NEGOTIATING MEANINGS AND POWER
THE POLITICS OF ROMANIAN IMMIGRATION IN ITALY AND SPAIN

McMahon, Simon Alexander

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NEGOTIATING MEANINGS AND POWER
THE POLITICS OF ROMANIAN IMMIGRATION IN ITALY AND SPAIN

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Thesis submitted for PhD in European and International Studies
Abstract

This thesis critically engages with the politics of citizenship, immigration and identity in Europe. It asks why different public and political responses to the presence of Romanian immigrants have arisen in Italy, where this nationality has been presented as a threat to security and public order, compared to Spain where this has not been so. In doing so, it has sought to bring an understudied immigrant population into mainstream academic view whilst contrasting the prevalent idea in academia and politics that immigrants constitute culturally homogeneous and bounded groups or communities.

It argues that different responses are due not to the cultural characteristics of immigrants themselves but rather to the choices and strategies of mobilisation of structurally-situated actors who negotiate what it means to be categorised as being of one of these nationalities. It then examines the implications of the accession of Romania to the European Union in 2007, finding that the legal category of EU citizen does not directly herald an increasing presence in the public sphere for Romanian immigrants. Instead, the impact of the rights of citizenship of the EU on public references to Romanian immigrants are contingent on local contexts and dependent on the ability of specific actors to take advantage of national and local opportunities for inclusion and participation.

The research project thus contributes empirically and methodologically to diverse literatures on the role of identity in contemporary politics, immigrant and ethnic minority political participation and social movements, and the implications of European Union integration on immigration, immigrant integration and social citizenship in the current phase of globalisation. It thus provides a perspective on the political dimension of immigration and ethnic relations as well as a way of unveiling and explaining the mobilisation of populist xenophobic discourses found in some European countries today.
Acknowledgements

The thesis carries my name but its completion would not have been possible without the support and help of others, from those willing to discuss its content and direction to others helping to distract me when I needed a break to clear my thoughts.

The project would not have gone anywhere without the feedback, encouragement and support of a whole range of people within and beyond academia. My time at King’s College London, the European University Institute and the Pompeu Fabra University has put me in stimulating environments of academics and PhD researchers from incredibly varied academic and personal backgrounds. My supervisors, Alex Clarkson and Simona Talani have both been incredibly helpful and supportive in their own ways and together they have shown me the importance of viewing problems through a wide lens which is capable of bringing together different perspectives. In particular (but in no order of preference), I am also indebted to Rainer Bauböck, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Mario Diani, Jason Xidias, Roxana Barbulescu, Daniela Vintila, Giovanni Picker, Remus Gabriel Anghel, Flora Burchianti and Tom Semlyen, as well as innumerable friends and colleagues for offering their information, opinions, criticisms, time, energy, laughter and housing to me during these few years of research.

Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my family and to my wonderful wife Carla who has been incredibly patient and encouraging, knowing how to push me on when in times of doubt and uncertainty.
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction. The Politics of Romanian Immigration in Italy and Spain</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SECTION ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defining who is who in the politics of immigration</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Explaining who is who in the politics of immigration</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SECTION TWO: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Structural Context of Romanian Immigration to Italy and Spain</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The National Dimension of the Politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Local Dimension of the Politics of Romanian Immigration in Rome and Madrid</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Cross-border Dimension of the Politics of Romanian Immigration in Italy and Spain</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>References</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Growth of Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain post-2000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Modes of politics of immigration in an interest group political economy model</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A de-ethnicized research design for studying identity</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Codifying frames</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Growth of legally resident Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Eurobarometer Italian public opinion 2003 – 2008</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Camera dei deputati debate on Romanians in Italy</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Eurobarometer Spanish public opinion 2003 – 2008</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Congreso de los diputados debate on Romanians in Spain, 1989-2008</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Romanian deportations from Spain</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Spanish data for which immigrant groups interviewees feel least kindness (menos simpatía)?</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Elections for Mayor of Rome Council, 1993-2008</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Election results for the three largest parties in the Madrid Assembly, 1983-2007</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>References of Romanian associations from Madrid in the newspapers El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razón</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Candidates and votes, Romanian representatives in Rome (2004-2006)</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Romanians in Communal elections in the province of Rome</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Romanian candidates for local elections in the Community of Madrid (2007)</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Romanian candidates for local elections in the Community of Madrid (2011)</td>
<td>275-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1
Introduction:
The Politics of Romanian Immigration in Italy and Spain

In October 2007 the body of Giovanna Reggiani was found in a ditch in a northern suburb of the city of Rome, Italy. The police, politicians and press immediately initiated a hunt for her killer, who would be revealed as the Romanian Romulus Nicolae Mailat. Perceptions of Romanian immigrants as a violent, criminal threat to Italy burst out in spectacular fashion. Walter Veltroni, the Mayor of Rome from the centre-left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), declared that the accession of Romania to the European Union (EU) earlier that year had opened the doors to the arrival of particularly aggressive criminals and that there were ‘too many Romanians [...] who do inacceptable things’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, L’opposizione contro Governo e Veltroni: interventi tardive, 1st November 2007, Barbagli 2008). Romanians in Italy were defined as ‘crime-tourists’ (Il Giornale, I turisti del crimine, 4th November 2007), and the areas of their settlement as dangerous places ‘where women are killed and raped in front of everybody’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, L’opposizione contro Governo e Veltroni: interventi tardive, 1st November 2007). Mass deportations were suggested as the answer with the Rome Prefecture rapidly announcing that 5,000 Romanians could be expelled in order to ‘clean the water of infected fish’ (La Repubblica, Romeni, scattano le espulsioni. “Via i primi cinquemila”, 2nd November 2007). When the Romanian government suggested that the treatment being directed at this population was disproportionate, the response from the right wing MP Paolo Grimoldi was to ask why they had not shown ‘the same concern when their citizens invaded our cities, stole from our aged citizens and raped our women?’ (Movimento Giovani Padani, La Romania non ci faccia ramanzine e si riprenda i suoi
delinquenti, 6th November 2007)\(^1\). Across the political spectrum, from those in power to those in opposition, the consensus dictated that Italian citizens were the victims of a dangerous, violent, criminal Romanian immigrant population. Romanians were unwanted.

Meanwhile, in the Spanish town of Badalona on the outskirts of Barcelona, tensions arose in 2010 when electoral pamphlets were published stating ‘we do not want Romanians’. The pamphleteer, the conservative candidate Xavier García Albiol, argued that a group of Romanian gypsies had committed too many crimes and lowered the security of the area. Yet the pamphlet was met with a barrage of criticism; Albiol’s party disassociated itself from him and the president of the regional wing of the party publicly apologised for causing any offence, a manifesto from 74 trade unions, NGOs charities and immigrant associations warned of ‘the increase of racism and xenophobia in Catalan politics’ and the right wing politician Felip Puig stated that ‘the discourse of Mr Albiol brings together all that I fully reject and that Convergence and Union [his party formation] wants to eject from political debate’ (CDC Notícies, Felip Puig reclama al PP no utilitzar la immigració com a moneda de canvi partidista, 12th November 2010)\(^2\). In April 2010 a case was presented against Albiol under Spanish penal law on offensive material (Organic Law 10/1995, art. 510) and racial discrimination (art. 607bis), brought by a group of organisations led by the human rights organisation SOS Racismo (El País, El PP juega con la xenofobia, 27th April 2010). These responses illustrate clearly how in Badalona and across Spain there was wide consensus on the victim status of Romanian immigrants who were considered to be at risk of being unfairly stigmatized.

These two examples are illustrative of a more general distinction in responses to the presence of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain: in the former, this nationality has been negatively represented and there has been an escalation of inflammatory rhetoric, whilst in the latter such a critical, aggressive approach has not

\(^1\) Surprisingly, this increased securitization came when the number of arrests of Romanians was reported to be decreasing, with a fall of 13.7% between 2006 and 2009 (Caritas Italia 2010)

\(^2\) This is particularly surprising if it is considered that the same person also commented in September 2011 that “there is a certain tendency of some communities to end up organising according to tribes or clans, like the Peruvians on the motorway, determined Romanian communities stealing copper and South Americans in urban gangs”, La Vanguardia, Puig creu que alguns col·lectius immigrants abusen del nostre sistema de llibertats, 4th September 2011
been common and in fact quite the opposite has been found. As is evident, tension, xenophobia, discrimination, exclusion and stigmatization may or may not arise with the presence of immigrants. But why do distinct responses arise in different places? And what, in the specific cases of Italy and Spain, has brought about such distinct responses to Romanian immigration in particular? The contemporary significance of an understanding of these topics is unquestionable in a European context in which immigration has become a fiercely contested political issue and where millions of mobile workers and third country nationals now reside in countries extraneous to their place of birth.

Addressing these questions, the objective of this thesis is to understand how and why responses to Romanian immigration have been so divergent in these countries. In doing so, it contributes to social science studies of the politics of immigration in three principal ways.

Firstly, it offers a case study of the political integration of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain, a nationality that has remained relatively understudied in Western Europe despite the fact that it is the second largest single nationality population of migrants in the EU, totalling over 2.5 million registered individuals (data from Eurostat).

Secondly, it argues against the prevalent idea in much academia and politics that the presence of immigrants is problematic due to the way that they constitute culturally homogeneous and bounded groups or communities (for this view see Huntington 1996, 2004, Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 2000, Putnam 2007, Schlesinger 1992, Walzer 1983, Wiener 1995). Indeed, the different responses to Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain are due not to the cultural characteristics of Italians, Spaniards or Romanians themselves but rather to the negotiation by structurally-situated political and social actors of what it means to be categorised as being of one of these nationalities. These negotiations have little to do with ‘real’ cultural similarities or differences between hosts and foreigners, but a great deal to do with the relations of power concerning who can influence and control this process and who cannot.

Thirdly, it contributes to an understanding of European political integration and citizenship in the EU by examining what it means for a population of geographical, political and legal ‘outsiders’ of the European Union project, as the
Romanians were until their country’s accession in 2007, to formally become citizens ‘inside’ the EU. Much academic literature has expected this supranational citizenship category to cause a shift in individuals’ status to one of equality of rights, loyalty towards shared institutions and a sense of united cultural and political belonging (Eder 2006, Herrmann and Brewer 2004, Laffan 2004, Maas 2007, Spohn 2005).

However, here it is found that the legal category of EU citizen does not directly herald an increasing presence of Romanian nationals in the Italian and Spanish public spheres. Instead it provides only an opportunity for such a development, the impact of which is dependent on local, national and transnational dynamics of political mobilisation and claims making. The legal category of EU citizenship thus provides an opportunity for change but the way in which this occurs is variable across locations.

Why Romanians in Italy and Spain?

This introduction will explore how Italian and Spanish experiences of immigration, and Romanian experiences of incorporation in these countries, are broadly similar. In this way it illustrates how different responses to Romanian immigration cannot simply be explained by looking at the migration experience in Italy and Spain or the nature of the Romanian populations in these countries but must examine the meanings and political dynamics that underpin the relations between them. In this way the argument that will be developed in this thesis states that the different responses to Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain are the outcome of processes of identification and categorisation which are inherently political.

A range of academic research has suggested that Italy and Spain are broadly comparable in their experiences of immigration, including them within a general ‘Southern European’ model of immigration (for example, Arango et al 2009, Baldwin-Edwards 2001, Calavita 1998, 2005, Castles and Miller 2003: 82-85, Danese 2001, Hartman 2008, Hepburn 2009, King 2000, 2001, King and Thomson 2008, Triandafyllidou 2009, Schierup et al 2008: 102-107). Migration flows to the Southern European countries have been described as contrasting the post-War labour migration experience of Northern European ones, which was largely state-regulated
(but not entirely, see Huysmans 2000), drew migrants from a limited range of geographical origins and was seen as temporary, with return assumed (at least in theory) once their labour was no longer necessary (King and Thomson 2008: 267). In the Southern European countries the rapid growth and diversity of migratory flows has been seen as a ‘surprise element’ for policymakers who were not expecting immigration at all (King et al 1997: 4). In response to insufficient ad hoc, piecemeal and often ambiguous policy approaches to immigration and integration, the key structures for the incorporation of foreigners in these countries have been the labour market and interpersonal networks rather than host society political or social institutions (Triandafyllidou 2009: 51). Legal residence has been tied to employment, which has itself been shaped by a demand for cheap and flexible precarious workers in secondary and informal or underground labour markets, resulting in a large degree of immigrant residence in Southern Europe being undocumented (King 2000: 18). The outcome is a context in which immigrants enjoy little access to rights or representation, as well as the seemingly paradoxical situation of rising immigration rates at a time of rising unemployment (Mendoza 1997).

Both Italy and Spain have considerable histories of emigration and immigration. Just to consider, from centuries of movement around the Mediterranean to the arrival of tourists and retirees from Northern Europe and workers from North Africa in the twentieth, foreigners have been moving to both countries before they became net receivers of immigration (Carfagna 1998, King 2001). However, since the 1980s a quantitative shift in the size of migratory flows to these countries has made them two of the principal receivers of immigration to the EU whilst a qualitative diversification of countries of origin has brought migrants from new places such as Albania (Italy), Latin America (Spain) and Romania (Italy and Spain). Indeed, data from Eurostat signals that in 1988 only 85,791 registered immigrants arrived in Italy and 24,380 in Spain, and that this rate saw little change until the mid-1990s when it began to expand rapidly, reaching 556,714 annual arrivals in Italy and 958,266 in Spain in 2007. This produced an increase over the decade between 1998 and 2008 of the total immigrant population of Italy from 991,678 to 3,432,651 (according to data from Institute of Multi-ethnic Studies, ISMU and the Institute for Statistics, ISTAT), and of Spain from 719,647 to 4,473,499 (according to data from the National Statistics Institute, INE). At the same time, continued emigration has
resulted in there being 3,649,377 Italians registered outside of Italy (on the AIRE register) and 1,194,350 Spaniards registered on the Spanish census for voters resident abroad (on the CERA register) in 2007.

In keeping with the Southern European model, in both countries underground labour markets have provided employment opportunities for immigrants regardless of their legal status, and these are characterised by a high degree of informality and lack of regulation or social welfare provisions (Arango et al 2009, Baldwin-Edwards 2001, Calavita 1998, 2005, King 2000, King and Thomson 2008, Hartman 2008, Schierup et al 2008). Immigrants thus respond to a demand for cheap and flexible precarious workers (King 2000: 18), illustrating, as noted by Reyneri, that ‘immigrants, while they certainly do not bring the underground economy into existence, contribute to its reproduction’ (2004: 88). In response to this informality and an associated high level of undocumented residence, amnesties for undocumented migrants have been regular in both countries, coming in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2009 (for domestic carers and nurses only) in Italy and in 1986, 1991, 1995 and 2001 in Spain. Amnesties do not result in permanent legal residence, however, because the renewal of permits is dependent on presenting a work contract. In this way the boundaries between legality and informality in Italy and Spain are blurred and shifting.

Finally, despite the fact that Italy and Spain became countries of net immigration in the 1970s and 1980s, their first comprehensive immigration laws were only passed in 1998 and 2000, respectively. Policy objectives in both countries have been described as ambiguous and contradictory, as well as criticised for producing immigrant illegality. Whilst Italian policies from the 1990s and 2000s have been accused of rejecting legal entry in favour of undocumented entry followed by regularisation amnesties (Colombo and Sciortino 2004b: 66, see also Sciortino 1999, Reyneri 2004, Zincone 1998, 2006), Spanish ones have been criticised for tying relatively short residence permits to precarious work contracts, thereby actively ‘irregularising’ immigrants by making it all but impossible to retain legal status over time (Calavita 1998: 531, see also Cachón Rodríguez 2009, Calavita 1998, Schierup et al 2008). In this context, immigrants have had few formal opportunities for stable residence, enfranchisement or sustained political participation in either country.
The political, economic and social circumstances of Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain mirror these general patterns. Migration flows began arriving in the 1990s but grew very quickly. Under the Romanian Communist Party regime, restrictive control policies for most residents prohibited emigration without *securitate* secret surveillance, until the regime’s fall in 1989 (Sandu et al 2004: 3, Stan and Turcescu 2005). During the early 1990s, emigration was primarily directed to Germany, with small flows to Italy as rising unemployment in Romania was accompanied by falling GDP and rising inflation from 1.9% to 210% in 1992 (according to the Institutul National de Statistica Romania, see also Ban 2009, Maddison 2008, Sandu et al 2004). The decline in living standards acted as a push factor for emigration whilst comparatively high salaries in Europe acted as a pull factor, encouraging movement in search of employment and stability (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 2004). Indeed, despite fluctuations throughout the decade, by the year 2000 the average monthly salary of a Romanian citizen was equivalent to 150 euros, compared to over 1,900 in the Eurozone (Viruela Martinez 2002: 234). The emigrants at this time were mostly educated individuals leaving Romania to look for professions that would enable them to earn a wage more fitting to their qualifications, bridging the education-income gap of their homeland (Uccellini 2010, Viruela Martinez 2002).

These migratory patterns changed from 2002 when a combination of lowered legal constraints on entry to EU Member States and improved travel connections contributed to flows growing and becoming more dynamic, with settlement often more temporary (Sandu et al 2004, Viruela Martinez 2008). Visa requirements for entry to the EU for stays of up to three months were removed, simplifying entry, whilst increasingly stable cross-border Romanian migration networks facilitated movement to destinations such as Italy and Spain where friend and kinship networks helped with finding regulated or informal labour market opportunities, housing and so on (Cingolani 2007, Cingolani and Piperno 2005, Elrick and Ciobanu 2009, Eve 2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008, Hartman 2008, Marcu 2009a, 2009b, 2011, Pajares 2007, Potot 2008, Sandu 2005, Viruela Martinez 2002, 2008). This ease of travel was confirmed in 2007 by the accession of Romania to the EU, granting nationals from these countries rights to freedom of movement between Member States, although not without restrictions, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
These changes in migration patterns meant that, despite forming a very small population in Italy and Spain in 2000, by 2009 Romanians were the highest ranking in size in both of these countries (see figure 1).

The growth of the Romanian population in Italy and Spain has subsequently been constant and rapid, whilst also undergoing a change in composition as migrants have arrived not only from Romania’s urban middle classes but also the rural poor, and chosen to live all across Italy and Spain, from small villages to the large cities (Sandu 2005). Despite these diverse backgrounds, the dominant employment roles in Italy and Spain have been restricted to domestic care, construction and agriculture (Birsan and Cucuruzan 2007, Caritas Italia 2010, Hartman 2008,

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>239,426</td>
<td>555,997</td>
<td>796,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10,983</td>
<td>54,688</td>
<td>211,325</td>
<td>718,844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Growth of Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain post-2000

Marcu 2009a, Perrotta 2006, Viruela Martinez 2008). Informal employment in these sectors has meant that legal residence and work permits have not been absolutely necessary in order to enter the labour market whilst waiting for a regularisation amnesty or to save money to return to Romania (Gabriel Anghel 2008, Perrotta 2006, Uccellini 2010). In both countries precarious or informal employment and undocumented residence, among other factors, have given Romanians little stability, few opportunities for political representation, and restricted bargaining power with their bosses or within trade unions (Perrotta 2006). However, the granting of a new EU citizenship status to two comparable populations such as these in 2007 provides a particularly interesting opportunity to see how a supranational structural change can influence the local and national political integration of immigrants in Europe.
The politics of immigration in research

The broad similarities between the migration histories and Romanian populations of Italy and Spain outlined above mean that an understanding and explanation of the different responses to the presence of Romanian immigrants in these countries needs to go beyond describing the characteristics of the immigrant populations or host societies.

Patterns of international migration and immigrant integration are tied into a wide range of political, economic, social and cultural processes across diverse local, national and global scales. As globalisation and the increased mobility of populations across international borders has contributed to the widening of humanity across expanding geographical and political spaces, in societies of immigration apparent divisions and a lack of consensus over shared understandings and cultures seem to provoke conflict and unrest. In this way, as noted by Saskia Sassen, ‘economic globalisation denationalizes national economies; in contrast, immigration is renationalizing politics’ (1996: 63). The resultant context has been described as ‘a scramble of differences in a field of connections’ (Geertz 2000: 250), as boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ or ‘Us-natives’ and ‘Them-immigrants’ are repeatedly debated and expressed or repressed in public debate, policies, laws and everyday life (Fennema 2000, Schierup et al 2008). Identity, it appears, has been brought to the forefront of the politics of immigration (Koopmans and Statham 2000: 1, Zapata-Barrero 2008: 13).

face of foreigners, such as Huntington’s declaration that Mexican and Asian immigration to the United States has threatened the dominant Anglo-Protestant work ethic, and with it the social and political integrity of the United States, and so should undergo greater assimilation to the dominant culture (2004: 27, 180, 243). Similarly, Weiner has described a ‘global migration crisis’, stating that societies have an absorption limit, beyond which tensions between natives and foreigners grow and public safety lowers, giving governments a moral obligation to restrict immigration in response to the fact that ‘in many countries, citizens have become fearful that they are now being invaded not by armies and tanks but by migrants who speak other languages, worship other gods, belong to other cultures’ (1995: 2). These concerns fit into a wider academic literature which has understood identity and cultural difference to be problematic for democracies as groups with distinct histories, languages and appearances exist as mutually exclusive, antagonistic entities challenging the liberal goals of equality and freedom of the individual (Appiah 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 2000, Rawls 1971, Taylor 1994, Waldron 1992, Walzer 1983).

However, these approaches are built on an inadequate understanding of groups and group identities, assuming that individuals belong exclusively to one group and that group identities are therefore fixed and clearly bounded as well as internally homogeneous and unchanging over time. In short, they define groups and group identities as objects, despite the fact that this view has been contrasted by a wealth of empirical and theoretical research from the 1960s to today which has illustrated how groups are liable to change their composition and defining character over time and in differing contexts (Barth 1967, 1969, 1981, Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Castells 2010, Cohen 1985, 1986, Eriksen 2002 [1993], Firth 1951, 1964, Goffman 1987 [1959], 1963, 1967, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Karner 2007, Leach 1954, Loveman 1999, Modood 2007, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009). Groups and group identities are defined according to the choices that individuals make concerning the representation of specific cultural criteria that establish similarity between group members and difference with group outsiders. These choices are tied to the social relations between social and political actors who emphasise or minimise group membership according to the opportunities for action in their particular setting and their interests, such as gaining access to some resources.
through membership of a group. With this in mind, the aim here is therefore not to
describe what identities are as objects and blindly accept cultural similarity and
difference as explanatory variables, but rather to understand and explain the
processes by which certain claims to group membership and group identity gain
popular resonance and dominance as legitimate views of the world (Malesevic 2011:
272). It is not necessarily identity and cultural difference that cause tensions to arise
in public and political responses to the presence of immigrants but rather, in the
words of Jenkins, the political negotiation of the meaning of ‘who is who’ (2008).

This thesis argues that the meaning of being a Romanian immigrant is
negotiated and cannot be explained without examining how, when, and why different
negotiation patterns occur (Castells 2010: 7). There exists already a significant body
of research from political scientists and sociologists exploring the political dynamics
of when and why immigration is presented and interpreted in different ways. As will
be examined in chapter three, much of this literature has focused on structural
variables such as class (Calavita 2005, Castles and Kosack 1985, Castells 1975,
1978, Phizacklea and Miles 1980), ideas and conceptions of nationhood (Bleich
institutional arrangements (Bauböck 2006, Cachón Rodríguez 2009, Cinalli and
Waldinger 1989). However, in doing so they underestimate the importance of the
agency of political actors and immigrants themselves to adapt to their structural
setting by suggesting, appropriating or resisting dominant ways of presenting and
interpreting social relations and issues (Adamson 2011, Buonfino 2004, Dembinska
strategies’ of individuals who adapt to the institutional and social characteristics of
the local environment have been emphasised as important examples of immigrant
agency influencing the process of incorporation (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004).

The analytical approach of this thesis attempts to overcome this divide
between agency and structure. It analyses the negotiation of a group identity through
dialectic processes of identification by group members and categorisation by non-
members. Through identification and categorisation social and political actors stake
a claim to who belongs to a group and what their shared characteristics are.
Moreover, these actors are themselves embedded in specific social and political
contexts (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2001, Jenkins 1997, 2008). Political responses to the presence of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain are therefore explained as the negotiation of the meaning of being a Romanian immigrant by social and political actors who are situated in layered discursive frameworks, institutional opportunities and relations of power. This constitutes a ‘de-ethnicised’ research design which views identity as a form of claims-making by politicians, policy makers, activists, the press, trade unions, charities and members of civil society propose perceptions of ‘who is who’ (Jenkins 2008). The challenge is to understand how and explain why some perceptions gain popularity and dominance as legitimate views of the world (Castells 2010, Jenkins 2008, Malesevic 2011, Wimmer 2008, 2009).

Despite being focused in Italy and Spain, this study cannot simply be built on a study of the Italian and Spain national contexts. Although immigration and citizenship have typically been considered questions of national identity and state sovereignty (Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Marshall 1992 [1950], Diehl and Schnell 2006, Joppke 1998a), during the contemporary period of globalisation international flows of finance, trade and workers have transformed the state’s control of its borders whilst universal human rights regimes have led to demands for the protection of individual rights beyond national boundaries (Castles 2002, Sassen 1996, 2006; Soysal 1994, 1996). Yet at the same time, decentralisation, new modes of urban governance and sub-state demands for welfare and administrative powers below the level of the state have emphasised the importance of the regional and local levels of politics and society in drawing the social boundaries of membership of the political community (Ambrosini 2012, Borkert and Caponio 2010, Caponio 2005, Davis 2009, Helbling 2010, Hepburn 2011, Guibernau 2007, Keating 1998, 2009, Zapata-Barrero 2004).

This layered structural context is particularly visible in the EU, where the introduction of a supranational category of citizenship has questioned whether the state is disconnecting from the control of its territory, accompanied by a transformation of its sovereignty and the rise of a post-national universal citizenship (Geddes 2001, 2008a, Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, Habermas 2001a, 2001b). At the same time, regional administrations from EU Member States have set up numerous regional offices and interregional associations in Brussels, EU structural funds have
been given directly to regional administrations rather than national governments and subsidiarity has urged decisions in the EU to be made at the closest administrative level to their impact (Marks et al 1996, Thielemann 2002, Vignali 2009). In short, the EU is a multi-level polity in which the rights, allegiances and identities of individuals are bundled at different administrative levels within and across national borders, whilst also being embedded in specific local contexts. In this way, horizontal and vertical ties between local, national and cross-border actors and institutions are an important part of politics and social relations in the EU; they potentially influence the way that identity negotiations and patterns of political mobilisation play out within and across Member States. Due to this complexity, the analysis of the following chapters is designed to incorporate diverse local, national and cross-border structures and dynamics whilst avoiding falling into ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck 2005).

**Thesis structure and contents**

The thesis is divided into two principal sections. The first is comprised of chapters two and three and presents the theoretical framework and methodological approach to the study.

Chapter two delves deeper into the conceptual debates regarding identity, ethnic relations and immigrant integration that have been outlined in this introduction, highlighting the shortcomings of much of the previous literature whilst setting out the conceptual content of an understanding of immigrant identity as a classification of ‘who is who’. This provides the foundations for the thesis’ study because it justifies a shift in focus from the characteristics of immigrants and host societies to the meaning of groups and group identities as negotiated by actors who are motivated by specific interests.

Chapter three outlines the methodological approach and research methods that are employed in the project’s ‘de-ethnicised’ research design, aimed at explaining how responses to the presence of immigrants are negotiated by social and political actors who are situated in, and adapt to, institutional and discursive structures (Wimmer 2007). The chapter argues that agency can be introduced into

The empirical analysis of the thesis will be presented in chapters four to seven. Firstly, chapter four outlines the historical development of laws and policies determining the status and rights of immigrants in Italy and Spain. These laws and policies are viewed as an important part of the process of categorising Romanian immigrants due to the way that they ‘mark a distinction between members and outsiders’ (Bauböck, 2006: 15), as well as demarcating the structural opportunities for and limitations against social integration and political participation (Brubaker 1992). The intention of the chapter is to show how Romanian immigrants have been formally categorised in the laws and policies of these countries and the implications that this has had for the evolution of their legal and social status over time. In doing so, it also provides a backdrop to the subsequent analyses because these laws and policies contribute significantly to defining the institutional structural context for this population’s integration and political participation.

Chapters five to seven examine respectively the national, local and cross-border dimensions of the negotiation of ‘who is who’ in Romanian immigration. These chapters bring these dimensions into one analytical framework by showing how institutional and discursive structures, distributions of resources and actor mobilisations have been embedded in diverse contexts, from national parliaments, political parties and press (chapter five) to local political parties, press, NGOs, and Romanian cultural associations in Rome and Madrid (chapter six) and cross-border Romanian government members, political parties, Churches and European parliament members (chapter seven).

Finally, the conclusions in chapter 8 will bring together these diverse dimensions into one summary of the politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain, illustrating how actors respond and adapt to their multi-dimensional structural context and availability of resources when engaging in situated negotiations of ‘who is who’. The chapter will also conclude by drawing out lines of convergence and difference with other case studies and by briefly addressing the implications for local
and national public policies regarding immigrant integration and the development of an EU citizenry.
SECTION ONE

Theoretical framework:

Negotiated meanings and power
Chapter 2
Defining who is who in the politics of immigration

As noted in the introduction, this thesis asks why different responses have arisen to the presence of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain. The objective is to understand how and explain why different Romanian identities are found in these countries, which implies being concerned with the study of what it means to be an immigrant and why varying patterns of classification are found in different countries. Without identity we cannot know who we are, who others are, or what relations exist between us and other individuals or objects, or as succinctly stated by Richard Jenkins, ‘identity is the human capacity – rooted in language – to know “who’s who” (and hence “what’s what”)’ (2008: 5). Furthermore, the process of defining these relations enables political and social issues to be outlined and given meaning (see for example the idea of ‘boundary work’ from Gieryn 1983), and can justify the choices and actions of individuals, groups, organisations or institutions. In this way, for example, claims to national identity have driven nationalist movements to compete for control of resources, legitimised the granting or denial of rights to members of a polity and posed as a powerful justification for war and violence throughout modern history (Kedourie 1993 [1960] 8-11, Smith 1991: 16-7). As will be argued here, identity is therefore a relational concept that is contextually situated in networks of meaning and power: actors do things with identity, at the same time that their actions are informed and motivated by it.

The present chapter will outline a relational concept of identity as a process of classification, understood as a dialectic between self-identification and categorisation by others, that will provide the foundations for the study. In doing so, it illustrates how the analytical puzzle is not to simply describe what identities are or what form they take, but rather to account for how, when and why claims to identity and group difference gain popular resonance and dominance as legitimate views of
the world (Castells 2010: 7, Malesevic 2011: 272). The implication of such a conceptualisation for this study is that responses to immigrants such as the Romanians in Italy and Spain should be interpreted not as reactions to a clash between incompatible cultures, but rather as part of a process of competition and negotiation of meanings, of determining ‘who is who’. The challenge for the remainder of the thesis will thus be to reveal what it means to be Romanian and who is doing what by defining it.

The chapter develops over two main sections. The first reviews a significant body of theoretical and empirical academic literature on citizenship, identity and immigration in liberal democracies. This body of work has defined identity as a fixed and shared characteristic of bounded, clearly demarcated and internally homogeneous social groups and argued that particular relations develop between groups, such as ones of inequality, exclusion or discrimination, due to their diverse identities. Identity is thus conceived as a fixed object that can be objectively measured and employed as a variable for explaining social relations. The second section takes a critical approach to this literature and reveals, in contrast, how groups are very rarely bounded, clearly demarcated or internally homogeneous, and that the terms of membership of groups are liable to change from one context to another. Groups and group identities are thus understood as constructed and negotiated over time: they are claims, rather than objects. This will be illustrated with examples of historical conceptions of national identity in Romania, Italy and Spain. Finally, it sets out the view of this thesis by conceptualising identity and group boundaries as a relational process of classification of individuals built on the selective presentation or recognition of similarity between group members and difference with group outsiders (Barth 1969, Brubaker 2001, 2004, Malesevic 2004, 2006, 2011, Jenkins 1997, 2008). In this sense identity is not an object with explanatory power, it is a political process of claims making that merits explaining (Zimmer 2003). The conclusion to the chapter will relate these concepts to the objective of this thesis and layout the methodological questions to be addressed in the following chapter.
Reviewing the literature: the problem of identity

Over the latter half of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty first centuries, identity has become a central concern of much academic research and political debate. Much of this concern has taken as its starting point the assumption that identities are problematic because they cause particular social relations such as inequality, social exclusion or discrimination to arise between groups. However, at the heart of this assumption is a conceptual fallacy that views groups to be fixed and bounded and group identities to be homogeneous and shared between all members. The two sub-sections below will illustrate the prevalence, and associated shortcomings, of this view in both theorising on identity and cultural difference in liberal democracies and empirical research that has taken groups and identity as measurable objects.

The problem of conceptualising identity

From the 1970s onwards, identity and equality became two of the central concerns of much Western liberal democratic political theory (Appiah 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, 2000, Rawls 1971, Taylor 1994, Waldron 1992, Walzer 1983). This was fuelled by events such as the burgeoning civil rights movement in the USA, race relations in the UK and the political and public responses to the incorporation of immigrants from across the world in the countries of Western Europe.

These studies saw identity and cultural difference to be problematic, in particular the question of how to achieve equality and freedom for citizens in societies characterised by a diverse range of cultural practices and varying conceptions of the good. These were not new challenges: Isaiah Berlin, for example, had already argued in the 1960s that the subjective nature of every individual’s self identity and beliefs meant that it would be impossible to demonstrate that some lifestyles should be a priori superior to others (Berlin 1962). In the face of different conceptions of right and wrong, it was argued that just state institutions should not dictate or promote conceptions of the good, and therefore of individuals’ cultural practices, as this would restrict the freedom of citizens and cause dominance of some
over others (Berlin 1969: 152, Walzer 1983: xiii). Cultural difference and diversity were therefore presented as a problem of group dominance when majority population values and practices restricted and limited the freedom and equality of minority groups (see for example Walzer 1983, Taylor 1994, Kymlicka 1995). Perhaps the most well known proposed solution was the Rawlsian race and ethnicity-blind state structure, established, in theory, from a universal moral starting point which could not impinge on individual, subjective cultural norms (1971). For Rawls, this structure should be hidden by a ‘veil of ignorance’ between citizens and institutions in order to eradicate any value bias (Ibid.). Identities were thus understood as problematic because they caused the dominance of some groups over others, but it was thought that equal citizenship could be obtained instead through ignoring cultural differences.

Yet this liberal theory did not appear to take liberal democracies closer to the equal outcomes that were intended (Modood 2007: 22). In particular, a primarily North American group of academics was concerned with the status of historic minority groups and the preservation of their cultures (see for example, Appiah 1994; Gutmann 2003, Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, 2000; Taylor 1994). These authors argued that inequalities remained because the laws and institutions of the nation state were already biased towards the cultural norms and traditions of the majority population, in detriment to the status of minority racial, ethnic and identity groups. In contrast to Rawls, it was thus claimed that blindness to cultural difference could not translate into parity of social status because ‘the rights of recognition, language and culture are ignored by liberal democracy but do not come under civic, political or welfare rights’ (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 5). Biased cultural practices, embedded in state institutions and laws, resulted in inequalities because ‘different sorts of groups have different histories, needs, aspirations and identities; and these differences influence the sorts of claims that they tend to make on the state’ (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 24). In response, they proposed a multicultural conceptualisation of equal citizenship that took as its starting point the recognition of the diverse cultural beliefs and practices of groups, whilst advocating the granting of differentiated rights to accommodate differences between them (Taylor 1994, Waldron 1992). Identity and cultural difference thus continued to be understood as problematic due to causing dominance and inequality,
but could be addressed by policy measures aimed at accommodating more groups’ diverse beliefs and practices. In this way identity and cultural difference were interpreted as both a problem and a solution.

The view of identity and cultural difference as problematic has also been particularly noticeable in studies of immigration which interpret the cultural diversity of foreigners as posing a challenge to the perceived stability and cohesion of the host society. Such diversity confronts the previously-held assumption that citizenship constituted membership of a culturally homogeneous political community (Huntington 2004, Joppke 2010, Marshall 1992 [1950], Smith 1991). In this vein, Walzer has suggested that states should regulate immigration to protect the equality and common understandings of a polity and the freedom, welfare and culture of its citizens, preventing neighbourhoods from becoming 'fortresses' against internal mobility (Walzer 1983: 39, Wilcox 2009: 2-3). Kymlicka and Norman also suggested that a degree of assimilation of immigrants was vital in order to protect the claims of historical minorities that were already disadvantaged in relation to the dominant majority culture (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 362-369), whilst Huntington has famously claimed that Mexican immigration provides a threat to the United States’ apparently unified Anglo-Protestant culture, arguing that the outside influence of diversity from ‘societies with cultures significantly different from those of the wealthy countries’ has risked ‘deconstructing’ America’s identity rather than allowing it to persist in its ‘essential character’ (2004: 180-181). Similarly, Schlesinger has suggested that ‘the historic idea of a unifying American identity is now in peril’ due to the cult and militants of ethnicity and multiethnic dogma (1992: 17). These authors are accompanied by other academics and policy makers in their concern for the assimilation of immigrants into the ‘national mainstream’ through acceptance of the national identity of the host society and rejection of the identity of the country of origin, evidenced by the establishment of 'civic integration' and assimilation policies in liberal states (Adamson et al 2011, Alba 2005, Alba and Nee 1997, Joppke 2010, Ono 2002, Triadafilopoulos 2011, Zhou 1997). These policies reveal the contradiction at the heart of liberal states that, as Joppke has noted, are ‘inclusionary and democratic to the inside [...] but] necessarily exclusionary and undemocratic to the outside’ (1999: 2).
However, at the heart of these studies there lay problematic conceptualisations of groups and group identities. It was claimed that individuals could have one, authentic identity and that this identity was subjective to the person in question, arguing as a result that liberal states should be culturally neutral because any imposition of cultural ways on citizens would ‘violate the dignity and the autonomy of the individual’ (Joppke 1998a: 32). They then extrapolated identity and autonomy from individuals to groups and reached the conclusion that groups shared one homogeneous identity that should not be violated by others. In doing so, they drew fixed boundaries around populations of individuals that were perceived as sharing cultural traits and declared that some of these populations should benefit from specific policy measures to prevent their traits from changing. In response, Modood has argued that the problem with dividing between groups to benefit from protection in this way is to falsely suggest that some identities and cultural practices have a greater ontological value than others, evidenced by Kymlicka’s distinction between historic and contemporary identities and the suggestion that groups that have been present in a place for a longer period of time are more deserving of protection against dominance than newly-arrived immigrant ones and should therefore have their practices protected from change (2007: 26-31). This assumes that after a certain period of time a group identity will gain its own status as a social object, but without clarification of how or when it may happen. In this way, Kymlicka (and others) ‘distorts the circumstances of some kinds of migrants in order to highlight the condition of national minorities and indigenous peoples’ (2007: 34).

Furthermore, the extrapolation from individuals to groups and the promotion of group-specific policies has led these authors to perceive groups as isolated and separate from one another. Yet this has done little to clarify whether individuals can be members of different groups contemporaneously, if group identities are felt and perceived by all members in the same way or how the composition of groups and the cultural content of their identities can change over time. Indeed, the authors mentioned above argue instead that groups are exclusive and that change should not occur in the content of their identities (Appiah 1994, Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 2000). This objectifies identity without asking how groups are formed, what membership means to individuals or which similarities or differences are significant and when. Whilst the ontological argument that identity is a person’s understanding
of who they are (Taylor 1994: 25) is logical, the claim that this is more authentic
than that presented socially is misleading because an individual cannot be taken out
of their social context, and vice versa, social identities are themselves varied because
individuals build a range of connections and cultural characteristics over the course
of their lives. In short, as noted by Jenkins, all identity is social and embedded in
multiple, varied and changing social relations (2008).

The Problem of Measuring Identity

The conceptual problem underpinning the studies mentioned above is not only a
theoretical one. In fact, it has been repeated in empirical studies that, despite
adopting different theoretical paradigms, research designs and scales of analysis,
present groups and identities as fixed, bounded, and therefore also measureable,
objects.

On the one hand, macro-level studies of ethnic relations and immigration
have analysed empirical data from censuses, election results, electoral registers and
socio-economic surveys to examine how cultural diversity, immigration and ethnic
relations play out in different ways according to the structural characteristics of the
host society. These have included studies of class (Castells 1975, Castles and Kosack
1985), institutions (Katznelson 1973) and spatial segregation (Castells 1978,
Martiniello 2000). For example, Castles and Kosack studied how the socio-economic
circumstances of immigrants contributed to the formation of communities by
analysing census surveys in in Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland (which the
authors admit present problems of comparability, see 1985: 483-486), in order to
measure the labour market status and access to education, healthcare and housing of
immigrant populations (1985). Similarly, Castells examined survey data to attempt
to explain how urban communities were formed by patterns of collective
consumption, labour market participation and spatial segregation in cities (1978).
The effect of spatial segregation on political participation was also analysed through
a study of electoral results by Martiniello in which he assessed whether high levels
of residential concentration of immigrants corresponded to levels of voting for
political candidates from the same ethnic background (2000). These studies have all
assumed that measures of nationality and ethnicity recorded through censuses and
electoral registers reflect the existence of such groups in society and take correlations of these with levels of inequality or location in cities to be illustrative of a causal relation between structural context, social status and group identity.

Micro-level studies, however, have focused their search for groups and group identities on the perceptions, identifications and allegiances of individuals. These are usually large-scale surveys using refined quantitative methods of analysis to assess the strength or weakness of certain identities according to the number of people that identify themselves in one way or another (see for example Ariely 2012, Diehl and Schnell 2006, Ono 2002, Putnam 2007). For example, Putnam has famously investigated the effects of diversity on social capital and trust in the United States by surveying 30,000 individuals, categorised as Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black and Asian, and recording their in-group and out-group attitudes (2007: 144). Similarly, Diehl and Schnell examined whether ethnicity was responsible for the non-integration of immigrants in Germany by collecting data on a sample of ‘foreigners’ from a 15 year repeated survey to find trends in ethnic identification, habits and social ties, particularly in reference to attachments to their homeland (ethnic) or host society (integrated) (2006: 787-8, 795-800). A similar design from Ariely used cross-national survey data from sixty three countries to determine whether a country’s level of globalisation was linked to individual-level attitudes towards national identity, concluding, rather confusingly, that higher levels of globalisation are linked with declining patriotism but that the relation to nationalism is inconclusive (2012: 461-2, 475-6). However, these surveys classify individuals into a reduced selection of ethnic or national categories and only allow respondents to be classified in one way. Cultural ‘distinctiveness’ is often presented as an explanation for the forms of social relations within and across these groups precisely because the survey format itself emphasises their exclusivity and requires them to be clearly differentiated in order to carry out subsequent statistical analyses and make general conclusions.

As noted above, despite their diverse orientations and methods, all of these studies treat social groups and identities as fixed and bounded objects that can be clearly demarcated and measured. In doing so, they set up false dichotomies between categories such as ‘natives’ and ‘immigrants’ or ‘Hispanics’ and ‘Asians’ that have been determined a priori and overly simplify the variety of possible identifications.
that individuals may express. Furthermore, these studies also position these ethnic or national categories as the explanatory variable or *explanans* of research, rather than the phenomenon to be explained or *explanandum* (Wimmer 2007, 2009). In other words, as noted by Brubaker and Malesevic, by attempting to impose general categorisations onto populations, they use identity to explain things rather than attempting to explain the political and social processes that contribute to the perception of groups and their boundaries as things-in-the-world (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Malesevic 2006, 2011). Thus, in the same way that Ulrich Beck has proposed a new academic view of the world away from the general categorisation of people and processes according to their national origin (2005: 43-5), in studies of identity and ethnic relations a distinct methodological focus is required to be able to uncover and explain the meanings, power relations and legitimising relationships that underpin the perception and definition of groups.

As a result, the choice to analyse Romanian immigrants in this thesis requires qualification. Indeed, it may seem counter intuitive to advocate a move away from general categorisations of social groups based on nationality or ethnicity as part of a study of immigrants of one nationality. However, social and political actors in both countries speak of 'the Romanian community' and offer their view of what it means to be a Romanian immigrant. This thesis is directed at understanding how and explaining why they do so, viewing the Romanian nationality not as an object or an explanatory variable but rather as the social category to be studied. Indeed, these views are sometimes similar, but also often quite different from one another, illustrating the way that identities are varied, layered and under constant negotiation between multiple viewpoints. In other words, different public representations of Romanian immigrants have not arisen in Italy and Spain simply because they are Romanian, but rather because the category of ‘Romanian immigrant’ has different meanings in these countries. As will be illustrated in the remainder of this chapter, this task requires a reconceptualisation of identity as a dialectic between the processes of identification and categorisation through which actors make a claim and negotiate what it means to be Romanian.
A conceptual framework: identity as negotiated claims-making

The theoretical and empirical literatures outlined above deny the findings of much social anthropology and sociology throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. In contrast to the work addressed so far, these studies were based on empirical fieldwork in varying settings and illustrated the malleable, blurred and messy reality of processes of group formation and perceptions of cultural similarity and difference (Barth 1967, 1969, Cohen 1985, 1986, Eriksen 2002 [1993], Firth 1951, 1964, Leach 1954, Goffman 1959, 1963, 1967). On the one hand, they argued that cultural differences between groups were not the product of their separation from others but rather would arise through contact and interaction between individuals and groups (see for example Firth 1951, 1964, Malinowski 1945). On the other hand, they also claimed that cultural practices and group membership were not fixed in time and place but could vary according to the selective representation of specific cultural criteria by individuals. Groups and group identities were thus conceptualised as forms of social organisation, negotiated through relations between individuals and developing over time.

This relational and processual perspective was evidenced perhaps most clearly and concisely in the Introduction by Fredrik Barth to the collection of essays Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969). For Barth, groups enabled individuals and cultural practices to be classified, and thereby existed as a type of social organisation which could give meaning to social relations and behaviour (Ibid.: 29-30). But instead of describing groups’ cultural practices, Barth shifted his attention from the ‘cultural stuff’ that characterised them to the boundaries and processes of boundary maintenance that demarcated them (Ibid.: 10). In this argument it was considered that group boundaries were constituted through the emphasis of specific cultural differences between interacting individuals, which would involve only certain cultural features, meaning that ‘most of the cultural matter that at any time is associated with a human population is not constrained by this boundary’ (Ibid.: 38). The selection of traits for drawing and maintaining boundaries was understood as the outcome of actors’ choices, which could vary according to the context and the group against which distinction was being defined. Aside from the select differences that were to be effective at drawing boundaries, Barth argued that groups should in fact
be structurally similar in order to be comparable (1969: 14, 35), leading him to claim that groups were not accidental or arbitrary, but were constructed through ongoing processes of boundary definition, and that these boundaries were at the same time permeable to exchange across them. Cultural difference and group boundaries were in this sense constructed through interaction which was facilitated by a certain degree of similarity.

Barth’s view would go on to provide the dominant constructivist paradigm for the concepts of ethnicity, identity, race, community and nationalism throughout the second half of the twentieth century (for studies of ‘race’, see Banton 1983, 1987; for ‘community’ see Cohen 1985, 1986; for ‘national identity’ see Anderson 2006 [1983], Eriksen 2002 [1993]). Such an emphasis on selected traits for differentiation built on that previously noted by Max Weber when he declared that ‘all differences of customs can sustain a specific sense of honour or dignity in their practitioners’ and ‘any cultural trait, no matter how superficial, can serve as a starting point for the familiar tendency to monopolistic closure’ (2010: 19). Furthermore, social closure, which is based on the recognition of group members’ similarities with each other and differences with outsiders in order to control access to resources and status, need not be a reflection of real or material cultural practices and traits. In this sense, as famously noted more recently by Benedict Anderson, although members of an identity group beyond the dimensions of face-to-face contact will never meet most of their fellow members, ‘in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (2006: 6). Thus the idea of unity within a group is necessarily imagined, and defined by the ideological emphasis of cultural and symbolic similarities between community members and selected, contextual boundary-establishing differences with others.

In light of these findings, the problem of cultural diversity in contemporary normative liberal theory is found to be built on a conceptual fallacy which falsely grants identity groups fixed and exclusionary boundaries and classifies their members according to a generalised perception of cultural similarity. As illustrated above, because individuals were understood as belonging to only one group and groups were at the same time taken as exclusionary and antagonistic in relation to each other, their identities were perceived as objects enclosed by fixed boundaries. In doing so, they presented ‘an uneasy amalgam of constructivist language and
essentialist argumentation’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 6). The arguments outlined above problematically assumed that the boundaries of (national) society, identity and culture coincided harmoniously, presenting national polities as culturally homogeneous and stable cultural entities to which immigration would provide an external shock (Wimmer 2007). However, an exploration of the claims to national identity of Romanians, Italians and Spaniards can illustrate with clarity how, in the succinct words of Jenkins, ‘the secure hermetically bounded group is an imaginative, somewhat romanticised retrospect’ (1997: 38).

Claims to nationhood in Romania have most commonly been founded on the differentiation of the Romanian people from their neighbours by emphasising a Roman heritage originating with the colonisation of the region of Dacia by Emperor Trajan in the second century and epitomised by the Latin roots of the Romanian language (Light and Dumbraveanu-Andone 1997: 31-3). Under the Ceausescu regime, the historiography of direct continuity of the Romanian people from these Daco-Roman origins was such that the 2050th anniversary of the Dacian state was celebrated in 1980 (Light and Dumbraveanu-Andone 1997: 33). Yet in the eighteenth century there was coexistence between different ‘nations’ such as those of Hungarian and Wallachian origin, as well as Saxon and Magyar elites and Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Unitarian, Calvinist and Orthodox religions (Hitchins 1999). The modern state of Romania was formed in 1878 by the independence of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia from Ottoman rule, but its contemporary form was established only in 1918 through the addition of Transylvania, which was previously part of Hungary (Brubaker 2004: 165).

Today, these elements remain in balance and tension. Predominantly, conceptualisations of Romanian nationhood have continued to emphasise the synthesis of the Orthodox religion and a Roman-Latin heritage, leading migratory networks across Europe to be defined as the construction of a ‘Latin bridge’ from Romania in the East to Spain in the West (Marcu 2005). Yet since the 1990s neo-protestant Churches of Pentecostals and Adventists have been growing in Romania and there continues to be significant minority ethnic populations of Hungarians, Romanis and Germans, as well as an Italian community that is also recognised as a protected minority (Ricci 2010). Diverse ways of ‘being Romanian’ are also to be found in the immigrant populations found in Italy and Spain, reflected in the
interviews carried out for this thesis, from Orthodox Christians to Adventists or atheists, nationalists to Europeans, and from modernists emphasising literary and artistic achievements to traditionalists remembering rural folk customs. To state that there is a unitary, homogeneous Romanian cultural way of being either in Romania itself or across the emigrant populations in Italy and Spain would therefore constitute a vague generalisation. Instead, at various points in time there have been differing degrees of consensus around the meaning of Romania’s past and symbols (Brubaker 2004, Brubaker et al 2006, Light and Dumbraveanu-Andone 1997). These cultural ways are best interpreted as *claims* to a Romanian identity that is remembered and enacted in diverse and historically-contingent ways (Brubaker 2004: 161-164).

Similarly, the development of a modern Italian conception of nationhood has been piecemeal and varied. Machiavelli’s sixteenth century manual to political power and rule, *The Prince*, confronted the difficulty of governing across the individual kingdoms making up the peninsula (2005 [1532]), and two hundred years later Napoleon also failed to found a new unitary Italian State (Duggan 2007). Indeed, until the nineteenth century the Italian term *nazione* was used to refer not to the nation, but rather to the place of one’s birth, giving rise to Lombard, Piedmontese and Venetian ‘nations’ and today the Italian word *paese* can ambiguously refer to the country or to a town or village. Local dialects have also remained prevalent, with a reported 48.5% of the population speaking either a mixture of Italian and dialect or solely their dialect with their family (ISTAT 2007).

The legacy of these persistently strong local and regional tendencies is often lamented, as noted by Ugo Amoretti’s statement that ‘this diverse array of historical experiences [...] sowed the seeds of a territorial differentiation that political unification could not fully sweep away’ (2004: 182). This territorial differentiation was recently brought to the fore in the politics of the 1990s and 2000s as there arose the Northern Leagues (*Lega Nord*, LN) which constructed a historical Celtic identity for the North of Italy based on local dialects, songs, heroes and stories that ‘demonstrated’ its difference to the South and ‘uncovered’ cultural roots in North European tradition (Albertazzi 2006). In defining this invented Northern identity, the Leagues ignored or actively rejected the international population movements that had defined Northern Italy over the course of history, from the diverse merchants of medieval Venice to the industrial workers from the south of Italy and the
contemporary immigrants from around the world (Albertazzi 2006, Cento Bull 2010). Moreover, this has not simply been a northern phenomenon. In the southern regions of Sicily and Apulia historical movements of diverse linguistic, religious and cultural populations have meant that Albanian and Greek villages where ancient non-Italian dialects are still spoken can also be home today to contemporary arrivals of North African and Eastern European immigrants who do not always speak Italian but often master the dialect (Douglas 2010 [1915]). In this way, population movements, cultural diversity and shifting group boundaries have been part of the ‘normal’ development of Italian identities.

Finally, modern Spanish identity has also been long-debated and conflicting accounts have come to dominate at different moments in time. On the one hand, the Spanish nation has been described as emerging from the fires of resistance against Napoleonic occupation, united against its common enemy to fight for independence, with anti-French groups ‘unanimous in their will to re-establish independence and the unity of the Spanish patria’ (de la Granja et al 2001, Nadal Oller 1975). On the other hand, however, it has been argued that the diversity of different legal codes, customs, laws, languages, traditions and identities of Catalans, Basques, Galicians co-existing in the same country have meant that the term ‘Spain’ largely reflected a geographical definition rather than a political community (Núñez Seixas 1999, Ringrose 1998). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Spanish identity was framed by competition between these traditionalist and liberal canons of patriotism (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, Molina 2010).

From the end of the 1930s to the 1980s the fascist regime of Franco intended to put an end to cultural plurality. It explicitly associated Spanish identity with the concepts of Hispanidad, built on the Castilian language and the belief that all nationals of Spain and its colonies were of the same race and bore the same characteristics, and National-Catholicism, tying national unity to a culturally homogeneous Catholic Church (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 32-34, Molina 2010: 250, Núñez Seixas 2001: 720). Yet resistance movements mobilised frequently around regional identities contrasting the official discourse, such as the opposition from Basque nationalists, the Catalan anarchists and trade unionists, or the artistic Catalanisme movements (Domènech Sampere 2012). With the fall of the Francoist regime, the new Constitution in 1978 defined Spain ambiguously as a nation of
‘indivisible unity’ made up of different peoples, regions and nationalities, whilst explicit affirmations of allegiance to the nation in public were associated with fascism and de-legitimised (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010, Núñez Seixas 2001, 2005). National and international migrations over the course of the twentieth century have further led to a diversification of the populations within these regions.

In this sense, certain configurations of national or regional identities have arisen and become more salient in specific periods over the respective histories of Romania, Italy and Spain. It is clear that within broad definitions of nationhood there are diverse interpretations of identity. These national identities are not, therefore reflections of homogeneous, fixed and unitary national populations, but rather claims that are influenced by social, political and economic developments over time. As briefly illustrated here, plurality has been common although the contexts in which the memories and cultural traits of these countries have been debated, interpreted, accepted or rejected and, at times, imposed and enforced, has changed. As the following sub-section will suggest, this illustrates how the formation and maintenance of identity groups is tied to wider social and political balances of power.

Identity as a negotiated boundary-making process

As mentioned above, the problem of identity and cultural diversity in liberal democracies and social science research is based on an interpretation of groups as fixed and bounded, exclusionary objects that denies much of the diversity and change over time that really characterises groups and group identities. In this way, they see immigration as a challenge to an apparently homogeneous and unified normality that is often imagined. However, if cultural diversity and change over time is common, as noted above, then the sociological challenge lies in understanding why some cultural similarities and differences become more significant in certain times and places rather than others. What is presented as an ontological problem regarding the nature of identity groups is therefore in reality an epistemological problem of knowing why certain representations of identity are perceived as true and legitimate at specific times and how they dominate over others.
Significant research across the social sciences has already been concerned with this task (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Castells 2010, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Karner 2007, Loveman 1999, Modood 2007, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009). Leading on from Barth's work on ethnic groups and their boundaries (1969), the central arguments of this perspective state that identity is a process of presentation and interpretation of select cultural criteria in interactional contexts, that groups are defined through the self-ascription of members as similar to each other and perception of non-members as culturally different, and that the boundaries that mark groups are not fixed and discrete but rather malleable and potentially changing according to the choices of actors regarding their presentation in interaction with others. As with the original constructivist position, identity is in this way conceptualised as a relational, generative process (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009).

However, there has also been divergence from Barth's original position. In particular, Rogers Brubaker and others have suggested that ethnic or identity groups do not truly exist, and even if they do the concept of groups either means too much or not enough to be epistemologically useful anyway (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Malesevic 2004, 2006, 2011). Brubaker has argued that ethnicity and identity, as well as groups and nations, exist in fact ‘only through our perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorisations and identifications’ (2004: 17). These categorisations and identifications do not reflect the social reality of groups, but contribute to a sense of groupness, increasing the tendency to recognise individuals and cultures as discrete and bounded entities, which Brubaker has in turn defined groupism (2004: 8). Consequently, the analyst’s aim should be to account for levels of groupness that can explain effective groupism, rather than attempting to use identity, ethnicity, race, nation and their respective groups to explain social phenomena because identity ‘belongs to our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit’ (2004: 9). Malesevic has similarly declared that ethnicity (and by extension, identity) is ‘not a thing or a collective asset of a particular group; it is a social relation in which social actors perceive themselves and are perceived by others as being culturally distinct collectivities’ (2004: 4). As a result, he claims that groups and their boundaries constitute ‘specific group labels in a particular moment of time and with a particular social and political reason’ (2004: 4). For Malesevic, these
labels are our empirical evidence: it is only through their discursive expression that we recognise the existence of group boundaries, and it is only through their being presented by actors in social contexts that they arise. Thus he argues that ‘groups [...] are not billiard balls, they do not and could never exist on their own’ (2006: 27). For these authors, identity is therefore an analytical category defined in social and political relations rather than a social object or independent variable.

These authors have suggested a re-orientation of the study of group identity by breaking the concept down into constituent analytical parts. These can be summarised as the following:

1. Firstly, they argue that identity must be understood in its cognitive dimension, that is to say, as a way of perceiving, positioning, interpreting and ordering the social world (Brubaker 2004). Identity is thus an ideological map that can provide structure and coherence to otherwise meaningless images, events and acts, as well as framing political competition and mobilisation (Malesevic 2011: 283).

2. Secondly, if identities and groups are processes and cognitive schemata, they cannot be actors and do not do anything. Actors frame identities and shape the interpretation of their actions in line with certain cognitive maps and according to their interests and motivations. In this sense, ethnic boundaries are defined not by ethnic groups but by organisations, individuals and institutions, from political parties to the state, social movements, schools, the military, mass media, local authorities, and so on (Brubaker 2004, Malesevic 2011: 285-6).

3. Finally, the classification of individuals in groups is a two-way process of self-identification and other-categorisation (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 14-5). This is a multi-layered and competitive process. For Malesevic, the concepts of ideology and solidarity can replace macro-categories such as national identity in order to grasp this multilayered interaction of imagined bonds and interpersonal relations in defining groupness (2011).
In summary, it is claimed that by analysing the processes by which individuals, institutions and organisations identify themselves and categorise others into apparently bounded groups, levels of groupness can be explained. The limitations of essentialising analytical groupism can thus apparently be overcome by a focus on the socially and historically situated processes by which identifications and categories of individuals come to be recognised as substantial entities with agency and permanence (Brubaker 2001, 2004, Brubaker and Cooper 2001, Brubaker et al 2006). As with Barth's work on ethnic groups, this advocates a move away from 'the cultural stuff' of identities to the process by which categories of individuals are given meaning and publicly presented.

However, the work of Brubaker and Malesevic has also been controversial. In particular, the ontological assertion that groups and identity do not exist has been criticised. One example is Modood’s multiculturalism, in which this author has agreed with the need to not essentialise the identities that are under examination, but taken issue with the overly analytical anti-essentialism of Brubaker that denies groups any sense of continuity and coherence (2007: 93). Another example comes from Jenkins who states that by declaring that identity and groups do not exist, Brubaker and Malesevic have pushed ‘a broadly sensible argument’ against viewing groups as clearly demarcated and bounded to ‘somewhere less sensible’ by denying their existence all together (2008: 8). In contrast, Jenkins argues that ‘groups may be imagined, but this does not mean that they are imaginary’ (Ibid.: 11). Nevertheless, despite these controversies, there has been broad agreement on the need for and benefits of a new analytical approach to identity. In this way, for Modood the challenge for multiculturalism and multicultural policies is to take as the starting point the relational context and changing perceptions of difference between groups rather than either a vague and generalised notion of culture or a too specific and essentialised idea of groups. For Jenkins and others, moreover, our understanding of identity and groups should similarly be founded on an awareness of patterns and dynamics of identification and categorisation of individuals and their cultural beliefs and practices (Brubaker and Cooper 2001, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Karner 2007, Loveman 1999, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009).

In particular, Jenkins’ attempts to construct a unified analytical approach to individual and group identity have also placed the processes of identification and
categorisation at their core (1997, 2008). Heavily influenced by Barth, for Jenkins identity is a transactional, relational and generative process inasmuch as it is constituted through the constant negotiation of cultural similarity and difference between contextually-situated individuals. As emphatically stated throughout his work, identity must therefore always be considered a social process. Unlike Barth, however, for Jenkins identity boundaries are defined from the outside, by non-members, as well as on the inside by group members. Jenkins’ conceptualisation of identity is therefore concerned with the dialectical relationship between self-identifications and other-categorisations of cultural similarity and difference. Identity, whether ethnic or national, individual or collective, is defined in its internal and external dimensions: individuals and groups define who they themselves are (their ego, in Freudian terminology), at the same time that they are also defined by others in ways that can validate or conflict with their own perspective (1997: 53). The boundaries of identifications and categorisations do not necessarily coincide, and a group identity is therefore necessarily a synthesis (an accomplishment, in Jenkins’ words) with the others’ perspective (2008: 41-3, see also Habermas 1985). These internal and external dimensions of groups and group identities are therefore constitutive processes reflecting a differential of power and the dominance of a specific world view placing individuals together (1997: 54-5, 2008: 43-5, see also Loveman 1999).

Finally, for Jenkins groups and group identities are also inseparable from the interests and objectives of the actors who stake a claim to their reality. Indeed, patterns of classification undoubtedly have the potential to affect the everyday lived experience of being something or someone and, vice versa, they can provide opportunities to adopt, reinterpret or resist the way that they are named (1997: 72, 2008: 45). In this sense, on one hand, identification establishes a self-conscious sense of collectivity as a group identifies and defines itself, whilst on the other hand, external people, groups and institutions can place individuals in categories according to their perceived similarities to each other or their difference to non-members. As witnessed with citizenship statuses, the categorisation of individuals by a state, for example, can entail the allocation of resources and/or penalties such as voting rights, access to education or a deportation order, depending on the status granted, which will in turn affect their lived experience and social status. The everyday lives of
individuals are therefore influenced not only by who they say they are, but by who they are categorised as by others (Jenkins 1997: 64-70, 2008: 127, see also Loveman 1999: 892).

As noted by Barth’s original approach, these contemporary theories illustrate how ethnic groups and identities cannot be explained only by describing their cultural traits, but instead must be analysed as a pattern of social organisation and claims making (1969, see also Barth 1981). Groups are therefore construed through a negotiation of similarities and differences that is in turn the outcome of the layered and varied dialectic between those who may or may not identify themselves as groups and others who may or may not be placed in categories. At the heart of this dialectic is the continuation of the work of Barth and Weber on the processual, relational and changing process of group boundary definition and closure in accordance with selected similarities and difference. However, it also goes further by shifting the analytical focus onto the multiple and diverse ways in which the meaning of identities is formally and informally negotiated in different social, political, cultural and institutional contexts, that are themselves characterised by power relations. It also permits ‘the inclusion of individual and collective identities within a unified analytical framework’ (Jenkins 1997: 71), along with the previously distinct concepts of ethnicity, ‘race’ and nation, as part of the socially-embedded dialectic between identification and categorisation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the meaning of the key concept of this thesis: identity. The objective of understanding how and explaining why different public responses to Romanian immigration have arisen in Italy and Spain has thus been conceptualised as a question of analysing how different claims to a Romanian identity are expressed, negotiated, resonate publicly and gain dominance. Responses to Romanian immigration are therefore understood as dialectic classificatory processes rather than reactions to a clash between incompatible cultures.

In outlining this conceptual approach, this chapter also highlighted weaknesses in a large portion of the previous literature on immigration, identity and
cultural diversity. Indeed, previous theoretical and analytical research has consistently understood groups and group identities as fixed, bounded and unchanging objects. On the one hand, theorists have supposed that these identities should be ignored or accommodated in public policy in order to ensure equality and freedom between culturally different individuals and groups. On the other hand, social scientists have supposed that these identities can be quantitatively measured because they are clearly demarcated and do not change over time. Both of these approaches suppose that identities cause problems or specific forms of social relations, and so can be put forward as an explanatory variable in analyses.

However, here a distinct viewpoint advocates that groups and group identities themselves require explaining. Indeed, the expression and character of individual and group identities are prone to change over time, according to the actions and interests of actors in relation to others. In short, individuals choose how to identify themselves and categorise others, according to the context in which they find themselves. The subsequent success or failure of these identifications or categorisations to gain dominance as legitimate reflections of the presence of groups is dependent on the competition and negotiation between them. The process of determining ‘who is who’ in the context of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain is thus tied to the claims making of actors who are embedded in social contexts and relations with others. In light of this, this thesis must ask: what is the content of claims to Romanian identification and categorisation? How do actors negotiate their claims? How and why do some actors' claims gain dominance over others? As the next chapter will outline in more detail, these processes are embedded in social relations between actors who are situated in specific structural contexts, mobilise with varying logics according to their beliefs, expectations, resources and objectives. Thus the question of ‘who is who’ is understood as an analysis not of ‘what’ a Romanian immigrant identity is, but rather of who constructs it, how, when and why.
Chapter 3

Explaining who is who in the politics of immigration

The previous chapter has outlined the foundations for understanding responses to Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain as negotiations of the meaning of identities, of ‘who is who’ and ‘what is what’ (Jenkins 2008). These definitions of who is who is constituted through the emphasis of certain similarities between individuals and their differences in relation to others, establishing a sense of groupness when there is consensus on the common perceptions and tacit understandings of what it means to be classified as part of a group. However, this classification is a negotiation between members of groups, who identify themselves in a certain way, and non-members who categorise groups as similar to each other. The negotiation of who is who is therefore a dialectic process of identifying groups and imposing categorisations through processes of labelling, knowledge production, political mobilisation and resistance, which can change over time due to the changing contexts, interests, motivations and power differentials of the actors undertaking them (Karner 2007: 52-68). In this way, negotiating identity is a process which is embedded in frameworks of meanings and relations of power.

This chapter will build on this conceptual outline by developing an analytical framework that will permit an explanation of why some claims to identity dominate over others. Its focus is on the following questions; how are group identifications and categorisations given meaning? Who influences the meaning of collective identities? And why do some meanings dominate?

The first section of the chapter critically assesses previous studies that have explained social and political responses to immigration as due to the structural conditions of the host society. This literature takes factors such as class and institutional structures, from discourses, to political frameworks or laws and policies, as drivers and shapers of ethnic community formation, immigrant political
participation and immigration policy making. However, it also neglects the choices and strategies of individuals in this process. The second section will illustrate how an awareness of agency can be brought into this structural framework via theories of symbolic interactionism and field and network analyses. This is necessary because structural settings of discourses, political frameworks, laws and policies do not only open or close opportunities for action, but are themselves strategically constructed, negotiated and subverted by mobilising actors. The third section will provide a way of explaining the choices and logics of action of these structurally situated actors as legitimacy-seeking frame alignment strategies through which they aim to build consensus with partners and audiences in order to achieve their interests. The fourth and final section will elaborate a three-dimensional, 'de-ethnicized' (Wimmer 2007) research framework which situates actor framing and network strategies within the context of institutional structures and the distribution of resources.

**Structural explanations of the politics of immigration**

A range of previous studies of immigration and ethnic relations have underlined the importance of structural conditions for explaining the way that societies categorise immigrants and how immigrants and ethnic minorities participate politically and identify themselves as sharing a sense of groupness. These can be summarised as studies of class, institutions and discourses.

**Class**

Some of the founding texts in contemporary immigration and ethnic relations studies have looked to explain immigrant-native and ethnic group relations within wider patterns of class relations (e.g. Body-Gendrot 2000, Castles and Kosack 1985, Castells 1975, 1978, Calavita 2005, Miles and Phizacklea 1977, Phizacklea and Miles 1980, Schierup et al 2008). Segregation between groups along lines of nationality or race were explained by these authors as ensuring the incorporation of immigrants into social divisions that were instrumental in maintaining the exploitation of the working class (e.g. Body-Gendrot 2000, Castles and Kosack
In these studies, host society responses to immigrants were viewed as the product of perceived competition between separate ethnic, racial and national communities. Competition facilitated divisions between workers of different national, racial or ethnic backgrounds that were in turn viewed as an important way of keeping a divided working class subordinated in relationships of production. For example, for Phizacklea and Miles, racism and discrimination in response to the presence of immigrants could not be understood in isolation from wider economic divisions and material inequalities which maintained black and white workers in a state of competition and conflict (1980: 225-9). For Castles and Kosack, however, the incorporation of immigrants into the worst jobs and the lowest social status regarding access to housing and education was understood as a possible source of commonality with the native working class (1985: 6-9), if not for socialisation processes in the host society which promoted prejudice towards them for not conforming to accepted norms and values (Ibid.: 448-50). This established the subordination of immigrants within the working class and reproduced the conditions for the exploitation of their labour (Ibid.: 458-60). More recently it has similarly been suggested that in Italy and Spain a subordinate status of immigrant populations has been due to their incorporation into a ‘segmented realm’ of the informal labour market (Schierup et al 2008: 58, 104). Calavita has in this way also argued that the labour market structure in these countries has created a segregated, primarily informal, immigrant underclass that is excluded from the rights and material benefits of the rest of society (2005: 48-70). Thus, she claims, ‘racialized immigrants, denied the economic rewards of late modern society and excluded from socio-cultural belonging, are scapegoated for the denials and exclusions experienced by others’ (2005: 165).

However, this class framework is problematic on various accounts. Firstly, it is highly normative and as a result explains prejudice as a lack of class consciousness rather than the presence of other possible modes of collectivity or community formation (Ireland 1994: 6). In this respect it adopts a teleological perspective of immigrant politics as developing, sooner or later, into class conflict. Secondly, it presents immigrants and ethnic groups as homogeneous categories of workers,
failing to account for diverse patterns of social stratification along non-economic lines, such as the development of ethnic groups with members from diverse socio-economic standings (Katznelson 1973: 18, see also Barth 1981). Thirdly, by emphasising socio-economic and labour market structures these authors underestimate the agency of individuals and their capacity to choose how to publicly define their group membership along lines different to class.

**Institutional and discursive structures**

A distinct approach concentrating on structural factors has positioned the politics of immigration within its institutional context. Institutions are understood in these studies as persistent structures of formal and informal rules and expectations. They can be categorised as the following; discursive structures, political frameworks, and laws and policies affecting individuals’ status.

Discursive structures can be understood as commonly-held ideas, political cultures, cleavages or public philosophies that influence interpretations of issues such as immigration. These ideas have been presented as relatively stable structures capable of contributing to a sense of belonging that cuts across class boundaries (Barry 1990 [1965], Bleich 2002, Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Gil Araujo 2009, Zapata-Barrero 2007). In doing so, discursive structures contribute to the construction of the social and cultural boundaries of citizenship and immigrant-native relations due to the way that they underpin the arguments that are used to debate them.

A central text in this literature has been Adrian Favell’s study of immigrant integration and citizenship policies, which claimed that ‘official public theories’ built around the cognitive frameworks of *citoyennete* and *intégration* in France or race relations and multiculturalism in Britain (1998). Favell argued that these frameworks were dominant due to being founded on sets of consensual ideas and linguistic terms regarding certain normative ‘sacred assumptions’ (Ibid.: 21-7). In doing so, he suggested that discussion and debate of immigration may change over time, but the outcome in terms of policy is usually the *status quo* due to the relative stability of these normative principles. Similarly, Rogers Brubaker examined how conceptions of nationhood influenced citizenship regimes in France and Germany (1992).
Brubaker saw debates and policies as marking a distinction between insiders and outsiders in line with historic conceptions of who ‘we’ as the national community are and who should or should not belong. Gil Araujo has also argued that distinct conceptualisations of the Spanish and Catalan nations in Spain’s multi-level polity have resulted in contradictory national and regional policy responses to immigrants (2009: 233-44). However, these authors have only studied mainstream political actors or governments and generalised descriptive categories of ‘immigrants’ and ‘nation’, neglecting the diverse and stratified identifications and categorisations occurring in social relations (Katzenelson 1973: 18, see also Ireland 1994, Wimmer 2007, 2009).

A greater awareness of the diversity of actors and categories has been presented by authors who have analysed patterns of immigrant claims making as part of a pluralist political model shaped by dominant political frameworks and modes of liberal democratic participation (Katzenelson 1973: 192, see also Cinalli and Giugni 2011, Ireland 1994, 2000, Koopmans and Statham 2000, Schmitter 1980, Waldinger 1989). In these studies, political responses to immigration and the political participation of immigrants themselves have been explained as due to the way that legal, political and administrative structures close or open opportunities for different claims-making dynamics.

An early example of this approach was Katzenelson’s study of race relations in immigration communities in the USA and the UK (1973). Unlike the studies of class above, Katzenelson was concerned with how race provided an extra dimension of stratification to the market and polity within a shared institutional framework. He examined the ‘racial linkages’ between black immigrant and white host communities across these divisions and argued that the lack of linkages was tied to distributions of power, enforced by established liberal democratic forms, rhetoric, and processes, which contributed to an institutional expression of racism (1973: 191-5). Thus, even when black citizens were given voting rights, these stable institutional arrangements ensured that the available choices in, and therefore the outcomes of, bargaining processes went unchanged (1973: 199). A similar conclusion was reached, twenty years later, by Ireland in his study of immigration in France and Switzerland, arguing that in these countries ‘each institutional context has produced its own evolving pattern of participatory forms and demands and, consequently, different types and
levels of impact’ (1994: 245). For Ireland, policy and administrative frameworks in education, housing, the labour market and social assistance, as well as the presence and actions of institutional gatekeepers such as trade unions, political parties and ‘solidarity groups’ (charities, human rights lobbies, etc) helped shape the level and form of political participation of immigrant groups (1994: 10). In the EU, Guiraudon’s study of a developing supranational immigration policy has also illustrated how the opening of opportunities for policy making and lobbying in the EU has allowed for interior ministries and security forces to pass restrictive immigration controls by ‘venue-shopping’ away from the restrictions of national judiciaries and publics (Guiraudon 2000).

Finally, these macro-level studies of identity discourses and political frameworks have been accompanied by micro-level studies of how citizenship legislation and immigrant integration policies constitute a system of rules and norms that provide the backdrop to the formal inclusion or exclusion of individuals from national communities, distinguishing between members and outsiders (Bauböck, 2006: 15, see also Colombo and Sciortino 2004a, Wiener 2003). In short, as noted by Schuck, ‘the law defines individual’s rights to property and economic activity, political participation, physical security, religious and cultural identity and family relationships’ (2000: 189). In this way, Cachón Rodríguez has argued, for example, that in Spain the integration (or lack thereof) of immigrants from less economically developed countries has been reliant on the legal conditions of entry and settlement that have seen them discriminated against in the labour market (2009). Yasemin Soysal has also argued that international rights regimes now assure the status and inclusion of immigrants across national borders, declaring the establishment of a post-national mode of citizenship (1994, 1996). It has since similarly been suggested by others that the political context’s influence on the mobilisation patterns of individual immigrants is ‘to be found not primarily in the overall institutionalized political system or in elites’ alignments, but rather in the citizenship rights that open or close their access to the national community’ (Cinalli and Giugni 2011: 44).

These pluralist models of political mobilisation in diverse discursive and institutional settings offer a more flexible framework for explaining the shape and form of the politics of immigration than the aforementioned studies of class. They accept that the social, political and cultural boundaries of immigrant inclusion and
exclusion are negotiated by a range of actors, and attempt to explain the shape these negotiations take by analysing the opportunity structures which enable political parties, interest groups or immigrant populations to come together as collective actors and effectively influence public debate and policy making processes (Koopmans and Statham 2000). Their point is, as noted by Bauböck et al, ‘to identity institutional incentives and disincentives that help to explain migrants’ political choices and strategies’ (2006: 66).

Nevertheless, although an analysis of institutional structures provides a useful perspective on which contextual factors facilitate mobilisation and, to a certain extent, how some actors gain greater leverage than others in public claims and decision making, it does not explain the choices made by these actors or the content of their claims. As with studies of class, they risk tending towards teleological conclusions, such as the assumption that the British philosophy of integration ‘is exemplified by the pragmatic concerns of toleration and the recognition of autonomy’ growing out of the philosophy of Mill, Locke and Hobbes (Favell 1998: 142), or that immigrants cannot ever influence public perceptions of their presence because they have less rights (Cachón Rodríguez 2009). Despite mentioning argument and debate, they do not show which actors are able to control the meaning of issues, nor whether the content of underlying public philosophies can change over time, or indeed why some arguments dominate over others (Carragee and Roafs 2004, Gillan 2008). They also do not explain the choice of meanings or account for how actors with a similar social, legal and political status articulate different political positions (Adamson 2011: 900 see also Dembinska 2012). In short, by focusing on the institutional structures *around* actors they do not concern themselves directly with the strategic choices of actors in constructing group identities.

**Introducing agency**

Following from the assessment of structural conditions above, this section will outline how agency can be brought into the analytical framework. The first part summarises studies focusing only on agency, highlighting the weakness of their
lacking inclusion of constraints and limitations on actor strategies and negotiation outcomes. This will be followed by outlining how actor choices and mobilisations can be structurally situated in discursive, political and legal settings.

Agency without limits: symbolic politics

A distinct approach to the study of the politics of identity and ethnic relations has grown from the work of communications studies academics who have aspired to unveil xenophobic, racist and prejudiced ways of talking and thinking in politics and society (Edelman 1967, Riesgl and Wodak 2000, van Dijk 1987, 1991, 2006, van Gorp 2005). This has developed from previous studies of symbolic politics which were concerned with the ability of interest-motivated individuals to present, define and manipulate the symbolic content of messages in front of their audiences (Edelman 1964). Such an approach claimed that political leaders enjoyed a great degree of freedom in determining the interpretations of their audience due to their access to power and knowledge, whilst audiences were essentially incapable of a rational understanding of events and issues (Ibid.: 27-8).

More recently, Teun A. van Dijk has been one of the leading contributors to this field, examining how language and discourse can be employed as markers of distinction between social in- and out-groups (1987: 47). For van Dijk, elites would tell publics how to think about out-groups by employing prejudiced and racist discourses; such discourses would emphasise negative out-group characteristics compared to positive in-group representations, establishing and maintaining power imbalances between them (1987: 61, 1991: 27). He has argued that elites have controlled this process because they have been able to reach the widest range of people through mass communications whilst benefitting from asymmetrical access to political, social, cultural, ideological and economic resources (1987: 367, 1991: 32). Such control of public interpretations of social relations constitutes elite power, which preserves the in-group’s superiority and reproduces the dominant ethnic consensus (1987: 359, 1991: 43). The public representation of social groups such as immigrants or racial or ethnic minorities should from this perspective be explained by the strategic actions of elites wishing to maintain material inequalities between groups.
The symbolic politics approach provides, nevertheless, a rather simplified view of political bargaining and claims-making. Firstly, it presents publics as generalised populations of weak and quiescent individuals, accepting blindly what they are told by elites. But in reality, elites cannot invent issue representations and meanings with absolute freedom; audiences actively interpret them and must find them understandable, relevant and recognisable in order to respond in the expected or desired way (Manin 1997: 218-230, see also Barth 1969, Goffman 1987 [1959]). Also, political elites are not usually the only actors to offer issue representations. Instead, a range of actors may compete for the salience of their perspective in public debate or in the policy process, from the press to administrative institutions, political parties and ‘solidarity groups’ (Freeman 1995, Ireland 1994, see also Chong and Druckmann 2007). Secondly, by explaining elites’ motivations as driven by maintaining an unbalanced access to all economic, political and symbolic resources, the symbolic politics approach does not account for how specific actors may strive for specific resources nor how their objectives may be better achieved by directing their attention at specific audiences rather than through appealing to a mass public (Boswell 2009, Boswell and Geddes 2011, Brunsson 1989). In short, the symbolic politics approach effectively describes how and by whom meanings are publicly defined, but has weak explanatory power when it comes to asking why choices are made.

_Agency as structurally situated: symbolic interactionism, fields and networks_

A more nuanced approach to the strategic presentation of issues and groups has grown out of the symbolic interactionist school, which arose in contrast to the objectivist structuralism of the early twentieth century. It was founded on the proposition that all meaning is socially negotiated (Baert 1998: 66-75). The self was therefore conceived as a social self, constituted through interaction by which it would be possible to adopt the attitudes of others and arrive at shared meanings for symbols (Ibid.: 68-9). All objects and symbols can have various meanings, but social patterns were understood to be reliant on repeated interpretations and reinforced references, expectations and actions, which actors could influence by drawing on previously reinforced extant frames of interpretation (Ibid.: 72-3). From a symbolic
interactionist perspective, the discursive structures outlined above therefore also constitute possible resources for mobilisation through interaction.

Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical understanding of interpersonal relations provided some of the early foundations for this approach (1987 [1959], 1986 [1974]). Goffman posited that individuals in interaction performed to each other and controlled their self-presentation according to the impression that they wished to give and their audience's expectations of consistency and coherence. He thus argued that self identity constituted an interactional, socially-mediated process which would be “‘socialized”, moulded, modified to fit into the understanding and the expectations of the society in which it [was] presented’ (1987: 37). From this view, an individual can be understood by their audience because there are commonly expected meanings attached to signs and symbols, such as certain actions, words or expressions. Moreover, for Goffman such expected commonalities and knowledge were not prescriptive but rather offered people the opportunity to intentionally create false impressions by altering their performance, implying that ‘Self, then, is not an entity half concealed behind events, but a changing formula for managing oneself during them’ (1986: 573, 1987: 69). The meaning of self identities was thus conceptualised as a mediation between what was known and what was presented, each conditioned by a performer’s and an audience’s prior knowledge, sources of information, and interpretations (1987: 13). As with Barth's interpretation of group boundary definition by ethnic entrepreneurs discussed in the previous chapter, Goffman’s performers did not therefore have absolute freedom to present themselves in any way that they wished. So, strategic manipulation of self-presentation is not unidirectional, but a constant and repeated process in which order, continuity and predictability are only possible when the tacit rules of the game are accepted by performer and audience alike (Giddens 2010 [1984]: 68-70).

This dramaturgical perspective of self presentation is also valid for groups. In this way, Goffman highlighted how it was possible for individuals to act together, forming a ‘team’. Teams were understood to be bound together by reciprocal dependency, which involved keeping in their roles in order to support each other, and reciprocal familiarity, which consisted of acting in a predictable way in order to preserve the coherence of the performance (1987: 88). Through such bonds of reciprocity, teams could build and maintain a working consensus on the meaning of
situations and identities (1987: 108). The notion of teams is in this way illustrative of how power relations can shape meanings and ‘how institutionalised context-setting shapes interaction and subjectivity’ (Jenkins 2008: 160). Rules, beliefs and expectations occupy a structural role that influences how individuals plan their actions, but they can at the same time also be changed by the outcome of actor performances. Indeed, it is the very existence of structure-like rules and expectations which presupposes and facilitates strategic action, and at the same time these actions are also interpreted by other individuals and can influence their expectations of future performances. For Goffman and others, changes in identities are therefore the result of shifting relationships in institutionalised contexts (Somers 1994: 626-7).

However, this theoretical framework remains analytically vague. Goffman does not explain how some teams impose themselves over others and it remains uncertain whether dominance is established through their quantitative (the number of members acting reciprocally) or qualitative (the content of their performance) characteristics. Also, the source of the meanings granted to symbols and performances appears uncertain and the association of meanings to contextual performances is often either assumed or given a magical quality. In this way, when arguing that ‘everyday activity provides an original against which copies of various kinds can be struck [... and] what the individual does in serious life, he does in relationship to cultural standards established for the doing and for the social role that is built up out of such doings’ (Goffman 1986 [1974]: 562), Goffman describes how changes in meaning occur in different contexts but not why some meanings are more salient than others in competitive situations.

The challenge therefore remains to incorporate dominance and power into this relational context of teamwork. Some of the most influential academic work in this vein has come from Pierre Bourdieu (Baert 1998, Bourdieu 2010 [1990], Brubaker 1985, Scholten 2011). For Bourdieu, the meaning of acts was inseparable from their practice and the context in which this arises. On the one hand, acts would occur because people made choices which could be (but were not necessarily) of a strategic or calculating character. On the other hand, moreover, these choices would be defined in relation to potentialities and expected outcomes which were in turn constituted through the accumulation of previously realised ends (2010: 53-55). From this perspective, action is informed and motivated by knowledge and
experience, but knowledge and experience are also products of previous actions which come to be seen as objective facts or common-sense. Bourdieu conceptualised this social practice as a balancing of the expectation of how things should happen and the reality of the way that they occur, describing it as ‘the site of the dialectic of the opus operatum and the modus operandi’ (2010: 52). The key to this overcoming of the structural and the individual is habitus, defined as;

‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures, predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends of an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them’ (2010: 53)

Habitus therefore occupies a role between routine and unreflexive custom, offering a potential for strategic action, but not requiring it; being enacted by and enacting the past, produced by and producing history. It is, in short, ‘an acquired system of generative schemes’ (2010: 55) or ‘a generative site of practices’ (Jenkins 2008b: 58), from which meanings are presented and perceived as objective and common-sense. This habitus, as with Goffman’s bridging of performance and the rules of the game of interaction, is provided for by consensus between actors on meanings and a constant reinforcement of these by their actions (Bourdieu 2010 [1990]: 58).

For Bourdieu, moreover, social practice was also structurally-situated. Relations and meanings would be situated in 'fields', in which actors with different access to goods or resources would compete to control situations. Resources are necessary for achieving this control and are therefore central to the use of power (Jenkins 2008: 159-162). These resources were defined by Bourdieu as capital, and included financial capital (money), social capital (who you know and how you are related to them), cultural capital (knowledge, education and cultural practices), and symbolic capital (social prestige and distinction) (Baert 1998: 31). The distribution of capital and the rules of the game manifested in dealings between actors were understood to be constitutive of a field as a set of structured social relations that were constantly at stake; changes in access to and use of capital within fields could result
in a restructuring of power relations and a renegotiation of the nature and boundaries of the field. In this sense Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social practice was composed of the relations between agents with different access to resources who act on and constitute a general, consensual meaning or *habitus*. Power is therefore relational.

A similar perspective has been provided by Castells' understanding of networks which are, as with fields and teams, marked by power relationships (Castells 2009, 2010 [1997]). As expressed by Castells, a network society is not composed of rigid stable arrangements of resources and opportunities, but constitutes itself as a dynamic, shifting structure of interrelations (2009). In this context meanings can be constructed by a range of actors who benefit from the social relations of networks by

> ‘using both horizontal communication networks and mainstream media to convey their images and messages [...] to increase their chances of enacting social and political change – even if they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, financial resources or symbolic legitimacy’ (2009: 302).

Networks are sets of interconnected nodes, the functioning and meaning of which depend on the general pattern of their relationships with other nodes and the wider network (2009: 19-20). Nodes increase their relevance by absorbing information and processing it effectively to other nodes. Connections need not be material, but can represent agreement on opinions and underlying beliefs and principles held by individuals. A high level of *connectedness* between nodes is representative of a working consensus between them (Diani and Bison 2004). However, not all connections are effective at establishing consensus and a dominant perspective. In this way Sinclair has evidenced how the global economy revolves around specific embedded knowledge networks, epitomised by bond-rating agencies (2000). Pilati has also shown how certain immigrant organisational affiliations and coalitions provide resources for political participation, but that links with autochthonous organisations are more relevant than links with immigrant ones for group mobilisation (2010, 2012). The spread of material resources, such as financial capital, among interconnected actors thus depends on their social capital and their
relative position within the wider structure of the network. Power is here, again, a relational capacity to influence others via the construction and communication of meanings in ways that favour an empowered actor’s will, interests and values (Castells 2009: 10).

So, in summary, the analysis of groups and group identities must enquire as to the construction of meaning by individuals who adapt to their structural setting. This setting is in turn characterised by frameworks of meaning (discursive structures), institutions and the distribution of material, symbolic and social or ‘network’ resources. Dominant perceptions of groups are premised on a formal or informal consensus concerning self-identifications and other-categorisations. Changes in meanings can be brought about by actors who adapt to their circumstances and by alterations to the balance of structural relations between actors, caused by new configurations of resources and/or institutions (Scholten 2011: 54). For Goffman, power lay in the reciprocal understandings of the tacit rules of interaction in their situation that would enable a team to maintain a working consensus in front of others. Bourdieu was more precise and argued that the study of collective identity required an empirical analysis of the distribution of types of capital, which defined the structural conditions of the field, and the assumptions and knowledge which would constitute their habitus. Finally, for Castells the dominance of a specific perspective or identity construction is the result of negotiations between actors, which are ordered by power relations in networks of communication. In all three of these theories, structurally-situated actors employ resources in order to control meanings. In this way, inter-actor connections delimit practical opportunities for material, social or symbolic exchange, which shape people’s ideas, identities and social representations (Diani 2000). In teams, fields and networks the power to control interpretations of issues and identities is therefore not a quality of one elite actor or a necessary product of structural contexts, but lies in the establishment of reciprocal modes of representing social reality in the claims made by actors who rely on and compete for a distribution of resources.
Explaining structurally-situated actor strategies

The approach outlined above provides the groundwork for an analysis of the mechanisms and contextual practices of negotiating meanings that can explain the perception of groups as bounded, unitary social objects (see also Bourdieu 2010 [1990], Brubaker 2004, Jenkins 1997, 2008, Loveman 1999, Wacquant 1997, Wimmer 2007, 2008, 2009, Zimmer 2003). Understood this way, the negotiation of groups and the boundaries between them thus constitutes a classificatory struggle in which, as noted by Wimmer, actors attempt to make their perspective of who belongs and who does not ‘generally accepted and consequential for everyday life’ (2007: 11-2). This struggle is driven by ‘ideal and material motivations’ (Loveman 1999: 896-7) as part of a broader competition for power and prestige (Wimmer 2007: 11), whilst being at the same time shaped by an actor’s strategic choices and access to material, social and cultural resources (Bourdieu 2010 [1990]: 53-55). However, to be able to explain the strategies of these actors we require an awareness of what is being done by them. This is the topic of this section.

A body of research that has been concerned specifically with how and why actors construct immigration in certain ways comes from the security studies literature. These authors have examined the definition of an existential threat in the form of immigration and how this has been facilitated by different institutional settings and policy making rationales (Angelescu 2008, Buonfino 2004, Buzan et al 1998, Collyer 2006, Feldman 2012, Huysmans 2000, 2006, Huysmans and Buonfino 2008). These texts fit into a wider body of security studies which consider that the state's military security function has become diversified and dispersed throughout society as crime-fighting (for example Andreas and Price 2001, Bigo 2005, Rumford 2006, 2009).

In these studies the construction of immigration as an existential threat has been due to its discursive representation by political and administration leaders as a challenge to ‘the continuation of political identity and the autonomy of the political unit to modulate itself as a free space of freedom’ (Huysmans 2006: 61). Immigration is thus constructed as a politicised phenomenon that is not a threat for what it is, but for what it represents, motivated by an expansion of state control of population movements (Buonfino 2004: 28). In this way, Huysmans’ study of the
EU claims that immigration has provided an effective meta-narrative, ‘through which functionally differentiated policy problems, such as identity control and visa policy, asylum applications, integration of immigrants, distribution of social entitlements and the management of cultural diversity are connected’ (2000: 770). This is facilitated by an institutional framework dominated by Home Affairs ministries and transnational police networks, as well as some national governments, mass media and far-right political parties which connect these issues and promote security responses to them (Ibid.: 758). In the same way, Buonfino has argued that a security discourse on immigration in Europe has become hegemonic due to being propagated by the mass media which has defined immigration as a contentious issue (2004: 29). Finally, Feldman has also stated that a definition of immigrants as a threat underpins the actions of ministries and agencies which are all driven towards objectifying the immigrant and controlling its movement (2012: 10-20). This increased control enables states to provide economic interests with a predictable supply of labour whilst satisfying nationalist public opinion that they are restricting the access of undesirable outsiders (Ibid.: 9-10).

However, in focusing only on security responses this approach has been criticised for adopting a limited understanding of actor rationality, due to considering that the driving motivation of political actors is always to maximise control (Boswell 2009: 36-40). Yet they may be motivated by other objectives, such as efficiency or values such as solidarity and a sense of responsibility towards others. Indeed, this narrow rationality means that despite understanding politics as a pluralistic negotiation, the securitisation approach cannot explain why migration entry policies are sometimes permissive rather than controlling, why states do decide to grant foreigners rights or why there may exist a significant gap between declared objectives of control and quite distinct policy outputs (Joppke 1998b, Hollifield 2004, McMahon 2012) This is particularly the case in Italy and Spain where debate on immigration seems at times to be quite separate from the policy decisions that are taken, defined by other authors as the ambiguity of migration policy making in these countries (Andall 2007, Bastien 2009, Geddes 2008b, Zincone 1998).

A more flexible approach has been presented by studies of interest groups (Freeman 1995, 2004, Freeman and Kessler 2008). These understand immigration policies as determined by state actors who are vote-maximisers who respond to
pressure groups in order to gain their support. According to this view, the politics of immigration can therefore be explained by analysing who wins and who loses from policy decisions. For Freeman, the likelihood of mobilisation is dependent on the spread of costs and benefits; immigration causes concentrated benefits, usually for business interests, and diffuse costs that develop over extended periods of time, such as pressure on public services (1995: 885-6). On the one hand, these diffuse costs, combined with a lack of accurate information, curb the organisation of individual voters on the immigration issue (1995: 883). On the other hand, concentrated benefits strongly incentivise organised groups, such as business leaders with a demand for foreign labour, to pressure governments (1995: 885). At the same time, Freeman suggests that a 'strong antipopulist norm' urges politicians not to exploit racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears in order to win votes, thus minimising the public salience of immigration in public debate (1995: 885). The outcome in this context is a tendency towards client politics whereby well organised interest groups with close working relationships with state officials negotiate and determine policies largely out of public view, explaining why immigration policies are often more liberal than public opinion (1995: 886).

Freeman’s interest group analysis offers a way to bring an understanding of how individuals and groups act and engage in collective behaviour into an awareness of the structural context of immigration policy making. In this plural model combining the preferences of individual voters, organised groups and state actors we find a more refined framework than the securitisation literature; rather than assuming that control and restriction of immigration are the only possible outcome of policy decisions, it is accepted that different actors have varying incentives and opportunities to mobilise around immigration issues (Freeman 1995, 2004, Freeman and Kessler 2008). This could result in four modes of politics: client, interest group, majoritarian or entrepreneurial (see figure 2). Any interest group-based explanation of responses and policy decisions in immigration politics must therefore examine the issue positions taken by organised groups such as labour unions and employer federations and the outcome of who wins and who loses from decisions.
However, despite these benefits, the interest group approach does not provide a clear image of the whole process of the politics of immigration. Firstly, it adopts a weak range of possible costs and benefits, limited primarily to economic factors (see for example Freeman and Kessler 2008). Nevertheless, organised groups may mobilise around distinct factors, such as a perceived challenge to national identity (as is the case of many right-wing populist politicians, see Betz 1998, Cutts et al 2011, Golder 2003, Mudde 2000, Rydgren 2008) or a moral claim for universal inclusion and equality (as is the case of some NGOs, pro-migrant lobbies and charities). Secondly, although the interest group approach has strong explanatory power it does not allow for an understanding of how groups organise and mobilise. This is because their preferences are taken as given and unchanging and the structural context as fixed. In this way, Freeman has highlighted an anti-populist norm and outlined different possible modes of politics but not shown how change
may occur and result in the introduction of populist, xenophobic and anti-immigrant responses to immigration or cause a shift from one mode of politics to another. As will be shown in the case studies of this thesis, preferences on immigration are not always related to the material costs and benefits of the phenomenon itself, while the capacity of different groups to become influential on immigration is often contingent on the choices that they make to adapt to their structural context; it is the interpretation of the possible costs and benefits of immigration that drive responses.

Two further approaches offer more nuanced models that specifically focus on the specific interactions and choices of actors. These can be summarised as social movement studies and institutional-systems theory ones.

Studies of social movements have strived to understand ‘the interaction processes through which actors with different identities and orientations come to elaborate a shared system of beliefs and sense of belonging, which exceeds by far the boundaries of any single group or organization’ (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 17, see also Eyerman and Jamison 1991, Tarrow 1998). They are therefore interested in explaining how consensus is reached between actors and for what political purposes. This literature has been highly influenced by Goffman’s later work, in particular the presentation of identities via a ‘framework’ that constitutes a ‘schemata of interpretation’ responsible for ‘rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful [... allowing] its user to locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms’ (1986: 21). Social movements undertake a process of framing or frame production in order to bring actors together around similar interpretations of the presence, causes and resolutions to social problems (see for example Benford 1993, Gamson et al 1992, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Snow et al 1986).

Frame choices can be explained by a combination of strategies, depending on the nature of the social movement itself and the audience that they are attempting to reach. Koopmans and Statham have in this way argued that the likelihood of success of political demands depends not only on the opportunities for gaining visibility but on an argument’s resonance in the public sphere and the establishment of an actor’s legitimacy through alliances with other actors (2000: 37). These processes have been defined by Snow et al in their seminal article as ‘frame alignment’ (1986, see also Benford 1993). Frame alignment is vital for developing correspondence between the
interpretive orientations of social movement organisations, members and potential participants (Benford 1993: 679). On the one hand, actors must establish consensus with their allies in order to put forward a shared, cohesive and coherent interpretation of the topic. This consensus ensures that different acts and events can be perceived as part of a longer lasting, consistent action, establishing networks of solidarity (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 16-9, Diani and Bison 2004: 284). It also ensures that their potentially conflicting interests, values, beliefs, actions and goals are made congruent and complimentary (Benford 1993: 679, Snow et al 1986: 464). The establishment of linkages with partners in this way legitimises and empowers actors within movements.

On the other hand, moreover, they must also present their message in such a way as to be viewed as legitimate by and achieve consensus with their target audience. Yet because audiences are active interpreters of social issues this involves choosing frames that resonate with their expectations, beliefs and narratives. In short, ‘claims that are congruent with the personal or everyday experiences of the target audience are more likely to attract and hold their attention and to resonate [...] they must also correspond with the target’s cultural narrations – the stories, myths and folk tales of their culture’ (Benford 1993: 693).

Actors thus put forward a symbolic framing of the issue at hand from a ‘cultural reservoir’ which allows it to be read and identified by other actors within a wider framework of their own values, discourses, and beliefs (Tarrow 1998: 110-2). Framing strategies therefore facilitate connections to be made between issue alignments and actor orientations that establish consensus with relevant partners and audiences (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 16, Diani and Bison 2004: 284, see also Benford 1993, Gamson et al 1992, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Snow et al 1986). In this way framing an issue constitutes a mobilisation strategy that enables actors to adapt to the discursive opportunity structure in which they are set.

A large body of studies has illustrated how movement actors mobilise by aligning with, or distinguishing themselves from, prevalent ideas, political cultures and dominant cleavages according to their intended partnerships and audiences. For
example, Diani has claimed that the relative (in)stability of social cleavages in Italy in the early 1990s provided the opportunity for Northern political movements to align with an anti-system dominant discourse prevalent at the time (1996), whilst Kessler and Freeman’s study of right wing populist political entrepreneurs in Austria and Belgium who successfully exploited cleavage structures by tying large-scale immigration and economic hardship to political disaffection to win votes (2005). Dembinska has claimed that actors in Poland adapted their mobilisation strategies according to state laws and institutional settings such as minority recognition and citizenship policies (2012), whilst Diani and Bison have also illustrated how connections between actors in local social movements in the UK enabled them to be weaved into broader, encompassing narratives and consensual, shared interpretations of the world (2004: 284-5). These examples illustrate clearly how actors’ framing strategies are aimed at adapting to institutional and discursive opportunities in order to gain recognition and support from partners and audiences. In doing so, they employ symbolic resources to build the social capital necessary to establish consensus and control the meaning of the issue at stake, whilst their choice of frame depends on the accessibility and the perceived expectations of the potential partners and the audience.

Similarly, studies of policy making from an institutionalist and systems theory perspective have put forward an approach underlining the importance of consensus-building between different actors (Boswell 2007, 2009, 2011, Boswell and Geddes 2011, Boswell et al 2011, Brunsson 1989, Geddes 2008a, Scholten 2011, Zapata-Barrero 2012). According to this approach, states are not unitary actors in decision making but are in reality composed of and linked with diverse ministries, departments, interest groups, political parties, and so on. The objective of these actors is to gain legitimacy by defining the social problem at stake and proposing its most appropriate solution, but unlike the securitisation approach above, they operate according to diverse logics and rationalities. This is because, as with social movements, they represent and gain legitimacy from a range of different audiences according to their structural position. In this way, a high ranking civil servant motivated by efficiency and meeting targets will not necessarily interpret or present issues in the same way as elected representatives who are being held accountable to the public. These actors define problems and potential resolutions in varying ways
that balance their own objectives with the perceived and real structural opportunities for action within their legal, institutional and organisational contexts. In this balancing act, traditions of thought and predominant paradigms also influence how issues are seen and perceptions of what constitutes an appropriate and legitimate response (Boswell et al 2011: 1-2). Discrepancies can therefore arise between definitions of the problem and the implementation of responses as actors interpret their structural settings in differing ways and adopt varying logics of action, with the result that policy measures do not necessarily match the content of the dominant discourse on the issue (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 71-5, see also Andall 2007, Brunsson 1989, Zincone 1998).

In particular, Boswell’s work on the expert use of knowledge sets out a comprehensive framework to explain why certain perspectives on issues are (or are not) given relevance in policy making (2009). She has analysed why politicians and civil servants commission research and what influences the way that this knowledge is used in the policy process. As with social movements, Boswell argues that political organisations use knowledge to develop shared norms and beliefs on certain issues and secure legitimacy and support from relevant others (2009: 11). She outlines three possible functions of this use of knowledge; an instrumental one in which it informs policy measures in order to achieve efficient outputs, a legitimising function that is directed at dissemination and the presentation of political perspectives as appropriate for the problem at hand, and a substantiating function that is employed to justify policy preferences and choices (2009: 86-8). Central to each of these is the use of knowledge for strategic purposes; on the one hand, it is directed at a search for internal consensus and legitimacy among partners in order to establish a shared, consistent approach (2009: 40), which is balanced, on the other hand with attempts to garner external legitimacy beyond the organisation in times when access to further resources may be required (2009: 43). In this way, political actors adapt to the opportunities and expectations in the structural context in order to build linkages with relevant others when negotiating issue meanings.

The way that organisations such as political parties, administrations, trade unions, and so on make public claims utilising their knowledge of certain issues is therefore dependent to a large degree on its organisational structure and relative position of power. For example, a catch-all political party with stable economic
resources and strong internal discipline may be concerned with using information as a legitimising tool to build support from public opinion and the mass media, whereas a smaller party in an unstable coalition with ideologically dissimilar partners is more likely to use knowledge in its substantiating function in order to build and maintain support from within its own coalition's ranks. In this way, Lahav has noted, for example, how party positions on immigration in the European Parliament can be influenced by internal ideological variations and beliefs between members of party groupings, hinting at variations in the dynamics of unitary parties and fragmentary coalitions (2004: 368). As noted by Boswell, this may be achieved by mimicking another norm-exporting body or by being coercively pushed into line, such as having to follow laws governing public debate (Boswell 2009: 67-8). Similarly, Adamson has critically examined the way that the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahir have both strategically deployed the category of ‘Muslim’ in order to create ‘a constructed constituency that transcends other ethnic, national or sectarian identities’ that positions each of them differently in relation to the liberal state: whereas the former sees no contradiction between Muslim and British identities and has historically close connections to the British political establishment, the latter is a global organisation which denounces existing political systems and seeks support and legitimacy from young second and third generation Muslims (2011: 901, 908-11). Thus the politicised category of ‘Muslim’ is constructed with different meanings according to the diverse objectives and strategic adaptations of actors to their structural setting and intended audience.

In summary, in explanations of responses to immigration it is important to highlight the balancing act of internal and external dimensions of seeking support and legitimacy. Identity claims can achieve this in two significant ways; firstly, they can define the presence of immigrants as a meta-issue, which apparently causes wider social issues or problems. By offering to resolve these problems they establish linkages with the concerns of potential audiences. In this way, for example, Rydgren has noted that framing immigration and social tensions together creates a perceived link that is important in mobilising electoral support for radical right-wing parties, employing the category of ‘immigrants’ as a resource for giving other issues saliency (2008). Secondly, identity claims can also be part of a process of boundary-making, promoting a sense of commonality and unity with partners and difference with
outsiders. This involves establishing consensus on a group identification or categorisation of different others. In this case, by defining boundaries between groups an actor can align themselves positively with the perceived character of their intended partners or supporters and distinguish themselves negatively from that of outsiders. Both meta-issue and boundary-making strategies are aimed at establishing consensus around the meaning of an issue or identity and building linkages with specific audiences.

**A three dimensional de-ethnicized research framework**

As noted in the previous chapters, in light of this framework the focus of the analysis of this thesis becomes 'the negotiations between immigrants and nationals as well as the various corporate actors, including state agencies, that have a stake in the outcome of these struggles over the boundaries of belonging' (Wimmer 2007: 19). The previous sections have outlined an abstract analytical approach for explaining claims to 'who is who' regarding Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain. This is intended to achieve that proposed by Wimmer when he calls for a 'de-ethnicized' research framework for the study of immigration and ethnicity (2007, 2009). The remainder of this chapter sets out the specific research methods to be employed in this framework.

In chapter two, quantitative studies of group resources and statuses, on the one hand, and surveys of personal attachment to identity categories on the other, were summarised and criticised for falling short of being able to adequately uncover the negotiation process of claims to groupness and boundary-making. This was because they followed a tendency towards groupism and ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck 2005: 43-50) by taking for granted the existence, *a priori*, of ethnic groups and national identities (Malesevic 2011: 274, see also Wimmer 2007, 2009).

The alternative that has been suggested in this chapter requires a focus on the claims making strategies of actors who are situated in discursive and institutional structural settings and a certain distribution of resources. A similar framework is Scholten’s analysis of the research-policy network in the Netherlands which
employed a combination of a constructivist view on social structures, such as scientific knowledge production and policymaking, with a structural perspective on the negotiation of the problem of immigrant integration (2011:32). In doing so, Scholten used a frame analysis of the way that actors made sense of research-policy relations in social practices and an examination of how these practices influenced their interpretation of problem situations in specific structural settings (2011: 58). The end result was an empirical reconstruction of how actors produced and reproduced knowledge fields through their social practices. This took three stages; Scholten firstly uncovered the historical emergence and change over time of integration frames in Dutch research and policy (discursive structure). Secondly, he analysed the individual perspectives of researchers and policy makers (framing strategies) and how they defined their relationships to each other (social capital and network strategies), asking how actors’ positions provide an explanation for their definition of relations. Thirdly, he examined the structural configurations between research and policy fields (institutional structures) and how these may have contributed to the rise or fall of specific frames (2011: 63-4). The result illustrated how problems were framed against the background of structural settings (2011: 65).

Wimmer has also argued that the study of boundary-making processes must combine an analysis of the content of specific discourses through which claims to group identification and categorisation are made with an awareness of the wider frameworks of meaning in which these claims are embedded. It must also, moreover, combine this with an assessment of the strategic objectives of actors and their relative structural positioning regarding the distribution of resources and power. He suggests a research design covering; firstly, institutional rules and how they ‘provide incentives to pursue certain types of boundary-making strategies rather than others’ (2007: 19); secondly, the distribution of resources and how this affects the capacity of actors ‘to have their mode of categorization respected if not accepted, make their strategies of social closure consequential for others, and have their identity be recognized as relevant and worthy of recognition’ (Ibid.); and thirdly, the arrangement of political networks and strategies of networking within them (Ibid).

The research framework for this thesis draws on these examples and the theoretical studies of this and the previous chapters. It is concerned with how actors attempt to build consensus around a framing of Romanian immigration by adapting
to and shaping institutional and discursive structures, on the one hand, and the distribution of resources, on the other. This can be envisaged as shown in figure 3. By institutional and discursive structures, the design refers to political frameworks (the relative position of political parties, trade unions, solidarity groups, etc), legal and policy frameworks (rights of citizenship), and dominant cleavages and discourses on immigration (public philosophies, and so on). By resources the model refers to types of capital; financial, social (connections with other actors) and symbolic (symbols, prestige and access to communications channels). Finally, actor strategies can be delineated as frame alignment and consensus-building through defining meta-issues and group or coalition boundaries.

Figure 3. A de-ethnicized research design for studying identity (inspired in King and Mai 2004, Wimmer 2007)
In this model, actors can be described as structurally-situated within open or closed institutional and discursive opportunity structures, on one side, and a concentrated or diffuse distribution of material, symbolic and network resources (financial, cultural and social capital) on the other. Where there are concentrated resources of financial and social capital for only autochthonous NGOs and dominant catch-all political parties, stable cleavages around each of their political ideologies and a lack of funding for forming associations or political parties, a reduced range of voices are likely to have access to public debate. In this context, if there are strong links between the catch-all parties and well organised interest groups, client politics will dominate and immigration will be likely to be taken off the agenda. Where there are open institutional structures, such as state-sponsored participatory channels or representative boards for immigrants and individual rights to voting and association, combined with a diffuse and equal spread of material resources, such as funding, access to mass media and connections to other actors in federations, mobilisation is more likely to be successful for immigrant associations. However, if there is also fragmented competition among many political parties and disagreement on the dominant cleavages shaping debate on immigration then these may align their view with the interests and concerns of the voting native population in order to attract votes and emphasise difference from their competitors.

The empirical material for this study has been gathered from a range of varied sources and examines the period from 1989, following the end of the Communist regime, to 2009/10. These include; parliamentary debates from Italy’s Camera dei Deputati and Spain’s Congreso de los Diputados between the years 1989 and 2008, when the latest complete legislature in both Italy and Spain ended (at the time of this research being carried out); political party manifestos and electoral material; public opinion surveys; press reporting from the national and local editions of daily newspapers (El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razón in Spain and Il Messaggero, Il Giornale, Corriere della Sera, and La Repubblica in Italy); policy documents and event archives of local authorities, trade unions and non-governmental or charity organisations; voter turnout and candidates of native and Romanian origin in local elections; content of websites, message boards and public conferences of Romanian cultural associations and political parties; and in-depth and
semi-structured interviews with local politicians and the leaders of key Romanian cultural associations.

The analysis of this wide range of empirical material ensured that different aspects of processes of identification and categorisation were revealed. In this way, qualitative analysis of political discourse, policy documents, press reporting, public opinion surveys and observations at public events, interviews and analysis of association websites reflect how Romanian immigrants are categorised and how Romanian actors identify themselves and the population they claim to represent. At the same time, quantitative data on references to Romanian representatives in the press, the existence of Romanian cultural associations and political parties and Romanian voter turnout and candidacies in local elections offer a reflection of the structural relations and connectedness among political actors and the wider population. The objective has been to collect data enabling an awareness of the presence of diverse and varied actors engaged in negotiating what it means to be a Romanian immigrant in Italy and Spain as well as their mobilisation strategies, the content of their frames and the material and ideological connections between them. Romanian identities are thus analysed in relation to varied social and political issues as well as shared identifications (Cherti 2008: 57, Diani and Bison 2004: 289-90, Weller 2010: 874).

The textual material has been qualitatively codified using a framing methodology. For Goffman interpretive frames are composed of knowledge of an event which has happened (a ‘primary framework’), a reflection on and interpretation of the event by an individual (a ‘key’), and an end-motivated strategic performance which attempts to promote consensus on an interpretation (transformative ‘rekeying’ and ‘fabrication’), but the success of which depends on the frames' links to others’ beliefs and values (the ‘anchoring’ of meaning). Since Goffman’s work, frame analysis has become a ubiquitous methodology across the social sciences. In communications studies, researchers have often determined explicit and implicit textual meanings through identifying and describing the content of frames (Borah 2011, Entman 1993, Matthes and Kohring 2008). In this field, Entman has comprehensively delimited the components of a frame and thus provided a methodological outline which can produce comparable results between cases (Entman 1993, see also Borah 2011, Matthes and Kohring 2008, Nickels 2008, van
Gorp 2005). He concisely stated that ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation’ (1993: 52). Despite a different vocabulary, this is similar to Goffman's original definition. In the analysis that follows, a frame will therefore be delimited as four elements: defining a problem, assigning responsibility, passing a moral judgement and reaching a possible solution.

The questions for codifying the data are shown in figure 4 below. These questions structured the analysis, meaning that the frames were codified deductively from the text through repeated readings rather than being imposed by the analyst.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Frame element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How are Romanian nationals defined?</td>
<td>Problem or issue definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the issue surrounding Romanian nationals?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the reasons for this issue arising?</td>
<td>Problem diagnosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is responsible for this issue?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the social implications of this issue?</td>
<td>Moral evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the legal implications?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the moral implications?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How should the response to this issue be?</td>
<td>Treatment recommendation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Codifying frames
Once the frames were uncovered, they were grouped into general categories of 'threat' or 'victim' frames, according to their portrayal of Romanian immigration. Limiting the frame to these two categories has inevitably simplified the complex negotiations that occurred in both countries, yet at the same time it has also enabled distinct arguments and issue discussions to be compared and general patterns to be found within and across the countries, thereby allowing the development of responses to be traced and compared over time and across the national, local and cross-border dimensions of this study. Within these broad categories there were contained variations regarding the problem diagnosis or proposed resolution, reflecting the way that immigration could be employed as a meta-issue, as well as providing a clear illustration of how the meaning of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain is inseparable from the wider social context and the pertinent social and political concerns of the time. It is hoped that this simplification may also provide an opportunity for comparison with other case studies at a later date.

In each of the three dimensions of this study, the frame analysis will be accompanied by an assessment of how linkages and ties have formed around the consensual perspectives of different actors. At the same time, this will be situated within an examination of the broader structural setting in which the negotiations of 'who is who' have occurred. This entails an outline of the development over time of national, local and cross-border discourses and institutional structures to respond to immigration and how these have facilitated or complicated the provision of resources and opportunities for mobilisation of the relevant actors.

**Conclusion**

The objective of this chapter has been to outline a framework to explain claims to group identification and categorisation and illustrate which methods will be used to analyse them in this thesis. Reviewing previous studies of the responses to immigration and the politics of ethnic relations, it has illustrated how studies have frequently concentrated on the structural conditions of class, ideas and conceptions of nationhood and institutional channels as drivers of particular forms of political relations and outcomes, with relatively little awareness of the role of agency. By
defining a framework based on an analysis of the mobilisation strategies that actors employ within structural settings characterised by institutional and discursive opportunity structures and with a specific distribution of material, symbolic and network resources (financial, symbolic and social capital), the chapter has presented an approach that views the actor-driven construction of meaning as embedded in relations of power. This is aimed at permitting the observation and explanation of consensus regarding the meaning of being a Romanian immigrant in contemporary Italy and Spain.

Consequently, the design outlined here has aimed to bring an awareness of actor agency into structural analyses. Conceiving of claims as embedded in frameworks of meaning and actors as situated in fields or networks has provided an opportunity to see how actor strategies adapt to, and are a constitutive part of, social and political structures. These actors are essentially understood to be legitimacy-seekers who select different framing strategies of immigration in accordance with their intended audience, from other political parties in a coalition to the possible voters or institutional gatekeepers who provide access to symbolic, financial and social resources. Strategies of framing immigration as a meta-issue and as a mechanism of boundary-definition have been outlined as central elements of this process of legitimacy-seeking that follows diverse logics depending on the audience and intention of the actor.

The politics of Romanian immigration is thus understood as a complex field in which diverse actors negotiate a range of issues from varying perspectives according to their interpretations and their interests. These strategies and structures will be further illustrated throughout the following chapters.
SECTION TWO

Empirical analysis:

The politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain
Chapter 4

The Structural Context of Romanian Immigration to Italy and Spain

The previous three chapters have set out, respectively, the research question, conceptual background and explanatory framework of this project. It has been asked why responses to Romanian immigration have been so different in Italy and Spain despite similarities in these two contexts and it has been proposed that the explanation lies in an analysis of the political claims-making by which the meaning of being a Romanian national is negotiated and defined. The previous chapter proposed to bring agency into structural explanations of this process and outlined a three-dimensional framework for the analysis, covering the institutional and discursive structural setting in which claims are presented, the distribution of resources which determines the relative power of each actor, and the strategic mobilisation and adaptation of actors to these structural conditions. The objective is to uncover how legitimacy-seeking actors speak to different audiences and adapt their framing strategies accordingly in order to build consensus around their perspective.

This chapter is concerned with the legal and policy context in which Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain has occurred. Laws and policies represent a central part of the institutional opportunity structure for immigrants’ social integration and political participation; they constitute a system of rules and norms which outline the rights of individuals and provide the backdrop to their formal inclusion or exclusion in the polity (Bauböck 2006, Colombo and Sciortino 2004a, Wiener 2003). As noted by Schuck, ‘the law defines individual’s rights to property and economic activity, political participation, physical security, religious and cultural identity and family relationships’ (2000:189). Laws and policies achieve this by categorising individuals according to criteria such as nationality, employment sector, length of residence, gender, economic standing and so on, and grant each category
distinct rights. Through these provisions legislation thus also defines who is who and what their status is in social, political and economic aspects. Citizenship laws and immigrant integration policies therefore constitute a central way of institutionalising differences between citizens and aliens or insiders and outsiders, thereby defining the social boundaries of citizenship (Bauböck 2006, Brubaker 1992, Borkert and Caponio 2010).

The chapter will outline the historical development of immigration laws and policies in Italy and Spain, examining how they have defined the status of Romanian nationals and provided opportunities for (or constraints against) social integration and political mobilisation. Accordingly, this chapter asks: what is the legal status of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain and what rights do they enjoy? What has been the development of policies and institutions for immigrant integration? What are the logics and beliefs that underpin these measures? How has the granting of rights of citizenship of the European Union affected this status?

The first section of this chapter will outline the field of study by summarising the academic literature on immigrant integration measures and citizenship laws and policies, illustrating how these determine the status of immigrants by categorising them and granting or denying certain rights. The second section outlines a range of commonalities and differences between Italian and Spanish experiences of immigration as part of the Southern European model of migration. The third section will ask how these laws and policies have influenced the status and incorporation dynamics of the Romanian populations in these countries and introduce the EU dimension, illustrating how the establishment of a supranational citizenship regime for the EU has added an extra layer in the stratification of citizen statuses for these ‘new Europeans’, but not led directly to a status of equality of membership. This is followed, finally, by some conclusions and implications for the remainder of this thesis.

**Boundary-defining through laws, policies and institutions**

As noted above, immigration laws and policies define the legal and social boundaries of citizenship. The contemporary definition of citizenship has typically been
understood according to T.H Marshall’s seminal text from 1950, in which he argued that ‘there is a kind of basic human equality associated with the concept of full membership of a community’ (Marshall 1992 [1950]: 7). For Marshall, the notion of citizenship as equality between community members signified the sharing of civil, political and social rights, and the expectation that each citizen fulfil certain duties and responsibilities. Its expansion to all members of a population corresponded with industrialisation and increasing social mobility, during which the rigidities of the class system would no longer be able to dictate the role and status of individuals in society. Freedom from the class system would imply the formation of a community of citizens.

Emerging from this conceptualisation there are two understandings of citizenship. One is a broad, inclusive notion of equality and inclusion between members of a political community; the other is a narrow, exclusive definition as a formal legal status of membership to a specific polity (Bauböck 2010: 847; Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 353). The status of immigrants lies at this juncture between the exclusive legal category of the citizen and a normative status of equality, revealing states to be ‘inclusionary and democratic to the inside [...] but] necessarily exclusionary and undemocratic to the outside, rocks of facticity that defy universal justice and human rights’ (Joppke 1999: 2). By distinguishing between individuals who qualify for membership and those that do not, laws and policies mark a form of social closure that is premised on distinguishing between members and aliens; insiders and outsiders (Brubaker 1992, Colombo and Sciortino 2004a, Wiener 2003). Furthermore, by setting out who is eligible for rights to property and economic activity, political participation, physical security, religious and cultural identity and family relationships, laws and policies also facilitate or restrict opportunities for equality and thus outline the social boundaries of membership of the polity (Bauböck 2006: 15, see also Borkert and Caponio 2011, Schuck 2000).

Yet there has been much debate regarding the limits and boundaries of citizenship. On the one hand, it has been claimed that the political community is, or should be, tied to the cultural idea and political and territorial limits of a nation state (Brubaker 1992, Schnapper 1998, Smith 1991). Following this argument, states ensure equality for all those defined as citizens whilst marking a distinction with noncitizens. This in turn projects a differential mark of identity, tying an idea of
national belonging to the legal definition of the citizen (Kivisto and Faist 2007: 16). On the other hand, it is argued that international rights regimes, notions of universal human rights and the emergence of multi-level polities such as the EU mean that states are no longer the exclusive deciders of the status of individuals (Sassen 1996, 2006, Soysal 1994, 1996). At the same time, sub-state identity groups stake claims to self-determination and argue that the boundaries of nations are no longer conterminous with those of states (Guibernau 2007), and many regional and local administrations increasingly have flexibility over the provision of opportunities for political participation and discretion in determining access to social services (Borkert and Caponio 2010). These calls for a post-national citizenship suggest that the bond between nation and state has been historically contingent and reveal tension between citizenship’s role as a formal, bounded legal category of equal membership and its value as a normative project of inclusion (Sassen 2006: 290).

Subsequent studies of the EU have, however, questioned the dichotomy between national and post-national models (Bauböck 2010, Bauböck and Guiraudon 2009, Faist 2001, Keating 2009). Whilst it is clear that for nationals of EU Member States some rights, in particular those to free movement and non-discrimination, are now defined and protected supranationally by the EU, it is not certain that the state has lost control. Indeed, it continues to be the case that Member State governments can deport foreigners, restrict enfranchisement and add requirements in education or housing that may disadvantage non-native residents. Public discourses of identity and belonging also typically continue to be fuelled by historical conceptions of nationhood and directed at justifying welfare chauvinism or discrimination, whilst political parties at both state and sub-state levels publicly present immigrants as unfavourable outsiders or beneficial new community members as a form of leverage for their own demands for sovereign control over social policies and population movements (Hepburn 2011, Huysmans 2006, Jeram 2012, Keating 2009, Kivisto and Faist 2007). It has therefore been suggested that social citizenship in the EU has not disappeared but become ‘nested’ or ‘bundled’ at distinct administrative levels (Bauböck 2010, Faist 2001, see chapter six).

In this context, the status of immigrants is outlined in a complex formal arrangement in which the terms of membership and opportunities for equality are intertwined with legal-institutional and discursive-cultural categorisations across
sub-state, state and supranational levels. As noted by Beck (2005), the boundaries of state, nation and society are not necessarily conterminous and aligned with each other. With this in mind, throughout this thesis the content of, as well as motivations for and logics behind, local, national and supranational or cross-border laws and policies will be studied; indeed, they are both an element of the process of categorisation of Romanian nationals in Italy and Spain, and a formal part of the institutional opportunity structure shaping their social integration and political participation. The current chapter will be limited to the national laws and policies that constitute the classificatory framework for Romanian nationals in Italy and Spain and the introduction of the rights of citizenship of the European Union following this country’s accession in 2007. The local and cross-border dimensions of these boundaries will be given a closer examination in chapters six and seven, respectively.

A history of immigrant integration laws and policies in Italy and Spain

As noted in chapter one of this thesis, there has been a body of research produced which has outlined the characteristics of a specific ‘Southern European model’ of migratory flows and migration policies (for example, Arango et al 2009, Baldwin-Edwards 2001, Calavita 1998, 2005, Castles and Miller 2003: 82-85, Danese 2001, Hartman 2008, Hepburn 2009, King 2000, 2001, King and Thomson 2008, Schierup et al 2008: 102-107). However, whilst the structural context of immigration in Italy and Spain is broadly comparable within the characteristics of the Southern European model, there are also differences, as will be noted below.

The case of Italy

The development of Italy’s immigration legislation has in general been piecemeal, as well as suffering criticism for its ambiguous intentions and methods (Zincone 1998, 2006). However, some general consistencies can be outlined. Firstly, there has been a focus on security and public order in public debate and policy responses. Secondly, politicians have interpreted immigrants principally as workers and seen the
regulation of labour as a way of controlling immigration. Thirdly, the law itself has made legality difficult to obtain and arduous to renew, fuelling illegality and informality (Colombo and Sciortino 2004b). Fourthly, the repeated use of amnesties has legalised the status of previously undocumented foreigners, propagating a view of immigration as a temporary problem to be solved by \textit{ad hoc}, sporadic measures. Fifthly, repeated \textit{sanatorie} or mass amnesties have also created two categories of illegal migrants: \textit{irregolari} or irregular immigrants that had once been legally registered but subsequently lapsed into undocumented status, for example, by outstaying a tourist visa or being unable to renew a work contract; and \textit{clandestini} or clandestine immigrants who arrive and enter the country without any documents, and have been vilified in public debate and associated with organised crime and public order problems. This pattern of public order and labour market-focused attempts to restrict undocumented migration and keep the documented migrant presence temporary has resulted in fluid and porous boundaries between legality and illegality (Schierup et al. 2008). As will be shown, rather than being superimposed over the national legal system, European Union citizenship for Romanian nationals has been interpreted through these existent perspectives. Awareness of these trends is vital to understand the status of Romanian citizens in Italy today.

The Italian Constitution of 1948 declared that the conditions of aliens were to be considered a matter of law (Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana Art. 10). However, there was little immigration and even less demand for policies. Early regulations were carried over from the Single Text of Public Security Norms in 1931 and the law 5/1961 on internal migrations (Gazzetta Ufficiale 18/02/1961, n. 43), which brought about a complex and bureaucratic process of obtaining residence and work permits (Sciortino 1999:235). This meant that the small and medium enterprises that provided the backbone of the Italian economy and labour market found foreign workers easier to hire if these rules were avoided. Labour market incorporation was thus dependent not on legal conditions but on migrant-native social relations. The first law on ‘Foreign workers and the control of illegal immigration’ was not passed until 1986 (Legge 943/1986, Gazzetta Ufficiale 12/01/1986, n. 8), and its focus was almost entirely on the legal labour market incorporation of immigrants. As reflected in the title, immigrants were conceived as workers, and their presence was duly regulated by the Ministry of Labour. As
workers they were guaranteed ‘equal treatment and full equality of rights regarding Italian workers [...] also the relative rights for the use of social and health services [...] the retention of cultural identity, schooling and housing’ (Legge 943/1986 Art. 1), and fines were introduced for employers hiring undocumented immigrants in an attempt to restrict the informal labour market (Einaudi 2007). Indeed, it has been estimated that at the beginning of the 1980s clandestine employment accounted for between 25% and 35% of the total Italian workforce (Weiss 1987: 222). The right of immigrants to public services was therefore dependent on their ability to enter formal employment, in a labour market with high indices of informality.

The 1990s constituted a period of greater policy change. Rising immigration rates and the continued incorporation of foreigners in the informal labour market was added to by an increasing perception of immigration as an invasion. The most vociferous in this respect was the political party the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN), which presented a rejection of migrants from Southern Italy and abroad as a key element of a strongly regionalist discourse (Albertazzi 2006, Cento Bull 2003, 2010, Geddes 2008b). The arrival of thousands of Albanian migrants to the port of Bari in 1992 was widely presented in subsequent years as photographic evidence of the supposed invasion of Italy. Non-EU illegal immigrants (clandestini extracomunitari) were frequently referred to in public discourse as bringers of crime and insecurity (Sciortino and Colombo 2004), and the indecisive parties of the left struggled to find a consistent and cohesive counter argument (Andall 2007, Picker 2011).

In this context, attempts to restrict immigration came through the ‘Martelli Law’ of 1990 (Legge 39/1990, Gazzetta Ufficiale 28/02/1990, n. 49) and the ‘Dini decree’ of 1995 (Decreto-Legge 489/1995, Gazzetta Ufficiale 18/11/1995, n. 270). Migration regulation was moved to the Ministry of the Interior (Colombo and Sciortino 2004b), and there a worker quota system was introduced which would provide residence permits to those meeting the demands for formal labour coming from certain sectors of the Italian economy (Calavita 2005: 32). Both of these measures were accompanied by expulsion powers in response to ‘socially dangerous’ arrested foreigners (Decreto-Legge 489/1995 Art. 7.1). At the same time, amnesty procedures also constituted an attempt to lower levels of illegality; in 1990
undocumented migrants were offered two years of legal residence regardless of presenting a work contract, or four years upon proof of employment, and in 1995 those who demonstrated having a permanent contract were given residence permits for two years with the possibility of later extension, whilst those with fixed-term contracts were given residence permits for the length of that particular contract. Those with no job but who could demonstrate a previous position lasting for longer than four months were able to obtain a permit for one year that could only be subsequently extended with proof of having attained a new contract (Carfagna 2002: 58). The first Romanian immigrants arrived in Italy at this time, following the fall of the Romanian Communist Party regime in 1989, although figures remained low until the second half of the 1990s, with around 1,000 registered arrivals per year in 1990 and 1991, falling to 500 in 1992 and 600 in 1993 (Sandu et al 2004: 25, Ban 2009). Although legal employment had to be obtained from Romania before travelling to Italy, the large underground labour market meant that this population could live and work informally until the regularisation amnesty.

The difficulty of obtaining permanent legal residence in Italy at this time should also be viewed in a context of increasing limitations to gaining national citizenship. This was outlined in the major reform of Italy’s citizenship law in 1992 (Legge 91/1992, Gazzetta Ufficiale 15/02/1992, n. 38). From 1912 Italy had a liberal regime that recognised the right of foreigners to become Italian citizens if born in the country, married to a native or resident in the country for five years or more (Colombo and Sciortino 2004b: 60). However, in 1992 more restrictive measures were established, adopting the rule of *jus sanguinis* (inheritance through the family line). If a child was born on Italian soil they should reside there for the first 18 years of their life in order to qualify for full citizenship. If a foreigner’s marriage to an Italian ended, they would lose the rights of Italian citizenship. Today, descendents of Italians can regain their nationality by residing in Italy for at least two years, but those without Italian blood have to reside uninterrupted for ten years, have sufficient income to live and demonstrate having a clean criminal record, whereas citizens of the European Community were to be offered access to citizenship after only four years of residence in the country. This has drawn sharp dividing lines in a stratified citizenship regime between Italians, Europeans and third country nationals, with the status of this last group trailing behind that of the previous two.
These developments constituted, nevertheless, largely *ad hoc* approaches to what had become a structural presence of immigrants in Italy (Colombo and Sciortino 2004b). Amnesties granting temporary legal status reflected a continued interpretation of the presence of immigrants as a contingent phenomenon. These steps failed in their aims to discourage illegal residence and improve social cohesion by integrating migrants (Zincone 2002:352). Instead they reinforced the temporary nature of incorporation in Italian society, as undocumented migrants could gain formal legality but would continue working in the informal economy and return to illegality when their residence permits expired (Reyneri 2004).

Subsequent political pressure in response to this policy failure was intense and brought demand for control of undocumented immigration and establishment of integration measures (Andall 2007, Zincone 2002). As a result, 1998 saw a ‘great reform’ from the centre-left in the form of the ‘Turco-Napolitano law’, Italy’s first systematic immigration law (Geddes 2008b: 348, Legge 40/1998 Gazzetta Ufficiale 12/03/1998 n. 59). The three principal areas of the law were; a) the control of Italy’s borders; b) adherence to European approaches to immigration; and c) an openness to citizenship rights and greater integration for migrants (Andall 2007: 140). However, although the main drive for the legislation came from within the centre-left government, much of its contents were influenced by an immigrants’ rights advocacy coalition, consisting of the Catholic charity Caritas, the Italian Workers’ Christian Association (ACLI), the inter-faith group GAIA, the left wing Association âRCI’, trade unionists and the Scouts, among others (Zincone 2006: 353-4). This was the only major advocacy coalition in the country and despite its members’ heterogeneity it broadly favoured expanding immigrants’ rights and integration measures.

Under the Turco-Napoletano law legal foreign residents were given greater permanency and stability. They could renew their permits an indefinite number of times, were given the right to equal treatment in the workplace, access to universal healthcare, and if resident in Italy for more than five years had the right to reside indefinitely once granted a residence card (*carta di soggiorno*) (Legge 40/1998 Art 7.1). There was also the possibility of individual Italians or legally resident foreigners sponsoring immigrants, claiming responsibility for them whilst they looked for employment in Italy (Art. 21) and legal migrants were allowed to open small companies and work independently (Art. 24). The link between residence and
employment was therefore loosened, and immigrant workers who lost their jobs had
the possibility of starting their own business or remaining to search for a new
position, rather than being sent back to their country of origin. In terms of social
citizenship, all legal or undocumented foreigners were also granted the right to
emergency healthcare (Art 33.3) and public schooling (Art 36.1). Finally, an
amnesty offered residence permits to foreigners: by 2001 over 217,000 permits had
been granted (Carfagna 2002:60).

However, the Turco-Napolitano law could also be seen as a continuation of
the same approach of the previous legislation. Access to the labour market was
regulated further by the quota system being given precise details under which
employers would have to request either an individual worker by name or a quantity
of workers required to fill vacant positions (Art. 3.4, Art. 19). Furthermore, the law
also contained measures for ‘strengthening the control of the border’ (Art. 9) and
establishing the creation of detention centres for those who could not be repatriated
immediately (Art. 12), whilst emphasis was put on effective deportations of
undocumented migrants in an effort to control illegal immigration (Arts. 10-14).
Thus, whilst legal immigrants had a series of rights extended to them, illegal
immigration was to be clamped down on strongly. This regulation of the labour
market and use of powers of detention and deportation emphasised the view that
foreigners without employment or legal status were not welcome in Italy.

Subsequently, amid social and inter-party tensions the centre-right returned to
power in 2001 on a tide of anti-immigration rhetoric (Geddes 2008b: 349). In 2002
the Turco-Napolitano law was replaced by the ‘Bossi-Fini law’ (Legge 189/2002,
Gazzetta Ufficiale 26/08/2002, n. 199). Whereas its predecessor was a product of
compromise between parties and social actors, the Bossi-Fini law was almost
entirely the work of the parties of the centre-right coalition Casa della Libertà,
specifically National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) and the Northern League
(Lega Nord, LN) (Zincone 2006: 361). In particular, the LN held a prominent
position as the party that had mobilised most strongly against immigration since the
1990s, as will be seen in the following chapter, and saw a new policy as ‘an electoral
IOU it had to honour’ (referenced in Zincone 2006: 361). Yet the law has been
contradictorily described as harsh, repressive and racist but also even moderate
(Geddes 2008b: 350). This is a result of the need to balance the exclusionary,
securitised and legalistic focus of LN with the solidaristic values of a Catholic advocacy coalition which had maintained links with conservative and Catholic right wing politicians (Zincone 2006: 362-3). The left wing parties of the opposition vehemently opposed the legislation as unconstitutional, overly punitive and dangerous, reflecting a highly polarised political and ideological context around the issue (Zincone 2006: 364).

But if anything, the Bossi-Fini law represented a return to 1986, reflected by the statement from Umberto Bossi, leader of LN, that ‘immigrants are to come to our country for one purpose only - work’ (cf. Calavita 2005:35). Legal residence was tied closer to employment by restricting the quotas of the Turco-Napolitano law to all categories of immigrants (Legge 189/2002 Art. 3.4), reaffirming that all migrants have contracts before arriving in Italy (Art. 4.2), stating that employers provide for the worker’s return to their country of origin following the end of their contract (Art. 6.5bis), prohibiting immigrant sponsorship, and declaring all immigrants to be illegal residents upon finishing a contract or losing a position of employment (Art. 5.3bis). The social rights of foreigners were also reduced significantly, increasing their exclusion and thus their distinction with the status of natives whilst ensuring the arrival of a cheap, temporary foreign workforce and restricting the number who could stay. However, although it was framed by a context of criminalisation of undocumented migrants and the association of illegality with public security the Bossi-Fini law also provided for the largest amnesty in Italy’s history, legalising the status of 646,000 people (ISTAT 2006). This has been seen as contradictory due to the way it facilitated the regularisation of immigrants’ status whilst also making it more difficult to obtain and renew a residence permit (Geddes 2008b:350). The result has been seen to produce illegality, which is a way of excluding migrants from membership and access to rights and thus reinforcing the categorisation of many migrants as outsiders.

The Bossi-Fini law has provided the backdrop to the most considerable wave of Romanian immigration to Italy (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 2004). Indeed, since its passing the Romanian immigrant population has grown dramatically from 239,426 registered individuals in 2003 to 555,997 in 2006 and 796,477 in 2009 (Caritas Italia 2004, 2009). Since the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 this nationality population has entered into the category of comunitari or ‘EU Citizens’, and is as
such governed largely by Community law. The final section of this chapter will outline some of the implications of this development for the Romanian immigrant population in Italy. Before that, the following sub-section will examine the case of Spain’s immigration and citizenship legislation.

The case of Spain

As with Italy, Spain has rapidly made a transition from a country of emigrants to one of the major receivers of immigration in the EU. Also of similarity has been the criticism of policy responses for being of an *ad hoc* nature, with ambiguous intentions and implications.

Some similar general consistencies can be outlined throughout the history of immigration policy developments in Spain. Firstly, immigration has been viewed as a predominantly temporary phenomenon that has not until recently been seen to require extensive legislation or policymaking in response. Secondly, as in Italy the law has made legality difficult to obtain and to renew, with a large informal labour market fuelling illegality whilst providing a cheap labour workforce for low productivity sectors in the Spanish economy. Thirdly, amnesties have been repeatedly used to legalise the status of previously undocumented foreigners, emphasising the understanding of immigration as a temporary problem to be solved by sporadic measures. Fourthly, immigration has predominantly been taken off the political agenda and perceived as a potentially divisive issue, aside from a period during 1999-2001, explaining the relative lack of policy developments until this time. Fifthly, when comprehensive immigration laws have been passed they have been concerned with the separate tasks of granting a relatively extensive range of social rights to immigrants whilst increasing security measures and opportunities for deportation in order to prevent further arrivals. In sum, the overall impact of the Spanish approach to immigration has been to maintain a large proportion of the immigrant population in an undocumented status, making permanent residence a distant possibility despite the range of rights afforded it and with little impact on the structural pull of the informal economy.

Since the 1980s Spain has constituted one of the ‘new countries’ of immigration in Europe by making the shift from net-exporter to net-importer of
flows. However, this recent intensification of the phenomenon does not mean that population movements to and from Spain were previously unknown (McMillion 1981, Ringrose 1998, Silvestre 2007, Zapata-Barrero 2009). Indeed, by 1970 some 38% of the population of Catalonia, and 47% of the population of Barcelona, were born outside the region (Calavita 1998:534, see also King 2001). Yet the relatively low level of flows and the fact that large-scale immigration was apparently not expected by decision makers meant that immigration during the 1970s and 1980s was not considered a major political issue (Zapata-Barrero 2009: 310-2, see also Davis 2009, González-Enriquez 2009). Migrations were relatively unregulated and early Spanish definitions of ‘immigrants’ were influenced by perceptions of class: prior to 1971, emigrants and immigrants were simply those travelling from or to any Spanish port in Third Class, and from 1972 onwards this was changed to include those financially assisted by the Instituto Español de Emigración (Bover and Velilla 2001: 4). Throughout the 1980s immigrants arrived predominantly from Britain, Germany and France and settled in coastal areas of tourism, and they were welcomed by the opening of Spain to mass package tourism and the expansion of low cost travel (O’Reilly 2002).

At this time the Spanish Constitution of 1978 had already placed responsibility for immigration policy with the Spanish State (Art. 149). This was complemented by the possibility of competences being delegated to the regional level of autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas) when deemed relevant (Art. 150), which would go on to provide the basis for a decentralisation of immigrant integration policies. The local dimension of this multi-level arrangement will be examined in more detail in chapter six.

Spain’s first comprehensive law on immigration, known as the Law of Foreigners (Ley de Extranjería, Ley Orgánica 7/1985), came in 1985. Its declared objective, and that of subsequent Spanish legislation, was to recognise the greatest possible level of rights and freedoms to foreigners, ‘practically equal’ to those of Spaniards, and to establish controls on the legality of residence and conditions of entrance to and deportation from Spain (Preámbulo, Boletín Oficial del Estado 158, 03/07/1985). The right to residence and movement (Art. 6), association (Art. 8), education (Art. 9) and strike action (Art. 10) were all made dependent on legal residence, whilst the right to participate in municipal elections was granted in cases
of reciprocity between Spain and the immigrant’s country of origin (Art. 5). The law was also clearly influenced by the terms and conditions of accession to the European Community, which Spain would join in the same year, as it sought to define a common southern border to Europe and protect the free movement rights of nationals of Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC). In this sense the law set out distinctions between migrants from the EEC and those from beyond, with the first being included in the communitary grouping or Regimen Comunitario and the second in the general grouping, or Regimen General. Whereas nationals of EEC Member States enjoyed rights to free circulation, residence and work in Spain, other foreigners had to apply for these before arriving. In order to enter Spain, these non-EEC citizens were required to present a visa, and for stays of over 90 days residence and/or work permits were required (Art. 12). Finally, permanent residence, family reunification, and integration measures were entirely absent from the law.

Aside from the law of foreigners, the long-term incorporation of immigrants in Spain was, and has continued to be, outlined instead by nationality law, laying out the requirements and conditions of citizenship in Spain. Nationality has been defined in the Constitution of 1978 and the Spanish Civil Code (updated in Law 36/2002, Boletín Oficial del Estado 242, 09/10/2002). This grants nationality to individuals of Spanish birth (jus sanguinis), defined as those who are children of a Spanish mother or father, whose parents have no nationality or their identity is unknown, or who are adopted by Spaniards. Furthermore, opportunities for foreigners to adopt the Spanish nationality (jus solis) are founded on a cultural understanding of Spanish culture and heritage, establishing a stratification of the statuses of non-Spanish born people: members of the Iberian Peninsula and the ex-colonies of Spain are given preferential access to citizenship over other nationalities and for nationals of Latin America, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Portugal, as well as descendents of Spanish Sephardic Jews a period of two years legal residence applies before nationality will be granted. The anomaly here is Moroccan nationals, who are categorised with other non-members of the European Community and must be legally resident in Spain for ten uninterrupted years and hold a clean criminal record before being eligible for the Spanish nationality. In light of this, full citizenship in Spain has been described as reserved for ‘culturally-similar’ neighbours (Gil Araujo 2009: 229).
As in Italy, immigration to Spain was interpreted in the law of 1985 as a temporary, labour market-based phenomenon. Residence and work permits were awarded in the migrant’s country of origin and work permits were dependent on the demand for labour in specific sectors of the Spanish economy, for which quotas were published annually. Also, for the decade following 1985 only a small minority of permits granted were for longer than one year (Watts 1998: 135). The complicated bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining these meant that it was easier for many migrants to enter the country on a tourist visa and stay after its expiry, or to enter the country clandestinely (González-Enriquez 2009). Also, the majority of immigrants were employed in small and medium sized enterprises with a high degree of informality (Watts 1998: 131-2). Thus, one criticism has stated that ‘while the dual rationale of the 1985 law and its successors has been to control the borders while ensuring immigrants’ rights, they do neither’ (Calavita 1998: 530).

Attempts to diminish the level of this undocumented residence and underground labour have taken the form of repeated amnesties for the legalisation of immigrants’ status, carried out in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000/1 and 2005. However, the restrictive granting of visas has meant that it has been difficult for many foreigners to maintain their legal status because renewals have depended also on holding a valid employment contract. Indeed, in 1992, following the amnesty of the previous year, 39,937 foreign workers were registered as contributing to social security payments, but by 1993 this figure had fallen to 11,808 as one-year work permits expired and foreigners returned to the underground economy (OPI 1999). In this context of predominantly short-term legal or undocumented long-term residence and restrictive conditions for the granting of nationality, access to permanent residence and rights of citizenship was particularly difficult.

The subsequent developments in Spanish immigration law would not come about until 2000, in a vastly different context to that of 1985. Between the first immigration law and the first proposals of a new law, in 1998, the immigrant population had increased by 500,000 (González-Enriquez 2009: 141). During these years there were only piecemeal developments in response to this changing context, despite the fact that in 1990 a government report on the situation of foreigners in Spain had already declared that ‘in the 1990s, Spain will become a country of immigration’ and called for a coherent immigration policy that would guarantee ‘in
accordance with our values, the complete integration of the foreign residents who have chosen our country as a place to live and work’ (Comunicación del Gobierno al Congreso de Diputados, Informe 15/90, December 1990). This was followed by the first Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants in 1994 and the establishment of space for dialogue and collaboration between the public administration, social organisations and immigrant associations in the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, in 1995 (Real Decreto 155/1995). Also, regulation of the undocumented foreign population was aided in 1996 by the inclusion of all residents, regardless of legal status, on the Municipal Register (Ley 4/1996 de 10 de enero, Art. 18.2). In order to be included on the register the person would only need to present a document of identity, not a residence or work permit, enabling counting of the foreign population (legal and illegal) in order to plan services more efficiently. Together, these steps demonstrated an acknowledgement of the increasing presence of immigrants in Spain and move towards granting them rights and opportunities for integration, whilst contradictorily maintaining a wider legal structure which continued to make entry and long-term legality, along with the wider rights to residence and welfare that this would bring, difficult to achieve.

The reforms to Law 7/1985 in 2000 were inspired to a large degree by the increasing salience of immigration as a concern in national politics and public opinion during the period surrounding 1999 and 2001 (Montijano 2008, Zapata-Barrero 2003, 2004: 93-162). In Catalonia in 1999, residents of the municipality of Terrassa protested against the Moroccan presence there, and between 2000 and 2001 there was the rejection of a mosque in Premià de Mar (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés Mascareñas 2011: 21). Tensions also surfaced elsewhere, at El Ejido in Almería, when a high profile violent revolt in 2000 saw the burning of immigrant houses in reaction to the murder of a Spaniard by a Moroccan citizen. This hit national headlines and in the national elections of March 2000, immigration was ‘discovered’ by the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) as an electoral issue (Zapata-Barrero 2004: 94, see also Zapata-Barrero 2003). Nevertheless, the proposals for reform had originally come from the conservative Catalan formation Convergence and Union (Convergencia I Unió, CIU) in 1998. They were concerned about a lack of integration of immigrants in Catalonia and called for increased social rights to facilitate this (González-Enriquez 2009: 141-2). In doing so, they also
highlighted a concern for the cultural impact of immigration on the Catalan national identity (Gil Araujo 2009).

In 2000, Law 7/1985 was in fact reformed twice, firstly in January through Law 4/2000 and subsequently in December through Law 8/2000. The Law 4/2000 had been rejected by some members of the incumbent PP and amendments were suggested by members of the Senate, before being accepted with the support of the opposition. In contrast to this, the latter reform came under the auspices of a PP majority government that had been elected in March of the same year and was no longer in need of cross-party consensus.

Early in 2000, the first reform (Law 4/2000, Boletín Oficial del Estado 10, 12/01/2000) resulted in a favourable outcome for immigrants in terms of residence and rights. On the one hand, regarding residence, a category of resident permit was introduced that would not require a work permit, but would also not allow the holder to enter employment if they held sufficient resources (Art. 29) and a category of permanent resident was introduced, which would be granted to individuals who had already legally resided in Spain for five years (Art. 30). For those wealthy enough, these terms separated the terms of temporary residence from an immigrant’s involvement in the labour market, and for all legal immigrants it separated permanent residence from the cultural criteria of the nationality laws outlined above.

Finally, the reform also introduced the opportunity for undocumented migrants to gain legal status if they could demonstrate at least two years of residence and employment in Spain. The establishment of this measure alongside the continued link between legal entry to Spain and the holding of a visa granted at the country of origin (Arts. 33-5) amounted to an acceptance of undocumented migration as a structural presence that would not be stopped.

On the other hand, Law 4/2000 offered a significant expansion of the rights and freedoms of immigrants in Spain. It continued to offer the right to residence and movement (Art. 5), association (Art. 8), education (Art. 9) and strike action (Art. 11) and maintained the right to participation in municipal elections in cases of reciprocity in international law (Art. 6). However, the law also went beyond these and declared that legal immigrants would also have the right to social security payments (Art. 14) and family reunification (Art. 17), whilst all those on the municipal register, regardless of legal status, would also have access to healthcare as
well as the right to join associations run by legal residents (Art. 8) and be granted the right to form immigrant associations and vote for their own representatives (Art. 6.2). For the first time, this offered social protection and a channel for political participation that were not dependent on legal residence or labour market status. In this way, Law 4/2000 therefore represented a significant shift in Spain’s immigration legislation in terms of the range of social and political rights made available and the categories of individuals eligible for them.

However, the reform of the same year would prove to be more restrictive, offering a distinct approach which emphasised controls on entry to and residence in Spain in order to ‘incentivise foreigners to enter and reside in a legal way’ in Spain (Exposición de Motivos V, Ley Orgánica 8/2000, 22/12/2000). On the one hand, there were checks made against illegality. It was clarified that immigrants could be deported from Spain if they were found guilty of undocumented residence, working without a relevant permit or leaving Spain without having relevant documentation (Art. 53), whilst the legalisation of those with undocumented status would be granted after five years, rather than two, and only in cases of a demonstrable rooting of the immigrant in local society or family ties. In 2004 this would be reduced again to three years under the newly-elected Socialist government. In this way, the reform of 2000 ambiguously criminalised and rewarded undocumented residence. On the other hand, Law 8/2000 also conditioned or removed a range of the rights and freedoms outlined above. Limitations were placed on the freedom to reside and move within Spain, in ‘exceptional situations’ of public security, resulting in removal of individuals from specific populations or the demand that they periodically present themselves to the relevant authorities (Art. 5). Rights of association, protest and strike action were also limited to individuals with legal residence or work permits (Arts. 7-8), whilst family reunification would be dependent not only on residence, but also on presenting ‘reasons which justify’ its ‘necessity’ (Art. 17). Political rights were therefore once again tied to legal residence in Spain, which was in turn a result of having sufficient means of subsistence and a visa granted in the country of origin, whilst employment also required a work permit in addition to a residence visa (Art. 36). In this way the political and social rights and freedoms of immigrants were restricted to those with legal status as part of a move from rights to control and security in order to ‘fight against illegal immigration’ (Title III).
The Law 8/2000 has provided the principal framework for the arrival of Romanian immigrants in Spain because the majority of the Romanian population movements have come after this moment. Indeed, in 2000 there were only 10,983 Romanians registered in Spain, but by 2009 this had risen suddenly to 718,844 (data from Observatorio Nacional de la Inmigracion). Although subsequent reforms have occurred to Spain’s immigration law in 2009 (Ley Orgánica 2/2009, Boletín Oficial del Estado 299, 12/12/2009), by this time the Romanian population was already governed by the *regimen comunitario* and therefore by Community law. The following section will outline the implications of these developments for the status of Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain.

**The status of Romanians in Italy and Spain**

Migration from Romania to Italy and Spain has grown consistently since the end of the Communist Party Regime in 1989, although the principal arrivals have occurred in the 2000s. Indeed, although the first Romanian migrants arrived in these countries in the early 1990s, numbers were negligible and it was only after 1996 that Italy became a significant destination and the same for Spain after 2002 (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 2004, Viruela Martinez 2002, see figure 5).

The first wave of contemporary migratory flows from Romania followed the fall of the Communist Party regime in 1989, and was mostly directed to Germany and a small population to Italy (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 2004: 3). A second wave of emigration came after 1996, when the Romanian government’s economic policies resulted in a period of ‘transition shock’ (Crowther 2010). This was primarily directed to Italy, although arrivals were also recorded in Spain. More recently a third wave of emigration from 2002 to the present day has been characterised by the dominance of Italy and Spain as the principal destinations (Ban 2009, Sandu et al 2004). The subsequent growth in migratory flows has meant that, despite constituting a small population in Italy and Spain in 2000, by 2009 Romanians were the highest ranking migrant population in both of these countries (see figure 5).
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14,212</td>
<td>28,796</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>239,426</td>
<td>555,997</td>
<td>796,477</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td>10,983</td>
<td>54,688</td>
<td>211,325</td>
<td>718,844</td>
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Figure 5: Growth of legally resident Romanian immigration to Italy and Spain
(Sources: Caritas Italia Dossier Statistico Immigrazione, Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración)

The dramatic growth of Romanian migration has come at the same time as a shift in the legal conditions regulating their entry to Italy and Spain. On 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2002 visa requirements for Romanian citizens visiting EU Member States for up to three months were lifted and entry was made dependent on demonstrating possession of economic resources, an invitation from a European citizen or institution willing to vouch for them or a hotel reservation and return ticket in order (Elrick and Ciobanu 2009:105). Whereas Romanian migrants previously had to either spend around 2,000 euros to obtain a Schengen visa or cross borders illegally to enter the EU, after the lifting of visa requirements for Romanian citizens the journey was much cheaper (Gabriel Anghel 2008, Viruela Martinez 2002, 2008), and although visa-free entry was conditional upon not undertaking employment many found informal opportunities. For example, for seasonal harvest work or a specific building contract three months was sufficient time to complete a period of employment before returning to Romania (Hartman 2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008). The Romanian government established the Office for Labour Migration (Oficiul pentru Migratia Forrei de Munca) in 2001, but despite this and attempts in Italian and Spanish law to set immigration quotas and promote the hiring of foreign workers in the country of origin, many Romanians emigrated without a work contract and thus without
following the formal, official channels, due to a degree to the Office for Labour Migration being perceived as understaffed, inefficient and either distrusted or unknown among potential emigrants (Ban 2009, Pajares 2007). In 2004, the Romanian Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family also established a Department for Labour Abroad with the objectives of improving the social and economic conditions and protecting the rights of emigrants, but its impact has similarly been minimal (Sandu et al 2004). In this way a shift in the legal framework in 2002 gave Romanian nationals the opportunity to legally enter Italy and Spain, but also reinforced the temporary nature of their stay and the informality of their labour market opportunities. For the majority of the Romanian migrant population, visa-free travel therefore took them only a little closer to being citizens by opening opportunities for economic activities, largely in informal, short-term precarious employment.

As noted above, for the majority of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain, their legal status, rights and freedoms have been outlined respectively in the Turco-Napolitano and Bossi-Fini law, and the Law of Foreigners 8/2000. In Italy this has resulted in a context in which initial rights to schools and emergency healthcare for undocumented migrants have been removed, and the opportunity for permanent residence which was originally tied to legal residence has been lost. Romanians in Italy have also not had a right to vote or participate politically and have faced deportation for undocumented residence and work. Whereas the Turco-Napolitano regime promoted permanence of legal migrants, the Bossi-Fini one emphasised the temporary nature of immigrants defined simply as a labour force. In Spain, the ad hoc context in which Romanian pioneers arrived was replaced in 2000 by a regime which granted access to healthcare and education for all, but tied the political rights of voting, association and protest to legal residence whilst facilitating the deportation of undocumented migrants.

In both countries, employment has been prevalent in low productivity sectors and high informality sectors and a general casualisation of the labour force has taken place, making stable employment and permanent residence difficult to obtain. As a result, challenges have arisen to the social and political integration of Romanians in Italy and Spain. It has been noted that the general level of education and qualification of Romanian emigrants is high (Pajares 2007: 210, Ricci 2008: 84) and
that the Romanian emigrant population has been varied, combining educated individuals leaving Romania to bridge the education-income gap of their homeland with poorer unskilled rural workers in the cheaper post-2002 period (Uccellini 2010, Viruela Martinez 2002). Despite this, the dominant employment roles in Italy and Spain have been in domestic care, construction and agriculture, sectors with a predominance of precarious short-term or informal employment and in which legal residence and work permits have not been absolutely necessary in order to enter the labour market (Birsan and Cucuruzan 2007, Caritas Italia 2010, Gabriel Anghel 2008, Hartman 2008, Marcu 2009a, Pajares 2007, Perrotta 2006, Uccellini 2010, Viruela Martinez 2008). Consequently, Italy and Spain have been attractive destinations for short-term settlement, and circular migration patterns have developed to enable workers to make the most of temporary and seasonal labour opportunities (Gabriel Anghel 2008, Hartman 2008, Sandu 2005). However, this informal employment comes without worker’s rights, giving individuals less bargaining power with their bosses and within trade unions and in politics (Perrotta 2006).

The precarious and undocumented status of Romanians has been confirmed in data from the latest amnesties in both countries: in Italy, the process of 2002 granted legal residence to 147,947 Romanians which equated to 60% of the population of 239,426 registered in 2003 (Ricci 2008: 86), and in Spain 97,941 Romanian nationals were granted legal residence permits in 2005, which equalled 51% of the total at the time of 192,134 (OPI 2006). Finally, from 2002 to 2006, Romanians were the nationality with the greatest deportations from Italy, overtaking Albanians and reaching a total of 29,825 in 2006 (Ministero dell’Interno 2006). In Spain, the number deported annually rose from 1,607 in 2001 to 59,386 in 2004, before lowering to 42,292 in 2006, many of whom were sent for not having regular residence permits (Baillo Ruiz 2008).

Since the joining of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, nationals from these countries have no longer been required to hold visas for residing in the countries of the Schengen space. In theory, the process of EU expansion and integration to the East should have played a key role in outlining the rights to be granted in order to uphold equality of status between Romanians and Italians or Spaniards, particularly regarding rights to free movement, non-discrimination and
the removal of restrictions on involvement in previously closed areas such as self-employment and employment in agriculture, tourism, domestic work and care, construction, engineering, management, highly-skilled work, and seasonal work.

The category of Citizen of the European Union and its definition as a specific legal status has developed out of the rights of free movement. The free movement of persons across national borders was established as a fundamental objective of the European project in 1951 (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community Article 69). At Rome in 1957, this would be summarised in the collection of free movement rights, made up of the right to move freely within Community territory in order to accept employment, to reside in another Member State for the purpose of employment, and to continue residing in a Member State after having been employed (Treaty on European Community 1957, see also Maas 2007). The evolution of these free movement rights into an institutionalised form of citizenship was driven by the goal of economic integration and the development of the Single European Market. In 1985 the European Commission's proposal for completing the single market by 1992 put forward the same deadline for the removal of ‘the obstacles which still exist in the Community to free movement for the self-employed and employees’ (European Commission 1985, referenced in Maas 2007:37). The Single European Act of 1987 was also pivotal by defining the freedom of movement of goods, services, people and capital at the heart of the single market project, and the intergovernmental Schengen Accord of 1985 constituted the first step forward in the formal elimination of border controls. By aiming to abolish physical borders between them, the signatories of the Accord moved closer to a double objective of facilitating the liberalisation of the Community labour market while also outlining a unified concept of European citizenship (Ibid. :37).

The concept of Union citizenship was institutionalised in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, according to which ‘every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’ (TEU 1992 Art. 9). This represented a step beyond the free circulation of labour across the European Economic Community by declaring that all citizens had the right to be considered as a national in any EU Member State and to not be discriminated against on grounds of nationality. Specifically, article 8 of the Treaty outlines European citizens’ right to free movement and residence in any Member State, the right to vote and stand as a
candidate in municipal elections and elections for the European Parliament in the Member State of their residence and the right to petition the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman. As EU citizens, any discrimination against an individual residing in a Member State is strictly against Community law. The adding of this right of non-discrimination to that of free movement marked the expansion of economic rights into limited political and social provisions, which was further contributed to through the Race Directive (2000/43/EC) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Arts. 20–23). In doing so, it has outlined a thin conceptualisation of social citizenship at the EU level which remains subject to the conditions governing welfare at the national level. The provision of rights and integration measures to TCNs through EU level policies has therefore been described as outlining only a quasi-social citizenship for migrants (Konsta and Laziridis 2010: 370).

For Romanian nationals legally working with a work permit or authorised residence in Italy or Spain on 1st January 2007, accession to the EU therefore implied continued access to the labour market of these countries without the need to renew work permits every two years, removing to a certain extent the impermanence experienced by previous migrants. However, the accession of Romania to the EU did not directly result in a shift in the legal status of Romanian migrants in these countries, for the following main reasons.

Firstly, in Italy and Spain the rules on labour market access did not come into force directly upon accession. Instead, transitional measures were put in place designed to balance the possibly negative effects of large amounts of workers arriving. These could be in place for two years, before a review and the possibility of maintaining them for another three. After that limits could only be applied in exceptional circumstances of damage to the host labour market. Complete freedom of movement, work and residence was to be guaranteed no more than seven years after accession, which is to say at the beginning of 2014 (COM(2002) 694). So, in this way for the first two years of EU membership, Romanian migrants were subject to restrictions regarding access to the labour market of Italy and Spain except for in self-employment or roles in agriculture, tourism, domestic work and care, construction, engineering, management and highly-skilled work, and seasonal work. In Spain this was lifted in 2009, but the economic crisis resulted in rising
unemployment from this year. This has particularly affected the construction sector, where the greatest destruction of jobs for immigrant workers has been seen. The implications are an increasing unemployment rate of Romanian nationals, from 60,826 in 2007 to 137,756 in 2009 and a 15% decrease in the activity rate of this nationality, although data for informal activity cannot be so easily measured (Pajares 2009b: 43-114). Limits were re-established in 2011 due to the ‘serious disturbance’ on the Spanish labour market (COM 2011/503/EU).

Secondly, according to the free movement directive of 2004, EU citizens can be refused entry or removed from a Member State if they are deemed to pose a threat to public policy, public security or public health (Directive 2004/38/EC). Residence is only guaranteed for periods up to three months of duration, beyond which point residents have to acquire a permit from the police and to demonstrate having ‘sufficient resources’ to provide for themselves and not be a weight on the national social security system (Art. 8). In line with these rules, Member States can therefore restrict the free movement and residence of citizens of the EU from other Member States (Art. 27). In Italy, this was transposed into national law in 2007 (Decreto Legislativo 30/2007, Art 20.1-3), which was modified in 2008 to introduce the requirement of all EU citizens to declare their presence to the local police and obtain residence permits for stays of longer than 3 months (Decreto Legislativo 32/2008). Failure to hold a permit would result in being categorised as an undocumented immigrant, with the possibility of being detained and deported. These deportations are decided on a case by case basis, such as the case of a Romanian criminal considered a danger to public security by a Prefect in 2009 (Libero, Epuso romeno scarcerato dai magistrato, 1st March 2009), and a resident of ten years being deported for participating in confrontations during a protest in Rome in 2011 (La Repubblica Roma, Maroni dispone l’espulsione del giovane romeno fermato, 19th October 2011). In Spain the free movement directive was transposed to national law in Decree 240/2007 (Real Decreto 240/2007, Boletín Oficial del Estado 51, 28/02/2007), which conditioned deportation orders for EU citizens on there being ‘serious public order or public security concerns’ and following consideration of the individual’s length of time in Spain, social and cultural integration, age, health, family and economic situations and the strength of their ties to the country of origin (Art. 15). However, deportations of EU citizens are not included in official statistics.
Nevertheless, when the very rare cases have been reported in the press this has occurred been as part of an extradition request from the Romanian government, or as part of an informal agreement rather than in line with the free movement directive, as seen with the town council that bought fifteen bus tickets to Romania for a group of gypsy families (El Público, *Motril expulsa a 15 rumanos y les paga el autobús a su país*, 17ᵗʰ November 2010).

Thirdly, as with all EU citizens in foreign Member States, Romanians cannot vote in national elections and only have political rights on the municipal and supranational levels. As will be examined in the following two chapters, this has resulted in a lack of a Romanian voice in national and, to a lesser degree, local politics in Italy and Spain, reflecting a certain disconnection between these two levels of politics. Yet at the same time, Romanian nationals in these countries have retained their enfranchisement in the national and presidential elections in Romania, with their votes being added to the Bucharest constituency until the establishment from 2008 of a specific constituency in Europe, with its own member of the Romanian parliament. This illustrates clearly how citizenship of the EU does not represent a unified status of equality across nationalities, but rather a varied collection of bundles of rights that are provided by different governments and institutions. Nevertheless, despite the maintenance of enfranchisement at local (in Italy and Spain), national (in Romania) and supranational (the European Parliament) levels, there has not followed a high level of participation from Romanian nationals, for reasons that will be discussed later. Instead, the move to EU citizenship has provided an opportunity structure for the participation of Romanian migrants to Italy and Spain that local autochthonous actors have adapted to in differing ways, depending on their context. In this way, in Italy there has been little interest in the local voting patterns of Romanian nationals, whereas in Spain concern over their vote preferences and favourable public events were held in anticipation of capturing their support since 2005. In this way the formal categorisation of Romanian immigrants as citizens of the EU has not directly resulted in a shift to equal status and a redefinition of ‘who is who’ on positive terms, but rather provided a backdrop against which actor negotiations could play out in new ways. The social impact of the cross-border citizenship of the EU therefore depends on political interests and mobilisation patterns that are embedded in local settings.
Conclusions

This chapter has aimed to outline the legal and policy frameworks which have governed the incorporation of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain. By analysing the development of these laws and policies in period of increasing Romanian immigration, it has illustrated how they have influenced the political and social status of Romanian immigrants in these countries within a stratified hierarchy of citizen categories.

The analysis of legal and policy measures above has shown that there are broad commonalities between Italy and Spain as regards their responses to immigration. In both countries, the presence of immigrants was initially considered to be a temporary phenomenon and few measures for permanent incorporation were established. The characteristics of the labour market contributed to a high level of undocumented immigration but also, in addition to social and personal networks between immigrants, acted as the principal route for integration. Long-term residence has been tied to legal employment in both countries, which has proven problematic in contexts of high levels of casual, short-term, precarious or informal labour. Accordingly, and as noted above, data from amnesties on immigrants’ undocumented status have shown the Romanian immigrant population to be characterised by a high degree of informality in both countries. As non-EU citizens, access to citizenship and long-term stability through naturalisation was also restricted and there were few, if any, opportunities or channels for the political participation of Romanian immigrants on a national scale. It should be noted, though, that integration measures and political participation have been on the Spanish agenda for longer than that of Italy.

The logic and modes of policy making in these countries have also been broadly similar. The general logic of developments has been one of attempting to restrict undocumented immigration whilst establishing a reliable supply of legal foreign workers. Regarding this distinction between the rights granted to legal residents and the security and control measures passed in reference to illegal ones there is a certain convergence across party political divides in both countries. In this way, the centre-left in Italy tightened the laws on deportation in 1998 and, despite their rhetoric, the centre-right passed a law in 2002 that allowed for the largest
regularisation in the country’s history. In Spain, moreover, the centre-left criticised the centre-right’s second reform of 2000 but did not subsequently repeal it when they entered into power from 2004. In both countries, policy making has incorporated certain demands of a limited group of social actors such as the Catholic Church, in particular the Catholic charity Caritas, which has been significant in shaping policy.

In this context, despite the supranational development of European Union citizenship meaning that the formal status of Romanian immigrants in Italian and Spanish has changed, the perspective of actors and institutions in Italy and Spain have not been easily moved. Indeed, a continued distinction between native and EU citizens in an increasingly stratified hierarchy of legal statuses has been epitomised by restrictions to the labour market and the capacity to deport those considered to be a threat. Thus a certain 'stickiness' has been visible in national responses to mobility from within the EU meaning that Romanians have not directly become legal insiders in Italy and Spain.
Chapter 5
The National Dimension of the Politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain

This chapter examines the categorisation of Romanian immigrants in national political debates. It asks how national politicians in Italy and Spain categorise Romanian immigrants in their countries. Whereas the previous chapter concentrated on the structural definition of categories of immigrants in laws and policies, here the focus shifts to the negotiations between political actors in the specific context of national party politics. The following chapter will further add to this by analysing local negotiations and mobilisations of political and social actors of autochthonous and Romanian origin in the two principal cities of Romanian immigration: Rome and Madrid, before the final chapter will examine the role of cross-border structures, networks and actors.

As already seen in the legal context in which Romanian immigration has occurred in Italy and Spain, legal residence and the rights that are associated with it have been tied to employment (although in Spain this association was somewhat looser in terms of healthcare and education). Romanians have been predominantly defined as ‘outsiders’ due to their short-term, precarious or informal labour market roles accompanied with undocumented residence, resulting in few opportunities for long-term residence, stability or political participation and representation. The granting of EU citizenship has not brought a direct change and shift to equality but rather established an additional level of stratification among citizenship statuses: Romanians are no longer undocumented third country nationals, but are also not equal members of a common polity. In this chapter, however, a political discourse will be highlighted that includes few explicit associations with the labour market and frames Romanian immigrants as a ‘threat’ in Italy tied to public order issues, and as ‘victims’ in Spain due to their disadvantaged position in society and politics. These
follow distinct logics of coalition-building in a fragmented political context in Italy and consensus-maintenance around the importance of rights and democracy in Spain following the country’s relatively recent transition to democracy. In this way, in both countries there have been processes of negotiation of what it means to be a Romanian immigrant which have developed against the backdrop of quite distinct institutional and discursive contexts.

The textual evidence to be qualitatively analysed in this chapter is primarily composed of records from the acts, proposals and initiatives from Italy’s Camera dei Deputati and Spain’s Congreso de los Diputados along with policy documents, electoral manifestos, press reporting and public opinion surveys. The material was collected from the period between 1989, corresponding to the beginning of contemporary emigration from Romania, and 2008, when the last complete legislature in each country ended at the time of analysis.

In national parliamentary debates, political actors are situated within a controlled institutional environment of the parliament itself, in which communication is regulated according to specific rules and conventions (Chilton 2004: 92-5). The rules and containment of actors within the same time and space enables a direct comparison between diverse perspectives on the same issue. The debates in parliament are significant to politics in two ways: on the one hand, they are a site of negotiation of the laws and public policies that respond to issues, and therefore form part of the wider process of determining ‘who is who’ that has been outlined in this thesis (Olmos Alcaraz 2007: 130, Zapata-Barrero 2007: 319). On the other hand, parliamentary debates are also ‘weapons in the party battle’ and are the site of differentiation and calls for action across party lines (Chilton 2004: 92). In this way the debates in parliament offer an opportunity to see how actors not only refer to the characteristics and implications of Romanian immigration but also mobilise around their view in competition with opposing perspectives. However, the parliament does not exist in a vacuum. Thus, although their immediate audience may be an opposition representative in the parliamentary chamber, politicians can choose to align their debates with the discourses, beliefs and norms of the voting public outside. In this way, the actors studied in this chapter do not only speak inside the Camera and the Congreso, and the issues that are discussed inside are also present in press reports and public opinion beyond the formal sessions. For this reason in this
chapter the parliamentary debates are also assessed in relation to an examination of press reporting, party documents, electoral manifestos and public opinion surveys in each country.

The chapter is divided into two principal sections, one on each country. Within each case study there is an outline of the national dimension of party politics, concentrating on the evolution of actor relations in their respective institutional and discursive contexts. This is followed by an examination of the way in which responses to immigration have developed over time, illustrating the evolution over time of political debate, press reporting and public opinion in response to the Romanian immigrant population in particular. Some general conclusions are presented at the end.

**Italy**

*The national dimension of politics in Italy*

The politics of immigration in Italy have developed during a time of political and social upheaval. During the 1980s and 1990s, social change and political corruption scandals heralded a shift in the balance of party competition, the strength of traditional cleavages and the structures and institutional rules of electoral politics. At the same time, immigration flows rapidly increased and territorial identity came to the fore as a regional political party, the Northern League (*Lega Nord*, LN) made calls firstly for the independence, and later federal autonomy, of the northern regions of the country.

In general from the 1950s through to the 1980s the political offer in Italy had been stable, divided between Christian Democrats (*Democrazia Cristiana*, DC) and Communists (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI). The post-World War II political landscape of 1948 was polarised along lines of working-class communism and conservative individualism. In 1945 Alcide de Gasperi narrowly won the popular vote for the Christian Democrats (*Democrazia Cristiana*, DC) to lead post-war Italy and the party would go on to provide every Prime Minister from 1947 to 1981 (Agnew 2002: 90). Yet during this time of consistency in party politics, Italian
society underwent great change. In the 1960s industrial productivity grew annually at 13.6%, and GDP at 6%, bringing with it wealth but also structural inequalities that reinforced economic imbalances along the lines of rural-urban and north-south territorial divides and fuelled mass migration from rural areas to urban centres (Ginsborg 1990: 219, Mammarella 2008: 273). The urbanisation of the workforce urged the centre right to reconsolidate its place in power, which had previously been strengthened by popular support from the rural peasantry. It did so through a process defined by Christopher Duggan as ‘the colonization of the state’ (2007: 563), or by Hopkin and Mastropaolo as ‘clientelist generosity’ (2001: 158), by which the Christian Democrats established a restrictive political hegemony that drew its support from networks of clientelism and state patronage (see also Golden 2000). These patron-client networks between politicians and business became ever more explicitly corrupt during the 1980s, culminating in the uncovering of the tangentopoli (Bribe City) corruption scandal in 1992, which implicated some 6,000 businessmen and politicians, including the Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, in the popularly-known Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) trials of 1994.

Tangentopoli may have sparked an institutional crisis, but significant pressure for change in Italian politics had already been building (Agnew 1995, Duggan 2007, Patriarca 2001, Ventresca 2006, Woods 1995). A combination of the social upheaval of modernisation and deindustrialisation, the fear of right and left wing terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s and the end of the Cold War contributed to an ideological distancing of the public from the dominant political blocs of the Christian Democrats and the Communists as the 1980s progressed (Agnew 2002: 90, Mammarella 2008: 273, for an overview see also Ginsborg 1990). In the early 1990s this was accompanied by a revision of memories of fascism as part of a ‘say anything’, uprooted and de-historicised political culture (Ventresca 2006: 101-3), and a wider public debate on Italian national identity and the many vices of the ‘Italian character’ (Patriarca 2001: 23-8). In short, traditional political alignments had already been crumbling, the dominant right-left cleavage was losing relevance and less people were identifying themselves with the main parties than before (Diani 1996, Zicone 1998). Indeed, there was widespread public distrust of the country’s political elites, illustrated by fifty percent of the population the beginning of the 1990s feeling that ‘all parties are the same’ and a declining share of the population
thinking that political parties were essential for democracy (Diani 1996: 1059). This confirmed an underlying distrust present since the 1970s (Cento Bull 2008, Diani 1996: 1061). Indeed, the Italian State has been described by Foot as ‘rarely [...] an institution that represented all Italians, but appeared to reflect the needs of only certain Italians at certain times’ (2003:51).

Between 1991 and the elections of 1994, the political landscape altered both in terms of the actors and the structural rules of party politics. The Communists held their last Congress in 1991, dissolving into the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico di Sinistra, PDS, later Democratici di Sinistra, DS, later Partito Democratico, PD in 2008) and Communist Reformation (Rifondazione Comunista, RC). In 1993 the Socialists and Christian Democrats were also dissolved. In short, the political supply was unpopular, untrusted and unsustainable, and this in turn opened the door for parties professing anti-system and anti-immigration attitudes to gain support. Furthermore, this decline of Italy’s mass parties was accompanied by electoral reform in 1993 that would further push the dramatically changing balance towards a geographically fragmented, coalition-based arrangement by introducing uninominal electoral districts and a combination of majoritarian (75%) and proportional (25%) voting. The intention was to produce a more bipolar political structure that would give increased alternation between ruling parties and prevent the prolonged dominance of one party, but in 1994 no single party had enough coverage to put forward uninominal candidate lists in every province and thereby to stand a chance of winning on a national scale. All parties were obliged to compete through coalitions, which would come together for elections but remain ideologically and territorially separate in reality (Chiaramonte and Di Virgilio 2006, Geddes 2008b).

The political groups to come out of this period were those that successfully distinguished themselves from the political past. On the political right, a coalition formed of Go Italy! (Forza Italia!, FI), Italian Social Movement-National Alliance (Movimento Sociale Italiano-Alleanza Nazionale, later only Alleanza Nazionale, AN) and the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN). In particular, the LN achieved significant and sudden electoral success in the north of the country. Some academics have attempted to explain this as due to identification between the electorate and their symbolic construction of a regional identity that ‘rediscovered’ a Padanian nation (Albertazzi 2006, Fremeaux and Albertazzi 2002, Tambini 2001). However,
this process should not be taken out of the institutional and social contexts described above, characterised by a changing stability of dominant cleavages, shifting rules on electoral politics and a general political crisis for the Italian State (Cento Bull 2003, Diani 1996). In this context, LN successfully directed an anti-system and anti-elite discourse against corrupt politicians in Rome who were defined as having lost all contact with ‘ordinary people’, combined with a rejection of political parties and individuals with ‘unconventional lifestyles’ such as immigrants, Muslims, gypsies, or homosexuals (Diani 1996: 1054-8, see also Cento Bull 2003: 46, Saint-Blancat and Friedberg 2005, Sigona 2005). In this way, Diani has illustrated how LN discourses managed to position the party within a wider collapse of traditional cleavages and principles, differentiating it from the de-legitimised political leaders of the past and portraying itself as the owner of issues relating to public grievances (Diani 1996). The success of the LN in the general elections of 1994, taking 8.4% of the national vote, gave it a vital role in the victory of the national coalition of the centre-right (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005). However, its inability to balance anti-system populism with participation in the government also led to tensions and was responsible for the fall of the government in the same year (Ibid.). This was not repeated during its second term in a centre-right coalition government, from 2001 to 2006, when its role as an ‘opposition within government’ responsible for ‘reproducing fear’ of EU integration, immigration, free trade, big business, secularism and multiculturalism was accepted as necessary to gain coverage of the political supply in the north (Ibid.: 961).

The same argument applies to the League’s coalition partners. At the head of Go Italy! (Forza Italia, FI), Silvio Berlusconi also represented a break with the past, using his charisma and media empire to project an attractive and populist image to voters, promising to lower taxes, to create employment, to establish a new Italian miracle, to oust the Communists from Italian institutions and to lower illegal immigration whilst welcoming legal workers (Foot 2003, Geddes 2008b). Berlusconi capitalised on the political context by running in two coalitions; the ‘Pole of Freedoms’ (Polo delle Libertà, with the Lega Nord and Lista Pannella in the North) and the ‘Pole of Good Government’ (Il Polo del Buongoverno, with Alleanza Nazionale in the South), assuring a national coverage of their political offer. Although his first government collapsed following the exit of the LN from
government in 1994, in this phase Berlusconi effectively constructed the contemporary centre-right in Italy (Diamanti 2007: 735).

Finally, AN grew out of the anti-system and ex-fascist Italian Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*, MSI) in 1993 and also pursued ‘an anti-immigration strategy motivated by the desire to win votes that is woven into a larger critique of the existing order’ (Geddes 2008b: 354). However, this would later be replaced by a shift towards the centre, aimed at a post-Berlusconi future and reflected by the claim in 1998 that immigration was ‘inevitable’, and in 2001 that it was ‘necessary’ for Italy’s future (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005: 963). In 2007, FI and AN joined forces to form the People of Freedom party (*Popolo della Libertà*, PdL), an umbrella party on the centre-right which would enter into coalition with the Lega in the North and the Movement for Autonomy (*Movimento per le autonomie*) in the South from 2008.

The contemporary Italian Left has been forged out of a combination of its Communist inheritance and a desire to reform and reinvent itself on the political centre ground (Andall 2007). Having been the biggest Communist party in Cold War Europe, in 1991 the PCI split into the PDS and RC, along with a number of other small parties ‘re-born from Christian Democratic ashes’ (Zincone 1998: 56). The PDS aspired to create a post-socialist political centre, whilst RC occupied a more marginal position further to the left but maintaining the Communist values of equality, rights and social inclusion (Foot 2003). A Catholic-centrist party The Daisy (*Margherita*) was also present from 2001 and ran in coalitions with the PDS. However, the coalitions of these parties suffered something of an identity crisis during these years. They were not publicly seen as ‘new’ and as a result they have struggled to win votes from the traditional anti-communist opposition and the working class (Diamanti 2007: 737). Emblematic of the confusion was an alliance made with the LN for the administrative elections of 1995, recognised at the time by the DS leader Massimo D’Alema as the leading party of the Northern working class (Andall 2007:137). A degree of unity came through the Olive Tree (*Ulivo*) coalition of Romano Prodi, a technocrat from outside the parties, which governed from 1996 to 2001. In this way, Prodi adopted a role akin to that of Berlusconi by being a charismatic leader capable of mediating between fragmented actors, although without such significant economic resources or the support of his own party.
(Diamanti 2007). However, at elections this coalition has frequently presented separate lists for the constituent parties and in power they have formed weak governments, with the Olive Tree collapsing and requiring new leadership in 1998, 2000 and at the elections in 2001.

The fragmented and polarised political context in Italy has been described as a ‘never-ending transition’ following the collapse of the party system in the 1990s (Cento Bull 2008). High political fragmentation and instability, distrust, a lack of accountability and anti-elitist, anti-political populism have been put in place rather than a stable and moderate democratic system in a situation defined scathingly by Perry Anderson as ‘not a party, or a class, but an entire order converted into what it was intended to end’ (2009). As the dominant Left-Right, Communist-Christian Democrat cleavage has declined there was a rise in regional conflict in the 1990s, and a return to ideological confrontation in more recent years (Cento Bull 2008, Patriarca 2001, Ventresca 2006). Moreover, this has also been influenced by further institutional change, with electoral reform in 2005 sealing the presence of small parties in coalition politics by reintroducing proportional representation with a threshold of 4% that must be reached by parties outside of any coalition, and only 2% within one, in order to gain representation (Pasquino 2007: 279). This has severely limited the introduction of new political actors without coalition support and confirmed the fragmented, bi-polar coalition politics that was born in the early 1990s (Diamanti 2007).

*The national dimension of the politics of immigration in Italy*

Such fragmentation and polarisation has directly influenced the politics of immigration in Italy since the 1990s, as a negative, exclusionary perspective has gained dominance under the influence of the parties of the right, but also not denied by PDS members on the left.

In their comprehensive review of public discourse and journalistic articles on immigration in Italy, Sciortino and Colombo have shown how, prior to the 1980s immigration was of minor public interest, although a distinction was made between the upper class Arab millionaires, Scandinavian actors, and CIA agents, highlighted for their fascinating and exotic nature, and the unskilled, lower class workers defined
according to administrative and class categories, as workers or components of the labour market or as perpetrators or victims of crimes (2004: 98-9). At this time public opinion showed only a small minority of Italians to be concerned with immigration (Zincone 1998: 48), and in politics the tendency of the dominant DC was to keep immigration off the national agenda (Andall 2007: 135). When immigration was referred to during the 1980s, expressions of solidarity cut across party political lines, coming from a range of parties such as MSI, the Communists and the Socialists. In this way, for example, the Italian Communists and left-wing social movements of the 1980s, conceived immigrants as ‘disadvantaged subjects’ pushed into moving by the ‘exploitatative capitalist system’ (Picker 2011: 610).

However, the dominant image of immigration would change during the 1990s. Over this time, some individual nationalities such as Moroccans and Albanians and a generalised perception of extracomunitari or immigrants from beyond the European Community were increasingly associated with acts of criminality and threats to public order in the press (Sciortino and Colombo 2004: 107). In press reporting, immigration became a politically salient topic: it was presented as a source of social conflict and distinctions were made separating acceptable legal immigrants from dangerous and problematic clandestine or irregular ones (Sciortino and Colombo 2004: 106-7). The fire was stoked when some 25,700 undocumented Albanian migrants arrived in Italy in only four days in March 1991, and on the 8th of August 1991 the arrival in the port of Bari of a ship loaded with another 17,000 caught the headlines in shocking fashion. An emergency was declared and the arrivals were transported to the city’s football stadium, before being deported back to Albania, but the photographs and television pictures were dramatic and stayed around for longer in the nation’s headlines and the propaganda of the Northern League.

Consequently, it has been said that throughout the 1990s Eastern Europeans, and Albanians in particular, provided a ‘lightning rod’ for a negative discursive framing of immigration (King and Mai 2009: 119). Moreover, this must be seen within a wider rejection of ‘extracomunitarian’ immigration from beyond the European Union, and ‘clandestine’ migrants arriving without documents. This rejection of immigration was built on the construction of a category of unacceptable, non-EU, illegal migrants. A review of poster archives illustrates how this was
particularly the case for the Lega and AN in the two years prior to the elections of 2001 and again in 2008. Indeed, examples of LN posters at this time are simple declarations in bold letters of ‘STOP! Clandestine Immigration’; ‘Clandestine Migrants Halt!’; and ‘No Amnesty Deport Clandestine Migrants’. An explicit association between crime and undocumented immigration was also clear in calls for ‘Clandestine Migrants and Delinquency STOP!’ and ‘Enough clandestine migration - solidarity in their home, yes, crime in our home, no’. The same category was employed in AN material in 2008, claiming that ‘Clandestine immigration is bad for women’ and ‘Never more clandestine immigrants at home’.

The political response towards the end of the 1990s shifted in a way defined by Zincone as from under-evaluation to over-evaluation (1998: 44). It has been increasingly dominated by the centre-right, in particular the Northern Leagues and National Alliance. For the LN, immigration was presented as an invasion posing a threat to the economic, cultural and political unity of the North in a similar way that previous migration from the southern Mezzogiorno had been in the 1980s, whilst AN has been defined as opportunistically adopting the same approach (Geddes 2008b: 354).

This coalition has had contradictory objectives and strategies. On the one hand, they have been supported by many small and medium businesses that benefit from a cheap foreign labour force, such as the northern business leaders who called for increases in immigration quotas in 2001 (La Repubblica, Lavoro, botta e risposta, 12th January 2001) and the representative body of Italian business, Confindustria, which claimed in 2009 that ‘Italian businesses are demanding an ever-increasing number of immigrant workers’ (Ansa, Confindustria, cresce la domanda aziende per immigrati, 18th November 2009). On the other hand, however, they also aligned with the concerns of working class and conservative voters by defining immigration as a

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3 Two archives were examined for this project. The first was of the Northern Leagues, available at http://leganord.org/ilmovimento/manifesti.asp, accessed 10th November 2011. The second was the ‘Manifesti Politici’ project by the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci in Emilia Romagna, which consists of an online collection of over 10,000 political and social posters, available at http://manifestipolitici.sebina.it/SebinaOpacGramsci/Opac, accessed 10th November 2011
4 In the original Italia these were: ‘STOP! Immigrazione Clandestina’, ‘Clandestini Alt!’, and ‘Nessuna Sanatoria Espellere I Clandestini’
5 ‘Clandestini + Delinquenza STOP!’ and ‘Basta clandestini – solidarieta a casa loro, si, criminalita a casa nostra, no’
6 ‘L’immigrazione clandestine fa male alle donne’ and ‘Mai piu clandestini sotto casa’
threat to Italian jobs and a cause of insecurity and criminality (Cento Bull 2010). This simultaneous securitisation and liberalisation of immigration has been built on a strong distinction between legal and undocumented migrants, welcoming the former only if they are ‘willing’ to work, and claiming to fight the entry of the latter at all costs. In this sense, it is undocumented clandestine migrants who have usually been equated with criminality, whilst legal foreign workers have not, although in practice the distinction between the two is fuzzy and often conflated. In this way, the fragmented Italian politics of immigration has become a combination of client politics in decision making and populist, majoritarian patterns in public debate, resulting in a clear gap between policy and discourse (Geddes 2008b). The influence of these actors on the perception of immigration is illustrated by data showing that at the time of the 2001 election an average of 65% of the Italian electorate saw immigration as an important problem, and a quarter of these also saw immigration specifically as a threat to security and public order (ITANES, referenced in Geddes 2008b). As will be shown below, the high degree of informality in the Romanian immigrant population noted in previous chapters would contribute to their being categorised in this way.

The left’s approach to immigration during the 1990s must be viewed within the wider struggles in ideology and identity outlined above. As noted in the previous chapter, the left’s immigration policy making has followed a typical model of client politics through collaboration with specific interest groups such as trade unions, NGOs and the Caritas. However, when confronted with the majoritarian and populist approach of the parties on the right, the lack of a shared understanding or public philosophy of immigration and national citizenship led to contradictions and a weak counter-argument. On the one hand, the leaders of the left have been described as ‘fearing’ the right wing discourse and loss of votes if they did not attempt to restrict immigration (Andall 2007: 138). On the other hand, the emphasis of cultural differences between positively-viewed immigrants and negatively-viewed natives was, often confusingly, incorporated into changeable arguments depending on the audience and context (Andall 2007, Picker 2011). This is because, as noted by Picker, ‘the shift from the socialist to the post-socialist Left was accompanied by the rise of identity politics, namely the struggle around “gender”, “ethnicity” and other cultural manifestations, which replaced the accent that the Left traditionally put on
class’ (Picker 2011: 610-1). Thus, the transformation of the post-communist left in Italy was accompanied by a replacement of class concerns with ones of ethno-cultural identity (Però 2005: 835). Consequently, measures by left wing groups in places such as Bologna and Florence were aimed at protecting the cultural specificity of immigrants and ethnic groups as different to Italian society, resulting in segregation (Però 2005, Picker 2011). In this way the PDS, whilst in opposition, contradictorily supported both a regularisation process and increased deportation procedures for undocumented migrants, before passing the Turco-Napolitano law which saw an expansion of immigrants’ social rights combined with increasing security and deportation measures. At times, the left similarly adopted the language and rhetoric of the right in debates on Romanian immigrants, particularly in response to acts of criminality in 2007.

Regarding voices from outside these coalitions, in the early 1990s a number of politicians from distinct parties stood for election under the banner of an Alliance for an Anti-racist Parliament (Patto per un parlamento antirazzista), with 90 individuals elected successfully in 1994 (Zincone 1998: 74). However, the experience was short-lived and with the establishment of polarised coalition politics opportunities for such cross-party initiatives diminished significantly (Ibid.). This failure illustrates the difficulty of establishing and maintaining consensus on issues of racism and ethnic relations across Italy’s fragmented and polarised political parties.

The politics of immigration in contemporary Italy have thus been shaped by a fragmented and non-consensual political context with a combination of client and majoritarian modes of politics. In public, negative responses to immigration over this period have had two principal functions. Firstly, with the establishment of coalition politics in which internal harmonisation across partners has been less relevant than external differentiation from the opposition, the symbolic construction of immigration as a threat has constituted a useful dividing issue between right and left (Baldassarri and Schadee 2004), providing a boundary-defining mechanism to denote who is who in the coalitions on left and right. However, whereas the right enjoyed a degree of consensus among its coalition partners regarding the public order challenges posed by immigration, the left was unable to do so. Secondly, it has constituted a meta-issue, being presented as a cause of a range of social issues that
have gone without resolution. Indeed, since 2003 Eurobarometer surveys asking citizens for the most serious concerns facing their country have found economic conditions, crime and security to be consistently higher ranking than immigration (see figure 6). The discourse of the political right blames these highest ranking concerns on the presence of immigrants, facilitating the claim that they can be solved through measures against immigration. Both of these patterns will be seen in the debates on Romanian immigration below.

Figure. 6: Eurobarometer Italian public opinion 2003 – 2008
This section will illustrate how Romanian immigration has been incorporated into this wider pattern of differentiation between categories perceived as welcome and others causing problems of public order and crime.

As noted above, early references to Romanian nationals in Italy emphasised solidarity and their need for asylum. A ‘victim frame’ also acted as a way for members of AN and LN to criticise decisions to not allow certain individuals to enter from Romania, such as ‘a daughter who is only asking for the chance to lovingly live with her mother during the last years of her life’ (Falvo, AN, 31/01/1995) and Mr Gheorghe Sinka who wishes to ‘hug his sister, who has lived for years in Italy and is married with an honest Italian worker’ (Dozzo, LN, 02/02/1995). Although these comments may be surprising in light of the views that would later be expressed by these parties, the victim frame here sits within the same broader criticism of the Italian State employed by them at the beginning of the 1990s in favour of ‘normal people’ such as families and honest workers.

Subsequent developments were, however, influenced by a negative turn in the early 1990s in reference to ‘Eastern European migrants’ who were seen as a problem, particularly those of Albanian and later Romanian, origin (King and Mai 2009). This built over the decade, with journalists writing on the ‘boom’ in the presence of foreigners and in particular ‘those coming from Eastern Europe, who roam around Europe’ (La Repubblica, Questa Milano non è piú da bere, 5th October 1995). Press representations of the Romanian population have been noted for having misrepresentations and scandal as their central factors at this time (Uccellini 2010). For example, Uccellini’s study finds that the majority of articles from 1989 to 2009 showed concern for Italy’s internal security when confronted with Romanians, usually related to drug dealing, prostitution, and human trafficking. Also, even when not openly criticising Romanians, these stories portrayed them as victims involved in criminal processes, reinforcing the association between Romanian identity and crime and insecurity (Uccellini 2010: 80).

Accordingly, from 1996 onwards parliamentary debates on Romanian immigration also shifted, which would culminate in the pre-election periods of 1999 to 2001 and 2006 to 2008. Such a shift was both quantitative, as reflected by the
increasing number of debates on Romanians in the Chamber of Deputies (see figure 7), and qualitative, as will be illustrated below. The results illustrate how, as the Romanian population in Italy has grown, so too has its presence in political debate. They also reflect a consistent increase in debate on Romanian migrants across parliamentary mandates regardless of the governing coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate period</th>
<th>Total frames</th>
<th>Frames per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987-1994</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-1996</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Camera dei deputati debate on Romanians in Italy

The qualitative shift saw an increasing ‘threat’ frame in relation to Romanian immigration. In the period of 1999 to 2001, this came predominantly from representatives of the right-wing parties FI, AN and the LN. Framing a threat from Romanian criminality and insecurity occurred in two ways; firstly, through association with clandestine residence, and secondly, referring to Romanians in conjunction with other national identities which were also seen as problematic or criminal:

‘the situation of public security in Padova is made more difficult every day [...] due to extensive traffic of prostitutes spread around many streets in the city and managed by Nigerians, Albanians and Romanians’

Rodeghiero, LN, 15/09/1999

The term ‘frames’ refers to occurrences by a single actor in parliamentary debates in which there is a definition of a problem, its cause, implications and recommended resolution regarding Romanian immigration.
‘the streets of the large metropoles of the North are ever day and every night a theatre for a spectacle as sad and dramatic as it is discomforting: the sale of human flesh, prostitution and child trafficking [...] from Albania, Romania and ex-Yugoslavia in particular’

Chincarini, LN, 19/07/2000

This generalising strategy emphasises the significance of cases of criminality by defining a threat frame associated with many problems and a large population of multiple immigrant nationalities. Doing so aligned the problem of Romanian immigration with other questions of public order as a meta-issue to be solved through security measures. A similar presentation was found in the press, such as comments by the head of AN, Gianfranco Fini, in an interview in 2001, regarding his fears of Romanian migrants ‘who come here without work and live off crime and benefits’ (La Stampa, Scegliamo i nomi con rigore, 20th February 2001). This also aligned debates on Romanian immigration with the previous securitising trends in press reporting from the 1990s, as noted above, and was directed at winning votes from an electorate concerned with public order and crime, as measured in public opinion surveys.

Through the threat frame the centre-right also engaged in boundary-making by classifying certain nationalities (Romanians, Albanians and Nigerians), and categories (clandestine migrants and extracomunitarians) as different to the majority society due to undertaking activities that were unfavourable and illegal. In the period following the passing of the centre-left’s Turco-Napolitano law in 1998 and preceding the election of 2001, the reciprocal framing of this threat was shared among the members of the centre-right coalition in criticism of the centre-left incumbent. All of the analysed examples complained about uncivilised behaviour and made calls for tighter security and checks on the ‘legality’ of the relevant individuals. In doing so, they provided a symbolic resource for the establishment of consensus between members of the centre-right coalition, marking a difference between them and the governing parties. The generalised threat frame thus employed symbolic capital in the form of negatively-perceived nationalities and generalised categories (extracomunitarian and clandestine migrants) to build ties around shared
interpretations of the immigration issue, which would be important for mobilising cohesively in the elections. In this way, immigration was a unifying issue for the centre-right in an institutional context of fragmented coalitional politics that was at the same time strategically directed at criticising and weakening their opposition.

During this period there was little debate from the centre-left on Romanian immigration. Furthermore, they followed very different framing patterns to those outlined above. The most common frame for the centre-left was a ‘victim’ frame which called for allowing entry of Romanian immigrants, usually referencing single cases as a specific, technical issue rather than a wider social concern. This technocratic approach contrasted the populist logic of the right wing’s threat frame, which was directed at the wider public. It also reflects the aforementioned tendency of the centre-left to not engage with public debate in order to not lose ground to the centre-right (Andall 2007), as well as the uncertainty surrounding the shift from class to culturally-based interpretations of immigration (Però 2005, Picker 2011). Indeed, Romanian nationals were ambiguously presented in the left’s discussions on gender and children’s rights. In these a victim frame defined women and children whilst the threat was a Romanian aggressor. For example, in 2000 it was claimed that Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Moldovans and Albanians were responsible for enslaving women as prostitutes, and that they did not belong in a ‘civil country’ such as Italy (Pozza Tasca, PDS, 15/03/2000). Similarly, the murder of a child by a Romanian clandestino was said to have been avoidable if he had been previously deported:

‘the murderer has been, after a short while, identified as Vasile Donciu, a clandestine Romanian immigrant of 20 years of age, who had worked as a barman but had also carried out theft [...] he had already been arrested and put forward for deportation. Unfortunately, like so many others, he remained in Italy’

Pozza Tasca, PDS, 28/09/2000

The definition of the Romanian immigrant here employs the same language as the threat frames described above, from the category of ‘clandestino’ to the generalisation of ‘like so many others’. The implication is that this aligns the
speaker’s perspective with that of their centre-right opposition, despite their focus being on the safety of children rather than immigration per se. This continued in subsequent years, when members of The Daisy criticised an act of violence towards an Italian homosexual man (Giacchetti, Margherita, 25/11/2004) and a violent sexual assault on a Romanian girl by a Romanian gang (Bianchi, Margherita, 29/11/2005). Such ambiguity contributed to a lack of consensus across the coalition of the centre-left, as well as indirectly increasing cross-party consensus concerning the threat status of Romanian immigrants, accompanied by proposals for their deportation from Italy.

So, in summary, the ‘Romanian threat frame’ provided a resource for actors in both right and left wing coalitions, albeit with different intentions: one to provide apparent solutions to problems of public order and crime and the other to define a post-socialist consensus around issues such as gender and sexual equality. In this way, underlying the use of the same categories and frames in reference to Romanian immigration we find different motivations and logics.

The most significant period of debate on Romanian immigration came in the years approaching and following the elections of 2008. At this time there was a prevalent equating of Romanian national identity with Roma ethnicity, and both of these with acts of crime. For the parties of the right, particularly LN and AN, the categories of extracomunitarian and clandestine migrant were replaced by definitions of ‘Rom’ or ‘nomads’. In the parliament, the calls against discrimination of Romanian gypsies met shocking, dramatic accounts of violence, lawlessness and criminality from LN and AN representatives. The threat frame defined a ‘Rom emergency’, a ‘security emergency’, ‘hygiene emergency’ and a ‘nomad emergency’ as well as complaining about the ‘social danger’ of nomad camps. Crime, violence and a lack of hygiene were posited as cultural characteristics and a way of life for this population, as boundary-making discourses categorised Romanians and Roma gypsies as one group, living in ‘nomad camps’ and ‘baraccopoli’ (shanty towns):

‘[Romanians are] proliferating phenomena tied to clandestine lives and criminality, also caused by an unseemly and undignified modus Vivendi which the people living in these overcrowded, dirty places without any
respect for basic hygienic and sanitary norms are compelled to adopt’

Gibelli, LN, 08/07/2002

‘From the twenty or thirty clandestini initially camped it has reached, day after day, an increasingly crowded settlement of clandestini: first 100, then 200 [...] an embarrassing ‘baraccopoli’ with 100 or so children, women, and old people who sleep in their cars and live in their own excrement’

Pezzella, AN, 15/05/2003

These follow the same meta-issue strategy of the previous period to present a generalised, homogeneous population causing a vast array of problems. They also employ the same symbolic resources in the form of the ‘clandestine’ and ‘extracomunitarian’ categories, whilst aligning their perspective with the already-present dominant view of immigrants as a threat to public order. The resolution proposed by these speakers was for greater security and effective implementation of the Bossi-Fini law. There were few attempts to reinterpret and appropriate this frame by the centre-left, such as the criticism of the destruction of a camp near Rome as destroying the homes of ‘not traditional nomads, but Romanians who were escaping from poverty and fear’ (Ciani, Margherita, 11/02/2003).

Yet this definition of Roma gypsies as culturally and ethnically different from the majority Italian population was not an original association. It should also be viewed in a wider context in which the Roma population in Italy had been problematised by right and left wing governments in political discourse and public policy, accompanied by their segregation in temporary camps (Però 2005, Picker 2011, Sigona 2005). On one hand, right wing actors have emphasised a sense of emergency and siege in their responses in an attempt to resolve ‘the gypsy problem’ without granting the ethnic Roma the full benefits of equal citizenship (Sigona 2005). On the other hand, in places such as Tuscany, left wing administrations had established camps for nomads to be temporarily housed in, supposedly practicing their ‘nomadism’, since the 1980s (Picker 2011). In the parliamentary debates studied here, the Communists also employed a victim frame in parliamentary debates to highlight exclusion of and discrimination against Romanian gypsies and their distinct way of life. During the 2000s RC members also presented discrimination as
a sort of ethnic cleansing and fascist intolerance at the hands of Italian institutions, organisations and individuals, blaming the rhetoric of the centre-right parties for an escalation of tensions. As an outsider from coalitions, RC did not aspire to build ties with other parties but defined a boundary between themselves, on the side of the victims, and the centre-right coalition and Italian State as the aggressors.

Across all of the parties of left and right there was, nevertheless, a general consensus on the categorisation of Romanians and Roma gypsies as a specific, culturally different and separate social group to mainstream Italian society. In this way, they shared an understanding of the policy problem to be addressed and its causes, but not the implications or solutions. This conflation of Romanian and Roma identities resulted in the incorporation of an ethno-cultural definition of Romanian immigration into an already publicly salient emphasis of security and public order. All of this also disregarded the fact that, although within the Romanian emigrant population there has been an ethnic Roma contingent, it has been estimated that this represents only a very small minority of the total (Cova 2009). Indeed in 2007 the population of Roma and other ethnicity gypsies in Italy was estimated to be 150,000 individuals (although accurate surveys or official figures are not available), of which only 50,000 were of Romanian origin (Motta and Geraci 2007). Nevertheless, confusion reigned in the press and public discourse on Romanians and Romani, emphasising the categorisation of both as outsiders (Harja and Melis 2010).

The crescendo of the use of the threat frame rose in 2007 when an Italian woman was murdered by two Romanian women in April and the dead body of Giovanna Reggiani was found in a ditch in a northern suburb of the city of Rome in October, killed by the Romanian national Nicolae Romulus Mailat who was living at the time in a camp on the outskirts of the city. The press was outraged, stating that Romanians had become ‘crime tourists’ and that consequently ‘everywhere Roma camps have become centres for criminality and violence’ (Il Giornale, I turisti del crimine, 4th November 2007). A criminal nature to Romanian nationals was emphasised in public and continued the generalisation of the whole population as a threat (Cajvaneanu 2008, Harja and Melis 2010, Devole and Pittau 2010). An angry mob burned down the camp in which Mailat lived, and security became the greatest concern in Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (see figure 7, above). Political responses followed, with Berlusconi speaking in public of ‘the Romanian problem’
(Il Giornale, Berlusconi: spero che l’Italia non diventi come Roma, 4th November 2007), whilst the AN representative Daniela Santanchë declared that Rome was now a place ‘where women are killed and raped in front of everyone’s eyes’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, L’opposizione contro Governo e Veltroni: interventi tardi, 1st November 2007). The Lega Nord representative Paolo Grimoldi made perfectly clear his opinion that the Romanian community was made up of thieves and rapists that had invaded northern Italian cities (Movimento Giovani Padani, La Romania non ci faccia ramanzine e si riprenda i suoi delinquenti, 6th November 2007). Completing the cross-party consensus view of Romanian immigration and Roma ethnicity as a security and public order threat, the left wing Democratic Party Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni declared that there was a specific problem with this population whilst the Prime Minister of the same party, Romano Prodi, passed security legislation enabling the deportation of EU citizens for motives of State security, public security and ‘other motives of public order’ when their presence is ‘incompatible with civil and safe co-existence’ (Decreto Legislativo 30/2007, Art 20.1-3).

In this context the accession of Romania to the European Union resulted in little change. Indeed, the threat of Romanian immigration was blamed on the EU as a source of criminal populations. For example, in 2007 Fugatti of LN mentioned the problem of ‘the consistent arrival of a number of nomads’ linked with the entry of Romania to the EU, and Ascierto of AN stated that

‘the recent entry of Romania to the European Community has caused an uncontrolled flow of Romanian citizens to our country. Although the majority of Romanian citizens legally resident in Italy is made up of good people who contribute to our country’s growth thanks to their work, there are also more and more numerous episodes of dark stories, among them also murder, perpetrated by criminals from Romania. The illegal prostitution market is now in the hands of Romanians [...] also there is the presence of the nomad community [...] and with this also the concentration of beggars and so-called ‘window cleaners’ now presiding over the majority of the traffic lights in our cities. These beggars and window cleaners in the majority of
cases belong to a system of abuse at the tip of an organised crime system managed by Romanian citizens’

Ascierto, AN, 10/09/2007

Also, the terms ‘extracomunitari’ and ‘clandestini’ were absent, as European citizenship meant that these were no longer relevant for Romanian nationals, but the tendency of framing Romanian immigration as a social danger was continued. This involved the simple replacement of the extracomunitarian categorisation with that of ‘neocomunitarians’ by members of LN in parliamentary debates and public speeches (Il Sole 24 Ore, Maroni: introdurre il reato di immigrazione clandestina, 10th May 2008), which was contrasted from the left with a definition of Romanians as ‘comunitarians’ with rights under EU law, with the PD describing them as citizens with voting rights. For members of RC, Romanians were Europeans with a right to be protected from discrimination, continuing the victim frame that they had employed since the early 1990s.

So, the political responses to Romanian immigration in Italy can be summarised as influenced by the following:

Firstly, the establishment of unstable coalition politics at the beginning of the 1990s meant that no single party was able to dominate or form majority governments. Consensus with potential coalition partners was therefore important. The parties on the right, Go Italy!, National Alliance and the Northern League were able to consistently adopt an interpretation of immigration as a threat to public order, whereas no similar consistency was visible amongst their opposition. By establishing consensus in this way, the parties were able to appeal to the Italian voters who were concerned about crime and insecurity. Immigration, by acting as a meta-issue related to other concerns and a source of consensus therefore had a unifying character for the right.

Secondly, the declining stability of cleavages at the beginning of the 1990s provided an opportunity for regionalist and populist politicians to appeal to the voters. The LN took the opportunity to frame immigration as a threat to the north, as part of a broad regionalist argument against all outsiders. At the same time, AN and FI representatives aligned with the public order and security content of this argument in order to establish a common approach for their coalition and to provide an
apparent answer to the principal concerns of the Italian public at the time. The switch to a post-socialist politics for the main parties of the left, however, led to a focus on ethnicity and gender equality which would ambiguously relate immigration to cultural differences, violence against women, or prostitution and human trafficking, which were central tenets to the security and public order view of their opposition.

Thus, parties of the right and left have acted as vote-maximisers that were embedded in specific contexts. In the political context of unstable coalitions, the social capital represented by consensus with other actors through frame alignment contributed to an empowering of the parties of the right and their control of the dominant interpretation of specific policy issues regarding crime, public order, insecurity, etc. At the same time, in the social context characterised by a lack of stable cleavages the actors of the right aligned not with wider values but with ‘the people’ and their concerns regarding crime and insecurity, which contributed to gaining a popular legitimacy that the left could not. The construction of ‘who is who’ in reference to Romanian immigrants in Italy was therefore very rarely concerned with Romanian immigration as a policy issue in and of itself, but instead included it within wider critiques of other social issues and as a dividing issue in the balance of inter-party competition.

Spain

The national dimension of politics in Spain

Contemporary politics in Spain, and particularly the politics of immigration, have developed against the backdrop of wider narratives and memories of the transition to democracy following the fascist regime of General Franco and competing forms of nationalism. This section will outline the development of institutions and dominant cleavages in the country and illustrate how they have contributed to forming a bipolar, moderate and stable pattern of contemporary party politics.

The institutional structures of today’s Spanish State and political parties can be seen as the product of both the transition to democracy at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, and the continued relevance of cleavages that have shaped
the interpretation of issues over a much longer history. At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s the principal concern in Spanish politics was the consolidation of democracy following the end of the regime of General Franco (Gunther and Montero 2009, Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004, Hopkin 2001, Montero Gibert 2008, Salom 2008, Torcal and Chhibber 1995). The government was considered the key to the stability of this new democracy, established as a presidential system chosen under proportional representation every four years (Salom 2008: 359-361). Yet, Spanish society had also undergone great social and economic upheaval and change. In the economy, a cumulative GDP growth rate of 7% from 1961 to 1974 fell to 2.3% by 1978 and 1.1% from 1979 to 1983, accompanied by shortening business cycles, more frequent recessions and sustained inflation (Barquero and Hebbert 1985: 285-7). By 1981 unemployment had risen to 14.6% (Barquero and Hebbert 1985: 287), up from only 2.6% in 1974 (Zaldivar and Castells 1992: 77). Nevertheless, it was found that, across all parties, ‘leaving the social and economic problems for more stable times constituted part of the general “consensus” that characterised the change in regime’ (Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 12). The result was a pattern of moderate political competition that would persist through much of the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, since the first democratic elections in 1977 the national Congress of Deputies has seen an alternation of power between dominant catch-all parties of the left and right holding around 80% of the available seats (Gunther and Montero 2009: 99).

Parties in contemporary Spain can be roughly divided according to their focus at national or regional levels. On the national level, there are the dominant parties of the Socialists Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrera Español, PSOE), the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) and the more minor federation of small parties United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU). On the regional level, there is a wider range of parties, the strongest of which are found in the autonomous communities of the Basque Country (the Basque Nationalist Party, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) and Catalonia (principally the conservative Convergence and Union, Convergencia i Unió, CIU, and the Catalan Republican Left, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC). In reality, the distinction between national and regional politics is not as clear-cut as suggested here, as the PSOE and PP have regional formations such as PNV and CIU have had representatives in the Spanish parliament. However,
this chapter will focus predominantly on the ‘Spanish’ national level parties as they are the dominant voices in national politics.

During the 1980s, the left wing Socialists (*Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE*) were barely challenged in Spanish national elections. At this time, the PSOE successfully employed vague discourses of modernisation, rather than a specific economic or social platform, to position itself as a catch-all party governing for all Spaniards (Torcal and Chhibber 1995). In contrast, the conservative opposition, Popular Alliance (*Alianza Popular, AP*) was led by an ex-member of the Francoist regime, Manuel Fraga, and repeatedly put forward a platform based on Catholic and family values (Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 20). In doing so, they remained tied to the hegemonic view of the previous regime, which had equated Catholicism with a unitary Spanish nationalism (National-Catholicism) (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, Molina 2010, Núñez Seixas 2001). The conservative right only managed to provide an electoral challenge to the PSOE from 1989, when the party would be renamed as the Popular Party (*Partido Popular, PP*) and re-directed away from religious and moral issues and towards specific economic problems by the new leader José María Aznar (Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 22). In 1992 the PSOE could only form a minority government and in 1996 electoral victory for the PP, albeit in a minority government formed with CIU in Catalonia and PNV in the Basque Country, represented the confirmation of Spain’s transition to a legitimate parliamentary democracy with a stable alternation of power.

The establishment of a two-party bi-polar democracy was made possible through a combination of cross-party consensus on the importance of state unity and an avoidance of engagement with the ideology, symbols and memories of fascist nationalism. At this time, explicit affirmations of allegiance to the nation were associated with the regime and delegitimised as an ‘indelible Francoist stigma’ (Núñez Seixas 2005: 122, see also Gunther, Montero and Botella 2004, Núñez Seixas 2001). Only sub-state nationalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia made use of the term ‘nationalism’, which referred to their specific sub-state regional movements rather than a sense of nationwide Spanish identity. Indeed, as noted in chapter two, throughout the history of Spain numerous claims to regional identity and nationhood can be found, and the country’s history has often been shaped according to interpretations of politics and society along the lines of
dichotomic myths of ‘Two Spains’ (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, Núñez Seixas 1999, Ringrose 1998). One myth heralded the enduring memory of a unified, eternal Spain derived from the periods of the Reconquista and monarchic absolutism, promoted and preserved by conservative Catholic intellectuals and elites (de la Granja et al 2001, Nadal Oller 1975). The other, moreover, emphasised a history of *convivencia* or pluralism and cooperation amongst regional, provincial communities, as promoted by liberal groups critical of their centralist, absolutist monarchical opponents (Ringrose 1998: 4). The Constitution of 1978 epitomised the ambiguity surrounding perceptions of Spain, defining it as a sovereign ‘nation of nations’ and an ‘indivisible unity’ made up of different peoples, regions and nationalities (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010).

Although the end of the regime of General Franco resulted in strict avoidance of centralist nationalist discourse, it did not eradicate this nationalist cleavage, despite it no longer taking an explicit ‘Two Spains’ form (Hopkin 2005: 6). On the left, shared experiences of resistance and exile to the Franco regime were posited as foundational myths for the two principal actors, the Socialist Worker’s Party and United Left (Núñez Seixas 2005: 125). For these the nineteenth century Republican ideal of a free and voluntary union of citizens across linguistic and ethnic distinctions continued in the understanding of Spain as a nation of equal citizens, with equality between individuals being worth more important than the autonomy of certain regions (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 74, Molina 2010: 243). Spain has in this way been conceived as a democratic, modern and tolerant nation of nations united by a post-transition civic consensus. On the right, moreover, the conservative Popular Party was formed from a varied range of Christian Democrats, liberals, populists and ex-Francoists (Balfour 2005: 148, Valles and Diaz 2000: 134). Moreover, in the 1990s the PP also emphasised its democratic and modern credentials, governed by consensus and avoided references to the Civil War or nationalism, albeit whilst underlining the unity of Spain in the face of regional movements, being reluctant to remove Francoist symbols from public spaces and refusing until 2002 to condemn the fascist *coup d’etat* of 1936 (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006: 400-5, Núñez Seixas 2001, 2005: 124). Thus the PP also recognised the value of publicly accepting post-transition values.
Nevertheless, the 2000s represented a period of change in Spain’s party politics. The period has been defined as a crisis for the PSOE who received the lowest number of seats since 1979 in the elections of 2000, following corruption scandals at the end of the 1990s (Kennedy 2003: 100, 103, Valles and Diaz 2000: 136). On the other hand, for the PP the election victory and majority parliament of 2000 resulted in a shift in focus away from the previously dominant trend of consensus and moderation, placing ‘valence issues’ such as security, cultural identity and ‘the unity of Spain’ in centre stage in an attempt to show them to be strong on issues of national importance (Gunther and Montero 2009: 136-9). The politics of consensus shifted to a politics of polarisation on questions such as immigration, terrorism, regionalism and religion, which became divisive rather than uniting, questions of state and were accompanied by an increasing ‘disdain for public opinion’ (Blakeley 2006: 332, see also Gunther and Montero 2009, Itcaina 2006, Zapata-Barrero 2003). This came during a period of tension in Spain, with violent clashes between immigrants and natives. However, punishment by the electorate for this period’s shift away from the post-transition value consensus came with a surprise victory of the Socialists in 2004 and heralded a return to moderation (Blakeley 2006).

As in Italy, the dominant post-transition cleavage thus provided opportunities and limitations for actors. It enabled actors to legitimise themselves as different to the Francoist past, but as will be illustrated below also raised the possibility of the politicisation of the regime’s continuation in contemporary views and actions. In response, a ‘guilty conscience’ pushed all actors to emphasise their modern, democratic and tolerant traits in the public sphere.

The national dimension of the politics of immigration in Spain

Political and social responses to immigration in Spain have been interpreted in diverse ways. Many have been concerned principally with the ‘switch’ from country of emigration in the 1970s to one of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s. In this sense, Patricia Griñán noted in 1997 that ‘the problem of foreigners [in Spain] is, in reality [...] a phenomenon that is uncomfortably perceived and lived by Spaniards as an altering of the ‘normal’ situation’ (my translation, Griñán 1997: 179). Much
academic work, whilst undertaking the socially important task of underlining cases of discrimination, has also tended to generalise and spot racism and xenophobia at every turn in Spain’s political and social responses to immigration (see for example Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martínez 2008, Pajares 1998, Santamaria 2002). Public opinion has also been somewhat confusingly defined as moderate and permissive as well as a form of ‘worried tolerance’ (Ayerdi and de Rada 2008).

However, to claim that migration is a new, abnormal and generally rejected phenomenon is to oversimplify the reality. Historical emigration flows meant that in the 1950s Spaniards could be found in intercontinental networks to the Americas, and during the 1960s and 1970s 11.5% of the labour force emigrated, primarily to join the guest worker populations of northern Europe (Barquero and Hebbert 1985: 287). At the same time, there have been historical immigration flows which have not solicited major political responses, illustrated by the fact that policy measures were deemed unnecessary until 1985, and even then went unreformed until 2000. In this context, Catalonia provided an anomaly from the rest of Spain as intellectuals and elites at different moments throughout the twentieth century considered the presence of immigrants and their cultural assimilation as a concern, but also potentially a positive contribution to the Catalan national project (for examples see Cardás i Ros 2007, Pujol 1976, Vandellòs 1935).

Despite this, the general trend has been a lack of concern for the implications of immigration in Spain’s national politics. During the 1990s, politicians interpreted immigration as a potentially divisive issue, particularly when tied to questions of nationhood, identity and ethnicity, and so viewed it as ground for cooperation rather than conflict across party lines (Kleiner-Liebau 2009). Parties of the left and right aspired to minimise potentially controversial responses to immigration, such as the expulsion of 103 undocumented migrants in 1996 (Rojo and van Dijk 1997). The immigration debate in Spain prior to the end of the 1990s was thus described as a technical political issue that was kept off the mainstream agenda (Zapata-Barrero 2003).

The turning point came during the period of 1999 to 2001, when immigration became a significant political and social issue (González-Enriquez 2009, Zapata-Barrero 2003). In 1999, residents of the municipality of Terrassa protested against the Moroccan presence there, and between 2000 and 2001 there was the rejection of
a mosque in Premià de Mar, both in Catalonia (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés Mascareñas 2011: 21). Tensions also surfaced at El Ejido in Almería, where a high profile violent revolt in 2000 saw the burning of immigrant houses in reaction to the murder of a Spaniard by a Moroccan citizen. El Ejido hit national headlines in dramatic fashion and forced politicians to ‘discover’ the immigration issue and present resolutions (Zapata-Barrero 2003). At the same time, as noted above, the government of the PP underwent a swing to the right and revived cleavages in Spanish society that had traditionally been played down (Gunther and Montero 2009: 139). The politics of consensus on immigration were thus changed to a politics of polarisation: immigration became a divisive, rather than uniting, question of state, giving the impression that it was *per se* a conflictive topic (Retis 2009). At this time there was also increased political debate and activity regarding the reform of the immigration law, firstly in January 2000 and then, after the electoral victory of the PP and the establishment of a majority parliament, in December of the same year.

![Figure 8: Eurobarometer Spanish public opinion 2003 – 2008](image-url)
Public opinion towards immigration since 2000 has developed in tandem with this increasing political salience. From the early 2000s until the outbreak of the economic crisis and rising unemployment in 2007, immigration was consistently ranked among the three greatest concerns for the Spanish population in Eurobarometer surveys (see figure 8). Yet the content of these concerns has been ambiguous. For example, González Enríquez has analysed data from the regular series of Barómetro opinion surveys from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) and found that national attitudes to immigration actually underwent a shift from largely negative to positive perceptions between 1990 and 2004, but that this was accompanied by an increasing tendency to associate immigration and crime and the fact that by 2003 half of the Spanish population thought there were too many immigrants in the country (2004). Greater clarity is offered by Zapata-Barrero’s study of the same data, which notes that social attitudes are dependent on interpretations of immigration more than on the facts of migrant numbers (2009). Peaks in negative public opinion towards immigration are thus linked to periods of politicisation, such as that during the period of 1999 to 2001 in which the Law of Foreigners was reformed twice, rather than being caused simply by an increasing presence of immigrants. In this way ‘negative attitudes are orientated towards policies and the government’s actions rather than towards immigrants’ (Ibid.: 1107).

When Spain’s political parties have discussed immigration there have been limited differences in approach, with a more recent move to consensus. Since 2000, the PP’s electoral manifestos have dedicated increasing space to the issue, and in 2000 and 2004 they sought to balance calls for Spain to be ‘an open society’ with equality of rights and obligations for all, on the one hand, and an expectation of immigrants to ‘integrate’ through assimilation to Spain’s traditions and culture, on the other (Partido Popular 2000: 152, 2004: 202-3). Proposals for points systems and integration contracts along these lines were also presented by CIU in Catalonia in 2006 and by the PP in 2008 (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martínez 2008: 12-13). As illustrated by these examples, immigration has been approached by the conservative centre-right as an issue of rights and equality combined with an expectation of cultural assimilation (Gest 2010, Zapata-Barrero 2007). In contrast, the Socialists’
manifestos from these years have viewed integration of the immigrant population as the sharing of rights and duties guaranteed by state institutions, rather than a one-directional process of assimilation. For PSOE, in 2000 and 2004 immigration constituted one element of a wider pattern of social exclusion of workers, pensioners and other groups of people (PSOE 2000: 73, 2004: 124-5). This provided an understanding of immigration as a problem of class and labour market exclusion to be resolved through granting and protecting their rights and promoting tolerance.

However, by 2008 such a difference across parties was no longer present, due to adaptations from both. In the PP’s manifesto for the elections in 2008, the chapter on immigration emphasised the preference of legal over illegal immigration and pledged to establish ‘an integration model’ based on ‘our principles and constitutional values’ (PP 2008: 20). In the PSOE manifesto of the same year there was a similar stance against illegal immigration and a push for integration ‘starting from the recognition of our constitutional values and our rights and obligations, as well as those that correspond to immigrants’ (PSOE 2008: 13-4). This highlights a return to consensus on immigration across the two dominant parties. It has similarly been suggested by others such as the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration that there has been a certain shared approach to the issue as political actors have strived to keep immigration off the agenda (Zapata-Barrero et al 2008: 7). Such a perspective has been noted in a previous analysis of parliamentary debates on immigration in Spain which suggested that there existed a similar understanding of ‘cultural difference’ between the PSOE and the PP in reference to immigration (Olmos Alcaraz 2007: 118-9). In fact, when tensions have subsequently arisen in political discourse these have come primarily from local municipal wings of national parties or fringe regional parties and have not translated into widely voiced opinions, as noted in the town of Badalona, near Barcelona (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés Mascareñas 2011).

This consensus has been formed of three key elements. Firstly, there has been an alignment with the perspective of Spain’s economic interests. The Spanish business sector has consistently emphasised a need to open the country to legal immigration and introducing greater control on undocumented flows. In 2001 a representative body of the Spanish business elite, the Circulo de Empresarios, claimed that immigration provided important solutions to the country’s problems of
little demographic growth and an aging population that should be taken advantage of through a combination of open national borders to trade and migration flows and controlled regulation of hiring from the country of origin (Círculo de Empresarios 2001). In 2007, these business leaders repeated that immigration constituted a needed source of wellbeing and balance to cover the scarcity of ‘manual labour, human capital and talent’ in Spain (Círculo de Empresarios 2006, see also ABC, Inmigración, control y cualificación, 18th April 2007). The Spanish business press also argued in 2007 that immigration had ‘allowed the lifespan of our growth model to expand’ and that ‘Spain needs migrants to continue growing and to confront the demanding challenges that arise in increasingly competitive global markets’ (Expansión, Inmigración y política, 10th February 2007). As these references clearly show, the Spanish business sector has demanded a stable provision of foreign labour, to be regulated through an immigration policy built on the three factors of openness, control and integration. As outlined above, the PP has repeatedly called for almost exactly these measures since the year 2000, and the PSOE has adopted them in its 2008 manifesto.

Secondly there has also been an alignment with the interests of labour representatives. The trade union Worker’s Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, CCOO) was the first of these to show an interest in immigration and immigrant workers, in Catalonia in 1986, according to the vision that ‘the Catalan working class is a diverse working class’ (Interview 01/12/2011). Since then, CCOO has argued that immigration should be regulated to ensure the rights of foreign workers within the Spanish working class, whilst promoting intercultural programmes against xenophobia and discrimination in the work place. Since 2000, the General Worker’s Union (Union General de Trabajadores, UGT) has also run a permanent campaign against racism and xenophobia called vive y convive (‘live and live together’) whilst calling for a reduction in the underground economy in order to strengthen the employment conditions of immigrants, exemplified in 2005 by the General Secretary’s declaration that ‘just immigration policies’ should ‘contribute to the respect of workers’ rights, the promotion of decent work and the wider objective of an equitable distribution of wealth’ (UGT 2005). In this way, the cross-party consensus on the need to emphasis regulate migration flows and reduce
undocumented immigration can be interpreted as a combination of the interests and concerns of representative of Spanish business and labour.

These two elements fit Freeman’s model of client politics in which decisions are made according to the costs and benefits affecting concentrated interest groups, in this case business and labour, who keep immigration largely off the public agenda (1995). Nevertheless, there is also a third factor of consensus that has been most visible in the parliamentary debates and determines how responses to immigration have been shaped in Spain. This is a cross-party alignment on the values of post-transition Spanish society and politics, as outlined above. The post-transition cleavage consists of an emphasis of rights in a democratic and tolerant Spain, in contrast to the Francoist period of the past. In the analysis that follows in this and the following chapter, it will be illustrated how in a context of general consensus, it is this post-transition cleavage that has provided the principal point of contention and shaped the framing processes employed by political actors debating Romanian immigration.

*The national dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Spain*

In Spain, the Romanian immigrant population has arrived in a very short space of time and showed rapid signs of demographic growth, as illustrated in the previous chapter. Yet as noted above, this has occurred in a political context in which immigration has usually been taken off the agenda, with the principal national parties emphasising a combination of a rights-based discourse of inclusion and an assimilationist expectation of adherence to Spain’s constitutional and legal norms and values. Public opinion has been concerned about immigration, but in an ambivalent way, viewing the expansion of social rights positively but the arrival of more foreigners as concerning. These views follow the politicisation of immigration by the political parties at the time.

This section will outline and explain the response to Romanian immigration in this context, in particular the construction of the Romanian population as an immigrant group by the main national political parties. Academic studies of Romanians in Spain have presented generalised observations that ‘[in Spain] the worst images of Romania have been projected: criminals specialised in stealing,
hold-ups, falsification of documents, begging and prostitution’ (González Aldea 2007: 132). The reference paints an image of a Spanish society that sees Romanian immigrants as bringers of problems, social tensions and criminal activities. Yet this is simply an anecdotal piece of evidence and, as this section will illustrate, it does not accurately reflect the way that the Romanian population is represented in national political debate.

As with the case of Italian politics, there has been an increase in the presence of Romanian immigration in Spanish political debate (see figure 9). However, it is clear that in Spain there has been considerably less debate on Romanians in than in Italy, despite the similar population sizes and patterns of integration in these countries. Indeed, until the PP government of 1996-2000, Romanian immigration had not been registered at all in Spanish parliamentary debates. This follows a pattern noted in public opinion surveys: throughout the 1990s the majority of Spaniards considered ‘immigrant’ to be synonymous with individuals from Morocco and North Africa, Romanians did not occur as a category at all and only one to two percent of interviewees thought of the broader category of ‘Eastern Europeans’ when they spoke of immigrants (data from CIS Barómetro Surveys, 1993-2000). Romanian immigration did not, therefore, elicit significant responses in political debate or public opinion during the 1990s.

![Figure 9. Congreso de los diputados debate on Romanians in Spain, 1989-2008](image-url)
Furthermore, the difference with the Italian case was not only quantitative. In Spain, the most common frame used in debates on Romanian nationals presents them as victims, against the dominant threat frame in Italy. Spanish politicians have not engaged at all in discussion of the specific content of Romanian identity or character and the general trend in debate has been to minimise the significance of issues referring to Romanian immigrants and keep them off the agenda. In this process, instead of referring to the immigrants themselves, the victim frame has been employed as a way of underlining the speaker’s commitment to rights, democracy and an understanding of Spain as a modern, tolerant country. These are the values that all actors must agree on in order to position themselves on the right side of the post-transition cleavage outlined above.

During the PP mandate from 1996 to 2000, questions to the government from the opposition parties of Nueva Izquierda (NI, an offshoot of IU that had joined a parliamentary mixed group), IU and PSOE were principally in reference to the clearing of a settlement of Romanian nationals in Malmea, on the outskirts of Madrid in 1999. The camp was considered to be inhabited by families of Roma ethnicity.

The PP government at this time employed generalised categorisations of Romanian immigrants as Eastern European gypsies or nomadic people. They also described them as poor and disadvantaged and showed concern for their living conditions and health in the camp. Defining the problem to resolve as the poverty of the residents, due to their ‘singular’ cultural characteristics, the clearing of the camp was presented as a charitable resolution to modernise and improve their standards of living:

‘the administration should [...] be capable of minimising the situations of necessity that certain layers of our social structure suffer and that affect groups that try to find an opportunity to live with dignity in our country [...] as long as the characteristics of these specific groups are favourable and they are willing to integrate’

Gil Lázaro, PP, 21/07/1999
Integration was presented as a process developing in one-direction as the immigrants should ‘be willing’ to adapt to the host society, although at the same time the situation of the camp was associated with broader structures of necessity and inequality that should have been improved. By justifying the destruction of the camp in these terms, the PP’s minority government could have aspired to build consensus with coalition partners regarding the need for an improvement for the camp residents, as well as reducing disagreement with the opposition and thus taking the issue off the agenda.

A similar victim frame was presented throughout this period by the parties on the left. Again, the problem was presented as the disadvantaged situation of Romanian nationals, but the cause was instead the actions of the Spanish government, with the PSOE representative asking whether ‘the minimum conditions of respect for the human dignity of these people was taken into account by the Government’. Other comments were more explicit:

‘they [the Spanish police] threw the people out of their houses, out from where they lived [... which] has nothing to do with personal dignity, because the least dignified treatment there is, is to say to people that they have to leave their houses and find another life’

López Garrido, NI, 21/07/1999

Yet, despite this frame being similar to that of the PP, due to being based on a victim status of Romanian nationals, the logic with which it was used by the parties of the left was quite different. Firstly, these parties directly criticised the incumbent PP government, blaming it for limiting the possibility of the camp population to lead a life with a minimum level of human dignity. This relation of the PP to social exclusion presented the camp residents as victims of the incumbent government. Secondly, by stating that the incumbent government had denied citizens their rights and employed force to remove them, these parties aligned their argument with the wider post-transition cleavage by associating the PP with undemocratic practices. This is evidenced, for example, by the likening of the denial of the camp residents’ basic rights to an episode of ethnic cleansing by members of NI and PNV and the use
of the image of innocent individuals disappearing in the night to hark back vividly to fascist state repression:

‘somebody who was there before, now is not, there are people who have gone and nobody knows where they are’

López Garrido, NI, 21/07/1999

The frame alignment choice of the PP towards the ideas and beliefs of the left was clearly not reciprocated: instead, the parties of the left employed the symbolic capital of fascist acts to mark a boundary between themselves and the incumbent.

The same dynamic was found during the following legislature from 2000 to 2004. As noted above, this was a period of polarisation of the politics of immigration between left and right and a lack of consensus. The central debate during this legislature came in response to the burning of a Romanian Evangelical Christian church in the town of Arganda del Rey, on the outskirts of Madrid, and it was suggested that the attack was carried out by members of neo-fascist youth groups.

Again, the Romanian immigrant population was framed as a victim by all parties.

On the one hand, the members of the PP argued that although immigration constituted a topic that could create ‘problems’ for society, the Romanian immigrant population in question was one that was well integrated and that there was no issue in Arganda del Rey:

‘I have it on good authority that the mayor of Arganda has on different occasions expressed the positive relations that exist between the Romanian population and the rest of the population’

Secretary of State for Security, Morenés Eulate, PP, 13/06/2002

‘In Arganda del Rey, where around 7,500 Romanian citizens live, there exists a magnificent atmosphere of social relations between the natives of Arganda del Rey and these Romanian citizens’

Gil Lázaro, PP, 13/06/2002
In their contributions these speakers’ classification of Romanian immigration in such positive terms distinguished them from other immigrants that were viewed as problematic, as well as dividing between the PP, who claimed there was no problem to discuss, and the opposition.

On the other hand, the left argued that the living conditions of Romanian immigrants were again impaired by the actions, or lack thereof, of the PP government. The event was a strategic dividing issue. Ruiz López of IU complained that ‘there are no protective measures for the colony of Romanian immigrants [in Arganda del Rey], [...] who are] threatened weekly’, a situation compounded by the political positioning of the PP, which aspired ‘to escape from their responsibilities by blaming immigrants for security problems or for the informal economy’ (Ruiz López, IU, 13/06/2002). The PSOE similarly suggested that the cause of social tensions was not the Romanian population itself but a government discourse in which ‘immigration is the same as delinquency’ (Mayoral Cortes, PSOE, 13/06/2002).

These criticisms were again aligned with the post-transition cleavage, epitomised by the statement that, by not sending a clear message to the public, the government risked provoking a widespread kristallnacht:

‘it gives the impression that a type of kristallnacht is being diffusely generalised, a ‘night of the crystals’ but generalised, in such a way that what was just one episode in one specific country of sad memories, it seems like it could continuously arise’

Mayoral Cortes, PSOE, 13/06/2002

The symbolic linking of the PP to Nazi fascism through this terminology is clear. In this sense, rather than competition over the meaning of Romanian immigration, the parties on the left both used a victim frame as a way of dividing between themselves and the PP on opposite sides the post-transition cleavage, associating the latter with xenophobic and fascist acts in Spanish society.

Distinct logics therefore lay behind the framing of Romanian immigrants as victims in this case. For the parties of the left the victim status of the Romanian immigrants divided between themselves and the PP incumbent. Thus, whilst there
may have been cross-party agreement on the victim status of Romanians as a socially excluded population, the wider structural values and beliefs of Spain as a modern, democratic country shaped the strategies of left wing actors. But with a majority government, the PP no longer required the support of other members of the parliament and by minimising the significance of tensions these speakers claimed to have a good record in terms of migrant integration, vindicating their policies and aligning with the press and local public opinion whilst separating themselves from the accusations. Indeed, their arguments precisely reflected press reporting from the week after the burning of the church, in which the Socialist mayor of Arganda was quoted as saying that it was ‘a tolerant city, not a racist one’ in which there was no problem of xenophobia (El Pais, *Un grupo neonazi actua desde hace meses en Arganda*, s egun el alcalde, 7th May 2002, ABC, *Arde en Arganda una iglesia evangelica de rumanos que habia recibido amenazas xenofobas*, 6th May 2002) and local residents declared that they had ‘never heard any type of comment against the Romanians’ (El Pais, *Un municipio donde residen muchos rumanos con profesiones cualificadas*, 7th Mayo 2002).

The final period of 2004-2008 saw a return to government for the PSOE. Questions referring to Romanian nationals in Spain raised the issue of international organised crime networks and the accession of this country to the EU. As noted above, electoral manifestos at this time reflected convergence between party perspectives on immigration. There was little debate and both the PP and the PSOE made a clear distinction between legal and illegal (between law-abiding or criminal) Romanian immigrants. However, despite attempting to limit social tensions when in power the PP adopted a threat frame of Romanian nationals portrayed as belonging to organised crime groups or as individuals without legal status in Spain. In this way, in 2005 members of the PP asked what police measures were going to be put in place to stop ‘the new mafias’ coming from Romania, complained about ‘the government’s incapacity to combat organised crime and human trafficking [from Romania]’ and made reference to the ‘invasion’ of Zaragoza by Romanian nationals. These were, however, the only comments from the PP and the response of the PSOE government to these questions was to minimise the specificity of the Romanian population. By speaking of ‘investigating and combating the networks and organised groups that profit from the illegal immigration of Romanian citizens’ [my italics], Romanians
were defined as immigrants who came into contact with criminal networks out of necessity. Organised crime was viewed as a structural problem not to be associated with individuals or a certain social group. As noted above, there was also consensus between the PSOE and the PP on the boundary between legal and illegal immigration and on the need to reduce the latter. Indeed, in the first year of the PSOE’s return to government a record of 59,386 Romanian nationals were deported, falling to 37,241 in 2005 and 42,292 in 2006 but remaining higher than the previous years (see figure 10). The only difference was to not signal Romanian immigrants as any different to other illegal ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>20,089</td>
<td>32,433</td>
<td>59,386</td>
<td>37,241</td>
<td>42,292</td>
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Figure 10. Romanian deportations from Spain (Data from Ministerio del Interior de Espana, reproduced in Baillo Ruiz 2006)

Finally, IU stood out since 2004 by emphasising positive links between Romania and Spain. Romanians were defined as European citizens, as part of ‘the European family’. This was interpreted through a continuation of the same rights frame seen previously: the Spanish government’s two-year delay on the granting of full access to the labour market was an act of discrimination and the nationals of Romania, Bulgaria and future new-EU Member States ‘should not have to exhibit their new Europeanism in conditions of inferiority as second-class citizens’. As in the Italian case, the new European identity of Romania was presented within an already existing interpretive framework, this time through a rights-based discourse.

In summary, in Spain Romanian immigration has largely been kept off the national political agenda despite the increasing size of this population. Romanians have occasionally been referred to specifically, but there has not been the same reporting of criminal activity seen in Italy. However, neither have they been
accurately represented or granted a voice in political debate. Consensus around the values underpinning post-transition Spanish values and expectations has ensured a different tone to frames of Romanian immigrants and stable catch-all parties on left and right have minimised the need for a balancing of opinions with volatile coalition partners, concentrating power within their internal structures. Two powerful catch-all parties and a stable post-transition cleavage in Spain have therefore contributed to emphasising the victim status of Romanians, while division referred to the state’s actions rather than the immigrants themselves. This has encouraged moderation as all actors have distinguished themselves from elements of fascism either by emphasising the importance of rights and freedom or by minimising the importance of the issue being discussed.

However, this minimising of debate on Romanian immigration has occurred despite the fact that public perceptions have increasingly signalled Romanian immigrants as a specific population with negative characteristics. Quantitative and qualitative studies have found that many residents in Spain increasingly associate Romanians with crime and insecurity, providing evidence from rumours they had heard and events they had seen in the street (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martínez 2008: 91). Indeed, Romanians were classified in 2008 and 2009 as the most ‘frightening and untrustworthy’ migrant population (31% of respondents), considerably more so than ‘Muslims’ (19%) and ‘gangs’ (8%) (Ibid.). They were thought of as the most likely to form ghettos (19% of respondents), and the second most segregated group due to differences of culture and traditions, behind Muslims (Ibid.:105, see also figure 11). It can therefore be assumed that the political parties in Spain position themselves in relation to each other, rather than public opinion. This illustrates the effectiveness of strong, stable and moderate catch-all parties concerned with reflecting the norms and values of post-transition Spain in keeping these perceptions out of debate.
The dynamics of political responses to Romanian immigration in Spain can be summarised under the following two factors:

Firstly, a pattern has emerged where stable, opposing catch-all parties on right and left have been situated in an institutional arrangement favouring ideologically moderate, majority governments. The absence of the fragmented, dissenting parties found in Italy has further contributed to this stability. So, in this political context the coalition-building required by Italy’s coalition parties was less important in Spain because consensus is internally determined within parties, which then maintain allegiance and discipline through control of the electoral lists. The
logic of action of PP was therefore to limit disagreement through a moderate framing of immigration and convergence between left and right which would effectively take the issue off the agenda.

Secondly, in the democratic era a post-transition cleavage has provided the backdrop to cross-party consensus on the importance of rights and democracy. This has meant that the PP and the PSOE have usually searched for the centre ground on potentially divisive questions of identity, religion and immigration. Indeed, particularly on immigration there has been convergence between the parties that emphasise the importance of social inclusion and rights whilst distinguishing between legal and illegal immigration. Similarly, there has been convergence on the victim frame for Romanian immigrants, although the actor strategies have followed different logics in relation to this. On the one hand, the parties of the left have emphasised the actions of the PP as being against the post-transition values and thus associating them with the past regime, at times with explicitly clear rhetoric and metaphors providing the relevant symbolic capital. On the other hand, the PP itself emphasised its post-transition values which aligning with actors from beyond the parliament, such as the press and town mayors, emphasising their aim of social inclusion and protecting immigrants’ equality of rights through consensus with them rather than the opposition in the parliament. In neither case did Romanian immigration constitute a policy issue itself, as debates instead constituted a discussion of the values underpinning Spanish society and politics.

Conclusions

This chapter set itself the task of analysing responses to Romanian immigration in the national politics of Italy and Spain. In particular, it has been concerned with how Romanians, Italians and Spaniards have been categorised in national political debate, by whom and why some categorisations have dominated over others. An analysis of parliamentary debates in these two countries combined with empirical material from press reporting, electoral manifestos, public opinion surveys and secondary literature has provided an opportunity to outline how actor choices in debates on Romanian
immigration have been tied to their structural situation and motivated by achieving consensus with or differentiation from relevant actors around them.

In both Italy and Spain, a relatively reduced group of actors has had a role in the debates on Romanian immigration and in neither country was there any reference made to representatives of Romanian organisations. In Italy, there was mention of the Italian charities of Sant’Egidio and Caritas in only two parliamentary debates, and only one mention of a charity supporting Roma populations, whilst in Spain there was only one mention of Caritas and the Red Cross. No Romanian representatives, associations or politicians were referenced either. Italian and Spanish politicians have also not engaged in discussion of Romanian national identities or character, but rather criticised or defended them in vague, generalised terms. Indeed, the representation of Romanians that occurs in the debates tells more about the actors in discussion and the contexts in which they are based than the Romanian population itself.

The implication of this has been to give distinct meanings to being Romanian in these countries. In Italy a threat frame has dominated as part of a public order approach established principally by the parties of the right. In a fragmented political context, these parties have built greater ties between each other than on the left, in particular around consensus on the threat posed by immigration. Romanians have been presented as ‘outsiders’ due to posing a security threat, a danger to women and children, or as having reified cultural differences which render their coexistence and integration in Italy difficult (or impossible). In the absence of stable cleavages and anchors for the discussion of issues within wider frameworks of meanings, the Italian political parties have been particularly concerned with the perceptions of the electorate and negative views towards immigrants. In Spain, moreover, the restricted range of actors, as well as their value consensus and policy convergence on immigration produced an equal division of power. This meant that dissenting voices were not able to be presented or mobilise an argument in contrast to the dominant tolerant consensus. Romanians have consequently been defined as victims and as ‘insiders’ by all parties, with the PP aligning their problems with wider questions of social inclusion and emphasising their otherwise magnificent integration, whilst the PSOE and IU associated their problems with the broader perception of continued fascism in contemporary Spain, in criticism of the PP. The stable, moderate party
system in Spain ensured that these parties could in this way position themselves in relation to each other and a stable post-transition cleavage rather than the electorate.

In this sense, debates on Romanian immigration tell us more about the values, strategies and power differentials of Italian and Spanish political elites than about the Romanian populations in these countries. The structure of party politics has not only influenced who has had a voice in debates, but shaped how actors have formulated their strategies. At the same time, actors in both countries have positioned themselves in different ways according to the presence or absence of stable cleavages and a wider value consensus. The negotiation of who is who has, in this way, been tied to the decisions and choices of actors who have been situated in quite different structural contexts in Italy and Spain. The following chapter will broaden the range of voices engaged in this classification of Romanian immigration by examining the specific dynamics found in the cities of Rome and Madrid.
Chapter 6
The Local Dimension of the Politics of Romanian Immigration in Rome and Madrid

The previous chapters have examined responses to Romanian immigration in the national laws, policies and political debates of Italy and Spain. They have shown how these responses do not expose ‘real’ cultural practices and characteristics but rather reflect a balance of power in the negotiation what it means to be a Romanian immigrant in these countries. This chapter takes the analysis further by examining the dynamics in the local dimension of politics in the two main cities of Romanian immigration in these countries, namely Rome and Madrid.

As will be illustrated below, in these cities there is a wider range of actors and interests than that found in the previous chapter, including the mobilisation of individuals and organisations claiming to represent a Romanian voice. In the local dimensions there is therefore an opportunity for the categorisation of Romanian immigration to be dialectically negotiated through processes of identification of the immigrants themselves. However, this expression of an immigrant voice does not necessarily result in a shift the empowerment of Romanians to control how their presence is defined in public debate. Furthermore, neither does it reflect a unified expression of identity by all Romanian immigrants in the cities studied, but rather a series of claims from specific actors who have been able to mobilise in public. View this way, the Romanian voice in Rome and Madrid is constructed only by a minority of Romanian populations which are in reality fragmented and divided. In this way, this chapter illustrates how a common national origin does not necessarily result in the construction of a community united through shared opinions, political preferences, cultural practices or social networks. This chapter will illustrate how specific social and political actors make a claim to being legitimate representatives
of the Romanian population, the success of which depends on their ability to respond to the different structural contexts of the cities studied.

The empirical material for this analysis comes from a range of varied sources. Data on political participation in local elections was available in both Rome and Madrid, as well as material for a qualitative framing analysis from archives of local editions of daily newspapers, local administration policy and press announcements, websites and announcements from local branches of political parties and Romanian cultural associations and political parties, observations of public events, conferences and seminars, and interview material with key stakeholders in both cities from local political parties and Romanian associations. The Romanian associations could be found on a register available through the Romanian Embassy in both Italy and Spain, and further information could be obtained through a ‘snowballing’ technique of passing through contacts with representatives. This range of data has been employed to provide an awareness of the plural and multi-faceted negotiations of the meaning of being Romanian in Rome and Madrid.

The chapter is structured in three main sections. The first defines and highlights the importance for this study of the local dimension through a brief review of the contemporary literature. The two subsequent sections address the case studies of Rome and Madrid, respectively. The presentation of each case study is shaped around an outline of local immigration policies in the studied country and city, concentrating on the evolution over time of actor relations, distributions of resources and institutional and discursive structures that have underpinned them, followed by an examination of the Romanian population in these settings. Finally, an analysis of how local actors have adapted to this structural context and influenced the politics of Romanian immigration will be presented in each specific context. Some conclusions follow at the end.

**The local dimension of politics**

It has often been claimed that the state is no longer the sole decision maker in national politics and that local and regional contexts are increasingly significant decision making arenas (for example, Alexander 2003, 2007, Bauböck 2010, Borkert

Firstly, regional and local administrations have had an increasingly significant role to play in structures of governance. On the one hand, regional administrations in EU Member States have had access to funds, decision making powers and policy competences in the development of a system of multi-level governance (Marks et al 1996). In this way, regional administrations from EU Member States have set up numerous regional offices and interregional associations in Brussels (Ibid.: 358-9), the partnership principle of European regional policy has given regions a say in the spending of EU structural funds that has questioned their hierarchical relationship to states (Thielemann 2002: 48), and the principal of subsidiarity in EU Treaties has promoted the centrifugal allocation of competences according to the rule that any decisions must be made as close as possible to those most likely to feel their impacts (Vignali 2009). On the other hand, cities have also recently received great interest amidst calls for new forms of local urban governance (Amin and Thrift 2002, Sassen 1994, 2005, 2009, Tops and Hartman 2009). This can be seen in part as recognition of the importance of patterns of implementation in the policy process (Tops and Hartman 2009: 191, see also Borkert and Caponio 2010, Triandafyllidou 2003). However, what is also significant, as noted by Saskia Sassen, is the changing nature of the city itself which is argued to have become ‘the space where the great social crises develop’, where social, political and economic equalities are largest, democratic representation is insufficient and invisible borders increasingly divide residents (La Nación, La ciudad es hoy un espacio de combate abierto, 17 August 2012, see also Duyvendak et al 2009). For Sassen, local urban responses to these crises constitute part of a wider transformation of the state and weakening of the national as a spatial unit in the current phase of globalisation (Sassen 2005, 2009). In this way, the local dimension is important due to wider structural developments in politics and the economy.

Secondly, social movements, interest groups and identity-based political formations have been able to mobilise politically in local and regional settings by capitalising on the opportunities available for vertical and horizontal connections with possible allies and partners in this multi-level context. As noted by Castells,
‘in a world marked by the rise of mass self-communication, social movements and insurgent politics have the chance to enter the public space from multiple sources. By using both horizontal communication networks and mainstream media to convey their images and messages, they increase their chances of enacting social and political change – even if they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, financial resources or symbolic legitimacy’ (italics in original, 2009: 302)

In this way sub-state nationalist movements in places such as Scotland and Catalonia have made regional claims to autonomy within a wider ‘Europe of the Regions’ whilst questioning the perceived unity of the nation state (Guibernau 2004, 2007; Keating 1998, 2009). In doing so, they have proposed that regional identities constitute the basis for control of social policies, welfare and administrative competencies (Hepburn 2009, 2011). This is a process which has seen a diversification of local and transnational sites and forms of contentious politics and claims to identity. In cities it has too been noted how specific vernaculars and vocabularies can emerge in response to the urban challenges that play out in them (Uitermark et al 2005, Uitermark and Gielen 2010). Indeed, cities are where a dense population concentration facilitates the development of formal and informal social networks and shared local experiences and grievances can enable common identities to be formed; they are where social and symbolic capital are concentrated (Uitermark et al 2005, Uitermark et al 2012). Thus the local dimension is also significant as the site where the political and social actors can exercise agency through the mobilisation of social and symbolic capital.

Immigration studies research has mirrored these interests, with expanding literatures being produced on structures of local governance and the way that these promote or restrict integration and political participation (for example, Ambrosini 2012, Borkert and Caponio 2010, Caponio 2005, Davis 2009, Fauser 2008, Helbling 2010, Ireland 1994, 2000, Triandafyllidou 2003, Zapata-Barrero 2004), as well as on the formation and actions of immigrant associations as political actors and channels for integration through forming civic communities (for example, Caselli 2009, Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001, Jacobs and Tillie 2004, Però and Solomos 2010,
These developments imply that the social, cultural and political boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of foreigners are increasingly being articulated in distinct ways at new territorial and political levels, emphasising the importance of the regional and local dimensions of politics in drawing the social boundaries of citizenship (Bauböck 2010, Faist 2001, Hepburn 2011, Keating 1998, 2009, Zapata-Barrero 2004). In this way, Faist (2001) has suggested that social citizenship in the EU has not disappeared but become ‘nested’ at distinct administrative levels, whilst Bauböck (2010) has argued that citizen rights should no longer be associated with only one national community, but rather seen as bundles of rights or ‘citizenship constellations’ granted by various political entities. As will be illustrated in the following chapter, national and supranational political processes are thus often embedded in local settings (Vertovec 2004, 2009). This challenges the assumption that immigration and citizenship are purely questions of national identity and state sovereignty (see Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Marshall 1992 [1950], Diehl and Schnell 2006, Joppke 1998a).

This chapter will bring these perspectives on the local dimensions of the politics of immigration together through two case studies in Italy and Spain, namely Rome and Madrid. In line with the literature outlined above and the wider research design and theoretical framework of this thesis, it will be concerned with addressing the formal and informal institutional rules and discursive structures for immigrant integration and political participation and the distribution of resources in the cities studied. In this context, it examines the adoption of mobilisation strategies by actors, particularly those claiming to stand for the Romanian immigrant population, contributing towards an awareness of how the social and political boundaries of citizenship are negotiated in practice.

**Italy: Rome**

*The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Italy*

This section outlines how the local dimension of politics and society (understood as sub-state administrations such as regions and cities) has become significant for the
politics of immigration in Italy. In doing so, it will illustrate the level of autonomy of regional and city administrations, before concentrating specifically on the Italian case study of this chapter: Rome. As will be highlighted below, despite variations in economic, political and social structures across the cities, regions and provinces of the country, national legislation has created channels for immigrant participation. However, this has not resulted in widespread participation or created an open institutional structure because access to material resources and opportunities to build ties with political parties and decision making institutions have been granted first and foremost to Italian organisations. The trend across Italy has thus been for local opportunity structures for immigrant political participation through institutional channels to be largely closed and the availability of the material resources and social capital necessary for mobilisation to be low.

As has already been noted in this thesis, throughout its history Italy has been characterised by fragmentation along territorial lines and the perseverance of strong local and regional allegiances. Local dynamics have played a significant role. In the second half of the twentieth century informal agreements and behind-the-scenes decision making gave territorial interests a voice in the distribution of resources even when their regions did not have explicit roles in the political process (Amoretti 2002: 132).

The principal distinction between localities in Italy has often been summarised as following a ‘fundamental’ and ‘indelible’ territorial divide between the north and south of the country (King and Mai 2004: 457, see also Daly 2001). Although the division is not uncontroversial and the processes and implications of the construction of the ‘southern question’ has been the topic of academic research and popular culture (see for example Gonzalez 2011, Petraccone 2005), there are some general regional differences to be noted in the economic, political and social structures that influence local experiences of immigration. Regarding economic differences, the centre-north region is generally more prosperous due to an effective combination of intensive farming and dynamic, efficient small and medium-sized enterprises, whilst the south has typically had a poorer economy based on agriculture, low productivity industry, low grade services, and although the informal economy is found throughout Italy it has been found to be larger in the south (King and Mai 2004: 461-2). This means that undocumented migrants may find
employment opportunities in southern contexts but less stability and wealth than in northern ones. Institutional responses to immigration have too been broadly different, summarised as a general acceptance of immigration as a structural phenomenon in many northern towns and cities, which have incorporated migrants’ needs within wider frameworks for responding to social exclusion, whilst in the south support structures for immigrants have typically come from the third sector, are largely uncoordinated and concern reception rather than long-term integration (King and Mai 2004: 468). However, higher costs of living and housing have made these frameworks for inclusion more important for immigrants in the north than in the south (Ibid.). Finally, regional political subcultures have sparked differing responses to immigrants, as epitomised by the political rise of the Northern Leagues amidst a growing emphasis on the cultural, political and economic unity of the north (Agnew 1995, Bull and Milner 1997, Woods 1995). The implication of this, as noted in previous chapters, has been a rejection of immigrants in public debate in the north, which some claim has been responsible for ruling out cooperation between local administrations and migrants’ associations in cities such as Milan (Camozzi 2011: 474, Caponio 2005: 948).

However, it has also been suggested that certain common characteristics can be found in the local politics of Italian regions and cities which shape the opportunity structure for immigrants in them. This principally concerns the tendency to not include immigrant political actors in decision making or policy implementation processes (Camozzi 2011, Caponio 2005, Caselli 2009). In this way, Caponio has noted that in Milan, Bologna and Naples there is little difference in the level of inclusion of immigrant associations in city politics, despite the distinct ideological backgrounds of their administrations (2005). Instead, Italian pro-immigrant organisations such as trade unions and Catholic organisations have been favoured by each local administration regardless of their ideological position, leading to the conclusion that:

‘the consolidation of immigrants’ associations seems to pass through some kind of informal collaboration with Italian organisations … [and] the Italian case seems to indicate that public intervention can have an indirect crowding-
out effect when delegation to traditional welfare organisations prevails’ (2005: 948).

The logic of this engagement with traditional Italian organisations rather than immigrant associations is one of pragmatism: the Italian organisations are known, have significant financial and organisational resources and are already networked with political actors, whereas immigrant associations are often small, underfunded and have little experience of the political process. Indeed, it has been noted that immigrant associations across Italy are largely unstructured and have little influence in society and politics (Caselli 2009: 60). In this way an imbalance in resources has established autochthonous organisations as institutional gatekeepers to a closed opportunity structure in Italian cities.

This tendency to favour Italian organisations such as trade unions, local NGOs and charities of the Catholic Church is also noticeable in regional, provincial and local participatory channels for immigrants. Immigrants from non-EU countries do not have local or national voting rights in Italy and remain disenfranchised, despite a range of proposed reforms on the matter, but Italian policymakers have provided consultative forums and channels for representation outside of electoral politics (see for example, Associazione Studi Giurdici sull’Immigrazione 2005). These forums began in 1986 with the National Consultation for the Problems of non-EEC Workers and Their Families (Consulta nazionale per i problemi dei lavoratori non comunitari e delle loro famiglie) and additional channels were established at the provincial level in 1998 with the National Organism for Coordination of Integration Policies (Organismo Nazionale di Coordinamento per le Politiche di Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri a Livello Locale, ONC) and the Territorial Immigration Councils (Consigli Territoriali per l’Immigrazione, CTI). The ONCs and CTIs have had similar functions, primarily encouraging dialogue between regional, provincial and communal levels of government as well as bringing local employment officers, health workers, trade unions and employer’s associations together with the immigrant associations representing the country’s most numerous nationality populations. But there has often been ambiguity concerning the selection of immigrant representatives for these initiatives: of the 103 CTIs established by 2003, 45 still had no immigrant associations on them, 25 had two and only 15 had
more than three (Ardovino and Ferraris 2005: 65). Immigrant associations have therefore usually been in a minority in participatory processes, putting them at a disadvantage in decision making processes that favour the majority (Ardovino and Ferraris 2005: 64). They have also been criticised for the uncertainty regarding how immigrant associations are selected (when this occurs), for the frequent overlap in their consulting and advisory tasks, and for a scarce capacity to influence policy making (Attanasio 2005).

In addition to these developments, since the Martelli law of 1990 (39/1990) city councils have also been able to modify their statutes to allow immigrant participation by creating the roles of regional consultant and adjunct councillors for immigration. By 2005 there were 40 local councils across Italy with adjunct councillors and the objective of these has been to give immigrants a greater voice in local politics, encourage participation and improve native-immigrant relationships (Ardovino and Ferraris 2005: 64). They are directly elected by immigrants and thus represent the first direct participatory channels in Italy, although this has been of primarily symbolic value because the impact of the consultants and councillors on policy making is dubious and levels of participation are not particularly high, as will be discussed below in reference to Romanian immigrants (Ibid.: 68-9).

So, in summary, differences in local responses to immigration and patterns of political participation for immigrants are noticeable across Italy. Cities, regions and provinces have diverse economic, political and cultural structural settings, which in turn influence the stability and social status of immigrants. However, similarities are also to be found. The trend across the country has been for local opportunity structures for immigrant participation through institutional channels to be largely closed. Immigrant representatives are selected, rather than elected, and Italian organisations, in particular the charity Caritas, are usually favoured by policy makers for informing decisions and contributing to implementation (Caponio 2005, Danese 2001). These organisations thus act as institutional gatekeepers with greater material resources and ties with political parties and institutions than immigrant associations. In contrast, the lower levels of financial and social capital provided to immigrant actors in this institutional context puts them at a disadvantage in terms of the resources and opportunities for mobilisation available to them. Such a pattern follows the national dynamic of client politics in local decision making regarding
immigration. However, as will be noted below, in Rome this has also been combined with what Freeman (1995) defined as majoritarian tendencies, as directly elected Mayors have followed a vote-maximising logic of voicing the concerns of the public in response to the presence of immigrants.

The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Rome

With the movements towards decentralisation outlined above there has been an expansion of the opportunities for political participation in Rome, based in the Lazio Region of Italy. Since 1993 the Mayor of the city has been directly elected, with elections enjoying a relatively high turnout level (see figure 12). Since 1993 there have been left-wing Mayors, with Francesco Rutelli between 1993 and 2001, followed by Walter Veltroni from 2001 to 2008, and a right-wing period since 2008 when the AN candidate Gianni Alemanno won the elections. However, in the Rome provincial elections the greatest share of the vote went to the right wing AN in 1998, 2003 and PdL in 2008, whilst in the Lazio Regional elections of 2005 the centre-left dominated. This illustrates a layered structure of parties involved in the government of the area of Rome, although the most visible public figure has been the Mayor.

The Mayors of Rome have been influential in the development of the politics of immigration in the city. It has been noted that a ‘non-policy’ approach existed regarding immigration prior to 1990, but that this underwent a dramatic switch in that year following a crisis in which 2,000 immigrants took over a vacant building (Alexander 2007: 55). Known as ‘the Pantanella crisis’ due to the name of the building in which they settled, the situation brought a lack of housing and precarious living conditions for a large immigrant population into public view, resulting in calls for policy change (terWal 1996, see also La Repubblica, Chiude la ‘fabbrica degli immigrati’ Pantanella a giorni lo sgombero, 7th November 1990). The Rutelli administrations of 1993 to 2001 responded by establishing a Special Office for Immigration (Ufficio Speciale per l’Immigrazione) in the Council’s Department of Social Services. Despite calls from Rutelli and the subsequent mayor Veltroni to develop immigrant integration measures further and the changing quantitative and qualitative characteristics of immigration in the city, this has remained in place as the basic institutional structure for immigrant integration.
However, in reality work on immigration has not been implemented by the city Council itself but instead been out-sourced to non-governmental agencies according to a strategy of delegation which has characterised much social service provision in Italy since the 1980s (Alexander 2007: 70). During the 1990s there were few organisations that directly represented immigrants, and these were largely unable to meet the formal requirements for funding from the Council (Alexander 2007: 72). The result was, as noted in other cities across Italy, that government money went to autochthonous organisations such as Caritas with the reputation, resources and networks to act in this area. NGOs and Catholic organisations for social assistance have thus dominated the relationship between city administrations and the immigrant population.
The focus of the Special Office for Immigration can be broadly divided into two areas; social assistance and integration. The former refers to immigrants’ access to welfare and legal representation, whereas the latter concerns their reception in the city, access to housing and insertion in the labour market. In the Lazio region specific funding schemes and research programmes have sporadically been carried out in reference to healthcare services since 2002 and Italian language courses have been promoted. At the level of the city council in Rome measures have continued to be directed at the reception of immigrants and their insertion in the labour market, seeing them primarily as disadvantaged workers. The council Immigration Office, based within the Department for Promotion of Social and Health Services, is responsible for managing twenty two ‘reception centres’ around the city and twenty two ‘intercultural centres for children’ as well as holding a register of cultural intermediators. A social cooperative called ‘Programma Integra’ has also been responsible since 2005 for the ‘formulation and management of integrated courses of Italian language, socio-legal orientation, professional qualification and support for labour market incorporation’ for the Rome city council. The objective of Programma Integra has been defined as ‘the promotion of integration in the territory of vulnerable people, convinced that support and care can contribute to wellbeing and territorial development’. This has been carried out through a range of projects that have been individually funded on an ad hoc basis, for example by private business or EU grants.

Both the Immigration Office and Programma Integra have concentrated measures for integration on the labour market and the capacity of the immigrants themselves to find employment. There are no long-term goals or an overarching philosophy of integration, although it has been accompanied by a rhetoric of pluralism, encouraging immigrant cultures to be expressed and promoting the teaching of Italian history and language (Alexander 2007: 78). Yet at the same time, the Rutelli and Veltroni administrations put forward a strongly essentialising

8 This information is available online through the website of the Lazio regional government’s health section; available at http://www.asplazio.it/asp_online/att_ospedaliera/fen_migratori_new/immigrazione/pubblicazioni.php, accessed 12th December 2012.


10 For example, see www.programmaretis.it, accessed 12th December 2012.
understanding of cultural practices and identities, in particular in confrontation with Romani and other ethnicity populations (Clough Marinaro 2003, Picker 2011). In 1994 Rutelli himself defined a ‘nomad emergency’ in Rome and promised to work to improve the hygiene and cleanliness of the Romani camps in the city by censusing and photographing the Romani population and establishing new camps under security observation (Clough Marinaro 2003: 207). This meant that they would be able to temporarily settle and practice their ‘nomadic lifestyles’, but would also be physically separated from mainstream society, evidencing the tension between decision makers’ rhetoric and practice.

Nevertheless, despite this lack of integration measures, since 2004 immigrants in Rome have been able to elect Regional Consultants (outlined by Deliberazione 191/2003, modified by Deliberazione 172/2006) and Adjunct Councillors for immigration, as a way of improving dialogue and interaction between immigrants and native citizens, organisations and institutions. The Adjunct Councillors have been chosen by secret ballot, with one representative in each municipality and the highest candidate from each continent (Africa, Oceania and Asia, Europe, Americas. EU nationals are not included) at the level of the Council. Yet, for the first elections of 2004, only 10% of the immigrant population was registered to vote and only 57% of these turned out on the day (Ardovino 2005: 92 and data from the Council of Rome). The influence of these elected individuals on the policy process has also been uncertain and much doubted (Alexander 2007: 72-8).

Integration measures and channels for political participation for immigrants in Rome should therefore be viewed as part of a closed opportunity structure in terms of funding and access to political institutions. Concern for socially excluded immigrants in the 1990s has resulted in the establishment of institutions that are channels for passing funding and influence to dominant gatekeeper social assistance NGOs and charities, such as through Programma Integra. This imbalance of power means that immigrant associations lack financial and social capital when it comes to participating in local politics. At the same time, in this closed context there has been no consensus on a public philosophy of immigration or long-term plan for responses to the presence of immigrants, resulting in a tendency to appeal to the voting public. The following section will examine how the identification and categorisation of
Romanian immigrants in the cities has been carried out by actors who adapt to this closed context of institutional and discursive opportunities for mobilisation.

The local dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Rome

Residents of Romanian origin form the largest immigrant population in the Italian capital, which has consequently been dubbed the Capital of Romanian immigration (Ricci 2007). The population in Rome has followed the national pattern of rapid growth, particularly during the period following 2002. In 2003, the Romanian contingent of the region of Lazio, of which Rome is the capital, was recorded at 23,551, rising to 89,466 in 2005, 158,509 in 2008 and 179,469 in 2009 (Caritas Roma 2007, 2009, 2010). Their incorporation has been into a dynamic and highly precarious labour market where informal or short-term formal opportunities are common, in which they have found employment primarily in the construction industry and the large tertiary service sector, composed on the one hand of restaurants, street vending and facilities for tourists, and on the other by a demand for domestic workers, nannies and carers for the elderly (CNEL 2003, 2006, 2009, Reyneri 2004, Caritas Italia 2010). As with across much of Italy, this has resulted in legal, documented residence being difficult to obtain or to retain. Indeed, although the Lazio region has the highest rate of job creation in Italy, it also has a higher than average rate of unemployment and job destruction (CNEL 2007: 70-1). This is reflected in official data from 2005 recording annual job creation at 96,392, which is almost matched by 91,853 jobs being lost in that year (CNEL 2008: 258). The precariousness of the labour market is also reflected in national rankings of Italian territories which placed Rome in 18th position (out of 103) regarding the demand for foreign labour, but in 100th position for social incorporation and 73rd for social and occupational integration, according to data from 2006 (CNEL 2009).

The political participation of the Romanian population in Rome has not been significant. Only one Romanian national has ever been elected as Adjunct Councillor, receiving 513 votes in 2004, which was a considerably lower result than the 2,539 votes received by the most voted candidate, of Philippine nationality. Of the fourteen Romanian candidates running in municipalities in 2004, none were elected, and in 2006 only two candidates ran, receiving 99 and 34 votes respectively.
(neither was elected in their municipality). Only two Romanian candidates have ever received over 100 votes in these elections. Furthermore, with the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 and the re-categorisation of Romanian nationals in Italy from ‘extracomunitarians’ to ‘comunitarians’, the right to participate in these elections was removed. As citizens of the EU, from this year Romanian nationals would instead be able to cast votes and stand in Italy’s local elections. This shift in status therefore provided a new opportunity for Romanians to have their interests represented and perhaps for local politicians to win votes off a numerous population. Yet in 2008 there was only one Romanian candidate, and she received only 53 votes (data from the Rome Council). The number of Romanian candidates in local elections rose from one in 2008 to eleven in 2011, yet the results show only one candidate receiving more than 100 votes whilst the mean for the remaining candidates was only 33 votes each (data from the Rome Council, for complete lists of candidates see figures 15 and 16 in the appendix).

Attempts to explain this low level of political participation have highlighted perceptions and tendencies carried over from Romania’s past:

“in the Romanian community there is a problem of disbelief regarding politics, regarding participation, and a lack of trust in institutions and organisations [...] in Romania we have had a revolution, we all believed in a better situation. The disbelief has been to find the same people in power as before”

(Interview 7/6/2011)

As will be discussed further in the following chapter, this suggestion that the years of corruption following the transition to democracy in Romania have contributed to a strong sense of apathy amongst Romanian nationals regarding politics and their political leaders has been repeatedly presented as explaining low levels of Romanian political participation.

Aside from these formal electoral channels, the principal actors claiming to represent the Romanian population in Rome have been relatively small cultural associations and a political party called the Party of Romanian Identity (Partidul Românilor în Italia - Partito Identità Romeni, PIR). Yet in 2007 there were only
three Romanian cultural associations in all of Italy registered with the Romanian Embassy (Ricci 2007: 103), although since then the number registered in and around the capital has increased to 28 (in 2011). In general the Romanian associations in Rome have been small in size and operated with limited resources. All have been registered as non-profit, voluntary organizations with a cultural focus, rather than as political movements or parties. Their level of formal organization has typically been low, with management and control normally carried out by one individual or a small council of members and funding coming from membership fees and sporadic, one-off grants from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Commune of Rome, the Ministry of the Interior, and the European Commission. These funding opportunities have not provided for either stability or expansive projects.

In addition to this lack of material resources, social capital in the form of networks of cooperation and coordination between associations across Italy has also been scarce. There were no attempts to overcome this until the creation of the Romanian League in Italy (Lega della Romania in Italia) in 2007 and the Federation of Romanian Associations in Italy (Federazione delle Associazioni dei Romeni in Italia) in 2009. Both were intended to establish a space for coordination among different organizations and be a stable point of reference for the population to gather around. Both also eventually failed due to internal fighting, corruption and individuals working for their own benefit (Harja and Melis 2010: 91). In Rome, similarly, the context was described in one interview as ‘a fragmented community as in the rest of Italy [...] everybody does whatever pops into their head’ (Interview 04/07/2011). Individualism, personal gain and an inability to tie-in the broader population that they claim to represent were thus highlighted as weaknesses of the capital’s associations:

‘no, no, everyone is on their own! Also with the associations [...] there might be only one, or two people but then they make their own network of associations [...] there is unity lacking among us’

(Interview 05/07/2011)
For many associations the short-lived Federation of Romanian Associations in Italy was the only moment of collaboration and following its failure they returned to largely solitary actions.

This fragmentation illustrates a lack of consensus between associations regarding their role and their perception of the status of the Romanian population. The declared motivation for the formation and mobilization of the Romanian representatives has predominantly been to build connections with Italian society, improve integration and understanding between Romanians and Italians and defend the legal rights of Romanian residents in Rome, although some have also been criticised as acting simply as leverage for individuals attempting to gain personal benefits. Also, distinct understandings of Romanian have been identity presented by them. Some such as the Party of Romanian Identity, Italy-Romania Future Together (Italia-Romania Futuro Insieme), and Romanian Spirit (Spirit Romanesc), emphasized Christian values and the moral principles of the Catholic and Orthodox Romanian Churches as central to a process of social integration:

‘An important factor in the national community of Romania has been the spiritual gift, that treasure of culture and popular tradition’

(association website, Romanian Spirit, accessed 10th July 2011)

‘we are engaged with constantly promoting a positive image of the migratory phenomenon and reinforcing communication between local and immigrant communities [...] certain that a better reciprocal knowledge of the spiritual values and cultures of these peoples favours a spirit of collaboration and communion among people from different nations’

(association website, Italy-Romania Future Together, accessed 10th July 2011)

Other organizations such as the Forum of Romanian Intellectuals in Italy and the Academy of Romania promoted a specifically Latin-Roman historical identity as a mode of integration and dialogue with Italians:
‘We propose to promote Romanian culture in Italy and Europe, dialogue between Italian and Romanian intellectuals and international cooperation among writers, artists, thinkers, students, journalists, and religious and political representatives’

(association website, *Forum of Romanian Intellectuals in Italy*, accessed 9th July 2011)

Distinct again were those presenting a rights-based discourse against the unjust treatment of Romanian nationals by Italian institutions (Friends of Romania).

Prior to 2008, this fragmentation between Romanian actors was accompanied by sparse connections with other actors in Rome’s politics or public debate. Consequently, Italian parties were criticised for being reluctant to open their ranks to Romanian members or appeal to Romanian voters:

‘the centre-Left, not knowing what the voting tendency of these citizens would be, whether they would vote for Right or Left, has not done anything [...] and on the other side, the centre-Right is not interested [...] they won the 2008 national elections and elections in Rome by using tabloid stories (*casi di cronaca*) which had Romanians as protagonists, so for them it was important that the Romanians did not vote’

(Interview 05/07/2011)

However, a different perspective was more critical of the Romanians themselves:

‘the problem is that the Italians have understood the importance of this community and the importance of this vote, but the Romanians have not! Because the Romanians are used to Romania, where they vote for whoever offers an extra beer, it is a vote in exchange’

(Interview 05/07/2011)

Aside from the cultural associations, the most visible pro-Romanian actor in Rome has been the Party of Romanian Identity. The party itself was formed in 2006 and by 2011 declared to have some 10,000 members around the country. It has a website,
prints a Romanian language weekly newspaper and holds conferences and small protests in the capital. Whereas the above associations are non-political in their constitutions (whilst not usually in practice), PIR is explicitly political as the only Italian political party aimed at Romanian residents. It has built connections with a small cluster of Romanian cultural associations, particularly Friends of Romania, the Party of Romanian Identity, We Are Romansians, the Forum of Romanian Intellectuals in Italy and Voice of Romania (Vocea Romanilor).

Furthermore, these connections with other Romanian associations have been established at the same time that the Party of Romanian Identity has collaborated with Italian political parties. This came for the first time in 2007, with the Union of Democrats for Europe (Unione dei Democratici per l’Europa) and Go Italy! (Forza Italia!). The Party has subsequently cooperated in elections with Italian parties by providing its own candidates, promoting candidates of other parties, and organising informative events and conferences. In Rome in 2008 the Party supported the Civic List of Gianni Alemanno, the successful mayoral candidate from National Alliance and in 2011 it had also signed a collaborative agreement with Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right party People of Liberty. However, despite the anti-communist perspective of PIR, this network of Romanian associations does not reflect a particular shared ideology favouring right or left. The leader of We Are Romansians, Silviu Ciubotaru has been included in electoral lists for the PD, for example, and all of them were involved in the establishment of the Friends of Romania parliamentary association in 2009 that brought together 48 members from all political groups. The parliamentary association was opened with a debate in the Chamber of Deputies at the Italian Parliament, with cross-party interest and involving the Forum of Romanian Intellectuals in Italy, the Party of Romanian Identity and Friends of Romania. In the fragmented population of Romanian associations and the closed opportunity structure of Rome’s politics, these ties have been rare and as a result the Party of Romanian Identity has held a significant position in networks between Romanian actors and autochthonous ones.

The formation of these connections amongst Romanian associations, on the one hand, and between Romanian associations and Italian political parties, on the other, has followed a pragmatic logic intended to overcome ideological cleavages. Between associations, the objective has been to create a sense of unity between
Romanians in order to present a broad consensus to the Italian institutions and public. This placed a sense of common purpose as Romanian nationals above left or right wing preferences or associations with rival parties. Yet with Italian political parties, the objective has been to open channels in the closed institutional structure through personal contacts. The result was a post-ideology, pragmatic networking strategy;

‘we cannot align with either the left or the right because, you know, if you are with the left and the right get into government, no, you have to always keep a central line […] even if I am from the right, for me that doesn’t mean anything, now I don’t have an ideology because here you can’t have an ideology defined as right wing […] no, you can’t have one, and I can always say that the left have done more for the foreigners in general than the right’

(Interview 06/07/2011)

‘The party [PIR] is without ideology because we are open, we have good relations with all the Italian parties […] we have collaborated with all of them apart from the Northern League […] we judge how political groups act city by city and we decide according to their treatment of the Romanian community’

(Interview 05/07/2011)

Moreover, these associations and their leaders have rarely been able to influence public debate through the press. Archive searches in the Rome editions of *Il Giornale, Il Messaggero, Corriere della Sera*, and *La Repubblica* reveal that there were no references to them prior to 2005, and in the three years of 2005 to 2007 only nine references were made.

So, in summary, the participation and mobilisation of the Romanian immigrant population in Rome since the first Romanian immigration in the 1990s can be described as scarce and fragmented. When the first associations formed, they found themselves without financial, social or symbolic capital and in a structural context characterised by few opportunities to influence political parties or decision
makers. This structure will be relevant again in the following chapter in reference to the establishment of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Italy.

The dynamics of the politics of Romanian immigration in Rome

The political and public responses to Romanian immigrants in Rome have generally followed the pattern of national discourse noted in the previous chapter: as the population has grown, their presence has become an increasingly salient issue associated with questions of public order and crime. Previous studies have concentrated in particular on the year 2007 and the murder of Giovanna Reggiani as the most significant point in the development of a public image of Romanians as violent criminals (Access to Rights and Civic Dialogue for All 2012, Angelescu 2008, Barbagli 2008, Cajvaneanu 2008, Devole 2008). In this way, it has been commented that ‘from the 1st of January 2007, the date of the entry of Romania into the European Union, discrimination seems to have been directed towards the Romanians in Italy’ (Cajvaneanu 2008: 217).

However, in reality there has been a longer development of the issue. In the 1990s and early 2000s, when there was a relatively low number of Romanian immigrants in Rome, contrasting responses arose in public debate. The arrival of Romanians, as well as other nationality immigrants and ethnic minorities, elicited localised protests, framing them in political and press communication in opposing ways as either victims or a threat.

On the one hand, Romanians were framed as victims due to being discriminated against in the labour market or being homeless, which should be understood as a continuation of responses to the Pantanella crisis and a lack of immigrant housing. In the national daily Corriere della sera an article entitled ‘The city under the bridges’ examined the living conditions of homeless Poles, Albanians and Romanians who had gone to Italy to escape poverty (La città sotto i ponti, 18th July 1996), whilst another described 50 people sleeping in a ‘Romanian village’ in a park in Rome as attempting to escape poverty and forget ‘years of suffering as factory and railway workers’ under Ceausescu (Il bosco dei salvaggi, 15th January 1996). Similarly, in 2002, the Catholic charity Caritas and the trade unions Italian Union of Work (Unione Italiana del Lavoro, UIL) and the General Italian
Confederation of Work (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, CGIL) described Romanian immigrants as victims of their ‘terrible history’ and labour market conditions which objectified and de-humanised them (Corriere della sera, *Sindacati: migliaia di irregolari licenziati. Un romeno si uccide*, 9th November 2002).

On the other hand, Romanians were also referenced in the press in reports of prostitution rings, minor crimes and, in particular, a prevalence of Romani gypsies. In 1999 the Rutelli administration’s proposed building of new temporary camps, as outlined above, was stopped by protests from local residents who blocked streets and chained themselves to the site gates (Clough Marinaro 2003: 213). As with the essentialist perspective of the Rome administration during the 1990s that saw gypsies as a population with a fixed and unchanging nomadic character to be protected by segregation, the political and press references to Romanians viewed their presence as a problem that should be resolved by their removal. For example, in 1996 the ex-fascist right wing councillor Teodoro Buontempo of National Alliance claimed that

‘[the mayor] has not realised that in the nomad’s caravans there are ex-Yugoslavs, Romanians and Albanians, which means foreigners who are not nomads … we want them out of inhabited areas: the camps should be temporary and put in open countryside’

(– Corriere della sera, *Arrivano i campi nomadi*, 18th June 1994)

The left responded to these protests from local neighbourhoods and right wing politicians against the construction of camps with public statements that contained a clear focus on security, a distinction between those legally resident and others who were undocumented, as well as concern over the dominance of the right on the issue:

‘it is better for us to be severe rather than for the xenophobes to be, our *laissez faire* approach would surely not help the immigrants: we cannot leave these contradictions in the hands of the right’

'it is right to protect the documented Romani, but the criminals will be expelled'

(Francesco Rutelli, PDS, La Repubblica, Casilino 700, sgombero all’alba, 29th December 1999)

This clearly reflects the identity crisis and uncertainty that reigned in the main party of the left regarding how to respond to immigration at this time, as noted in the previous chapter. It also shows the beginning of a left-right consensus on the acceptance of segregation as an effective policy measure.

Throughout the 2000s the dominant tendency in Rome increasingly became the use of the threat frame of Romanian immigration (Barbagli 2008, Cajvaneanu 2008, Devole 2008, Harja and Melis 2010). In the press, there was an abundance of headlines of the type ‘two Romanians stopped, they killed a friend’, ‘mummy, a Romanian has molested me’ and ‘the assassins of a pensioner stopped: they were heading for Romania’. Responses from citizens and politicians to acts of violence also went against the Romanian population. For example, in October 2006 a group of thirty Italian men attacked and set fire to a bar that was frequented by Romanians who had been causing disturbances for months by playing loud music, drinking and parking badly. The attack followed an argument the day before that had seen three Romanian men shot in the legs and abdomen by Italian men in the same area. For many of the local residents, although the action was outside the law and rumoured to have been orchestrated by neo-fascist groups, it was accepted as necessary to bring a sense of normality back to the area. Such normality was framed by a clear perception of cultural difference between Italians and Romanians;

‘I work, pay my taxes and don’t bother anyone. But they [Romanians] don’t do anything from morning to night, they drink and nobody asks anything of them. They’ve become the bosses’

(Il Tempo, Abbassa il vetro dell’auto e gongola: ‘aoh, e bello sta senza rumeni’, 4th October 2006)
The outcome was that local residents did not condemn the event because it marked an end to an unliveable situation (Cuppone 2010: 120), with which the mayor of Rome from the Democratic Party, Walter Veltroni, seemed to agree by announcing immediate deportations: that day 75 undocumented Romanians from the centre of Rome were removed (Corriere della sera, Trullo: la protesta arriva in commune, 4th October 2006). As found in the national debates of the previous chapter, here the PD accepted that problems with Romanian immigrants were caused by their presence and should be resolved by their removal.

The same dynamic was repeated in response to the death of an Italian woman in a fight with two Romanian women in April 2007 and in October of the same year when the Italian woman Giovanna Reggiani was murdered. The mayor Veltroni reacted by stating that the accession of Romania to the EU had opened the doors to the arrival of particularly aggressive criminals and that there was a ‘specific problem’ with this nationality (for a summary see Barbagli 2008). It was subsequently suggested that mass deportations should be considered, and in November the Rome Prefecture announced that 5,000 Romanians were ready to be expelled in order to ‘clean the water of infected fish’ (La Repubblica, Romeni, scattano le espulsioni. “Via i primi cinquemila” 2nd November 2007). Reports claimed that twenty individuals were deported from Rome and Milan in the first week (BBC, Italy starts deporting Romanians, 5th November 2007)11, although Mailat himself remained in Italy to face trial. Such deportations, regardless of their connection to the specific murder case, were justified by the same frame which defined Romanian immigration as a threat to be resolved through segregation and removal.

But why was this threat frame employed? Two logics can be highlighted. One was founded on an understanding of population groups as fixed and sharing an essentialised, unchanging culture and intended to protect the cultural specificity of immigrant and minority groups. This developed from the Rutelli administration’s response to Romani settlements in the late 1990s, which in turn could be seen as in line with a prevalent essentialist cultural ideology in the post-socialist left in other cities such as Florence and Bologna (Però 2005, Picker 2011). The second logic was one of electoral politics in the form of pragmatic reactions to negative public

11 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7078532.stm, accessed 14th January 2013
opinion. In this way, Rome’s mayors reacted to the sentiments of residents in neighbourhoods in which tensions arose, resulting in convergence between right and left on the need for controls and security measures because this was demanded by the people. In fact, this switch to security was already noted in the 1990s as a result of ‘submission to the anti-Roma hostility of parts of the voting public’ (Clough Marinaro 2003: 203). The choice of multiple deportations constituted the development of the logic of separation due to cultural difference into one of security to reassure voters. At the same time, the lack of local representation for Romanian immigrants meant that they were not a relevant constituency for politicians.

Responses to these framing processes came from Caritas, the trade union CGIL and the Romanian associations. In 2008 Caritas published a volume of essays aiming to provide an objective view of the phenomenon of Romanian migration beyond the dominant trend of public debate, and its presentation to an overflowing room of press, activists, immigrant campaigners, Romanian cultural association representatives and the public illustrated the demand for such a publication (Interview 06/07/2011). In the same year, a bilingual Romanian-Italian manual to the workplace was presented by the Italian Federation of Wood, Construction and Extraction Industry Workers (Federazione Italiana dei Lavoratori del Legno, dell’Edilizia, Industrie affini ed Estrattive, FILLEA), part of the CGIL. These were followed by a bilingual book on ‘Romanians in Italy’ from Caritas in 2011 as well as a novel ‘Ionut’s Journey’ about a Romanian construction worker’s integration in Italy, which was presented by FILLEA to a full room of politicians, press representatives and civil servants at the offices of the Region of Rome in the same year (Olezza 2011). In this way, both Caritas and the CGIL have illustrated a capacity to produce knowledge through these publications and communicate it to a relevant audience of decision makers that cultural associations have not been able to reach so easily, although it has taken them a long time to do so.

In contrast, a lack of material resources and symbolic capital in relation to the press and relevant political actors has made the mobilisation of the Romanian cultural associations difficult. However, the increasing salience of public debate on Romanian immigration did provide an opportunity for mobilisation in two ways. Firstly, the negative images provided an opportunity for a shared victim frame to unite Romanian actors. The frame was composed of a problem facing Romanian
nationals such as discrimination, a denial of political rights, or a lack of employment opportunities compared to other nationalities. This problem was presented as caused by Italian individuals, institutions or laws, and could be resolved through greater justice and equality for the Romanian population:

‘The justice system has to run its course and those responsible have to pay [for their crimes]. But I think the problem here are not the Romanians in Italy, as much as it is the ignorance of Italian people’

(Simona Farcas, *Italy-Romania Future Together*, La Repubblica, 4th November 2007)

‘over the last months ‘Romanian-phobia’ has spread, a collective hysteria which Romanian carers and nurses are beginning to lose their jobs for’

(Giancarlo Germani, *Party of Romanian Identity*, La Repubblica 22nd February 2009)

‘Let us open spaces for participation from Romanian citizens, for security without discrimination [...] among our community fear is spreading, above all among those who live in the outskirts of the large cities’

(Eugen Terteleac, *Association of Romanians in Italy*, La Repubblica 24th February 2009)

Despite differences in perceptions of the roots of a Romanian identity from one association to another, there has been alignment and consensus with this victim frame of the meaning of ‘being Romanian’ in Italy. This followed the motive expressed above of uniting the Romanian population in order to present reciprocal understandings of their situation in Italian institutions and society.

Secondly, a distinct alignment strategy saw Romanian actors express consensus with the security-based frame that dominated public debate. They accepted that there was a problem in Rome of crime caused by Romanian nationals, but suggest that increased cooperation, vigilance and security measures by both nationalities could resolve it:
‘[we require] legislative interventions aimed at delinquents [...] for those in prison with life sentences their benefits should be eliminated. Italy needs to do the same as Romania, where if someone steals a chicken, they have three years in prison’

(Giancarlo Germani, *Party of Romanian Identity*, La Repubblica 11th May 2008)

Alignment with the dominant threat frame of the wider public debate in this way required a boundary to be defined between good, hard-working Romanians and the badly-viewed, criminal, violent Romanians prevalent in press reporting and public perceptions:

‘we are making Romanian migrants aware so that they report their co-nationals who are involved in violence and criminality [...] the right way to act should be: get your head screwed on or we will report you to the police. The Romanians in Italy are estimated at between 800,000 and one million and they can constitute a precious network for reinforcing security’


This strategy has resulted in the associations and Party of Romanian Identity being more present in the mass media, with the number of direct quotes from them rising from nine between 2005 and 2007 to thirty two between 2008 and 2010. In this way, the strategies used to make claims to a Romanian identity that was not a threat were adapted to the discursive opportunities in Rome.

In summary, the dominant view of Romanian immigration in Rome has been defined by the choices of local actors of Italian and Romanian nationality organisations. In particular, local politicians’ choices have been shaped by essentialist cultural interpretations of Romanians, and in particular the Romani minority, and motivated by an instrumentalist logic of following local public opinion in order to secure the support of the electorate. This was facilitated by a structural context characterised by closed institutional opportunity structures and a dense concentration of resources in three ways: firstly, despite the establishment of
directly-elected mayors and the increasing powers of city councils in cities such as Rome, the Romanian population (or other immigrant populations) was not eligible to vote in local elections until after 2007. These Mayoral and council candidates would compete for the votes of the Italian public, the number and availability of which was not directly reduced by deporting Romanian immigrants. Secondly, integration measures for immigrants in Rome have concentrated primarily on the access of individuals to housing and the labour market and have not provided resources for group-level organisation or political participation. This has limited the capacity of actors of immigrant origin, such as the Romanian associations studied here, to build significant networks of support or influence policy measures and local debates.

Thirdly, when opportunities have arisen for funding integration initiatives and being present on local representative bodies, these have been taken first and foremost by local Italian organisations. As a result, the participation of immigrant origin organisations must engage with these gatekeeper organisations. In the case of Romanian immigration, Caritas and the CGIL were the providers of a counter-argument to the dominant threat frame but this mobilisation came late. Consequently, a Romanian voice was at least initially unable to make an alternative claim to the dominant framing process due to an unavailability of material resources or ties to the press, political parties or political institutions.

Finally, representatives of the Romanian population have not, moreover, sought to entirely discredit the dominant view but rather align with it by balancing victim and threat frames. This was made possible by a boundary defining process distinguishing between who were positive and beneficial Romanians for the city of Rome and who were not. In this way they adapted to the dominant perspective in public debate in an attempt to build consensus with Italian political parties and press, illustrating how a negative framing pattern could constitute a discursive opportunity structure for mobilisation of specific actors through boundary-making. Nevertheless, this did not result in a shift in power, because it had relatively little success at changing the dominant framing pattern. Indeed, change would only came after the period studied in this thesis, as evidenced particularly clearly by the right wing Mayor of Rome, Gianni Alemanno in a speech on the occasion of the national day of Romania in 2011. He commented that:
‘I am happy to be here today among you. You are true friends. There is a profound bond, fraternal, between Romania and Italy, Rome and Romania. Remember, that you can vote for your Council in Rome [...] Feel yourselves as citizens of Rome! Be a part of this community! In every population and community there are the right people and the mistaken ones. You are the majority of Romanians who behave well and give much to this city’

In doing so, Alemanno aligned his categorisation of Romanian immigrants with that of Romanian actors in 2007 by adopting their same boundary definition process between good and bad individuals. However, this could only occur in combination with the new structural context in which Romanians could participate in local elections as EU citizens. By calling on them to vote, he thus strategically and rationally followed the logic of electoral politics to include, rather than exclude, Romanian nationals. This constitutes a dramatic and opportunistic shift from the comments and actions of Alemanno and some of the members of his party over the previous decade.  

Spain: Madrid

The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Spain

The variation between regional and local political settings in Spain must be understood in the context of two process; historical sub-state nationalism and institutional decentralisation or ‘territorialisation’ (Brugue’ et al 2000 see also Davis 2009, Gibernau 2000, Gil Araujo 2009, Grau Creus 2005, Moreno 1997). The result is a varied pattern of cultural, social and political boundaries across regional and local contexts.

Firstly, a history of regional allegiances, cultures and languages have persisted in Spain’s regions and contributed to the formation of a state of multiple

12 For example, during the electoral campaign of 2008 Alemanno was reported to have promised the deportation of 20,000 nomads and immigrants from Rome if he was elected (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/11/italysshame)
nations. Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the term ‘Spain’ had for many largely constituted a geographical definition rather than representing a political community, and was recognised as such by foreigners rather than the native community (Núñez Seixas 1999), whilst during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, late industrialisation and weak state penetration of peripheral areas underlined an inability to establish allegiance to the state (Nadal Oller 1975). This was contrasted by a concentration of economic and political power in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country (Guibernau 2000, 2006, McRoberts 2001, Núñez Seixas 1999, Ringrose 1998). In Catalonia, the Catalan language as well as the art, architecture and history of the *Renaixença* movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided cultural grounds for claims to autonomy vis-à-vis the central state, whereas in the Basque Country this was grounded in an ethnic conceptualisation of identity based on the Euskera language and blood-line inheritance. In both regions, these claims represented a voice of unity against the centralised Francoist government and in contemporary Spain have constituted the source of demands for their recognition as nations without states. More recently calls for increased autonomy and devolution of competences have been exemplified by demands from Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalist parties in 1998 for Spain to be officially defined as multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-national (Guibernau 2000: 63). In this way, the local dimension of society and politics in Spain has been shaped by the historical development of internal boundaries between culturally different regional movements.

Secondly, and intertwined with the political demands for autonomy from the sub-state nationalists outlined above, institutional decentralisation in the post-Franco era has seen the establishment of seventeen regions known as autonomous communities (*comunidades autónomas*) with legislative and policy making powers in a range of areas. In some regions these powers have a long history: autonomous governments had already existed in Catalonia from 1913 to 1923 and again from 1932 to 1938 and the Basque Country was also granted an autonomous statute in 1933, as was Galicia in 1936, although these were not implemented before Civil War broke out in 1936 (Guibernau 2000: 58). The current arrangement of regional governments and the decentralisation of competences to them was outlined in the Constitution of 1978, which declared that ‘the State is organised territorially into
municipalities, provinces and autonomous communities […] All of these bodies enjoy self-government for the management of their respective interests’ (Art. 137). In municipalities, councils and mayors were to be directly elected (Art. 140), and in autonomous communities a regional legislative assembly would consist of deputies elected by proportional representation. The regional administrations have so far been granted law and policy making competences in fields such as public transport, housing, agriculture, cultural activities, healthcare and education (Art. 148). This means that, although the Constitution claimed that the central state would have exclusive competence on nationality, immigration and the status of aliens on Spanish territory (Art. 149), autonomous communities actually hold the capacity to decide on questions that define the boundaries of social citizenship and influence the inclusion and exclusion of foreigners in their polities.

Together, sub-state nationalism and institutional decentralisation have had significant implications in terms of the local dimension of immigrant integration and political participation. On the one hand, differing philosophies of integration across regions have provided the normative foundations for local laws and policies concerning immigration (Davis 2009, Fauser 2008, Gil Araujo 2009). For example, Catalonia’s approach to immigration and integration has been highly conditioned by the political promotion of a unitary Catalan culture in response to arrivals from the rest of Spain in the early twentieth century or from around the world in the twenty first century, resulting in the presence of immigrants being interpreted as a positive contribution to Catalonia if it can be mitigated by their cultural assimilation to the Catalan national project (for examples see Cardàs i Ros 2007, Pujol 1976, Vandellós 1935). The objective of maintaining an integrated common public culture in Catalonia has motivated immigrant integration policies that emphasise equality, social cohesion, diversity, normalisation, political participation and the Catalan language as their central principles (Fauser 2008, Gil Araujo 2009). Similarly, it has been found that the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) has made use of its competences to define its own distinctive approach to social citizenship, which offers incentives for foreigners to move to the Basque community and in doing so, they ‘suggest that the Basque national community has different values and priorities than the Spanish one and therefore requires more autonomy’
(Jeram 2012: 3). In Madrid a distinct ‘intercultural’ approach can be found, as will be outlined below.

On the other hand, the implication of the multi-level structure of politics and policy making in Spain is also that different localities establish varying modes of politics and channels for political participation. For example, in Catalonia the Barcelona city council’s long history of opening channels for local political participation influenced the form taken in 1985 of the Working Group on Refugees and Foreigners (Grupo de Trabajo de Refugiados y Extranjeros), which brought together political parties, trade unions, businessmen, NGOs and experts (Fauser 2008: 137). This was followed by the Municipal Immigration Council, established in 1997, which was constituted almost entirely by immigrant associations and followed the institutional structure outlined by local Consultative Councils (Consejos Consultativos) that had served since 1985 as a way of widening citizen participation in the city’s post-dictatorship politics (ibid.:136-141). In contrast, in a range of northern regions funding has been granted primarily to autochthonous institutions and organisations for immigrant reception, rather than promoting the participation of immigrants themselves in decisions. In this way, in Asturias the native ‘third sector’ is favoured, in Galicia NGOs and local councils are, and in Cantabria local councils and the regional Youth and Education Council are the beneficiaries (Fernández Suárez 2008: 57-8). In this way institutional opportunity structures in Spain’s local contexts vary not only in terms of the formal and normative content of policy measures, but also in the institutional structures and relations that underpin their implementation. The following sections will illustrate how this is the case in the region and city of Madrid and the way that this has influenced the evolution of the politics of Romanian immigration in the city.

The local dimension of the politics of immigration in Madrid

The administration of the Community of Madrid has been decided by deputies who are chosen by election every four years for the regional parliament, the Madrid Assembly (Asamblea de Madrid). The outcome of these elections has seen the centre right PP dominate the Community of Madrid for the two decades since 1991 (see
figure 13). Thus, there has been stability and consistency during the period in which the region and city of Madrid have become a significant site of immigration.

These PP administrations have favoured Spanish social organisations for managing immigration, in particular Catholic organisations that have extensive experience of providing services aimed at social inclusion for poor and disadvantaged populations. Early developments were small in scale, with one-off projects with cultural mediators during the 1990s and an EU-funded local integration project in two municipalities from 1996 (Fauser 2008: 142, Gil 1998). These measures were carried out by local NGOs and district authorities and did not generally include immigrant representatives. Subsequently, resources from the regional administration have also been granted to Caritas and the Daughters of
Charity for reception centres, although these are open to all in conditions of need and not only to immigrants. The Association of the Spanish Catholic Commission for Migration (Asociación Comisión Católica Española de Migración, ACCEM) has also been favoured for social intervention projects with immigrant families and Eastern European ethnic minorities. Aside from these projects, the process of establishing participatory channels for immigrants is a recent development, as will be outlined below.

The first immigration plan for the Community of Madrid was published in 2001, under the regional government of the PP. Entitled the Plan for Social and Intercultural Coexistence (Plan Madrid de Convivencia Social e Intercultural), it underlined the importance of ‘dialogue, participation and equal responsibility’ across the city (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 2004: 4). The driving concepts of the first Plan were equality and respect for cultural difference through shared norms, tolerance, a shared model of what it meant to live in a plural and diverse society and equal access to resources (Ibid.: 47-51). When presenting the plan in public, the Mayor of Madrid stated that the city was constituted by ‘not only what we were, but above all what we are beginning to be, and in this shared task there is space for everyone’ (referenced in Madrid Convive 2005a: 2). Similarly, in 2006, the Councillor for Immigration declared that ‘Madrid has always been an open community. A region characterised by being welcoming because among its population there are people who come from all around the world’ (de la Calle 2006). She outlined the three objectives of the integration model in Madrid in as equality of opportunities, social cohesion and corresponsibility, understood as the acceptance of change by immigrants and the autochthonous population (de la Calle 2006). The second Plan for Social and Intercultural Coexistence concentrated specifically on immigrants and aspired to their ‘full and free incorporation in Madrid’s society’ (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 2008: 6). It was guided by the three principles of universality independent of an individual’s origins or administrative situation, active integration, and interculturality (Ibid.). These values reflect a clear consensus emphasising tolerance and democratic participation in response to immigration. The intercultural approach

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13 For more information see Madrid Convive, available online at http://www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/ayuntamiento, accessed 10th December 2012
in the city of Madrid thus mirrors the cross-party consensus in Spain on the values to be upheld in post-transition Spain that was outlined in the previous chapter.

Yet despite this ‘intercultural’ focus to integration measures, immigrant-specific services have been created in the form of Immigrant Social Assistance Centres (Centros de Atención Social a Inmigrantes, CASI) (Davis 2009: 148), which were added to in 2006 by Centres for the Participation and Integration of Immigrants (Centros de Participación e Integración de Inmigrantes, CEPI). The CEPI have been more prevalent, and are described as meeting places for new and old madrileños, offering educational courses, legal support, employment workshops and cultural activities (inmigra-madrid). They cater to specific nationalities, but not exclusively: the Romanian-Hispanic Centres in Alcalá de Henares and Coslada (Centro Hispano-Rumano) are CEPIs which offer Romanian language services such as translations and cultural activities as well as promoting local money-wiring services, loans and employment to people of Romanian origin. It has been suggested that this continues the city’s tradition of integrating different social and cultural groups from within Spain into the national patria grande by giving space for their culture of origin, or their patria chica (Davis 2009: 150). Neither are they managed by immigrants themselves: rather than connecting pre-existent associations and organisations of Romanian origin, the Romanian CEPIs have been established and managed by the Fundación Iberoamérica Europa, the President and ex-vice President of which are ex-Members of Parliament and Senators for the PP. This tendency to involve autochthonous organisations and actors rather than immigrant associations has been common in Madrid (Fauser 2008: 142). For some the Romanian-Hispanic Centres have been portrayed in negative terms as an attempt to undermine the existent associations and separate this population from local citizens, whilst for others this has not been the case and they have been seen positively as providing a space for activities to be held in.

Further steps for immigrant integration and political participation have been the Madrid Forum for Dialogue and Coexistence (Foro Madrid de Diálogo y Convivencia) and district tables for dialogue and coexistence (Mesas Distritales de Diálogo y Convivencia). Both of these were intended to create spaces for participation and dialogue but were not given a formal presence in the policy process, although the district tables could present motions to policymakers. The
Madrid Forum was established in 2007 and followed the format of the national level Forum, including ten immigrant associations among its 64 members (raised to 68 in 2011) such as representatives from the city council, the autonomous community, the Spanish State, and other civil society organisations from charities to NGOs, political parties, trade unions, business representatives, and neighbourhood associations. In 2011 these associations were elected by the entire body of registered immigrant associations in the Community of Madrid. The District Tables existed from 2006 to 2010 and involved a wider range of actors, with each table composed of a combination of local charities or NGOs, immigrant associations, and individuals. However, it was felt at times by members that participation was limited, at least in terms of the quantity of people reached, and that impact was inhibited by a lack of technical knowledge and exclusion from policy making (Entredistritos 2008: 4-5, Madrid Convive 2005b: 3). Of the 141 projects carried out by the District Tables only three were concerned with ‘citizen participation’ and four with ‘strengthening associations’ (Entredistritos 2009: 3), and instead of widening immigrant political participation, the majority of the tables’ work was instead focused on labour market insertion (thirty one projects) and ‘coexistence and integration’ (forty one projects) (Ibid.). In general, Madrid’s forum and district councils have mostly been populated by autochthonous NGOs and institutional representatives. As will be illustrated below, this separation of immigrant representation from the policy making process has made immigrants visible in local society but not very influential in achieving policy outputs in their favour.

So, in summary, the official conception of immigrant integration in the Community of Madrid can be understood as working towards interculturality whereby a process of change in the host society towards immigrants has accompanied adaptation from immigrant populations towards the hosts. An inclusive, open discourse from regional and city administrations has emphasised universality of access to welfare, labour opportunities and participation, social cohesion through active interaction, and the development of a shared vision of a diverse Madrid through the notions of co-responsibility and intercultural exchange. Tolerance and democratic participation have constituted central elements of the public philosophy of immigrant integration in the city, reflecting consensus on the post-transition cleavage that emphasises the liberal democratic character of
contemporary Spain. However, in practice there has been the establishment of spaces for segmented integration along lines of national origin. Implementation has also favoured autochthonous actors, in particular Catholic NGOs and charities and individuals with close links to the governing PP. The following section will analyse how the Romanian population has been categorised and Romanian actors have made a claim to their identity in this structural context.

The local dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid

For early migratory patterns from Romania, the city of Madrid represented one of the most significant places of settlement, along with Castellón and Zaragoza (Domingo et al 2008: 6). This growth was very rapid; in 1998 there were only 906 Romanian nationals registered in the Community of Madrid region which rose to 13,961 in 2001 and 189,477 in 2008, an increase of over 200% in a decade (data from INE). In 2011, the latest year available, 219,095 Romanian nationals were registered in the region.

Almost a quarter of the registered Romanian workers in Spain are found in the Community of Madrid (Domingo et al 2008: 11). The greatest concentrations of Romanian population are found in the towns of Alcalá de Henares, Coslada and Arganda del Rey on the outskirts of the capital. As in the rest of Spain, their occupations have been gendered: dominant roles have been in construction and services for men and domestic work for women, both of which have a high level of informal employment, whilst in domestic work there are also frequent cases of exploitation particularly when the worker is undocumented (Domingo et al 2008, Marcu 2009a, Pajares 2007, Viruela Martinez 2008). In fact it has been estimated that in 2005, prior to the amnesty to legalise the status of migrants in the same year, the level of undocumented residence of Romanians in the city of Madrid was equal to 76% of the registered population (Diálogos 1). As in Rome, this data illustrates how much of the Romanian immigration to Madrid prior to the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 was incorporated into a precarious and largely informal labour market, frequently without legal resident status. However, regardless of their legal status, during the period of this study all immigrants in Madrid and across Spain have enjoyed access to healthcare and education as long as they are signed
onto the municipal register. This has provided an opportunity to access basic services, and survey data has also suggested that the majority of immigrants in Madrid are satisfied with the availability and standard of healthcare, housing and education (Calatrava and Marcu 2006).

As outlined in the previous section there have been few opportunities for direct participation of Romanian immigrants in electoral politics in Madrid prior to their entry to the EU in 2007. At the level of specific districts, the participation of Romanian actors has generally been low and the participants in the district tables have predominantly come from Latin America or Morocco: Romanian nationals or associations have been mentioned only twice in the eight editions of the newsletter and diary of events for the twenty one district tables, Entredistritos, and following elections to the tables in 2006 only one percent of positions were held by individuals or associations of this nationality, compared to forty nine percent of Spanish nationality, fourteen percent Ecuadorian and ten percent Colombian (Madrid Convive 2006: 5-8).

Nevertheless, from 2007 there has been an abundance of Romanian electoral candidates in the Community of Madrid (for full lists see figures 16 and 17 in the appendix). From the electoral register prior to the local elections of 2007 some 27 candidates have been found on lists, with particular concentrations in the municipalities of Arganda del Rey, where seven candidates ran for the Greens, and Alcalá de Henares, where the list for Democratic Solidarity was headed by the Romanian Gheorghe Gainar and included four more co-nationals (Boletín Oficial de la Comunidad de Madrid, Num 102, 01/05/2007). Yet, despite this relatively high number of candidates, the electoral support for these lists was low: in 2007, the almost entirely Romanian list for the Greens in Arganda del Rey received only 1.1% of the vote (214 votes), the list headed by Gheorghe Gainar received only 0.12% of the vote in Alcalá de Henares (108 votes) and the only Romanian elected was Gica Craioveanu for the PP, an ex-professional footballer in Getafe in 2007 (and he did not take his seat). Furthermore, the total participation of Romanian nationals in the local elections of 2007 was also low: although Romanian voters around the country totalled 66,330, giving them the second highest turnout of foreign voters in absolute numbers (behind British immigrants), this represented only 12.5% of the total registered Romanian population of 527,019 (according to data from the National
Statistics Institute\textsuperscript{14}). For 2011, the number of Romanian candidates recorded rose to 56, with notable concentrations in Morata de Tajuna, where an independent party put forward an almost entirely Romanian list (10 candidates), and in the municipality of Villamanrique de Tajo the Iberian Party for Romanians (\textit{Partido Ibérico de los Rumanos}, PIRUM) put forward seven candidates (Boletín Oficial de la Comunidad de Madrid, Num. 93, 20/04/2011). However, the level of support and turnout did not rise at this time. As in Italy, it has been suggested in interviews and academic research (Pajares 2007) that this is due to a political culture of apathy and distrust in response to experiences of politics in Romania.

The Romanian population across Spain has been defined in previous studies as a population with weak social networks, a lack of links between individuals of the same nationality and distrust of social and political organisations (Pajares Alonso 2007, 2009). The low turnout of voters would appear to support this, but does not reflect the entire situation because there has been a number of associations that claim to represent the Romanian population. The first associations for Romanian immigrants were formed and based in the towns of Alcalá de Henares and Coslada to the north of Madrid. In these towns there was the greatest concentration of Romanian immigrants, with a plaza in the centre of Coslada later being denominated the ‘Plaza of the Romanians’ due to the way that they gathered there during the day. In Alcalá de Henares the Cultural Association for the Support and Integration of the Romanian People (\textit{Asociatia Culturala de Sprijin si Integrare a Romanilor}, ACSIR) was the first formed in 1998, and in Coslada the Spanish association Obatalá was also formed in 1999 and would focus on helping Romanians find employment, access public services and organise in cultural activities as this nationality came to represent the vast majority of immigrants in the town. At this time the first associations were also formed in other parts of Spain such as Barcelona (in 1999) and Castellón (in 2001). A decade later, in 2009, the total from the Community of Madrid registered with the Romanian Embassy had grown rapidly to reach 36.

The associations are voluntary and non-profit organisations that have benefited from the provision of resources by the local administration. They have

\textsuperscript{14} The Romanian turnout represents a proportion of the total population of Romanian immigrants rather than of the eligible Romanian voters. However, when the same figures are used for other countries the level of Romanians remains low in comparison, below the 29% of the French population, 28% of Italians or 27% of British, but above the Poles (9%) and the Bulgarians (11%).
been funded from a combination of public and private sources from Spain and Romania. Funds from the Romanian government are limited and give little stability, whereas the grants from the Spanish government and Madrid administration have been significant in providing for projects and maintaining associations operating, although only for those who have been able to complete successful applications in the bidding process, and private sponsors for public events have included the international money-transfer companies Money Gram and Western Union. At the same time, the CEPI centres have provided spaces for Romanian associations to cheaply hold meetings and public events.

Relations between associations have been varied. On the one hand, corruption and distrust have been common. The objectives of many have been to make money and perhaps hold a small cultural event, and the motives for their existence have often been questioned by others:

‘Many people don’t have a background in associations and they make their associations as a personal economic source for their lives’

(Interview 28/11/2011)

‘A Romanian associative culture does not exist. In other words, there are Romanian associations but they are directed and managed completely by political powers. Why? Because they are associations that do not aim at helping the Romanian community but rather at making money … Romanians have little associative culture, the phrase “non-profit” does not make sense for many of them’

(Interview 29/11/2011)

Such criticisms appear to be confirmed by the high number of ‘dead’ associations with no recorded activities, no contact details and that have not responded to any contact for this project.

On the other hand, however, it is true that cooperation has been common between others:
‘There are all sorts. I cannot say that there is a unanimous representation, but there are collaborations between groups of associations. I mean, there are associations that are truly active and hard-working, and there are also false associations’

(Interview 09/12/2011)

The specific objectives of these associations are varied, but all declared to work towards ‘integration’ through recognition of the rights and cultural identity of the Romanian population, whether through projects in schools, family excursions, arts and crafts, informative events, protests and so on. For example, the associations Dor Roman and Scanteia emphasised folkloristic cultural events such as performing traditional dances and painting Easter eggs, whereas others would undertake religious events such as the establishment of the Romanian Orthodox church in Alcalá by ACSIR and others, an Orthodox mass organised in the town square by the Association of Romanians in Móstoles, and suggested links between members of the Federation of Romanians in Europe (FADERE) and the Adventist church. Other associations such as Obatalá and ‘European Dialogue’ (Asociación Cultural Hispano-Rumana Diálogo Europeo) combined cultural events aimed at promoting the image of Romania in Spain with information on rights, political participation and calls for social inclusion, particularly as citizens of the EU since 2007. As this variety illustrates, there has been a range of ways of perceiving the identity and needs of Romanian immigrants in Spain presented by the associations. The expression of these identities in public has been interpreted as contributing to the socio-cultural integration of this population, and has been funded as such by grants from the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration and local administrations.

Collaboration for these projects has been particularly common between the associations based in Coslada (Obatalá, Association Decebalus and the Association of Romanians from Coslada and San Fernando), although the central node across the Madrid area has been the Federation of Romanian Associations in Spain (Federación de Asociaciones de Rumanos en España, FEDROM). Registered officially in 2004

15 For more information see online, available at http://spanish.adventistworld.org, accessed 9th September 2011
(although negotiations between members began in 2002), FEDROM brought together four associations from Madrid (ACSIR, Association ROM-Madrid, Romano-Hispanic Association ‘Romania’ and the Association of Romanians from Coslada and San Fernando) and one from Castellón (Association of Eastern Countries, in Valencia). In 2006 this expanded to nine members and in 2008 this expanded further to twenty associations from across Spain, eight of which were based in Madrid. The objective of the Federation has been to bring together associations that work for the integration of Romanians in Spain in order to ‘promote respect, living together, and the spread of the Romanian culture in Spanish society’. FEDROM provides an important resource for these associations, as it has constituted the only organisation to have its own headquarters, lawyer and up to date, fully working website (Interview 29/11/2012). On the website for FEDROM the contact details for all of the associations from the Community of Madrid have been made available to the public, regardless of whether they are members of the federation or not, meaning that the site could also act as an information hub for Romanian and Spanish organisations and institutions.

The ties between Romanian associations have also been accompanied by a range of connections with government institutions and Spanish organisations. Indeed, the atmosphere has been described positively as one of inclusion and collaboration with local government institutions:

‘It began in this way, a collaboration of support and information for the development of the activities of the associations of immigrants. The Immigration Council [of the Community of Madrid] deserves pretty big praise for this. There has been an open and hard-working relationship, not something abstract without any access.

(Interview 9/12/2012)

The CASI and CEPI centres have also been positively reviewed for providing material resources, from funding to space for meetings, and regular access to telephones and computers. Indeed, it has been suggested that the CASI in Alcalá contributed to the formation of FEDROM by providing a meeting space and granting funds for the travel expenses of representatives from outside Madrid (Interview...
30/11/2011), evidence of how the local administration’s objective of establishing democratic participation of immigrant representatives has been developed in practice.

Regarding ties between the administration and associations, FEDROM has provided the principal link, acting as a gatekeeper in a similar way to the role traditionally occupied by Catholic organisations and trade unions. In the participatory channels for immigrants in Madrid outlined in the previous section, FEDROM has been the only Romanian representative. In 2006 the Director of Madrid’s Immigration Council in the regional administration declared that they would offer logistic support for the presentation of projects by FEDROM and its member associations and in the same year the Federation was placed on the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants. It has also sat on the Madrid Forum for Dialogue and Coexistence since its inauguration in 2007 and its President was elected vice-President of the Forum in 2011. FEDROM has signed agreements for projects for the reception and integration of Romanian immigrants, cultural activities and cultural mediation with four town councils (Alcorcón, Coslada, Don Benito and Aranjuez) and in 2009 was included in the CON-FLUENCIA Forum for gender equality at the Ministry of Equality. Links with organisations of immigrants of other nationalities were formalised in 2008 through the REDCO network of 21 associations from around Spain, and conferences and public events have also been held since the same year in collaboration with the General Workers’ Union trade union (Union General de Trabajadores, UGT). In this way FEDROM has provided an important node not only for connecting Romanian associations to each other, but for linking these with the material resources and opportunities for representation provided by Spanish institutions and organisations.

A wide range of ties have also been formed with Spanish political parties. In particular, the PP has been active in publicly supporting Romanian immigrant activities. For example, in 2006 the President of the Community of Madrid from the PP formally opened the first Congress of Romanians in Spain, in Coslada. In the same year, the Romanian Elena Roman of the Association Dacia was placed as

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Director of Immigration for the PP administration of Alcalá de Henares, the Mayor of which authorised the building of the first Romanian Orthodox Church and was reported to have spent 60,000 Euros on public celebrations of the national day of Romania (El País, *Medio millón de nuevos votantes, un gigantesco ‘caramelo’ para los partidos*, 31st December 2006). As noted above, in electoral politics, the director of ARCIS, Gheorghe Gainar, also headed the Solidarity and Democracy (Solidaridad y Democracia) electoral list in Alcalá de Henares in 2007, although the whole list received little more than 100 votes.

However, these relations and connections have been interpreted in differing ways. For some, it represents an important part of the political process by establishing communication between decision makers and the public:

‘Politicians need partners, and if they don’t have them, they invent them in order to manage, in some way, things between Spain and Romania. So, in some way, you get an association to do something for you’

(Interview 29/11/2011)

For others, however it has been viewed more critically as an exchange of favours, of offering grants for immigrant-related projects in return for promotion of the party:

‘There are associations that have done electoral campaigns for the PP here and that way have received a grant. Of course, it’s not money in an envelope, but a call for grant proposals is made and they are given it’

(Interview 28/11/2011)

It is particularly significant that these links between associations and local political parties have been established since 2006 and with a view to the participation of Romanian nationals in the local elections of 2007 and 2011. In fact, interest in the voter preferences and actions of the political parties towards the new electorate from 2007 was already a significant issue in the press from 2005 (El País, *Los Partidos, a la caza del voto de los inmigrantes que irán a las urnas en 2007*, 13th November 2005), illustrating a concern for how to react to the entry of Romania to the EU. At the same time, references to the Romanian associations have been recorded in the
Spanish press since 2001 and risen in the years before the entry of this population to the EU in 2007 (figure 14). Indeed, between 2005 and 2007 there were 36 references to them in the newspapers *El País*, *El Mundo*, *ABC* and *La Razón*, 19 of which were quotations from the director or spokesperson for FEDROM.

The general pattern of Romanian immigrant politics in Madrid has thus evolved in the context of an open institutional structure with opportunities for collaboration and representation of Romanian interests in local politics. Connections with Spanish institutions and organisations have come in response to the symbolic capital of these actors as representatives of Romanian immigrants in the city and their social capital as points of contact for their co-nationals, particularly in the case of political parties that have been interested in ensuring that they appeal to the new European voters after 2007. In return, ties and connections have been accompanied by access to material resources for the Romanian associations.

Figure 14. References of Romanian associations from Madrid in the newspapers *El País*, *El Mundo*, *ABC* and *La Razón*.
So in summary the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid has been characterised by the presence of institutional channels for cultural recognition and representation and the provision of material and network resources through autochthonous institutions and organisations. On the one hand, funding opportunities from the national government, regional and local administrations and private companies have promoted the formation of associations and encouraged them to undertake cultural activities. On the other hand, the city administration and local political parties have also shown themselves to be open and encouraged the activities of Romanian associations, although this has been criticised as due to a superficial and not particularly transparent hunt for votes in the years preceding and following 2007. At the same time, the Romanian population itself has, aside from the short-lived associations that have sporadically arisen for personal or political purposes, been organised in a coherent and cohesive manner through the formation of a Federation that has been able to act as a node between them as well as giving them a voice in public and political debate.

The dynamics of the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid

How have the identification and categorisation of Romanian immigrants in Madrid developed over time in this institutional and relational context?

During the 1990s, the public image of the very small Romanian population of Madrid was tied to that of gypsies. In particular, at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s there was an intense debate on gypsy camps around Madrid. The removal of one camp in Malmea passed into national political debate, as evidenced in the previous chapter, but others nearby in the north of the city in 1999 and 2000 and in Vallecas in the south in 2001 and 2002 were also the source of much debate. In the Madrid Assembly there were 13 debates on Romanians between 1998 and 2000, and these were all in reference to Romanian gypsy camps. Local tensions were also visible with neighbourhood protests such as those in the summer of 1999 from the residents of the northern neighbourhood of Begoña, where a petition of 2,500 signatures contributed to the removal of a camp nearby, which took place on the 8th of July (El País, un laberinto de salida incierta, 17th August 1999). There were
frequent reports in the press of the clearing of camps and once the camp residents were re-installed in the Madrid council’s temporary housing in November there were further complaints that there were insufficient resources for the population (El País, un centenar de niños rumanos lucha contra la helada en tiendas sin agua ni luz, 14th November 1999. The left wing newspaper El País presented the population as victims of social exclusion, poverty, hunger and misery at the hands of a dysfunctional administration. The right wing ABC presented them as an ethnic group that would not change its way of life and could not be integrated (ABC, somos nomadas, esta es nuestra vida, 23rd September 2001). However, throughout this period press headlines from across the studied newspapers referred directly to them as a national rather than ethnic category: ‘the Romanians’ of the camps.

At this time there was very little concern for Romanian nationals of a non-ethnic minority background. For the PP administration, the Romanian population was one of gypsies who had particular cultural differences with the Spanish population that urged a distinct integration plan based on building segregated, temporary camps. These camps were justified by the councillor Pilar Martinez López as due to the fact that ‘the nomad population has the singular trait, that in its country of origin, it slept under the stars in its own vans and in the cold’. The PSOE directly criticised the PP administration for their management of the situation, yet did not disagree on the causes of the presence of camps being the specific cultural character of the ‘nomadic Romanian gypsies’. The criticism of the PP did not argue against creating temporary segregated camps but complained that there was not enough camps for all of them (El País, El PSOE exige otro campamento para los rumanos no censados, 4th January 2000), and an IU member of the city council similarly criticised the methods of the administration, but not the definition of Romanians as nomads, stating that

‘it is certain that there is a type of immigration that is more nomadic, but the government in response should create provisional reception infrastructures and reach agreements with the rest of the institutions to carry out social policies’

(El País, El alcalde declara que la ‘etnia rumana’ no viene a Madrid a trabajar, sino a situarse en la marginación, 16th May 2000)
Across all of the parties, there was consensus regarding the need for policies for the population of the camps that protected their rights and ensured their social inclusion:

‘We have a responsibility to procure the well-being of the most unprotected and vulnerable sectors of our community [… we act] according to the most scrupulous respect for these peoples’ human rights and dignity’

(Martinez Lopez, PP, Asamblea de Madrid, 2/8/1999)

‘[we should] avoid problems such as this, which have to be solved with solidarity, tolerance and the most scrupulous respect for the dignity of the people and their human rights, becoming xenophobic and hostile attitudes towards immigration’

(Almeida Castro, PSOE, Asamblea de Madrid, 2/8/1999)

This fixed cultural identity is similar to that noticed in the city of Rome during the same period. Yet in Madrid there was consensus over the cause of the problem (gypsy culture), its implications (social exclusion and lack of dignity) and also the resolution to implement (camps). Both representatives’ emphasis of dignity and tolerance represent a clear consensus, whilst disagreement was instead in reference to logistical and technical questions concerning the length of stay for individuals in the camps, their location and the responsible administrative body.

With increasing Romanian immigration in the 2000s, however, the debate shifted. As the Romanian immigrant population grew, stories of gypsies took up a smaller proportion of press reporting, and between 2000 and 2006 there were no debates at all regarding Romanians in the Madrid Assembly. A piece in El País in 2001 examined the settlement of Romanian nationals in Alcalá de Henares and Coslada, emphasising the poor living conditions in Romania and the shared Latin language and cultural heritage of the two countries (El País, Del Europa del Este al este de Madrid, 10th September 2001), whereas in the right wing press there appeared an increasing number of headlines reporting crimes, such as ‘Convicted, two Romanians for kidnapping and rape’ and ‘a gang of Romanians is stealing from drivers in the South station’. Reports of a Romanian Orthodox Church being set on
fire in Arganda del Rey in 2002 also reached national parliamentary debate due to the presence of neo-Nazi groups in the area, as evidenced in the previous chapter, although local fears of being ‘invaded’ by the arrival of ‘buses loaded with Romanians’ were also reflected in reports. (ABC, *Tensión vicinal en Arganda ante el aluvión de inmigrantes y los incidents xenófobos*, 13th May 2002). As a result, for one Romanian interviewee who arrived in 2003, there was already a sense of suspicion in the city:

‘I had never in my life thought that in any country in the world, at any moment, someone would say to me ‘hey, you’re a criminal!’ […] and] it wasn’t like they stopped in the street and said ‘you are a criminal!’ but it was the press, and above all the older people’

(Interview 28/11/2011)

However, these issues were rarely discussed in the local parliament or in public.

The growth of debate on Romanian immigration and the increasing visibility of Romanian actors in Madrid truly came after 2005. This was due to the continued growth of the Romanian population as well as the preparation for the accession of Romania to the European Union in 2007. These factors are inter-related: the accession of Romania to the EU, with the granting of rights to free movement and local enfranchisement, brought fears of an increasing growth of the population from 2007 but also meant that Romanians could represent a potentially influential electorate in local elections, particularly in the towns in which their presence was significant, such as Coslada and Alcalá.

Two framing processes can be highlighted over this time in debates and press reporting. On the one hand, a victim frame was presented by representatives of FEDROM, composed of defining Romanian nationals as being disadvantaged due to their structural exclusion in laws, state policies and labour market conditions. The normative implication was that social exclusion was negative for the Romanians themselves but also for Spanish society as it meant that they could not contribute politically and economically, such as by paying their taxes:
‘Today Romanians have very limited expectations for their work, but a time will come in which they will not conform to accessing only the lowest levels of the productive system. Their qualifications are not recognised’.

(Miguel Fonda, FEDROM, El País, 24/6/2006)

‘The most certain is that Romanians have jobs here, even if they are informal ones, but what they want is to legalise [their status] and pay their taxes’

(Gelu Vlasin, FEDROM, El País, 28/10/2006)

At this time the trade unions, in particular the General Union of Work (Union General de Trabajo, UGT) and Workers Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, CCOO), were supporting a delay on the opening of the Spanish labour market to Romanian nationals as part of the EU accession process. Whilst the former underlined that they did not think there would be ‘an avalanche’, the latter was concerned of a threat of the arrival of Romanians:

‘We consider a transition period to be prudent, in line with other countries, because we fear that if it is not done, a quantitatively significant movement could be produced that generates imbalances in the Spanish labour market’

(Julio Ruiz, CCOO, El País, Los sindicatos proponen retrasar la entrada de rumanos y búlgaros al mercado de trabajo, 27th October 2006)

Despite being a recognisable representative for much of the Romanian population in Madrid and having a visible presence in local politics and press, FEDROM was not able to prevent the restrictions to the Spanish labour market participation coming into force between 2006 and 2008. This policy outcome thus illustrates the limited weight of the Federation in policy making regarding the labour market in comparison to the trade unions, reflecting the continued strength of organised interests in a client politics decision making model. Despite giving organised Romanian representatives an opportunity for mobilisation, this restricted institutional structural context thus maintained a power differential vis-a-vis Spanish organised interests.

On the other hand, however, the presence of Romanians in Madrid was also framed as an opportunity by politicians, press and Romanian actors. The first
reference in this sense came in 2005, with a report in the newspaper El País on the impact of immigrant populations being allowed to vote in the local elections in 2007:

‘The political parties have not let the situation go unnoticed and they are carrying out the first actions to bring the over a million new voters to their ground […] all of the politicians consulted by El País recognise that the immigrant vote will have a decisive influence in the local elections and they agree that the most important thing is to encourage participation’

(El País, *Los partidos a la caza del voto de los inmigrantes*, 13th November 2005)

Similarly, in 2006 the large Romanian population was described as a ‘gigantic sweet for the parties’ (El País, *Medio millon de nuevos votantes, un gigantesco ‘caramelo’ para los partidos*, 31st December 2006) and in 2007 the Romanian vote was defined ‘a highly valued good’ to compete over (El País, *A la caza del voto de Pírcalabescu*, 1st March 2007).

This framing of Romanian immigrants as an electoral opportunity in the period preceding and following 2007 must be seen in conjunction with the attempts of political parties, particularly the PP, to treat Romanian immigrants favourably in public. For example, in Alcalá de Henares the PP administration provided for the national day of Romania to be celebrated and permission was granted for an Orthodox Cathedral in 2006. The President of the Community of Madrid, also from the PP, visited Romania in the same year to discuss immigration, Romanian culture and bilateral relations between Madrid and Bucharest (ABC, *Rumanos de ida y vuelta*, 1st February 2006). Romanians were included on party lists, described by one member of the PP as a decision taken at the regional rather than local levels of the party, suggesting that it constituted part of a wider party strategy rather than a reflection of local activism or participation:

‘They offered it to me. In the Popular Party there was an interest, not at local level but at provincial and regional levels, in that they were considering that there could be participation from immigrants in the local elections. And as [in the town] they already knew me from before [they included me on the list]’

(Interview 13/12/2011)
At this time, the President of Romania and the head of the Romanian Orthodox Church visited the PP administration in Madrid and Romanian political parties signed agreements with the PP and the PSOE before establishing offices and networks throughout Spain too, the motivations and implications of which will be discussed in the following chapter.

In contrast, the parties on the left also framed the Romanian immigrant population as an opportunity, but this was seen as part of a wider development of an inclusive and participatory democracy rather than an appeal to a specific nationality population:

‘A population as important as the Romanian one in Coslada cannot live with its back to the rest of the citizens and we need them to build an open and solidary city’

(Agustín González Plasencia, PSOE, in ABC, 27/8/2006)

‘[the Romanians] have the same rights and obligations as any other group of residents’

(Julio Setien, IU, in El País, 1/3/2007)

These comments illustrate a universal approach to immigration which saw the presence of Romanians as part of a wider process of establishing social inclusion and equality.

The actions of the Spanish political parties in framing Romanian immigration as an opportunity followed two distinct logics. For the PP, it involved selecting a specific nationality group as the basis for electoral campaigns. This was the same logic of treating immigrants as separate nationality groups that had been behind the original establishment of CASI and CEPI integration centres. For the parties on the left, the opportunity frame implied a more universalistic and less segmented view of the Romanian community and immigrant integration in general. However, these were both closely linked to the accession of Romania to the EU and in particular to the granting of local voting rights. Indeed, whereas FEDROM’s mobilisation around a victim frame prior to EU membership did not produce a change in the policy of
restricting labour market access, the possibility of Romanian voters influencing electoral results after 2007 resulted in close relationships between political leaders and Romanian representatives. The change was clearly noted by a Romanian representative in Alcalá in 2007:

‘Now I feel happy because, when we arrived as immigrants we always had to ask [the political parties for things], and now it is them who offer’

(Nelia Pircalabescu, Association of Romanians from Coslada and San Fernando, in El País, 1/3/2007)

In this way, the structural change in the status of Romanian nationals provided an opportunity for a shift in the way that Romanian immigration was framed. Among the local politicians debating Romanian immigration there was consensus on the opportunity provided by the population.

To summarise, as found in Rome the dynamic of defining the boundaries of ‘who is who’ in Madrid has been tied to the way that structurally situated actors have presented the Romanian population in public. While the Romanian population was small, the only publicly visible issues about them were concerned with their presence in gypsy camps around the city. Yet as the population has grown so this aspect has diminished. In part, this is simply because increasing Romanian immigration has resulted in gypsies constituting a smaller proportion of the total population and thus a smaller proportion of public debate. However, it has also been accompanied by a qualitative shift towards viewing the presence of Romanian immigrants as an opportunity, which has gathered cross-party consensus. At the root of the opportunity frame was an appeal to the votes of the Romanian immigrants that became citizens of the EU with local voting rights in 2007. This was particularly the case with the PP in places such as Alcalá de Henares where the Romanian population was especially large.

The very fact that the public framing of the presence of Romanian immigrants as an opportunity came at the same time that restrictions were applied to further Romanian immigration, however, illustrates the way that politicians and decision makers speak in different ways and follow different logics of action according to their audience. In this way, whereas the opportunity frame followed a
majoritarian vote-maximising logic prior to elections, the restrictions to the labour market reflected the greater bargaining power of organised labour interests in decision making (Freeman 1995). In this way, in Madrid there has been an opposite policy gap to that found in Italy, as an open discourse has accompanied increasing immigration controls rather than a restrictive discourse whilst opening borders for foreign workers.

Moreover, this move to categorise Romanian immigrants due to the opportunity that their presence provided was a noticeably early development that came in the years before their membership of the EU in 2007. This was quite different to the pattern found in Rome, where the impact of the shift in legal and political status from accession the EU did not even occur in the years after 2007. The explanation for the situation in Madrid lay in the institutional and discursive structures that had shaped the local politics of immigration there. Solidarity, equality and participation had been the defining principles of the local policies for immigrant integration in Madrid, repeating the same values that constituted the post-transition cleavage outlined in the previous chapter. The channels for political representation and participation promoted the organisation of immigrants along lines of nationality and, to this end, material resources were made available for the formation of associations. This facilitated the formation of Romanian organisations, in particular the Federation FEDROM, which would in turn benefit from the tendency of political parties and institutions to favour specific, large gatekeeper organisations over others in communication networks. In such a structural context, reaching and appealing to representatives of Romanian origin in anticipation of their vote was easily achieved through interaction with established associations or by funding new ones. In sum, the availability of material resources and the development of social capital bonds between Romanian actors and local Spanish actors in Madrid facilitated their mobilisation in anticipation of the Romanian enfranchisement in 2007.

Finally, although the structural context has facilitated the formation of communication networks and the presentation of an inclusive view of Romanian immigrants as an opportunity, it has only empowered Romanian actors in a limited way. On the one hand, it is true that through their social capital and situation in an inclusive institutional context, Romanian associations gained access to material resources that enabled them to operate, hold cultural events, establish an Orthodox
church, celebrate the national day of Romania and undertake projects for their ‘integration’. However, on the other hand these resources did not enable them to prevent the Spanish government from placing restrictions on their inclusion in the labour market from 2007 to 2009, a policy decision that showed the trade unions to be the winners, illustrating their greater power in policy making. Following from the end of the period of study for this thesis, labour market restrictions were re-applied in 2011, with no widespread responses from the Romanian actors. In this way, the local dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in Madrid represents an opportunity for inclusion as cultural and political members of the polity, but also a restricted empowerment that does not enable them to influence wider policy decisions that affect their status.

Conclusion

The topic of this chapter was the local dimension of responses to Romanian immigration in the local contexts of Rome and Madrid. An open definition of the ‘local dimension’ was employed to cover the regional and city administrations of Lazio and Rome in Italy, and the Community and city of Madrid in Spain. This enabled inclusion of the varied structures, discourses, activities and social relations that shape society and politics in these places. Indeed, in both cases some of the actors referenced were based around these cities, although they did carry out activities in them.

The analysis presented in this chapter has found the local dimension to be a significant site of the politics of immigration and the definition of the social boundaries of inclusion in the polity. A wider range of actors have engaged in the definition of Romanian immigration than that found in the national debates of the previous chapter. These included political parties, local administrations, charities, trade unions, NGOs, press and Romanian cultural associations. This illustrates the way that, although local institutional structures may provide wider opportunities for a greater range of voices to engage in the negotiation of ‘who is who’, the greater resources that are enjoyed by dominant political parties and social organisations with national reach, such as trade unions and the Catholic Church, continue to ensure a
balance of power in their favour that permits their control of the dominant framing pattern.

In both cases the way that Romanian immigrants have been framed has been broadly similar to that found in the national dimension. In Rome, there has been a dominant threat frame that has been presented with consensus across right and left wing parties, whereas in Madrid there has been a more inclusive approach, emphasising how the presence of Romanians constitutes an opportunity. These distinct patterns have occurred as actors have adapted to their structural settings and the quite different arrangements of institutions, discourses and networks in the two cities.

In Rome, the opportunity structure favoured Italian political parties and dominant autochthonous gatekeeper organisations, whilst Romanian immigrants had limited access to material resources and formed a fragmented and divided body of actors. At the same time, in Rome there has been no real understanding of immigration as a structural phenomenon with implications beyond the labour market and no over-arching consensus on a public philosophy of immigrant integration in the city. The rise of a dominant discourse seeing Romanians as a threat was in part a continuation of an essentialising interpretation of cultural difference as requiring segregation and separation, through building temporary camps for Romani gypsies or deporting Romanian immigrants. However, it was also a repetition of that seen in the previous chapter as a vote-maximising logic saw public concerns emphasised and brought to the fore by both major parties on the right and left. Disenfranchised immigrants were unable to exercise an influence in the sense that they were not, until 2007, potential voters. In this context of a closed institutional structure, the opportunity for mobilisation of a counter-argument from Romanian actors came in the form of alignment with the only consensual discourse; that of the threat frame.

In contrast, in Madrid there was a much greater availability of material resources for Romanian associations, which facilitated the positioning of FEDROM as a significant actor in contact with autochthonous institutions. At the same time, a clearly defined philosophy of integration based on the concept of interculturality and emphasising tolerance and democratic participation as central values to contemporary Spanish society and politics motivated the construction of social spaces and cultural associations for immigrants. Across left and right wing parties
there was consensus in debate on the importance of the notions of tolerance for cultural difference and equal access to resources that underpinned this philosophy. Thus, the values of a post-transition cleavage emphasising democracy and tolerance have continued to broadly shape the local dimension of politics in Spain, which has been put into practice through policies facilitating the formation and mobilisation of immigrant-specific organisations. Consequently there was relatively little discussion of Romanian immigration at all, despite the fact that public opinion surveys have recorded an increasingly negative view of immigrants of this nationality, as noted in earlier chapters. When responses to Romanian immigration were made, moreover, they were positive, driven by a logic of vote-maximising in anticipation of 2007.

Despite this difference in context and frame content the logic of action of dominant actors in each case has been similar: local elected political actors have been concerned with appealing to voters. In Rome, local politicians called for deportations and underlined an apparently criminal, violent nature to Romanian immigrants in response to public tensions, accompanied by Romanian actors who have also emphasised the presence of criminal co-nationals in order to define themselves as a potential resource in fighting crime. In Spain, moreover, local politicians have formed connections with Romanian actors and facilitated social and cultural activities for them in order to appeal to their potential votes. The granting of local voting rights to Romanian immigrants has thus provided a vital shift in the opportunity structure and changed the way that local politicians refer to them. In Madrid, local politicians could benefit from their established networks with Romanian actors in order to appeal to potential voters, whereas in Rome a longer process of mobilisation and negotiation through frame alignment from specific Romanian actors would be required to overcome the uncertainty of Italian politicians. In short, a greater imbalance of power in Rome has posed more significant barriers to influencing the dominant frames used to categorise Romanian immigrants than that found in Madrid.
Chapter 7
The Cross-border Dimension of the Politics of Romanian Immigration in Italy and Spain

So far, this thesis has analysed the national and local politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain by studying how different social and political actors have negotiated the meaning of being a Romanian immigrant. These actors have used material, symbolic and network resources to mobilise publicly, framing Romanian immigration in ways that balance their view with their discursive and institutional contexts. This chapter will contribute further by asking how actors, structures and resources from beyond the territorial borders of Italy and Spain have too influenced these negotiations. Indeed, individuals, organisations and institutions in both countries have established and maintained political, economic and personal links with Romania and other countries. At the same time, their movement and legal status has recently been characterised by the granting of cross-border rights by both the Romanian State and the European Union (EU). The issue to be studied here is how these cross-border relations and processes have influenced the politics of defining the meaning of ‘who is who’ in Italy and Spain.

The ‘cross-border dimension’ referred to here illustrates the way that social networks, boundaries of socio-cultural belonging, avenues of capital and resources and institutional structures are multi-dimensional and layered; they are not simply tied to the territorial borders of cities, regions or countries. Transnationalism has gained much popularity as a way of describing and interpreting such cross-border activities and processes in studies of globalisation, international migration and EU integration. This literature is concerned with how structures, networks and flows of people, ideas, rights, capital, goods and services that go beyond the territorial borders of individual countries are embedded in local settings. Similarly, the objective of the current chapter is, to paraphrase Faist, to explain whether ‘old’ national and local
terms of citizenship, belonging and membership acquire ‘new’ meanings in a context of cross-border flows and activity (Faist 2010: 34).

In the specific case studies of this thesis, cross-border activity has increased in recent years at the macro-level of the Romanian State and the EU and at the meso-level of political parties and organisations. This has offered increased opportunities for political representation of Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain, but not resulted in widespread participation in practice. As will be evident here, neither has it influenced the dominant framing patterns that have characterised responses to Romanian immigration in these countries. Thus, although there has been a significant level of cross-border activity, the impact this may have on the politics of immigration is contingent on the balance of power and choices of political actors in the local context.

This argument will develop over three main sections. The first will outline the theoretical basis for an understanding of cross-border activity by summarising the academic literature on transnationalism in the context of globalisation and European Union integration. The second examines the development of cross-border activities of Romanian nationals in Italy and Spain, describing how a cross-border dimension to the politics of immigration has only developed in the late 2000s and in a primarily top-down, elite-led way with few resources and little in the way of initiatives to encourage widespread participation. Finally, the third section analyses the influence of this cross-border dimension on the negotiation of what it means to be a Romanian immigrant in Italy in Spain. It will be argued that, despite developing significantly during the 2000s, the cross-border dimension has not resulted in the empowerment of Romanian actors to transform the dominant framing patterns that have already been witnessed in the national and local dimensions of the previous two chapters. In fact, the Romanian State has been slow and under-resourced when it has come to reacting to situations of need of Romanian citizens abroad, whilst political parties have aimed to gain influence in Romania, rather than in Italy or Spain.
Transnationalism in the context of globalisation and European Union integration

This section will set out the relevance of examining cross-border activity within Europe, in particular how processes of transnationalism and European Union integration are illustrative of ‘changing forms of cross-border mobility, membership and citizenship’ (Faist 2010: 13).

Over the past two decades, transnationalism has become widely referenced across the social sciences, and particularly in immigration studies (for example, Amelina and Faist 2012, Bauböck and Faist 2010, Kivisto 2001, Levitt 2001, Portes 2001, Portes et al 1999, Vertovec 1999, 2001, 2009). Indeed, international migration and transnationalism have been described as ‘reciprocally interconnected phenomena’ (Kivisto 2001: 551). One of the founding studies of the contemporary interest in the topic, from Nye and Keohane, defined transnational relations as cross-border interactions involving ‘at least one actor [who] is not an agent of a government or an international organisation’ (1971: 332). Similarly, Portes has distinguished transnational activities from international relations between states and multinational activities of single large corporations due to the way that they are

‘initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors, be they organized groups or networks of individuals across national borders […] even when supervised by state agencies, the key aspect of transnational activities is that they represent goal-oriented initiatives that require coordination across national borders by members of civil society’ (Portes 2001).

Similarly, Faist has defined transnational spaces as ‘relatively stable, lasting and dense sets of ties reaching beyond and across borders of sovereign states’ (2010: 13) and Vertovec has noted how ‘most social scientists working in the field may agree that “transnationalism” broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (1999: 447).

Defined in these open terms, some form of transnationalism is a situation found in the everyday lives and political, socio-cultural and economic activities of many, although not all, international migrants. Furthermore, mobility and the
maintenance of ties and interactions across the borders of states may influence how they understand their own identity, undertake their everyday activities, organise collectively and participate politically and economically within or across different places and localities (Vertovec 2009: 24).

Transnational activity cannot be viewed in isolation from the multi-dimensional and multi-location flows and processes that characterise contemporary globalisation. Indeed, much theory and empirical analysis has explored the way that cross-border flows of capital, ideas, people, goods and services in the current phase of globalisation have contributed to a blurring of the boundaries between local, national and international levels of politics, economics and social relations (see for example, Beck 2005, Castells 2000, Sassen 1996, 2006, Talani 2004, 2009, Walker 1993, 2010). This research has promoted a move away from ‘methodological nationalism’, which posited that the cultural boundaries of nations were fixed and coincided with the administrative and territorial boundaries of states and societies, towards a focus on mobility and networked flows of people, ideas and capital among diverse spatial locations (Beck 2005). In this way, for Castells globalisation and modern communications technology have contributed to the formation of a ‘network society’ in which dynamic flows of capital and information, and therefore power, are embedded in specific local institutional and cultural networks (2000, 2009, 2010). Similarly, Sassen has suggested that global cities such as London, Tokyo and New York are hubs of power because they are where financial and social networks are most densely concentrated, from information technology and the finance sector to physical interaction and transaction between highly diverse peoples (1991, 1994, 2006). However, whereas these studies are interested in characterising and explaining shifts in economic, social and political structures in the global age, transnationalism studies ask what the implications of this are for the actions of individuals, organisations and institutions. In the same way, the cross-border dimension of the politics of immigration is concerned with examining how agency can be enacted within this layered and multi-dimensional global context (Faist 2010: 23).

These developments are particularly evident in the European Union. Cross-border activity and flows have constituted a central part of the social and political development of the EU, although the precise notion of ‘transnationalism’ has been
used less frequently than would perhaps be expected in academic studies (for examples that do, see Hurrelmann and DeBardeleben 2011, Kaiser and Starie 2005, Rogers 2000). As noted in previous chapters, the cross-border free movement of workers and businesses between Member States of the Community were objectives in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the removal of obstacles to goods, services, workers and capital has been an objective since the Single European Act of 1985 (Maas 2007: 37). Despite this process being driven to a large degree by the economic interest in creating a common market (Talani 2004), many policy makers and academics also aspired that cross-border mobility and ties would contribute to the construction of a unified EU polity. According to this perspective, free movement and a shared labour market would eventually spill over into feelings of loyalty towards shared institutions and a sense of cultural and political unity among equal Europeans (Eder 2006, Herrmann and Brewer 2004, Laffan 2004, Maas 2007, Spohn 2005). From 1992 the establishment of an EU citizenship regime in which rights to employment, mobility, non-discrimination and local and supranational political participation have been bundled at the EU level (Bauböck 2010) appears to further this process by providing opportunities for vertical connections to form between individuals and organisations in civil society and the EU institutions, as well as horizontal ties to develop between freely moving citizens. This has led Kaiser and Starie to argue that the increasing constitutionalisation of the EU ‘expands the scope for cross-border exchanges, transnational socialization and policy transfer below the EU level’ (2005: 1). In short, as with the studies of immigrant transnationalism mentioned above, in this European studies literature it has been suggested that cross-border relations and processes provide opportunities to change the way that people think of themselves, their everyday activities and their connections to institutions, organisations and other people.

However, the study of transnationalism has also been problematic, particularly so in the context of the EU, for the following reasons:

Firstly, approaches to ‘transnational’ relations have been criticised for focusing on a reductive interpretation of ties and allegiances as restricted to two nation states and for favouring essentialised national categories over those based on gender, ethnicity or mutual interest (Wimmer 2007).
Secondly, transnationalism has often been referred to as a ‘concept’ yet has little, if any, explanatory value; rather, the notion of transnationalism represents a description of a context in which relations and processes from beyond the territorial borders of states are embedded in local and national contexts. As noted by Cingolani and Piperno in reference to international migrants, ‘transnationalism is not an ontological property [… but rather] one of the many dimensions of the migration experience, tied to precise choices and opportunities’ (2005: 17). In light of this, the study of the cross-border dimension of the politics of immigration must be concerned with how cross-border relations and processes provide opportunities for political actors to engage in the negotiation of ‘who is who’ and why these actors decide to make specific choices.

Thirdly, in studies of the EU, transnationalism has problematically been presented as a macro-theory of social and political integration, due to the teleological assumption that increasing opportunities for cross-border activity will lead directly to the construction of a sense of unity and shared identity among individuals and groups (see for example Kaiser and Starie 2005). In contrast, and as the previous chapters of this thesis have already illustrated, cross-border mobility and shared rights of EU citizenship do not necessarily lead directly to this outcome. Instead, national and local boundaries of inclusion or exclusion have been defined through negotiations between specific actors who have not always wanted to welcome EU citizens from other Member States. In this way, citizenship of the EU is not only bundled at different administrative levels, but also socially embedded in local contexts. An understanding of the impact of cross-border activities and processes on the development of a polity of the EU must therefore concentrate on how political actors in specific settings adapt to the shifting transnational context to negotiate their role and presence.

From these diverse studies, some cornerstones for the analysis of this chapter can be uncovered. It will firstly be asked, in the following section, whether cross-border relations exist, between who and why. Subsequently, the way in which political actors claiming to categorise or represent Romanian immigrants respond to these cross-border relations and processes will be analysed. The chapter thus examines how the negotiation of ‘who is who’ in reference to Romanian immigration
is structurally situated in structures and differentials of power that are not necessarily bounded by the borders of the Italian and Spanish States.

The cross-border dimension of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain

Cross-border activity and flows have already figured largely in academic research on Romanian migration in Europe. However, the emphasis has been narrowly placed on the phenomenon of migration networks between locations of origin and settlement (Cingolani 2007, Cingolani and Piperno 2005, Eve 2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008, Marcu 2009b, 2011, Potot 2008, Sandu 2005, Viruela Martinez 2002, 2008). This section will summarise this literature before moving on to discuss the specific political cross-border activities that have developed involving individuals, organisations and State institutions. In doing so it will illustrate the way that as the Romanian emigrant population has grown so too have the opportunities for cross-border political activity.

The micro-level: individuals

Emigration from Romania has both benefitted from and encouraged further the development of cross-border mobility patterns, kinship ties and economic relations. As will be illustrated below, accession to the EU has also undoubtedly influenced this cross-border activity with the outcome that by 2010 Romanian migrants constituted the largest nationality population of mobile citizens moving from one Member State to another (data from Eurostat).

Although the general settlement pattern amongst Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain has been reported as fragmented in and beyond the local contexts of settlement (Cingolani 2007, Eve 2008, Gabriel Anghel 2008,), the migration process has to a large degree been facilitated and driven by close interconnections between personal contacts, kinship networks and migrant brokers (Pajares 2007: 102-4). In this way, Sandu has illustrated how friendship and kinship ties have constituted important resources for emigrants from Romania, such as early migration by ethnic Hungarians and Germans being facilitated by their great number of relatives or
acquaintances abroad, while subsequent patterns forged ties linking regions and villages in Romania with specific localities in other countries (2005: 560-2). In Spain, for example, the prevalence of migrants in Coslada from the same Adventist congregation in Romania, and agricultural workers in Almeria from the region of Teleorman in southern Romania also attest to the significance of these interpersonal contacts (Potot 2008: 90).

However, as visa free travel and later free movement rights have been granted and transport connections have improved, networks have become less significant and diverse types of mobility have arisen. In this way, patterns of circular or temporary migration became more common as individuals could travel from Romania to Italy for ‘working holidays’ in short term roles (Eve 2008: 82-3, Gabriel Anghel 2008: 792) and ‘networks that favoured intense, cyclical mobility between Romania and Spain were formed’ (Marcu 2011: 1). The ease of mobility characterising these temporary movements has meant that employers in Italy and Spain have had access to a flexible labour source whilst workers have benefitted from higher earnings than those in Romania, enabling them to pay for their own homes, buy a new car or television, or send a child to university upon return (Cingolani and Piperno 2005: 8, Eve 2008: 84). In this way, the granting of free movement rights is said to have boosted consumption ‘at home’ as it became easier than before to travel back to Romania to spend the wealth found abroad (Gabriel Anghel 2008: 798). For some, free movement between the countries also meant that life could be balanced between living in one or the other place;

‘I have two homes, I am from here and from there, and there is no trouble, no suffering. Since there are two languages in my head, it is normal to have two homes, right?’ (interview referenced in Marcu 2012: 42)

For others an eventual return to Romania is often considered, from regular holidays in the summer to years spent abroad before returning or only temporary seasonal emigration (Cingolani 2005: 4, Pajares 2007: 126-9). Finally, for some in Spain permanent return has been reported as an option since the economic crisis began in 2008 (Marcu 2011, 2012).
The increasing cross-border mobility outlined here has been accompanied, to a degree, by economic cross-border flows. On the one hand, Romanian goods have been sold in shops in Italy and Spain (Cingolani 2007: 10-13). On the other hand, remittances have provided a significant source of income to Romania since the late 1990s, whether through formal transfer systems or informal cross-border deliveries (Ban 2009: 12-4). However, little investment from the emigrant population has been reported in Romanian business (Pajares 2007: 124-5). This activity has also been described by Cingolani and Piperno as a form of ‘weak transnationalism’ occurring irregularly and being based on individual strategies and connections rather than collective organisation (2005: 3).

These factors illustrate how the limited and inconsistent cross-border activities between individuals have not established a stable transnational social space.

The macro-level: States and EU institutions

At the macro-level, both the Romanian State and institutions of the EU have developed avenues for vertical cross-border links to be made with Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain.

The Romanian State has increasingly attempted to strengthen connections with the growing population of political exiles and emigrants around the world. Government departments have created opportunities for cultural, economic and social activities to be carried out in the countries of settlement of Romanian emigrants. In particular, in 1998 an Under-Secretariat for Romanians Abroad was created. It was renamed the Department for Romanians Abroad (Departamentul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni, DRP) and transferred to the Ministry of Public Information in 1999, then moved to the General Secretariat of the Government in 2003, to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister in 2004 and finally to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005, where its budget and activities have increased (Departamentul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni, The History). The objectives of the DRP have been ‘preserving and affirming the ethnical [sic.], cultural, linguistic and religious identity of Romanians’ as well as ‘strengthening the links between Romania and the Romanian communities abroad’ by offering grants for cultural,
educational and religious projects and building closer ties to ‘personalities or organizations from the Diaspora’ (Departamentul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni, *DRP Objectives*). In 2004, the Romanian Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family also established a Department for Labour Abroad (*Departamentul pentru Muncă în Străinătate*) with the objectives of improving the social and economic conditions and protecting the rights of emigrants (Sandu et al 2004).

However, the impact of these departments has been doubtful. The Department for Labour Abroad has been described as unknown by many Romanians and ineffective by others (Pajares 2007). The choice of projects of the Department for Romanians Abroad has also been criticised and the amount of funding available described as ‘limited’ (Interview 28/11/2011). Indeed, the Department has been under-resourced for the size of the Romanian emigrant population and inactive when it has come to building and maintaining institutional ties in the countries of Romanian immigration. The impact of funding has been further restricted by the exchange from the Romanian lei to the euro, so that from the perspective of emigrant organisations ‘what is a large amount for them, is little for us’ (Interview 09/12/2011). In sum, the Departments for Romanians Abroad and for Labour Abroad have been viewed as symbolic developments with little real impact on the lives of Romanian emigrants.

The most high profile cultural activities in Italy and Spain that have been directly funded by the Romanian State are those of the Academy of Romania in Rome (*Accademia di Romania in Roma*), and the Romanian Cultural Institute in Madrid (*Instituto Cultural Rumano*). Both form part of a network of 16 Romanian cultural institutes across the world, headed by the ‘Romanian Cultural Institute’ in Bucharest, which was established in 2003 in order to increase the visibility of Romanian culture in the world and communicate with foreign audiences. In Rome, the Academy of Romania has had an historic and prestigious presence in the city, existing as a school since 1921 before being inaugurated as a cultural academy in 1933, with Mussolini in attendance (*Giornale Luce*, January 1933). Its activity has to this date focused on studying the arts and humanities and promoting Romanian culture through exhibitions, concerts, conferences and shows. The Cultural Institute

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17 At the entrance to the Academy there remains a stone plaque from 1932 of donators on which Benito Mussolini is the only Italian name.
in Madrid was formally established only in December 2006, although it had existed as a smaller Cultural Foundation for the previous five years and it contains spaces for art exhibitions, classes, workshops and film screenings (albeit in a considerably smaller space than that of the Academy in Rome). These Institutes employ the material resources provided by the Romanian State to project a positive international image of modern and traditional cultural activities and products from Romania. As a result, their audiences have principally been the respective Italian and Spanish populations in these capital cities, rather than Romanian emigrants (Interview 21/11/2011).

The opportunity for vertical linkages to form between individuals and the Romanian State has also, moreover, been established through the granting of external voting rights to Romanian citizens abroad. Since 1991, the Romanian citizenship law has allowed dual citizenship, with national enfranchisement, for individuals who either lost or were forced to renounce their membership in the past (Burean 2011, Iordachi 2009, Popescu 2012). This enabled the repatriation of many individuals without them having been residents in Romania and their enfranchisement from abroad, with their votes in national and presidential elections being added to the Bucharest circumscription. In 2008 this was expanded when four deputies and two senators for ‘the diaspora’ were established. Eligible to run and vote were emigrants who could demonstrate being resident in their host country and dual-nationality Romanian citizens abroad (Popescu 2012). Despite these opportunities, however, in the Romanian presidential elections of 2009 the Romanian turnout in Italy and Spain was low, with 42,500 votes cast in Italy and 38,500 in Spain, considerably below the total Romanian population in either country (Burean 2011: 102). As suggested by Harja, although this represented a rising voter turnout it is still ‘very far from marking a mass or ‘physiological’ participation in the political life in Romania’ (2011: 101). Thus, an institutional opportunity for vertical ties between emigrants and the Romanian State has been established, yet has provoked little in the way of bottom-up participation.

Similarly, since the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007, Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain have been granted the right to participate in local and European Parliament elections. As noted above, this constituted an opportunity for the formation of vertical political ties between Romanian nationals and local and
supranational institutions. However again, the granting of local voting rights has not brought about a significant level of electoral participation from Romanian nationals in either Italy or Spain, as noted in the previous chapter, and neither has the possibility of voting in elections to the European Parliament. Indeed, it was reported that for the European elections of 2009, only 28,467 Romanians registered to vote in Italy and 49,317 in Spain (Popescu 2012: 107).

In summary during the 1990s and early 2000s there were very few opportunities for cross-border political activity and the resources available were minimal. In later years, despite an increase in both opportunities and resources for Romanians abroad, vertical ties between Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain and either the Romanian State or EU institutions have involved only a minority of the population.

Meso-level: Organisations and Institutions

At the meso-level of organisations there has also been a growth in cross-border activity as the Romanian populations in Italy and Spain have grown. The principal organisations have been political parties and religious institutions which have expanded in response to the shift in the status of Romanians as voters abroad and citizens of the EU. As with macro-level developments, these have nevertheless only recently been established.

Since the late 2000s, the two largest Romanian parties, the Democratic-Liberal Party (PD-L, Partidul Democrat-Liberal) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partidul Social Democrat), have both been active within the emigrant population as this has grown and specific seats for Romanians abroad in the national parliament have been created. This interest has responded to the importance of the emigrant vote in legislative and presidential elections that were decided by very small margins. In Romanian politics, conflict and polarisation between communists and anti-communists, as well as patronage and clientelism by both, characterised the 1990s and led to instability in the 2000s. In response, after winning the elections of 2000 the Social Democratic Party (PDSR, Partidul Democratiei Sociale) merged with the other historic Social Democratic Party to form a new Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) and emphasised a new platform built on
modernisation, integration with the EU and globalisation (Ciobanu 2007: 1438). However, the elections of 2004 produced an evenly divided parliament between the PSD’s coalition on the left and the so-called Alliance of Truth and Justice coalition on the right, the latter with a weak majority. In the same year, the presidential election was also won by only 250,000 votes by Traian Basescu of the Democratic Party (*Partidul Democrat*). After this victory, the Democratic Party promptly left the Socialist International and adopted a populist right wing approach from 2005 onwards, finally merging with the Liberal party in 2007 to form the Democratic Liberal Party (*Partidul Democrat-Liberal*, PD-L), the largest party on the right (Ciobanu 2007: 1441). Following the legislative elections of 2008 the PD-L was the largest single party in the Chamber of Deputies with 51 seats, only two more than the PSD and Conservative coalition in the opposition, and in the 2009 Presidential election Traian Basescu of the PD-L was re-elected, albeit in contested circumstances after receiving 50.3% of the vote in the runoff and being accused of fraud. In such close elections, the external vote of Romanians abroad could prove significant, and indeed it was; in 2009 the re-election of Basescu as Romanian President was assured by the 115,831 votes that he received from Romanians abroad, polling 78.9% of the external voter turnout (Burean 2011: 100).

Both of these principal parties have opened offices in Italy and Spain as part of an expansion into ‘diaspora’ politics. The diaspora sections of the PD-L and PSD consist of branches in Spain and Italy, each with smaller local organisations. The first PD-L branch in either country was established in 2005 in Castellón, in Spain, and since then they have also arisen in many other cities across Italy and Spain. The leader of the PD-L in Castellón, William Brinza, was elected to the Romanian parliament as representative of the diaspora in 2009, and he has since emphasised the importance of Romanian remittances, promoted return migration of emigrants and criticised the lack of support offered to emigrants by the Romanian government. Similarly, the PSD has existed in Italy since 2005, although the foundation of its Italian section was only formally communicated in 2010 (PSD Italia–proiecte generale de activitate) and in Spain since 2007, when the first branch was

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18 For reports on these elections see also Impact News Romania, *Rezultate finale : Băsescu câştigă cu 71 de mii de voturi*, 7th December 2009, available at http://www.impactnews.ro/Alegeri/Rezultate-finale--B%C4%83sescu-c%C3%A2%C5%9Ftig%C4%83-cu-71-de-mii-de-voturi-24710c, accessed 10th February 2013
established in Barcelona. The declared aims of the PSD Diaspora section have been to stimulate and maintain links between party members and sympathisers in Romania and abroad, developing relations of dialogue, promoting the party and contributing to an improved political image of Romania abroad (Statute Art. 5-6).

Both the PD-L and PSD have also reached formal agreements with the primary Italian and Spanish political parties to collaborate in elections. Since 2009 the Romanian PD-L has collaborated with the Italian PDL and the Spanish Popular Party (PP), gaining support for the presidential candidacy of Traian Basescu and in return promoting the electoral lists of the latter in European Parliament elections. The PSD also signed a bilateral agreement with the Spanish PSOE to act as ‘sister parties’ in 2008; in November of the same year they ran joint local campaigns for the elections for the Romanian parliament and in June 2009 the vice-president of PSD Spain was supported as a candidate on the party lists for European Parliament elections. In Italy an agreement of cooperation was signed between the PSD and the Italian Democratic Party (PD) in 2010 in which the PD promised to support PSD candidates in Italy during Romanian elections and establish an office for the Italian section of the party, whilst the PSD would support PD candidates among potential Romanian voters. In both countries, the PD-L has however been the most effective at mobilising electoral support; in the presidential elections of 2009, for example, they won 78% of the vote in Italy and 81% in Spain (Burean 2011: 102).

The development of these activities in only recent years has been due partly to the increasing size of the Romanian population during the 2000s, and particularly to the changing legal and institutional context found since 2007. Indeed, following the period of 2007 and 2008 the benefits of establishing branches of the PD-L and PSD in Italy and Spain increased significantly because of the added seat in the parliament for the Romanian ‘diaspora’ and the growth of the Romanian electorate abroad.

The granting of accession of Romania to the EU at the same time also provided two further opportunities. On the one hand, the PD-L and the PSD were able to join European Parliament party groups; the former became a member of the European Peoples Party and the latter of the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.

19 A general overview of the PSD Italian and Spanish branches are available on their websites, at http://psditalia.eu and http://www.psdbarcelona.es, accessed 10th February 2013
These shared groups were explicitly mentioned in the collaboration agreements with Italian and Spanish parties: shared membership reflected shared interests and ideologies, thus creating a justification for mutual collaboration. On the other hand, the granting of local voting rights to Romanians in Italy and Spain has provided a potential source of support for Italian and Spanish parties. The Romanian parties were viewed as possible interlocutors with potential voters, reflected in the collaboration agreements’ explicit mention of joint campaigning. The establishment of party branches in ‘the diaspora’ and connections with local actors has in this way reflected how Romanian parties could adapt to the changing institutional context by making use of networks in the European Parliament and mobilising their symbolic capital as recognisable actors for the Romanian migrant population (despite the fact that low turnout figures reflect the level of this capital to be considerably less than could have been expected).

A similar process has occurred regarding the establishment of Romanian religious networks in Italy and Spain. The three churches that are relevant in this respect are the Romanian Orthodox, Pentecostal and Adventist Churches. These Churches are all examples of institutions that are rooted in specific local contexts in Italy and Spain whilst also constituting a cross-border network in various countries within and beyond Europe. The largest, the Romanian Orthodox Church, has been described in interviews and reports as perhaps the only institution capable of bringing Romanian emigrants together with a sense of community by constituting a meeting point and cultural anchor (Interviews 04/07/2011, 30/11/2011, see also Harja and Melis 2010, Neagu 2008). The Pentecostal and Adventist Churches can both instead be defined as ‘global’ churches and have benefitted from funding from around the world, in particular from individuals in the United States, making them ‘transnational by nature’ (Cingolani 2007: 16). The Romanian Orthodox Church has also benefitted from the attention of Romanian and, in Spain, local autochthonous political actors, whereas this has been less the case with the Adventist and Pentecostal Churches despite President Basescu’s visit to the Adventist parish of Coslada in 2008, where there is a particular concentration of this religion.

The Romanian Orthodox Church has historically been the principal religious institution in Romania and among Romanian emigrants. During the 1990s, parishes in Italy and Spain were under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Archiepiscopacy of
Paris, although it has been suggested that individual parishes have been more concerned with their own local communities and formed few links beyond their local area or country (Cingolani 2007: 17, see also Ihlamur 2009). In Italy the first stable Romanian Orthodox parish was established in 1975, in Milan, followed by others in 1978, 1981 and 1983. These were the only parishes in the country prior to the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989 and they were often suspiciously viewed by the Romanian exile population as potential spies providing information to the securitate (Ihlamur 2009: 232, see also Stan and Turcescu 2005). By 2004 this had risen to 34 parishes, an estimated 85 by 2007 and 122 in 2011 (Episcopia Italiei, no date, Ihlamur 2009: 242). In Spain, the first Romanian Orthodox parish was established in Madrid in 1979 and as the emigrant population has grown since the 1990s so has the number of parishes; in 2010 there were 76 parishes from across Spain on the register of Orthodox Churches from the Romanian Embassy. Although the Church has seen its role as one of spiritual guidance, the ceremonies and events have also typically represented a meeting place for individuals where they have been able to share information about residence regulations, employment opportunities, housing, and so on. This would usually occur outside the Church during or after services, although in Barcelona the parish has provided a weekly drop-in session through which the priest and congregation were reported to have enabled hundreds of people to find jobs through their personal connections.

As with the political parties, the Romanian Orthodox Church has also experienced its most significant expansion in Italy and Spain since 2007, prior to which its presence was complicated by the institutional contexts of these countries. The Church was not recognised as an official religion in Spain until 2005 or in Italy until 2012, which resulted in limited material resources such as places of worship, economic contributions from the state or tax exemptions. In contrast, the global networks of Pentecostal and Adventist Churches have provided sufficient material resources for their establishment. Romanian Embassy records showed there to be nine Adventist priests in Coslada in 2010, and only four in other parts of Spain. During this period the Catholic Church provided spaces for Orthodox events and ceremonies in both countries, although some places of worship were improvised and had to be dismantled afterwards (Harja and Melis 2010: 27). In Italy it was also commented that new priests would have to find their own employment in order to
support themselves before the contributions from parishioners were enough to maintain them, yet this came during a period when residence permits for priests were difficult to obtain because they would not be granted to representatives of a church that was not formally and legally registered with the state (Interview 08/07/2011). The first parish in either country that successfully obtained permission to build its own church and cultural centre was that of Barcelona, although it was achieved without external support:

‘For years we tried, through the city council and the bishop, to get a space that was a little more dignified, and they haven’t helped us at all, not at all, and this parcel of land is from our own effort’

(Interview 23/11/2011)

The context during this period leading up to the accession of Romania to the EU can therefore be described in both Italy and Spain as one of a closed institutional structure providing few opportunities for stability or expansion and a lack of material resources. In both Italy and Spain the process of gaining formal recognition for the Church came from individual priests in their local parishes; they would only get attention from political leaders once these required a way of building networks within the Romanian emigrant population.

However, this pattern changed significantly in subsequent years. In Italy, the Romanian State provided funding for the building of a Holy See in 2008 whilst in Spain an increasingly open approach from local government representatives in public accompanied the granting of space for the construction of places of worship, first in Alcalá de Henares in 2006 and later the Carabanchel district of Madrid and the town of Guadalajara in 2010 (El Mundo, La primera iglesia rumana ortodoxa en España será realidad en Alcalá en dos años, 31st October 2007). Furthermore, the granting of these sites was accompanied by communication and public appearances with diplomatic representatives, Romanian political actors and leaders of the Orthodox Church. For example in Italy President Basescu attended the inauguration of the Romanian Diocese in 2008 (Ihlamur 2009: 263-4), and the laying of the first brick of the churches in Alcalá de Henares in Spain in the same year, along with the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church, William Brizna (PD-L representative for the
diaspora), Romanian MEPs, and the Mayors of Alcalá de Henares and Madrid (Adevarul, *Traian Basescu a vizitat Biserica Adventista din Madrid*, 5th October 2008). In both countries, this arrival of Romanian politicians at Orthodox Church events constituted a push to establish networks of support among the emigrant population. In Spain in particular, moreover, this was accompanied by support from local Spanish politicians with the same objective, as emphasised in one interview:

‘We here in the Council […] we know that the churches are the only organised interlocutor in the Romanian population, and if there are no associations then you have to go to the churches’

(Interview 29/11/2011)

The situation of the Orthodox Church was therefore inseparable from the changing legal and political contexts in the EU and in Romania. Social networks within the emigrant population were viewed as a potential source of electoral support for Spanish parties and for the Romanian PD-L in the period leading up to and following the institutional developments of 2007 and 2008. In this context, the accession of Romania to the EU has been significant due to granting free movement rights to priests as citizens of the EU and promoting greater interest from local political actors in building linkages within potential voters in the Romanian population.

To summarise, the development of Romanian meso- and macro-level cross-border political relations and processes in Italy and Spain has come in a predominantly top-down fashion and not been met with significant participation from the majority of the Romanian populations at the micro-level. These developments have only come since the late 2000s, following the growth of the Romanian populations of these countries and in response to a shifting opportunity structure. Cross-border activity in this context has functioned in three ways. The first is as a foreign policy tool, projecting a positive image of Romania abroad through cultural events in the network of Cultural Institutes and by funding the projects of Romanian cultural associations. The second is as an economic tool by building and maintaining perceived and material connections between emigrants and Romania with a view to them continuing to send remittances. The third is as a political tool by
harvesting the benefits of the external vote in Romanian presidential elections, as so effectively exemplified by Basescu’s PD-L in 2009.

The cross-border dynamics of the politics of Romanian immigration

The previous sections have examined the structural conditions that have led to an increase in the cross-border activity of the Romanian emigrant populations of Italy and Spain. This section examines whether these activities have influenced responses to the presence of Romanian nationals in these countries.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, the cross-border dimension had little influence. At this time the populations were small, although growing, and cross-border activities were limited to individual-level mobility patterns and economic transfers. Romanian or European politicians had not taken interest in this emigrant population whilst the Orthodox Church remained without resources and concentrated on the spiritual concerns of its parishioners. Indeed, the only regular example of an identification of Romanian culture was in Italy, where the Academy of Romania in Rome regularly held exhibitions and conferences on classic and modern art, poetry and prose, religion and the Latin roots of the two countries. The dominant patterns noticed in previous chapters of a negative representation in Italy and a more positive one in Spain were thus unchallenged by cross-border actors.

Nevertheless, the period prior to and following 2007 saw an increased range of Romanian political voices in Italy and Spain. As outlined above, this was a period in which a shifting institutional context was accompanied by increasing organisational networks between actors claiming to represent the Romanian emigrant population. In this context, financial capital from the Romanian Department for Romanians Abroad and the cultural capital of Romanian political parties and the Orthodox Church facilitated the expansion of the cross-border dimension of the politics of Romanian immigration in both countries.

In Italy, as noted in previous chapters, this was a period of confrontation with a widespread perception of Romanian immigration as a threat. Following the murders by Romanian nationals in 2007, and the retaliatory attacks by Italian residents on gypsy camps and in the street (Il Tempo, Raid punitive anti-romeni, tre
feriti, 3rd November 2007), there were protests in front of the Italian embassy in Bucharest. Under this pressure, tense exchanges between Romanian and Italian government representatives and political parties came to the fore. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release through its Embassy in Italy, declaring that it

‘condemns in the strongest possible way this act of aggression against Romanian citizens [...] all of the Romanian public opinion hopes that the institutions of the Italian State take the necessary measures to ensure that xenophobic acts of this kind are not repeated’

(Il Giornale, Bucarest: l’Italia fermi la xenofobia, 3rd November 2007)

At the same time, in Bucharest there were public protests in front of the Italian embassy to Romania, leading the ambassador to comment that ‘we are living a period of increasing crisis in the relations between the two countries’ (Corriere della sera, Bucarest, corteo di protesta davanti all’ambasciata italiana, 7th November 2007). Following strong lobbying from pro-Roma ethnic minority organisations in Brussels (European Network Against Racism 2008), a plenary of the European Parliament on the treatment of Romanian Roma in Italy took place in May 2008, in which the European Commission also declared that

‘the EU and Member States must do their utmost to improve the social inclusion of the Roma [...] Community law guarantees that Romanian citizens enjoy the same freedoms as those of other countries of the Union, and that the Commission will ensure that their rights are respected’

(Commissioner Vladimir Spidla, 22 May 2008)20

These comments clearly framed Romanians (particularly but not exclusively those of Romani ethnicity) as victims and called for a shift in the Italian States’ actions.

However, the claims from abroad had little direct impact on the local and national responses to Romanian immigration in Italy. As has been widely discussed in the previous chapters, despite the Italian parties PD and PDL condemning the violent attacks there was already, and would continue to be, consensus that Romanian immigrants posed a threat due to their criminal nature (Il Giornale, Bucarest: l’Italia fermi la xenofobia, 3rd November 2007). The continuation of this was particularly evident in the response of the Northern League member Paolo Grimoldi to the Romanian government’s concern:

‘A lecture from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was just what was missing. They should think instead about taking back the criminals that they have sent out in such large quantities […] The Embassy and the Government of Romania, that today are so concerned, why did they not show the same concern when their citizens invaded our cities, stole from our elderly and raped our women?’

(Giovani Padani-Lega Nord, Grimoldi: La Romania non ci faccia ramanzine e si riprenda i suoi delinquenti, 6th November 2007)

In 2009 the tensions were still present in an interview with the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he complained about ‘certain approaches, above all on the part of some representatives of the Italian government that are directed at inciting xenophobia through a very aggressive and provocative rhetoric’ (Corriere della sera, Il ministro degli Esteri romeno: “nel governo italiano incitazioni a xenophobia”, 9th February 2010). In the same year, the Romanian Orthodox Church also sent a letter, written in first person, to national and local authorities and Italian Catholic parishes entitled Cara Italia (Dear Italy) in which it expressed the pain of being discriminated against as an outsider and criticising the tone of press and political references to Romanian immigration. This too confirmed the continued pattern of treatment despite the calls from Romanian government representatives.

As the Romanian political parties became more established in Italy, they also engaged in identifying the Romanian immigrant population as victims. However, for
both the PD-L and the PSD the victim status was due to different factors. For the PD-L representative of the diaspora, William Brinza, it was due to a lack of action from the Romanian government:

‘It is enough to open an Italian newspaper and you see only bad news, all committed by Romanians. It started with the case of Mailat [the murderer of Giovanna Reggiani] that was treated lightly by the Tariceanu government and now the situation has worsened’


The PSD instead lay responsibility with the Italian parties of the right, with the leader of the PSD in Romania, Victor Ponta, commenting in 2010 that he was ‘worried about the situation of Romanians in Italy, which form the largest Romanian diaspora community, but also the most severely threatened by the radical anti-immigration policy of the populist right’ (PSD Italia, Victor Ponta semneaza un accord istoric cu Pier Luigi Bersani, www.psditalia.eu).21 Both parties refrained from criticising their own Italian and European partners. Indeed, the possible implications of insulting a partner was seen in the European Parliament in 2007 when the far right party group ‘Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty’ collapsed; 18 Romanian members left the group in response to an accusation from Italian member Alessandra Mussolini that the Romanian population was ‘making crime a way of life’ (La Repubblica Metropoli, Crisi Romania-Italia, Europarlamento diviso, 19th November 2007).

Significantly, the LN had greater freedom due to not belonging to a European Parliament group with Romanian members. In this way, the fragmentation among parties provided an opportunity for autonomous action for the LN despite its Italian coalition partners’ agreements with Romanian partners in the European Parliament.

In Spain, as the previous chapters have shown, a negative threat frame was not prominent in national or local responses to Romanian immigration during this period. If anything, there was emphasis placed on the cultural and historical

21 A report can be read at http://psditalia.eu/agenda/victor-ponta-se-intalneste-cu-romanii-din-italia, accessed 10th February 2013
similarities between the two countries. For example, in an interview in 2007 Horia Barna, the Director of the Romanian Cultural Institute underlined that

‘The similarity between our civilizations is impressive, and I would like to highlight the profound Latin character of the Romanian people, key to the East of Europe, and the Latin character of Spain on the other side of the continent. Both civilizations were on the borders of the Romanian Empire and following its collapse they both maintained their Latin character’

(Horia Barna, quoted in ABC, Horia Barna: “Las culturas rumana y española guarda parecidos impresionantes” 27/05/2007)

Furthermore, the Romanian government representatives and politicians who were present in Spain did not publicly discuss Spanish social or political issues, but repeatedly emphasised the view that Romanian immigration was temporary, evoking the image of ‘home’ to their audiences. In this way, in 2008 President Traian Basescu, speaking on a visit to Madrid asserted that

‘in three years it will be much better in Romania. I assure you that in Romania you will find a workplace in the next period, a well paid, decent working place’

(quoted in Soros Foundation 2009: 36)

Similarly, as part of the PD-L campaign in 2009 William Brinza offered free flights home and support for their first house and the PSD in Spain campaign promoted opportunities for an ‘effective and ordered return policy that enables the sons of the diaspora to be returned in dignified conditions so that they help to build the new Romania’.

It has been argued that the attempt to remind emigrants of their homeland serves as a way of promoting patriotism and making it more likely that remittances would be sent back, providing a significant source of revenue (Soros Foundation 2009: 36). Indeed, this was suggested in comments made by President Basescu on a visit to Madrid in 2008 in which he thanked the emigrants for their remittances and encouraged them to continue sending by telling them not to return yet:
‘Romania has managed to secure good economic growth, with the considerably great support that the over two million Romanians abroad have given by sending large amounts of money to the banks in the country and I thank you for that […] I do not think that Romania should recover in one way or another all of its citizens. We have a large space, the European space where we can meet anytime’

(Adevarul, Traian Basescu a vizitat Biserica Adventista din Madrid, 5th October 2008)

These speeches were not aimed at influencing perceptions or policies in Spain, nor were they directed at a Spanish audience, but they were instead constructed for the Romanian nationality population.

Cross-border political activity has therefore developed in different ways in Italy and Spain and the content of the claims to the meaning of being Romanian has varied in both countries. In Italy, the Romanian State and the EU institutions responded to actions in Romania and Brussels by issuing public announcements. Yet the dominant threat frame did not change, even following the inclusion of Romanian political parties in European Parliament groups and the signing of agreements for collaboration with Italy’s PDL and PD. As noted in the previous chapter’s study of the context in Rome, local politicians at this time were unsure how or in what numbers the Romanian population would vote, and so had little incentive to change the status quo and promote their participation. Instead, the LN in particular continued to frame Romanians in the same way following 2007.

In Spain, moreover, the Romanian State and EU institutions were not active in the same way. Even when similar concerns regarding xenophobia could have arisen, such as following an arson attack on the Romanian Orthodox Church in Arganda del Rey in 2002, there was consensus from all Spanish political parties that Romanians were victims and that tolerance should be emphasised in response. Chapter five showed how the stability of the dominant catch-all parties, the PP and the PSOE, and their consensus on the importance of emphasising democracy and tolerance in contemporary Spain underlined these debates. Chapter six also illustrated how the logic of vote-maximising by local politicians, particularly from
the PP, led to favourable public announcements and actions for Romanian immigrants in the city of Madrid in the years prior to and following 2007. Here, the development of a cross-border dimension has added further to these processes by providing a possible communication channel to Romanian nationals in Spain at election time in the form of Romanian political parties. Connections between Romanian and Spanish organisations and political parties were already developing in cities such as Madrid, Castellón and Barcelona in preparation for the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007, promoting the development of collaborative activities that would facilitate the building of networks within the local Romanian populations in Spain. Finally, these actors were also voicing the assumption that Romanian campaigning was only temporary and would be followed by return migration, which may have contributed to maintaining a pattern of taking Romanian immigration off the public agenda.

Finally, the more recent participation of Romanian political parties in Italy and Spain may have not contributed to the image of Romania in a positive way. Following the elections of 2009 accusations of fraud by the PD-L and PSD were common in both countries. Voters were not required to register prior to the election-day but could arrive at the polling booth with a valid Romanian document of identification and confirmation of residence in the country in which they were voting, such as an entry on the municipal register in Spain. It has been suggested that voters could therefore be driven from one polling booth to another and cast their vote repeatedly. Other suggestions were that votes could be bought:

‘I have seen some things [...] of the 15,000 Romanians [in this town], 3,000 vote for the Romanian election, which is not many, and I saw a leader of one political party, I don’t even remember which one, passing around 20 euro notes [...] it is illegal, but it happens’

(Interview 29/11/2011)

The outcome was a negative view amongst interviewees in Italy and Spain, and a reaffirmation of the perception of Romanian politics as corrupt and untrustworthy amongst Romanian individuals and associations:
‘I haven’t voted because, you know, I haven’t had time and I don’t like politics anyway [...] I am not going to waste a day going there to vote for some politicians who, it’s not that they’re gangsters (mafiosos), but they grab the money’

(interview 17/11/2011)

‘after the revolution both the party on the left and the one on the right have made a mess [...] they have tried everything in Romania, they haven’t thought about the population, and here’s the result you see, over two million Romanians have gone abroad’

(interview 06/07/2011)

Indeed, corruption has been a problem in Romanian since the end of the Ceausescu regime and although political activity is formally democratic, patronage networks within parties and corruption by economic elites have been highlighted as persistent dangers to the rule of law (Transparency International 2012). Stories of corruption may reinforce these perceptions and explain the inability of Romanian parties in Italy and Spain to encourage any significant electoral participation of their co-nationals. It could also place a question mark over the future of this cross-border political collaboration if little tangible electoral benefit arises for the autochthonous parties.

Conclusions

In this chapter it has been asked if actors, structures and resources stretching beyond the borders of Italy and Spain have played a role in influencing responses to Romanian immigration in these countries. This has been defined as the cross-border dimension of negotiating ‘who is who’. The study has been shaped by the academic literature on transnationalism and globalisation, which has illustrated how cross-border activities and processes across micro-, meso- and macro-levels may influence the negotiation of the social and political boundaries of membership to national polities. This incorporates an awareness of how local and national opportunities for
political participation and mobilisation can change as a result of shifting structural settings beyond the country’s borders into this thesis.

In particular, the most significant shifts in this development of a cross-border dimension to the politics of Romanian immigration have been the establishment of external voting rights by the Romanian State and the granting of EU citizenship rights to Romanian nationals, which have led to joint campaigning, public appearances and the provision of places of worship in cities such as Madrid, Castellón and Barcelona in Spain, and to a lesser degree Rome and Turin in Italy. However, these discrepancies between the two countries illustrate effectively how the influence of the cross-border dimension is contingent on local contexts and the specific choices made by local political actors.

International migration and European Union integration have in this sense facilitated a reinterpretation of the terms of citizenship of Romanian emigrants in Italy and Spain. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Romanian migration to these countries was described as fitting into a typical Southern European model, characterised by a high degree of undocumented residence and informal or precarious labour. As noted in more detail in chapter four, stable membership of the citizenry of these countries was made difficult by legal residence being arduous to obtain and hard to maintain and opportunities for political participation in local or national politics being limited. The development of cross-border political structures and processes, especially since the latter half of the 2000s, has brought about a change in this context that has seen Romanian nationals enfranchised in presidential elections in Romania and in local and European Parliament elections in Italy and Spain, as well as facilitating the expansion of cultural projects and the stability of the Romanian Orthodox Church outside of Romania. This is a clear example of the bundling of citizenship rights at distinct administrative levels (Bauböck 2010).

However, the development of cross-border rights has only changed the formal status of the Romanian population but not enabled actors to influence how local public responses to their presence have played out. Indeed, the cross-border dimension has only become significant in recent years; it had no role in the negotiation of responses to Romanian immigration during the 1990s or the 2000s. At this time, the resources committed by the Romanian State or made available by the Romanian Orthodox Church were inadequate for such a dramatically growing
emigrant population. Since then, the cross-border dimension has developed in an almost entirely top-down way, by which increased activity has been found on the macro-level by the Romanian State as well as on the meso-level by political parties and religious institutions, but without promoting widespread popular participation or the development of a general, stable cross-border social system. The result has been an opening opportunity structure for political actors but limited provision of material resources and little in the way of empowerment to define the social boundaries of what it means to be an immigrant in these countries. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Romanian State’s activities are merely symbolic gestures to show attempts to regulate emigration, whilst the connections built by the diaspora branches of Romanian political parties have been concerned with gaining power in Romania, rather than in Italy or Spain. In this way, the cross-border dimension of the politics of immigration in these countries introduces a range of diverse actors whose objectives are not necessarily related to influencing local and national responses to Romanian immigration.
Chapter 8
Conclusions

In the contemporary era of globalisation, international migration has become a social and political fact across Europe. However, responses to the presence of immigrants have varied from one country to another. This thesis has asked why different responses arise to the presence of immigrants in host societies and what influences how immigration is represented in public debate. As this concluding chapter will summarise, the study of the politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain contributes to an understanding of these questions. The chapter will also seek offer a critical reflection on the influence of citizenship of the European Union on the social and political integration of intra-EU migrants and to situate these case studies in the existing literature, asking whether the politics of immigration differ in Southern Europe compared to other countries.

These questions are of utmost social and political relevance at a time when immigration has become a politically salient and emotionally charged topic across much of Western Europe. In particular, right-wing populist movements with growing support bases have called out against the presence of immigrants as posing a range of threats. For example, since the 1980s the Belgian Vlaams Blok has claimed that a mass invasion of foreign guestworkers provides an existential threat to the ethnic purity of the Flemish population of the country (Mudde 2000: 97-9), whilst the French Front National has widely spread propaganda depicting Muslims as a mysterious and dangerous presence due to their apparent religious extremism and tendency towards terrorism (Hargreaves 1995). More recently, Swiss local elections in 2008 saw the distribution of posters depicting a black sheep being kicked off the Swiss national flag whilst in 2012 and 2013 there have been reports of neo-Nazi groups in Greece attacking immigrants in the street and entering hospitals to remove undocumented workers. In light of this, Betz commented that immigrants have
become ‘by far the most important targets of contemporary right-wing radical populist resentment’ due to the way that they ‘offer a wide range of points of attack’, from complaints about taking jobs from natives to posing a burden on the welfare state, from representing a perceived threat to the cultural purity of national identities to providing an security risk through terrorist activity (Betz 1998: 6).

However, these complaints have not only been voiced by the far-right. National leaders across Europe and beyond have also taken to criticising the socio-cultural diversity that they see as introduced by immigrants, announcing the Death of Multiculturalism as an adequate policy frame for social cohesion. In this way, multicultural policies have been criticised for emphasising the cultural differences of immigrants and not creating cohesive, unified communities. For example, in October 2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that

‘of course the tendency had been to say, “let's adopt the multicultural concept and live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other”. But this concept has failed, and failed utterly.’


At the same time, her colleagues stated that they were committed to a ‘dominant German culture’ and feared becoming ‘the world's welfare office’ (Ibid.). The British Prime Minister, David Cameron, was in agreement in a speech on the same issue in February 2011 in which he commented that

‘Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.’

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Britain and Germany are not the only countries to have followed this route. Among others, in June 2011 it was asked if the acquittal of the politician Geert Wilders from charges of discrimination against Muslims signalled the death of Dutch multiculturalism (Time World, 29th June 2011), whilst in 2008 Andrew Jakubowicz of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Civil Societies in Australia had already mentioned the ‘slow death’ of multiculturalism there too (2008).

The contribution of this thesis to understanding such shifts in political postures is to highlight the processes, strategies and power balances that underpin them. When these political actors publicly state that immigration is a problem, they frame the presence of immigrants in specific ways. This involves claiming that certain social groups can be distinguished from others according to their ethnicity, religion or nationality, that their presence has implications for social cohesion, and that strict terms and conditions should regulate their residence. In other words, they take part in a process of defining ‘who is who’ deciding the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and groups in a given political community (Jenkins 2008). In this way, the politics of immigration is a process of negotiating the social and political boundaries of the polity.

Much academic analysis has called out against rising xenophobia and discrimination in societies of immigration. For example, van Dijk has analysed political discourse in a range of countries and media and found that the construction of a negatively-viewed out-group in contrast to a positively-viewed in-group is a highly prevalent way of maintaining an imbalance of power between the two (1987, 1991). Annual reports from the Spanish Observatory of Racism and Xenophobia (Observatorio Espanol del Racismo y la Xenofobia, OBERAXE) have also equated the presence of immigrants with rising and persistent xenophobic attitudes among Spanish society and urged political responses to prevent tensions arising (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martinez 2008). Nevertheless, a large body of research has also agreed with the public fears that immigration poses a threat to bounded, culturally unified national communities. Perhaps most famous of these has been Huntington’s claim that Mexican immigration has posed an existential threat to the traditional values of the USA (2004). Huntington’s view that cultural differences between Mexicans and Americans are unassailable and opposing mirrors the fear expressed previously by Schlesinger, who commented that ‘the historic idea of a
unifying American identity […] was in peril’ due to cultural diversity (1992:17). It has not only been conservatives to address this issue, as evidenced by Kymlicka’s claim that the cultural diversity brought by immigrants to countries such as Canada placed the stability and persistence of the ethnic minorities that were already present there in danger (Kymlicka 1994, Kymlicka and Norman 2000).

Despite their different viewpoints, these political debates and academic studies share the same assumption that immigration involves the arrival of culturally diverse social groups and always results in the emphasis of xenophobic sentiments. Yet this fails to account for cases where this has not happened. One such case study has been found in the political responses to Romanian immigration in Spain that have been examined through this thesis. Indeed, despite a rapidly growing Romanian population, public concern over immigration (recorded in Eurobarometer surveys) and negative public opinion towards Romanian immigrants in particular (recorded in surveys by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas), political debates have seen this nationality described as cultural twins from across a ‘Latin bridge’ from one side of Europe to the other, as a magnificently integrated population in Spain and as an opportunity for local democracy. In contrast, in Italy a Romanian immigrant population of a similar size, cultural character and class structure to that found in Spain has been publicly criticised for apparently having a violent criminal nature and posing a threat to public order and security.

The case studies of this thesis thus emphasise how negative responses to the presence of immigrants are not automatic or natural. Furthermore, the distinct experiences in Italy and Spain also suggest that the characteristics of immigrants, such as the size of the population, the language that they speak, their class or their social structure are, on their own, insufficient variables to explain different responses to their presence. The Romanian immigrant populations of Italy and Spain are broadly similar in their characteristics and social status; what differs between the cases are the social and political contexts in which immigration and political negotiations about its implications have occurred.

Analysis of the politics of Romanian immigration as a situated negotiation of meanings has required a shift away from the previous approaches mentioned above. Immigration has been seen as a problem by them because the identity and cultural diversity of immigrants has been employed as a variable to explain social tensions.
In contrast, this thesis has understood identity to be a potentially shifting and malleable process of classification. This requires the presentation of certain characteristics as distinguishing certain individuals as culturally-similar to each other and different to the mainstream or majority population (Barth 1969, Goffman 1959). Yet this thesis has illustrated how this is a plural process through which individuals, organisations and institutions make a claim to the legitimacy of their perspective. In sum, the classification of who is who is a negotiated process whereby a range of voices aspire to build the necessary consensus for their perspective to dominate as an accurate reflection of society.

Participation in this negotiation of the character and implications of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain has required the mobilisation of material, social and symbolic resources and has been shaped by different structural opportunities for action in each country. It is in this way that the politics of immigration is conceived as a structurally-situated, plural process of negotiation between actors with differential access to types of capital (Bourdieu 1986, 2010 [1990]). What is more, it is also in this way that the politics of Romanian immigration in Italy and Spain tells us more about the actor strategies and political contexts found in these countries than it does about the immigrants themselves.

In the Italian case responses to Romanian immigration have been immersed within a wider critique of immigration, led by the Northern League in the early 1990s. In a polarised political structure and a social context in which the dominant left-right, Communist-Christian Democrat cleavage of the previous decades had lost relevance amidst corruption charges and rising distrust of elites, the right-wing parties came forward as a voice of the people, different to the discredited leaders of the past. They had little in common apart from a desire to win elections, and immigration provided one of their few consensual issues; a perception of immigrants as a threat to public order, security and employment served as a point of agreement. Immigration (particularly but not only that of Romanian origin) acted as a meta-issue enabling a range of social problems to be apparently resolved through passing immigration legislation, with the threat frame enabling the building of consensus amongst coalition partners who held divergent views on other issues.

At the same time, factions on the left were divided, failing to form strong governments when in power and struggling to build a shared post-socialist platform
in opposition. Immigrants, particularly of a Romanian origin, were presented contradictorily, both as victims of the policies and discourse of the right but also as a threat, by emphasising their involvement in human trafficking and prostitution networks or by calling for their deportation in 2006 and 2007. Aside from political parties, the only other Italian organisations with a voice were Caritas and the trade unions, and they did not mobilise a counter-argument to the dominant threat frame until 2008. Similarly, the Romanian government would only respond in the years after 2007, their calls for moderation responding to protests in front of the Italian embassy in Bucharest. Despite gaining recognition in the Italian press, these calls were unable to establish consensus among the polarised Italian party politics and were met with stern replies from members of the Northern League in particular. The outcome was discussion of the implications of Romanian immigration by a small range of actors from Italian political parties.

In the Spanish case, however, Romanian immigration has rarely been on the agenda and when it has gained in salience there has been cross-party consensus on the status of Romanian immigrants as victims to be supported or as an opportunity for local democracy. In contrast to the context found in Italy, Spanish society and politics have been generally shaped by the consensus and moderation characterising the transition to democracy following the end of the regime of General Franco. Spain’s contemporary democracy was marked by acceptance of a need for stability in order to protect the legitimacy of the Spanish State and differentiation from the past by emphasising respect for democracy, the protection of rights and tolerance of diversity. In debates on Romanian immigration the two stable catch-all parties of left and right, the Socialist PSOE and the conservative PP, have positioned themselves in line with this post-transition cleavage by emphasising the need for social inclusion and tolerance. Consensus has been reinforced by the broad range of support enjoyed by these parties and an absence of dissenting voices.

In local politics, active policies for establishing representative organisations of immigrants have been prevalent where the Romanian population has been most concentrated. Strong connections have developed between representatives of the Romanian immigrant population, local authorities and branches of the principal political parties. Public funding and the formation of a national Federation (FEDROM) facilitated this further by building networks among autochthonous
institutions and the organisations of Romanian immigrants. This closeness kept the negotiation of responses to Romanian immigration to a small network of political elites of Spanish and Romanian origin, following a typical client politics model of consensus-building. Yet it also enabled targeted electoral campaigns to be carried out in towns such as Coslada and Alcala de Henares following the granting of local voting rights to Romanians in 2007. In this way, the Spanish case reflects how a strong normative cleavage and close organisational networks are likely to result in consensual responses to the presence of immigrants. Indeed, this was clearly the case when a local election candidate for the PP published a pamphlet stating ‘we do not want Romanians’, as he was criticised by the regional and national branches of his party in order to maintain the publicly moderate and tolerant status quo, as well as the potential support of Romanian local associations, in other areas of Spain.

Perspectives of ‘who is Romanian’ in these countries are in this way inseparable from an awareness of the way that actors respond to existent frameworks of meaning and adapt to their structural context. In Spain, the stability of the dominant political parties and social organisations contributed to maintaining a dominant existent framework in the form of the post-transition cleavage, which in turn influenced how specific issues such as Romanian immigration were interpreted. In Italy, however, the crisis of the party system in a context of declining social cleavages meant that actors with disparate views and interests were able to enter into power on the back of weak coalitions held together by consensus on specific issues, such as immigration. In a Spanish context of concentrated social capital, Romanian immigration was taken off the agenda; but in an Italian context of polarised politics, the threat of Romanian immigration was a source of symbolic capital and thus pushed onto the agenda.

In this context, how could new voices be heard and change be brought about to the dominant framing patterns?

Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain have not acted as a cohesive, united community or with any sense of mass participation. For Romanian immigrants in these countries there were few opportunities to have their voice heard prior to 2007, with no right to enfranchisement and legal residence tied to the holding of a formal employment contract despite the fact that many immigrants were employed in short-term roles or the informal labour market. Moreover, the situation would change
during the 2000s. As part of the accession procedure for Romania to join the EU, visa-free travel facilitated mobility from 2002 and citizenship of the EU added rights to non-discrimination and participation in local and European Parliament elections from 2007. During the same period, the Romanian government established elected positions in the Romanian parliament to compete for the votes of Romanians abroad. The legal context has thus been one of increasing opportunities for Romanian nationals in Italy and Spain to have a voice in distinct local, national and transnational political arenas, illustrative of the way that rights in the EU are bundled at different levels of governance. Yet these institutional developments have not resulted in any widespread political participation in either country. Indeed, it was only specific associations and political parties which did mobilise by making a claim to represent the Romanian immigrant population. In a strict sense, they did not truly stand for their countrymen; they were not chosen or held to account through elections and only ‘stood for’ Romanian immigrants in Italy and Spain in a weak descriptive sense, by sharing language and nationality with them (Pitkin 1974).

However, specific organisations have benefitted from the structural changes brought about from 2007. In Spain, local policies promoting the formation of immigrant associations provided an opportunity for networks to develop between political parties and individuals or groups claiming to represent the Romanian population. Particularly in Alcala de Henares, building connections with Spanish political parties was a way of gaining specific rewards, such as funding to celebrate the national day of Romania, a space for a Romanian Orthodox Church and positive comments in public events and the press. At the same time, Romanian political parties could cooperate with their Spanish partners for electoral purposes, benefitting mutually from each other in order to achieve complimentary goals, namely, winning elections in their respective countries rather than competing for the same constituencies. In this way, changes to EU and Romanian legislation have provided an opportunity for new voices to be heard in the local politics of Spain. In Italy the process was distinct; Italian political parties were more resistant to change due to uncertainty regarding the preferences of the Romanian population and to a lack of knowledge regarding potential partners from amongst the fragmented and divided range of Romanian organisations. The response of a small network of Romanian associations and the Party of Romanian Identity was to align with the security and
public order-based threat frame of Italian parties in political and public debate, reproducing the lines of closure that were already dominant. In a context of few funding resources and a closed institutional structure dominated by gatekeeper organisations, this mimicking strategy provided a quite distinct way of building social capital to that found in Spain.

The structure of relations amongst these actors and the distribution of social and symbolic capital therefore influenced way that change in the negotiation of ‘who is Romanian’ could occur in the shifting institutional environment heralded by accession to the EU. In this sense, the cross-border rights of citizenship of the EU can provide an opportunity for the political participation and inclusion of intra-EU migrants, but the extent to which this occurs and the direction that it takes is tied to the actions, relations and mobilising strategies of local actors. In sum, the structural context in Spain was more conducive to an active appeal to the new Romanian electorate than that found in Italy.

Finally, the opening chapters of this thesis outlined how Italy and Spain have often been studied through the lens of a specific Southern European model of immigration patterns and immigrant integration policies. However, when it comes to immigration frames in political and public debate, the dynamics found in this thesis go beyond the setting of Southern Europe. For example, Scholten has found in his study of Dutch integration frames that a traditionally inclusive multiculturalist approach in the Netherlands developed within largely technocratic channels amongst a small network of actors, similar to the consensual client politics found in Spain (2011). He also shows, moreover, that an increasing diversity of academic viewpoints on immigrant integration frames subsequently enabled politicians to pick and choose according to their own interests and opinions, creating a more fragmented and confrontational approach to policy making. This fragmentation marked the arrival of a populist exclusionary turn akin to that found in Italy, with calls for policy making to be out in the open and to reflect their vociferous claims of the concerns of the people. Furthermore, in comparing the Dutch model to other case studies, Scholten also illustrated how such situational factors and specific actor strategies influenced the direction of change of integration frames in France, Germany and Britain (2011: 285-6). Elsewhere, Bommes has similarly illustrated how a structural shift in integration policies was part of a local turn in Germany in
response to the realisation that immigrants had become a ‘normal clientele’ of the German federal welfare state (2013). For Bommes, this shift provided an opportunity for mobilisation by local administrations, welfare associations and NGOs to influence immigrant integration measures in a new direction, but that this could not be achieved without gaining publicly recognised legitimacy for their view by aligning it with existent models (2013: 126). This suggests that the structural contexts and strategic dynamics found in Italy and Spain are not dissimilar to those found elsewhere, although further comparative study would be required to go further.

These insights offer potential for a deeper understanding of why different responses arise to the presence of immigrants in host societies. Returning to the beginning of this concluding chapter, they may also provide a chance to explain the decision making and strategic dynamics behind tensions with immigrants from far-right populists to mainstream politicians heralding the death of multiculturalism. If, as argued throughout this thesis, it is not simply cultural diversity which lies behind groups and group identities, then closer inspection requires examining the choices that these actors have made in response to their discursive and institutional contexts. This is not to say that people’s concerns or fears regarding immigration should be entirely ignored, but rather that tensions with immigrants may have more to tell us about the structures and relations of power in host societies than is currently supposed.
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269


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APPENDICES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Votes (total)</th>
<th>Votes (% turnout)</th>
<th>Elected?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ionut Gabriel RUSU</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Commune)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emil Sorin CEHAN</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Commune)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elena Viorica LECHEA</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Commune)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mihaela IAMANDII</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 8)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9.27%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgeta Laura POPA</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 10)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>13.54%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniela SACALUS</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 4)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>11.58%</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gheorghe Emil PATRASCU</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marius LIVANU</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 8)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6.37%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simona PASCU</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 5)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10.96%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvia PACURAR</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 16)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9.15%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerica Marian TERTELEAC</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 8)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5.79%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ion BAMBALAU</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 15)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.92%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valentin HUIBAN</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 17)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
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<td>Dana Ioana MIHALACHE</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 18)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6.65%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurelia POP</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 1)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gheorghe Emil PATRASCU</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gheorghe Geani RAU</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daniela SACALUS</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 4)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>10.96%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marioara POP</td>
<td>Adjunct Council (Municipality 4)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
<td>no</td>
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Figure 15. Candidates and votes, Romanian representatives in Rome (2004-2006)
Source: http://elezioni.comune.roma.it
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comune</th>
<th>Party list</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Votes (total)</th>
<th>Elected?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Lista Civica Alemanno</td>
<td>Ramona Badescu</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciampino</td>
<td>FLI</td>
<td>Melania Sandu</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ciampino</td>
<td>Realtà Ciampinesi (PdL)</td>
<td>Marian Băsescu</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciampino</td>
<td>Realtà Ciampinesi (PdL)</td>
<td>Margareta Lacz</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciampino</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Silviu Ciubotaru</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomezia</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Diana Apintei</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomezia</td>
<td>Social Democrazia PSDI</td>
<td>Varvara Vizir</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riano</td>
<td>Popolo della libertà</td>
<td>Stoica Teodor</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>Riano</td>
<td>Progetto Riano</td>
<td>Ipate Mihaela</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>Riano</td>
<td>Cambia Riano</td>
<td>Pirjolea Gabriel</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>Castel Madama</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Luca Marius</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morlupo</td>
<td>Risorgimento Morlupese</td>
<td>Daniela Constantin</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
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Figure 16. Romanians in Communal elections in the province of Rome

Sources: Romeni in Italia, Ministero dell'Interno, Comune di Ciampino, Comune di Pomezia, Comune di Riano, Comune di Castel Madama, Comune di Morlupo, Political parties
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<th>Candidate</th>
<th>List position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arganda del Rey</td>
<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Nina Dana Bolnavu</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Daniel Radu Radu</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Ion Bolnavu</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Marian Grecu</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Extera Curcan</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Cornelius Curcan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Mariana Grecu</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcalá de Henares</td>
<td>Solidaridad Democrática</td>
<td>Gheorghe Gainar</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solidaridad Democrática</td>
<td>George Alexandru Gainar</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solidaridad Democrática</td>
<td>Liviu Herman</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solidaridad Democrática</td>
<td>Sergiu Lenghea</td>
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<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Tiberius Iulian Solescu</td>
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<td>Los Verdes</td>
<td>Larisa Beatrice Solescu</td>
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<td>Carabana</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Adrian Deac</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Cobena</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Constantin Adrian Dascaleanu</td>
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<td>Cobena Iniciativa de Progreso</td>
<td>Alexandra Ioana Turcu</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Mihaela Anca Mitrut</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Partido Democatra Espanol</td>
<td>Nicolae Angelache</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colmenarejo</td>
<td>Agrupacion progresista independiente de colmenarejo</td>
<td>Ingrí Claudia Mertoiu</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cubas de la sagra</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Viorel Alexandru Moldovan</td>
<td>Suplente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Boalo</td>
<td>Centro Democratico Liberal</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>El Molar</td>
<td>Organización Nacional Centrista</td>
<td>Sorin Ioan Budeanu</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Getafe</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Gica Craioveanu (ex-football player)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Leganes</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Laurentiu Eugem Elie</td>
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<td>Navacerrada</td>
<td>Coalicion Independiente de Navacerrada</td>
<td>Antoneta Dumitru Secriuer</td>
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<td>Mihaela Gheorghi</td>
<td>Suplente</td>
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<td>San Fernando de Henares</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida de la Comunidad de Madrid</td>
<td>Rodica Moldvai (independent)</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>Total:</td>
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<td>27 (2 suplentes)</td>
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Figure 17. Romanian candidates for local elections in the Community of Madrid (2007)
<table>
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<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate Name</th>
<th>List position</th>
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<td>Alamo</td>
<td>Grupo Alameno Municipal independiente</td>
<td>Mirella Elisa Ciobanu</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcalá de Henares</td>
<td>Partido Humanista</td>
<td>Liviu Hermán</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Ana María Román</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>Alcobendas</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Dan Ilie Secheli</td>
<td>19</td>
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Figure 18. Romanian candidates for local elections in the Community of Madrid (2011)