{43} caused apprehension in Poland.

On the whole, Poland welcomed the disintegration of the \textit{Pax Sovietica} and the Soviet Union, but it also was aware that the collapse of the imperium would present the country with serious problems. Unlike the old Soviet Union, which represented the threat of military strength, the post-Soviet republics constitute the security threat of structural weaknesses.

Poland began to develop relations with individual Soviet republics as early as the winter of 1990. According to Roucek, Poland was among the first countries 'to foresee the "republicanization" of the USSR'\textsuperscript{44}. Polish post-communist foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was based on a 'dual track' approach. Thus Poland pursued both friendly relations with the authorities in Moscow and its first cultural and economic contacts with the individual republics.\textsuperscript{45} The dual track strategy was aimed at permitting Poland to support national self-determination movements to the East of its borders. It had the effect of creating the foundations for future cooperation with independent republics. Some observers argue that this Polish strategy laid the groundwork for cooperation with the Soviet republics without substantially damaging Poland’s political and economic links with the central organs of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{46} However, it seems that the dual-track policy was not fully appreciated in the new republics or in Moscow. Polish political forces continue to be divided on this issue.\textsuperscript{47}

\textit{After the Collapse of the Soviet Union}

While the dual track strategy has been still relatively successful, the collapse of the Soviet Union exposed Polish Eastern policy to a tough test. Poland’s reaction to this

\textsuperscript{43} 'Rosja domaga sie rewizji ukladu o redukcji zbrojen konwencjonalnych' [Russia demands a revision of the treaty on reduction of conventional armaments], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (7 October 1993). See also Chapter Six.


\textsuperscript{46} Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 10.

\textsuperscript{47} Jerzy Marek Jezioranski, 'W poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji' [Searching for a new concept], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (14 January 1994).
development was somewhat incoherent.\textsuperscript{48} Polish political activities in the \textit{Miedzynarodzie} area, including the signing of bilateral economic and military treaties with non-Russian former Soviet republics, have been criticised by Russian leadership.\textsuperscript{49} Faced with Russian disapproval and integratory tendencies within the framework of the CIS, Poland's diplomacy slowed down its efforts to establish close links with neighbouring republics.

**Belorus:** Belorus declared its sovereignty within the USSR on 27 July 1990. The chance of bilateral relations between Belorus and Poland before this step was practically non-existent, but following the Belorussian declaration of sovereignty, the Polish government attempted to establish closer relations with the republic.\textsuperscript{50}

In October 1990, Poland's Foreign Minister met with representatives of the Soviet government, and of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorus. Yet although declarations of friendship and cooperation renouncing territorial claims and declaring mutual willingness to cooperate on minority issues\textsuperscript{51} were signed with Russia and Ukraine, none could initially be concluded with Belorus.

The reasons for the initial Belorussian refusal are not clear. The Polish side insisted that legal and procedural obstacles were at the heart of the problem. Nevertheless, as Zielonka reports, Poles added that Belorus made 'unspecified' territorial claims to the Polish district of Bialystok and complained about the treatment of the Belorussian minority there.\textsuperscript{52} During initial negotiations, Belorus' government refused to endorse a clause declaring the frontier between the two countries inviolable, arguing that the border had been originally established by an agreement with the Soviet Union rather than with Belorus. Minsk also expressed reservations regarding the treatment of the Belorussian minority in Poland. Observers suggest, however, that one of the reasons Belorus' policy-makers resisted signing the declaration was the unclear relation of Belorus

\textsuperscript{48} See discussion of this aspect by Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland's eastern policy', \textit{RFE/RL Research Report} Vol. 3, No. 7 (February 1994); Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, 'W poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji' [Searching for a new concept], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (14 January 1994).

\textsuperscript{49} Andrzej Romanowski, 'Czy przespalismy "smute"?' [Have we slept through 'smuta'?], \textit{Tygodnik Powszechny} (3 October 1993).

\textsuperscript{50} Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 24.

\textsuperscript{51} The Belorussian minority in Poland is 15,000-300,000 strong. Estimates of the number of Poles in Belorus vary as well, and are estimated at between 417,000 and 600,000. See Jan Zaprudnik, \textit{Belarus: At a Crossroads in History}. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 215.

\textsuperscript{52} Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 24.
with the Soviet, later the Russian, government. There were also communist party officials in the Belorussian government who resented the internal changes in Poland.\textsuperscript{53}

Relations improved after the Belorussian proclamation of independence on 25 August 1991, when Belorus turned its attention toward the West and became aware of the potential benefits of links with Poland.\textsuperscript{54} On 27 December 1991, a few days after it was announced that the Soviet Union would cease to exist as of 1 January 1992, Poland recognized the independence of a number of former Soviet republics, including Belorus.\textsuperscript{55} Soon after, on 23 June 1992, the presidents of the two countries signed a Treaty of Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation.\textsuperscript{56} Issues relating to minorities and borders were agreed upon. In July, Belorus opened its first embassy abroad in Warsaw.\textsuperscript{57} A series of economic and political agreements has since been concluded by the two countries. At this point, the previously non-existent economic cooperation began to develop positively. In 1991, Poland became one of Belorus’ most significant trade partners. Indeed, despite the general slump in Polish-Soviet commerce, trade with Belorus in that year underwent a 20% increase. After Russia, Poland was the most important destination for Belorussian exports and, after Japan, also the most


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{55} See 'Uchwała Rady Ministrów RP nr 170/91 (w sprawie uznania przez Rzeczpospolita Polska Republiki Armenii, Republiki Azerbejdżanu, Republiki Białorusi, Federacji Rosyjskiej, Republiki Kazachstanu, Republiki Krymu, Republiki Mołdawii, Republiki Tadżykistanu, Turkmenistanu i Republiki Uzbekistanu) - Warszawa, 27 grudnia 1991 r.' [Resolution of the Council of Minister of the Polish Republic No. 170/91 (concerning the recognition by the Polish Republic of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belorus, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Krymu, the Republic of Mołdowa, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Republic of Uzbekistan], \textit{Zbiór Dokumentów/Recueil de Documents} 2 (1992).


important source of imports. However, trade patterns changed the following year, with Germany becoming Belorus's most important foreign economic partner. Trade with Poland increased again in 1994, but the policy-makers of both countries recognize that economic cooperation could be substantially improved.

Poland and the independent Belorus also pursued a dialogue aimed at dealing with their security concerns. However, although Poland considered Belorus’ statehood as significant for Polish security, it did not seek closer security relations. Despite the assurances of Polish policy-makers that Poland was interested in strengthening Belorussian independence and sovereignty, Polish governments did not take up Belorussian proposals for the creation of a subregional security framework or suggestions of Visegrad expansion. Belorus, thus deprived of external support, concluded a number of bilateral agreements with Russia. These agreements were so extensive that Russia’s Prime Minister, Egor Gaidar, interpreted them as tantamount to the creation of a ‘Belarussian-Russian confederation within the CIS framework.’ In particular, Poles considered the Belorussian 1994 decision to join the CIS’ security organization potentially dangerous. Supporters of this pact in Belorus have also been insinuating that Poland is a security threat to Belorus. Burant suggests that Belorussian fears are a result of Soviet ‘divide and rule’ policy, which ‘encouraged Belorussians to believe that, given an

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62 On proposals of subregional cooperation frameworks, see Chapter Nine.


64 Antoni Z. Kaminski, 'Dlaczego Polska me rna polityki wschodniej' [Why Poland has no Eastern policy], Rzeczpospolita (8 March 1995).

opportunity, Poland would seize Belorussian lands annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II'.

In January 1994, Belorus chose Miechyslav Grib, a former Communist as president. His position on the direction of the country’s foreign policy differs substantially from that of the previous president, Stanislav Shushkievich. Grib announced early on that, unlike Shushkievich, who had supported concepts of collective European security and neutrality for his country, he believed that Belorus’ best option was to participate in the security arrangements of the CIS. The change also indicated an end to Belorussian good-will concerning Polish foreign policy aspirations. Indeed, Belorus now opposes Polish membership in NATO, and in March 1995 linked the issue of prospective NATO extension indirectly to its decision to halt implementation of the CFE treaty. This decision was evaluated by Poles as an indication of Belorus’ dependence on Russia’s strategic interests.

In addition to their differences on security issues, Poland and Belorus could not solve all territorial and minority problems using diplomatic procedures. One unresolved territorial issue was that of the Lithuanian districts of Vilnius and Salciniankai. These districts are largely inhabited by Poles, but Belorus on occasion made territorial claims to them. The border issue was finally settled by Lithuania and Belorus in January 1995.

Furthermore, there are ongoing conflicts between religious communities in each country’s areas inhabited by national minorities. Polish Catholic priests in Belorus work on behalf of Polish nationalist ideas and see themselves as defenders of the Polish minority in Belorus. Incidents in which the Polish flag was flown from Catholic churches

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66 Burant, 'Problematyka wschodnia', p. 42.
67 Malgorzata Leczycka, 'Bialorusini postawili na komunistow' [Belorussians placed on communists], Polska Zbrojna (31 January 1994).
68 'Bialorus przeciwko rozszerzeniu NATO' [Belorus against widening of NATO], Rzeczpospolita (10 March 1995); 'Bialoruski premier o Polsce i NATO' [Belorussian Prime Minister about Poland and NATO], Rzeczpospolita (14 January 1994); 'Bialorus wstrzymala realizacje ukladu CFE' [Belorus halted the implementation of the CFE treaty], Rzeczpospolita (24 February 1995).
70 Maja Narbutt, 'Mniej wojsk, wiecej integracji' [Less military, more integration], Rzeczpospolita (7 February 1995).
further aggravated local ethnic conflicts, since these were interpreted as expressions of Polish imperialism.

Burant argues that because both the Polish minority in Belorus and the Belorussian minority in Poland are small, they do not pose a threat to the integrity of these countries. Nevertheless, the Bialystok district inhabited by Belorussians is one of the poorest and least developed parts of Poland, and thus it is not surprising that as minorities in Poland are becoming more assertive, the Belorussian minority is beginning to voice concerns and grievances. There are marginal groups advocating the inclusion of all territories inhabited by Belorussians into Belorus, which would encompass areas now part of Poland. Similarly, there is a Polish minority in Belorus, which could bring forward autonomist demands, if the already difficult economic situation were to deteriorate further.

While Belorussian elites seem to be fascinated by Poland, they are also highly fearful of Polish domination. Such feelings are caused by images of the past as well as by current tensions, created for example by the presence and behaviour of Polish Catholic priests in Belorus. On the other hand, Poles know little of Belorus, and tend to view the smaller republic in a patronizing way. Observers indicate that Polish governments have done too little to strengthen the country’s relations with Belorus.

Ukraine: For Poland, Ukraine is, after Russia, the most important partner among former Soviet republics. As in the case of Belorus, Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty on 16 July 1990 marked the beginning of closer relations between the two countries. In fact, the size and potential significance of Ukraine meant that Poland was prepared to risk jeopardizing somewhat its relations with Moscow for the possibility of cooperation with Kiev. A series of treaties on economic, political and military cooperation were concluded.

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71 Adam, ‘Lauter neue Nachbarn’.

72 Burant, ‘Problematyka wschodnia’, p. 45.

73 See Andrzej Kaczynski, ‘... ale z dusza, bracia, sprawa ciezka’ [... but with the soul, brothers, the situation is difficult], Rzeczpospolita (25-26 February 1995).


76 See Wojciech Gorecki, ‘Wiedza ze znaczka pocztowego’ [Knowledge from a stamp], Rzeczpospolita (23 March 1995).
On 13 December 1990, the two countries signed a declaration of directions for the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations. This document contained a clause regulating border issues.\textsuperscript{77} It also functioned as the basis for an economic cooperation agreement in January 1991 and for the establishment of a Joint Commission on Polish and Ukrainian Minorities in March 1991.\textsuperscript{78}

After Ukraine’s secession from the former Soviet Union in December 1991, official Polish-Ukrainian contacts improved even further. Poland was the first country which recognized Ukraine’s statehood\textsuperscript{79}, a fact remembered by Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{80} At trilateral political consultations held in Warsaw on 14 February 1992, representatives from the foreign ministries of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary stated that a stable, prosperous Ukraine was in the interest of Central Europe. They also decided to strengthen and deepen cooperation with their new eastern neighbour. At the same time, however, they rejected Ukraine’s requests to either create a new subregional security framework or to be admitted to an existing subregional structure.\textsuperscript{81}

In May 1992 Poland and Ukraine signed a treaty on Good-neighbourly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation.\textsuperscript{82} The treaty was ratified in January 1993.\textsuperscript{83} The text of the treaty guarantees the inviolability of shared borders, and envisages cooperation regarding approaches to European organizations and security issues. In May 1993, during a Polish-Ukrainian summit, agreements promoting cooperation in matters of immigration, trade, law enforcement and nuclear reactor safety were also signed. Furthermore, a bilateral Presidents’ Consultative Committee on Polish-Ukrainian Relations was

\textsuperscript{77} Burant, 'Problematyka wschodnia', p. 21.

\textsuperscript{78} Ian J. Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe’s Neglected Strategic Axis', \textit{Survival} Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), p. 29-29.


\textsuperscript{80} Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 29-29.

\textsuperscript{81} For a discussion of both options see Chapters Eight and Nine.


\textsuperscript{83} Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 29.
established\textsuperscript{84}, but has subsequently failed to live up to the expectations placed on it.\textsuperscript{85}

A sovereign Ukraine is said by Polish analysts to be a precondition of Polish independence.\textsuperscript{86} In addition to security benefits stemming from its existence for Poland, Ukraine is a nation rich in resources and thus a possibly promising economic partner. This is still only a possibility, however, since Poland’s trade with Ukraine in 1992 amounted to only $350 million.\textsuperscript{87} Nevertheless, Ukraine has the potential to act as a political and economic bridge between Russia and Poland.

For Poland, the most important issue at stake is Ukraine’s internal stability. Indeed, Poland could become a destination or a transitional stop on the way to the West for a wave of Ukrainian refugees, if the Ukrainian experiment were to fail. Particularly worrying is any internal conflict scenario involving the Ukrainian armed forces. The Polish Vice-Minister for Defence, Przemyslaw Grudzinski, stated in an interview that despite Ukraine’s adherence to the CFE treaty, the size of the Ukrainian armed forces did not correspond to the country’s relatively limited defence needs\textsuperscript{88}, and dwarfed Polish capabilities.

Yet the worst case scenario for Poland involves political and economic failure in Ukraine, leading to its reintegration into Russia. Observers argue that such a development would probably involve some form of regional conflict. And in this instance, Poland would also suddenly be bordered by a powerful imperial Russian state.\textsuperscript{89}


\textsuperscript{85} See Władysław Gill, ‘Stosunki Polski z Ukraina’ [Poland’s relations with Ukraine], \textit{Polska i jej nowi sasiedzi}. (Poznan: Adam Marszałek, 1994), p. 111. For further information on the Committee, see Chapter Nine.


\textsuperscript{87} ‘Problems of Trade with Ukraine Viewed’, \textit{FBIS-EEU-93-044} (9 March 1993).


\textsuperscript{89} Brzezinski, ‘Polish-Ukrainian’, p. 27.
A first indication of potential problems to come between the two countries surrounds the issue of Polish membership in NATO. Prior to April 1994 elections in the Ukraine, Ukrainian politicians were supportive of Poland’s desire for admission to NATO, but the NATO issue became a bone of contention following the election, when Ukraine elected a deeply fragmented parliament which created a post-communist government. Ukraine’s politicians fear that if Poland’s joined NATO, their own country would find itself in a buffer zone between East and West, and are concerned about Russia’s reaction to NATO expansion.

There are also disagreements between Poland and Ukraine on minority issues. Nevertheless, most observers agree that these ethnic conflicts are not likely to lead to conflicts between the two states in the foreseeable future. Yet, mutual fears are fuelled by the existence of groups with revisionist programmes on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border. Polish observers criticize that the Polish society views Poland’s relations with Ukraine from the perspective of Lwow (German Lemberg, Ukrainian Lviv, a formerly Polish city), not from the perspective of Kiev, its current capital. To put it in different words, Poles continue to see Ukraine as a former part of Poland rather than as an independent country. However, voices in Poland that want to open the issue of the eastern borders represent, for the time being, only a small fraction of the political

90 ‘Wspolnie o bezpieczenstwie’ [Together about security], Rzeczpospolita (29 October 1993).

91 Piotr Koscinski, ‘Komunisci beda tworzyc najwieksza frakcje w nowej Radzie Nawysznej Ukrainy: Kto jest kim w nowym parliamencie’ [Communists will create the largest fraction in the new Supreme Committee of the Ukraine: Who is who in the new parliament], Rzeczpospolita (19 April 1994).

92 ‘Rozumiemy Polske, niech Polska zrozumie nas. Rozmowa z ministrem spraw zagranicznych Ukrainy Gennadijem Udovenka’ [We understand Poland, Poland should understand us. Conversation with Ukraine’s foreign minister Gennady Udovenko], Rzeczpospolita (13 March 1995); ‘Ostrozniej do NATO’ [More carefully into NATO], Rzeczpospolita (1 December 1994); ‘Ukraina przeciwna naszemu czlonkowstwu w sojuszu’ [Ukraine opposed to our membership in alliance], Rzeczpospolita (15 February 1995).

93 For a discussion of the situation of the Polish minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, see Gill, ‘Stosunki Polski z Ukraina’, pp. 116-120.


95 This city belonged to Poland from 1340 to 1772, to Austria until 1918, and finally went to the Soviet Union in 1945. See Jan Krauze, ‘Poland’s new eastern policy takes place’, Guardian Weekly (15 March 1992).

96 ‘Nie wyprowadzam sie z Polski: Ze Jerzym Giedroyciem rozmawia Andrzej Garlicki’ [I am not moving away from Poland: Andrzej Garlicki speaks with Jerzy Giedroyc], Polityka (26 October 1994).
spectrum. The political mainstream in Poland is fully aware of the disastrous consequences any such move would entail for Poland’s western territories, just recently finally confirmed in the treaty with united Germany.97 Yet, Kozak argues that Poles do not always understand that members of the Ukrainian minority in Poland are not foreigners, that they have lived in their areas for centuries and that most are loyal Polish citizens. Simultaneously, Poles of Ukrainian descent think of themselves as disadvantaged in the Polish political system, since it puts small political groupings such as parties representing ethnic minorities at a disadvantage in an attempt to avoid political splintering. Furthermore, they feel that their cultural, religious, and social needs are not fulfilled.98

Conflicts between local Roman Catholic and Greek-rite (uniate) Catholic Churches on both sides of the border have contributed further to the deterioration of relations on the local level, on occasion sharpening Polish-Ukrainian tensions.99 Relations between the two religious communities have always been difficult. But serious tensions evolved following the Ukrainian independence when Roman Catholic Poles in Ukraine and in Poland began to reclaim property which the Orthodox Church had claimed for itself. There were cases of violent clashes between members of both congregations on both sides of the border.100

The Polish-Ukrainian partnership represents a new facet, then, in a relationship that has historically been characterized by acrimony, confrontation and conflict.101 Despite some progress in Polish-Ukrainian relations, one cannot take friendly contacts for granted. The problem is that of the many agreements between the two countries’ governments, few are more than mere statements of intent. Many factors are at the root of this phenomenon. Poland tries to avoid provoking Russia and has doubts about Ukraine’s future as a state. Roucek adds that ‘long historical memories, fuelled by the revival of nationalism and transborder ethnic interests, might be strong enough to cause

98 Stefan Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy i Dialogi' [Polish-Ukrainian Dilemmas and Dialogues], Polska w Europie No. 10 (January 1993), p. 46.
99 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 22; Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 32.
100 Royen, 'Central Eastern Europe and the Western CIS', pp.5-6.
101 Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 28.
at least some irritations and frictions.' Kozak argues that the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations will depend to a large degree on whether the two nations will be able to free themselves of the weight of the past. However, as in the case of Belorus, in the long run, Ukraine's relations with Russia will be the main determining factor in the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

Lithuania: The independence of Lithuania was proclaimed on 11 March 1990. It was well received in Poland, and the Polish government was among the first to recognize its independence. Significantly, as Roucek observes, 'in contrast to the Ukrainian question, where the Central European reaction was motivated primarily by national interests and geopolitical considerations, their support for Baltic independence was more a matter of principle.'

Developments since 1990 suggest, however, that Polish-Lithuanian relations are complicated by historical factors. Attempts to normalize relations between the two countries have been stifled by the attitudes of nationalistic forces on both sides, who invoke the historical domination of Lithuania by Poland during the existence of the I Rzeczpospolita. Poles speak of Polish achievements and their civilizational mission in the East; Lithuanians see in Poland a powerful and patronizing country.

Lithuania was the last neighbouring country with which Poland signed a treaty of good-neighbourliness (after five rounds of difficult negotiations). The arduous process

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102 Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 15.
103 Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie', p. 58.
105 Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 12.
108 The treaty was initialled by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in Warsaw on 28 March 1994, and signed in Vilnius 26 April by the respective presidents. The treaty contains a compromise statement on the condemnation of the use of force which had occurred in past relations between the two countries. Initially, the Lithuanian government demanded the inclusion of a clause castigating Polish interwar policy towards the Lithuania, particularly the occupation of Vilnius (Wilno), but they eventually agreed to omit specific historical references. The parliaments of the two countries ratified the treaty in the autumn of 1994. See Rzeczpospolita Magazyn Wydarzenia 1994 (January 1995), p. 17; 'Droga do ratyfikacji traktatu polsko-litweskiego' [Way to ratification of the Polish-Lithuanian treaty], Rzeczpospolita (13 October 1994); and text of the 'Traktat miedzy Rzeczpospolita Polska a Republika Litewska o
of finding a formula acceptable to both Poland and Lithuania points to the unresolved problems and differences between the two governments, particularly regarding interpretations of their common history.\textsuperscript{109} Significantly, according to public opinion polls, Poles have felt increasingly less sympathetic toward Lithuanians since 1991.\textsuperscript{110}

Poland does not feel that Lithuania poses a military threat. The latter has armed forces of some 16,000, including 5,000 border guards and another 5,000 rapid reaction forces.\textsuperscript{111} There are no disagreements on the principles of economic cooperation, although trade levels are still low. Problems still exist, however, on the issue of national minorities. There are estimated to be over 300,000 Poles in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{112} The Polish ethnic minority makes up 7\% of the Lithuanian population. In the districts of Vilnius and Salciniankai some 80\% of the population calls itself Polish.\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, ethnic conflicts centring around the Polish minority in Lithuania intensified after the collapse of the Pax Sovietica. A large section of Poles in Lithuania, afraid of what they called 'anti-Polish' propaganda on the part of the independence movement Sajudis, opposed the Baltic republic’s pursuit of independence. A 1988-89 Lithuanian language law that gave no official standing to the Polish language in the districts of Vilnius and Salciniankai confirmed their fears. Yet, the Polish government did not come to the support of the Polish minority’s concerns until September 1991, when the Lithuanian parliament dissolved the local councils in these two Polish-dominated districts, apparently as a punishment for supporting the August coup attempt in Moscow. On 4 October 1991, however, a joint statement of intent recognized the rights of ethnic minorities to public participation and to education in their native language, and soon after Poland and Lithuania signed an agreement establishing consular relations. Nevertheless, the situation

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{109} See for example Maja Narbutt, 'Burza wokół "Ostrej Bramy"' [Storm surrounding "Ostra Brama"], Rzeczpospolita (4 July 1994); Maja Narbutt, 'Litwa-Polska: Spór o historię' [Lithuania-Poland: Argument about history], Rzeczpospolita (15-16 October 1994).
\item\textsuperscript{110} 'Litwa: dyskusje wokół ratyfikacji traktatu z Polską' [Lithuania: discussions about ratification of the treaty with Poland], Rzeczpospolita (8-9 October 1994).
\item\textsuperscript{111} Maja Narbutt, 'Litwa: Najsilniejsza w Nadbaltyce' [Lithuania: Strongest in the Baltic], Rzeczpospolita (16-17 January 1993), p. 8.
\item\textsuperscript{112} Brown, 'Crisis and Conflict', p. 7.
\item\textsuperscript{113} Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', pp. 20-22.
\end{itemize}
of the Polish minority in Lithuania is not thought to have improved significantly.\footnote{Helena Fiedorcowa, 'Bolesnych spraw mniejszości polskiej nie ubywa' [Painful issues of the Polish minority do not diminish], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (25 April 1994).}

An attempt to deal with the issue of minorities was made in the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation between Poland and Lithuania, signed on 13 January 1992. This document contains a statement of willingness to pursue minority rights on the basis of CSCE principles. Yet, the accord caused considerable tension. Polish right wing forces, as well as the Polish minority in Lithuania argued that by signing the Declaration, Poland relinquished its political leverage in Vilnius, thus deserting the Polish minority. Lithuanian nationalists, particularly the \textit{Vilnija} movement and parts of the \textit{Sajudis} group, criticized the Declaration as an instrument of Polish revisionism.\footnote{Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 16.}

Another source of potential tensions is the question of Kaliningrad Oblast, a Russian enclave bordering on both Poland and Lithuania. Roucek states that although Poles deny aspirations of gaining influence over this area, Lithuania has on occasion openly expressed its interest in the Oblast.\footnote{Ibid., p. 16.} For the time being, the issue of Kaliningrad is a hypothetical one, yet it could become a bone of contention in the event of further disintegration in the Russian Federation.

Russia: Poland borders on Russia only through the small enclave of Kaliningrad Oblast (KO).\footnote{The Kaliningrad Oblast is a smaller part of the pre-1918 East Prussia. The remaining part of East Prussia now belongs to Poland and Lithuania. See Vladimir Kusin, 'Notes on Kaliningrad', \textit{Notes from Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs}, NATO HQ (9 November 1992), p. 1.} Yet, the Russian military presence in this area is one of Poland’s major security concerns.\footnote{Zajaczkowski, 'Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie', pp. 190-191.} Of KO’s population of 900,000 people, two thirds consists of military personnel, their families, and civilian employees of the armed forces.\footnote{Not counted in this calculation are military troops stationed there temporarily after withdrawals from former Warsaw Treaty Organization countries. See Grzegorz Lys, 'Czołgi za ścianą' [Tanks behind the wall], \textit{Zycie Warszawy} (11 February 1993).} Poland sees the large contingent of Russian combat troops in the Kaliningrad region as a critical problem in its relations with Russia. Poles calculate that Russia’s troops in Kaliningrad
alone equal half of the entire Polish armed forces.\textsuperscript{120} The disintegration of the Soviet Union makes the area difficult for Russian access\textsuperscript{121}, and thus KO is of little value as a forward deployment base. However, Russia does not have a place for the men and hardware now stationed in Kaliningrad.\textsuperscript{122} Thus, Poles fear that Kaliningrad will become a greater problem in future, since the economic situation in deteriorating Russia could result in discontent among the forces.\textsuperscript{123} Polish military observers speak of the 'powder keg' Kaliningrad.\textsuperscript{124}

Another concern is German economic interest in the KO, and Russian-German cooperation in this area.\textsuperscript{125} This kind of cooperation, Poles fear, may be to the detriment of Polish needs and interests.\textsuperscript{126} For this reason, Warsaw has put forward a number of proposals and initiatives aimed at strengthening Polish economic presence in the Oblast.\textsuperscript{127}

Thus, Poland's security concerns associated with Kaliningrad are either fears of a powerful Russia, or fears of a weak and disintegrated Russia. Such worries are certainly fuelled by anti-Russian sentiment, which is still strong among segments of


\textsuperscript{121} Kusin, 'Notes on Kaliningrad', p. 3.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 4. Russia proposed in 1994 to create a 'special defense zone' in the Kaliningrad Oblast, aimed at defense of air space and the Russian border with Poland and Lithuania. Poles interpreted the announcement as a move away from the policy of normalization in this highly militarized area. They saw it as an attempt to assert Russia's role in the Baltic 'near abroad'. The plan violates the CFE agreement which allows for 36,000 troops in Kaliningrad. See Maria Wagrowska, 'Nowy problem: Kaliningrad' [New problem: Kaliningrad], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (21 March 1994). In September 1994, Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev announced that Russia was prepared to move some of the troops based in Kaliningrad, but that would require amending the CFE treaty. See 'Mniej wojsk w Kaliningradzie' [Less armed forces in Kaliningrad], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (12 September 1994). For Poland the prospect of solving the Kaliningrad issue, is enticing, but it fears reopening up the CFE debate.

\textsuperscript{123} Ireneusz Michalkow, 'Kaliningrad: Grozba destabilizacji czy szansa rozwoju' [Kaliningrad: threat of destabilization or chance for development], \textit{Polska Zbrojna Magazyn Tygodniowy} (22-24 July 1994).


\textsuperscript{125} Roger Boyes, 'Resurgence of Kaliningrad troubles Poland', \textit{Times} (15 May 1992).

\textsuperscript{126} Bugajski, \textit{Nations in Turmoil}, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{127} Maja Narbutt, 'Otwarto Polski konsulat w Kaliningradzie' [Polish consulate was opened in Kaliningrad], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (22-23 January 1994): Mieczyslaw Tomala, 'Kaliningrad i jego sasiedzi' [Kaliningrad and its neighbours], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (22 August 1994); 'Współpraca z okręgiem kaliningradzkim: Minister Korona pełnomocnikiem' [Cooperation with Kaliningrad Oblast: Minister Korona as plenipotentiary], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (21-22 May 1994).
public opinion.

Poland's relations with Russia proper, which emerged as the Soviet Union's legal successor after the collapse of the USSR on 21 December 1991, affect its relations with all of the other countries in the region. Although the quality of relations between Poland and Russia has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, because of the size of Russia (70 times that of Poland), its population, economic weight, and military strength, as well as historical images associated with it by Poles, Russia is the most important of all the former Soviet republics for Poland and other Central European countries. Adding to the uncertainty, Russia's final political and territorial form have not yet been defined, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), linking Russia with most post-Soviet republics in the realm of politics, economics and security is likewise still in the process of definition and creation.

Initially, Poland's relations with post-Soviet Russia were relatively limited, and occasionally rather cool. One of the sources of tensions in Polish-Russian relations was found in the economic sphere, as trade practically collapsed following the dissolution of CMEA, and the issue of mutual debt was not resolved until January 1995. Political factors also played a role in creating problems. By keeping relations with Russia at a low profile, Poles hoped to deter any conceivable return to imperialistic behaviour on the part of Russia. This early and difficult phase of Polish-Russian relations could be described as the 'de-Sovietization' of links. One of the main issues at stake in relations between the two countries during this phase was the clarification of historical issues.

A treaty signed by Presidents Walesa and Yeltsin on 22 May 1992, and a military agreement from July 1993, are considered to have created a new framework for

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128 Andrzej W. Pawluczuk, 'Daleko i blisko Rosji' [Close and far from Russia], Rzeczpospolita (10-11 December 1994); Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Pozycja Polski w Europie: dzis i jutro' [Position of Poland in Europe: today and tomorrow], Gazeta Wyborcza (8-9 January 1994).

129 See Slawomir Popowski, 'Dwa panstwa, dwie koncepcje' [Two countries, two concepts]. Rzeczpospolita (17 February 1995); Piotr Niemczyk, 'Ostroznie z Rosja' [Carefully with Russia]. Rzeczpospolita (31 October - 1 November 1994).


131 Slawomir Popowski, 'Obie strony licza na wieczę' [Both sides count on more]. Rzeczpospolita (23 August 1993).

relations. According to some Polish observers, old prejudices are slowly being replaced by cooperation and coexistence.¹³³ Yet, it is the beginning of a difficult process. A Polish Foreign Ministry official said that due to the delicate nature of Polish-Russian relations, their links will develop along a ‘wavy’ and not a straight line.¹³⁴ This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that Russia does not have a clear Central European policy¹³⁵, and Poland, faced with multifaceted changes to the East of its borders, has had some difficulty in creating a coherent Eastern policy.¹³⁶

Russian politics continues to be marked by struggles between reform forces and conservative elements. Russia’s foreign policy remains vague, and characterized as much by imperialist overtones as by democratic concepts. There has been a resurgence of Russian interest in Central Europe since mid-1993, reflecting a more assertive Russian foreign policy, and an increasingly serious debate about the expansion of NATO. One of the most significant examples between the difficulties in relations of the two countries is the so-called Yeltsin declaration which the Russian President presented while visiting Warsaw in August 1993.¹³⁷ In it, Yeltsin expressed understanding for the Polish desire to join NATO, and stated that Poland’s aspirations did not damage the interests of Russia.¹³⁸

Under pressure from Russia’s conservative elements, Yeltsin retracted his words, and accepted a doctrine in which Russia declared itself prepared to intervene where its


¹³⁴ ‘Falowanie z Rosją’ [To wave with Russia], Gazeta Wyborcza (15 March 1995); Janina Jarocka, ‘Dobre podstawy budowy zaufania’ [Good foundations for creating trust], Polska Zbrojna (9-11 July 1993). For a chronology of Polish-Russian links, see ‘Polsko-rosyjskie kalendarium’ [Polish-Russian calendarium], Rzeczpospolita (17 February 1995).

¹³⁵ Kazimierz Dziewanowski, ‘Bez koncepcji’ [Without a concept], Rzeczpospolita (8 December 1994).

¹³⁶ Antoni Z. Kaminski, ‘Dlaczego Polska nie ma polityki wschodniej’ [Why Poland does not have an Eastern policy], Rzeczpospolita (8 March 1995); Sławomir Popowski, ‘Dwa państwa, dwie koncepcje’ [Two states, two concepts], Rzeczpospolita (17 February 1995); Kazimierz Dziewanowski, ‘Bez koncepcji’ [Without a concept], Rzeczpospolita (8 December 1994).

¹³⁷ See Ryszard Malik, ‘Czas rozpoczec odliczanie na nowo’ [Time to begin calculations again], Rzeczpospolita (26 August 1993); Anna Wielopolska, ‘Politycy stawiaja znaki zapytania’ [Politicians place question marks], Rzeczpospolita (30 August 1993); Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, ‘Traktat i umowy nie wystarczaja’ [Treaty and agreements are not sufficient], Rzeczpospolita (28-29 August 1993).

¹³⁸ Bratkiewicz, ‘Stosunki z Rosja’, p. 129.
ill-defined national interests were threatened. Finally, President Yeltsin’s stated in a letter to four NATO countries’ leaders that Russia had reservations about Central European membership in NATO. Thus, visions of European security in Poland and Russia differ significantly.

Poles do not necessarily see Russia as a potential aggressor - although they take seriously the possibility of a return of authoritarian rule and neo-imperialism in Russia - but rather as a country seeking to reduce Central Europe to a *cordon sanitaire* by thwarting its desire for integration into Western organizations and institutions. Russia’s claims to a ‘sphere of influence’, ‘special interests’ or ‘role’ in neighbouring countries and its ideas concerning Russian or Western-Russian patronage in Central Europe and a ‘conditional’ membership in NATO (marked by the non-stationing of foreign forces and nuclear weapons on Polish territory) are seen by Poland as potentially threatening to its sovereignty. In this context the close political and military links between Russia and Belorus are considered potentially dangerous to Polish security. The withdrawal of Russian troops from Belorus has been halted, and Belorus has decided not to continue to implement the CFE agreement. Thus there is a realistic prospect that

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139 Los-Nowak, 'Transformacja formyły', p. 112; Jerzy Nowakowski, 'Rosja uzbraja ... doktryny' [Russia arms ... the doctrine], *Polska Zbrojna* (28 October 1993); Andrzej Karkoszka, 'Interesy - tak, strefy wpływu - nie', *Polska Zbrojna* (12-14 November 1993).

140 Andrzej Wilk, 'Cien Frankensteina' [Shadow of Frankenstein], *Rzeczpospolita* (30 October - 1 November 1993); Anna Wielopolska and Zbigniew Lentowicz, 'Muzyka Przeszłości' [Music of the past], *Rzeczpospolita* (2-3 October 1993).

141 Ryszard Malik, 'Historia zaprzepuszczonych szans' [History of wrecked chances], *Rzeczpospolita* (24 August 1994); Popowski, 'Dwa państwa, dwie koncepcje'.


Poland will be faced with the Russian army again along its borders. Recent Ukrainian opposition to Polish NATO membership is also viewed by the Poles in the context of Russian attempts to create zones of influence. Polish observers argue that this attitude reflects the Ukrainian leadership’s awareness that once Central European countries join NATO, former non-Soviet republics will find themselves behind a new Iron Curtain. Moreover, the Western focus on Russia’s ‘needs’ is considered detrimental to Polish security. German links with Russia are particularly feared.

The war Russia has been conducting in Chechnya, although considered an internal matter by the Polish government, is subject to a vigorous political debate among both policy-makers and the public. The use of force is condemned and judged a vindication of Polish fears about both Russian imperialism and the disintegration of the multi-national country. Simultaneously, the scope of Western reactions to Chechnya is compared to the West’s weak response to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Poles fear that the conflict in Chechnya is undermining any remaining Western consensus concerning ways to structure Western relations with Eastern and Central Europe. Indeed, the Polish discussion of the Chechnya crisis is often accompanied by speculations about whether the crisis will have an impact on the speed of Poland’s integration into NATO. Occasionally, Poles seem to believe that the more threatening the situation to the East of the country’s borders, the better the prospects for the country’s membership in

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144 Chabiera, "Warunki Rosji".
145 Ibid.
146 Los-Nowak, "Transformacja formuly", p. 113; Maciej Wierzynski, "Kochany Jelcyn" [Dear Yeltsin], Rzeczpospolita (16-17 October 1993); "NATO-Europa Środkowa: Z Rosja w tle" [NATO-Central Europe: With Russia in the background], Rzeczpospolita (7 January 1994).
148 For the specifics of the Polish discussion of the Chechnya crisis, see 'Foreign Ministry: Chechnya is Russia’s internal affair', BBC SWB EE 2178 (14 December 1994); 'Foreign Minister Olechowski critical of Russian operations in Chechnya' BBC SWB EE 2188 (29 December 1994); Marian Moraczewski, "Czeczenki (?) Znak Zapytania" [Chechen (?) question mark], Polska Zbrojna (14 December 1994); Sławomir Popowski, 'Pokojowy plan kapitulacji' [Peaceful plan of capitulation], Rzeczpospolita (28 December 1994); Maria Wagrowska, 'Pozegnanie ze złudzeniami' [Farewell to illusions], Rzeczpospolita (13 December 1994); 'NATO nie chce przyspieszyć' [NATO does not want to speed up], Rzeczpospolita (16 January 1995).
NATO.  

Recent developments in relations between the two countries have been mixed. Polish initiatives have not found a positive response in Moscow, and the signing of several agreements has been postponed. Difficult issues include Russian police aggression against Polish Catholics in Moscow, and the Russian decision to celebrate 17 November as an anniversary of the liberation of Moscow from Polish invaders in the year 1612. However, the decision on the construction of a cemetery for the murdered Polish officers in Katyn, and the decision about a framework for consultations between the respective Foreign Ministries bring some hope for the two countries’ relations. Trade relations after the collapse of CMEA remain weak, and Polish initiatives aimed at improving the trade balance between the two countries have not garnered support in Moscow. Polish analysts indicate that economic cooperation with Russia is often contingent on Moscow’s political aspirations.

5. Poland’s Relations with its Southern Neighbours: Czechoslovakia/ Czech Republic, Slovak Republic

Compared to the apparent importance of Poland’s relations with its eastern and western neighbours, Poland’s southern neighbours, particularly Slovakia, are only of peripheral concern to Warsaw. The relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia were 'frozen' prior to the 'velvet revolution', since the Czechoslovak leadership refused to accept political changes taking place in Warsaw. Following the 'velvet revolution',

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149 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Marek Siwiec, 'Czas pragmatyzmu' [Time of pragmatism], Rzeczpospolita (23-24 July 1994). It was revealed that in 1992, the then Defense Minister Jan Parys commissioned a study on cooperation with NATO in case of armed conflict with the country’s eastern neighbour. 'Zarzuty Parysa: Kto zagraza bezpieczenstwu Polski' [Parys’ accusations: Who threatens Polish security], Rzeczpospolita (27 June 1994). Significantly, sections of the political spectrum believe that Poland was closest to membership during the unsuccessful coup in Moscow in 1991.


151 'Falowanie z Rosja' [To wave with Russia], Gazeta Wyborcza (15 March 1995).

152 Slawomir Popowski, 'Partnership for development' with Russia, Rzeczpospolita (15 March 1994); idem, 'Dwa stanstwa, dwie koncepcje'; Bratkiewicz, 'Stosunki z Rosja', p. 131.

153 Piotr Niemczyk, 'Ostroznie z Rosja' [Carefully with Russia], Rzeczpospolita (31 October-1 November 1994).

however, former dissidents who seized power in both countries soon found a common language.

Polish relations with Czechoslovakia developed positively, both in the realm of bilateral relations, and in consultations about potential directions for foreign policy. The Czech and Slovak republics, created after the 'velvet divorce' of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993, do not constitute a security threat to Poland in any way. Their military and economic potential is comparatively small. Not surprisingly then, Poland recognized the new republics immediately. Furthermore, Poland and the two post-Czechoslovak republics are members of frameworks which promote limited cooperation. Indeed, cooperation with Central European neighbours is an important aspect of Warsaw’s foreign policy.

Nevertheless, debates about the future of the region showed vital initial differences between the political attitudes of the two countries. The former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski put forward a proposal for a Polish-Czech confederation in his article on 'Post-communist nationalism' in the winter 1989/1990. In it he argued that closer relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia, eventually leading to a confederation, would have stabilizing effects, both economically and politically. In his words, 'institutionalized Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation would create a stronger unit in the vulnerable area between Germany and Russia, and thus contribute to greater central European stability.' In Brzezinski’s opinion, such arrangements would fill 'the security vacuum’ in the region and should be supported by the West. The idea of setting up a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation was not new and had been discussed both after

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World War I and during World War II, by the Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile.\textsuperscript{160}

As a response to Brzezinski's plan, there were unofficial discussions between Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1990. According to a Polish observer, these discussions lasted no longer than two or three months.\textsuperscript{161} Although there was more support for this idea among Polish representatives, it was by no means a popular concept. It was openly rejected by Czechoslovak officials. The Czechoslovak side avoided any indications that it was discussing a potentially anti-German framework. Czechoslovakia also distanced itself from any plans which could be interpreted as watering down its policy aimed at integration in European organizations and institutions.\textsuperscript{162} Instead, Czechoslovak leaders proposed a loose trilateral cooperation framework involving the participation of Hungary, whose Prime Minister Jozsef Antall had, before the formal dissolution of the WTO, proposed the creation of a Central/East European Union once his and other countries had left the Eastern alliance.\textsuperscript{163} This proposal led to the creation of currently the most significant subregional framework for cooperation between Poland and its southern neighbours - the Visegrad Quadrangle, or Group (formerly Triangle). Yet, the member countries, particularly the Czech Republic, made the conscious decision to refrain from dealing with security problems within this framework.\textsuperscript{164}

Poland and the Czech and Slovak republics also cooperate within the framework

\textsuperscript{160} Jan Obrman, 'Czechoslovakia Overcomes Its Initial Reluctance', \textit{RFE/RL Research Report} Vol. 1, No. 23 (5 June 1992), p. 20. See also Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{161} Krzysztof Gorski, Senior expert, National Security Office at the President's Chancellory, Polish Republic, interview by author, 6 February 1995, London.

\textsuperscript{162} Obrman, 'Czechoslovakia Overcomes', p. 20.

\textsuperscript{163} Antall first mentioned the plan at the European Democratic Union conference in Helsinki in September 1990. When asked to elaborate on the concept he stated that it was not a political union or an economic union. He stressed that the goal was not to create an alternative to existing Euro-Atlantic organizations. His proposal was centred on creating an organization to include Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, of a military security nature, like the Western European Union, which could function as an example. He believed that later on other smaller member states of the Warsaw Pact could join the structure. 'Speaks on the Future of Union', \textit{FBIS-WEU-90-173} (6 September 1990), p. 3.

In an interview, Antall added that effects of membership in WTO imply that Central European armies 'gain time in the transitional period - for example, for the maintenance of the military technology, spare parts supply, and replacements - because our interests would not be served either if, from one day to the next, our Army would suddenly find itself in possession of a scrap yard, completely obsolete weaponry and equipment.' 'Comments on Pact, NATO Issues', \textit{FBIS-WEU-90-173} (6 September 1990), p. 3.

of the Central European Initiative (CEI), a loose regional cooperation group emphasizing economic cooperation, described in Chapter Eight. The structure is theoretically capable of dealing with security issues, yet so far the member countries have refrained from putting them on the agenda.  

There is, however, a lack of political coordination between Poland and its Visegrad partners, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary. This is in part because historical preconceptions and distrust were not swept away with the collapse of communism. Zielonka states that 'Poland ... used to view itself as a regional power in security terms, and was reluctant to work together in this field with two small players such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia.'

Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, relations among the Visegrad countries were damaged by a number of disputes of an economic, ethnic and environmental nature, such as quarrels concerning the ethnic Poles in the Czech section of the Cesin region. In January 1992, when Poland and Czechoslovakia were to sign a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), one of the major right wing Polish parties, spoke against such a step in the Sejm because, it argued, a Polish renunciation of rights to the Cesin region would be problematic in view of the fact that a Polish minority lives in the area. As a result, the presence of the Polish minority in the Czech republic continues to be an important issue in relations between the two countries. There are also minor unresolved border issues between Poland and both Slovakia and Czech Republic but they have not been raised by any major political forces in either state.

The race to join Western European institutions has been another source of discord among the countries in question. Furthermore, despite the creation of the Central

165 For a discussion of the Visegrad Group and the CEI, see Chapter Eight.

166 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle'.


169 Barbara Sierszula, 'Obietnice dla polskiej mniejszosci w Czechach' [Promises for the Polish minority in Czechia], Rzeczpospolita (27 April 1994); Anna Paciorek, 'Polskie wyspy na Zaolziu' [Polish islands behind the Olza], Rzeczpospolita (26 April 1994).

170 Barbara Sierszula, 'Czesko-polskie granice: Korekta czy odszkodowania' [Czech-Polish borders: Correction or compensation], Rzeczpospolita (22 April 1994); 'Tatry beda podzielone' [Tatra will be divided], Rzeczpospolita (8 June 1994).
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA; for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Eight), economic links between Poland and the Czech and Slovak republics are weak.  

The new Slovak government formed after the September-October 1994 elections has not followed a clear foreign policy, despite announcements that it aspires to EU and NATO membership. The coalition government also includes extremist parties: the Slovak National Party and Workers' Union. The leader of the National Party, Jan Slota, is a pan-Slavist and a friend of the Russian nationalist Zhirinovsky, and not convinced about the wisdom of the government's Western direction of foreign policy. The government actually announced that Slovakia must turn to the East should it not be accepted into Western organizations. Some Slovak politicians continue to speak of a neutral Slovakia. Thus, while the Czechs are turning Westward, away from Central European partners, Slovaks could potentially do the opposite. Neither prospect is considered advantageous by Polish policy-makers.

6. Summary and Conclusion

Poland regards its relations with Germany and Russia as crucial. In the past, these two countries have often challenged the country's sovereignty. Polish policy-makers consider the task of assuring the country's security as unthinkable without a lasting settlement with Germany and Russia. The first priority for Polish policy-makers after the end of the Cold War was to settle the Polish-German border issue. However, even Polish participation in the 'Two-plus-Four' negotiations and the conclusion of a border treaty has not fully alleviated Polish fears of Germany.

Poland has also attempted to develop constructive responses to the disintegration of its eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union. Even before the final collapse of this multi-state creation, Poland began to pursue a dual track policy, focusing on contacts with both Moscow and the republics. The collapse of the Soviet Union was both anticipated and welcomed, despite the many security problems it necessarily created for Poland. In fact,

171 See for example 'Uniknelismy napieć społecznych i strajków. Z prezydentem Republiki Słowacji Michalem Kovaczem rozmawia Jan Forowicz' [We avoided social tensions and strikes. With the President of the Slovak Republic Michal Kovach speaks Jan Forowicz], Polska Zbrojna (3 March 1994); Andrzej Niewiadomski, 'Premier Słowacji o współpracy z Polską: Wyjść poza deklaracje' [Slovakia's Prime Minister about cooperation with Poland: To go beyond declarations], Rzeczpospolita (31 March 1994).


Poland evaluated the disintegration as an opportunity to develop relations with its eastern neighbours based on partnership. In many aspects of Poland’s relations with the post-Soviet states, this has indeed been the case. Nevertheless, there are clear tensions with most of these newly independent states, both on the governmental and local community level, particularly regarding minority issues. Poland continues to fear the strength of its neighbours, but is now also concerned about potential problems created by their weakness.

In terms of security, Poland’s relations with its southern neighbours are not of the same importance to the country’s policy-makers as are relations with the West and the East. Poland cooperates with the Czech and Slovak republics within regional cooperation frameworks. Their relations can be described as good, although tensions and disagreements exist concerning the purposes and intensity of cooperation.

Both historical relations and geopolitical considerations about the sheer political and economic weight of Germany and Russia make it seem that multilateral subregional links with either Germany or Russia would hardly be in the Polish interest (although some far left and far right political forces in Poland do occasionally advocate coming closer to Russia as a solution to Poland’s problems, and relatively close cooperation with Germany is pursued within the framework of European integration by mainstream forces).

Relations with Poland’s southern neighbours have developed relatively well, and existing troublesome issues are not acute. But the discussion of Poland’s relations with neighbouring countries undertaken in this chapter has shown that countries to the south are relatively insignificant for Polish foreign policy compared to the links with the large and historically difficult neighbours to the East and West.

The non-Russian former Soviet republics to the East of Poland’s borders (Ukraine, Belorus, Lithuania) constitute, together with Russia, one of the most difficult aspects of Polish foreign policy. In its relations with these countries Poland intends to support democratic transformation, the creation of free market economies, the construction of economic links based on partnership, non-governmental links, and the protection of Polish minorities. The difficulty in its relations with these republics is that on the one hand Poland’s security requires that these countries be independent and sovereign. On the other

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hand, Poland cannot do much to influence the quality and quantity of their relations with Russia. An assertive policy on the part of Poland would alienate Russia. At the same time, difficult historical heritages make sound bilateral links with these countries difficult. Thus, Polish policy’s biggest dilemma in the Polish debate over subregional cooperation in East and Central Europe is the country’s Ostpolitik.
CHAPTER SIX

POLISH PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY THREATS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses contemporary Polish notions of threats to national security. States' foreign policy choices clearly reflect their perceptions of the threats to their security. Thus, questions about the need for subregional security cooperation between Poland and its neighbours cannot be discussed outside of the context of Polish perceptions of threats to security in the post-Cold War era.

As Chapter Two suggests, one of the factors which determine whether or not countries choose to align with other countries is the perception of an external or an internal threat. Chapter Five, which discusses Poland's relations with its immediate neighbours after the end of the Cold War, presents many of the external geopolitical security problems with which face Polish leaders. Polish perceptions of security issues arising from its being sandwiched between Germany and the former Soviet Union will not be granted much attention in this chapter, since they have been exhaustively considered in Chapter Five.

The first section of the chapter argues that in the post-Cold War era the notion of security threats in Poland is based on both traditional and so-called 'comprehensive' definitions of security. The second part considers Polish policy-makers' perceptions of

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1 See also Curt Gasteyger, 'The remaking of Eastern Europe's security'. Survival Vol. 33, No. 2 (March/April 1991), p. 117.
external geopolitical security threats and concentrates on considerations of military potential and the role of arms control agreements. External threats of a non-geopolitical nature are the subject of the third section. This discussion concentrates on threats emanating from wars in the former Yugoslavia, local conflicts, and potential mass migration. In addition, the chapter addresses 'home-made' threats and military and non-military risks (economic, and ecological/environmental). Military risks are seen as reflecting the challenges of the reform of the defence system (financial constraints, the renationalization of defence, civilian control of the military, doctrinal matters, and the reform of the armed forces). In conclusion, the chapter attempts to assess the intensity of Polish perceptions of threats and risks to the country’s security, and discusses them as an important but not an exclusive explanation of foreign, security and defence policy choices.

2. Notions of security threats

As Chapter One indicates, many if not most Central Europeans, considered the region as having entered a 'grey zone of security' or a 'security vacuum' after the collapse of the WTO\(^2\), marked mainly by an absence of security guarantees. Yet Central Europeans’ present perceptions of security threats are occasionally difficult to describe as they tend to be steeped in ambiguity\(^3\), as they tend to be divided between two conflicting claims. Following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, all of the former NSWTOs stated that they did not expect military aggression from any direction.\(^4\) Simultaneously, they emphasized that their countries required firm security guarantees. Thus, they refrained from presenting specific threat scenarios, and yet continued to emphasize the importance of NATO and its vital role in Eastern and Central Europe.

Poles, and Central Europeans more generally, fail to provide clear definitions of the potential threats to their security for three reasons. First, the process of defining potential security threats in a fluid environment is a complicated one. After all, most of


\(^4\) See for example Eliza Olczyk and Jerzy Pilczynski, 'Rząd nie widzi zagrożeń dla Polski' [The government does not see threats to Poland], *Rzeczpospolita* (22-23 January 1994).
the former NSWTO countries have a number of new states as their neighbours. Second, naming threats is seen as a potential obstacle to Central Europeans’ attempts - which have not always been successful - to create friendly bilateral relations within Central Europe. Indeed, they try to avoid possible self-fulfilling prophecies, that is naming security threats that then create tensions, and thus security threats. The final point is that the region’s policy-makers are aware that in all likelihood no immediate aggression will take place, but that one should not infer too much from the present situation, since not all the post-Cold War changes are necessarily irreversible. In addition, as Chapter One argues, security has been interpreted in more general terms since the end of the Cold War, making Poles feel insecure. Increasingly, Polish security fears are shifting away from traditional, external geopolitical worries. The Polish debate of security matters is ‘plugged in’ to the Western debate, and of course also the Russian debate. Polish scholarship contains references to Western and Russian events, speeches, and literature. It is thus not surprising that the Polish debate is shaped by many of the trends visible among the international security community abroad.

3. External threats

*External geopolitical threats*

Germany is no longer seen as a potential aggressor, particularly as a result of its membership in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Polish officials admit that a reconstruction of the German military potential is possible, but not probable. Still, a disintegration of NATO and/or the EU would place Poland in a dangerous position between ‘two giants’. Yet, for the time being, Polish policy-makers see this scenario as a highly hypothetical one.

The threats emerging from the former Soviet Union are the most serious traditional security problem Polish policy-makers find themselves confronting. But even

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here, there is little fear of a direct attack. However, the military capabilities and potentials of neighbouring countries are considered a source of insecurity. Polish policy-makers and military planners are concerned about the possibilities of 'blackmail' and of conflicts involving armed forces that could spill over into Poland.

Polish policy-makers and military planners are particularly concerned about the military potential to the East. While the Tashkent agreement of CIS countries, which decided the division of CFE treaty-limited equipment, complied with 'aggregate equipment ceilings on the Soviet Union and the Eastern group of states, but also with the regional sub-ceilings', it also, according to Poles, gave disproportionately high limits to the republics along its Eastern borders (although the three Russia, Ukraine and Belorus also had the largest reduction liabilities, which means the largest amount of equipment to be stored or destroyed, in the former Soviet Union). The non-Russian republics bordering on Poland (including Kaliningrad) have close to 1 million armed forces, a quarter of whom are based along Polish borders because of the heritage of the WTO and provisions of the CFE Treaty. The Polish armed forces are dwarfed by this military presence.

Poland is also faced with Russia’s estimated 1.7 million strong armed forces (expected to be reduced to 1.5 million in the future) and Ukraine’s more than half a million (to be reduced under the CFE agreement to some 400,000). Belorussian armed

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7 'Boimy sie bardziej Rosji niz Niemiec’ [We are more afraid of Russian than Germany], Rzeczpospolita (2 December 1993); 'Rosja i Niemcy - sasiad nie sojusznik' [Russia and Germany - neighbour, not ally], Rzeczpospolita (1 August 1994).

8 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy and Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland. (Warsaw: Polish National Security Office, November 1992); Ernest Skalski, 'Bac sie czy nie bac' [To be or not to be afraid], Gazeta Wyborcza (9 November 1994).

9 See for example Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 6.


11 See ibid., p. 286.


13 Ibid., p. 104.
forces, although smaller (currently some 92,500 strong), have not only a larger amount of equipment than the Polish army but also arms that are more advanced.14

Confronted with such military potential, Poland could be expected to have benefited greatly from arms control measures. Indeed, Poland does carry out all arms control obligations, and sees the process of arms control as a pillar of security and stability in Europe.15 According to the Polish defence doctrine, Poland 'favours strict adherence to the principle of nuclear arms non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear arsenals'.16 Poland endorsed the denuclearization of Ukraine and Belorus. Poles welcomed the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the two countries to Russia in 1992 and the declarations on the future of the Ukraine as a neutral and non-nuclear state.17 Polish politicians were also involved in attempts to convince Ukrainian policymakers that relinquishing nuclear status was 'the best passport into Europe'.18

Poland supports the process of nuclear disarmament to the East. Here it is, however, worth mentioning that the 1995 Russian debate on 'conditional' membership of Central European countries in NATO, which would among others be characterized by NATO's commitment not to deploy its nuclear weapons in this region, has not been welcomed or accepted by the Polish policy-makers. They argue that although this is a highly hypothetical scenario, Poland, as a sovereign country should be permitted sovereign decision-making in its foreign and security policy.19

For Poland, the most important arms control agreement regulates the conventional

14 Zygmunt Czarnota, 'Armia z poteznym arsenalem' [Army with huge arsenal], Polska Zbrojna (23 March 1995).

15 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 10.

16 Ibid., p. 12.


19 'Jerzy Milewski w Bruselsku: Do NATO bezwarunkowo' [Jerzy Milewski in Brussels: Unconditionally into NATO], Rzeczpospolita (9 March 1995); 'Bez broni nuklearnej i obcych wojsk w Europie Środkowej' [Without nuclear weapons and foreign armies in Central Europe], Rzeczpospolita (7 March 1995).
military balance with respect to land forces in Europe.\textsuperscript{20} The CFE-1 (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) and CFE-1 A establish ceilings on certain categories of equipment and ground and air force personnel.\textsuperscript{21} The 1991 CFE agreement was aimed at ending the conventional disparity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was based on establishing fixed ceilings for the various Warsaw Pact countries, rather than on constructing an adequate security concept in the individual countries of the collapsing military bloc. The geopolitical changes in Europe, however, have brought with them new imbalances of power.\textsuperscript{22} Addressing this problem, the Polish Deputy Defence Minister Przemyslaw Grudzinski stated in 1991 that 'talks on disarmament must ... continue and thought should be given to a new mandate to them, their former mandate being based on the division of Europe and the existence of blocs. More countries should be brought into the talks.'\textsuperscript{23}

While the limits on conventional forces are applauded, Polish policy-makers and analysts often point out that the treaty allows its eastern neighbours disproportionately high limits.\textsuperscript{24} The CFE suffers from a number of other problems, which Poland considers significant. Some countries (post-Yugoslav republics, Baltic republics) are left out of the agreement altogether, which is potentially threatening to the sensitive balance.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, the treaty does not limit ballistic missiles, and none of the Central European countries are capable of defending themselves against these missiles.\textsuperscript{26}

While the Polish government is officially committed to the implementation of the

\textsuperscript{20} See Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 93-94.

\textsuperscript{26} van den Doel, Central Europe: The New Allies?, p. 51.
CFE Treaty, some Western observers have pointed out that the process is not without its problems. Van den Doel reports that the unclear security/political future makes some Polish officials feel that the country should construct a credible defence organization, if not in terms of quality then at least in quantity.\(^{27}\) President Walesa expressed this sentiment when he said: 'we need military organization today as we need air'.\(^{28}\) Many Central European officials see the CFE treaty as a memento of the Cold War’s bloc-based approach to arms control. For some, the specifics of the CFE treaty mean the continued subjugation of Central Europe to Moscow.\(^{29}\) For example, Poles rejected the intra-bloc verification procedures, which would have forced Poland to cooperate with Russia.\(^{30}\)

Yet, Russian and Ukrainian demands for a revision of certain articles of the Treaty are not welcomed in Poland. Jerzy Nowak, the chief Polish negotiator of the Treaty claimed that the proposed changes 'do not directly concern Poland although it would be advantageous if Russian and Ukrainian equipment could be moved away from the Polish border. Nevertheless, it is also in Poland’s interest to defend the integrity of the Treaty and block the attempts to tamper with it.'\(^{31}\)

The CFE treaty, then, offers a minimum of strategic predictability.\(^{32}\) However, Poles today are more concerned about the possibility of local conflicts spilling over the country’s borders than about the prospect of full military aggression. In this respect, too, the CFE does not provide much reassurance. Thus, the suggestion that existing arms control agreements in themselves have little impact on the militaries or the security of most former non-Soviet WTO states\(^{33}\) appears largely correct in the case of Poland.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 69.

\(^{28}\) 'President stresses importance of army at time of "great danger"', BBC SWB EE (25 November 1992).


\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 84.

\(^{31}\) Nowak, 'CFE Treaty', p. 100.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 105.

External non-geopolitical threats

The former Yugoslavia: The Yugoslav crisis is for Poland a test case of Western resolve and ability to deal with actual or potential problems in Central Europe. Consequently, the Yugoslav crisis must have implications for Polish perceptions of national security. It has been suggested that the experience of Western involvement in the Balkans has taught Central Europeans that 'there is no NATO, no Europe, and no reliance on American help.' And indeed, it is undeniable that the Balkan crisis has been a sobering experience for Poles.

Due to the nature of the conflict and the physical distance between the former Yugoslavia and Poland, no direct threats to the country's security emerge from the Balkans. Polish feelings of insecurity created by the events in former Yugoslavia are indirect: dismay about the West's lack of unity on basic principles and its failure to give firm backing to agreed courses of action. Poland cannot feel secure in the aftermath of Sarajevo, one Polish commentator argues, because it will be hard to convince the West that the Visegrad countries are not comparable to the Balkans. Hence, for Polish policy-makers, the situation in Yugoslavia demonstrates the West's confusion about its interests in Eastern and Central Europe.

Polish leaders have assessed the Western European involvement in the former Yugoslavia so far as both delayed and largely inadequate. They attribute this to the inability of Western organizations to cope with the crisis, stemming from disagreements among Western powers, a lack of proven mechanisms of coordination between European and Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as the West's lack of commitment to the region. The governments of Hungary and Slovakia for example began, in response, to emphasize domestic interests and even to strengthen their own defences. Such developments have the potential to endanger the stability of the region because countries faced with increasingly armed and uncooperative neighbours are likely to respond in kind. Local

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34 'Gorazdes Fall bedrohte alle postkommunistischen Staaten', Die Welt (19 April 1994).

35 Dawid Warszawski, 'Zmeczenie i lek' [Fatigue and fear], Gazeta Wyborcza (24-26 December 1994).

36 See for example 'Address by Hanna Suchocka to the Council of Europe, 13 May 1993', (1993).

37 As a result of perceived threats to its security stemming from the Yugoslav conflict combined with a lack of Western security guarantees, Hungary recently sought to modernize its air force and air defense systems. In 1993, Hungary accepted 28 MiG fighters from Russia in partial repayment of trade debts. Shortly after, Slovakia accepted a similar settlement. 'Eastern Europe caught up in new arms race', Financial Times (12 January 1994).
arms races in south-eastern Europe thus appear possible. The continuing lack of arms control measures in the Balkans may in the future make this problem a significant one. Such a development could actually threaten Poland's security directly.

**Potential local conflicts:** The reappearance of historical disputes and tensions among Central European countries constitutes another source of threats to Polish security. Poland sees itself as an island of stability in the region. It has formally regulated its relations with all neighbouring countries by the means of bilateral treaties. And although negotiations for the good-neighbourliness treaty with Lithuania were difficult, (see Chapter Five), neither this situation nor any lesser problems with other neighbouring countries are considered acute.

However, there are concerns about the potential spill-over effects of ethnic, territorial, religious, and nationalistic tensions among other countries of the region. Examples of such tensions range from the dangerous strain between Ukraine and Russia over eastern Ukraine and Crimea, to disputes between Slovakia and Hungary regarding the construction of a joint project on the river Danube (the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage), and unresolved minority matters between Romania and Hungary. There is a sense, for example, that social and environmental problems could spark nationalist responses which would further exacerbate existing ethnic conflicts.

The inadequate Western attempts to stop the killing in the former Yugoslavia has implications for the ways that Poles view the sources of tension in the region. The public in Central European countries is aware that 'if the West and the world cannot stop this war, perhaps they could not stop other wars that may break out in the Balkans or in east central Europe generally.' Polish leaders reason that the best assurance would come with membership in Western organizations which could contribute substantially to improving cooperation and calming tensions in the region. Polish policy-makers believe that 'controlling mechanisms' to resolve existing conflicts and prevent emerging conflicts

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38 Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk, 'Poland', *Military Technology* (6 June 1992); Tadeusz Mitek, 'Nowe myślenie o obronności państwa' [New thinking about national defense], *Polska Zbrojna* (23 May 1994).

39 Skalski, 'Bac sie czy nie bac?'.


in the region are necessary. Such mechanisms, they postulate, could only be provided by existing Western European organizations. The only alternative would be the unchecked build-up of military capabilities.

**Migration:** Polish government officials have often argued that another external non-military risk is potential mass migration, particularly from the former Soviet Union and later from post-Soviet republics, but also from South Eastern Europe (Balkans), and to some degree the Third World. Polish authorities cite two reasons for treating migration as a source of security problems. First, officials argue that mass migration would result in the economic destabilization of the country. Second, they link the threat of mass migration to a potential rise in organized crime. Although only approximately 1 percent of criminal acts in Poland are committed by foreigners, Polish officials point out that these also tend to involve more serious crimes such as robbery, murder and blackmail, committed by organized groups.

An exodus from the former Soviet Union is considered the most realistic mass migration scenario. While Poland in the past protected its Western border, the Eastern border was hardly manned. Accordingly, Poland is only now constructing adequate border protection, capable of dealing with the rapidly increasing numbers of legal and illegal border crossings.

So far, the expected tidal wave of migration has not materialized, despite the fact that Russia has opened its Western borders. A Polish analyst, following Russian sources, argued in 1993 that about 10 million former Soviet citizens could migrate to Central Europe within the span of 10 years. The number of border crossings from the former

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44 'Nie otworzyłem puszki Pandory. Rozmowa z Jerzym Zimowskim, wiceministrem spraw wewnętrznych, negocjatorem porozumienia azylowego' [I did not open Pandora's box. Conversation with Jerzy Zimowski, deputy minister of home affairs, negotiator of the asylum agreement], *Rzeczpospolita* (1 July 1993).

45 Robert Kowal, 'Granica (nie)bezpieczeństwa' [Border of (in)security], *Polska Zbrojna* (7 June 1994).

46 Aleksander Korybut-Woroniecki, 'Migracyjne Problemy' [Migratory Problems], *Polska w Europie* No. 10 (January 1993), p. 86.
Soviet Union has in fact increased dramatically, yet most of the individuals actually leave the country again. Generally speaking, the black market work, trade and tourism have been the most important motivations for visits from the East. As a result, the number of refugees from this direction are so far manageable, but officials warn that arrivals from the former Soviet Union are on a slow but steady increase.

In addition, some Poles expect that Western European, particularly German, restrictions on migration will further exacerbate the Polish immigration problem. Consequently, in this context, the EU’s efforts to tighten controls along its borders, and to send refugees back to countries (such as Poland) from which they have attempted to enter the EU heighten the feeling of exposure to waves of migration. In May 1993, Poland concluded an agreement with Germany which obliged Poland to take back expelled asylum-seekers who had arrived in Germany from Poland. In return Germany agreed to support Poland financially in its efforts to enforce stricter border controls.

Yet in May of the same year at a meeting of the Council of Europe Hanna Suchocka, Polish Prime Minister, stated:

As far as migration problems are concerned, we are explicitly against attempts made by individual states to pass the responsibility for creating conditions of their own security onto other countries. The only possible result of such an approach is an export to weaker countries of one’s own social and political tensions which partially derive from illegal immigration; the weaker countries are thus being transformed into some kind of refugee camps. In order to avoid this situation, bilateral agreements must be concluded between the countries involved and, first

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47 Ibid., p. 88.

48 'Czy wiosna ruszy Wschod' [Will the East move by spring], Rzeczpospolita (4 January 1994).


50 See 'Porozumienie miedzy Rzadem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rzadem Republiki Federalnej Niemiec o współpracy w zakresie skutków wynikających z ruchu migracyjnych - Bonn, 7 maja 1993 r.' [Agreement between the government of the Polish Republic and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on cooperation in the realm of effects caused by migratory movements - Bonn, 7 May 1993], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1993). About 100,000 of the 500,000 refugees who have not received asylum in Germany have arrived in this country from Poland. Zimowski, 'Nic otworzyłem puszki Pandory'.
of all, a purposeful action should be taken on a European scale.\(^51\)

In fact, the agreement has not so far resulted in a wave of deportations, but it continues to be subject to criticism by parts of the Polish political spectrum that see it as a 'Pandora's box'. According to Polish officials, only about 70 percent of non-Polish deportees from the EU to Poland leave Poland as obliged. Of the remaining, few stay in Poland and some attempt to cross the Western border again.\(^52\)

In addition, Polish policy-makers fear that Polish minorities in the former Soviet Union, driven by economic problems and rising tensions, will want to return to their country of origin. It is not clear how many Polish nationals actually live on the territory of the former Soviet Republic. A Western expert calculates that there are approximately a million. According to him, the most sizable group lives in Belorus (600,000). There are also Poles in Lithuania (250,000), Ukraine (300,000) and Russia (95,000).\(^53\) Polish sources, following information from the Polish Main Statistical Office, speak of some 2.5 million, with the largest concentration in Ukraine, Lithuania, Belorus and Kazakhstan.\(^54\) But according to local members of the Polish minority in Kazakhstan, some 65,000 in this community are interested in emigrating to Poland.\(^55\)

The repatriation of Polish minorities (cross-border Poles) from countries to the East is increasingly a focus of Polish political debate.\(^56\) The numbers of returning ethnic Poles are still low but 'the higher the degree of nationalist tendencies and religious fundamentalism in the former Soviet republics, the greater the number of Poles eager to

\(^{51}\) 'Address by Hanna Suchocka, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland on the occasion of the 44th Session of the Parliamentary Assembly (5th part) of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 13 May 1993.', Council of Europe Press Release D14(93) (13 May 1993).

\(^{52}\) Korybut-Woroniecki, 'Migracyjne Problemy', p. 86; Zimowski, 'Nie otworzylem puszki Pandory'; Zhigniew Lentowicz, 'Najczesciej deportuja naszych' [Most often they deport our own people], Rzeczpospolitia (8 July 1993).

\(^{53}\) van den Doel, Central Europe: The New Allies?, p. 43.


\(^{55}\) 'Czy nasi powroca z Kazachstanu' [Will our people return from Kazakhstan], Rzeczpospolit (20 April 1994).

\(^{56}\) See analysis published by the Polish parliament: Ewa Toczek, 'Warunki ewentualnej repatriacji Polakow z bytych republik radzieckich' [Conditions of repatriation of Poles from former Soviet republics], BSE Informacja 120 (March 1993). See also Piotr Kosinski, 'Masowa emigracja czy "Kartka Polaka"' [Mass emigration or the "Polish card"], Rzeczpospolit (20 August 1994); Helena Fiedorcowa, 'Polacy za granicami kraju' [Poles beyond the country's borders], Polska Zbrojna (22 June 1994); 'Czy nasi powroca'.
return to Poland', one Polish commentator warns.\textsuperscript{57} Polish government officials have declared that the country does not have the resources to accommodate even a limited wave of repatriates.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, the general attitude is that members of Polish minorities in the East, some of whom have found themselves 'in exile' as a result of border changes and some as a result of Stalin's policies, should be permitted to move to Poland.\textsuperscript{59}

Unlike other Western or Central European countries, Poland has not experienced a massive surge of refugees from the Balkans.\textsuperscript{60} In 1992 it was reported that Poland accommodated about 1200 refugees from the former Yugoslavia and was prepared to take in a larger number, if necessary.\textsuperscript{61} It is significant however, that these additional refugees were not supported by the state, and that they had to depend on Polish families to provide accommodation.

Poland has not yet consolidated its immigration laws\textsuperscript{62} and the country is increasingly seen not only as a transitory state but also as a final destination for citizens from impoverished countries in the region (Romania for example), and the Third World. So far, the situation has been manageable, with only 2-3 percent of the 'migratory mass' that moves through the country asking for asylum in Poland. Mass migration remains a hypothetical scenario. The reasons for this phenomenon are numerous. First, the Polish government is adopting practical measures aimed at countering this threat.\textsuperscript{63} Second, most areas of the former Soviet Union have no tradition of migration, and the Balkans are distant enough that only a small percentage of Balkan refugees actually make their

\textsuperscript{57} 'Repatriation of Poles', p. 18. See also Piotr Koscinski, 'Masowa emigracja czy "Kartka Polaka"', [Mass emigration or the 'Polish card'], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (20 August 1994).

\textsuperscript{58} See 'Czy nasi powroca'.


\textsuperscript{60} In 1992, Hungary had 50,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia. See Nico Colchester, 'Survey of the European Community (8): United in Rivalry - One of history's flabbier alliances is on the drawing board', \textit{Economist} (11 July 1992). Refugees from former Yugoslavia accounted in 1993 for 20 percent of those applying for asylum in Western Europe. 'Circling the wagons. Immigration controls in Europe', \textit{Economist} (5 June 1993).

\textsuperscript{61} 'Government Willing to Aid Balkan Refugees', \textit{FBIS-EEU-92-231} (1 December 1992).

\textsuperscript{62} Bernatowicz, 'Biuro Pelnomocnica', pp. 324-325.

\textsuperscript{63} Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 30.
way to Poland. There are also other, more theoretical, explanations, including the small current differentials in purchasing power between Poles and their eastern neighbours, and the fact that where basic human rights are generally observed, people tend not to move on a massive scale. Conversely, the latter two factors also explain why the current lack of mass population movements should not be taken for granted. Poles have begun to see Poland as a 'frontier' state or 'vestibule' on the migration front. The country failed to achieve cooperation or coordination of efforts with other states in similar position (such as Austria and the Czech Republic), and efforts to discuss issues of migration within existing subregional frameworks, although useful as fora for the exchange of information and experience, have not resulted in concrete agreements.64

4. 'Home-made' threats

Despite the seriousness of external problems, Central European policy-makers now find that some of the most significant security threats have emerged from internal developments. The transition to democracy and market economies creates a number of 'home-made' problems. It is understood that social strain can give rise to anxiety, disappointment, and ultimately to general instability.65 In addition, there are 'home-made' risks of military nature, related to the process of military restructuring.

Domestic non-military risks

Economic: Internal instabilities, created by the transition to the market economy are seen as the greatest domestic source of insecurity by many Eastern and Central European politicians, but also by the publics.66 In January 1990, the Polish government imposed economic 'shock therapy', unmatched so far by any other former communist countries. The Balcerowicz plan (named after the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, who crafted it) freed prices, set out to sell state-owned

64 Bernatowicz, 'Biuro Pelnomocnika', p. 324.
property and made the Polish currency convertible. This programme saved the country from hyperinflation and resulted in agreements reducing Poland’s foreign debt. Simultaneously, however, the resulting phenomena of recession, a slump of production by close to 50 percent, unemployment of nearly 16 percent, and social disorder are seen by Polish policy-makers as a cause of a temporary rise in internal security threats of a political and socio-economic nature. Such threats weaken the state structure and make it more susceptible to external pressures, as the Polish post-Cold War defence doctrine argues.

This thesis does not aim to describe or explain the economic processes of transition. Suffice it to say that Poland’s economy has been showing the first signs of recovery. There are however no quick fixes and the situation is difficult due to foreign debt, problems with the process of privatization, threats of inflation, the collapse of CMEA markets, and the failure to find alternative markets.

The rapid dismantling of the CMEA in mid-1991 and the Soviet-initiated ‘dollarization’ of trade among its former members beginning in January 1991 were factors which bore a significant responsibility for the extent of the subsequent recession in Central Europe. The Soviet Union embodied for Central Europe what has been described as ‘a large captive market for poorly made but expensive manufactured goods’ manufactured by NSWTO countries. In addition, the Soviet Union once supplied the region with cheap energy. The loss of the Soviet market has had a tremendous impact on

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68 On Poland’s debt deals see for example 'Eastern Europe comes in from the cold: Poland’s debt deal will spur an investment boom in Eastern Europe that is already in the making', Economist (19 March 1994).


70 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 7.

71 The Polish economy grew by a strong 4 percent in 1993. See 'Eastern Europe comes in from the Cold: Poland’s debt deal will spur an investment boom in Eastern Europe that is already in the making', Economist (19 March 1994). The Polish government has recently presented a draft economic strategy, in which it forecasts an economic growth rate of 5 percent per annum. See Strategy for Poland.
the economies of Central European countries. In 1991, the Polish Finance Minister at the time, Leszek Balcerowicz, blamed two thirds of the drop in Polish production on the breakdown of the country’s trade with the Soviet Union.

In addition, intra-regional trade too collapsed dramatically with the dissolution of the CMEA. Simultaneously, despite the conclusion of Europe Agreements with what was then the EC, economic links with the West were still insubstantial and poorly established. Even now, the European Union continues to deny access to its markets to Central Europe’s most competitive products. Central European steel, textiles and farm produce are subject to EU quotas and tariffs. Central European officials fear that economic distress caused by these factors could easily lead to disappointment and long periods of destabilization.

A special place in any consideration of Polish perceptions of economic security risks must be reserved for German investment and economic initiatives in Poland. While the majority of policy-makers maintain that Poland benefits immensely from close economic ties with Germany, sections of the Polish public and some politicians seem to disagree with this judgement. Many Poles suspect that Germany is mainly interested in exploiting its position of economic superiority over the states of Central Europe. Occasionally, even Polish officials seem to fear that their country’s economy could be moulded to fit the needs of German industry, and that their country’s political and


73 Patrice Dabrowski, ‘East European Trade (Part I): The Loss of the Soviet Market’, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 40 (4 October 1991), p. 34. On developments in Poland’s trade with the former Soviet Union, see for example ‘Wymiana handlowa Polski z krajami b. ZSSR’ [Poland’s trade exchange with the former Soviet Union], Rynki Zagraniczne Nr. 35 (23 March 1993); Malgorzata Pokojska, ‘Na Wschod!’ [To the East!], Gazeta Bankowa Nr. 26 (25 June 1993); ‘Szanse i zasadzki rynkow wschodnich’ [Chances and traps of eastern markets], Zycie Gospodarcze Nr. 42 (17 October 1993).


cultural identity would be then compromised.

While there has been grave economic deterioration in Poland, no mass social strife has so far broken out. Although this is an encouraging sign, Polish policy-makers warn that time is working against them, and continuously request Western assistance and, most importantly, access to Western markets. There is, therefore, the potential for a radicalization of Polish domestic politics, as elsewhere in East Central Europe, if the ideology of free market and Western-style democracy is not seen to bring hoped for advantages.

Ecological/Environmental: Poles today also perceive ecological risks, particularly, but not exclusively, related to possible nuclear contamination by Central and Eastern European nuclear reactors which are in a state of disrepair.\(^78\) Moreover, some of these reactors are placed in potential or actual conflict zones, making them vulnerable to terrorist action, and to problems with supplies and energy sources. As both Western and Central European specialists and observers suggest, technical and financial support to end this problem can only come from the West.\(^79\)

Other environmental problems (domestic and global) which are seen as potential security threats are contamination by heavy metals, acid rain, and limited water reserves, among others.\(^80\) It should be mentioned here, too, that Poland is coping with substantial environmental problems, which are a result of 45 years of industrialization without appropriate environmental protection.\(^81\) In the opinion of the Polish policy-makers, the scale of problems is of such magnitude that massive Western involvement would be necessary to tackle them. Environmental degradation and its effects on human health are considered to be a significant security issue.\(^82\)

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\(^78\) See for example Skubiszewski, 'Problems of Security in Central Europe', p. 2; Pastusiak, 'Threats to security', p. 4.

\(^79\) Krystyna Forowicz, 'Rodos - zdzyc przed katastrofa' [Rodos - to make it before a catastrophe], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (16 January 1995); van den Doel, \textit{Central Europe: The New Allies?}, p. 42.


\(^81\) See for example Krystyna Forowicz, 'Homo jeszcze sapie' [Homo still breathing], \textit{Rzeczpospolita Magazyn} 2/29 (February 1995); Andrzej Kepinski, 'Piata kolumna czy fundament' [Fifth column or foundation], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (14 December 1994); 'Chance fur einheitliche Entwicklung', \textit{Das Parlament} 10 (5 March 1993).

Military risks of domestic kind

Poland is also coping with domestic military security challenges which centre on the reform of the armed forces. In Central Europe (unlike the former Soviet Union) military transition cannot be seen as a direct threat to the existence of the democratic order. Rather, the region’s armed forces, undergoing difficult restructuring processes under tight fiscal requirements, are often perceived as not being capable of dealing adequately with the various potential threats to the countries’ security. 83

Financial Constraints: Both in relative and in absolute terms Poland’s defence budgets are among the lowest in Europe. 84 To give one example, Poland’s military budget for 1992 was just $1700 million, which is approximately 3% of the military budget of the United Kingdom. 85 Only 4% of Polish defence spending in the same year was allocated for the purchase of arms and equipment. 86 By 1992 the Defence Ministry’s budget was 56% lower than the 1988 figure.

In 1994, when only 2.4 percent of the Polish GNP was earmarked for defence spending, high-ranking military officials warned that if spending was not increased to 3 percent, the Polish armed forces would have to be cut by about a third. 87 The budget for 1995 was not higher. 88 In 1995, Polish Prime Minister Pawlak and President Walesa spoke of the process of a ‘technical degradation of the armed forces’ caused by budgetary


86 As has been noted, this would pay for six military aircraft or half a warship. ‘Budget Cuts Hit Military’, RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 4 (24 January 1992), p. 64.


Like the military itself, the national defence industry suffers as a result of constraints imposed on defence spending. The Polish arms industry is experiencing a crisis because of cancellations of orders both from abroad and from domestic sources, as well as related problems, such as unpaid debts from the former Soviet Union and the effects of embargoes which closed such traditional export destinations as for example Iraq to Polish exports. While most of the defence industry remains in public hands, it is still expected to conform to market principles. This expectation is somewhat at odds with the government’s impulse to maintain levels of employment. Thus, the country’s vocal industrial lobbies and trade unions accuse the Polish government of destroying the Polish arms industry because they are not resisting pressures from foreign capitals. Backers of a strong domestic arms industry, who usually support their statements by drawing historical parallels, as, for example, the situation of Poland in 1939, argue that domestic production could satisfy 60 percent of domestic needs.

Expansion of foreign arms sales has also been examined as a partial solution to the problems facing the defence industries in Poland. Yet, after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the West was interested in curtailing arms production and trade in the former members countries. In response, Poland signed a number of agreements limiting both the kinds of arms it can sell and the destinations of its arms trade. This situation

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89 Pawlak, ‘Obronnosc we wspolnociє’; ‘W interesie Polski jest, aby sily zbrojne byly odizolowane od partyjnych rozgrywek. Przemowienie prezydenta RP Lecha Walesy’ [It is in the interest of Poland, that its armed forces be isolated from parties’ contests. Address by President of the Polish Republic Lech Walesa], Polska Zbrojna (22-22 January 1995).

90 In 1994, domestic orders amounted to a quarter of orders from 1990. See Jan Forowicz, ‘Rezolucja w sprawie ograniczen w eksportie broni: Inicjatywa nieco spozniona’ [Resolution on the issue of restrictions in arms exports: A somewhat belated initiative], Polska Zbrojna (30 May 1994); Mika, ‘Los zbrojeniowki’.

91 Wieslaw Mazur, ‘Zbrojeniowka zawiesza akcje protestacyjne’ [The arms industry suspends protest actions], Rzeczpospolita (27 July 1993).


93 Szeremetiew, ‘W boj bez broni?’.


95 ‘COCOM na emeryturze: Zniesienie instytucji i zakazow’ [COCOM retires: Cancellation of institution and bans], Polska Zbrojna (29 March 1994).
is occasionally interpreted by Polish observers as a successful Western attempt to wrestle arms markets from former enemies. In 1994, the Polish parliament discussed the possibility of limiting arms trade restrictions to UN lists, and thereby widening the range of countries to which Polish companies could export armaments. Such a shift would imply dropping self-imposed restrictions which are part of list compiled in 1990. Polish analysts describe this list, which has not been made public, as 'the longest in the world'. No decision on this issue has yet been made.

Western experts argue that a strategy of maintaining the arms industry based on foreign sales is not likely to be successful. Ian Anthony states that foreign markets likewise have been transformed by political and economic barriers to sales. Additionally, there has been a change in the rationale for arms sales, which have made its appeal to Central Europeans less political and more commercial. In this context, many of the former recipients of arms are not capable of paying for their orders.

Another way to support domestic arms industries which the Polish government considered was to expand the share of domestic arms consumption. In 1992, the Polish defence ministry decided against ordering large amounts of Western-made equipment in spite of their policy of reaching technological compatibility with Western armies. In 1994, 90 percent of the budgetary expenditure earmarked for funding new military equipment and repairs was spent within the country. However, this meant that the domestic arms industry's capability was exploited to only 15 percent. Enterprises with strategic significance (which number about 30) will continue to be

96 Ryszard Rogon, 'Rosjanie tez dali sie nabrac' [Russians have been had too], Polska Zbrojna (22-24 July 1994).
97 Forowicz, 'Rezolucja w sprawie ograniczen'.
98 Mika, 'Los zbrojeniowki'.
99 Anthony, 'Conclusion', p. 131.
100 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 15.
102 Ibid.
103 Forowicz, 'Rezolucja w sprawie ograniczen'.
supported by the state and undergo debt rescheduling.\textsuperscript{104} Poland has also become interested in licensing agreements, which would allow foreign technology to be brought into the country, and would permit the export of parts of production.\textsuperscript{105} Poland is prepared to purchase foreign weapon systems, but in return for the chance to pay with licensed equipment produced in Poland.

The country is thus currently experiencing a growing gap between the scale of perceived security threats and the means available to counter such threats. This is not only a result of the changing international environment, but also of the condition of the Polish military which reflects the more general problems of the society, economy and political system.\textsuperscript{106} Polish leaders acknowledge that in terms of defence, the country 'cannot go it alone', as in fact very few powers are capable of doing so. It is for this reason that the Polish post-Cold War defence doctrine specifies that Poland will attempt to deal with local and regional problems on its own, but that when faced with other threats, it will require Western assistance.\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{Renationalization of defence}: Two of the processes that uniformly characterize the post-1989 Central European political landscape are the de-Sovietization and renationalization of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{108} The means of lustration has been employed in a number of Central European countries in order to depoliticize the armed forces, which under the WTO functioned as tools of the communist regimes. Some countries, like Czechoslovakia, for example, have adopted a severe approach by screening all

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{104} Apolinary Wojtys, 'Nadzieje zbrojeniowki' [Hopes of the arms industry], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (21 March 1995). The Polish defense doctrine announces that 'the functioning of selected defense industry enterprises will be protected by states guarantees'. \textit{Tenets of the Polish Security Policy}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{105} Pawel Nowak, 'Pieniadze dla wojska' [Money for the army], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (22 March 1995); Pawel Wieczorek, 'Czy bedziemy kooperowac z krajami NATO w przemysle obronnym?' [Will we cooperate with NATO countries in defense industry?], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (3 March 1994).

\textsuperscript{106} In a recent poll, for example, 64 percent of Polish respondents felt that the country's army could not assure the country's security because of financial constraints. Reported by Tadeusz Mitek, 'Szacunek bez zludzen' [Appraisal without delusions], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (8 December 1994). See also Ryszard Choroszy, 'Siodmy chudy rok' [Seventh thin year], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (17 August 1994).

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Tenets of the Polish Security Policy}, p. 7.

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professional soldiers. Countries which pursued a more gradual political transition, and in which the 'post-communist' forces did not discredit themselves entirely, such as Hungary and Poland, have so far avoided purges and conducted a de-Sovietization of the officer corps within the framework of reforming the defence sector. The priority of Polish policy-makers in the complicated international environment was to ensure that military preparedness was not affected by purges of former communist activists. Nevertheless, as Zielonka reports, in Poland about 75% of high-ranking posts have undergone personnel changes. In many cases, ordinary retirements take care of this problem. In addition, in Poland, professional soldiers are now required to remain apolitical.

In Poland, the debate surrounding the issue of lustration has calmed down but is far from over. However, it appears, not only among high-ranking military officials, that the prevailing opinion is that dogmatic attempts at lustration could destabilize the Polish armed forces. Indicative of the general mood is the statement of a Polish military official, who, from the perspective of the country's security, defined lustration as 'a tragedy for the entire country'.

Civilian control of the military: A vital process in Central Europe has involved educating civilian experts and establishing civilian control of the military. The collapse

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109 In Czechoslovakia about 5,000 high ranking officers, including all generals, deputy ministers of defense, heads of military colleges, district commanders and political officers have been released in the process. Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 47.

110 See Tadeusz Mitek, 'Restrukturyzacja oznacza masowa redukcje' [Restructurization means mass reduction], Polska Zbrojna (22 March 1995).

111 Bronislaw Komorowski (Deputy Defense Minister), 'Ostoja demokratycznego państwa i suwerennego narodu może być tylko demokratyczna armia' [Mainstay of a democratic state and sovereign nation can only be a democratic army], Polska Zbrojna (27 October 1993).

112 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 47.


114 Eliza Olczak and Jerzy Pilczynski, 'Osiem recept na lustracje' [Eight recipes for lustration], Rzeczpospolita (8 July 1994); Tadeusz Mitek, 'To byłby demontaz armii' [That would be deconstructing the army], Polska Zbrojna (14 February 1994).

of the Warsaw Pact left Central European countries with militaries which had complete and secretive control over military issues. Without a body of civilian expertise, Central European countries were forced to reform defence ministries, create parliamentary commissions, decide budgets, and begin a public debate on issues of defence and defence spending. Furthermore, under the NATO Partnership for Peace programme, Poland is obliged to implement effective civilian control of the military.

Today, civilians in the Polish defence ministry and in parliament have officially assumed control over the military. However, some observers warn that 'few of them have developed any expertise in security matters or have any sympathy for the extensive needs of the defence sector.' The area of security and defence policy-making has been a battlefield for many competing interests and political forces (though the different voices have remained within the democratic framework). Often, these power struggles, called in Poland 'battles on top', have been translated into political paralysis.

Poland has succeeded in appointing civilian defence ministers (against the grain of the national tradition, as some would say), transforming the Ministry of Defence (MoD) into a political and administrative body for the direction of the defence establishment, and the General Staff (GS) into a central command for the armed forces. In addition, a civilian section of the MoD has been created, and the GS has been made subordinate to the Minister of Defence. Problems have occurred however in defining the scope of parliamentary control over the military.

The civilians appointed to the post of ministers of defence and also to other high-ranking posts in the MoD are often actually non-active military personnel. Many positions supposed to be in civilian hands are thus held by individuals who have retired, or have been released from military duty while holding the civilian appointment. In practice, even the civilian section of the MoD is dominated by military personnel.

Similarly, it has proved difficult to clarify the position of the General Staff. President Walesa and many generals question the arrangement according to which the

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117 This has been the case mainly because until very recently there was an almost complete lack of interest on the part of the parliament and its national security commission in military and security matters. But there has also been no interest in having the parliament involved on the part of the military leaders. For example, the parliamentary committee was not consulted on doctrinal matters when a new doctrine was developed in 1992.

118 For example, Piotr Kołodziejczyk was defense minister while on active duty as a Vice Admiral in 1991, and took the post up again when retired, under Pawlak.
General Staff is subordinate to the Minister of Defence. There is a clear tendency to transfer power from the MoD to the GS. This process is openly supported by Walesa, but ignored by parliament and the Defence Minister.\textsuperscript{119}

In Poland, the principle itself of civil control over the military is not contested. It is, however, not yet clear who precisely should exercise this control. The problem hinges on the country’s failure to provide a constitutional framework for the command and control of the armed forces, and thus to establish intelligible rules for the disassociation of the armed forces from political power.\textsuperscript{120} Difficulties also stem from the apparent inability to reassure the military that its concerns are heard by civilians. Civilian-military tensions are exacerbated by the conflict between post-communist forces and the post-Solidarity president, upcoming presidential elections, and delays in constitutional discussion.

**Doctrinal matters:** The conception and execution of a cohesive defence policy can be considered one of the main prerequisites for the stability of a state. In this process military doctrine plays an important function since its role is to guide the formulation of security and defence policies. In Central Europe, the post-WTO security and defence policies have been adapted, often on an \textit{ad hoc} basis, to reflect the new European realities, but their directions have for a long time remained uncodified in post-Cold War defence doctrines. In addition, the new doctrines fail to specify potential conflict scenarios and thus, as Zielonka argues, cannot suggest directions concerning ways to cope with security problems.\textsuperscript{121}

Poland has had a post-Cold War defence doctrine only since November 1992. The doctrine was presented in the form of two documents prepared by the Presidential National Defence Committee - **Tenets of the Polish Security Policy** and **Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland**. The form which these documents have taken and the fact that they were not presented to the Parliament indicated that due to a constitutional debate, which raised issues of responsibility for security and defence issues, a more formal document could not be agreed upon. The documents’ orientation was


\textsuperscript{120} See ‘Wojsko w oczach parlamentarzystow - stanowiska klubow poselskich’ [Army in the eyes of parliamentarians - positions of deputies’ clubs], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (23 January 1995).

\textsuperscript{121} Zielonka, ‘Security in Central Europe’, p. 49.
clearly defensive and pro-Western, with a strong emphasis on future membership in Western organizations and institutions. They considered isolationism to be unacceptable. The doctrine did not foresee a direct military aggression from any direction, but discussed a number of security risk of both external and internal nature.\textsuperscript{122}

The doctrine has been controversial, mainly because it did not foresee the creation of feasible and viable national defence structures but emphasized the need to rely on external help in case of aggression against its territory, and is expected to be reviewed in 1995. The Polish defence doctrine professes to adhere to the principles of international law, and to concepts of both limited defence, and circular defence. As such, the new doctrine constitutes a symbolical break with the WTO doctrine. In addition to the declared adherence to rules and laws of the United Nations (UN), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements, the Polish defence doctrine professes to adhere to the principle of the inviolability of borders.

Two of the most important principles presented by the new doctrine are the move away from an offensive posture, and the creation of principles for territorial defence\textsuperscript{123}. The main goals are to decrease the size of the armed forces while increasing mobility, and to acquire defensive weapons, such as those required for air defence.\textsuperscript{124} The practical implications of this change are further discussed in the following section which considers reform of the armed forces.

Thirdly, in the new defence doctrine, Poles decided to pursue defence based on a \textit{tout azimuts} (all around) principle as a logical consequence of their concept of not facing any specific enemies. Thus, the idea of ensuring the defence of all borders was put forward as a guiding principle for the military restructuring process. The redistribution of forces would allow the military to deal with potential threats from the East without declaring the Soviet Union or the post-Soviet republics to be a specific source of security.

\textsuperscript{122} For a discussion of the doctrine see Monika Wohlfeld, 'Poland's defence doctrine', Notes from the Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs (21 December 1992).

\textsuperscript{123} Territorial defence has been defined as conventional defence (with a negligible offensive potential) of the territory of a state. It relies on a strong defence capability rather than on the threat of retaliation. See Colin McInnes, 'Glossary of Strategic Terms', in John Baylis et al (eds), Contemporary Strategy II (2nd ed.). (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), p. 201.

\textsuperscript{124} 'Byc daleko od polityki. Rozmowa z Piotrem Kołodziejczykiem, ministrem obrony narodowej' [To be far from politics. Conversation with Piotr Kołodziejczyk, minister of national defense], Rzeczpospolita (26 January 1994).
problems. During the existence of the WTO Polish forces were concentrated almost exclusively in the western sections of the territories, and thus a redistribution to the East has been initiated, but has proved difficult.\textsuperscript{125} Poland can claim only partial success in the relocation of the armed forces across its territories.\textsuperscript{126}

Considering the tremendous expense connected with setting up new infrastructures Poland can be expected to tacitly move away from the \textit{tout azimuts} concept, or at least to suspend or postpone its implementation. Poland has instead made the improvement of the technical state of its armed forces a priority. Accordingly, the transfer of troops has not received the necessary funds. In addition, Kolodziejczyk, the defence minister at the time, indicated that such transfers would cause frictions with Poland's eastern neighbours Belorus and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{127}

Generally speaking, the practical implications of the principles put forward in the new Central European doctrines are still unclear. It is possible to say that not all of the new ideas presented by the post-WTO defence doctrines in Central Europe actually guide the making of current security and defence policies. While Poland can be expected to continue to adhere to principles which do not require substantial financial commitments, without external financial support they may slow down or stop altogether the implementation of costly redeployments.

**Reform of the armed forces:** The Polish armed forces are currently undergoing various processes of reform. Some of the changes, particularly cuts in the size of the forces, date back to the late 1980s, but most have been initiated since the dissolution of the WTO.\textsuperscript{128} Both voluntary and enforced reductions of the size of the armed forces and armaments constitute an important trend. While the impact of the 1990 Armed Forces in

\textsuperscript{125} For a description of the process in Poland, see for example Heiko Flottau, 'Poland's Angriffsarmee muss umsatteln' [Poland's offensive army must resaddle], \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} (22-23 January 1994); Kolodziejczyk, 'Byc daleko od polityki'.


\textsuperscript{127} Kolodziejczyk, 'Byc daleko od polityki'.

\textsuperscript{128} During the existence of the WTO, Poland's troops strength was 410,000. In 1992, it reached some 240,000. Polish policy-makers announced that the size would eventually drop to approximately 180,000. Jerzy Milewski, 'Jaka armia, takie bezpieczeństwo' [What sort of army, such security], \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza} (17 February 1992).
Europe (CFE) treaty\textsuperscript{129} and the new emphasis on defensive rather than offensive capabilities play a role, one of the motivations for the reform process is in fact financial constraints. The difficult economic situation of the officer corps has actually resulted in an exodus of career and noncommissioned officers. The Polish army, which by the end of 1992 had armed forces of 225,000 (313,000 personnel) in a country of approximately 38.5 million\textsuperscript{130}, is expected to stabilize at about 180,000.\textsuperscript{131}

Another important principle guiding military reform is interoperability and compatibility with western standards. This principle was initially intended to guide the modernization of equipment and arms acquisition, as well as the training of forces, but efforts have been hampered by a number of factors, including the small numbers of English-speakers in the Polish military, a lack of funds to purchase Western equipment and technology\textsuperscript{132}, and the social costs created by the elimination of jobs in the defence industries. Generally speaking, the Polish armed forces are opening themselves to the West, but they remain equipped with Soviet-style arms.\textsuperscript{133}

In addition to financial problems, the aim to reduce dependence on Soviet equipment in favour of Western arms has been limited in the past by Western export restrictions, imposed both by the now defunct Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), and by national control systems in individual countries, particularly the United States.\textsuperscript{134} COCOM coordinated the West’s policy of export controls concerning Eastern and Central Europe. In 1990/91 the COCOM embargo was

\textsuperscript{129} The CFE treaty limits the Polish armed forces to a size of 234,000. See ‘Nasza armia silna. Rozmowa z generalem broni Tadeuszem Wileckim, szefem Sztabu Generalnego’ [Our strong army. Conversation with general Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (10 March 1994).


\textsuperscript{131} Mitek, ‘Trwaja spory’.


\textsuperscript{133} Zielonka, ‘Security in Central Europe’, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{134} For a discussion of these limitations and their impact, see Katarzyna Zukrowska, ‘COCOM a Polska’ [COCOM and Poland], \textit{Studia i Materiały} 44 (December 1992).
modified. It ended 'in its present form' in March 1994 after 47 years of existence, leaving in place individual national restrictions on trade with Central Europe.\textsuperscript{135}

In 1994, the U.S. Congress, reflecting the emphasis on military cooperation encouraged by the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative, gave permission to the four Visegrad countries to purchase American weapons. While this decision will not incite a stampede to purchase American technology because the Central European countries currently lack the necessary funds, it does address some of their concerns regarding restrictions of arms procurement. On the other hand, however, Western observers warn that efforts to acquire Western equipment are being made without due consideration for their potential to spur regional arms races.\textsuperscript{136}

Polish defence planners stress mobility over heavy equipment. They are trying to create lightly armoured, mobile forces and rapid reaction forces, and are preparing quick mobilization procedures. However, the costs of such restructuring are prohibitive. While some mobile units have been created, they can be expected to remain an exception for the immediate and mid-term future. In addition, the creation of rapid reaction units carries the danger of creating tensions with neighbouring countries, which could be the potential objects of force.

A further goal for reform is the professionalization of the armed forces. In Poland, the number of conscripts is around 160,000, which is more than 50\% of the total number of troops.\textsuperscript{137} Compulsory military service has already been cut from two years to eighteen months\textsuperscript{138}, and may be cut further to one year in the future in connection with plans for professionalizing the Polish armed forces.\textsuperscript{139} The chief of the Polish General Staff stated that by the end of 1995, he expected to be able to man all


\textsuperscript{138} Herspring, 'Case of the Military', p. 64.

\textsuperscript{139} Wilecki, 'Nasza armia silna'. 
modern equipment with professional soldiers. Yet, despite announcements of expected changes to the ratio of conscripts to professional soldiers, Polish policy-makers recognize now that such reforms are too costly. Furthermore, they realize that it will be difficult to fill professional positions, since young people are deterred by low wages of military jobs, and thus prefer to enter the private sector.

The effort to professionalize the armed forces is also intended to foster peace-keeping capabilities. Few Central European policy-makers believe in the possibility of effective regional peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions in the immediate future. Nevertheless, Poland and other Central European countries are prepared to participate in international peace-keeping activities and to cooperate with other countries in the training of peace-keepers. They view peace-keeping operations as a route to further integration with NATO forces. Poland currently participates in a number of UN peace-keeping operations. In addition, the country has built up an extensive network of exchange and peace-keeping training programmes with the participation of a number of Western European and North American countries.

Although the process of restructuring the armed forces has been progressing, it is severely affected by budgetary shrinkage. It is evident that democratic countries facing critical domestic problems and the impact of economic transition cannot give priority to the modernization and reform of their militaries, and thus it is currently impossible to assess prospects for the implementation of the principles discussed above. In the meantime, the armed forces of the former NSWTO countries cannot provide the capabilities considered necessary to cope with perceived threats. Structural changes are

140 Ibid.
141 Security for Europe Project, p. 41.
limited by fiscal constraints, but their direction is clear: an emphasis on professionalization, civil control of the military, and compatibility is aimed at gaining NATO membership. As Simon reports, Central European governments view "their military restructuring as an instrument for achieving the goal of Western integration rather than as one of meeting immediate defence needs and requirements."144

5. Summary and Conclusions

Increasingly, Polish security fears are shifting from worries about traditional, external geopolitical threats. Only the threats emanating from the former Soviet Union pose a truly significant traditional security problem. The post-Cold War 'comprehensive' security risks that Polish leaders consider relevant are both external and 'home-made' in nature. They are less 'intensive' than Cold War security threats, but more difficult to predict, avert and eliminate. In Poland, a feeling of insecurity is generated by the West's inadequate response to the Yugoslav crisis. This is a reflection of the concern that the West is confused about its interests in Eastern and Central Europe. Local conflicts in the region and the possibility of mass migration are two other concerns which top the list of Polish perceptions of external security threats.

Domestic threats are increasingly seen by Polish policy-makers as a significant source of insecurity. Risks of non-military kind, such as economic difficulties created by the process of economic reform, and environmental and ecological problems, are seen to contribute to the rise of security threats. In addition, domestic military reforms are thought to affect Polish defence capabilities and therefore to contribute to the country's inability to assure viable defence structures. Security is gained by preserving a dynamic balance between threats and capacities.143 In the Polish case, such a balance has not been struck.

While many Western observers imply that the former NSWTO countries do not require Western security guarantees, in the opinion of Central European governments the current situation of de facto neutrality/non-alignment is a dangerous one. Central Europeans do not extrapolate their security threat perceptions from today's relatively peaceful situation, but foresee the possibility of a deterioration in their security

144 Ibid., p. 2.

environment. The discussion of Polish perceptions of risks to Poland’s security indicates that since 1989 threats have widened and intensified, even though Polish policy-makers see few direct external military dangers.

The new security and defence policies pursued by Poland attempt to cope with the fact that no country in Central Europe can guarantee its security entirely independently, even if it undertakes all-out militarization, and that no firm security guarantees will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Nelson is not alone in his assessment that 'Europe’s eastern half will not obtain security through national armed forces. ... Even for a state with notable resources - Poland, for example - maintaining a credible conventional defense is doubtful, given the current budgetary constraints'.

Polish efforts have not been directed towards coping with threats directly (by means of nationalizing defence), but rather towards creating the appropriate conditions for entrance into Western organizations and institutions, which could provide security guarantees. In addition to Western-oriented foreign and security policies, reforms of the armed forces have likewise been undertaken in light of membership in Western institutions. Thus, Poland has increasingly tied its fate to expected NATO and EU/WEU membership.

144 Ibid., p. 167. Of course, one could also argue that in a nuclear world, conventional defence cannot be credible by definition. It is, however, not the purpose of this thesis discuss and resolve this complicated debate.
CHAPTER SEVEN

POLISH FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS AFTER
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE EASTERN BLOC

1. Introduction

When the military functions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization came to an end, Poland was left without any formal allies, in a strategic limbo characterized by the progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, and domestic instability. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Poland had, at least hypothetically, various foreign policy options open to it. Since that time, the Polish government has discussed and advocated a number of different approaches in order to enhance the country’s security. This chapter presents the various options, and describes the debates surrounding each one. It is not intended to provide a detailed account of the history of Polish relations with all of the organizations, institutions, and frameworks which were at times considered relevant to Polish security, but presents such information only where the quality of relations has actually affected Polish debates about foreign policy options.

The first section of this chapter discusses the rather unpopular option of Soviet/Russian security guarantees for Poland. The section that follows focuses on another possible foreign policy - neutrality/non-alignment - which Poland considered only briefly. In the third section, the chapter considers the option of membership in a pan-European collective security framework, mainly advanced by Czechoslovakia, but also discussed for a short period in Poland. Finally, the last sections address the possibility of security guarantees from various existing Western security organizations.
The chapter discusses the options Polish policy-makers have considered viable and why they have favoured them, the ones they have rejected, and those not open to Central European countries. Thus, it focuses on two basic factors: willingness and opportunity. This approach highlights the expectations of Polish leaders as well as the realities of the international system. The Central European subregional cooperation security option must be understood as only one of the many foreign and security policy possibilities which Central European leaders have debated following the collapse of the Eastern bloc. With this chapter as background, then, subregional arrangements are the specific subject of separate chapters (Eight and Nine).

2. Russian option

A Polish commentator stated recently that 'the Russian orientation is richly represented in the Polish political scene'\(^1\). However, he included in his account all anti-Western groupings, opposing Polish membership in NATO. The 'Russian option' or 'Russian orientation' is in fact probably the least popular of all the possible foreign and security policy possibilities theoretically available to Poland in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, according to opinion polls, Germany is seen as a better alliance partner than Russia among the younger generation in Poland, while the older generation opts for neither.\(^2\) With the exception of the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), whose foreign policy platform of subregional cooperation frameworks is presented in Chapter Nine, all serious political forces currently represented in the Polish parliament favour integration with the West.\(^3\)

While any form of Russian or Russian-Western security guarantees is immediately and disdainfully dismissed by most political forces as threatening to the country's newly won sovereignty, there are marginal parties with little popular support which clandestinely, rather than openly, advocate close links with Russia. As Kazimierz Dziewanowski, the former Polish Ambassador to the US, says, in the current climate few

\(^1\) Jacek Kwiecinski, 'Promoskiewski oboz w Polsce' [Pro-Moscow camp in Poland], *Gazeta Polska* (January 1993).

\(^2\) 'Rosja i Niemcy - sasiad nie sojusznik' [Russia and Germany - neighbour, not ally], *Rzeczpospolita* (1 August 1994).

\(^3\) Krzysztof Gorski, senior expert, National Security Office at the President's Chancellory, Polish Republic, interview by author, 6 February 1995, London.
dare to speak of Russian orientation openly. Significantly, pro-Russian groupings exist both on the left and right of the political spectrum, and have populist leanings. These 'positivist', neo-Dmowskiite, or pan-Slavist groupings include for example the right-wing nationalist, pan-slavist (and pro-Russian) Polish National Front - Self-defence (Polski Front Narodowy - Samoobrona). The leader of this small grouping invited Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Russian nationalist who foresees the possibility of Germany and Russia dividing Poland again, to visit Poland in 1994. The invitation caused a political storm in Warsaw.

Polish observers occasionally suspect pro-Russian tendencies among sections of the postcommunist parties. There is no doubt that there are social and financial links between former Russian and Polish communist forces. Dziewanowski calls this 'the nostalgic option', characterized by a longing for the Eastern bloc past.

Today, the Russian orientation in Poland is mainly based on an economic argument that a vast eastern market exists. Currently, Poland’s exchange with Russia accounts for only 8 percent of the country’s trade. Most Polish observers dismiss the claim that the way to economic recovery for Poland is through Russian markets because of the chaotic state of the Russian economy. Occasionally other reasons are presented, ranging from assertions that Russia does not seem to be interested in opening its markets to Poland, to the warning that Russia might use economic links as an instrument of political pressure.

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5 Kwiecinski, 'Promoskiewski oboz'.


7 See for example the statement by Andrzej Ananicz from the Presidential Chancellory to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Polish parliament, in Biuletyn Nr. 1238, p. 24.


9 Kaziemierz Dziewanowski, 'Aby Wrzesien nie mogl sie powtorzyc' [So that September cannot repeat itself], Rzeczpospolita (6 February 1995).
3. Neutrality

In 1989, the option of neutrality had supporters among Hungarian and Czechoslovak elites. The Hungarian discussion concerning future foreign policy directions focused on the so-called 'Finnish' model of neutrality, characterized by close political and economic ties to Western Europe and good relations with the Soviet Union as an alternative to WTO membership. Gorbachev's visit to Finland in October 1989, during which he recognized Finnish neutrality, seemed to strengthen the Hungarian belief that neutrality was a viable policy alternative.

The debate was fuelled by a number of unofficial statements by Soviet analysts and academics, which indicated that the Soviet policy of non-interference in Central and East European affairs could be interpreted as a way of permitting Hungary as a former Soviet satellite to become neutral without hurting Soviet interests in the Central European region. Indeed, some even argue that after the collapse of the WTO, the Kremlin pursued a conscious policy of 'Finlandization' in the region.

Furthermore, some Western observers suggested in 1990 and 1991 that a neutral or non-aligned status for the countries of the Central European region would permit them to free themselves gradually from Soviet domination. Others argued that although no Central European country wished to be part of a 'buffer zone', they played that role anyhow 'by virtue of geography'. Barry Buzan, Henry Kissinger, and Steven van Evera, as well as Paul K. Davis and Robert D. Howe from the RAND Institute, have advocated the 'neutralization' of Eastern and Central Europe as a long-term solution to

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the region’s security problems. However, for most Polish policy-makers, these unofficial suggestions were an illustration of Western indifference towards the security of the states of East-Central Europe.

Neutrality, then, was initially seen by Hungarians as an alternative to WTO membership and as a guarantee of independence and sovereignty as well as a means of securing access to markets in both East and West. The Czechoslovak approach to neutrality, however, was less optimistic than the Hungarian. The Central European country least interested in this policy option was Poland. Initially, Polish policy-makers believed on the one hand that the country required the WTO both as a security guarantee and as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Germany, and on the other hand that the Soviet Union continued to see Poland (more than other Central European countries) as part of its sphere of influence. Thus, while Hungary debated neutrality, Poland continued to preserve its position within the WTO, albeit at the same time pushing for its restructuring.

Polish elites began to consider options other than membership in the WTO in late 1990 and early 1991, by which time the discussion of neutrality had almost come to an end in other Central European countries. As the Report on the State of National Security says, Poland had a brief flirtation with the idea of "armed neutrality" or the formula of "equal distance" vis-à-vis our Western and Eastern neighbours, which appeared in the official pronouncements of government ministers at the turn of 1991. Indeed, these November 1991 statements on the new direction of the Polish security and defence policy presented at the Second Conference on Security and Cooperation in

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18 Ibid., p. 56.

Europe (CSCE) Seminar on Military Doctrine indicate that Poland favoured the concept of 'equal proximity' - preserving the balance in relations between Poland's two largest neighbours at the time, Germany and the Soviet Union.

Neutrality may have been an option as long as it presented a relatively harmless alternative to membership in the Warsaw Pact. But for Poland, with its many security concerns, neutrality was hardly appealing. According to Gasteyger, one concern was that neutrality meant a total absence of security guarantees. Furthermore, Polish leaders believed that the USSR would consider a neutral belt to its west as an attempt to isolate the region from Europe. In addition, in the post-Cold War era, neutral status could not provide solutions to security problems of a social and economic nature. Some observers suggest in addition that neutrality lacked appeal for historical reasons - since Poland has no tradition of neutrality.

The 1992 doctrine lacked any reference to the concept of 'equal proximity'. The move away from this concept was triggered by the changes to the East of Poland's borders, particularly the instability after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the consequent creation of the shaky Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Recently, there have been reports of a resurgence of the idea of neutrality among Slovakia's opposition parties. Neutral status for Slovakia would certainly mean stronger ties with Russia. Such a possibility would not be considered advantageous by Polish policy-makers, who, as a result, are likely to work towards including Slovakia in the Visegrad framework, and to develop joint approaches towards membership in Western organizations and institutions.

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22 Ibid., p. 123.


The irony of the situation is that while Poland turned away from the concept of neutrality as early as in 1991, today Poland continues to find itself in a de facto situation of neutrality/non-alignment. Most political forces are dissatisfied with this status because it is expensive, and, as it is argued, must entail militarization.25 Nevertheless, as the Polish deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Towpik stated to the Sejm Committee, there is no dearth of people who support the concept of armed neutrality.26 This foreign and security policy option is a natural extension of the 'neither' orientation, that is, the neo-Pilsudskiite desire to create distance between Poland and both Germany and Russia. There are supporters of this option both among left- and right-wing forces of the Polish political spectrum27, but it seems to be advocated mainly in military circles.28 In November 1993, for example, a high ranking military official said that following the end of what he called 'NATO-mania', Poland must develop realistic approaches to its security based on the recognition that Poland is effectively alone. While Poland should continue to emphasize that it is interested in and available for coalitions, alliances, and collective security frameworks, its military must develop based on the principle of self-sufficiency.29

4. Collective Pan-European Security

The notion of pan-European collective security dates back to the interwar League of Nations. According to Ken Booth, 'the basic principle of collective security is that an attack upon one state will be regarded as an attack upon all states. In theory, the international community would act as one to deter and, if necessary to stamp out aggression.'30


26 Statement by Andrzej Towpik to the Foreign Relations Commission of the Polish parliament, in Biuletyn Nr. 1238, p. 12.


28 Krystian Piatkowski, senior expert, National Security Office at the President’s Chancellory, Polish Republic, interview by author, 15 March 1995, Warsaw.

29 'Polska myśl wojskowa: Dobrze, że skończyła się "NATO mania"' [Polish military thought: Good, that 'NATO-mania' ended], Rzeczpospolita (26 November 1993).

Encouraged by the rapid collapse of the Cold War framework, Central European countries, and especially Czechoslovakia, pinned their hopes on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, since its 1994 Budapest conference renamed the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) and its future transformation into a pan-European collective security framework. Czechoslovakia considered the CSCE a structure that could give the Central European states some form of security vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and Germany, and would keep the United States in Europe. Beginning in early 1990, Czechoslovakia, both on its own and jointly with other states, advocated a number of ambitious schemes for a new pan-European collective security framework based on the CSCE process.

While Czechoslovakia, and to some degree, Hungary saw the Helsinki process as an imminent security guarantee for the Central European states, Poland stressed that, although the idea of a collective security system was an interesting one, the creation of such an order would require time and hard work, and in any case, it was not clear whether or not the creation would be successful or effective. Jane Sharp argues that beginning in early 1991, after the collapse of the WTO, 'few Poles were reassured by the CSCE. The government in Warsaw continued to search for ways to strengthen the CSCE but also sought closer ties with NATO and WEU, as well as bilateral agreements...'

Polish diplomacy was nevertheless relatively active in the CSCE process, due

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31 Due to its membership and mandate, the CSCE seemed well suited to deal with the post-Cold War security challenges. It includes virtually all European states, the United States and Canada as members. Its mandate covers issues of security, human rights and economic development. Most importantly, unlike any other European organizations, it was not built around one of the two Cold War security blocs. Indeed, many saw the CSCE, through its support for human rights in Eastern and Central Europe, as a contributing factor in the collapse of the bi-polar structure in Europe. James Steinberg, 'The Role of European Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons from Yugoslavia', RAND Note (1992), p. 3.

32 In March 1990, Czechoslovakia first presented the idea of an European security commission within the CSCE framework to the Warsaw Treaty members. In April, a memorandum outlining the proposal was presented to the CSCE. See: 'Dienstbier proposes European Security Commission', FBIS-EEU-90-067 (9 April 1990).


probably to a mixture of factors, including the desire to remain a visible and 'uncomfortable' country, as well as a combination of euphoria, inexperience and personal ambition within the Polish diplomatic staff itself. In June 1990, a joint proposal on the institutionalization of the Helsinki process was presented by Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland. In September 1990, a Polish-Austrian initiative to institutionalize the CSCE process proposed that representatives of CSCE member states should meet twice a year. In October 1991 Poland submitted a proposal suggesting the creation of a CSCE monitoring and peace-keeping force.

Central European attitudes towards security began to change substantially beginning in late 1990, as a response to a number of perceived and real new security risks, dangers and threats, and to changing perceptions of CSCE’s capabilities. The fall and winter of 1990-1991 were characterized by several important developments - the unification of Germany, the Gulf War, and especially the turn towards conservatism in the Soviet Union which culminated in early 1991 with the violent crackdown in the Baltics. The most pessimistic scenario was presented by President Lech Walesa of Poland, who saw the possibility that the Soviet crackdown in the Baltics was only the first step in the USSR’s attempt to reclaim Eastern and Central Europe.

Also during this period, a shift in Central European perceptions of institutional opportunities and limitations became apparent. Beginning with the Paris Summit of 19-21 November 1990, the CSCE developed both institutions and mechanisms intended to give operational capability to what could be described as a debating forum, but its contribution to European security has continued to be marginal.

38 See: ‘Monitoring and Peace-Keeping Forces under the Auspices of the CSCE’, proposal submitted to the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials by Poland on 22 October 1991. The proposal was radical for its time, and although since implemented, was originally turned down in 1991. Piotr Switalski, ‘The role of the CSCE in Conflict Settlement’, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs Vol. 2, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), p. 29.
The fact that the CSCE has not assumed a more important role in the post-Cold War era can be ascribed to a combination of factors. Probably the most important of these is the CSCE’s lack of capabilities when it comes to handling changes in the character of security threats. The CSCE’s new tools are under-utilized, because they are not appropriate to conflicts where questions of territory or identity are involved, where there is no effective state control, and where violence is used.

Secondly, states anxious about the possibility that the CSCE might grow at the expense of other organizations have blocked attempts to institutionalize it. The US leadership was concerned about the potential effects of the CSCE on NATO. Others opposed the new development as distracting attention and resources from the CSCE’s traditional human rights focus.

A third problem has been the CSCE’s continual lack of financial resources. This has meant that its institutions have continued to under-perform, failing to make themselves more appealing to member states. The funding for the CSCE has always been minimal, and it is clear that states proved more reluctant to fund the CSCE institutions than they had been to create them.

Fourthly, the CSCE has suffered from problems relating to its decision-making mechanisms. The principle of unanimity gave countries a veto right and thus the chance to block any initiative. The stalemate resulting from the Soviet refusal to discuss the crackdown in the Baltic republics demonstrated that the CSCE could not deal with matters of security effectively because of its decision-making mechanism. The problems

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41 Procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and peacekeeping have never been employed. Other mechanisms (such as the Berlin Emergency Mechanism, or the Vienna Mechanism on unusual military activities) have only been used sporadically. 'Deciding the CSCE’s Future', p. 8.


45 'Deciding the CSCE’s Future', p. 8.

46 Beyond Process, p. 8.

47 Maria Wagrowska, 'Koniec KBWE' [The end of CSCE], Rzeczpospolita (7 December 1994).
of seeking CSCE-wide consensus had also been visible during the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow. As a result the 'consensus minus one' and 'minus two' rule was developed in 1992.\textsuperscript{48} Decision-making processes were made difficult by the growing membership of the organization. Expansion began in June 1991. From 34 before the Paris Summit, the CSCE grew to 52 members in 1992. There are 53 member states today.

Fifthly, the CSCE’s role was curtailed by other organizations, which took over its tasks in a struggle to redefine their functions in the post-Cold War era. The CSCE suffered a blow with NATO’s creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and later PfP (Partnership for Peace), when the North Atlantic Alliance incorporated many of the functions which had been traditionally provided by the CSCE. These included arms control and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs).\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, NATO’s peacekeeping role took over the CSCE’s mandate. In addition to NATO’s initiatives, the EU’s European Stability Pact, which tackled matters previously discussed under the CSCE’s auspices, also shows the minor position Western governments assign to the CSCE.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, NATO and PfP took over the tasks of the CSCE’s first ‘basket’ (security); the EU secured the second ‘basket’ (economy); and the third ‘basket’ (human rights) was seized by the Council of Europe.

Sixthly, and finally, the CSCE does not possess viable enforcement capabilities.\textsuperscript{51} At the Helsinki Review Conference of 1992, CSCE Heads of Government and State decided to consider the organization a regional arrangement under the auspices of the UN. In theory, this allows the CSCE to carry out enforcement actions and peace-keeping operations by permission of the UN Security Council. In practice, until late 1994 the CSCE has not been involved in any peacekeeping, and is unlikely to take a peace-making or peace-enforcing role.\textsuperscript{52}

The idealistic dissident visions of the CSCE security guarantees have in effect

\textsuperscript{48} Wagrowska, 'Spor o bezpieczenstwo'; Switalski, 'The role of the CSCE', p. 30.


\textsuperscript{50} 'Deciding the CSCE’s Future', p. 5.

\textsuperscript{51} Marcinkowski, 'KBWE wobec konfliktow'; Switalski, 'The role of the CSCE', p. 31.

\textsuperscript{52} 'Deciding the CSCE’s Future', p. 7.
been abandoned by Polish decision-makers. The concept of a pan-European security framework based on an institutionalized CSCE has not been discarded entirely, but the realization of such a system is not envisaged for the near future. Poles expect the CSCE to play a role in the former Soviet Union, where it should undertake tasks such as preventative diplomacy, observer missions, peace-keeping, and human rights monitoring. In addition, Polish policy-makers want it to continue to play a role in arms control.

The former NSWTO countries have not entirely abandoned the concept of collective pan-European security, but they no longer see it as a potential source of security guarantees. Yet pan-European security is in fact Russia’s preferred choice. Recently, Russia’s Defence Minister Pavel Grachev presented a plan at the January 1994 Brussels conference of NATO defence ministers according to which NATO would be subordinate to the CSCE. This Russian proposal was reiterated in preparation for the October 1994 Budapest Summit of the CSCE. According to this version of European security architecture, the CSCE would play a predominant role, while NATO would become practically its subordinate. The CSCE would be equipped with a decision-making body similar to the UN Security Council. NACC, separated from NATO and attached to the CSCE, would be responsible for matters such as peace enforcement, military activities, and conversion of arms industries. PfP would fall under NACC’s responsibility. NATO, WEU, and the CIS would be subordinate but equal to one another bodies with their own peace-keeping forces. Central Europe, in this proposal, would be given guarantees by both Russia and NATO.

Russian officials have subsequently denied that they want to subordinate NATO

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55 Jacek Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment' [Particular moment], Rzeczpospolita (5 July 1994); Maria Wagrowska, 'Minister Olechowski wierzy w KBWE: Nowy program kontroli zbrojen' [Minister Olechowski believes in CSCE: New programme of arms control], Rzeczpospolita (8 September 1994).

56 Wagrowska, 'Czy KBWE sie przezyla'.


58 Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment'.

to CSCE, and their proposal to subordinate NACC to the same organization was rejected by Western governments even before the January 1994 NACC meeting. Nevertheless, the Russian plan worries Central Europeans, particularly Poles. A strengthened CSCE would increase Russia’s leverage in the direction of European security. Indeed, even in the West, observers suggest that Russia wants to use the CSCE to gain influence over NATO.

In this context, it is worth noting the Polish reception of the initiative launched by the German and Dutch Foreign Ministers Klaus Kinkel and Peter Kooijemans on 17 May 1994. An advisor to the Polish Foreign Minister interpreted the attempt to strengthen the CSCE by linking it to NATO as a way of giving Russia a participatory role in shaping the European security framework - a goal which does not please Poles. In the Polish view, the proposal could well result in an unacceptable Western - Russian condominium in Central Europe.

5. Membership in alliances

According to Booth, ‘if states have not been able to secure their interests by going it alone, then searching for allies has been their normal course. Other alternatives, collective security and neutralism have not been seen to be satisfactory options…’ The foreign policy choice which all former NSWTO countries eventually favoured was membership in Western organizations and institutions. NATO, the WEU, and occasionally also the post-Maastricht EU were all seen as potential sources of security guarantees, and Central Europeans pursued a ‘catch-all’ policy aimed at establishing links with as many of these as possible. In this chapter, the various institutions are discussed separately, although their organizational links are becoming increasingly complex. NATO is focusing more and more on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

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60 Bruce Clark, ‘Russia and West split on Europe’s security’, Financial Times (10 October 1994).

61 Czaputowicz, ‘Szczegolny moment’.


63 The Maastricht Treaty is an agreement on foreign and security policy, reached by the EC at the Maastricht summit on 9-10 December 1991. See Steinberg, ‘Role of European Institutions’, p. 5.
and its relationship to America, while the WEU relies on NATO’s military assets, but has connections with the EU’s CFSP. Links are also being created and strengthened between these organizations and bodies such as the CSCE and the UN, as the above section on pan-European security describes.

The Atlantic option: NATO membership

Among Central European countries, it was Hungary that initiated the rapprochement between Central Europe and NATO. In early 1990, the Hungarians submitted that WTO members should be able, in time, to join the various political and consultative bodies within NATO. This visionary proposal foresaw the possibility of 'common membership' within the formerly Western alliance. Hungary was joined by Poland in its demands for the 'modernization' and reform of the WTO but not in demands for dismantling it altogether. Czechoslovakia, which initially called for the dissolution of both military pacts soon modified its approach. By May 1990, it emphasized the importance of US troops in Europe, and began to treat NATO as a potential nucleus for a new security system. In June 1990, Hungary announced that it intended to withdraw from the military arm of the WTO by the end of 1991.

Poland, however, continued to follow the policy of preserving its relations with the USSR and its position within the WTO, while advocating a reform of the bloc. This policy took into account the country's security concerns, since it was a priority for Poland to be involved in the negotiations over German reunification, and to secure a border treaty with Germany that would recognize the Oder-Neisse line as common border. Jane Sharp reports that President George Bush's call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland in July 1989 came as a surprise to the Polish government, which continued to see Soviet troops as the guarantor of Poland's western border.

Poland's relations with NATO began in March 1990, when the then Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski visited the NATO Headquarters for the first time. In

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66 Sharp, 'Security options', p. 64.

67 The following section draws mainly upon a brief history of the country’s relations with NATO, published in Polska Zbrojna (28 September 1994).
June 1990, NATO issued its London Declaration\(^68\), announcing the organization’s interest in cooperation with the Central European countries. In September of the same year, Manfred Wörner, NATO’s Secretary General, visited Warsaw. During his visit Skubiszewski announced that Poland did not see membership in NATO as one of its foreign policy goals, and Wörner stated that NATO was not interested in Polish membership.

The border treaty with Germany was signed in November 1990, and following this event Poland opened talks concerning the withdrawal of Soviets.\(^69\) By the autumn of 1990, Poland and Czechoslovakia had joined Hungary in calling for the termination of the WTO, which they now saw as an 'empty shell'.\(^70\) It was also in the autumn of 1990 that Poland established its first diplomatic relations with NATO. The Soviet withdrawal negotiation proved difficult, and an agreement was not reached until Spring 1991.\(^71\)

In April 1991, the Polish deputy Defence Minister Janusz Onyszczewicz stated that 'joining NATO offers no solution to their [Visegrad countries’] security needs and would in some ways recreate the division of Europe ...'\(^72\) In describing the Polish foreign policy of this time, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski said that the initial decision not to pursue NATO membership was inspired by the realization that links with the West would have to be established in a gradual manner. In this process, according to him, NATO could not be the first institution with which Poland would establish close relations. Instead, Polish diplomacy worked towards changing NATO’s picture of Central European countries as enemies.\(^73\) Many Polish observers however speak of the Polish foreign


\(^{69}\) Reisch, ‘Central and Eastern Europe’s Quest’, p. 35.

\(^{70}\) Ibid., p. 36.


\(^{73}\) Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Poszycja Polski w Europie: dzis i jutro' [Poland’s position in Europe: today and tomorrow], Gazeta Wyborcza (8-9 January 1994).
policy during this period as characterized by 'wasted chances'.74

Under pressure to deal with the changing international environment, NATO’s foreign ministers announced in June 1991 in Copenhagen that 'the consolidation and preservation of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are ... of direct and material concern to NATO'.75 The Western alliance did not directly guarantee the security of Central Europe, but some Central Europeans felt that the formulation of the communique implied that NATO would be prepared to help, if any power were to threaten the new European democracies.76 At the same time, NATO governments made it clear that they were not prepared to extend membership to these countries in the immediate future.

In early October 1991, facing a disintegrating USSR to the east and the war in Yugoslavia to the south, Central European leaders emphasized a new desire for a treaty-based relationship with NATO as the only means of reassurance in an increasingly unstable Europe.77 For Central Europeans, the case of the former Yugoslavia was in fact a test of the various security institutions and organizations. In this conflict, NATO demonstrated to Central Europeans its superiority over other, purely European, institutions because of the perceived importance of its US leadership, its quicker decision-making processes, and its military capability. Since in the former Yugoslavia Central Europeans perceived the dependence of Western Europe on America along with America’s tendency to distance itself from European problems, they increasingly voiced concern that the US administration was more interested in the Far East and Russia than in their own region.

The year 1992 was a significant watershed in relations between Poland and NATO. Although towards the end of 1991 the Polish government had begun to speak

74 See for example Kazimierz Dziewanowski, 'Polityka wlasniwego czasu' [Policy of right time], Rzeczpospolita (16-17 July 1994).


seriously of NATO membership, it was not until early 1992 that the Polish government declared that full membership in NATO was the main strategic aim of Polish policy. In addition to declarations by Polish policy-makers, the November 1992 defence doctrine stated that Polish membership in NATO was to be accomplished before the end of the century. Nevertheless, perceptions of Polish chances for NATO membership differed among Polish leaders. The Foreign Minister asserted that there was no doubts about the fact that membership could not be achieved overnight. Prime Minister Suchocka however spoke in October 1992 of 'a clear prospect of Poland’s fast integration with the NATO structures.'

Poland began to see NATO and the continued presence of the United States in Europe as a more important element of stability than many of NATO's own member countries whose leaderships wondered whether NATO had become obsolete. Central European policy-makers pursued the NATO option not only in the interests of security but also for domestic reasons. They saw NATO membership as a way to show their electorates the new standing of their countries in the international community, and their new-found freedom to co-determine the course of international events. Moreover, the desires of Central European leaders to pursue this foreign policy orientation involved economic considerations. NATO membership, they thought, would be an indication of stability, which would then encourage foreign investment. It would also mean that membership in other Western organizations - such as the European Community (European Union) - was within reach. Thus, membership in the Western military alliance would generally bring Central Europeans closer to Western Europe, and help them to achieve a solution to the region's economic and social problems.

Although the policy-makers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland expressed their willingness to become NATO members, NATO initially communicated that it would not open its doors to the former Warsaw Treaty Organization countries. In response to


79 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 6.


82 Sharp, 'Security options', p. 56.
Central European interest in NATO, the organization's Secretary General Wörner stated: 'We can only guarantee the security of our member states', Wörner said, but declared, as well, that NATO functioned as a stabilizing factor for all of Europe: 'NATO can contribute to deterring the use of ... military force against any East-Central European country.'

The reasons cited by the Western alliance for initially showing reluctance to Central European membership are too numerous to discuss here in depth. Suffice to say that they included the desire not to have a border with the Soviet Union and not to change the military balance at the expense of Moscow. Soviet leaders made it clear that Moscow had no inclination to give up its 'legitimate security interests' regarding its former allies. The German unification which led to the absorption of East Germany into NATO had already jeopardized NATO's relations with the Soviet Union, and NATO was not prepared to risk provoking the USSR further by extending the alliance to the newly democratic Central European countries. This position induced Polish fears that the Soviet Union, and later Russia, would have an impact on Polish links with Western organizations, or on the creation of a Western-Russian condominium in Central Europe.

In addition, the Western alliance occasionally cited other problematic issues, including the potential need to act in cases of regional conflicts, the costs of technical compatibility, and the military difficulties of providing security guarantees to the East/Central Europeans. NATO also recognized that it was not well suited to be able to tackle some of the security concerns facing Central European countries - such the potential influx of refugees, cross-border conflicts, nationalist and ethnic unrest, and,

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83 See 'NATO's Wörner Discusses Upcoming Visit', FBIS-EEU-90-223 (19 November 1990). Generally speaking, NATO has the option to accept new European members by unanimous vote. That state has to be in position to contribute to the North Atlantic area (Art. 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty). Article 10 provides for the possibility of accession to the treaty by any other European state in position to further the principles of the Treaty. In 1952, Greece and Turkey, in 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany, and in 1982, Spain, acceded to the Treaty under this article. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures. (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1984).


initially, delays in the withdrawal of Soviet troops.\textsuperscript{87} In addition, there were warnings that NATO would not survive an enlargement in its current form, as its decision-making mechanisms were designed for a small and coherent group of member states. A major reason for NATO’s caution in regard to Central Europe was the debate over the future of the alliance as well as the entire security architecture of Europe, which left the issue of NATO’s tasks in the post-Cold War era unresolved.\textsuperscript{88}

At the NATO Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO members agreed to deepen the dialogue with the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization members. They invited these countries to join them in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in the ‘Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation’.\textsuperscript{89} The invitation reflected the desire of NATO members to protect their own interests while offering cooperation on civil-military relations, defence policy, defence conversion, and peacekeeping\textsuperscript{90} which would not carry a large price tag. According to some observers, the declaration actually focused on ways of safeguarding the security interests of the present NATO members.\textsuperscript{91}

The Council began operating in December of 1991. NACC, which claims all of the NATO and East and Central European countries as members, was not well received by Poles, who complained that it could not ‘change anything’ and, what is worse, that it was never intended to do so. Polish authors also criticized NACC’s failure to differentiate among the many countries invited to join it.\textsuperscript{92} Central European states discovered that the NACC was only what Vladimir Kusin calls a ‘meet-and-chat-


\textsuperscript{92} Tadeusz Chabiera, ‘Jak przyjac propozycje NATO: Tylko spokojnie’ [How to accept NATO’s proposals: Only calmly], Rzeczpospolita (8 November 1993).
groove\textsuperscript{93} - a forum for communication - and so continued to push for full NATO membership.

In March 1992, during the second visit of NATO’s Secretary General to Warsaw, Skubiszewski said that there was a possibility that Poland would enter NATO, but that it was not clear when such an event might come to pass. At approximately the same time, Walesa presented his alternative subregional security cooperation scheme, the 'NATO-bis' proposal, described further in Chapter Nine. But the government distanced itself immediately from that initiative.

Soviet, and later Russian attitudes played an important role in the process of developing Central European relations with NATO, and Central Europeans perceived Russian opposition to the expansion of NATO as a major obstacle. This problem seemed to vanish when in August 1993, during his visit to Warsaw, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia would not stand in the way of Poland’s attempts to gain entry into NATO.\textsuperscript{94} ‘Now the West has no argument to say no to Poland, it can’t use Russia as an excuse’, said a presidential spokesman.\textsuperscript{95} Prime Minister Suchocka concluded that ‘any further [concerning NATO membership] does not seem possible’.\textsuperscript{96} However, soon after Yeltsin’s Warsaw statement, Yurii Kashlev, the Russian ambassador to Poland, claimed that Yeltsin had been misunderstood. Among others, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev actually lobbied to veto Yeltsin’s statements.

In September 1993, the last Russian soldiers left Warsaw.\textsuperscript{97} In the same month in Budapest, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl informed the Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, that a post-communist victory in the upcoming Polish election could make Poland’s way into NATO more difficult. The Polish electorate did return the ex-

\textsuperscript{93} Vladimir Kusin, ‘NATO and Central Europe: The Problem of Conjunction’, Notes from the Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs (26 October 1993), p. 7.

\textsuperscript{94} Ryszard Malik, ‘Rosja nie sprzeciwia sie wejsciu Polski do NATO: Czas rozpoczac odliczanie na nowo’ [Russia does not oppose Poland entering NATO: Time to start fresh count], Rzeczpospolita (26 August 1993); Anna Wielopolska, ‘Jelcyn zgadza sie na Polske w NATO: Politycy stawiaja znaki zapytania’ [Yeltsin agrees to Poland in NATO: Politicians place question marks], Rzeczpospolita (30 August 1993).


\textsuperscript{96} See Andrew Marshall, ‘NATO moved to include former enemies’, Independent (7 September 1993).

\textsuperscript{97} Ian Traynor, ‘Back in the arms of Boris’, Guardian (21 October 1993).
communists to power. But, despite some early insinuations to the contrary, the new government continued with foreign and security policies aimed at 'integration with Europe' and membership in NATO.

In October, after the coup attempt in Moscow, Yeltsin wrote a letter to heads of states which had taken part in the 'Two-Plus-Four' negotiations (the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) explaining that the membership of Central European countries in NATO could isolate Russia and that any enlargement of NATO must respect Russia's security interests. Following this statement, Les Aspin, the American defence secretary, presented the blueprint of the so-called Partnership for Peace during a NATO meeting in October 1993. For Central Europeans the timing of this appeared to be no coincidence: despite Western assurances to the contrary, PfP's launch is still considered a direct response to Yeltsin's letter. In November of the same year Yeltsin signed a decree putting into force a military doctrine which saw the expansion of military blocs and alliances as a potential cause of war. In December the Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski visited Washington D.C., and heard assurances from the American government that Russia would not have a right to veto the issue of his country's membership in NATO.

Hopes for Polish membership in NATO were fuelled by German support, albeit verbal in form. German Defence Minister Volker Rühe continued to emphasize that Poland could enter NATO as the first new member or as part of the first group. This did not depend on Russian attitudes, the minister claimed during a Warsaw meeting of the defence ministers of the Weimar Group (Poland, Germany, France) on 17 July 1994. According to Rühe, membership could be granted before the year 2000.

Poles see the German government as unlike the other EU countries in that it actually has an eastern dimension to its policy. But even German support is not seen as

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98 Anthony Robinson and Christopher Bobinski, 'Poland returns ex-communists to prominent role', Financial Times (20 September 1993).

99 Adam Lebor, 'Polish leaders cast doubt on entry to NATO', Times (21 September 1993).


full.\textsuperscript{102} Support from other countries has not been forthcoming, with the US giving mixed signals until the spring of 1995, and others flatly resisting plans for the expansion of NATO.

The January 1994 NATO summit endorsed two new initiatives which first had been put forward by the Americans at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers at Travemunde in October 1993: namely, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).\textsuperscript{103} PfP is open to all CSCE countries.\textsuperscript{104} In principle, it opens NATO to the possibility of new members without specifying when and how they might join. Thus, the PfP initiative did not in fact reflect the bolder plans discussed before the January 1994 Summit, which entailed that the Visegrad countries would be considered for NATO association or membership.\textsuperscript{105}

The PfP initiative met with a mixed reception, and Romania and Bulgaria were more enthusiastic than their northern neighbours, who had been hoping for more.\textsuperscript{106} In January 1994, during talks with Clinton's aides, Ambassador Madeleine Albright and General John Shalikashvili, Walesa claimed that Poland might reject the initiative if NATO did not state that Poland would certainly gain membership at some point in the future. The Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski summed up Polish concerns when he said that the Americans required Central Europeans to pursue a programme in order to be accepted as fellow NATO members, but left themselves the option to refuse

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\textsuperscript{102} Maria Wagrowska, 'Polska-Unia Europejska: Trudne narzeczenstwo' [Poland-European Union: difficult engagement], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (22 June 1994).

\textsuperscript{103} CJTFs are intended to make NATO's military structure flexible for regional tasks. The task forces can, if NATO is not willing to react, perform on a European level. Schmidt, 'European Defense Identity', p. 18. In addition to pragmatic considerations, CJTFs are intended to be an arrangement for cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries under the auspices of PfP. However, since the CJTFs proposal has been embraced by NATO, deliberations on specific arrangements have been deferred. Analysts indicate that the delay reflects the diverging interests of NATO members. 'NATO, Peacekeeping', p. 29.

\textsuperscript{104} For the Text of the Partnership for Peace invitation, see \textit{RFE/RL Research Report}, Vol. 3, No. 12 (25 March 1994), p. 22. For the list of NATO Partners up until June 1994, see \textit{NATO Review} No. 3 (June 94), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{105} 'NATO, Peacekeeping', p. 25.

to expand the institution.  

While Poland deliberated over the initiative and conducted reportedly 'sharp' discussion with NATO representatives, the Czechs and soon after also the Hungarians endorsed the proposal, and during the NATO summit of 10 January 1994 NATO member countries accepted it as an official programme. Shortly thereafter, during a meeting with Clinton in Prague, the leaders of all the Visegrad countries, including Poland, confirmed their acceptance of the PfP. Not having much choice, Poland signed the PfP on 2 February 1994. Nevertheless, the initiative remained controversial among Poles. In January 1995, Prime Minister Pawlak stated that Poland thought of the PfP as a step towards full NATO membership. Costs of the realization of the PfP programme are thus seen as an 'investment' in future NATO security guarantees.

The PfP was criticized by the Polish press for not providing a political defence against pressures from the Russian Federation. Since the Russian desire to create a 'grey zone' of security in Central Europe has not provoked an appropriate reaction on the part of Western powers, Poles are reminded of events surrounding the Yalta agreements. A Polish author reports that Polish diplomats find it disconcerting that according to the PfP document, admission of new members is to depend not only on their particular achievements and readiness, but also on NATO's judgement of the political and security situation in Europe as a whole. This situation implies some form of Russian veto.
over Polish foreign policy plans.

For Poles, the PfP cannot be analyzed apart from Russian attitudes towards Central European membership and affiliation with NATO\(^{113}\), or from the West’s inability or unwillingness to respond adequately to the changes in Europe.\(^{114}\) Indeed, even Western observers perceive that the proposal tries to avoid alienating Russia\(^{115}\). Although Russia’s Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared repeatedly that Russia would sign the PfP Framework document, others, including Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and other military officials, favoured the idea of signing it only if NATO allowed Russia to amend CFE-limits in the Southern Region and gave the country a special status within the PfP.

Eventually, during his visit to the May 1994 meeting of the NATO Defence Ministers, Pavel Grachev agreed to sign the PfP agreement. ‘In response, NATO members indicated that they would informally have a special relationship with Russia, giving them consultation beyond that offered by the PfP.’\(^{116}\) NATO’s commitment was acceptable to Poles only because they lacked alternatives, and the new situation did not alleviate their fears about the potential implications of Russia’s special status within the PfP. In fact, in December 1994, Russia’s Foreign Minister Kozyrev stunned NATO’s foreign ministers by briefly rejecting the partnership agreement on the grounds that NATO was planning to study the possibility of expanding into Central Europe.\(^{117}\)

Much has been written on the PfP, its advantages and disadvantages, and Central European responses to it. This section does not therefore aim to provide an in-depth discussion of the initiative. It is, however, necessary to note briefly that the PfP is expected to have an effect both on the way Central European countries cooperate with

\(^{113}\) Piotr Kołodziejczyk dla "Rzeczpospolitej": "Partnerstwo dla pokoju” nie może być droga donikąd’ [Piotr Kołodziejczyk for ‘Rzeczpospolita’: ‘Partnership for peace’ cannot be a road to nowhere], Rzeczpospolita (14 June 1994); ‘Oczekujemy partnerskiego traktowania. Wypowiedz Lecha Walezy dla PAP’ [We expect to be treated like partners. Statement of Lech Walesa for PAP], Polska Zbrojna (1 January 1994); Sylvester Walczak, ‘Strobe Talbott i jego doktryna: Człowiek, który zatrzymał NATO’ [Strobe Talbott and his doctrine: the man who stopped NATO], Rzeczpospolita (30 January 1994).

\(^{114}\) Maria Wagrowska, ‘Członkowstwo w sojuszu polnocnoatlantyckim: Daleki horyzont’ [Membership in the Northatlantic alliance: Distant horizon], Rzeczpospolita (7 January 1994).

\(^{115}\) ‘NATO, Peacekeeping’, p. 25.

\(^{116}\) Ibid., p. 27.

NATO and Western armies, and on the quality and quantity of relations among themselves. The PfP may even have the effect of inadvertently undermining sub-regional cooperation. One of the analysts involved in crafting the PfP blueprint, Charles Kupchan, wrote that insufficient focus on intraregional military cooperation was one of the initiative’s shortcomings. He argued that ‘the design of the partnership actually inhibits regional ties by encouraging neighbors to compete with each other in expanding their individual relationships with NATO and preparing for full membership.’

Although Poles continue to emphasize that NATO is the most significant organization for Polish security, there have been slight changes in their approach to NATO. Today there is concern about Western disputes concerning the role of the alliance, and the structure of European security architecture. In the West the debate over the place of Central Europe within the European security architecture is far from over, and this is considered threatening by Central Europeans. In addition, Central Europeans are concerned that the various Western security organizations and institutions are not interlocking, as it has often been suggested, but are actually in competition or even interblocking. The PfP has not alleviated these concerns. As an advisor to the Polish Foreign Minister stated, the PfP is a slow process, and its aims are not well set out.

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120 In a 1994 poll, 40% of the respondents stated that they expected Poland to be a NATO member within a few years. Another 12% expected membership ‘soon’, and 25% – in many years. Only 7% believed that Poland would not become a NATO member state. 71% believe that Poland should aim at membership in the organization, and only 9% that Poland should align with Russia or other East/Central European countries. See ‘Polacy o członkowstwie w NATO’ [Poles about NATO membership], Polska Zbrojna (9 August 1994).


123 Quoted in Maria Wagrowska, ‘Podpis pod “partnerstwem”’ [Signature under ‘partnership’], Rzeczpospolita (1 February 1994).
The Western European option: WEU/EU membership

In Europe, the end of the Cold War has brought a renewed interest in developing a Western European rather than an Atlantic approach to security. The desire of Western European countries to anchor Germany by means of European integration and their aspiration to create an out-of-area capability have been the main reasons for this phenomenon. Proposals for expanding the European role in the realm of security focus on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to deal with both the political and the economic facets of security; and on defence policy, linking the WEU and the EU.

WEU membership: Initially denied membership in NATO, Central Europeans began to explore the possibility of turning the Western European Union into a pan-European security framework. Accordingly, they expressed their interest in institutional affiliation and membership but applied less pressure on these organizations than on NATO.

Polish decision-makers indeed considered the WEU as one - but not the main - tool available to accomplish the task of overcoming the division of Europe. This approach echoed Western debates about the future of the organization. Poland continued to emphasize the significance of the American presence in Europe, and thus also the desire to see NATO and the WEU as compatible and not as competing organizations. The growing emphasis on cooperation with the WEU, however, was mainly a function of disappointment about the progress of integration into NATO.

The WEU interested Poland and the other Visegrad countries on three counts. Firstly, it did not seek close relations with Russia, and created fora for Central Europeans without Russian participation. In addition, Central European membership in the WEU was considered less provocative to Moscow than membership in NATO. And indeed, Poland's rapprochement with the WEU did not provoke an angry Russian reaction.

124 Schmidt, 'European Security and Defense Identity'.

125 Steinberg, 'Role of European Institutions', p. 4.


Nevertheless, Polish policy-makers foresee the possibility of such reactions in the future. Unlike NATO, the WEU was prepared to differentiate among former NSWTO countries and the successor states of the Soviet Union. It did not, however, make a distinction between Visegrad countries and other Central European countries, for which it was criticized by Polish observers.

Secondly, it offered prospects of stronger guarantees than NATO. The 1948 Brussels Treaty and the 1954 Amended Brussels Treaty (on which the WEU is based) provided a firmer security guarantee than does the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty). And thirdly, under Maastricht Treaty provisions, links with the WEU could be translated into links with other European organizations.

According to the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU plays what Peter Schmidt calls the role of a *passe-partout*. It works as a possible defence arm of the EU, as well as a European pillar within NATO. In addition, according to the 1992 Petersberg

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133 The Treaty on European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty) was agreed by the Heads of State and Government of the EC at Maastricht on 11 December 1991. The EC and WEU decided to enhance the capabilities of the WEU and agreed that it should become a component of the EC’s political union. Implicit in the Maastricht formulation was some unspecified role for the WEU in the NATO area. Steinberg, ‘Role of European Institutions’, pp. 6-7.

The Treaty was signed in February 1992, ratified by all members, and came into force in November 1993. See also SIPRI *Yearbook 1994*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 217-220. Until the ratification of the Treaty, the WEU focused on its relations with NATO. See ‘WEU in the process of European Union - reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council’, *Assembly of Western European Union Document* 1417 (10 May 1994), p. 4. According to the WEU Secretary General, despite the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions, in 1994 it continues to be unclear whether the WEU will take on a role in the formation of the foreign policy in the context of the EU. See also *Atlantic News* No. 2531 (4 June 1993).

According to Jane Sharp, the Central Europeans initially preferred the WEU to be associated with the EC, since EC membership would automatically mean WEU membership. By October 1991, the EC’s door seemed to be closing, and Central Europeans began to give preference to joining NATO. See Sharp, ‘Security options’, p. 57.
Declaration\textsuperscript{134} it can play a role in all UN actions. It can also be used by members states in the case of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN’s Charter.

On the other hand, there were several reasons why the WEU seemed less suitable than NATO to Central Europeans. Firstly, it did not assure a North American presence in Europe. Secondly, it had no military capabilities. Indeed, its real contribution to European security remains uncertain: While its Maastricht provisions sound impressive, they are largely of a hypothetical nature, as the WEU lacks military resources.\textsuperscript{135} This state of affairs can theoretically be changed by CJTFs, but it is not clear how this new mechanism would be used in practice. Thirdly, the WEU’s links to NATO and the EU were vague. And finally, as discussed below, the WEU failed to develop a clear strategy aimed at Central Europe, and opted for the creation of yet another ‘discussion club’.

The WEU’s response to the changes in the European order roughly followed three stages. It first decided to establish bilateral information links with nine Central European countries; then it conducted multilateral discussions in the Forum for Consultation; and finally it offered the status of ‘associate partners’ to Central European countries in May 1994.\textsuperscript{136} The first phase concentrated on dialogue and the exchange of information. Poland established its first contacts with the WEU when its Foreign Minister participated in an extraordinary session of the WEU Assembly in Luxembourg in March 1990. There, he emphasized the importance of the WTO for his country, and spoke of the need to create a pan-European security framework, while affirming that Poland was interested in developing links with the WEU.

In April 1990, at the Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels, the Presidency and the Secretary General of the WEU were asked to initiate contacts to exchange information with the new governments in Central and Eastern Europe. These contacts were established in the form of fact-finding missions first to the Visegrad countries, and later to other parts of Central Europe. Poland was visited by the WEU Secretary General William van Eekelen in July 1990 for the first time. The focus of Polish relations with the WEU at that stage involved the intensification of dialogue, rather than the creation

\textsuperscript{134} ‘Petersberg Declaration’, Bonn, WEU Council of Ministers (19 June 1992).


of official institutional links. This emphasis on dialogue reflected Polish security concerns and Poland’s initial decision to pursue gradual re-integration with Europe, as well as the WEU’s caution. It is for these reasons that when cooperation began, it centred on the WEU’s fora for discussion (the Assembly, and the newly created Institute for Security Studies) rather than on the Council (the WEU’s main decision-making body).

The Secretary General visited Poland again in March 1991. This time, security issues were on the agenda. The first meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU members and their Central European counterparts took place in June 1992. During the meeting a formal framework for regular meetings of this kind was established. Although Polish interest in the WEU was clear, the debate about the future role and functions of the WEU made it initially difficult to see it as a source of viable security guarantees.

The second phase of Polish relations with the WEU focused on bilateral discussions and culminated in a new status for Poland as a Consultation Partner. It was not until June 1992, when the WEU offered the six NSWTO countries and the three Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) the status of Consultation Partners, that formal multilateral contacts with the region’s countries were established. The Forum for Consultation focused on discussions about 'the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament'. The Forum’s task was 'to get to know each other better', rather than to provide security guarantees. The first consultation meeting of the permanent representatives on the WEU Council and the heads of Central European missions took place on 14 October 1992 at

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137 The WEU Assembly is a consultive body. It developed a framework for dialogue with Central European parliamentarians. However, its powers are limited. See for example 'Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum for Consultation', Assembly of Western European Union Document 1414 (4 May 1994); Podraza, 'The Western European Union' p. 25. Deputy Longin Pastusiak (Head of the Polish delegation to the spring 1994 session of the WEU Assembly) said in June 1994 that 'the status of a permanent observer, granted Poland by the Assembly of the Western European Union, is unsatisfactory.' See 'Chronicle, June 1994', Materials and Documents 7-8 (1994), p. 565. The Polish delegation could not vote, participate actively in the various Committees, or amend reports.

138 Consequently, reflecting the Western debate on the future tasks of the WEU, the November 1992 Polish defense doctrine states that Poland follows 'with interest' the development of the organization. It sees the WEU as an eventual military structure of the EC (EU) and at the same time the European section of NATO. Accordingly, Poland is to gain in it a status corresponding to that within the EC (EU). See Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 13.

the WEU Secretariat in London.\textsuperscript{140}

While Poland expressed appreciation for the chance for dialogue with the WEU countries, it was clear that Poles were not satisfied with this arrangement. Poland’s Prime Minister stated that ‘such consultations do not take advantage of all existing opportunities for our cooperation.’\textsuperscript{141} And the Foreign Minister Skubiszewski called the arrangement ‘rather weak’.\textsuperscript{142} Poland was ‘interested in obtaining a formal status with that institution’\textsuperscript{143} and felt that its requests for association were brushed aside and, moreover, that the organization’s earlier political declarations had indicated a greater interest in close cooperation.\textsuperscript{144} Polish interest in formal status, however, actually increased following the January 1994 NATO decisions.\textsuperscript{145}

Poland also attempted to join the WEU’s Eurocorps\textsuperscript{146}. The prospect of Polish soldiers entering the Eurocorps was seen by Polish policy-makers as a step toward the realization of military integration.\textsuperscript{147} Nevertheless, today Polish membership in the Eurocorps seems rather unlikely, although Secretary General van Eekelen affirmed in

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\item[^{140}] van Eekelen, ‘WEU’s Approach to Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 7.
\item[^{143}] ‘Address by Mr. Lech Walesa, President of the Republic of Poland to the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal, Lisbon, 12th May 1993’, \textit{Materials and Documents} Vol. 2, No. 5 (1993), p. 125.
\item[^{144}] Ibid., p. 325.
\item[^{145}] Ibid., p. 325.
\item[^{146}] The Eurocorps is part of the WEU, and potentially the nucleus of a European army. It comprises units from 5 WEU countries. It was formally established in November 1993. See for example: ‘Wspolne akcje sa mozliwe’ [Common operations are possible], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (13 October 1994), and Giovanni de Briganti, ‘Eurocorps May Include Polish Troops’, \textit{Defense News} (7-13 March 1994); ‘Wystapienie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego na Spotkaniu Ministerialnym Forum Kosultacyjnego UZE w Sprawie Rozwoju Stosunkow Pomiedzy UZE i Partnerami Konsultacji. Rzym, 20 maja 1993 r.’ [Statement by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski at the Ministerial Meeting of the WEU Consultation Forum on Development of Relations between WEU and Consultation Partners. Rome, 20 May 1993], \textit{Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents} 2 (1993), p. 140.
\item[^{147}] de Weydenthal, ‘Poland Builds Security Links’, p. 29.
October 1994 that, theoretically, Poland could participate in WEU military operations.\textsuperscript{148} And in the Spring of 1994, France and Germany invited Poland to send observers to the Eurocorps.\textsuperscript{149}

The third phase of Polish-WEU relations, beginning in May 1994, brought the Kirchberg Declaration, in which the WEU offered its consulting partners the status of 'associate partners.'\textsuperscript{150} This new status reflects the Europe Agreements of the Central European countries with the EU. According to the WEU Secretary-General, 'the links with the EU are, and will increasingly be, a criterion in the development of WEU's relations with Central European countries.'\textsuperscript{151} The new status allows Central European countries to attend Council meetings and to be regularly briefed on the activities of its working groups. They may be invited to attend these groups, but only on an ad hoc basis. They are also given the opportunity to set up a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell. They will be permitted to participate in exercises and exercise planning 'unless otherwise decided by the majority of member States'. They will also be requested to specify which units of their armed forces may be used in WEU operations. This arrangement will not be extended to former SU countries.\textsuperscript{152}

WEU's initiatives have been condoned by all Central European countries, but have provoked only sparing commentaries, and little political attention. Generally speaking, it is accepted in Central Europe that associate partnership will have little effect on the military security of the NSWTO countries. Longin Pastusiak, the Head of the parliamentary delegation to the WEU Assembly, called the new status 'unsatisfactory'\textsuperscript{153}, and Polish media observers called it 'a door barely ajar'.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{148} See 'Wspolne akcje sa mozliwe'.

\textsuperscript{149} de Briganti, 'Eurocorps'.

\textsuperscript{150} The offer provides the option to attend some of the WEU meetings. Partners will have the right to speak but not to veto decisions. The agreement does not allow partners to be able to call emergency meetings. They have the right (but not the duty) to participate in WEU actions, for example peace-keeping operations. The new status does not provide any security guarantees, and does not offer prospects for full membership. See Declaration. WEU Council of Ministers, Luxembourg (22 November 1993): 'Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation', Assembly of Western European Union Document 1414 (4 May 1994).

\textsuperscript{151} van Eekelen, 'WEU's Approach to Central and Eastern Europe', p. 7.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{153} 'Polska-UZE: Wspolpraca, ale nie wystarczajaca' [Poland-WEU: Cooperation, but not sufficient].
Nevertheless, according to Jacek Czaputowicz, an advisor to the Polish Foreign Minister, WEU associate partnership status is of psychological significance.\textsuperscript{155} And it is probably for this reason more than anything else that Central Europeans continue to press for full membership in WEU. The WEU is considered appealing mainly for its Maastricht links to NATO and EU. Currently, it is not seen as an alternative to NATO, unless it can be treated as its European pillar. Poland’s Prime Minister stated in February 1994 that his country regards ‘NATO and the WEU, consonant with the intentions of their members, as complementary organisations working to achieve the same basic objectives’.\textsuperscript{156}

Despite its links to NATO and the EU, however, the WEU’s approaches to Central Europe differ significantly from those of NATO\textsuperscript{157} and the EU\textsuperscript{158}, making it difficult to foresee the shape and force of the WEU eventual involvement in that part of the world. Not surprisingly, there are concerns that these differing institutional arrangements are ultimately incompatible. For example it is not clear how a non-NATO member could become a full WEU member\textsuperscript{159} without making the WEU a ‘back door’ into NATO.

**EU membership:** Central Europeans occasionally mention the European Union (EU) itself as a potential source of security guarantees.\textsuperscript{160} The Polish November 1992 defence doctrine specifies that future membership in the EC (now the EU) is of paramount importance both in terms of economics and of security. This document argues for a further deepening of European economic and political integration and for the

\textsuperscript{154} ‘Europa Srodkowa-Unia Zachodnioeuropejska: Drzwi ledwie uchylone’ [Central Europe: Western European Union: Door slightly ajar], Rzeczpospolita (23 November 1993).

\textsuperscript{155} Czaputowicz, ‘Szczegolny moment’.

\textsuperscript{156} Pawlak, ‘Statement at the Permanent Council of the Western European Union’, p. 324.

\textsuperscript{157} NATO established institutionalized links with all post-WTO states. The WEU on the other hand privileges possible new EU members (currently nine countries which either concluded or are expected to conclude association agreements). See Schmidt, ‘European Defense Identity’, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{158} The WEU preceded the EU in initiating contacts with Central European countries by inviting nine of them to take part in the Consultation Forum. The EU has institutional links with only six of them. The Baltic countries have to date no Europe agreements similar to those signed by the Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and Romania. ‘The evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU’, Assembly of Western European Union Document 1410 (23 March 1994), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{159} ‘The evolution of NATO’, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{160} See for example Jaroslaw Drozd and Jaroslaw Mrozek, ‘Polityka bezpieczenstwa Wspolnot Europejskich - w poszukiwaniu nowego wymianu’ [The security policy of European Communities - searching for a new dimension], Studia i Materiały 59 (February 1993), pp. 22-24.
One main advantage of the EU option is that Russia does not object to either the deepening and widening policy of the EU, including security and defence, or to Central European membership in it. Nevertheless, Russia’s positive approach to the EU could easily change rapidly.

Although on 16 December 1991 Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland signed separate but identical agreements of association with the EC, these did not come into force until 1 February 1994. These agreements are mainly of an economic nature and do not specify future EC membership as a consequence of association, but rather hold it open as a possibility. The problem with the Europe Agreements, according to one Polish commentator, is that they had been negotiated before there were any prospects of Central European membership. This affected the way that the EC approached trade with the region’s countries.

The agreements are treated by the Polish side as 'the last phase before membership'. Although a clause in the preamble to the agreement between the EC and Poland states that membership is a Polish objective, this section was only included at the final stage of negotiations due to Central European insistence. For Poland the fact that no conditions for membership, procedure or timetable were established makes the agreement problematic. Jolanta Adamiec says that 'actually, if we take precisely the wording of the treaty the membership remains an objective for Poland, but not for the

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161 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 13.


163 ‘Umowy o Stowarzyszeniu Polski, Czechosłowacji i Węgier ze Wspólnoty Europejskiej’ [Agreements on Association of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary with the European Community], in Polskie Drogi do Wspólnoty Europejskiej. (Gliwice: Wokół Nas, 1993); ‘Przemówienie Wicepremiera RP Leszka Balcerowicza z okazji podpisania umowy o stowarzyszeniu ze Wspólnotą Europejską, Bruksela, 16 grudnia 1991 r.’, [Speech by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz at the signing of the association agreement with the European Community. Brussels, 16 December 1991], Zbior Dokumentów/Recueil de Documents 2 (1992); Zdzisław Wołodkiewicz-Donimirski, ‘Realizacja Układu o stowarzyszeniu ze Wspólnotami Europejskimi’ [Realization of the Treaty on association with Economic Communities], Biuro Studiów i Ekspertyz Informacyjna nr. 158, 1-158 (December 1993).

Community. Following the association agreement, Polish officials expressed the desire for EC/EU membership on numerous occasions. These statements were accompanied by a criticism of Western Europe’s lack of vision in its relations with Central Europe.

On 8 April 1994, eight days after the Hungarian application for full EU membership was submitted, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski applied for full EU membership for his country. The application was widely understood to be of a declarative character. There has been no formal EU answer to the application so far. Polish diplomats, however, think that negotiations could start as soon as 1996, with membership granted by the year 2000. ‘Given that membership talks will take years to conclude, Poland wants the Union to commit to a review of relations in 1996 that would lead to negotiations’, said Jan Kulakowski, Polish ambassador to the European Union. Among Polish priorities now is the attainment of observer status for the intergovernmental conference to review the Maastricht Treaty in 1996.

The Polish pressure to begin negotiations is partly a reflection of German efforts to promote Central European membership in Western organizations and institutions. Poles however were also aware that a number of countries was waiting to be admitted to the EU. Moreover, Poles expected the admission of Austria, Sweden, and Finland in January 1995 to slow down the process of Central Europe’s integration with the EU.

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166 See for example Ewa Szymanska, 'Olechowski w USA: Europejczycy bez wizji' [Olechowski in the USA: Europeans without vision], Rzeczpospolita (26 January 1994).

167 ‘Statement by Mr. Andrzej Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on Poland’s application for accession to the European Union at the sitting of the Diet of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 7th April, 1994’, Materials and Documents 3-4 (1994); ‘Polska złożyła wniosek o członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej: Marzenie na lata’ [Poland filed an application for membership in European Union: Dreams for years], Rzeczpospolita (9-10 April 1994).

168 Maria Wagrowska, ‘Sygnał dla Zachodu’ [Signal for the West], Rzeczpospolita (30 March 1994).


172 This section is based on Artur Bilski, ‘W kolejce do Europy’ [In queue to Europe], Polska Zbrojna (28 September 1994).
They fear that the new members could treat the EU as nothing more than a free trade area, or that they could push first for membership for the Baltic republics. Indeed, poorer southern countries could even attempt to block further admissions altogether. Also, in a larger EU it will be more difficult to achieve unanimity on the question of new members. None of the countries on their way into the EU have declared that they would be eager to include Poland as a partner. This, however, is not surprising: in many areas, the former EFTA countries compete economically with Central Europeans.\textsuperscript{173}

In the West, the institutional debate centres on the possibilities of variable speeds and concentric circles for the existing EU members\textsuperscript{174}. According to one report, 'Polish ... officials say they welcome this debate on "variable geometry" because it makes East European aspirations to become members of the EU more credible.'\textsuperscript{175} However, there is concern that if the French and the Germans are prepared to leave other West European countries behind in their drive for integration, they might well be prepared to be even more brutal concerning Central Europeans.

At the EU summit in Essen on December 9th and 10th 1994, a pre-accession strategy for the Central European partners was accepted by the member countries. One of the points of this proposal is a paper which defines areas where Central Europeans must adapt their legislation to EU standards. But, this process is not linked to any firm promises on the part of the EU. Poland does not consider this development a significant step forward, according to Jerzy Wojciechowski, head of the legal department of Poland's European Integration Office, since Poles have their own white paper on changes required to make their legal system correspond to EU standards. According to Wojciechowski, his office calculates that all the work required could be concluded in about five or six years.\textsuperscript{176} In his opinion, then, the EU's strategy will not substantially speed up a process that Poland has already begun.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{173} Wagrowska, 'Polska-Unia Europejska'.

\textsuperscript{174} The German Christian Democrats put forward a proposal to create a 'hard core' of five nations in a multi-speed EU. The French Prime Minister Balladur suggested a 'three-tier' Europe with the French and Germans at its core. Lionel Barber and James Blitz, 'Kohl plays down plan for multi-speed EU'. \textit{Financial Times} (6 September 1994).

\textsuperscript{175} Lionel Barber, 'Measuring up for a wider EU', \textit{The Financial Times} (27 September 1994).

\textsuperscript{176} 'Laying down the law', \textit{Economist} (10 December 1994).

\textsuperscript{177} 'Byc blizej siebie' [To be closer to each other], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (30 December 1994), 'Strategia i kalendarz' [Strategy and calendar], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (12 December 1994).
Poland’s relations with the EU have been likened to a protracted engagement. A Polish commentator asks why, if there is going to be a ‘wedding’ between Poland and the EU, has it not been announced, and no date been set.\footnote{Wagrowska, ‘Polska-Unia Europejska’.} Polish Prime Minister Pawlak argued that ‘if Poland remains outside [the EU], this could slow integration and could create instability in the countries around the European Union’.\footnote{Buerkle, ‘EU Joins NATO’.} And Polish knocking on the EU door has recently become louder as a result of disappointment with NATO initiatives.

Yet, this impatience mainly reflects Poland’s interests in the economic sphere. The EU does not yet have a clear security role except in stabilizing economies and political systems. As far as security more generally is concerned, the EU established links with the WEU and created a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agreed under the Maastricht Treaty.

The first CFSP action undertaken, and so far the only diplomatic initiative challenging NACC/PfP, was the decision to back the Stability Pact initiative (also known as the Balladur proposal, named after its creator)\footnote{The French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur first presented his Memorandum, ‘Proposed European Stability Pact’, to the June 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen. For the text of the initial proposal, see ‘French Proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe’, SIPRI Yearbook 1994. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1994), pp. 247-249.}. This initiative was aimed at stabilizing the Central European region by backing the conclusion of bilateral treaties between states experiencing tensions related to minority or ethnic issues. Its implicit objective was to revive the failing credibility of the EU’s foreign policy-making process which had suffered due to events in the former Yugoslavia\footnote{The EU is the definitive loser in the ‘organizational contest’ in the former Yugoslavia. Because of its lack of military capabilities and slow decision-making mechanisms, the EU is not perceived to be able to deal with already destabilized, conflict-ridden areas.}, and to create a stimulus for the Maastricht Treaty’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).\footnote{‘NATO, Peacekeeping’, p. 30.}

The Pact was to have the form of a set of agreements signed by all the participants in two regional tables (Central Europe and the Baltics). It involved nine countries - Slovenia alone was not invited to the Paris conference. The CSCE would observe the
execution of decisions taken in the agreements.\textsuperscript{183}

The Pact was seen in Central Europe as a 'supplementary measure.' Because the plan was endorsed by the EU, all of the Central European countries pledged to participate in the conference - but without enthusiasm. They criticized the plan because they considered it vague, based on inadequate provisions of international law, and more importantly, because it concentrated solely on Central and Eastern European 'hot-spots', even though numerous Western European countries face similar ethnic and secessionist problems.\textsuperscript{184} In addition, Poles suspected that if the initiative failed it would be used by the EU as an 'alibi' to delay full membership for Central Europeans.\textsuperscript{185} Thus, all Central European governments reason that European integration with a strong Atlantic component is a better answer to the region's problems than bilateral treaties proposed by the Balladur plan.

According to an advisor to the Polish Foreign Minister, Poland chose to treat the Pact as a step towards EU membership. Poland considered itself to have regulated all bilateral issues prior to the Pact, and thus, irritated by being placed in the same group as countries with more serious minority problems, offered to share its experiences with other countries rather than to participate in the negotiations.\textsuperscript{186} Following the March 1995 signing of the Pact, Polish officials stated that they were 'satisfied' with the conference, because against expectation, 'it has not hurt our interests'.\textsuperscript{187} Polish commentators pointed out however that the Pact did not tackle any Central European problems.\textsuperscript{188}

Polish Prime Minister Pawlak coined the idea of 'Partnership for Development' based on NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative - aimed at reproducing the PfP on an economic level with the EU. He first presented the idea during the Prague meeting of

\textsuperscript{183} Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment'.

\textsuperscript{184} Maria Wagrowska, 'Dwie niewiadome' [Two unknowns], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (20 March 1995).

\textsuperscript{185} Maria Wagrowska, 'Nasza patronka Unia Europejska' [Our patron European Union], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (30 May 1994).

\textsuperscript{186} During the Paris meeting Olechowski presented a document describing how Poland dealt with problems which the Pact attempts to tackle. See Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment'; Wagrowska, 'Dwie niewiadome'.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{188} Piotr Kasznia, 'Pakt o stabilnosci przyjety, problemy pozostaly' [Pact about stability accepted, problems stayed], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (22 March 1995).
6. Summary and conclusions

Poland was slow to abandon the WTO after 1989. In an initial period of confused foreign policies, a discussion of the viability of neutrality took place. This option however was only briefly debated seriously. While Hungary pondered this foreign policy option, Poland was preoccupied with border negotiations with Germany, during which it preferred to remain within the WTO. Once the border issue was settled, it became clear that more satisfying foreign policy alternatives than the WTO were available. Significantly, however, neutrality continues to find some support on the Polish political spectrum.

Following this brief debate, Poland’s elites debated a number of foreign policy options. The concept of collective pan-European security based on the CSCE was considered, but, like neutrality, failed to offer any real reassurance. Poland considered that such a framework was still very distant, and focused instead on membership in military alliances. Some Polish observers believed that neutrality and collective security actually had the same implications for Polish security, effectively leaving the country without security guarantees. Poles expect the CSCE to continue to play a role concerning both the former Soviet Union, and arms control, but Russia’s plan to strengthen the CSCE at the expense of NATO is unacceptable to Poles, since only existence of a strong NATO is seen as a guarantee of stability.

Poland established contacts with NATO relatively late, but came to see it as an important ingredient of the stability and balance of power in Europe. Consequently, NATO’s decision not to accept new members but rather to create NACC and the Partnership for Peace was considered disappointing. Poles saw the two initiatives as ‘discussion clubs’ and pushed instead for time-tables, requirements and concrete commitments to the acceptance of new members. Poland feared Russian interference in this process.

The WEU was under less pressure to give guarantees to Central European countries since it was not seen as an alternative to NATO, but at best a complementary

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189 Wagrowska, 'Partnerstwo - jedyna droga'.

190 See for example Towpik in Biuletyn, p. 12.
organization. The WEU created a Forum for Consultation, and eventually granted associate partnership status to Central European countries. Neither has stirred much attention, and except for a psychological effect they have no direct impact on the region’s security.

EU membership is occasionally considered by Central Europeans to be a matter not only of economics but of security. The Poles and their neighbours have encountered two problems in dealing with the EU. First, the process of accession is proving to be protracted and uncertain. Second, the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy has so far been anything but successful, making it clear to Central Europeans that no immediate guarantees should be expected from the EU.

Despite the fact that the Western orientation of Polish foreign and security policy is supported by almost all political forces in the country, other concepts live on in the Polish political spectrum. Membership in a cultural, economic and political Europe is not universally accepted.\(^{191}\) Polls suggest that about one tenth (10\%) of Poles believe that the country should align with Russia or other East/Central European countries.\(^{192}\) The Western orientation is rejected by nationalist forces, but these constitute a small section of the Polish political spectrum.

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\(^{192}\) See ‘Polacy o członkowstwie’.
CHAPTER EIGHT

EXISTING SUBREGIONAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS

1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on Polish approaches to the most successful existing subregional structure in Central Europe, the Visegrad Group (VG, also called Visegrad Four or V4), consisting of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics. It also takes into account Polish views of the Central European Initiative (CEI, previously Pentagonale and Hexagonale). All VG countries are simultaneously also CEI members. Indeed, the Visegrad Group has been occasionally described as 'an inner core' of the CEI. It is for this reason that the CEI, although basically an economic arrangement, will be included in this analysis. Nevertheless, the CEI, which has Western members, differs from the VG which comprises only Central European members and is mainly a vehicle for management of links with Western countries.

This chapter does not consider Baltic cooperation for two reasons. First, Baltic cooperation structures include large powers Germany and Russia, and thus do not conform to the definition of subregional cooperation frameworks. This thesis understands such structures to consist only of small and medium-size countries (see Chapter One). Second, the Baltic Council and other forms of cooperation among Baltic states specifically exclude the treatment of security issues.¹ Thus, Baltic cooperation, although certainly an interesting aspect of post-Cold War Europe, does not represent what this

thesis defines as a subregional security cooperation framework.²

The first section focuses on the potential benefits of subregional security frameworks for Poland. This chapter then provides a brief description of the history of the Visegrad Group and the CEI. In the third section, the chapter discusses issues which hinder both frameworks in their development into viable subregional security cooperation structures. It focuses on three kinds of constraints: limitations originating within the region; restrictions stemming from the approaches of Western organizations; and, finally, pressures generated by East and Central European countries which are not members of these two frameworks. The fifth section discusses specifically Polish attitudes towards subregional cooperation frameworks. Finally, the chapter briefly explores the future of subregional cooperation in Central Europe.

2. Potential Benefits of Subregional Security Cooperation

Situated between a unified Germany and disintegrating post-Soviet republics and conscious of the potential for ethnic conflict in the region, Central Europeans are aware that none of the region's countries can currently assure their sovereignty and security by 'going it alone'. Furthermore, Central European countries cannot individually bear the costs of achieving military compatibility with NATO. Aside from the issue of the military potential of neighbouring countries, the inability of these states to assure their own security is at least partly a result of the common legacy of membership in the militarily-integrated Warsaw Treaty Organization. Following the collapse of this alliance, Central European deployment patterns and defence doctrines were replaced, technologies acquired, and defensive capabilities, especially air defence, strengthened. The reorganization and upgrading of military forces is actually necessary to deal with the new de facto security vacuum. Clearly, in this situation subregional security cooperation could not provide a viable security guarantee, but could improve the military capabilities of the Visegrad countries.

Subregional cooperation frameworks could also affect the political weight of these countries in the international arena. It would show the West that these countries can act collectively and collaborate among themselves, thus demonstrating their ability and

² For more information on the issue of Baltic cooperation, see Zdzislaw Galicki and Janusz Jezioranski, 'Wspolpraca regionalna i transgraniczna w strefie Morza Baltyckiego (aspekty polityczne, gospodarcze i prawne)' [Regional and transborder cooperation in the Baltic Sea area (political, economic, and legal aspects)], BSE Raport 43 (May 1993).
willingness to cooperate within the framework of Western multilateral organizations. For example, after the negotiations of the European Agreements, it was suggested that the Central European countries would have achieved better results if they had coordinated their approaches and insisted on being treated as 'one basket'. A similar discussion arose after the V4 individually announced their attitudes towards the American proposal for the NATO Partnership for Peace.

In addition, subregional frameworks would link Poland with its neighbours to the South, thereby potentially cutting across the dreaded East-West axis, and creating security and economic links with countries which are not perceived to be threatening to Polish security or sovereignty. In fact, economic and political differences between Poland and its southern neighbours are lessening, thus improving chances for subregional cooperation. And for Poland, cooperation with southern countries could be advantageous because, as one Polish observer indicates, in not having to cope with traditional geopolitical problems, Poland would have the opportunity to pursue a foreign policy based on national interests.

Finally, a subregional framework in Central Europe could be used as a basis for settling problems relating to border disputes and the problems of ethnic minorities. In other words, the Visegrad Group might function as a regional 'policeman' exerting 'peer pressure'. This effect could extend to include other countries in the region, and might serve as stabilizing example.

3. Brief history

The Central European Initiative (CEI)

The CEI grew out of a meeting of the foreign ministers of Italy, Austria and Hungary in Budapest on 11 November 1989. With the membership of Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia it became the Pentagonale Group, renamed the

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5 Ryszard Zieba, '"Nowy regionalizm" w Europie a Polska' ['New regionalism' in Europe and Poland], Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1-2 (1992), p. 43.
Hexagonale after Poland joined in July 1991. The Hexagonale took into account the disintegration of Yugoslavia at a special meeting in Venice in November 1991, and accepted all of the Yugoslav successor states with the exception of the rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) as members. In March 1992, the CEI Foreign Ministers agreed not to extend membership to Belorus, Bulgaria, Romania, or Ukraine for the time being. However, they invited experts from these countries to join the CEI working groups. In March 1994, in order to strengthen contacts with these countries, the Foreign Ministers created a Council of Association which convenes High Officials, Foreign Ministers, and Prime Ministers. The Council held its first meeting in Rome on 24 July 1994. In this context, it is also worth noting that Bavaria is playing an increasingly active role in CEI's working groups.

An inaugural CEI meeting in early August 1990 implied the existence of common interests in economic, and environmental issues, and in human rights, as well as a shared concern for regional stability. In addition to working as a framework for economic and political cooperation, the organization was intended to tackle issues relating to military cooperation. However, the security dimension has not been on the agenda of this subregional structure, although its member states have indeed felt compelled to discuss security problems like the Yugoslav crisis.

Originally, this framework emphasized purely economic cooperation. However, the CEI is not, at least according to its declarations, striving toward economic integration. Projects are financed nationally, through the EU's PHARE program or the assistance of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The CEI tackles concrete subregional infrastructure projects. Projects are carried out by a number of working groups, including ones focusing on the EU, the CSCE (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and ethnic minorities. There are also consultations concerning some specific issues of migration. The framework is not institutionalized, and has no budget and no

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secretariat (although an Austrian proposal to create one in Vienna was discussed in 1993). Its presidency rotates on an annual basis. Consultations are conducted at the level of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. Since 1990, the CEI has also had a parliamentary dimension, with CEI parliamentarians meeting alongside the summits. Recently the CEI’s economic tasks have been dwarfed by the dramatic collapse of Yugoslavia, the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czechoslovakia, and issues relating to Hungarian minorities abroad. As a result some politicians have criticized the CEI for mixing economic cooperation and minority issues. For many member states, the CEI should remain an economic framework,

Indeed, it is true that the prominent issue of national minorities plays a divisive role in the forum. CEI states have for a while been attempting to reach a common position on the minority question. At the organization’s summit in Trieste in March 1994, Slovakia, backed by the Czech Republic and Poland, voiced reservations about a draft proposal concerning the treatment of minorities. Their reasons for these doubts included the perceived need to follow European standards, rather than specific subregional norms, and concerns about the political and territorial implications of the idea of collective minority rights.

The Yugoslav conflict began to interfere with the functioning of the group as long ago as late 1991. This crisis has since been one of the most urgent issues discussed within the group. In fact, member countries have had conflicting ideas about possible solutions to the conflict which has virtually paralysed the CEI. Eventually, all Central European governments agreed to follow the decisions and measures of Western
organizations regarding the Yugoslav crisis. However, as the West was gradually drawn into the conflict and began to pursue increasingly interventionist policies, Central European support for specific policies adopted by the international community began to vary considerably from country to country, and from measure to measure, reflecting particular domestic concerns. Indeed, it has become painfully obvious that the countries grouped together in the Central European Initiative have widely different geostrategic concerns, interests, and historical sensitivities.

In 1993, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus publicly questioned the raison d'être of the CEI. A discussion about the proper tasks of the organization at the July 1993 CEI summit exposed the weaknesses of the CEI framework. Most notably, member countries failed to answer one vital question, which was how the Central European partners should deal with the issue of NATO's expansion. At this summit, members agreed that the CEI needed a new set of goals. The results of this on-going process have yet to emerge.

Visegrad Group

In 1989, the American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed the creation of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation (see Chapter Three for the historical concept and Five for Brzezinski's proposal). While the Poles were relatively responsive to this idea, Czechoslovak leaders proposed instead the creation of a loose trilateral framework in January 1990. The new leaders, whose links as former dissidents made them responsive to suggestions of cooperation, reacted favourably to the idea.

The most prominent Central European subregional group which then emerged was the Visegrad Group, which comprises the Czech and Slovak Republics (Czechoslovakia until January 1993), Poland and Hungary - the so-called V4 countries. Visegrad remains more of an ad hoc initiative than an institution: it has no permanent seat, or secretariat; its affairs are often based on bilateral, rather than on multilateral agreements; and its members seem determined not to let Visegrad activities interfere with their plans to join

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16 Reisch, 'Central European Initiative', p. 32.

17 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 28.
Euro-Atlantic frameworks.\textsuperscript{18}

The first manifestation of formal cooperation among the founding states (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) was a summit meeting in Bratislava in April 1990. It was ill-timed, since the three participating countries were then at different stages of the political reform process, and it produced very few tangible results. Pal Dunay claims that it was the WTO summit in Moscow on 7 June 1990, that actually triggered Visegrad cooperation, since there the countries voiced the common desire to convene an extraordinary session of the Consultative Committee of the WTO in order to review the organization.\textsuperscript{19}

In February 1991, the second summit meeting took place at Visegrad on the Hungarian-Slovak border. After the group's rocky start in Bratislava, this meeting was comparatively successful. Indeed, the brief Visegrad Declaration issued at this summit is still seen as the 'manifesto' of the subregional framework. This joint statement of cooperation listed as its members' common goals independence, and freedom as well as the modern market economy and parliamentary democracy. In addition, the Declaration saw 'the total integration into the European political, economic, security, and legislative order' as an aim of all the member countries.\textsuperscript{20} It stated too that members 'shall consult on questions concerning their security', and addressed minority rights.

Yet, the Visegrad summit has actually been evaluated as a conscious decision to refrain from dealing with security problems within a subregional alliance, and hence as the end of an idealistic phase.\textsuperscript{21} At Visegrad, Polish proposals to institutionalize cooperation were rejected. Following the meeting, Poland attempted to bring the question of security into bilateral treaties among the Visegrad members, as the starting point for

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a security network. The idea was supported in principle by Czechoslovakia, but rejected by Hungary. Instead, then, bi- and tri-lateral consultations on security issues were introduced, and functioned mainly as fora for discussion, for the coordination of approaches to the USSR, and for the consideration of matters of integration.

The failed Moscow coup of August 1991 was the first significant security crisis that Central European leaders faced. During the coup, they coordinated their approaches and maintained frequent contact. The Central European defence ministers met in August 1991 and again some three months later, to deal with the implementation of bilateral military agreements and cooperation in military production and technology. The outcomes of these discussions, however, were modest. In September 1991, after the Moscow coup, Central European leaders stressed that the military cooperation among their countries was not a new military alliance and had no reference to any other country. Even though Central European policy-makers faced comparable geopolitical problems, they emphasized explicitly that they were not willing to base security cooperation on anything more than bilateral agreements. Thus, there is no Visegrad provision for mutual immediate assistance in case of emergency. Bilateral treaties linking all VG members exist, and provide for consultation, but not for assistance in cases of external aggression.

The Group’s summits have repeatedly specified that relations with Western institutions are a priority. Central Europeans think of the Visegrad Group as a step towards NATO and EC membership rather than as an alternative to either organization. Among the VG countries, Czechoslovakia, and lately the Czech Republic, has been most clearly opposed to a deepening of the Group. While still cooperating within the framework, the Czechs have decided to follow an individual approach to gaining membership in Western organizations. In September 1993, the Czech President, Vaclav Havel, emphasized that his country believed that the function of the Visegrad Group had changed. He argued that the group should take on a new role as a consultative forum and as an economic grouping, open to new members. Czech Prime Minister

23 Clarke, 'Central European Military Cooperation', p. 45.
24 Barbara Sierszula, 'Czesi chca własnej drogi do Europy' [Czechs want own way into NATO]. Rzeczpospolita (2 September 1994).
Vaclav Klaus also repeatedly questioned the effectiveness and usefulness of the group, describing it as merely a response to Western demands.26

Serious complications emerged during the negotiations over the NATO Partnership for Peace proposal. During a Prague meeting with the U.S. President Clinton in January 1994 regarding the Partnership for Peace, the Czechs avoided all emphasis on the Visegrad Group and insisted on a separation of 'common' and 'individual' interests.27 Indeed, the Czechs treated the U.S. President's visit as a bilateral meeting, arguing that there was 'no reason why the Visegrad Four should coordinate their steps and work out a joint stand with regard to NATO membership'.28 Hungary, Poland, and a more doubtful Slovakia favoured the presentation of a joint approach to the Partnership for Peace, but could not persuade the Czechs to agree.29 Finally, the VG countries presented independent responses to the initiative, but their defence ministers issued a common declaration stating that their approaches to the Partnership for Peace were shared.30

Slovakia, which prior to the 'velvet divorce' had harboured some resentment towards the Visegrad framework because of concerns about the intensification of its relations with Hungary31, is now more supportive of the Visegrad Group. When it was mentioned that only three of the Visegrad countries might be admitted into NATO32, the Slovaks insisted that the V4 countries should coordinate their efforts towards NATO

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26 'Wyszehrad nie istnieje' [Visegrad does not exist], Rzeczpospolita (4 October 1994). For the Polish reaction to Klaus' statements, see 'Blizej czy dalej Wspolnoty Europejskiej' [Closer or further away from the European Community], Rzeczpospolita (18 January 1993); for the Hungarian reaction, see 'Central European Foreign Ministers Discuss Bosnia, Visegrad at Paris Meeting', BBC SWB EE (16 January 1993).

27 'Zgoda na Partnerstwo'[Approval of Partnership], Rzeczpospolita (13 January 1994); 'Havel proponuje nieformalne spotkanie' [Havel proposes informal meeting], Rzeczpospolita (17 January 1994); 'Maria Wagrowska, 'Ministrowie obrony Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: Cel jeden, drogi rozne' [Defense Ministers of the Visegrad Group: One goal, different ways], Rzeczpospolita (8-9 January 1994).


29 'Trudne dni Grupy Wyszehradzkiej' [Difficult days of the Visegrad Group], Polska Zbrojna (7-9 January 1994); Jerzy Markowski, "Smuty" w Grupie ["Smutas" in Group], Polska Zbrojna (12 January 1994).

30 'Komunikat po spotkaniu ministrow obrony panstw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Warszawa, 7 stycznia 1994 r.' [Communique following the meeting of ministers of defense of the Visegrad Group countries], Polska Zbrojna (10 January 1994).


32 Reisch, 'Disappointments and Hopes', p. 31.
membership. However, Slovakia’s new ties with Romania and Russia have sparked concerns among the V4 members about Slovakia’s Western orientation.\(^{33}\)

Hungary distanced itself somewhat from the framework as well. Hungary’s Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky stated that he did not believe ‘that Visegrad can be forgotten, yet we have actually completed its modern mission. We can carry on with this within trilateral or quadrilateral frameworks, we can carry on with it in the CEI.’\(^{34}\) As a result of the Yugoslav crisis, Hungary has found itself in a new situation, with increasingly important links to Austria, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, and recently even Serbia, taking priority over links with the other Visegrad countries.

Within the Visegrad Group, the Czech position might be called ‘minimalist’. Apparently, now that the country’s geopolitical position makes it the most western section of Central Europe, the Czech view is that they do not intend to let subregional cooperation take precedence over progressive integration with the EU. For Slovakia, by contrast, the Visegrad Group is a chance to develop links with the West. Hungary’s approach is pragmatic, but concerned to establish a process rather than an institution.\(^{35}\) Finally, then, Poland’s approach, which will be described in more depth in a separate section of this chapter, is of a ‘maximalist’ character. Polish policy-makers hoped that this structure of cooperation could solve many of the problems of Central Europe.\(^ {36}\) And thus, within the framework, Poland and Hungary function as cooperative partners, often but not always joined by Slovakia.\(^ {37}\)

The Visegrad Group has gradually developed an economic cooperation structure. In December 1991, the Visegrad countries concluded the negotiations of their association agreements with the EU (then the EC). Each of these agreements was negotiated

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\(^{34}\) ‘Central European Foreign Ministers Discuss Bosnia, Visegrad at Paris Meeting’, BBC SWB EE (16 January 1993).

\(^{35}\) Wright, ‘Security and Co-operation in Europe’, pp. 5-6.

\(^{36}\) Golembski, ‘Visegrad Group’, p. 66.

\(^{37}\) ‘Wegry - najlepszy partner’ [Hungary - best partner], Rzeczpospolita (16 January 1994); ‘Prezydent Wegier w Polsce: Wielobarwna Europa regionow’ [Hungary’s president in Poland: Multicolored Europe of regions], Rzeczpospolita (30 March 1994); ‘Przed szczyciem NATO w Brukseli z ministrem spraw zagranicznych Andrzejem Olechowskim rozmawiaj\’ Edward Krzemien i Piotr Najsztub: Mam trzech szefow i swiat na glowie’ [Edward Krzemien and Piotr Najsztub speak with Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski prior to the NATO summit in Brussels: I have three overseers and the world on my mind], Gazeta Wyborcza (6 January 1994).
separately, and although some coordination took place within the Visegrad framework, the process was marked more by competition than by close cooperation among the Central European states. Thus, the provisions of the European Agreements were rather disappointing to all of the countries in the region.\(^\text{38}\)

Also in December 1991, the Visegrad free trade agreement (CEFTA) was signed in order to lower customs duties and reverse decline in trade among the Visegrad partners, but most of all to strengthen the prospects of members’ integration with the EC.\(^\text{39}\) The agreement took effect in March 1993. The original goal was to eliminate all duties on products originating within the V4 by the year 2001. The reduced customs duties agreed by the Visegrad countries only matched those already granted to the EU.\(^\text{40}\)

In April 1994, the VG agreed that tariffs would cease three years sooner than planned, in 1998.\(^\text{41}\)

The CEFTA agreement has not yet provided any tangible results for the VG countries. It could however become a stimulus for political cooperation and contribute to a revival of the group. In any case, the V4 believed that the new protocol improved their chances of EU membership.\(^\text{42}\)

Since 1992, Hungary’s declared intention was a full integration with the EC, which it was prepared to pursue unilaterally. In April 1994, Hungary and soon after Poland, applied for EU membership. Hungary and Poland did not expect an answer to their applications, but submitted them to communicate their commitment and

\(^{38}\) For a discussion of the agreements, see Commission of the European Communities DG External Relations, *Background Brief: Association Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary* (March 1992).


\(^{41}\) 'CEFTA nabiera tempa: Cia w dol' [CEFTA speeds up: customs down], *Rzeczpospolita* (1 July 1994).

\(^{42}\) 'Kraje CEFTA potwierdzają wole zaciśnienia współpracy' [CEFTA countries affirm the will to cooperate closely], *Polska Zbrojna* (28 November 1994).
determination to the process of integration. The other VG countries were not yet ready to take such a step and accused the two of playing a domestic political card. They were concerned that the Hungarian and Polish governments acted without regard for their VG partners, in order to strengthen their positions at home. The problems of coordinating VG approaches to Western economic fora reflect the competition among the Visegrad members for the markets, investments and credits.43

To summarize, then, the Visegrad member countries had two initial kinds of goals: those focused on external matters - including coordination of European integration, and those aimed at internal problems - mostly those concerned with economic cooperation in the region. The institutionalization of subregional cooperation was an additional point of discussion, and initially Poland was clearly in favour of this aim.44 After the Moscow coup and the outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia, however, the situation changed somewhat, and the security dimension of the V4 took on a more important role. Member countries arrived at the conclusion that they were caught in a security vacuum. After the Cracow summit in October 199145, the most important issue was European integration. The Czechoslovak divorce, and the ensuing change of elites resulted in the loosening of subregional frameworks. The new Czech elite, and particularly Klaus, believed that subregional cooperation would create a cordon sanitaire, which would have a detrimental effect on the Czech Republic's drive for integration. Simultaneously, the split created a 'Slovak problem' within subregional organizations, which now became preoccupied with Slovak-Hungarian tensions and minority issues. It is partly as a result of these developments that the Visegrad Group is said to be stagnating. Its significance for the pattern of power in Europe is described as 'next to negligible'.46

It would seem that the motives which initially bound the V4 countries together

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44 There have been numerous unsuccessful proposals for subregional cooperation. These concepts are discussed in Chapter Nine.


46 Golembski, 'Visegrad Group', p. 63.
have been exhausted and new ones have not yet been defined.47 While the articles of the Visegrad Declaration which spoke of shaking off Soviet domination have been accomplished, the goal of total integration with the West has not yet been fulfilled, and there are no clear prospects for success in this project (see Chapter Eight). Dunay suggests that 'the intensity of security cooperation had already reached its peak when the three countries were cooperating in the dismantling of old structures, primarily the WTO, and trying to get closer to Western security institutions ...'48 Libour Roucek identifies the common experience of Soviet domination and the common interests in overcoming it as the driving force behind subregional multilateral ties.49 This motive, of course, had a limited life expectancy, and subregional frameworks today lack the clearly defined, pragmatic, and realistic short- and medium-term goals, which could strengthen, stabilize and guide this form of cooperation.

4. Problems of existing subregional cooperation frameworks

Bilateral tensions within the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative

Despite the potential advantages of creating a viable subregional cooperation structure, the VG and the CEI have not developed beyond relatively loose consultative arrangements. Internal cooperation has not come easily to the Central European countries. The Visegrad members have conflicting security concerns, since Hungary and the Czech Republic do not share borders with the former Soviet Union, and have different perceptions of Germany than those found in Poland50 (see Chapter Nine). Hungary and the Czech Republic often seem uninterested in cooperating with unruly and poor neighbours. Even where interests or goals are shared by all members, such as membership in NATO or the EU, there are significant controversies about how these

47 Barbara Sierszula, 'Entuzjazm wyparowal, zostala szara rzeczywistosc' [Enthusiasm evaporated, gray reality remained], Rzeczpospolita (20 October 1993).

48 Dunay, 'Hungary: defining', p. 139.


should be achieved. In addition, most of Poland’s southern V4 partners are concerned about its size and economic potential. Matters are made worse by the country’s distant history of imperialism (see Chapters Four and Five).

Moreover, nearly all of the countries involved in subregional cooperation nurse grievances against other members. The Czechoslovak 'velvet divorce' (in response to the June 1992 election results Czechoslovakia split peacefully on 1 January 1993) caused tensions among member countries. The divorce created a new geopolitical balance in the region. The Czech Republic, now without borders with the former Soviet Union, chose to turn westward, 'weakening the Visegrad Group and creating the potential for isolating Slovakia with reverberations extending to Ukraine.' Slovakia, on the other hand, now had to rely more on subregional cooperation structures. Poland and Hungary, afraid that Slovakia might turn East, expressed interest in keeping it in the VG. Hungary in particular feared the emergence of a Bratislava-Bucharest-Belgrade axis, potentially extending to Kiev and Moscow (a development which calls to mind the anti-Hungarian Little Entente).

A second problematic issue has involved the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. One of Hungary’s main foreign policy objectives, primarily prior to the last election in May 1994, was to improve the lot of its minorities abroad. Thus, it attempted to persuade Slovakia to accept its plans for the treatment of the Hungarian minority there. Slovakia then became concerned about possible pressures for autonomy from the minority. A

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52 See for example, Golembiski, 'Visegrad Group', p. 62; Morawiec and Kupich, 'Udzial Polski we wspolpracy', p. 91; Jerzy Jackowicz et al, 'Dlaczego potrzebujemy Grupy Wyszehradzkiej' [Why do we need the Visegrad Group], Rzeczpospolita (24 March 1994).

53 Wright, 'Security and Co-operation in Europe', pp. 5-6.


55 See statement by Akos Engelmayer, Ambassador of Hungary to Poland, during a meeting of the Foundation 'Poland in Europe': 'Grupa Wyszehradzka... Co dalej?' [Visegrad Group... What now?]. Polska w Europie 10 (January 1993), p. 125.

56 The minority is between 570,000 and 700,000 strong.

57 See for example Ryszard Bilski and Barbara Sierszula, 'W trojkacie Budapeszt - Bratyslawa - Praga: Konflikty i porozumienia' [In the triangle Budapest - Bratislava - Prague: Conflicts and agreements]. Rzeczpospolita (21 July 1993).
meeting of the Hungarian and Slovak Foreign Ministers was cancelled in November 1993 by the Hungarian side in response to Slovak demands for a declaration of the inviolability of common borders.\(^{58}\) In April 1994, a planned meeting of the Prime Ministers of the two countries was cancelled for the same reason.\(^{59}\)

A further bilateral problem which promises no immediate solution is the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros barrage. This joint dam and electrical plant project in the common reach of the Danube was abandoned by the Hungarian side in 1989, because of 'the unpredictable ecological damages (sic), to the new political tensions thus generated in the region and to the vehement protest of the concerned population'\(^{60}\), as the Hungarian government declared. Slovakia rejected such Hungarian claims as 'slander' and proceeded to construct a structure entirely on Slovak land.\(^{61}\) Such a solution did not satisfy Hungarian concerns. Despite delicate Polish suggestions, neither the VG nor the CEI have taken a mediating role in this conflict and the issue is now to be decided in the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

In this context, the Slovaks have expressed anxiety about what they perceive as a military build-up in Hungary. During the Yugoslav conflict Yugoslav aircraft violated Hungarian airspace and dropped bombs on a village near the Hungarian border.\(^{62}\) Hungary reacted by acquiring $800 million worth of MiG 29s from Russia. The MiGs, together with the equipment provided to Hungary by Germany, and the IFF system supplied by the United States, will significantly increase the potential of the Hungarian air force.\(^{63}\) Slovakia has thus responded in kind, by purchasing the same type of aircraft.\(^{64}\) It is generally recognized that while these arms purchases do not exceed CFE limits and 'while the Hungarian-Russian arms deal does not jeopardize the subregional

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\(^{58}\) Fisher, 'Slovakia’s Foreign Policy', p. 32.

\(^{59}\) 'Moravcik says no conditions were set for meeting with Hungarian counterpart', \textit{BBC SWB EE} (25 April 1994); 'Kucan: cancellation of Slovak-Hungarian summit should not harm relations', \textit{BBC SWB EE} (25 April 1994).


\(^{61}\) For Slovak interpretation of the situation, see \textit{The River Danube of Europe}. (Bratislava: Government of Slovakia, 1993).


\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 55.

\(^{64}\) Simon, 'Velvet Divorce', p. 8.
balance of forces, the potential for an arms race in the area exists.\textsuperscript{65}

A further element disturbing the cohesion of these subregional groupings is the unequal exposure of member countries to the conflict in Yugoslavia. Although neighbouring countries must cope with a security threat and the economic impact following the international sanctions regime on the rump-Yugoslavia, the responses of subregional fora to the Yugoslav crisis have been lukewarm. They have issued statements condemning the violence, and calling for a negotiated solution to the crisis. The tepid support that Hungary was offered by its partners in the autumn of 1991, when faced with a limited military threat from Yugoslavia, demonstrated the limits of subregional security cooperation.\textsuperscript{66}

In summary, then, subregional Central European cooperation fails to provide a means for resolving bilateral tensions and other problems which plague the region in the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{67} The treatment of national minorities, in particular, continues to be a bone of contention within both subregional organizations. This failure may be partly a result of the Central European belief that European integration is a better solution to these problems than solutions negotiated on a subregional scale, and partly a reflection of the process of defining national - and therefore different interests.

\textit{The approaches of Western organizations to subregional cooperation}

Arguably, rivalry within subregional groupings has been a consequence of the failure of Western organizations and institutions to address the question of Central European integration: whether it would be easier to achieve for individual countries or for 'baskets' of countries.\textsuperscript{68} Western organizations perhaps cast a benevolent eye on subregional structures since they have not been able themselves to satisfy Central European demands and needs. Indeed, the West seems to favour the creation of self-help structures which they can treat as units, rather than having to cope constantly with individual governments. Nevertheless, in the long run Western institutions have failed to state whether or not such cooperation would bring Central Europeans closer to their goal

\textsuperscript{65} Reisch, 'MiG-29s', p. 49; Fisher, 'Slovakia's Foreign Policy', p. 33.


\textsuperscript{67} Roucek, 'After the Bloc', p. 21.

\textsuperscript{68} Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around?', p. 58.
of integration. Jan B. de Weydenthal suggests that 'although the emergence of the [Visegrad] Triangle was supported by numerous Western politicians and influential observers, there was little tangible support for the venture by Western governments.'

At the core of the debate surrounding subregional cooperation is a conceptual problem, inadequately addressed by Western organizations and by Central Europeans themselves: is differentiation among the former Eastern bloc a worthwhile and welcome approach or does it have negative consequences for relations among the region's countries? As this question has not been answered satisfactorily, initiatives adopted by NATO, the WEU and the EU comprise 'a mixed bag'. While the EU's European Agreements and NATO's Partnership for Peace differentiate or foresee the possibility of differentiation, the WEU's Consultation Forum and Associate Partnership, the EU's European Stability Pact, and NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council tend to treat the Central European region as 'a basket' (see Chapter Seven). Differentiation, although generally a wise approach, does have the side effect of damaging subregional cooperation. Conversely, lack of differentiation, although conducive to subregional cooperation, may be perilously simplistic, since Central European countries are currently developing their own sovereign national interests, which will necessarily diverge.

Observing the confused Western approaches toward subregional cooperation, Central European decision-makers have argued that the creation of subregional security and economic structures could potentially hamper their separate prospects for entering Western structures. Two reasons are cited for this belief. First, it was always expected that Western organizations could not treat all Central European countries as a single 'basket', and grant them simultaneous membership since this would create an unbearable burden for these institutions. Second, if, however, the West were indeed to decide to treat Central Europe as a group, an economic or social failure in any one of these countries would preclude others in the group from being admitted as members. Thus, Central European policy-makers wanted to give their own security and military cooperation a low profile, so that it would not be seen as either an alternative to or a detraction from their goal of joining Western multilateral frameworks.

69 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle as a Means To Reach other Goals'. RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 23 (5 June 1992), p. 17.

70 Their conclusion, according to Dunay, is that military cooperation should include only matters such as discussions on issues of mutual interest, cooperation in securing spare parts for Soviet equipment, and conversion procedures. Dunay, 'Hungary: defining'. p. 153.
Consequently, some of the region’s countries began to demand a policy of differentiation in Central Europe. In response to the NATO Rome summit of November 1991, VG members first demanded differentiation in favour of the four countries in the group, using as an argument the fact that they were the only ones to have concluded association agreements with the EC at the time. Hungary’s Foreign Minister Gyula Horn reflected these concerns when he said:

although I understand those whose view is that no differentiation must be made among individual countries, I find this unacceptable since the admission of Hungary to NATO before the others would not mean the exclusion or the keeping at a distance of others, but rather a recognition of the country’s particular character.

Central European policies focus primarily on national concerns, and this will face European organizations with difficult decisions regarding differentiation among the various Central European countries. It is becoming increasingly obvious that while some of the countries insist on differentiation in Western approaches to the region, others resent such distinctions and consider them discriminatory.

**Pressures from other Central and East European countries**

Both the VG and the CEI have as their institutional goal the improvement of the economic and political conditions of member states. By definition, then, they strive for exclusive treatment, by the West in particular. Member countries believe that the goals of the two frameworks imply that countries which differ, whether in economic, political or security arrangements, could not be accepted into the groups for the time being. In addition, member countries fear tensions with or among potential new members. Russian strategic perceptions also play a role - where Ukrainian membership is concerned, for example. In addition, it appears that members countries are not interested in extending the Visegrad Group to the south because they want to prevent the creation of a belt which could be interpreted as a cordon sanitaire.

As both the VG and the CEI do not currently intend to accept new members

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72 Horn, quoted in ibid., p. 122.

(although some forms of cooperation are open to non-members), it is not surprising that some of the countries outside of these subregional frameworks resent their development as well as demands for differentiation in their favour. Relegated to the sidelines of Central European subregional cooperation, a number of them now feel isolated. These countries, generally speaking, oppose the institutionalization of subregional frameworks for this reason.

Romania is one of the newly isolated states in the region. A Romanian request for Visegrad membership in February 1991 was rejected by the VG countries, and it did not have much more luck in the CEI. With the Hungarian-Slovak problems in mind, members of both subregional structures recognize that the membership of Romania would bring further problems. However, this exclusion leaves Romania on the margins of what has come to mean 'Central Europe'. Like Romania, Bulgaria has also expressed interest in the Visegrad and CEI frameworks.

Russia has also expressed its concern about the development of frameworks such as the VG and the CEI. Initially, what was then the Soviet Union was suspicious of Central European cooperation, as potentially directed against itself. The current Russian attitude is somewhat ambivalent, with recent statements indicating that subregional cooperation may now be seen as a guarantee of stability in the Central European region. Russia is however concerned about possible Ukrainian involvement in the group. Not surprisingly, Ukrainian membership is currently deemed unacceptable by the VG countries.

Different member countries support the applications of prospective candidates. During a meeting with President Walesa in March 1994, for example, Arpad Göncz spoke in favour of accepting Slovenia as a member of the VG. He also speculated that

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77 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 32; Maria Wagrowska and Marian Suchowiejko, 'Bulgarii podoba sie CEFTA' [Bulgaria likes CEFTA], Rzeczpospolita (22 July 1994).
a similar step could be undertaken with Croatia after the end of the Yugoslav conflict. Slovakia is prepared to support the participation of Bulgaria in the CEI. Belorus. Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Albania, and Romania have aspirations to CEI membership. But both the VG and the CEI have indicated that there are no plans to extend membership in the near future.

From within these organizations it would seem that only the Czechs are prepared to use the issue of new members to support their arguments for transforming subregional groupings into loose consultation fora. Antonin Baudys, the Czech Defence Minister, said that from the perspective of his ministry, the Visegrad Group no longer existed. He added that since other countries (the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia) now want NATO membership as well, the following question arises: why should Visegrad countries be treated differently by Western organizations than the rest of Central Europe? Thus he considers military cooperation that is limited to the V4 unacceptable. Josef Lux, the Czech Minister of Agriculture, told his Romanian counterpart that the Czech Republic saw arrangements such as the CEI as 'temporary'. Even President Havel announced that the Visegrad Group 'should give less and less impression of being a special club of post-communist countries.'

Some Western observers have criticized existing subregional frameworks because they 'contain shades of ententisme and exclusivism'. And it is true that both CEI and Visegrad attend only to the interests of a few states, and exclude the post-Soviet republics. Thus it is said that they increase the danger of interwar-style regional fragmentation. The creation of viable subregional structures carries the danger, too,
of triggering the development of other subregional blocs composed of the countries that have been rejected, thus creating a volatile and unstable situation in the region. On the other hand, Polish observers argue that some form of differentiation (although never clearly defined) seems to be the West’s rule in dealing with the former WTO countries. It is clear that it will be impossible for all of the former Eastern bloc countries to be admitted to Euro-Atlantic structures simultaneously. As existing subregional cooperation frameworks aim to bring closer to the West, 'exclusivism' appears to be a appropriate approach.  

5. Polish perceptions of existing subregional groupings

When subregional cooperation frameworks first came into being in Central Europe, Poland’s government was an ardent supporter of this kind of cooperation. It has been suggested that Polish support for subregional cooperation reflected the determination of Polish policy-makers to create a 'new European order'. Thus, subregional cooperation was declared to be one of the priorities of Polish foreign policy. The 1993 Report on the State of National Security: External Aspects, presented by a think-tank of the Foreign Ministry, declared this policy to be on the same level as policies aiming at entry into Euro-Atlantic structures.

At subregional summit meetings, Poland subscribed to all measures that had the potential to further subregional cooperation, and supported the idea of institutionalizing these structures. The press championed the notion of subregional cooperation in the initial phase, arguing that in terms of security, Poland could clearly rely more on

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86 Jarosław Bratkiewicz, 'Polska koncepcja zjednoczenia Europy na szczeblu regionalnym i subregionalnym' [Polish concept of unification of Europe at a regional and subregional level], in Kazimierz Lach (ed.), Polska i Ukraina w nowej Europie, (Warsaw: PISM, 1993), p. 22. In fact, in March 1995, the German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe stated that there will be no group admissions into NATO. 'Volker Ruhe o jednostkach NATO w Polsce: Rosja nie moze decydowac' [Volker Ruhe on NATO units in Poland: Russia cannot decide], Rzeczpospolita (8 March 1995).

87 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle'. Nevertheless, the issue of regional cooperation is the most controversial foreign policy issue among the country’s political parties. See 'Parties' positions on foreign policy', BBC SWB EE (l September 1993).

88 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle', p. 15.


90 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle', p. 15.
Czechoslovakia than, say, on Portugal. In fact, Polish policy-makers saw the subregional frameworks as a means of overcoming the country’s geopolitical position. There was hope that such forms would 'cut' across the dreaded West-East axis, and Poland saw itself as a bridge between the CEI countries and the Baltics, thus creating a framework to link North and South. Polish policy-makers also assumed that encouraging regional stability through the Visegrad Group would have a stabilizing effect on the neighbouring post-Soviet republics.

In addition, Polish policy-makers counted on the economic advantages stemming from cooperation in projects with Poland’s southern neighbours. This emphasis on the economic aspect of cooperation reflected the belief that trade links with southern countries would be less competitive than East-West economic relations. Finally, Poles expected that this form of cooperation would bring the country closer to Western European economic structures. Through cooperation with CEI countries like Italy and Austria, Poland felt closer to the EU.

After this initial phase, however, the Polish government entered a phase of 'realism' in its approaches to subregional frameworks. It explicitly defined the boundaries of subregional cooperation in order to indicate that the group should not resemble an alliance. The 1993 Report on the State of National Security emphasized that the VG, though an important contribution to Polish security, was not seen as a regional alliance which could 'fill the gap left by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, although military cooperation is in fact one of the stronger points of the Group.' Onyszkiewicz, then the deputy Defence Minister of Poland, emphasized that the Visegrad members 'did not intend to conclude a military pact ... or form a defence union, as regional military pacts

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92 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 35.

93 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle', p. 18; Unger, 'Dwie Racje Bytu'; Tenets of the Polish Security Policy and Security Policy, p. 6.

94 Anna T. Kowalewska, 'Ideologia i praktyka' [Ideology and practice], Rzeczpospolita (18 July 1994).

95 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 33.

96 Leczycka, 'Inicjatywa Strodkowoeuropejska'; Golembiski, 'Polska w ugrupowaniach regionalnych', p. 90.

had no place in today’s Europe.\textsuperscript{98}

In this phase, Poland emphasized that it was no interested in setting up an institutional framework.\textsuperscript{99} The \textit{Report on the State of National Security} specifies that, even in the economic sphere, which came to occupy the foreground of the Visegrad cooperation, there should be no institutionalization.\textsuperscript{100} This reluctance to institutionalize the framework has been interpreted by observers as a sign of the fragility of the group.\textsuperscript{101}

In the initial phase of subregional cooperation, Poland’s policy-makers saw these frameworks as ways of improving relations with Eastern and South-Eastern neighbours. Instead of doing so, however, a deepening of cooperation without a simultaneous widening came to be regarded by non-member countries as potentially threatening. In response, Polish policy-makers soon began to emphasize that the organizations, specially the CEI, should be opened to new members, particularly Belorus and Ukraine, countries with which Poland feels a historical bond.

In the second phase, then, the primary goal of the Polish government within subregional frameworks was to improve relations with the West. Poland began to advocate relatively loose cooperation of positions on particular issues relating to integration. To extend this argument further, it would appear that even support for limited cooperation within the VG has often been a reflection of Polish perceptions of Western wishes or preferences, rather than a genuine interest in deepening relations with neighbouring countries. Thus, by the end of 1992, when it became clear that the VG framework was becoming less important to its other members, Polish observers interpreted this as a possible result of a lack of interest on the part of Western organizations and institutions after the conclusion of Europe Agreements with the non-Visegrad Central European countries.\textsuperscript{102}


\textsuperscript{99} See for example statements by Defense Minister Piotr Kołodziejczyk quoted by Artur Bilski. Zdzisław Lasota and Andrzej Medykowski, ‘Interesuje nas pełne członkowstwo w Pakcie’ [We are interested in full membership in the alliance], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (10 January 1994).

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Report on the State of National Security}, p. 72.


\textsuperscript{102} ‘Przelomow już nie bedzie’ [There will be no break-throughs], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (27 October 1992).
Poland's governing forces continued, however, to prefer to present a common Visegrad approaches to Western institutions\textsuperscript{103}. Two factors are relevant to this preference: first, there were fears expressed in Poland that the potential breakdown of the group would result in harmful competition among the region's countries on their way into Europe\textsuperscript{104}; second, Poland believed that joint positions were, if not supported, certainly welcomed by Western organizations and institutions.\textsuperscript{105} At the same time, Poland dismissed the charges brought by the Czechs that VG cooperation was only formed under Western pressure. Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski spoke out against Czech criticisms of the subregional framework\textsuperscript{106}, and Senator Edward Wende went further, assessing Klaus' criticism of the group as destabilizing to the region, and saying that it would slow down the entry of all of its members.\textsuperscript{107}

Poland continued to actively try to deal with a number of obstacles which affected subregional cooperation. During the negotiation of the CEFTA, Poland, faced with problems related to the division of Czechoslovakia, was prepared to pursue a free trade agreement with Hungary, and to put the two post-Czechoslovak states under pressure to join the arrangement. Furthermore, Poland's Prime Minister Suchocka, hoping for smoother VG cooperation, suggested on a number of occasions that her country was prepared to take on a mediating role between Budapest and Bratislava.\textsuperscript{108} The main motivation for this behaviour on the part of Polish policy-makers seems again to have been Western perceptions. In the words of the Report on the State of National Security, 'from the Western point of view, the objective of joining the EC and NATO may seem problematic if the members of the Group are unable to agree and cooperate on basic matters within a far less complex structure.'\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{103} Reisch, 'Disappointments and Hopes', p. 32.

\textsuperscript{104} See 'Przelomow ju¿ nie bedzie'.

\textsuperscript{105} Janusz B. Grochowski, 'Grupa Wyszehradzka: Kiedy w NATO' [Visegrad Group: When in NATO], Polska Zbrojna (3 September 1994).

\textsuperscript{106} 'Polish Foreign Minister denies Visegrad agreement "masterminded" by the West', BBC SWB EE (16 January 1993); 'Skubiszewski promotes regional cooperation', RFE/RL Daily Report 11 (19 January 1993).

\textsuperscript{107} 'Blizej czy dalej Wspolnoty Europejskiej' [Closer or further away from European Community], Rzeczpospolita (18 January 1993).

\textsuperscript{108} 'Polen und Ungarn rücken zusammen', Die Welt (25 September 1992).

The third phase of Polish attitudes towards existing subregional cooperation frameworks can only be described as disappointment. On a declaratory level, Polish politicians continued to support the concept of subregional cooperation within both the VG and the CEI. However, their achievements were criticized. The lack of cooperation displayed by Visegrad countries during the negotiations of the Europe Agreements, and during talks on the form of NATO’s Partnership for Peace proposals caused dismay among Poland’s politicians. President Walesa suggested that the Visegrad group may have wasted a historical opportunity in this process. Discussing the progress and dimensions of cooperation, Polish observers argue that the country’s expectations for both the Visegrad and CEI were disappointed. A prominent Polish analyst likened the CEI to a cul-de-sac. He also claimed that Poland devoted too much energy to the Visegrad Group.110

In September 1994, President Walesa suggested that Visegrad cooperation needed to develop a new set of goals. In his opinion, the most important cooperation issues should be matters pertaining to NATO and EU membership. In addition, he suggested an exchange of opinions with other VG members about the CSCE.111 Polish policymakers also wanted to give the CEI a new pragmatic character, particularly in their efforts to join the EU. At the same time, they emphasized economic cooperation and the liberalization of trade among CEI member countries.112 Polish leaders did not, however, see the CEI as having a security role, and this group was not at the focus of the security debate.

To summarize, then, Poland, although a staunch supporter of subregional cooperation on the level of declaratory policy, actually sees it today almost exclusively as a vehicle for cooperation and integration with the West. This approach reflects the belief of Polish policy-makers that such arrangements are supported or indeed expected by Western organizations and institutions, and that without cooperation frameworks, the other VG members would attempt to leave Poland behind in their rush for European integration.

110 Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, 'Stracone szanse czy stracone zdziesienia' [Lost chances or lost illusions]. Rzeczpospolita (2-3 July 1994).
111 'Poszukiwanie wspólnego stanowiska' [Search for common positions]. Rzeczpospolita (29 September 1994).
112 'Inicjatywa Środkowo-Europejska w cieniu wojny' [Central European Initiative in the shadow of war]. Rzeczpospolita (21 November 1994).
6. Prospects of existing subregional groupings

In Dunay's words, 'looking back on the developments of relations in the Visegrad Group, it is fairly easy to conclude that the security potential of this subregional organization was grossly overestimated.' How, then, will these frameworks develop? Will disappointment with half-hearted Western integration offers translate into increased support for subregional structures? Would an external security crisis bring member countries closer together, as the Moscow coup did in 1991?

It is difficult to be optimistic. Dissatisfaction with Western efforts has so far been translated not into closer cooperation but into competition and the re-nationalization of policies. External security threats, like those generated by the Balkan crisis, have been answered with lukewarm declarations.

The CEI and the VG may have a future as lobby or pressure groups, but it does not seem likely that they will evolve into multilateral security structures, capable of filling the Central European security vacuum. In this respect, Central Europeans see only one option: integration with Western European organizations. Since it is not clear which of these multilateral frameworks will be most willing and most suited to resolve the security problems in Central Europe, the region is pursuing a 'catch-all' strategy intended to improve relations with all of them. At the same time, 'subregional pacts run the risk of becoming second-class associations.'

Ultimately, it would seem that there was only one way to avoid the marginalization of Central European cooperation: involvement in organizations such as NATO, the WEU and the EU. Thus, Western organizations would have to facilitate subregional initiatives in Central Europe as part of the process of a 'return to Europe' - by relying, for example, on the principle of subsidiarity. Dunay suggests that 'the only way for voluntary security cooperation is the framework of western integration.' Maciej Perczynski also submits that 'the creation of a subregional cooperation organization in Central and Eastern Europe seems impossible without the support of Western institutions. This is a matter of, on the one hand, properly framing this organization's political and systemic identity, and, on the other, mapping the directions

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113 Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around?', p. 58.


115 Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around?', p. 59.
of its movement to Europe and the world.\textsuperscript{116}

As logical as these recommendations might sound, they may not be easy or even possible to realize. One of the most serious complications has been that Western nations seem to be at odds about their interests in Central Europe. Europe has had problems defining its institutions and their functions. Meanwhile, the Central Europeans are in the process of developing their national interests, which will make it more difficult for the West to approach them on a multilateral basis. Furthermore, Western involvement would imply making subregional cooperation groups into 'anterooms of European integration', which would in turn suggest the need to specify requirements and time frameworks for the actual integration. It is doubtful that any Western organization is currently capable of presenting such clear plans.

It should not be forgotten that a subregional cooperation framework 'can do only as much as its members want it to do in solving political, economic, minority and other issues.'\textsuperscript{117} If Central Europeans foresee a future for their subregional multilateral cooperation, they will have to define their common interests and problems, and specify which of them can be solved regionally. Polish observers have suggested that there are areas in which the Visegrad Group could provide pragmatic and useful security benefits, such as matters relating to defence industries or migration.\textsuperscript{118} The process would not be an easy one\textsuperscript{119}, but some cooperation on these matters already takes place.\textsuperscript{120} In this crisis of subregional structures, only concrete results, still sadly lacking, could


\textsuperscript{117} Reisch, 'Central European Initiative', p. 37.

\textsuperscript{118} Henryk Szlajfer, 'Dezintegracja przestrzeni eurazjatyckiej a bezpieczeństwo Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej' [Disintegration of the Eurasian space and East Central Europe's security], \textit{Studia i Materiały} 65 (June 1993), pp. 16-18.


salvage Central European security cooperation.

In this context, Polish support for subregional cooperation may turn out to have been 'too little, too late'. It may be late because other member countries are currently perceiving that such forms of cooperation are in crisis. It may be too little because even Polish support is motivated by Western preferences, rather than by the genuine desire to create a viable and long-term subregional cooperation framework. Polish policy is thus lacking credibility in its combination of regionalism and the quest for European integration.

7. Conclusion

To observers, the security vacuum in Central Europe soon indicated the need for some form of security cooperation among countries in the region. It was suggested that the creation of such structures would be advantageous to the newly democratic countries of the region. Jeane Kirkpatrick, for example, suggested the formation of an 'Eastern European Union' which would balance the WEU under a NATO umbrella. But a union of this kind has never been seriously entertained by governments in the region. The idea of filling the security vacuum in the wake of the Warsaw Treaty Organization with subregional security arrangements was, however, heralded as a promising pattern for interaction in a region that is desperately seeking security.

During the first, idealistic phase of post-1989 Central European foreign policies, subregional groupings were established. At the least, the Visegrad Group, and the Central European Initiative, the two subregional cooperation frameworks discussed in this chapter, seemed to have the potential to become viable organizations to handle both security and economic issues. It is too soon, however, to give a clear picture of their future development, but it is obvious that, as yet, they have not developed into mature security structures. Indeed, both find themselves suffering from a crisis of confidence. It would appear, in fact, that most Central European countries today, including Poland, are experiencing a period of disillusionment regarding existing subregional structures which have outgrown systemic changes in the former Eastern bloc.

To recapitulate briefly, then, the subregional cooperation structures were used initially to coordinate Central European approaches to Western European organizations.

121 Jeane Kirkpatrick, 'Cautions for Clinton on Foreign Policy'. International Herald Tribune (7-8 November 1992).
As discussed above, the deepening of subregional cooperation faltered under various constraints from within the region itself, from other Eastern European states, and from Western organizations. Cooperation also suffered because bilateral tensions amongst members could not be resolved within the subregional frameworks. Moreover, countries in the region that had not been given the opportunity to enter these frameworks put pressure on these groups not to create exclusive clubs, and not to push for a differentiated approach from Western organizations. Finally, organizations in the West, though generally supportive of subregional initiatives, did not make clear to the Central Europeans whether cooperation on the subregional level would help them or hinder them in their drive for integration into Western organizations.

As a result, both the VG and the CEI have begun to take on the function of consultative fora, rather than security frameworks. A positive outcome of this is the increased attention paid to subregional economic issues, but it remains to be seen whether or not intra-regional economic activity will increase, and whether such an increase will result in closer political and security ties.
1. Introduction

The idea that a subregional security cooperation framework in East Central Europe is desirable crops up again and again in Poland despite the fact that none of the existing cooperation structures seem capable of assuming a meaningful security role. As an alternative to a Western orientation, a closing of ranks among the countries in the 'grey' security zone is advocated periodically, particularly by political forces that think themselves in the tradition of Pilsudski.

This chapter explores an aspect of the Polish political debate which is little known outside the country. It examines proposals for subregional security cooperation that have been presented since 1990 but have not been translated into actual institutions. In Poland, political forces which propose to address the problem of security by means of subregional cooperation draw on historical concepts of East Central European security cooperation. Where necessary, then, this chapter refers to relevant historical notions and proposals, discussed in more depth in Chapter Four.

The discussion here focuses primarily on two concepts of subregional cooperation that are based on neo-Pilsudskiite reasoning and put forward by political forces in Poland: NATO-bis, and Miedzymorze, which translates as Between-the-Seas, Baltic-to-Black Sea, Isthmus, or Intermarium. In addition, this section provides a brief discussion of similar

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1 For a discussion of existing frameworks see Chapter Eight.

proposals put forward by political forces in the neighbouring post-Soviet republics.

This chapter suggests that Polish proposals focus, to a varying extent, on organizing relations with the country’s eastern neighbours, rather than, as in the case of official policies, on links with Western Europe. The proposals thus reflect Pilsudski’s ideas relatively closely, and refer to the period of Polish greatness which ended with the disintegration of the multi-national Polish-Lithuanian state in the 17th century.\(^3\) In this tradition, some political forces foresee that Poland will take on a special role in the subregional context.

This chapter concludes that Polish proposals are not necessarily a reflection of pragmatic considerations but of Poland’s images of the past. As such, they differ from the subregional cooperation frameworks which have actually been implemented (Visegrad, CEI). As the previous chapter argues, these frameworks largely reflect pragmatic attempts at cooperation, and only indirectly refer to historical ties. Accordingly, the political support enjoyed in Poland and abroad by the proposals discussed here is relatively limited, and based mainly on democratic nationalist or patriotic groups in the relevant countries. Because of the different political traditions in the region, these may not be seen as nationalist proposals by the Poles themselves. Indeed, Western historians do not generally distinguish between the nationalist and the patriotic traditions in Polish political thought. The difference exists, however, and reflects the continuing influence of the positivist and romantic traditions (see Chapter Four). The difference between these two approaches is mostly apparent in ideas about the treatment of minorities.\(^4\)

### 2. Brief history of subregional proposals in the 1980s and 90s

#### Subregional proposals in the perestroika period

During the *perestroika* years, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaders of the national independence movements or fronts in Ukraine, Belorus, and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), held several consultations about the possibility of a so-called Baltic-to-Black Sea Union or alliance. At a gathering of independence-minded opposition leaders, held in the Belorussian city of Minsk on 23-24 November 1990, a statement was agreed upon which pronounced that the USSR would

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\(^3\) For a more in-depth discussion of this aspect see Chapter Four.

not live much longer. The opposition members demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In addition they agreed to establish a commonwealth among the five states. The agreement was obviously premature. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the Baltic states began to look more to Scandinavia than to East Central Europe for cooperation in both economics and security. Thus, Ukraine, and particularly Belorus, found themselves under pressure to join the shaky Commonwealth of Independent States and gradually turned eastward.

Nevertheless, the idea of a Baltic-to-Black Sea union continues to be favoured by a number of nationalist parties which sooner or later found themselves, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in democratic opposition rather than in power. The Belorussian Popular Front (BPF) 'Revival', for example, continues to support the Baltic-to-Black Sea concept. BPF, lead by Zianon Pazniak, is the largest democratic nationalist opposition organization in Belorus.

The Baltic-to-Black Sea proposal originally foresaw a subregional security framework composed of the Baltic States, Belorus, and Ukraine. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, BPF politicians began to include Poland in this concept and encouraged a relationship with this country as a way of reducing domination by the Russian Federation. In addition, this Belorussian group expressed interest in some form of association with the Visegrad group. They received little, however, in the way of a response or support from the Polish government.

One Polish commentator sees the BPF's support for the Baltic-to-Black Sea alliance as political ploy rather than a realistic idea. In general, the concept faltered because the countries concerned were in no state to help one another economically and the hard-pressed Belorus chose to turn to Russia instead as an economic and political

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6 BPF was created in December 1988 as an anti-communist movement campaigning for independence and national revival of Belorus. Its beginning was interpreted as a significant step to independence as its members demanded the creation of a sovereign and democratic country. Belorus, which had never before enjoyed statehood, achieved independence in July 1990.


The BPF is still pursuing the concept, but the Belorussian government is more and more seriously looking to Russia.

Ukrainian nationalists were also solidly opposed to the idea of the CIS and favoured instead the creation of a Baltic-to-Black Sea alliance. The concept became more difficult to support when Belorus entered into a military alliance with Russia in early 1993 and an economic union in early 1994. For geographical reasons, a community of this kind could not function with the Baltic countries and Ukraine alone.

It is probably for this reason that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk proposed an anti-Russian *cordon sanitaire* from the Baltic to the Black Sea, tactfully named 'the collective security zone' and modelled after the NATO-bis proposal, presenting this idea to the Central European governments in May 1993. Belorus' position in this proposed structure was never clarified.

Responses to the proposal varied according to how the respective countries perceived their chances of Western integration. It has been reported that only Romania and Slovakia expressed interest in the proposal. The Polish government chose not to turn down the proposal, but not to support it either. As in the case of Belorus, the Polish government was interested in bilateral cooperation, but not in close multilateral relations with Ukraine. Walesa was more supportive of the idea, but did not link it to his NATO-bis concept, although he was still feebly floating the idea of the NATO-bis at this time.

In November 1993, Kravchuk's concept was discussed during a meeting of the Polish-Ukrainian Consulting Committee of the Presidents which has been created in the previous May in Kiev. Both Polish and Ukrainian members of the committee pointed

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10 Andrzej Romanowski, 'Czy przespałismy "smute"?' [Did we sleep through 'smuta'?], Tygodnik Powszechny (3 October 1993).


13 'Statut Komitetu Konsultacyjnego Prezydentow Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy' [Statutes of the Consulting Committee of the Presidents of the Republic of Poland and Ukraine], Warsaw (30 April 1993); 'Komunikat z posiedzenia Komitetu Konsultacyjnego Prezydentow Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy' [Announcement from the meeting of the Consulting Committee of the Presidents of the Republic of Poland and Ukraine], Kiev (27 May 1993).
out the topicality of the Kravchuk proposal. The communique was ultimately a compromise position, since it also contained a supportive Ukrainian statement concerning Polish efforts to join NATO. In this way, Ukraine was granted a mention of the proposal, and Poland support for its NATO policy. The communique also stated that both Warsaw and Kiev support bi- and multilateral subregional cooperation, seeing in them guarantees of security and stability for the whole of Europe.

The Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), an independence party with populist leanings and leftist economic beliefs consistently supported Ukrainian, Belorussian and Baltic aspirations for independence, as well as the notion of a subregional security grouping. This support was not sufficient, however, to implement the concept, and "Ukraine was forced to content itself with a series of small measures designed to create links with central and eastern European states".

Soon, the issue of Polish membership in NATO became a bone of contention in its relations with Ukraine and Belorus. Initially, Ukraine supported Poland in its drive for NATO membership. This has changed since the last Ukrainian election, and Ukraine’s new leadership is concerned about the possibility that such a solution would reduce Ukraine to a buffer zone between NATO and Russia, and could also further 'polarize' the eastern and western parts of Ukraine. In January 1994 Belorus’ Prime Minister Viacheslav Kiebich stated that Polish or Lithuanian membership in NATO would create a difficult situation for his country. These disagreements have strained relations


17 Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth, p. 681.

18 'Ostrożniej do NATO' [More carefully into NATO], Rzeczpospolita (1 December 1995); 'Ukraina obawia się Polski w NATO' [Ukraine fears Poland in NATO], Rzeczpospolita (6 December 1994); 'Ukraina przeciwna naszemu członkostwu w sojuszu' [Ukraine opposed to our membership in alliance], Rzeczpospolita (15 February 1995).

19 'Białoruski premier o Polsce i NATO' [Belorussian Prime Minister about Poland and NATO], Rzeczpospolita (14 January 1994).
between Poland and its eastern neighbours.

The idea of an East Central European subregional grouping is also alive in Lithuania. In November 1993, Antanas Terleckas, the leader of League for Freedom of Lithuania, a small right-wing party without representation in the Lithuanian parliament, said in an interview that he was in favour of creating a confederation composed of the three Baltic republics, Poland, Belorus and Ukraine. He called this creation Baltoslavia. In his opinion, the formation of a political-military arrangement among these countries would protect them from threats arising from their geopolitical location. Terleckas argued that his concept would work if fears of polonization did not interfere. There would not be an official language, but diplomats should converse in Polish, he said. In this context, it ought to be noted that Terleckas is in fact ethnically Polish.

The concept of the Baltic-to-Black Sea community was, when initially conceived, not actually intended to involve Poland’s direct participation. The forces in the Soviet republics that were discussing the idea had to take into the account the continued existence of the Soviet Union. At that point, Poland was concentrating on structuring its relations with Moscow while at the same time dealing with the issue of the German-Polish border. So it was only once the border treaty had been signed and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had disintegrated, that the baltic-to-Black Sea concept was picked up by nationalist political forces in Poland.

While these parties would be defined by the West as 'nationalistic', they are not necessarily described as such in Poland. Parties in the Pilsudski-tradition like the Confederation for Independent Poland are considered 'independence parties', or patriotic groups. Organizations focused on nationalist ideologies are typically 'difficult to pigeonhole programmatically.' They include the pan-slavist Universal Party of Slavs and Allied Nations (Powszechna Partia Slowian i Narodow Sprzymierzonych), which advocates the incorporation of Poland into a 'Union of Free Nations' spanning from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea; and the Polish Independence Party (Polska Partia Niepodleglosciowa).

Parties with Dmowski-like platforms are defined in Poland as nationalist. Some advocate expansionist policies. These parties are small and insignificant, and include the

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National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe); the National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne); the Polish National Front (Narodowy Front Polski), which openly seeks to build a 'Great Poland' - a Polish empire created at the expense of the country's eastern neighbours; and the Polish National Commonwealth - Polish National Party (Polska Wspolnota Narodowa - Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe) which shows pan-Slavistic leanings.

The main difference between these two political traditions is their attitude towards Russia. While Pilsudski-ite parties advocate distancing Poland from Russia, Dmowski-ite parties are prepared to accommodate close ties with Russia. Thus, they see Polish expansion as possible only with Russian approval or help.22

Miedzymorze

In Poland, the principal support for the Baltic-to-Black Sea concept has come from an opposition party, the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN). The KPN was established in September 1979, as a separate organization within what was then the illegal Movement for the Protection of Human and Citizens' Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela). The organization was legalized in 1989, but it was not until late in 1990 that it began to play a role in the political life of the country. In 1990, its leader, Leszek Moczulski, ran unsuccessfully in the presidential election. In the 1991 parliamentary election KPN won 46 parliamentary and 4 Senate seats, and it is rumoured that it hoped to join the coalition and take charge of the defence portfolio. Eventually, however, the party resigned from coalition discussions and remained in opposition.23 In the 1993 election it won 22 Sejm seats and no Senate seats.24

During the last election campaign the KPN somewhat abandoned its emphasis on issues of foreign and security policy, which had centred on independence and patriotic slogans, in favour of a platform based on economic issues. As a result, it lost a significant proportion of its voters. It now has only 16 seats in the parliament (after

22 For a brief discussion of the various nationalist political parties in Poland, and their political platforms, see ibid., pp. 374-390.

23 'Nie ma rozlamu - mowi Moczulski: Cos w KPN pекło, cos sie skonczylo' [There is no split - says Moczulski: Something broke in KPN, something ended], Rzeczpospolita (3 August 1994).

losing some through defection after the parliament was formed).\textsuperscript{25}

In 1989 and 1990, Polish political forces debated the concept of a subregional community between the USSR and NATO which would connect southwards with countries like Austria and Yugoslavia, but there was no response among prospective partners.\textsuperscript{26} It is reported that the concept of \textit{Miedzymorze} - and neutrality - is gaining supporters among the representatives of the coalition party Polish Peasant Party (PSL)\textsuperscript{27}, although KPN denies any links with this party.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, influential forces such as those on more extreme Left sympathize to a certain extent with the nationalist - anti-Western message of the idea of subregional security cooperation frameworks. The government, however, officially dismisses the concept.\textsuperscript{29}

The Baltic-to-Black Sea idea is known in Poland under the historical name of \textit{Miedzymorze}, and forms the core of the KPN’s foreign policy platform. The KPN favours the integration of all of the countries between Germany and Russia and proposes to construct an institutionalized Central and East European alliance (but not a federal structure of the kind that Pilsudski put forward), with Poland as an active leader of the group.\textsuperscript{30} The KPN considers this a way of establishing better relations with Ukraine\textsuperscript{31}, and also with Belorus and Lithuania - countries which are home to members of Polish ethnic groups. The KPN’s leader Leszek Moczulski emphasized that \textit{Miedzymorze} is not intended to establish a \textit{cordon sanitaire} against Russia. But he was quick to argue that

\textsuperscript{25} Kazimierz Groblewski, 'KPN i BBWR bliżej: Sojusz z konieczności' [KPN and BBWR closer: alliance out of necessity], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (24 January 1995); Miroslaw Usidus, 'KPN - zwinięta wola mocy' [KPN - dislocated will of power], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (18 September 1993).

\textsuperscript{26} ‘Article Views Foreign Policy Option’, \textit{FBIS-EU-90-135} (13 July 1990).

\textsuperscript{27} Maria Wagrowska, 'Elitarny klub i twarde reguly' [Elite club and tough rules], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (8 February 1995).

\textsuperscript{28} Tomasz Szczepanski, Head, \textit{Miedzymorze} Department, Confederation for Independent Poland, interview by author, 14 March 1995, Warsaw.

\textsuperscript{29} ‘Polityka zagraniczna: Nikt nie podwaza roli NATO’ [Foreign Policy: Nobody undermines the role of NATO], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (1 February 1995).

\textsuperscript{30} See Tomasz Szczepanski, \textit{Miedzymorze: Polityka Środkowoeuropejska KPN} [\textit{Miedzymorze}: KPN’s Central European policy]. (Warsaw: Dział Poligrafii KPN, 1993); \textit{Tezy programowe IV Kongresu: Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej} [Programme Propositions of the IV Congress: Confederation for Independent Poland]. (Warsaw: Dział Poligrafii KPN, January 1993); ’Apel IV Kongresu KPN do społeczeństw i sił politycznych krajów Miedzymorza’ [Appeal to the societies and political forces of the countries of \textit{Miedzymorze} by the IV Congress of the KPN] (March 1992).

\textsuperscript{31} See Tadeusz Andrzej Olszanski, 'Ksztalt Miedzymorza' [The Shape of \textit{Miedzymorze}], \textit{Gazeta Polska KPN} 1 (1992).
Miedzymorze would be comparable to Russia in geopolitical potential. He explained, too, that Russia could not participate in this subregional structure because it would dominate it, but good relations with Russia should be maintained.\textsuperscript{32} The KPN sees not only Russia but also Hungary as a potential problem. Tomasz Szczepanski, the head of the party's Miedzymorze department said: 'Hungary can push Slovakia and Romania into Russian arms, just like Germany can push Poland into Russian arms.'\textsuperscript{33} This kind of situation would threaten the entire subregional concept.

The KPN's leaders are not enthusiastic about NATO and emphasize that it would be impossible to join NATO's military structures. They also emphasize that it is wrong to assume that NATO could provide security for Poland. The proponents of Miedzymorze frameworks believe that Poland must avoid 'distant and exotic alliances'.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, the party suggests organizing relations with neighbouring countries as a foreign policy priority, rather than establishing security links with European or Euro-Atlantic organizations. The concept of Miedzymorze, the KPN's leader Moczulski argues, foresees that the process of improving relations with neighbouring countries will take place within the framework of a pan-European integration.\textsuperscript{35}

Within Miedzymorze, Moczulski advocated creating structures and processes similar to those in the West - economic cooperation and political integration. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the sovereignty and individuality of participating countries should be preserved. According to Moczulski, this would allow the region to speed up its developmental processes, and to equalize the levels of development in Western and East-Central Europe. This should occur, he claimed, within some twenty five years. Moczulski conceded that these efforts should take place in cooperation with the EU, and culminate in the integration of all of Europe.\textsuperscript{36}

Szczepanski argued that if NATO was to expand only to select Miedzymorze countries (excluding Ukraine and Belorus), Poland would become a frontier state. Thus

\textsuperscript{32} 'Wiecej szybkich reform: Rozmowa z Leszkiem Moczulskim, przewodniczacy Konfederacji Polski Niepodleglej' [More fast reforms: Discussion with Leszek Moczulski, chairman of the Confederation for Independent Poland], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (27 August 1993).

\textsuperscript{33} Szczepanski, interview by author, 1995.

\textsuperscript{34} Jacek C. Kaminski, 'Miedzymorze', \textit{Mysl Polska} (December 1993).

\textsuperscript{35} Moczulski, 'Wiecej szybkich reform'.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
Poland should campaign on behalf of the membership of its eastern neighbours. He also claimed that Miedzymorze could cease to exist or be transformed into an arrangement resembling the Benelux, that is a subregional cooperation framework within a large structure, if Euro-Atlantic structures absorbed all of its members.

The KPN was one of the instigators of an international conference of political parties from the Miedzymorze region together with the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, and the Green Party of Ukraine. The meeting took place on 29-30 July 1994 in Kiev. It resulted in the creation of an 'Intersea League' which brought together a number of political parties from Belorus, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine. None of the parties in power in the Visegrad countries were included in this structure, a situation that is curiously similar to both the Pilsudski blueprint of a East Central European federation and to the original Baltic-to-Black Sea idea. League members, in addition to the KPN, are all nationalist groups from the former non-Soviet republics, with anti-communist views, and patriotic and independence-focused platforms. Among them is a section of the Rukh movement led by the radical leader

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39 The Kiev meeting was attended by representatives of the following parties: for Belorus - the Popular Front of Belorus and the United Democratic Party; for Bulgaria - Radical Democratic Party; for Estonia - Pro Patria Parti; for Latvia - For Motherland and Freedom; for Lithuania - United Democratic Party; for Poland - Confederation for Independent Poland, Democratic Party of Poland (Third Force); for Latvia - For Motherland and Freedom; for Lithuania - Conservative Party, Lithuanian National Union; for Poland - Confederation for Independent Poland, Republican Party of Poland (Third Force); for Lithuania - Conservative Party, Lithuanian National Union; for Poland - Democratic Party of Poland; for Ukraine - Ukrainian Republican Party, Democratic Party of Ukraine, Green Party of Ukraine, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, and Social-Democratic Party. See 'A New Geopolitical Factor in Europe was brought to life in Ukraine’s capitol’, Intersea bulletin: Countries of Baltic-Black Sea-Adriatic Region. League of Parties 1 (August 1994), p. 15. Only the representatives of a number of Belorussian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Ukrainian parties signed 'The Statement on Creation of the League of the Intersea Countries’ Parties'. 'The Action Program of the League of Intersea Countries’ Political Parties’ was signed only by representatives of parties from Belorus, Poland and Ukraine. For texts and signatories see Intersea Bulletin, pp. 14, 16-17.

40 Rukh (Ukrainian National Movement) was founded in 1989, and is the oldest and the largest political organization of this kind in the country. It registered as political party in 1993. One of its leaders, Viacheslav Chornovil ran unsuccessfully in the December 1991 presidential election in Ukraine (with 23.3% of the popular vote). Rukh was in opposition to the government led by Leonid Kravchuk and now also by Leonid Kuchma. Rukh won 28 seats during April 1994 general election. For a discussion of this party, see Ryszard Malik and Piotr Kosciński, 'Ukraińa - czas zmian: Partie i organizacje polityczne' [Ukraine - time of change: Parties and political organizations], Rzeczpospolita (3-4 October 1992); Piotr Kosciński. 'Komunisci beda tworzyć największa frakcje w nowej Radzie Nawyszjej Ukrainy: Kto jest kim w nowym parliamencie' [Communists will create the largest fraction in the new Supreme Committee of the Ukraine: Who is who in the new parliament], Rzeczpospolita (19 April 1994).
Viacheslav Chornovil, the Belorussian Popular Movement led by Zenon Pazniak, and the Freedom and Fatherland Party in Latvia. Lithuania's Sajudis movement, lead by Vytautas Landsbergis, took an interest in the idea only when it became an opposition party.

The goal of the organization is to coordinate party policies in East Central European countries (but mainly in the former western republics of the Soviet Union and in Poland), with the aim of advancing the idea of Miedzymorze and potentially also preparing to implement the concept. 'The Action Programme of the League of Intersea Countries' Political Parties' indicates that the founders of the organization foresee a certain degree of institutionalization, with the formation of a representative coordination body (the Consultative Council of the League of Intersea countries' parties), annual meetings, and the creation of a fund. In the field of national security it specifies, among other things, the goals of working towards preventing the recognition of the CIS as a subject of international law, and opposing the UN recognition of Russian peacemaking in the CIS as 'an imperialistic recurrence'. The programme stipulates a number of other areas of cooperation (problems of ethnic minorities, economic cooperation, cultural relations and environmental protection).

The League is an association of a number of relatively weak parties. A Polish official suggested that the member parties are all still trying to develop various independent approaches to security problems in their countries. For example, Miedzymorze is not the only framework they seek to establish, since for many of them, security cooperation with Scandinavian countries is also a priority. Miedzymorze is thus only one part of the foreign policy platforms rather than an exclusive programme, as it is for the KPN.

NATO-bis

Polish President Lech Walesa presented what was probably the most celebrated and discussed proposal for a subregional security cooperation framework in East Central

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41 The democratically nationalist Freedom and Fatherland Party won 5.36% of the popular vote in the parliamentary elections of June 1993. It is currently the fifth-largest party in the Latvian parliament.


43 'The Action Program', p. 16.

Europe which has never been translated into practice. In March 1992, during an official visit to Germany, impatient with the progress of Polish affiliation with European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, Walesa proposed to set up 'NATO-bis'.

He conceived of NATO-bis as a transitional security arrangement (without ever specifying its time-frame) which would involve an Eastern and Central European alliance and trade pact. The proposal had as its goal the preparation of the former NSWTO countries for eventual NATO and EU membership. Walesa failed to specify, however, how the admission of some or all of the NATO-bis members into Euro-Atlantic structures would affect relations with the NATO-bis.

Walesa indicated in March 1992 that NATO-bis would include Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Ukraine and Russia, and possibly Belorus. Unlike the original Baltic-to-Black Sea proposal, NATO-bis did not foresee the participation of the three Baltic republics, acknowledging their lack of interest in Central Europe.

Walesa said that the concept was based on four tenets: no changes in borders, no use of force, NATO power over the region's chemical and nuclear forces, and the use of intra-regional military forces to enforce these principles. He suggested that each country should be committing a military division to NATO-bis. Thus, the project envisioned the creation of common armed forces consisting of units from the former WTO countries, and sponsored by NATO. It foresaw joint conflict prevention measures in Eastern and Central Europe. It assumed common interests in the sphere of security in East Central Europe, and aimed to extend Western security guarantees to the region.

NATO-bis was seen by its proponents as a mechanism for preventing and managing conflict. Responding to the question of why such a framework was necessary, given that there was NACC and CSCE, Jerzy Milewski, the minister of state at the

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47 Edward Krzemien, 'Moje słiczne NATO-bis' [My beautiful NATO-bis], Gazeta Wyborcza (3 November 1992); 'Udzielone w ostatnim tygodniu wywiady Lecha Walezy na tematy polityki zagranicznej: Bark wizji Europy budzi demony' [Lech Walesa's last week's interviews on issues of foreign policy: Lack of European vision wakes demons], Rzeczpospolita (8-9 January 1994).

48 Helena Fiedorcowa, 'W drodze do Europy' [On the way to Europe], Polska Zbrojna (4-5 February 1994).
President's Chancellery and head of the National Security Office, said that while Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh proved that existing structures were passive, NATO-bis could be an active mechanism capable of preventing conflicts, eliminating tension, and extinguishing conflicts that had already erupted.⁴⁹

According to Milewski, Poland should have been capitalizing on the fact that most of its eastern neighbours wanted to join NATO. Since they could not reasonably be expected to be given the chance to join immediately, 'one can exploit this joint desire to join NATO and talk these countries into concluding - under the auspice of and with help of NATO - an accord ...'.⁵⁰ NATO's support was needed, then, according to Milewski, to prevent the impression that NATO-bis was a recapitulation of the Warsaw Pact, and to allay fears about Russia's dominance.⁵¹

The concept of NATO-bis was accompanied by the presidential idea of EC-bis. The concept was based on the assumption that the collapse of the CMEA left an economic cooperation vacuum. It aimed to strengthen trade and financial relations among the East-Central European countries, with the support of the EC and other international economic and finance bodies. It also was intended to prepare its members to join the EC. As Polish observers have pointed out, the only success of the idea for EC-bis was that it drew Western attention to the fact that it was not only domestic progress but also economic relations among the region's countries that were relevant to the process in economic restructuring of the East Central European countries.⁵²

The NATO-bis and EC-bis proposals have never been elaborated in detail, a vagueness that prompted questions and commentaries from the Polish press.⁵³ To explain this lack of particulars Milewski said that NATO-bis was 'an idea and not a project existing in real life'.⁵⁴ Despite Walesa's campaign, too, the concept did not find its way into the Polish defence doctrine of November 1992.

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⁴⁹ Milewski, in 'Uczmy sie angielskiego'.
⁵⁰ Ibid.
⁵¹ Ibid.
⁵² Fiedorcowa, 'W drodze do Europy'.
⁵³ Kazimierz Groblewski, 'NATO bis sliczne jak pani' [NATO-bis is as lovely as you madam], Rzeczpospolita (14 October 1992).
⁵⁴ 'Doktryna obronna prawie gotowa' [Defence doctrine almost ready], Rzeczpospolita (28 October 1992).
The NATO-bis concept never gained the support of the government or any other political force in Poland. Indeed, the government never even officially responded to the concept of NATO-bis, but rather put effort into mitigating its effects from the day Walesa first presented it. Reacting to Walesa’s first reference to the idea during a visit to Germany, the Polish Foreign Minister sent out a memo to all Polish embassies abroad that in case of media enquiries about NATO-bis, Polish diplomats should emphasize that Polish policy toward joining the EC and NATO had not changed. The Polish government’s priority was to prevent the impression that there was political conflict and a lack of cooperation between the government and the president. Most Polish government officials, however, unofficially considered the proposal incoherent and incompatible with Polish policies.

In October 1992, minister Skubiszewski, on his return from a visit to Brussels, met with Walesa, and after what was deemed a 'lengthy discussion', gained the president’s assurance that he would no longer speak publicly about NATO-bis. He was to reassure the foreign observers that the primary goal of Polish policy was membership in the EC and in NATO, with no halfway structures, except for the Visegrad group. This statement indicates a change of heart on the part of the Polish government. In April 1991, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, then the Polish deputy defence minister, had still been arguing that 'regional groupings are important and ideally there must be several of them, overlapping to some extent in order to avoid competition and to build bridges between them.'

Despite the views of the government, President Walesa returned to his idea in October 1992. He explained that he was trying to protect the country from 'a disaster heading its way' - namely Russian neo-imperialist tendencies. According to his close advisers, the president saw NATO-bis as one of his most important ideas, but he still refrained from trying to put it into practice.

In January 1994, Walesa defended his concept yet again. Addressing voices

55 Krzemięń, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis'.
56 See Longin Pastusiak, 'Stac nas na konsensus' [We can afford consensus], Rzeczpospolita (5-6 November 1994).
57 Krzemięń, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis'.
critical of NATO-bis, he said that he believed it had been the right concept at the right time. He prided himself on proposing a regional solution to security problems a year before the war in former Yugoslavia had begun, arguing that such a structure could have prevented the outbreak of the conflict as well as the division of Czechoslovakia. Speaking at the time of the NATO summit which endorsed what was for him the disappointing Partnership for Peace initiative, he said that NATO-bis was a warning that ways must be found to solve the region’s problems. Even now, the president continues to speak of his concept occasionally, indicating that although it has been shelved, it could be revived, if Western countries fail to provide a solution to the ‘grey’ security zone in Central Europe.

3. Spiritual Foundations of Miedzymorze and NATO-bis

the KPN is an openly nationalist-patriotic, neo-Pilsudskiite opposition party. Its values are almost dogmatic, focusing on anticommunist ideology, and a devotion to the country’s independence. The neo-Pilsudskiite element of the KPN’s platform that the party emphasizes most is the goal of multi-ethnic alliance in East Central Europe. Significantly, it also chooses to endorse many elements of Dmowski’s programme, such as an emphasis on the concept of the ethnic 'nation' (which Pilsudski never shared), the recognition of minorities, the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of neighbouring countries, and a rejection of the federalist programme. Nonetheless, one Polish observer’s claim that the KPN’s programme reads like the old argument between Pilsudski-ites and traditional nationalists somewhat overstates the importance of Endecja (National Democrats) influences. Clearly, the KPN’s leaders realize that in today’s geostrategic situation, Poland could create a Miedzymorze federation only with

59 Walesa, in ‘Udzielone w ostatnim tygodniu wywiady’.


61 See Kaminski, ‘Miedzymorze’.

the agreement (and probably the assistance) of Russia. The party, however, sees Russia the main problem of the region’s security, and aims to maintain distance. Thus, the suspected *Endecja* influences may in fact be reflections of pragmatic considerations on the part of the KPN’s leadership. The KPN prefers to speak of historical continuity than of the revival of old concepts.

On a superficial level, at least, there are perceptible links between Pilsudski’s concepts and Walesa’s NATO-bis proposals. The former trade unionist Walesa has often admitted to admiring the interwar strongman of Polish politics and has referred to his political solutions on numerous occasions. Many parallels have been drawn between the two leaders, not only by analysts and observers but also by Walesa himself. However, many Polish historians dispute the notion that Walesa simply and uncritically copies Pilsudski’s ideas.

Walesa’s preferred field of action has always been foreign and security policy, and his NATO-bis concept, drawing on interwar ideas, may have been part of his long-term campaign to gain constitutional powers in these areas for the presidential chair. In 1995, there are as yet no clear constitutional guidelines on developments in security policy. The last full Polish constitution was adopted in 1952 and only amended in 1989 to replace the most offensive clauses from the communist era. The institution of the presidency was created during round-table discussions between the communist government and the opposition in 1989 and was tailored for the communist General Jaruzelski. Thus, the opposition attempted to restrict the President’s powers by imposing parliamentary controls. When Lech Walesa was elected to the office at the end of 1990, he found that the presidency did not give him the opportunity to shape Polish policies. Soon after his election, the President and his supporters began to campaign for a redefinition of his powers, favouring the model of the French presidential system. There was, however,

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64 Szczepanski, interview by author, 1995.

65 See for example Mariusz Urbanek, ‘Przeswiadczeni o swajej nieomylnosci’ [Convinced of their own infallibility], *Rzeczpospolita* (12-13 November 1994).

66 Interview with Prof. Andrzej Garlicki, ‘Pilsudski-bis: Bez wspolnego języka’ [Pilsudski-bis: Without a common language], *Rzeczpospolita* (25-26 February 1995); Interview with Andrzej Zakrzewski, ‘Nie grozi nam powtorka maja 1926’ [We are not threatened by a repetition of May 1926], *Rzeczpospolita* (25-26 February 1995).
considerable opposition to his plans among forces that advocated a parliamentary system. 67

The need for a constitutional remedy was universally acknowledged in 1991, in light of statements made by the president and his officials and advisors that were contrary to official government policy. Morale in the armed forces was affected. 68 As a means of defining the powers of the different political organs, a provisional, so-called 'little' constitution was drawn up, and replaced the old in December 1992. 69 The little constitution represents a compromise between presidential and parliamentary systems of government: the president gains power, but it is counterbalanced by new governmental controls; the Prime Minister must consult the President about candidates for the Ministers of Foreign and Internal Affairs and of National Defence; and the President approves all top military appointments. Walesa, however, continued to push for constitutional changes, and particularly for more powers in the area of security and defence. Thus, it may be that Walesa is linking himself to Pilsudski-ite notions because they also imply more presidential responsibility. After all, the initially elected Pilsudski quickly developed into a cherished strongman of Polish politics.

The KPN, while not, at least at the moment, closely linked to the President, or the presidential Bezpartyjny Blok Wsparcia Reformy (BBWR, Non-party Bloc for the Support of Reform) 70, could nonetheless be classified in a similar category - as


69 See 'Ustawa konstytucyjna z 17 pazdziernika 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach miedzy władzą ustawodawczą i wykonawczą Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorządzie terytorialnym' [Constitutional law from 17 October 1992 on interaction between juridical and executive authorities of the Polish Republic and on regional self-government], Rzeczpospolita (19 November 1992).


Walesa's BBWR has succeeded in overcoming the electoral hurdle of 1993, the first election it participated in. It placed representatives in the parliament (16 in the Sejm and 2 in the Senate), but its performance during the elections has been disappointing. See Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Walesa's Conflicts and Ambitions', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 3, No. 14 (8 April 1994); Vinton, 'Poland Goes Left'.
nationalist-patriotic, and neo-Pilsudskiite. However, compared to the presidential NATO-bis concept, *Miedzymorze* has a more eastern orientation. NATO-bis has always been aimed at membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations. The KPN on the other hand is fairly ambiguous and sceptical about NATO membership. It is for this reason that Walesa has never supported this proposal. Simultaneously, NATO-bis has never been considered viable by the KPN. In September 1994, KPN’s Marcin Krol criticized Polish foreign policy for its lack of innovative concepts. He maintained at the same time that NATO-bis was an absurdity, which could have no influence on the real course of events. It appears, then, that there is no formal cooperation or official link between Walesa’s office and the KPN concerning subregional security plans.

Both the presidential NATO-bis and the KPN’s *Miedzymorze* reflect Pilsudski’s notion of Poland’s significance and destination. As Piotr Wandycz explains, Pilsudski could not envisage Poland 'as a small state reduced to the minimal ethnic core of her national territory'. Updating Pilsudski’s notion, however, the KPN sees the European Community as a model for the region’s integration.

NATO-bis was a relatively pragmatic interpretation of Pilsudski’s ideas by Walesa. It was based on the idea of Central Europe as *Antemurales* NATO so to speak, as a bulwark of the West in the East. In this respect, Walesa departed from Pilsudski’s principles, which believed in 'equal distance' from West and East and in balancing the two sides.

Both geopolitical concerns and perceptions of threats were at the heart of the many interwar Polish proposals to close ranks in East Central Europe. They were also founded according to ingrained Polish historical images of Sarmatism - the conviction that Polish

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In January 1995, the KPN and the BBWR decided to cooperate closer within the parliament. Groblewski, ‘KPN i BBWR’.

71 Bromke, ‘Jak korzystamy’. See also Sadecki, ‘Moczulski w Krakowie’; Groblewski, ‘KPN i BBWR’.


73 Marcin Krol, ‘Jak korzystamy z naszej suwerennosci? Szansa dla Polski’ [How do we use our sovereignty? Chance for Poland], *Rzeczpospolita* (6-7 July 1994).


75 Vinton, ‘From the Margins’.
traditions are superior (see Chapter Four) and even guided by Messianism. It is to these attitudes that Hatschikjan refers when he says that today the endeavour to establish subregional cooperation frameworks 'unmistakably reflects the view that this part is "the better Europe" anyway.' In October 1992 Przemyslaw Grudzinski, then deputy defence minister, spoke of the fact that some parties wanted to solve the problem of security in Central Europe on a subregional scale, by returning to some historical concepts. He warned that such ideas were based on the idea of an active Polish leadership, leading to the crystallization of a security zone in Central and East Europe. He referred to the desire of some political forces in Poland to create a Polish 'near abroad'. One Polish commentator, speaking of the early subregional proposals, remarked that 'when you look at these proposals through Polish eyes, all you see is the eagle’s crown shining more and more brightly.'

Interestingly, the proponents of subregional security solutions like Pilsudski’s concept and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth neglect to mention that historically the implementation of such frameworks has proven difficult or impossible, and where implemented, have failed to establish the security they were designed to provide. Traditionally, members of subregional cooperation frameworks in East Central Europe have looked to great powers for security and protection. Indeed, one Polish historian has called the attempts of the inter-war period to create subregional cooperation frameworks 'episodes of little meaning'.

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78 See 'Article Views Foreign Policy'.


80 Ibid.
4. *Miedzymorze* and NATO-bis as Ways to Establish Links with West and East

*Links with the West*

The KPN is fairly ambiguous about its ideas concerning the country’s links with the West, and only vaguely sees *Miedzymorze* as a step in a long-term process of integration. This proposal cannot therefore be considered a way of improving links with the West. Instead, it could be viewed as a means of developing processes and frameworks which would make East Central Europe a stronger and more viable region, both politically and economically. The KPN’s declared goal is for Poland to be on the same level as Western European countries, but not by means of quick integration.

NATO-bis was intended to be an instrument for managing relations with the West, particularly with European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. Polish observers occasionally see this initiative in connection with attempts to enter NATO. They argue that after the German border issue was settled and Soviet troops in Poland were no longer required, the two options pursued in parallel were NATO membership and NATO-bis. 81 Both approaches were seeking the same goal. It appears however, that this view of the two foreign policy options simplifies the actual situation by ignoring the fact that NATO-bis was in fact a response to Poland’s frustrating efforts to gain NATO membership without creating an intermediate stage of the kind that NATO-bis would have been. Walesa never actually addressed arguments which claimed that the establishment of an arrangement resembling a subregional alliance could in fact provide the West with arguments for refusing to integrate the countries of Central Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Another question that President Walesa has never addressed is whether his NATO-bis proposal was also part of an international game, a bluff meant to test Western responses to the possible turn of Central Europe away from the Western foreign and security policy option. Occasionally Polish analysts see it as an attempt to gain leverage with NATO countries, rather than a way to guarantee Poland’s external security. 82 The fact that the proposal has not been officially acknowledged or prepared in more detail,

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81 Ewa Kaszuba and Krzysztof Olszewski, 'Polscy politycy o przystapieniu do NATO: Zgodny chor i solista' [Polish politicians about joining NATO: unanimous choir and a soloist], *Rzeczpospolita* (10 January 1994).

82 A Polish analyst working at the time in the President’s Chancellery assessed the proposal as a delusion conducted in the hope that Poland could pressure the West into meeting some of the expectations of rapid integration into Western structures. Gorski, interview by author, 1995. See also Marek Tabor, 'Wspolzaleznosci miedzynarodowe Polski w dziedzinie wojskowej' [International interdependencies of Poland in the military sphere], in Edward Halizak and Marek Tabor (eds), *Polska w Srodowisku Miedzynarodowym: Problemy Wspolzaleznosci*. (Warsaw: ELIPSA, 1993), p. 75.
though it has been repeatedly discussed, speaks in favour of this interpretation. Furthermore, Walesa has used such rhetorical methods on more than one occasion. In January 1994, for example, prior to the NATO Summit, the Polish president, putting pressure on the US government, warned that if NATO remained closed to Central Europeans, it risked a revival of the Soviet Pact.\(^{83}\)

In an interview from June 1993, Janusz Onyszkiewicz carefully stated that the NATO-bis concept might play a useful role in generating discussion in various international fora, for example in the CSCE, concerning the construction of a European security system which would include Central European countries. While he supported bilateral military cooperation, he did not believe that an institutionalized subregional structure involving all or some of the Central and East European countries was a viable proposal.\(^{84}\) Deputy Defence Minister Grudzinski said that he understood the concept of NATO-bis as a challenge presented to Western European strategists. His speculation, although not the official position of the ministry, was that it was an attempt to show the West that there were alternative solutions, and that a rapid inclusion of these countries would be the best option.\(^{85}\)

Poland, of course, has no other means of influencing Western decisions - it does not have the economic leverage, or the military potential that could give it the influence it seeks. In short, then, the NATO-bis concept could be interpreted as an attempt to develop a form of political leverage in Western debates concerning the future of the European security architecture.

**Links with the East**

Poland’s *Ostpolitik* has been a battleground for various political forces with conflicting views effectively paralysing attempts to create coherent and effective political strategies, particularly concerning Russia, Ukraine and Belorus. While Poland’s relations with Western European countries and organizations have been guided by clearly defined aims and relatively consistent policies, then, its relations with its new eastern neighbours

\(^{83}\) Martin Fletcher and Michael Binyon, 'Walesa fears Nato snub could revive Soviet bloc', *Times* (5 January 1994).

\(^{84}\) 'Sojusznicze niezaangażowanie: Rozmowa z Januszem Onyszkiewiczem, ministrem obrony narodowej RP'. [Allied non-engagement: Conversation with Janusz Onyszkiewicz, minister of national defense of the Polish Republic], *Trybuna* 129 (4 June 1993).

\(^{85}\) Grudzinski, 'Droga do NATO'.
have been subject to a vigorous but inconclusive debate about priorities, means and goals among the Polish elites. Some argue that the Polish 'Drang nach Westen' has had the detrimental effect of overlooking the importance of its relations with the East.

Many Polish analysts argue that Poland needs an active eastern policy, coordinated and supported by the West, combined with an emphasis on a gradual rapprochement with Western institutions and organizations like NATO and the EC (EU). As A.Z. Kaminski and J. Kurczewska argue, there is actually a connection between Poland’s eastern policy and the quality of the country’s contacts with the West. The role Poland plays in the east may well determine whether Polish goals of integration with the West will be fulfilled.86 However, to this day the Polish government’s relations with its eastern neighbours appears limited to the avoidance of complete alienation. Some, however, see Poland’s relations with the East as entirely isolated from links with the West.

*Miedzymorze* was intended to function as a tool for improving Poland’s relation with its eastern neighbours and thus it reflects a belief in the separation of eastern and western orientations. The KPN’s priority is close relations with the post-Soviet republics, and it intends to establish these link within a security cooperation framework dominated by Poland.

NATO-bis has also been interpreted as a way of organizing relations with the country’s eastern neighbours. According to Milewski, the point of the proposal is that 'the new independent countries created after the collapse of the USSR should not be left isolated and forced to rely on their own defence resources.'87 Another Polish observer sees NATO-bis an indication of need to prevent security risks emerging from the East. He reasons that existing bilateral agreements with countries to the East should be vital and active, and sees the proposal as a 'metaphor' for animating these links.88 His argument is thus that NATO-bis and other subregional security cooperation concepts should not be taken too literally but should rather be seen as attempts to establish better security relations with Poland’s Eastern neighbours. Nevertheless, in its conception NATO-bis was certainly not intended as a way of making 'Ostpolitik' completely separate

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87 Milewski, in 'Uczymy sie angielskiego'.

88 Ryszard Zieba, 'Wspolzaleznosc bezpieczenstwa Polski ze srodowiskiem miedzynarodowym' [The interdependency of Polish security and the international environment], in Halizak and Tabor (eds), *Polska w Srodowisku Miedzynarodowym*, p. 222.
from relations with the West.

Speaking against an interpretation of NATO-bis and Miedzymorze as viable tools for improving relations with Poland’s eastern neighbours is the fact that these initiatives have in fact generated mixed responses from Eastern neighbours. In particular, the NATO-bis proposal has met with disapproval in Russia, concerned that it would become isolated if Central Europe created a bloc. Countries like Ukraine, Belorus, and Lithuania, though they might appear to be grasping for straws in their efforts to assure their security, have not always been responsive to the suggestion of an East Central European security framework. One of the reasons for this weariness involves their relations with Russia. Another is the concern that Russian domination would be replaced with Polish influence. Indeed, all of these countries have at some stage in history experienced Polish influence or rule, and have undergone attempts at Polonization (see Chapter Three). Of course, Poland had a better claim to behave like a superpower when it was larger and stronger, but the continuous reminder of historical images of Polish domination in the region still troubles its eastern neighbours.

Ukrainian and Belorussian independence is in Poland’s interest (see Chapters Five and Six), but Russia’s attitudes constrain Poland’s relations with these countries. The balance between helping these republics to deal with security dilemmas without alienating Russia has not yet been struck, and according to most political forces in Poland the NATO-bis proposal does not provide a feasible solution to this problem.90

Links with Visegrad countries

Miedzymorze aims to include all of the countries between Germany and Russia, but there are in fact two geographical versions of this. The version that is currently more popular does not include the Balkans. There is however the older, so-called ‘ABC’ concept, which reaches from the Adriatic to the Black and Baltic Seas. ABC is often seen as providing a more viable basis on which to resist German and Russian influences. On the other hand, Miedzymorze supporters realize that drawing the Balkan countries into a subregional group would create more problems than it could solve.91

Nevertheless, the main focus of KPN’s Miedzymorze is the former Soviet republics

90 Malik, ‘Slowianska jednosc’.
- areas, that is, that are occasionally interpreted as historically Polish. In this context, the KPN's links with parties in Visegrad countries are weak. The party has occasionally expressed support for cooperation within the Visegrad Group, seeing it as Miedzynarodowe in embryonic stage. But as membership in the 'Intersea League' demonstrates, political forces in Visegrad countries have shown little interest in the concept.

NATO-bis required the participation of the Visegrad countries in order, geographically and ideologically, to link East Central Europe to Western Europe. However, although it was planned to include the Visegrad countries, NATO-bis was never elaborated in connection with what was by then the functioning Visegrad cooperation framework. Krzysztof Gorski, an official from the President's Chancellery, explained that the Visegrad Group was a political-economic organization not intended to institutionalize security cooperation. Thus, to open it up to new countries might mean the destruction of this framework. Such a development would leave Poland without any reassurance whatsoever. NATO-bis, by contrast, was actually conceived as a political-military structure. Thus it was to function in parallel to the more economically inclined Visegrad Group. According to Gorski one has to imagine that the relationship between Visegrad and NATO-bis is similar to the relationship between the EU and the WEU.

Nevertheless, as argued further below, Poland's Visegrad partners have not been in any way supportive of the presidential proposal, maintaining that it would move them further away from the declared goal of integration with Western Europe. As the political scientists Antoni Kaminski and Lech Kosciuk observe, the Visegrad countries have not succeeded, either individually or as a group, in working out a political strategy concerning Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic has no shared border with the former Soviet Union, and certainly no interest in being tied to any of the post-Soviet republics and their problems. Slovak relations with Ukraine have been not the best as a result of warm relations between Moscow and Bratislava. This changed somewhat following the

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92 Ibid.
recent Ukrainian election which changed the course of Kiev's politics to more pro-Russian. Moreover, all three of Poland's Visegrad partners - the Slovak and Czech Republics, and Hungary - are small states, which would be dwarfed by a state Ukraine's size. In addition, while there is some tradition of Polish cooperation with countries like Belorus, Ukraine and Lithuania, none of the other Visegrad countries claims such links. Russia's presence in this kind of subregional cooperation framework would make these problems even more significant.

**Geopolitical considerations: Creation of a North-South axis**

Polish authors occasionally point out that subregional security cooperation frameworks could fulfil an important geopolitical role for Poland. Subregional structures reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea would create a North-South axis that would cut through what for Poland has been the historically dangerous East-West axis. The desire to create this additional axis has been present in Polish foreign policy since the creation of the II Republic, and it continues to be a significant consideration. In May 1992 the Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski expressed this in a Sejm address on foreign policy:

Actively participating in the work of the Visegrad Triangle, and in Baltic and central European cooperation, Poland desires to contribute to stability and development in this part of the continent, as well as on the North-South axis, from the Baltic to the Adriatic, an axis that has not been developed hitherto and that was clearly eliminated in the period of the Cold War.

Despite the sentiments articulated in this address, Skubiszewski has never supported the concept of NATO-bis.

A significant problem for any concept of a belt from north to south is the destabilized situation in the Balkans, along with the fact that many of the region's countries are unwilling to take part in such a structure. However, today, as in the interwar period, the two predominant concerns are whether such a structure would be able to protect the small and weak countries of Central Europe from any form of

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96 Roman Kuzniar, 'Geostrategiczne uwarunkowania współzależności Polski i środowiska międzynarodowego' [Geopolitical conditioning of interdependence of Poland and the international environment], in Halizak and Tabor (eds), *Polska w Środowisku Miedzynarodowym*. p. 38.

external, regional or domestic threat, and whether it might alienate Russia.

Domestic sources of insecurity like financial and economic constraints could not be addressed by means of subregional security cooperation with poorer countries. It is also questionable whether subregional structures could quell regional problems like issues of minority rights and border disputes. The Visegrad Group is, despite all the best efforts, unable to cope with low intensity tensions among its neighbours and within the group. Indeed, it appears possible that membership in an East Central European security framework could exaggerate some of the existing or potential tensions that can be ascribed to historical concerns.

Both NATO-bis and Miedzymorze were intended by some of their protagonists to protect Central Europe from Russia's expansionist policies. For some, NATO-bis, and other subregional cooperation concepts are the desperate response of countries finding themselves in a political and military vacuum, feeling 'Russia's breath' behind them, and perceiving Germany's influence. But even analysts who are supportive of this form of cooperation acknowledge that if functioning subregional groupings such as the Visegrad Group are not filled with meaning, the only use for subregional security cooperation will be its function as a semantic 'skeleton-key' used in discussions with Euro-Atlantic organizations. Most political forces in Poland and in other countries of the region consider it unreasonable to imagine that subregional frameworks could provide security from Russia. Western observers share this opinion. As Edward Luttwak says, Poles are not realistic when they say that together with Ukraine and Belorus they are capable of creating a bloc as strong as Russia.

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98 See for example Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis'; Kusin, 'NATO and Central Europe', p. 2.

99 Boguslaw W. Zaleski, 'Znaczenie wspolzaleznosci dla polityki zagranicznej Polski' [The Significance of interdependence for Poland's foreign policy], in Halizak and Tabor (eds), Polska w Srodowisku Miedzynarodowym, p. 187.

100 L. Lengyel, 'Polaczenie nie moze bye zrealizowane' [Union cannot be realized], Wprost (11 October 1992); Zaleski, 'Znaczenie wspolzaleznosci', p. 198.

101 Kazimierz Dziewanowski, 'Potrzeba wielkiej debaty' [The need for a great debate], Rzeczpospolita (24 January 1995); Idem, 'Aby Wrzesien nie mogl sie powtorzyc' [So that September cannot repeat itself].

102 'Edward Luttwak dla "Le Figaro": Polska doprowadza kazdy sojusz do katastrofy' [Edward Luttwak for "Le Figaro": Poland brings every alliance to a disaster], Rzeczpospolita (11 January 1994).
5. Problems with subregional security concepts

None of the East Central European governments is currently supporting the creation of subregional security cooperation frameworks. *Miedzymorze* continues to have a small but vocal group of supporters in Poland, as well as among a few political movements to the east. The plan for the 'Intersea League', joining Polish political forces with other nationalist-patriotic forces is a sign of this factor. Some support for this idea also comes from members of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), currently a coalition partner in the Polish government. It is clear, however, that the KPN is and has always been an opposition party with the freedom to advance vague solutions and proposals.

It is more difficult to assess whether NATO-bis continues to be on the political agenda in Poland, and if not, at what point it was abandoned. In September 1992, Jerzy Milewski, the head of the Office of National Security at the Presidential Chancellery, claimed that the NATO-bis concept remained valid. 103 Other Polish officials, however, state that the concept has not been taken seriously since 1992. In 1992 all significant political forces in Poland are thought to have agreed upon the pursuit of the 'Western option', which has meant that the subregional option has not been seriously pursued. 104

In November 1994, for example, a Polish observer following the CEFTA meeting of heads of state of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics wrote that the creation of a subregional Central European economic bloc, NATO-bis was not on the agenda; nor, even, were common approaches to joining the EU. 105 Gorski indicates that the president's chancellery no longer promotes the idea and according to him, it could not be revived, since it is now clear that the countries it aims to include have no interest in creating such a structure. 106 However, the president himself indicates occasionally that the option, though shelved for the time being, could be revived, should the need arise. In March 1993, the President's office continued to support the concept, indicating that 'it is awaiting detailed elaboration and preparation in the form of a specific blueprint.' 107

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103 Milewski, in 'Uczmy się angielskiego'.


January 1994, Walesa did not exclude the possibility of reviving NATO-bis either, when he realized that the NATO Summit would not meet Polish expectations.\footnote{Walesa, in 'Udzielone w ostatnim tygodniu wywiady'.} It is apparent, however, that no political force seriously supports NATO-bis at this time.

**Differences among countries:** A major problem facing any plan for a subregional security structure is the vast differences among countries in the region. Few common features can be found among the states of East Central Europe except for their common post-Communist and post-WTO legacy.\footnote{Jerzy Maria Nowakowski, 'Jalta czy Niderlandy' [Yalta or the Netherlands]. Rzeczpospolita (12 September 1993).} Some observers find it useful to divide the entire region into two parts: on the one hand, Central Europe with its northern and a southern tier (or the Visegrad Four, and Bulgaria and Romania); and on the other, the post-Soviet republics (East Central Europe or Eastern Europe). Yet, any division of this kind overlooks the fact that, while there are some similarities, even within these groups approaches to matters of defence and security vary substantially. Any attempt to create a security cooperation structure would have to overcome differing definitions of security threats, and contrasting foreign policy options. In addition, there are subtle but significant cultural and religious differences among the countries, which have played an important historical role, and continue to be a divisive factor.

A Polish observer notes that a framework with the territorial reach of *Miedzymorze* would have to deal with differences and discrepancies among interests in the region. In his opinion, the architects of such subregional cooperation plans belittle and minimize these divisions.\footnote{Tomasz Lubinski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At Europe’s door]. Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993).} The supporters of *Miedzymorze*, however, see collective retraction of territorial claims and the recognition of minority rights as a means of handling the tensions among the region’s countries. The ongoing process of disintegration to the East contributes to the suspicion with which post-Soviet republics see any prospects for the creation of multilateral structures.\footnote{Tomasz Lubinski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At Europe’s door]. Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993).} They feel that a reliance on the functioning of these untried mechanisms, and simultaneously risking a conflict with Russia by doing so, would not be the wisest strategy.

Another problem is that while the KPN sees German economic and cultural
influences as a very real and significant threat to Central European security\(^\text{112}\), countries to the East of the Polish border are unlikely to feel as concerned about this issue as Poles. Thus, a common interest in terms of security is limited to the curtailing of Russia’s influence. While many observers acknowledge the Russo-phobic nature of the *Miedzymorze* concept, most argue that a framework of this kind would not have the necessary political weight or military potential to be considered a serious partner by Russia.

**No takers:** A more practical problem of course, has been the lack of interest among the countries that the NATO-bis and *Miedzymorze* concept intended to incorporate. Jerzy Milewski stated that Poland’s neighbours to the south and east were ‘interested in every proposed action which could help them consolidate their new and still very unstable statehood’.\(^\text{113}\) Thus, the President’s office saw Ukraine as the main partner for Poland in NATO-bis.\(^\text{114}\) Milewski indicated that Ukraine was very much interested in the proposal.\(^\text{115}\) Yet, these statements were overly optimistic. The Ukraine does not have full independence, and is therefore without a clear political strategy. The foreign policy options which appear possible for Ukraine at this time are neutrality, a subregional security cooperation framework with Poland, or some form of reintegration with Russia. Due to the results of the last Ukrainian election in 1994, Ukraine is expected by the Poles to increasingly express interest in strengthening of the CIS.\(^\text{116}\)

Belorus and Slovakia are also problematic potential partners because of their actual or possible relations with Russia. Belorus’ statehood is questionable\(^\text{117}\), and the Polish president has chosen not to make explicit references to Belorus as a plausible member of NATO-bis. Slovakia has not yet developed a clear blueprint of its foreign policy. The Slovak leadership may not want to affect relations with Russia by joining a subregional

\(^{112}\) See for example KPN’s pamphlet, Szczepanski, *Miedzymorze: Polityka*.

\(^{113}\) See ‘Security Chief Interviewed’.

\(^{114}\) Gorski, interview by author, 1995.


security framework.\textsuperscript{118}

The Czech Republic, not surprisingly, has rejected the NATO-bis concept. Its leadership has chosen a foreign policy orientation which emphasizes the country’s individual achievements over cooperation with other countries in the region, believing that this will be the shortest way into Europe\textsuperscript{119} (see Chapter Eight). It is reported that ‘some Prague politicians … tended to consider Poland as a volatile country with exaggerated regional ambitions’.\textsuperscript{120} The proposal for NATO-bis certainly did nothing to dispel this perception. Hungarian policy-makers, as well, rejected the NATO-bis concepts and similar ideas outright on the grounds that subregional pacts and alliances would work against the goal of unifying Europe.\textsuperscript{121} Hungarian commentators also criticized as the notion of \textit{Miedzymorze}.\textsuperscript{122}

Confronted with the statement that Visegrad countries had not responded favourably to the proposal either, Milewski said that some opposition politicians in the Czech republic, Hungary and Slovakia had indeed expressed interest in the concept.\textsuperscript{123} Yet while nationalist-patriotic groups in the Visegrad countries may have been more sympathetic towards the idea than other parties, in practical terms their support was of little value.\textsuperscript{124}

The Baltic countries, not initially envisioned as members of NATO-bis, have come forward with a project similar to it for the Baltic region. Reportedly, during a November 1993 meeting of the Estonian President Lennart Meri and the chiefs of the armed forces of the three Baltic republics, a concept of a ’Baltic NATO’ made up of these three

\textsuperscript{118} Gorski, interview by author, 1995.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{122} For a discussion of Hungarian approaches to this concept, see Rafał Wisniewski, ‘Z Wegierskich scenariuszy przyszłości Europy Środkowej’ [From Hungarian scenarios of the future of Central Europe]. \textit{Polska W Europie} 12 (June/July 1993), p. 43.

\textsuperscript{123} ‘Security Chief Interviewed’, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{124} Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
countries was presented.\textsuperscript{125} It reflected the desire of the Baltic republics not to be left behind in the drive for NATO membership. Thus, the leaders of the three countries continue to campaign for the creation of an intermediary stage on the way into NATO, not, however, for membership in NATO-bis.

According to Milewski, in fact, the main audience for the NATO-bis proposal was actually politicians in the West. He stated that, if the NATO-bis concept is to be realized, Western states must first acknowledge it as interesting enough and significant enough from their own viewpoint. There is no such interest on the part of the West so far, and this is why the concept remains in the sphere of ideas and has not been transformed into a concrete proposal.\textsuperscript{126}

His statement implied further that the countries the proposal aimed to include would show more interest if the West gave it its blessing. However, not unlike other subregional initiatives, NATO-bis has not found a positive echo in the West.\textsuperscript{127} Circles critical of Walesa commented that the NATO-bis proposal was another blow to aspirations for Polish membership in the EU and NATO.

The Polish government saw the NATO-bis proposal as an unnecessary diversion which undermined Polish credibility abroad.\textsuperscript{128} It continued to emphasize that the Visegrad Group remained the most promising political concept on a subregional scale\textsuperscript{129}, and that the main aim of Polish policy remained full membership in NATO.\textsuperscript{130} An unnamed minister from Suchocka's cabinet spoke of the fact that countries such as Russia and Ukraine and Belorus had no prospects of entering NATO. By organizing cooperation within NATO-bis, Polish chances of joining NATO would thus also be diminished. A similar approach to the problem was manifested by deputy defence minister Grudzinski who said to \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza} that even within the Visegrad Group, the membership of countries like Ukraine and Bulgaria would not be acceptable to the

\textsuperscript{125} 'Propozycja "Baltyckiego NATO"' [Proposal of a "Baltic NATO"], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (22 November 1993); Helena Fiedorcowa, 'Baltycki sojusz' [Baltic alliance], \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (19 April 1994).

\textsuperscript{126} 'Security Chief Interviewed', p. 24.

\textsuperscript{127} Fiedorcowa, 'W drodze do Europy'.

\textsuperscript{128} Radek Sikorski, 'Jak korzystamy z naszej suwerennosci? Nie odwzajemnione zaloty' [How do we use out sovereignty? Unreciprocated courtship], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (15-16 October 1994).

\textsuperscript{129} Grudzinski, in 'Droga do NATO'.

\textsuperscript{130} Jacek Kwicinski, 'O bezpieczenstwie Polski - dzis i w roku 2010' [About Polish security - today and in the year 2010], \textit{Rzeczpospolita} (8 September 1992).
Polish government because it would have the effect of moving Poland further away from NATO. Andrzej Drzycimski, too, said that he could see that NATO-bis might be a useful concept for Ukraine or Bulgaria but not for Poland, obviously because the latter was closer to reaching the goal of NATO membership.

There was also concern that the realization of the proposal would recreate a separation into detached security arrangements for East and for West. A Polish observer warned that 'East-Central Europe can of its own accord slowly become ever more Eastern'. Thus Polish authors point out that the concept of NATO-bis might have been viable in 1990 and 1991, but with the establishment of closer contacts with Western structures it has become largely irrelevant.

**Historical images:** An additional problem that should not be underestimated is the continued presence of images of the past among the peoples of the region. Any concepts of subregional security cooperation in East Central Europe must address the problem of historical Polish, German and Russian domination. Polish observers note that to this day pro-Polish segments of the political elites are weak in Ukraine, Belorus and Lithuania.

The Belorussian and Lithuanian supporters of blueprints for subregional security cooperation in East Central Europe have acknowledged the problem of the perceptions of Polish participation in such structures. While the Lithuanian Terleckas encourages Polish participation and even a central role in such an arrangement, he specifies that this could only be achieved if anti-Polish feelings did not run to strong. The KPN's Szczepanski, as well, acknowledged the problem of negative historical images, but argued that it was not reasonable to imagine that there was a real threat of polonization with

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131 Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis'.

132 'Spotkanie z min. Andrzejem Drzycińskim: Rosja jest szansa dla naszej gospodarki' [Meeting with minister Andrzeja Drzycimski: Russia is a chance for our economy], *Polska Zbrojna* (16 November 1993).

133 "Trzeba naprawic bledy: O kontynuacji i zmianach w polityce zagranicznej mówi profesor Wojciech Lamentowicz (Unia Pracy)" [It is necessary to mend mistakes: Professor Wojciech Lamentowicz (UP) speaks about continuation and changes in foreign policy], *Rzeczpospolita* (24 September 1993).


135 Drzycimski, in "Rosja jest szansa"; Fiedorcowa, "W drodze do Europy".

136 Dziewanowski, 'Potrzeba wielkiej debaty'.

137 Kaminski, 'Miedzymorze'.
nations like Ukraine and Lithuania, which have a solid national consciousness. Furthermore, Polish supporters of the *Miedzymorze* acknowledge that Polish neo-imperialist tendencies would be destructive.\textsuperscript{138}

It is obvious that any Polish pressure to convince eastern neighbours to join a club of countries which could be dominated by Poland would be perceived as neo-imperialist policy.\textsuperscript{139} Any such behaviour would damage the carefully established and still fragile political economic and cultural links between the country and its newly independent eastern neighbours (see Chapter Five).

**Relations with Russia:** For the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO-bis is a difficult concept because of the unresolved issue of its links with Russia. Historically, subregional proposals were intended to weaken Russia (see Chapter Four). Today, however, Polish policy-makers believe that a large but weak Russia is not in the Polish interest\textsuperscript{140}, since this would create numerous security problems, rather than guarantee Polish security (see Chapter Five). In addition, if such a structure were created without Russian participation, Russia would see it as an attempt to create a *cordon sanitaire*, an effort to push it back into Asia. Russia has expressed its disapproval of active Polish policy towards countries in the *Miedzymorze* region, and of proposals aiming to institutionalize links between Poland and the former Soviet republics Ukraine and Belorus.\textsuperscript{141} If Russia were to find itself outside of a subregional East Central European security framework, it would respond by attempting to expand its sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{142} Russian isolation would also be difficult to accept for Western governments. Polish officials thus claim that Russia’s inclusion in NATO-bis would invariably recreate the WTO.\textsuperscript{143}

The Polish National Defence Ministry indicated that the greatest practical problem

\textsuperscript{138} Szczepanski, interview by author, 1995.

\textsuperscript{139} Kazimierz Dziewanowski, 'Aby Wrzesień nie mógł się powtórzyć' [So that September cannot repeat itself], *Rzeczpospolita* (6 February 1995).

\textsuperscript{140} Antoni Z. Kamiński, 'Bezpieczeństwo Polski na tle rozwoju procesów politycznych w Europie. Uwagi metodologiczne' [Poland's security against the background of the development of political processes in Europe. Methodological remarks], *Studia i Materiały* 64 (May 1993), p. 13.

\textsuperscript{141} Romanowski, 'Czy przespalismy "smutek"?'.

\textsuperscript{142} Sławomir Popowski, 'Koniec gry' [End of game], *Rzeczpospolita* (6 September 1993).

\textsuperscript{143} Krzemien, 'Moje słiczne NATO-bis'.

with Russian participation in a NATO-bis-like structure would be posed by the proposition that Russia should renounce control over its chemical and nuclear weapons. A Polish official said that this was impossible because it would mean the full capitulation of Russia and its resignation from the group of nuclear countries.\footnote{Ibid.}

Another Polish observer remarked that Russia would never be prepared to allow the Ukraine to be part of a bloc like NATO-bis or \textit{Miedzymorze}.\footnote{Popowski, 'Koniec gry'.} Indeed, Russian commentators have labelled any attempt on the part of Poland and Ukraine to cooperate in the sphere of security as the potential creation of a \textit{cordon sanitaire}. Instead of increasing security in the Central European region, then, subregional security cooperation frameworks could well have the opposite effect.

\section*{6. Summary and Conclusion}

Although official Polish policies can be classified as clearly pro-Western, weak political parties and unstable political organs have generated a number of contesting, but rarely elaborated ideas about the security and defence of the country, and its foreign policy. These ideas more often than not fall into the category of what has been called the "third arrangement" (a permanent, multifunctional Central European community).\footnote{Hieronim Kubiak, 'Poland: national security in a changing environment', in Regina Cowen Karp, \textit{Central and Eastern Europe}. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 100. See also "'Kres Europy" to tylko literacka przenosnia: Dodawanie ulamków", ['End of Europe' as a literary metaphor: adding up fractions] \textit{Polityka} (17 October 1992).} They return to the interwar foreign policy concept of a belt of countries creating a North-South axis, and are based on historical images of Jagellonian Poland. Thus, they often reflect the notion of special Polish role in a subregional context, particularly to the East, in areas which were part of the multi-national and expansive Polish-Lithuanian state.

The two proposals examined in this chapter, NATO-bis (advanced by presidential circles) and \textit{Miedzymorze} (supported mainly by the Confederation for Independent Poland), can both be described as neo-Pilsudskiite, although the former was also intended to create links with Euro-Atlantic organizations, a notion which the supporters of the latter reject. \textit{Miedzymorze} was conceived as a separate entity, which could be dissolved when East Central Europe reached a level of development which would allow it to be
integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO-bis was seen as a strictly a transitional arrangement.

The two proposals fail to take into account the significant differences among countries in the region, they do not adequately address negative historical images of domination, and they have found no 'takers' among neighbouring countries. Most importantly, the concepts fail to address the fact that Russia is opposed to any subregional security cooperation plans that either exclude it, or are directed against its power.

Although the sections of the Polish political spectrum that support these subregional concepts are relatively small, the option continues to be debated. This aspect of Polish foreign and security policy is little known outside of the country, and its historical roots and practical implications remain unfamiliar, particularly in the West.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Subregional cooperation has been hailed as a means for coping with post-Cold War instabilities. Following the collapse of the Eastern bloc many observers suggested that such form of security cooperation would provide some solutions to the security problems the newly democratic countries of Central Europe were facing. However, although a number of frameworks for cooperation was created, subregional collaboration remains weak. This thesis focused on Polish views of subregional security cooperation in Central Europe in order to explain its deficiencies.

The disintegration of the Eastern Pact left Poland in a position of de facto neutrality and non-alignment. Simultaneously, the end of the Cold War era did not lessen Polish perceptions of threats to national security. In fact, threat perceptions grew with the spread of a new, broader definition of security. Once again, foreign policy became probably the most important aspect of Polish sovereignty. A variety of policy options thus emerged in the Polish security debate. In this context, the option that Poland and all the Central European states soon adopted was membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations.

Polish policy-makers argued that the North-Atlantic community was the only structure which could prevent the isolation and balkanization of the area between the Baltic and the Black Seas.\(^1\) Poland's preference, then, was membership in a strong North Atlantic alliance which guaranteed a US presence in Europe. combined with a European

\(^1\) Jerzy Maria Nowakowski, 'Jalta czy Niderlandy' [Yalta or the Netherlands], Rzeczpospolita (12 September 1993).
security identity. As far as Poland was concerned, a European/North Atlantic security framework should include Central Europe, but should not offer a preferential position to Russia.

Policy-makers in Poland also suggested that this strategy of integration in Euro-Atlantic organizations should come with early Western decisions on time tables, entrance requirements, and a Western policy of differentiation among the former WTO countries. It would also require close cooperation between Western and Central Europe concerning the aim of military integration, which would mean splitting up the peace-dividend - a premium so far enjoyed only by a few Western countries. In addition, it would make the participation of Central Europe in the decision-making of Western organizations necessary, at least concerning questions that affected the future of the region. When hardly any of these stipulations were fulfilled by the West, Polish policy-makers and observers realized that Poland had neither the economic nor the political means to put pressure on its Western partners to come up with a longer-term strategy towards Central Europe.

The vast majority of Polish decision-makers continued to be united in their desire for a 'return to Europe'. There was, generally speaking, a political consensus on the proper direction for Polish foreign and security policy. However, Poland (and Central Europe more generally) was quickly losing the special treatment it had been granted for its role in the process of decommunization, yet, at the same time, continued to find itself outside of the Western world. Polish analysts wrote that the paradox of Polish foreign and security policy was that as economic reforms proceeded and democratic structures were consolidated in post-Soviet states, the chances of hard security guarantees for Poland actually diminished. There was thus a growing sense of unrequited affection in Poland. Although officials avoided voicing their disappointment over solutions proposed by Western partners, they regretted the absence of a Western strategy, a vision of the future of Europe. As one Western commentator observed, 'continual waffling over Eastern enlargement - by NATO and the European Union - has frustrated the efforts of those

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reformers who have argued that pursuing a "Western" track and gaining membership cards in NATO and the EU would result in tangible benefits'.

Following suggestions from the West that cooperation in the region would bring Central Europeans closer to Western organizations, and realizing that the goal of full and immediate integration would not be reached in the immediate future, Central European countries formed subregional security cooperation frameworks, primarily the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative. Of course, it is also true that subregional security frameworks can be useful if they foster interaction and collaboration among neighbouring states which lack a tradition of cooperation, and in the Central European context, they could also help the states involved to cope with some of the post-Cold War security problems of a regional or local nature.

In Poland, however, these frameworks are understood as components of the official Polish policy aimed mainly at managing relations with the West and achieving eventual integration - hence their motto calling for a 'return to Europe'. The creation of subregional frameworks was thus based on common cultural, economic and political circumstances. And this imperative clearly demands tolerance rather than nationalist attitudes.

The Visegrad Group and the CEI are pragmatic cooperation frameworks which concentrate on a number of 'low' issues and projects, such as trade in the region and environmental cooperation, and in the case of Visegrad some minor military issues like the exchange of spare parts for weapon systems. Polish policy-makers have indeed acknowledged the security potential for this form of cooperation: the 1992 defence doctrine stated that developing subregional cooperation with Hungary and Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech and Slovak Republics) was expected to help to reduce threats. Considered promising in the West, these frameworks have not however taken on a security dimension, since Central European policy-makers have emphasized that their goal was never the creation of a 'third way', but integration with the West.

Moreover, for Poland, the important cooperation with its eastern neighbours Ukraine, Russia and Belorus has remained based on bilateral agreements, rather than on

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multilateral frameworks. In relations with eastern neighbours, Visegrad and the CEI assist at best only by 'force of example', since its members have chosen for the time being to exclude a number of countries which have expressed interest in joining.

Yet, there are groups on both the left and the right of the Polish political spectrum that do in fact subscribe to the idea of subregional security cooperation frameworks not as intermediary stages but as final goals. They ascribe a different function to such frameworks than the governing forces. These groups include mainly the so-called patriotic or independence elements; in the Western understanding of the concept, they can be described as nationalist. Significantly, concepts put forward by these sections of the Polish political spectrum are also supported by parts of the former Communist movements.

The political platforms of these parties are hardly known outside of Central Europe. The reasons for this are numerous and range from the fact that these elements are not interested in courting Western attention, to the point that their motivations must be understood in the wider cultural and historical background which so few Western observers grasp. This thesis puts these proposals both in historical and in contemporary perspectives.

Polish nationalist political forces and some post-Communist supporters have been critical of the fact that the government has not been capable of addressing security threats without turning to Euro-Atlantic organizations. They have suggested that by exploiting the initial willingness of neighbouring post-Soviet republics to establish closer relations with Poland after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country could have avoided the humiliation of its pro-Western foreign policy. Official Polish policy was castigated for conducting a timid strategy, characterized by utter deference to superpowers and arrogance towards less powerful states. It was also argued that Western-oriented policies did not help to overcome Poland's perennial security dilemma stemming from its place on an East-West axis. These forces suggested that the creation of a North-South axis with other Central European states would remedy this difficult problem. Poland's nationalist forces thus sought to establish and manage relations with the country's eastern, and occasionally also southern, neighbours by forming subregional security frameworks intended to push away both the West and Russia.

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As Aleksander Hall, a right-wing Polish leader, remarked, all European right-wing formations refer to tradition and national heritage. In his opinion, this tendency is particularly pronounced in the Polish case. Indeed, Polish nationalists have almost exclusively sought an answer to Poland’s security problems in the country’s history. Their plans for subregional alliances, confederations, and cooperation frameworks, and the neo-Pilsudskiite notion of 'equal distance' are all based heavily on Polish historical images.

The most important proposal of this kind is *Miedzymorze (Internerarium)*, a concept put forward by the Confederation for Independent Poland, a political party that often refers to its neo-Pilsudskiite orientation. It aims to create an alliance among the countries between Germany and Russia. *Miedzymorze* is a 'third way' concept, not primarily interested in close relations with the West. It also proclaims a mission for Poland among neighbouring countries, and rejects official Polish foreign policy.

It is worth noting that a similar proposal has been put forward by the political camp surrounding President Walesa. The presidential NATO-bis proposal can, however, be understood as an intermediary concept designed to manage relations with both East and West. By formulating this proposal, Walesa probably intended to provoke a reaction from the country’s Western partners, rather than to suggest a real alternative to official Polish foreign policy. Thus the proposal could be classified as a *ruch pozorny* - a 'pretending motion'.

Most Polish observers are dismayed that the policy discussion conforms to Jerzy Giedroyc’s thesis that the country is ruled by the spirit of the two interwar political leaders Roman Dmowski and Jozef Pilsudski - both of whom defined anti-Western foreign policy orientations. They warn that some policy concepts aimed at managing relations with neighbouring countries are inspired by unrealistic myths and historical images. In fact, the concept of *Miedzymorze*, and to a lesser extent NATO-bis, have as their ideological base the Pilsudskiite idea that Poland is responsible for the countries east of its borders, and that it is a bulwark of Western civilization in the East.

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6 Aleksander Hall, 'Co dalej z prawica?' [What next with the right wing?], *Rzeczpospolita* (16 February 1995).

7 Artur Bilski, 'W kolejce do Europy' [In queue to Europe], *Polska Zbrojna* (28 September 1994).

8 Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, 'W poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji' [Searching for a new concept], *Rzeczpospolita* (14 January 1994).
Because of the historical implications of these ideas for neighbouring countries, these platforms could be damaging in a number of ways. They could establish 'second-class' associations of countries, which would not be a source of strength. In the long run, they could recreate the inter-war fragmentation of Europe. They also have the potential to damage the delicate links created so far between Poland and its eastern neighbours, since areas of Ukraine, Belorus and Lithuania have historically experienced Polish domination.

For now, however, there is little interest in these concepts among Poles, their eastern neighbours and the West. Most Polish observers would assess *Miedzyomorze* and NATO-bis as policies without a chance of success. The main reasons for this appraisal are the lack of interest in these ideas among serious contenders for power, differences among the interests and power potentials of the involved countries, and the possible alienation of Russia. Responses of other post-Soviet republics to NATO-bis and *Miedzyomorze* plans have also been indecisive. Reactions have ranged from a total absence of interest and concerns about potential Polish domination to the tacit agreement to a special role for Poland in the region by those few forces which have been prepared to see this form of cooperation as a link to the West.

So far, then, the Pilsudski-inspired subregional policy option has not exerted a formative influence on official Polish foreign policy. But the scant interest in such subregional security arrangements in Poland could conceivably grow in the long term. For now, even 'efforts toward ... collaboration encouraged by the West and partly successful have been noticeable among more politicians and intellectuals than on the popular level'. But unlike existing cooperation frameworks, the NATO-bis and *Miedzyomorze* proposals are of a populist character, appealing to a Polish sense of the country's role and mission. Moreover, although nationalist and populist forces do not have as significant an influence in Poland as they do in many other states of Eastern and Central Europe, they do exist and reflect longstanding elements of Polish political culture. As such they cannot be disregarded.

Indeed, the East Central European region remains trapped by the legacy of its history. Subregional arrangements which do not reflect historical experiences, like the

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Visegrad Group, have proved difficult to establish. Frameworks which refer to the past of the region, such as *Miedzymorze*, carry with them historical images of domination or neo-imperialism. It is not only the complex contemporary geopolitical situation of Central Europe, then, but also the difficult history of the region that makes cooperation a problematic endeavour. It is not surprising that observers say that 'Eastern Europe seems doomed to remain a fragmented region where the countries refuse to see their common interest, regardless of geographic proximity.'

Polish policy-makers suggest that effective subregional cooperation could take place only within the framework of Euro-Atlantic organizations. Such a solution would help to overcome traditional hostilities in the region, and provide reasonable and workable goals. Until membership in Western organizations makes this possible, existing frameworks will continue as secondary fora. In the meantime, proposals for subregional cooperation - the 'third option' - will continue to be advanced by Poland’s nationalist elements.

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APPENDIX A: MAPS DOCUMENTING CHANGES OF POLISH BORDERS OVER TIME

MAP 1: POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH

THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN
and BOHEMIAN KINGDOMS
at the Beginning of the
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

SOURCE: HEYMANN, POLAND & CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
MAP 4: POLAND AFTER WORLD WAR II

SOURCE: HEYMAN, POLAND & CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
MAP 5: CONTEMPORARY POLAND

APPENDIX B: MAP OF MIEDZYMORZE AREA

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