Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919-1922.

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"GREECE IN ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK ADMINISTRATION OF THE VILAYET OF AIDIN, 1919 - 1922"

BY

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Abstract

In May 1919, following the Allied victory in the Great War, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference was deliberating in Paris. With ample prompting from the Greek side and in order to avert a similar Italian move, the Council soon decided to request the landing of Greek troops in Asia Minor, to establish law and order and to protect the Christian minorities from excesses on behalf of the Turks. This landing, was followed by the establishment of the Greek High Commission of Smyrna, whose task was to supervise the Turkish administration of the territory occupied by the Greek army until the peace treaty with Turkey was signed. Further, the High Commission was to be the mediator between the occupying forces and the Ottoman civil authorities. After the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres which provided for a substantial part of Asia Minor to be administered by Greece for an initial five-year period, the High Commission assumed the administration of the Greek zone, together with that of the zone occupied de facto by the Greek forces but not included in the Treaty, and was renamed Greek Administration of Smyrna.

The object of this thesis is to examine the conditions under which Greece was called to supervise the Turkish administration, from which she was subsequently to take over, the administrative work carried out during the 1919-1922 period and the inherent contradictions present in Greece's Anatolian venture, which has been described as "the worst day's work for his country which Venizelos ever did". Further, in the light of the archival material examined, an attempt is made to evaluate the feasibility of a Greek Asia Minor based on the principle of peaceful coexistence between Greeks and Turks. On the basis of the extensive primary sources consulted, the thesis also attempts to examine the external forces opposing the scheme and hampering any chances of success it ever had.

On the Greek side, the name which stands out throughout the period under examination is that of Aristidis Stergiadis, the controversial High Commissioner of Smyrna and its omnipotent ruler until the 1922 catastrophe. The thesis examines the Stergiadis administration and attempts to evaluate the work carried out, as well as the outcry that followed the High Commissioner during his long self-exile from Greece, and which persists until today.
For my Uncles
Christos S. Solomonidis
Dimitris G. Papamichalopoulos
A Note on References to Documentation

For abbreviation purposes, primary material from the Greek archives appears in references and footnotes as follows:

MOFA 22a tel. no. 10346/22.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos

In this example, telegram number 10346 was addressed by Stergiadis to Venizelos on 22 January 1920. The abbreviation MOFA corresponds to the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while number 22 is an abbreviation for the full title of the file, as it appears in the Bibliography at the end of this thesis and corresponds to the sequence with which files were made available to me during the course of my research. In this particular example, the full title of MOFA 22 is A Politiki, Smyrni, documents numbered 10,001-end, 1920 [1st Political Directorate, Smyrna, 1920]. The letter a denotes that this particular telegram was the first document photocopied from file MOFA 22, and appears here to facilitate access to the card index on the documents used for the purposes of this thesis.

The same system applies to documents deposited with the General Archives of the State [Genika Archela tou Kratous - GAK] and the Venizelos' Archive at the Benaki Museum [Archeio Venizelou - AV]. For example,

GAK 13k document no. 3361/13.4.22, Gounarakis to MOFA

denotes that this document, addressed by the Secretary General of the High Commission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the tenth document photocopied and the original is filed in the file YAS Dieythynsis Esoterikon, 1920-1922 [SHC Department of Internal Affairs, 1920-1922]. In turn, this file was the thirteenth file consulted in the General Archives of the State, while

AV 13 letter, n.n./22.4.20, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos

denotes reference to a letter addressed on 22 April 1920 by Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos. It did not bear a document number [n.n. = not numbered], notes were taken but it was not photocopied [no letter follows AV 13], and its original can be found in file 24, Episima Ypourgiou Exoterikon, 1919, xii [Official Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1919 xvii].

Italian primary material, the majority of which was located in the Historical Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [ASMAE], is referred to in the following form:

ASMAE Turchia 1644/7738/1467/27.4.19, Sonnino to Ravel

This denotes that telegram number 1467 was addressed by Sonnino to Admiral di Ravel on 27 April 1919, and was located in the collection of documents pertaining to Turkey [Turchia], in Packet [Pacco] number 1644 (1919), File [Busta] 7738, Occupazioni greche in Asia Minore [Greek occupations in Asia Minor]. Again, a list of the main files consulted at the ASMAE
can be found in the Bibliography.

References to documents published in the various volumes of the *Documents of British Foreign Policy* series [DBFP], appear either as

DBFP IV no. 577
denoting document number 577 in the fourth volume of the first series, whenever reference to the document as a whole is implied, or as

DBFP VII p. 98
when a particular part of a longer document is referred to.
List of Abbreviations

AR  Foreign Office, Annual Report
ARG  Foreign Office, Annual Report for Greece
ART  Foreign Office, Annual Report for Turkey
ASMAE  Historical Archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry
AV  Venizelos Archive
CAB  Cabinet Papers, London
CH  Current History, USA
CHC  Greek High Commission in Constantinople
DBFP  Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series
DICP  Italian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference
DIFP  Documents on Italian Foreign Policy
DKMS  Journal of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens
DPA  Diotnidis-Paraskevopoulos Archive
FO  Foreign Office Papers, London
GAK  General Archives of the State, Athens
GAS  Greek Administration of Smyrna
GGG  Greek Government Gazette
GGS  Greek General Staff
HC  House of Commons, London
ICI  International Commission of Inquiry
IEE  Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous
KMS  Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens
MAE  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
MANTOUX  Les Délirations du Conseil des Quatre
MOFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens (Also Archives of...)
MOZ  Militarily Occupied Zone, Asia Minor
n.d.  not dated
n.n.  not numbered
n.s.  not signed
n.v.  Note Verbale
SHC  Smyrna High Commission
tel.no  Telegram Number
"The story carried us back to classic times. It is true Greek tragedy, with Chance as the ever-ready handmaid of Fate... The interplay between Greek love of party politics and the influence exercised over them by Venizelos constitutes the action of the piece. The scene and the lighting are the Great War; and the theme 'How Greece gained the Empire of her dreams in spite of herself, and threw it away when she awoke!' 1/. Although not complete as it avoids any mention of the role entrusted to Greece's Allies in the play, this is a more or less accurate picture of the period to be discussed in this study. The particular diplomatic and military manoeuvres to be examined seem to have been but an episode in one of the longest-running problems in world history: In 1919, at the wake of the Great War, Greece accepted the Allied offer of substantial territory in Asia Minor, enshrined in the abortive Treaty of Sévres, and she thereby came to occupy much the same area as Agesilaos had done in 396-394 b.C., with as little prospect of success 2/.

The Treaty of Sévres was the last of five peace treaties concluded at various stages after the armistice between the Allies and each of the Central Powers. Most of these treaties were characterized by a blatant disregard of the principles of self-determination and protection of minorities which the Allies had professed to honour. The frontiers drawn as a result, were motivated by strategic rather than ethnic considerations and the Treaty of Sévres was no exception. It incorporated most of the provisions of the four secret treaties concluded among the Allies during the War, which, in turn, constituted a glaring contradiction of the Wilsonian fourteen points adopted by the Peace Conference as a basis for discussion, because they provided for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire a priori. According to the Wilsonian declarations, exclusively Turkish territory was to remain independent and the non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire were assured "an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development". The Treaty of Sévres provided for important concessions for Greece, which were to have far reaching consequences not only for the Ottoman Greek minority, but for the Balkan peninsula in general 3/. As it happened, this treaty proved to be the only one that could not be enforced. Its revision was being discussed in earnest before it was even signed and, by the time of its signature, the position of the Greek army which was called to enforce it, was patently untenable.

In the end, among the Central Powers, Turkey alone was able to repudiate the terms imposed on her by the victorious Allies, to the largest part unwillingly. Not only she defeated the Greek army and defied Allied authority, but, what was probably more important, she succeeded in transforming herself from the rump of a universal empire into a national state, within the short space of three years. As Smyrna burned, the Greeks of Asia Minor fled to the mainland in their hundreds of thousands, together with the remaining destitute Christian communities of the area. The problem of the Christian
minorities in Turkey seemed to have been solved, since they had ceased to exist.

This study focuses on the administration of the areas occupied by Greece in Asia Minor as a result of post-war considerations in conjunction with her own determination - or that of her leaders - to implement the Megali Idea. The prospects for the realization of this centuries-old dream within the framework of Greek participation in the Allied war effort were mainly responsible for hopelessly dividing the country during the preceding five years and for pushing it to the brink of civil strife.

In the process of this research, it became clear that the activities of the Greek administration could in no way be studied and evaluated without being placed within the context of post-war Allied relations, the plight of the Christian minorities in Turkey and the upsurge of the Turkish nationalist movement, the delicate situation at home and the developments both at the military front and at the table of diplomatic negotiations. These factors greatly determined the outcome of Greece's administrative efforts in Asia Minor and, in view of their interaction, their assessment was deemed essential. As a result, a substantial part of this study considers the odds against which the Greek authorities in Asia Minor had to fight in order to create an effective administrative structure. This effort, in effect, was based on the grave misunderstanding that Greece had been called to govern Western Anatolia, while the truth of the matter was that the Allies had simply entrusted to the Greek forces the policing of the area for a limited period of time.

The material examined here was divided into five chapters, while the introductory notes attempt to set the background in Anatolia through a survey of the period 1913-1918. Chapter One examines the diplomatic considerations which compelled the Allies to request the landing of the Greek forces in Smyrna, in defiance of the gloomy forecasts of their military advisers. The disastrous execution of this landing and the ugly episodes that followed, together with the interallied inquiry into these episodes, also form part of this chapter, as this series of events illustrated the realities against which the Greek administration would have to work during its short-lived existence.

The Greek strife to secure the successful conclusion of the peace treaty against all odds and the interaction of the intricate development of Allied relations, are examined in Chapter Two, in so far as they had a direct bearing on the decision to impose the Treaty of Sèvres on Turkey. The chapter also examines Allied efforts -or lack of- to bring about a lasting settlement by reversing the Treaty on Sèvres on the pretext of the return of King Constantine to the Hellenic throne. Reference is made to the abortive Greek threat on Constantinople and the manifest Allied discord which, in the event, enmeshed Greece in a diplomatic tangle from which she proved unable to extricate herself. Further, a brief survey of the military situation prevailing in Asia Minor throughout the period under consideration is attempted.
On the basis of Chapters One and Two, Chapter Three sets out to examine the direct bearing of the above factors on the day to day running of the administration and to evaluate the few positive aspects of its course. This topic is taken over to Chapter Four, where the personality and efforts of Aristidis Stergiadis, the Smyrna High Commissioner, are studied, in an attempt to clear the controversy surrounding his name and to analyze the origins of the fury it raises among refugee circles even today. The Chapter also examines the internal problems and contradictions faced by his administration, and incorporates a section on the establishment of the illusory Asia Minor Defence, a belated reaction to the Turkish nationalist movement on the part of the local Greeks. Chapter Five refers to the last days of the Greek administration and the end of Smyrna and incorporates the conclusions derived from this research.

In view of the regulations delimiting the length of this study, several important aspects that have determined this or the other course of action taken by the Greek administration, have been omitted or not examined in detail. Among them, the development, complexities and hindrances of the Turkish nationalist movement and its juxtaposition with the development of the Megali Idea and the Hellenic perception of the Ethniko Kentro [National Centre]; the Armenian, Circassian and Kurdish strife for independence and the active encouragement they received by the Greeks; the alternative option of Eastern Thrace and events in the province during the period under consideration; the attempt to create an autonomous state in Pontus; the Treaty of Neulilly with Bulgaria and the cession of Western Thrace to Greece, to name but the most important. To complete the extensive and intricate list of forces adversing all efforts to secure a viable administration under conditions of full-scale war and martial law, one would also have to examine in detail the stance of France, Italy and international finance vis-á-vis Greece in Asia Minor and to refer to the separate agreements concluded with the nationalists as part of the Franco-Italian quest for concessions and preponderance in the Near East. This aspect is essential in view of the pressure brought to bear at the negotiating table by factors which had little to do with the professed allegiance of the Peace Conference to the principle of self-determination.

Also, on the whole, I have refrained from examining in detail the course of internal Greek and Turkish politics and that of the nationalist movement, and I only referred to them briefly in so far as they were essential for the continuity of the narration. Similarly, I have not examined the issue of population statistics which is covered in a number of works included in the bibliography. This is mainly due to the fact that, during the course of the research, it became clear that there was little connection between decisions taken in Europe and the true state of affairs in Asia Minor. Therefore, a detailed examination and comparison of the available statistics seemed to fall outside the scope of this study. Nonetheless, the questions referred to above have not escaped the efforts of this research and the intricate issues they involve were taken into consideration when I came to
conclusions at the end of this detailed and in parts painful survey.

On the basis of these conclusions, it is clear that the study of the Asia Minor Question outside the scope of folklore is long overdue, no matter how painful the results may prove to be. A careful study of events and personalities sine ira et studio, may serve the interests of Greece, and, foremost, those of the refugees, in that there is many a lesson to be derived from the tragedy that befell them in 1922. Although at the outset of this research the intention was to provide a blue-print of every day life in Asia Minor under the Greek administration, the understanding that in the mind of the High Commissioner the futility of this exercise was crystal clear, compelled me to stray.

Through the course of this study, many individuals encouraged, supported and tolerated me. Among them, P. N. Diamandouros, P. K. Kitromilidis, P. Hidiroglou, Th. Veremis, S.V. Papacosma, A. Alexandris L. Tsoukalis and D. Hardy were most helpful in pointing out to me considerations and sources that had escaped my attention. My thanks are also due to M. Llewlyn Smith and N. Petsalis-Diomidis for their comprehensive studies of subjects closely connected with my thesis, as they furnished me with invaluable material and, through their work, encouraged me to sustain a number of arguments contained in this thesis. I should also like to acknowledge the guidance and help provided by Ambassador Ch. Zamarias, private secretary of A. Stergiadis, and that of Mrs. P. Gounarakis, who was kind enough to let me consult her late husband's unpublished papers. In one of the letters contained in this collection we read:

"After the Asia Minor catastrophe", he wrote to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs on 16 March 1968, "the undersigned handed the confidential archive of the Smyrna High Commission to the Ministry of Justice, following orders by the then Minister of Interior. Later, I was informed that this archive was handed over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I visited A. Michalakopoulos, who was Minister at the time, and I ventured to suggest that this confidential archive be put in order and that those who served with the High Commission should provide explanatory notes on the documents with reference to the events. I added that this work should start immediately because those who had served with the High Commission would gradually leave this world, leaving behind an archive with no beginning and no end, an archive without any explanations which would be difficult to be studied by a historian researching the period from May 1919 to September 1922...The then Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that my proposal was excellent but that we were too near the events...and that it would be preferable to let time heal the wounds before undertaking such a task...A substantial amount of years has now gone by and, consequently, the discussion of the Asia Minor question today cannot but have historical character and not the character it would have had before forty
years...With this in mind, I wish to repeat my proposal to help put the archive in order. The issue of the Greek occupation of Asia Minor can be studied under three different headings: a. political (national and international), b. military, c. administrative. A lot has been written by Greek and foreign writers on the political and military aspects of the issue but nothing on the activities of the Greek civil administration of Smyrna... The researcher of this most important aspect can find a lot of material in the confidential archive, in the general archive of the High Commission whose whereabouts escape me [General Archives of the State], and from the memory of those who served in Smyrna”.

It is very unfortunate that Gounarakis did not receive a reply to his offer and, as a result, neither the confidential nor the general archive of the Smyrna High Commission were arranged on the basis of explanations by those who composed most of the documents contained therein. As one among the first students of the period to have been allowed access after the lapse of the fifty year rule, my task was made easier through the kind assistance of Effi Allamani and Christa Panayiotopoulou, who were at the time in charge of the Archives Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most valuable help was also provided by the late FiFi Anastasiadi and Valentini Tselika of the Benaki Museum Archives, to whom I am grateful.

It is customary for PhD candidates to express their thanks to their supervisors for advice and guidance rendered through the course of their study. In this case, the expression of gratitude is, I think, in order, as Mr. R.R.M. Clogg gave me not only support and guidance, but also the opportunity without which the completion of this thesis would not have been possible.

This work is dedicated to my Uncles Christos S. Solomonidis and Dimitri G. Papamichalopoulos. The first inspired me since an early age through his books and narrations about "the glory that was Smyrna" and his determination to preserve for posterity what was left of it: its history, customs and traditions. The second, a staunch Venizelist M.P., gave me unimpaired guidance through his first-hand knowledge of the events and supported me strongly in my effort to come to a better understanding of the issues at hand and to attempt to challenge their conventional version on the basis of unpublished primary material.

INTRODUCTION:
Asia Minor, 1913 - 1919

"And now, we must turn our eyes to the East".
E. K. Venizelos *

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After the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest which concluded the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, euphoria reigned in Greece and Venizelos was "turning his eyes to the East". In the meantime, the position of the Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor became more precarious day by day. After their defeat in the Balkan Wars, the Young Turks came to believe that the local Greek population would be a menace in their effort to consolidate what was left of the Ottoman Empire and took active measures in order to maintain their hold over the remaining territories and especially over Anatolia, the cradle of Turkish nationalism 1/. In this context, it was thought that the recent Greek acquisition of Lesvos, Chios and Samos constituted a danger to Turkish sovereignty because of the islands' strategic position at the entrance of the Dardanelles and their consequent domination of naval communications between Constantinople and Smyrna 2/.

As a result, with the ordeal of the Balkan Wars scarcely over, a new wave of persecutions against the Christian populations began in the districts of Edirne and Kirk-Kilisse in Thrace and soon spread to Western Anatolia 3/. Together with the promotion of Turkish nationalism, the anti-Greek persecutions also served as a means of exercising pressure on the Athens government over the issue of the Aegean islands. In contrast to the persecutions in Thrace which were engendered by the nationalist fervour of the Young Turk revolt of 1908, this new wave was a systematic effort to rid the Asia Minor littoral of its Greek inhabitants. As early as January 1914, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Constantinople called the attention of his government to the grave repercussions of this policy which seemed to be dictated by the fear that the Greek populations might prevent quick mobilization of Turkish troops and hinder their speedy movement in the event of a new war 4/.

Parallel to the military considerations which seemed to dictate the expulsion of the Greek populations, the partial uprooting of Muslim communities from Macedonia and Western Thrace at the end of the Balkan Wars led to reprisals against the Anatolian Christians. These reprisals reflected not only the Turkish wish for revenge, but also the realization that

2/ Köhler, F. Der neue Dreibund, ein politisches Arbeitsprogramm für das deutsche Volk und seine Freunde. Munich 1915.
in the home of every deported Christian family, a Muslim refugee household could be resettled. As a result of the collaboration between the irregular (chette) bands and the Ottoman authorities in this program, a great many of the Greek communities of the Asia Minor littoral were uprooted 5/. One observer noted that "the procedure bore evidence of being systematic. The terror attacked one district after another and was carried on by the chette bands enlisted among the Rumeli Muslim refugees, as well as from the local population, and nominally attached as reinforcements to the regular Ottoman gendarmerie" 6/.

As a means of forcing the Ottoman Greeks to leave Turkey of their own will, a commercial boycott was introduced as early as 1910. Control of the boycott was entrusted to a special committee residing in Constantinople, while its implementation was placed in the hands of Turco-Cretan chette bands 7/. These bands roamed the country and forced the Muslim population to sever all connection with the Greeks to the extent of leaving their debts unsettled. As a result, Greek commerce in Anatolia almost came to a standstill 8/. When the boycott reached its climax at the beginning of 1914, the Patriarch protested against the economic persecution of the Ottoman Greeks with a takrir addressed to the Minister of Public Justice and Worship: "The economic boycott against the Orthodox Greeks is now applied throughout Turkey and is endorsed by the open assistance of government officials. Commercial transactions with the Greeks are practically non-existent while those Muslims who wish to continue contacts with them, face threats on their lives. In addition, and as a result of diverse means of pressure, the Orthodox Greeks of certain regions are being forced to migrate and are immediately replaced by Muslim migrants" 9/. The Patriarch went on to accuse the Sublime Porte of responsibility for "a merciless persecution, aimed at the total annihilation of the Greek element". In his reply, the Minister assured the Patriarch that the Imperial Government was taking all appropriate measures to improve the situation 10/.

This, however, did not seem to be the case. In May 1915,

6/ Toynbee, A. The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. 1924. p. 140.
9/ ibid, pp. 180-81.
10/ ibid, pp.188-89. The same reply was given to the numerous demarches of the Greek government. See MOFA 145, Note no. 3301/3.7.15, MOFA to Sublime Porte. Note 69728/22a/3.8.15, Sublime Porte to MOFA.
an official circular addressed to the Vali of Smyrna by Talaat and Ali Riza accused the local Greeks of "working day and night for the realization of the Great Idea" and stated that the propagation of such revolutionary ideas within the Ottoman State was unacceptable. Therefore, the Greeks should be forced to evacuate their villages along the coast and move to the districts of Erzerum or Chaidra. If they refused to comply, the local Muslims should be instructed "to commit excesses of all kinds" in order to force their expatriation. In all cases, the local authorities were instructed to obtain a certificate signed by those migrating, stating that they were leaving on their own initiative 11/.

In the period between the end of the Balkan Wars and the beginning of the Great War, about 130,000 Ottoman Greek refugees were settled in Macedonia, 70,000 in the Aegean islands and some 30,000 in Old Greece 12/. During the same period, Turkey received 122,665 Muslim refugees 13/. Thus, while the strategic security of the Asia Minor littoral was being ensured and a refuge for the Muslims who had left, or were forced to leave Macedonia and Thrace after the Balkan Wars was found, a considerable number of Greeks was forced to migrate. Only the two big centres of Hellenism, Constantinople and Smyrna, were spared, primarily because of the density of the Greek population. "The number of Greeks there, [in Smyrna and Constantinople] was too great for all of them to be exterminated" 14/.

At the same time, the build-up of an ethnic Turkish population in areas of strategic significance had become an issue of exceptional importance for Constantinople. To this end, in April 1914, the Ottoman government proposed to Athens the exchange of the Greek population of the Asia Minor littoral with the Muslim inhabitants of Macedonia 15/. This Turkish proposal has been commented upon both as "the most constructive scheme that has yet been tried in the Near and Middle East for the solution of a minority problem" as well as "the origin of the 1923 population exchange: a case of extreme necessity imposed on Greece" 16/. In the number involved in this proposal, the Porte included among the population of the Asia Minor littoral the Greeks of the Aegean islands. This argument was later taken up by Venizelos during the Paris Peace Conference, to prove the Greek preponderance in the

11/ Circular dated 14 May 1914. It was subsequently published in Les Temps, on 26 July 1916.
13/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 138.
14/ Morning Post, 11.12.18.
15/ Kohler, op.cit., p. 121. Toynbee, op.cit., p. 70.
16/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 141.
Venizelos did not favour this proposal in view of the strained Greek-Turkish relations at the time, over the issue of the Aegean islands. However, he initially accepted the formation of a mixed commission to look into it as he believed that if the proposal was rejected out of hand, the Asia Minor Greeks would be forced to migrate. It was also thought that through such an exchange, atrocities would be avoided and the eventual economic disaster would assume smaller proportions. Before accepting the proposal, Venizelos sought royal approval. King Constantine did not object because he seemed convinced that the Asia Minor Greeks would eventually be forced to leave their homeland 17/. The agreement to proceed with the appointment of the commission was also seen as a preventive measure to improve inter-state relations at a time when the dispute over Lesvos, Chios and Samos had created a state of undeclared war between the two countries and the outbreak of the Great War could not but worsen the situation 18/. The commission convened in Constantinople and Smyrna from May to at least the end of December 1914. All secondary sources referring to its meetings suggest that the commission interrupted its sessions with Turkey's entry to the War in November 1914. However, documents in the relevant file of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that they continued after that date 19/. Even so, no agreement was reached in view of Turkish intransigence over the issue of properties to be exchanged and indemnities to be given to the Greeks, an intransigence intensified by Turkey's entry into the War on the side of the Central Powers.

After the project on the exchange of populations was abandoned, anti-Greek persecutions intensified to the point of threatening the very existence of Hellenism in Asia Minor. One of the first measures taken upon Turkey's entry to the War was a special decree which modified the law regarding the conscription of Christians to the Turkish army. The existing law, passed soon after the restoration of the constitution in 1908, stipulated that all Christians up to the age of 31 were liable for military service while those above this age limit were exempted since they had already paid the military tax. The new decree increased the age limit to 48 and provided that those belonging to the reserve classes could obtain exemption on payment of 45 liras. The Greeks, not accustomed to military service, naturally preferred to pay the high tax. However, those who did not have the means, either had to sell their possessions to raise the sum or else flee the country and become deserters. The frequent desertions gave the Ottoman authorities yet another excuse for hard measures. The property

17/ Vendiris, op. cit., p. 192.
19/ MOFA 147.
of all deserters was duly seized and their families were deported to the interior of Anatolia. No distinction was made between deserters and those already deported by the Ottoman authorities but not removed from the roll: their families were treated in the same way 20/. On 21 October 1915, the Constantinople Recruitment Office issued a regulation providing for the deportation of the families of the deserters to the interior of Anatolia. In the district of Kerassounda alone there had been 300 desertions; as a result, 88 villages were burnt to the ground in the course of three months. Some 30,000 inhabitants of these villages were obliged to walk to Ankara in mid-winter, a quarter of them perishing on the way 21/.

The Greeks enlisted in the Turkish army were not given combatant status. This was out of the question as they were suspected of furnishing British submarines in the area with supplies, of conducting espionage on behalf of the Allies and of looking forward to the day when Greece would encompass the Asia Minor littoral—a charge unquestionably true. In short, the Ottoman Greeks could not be trusted to take part in the military operations as an integral part of the Ottoman army 22/. As a result, they were made to serve in the labour battalions (emele taburu) and were mainly sent to the interior of Anatolia to work on road construction, on the excavation of the Taurus tunnel and other infrastructure projects. The Greek Consul at Konia reported on the subject: "The new peril facing the Ottoman Greeks is the formation of the labour battalions which are exclusively composed of conscripted Christians. These poor souls are sent to the interior of Anatolia to construct tunnels for the Baghdad railway. Until a few months ago, those who could afford to buy off their military service were able to escape but since the end of 1914 and Turkey's entry to the War this is no longer possible" 23/. As the deportations of Christians to the interior of Anatolia had been legalized by a special law in 1913, in all parts of Turkey, the Greeks were gathered in groups and were transported to the interior, mostly on foot. The total number of those that perished during the War is not known; estimates vary from two hundred thousand to one million 24/.

Clearly, for the Asia Minor Greeks, Turkish participation in the War merely signified the continuation of persecutions accompanied by excesses of nationalist and religious

20/ MOFA 145, Report no. 1438/31.3.15, Greek Consul in Smyrna to CHC.
21/ Puaux, R. and Alaux, A. Les persecutions antihelléniques en Turquie, Résumé des rapports officiels des agents diplomatiques et consulaires. Lausanne, 1918. Report 319/11536, Greek Vice Consul in Vourla to MOFA.
22/ ibid.
23/ CHC Report no. 3500/6557/14.6.13 in Alaux et Puaux, op.cit..
24/ Morgenthau, H. Secrets of the Bosphorus. p. 31.
fanaticism 25/. A significant difference, however, was observed in the change of the motto prompting these persecutions from "Ottomanism" to "Turkey for the Turks", an aim to be partly accomplished by the deportation of the remaining Ottoman Greeks. Rebellions against such treatment evidently resulted in occasional massacres, an example of which is Old Phocaea where more than 50,000 Greeks perished after their town was attacked by chetse bands 26/.

"There is no doubt whatsoever", an eyewitness wrote, "that the plundering of this town was an organized plan aimed at the expulsion of the rayas from the seacoast. It is not possible that the invading brigands could have possessed so many firearms if they had not been distributed to them beforehand...We now read in the newspapers that order has been established and that in the region of Phocaea no one need have any apprehension as to one's life and fortune. As a matter of fact, order exists because there is not a single inhabitant left; there is no danger to property either, it all being safely in the hands of the brigands" 27/.

At the beginning of 1915, the economic boycott assumed greater proportions. It was now applied against Greeks and Jews alike. The local authorities demanded that all foreign business firms in Smyrna dismiss their Greek employees and replace them with Muslims. "Talaat explained his national policy...These different blocs in the Turkish Empire, he said, had always conspired against Turkey. Because of the hostility of these native populations, Turkey had lost province after province and had dwindled to the vanishing point. If what was left of Turkey was to survive, he added, she must get rid of these alien peoples" 28/. In fact, the rule of Talaat, Enver and Çemal Pashas was characterized by a ruthless policy of repression, applied throughout the Empire and providing the context for the anti-Greek persecutions 29/.

It has been argued that as the Greeks were the most intransigent of all these "alien peoples" and the warmest advocates of the grandeur of their nation, there could be no room for them in a Turkified Turkey. At the same time, wholesale massacre would have caused such a reaction in Greece that even the most pro-German king would have been unable to keep the country out of the War. It was therefore rather a 25/ Petsalis, op.cit., p. 35. 26/ Horton, G. The Blight of Asia. Indianapolis, 1923. p. 46. Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 32. 27/ Greek Patriarchate, op.cit., pp. 72-3. Sartiaux, M. "Le sac de Phocée et l'expulsion des Grecs Ottomans d'Asie Mineure" in Revue des deux Mondes, 15.12.14. Shortly after these events, the city of Marseilles sent 20,000 francs for the relief of Phocaea, its ancient Metropolis. 28/ Morgenthau, op. cit., p.32. 29/ Lewis, B. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London, 1968. p. 226.
matter of state policy that saved the Ottoman Greeks "from the horrors that befell the Armenians" 30/.

After a short interval, a new wave of deportations started in the spring of 1916, lasting until October 1918. It was once again implemented as a measure of military precaution and affected mainly the areas facing the Aegean Islands, at the time occupied by the Allied forces. "At Kini, Bergama, Aivali and Dikeli I can state from personal observation that Greek communal buildings -churches, schools, hospitals, baths- were wantonly desecrated and defaced and mercilessly ransacked, even beams and window frames being removed, and that private houses were thoroughly plundered and then occupied by Muslims. The destruction seemed to have been most savage at Aivali probably because it was a self-contained Greek community which might have had some personal link, however little, with the deportees. Aivali was made over, after 27 March 1917, to the Rumeli Muslim refugees embittered by years of misfortune and the damage they did was proportionately great" 31/.

As a result of the critical situation in Anatolia, a large number of Greeks resorted to Smyrna in the hope of saving their lives and what little had been left of their properties 32/. Conditions in Smyrna, however, were no better. Rahmi Bey, the Vali, was particularly scrupulous in the implementation of orders received from Constantinople. His zeal led to a systematic application of the boycott, the expulsion and persecution of individuals, and the violation of regulations pertaining to the communities together with the century-old privileges enjoyed by the Rum milleti 33/. At Rahmi's instigation, a ministerial decree was presented to the Patriarchate on 15 June 1914, demanding that Chrysostom, the Metropolitan of Smyrna, should be recalled to Constantinople. His presence in Smyrna, it was stated, was undesirable as he encouraged the Christians to emigrate and facilitated the departure of Ottoman Greeks who sought refuge in Smyrna from the neighbouring areas.

The Patriarchate duly called the attention of the Ottoman government to the falsity of this accusation but to no avail. The explanations furnished by the Metropolitan himself to the Vali did not alter the situation in any way. On 21 August ,

30/ Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 214. Turkification succeeded Ottomanism as the dominant ideology after 1912 and was directly opposite to the Greek Megali Idea.
31/ Toynbee, op.cit., pp.142-43. A detailed description of the events in the Diocese of Aivali can be found in Greek Patriarchate, op.cit., pp. 64-66.
32/ Greek Patriarchate, op.cit., p. 64.
33/ ibid., pp. 76-77. For the Rum Milleti see Clogg, R.R.M. "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire" in Brandt, B. and Lewis, B. eds. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire.
gendarmeres went to the Bishopric, took the Metropolitan by force and put him on board an Italian ship bound for Constantinople. Despite the Patriarch's repeated demarches to the Porte, Chrysostom's return to Smyrna was strictly prohibited and he was not allowed to return to his diocese until after the Armistice. His prolonged exile only increased his nationalist and partisan fervour and helped build up the image of a priest-cum-fighter-cum-national hero among the Smyrniots. Chrysostom was to live and to die up to this image.

The Metropolitan of Smyrna was by no means alone in assuming the duties of a secular national leader in addition to his religious ones. The Greek Metropolitans of Western Anatolia, mindful of what they considered to be their duty, worked ceaselessly to protect their flock from persecution. To this end, on 12 June 1914, they addressed a collective memorandum to the chief dragomans of the Great Powers in Constantinople, when they visited Smyrna to examine and report on the situation:

"The acts of persecution and oppression committed against the Christian element [in Turkey] date from old and are by no means isolated cases. It seems as if this phase is the one before the last, perhaps the last in the form of a general massacre, still in store for us. The hatred and fanaticism of the Muslims is brought to a pitch of violence by the exhortations of the Turkish press which constantly preaches the extermination of the Christians. This phase includes the commercial boycott and isolated massacres, daily increasing in violence and inspiring panic."

Though representative, this memorandum was by no means unique. In view of the aggravated situation following the Balkan Wars, the Patriarchate had made repeated demarches to the Imperial government, invariably receiving in reply promises of immediate suppression of the evil. As the situation worsened and persecutions spread to the whole of Asia Minor, the Patriarchate had no alternative but to suspend church services and school classes, an obvious luxury for a population whose extinction seemed imminent. In token of general mourning, schools and churches closed on 25 May 1914. They reopened two months later following a personal request of the Grand Vizier and promises of the Ottoman government that every possible measure would be taken to satisfy the Patriarchate.

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34/ Solomonidis, Ch. O Smyrnis Chrysostomos [Chrysostom the Metropolitan of Smyrna]. Athens, 1971.
In his tezkere to the Patriarch, the Grand Vizier wrote: "The Imperial government is already proceeding to examine the causes of emigration of several Ottoman Greeks and the measures to be adopted in order to remedy a situation prejudicial to the concord and tranquility of the inhabitants" 36/. In the months that followed however, no measures were taken to ameliorate the situation. Instead, deportations en masse were decided upon by the Turkish government at the beginning of 1915.

In this process of Turkification, the Ottoman state was helped and prompted by Germany. In the twenty years before the young Turk revolution, German influence in Turkey had increased. After 1908, a clear shift towards Britain occurred, but was short lived. After the disastrous defeat of the Balkan Wars, Turkey turned to Germany for help and advice. In the meantime, the German government itself had adopted an anti-Greek stance. Several considerations led to this attitude:

Hellenism in Asia Minor formed a barrier to Pan-German aspirations; as long as the Anatolian littoral retained its predominantly Greek character, it would form a natural obstacle to Germany's road to the Persian Gulf. At the same time, Greece proper obstructed a possible German outlet to the Aegean and, crucially positioned on the road to India, she was a constant menace de flank for the communication line between Berlin and Baghdad. On the other hand, since an important part of commerce in Asia Minor was conducted through Greek hands, the Ottoman Greeks could only be a hindrance to German commercial expansion in Turkey after the War. Consequently, Pan-Germanism could not but treat the Ottoman Greeks as enemies while successfully evoking "military necessity" to prompt their deportation 37/. The complicity of General Liman von Sanders, Commander of the Yildirim Army Group, is apparent in a telegram he addressed to the Grand Vizier when asked to account for the deportations of Ottoman Greeks from the vilayet of Aidin. He claimed that if these deportations ceased, he could not guarantee the security of the Turkish army and stressed that military necessities in time of war out-weighed political motives. He also stated that the German General Staff approved entirely of his activities concerning the expulsion of Greeks from the Aivali district 38/. On 13 December 1918, the Greek members of the Ottoman parliament

36/ ibid, pp. 129,131,139,140,142. Extracts from the official correspondence exchanged between the Patriarchate and the Sublime Porte.
37/ This view is expressed in Kohler, F.op.cit., published by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
presented a memorandum to the Chamber, naming Liman von Sanders as the instigator of the Aivali massacres 39/.

In the summer of 1915, King Constantine had protested to the German government against Liman von Sanders' activities and, in repeated demarches to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek Ambassador Theotokis requested the mediation of the German authorities for an end to the persecutions. On one occasion, together with the vague promises of support, he was told that the Ottoman Greeks were "obsessed by a unique determination to betray Turkey to her enemies". Greek diplomatic despatches from Vienna and Berlin expressed the futility of Greek demarches to Germany and confidential memoranda from Constantinople stated that the Ottoman authorities proceeded with the deportations only after the German High Command had given its consent. Foreign Minister von Jagow unsuccessfully attempted to convince the Greek government that von Sanders was acting on his own initiative and, in order to prove German good intentions towards the Ottoman Greeks, the German Embassy in Constantinople sent one of its members to examine the situation in Aivali. Although his report emphasized the gravity of the situation, no direct measures were taken 40/. On the contrary, German activities went now as far as direct involvement in the economic boycott. In 1915, the German controlled Palästina Bank circulated a memorandum recommending the rupture of all commercial relations with the Greeks. Meanwhile, heavy requisitioning was added to the financial measures against the Ottoman Greeks, allegedly to supply uniforms for the troops and cover certain naval expenses, but in reality, it seemed, to accelerate their economic downfall 41/.

This was the situation in Asia Minor when the Great War came to its end. After the Bulgarian defeat, Talaat and his ministers resigned on 7 October 1918 and were succeeded by a new government under Izzet Bey. His first move was to send General Townshend—a prisoner of war captured after the Turkish victory at Kut-el-Amara—to propose to the British government peace under certain conditions, the foremost of which was that Constantinople would not be occupied by Allied forces unless the Turkish government failed to maintain order. Although the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon seemed in favour of such an occupation, the Turkish condition was accepted, the
Armistice was signed at Moudros on 30 October 1918 and, in accordance with its first article, the Allies only occupied the forts of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles while an inter-allied mission of military control took up duties in Constantinople.

The news of the armistice was received coolly in Athens. In view of the vital Greek interests in the area, Greece had formally requested to be consulted before the Allies reached an agreement with Turkey. This request, however, was ignored and when the terms of the armistice became known, Greek public opinion considered them very lenient towards Turkey, particularly as they included no reference to the Ottoman Greeks.

In Smyrna, on the contrary, the Greek population greeted the conclusion of the armistice with enthusiasm. Greek and Allied flags were unfurled and rejoicing groups demonstrated in the streets of the city. A few days later, the arrival of the first Allied vessel bringing Commodore Dixon, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied naval forces to Smyrna, gave rise to new demonstrations; the local Greeks were celebrating what they thought was their liberation from Ottoman rule. Since this was definitely not the case, the boisterous demonstrations were strongly criticized by Nureddin Pasha, the Vali, who, with an official circular, banned all manifestations and prohibited the flying of flags. In the meantime, Commodore Dixon issued a proclamation warning the Greek populace to suppress their enthusiasm as no peace treaty had been signed yet.

While the Greeks were rejoicing and celebrating, the Turks organized the Smyrna Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights (İzmir Müdafayi Hukuku Osmaniye Cemiyeti), only seven days after the conclusion of the armistice. This society was among the first similar organizations for the Defence of Ottoman Rights which sprung up all over the country with the aim to preserve Turkish independence.

As a result of Dixon's proclamation, demonstrations...

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42/ FO 371/3160-190858/2.11.18, Politis to Granville. Petsalis, op. cit., p. 68.
stopped for a few days, only to be repeated with the arrival of the first French vessel and the reopening of the French Consulate in the city. Dixon issued yet another proclamation prohibiting demonstrations, this time arousing suspicions among the local Greeks as to his real feelings towards Turkey. Though unfounded, these suspicions were strengthened by the fact that, at the instigation of Rahmi Bey, the ex-Vali, the Turkish authorities rapidly took precautions against any excessive display of exuberance by the Greeks. Armed bands of bashibazouks patrolled the streets openly terrorizing the Christians, the Muslim population was provided with weapons while large depots of arms were established in various locations in the city, and Rahmi Bey instructed the Turkish notables to hold themselves in readiness for all eventualities.

Dixon was not the only one to worry about the repercussions of the Greek celebrations on the already shaky state of law and order in the Aivali district and the precarious situation prevailing in Smyrna itself. Venizelos ordered Captain Papazafiropoulos, naval commander of Chios, to visit the Greek primates of Smyrna and report on the situation 46/. Papazafiropoulos arrived on 21 November 1918 and during his meeting with the dimogerontes, advised them to restrain the population from any nationalist manifestations that might harm the negotiating effort of Greece at the forthcoming Peace Conference 47/. This, indeed, was a very difficult task and was to prove beyond the capability of the primates, both at that time and later, during the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland. The local Greeks, embittered by endless years of persecution, could not and would not understand the reasoning behind the Venizelist policy of appeasement and leniency towards the Turks, a policy essentially meant to convince the Allies that Greece was capable to rule over ex-enemies, forgetting and forgiving.

On the other hand, the defeatist atmosphere and the relatively accommodating attitude towards the Ottoman non-Moslems prevalent in Turkish circles before the conclusion of the armistice, at a time when even the will to independent survival seemed to have failed and political discussion centred on the form which Turkish subjection was to take, gave way to an intransigent and provocative attitude as soon as the lenient armistice terms became known in Asia Minor. This attitude was reinforced by the predisposition of the Allied authorities, reluctant to intervene on the Greek side for fear of hurting Turkish pride. In a special circular to the

46/ MOFA 150, tel. no. 11068/27.11.18, Politis to Romanos and tel. no. 11198/30.11.18 Politis to Simopoulos. Petsalis, op.cit., p.107.
47/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 34.
48/ Lewis, op.cit., p.241. Petsalis, op.cit., pp. 94-95
Alexandris, A. "The Constantinopolitan Greek factor during the Greco Turkish Confrontation of 1919-1922" in Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol. 8, 1982/83.
Turkish population, the Vali stressed that the armistice terms were favourable to Turkey while Colonel Katechakis, Greek representative at the Allied Military Mission in Constantinople, reported to his government that the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), although officially dissolved, had preserved its organization intact and was arming the Turkish population. The chasm between Greeks and Turks, he concluded, was such that there could be no hope for reconciliation and therefore measures should be taken for the protection of the Greek populations, for the repatriation of the Greeks deported to the interior and for the occupation of the main towns of Asia Minor by Allied or Greek troops 49/.

After the conclusion of the armistice, the Anatolian Greeks who had sought refuge in Greece during the War started heading for their homelands. Most of them arrived in Constantinople penniless and, as their immediate repatriation was impossible, they lived on generous donations from the Patriarchate, the Greek government and the local Greeks. In November 1918, a Central Committee for the Relief of Refugees was formed by the Patriarchate and the Athens government contributed ten million drachmas towards its expenses. But with local Greek resources damaged by the financial boycott, relief was of a temporary and insufficient character. As a result, the frustrated groups of refugees, eager but unable to return to their homes, became a source of trouble and unrest in the Capital. According to the Sublime Porte, 12,300 Greeks had returned to the Aivali district up till March 1919 50/.

At this point, Admiral Kakoulidis reported from Constantinople that Hellenism in Anatolia was in grave danger and suggested that the Turks be informed that if any Greeks were harmed, Greece would be allowed to continue the war alone, with the Allies remaining neutral 51/. The pronounced threat to Hellenism in Asia Minor was also reflected in Papazafiropoulos' report which stated clearly that, despite the Turkish defeat, anti-Greek persecutions continued. However, the Ottoman Greeks now started retaliating whenever

51/ MOFA 151, tel. n.n./23.11.18, Kakoulidis to Admiral Koundouriotis.
attacked and demanded the restoration of Greek property confiscated during previous years and the repatriation of those exiled, deported or recruited in the labour battalions. A Turkish newspaper commented: "We believe that we will not be punished for the crimes we have committed during the past five years but the Greeks who were chased from their homeland will return and all the products of looting will have to be returned" 52/.

Realizing the gravity of the situation, Athens instructed the Greek Ambassador to Paris A. Romanos to present a note to the French government requesting urgent measures in view of the dramatic events in Asia Minor 53/. Earlier Greek demarches in Allied circles had produced no direct results since the opinion prevailing in these circles was that "Greek misbehaviour provoked Turkish action" 54/. This was an early indication of the future stance of the French and the British. At the same time, the negative Italian position vis-à-vis Greek aspirations in Asia Minor had been clear from the beginning of the War. Italian plans, activities and propaganda regarding Asia Minor were communicated to Athens through detailed reports of the Greek embassies in western Europe and the Greek consulates in Turkey and the Greek government knew, or should have known, what to expect from that quarter 55/.

At this point, the Italian warship Piedmonte entered the port of Smyrna to join the Allied squadron. Among the Allies, only Greece was absent and, under the circumstances, this absence filled the local Greeks with anxiety. The Italian presence in the port of Smyrna prompted the Greek government to request Vice-Admiral Calthorpe, successor to Commodore Dixon, that a Greek ship be allowed to join the Allied squadron. This request was not granted at first because, during the armistice negotiations, the Turks had insisted that no Greek ships should go to Smyrna. Moreover, upon intimation from the Italians that they felt strongly against Greek forces being allowed to land in Asia Minor, the British government decided that it was not "advisable" to permit an official Greek presence in Smyrna 56/. Calthorpe also felt that the arrival of a Greek man-of-war there might provoke militant action on the part of the local Greeks. However, following a

52/Sabah, 24.11.18, quoted in Les Temps. Also Reports of Alexandropoulos and Chonaios quoted in Petsalis, op.cit., p. 98.
53/ MOFA 150, n.v., n.n./7.12.18, Romanos to Pichon.
54/ Petsalis, op.cit., p. 107, quotes note of Alexandropoulos, Greek representative in Constantinople, to British and French High Commissioners in the city.
55/ MOFA, A/5/1915, Italikai Drastiriotites ke Diatheseis Pro ke meta tin Eisodon tis Italias eis ton Polemon [Italian activities and disposition before and after Italy's entry to the War], MOFA 152.
56/ CAB 23/14 WC 494A, 31.10.18.
meeting with Captain Mavroudis of the Greek Royal Navy and assurances from Athens to the contrary, he was able to secure French and Italian approval for the despatch of the destroyer Leon which, under Mavroudis, arrived in Smyrna on 23 December 1918 57/.

Once again, the Greek Smyniots took to the streets rejoicing. Leon became a place of pilgrimage, a herald of the freedom soon to come. The following day the Greek flag was raised at the Consulate and a few days later Metropolitan Chrysostomos was allowed to return to Smyrna from his exile. Captain E. Mavroudis was accompanied by P. Zamanos, a former MP for Cyclades who acted as his political adviser, and they were soon joined by a number of well-trained civil employees, including P. Skeferis from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the meantime, all the Turkish parties, organizations and societies in the district of Smyrna were incorporated into a single bypartizan organization, the Committee for Consultation [Heyeti İstişare]. Turkish circles in the city believed that "the insolence of the local Greeks, manifested by the covering of Smyrna in Greek flags [upon the arrival of the Leon] would act as a catalyst in stimulating the emergence of Turkish nationalism and bring about the liberation of the Turks" 58/. What the Greeks seemed to have forgotten, were the events in Crete some years earlier. The Turks then held the coastal towns and the Greeks the hinterland and the mountains. Subsequently, the Ottoman Empire had lost Crete. Now, with the Turks dominant in the Anatolian hinterland, the Greeks would eventually have to abandon the coastal strip they were said to have been promised by the Allies 59/.

The Leon was followed by Amphitriti which carried a Red Cross mission under Dr. P. Tsounoukas. In the course of the next two years the Greek Red Cross treated 224,750 Greeks, 47,425 Turks and approximately 25,000 patients of various other nationalities. It organized hospitals and infirmaries in several towns and was officially congratulated by the Vali of Smyrna for the services it rendered the Muslim population. The Italians disapproved strongly of its presence and activities and accused the Greek government of using it as a cover for smuggling weapons and soldiers to Smyrna. As Red Cross activities contributed favourably to Greek propaganda aims, significant Italian measures were taken to counteract its effectiveness, including a campaign against the Vali who was

58/ Morali, op.cit., p. 42.
59/ ibid, pp. 43-44.
Gradually, during the first weeks of 1919, "a united front of Greek action" was formed. The local Greeks were overwhelmed by what seemed to them a unique opportunity for the realization of the Megali Idea. However, Mavroudis tried to moderate the dynamic expression of their enthusiasm since, as it had become apparent from the very first days of official Greek presence in Smyrna, their attitude constituted a major obstacle to the amelioration of community relations in the area, a factor of utmost importance if the policy for the realization of the Megali Idea were to succeed.

The objectives of the Mavroudis' Mission, as the group came to be known, were, on the one hand to collect all the information necessary to support Greek claims over Asia Minor at the Peace Conference and, on the other, to work for the improvement of community relations so that the local population would eventually be able to live peacefully together under Greek rule. The first objective was soon accomplished due to the hard work put in by the members of the Mission. Statistics were compiled, reports written and maps drawn up. These soon found their way to Paris, where the Greek delegation was working to promote "vital national interests". The task of achieving the second objective, however, was impeded by several factors which militated against Asia Minor ever becoming part of Greece.

The local Turks, emboldened by the negative attitude displayed by the Allied representatives in Smyrna towards Greek interests, set up committees and associations for the defence of Turkish rights and organized a conference of representatives from the major towns of the vilayet of Aidin, the resolutions of which were communicated to the Allied authorities: "We the representatives of the Aidin vilayet, and the delegates of Menteşe and Karesi, appeal to you on behalf of the Turkish nation which forms the great majority of the population of the area. We hear with great regret that some small nations, enemies of our race, endeavour to take advantage of our painful situation and dominate us. This province that they want to occupy is an inseparable part of our existence. We appeal to the Peace Conference to protect our basic rights and preserve world peace by respecting our demand" 61/. Local Turkish officials procured arms to the

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60/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738, Report no. 73/12/3.4.19, Biancheri to Sonnino. 1646/7746, Report 543/4.3.19, Italian Legation in Paris to MAE. AV 9, tel. no. 1312/22.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos.
Muslim population and, to sum up the situation in Mavroudis' words, "the remains of Hellenism in Asia Minor is sitting on an active volcano...not a day passes without one or more innocent Greeks being killed. Daily, Christians are arrested without cause, they are beaten up, made to walk through the streets handcuffed and are finally thrown in prison unable to defend themselves" 62/. During the same period, freedom of travelling, commerce and fishery was denied to the Greeks. Greek newspapers of the time appeared with most of their articles supressed by censorship at a time when the Turkish press was free to accuse and reproach all things Greek. What little merchandise was imported from Greece almost disappeared from the market 63/. Meanwhile, Venizelos' directives concerning the Greek response to these provocations were clear cut. The Anatolian Greeks should not only proclaim their wish for enosis but also prove to the Allied observers that they could co-exist, if not fraternize with the Turks. Any action contrary to this policy of peaceful coexistence could prove detrimental to the realization of the Megali Idea 64/. However, the reports of his representative on the spot, confirmed that the prevailing conditions were none too rosy.

According to Mavroudis, the bleak situation was largely due to the attitude of the Allied representatives who were "obsessed with the idea" that Greek Smyrniots were the source of all evil, always seeking to provoke the Turks. This opinion was partly the result of continuous efforts of the Levantines who eagerly offered their services in the field of "information" to the Allied representatives. "The Levantines were overjoyed with the Allied victory because, as a result, Germany would move out of the Near East where she was dominant before 1914 and this would give them a good opportunity for profiteering" 65/. But who were these Levantines? "A Levantine is really a foreigner whose forefathers settled in the Near East one or more generations ago, who has become thoroughly versed in oriental dealings, who speaks the languages and some of whose ancestors may have intermarried with Greeks or Armenians...These people generally cling to their original nationality. Protected by the Capitulations, they have been able to amass great fortunes" 66/.

"In one word", continued Mavroudis, "the Italian representative Consul Manfredi...continuously declared himself in favour of and worked for and collaborated with the Turks

62/ MOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
63/ Amalthia, February and March 1919.
64/ MOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. AV 1, Report no. 637/18.1.19, Politis to Diomidis.
65/ Rodas, op.cit, p. 51. For the detrimental role of the Levantines as far as the Greek cause was concerned, MOFA 9, Report no. 2278/14.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. Also, MOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
66/ Horton, op.cit., p. 103.
against us. The French representative Captain Docteur...suggested in his recent reports to Paris that Greek rule would prove disastrous and the British representative, when he is not furious with us, he is cold and indifferent towards our interests and does not even reprimand the activities of certain members of his staff whose objective is Turkish autonomy" 67/.

Italian activities in the area were not so much pro-Turkish as anti-Greek. In principle, Italy was opposed to any territorial aggrandizement of Greece and to any possible reinforcement of Greek power. This policy came as a direct result of the realization that Greece was Italy's direct rival in the Adriatic and Aegean seas and, as a consequence, a cold war atmosphere developed in relations between the two countries. To forestall any such Greek or Allied move, and despite warnings by British officials, the Italians landed troops in Makri and Marmaris, sent forces to Adalia, Egridir and Konia and increased their naval strength in the port of Smyrna 68/. From these areas, Italian missions were sent to the interior of Anatolia with the object of creating incidents between Greeks and Turks and of subsequently accusing the former of being incapable of ruling the area 69/. To counteract Italian moves and following Calthorpe's approval, the Averof was sent to Smyrna, transporting a small landing force to reinforce the Greek presence in the port 70/.

After the Italian landing at Adalia, Count Sforza communicated to the Italian delegation in Paris that the Grand Vizier was pleased with this Italian move which was seen as a response to Greek provocations. "We thus conclude", Sforza wrote, "that he is asking to a certain extent for an Italian occupation...[I have given instructions to our agents in Adalia] to maintain appearances at all costs with regard to the Turkish authorities of the area" 71/.

However, the nationalists seemed to defer in their understanding of the Italian efforts to placate Turkey: "The Italians, who were opposed to the Greek landing, appeared

67/ MOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, p. 5, Mavroudis to MOFA.
69/ Kitsikis, op.cit., p. 53, quoting a telegram by Politis to the Greek Embassy in London, 3.5.19. Also MOFA 9, tel. no. 2295/14.3.19, Politis to Venizelos: "No doubt, it is the Italians who entice the Turks to act against us". MOFA 140, tel. no. 3970/29.4.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
70/ GAS 1, Press release, 5.4.19.
71/ ASMAE Turchia, 1646/7746, no. 852/30.3.19, Sforza to DIPC.
to support the Turkish cause, but in fact all they wanted was to replace the Greeks and place Smyrna under Italian rule... One day I was invited to the Italian Embassy. The Italian Ambassador [Count Sforza] informed me that the Greek landing in Smyrna was a matter of days. He then suggested that we should prepare ourselves to resist the Greeks. Instead of the Greeks, Count Sforza advised, we should advocate the establishment of the progressive, civilized and friendly rule of the Italians in Smyrna. But while I politely declined his suggestion by saying 'neither they nor you', I asked the Count to collaborate with us in our struggle to frustrate the realization of the British plan for Western Anatolia... Realizing that his best option was to help us, the Count informed me that the Italian torpedo boat Bronzetti would transport our delegation from Smyrna to France, where it was to appear before the Peace Conference" 72/.

In his reports to Athens, Mavroudis spoke harshly of these Italian activities. "This unheard of stance of the Italian government towards an Allied state has proved the greatest obstacle in the successful completion of the already arduous task entrusted to this Mission. What little had been left standing after the successful collaboration between Turks and Germans against the Ottoman Greeks has now been entrusted for demolition to the Italians. [To make matters worse,] they have found eager help in their strife against us from the Levantines and the few Greek catholics won over by the Italian propaganda 73/.

To counteract Italian moves, the Mavroudis' Mission resorted to intensive propaganda through the local press, Greek and Turkish alike, as well as through agents sent to various parts of the vilayet. "However, neither our efforts through the press nor our other activities have produced satisfactory results. Turkish fanaticism is intensified while Levantine efforts to denigrate us in the eyes of the Allies increase daily... We have not yet managed to convince the Turks that it is to their advantage to review their intransigence towards Greece and the Greeks, in order to secure their interests in the event of Asia Minor coming under Greek rule and, if not so, to serve the interests of the Turks living in Greece... The Turks do not believe that our regime is liberal and just. They are not allowed to by the Italians who have undertaken to complete the anti-Greek campaign left unfinished by the German officers" 74/. Italian assistance to the

72/ Morali, _op.cit._, pp. 51-52. The author was a member of the Turkish Delegation to the Peace Conference.
73/ GAS. 1, Report no. 864/11.4.19, p. 2, Mavroudis to MOFA.
74/ MOFA 9, Report no. 2475/11.3.19, p. 4, Mavroudis to Greek Legation in Paris.
nationalists went as far as transmitting telegrams of the Turkish delegation in Paris to the Sublime Porte through Rome. The funds required by the Turkish delegation were transported through the Italian High Commission in Constantinople 75/. Meanwhile, the Committee for Consultation succeeded in organizing an unprecedented event in Smyrna. On 19 March 1919, all notables of Western Anatolia participated in a congress which resolved that the Turks had to "fight the danger facing their country by the force of arms", and concluded its proceedings by effecting the smuggling of arms to Anatolia 76/. In Smyrna, it was no secret that the Committee enjoyed the assistance of a number of prominent members of the French community 77/.

On the other hand, the passive at best and more often negative attitude displayed towards the Greeks by the Allied representatives was coupled with an "obvious tendency to placate the Turks". The Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights appears to have contributed significantly to this end. Among others, it approached Commander Roland, correspondent of Les Temps in Constantinople, who was sympathetic to the Turkish cause and it was him "who influenced General d'Espérey to change his initial position of Turcophobe into a Turcophile" 78/. There was not much Mavroudis could do to alter the situation as "the friendly Allied authorities are caught in the spell of a pro-Turkish attitude, successfully promoted by our adversaries" 79/. The only way to improve the situation would be by directives from their respective governments. As this was not to be expected, the Greek Foreign Minister expressed fears that the Turks would "resort to massacres and stifle all nationalist manifestations on the part of the Greeks, in order to prove that Greek national consciousness is non-existent among the Ottoman Greeks" 80/.

Where Mavroudis' Mission did meet with success was in the promotion of relations with the Armenian and Jewish communities. The Mission was in constant contact with the Armenian primates, informing them of the steps taken by the Greek government in favour of the establishment of an Armenian state. This pro-Armenian stance of Greece, together with the close collaboration between the two Metropolitans on one hand and Mavroudis and the Armenian primates on the other, resulted in "a brotherly solidarity" between the two communities 81/. The effort to convince the Jews that it was in their interest to favour Greek rule in Asia Minor was also successful but to

75/ ASMAE Turchia, 1641/7732, Despatch no. 7468/3.4.19, Turkish Delegation in Paris to Sublime Porte.
76/Morali, op.cit., pp.12-13, 16.
77/ibid, p.13.
78/ ibid, pp. 17-18.
79/ MOFA 9, tel. no. 2295/14.3.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
80/ ibid.
81/ MOFA 9, tel. no. 2475/11.3.19, p.2, Mavroudis to Greek Legation in Paris.
a somewhat lesser extent. "It was important to enlighten the Jews about the favourable position of their co-nationals in Greece in order to make them realize that it would be to their advantage to favour Greek claims in Asia Minor so that when the time comes they will be the first to profit from the riches of the land" 82/. Mavroudis' efforts may have succeeded in convincing Jewish and Armenian community leaders of the advantages of Greek rule. However, a major part of the Jewish and European population of the area strongly believed that their interests lay with the preservation of the old rule and the regime of capitulations, and did not hesitate to defy the guidelines given by their community leaders 83/. For them Greek rule signified grave financial losses as it was certain to favour the expansion of Greek capital in the area 84/.

Yet, the Mavroudis' Mission was not a failure, as has been claimed 85/. Its multiple tasks were carried out for the most part successfully. Vital, on-the-spot information was transmitted to Paris, the rights of the local Greek population were protected as far as possible, a propaganda network was established and essential preparatory work was carried out to ease the task of a potential Greek regime. Opposing forces were evaluated and detailed reports covering their activities, conducted mostly underground, gave a clear indication to the Greek government of what to expect. Careful propaganda succeeded in winning over a considerable portion of the local population. However, it was not humanly possible to oppose with complete success either the Italian and Levantine propaganda or the rising wave of Turkish nationalism. This must have been known to the Greek government which, under the circumstances, could not have expected any Mission to win over the whole population of the area. Thus, the role entrusted to Mavroudis and his colleagues was essentially exploratory and, in that sense, it met with success.

By late March 1919, the uncertainty surrounding the future of western Asia Minor, in conjunction with the secret war between the prospective rulers of the area, had caused tensions to mount. Rumours kept the populace in suspense and created a tense atmosphere in the city. The local Greeks, tired of trying to prove their cultural superiority to the Allies as dictated by venizelist directives, were ready to attack the Turks if provoked. On the other hand, it was clear that the latter were bound to resist should western Anatolia come under Greek rule, as it had proved impossible to convince them of its benefits and they were "continuously encouraged to

82/ ibid.
83/ GAS 1, tel. no. 2926/16.3.19, Politis to Mavroudis.
84/ Smith, op. cit., p. 86.
85/ Smith, op. cit., p. 88.
react violently to a Greek landing" 86/. Italian and Levantine circles were confident that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference would present a mandate over western Asia Minor to Italy and that the Italian fleet would soon enter the port of Smyrna which by mid-April was host to thirty Allied and Greek warships 87/. At the same time, several secret treaties concluded during the War seemed to have sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The most important among them were:

a. The agreement of 3 March 1915 between Britain, France and Russia. It stipulated that in case of Allied victory, Russia would receive Constantinople with its hinterland on both sides of the Straits.
b. The Treaty of London, 26 April 1915, between Italy and the Allies. Italy was to receive Valona, the Dodecanese and Adalia with its hinterland if she contributed substantially to the Allied war effort. Italian gains in the rest of Asia Minor were not precisely defined.
c. The agreement of 16 May 1916 between France and Britain, known by the names of its authors, Sykes and Picot and signed by Russia later. This agreement recognized the right of the signatories to annex parts of the Ottoman Empire and to exercise "exclusive influence" over specified areas after the conclusion of peace.
d. The Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, signed on 19 April 1917 as a result of a conference between the Prime Ministers of Britain, France and Italy. It aimed at calming Italian resentment of the Sykes-Picot agreement by including Smyrna and its hinterland in the Italian sphere of influence 88/.

What seemed to escape the notice of the French and the British was the fact that if the Wilsonian concept of the self-determination of nations to which they had explicitly adhered on 7 November 1919, was ultimately followed, most of these secret agreements would be surely overthrown. At the

same time, and unlike the rest of the Allies, the United States had never been at war with Turkey and, therefore, could assume a role in Near Eastern Affairs only on the basis of her League of Nations' membership. Any contribution made on these grounds would have as a prerequisite the application of the Wilsonian points and principles on self-determination, which were supposed to form the cornerstone of the League of Nations. To complicate matters further, Britain and France had been commercial and imperial rivals in the Near East for centuries. Britain, therefore, was quite unlikely to sacrifice its supremacy in the Near East because of war time commitments to France 89/.

Against this background, the Supreme Council was to decide on a landing of Greek troops in Smyrna. Community relations had been damaged beyond repair by a decade of continuous persecution of the Greeks which contributed to a growing desire for revenge and enosis. On the other hand, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire together with the Turkification policy, had contributed to the rise of Turkish nationalism which, with ample prompting from the forces opposing Greek expansion in Asia Minor, assumed great proportions by May 1919. Although well known to the Greek decision makers, these facts were not enough to curb Venizelist optimism as to the chances for the success of a Greek "Anatolian Venture".

CHAPTER ONE:

I. The Paris Peace Conference

"They all sit around the map. The appearance of a pie about to be eaten is thus enhanced".

Harold Nicolson *

* Nicolson, H. Peacemaking, 1919. London 1933, pp. 272-73. The quotation refers to the meeting of the Big Four on 13 May 1919, to regulate the question of the mandates and spheres of influence in Asia Minor.
Greek diplomatic activities to secure the realization of the Anatolian Venture had started even before the signature of the Moudros Armistice which officially ended the hostilities between Turkey and the Allies. In September 1918, a Greek communication to the British government listed Greece's territorial claims for the proposed Peace Conference and explicitly stated that in the event of total or partial dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Greece would claim the annexation of those districts in which the majority of the population was Greek or, alternatively, local autonomy for the areas in question, the return of the Greeks forced to leave Asia Minor during the War and the restoration of their confiscated properties. Venizelos' postwar diplomatic campaign to secure western Asia Minor for Greece was launched on 30 December 1918. Following President Wilson's advice from an earlier meeting, the Greek Premier submitted a memorandum to the Allied Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Greece. According to this memorandum, Greek claims included part of the vilayet of Brusa and the vilayet of Aidin with the exception of the sancak of Denizli where the population was exclusively Turkish. Statistical tables submitted with the memorandum raised the Greek population of Asia Minor to 1,013,195, of which 812,210 lived within the claimed area. For the Ottoman Greeks living in other parts of Turkey an exchange with the Muslims residing in the claimed area was proposed. The accuracy of these statistics was strongly contested by Turkey mainly because they lumped Greeks of Greek citizenship among Ottoman Greeks.

In fact, the absence of reliable population statistics complicated the issue further. It was generally accepted that Turkish persecution of the Greeks during the War had altered the balance of population in many former Greek areas. However, Allied acceptance of these alterations would seem to condone the Turkish atrocities while failure to recognize them would make it difficult to achieve a realistic and workable solution for the future of the area. With the opening of the Paris Peace Conference on 18 January 1919, a set of politically realistic questions were seeking practical answers: How were Wilson's various declarations of purpose to be reconciled with the secret agreements of the war years? How could one determine the wishes of the peoples of the Near East, and, if they could be determined at all, were their aims economically and politically feasible? How could the sizeable capital...

1/ FO 371/3147-153245, Ambassador Caclamanos to FO, note, unsigned/10.9.18.
2/ This Committee was usually referred to as the Committee on Greek Affairs or Greek Committee.
investment of European nations in the Ottoman Empire be safeguarded, and what provision would be made in regard to the enormous Ottoman debt? 5/.

Apparently oblivious of these questions, Venizelos presented the Greek case before the Committee on Greek affairs, shortly after the official opening of the Peace Conference 6/. Its report submitted to the Supreme Council a month later reflected the differences of opinion prevailing among the Allies with regard to Greek claims: British and French experts agreed to a Greek landing over a limited area of Asia Minor while the Americans were opposed to such a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and suggested a "sponsorship" of the new Turkish state by one of the Great Powers. The Italians put forward two reasons for refusing even to discuss Greek claims; the part of Asia Minor claimed by Greece had not only been the object of international agreements concluded during the War but, at the same time, it could not be separated from the rest of Anatolia for political, financial and ethnic reasons 7/. The contradiction inherent in the above arguments -how could these international agreements come in force without dismembering the Ottoman Empire?- reflected Italian policy on Asia Minor: to proceed with the realization of Italian claims through landings on the coast of Western Asia Minor unauthorized by the Allies while at the same time keeping up the appearance of Ottoman rule in the occupied areas and thereby placating the Turks 8/.

Italian claims over western Asia Minor and Smyrna in particular were well-known to the Greek government. As early as the winter of 1914-15, Italy had made clear that she regarded the vilayet of Aidin as falling within her legitimate sphere of influence since it was situated opposite the Italian occupied Dodecanese. The Greek Ambassador in Rome warned Athens: "The Italians will do all they can to ensure that we inherit as little as possible in Asia Minor" 9/. In support of their claims at the Peace conference, the Italians put forward the secret treaties concluded by the Allies during the War according to which the region was ceded to Italy. Under the 1915 Treaty of London, Italy was to receive unspecified territories in the area "in the event of total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia", while the Treaty of St. Jean de

8/ ASMAE, Turchia, 1646/7746, Tel. n.n./30.3.19, Sforza to DICP.
Maurienne specified that the agreement was subject to Russian approval which, as a result of the October Revolution and the subsequent renunciation of all secret treaties by the Soviet regime, was not forthcoming 10/. In retrospect, it seems that the withdrawal of Russia from the war had removed the cornerstone on which much of the subsequent network of agreements had been built 11/. Since no partition of Turkey had taken place and since Russia had never approved the St. Jean de Maurienne Treaty, Italian claims were groundless and, what was more, clashed with the Wilsonian fourteen points and four principles already adopted by the Peace Conference. On the other hand, the conditions under which Britain had originally offered Greece substantial but unspecified concessions in Asia Minor had not been fulfilled owing to the opposition of King Constantine and his General Staff to a Greek entanglement in the War and the subsequent resignation of Venizelos 12/. On the other hand, since the Moudros Armistice laid down no conditions for the negotiation of the Peace Treaty, the Turkish surrender seemed at this stage unconditional. Nonetheless, the considerations described above dictated that the whole problem of Turkey had to be considered afresh by the Peace Conference 13/.

Among the Supreme Council members, only Lloyd George supported Greek aspirations from the outset despite the opposition of both the India and War Offices 14/. In fact, so great was this opposition, that R. Vansittart of the Foreign Office noted on 8 April 1919 that he had not seen the name of anyone well acquainted with the Near East who thought that "Smyrna should go to Greece" 15/. As it happened, the minority view was to prevail, championed chiefly by Harold Nicolson, Sir Eyre Crowe and above all Lloyd George. Some months later,

10/ Psomiadis, op.cit., p. 24.
11/ Helmreich, op.cit., p. 4.
13/ FO 800/214, Turkey in Europe and Asia, memorandum by W. Tyrell. 20.10.17.
however, and although he remained firm in his pro-Greek stance, Nicolson noted on the question of Asia Minor: "It is immoral and impracticable... The Greeks are getting too much" 16/. The exception taken by the India Office was concretely based on the fact that the Moslems in India constituted the single strongest group that supported the British and opposed independence. In fact, a few months later, a pan-Indian conference with the participation of the Hindu Swarajists led by Mohandas Gandhi, joined the Moslems in calling for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire 17/.

On the American side, President Wilson's role in the Anatolian debate was complex and contradictory. At this, first, stage, he soon came to believe that a Greek mandate over western Asia Minor would be the lesser of two evils as an Italian fait accompli in the area of Smyrna would have far worse consequences than a Greek landing under Allied auspices, supervision and guidance. For his part, Clémenceau declared that France would give warm support to a solution of the Smyrna question in favour of Greece only after the latter's decision to participate in the Ukraine expedition was announced. This declaration had been preceded by a joint Anglo-French declaration on 7 November 1918, according to which the two countries aimed at "the complete emancipation of people so long oppressed by the Turks" 18/.

Italy alone remained recalcitrant and her consent for the Greek landing in Smyrna was only obtained pro forma after she chose to force events by presenting the Supreme Council with an accomplished fact: on 28 March 1919, Italian troops landed at Adalia, south of Smyrna, without Allied authorization. This move apparently was dictated by the French occupation of Mersina and the British unwillingness to permit similar Italian action in Asia Minor. By early May, news reached the Conference that the Italians had occupied Makri and Marmaris even though their Chargé d'Affaires in London had been advised by Lord Curzon that future Italian landings were likely to provoke decisive Greek action in the Smyrna district 19/. However, no warnings could be effective at this stage. Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Italy was anxious to preserve "the Mediterranean Equilibrium" and nothing would endanger this equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean as much as the extension of Greek control to the

16/ Nicolson, Peacemaking, p.335.
19/ FO 421/2017/53320, Despatch 194/5.4.19, Curzon to Redd.
Asia Minor Aegean littoral 20/. Tittoni could not have expressed this position more clearly when he declared in the Italian Senate that "if others have nothing, we will demand nothing. This is not an imperialistic criterion, it is only the criterion of distributive justice" 21/. In fact, the Italians were ready to start landing forces in western Asia Minor as early as the beginning of January 1919 but they postponed the move following British pressure 22/.

Nonetheless, starting in mid-March 1919, Italian troops landed periodically at Adalia for the purpose of "maintaining order", but always reembarked promptly. These spot landings and withdrawals continued throughout April and by 5 May, the Italians had troops on a more or less permanent basis at both Adalia and Marmaris. Obviously, the Italians were on the verge of occupying the territory they regarded as being rightfully theirs 23/. In Paris, Venizelos complained constantly that the Italians were subsidizing the Turkish press and that they were encouraging the Turks in Smyrna to oppose a Greek occupation by force of arms 24/. Although the Turks subsequently protested mildly against the Italian occupations, they also sought military and diplomatic help from the Italians in order to oppose Greek territorial ambitions 25/.

On 24 April, the Italian delegation withdrew from the proceedings of the Conference following a rupture with President Wilson over the question of Fiume and his

22/ On directions for and subsequent postponement of the Italian landing at Adalia: ASMAE Turchia, 1646/7746, tel. nos. 98/5.1.19, Sonnino to [Italian] War Office. 911/5.1.19, General Elia to War Office. 00911/4.1.19, General Elia to War Office. 414/5.1.19, Sonnino to Ambassador Rodd.59/5.1.19, Sonnino to General Staff. 75/7.1.19, Chief of General Staff to Sonnino. FO 406/41/6861, Despatch no. 10/7.1.19, Rodd to Balfour.
publication of a manifesto regarding the future of this area 26/. During the Italian absence, the Supreme Council received yet more disquieting information from the Smyrna district to the effect that the Turks, stimulated by Italy, were continuing their policy of oppression and massacre. The Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople Count Sforza accepted later that he personally played an important role in the promotion of the Turkish nationalist movement in a way that apparently scandalized the other High Commissioners in Constantinople and the Allied ministers in Paris. Apparently, through journalists and other intermediaries, he encouraged from the outset Kemal's plans for a militant nationalist movement and offered material as well as moral support 27/. Femal's biographer quotes him as having said to the nationalist leader that "if you are in trouble, this Embassy is at your disposal" 28/. In the meantime, Venizelos had informed Clemenceau of the deterioration of the situation in the vilayet of Aidin where, with Allied tolerance, the moslems were committing excesses against the Greek population under the orders of the Vâlî, Nouredin Pasha. The British were being kept well informed by their intelligence officers in the area, whose reports underlined both the Italian complicity in the deterioration of law and order and the indifference of local Allied representatives 29/. It was also known that Italian naval strength in the port of Smyrna had increased considerably, although subsequently the Italians denied the accusations 30/. At this point, Venizelos reported further Italo-Turkish co-operation to the Supreme Council and requested that Allied vessels should be sent to Smyrna, a request which the Big Three decided to accept 31/. However, this decision was not carried out. On 5 May, the Three discussed news of Italian anti-Orthodox repression in Rhodes on Easter Sunday and Lloyd George expressed the view that this was but a part of Italy's general plan of action in the Eastern Mediterranean. With their successive landings in Asia Minor, he concluded, the Italians would come to occupy half of Anatolia. Indeed, the Italian General Staff was pressing the government "to take advantage of the favourable situation by swift action and to set foot in Asia Minor as soon as

31/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, LVIII, pp. 455-56 and LIV, p. 422.
possible, thereby preventing a similar Greek move" 32/. The only way for the Council to forestall such an outcome would be by regulating the whole question of mandates over Turkey. As this would entail long negotiations among the Allies, Lloyd George concluded: "We must let the Greeks occupy Smyrna. A massacre is taking place over there and there is nobody to protect the Greek population" 33/.

It was by now obvious that the Italians and the Greeks were each striving to be the first to land a garrison in Smyrna. The additional complication of the successive Italian landings and the rapidly deteriorating situation in Asia Minor made the question of determining the zones of Allied occupation in Turkey a matter of top priority. At Lloyd George's suggestion, the Three sought to decide the issue before the Italians returned to the Conference. At the Supreme Council of 6 May, his proposal to send Greek troops to Smyrna immediately in order to forestall similar action by the Italians was approved without delay and the outcome of this race was eventually determined by the intervention of the Three. The dialogue that sealed this decision is characteristic:

"Lloyd George: My opinion is that we must ask Mr. Venizelos to send troops to Smyrna. President Wilson: Why not ask the Greeks to disembark immediately? Do you have any objections? Lloyd George: None. Clémenceau: I do not have any either but should we not inform the Italians? Lloyd George: I do not think so" 34/.

Wilson later commented "...the attitude of Italy is undoubtedly aggressive. She is creating a menace of peace, even in the middle of a conference of Peace" 35/. Expressing the anti-Italian feelings prevailing among the Three, which had by then reached fever-pitch, Lloyd George wrote: "Prompt action taken by Wilson, Clémenceau and myself, enabled Venizelos to get a Greek force into the town whilst the Italians were hesitating" 36/.

Venizelos was officially informed of this decision on 7 May, during a Supreme Council meeting. This was followed by a conference of the Committee on Greek Affairs which discussed the details of the operation. According to the conclusions of this conference, the Allied advisers were not sure whether

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32/ ASMAE Grecia, 1214/4918/37/2/11.1.19, Romano Avezzana to Sonnino.
33/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, LXII, pp. 485-86.
34/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, LXIII, p. 492 and 499.
35/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, p. 455, 2.5.19.
36/ Lloyd George, op.cit., p. 806.
such action was covered by the armistice terms 37/. Moreover, the British adviser Field Marshal Wilson had repeatedly expressed his opposition to such a landing and the War Office insisted that Greece's Anatolian claims were "ethnologically indefensible" 38/. This view was shared by the Allied representatives supervising the implementation of the armistice on the spot, who had made emphatic comments and forecasts as to the repercussions of such a decision 39/. However, the armistice reserved for the Allies the right "to occupy any strategic points [in Turkey] in the event of any action threatening the security of the Allied countries"; Greece happened to be one of the Allied countries 40/.

The details regarding the military side of the operation were discussed during the afternoon session of 10 May, in the presence of the Allied military advisers Generals Wilson and Bliss, but in the absence of the Italian delegates who had by this time returned to the Conference. During this meeting, Venizelos proposed that it would be preferable if Admiral Calthorpe informed the Italians from Constantinople at a suitable moment, but the military advisers expressed opposition to such a course 41/. Meanwhile, the Italians were kept well informed by their diplomatic representatives in Athens and Constantinople. They had also succeeded in intercepting despatches to the Greek Embassy in Rome, including top secret telegrams from the Greek legation in Paris and confidential reports from the Embassy in Rome to Athens and Paris 42/. On 7 May 1919, the Italian Ambassador in Athens informed his legation in Paris that preparations were continuing at top speed while Count Sforza telegraphed from Constantinople that his "English colleague" had informed him of the Supreme Council's decision 43/. At the same time, the Italian government was considering a landing in Scalanova

37/ FO 608/90-16700, Memorandum "Conclusions of a Conference Held in Hotel Astoria, Paris".
38/ Lloyd George, op.cit., p. 1234, quoting War Office memorandum, 16.1.19.
40/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXII, p. 51.
41/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXII, pp. 32-33.
42/ ASMAE Grecia, 1214/4918-909/16.3.19, Politis to Simopoulos, 1214/4918-3470/3.4.19, Simopoulos to MOFA.
43/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-1202/7.5.19, Romano to DICP and 1644/7738-1194/8.5.19, Sforza to MAE. According to Romano, the preparations for the expeditionary force to land in Asia Minor had already started in early April: ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-1096/3.4.19.
to coincide with the Greek one in Smyrna 44/ .

During the next meeting of the Supreme Council, on Clémenceau's initiative and in an effort to preserve Allied unity, the departure of the Greek troops for Smyrna was delayed for 48 hours so that the Italian legation could be officially informed 45/ . When Italian Prime Minister Orlando was notified on 12 May, he was not in a position to raise objections since, during the same meeting, his government was strongly criticized for ordering Italian landings in southwest Asia Minor without the previous consent of the Council. His subsequent proposal for an interallied occupation of Smyrna was rejected while the Italian army was asked to participate in the Allied landing to occupy the city forts before handing them over to the Greeks. At this point, Clémenceau told Orlando that the decision was taken at Greek request. However, he was interrupted by Wilson who pointed out that the initial proposition had been put forward by the Three: "Wilson: It was we who pointed out to the Greeks that they should land in order to forestall any further massacres. Clémenceau: Yes, this is the truth" 46/. Further, Orlando was assured that "the landing was without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of Smyrna in the Treaty of Peace" 47/. Under the circumstances, the Italian delegates were obliged to give their consent thereby making the approval for the Greek landing in Smyrna unanimous.

Before this decision is interpreted as an indication of Allied support for Greek irredentism in Asia Minor, account must be taken both of relations among the Big Four and of their foreign policy considerations. The Italian position regarding Greek claims was well known; Greek expansionist aims could not be accepted as long as they conflicted with the Italian expansion foreseen in the secret treaties concluded during the War. French foreign policy at the time was oriented towards the settlement of the Rhineland question and the issue of German reparations. France had left the question of Turkey in the hands of Britain, anticipating her support on the aforementioned issue in the short run and collaboration in the exploitation of the Mosul oil fields in the long run. Despite Clémenceau's promise to support Greece on the Smyrna question, France soon declared that the Greek occupation was temporary and would not determine the final settlement of the issue. America's consent was somewhat unexpected. President Wilson's refusal to accept any further dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was overcome mainly by his resentment of the successive

44/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-1647/27.4.19, Sonnino to Naval General Staff. 1644/7738-1804/3.5.19, Sforza to MAE.
45/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXV, p. 48.
Italian landings. It is significant that Wilson gave his consent for the operation without informing the American experts in the Committee on Greek Affairs: "Under a secrecy which kept knowledge of this decision absolutely from the office of the American advisers...[Venizelos] gained permission to occupy Smyrna with Greek troops" 48/.

The British Prime Minister and the Foreign Office were the main supporters of the plan to send Greek troops to Smyrna "to restore public order and forestall the massacres" 49/.

In his memoirs, however, Lloyd George stresses that it was the unauthorized Italian landings which dictated the decision and does not mention the massacres of Christians as a determining factor 50/.

British foreign policy makers could not ignore the urgent needs of the post war period, the political crisis facing the Lloyd George coalition government or the anti-militarism prevailing in the press and public opinion. Any prolongation of military operations in the Near East by Britain was out of the question particularly because vital British interests in Egypt and India were threatened by the likelihood of a violent Moslem backlash against a deposition of the Turkish Sultan Calif. It was clear that Pan-Islamism continued to serve as an ideological argument against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. To prove the point, two days after the Greek landing, a Moslem delegation from India appeared before the Supreme Council and protested against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire 51/.

Moreover, War Office circles considered that a Greek landing in Asia Minor would entangle Britain in a new and protracted war 52/. These views were represented mainly by Field Marshal Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Admiral John de Robeck, British High Commissioner in Constantinople. At the same time, Britain was unwilling to relinquish traditional British interests which would only be secured through her indirect control of the Straits and which, in turn, determined her military and commercial preponderance in the area.

In its efforts to apply a policy along these lines, the British government found in Greece an ally whose foreign policy aims at the time largely coincided with the needs of British policies. For Britain, however, the Greek landing implied neither a definitive settlement of the Asia Minor question in favour of Greece nor the conclusion of a formal official alliance with mutual financial and military obligations. This position was clearly stated by Andrew Bonar Law who declared on behalf of the British cabinet that no obligation whatsoever had been assumed towards Greece 53/.

49/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXIV, p. 41.
51/ Nicolson, op.cit., p. 83.
53/ House of Commons, 26 March 1920.
Although the following comment seems overly harsh, there is much to indicate that domestic Greek politics were partly responsible for British support of the scheme as the Greek delegation made very clear that the future of Venizelos' government at home depended on his success in obtaining the areas that he had promised to the Greek people in return for their hardships during the National Schism and the War. Clearly, his fall from power would in no way help British interests and influence in the area 54/. Important as all these factors may have been, it is difficult to see any of them as constituting the chief reason for the Supreme Council's decision to sponsor a Greek occupation of Smyrna. More likely than not, the decision was mainly due to the fact that the only alternative to Italian hold over Asia Minor, was an Allied sponsored Greek occupation 55/.

Clearly, it was not generosity of some sort or an overwhelming feeling of friendship and compassion towards Greece. On the contrary, the presence of a friendly state which Britain would have supported in its growth, would be ideal to act as a counterweight of French and Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean. A strong Greece would secure British dominance in the Near East more thoroughly than the Ottoman Empire had done in the days of its glory. Thus, by deciding on a Greek landing in Smyrna, the Allies found a convenient, albeit temporary, solution to the question of Asia Minor mainly based on the fact that "there was such strong jealousy among them and they could not go ashore either together or separately" 56/. None the less, the Four made it clear that the Greek landing did not in any way signify that the area had been awarded to Greece on a permanent basis 57/.

For Greece, the Allied decision of 12 May 1919 represented a starting point for the realization of her aspirations in Asia Minor, as visualized by Venizelos. "The overwhelmingly favourable impression created by Venizelos in Paris cannot be overemphasized" 58/. Even those delegates who bitterly opposed the Greek aspirations, expressed personal admiration and liking for the man. As for the Allied leaders, their stance confirmed that they felt a heavy debt of personal gratitude for Venizelos, much more obligation certainly than

54/ FO 608/37/92-1-1/755, Nicolson memorandum, 26.1.19: "It is a direct British interest that M. Venizelos' personal influence in Greece should be maintained and strengthened". Venizelos made the same point during a lengthy meeting with Lloyd George on 5.2.19, CAB. 21/153.
56/ Horton, op.cit., P. 73.
58/ Helmreich, op.cit., p. 39.
they felt towards Greece. An enthusiastic admirer among the British delegates, wrote on the subject: "I cannot tell you the position that Venizelos has here! He and Lenin are the only two really great men in Europe" 59/.

Indeed, his skillful diplomatic moves, together with a series of circumstances favouring the Greek cause, brought about the realization of one of the foremost Greek irredentist aspirations. However, the temporary and vague nature of the mandate together with Italian hostility to Greek expansion and the centuries'-old differences between Greeks and Turks, were bound to lead to events which would seriously bring into question the Greek government's wisdom in accepting the Allied offer. Churchill, who opposed the scheme from the start, later commented: "I cannot understand to this day how three eminent statesmen in Paris, ... whose wisdom and prudence had raised them under the severest tests so much above their fellows, could have been betrayed into so rash and fatal a step" 60/. A. H. Lybyer gave a partial, though biased, answer: "The pleasant, insinuating ways of Venizelos more and more obscured the fact that his position even in Greece rested upon Allied bayonets" 61/.

60/ Churchill, op. cit., p. 390.
II. The Greek Landing at Smyrna

"I must confess I could not have imagined a more unfortunate execution of the Greek landing".

Captain E. Mavroudis

* MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
In the meantime, preparations for the Greek landing started simultaneously in Athens, Salonica and Kavala. An influx of cables from the legation in Paris to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave specific instructions concerning the details of the operation. Venizelos directed his ministers to act in utmost secrecy for fear that any indiscretion would endanger fundamental national interests. The need for secrecy was twofold. First, the nationalist and CUP bands already active in western Anatolia should not be given the time and opportunity to organize armed resistance. Secondly, if the local Greeks were informed before the Greek army had assumed full command of the situation, it would be impossible to prevent excesses against the Turkish population. It was unfortunate that this secrecy was not adhered to. The Ottoman authorities were informed of the project as soon as the decision was taken in Paris. On 11 May, Balfour said in the presence of Venizelos that there had been "an indiscretion in Constantinople. The Turks have been informed—it seems by our own representatives—about our intentions concerning Smyrna".

None the less, Greek mobilization continued at full speed and all awaiting ships were ordered to sail to the port of Eleftheria, near Kavala, to transport the First Division of the Greek army to Smyrna. Although the occupation was strictly military with an overall control over the Turkish civil authorities, Venizelos ordered the immediate departure of the Governor General of Epirus Aristidis Stergiadis for Smyrna, where he was to assume the post of political adviser to the Military Commander until the Greek occupation was extended to incorporate the civil administration of the area. Orders were also given for a 500-gendarmerie corps to follow after the landing and for the organization of 21 new army regiments to be held in readiness. Should the number of men available among the existing forces prove insufficient to form these regiments, Venizelos suggested that soldiers released on indefinite leave should be called back to service. He was confident that even after seven years of fighting wars the Greek people would not object to serving again as soon as the destination of the First Division became known.

While preparations for the operation were going ahead, the danger of a violent Turkish reaction to the Greek occupation was being considered, together with that of a simultaneous Italian landing. Mavroudis reported to Paris that the Turkish population "has obtained arms and has founded a secret society which will lead the armed masses to the hinterland and will organize armed resistance in the event of

1/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 3823/n.d, Diomidis to Paraskevopoulos.
2/ Mantoux, op. cit., II, LXXIV, p. 41.
3/ AV 5, tel. no. 1204/4226/6.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA. MOFA 141, tel. no. 3849/11.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis and 3890/11.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
a Greek occupation". He also suggested that the landing should not solely take place at the port of Smyrna but also at other strategic points along the coast, in the vicinity of the city 4/. At the same time, Repoulis was asking Venizelos for instructions in the event of an Italian landing before or after the Greek one. His fears were not unfounded as the Italians were indeed considering a move along these lines 5/. Repoulis also informed Venizelos that although all possible measures had been taken to secure the secrecy of the operation, very few believed that the aim of the mobilization was to transport Russian refugees to Greece and rumour already had it that the destination of the Greek ships was Smyrna 6/.

In the afternoon of 11 May, the Commander of the First Division in Kavala, Colonel D. Zafiriou, received orders from Athens that all troops were to sail by the morning of the next day. The same orders stressed that any delay would have serious repercussions for Greek national interests 7/. The troops had already begun embarking when this order was revoked and the operation was delayed for forty eight hours 8/. Before twenty four hours had lapsed, however, the Italian delegation had been informed, the Supreme Council had reached a unanimous decision on the issue and Venizelos ordered the troops to sail for Smyrna immediately 9/. According to his briefing of the MOFA, "the occupation is precipitated... because the Italians intend to occupy Bodrum shortly" 10/. In the course of 37 hours, 13,000 men and the auxiliary corps boarded the ships and were ready to sail in pursuit of the Megali Idea.

On the following day, escorted by 3 British and 4 Greek destroyers and with captain Granville in command of the expeditionary force, the 18 Greek transports sailed for Smyrna 11/. Only after their departure did the Greek soldiers learn that they were not going to Bessarabia to take part in the Ukraine expedition or to transport refugees from Russia as they had been led to believe. Zafiriou's order of the day revealed both the aim and the nature of their mission:

"Wherever we may go, we must know that we are going to

4/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4365/9.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos.
5/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-1647/27.4.19, Sonnino to Naval General Staff.
6/ MOFA 140, tel. no. 3869/13.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos and tel. no. 3822/-5.19, Politis to MOFA.
7/ General Staff order no. 64087/1037/11.5.19.
8/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4544/11.5.19, Paraskevopoulos to Repoulis and tel. no. 4004/11.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis and Diomidis. MOFA 140, tel. no. 3958/12.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos and tel. no. 3968/12.5.19, Repoulis to Paraskevopoulos.
9/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4425/12.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
10/ AV 5, tel. no. 1204/4226/6.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
11/ MOFA 141, tel. n.n./13.5.19, Repoulis to Paraskevopoulos.
liberate our brethren under alien rule. The enthusiasm filling our hearts is fully justified but any improper manifestation of this enthusiasm will be entirely out of place. We must not forget that when we reach our destination we shall meet Turks, Jews and Europeans of other denominations. Everybody should be treated in the same way. In a little while they will become our brothers as if they were true Greeks" 12/.

In his capacity as Minister of War, Venizelos also sent a message to the troops, pointing out that their behaviour towards the foreign elements of the population should be impeccable. And he concluded: "The feeling of confidence and security which you will inspire among the foreign communities and especially among the Turkish one which is the most numerous, will greatly help the realization of our national interests. The best wishes of the nation are escorting you" 13/. The text of this proclamation has been repeatedly published in a modified form 14/. In addition to a few changes in the vocabulary whereby "the realization of our national interests" is changed to "the realization of our national aspirations", the omission of a whole sentence must be noted: "The Conference has not announced its final decision concerning our national claims". This omission was probably effected "so as not to reduce the enthusiasm of the First Division" 15/.

To allow time for landing preparations in Smyrna, the convoy stopped at the port of Gera in Lesvos where it arrived in the early hours of 14 May. Colonel Zafiriou and his Staff visited the headquarters of the Mavroudis' Mission in Smyrna where they discussed the details of the landing with the Greek representative. The plan prepared during this meeting provided the Greek troops with two objectives: to surround the city as quickly as possible in order to curtail any attempts at resistance and to separate the Turkish and Greek quarters of the city in order to forestall clashes between the two communities.

The 1/38 Evzones Regiment was ordered to encircle the city from the Quarantine to the Fort of Mount Pagos. The Fifth Infantry Regiment was ordered to surround the city from the north-eastern side, i.e. from the Pounta Station via the Aidin Railway up to the Fort of Mount Pagos, while the Fourth

13/ Original Proclamation in MOFA 105.
Infantry Regiment was ordered to divide the Greek from the Turkish quarter by occupying streets and sokaks pointed out to its Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schinas by local guides who were to lead the troops. According to the same plan, the Turkish troops comprising about 3,000 men were to remain confined to their barracks behind the Konak. Mavroudis furnished Zafiriou with the appropriate maps and assigned a member of his staff, former Consul O. Liatis, as his adviser. During their journey back to Lesvos, the Staff drew up the orders for the troops 16/.

Meanwhile, at a meeting held aboard the British flagship on 13 May, various other aspects of the landing had been considered. Complying with orders from Paris, it was decided that all outer forts should be occupied by Allied detachments on the following day. The forts were then divided into four groups to be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek troops respectively. Admiral Calthorpe's message to the Vali regarding the Allied occupation of these forts was to be followed by a second one to be delivered during the early hours of 15 May, announcing the landing of the Greek troops to which the forts were to be handed over 17/. A proposal by the U.S. Senior Naval Officer in Smyrna that the city should be occupied by Allied detachments on the 14th and handed over to the Greeks on the 15th of May was rejected. The U.S. Consul commented on this point: "At any rate this advice could not be followed for evident reasons. We could not disembark because [the Allies] were as usual observing...This was the first indication of the lack of united support that ultimately caused the Greek disaster and the destruction of Smyrna" 18/.

During the morning of 14 May, the Vali was informed by Admiral Calthorpe of the Supreme Council's decision to implement the provisions of Article 7 of the Moudros Armistice. According to these provisions, the Turks were placing themselves at the disposition of the Allies to whom they surrendered the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts, opened the Straits to Allied warships, promised to demobilize and authorized the Allied military occupation of strategic points such as Batoum and Bacou 19/. The impending occupation of the Smyrna outer forts was announced simultaneously to the Grand Vizier and it was stressed to the Porte that the measure had become imperative in view of the reported deteriorating situation in the neighbourhood of Smyrna 20/. To a cable from the Vali requesting instructions, the Grand Vizier replied that as long as the landing concerned only the application of the armistice terms, local Turkish authorities should comply

16/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4265/7.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
17/ On the meeting aboard the British flagship, MOFA 141, Report no 4163/20.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos.
18/ Horton, op.cit.,p. 72.
20/ FO 608/104/10126, tel. no. 1032/14.5.19, Webb to Balfour.
with Allied orders 21/.

A little later on the same day, the Turkish military authorities were informed of the imminent Greek landing. In his note to Ali Nadir Pasha, Commander of the 17th Army Corps stationed in Smyrna, Admiral Caithorpe stressed that all Turkish troops should remain in their barracks and await the instructions of the Occupation Army Commander. The note went on to mention that the Allied fleet anchored in the port would take an active part in the restoration of law and order, should incidents break out 22/. In vain did Ali Nadir plead to Constantinople for instructions. His telegrams remained unanswered 23/.

News of the Allied landing spread rapidly and crowds started to gather at the pier, watching the passing troops. Just before noon, Allied detachments occupied the forts and put guards on the consulates, banks and foreign post offices 24/. The Greek detachment occupied the Çanak Kalesi Fort on schedule and without any resistance on the part of the Turkish garrison. Turkish troops retired to their barracks without any incident. Despite the Vali's silence, news of the planned Greek landing soon reached the Turkish quarter of the city where CUP members conferred with the nationalist followers of Nouredin Pasha who had been Smyrna Military Commander and Vali at the time of the Armistice and had since organized the League of Reserve Officers.

These gatherings were subsequently described as demonstrations of the peaceful intentions of the Turks 25/. However, A. Morali, a nationalist cadre who took part in the gatherings and assisted in their organization, has expressed different views: "The Committee Against Greek Annexation [Reddi İlhak Heyeti] was organized by the Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights twenty four hours before the Greek landing. On the eve of the Greek occupation, numerous meetings were initiated and in speeches the population was warned against the Greek designs at the expense of Turkey. These protests continued throughout the night. During these crucial hours, the committee organized the transportation of material and ammunition to the interior and the release of all prisoners held in Smyrna jail... After the landing, the Society continued its activities from Constantinople where it established its headquarters officially and published daily bulletins endeavouring to rise the moral of the Turks and praising the nationalist Yeşil Ordı [Green Army]. With the spreading of the nationalist cause, a need was felt to

21/ Turkish report quoted in Rodas, op.cit., p. 55.
22/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 55.
24/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 58.
regulate the resistance of the guerilla [efeler] groups and a vigorous press campaign in such front cities as Denizli and Aidin were soon under way. After the occupation of the Ottoman capital by the Allies on 16 March 1920, its members escaped to Ankara, where they joined the nationalists" 26/. It must be remembered that the Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights was founded on 1 November 1918 27/. Its principles, together with those of the Committee Against the Annexation, are clearly depicted in the following text:

"It also became necessary to explain that the British trap, through their Greek intermediaries, would not only cost a great deal to the Turks but also to Greece and in particular to the Ottoman Greeks. This was brought about by great effort and resolution which resulted in the famous Congress of Western Anatolia on 19 March 1919 [1919]. In this unprecedented event, all notables of Western Anatolia were present...and decided that the Turks had to combat with arms the danger that the country was facing. The initial success was largely due to the Vali Nouredin Pasha, but he was replaced by Izzet Bey soon after the congress...The new Vali discouraged the activities of the Society and accused its members of CUP and Bolshevik affiliation" 28/.

The subsequent meeting of 14 May 1919, resolved that the Turkish people should take the situation into their own hands and organize resistance because both Izzet Bey and Ali Nadir Pasha were ineffective. A Defence Committee was set up and the Muslim population was invited to the hills of Bahri Baba to demonstrate its will to resist Greek occupation 29/.

In the meantime, Turkish administration ceased to exist from the morning of 14 May. The Turkish quarter of the city resembled a volcano ready to erupt. Nouredin's followers were conscripting men and in the printing house of Anadolu, two proclamations of the Defence Committee were printed, once again inviting the population to the hills of Bahri-Baba where, the same evening, fires were lit and drums beaten in protest 30/. Later, the originals of these proclamations were found and presented to Admiral Calthorpe 31/.

In contrast, no official communication was made to the local Greeks as to the landing of the First Division, following strict orders from Venizelos to the effect that the

27/ G. Jaschke, in his Türk İnkılabı Tarihi Kronolojisi [The Historical Chronology of the Turkish Revolution], vol.2., p. 27.
28/ Morali, op.cit., p. 11ff.
29/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4459/23.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos.
30/ AV 6, Report no. 1319/23.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos on the gatherings at Bahri-Baba.
31/ MOFA 141, tel. 4089/13.5.19, Venizelos to Mavroudis.
dimogerontes were to be informed only a little while before the arrival of the Greek expeditionary force 32/. In accordance with these orders, Mavroudis invited the primates to a meeting in Agia Fotini, the Metropolis, to be held at 4 in the afternoon. By that time, a large congregation had gathered in the courtyard of the church. In the presence of Metropolitan Chrysostomos and the primates, Mavroudis read Venizelos' proclamation "to the Greeks of Asia Minor" in front of a wildly enthusiastic audience. In his message, the Greek Premier emphasized that in order to serve "utmost national interests", the local Greeks should prove to the other elements of the population that "Greek freedom would bring equality and justice to everybody, irrespective of race and religion", while "special consideration should be given to the Italians living in the area" 33/. The crowds cheered with enthusiasm for what they believed to be their moment of liberation and union with Greece. Conscious that this interpretation was nowhere near the true state of affairs, Mavroudis asked the crowds to control their emotions and stressed that "our country requires us to prove worthy of our great freedom" 34/.

In the meantime, the Turkish proclamations were being distributed and the printing house of Amaithia was printing the message of Colonel Zafiriou, Commander of the Greek Occupation Army, to the people of Smyrna which announced the military occupation of the city by order of the Greek government, implementing a decision of the Allied powers 35/. In contrast to Venizelos' message which was exclusively addressed to the local Greeks, Zafiriou emphasized that the military occupation of the city did not in the least aim at predetermining the decision of the Peace Conference as to the future of the area and affirmed that the Greek army would attach special importance to the free exercise of religious rights and various other customs of the Smyrna communities. This proclamation was posted all over Smyrna during the night of 14 May 36/.

In an effort to exclude all possibilities of disturbances, an intelligence bureau was organized at the Greek Consulate under Consul S. Liatis and Naval Commander C. Boufis and with the task of observing Turkish movements closely. A. Vedova, a philhellene of British citizenship, spent the afternoon and night of 14 May in the Turkish quarter

32/ ibid.
33/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 61. The complete text of Venizelos' proclamation in Greek General Staff, op.cit., Appendix 3.
34/ Original proclamation in MOFA 105. The text was composed and cabled by Venizelos to be printed in Smyrna and await the arrival of the Greek army. MOFA 141, Tel. n.n./10.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis.
35/ Original proclamation in MOFA 105.
and reported on the situation by messengers. Mavroudis communicated his alarming reports on Turkish preparations and intentions to Admiral Caithorpe who assured the Greek representative that he had made Ali Nadir Pasha and Izzet Bey responsible for any disturbance caused by the Turkish troops or population 37/. Nonetheless, that same night and while the Greek troops were leaving the port of Gera for Smyrna, several hundred convicts were allowed to escape from the Turkish Central Prison, situated behind the Konak (Government House), with the open complicity of the Turkish authorities and, especially, of Major Carossini, Head of the Allied Prison Control 38/. The circumstances of their escape became all the more suspicious as all Christian political prisoners had been set free by the British representative in Smyrna after the Moudros Armistice.

What was worse, a depot near the barracks was broken into and a considerable number of Turks were furnished with arms and ammunition. At the same time, the Greek intelligence bureau was informed that groups led by Turco-Cretans were organizing active resistance at the Quarantine, one of the landing points of the Greek troops 39/. During the night of 14 - 15 May, the Quay was lined with barges ready to receive the Greek troops while excitement mounted in the Greek and Turkish quarters. The parallel mobilization of the two communities indicated that unless strict precautionary measures were taken, the Greek landing would not be effected without incident.

May 15, 1919 was a beautiful day. Crowds of local Greeks poured towards the pier from all parts of Smyrna and the nearby villages, some even came from the towns of the hinterland. Because the gathering of crowds in the landing area had been prohibited and Greek patrols had blocked all access routes to the pier, people of every class and age filled the by-roads and sokaks 40/. With flags and flowers, they had come to welcome the Greek troops whose imminent landing signified nothing less than the permanent union of the area with Greece.

A small Greek detachment had landed a few hours earlier to guard the disembarkation points but as soon as the first ship appeared at the entrance of the port, any control the

40/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
patrols might have exercised became impossible and the crowds filled the Quay. The first ship to reach the dock was the liner Patris. The landing started at 7:30 a.m. to be concluded at great speed 41/. Within two hours, the three Greek regiments had landed at different points along the Quay and were ready to proceed with the occupation of the city. The road from the Post Office to the Pounta was crowded with troops. Assisted by all the priests of Smyrna, Metropolitan Chrysostomos blessed the passing troops in front of the Hunters' Club. Outside the Kremmer Hotel, a group of Evzones started a folk dance while the delirious crowds embraced soldiers and officers.

The 1/38 Evzones Regiment were the last to land. Their objective was to disembark at the Quarantine and encircle the Turkish quarter from the rear. Shortly before the rest of the troops marched off, Mavroudis informed the Chief of the Occupation Army that he had ordered part of the Evzones Regiment to land at a different point on the Quay and follow a revised itinerary. In his opinion, this change was dictated by strong evidence and information received during the night and communicated to Admiral Calthorpe immediately, according to which Turkish preparations for active resistance in the vicinity of the Quarantine were going ahead at full speed 42/. Zafiriou commented that it would be better to meet resistance at the Quarantine so that any eventual clashes could be kept out of the city centre. At any event, he concluded, if the Evzones landed elsewhere in an attempt to avoid the alleged resistance, the Turks would be encouraged in their intransigence 43/. However, Mavroudis' orders had already been transmitted and there was no way of revoking them.

This change of itinerary was communicated at the last moment to Lt. Colonel Stavrianopoulos, Commander of the Evzones Regiment, who had already landed with the major part of his troops in front of the Hunters' Club, as originally planned. Stavrianopoulos thought that these new orders were the result of a misunderstanding. As he could not communicate with the rest of his Regiment who were already in the process of landing at what he believed to be the wrong place, he decided that in order to attain his objective as soon as possible, he would have to guide another detachment to the Quarantine and proceed to march his troops along the Quay. Instead of proceeding to the Mount Pagos Fort through Profitis Elias Street as the revised itinerary dictated, he led part of his troops to the Quarantine via the sea shore, in front of the Konak, the Turkish barracks and through the Turkish quarter. By that time, the crowds had managed to break through the patrols and the Evzones marched towards the Quarantine.

41/ MOFA 140, tel. no. 32/15.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos and tel.no. 63/15.5.19, Zafiriou to Repoulis and Paraskevopoulos.
42/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA, on the events of the landing.
43/ ibid.
encircled by a large number of delirious Greeks.

The Turks were merely watching dumbfounded and motionless until about 10:00 a.m., when the Evzones took the turning in front of the Konak. When the troops reached the middle of the street in front of the prisons, the first shot was heard; it acted as a catalyst. Pandemonium broke out with the Turks firing from the prison, the houses of the Turkish quarter, the barracks, the Konak, the Gendarmerie School and the fishing boats in the harbour. At the same time, as if a signal had been given, Greek troops and crowds were fired upon from the hotels situated opposite the Customs House. Following the first shots, the crowds tried to turn back and filled the road from the Customs House to the Konak, thus placing themselves between the Evzones and the 4th Infantry Regiment. This area witnessed severe clashes between the Greek army and the Turkish crowds which had now taken to the streets, as well as between groups of civilians. Later, the bodies of two Greek soldiers and approximately ten Turkish officers were found at this point, together with those of a number of civilians of various nationalities who were either stabbed or pushed into the sea and drowned during the panic that followed the first shot. For several days, corpses were cast up on the shore, to be sunk again by the Greek marines on Kakouidis' orders 44/.

Meanwhile, the Evzones replied to these first shots with a brisk fusillade which lasted for about twenty minutes, until the Turks surrendered and started coming out of the buildings with their hands in the air 45/. The Konak and the near by buildings were searched by Greek troops and a large number of Turks were arrested, the Vali and his colleagues among them. It seems that the Vali had not been recognized by the Greek soldiers. As soon as his identity became known, he was released and reassured by Zafiriou that he would be allowed to perform his duties unobstructed 46/. The Greek crowds, still shocked by the sudden attack, mistreated and beat some of the prisoners. A little later, when the Turkish prisoners were being marched along the Quay to be imprisoned on the Patris, discipline broke down completely. In front of the "observing" Allied warships, Greek civilians harassed the passing prisoners while the officers had difficulty preventing their men from taking part. Some of the prisoners were forced to shout "Long Live Venizelos" and "Long Live Greece". Finally, they were imprisoned on the Patris. Further clashes on the Quay were forestalled by a squall which dispersed the crowds 47/.

44/ AV 9, tel. no. 1769/6015/15.7.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
46/ MOFA 141, Report n.n./16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
47/ Housepian, M. Smyrna 1922. London 1972. p. 66. Strange though it may seem, this sudden change of weather that forced the crowds to disperse is not mentioned in most accounts of the landing. The effect of the squall on the crowds was described to me by an eye-witness, A. Aronis, interviewed in Athens on 13.8.79.
While the firing went on, public order collapsed in the rest of the city. Bands of civilians of all nationalities took advantage of the disorder to plunder and loot shops and houses. The disappearance of the police led the looters to believe that they would go unpunished. However, many of them were arrested the following day and were later given heavy sentences by a Greek Court Martial which commenced its proceedings on 16 May. Those convicted represented most national groups of the Smyrna population.

Meanwhile, as fighting and looting continued, during the early afternoon of 15 May, the Commander of the Italian dreadnought Duilio suggested to Admiral Calthorpe that "after the failure of the Greek landing" the Allies should land troops in order to protect the interests of their respective subjects. Anticipating an affirmative reply, he had already even given orders for the preparation of a detachment complete with machine guns to be ready to land. However, Calthorpe replied that the Greeks had not asked him to undertake such action and that he believed that law and order would soon be reestablished by the Greek troops 48/. Indeed, by four in the afternoon, the shooting stopped altogether with the help of a British steam launch which compelled the Turks shooting from the kaiks in the harbour to stop 49/.

Although popular Turkish accounts of the events name Tahsin Bey as the person who fired the first shot, it is still not clear who did fire it 50/. The Interallied Commission of Inquiry which investigated the matter two months later, found it impossible to establish who shot first and resolved that Greek troops only fired in response 51/. However, in the light of the events that followed, this first shot was probably the signal for the Turkish attack, planned and executed under Italian auspices 52/. Turkish sources indicate that as soon as the Greek troops started marching towards the Konak an Italian steam launch came near the barracks and gave last minute orders for the attack. Italian sources confirm this indication and provide the additional information that Major Carossini was aboard this launch. The presence of the notorious Commander of the Turkish gendarmerie in the area where the first shot was fired and the most serious clashes ensued is unlikely to have been accidental. Still less so as

48/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 70.
49/ AV 9, Report no. 1769/6015/5.7.19, Diomidis to Politis.
50/ Turkish popular magazine Tarih, May 1980.
51/ DBFP, II, no. 17, app. A.
52/ Telegrams exchanged between Sonnino, Sforza, Tittoni and Biancheri openly refer to Italian agents active in the area as well as to the organization of the incidents: ASMAE Turchia, 1651/7732/141/26.10.19, Sonnino to Biancheri. 1641/7734/2130/, 10.7.19, Italian Consul in Smyrna to MAE. 1646/7746/2097/, 7.7.19, Sforza to DICP. 1646/7746/1281/14.5.19, Sforza to DICP. 1644/7738/1467/27.4.19, Sonnino to Admiral di Revel. 1644/7738/1848/9.5.19, Sforza to MAE.
immediately after the first shots, and instead of making any
effort to stop the fighting, Carossini left the scene to
appear an hour later at the other end of the Quay, where the
Turkish prisoners were boarding the Patris 53/. The official
Turkish view as to the issue of the first shot is expressed in
Gendarmerie Colonel Ali Kemal's report to his Commander in
Constantinople: "Probably, one of the armed individuals who
followed the Greek battalion fired a shot, possibly
involuntarily" 54/.

A few days later, High Commissioner Stergiadis wrote to
Venizelos:
"There is evidence that the resistance was
organized by the remnants of the CUP in
collaboration with a foreign propaganda which
also influenced the Turco-Cretans. The same
foreign propaganda continues to foment similar
upheavals in the interior, wherever our army
advances. I can assure you that if this
foreign instigation did not exist, we would
have met no resistance but in few, sporadic
cases" 55/.

It is to be noted that although Stergiadis knows quite
well which foreign propaganda he refers to, he hesitates to
name it. This attitude conformed to the venizelist line
expressed in the proclamation to the Greeks of Asia Minor:
"Special attention should be paid to the Italian element of
the population". It is also to be noted that Repoulis did not
agree with Venizelos in this respect: "It is obvious that we
[the Greek army] will meet the Italians in Ayiasuluk...I
believe we should advance and, if they resist, we should clash
so that the Allies will intervene to clarify the situation" 56/.

Italian complicity in the organization of Turkish
resistance was openly criticized in Smyrna and an official
letter of complaint was addressed to Lloyd George by the
Metropolitan 57/. Likewise, public opinion in Greece was
highly critical of Italian involvement and the Italian
Ambassador to Athens was ordered to complain to the Greek
government about the suposedly unfounded accusations 58/.

By late afternoon on 16 May, the objectives of the
landing had been attained and clashes had stopped altogether.
The Court Martial commenced its proceedings on the same day,
with cases against local Greeks. In an effort to forestall any

53/ ASMAE-Turchia, 1644/7738/Report no. 1200/31.5.19, Admiral
di Revel to Sonnino.
54/ MOFA 59, Report n.n./19.5.19, Ali Kemal to the Chief
Commander of the Gendarmerie in Constantinople.
55/ AV 5, Report no. 1337/26.5.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
56/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4356/21.5.19, Repoulis to MOFA.
57/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7728/2066/18.5.19, Italian Consul in
Smyrna to MAE.
further anti-Turkish demonstrations and to prove the impartiality of the Greek army, the first two sentences passed by the Court Martial were announced on 18 May. Two Greeks, a civilian and a soldier, received death penalties and were executed on the same day. The impact of these executions was so strong that, from 19 May, many articles stolen during the looting were abandoned in the streets of the city and its suburbs. A special service was immediately organized to collect them and return them to their owners. A few days later, Stergiadis wrote to Venizelos:

"So far, 14 Greeks, 2 Turks and 1 Italian have received sentences for looting. The date of the trial of another 10 Turks, 4 Armenians, 3 Jews and 20 Greeks accused of taking part in the looting has been fixed. At the same time, inquiries regarding 27 Greeks, 12 Turks, 2 Italians and 2 Serbs are being conducted. Due to lack of personnel and eye witnesses ready to testify against the looters, the Court Martial has not worked quickly so far. However, the population has regained courage and more looters are prosecuted while further arrests are effected every day" 59/.

By the middle of August, the Court Martial had almost completed its proceedings: 72 individuals were convicted, 3 of whom received death sentences, 4 life imprisonment and 65 lighter sentences. Forty nine were Greeks, thirteen Turks, twelve Armenians and one Jew. One Greek soldier was given a death sentence because he could not explain to the Court how he had got hold of the Turkish gold found on him at the time of his arrest 60/.

Although the Greek government was not legally responsible for damages resulting from the looting that took place in a city not under Greek occupation at the time, two commissions were formed to examine relevant claims and estimate the damage caused by the events of 15 and 16 May. The first commission examined the claims of persons of French, British or Italian nationality and was composed of four representatives of the above communities and the President of the Serres Tribunal, P. Tsirimonakis representing Greece. The second commission examined the claims of Greeks, Turks and other nationals and was composed of Tsirimonakis, the Prefect of Drama Ali Bey Naip Zade and Greek lawyer G. Photiadis.

Venizelos attached great importance to the prompt settlement of this matter. According to his orders, all those

58/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738/1525/30.5.19, Italian Ambassador in Athens to DICP.
59/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4981/22.5.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
60/ MOFA 59, tel. no. 5790/12.8.19, Politis to MOFA.
accused of participation in the events were to be tried and convicted as soon as possible and the payment of reparations should start immediately. By August 1919, the two commissions had deliberated on 780 cases and 764 others were under consideration. The sum paid for reparations up to the same time was 2,500,000 francs. The fact that most of those convicted by the Court Martial were Greek, in conjunction with Venizelos' declaration that the Greek government would pay reparations to the victims of looting, amounted in Turkish and Italian circles to indirect admission of Greek responsibility for the events 61/.

By 17 May, order had been reestablished in the area of Smyrna but reports of attacks against Turks in the towns and villages of the hinterland persisted 62/. The British representative received orders to protest to Kakoulidis and to request the immediate implementation of strict measures for the reinstatement of public order. As a result, Colonel Zafiriou issued a proclamation ordering the population to return to their peaceful tasks and stressing that the area was under martial law which strictly prohibited the possession of arms 63/. Zafiriou's proclamation did not bear any significant results and tensions persisted. Yet another proclamation was issued advising the Greeks to "respect the personal freedom and religious beliefs" of their compatriots and stressed that "in the future, the Court Martial will be responsible for the punishment of those violating these orders" 64/. However, by this time, the Turks had come out of the initial shock following the landing events and had started retaliating by committing excesses against the unprotected Greek populations

61/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4663/18.5.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos. MOFA 73, tel. no. 15833/2.8.19, Politis to MOFA. MOFA 59, Report no. 6483/6.8.19, Stergiadis to MOFA. MOFA 6, tel. no. 7279/25.7.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA. For the constitution of the committees, MOFA 2, tel. no. 8387/24.8.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
62/ MOFA 141, tel. n.n./16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. AV 6, tel. no. 1769/6015/5.7.19, Diomidis to Politis.
63/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 75.
64/ ibid.
outside the occupied zone 65/.

In the meantime, the Turkish troops had evacuated Smyrna on 23 May and the city was left to the Greek army 66/. The Turkish civil authorities and civil employees had been restored to their positions by 17 May, following Colonel Zafiriou's apologies to the Vali for the harsh treatment he received on 15 May 67/. The matter of the restoration of the civil authorities was urgent for the Greek military in view of the problems in communication and provisioning caused by their absence 68/. At the same time, the need to build up the Greek forces in Asia Minor had by now become imperative for the preservation of law and order in the hinterland.

In Smyrna, life recovered its normal pace gradually. The Court Martial continued its proceedings and extensive inquiries were held to establish any responsibility of Greek officers. People returned to "their peaceful tasks" and business continued as usual. However, the events of 15 and 16 May were far from forgotten. It was clear that they had torpedoed what chance there had ever been for the successful implementation of the venizelist policy of peaceful coexistence. Although there is little doubt that the local Greeks committed excesses against the Turkish population in the belief that, at long last, the moment had come for them to avenge the massacres, violations, looting and plundering of a decade, responsibility for the incidents can not be attributed to them. These events, so detrimental to the Greek cause, were mainly due to Allied hypocrisy as to the nature of the Greek

65/ MOFA 140, Report no. 1144/16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. MOFA 141, Report no. 4164/16.5.19, Kakoulidis to Ministry of Marine.


67/ For Greek efforts to convince the Vali to resume his office: MOFA 141, tel. no. 4230/18.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos. MOFA 141, report no. 4365/18.5.19, Mavroudis to Politis. AV 5, Report 1286/18.5.19, Mavroudis to Politis. GAS 1, tel. no. 2530/1.6.19, Stergiadis to Kanellopoulos.

68/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4164/16.5.19, Kakoulidis to Ministry of Marine.
occupation and the resulting stance of each of the Powers with reference to the measures to be taken to safeguard it.

The British Admiral seemed to believe that his notes and recommendations to the Turkish authorities would suffice to preserve public order. The Italian representative surely could not be expected to suggest measures to safeguard the security of a landing operation he was doing everything in his power to undermine 69/. The French and American representatives were simply "observing" at a time when they should have insisted on the evacuation of the Turkish army before the Greek landing or, at least, the surrender of its arms. What was more, the Allied representatives had collectively remained indifferent to the release of so many criminals from the prisons the night before the landing.

Although not clear from all responsibility, one must note that the Greek representatives had not had the time to suggest measures regarding the evacuation and disarmament of the Turkish troops. They did, however, communicate all information regarding Turkish preparations for resistance to Admiral Calthorpe. On his part, he seemed sure that he could forestall the repercussions of such a provocative action as the landing of Greek troops in broad daylight in front of Turkish crowds, by simply holding the Turkish authorities responsible for any disturbances 70/. The very presence of the Turkish troops in the city represented a hope for the Turkish population, inflamed its nationalism and - with the invaluable aid of the Italian propaganda - turned the city into a dangerous volcano. It is indicative of the importance attached to the army's presence that after the Turkish troops were confined on the Patris, the Muslim civilians returned to their homes peacefully while the organizers of the Bahri-Baba demonstrations escaped to the interior. On the basis of this and subsequent events, it is doubtful if in the army's absence any Turkish civilian would have dared shoot against the Greek troops 71/.

The responsibility of the Greek officers in charge of the landing is also grave, especially as regards the free movement of the crowds on the Quay. The plans and measures taken by them were clearly inadequate. This was partly due to the absence of officers with great prestige among the troops and from the fact that the whole operation was entrusted to a Colonel. Later in the year Colonel Zafiriou was dismissed from

69/ Instead, he chose to instigate the Turks by promising them direct aid. MOFA 141, Report no. 1144/16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. Horton, op.cit., p. 72.
70/ Admiral Calthorpe's suggestions to the Turkish authorities were transmitted to the Minister of War in Constantinople by Ali Nadir Pasha. His reports quoted in Rodas, op.cit., pp. 72-73. Smith, op.cit., p. 91.
71/ MOFA 141, Report n.n./16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
the army. In two letters he addressed to Venizelos on the issue of his dismissal, he claims he had been punished "without any official justification. Unofficially, however, I was told that my punishment is connected with the landing at Smyrna, my command during its execution and generally with the incidents of 15 and 16 May. I was also told that it is based on the conclusions of an inquiry conducted by Major General Leonardopoulos" 72/. He further claimed that he did not find out about the Konak incidents until two hours later and that he had mistaken the shots he heard around ten o'clock for shots fired in rejoicing. In his second letter, Zafiriou stated that during the afternoon of 14 May, he had a meeting with Admiral Calthorpe who assured him that the Quay would be heavily policed during the landing, by a naval detachment under Mavroudis. In fact, he continued, the following day the detachment had cleared the crowds from only a small part of the Quay, up to the Customs House, while the remaining part was full of cheering, delirious crowds. "This uproar is the reason why neither I, nor my staff or Captain Mavroudis heard the shooting" 73/. Whether disciplinary action against Zafiriou was justified, is a matter of debate which can be fully clarified if an answer is given to the question why Captain Mavroudis was neither reprimanded nor punished, although he shared the responsibility for the landing of the troops and, what is more, for its preparation.

On the whole, it seems that Greek responsibility for these events has been exaggerated out of proportion in a further attempt to serve the interests of those who instigated them. An eye-witness has commented:

"Much has been said about the atrocities and massacres committed by the Greek troops at the time of their landing at Smyrna on May 15, 1919. In fact, the events that occurred on that and the few succeeding days have taken on larger proportions in the public mind than the deliberate extermination of whole nations by the Turks, and no consideration seems to have been given to the prompt suppression of the disorders by the Greek authorities, and the summary punishment of the principal offenders, several of them by death...The whole responsibility was thrown upon the Greeks who landed among a population, so far as the Turks were concerned, more insulted by their advent than the white citizens of Mobile would be if it were given over to a mandate of negro troops" 74/.

On 23 May 1919, when order had long been reestablished and High Commissioner Stergiadis had finally arrived in Smyrna, the Italian newspaper Messagero wrote: "The Greeks continue to arrest the Turks en masse. The Turkish quarter in Vourla is in flames. Violence and looting continues. The situation is menacing".

72/ AV 5, letter n.n./4.10.19, Zafiriou to Venizelos.
73/ AV 5, letter n.n./7.10.19, Zafiriou to Venizelos.
74/ Horton, op.cit., p. 72.
III. The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry
News of the disastrous execution of the landing reached Venizelos through the British Admiralty 1/. His colleagues in Athens chose not to inform him immediately and when they did, they communicated only half the truth; Mavroudis' shattering report was conveniently hushed up 2/. In a telegram to Colonel Zafiriou, the Greek Premier expressed his bitterness and despair:

"Greek participation in the events grieved me immensely. Of course, no city is devoid of rascals but I could never imagine that [the local Greeks] could celebrate their liberation with acts that can seriously damage the national cause...You will invite the Metropolitan and the primates and complain about the behaviour of those rascals that want to call themselves Greeks" 3/.

Fear of possible repercussions, as well as his anxiety over the delayed arrival of the Greek High Commissioner in Smyrna, drove Venizelos to despair. As early as February 1919, he had chosen Aristidis Stergiadis, Governor General of Epirus, to serve as first Greek High Commissioner of Smyrna, although he knew that his choice would not be favourably received by the Liberal Party 4/. On 2 April he wrote to Stergiadis that "in the event, as I hope, Smyrna is given to us, you will have to undertake its administration" 5/. Knowing of Stergiadis' poor health, he invited him to Paris to undergo treatment and to discuss issues concerning the administration of the new territories. However, Stergiadis refused to go on the excuse that his presence in Jannina was indispensable.

On 7 May 1919, Repoulis cabled Stergiadis to return to Athens immediately. Yet, six whole days passed without any news from Jannina reaching Venizelos who believed that this delay was due to forces in Athens acting against Stergiadis. In the event, he was informed that the Governor General could not depart immediately because of poor health 6/. The Prime Minister was very anxious to see the High Commissioner take up his post as soon as possible because he considered his presence indispensable for the successful completion of the landing 7/. "The absence of our political representative in Smyrna is especially worrying" he wrote to Diomidis 8/.

1/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 607/17.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
2/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis' Report on the events, according to which, Italian officers were the main instigators.
3/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4252/19.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
4/ Smith, op.cit., p. 91.
5/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 3028/2.4.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
6/ MOFA 141, tel. n.n. Venizelos to Zafiriou. MOFA 141, tel.no 305/13.5.19, Gounarakis to MOFA.
7/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4485/11.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
8/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4575/16.5.19, Venizelos to Diomidis.
fill the vacuum, Repoulis was instructed to leave for Smyrna immediately to ensure the establishment of public order and the restitution of the Turkish civil authorities. This was a matter of top priority for Venizelos who wanted to be in a position to refute any claims to the effect that the Greek presence in Smyrna created chaos whereas no disturbance had occurred at the Italian points of landing 9/. Repoulis arrived in Smyrna on 18 May and the following day a meeting was held with Admiral Calthorpe to discuss the situation. After the meeting he reported to Paris:

"[During the events] the most active among the local Greeks were the Asia Minor reservists who returned victorious after five years in exile, to find their families ruined both morally and financially. The Asia Minor Greeks serving in our army managed to return here wearing their uniforms despite government orders" 10/. Stergiadis arrived in Smyrna on 21 May and Repoulis left for Athens on the same day. His presence in the city, especially in the absence of any Greek civil authority, reassured the local Turkish authorities as to the good will of the Greek government and, to a degree, helped ease the tense atmosphere prevailing in the city 11/. In the meantime, Venizelos in Paris launched a new diplomatic campaign to convince the Allies that Greece was not responsible for the landing incidents. In his effort to ensure that the Supreme Council would not revoke the Greek mandate to Smyrna, he wrote to Clémenceau: "Unfortunately, this [Turkish] resistance had been deliberately planned...These disturbances were the work of the partisans of the Young Turks [who were] encouraged by a certain propaganda, without the instigation of which - it can be affirmed - public order would not have been disturbed" 12/. Yet, Venizelos did not know the whole truth about the events. He had not been informed of the killing of Turkish prisoners on the way to the Patris and Mavroudis' detailed report on the events had not been communicated to him by the Greek authorities. The full picture was presented to him only in late June through his close friend Ronald Burrows, Principal of Kings' College in London, who, in turn, had been briefed by his contacts at the Foreign Office. Venizelos

9/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4606/17.5.19, tel. no. 4356/21.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos. AV 6, tel. no. 1303/n.n./20.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.
10/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 143/19.5.19 and tel. no. 4356/21.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos. AV 6, tel. no. 1303/n.n./20.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.
11/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4460/24.5.19, Stergiadis to MOFA and tel. no. 4356/21.5.19, Repoulis to MOFA.
12/ AV 9, letter n.n./29.5.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
immediately employed the good services of his friend to obtain more information as to what the Foreign Office thought of the events and Burrows promptly reported:

"I had extracts from the Admiralty reports read out to me. I am sorry to say that the impression they left on the Foreign Office was deplorable...[My contact said] We were glad to observe one Greek officer restrain his men...The Foreign Office laid stress on the Evzoni getting out of hand when escorting the prisoners...and themselves taking part in the killing of men who had surrendered. [My contact continued] The less said about the matter, the better. It was a bad business. Probably however, this evidence was given by the British residents of Smyrna who, as we know, are prejudiced" 13/. Burrows arranged for parts of the Admiralty reports to be despatched to Venizelos who wrote to him a few days later:

"I need not assure you that the first I knew of the killing of Turkish prisoners by the Greek soldiers escorting them was from your letter...I had known of course that...the worst elements of the population, which are by no means scarce in a big sea port, took advantage of the opportunity and committed murders and especially gave themselves to acts of looting...Considering the circumstances, I did not regard these incidents -however regrettable they were- as surpassing what one might expect to happen under similar circumstances...I am convinced, dear Friend, that our Army is conscientiously fulfilling the task entrusted to it by the Council in Asia Minor, in spite of the greatest difficulties which naturally the enemy puts in its way and, what is really the hardest task, in spite of the intrigues of one of our Allies"

and Burrows replied:

"My informant [at the Foreign Office] on my leaving said that this is the end of the Turks being turned out of Europe...Such views represent Lord Curzon and they will grow as letters come back from the fleet. I fear that they will strengthen the old argument that Greece cannot be trusted with the Moslem minority in Cyprus...I feel that the Greek

13/ AV 21, letter n.n./21.6.19, Burrows to Venizelos.
press has got an altogether too rosy view of
the situation and that it might be well to
prepare them indirectly for disillusionment." 14/.

A few days later, the matter was brought up in the
House of Commons. Lt. Colonel Aubrey Herbert asked Curzon
whether he had any official information to the effect that the
Greeks massacred their prisoners in Smyrna in full sight of
the Allied warships; he received an affirmative reply. The
following day, the Manchester Guardian commented editorially
on the "murder of old grey-bearded civilians as well as of
soldiers". It further regretted the fact that the Foreign
Office and Venizelos had "avoided mentioning anything of these
atrocities before 26 June" 15/. The news was greeted with
great surprise at the headquarters of the Greek delegation in
Paris. Venizelos, by now exasperated, cabled Stergiadis for
more information regarding the accusations. His deep grief was
expressed in a letter he wrote to Balfour:

"The statement [in the House of
Commons]...grieved me immensely as I had no
news from the Greek authorities or any
intimation whatever from the English
Government to the effect that Turkish
prisoners had been killed by Greek soldiers
escorting them. [The Greek government]
believes that, however regrettable these
incidents may be, they do not exceed in
intensity the unavoidable brought about by the
circumstances under which they occurred...But
even if this impression of the Greek
government be proved false, [we] would really
prefer the whole truth of the case to come to
light for the sake of establishing the
responsibility of and exacting punishment of
the authors, as [we] do not in the least
desire that such despicable crimes be silenced
or remain unpunished" 16/.

Although in his communications to the members of the
Supreme Council Venizelos tried to minimize the importance and
the impact of the incidents, the language he used when
addressing the troops indicated his full understanding of the
possible consequences:

14/ MOFA 26, tel. no. 7114/23.7.19, Venizelos to Diomidis. AV
9, letter 1693/6345/9.7.19, Venizelos to Burrows. A few days
later, Venizelos wrote to his friend T.P. O'Connor, M.P.,
repeating the same arguments. AV 9, letter n.n./18.7.19,
Venizelos to O'Connor.
15/ AV 8, tel. no. 1684a/28.6.19, Cacalmanos to Venizelos. In
July, Venizelos wrote to C.P. Scott, Editor in Chief of
the Manchester Guardian, in an effort to explain the Greek
position. AV 9, letter n.n./16.7.19, Venizelos to Scott.
16/ MOFA 44, letter n.n./2.7.19, Venizelos to Balfour.
"[These incidents] may destroy our national cause at the most crucial moment...You must make the [local Greek] population realize that no misconduct will be tolerated by the army. Regardless of our compassion for their past sufferings, we can not allow them to endanger the honour of a whole nation through their bad conduct...If we find them adverse to the important mission we have undertaken, we will treat them as enemies..." 17/.

High Commissioner Stergiadis shared Venizelos' views about the local Greeks:

"Here, the military have difficulties in reconciling their double task; administration and police work to preserve public order on the one hand and fighting on the other. This difficulty could be easily overcome if it were not for the disastrous influence of the local Christians who are disobedient to our orders, rancorous towards the moslems and ready to revenge and loot. Sometimes they succeed in inducing soldiers and officers to misconduct...No atrocities would have ensued had the local [Greek] population not taken part [in the clashes]...When I arrived eight days later, I concentrated my efforts in finding and punishing the culprits but no one seemed to be in a position to inform me, while many did not seem to realize the necessity [of my efforts]" 18/.

Yet, Venizelos' harsh words were not only for the local Greeks:

"The army's misconduct during the first two days of the occupation in Smyrna, has not only destroyed us morally but could also influence and endanger the outcome of our national interests...Only by confessing the truth about this misconduct and by punishing these officers who tolerated such barbarism from their soldiers, can we minimize its impact..." 19/.

Venizelos was not exaggerating. Although the local Greeks could not be accused of instigating the incidents, it

17/ AV 9, tel. no. 1783/6625bis/5.7.19, Venizelos to Nider, Order of the Day, addressed to the Greek troops.
18/ AV 9, tel. no. 1748/n.n./3.7.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
19/ AV 8, tel. no. 1693/6345/29.6.19, Venizelos to Nider and Stergiadis.
was clear that their grievances against their former oppressors broke loose at a most inopportune moment. The venizelist policy of "peaceful coexistence" between Greeks and Turks had proved unrealistic.

Earlier in June, the Greek General Staff had ordered Major General Leonardopoulos to proceed to Smyrna and report on the events. His report was soon completed and his conclusions were transmitted to Paris. Leonardopoulos praised the conduct of the troops in general and stated that the 4th Infantry Regiment had done its best to protect the prisoners. His investigation concentrated mainly on the issue of the unfortunate planning and execution of the landing. General Paraskevopoulos commented that since the Commander of the First Division was "partly justified" by the report and since Stergiadis did not "wish the replacement of Zafiriou and Stavrianopoulos" he had not made any changes in the leadership of the troops. "However", he noted, "if you think that the political side of the issue dictates the sacrifice of a few officers, please order their dismissal with the view to reinstating them in due course" 20/. In view of the discussion in the House of Commons, Venizelos could no longer remain satisfied with the investigation of a Greek officer, still less so as he wished to make the accusation of the killing of Turkish prisoners the focus of an Anglo-Greek inquiry. "Even if these incidents prove to be worse than I think", he wrote to Caclamanos, "I prefer to have them come out into the open and to impose the necessary penalties. Only in this way can we reestablish our good name and not by trying to cover them up" 21/.

Caclamanos was further instructed to call at the Foreign Office and leave a note with the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs C. Harmsworth, requesting a thorough investigation into the Smyrna events by a high ranking British officer in collaboration with a Greek officer of the same rank. Harmsworth expressed his doubts as to whether the British government could alone accept a proposition which seemed to fall under the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference. Thereupon, Venizelos wrote to Balfour, in an effort to secure Cabinet approval "to enlighten British public opinion because the accusation against the Greek army was based...on British sources". His main arguments for an Anglo-Greek investigation were as follows:

"The undertaking of this investigation by the Peace Conference would necessarily imply the participation of other Great Powers and, owing

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20/ AV 8, tel. no. 6346/n.n./29.6.19, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos. AV 9, tel. no. 1700/n.n./29.6.19, Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos, communicating Leonardopoulos' Report.
21/ AV 8, tel. no. 1695/6351/29.6.19, Venizelos to Caclamanos.
to the conflicting interests of one of them with those of Greece as regards western Asia Minor, the impartiality of the investigation would be greatly handicapped and its success seriously compromised. Nor do I consider it fair that the work of the Greek authorities should be subjected to the criticism of a government whose agents in the Smyrna region have done nothing to facilitate the task of the Greek forces in their undertaking to accomplish a duty assigned to them by the Peace Conference" 22/.

However, the British government was unable to see its way clear to accepting this proposal and Balfour advised Venizelos not to insist on an Anglo-Greek inquiry but that such an investigation should be carried out by the Greek authorities alone, the Greek government communicating to the British the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed on the culprits. Should any doubt be expressed as to the results of the inquiry, Balfour suggested that Venizelos could then request the investigation of the issue by a mixed commission 23/. The Greek Prime Minister was obliged to accept these suggestions and commissioned Colonel Alexander Mazarakis, his Military Adviser at the Peace Conference, to proceed to Smyrna and conduct investigations. In his subsequent report, Mazarakis made the following points:

1. There was no doubt that atrocities were committed against the Turkish army and unarmed civilian population.

2. The landing of the Greek troops should not have taken place in the city port. After landing at another spot along the coast and while a curfew had been imposed, the Greek troops should have proceeded with the occupation of the main part of the city.

3. In addition to the clashes near the Konak, several others took place in different parts of the city.

4. The incidents left about one hundred victims, 15 to 20 of whom were among the 2,500 Turkish prisoners.

5. The way the British report was composed gave the impression that the numerous eye-witness accounts referred to different incidents when it was obvious that many of them referred to the same events.

22/ MOFA 141, letter n.n./2.7.19, Venizelos to Balfour 23/ AV 8, tel. no. 1695/6351/29.6.19, Venizelos to Caclamanos. MOFA 44, letter n.n./2.7.19, Venizelos to Balfour. MOFA 2, letter n.n/2.7.19, Venizelos to Balfour. AV 11, note no. 2314/56-57/n.d., not signed, reporting in detail the steps taken by the Greek side to ensure that the mandate of Smyrna would not be revoked.
6. The Command of the First Division was responsible for the unsatisfactory plan, for the mistakes in its implementation and for not conducting a prompt and thorough investigation. Lt. Colonel Stavrianopoulos was not responsible, even though he had already been punished and removed from Smyrna.

7. Turks hidden in shops, hotels and boats, started the shooting. Logic dictated that it would have been unreasonable for Greeks to hide and shoot against a street filled with Greek troops and civilians. Consequently, although excesses were indeed committed against some of the prisoners, most of the victims were killed in other parts of the city 24/.

In the meantime, against Venizelos’ explicit instructions to the contrary, Stergiadis and Zafiriou chose to extend the Greek occupation to the north and east (Manisa, Kasaba) as well as to the south of Smyrna, in order to forestall an Italian advance in the Meander Valley which would hinder a future incorporation of this area into the Greek zone. According to the original plan, the Greek occupation was to be confined to the town of Aidin, the sancaks of Smyrna and Manisa and the kaza of Aivali. Only if there were a real threat to public order and this only with the Senior Naval Officer's consent, should the Greek troops advance further south and, in any case, not beyond Aidin 25/. However, Greek troops, by now amounting to five divisions, occupied Menemen on 22 May, Manisa, Ayiasuluk and Aidin on 25 May and Aivali on 29 May. Odemish was occupied on 1 June, Nazili on 3 June, Akhisar on 5 June and Bergama on 12 June. This advance placed the Greek troops in a strong position and although the Senior Naval Officer had not authorized it, he could not order them to withdraw for fear of new disorders 26/. As cables from Smyrna to Paris were delayed, probably due to Italian interference in their transmission via Rome about which Venizelos complained to the Supreme Council, the Greek Premier thought that the advance of the Greek troops was the result of a misunderstanding 27/. It soon proved that a further advance was necessary and on 27 June, four days after communicating his decision to the Supreme Council, Venizelos authorized Stergiadis to undertake a "defensive-offensive", in order to disperse the Turkish irregular forces threatening to besiege Smyrna. This resulted in the mistaken evacuation of Aidin on

24/ AV 9, tel. no. 1885/n.n./17.7.19, Mazarakis to Venizelos. Mazarakis, op. cit., pp. 263-265.
25/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4712/19.5.19, communicating to Smyrna the decision of the Supreme Council on the issue of the boundaries of the Greek occupation. Petsalis, op. cit., p. 215.
26/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 700/11.9.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
27/ FO 608/90-14763, Report by Kerr on his interview with Venizelos, 7.7.19.
29 June. The town was subsequently burnt and some 2,500 Greek inhabitants massacred by the irregulars before it was reoccupied by the Greek forces on 4 July. The events of Aidin and the occupation of towns such as Menemen, Bergama and Odemish by the Greeks had been followed by incidents similar to those of Smyrna 28/. These incidents were used by the Sheik-ul-Islam to accuse the Greek troops of alleged atrocities against the Turkish population.

Mazarakis' report had barely reached Venizelos when, on 18 July, the Supreme Council discussed a letter from the Sheik-ul-Islam which stated:

"Thousands of Moslems have perished and more than 15,000 were obliged to leave their villages and seek refuge in the interior in order to escape the horrors and massacres".

The Greeks were further accused of trying to replace the indigenous Turkish population with immigrants from Greece and the Supreme Council was requested to order the evacuation of the Greek troops and the constitution of an Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry (ICI) to investigate the alleged Greek atrocities. However, when the Sheik-ul-Islam was called to testify under oath before the ICI, he refused because such an act would not be compatible with his religious status 29/. During the discussion that followed, Balfour pointed out that he did not object to the proposal itself, though he thought that if Commissions of Inquiry had to be sent to investigate all charges of atrocities throughout the world, he did not believe he would be able to lay his hand on a sufficient number of officers. He also thought it was more important to prevent the recurrence of atrocities in the future than to investigate those which had already taken place. Nonetheless, on the same day, the Council decided to appoint a commission of inquiry, consisting of a British, a French, an Italian and an American officer 30/. On the same day, Venizelos and Tittoni announced their agreement in defining the Greek and Italian zone in Asia Minor. Despite the Council's objections,


30/ DBFP, I, p. 130 and 142.
Tittoni pointed out that the approval of this agreement by the Supreme Council tantamount to an official recognition of the Italian presence in Asia Minor. This argument was subsequently used extensively by the Italians in an attempt to legitimize their unauthorized presence in the area.

The composition of the ICI caused the protests of Venizelos. Not to allow for the representation of the Greek army at the Commission, he wrote to Clémenceau, was to inflict upon it an unwarranted stigma by implying it was collectively responsible for the alleged crimes. The absence of a Greek officer from the inquiry would tantamount to disregard of the mandate by virtue of which the Greek army was now in Asia Minor where it had been sent at the request of the Allied and Associated powers. Greek objections were discussed by the Supreme Council on 21 July and, despite the objections voiced by Clémenceau and Tittoni, it was agreed that Venizelos "might appoint a Greek officer to follow the labours of the Commission. This officer will not however have a vote in the ICI and will take no part in its findings". This decision appeased the sensitivity of the Greek army to a very limited extent; nevertheless, Colonel Mazarakis was appointed Greek representative to the Commission. Yet, the phrase "to follow the labours of the Commission" was to cause a lot of friction between the ICI and the Greeks, because the members of the Commission decided to interpret it as excluding the presence of the Greek delegate from the proceedings 31/.

At a later Supreme Council meeting, it was decided that the Commission would inquire into the incidents which took place during and after the Greek occupation of Smyrna, Aidin, Aivali and adjacent regions. The inquiry was to extend to all such events from the date of occupation to "the present moment", 25 July 1919. The ICI was to allocate responsibilities and to submit a report to the Supreme Council together with "such conclusions as it might consider relevant" 32/. On 2 August, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople announced to the Porte the decision of the Supreme Council regarding the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones of occupation and the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the events that took place in consequence of the Greek occupation of Smyrna. Two days later, an official Turkish communiqué to the High Commissioners expressed Turkish satisfaction with the composition of the ICI and stated that "without doubt the humanitarian decision of the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude". Even before the composition of the ICI had been officially communicated to the Porte, the Turkish Ministry of Interior had ordered a group of civil employees to prepare all the necessary documents concerning the occupation of Smyrna in order to submit them to the Commission. According to this material, during and after the Greek occupation, 8,500 Turks

32/ DBFP, I, p. 188, Supreme Council meeting of 25.7.19.
were killed while another 1,500 had disappeared together with 1,200 Armenians and Jews who escaped to the interior. On 30 July, the Ministry of Interior issued a circular according to which all Turkish authorities should "facilitate" the work of the ICI and do their best to suppress the bands of irregulars while the Commission was in the area 33/.

The Commission, composed of Admiral Bristol for the US, General Bunoust for France, General Hare for Britain and General Dal'olio for Italy, held its first meeting in Constantinople on 12 August, in the absence of the Greek representative. Venizelos' protests to the Supreme Council were received concurrently with a telegram from the French High Commissioner in Constantinople which requested the Council to define whether Colonel Mazarakis "can or can not be present" and stated that the Turks would also ask to be represented at the ICI should the answer to the above question be affirmative. The matter was discussed at the meeting of 14 August and it was agreed that all necessary data should be communicated to Mazarakis by the Commission. Similar facilities should be extended to a Turkish representative "if subsequently appointed". Again, the phrase "all necessary data should be communicated to him", was to create misunderstandings as to what should be considered as "necessary data" 34/. On 20 August, the ICI informed the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople that, following instructions from Paris, a Turkish officer was to be allowed to follow the work of the Commission under the same conditions and with the same privileges as the Greek officer. The rights of the Turkish representative Kathri Bey were reasserted and, thus, victorious Greece found herself on the same footing with defeated Turkey 35/. Venizelos repeatedly, though unsuccessfully, solicited a decision of the Supreme Council in respect of "the unfair procedure followed by the ICI in disallowing the presence of the Greek delegate at the examination of witnesses and at the work of the ICI in general", which seemed to disregard the very decisions of the Council. The Commission deemed preferable that the Greek representative should not take part in the examination of witnesses on the grounds that this might intimidate some of them 36/. The intransigent stance of the ICI prompted new protests from Venizelos. On 14 September, he wrote to Clémenceau:

"I have already appealed to your sense of justice in order to secure an alteration in the procedure

33/ DBFP, I, p. 343, Supreme Council meeting of 6.8.19. MOFA 6, tel. no. 7339/27.7.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA. MOFA 61, tel. no. 7455/30.7.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
34/ DBFP, I, p. 466. MOFA 141, tel. no. 7775/20.8.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA. MOFA 61, tel. no. 7773/20.8.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
35/ DBFP, I, p. 418, app. E to no. 30. ibid, p. 413.
36/ AV 11, letter 2202b/n.n./14.9.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
which is so obviously contrary to the acknowledged rights of defence. Since then, through the General Secretary of the Conference, on several occasions I have requested the Council to come to a decision concerning this matter. In the meantime, as no further instructions reached the Commission, it has proceeded with its work on the same erroneous basis...Notwithstanding that in Constantinople the Commission had declared that in case the Greek Representative were not permitted to attend the cross-examination of the witnesses, he would be subsequently acquainted with their evidence and be told of the result of the inquiries, I regret to learn that even this has been denied him. Our representative has been kept in ignorance of the examinations carried through and of the conclusions reached by the Commission, who has often refused to examine several witnesses proposed by our side on the ground that information collected thus far was sufficient. It did not however acquaint our representative with the nature of this information...Thus, the inquiry was started in violation of all common rights of Penal Law and has been carried on in an atmosphere of increasing mystery...Through the mere accusation brought against it by the denunciation of an enemy authority, the Greek army suddenly found itself placed in the position of a defendant who does not even have the sacred right to present his defence" 37/.

The Greek protests were discussed once again by the Supreme Council at its meeting of 30 September, on the basis of two letters from Venizelos in which he complained about the insufficient extent to which Colonel Mazarakis was associated with the work of the Commission, although on 31 July, General Bunoust had assured Kanellopoulos that the ICI would communicate to Mazarakis the depositions of the witnesses 38/. It was then decided that the ICI should communicate to the Greek representative the minutes of the meetings, including the testimony of witnesses. Mazarakis would be asked and allowed to notify the Commission of any criticisms he desired to formulate regarding the matters in question 39/. To these instructions, the ICI readily replied that for the purpose of obtaining reliable information and avoiding reprisals, it had promised certain witnesses, mainly Turks and Europeans, that their testimony would be held secret. Therefore, no evidence could be communicated to Mazarakis. This caused new Greek

38/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 7453/31.7.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA. AV 11, letter n.n./27.10.19, Venizelos to Curzon.
39/ AV 11, memo, n.n./18.10.19....
protests which were discussed by the Council on 16 October. It was then decided that the ICI should communicate to Mazarakis all the evidence received after 30 September, date of the previous Supreme Council decision. However, this new decision did not have any effect as the ICI had by then completed its investigations 40/. Yet, Colonel Mazarakis was informed that he would soon receive the ICI report and he was requested to express any criticism he desired to formulate. To his previous protests about not being allowed to participate in the proceedings, the ICI had replied that "the Commission is not a tribunal to observe the procedures of a court". It also stressed that it had conducted the inquiry with absolute impartiality, conforming to the successive instructions received from the Peace Conference. What could hardly be concealed however, was the obvious effort to interpret these instructions in their most possible anti-Greek spirit.

The questions put by the ICI to the witnesses indicated the view the Commission was trying to establish: the resistance of the Turks originated from their deep hatred of the Greeks who were in no position to impose law and order. It followed therefore that if Asia Minor were given to Greece, fighting would continue in the area. This view was also expressed in a cyphered telegram addressed by the Vali to the Porte and intercepted by the Greek authorities; Admiral Bristol had assured Izzet Bey that the Greeks would not achieve their goal in view of the Smyrna events and that Turkish rights would be respected 41/. The Italian representative Dal'olio was also reported to have declared that the mission of the ICI consisted of examining whether Greece was capable of undertaking the Asia Minor mandate 42/.

The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry concluded its proceedings in the middle of October, after holding 36 meetings and examining 175 witnesses in several towns of western Asia Minor, Smyrna and Constantinople. On 14 October, High Commissioner Kanellopoulos informed Venizelos: "ICI has unanimously adopted conclusions clearly unfavourable to us. It does not approve of the Greek occupation which it considers as a mistake attributed to false information passed on to the Peace Conference [by the Greeks]" 43/. Acting on specific orders from his government, Mazarakis refused to sign the ICI report. To the relevant request of the Commission, he observed that the procès-verbaux which supposedly aimed at briefing him on the proceedings of the Commission, contained only the names of persons examined and the itinerary followed by the Commission during its trip within Anatolia. Without the texts of the witnesses' depositions, he stressed, he could not see

41/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 8463/29.8.19, Katehakis to MOFA.
42/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 7943/23.8.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
43/ MOFA 44, tel. no. 10237/14.10.19, Kanellopoulos to Venizelos.
how he could comment on them 44/.

The conclusions of the ICI, formulated in a lengthy report, suggested that the Greek occupation was not necessary because there had been no massacres of Christians after the Moudros Armistice and that the Supreme Council had been misled by false information into authorizing a Greek landing. It attributed the events to an alleged deep religious hatred between the Greek and Turkish communities, the manifestation of which the Greek authorities took no measure to prevent. The Greek occupation, far from performing a "civilizing mission", immediately took the form of conquest and crusade. Responsibility for the incidents rested with some Greek officers who did not restrain the population from committing excesses and with the Turkish authorities who had tolerated the arming of the escaped convicts a few hours before the Greek landing. While the Armenian massacres and the Greek persecutions during the War were forgotten, the mistakes of an army which the same report partly exonerated, were underlined in other parts, possibly in order to stress its culpability.

Had the mission of the ICI been the investigation of how justified the Supreme Council was in authorizing the Greek landing, the period between the conclusion of the Moudros Armistice and the Greek landing should have formed the focus of the inquiry. Such a procedure would have ascertained that resistance to the Peace Conference decisions and the persecution of the Christians had been planned before the Greek landing was even decided. The fact that the Turkish intention to resist Greek occupation was violently manifested during the landing indicated the wish of Turkish nationalists to place Greece in Allied disfavour through such events. They also seemed hopeful to take advantage of a resulting rupture between the Greeks and the Powers, as they had taken advantage of differences among the Allies in the past 45/. Further, if the Franco-British alignment could be disrupted, Turkey would be likely to retain the support of France because of the large French commercial interests and investments in the Ottoman Empire and the threat that a disruption of Turkish political and economic stability would pose to the security of Ottoman Debt bonds, the majority of which was in French hands. It was increasingly evident that the interests of the various European nations in Turkey were tending to create among them the very split the Turks had so long hoped for. Indeed, Turkey's foremost hope was to pursue the time honoured practice of exploiting differences between the victors 46/. Moreover, as the Times commented, the C.U.P. existed almost intact and was "the only efficient thing Turkey had

44/ MOFA 44, letter n.n./7.10.19, ICI to Mazarakis and Letter n.n./8.10.19, Mazarakis to ICI. MOFA 44, tel. no. 7214/20.9.19, Politis to Mazarakis. MOFA 6, tel. no. 8342/21.9.19, Politis to Mazarakis.
45/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 7643/5.8.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
46/ Helmreich, op.cit, p.108.
produced" 47/. Nouredin may have been forced to leave Smyrna in October 1918, but the underground movement which he had organized to perfection was ready for action on the day the Greek occupation materialized. What followed is not without precedent in Turkish history; the Turks tried and succeeded in obtaining gains from incidents they had themselves prepared 48/.

On 8 November 1919, the Supreme Council discussed the report of the ICI in the presence of Venizelos who had expressed the wish to be heard before the Council deliberated. Also present was General Bunoust, French delegate to the ICI. After pointing out that the Greeks had been sent to Smyrna on the clear understanding that their occupation should not be considered as a definite award of the territory to Greece, the report indicated that in many respects the conduct of the Greeks had been abominable and that Turkey would never accept either Greek or Italian occupation unless compelled to by force. What, in effect, the report recommended, was the replacement of the Greek troops with a much smaller Inter-Allied force, which might or might not have a Greek contingent. Even this force should be temporary and the Turkish gendarmerie should be reconstituted under the command of Allied officers so that the Inter-Allied force could be withdrawn as soon as possible 49/.

Clémenceau expressed the view that the information included in the report was accurate and he felt that the Council would be increasingly led to respect Turkish territorial integrity. Under these circumstances, he stressed, it was imperative to warn the Greeks that they should not behave as conquerors in Asia Minor because no question would have arisen had their occupation not provoked certain incidents. The Italian delegate expressed his agreement with Clémenceau and went on to say that relations between Italian troops and the Turkish population of Anatolia were excellent with no regrettable incidents taking place. On the contrary, the local population and authorities had indulged in manifestations of gratitude towards the Italian occupation on a number of occasions. At this point, Sir Eyre Crowe, the British representative, underlined the fact that the ICI conclusions went beyond the instructions issued by the Supreme Council as to its task. The report treated in general terms the whole problem of the Greek occupation and also questioned the decisions of the Supreme Council. What would happen if the Council, as suggested by the ICI report, asked the Greeks to

47/ Times, 1.1.19.
48/ MOFA 44, tel. no. 6348/31.8.19, Mazarakis communicating to MOFA the deposition of E. Emmanouilidis, former Greek M.P. in the Ottoman Chamber.
evacuate Smyrna? If an Inter-Allied occupation was impossible could the Council really think of allowing the Greeks to evacuate when there was no one to replace them? This vital question compelled Clémenceau to agree with Crowe that the Greeks should not be asked to leave Asia Minor "for the time being".

The provocative comments of General Bunouost to the effect that the Turkish proclamations distributed on the eve of the landing were not appeals for resistance and that the Turkish assemblies at the hills of Bahri-Baba took place in order to prove that the Turkish element was in a majority, induced Venizelos to take part in the animated discussion that followed. He later pointed out to the French General that the numbers of alleged Turkish victims contained in the report were largely inaccurate. To this, Bunouost observed that the ICI attached very little importance to the figures and was perfectly aware of their inaccuracy 50/.

Not satisfied with the course of the discussion, Venizelos asked for the ICI investigation to be considered null and void on the grounds that in placing Mazarakis on the same footing as the Turkish representative, the Commission had violated elementary principles of justice and "put, unintentionally doubtless, a positive premium upon false testimony". Further, Venizelos expressed the feeling that "civil investigators would have been more anxious not to violate cardinal principles of justice and that they would not, for instance, have allowed witnesses to be heard without being sworn". He concluded his intervention by accepting that animosity between Turks and Greeks was an uncontestable fact; it was also certain that many Europeans in Smyrna preferred the continuation of the Turkish regime which was a regime of special privileges with respect to foreigners, rather than the establishment of the Greek regime which was a regime of equality. He added that he did not wish to discuss conclusions based on testimony which had not been communicated to the Greek representative 51/.

On 10 November, the Council discussed the situation in Smyrna and the ICI report once again. Crowe expressed the view that should the Greek side have been heard during the inquiry, the conclusions of the report might have been different. He also repeated that the ICI had exceeded the limits of its authority by questioning the decisions of the Supreme Council. Bunouost replied that the complaints of the Sheik-ul-Islam had formed the basis for the investigation and it was these complaints which emphasized that the Greek occupation was unjustified. Therefore, he concluded, the ICI had necessarily examined the question. Crowe also observed that it might have been possible to give Colonel Mazarakis the depositions without the names of the witnesses. On the whole, he felt that

50/ DBFP, II, p.229, Supreme Council meeting of 8.11.19.
51/ ibid.
the Greeks had done their best and had succeeded "rather well". Clémenceau once again insisted that Venizelos should be "forcibly" reminded that the Greek occupation was only provisional.

What comes through from the study of the minutes of these discussions, is an irritation at the ICI for reviving an issue about which the Powers had since come to have a good many doubts and one that they would have preferred to bury as far as possible from the light of public display 52/. What the ICI had failed to consider in the report, was the chief reason for sending the Greek troops to Smyrna, which was the threatened Italian occupation. The Supreme Council could not afford to have its excuse about the protection of the Christian minorities exposed as fake, all the more so as the disclosure of the actual reason would affect each one's position at the home front, where public opinion would be sure to voice loud objections.

During the session held on 11 November, the Supreme Council composed a written reply to the comments and reservations expressed by Venizelos regarding the report of the ICI. The above points were included and it was stressed that although the Council accepted Greek reservations as to the conditions under which the inquiry had been conducted, it did not think that its conclusions could be considered vitiated in so far as the excesses and acts of violence committed by the Greek troops were concerned. The responsibility for these events rested solely with the Greek military authorities and the main cause for their occurrence was the almost complete absence of precautionary measures. The Supreme Council expressed its admiration for the impartiality of the members of the Commission and the scrupulous conscience which guided their work. As to the region of Aidin which the Greek army had occupied without Allied clearance, the Council deliberated that in view "of the practical difficulties and political inconvenience" of an Inter-Allied occupation, it was preferable to maintain the de facto Greek occupation 53/.

In his reply to the Supreme Council, Venizelos protested about the statement that Greek occupation was temporary. "In occupying Smyrna", he wrote, "Greece knew that if she was not yet legally, she was at least morally entitled to it". The Supreme Council did not seem to agree with this view. On 18 November, it reminded Venizelos that he had been warned of the temporary character of the Greek mandate as soon as the Allies had decided to implement it 54/. The full truth of the matter, however, justified Venizelos in the sense that he had not been told initially of the temporary -or any other for that matter- character of the occupation. The first he

53/ DBFP, II, p. 275, Supreme Council meeting of 11.11.19.  
54/ AV 11, tel. no. 173/7242/18.11.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
heard about the provisional restriction was only when the Italians were informed of the landing 55/. The reply of the Supreme Council and the Allied warnings as to what the future might hold, did not seem to worry the Greek Premier. "The hesitations expressed by the Supreme Council as to the final arrangements of the future of Smyrna are only due to disagreements among the Allies on other matters concerning Turkey", he wrote to Stergiadis. Clearly, he was unable to see that these hesitations could prove detrimental to the realization of his irredentist plans 56/. Once again it was clear that although nobody, except perhaps Greece, was in favour of the Greek occupation of Asia Minor, other factors determined its continuation as the sole alternative to the "practical difficulties and political inconvenience" of an Inter-Allied occupation. The ICI had aimed at, and succeeded in proving, that the events of 15 and 16 May were merely the result of "religious hatred" prevailing between Greeks and Turks.

The fact that the ICI report was not published by the Supreme Council has been repeatedly interpreted as a favourable act towards Greece 57/. Yet, the Greek government had wanted its publication and, at one stage, contemplated publishing it of its own accord 58/. It seems that the decision of the Supreme Council to the contrary was due to its refusal to accept that the decision to send Greek troops to Asia Minor had been a blunder. Should this bitter truth be accepted, the Allies would have had to order the evacuation of the Greek forces, which would in turn lead back to the "practical difficulties and political inconvenience" which had initiated this vicious circle.

By the end of November 1919, it was quite clear that the events of 15 and 16 May had achieved the goal set by their instigators: Greece was in Allied disfavour as, in view of her inability to restrain the clashing nationalism of Greeks and Turks, the Supreme Council could no longer rely on her to play the convenient role of policing Asia Minor until the oil fields had been distributed and the Peace Treaty with Turkey had been concluded.

55/ DBFP, iv, p.204, Curzon to Crowe, 26.11.19.
57/ Toynbee, op.cit.,
58/ This is attested by a 1920 draft document in the Venizelos Archives. It is not clear, though, why the Greek government did not proceed with the publication.
CHAPTER TWO:
I. International Developments 1919 - 1922
The protracted negotiations and the resulting delay in the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Turkey underlined the inability of the Allies to propose an agreement which could both accommodate their clashing interests and satisfy the demands of the various national groups in the Ottoman Empire. What escaped the notice of the Supreme Council was a factor that was to play the major role in the final solution of the Eastern Question. This was the Turkish nationalist movement which was in the meantime gaining momentum. As a result, in November 1919, the enforcement of an eventual peace treaty seemed much more problematic than it had a year before. Curzon was quick to predict that by the following spring, the defeated Turkey would declare war upon the Allies and dare them to enforce their terms. "The ignominious result might be that the weakest and most abject of our foes would end by achieving triumph" 1/. The Greek position was further undermined by the firm and unyielding stance displayed by the nationalists during the conference of the Ankara National Council in January 1920, when the determination of the Turks to repel any efforts to dismember the Empire was manifested. The display of Turkish determination to resist strengthened the arguments voiced in many Allied circles, that only after the evacuation of all foreign troops from Asia Minor could the Entente seek a compromise with Turkey.

When the Allied High Commissioners were officially informed of the recommendations of the February 1920 London Conference regarding the Peace Treaty with Turkey, they expressed the unanimous opinion that it would be impossible to enforce such severe terms. In their view, the Sublime Porte would either refuse to sign the Treaty or, if she signed it, would refuse to ratify it or, if she ratified it, would refuse to implement it. At this point, the British government chose to clarify its position regarding any possible help Greece

could expect on its part. On 19 March 1920, Venizelos was summoned to the War Office where Churchill inquired whether Greece would be disposed to enforce the Treaty by undertaking military action against Turkey should the latter refuse to comply with its terms. It was made clear to him that in view of her many obligations Britain was not prepared to spare even one man and that no help was likely to come from the French or the Italians. To his comment that Greece should think twice before undertaking a task surpassing her abilities, Venizelos replied without reservation that his government undertook to impose the terms of the Treaty in the zone awarded to Greece 2/. Sir Henry Wilson, who was present at the meeting, noted in his diary: "I told [Venizelos] that he was going to ruin his country, that he would be at war for years with Turkey and Bulgaria and that the drain in men and money would be far too much for Greece. He said he did not agree with a word I said" 3/.

Meanwhile, the impact of the Report of the Allied High Commissioners was such that Millerand announced to Romanos that he would request the reconsideration of the peace terms decided by the London Conference because he was convinced that should the Allies insist on the imposition of a harsh treaty, then France would have to send 100,000 troops to safeguard her interests in Asia Minor and to protect the Christian populations. The French Premier also stated that even if the terms of the Treaty were reconsidered, Greece would receive substantial territorial gains which would exclude any possibility of undermining the Venizelist regime. This last remark came as a reply to Romanos' argument that, should France withhold her support of Greek claims, the Venizelist regime would crumble, to the detriment of both countries 4/. The Italian position was scarcely discussed since it was obvious that Greece could not expect any help from this quarter. During a meeting with Venizelos, Lloyd George openly admitted that, on the contrary, Italy could be expected to encourage the Turks to reject the Treaty altogether and would be only too glad not to see it implemented 5/.

Nonetheless, during the Allied Conference at San Remo in April 1920, the terms discussed at the London Conference were confirmed mainly because a number of other pending issues was regulated according to the interests of each Ally: Italy was permitted to establish economic relations with the Soviet regime, France succeeded in prompting a strong Allied demarche to Germany regarding the issue of reparations and Lloyd George managed to impose his solution for the Turkish question. Thus, by a decision taken on 18 April 1920, the Allies granted the Smyrna zone to Greece for an initial five year period.

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2/ MOFA 7k tel. no. 11650/19.3.20, Venizelos to Politis.
4/ MOFA 71 tel. n.n./24.3.20, Romanos to Venizelos.
5/ MOFA 49 tel. n.n./16.6.20, Venizelos to Repoulis.
under the suzerainty of the Sultan. A plebiscite was to be conducted after five years to decide whether the zone should be annexed by Greece. The draft treaty as a whole, was eventually approved by the Supreme Council on 16 March 1920, while Allied detachments were proceeding with the occupation of Constantinople 6/.

Upon notification of the Supreme Council's approval of the draft treaty, the British, French and Italian High Commissioners in Constantinople, jointly commented that this decision violated every principle of self-determination and Robeck warned Curzon that "it is unthinkable, as the Foreign Office has constantly been informed by us here, that the Musulmans in those areas will peacefully accept Greek annexation...the terms are such that no Turk, CUP or pro-Entente can very well accept. The Supreme Council, thus, are prepared to do violence to their own declared and cherished principles, they are prepared to perpetuate bloodshed indefinitely in the Near East and for what? To maintain M. Venizelos in power in Greece for what cannot in the nature of things be more than a few years at the outside. I cannot help wondering if the game is worth the candle...M. Venizelos' deserts vis-à-vis the Entente are great but is it wise to run the almost certain risk of plunging Asia in blood in order to reward Greece according to the deserts of M. Venizelos, which are very different from the deserts of Greece?" 7/.

Lord Curzon commented that if the Allies did not wish to see the revision of the Treaty imposed on them in a few months, they should themselves revise it as soon as possible. Comments in the press went even further. The Westminster Gazette called the Treaty an "oratorical formula, destined to mask the problems which the Allies have not been able to resolve" and the Observer bluntly called it "artificial", "precarious" and "transitory" 8/. Le Temps sharply commented that the Treaty had been allowed to come about simply because it was negotiated at a time when Britain had France at a disadvantage in view of her total concentration in the German Treaty 9/. Such was the hostility expressed by the Italian press that Nitti was obliged to state that Italy would play no role in any "fatal war" that might ensue 10/.

Curzon had been right all along. By the middle of June 1920, it was obvious that the only options open to the Allies were the revision of the Treaty before it had even been signed

8/ "How will the Turkish Treaty Work?" in Literary Digest 66, 28.8.20, pp. 19-20.
9/ ibid. Also, Helmreich, op.cit., p. 314.
or, alternatively, military action aimed at crushing the nationalists and compelling Turkey to sign it. Lloyd George seemed "oblivious to all but his vision of a Greek empire doing Britain's work in the Eastern Mediterranean, and fully believed that Greece would undertake a limited campaign that would humble the Kemalists and force the government at Constantinople to sign the Treaty...He dismissed all opposition from within the British government as merely political and of Tory origin, for at this time the ties that held the coalition government together were becoming quite strained especially over the question of Irish home rule" 11/. In the event, Lloyd George's view prevailed, and as soon as the French and the Italians reluctantly agreed, the Greek army was requested by the Supreme Council to restore the peace in the Ismid Peninsula 12/. The Greek offensive began on 22 June 1920 and met with immediate success. By the middle of July, the Greek army had removed all nationalist opposition in the Straits zone and, what was more, pressure on the British garrison at Ismid was relieved.

At this point Venizelos offered the services of the Greek army to crush the nationalists once and for all. However, fears of increased Greek influence in Asia Minor led France and Italy to demand the immediate suspension of operations and the Greek proposal was rejected by the Supreme Council. These spectacular Greek successes soon convinced those who wanted to be convinced that the proposed treaty would be enforced and executed.

Nonetheless, during the Boulogne Conference in July 1920, the issue of lessening the terms of the Treaty was discussed again. After the recent successes at Ismid and the Dardanelles, the question was whether to review the terms of the Treaty and make them less harsh for Turkey so as to secure its implementation, or to insist on the terms already agreed upon by the Allies and leave Greece to impose them by force. Venizelos' firm offer to crush nationalist resistance single handed and to provide the additional troops required for the operations forestalled the revision of the terms decided at San Remo, a fact hailed by the Greek Premier as a major diplomatic victory. Paraskevopoulos, however, did not seem to share Venizelos' optimism. He feared that the boundaries arrived at after the June 1920 offensive were not defensible and argued that Kemal was sure to reject the Treaty. To his mind, the nationalist movement should be crushed there and then by capturing the important railway junctions at Eski Shehir and Afion Karahissar while at the same time pressing towards Ankara and even Konya 13/. Venizelos, though, was convinced that with the support of the

12/ For the origins of this expedition, see CHAPTER TWO, SECTION II.
13/ Greek General Staff, op.cit, ii, app. 27.
British Premier and despite the adverse opinion of his colleagues in the government and his Allies at the Peace Conference, Greece was sure to receive what was due to her. Once the Greek people realized these gains, he believed that they would not voice any objection regarding further mobilization.

However, events subsequent to the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres were to show that he vastly overestimated both the extent of his popular support at home and the capabilities of the Greek military machine. Nonetheless, in August 1920, it seemed that at long last the struggle to conclude the Peace Treaty with Turkey was at an end. What remained to be seen was how and by whom this Treaty would be enforced as the Greek military operations of the summer 1920 had not succeeded in eradicating the nationalists.

Despite the Sublime Porte's announcement that it intended to sign the Treaty, the fall of the Italian government a month earlier and the subsequent denunciation of the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement by the new Italian Premier, caused further complications and impeded the signature of the Treaty. The stalemate was only resolved when Venizelos announced in turn that Greece would refuse to sign the Peace Treaty and, what was most important, to recognize the attached Tripartite Agreement on the partition of Asia Minor into economic spheres of influence. With Lloyd George siding with Venizelos, this would have been a serious setback for both France and Italy as they stood to lose Cilicia and the zone of Adalia respectively. Through these measures, the Allied domination of Turkish economic life which had started with the gradual imposition of the capitulations during the past two centuries, was institutionalized 14/.

On 10 August 1920, nineteen months after the armistice, the Allies signed the Peace Treaty with Turkey at Sèvres. As a result, the nationalist government immediately declared the Turkish signatories of the Treaty "traitors" and Mustafa Kemal issued a proclamation declaring Turkey "in peril" and calling the Turkish people to take up arms for new struggles. The symbolism of Sèvres, home of the most fragile porcelain, was soon appreciated with reference to the Treaty with Turkey. Many agreed with the comment that it constituted "a nineteenth century imperialistic solution to a nineteenth century problem" 15/. According to the terms of the Treaty, the city of Smyrna and its hinterland remained under the suzerainty of Turkey which, however, transferred her sovereign rights to the Greek government (Article 69). Greece became responsible for the administration of the region (Article 70) and for the organization of a local parliament in which all nationalities were to be proportionately represented (Article

14/ Treaty Series (no.12), Tripartite Agreement between the British Empire France and Italy Respecting Anatolia cmd 963, 1920. For further information on this Agreement, see Thompson, op. cit., p.240-41.
After a period of five years, this parliament could by a majority of votes ask the Council of the League of Nations for the definitive incorporation of the zone in the Kingdom of Greece; in its turn, the Council might require a plebiscite to be conducted and, should the results favour Greece, Turkish suzerainty would cease (Article 83). The term "city of Smyrna and its hinterland" referred to an enclave of about 20,000 sq. kilometres inhabited according to Greek sources by 550,000 Greeks, 299,000 Moslems and 92,000 others, a total of 941,000. The particulars regarding the powers and functions of the Greek administration were soon defined by law. The High Commissioner was given ministerial rank and absolute powers within the zone, pending the organization of the parliament. Greek administration seemed to be "firmly established" in Asia Minor.

In Greece very few realized that the signature of the long awaited Treaty signified the continuation of the war. Among them, perhaps Venizelos was the only one in a position to realize the major difficulties its implementation would face, as a result of the harsh terms he had secured and celebrated as a personal diplomatic victory. The only possible solution was a large scale expedition aiming to crush the nationalist movement. He had discussed this on numerous occasions with the Allies but at this point the implementation of such a scheme was vital in view of the upsurge of Turkish nationalism, resulting from the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres. However, this expedition could not be undertaken solely by Greece without, at least, financial aid from the Allies. It soon became obvious that such aid was not forthcoming and Venizelos intimated to Lloyd George that if help was not granted before the winter, he would be forced to order the demobilization of the Greek army in view of political and financial considerations.

Churchill aptly encapsulated the situation:

"At last peace with Turkey: and to ratify it, War with Turkey. However, so far as the Great Allies were concerned, the war was to be fought by proxy. Wars when fought this way by great nations are often very dangerous for the proxy."

In Greece, Venizelos presented the treaty to the Chamber on 7 September 1920, careful to point out that its lasting effects would depend on the capability of the nation to continue the struggle until the peace settlement became permanent. At the same parliamentary session he called for the long overdue elections to be held on 7 November 1920. Unluckily, King Alexander died on 26 October 1920, in the middle of the electoral campaign, thus bringing forward the

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16/ Poincaré, R. Histoire Politique, i, p.264.
17/ GGG, Series A,i, Law 2493/10.9.20.
18/ FO 406/44/no 183/20.9.20.
20/ Markezinis, op.cit., iv, p.310.
21/ GGG, series A, i, 11/24.9.20.
issue of the throne once again and changing the basic issue of the election to "Venizelos versus Constantine".

In Smyrna, polling day on 14 November 1920 passed without incident. The venizelist feelings of the majority of the population were well known and so was the liberal affiliation of most officers and commanders at divisional level. Surprisingly, in a sudden change of fortune "which resembled the apex of an Aeschylean tragedy", the Phileleftheri lost the elections and their leader was not even reelected as a member of parliament 22/. Venizelos informed Stergiadis and Paraskevopoulos of the loss of the election and pleaded with the High Commissioner to remain in his position 23/. As soon as the venizelist defeat became known in the city, soldiers flooded the Quai holding pictures of Constantine and olive branches, the symbol of the royalist coalition. No officer seemed able to impose order and clashes with the population were sure to follow. The firm attitude displayed by the High Commissioner towards alarmist rumours and the provocative stance of some royalist officers soon defused the explosive situation and demonstrated that no change had taken place in Greek policies 24/.

Despite Venizelos' pleas, when the Rallis government was sworn in and Queen Mother Olga was appointed Regent, Stergiadis submitted his resignation. However, he was requested to continue offering "his most valuable services to the nation" 25/. General Paraskevopoulos lost his commission and General Papoulas, the new Commander in Chief of the Greek forces in Asia Minor, arrived in Smyrna on 4 December 1920 to an enthusiastic reception. He was believed to be the only General capable of uniting royalist and venizelist troops under his command and reestablishing the much needed peace within the army. From a foreign policy point of view, however, Papoulas was not the best choice as the French considered him responsible for the events that took place in November 1916, when one hundred, or so, French marines fell during the Allied blockade of Athens 26/.

In the meantime, although the full effects of the change were not felt in Asia Minor, the difficulties encountered by the new government on the diplomatic front

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22/ Pentzopoulos, _op.cit._, p.29. For a detailed treatment of the electoral campaign and the elections, Smith, _op.cit._, pp. 138ff.
23/ Rodas, _op.cit._, p.189.
24/ Information about the movement of troops to that end, on Paraskevopoulos orders is given in GGS, _op.cit._, ii, pp.265-68. Also, in his _Memoirs_, p.283, Mazarakis suggests that Pangalos was preparing a coup in case Venizelos lost the elections.
25/ MOFA 22g tel. no. 14730/19.11.20, Stergiadis to the Regent and tel. no. 14731/20.11.20, Rallis to Stergiadis.
echoed loudly in Smyrna. The venizelist electoral defeat and
King Alexander's death had opened the way for the return of
Constantine. A plebiscite to decide the question was called
for 18 December against a background of repeated declarations
by the new government to the effect that there would be no
change in Greek foreign policy and an amnesty would be granted
to all political offenders.

Nevertheless, it was soon apparent that the French
wished not only to prevent the return of the ex-King or,
ailing this, to punish the Greeks should they recall him, but
also to take this opportunity to improve their standing in
Turkey by insisting on the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres
27/. The British General Staff advised the British government
to readjust its policy in the Near East with a drastic
revision of the territorial terms of the Treaty with regard to
Smyrna because, it was claimed, it had become unsafe to rely
upon the Greek army to cover the Allied positions in Turkey
28/. On 26 November 1920, during the next session of the
Council in London, the French suggested that Constantine
should not be allowed to return to Greece, urged that Smyrna
be given nothing but local autonomy under Turkish suzerainty
and made it clear that France would not ratify the Treaty
before it was renegotiated. As a result of French pressure,
two Notes were to be handed to the Greek government, one
declaring that Constantine's reinstatement to the throne would
be considered as the Greek people's endorsement of his
hostile attitude towards the Allies during the War, and the
other that all Allied financial support would be withheld from
Greece 29/. On the eve of the plebiscite, the Allied Ministers
at Athens handed a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
declaring that should the Greek people opt for the return of
Constantine the Allied powers reserved for themselves the
right to settle the arising issues as they saw fit 30/.  

Harold Nicolson who advocated that the British should
support Constantine despite French and Italian determination
to renegotiate the Treaty of Sèvres on the pretext of his
return, commented:
"The idea which prompted our support for Greece
was no emotional impulse but the natural expression
of our historical policy: the protection of India
and the Suez canal...Geographically the position of
Greece was unique for our purpose: politically she

27/ DBFP, xii, no 438, conversation between Crowe and
P.Cambon on 19.11.20. On the French suggestions for the
renegotiation of the Treaty, DBFP, viii, p.816, Minutes of the
Supreme Council session in London (26.11.20). Smith, op.cit.,
p.162.
28/ Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 23.11.20,
29/ For the texts of the Notes, DBFP,xii, no 457, 2.12.20 and
no 436, 5.12.20.
30/ DBFP, xii, no 451, 4.12.20, Granville to Curzon.
was strong enough to save us expense in peace and weak enough to be completely subservient in war. The Treaty of Sévres was thus an immense asset had it succeeded" 31/.

Despite the King's declaration on his arrival in Athens that he was to work towards a better understanding with the Allies, it was clear that events in Greece in conjunction with the growing strength of the nationalists and the urgent Allied need to conclude peace with Turkey, undermined Greek ambitions in Asia Minor severely 32/. Clearly, the laments and distress expressed in Europe following Venizelos' defeat were in the main insincere as it was obvious that the change of regime in Greece and Constantine's return to the throne would serve the interests of the European financial circles and their respective governments by providing the excuse for them to implement policies very different from those that had dictated their brotherhood in arms and, to a large degree, the Treaty of Sévres as a manifestation of these policies. France and Italy could now openly negotiate a new system of capitulations with the nationalists while Britain would be free to implement the plans for the Arab federation which would contribute towards British preponderance in the Near East.

The successive Greek cabinets following the November 1920 elections could be criticized for errors of military tactics and strategy but, in the sphere of foreign policy, no mistakes seem to have been committed from the Allied point of view. Greek leaders made strong efforts to clarify what they believed to be misunderstandings shading their relations with the Allies and on many occasions manifested their wish to follow the foreign policy of their predecessors. They went to great pains to convince the Allies that by voting against Venizelos, the Greek people had voted only against his domestic policies, claiming that Venizelos had not been constitutionally elected in 1917 but had been imposed by a coup which was never endorsed by the Greek people. On the issue of Greek foreign policy, the line followed by Venizelos was only the reflection of the feelings of the nation which, it was concluded, no ruler of Greece, whether King or Prime Minister, could defy 33/.

Meanwhile, the nationalist movement was gaining momentum and was openly contesting the right of the Allies to determine the fate of Turkey. By January 1921, Kemal was demanding no less than the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor and the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over all parts of the Ottoman Empire. It was evident that a revision of the Treaty of Sévres was on the cards and, in an effort to resolve the stalemate, a conference was called for February 1921 in London, to which representatives from Athens, Constantinople and Ankara were summoned by the Allies.

31/ DBFP, xii, no 488, Nicolson's memorandum dated 20.12.20.
32/ Anderson op.cit., p.369.
33/ MOFA 41a, memorandum n.n,/n.d., signed by D.Dracoulis of the Press Office.
By that time, conditions in Greece changed rapidly as the issues that were to transform the Asia Minor expedition to the Asia Minor embroilment came to the surface. As the London Conference was approaching, Venizelos from self-exile offered his advice: Greece had to choose between the abdication of Constantine with Prince George succeeding him, and the shortening of the military front to cover an area larger than the one foreseen by the treaty of Sèvres but requiring only 3 divisions for its protection according to his calculations. Although in retrospect this solution may seem attractive, its military drawbacks were numerous. Therefore, as Venizelos suggested, there was a need to review the initial line. The new lines put forward, however, tended to revoke all plans for withdrawal and defensive tactics because each one of them was subsequently discarded as unrealistic for military purposes and a new, longer one, was proposed.

This dilemma was present even before the operations of the summer 1920 and what brought it to the fore in January 1921 was the adverse set of circumstances facing Greece in the diplomatic, military and economic field. Moreover, the vision of the Megali Idea had contributed to the creation of an atmosphere overcharged with nationalism which compelled public opinion to reject the Venizelos' proposal for withdrawal without second thought. A major reason behind this stance of the public in Greece was that throughout the 1919-1922 period a complete absence of public information was noted and both the press and the declarations of the various governments played an important part in keeping the public in the dark or providing it with false information.

During the London Conference, Lloyd George urged the Greek delegation to show a conciliatory stance and accept a partial revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. Such a stance, it was argued, would compel the Allies to support Greece in case of Turkish refusal to accept the new terms. This British line of thought clearly provided London with the opportunity either to find a solution of compromise with Ankara to the detriment of Greek positions in Asia Minor, or to impose the Treaty of Sèvres through a successful Greek offensive that would not cost the Allies a penny. However, in the minds of the Greek delegation, this equivocal stance of Lloyd George tantamounted to British sanctioning of renewed Greek military operations in Asia Minor which, in turn, signified future active help.

In view of substantial changes in French and Italian foreign policy orientations, the London Conference soon lost its importance. The first few meetings were spent in the discussion of controversial population statistics, whereupon the French and Italian delegations proposed that an Interallied Commission of Inquiry should examine the issue with view to revoking the Greek mandate should the results of

34/ IEE op.cit, pp. 166 ff.
its research prove that there was no Greek majority in the Smyrna zone 35/. The scheme was outwardly rejected by Greece on the grounds that during the undetermined period of time required for the completion of the inquiry, military operations would be suspended thus giving the opportunity to the Nationalists to conclude their separate negotiations with the French regarding the evacuation of Cilicia and to concentrate all their military resources on the Greek front. What decided the issue though, was the realization on the Allied side that such an inquiry would form a precedent for reconsidering issues already decided upon by the Supreme Council. This precedent could be likely to promote efforts already under way for the reconsideration of the Versailles Treaty with Germany 36/.

On 12 March 1921, a further set of proposals for the revision of the Treaty was submitted by the Allies. This time the proposed modifications essentially amounted to the whittling down of the Greek claims 37/. Complying to what they thought were British soundings, the Greek representation, including Gounaris who had in the meantime joined them, accepted the Allied proposals but, at the same time, expressed strong reservations which amounted to partial rejection. On his side, the nationalist representative, Bekir Sami Bey, felt obliged to return to Ankara for consultations before making any commitment. Thus, no significant progress was made and, at the end of March 1921, hostilities were resumed 38/. In fact, it seems that the only positive result from the Conference came from the contacts made by the Turks mainly with the French, which ultimately led France to be the first of the Allies to break the solid front and recognize the Ankara government 39/. The Allies had not been able to preserve a common policy regarding the Eastern Question. While the French and the Italians ventured to conclude separate agreements

35/ For the conversations related to the proposal for an Allied inquiry into the nationality question in Asia Minor and Thrace, see DBFP, vol. XV, nos. 22, 23, 24.
36/ For the dropping of the scheme see DBFP, vol. XV, nos. 32 and 33. As a point of reference, it should be mentioned that the Turkish side claimed that the Turks amounted to 75% or roughly 1,250,000 out of 1,500,000 in the vilayet of Aidin and the non-Greeks to 57% in the Smyrna city. On the Greek side, Gounarakis put the pre-war population of the Treaty of Sèvres zone at 548,000 Greeks and 390,000 Turks and the post-war population at 460,000 Greeks and 450,000 Turks. Also see The Times, 25.2.21.
37/ For comments in extenso, see The Times, 14.3.21.
38/ For the Greek offensive of spring 1921, (23.3.21-2.4.21), see Rodas, op.cit, p. 175ff.
39/ ibid.
with the Nationalists, the British came to realize that a Greek collapse would present not only a military but also a political problem of great magnitude since a resuscitation of the Ottoman Empire would threaten the British position in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt and India. Further, British observers suggested, it seemed that the policy of Ankara was to thrust France and Britain apart and to appease each sufficiently to deter them from assisting Greece 40/. The Turko-Soviet agreement of friendship and cooperation which was signed on 18 March 1921 but dated 16 March 1921 to commemorate the first anniversary of the Allied military occupation of Constantinople, strengthened such arguments. Neither the symbolism of the date nor the significance of the agreement itself were lost by the Entente observers.

In the meantime, the combination of British indirect instigation and the rebuff of the London Conference had decided the issue of the Greek advance. During its course, the Greek army met with its first check which, although not very important from a military point of view, was to have severe psychological consequences on the morale of the troops. What was more, it seemed by now clear that the government's policy regarding the Asia Minor war had reached a deadend. As a result, Calogeros' resignation followed suit and on 8 April 1921, D. Gounaris became Prime Minister. The new cabinet was soon attacked fiercely in Parliament for its handling of the national question and the circumstances of the army.

On 11 June, King Constantine left Athens for Smyrna, accompanied by the Crown Prince and Gounaris. His presence there rendered impossible the abandonment of the offensive in spite of Allied pressure, and, by 15 June 1921, the Greek army reached Sivrihisar, only 60 miles from Ankara. As a result of a very short Anglo-French lune de miel, fresh attempts at mediation were made by the Allies at the end of June, and Greece was requested to place its interests in the hands of the Allies 41/. However, with the impressions of the recent successful offensive still fresh, the Greek government refused the offer. "Any adjournment of the operations would compromise the situation to the disadvantage of Greece and the encouragement of enemy resistance" 42/. Still, the Allied representatives in Athens seemed convinced that after their initial successes and the attainment of the line Afion Karahissar - Eski Shehir - Kioutahia, the Greeks would accept mediation 43/.

40/ FO E 6895/1/44, 14.6.21, Rattigan to Curzon.
41/ FO E 7152/143/44, 21.6.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon.
42/ Text of British note and Greek reply were officially published in The Times, 27.6.21. FO E 8463/143/44, 21.7.21, Granville to Curzon.
43/ FO E 7371/143/44, 27.6.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon.
In the meantime, Nationalist intransigence intensified. In July 1921, Kemal sought a meeting with General Harrington, Head of the Allied forces in Constantinople. On the General's agreement for the meeting, the Nationalist leader insisted that the Allied representative should go and meet him at Inebol where he would be welcome provided he accepted that the basis for all negotiations would be the complete liberation of the Turkish national territory and total independence of this territory in the fields of finance, economy, education and jurisprudence. If General Harrington intended merely to initiate an exchange of views, then Kemal would not meet him himself but would appoint one of his aids for this purpose. The Head of the High Commission at the time reported to London that he had stressed to the Porte how preposterous he considered the nationalist stance and added that the Kemalists appeared "to have taken leave of their senses" in formulating such a demand. Curzon did not seem to agree with Rattigan's estimation of the situation and replied: "Question raised by reply of M. Kemal is really one for Cabinet decision and ought not to be prejudiced by local action" 44/.

During the Third Allied Conference in Paris in August 1921, the Allies reaffirmed their strict neutrality, at the same time stipulating that private firms should be permitted to conclude arms deals with both belligerents 45/. Lloyd George finally faced up to the facts and announced that the Treaty of Sèvres "had been torn up" 46/. Still, the British government could not see its way to taking a firm stance: "Our view is that we can no longer intervene to prevent military supplies reaching the Nationalists nor, on the other hand, deny the Greeks the right of search and blockade" 47/. Far from favouring Greece, this new scheme brought to the fore the question regarding Greek rights of search and seizure, which the Italians and the French refused to recognize on the grounds that "relations between Allies and Greece were abnormal and that they were therefore absolved from a strict interpretation of the neutrality which they had proclaimed" 48/. Despite British protests, large amounts of military supplies reached Ankara from Western Europe while, in view of her financial difficulties, Greece was in a precarious position. By the end of summer 1921, with the Allies declaring their determination to observe strict neutrality between the two parties, the momentum of the Greek offensive was exhausted and the Greek army was in a serious position.

44/ DBFP, vol. xvii, nos. 291, 292, 293.
47/ FO E 9662/143/44, 28.8.21, Curzon to Rumbold.
Far from the iambic cries of June, the general tone of the press indicated that mediation would be welcome 49/. At this juncture it was thought that a British proposal of combined Allied mediation based on the evacuation of Asia Minor by Greece was in the wings and the Turks seemed prepared to discuss it. However, it seems that this opportunity was compromised by advice deliberately supplied to Ankara from the Quai d'Orsay suggesting that "it would be a false step for the nationalists to demand European intervention and that the weariness of the Greek army would finally compel Greece to accept European mediation on terms more favourable to the Turks than it would now accept" 50/.

Meanwhile, in August 1921, Granville suggested to London that time for negotiations was ripe and requested authority to give Gounaris a hint to that effect 51/. He further impressed upon his government that a Greek defeat would be a serious setback for the Entente and advocated that Britain should render Greece moral and material assistance 52/. However, Curzon considered the moment inopportune for negotiations and suggested that Gounaris should go to London in the middle of October 53/.

The conclusion of the Franklin Bouillon agreement with Ankara in October 1921 could not but worsen the situation. For Greece, it represented the most adverse diplomatic event of the year as it rendered the Nationalists free to concentrate their forces along the Greek military front. It also underlined the complete isolation of Greece which could hope only for a very limited help from the British. Despite these grim prospects, in October 1921, Gounaris left for Paris, London and Rome in an effort to find a way out of the deadlock 54/. The Greek delegation arrived in London in late October, after two rather disappointing meetings with Briand in Paris, during which it was stated in no uncertain terms that the only way out for Greece would be to consider evacuation 55/. Further, Curzon suggested that Greece should place her interests in the hands of the Powers who would undertake to find a solution 56/. This was agreed to and on 2 November

49/ FO E 11071/143/44, 5.10.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon. 50/The Times, 10.10.21, quoting Nabi Bey. 51/ FO E 9516/143/44, 20.8.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon. 52/ FO E 10939/143/44, 23.9.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon. 53/ FO E 11096/143/44, 7.10.21, Curzon's Memorandum. 54/ On the Paris meetings: FO E 11620/143/44, 21.10.21, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon. FO E 11621/143/44, 21.10.21, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon. FO E 11834/143/44, 27.10.21, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon. 55/ FO E 12734/143/44, 19.11.21, "Minutes of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office between the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston and Greek Representatives". FO E 12728/143/44, 19.11.21, Curzon to Paris and Rome. FO E 13179/143/44, 21.11.21, Curzon to Paris and Rome. 56/ FO E 12088/143/44, 2.11.21, Curzon to Paris and Rome, announcing Greek acceptance of Allied mediation.
1921, Greece formally accepted Allied mediation on the sole condition that the Entente would undertake the protection of the Christian minorities after the evacuation of the Greek troops 57/.

Another pressing matter on Gounaris' agenda was that of contracting a loan in the London free market. If Greece was to continue the war effort until peace could be secured, then a loan was essential because the Greek treasury was almost exhausted 58/. In late December 1921, the British government gave its consent to the assignment of security by Greece to a loan to be raised in Britain up to £15 million, as much as possible of which was "to be expended in Great Britain on British goods" 59/. Despite jubilation in Athens, this agreement did not constitute the raising of the financial blockade imposed in December 1920, nor did it imply that the British government were prepared to hand out financial assistance to Greece 60/. As negotiations with the City and Greek reserves diminished, Gounaris urged the Foreign Office to mediate as, if loan negotiations broke down, Greece would have to evacuate Asia Minor without waiting for the conclusion of a general Near Eastern settlement 61/. However, whatever meagre chances there were for the contraction of the loan, seem to have been compromised by the French who were reported to be doing all they could to prevent it 62/.

Indeed, it seemed that the situation was getting desperate. On 28 February 1922, Gounaris, still in London, authorized his colleagues in Athens to proceed immediately

57/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 431 and 449.
58/ FO C 23804/60/19, 22.12.21, Bentnick (Athens) to Curzon, reporting the grave financial situation of the Greek government which, although incapable of raising a loan, was nevertheless trying to pay British debts.
59/ FO C 24060/60/19, 23.12.21, Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with the Greek Chargé d'Affaires. FO C 24179/60/19, 30.12.21, Bentnick (Athens) to Curzon. FO C 24179/60/19, 3.1.22, Curzon to Bentnick (Athens).
60/ FO C 24179/60/19, 30.12.21, Bentnick (Athens) to Curzon.
61/ FO E 1900/5/44, 17.2.21, Curzon to Lindley (Athens).
with such measures preliminary to withdrawal as they considered necessary and requested an urgent audience with Lloyd George in the hope of convincing him to mediate for the floating of the loan 63/. This audience was not granted and the Greek Prime Minister left London. To his grim note of 15 February, Curzon noted that as there seemed little prospect of a Greek loan, he hoped that the Greek military position in Anatolia was less critical than the note of Gounaris suggested and that, in view of the Greek failure to raise the loan, a diplomatic solution must be sought. Obviously, this approach excluded the possibility of a hasty Greek evacuation which would place the Powers in a very difficult position 64/.

True enough, reports from British sources on the spot, warned that a hurried Greek evacuation of Asia Minor would be fraught with serious consequences for the British position in the Near East and would render a peaceful settlement on terms other than the National Pact almost impossible. "No stone should be left unturned to deter the Greeks from evacuating Asia Minor precipitately...and every effort should be made to accelerate a general settlement of which the eventual evacuation of Asia Minor would form part" 65/. Clearly, though, it would not be easy to induce the Greeks to hold on to Asia Minor in the interests of a settlement under which they would be later asked to evacuate the area unconditionally.

It therefore followed that the Greek army could neither take the offensive nor withdraw from Asia Minor in exchange for a British promise to convene an Interallied Conference as soon as possible. However, Greece had been expecting this move since November 1921 when she had accepted a priori, in principle and unconditionally the Allied peace proposals. With no other options open, Gounaris agreed to do just that 66/.

63/ FO E 2588/5/44, 1.3.21, Letter from the Greek Chargé d'Affaires to Vansittart, communicating letter of 27.2.22, from Gounaris to Lloyd George who later claimed that he had never seen this desperate letter. DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 544, note 3. 52 H.L. Deb. 5s. cols. 337-40.
64/ FO E 2471/5/44, 6.3.22, Curzon to Gounaris. This document was to arouse much discussion both in Britain and in Greece during the trial of Gounaris.
65/ FO E 1547/5/44, 9.2.22, Memorandum by Ryan, respecting the Evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek troops.
66/ FO E 745/5/44, Note of conversation held at the Villa Valetta, Cannes, between Lloyd George, Curzon and Gounaris on 12.1.22.
At the same time, it was by now clear that the Turks would settle for no less than the evacuation of Asia Minor by Greece 67/. There was little chance that the Allies could agree to this, as it would create an impossible situation for their immediate concerns in Turkey because, with Greece out of the way, Kemal would be free to dictate his terms. For the Allies, the primary necessity was obviously the conclusion of an armistice which would give them time to manoeuvre and secure their interests without further compromising Greece and the Christian minorities and with the ability to use the Greek army again, should the need arise. In the meantime, Gounaris was pressing for immediate aid and was threatened to order immediate evacuation. If Britain considered the presence of the Greek army vital for the maintenance of British or general Allied interests, then she should contribute towards the costs of the expedition. Curzon, however, concluded that although a Greek evacuation would amount to a serious threat for the British positions along the Straits, it would not be implemented by the Greek government for the simple reason that the desertion of populations forced to seek refuge in Greece would create internal problems much more serious than the fall of the government or the abdication of Constantine. Clearly, not much headway had been made since the London Conference of March 1921 and the prospects for the future were rather bleak 68/. Meanwhile, the Turkish position remained unchanged: their government was "always ready to compromise", but, if the British government departed too far from the Turkish desiderata, a solution was impossible 69/.

It was against this grim background that on 22 March 1922 the long overdue conversations between the Allied Foreign Ministers started in Paris 70/. As a prerequisite to a peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor, Lord Curzon proposed the immediate cessation of hostilities and the subsequent retirement of the Greek forces in stages that would last up to five months. In the event, the Allied proposal was formulated to include a renewable armistice period of three months, until the belligerents had come to an agreement as to the general peace terms. With reference to the minorities' issue,

67/ FO E 3001/5/44, 18.3.22, Memorandum of an Interview between Lord Curzon and Yusuf Kemal Bey.
68/ ibid.
69/ FO E 3001/5/44, 19.3.22, Memorandum of an Interview between Lord Curzon and Izzet Pasha.
70/ For the minutes and resolutions taken during the Conversations in Paris between British, French, and Italian Representatives, March 22-6, 1922, see DBFP, vol. XVII, Chapter IV. An interesting interpretation of the meetings is given by Toynbee, op. cit., p. 106, where these conversations, far from underlining the struggle between France and Britain, are interpreted as the first evidence of a genuine determination on the part of the powers "to act in unison and impartiality".
a lengthy discussion resulted in transferring the responsibility for the protection of the Asia Minor Christians to commissioners to be appointed by the League of Nations.

The conversations continued until 26 March 1922 and ended with a text of resolutions of the Conference regarding the programme of evacuation of Asia Minor, the minorities, Armenia, Thrace, the demilitarized zones in Europe, Asia and the Islands, the Turkish armed forces, the Capitulations and related financial issues 71/. These points were considered by the Allies as part and parcel of the Near Eastern settlement and, as they included crucial issues such as those of the Straits and the Capitulations, they were not willing to give way to the Nationalist demands for unconditional Greek evacuation. The Allied proposal entailed the following steps: a. Immediate conclusion of Armistice between Greeks and Turks, b. Retreat of both armies to a line 10 kilometres behind their present lines of occupation. c. Prohibition of movement of army units to or from the military front. d. Observance of the implementation of these measures by an interallied commission. e. The Armistice would initially last for three months. During these three months, the peace proposals would be submitted to be followed by the evacuation of the Greek army. This step would be followed by the elaboration of the preliminary peace conditions and the final peace treaty 72/. Far from any thoughts of immediate evacuation, the Allies demanded that the Greek army remained in full force in Asia Minor 73/.

In Greece, these proposals were met with surprise and indignation, public opinion was strongly against them and the press reacted violently 74/. The British Representative in Athens had advised London that as soon as the Allied proposals were known in detail, regular panic would ensue together with a general exodus "of frenzied inhabitants who would achieve destruction of Greece" 75/. It was clear that the Greek government could neither accept these proposals without causing popular revolt, nor refuse to accept them. The reply of Ankara delivered Athens from the dilemma. Kemal rejected the proposals outwardly not by refusing to accept the general terms but by demanding changes in the procedure for their

71/ FO E 3512/5/44, Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d' Orsay at 9.45 p.m., March 26, 1922.
FO E 5774/5/44, Text of Resolutions &c., of the Paris Near Eastern Conference of March 1922 as Finally Agreed upon between French and British Governments.
72/ FO E 3274/5/44, Minutes of the First Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d' Orsay at 1.30 p.m., March 22, 1923.
Greece was quick to indicate that her favourable answer to Allied proposals for the armistice should be expected. FO E 3509/5/44, Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d' Orsay at 3 p.m., March 25, 1922.
73/ FO E 3372/5/44, 28.3.22, Lindley (Athens) to Curzon.
74/ See Greek newspapers between 26 March and 3 April 1922.
75/ FO E 3418/5/44, 29.3.22, Lindley to Curzon.
implementation. He demanded the immediate evacuation following the conclusion of the armistice on the grounds that the Greek army would attempt a full scale attack against Ankara, during its three-month duration.

With Ankara's rejection of the Allied proposals, six whole months of expectation of a diplomatic solution to the military deadend following the Sakkariya retreat, six whole months of Greek inactivity in Asia Minor with disastrous effects on the morale of the army and the finances of the state, came to nothing 76/. Poincaré seemed set to send delegates to Ismid to enter into unspecified pourparlers préparatoires with the nationalists on their own ground and urged the other Allies to do the same as this course of action seemed to offer the best chances for an eventual settlement 77/. In the meantime, Greek finances had dwindled and despite the forced internal loan contracted earlier in the year by cutting the bank notes in two pieces, the state revenues were barely enough for the maintenance of the army and the implementation of the evacuation until October 1922.

With the Nationalists now pressing for the evacuation of the advanced strategic position held by the Greeks along the Afion Karahisar - Eski Sehir railway line within 15 days of the armistice, it was obvious that their continued correspondence with the Allies was intended for purposes both of propaganda and, what was worse, procrastination 78/. Clearly, it would not be easy to find "an honourable exit from the present deplorable impasse" and by May 1922, the main question that seemed to preoccupy Allied correspondence was at whose door the responsibility for the eventual breakdown of negotiations would be laid 79/. For Greece, the sands were really running out. With the rapid succession of cabinets and the forced loan, the forecasts of the British Representative in Athens were quite gloomy 80/. With the French determined to conclude peace with Kemal at all costs and the Italians eager to secure economic advantages in Turkey, it was not surprising that the Nationalists became more intractable daily

76/ FO E 3677/5/44, 5.4.22, Rumbold... FO E 3718/5/44, 7.4.22, Curzon to Paris and Rome: "On the other hand it is conceivable that the evacuation might begin before expiration of the three months if in the meanwhile the body of the conditions of peace had been accepted".
77/ FO E 4465/5/44, 1.5.22, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon. At this point it was announced that M. Kemal himself would be willing to go to Ismid.
78/ FO E 4853/5/44, 10.5.22, Curzon to Paris.
79/ ibid. On the same issue, FO E 4987/5/44, 18.5.22, Curzon to Constantinople. FO E 5299/5/44, 23.5.22, Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon.
80/ FO E 5499/5/44, 20.5.22, Lindley (Athens) to Curzon. A few days later, on 23.5.22, G. Hadjianestis assumed the Command of the army in place of Papoulas who resigned.
and, by the end of May 1922, no hope could be entertained of bringing Ankara to accept the Paris proposals through diplomatic procedures 81/.

The French attitude had driven Curzon to the point of exasperation, at which he even contemplated independent action to be decided by a convention of the signatories of the original Treaty of Sèvres:

"My view of the case is that we should decline to be shuffled or squeezed or shouldered out of the Paris agreement letter by the tactics of Angora or the disloyalty of M. Poincaré...But when we know, as we do, that M. Poincaré is secretly promising the Turks his assistance and telling them that the Paris terms will never be enforced, and when we collate this knowledge with the proposal to hold a meeting on a French ship with a French Chairman, -we can have little doubt in our own minds....that what M. Poincaré is really after is a rupture, the responsibility for which can be laid upon us " 82/.

What seemed sinister was a belated French effort to convince the British that the nationalists would not, in the end, be so intractable as might be imagined and that the French were still adhering to the Paris proposals which they were eager to see implemented 83/. However, the scope behind these renewed declarations of Allied unity was not lost in London. Crowe minuted on 21 June 22:

"I wish I could believe in the sincerity of the French declaration that they mean to stand by the conditions agreed upon at the Paris conference but I cannot...Our secret information leaves little doubt that the object of the present French move is to force Great Britain to concede more favourable terms to Turkey, at British expense, France being compensated by obtaining special favours from Turkey, financial & railway concessions, monopolies, control of the gendarmerie etc., etc...My belief is that the immediate object of the French govt. is to delay a settlement, and meanwhile to supply Angora with a constant supply of arms & ammunition so that after a certain time, no armistice

81/ FO E 5314/5/44, 20.5.22, Letter from Sir E. Crowe to the Italian Ambassador. FO E 5299/5/44, 22.5.22, Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon. Even the British High Commissioner at Constantinople who, at the beginning, rejected the Ismid scheme, seemed now to have come to terms with it.
82/ FO E 5299/5/44, 23.5.22, Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon.
83/ FO E 6136/5/44, 17.6.22, Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Balfour.
having been concluded, the Turks will have sufficiently strengthened their position to be able to undertake another move forward against the Greeks" 84/.

Further, because of persistent rumours that Athens was trying to establish direct channels of negotiation with Ankara, a course totally disagreeable to the Allies, it was felt that it would be very difficult to compel the Greek government to conform to the Paris proposals without threat of force 85/. By now Britain was determined not to allow Greece to evacuate or withdraw to new lines on her own accord "as any withdrawal without previous agreement would react on Allies" 86/. Athens was by now exasperated as it had become even more impossible to continue acting in the uncertainty dictated by the Allied policies and practices. Lindley warned London that he would not be surprised by a sudden decision of the government to pull out of Asia Minor and throw the responsibility for the desertion of the Christian population on the Allies. He also hinted that Greek troops might be allowed to occupy Constantinople in the event of British withdrawal, subsequent to a Greek evacuation of Asia Minor 87/.

According to Curzon, the only course available dictated that the Allies should formally assure each other that they intended to adhere to the Paris conversations throughout the preliminary conference and should present a united front on this basis. They should also agree to implement the usual rules of international maritime law thus enabling the Greek government to exercise its right to visit and search private merchantmen carrying contraband of war to the nationalists. If this last point were not agreed upon it would not be just to condemn such action by the Greek government as the bombardment of Samsoun 88/. The accepted principle of international law was that neutral traders may at their own risk sell war material to a belligerent, but the belligerent had the right to prevent this operation by searching neutral vessels for contraband and confiscating it when found 89/.

British insistence that this rule be implemented may seemed quite odd if examined under the umbrella of British efforts not to disrupt the Allied united front by hook or crook. However, in spite of invoking "principles of vital importance" in the official correspondence with Paris, a

84/ ibid.
85/ FO E 5986/5/44, 16.6.22, Lindley to Balfour.
86/ DBFP, vol. xvii, p. 873, n. 3.
87/ FO E 6602/5/4, 23.6.22, Lindlay to Balfour.
88/ FO E 6767/5/44, 7.7.22, Lord Hardinge to Balfour. The French and Italian refusal to grant the right of seizure and search to Greece was repeated during a "desultory conversation".
89/ FO E 6767/5/44, 14.7.22, Balfour to Lord Hardinge.
private letter addressed by Sir E. Crowe to Lord Hardinge on 14 July, is quite illuminating:

"You should point out verbally to M. Poincaré that quite apart from the juridical aspect of the matter...the course of action pursued by the French [in providing Kemal with weapons] might put the Turks in a position to menace us very gravely in Irak; and that such neglect of our interests on the part of an Ally would be tantamount to an unfriendly act. As it may be necessary to publish our despatch, Lord Balfour thinks it preferable not to embody the foregoing in our official instructions to you, but to leave it to you to mention it orally when acting on them 90/.

Nonetheless, the French reply stressed that the application of the right of seizure and search on French and Italian ships would only result in the Turks obtaining their weapons from the Soviets and, therefore, being forced to come to terms with them at the expense of Western interests.

Meanwhile, the preparatory discussions on the proposed preliminary meeting seemed to last forever especially as now the preliminary meeting was to be preceded by an interallied conference for which the date had not been fixed and at which the nationalists seemed very keen to participate without having made any commitments as regards the Allied proposals of Paris 91/. With preliminary negotiations to decide the preliminary meeting continuing, in Greece people were clamouring for peace and it was now certain that what financial resources there were, would dwindle by September or October 92/. Clearly, there could be no talk of the Greek army remaining in Asia Minor but, equally, the Allies seemed reluctant or unable to authorize its evacuation or, even, its withdrawal. By July, the war was costing the country ten million drachmas a day and Stergiadis was suggesting as the only way out the creation of an autonomous zone under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

While Stergiadis' proposals were being discussed in Athens, the British Army Council had no difficulty in obtaining "clear and unimpeachable evidence" that the French were trafficking Turkish war material under Allied control and General Harrington warned London that should the Greeks be allowed to withdraw into the proposed zone, the southern shore of Marmara in the Mudania - Brusa area would fall under nationalist occupation, on the flank of the British troops 93/. Meanwhile, as a result of the deadend facing the Greek army after the Sakkaria retreat, a Greek advance from the

90/ FO E 6767/5/44, 14.7.22, Balfour to Lord Hardinge.
91/ FO E 6798/5/44, 7.7.22, Henderson to Balfour.
92/ FO E 6800/5/44, 7.7.22, Lindley to Balfour.
line of Chataltza in Eastern Thrace to Constantinople seemed to be the only option open to Athens. In May 1922, the Greek newspapers started pressing for the implementation of the scheme. The government, though, continued to be bound by the a priori acceptance of the Allied terms and was reluctant to make such a major, unilateral move. When, however, the end of July came and there was no sign either of an interallied conference in London or a preliminary conference elsewhere, Athens reluctantly had resolved to bring matters to a head and reassert the liberty of action renounced when the Greek case was placed in the hands of the Allies. In the first weeks of July, successive crown councils resolved to request Allied permission to resume freedom of action, to return that is to the situation prevailing before Greece placed her interests in the hands of the Entente. At this point, information from a number of sources indicated that Greek forces in Thrace had been reinforced by three divisions from Asia Minor and the possibility of a coup against Constantinople could not be excluded. In Athens, on his announcement that in the face of Allied inability Greece was obliged to consider the best measures to put an end to the conflict, the Foreign Minister was advised by Lindley that an advance to Constantinople would not be tolerated and that it would be resisted by Allied forces of occupation, an eventuality which would entail the most serious consequences for Greece.

Nonetheless, the Greek government declared its conviction that only the occupation of Constantinople would bring about the conclusion of peace and on 29 July requested the Allies to give the necessary orders to the occupying troops not to contest the advance of the Greek army. Unluckily for Greece there seemed to be no force in the country willing to take the risk of such an operation and, as soon as Balfour expressed his astonishment that such a move could have been contemplated, the government rushed to declare that on no account would the Greek forces enter the neutral zone without Allied consent. During the night of 31 July 1922, a telegram from Athens to the Constantinople High Commission, ordered the cancellation of the operation and General Harrington soon arrived at Rodosto to observe the implementation of the orders from Athens. Meanwhile, the Constantinople Interallied Military Command had received orders to repel by force every military movement directed against the zone occupied by the Allies.

94/ FO E 7463/27/44, 27.7.22, Henderson to Balfour.
95/ FO E 7471/5/44, 27.7.22, Bentick to Balfour. FO E 7484/5/44, 27.7.22, Mr. Bentick to Balfour. FO E 7472/27/44, 28.7.22, Balfour to Bentick.
96/ FO E 7517/5/44, 29.7.22, Bentick to Balfour.
97/ FO E 7517/5/44, 29.7.22, Balfour to Bentick. FO E 7519/5/44, 30.7.22, Bentick to Balfour.
98/ FO E 7522/5/44, 30.7.22, Bentick to Balfour.
99/ FO E 7600/5/44, 31.7.22, Bentick to Balfour.
As the Greek government was no longer in a position to defray the costs of a war it was forced to continue mainly because of British insistence that the army should not be evacuated before the nationalists should agree to a general settlement in Turkey, Athens renewed their request to London to mediate for the conclusion of a loan 100/. The desperate financial and political situation in Greece was soon reported to London by the British Ambassador to Athens:

"Late in June I again warned H.M.G. that the sands were running out quickly, and that it would soon be too late. So impressed was I with the danger, that I requested leave of absence earlier than I otherwise should and saw Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Balfour, who was at the Foreign Office, as soon as I reached London. The whole situation was reviewed at this meeting and I expressed the conviction that Greece would inevitably collapse in the autumn unless she received material and moral help from Great Britain... Mr. Lloyd George went straight from the conference to the House of Commons and made his famous speech of the 4th August, which was intended to take the place of that material assistance which I had postulated as a necessary condition of continued Greek resistance. The speech raised a wave of enthusiasm in Greece...and it produced in the minds of the Turks the feeling that, if they did not act quickly, they might find themselves faced by the British" 101/.

Lloyd George's speech helped preserve until the last moment the Greek illusions as to a future British help while its main consequence seems to have been the precipitation of the nationalist general attack against the Greek forces in August 1922. If the Turks did not attack before the end of the summer, their counter-offensive would have had to be postponed because of weather conditions until the spring or the summer of 1923 by which time, as Ankara's interpretation of the Lloyd George speech had concluded, the Greeks were bound to receive help from Britain.

In the meantime, six months after the Paris proposals, it now seemed that everything was ready for the preliminary meetings which would be followed by the preliminary conference, which was to proceed the final peace settlement 102/. The first step would be to urge on both belligerents the conclusion of an armistice in Asia Minor and a corresponding immobilization of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace. The second step would entail efforts to recommend and explain to both Greeks and Turks the peace proposals drawn up

100/ FO E 7785/5/44, 5.8.22, Bentnick to Balfour.
101/ FO ARG 1922. DBFP, xvii, p. 3. For the text of the speech see 157 H.C. Deb. 5s., cols. 1997-2006.
102/ FO E 7759/5/44, 18.8.22, Curzon to Hardinge.
at Paris in March 1922. Failing the conclusion of an armistice and the acceptance of the peace conditions in principle, there would remain no basis for discussion or negotiation and the preliminary conference would end there and then without any decisions being taken 103/.

Meanwhile, the draft of the invitation to the participants was being scrutinised in a time-consuming correspondence between London and Paris and the wording was being carefully examined while Italian sources indicated that Kemal was preparing an offensive "somewhere on the Eski Sehir front" and thought it had a good chance of success 104/. Athens' request for a loan had not even been replied to when the Greek government reiterated that, without it, they could no longer maintain an army in Asia Minor. To this plea, the Treasury's reply came quickly: "...As was explained to Monsieur Gounaris when he was in this country, there is no government control upon the flotation of loans in the London market and it is the policy of H.M.G. not to intervene between Foreign Governments and potential lenders in this country, such questions being left to be decided according to purely financial considerations. In these circumstances there can be no question of the encouragement of a Greek loan by H.M.G., apart from the facilities already granted by the agreement of 22nd December last" 105/. Again, there seemed to be a crossed line in communications. Was Greece simply a Foreign Government or an Ally fighting Britain's war in the Near East? Lord Curzon did not seem to think this reply was quite right and he minuted: "I am not clear that it would be advisable to send this telegram in the hour of Greece's disaster. No loan can save them now..." 106/.

Indeed, it was too late. While the Greeks were expecting British aid, the British Representative in Athens commented that, despite the Greek government's perfectly loyal stance towards Britain, he could not be certain that this attitude would continue "if it should transpire that H.M.G. have merely encouraged the Government to continue the war against an enemy who was known to receive material support from Britain's Allies and that Great Britain should show weakness and not only not assist Greece in any material degree, but should give away Greece's interests for the sake of good relations with France and Italy" 107/. If the preliminary Conference failed, or worse still, if England should fail them, he continued, none of the courses which the

103/ FO E 7759/5/44, 18.8.22, Curzon to Hardinge.
107/ FO E 9230/27/44, 29.8.22, Bentnick to Curzon.
Greeks might take would be pleasing to London. Therefore, the British Representative concluded, if Britain did not intend to remain indefinitely in occupation of Constantinople, handing it over to Greece was the only solution of the Eastern problem which contained seeds of finality. A solution of this nature, he stressed, was hinted at in the Treaty of Sèvres 108/.

While the situation at the military front was going from bad to worse, British attention focused in the discussion of the question regarding the supply of munitions by France to the Kemalists. The evidence collected was so serious that the Foreign Office committed in writing its fears that, unless the right of seizure and search was recognized to the Greeks, one of the indirect results of the provision of French munitions to the Turks would be their use for a possible eventual attack on British troops in Irak 109/. It seemed that the munitions referred to were not supplied by private merchants but by the French government or by the French forces in Syria. Poincaré denied the accusations on the grounds that any arms used against the British in Mesopotamia might possibly in the long run be utilized against the French themselves in Syria 110/. General Harrington, however, did not seem to agree. In his words, the irrefutable fact remained that "the Greeks have been unfairly handicapped by ...arms and ammunition being transferred by French and Italians from Turkish dumps in Allied charge and by being denied right of search....It is right to say Kemalists have been helped as hard as they could be by Constantinople government officials, French and Italians" 111/. Most independent observers would have additionally argued that the Greeks had also been unfairly handicapped by British inactivity in changing this state of affairs. In the event, with the Greek collapse, the British military position in the Near East was jeopardized and the Chanak incident of October 1922 indicated what pressure the joint Greek-British action could have brought to bear on the nationalists 112/.

By the first days of September, the situation at the front and the failure of the two army corps to join hands, made all these considerations insignificant. On 2 September, there was already talk of abandoning ship—and Smyrna, and the Greek government was ready to accept proposals for an armistice on the basis of immediate evacuation of Asia Minor. The Greek government made a definite request to the British government to arrange an armistice for them on the basis of immediate evacuation which Kemal had demanded in March 1922 but to which the Greeks had not been prepared to agree until

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108/ ibid.
109/ FO E 8153/76/44, 29.8.22, Curzon to Hardinge.
110/ FO E 8652/76/44, 30.8.22, Hardinge to Curzon.
111/ FO E 8646/27/44, 29.8.22, Bentnick to Curzon.
112/ Toynbee, op.cit, p. 83. For the Chanak incident, DBFP, Vol, XVIII, Chapter I.
With the Greek collapse and unconditional request for an armistice, one would have thought that the worst was over. This, though, was not the case. French susceptibilities were hurt because the Greeks had not asked Paris to mediate for the armistice and, to avoid irritating the French, a lengthy correspondence ensued with the result that the armistice was not requested until one week after the Greeks had placed their fate in British hands for yet one more time 114/. One of the most striking points of this correspondence was the fact that Lloyd George suggested to Lord Curzon that in order to induce the Turks to accept the protection of minorities by the League of Nations, Ankara and Constantinople should be informed that the British were ready to grant facilities for a Turkish loan on the London market. Although Lord Curzon commented that the proposal was "inadmissible", the point remained to show how rigid British policy was in connection with facilitating the contraction of loans by Foreign Governments 115/.

The effort to defer the issue of asking for an armistice was paramount. The Greek government were convinced that London would be able to obtain better terms for Greece than they could themselves obtain by direct request to Kemal 116/. The question was whether British interests in Turkey would be hampered by such mediation which would identify in the minds of the nationalists His Majesty's government with that of Greece. Sir H. Rumbold advised: "I feel that we should keep our hands as free as possible even at the expense of advising Greeks to seek armistice in the usual military fashion by arrangement between military commanders" 117/.

By 7 September 1922, the gravity of the military situation was such that Sir H. Rumbold decided to waive all opposition to the scheme and convinced his colleagues to endeavour at once to bring about an armistice 118/. Now that the question of who was to ask for the armistice seemed to be settled, another question arose: were the Greeks and the Turks still to be summoned to Venice or would they be allowed to establish peace on their own? "If Turks and Greeks came to agreement between themselves, they might do so to prejudice Allied interests, and [it would be preferable] that the Allies should keep some control over the negotiations" 119/.

113/ FO E 8748/27/44, 2.9.22, Bentnick to Curzon.
115/ FO E 8766/27/44, 4.9.22, Curzon to Hardinge.
116/ FO E 8878/27/44, 4.9.22, Rumbold to Curzon.
117/ FO E 8890/27/44, 5.9.22, Rumbold to Curzon.
118/ FO E 8981/27/44, 7.9.22, Rumbold to Curzon.
119/ FO E 9095/27/44, 8.9.22, Graham to Curzon.
"Mais l'invasion des grecs au sein même de notre patrimoine national, nous a sécoué de la torpeur produite par les fatigues de la guerre et nous a jetés dans les tourbillons d'une nouvelle lutte avec toute la vehemence d'un homme qui ne craint plus de perdre quoi que ce soit. Il s'en est suis qu'au lieu de nous mettre devant la table de la conference en vaincus, nous y sommes allés en vainqueurs" *.

*Turquie Nouvelle, 3.12.23.
As the territorial extent of the Greek mandate was rather vague, further talks in Paris resulted in the Allied consent to the advance of the Greek troops to occupy the whole of the Smyrna sancak and the kaza of Aivali, should this advance become imperative for the preservation of public order 1/. Although the relevant military operations were left to the discretion of the Greek High Commissioner and the Commander of the Greek army, the Allied decision specified that under no circumstances should the Greek occupation extend south of Ayiasuluk. These boundaries in no way formed a viable military front for the Greek forces to repel Turkish attacks which, according to intelligence sources, were imminent 2/. Several points of concentration of Turkish "regulars" and "irregulars" were reported, especially in the areas south of the Meander and around Panderma, Bergama and Aivali. Further, Greek intelligence reported from the areas of Aidin and Odemish that the Italians were providing arms to the Moslem population 3/. The Greek landing had convinced the Turks that the consequences of not resisting the occupation forces would be far greater than any breach of the armistice terms such resistance would entail. Therefore, disarmament came to a halt, breech blocks and munitions were no longer handed in, reservists enlisted again and the Turkish army began to grow. As predicted by Greek intelligence, the advance met with major nationalist resistance in most areas while the Greek forces were also restricted in their attempt to occupy strategic positions necessary for the efficient protection of the occupied districts against attacks by the Turkish forces. In fact, during the period June 1919-June 1920, the Greek army was under the command of the British G.H.Q in Anatolia and could not assume any initiative but for purposes of limited local defence, despite its superiority to the nationalists and the immediate need for their dispersal.

At the end of May, the Greek occupation extended to the Smyrna-Aidin railway in the South, up to the Aidin-Nazili railway in the South-East, to the towns of Manisa and Kasaba in the North-East and to Aivali and Bergama in the North. By this time, the Greek military considered that it was essential for the security of the occupation to extend its limits and incorporate all the principal communication lines leading to Smyrna from the North, the East and the South, which, in Venizelos' mind, appeared to constitute the absolute minimum necessary to guarantee the security of the Smyrna region 4/. Nonetheless, it was due to Stergiadis' decisive moves that Greek presence was initially established in Asia Minor. As Commodore Fitzmaurice noted, "through his non-compliance

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1/ MOFA A/5 IV, Tel. No. 4622/17.5.19 and 4670/19.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
2/ MOFA 136s Tel. No. 38535/20.6.19, Caclamanos to Venizelos.
4/ MOFA 136 t letter, 18.6.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
with his instructions, Stergiadis has put the Greeks in quite a strong position. The Greek High Commissioner ordered the occupation of Menemen, Manisa, Kasaba, Ayiasuluk, Aidin and Nazili which took place between 22 May and 12 June, 1919, against the orders of Venizelos and without authorization from the S.N.O. As Stergiadis was to explain to Venizelos later, the animosity of the local Allied representatives, continuously enhanced by Levantine and Italian propaganda, was so considerable that he had concluded that the chances of obtaining permission to occupy territories beyond the Smyrna sancak were very slight indeed. At the same time, British intelligence informed London that "the situation in the Smyrna region [was] practically one of formal war between Greeks and Turks. The Greeks were ready to make fresh advances ignoring the SNO's instructions and the Turks were determined 'to push the Greeks into the sea'. Taking advantage of the restrictions imposed on the Greeks by the Supreme Council, the Turks launched attacks from outside the Greek zone and instituted sabotage by the Turkish population from within". Therefore, a rapid advance had been necessary and the occupation of Manisa, Kasaba and Aidin was ordered in order to pave the way for the Greek army's move eastwards, in the direction of Alasehir, and southwards, in the direction of Nazili and Denizli. The Greek forces occupied Menemen on 22 May, Manisa and Ayiasuluk on 25 May, Aidin on 27 May, Kasaba and Aivali on 29 May, Odemish on 1 June, Nazili on 3 June, Akhisar on 5 June and Bergama on 12 June.

In the south, the nationalists attacked the Greek positions around Aidin and forced the Greek troops to retreat. Their short-lived reoccupation of the city was marked by arson and extensive massacres of Christians. When the Greek army recaptured Aidin three days later, out of 11,000 Greeks only 4,500 had survived. A few days later, the retreat of the Greek troops from Menemen was met with fierce Turkish resistance and a two hour battle ensued within the town during which deplorable excesses took place on both sides. These events were soon followed by inflammatory nationalist proclamations calling for the immediate mobilization of the Turkish nation.

The Aidin events were proof that the Turkish irregulars were in a position to challenge and threaten the security of the Greek forces. In the eyes of the military, the situation worsened daily as cooperation between Turks and Italians came...
into the open 11/. The only way to strike a decisive blow against the nationalists seemed to attack them within their base in the Italian zone. As this was out of the question, the Greek army found itself in a precarious position which belied the optimism expressed by the Salonica Military Headquarters and General Paraskevopoulos in particular. However, three days after his arrival in Smyrna on 28 June, the Greek Commander in Chief lost his optimism and advised Venizelos that the centres of Turkish resistance should be crushed immediately even without the consent of the Allies. The S.N.O. however, did not agree with this view and believed that the Greeks should carry out any further occupation "in a peaceful manner" 12/.

Venizelos had written to Clémenceau on 20 June, requesting that the Supreme Council should grant the Greek troops freedom of action to counterattack the nationalists. As no reply seemed forthcoming and in the face of the growing risk to the security of both Greek troops and population, on 23 June 1920, Venizelos ordered the army to abandon the "ruinous inaction" and undertake operations to stop the nationalist advance, disperse the Turkish forces and prevent any eventual reconcentration. As no reply was received, on 10 July 1919 Venizelos addressed yet another letter to the President of the Supreme Council stressing the point that nationalist mobilization threatened to extend the theatre of military operations throughout Anatolia thereby making an Allied agreement over the whole of Turkey impossible 13/. The fact that the Supreme Council chose not to comment on Venizelos' note announcing his orders which gave the Greek army freedom of action in Asia Minor, was perceived by Greek circles as indirect tolerance of this initiative 14/. Stergiadis was instructed not to agree to any intervention by the Senior Naval Officer and to inform him that the Greek forces were acting on the specific orders of the Prime Minister. Should he wish these orders revoked, Fitzmaurice would have to address himself to his government which, in turn, should request the retreat of the Greek forces 15/. Although these orders remedied part of the problem, the situation in the southern part of the Greek zone did not change as the nationalists remained free to launch their attacks from the Italian zone and retreat to it in safety. In the meantime, the May-June operations had led to the establishment of the first military front. The Greeks had secured elbow-room for holding Smyrna and its maritime approaches but, while the Greek army remained inactive within its "boundaries", the nationalist military organization went

11/ MOFA 136 t letter, n.n., 18.6.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau
12/ MOFA 26p Note 12.7.19, Commodore Fitzmaurice, Commanding Officer of the Aegean Squadron to Stergiadis.
14/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 6300/15.6.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
15/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 6424/19.6.19 and 6832/29.6.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
On the basis of the situation evolving in Asia Minor, on 18 July 1919 the Supreme Council fixed the boundaries of the provisional Greek zone. These boundaries extended eight kilometres to the north of Aivali, 20 kilometres to the north of Bergama, 15 kilometres to the north east of Manisa, 20 kilometres to the north east of Kasaba and ended on the left bank of the Meander in the south, including Aidin and Odemish. This line came to be known by the name of Admiral Calthorpe's successor, General Milne who was appointed Commander of the Allied forces in Asia Minor and was entrusted with the task of delimiting the Greek zone, keeping the Greeks within it and preventing serious Greek-Italian friction. The Milne Line was defined by barbed wire which separated the Greek forces in forced passivity from the nationalist attacks. "Guerilla warfare", commented Milne, "will continue as long as Greek troops remain in [the] sancak and any further advance will tend to create further difficulties". He also suggested that the Greeks should either be allowed to proceed and extend their zone until they had attained a defensible frontier, or vacate the Meander valley and be replaced by an inter-allied force. However, this military point of view was not taken into consideration and the Supreme Council decided that the Greeks should not advance or retreat, and that they should remain the sole occupying force in the territories they held.

The Supreme Council's decision regarding the Milne Line filled Venizelos with renewed optimism. He wrote to General Nider that Milne's orders should be followed to the letter and concluded: "I am sure you are aware that the enemies of our occupation of Asia Minor are many. However, I believe that we have succeeded in dispersing all the hopes they had based on our mistakes of the first days. We must therefore make certain that these mistakes will not be repeated".

Nonetheless, despite the delineation of the Milne Line and the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement, the guerilla warfare on the part of the nationalists intensified and concentrated efforts were needed once again to secure Allied consent for the freedom of movement of the Greek troops. These efforts resulted in the Greek army being granted the right to persecute the nationalists one and a half kilometres outside the Greek zone with the obligation to return within its boundaries after each operation. Even so, each operation undertaken would have to be sanctioned by General Milne in advance. Towards the end of September 1919, there were signs of improvement as Milne gave the Greek military permission to enter the Turkish zone in order to repel attacks.

16/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 5507/25.5.19 and 5587/27.5.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
17/ FO 608/103-17942, Tel. No. A6746/11.8.19, Milne to Curzon.
18/ DBFP, i, p. 879, S.C., 10.7.19, App.
19/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 7557/12.11.19, Venizelos to Nider.
pressure by Venizelos resulted in yet another agreement providing for the freedom of the Greek troops to advance within three kilometres from the point of the nationalist attack, again with the obligation to return to their original positions after each operation. As no solution was given to the problem of inaction, a wave of discontent swept the army. However, any thought of offensive military action on Greek initiative was out of the question 20/.

On 7 October 1919, the Supreme Council examined a report submitted by General Milne regarding the boundaries of the Greek occupation. The General pointed out that the nationalist forces "completely escaped the power of the Constantinople government, adopted an aggressive attitude and were of considerable number. Any further advance in order to secure better positions, the report concluded, was sure to meet with strong resistance and had no hope of succeeding without heavy fighting 21/.

Milne could not have been nearer the truth. After his arrival at Samsoun on 19 May 1919, Moustafa Kemal gradually organized a new body from the debrý of the CUP. The new organization had clear nationalistic aims which featured the concepts of national identity and popular sovereignty. Turkish nationalism was at once the acceptance of a western idea and a revolt against western domination 22/. With the incorporation of the Sivas declaration of 19 September 1919 with the Amasya Protocol, the National Pact took shape and spelled clearly such principles as the renunciation of the capitulations and the rejection of any outside interference "in political, financial and other matters" 23/. By this time, Kemal had also succeeded in establishing channels of communication with several Allied groups and agents. One such British agent was reported to have warned Curzon of the nationalist danger in

20/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 11608/26.2.20, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
21/ Milne was requested to compile this report on 18 July 1919, upon conclusion of the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement. AV 11p, Letter, 9.10.19, Clémenceau to Venizelos.
the early fall of 1919 24/.

With the strength of the nationalist forces increased many times over since September 1919 and estimated to comprise 80,000 men, it was already too late 25/. By that time, in Europe and Anatolia there were 160,000 Allied troops out of which some 90,000 were Greek. Back at the Conference, Lloyd George argued that "if two soldiers could not defeat one Turk, the Allies ought to start their conference anew and ask the Turk upon what terms he would condescend to make peace" 26/.

It is difficult to understand the optimism expressed by Venizelos when, at the Supreme Council meeting of 16 February 1920, he was asked as to the numbers involved in the permanent Greek garrison to be maintained in Asia Minor after the conclusion of peace with Turkey. Although not in a position to give exact numbers, he declared that the Asia Minor garrison should, in his opinion, bear the same ratio to the population as the number of troops maintained in any other part of Greece. His belief was that in case of difficulty, some 100,000 men could be raised from the one million Greeks of Turkey 27/. Further pressed by Lloyd George to give his opinion as to the possibility of the nationalist attacks continuing after the Greek takeover, Venizelos replied that since the Greek forces had been able to repel the nationalists until then, he was confident that after the conclusion of peace, "the likelihood of any such attacks would soon disappear" 28/. A few days later, he expressed the same, if not stronger, sense of optimism. When the French Premier made it clear that his country had no intention of entering into further hostilities with Turkey in order to impose the peace treaty, Venizelos assured him that Greece not only would not need such assistance as she was in a position to enforce the terms relating to her territorial claims, but also intended to play the major role in the imposition of the peace treaty on Turkey as a whole 29/. The only move needed after the conclusion of his agreement with Tittoni, he wrote, was an Allied demarche to the Porte demanding that no relations

27/ AV 15d Tel. No. 2684/16.2.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
28/ MOFA 41n Tel. No. 11433/25.2.20, Venizelos to MOFA.
29/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 6999/3.7.19, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
should be fostered with the nationalists. If this step were taken, Venizelos concluded, the nationalist formations would be reduced to insignificance as far as the security of the occupied territory was concerned and, as a result, fewer Greek troops would be required for its protection 30/.

In fact, the question of maintaining troops in Anatolia had been preoccupying the Allies and the French in particular for the past few months as they found themselves in an increasingly awkward position in Cilicia. By February 1920, nationalist raids reached the point of a full-scale revolt, which escalated into a general massacre in Cilicia, particularly around Maraş, essentially because the majority of the occupying French forces consisted of enlisted local Armenians 31/. Following these events, the Supreme Council decided to occupy Constantinople as a means of bearing pressure on the nationalists. This occupation was enforced on 16 March 1920, by a contingent of British, French and Italian forces. Allied proclamations assured that it was of a provisional character, seeking to support the Constantinople government and the authority of the Sultan 32/. This operation brought the Straits zone under exclusive Allied control and was followed by the deportation of some forty members of the Ottoman parliament which was dissolved on 11 March 1920 at the insistence of the Allies.

Kemal proclaimed elections for an "extra-ordinary assembly", which convened with the participation of members of the old parliament on 22 April 1920 in Ankara, as the Grand National Assembly. Its professed purpose was to free the country from the invaders and rescue the Caliphate from the hands of the enemies 33/. Kemal later suggested that even at the time of the Constantinople occupation, French and Italian agents assured him that this was all due to British policy with which Millerand and Nitti did not agree 34/. Upon the official announcement of the treaty terms, a large scale Turkish exodus from Constantinople to Asia Minor was witnessed, together with a marked increase in the number of recruits rallying to the nationalist cause 35/.

By March 1920, while the arbiters of the world were convening at San Remo to confirm the harsh peace treaty on Turkey, the Italians had evacuated the area of Konya, the French had come to an initial agreement with Ankara and in April, the Allied detachments and control officers in Anatolia

30/ Toynbee, op.cit., pp. 226 ff.
31/ DBFP, vii, p. 85, 16.2.20.
32/ DBFP, vii, pp. 415-20, S.C., 5.3.20. FO 406/43/105, Curzon to Robeck, 10.3.20.
33/ DBFP, xii, pp. 22-24, Curzon to Lindsay, 12.3.20.
were being withdrawn to escape internment. The uninterrupted reinforcement of the nationalist movement, despite its internal difficulties, had radically changed the scenario of the secret War treaties and in June 1920 the Allies sanctioned the Greek occupation of a new front line extending from Panderma through Balikesir, Soma, Kirkagaç and Ahmedli to Alasehir (Filadelfia). This permission came as a direct result of the threat presented to the inadequate British forces stationed in the Ismid district by nationalist concentrations. The British further requested that the Greeks advance as far as Brusa. Neither Venizelos nor Paraskevopoulos considered the occupation of this largely Moslem city as indispensable for the security of the Greek zone 36/. On the contrary, a little before the operation was suggested by the Allies, Venizelos had advised Paraskevopoulos not to advance eastwards unless such an advance was deemed extremely necessary. "The enemy", wrote Venizelos, "has every interest in inducing us to advance. But we have the opposite interest: not to extend our lines of communication and not to advance among a population for the most part alien" 37/.

When Venizelos was informed of the Allied wish for the Greek troops to occupy Brusa, he wrote to Paraskevopoulos that although Greek interests lay in the concentration of every effort for the immediate occupation of Eastern Thrace, it was the duty of the Greek forces to hasten to the aid of the Allies if the British feared a nationalist attack against them in Ismid, which they thought could be counteracted by the Greek occupation of Brusa 38/. In the event, after "a careful estimation of the situation in view of this highly critical moment in the country's history", Venizelos declared to Lloyd George not only that he would send one division to Ismid but also that he undertook to crush the nationalist concentrations and safeguard the coast of Propondis from any possible invasion 39/. In the event, the Greek army extended its occupation to Brusa, Panderma and Uşak in order to accommodate Allied requests 40/. Thus, after the June 1920 offensive, the Greek zone of occupation covered over 53,000 square kilometres 41/.

Within a month, the objectives of the operation had been attained and the Greek army had occupied Panderma,

36/ MOFA 161 Tel. Nos. 12060/2.7.20, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos, 3563/1.7.20, Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos and 4019/5.7.20, Romanos to Venizelos.
37/ MOFA 161 Tel. N.N./25.6.20, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
38/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 12087/25.6.20, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
39/ MOFA 7k Tel. no. 12086/n.d., MOFA (Press Office) to Stergiadis.
40/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 64/18.2.21, Stergiadis to High Command and 10862/20.8.20 Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
Alaşehir and Brusa. After this successful offensive, combined French and Italian action secured an Allied decision to the effect that since the Dardanelles and the Ismid peninsula were now secure, there was no need for a further advance of the Greek army. The halting of the Greek offensive resulted in the loss of a unique opportunity to crush the nationalists and gave Kemal ample time to reorganize his forces. Despite the stunning success of the operations, it was clear to military observers that the Greek forces had abandoned a continuous front near Smyrna for three isolated fronts, ill-connected with their base. What was more, the Ismid occupation force had sea communications alone, between Panderma and Brusa there was no railway while the lines between Smyrna and Panderma were exposed to nationalist attacks. At the end of the day, the positions gained by the Greek army during its last offensive could only be temporary and its leaders had to choose between proceeding with the occupation of Afion Karahisar and Eskişehir, thereby reducing the distance between the two major points of troop concentration, and withdrawing towards Smyrna, thereby attaining a defensible military front.

After the extensive changes in the army leadership took place after the November 1920 elections. General Paraskevopoulos was replaced by General A. Papoulas while many high ranking officers known for their venizelist affiliation resigned and were replaced by some 1,500 officers who had been dismissed by the venizelist regime during the 1917-1920 period. Some 150 of the resigned venizelist officers went to Constantinople where they founded the National Defence (Ethniki Amyna) with the financial assistance of the local Greeks. The overall result of these changes was the creation of an experienced, "venizelist" army with an antivenizelist leadership which had no knowledge of the conditions prevailing in Asia Minor. Thus, at the beginning of 1921, the Greeks had won brilliant but precarious successes and the nationalist tide was gradually gathering in intensity. By this time, the Greek army consisted of eleven divisions organized in three army corps, one cavalry brigade, two regiments of army troops and a line of communication troops including five special battalions which brought the number to some 200,000.

Fresh operations started on 5 January 1921, entailing a "reconnaissance" mission from Brusa towards Eskişehir and Afion Karahisar. It was felt that the occupation of these two vital railway junctions and the railway connecting them, would

43/ Smith, op.cit., p.173 ff. Some eight months later, British sources observed that "balancing losses and gains, the army has benefited on the whole by the changes in the command". DBFP, xvii, p. 239, 16.6.21.
44/ Temperley, op.cit., p.31.
deprive the nationalists of their continuous interior lines and it would reunite the discontinuous Greek front which would then be served by an uninterrupted railway from Smyrna to Ismid. Although the Greek army had no orders to occupy these towns, the fact that it retreated towards Brusa and Uşak after its reconnaissance operation was widely interpreted and publicized as a defeat of the Greeks. This exercise, more than anything else, brought home to the Greek authorities that the nationalist forces had significantly improved in numbers, arms, organization and discipline in comparison with their performance during the operations of the previous summer. The warning about the intentions of the Greek forces was not lost by the nationalists who spent the next two months fortifying the approaches to Eski Sehir, while the Greeks were marking time in Brusa and the Peace Conference was dragging on in London.

In March 1921, the Greek Northern army was halted in its second attempt to reach Eski Sehir by the well-trenched slopes manned by the nationalist troops and in a few days the Greek forces had fallen back to their old lines. Not only had the Turkish military machine been reassembled, but also it had succeeded in the repulse of the Greek army at the battles of İnönü, in effect on the first occasion that Greek and Turkish regular forces had clashed. Indeed, these battles proved the turning point in the Anatolian War and demonstrated the danger of an unnecessary dispersal of forces. Despite the spring rebuff, by the end of July 1921, the long-coveted positions of Afion Karahisar and Eski Sehir had been captured by the Greek army. However, as in 1920, no serious blow had been inflicted against the bolt of the nationalist forces. Despite their estimated hundred-fold increase in numbers—from 20,000 in 1919 to 200,000 in July 1921—the nationalist leaders clearly bartered territory for time. Evidently, if the Greek army wanted a full scale clash with the nationalists, it would have to go a long way to find them.

In the event, after a ten-day march, the two forces came face to face on the banks of the Sakkaría river. The result of the ensuing battle was not clear and both forces officially celebrated their "tremendous victory" after strenuous weeks of fighting which ended with the Greeks withdrawing west and north of the loop of the Sakkaría. The stalemate thus reached predicted that the Anatolian war would not be decided on the battlefield. Since mediation by the Allies was proving impossible, the only alternative could be a passive contest of endurance between the two nations, with the Turks fighting what was essentially a defensive battle in their own country. After the battle of Sakkaría, the Greek army appeared to be holding its own, and retiring in good order to positions already decided upon, despite the energetic raids of the Turkish cavalry.

45/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 237.
46/ DBFP, iv, pp. 998-99, Curzon Memorandum, 4.120.
Time was clearly on the Turkish side, since the Greek troops' morale was sure to suffer during the winter months in the trenches. In all fairness, the Greeks had gambled for a military decision in Anatolia on a very narrow margin and the circumstances under which they were striving for victory over the nationalists could not have been more adverse 47/.

At this stage, and as a rational preliminary to the projected summer offensive, a withdrawal from the Ismid and Yalova areas was decided by the Greeks in an effort to concentrate their dispersed forces. Although the British Military Council admitted that when the Greeks withdrew, the Christian population of the peninsula would be in serious danger and that many would be killed, the War Office intimated to Curzon that even if a sufficient force were available to replace the Greeks, this was not considered a wise move as it would "jeopardize our position of neutrality in the present Greek-Turkish operations" 48/. In a half hearted effort to mitigate the evil, the British proposed that an effective Turkish gendarmerie be established before the Greek withdrawal but the French and Italian governments refused to cooperate "and they must bear the responsibility for any massacres which take place" 49/. The Greeks withdrew from Ismid on 27 June 1921. Their withdrawal inspired panic in the district and a number of Turks were reported massacred by Armenians in the town itself 50/. Practically all inhabitants were evacuated with the Greek forces, but both Armenians and neutral Turks were terror stricken and attempted to flee to the Constantinople zone.

Thus, the occupation of Ismid which had been effected a year earlier at the expressed request of the British, ended in shambles, with the British refusing to extend help to populations whose predicament could largely be laid on their doorstep. Soon, extensive massacres on both sides were reported and in early July, on Curzon's initiative, the Allied representatives were instructed to complain to the Greek government because the Greek troops retreating towards Yalova were reported to be burning villages along the coast 51/.

Granville in Athens, however, did not seem to agree: "I presume", he wrote, "that General Franks had evidence that burning of villages was done by Greek troops and was wanton destruction. But it should be remembered that during the Greek retirement from Eski Sehir in March and April, the Third Division and probably others were fired at from practically every village near the line of march and that several villages on the road were set on fire by Turkish inhabitants to make

47/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 247.
48/ DBFP, xvii, no. 174 and 71.
49/ DBFP, xvii, no. 199.
50/ DBFP, xvii, no. 267.
51/ DBFP, xvii, no. 286.
the road impassable. I would point out that the repeated use of the word retreat for the movement of the First Division from Ismid to Yalova gives a wrong impression; this movement was part of the Greek scheme of concentration and was planned and communicated to the Commander in Chief in Constantinople some weeks ago. 52/.

In early August "grave moslem excesses in Anatolia against christian inhabitants" were reported by the Allied representatives in Constantinople. In a private letter to the British Ambassador in Paris, Curzon commented that it was this sort of nationalist action that made it difficult for the British to accord Turkey the concessions that the Indian moslems were demanding on their behalf. He was convinced that Ankara was pursuing the policy of extermination systematically and that it was "incubent on the Allies to do everything they can to stop these barbarities" 53/. However, the Italian government soon stated that the terms of the proposed representation were unsuitable "in view of the policy adopted by the Allies of holding themselves completely free with regard to the two belligerents", in order to be in a position to intervene when the occasion was presented to secure a cessation of hostilities 54/.

To make the situation quite intractable, every vestige of Allied control in Anatolia had ceased to exist. In March 1920 the control officers disappeared from the scene on both sides of the front; a year later the Allies had officially declared their neutrality in a joint proclamation by the three High Commissioners in Constantinople. This declaration, a confession of impotence on the part of the Allies, contrasted strongly with the impression of omnipotence pervading the Treaty of Sèvres 55/. By March 1922, it was clear that the situation entailed grave risks for the Allies themselves: if they failed to secure peace they would be in great difficulties as the whole question of Islam in Morocco and India would be involved 56/. On the basis of these considerations, the Council decided to brief the press on its plans "for the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor" 57/. The major dilemma in the drama was thus presented: the Greek government could neither hold nor relinquish its occupied territories. To hold them indefinitely would mean more money and men than could be obtained or mustered because of the long period of mobilization and the depreciation of Greek currency. To let them go and withdraw the Greek troops would bring greater calamity and more persecutions of the local Greeks.

52/ DBFP, xvii, no. 308.
53/ DBFP, xvii, no. 321.
54/ DBFP, xvii, no. 366.
55/ Temperley, op.cit., pp. 48-49.
56/ DBFP p. 680
57/ MOFA 52a Tel. N.N./24.3.22, Metaxas from Paris to MOFA, reporting on the reaction of the French Press.
than they had yet witnessed 58/.

Stergiadis was of the opinion that if a peaceful evacuation could be negotiated to include guarantees for the protection of the local Greeks, a major catastrophe could be averted. This view was openly criticized in the Athenian press and Liberal circles as defeatist 59/. Nonetheless, it seems to have reflected the true situation. The morale of the army seemed to be at its lowest ebb. News about a possible evacuation was received with enthusiasm and desertions reached an unprecedented number. When officers were asked to explore the possibility that the troops would welcome orders to remain in Asia Minor after the official evacuation, the result of the inquiry was a foregone conclusion 60/. Aptly describing the situation, Patriarch Meletios wrote to Venizelos: "It is certain that we are all fighting aimlessly in the dark, firing against friends and enemies alike and we are not able to agree even as regards the utmost national interests" 61/. This was the reality against which the idealists of the Asia Minor Defence were planning to hold on to Asia Minor even without the support of the Greek state 62/.

The signs of impending disaster were now clear on the diplomatic scene and the final act of the drama only remained to be enacted on the military front. General Papoulas resigned at the end of May 1922, and from June 1922, the nationalists started raiding the towns along the front. General Hadjianestis, the new Commander in Chief, was speaking about a partial retirement to a new line of defence to reduce costs or, alternatively, to withdraw into a zone immediately around Smyrna, the retirement to which would mean that the Greeks would have at least 500,000 refugees on their hands, if the Ismid experience was anything to go by, and this at a time when even the provision of food to the army would become problematic.

By August 1922, the aeroplanes received by the nationalists from Italy the previous June enabled them to paralyze Greek air reconnaissance while the Greek cavalry were too few to watch the whole of the military front 63/. This was one of the reasons why the nationalist concentration near Afion Karahisar was discovered too late for the reinforcements to arrive from the general reserve twenty-five miles away, eventhough some days before the nationalist

59/ MOFA 118h Embros, 9.4.22. MOFA 48b p. 76 AV3ab 1/5.4.22, Liberal Parliamentary Committee to Venizelos.
60/ AV a5 unsigned letter, dated 7.4.22 and addressed to "Dear George".
61/ AV a2 letter, 25.4.22, Meletios to Venizelos.
62/ AV 21b letter, 173/2.4.22, Papoulas to the Council of the National Defence in Constantinople.
63/ DBFP, xvii, p. 936.
attack, a Turk had appeared at the First Division and informed them that the enemy was concentrating its forces south of the Akar river and the Greek airforce had verified the information 64/. Initially, the General Staff seemed confident that the incidents in the Meander valley and the offensive launched on 26 August 1922, would be repelled. However, the communique issued two days later stated that a Turkish force of ten divisions with strong artillery had attacked Greek positions south of Afion Karahisar from the Akar river and that fighting continued day and night 65/. A few hours later, a further communique stated that because of the severity of the enemy's offensive, the evacuation of Afion Karahisar had been ordered and that the Greek forces were now occupying lines to its west 66/.

Within a week, the situation had deteriorated dramatically. Stergiadis informed Athens that conditions in the army were extremely serious and that it was imperative for the Minister of War to go to Smyrna immediately to be briefed on the real state of affairs 67/. But the visit of the ministers could not reverse the situation. One of the army corps was reported cut off and driven north with supplies and ammunition only sufficient for a few days. The army seemed to have lost its morale and Athens was seriously contemplating asking for an armistice. On 2 September 1922, Stergiadis warned the Allies that in view of the impossibility of defending Smyrna against the nationalists, urgent measures were required for the protection of the town in the interests of their nationals 68/. While the British High Commissioner in Constantinople was instructed to concert with the Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean for the protection and possible evacuation of the British colony of Smyrna, the British Embassy in Athens conveyed to the Foreign Office that the Greek government "would accept proposals for an armistice on the basis of an immediate evacuation...The Greek government begs H.M.G. immediately to take such steps as they judge necessary in the circumstances" 69/.

64/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 177.
65/ Istoria tou Ellinikou..., xv.
66/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 179.
67/ Housepian, op.cit., p. 181.
68/ DBFP, xvii, p. 947.
69/ DBFP, xvii, p. 947.
CHAPTER THREE:

I. The Greek Administration, 1919-1922
During the first days of the Greek occupation, the foreign press predicted that, in administering Smyrna and its hinterland, Greece would have no easy task to perform. If she were to make the most of the territory and to do it justice, her administration would need to command the goodwill and respect of the foreign communities and at least the respect of the Turkish population. Yet, pending the signature of the Peace Treaty with Turkey, this occupation was of a very particular nature. Had it been a strictly military occupation of an enemy country, Greece would only have had to take the necessary action pertaining to the attainment of military objectives, without becoming directly involved with its administration. In fact, Greece's presence in Asia Minor did not solely come about as a result of military operations nor was the land exclusively hostile. On the contrary, as the resolution of the Supreme Council emphasized, the Greek mission was perceived largely as a means of securing peace, law and order in a country where a substantial part of the population was Greek. In effect, this entailed direct involvement with the Turkish administration, which was itself in need of extensive re-organization as several attempts at administrative reform had failed in the past. Undoubtedly, Greece found herself in an awkward predicament: her representatives in Asia Minor had to collaborate with the local Turkish administrative authorities, who were, at best, suspicious of Greek good will or, at worst, sabotaged every effort and worked hard for the promotion of the Turkish nationalist movement. The first signs of organized nationalist resistance to the Greek occupation manifested themselves in early June 1919. A proclamation by the Commander of the Turkish troops in the area of Denizli invited the inhabitants to take up arms and resist the Greek invaders. Proclamations posted in Menteşe stressed that the Turkish people might possibly tolerate the occupation of their country by a foreign army but in no way would they agree to be subjugated by Greece.

To complicate matters further, the efforts of the new regime to convince the Turkish community of its good will risked alienating the local Greek element which, after decades of persecution, expected preferential treatment by the Greek authorities. Moreover, those foreign communities with vested economic interests in the area were anxious to see the system of capitulations maintained, and had to be placated and convinced that these interests were in no way threatened by the Greek occupation. It was thus obvious from as early as May 1919 that the interval between the Greek landing and the signature of the Peace Treaty with Turkey would serve as a test period during which Greece would have to perform a tightrope walk and prove at every instance that she was capable of administering a society of so many inherent contradictions.

1/ The Times, 17 and 20 May 1919.
2/ MOFA 1361 tel. no. 5902/15.6.19 Zafiriou to Venizelos.
Already in February 1919 Venizelos had selected Aristidis Stergiadis as the future ruler of Asia Minor. His strict and uncompromising character guaranteed that he would not tolerate any form of misconduct on the Greek side. In April 1919, two months after he was informed of his selection, Stergiadis was still very reluctant to take office, on the grounds that he suffered from poor health. Venizelos, however, was adamant and suggested that he should visit him in Paris to discuss the details of his appointment and consult a doctor 3/. Stergiadis still did not comply and when, on 7 May 1919 Repoulis urgently recalled him from his post of Governor General of Epirus, it took him a whole week to reply that he could not go to Athens because he was ill 4/. The reasons for his reluctance will probably never be known. However, if one is to draw conclusions from his subsequent conduct, it is quite likely that he was against the expedition from the outset and very reluctant to take part. As the occupation was to be of a nominally military character only, Stergiadis would initially go to Smyrna as political counsellor to the Commander in Chief, until the situation permitted his appointment to the position of High Commissioner. This was yet another contradiction since, according to Venizelos' specific instructions, Stergiadis was to be considered by the Greek army as the highest authority representing the government, whose orders should be unquestionably obeyed, although nominally he would be under the jurisdiction of the army 5/. The Greek Premier strongly believed that Stergiadis would be able to exert his authority over both the Greek army and the Turkish authorities, to deal successfully with any problems that might arise with regard to the foreign communities and, also, to pave the way for the future Greek administration of Western Asia Minor 6/.

After the events of May 15 and 16, the urgent need for a political representative of the Greek government became apparent as the absence of a political coordinator at the time of the landing had proved detrimental. Mavroudis urged Athens to send a person invested with the authority to deal with all matters pertaining to the administration of the area and to the relations with the foreign, non-military, representatives. He felt this was essential as Zafiriou's perception of the problematic situation was purely military and, consequently, his actions were not governed by any political or foreign policy considerations. There was clearly no time to experiment with Stergiadis in the role of political counsellor to the Commander in Chief and orders were issued to the effect that he should take up the post of High Commissioner immediately 7/. Venizelos had such confidence in

3/ MOFA A/5VI tel. no. 3028/2.4.19 Venizelos to Repoulis.
4/ MOFA A/5VI tel. no. 3686/7.5.19 Repoulis to Stergiadis and tel. no. 305/13.5.19 Gounarakis to Repoulis.
5/ MOFA A/5VI tel. n.n./28.4.19 Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
6/ MOFA A/5VI tel. no. 3890/24.4.19 Venizelos to MOFA.
7/ MOFA 141 tel.no. 4606/17.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis.
Stergiadis that he attributed his delay in taking up the post either to a breakdown in communications or to machinations from Athens 8/. Describing the Greek Premier's helplessness, Politis wrote to Diomidis: "Venizelos had foreseen and organized everything. He prepared the details of Stergiadis' mission months in advance because he knew that only he could save our prestige in Smyrna" 9/.

The Greek military authorities in Turkey were immediately ordered to conform to Stergiadis' directives and it was made clear that his jurisdiction was to extend over all aspects of the occupation, military, political and civilian alike, except for matters of discipline within the armed forces and their tactical use during military operations, of which, nonetheless, he would have to approve. Venizelos was convinced that even without his personal instructions the military authorities would stand by the High Commissioner and render him all possible assistance towards the completion of his task 10/.

In view of the critical situation created by the events following the landing, urgent steps were required to establish a semblance of normality in the everyday life of the city. Venizelos' orders regarding the Turkish authorities were clear: no cost or effort should be spared in order to persuade the Turkish civil servants to resume the administrative duties they had abandoned after the events of May 15. The Turkish civil authorities should be preserved at all costs although they were to be under the High Commissioner's control. Should the Vali or any member of his administration refuse to continue to offer their services, Venizelos suggested the replacement of the former with a high ranking Turkish official and the latter with Turko-Cretans willing to serve under the Greek regime. The incentive of a substantial raise in salaries should also be used 11/. At the same time, these directives were motivated by Admiral Calthorpe's intimation that failure to reinstate the Turkish civil servants would prove detrimental 12/. In the event, Izzet Bey, the Vali of Smyrna, resumed his duties with little persuasion by Repoulis and he was soon followed by most of the members of his administration. Only those serving at the Smyrna Municipality were hesitant to return to their posts but adequate prompting on the side of the Greek authorities soon

8/ MOFA A/5VI tel. nos. 4521/15.5.19, 4575/16.5.19, 4682/19.5.19 Venizelos to Diomidis and tel. nos 4191/17.5.19, n.n./19.5.19 Diomidis to Venizelos and tel.no. 243/24.5.19 Stergiadis to Venizelos.
9/ DPA, 'letter in French 17.5.19, Politis to Diomidis, in Petsalis, op.cit., p.211.
10/ MOFA 141 tel.no. 4536/14.5.19 Venizelos to MOFA.
11/ MOFA 141 tel.nos. 4606 and 4607/17.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis and Zafiriou respectively.
12/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4164/3.5.19 (16.5.19), Kakoulidis to Ministry of Marine.
convinced them that Greece would respect them as she had respected the Turkish municipal authorities in Macedonia 13/. Moreover, it was stressed, every effort would be made to ascertain the position of the Turkish language as one of the two official languages to be used under the Greek occupation. All official announcements and communications from the civil and military authorities were to be made in both languages. As this system was to continue after the signature of the Peace Treaty and the anticipated handing over of the administration to the Greek side, a special translation department was to be instituted at the High Commission 14/.  

It was not until 22 May, a whole week after the landing, that the High Commissioner took up his post. The foreign press commented that the selection of Stergiadis, regarded in many quarters as Greece's up and coming man, made it clear that the government realized the necessity to create the best impression in the new territory and it had therefore sent its ablest available representative to take control in Smyrna. "The Greek High Commissioner", wrote the Times, "has completed a successful two years of office as Governor of Northern Epirus, where any improvement that has been effected in the relations between Greeks and Albanians may be attributed to his personal efforts, his broadmindedness and administrative capacity. No better choice could be made for Smyrna. Mr. Stergiadis is prepared to face facts and he has shown that he could even face the unpleasant facts of the original Greek landing" 15/.  

The High Commissioner was accompanied by P. Gounarakis, Secretary General of the Epirus Administration, Ali Bey Naip Zade and G. Krionas, nomarchs of Preveza and Drama respectively, G. Xynopoulos of the Ministry of National Economy and E. Koufidakis of the General Accounting Office. The members of the Mavroudis' Mission were to join this team while Mavroudis returned to his duties on the Averof, as Commander of the Greek naval base in Smyrna 16/. Thus, the nucleus of the Greek High Commission was formed. More employees were to come from Athens as soon as the specific needs were evaluated. Irrespective of which Greek ministry they came from, they were to report and be responsible directly to Stergiadis who would appoint them to such positions as the situation necessitated 17/.  

At the same time, the importance of training the employees to serve under the prospective Greek administration was not overlooked. Venizelos and Stergiadis shared the

13/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 143/19.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.  
14/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4888/22.5.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.  
15/ The Times, special Correspondent, 30.5.19 and The Near East 21.6.19.  
16/ AV6z tel. no. 1286/18.5.19, Mavroudis to Politis, MOFA 141 tel. no. 1170/4.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.  
17/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4536/14.5.19 Venizelos to MOFA.
opinion that the youth of Asia Minor, Turkish as well as Greek, should have an important position within the new regime. Local high schools such as the Evangeliki Scholi Smyrnis were known to produce graduates of a high standard. Those interested in taking up a post with the administration would be sent to Athens for a short period of training and would subsequently return to Asia Minor to serve in appropriate positions 18/. Furthermore, from the first days of Stergiadis' presence in Smyrna, the leaders of the Jewish and Armenian communities in the city were informed that the future Greek administration intended to employ a significant number of well qualified Jews and Armenians. Those Turks working in the public sector until the Greek landing would be asked to remain in their positions, while more would be added according to the needs of the new regime, with a view ultimately to forming a multiracial administration reflecting the nature of the society to be administered 19/.

The High Commission was housed in the former Greek Consulate and several high ranking civil servants from Greece soon joined Stergiadis' team. As the military occupation was extended over a major part of the zone anticipated by Greece from the peace treaty, representatives of the High Commissioner were sent to the interior of Asia Minor to take charge of the situation. In view of the influx of civilians and army officers taking part in the occupation, their housing was one of the immediate problems for the Greek authorities. Services and departments were to be housed in public buildings while appropriate houses, preferably of Greek ownership, were to be rented by a special committee for the housing of officers and civilian employees of the administration, comprising of one officer, one primate and one representative of the High Commission. Army officers were not allowed to accept hospitality from local civilians of any nationality and commandeering of houses was forbidden 20/.

Gradually, the departments of the High Commission started taking shape. Their task was threefold: to exercise discreet control over the Turkish authorities until Greece assumed the administration of the area after the signature of the peace treaty, to represent Greek interests and liaise with the representatives of the powers in the city as well as with the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople and, thirdly, to lay the foundations for the establishment of an effective state machinery in Asia Minor.

The administrative work carried out by the Greek High Commission of Smyrna, falls into two periods: that preceding the signature of the peace treaty (May 1919 to August 1920)

18/ Vaccas, op. cit, p.269 quoting Venizelos' instructions to Stergiadis.
19/ MOFA 136z tel. no. 2884/17.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
20/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4003/29.4.19, Venizelos to Mavroudis for Zafiriou.
and that following the treaty and lasting until September 1922. During the first period, the High Commission was to exercise overall control over the Ottoman administrative authorities which were to be preserved intact until the Peace Conference conferred the rule over the occupied area to Greece. This arrangement entailed a number of problems in view of the reforms needed and the bad faith displayed towards the new regime by the Turkish, Greek and foreign communities alike. To complicate matters further, the administration of Turkey as a whole, including the zone mandated to Greece, was under the direct supervision of the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople during both periods. After the signature of the treaty, Greece was to receive administrative responsibility for the zone assigned to her (Greek zone) and, at the same time, to exercise control of the Turkish authorities in the area she occupied de facto, as a result of subsequent military operations outside the boundaries of the officially mandated zone.

Initially, the High Commission was organized into twelve departments including the Office of the High Commissioner, the General Secretariat, and the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Repatriation and Rehabilitation of Refugees, Post Offices, Prisons, Finance, Public Works, Moslem Affairs, Public Health and Translation. Commenting on the tremendous task undertaken by these departments, Stergiadis noted:

"The task we have undertaken in Asia Minor is not beyond our capabilities and I am convinced that it will be completed. I must, however, forewarn you that it is unlikely that we will complete it impeccably. My cause of concern lies with the military and the local Christian population: the military experience difficulties in reconciling their double task, i.e. police and administrative work for the preservation of public order on the one hand and military duties on the other. These difficulties could probably be overcome if it were not for the destructive influence of the local Christians. They are disrespectful to us, resentful towards the Moslems and, being inclined to revenge, they induce our soldiers to cause disturbances. What is more important, still petrified of the ferocious past, they initiate rumours exaggerating the numbers of the enemy as well as the dispositions and plans of the local Moslems, thereby creating an atmosphere prone to panic" 21/.

Venizelos was aware of these problems and realized that Zafiriou and his staff might not be able to impose

21/ MOFA 136t tel. no. 6578/3.7.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
discipline on the local Greeks, thereby risking their amicable relations with them. In his messages he underlined the risks involved and with pleas and firm orders urged the military to face the situation with severity. Diomidis wrote to Paraskevopoulos along the same lines:

"We shall be on trial and the final form and, above all, the territorial extent of our role will depend on the impartiality of our administration and our strong defence of the rights of the minorities. If events prove that we are not even subconsciously inclined to avenge our sufferings at the hands of the Turks for five centuries and that we know how to treat them because we are carriers of a higher civilization, only then can we hope to extricate the decision of the conference for extensive rule over extensive territories".

Indeed, the work carried out by the High Commission during the three years of Greek occupation and the diversity of the tasks undertaken indicate that Stergiadis was one of the best administrators ever produced by Greece. These tasks ranged from the repatriation and rehabilitation of some 250,000 refugees to the institution of the most progressive university in the area, the organization of an excellent public health service free to all nationalities, the conduct of major archaeological excavations and the care of Moslem institutions such as the Vakoufs, in a way that doubled their proceeds. However, the efforts of the High Commissioner and his team to create the circumstances which would secure the peaceful coexistence of the various communities and result in the prosperity of the country were impeded by numerous factors.

The Ottoman Empire had always been an important field of western European economic activity mainly because of the absence of Turkish businessmen antagonizing foreign interests. By contrast, Greek merchants and businessmen were eager to occupy a dominant position in the economy of the area should Smyrna, the entrepot of trade between East and West, be assigned to Greece. This was well known to western capitalists who had no wish to share the Anatolian market with their former employees. Venizelos optimistically believed, however, that the "European communities of Smyrna" which reacted negatively to Greek claims would soon become the best allies of Greece in her effort not only to keep the zone awarded to her but to increase it further. It was his belief that this would happen once the levantine community was convinced that Greece was there to stay. What he did not

22/ Petsalis, op.cit, p.210, quoting a letter from Diomidis to Paraskevopoulos dated 16.5.19, from DPA.
23/ MOFA AAK 1919 tel. no. 4384/11.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
seem to have considered was the fact that the major financial interests of Britain, Italy and France in such Turkish monopolies as the Regie des Tabacs, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Debt, together with smaller private interests, exercised tremendous pressure on the Allied leaders and their representatives in Turkey. Indeed, this pressure had a lot to do with the Allied refusal to agree to a permanent role for Greece in Asia Minor 24/. What was more, the preservation of the capitulations and extraterritoriality for foreign nationals within the Greek zone led to the creation of an Allied state within the Greek state which, in its turn, was a state within Turkey, at the time divided into the state of Constantinople and the state of Ankara 25/. At the same time, the absence of a clear definition of the Greek mandate and the existence of interallied authorities whose functions and duties largely overlapped with those of the Greek administration complicated matters further. This situation, coupled with the decision of the Supreme Council that all movements of the Greek army had to be approved by General Milne, resulted in a series of misunderstandings and friction between the Greek High Commission on the one side and the Allied representatives and the Turkish authorities on the other. These were mainly due to the absence of any definition of the mandate over Smyrna and its hinterland given to Greece by the Allies. No one knew the extent or the limits of the authority and jurisdiction of either the Greek High Commission or the Allied representatives. It was thus clear that, as long as this confusion persisted, it would be impossible to avoid regrettable incidents.

The first to complain was the Italian Consul in Smyrna who protested to his Minister in Athens about the alleged anti-Italian stance of the Greek authorities. In his reply, Stergiadis did not refute the fact that there existed open animosity on the part of local Greeks towards the Italians but, he went on, this animosity was reciprocated. Despite the bad feelings, the Greek High Commission did its best to forestall any serious manifestation of this animosity and gave in to nearly all the demands of the Italian representative with the exception of cases where vital Greek interests were at stake. One such instance arose when the Italian Consul demanded that the capitulatory rights of his citizens be applied not only as they used to be under the Turkish regime but also in connection with cases before the military courts. This in effect meant that Italian citizens charged with espionage against the Greek forces would be tried by the Italian consular court. This demand was satisfied "temporarily" and the matter was to be settled at intergovernmental level 26/. The Greek authorities went to extremes - to placate the Italians. When a letter addressed to

24/ Solomonidis, V. "International Finance Versus Greece in Asia Minor", article submitted for publication.
25/ ibid.
26/ MOFA 136p tel. n.n./20.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos and Diomidis.
Major Carossini -well known for his spying activities- was mistakenly opened by the military censors, Stergiadis apologized publicly after the incident was reported to the Italian Ambassador in Athens who made a demarche to the MOFA in this respect 27/.

Following the example of his Italian colleague, the French Consul reported to Paris that the Greek civil employees were using their position to extract money from Turkish and Greek civilians. Stergiadis protested strongly against this accusation and, in his turn, accused the French Consul of bad faith. Although the conduct of the civil servants was spied upon on a methodical and constant basis and reported directly to the High Commissioners in Constantinople, the issue was never raised officially. On the contrary, he continued, the trust of the locals towards the Greek authorities had grown steadily to the extent that issues falling under the jurisdiction of the Allied Consular authorities in Smyrna were brought to them instead, in the belief that the Greek High Commission would be able to resolve them sooner, in a more efficient way. A telegram sent to Constantinople by the Vali and intercepted by the Greek authorities, wrote Stergiadis, confirmed that the Greek civil servants were treating the Turkish public well 28/.

These and other incidents soon resulted in a demarche by the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to their respective governments requesting the intervention of the Supreme Council to resolve the issue. In December 1919, the Supreme Council referred the matter to the Greek Committee which, in turn, asked the Allied representatives in Constantinople "to proceed with the examination of questions relating to the Greek administration and to establish certain facts relative to the interference of the Greek authorities in the administrative and judicial affairs of the interallied services or the Ottoman authorities in Smyrna" 29/. In their note to the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople, his Allied counterparts concluded that, far from disturbing the Greek authorities, this inquiry would facilitate their mission by defining their role and jurisdiction and could, in any case, only serve to clarify the situation 30/.

Venizelos was quick to realize the real issues behind this proposed inquiry and, in view of Greek blunders in the

27/ MOFA 136t 6327/28.6.19, Diomidis to Italian Ambassador. For Italo-Greek relations in Smyrna, Solomonidis, V."Italy Versus Greece in Asia Minor", article submitted for publication.
28/ MOFA 59g tel. no. 7338/24.9.19, Stergiadis to MOFA and Venizelos.
29/ DBFP IV, no. 581, tel. no. 2033/5.11.19, Robeck to Curzon, FO 608/103-21220, desp. 330/5/11.19 Morgan to Robeck, desp. 2174/19.11.19, Robeck to Curzon. MOFA 76z tel.no. 12192/5.12.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
30/ AV14e 173/2629/5.12.19, Kanellopoulos to Venizelos and Stergiadis.
execution of the landing, the events following the occupation of Menemen and Akhisar and the destruction of Aidin, he feared that there was a serious risk of Greece being ousted from Smyrna as a result of the inquiry 31/. He believed that these blunders "were expertly used by the enemies of the Greek occupation in order to cast doubts on its credibility and possibly succeed in bringing it to an end as it afflicted a multitude of powerful foreign interests" 32/.

He was also quick to draw the attention of the Greek military to the need for close contact and cooperation with General Milne so as not to give him any cause for complaint, but, on the contrary, to win him over and put him in a position to testify in favour of the Greek side at the inquiry. In view of the blunders committed since the landing of the Greek troops, Venizelos seemed to have lost his faith in the ability of the Greek soldiers and the local population to behave in a way "worthy of the Allied trust" and took every opportunity to castigate civilians and soldiers alike:

" Until now we have not proved worthy of the trust of the Allies. If we do not remedy the situation immediately and if we do not forestall any further regrettable incidents, it is likely that we will be subjected to the insult of being considered once and for all unworthy of this trust and everyone understands what this will entail. I demand from the officers that they realize the gravity of the situation at hand and act swiftly in order to avoid any further complications...The local Greeks should also come to realize that no act of revenge will be tolerated by the army. As much as we sympathize with their past sufferings, we cannot allow them to endanger the good name of the nation. We came to Asia Minor not only to bring freedom to our brothers but also to secure the freedom of all the elements of the population. If we find them standing in the way of the honourable task we have undertaken, we will treat them as enemies" 33/.

In fact, it seems that the local Allied representatives were partly responsible for the awkward situation. The Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople had

31/ For the events following the advance of Greek army see Chapter Two, Section II.
32/ MOFA 41th tel. no. 7267/16.11.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
33/ MOFA 136t tel. no. 6625/5.6.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis for Zafiriou. In the same message, Venizelos instructed the army officers not to accept any accusations of the local Greeks against foreign nationals before careful examination of the facts.
repeatedly reported to Athens that, ever since their arrival, whenever a case arose for them to mediate between Greece and Turkey, they refused to do so on the pretext that they were in Constantinople in order to survey the execution of the armistice terms. Kanellopoulos' comment was that if one were to judge by the facility with which the population was able to procure arms, one could safely say that even this surveillance was not carried out effectively. The Greek High Commissioner further reported that, in his mind, the Allied representatives were in no position to intervene mainly because of lack of unity among them as they each sought to attract the favour of the Turks by using old diplomatic methods. Thus, a mutual mistrust had developed which was soon perceived and cultivated by the Porte to its advantage while on a number of occasions, the policies followed by the Allied High Commissioners on the spot, were contrary to the official policies of their governments vis-à-vis Turkey. Kanellopoulos concluded that the Allied representatives had a large share in the blame they attached to the Greek administration of Smyrna 34/. Venizelos seemed to share this view and complained to Clémenceau, at the time President of the Supreme Council, that "certain agents" of the Allied powers misunderstood the intentions of their respective governments and continued to manifest their negative attitude towards the Greek administration of Smyrna "in the most deplorable way". The Greek Premier further requested that the Powers instruct their agents to be objective in their assessment of the situation in order to avoid regrettable complications from which only the enemies of the Allies could benefit 35/.

In the meantime, the Greek Committee had briefed Venizelos on the grievances of the Allied High Commissioners against the Greek administration, which mainly revolved around the issues of press censorship and the existence of two parallel boards of censors, one interallied and one Greek, the alleged obstruction of the duties of the Turkish police and gendarmerie, the operation of the Turkish civil courts and the substitution of the Allied port, customs and immigration authorities by Greek ones. In a letter to Stergiadis, Venizelos commented upon this meeting: "As soon as we managed to avert the dangers emanating from the International Commission of Inquiry, we are again facing obstacles put in our way by the ever-powerful, pro-Turkish international circles" 36/. The Greek premier immediately requested a report on the situation and, in the meantime, tried to convince the Committee that all grievances, even if based on facts, referred to the exercise of rights given to Greece as a result of a military occupation. He argued that it was already a great concession on the part of Greece to allow an Allied censorship to operate and, if there was any obstruction of the duties of the gendarmerie, it was probably due to the mistrust

34/ MOFA 26d tel. no. 5119/27.1.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
35/ MOFA 59b letter, n.n./4.11.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
36/ MOFA 41th 7367/1911.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
it generated by its anti-Allied conduct. Although the Committee accepted Venizelos' explanations, it did nothing to ameliorate the tense situation and the relations between the Greek administration, the Allied authorities and the local population.

Although no practical decisions were taken at that stage, Venizelos intimated to Stergiadis that, as he understood it, the adversaries of the Greek occupation were striving for the creation of a council comprising six Allied representatives with the Greek High Commissioner as chairman, supposedly to avert similar problems and grievances but in reality to diminish the authority of the Greek High Commissioner and to interfere in the affairs of the Greek administration on a daily basis. The establishment of such an Interallied administration could not of course be accepted by Greece and it was Venizelos' conviction that he would be able to forestall these efforts as "in Smyrna we have gone to stay for good despite the venomous - albeit understandable - reactions of many circles" 37/.

Stergiadis hastened to reply with a long report refuting all accusations and explaining the difficult conditions the Allied representatives imposed on the performance of his duties. He made the following points:

According to international law, the occupation of Smyrna by Greece should have had as a normal consequence the conducting of press censorship by the Greek military authorities. This procedure, however, entailed the abolition of the Smyrna branch of the Interallied Board of Censors which had been established after the armistice to exercise preventive censorship and to consider applications for the publication of new newspapers 38/. Taking into consideration Allied susceptibilities, the Greek government tolerated the existence of the Interallied Board of Censors (IBC) and was willing to let things be were it not for the grave problems this state of affairs presented. For this reason, it was decided to create a parallel Greek board, independent of the military authorities and to relieve the IBC of the duty to examine applications for new publications. In this way, although the IBC was free to allow the publication of any article that would seem reprehensible, the Greek board would be able, in turn, to prevent publications against its interests. This measure, Stergiadis emphasized, was based on the precedent set in Salonica where, during the War, the

37/ MOFA, ibid and AV14a tel. no. 2577/966/22.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
38/ It is worth mentioning that the Interallied Board of Censors in Constantinople was reported to present grave problems to the local Greek press. At one stage, even the publication of the text of Venizelos' speeches was censored. MOFA 62a, letter n.n./23.11.19, K. Spanoudis, editor of Proodos, to Kanellopoulos.
Commander in Chief of the Eastern Armies had reserved the right to exercise censorship alongside the Greek authorities eventhough Greece was not an enemy country under occupation.

The Allied High Commissioners perceived this measure as an effort on the Greek side to nullify the work of the IBC. Although they noted the fact that the Greek administration was responsible for the security of both the troops and public order and, therefore, more directly interested in the control of censorship, they underlined that "this legitimate anxiety" must be in harmony with the interests represented by the Allied delegates. To their mind, the problems that occured could be remedied by abolishing the Greek board of censors and by attaching a Greek officer to the IBC. Every member of the IBC would have the right of veto, whereupon the publication of the article in question would immediately be subject to the approval of the three Allied delegates and the Greek High Commissioner in Smyrna. In case of disagreement at this point, it was proposed that the matter would be decided by the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople, in whose mind the measures described above would alone lead to a precise definition of the character of the Greek mandate in Turkey.

To these arguments, Stergiadis countered that the Greek High Commission recognized the unlimited right of the IBC to censor all publications favouring Greece but not the right to award unlimited freedom to the Turkish press. As early as November 1919, Venizelos had drawn Clémenceau's attention to the fact that the IBC was unnecessarily hostile to any pro-Greek publication. The case at hand concerned the suppression of an article by a French engineer, in which he elaborated on the view that, far from clashing, French and Greek interests in Asia Minor were in perfect harmony, and another article in which the High Commissioner was praised for the measures he had taken regarding the lighting of the streets at night. Although no satisfactory reply was received to this complaint, it was the IBC that precipitated a direct clash with the Greek authorities when a Turkish newspaper was convicted by the Greek court martial for publishing an article accusing the Greeks of being "detestable insects sucking Turkish blood for one and a half centuries". This article was passed by the IBC and its publication -along with others on the same lines- made a strong impression in Moslem circles which interpreted the tolerance of the IBC as a sign of its pro-Turkish sympathies and led them to believe that any revolutionary move on their part would be tolerated and even encouraged by the Allies. Upon publication, the author of the article and the owner of the newspaper were courtmartialled and received sentences of one year's

39/ MOFA 36t tel. no. 3357/13.3.20, Kanellopoulos to MOFA communicating the Report of the Allied High Commissioners on the administration of Smyrna and its hinterland.

40/ MOFA 59b letter, n.n./4.11.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
imprisonment. The Greek Court Martial perceived these sentences as a preventive measure against any eventual rising of the Turks in the Greek zone. Commenting on this particular article, the Allied High Commissioners pointed out that "it would be preferable if the article had not been published" but they also remarked that the Greek authorities should not have prosecuted those responsible for an article passed by the IBC. As it happened, a month later, Venizelos asked Stergiadis to set the two men free in view of "foreign policy considerations 41/.

Stergiadis pointed out that the IBC assumed great responsibilities when displaying such severity towards all articles favouring Greece and such magnanimity towards all publications encouraging revolutionary tendencies. The Greek authorities were prepared to overlook the suppression of the former but they could not accept that the IBC had the right to protect the freedom of the Turkish press at the expense of the preservation of public order for which Greece was solely responsible. The Greek argument was given further credibility by the fact that Stergiadis was adamant that journalism in Smyrna should be left to its own devices and that there was no reason for the Greek administration to exercise any sort of influence on the newspapers. On the contrary, he advocated that neutrality in this matter was essential 42/.

In the event, the Greek side compromised and the Greek board of censorship was abolished as a result of allied pressure. The IBC was reorganized to include a Greek delegate, on the same footing as his Allied colleagues, and an agreement was reached on the following points: as requested by the Greek side, no new Greek or Turkish newspaper would be allowed to start publication during the armistice period; for newspapers in other languages a special permit by the IBC was required; the IBC had the power to enforce the temporary suspension of the publication of a newspaper; the censoring of articles was to be decided by a majority vote. If the Greek delegate objected to an article passed with a majority of votes, its publication was to be postponed until the Greek High Commissioner and the Allied representatives in Smyrna had expressed their opinion. Stergiadis reported that through these measures, sources of friction with regard to the control of the press were minimized 43/ After the signature of the treaty, the IBC for Smyrna was disbanded and all matters relating to the press came under the jurisdiction of the Press Office of the Greek Administration of Smyrna.

41/ MOFA 59b letter, n.n./4.11.19 Venizelos to Clémenceau.
42/ MOFA 143d tel. no. 12298/8.12.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
43/ MOFA 142o tel. nos. 7493/12.8.19 Diomidis to Stergiadis and 7755/9.8.19, Stergiadis to Diomidis. At that time, 27 newspapers were published in Smyrna: 11 Greek, 4 French, 5 Armenian, 5 Jewish and 7 Turkish. List in GAK 53/1919.

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With reference to alleged obstruction of the proceedings of the Turkish civil courts, Stergiadis reported that problems arose only when a decision of a court had to be enforced against a foreigner enjoying capitulatory and extraterritorial rights. In fact, no decision of a Turkish court against an Allied citizen could be carried out if it were incompatible with the system of capitulations. The source of friction in this respect stemmed from the fact that at one stage the Greek court martial took upon itself to try common law cases. When the Allied representatives refused to recognize this extension of the court martial's authority and jurisdiction, the matter was dropped 44/.

As far as the issues connected with the Turkish gendarmerie were concerned, Stergiadis agreed that there existed a very serious problem. He argued however that the Greek administration had never obstructed its functioning but was exercising overall control. This control was vital in view of the fact that the Turkish gendarmerie was a body of well trained, armed men, the majority of whom had nationalist or CUP connections. Therefore, should the gendarmerie be allowed to perform its duties without any control, it would constitute a grave danger to the security of the Greek forces which could at any time be attacked from the rear. Even small units of gendarmerie could cause grave damage by transmitting or facilitating the flow of information and war material to the nationalist camp or, even, by contributing to the blowing up of bridges and railways. Stergiadis was not speculating but speaking on the basis of plots already uncovered by the Greek forces. On a number of occasions he mediated with the military authorities regarding the sentences received by gendarmes arrested on charges of espionage. At times he even set a number of them free on the condition they left the Greek zone immediately and, as a rule, he did not permit any death sentences to be executed.

Precautionary control was exercised in the recruitment of gendarmes and the numbers to be assigned to each district and through the immediate transfer of any gendarme under suspicion. Their duties were restricted to escorting the tax collectors, executing court orders, guarding public buildings and escorting the mail pouches to the interior of the zone. This restriction of duties, however, was possible only in places where an adequate Greek gendarmerie unit existed to undertake the remaining responsibilities of the corps.

In areas where no Greek gendarmerie or troops were available, the Turkish units were allowed to perform their

44/ MOFA 12e tel. no. 6484/12.10.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
duties on the condition that, should a crime be committed in their area of jurisdiction, the nearest Greek authority should be informed and those arrested should be handed over to be prosecuted under Greek martial law. Although all heavy weapons had to be surrendered, the gendarmes were allowed to keep their knives and revolvers.

During a meeting with the commander of the Turkish gendarmerie, Stergiadis analyzed the contradictions involved and the resulting suspicions of the Greek military and added that, as he was convinced that they would perform their duties impeccably, he would not hesitate to entrust his men with the security of the urban areas, if the nationalists stopped attacking the Greek army and if serious guarantees were given to this effect. The Turkish commander recognized the difficult conditions that caused the Greek authorities to doubt his men and agreed that the measures taken by Stergiadis were the best under the circumstances.

According to Stergiadis, the grievances of the Allied High Commissioners with regard to the Smyrna Port Authority were unfounded. After the conclusion of the armistice, the Allied High Commissioners had established an Interallied Commission of Navigation Control in Turkish waters, whose delegation in Smyrna functioned satisfactorily but it was deprived of its objective when the Greeks took over the port and the Customs House and, with the exception of a small Turkish police contingent, placed the policing of the port entirely in the hands of armed Greek marines under the direct control of the Greek Port Master 45/.

The Greek side had taken over "by right emanating from the military occupation" and exercised the policing of the port with the exception of passport control, travel permits, and arrivals and departures of civilians. These duties were entrusted to the Interallied Port Police headed by a French, an Italian, a British and a Greek officer working "in harmony". This arrangement had been arrived at by a compromise on the Greek side. From the first days of the Greek occupation it had been established that the Italian authorities issued Turkish nationalists with passports on the basis of which they arrived at and departed from Smyrna freely. What was more, they were also provided with certificates of Italian protection and were made to wear special badges. The pretext in most cases was that the protected person was of Albanian or Dodecanesian origin. This measure was thought as contravening the decision of the Supreme Council by which the protection of the Smyrna

45/ MOFA 36t doc. no. 3357/13.3.20, Report...Stergiadis had insisted that experienced officers be sent from Athens to undertake the administration of the port. MOFA 142st tel.no. 10472/4.9.19, Stergiadis to Ministry of National Economy.
population as a whole was entrusted to the Greek army 46/. On Venizelos' specific orders, the Greek authorities refused to accept the validity of these passports and did not allow anyone to leave the city without documents issued or endorsed by the Greek police. As the military occupation of the city was in Greek hands, it was stressed, it was the Greek authorities who were responsible for the preservation of public order and, consequently, for the performance of police duties 47/.

Demarches to the Italian Ambassador in Athens were to no avail and, at first stage, the issue of the passport control was arranged as follows: Foreign nationals holding passports of their own nationality and endorsed by the Interallied Port Authority, were allowed to come and go as they pleased. Turkish or other nationals, who were holders of protection certificates required a permit by the Greek police to travel. Those who had not secured this permit beforehand, obviously met with difficulties at the time of departure. In the event, because of strong allied pressure, the Greek side was forced to abolish all distinctions between foreign nationals and Turkish citizens under foreign protection 48/.

Furthermore, despite the dangers this arrangement entailed in view of the martial law in force, the Greek Port Authority did not interfere with the management of the quay and the lighthouses in the Smyrna gulf which had been entrusted by the Ottoman regime to international companies within the context of capitulations 49/. Clearly, this was yet another case where the function of a Greek authority overlapped with that of an Interallied one.

To complicate matters further, major problems arose over the control of the Health Services and the demand of the Allied High Commissioners that the Greek Health Authorities should conform to the orders of the Interallied Commission on Health and Hygiene established in Constantinople. The real cause of the friction between the two authorities seemed to lie in the fact that the body in charge of the Health Service, effectively had in its hands the best propaganda machinery with which to convince the Turkish population of the benefits of this or the other regime.

In September 1919, following a plague epidemic in Smyrna, the Allied High Commissioners decided to establish an Interallied Commission on Health and Hygiene composed of French, English, Italian, American, Greek and Turkish doctors. Its mission was to exercise control over the health conditions

46/ AV tel. no. 1304/21.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.
47/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4396/28.5.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
48/ MOFA 136t tel. no. 6327/28.6.19, Diomidis to Italian Ambassador. MOFA 136p tel. n.n./20.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos and Diomidis.
49/ AV 14a tel. no. 2577/966/22.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
in the area while the Turkish administration was responsible for the implementation of the measures suggested by the Commission. The Turks, however, were soon in no position to do this because of lack of funds. In view of the grave danger of epidemics spreading to the troops, the Greek authorities could not overlook the Turkish inactivity and soon established their own Health Authority. The High Commissioners admitted that "this initiative was legitimised by the necessity to protect the health of the troops". In their opinion, however, this preoccupation could not justify the fact that the Greek authorities implemented various measures without previously consulting the Interallied Commission on Health and Hygiene. To their mind, "the Interallied Commission on Health has been reduced to insignificance, its role is nominal and it is not in a position to implement the orders given to its Ottoman agents". The only way to improve health and sanitation conditions in Smyrna, it was argued, was for the Greek government to instruct the Health Authority to conform to the decisions of the Interallied Commission.

At the insistence of the High Commissioners, Stergiadis agreed to let the Health Service be provided by the agents of the Interallied Commission on the condition that the Greek Health Authority could function alongside it and implement as many measures as it considered necessary for the protection of the Greek army and population, including, among other things, vaccinations and the disinfection of buildings. Showing a conciliatory spirit, Stergiadis agreed that the Turkish Health Inspectors acting for the Interallied Commission should inspect the ships arriving at the Smyrna port first, to be followed by their Greek colleagues. Should a ship flying a foreign flag refuse to accept this second inspection, the Greek Health Inspectors had orders not to insist.

The matter of the Customs Authority was rather more complicated as it touched upon an area more sensitive to Allied susceptibilities than the health of the troops and population or the freedom of movement and contraband granted de facto to the nationalists by the various Interallied Authorities. The Allied High Commissioners complained that although the Turkish Custom Authorities continued to function regularly, they were subject to the strict control and the constant intervention of Greek functionaries attached to them and responsible for the consideration of applications for exports. The Greek military authorities had taken upon themselves to compose a list of articles whose exportation from the Greek zone was prohibited so that the needs of the army should receive priority. Although this list, the High Commissioners admitted, remained a dead letter, General Nider who instigated it, had perpetrated the crime of ignoring the existence of the Interallied Commission of Exports in Constantinople which was the only body competent to regulate

50/ On the work of the Greek Health Service see Chapter Three, Section III.
51/ MOFA 36t doc. no. 3357/13.3.20, Report...
the matter and to ensure the regular provisioning of goods for the whole of the Ottoman Empire.

This in effect meant that the Greek Customs Authority not only had to observe the controls set by the Interallied Commission for the whole of the Empire but also to apply to this Commission in order to secure permission to implement the special measures needed in Smyrna at any point in time. However, this procedure was not easy to apply because as soon as the news of a Greek application reached the foreign businesses dealing in the merchandise in question, all the stocks of the merchandise were exported from Smyrna before this application could be considered by the Commission. Therefore, it was essential for the Greek authorities to be able to ban the exports of a particular product pending the decision of the Interallied Commission 52/.

The Greek authorities were also criticized "for interpreting the term exportation in its widest sense" as they had not only prohibited the exportation of certain goods from the port of Smyrna to other countries but also to Constantinople. Since no definite decision had been taken by the Supreme Council regarding the future of Smyrna, the prohibition of exports from one Turkish port to another could not be accepted 53/. In the minds of the Allied High Commissioners, the matter could be resolved by the institution of yet another Interallied Authority to represent the Interallied Commission of Exports in Smyrna. What they did not seem to appreciate was that the Greek authorities had to reinforce the Custom House with a large number of guards in order to forestall the contraband of arms and ammunition destined for the nationalists and flourishing along the coast of western Asia Minor 54/.

In January 1920, the Allied Admirals in Constantinople communicated to Stergiadis their decision to establish a new Interallied Authority in the port of Smyrna, comprising three Allied and one Greek officer. Its functions would be as follows:

To secure the implementation of all measures taken for the abolition of contraband in war material; to survey the

52/ MOFA ibid. This procedure was followed in the autumn of 1919 when the export of cotton from the port of Smyrna was prohibited for a few days, pending a decision from the Constantinople Exports Commission. The decision to ban cotton exports was taken to safeguard the local thread and yarn industry, mostly in the hands of French businesses. It was lifted within a few days because of strong protests by the British Chamber of Commerce of Smyrna. AV 14a tel. no. 2557/966/22.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
53/ MOFA 36t doc. no. 3357/13.3.20, Report...
54/ AV 14a tel. no. 2557/966/22.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
exports and imports of merchandise in conformity with the rules set out by the Interallied Commission of Exports in Constantinople; to have overall authority on matters relating to the surveillance of the movement, docking and security of ships in the port, the implementation of all measures set out by the Interallied Commission on health and hygiene, the policing of the port and the functioning of the lighthouses in the port of Smyrna. Finally, to assist in all matters relating to the Interallied Passport Control, the administration of the local police and the functioning of the Customs House. In all cases, the duties of this new Interallied Authority would be exercised with "every respect due to the rights of the international companies in charge of the quays and lighthouses of the Smyrna gulf". Each of the four officers was to be allocated specific duties and was to conform to orders received by his respective superior in Constantinople. Stergiadis immediately communicated this note to Athens and Paris with the comment that under no circumstances could he accept "interallied interference" in the policing of the city 55/. Politis expressed the view that should these measures be implemented the Greek occupation would prove impossible to maintain. The Greek Foreign Minister was most annoyed as no previous intimation had been made to the Greek government regarding the institution of yet another interallied authority 56/.

Following Venizelos's instructions, Stergiadis replied to the Allied High Commissioners that the Greek High Commissioner in Smyrna had been appointed by his government in order to supervise the implementation of a mandate entrusted to Greece by the Supreme Council. He therefore assumed absolute responsibility for the maintenance of public order within the Greek zone, a duty he would not be in a position to fulfil on the basis of orders and directives by the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople. For this reason, Stergiadis wrote, the High Commissioners were requested whenever they wished to propose the application of new measures, to prompt a relevant decision of the Supreme Council. The latter was sure to request the view of the Greek government before taking any decision and would, in this way, provide the Greek High Commissioner with the chance to voice his comments or possible objections. According to the system the Allied High Commissioners sought to implement, Stergiadis concluded, the Greek High Commissioner was asked to become an executive organ and implement measures and decisions taken without his being consulted, "by persons residing in a city where news regarding the situation in Smyrna cannot always be objective" 57/.

55/ MOFA 51b tel. no. 11333/2.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
56/ MOFA tel. no. 12885/7.1.20, Politis to Venizelos.
57/ MOFA 51b tel. no. 111517/7.1.20 Venizelos to Stergiadis and 345/18.3.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos. It seems that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been informed either and, for this reason, the strong words used by Stergiadis in his reply to the note, received Clémenceau's approval.
After this reply the matter was dropped, only to be raised again three months later, when the Allied representatives in Smyrna reminded Stergiadis that "the jurisdiction of the Allied High Commissioners extended over the whole of Turkey, including Smyrna" and informed him that an Interallied Authority for the port of Smyrna would soon arrive in the city and hoped to collaborate with a Greek officer. In a conversation with Admiral Fitzmaurice and General Highbury, Stergiadis established that the British delegates considered the implementation of the measure pointless as it had been conceived at a much earlier stage under different circumstances and with reference to the whole of Turkey and not exclusively to Smyrna. However, they were quick to point out that, as this decision was taken by the Allied High Commissioners, the British authorities in Smyrna could not disobey their orders or refuse to implement the measures. To a question by Admiral Fitzmaurice asking what his reaction would be should the High Commissioners insist, Stergiadis replied that the Greek authorities could in no way accept the interference of an Interallied Authority in the policing of the city. "With reference to the administration of the port, should they insist despite our objections, we do not plan to put up armed resistance" 58/. Stergiadis seemed convinced that the local British representatives wished to see the measure suspended because they recognized that interference by the various Allied bodies in the administration of Smyrna complicated and obstructed the Greek task. In the event, it was decided in Constantinople not to insist on the institution of the Interallied Port Authority but to maintain the unofficial surveillance of the passport control. Nonetheless, "it was in this desire to prove their liberalism that the Greek authorities were unable to forestall the levantine-european conspiracy and, in effect, allowed the nationalists to prepare everything from the start" 59/.

It was quite clear that all these problems and sources of friction were the result of a clash of authority between the Greek administration and the various Interallied bodies. The only possible way to remedy the situation, it was felt, would be to define in a precise manner the role and the powers of the Greek functionaries 60/. At this point, another issue of considerable importance was noted: "The accession of territory which Greece receives as an outcome of the war, brings to the fore the broad question of the country's administrative capacity...At a moment when Greece finds her administrative responsibilities largely increased, she is trying to carry on with a civil service considerably depleted as a result of the division of the country into two hostile camps. In the interests of Hellenism, it would now be necessary to make a definite attempt to heal the breach that now renders Greece a

58/ MOFA 51b tel. no. 345/18.3.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
59/ Andreadis,A. La destruction de Smyrne, Athens 1923, p.11.
60/ Near East, 21.6.19.
country divided against herself" 61/.

The Treaty of Sèvres assigned an area of 17,452 square kilometres in Asia Minor to the jurisdiction of Greece, under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The area was to be administered by Greece with the cooperation of a local parliament where the various national and religious groups would be proportionately represented. The Treaty also provided for a referendum to be conducted after five years to decide the issue of the annexation of the area by Greece 62/. Under the Turkish administration, Asia Minor was divided into 13 vilayets (general administrative units), which consisted of sancaks (provinces), in turn consisting of kazas (counties). The Vali, the Moutesarif and the Kaimakam were in charge respectively. The vilayet of Aidin consisted of four sancaks, those of Smyrna, Sarouhan, Aidin and Denizli. The sancak of Smyrna had 13 kazas, the sancak of Sarouhan 11, the sancaks of Aidin and Denizli 6 kazas each.

The Treaty of Sevres Zone, or the Greek Zone, extended over parts of the vilayets of Aidin and Brusa and had an estimated population of just over a million. The Greek part of the vilayet of Brousa extended over the kaza of Aivali, the Emrout-Abat area of the kaza of Vourhanie and the Moschonisia islands. In the vilayet of Aidin, Greece received the following areas:

a. The sancak of Smyrna except for a small part of the kaza of Odemis, and the kaza of Kouşadaşi (Ephesos). The Greek administration estimated that 806,000 out of the 827,000 inhabitants of the sancak were included in the Greek zone.

b. Part of the sancak of Sarouhan including most areas of the kazas of Manisa (Magnesia), Kasaba and Akhisar (Axari). It was estimated that out of 398,700 inhabitants, 195,000 were included in the Greek zone.

c. A small part of the sancak of Aidin, extending over parts of the kazas of Aidin and Nazili and totalling 45,000 out of the 204,500 inhabitants.

When there were no more doubts about the signature of the Treaty and the extent of the zone to be mandated to Greece, orders were received from Paris to the effect that all the ground work for the take over of the administration should be completed as soon as possible 63/. The day following the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, Stergiadis was to summon the Vali and request the handing over of the administration. This by no means signified that the Turkish authorities would be abolished or that the Turkish civil servants would be

61/ ibid.
62/ For the complete text of the Treaty of Sèvres pertaining to Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, as well as for the other Treaties signed on the same date at Sèvres see British and Foreign State Papers, Treaty Series, no 11 (1920), CMD 964.
63/ MOFA 49a tel. no. 11445/25.2.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
dismissed. On the contrary, every effort should be made to incorporate them into the Greek administration which, at the same time, should make use of the local Greek, Armenian and Jewish resources in personnel, on as great a scale as possible. Instead of dissolving the Turkish administrative structure in order to introduce a Greek one, Stergiadis tried to shape the existing machinery to the needs of the new regime and add Greek as well as foreign nationals to the civil service, thereby reflecting the multinational character of the zone to be administered. The only major change to be effected was the severing of all links between the Turkish employees and the Ottoman government. Stergiadis was to decide on the time limit to be given to the Turkish civil servants to declare whether they wished to offer their services to the new administration. On the issue of the customary oath taken by the members of the Greek civil service, Stergiadis suggested that the Turkish nationals should sign an affidavit instead, until such date as the Parliament decided on the issue 64/.

By the end of July, the High Commissioner reported that the Greek authorities were ready to assume the administration and that an adequate number of experienced civil servants had already arrived from Athens to take charge of the departments of justice, finance and national economy 65/.

To ensure that the take over would be effected without problems, Stergiadis asked the Vali to request instructions from Constantinople. As it did not seem that orders were forthcoming and in order to avoid any unnecessary delay and subsequent friction with the Turkish authorities, the High Commissioner sent a group of high ranking Turkish civil servants to Constantinople, to request directions. The Sublime Porte instructed them to relinquish the administration of the area as soon as the Treaty was signed and gave permission to those wishing to offer their services to the new regime to do so. This was vital for the Greek authorities who wished to maintain as many of them as possible as a guarantee of their good intentions towards the Turkish community.

Only three sections of the civil service were not included in the offer of the Greek administration: the gendarmerie, the police corps and the judiciary. Stergiadis considered reemploying at a later stage those who were prepared to resign from the Turkish gendarmerie to join the equivalent Greek corps. The local police force could not be maintained because no such body was to be included in the Greek administration. As far as the judiciary was concerned, a special law was needed to modify the organization of the equivalent body in Greece as the prevailing law did not provide for the incorporation of judges into the hierarchy. When this law was passed, the members of the Turkish judiciary

64/ MOFA 41e tel. no. 12124/20.7.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
65/ MOFA 16k tel. no. 818/18.8.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
would be asked to join the Greek administration. The personnel of all the other departments were to remain in their positions provisionally until a gradual evaluation of the abilities of each civil servant could be made. Similarly, no changes were to be made in the personnel of the Moufti's Office, the Ottoman Bank and the Turkish schools.

The instrument of the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey was signed at Sèvres on 10 August 1920. Two days later, a protocol was signed at the Governor's House (Konak) in Smyrna by which the Turkish side relinquished all authority to the Greeks. The Protocol was signed by Ahmet Besin, representing the Vali, and P. Gounarakis, representing the High Commissioner 66/.

The division of the Greek zone into administrative units was largely based on the system prevailing under Ottoman rule. Except for the kaza of Smyrna and the adjacent area of Ayiasuluk which were under the direct control of the Smyrna High Commission -renamed the Greek Administration of Smyrna (GAS)- the remaining zone was divided into fourteen counties (Ypodioikiseis) and one province (Nomarchia), as follows: The Province of Manisa and the Counties of Odemíç, Tire (Thira), Bairdér (Vaindirion), Nymphon, Krini, Karaburna, Sivríhisar, Vryula, Palea Fokea, Menemen, Kasaba, Bergama and Aivali 67/.

In the area occupied by the Greek army outside the Treaty of Sèvres zone, the system prevailing before the signature of the Treaty would be maintained since this territory was not, in any sense, given to Greece. Moreover, whilst the Greek administration was anxious to preserve both public order and the Turkish authorities at all costs, it viewed this area merely as a buffer zone between the nationalists and the Greek army. According to Venizelos, Greece would not evacuate the extended zone occupied in the summer of 1920 until the terms of the Treaty were carried out and, what was more, should Turkey fail to do so, the Greek forces were to advance far enough to render any efforts of the nationalists ineffective 68/. This area was known as the Militarily Occupied Zone (Stratiotikos katechomeni chora-MOZ) and, under the Greek regime, it was divided into administrative units, each headed by a representative of the High Commissioner.

By September 1922, the number of these units came to twenty. These were: the Higher Representation (Anotera Antiprosopia) of Brusa and the Representations (Antiprosopies) of Mudania, Panormos, Kios, Mihalits, Inegiol, Biga, Ezine, Balia, Balikesir, Soma, ADRAMYT, Salihli, Alasehir (Filadelfia), Koula, Uşak, Simav, Afion Karahisar, Kutahia and Eski Sehir. The Turkish authorities within these units would be preserved intact, together with the gendarmerie and the police force. The task of the Greek representatives

66/ MOFA 49a tel. no. 11445/25.2.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
67/ ibid.
68/ AV26t letter, n.n./5.8.20, Venizelos to Viscount Bryce.
was to supervise the Turkish administration and the application of Turkish laws regarding the administration, the tax system, the courts of justice etc. The representatives also saw to the application of the High Commissioner's orders and directives and, whenever possible, acted as intermediaries between the Greek military authorities and the Turkish administration.

After the military offensive during the summer of 1920 and the addition of new territories to the MOZ, representatives of the High Commissioner accompanied by Turkish gendarmerie units were sent to the areas of Salihli, Kirkagac, Soma, Adramyt and Kemer. Their first task was to reinstate the Turkish authorities, an effort which, reportedly, went a long way towards winning the trust of the local population and securing public order. After these successes of the Greek army, Stergiadis seemed to believe sincerely that the attitude of the Turkish public was "almost friendly, mainly because of the insufferable tyranny of the Kemalists and the certainty that the nationalist movement had been crushed" 69/. By September 1921, another thirteen representatives of the High Commissioner had been put in charge of the 31 kazas of the MOZ. Four of them doubled as inspectors of finances. They were all directly responsible to the High Commissioner and a special department was organized at the GAS to supervise and coordinate their work 70/. After the successful offensive of the Greek army, Stergiadis himself travelled in the occupied zone to secure the immediate reestablishment of the Turkish authorities and to persuade those Turkish civil servants reluctant to resume their posts to do so. Special orders to the Greek military and his representatives stressed the need not only to allow the Turkish administration to operate normally but also to protect it and render it every possible assistance. He also asked for the cooperation of the acting Vali of Smyrna and the Moutesarif of Manisa in the attempt to convince the Turkish civil servants to return to their duties and, failing this, to appoint new ones so that the work of the administration should not be disrupted. On the delicate issue of tax revenue management, Stergiadis ordered that all taxes should be collected by the Turkish authorities as in the past but all proceeds would be used in the first instance to pay the salaries of the Turkish civil servants. The rest would be used according to the directives of the Ottoman government. He further asked the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople to inform the Allied representatives and the Sublime Porte that the Greek administration had no wish to interfere in the financial affairs of the occupied zone (MOZ) but, in view of the deplorable financial situation of many Turkish civil servants due to delays from Constantinople in the payment of their salaries, he would have to intervene and use part of the

69/ MOFA 41e tel. n.n./23.7.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
70/ GAK 14a4 1978/22.9.21, Circular signed by the Secretary General of the GAS.
taxes for this purpose should these delays persist.

After the signature of the treaty and the official takeover of the administration, Stergiadis was anxious to have his jurisdiction, and especially his legislative powers, specified by law in order to govern the area with a free hand until the local parliament could be convened and for this reason he went to Athens on 20 August 1920. During his absence in Athens and on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty, the local Greeks prepared to organize celebrations "for the liberation of Smyrna and its unification with the motherland". Admittedly, this was a day the local Greek population had been awaiting for a long time. However, as the day of the "unification with the motherland" was in reality nowhere near, Stergiadis gave orders from Athens to the civil authorities not to take part in the celebrations so as not to offend Turkish national pride. He also ordered that the celebrations should be confined to the Greek Cathedral and strictly forbade all pageants, processions and the delivery of "the usual stupid speeches".

As a result of the High Commissioner's talks with the government, a law was passed stipulating that the Greek Administration of Smyrna would be headed by a representative of the government to whom all authorities in the Greek zone would answer, including the military High Command. This representative would bear the title of Smyrna High Commissioner and would be appointed by Royal Decree on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The law further stipulated that the post of High Commissioner was compatible with a ministerial portfolio and would have absolute administrative, judicial and legislative powers until such date as the local parliament could be convened after the ratification of the Treaty by Turkey. The High Commissioner was further given power to issue and sign decrees and to establish a University, a Moslem seminary and any other institutions he deemed necessary. Another law passed on the same date provided that the appointment of civil servants to the GAS and the institution of posts was to be done by Royal Decrees.

The Greek Administration of Smyrna (GAS) was organized into the following departments: Office of the High Commissioner and General Secretariat, Departments of Interior, Finances, Justice, Education, Public Health and Social Welfare, National Economy (divided into sections of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture), Public Works, Moslem Affairs and General Inspectorate.

71/ MOFA 3p tel. no. 9957/ 12.8.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos and Repoulis.
72/ MOFA 106b 1072/28.8.20, Stergiadis to Gounarakis.
73/ GGG, Series A, Law no. 2493/10.9.20.
74/ GGG, Series A, Law no. 2495/10.9.20.
Following the military operations of the summer 1921 and the addition of new territories to the MOZ, a major redistribution of tasks and a reorganization of the various departments within the GAS took place. As a result, ten departments were formed in order to deal more effectively with the ever increasing work load. These departments were:

1. **General Secretariat**: This included the Office of the High Commissioner, Sections for Political Affairs, External and Foreign Affairs and the Press Office.
2. **Department of Justice** with Sections for Prison Administration, Legal Translations and Personnel. This Department was represented in fifteen major towns of the Greek zone 75/.
3. **Department of the Interior** with Sections for Local Authorities and Administration, General Administration, Public Order and Religion.
4. **Department of Education** with Sections for Primary, Secondary and Higher Education, Antiquities, General Inspectorate and School Hygiene.
5. **Department of Finances** with Sections for Direct Taxation, Indirect Taxation, Public Property and Proceeds and Administration.
7. **Department of Public Works** with Sections for Administration, Roadworks, Harbours, Sewerage, Plumbing, Architecture and Public Buildings.
8. **Department of Telecommunications** with Sections for the Post Offices and Telegrams-Telephones.
10. **Department of Moslem Affairs** with Sections for Moslem Institutions, Moslem Education and Moslem Courts-Judicial Affairs 76/.
11. **Department of the Militarily Occupied Zone**, which acted as a coordinating body for all the representatives within the MOZ.

After this reorganization, the civil personnel of the GAS, with the exception of the judiciary, was incorporated

75/ MOFA 120g doc. no. 9475/31.5.21, Department of Justice to the High Commissioner.
76/ MOFA 120a2 circular 2/1.8.21, Stergiadis. The following were in charge of the Departments: 1. P. Gounarakis 2. G. Tomas 3. S. Skarpetis 4. S. Vassilias 5. I. Karamanos 6. Ortentzatos 7. G. Xynopoulos 8. D. Voudouris. For the Departments where no Director was appointed, Stergiadis acted as Head.
into the following categories and ranks, with monthly salaries specified accordingly:

I. Administration
1. Head of Department and Secretary General 2,000 drs
2. Director of Department (First Grade) and Nomarch 1,200 "
3. Director of Department (Second Grade) 1,050 "
4. Head of Section (First Grade) 900 "
5. Head of Section (Second Grade), Representative and Deputy Governor (First Grade) 750 "
6. Representative and Deputy Governor (Second Grade) 675 "
7. Secretary A' 600 "
8. Secretary B' 475 "
9. Attaché 375 "
10. Administrative Personnel A' Grade 300 "
11. Administrative Personnel B' Grade 250 "

II. Translators, Interpreters and Foremen
1. First Grade 600 drs
2. Second Grade 475 "
3. Assistants A' 375 "
4. Assistants B' 300 "
5. Head Foreman 250 "
6. Foreman A' 240 "
7. Foreman B' 200 "
8. Foreman C' 150 "
9. Cleaner 150 "

In October 1921, Stergiadis visited Athens to discuss further administrative measures to be taken for the effective organization of a civil administration throughout the area under military occupation 77/. The administration of the Treaty of Sèvres Zone was to continue as it was, while in the rest of the occupied territory, more Greek controllers and gendarmes would be appointed. In a subsequent meeting with Granville, Stergiadis tried to press the point that these measures were made necessary by the non-ratification of the Treaty and urged the imperative necessity for a speedy settlement. He seemed satisfied with the performance of the Ottoman authorities who were continuing to offer their services in the name of the Sublime Porte within the MOZ. All in all, the new measures agreed in Athens, came to an extension of the up until that time Smyrna Administration, to include the occupied territories (MOZ), without involving annexation or administrative assimilation to Greek territory 78/. In the framework of this reorganization, the Smyrna High Commission (Ypati Armosteia Smyrnis) was renamed Greek Administration of Smyrna (Elliniki Diikisis Smyrnis) 79/.

The Greek Administration of Smyrna continued its work along the same lines for the next year, until August 1922, when the scheme of Autonomy was abortively implemented 80/.

77/ DBFP, xvi, no. 401, Granville to Curzon 5.10.21.
78/ DBFP, xvi, no. 415, Curzon to Rumbold, 19.10.21.
79/ DBFP, xvi, no. 412, Rumbold to Curzon, 15.10.21.
80/ See Chapter Four, Section II.
has since been claimed that from the study of the negotiations that brought about the disaster of September 1922 "no villain emerges. Yet there is alas much to criticize and unfortunately little to praise" 81/. If this statement is true, then the one aspect of the 1919-1922 period which stands out as positive and constructive, is the work carried out by the High Commission of Smyrna, against all odds. Even if its achievements were lost under the crumbling 19th century diplomacy that dictated the Treaty of Sèvres, one thing remains clear: The Greek functionaries had been given the most difficult administrative task conceivable, because they had to govern a country with a mixed population in which, one of the elements was of the same nationality as themselves. As Toynbee noted, the problem of ruling Turks and non Turks in the Ottoman Empire had completely beaten the Osmanlis themselves 82/. However, it would be rather oversimplified to suggest that national animosity was the only or even the primary reason for the collapse of the Greek venture. Still, despite its predicament, the Smyrna High Commission, manned by a substantial number of very able functionaries, produced the only positive work carried out throughout the three years, three months, three weeks and three days of official Greek presence in Asia Minor.

Toynbee's own account of Stergiadis' administration, clearly refutes his conclusion that the ledger balanced against the Greek administration:

"[on the credit side, the chief item] was the repatriation of more than 120,000 Greek refugees and deportees, which was admirably done...Bergama and Aivali got on to their feet after the harvest of 1920; Kinek was struggling up by the winter of 1921...Relief was also given to the Turkish population. I saw destitute Moslem women receiving rations of food from the High Commissioner's representative at Aidin and subsidies were paid to the Turkish orphanage (Daru'l-Yetim) at Smyrna. Besides this, certain positive measures were taken for economic and social development. In rural districts, cheap light ploughs were put on sale at cost price by the administration; an experimental farm for mechanical agriculture was established at Torbaly and Professor Karatheodoris began to organize his new university of which the departments of hygiene and oriental languages were to be launched in the autumn of 1922. If this scheme was prematurely ambitious, nothing could have been more practical than the overhauling of the municipal administration of the Smyrna city, which was entrusted to a Greek refugee from Varna Mr. [A.] Krionas" 83/.

81/ Helmreich, op.cit., p. 327.
82/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 158.
On the basis of the archival evidence, it is safe to say that had the torch which burnt down the city not been lit, the Greek Administration of Smyrna would have left behind a lot more that the ruins left standing in Cilicia after the French departure a year earlier.

To counteract efforts to discredit the work of the Greek administration, in 1921 the Press Office of the MOFA published a pamphlet entitled "Greece in Asia Minor, 1921", which seems to have been an official apologia of the Greek administration of the occupied territories and a detailed description of the work carried out. It is unfortunate that during the course of research for this study, it was not possible to consult this publication. It is also unfortunate that the existing archival or secondary material does not include details for most of the departments of the administration and, consequently, it is not possible to give a full picture of their endeavours or to give a complete catalogue of those who worked for the High Commission. Nonetheless, archival research has produced some material reflecting the task of three of these departments, namely those for Public Health and Social Security, Education and Moslem Affairs. In addition, secondary material provides information on the establishment of the Greek Post Office in Smyrna.

84/ See Chapter Three, sections II to VI.
II. The Repatriation and Rehabilitation of Refugees
In May 1919, as soon as the Greek authorities were established in Smyrna, the repatriation of the Greeks from Asia Minor who had sought refuge in the Greek Kingdom as a result of the deportations and persecutions during the period 1908 - 1919, assumed top priority. What the Greek authorities wanted to avoid at all costs was the return of the refugees without their supervision and planning of the homecoming. This could prove catastrophic as clashes with the Turkish population, who had by that time moved into the Greek properties, were sure to ensue. A Department to supervise the return of the refugees to their homes was organized within the High Commission and several surveys were conducted in Greece to establish the number of refugees that wished to be repatriated. The High Commissioner was adamant that all surveys and infrastructural work were completed before the arrival of any refugees because he wanted to forestall all possible disturbances and, also, because only those refugees originating from the zone under Greek occupation should be repatriated. In view of these considerations, orders were issued by the Greek authorities prohibiting the repatriation of any refugees without clearance from the High Commission 1/. Those who came back without permission were threatened with immediate deportation, to serve as an example to the rest of the refugee population eager to return and unable to understand the political considerations necessitating the measure. In the event, no one from those who returned without clearance was deported on the condition that each refugee group would be collectively responsible for the payment of indemnities and would be punished with immediate deportation should any anti-Turkish disturbances occur 2/. However, the return of the refugees could not be postponed for later than November as weather conditions would not permit their provisional settlement in camps etc. Consequently, the Department had a very tight time limit within which to complete the preparatory work required. The return of the refugees who held permits to do so was further impeded by the lack of ships to transport them to the ports scheduled for their landing, as well as of means of transport to their final destination 3/.

The safe reinstatement of the refugees under the supervision of the Greek authorities assumed urgent priority as, immediately after the Greek landing, they started proceeding towards their places of origin in large numbers while armed Aivaliot refugees crossed to Aivali from Lesvos and tried to re-occupy their properties forcibly evicting the Turks who occupied them since their deportation. What made the

1/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4263/20.5.19, Diomidis to Paraskevopoulos: "For the time being, the repatriation of the refugees should not be allowed".
2/ AV11 tel. no. 8021/18.9.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
3/ AV10st tel. no. 2082/6925/23.8.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
situation worse was the fact that during the period 1914-1918, the Turkish authorities had established some 30,000 Moslem refugees (mohadjirs) from Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Epirus, the Aegean islands and Crete in the homes and properties of the deported Greeks 4/. Evidently, there was grave danger for the collapse of the already shaky public order in the area and Venizelos requested from the Supreme Council permission to extend the Greek military occupation over the coast from Aivali to Ayiasuluk. As a further precautionary measure to avert any clashes, the Greek authorities were presented with the task to organize the resettlement of the Moslem refugees and, at considerable cost on the part of the High Commission, some were transported and reinstated in their properties in Greece, others were moved to the interior of Asia Minor or the zone around Constantinople while those who wished to do so were established in exclusively Turkish villages within the Greek zone 5/. In areas with dense Moslem refugee population, the repatriation of the Greek refugees was altogether prohibited.

At this point, the efforts of the Department for the Return and Rehabilitation of Refugees were further hindered by the Turkish authorities which, naturally, urged the Moslem refugees not to hand back Greek property and to remain in the Greek zone. In a number of confidential telegrams to the Ministry of Interior in Constantinople, the Vali of Smyrna accused the Greek authorities of evicting the Turks "from the homes they inhabit" in order to install "Greek migrants". He further urged the Sublime Porte "to exercise its rights and forbid the installation of the Greeks", which, in his view, was illegal 6/. In the meantime, the Turkish authorities continued to install local Moslems in Greek properties 7/. In the event, the danger of major clashes between the returning Greeks and the Turks -local or refugee- were averted by policing the area with special patrols and by the issue of orders by the High Commissioner to the effect that any repatriated Greek intending to harm a Turk or disrupt public order would be deported immediately. The fact that major clashes were averted, constituted a major success for the Greek authorities, even more so as in other areas of the Ottoman Empire where refugees had returned after the War, it

4/ In the area of Bergama alone, 12,000 mohadjirs had been settled during the same period. MOFA 116 a5.
5/ GAK 22a file 85-86, doc. no. 25545/9.9.20, Gounarakis to High Commissioners's representative at Adramyt.
6/ MOFA 143 doc. no. 5567/9.12.19, Katehakis to First Military Corps in Smyrna, transmitting copies of six telegrams by the Vali. The fact that these telegrams, containing hard accusations against the Greek authorities, had not been intercepted in Smyrna but had been freely transmitted, tends to suggest that the Turkish authorities were not limited in their movements by the Greek occupation.
7/ MOFA 116 a5.
had not proved possible to avoid them 8/.

By October 1919, the preparatory work was completed and official permission was granted for the return of the Greek refugees in stages 9/. As a result of concentrated Turkish efforts, the Allied High Commissioners tried to prevent this repatriation and presented a collective note to the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople stating that "in view of the density of the population and the unsatisfactory conditions of sanitation in the Greek zone", no person embarking from Black or Aegean Sea ports and travelling 3rd class would be allowed to disembark in Turkey without having secured a written permission signed by a representative of one of the Allied powers at the point of embarkation. At the port of disembarkation, it was also stated, the traveller should give "substantial" reasons for his trip to Turkey and prove to the representatives of the Interallied Port Authority that he had adequate means of support. With the same note, the Allied High Commissioners also made known that the repatriation of large refugee groups was prohibited "in principle". Exceptional cases were to be studied by the Allied representatives at the port of embarkation and the High Commissioners were to decide whether their return would be permitted 10/.

Stergiadis refuted the reasons given by the High Commissioners for the prohibition of the repatriation of the refugees and asked Venizelos to secure a Supreme Council directive lifting the ban imposed from Constantinople. Should the ban remain in force, he concluded, friction between the Greek authorities and the Allied representatives in Smyrna and Constantinople could not be avoided 11/. His view was that the area where repatriation was taking place was definitely not overpopulated and that the standard of sanitation and public health in the Greek zone was far better if compared to previous years. In collaboration with the Department of Public Health of the Smyrna High Commission, doctors were posted to the refugee camps and surgeries were established to look after public health and distribute medicine free of charge wherever needed. Despite the heavy winter conditions and the multitude of endemic diseases, the refugees were in good health 12/. Stergiadis further argued that there was no danger of large

8/ G. Gantherot, Commander of the French Army in the Levant, in his book La France en Syrie et en Cilicie, p.192, describes the clashes between Armenians and Turks in Cilicia and concludes: "Comment éviter d'ailleurs des sanglantes rencontres entre les malheureux refuges qui commençaient a rentrer et les démobilisés, les déserteurs, les vagabonds de tout sorte qui se rendant dans les localités videes de leurs habitants par la guerre, les deportations et les massacres, y prenaient possession de maisons et des biens arméniens".
9/ High Commissioner's order no. 13319/19.10.19.
10/ MOFA 51g tel. no. 19029/3.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
11/ MOFA 51g tel. no. 19029/3.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
12/ MOFA 116 a5.
refugee groups returning at the same time as the resettlement was carried out gradually and, in any case, half of the refugees had already been repatriated.

In the event, the repatriation continued with the refugees arriving at ports other than Smyrna, where the French representative prohibited their disembarkation and, to make matters more difficult, the Interallied Passport Control enforced inflexible and strict procedures through which the place of origin of those refugees who had received permits was doubted and their right to disembark was put to question 13/.

The next major problem was the housing of the returning refugees. A survey conducted by the Department showed that more than 150 towns and villages along the coast from Adramyt to Sokia had been destroyed during the War. Of the 45,000 households belonging to Greeks, 23,000 were destroyed, 18,000 partially damaged and only about 4,000 were in habitable condition. Building materials in the Greek zone were scarce and went for exhorbitant prices, thus making the repair of the homes impossible and the housing of the refugees problematic. Those that returned during the first months of the Greek occupation had to stay in tents while the huts built for the refugees from the Erithrea Peninsula during their stay in Chios (1914-1918) were dismantled and their components were used to repair partially damaged houses in thirty one villages and towns of the peninsula. Additional materials came from Smyrna and the builders and technicians among the refugees were recruited by the Department to repair the houses. Some 800 refugees were employed and organized into 30 teams which worked to rebuild homes, churches and schools, to clean water pumps and to repair roads and bridges 14/.

The need to provide jobs for the returning refugees in order to support them until they could harvest their lands again was pointed out by Venizelos in early May 1919. The MOFA was instructed to send to Smyrna a team of engineers with a senior official of the Ministry of Public Works in charge, to plan, organize and supervise roadworks urgently needed for communication and transportation purposes. Furthermore, roadworks of local or minor importance should be undertaken to provide the refugees "with wages instead of unemployment benefit" 15/.

By employing the refugees to carry out part of the work needed for their rehabilitation, the Greek authorities made good out of an idle workforce, which would have been bound to cause problems had it remained unemployed for a protracted period of time. This, however, could not but be a temporary measure because the major part of the returning refugees were farmers for whom the point at issue was the

13/ MOFA 116 a5.
14/ MOFA 116 a5.
15/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4166/3.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
redress of their farms. These farms were, for the most part, in deplorable situation as they had not been cultivated for four consecutive seasons or they had been cultivated by ignorant hands. This was one of the major reasons why Stergiadis suggested that those refugees who had been successfully settled in Macedonia between 1914 and 1918, should be discouraged from returning 16/.

Urgent measures were needed to remedy the situation. The law by which the Greek High Commission of Smyrna was instituted provided for loans up to a sum of 20 million drs to be extended to the inhabitants of the Greek zone 17/. Stergiadis urged Athens to establish a branch of the National Bank of Greece in Asia Minor. He considered this an absolute must for, among other reasons, the impartial distribution of the loans. Despite the efforts of A. Korizis, the representative of the Bank in Smyrna, the scheme did not take off until November 1919, mainly due to lack of personnel 18/. Until May 1920, the Bank had distributed loans to a total of 15 million drs among the 80,000 refugees already repatriated. Some five more million were awaiting the return of another 25,000. The loans were distributed under the supervision of the Department and their repayment was secured by holding the refugee community the recipient belonged to collectively responsible. Stergiadis strongly believed that the Greek state was sure to recover the loans and that collective responsibility would have better results than the introduction of farmers' cooperatives or of a mortgage option to secure payments 19/. Although strong efforts were made to distribute the loans equally and according to the needs of each area, some of the refugee communities seemed to have important connections in Athens through which they pressed for preferential treatment and a bigger share in the loan. They also pressed for the initial total sum of 20 million drs, to be increased. Their wishes were transmitted to Venizelos who sought Stergiadis' advice. The High Commissioner was adamant that the loans should not exceed that sum and that each community should receive loans according to its particular needs and not according to its connections. "If we give in to all the requests for loans we receive without prior examination " , he concluded, " we will end up paying for the upkeep of the whole population of Asia Minor " 20/.

One of the communities which expressed requests for bigger loans were the Aivaliots. They claimed that as their town was exclusively Greek and because their area had been particularly stricken during the past decade, an

16/ AV10st tel. no. 2082/6925/23.8.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
18/ For the institution of the National Bank in Smyrna, Solomonidis, V. "International Finance Versus Greece in Asia Minor", article submitted for publication.
19/ MOFA 36 tel. no. 563/18.5.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
20/ ibid
additional loan of 5 million drs should be extended to them. Asked by Venizelos to comment, Stergiadis insisted that the request should not be granted as the Aivaliots were not worse off than other refugee communities. To their subsequent request that the distribution of the loans allocated to them should receive priority, Stergiadis replied that no priorities could be given and the loans were to be distributed all at the same time. If there were any areas were preferential treatment should be given, he concluded, they should be those with a large Moslem population. He further intimated to Venizelos that should the Aivaliots, or any other group for that matter, be put on a better footing as a result of "string-pulling" in Athens, it would transpire that the only procedure to be followed by a community seeking preferential treatment would be to appoint a "protector" in Athens, bypassing the only authority responsible for such decisions, that of the High Commissioner 21/. These ideas were of course incomprehensible for the mass of the returning refugees who, because of their past sufferings, could not possibly understand that it was absolutely necessary for the Greek authorities to prove their impartiality. The incidents connected with the distribution of the loans and the refusal of Stergiadis to grant the slightest concession to any group, community or nationality set the first seeds of discontent against him.

Stergiadis' hard line towards the Aivaliots was very much due to the fact that they had been the first to organize acts of revenge against the Turks, after the Greek landing. On 20 May 1919, Repoulis reported to Athens that he had sent a destroyer in order to restore public order "and to make them realize that if they revert to revenge, they would destroy all hopes for permanent liberation" 22/. Despite Stergiadis'inflexibility and threats, the Aivaliots repeatedly defied his orders. At one instance, an important number was repatriated without the permission of the High Commission, with the excuse that the Aivali area was exclusively Greek and, therefore, no clashes between refugees and Turks could ensue. The High Commissioner threatened to deport them and only the persistent representations of the Metropolitan of Kydonies (Aivali) averted the implementation of the measure. Stergiadis postponed the deportations on condition that the whole Aivaliot community would be responsible and liable for deportation should any disturbances occur. As it happened the community undertook the responsibility for most of the repatriated with the exception of 40 individuals who, however, were given permission by the High Commissioner to stay 23/.

After the offensive of June 1920 and the addition

21/ MOFA 143a tel. no. 11033/26.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos, in reply to his 10983/20.11.19.
22/ MOFA 142 tel. no. 23719/16.8.19, Governor of Lesvos to MOFA, tel. no. 7816/10.8.19, Diomidis to Stergiadis, tel. no. 6988/12.8.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
23/ ibid.
of new territories to the Greek occupation, the gradual return of more refugees was permitted. The movement of the refugees towards their homes in the Adramyt area was officially authorized in July 1920 on condition that those returning would be allowed to disembark only if they held permits issued at their port of provenance by the appropriate Greek authorities. Firm orders were issued to the effect that they should be housed in their own properties under the supervision of the High Commissioner's representative. Should their homes be damaged or occupied by Moslems, they were to be housed provisionally in schools, churches and other available buildings. No Moslem refugee or local Turk should be evicted without the permission of the Smyrna High Commission, to be granted on the basis of a report by its local representative. The same procedure applied to farms 24/. The Kaimakam would be responsible for the preparation of adequate housing facilities for the Moslem refugees, mostly Bosnians and Pomaks, who were to be moved to homogeneous Turkish villages in the area. No undue pressure should be exercised upon them in order to vacate the Greek properties they occupied and they should be given adequate time limits to facilitate their departure. Whenever Moslem refugee groups were to be moved to the interior, the Mutesarifs of all the villages on the itinerary were to be informed in advance so as to assist them in every possible way during their passage 25/.

During 1920, the loans allowed the refugees to cultivate their farms up to 80% of their capacity. Badly needed ploughs were imported, mainly from the USA, and were sold at very low, subsidized prices or, at several instances, they were distributed free of charge. Mechanical cultivation and tractors were introduced and a 30,000 acre model farm at Tepekioy which was to form part of the Ionian University, provided short training courses for farmers. During the same year, an additional number of public works was undertaken, this time not to secure work for the unemployed but to facilitate the transportation of agricultural produce, and especially raisins, to Smyrna 26/. Those refugees reinstated in their farms during the summer of 1920, were given permission to harvest the crops cultivated by the Turks during their absence. The farm owners were obliged to pay back all the costs of the cultivation and give two thirds of the harvest to the Turks who had produced the crop. Anyone who did not observe these regulations would be arrested and

24/ GAK 22a doc. no. 20545/13.7.20, Gounarakis to High Commissioner's representative at Adramyt.
25/ GAK 22a doc. no. 25545/9.9.20, Gounarakis to High Commissioner's representative at Adramyt.
26/ MOFA 3k tel. no. 13904/18.5.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos, in reply to the latter's query in tel. no. 6301/15.5.20. The decision to import ploughs and other agricultural equipment from the USA came as a result of "political considerations" as Stergiadis accepted in his telegram to Venizelos.
deported immediately 27/.

By August 1920, out of the initial sum of 20 million drs, only 3.5 million had not been absorbed. As this sum was not adequate for the rehabilitation of the remaining 30,000 refugees from the areas of Adramyt and Akhisar and, at the same time, subsidiary loans were badly needed for Bergama where adverse weather conditions had destroyed the crops, an additional loan of 5 million drs was successfully negotiated in Athens 28/. By 1921, out of the estimated 180,827 Greeks deported from the Treaty of Sévres zone during the War, some 144,000 had been rehabilitated 29/.

During the period of the repatriation of the refugees, the Department also had to cater for those Ottoman Greeks from areas not included in the Greek zone, who were seeking refuge in their hundreds in order to avoid the fury of the nationalists. With them, came Armenians, Jews, Kurds, Circassians and Turks who, for various reasons, did not wish to remain in the nationalist occupied territories. The daily arrival of such refugee groups from the interior and the urgent task of catering for their most immediate needs, represented yet another major problem for the Department and an additional strain on its budget. Provisions were made and services offered to all of them, irrespective of creed or religion. As an illustration indicating the numbers involved, it may be mentioned that during the period May 1919 – June 1920, 64,500 refugees from the interior of Asia Minor flooded the Greek zone and especially Smyrna. In all major towns, free meal services were organized for both the refugees and the poorer of the inhabitants and orphanages were instituted for hundreds of orphans who had sought refuge in the Greek zone. One was in Smyrna and catered for 180 boys, one in Bayrakli for 200 infants, one in Buca for 180 girls and one in Moschonisia for 200 boys and girls 30/.

In Smyrna alone, the other services provided included a free meal service distributing 2000 portions per day, 1000 of which were exclusively distributed among the Moslem population; a bureau under the direction of Sivri Bey of the Turkish civil service was organized to coordinate the measures taken for the welfare of Moslem refugees, distribute clothing, flour, small sums of money and look after the housing of the refugees and the repatriation of those from Greece who were in Smyrna in transit, wishing to return to their place of origin; a refugee camp was established in Kokaryali with room for about 150 families of 4 to 5 members.

27/ GAK 22a doc. no. 20545/13.7.20, Gounarakis to High Commissioner's representative at Adramyt.
28/ MOFA 22g tel. no. 11300/28.8.20, Gounarakis to Stergiadis in Athens.
29/ Notaras, op.cit..
for about 150 families of 4 to 5 members and a job centre was created to provide jobs to those who wished to remain in the Greek zone.

In March 1921, a special infirmary and surgery was established in the Turkish section of Smyrna to cater exclusively for the Moslem refugees. The doctors paid house calls to those unable to visit the surgery and, except for the medical care, they also provided small sums of money to buy milk, coal and meat for the patients. During the first six months of operation, the surgery looked after 3,556 patients, inoculated Moslem refugees against major endemic diseases and was in charge of the immunisation work carried out in all Moslem refugee camps 31/.

When in the early summer of 1921 it became obvious that the Greek army would soon have to retreat from Nikomedia (Ismid), the High Commissioner urged Athens to allow the transportation of some 35,000 refugees from the area to Thrace. The number included 22,000 who had sought refuge in Ismid during the period of Greek occupation and the 10,000 Greek and Armenian inhabitants of the city who wished to be evacuated for fear of nationalist persecutions 32/. Stergiadis believed that the best solution to the problem would be for the British forces to occupy Ismid, or, as this was quite unlikely, to allow the Christian population to move into the Constantinople zone of occupation 33/. As it happened, the evacuation had to be completed within two weeks because the Greek retreat was imminent. At the same time, the Greek government was anxious to receive information concerning the number of refugees in the rest of the territory to be evacuated. Gounarakis was sent to examine the situation and reported that in Brusa alone, 12,500 Greek and Armenian refugees were being supplied with food and medical care by the Greek army and the Armenian community since the summer of 1920 when the Greek army occupied the city. This population would have to be evacuated before the departure of the Greek forces and was sure to be followed by a mass exodus of the Greek and Armenian residents of Brusa. In the event, 32,000 refugees were evacuated to Thrace immediately after the Greek

31/ MOFA 116a2 Report Ekthesi Pepragmenon tou para tin Tourkiki synolikia Leitourgountos Iatreiou (Report on the activities of the Infirmary Operating in the Turkish quarter of Smyrna) 27.10.21.
32/ On the reasons for the occupation of Ismid and its subsequent evacuation, see Chapter Two, Sections I and II.
33/ Although they were never accepted by the British, these proposals together with the interest he showed in all matters related with the refugees, suggest that the accusations voiced against the High Commissioner after the disaster to the effect that he did not have any feelings for the human factor (Akropolis, 4.3.79, to state one recent example), were quite far from the truth.
The three year period of Greek administration experienced a continuous movement of refugee populations which, in their transit from the Greek zone, were cared for by the Greek authorities with the help of charitable institutions of the Turkish, Armenian and Greek communities and bodies such as the Red Cross and the Patriotiko Idryma (Patriotic Institution).

This destitute population fell mainly into three categories: The Asia Minor Greeks, deported during the War and returning to their homes, Moslems from the Balkans transported to Turkey during the same period and sent to Greece or other parts of Turkey after the Greek occupation, and, thirdly, refugees of various nationalities, originating either from areas outside the Greek zone or from areas which the Greek forces evacuated after a brief period of occupation.

34/ The cost of the upkeep of these refugees came to a total of 1,500 Turkish liras per month.
III. Public Health
One aspect of the work carried out by the Department of Public Health and Social Welfare of the Greek Administration, was the strenuous effort to improve public health and to rid the area of widely spread venereal and other contagious diseases such as malaria, smallpox etc. The important number of obstacles encountered by the Department in this task were connected, to name but a few, with the construction of Asia Minor towns which usually excluded any sanitary measures, the fatalistic beliefs of the Moslem population in matters of health and the lack of any statistics on the mortality and birth rates which could facilitate the task of the administration by suggesting the weak points of public health and the intensity of measures to be taken.

During the Ottoman rule, no registry of births and deaths was kept nor were any statistics on the numbers of the various age groups ever conducted. At the same time, no law provided for the registration with the Health authorities of either patients suffering from contagious diseases or of the deaths caused by them. Although from August 1920 a weekly statistical record was kept with reference to contagious diseases (cases and deaths), no accurate comparison between the state of public health under the Turkish and Greek administrations is possible.

The measures taken by the Greek administration included the following:

Teams of doctors and nurses were organized and divided into mobile and permanent surgeries. Each team included one doctor, vaccination and disinfection specialists, nurses, technicians and ratkillers. Two mobile inoculation teams furnished with microbiology laboratories were established to diagnose infectious diseases. They visited every village in the Greek zone for that purpose and complemented the work carried out by a major microbiological laboratory, organized in Smyrna to perform various clinical and other tests free of charge. The mobile teams did not only go wherever they were called but also went in search of plague victims and proceeded with their treatment and the inoculation and immunization of the area. In its effort to combat smallpox, the team met with major difficulties in view of the particular need not to intrude in Moslem households. When, however, in the summer of 1920 a smallpox epidemic was diagnosed, the teams conducted practically a house to house search escorted by the police. As a result, very few cases were reported in the subsequent months. These teams also worked in hotels, public lavatories and refugee camps to clear them from lice and distribute appropriate medicine.

Ambulances and special vehicles were purchased for the transportation of infected articles and patients suffering from contagious diseases. Stationary steam furnaces and smaller mobile ones were procured to disinfect homes and household articles on the spot. They were also used in conjunction with the Smyrna Hospital for Contagious Diseases, to combat the epidemics with the result that, within a year from the take over of the administration, the three major diseases from which the zone was suffering, i.e. plague,
exanthematic typhoid fever and small pox, lost their endemic character and only sporadic cases were reported. A major contribution was also made to the fight against influenza through medical care, distribution of milk and medicine to the poor and, what was vital, instructions for personal protection.

In August 1919, a Rabies Hospital was instituted in Smyrna together with a branch of the Pasteur Institute and Inspectorates for Public Health at all ports of the Greek zone. These had the task of tracing all carriers of contagious diseases. The Metropolis of Smyrna offered to house the Hospital in one of its buildings, near the grounds of the Panionios Athletic Association, in the outskirts of the city. Special care was given to the health of the children. A children's hospital was organized in Smyrna while the orphanage at Bayrakli included a clinic for eye and skin diseases. In April 1921, a Clinic for Skin and Venereal Diseases started operating for the first time in Asia Minor, attached to the Hospital for Skin and Venereal Diseases of Manisa. The Clinic and the Hospital provided a much needed service as, during the War, these diseases had assumed almost endemic proportions and they also undertook the conduct of a campaign to inform the public on matters of personal hygiene.

The scope of this exercise was not only the combating of particular infectious diseases but mainly the establishment of a high standard of public health throughout the Greek zone. For this reason, an Institute of Hygiene equipped with the latest facilities and specialized personnel was foreseen to operate within the Ionian University. The Institute was to carry out research, conduct tests, produce vaccines, antitoxins, antidotes etc. and, at the same time, supervise the planning and implementation of public works relevant to the hygiene of the area such as sewage, plumbing, water provisions etc. It was also to organize courses for doctors wishing to serve in the public sector and antenatal classes for expectant mothers. It would supervise the organization of the registry for births and deaths, compile medical statistics and recommend special health measures needed for the various professions 1/.

The Greek Red Cross also played an important part in the effort to provide a good standard of health service to the population. Through its efforts, two hospitals were established in Aidin in early June 1919, one for the Greek and one for the Turkish community. After the destruction of the city during the military operations of the same month, one hospital was organized in Aidin to take care of the destitute population and another one at the refugee camp established for those who had sought refuge in Smyrna after the tragic

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1/ MOFA 116a4, Report, Ekthesi Ypiresias Dimosias Ygias (Report of the Department of Public Health, 1.11.21.)
The number of Turks seeking treatment and help by the Red Cross could have been much larger had it not been for the unsupported accusations that it had exclusively political aims and that its main task was to transport arms and ammunition for the Greek civilians 3/. The work of the Red Cross was complemented by the activities of the Patriotikon Idryma (Patriotic Institution) which provided clothing and other essential items to refugees coming to the Greek zone from the interior of Asia Minor. It also organized orphanages and homes for the needy and was in charge of the Children's Hospital in Smyrna and the Department of Obstetrics in the two General Hospitals of the city. Further, it subsidized the local Community Hospitals and many other charitable institutions. The activities of the Institution extended over the whole of the Greek zone and into the Turkish territory where money and clothing was sent to the Metropolitans for distribution among the needy in districts as far as Kayseri, where 800 orphans were clothed and fed through these funds 4/. Although it is quite probable that the measures taken by the Greek administration were intended to a certain extent to placate the non-Greek communities of the zone and particularly the Moslems, it is also quite clear that the impact of these measures on the population was considerable as no previous administration had shown such diligence and care in matters of public health. It is equally clear that this impact did not please the local anti-Greek circles who pressed the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to institute an Interallied Health Authority in Smyrna to undertake total responsibility for matters of Health. The opportunity for such a request arose with a plague epidemic during the summer of 1919. The High Commissioners thought fit to propose the measure to the Greek authorities but Stergiadis was adamant 5/. As a result of concentrated efforts by a team composed of 12 doctors (Greek and foreign), the epidemic soon receded and the Allied demand was dropped.

At the same time, the Red Cross and the other charitable institutions operating in Asia Minor had to answer serious accusations. In January 1920, the President of the British Red Crescent published an article in the Morning Post to the effect that the Greek institutions did not treat Turkish patients. Rev. Robert Frew was sent as his representative to examine the situation at the Greek zone and

2/ See Chapter Two, Section II.

3/ For the activities of the Greek Red Cross and the accusation against it, see Rodas, op.cit.

4/ For information on the activities of the Patriotiko Idryma, see Rodas, op.cit. Nata Mela, chairman of the Patriotiko Idryma, visited Smyrna on a number of occasions. See below, Chapter Four, reference from the Diary of Ph.Dragoumis.

5/ For the Allied proposal see Chapter Three, Section I.
the Aidin area in particular because, in October 1919, the League for the Defence of Ottoman Rights had complained to the Supreme Council and had expressed worry for the 300,000 Turks, who, according to the League's estimations, had left the area as a result of Greek persecutions. At this point, Venizelos had provided the Supreme Council with information according to which the number of Turks who had left the Greek zone did not exceed 180,000. They originated mainly from the areas of Brusa, Aidin, Nazili and Denizli. Some of them had subsequently returned but, according to the Greek Premier, a great number wishing to do the same was impeded by the nationalist forces while the Smyrna High Commission made every effort to make the return to their homes possible. To this effect, Stergiadis wrote to Colonel Henderson, C.C. to General Milne, assuring him that no Turk wishing to return to the Greek zone would be prosecuted for crimes committed against the Greek army or for common law offenses. He also promised that every possible help would be extended to the Turkish refugees, including health service and the distribution of farming equipment free of charge. For their protection, the Turkish communities would be allowed to elect among them a group of men who would form civil guards and would be paid by the Greek authorities. In effect, the High Commissioner undertook the commitment to examine favourably and to grant every "logical" demand on the part of the Turkish refugees. Colonel Henderson agreed that these proposals were satisfactory and conveyed them to the refugee groups outside the Greek zone who rejected them. As the report of the ICI established, this rejection was mainly due to pressure exercised by the nationalists and, what was more, to the fact that they were not prepared to return to areas bound to be under nationalist attacks in the future.

After touring the area, Rev. Frew testified that the number of refugees stated by the League was grossly exaggerated and that the main number of them was so far from the Greek zone that the Greek charitable institutions could not help them no matter how much they wished to. He was also convinced that the High Commissioner wanted to assist these refugees but was unable to do so because of the nationalist intervention which compelled them not to accept any help from the Greeks. As examples of this policy of the nationalists, he mentioned the cases when the Greek administration sent T.L. 6,000 to the British Red Crescent to be distributed among the refugees from the Aidin area but it was soon returned as no one would put a claim. The Greek authorities also sent 2,500 and T.L. 2,000 respectively to Nazili and Denizli refugees through the Ottoman Debt and the Règie des Tabacs, but both sums were returned. As far as the treatment of Turkish refugees within the Greek zone was concerned, Rev. Frew testified that "they enjoyed such good care and protection which they could have never dreamt of" 6/.

After this testimony, Stergiadis asked him to

6/ Correspondence with Rev. Frew in MOFA 136.
arrange for another article by the President of the Red Crescent in the Morning Post but Rev. Frew expressed the opinion that it was up to the President to revoke his article, which he never did 7/.

The Greek administration's extreme efforts to establish a reasonable standard of public health in its area of jurisdiction were primarily dictated by the necessity of keeping the troops in good health and, at the same time, by considerations of political expediency and purposes of propaganda. Nonetheless, the fact remained that throughout the period under examination, the Asia Minor zone under Greek occupation experienced the benefits of a public health service which was easily accessible and free for all who cared to request it. Significantly enough, this was one of the few activities of the Greek administration that the foreign press did not choose to criticize.

7/ ibid.
IV. The Department of Moslem Affairs
After August 1920, all sections of the Turkish administration that dealt with matters pertaining to religion, education and family affairs were transferred intact under the umbrella of the Department for Moslem Affairs of the GAS which coordinated their work. The Greek personnel added to the Department was fluent in Turkish and included experts of the Ottoman legal system and Moslem affairs in general. Correspondence with the Moslem institutions was conducted in Turkish and major efforts were made to ensure that no changes were effected to their particular administrative system. The interest of the GAS in the welfare and prospering of these institutions was obviously great and an annual sum of 175,000 Turkish liras, an equivalent of 2,500,000 drs, was spent on their upkeep. The Department of Moslem Affairs coordinated the work of the following institutions:

a. Religious Courts. On the basis of the Holy Law, the Seriat, these dealt mainly with the settlement of inheritances and other matters involving family relations such as marriage, divorce, settlements etc. All the Religious Courts which came under the GAS were maintained under the supervision of the Religious Judge of Smyrna, the Kadi, and their judgements were executed with the help of the Department. The salaries of the Religious Judges and the administrative personnel of the courts, together with the running costs, were met by the GAS to a total of 35,000 Turkish liras per year. Should a position of a Religious Judge become vacant, the GAS appointed a successor at the suggestion of the Kadi of Smyrna.

b. Mouftis. The main task of this body was to supervise the operation of the mosques and perform all religious services. They also had the right to interpret the Holy Law whenever their expert opinion was requested by either the Religious Judges or by private citizens. The GAS met their salaries which came to an annual sum of 6,747 Turkish pounds.

c. Orphanage Treasuries. These institutions continued to work under the supervision of the respective Religious Judge, on the basis of the Turkish law governing the properties of orphans, and retained the administrative system they had under the previous regime. Their task was to manage the properties of orphans until their coming of age. In order to avoid mismanagement and profiteering at the expense of the orphans, the GAS had the overall inspection of the operations and paid a total of 6,190 Turkish pounds annually for the salaries of the employees.

d. Vakoufs. These institutions dealt mainly with the management of the properties, farms and land bequeathed to mosques or other, charitable Moslem establishments. Previously under the

1/ MOFA 116a Report Merimna Ellinikis Dioikiseos Smyrnis peri ton Mousoulmanikon Plythismon tis Dioikoumenis Zonis (Measures Taken by the GAS for the Welfare of the Moslem Populations of the Greek Zone).
management of the Turkish Ministry of Vakoufs and the local Ephors (Mutevlevi), they now came under the jurisdiction of the Department of Moslem Affairs which was anxious to provide an excellent service to the Vakoufs as the maintenance of very important religious and other, social, Moslem institutions depended upon their proper management. The Vakouf Committees, composed of primates and religious men enjoying the respect of the community, were introduced by the Turkish government to control the Vakoufs and the rent of their lands. These committees were retained by the new regime with the additional task of managing the taxes collected by the GAS on their behalf and kept at the Vakouf Treasury. The proceeds of the Vakoufs were used according to the wishes of the donors. Despite the financial difficulties and the urgent military needs, every effort was made so that no building or land belonging to the Vakoufs would be commandeered by the Greek authorities. The reasons of political expediency dictating such a policy became all the more evident when on the one case where a building belonging to the Moslem High Schools of Smyrna was commandeered, the press in Constantinople and abroad made the most of the event to suggest that the Greek administration was exploiting the Religious institutions and their property 2/.

e.Moslem Education. Under the Turkish regime, the Moslem secondary schools were maintained by a special tax imposed over the farm tax. As the GAS did not collect this tax which had been mortgaged by the Ottoman Public Debt against a loan contracted by the Turkish government, their costs were met by the Greek Treasury. Further, the GAS provided funds for two Moslem Schools in Smyrna, two in Manisa and Odemiş and three Religious Seminaries in Thira, Odemiş and Manisa to a total of 70,000 Turkish liras per year. A special polytechnic school was instituted in Smyrna and catered for 210 Moslem students for whom board and lodging were also provided. Its running costs came to 45,000 Turkish pounds per year and were met by the GAS.

As regarded Moslem primary education, educational committees were instituted at the seat of each county as stipulated by the Turkish law. School committees were also instituted in all towns, or neighbourhoods, where a primary school existed. These committees consisted of Moslem primates who supervised the schools and conducted the fund raising among the population for the maintenance of the schools, as stipulated by Turkish law. Moreover, the GAS actively encouraged the institution of new Moslem schools even in the most remote villages of the Greek zone 3/.

2/ For example Presse du Soir, 28.1.22, (Constantinople). Toynbee, *op.cit.*, pp. 174, 176, 387, 388. The building was used for the Courts of Justice and the High School was transferred to suitable premisses.
3/ MOFA 94th doc.no. 351/3.2.22, Department of Moslem Affairs.
V. Archaeological Excavations
Archaeological excavations in Asia Minor were of special importance for the Greek administration as any discoveries in this domain would contribute to "the irrefutable establishment of the Hellenicity of the area". On the other hand, during the last years of Turkish rule, a number of archaeological expeditions were organized by various European countries to discover and study the ancient Greek towns of Asia Minor. These expeditions concentrated mainly in areas around major towns and along the coastline.

After August 1920, the archaeological exploration of Asia Minor became the object of the Antiquities Section at the GAS. The excavations were to be conducted by Greek archaeologists and, at the same time, other countries would be asked to participate. Greek excavations were conducted during the seasons of 1921 and 1922 at three different sites:

a. Klazomene, a town well known to archaeologists for the hand painted clay shrines found scattered in the fields near Vourla. The excavation was conducted by G. Oeconomou of the Athens Archaeological Society and soon an ancient cemetery was discovered together with a multitude of pottery items which brought to light an important part of the history of Ionian ceramography. On the nearby island of St. John, excavations uncovered a cobblestoned road together with the remains of a few houses with mosaics in excellent condition dating from 2nd century BC.

b. Ephesos. This excavation was conducted by G. Sotiriou, Ephor of Byzantine Antiquities. In previous years, the British had conducted excavations in the same area and had discovered the temple of Ionian Artemis. Also, Austrian archaeologists had excavated the remains of the city built in the period of Lysimachos. The Greek excavation aimed to uncover the Byzantine church of St. John the Theologian which, according to a legend, was built by Justinian in the 6th century AD. It was believed to have been an immense, luxurious church, comparable to St. Sophia. Until 1921, the local Greeks had resisted persistent efforts of foreign archaeologists to excavate the remains of the church, mainly because of their religious beliefs. The findings of the Greek excavation suggested that the church was as large as the legend would have it and was decorated with beautiful mosaics. This discovery was to be a major contribution to the history of Byzantine Art as the church dated from the first years of its peak period. At the same time, this excavation provided interesting material for the history of Ancient Greek Art as several pieces of marble, believed to have been parts of the badly damaged temple of Artemis, were incorporated into the masonry of the church.

c. Nissa was a town built by Antioch of Syria during the 3rd century BC in the vicinity of the Meander river on the Ephesos-Trallea road. It had been excavated by the German archaeologist V. Diest who brought to light the position of the various important buildings of the town such as the Library, Gymnasium, Agora etc. The Greek excavations aimed at uncovering and restoring the remains of these buildings. By July 1922, most of the Agora had been uncovered and restored.
VI. The Ionian University of Smyrna
One of the major projects undertaken during the Greek administration of Asia Minor, was the institution and organization of the Ionian University of Smyrna. Originally conceived by Venizelos, this grandiose scheme was entrusted for realization to Professor C. Karatheodoris of Göttingen University, who had long since called for the creation of a new University in Greece 1/. Karatheodoris believed that this new University was needed to cater for the enormous needs in higher education created with the addition of new territories during the past decades and the urgency to educate those who were to work for the progress of the country into the twentieth century. "He was interested in everything", writes Toynbee. "Archaeology, hygiene, economics, languages- and constantly reminded me of what I had read about Ludwig Ross and the other German savants who came out to Greece in the thirties of the last century in the train of King Otto. In fact, Karatheodoris was a Westerner abroad -constructive, broadminded, humane and out of water" 2/.

With Greece extending its rule over Asia Minor, it was thought that the significant number of minorities to be incorporated within the Greek Kingdom would, ideally, take an active part in the public life and the progress of Greece. Therefore, it was argued, Greece should also take an active interest in the Eastern World and its various cultures and come to realize the importance of educating specialists in the field. On the other hand, the creation of a genuine Universitas Literarum in Smyrna would serve as a means of reconciling the differences among the various population groups and, at the same time, show that "Greece did not go to Asia Minor to conquer alien populations, but to bring to them her superior civilization" 3/.

In September 1919, Karatheodoris was invited to Paris to discuss the project with Venizelos and, a few weeks later, he submitted a lengthy report in which he described in detail his views on the scopes of the scheme and put forward proposals regarding its operational framework, means of instruction to be employed and Schools and Departments to be instituted 4/. His proposals accepted by Venizelos, at the end of the academic year 1919-1920 he left Berlin University for Athens to undertake the supervision of the preparatory work. In August 1920, he accompanied Venizelos during his brief visit to the harbour of Smyrna where he met with

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1/ For extensive notes on Karatheodoris, Vovolinis, op.cit., V, pp. 484-504.
2/ Toynbee, op.cit., p.166.
4/ MOFA 23 Projet d'une nouvelle Université en Grèce présenté au Gouvernement Hellénique par C.Karatheodori, Paris 20.10.19. This report was later formulated into the Decree for the Institution of the Smyrna University (Diatagma Idrýseos Panepistimiou Smyrnis), GGG, Series A, ii, Law 2251/14.7.20.
stergiadis to discuss the scheme which was to become the High Commissioner’s dearest project 5/.

On 28 October 1920, the High Commissioner issued a decree appointing Karatheodoris head of the project and Professor of Mathematics at the University of Smyrna. At the same time, a special section was organized within the Department of Education of the High Commission to deal with all matters pertaining to the organizational infrastructure. N. Kritikos, at the time doing his military service in Asia Minor and later to become Professor of Mathematics at the National Technical University in Athens, served as secretary to this section which was called Grafio Organoseos Panepistimiou Smyrnis 6/. This section initially worked on several legal aspects, the drafting of rules and regulations, the completion of the buildings and the development of the surrounding sites. The finances for the scheme were provided by the High Commissioner who also offered to house the University in two unfinished buildings situated on the hills of Bahri Baba, on the western side of Mount Pagos.

Originally, the major part of the expenses regarding the completion of the building and the running costs of the University, was to be met by S. Palantzis, a Greek magnate living in France. On 1 November 1919, Palantzis signed a contract to this effect with Venizelos, acting on behalf of the Greek government. By this contract, he undertook to pay 2 million french francs towards the buildings, equipment etc, and promised to pay 250 thousand french francs per year towards the running expenses of the University. In the event, for some unclear reason, Palantzis did not contribute a penny.

The buildings that were to house the University were originally constructed by Rahmi Bey, Vali of Smyrna until 1918, to house a public library and an institute of higher education. The site had been used in the past as a cemetery for the needs of the Jewish community. In 1914, defying the latter's claim to ownership, Rahmi Bey proceeded with the construction of the buildings on the grounds that the community had not paid any rates for the use of the land since 1883. After the Mudros armistice, the Jewish community attempted to assert the same claims but the Smyrna County Council ruled that the area was public property which had been rented to the community in the past. As no rent or rates had been paid since 1883, the Jewish community had no rights on the site. This was the situation in 1920, when the Greek administration decided to use it for the needs of the University. The Jewish community staged a complaint and tried to obstruct the scheme but, as the land and the buildings had been declared public property by the Turkish administration,

6/ Grafio Organoseos Panepistimiou Smyrnis (Bureau for the Organization of the Smyrna University).
the rightful owner was the GAS 7/.

By the summer of 1922, the buildings were completed at a cost of 110,000 Turkish liras and included 70 lecture rooms, a large amphitheatre, separate smaller structures to house the offices of the chancellor and the professors as well as a number of laboratories. Although the buildings were quite spacious, it was believed that they would not be sufficient to house all the departments envisaged for the future. Therefore, the remaining site was to be used as a public park in which to construct new buildings as the needs would arise 8/.

Karatheodoris and his team were on excellent terms with Stergiadis who took an active interest in the affairs of the University and helped solve the numerous problems faced by the organizers. It was the Greek Administration of Smyrna and not the Greek Ministry of Education, which was responsible for the implementation of the project and Karatheodoris had to receive clearance from Stergiadis before proceeding with book and equipment orders or before negotiating with prospective professors and lecturers of the University 9/. Karatheodoris envisaged a thoroughly modern university that would not imitate either the English or the German educational systems, a university that would reflect and cater for the local needs. He believed that the Ionian University should be the antipode of the Athens University, by nature orientated towards classical antiquity, and significantly chose as its motto "Ex Oriente Lux" 10/. The University was to comprise of the following schools 11/:

a. The School for Natural and Technical Sciences consisting of Departments for civil and chemical engineering, geology, botany, zoology and physics. It was intended to become the centre for scientific research in the area and to produce the scientists that would be entrusted with the planning and construction of vital public works, essential for the exploitation of Asia Minor's rich natural resources to the full.

b. The School of Agriculture was going to offer courses of two or four years' duration in order to cater both for those interested in the practical study of agriculture as well as for those intending to pursue a scientific career. Also, it would organize seminars for farmers and landowners and conduct scientific research in its well-equipped laboratories in conjunction with the experimental farm at Tepekioy. The

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7/ Solomonidis, Chr. I Pedia Sti Smyrni, (Education in Smyrna), Athens 1961.
8/ MOFA 116a7. The plans were made by architect A. Zachos, 1879-1939.
9/ See reports published in Vovolinis, op.cit..
11/ MOFA 23a Projet...
purpose of the School was threefold: to educate specialists in
the science of agriculture, to educate those engaged in the
practical side of agriculture and advise them on matters of
cultivation, husbandry etc and, finally, to improve the
existing methods of cultivation, introduce new ones and
promote the agricultural industry. As there was a shortage of
labourers in the area, the School also aimed to promote
mechanized cultivation.

c. The **School of Oriental Ethnology and Languages** was to provide
courses on the history, literature, civilization, culture and language of the various eastern peoples. It was mainly envisaged as a means to promote peaceful coexistence among them, through the knowledge and understanding of each other's culture. In this framework, Turkish, Arabic, Farsi, Armenian, Hebrew and Greek would be taught and special seminars would be organized to be attended by the students of the other Schools of the University. Even if the University was "a castle in the air, without local foundations...a doubtful experiment even if made at the cost of nothing else", as Toynbee believed, it would seem fair to claim that its existence would have been fully justified by the operation of this School alone 12/.

d. The **School of Civil Service**. With the addition of such extensive territories to her boundaries, Greece faced a lack of adequate personnel to administer them. This School was designed to educate highly competent civil employees and would in time, expand to become a School for Economic and Social Sciences.

The University would also include the following:

a. The **Department of Preliminary Studies** which would provide one year courses for prospective university students who did not have the necessary qualifications to be eligible for matriculation with one of the Schools.

b. The **Institute of Hygiene**, which would conduct medical research and offer various microbiological and biochemical tests to the public, together with inoculations etc. It would also run courses for medical doctors wishing to specialize in the sector of public hygiene, for midwives and for nurses. By the summer of 1922, the instruments for its laboratories had been installed and were considered to be the best laboratory equipment in the Balkans and the Near East.

c. The **Department of Commercial Studies** was intended to educate employees of the major international commercial firms which would be encouraged by the Greek State to expand their operations in the area. It proposed to offer higher as well as intermediate level courses.

12/ Toynbee, *op.cit.*, p. 175.
d. The School for Construction Supervisors was to educate technical personnel urgently needed to supervise the construction of major public works planned to start in Asia Minor as soon as the military situation permitted it.

e. The School for Higher Studies in Moslem Religion would offer courses for the prospective Mouftis and Religious Judges. Initially it was going to form part of the School of Oriental Ethnology but, in view of the particular nature of the courses, this idea was abandoned.

f. The Experimental Farm at Tepekioy, already in operation since 1920, was to serve as the basis for the practical instruction of agriculture students at all levels. In the meantime, experimental cultivation methods were tested and farmers were taught to use and repair tractors and other types of machinery used in agriculture 13/.

g. The Library was considered by Karatheodoris the backbone of the University 14/. It was to expand and become a public library and to include books and periodicals covering subjects not taught at the University. A special bureau was organized to deal with the acquisition of the books and, until September 1922, an important number of volumes had been bought, including collections of rare books on Asia Minor such as the collection of the Austrian Archaeological Institute, for which the sum of 18,000 swiss francs was paid. The Library was also to contain a collection of all newspapers published in Asia Minor, including those published at the military front.

The various Schools and Departments of the University were to start operating gradually. The Institute of Hygiene, the Department of Preliminary Studies and the Library were scheduled to be inaugurated at the beginning of the academic year 1922-1923. However, the Ionian University of Smyrna was destined never to open its gates. C. Karatheodoris left Smyrna on 8 September 1922, aboard the Naxos. He succeeded in taking with him the archives of the University, some of the precious laboratory equipment and a significant number of the Library books. The books and equipment were later distributed among the relevant Schools of the Athens University, while the Archives were deposited with its Department of Chemistry 15/.

13/ On the work carried out at the farm, Horton, op.cit. Also Toynbee, op.cit., p.201ff and p. 166.
14/ MOFA 23a Projet...
15/ The biggest part of the Archive remains unpublished. Some of the material was used in Solomonidis, I Pedia... and Vovolinis, op.cit..
"He did not flatter the masses with rhetoric and he had such authority that he could oppose them and provoke their rage".

Thucydides, B' 65.
Born in Heraclion, Crete, in 1861, of Macedonian origin, Aristides Stergiadis studied Law at Athens University and completed his studies in France, Germany, and Italy. He returned to Heraclion in 1889 where he practiced law for several years and was considered one of the best lawyers. Although, at the time, distinguished lawyers had brilliant prospects in Greek politics, he chose to stick to his profession. He became closely involved with the Therissos Movement and, as a result, he was imprisoned by the British. He had a keen interest in the municipal affairs of his home town and on 2 March 1906, he was elected president of the Municipal Council of Heraclion, a post which he held until December 1910 1/. A personal friend of Venizelos, he worked closely with the Prime Minister before and after the unification of Crete with Greece and contributed to the extensive legislative work carried out by the first liberal government. Among other laws, he was responsible for the one regarding local government. With the end of the Balkan Wars, he took part in the drafting of the Treaty of Athens as an expert in Moslem Affairs 2/. In 1917 he was appointed Governor General of Epirus, a post he held successfully until his transfer to Smyrna as High Commissioner. During his term in Epirus, he achieved the suppression of brigandage and came to be known as a very able administrator. After the Asia Minor Catastrophe, he became the target of serious accusations emanating from refugee circles and regarding his responsibility for the disaster that befell them. "It is quite rare for one person to attract so much hatred. With the passing years, the law of mercy was applied to others responsible. Half a century after the destruction, however, the hatred of Stergiadis remains deep" 3/. He soon became one of the most contradictory figures in modern Greek history, with the myth that he was the principal culprit persisting until today in refugee circles. However, careful examination of his service as High Commissioner on the basis of archival material suggests otherwise.

Stergiadis was very reluctant to take up the post offered to him in Smyrna and the real dimensions of the task ahead did not escape him. He was afraid that the Greek venture in Asia Minor could degenerate into a war between Greece and Turkey which would result in a state of devastation. In his view, Asia Minor would become the tomb of Greece and, in Smyrna, Athens would find a second Syracusan expedition from

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1/ Information and dates confirmed by the Editor of the Heraclion daily Allagi. For an example of his deep interest in municipal affairs, see Spanakis, S. I Idrefsi tou Irakliou, T.E.E. [Greek Chamber of Engineers], 1981, publishing a long speech by Stergiadis regarding the issue of water provision.
3/ Venezis, op.cit, p.69.
which she could never recover 4/. The reasoning behind his decision to accept the post is not clear. His subsequent stance, however, rules out political opportunism and suggests that his friendship with Venizelos and the latter's insistence that only Stergiadis was capable of dealing with this tremendous task, tipped the balance and decided the issue. Despite the general belief that Stergiadis was a megalomaniac "thirsty for power", during his time as High Commissioner he took a number of decisions which suggest the contrary. He not only refused offers such as the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of the Liberal Party, but he even declined to accompany the Prime Minister at the March 1921 London Conference and, on this occasion, declared that "only in Smyrna could he be of some help and this for a limited period " 5/. In the world of Greek politics, however, the post of the High Commissioner was a very desirable appointment as it was considered to be one step away from an important ministerial portfolio. The Smyrna High Commission, presented the added attraction of the cosmopolitan character of the city and, therefore, the jealousy Stergiadis attracted and the constant efforts to undermine his standing in the eyes of Venizelos, and public opinion, should not be difficult to comprehend.

Adding insult to the injury effected on Greek professional politicians by his appointment, Stergiadis made clear from the start that he was not going to tolerate any interference from Athens in the performance of his duties and forewarned Venizelos that the government would only have the right to appoint and dismiss him should he fail in the mission entrusted to him 6/. Venizelos' trust in his judgement was such that he left major issues requiring "on the spot" solutions to be decided by the High Commissioner, providing him not with orders but with suggestions and, wherever appropriate, sanctioning the measures taken in retrospect 7/.

Despite the fact that Stergiadis took up his duties in Smyrna on 21 May 1919, he was not formally appointed until 25 January 1920 and there is no archival evidence to suggest that he ever took the necessary oath. Although he went to Athens in

4/ FO 608/91-17424, Bucker to Vansittart, letter, 7.8.19, communicating Horton's minutes on his discussions with Stergiadis (19.7.19).
5/ MOFA 121 b Tel. No. 8847/26.8.22, Kalogeropoulos to Stergiadis. AV 3a4, Memo 1/5.4.22, not signed. Quotation from MOFA 124a4 Tel. n.n./7.2.21, Stergiadis to Prime Minister.
6/ F. Dragoumis, Diary, entry for 12 April 1921, reporting on his meeting with the High Commissioner. This Diary has not yet been published. The extracts relating to Dragoumis' visit to Smyrna in the spring of 1921, as escort to Nata Mela, president of the Patriotiko Idryma, were kindly brought to my attention by Dr. F. Kitromilidis of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies (KMS).
7/ AV 6e Tel. No. 1272/5086/29.5.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis and MOFA 59b Letter, n.n./4.11.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
February 1920 to be sworn in by the King, he had to return to Smyrna, as the sovereign was visiting Salonica at the time 8/. Until his official appointment he continued to receive his salary as Governor General of Epirus with the addition of the sum of 5,000 drs per month. 9/. Research in the Government Gazette indicates that he continued to sign laws and decrees with regard to Epirus until late October 1919, in his capacity as Governor General 10/.

His appointment was hailed as a success for the government by foreign and Greek press alike and he seemed to be regarded with high esteem by the members of the cabinet. Introducing him to the Italian Minister at Athens, Diomidis noted: "Mr. Stergiadis has the absolute confidence of the government and during his term in Epirus gave ample proof of his competence in the field of politics and his conciliatory spirit to which the Italian authorities have paid homage on many occasions. His presence in Smyrna is a guarantee for the establishment of friendly relations between our two communities" 11/. Venizelos missed no opportunity to express his trust and support for the High Commissioner and the reports of the foreign representatives in Smyrna more often than not gave credit to the impartiality of his administration, although he was usually pessimistic about the outcome of the venture 12/. However, after the initial lune de miel, when it became clear to all interested parties that Stergiadis was determined to rule on his own following the directives of the Prime Minister to the letter, the situation changed radically.

The first to express their dissatisfaction were the local Greeks who, rightly or wrongly, believed that their time had come to rule Asia Minor and were ready to put into practice the experience gained by their leaders, the dimogerondes, after decades of community self-government. As the events following the occupation of Aidin, Menemen etc. were to show, this attitude entailed acts of revenge against the Moslem communities which neither Stergiadis nor Venizelos were willing to condone 13/. The Prime Minister's orders in this respect were clear: the local Greeks would have to realize that no misconduct on their part would be tolerated. No matter how compassionate the Greek authorities were towards

8/ AV Letter, n.n./27.2.20, Politis to Venizelos, reporting on Stergiadis' visit to Athens.
9/ MOFA 141 Tel. No. 5002/25.5.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
11/ MOFA 136t Note 6327/28.6.19, Diomidis to Italian Minister.
12/ MOFA 141 Tel. No. 4536/14.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA. MOFA 22g Tel. No. 10615/15.8.20, MOFA to Stergiadis. Also MAE Turquie, 210, 280-1, Laporte to Defrance desp. n.n./3.8.19; 210, 341-3, Laporte to Defrance, desp. n.n./20.8.19.
13/ For detailed account of the events following the occupation of these towns, Rodas, op.cit, pp.153 ff. Also, Chapter Two, Section II.
their sufferings, they could not allow the local Greeks to endanger the good name of the nation of which they formed an integral part. Greece, Venizelos stressed, had come to Asia Minor not only to bring freedom to her unredeemed children but also to secure it for the other communities. Should the local Greeks obstruct this task, they would be treated as enemies 14/.

These were Venizelos' guidelines. The military authorities chose to be lenient towards the local Greeks and not to apply them, except in a few extreme cases. Stergiadis chose to implement them to the letter thus displeasing both the local Greeks and the army leadership, whom he had to call to order in this respect on numerous occasions 15/. The critical situation created by the events of Aidin caused extreme anxiety to Venizelos and cast grave doubt on his optimism about the successful outcome of the expedition. He wrote to Stergiadis that his only encouragement was the latter's presence in Smyrna which assured him that all possible measures were being taken 16/. Despite the Premier's approval of his methods, Stergiadis did not fail to recognize the fact that he was far from lenient in his treatment of the local Greeks: "I am obliged to inform you that I have dealt strictly with any Greek misconduct, at times displaying excessive severity" 17/.

Stergiadis could not be dissuaded from actively opposing anything he considered incompatible with his duties and the confidential mission entrusted to him by the government. It was mainly this conviction which was the immediate cause of his discord with the local primates. He considered himself the only authority responsible to the government and the Allies and for this reason he could not accept neither their interference with or their suggestions as to what his stance vis-à-vis the various issues facing the administration should be, especially after the international outcry against the local Greeks following the events of May 15-16. In his opinion of the local Greeks, Stergiadis was by no means alone. In late June 1919, expressing an extreme view General Paraskevopoulos' ADC Major Vyzas wrote: "Our worst enemy here is neither the Turks nor our Allies. It is the local Greeks who think they found the opportunity to avenge in a few days the pressures and persecutions of many centuries" 18/. And Vyzas concluded: "It is also some officers and

14/ AV 9th Tel. No. 1782/6625/5.7.19, Venizelos to Nider and Stergiadis.
15/ ibid
16/ MOFA 136t Tel. No. 6627/5.7.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
17/ MOFA 59g Tel. No. 7338/24.9.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
18/ Petsalis, op.cit., p. 221, quoting letter of M. Vyzas to A. Kyrou, 24.7.19.
soldiers with their miserable 1912 conception of plunder and massacres...All this would have been of no consequence if we had countered the propaganda of our dearest Allies and our friends the Levantines who, with excellent skill, manage to represent the insignificant as important and vice versa" 19/.

It should, however, be remembered that the local Greeks either as members of the communal organizations (Dimogerondia and Kentriki Epitropi) or as ephors of the educational and charitable institutions or, finally, because of their social status, had been used to playing an active role in all matters relating to the Greek Orthodox Community. The Smyrniot primates in particular, could not comprehend the fact that the establishment of the Greek administration would signify the end of the privileged regime of self government they had enjoyed for decades. This was not the first time the local notables tried to assert their authority. On a number of occasions they had been at odds with several Metropolitans and in open conflict with each other 20/. Complaints became the order of the day as soon as the various departments of the High Commission began to "interfere", in the primates' opinion, with the administration of what they considered to be community affairs. Their view was that the High Commission and its representatives in the various towns, together with the military, should seek their advice before taking any major decisions in view of their long experience of dealing with Asia Minor realities. As far as Stergiadis was concerned, this could have been the case if the vilayet of Aidin had been permanently annexed by Greece but in no way could he accept their involvement in the administration under the prevailing conditions. What seemed to escape the attention of the local Greeks was the fact that peace had not come yet and that a long battle lay ahead.

These conflicting views resulted in the High Commissioner's harsh treatment of the local Greeks and their mistrust of his good intentions. To make matters worse, Stergiadis' relations with Metropolitan Chrysostomos were not smooth from the start. The issues causing the rift between the two men stemmed from an inevitable clash of authority, given that before the advent of the High Commissioner the Metropolitan was the undisputed leader of the Asia Minor Greeks and, as such, he had exercised total authority which after May 1919 was claimed by Stergiadis as the lawful representative of the Greek government and mandatory of the Allies. "This fact seemed to be beyond the comprehension of Chrysostom" 21/.

19/ ibid.
20/ N. Beis, "Peri Dimitriou Lotou" [On Dimitrios Lotos], Mikrasiatika Chronika, VI. G. Anastasiadis, "Mitropolitis Iakovos" (Metropolitan Iakovos), Mikrasiatika Chronika, VII.
The situation deteriorated further when Stergiadis was asked by Venizelos to persuade the Metropolitan and the clergy to restrict themselves to their religious and charitable duties and to avoid in their sermons any explicit or implicit nationalist remarks that might offend foreign nationals and especially the Turks. It was the Prime Minister's belief that the priests and notables of Asia Minor should become apostles, going around the provinces and preaching the gospel of forgiveness for the past Turkish crimes in order to secure peaceful coexistence between the two communities under an impartial Greek administration 22/. For their part, however, the local Greeks were still under the bitter impressions left behind by the events of 1913-1918 and did not seem able to grasp the essence of this policy. Clearly, somewhere along the line, Venizelos had made a wrong judgement with regard to the conditions prevailing in Asia Minor and, as a result, his policy of a rapprochement between the Greek and Turkish community seemed rather unfeasible 23/.

For his part, Stergiadis did not seem offended by the fact that he was thought to favour the Turks when on various occasions he was forced by political considerations not to justify the Greeks. Clearly, his priority at the time was to convince international public opinion that the Greek administration was not behaving as a conqueror towards the alien communities under its jurisdiction. He seemed prepared to fight his battle on the home front if the army were left to settle the issue at the military front. However, matters came to a head only two months after his appointment. Numerous complaints by the Smyrniots of alleged mistreatment were transmitted by General Paraskevopoulos, a Smyrniot himself, to Diomidis and Repoulis in Athens who hastened to inform Venizelos that Stergiadis had probably lost his senses and, in any case, was not capable of performing his duties successfully. Venizelos was enraged by these communications and immediately replied that if anyone had lost his senses, it was not Stergiadis but his colleagues in Athens who could not perceive how critical the situation was and were simply accusing Stergiadis in order to see him replaced by one of their own. And Venizelos erupted:

"I see and understand from here, that there are people in Athens who claim that they ought to have been entrusted with this difficult commission themselves...And when I see such petty mindedness at a time when our position in Smyrna is daily rendered politically more dangerous, not from Stergiadis' incapacity but from the misconduct of our army, from the damaged brains of his collaborators who provide ammunition for our innumerable enemies of all

23/ For comments on the letter and the feasibility of the scheme, M.Notaras, op.cit., pp.53-57.
nationalities who lie there in ambush, I then despair and begin to wonder whether those who sneer at my Asia Minor policy might not have been right or whether our stature is too small for works of such magnitude... 'Verily I say unto you' that if we do not recover our senses and, particularly, if our military in Smyrna do not recover from their intoxication, prevent any further misdemeanours and punish with the necessary severity those already perpetrated, we will end by being thrown out of Smyrna bag and baggage, degraded and humiliated... Let [Paraskevopoulos] raise himself to the height of circumstances. Let him knock down whomsoever will not comply with the new conceptions. I will support him to enforce the harshest punishments. But let him not tolerate it to be said that the Greek army proved unworthy of the trust of the conference while he was its Commander..." 

Although Venizelos did not seem to believe any of the accusations voiced against Stergiadis, he thought it appropriate to send his private secretary, Klearhos Markandonakis to Smyrna to investigate the situation on the spot. He wrote to Repoulis that the fact that both he and Diomidis had been convinced by the polemics against Stergiadis worried him and Markandonakis' mission would entail a prolonged stay in Smyrna so that, if the President's views proved correct, the High Commissioner would have near him someone who could share his anxiety. If on the contrary the accusations proved to be valid, Markandonakis was to suggest Stergiadis' replacement. In the same letter to Repoulis, he went on to note that if General Paraskevopoulos wished to remain in Smyrna, he should stick to his military duties and follow Stergiadis' instructions and recommendations to the letter. In the event, Markandonakis' report not only confirmed Venizelos' suspicions about the nature of the accusations but also underlined the good name the High Commissioner had created for the Greek administration and himself among the Turkish communities, which Markandonakis visited extensively. Confidential Turkish intelligence reports confirmed the information: "It is noted that the Moslem population is gradually becoming accustomed to the Greek administration. The Greek civil servants and military

24/ AV9v Letter 1879/7036/18.7.19, Venizelos to Repoulis with a copy of Repoulis' letter to Venizelos. Translation of the letters from Petsalis, op.cit., pp. 223-227. These letters have been widely published and are included either in part or as a whole in most works dealing with the Asia Minor expedition.
25/ AV 9v Letter 1879/7036/17.7.19, Venizelos to Repoulis.
Commenting on the effect of the accusations against Stergiadis on Venizelos, Politis informed Diomidis that the President was now convinced the Greek populations in Asia Minor and his colleagues in Athens were "incapable of realizing the duty which is imposed on them in their own interest...and even if they are willing to listen to his policy they do not understand it" 28/. On Prime Minister's orders, Diomidis was asked to visit Smyrna "to ring a clear bell of warning to Paraskevopoulos". Reporting to Venizelos on his brief visit to Smyrna, the Foreign Minister commented that his perception of the situation had changed radically and that, indeed, Stergiadis was in complete control. His impression of the local notables did not differ from that of Venizelos:

"Having themselves created the adverse situation, the notables are and will remain furious with Stergiadis but they are in the wrong...They demand to be obeyed and they are prepared to exercise their authority tyrannically, owing to their lack of any political instinct...Stergiadis does not pay too much attention to them, he keeps them at a distance and does not hesitate to discipline them with a rather heavy hand...Any future Greek governor will have to struggle with this difficulty " 29/.  

Another factor which contributed to his strained relations with the Smyrniots, was his belief that by placing himself outside the circle of social relations, he would be in a better position to achieve the tasks entrusted to him by Venizelos. He lived a lonely life, out of which stemmed the accusation that he was a misanthrope. With his total dedication and application to his mission, he offended the hospitable establishment of Smyrna which did not succeed in welcoming the High Commissioner to its drawing rooms where local politics were extensively discussed according to the centuries-old custom 30/.

Although Diomidis was quite honest in his description of Stergiadis' relations with the local Greeks, his perception of the High Commissioner's rapport with the military leaders was far from the real state of affairs as, in the same letter to Venizelos, he reported that their relations were "smooth". Despite Paraskevopoulos' declaration that he unreservedly placed the army at the disposal of the High Commissioner and

27/ MOFA 91e, Report by the Inspector of Information and Security Department, 17.12.21, intercepted by Greek intelligence.  
28/ AV9v Letter 1868/15.7.19, Politis to Diomidis.  
29/ AV9v Letter 1881/26.7.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.  
30/ M. Notaras, op.cit., p. 57.
that he would suppress any misbehaviour ruthlessly. Stergiadis had realized from his first days in Smyrna that his relations with the military would prove difficult in view of the dual task of the latter, a task entailing their active participation in the administration, which was foreign to the military character. To complicate matters further, the High Commissioner himself had to deal with a dual task: he had to administer the zone successfully and, at the same time, control the military expeditions in such a way as both to avoid alienating the Allies by allowing the occupation of areas outside the vague Greek mandate and to ensure the security of the Greek forces and population without provoking the nationalist feelings of the Turkish population.

Soon after his arrival in Smyrna, Stergiadis advised Athens that the High Command of the army was inadequate both in numbers and because "unsuitable" officers had been appointed. Paraskevopoulos agreed with the High Commissioner on this point but attributed the initial problems to friction between the Commander of the First Division and his Chief of Staff which led to "regrettable incidents, gravely compromising the task of the High Commissioner and his relations with the military." The General considered the matter closed as he had already ordered substantial changes in the High Command and had appointed Lieutenant Commander Sarriyannis as Chief of Staff. This, however, was not to be: Stergiadis' already strained relations with the military were further tested by his issuing orders regarding the expansion of the Greek occupation, thereby superseding the Army High Command.

It should at this point be remembered that Stergiadis, defying Venizelos' orders to the contrary, took the initiative to order the occupation of Manisa, Kasaba and Aidin. It was his belief that swift action by the army was the only viable weapon against the hostility of the local Allied representatives, who opposed any expansion of the Greek zone. This initiative brought about a fait accompli which the Allies could not ignore. Nevertheless, the advance of the Greek army created more problems for Stergiadis because of the anti-Turkish persecutions that ensued in a number of towns. After the events in Menemen, he was obliged to send the public prosecutor to investigate the incidents on the spot and arrest those found implicated. In his report to Venizelos, he underlined his anxiety that these incidents might be

31/ AV 9v Letter 1881/26.7.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
32/ AV 9d Tel. No. 6578/22.5.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
33/ MOFA File 1919 AAK, Tel. No. 4670/18.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
34/ MOFA 141 Tel. nn./30.5.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
35/ MOFA 141, Tel. No. 5209/20.5.19, Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos and MOFA.
36/ FO 608/90-16411, Report no 40 (b)/6.6.19, Fitzmaurice to Calthorpe.
repeated wherever the Greek army advanced "because of the character and attitude displayed by the local Greeks and the leniency of the military authorities in dealing with them" 37/.

The strict sentences pronounced by the court martial on army officers and soldiers found guilty of "mishandling the situation" in Menemen, Akhisar and elsewhere, were received with indignation in Athens. Concern was expressed over the investigations against Greek military and their detention in custody because of "the manner with which they defended themselves against Turkish slaughterings". Such treatment, it was claimed, might result in cooling off the impetus of the army and embolden the Turkish nationalists. This view was voiced by Repoulis who argued that at a time when Turkish nationalists were "impaling" the dead bodies of Greek soldiers, he did not consider just to conduct investigations against soldiers and officers, particularly since these investigations aimed at clarifying the conditions under which "some Turks" had been killed during military operations. His view was that even during a period of armistice, Turkey was continuing the excesses and the war against the Greeks. What was worse, the Allies not only tolerated the situation but also did not allow the Greeks a free hand. "As the centre of Turkish activities is Panderma", he concluded, "the mere appearance of the Allied fleet in the sea of Marmara would suffice to compel them to stop" 38/.

This view was widely shared by the members of the cabinet and the Athenian press. Invested with the authority to deal with those deported by the High Commissioner to Old Greece for "disturbing public order" in Asia Minor, the Minister of Justice repeatedly interfered and asked Stergiadis to grant pardon to individuals found guilty by the court martial. This interference enraged the High Commissioner as he believed it weakened the discipline of the local population and their obedience towards his directives. Therefore, he informed the Minister of Justice that nobody, either in Athens or in Smyrna, should be allowed to believe that one could secure personal favours through petitions or mediation of "protectors" within the government. In this context, he stressed, the question of granting pardon should be left with the High Commission 39/. The authority to deport any Greek responsible for anti-Turkish activities had been given to the High Commissioner by Venizelos after the disturbances of 15 and 16 May 1919. The Premier had given orders for the strict punishment of local Greek "rascals who did not prove worthy of

37/ MOFA 136p Tel. No. 3028/19.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
38/ MOFA 136h Tel. No. 5590/22.6.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.
39/ MOFA 143b Tel. No. 12225/6.12.19, Stergiadis to Minister of Justice and MOFA.
their liberation" 40/.

Stergiadis attached such importance to this point that he threatened to resign his position if the government did not share his views. Should this be the case, he noted, his departure from Smyrna would be the best solution because the incompatibility of views in such a delicate matter would prove harmful to "the Greek cause". He further asked the Minister of Justice to refer all petitions to him and inform the petitioners and their protectors that the High Commissioner was the only authority competent to examine their requests 41/. This was by no means the only instance in which Stergiadis had complained against interference from Athens regarding the preferential treatment of an individual or a community. As soon as the distribution of state guaranteed loans to the returning refugees commenced, continuous requests from Athens for the favourable treatment of various communities compelled him to communicate his strong disapproval of this procedure to Venizelos. He argued that the strenuous efforts of the Greek occupation had finally succeeded in securing the strict, sometimes grateful, discipline of one million Greeks and Turks and it would be at least unwise to let the population believe that in order to secure "favouritism" it would suffice to either send a committee to Athens or appoint a "protector" in the capital, thereby bypassing the only authority competent to decide on such matters, i.e. the High Commission 42/.

Another factor which contributed to his strained relations with the military was the frequent transfer of officers from posts where they had succeeded in securing the trust of the population -Christian and Muslim- through their good conduct. Stergiadis argued that as these transfers were not dictated by strategic considerations but by pure favouritism, they could not contribute to the consolidation of security and order in the area which should be the top priority of the army 43/. However, it was not only the transfers of lower rank officers that were decided without consulting the High Commissioner. Major decisions such as the transfer of the Greek forces' High Command from Salonica to Smyrna and the subsequent arrival of General Paraskevopoulos were only communicated to him at the last minute 44/. Venizelos shared his dissatisfaction on the issue and tried

40/ MOFA 141 Tel. No. 4252/19.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou and Stergiadis. These orders, together with Stergiadis' experience on the spot, seem to have laid the foundations of mutual mistrust.
41/ MOFA 143b Tel. No. 12225/6.12.19 Stergiadis to Minister of Justice and MOFA.
42/ MOFA 143a Tel. No. 1033/26.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos and MOFA. MOFA 142p Tel. No. 7656/6.8.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
43/ GAK 8d Tel. No. 2243/11.11.21 Stergiadis to High Command.
44/ MOFA 106d Tel. No. 909/29.10.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
to play down its importance by stressing that the transfer was of a temporary nature in view of the imminent military operations. The matter of the seat of the High Command was to be discussed between the two men at the first opportunity. The Greek Premier was right in suspecting that the reason behind Stergiadis' opposition to the transfer of the High Command was that he foresaw problems in his collaboration with Paraskevopoulos. He assured therefore the High Commissioner that the General would be replaced should cooperation with him prove impossible 45/.

In the event, relations between the military and the High Commissioner reached a stalemate and Venizelos himself visited the port of Smyrna in January 1920 to settle the issue. During a conference between the military leaders, the High Commissioner and the Prime Minister it was decided that, while the High Command would be responsible for the military aspects of the occupation, Stergiadis would have the overall command and would take the political decisions 46/.

However, the peace resulting from the Premier's mediation was short lived. When in February 1920 the High Command was transferred from the military front back to Smyrna, the storm broke out 47/. Stergiadis was in Athens at the time and the Secretary General of the High Commission advised him to return immediately as major changes were likely to be ordered by Paraskevopoulos during his absence 48/. Indeed, despite Stergiadis' protests these changes were effected. The High Commissioner was convinced that they were only the result of the Greek government's favourable treatment of officers who wished to be transferred from Old Greece to what were considered "the prestigious posts of Asia Minor". Even if they were due to the actual needs of the army, he argued, it was essential that the High Commission's views be heard beforehand as it was vital to appoint officers with whom a harmonious collaboration could be secured.

While in Athens, Stergiadis had made clear to the Minister of Defence that should the government wish him to remain in his post, he would not tolerate any change in the officer corps without his previous consent. Nonetheless, three major changes were soon announced without Stergiadis' being consulted, and Colonel Pangalos, General Paraskevopoulos' Chief of Staff, had left for Smyrna to persuade the High Commissioner to accept the appointments. At this point, Stergiadis demanded the revocation of the transfers as well as the cancellation of Pangalos' mission and threatened to prohibit the landing of the three officers in Asia Minor.

45/ MOFA 106d Tel. No. 7173/31.10.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
46/ On Venizelos' visit, IEE, op.cit., p.124.
47/ MOFA 106d Tel. No. 7419/17.2.20, Paraskevopoulos to High Command.
If the government disagree with his decision, he asked to be recalled to Athens as this was the third time within eight months that he had had to express serious complaints against the military. He further commented that even though urgent military considerations necessitated the immediate reinforcement of the troops as well as the replacement of 15,000 men discharged after the last operations, the Ministry of Defence and the High Command were occupied with personnel changes that could have serious repercussions. Stergiadis also stressed that after this telegram, the government should either recall him or compel the Ministry of Defence and the High Command to conform to the terms "on which my stay in Smyrna depends" 49/. As noted by a foreign commentator, it was "an open secret that the Greek civil and military authorities in Asia Minor have been hotly engaged in a struggle which seems inevitable in the circumstances prevailing in occupied territory" 50/.

Stergiadis' task in Asia Minor was further complicated by the involvement of the Allied representatives in Turkey in matters related both to the administration and to the military occupation and its expansion. With few exceptions, the representatives opposed the Greek presence in Asia Minor on various grounds, ranging from genuine concern as to any chances for the success of the venture to outward hostility towards anything Greek. These views corresponded to a large extent to the ones that had been expressed by the various Allied experts in Paris, during the first months of the Peace Conference 51/. Although it is widely admitted that on a personal level the High Commissioner had established a good working relationship with most Allied representatives, archival sources show the continuous struggle he had to put up in order to counteract the anti-Greek propaganda mainly waged from within the Allied Consulates in Smyrna and their respective High Commissions in Constantinople.

This was not going to prove an easy task. Although no effort was spared to convince the foreign representatives in Turkey of Greek good intentions, minimal progress was made. General Milne, Commander of the Allied troops in Turkey, visited Smyrna in early August 1919. He shared the views of the British High Commissioner in Constantinople; they both believed that the best solution to the Asia Minor question would be the withdrawal of Greek and Italian troops 52/.

49/ MOFA 106d Tel. n.n./21.2.20, Stergiadis to MOFA.
50/ FO 371/7584/5681/1.6.22, British Legation in Athens to Earl Balfour.
51/ For an analysis of the various opinions expressed regarding the Greek venture, see Kitsikis, Le rôle des experts.... Also Petsalis, op.cit, pp.172-228. Helmreich, op.cit..
52/ DBFP, IV, no. 14 and FO 608/91 - 18090, Tel. No. 1669/17.8.19, Webb to Curzon.
Milne further suggested to the Foreign Office that the administration of the Greek zone should be entrusted to an interallied commission 53/. The views of Osmir Laporte, French Consul General at Smyrna, went even further. As early as March 1919, he wrote to his superiors in Paris: "No future solution can have more adverse consequences for our national interests... than the attribution of this province, in part or as a whole, to Greece" 54/. Laporte seemed convinced that Greek chauvinism would leave little room for the commercial activities of the European communities of Smyrna which would soon be forced to leave. Soon after the Greek administration took shape, he expressed the conviction that the zone should remain in the hands of Turkey under interallied control. Annexation by Greece, he noted, would have deplorable effects and there was no way it would be accepted by the Turks 55/. At the same time, he reported that the Greek authorities adopted a conciliatory stance towards the Turks and Stergiadis' "tyrannical but honest" administration had brought a semblance of normality to the area 56/. It was quite clear that Stergiadis was fighting a losing battle: any successes the Greek authorities might score in their administrative task of administration, would have little impact on the final settlement of the issue.

It was also clear that his friendly relations with the Consuls could not counterbalance the pressure exercised by their nationals and their continuous complaints against the Greek administration. Even though Stergiadis' attitude towards the foreigners, and especially the Italians, was dictated by the Prime Minister's directives to placate, compromise and give way, at times their direct involvement in anti-Greek propaganda was so obvious that he could not avoid expressing his displeasure:

"Dear Mr. Delegate,
I have the honour to bring to your attention that on every occasion a communication containing complaints by Italian citizens has been received from your office, I have immediately ordered the conduct of an inquiry to establish responsibilities. In my sincere wish to prove my amicable feelings towards you, I have taken measures to your satisfaction even before the matter at hand had been examined by the Greek authorities or even in cases I had the absolute right to refuse...I could have, in my turn Mr. Delegate, communicated to you numerous complaints against Italian citizens, some of which are

53/ FO 608/103-17942, Tel. No. 6746/11.8.19, Milne to War Office.
54/ MAE Turquie, 208, 102-3, Report, 29.3.19, "La situation politique de Smyrne et du vilayet d' Aidin". P221.
55/ MAE Turquie, 210, 282, desp. n.n./4.8.19, Laporte to Defrance.
56/ MAE Turquie, 210,280-1, desp. n.n./20.8.19, Laporte to Defrance.
extremely grave. But in my sincere wish to contribute to the confirmation of amicable relations between our two countries, I have refrained from doing so "57/.

What made matters worse was the fact that Stergiadis' leniency towards those Italians suspected of espionage and whose arrest he refused to permit, soon became another source of friction with the military. As a result of the provocative Italian stance, Stergiadis assumed the role of mediator between the Italian authorities and the Greek military. His position was made even harder by his conviction that the military were in the right 58/. The High Commissioner fully realized the danger emanating from this policy and believed that his leniency and conciliatory spirit could not prevail over the just indignation of the military towards espionage activities sponsored by the Italians 59/. In his efforts to avoid any friction with the Italians, Stergiadis had to restrain the military from taking action against them because of the open assistance they rendered the Turks both inside and outside the Greek zone, the prime example being the use of the Sokia region as a nationalist haven 60/.

Pressure exercised by the local European residents on the representatives of their respective countries soon resulted in official complaints being voiced against the administration. While a number of these complaints were justified, the overall purpose was to precipitate an Allied decision that Greece should withdraw from Asia Minor. Thus, in September 1919, the British Delegate in Smyrna J. Morgan, complained that Stergiadis maintained the Turkish administration in theory but ignored it in practice. "Every day", he wrote, "sees some further attempt on the part of the Greeks to substitute their administration for that of some Turkish department. As long as the Greeks remain in Smyrna...one may be justified in saying that their attitude towards foreign authorities in military and other matters will be marked with duplicity...It would seem impossible to keep them to their word" 61/. What seemed to escape his attention, however, was the duplicity with which the Greek authorities were presented by the Allied representatives and, needless to say, the Turks, which necessitated their taking over the administration if the Greek venture was to have any chances of success. As Stergiadis reportedly pointed out to Morgan, "the expressed trust of the British government is of no use if its representative in Smyrna shows such enmity towards the Greek

57/ MOFA 136 Draft Note to Italian Delegate in Smyrna.
58/ MOFA 21a Tel. No.3527/17.3.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
59/ MOFA 35b Tel. No. 8645/6.8.21, Stergiadis to MOFA, reporting on complaints of the Italian Consul. " I can not...impede the prosecution of individuals whose activities endanger the security of the army".
60/ MOFA 86 Tel. No. 12036/30/13.11.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
61/ FO 608/9-20692, desp. 179/10, 12.9.19, Morgan to Robeck.
Significantly enough, only a month later, Morgan himself admitted that the numerous complaints against the Greek administration had been brought up "by the Turks" for political reasons and that the Greeks were the better administrators. "Owing to the efficient control of the Greek gendarmerie", he further commented, "there were very few cases of crime; the Greek disregard of Turkish rights has something to recommend it. The Turk, who mistakes mildness for weakness, is at his best when under firm rule". This view regarding the harsh treatment of Turks by the Greek administration is characteristic of the vicious circle Stergiadis had found himself in. Accused by the local Greeks of being unfair towards them and too lenient towards the Turks, he also had to deal with daily complaints on the part of the Allied representatives of his alleged maltreatment of the Moslem community. Despite these complaints, however, Stergiadis seems to have been regarded with great respect by the foreign representatives and their colonies. "On many occasions", writes Paraskevopoulos, "the High Commissioners, various foreign nationals, even the Levantines, expressed their admiration. Stergiadis' prestige grew among the representatives of the Allied powers who considered him a most able and trustworthy person.

Their admiration for the High Commissioner did not stop the foreign and the Levantine communities from presenting him with numerous issues, stemming from their determination not to allow the Greek merchants to usurp their privileged position in the commerce of the Near East. When, for example, the export of rolling stock from the port of Smyrna was temporarily prohibited in view of pressing army needs, the British, American, French, Italian and Dutch Chambers of Commerce in Smyrna presented the British delegate with a memorandum criticizing the Greek administration, addressed to the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople and requested it to be forwarded to them. The High Commissioners immediately asked to receive Morgan's comments on the complaints and requested that he should call attention to any further grievances in his future despatches. Morgan though did not feel justified in doing so because, as he commented, the complaints were mainly based on grievances from businessmen who did not like the fact that their trade was interfered with by war conditions. "The Levantines of Smyrna", he noted, "did not so much resent the doings of Stergiadis as the very presence of the Greeks whom they dislike because they are accustomed to look upon the Greeks everywhere as an inferior

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62/ Rodas, op. cit., p.126.
63/ FO 608/103-20831, desp. 264/10, 10.10.19, Morgan to Robeck.
Morgan's report was forwarded to the Times with an unsigned memorandum, probably by a local correspondent. The author of the memorandum noted that even though the Times' diplomatic correspondents referred to Stergiadis both as an excellent governor and as a man who might take a leading part in a ministerial coalition, certainly not all Smyrna was enamoured of him. For his part, Morgan noted that there was no doubt that Stergiadis was not popular with a large number of Smyrniots whether Greeks, Turks or foreigners and that he had been told by the Greeks that the day they got hold of him they would lynch him and drown him in the bay of Smyrna. These intentions were expressed a year before the catastrophe and the alleged abandonment of Hellenism by the High Commissioner, which is said to have been the main cause of the hatred of the refugees.

After the loss of the November 1920 elections by the Liberals, Stergiadis was quick to submit his resignation. However, concentrated efforts and pleas from both Venizelos and the Royalists persuaded him to remain in his post. It is significant that the new government refused to accept his resignation although practically all Venizelist officials, civil and military, had been replaced. The general feeling was that "there was no other man who could take his place in Asia Minor". Nonetheless, it was soon felt that the government had complete confidence in Stergiadis' ability and equity and had practically given him carte blanche in Smyrna.

The change in the government soon brought changes in the military and civil personnel serving in Asia Minor. The changes in the civil service and the police force within the area of his jurisdiction enraged Stergiadis who threatened to resign once again. This latest incident was caused by the order of the Minister of Interior regarding the transfer of I. Karidis, Commander of the Police, who had served under Stergiadis both in Epirus and Asia Minor. The High Commissioner guaranteed that the Commander was a man of duty on whom any government could rely. In a long telegram to the government he argued that for 19 months he had striven to apply an administrative system according to which the High Commissioner was responsible for all the civil employees and members of the police under his jurisdiction, without allowing any governmental interference whatsoever in what concerned matters of personnel, be it appointments, transfers or dismissals. This was a method he had successfully applied in

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65/ MOFA 41d, copy of Morgan's report and attached memo, n.n./n.d.
66/ ibid.
67/ Henderson, op. cit., p. 596.
68/ DBFP, xvii, no. 428, Bentick to FO, 15.8.22, reporting conversation with M. Baltazis.
Epirus and had tried to repeat in Smyrna, on a wider scale. The careful implementation of this policy, he claimed, was essential in Asia Minor in view of the delicate conditions necessitating specially trained personnel. Should the need arise for the replacement of civil employees, of high and low ranks alike, it would be pointed out by the High Commissioner himself who had not hesitated in the past 19 months to replace two commanders of the Smyrna police force. The commanders were excellent officers, Stergiadis noted, but had proved unable to adapt to the local circumstances. These and other changes requested by the High Commissioner had nothing to do with personal preferences and favouritism. They were due to the implementation of "a particular administrative method which I have not regretted and which I cannot alter (if I am to help the government) with the national task, not completed or consolidated as yet" 69/. His vigorous reaction prevented any further changes without the High Commissioner's consent. He was further assured that this transfer was due to a mistake of the Ministry of Interior, which had now received strict orders not to effect any changes in the High Commissioner's area of jurisdiction. The government expressed its confidence in "his enlightened administration" and its wish "not to interfere in the performance of his duties" 70/.

The change in the regime and the subsequent changes in the army leadership do not seem to have had any positive effect on his strained relations with the military who chose to disobey the orders of both the government and the High Commissioner and continued to interfere with the administration of the finances of the zone under military occupation. Within this zone, the High Commissioner had established a special administrative system of civil and financial affairs with satisfactory results. His intention was to develop this system gradually in such a way that the militarily occupied areas (MOZ) would be administratively absorbed into the Treaty of Sèvres Zone. By November 1920, the Greek administration had absorbed the zone north of the Meander up to Smyrna and aimed to incorporate soon the area from Adramyt to Balikesir and Soma, to Salihli and Alasehir (Filadelfia). This move would not cause any Allied protests as it would only affect the Turkish authorities without touching upon vested western interests such as the Public Debt, the Régie des Tabacs, the administration of the railways etc. It was also contemplated as a means to free the military authorities from duties for which they did not possess the administrative competence or the ability to adapt continuously to the ever changing conditions and to give solutions to the various problems arising daily. It was Stergiadis' conviction that the interference of the military in the administrative, judicial and, what was most important, financial affairs of the occupied zone would certainly lead to "an upheaval which

69/ MOFA 22g Tel. No. 15374/27.11.20, Stergiadis to Prime Minister.
70/ MOFA 22g Tel. No.15374/28.11.20, MOFA to Stergiadis.
could compromise the Greek cause by shaking Allied confidence in Greece's ability to govern and pacify Anatolia" 71/.

Stergiadis requested the immediate intervention of the government so that the military authorities would strictly abstain from any interference in the administration of the finances of the occupied territories and adhere to the High Commissioner's instructions. This intervention was requested because his repeated demarches to the High Command had brought no results. General Vlachopoulos, Chief of Staff at the time, refused to comply with the instructions of the High Commissioner because he had conflicting orders from the Commander of the Asia Minor Army. This seemed to be the case with most instructions of the High Commissioner to the military authorities which, once they had received a given order from the Commander of the army, could not follow opposite orders received from the High Commissioner. Therefore, Stergiadis concluded, it was up to the government to decide on the administration of the occupied territories and to issue specific instructions so that no doubt or friction could arise 72/.

All in all, Stergiadis was very reluctant to give his consent for the military to undertake activities of what he described as a "civilian or political nature". The experiences of the first months of the occupation had taken their toll in his view of the ability of the officers to perform "civilian tasks" 73/. At the same time, the Greek military were not ready to accept the authority of the High Commissioner over them or his right to issue orders to them. The frequent conflicts that ensued were usually solved to Stergiadis' satisfaction with the mediation of Athens. Nevertheless, this involved a time consuming procedure which annoyed Stergiadis immensely because it conflicted with the strict system of administration he wanted to implement in Asia Minor. In April 1921, he confided to Philip Dragoumis that under normal circumstances he would be the first to criticize his severe treatment of military and civilians alike. He believed however that the delicate situation dictated his actions which, in the long run, would prove beneficial 74/. In order for a system of administration to succeed, he concluded, the person chosen to implement it must dedicate at least ten years to the task but, in view of his poor health, he did not believe he was to stay in Smyrna for long 75/. Admittedly, his administrative methods were not compatible with the character and strong personality of the Smyrnios. One of his critics comments: "From the first days of his presence in Smyrna, Stergiadis put into practice administrative methods using terror against the local population. Surrounded by men who sought to conceal 71/ MOFA 24a Tel. No. 9507/19.8.21, Stergiadis to MOFA.
72/ MOFA 24a Tel. No. 9507/19.8.21, Stergiadis to MOFA.
73/ Rodas, op. cit., p. 165.
74/ Dragoumis, Ph. op. cit., entry for 15/16 April 1921.
75/ ibid.
their ignorance behind a stupid arrogance, Stergiadis proved to be a real tyrant with interminable crises of madness. In his internal politics, Venizelos has committed a series of grave mistakes which accelerated the dramatic failure of his foreign policy. One of these mistakes was the appointment of Stergiadis" 76/.

On the contrary, Prince Nicholas who met the High Commissioner during his visit to Asia Minor with King Constantine in June 1921, noted in his diary: " Stergiadis seems to be a man of rare abilities and energy. He works tirelessly and, what is rare, his administration is impartial. I believe he is a Venizelist, a fact he does not refute anyway, but, above all, he considers himself to be a Greek who is interested in the progress and the good name of his country...Let us hope he will remain the same person until the end...Without any doubt he is today what the British call the right man in the right place " 77/.

Although an ardent Venizelist, Stergiadis did not seem to have any difficulties in collaborating with the new regime as he could easily distinguish party political preferences from his duties as a civil employee. His strong sense of duty was one of the main reasons that led him to oppose the Asia Minor Defence plans for autonomy. Indeed, if one is to draw conclusions from his past performance, it would have been impossible for him to actively assist or even endorse a movement that was not sponsored by the Greek government, let alone to assume its leadership. His allegiance to the elected government of Greece must have also been the main reason for his disapproval of Patriarch Meletios and the circumstances of his election to the patriarchal throne 78/.

76/ Dourmoussis, op.cit., p.30. Although criticizing Stergiadis on many points, M. Rodas who worked in the High Commission for the most part of the Greek administration, he does not seem to agree with Dourmoussis on the issue of Stergiadis' surrounding himself with ignorant and arrogant men. On the contrary, he emphasizes the fact that the formidable administrative task accomplished in such a short period of time was due to a team effort. Rodas, op.cit., 77/ Markezinis, op.cit., p.291. For the royal visit to Asia Minor, Nicholas, Prince My Fifty Years, London n.d., pp. 293ff.

78/ On the election of Meletios Metaxakis and subsequent reactions, A. Alexandris, "The Constantinopolitan Greek Factor...", Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol. 8, 1982/83. In his Annual Report (1922), the British High Commissioner in Constantinople criticized Meletios for inciting the Greeks against the Turks with his inflammatory sermons. FO 371/91 76/7.11.23, Henderson to Curzon, p.34 ff. On Stergiadis and his refusal to head the movement, AV 21b Pepragmena Ethnikis Amynas Constantinoupoloos (Annual Report, Constantinople National Defence), 23.4.22. Also Chapter Four, Section II.
Meletios accused Stergiadis of having turned against Hellenism in Asia Minor and of having changed from "a liberal aching for the salvation of Asia Minor" to "the most fanatic organ of the royalist regime, striving to silence every voice of protest against the imminent return of the Christian population to Turkish rule" 79/. These accusations, however, came only after the High Commissioner had turned down the offer extended to him by Meletios and the Asia Minor Defence to assume its leadership 80/. Another issue closely related with that of the Amyna, was the proposal for the organization of a civil guard. The High Commissioner was very much against the organization of such a body and of supplying arms to the local Greeks 81/.

Even if the government had sponsored this movement, it is highly unlikely that Stergiadis would have been involved in its leadership. As he explained to General Danglis, at the time leader of the Liberals, he did not trust either General Papoulas or the army to undertake successfully such a major task. At the same time, he feared that once this movement failed, which it was likely to do, the disaster would be even greater. To his mind, only intense diplomatic activity could secure the protection of minorities in Turkey, the only issue in which Greece could have a say 82/.

It is quite surprising that although the Smyrniot establishment had fought for Stergiadis' replacement from his first days as High Commissioner and had repeatedly accused him of behaving as a tyrant, it decided to offer him the leadership of the Amyna. Albeit at a very late stage, the Smyrniots seemed to have discovered his virtues as a leader and the respect he enjoyed within Allied circles. Significantly enough, Venizelos had not changed his mind about his former colleague, despite the venomous accusations from Smyrna and Athens. When Meletios asked for his advice as to whether the Amyna should go on with its plans despite Stergiadis' refusal to assume its leadership, Venizelos commented that if the High Commissioner did not support the movement then no good could come out of it. At the same time, he had repeatedly advised the leaders of the Mikrasiatiki Amyna that none of their plans should be implemented unless Stergiadis undertook the leadership of the movement 83/.

Until April 1922, the Venizelists had generally

79/ AV a2 Letter, n.n./24.5.22, Meletios to Venizelos.
80/ On this offer, see Chapter Four, Section II.
81/ In a long report regarding the organization of the civil guard, General Petimezas criticizes Stergiadis strongly for not allowing the implementation of the plan. Petimezas Archive, Benaki Museum.
82/ AV 3a1 Letter, n.n./12.4.22, Danglis to Venizelos.
83/ Notaras, op.cit., p. 62.
refrained from openly accusing Stergiadis for fear of his being replaced by a confirmed royalist. The Smyrniots in particular, did not dare to lodge any complaint with the Gounaris government against him because, as Venizelists, they abstained from openly discrediting the only remaining high Venizelist functionary. A British correspondent noted: "...The Royalist government did not dare touch him for fear it might arouse an outcry like the one caused in January 1921, when it removed Zaimis from the directorship of the National Bank...In all the time he has been in Smyrna he never mixed with the people, he never condescended to recognize socially any of the leading Greek families, he never accepted an invitation to their homes and never invited any of them to his residence which is guarded like a bear's den". The same correspondent reported that although he had asked to be received by the High Commissioner twice and whilst the King, Gounaris and all the Ministers accepted readily, Stergiadis had refused twice and said that he never received journalists 84/. In the spring of 1922, however, his having opted for the solution of the evacuation of the Greek army brought on the open attack of the Venizelist press. "Contrary to all expectations", wrote Embros, "surprising and disappointing all those who believed in his wide and mature political horizons and based many of their hopes on his character and strength, Mr. Stergiadis has agreed with the [evacuation] policy of Mr. Gounaris. The policy of evacuation and abandonment of Asia Minor" 85/.

What Embros failed to mention was that in February 1922, during one of his visits to Athens, Stergiadis had a meeting with the leaders of the Liberal party and expressed to them his anxiety over the Asia Minor question. He insisted that the army should be evacuated immediately with exemplary order so as to make the most out of the situation and not to compromise "the national prestige". The Liberal leadership seemed to agree with his views and P. Melas inquired whether Stergiadis would consider resigning from his post to assume the leadership of the Phileleftheri. To this offer the High Commissioner replied that it was his wish to remain in Smyrna and "drink the whole glass" 86/.

Meanwhile, a number of newspapers, including some reflecting the views of the opposition, voiced the view that Stergiadis should assume the Premiership. In February 1922, Lindley briefed Curzon: "It is here that M. Stergiadis comes in. He was one of M. Venizelos's most trusted lieutenants, but has kept studiously out of party politics. He is universally respected both for his political and financial honesty, and public opinion is more and more turning towards him in this critical time. In the conversation with him...of the

84/ Copy of the report in MOFA 41d.
85/ MOFA 118h Embros, 9.4.22.
86/ AV 3a4, 1/5.4.22, Memo to Venizelos, not signed.
6th instant, he did not touch on the possibility of his forming a government but I have since learned that he contemplates it seriously -after but not before- he has carried out the evacuation of Smyrna. His idea is to gain the support of the moderate wing of the anti-Venizelist party by accepting King Constantine and to take with him the Right Wing of the Venizelists, who are naturally inclined to support him, and whom he would satisfy by such measures as the dissolution of the political clubs [epistrati].

It will be sure that M. Stergiadis aims at nothing less than the pacification of the country. His programme is that of a statesman and a patriot, but there is no doubt that he will meet with serious difficulties. In the first place, signs are not wanting that already some Venizelist veterans resent the appearance of a new man just as the old party leaders resented the appearance of M. Venizelos. They are jealous of him and twit him with disloyalty to the illustrious exile [Venizelos]. If some of the Venizelists think in this manner, it may be imagined what the leaders of the older parties feel. They are like a flock of daws on whom has fallen the shadow of a peregrine -cawing abuse and tumbling in the air without the courage to come to grips. In spite of these difficulties, I am inclined to think that events will bring M. Stergiadis into power before many months are over. How long his collaborators will stomach his despotic methods and violent temper is another matter; still more, perhaps, how long his compatriots will bear with his superiority to themselves. The examples of Aristides and Venizelos are not encouraging" 87/.

It seems, however, that Lindley had misinterpreted Stergiadis' intentions, and a few days later he reported to London that when he asked the High Commissioner about the truth in the reports about his assuming the premiership, he replied that the internal and external situation of Greece were inextricably interwoven, and that he thought no good would follow a change of government at that stage. "The present government must liquidate the war, and it was the duty of all patriotic Greeks to help them. Besides, he would have no majority in the Chamber were he to try to form a Government, and fresh elections were not to be thought of now. He could not take up the responsibility of forming an unconstitutional Government in present circumstances" 88/.

Despite Stergiadis' blunt refusal to commit himself, the campaign to bring him at the forefront of Greek politics appears to have continued right until the first days of September 1922, when Bentnick reported: "It is of interest to note that the "Kathimerini", hitherto the chief prop of M.

87/ FO 371/7584/ Lindlay to Curzon 20.2.22.
88/ FO 371/7584/ Lindlay to Curzon 24.2.22.
Gounaris, is now one of the newspapers which attacks him and his Government with great violence and advocates with all its eloquence the resignation of the present Cabinet and the access to the Premiership of M. Stergiadis. Some of the Venizelist newspapers, on the other hand, which used to place all their hopes on M. Stergiadis, have now turned against him...Prince Andrew [is] favourable to M. Stergiadis, as he thought he was strong enough to tell the King, if need be, that he ought to retire" 89/.

In the chaotic situation of early summer 1922, with conflicting rumours about the Greek position in Asia Minor and at the conference table, only Stergiadis seemed to realize what the final outcome of the situation was going to be. "The High Commissioner was totally pessimistic. He was the only one to foresee the disaster. He kept telling us that everything would be lost soon" 90/. Indeed, it seems tragic that the High Commissioner from Smyrna could make such predictions while the government which knew the harsh reality of the fruitless negotiations, was in no position to take measures for the evacuation of the population 91/.

Meanwhile, Stergiadis did not fail to inform the Liberal leadership about the real state of affairs in Asia Minor and about his views on the hopelessness of the situation. In early July 1922 he had long talks with George Papandreou, specially sent by the Liberal leadership to meet with the High Commissioner aboard the ship taking him from Athens to Smyrna. During these talks, Papandreou reportedly informed Stergiadis that the Liberal party had also adopted the policy of the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor 92/. The High Commissioner seems to have convinced Papandreou that any thoughts for the self defence of Asia Minor by the Amyna were out of the question. Further, he conveyed to the Liberal envoy his anxiety and helplessness over the imminent disaster. "Nothing, absolutely nothing could be done" 93/.

89/ FO 371/7585/ Bentnick to Curzon 6.9.22.
90/ Deposition of N. Theotokis during the trial of The Six. ProTa publication.
91/ See Chapter Two, Section I.
92/ An unnamed journalist or agent of the MOFA Press Office travelled on the same boat with Stergiadis and Papandreou to report on their movements MOFA 52b, Report, n.n./4.7.22, unsigned addressed to Aravantinos, Head of the Press Office. A popular account of the meeting between the two men is given in Venezis' Mikrasia Chaire, p. 76 and is a characteristic example of how events could be distorted or magnified out of proportion, or both, to give credibility to criticisms. According to this account, the author of which was supposed to have organized the meeting between the two men, the encounter did not take place on the liner to Smyrna at all but in Smyrna itself and Papandreou is supposed to have said to this witness that Stergiadis was having a nervous breakdown. 93/ ibid.
When Stergiadis visited Athens in July 1922, Exindaris, another leading Liberal and close friend of Venizelos, approached him with a view to arranging a meeting of the two men at the request of the ex-Prime Minister. In the past, the High Commissioner seems to have expressed the wish to meet with his former "brother in arms" and, when Exindaris put the details to him, he was willing to go ahead with the proposal. However, when Exindaris returned a few days later to make the final arrangements, he found a completely changed man. Stergiadis had in the meantime received a number of venomous, anonymous letters and had become furious. At the same time, he had come to realize that the esteem and the trust he had enjoyed among the Liberal followers in the past had now been replaced by accusations and mistrust. The realization of the new situation, of which he was hitherto unaware, created in him a stormy psychological condition. "Mixed feelings of surprise, bitterness, grievance and despondency seemed to clash in his soul". He believed that rarely had a man found himself in the difficult position he was in. While performing what he thought was his duty, he had wasted all his energy and mental abilities. Nonetheless, instead of his services being recognized, as he hoped they would, he suddenly realized there was a general outcry against him. This sudden discovery had turned him into a broken man and his disappointment was such that Exindaris admitted he felt sorry for him. After these events, he saw the prospect of a meeting with Venizelos in a totally different light. "It will seem", he said to Exindaris, "as if I am going to the meeting in order to defend myself and this I will never do, for the life of me. If Jesus Christ said to me 'light a candle in my name and you will go to Heaven', I would reply I do not care about you or your paradise".

This was the High Commissioner's state of mind when he was asked to accept the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "in view of the critical situation". Needless to say, he did not even consider the possibility not only because he knew very well that no governmental change could have any effect on the impending disaster, but also because, as he had repeatedly declared, he did not have any political ambitions and considered himself a "high ranking functionary". Therefore, irrespective of whether the Asia Minor disaster was the result of military failure or political imprudence, it can in no way be attributed to Stergiadis. He was neither in charge of the army nor did he take part in the shaping of the country's foreign policy. He was not even a politician collaborating with the government. On two issues he was totally responsible and indeed had every initiative: the

95/ ibid.
96/ ibid.
97/ MOFA 121b 8847/26.8.22, Kalogeropoulos to Stergiadis.
FO 371/7585/ Bentnick to Curzon 6.9.22.
internal administration and the preservation of public order within the zone under Greek occupation. As admitted by his critics, he was successful in both areas:

"If we wish to be objective, we must accept that the Greek administration of Smyrna conscientiously performed its task, which was both heavy and awkward and at the same time patriotic and of extreme national importance. The exemplary and enviable [administration] of the area, together with the consolidation of public order were the achievements of the High Commission. Under the circumstances, no one but the dry and realistic Stergiadis could have been more appropriate for the post of the High Commissioner. With his policies Stergiadis not only did not harm but without doubt benefited the Greek cause" 98/.

Nonetheless, the slandering campaign in the press had already started. Lindlay noted in his report: "There is no doubt that the strong line taken by M. Stergiadis, both towards the National Defence Movement and towards the Greek Military Authorities in Asia Minor has made him many enemies in Greece. The papers have lately been full of abuse of the High Commissioner, who is denounced by some of the Venizelist Press as a renegade and by other journals as a traitor to the cause of Hellenism. In my opinion he is almost the only man of strong character and high political integrity at present occupying an important post in Greece, and he is the greatest moral asset possessed by the Greek Government and the Crown" 99/.

Despite the fact that he had informed all the interested parties on the disaster about to befall the Christians of Asia Minor months in advance, the responsible political leaders -royalist and liberal alike- did not deem it essential to prepare the population. Highlighting the tremendous complexities involved, Lindlay commented in February 1922: "Although most responsible Greeks would be glad now to evacuate Asia Minor immediately, I do not believe the present Greek government would have the nerve to do so without adequate guarantees for the safety of Christians...I doubt even if Mr. Stergiadis were he in power would take responsibility for either leaving the population or swamping this impoverished country with two or three hundred thousand more refugees. It may be that at one time the safety of the Christian population was a pretext for the Greek occupation. If this was so, it has long ceased to be the case. It is now the real obstacle to the evacuation and has become more serious since the guarantees obtained by the French for Cilicia proved inadequate to prevent the population from leaving the country en masse" 100/.

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98/ Prosfygikos Kosmos, [Refugee World], 14.9.72.
99/ FO 371/7584/5681 Bentnick to Earl Balfour, 1.6.22.
100/ DBFP, xvii, no. 536, Lindley to Curzon, 19.2.22.
Nonetheless, when the disaster came, he was accused of having hidden the truth from the population and of not providing the means for its departure from Asia Minor. These accusations, however, do not reflect the true state of affairs. In repeated telegrams he had requested the immediate dispatch of ships to transfer the population and when it became clear that none were available, he asked the Royal Navy to anchor along the coast to encourage the population and give a semblance of security. He also asked those representatives of the High Commission who believed that their stay in their area of jurisdiction was essential, to remain until further notice 101/. Even if he had wanted to hide the truth, he would not have succeeded since from June 1922 the Greek inhabitants of the interior of Asia Minor began arriving at the coast, and especially Smyrna, in their hundreds, bringing the news of the catastrophe 102/. However, it seems that although the Christian communities and especially their notables knew the real state of affairs, no one wanted to believe that the end was so near 103/.

Despite stories to the contrary, Stergiadis was the last Greek official to leave Smyrna. General Polymenakos, Commander of the army, and his staff had boarded the warship on 7 September and were ready to leave. On 8 September, the High Commissioner boarded the British Iron Duke. There were no enraged crowds and no foreign detachment with fixed bayonets to protect him 104/. Stergiadis handed the keys of the High Commission to the French Consul and left, "a broken man who had assumed a post he did not want and had retained it out of duty" 105/. The following morning, the first Turkish detachments entered Smyrna while the ship that was to transport Stergiadis to Constantinople was still in the harbour.

In June 1922, during a debate in parliament, the spokesman of the Liberal party said: "No one appreciates more than the Liberals the task performed in Asia Minor by Mr. Stergiadis, thanks to whom Greece can today proudly demonstrate an original, civilized administration which honours the Greek state. No one is in a position to criticize the patriotic work of the High Commissioner and all of us agree about the excellence of his work" 106/. This was said only two months before the disaster. When a hate campaign was started against Stergiadis after the destruction, no official

101/ MOFA 121g Tel. No. 15007/25.8.22, Stergiadis to the Representatives of the High Commission.
102/ Notaras, op.cit., p. 64.
103/ Venezis, op.cit., p. 94.
104/ For the legend surrounding his departure and the alleged efforts of the crowds to lynch him, Venezis,op.cit., p. 68. Angelomatis, op.cit., p.213.
105/ Notaras, op.cit., p.76.
106/ Praktika Voulis ton Ellinon, [Minutes of the Greek Parliament], 10 June 1922.
voice rose to defend him although no government and no political party has ever officially accused him of the charges made against him, initially started by a small group of refugees from Smyrna. The origins of the public outcry against Stergiadis coincided with the arrival of the first refugees to Greece and, mainly, of those Smyrniots he had embittered with his policies. As no one seemed to object to the accusations, they soon found their way into publications, inflammatory articles and speeches, creating a myth which, without any thought or research, was soon adopted as part of the story. The atmosphere prevailing in Greece at the time helped the word to come out, make its round with extreme speed and convince the long suffering masses of the refugees that, as well as The Six "who found the end they deserved", Stergiadis was also responsible for the disaster. Since he was neither dead, nor in Greece to reply to his critics, he attracted the formidable hate of more than one million people.

Thus, hastily formed public opinion soon found its place in Greek folklore. Venizelist declarations to the effect that "no liberal politician believes that the governments following November 1920 committed treason against the motherland or that they consciously directed the country to the Asia Minor disaster" 107/, precipitated the process by suggesting that if the royalist politicians were not responsible for the disaster, then it surely followed that Stergiadis was the sole culprit for the sufferings of the refugees. It would be unrealistic to expect the political leaders and parties of the time to defy public opinion by defending Stergiadis, as such a stance would certainly have been tantamount to political suicide 108/.

In contrast, when in 1924 a group of refugee MPs attacked him in parliament, the then government and the other political leaders avoided taking part in the debate. By this stance, they neither endorsed the accusations nor did they side with Stergiadis. Was their silence an indication of their endorsement of the accusations or was it dictated by other considerations? The one person who could have changed public opinion in favour of Stergiadis was Venizelos. He chose not to do so although it is very unlikely that he did not know the facts. In a rare moment of compassion for his former comrade in arms, Venizelos wrote to his sons: "I beg you not to forget that you should never condemn a person before giving him the chance to be heard, no matter how self-evident the charges against him are. In this instance, compassion is due to Stergiadis because he found himself under very difficult circumstances, under which anyone would have broken" 109/.

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107/ AV1 Letter, n.n./3.2.29, Venizelos to Tsaldaris.
108/ Notaras, op.cit.
109/ AV 25, Letter, n.n./13.10.22 Venizelos to his sons Kyriakos and Sophocles.
These comments were prompted by Stergiadis' visit to the Paris residence of Kyriakos and Sophocles Venizelos in early October 1922. The biographer of Sophocles Venizelos notes: "At the end of September 1922, Stergiadis arrived at the French capital. His first concern was to leave his visiting card at the residence of Sophocles. As soon as E. Benakis knew of the event, he advised Sophocles to return it. Such was the outcry against Stergiadis, mainly among the refugees, that any contact with him would be to the detriment of the Venizelos' family. The opinion of the father was sought, and he was quick to reply: 'Dear Sophocles, to the question of Kyriakos, I replied yesterday on the telephone that I do not approve of the view of our friend Mr. Benakis that you should return the visiting cards left by Mr. Stergiadis. I believe that you must return his visit without delay, by simply leaving a card without seeking to see him. But if he asks to see you, you must hurry to receive him and to listen to him with great attention. If you find his explanations sound and worthy of attention you should not hesitate to tell him so...You may also add that I will return [from Deauville] on Saturday and that I will be happy to see him if he is in Paris" 110/.

There seems to be no evidence to suggest that this meeting took place. Nonetheless, Venizelos' advice to his sons tends to indicate that the Liberal leader who was among the very few to know how and why Greece's Anatolian venture had failed, was reluctant, to say the least, to accept that the fate of the refugees was all Stergiadis' doing.

During his twenty eight years of self exile in France, Stergiadis spoke but once. In April 1927 he gave an interview to Kostas Ouranis for the leading Venizelist paper Eleftheros Typos 111/. Ouranis reportedly asked him what was his reaction towards the refugees, in view of their hatred towards him and their conviction that he was the only person to be blamed for the catastrophe that befell them and Stergiadis commented:

"I know it, I know that if I fall in their hands they will lynch me. I will not however try to change your mind. Maybe one day the truth will be known and then you will realize and all the world will realize that I did what I had to do and, therefore, I can have a clear conscience. I had two obligations: to secure the transportation of the army and to avert panic. In the first one I succeeded. In order to succeed in the second, I assured the public that Smyrna was not facing any immediate danger. It goes without saying that I did not give this assurance on my own. On this occasion I was but the porte parole of the military who were adamant that it would take the Turks at least one month

111/ Eleftheros Typos [Free Press], 7 April 1927.
to enter Smyrna 112/. I did nothing more but repeat their assurances and, also, I did not for a moment stop asking the government to send an adequate number of ships to Asia Minor for the transportation of the population. The official documents are there to prove it".

Indeed, archival material supports this statement. What Stergiadis did not mention either during this interview or at any other point, was the fact that although he had foreseen the necessity for an evacuation as early as the beginning of 1922 and he could have resigned under any pretext a few months before the catastrophe, he remained in his position in order not to cause panic or be accused of cowardice. It must be remembered that in May 1922, General Papoulas, Commander in Chief of the Greek forces, had resigned. Therefore, Stergiadis had both the alternative and the precedent.

To Ouranis' remark that he could have requested the Allied warships at the time at the port of Smyrna to transport the Christian population to the neighbouring Greek islands, Stergiadis observed that he had indeed tried to do so but the Allied commanders had received orders from their governments to remain neutral "until the situation was stabilized". At this point, Stergiadis expressed his indignation towards the Allies "who did not protect the Christians because they did not want to dissatisfy the Turks. It is for this reason that they went to the extent of throwing boiling water on those that managed to swim to their ships". Although clearly Stergiadis knew a lot more about the Asia Minor question than any other Greek, except perhaps Venizelos, during this interview he only touched on events that were common knowledge. If there is a mystery surrounding the man, it is his reasons for not speaking or writing about the tragic events he knew so well. It has been suggested that this was maybe due to his "magnanimous and forgiving character" or to the fact that he did not wish to name the real culprits of the disaster 113/.

Stergiadis shared the opinion of Patriarch Joachim III who, contrary to those believing in the Slavonic danger, estimated that no other power except Russia could offer a guarantee of security to Hellenism in Turkey. This was because the Turks tolerated the Greeks as long as the Christian Orthodox Russian bogey existed. When the Soviet regime came to power, the Turks were ready to exterminate the Greeks and the Europeans were sure to observe this extermination not only with indifference but even with malice. These views, Stergiadis concluded, he had analyzed to Venizelos when the

112/ General Hadjianestis is quoted by Rodas, op.cit., p. 339, as having reassured Metropolitan Chrysostomos on 4 September 1922 that the Greek army was capable of holding the front for a year.
113/ Dafnis, op.cit., p. 113.
post of the High Commissioner was offered to him 114/.

Ouranis noted that Stergiadis had not exchanged a word with a living soul for six months and that even with his maid he seemed to communicate with gestures and half sentences. The High Commissioner's seclusion was confirmed some twenty years later in a letter from Nikos Kazantzakis to M. Saikalabaniis. In this letter, Kazantzakis reported that he found Stergiadis a broken man, both physically and mentally. He seemed to have forgotten the Greek language and conversed with the author in French. Although he knew Kazantzakis and his family very well, he did not seem to recognize or remember him 115/.

In December 1922, a confidential communication from the Commission of Inquiry into the National Disaster to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requested Stergiadis' address in France together with the Ministry's opinion whether his extradition would be possible, should the need arise 116/. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon informed the Commission that Stergiadis was in Paris and that the outcome of an application for extradition depended on the nature of the crime for which the extradition would be requested 117/. In the meantime, the Commission submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a set of questions to form the basis for a statement by Repoulis, at the time also in Paris, in order to establish the culpability, or otherwise, of the High Commissioner. The Commission wanted to know what Repoulis knew of the contacts between Venizelos and Stergiadis after November 1920, what were Venizelos' instructions as to the policy to be followed in Asia Minor, whether the ex-Premier had given instructions to the High Commissioner regarding the schemes for the autonomy of Asia Minor and, finally, what Repoulis knew as to the extent of Stergiadis' responsibility for the disaster 118/.

Although there seems to be no archival evidence as to the replies Repoulis gave to the above questions, the matter of Stergiadis' legal prosecution seems to have been dropped because no charge could be established against him. Should it have taken place, Stergiadis' trial would have been of extreme interest, even more so as Venizelos would have had to testify. As indicated by the questions put to Repoulis by the Commission, what the Inquiry mainly wanted to establish was the ex-Prime Minister's stance vis-à-vis Stergiadis and the Asia Minor question after November 1920.

Until his death in 1950, Stergiadis lived in France

114/ Views expressed to Ouranis, Eleftheros Typos, 7.4.29.
115/ Kazantzakis' letter published in Allagi [Change], 4.5.83.
116/ MOFA A/2 1923, Doc. No. 189/30.12.22, Commission of Inquiry into the National Disaster to MOFA.
117/ MOFA A/2 1923, Doc. No. 150/7.1.23, MOFA to Commission...
118/ MOFA A/2 1923, Doc. No. 159/12.12.22, MOFA to Greek Embassy in Paris, communicating questionnaire by the Commission...
where he kept a very low profile. None of his former colleagues and friends kept contact with him and he seems to have led a very lonely life. During his 28 years of self exile, in contrast to so many others, he neither spoke nor wrote to defend his name. This would have been out of character as, in order to whitewash himself, he would have had to bring accusations against many others. Folklore around Stergiadis suggests that during his exile he was supported by the British Intelligence Service, whose agent he was supposed to have been despite the fact that he had spent one year of his life in a British prison. The truth of the matter, however, is quite different. Until his death Stergiadis was supported by his nephew. N. Plastiras who remained a friend until the end and visited him regularly, knew the bad state of his finances and the dignity with which he faced his poverty.

Several among his long list of critics were army officers who had served in Smyrna. Most of them did not have any specific charges to make but simply repeated the accusations of the Smyrniot notables with whom they were in close contact throughout the period of the Greek occupation. Very few among those not convinced by the charges against Stergiadis stood up to be counted. It is significant that this short list includes persons who served at the High Commission through the 1919-1922 period and therefore witnessed the events closely. Among them, Petros Gounarakis, Secretary General of the Armostelia wrote in 1968:

"I do not believe that a close associate of Stergiadis has the right to remain silent when for the last forty years his name has continuously been soiled with mud, without the altera pars being heard. There is no doubt that Stergiadis sometimes reacted in an exaggerated way but his exaggerations were always dictated by deep thinking and by the policy he was ordered to follow... Even E. Repoulis in his regrettable telegram to Venizelos recognized the many qualities, the tireless work and activity of Stergiadis in the same way they were recognized by all the politicians and military who lived through the 1919-1922 tragedy. One

119/ Stergiadis' nephew was a civil employee with the Greek Parliament. The information regarding the sums of money he sent to his uncle was first published in Notaras, op.cit., p. 82.

It was further confirmed to me by D. Papamichalopoulos, who at the time was serving at the Smyrna Port and subsequently became a Liberal MP for Lakonia and Minister for Merchant Marine in all the post-1922 liberal governments. During our interviews, Papamichalopoulos, an ardent friend of Venizelos, confirmed that both his experience of the events and his subsequent talks with the Liberal leader had convinced him that Stergiadis did not bear any blame for the disaster. Interviews with D. Papamichalopoulos, Athens 13-18 July 1979, 20-30 August 1983.
should not forget that it is a fact of history for the captain of the ship to bear the responsibility for its sinking, irrespective of whether he contributed to it or not...As his associate both in Epirus and Asia Minor, I can certify that Stergiadis may not have had the qualities of a parliamentarian and it is doubtful whether he could have distinguished himself in parliamentary activity. He was, however, a unique administrator of a calibre Greece does not have but a few...[In a number of incidents] I would not have reacted as Stergiadis did. But as a just person, I am obliged to say that his policy was correct: the Greek population of Smyrna had to stop believing that the freedom brought to it by the Greek landing signified that the Greeks could revenge all the crimes perpetrated against them by the Turks during the course of four centuries 120/.

This letter was sent to Estia as a reply to an article entitled "The Miserable Activities of Stergiadis in Smyrna", published in the newspaper on 26 February 1968 and reprinting a selection of the stories regarding his alleged beating of priests etc. Although Gounarakis' letter is of significant importance in that it was the first time such a close associate of the High Commissioner had decided to take his side openly, the newspaper did not print it. Such publications continued well into the 70's and 80's. On 4 March 1979, for example, the Athenian daily Acropolis, devoted one of its leaders to the "Stergiadis' Issue" and concluded that had he returned to Greece, even the dead would have thrown stones at him.

Among the few Greeks who have defended Stergiadis in their writings, is M. Notaras who also served with the High Commission. He is emphatic that Stergiadis' only mistake was that "because of his sui generis character and the difficult circumstances he embittered and mistreated 50 to 60 members of the Smyrniot establishment mainly due to his insistence on not allowing the clergy, the notables and the dimogerondes to share in the government of Asia Minor"...[The High Commissioner] was distinguished for his honesty, his maturity, his acute intelligence and correct judgement. He always said what he believed to be true, he was very active and liked to work. At the same time, he was very authoritative, easily angered, and not at all flexible. This is to say he was a person of opposing qualities and defects. His image was damaged by his lack of political flexibility and his exaggerated reaction in a number of cases. Very few men have been the object of such [unjust] fury 121/.

120/ Letter by Petros Gounarakis to Estia, dated 5.3.68. This letter was kindly given to me by Mrs. Gounarakis together with other papers of her late husband relevant to Stergiadis and the work of the High Commission.
121/ Notaras, op.cit., p.55.
Charilaos Zamarias who served as Stergiadis' secretary both in Epirus and Smyrna, confirmed these comments and added that the High Commissioner was not a man to be evaluated by conventional standards. He was a very important man, a great patriot with strong will power who simply happened to use extraordinary methods in his collaboration with his colleagues and his treatment of the public 122/. Zamarias further expressed the view that Stergiadis was a man of very simple needs and illustrated his point by mentioning that when at one point the High Commissioner was offered a villa to use as his residence, he decided to turn it into an orphanage for girls which was urgently needed. On an earlier occasion, he had been sent a car from Athens to use in his public appearances, which he had sent back immediately because he thought it was useless. He refused all social engagements and lived in total seclusion, lest he be accused of partiality towards the Greeks 123/.

G. Spyridonos, who served with the General Staff as colonel, gives a clear picture of the problems faced by the High Commissioner: " [Stergiadis] enjoyed the absolute trust of Venizelos and received orders from him alone. These orders governed all his actions and were manifested in his behaviour. He had to safeguard the Turkish population and to repress immediately any tendencies for revenge on the part of the local christians...It is thus evident how heavy a responsibility he carried on his shoulders. He had to face a series of never ending insoluble issues and strove to restore amicable relations between groups of individuals who had clashing interests. The continuous interference of the Allied High Commissioners and the Allied military authorities made his task even heavier. This interference caused the discontent of the local Greeks and their resentment of the High Commissioner who, in my opinion, did everything possible to be consistent with Venizelos' directives and who at every opportunity stressed the necessity for a benevolent treatment of the Turks. It is also my opinion that he fulfilled his mission. His only defect was that he behaved in a rough manner and thus caused unnecessary discontent" 124/.

Toynbee who met Stergiadis during his visits to Asia Minor as correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, had this to say for the High Commissioner:

123/ Both stories are confirmed by documents in the MOFA archives, MOFA 136 st, 3306/29.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos and MOFA 2b1 9871/5.10.19, Stergiadis to MOFA. Before leaving Smyrna in 1922, Stergiadis left a substantial sum with the American Consul General, to be used for the upkeep of the orphanage. Angelomatis, op.cit. p. 426.
124/ G. Spyridonos, I Mikrasiatiki Ekstrateia Opos tin Eida, [The Asia Minor Expedition as I saw it], Athens 1957.
"Stergiadis began his career as a successful barrister in Crete and bears the marks of his country and profession. He is highly strung - resourceful and courageous but capricious and hot-tempered - and his method of administration was to strike unexpectedly and hard, as if he were pleading a weak case or fighting a desperate duel. This fencing style of government, with its lunges, feints and dexterous avoidance of hostile thrusts, is unwestern and particularly un-English, but then Stergiadis did not command the means of an Indian lieutenant governor. To begin with... he had no judicial system and no civil service. He had to hold his own against the military who became less amenable as the situation grew more grave... He had to improvise everything pending the inauguration of the Sèvres regime and to act as if he believed in the prospects of Greek rule in Anatolia when every month it was becoming more evident that the Supreme Council's irresponsible decision would have to be reversed... If the Treaty of Sèvres had come into force and the plebiscite in favour of Greece, he would not have been accused of having misused his powers. If the vote had gone the other way, his fellow country men would have made him the scapegoat for their national disappointment... He could hardly have had a worse start or performed a more brilliant acrobatic feat than to keep afloat as he did in such a sea of troubles." 125/.

Although "such difficulties might paralyze a professional western administrator", Stergiadis seemed to fare well 126/. Clearly, he was not an ordinary man for he succeeded in reducing troops and civilians to order and in asserting his authority in the occupied area. With his team, he managed to construct an effective civil administration under conditions of martial law and continuous warfare. However, his achievements were nullified by the fact that his task presupposed a reversal of local relationships which only time and tranquility could have brought about.

125/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 163.
126/ ibid, p. 159.
II. The Asia Minor Defence Movement
The rumours of an imminent Greek evacuation of Asia Minor became more persistent towards the end of 1921 and gave new impetus to the Asia Minor Defence Movement which had been organized in Constantinople after the elections of November 1920 by Venizelist officers, mainly colonels, members of the Liberal party and prominent members of Constantinopolitan society. Little is known about the internal organization and the wider orientations of the movement. It seems, however, that it sprang up as a direct expression of the fears and apprehensions of the Asia Minor Greeks regarding the policy to be followed by the new regime, faced by the crucial dilemma of the continuation of the war for the imposition of the Treaty of Sèvres or the evacuation of Asia Minor. By the end of 1921, these fears had been calmed but the inability of the Gounaris cabinet to effect a major military success and the persistent rumours of the evacuation of the army led the Defence to the decision to mobilize with the view to declaring the Smyrna zone an autonomous state with its own army. It was envisaged that this army would be mainly composed by officers and soldiers of the regular Greek force who would choose not to be demobilized and by volunteers from the zone itself and other Greek communities abroad. It was also envisaged that these communities would undertake to support the autonomous state financially, either through fund raising or by contracting an internal loan. Their first aim was to gain British support through the good offices of Venizelos because they believed that this support was of paramount importance for the creation of the envisaged autonomous Ionian State. For some of the Defence members, this state would be the launching pad for the operation to overthrow King Constantine and unite Asia Minor with Old Greece in the same way that the 1917 revolutionary regime of Salonica had achieved the restoration of Venizelos to power with the help of the French bayonets.

The relationship between the Liberal leader and the Defence is not very clear. It seems that Venizelos was not himself very sure as to where he stood vis-à-vis the movement and, except for his unequivocal good will, he does not appear to have offered very much towards its success. One possible explanation for his stance may be that he did not want to assume the leadership of the Amyna in order to avoid the suggestion that he was trying to return to power and also in order not to compromise politically its "national aims". Nonetheless, it was through his mediation that in January 1921 the representatives of the Defence visited London and briefed Lloyd George in an effort to enlist his support. Lloyd George displayed an interest in the movement but, as with the approaches of the Greek government, he did not commit the British government to any form of practical aid. However, during their visit to London, the representatives seem to have established close contact with major Greek personalities, such as Sir John Stavridi, who are thought to have

1/ IEE, op. cit., pp. 189-196.
2/ IEE, op. cit., pp. 189-196.
helped the movement financially.

At the end of October 1921, a similar organization sprang up in Smyrna. The Asia Minor Defence Committee of Smyrna comprised 33 members, twelve from the various community institutions of Smyrna and twenty one members from the corresponding bodies in Ephesus, Aivali, Filadelfia and other districts. A three-strong governing body was elected with its base in the Metropolis of Smyrna. Its scopes and goals were incorporated in the "National Programme" which consisted of the following points:

a. The preservation of the freedom of the areas liberated by the Greek army and

b. The assurance of guarantees for the protection of the sister minorities of the interior, whose redemption had not been achieved.

One of the Committee's main tasks was to reinforce the ranks of the regular Greek army with as many Asia Minor Greeks as possible. At the same time, it undertook "to enlighten public opinion in Europe and America about the plight of Asia Minor, by organizing rallies, signing petitions, sponsoring publications in the foreign press and despatching representatives abroad" 3/. For a later stage, the Defence advocated the conscription of all the Asia Minor Greeks from 18 to 50 years of age and the commandeering of 1/5 of their properties, together with that of the churches 4/.

Surely, the Defence leaders could not have expected to secure Allied support as far as recruitment and conscription were concerned. Their position in the matter was clear in a note they had addressed to the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople 5/. Moreover, Allied support or not, the experience of conscripting Asia Minor Greeks during the previous two years, indicated that the results of such a move in 1922 would bear fruits nowhere near the numbers anticipated by the optimistic expectations of the Defence. Even before the 1920 elections, when things seemed to be going well, Stergiadis was reporting that he had to exercise pressure on the Asia Minor youth to undertake military service. Their reluctance was apparent when in June 1920 officers were sent to the interior of the Greek zone to raise volunteers. The same reports applied to Smyrna where it appears that a number of Greek citizens eligible for military service put to question their citizenship in order to avoid conscription 6/. What was more, in order to curb the flight of the Asia Minor Greeks liable for military service, both the High Commissioner and the military authorities issued strict orders to the effect that no Greek between the age of 18 and 37 years of age should be given permission to leave Asia Minor regardless

3/ Unsigned and undated memorandum in MOFA 113b.
4/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 146.
5/ Unsigned and Undated Note, MOFA 26d.
6/ MOFA 3m tel. no. 637/5.6.20, Stergiadis to MOFA.
of his citizenship 7/. In the event, as the wave of desertions increased an amnesty was granted providing both for the deserters and for those evading military service, on condition that they would enlist within 15 days 8/.

The establishment of the Smyrna Defence was soon followed by branches in London, Bucharest and in other cities with major Greek communities. Two months later, the election of Meletios Metaxakis to the Patriarchal throne of Constantinople gave a tremendous boost to the activities of the Defence as he was quick to lend his unlimited and unconditional support 9/. By now, the initiation of Stergiadis and Papoulas, Commander in Chief of the Greek forces in Asia Minor, had assumed top priority for the movement. However, this task did not prove an easy one. The High Commissioner was known for his conviction that Asia Minor was to be governed by Athens through him and not by the old Dimogerondia or any organization willing to take its place. Therefore, it could be expected that he would not permit any movement which would not be directly controlled by the High Commission.

True enough, when he was approached by the leaders of the Amyyna movement to enlist his support, Stergiadis was adamant that he would not allow any organization to operate if it would not obey his directives. The reasons behind Stergiadis' decision not to support the Defence were mainly that he did not believe that there was any chance of holding the military front or, even more so, of crushing the Kemalist forces according to the plans of the movement for autonomy. The High Commissioner evidently refused to lull the Defence leaders with false hopes or to assume its leadership of the movement himself because he seemed convinced that the whole operation was condemned to failure and that the plan as such was based on over optimistic assumptions. What was more, the government had intimated to the High Commissioner that it did not support the movement and it would have been totally out of his character to implement plans contrary to the wishes of Athens 10/. It is characteristic that during one of his meetings with the Defence leaders, he is quoted as having told them: "I am not Venizelos. He is both a politician and a revolutionary. I have neither his abilities nor the strength for such a responsibility" 11/. On 1 January 1922, 3,500 well-wishing telegrams were reportedly sent to Stergiadis from the military front as part of the effort to convince him to assume the Amyna leadership. To all this, the High Commissioner retorted that he was a civil servant and not a revolutionary 12/.

7/ GAK 20n Asia Minor Army, General Staff, Order No. 31175/18151/22.4.21.
8/ GAK 20 st Circular No. 9936/28.5.22, Gounarakis to the Representatives of the High Commission.
10/ Notaras, op.cit., p. 61.
11/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 144.
11/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 269.
The stance of the Commander in Chief was bound to be more favourable. Since his arrival in Asia Minor he had shown a conciliatory stance towards the Venizelist officers serving at the front and this had gained him popularity among the troops. In December 1921, he had a first contact with Yiagios Siotis, one of the most prominent members of the Constantinopolitan Defence, who visited him in Smyrna to propose that he would assume the leadership of the movement. Papoulas showed a keen interest in the plans for autonomy but declared that he could not assume the leadership without the approval of the government. Indeed, this was a point of paradox. The Defence, an essentially Venizelist movement which in its aims included the overthrow of the legitimate regime in Greece, was now requesting the support of the Athens government in order to achieve these very aims.

In February 1922, Siotis came to Smyrna for a second time and Papoulas seems to have been convinced to assume the leadership of the Amyna "in principle". However, he pointed out, the movement would not have any chances of success if it were not supported wholeheartedly from Athens, both militarily and financially. By then, it should have been clear to the Amyna that Papoulas was willing to contribute to the struggle in every possible way, but not to the extent of assuming the leadership of the autonomy movement without the government's approval 13/. In order to prove his good will, he sent two of his close aides without delay to Constantinople to discuss the plans with the Patriarch and to negotiate a possible collaboration between the Amyna and the Asia Minor army 14/. From Constantinople, they proceeded to Athens accompanied by Siotis, to brief the government and enlist its support. Evidently displeased with Papoulas' involvement with a Venizelist organization both Gounaris and Theotokis, the Minister of Defence, asked the Commander in Chief to come to Athens and explain the situation.

This was exactly what Papoulas did on 19 March 1922, a little after the announcement of the Paris proposals which had caused a tremendous upheaval in Greek public opinion. Naturally, the Asia Minor Greeks were particularly perturbed by the prospect of evacuation, as envisaged in these proposals. The Smyrna Defence leaders addressed a resolution to the Allied governments, proclaiming their determination to leave Asia Minor rather than see it return under Ottoman rule 15/. On 21 March 1922, Tharros published flaming proclamations of the Amyna with which all Greeks between 18 and 50 years of age were called to the colours and every one was urged to continue the struggle against the implementation of the Paris proposals 16/. Reflecting this frame of mind, Papoulas

13/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 152.
14/ Unsigned, undated memorandum in MOFA 113b.
15/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 137.
16/ Tharros, 21.3.22.
told Gounaris that if the government could not denounce these proposals, it should either accept his resignation or allow him to declare the autonomy of Ionia in collaboration with the Asia Minor Defence. In the event, Papoulas was persuaded not to resign but to return to Smyrna and await the reinforcements the government had been promising him for months.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence were not in a position to agree with Papoulas because they considered the plan totally unrealistic and, in the remote chance that it succeed in both securing Allied approval and defending the Greek zone with only 60,000 men as it professed, it would quite probably turn against Athens. What was more, it was quite clear that the Allies, including the British, would never give their consent for the implementation of the plan. When Lindley reported from Athens that the movement for defending the Smyrna zone and establishing autonomy was gathering strength, Curzon asked him to make clear to the Greek government that such a movement would be viewed in England "with the greatest disappointment and displeasure and could only have disastrous results." Sir Harry Lamb, the British Consul General in Smyrna, was also instructed to make a similar communication to Stergiadis. In his reply, Stergiadis assured him that he strongly opposed the Amyna and although he was unable to suppress all expression of opinion or the manifestation of feelings on the part of a population "whose welfare and even existence was at stake", he had prevented the movement from assuming a really dangerous shape.

In the meantime, the Grand Vizier had protested against the institution of the Amyna to the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, who was quick to comment that any attempt to create an independent state in Asia Minor by a refusal of the Greek army to evacuate, could be defeated by a British threat to cut off sea-borne supplies.

Patriarch Meletios had been trying to contact Venizelos for some time seeking his advice as to the chances of the autonomist movement. To this end, he despatched P. Argyropoulos, one of the Constantinopolitan Defence leaders, to meet the former Premier and brief him on the situation prevailing in the City and in Smyrna. In his introductory letter, Meletios wrote:

"Among the many insoluble problems we face is that of the stance of M. Stergiadis. Towards the Patriarchate he displays a stance more inimical that that of Gounaris. While he professes that the State cannot prolong the Asia Minor occupation, he treats badly the Metropolitans we sent to guide the population...It is certain that all of us both in Smyrna and in Athens, we are fighting in the dark, shooting against friends and

17/ DBFP, vol. xvii, nos. 577 and 578.
19/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 552.
enemies alike without any particular goal since we differ hopelessly even in the understanding of the general interests of the fatherland. For this reason, we are all expecting the sun beams of your ingenuity so that we can at least understand where we are and what we should aim at. If, like Mr. Stergiadis, you consider the continuation of the struggle against the interests of the nation, please let us know so that we can change the stance of the Patriarchate accordingly" 20/.

In a lengthy reply, Venizelos declined the leadership of the movement which he considered to entail unsurmountable difficulties. He was very cautious, however, not to assume any responsibility in advising the Asia Minor Greeks either to go on with their plans or to drop them. What he did advise was that the scheme would have better chances of success if it were to assume an "Asia Minor/Christian" character as opposed to an "Ionian/Greek" one. In any case, he seemed convinced that the Entente would never support such a movement and, if Stergiadis did not accept the leadership, he suggested that the whole issue be dropped.

His gloomy predictions appear to have emanated from a conversation he had at the Foreign Office shortly before writing to the Patriarch. During a meeting with Sir E. Crowe, Venizelos put forward the thought that, now that the evacuation of the Greek army was a must, the only possible solution to the issue of the protection of minorities would be if the districts from Smyrna to Ismid were patrolled and guarded by a local organization. This would make it impossible for Kemal either to penetrate into these districts or to leave them aside "whilst undertaking enterprises across the water [against the British zone]". When the Greek army would be evacuated, he continued his argument, plenty of officers and men, originally drawn from those districts, would be willing to remain if some security were offered to them. What Venizelos in fact was suggesting was that the Allies should support the venture financially and share the costs among them with the British footing the Greek bill as well 21/. On the record of this conversation, Curzon minuted: "M. Venizelos's suggestion that the situation can be saved and the safety of the minorities secured by the arming of the local organizations in the area between Ismid and Smyrna (to be financed by Europe) is in my view quite illusory. That the Allies will finance the attempt is doubtful. That the bands so organized would be able to stand against the armies of Kemal (with all the resources of modern warfare) and to hold the wide area from Ismid to the Mediterranean is quite out of the

20/ AV3a2 Letter, n.n./25.4.22, Patriarch Meletios to Venizelos.
21/ FO E 5425/5/44, 25.5.22, Record of a Conversation between Sir E. Crowe and M. Venizelos.
question" 22/. In retrospect, it seems that Venizelos only put forward this scheme in an effort to test the waters at Whitehall. He must, however, have known that this plan had no chance of being accepted by the Allies who were not even willing to come to the aid of the regular Greek army. Leading Venizelists in Athens, like General Danglis, were fully aware of the difficulties inherent in the movement which were at the same time the prerequisites for its success: financial resources, substantial armed forces and excellent leadership. All three were simply non-existent in Smyrna 23/.

Venizelos' letter to the Patriarch was followed on 22 April 1922 by an official declaration of the British government which refuted rumours that it sponsored the Defence. It appears that this declaration came as a result of a conversation between Stergiadis and Lindley on 20 April 1922, when the High Commissioner assured the latter that the Amyna would have been even less successful had it not been for "certain Greeks" who gave out that the movement was encouraged by "influential persons abroad" 24/. Stergiadis was also quoted as having appealed to the British Ambassador "to help dispel the idea that there was one official and another unofficial policy regarding this question" 25/. Evidently, Stergiadis' remarks were intended to apply to influential Greeks in London, who were soon informed that they could not be allowed to work in Britain against the policy of the government and its Allies and equally against the policy of the Greek government 26/. On 22 April, Harold Nicolson recorded that he had spoken to Sir John Stavridi along the above lines. In his presence, Stavridi telephoned General Frantzis, a liaison with the Defence who was to leave for Constantinople the following day, and instructed him to inform the Patriarch and General Papoulas that the British government would in no circumstances countenance their movement. Harold Nicolson recorded after his meeting with Stavridi on 22 April: "I gained the impression from Sir John Stavridis's attitude that they had no hope of either M. Venizelos or M. Stergiadis heading the movement. I gathered however that they were convinced that the movement would be supported, either openly or secretly, by the present government at Athens and that in such an event they would be able to resist the Kemalists for at least two months" 27/.

In a last effort, to convince Papoulas, Argyropoulos, on his way to visit Venizelos in London, visited Smyrna on 28 April 1922. However, this effort also met with failure and, by now, the Smyrniot Defence which was of decidedly less Venizelist character, had dropped all ideas of renouncing the

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22/ ibid.
23/ AV3 Letter, n.n./12.4.22, General Danglis to Venizelos.
24/ FO E 4180/27/44, 20.4.22, Lindley (Athens) to Lord Curzon.
25/ ibid.
26/ ibid. Minute by Osborne, dated 22.4.22.
27/ ibid.
Athens government and proclaiming autonomy during a mass
demonstration. Instead, they were convinced that their only
chance of success came hand in hand with securing the support
of the government. To this end, three members of the Committee
visited Athens at the end of April 1922, where Gounaris tried
to assure them that the Greek army would never evacuate and
leave them to their fate but, at the same time, refused to
make any commitments for aid and suggested that from then on
they should address any request to Stergiadis who enjoyed the
wholehearted support of the government. As a result of this
visit and in open contrast to Greece's acceptance of the
Paris proposals in principle, an official communiqué published
on 24 April 1922, assured the Asia Minor Greeks that the Greek
army would not be evacuated before the signature of the peace
treaty.

In a letter to Siotis, Papoulas stressed that all plans
pertaining to the struggle for the defence of Asia Minor
should be made in the light of the "pessimistic reality" and
not of idealistic, non-existent circumstances suggested by the
Amyna in its estimation of the situation 28/. All in all,
Papoulas seems to have been more reluctant to accept the Amyna
leadership than popular accounts appear to suggest. One month
before his resignation, he published a declaration in the
Athenian and Smyrniot newspapers to the effect that in order
to stop speculation around his name, he declared that he only
followed orders from the government and would not be prepared
to take any action contravening his military oath 29/. Not
discouraged, in May 1922 Siotis made yet another effort to
convince Papoulas but, by that time, it seems that the
Commander in Chief had already decided to resign his
commission and his resignation on 23 May 1922 sounded the end
of the Asia Minor Defence efforts for the autonomy of Ionia.
One of the last activities towards that goal, was a collective
letter addressed to Sir H. Rumbold, the British High
Commissioner in Constantinople, in an effort to protest
against the restoration to Turkey of territories under Greek
occupation, in an effort to exercise moral pressure on the
Powers in favour of reconsideration of the Paris proposals
30/. An earlier meeting with Meletios had clarified the
ideological standing of the Amyna, which was now viewed not
simply as a purely Venizelist movement but as a general Greek
movement of resistance to the implementation of the plans for
evacuation 31/. Patriarch Meletios pressed the point that, in
Paris, the Powers had made the mistake of treating the issue
as one between Turkey and Greece, whereas the real issue at
stake was the position of the Greeks in Turkey. To his mind,

29/ Tharros, 13.4.22.
30/ FO E 2924/10/44, 3.5.22, Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
to Lord Curzon.
31/ FO E 2894/10/44, 18.4.22, Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
to Lord Curzon, communicating Memorandum on Conversation
between Mr. Ryan and the Patriarch.
guarantees for their protection would serve no purpose as they
had availed nothing in Cilicia, where the population had
fled. The same thing, he forecast, would happen in Asia Minor.
"If the Greek army left, the Christian population would be
found trooping after them to the coast...Their choice lay not
between life and death, but between different kinds of death"
32. In line with the points made by the Patriarch, a little
before the resignation of Papoulas, the Amyna made a formal
application to the High Commissioner seeking permission to
procure arms and arm a civil guard 33.

At this point, another plan emerged. This time, it was
sponsored by Athens and, at first sight it seemed to present a
lot of similarities with that of the Amyna. The plan entailed
the effort to create an autonomous state in Asia Minor with
Smyrna as its centre, governed by a Christian ruler under the
suzerainty of the Sultan and, in general terms, presented a
number of similarities with Venizelos' suggestions put to the
Patriarch a few months earlier 34. In Stergiadis' mind, this
state should be created by the Allies, within boundaries wide
enough to make it self-supporting. It should comprise the
whole of the Mediterranean sea-board of Asia Minor with the
exception of Constantinople and the Arab districts. A
permanent administration and gendarmerie force could be built
up by employing local elements of all nationalities, "who
would come forward if they were persuaded that the settlement
was permanent" 35. Its character would be exclusively that of
Asia Minor without any Christian or Greek tendencies and it
was to comprise a zone wider that the one envisaged by the
Treaty of Sèvres. In contrast to the Asia Minor Defence plans,
this autonomous state would base its existence on the support
of the Allies and would not be intended as a means to preserve
the Hellenic character of Ionia. The scheme encountered
initial success in the form of securing the recommendation of
the British Ambassador in Athens to the Foreign Office, that
it should be considered seriously 36. This was more than
can be said about the initial British reaction to the Smyrna
Defence which, it was felt, was largely talk, undermined the
confidence of the population and alarmed the Moslem community
37. Once again, however, the weak point was the military

32/ ibid.
33/ MOFA 136b, Memorandum n.n./n.d.
34/ AV3a2 Letter, n.n./31.3.22, Venizelos to Patriarch
Meletios.
36/ ibid. Osborne commented on 15.3.22: "I do not like the
Greek anxiety to pre-warn us of impending developments; it
indicates the belief, which Mr. Lindley is anxious to dispel,
that an anti-monarchist coup d' état would change our policy".
37/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 552. Sir H. Lamb commented that, in
the light of previous experience, this element of alarm was
at the root of most excesses.

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support of the state by volunteers from the regular Greek army who would be requested to remain after the evacuation.

In a long memorandum presenting the advantages of the autonomy plans as seen by the Greek side, we read:

"It is now clear that immediate action has to be undertaken to resolve the stalemate reached in Asia Minor because the aimless exhaustion of both the Greek army and the Greek finances does not permit any further prolongation of the situation. Some Greek circles propose immediate evacuation. However, should the Greek forces be withdrawn, massacres and persecutions against the Christians will surely follow...One million five hundred thousand refugees will flood Smyrna and, when transported to Piraeus, will cause anarchy to erupt. Therefore, the Greek army can neither leave Smyrna nor stay forever. Europe has decided that we should go but she neither wants us to go now nor can she compel us to evacuate. It is therefore imperative that we should act ourselves and the first task in that direction is to make sure that we will not need financial aid from Europe. Two solutions are apparent, Annexation and Autonomy. Annexation is impossible in view of international considerations and also because the creation of a strong Turkish state as a neighbour will prolong the need for a strong Greek military presence...Greece will say to Europe: 'Since you do not want us to stay in Asia Minor and you do not want to implement the Treaty of Sèvres, you cannot refuse the right of the local population to defend themselves from the new Turkish slavery, massacre and annihilation'. Greece, guided by elementary humanitarian concepts and by a liberal tradition of 3000 years, cannot abandon the populations she has liberated to destruction and sees as her duty to organize Asia Minor into an Autonomous State which will become emancipated when it will become capable of defending itself and living on its own...To this end, it is vital that the Greek occupation expands towards Ismid on one side, and towards Adalia on the other. The presently occupied zone does not have natural boundaries...The line Ismid - Adalia has the advantage that it should cut the present front by 100 kilometres and that...it comprises a self-supporting entity as it comprises the whole of western Asia Minor coastline and islands, with most Greek communities, and other non-Turkish minorities...There is no doubt that the European nations and America will hail with joy this noble act of the small Greek state and that the League of Nations will want to place the new State under its protection".

38/ MOFA 48b, Memorandum, undated and unsigned.
It was further put forward that the nationalists based their strength mainly on the fatigue of the Greek army. Once, however, they were convinced that the Greek forces were there to stay, their troops would soon show signs of fatigue themselves. In order to sustain the difficult months ahead, it was proposed to impose a military tax of 25% over all existing taxes and to stop payments to the Ottoman Debt "which the High Commission pays regularly while Kemal pays nothing".

Stergiadis seemed quite confident that if any plan had any chances of success, then it had to be the plan for autonomy. In the middle of July 1922, he went to Athens to discuss the details for the implementation of the scheme with the government and, a while before his return, the rumours for the declaration of autonomy reached Smyrna. After his arrival, it was expected that he would announce the change of the regime immediately. As the days passed with no announcement, the air was tense with apprehension. Finally, on 28 July, the Turkish primates were invited to the Smyrna Town Hall where Ali Naip Zade, head of the Department of Moslem Affairs at the High Commission, briefed them on the details of the scheme and asked them to urge their communities to participate in a rally organized for the following Sunday, 31 July, during which autonomy would be declared. Shops and offices were to remain closed and would be decorated with Ottoman flags. The primates reluctantly accepted to convey the information to their communities but commented that they could not guarantee the participation of the Turkish population in a mass rally organized by the Greek administration. In the meantime, two Turkish officers of the gendarmerie were given leave by the Greek authorities in order to visit the Turkish quarters of the city and engage in propaganda for the autonomy plans among their co-nationals.

According to intelligence reports, the French Consulate had received instructions from Constantinople to report all reactions against autonomy to the French press in an effort to convince public opinion that an important part of the population was opposed to the scheme. Further unconfirmed information indicated that the Consulate was also instructed to fabricate incidents and evidence to this effect and, for this reason, its Information Office had employed the services of a former lieutenant of the French army, specialized in intelligence work. In contrast to what could have been expected, the Italian authorities did not show any interest in participating or organizing anti-autonomy propaganda. Nonetheless, Dr. A. Brounetti, one of their known agents, attempted to incite the Turkish primates to draw up a memorandum of protest and submit it to the Italian and French authorities.

39/ GAK 17n3 Unsigned Intelligence Report, 2645/9.8.22.
40/ GAK 17h2 Unsigned Intelligence report, 2646/9.8.22.
41/ GAK 17th Unsigned Intelligence Report, -/3.8.22. GAK 17n1 Unsigned Intelligence Report, 2648/9.8.22.
Consulates. Also, he urged the primates to take action and "perform their patriotic duties" as it was their actions which would precipitate the Greek evacuation 42/. In the meantime, a confidential circular of the Greek High Commission, informed its Representatives that the autonomous regime would be implemented in all the areas occupied by the Greek army with the exception of the vilayet of Brusa and the sanjak of Tuzki Sehir, Kütahya and Afîrci Kazakh. The reason given for postponing the implementation of autonomy in these areas was the lack of competent personnel and the need for a further study of the special conditions prevailing therein, together with "the creation of the appropriate circumstances" 43/.

The intentions of the High Commissioner with reference to the administrative reforms which would determine the character of the new autonomous state are preserved in some explanatory notes in the handwriting of P. Gounarakis, the General Secretary. These notes elaborate on the Autonomy Decree which is characterized as the framework of the new administrative machinery. The Autonomy Decree was to be expanded and improved upon by a new Department within the Administration of Smyrna which would prepare the drafts of laws and decrees needed to explore all the suggestions included in it.

As the Autonomy Decree provided for the fusion of certain kazas, a fact likely to alienate the local populations, it was suggested to have explained to them that the existing boundaries and local authorities would be preserved "for the time being", until the roadworks and other public works necessitated by the fusion could be planned and carried out. It was also suggested that the following points should be fully exalted by the Representatives in their speeches upon the proclamation of autonomy:
   a. The population would be asked to participate in the central government of the state.
   b. The police and gendarmerie would be composed of both Greeks and Turks.
   c. The self-governing bodies would continue to receive their tax percentages, to which new ones would be added.
   d. The communal organizations and local authorities would be preserved intact 44/.

In Smyrna, the autonomy of the State of Asia Minor was proclaimed during a rally in front of the Government House on 31 July 1922. A conservative estimate counted 300 participants most of whom were employees of the High Commission. Some Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish and Jewish primates were also present and delivered short speeches after Stergiadis had

42/ ibid.
43/ GAK 17e Circular No. 2613/9.8.22, Secretary General to Representatives.
44/ MOFA 23e Notes in Gounarakis' handwriting, undated and unsigned.
declared the zone autonomous 45/. The proclamations read on behalf of the Greek government and the High Commission stressed the multiracial character of the new administration and gave details of the reorganization of the present state machinery in which all would be called to participate regardless of their creed or religion. Stergiadis' proclamation announced that he was authorized by the Greek government to inform all populations of the occupied countries about the decision arrived at concerning the future organization of Western Asia Minor. In general terms, far from proposing autonomy, he spoke about administrative rearrangements and not for the creation of an Ionian, Hellenic state of Venizelist character 46/. To those who came to congratulate him, Stergiadis was quoted to have said: "You are all children of the same motherland. Religious and political adventures have divided you on many occasions and caused you to jump at each other's throats. Let the sufferings of the past become lessons for the future" 47/. One of his staunchest critics, commented that with these few words and because he did not speak anymore about Asia Minor Greeks but about the people of Asia Minor, Stergiadis had written off the three thousand year old history of Greek Asia Minor together with all that was the ideal of the Greek race 48/.

The mass demonstration certainly lacked in participation and spontaneity. The disbelief of the Moslem population in conjunction with the displeasure of the local Defence indicated that the popular approval was very restricted. An advocate of the Defence wrote subsequently that the autonomy, under the shape it was going to take, was an act of desperation that did not permit any hope. During the demonstration, he notes, everyone had the feeling that Greek Asia Minor was being interned 49/. Although at the beginning the French alone raised some objections, fifteen days later, the Entente representatives handed a note in Athens declaring their refusal to accept the autonomy and stressing that although Greece was free to administer areas under her military occupation as she pleased, the fate of western Asia Minor would only be determined by the Peace Conference 50/. Soon after, events at the front and the Greek debacle made the whole scheme redundant and decided the fate of western Asia Minor and its inhabitants once and for all.

45/ Anadolou, 10.8.22. Anadolou was a newspaper published in Adalia.
46/ Text of Proclamation in Rodas, op.cit., pp. 324-325.
47/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 168.
48/ ibid.
49/ ibid., p. 165.
50/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 732. FO E 7530/5/44, 30.7.22, Mr. Bentnick (Athens) to Earl Balfour. FO E 8538/5/44, 15.8.22, Mr. Bentnick (Athens) to Earl Balfour, informing him that the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to the Allied note with the comment that the object of the proclamation was not so much for the Christian as for the Moslem population.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions: The End of Smyrna
As the Greek position deteriorated, that of the Christian communities of the interior became more precarious daily and the issue of their protection in the event of a Greek evacuation assumed paramount urgency, together with the protection of their brethren of the coastline. Towards the end of 1921, events in the Pontine region left little doubt as to the fate of these minorities in the event of an absolute Turkish victory. To a vigorous joint telegram of the Allied High Commissioners insisting on the cessation of excesses against the Christians, Yusuf Kemal, the Ankara Representative in Constantinople retorted with protests against Allied criticisms against "legal and impartial sentences on Turkish subjects of the Samsoun region, who plotted the dismemberment of Turkey" 1/. Yusuf Kemal also indicated to the Allies that they should not "show leniency towards the Greek crimes and massacres because the devastations perpetrated by the Greeks would make it impossible for Turkey to repay the interest on the Ottoman Debt". As he stated further, the National Assembly of Ankara would contemplate the linking of the Ottoman Debt interest with that of the reconstruction of the devastated regions.

This reply which not only avoided the issue but also threatened the Allies on a most sensitive point, infuriated their representatives in Constantinople. Allied protests to Ankara, it was realized, only provoked counter accusations against the Greeks. As the communications from Ankara assumed an ever-increasingly defiant and insolent tone, it was thought that the best course of action to stop the massacres would be to give wide publicity to all authentic information regarding deportations and excesses by either side 2/. The numerous difficulties encountered during this course of action underlined the absolute necessity to include strong measures for the protection of minorities in the forthcoming peace treaty. Lord Curzon had been pressing for these measures for a long time but he had not succeeded in convincing the French. Their reluctance was based on the certainty that such measures would never be accepted by Kemal, if, as Curzon insisted, the terms of the clauses were to be stronger than those included in the European peace treaties with reference to the protection of the minorities.

During the Paris meeting of March 1922, Lord Curzon, pressing his point, commented that, when faced with evidence of massacres, the Turks took up an attitude of innocence and maintained that these events were due to acts of hostility or insolence on the part of the victims. This, however, did not seem to be the case. Colonel Rawlinson, who had been kept in confinement by the Nationalists for a year and a half, saw with his own eyes on his return journey "wholesale deportations of Greeks, the outrage of women and children,

and men dying of starvation and exposure" 3/. The old Turkish plan of massacre and deportation, Curzon continued, was still in full operation and aimed to rid the country of the minorities. This was a moral responsibility on all the Allies, and public opinion would not tolerate that they could not try to secure serious and, so far as possible, adequate protection for these unhappy communities 4/. None the less, his strong words did not have any effect and secured only a vague promise for the protection of the minorities in cooperation with the League of Nations.

In the meantime, the Nationalist protests against alleged Greek excesses multiplied. The British High Commission in Constantinople noted that the new protests were merely an attempt to forestall protests against the Kemalists and underlined to the Nationalist Representative that "such protests did not come well from the Angora government" 5/. Further evidence received from American sources indicated that the Turks appeared to be working on a deliberate plan to get rid of the minorities. "The whole Greek male population from the age of 15 and upwards of the Trebizond area and its hinterland is being deported apparently to labour battalion at Erzerum, Kars and Sari Kamish" 6/. This information, mainly from American relief workers, seems to have shocked the British who "having assumed a serious responsibility for the future protection of the Christian minorities, could not allow such reports to remain uninvestigated, or such incidents to continue unchecked" 7/. A British proposal was soon put forward that each of the four Powers represented in Constantinople, should at once depute a carefully selected officer to proceed to Trebizond and to such places in the interior as may best enable them to conduct the necessary investigation of the allegations.

It was also suggested that the permission of Ankara would be sought and facilities would be demanded. If permission was refused, the British government threatened to reconsider their entire attitude towards the peace proposals. The British professed officially that it was "inconceivable that Europe should agree to hand back to Turkish rule, without the most stringent guarantees, communities who would be liable to be treated in the manner described by competent American witnesses, whose reports moreover are confirmed by independent information in our possession" 8/. Meanwhile, Lord Curzon advised Lloyd George privately that if

4/ The evidence on Turkish massacres cited by Lord Curzon during this meeting came from a long memorandum composed at his request by the Greek desk. FO E 3148/19/44, 20.3.22.
7/ ibid.
8/ ibid.
Ankara refused to afford facilities for the proposed mission of enquiry, Britain "should then be in a very strong position if we decided to retire altogether from the peace negotiations which threaten in any case, largely owing to want of loyal French and Italian support, to prove abortive. This breakdown on a point like this would at least be more favourable to us and enlist wider sympathies abroad than failure to secure acceptance of conditions as settled by the Paris Conference" 9/.

Clearly, there seemed to exist more than one very good reason for the British government's insistence that the minorities should be protected.

A speech made by Chamberlain in the House of Commons, in which he vividly described the troubles of the Asia Minor Christians, boosted British backing of the plan for a "mission of enquiry" into alleged Turkish excesses 10/.

The dispatch of the mission seemed all the more important because, according to the Foreign Office, there seemed to be a real danger that Turkish deportations and outrages in Eastern Anatolia might lead to retaliations in the zone of Greek occupation either at once or at the event of an evacuation. To avoid any such danger, the British Ambassadors to the Entente capitals were instructed to urge the government to which they were accredited "to instruct their representatives in Athens to join with their British colleagues in requesting the Greek government to assent to the despatch of officers also to regions under Greek occupation" 11/.

This move was dictated by the consideration that such a procedure would deprive the Nationalists and their sponsors in the Allied camp of the excuse for rejecting the proposal to despatch a commission of inquiry to their territory on the grounds that the Allied powers had taken no notice of the alleged Greek atrocities 12/.

However, despite Greek acceptance of the plan, the commissions were never to set off because of persistent French efforts to delay their departure on various pretexts 13/. While the Allies were engaged in endless correspondence regarding the expenses of the commissions, the possible involvement of the Red Cross and the American participation, the Nationalist sword was soon to cut the diplomatic knot once and for all 14/.

9/ ibid.
10/ For the text of Chamberlain's speech, see House of Commons, Deb. 5 s., cols 46-50.
13/ For the protracted correspondence between British and French and the latter's objections and counterproposals which resulted in delaying the scheme, see DBFP, vol. XVII, Chapter II.
14/ Temperley, op. cit, p. 37.
All through the summer of 1922, Turkish military preparations had continued at full speed. On 4 August 1922, Lloyd George spoke in the House of Commons in a tone unfavourable to the Turks and highly eulogistic to the Greek army. Within little more than a month from this date the Turks had swept the Greeks out of Asia Minor and captured Smyrna. On 26 August, the Turkish army began to move forward in what has come to be known as the Great Offensive [ Büyük Taarruz]. With a force stretching 100 kilometres from İsmik to Afşin Karahisar, they advanced against the enemy, and on the same day, important Greek defence positions were overrun while on 30 August the Greek army suffered a major defeat at Durupinar. M. Kemal issued his famous order: "Armies your first goal is the Mediterranean. Forward!" 15/.

In early August 1922, following the rebuff of Greek army units in the area, A. Vacalopoulos, the Representative of the High Commissioner at Aidin informed Stergiadis that public order was on the verge of collapse. Turkish irregulars abducted civilians and released them only if a large sum had been paid in ransom and the local agricultural population was afraid to work in their farms outside the town 16/. Vacalopoulos requested immediate measures to be taken to reinforce the local gendarmerie with at least 125 men. To this request the High Commission replied that all possible measures had already been taken by the military authorities and that he should reassure the population and forestall their departure en masse 17/. By now, though, it was too late. The Turkish units had already begun to move down in force against the Greeks.

By 1 September, the speedy retreat of the Greek army was accompanied by the exodus of the Christian populations from the areas captured by the nationalists. On the coast between Adramyt, Alivali and Dikeli, 60,000 refugees gathered and asked for protection and means of transportation. As the priority of the ships was the transportation of the army units to mainland Greece and it was clear that it would be sometime before the population would be transferred, Stergiadis requested Admiral Kalamidas, in charge of the Greek fleet in Smyrna, to send a small man-of-war to these ports in order to encourage the population and to facilitate the embarkation of the Greek civil authorities on the Aktion which was impeded by the refugees 18/. Indeed, on 1 September, the Greek civil authorities of the provinces were asked to pack their archives and assemble in Smyrna urgently. These orders were leaked to the population and inspired panic in the Christian

15/ Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6 kp. 2, p. 277.
16/ GAK 17z, tel. no. 2066/6.8.22, Aidin Representative to the General Secretary of the High Commission.
17/ GAK 17z tel. no. 2578/7.8.22, General Secretary of the High Commission to the Aidin Representative.
18/ MOFA 121e tel. no. 15012/25.8.22, General Secretary of the High Commission to Admiral Kalamidas.
communities, especially those of the interior which knew they
would not be able to seek refuge on the coastline in time,
due to lack of transportation means. Little did these
wretched communities know that even if they could secure means
of transport and succeeded in arriving in mainland Greece, the
chances were that they would not be allowed to disembark. A
Law was passed on 20 July 1922 "Regarding the illegal
transportation of persons arriving at Greek ports from abroad
in groups", the first article of which prohibited the
dismbarkation in Greece of groups arriving from abroad, if
each member of the group did not have a valid passport. The
Law also provided for measures against those shipowners or
ship captains who chose to carry such passengers.

Metropolitan Chrysostomos thought that there was still
time to avoid the catastrophe if only Constantine would
abdicate, Venizelos would assume the premiership, the army
leadership was entrusted to the Amyna and Stergiadis and
Hadjianestis were removed from Smyrna. Venizelos' reply to
Chrysostomos's pleas was quite categorical:
"In the face of the national disaster, unfortunately I
am unable to take any action. Please send me your
suggestions as to whatever you may think I should beg
the Allies for. Keep in mind that they will never agree
to a military intervention which would be the only
possible way out."

Meanwhile, large groups of panic stricken refugees
gathered in the towns with a railway station, wandering in the
streets and begging for trains to come and transport them to
what they thought was the security of Smyrna. In Odemish
alone, their number swelled to 10,000 within a few days from
the start of the Turkish offensive. The Smyrna High
Command asked the High Commission to take the measures needed
for the protection of these refugees and to provide means for
their transportation. It was now clear that the military
authorities would barely be able to cater for the
transportation and the protection of the army units. The
Smyrna High Command was very anxious to be briefed on the
measures that had been taken by the High Commission,
especially after the disquieting reports received from Baindir
and Odemish and the leakage of the orders given to the civil

19/ MOFA 122 b4 document no. 145/20.8.22, Commander of Baindir
to High Command Representative in Odemish.
20/ Law 2870/20.7.22.
21/ AV 4c Letters addressed by Metropolitan Chrysostomos to
Venizelos and King Constantine and dated 25.8.22 and 21.8.22
respectively.
22/ AV 4, Letter dated 9.9.22, addressed by Venizelos to
Metropolitan Chrysostomos.
23/ MOFA 122 p5 doc. no. 729/21.8.22, Commander of the Second
Army Corps to Smyrna High Command.
24/ MOFA 122 b1 doc. no. 16187/8549/22.8.22, Smyrna High
Command to the High Commission.
authorities regarding their departure 25/.

In Aivali, N. Zannis, the Representative of the High Commission, refused to follow the orders received from Smyrna regarding his departure and telegraphed to the Minister of Interior that he could not abandon the 30,000 helpless refugees gathered in the city without any protection. He requested the immediate despatch of a man-of-war to encourage the Christian populations and also transport ships for those who wanted to leave. Should these ships not arrive, he concluded, the local Greeks would impede by force the departure of the civil authorities 26/. The telegram was immediately transmitted to Stergiadis with the Minister's comment that he was the only competent person to reply. The High Commissioner asked Zannis to remain in his position if the locals considered his presence indispensable and assured him that he would make every possible effort to send a warship but that he had no transport ships available 27/.

The mass exodus of the Christian population from Asia Minor following the Greek rebuff was by no means surprising for the Allied representatives. The question as to their fate first arose during the Paris Conference of March 1922, when plans for an eventual evacuation of the Greek army from Asia Minor were discussed 28/. The imperative need for protective measures was also discussed and it was thought that their implementation should commence before the evacuation started 29/. The scheme included the presence of Commissioners appointed by the League of Nations to supervise the implementation of the clauses of the future peace treaty with relation to the minorities. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the British High Commission in Constantinople pressed that these Commissioners should be present in Asia Minor before the commencement of the evacuation, in order to avert panic 30/. London, however, did not seem to share these preoccupations and commented that it would be up to the Allied High Commissioners to calm and protect the Christian communities until the Peace Conference had deliberated on the rights of the minorities and the Turks had accepted them formally 31/. The High Commissioners were to work towards this end with the Allied Generals in Constantinople who were to

25/ MOFA 122 st doc. no. 16145/3/21/21.8.22, Smyrna High Command to the High Commission. As noted on the document, the reply to the questions set in it was given verbally.
26/ MOFA 121 c2 tel. no. 15007/25.8.22, N. Zannis to the Minister of Interior.
27/ MOFA 21 c2 tel. no. 15007/25.8.22, Stergiadis to N. Zannis.
28/ DBFP, vol. XVII, nos. 560 to 570.
control the evacuation 32/.

In the meantime, the Allied High Commissioners had appointed a commission to examine the issue of "an eventual exodus of the Christian population in the event of Greek withdrawal from Asia Minor" and to suggest measures to be taken should the need arise. The first resolution of the commission was to suggest the return of the occupied territories to Turkish rule with more favourable conditions for the Christian element and to proceed with the establishment of figures and statistics as to the number of people eventually to be displaced. To this end, General Franks as Chairman of the commission, held preliminary talks with G. Zarifis, Representative of the Red Cross in Constantinople. During these talks Zarifis was adamant that if the Greek army was evacuated, then a general exodus of the Christian populations was to be expected as the persecutions of the years 1914-1918 were still vividly remembered.

As it happened, no plans had been made until late in the summer of 1922, and the preparations for the evacuation of the Greek army were only decided upon by the Greek Ministers who visited Smyrna on 30 August 1922. When in Smyrna, Stratos cabled the Minister of Marine with orders to commandeer all ships anchored in Greek ports and send them to Smyrna for the evacuation of the population. He also cabled Protopapadakis, advising the immediate evacuation of army and population. It seems, however, that Gounaris was against the evacuation in order to avert panic and, once again, no decisions were taken regarding the issue of the transportation of the population 33/. Surprisingly enough and although events followed rapidly, most of the Smyrna population and numerous members of the foreign communities were not willing to leave Smyrna and considered that their safety was guaranteed as long as they remained within the city 34/. The presence of 21 Allied ships in the harbour of Smyrna constituted a guarantee of protection. At that stage, very few could foresee the extent of violence and destruction which was to follow the entrance of the Turkish army to the city and the fire that was to destroy it. For most of the 600,000 Greeks who either lived in Smyrna or had sought refuge in the city and its periphery, there was no question of departure 35/.

It was mainly because of this feeling of security that by the end of August 1922 the population of Smyrna and its suburbs had swollen to more than half a million. In view of the precarious situation on the military front, the Smyrna Police Prefecture issued directives for measures to be implemented should disturbances occur in the city. Policemen

33/ Angelomatis, op. cit, p. 207.
34/ Notaras, op. cit, p. 64.
35/ Notaras, op. cit, p. 66.
were only to fire in defence of themselves or that of civilians under threat. Should the alarm signal be given, most of the police force was to gather in the periphery of the Metropolis while the rest were to take up positions in front of banks, post offices and other buildings were large sums of money and valuables were kept. In collaboration with the gendarmerie and one army unit, the men of the 4th Police Station were to stop any Turks intending to leave the Turkish quarter and proceed towards the Greek and Armenian parts of the city. The men attached to the Army High Command were to take up positions near the Italian base and impede anyone from entering or leaving. Another fifty five men were allocated for the protection of the High Commission and the residence of the High Commissioner 36/.

The sands, however, seemed to have run out for good and no measure could forestall the impending catastrophe. With a carefully planned offensive, the Nationalist forces managed to drive the Greek army from its positions in the depths of Anatolia to the Aegean shores bag and baggage, accompanied by frantic groups of Christians who knew only too well the fate that awaited them should they be left behind. The events to follow could be clearly read between the lines of two communications of the Ankara National Assembly addressed to the League of Nations and the Allies respectively, where, without producing any evidence or particulars, the Greek army was accused of "innumerable atrocities against the peaceful and defenceless Moslem population, whom the Greeks violated, massacred, pillaged and left in ruins. Turkey declines any responsibility of the consequences that these terrible provocations might have" 37/. Five days before the fire erupted, as if Ankara had the power to foresee the destruction that was to befall Smyrna, the Grand National assembly shook off any responsibility regarding its fate: "The army of the enemy...has destroyed all the monuments of art which have a historical value...The Grand National Assembly proclaims its profound sorrow and, in order to prevent similar vandalism in the cities of Brusa and Smyrna which possess works of art of immense value and whose occupation by our troops is imminent, the Grand National Assembly has asked its president to protest in its name to the civilized world against the excesses of the Greek government and to make clear that our people will never forgive such crimes" 38/.

The scene was now set for the first act of the drama. On 2 September, only six days from the start of the Turkish

36/ GAK, circular n.n./14.8.22, Lieutenant Colonel N. Nikiforakis, Commander of the Police Force.
37/ ASMAE, Pacco 1676/7812, Note no. 82127/5.9.22, on paper headed "Delegation de Turquie (Angora)-Rome".
38/ ASMAE, Pacco 1676/7812, Report no. 10596/820/21.9.22, the Italian High Commission in Constantinople transmitting Note signed by Dr. Adnan, Vice President of the Grand National Assembly and dated 7 September 1922.
offensive, the Greeks accepted their defeat and their Chargé d'Affaires in London communicated to the Foreign Office their request for an armistice. On 5 September, most of the Greek employees left Smyrna aboard the Yperochi and the Atromitos. Atromitos also carried the archives of the Smyrna High Commission which constituted the only proof that Greece had been to Asia Minor. The remaining civil authorities had gathered in Brousa and Panderma and were to follow the Third Army Corps on its evacuation to Old Greece. Some thirty higher officials of the High Commission, including the General Secretary, left Smyrna on 8 September 1922 for Syros, where they awaited transportation for Pireaus 39/. With the Army High Command aboard the ships and ready to leave as from 7 September, Stergiadis was the last Greek official to leave the city. On 8 September, he went by launch to the Iron Duke, the British flag ship, where he met with Gounarakis for the last time 40/. He was soon transported to Constantinople where he was to board a Roumanian ship bound for Konstanza. According to information confirmed by D. Papamichalopoulos, the Greek member of the interallied port authority, upon arrival in Constantinople, it was made clear to him that, should he disembark, the mob wouldlynch him. At the insistence of Papamichalopoulos, Stergiadis remained aboard the Iron Duke until the arrival of the Roumanian ship 41/.

On 8 September 1922, the ships carrying Greek army units gathered in Smyrna, sailed towards Chios, Mytilini or Chesme where the remaining forces were waiting to be evacuated. With the civil authorities already departed, the last vestige of Greek authority in Asia Minor ceased to exist. As from the afternoon of Friday, 8 September 1922, Smyrna was left without any sort of authority to take charge of the situation and avert panic. The Allied Representatives had refused to undertake this responsibility until the arrival of the Turkish forces. Instead, a few days earlier, they had asked the Commander in Chief of the Greek army to reassure them that the Greek forces would refrain from acts of violence during their retreat 42/. With every authority gone, the Greeks and Armenians swarmed to their churches and besought the clergy for reassurance. Not knowing what else they could do, the two Archbishops addressed an appeal to the Archbishop of Canterbury requesting his intervention with the British government so that an armistice would be arranged as soon as possible 43/.

In the meantime, two American destroyers were added to

39/ MOFA 121 g1 tel. n.n./n.d., General Secretary to Ministry of Interior through the Nomarch of Cyclades.
40/ ibid.
41/ Interview with D. Papamichalopoulos, Athens, 14.9.80. Stergiadis' last concern was to arrange for the safe transportation of the remaining public funds to Athens.
42/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 110.
43/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 112.
the 21 men-of-war in the harbour with orders not to enter into open cooperation with the Allied contingents who were at war with Turkey but, simply, to coordinate their work with them "only in defence of American lives and property" 44/. A force of 55 men was landed and distributed among American institutions throughout the city. The British landed another 200 marines who were posted at the Consulate, the British Post Office, major British firms such as the Oriental Carpet Company, and, as the insurance companies underwriting most businesses and properties in Smyrna were British, the fire station. The French also landed a small number of marines to guard their Consulate and the Credit Lyonnais and the Italians were preparing to cooperate with the Turks in the patrolling of the city.

At nine in the morning of Saturday 9 September 1922, the Turkish army reached the outskirts of Smyrna. Two hours later, the Fourth Cavalry Regiment entered the city. The Regiment was the advance guard of the Turkish forces, which, under the command of M. Kemal, were sweeping forward. An American eyewitness tells of the entrance of the Turkish troops:

"The first that entered were dressed in black with black fezzes with their red crescent and red star, riding magnificent horses, carrying long curved swords, proudly they rode into the city. With one hand raised they called out to the terrified inhabitants 'Fear not! Fear not!', but the inhabitants of Smyrna were filled with terror. All morning long the Turkish army marched into the city and about three o' clock that Saturday afternoon, they started the most terrible looting, raping and killing that is possible to describe in words. The city was systematically looted and things were carried in carts down to the Turkish quarters. The American teachers in our American Girls' School watched the soldiers kill civilians in the street in front of the school, enter homes and kill families and throw them into the street, and then take cartloads of goods along with them. When the sun set that evening, dead bodies were lying all over the streets of that doomed city" 45/.

The first cavalry company to enter Smyrna was headed by Cherefeddin Bey who was suddenly hit on the cheek by a grenade. The grenade did not explode but seven or eight civilians among the crowds were killed on the spot in retaliation. A little later, the company reached the Konak where the Allied representatives hurried to congratulate Cherefeddin on the Turkish victory. The Bey informed them that on his way through the outskirts of the city he had received three bombs thrown by Armenians. Two years later, when he gave

44/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 113.
a sworn statement during a trial for insurance claims, Cherefeddin declared that there was only one bomb, which was not thrown by an Armenian but by a Greek soldier in uniform 46/. Before dusk of 9 September, the main body of troops had come up and the city was fully occupied. The Turkish military authorities issued a proclamation which appeared on the walls of Smyrna that same evening and bore the signature of M. Kemal. The proclamation informed the public that the killing of Christians would be met with capital punishment. Two days later, the phrase "capital punishment" was replaced with the word "punishment" 47/. The correspondent of the Morning Post telegraphed that the military authorities did not make any effort to restrain their men or the irregulars that soon filled the city. During the same evening, looting and killing of Christians started sporadically, to become systematic by the next morning. Panic stricken groups of Greeks and Armenians took to the streets and plagued the gates of American and other foreign institutions begging to be let in. What made these scenes all the more frightful was the impotence displayed by the Allied Representatives, military and civilian. This impotence seemed to be dictated by political expediency and while the Allied marines stood idle, Turkish regulars and irregulars chased their victims into the sea to shoot at them as they swam. Clearly, the foreign representatives were adhering to their orders not to interfere with the course of events but to confine themselves to the protection of their co-nationals' lives and property.

While Kemal and his entourage had halted at the hills of Nif outside the city, his forces in Smyrna were cooperating with Italian cavalry officers who were now patrolling with Turkish units the Armenian quarter, "ostensibly to search out for assassins and trouble makers" 48/. The Italians had also organized a militia composed of Jews of Italian citizenship, whose members escorted Jews from isolated areas to the safety of the Beth Israel Temple in Salahane, a prosperous Jewish community at the city's edge. These obviously precautionary measures caused a resurgence of panic among the minorities 49/. On Sunday noon, a day as beautiful as that of the Greek landing three years earlier, M. Kemal appeared at the balcony of the Konak and saluted the crowds who had come to greet him with acclamations of "Ghazi", the conqueror. During a conference in the Konak, Kemal entrusted the control of the city to Nouredin Pasha, commander of the Nationalist First Army Corps, well-known to the Greeks for his ruthlessness and ambition since his tenure of the post of Vali

46/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 118. Transcript of the Trial from the Papers of Admiral Bristol.
48/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 121.
49/ ibid, quoting interview with member of militia.
of Smyrna 50/. According to Count Senni, the Italian Consul, during the same meeting, the destruction of the Armenian community was discussed and, by Monday morning, the Armenian quarter was surrounded by Turkish soldiers while a public crier roamed the sokaks calling the Moslems to leave the area. On Monday afternoon, a new proclamation appeared announcing that whoever concealed an Armenian in his home would be liable for prosecution by the court martial 51/.

On Tuesday, 12 September Metropolitan Chrysostomos, the last protector of the Greeks in the city, was summoned to the Konak where, according to the legend, Nouredin Pasha called him to settle their personal accounts, outstanding since 1918. Chrysostomos' last moments have been preserved by the legend in various versions. A French eyewitness quoted in one of the sources claimed to have heard Nouredin deliver the Metropolitan to the mob outside the Konak with the words "If he has wronged you, you do him wrong as well!". Thereafter, the Metropolitan was led to a barber shop which belonged to a Turk under Italian protection, and was lynched in the presence of a French marine detachment, which, conforming to orders, did not make any attempt to save him. A Turco-Cretan gendarme whom Chrysostomos had helped in the past, is said to have fired four times on the Metropolitan to save him from the ordeal of slow death. His mutilated body is said to have been buried by Greek soldiers hiding in the area within the compound of the "Apollon" Athletic Association 52/. A little later, as the witness followed the French marines towards the European quarter, he saw a car at the rear of which one of the three primates who had escorted Chrysostomos to the Konak was tied by the legs, his lifeless head dragging on the cobble-stoned street 53/.

In the early afternoon of the following day, fire broke out near the Basmahane Train Station in the Armenian quarter. It spread rapidly "through gasoline soaked buildings" and by five in the afternoon, a number of other fires were raging.

50/ For account of Nouredin's career and persecution of Greeks, see Solomonidis, V. "O Ephessou Chrysostomos gia tin Katastrophi tis Smyrnis" [Chrysostom, Bishop of Ephesus on the Destruction of Smyrna], note 11, in DKMS, 1984.
51/ Horton, op.cit, p. 141.
With the wind blowing from the south the flames soon reached the European quarter. In a few hours, the non-Turkish quarters of the city were in flames. Despite the hard work of the Smyrna fire brigade, a mixed company of Greeks and Turks organized and supported by the British insurance firms operating in Smyrna, there was no keeping up with the fire as there was neither enough water nor enough manpower to contain it. The direction of the wind was such that only the Turkish and the adjacent Jewish quarter remained unscathed. As the fire began to spread, refugees and locals crowded the quay. By nightfall, thousands and thousands stood between the burning city and the waterfront. Clearly, the time had come to evacuate the city. The fire raged throughout the night. In the morning, the prosperous European quarter, together with the Armenian and the Greek, had been reduced to ashes. An official communiqué issued on 14 September from Ankara announced that "the fire of Smyrna was put out today by our forces". Not everyone, however, seemed to agree with this version of events: "it is the opinion of many prominent Britishers that burning was resorted to cover the traces of wholesale butcheries in the Armenian quarter".

According to information collected by Ch. Solomonidis, 4,000,000 sq. m. were destroyed by the fire. This area contained 5,000 shops and businesses together with 55,000 houses, 43,000 of which were Greek, 10,000 Armenian and 2,000 belonged to the European community. Most orthodox churches were burnt to the ground together with 117 schools and the Greek, Dutch and Catholic hospitals, including the patients who were not able to walk out.

An American eye witness noted: "From the bridge of the Armenian, anchored 400 yards away until the captain, owing to the ashes and smoke had to move further, I could see all the unfortunate wretches, thirteen to fourteen deep, swaying in the sweltering heat. At either end there were Turks posted with machine guns, while the approaches to the burning city were likewise guarded. With the very parcels under their arms actually on fire, demented men, women and children struggled to get free, throwing themselves where possible in the water, swaying this way and that, more dead than alive. There is direct evidence of the Turks barricading houses before firing them and also of their spreading kerosene about the Armenian quarter. By ten o' clock of Thursday morning, every available vessel was filled but most of the population was still on the Quay where fires still burnt until the afternoon when the wind shifted and blew the flames inland. On Friday, 15 September 1922, as the fires were beginning to burn themselves out with nothing left to ignite, the American Winona was the first ship to arrive in Pireaurs full of

54/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 156.
55/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 168.
56/ Bierstadt, op.cit, p. 214.
57/ ibid, p.214, testimony of Mr. Roy Treloar.
refugees 58/. The second act of their drama was just beginning.

Numerous eye witnesses interviewed by foreign correspondents verified that the fire was a result of arson by the Turks. Among them, Minnie Mills, principal of the American Intercollegiate Institute testified that she saw men of the regular Turkish forces setting fire to Armenian buildings near the school. Soon, the European press was filled with reports that the Turkish authorities made no serious attempts to contain the fire and that the next day groups of Turkish soldiers were seen to set light to buildings that were still standing. "Shooting and looting became general and by 15 September, the whole town was in a state of confusion, Turkish regular soldiers joining with irregulars and with the Turkish inhabitants in wholesale robbery and murder" 59/. The Daily Telegraph reported: "Except for the squalid Turkish quarter, Smyrna has ceased to exist...The problem of minorities is here solved for all time. The refugees are being removed to other lands as fast as possible...No doubt remains as to the origin of the fire. On the sworn testimony of the American staff of the Collegiate Institute, the torch was applied by Turkish regular soldiers" 60/. To complete the picture, the Times commented: "It now appears probable that the reason why the Turks were inactive during the first two days of their occupation of Smyrna was the direction of the wind which would have involved the Turkish quarter, but on the third day the conflagration was deliberately kindled. The testimony of Miss Mills is confirmed by other Americans today, who declare that they themselves saw Turkish regulars entering many previously looted and deserted houses with rags soaked with benzine, and an outbreak of flames was seen afterwards" 61/. Minnie Mills' testimony received extensive publicity. She subsequently stressed her view that even if the origin of the fire was thought to be uncertain, there should be little doubt that the Turkish authorities could have prevented its spread to the European quarters and that Turkish soldiers acting deliberately were the prime cause of the terrible extent of the disaster 62/.

Reuters' reported that French and Italian warships refused to take on board persons failing to produce certificates of nationality while British vessels took refugees on board though they naturally gave the first place to British citizens. However, not all accounts seem to agree with Reuters' report. A summary of most available sources

58/ Housepiari, op.cit, p. 174.
60/ Daily Telegraph, 16.9.22.
61/ Times, 18.9.22.
62/ Minnie Mills later headed The Orlinda-Childs-Pierce College for Girls, instituted in Athens as a substitute for the loss of the Smyrna Intercollegiate Institute and still operating today as Deree-Pierce College.
suggests that Italian ships took up everyone fortunate enough to swim or float within their reach and the French ships took off boatloads from the shore as their consular officials offered passes to anyone lucky enough to be able to say in French "I am French". Only the British and American ships stood by impotent. The British Admiral had to give Nouréedin assurances of neutrality, if not assurances of friendship. The American contingent had received the strictest orders from Admiral Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople, not to intervene in favour of the Christians and his representative in Smyrna Admiral Brock argued for several hours with his officers before he was convinced of the need to cooperate and save as many Christian lives as possible 63/.

During the daily meetings of the Allied representatives it was clear that they were not willing to act in unison or individually in order to save what remained of the Christian populations of Asia Minor: the French were evidently perturbed by the possibility of Kemal's marching against the neutral zone of Constantinople, where they would be expected to help the British in stopping him. Therefore, their priority was to dissuade him from such a move and not to mediate with him for the salvation of the refugees. The Americans seemed determined not to allow themselves to be lumbered with the expense of the whole operation or to assume the burden of settling the refugees once they were taken away 64/. One of Admiral Bristol's major preoccupations was to discourage the notion that the Turks had deliberately burnt Smyrna. "Foresight required that the disaster be minimized and the Turkish hand played down, not merely to accommodate the Turks but in anticipation of insurance claims for the loss of American property. The insurers, as it happened, were British" 65/.

Among the numerous testimonies and eye witness accounts published at the time, that of Reverend Charles Dobson, the British Chaplain of Smyrna is of particular interest because, as it claims, it is stripped of all hysteria, human tendency to exaggerate and disproportion caused by personal loss:

"I was astonished when in Italy and again here in France to find how unwilling some circles were to believe the culpability of the Turkish troops in the burning of Smyrna. It seems to me that the firing of the city by the fanatic element of the Turkish army was the natural culmination of the breakdown of restraints imposed by military necessities, and of the unbridled indulgence of xenophobia. I have not yet met anybody who was in a position to know the circumstances, who does not contemptuously discredit the assertion that the

63/ Daily Telegraph, 18.9.22. "It is said that the regular Turkish population of Smyrna and even servants employed by the High Commission, took active part in the massacres". Housepian, op.cit, p. 171.
64/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 186.
65/ ibid.
Armenians fired the city. During a month living in Lazaretto of Malta as a refugee, I and my fellow refugees have compared experiences and as a body when we heard of the statement that the Turks were not guilty of firing the city, asked the Bishop of Gibraltar who was visiting us to ask the people of England to suspend judgement until the truth could be known. The Bishop invited us to make a statement to him. We met him at the house of the Lieutenant Governor. We were Herbert Whitall senior, Robert Hadkinson with his son and J. Epstein and the three British Chaplains respectively of Smyrna, Burnabat and Buca" 66/.

It is significant to note that the fire broke out in several places at very short intervals and pointed to a systematic incendiarism such as only a well coordinated plan could have effected. The fact that the fires started immediately after the change of the wind which, during the previous three days, had been blowing in the direction of the Turkish quarter, also points at Turkish culpability. Any fire started previously to the change of the wind would have swept the Turkish quarter. Further, the destruction of the city should not be attributed to any breakdown of public order. The available evidence seems to point in two directions: Smyrna was destroyed firstly because all traces of Christian presence had to be effaced if Turkey was to belong to the Turks, and secondly because the products of the looting of this "entrepot of trade between East and West" were the only compensation Kemal could afford for his loyal irregulars 67/. Also, Christian Smyrna had to be destroyed because past experience proved that as long as their homes and churches were standing, the Greeks would find a way to return.

The account of the events by Turkish sources paints a very different picture: Thousands of Greek soldiers and peasants flooded into Smyrna from all over Anatolia "and were loaded on Allied transport ships for shipment back to Greece. Civil government in Izmir was now back in Turkish hands, and desperate efforts were made to keep order and prevent looting. On September 13 a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter of the city. It spread rapidly through gasoline soaked buildings while the Turkish army's efforts to extinguish it were stymied by the discovery that all the city's fire hoses had been cut and the fire cisterns emptied. In a single day as many as 25,000 buildings were burned and half the great city destroyed. Perhaps the last atrocity of the war was the suggestion, quickly taken up by the Western press, that the

66/ Bierstadt, op.cit, pp. 224-28, quoting the testimony of Rev. Ch. Dobson.
67/ Temperley, op.cit, vol. VI, p. 21. Housepian, op.cit, p. 189, comments: "Observers agreed that license to rob and rape, loot and scourge were part of the scheme to reward the victorious Turkish troops".
victorious Turkish army was responsible for burning the conquered second city of the old empire. Actual culpability has never been proved" 68/. Although this version seems to be the official Turkish view of the events, other Turkish apologists tend to put the blame for the atrocities and the fire on the shoulders of the irregular forces. Even if one is prepared to accept this argument, "and there is enough evidence to sink it", the direct responsibility for what happened in Smyrna remains with the military authorities in command of the city at the time, in the same way that the responsibility for the atrocities committed following the Greek landing was attributed to the Greek military. " The failure of the Turkish authorities to maintain order in Smyrna was undoubtedly one of the contributing causes for the extent of the disaster" 69/. British Admiral Hepburn commented that his observation on the discipline of the Turkish troops in Smyrna led him to disbelieve that any revolt would have followed stern, repressive measures and that, if they wanted to, the Turks could establish order within two hours 70/.

Although it is highly unlikely that the Allied governments did not know the truth about the culprits of the destruction of Smyrna, it is indicative that they allowed public opinion in their countries to remain in doubt as to who had set fire to the city and concentrated their efforts to minimize the full extent of the atrocities that took place. "The first attempt was to belittle the whole matter; it was denied in the French Chamber of Deputies that there had been any massacre, and the responsibility for the fire was placed upon the Greeks and Armenians...Eye-witnesses who knew the truth were warned both in France and Italy that their best policy was silence. Every effort was made to hide from the world the truth of what had happened. And why? Because the governments of the Powers knew well that the forces behind them, the economic interests, could best be served by keeping on friendly terms with Turkey at any price; and because they knew too that if the great public whom they were supposed to represent once knew the truth, and the whole truth, they would be forced to act...Therefore it paid to be friendly. The price of friendship between Turk and Christian was the obliteration of the Christian civilization of Asia Minor, the massacre of 100,000 innocent people, the exile and deportation of 1,150,000 more, the enslaving of 160,000 men, the burning of Smyrna, the betrayal of Greece, the sacrifice of the American philanthropic investment in Asia Minor, and an indelible stain upon the honour of the nations. That price was paid" 71/.

On the basis of European efforts to minimize the proportions and consequences of the drama, M. Kemal's view of

68/ Shaw, op.cit, p.363. Türk İstiklâl Harbi, II/6, kp. 3, p. 156.
69/ Bierstadt, op.cit, p. 27, quoting letter of American Secretary of State G. Hughes to Republican Senator Lodge.
70/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 189.
71/ Bierstadt, op.cit, p. 47. For the upheaval created by the publication of this book, see Housepian, op.cit.
the burning of Smyrna should not come as a surprise. It was a disagreeable incident, he said, but essentially an episode of secondary importance 72/.

Noureddin Pasha himself reportedly attributed his inability to forestall the destruction of the city to his concern for the military situation and the priority given to the persecution of the Greek army 73/. However, the unsatisfactory and lame stories related by the Turks to independent witnesses who visited Smyrna after the fire, tend to confirm their guilt in this matter. The testimony of Alfred Brady, member of the American Smyrna Disaster Committee, is one of the many striking examples. Brady states that during his two weeks in Smyrna, he found the Turks opposing the Committee's efforts to aid the panic-stricken Christian population.

"Although the majority of Greek and Armenian civilians have been deported to Ankara into what is tantamount to slavery, and the majority of women and children are exiled, the Turkish campaign of massacre and terror continues as the last surviving Christian communities are being wiped out one by one. I made my headquarters in Mytilini, while a fleet of seventeen vessels flying British and American flags took off the refugees from the coast villages. On 2 October, I was informed that 10,000 refugees, women and children, had been concentrated by the Turks at Aivali Bay. I proceeded there on an American destroyer. Arriving outside the port, we went to the beach in a shoreboat flying the American flag. Turkish troops turned a machine gun on the boat and bullets snapped off the flagstaff. When we landed the Turks denied there were any refugees there. Later we found higher officials who told us we could take off refugees. Before the refugees were put into the small craft all were passed through lines of Turkish troops in the Customs House. These troops supposedly searched them for arms and ammunition but in reality systematically looted them of every bit of money and jewelry the old men and women possessed... Hearing that there were refugees on the beaches of Fovies, Asia Minor, I went there aboard the British steamer Pavia. The Turks opened fire with machine guns from two sides of the quay when we attempted to land, despite the fact that the ship was flying the British flag. The ship made six attempts to enter the harbour, being turned back by machine gun fire each time. At the seventh attempt we landed and the Turks said: 'There are no refugees here. Further, you are not wanted!'. The refugees had obviously been herded out of sight for the deserted streets were full

72/ Kinross, _op.cit_, p. 372.
73/ MOFA 28a tel. no. 19169/14.9.22, C. Panagopoulos, Nomarch of Chios to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoting French businessman A. Gireau who arrived from Smyrna on 13.9.22.
of refugee baggage. Soldiers with fixed bayonets prevented us from entering the town to investigate" 74/.

From none of the accounts is it possible to come to any exact figures as to the number of the victims that perished during the first week of Turkish occupation of Smyrna, but it is feared that they came to over 100,000 75/. Also, it is not possible to have an accurate figure of those who perished during the fire because during the two weeks preceding the arrival of the Turkish troops, panic-stricken Armenians, Greeks and Turks had poured in from the surrounding countryside and the population of Smyrna doubled and trebled. It is safe to say that on 9 September, the major part of the entire Christian population of Asia Minor had sought refuge in Smyrna where they thought they would find a real haven of salvation 76/. The declaration of the Greek Commander in Chief to the Smyrniot press that the Turks "will enter Smyrna not in ten days but not even in ten months", strengthened this conviction 77/. Less than a month later, the Turkish authorities of Smyrna stated explicitly that those Greeks who were allowed to leave should do so by 1 October 1922, otherwise they would be transported to the interior to serve in the labour battalions. As the Allied representatives conferred continuously in an effort to settle their policy differences which forbade them to come in aid of the refugees, Italian Admiral Pepe commented: "There will be no refugee problem by the time we get through con-conferring" 78/.

The evacuation of those gathered along the Asia Minor coastline officially started on 24 September 1922. Dr. Esther Lovejoy, who arrived in Smyrna on that day testified about the conditions under which the evacuation was effected:

"The quay was wide and the unfortunates squatted as closely as they could, and held their places because it was presumably the place of greatest safety. At night it was possible for the warships in the harbour to throw on this group their searchlights when the women screamed for protection, as they did night after night...One could constantly hear the screams and moans and shrieks of these poor women and girls moving up and down that quay...There was no retreat from that position. If they had tried to go back to the ruins of the city they probably would have lost their lives. The quay became a reeking sewer and at last the evacuation started on September 24...There were eight refugee

74/ Manchester Guardian, 14.10.22.
75/ Daily Telegraph, 18.9.22.
76/ Angelomatis, op.cit, p. 192.
77/ Tharros, 22.8.22.
78/ Housepian, op.cit, p.181, 197. For the extraordinary story of how a substantial number of refugees were transported to Greece through the efforts of a minor American missionary, see Housepian, op.cit, pp. 192-200.
ships on September 24. On September 25, one ship came in and loaded and went away. On September 26, at night, 19 ships came in for refugees, and from that time a large number of ships came every day until the end of the week...The Turkish airplanes...dropped down a proclamation saying that all were to be deported on September 30 to the interior, regardless of age and sex, women and children as well as men. All the men between 18 and 45 were deported to the interior, anyway. And they all looked upon deportation to the interior as nothing less than a sentence of death. It is in fact worse than death, because it is preceded by slavery on the part of the men and even worse on the part of the girls and women...On September 26, the 19 ships began to evacuate the people of the city. the sight was indescribable. The great mass of miserable people pushed on down toward the quay and the long railroad pier in order to get aboard the rescuing ships. Practically all of them had on their backs all their earthly possessions at that time. Many of them carried their sick and their infants on their back. And many of these people had lived in that city for years and their families had lived in that city since Saint Paul was a missionary in that country, long before the coming of the Turks from Asia..."79/.

As mentioned in the above testimony, all males between the age of 15 and 50, Greek and Armenian, were to be deported into the interior to serve in the labour battalions. This was announced on 16 September in a circular signed by Nouredin, in which it was stated that

"A. All Greeks and Armenians between 18 and 45 years of age who are now in the areas liberated by our army, together with those Greeks and Armenians transported by the Greek troops to the coast and abandoned there in view of the tremendous pursuit of our army, must surrender immediately. They will be kept hostage until the end of the hostilities. This measure is taken against them because they officially took up arms against the Motherland, because they enlisted in the enemy's army, because even lately they set fire to towns and villages and committed unheard of excesses against the peaceful population and so that, if set free, they will not come to the aid of the enemy's army.

B. All those not included in the first article and all the Smyrniot families or the Greek and Armenian refugees, can emigrate until the 30th of September 1338 [1922]. Those who will remain after the lapse of

79/Dr. E. Lovejoy was a pioneer of the American Women's Hospitals. For her relief work in Asia Minor and Greece see Housepian, op.cit. Her testimony is published in Bierstadt, op.cit., Appendices B and C, pages 215 and 224, also pp.39-43.
the deadline will be driven outside the war zone and will be suspected of constituting a threat against the security of the army and public order in general.

C. Because the Grand National Assembly has taken all appropriate measures to clear up the area from the remnants of the Greek army and secure the annihilation of the destructive enemy organizations, all the inhabitants, irrespective of race or creed, must return to their homes and to their peaceful tasks" 80/.

Although the circular seemed to ignore the fact that the bulk of the Greek army had departed eight days before it was issued and that the war zone did not exist any more as there was no enemy to fight against, its impact was to intensify the looting, the massacres and atrocities against the unfortunate minorities. Eventually, the time limit was extended to 8 October and another proclamation was issued to the effect that all Christians should leave Anatolia within thirty days. The last boatload of refugees left Smyrna only six hours before the lapse of the deadline. The total number of those removed from the coastline until that date is estimated within the region of 250,000. As it were, this act of the refugee drama was concluded only two years later with the exchange of populations, following the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. With this exchange, the fateful circle of history which opened in the 10th century B.C., when the Greeks first settled in Asia Minor, came to its close on 17 December 1924 when the last boatload of Greeks about to be "exchanged" left the port of Mersina in Cilicia for Piraeus 81/.

In Europe, the story was already undergoing considerable revision. Among those who worked towards this end were the missionaries who had discredited their own eyewitness testimonies "and Arnold Toynbee...who expressed the opinion that although the truth about the burning of Smyrna could never be known, the Armenians shared the responsibility for it" 82/.

It is quite probable that most of the massacres could have been averted if the 21 Allied warships present in the Smyrna harbour had turned their cannons towards the Turkish quarter and threatened to bombard it. However, it seems clear that no deus ex machina could have changed the ultimate fate of Hellenism in Asia Minor, which was decided as soon as nationalism became a determining factor in the policies adopted by the Turkish governments. Panturkism, the new ideology, was prominent in the 1909 Armenian massacre in

80/ For the full text of the proclamation, IEE, op. cit, p. 237. The term "destructive enemy organizations" probably refers to the Asia Minor Defence.

81/ Pallis, A.A. Statistike Melete peri Pyletikon Metanastefseon [Statistical Studies on Racial Migration]. Athens 1925.

Cilicia, where the religious fanaticism characterizing the 1896 persecutions had obviously given way to nationalism. And again in 1914, when the deportations of Greeks and Armenians started, it was evident that the underlying current was not religious fervour dictating the expulsion of infidels but national fanaticism. In 1909, with the advent of the Young Turks, Turkey had decided to clean up its territory from elements alien to Panturkism. The first targets were the Armenians and the Greeks. Then came the turn of the Arabs, even though they were Moslem, and the Kurds whose ousting has not been completed to date. Clearly, the new Turkey was for the Turks and the non-Turkish components of the old Ottoman Empire were not to be trusted.

A large percentage of public opinion in Greece still maintains that if the country had not embarked on the implementation of the Megali Idea and the policy which indirectly involved the ultimate settlement of accounts between Greece and Turkey, Hellenism in Thrace, Pontus and Asia Minor would have remained secure in its cradle. This, though, seems hardly to have been the case as, after the establishment of the Young Turkish regime, the struggle between the two nations had developed to an open war of extermination against the Ottoman Greeks. Their existence within the new Turkish state became problematic and the final battle had to be fought to determine whether they would be able to remain in their homes. The fate that befell the Greek community of Constantinople a few decades later in spite of the strong terms of the Treaty of Lausanne regarding its protection, indicates what would have happened in Asia Minor, Pontus and Thrace regardless of whether or not the Greek venture in Asia Minor had taken place 83/. Hellenism in Turkey was not protected either by the Treaty of Lausanne or by the agreements of Ankara and Athens or the improvement in the relations between the two countries. The measures taken against the minority in terms of taxation, financial boycott, special conditions of military service and exercise of profession soon led the Greeks to leave Turkey and opt for self-exile. In this they were by no means alone. Jews and Armenians followed in their steps 84/. With hindsight, it seems highly unlikely that Hellenism in Turkey could have been spared if it were not for Greek involvement in the Great War and Asia Minor expedition. Neither could it be spared if its fate had been left in the hands of the Allies. This would only be the case if Turkish nationalism came only as a result of the Greek landing in Smyrna; Turkish nationalism, however, was the product of 19th century historical evolution and it was manifest not only in Asia Minor but also in Cilicia, Sokia and Mosul, under French, Italian and British occupation respectively. The victorious Entente powers were unable to

83/ For a comprehensive treatment of the Greek minority in Constantinople, see Alexandris, A. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations. Athens, 1983.
84/ Lewis, B. op.cit, p.p. 118-9.
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83/ For a comprehensive treatment of Constantinople, see Alexandris, A. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations. Athens, 1983.  
84/ Lewis, B. op.cit, p.p. 118-9.
exert protection not only over the Armenians and the Greeks but also over their own citizens, most of whom were forced by the circumstances to leave Turkey.

Therefore, together with that of the other minorities, the fate of Hellenism in Turkey was decided by the flaring Turkish nationalism. At the time, it was believed that if the Ottoman Greeks were to survive, they either had to gain control of the territories they inhabited or, at least, to secure the unlimited and active support of an outside power willing to impose at any given moment respect towards the Hellenic and autonomy of the Greek community. In retrospect, however, it is quite apparent that neither of these options had much chance of success. Hellenism in Asia Minor, and Greece for that matter, did not have the resources to fight the battle on its own. What was more, subsequent events clearly showed that no power was ready to sacrifice the interests of its respective financial circles in order to safeguard the Christian minorities in Turkey. This was evident long before the Greek elections of November 1920, whose outcome provided the pretext for the de jure abandonment of the minorities to their fate and brought home the truth of the matter: the Greek army would have to carry out the Asia Minor campaign on its own and at its own risk.

Inevitably, the issue of allocating responsibilities for the catastrophe is extremely complicated. Although on numerous occasions in Greek history the option of blaming the foreign powers is all too lightly employed, the case of the Anatolian campaign presents the researcher with an exception, the Allied share in the responsibility for the disaster being so clear. Nonetheless, this allocation of responsibilities should not be the main issue at hand. This should mainly revolve around the question as to what could the western civilized world have done for the protection of populations doomed to be exterminated and what in actual fact it did.

On the basis of the above considerations, it would seem unnecessary to ponder on political, strategic and diplomatic errors committed subsequently to the decision for the Greek landing in Anatolia, which can only assume secondary importance. Indeed, what can be the purpose of elaborating on mistakes or even blunders committed by Stergiadis, Paraskevopoulos, Papoulas or Gounaris, when it is clear that these blunders were not in essence responsible for the disaster and that the failure of Greece's Asiatic venture was a foregone conclusion from its outset? On the hills of Afion Karahisar, wrote Karolidis, the Greek army was not defeated by Kemal but by the French and Italian policies which completed the uprooting of the Greek populations of Asia Minor, an uprooting initiated by Liman von Sanders some fifteen years earlier. In Toynbee's words, "there is no doubt that the Big Three were morally as well as technically responsible for the consequences of [their decision to send the Greek army to Smyrna]."

One of the open-ended arguments regarding the Asia Minor issue is the question as to when did the Allies,
separately or collectively, realize the intractability of the situation created by this decision. Although most secondary sources suggest that the change of regime in Greece marked the change in Greek fortunes, it appears that the magnitude of these consequences had been realized even before the Greek landing that perpetrated them. A few months later, Admiral V'Elle, British High Commissioner at Constantinople, wrote to Crowe: "The worst day's work which Venizelos ever did was when he induced the Supreme Council to allow the Greek troops into Smyrna... Apart from turning the whole district into shambles, which never would have occurred if the Allies had been left to control it, it has sown the seed of still more bitter animosity between Greece and Turkey than existed before" 85/. In view of events in French occupied Cilicia, the conviction that conditions would be better if the area was left in Allied control is questionab.e. However, the underestimation of this bitter animosity and the overestimation of the ability of both peoples to forget the past and live in peace, seems to have been one of the most vital misjudgements of Venizelos, especially in the light of the 1908-1918 events in Anatolia and the rise of Turkish nationalism. On the French side, Poincaré wrote a few years after the disaster that "Lloyd George in close collaboration with Venizelos, dragged Greece into an adventure whose main task was the successful implementation of the policies of British imperialism in Asia Minor, and which was to fail from the outset" 86/. In view of French participation in the Supreme Council meetings and Clémentel's unreserved approval of the scheme, Poincaré's attempt to shift France of all responsibility cannot be accepted.

Nonetheless, Venizelos himself appeared to have had second thoughts and to recognize the dangers looming ahead. In July 1919, he wrote to Diomidis that those who opposed his Asia Minor policy might have been right, and that there was a strong possibility that the Greeks "might be thrown out of Smyrna bag and baggage, degraded and humiliated" 87/. General Metaxas, among those opposing his expansionist policy on purely strategic terms, had foreseen in his memoranda of 27 and 31 January 1915, a repetition of Napoleon's war in Russia. His gloomy prophecy was soon fulfilled and the result was a national disaster of the first magnitude 88/. But did Venizelos fall to the charms of Ionia blindly or did he take the risks with his eyes open? On the basis of his previous and subsequent brilliant and lasting achievements, it seems quite unlikely that the first could have been the case. More likely than not, his policy seems to have been decided partly by some force majeure and partly by the expectation that the dangers would be discounted by the inability of the Allies to undertake military operations in Asia Minor and their

87/ Petsalis, op.cit., p. 225.
88/ Pallis, op.cit., p. 195.

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consequent delegation of the war for the battlefields of the Near
and Middle East to Greece.

The force majeure clearly was a result of his
precarious political position at home: In 1915, "Venizelos was
induced to accept Smyrna against his better judgement perhaps.
Having once accepted, he dared not turn back. He had told the
Greek people that they would get Smyrna [in exchange for their
participation in the War on the Allied side]\(^{99}\). In 1917,
after the National Schism had taken its toll, he was brought
back to power by foreign bayonets. The Greek army first
mobilized in 1916 on the demand of the Allies, then
mobilized in 1917, was rushed to the Macedonian front and,
after defeating the Bulgarian army, was sent to the Ukraine,
at a time when the Allied powers were demobilizing rapidly. To
have gone through the vicissitudes of the last five years only
to be told at the end that the initial conception of the plan
had been wrong, would be sure to precipitate a violent
reaction in internal Greek politics. Clearly, Venizelos could
not go back on his promise because a politically irreversible
step had been taken in 1915\(^{90}\). If the venture was
successful, he might prolong his tenure of office for an
indefinite period "and devote all his abilities to warding off
the dangers which the necessities of the moment bade him
incur"\(^{91}\). Not everyone seemed to agree with this turn of
thought. On 14 April 1919, a whole month before the Greek
landing, Nicolson noted in his diary: "We shall be unable to
put the Greeks into Smyrna -I mean keep them there. They can't
hold it without Allied support... Yet, if they do not get
Smyrna, Venizelos will fall from power"\(^{92}\). It was this
argument which turned the scales in favour of the Greek
landing, inspite of all the misgivings expressed in Greece and
the West.

Thus, in 1919, in spite of warnings from friends and
foes, more or less disregarding the consequences, and not
withstanding the contrary opinions of the highest military
authorities, both Allied and Greek, Venizelos launched the
Anatolian campaign, before the peace terms had been finally
settled. There seems to be little doubt that this was a fatal
error which, nonetheless, might still have been partially
repaired if, in 1920, after having obtained the recognition of
Greek claims to Western and Eastern Thrace and the Dodecanese,
"Venizelos had availed himself of this excuse in order to
abandon Smyrna"\(^{93}\). Once this chance was lost, and the
elections were lost, no subsequent government could order the
evacuation of Asia Minor, as such a decision would be sure to
lead to a political crisis at home, signaling the downfall of
the cabinet responsible for taking it. Indeed, this argument
was taken up by Venizelos in March 1920, when France announced
its intention to propose a revision of the Peace Treaty at the

\(^{89}\) Pallis, op.cit., p. 197.
\(^{90}\) Campbell-Sherard, op.cit, p. 123.
\(^{91}\) Toynbee, op.cit, p. 69.
\(^{92}\) Nicolson, op.cit, p. 312.
\(^{93}\) Pallis, op.cit, conclusions.

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Supreme Council. Millerand was immediately informed that French hostility to the Greek claims would tantamount to the downfall of the Venizelist regime, to the great detriment of French interests 94/. Although this argument tipped the balance yet again in favour of Venizelos, his insistence on retaining Western Asia Minor cannot be defended, especially after March 1920, when the inability of the Allies to render a decisive assistance to Greece in order to impose the terms of the Peace-Treaty on Turkey had been made clear to him by Churchill and Wilson 95/. At this point, Venizelos seemed to be putting Poincaré's axiom that the art of politics is to choose between two inconvenient options, only to have chosen the wrong one 96/. As things turned out, if Venizelos had remained in power after November 1920, he could have been faced with precisely the same dilemma as his successors: Should the Greek forces advance or evacuate? The Allied laments on the Venizelist loss of the elections did not last long. Constantine's return presented a plausible excuse for the West to evade its obligations towards its former Ally. "There was no need any more to pursue an anti-Turkish policy" 97/. In February 1921, Nicolson wrote in a memorandum: "It will be important to maintain the fiction that the Greeks are acting as Allies" 98/. If the Greece of Venizelos had been treated like a poor relative, the Greece of Constantine was to be treated as an impostor, despite the fact that the retaliatory measures adopted after his restoration made it more difficult for Greece to carry on the struggle in Anatolia 99/. Nonetheless, Gounaris and the Royalist party leaders cannot be absolved from all responsibility in the disaster. Despite their opposition to Venizelos's expansionist policy, they did not possess the moral courage to evacuate the Smyrna enclave as soon as they came to power. However, in taking this stance, they were prompted by Lloyd George who repeatedly aroused false hopes of eventual British support and deterred them from evacuating Asia Minor. What was more, evacuation was an action as politically difficult for them as it had been for Venizelos 100/. Apart from a legitimate anxiety for the fate of the Christian minorities following the departure of the Greek forces, there was a dread for the reaction of public

94/ Frangoulis, op.cit, II, p. 136. Practically speaking, France had invested sums totalling more than 2 billion francs in the Ottoman Empire. In the absence of substantial French forces, how could the sizeable capital investment of France be safeguarded and what provisions would be made with regard to the enormous Ottoman Debt? Gidney, J.B. A Mandate for Armenia, pp. 98-99.
95/ Churchill, op.cit, p. 383.
96/ Poincaré, R. Au service de la France, ix, p. 177.
97/ Churchill, op.cit, p. 388.
98/ DBFP, XVII, no 41.
99/ DBFP, VIII, no 100.
100/ Campbell-Sherard, op.cit, 125.
opinion and a fear lest the Venizelotist opposition exploit the move.

The evacuation of ismid in the summer of 1921, gave an insight to the future Smyrna events: "Greeks evacuated ismid last night...Indiscrivable panic in the district. Practically all Greek inhabitants are reported to have been evacuated with Greek forces but Armenians and neutral Turks are terror struck and are attempting to flee...in thousands" 101/. This prophecy of impending disaster was dramatically fulfilled a year later, with the final and absolute Turkish victory. This victory was not only due to the successful national movement but also to a remarkably effective diplomatic campaign, by which the serious differences among the Allies were exploited and separate treaties were concluded with each of them to the detriment and isolation of Greece. To top it all, with the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation concluded on 16 March 1921, a Turco-Soviet united front juxtaposed the hopelessly divided Allied camp.

After the Greek debacle, the Conference opened at Mudanya on 3 October 1922. Significantly, the first session was underway before the Greek delegates arrived. In the event, because of lack of space, they were not invited to the table of negotiations 102/. The tragedy moved to its close with the execution of the Six, the banishment of Constantine and the exodus from the two sides of the Aegean which had started in 1908 and was completed in 1925.

On the basis of the above, it would seem that the Anatolian Venture could not come to a different conclusion. However, with hindsight it appears that Greece had one more option open to her, if her leaders had been brave enough to take it. "Indeed, both belligerents had, they recognized their true interests, they would have made up their minds to enter into direct negotiations with one another than allow the Western Powers to exploit them any longer;...our interest in stopping the Greco-Turkish war was not so immediate as that of the combatants" 103/. On the contrary, it appears that the Great Powers preferred to see an Ally destroyed rather than proceed to separate negotiations with the nationalists, something they had themselves already done, only to secure commercial interests in the Near East and not minorities doomed to be exterminated 104/. After timid Greek efforts to open direct channels of communication with Ankara became known, the British position was summed up in the following Foreign Office memorandum:

"It may be said that further political course of events depends almost entirely on the issue of the hostilities in Anatolia. On a review of the situation I venture to think that a complete Greek victory would be less disastrous than a complete nationalist victory. The best result to hope for is a stalemate, which will leave both sides exhausted" 105/.

101/ DBFP, XVII, no. 267.
103/ Toynbee, op.cit, p. 101.
104/ DBFP, XVII, no 697.
Indeed, the most grave error committed by the Royalists seems to lie in the fact that they postponed all decisive action, expecting the Allies to change their minds, when it was quite clear that there could be no change in Allied policies. Perhaps a dash for Constantinople could have brought a solution to the Greek stalemate. It was probably to the great detriment of Greece that the army leaders in Thrace not take the situation in their own hands and advance to Constantinople. Despite Allied threats and serious consideration of employing Turkish troops to repel such an offensive, it seems highly unlikely that the Powers would have actually fought against Greece. Such a move would have defeated the whole purpose of having sent Greece to Asia Minor at first place, i.e. to achieve the goals set by their respective Near East policies without using Allied military resources. In the meantime, the Greeks could be expected to enter Constantinople as it was defended by a handful of troops only. The Greek forces would have the extreme advantage of heading eis tin Polin, a fact that was sure to boost their moral and give them the upper hand in any encounter with Allied detachments, which would only be fighting for financial concessions. Such a success would have given Greece the chance to negotiate from a stronger position. But, more significantly, the Greek occupation of Constantinople even for a few days would have been enough to justify to the Greek people the sufferings of the past decade.

However, the project to occupy Constantinople touched upon utopia. Any such effort against the Allied wishes would contradict the very existence of Greece as defined by the 1828 and 1832 Treaties of Paris and London, which clearly specified the subservient role of the country within the western European community. The factors determining Allied reluctance to accept the Greek presence in Anatolia before August 1920, did not cease to exist after the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres and were still there after the change of regime in November 1920. Allied interrelations, their bearing on Greek aspirations and the fact that Greece had virtually no options after she landed in Asia Minor, were never made clear to the Greek people which was led to believe that the expedition had the unconditional backing of Europe. Instead of explaining the situation and facing his responsibilities, in 1920 Venizelos chose to leave Athens for the second time within six years. He further chose to advise the royalist cabinets to implement measures he could have never put to practice for fear of public opinion. Was there any way out of this vicious circle? Had the royalist governments openly explained the situation to the people and insisted on evacuating immediately, could they have compelled at least the British to take some helpful measures? It would be extremely difficult to give a positive answer. Any proud stance on the part of the Greek governments of the day would also be touching upon utopia in the face of their subservient policies and their inability to separate personal political gains from the welfare of the country. Clearly, the pondering on the errors of secondary importance committed after the Greek landing at Smyrna, brings us back full circle to the realization that once the Allies and Venizelos had decided on the Anatolian Venture, no force could have saved the minorities short of a deus ex machina.
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Plan of Smyrna before 1922