The Contribution of Hegel's immanent critique to the theory of International Relations and the Conceptualization of Citizenship

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The Contribution of Hegel’s Immanent Critique to the Theory of International Relations and the Conceptualization of Citizenship

Athanasios Gkoutzioulis

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Introducing the Contribution of Immanent Critique to IR
Thought After Considering Hegel’s Philosophical System of
Spirit (Geist)

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Overview

The objective of this dissertation is to reinstate the significance of Hegel’s thought to the theory of International Relations (IR). It seeks to demonstrate that Hegelian thought can offer an alternative conceptualisation of agency, freedom and ethics which enriches our understanding of inter-state relations, citizenship, security and international development. Although Hegel’s insights have inspired certain IR scholars before, yet their approaches are limited, mainly because they underplay his notion of Spirit (Geist) and the contribution of Hegel’s method of immanent critique and since they fail to take into consideration - coherently - the content of Hegel’s work. These IR scholars focus primarily on specific excerpts of the Philosophy of Right or the Phenomenology of Spirit and treat Hegel as a proto-realist thinker, ignoring Hegel’s notion of immanent critique and his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). In that respect, these IR approaches are unable to follow Hegel’s thought consistently and fail to unveil not only Hegel’s intellectual wealth but also the contribution of his insights to the field of International Relations. In short, this dissertation after following Hegel’s thought consistently and taking into consideration Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist), seized novelty as it: a) rectifies and enriches Hegelian thought in the field of IR; and b) forms an additional philosophical point of reference which was previously ignored by IR theorists. This Hegelian perspective is strong enough to counterbalance the highly influential Kantian and Foucaultian philosophical IR
approaches after exposing their theoretical shortcomings while providing a more complete, if not superior, philosophical alternative.

Moreover, the consideration of Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist), reveals the distinctive contribution of immanent critique, which overcomes the separation between: 1) the subject from the object of knowledge; 2) the universal from the particular dimension (providing a content to empty supranational norms); 3) empiricism and idealism after re-approaching the conjunction of reality and reason. The value of these points which provide a deeper understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, freedom, reality and reason become evident throughout the five chapters of this dissertation which enrich our conceptualization of agency, security, ethics and citizenship. Specifically:

The first chapter, with the title - *Revisiting Hegel’s Contribution On Interstate Relations, War and Security* - traces the limits of IR thought with regard to subjectivity and the method of knowledge. Specifically, after focusing on the evolution of the consciousness forms as found in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it is stressed, how a flawed understanding of subjectivity is responsible for a flawed method of acquiring knowledge regarding interstate relations and the issue area of security. An immanent critique of the (neo)realist, the Copenhagen and the critical school of security unveils these flaws and demonstrates the shortcomings of separating the subject from the object of knowledge (point 1). Separating the subject from the object of knowledge conveys a problematic account of subjectivity which accommodates only a descriptive or a prescriptive approach to knowledge. Thus, Hegelian thought helps us see how IR thought and security studies are committed to a divide between prescriptive and descriptive theorizing, which is limiting and misleading.

The second chapter, titled - *The Shortcomings of Foucaultian Application In The Theory of International Relations From A Hegelian Perspective*, departs from the point the previous chapter ended. Namely, how the problematic account of subjectivity and knowledge is echoed in Foucaultian thought. Specifically, it is argued that Foucault unsuccessfully attempted to reconsider reality without transcendental means via the notion of power. It is demonstrated that Foucault failed where Hegel’s immanent critique and his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) succeeded as the Foucaultian notion of power is based on transcendental premises and forms a misleading account of subjectivity which separates
empiricism from idealism (point 3) rendering knowledge and subjectivity relativistic. Such a relativistic treatment of subjectivity promotes a self-alienated agent who is controlled by the administrative mechanisms of power and lacks consciousness. Thus, any attempt of the subject to emancipate itself is self-defeating, since an infinite succession of Foucault’s power regimes, renders the subject eternally contingent and relativist. This chapter will in turn clarify the implications of Foucaultian approaches on IR thought. Specifically it is shown that IR scholars tend to take uncritically for granted Foucault’s concepts of power, subjectivity and freedom. Here, it is argued that an elaborate examination of these concepts, from a Hegelian perspective, reveals the intellectual flaws these concepts entail which IR scholarly debates leave unexamined. Foucault inspired IR scholars promote too a flawed understanding of subjectivity in the form of a relativistic and self-alienated individual that lacks self-consciousness and free will. Foucault’s notion of power is guilty of promoting a problematic account of subjectivity and freedom since it fails to promote the self-consciousness of the subject.

The third chapter titled - *Hegel’s Contribution Towards Unveiling the Limits of Conceptualizing Freedom in Foucaultian, Kantian and IR Thought* - elaborates further on Hegel’s understanding of freedom. Hegel’s notion of immanent critique unveils that Foucaultian, Kantian and IR thought accommodate a misleading account of freedom. In particular an immanent critique of Foucault’s and Kant’s perspective reveals that their conceptualisation of freedom rests on transcendental and contingent premises which promote a misleading conceptualisation of subjectivity and ethics. Highlighting Hegel’s enriched account of subjectivity and consciousness (point 1) as well as the interplay between the universal and the particular dimension (point 2) demonstrates not only the limits of Kantian and Foucaultian thought, but also how a problematic understanding of subjectivity and freedom is promoted in IR thought too by the scholars who are inspired by Foucault and Kant. The transcendental premises of their thought which immanent critique reveals, separate the universal from the particular dimension and promote a misleading understanding of freedom with excluding and non-emancipating effects. Similarly the IR scholars who separated the universal from the particular dimension and promoted a misleading understanding of consciousness such as
Mervyn Frost and David Chandler promote too a self-defeating understanding of freedom. Their understanding of freedom too is responsible for nourishing liberal ideals with socially excluding effects which promote coercion and undermine the agents’ free will.

The fourth chapter titled - *Hegel’s Contribution Towards a Richer Understanding of Citizenship* - stresses how an immanent critique of certain universalist or cosmopolitan perspectives on citizenship unveils their transcendental theoretical premises. Specifically, Hegel’s immanent critique and his philosophical system of Spirit (*Geist*), allows us to see how the distinction between the universal and the particular dimension of citizenship is misleading, demonstrating the significance of (point 2). The universal approaches of citizenship which celebrate only one the two dimensions are based on the promotion of the cosmopolitan character of (liberal) rights. Hegel’s insights unveil how the separation of the universal from the particular dimension contributes to the inaccurate understanding of citizenship. The theoretical flaws of these approaches to citizenship are associated to: i) The treatment of abstract principles such as ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘(human) rights’ which are founded on transcendental premises as normative truths; ii) The incorporation of a self-defeating understanding of nation(alism), culture, values and duty based on empty formalisms. On the other hand Hegel’s notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) which rests on his philosophical system of Spirit (*Geist*) provides and alternative account of citizenship, capable of rectifying these flaws after: putting forward a theory that is neither descriptive nor prescriptive which rejects transcendental normative truths. Moreover, Hegel’s notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) overcomes the empty formalism of universal supranational values and the abstract foundations of (human) rights. Thus, the insights of Hegel’s immanent critique which rest on his philosophical system of Spirit (*Geist*), allow us to overcome the shortcomings which emerge from the distinction of citizenship between the universal and particular dimension after incorporating both dimensions.

The last chapter titled - *An Empirical Analysis of Hegel’s Conceptualization of Citizenship: On the Alternative Implications of Economy and the Market in Singapore* - adds a case study unlike the previous chapters. This case study is added to demonstrate that the metaphysical dimension of
Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist), upon which the contribution of immanent critique lies, does not rest on transcendental premises. Moreover, the case study reveals the practical application of Hegel’s immanent critique which promotes an alternative understanding of knowledge that is not founded on the authority of the subject (or theorist) after avoiding the separation between the subject from the object of knowledge (point 1). In that respect, the case study of Singapore which reveals how the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) actualises and evolves, clarifies that Hegelian thought is not founded on transcendental but immanent premises since it is tied to the evolution of history and the contingency of the theoretical object. Just as the Philosophy of Right portrays the explanatory strength of immanent critique after elaborating on the evolution of the subject’s self-consciousness - without transcendental premises - via the development of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state; similarly the case study of Singapore is introduced to illustrate the explanatory strength of Hegelian philosophy in practical and immanent terms rather than abstract ones. The case study of Singapore elucidates immanent critique’s practical contribution after portraying the civic evolution of the Singaporeans from opportunistic individuals (which echoes the incomplete moment of civil society) to selfless citizens which suggests a primitive form of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Finally, since Singapore celebrates capitalism without sharing the traits of liberal democracies, the island-state serves as an ideal example to explain the implications for citizenship of Singapore’s development from a Hegelian perspective which the liberal-capitalist inspired analyses of Singapore have failed to grasp.

**Introduction to the Contribution of Hegel’s Philosophical System of Spirit (Geist) and Immanent Critique**

To begin with, this chapter will be divided in three parts. The first part, reviews the approaches of certain scholars who attempt to substantiate a Hegelian account of IR, after focusing solely on specific excerpts of the Philosophy of Right without taking into consideration the Hegelian notion of Spirit (Geist). Specifically, these scholars tend to rely primarily on the third section (‘The State’) of the Philosophy of Right and sometimes on the ‘Lord and Bondsman’ dialectic, in order analyse interstate relations, conflict and war.
Therefore these scholars treat Hegel as political realist since the excerpts they rely on, portray interstate relations as anarchic and antagonistic whereas the effectiveness of international law is dismissed. However, Hegel’s association with political realism is challenged here as it stems from an incomplete reading of the *Philosophy of Right* which is disorientating and lacks depth. Moreover, applying Hegelian theory in a prescriptive manner to explain interstate relations is not valid as it attributes to Hegel a theoretical role he dismisses. Ultimately, it will be argued that it is misleading to borrow solely from the *Philosophy of Right* in order to form a Hegelian account of IR, as that provides an incomplete approach to Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (*Geist*). In that respect, this part enriches Hutchings’s approach, which argues that it is misleading to ignore Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit and rely on certain ideas conveyed in the *Philosophy of Right* without taking into consideration the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The following part explains how Hegelian philosophy can make a greater contribution to IR theory, after dismissing Hegel’s association to political realism while taking into account his philosophical system of Spirit (*Geist*) as well as his notion of immanent critique.

Since Hegelian philosophy attracts the attention of many scholars, Hegel’s thought invites various interpretations. The second part of this chapter stresses that Hegel’s immanent critique brings to our attention a number of insights when approaching subjectivity, consciousness, knowledge and ethics. These insights can add value to our analysis and further stimulate the problematization of subjectivity as well as the interplay between: reason and reality; idealism and empiricism; rationalism and historicism; the subject and object of knowledge. Scholars like Taylor, Rosen, Buchwalter and Benhabib have treated Hegel as the philosopher of immanent critique. This part therefore delineates the scholarly approaches of Hegel’s immanent critique before elucidating the concept of immanent critique. It is noted that Benhabib’s approach which treats Hegel’s immanent critique as ambivalent, takes only into consideration his early work (the 1802 essay *On Natural Law*) without considering his late work, namely the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right*. Rosen’s analysis stresses too that Hegel’s immanent critique nourishes a paradox. However, he argues how this paradox can be overcome.
once Hegel’s immanent critique is viewed as determinate negation and the notion of Spirit (Geist) is taken into consideration.

The third part of this chapter elucidates what is metaphysics and the notion of Spirit (Geist) according to Hegel while explaining that immanent critique cannot be realized without considering Hegel’s metaphysical dimension and his notion of Spirit (Geist). After referencing Buchwalter’s, Taylor’s and Beiser’s work it becomes clear that the conceptualization of Hegel’s immanent critique necessitates the consideration of Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) while avoiding the separation of his method from his system. Ultimately it is argued that such an understanding of Hegel’s immanent critique can enrich our conceptions of subjectivity, freedom, ethics and citizenship while contributing to a more complete account of acquiring knowledge. This part elaborates further how immanent critique allows us to acquire a more complete understanding of: 1) subjectivity after overcoming the separation between the subject and the object of knowledge; 2) ethics and norms after avoiding the separation of the universal and the particular dimension while providing a content to the (empty) form; 3) historicism and rationalism after elaborating further on the interplay between empiricism and idealism rather than their mutual exclusion while re-approaching the conjunction of reality and reason from the perspective of immanent critique.

The contribution of these insights which rest on Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) and his notion of immanent critique, will become clear in the following chapters of this dissertation which unveil the conceptual shortcomings of subjectivity, knowledge, freedom, ethics and citizenship that IR thought accommodates.
I. Implications of Hegelian Inspired Approaches to IR which Downplay the Philosophical System of Spirit (Geist)

The following paragraphs review a number of Hegelian influenced IR approaches to inter-state relations, conflict and war. It appears that these IR scholars tend to form a Hegelian account of IR without considering Hegel’s philosophical system and the notion of Spirit (Geist). Instead, they rely on particular excerpts of Hegel’s work. Specifically, Jaeger, Brooks, Vincent and Smith rely primarily on the Philosophy of Right’s third section (the State) and the Phenomenology’s ‘Lord and Bondsman’ dialectic. The conclusions often drawn from such a selective reading of Hegel’s work, relate to the classification of Hegel as a proto-realist after stressing the impossibility of international law; perceiving the state as an individual in a state of nature while glorifying war as a mean of civic education.

It is true that one might end up with similar conclusions should one exclusively focus on specific extracts of the Philosophy of Right. However, such a selective reading is inaccurate, since it fails to take into account Hegel’s philosophical system within the realm of Spirit (Geist) and ends up portraying Hegelian theory - deceptively - as a prescriptive and descriptive account of interstate relations.

To begin with, according to Brooks’ earlier work, Hegel’s theory verifies the ideals of (neo)realism. However, it needs to be noted that in his latest work, Brooks admits that the Philosophy of Right should be understood within the context of Hegel’s larger philosophical system and in particular the notion of logic.¹ Nevertheless, in his earlier work Brooks parallels Hegel to (neo)realism, since in the last part of the Philosophy of Right the states: i) appear to behave as unitary-rational actors; ii) the relations between them are akin to the state of nature; iii) fail to establish permanent international treaties between them whereas international law is not applicable as there is no higher adjudicator. In Brookes’ words, Hegel assumes the role of a pure realist.²

¹ Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading Of The Philosophy of Right (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2013), 3-5
Unlike Brooks, Jaeger describes Hegel as a ‘reluctant realist’. Although certain Hegelian ideas comply with (neo)realism, Jaeger avoids classifying Hegel as a pure realist. Indeed Jaeger holds that much of what Hegel says about state relations, international anarchy, the absence of common jurisprudence and international law, echo (neo)realism. Jaeger also adds that Hegel’s treatment of war as the primary mean to resolve conflicting interests among states, while dismissing the Kantian idea of perpetual peace through a league of nations which presupposes a moral and religious bond among states, reflects Hegel’s realism. Yet Jaeger takes Hegel to be a ‘reluctant realist’ as the Hegelian notion of recognition relies on the mutual recognition among sovereign states which prevents their rigid demarcation and autonomy, rendering both their association as well as their interaction necessary. For Jaeger, Hegel advances a peculiar kind of realism as Hegel’s understanding of international relations via recognition is founded on the states’ interaction and mutual dependence rather than conflict.

After citing the third part of the *Philosophy of Right*, Brooks dismisses Jaeger’s position and acknowledges Hegel as a pure realist rather than a ‘reluctant’ one. According to Brooks, in the *Philosophy of Right*, the state is explicitly described as an independent and sovereign entity despite the dimension of recognition. Brooks contends that Hegelian recognition among states takes a purely formalistic form that is confined by temporary treaties. This implies the impossibility of international law and the weakness of international institutions. Moreover, after quoting a number of references as found in the *Philosophy of Right*, Brooks adds that Hegel parallels the state with the individual in the state of nature. Ultimately, states may only be able to settle conflicts through war.

Despite their differences, Brooks and Jaeger after relying primarily on the *Philosophy of Right*, attribute to Hegel a realist-friendly descriptive account of IR theory. For both, Hegel’s realism is echoed after identifying the states as the sole agents of IR in an anarchic state of nature, where war serves as the only mean to resolve their differences, prescribing an antagonistic form of interstate relations.

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4 Jaeger, Hegel’s Reluctant Realism and the Transnationalism of Civil Society, 479-499
5 Brooks, Hegel’s Theory of International Politics: A Reply to Jaeger, 150-151
Vincent is another scholar who draws only on the *Philosophy of Right* in order to develop another Realist-friendly version of Hegel. Vincent too relies primarily on the *Philosophy of Right’s* paragraphs 321-340 to highlight the Realist points of Hegelian thought. Vincent draws the conclusion that Hegel’s understanding of the state and interstate relations is summarized as follows: a. there is a plurality of nation-states with sovereign wills; b. the only international law that can be formulated is ‘treaties ought to be kept’; c. However since each state has its own conceptions of welfare, any notion of international law is not coercive, simply remains an ought to be.⁶

Beyond the critique of International Law and the understanding of the state as an individual in the state of nature, Hegel is again referenced in IR thought to promote another dimension of political realism, namely the essentiality of war and the conflicting nature of inter-state relations. In the *Philosophy of Right*, war appears to be projected as an inevitable phenomenon which provides a necessary form of civic education, underscoring the impossibility of International Law.⁷ In that respect, Smith and Avinieri draw on the *Philosophy of Right* to describe war as an inevitable phenomenon with an ethical and educative purpose celebrating Hegel as proponent of realism.

Steven B. Smith stresses that Hegel’s analysis of war has a civic educational dimension, reasserting the primacy of the state over and above private interests. Only in times of war or severe national crisis, the chief end or function of the state can be fulfilled, namely the marshalling of civic obligation in a selfless manner. The state for Hegel, according to Smith, is not an instrument for the achievement of material ends and purposes but a mode of relating which stresses shared values and common sacrifice at the expense of individual interests. The Hegelian notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) indicates how the community’s interests are paired with the individual’s.⁸ Smith notes that Hegel far from viewing war as something accidental, attempts to give it a metaphysical foundation built into the very nature of things. Smith focuses on the ‘Lordship and Bondage’ chapter in the *Phenomenology* to argue that for Hegel the

⁷ Steven B Smith, ‘Hegel’s Views on War, State and International Relations’, *The American Political Science review*, Vol 97, No 3 (Sep. 1983), 630
⁸ Smith, Hegel’s Views on War, State and International Relations, 625-627
archetypical relation between human beings is one of conflict and struggle for recognition. Individuals are apparently not isolated or self-sufficient from nature but come to develop a personality or identity through a protracted period of opposition with one another. Enmity, not friendship is by far the most characteristic condition of human beings and states. Moreover, Hegel, continues to think of war as a necessary means to preserve the state from the internal tensions generated by civil society and its market economy. War becomes a type of school for the civic education of the modern bourgeois. This is not to romanticize war, but to turn it into a means for promoting certain types of civic virtues for citizens who in normal times are used to consult only their private interests.9

It is true that if one emphasizes certain parts of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel’s thought resembles realism. To be more precise, in paragraph 322, Hegel indeed appears to equate the individual with the state, stressing the relation among states as independent units:

‘...individuality is awareness of one’s existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others. This autonomy, embodies mind’s actual awareness of itself as a unit and hence it is the most fundamental freedom which people possess as well as its highest dignity.’10

Moreover, in paragraph 334, it is highlighted that due to the state’s individuality, their relations are settled by war and long-term peace is harmful for the state:

‘...if states disagree, and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war. A state through its subjects has widespread connections and many-sided interests and these may be readily and considerably injured but it remains indeterminate as to which of these injuries is to be regarded as a specific breach of treaty or as injury to the honour or autonomy of the state [...] the state may regard its infinity and honour at stake [...] and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad’.11

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9 Steven B Smith, Hegel’s Views on War, State and International Relations, 628-629
11 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 214
In paragraphs 324-325, the inevitability of war is stressed as well as its civic educational impact. The occurrence of war is associated with the undermining of individualistic behaviour and the cultivation of selfless virtues such as sacrifice for the community’s sake:

‘War is not to be regarded as absolute evil and as purely external accident. It is to say that is by nature that accidents happen and the fate whereby they happen is a necessity. Here as elsewhere, the point of view from which things seem pure accidents vanishes if we look at them in the light of the concept and philosophy, because philosophy knows accident for a show and sees it as necessity. It is necessary that the finite -property and life- should be definitely established as accidental because accidentality is the concept of the finite. This necessity appears in the form of the power of nature’.  

12

‘The individuals substantive duty, is the duty to maintain this substantive individuality, the independence and sovereignty of the state, at the risk and the sacrifice of property and life. An entirely distorted account of the demand for this sacrifice results from regarding the state as mere civil society and from regarding its final end as only the security of the individual life and property [...] War deals in earnest with the vanity of temporal goods and concerns. War has the higher significance that by its agency ‘the ethical health of the people is preserved in their indifference to the stabilisation of the finite institutions. So corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone perpetual peace.’  

13

The previous excerpts from the Philosophy of Right appear to associate Hegel with political realism, since: the state is identified as an individual agent in a state of nature, international law is rendered impossible and war is considered to be unavoidable if not necessary; verifying the approaches of scholars like Brooks, Jaeger, Vincent and Smith. Although these excerpts draw a parallel between Hegel and realist thought, yet they lack depth since they stem from an incomplete understanding of Hegel’s philosophical system and fail to provide a reliable guide for the understanding of international relations. Unlike Brooks, Jaeger, Vincent and Smith, it is argued here that Hegel’s objective was neither to develop a prescriptive nor a descriptive account of interstate relations. Descriptive or prescriptive theorizing, violates Hegel’s conceptualization of knowledge and ignores his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). Moreover as
Hegel himself contends, in the preface of the *Philosophy of Right*, his study does not contain the science of the state but is an endeavour to apprehend the state as something inherently rational within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*). Thus, the instruction of the *Philosophy of Right* does not consist of teaching what the state ought to be but how the state is to be understood.\(^{14}\)

Therefore, after understating the notion of Spirit (*Geist*), the existing Hegelian IR approaches end up promoting a (neo)realist friendly interpretation of Hegel. Unlike these interpretations, this dissertation - in accordance to Hutching’s remarks - argues that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Hegel’s notion of Spirit (*Geist*) should be treated as the point of departure in order to comprehend the *Philosophy of Right*. The consideration of Spirit (*Geist*) prevents the treatment of Hegel in a realist vein. Moreover, it clarifies that Hegel is neither offering a prescription for contemporary international politics nor his comments on state sovereignty, international law and war serve to describe interstate norms. After the content of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is considered coherently and the importance of Spirit (*Geist*) is acknowledged, Hegel’s remarks in the *Philosophy of Right* cease to appear descriptive or prescriptive. Thus, the *Philosophy of Right* is meant to be understood from the perspective of Spirit (*Geist*), which helps us acquire a complete understanding of how consciousness and subjectivity is formed via ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) within the limits of the state and how inter-state relations serve the accomplishment of the subject’s self-consciousness within the state.

In that respect, after considering Hegel’s notion of Spirit (*Geist*) it becomes clear that Hegel rejects abstract *a priori* normative claims which prevent him from developing a prescriptive theory of interstate relations or a normative account of universal values or norms. On the other hand, the evolution of the subject’s forms of consciousness, as presented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is tied with the concept of Spirit (*Geist*) and challenges the treatment of the theorist as a self-dependent subject who puts forward normative truths. Hegel rejects such normative truths in an attempt to indicate a dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object. As Hutchings notes, for such relations to be dynamic, the subject as theorist cannot have a pre-determined or a

\(^{14}\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 10-11
fixed point of view. Such a fixed point of view is offset by the subject’s abstract normative claims and provide a generalized descriptive account of theory which rests on abstract (universalistic) premises that lacks a particular content.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, Hegel’s analysis elucidates that it is misleading to treat the object of study as passive. In Hutchings’ words, ‘the theorists must recognize themselves as patients and participants in the processes they seek to understand and judge’.\textsuperscript{16}

Therefore, as the following part elaborates, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) is a crucial part of Hegel’s (late) corpus which does not only provide an accurate understanding of the state but also an accurate understanding of immanent critique which enriches our understanding of what knowledge is and how it is acquired with respect to the subject and the state. Immanent critique which demonstrates the shortcomings of separating the subject from the object of knowledge, becomes an invaluable tool which enriches our understanding of consciousness, agency, reality, reason and citizenship. Hegel’s immanent critique has attracted numerous scholarly interpretations some of which do not stress the importance of Spirit (\textit{Geist}). The next paragraphs contend that the strength and contribution of Hegel’s immanent critique rests on the consideration of his Philosophical system of Spirit (\textit{Geist}).

\textbf{II. Delineating the Approaches Which Treat Hegel as the Philosopher of Immanent Critique}

Hegel’s immanent critique allows us to reexamine reality not with arbitrary or transcendental means but with norms which are part of the reality itself. In that respect, Hegel via immanent critique was capable of conceptualizing reason and subjectivity in a non-transcendental vein, after transforming the understanding of “what is” into a process. This process is generated empirically and historically and elevates reality to what Hegel defines as the concept (\textit{Begriff}). The following paragraphs elaborate how this process which assists reality to rise and meet the concept (\textit{Begriff}), contributes not only to the decomposition of a-priori transcendental preconditions but also to the


\textsuperscript{16} Hutchings, \textit{International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era}, 103
revelation of empirical misconceptions, after eliminating the conflict between reality and its true essence. Therefore, Hegel via imminent critique conjoins reason and reality and avoids the separation of the subject with the object of knowledge in order not to legitimate but judge the existing empirical conditions with empirical and historical tools. Although according to Hegel’s immanent critique the conjunction of reality and reason is not transcendental, yet it is stressed that immanent critique can only be realized via Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist). The following section after delineating a diversity of scholarly approaches to immanent critique, explains why the notions of determinate negation and restlessness are important in order to realize the evolutionary dimension of Hegel’s immanent critique, dialectic and Spirit (Geist).

Scholars like Taylor, Rosen, Buchwalter and Benhabib acknowledge Hegel as the philosopher of immanent critique. However, Benhabib challenges the efficiency of Hegel’s immanent critique. For Benhabib, Hegel’s exercise of immanent critique found at his early work, namely the essay On Natural Law (written in 1802), appears to be ambivalent and self-defeating. Benhabid does not refer to Hegel’s late work (The Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right) and downplays Hegel’s metaphysical dimension as well as his notion of Spirit (Geist) with respect to immanent critique.

This part commences with Benhabib’s approach to immanent critique, suggesting that the failure to consider Hegel’s metaphysical dimension and his notion of Spirit (Geist) as found at his late work, undermines the intellectual contribution of immanent critique. Then Buchwalter’s and Rosen’s approach will be elaborated in order to explain: 1) what immanent critique is; 2) the paradox it entails; 3) how Hegel’s late work and his metaphysical dimension are crucial for the appropriate conceptualization of immanent critique. Ultimately, it will be explained how such a conceptualization of immanent critique can enrich our understanding of subjectivity, ethics, rationalism and empiricism after re-conceptualizing reality and reason.

Benhabib stresses that Hegel’s essay on Natural Law, illustrates the shortcomings of the normative foundations of natural law theories. For Benhabib, Hegel develops in this essay a methodological critique of certain procedures of normative argumentation. He maintains that the use of contrary-to-fact thought experiments, like the “the state of nature” is objectionable. The
utilization of such procedures always results to a fallacy in which a conclusion is
taken for granted. Such argumentations presuppose or take for granted precisely
what they set out to prove. Benhabib notes that the conceptual problem addressed
by Hegel in the *Natural Law* essay associates to the concerns voiced in his essay
*The Difference Between the Fichtean and the Schellingian Systems of
Philosophy*, written in 1801. In these works, empiricist and transcendental
philosophies are criticized for separating concept and intuition; form and content;
unity and multiplicity; identity and difference; finitude and infinity. For Hegel,
argues Benhabib, the presence of these dichotomies in philosophy is the
expression of a deeper rift within cultural life.\(^{17}\) Benhabib adds that Hegel in
order to avoid the naivety of prescriptive conclusions stemming from normative
natural law approaches, develops a method of immanent critique. The purpose of
this critique is to demystify the apparent objectivity of social processes by
showing them to be constituted by the praxis of the knowing and acting subject.
Thus, Hegel develops the method of immanent critique in order to avoid the
pitfalls of criteriological and foundationalist inquiries both in moral and political
philosophy. His essay on *Natural Law* uses a similar argument to criticize
empiricist and formalist theories of modern natural right. Benhabib observes that
Hegel’s immanent critique rejects modern natural right theories after criticizing
their internal inconsistencies and contradictions.\(^{18}\)

According to Benhabib, Hegel’s argument against the “state of nature”
can be put as follows: if a theory begins by resorting to a counterfactual
abstraction, then the theorist must possess criteria in light of which certain
aspects of the human condition are ignored while others are included in the initial
abstraction. But any such criteria will themselves be normative for they will
depend on what the theorist considers essential or inessential aspects of human
nature. When one examines the normative criteria in these early natural right
theories, one sees how humans in modern bourgeois society become the guiding
criterion in determining what they ought to be or might have been like in the
state of nature. This counterfactual abstraction from which the theorist proceeds
does not justify the concept of human nature and reason that he subscribes to.

\(^{17}\) Sheyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study on the Foundations of Critical Theory*
(New York: Columbia University Press 1986), 21-22
\(^{18}\) Benhabib, *Critique, Norm and Utopia*, 9
Hegel’s main concern in the essay on Natural Law is to show that the abstractions to which these theorists resort, destroy any genuine conception of ethical life.\(^\text{19}\)

Nevertheless, Benhabib concludes that Hegel’s exercise of immanent critique is ambivalent and self-defeating. She argues that while Hegel on the one hand criticizes the dogmatism of modern natural rights theories in reifying present social relations, on the other hand, Hegel admits that there is no moment in the present upon which to anchor the view of a unified ethical life. The ideal of ethical life is not an immanent but a transcendent ideal, in the sense that it involves looking back to the past. This means for Benhabib that the normative standard governing Hegel’s critique is a retrospective one, drawn from memory. In that respect Benhabib contends that Hegel’s critique of natural right theories is not immanent either for it is unclear to her why the view of a unified ethical life \((\text{Sittlichkeit})\) should be considered less dogmatic an assumption in the face of the realities of the modern world that the assumptions of the natural right theories.\(^\text{20}\)

Benhabib argues that Hegel sees meaning in social life to reside in “the perspective of a third, of an observer-thinker”\(^\text{21}\) which she refers to as “trans-subjectivity”.\(^\text{22}\) She criticizes Hegel for not analyzing how “trans-subjectivity” can be translated back into the lived perspective of social actors. Instead she accuses Hegel of appealing to an epistemological standpoint which is objectivist and remote from the social actors. This for her is responsible for portraying ethical life \((\text{Sittlichkeit})\) as a transcendent totality, alienating itself from itself in history.\(^\text{23}\)

Benhabib’s analysis of immanent critique focuses solely on Hegel’s early work which merely criticizes (successfully) the normative criteria of natural law theories without advancing an analysis of the conjunction between reason and reality that his late work covers. Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of reason and reality which takes place at his late work, namely the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} and the \textit{Philosophy of Right}, rests on his metaphysical dimension and the notion of Spirit (Geist) which theoretically enriches immanent critique.

\(^{19}\) Benhabib, \textit{Critique, Norm and Utopia}, 25
\(^{20}\) Benhabib, \textit{Critique, Norm and Utopia}, 32
\(^{21}\) Benhabib, \textit{Critique, Norm and Utopia}, 31
\(^{22}\) Benhabib, \textit{Critique, Norm and Utopia}, 31
\(^{23}\) Benhabib, \textit{Critique, Norm and Utopia}, 32
Therefore as Buchwalter stresses, the metaphysical dimension needs to be taken into consideration in order to comprehend Hegel’s conjunction between reason and reality and conceptualize immanent critique.

As Buchwalter argues Hegel’s immanent critique, evaluates reality not with alien principles of rationality but with principles intrinsic to reality itself. Reality is challenged not with arbitrary constructions of transcendental rationalism but with norms which are part of the reality itself. Thus, Hegel’s synthesis of thought (Reason) and being (Reality) furnishes a social criticism which overcomes the dichotomy of descriptive and prescriptive approaches.24 Moreover, Buchwalter emphasizes that the metaphysical dimension upon which the conjunction of Reason and Reality is based, forms the precondition of immanent critique. As he mentions “Hegel’s conception of this conjunction is virtually identical to the concept of immanent critique […] without denying that there is a metaphysical dimension to Hegel's conception of the relationship of reason and reality, I contend that, properly understood, this dimension, far from obstructing development of a meaningful concept of immanent critique, actually is its precondition”.25

Buchwalter notes that Hegel’s immanent critique assist the decomposition of preconditions and assumptions as well as their cleansing of their adventitious impurities in order to understand “what is” and meet the demands of Hegel’s philosophical truth. However, this truth for Hegel is not the capitulation of thought to given reality but the elevation of reality to the concept (Begriff). Thus, the comprehension of “what is”, is not the positing of reality out of concepts but a process in which the material generated empirically and historically is brought to the concept. In that respect, Hegel conjoins reason and reality not to legitimate existing conditions but in order to judge them.26 Therefore, as Buchwalter summarizes, Hegel’s true reality or actuality establishes: Firstly, a developmental order of conceptual categories (different from empirically generated phenomena); and Secondly, new categories via a conceptual reconstruction.

25 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 255
26 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 256
expanding categories and principles which have been ascertained in an empirical manner.  

At this point, as Buchwalter observes, Hegel’s immanent critique might strike one as paradoxical. This Hegelian reconstruction of actuality or true reality, judges reality not on its own standards but on a speculative concept of reason that relies on a metaphysical dimension which allows one to suggest that it obstructs the critique of the real in its own terms.

Rosen too analyses extensively this seemingly paradoxical dimension of Hegel’s immanent critique from a different scope, referring to it as the post festum paradox. Nevertheless, Rosen argues that this paradox ceases to exist once Hegel’s dialectical method is treated as determinate negation within his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). The confusion Hegel’s conceptualization of actuality and the concept (Begriff) raises is associated to Hegel’s understanding of the absolute, whole and truth. According to Hegel, “the true is the whole. But the whole is only the essence which completes itself through its development. It is to be said of the absolute that is essentially a result, that only at the end is it that which it is in truth [...] the true form in which the truth exists can only be as its scientific system”.

As Rosen explains, if the truth requires a system, then it properly exists at the point of the completion for the system and what precedes it is only partial. Rosen notes that what interests us is how this point of completion is attained and whether we have arrived at it legitimately or not. However, he contends that since the standpoint of truth, can only be attained when this system is completed, we are not in a position to fully comprehend the method by which it was reached. Therefore, in Rosen’s words we are facing the following paradox, “to criticize Hegel is to claim that the system does not attain validly its point of completion [...] but to critics any other than the point of completion violates a crucial presupposition of the system itself, namely, that only someone who has really attained its final point can perceive that rationality of its attainment. I shall

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27 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 259
28 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 260
29 Michael Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982), 23
30 Georg W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), par. 20
31 Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism, 23
call this the *post-festum* paradox".\(^{32}\) According to Rosen the only way to overcome this paradox is to treat Hegel’s dialectical method as immanent critique. Such a dialectical method should be perceived as determinate negation, incorporating the previous opposing systems without discharging them as worthless illusions but as lower yet necessary standpoints which ultimately contribute to the formation of a complete philosophical system that is open, evolutionary and positive.

Hegel’s dialectical method is premised on the notions of negativity and restlessness which are the key to acquire an accurate understanding of Hegel’s Spirit (*Geist*) and immanent critique. After taking into consideration negativity and restlessness, Hegelian dialectic can be perceived as *sublation* (*Aufheben*). According to Hegel, *sublation* (*Aufheben*) is a reconciliation of opposites that does not eliminate the two opposites within it. In that respect, Hegel’s dialectical method, maintains the unity of the opposites, while carrying its own contradiction within itself which explains how it assumes an evolutionary role.

The excerpt below indicates that the notions of restlessness and determinate negation underlie not only Hegel’s dialectical method but also his conceptualization of Spirit (*Geist*). Hegel, in paragraph 377 found in the *Philosophy of Mind* contends that:

Nancy cites this excerpt too in order to argue how the Spirit (*Geist*) nourishes the notions of negativity and restlessness which permit the conjunction between reason and reality in immanent terms rather than transcendental via the dialectical process. As Nancy observes, for Hegel the (empirical) world - the realm of the finite - is sheltered and revealed in the infinite work of negativity. According to Hegel, this empirical world is not a simple fact which can be understood directly through a descriptive empirical approach. Also, for Hegel the

\(^{32}\) Rosen, *Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism*, 24

empirical reality can not be perceived or determined by a transcendental a-
priorism driven by a prescriptive idealistic approach. Hegel, via the evolutionary
realm of Spirit (Geist) conceptualizes the empirical world in terms of its own
movement and restlessness. It is in the restlessness of the immanent empirical
world that the Spirit actualizes.\textsuperscript{34} As Nancy argues, ‘the Spirit neither seeks
itself, it neither finds itself but effectuates itself: it is the living restlessness of its
own concrete effectivity’.\textsuperscript{35} Finally, the subject becomes the means which
permits the Spirit to actualize itself in the immanent empirical world.
Specifically, the subject’s self-consciousness which is seized according to Hegel
via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state, allows the Spirit to actualize itself.

Moreover the reading of the dialectic as restless and sublating (Aufheben)
from the perspective of determinate negation has an impact on Hegel’s
subjectivity. Hegel’s understanding of subjectivity also reflects the notions of
negativity and restlessness. As Nancy contends, ‘the subject is what it does, in its
act and its doing is the experience of the consciousness of the negativity of
substance as the concrete experience and consciousness of the modern history of
the world’.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, for Hegel, the self is not an autonomous or a self-determining
entity. On the contrary the self’s consciousness is a process characterized by
evolutionary moments, including that of separating from itself while maintaining
a relation with the empirical world. The development of self-consciousness
reflects a relation whose terms are not given, marking a separation from itself
which liberates itself not in transcendental terms but in terms of the immanent
empirical reality.

At this point it is important to stress that the treatment of Hegel’s
dialectic as restless does not suggest that the dialectic has contingent effects due
to the realization of reason and subjectivity in terms of the immanent empirical
world which is ephemeral. On the contrary, the understanding of Hegel’s notion
of subjectivity which is formed via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state,
illustrate the positive effects of Hegel’s dialectical method. Therefore, Hegel’s
notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), subjectivity and reason can be perceived via
immanent critique which in turn elevates reality the concept (Begriff).

\textsuperscript{34} Jean-Luc Nancy, \textit{Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative} (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press 2002), 4-5
\textsuperscript{35} Nancy, \textit{Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative}, 6
\textsuperscript{36} Nancy, \textit{Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative}, 4
Rosen stresses too the positive dimension of Hegel’s dialectical system. For Rosen, the positive dimension of this system is assumed after the dismissal of dialectic’s skeptical dimension and the production of a positive outcome that rests on the evolutionary mode of Hegel’s system. Rosen insists that Hegel’s dialectical method cannot be separated from his system. The Hegelian method cannot be extracted. The object of Hegel’s science is the system of truth and the notion of the concept (Begriff). As Hegel argues ‘Now only the communication of the scientific method but even the notion (Begriff) of the science itself belongs to the [Logic’s] content and constitutes indeed its final result’. Therefore, after treating immanent critique as a dialectic of determinate negation, it becomes clear how the post-festum paradox is overcome and why Hegel’s dialectical method cannot be separated from his system. In that respect the inability to reply “what is” in advance is neither nourishing a paradox nor applying an objectivist or transcendental criterion of attaining knowledge beyond reality. Hegel’s alternative treatment of reality and reason via the dialectic as determinate negation brings out this knowledge within reality as its last element and completion.

As Rosen notes, such an understanding of the dialectical method appears to defuse the paradox’s destructive implications. The dialectical method, does not pose a method in the sense of a procedure, presupposed and intersubjectively acknowledged prior to the commencement of its investigation. In Rosen’s words the dialectic is a ‘law into itself’. Being a law into itself, dialectic is autonomous which is not the same thing as being arbitrary. Dialectic can escape this charge of arbitrariness by returning to its roots in the sense of a purposeful discussion, dialogue, debate. On this view the dialectic is methodologically open, positive and autonomous, generating binding principles from its own resources which are neither arbitrary nor transcendental, supporting the understanding of dialectic as immanent critique. As Hegel notes ‘the general remark has already been made elsewhere with regard to the refutation of a philosophical system, that the erroneous conception must be excluded by which

37 Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism, 28-29
38 Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism, 28
39 Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism, 29
the system is to be presented as entirely false and as if the true system by contrast was merely opposed to the false one’.  

Therefore for the dialectic as determinate negation, opposing systems are not just worthless illusions, they are rational enterprises, albeit imperfect ones. The true system develops and vindicates itself by including these lower standpoints within itself. But it must not do that ‘externally’. It must establish common ground with them, and this means participating in their assumptions. Thus, the doctrine of determinate negation amounts to the claim that negation in the course of the dialectic is positive. As Hegel notes ‘the only prerequisite for the acquisition of scientific progression – is the acquisition of the logical proposition that the negative is equally positive or that which contradicts itself does not dissolve into zero but essentially into the negation of its particular content or that such a negation is not all negation but the negation of the determinate subject-matter which dissolves and is thus determinate negation’.  

This thesis about the nature of immanent critique that leads to a positive result is fundamental to Hegel’s understanding of the nature of his philosophical system. Moreover the treatment of the dialectical method as immanent critique which assumes the doctrine of determinate negation allows Hegel to overcome the sceptical dimension of his philosophical system. This understanding of criticism in purely negative terms, makes formal philosophy the ally of scepticism. But Hegel’s philosophical system avoids this by producing a positive result which is clearly stressed in Hegel’s late work. As Hegel notes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ‘true philosophy includes the sceptical principle as a subordinate function of its own in the shape of dialectic. In contradiction to scepticism however, philosophy does not remain content with the purely negative result of the dialectic. Scepticism mistakes the true value of its result when it holds fast to it as mere, that is to say abstract negation. The negative, as the result of the dialectic is at the same time positive; it contains what it results from absorbed into itself and does not exist without it’. Rosen adds that, the ‘scepticism’ of the natural consciousness which denies the possibility of a

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41 Rosen, *Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism*, 30  
43 Rosen, *Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism*, 31
positive result from immanent critique is displayed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as ‘one of the patterns of incomplete consciousness that has already been left behind. In that respect, scepticism is taken to be an incomplete pattern of consciousness which is succeeded by a higher and more complete stage of consciousness within the sequence of determinate negation which transforms Hegelian dialectic into a positive process.\(^{44}\)

The previous paragraphs explained how the treatment of Immanent Critique as a dialectical process of determinate negation, defuses the post-festum paradox and the allegation according to which Hegel’s conjunction of reason with reality lies on a transcendental dimension which obstructs the critique of the real in its own terms. The following paragraphs, after citing Beiser’s interpretation of Hegel, explain how Hegel’s metaphysical dimension should not be equated to transcendentalism. Moreover, from this analysis it will become clear that immanent critique as a dialectical process of determinate negation which escapes scepticism and the implications of the post-festum paradox, can only be perceived from such a metaphysical dimension and the notion of the Spirit (*Geist*). This conceptualisation of metaphysics allows the dialectic to assume a positive role within Hegel’s system, after including the lower standpoints of consciousness within itself, contributing to the conjunction of reason and reality that does not rest on a transcendental dimension.

III. On Hegel’s Metaphysics, the Notion of Spirit (*Geist*) and the Contribution of Immanent Critique

Let us recall that, according to Buchwalter, Hegel’s immanent critique evaluates and challenges reality not with arbitrary constructions but with norms which are part of the reality itself. Immanent critique, eliminates the conflict between reality and its true essence, resting on Hegel’s metaphysical dimension and the notion of Spirit (*Geist*), without however depending on a transcendental notion of reason.

Therefore, in order to acquire a more complete understanding of the immanent critique, it is important not only to consider Hegel’s metaphysical dimension but also to understand how Hegel perceives metaphysics and the

\(^{44}\) Rosen, *Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism*, 41
notion of the Absolute. As Beiser stresses, “Hegel’s philosophy is not metaphysical in the sense proscribed by Kant […] Hegel denied the experience of the transcendent, the purely noumenal or supernatural. Hegel’s own concept of the infinite or unconditioned is entirely immanent, the infinite does not exist beyond the finite world but only within it”.45

It has already been argued that immanent critique contributes to the understanding of actuality after decomposing the preconditions that form our incomplete understanding of reality, via the notion of the pure concept (Begriff) which rests on Hegel’s conceptualization of the Absolute.46

For Hegel, the notion of Absolute is tied to metaphysics without alluding to a transcendental or a theological dimension. As Beiser explains, Hegel’s metaphysics differ from theology since Hegel argues that the Absolute should be the result, not the starting point of doing philosophy.47 Unlike theology, Hegel insists that it is only after an investigation that the philosopher understands that the object and subject matter of philosophy has been all along the Absolute.48 According to Hegel the object and subject of knowledge are embodiments of the Absolute and not meant to be separated. The notion of the Absolute, allows Hegel to overcome this dualism denying that there should be a separation between: the subjective and objective, the ideal and the real, the mental and physical, the universal and particular, affirming instead that they are distinct moment of the same process. This becomes clear in the Phenomenology of Spirit, elaborating on the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge challenging ordinary experiencing. That the subject is distinct from the object (meaning that the object is given and produces representations independent of our will) is a fact of ordinary experience. Nevertheless, Hegel contends that philosophy should not dismiss this appearance as an illusion but it should explain and show its necessity. Philosophy is capable of explaining the opposition between the subject and object of knowledge as an incomplete pattern of consciousness entailed in ordinary experience which is succeeded by a higher and more complete stage of consciousness which overcomes this distinction.49

45 Frederic Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 55
46 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 256
47 Hegel G F, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), par. 20
48 Frederic Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 60
49 Frederic Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 65
As Hegel overcomes the separation between the subject and object of knowledge, similarly he treats the universal and particular as complementary. Beiser notes that according to Hegel, universals do not exist as such but only en re in particular things. In that respect the content of the universal forms is occupied by the particular, bridging the gap between empiricism and idealism. According to Hegel’s notion of the Absolute, the dispute between empiricism and idealism is misconceived. The Absolute is neither subjective nor objective, neither founded on idealism nor on empiricism, neither universal nor particular. The combination of these dimensions: subjective-objective, idealism-empiricism, universal-particular, are equally essential and necessary condition for the self-realisation of the Absolute. This becomes clearer in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel contents that the subject seizes self-consciousness and freedom via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state, suggesting that the Absolute, fully realises itself in the realm of history and the state in the domain of culture, art, and ethics. In that respect, the Hegelian notion of the Absolute is neither dualistic nor transcendental, but immanent.\(^{50}\)

Finally, Beiser stresses that Hegel’s notion of the Absolute proceeds from an evolutionary organic vision of the world. Hegel understands the Absolute in organic terms. The organic view of the world appears throughout Hegel’s system and plays a fundamental role in its logic, ethics, politics and aesthetics. The significance of this organic vision is also evident from Hegel’s conceptualisation of the dialectic as determinate negation which rests on the unity of the opposites, while maintaining them, ultimately forming an identity-in-difference. All these concepts grew from his organic concept of nature and presuppose, what Beiser defines as a triadic schema; “unity, difference, unity-in-difference”. The oxymoronic aspect of these concepts derives from the thesis that organic development is essentially a movement between opposites: unity and difference; essence and appearance; idealism and empiricism; universalism and particularism.\(^{51}\)

Hegel’s organic world view is also tied to the philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). As Beiser observes, Hegel never understood the notion of the Spirit (Geist) as something transcendent and associated the Spirit with the

\(^{50}\) Frederic Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 67
\(^{51}\) Frederic Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 80-81
evolution of history, society and human within the state.\textsuperscript{52} Singer argues that Hegel has always been concerned with the nature of mind or consciousness and its relation to the physical world avoiding the division of human nature between senses and reason, body and mind.\textsuperscript{53} Taylor stresses that the epistemological gap between man and nature expresses itself in its best known form in the Kantian distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves. The latter were in principle unknowable. Hegel directs a powerful polemic against the thing-in-itself, rejecting transcendentalism, as he was against this abstract segregation between man and nature, senses and reason, body-mind. In brief, this opposition is overcome in the fact that our knowledge of the world turns ultimately into the Spirit’s (\textit{Geist}) self-knowledge. For we come to discover that the world which is supposedly beyond thought, is really \textit{posited}\textsuperscript{54} by thought, that it is a manifestation of rational necessity. As Taylor argues, for Hegel, this dualism between subject and world, rationalism and empiricism is overcome after perceiving the world as the necessary expression of thought while seeing ourselves as the medium that assists the actualisation of this thought (in the physical world) at the point where it becomes conscious.\textsuperscript{55}

According to Hegel, the misleading dualism between infinite-finitude, man-nature, senses-reason, body-mind, can be overcome once the Spirit’s infinite dimension is realised via the finite subject. For Hegel, the finite subject must be a part of a larger organic order. But since this is an order deployed by an unconditional rational necessity it is at no point foreign to ourselves as rational subjects. The rational agent loses none of her freedom in coming to accept (that she becomes the medium of the Spirit’s actualisation in the physical world) this vocation as vehicle of cosmic necessity. Nor does this union with the Spirit only accommodate us as subjects of rational thought at the expense of our empirical desiring nature. The Spirit as an infinite subject is such that in order to be, it must have an external embodiment. The infinite subject can only be through a finite one. Two related essential features of the Hegelian solution follow from this. The first is that the unity of man and world, the finite and infinite subject does not

\textsuperscript{52} Frederic Beiser, \textit{Hegel} (New York: Routledge, 2005), 111-112
\textsuperscript{54} Authors comment: Taylor uses the word ‘posited’ after translating the German word \textit{besetzen} which means based on, placed
\textsuperscript{55} Charles Taylor, \textit{Hegel}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 117
abolish the difference but ultimately retains the difference in it. We remain finite subjects over against the world and Spirit, subjects with all the particularities of our time, place and circumstances, even as we come to see this particular existence as part of a larger plan, as we come to be the mediums which assist the actualisation of the Spirit. As Taylor notes, humans are not merely a part of the infinite world. In another way humans reflects the organic whole: the Spirit (Geist) which expresses itself in the external reality of nature, only comes to conscious expression and self-awareness in humans.

The finite person’s relation to this infinite creative force - Spirit (Geist) - is reflected in the notion that human consciousness does not simply represent a passive part determined by nature but an active one that completes or perfects it. On this view, the Spirit (Geist), which unfolds in the physical world, is striving to complete itself in conscious self-knowledge and the locus of this self-consciousness is the mind of humans. So the Spirit (Geist) reaches its fullest expression in self-awareness. But this is not achieved in some transcendent realm beyond humans. This is achieved, as Hegel elaborates in the Philosophy of Right, once the individual seizes her self-consciousness and freedom via the realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the State. In that respect, Hegel’s notion of Spirit is not essentially transcendental but associates to the society’s and the state’s evolution.

Therefore, Hegel did not annul the dualism between finitude-infinity, man-nature, body-mind, senses-reason. On the contrary, he treated this dualism as something which unites rather than something that separates. Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) made that possible. This idea of duality, which is overcome without being abolished, finds expression in two Hegelian terms sublation (Aufhebung) and reconciliation which help articulate the treatment of Hegel’s dialectic as determinate negation. These terms imply that although the dualism remains, its opposition is overcome. Ultimately, the distinction between: finitude-infinity, man-nature, senses-reason is overcome only after supporting that the Spirit’s (Geist’s) self-awareness is formed via the humans’ self-

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56 Taylor, Hegel, 119
57 Taylor, Hegel, 10
58 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 22-26
consciousness in the physical world (formed via the ethical life/ Sittlichkeit in the state), undermining any transcendental conceptualisation of the Spirit.59

The Contribution of Immanent Critique After Conceptualizing Hegel’s Metaphysics and Spirit (Geist) from a non-Transcendental Dimension

The previous analysis elaborated that immanent critique does not appear paradoxical once Hegel’s metaphysical dimension and the philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) ceases to be ignored. The paradoxical impression, according to which immanent critique assumes a transcendental status which obstructs the critique of the real in its own terms, is challenged after emphasising on an interpretation of Hegel’s philosophical system which takes into consideration the dimension of metaphysics and the realm of Spirit (Geist). Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) is founded upon an organic vision of the world that promotes an evolutionary notion of dialectics which rests on the following triadic schema: unity-difference-unity in difference. Such a dialectical schema avoids the dualism which keeps separate: the subject from the object of knowledge, reason from reality, rationalism from empiricism, the universal from the particular, contributing to a non-transcendent conceptualisation of the Absolute and of the Spirit (Geist).

As Buchwalter stresses, the non-transcendent conceptualisation of immanent critique succeeds in reconciling reality with reason, empiricism with idealism and the Universal with the Particular. According to Buchwalter, immanent critique is not purely transcendental since for Hegel the reality of the logic (Sache der Logik) can only provide access to the logic of reality (Logik der Sache).60 Only with an account of the appropriate concept (begriff) can one judge the adequacy of any empirical conjunction of form and content. Thus, the evaluation of an empirical condition in terms of the subject’s own cognition, is an incomplete process of acquiring knowledge and perceiving reality.61 As

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59 Taylor, Hegel, 120
61 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 263
Buchwalter adds, immanent critique for Hegel presupposes a metaphysical approach to reality, one focused not on given definitions of reality determined by the subject alone but ‘on those pertaining to what the object is in and of itself’. Only by focusing on the essential and underlying nature of things, does one analyze an entity in terms of its own intrinsic concept.\(^62\) As Hegel argues in *the Philosophy of Right*, a concept of critique focused on an immanent analysis of the relation of a thing to its true essence, does not attend to standards contained "in the subject’s ideas and language" but to those conforming to "the essential nature of the thing itself".\(^63\)

The previous paragraph illustrated that an understanding of immanent critique, which is premised on the notion of Spirit (*Geist*) provides us a more complete understanding of subjectivity and empirical reality. The following paragraphs outline how this approach of Hegel’s immanent critique can enrich our understanding of ethics, freedom and citizenship, designating the limits of Kantian, empirical or liberal ideas.

Let us remind ourselves that immanent critique exposes and eliminates the contradiction between reality and its true essence, explaining how the real is elevated to the pure concept (*Begriff*) rather than a concept determined solely by reality.\(^64\) This contradiction pertains not to the wholesale falsity of existing reality but to the disparity between existing reality and its true nature which separates empiricism from idealism. Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) explains how the real is elevated to the pure concept (*Begriff*) reconciling empiricism with idealism.

The forth chapter elaborates in detail the implications of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) on citizenship after re-examining reality and reason from the perspective of Hegel’s immanent critique, after citing Patten, Molland and Dickey. According to Dickey, Hegel treats ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) not as a transcendental ideal but as an ideal situated within a historically-specific constellation of socioeconomic forces. Nevertheless, Hegel’s objective was to rectify the bourgeois socio-economic implications associated with a purely materialistic approach to economy that lead to the promotion of liberal ideals and

\(^{62}\) Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 262
\(^{63}\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 4
\(^{64}\) Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 261
the alienation of citizens. For Dickey, Hegel resisted the Scottish scholars who insisted on treating individuals as social beings whose nature was essentially economic. Thus, Hegel’s conception of ethical life is essentially formed through the interplay between the moral and economic aspects of his thought which aspire to overcome the disparity between existing reality and its true nature.\textsuperscript{65} From this perspective, Hegel’s concern with values and dispositions such as honour, courage and the notion of patriotism aim at redressing the purely-economic-materialist approach that produces egotistic citizens alienated from their state.

As Patten notes the aim of Hegel’s ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) is therefore to integrate dispositions such as selflessness, patriotism and honour in regard to the community and the state founded on an alternative conceptualisation of freedom. Hegel’s notion of freedom, unlike Kant’s, is formed via the development of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) in the state, within the realm of Spirit. According to Kant, the subject alone is able to seize freedom. The Kantian subject attains freedom only via the exercise of reason, diminishing the influence of the senses, dispositions, social institutions and the immanent empirical world. Thus, from a Hegelian perspective Kant formulates an incomplete notion of subjectivity according to which the subject is perceived in the form of an individual ego that is autonomous and self-determining. Moreover, Hegel argues that Kant’s categorical imperative, upon which his notion of freedom rests, is abstract and vacuous, reproducing an empty formalism. By contrast, Hegelian thought overcomes the flaws of Kant’s understanding of freedom by offering an alternative account of subjectivity and freedom – one which is tied to his concept of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) and determined by his notion of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) and the state.\textsuperscript{66}

To be rational, self-determining and free in the Hegelian sense, an agent must strive to synthesize his choices into rational harmony with his desires. According to Hegel, there are specific dispositions, feelings and motivations that an agent must possess in order to acquire self-consciousness via the ethical life within the state. Thus, Hegel places emphasis not exclusively on reason, but also

on disposition. Hegel rejects Kant’s proposition that a moral action should be motivated by a transcendental notion of reason or duty alone, rather than by an inclination or desire on the part of the agent. Hegel argues that Kant’s doctrine of ‘duty for the duty’s sake’ not only impedes understanding of how action arises at all, but also appears to underestimate the ethical significance of certain emotions and dispositions. For Hegel, it is only when an agent performs the right action with the right disposition (not any contingently-given desire) that she attains an awareness of the rationality of her activity and thus becomes a rationally self-determining free subject.

Hegel’s notion of freedom within the realm of Spirit (Geist) is a process - not merely an absence of dependence on the other, won outside of the other, but won within the other and actualized within the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state. This notion of otherness which is maintained and forms a unity-in-difference, echoes the sublating (Aufheben) effect of the dialectic as determinate negation. The same effect is also reflected on the fact that Hegel does not dismiss the civil society of alienated and antagonistic individuals but maintains it as an incomplete moment of ethical life.

As Buchwalter adds it is true that Hegel treats civil society as a necessary moment of a process which leads to the development of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) via the evolutionary notion of Spirit (Geist). Yet this metaphysical consideration is necessary not to transcend the given but to actualize its true being, rendering it immanent. Similarly, Hegel’s immanent critique contributes to an alternative conceptualization of freedom, elucidated below, after attacking a concept of right which is based on an abstract universalist juridical restraint that safeguards private interests from external interference. Hegel maintains that true freedom is realized in a communitarian account of social relations, where others are regarded not as limitations but as conditions for the individual’s self-consciousness and self-realization within the state.

These insights allow Hegel to differentiate from liberalism after challenging the liberal understanding of private right without jettisoning the concept of right itself. Hegel’s critique of liberal individualism which shapes the

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67 Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 72-73
68 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 266
69 Buchwalter, ‘Hegel, Marx and the Concept of Immanent Critique’, 270
notion of private rights, contributes to an enriched conceptualization of citizenship that will be elaborated in the following chapters. As Franco argues, Hegel offers a way out of the atomism and narrow self-interest of the traditional liberal theory. He offers us a conception of ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) and the social good which is more inspiring than simply securing life and property. He does all this without sacrificing the individual rights and liberties which constitute the central ideals of liberalism. With respect to these ideals, Hegel sets them in a larger context which endows them with a meaning, purpose and ethical conduct beyond the ordinarily given in traditional liberal theory. In Franco’s words ‘Hegel’s subjective freedom, particularity, and even arbitrariness are not seen as ends in themselves but rather as essential elements in a much grander conception of the nature and overall destiny of human beings’. 

As Hegel notes in the *Philosophy of Right* ‘if the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of the individuals as such becomes the ultimate end for with they are united and follows from this that membership to the state is an optional matter. But the relationship of the state to the individual is of a quite different kind. Since the state is objective Spirit, it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth and ethical life. Union as such is the true content and end and the destiny of individuals is to lead a universal life’. 

Also according to Buchwalter’s perspective, Hegel demonstrates that the liberal concept is unintelligible without a public dimension. Central to his argument is the concept of autonomous personality, the principle he claims informs modern principles of rights and liberties. For Hegel, the concept of personhood presupposes an established political community committed to the importance of every individual’s will. Personal rights have no meaning in a state of nature, where social relations are ruled by force, violence, and caprice. They require, instead, a lawfully ordered community and institutions that allows and encourages individuals freely to pursue their own conceptions of well-being. And because institutions guaranteeing personal autonomy are effective only to the

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71 Paul Franco, “Hegel and Liberalism”, 857
72 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 31
extent that individuals acknowledge the legitimacy of those institutions and contribute to their continued existence, rights are themselves meaningful only if individuals self-consciously embrace public duties within the state. Therefore, rights cannot simply be claimed; they have to be earned and won through the endless mediation of discipline acting upon the powers of cognition and will. Rights have real meaning only when individuals recognize duties to uphold just institutions. As Hegel notes, ‘a man has rights insofar as he has duties, and duties insofar as he has rights”. In short, personal rights are, for Hegel, intelligible only against the backdrop of a reciprocal relationship between individual and community within the state.

The previous analysis suggested that Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of knowledge, subjectivity, freedom and ethical life can overcome the limits of Kantian, liberal and empirical inspired approaches which strongly influence IR thought. Kantian thought is often referenced among prescriptive IR scholars who promote a universalist dimension which celebrates the cosmopolitanism of (human) rights and the transcendental sense of duty upon which a theory of transnational institutions can be founded. On the other hand, empiricism characterises descriptive IR approaches which rest on certain axioms which stem from the perspective of a self-determining subject of theory. These empirical approaches after treating the theorist as a self-determining subject, separate the subject from the object of theory and nourish a misleading account of knowledge.

On the contrary, Hegel’s immanent critique promotes an alternative understanding of subjectivity and freedom, based on the notion of Spirit (Geist), which can reveal the shortcomings of the IR approaches driven by Kantian, liberal or empiricist insights. Specifically, this Hegelian inspired thesis challenges the universalist effects of Kantian thought. Hegel’s insights will demonstrate in the following chapters that the application of Kantian thought to IR, fails to support the universalism of cosmopolitan norms and (human) rights which rely on a vacuous sense of duty. This vacuous notion of duty is not genuinely universal but often rests on particular (liberal) ideals with politically excluding effects. Similarly, this thesis will seek to show that the appropriation

74 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 109
of Foucault’s philosophy to IR thought which takes into consideration the particularities of diverse sociopolitical historical contexts, nurtures a relativistic account of subjectivity and knowledge which on occasion paves the way to the promotion of liberal ideals. As in the case of Kant, these liberal ideals trigger political exclusions which undermine the theoretical contribution of the Foucaultian inspired IR perspectives.

Therefore, Hegel’s insights can expose the limits of Kantian and Foucaultian inspired IR thought while revealing how an incomplete understanding of subjectivity and freedom, formed by empirically descriptive or prescriptive theorising is responsible for nourishing liberal ideals. Hegel differentiates himself from liberalism after dismissing the individualistic self-determination of the liberal subject by criticizing the liberal purpose of the state which prioritizes the protection of the individual’s life, liberty and property. Thus, the will of an individualistic, self-determining subject is not free, according to Hegel, since the agent’s sociopolitical choices rest on options determined by liberal ideals rather than the subject itself. Moreover the same liberal ideal which are neither neutral nor Universal, fail to promote sociopolitical diversity, pluralism and free will, triggering socio-political exclusions.

Finally, this dissertation reaffirms the contribution of Hegelian thought after considering the significance of his notion of Spirit (Geist) towards the understanding of subjectivity, freedom, ethics and the state. Therefore an understanding of immanent critique that takes into consideration Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist), allows us to acquire a more complete understanding of: 1) subjectivity after overcoming the separation between the subject and the object of knowledge; 2) ethics and norms after incorporating the universal and the particular dimension which avoids the separation between the form and its content; and 3) the interplay between empiricism and idealism which overcomes the treatment of knowledge and subjectivity as relativistic with regard to particular contexts.

The next section illustrates how exactly Hegel’s notion of Spirit accommodates the interplay between: 1) the subject and the object of knowledge; 2) the universal and the particular dimension; 3) empiricism and idealism.
How Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) Accommodates and Reconciles the Interplay of Antithetical Dimensions

The previous part elucidated that Taylor, Beiser and Buchwalter take into consideration Hegel’s concept of Spirit (Geist) whose actualisation rests on the development of the subject’s consciousness via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in the state; overcoming the examination of reality with transcendental means. Such a non-transcendental notion of Spirit (Geist), which unveils the contribution of immanent critique, accommodates the interplay between: 1) the subject and the object of knowledge; 2) the universal and the particular dimension; 3) empiricism and idealism. Before these three key points are analysed, it is important to comprehend how exactly the notions of Geist and Sittlichkeit were developed by Hegel in order to cope with certain philosophical dead-ends of his time. The notion of Spirit (Geist) and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) were Hegel’s reply to approaches which celebrated the division of human nature between body and mind as well as the limits of Kantian thought. Not only Hegel, but also Fichte\textsuperscript{75} and Schiller,\textsuperscript{76} rendered Kantian thought problematic. The shortcomings of Kantian thought are associated with: a misleading account of subjectivity and the intellectual nourishment of an empty formalism.

Broadly, Hegel agrees with Kant and Fichte about this relationship between freedom, reason, and desire but departs from their framework. Hegel puts forward a different understanding of reason. Where Kant, for instance, looks to a formal principle such as the categorical imperative\textsuperscript{77} which in order to determine what reason demands, draws a distinction between man’s reason and passions. On the other hand, Hegel develops a richer, more concrete account of the ends and duties prescribed by reason, resting on the customary morality of the community (Sittlichkeit).\textsuperscript{78} Hegel also thinks that the Kantian view of freedom underestimates the ethical significance of various emotions and feelings.

\textsuperscript{75}Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) was a philosopher, one of the founding scholars of German idealism.
\textsuperscript{76}Friedrich Von Schiller (1759-1805), German philosopher and poet. In his work \textit{Duty and Inclination} he reconciles human senses with reason.
\textsuperscript{77}Kant affirms the existence of an absolute moral law via the categorical imperative. The application of categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a sense of duty which is emancipating, instead of the individual desires which prohibit the subject’s self-control and determination.
\textsuperscript{78}Alan Patten, \textit{Hegel’s Idea of Freedom}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 43-45
Via *Sittlichkeit* the aim is to integrate dispositions such as selflessness, honour in one’s estate and patriotism into a theory of freedom and into ethics more generally. Hegel’s point is not that the objectively free agent is motivated by reason but that s/he is motivated by a desire that is reasonable or appropriate for her to have in the circumstances stemming from *Sittlichkeit*.79

For Hegel, Ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) is a form of morality, the content of which is derived from social institutions (family, civil society, state). Thus, the subject’s emancipation occurs once it reconciles itself with community within the realm of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Hegel attempts to promote an alternative understanding of freedom based on an alternative conceptualisation of the subject and the state - within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*) - which stems from ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). In this manner, Hegel provides an alternative conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity, which rests on the society and the culture of a community rather than on a self-determining and transcendent subject. Unlike Hegel, Kant equated the subject to a self-constituted individual and argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than senses or whims, in accordance to the categorical imperative. The application of categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a sense of duty, which is emancipating. However, the content of this sense of duty is vague in Kant’s thought.80 Hegel gives a concrete content to Kant’s seemingly abstract requirement of freedom. The categorical imperative is a vague universal duty that promotes and sustains a self-determined form of subjectivity, which is alienated from the community. On the contrary, Hegelian freedom overcomes the alienation of the self-determining subjects, which nourish the tension between the individual and her community and promotes the understanding of freedom via ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). According to Hegel’s thought ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) is the customary morality of the community where the content of freedom is derived from the levels of society (family, civil society, state).81

As Taylor notes, the notion of Spirit (*Geist*) which is responsible for promoting an alternative account of subjectivity, statehood, freedom and ethical life, grounds Hegel’s philosophy of history and politics in an ontological vision.

79 Patten, *Hegel’s Idea of Freedom*, 54-56
81 Luther, *Hegel’s Critique of Modernity*, 135-140
Via Spirit (Geist), Hegel develops a certain conception of the direction of history and of the shape of the fully realized state. The goal towards everything is the self-comprehension of Spirit or Reason. But the full realization of Spirit presupposes a certain development of man in history. Man starts off as an immediate being, sunk in his particular needs and natural drives. This is another way of putting the point that Spirit is initially divided from itself and has yet to return to itself. If man is to rise to the point where s/he can be the vehicle of this return, s/he has to be transformed, to undergo a long cultivation or formation (Bildung). This transformation is not seized by the individual subject alone but it is developed via the society as the subject’s self-consciousness is nourished by the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that is formed within the limits of the state.

In other words, it is necessary for man to evolve culturally and politically in order to seize his/her free will and self-consciousness and assist the actualisation of Spirit (Geist). Thus, Sittlichkeit and the state become the means of this evolutionary process. This evolution rests on man’s attainment of a social life. Just as man does not acquire consciousness alone but socially; similarly the Spirit (Geist), can only know itself in the world after bringing about an adequate embodiment in human life, in which it can recognize itself. The goal of world history is that Spirit (Geist) comes to a knowledge of what truly is and realizes itself in a world which lies before it. In order to realize Spirit’s (Geist) fulfilment, humans need to envision themselves as a part of a larger life. And that requires as a living being to be socially integrated into a larger life. The state is the real expression of that universal life which is the necessary embodiment for the vision of the absolute. Thus, society and the state are essential to Spirit’s (Geist) and man’s progress. This is what Hegel means in that famous line of the Philosophy of Right ‘that the state is the march of God through the world’, which triggered various interpretations, often treating Hegel as the anti-liberal apologist of the Prussianism.83

1) Regarding the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge, the philosophical system of Spirit helped to clarify that Hegel did neither promote the understanding of the subject in the form of the indeterminate,
relativistic individual nor in the form of the individual self-determining, autonomous ego. Both forms rest on Hegel’s incomplete moments of will, which once abstracted from the realm of Spirit (*Geist*) and treated independently, they contribute to a lack of self-consciousness and free will. To begin with, Hegel doesn’t treat self-consciousness, free will and reason as something (naturally) predetermined or entailed upon the individual. As Taylor stresses, a developed self-consciousness and rationality is not something a human starts with but something he comes to. This means two things: first, beyond the hierarchy of forms of life, there is a hierarchy of modes of thought. As a person’s rational consciousness of herself evolves, so her mode of expression of this self-consciousness is altered. A person’s language, art, religion, philosophy must change; for thought cannot alter without a transformation of its medium. Thus, there must be a hierarchy of modes of expression in which the higher one is more accurate, lucid and coherent than the lower one. The fact that rationality and consciousness are something a human achieves rather than starts with, means that the formation of subjectivity is contingent and has a history. In order for the subject to acquire self-consciousness and freewill, s/he has to work her way with efforts and struggle through the various stages of lesser or more distorted consciousness or in Hegel’s terms succeed the moments of will. S/he starts as a primitive being and has to acquire consciousness and a social culture painfully and slowly. This, as it has already been stressed, does not rest on the subject’s individual efforts but develops socially within the realm of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) that is nourished in the state.

In that sense Hegel does not associate subjectivity with the autonomous individual ego who is self-determining. For Hegel, the subject’s self-consciousness can only be developed socially, not independently, within the limits of the state and its particular community. A particular ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) is nurtured in the state, which assists the progression of the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom. We can thus see that this transformation over time involves more than the ascent up of a hierarchy of consciousness modes. It requires that the subject evolves her (self-)consciousness after transforming the immediate dispositions via the ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) into an appropriate disposition which expresses the demands of rationality and freedom.
In this regard, self-consciousness and subjectivity are contingent due to the evolution they undergo but are not relativist. Contingency is reflected in the first moment of will (Indeterminacy) which is incomplete but unavoidable since it allows the subject to progress and acquire self-consciousness and free will in terms of a particular ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Although the development of the ethical life echoes the particularity of a culture within the limits of a specific state, this does not render the formation of subjectivity relativistic. The formation of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the limits of particular states, rests on a specific culture but they all serve the evolution of subject’s consciousness within the realm of Spirit (Geist). Thus, the incorporation of Spirit (Geist) allows us to overcome any culturally or contextually relativistic account of subjectivity, since the subject’s ultimate goal is the seizure of its self-consciousness, free will and freedom which is absolute; whereas the cultural particularities of the each state’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) only serve as mediums for subject’s evolution.

2) Regarding the interplay between the universal and particular, Hegel’s analysis helps us overcome the empty formalism of Kant’s approach which stems from the separation of the universal and the particular. The following chapters will demonstrate that both the approach of Kant himself as well as the Kantian inspired cosmopolitan approaches, separate the universal from the particular dimension and provide a misleading definition of ethics, duty, reason and freedom. Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) has a crucial role here. Spirit (Geist) presupposes a certain development of man in history, so that man can evolve and form a self-conscious entity that assists the actualisation of the Spirit. In order to know itself in the world, the Spirit has to bring about an adequate embodiment in human life in which it can recognize itself. The state is essential for both man’s progress as well as the Spirit’s fulfilment. Since the goal of world history is that Spirit comes to a knowledge of what truly is, this can only take place via the evolution of the subject’s self-consciousness which is formed via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of the state.84

Sittlichkeit refers to the moral obligations the subject has towards the community. It is due to this interaction between the subject and the community of the State the subject belongs to that obligations emerge; and the fulfilment of

84 Taylor, Hegel And Modern Society, 71
these obligations which stem from *Sittlichkeit* is what sustains and keeps it in being. Hence, in *Sittlichkeit* there is no gap between what ought to be and what is. In contrast to that, with Kantian morality (*Moralität*) the opposite holds. In Kant’s case we have an obligation to realize something which does not exist. The abstractness of the universality involved in the categorical imperative dismisses particularity and promotes an empty sense of duty. The categorical imperative’s sense of duty which is promoted as an vacuous ought to be, contrasts to what is. And connected to this, the obligations of the subject are not formed by the community but from an individualistic rational will. Hegel’s critique of Kant can then be put in this way: Kant identifies ethical obligation with *Moralität* and cannot get beyond this. For he presents an abstract, formal notion of moral obligation which holds of man as an individual and which being is defined in contrast to nature as an endless opposition to what is.\(^8^5\)

Finally, the problem with Kant’s criterion of rationality is that he has purchased radical autonomy at the price of emptiness. Kant attempted to avoid any appeal to the way things are. The criterion of right is to be purely formal. Moral autonomy has been purchased at the price of vacuity. Kant’s concrete content of duty is deduced from the very idea of freedom itself. Because Kant only has a formal notion of freedom, he cannot derive his notion of the polity from it. His political theory ends up borrowing from the utilitarians. Its input is the utilitarian vision of a society of individuals, each seeking happiness in their own way. The problem of politics is to find a way of limiting the freedom of each so that it can co-exist with that of all others under an abstract, universal law which has a form but lacks a content derived from the polity.\(^8^6\)

3) Finally, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (*Geist*) accommodates the interplay between empiricism and idealism which prevents the development of subjectivity and reason on transcendental premises and dismisses a relativistic treatment of knowledge. Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) overcomes the relativistic treatment of knowledge after incorporating historicism without lapsing into relativism which allows the interplay between empiricism and idealism. As Beiser notes, the concept of Spirit (*Geist*) allows Hegel to pursue a philosophical enquiry which is neither descriptive (prioritizing empiricism) nor prescriptive.

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\(^8^5\) Taylor, *Hegel And Modern Society*, 82-83
\(^8^6\) Taylor, *Hegel And Modern Society*, 77-78
Hegel’s objective is not to construct ideals but understand what is actual. Spirit (Geist) assists Hegel to exhibit the rationality or reason which has informed the development of history. The fundamental claim behind this conception is that any universal concept or value such as reason, ethics or nation are embodied in the culture and language of people at a specific place and time.\(^\text{87}\) The co-existence of particularity with universality in Hegel’s social historical teleology is maintained as Hegel preserves the truths and cancels the errors of idealist and historicist traditions. Hegel, without dismissing the idealist’s formalism that values are objective (entailing a universal status) he accuses them of seeing the values as eternal norms above history or as static essences within nature. Rather, these values are realized only in history and through the activity of particular individuals. In plain terms, according to Hegel, the actualization of (universal) values can only take place within (particular) historical contexts. Also, from a Hegelian perspective, the historicists were correct to see the norms embodied in the way of life of a people but their flaw lies in the identification of norms or values solely with particular contexts. Certain scholars accused the historicists of confusing the historical explanation of values with their demonstration. Historical explanation merely focuses on factual causes (particularity). On the other hand Hegel’s approach emphasizes on an evolutionary development of history which underlines the formation of particular norms or values within the realm of Spirit (Geist).\(^\text{88}\)

In that respect, the notion of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to bridge the gap between idealism and empiricism and overcomes the treatment knowledge as relativistic with regard to the contingency of historical events. This allows Hegel to form a more complete account of subjectivity and knowledge. The following chapter demonstrates this point in detail after revealing the shortcomings of descriptive and prescriptive IR approaches to security. The superiority of Hegel’s conceptualisation of subjectivity and knowledge concerning interstate relations and security becomes clear after avoiding the separation of the subject from the object of theory.

\(^{87}\) Beiser, *Hegel*, 22-25

\(^{88}\) Beiser, *Hegel*, 29-31
CHAPTER 1: Hegel’s Contribution On Interstate Relations, War and Security via the Exercise of Immanent Critique

Overview

The previous chapter elucidated how immanent critique avoids the separation of the subject from the object of knowledge thanks to Hegel’s dialectical method (determinate negation) and his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). Hegel’s method of immanent critique promotes an alternative understanding of subjectivity and knowledge which overcomes the limits of descriptive and prescriptive approaches. Let us recall that immanent critique avoids the examination of reality with arbitrary or transcendental means, avoiding the shortcomings of descriptive empirical approaches and the flaws of normative prescriptive theories. Therefore, this chapter after applying the insights of Hegel’s method of immanent critique on a diversity of IR approaches to security, illustrates that these approaches promote a misleading account of reality and knowledge because they rest on a flawed notion of subjectivity which stems from the separation of the subject from the object of study.

The current chapter is divided in two parts. The first part focuses on the Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) which serves as the theoretical premise of immanent critique. Immanent critique provides an enriched understanding of reality and knowledge, after Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) it taken into consideration. According to Hegel, knowledge and subjectivity undergo an evolutionary process within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which rests on the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge. The Phenomenology of Spirit delineates this evolutionary process between the subject and the object of knowledge, which prevents us from treating Hegel as a descriptive or prescriptive philosopher who offers an empiricist or normative account of contemporary politics, interstate relations, war and security. In that respect it is argued that Hegelian thought can provide a greater contribution to IR theory after taking into consideration his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). Therefore, this part enriches Hutching’s argument, according to which the
Phenomenology of Spirit should be taken into consideration in order to comprehend Hegel’s political philosophy (the Philosophy of Right) and acquire an enriched account of subjectivity which complements an insightful critique of IR thought.

The second part further unveils the contribution of immanent critique to the IR field. After the previous part demonstrated why Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) needs to be incorporated to our analysis, this part discloses that a diversity of IR approaches to security which separate the subject from the object of study, form an incomplete account of subjectivity and knowledge. Specifically, after analyzing (neo)Realism, the Copenhagen School and the Critical Security perspectives, it becomes clear that these approaches separate the subject from the object of knowledge. This becomes clear after taking into consideration the stages of consciousness as portrayed in the Phenomenology of Spirit which describe how the evolutionary process of knowledge and subjectivity is shaped after delineating the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge.

I. Implications of Considering Hegel’s Notion of Spirit (Geist) and Prioritizing The Phenomenology of Spirit

The previous chapter explained that immanent critique rests on the consideration of Hegel’s dialectical method (determinate negation) and his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) whereas this part focuses on a detailed analysis of the Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist). According to Hegel the development of the subject’s self-consciousness and knowledge undergoes a process. This evolutionary process is founded on the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which permits a more accurate understanding of reality beyond transcendental or arbitrary means. As the following paragraphs illustrate, approaching reality and knowledge via transcendental or arbitrary means is misleading and rest on a flawed account of subjectivity which detaches the subject from the object of knowledge. According to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the evolution of the subject’s consciousness and knowledge depends on the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge. Therefore, once the
Phenomenology of Spirit is taken into consideration, one is capable of perceiving Hegel’s enriched understanding of subjectivity and knowledge which avoids the separation of the subject from the object of study, verifying the merits of immanent critique.

On Hegel’s Spirit (Geist) and the Phenomenology of Spirit

Hegel’s ideas should be taken into consideration within the philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) he is trying to develop. The Phenomenology of Spirit portrays the evolution of the subject’s consciousness and knowledge within the realm of Spirit (Geist). As Hutchings has already noted, the Phenomenology of Spirit should be treated as the point of departure in order to comprehend the Philosophy of Right. After prioritizing the reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the notion of Spirit (Geist), it becomes clear that Hegel’s objective is neither descriptive nor prescriptive.¹ As Hegel himself contends, in the preface of the Philosophy of Right, his study does not contain the science of the state but is an endeavour to apprehend the state as something inherently rational within the realm of Spirit (Geist). Thus, the instruction of the Philosophy of Right does not consist of teaching what the state ought to be but how the state is to be understood.²

From this perspective, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ceases to appear as a study on inter-state relations, war and the limits of international institutions and law. Instead, it is an inquiry into how the subject’s self-consciousness emerges within the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which is formed in the State, within the realm of Spirit. The Phenomenology of Spirit makes clear that rationality and self-consciousness are not something a person starts with, but something she comes to. This means two things: First, beyond the hierarchy of the forms of life there is a hierarchy of the modes of thought. As a person’s rational consciousness of herself grows, her mode of expression of this self-consciousness evolves. Also, the fact that rationality and self-consciousness are something that a person

² Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 10-11
achieves rather than starts with, means that she has a history.\(^3\) However, history is perceived here within the realm of Spirit (\emph{Geist}) as a teleological process that serves the evolution of the subject’s knowledge and consciousness towards seizing freedom. In that sense, Hegel avoids using history as an infinite socio-historical process that merely assists the subject to improve her cognitive capabilities, since that would promote a relativistic account of history and subjectivity.

The \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} involves a description of how the forms of consciousness evolve historically, serving as an instructive process within the realm of Spirit (\emph{Geist}). In that work, Hegel analyses the development of all forms of consciousness (Consciousness - Self-Consciousness - Unhappy Consciousness) which describe the evolution of subjectivity and of obtaining knowledge within the realm of Spirit (\emph{Geist}). According to Hegel consciousness evolves, one form succeeds the other. One starts with a simple form of consciousness that takes itself to be genuine knowledge. This simple form of consciousness will however prove itself to be something less than genuine knowledge and so will develop into another form of conscience and the process will continue until we reach true knowledge. The succession of one form of consciousness by another reveals a teleological process towards the subject’s seizure of self-consciousness and freedom.\(^4\) Again it is recalled that it is important to treat these forms in a cohesive manner, stressing the evolution of man’s consciousness rather than separate them and focus on a specific form, isolating it from the others just as certain scholars do with the lord-bondsman dialectic.

The next section analyses Hegel’s forms of consciousness as found in the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}. The First one - ‘Consciousness’ - includes the moments of ‘Sense Certainty’, ‘Perception’ and ‘Understanding’. The Second one, - Self-Consciousness - includes the moments of ‘Lord-Bondsman dialectic’, ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’ while the third one - Unhappy Consciousness - ultimately leads to ‘Reason’ and the revelation of Spirit (\emph{Geist}).


Hegel’s ‘Consciousness’ is divided into the moments of ‘Sense Certainty’, ‘Perception’, ‘Understanding’. In ‘Consciousness’, Hegel examines the subject-object relation and challenges the self-determining understanding of the subject. In that respect, Hegel argues how all possible models of experience, imagined from the point of view of the experiencer are neither accurate nor coherent. Hegel’s Phenomenology involves a process of imagining all possible models of experience. The moments of ‘Sense Certainty’, ‘Perception’, and ‘Understanding’ illustrate that when experience is imagined from the point of view of the experiencer as a self-determining subject, is neither coherent nor possible and leads to a mis-orientating account of knowledge. 5

Sense Certainty

Sense certainty makes no attempt to order or classify information. It has a claim to be a genuine knowledge for it is directly aware of ‘this’ without imposing on it the distorting filters of a conceptual scheme involving space, time or other categories. However, what is the ‘this’ Hegel wonders? If we take the ‘this’ in the twofold shape of its being as ‘Now’ and ‘Here’, the dialectic it has in it, will receive a form as intelligible as the ‘this’ itself is. 6

To the question ‘what is now’, the answer eg is ‘Now is night’. This self-preserving ‘Now’ is not immediate but mediated. This as well as that - such a thing we call a universal. So it is in fact the universal that is the true (content) of sense certainty. The universal is the true content of sense certainty and language expresses this true content alone, it is just not possible for us to ever to say or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean. Again therefore the ‘this’ shows itself to be a mediated universality. 7 Now is in truth a plurality of ‘Now’s’ taken altogether and the pointing out this, the experience of learning that Now is a universal. Here is similarly a plurality of Heres. It is clear that the dialectic of

sense certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of its experience and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this history.\(^8\)

As Taylor comments, if being aware of something is being able to say something about it, then it involves grasping the objects before us through aspects they have in common or have in common with other things, rather than in their own particularity. It is this impossibility of bare knowledge of the particular that Hegel devotes most attention to in this chapter. Hegel’s argument for the necessary mediation of knowledge through a concept or universal has basically two stages: In the first, he imagines the protagonist of the sensible certainty answering the request to say by pure demonstratives (this-here-now). These must be inadequate expressions of what I am aware of. Such expressions could apply indifferently to many different contents and hence shows that there can be no immediate knowledge of the particular-knowledge unmediated by general or universal terms.\(^9\)

In brief, Sense-certainty, collapses through its own incoherence. We were led to appreciate the impossibility of knowledge of pure particulars and thus the necessity of bringing particular sense-experiences under some form of conceptual scheme, a scheme that classifies what we experience under a universal aspect.

**Perception**

In the previous section the main argument was that we can grasp these particular objects of sense certainty by ‘pointing’. But the experience of pointing is that in trying to grasp one thing we show the fleeting, un-seizable nature of the particular and we can recover it and hold it before our gaze only by subsuming it under a universal. However, as Hegel notes, two moments occur: one being the very same movement of pointing out or the act of perceiving, while the other being the object perceived. And the object is the apprehended togetherness of the moments.\(^10\)

As Hegel mentions, at first, I become aware of the object as a particular, as a One. If in the course of perceiving it, something turns up which contradicts

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\(^8\) Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 64


\(^10\) Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 67-68
it, this is to be recognized as a reflection of mine. In other words, instead of pointing out as ‘this’ with the immediate certainty of sensation, this moment of knowledge sees a common feature among many ‘this’ and begins to take them as many appearances of the same thing, undermining the particular features or the ‘oneness’ of this object while attributing to it a universal dimension. But this universal treatment of the object since it originates from us, it is essentially conditioned by us and hence the object ceases to be a self-identical universality at all.

**Understanding or Intellect**

Before we proceed to ‘Understanding’ or ‘Intellect’ (as it is referred in the *Philosophy of Mind*) an attempt will take place to summarize in simpler terms what has been discussed so far in Stace’s words.

In sense-certainty the object has taken an independent position. It is this independence of the object which first gets recognition. It is not yet realized that the object is in its truth only a projection of myself. It is at first seen as a completely external, independent and alien from the subject. Thus, the object is isolated and unrelated to anything. For example, I perceive ‘this’ chair. But I perceive it as a chair, as a member of a class of things designated as chairs. The object purports to be ‘this’. An absolutely unrelated, unmediated sense-unit. But what is ‘this’? This is invested with a universal character, the very opposite of what it is supposed to have. So sense certainty refutes itself and breaks down. What the senses alone can apprehend is the object elevated with universality.

In ‘Perception’ the subject apprehends the chair, the table, the man, as members of the various classes of objects to which they belong. It apprehends them in class nature, their universal nature. The contradiction which it develops, is that between the individual and the universal. But at the same time its only

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11 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 72-76
13 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 72-76
truth and meaning have already been shown, to consist in the fact that it is not an individual but a universal.\textsuperscript{15} The ‘truth’, can only be pure universality with the element of singleness dropped out altogether. Hence, consciousness now takes pure universality for its object which ceases to be an individual thing, and becomes a pure universal.\textsuperscript{16}

In the moment of ‘Intellect’, the subject evolves beyond ‘Perception’ as the mind necessarily passes to pure universals, which are not perceived as nonsensuous universals. For instance, we can not see, or touch or sensuously perceive for example law, gravity etc. These are pure universals. When the mind takes for its object such pure universals it has become intellect, it seizes the process of Understanding. Thus, the intellect draws a distinction between reality and appearance (sensuous objects). It regards the universal as reality. However it is still aware of the single individuals of sense as appearance.\textsuperscript{17}

To sum up, in ‘Consciousness’, Hegel wishes to stress the limits posed to knowledge after treating the subject as a self ascribed authority. The forms of ‘Sense Certainty’, ‘Understanding’ and ‘Intellect’ underscore the problematic account of knowledge which stems from the (self-determining) subject – object relation. According to Hegel, in ‘sense certainty’ the subject treats the object as a pure particular without imposing on it the distorting filters of a conceptual scheme such as space, time or other categories. Here, the subject makes no attempt to order or classify information. Yet, this form of consciousness fails to provide a reliable account of knowledge as the subject is led to appreciate the impossibility of knowledge after treating the object as pure particular. Eventually the subject is led to the necessity of bringing particular sense-experiences under some form of conceptual scheme that classifies what the subject experiences under a broader or universal category which dismisses the object’s particularity.\textsuperscript{18}

However, the treatment of the object in its particularity, as completely independent and alien from the subject, did not add to the subject’s knowledge according to Hegel. Thus, ‘sense certainty’ was succeeded by other forms of consciousness - namely ‘understanding’ and ‘intellect’ - in the subject’s attempt

\textsuperscript{15} Stace, \textit{The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition}, 345
\textsuperscript{16} Stace, \textit{The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition}, 345
\textsuperscript{17} Stace, \textit{The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition}, 348-349
\textsuperscript{18} Stace, \textit{The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition}, 348-349
to overcome the flaws of ‘sense-certainty’. The subject ended up establishing specific categories in order to classify the object and apprehend it. Once the object was placed under specific categories or classes via the subject’s ‘intellect’, the element of its particularity is dropped out altogether and assumed a universal dimension via its categorisation and classification.\textsuperscript{19} However, this moment of consciousness, which Hegel calls ‘Understanding’, appeared also to be incomplete too as the acquired knowledge of the object, consisted entirely in the universal and dismissed the object’s particular dimension.

Yet, the moment of ‘intellect’ unveils the tension which exists between appearance and reality within the object’s inner truth as the object bears the antithesis between the universal (nourished by the categories of the subject’s mind) and the particular (nourished by the world of the senses).\textsuperscript{20} Hence, it becomes clear that ‘Consciousness’ nurtures an incomplete account of knowledge due to the self-determining nature of the subject.

**On Self-Consciousness: ‘The Desiring Subject’, ‘The Lord and Bondsman Dialectic’, ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’**

After Hegel demonstrating that knowledge which stems from the self-determining subject and based on the subject-object interaction is incomplete, he proceeds to *Phenomenology’s* chapter four, entitled ‘Self-Consciousness’. This form of consciousness, succeeds the previous one marking the transition from Hegel’s subject-object relation to the subject-subject relation.

In ‘sense-certainty’, ‘understanding’ and ‘intellect’ the subject was projected as a motionless tautology of ‘I = I’. However, Hegel in the important paragraphs 167 and 175, unveils the double nature of self-consciousness which is influenced by the object’s reception. Specifically, the consciousness of an object, as this-such (particular) and the non-positional consciousness awareness of my taking it to be this-such (object under a universal category) triggers a tension to self-consciousness which needs to be overcome. While describing this apparent

\textsuperscript{19} Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition*, 341-343

\textsuperscript{20} Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition*, 350
antithesis of self-consciousness, Hegel introduces us to the treatment of self-consciousness as desire.\textsuperscript{21}

Hegel, notes that the subject is aware of a distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’. The first addresses to the diversity stemming from the particularity of the independent theoretical object as such (Particularity). The second addresses the singularity of the real, which is formed by the subject that attempts to develop a prescriptive theory (Universal) and which neglects the objects’ particular characteristics as the subject aspires to control them after categorising them and classifying them. However, a self-conscious subject is aware that the distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ is illusory, as the singularity of reality, when emptied of all particular content (of theoretical objects) is a mere blank, whereas the pluralism of appearance when separated from the reality is a blind and unintelligible medley. Thus, for Hegel the conditions for the subject’s self-consciousness includes a double antithetical nature: i) the consciousness of a theoretical object as such, in itself; and ii) the theorist’s awareness of her/his thinking it to be as such. This is why for Hegel self-consciousness is desire. For the subject in order to acquire its self-certainty or prescriptive role needs to undermine the object’s independence upon which the subject is dependent. Although the subject acknowledges the illusory separation between ‘appearance’ (Particularity) and ‘reality’ (Universality) and tries to reject it; the subject re-introduces it in every attempt to become prescriptive and acquire self-certainty by undermining the independence of the object upon which it is depended on.\textsuperscript{22}

The ‘subject of Desire’ gives rise to three additional problematic forms of self-consciousness which spawn an flawed perception of knowledge and subjectivity. These forms are: i) the lord-bondsman dialectic; ii) stoicism; and iii) scepticism.

\textsuperscript{21}Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, 104-108
\textsuperscript{22}Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, 109
Lord and Bondsman Dialectic

After analyzing the ‘desiring subject’, Hegel proceeds to the ‘lord-bondsman dialectic’ describing the implications of the subject-subject relation while both attempt to seize their self-consciousness. For Hegel each subject needs the other to establish her own awareness of herself, requiring acknowledgement or recognition. The demand for recognition is mutual however not equal, taking the form of the ‘Lord and Bondsman’.

According to Hegel, self-consciousness exists in and for it-self when and by the fact that it so exists for another. At first is exhibited the side of the inequality of the two, as opposed to one another. One is being only recognized while the other is only recognizing. Each has indeed certainty of its own self, but not of the other. Hence, as individual self-certainties, the only truth they have is their own being-for-self. Therefore, they must engage in a struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth both in the case of the other and in their own case. The demand for recognition is mutual however not equal, taking the form of the ‘Lord and Bondsman’. Since to begin with they are unequal and opposed, their reflection into a unity has not yet been achieved, they exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness (Lord) whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness (Bondsman) whose essential nature is simply to live and be for another. In both of these moments the Lord achieves his recognition through another self-consciousness. However, according to Hegel, this form of self-consciousness is problematic too as the outcome is a recognition which is one-sided and unequal. The Lord acquires a recognition from a subject he does not acknowledge as equal and independent.23

However, the outcome is a recognition which is one-sided and unequal. What now really confronts the lord is not an independent consciousness but a dependent one. On the other hand, the bondsman through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence and become a ‘stoic’. Through work the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is. While fashioning the thing he produces, he become aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he

23 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 111-115
himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. It is precisely via work, wherein the bondsman nourishes an alienated existence that allows her to acquires a mind of her own, re-discovering herself by herself after detaching from natural existence, seizing ultimately ‘Stoicism’.24

Stoicism

Although ‘stoicism’ attempts to bridge the gap between the ‘lord’ and ‘bondsman’, yet this form of consciousness is again problematic. According to Hegel, the repressed slave who has come to full self-awareness through work, finds a type of recognition and freedom via the withdrawal from the external world, retreating into her own self consciousness. However, once one chooses to remain simply in touch with oneself, ultimately, her thought is cut off from the real world, thus the subject remains solely in communion with herself.25 This type of freedom is called ‘stoicism’ where the subject appears to be indifferent to natural existence.

The freedom of stoicism, nourishes away of thinking which has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking content and the fullness of life. Hence, the stoic freedom is only the notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself.26 According to Hegel, a Stoic is perplexed when she is asked for what is ‘the criterion of truth as such’ is or in other words which is the content of thought itself. Hegel notes that for a stoic:

[…] The true and the good shall consist in reasonableness but this self identity of thought is again only the pure form in which nothing is determined. ’ The True and Good, wisdom and virtue, are general terms beyond which stoicism can not get and since in fact they can not produce expansion of the content, they soon become tedious.27

Therefore for Hegel, ‘Stoicism’ represents an empty formalism and content-less thought as it is detached from the real world, contributing to a problematic form of consciousness.28

24 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 116-119
25 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 119-120
26 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 121
27 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 122
28 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 121
Scepticism

Finally, the moment of ‘scepticism’ succeeds stoicism as well as the subject’s notion of seeking freedom and recognition detached from the real world.

The skeptic self-consciousness challenges the stoic indifference towards the real world as well as the stoic subject’s unchanging and genuine certainty of itself. On the contrary sceptic self-consciousness is itself an absolute dialectical unrest. Due to this unrest, sceptic consciousness instead of being self-identical it is transformed into a confused medley, the dizziness of a perpetually self-engendered disorder. Sceptic consciousness is aware of this as it maintains and creates this restless confusion. This consciousness rambles back and forth from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness, to the other extreme of the contingent consciousness. At one time it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising above all the contingency of existence and at the other admits to a relapse into occupying itself with what is unessential.29 As Hegel notes in paragraph 206:

In skepticism, consciousness truly experiences itself as internally contradictory. From this experience emerges a new form of consciousness which brings together the two thoughts which Scepticism holds apart [...] this new form is therefore, one which knows that it is the dual consciousness of itself, as self liberating, unchangeable as well as self-bewildering, changeable and self-perverting, growing the awareness of this self-contradictory nature of itself [...] In Scepticism this freedom becomes a reality, negates the other side of determinate existence, but really duplicates itself and now knows itself to be a duality. Unhappy consciousness of the self as a dual nature, is a merely contradictory being.30

In plain terms, scepticism emerges when the subject although it aspires to be independent of the material world, at the same time it recognizes that it is part of the material world as her physical desires, pains and pleasures are real and inescapable. Thus, scepticism nourishes subject that fails to acquire self-consciousness too as since is self-alienated and divided against itself.31

Hegel’s analysis makes clear that all previous forms of consciousness nurture an incomplete account of knowledge, stressing how the self-conscious

29 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 124-125
30 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 126
31 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 123-126
and free subject is not something preexisting or *a-priori*. The subject’s self-consciousness which ultimately leads to freedom, is gradually seized after an evolutionary process within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*) which is formed after the succession of the incomplete moments of the ‘Lord and Bondsman dialectic’, ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’.

**Implications of Prioritizing Hegel’s Notion of Spirit (*Geist*) and the Phenomenology of Spirit on the Conceptualization of Subjectivity and Knowledge**

Therefore, once the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is taken into consideration, one is capable of perceiving Hegel’s enriched understanding of subjectivity and knowledge which avoids the separation of the subject from the object of study, verifying the merits of immanent critique. The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, allows us to understand that Hegel’s point of departure was an enquiry of (self-)consciousness, subjectivity and obtaining knowledge. Before Hegel, most philosophers nourished the separation of: the subject from the object of theory; the universal from the particular; and reason from senses, rendering knowledge and (self-)consciousness problematic. In particular, Hegel addressed to Kant’s distinction between phenomena and the things-in-themselves. Hegel saw this distinction as part of the problem since the things-in-themselves obstructed knowledge as they were in principle unknowable. Hegel was against of this abstract separation between man - nature, senses - reason, body-mind. In brief, according to Hegel this opposition which echoes the ‘stoic’ form of consciousness can be overcome only after seeing the world as the necessary expression of the subject’s thought and rational necessity.³² As the following part elaborates, Hegel accommodates rationalism with empiricism after taking into consideration the universal and the particular dimension within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*). As Beiser observes, for Hegel the universals exist only in particular things. The fundamental claim behind this conception is that any universal concept or value such as reason or ethics are embodied in particular

empirical contexts. The universal effects of these values is realized only in
tempirical terms and through the activity of particular individuals.33

According to Hegel, the flaws of Kant’s thought are associated to the
individualist notion of self-determining subjectivity which separates the subject
from the object of knowledge while promoting an abstract understanding of
freedom as Hegel observes in paragraph 135 found in the Philosophy of Right.34
Kant argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than
senses or whims, in accordance to a sense of duty he terms as categorical
imperative.35 However, that content of this sense of duty is an empty formalism,
argues Hegel.36 He instead provides a concrete content to Kant’s seemingly
abstract requirement of freedom via what he defines as ethical life (Sittlichkeit).
Ethical life is the customary morality which emerges in the community and
develops in the state. This bridges the gap between senses-reason, reality-world
of ideas and provides a communitarian dimension to Kant’s self-determining
subject.37

The actualization of Hegelian freedom in the state via ethical life
(Sittlichkeit), unveils the limits of the Kantian sense of duty and morality upon
which certain universalist or cosmopolitan approaches are founded. Hegel makes
clear that a sense of duty and moral values cannot be based on abstract universal
principles, empty of content, while illustrating the perils such approaches entail
after he refers to the emergence of terror during the French revolution.38
Therefore, when Hegel alludes to the key role of war and conflict-prone state
relations; his point is not to stress in a descriptive manner the Hobbesian state of
nature of inter-state affairs and prescribe a non-pacifist policy conduct in a realist
vein. Instead the instability of inter-state relations which stems from the uneasy
process of recognition, appears necessary since it contributes to the formation of
the state’s independent and sovereign status and allows the development of an

33 Frederick Beiser, Hegel, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 22-25
34 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , 89-90
35 Kant affirms the existence of an absolute moral law via the categorical imperative. The
application of the categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a
sense of duty which is emancipating, instead of the individual desires which prohibit the subject’s
self-control and determination.
36 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , 89-90
37 Timothy C Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 135-140
38 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , 157
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which contributes to the formation of the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom. Unlike Kant, for Hegel self-consciousness and freedom can only emerge in the empirical field of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which is developed only within the limits of a sovereign state that celebrates a particular identity after differentiating itself culturally from the rest.\textsuperscript{39} War sometimes serves as the unfortunate medium which reinforces the state’s particular cultural awareness and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) after toning the citizens’ communitarian perspective. War, argues Hegel, encourages citizens to look beyond their private interests while reconciling both between themselves and their state, boosting further their self-consciousness and freedom.\textsuperscript{40}

To sum up, after treating the Phenomenology of Spirit as the point of departure in order to comprehend Hegel’s political philosophy (The Philosophy of Right) it becomes clear that Hegel:

a) puts forward a theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive after rejecting abstract \textit{a priori} or normative claims. Instead Hegel develops an enriched understanding of subjectivity which rests on the evolution of the forms of consciousness within the realm of Spirit, avoiding the separation of the subject from the object of knowledge. The interplay between the subject and the object of theory permits the analysis of reality without arbitrary or transcendental means, verifying the contribution of immanent critique.

b) develops an (immanent) understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and freedom which is not based on transcendental premises after elucidating that the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom is formed within the limits of the sovereign state. More importantly, the Hegelian insights of the first point (a), serve as an invaluable intellectual tool which unveil the theoretical shortcomings of certain IR approaches to security, as the next part elaborates.

Furthermore, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit allows us to follow the evolution of the forms of consciousness within the realm of Spirit (Geist). Therefore, the next part contends that Hegel’s analysis of subjectivity does not restrict itself to the ‘Lord and Bondsman dialectic’ but incorporates too the moments of ‘Stoicism’, ‘Scepticism’ and ‘Unhappy Consciousness’, since they all reflect incomplete moments of self-consciousness.

\textsuperscript{39} Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 22-26

\textsuperscript{40} Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 209-210
Besides the ‘Lord and Bondsman dialectic’, the moments of ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’ are of special interest here as they breach one important principle of immanent critique. Specifically, they separate the subject from the object of knowledge and nourish a flawed account of subjectivity according to which the self-determining or relativistic treatment of subjectivity promotes the examination of reality with transcendental or arbitrary means. In the next part, it will be argued how this flawed account of subjectivity is reflected on certain IR approaches to security. In particular the shortcomings of the Lord-Bondsman dialectic which promotes an incomplete account of subjectivity, appear on the Copenhagen School’s self-determining subject, which gives rise to a prescriptive account of security.

Stoicism refers to an autonomous subject that cut off from the empirical environment. This subject is associated with mere thinking for itself, which relies on abstract self-imposed empty principles, echoing Kant’s transcendental subject. This flawed account of subjectivity is encountered in the Kantian perspectives of Critical Security approaches.

Scepticism refers to a subject that is contingent and divided against itself. This is a form of self-alienated and relativistic subjectivity which does not allow the subject to acquire self-consciousness. The subject aspires to be independent of the material world while at the same time it recognizes that it is part of this material world. The Foucaultian inspired Critical Security approaches promote such a flawed account of subjectivity.

Thus, the aftermath of the ‘Lord-Bondman dialectic’, is not the solution but a part of the problem since Scepticism and Stoicism are responsible too for the formation of an incomplete form of consciousness. Without incorporating the notion of Spirit (Geist) our understanding of subjectivity is incomplete since the dualism which separates; the universal from the particular, the subject from the object, reason from senses, rationalism from historicism, remains.
II. The Contribution of *Phenomenology of Spirit* to a Critique of Certain IR Approaches to Security

The previous part, after focusing on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, stressed that Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit rejects abstract *a priori* normative claims. Moreover it was noted that Hegel is neither putting forward a prescriptive theory of interstate relations nor a normative account of universal values and norms. The evolution of the subject’s forms of consciousness, as presented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is tied with the concept of Spirit (*Geist*) and challenges the treatment of the subject as a self-dependent theorist who puts forward normative truths. Hegel rejects such normative truths in an attempt to indicate a dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object. As Hutchings notes, for such relations to be dynamic the subject as theorist should not have a pre-determined or fixed point of view, treating the object of study as passive. Such a relation between the subject and the object of knowledge which rests on the subject’s abstract normative claims, provides a fixed, descriptive account of theory which rests on an abstract (universalistic) premise, lacking a particular content. Thus, the object of study should not be treated as passive. In Hutchings’ words, the theorists must recognize themselves as patients and participants in the processes they seek to understand and judge.\(^4\)

This part demonstrates the contribution of immanent critique after scrutinizing a diversity of IR security approaches. It is argued that these approaches nourish a misleading account of reality and knowledge after employing arbitrary or transcendental analytical tools. Thus, it is noted that the separation of the subject from object of knowledge is responsible for the shortcomings of descriptive and prescriptive approaches which verifies the insights of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the contribution of immanent critique.

Although the (neo)realist, the Copenhagen School and the Critical security approaches have been criticized before, a Hegelian critique inspired by the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, allows us to go one step further and demonstrate

that these security approaches convey a problematic account of knowledge due to their flawed: a) understanding of subjectivity; and b) treatment of the subject-object of theory relation.

Therefore, after considering the content of the Phenomenology of Spirit coherently via the notion of Spirit (Geist), it will be stressed, how an incomplete perception of subjectivity, leads to an inaccurate account of consciousness and knowledge. The IR security approaches that will be scrutinized belong in the (neo)realist tradition, the Copenhagen and the Critical school of thought. Although it is acknowledged that many scholars have written extensively on each school, here emphasis is drawn on Buzan’s, Weaver’s and Jaap de Wilde’s approach regarding the Copenhagen School. Regarding the Critical school, Ken Booth’s, Michael Dillon’s and Andrew Neal’s approaches are taken into consideration. The objective is evaluate these IR approaches to security on the basis of their understanding of subjectivity in order to stress, from a Hegelian perspective, that their account of knowledge and security is problematic. Below, a parallel is drawn between the succession of Hegel’s forms of consciousness and the emergence of diverse security approaches.

This theoretical diversity among security theories echoes the succession of the forms of consciousness. According to the Phenomenology of Spirit, these forms of consciousness progressed after each new form challenged the previous one in terms of the relation between the subject and object of study. Similarly, it is argued that the understanding of security underwent similar changes as one theory attempted to rectify the other on the basis of the relation between the subject/theorist - object of theory relation. Therefore, the contribution of the Phenomenology of Spirit lies on the fact that it allows us to see that these security approaches still remain incomplete and convey an inaccurate account of knowledge and reality due to a flawed understanding of subjectivity they nourish. This flawed account of subjectivity which rests on the separation of the subject from the object of knowledge while maintaining the separation of the universal from the particular dimension, verifies the contribution of immanent critique. Immanent critique stresses allows us to acknowledge that the aforementioned separations, provide an misleading account of subjectivity and reality.
How the (neo)Realist Security Approach Lapses into ‘Intellect’

In contrast to the method of immanent critique, the separation of the subject from the object of study triggers a misleading analysis of reality and knowledge, based on transcendental or arbitrary means. Such analysis, takes the form of a descriptive or a (normative) prescriptive approach which rests on a flawed account of subjectivity. Here, it will be argued that the (neo)realist school suffers from the scholar’s attempt to provide such a prescriptive account of knowledge. (Neo)realists rest on a transcendental understanding of scientific knowledge which yields a form of knowledge beyond time and history. This form of knowledge is dictated by the self-determining subject which treats external reality objectively and neglects Hegel’s distinction between ‘Appearance’ and ‘Reality’, echoing the mode of Intellect/Understanding. The (neo)realist approach to security entails the scholar’s calculating approach to politics, often in the form of a closed inter-state system and the prescription of non-pacifist policy conduct. Thus, after citing Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the insights offered by using his method of immanent critique become clear with respect to the (neo)realists, as their approaches is founded on a flawed understanding of subjectivity which delivers a misleading account of reality and knowledge.

According to Booth, the (neo)realist approach of security is characterised by two elements: a) emphasis on military threats; and b) status quo orientation after focusing on the antagonism among states that seek to strengthen themselves in a contending environment. Moreover, Smith added that certain realist approaches of security were paired with rational choice theory by assuming that the states are rational, self-interested and value maximizing agents.

Keith Krause and Michael Williams deepened their critique against (neo)realist security approaches via the addition of an epistemological dimension. For them, the history of security studies follows the model of a

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particular understanding of the growth of scientific knowledge which yields a form of knowledge beyond time and history. Neorealists such as Walt portray this view as the apogee in a linear process of scientific progress, creating an explicit epistemic hierarchy. However, as Krausse and Williams note, such claim to authority is justified by a commitment to a form of knowledge that is presented as self evident and authoritative but never fully articulated. More often than not, (neo)realist argumentation is supported through a series of fundamental claims which are presented as unproblematic facts.\textsuperscript{44}

(Neo)realist theory projects a positivist conception of states and their actions, and this rests on a self-determining understanding of subjectivity as the (neo)realist scholars assume that they treat the external reality to which they relate objectively. In a conception most commonly originating from Hobbes, the individual subject is treated as an autonomous rational actor, confronted by an environment filled with other similar actors. These actors pose for the (neo)realists as a source of insecurity, hence the classic security dilemma of (neo)realist theories.\textsuperscript{45} Hence (neo)realism entails not simply a claim about the nature of international relations but a claim to know: specifically a scientific claim to know objectively the reality of international relations. This belief in the appropriateness of the physical sciences as the model of knowledge and the desire to separate objective truth from subjective opinion is misleading. In (neo)realist theory the key to understanding the rational nature of reality is rationality itself. In epistemological terms this means that the discipline must treat phenomena under consideration as passive objects. The (neo)realist theory of IR puts forward the concept of rational self-interest as universal and unchallenged.\textsuperscript{46} Krause and Williams argue that unlike (neo)realist thought, we must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental actors and scientific methods.\textsuperscript{47}

Already, Krause, Williams and Booth have already underscored that (neo)realism’s methodology entails flaws which rests on abstract transcendental

\textsuperscript{44} Keith Krause & Michael Williams (eds), \textit{Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases}, (London: Routledge, 1997), 37-38
\textsuperscript{45} Krause & Williams (eds), \textit{Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases}, 39-40
\textsuperscript{46} Krause & Williams (eds), \textit{Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases}, 42-44
\textsuperscript{47} Krause & Williams (eds), \textit{Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases}, 50
key premises such as the rational self-interest or materialistic utilitarian benefits, which fail to attribute a proper amount of consideration to particular historical conditions and practices. The (neo)realist declaration that the state is the subject of security, whereas anarchy the eternal condition of IR, is neither premised on ‘objective’ facts nor on empirical premises but is grounded in a set of claims which stem from the stand point of the self-determining subject. Hegelian insights helps us acknowledge that the shortcomings of (neo)realism are grounded in; a) The understanding of human subjectivity as self-determined; and b) The nature of the theorist – object of study relation, according to which the self-determining subject bares the scientific claim to know the ‘objective’ reality of international relations, treating phenomena as passive objects. Therefore, from a Hegelian perspective (neo)realist thought celebrates a problematic account of knowledge as (neo)realist scholars rely on subject-object relation that echoes Hegel’s ‘Intellect’ which rests on a incomplete form of consciousness.

According to Hegel, ‘Intellect’ is the processes in which the subject as theorist apprehends the object from a perspective of an abstract category (universal) that stems from the self-determined subject’s flawed consciousness, which denies the object’s particularity and independent nature. As Hegel observes, ‘Intellect’ is a mere moment in the evolution of the subject’s self consciousness. Therefore, the relation between theorist and the object of theory undergoes consideration and revision in order to form a more complete account of knowledge which overcomes the limits of the previous form, just as Krause and Williams did with (neorealism). The re-consideration of the subject-object relation brings to light Hegel’s ‘subject of desire’ and the distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’. ‘Reality’ addresses to the acknowledgment of the theoretical object’s particular and independent characteristics (eg the state-in-itself); whereas the ‘appearance’ to the theorist’s determination of the theoretical object in an attempt to develop a prescriptive theory.

Via the ‘Subject of Desire’ which takes into consideration ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’, the dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object becomes explicit with all the nuances this relation entails. For such relation to be dynamic, the subject as theorist can not be pre-determined or fixed after treating

48 Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition, 345
the object of study as passive and providing a prescriptive account of theory. In more concrete terms this distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ is highlighted when Krause and Williams argue that unlike (neo)realist thought, we must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security, problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental actors and scientific methods. Therefore it is precisely the acknowledgement of the dynamic relation between the subject and object via the ‘Subject of Desire’ which renders the subject of ‘intellect’ responsible for a nurturing a flawed account of knowledge.

It needs to be acknowledged that the mode of ‘intellect’ cannot be overcome as long as the subject is taken to be self-determining. As Hegel argued, that the limits of ‘intellect’ generated alternative modes of consciousness in relation to knowledge; similarly alternative approaches of security emerged in an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of (neo)realist approaches. Krause, Williams and Booth correctly noted that the (neo)realist scholar implements an artificial generalisation upon the object of study - which echoes Hegel’s ‘intellect’ - when the agents or states are treated as rational undifferentiated units that interact in an anarchic self-help system. After acknowledging the limits of the (neo)realist approach, the alternative security approaches which emerged are still problematic from an Hegelian perspective. Their problems lie on the ‘Subject of Desire’’s distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ which reflects the nuances of the theorist - object of theory relation. This ambiguous relation offsets a diverse interpretation of both the subject and object, which triggers again a problematic account of knowledge due to the incomplete forms of consciousness which emerge.

Accordingly, below will be indicated how the scholar’s attempts to overcome the intellectual flaws of (neo)realist security approaches, via the Copenhagen School and the Critical Security Studies approach, lapse into the Hegelian modes of Lord-Bondsman dialectic, Stoicism and Scepticism.

**How The Copenhagen School Lapses into the Lord-Bondsman Dialectic**

The ‘Copenhagen School’ attempts to attribute a more contingent dimension to the theoretical object of security, toning down the subject’s
influence on the object of study. Security is treated as a speech act, which casts the issue of an existential threat, calling for extraordinary measures. A speech act does not relate to the theorist’s attempt to trace a number of threats and raise the issue of security; but instead constructs a shared understanding of what is to be considered a threat.\(^4^9\) However, the understanding of security as a speech act, begs the following questions: Who decides regarding this speech act? Who can perform or speak on security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions and with what effects?

These questions allude to the significance of immanent critique according to which the separation of the subject from the object of study forms a misleading account of reality and knowledge based on transcendental or arbitrary means. The following paragraphs will explain that according to the Copenhagen school, the decision on security (object of study) in a state of emergency is ultimately conditioned by a transcendental notion of subjectivity. Such a transcendental and self-determining understanding of subjectivity ignores the particular conditions which have an impact on security and portrays reality misleadingly.

Specifically, according to the Copenhagen school, security means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors such as Military, Environment, Economy, Society and Politics.\(^5^0\) The Copenhagen School argues that threat perception and security cannot be determined by the subject itself or by fixed points of analysis. The exact definition of threat and security are constituted by an intersubjective establishment of an existential threat to a referent object which does not by itself create threats. In other words, it is not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat. Therefore, a successful approach to security, according to the Copenhagen School, necessitates the following three components: existential threats, emergency action and the effects on interknit relations by breaking free of rules.\(^5^1\)

However, when it comes to concrete analysis, the Copenhagen School contends that it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in


\(^{5^0}\) Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 27

\(^{5^1}\) Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 24-25
articulating security. Thus, ‘securitisation’, emphasizes on how threats are determined, on what issues, for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and under which conditions. The Copenhagen School, relies heavily on J L Austin’s theory of speech acts.52 The proponents of this school contend that the conditions for a successful speech act fall under two categories: 1) Internal or linguistic grammatical, by following the rules of the act (or as Austin argues the accepted conventional procedures must exist and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and, 2) External contextual and social, by holding a position from which the act can be made (the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked).53

Yet, Copenhagen school scholars admit that their approach links itself more closely to the existing actors, trying to understand their modus operandi and assume that the future management of security will have to include the handling these actors. Although their philosophical position appears in some sense more constructivist in holding security to always be a political construction in an effort to understand the modus operand they end up attributing to certain actors a determining role in formulating the security assumptions.54

Williams has already argued how the Copenhagen School’s understanding of security as an exceptional and indeterminate phenomenon reminds us of Carl Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy division which attributes a protagonist role to the sovereign subject which ends up determining the theoretical object. However, Hegel’s insights allow us to understand how a) this flawed account of subjectivity; and, b) the theorist – object of theory relation it nourishes, is responsible for triggering an inaccurate account of knowledge.

As Williams notes the Copenhagen School’s perception of security relies on the issue of an existential threat which calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics. The component of successful ‘securitization’ (existential threats, emergency action by an agent and the effects on interknit relations by breaking free of rules) echoes Schmitt’s

53 Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 32
54 Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 35
views, argues Williams.\textsuperscript{55} Schmitt’s concept of the political is defined by the friend-enemy relationship, which underscores the sovereign subject’s decision during the emergent states’ of exception. For Schmitt, sovereignty is defined by the act of \textit{decision} and the capacity to definitely decide on contested legal or normative disputes within the state. Deciding when a threat to the political order has reached a point where it constitutes an ‘emergency’, requires the suspension of normal rules and procedures so that the political order itself can be preserved. The sovereign subject decides whether there is extreme emergency and what is to be done to eliminate it.\textsuperscript{56} Although the sovereign stands outside the normally valid legal system, she nevertheless belongs to it. For Schmitt, all rule-bound orders depend ultimately upon a sovereign subject’s decision that itself stands outside of the given structure of rules.\textsuperscript{57}

The Copenhagen School’s formulation of ‘securitisation’ as an exceptional and indeterminate phenomenon, presented, security with the logic of an existential threat and extreme necessity. This mirrors the intense condition of existential division of friendship and enmity which constitutes Schmitt’s concept of the political. Thus, under the condition of existential threat, a Schmittian logic of friends and enemies is invoked while necessitating a sovereign subject’s decision-making.

The Copenhagen School’s argumentation entails a contradiction since although its philosophical position on security appears constructivist in holding security to be always a political construction beyond fixed points of analysis they admit that in their purposes they are closer to traditional security studies, declaring that in concrete analysis, it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating security. Therefore, although the Copenhagen School does not support that security is only about the state, nevertheless the state is acknowledged as a privileged actor and that the existential security issues and decision-making should be dealt by top leaders.

From a Hegelian perspective this contradiction, echoes the ambivalence of the the ‘Desiring Subject’. This ambivalence on the one hand stems from the

\textsuperscript{55}Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, 515
\textsuperscript{56}Carl Schmitt, \textit{The Concept of the Political} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 27-31
\textsuperscript{57}Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, 516-517
Copenhagen School scholars’ treatment of ‘securitisation’ as a practice beyond fixed agents allowing diversity of particular interpretations; while on the other admitting that some agents are more privileged to determine security and threats. Just as the ‘Subject of Desire’ attempts to treat the object of study as autonomous, but at the same time the subject revokes such treatment in order to secure its self-certainty and self-determination. In that respect, just as the ‘Subject of Desire’ conflates ‘reality’ (a theorist claim to know prescriptively) with ‘appearance (the autonomy of the theoretical object), similarly the Copenhagen school accommodates this separation and tries to overcome it via the concept of ‘securitisation’. However, although ‘securitisation’ entails the emergency action which allows for indetermination and breaking free from the ‘rules’ of the social; yet ‘securitisation’ ultimately grants decision-making to the sovereign subject acknowledging her as the protagonist of determining security.

As Williams added, under the condition of existential threat, a Schmittian logic of friends and enemies is invoked and with it a politics of exclusion. A successful ‘securitisation’ of identity is precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity and to oppose it to what it is not identified as security - the other- through a relationship of threat or enmity. The Copenhagen School’s scholars accommodation of ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ via ‘securitisation’, echoes a Schmittian driven understanding of security that lapses into Hegel’s Lord-Bondsman dialectic.

In the Lord-Bondsman dialectic each subject therefore encounters the other initially as an ‘object’, as a ‘thing’ to be integrated into the first’s plans and project’s. From the standpoint of these agents there is no way to reconcile these two subjective points of view into a third more objective point of view. Since the objective, impersonal point of view cannot be ‘discovered’, it must be itself ‘constructed’ out of social practice. Therefore, the subjects themselves construct a ‘social’ point of view on the basis of which they will be able to reconcile the various conflicting judgements, generated out of their personal points of view.58

However, no such universal objective point of view is available for these agents. The encounter between the two self-conscious agents is the attempt on the part of each to impose her own subjective point of view on the other and to

58 Pinkard, *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, 54-57
claim for her own subjective point of view the status of being ‘true’. The Lords’s point of view is thus dependent on the Bondsman’s having come to accept it as dominant. The Lord’s point of view has no epistemic priority over the Bondsman’s point of view but its dominance turns out to be a social fact. The Lord too has not established his own subjective point of view as the truth but managed to have the slave accept it as the truth. This unequal relation promotes an inaccurate account of knowledge.\(^{59}\)

Here the reference to Hegel’s Lord-Bondsman’s dialectic, serves as a medium to reveal the theoretical shortcomings of the Copenhagen School. The ‘Subject of Desire’ via the distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ illustrated the tension inherent in the Copenhagen School’s ‘securitisation’ approach. Although the Copenhagen School attempted to provide a constructivist and contingent definition to the theoretical object of security; yet the definition of ‘securitization’ contributed to the prioritization of a self-determining form of subjectivity. In particular, after defining ‘securitization’ from the perspective of existential threats and decision-making via ‘states of emergency’, as Williams noted, this paved the way to acknowledge the states and their leaders as the sovereign agents who determine the decisions autonomously in regard to securitization due to the very nature of the ‘state of exception’ and emergency. These types of decision-making rests on the form of self-determined subjectivity which according to Hegel is responsible for sustaining a flawed form of knowledge.

**Shortcomings of the Critical Security Studies Approaches**

Below it will be argued how the flawed perception of subjectivity in the critical security approaches, leads to an inaccurate account of knowledge. Again, paralleling to Hegel’s forms of consciousness - namely stoicism and scepticism - it will be argued how certain critical approaches after treating the object of study in an empty formalistic manner (Kantian/ Habermasean driven perspectives) lapse into stoicism; whereas other critical approaches which attribute a solely contingent role both to the subject and the object of study (Foucaultian influenced perspectives) lapse to scepticism. Booth, as one of the pioneering

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scholars of critical security studies, identified security as Emancipation, attempting to lift people as individuals and groups out of structural oppression. Security as emancipation has already been treated with some suspicion. Unlike previous critiques, here it will be stressed that Booth’s shortcomings emerge when he assumes Emancipation from a Kantian account of a self-determining subjectivity.

Moreover the conceptualisation of security as emancipation entails further intellectual calamities which beyond Stoicism, can lead to Scepticism too. Stoic points of view are reflected by Linklater’s cosmopolitan ideas of ‘human security’, influenced by Kantian and Habermasian thought; whereas Sceptic points of view are reflected by Foucaultian security approaches which presuppose a self-alienated and incomplete subject. Thus, the following paragraphs after citing the Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s forms of consciousness (stoicism and scepticism) confirm the insights of immanent critique according to which the separation of the subject from the object of study, delivers an inaccurate account of reality and knowledge. This inaccurate perception of knowledge and reality is triggered by a transcendental and contingent understanding of subjectivity which separates the universal from the particular dimension.

**On The Kantian Inspired ‘Security as Emancipation’ and Stoicism**

Before Booth defines security and his idea of emancipation, he ponders the reliability of our knowledge. He claims to re-approach security from the bottom up, constructing a critical security studies perspective after taking into consideration *ontology* (ideas about the nature of being) and *epistemology* (beliefs about what comprises ‘true’ knowledge). Beyond ontology and epistemology, he adds an orientation towards, praxis which is explicitly emancipatory that moves beyond statist orthodoxy, distancing himself from the Copenhagen School. Booth, does not equate security with survival or the maintenance of an enduring physical existence. Instead, he describes security as survival plus. The plus, according to Booth is the choice that comes from relative freedom from existential threats and it is this freedom that gives security its value. Booth holds that survival does not guarantee security because it does not
eliminate threats. For Booth, the equalisation of security with survival is a serious mistake, rejecting the Copenhagen School’s argument, according to which security is about survival. Instead, Booth contends that security should offers choices. Security should be an instrumental value that allows individuals and groups not just to establish a mere natural existence but provide options which diversify, and enrich rather than restraining their existence. As he puts it, survival is being alive; security is living, providing a contingent definition of security.\footnote{Ken Booth, \textit{Theory of World Security}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 106-107}

Booth conceptualises security as emancipation. He approaches emancipation ‘as a discourse of politics that secures people from those oppressions which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do’.\footnote{Booth, \textit{Theory of World Security}, 108} Booth takes ‘security as emancipation’ to be a medium for inventing humanity. However, suspicions should be raised as soon as Booth’s emancipation and freedom are associated to an understanding of knowledge which is consonant with Kant’s enlightenment motto \textit{sapere aude} (dare to know).\footnote{Booth, \textit{Theory of World Security}, 113} Already, Foucault’s critique of Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment’ already underscored how Kantian enlightenment fails to promote freedom but instead reinforces subjection once it is viewed as a process which necessitates external assistance or intervention. Foucault argues that Enlightenment for Kant is not merely a personal evolutionary process according to which individuals should ‘dare to know’. Enlightenment, for Kant simultaneously is to be perceived as a general process affecting all humanity and as an obligation prescribed to individuals. At this moment Kantian enlightenment appears to be a political problem too, argues Foucault, which necessitates the appropriate circumstances that permit the emergence of enlightenment. Thus, Enlightenment involves not only personal action but also external assistance or intervention. Foucault, stresses with dismay how Kant ends up posing the example of the reign of King Frederick II of Prussia as the appropriate environment which permits the development of enlightenment.\footnote{Michel Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ found in \textit{The Foucault Reader}, New York, Pantheon Books, 1984, 32-50}
Moreover, Booth’s Kantian affiliation is further stressed when he defines freedom as the moment our noumenal selves control our phenomenal selves. In other words, freedom is when our actions are not the result of passion but are fully voluntary founded on reason.\(^{64}\)

Already Nunes has already commented that security as emancipation was criticised for being too idealistic and trying to impose western values due to its connection to liberalism and for assuming an individual-centered subjectivity. These criticisms seem to stress the assumption that security as emancipation promotes western ideals as ‘universal’ since it relies on the Enlightenment’s understanding of subjectivity and freedom.\(^{65}\) However, in order to avoid such critique, Booth did not restrict himself to the Kantian affirmation of freedom but introduced the difference between true and false emancipation. False emancipation is any conception that understands emancipation as timeless or static and avoids using emancipation as a cloak for the west’s power projection.\(^{66}\)

Yet Booth’s understanding of Freedom undeniably promotes a self-determining understanding of subjectivity since he adopts the Kantian perspective of freedom and reason. Booth’s (Kantian inspired) reason may serve as the medium of universal emancipation as it can be seized by any (self-determining) subject who choses to act on the merit of reason. Such cosmopolitan ideas of reason and subjectivity helped to trigger a cosmopolitan understanding of security, often promoted by concepts such as Linklater’s ‘human security’, which celebrates the self-determining subject and the predominance of reason.

According to Linklater, critical theory links the discussion of security with the wider analysis of community and emancipation based on communicative action. He argues that viable sovereign states are not adequate forms of political community and security becomes for him inextricably linked with emancipation and a form of community beyond the state.\(^{67}\) For Linklater,

\(^{64}\) Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 114  
\(^{66}\) Booth, *Theory of World Security* 315  
human security can be feasible through the promotion of political frameworks in which communicative action (in a Habermasean sense) will be free to develop.⁶⁸

Linklater holds that Kant’s normative international theory - which takes subject to be self-determining - entails the possibility of transforming the conceptual framework that human beings apply to conflicts of interest and identity. Kant stressed the importance of developing conceptual systems that give expression to the human capacity for living in accordance to moral universals. Critical theory in the Kantian mode insists that these universals do not require a particular conception of the good as a universalist maxim. What is required is the willingness to engage in an open dialogue in which all human differences are treated with respect and in which no prior assumptions are made about where the dialogue will lead or about how ideally it should end.⁶⁹ Therefore, ‘human security’ requires the establishment of political structures that guarantee the effective participation in dialogic arrangements.⁷⁰

From the preceding summary it becomes clear that Linklater’s definition of ‘human security’ is obscure. Although it was mentioned that ‘Human Security’ simply requires the appropriate dialogic arrangement and not a particular conception of the good as a universalist maxim still this strikes as an abstract (universal) form of ‘Human Security’ with cosmopolitan applicability lacking a (particular) content. An establishment of political structures which guarantee effective participation in dialogic arrangements and the extension of these arrangements towards the formation of an ideal community, strikes one as content-less. Linklater’s dialogic forms of life as the key to advance a Kantian ideal of a ‘cosmopolitan condition of general political security’ without providing more detail on how that might become practically applicable appears to be an empty formalism.

This empty formalism bring to mind the characteristics Hegel attributed to Stoicism. According to Hegel, a stoic account of knowledge is flawed since it emerges from a self-determining subject that rests on an abstract sense of reason and fails to take into serious account the empirical world. The stoics claimed this

⁶⁸ Linklater, Political Community and Human Security, in Booth (ed), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 120
⁶⁹ Linklater, Political Community and Human Security, in Booth (ed), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 125-126
⁷⁰ Linklater, Political Community and Human Security, in Booth (ed), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 127
‘criterion’ of rationality upon which they could decide what was true and valuable. However, the empty formalism of their principles cannot provide this criterion. For the Stoic, nothing counts unless it can be brought into some scheme of rational thought. However, once reason is taken to be ‘impersonal’ and transcendental, it is transformed into a very abstract concept which does not allow the stoic to provide it with a (particular) content, except the claim that it is ‘rational’. The stoic comes to believe that freedom as well as the independence of thought for which she strives is not the imposition of her own subjective point of view on things, but rather an attempt to become indifferent to all particular things and to assume the point of view a ‘rational being in general’. Thus the stoic self-determined subject - upon which the Booth’s and Linklaters ‘security as emancipation’ lies - provides an inaccurate account of knowledge since it rests on a supposedly ‘universal’ rational form that is emptied of any particular content and is detached from the empirical word of experience.71

On the Foucaultian Inspired Critical Security Approaches and Scepticism

In the previous section was analysed how Booth’s conceptualisation of security as emancipation’ lapses into stoicism. This incomplete stoic account of knowledge emerges after resting on Kantian subjectivity and freedom while developing an account of security based on an abstract universal form which lacks an empirically particular content.

Williams reacted towards Booth’s idea of security as emancipation that rested on Kant’s self-determining subject implying that Booth down-played the empirical world. For Williams, Booth’s approach needs to shift from the unquestioned reliance upon the (stoic) subject that is detached from the empirical world and lean towards the politics of materialisation. Moreover, Williams adds that Booth remained at a very abstract level as to what power is and does. Williams suggests that the missing materialist dimension can be added once the understanding of power in ‘security as emancipation’ is enriched by the Foucault’s account of power. Foucaultian power as governmentality plays a fundamental role not just in repressing subjects but in constituting them while

71 Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 66-67
adding the empirical materialist dimension which Booth’s analysis lacks. Thus, for the first time the understanding of security, via Williams, moves beyond the idea of a self-determining subject.\textsuperscript{72} Foucault’s understanding of power and government provides the opportunity to conceptualise insecurities beyond the enumeration of threats from the standpoint of the individual subject. Instead, Williams’ Foucaultian understanding of security, emphasizes social relations and structures that constitute the condition of (in)security.

For Foucault, governmentality signals a shift from the exclusive concern with the protection of the sovereign towards the optimisation of the natural capabilities of individuals and populations – in the name of an efficient and economic and political organisation. This means that power does not just repress subjects but plays a fundamental role in consisting them. Therefore, incorporating this view of power into security as emancipation’ allows us to recognise the effects of pre-dominant security arrangements, approach them empirically and after rendering them contingent, act upon them. Thus Williams contends that the incorporation of Foucaultian power to ‘security as emancipation’, perceives our understanding of security as contingent while allowing us to analyse how security is involved in the constitution of subjects, instead of treating them as self-determining.\textsuperscript{73}

Moreover, Nunes adds how power as governmentality and ‘domination’ brings to light the unequal relationship according to which forces or groups are subordinated in order to secure reasonably good outcomes or results. Such domination prevents people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions. Thus, Foucaultian governmentality and domination, notes Nunes, allows for an inquiry into the context specific empirical world in order to seek the reasons behind the structural constraints which limit the actions of subjects. In brief, supplementing ‘security as emancipation’ with governmentality and domination, opens the ground for an empirical analysis due to the treatment of structures as unfixed in an attempt to explain how disadvantaged subjects that lack autonomy emerge. Moreover, the treatment of power as indeterminate power relations further attributes an unfixedness upon the

\textsuperscript{72} Williams, ‘Modernity, Identity and Security: A Comment on the Copenhagen Controversy’, 438
object of analysis (security), rendering it free from the conceptual and definitional control of the subject.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, power relations encourage an empirical approach of the object of study while rescuing it from the determination of the subject.

However, it needs to be noted that unlike Williams and Nunes, for Bigo the question of security is not directly discussed by Foucault. Bigo stresses that Foucault’s analysis has less to do with security than with discipline.\textsuperscript{75} As it will be elucidated in the next chapter, according to Foucault, discipline breaks down norms dividing normal from abnormal. Bigo argues that Foucault’s security is an interplay of differential normalities, unlike discipline which puts forward a clear division between what is normal and not.\textsuperscript{76} Nevertheless, Williams’ and Nunes’ points are confirmed by Bigo since he puts forward too a Foucaultian inspired understanding of security as power relations. Implicating the contingency of power relations rather than decision making, it becomes clear that Foucaultian security begs for the empirical examination of power relations while challenging the self-determining subjectivity and opposing to Schmittian ideas of sovereign decision-makers that stem from the abstract ‘states of exception’ problematic tacitly implied by the Copenhagen School.\textsuperscript{77}

A Foucaultian treatment of security, challenges the unquestioned reliance of the self-determining subject while emphasizing too on an empirical analysis of power relations. For Foucault, power, knowledge and truth are inseparable, drawing attention to power relations and the regimes of truth which open up the possibility of alternative regimes. The treatment of power as fluid power relations begs for their empirical examination. Knowledge and truth may well be complicit not only with power but also with forces of resistance and struggle. Such an approach to power opens up new possibilities for thought and action rendering the subject as well as the object of analysis as contingent. This understanding of security, for Williams, Dillon and Nunes substantiates the

\textsuperscript{74} Nunes, ‘Reclaiming the Political: Emancipation and Critique In Critical Security Studies’, 354-357
\textsuperscript{75} Michael Dillon & Andrew Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War, (London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2008), 96-97
\textsuperscript{76} Dillon & Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War, 98-101
\textsuperscript{77} Dillon & Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War, 110-114
fragility of transcendental (or universalist oriented) theories of security which rest on self-determined subjectivity.

Yet it is argued here that a Foucaultian conceptualisation of security is still inefficient as it implicates too a problematic form of subjectivity unable to provide reliable knowledge. From a Hegelian perspective the Foucaultian subject of the power relations echoes the shortcomings of scepticism. According to scepticism the subject fails to provide a reliable account of knowledge as it becomes self-alienated. In our case, self-alienation emerges as soon as the subject realises its entrapment within the unavoidable relativity which is formed by the contingent contextual basis of Foucault’s power relations.

For Scepticism, nothing can count as stable, independent and ‘objective’ except the sceptics own consciousness of the relativity of everything else. Paradoxically, although scepticism stresses the absence of an ‘objective’ point of view, yet sceptics embrace as unrivaled and ‘objective’ the premise that affirms the existence of solely subjective points of view.

The paradox in assuming that the ‘objective’ point of view is necessary to justify the subject’s (relativistic) claims to knowledge whereas the subject still takes itself as incapable of assuming that ‘objective’ point of view. For Hegel, this wavering between the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is responsible for the stoic subject’s ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ which triggers a flawed account of knowledge. The ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ is formed when the stoic becomes aware of this paradoxical contradiction but realises that there is no way out of the contradiction and must therefore live with it rather than avoid it whilst developing philosophical theories. The ‘Unhappy consciousness’ is divided within itself and is often paralleled with Socrates’ ‘I know one thing: That I know nothing’. The Stoic subject accepts this paradoxical result but realizes that it can not abandon the ‘objective’ point of view itself, since it is due to the application of that ‘objective’ claim that scepticism was possible in the first place.

Foucaultian security scholars after criticizing the empty formalism of Kantian perspective, re-approached security as power relations, which adds an empirical dimension that was previously missing, while dismissing the self-determining subject. From the Foucaultian perspective, the subject ceased to be

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78 Pinkard, *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, 68-69
79 Pinkard, *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*, 72-76
self-determining and knowledge assumed an indeterminate role as it was tied with the contingent contextual basis provided by the power relations. Security too, as the object of study, turned contingent due to the fact that power relations were un-fixed, rendering impossible to determine security in an ‘objective’ way or define it in an transcendental manner. Yet, a Hegelian perspective helps us realise that such stoic treatment of subjectivity and the objectivity in a contingent manner - influenced by the relativity of the empirical realm - provides an indeterminate account of knowledge which echoes Hegel’s ‘Unhappy Consciousness’. Unhappy consciousness entails a paradox which renders its contribution to knowledge misleading.

The paradox of ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ unveils the limits of Foucaultian thought in terms of knowledge and subjectivity. Imagining security as a dynamic form of power relations, always contingent and context specific, uncovers the discursive conditions of dominant regimes of truth. Treating security as product of unfixed power relations, leads the subject as a theorist to deny an ‘objective’ or a transcendental form of knowledge regarding security. Thus, knowledge becomes too contingent and context specific undetermined by the subject. Moreover, as the subject takes itself to be contingent too, is feeling entrapped within the relative contextual basis of these power relations, holding that there can be no ‘objective’ point of view at all. Therefore the sceptic subject treats all claims of knowledge as temporary. Nothing can count as stable and independent except the sceptic’s own consciousness of the relativity of everything else. Thus, according to the Foucaultian critical thinkers, the treatment of security as contingent and context specific power relations, conveys only a temporary and subjective account of security which lacks ‘objectivity’, rendering knowledge indeterminate.
Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the light Hegel’s method of immanent critique throws on a diversity of IR approaches to security. In immanent critique the separation of subject from the object of study triggers a misleading analysis of reality and knowledge which is based on transcendental or arbitrary means. The contribution of immanent critique - which is capable of overcoming this separation – is realized after Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) is considered. In that respect a detailed analysis of the Phenomenology of Spirit, clarifies the insights offered through immanent critique as the Phenomenology provides an enriched account of subjectivity and knowledge after portraying the evolution of the subject’s consciousness and knowledge via the interplay of the subject and object of study within the realm of Spirit (Geist).

The first part of the chapter, focused on the Phenomenology of Spirit, describing the evolution of the subject’s form of consciousness within the realm of Spirit (Geist) and Hegel’s alternative understanding of subjectivity. Following the insights of the Phenomenology of Spirit, it becomes clear how an inaccurate account of knowledge and reality emerges from: a) a flawed understanding of subjectivity; and b) the separation of the subject from the object of study. Thus, Hegel’s analysis which described the evolution of the forms of consciousness within the realm of Spirit, provides an enriched conceptualization of subjectivity which serves as an important intellectual tool which assists the assessment of reality and knowledge.

The second part, demonstrated how the insights of the Phenomenology of Spirit unveil the theoretical shortcomings of various IR approaches to security. After comparing Hegel’s incomplete modes of consciousness to the notions of subjectivity these approaches nourish, it was argued that these IR perspectives separate the subject from the object of knowledge. This separation triggers an incomplete account of subjectivity, knowledge and reality, verifying the theoretical contribution of immanent critique. After focusing on the (neo)realist, the ‘Copenhagen School’ and the Critical Security approaches, it was argued that these theories succeed one another - in regard to their conceptualization of
subjectivity and the theorist-object of theory interaction – in a way that echoes Hegel’s incomplete modes of consciousness, and knowledge. To be more precise, (Neo)realism, the Copenhagen School and the Critical approaches to security resemble Hegel’s ‘Intellect’, ‘Subject of Desire’, ‘Lord-Bondman dialectic’, ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’; all of which represent misleading modes of consciousness and knowledge, stemming from a flawed account of subjectivity. Just as Hegel’s ‘Desiring Subject’, lapses into the flawed stages of the ‘Lord-Bondsman dialectic’, ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’; similarly the evolution of security theorizing appears to be following this sequence.

The last section of this chapter explained that the treatment of the subject as relativistic, lapses into ‘Scepticism’ and provides a misleading account of knowledge. Thus, approaching security from the Foucaultian perspective of power relations provides an indeterminate form of knowledge. The shortcomings of the Foucaultian inspired IR approaches as well as the inherent limits of Foucaultian thought will be further elaborated in the next chapter. The application of Foucaultian thought to IR is a controversial issue among IR scholars. No matter, how valuable this IR debate might be yet it fails to explain that the problem does not lie in the application of Foucaultian concepts such as ‘power’, ‘power relations’, ‘biopower’ but in the flaws these concepts entail. Thus, the next chapter elucidates, from a Hegelian perspective, that the limits of Foucaultian thought are associated to his understanding of power and subjectivity which undermines the subject’s self-consciousness and negates free will.
CHAPTER 2: Examining the Implications of Foucault’s Application In International Relations From the Perspective of Hegel’s Immanent Critique

Overview

The last part of the previous chapter focused, *inter alia*, on the shortcomings of the Foucaultian-inspired security approaches. Their flaws rested on the perception of the subject in the form of a contingent, relativistic, self-alienated individual. This, from a Hegelian perspective, echoes Scepticism, which is an incomplete mode of consciousness as it fails to promote the subject’s self-consciousness, knowledge and free will. Scholars such as Williams, Dillon and Neal adopted Foucault’s understanding of power and governmentality since their objective was the conceptualization of insecurity beyond the enumeration of threats. According to these scholars, incorporating Foucaultian power and governmentality was useful in identifying the social relations and structures which constitute that condition of insecurity. The application of the Foucaultian notion of power to IR security approaches also promoted the idea that power does not only repress subjects but also constitutes them. Just as Williams argues, for the first time IR security scholars via Foucault move beyond the idea of an individualist, autonomous and self-constituted subject.¹ However, as was previously noted, the Foucaultian-inspired perception of subjectivity promotes an understanding of the subject as a relativistic and self-alienated individual, suffering from what Hegel described as Unhappy consciousness which lapses into Scepticism.

The current chapter elaborates further on Foucault’s thought and is comprised of two parts. The first reviews the diversity of Foucaultian-influenced approaches to IR. In this section, it becomes clear that Foucault’s contribution to IR thought is contested. Whereas certain IR scholars praise the Foucaultian contribution to IR thought in terms of an intriguing alternative understanding of

power, war mobilization and human rights; others remain skeptical. It appears that the scholarly debate on Foucaultian IR is orchestrated to reply to the following question: is Foucault’s application appropriate in the field of International Relations or not?

Here it is argued that this question is misleading since it fails to unveil the shortcomings of Foucaultian thought. Moreover, the critique of Foucaultian IR approaches from the perspective of Hegel’s immanent critique unveils limits of Foucault’s notion of power and subjectivity, as the following part indicates. Nevertheless, this debate among IR scholars proves useful as it discloses some of the flaws entailed in the appropriation of Foucaultian thought to IR theory.

Instead, the second part of this chapter puts forward a different question, namely: how do Hegel’s insights unveil the intellectual flaws entailed both in certain Foucaultian IR approaches as well as Foucault’s thought?

This question targets the nature of Foucault’s theory itself. It will be analyzed that Foucault’s objective – just like Hegel’s immanent critique – was to reconsider reality without transcendental means but with norms which are part of the reality itself, via the notion of power. However, this analysis will make clear that Foucault failed to meet this objective as his notion of power is based on transcendental premises which prevents him from examining reality without transcendental means. The limits of Foucault’s approach from the perspective of immanent critique associate to: a) The portrayal of power as an empty formalism which triggers a problematic conceptualization of subjectivity; and b) A flawed understanding of subjectivity according to which the subject is perceived as a relativistic individual who is subjected to power and fails to acquire self-consciousness.

Although it is noted here that Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s approaches also highlight the shortcomings of Foucault’s understanding of power and subjectivity, Hegel’s insights take us one step further. From a Hegelian perspective, it becomes clear that Foucaultian thought negates free will and undermines the formation of the subject’s self-consciousness. Besides unveiling the flaws of Foucaultian thought, Hegel’s immanent critique contributes to an alternative understanding of subjectivity and freedom which overcomes these flaws. The superiority of Hegel’s method will become clear after we have criticized the shortcomings of Foucaultian IR approaches. Immanent critique
stems from the consideration of Hegel’s dialectical method and of his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). The combination of the dialectical method and of the Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to reconsider reality after putting forward an alternative notion of subjectivity, self-consciousness, ethics and freedom which are interconnected and actualize in the state. In the last part of the chapter we demonstrate the transcendental premises of Foucault’s notion of power and the negative effects this has on Foucaultian IR thought. Hegel’s insights allow us to trace these shortcomings in: i) the uncritical reception of the Foucaultian concepts of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power-relations’; and ii) the uncritical application of the terms contingency, consent and voluntarism that Foucaultian IR scholars refer to without further elaboration. Ultimately, this Hegelian inspired analysis illustrates that Foucault’s conceptualization of power and subjectivity is self-defeating as these Foucaultian concepts undermine the development of the subject’s consciousness and negate free will.

I. Delineating The Foucaultian IR Debate

Approaches Espousing Foucault’s Application in IR

Certain IR scholars welcome the application of Foucault’s notion of power in the domain of the international. Accordingly, the application of Foucaultian theory in the field of International Relations is seen as assisting to: a) expose the limits of dominant IR approaches which rest on an understanding of subjectivity that is tied liberalism; b) reconsider understandings of human rights; c) promote an alternative perspective on war in contemporary IR after implicating the concepts of ‘docile bodies’ and ‘biopower’; and d) to enrich the understanding of power in IR thought in terms of Foucault’s ‘power relations’ which permits resistance and reinforces the formation of agency.

With respect to the first function (a), scholars like Pasha, praise Foucault’s methods of inquiry into the making and unmaking of modern subjectivity. According to Pasha, Foucault helps us acknowledge the subject of Western IR as a liberal one, with all the accoutrements of historically-constituted social affirmations and negations. For Pasha, virtually the entire conceptual
apparatus (including notions of citizenship, sovereignty, rationality and interests) of IR derives from an unacknowledged recognition of liberal subjectivity as a universal reference. International practice takes this liberal subject both as the site and the agent of articulating relations between citizens and polities. The liberal modern subject is the originator and the recipient of projects of amelioration or self-help, pacification and the civilizing process. As Pasha notes, Foucault’s uncovering of the social production of the liberal subject opens up vast thinking spaces on the limits of Western IR.2

In accordance with the second issue (b), certain IR scholars apply Foucault’s notion of power in order to analyze the global discourse of human rights. Manokha is one of the scholars who analyses this discourse from a Foucaultian perspective. He demonstrates that it has contributed to the transformation of human rights into a kind of a global standard or norm according to which agents increasingly evaluate themselves and are evaluated. Manokha employs the two dimensions of Foucault’s conception of power and elaborates on the way in which the global discourse of human rights conditions the behavior of different forms of agency. As Manokha stresses, Foucault’s conception of power has two features; firstly, power is not reducible to agents that exercise it, but rather mediates the dominant view of what constitutes normal and acceptable agency. Moreover, power influences the prevailing conventions which determine how to deal with those who deviate from the norm. Secondly, Foucault describes forms of power that are not based on repression, but instead produce a positive behaviour even in the absence of coercion, since agents exercise power over themselves in order to conform to the dominant norm. Manokha, focuses on Foucault’s positive, non-oppressive dimension of power in order to promote an alternative understanding of human rights. For Manokha, Foucault can enhance our understanding of the operation of the global discourse of human rights in terms of the causal power it retains with respect to social practice. Manokha objects to certain human rights analyses in IR that neglect the Foucaultian conceptualization of power and treat the use of force in the name of

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human rights as a justification fabricated by western states to dominate or colonize the world.  

In contrast to such approaches, Manokha puts forward a number of case-studies which in his opinion reveal that the promotion of human rights neither stemmed from the influence of western powers, nor amplified their interests. Specifically, he examines a number of instances involving the exercise of power with reference to human rights which do not rest on western powers’ actions to perpetuate domination or colonization. These case-studies include the exercise of power with reference to human rights by: i) non-western states with respect to non-western states; ii) NGOs with respect to business enterprises; and iii) business enterprises with respect to non-western states.

These examples provide the means for Manokha to suggest that non-Western states, NGO’s and enterprises actively participate in the agenda-setting of international organizations, governments and corporations via the promotion of human rights. As a number of scholars observe, human rights have become a global norm which plays a causal role in structuring the behavior of different actors. Manokha quotes a number of scholars such as Risse, Popp and Sikknik who argue too that human rights have emerged as a global standard which increasingly governs the behavior of individuals and states. Human rights norms prescribe rules for appropriate behavior and assist in defining identities. Moreover, as Donnelly argues, regimes that do not at least claim to pursue popular political participation (democracy) and respect for the rights of their citizens place their national and international legitimacy at risk.

For Manokha, these instances illustrate Foucault’s second dimension of power, namely its positive dimension, by revealing how dominant discursive structures ‘produce’ behavior and how agents even in the absence of coercion, decide to transform themselves. Manokha does not suggest that corporations or certain non-western states, for example, have a genuine concern for human rights. It is highlighted only that they find it necessary to claim that they engage

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4 Manokha, “Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights”, 438-441
in the promotion of human rights and thereby contribute to the development of the global human rights discourse.\(^5\)

With relation to the third point (c), Reid among others, stresses the importance of Foucault’s thought in evoking an alternative perspective on the problem of war in contemporary international relations theory. Reid notes Foucault’s theoretical shift from *Discipline and Punish* to *The History of Sexuality*. Despite this shift, Reid appears to treat these two works as complementary, stressing the relevance of ‘tactics’ to ‘strategy’ which the two works put forward respectively. According to Reid, *Discipline and Punish* focuses on ‘tactics’, implying the formation of individuality via disciplining the body, while the *History of Sexuality Vol.1* focuses on ‘strategy’ as the formation of collective bodies of populations via ‘biopower’. In the *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault demonstrated the role of discourses and practices derived from the military sciences. These discursive and practical tools reinforce the strategies of pacification that modern regimes pursue against their societies through the development of disciplinary power over life. Foucault later shifts his emphasis to how the development of ‘biopower’ mobilizes populations to wage war in the name of life necessity. It is in Foucault’s ‘biopower’ as opposed to disciplinary power that Reid locates the paradoxical logic through which modern regimes in the international sphere induce peace simultaneously with war.\(^6\)

Reid argues that it is in the final chapter of the *History of Sexuality Vol.1*, ‘Right of Death and Power over Life’, that Foucault re-conceptualizes the relation of war to society. In *Discipline and Punish*, he shows that the development of military sciences had functioned to establish an absence of war in societies through the creation of docile bodies. In the *History of Sexuality Vol.1*, the focus shifts to address how the emergence of a form of power concerned with exercising control over life leads to a proliferation and intensification of the problem of war between societies.\(^7\) According to Reid, in the *History of Sexuality Vol.1*, Foucault shifts his focus from the relations between power and the individual to those between power and the population.

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\(^5\) Manokha, “Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights”, 443


\(^7\) Reid, *Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault*, 71-72
Here, power over life evolved in two basic forms linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these forms centers on the ‘body as machine’. This involves the body’s disciplining, optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and docility, and its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls. The second form focuses on the ‘species body’, that is, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological process. This includes factors of propagation, birth - mortality, levels of health, life expectancy and longevity, as well as all the attendant conditions that can cause these to vary. The first form (the body as machine) focuses on the individual and is associated with what Foucault terms ‘tactics’, while the second refers to the population and is associated with ‘strategy’. That new-found docility of the individual provides modern regimes with the ability to secure an absence of war within the civil societies they govern. However, where the development of biopolitical techniques focuses on the collective bodies of populations, Reid applies Foucault to argue that what is at stake in the contemporary world is the biological existence of a population. Accordingly, modern states afford themselves a new basis for the mobilization of war which is beyond the juridical existence of sovereignty, but which affects the survival of their population within the international domain.8

According to Reid, for Foucault war as strategy is the continuation of politics. However, it must not be forgotten that ‘politics’ has been conceived as a continuation of war. In the History of Sexuality, disciplinary power evolves through the development of tactical measures which render the natural life of the individualized body as the object of power over life. Biopower evolves through the development of strategies which constitute individual bodies in relation to populations. There is no discontinuity between the functioning of ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’. In fact, one complements the other. Tactics contribute to the individuation of bodies via discipline and the operation of ‘strategies’. Through strategies, the social body is mobilized as a population. ‘Strategies’ are

8 Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, 73-74
inconceivable in isolation from those tactical mechanisms that determine how the natural life of bodies comes to be individualized.⁹

In summary, Reid applies Foucault’s ‘biopower’ to explain how modern politics become a continuation of war for the state. According to Reid, a mobilization for war is no longer related to sustaining the juridical sovereignty of the state, but rather, to the survival of the states’ population as well as the administrative domains which form that population. The states’ various administrative domains become re-conceived as the terrains of a struggle in the international sphere rather than as sources of domination or exploitation in the domestic sphere. The security of these institutions becomes the guiding criterion for the pursuit of war. According to Reid, this struggle for the security of the state’s administrative institutions thus constitutes the modern bio-political war within the modern international relations domain.¹⁰

With respect to the final matter (d), certain IR scholars draw our attention to the implications of replacing the dominant understanding of sovereign power with Foucault’s notion of ‘power relations’. Beyond the application of Foucaultian ‘biopower’ in the domain war, Edkins and Pin-Fat emphasize the impact of applying Foucault’s ‘power relations’ to IR thought. Challenging the concept of sovereign power in international relations and replacing it with the Foucaultian notion of power relations, the development of resistance forms is highlighted to permit the emergence of agency. After comparing power relations with sovereign power which sustains relations of violence, Edkins and Pin-Fat argue that the latter refuses agency to the forms of life it produces and controls, substantiating the absence of the political in the international domain.

Without power relations, there is no possibility of resistance and no freedom. Freedom and resistance are found as part of power relations and such relations are productive of subjectivities. For Foucault, power relations comprise a specific form of social relation. The power relation is to be viewed as distinct from a relationship of violence. As Foucault notes, a relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be passive. A power relationship can be articulated purely on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it

⁹Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, .76-83
¹⁰Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, .88-89
is to constitute a power relationship: that the ‘other’ - the one over whom power is exercised - is recognized and maintained to the very end as the subject who acts. That faced with a relationship of power enables the opening up of a whole field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions.\(^\text{11}\)

Edkins and Pin Fat argue that sovereign power is not a form of power relations but rather a relationship of violence. Sovereign power seeks to refuse those whose lives it controls any valid political response, and therefore operates as a form of technologized administration. By distinction, a power relation is one that is accompanied by resistance, with the subjects produced acknowledged as part of that relation. Thus, their freedom to resist is a necessary component of that interaction. Sovereign power on the other hand attempts to rule out any possibility of resistance. A proper political power relation is not practicable under those circumstances. Accordingly, in challenging sovereign power we are not faced with a power relation but with a relationship of violence. Resistance as such would only be possible within a power relation. In circumstances of a relationship of violence, other forms of opposition must be found in order to reinstate a proper political relation which permits resistance and ultimately produce a form of power as a power relation.\(^\text{12}\)

**Scepticism Regarding Foucault’s Application in IR**

This section challenges the approaches which celebrated the application of Foucaultian thought in the field of IR. According to these approaches, the contribution of Foucaultian thought lies on the reconsideration of: a) subjectivity from a non-liberal perspective; b) human rights; c) the mobilization for war and d) power as a medium of resistance and agency. On the contrary, here it is argued that certain scholars doubt whether Foucault’s application is appropriate in the field of international relations. To be more specific, Neil’s argumentation focuses on Foucault’s theory and the contingency it entails, arguing that such contingency renders it incompatible to the fixed discipline of IR. Debris and Richmond write in a similar vein. More importantly, Selby and Chandler, unlike Pasha, contend that Foucaultian IR thought ends up promoting liberalism instead

\(^{11}\) Jenny Edkins, Veronique Pin-Fat Michael J Shapiro (eds), *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics* (London-New York: Routledge), 4-10

\(^{12}\) Edkins, Pin-Fat and Shapiro, *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, 11-12
of exposing the limits of IR perspectives which rest on a liberal understanding of subjectivity. In particular, Selby argues that the understanding of Foucault’s power within the realm of globalization and the international sphere encourages an internationalist liberal understanding of world power which ultimately fails to interrogate liberalism. Chandler too arrives at a similar conclusion according to which Foucaultian IR thought not only fails to undermine liberalism but also unintentionally assists the perpetuation of the dominant liberal cosmopolitan paradigm.

Towards the end of this section, it will be explained that although the arguments of Neil, Debris, Richmond, Selby and Chandler are indeed useful, they fail to address the reasons why Foucaultian notions of ‘power’ (according to Manokha), ‘docile bodies’/‘biopower’ (according to Reid) and ‘power relations’ (according to Edkins and Pin-Fat) are adequate to explain how: a) human rights have transformed into a global standard which does not necessarily prioritize the promotion of western norms; b) the subject’s mobilization of war is triggered from an effort to protect the administrative mechanisms, and c) resistance and agency emerge from an alternative understanding of power as ‘power relations’. At that point, it will become evident that Hegel’s insights are useful in that they efficiently tackle the shortcomings of Foucault’s notions of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power relations’ which form a conceptualization of subjectivity that lacks self-consciousness and free will.

Neil is among the scholars who openly challenge Foucault’s theoretical appropriation in the field of international relations. He notes that it is not consistent to apply Foucault in IR as he does not offer a general theory. Neil insists that in Foucault’s work, we confront particular interests of power and historically-specific systems of thought. Therefore, Foucault does not offer a generalizable theory or system of thought and to try to incorporate him into such a system will be unsuccessful. For Neil, it makes little sense to ask what Foucault can do for IR, when his critical achievement is to help make IR a less-disciplined discipline, as it were.13

As Neil notes, Foucault studies rationalities of government. What seemed to intrigue Foucault was how new or altered rationalities of government emerge

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in history in the form of practices rejecting ideologies or paradigms. Foucault looks for marginal figures or documents that might be unfamiliar. He is not a historian of facts who imposes a systematization on the raw matter of history. The difficulty, Neil stresses, with trying to make Foucault speak to questions regarding the international is that this entails strong disciplinary principles and authorities, as well as the provision of authority to those (international) concepts.¹⁴

In other words, if we attempt to use Foucault in a manner consistent with the IR discipline, it is impossible to remain faithful to a fixed understanding of such a discipline. Simultaneously, this means that we become inconsistent with respect to Foucault. For Neil, engaging with Foucault equates to being unfaithful. Foucault shows no compassion in dismissing his previous work. We should therefore not allow Foucaultian concepts to become disciplinary when Foucault himself did not hesitate before abandoning them. In the Birth of Biopolitics, his choice of method consisted of: a way of not taking as a primary, original, and already given object notions such as sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state and civil society. Thus, Neil concludes that Foucault does not allow us to give ontological or epistemological priority to any object, concept or category, including the ‘international’.¹⁵

In a similar vein, Debrix and Richmond highlight that being a Foucaultian cannot be reduced to an identity. Therefore Foucault is incompatible with IR which projects the idea and the belief that there must be one discourse, one modality of knowledge and one practice of the global. For Debrix, a genuine understanding of Foucault is inconvenient to IR’s need for utility and knowledge-accumulation. In order to make his point more powerfully, Debrix brings to our attention the following Foucaultian quote: ‘do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same; leave it to the bureaucrats and the police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write’.¹⁶

Richmond argues that Foucault has reminded us that the study of power, knowledge, government, peace and war have their own inherent biases,

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¹⁴ Neal, “Rethinking Foucault in International Relations: Promiscuity and Unfaithfulness”, 539-540
¹⁵ Neal, “Rethinking Foucault in International Relations: Promiscuity and Unfaithfulness”, 541-542
¹⁶ Francois Debrix, “We Other IR Foucaultians”, International Political Sociology (2010), Vol 4 (2), 198-199
explicated as practices in specific contexts. However, much of the development of mainstream theory in IR, peace and conflict studies, conflict resolution, peace-building and state-building has been ambivalent to such an insight. IR often speaks of (Foucaultian) power via power as truth, converted into governmentality and increasingly, an approximation of biopolitics. Where debate begins, biopolitical governance and reflexive censorship intervene rather than reflexion and engagement with political agency.17

Like the previous scholars, Selby argues that Foucault centered his analysis on asylums, prisons, hospitals and other sites of social discipline. Thus he did not focus on the juridical edifice of sovereignty, state apparatuses, ideologies or directly on international relations. Selby holds that Foucault in his work seems above all to be an abstract epistemologist of the relations between texts, truth and power, rather than an empirically-grounded theorist of historical shifts in the relations between knowledge, institutions and the constitution of subjects. According to Selby, the traditional concerns of international relations theory (war, interstate relations, foreign policy, diplomacy, security etc.) seem a long way from Foucault’s pre-occupation with the micropolitics of power relations and the constitution of the limits of subjectivity. Foucault emphasized the ontological primacy of those micro-physical architectures, techniques and procedures invented by liberal scholars such as Bentham over the macro-level called ‘state’. Foucault was an analyst of mechanisms and rationalities of governance and self-governance under conditions of formal freedom - that is, the historically-specific procedures of social control that are characteristic of liberal societies.18

Selby criticizes Dillon who depicts global liberal governance as a form of global biopolitics. As Dillon puts it, ‘global liberal governance is a Foucaultian system of power/knowledge that depends upon the strategic orchestration of the self-regulating freedoms of populations […] we are now living in an era of global governmentality’. Selby argues that across the range of Dillon’s and Reid’s work, Foucault’s writings do not provide tools for analyzing discrete

techniques and practices of liberal governance, but instead that they develop a newly Foucaultian picture of contemporary world order.¹⁹

For Selby, powerful as these claims are, their translation and elevation of Foucault to a global plane is problematic in two regards. First, the internationalization and globalization of Foucaultian power is necessarily both premised upon and productive of a paradigmatically liberal internationalist understanding of world order. Effectively international relations are subjected to a double reading: they are read first as liberal and on the strength of this, political realities are analyzed as products of disciplinary and bio-political power. Without such a reading, the characterization of contemporary world as ‘globalized bio-politics’ would be impossible. The result is that in Reid’s and Dillon’s work, Foucault is ultimately used less to interrogate liberalism than to support the reworked and reworded liberal accounts of international politics. Selby admits that although Dillon and Reid are far from liberal in many of their assumptions about politics and society, in relation to international politics where the most abiding opposition is between broadly liberal and realist perspectives, their globalization of the Foucaultian model of power insures a quintessentially liberal rather than a realist reading of IR.

Chandler, like Selby contends that the fixity of the IR field necessarily disciplines and restrains Foucault’s (presumed) contingency, significantly limiting his theoretical contribution to IR. Moreover, Chandler adds that the unavoidable dogmatization of Foucault serves to promote the liberal problematic that governs IR thought. Chandler noted that unlike the discipline of political theory which implicates sovereignty, the framing of rights and law and the permeation of institutionalism; the IR discipline was defined precisely by its lack of content - an emptiness which contrasts the fullness of the world bounded by a sovereign state expressed in political theory.²⁰

For Chandler, IR could be portrayed as a discipline that promotes liberal assumptions after suggesting that the sovereign didn’t exist, that we inhabit a world of globalization, complexity and interdependence. A ‘liberal’ framing of institutionalism and IR in which there is nothing beyond the irreducible subject

¹⁹ Selby, “Engaging with Foucault: Discourse, liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucaultian IR”, 334-335
of individual interests and which thereby undermine the notion of state sovereignty, was now repackaged as a new discipline according to which the world becomes globalized in the imagination. It was through IR that the blockages of political theory, the ‘boundaries’ of the sovereign, the framing of law and the permeation of institutionalism could be overcome and restructured. Chandler from the outset poses the rhetorical question: how do we govern in a world with no sovereign and no citizens, only homo-economicus of interest bearing individuals? This is a liberal inspired problematic which drives IR and transforms political theory into the philosophy of a world which no longer exists. According to Chandler, IR is a fixed discipline. Inevitably, the incorporation of Foucault into such a discipline serves its purpose and undermines the genuine Foucaultian contingency that promotes un-fixity and agency.\textsuperscript{21}

After Chandler indicating how the Foucaultian application in IR unintentionally serves to substantiate a liberal perspective, Chandler becomes more specific, arguing that liberal cosmopolitan and radical post-structural approaches have many similarities. In order to provide additional strength to his contention, Chandler criticizes the work of Douzinas and Jabri who adopt a post-structural approach. For Chandler, the work of Jabri and Douzinas is melded with post-Foucaultian readings of cosmopolitan rights. Jabri and Douzinas read cosmopolitan rights as an exclusionary and hierarchical exercise of biopower.\textsuperscript{22}

The biopolitical critique of the discourse of cosmopolitan rights is that instead of a mechanism of empowerment, it acts as an exercise of power. The post-structural critics wish to portray all human rights constructions in terms of the territorialized ‘citizen’ or the deterritorialized ‘human’ as equally oppressive and hierarchical. For both liberal cosmopolitan theorists and post-structuralists, rights regimes are understood to be constituted independently of and prior to the subjects of rights. For cosmopolitan advocates, it is precisely because the poor and the excluded cannot autonomously enforce their rights that an external agency needs to intervene to empower them. For post-structuralists, rights are also constituted independently and prior to their subjects. It is the declaration of rights which constitutes the subject, and rights are therefore understood as

\textsuperscript{21} Chandler, “Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault...”, 206-207
\textsuperscript{22} Chandler, “Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The limits of Biopolitical Approach”, \textit{International Political Sociology} (2009) 3, 53
preceding and interpolating the subject. Douzinas therefore stresses the darker side of rights, referring to the inexorable rise of registration, classification and control of individuals and populations.23

Chandler argues that post-structuralist critics exaggerate the cosmopolitan claim that rights are independent from the subjects in order to view all rights claims as fictions. Therefore, in the frameworks of cosmopolitan and biopolitical theorists of post-territorial political community, the political community is no longer constituted on the basis of a framework of rights or autonomous subjects. Formal frameworks are held to be independent of the political subject, which is reinterpreted in Foucaultian terms as the object of administration and regulation, rather than as a subject of rights. For liberal cosmopolitans, the existence of rights prior to and independently of political subjects is held to legitimize regimes’ international intervention and regulation, while for post-structuralists, the autonomy of law is read as the autonomy of power to interpolate and create the ruled subject. Both approaches hint at the absence of subjectivity and territorial community. Finally, as Chandler argues, both cosmopolitan and post-structural approaches are free to establish the existence of political community at the global level as a post-territorial construction. Again, such a community is closer to liberalism than realism and appears to serve the needs of the former.24

II. Challenging The Foucaultian Inspired IR Approaches From the Perspective of Hegel’s Immanent Critique

Overview

The previous section delineated the prevailing debate on Foucaultian IR approaches, arguing that such debate is triggered by the question of whether Foucault’s application in the international field is appropriate. Here it is noted that this question is disorientating. The attempt to provide a response revealed an ambivalence around the suitability of Foucault’s theory to IR. While certain perspectives support Foucault’s application to IR, other approaches contest it,

23 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The limits of Biopolitical Approach’, 56
claiming that the contingency which Foucaultian theory employs is not compatible with the fixity of the IR discipline. This section challenges the prevailing debate of Foucaultian IR approaches and instead puts forward an alternative question: how can Hegel’s insights unveil the intellectual flaws entailed both in certain Foucaultian IR approaches as well as in Foucault’s thought?

From the perspective of Hegelian immanent critique it becomes clear that the flaws of Foucaultian thought lie in his conceptualization of power and subjectivity. Foucault via the notion of power purports to reconsider reality without reference to transcendental means. However, from the perspective of immanent critique, it becomes clear that Foucaultian power rests on transcendental premises which does not only fail to reconsider reality beyond transcendental means but also nourishes a flawed account of subjectivity. Furthermore, scholars such as Rose, Allen, and Taylor criticize Foucault’s approach and confirm that his account of power has transcendental premises whereas his notion of subjectivity forms a contingent form of identity which alienates the subject from herself. According to Rose’s and Allen’s critique, Foucaultian power reflects an empty formalism which rests on the failure to overcome the transcendentalism of the Kantian notion of subjectivity. For Rose, Foucault’s concept of power constituted an attempt to provide an alternative approach to the Kantian self-determining and transcendental subject. Rose illustrates how the problematic account of Foucaultian power emerges as soon as Foucault lapses into the Kantian intellectual dead-ends he originally aspired to overcome.

Taylor contends that Foucaultian power nurtures a relativistic account of subjectivity. Before elaborating further on Taylor’s scholarship, it is instructive to attempt to demonstrate the discontinuity of Foucault’s thought by comparing his early work (*Discipline and Punish*) with his late work (*History of Sexuality* and *The Subject and Power*). Foucault’s early work identifies power as the sole knowledge and subject producing force, whereas the latter re-introduces the concepts of freedom and subjectivity independently of power. However, as Taylor’s approach stresses, Foucault’s conceptualization of subjectivity retains flaws despite his attempt to revise his theory.
Although Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s critique of Foucault’s thought corresponds to the insights that immanent critique can produce, this part elaborates that Hegel’s insights allow us to go one step further, demonstrating that Foucault nourishes a flawed understanding of power and subjectivity which negates the subject’s self-consciousness and free-will. The final section of this part stresses the contribution of Hegel’s immanent critique, which succeeds where Foucault failed. Namely, the reconsideration of reality without transcendental or arbitrary means permits an alternative understanding of subjectivity and freedom which overcomes these flaws,. Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom will be applied to expose the shortcomings of the Foucaultian-inspired IR approaches which uncritically adopt Foucault’s notions of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power relations’. These approaches, by neglecting to incorporate a detailed analysis of free will, ultimately rely on a misleading understanding of the terms contingency, consent and voluntarism.

**Tracing the Origins of Foucault’s Flawed Account of Power: How Power’s Empty Formalism Rests on the Contingency of a Military-Theological Transcendentalism**

This section examines where the problem in Foucault’s understanding of power lies. Foucault - just like Hegel with immanent critique - aspired to examine reality beyond transcendental means. Foucault applied his notion of power and the effects of power’s administrative mechanisms on the formation of subjectivity in order to reconsider reality beyond a transcendental dimension. However, the following paragraphs illustrate that Foucault’s notion of power has transcendentalist premises.

From the perspective of immanent critique, the shortcomings of Foucaultian power emerge soon as it assumes a transcendental dimension that prevents it from examining reality with means which belong to the reality. The analyses of Rose and Allen confirm that Foucault fails to re-examine reality beyond transcendental means after demonstrating that the notion of power replicates the Kantian shortcomings which Foucault originally aspired to overcome. Moreover, Taylor’s approach illustrates how Foucault’s
transcendental conceptualization of power contributes to a flawed account of subjectivity which lacks a contingent form of identity and self-consciousness.

In that respect, after Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s analyses confirm the transcendental premises of Foucault’s notion of power which is responsible for triggering a flawed notion of subjectivity, the superiority of Hegel’s immanent critique is confirmed. Immanent critique accommodates Hegel’s dialectical method and his philosophical system of Spirit which reconsider reality with means and norms which stem from reality itself while promoting an alternative conceptualisation of subjectivity, self-consciousness and freedom which overcome the flaws of Foucaultian thought.

Rose’s and Allen’s analyses make clear that the empty formalism of the Foucaultian conception of power rests on power’s contingent transcendentalism. Foucault portrays power as the new location of the origin of knowledge with its mix of force, generality and transcendentalism. Rose and Allen do not treat Foucault’s *The Order of Things* as discontinuous from *Discipline and Punish*. Rather, it is claimed that Foucault’s objective was, among others, to overcome the transcendentalism of Kantian Subjectivity, though it nonetheless ultimately introduced another form of abstract transcendentalism. This transcendentalism took either the form of the *a priori* rules of scientific discourse according to Allen, or the form of power’s control over knowledge and bodies, in to Rose’s terms.

Rose argues that in *The Order of Things*, Foucault’s notion of history changes. This shift from the delineation of *episteme* to the delineation of ‘powers’ as viewed in *Discipline and Punish*, marks a move from an interest in the idea of scientific regularities to one in power as an unjustifiable source which conforms to no regularity. These elisions of method and thesis, technology and technique, strategy and tactic, are the sleights of hand by which Foucault dissolves politics into ‘powers’.

In the *Order of Things* Foucault abandoned the problem of the causes behind transformations and chose to describe the transformations themselves, in the belief that this would be an indispensable step if a theory of scientific

26 Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law*, 172
language and epistemological causality was to be constructed. In short, Foucault attempted to explore scientific discourse not from the agents’ point of view, but from the perspective of the rules that come into play in the very existence of such discourse. As Foucault emphasizes, ‘if there is one approach I do reject [...] it is that which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes, a consistent role to act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity which leads to a transcendental consciousness’.27 Such a remark clearly rejects the Kantian transcendental subject.

Foucault speculates on the establishment of classifications, for example, posing the question that when we say that a cat and a dog resemble each other less than two greyhounds do, what is the ground upon which we are able to establish the validity of such classification with complete certainty? For him, it is not a question of linking consequences, but of grouping and isolating, of analyzing, and of matching concrete contents; there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical that the process of establishing an order among things. The *Order of Things*, provides an analysis that does not belong to the history of ideas or science. It is an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible, within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical *a priori* and in the element of what positivity ideas can appear, sciences can be established, experience can be reflected in philosophies and rationalities be formed, only to dissolve afterwards. Foucault is not concerned with describing the process of knowledge towards an objectivity in which today’s science can finally be recognized. What he is attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field - the *episteme* in which knowledge (envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or its objective forms) grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection.28

Thus, in the *Order of Things*, Foucault designates the importance of the rules of scientific discourse after rejecting the absolute prioritization of the transcendental observing (Kantian) subject as the basis of knowledge. Certainly, Foucault’s objection to Kant’s subject, one who permeates all historicity and

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28 Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of Knowledge*, xix-xx
forms a transcendental consciousness, reflected a point of critique and theoretical departure from which to develop his theory on scientific discourse.

According to Allen too, Foucault’s argument is that subjectivity should not be conceived as the necessary fixed point, as Kant and Descartes much earlier claimed. Allen contends that Foucault shifts the conceptualization of subjectivity from the position of that which explains, to the position of that which must be explained, from *explanans* to *explanandum*. Foucault maintains that the modern, humanist conception of subjectivity is contingent at this particular point in history and requires explanation. If Foucault is trying to shift the subject from its usual position to the position of ‘to be explained’, then we must set aside the preconceived notions of the subject. Thus, it becomes important to understand how the subject is constituted in a particular way and in this particular cultural and historical milieu. According to Allen, after initially negating transcendental forms of subjectivity via the concept of power, Foucault’s project appears to be delineating the ways in which a historically-specific discourse makes possible particular modes of subjectivity.29

Yet, Allen notes that as Foucault criticizes the Kantian transcendental subject, he paradoxically falls victim to a different form of transcendentalism. Foucault differentiates his approach to the constitution and self-constitution of the human subject from Kant’s. Accordingly, he holds that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as a subject of what we are doing, thinking and saying. In this sense, his criticism aspires to be that of non-transcendental nature. In other words, it involves laying out the historically, socially and culturally-specific conditions of possibility for subjectivity. Nevertheless, Allen underlines that although Foucaultian critique does not appear transcendental in this respect, it becomes transcendental in another sense, at exactly the moment Foucault seeks to specify what he defined as the historical *a priori*, or the rules of scientific discourse. As Allen notes, Foucault objects to Kantian transcendental subjectivity as the condition of possibility for experiencing. Instead, he focuses his attention on the search for the historically-contingent and

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29Allen, “The Anti-Subjective Hypothesis: Michel Foucault and the Death of The Subject”, 121-123
constitutive conditions of the possibility of subjectivity. Foucault is interested in laying-out the historically *a priori* conditions for the possibility of subjectivity.30

Rose also contends that Foucault’s attempt to overcome Kant’s transcendental subject ‘entrap’ him in a different form of transcendentalism. She notes that just as Foucault’s notion of history changes from the delineation of *episteme* to the delineation of ‘powers’, similarly, this marks a shift from scientific regularities to power as the unjustifiable source which conforms to no regularity. Rose maintains that Foucault treats knowledge as the sole resource of power, disabling him from drawing a distinction between different forms of apprehension. Among these forms, the notion of critical self-reflexion is essential, since such forms of apprehension are preoccupied with their connection to the position from which they speak as well as their form of speaking.31

As a result, after treating power as the sole resource of knowledge without acknowledging the forms of apprehension that necessitate critical self-reflexion, the command of power is left alone to recommend and to employ the object or actuality to be apprehended. Therefore, the function of the previously transcendental subject of Kant is replaced by the material reality of power’s (transcendental) control over bodies. But this materialism is spurious, argues Rose, as it deliberately revives the theological and Kantian opposition of the body and reason.32

Rose argues that although Foucault’s genealogy was founded to transcend the finite and anthropological Kantian dichotomy of transcendental vs empirical by dropping both the thing-in-itself and the transcendental subject, Foucault unintentionally reproduces this dichotomy. In his effort to overcome it, Foucault becomes resolved to a *mathesis* of the origin, the historical *a priori*, upon which he replicates the Kantian dichotomy. This attempt to replace the Kantian oppositions with the *mathesis* and the historical *a priori* via the notion of power takes shape in *Discipline and Punish*. The idea is that the *mathesis* is retained, but all associations with the question of justification or validity, and even with regularity, are abandoned and replaced by power. For Foucault assures us that

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30Allen, “The Anti-Subjective Hypothesis: Michel Foucault and the Death of The Subject”, 125
31Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law*, 172-175
32Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law*, 178-180
power has nothing to do with politics, but preceded all political and epistemological validity. Ultimately, Foucault transforms power into the anarchic terminology of warfare without politics.\footnote{Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law, 181-185}

As Rose notes, Foucault’s conceptualization of power underlines an infinite and eternal disorder rather than order. Power as the new location of the origin of knowledge, with its mix of force and generality, if not transcendentalism, alludes to the mystery of Kant’s categorical imperative: inconceivable but absolute. Power as force and generality is re-exploited as a multiplicity without a rule. This further explains why Foucault works so hard to divorce power from politics in an effort to neutralize and promote it as an impartial and unavoidably transcendental force upon which knowledge is dependent.\footnote{Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law, 1-2}

**Unveiling the Shortcomings of Foucault’s Conceptualization of Subjectivity**

This section focuses on the shortcomings of Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity. Taylor’s analysis discloses that the relativism of the Foucaultian subject is nurtured by the ‘neutrality’ and contingency of the power-relations which form it.

Before analyzing how this relativism emerges and triggers an incomplete account of subjectivity, it is noted that Foucault does not appear to be treating subjectivity in a consistent manner throughout his work. Rather, his ideas seem to be discontinuous after comparing his early work (*Discipline and Punish*) with his late work (*History of Sexuality Vol.2* and *The Subject and Power*). In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault appears to be identifying power as the exclusive knowledge and productive force of subjectivity, whereas in the *History of Sexuality Vol.2* and the essay *Subject and Power*, he appears to be reintroducing subjectivity disentangled from the tight control of power, and thus permitting agency. At first, it seems that Foucault is attempting an alternative conceptualization of subjectivity. However, Taylor contends that Foucault’s late
work still promotes an understanding of the subject that is subjected to power’s control.

Taylor’s analysis indicates that the relativism of the Foucaultian subject is maintained in spite of the fact that Foucault’s treatment of subjectivity changes throughout his work. Taylor makes clear that this relativism stems from Foucault’s conceptualization of power. For Taylor, Foucault’s early (Discipline and Punish) and late (History of Sexuality Vol.1 and Vol.2) work celebrates a conceptualization of subjectivity that fails to control itself efficiently and which is dominated by power’s control mechanisms. Taylor’s work reveals that Foucaultian power predetermines the limits of the subject’s agency, where the purposeless succession of the (supposedly neutral) power regimes deprives the subject of the ability to form an identity for itself. This renders the subject relativistic since it adheres to the instability of the power regimes which form it.

**Foucault’s Account of Subjectivity in Discipline and Punish**

In Discipline and Punish, published in 1975, power is treated as a force which produces a passive form of subjectivity via the notion of discipline, transforming the individual into a ‘docile body’ in order to control it.

As Foucault outlines, the historical moment of discipline was the moment in which an art of the human body was born. This art was directed not only at the growth of the body’s skills, nor the intensification of its subjection, but the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes the body more obedient as it becomes evermore useful. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body - a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures and its behavior. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explored it, broke it down and rearranged it. Such political anatomy was also a ‘mechanics of power’. Thereby, discipline came to produce subjected and practiced bodies; ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline, Foucault held, increases the forces of the body (in economical terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in the political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body. On the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a ‘capacity’ which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of
the energy, the power that might result from it and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.  

Furthermore, Foucault elaborates how that the subjects, as docile bodies, are controlled by the disciplinary apparatuses of power. Via the workshop, the school, the army, individuals are subject to a whole micro-penalty of time (lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle character, insolence), of the body (‘incorrect’ attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), and of sexuality (impurity, indecency). Thus, under such processes the individual is doubtless the fictitious atom of an ideological representation of society. Yet he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that Foucault has called ‘discipline’. He stresses that we must cease, once and for all, to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In fact, he argues, power produces. It produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that might be gained about the individual belong to this production.

According to Foucault, discipline is a form of power. Because discipline can be identified with neither an institution nor an apparatus, it becomes a type of power, a modality of exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application and targets. Discipline is an anatomy of power, a technology, and it may be taken over by specialized institutions, or by institutions which use it as an external instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), as well as by pre-existing authorities that find in it means of reinforcing or re-organizing their internal mechanism of power. Finally, it may be taken over by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to ensure that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police).  

36 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, 178
37 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, 194
Foucault’s Account of Subjectivity in the History of Sexuality Vol.2 and The Subject of Power

In The History of Sexuality Vol.2, published in 1984, Foucault re-introduces the notion of subjectivity as agency via the term of ‘arts of existence’. By this phrase he means those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to turn their lives into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. These ‘arts of existence’, or ‘techniques of the self’ as Foucault describes, lost some of their importance and autonomy when they were assimilated into the exercise of priestly power with the development of Christianity. However, Foucault insists that the significance of the ‘arts of existence’ was again amplified during the Renaissance, signifying the permeation of subjectivity. 39

Using examples from ancient Greece, Foucault explains how morality relates to the practice of the self. For an action to be moral, it must not be reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, law or a value. All moral action involves a relationship with reality and a relationship with the self. The latter is not self-awareness but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’. There can be no forming of the ethical subject without the ‘modes of subjectivation’ and ‘ascetics’ or ‘practices of self’ that support them. Moral action is indissoluble from these forms of self-activity. Here Foucault introduces two key words: enslaveia and askesis. As in Aristotle’s analysis, enslaveia is defined as self-mastery and victory, presupposing the presence of desires. Sophrosyne, defined as a state of virtue, does not imply suppression of desires, but rather their control. It is not abstinence from pleasures, but mastery over them. In classical Greek thought, the askesis that enabled one to make oneself into an ethical subject, was an integral part of the practice of the virtuous life. This was also the life of a ‘free’ man in the full, positive and political sense of the word. 40

40 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, 77-78
Sophrosyne was a state that could be approached through an exercise of self-mastery and through restraint in the practice of pleasures. Such self-mastery was affirmed, active freedom. In short, it represented a way of being, active in relation to what was by nature passive and ought to remain so. The development of the self, as an ethical subject, consisted in setting up a structure of virility that related oneself to oneself. This freedom-power combination that characterized the mode of being of the moderate man could not be conceived without a relation to truth. One could not practice moderation without a certain form of knowledge. One could not form oneself as an ethical subject in the use of pleasures without forming oneself at the same time as a subject of knowledge. As Foucault summarizes, whether it be in the form of the hierarchical structure of the human being, a practice of prudence or of the soul’s recognition of its own being, the relation to truth consists of an essential element of moderation. This moderation was necessary for the measured use of pleasure and for controlling violence.41

The above point marks a significant difference between Foucault and Kant, as the former rejects any form of universality. According to Foucault, moderation culminates within the limits dictated by a particular regimen. A regime should not be understood as a corpus of universal and uniform rules. It is more in the nature of a manual for reacting to situations in which one might find oneself - a treatise for adjusting one’s behavior to conform to specific circumstances. Such practice of the regiment forms an ‘art of existence’. Such ‘arts of existence’ in turn form oneself as a subject.42

Foucault examines subjectivity elsewhere beyond The History of Sexuality Vol.2. In one of his latest articles, The Subject of Power, his primary objective was to develop a history of the different modes by which human beings are transformed into subjects. Foucault maintains that there are certain modes of ‘objectification’ which transform human beings into subjects. The first attempts to give itself the status of science. The second relates to ‘dividing practices’, through which the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others, for instance, through the division of the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’. Thus for Foucault, subjectivity emerges only within a domain such as sexuality, or the penal system etc.

41 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, 82-86
42 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, 106-108
Foucault thereby no longer focuses on power, but on the subject which henceforth becomes the general theme of his research. The instant Foucault prioritizes the subject, his definition of power changes. What he now requires is an economy of power relations. Power relations consist in forms of resistance against different forms of power. Foucault uses resistance as a catalyst to: i) bring power relations to light; ii) locate their position and trace the point of their application. Such forms of resistance within the realm of power relations contribute to the development of subjectivity.\footnote{Michel Foucault, “The Subject of Power”, Critical Enquiry 8 (Summer 1982), The University of Chicago Press, 777-780}

These struggles are not against the individual, but against the government of individualization. They are an opposition to the effects of power, which are linked to knowledge, competence and qualification: struggles against the privileges of knowledge. The main objective of these struggles is an attack, not on an institution of power, a group, elite or class, but rather on a technique, a form of power. According to Foucault, such a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two conditions: a) each pole of such struggle is necessary and indispensable, meaning that the ‘other’ (over whom the power is exercised) is thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and b) within such relationships of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions opens up. In this manner, the exercise of power is neither violence nor consent. Power relations instead form a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions.\footnote{Foucault, “The Subject of Power”, 781-782}

Moreover, such power relations for Foucault consist in guiding the possibility of conduct and ordering the possible outcome. Power is essentially less a confrontation between two adversaries, and more a question of government. Foucault’s understanding of ‘government’ does not refer only to political structures. To govern is to structure the possible field of the action of others. To define the exercise of power as ‘government’, structuring a field of others’ actions necessitates one important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who face a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving permit several reactions to be realized. Consequently, there is

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\footnote{Michel Foucault, “The Subject of Power”, Critical Enquiry 8 (Summer 1982), The University of Chicago Press, 777-780}

\footnote{Foucault, “The Subject of Power”, 781-782}
no confrontation between power and freedom but a complex interplay. In this
game, freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power, since
freedom must exist for power to be exerted.

How the Purposeless and ‘Neutral’ Succession of Power Regimes
Promotes a Relativistic Account of Subjectivity

The arguments raised in Subject of Power entail certain aporias which
bring us to the following questions: is Foucault’s subject indeed an agent or a
limited actor? Do Foucault’s modes of objectification promote the understanding
of a subject that is autonomous or conditioned by the power-relations? Is it
restricting to assume that subjectivity emerges only within specific domains,
such as sexuality or the penal system?

Below, Taylor’s analysis suggests that Foucault’s understanding of
power, no matter how he conceptualizes it throughout work, promotes a
relativistic and passive account of subjectivity. Taylor argues that since the
succession of power regimes is portrayed as purposeless, so too the truth that
these power regimes convey is contingent and purposeless. This undermines the
subject’s sense of identity which rests on power’s contingent truth regimes and
promotes a relativistic form of subjectivity that is determined by the purposeless
succession of power regimes.

To be more precise, Taylor read Foucault’s The History of Sexuality as a
work which promotes a perception of subjectivity according to which the subject
is controlled and oppressed by power. For Taylor, the prerequisite of elaborating
a specific domain where the individual is given the opportunity to exercise his
freedom in fact acts as a domain in which the individual submits herself to
control. He contends that the incorporation of the idea of our nature as sexual
beings, dictated by the domain of sexuality, is responsible for our (sexual)
oppression, from which we strive to liberate ourselves.

Taylor offsets his analysis by arguing that the link between the
domination of nature and the domination of man has been developed previously.
Schiller was among the first to develop a critique of enlightenment humanism,
arguing that objectifying our own nature and trying to bring it under the control

\[45\text{ Foucault, “The Subject of Power”, 785-786}\]
of reason divides what should be a unity. This introduces a master within - an internal relation of domination. Foucault offers the Schillerian perspective another connection. The objectification and domination of man’s inner nature comes not only through a change of attitude, but also through training in certain disciplines. For Foucault, the disciplines which construct this new way of being are social, such as the hospital, the school and the factory. Thus, individuals lend themselves to control by others. The inculcation of self-discipline is often the imposition of discipline by others.46

In The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, crucial aspects of the individual’s inner nature must be articulated within the acknowledgement of this nature as sexual, among other things. The acceptance that we have such a nature in turn makes us an object of control. As soon as our sexual nature is located, the expert’s intervention and the help is required, in whose care we must put ourselves. According to Taylor, the whole notion therefore emerges as a strategy of power, of engendering control. This manifests as sexuality entails a crucial fulfillment of the human self. The entire idea that we are sexually repressed and above all, in need of liberation lures us into self-entrapment. In striving for liberation, we see ourselves as escaping a power understood in terms of the traditional model. Yet in fact we live under power of a new kind, and are therefore not escaping.

Finally, Taylor holds that the modern idea of sexuality is part of a technology of control.47 He criticizes the idea of power without subject, arguing that Foucault’s power cannot be neutral. Foucault sets aside the old model according to which power is exercised by the subject. Power for him becomes nothing more than forms of domination. On this basis, Taylor argues that the doctor (power) – patient (subject) relation is defined by a supposed common goal. But this coming together as a common goal is inseparable from a relation of power founded on the presumption that one party knows and that the other has an overwhelming interest in taking advice. Such a relation of force is thus substantiated by a common goal. This constitutes a relation of power but not on the Hobbesian model. Taylor argues that such power can not be neutral because

47 Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, 159-163
although both parties are constrained, there is domination on the part of the
Doctor.\textsuperscript{48}

Taylor is also critical of Foucault’s stance that the succession of power
regimes is purposeless. He dismisses such idea on the grounds that the agents
involved in Foucault’s power relations require a purpose in order to act and to
ignite such succession. Foucault’s (presumed) neutrality of power which is
founded on purposelessness is incapable of stimulating the subjects’ conscious
action upon which their agency is determined. An approach of strategies without
projects is a useful formula for describing Foucault’s historiography. This is
exemplified in the whole constitution and maintenance of the system of control.
Foucault speaks of its growth and self-domination in strategic terms. Such a
notion of global strategies is essential to Foucault’s reversal of a Clausewitzian
thesis of war as the continuation of politics with other means, into politics as the
continuation of war with other means. However, as Taylot notes, ‘purposelessness without purpose’ requires a particular explanation in order to be
intelligible. The undersigned systematicity must be related to the purposeful
action of agents in a manner that we can understand. This is required because the
text of history which we are attempting to explain is comprised by purposeful
human action. It is a mistake to think that the only intelligible relation between a
pattern and our conscious purposes is that direct one in which the pattern is
consciously willed. This idea is inherited from classical Cartesian-empiricist
views of the mind and, Taylor argues, Foucault is right to ridicule it. While it is
certainly not the case that all patterns are issued from conscious action, all
patterns have nonetheless to be made intelligible in relation to conscious action.\textsuperscript{49}

Finally, Taylor criticizes the lack of equilibrium and judgment which run
through Foucault’s succession of truth regimes within the realm of power. Taylor
argues that the lack of judgment which characterizes the succession of the truth
regimes, acts as a safety valve of Foucault’s power, sustaining its monolithism,
protecting it from criticism, and reproducing its exercise of control. Taylor
speculates on how a change can be perceived uncritically. Changes are discerned
and losses are experienced. It is impossible to form an identity without the
exercise of choice, yet in order to choose, a comparison needs to be drawn to

\textsuperscript{48} Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, 165-168

\textsuperscript{49} Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, 168-170
realize loss, thus developing a measure of comparison. This measure is precisely what forms an identity, argues Taylor. Within relativism, there cannot be an identity, only the perspective of an unaffected outsider which is of course, far from accurate.

According to the Foucaultian thesis, moving from one context to another cannot be seen as liberation, argues Taylor, because there is no common measure between the impositions of one context and those of the other. The Foucaultian regime of the relativity of truth means that we can not raise the banner of truth against our own regime. So liberation in the name of truth can only reflect the substitution of another system of power. As a result of such relativity, the transformation from one regime cannot be a gain in truth or freedom, as each is redefined in the new context. Foucault cannot envisage liberating transformations within such regimes because the relativity of the truth regimes makes them incomparable. However, such incomparability disqualifies any sense of loss or gain from the previous system to the next. Taylor underscores the notion that our sense of both gain and loss depends on comparability and constitutes our understanding of identity. However, Foucault’s monolithic truth regimes do not permit comparison, or the discerning of gains or losses, and thus ultimately deny a development of identity. Monolithism and relativism are two sides of the same coin. One is just as necessary as the other to create this incomparability across changes in history. Taylor elaborates that Foucault’s monolithic relativism is only plausible if one adopts the outsider’s perspective. Without an a-priori identity, the individual could not begin to choose.\(^{50}\)

Finally, Taylor’s analysis assists to elucidate how the relativism of the Foucaultian subject emerges. Foucault’s treatment of power as neutral serves to dominate the subject while rendering it relativistic. A subject that is formed by the purposeless succession of power regimes fails to develop an identity by itself as it is conditioned by the relativism of any change in such power regimes. As soon as the succession of power regimes is portrayed as purposeless, it is impossible to stimulate a sense of comparison among the truths each power regime conveys. Thus, Foucault’s purposeless succession of power regimes nurtures a pluralism of truths beyond comparison, thereby undermining the

\(^{50}\) Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, 176-180
subject’s sense of consciousness and purposeful agency. The Foucaultian subject ends up relying on the contingency of power regimes rather than on itself, transforming it into a self-alienated and relativistic entity. Here, it is argued that the relativism of Foucault’s subject lacks self-consciousness and free will. For this reason, the insights of Hegelian thought are useful as an approach which elaborates extensively on the development of self-consciousness. In the following section, the shortcomings of Foucaultian IR approaches will be examined from the Hegelian perspective of self-consciousness and free will.

**Unveiling the Limits of Foucaultian IR Approaches From The Hegelian Perspective of Self-Consciousness and Free Will**

Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s remarks have exposed the shortcomings of Foucault’s notion of power, which rests on transcendental premises and fails to consider reality from a non-transcendental dimension. Moreover, this transcendental foundation of power triggers a self-defeating conceptualization of subjectivity and freedom which negates the subject’s consciousness and free will, confirming the explanatory strength of Hegel’s immanent critique. Immanent critique succeeds in reconsidering reality by developing from it an alternative understanding of ethics and subjectivity which nourishes the subject’s self-consciousness and free will within the state. In that respect Hegel’s insights unveil that Foucaultian thought fails to nourish the subject’s self-consciousness after resting on a transcendental notion of power which portrays the succession of power regimes as purposeless, rendering the subject’s identity contingent with respect to the particular contexts it is affiliated.

The next chapter exposes the flaws of Foucault’s understanding of freedom, after elaborating on Hegel’s understanding of free will, whereas the current chapter notes that the incapacity of the Foucaultian subject to seize free will is responsible for the flaws of Foucaultian-inspired IR approaches. These flaws stem from the IR scholar’s uncritical reception of Foucault’s concepts ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power-relations’. In contrast to Neil, Deibrix, Richmond, Selby and Chandler who considered the application of Foucaultian thought in IR inappropriate here it is stressed that from a Hegelian perspective, the inapplicability of Foucaulian theory to IR lies in the negation of free will.
It is worthwhile recalling that Debrix, Richmond, Selby and Chandler considered the application of Foucaultian thought to IR inappropriate on different grounds. Specifically, Neil, Debrix and Richmond noted that it is misleading to constrain Foucaultian thought to the discipline of IR since Foucault himself did not offer a generalizable theory or system of thought which permitted its incorporation to a specific discipline. Moreover, Selby contends that the globalization of the Foucaultian notion of power and its incorporation into the international sphere contributed to the production of a liberal internationalist understanding of world order. For Chandler, Foucaultian post-structuralist analyses fail to deliver an escape from liberal IR approaches and instead promote an argumentation that befitting of liberal cosmopolitanism. Yet the insights of these scholars, no matter how important, do not address in depth the approaches of Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat who celebrate the application of Foucaultian thought. Below, it is stressed that these approaches appear to be taking for granted the Foucaultian notions of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’, and ‘power relations’, while leaving unanswered some important questions. Here, after attempting to respond to these questions, we are brought closer to the limits of Foucaultian thought which negates free will by undermining the development of the subject’s self-consciousness.

Manokha, after focusing on the Foucaultian notion of power, promotes an alternative understanding of the global discourse of human rights. He dismisses the claim that human rights are a coercive means of western intervention and world-colonization. Instead, suggests that the dominant structures of power produce a behavior according to which the agents, in the absence of coercion, decide to conform voluntarily to the human rights norms. However, Manokha’s argument begs the following questions: how exactly does this consent emerge, and most importantly, is this consent a product of the agent’s free will?

Edkins and Pin-Fat challenge the dominant understanding of sovereign power and propose replacing it with Foucault’s notion of ‘power relations’. Sovereign power is seen as a relationship of violence and its opposite pole as passive. However, the treatment of power as ‘power relations’ is based on the

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interaction between two poles that are indispensable, permitting a field of mutual response. Thus, the notion of contingency upon which this understanding of power rests does not only permit resistance but also relies on it. According to Edkins and Pin-Fat, this contingency assists in the promotion of agency and subjectivity. However, the question posed here is whether this notion of contingency alone is adequate to promote an understanding of subjectivity that accommodates free will?

Finally, the Foucaultian notions of ‘docile bodies’ and ‘biopower’ for Reid stimulate an alternative perspective on the problem of war and in particular, on the mobilization of war. Here it is nevertheless argued that what lies at the heart of Reid’s argumentation is a deeply biological, perhaps even a materialistic, argument. We are encouraged to believe that Reid’s biological and materialistic rationale behind war mobilization becomes evident in his suggestion that such a mobilization emerges in order to sustain the survival of the state’s population and the administrative domains constituting that population. This statement begs the following questions: if the subjects are not conscious of the administrative mechanisms that produce them, but simply experience them as coercive (just as Foucault’s ‘docile bodies’ suggest), why would they voluntarily fight and even die for these administrative mechanisms? Moreover, is it convincing enough to suggest that these administrative mechanisms nourish an appropriate disposition which in turn renders the subject willing to participate in an armed struggle, self-consciously, freely and voluntarily?

These questions make clear that IR scholars such as these take for granted the notions of consent, contingency and voluntarism, whereas our attention is drawn away from the concepts of free will and (self-)consciousness. Here it is instead suggested that consent, voluntarism and contingency demand a deeper examination and that Hegel’s conceptualizations of free will and self-consciousness assist us towards this goal. Previously, the insights of Rose, Allen and Taylor revealed that Foucaultian thought entails a misleading understanding of power and subjectivity which rest on power’s empty formalism and the relativism of Foucault’s subject. However, Hegel’s method of immanent critique provides a superior conceptualization of subjectivity which overcomes the intellectual shortcomings of Foucault’s thought after elucidating the formation of
the subjects self-consciousness and free will via the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which emerges from the state.

From a Hegelian perspective, Manokha’s approach entails weaknesses as he takes for granted notions of subjectivity and consent, without examining whether the agent’s consent to human rights discourse is a product of free will. Similarly Edkins’ and Pin-Fat’s approach does not appear to examine the dimension of subjectivity thoroughly, considering Foucault’s ‘power relations’ and the notion of contingency it entails as the sole source of agency upon which subjectivity can be founded. However, Hegel’s insights suggest that the formation of a subject’s self-consciousness cannot rest only on the dimension of contingency. Contingency echoes Hegel’s first moment of will as indetermination and nourishes an incomplete account of subjectivity which fails to seize self-consciousness and free will. Similarly, with respect to Manokha’s approach, the subject’s consent to the human rights discourse is unsuccessful in substantiating that this consent is a product of the subject’s free will, resulting from the absence of coercion.

For Hegel, free will is not a quality of the individual, but a process which presupposes three moments. The first moment (Indetermination) rest on contingency as it includes the element of pure indeterminacy and the will is content-less. The individual does not participate, nor is the will’s content subject to any restriction. Its content is from the outset, confronted with nature, needs, desires and impulses. In this sense, the subject is contingent, relativistic and alienated from itself as it fails to control its will. The second moment (Determination) includes the transition from a state of indeterminacy to differentiation and determination, positing a will with content. Although the will here is the product of an individual’s decision, it is not free because it adheres to a ‘selfish’ state of fixity as the ego intervenes to determine existence through this positing of itself as determinate. In the third moment, the will becomes the unity of the previous two moments and considers the genesis of the subject’s free will as a reciprocal action between individuals and the social world they form.

53 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 22
within an evolutionary process dictated by the Spirit (Geist). Thus, from a Hegelian perspective, the Foucaultian subject that rests on contingency and is a product of power relations portrays an infinitely restless moment that echoes the first moment of will (Indetermination). In this manner, Edkins and Pin-Fat who perceive the formation of agency solely from the dimension of the contingency of power-relations, give an incomplete account of subjectivity that is lacking (self-)consciousness and free will. Similarly, Manokha who also allies with Foucault’s subject-productive dimension of power-relations, rests on this dimension of contingency which echoes Hegel’s first moment of will. However, each moment of will cannot be treated separately. Instead, they must be viewed as complementary as all moments contribute to the formation of the self-conscious subject. The first moment of will therefore manifests an incomplete form of subjectivity since the subject is unable to control its will and thus fails to seize its self-consciousness and free will.

Reid applies Foucaultian theory in order to put forward an alternative approach to war mobilization. For Reid, the mobilization of war relates to the survival of the population and the subjects’ will to protect the administrative mechanisms of power which form them. Reid’s argument, which neglects the dimension of the subjects’ self-consciousness and free will, appears to rest on biological and materialistic premises. He treats the administrative mechanisms as power’s means of producing a subject in the form of a ‘docile body’. Again, this understanding of subjectivity undermines the subject’s notion of self-consciousness and free will. In this sense, he makes a very weak argument as to how an appropriate disposition can be formed that motivates the subject to wage war. Moreover, it is dubious to argue that a subject perceived in the form of ‘docile body’ is consciously willing to sacrifice itself for an administrative mechanism, whose dependence upon which it is not conscious of owing to its function as a means of oppression.

Reid describes administrative mechanisms as something abstract, yet efficient enough to produce the appropriate dispositions which will stimulate the subject’s sense of duty and mobilization to engage in war. However, these administrative mechanisms, formed via the notion of power-relations, strike one
as an empty formalism. A form that lacks a particular content and dismisses the empirical dimension cannot provide us with an accurate explanation as to how these dispositions emerge. For Hegel, these dispositions cannot be formed independently of the notion of a particular society and of the state. Reid’s analysis gives the broad impression that these administrative mechanisms - as empty forms - shape the subjects’ dispositions in a top-down manner (after tampering with the subjects’ biological functions), without elaborating further on the subject’s free will and self-consciousness.

Hegel’s analysis instead provides concrete content for these empty forms via his definition of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), incorporating the interplay among the subject, the society and the state. Ethical life, he suggests, is the customary morality which emerges in society and develops in the state. This provides a communitarian dimension according to which the subject seizes self-consciousness and free will through the state, though not in a passive manner.55 Hegel’s distinction of the will into three moments and division of the realm of society into three parts (family, civil society and the state) does not aim to treat each moment or part separately, but as complementary, in the form of an evolutionary process. Such complementary treatment contributes to a view of the succession of each moment of will and of each part of society as a process leading to the formation of the individual’s self-consciousness and freedom, actualized within the state. Thus, the Hegelian subject seizes its self-consciousness and freedom within the community’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) - a life which is formed in state and not determined by abstract administrative forces.56 Furthermore, Hegel’s description of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) gives rise to the notion of Patriotism, a disposition which complements the development of the subject’s self-consciousness while reconciling it with the state, rendering the individual ready to freely sacrifice for the state.

For Hegel, patriotism is such a disposition, with the citizen nurturing a truthful and rationally-grounded devotion to the state. Patriotism is a consequence of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and of the institutions within the state - a

55 Timothy C Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 135-140
56 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 22-26
volition which has become habitual.\textsuperscript{57} This Hegelian patriotism is grounded in freedom, but not of the liberal individualistic kind. The freedom Hegel conceives of is the free will which reconciles the individual with the community and the state. Hence, Hegel claims that patriotism is a consciousness that the subject’s substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and ends of another (the state), and in the latter’s relation to the individual. He notes that the modern state is based on the self-consciousness of citizens’ readiness to cooperate with each other and thus calls for increasingly less coercion. Here, neither coercion nor fear makes citizens social and free, but rather habit, volition and a rationally-grounded truth that are embodied in the irreducibly-collective institutions and practices of a modern state, such as the rule of law.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, Hegel’s analysis gives concrete content to the notion of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}). This life emerges from the interplay among individuals, social institutions and the state, and forms the disposition of patriotism, contributing to the subject’s self-consciousness and free will while shaping its willingness to sacrifice for the state.

In summary, this section has contended that the terms of contingency, consent and voluntarism (all of which were applied by the approaches of Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat) demanded a more sustained examination. In an effort to scrutinize these terms further, this section implicated a Hegelian-inspired analysis of the subject’s self-consciousness and free will. After considering Hegel’s insights regarding the formation of the subject’s self-consciousness, it became clear that Foucaultian IR approaches relied uncritically on the Foucaultian notions of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power relations’. In particular, the neglect of Foucaultian IR scholars to analyze free will before applying the concepts of contingency, consent and voluntarism, unveils the limits of a Foucaultian IR thought which undermines the formation the subject’s self-consciousness and ultimately, negates free will.

\textsuperscript{58} Gordon, “Modernity, Freedom and the State: Hegel’s Concept of Patriotism”, 305-310
Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that the ambivalence of Foucaultian-inspired IR scholars toward Foucault’s applicability to IR is misleading. It is contended that this debate fails to shed light on the actual limits of Foucault’s thought. While Pasha, Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat celebrated the contribution of Foucault to IR thought to an alternative understanding of a non-liberal subject, war mobilization, human rights norms and power, other scholars remain skeptical. Broadly, the skepticism of Neil, Debrix and Richmond relates to their assertion that any effort to incorporate Foucaultian thought into a particular discipline or a generalizable system of thought undermines the contingency on which Foucault’s theory rests. Moreover, Selby and Chandler go one step further in describing how Foucaultian-influenced post-structuralist approaches ultimately promote liberal cosmopolitanism, rather than undermine it.

Regardless of how engaging the insights of these scholars might be, they fail in practice not only to criticize in detail the approaches of Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat, but also to trace the actual limits of Foucaultian thought. After taking into consideration Hegel’s method of immanent critique, it became clear that Foucault’s re-examination of reality from the perspective power not only fails to reconsider reality beyond transcendental means but also nourishes a self-defeating understanding of subjectivity and freedom. In this respect, the critique of Foucault by Rose, Allen, and Taylor confirms that Foucault’s account of power assumes a transcendental dimension which represents an empty formalism. Moreover, Taylor underscores that Foucault’s purposeless succession of power regimes triggers a contingent notion of subjectivity which is self-alienating and lacks a self-conscious identity. Specifically, Rose’s and Allen’s approach contributed in exposing where the exact limits of Foucault’s understanding of power lie. From their analysis, it becomes clear that this empty formalism rests on the transcendental premises of Foucault’s power, since it is portrayed as the new location of the origin of knowledge, with its mix of force, contingency and transcendentalism. Taylor’s approach discloses the shortcomings of Foucaultian subjectivity.
Although Foucault’s treatment of subjectivity and power does not appear to be consistent across his work, according to Taylor, it nonetheless remains problematic. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault appears to be identifying power as the exclusive knowledge and subject-productive force, whereas in *The History of Sexuality Vol.2* and *The Subject and Power*, he re-introduces the concepts of freedom and subjectivity, disentangled from the tight control of power, and thus permitting agency. Nevertheless, *The History of Sexuality Vol.1 and Vol. 2* are for Taylor both works which imply the subject’s dependence upon power’s control. Ultimately, Taylor’s work reveals how the relativism of the Foucaultian subject emerges. For Taylor, Foucault’s treatment of power as neutral and his concept of the purposeless succession of power regimes serve to dominate the subject while rendering it relativistic. This purposeless succession of the power regimes deprives the subject of the ability to form an identity for itself as it nurtures a plurality of truths. This plurality of truths in turn render the Foucaultian subject relativistic with respect to the diverse truth regimes, undermining the subject’s sense of consciousness and purposeful agency. Ultimately, Foucault’s relativistic account of subjectivity thereby negates the subject’s self-consciousness and free will.

On the other hand, Hegelian immanent critique, which takes into consideration Hegel’s dialectical method (as determinate negation) and his philosophical system of Spirit (*Geist*), permits the reconsideration of reality without transcendental means and succeeds where Foucault failed. Hegel, via immanent critique is capable of reconsidering reality without transcendental or arbitrary means and thereby introducing an alternative conceptualization of ethics and subjectivity which emerge within the state and allow the subject to acquire self-consciousness and free will. Hegel’s conceptualization of free will was cited in this chapter to demonstrate the shortcomings of Foucault’s understanding of freedom, whereas the next chapter will analyze the notion of free will in detail. Here, Hegel’s notion of free will was applied to expose the shortcomings of IR scholars who celebrate the application of Foucaultian thought to IR. More precisely, it was argued that the approaches of Reid, Manokha, Edkins and Pin-Fat, by relying uncritically on Foucault’s notions of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power relations, promoted a misleading understanding of the terms contingency, consent and voluntarism. In an effort to examine these
terms further, this section drew on a Hegelian-inspired analysis of the subject’s self-consciousness and free will. Hegel’s insights revealed that Foucaultian IR thought prevents the subject from acquiring self-consciousness, undermining the notions of consent and voluntarism they rely on.
CHAPTER 3: Hegel’s Contribution Towards Unveiling the Non-Emancipating Effects of Freedom in Foucaultian, Kantian and IR Thought

Introduction

The current chapter which is divided into two parts, elaborates further on Hegel’s notion of free will and enriches the previous chapter’s critique of Foucault. This chapter demonstrates that an immanent critique of Kant’s and Foucault’s thought shows that their understanding of subjectivity and freedom is self-defeating since the Foucaultian notion of power and the Kantian conceptualization of the subject rest on transcendental premises. Also the implications of these transcendental premises are reflected on the Foucaultian and Kantian inspired IR approaches too. Hegel via immanent critique attempted to conceptualize subjectivity and freedom without arbitrary or transcendental means and promoted an alternative understanding of free will as a process which stems from the development of the state’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Such a notion of free will avoids the separation between senses and reason as well as the separation between the universal and the particular dimension. In that respect Hegelian free will overcomes the empty formalism of Kantian ethics and the relativism of Foucaultian subjectivity, both of which deprive the subject of its self-consciousness and free will.

Specifically, the first part explains why Foucaultian and Kantian thought fail to promote free will from the perspective of Hegel. Foucault’s and Kant’s understanding of subjectivity and freedom are undermined by Hegel’s conceptualization of free will within the realm of Spirit (Geist), which promotes the understanding of freedom as a process, formed by the three moments of will. Hegel’s discrimination of the three moments of will discloses how the shortcomings of Foucaultian and Kantian thought emerge. Hegel’s understanding of free will reveals a self-defeating conceptualization of freedom that is not only observed in Kantian and Foucaultian thought but also in contemporary IR thought. This self-defeating understanding of freedom occurs when: i) the
subject is perceived as a relativistic or a self-determining individual which reflects Hegel’s incomplete moments of will; and ii) freedom is understood as an unobstructed choice-making capacity. What this understanding of freedom misses is the failure to acknowledge that a subject’s ‘free’ options emerge from a particular domain, which is beyond the subject’s control.

The second part elaborates how the understanding of freedom by certain IR approaches is not emancipating and paves the way to the promotion of liberal ideals. Hegel’s treatment of free will as a process comprised of three moments which are shaped by the development of the state’s ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), reveals how Sen’s, Chandler’s and Frost’s conceptualization of freedom is self-defeating and nourishes liberal ideals. Hegel’s free will unveils that Sen’s and Chandler’s approaches promote a non-emancipating definition of freedom. Sen’s treatment of the subject as a self-determining individual, echoes Hegel’s second incomplete moment of will, whereas the options which are portrayed as ‘free’, remain beyond the subject’s control. Chandler on the other hand treats the human subject as an entity lacking determination, bearing an infinite freedom with unlimited capabilities. However, this notion of an infinite freedom which lacks determination is not emancipating, echoing Hegel’s first incomplete moment of indeterminate will. Thus, Chandler’s and Sen’s approaches to subjectivity, negate freedom as they represent an incomplete development of the subject’s self-consciousness and free will. Moreover since they both treat the ‘free’ options as values stemming from the democratic liberal state paradigm, Sen’s and Chandler’s understanding of freedom ends up encouraging liberal ideals.

Finally Frost’s analysis, after dismissing Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit - upon which the Hegelian understanding of subjectivity and free will rest - he ends up treating the subject as a self-determining unit, echoing Hegel’s incomplete first moment of will. Frost, instead of adopting Hegel’s notion of free will within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*) and incorporating all three moments of will, he puts forward an alternative account of freedom. Frost portrays freedom as the outcome of the individual’s rights which stem from the double anarchy of the Global Civil Society (GCS) and the Society of Sovereign States (SOSS). However, Hegel’s insights reveal that Frost’s understanding of freedom undermines free will as the double anarchy fails to promote diversity and
pluralism but favours an understanding of freedom which is conditioned by democratic liberal ideals.

I. How Hegel’s Conceptualization of Free Will Unveils the Limits of Foucaultian and Kantian Understanding of Freedom

Hegel’s immanent critique reveals that a self-determining or relativistic perception of subjectivity promotes an understanding of the real which rests on transcendental or arbitrary premises. This triggers an understanding of ethics and power as an empty and transcendental formalism which leads to a self defeating conceptualization of freedom.

Let us remind that Hegel’s immanent critique succeeds in forming the critique of the real in its own terms after taking into consideration the philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) and the dialectical method. The combination of Hegel’s system with his dialectical method avoids the dualism which separates: the subject from the object of knowledge; reason from reality; rationalism from empiricism; the universal from the particular, contributing to a non-transcendental conceptualization of the Absolute. In that respect, an understanding of immanent critique which is premised on the notion of Spirit (Geist) provides us a more complete understanding of subjectivity and empirical reality after exposing the contradiction between reality and its true essence. This part will explain how this approach of Hegel’s immanent critique can enrich our understanding of ethics and freedom after eliminating this contradiction which exacerbates the disparity between existing reality and its true nature. Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) overcomes this disparity after promoting an alternative understanding of subjectivity and free will. According to Hegel, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is formed within the state and contributes to the development of the subject’s self-consciousness and free-will as a process comprised of three moments. This enriched understanding of subjectivity and freedom overcomes the limits of Foucaultian and Kantian thought.

To be more precise, this section will firstly bring to our attention the flaws of Foucaultian subjectivity, power and freedom that where analyzed in the previous chapter. Secondly, it emphasizes on Hegel’s understanding of freedom within the realm of Spirit (Geist), commencing with the important discrimination
Hegel draws among the three moments of will. After arguing that each moment of will promotes an incomplete idea of freedom, Foucaultian thought is undermined since his understanding of subjectivity and freedom echoes these incomplete moments of will. Thus, the analysis of Hegel’s free will makes clear why Foucaultian thought is self-defeating since Foucault’s understanding of freedom fails to emancipate the subject. Foucault’s failure to promote a free subject stems from his flawed understanding of power and subjectivity which reflect only one of Hegel’s three moments of will, depriving the subject of the process that enables her to form a free will and actualize it within the state. Finally, a few additional comments will be raised which describe how Hegel’s conceptualization of freedom differs from Kant’s after stressing the implications of Hegel’s alternative understanding of the subjectivity and freedom.

The previous chapter, highlighted a number of flaws entailed in Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity, power and freedom. In the Subject of Power it appears as if Foucault ‘invents’ freedom out of necessity. He treats freedom as power’s ‘tool’, incorporated to accommodate the government of power relations. Foucaultian ‘freedom’ assists the development of a domain which renders possible the subject’s ‘agency’. It was argued that the exercise of the subject’s freedom was restrained within a very specific domain, the limits of which were dictated by power. Therefore, at the very same moment that the subject’s ‘agency’ emerged within the limits of this domain, power assumed the control of the subject.\(^1\) In that sense, Foucault’s freedom becomes nothing but a tool, utilized by power which allows just a set of (predetermined) options within a specific domain, permitting -if at all any- a very limited form of agency. Thus, Foucault’s ‘freedom’ becomes a means of controlling rather than emancipating the subject.

Moreover the projection of power as neutral and the purposeless succession of one power regime for another is not a process which liberates the subject. As Taylor notes, elaborating a specific domain where the individual is given the opportunity to exercise his freedom, acts in fact as a domain where the individual submits himself under control. The Power – Subject relation takes the form of a Doctor - Patient respectively. Such relation is founded on the

\(^1\) Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject of Power’, Critical Enquiry 8 (Summer 1982), 781-782
presumption that one knows (Doctor/ Power) and that the other has the
overwhelming interest in taking advice (Patient/ Subject). Therefore, a Doctor-
Patient relation cannot be neutral because although both parties are constrained,
the first part (Doctor/ Power) dominates the other restricting the subject’s agency
and freedom. Paradoxically again, Foucault’s ‘neutral’ power produces a subject
which is not free but oppressed.

In the next section, Foucault’s understanding of power, subjectivity and
freedom will be further undermined by Hegel’s conceptualization of free will. Hegel approaches freedom as a process via the three moments of will within the
realm of Spirit (Geist). Hegel’s discrimination of the three moments of will disclose how the shortcomings of Foucaultian thought emerge.

**Hegel’s Conceptualization of Freedom**

This section focuses on Hegel’s conceptualization of free will as found in the *Philosophy of Right*. Although emphasis here is drawn on the three moments of will, the next section examines in further detail how freedom is formed within the realm of Spirit (Geist) after implicating Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state.

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel after describing what freedom is via the three moments of will, he holds that the state is the necessary ground which allows men to actualize freedom. In more general terms, as Luther mentions, the Hegelian concept of right concerns free will and its realization, which requires transition to practice. The state, is at the heart of Hegel’s political philosophy as it is the ground where Hegel’s idea of freedom actualizes.

Unlike liberalism, freedom for Hegel is not a quality of an individual, but a process. A process of acquiring self-consciousness and knowledge. According to Hegel, the acquisition of free will is a process which presupposes three moments:

1. Indeterminacy;
2. Transition to determination (differentiation, finitude, particularization);
3. The will as the unity of these moments (1) and (2).

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4 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 20
In further detail, the first moment (Indeterminacy) includes the element of pure indeterminacy. In that sense the will here is content-less. The individual does not participate or is nowhere to be found here and it is the will-in-itself, belonging to itself. In this moment, the will’s content is not subject to any restriction. Its content is immediately presented by nature, needs desires and impulses. Here, the will is not in a state of freedom, it is content-less as the will of unrestricted infinity and absolute abstraction or universality.\(^5\)

The second moment (Determination), includes the transition from a state of undifferentiated indeterminacy to differentiation and determination, positing will with a content. Although the will here is the product of an Individual’s (subjective) decision, still, it is not free as well as it sticks to a ‘selfish’ state of fixity. In Hegel’s words ‘the ego steps in principle into determinate existence through this positing of itself as something determinate’. This poses as the absolute finite moment, where the individual’s ego is particularized.\(^6\)

In the third moment the will is the unity of the previous two moments which brings us to a state of true freedom as it combines the moments of will-in-itself and for-itself. In this moment, as Hegel notes, ‘the will transforms into a particularity reflected into itself and so brought back to universality i.e. its individuality’.\(^7\) In that sense, the will is not something complete and universal prior to its superseding and idealising this determination. The will is not a will until this self mediating activity, returns to itself.\(^8\)

The Hegelian moments of will could be described in more simple terms as follows; every self-consciousness knows itself: Firstly as universal, as the potentiality of abstracting from everything determinate; and Secondly as particular with a determinate object content and aim. Still the first two moments are only incomplete forms of freedom. For Hegel, freedom is an ever lasting process, while constantly remaining a moment our self-consciousness and self-knowledge (γνῶθι σεαυτόν)\(^9\). Thus, freedom for Hegel is not when our decisions are influenced -if not controlled- by impulses, desires and choices dictated by the maximization of pleasure. This is immediate will, corrupted and not subject to

\(^5\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 21

\(^6\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 22

\(^7\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 23

\(^8\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 24

\(^9\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 25-27
the individual’s self-conscious control, thus not free.

Before criticizing Foucault’s conceptualization of Freedom from a Hegelian perspective, it is necessary to summarize in more approachable terms the first two moments of will. These two moments of will, which manifest an incomplete form of freedom, bear similarities with Foucault’s understanding of freedom, indicating the flaws of his approach whilst explaining how Foucault’s paradoxical conclusions emerge.

What Hegel appears to be arguing is that the first moment of will, includes the element of pure indeterminacy. In that sense the will here is contentless. The individual does not participate or is nowhere to be found and it is simply the will-in-itself, belonging to itself. The first moment of will is responsible for the absence of subjectivity. The second moment of will includes the transition from a state of undifferentiated indeterminacy and the lack of subjectivity, into differentiation and the determination of the subject. However, the will here is not free on two accounts: a) Such will is the product of an Individual’s (subjective) decision, which it is not free as it sticks to a ‘selfish’ state of fixity which is not emancipating as the will becomes restrained by the ‘Egotistic’ subject; b) The egotistic subject maintains a false impression of acquiring freedom via its ability of free choice. However the real question for Hegel lies in what determines the agents options and decision. An agent does not enjoy freedom via unobstructed choice because his actions and determinations are grounded in his drives, desires and inclinations. The defect of this conception is that it stops at something given from the outside: it stops at drives and desires, the content of which is not determined internally but externally, not by the agent but the nature. The agent is not fully self-determining because the material of his reflexion and deliberation, the menu from which he chooses is given by nature and not determined by him/herself. It is precisely these two incomplete moments of free will which expose the shortcomings and paradoxes of Foucault’s theory.

**Explaining Why Foucaultian Freedom Fails To Emancipate the Subject**

Here, it will be argued that Foucault’s understanding of freedom is self-defeating since it fails to emancipate the subject. Quite on the contrary Foucaultian ‘freedom’ becomes a means that allows the perpetuation of power’s
control over the subject. Hegel’s insights, reveal that the failure of Foucault’s freedom to promote a free subject, stems from his flawed understanding of subjectivity and power which fail to examine reality without transcendental or arbitrary means. Taylor’s and Rose’s analysis, at the previous chapter revealed how the portrayal of Foucaultian power as neutral rests on transcendental premises and nourishes a relativistic notion of subjectivity that lacks self-consciousness. Taylor dismissed the Foucaultian idea of neutral power on two accounts: Firstly, the treatment of power as neutral and the succession of power regimes as purposeless cannot be seen as liberating due to the relativism it entails. Moving from one context to another, without purpose, denies the subject’s conscious agency. As Taylor holds, while it is certainly not the case that all patterns of activity are issued from conscious action, yet all patterns have to be made intelligible in relation to conscious action. In that sense the Foucaultian ‘neutral’ power produces a subject which is not free but relativistic and controlled by the changing power regimes.

Taylor’s remarks, no matter how useful they are, they fail to explain why Foucaultian thought renders the subject’s free will impossible. The Foucaultian subject’s relativism, echoes Hegel’s first moment of will as indeterminacy. Hegel’s understanding of free will makes clear that Foucault’s relativistic subject, since it is alienated from itself and the control of its will, represents an incomplete form of subjectivity since it fails to acquire self-consciousness and freedom. This lack of consciousness and the subject’s failure to control her will is reflected on Foucault’s treatment of freedom. In the case of Foucaultian freedom, the domains which form the subject (disciplinary, sexuality etc) as well as the options which stem from these domains, provide the subject with a range of ‘free’ choices which are in fact beyond the control and determination of a self-conscious subject. These options are provided by an external domain beyond the subject’s influence, thus the subject’s consciousness ceases to be self-determined but externally regulated. As Patten notes, an enquiry on what constitutes freedom should go beyond the notion of unobstructed choice. If we bear firmly in mind

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10 Taylor, ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’, 167-168
that the content of what one wills is a given one, it follows that she is determined by it and in this very respect she is no longer free.\footnote{Alan Patten, \textit{Hegel’s Idea of Freedom} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 49-51}

At this point it is necessary to illustrate the differences between the Hegelian and the Kantian notion of freedom since Kant too does not equate freedom to unobstructed choice. Hegel’s analysis of freedom bears some similarity with Kant’s since they both argued that neither the subject’s natural will nor the subject’s ability of unobstructed choice-making leads to freedom. However, their differences will be stressed below after developing a more detailed analysis of Hegelian freedom within the realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) that implicates too the notions of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) and the State.

\textbf{Differences Between Kantian Freedom and the Hegelian Understanding of Freedom Within the Realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist})}

According to Kant, the subject alone is able to seize freedom. The Kantian subject reaches freedom alone via the exercise of reason, understating the influence of the senses, dispositions and social institutions. Here it is suggested that Kant’s conceptualization of freedom is founded on two problematic themes. Firstly, the Kantian subject is perceived in the form of the individual ego that is autonomous and self-determining. Secondly, Kant’s categorical imperative, upon which his notion of freedom rests, is abstract and vacuous, reproducing an empty formalism. On the other hand, Hegelian thought overcomes the flaws of Kant’s understanding of freedom after putting forward an alternative account of subjectivity and freedom which is tied with his concept of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) and are determined by his notion of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) and the state.

Kant’s understanding of freedom prioritizes reason over desire or other dispositions, while drawing emphasis on the individual’s capacity to acquire freedom alone. For Kant, human freedom rests on the individual’s ability to be self-determining, acknowledging that human nature already entails a finite rational will. Therefore, rational will is according to Kant the source of human freedom. His conception of freedom relates to free choice as independence from
determination by sensuous impulse. Thus, the basis of duty or moral obligation is found in an abstract, a priori concept of reason. Hence, no external authority is necessary to constitute or inform of the demands of morality. For Kant, duty is not tied to social expectations or laws. Instead Kant treats duty as an action one performs whilst being fully rational. For Kant, being moral consists of knowing the right action and not acting because of social pressure. According to Kant, performing a right action via reason and the ability to seize freedom is within the capacity of each rational being alone. This unconditional moral obligation is founded on a maxim that each individual has an a-priori reason to obey. According to the categorical imperative a rational being ‘acts only in accordance with that maxim through which one can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law’.  

On the contrary, Hegelian freedom stresses both the importance of the individual, the community and of the social institutions towards the formation of an individual’s self-consciousness, and freedom. Since Hegelian philosophy rests on the notion of Spirit (Geist), this allows Hegel to overcome the problematic themes of Kantian thought, after: a) putting forward a theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive that rejects abstract a-priory or normative claims; b) developing an understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which overcomes empty formalisms, values or abstract behaviorisms.

Regarding the first thematic, Hegel rejects abstract a-priori or normative claims, as his philosophy is neither aiming in putting forward a descriptive account of concepts or events nor in prescribing values in a formalistic way. The Hegelian philosophical system is tied with the concept of Spirit (Geist) which challenges the treatment of the subject as self-dependent individual who is able to put forward normative truths. Hegel rejects such normative truths in an attempt to indicate a dynamic relation between the subject and the theoretical object. As Hutchings notes, for such relation to be dynamic the subject as theorist should not have a pre-determined or fixed point of view, treating the object of study as passive. In other words, the theorists must recognize themselves as patients and participants in the processes they seek to understand and judge.  

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To be more precise, in the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel questions claim-making authorities, whereas in chapter four, Hegel questions self-ascribed authorities. According to Hegel, self-consciousness, must always be provisional. Self-consciousness should not be projected as a motionless tautology of ‘I = I’. In paragraphs 167 and 175, Hegel unveils the double nature of self-consciousness (consciousness of an object as this-such and the non-positional consciousness awareness of my taking it to be this-such). Thus, after refuting the theorists self-certain consciousness, Hegel attempts to indicate the dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object which dismisses any pre-determination or fixity on behalf of the subject and ceases to treat the object of analysis as passive. In other words, as Taylor notes, Hegel, protested against Kant’ view of man, dismissing the motionless tautology of ‘I = I’. According to Hegel, rationality and self-consciousness is not something a man starts with, but something he comes to. Unlike Kant, this means two things: First, beyond the hierarchy of the forms of life there is a hierarchy of the modes of thought. As a person’s rational consciousness of herself grows, her mode of expression of this self-consciousness evolves. Also, the fact that rationality and self-consciousness is something that a person achieves rather than starts with, means that she has a history. Moreover for Hegel, as it is clearly indicated in the *Philosophy of Right*, this ascend up of a ladder is formed by the society’s parts (family, civil society and state) which contribute to the development of man’s self-consciousness and ultimately freedom within the realm of community. Thus, Hegel’s understanding of freedom, is not associated with the individualist notion of self-determining subjectivity but it is formed through an ethical life *(Sittlichkeit)* within the state.

Hegel developed ethical life *(Sittlichkeit)* in order to promote an alternative conceptualization of Kantian morality which is founded on a vacuous and abstract understanding of duty and reason. Ethical life *(Sittlichkeit)* is a form of customary morality, the content of which is derived from particular social institutions (family, civil society and is actualized in state. Thus, ethical life is developed in accordance to the customary ethics of particular social institutions

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14 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 104-109
(family, civil society) within state and is not based on abstract universal principles. Therefore, the subject’s emancipation occurs once it reconciles itself with society within the realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Immanuel Kant equated the subject to a self-determining individual and argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than senses or whims, in accordance to the categorical imperative. The application of categorical imperative\(^\text{16}\) is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a sense of duty which is emancipating. However that content of this sense of duty is vague in Immanuel Kant’s thought.\(^\text{17}\) Hegel gives a concrete content to Immanuel Kant’s seemingly abstract requirement of freedom. The categorical imperative is a vague universal duty which promotes and sustains a self-determined form of subjectivity which is alienated from society. On the contrary, Hegelian freedom and subjectivity overcomes the alienation of the self-determining subjects which nourishes the tension between the individual and society and promotes the understanding of freedom via ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Therefore, Hegel’s understanding of ethical life as a customary morality, formed within a particular community, succeeds in providing a content to abstract empty principles whereas it reconciles the subject with the social institutions, transforming her as an organic part of the whole, cultivating the citizen’s fulfillment and affinity within the state.\(^\text{18}\)

As Patten notes, Hegel’s aim was to reconcile modern Europeans to the central institutions and practices of their social world. Hegel’s project involves an alternative understanding of freedom which gives people a reason to reconcile with their social institutions, after indicating that these institutions and practices are necessary for the full actualization of their freedom.\(^\text{19}\)

Patten argues that there is a strong Kantian element in Hegel’s conception of freedom. Both Kant and Hegel are not treating freedom as an unobstructed choice-making capacity. However Hegel departs from the Kantian framework since he does not solely associate the development of freedom with the notion of reason. Where Kant, for instance looks to an abstract principle like the

\(^{16}\) Immanuel Kant, affirms the existence of an absolute moral law via the categorical imperative. The application of categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a sense of duty which is emancipating, instead of the individual desires which prohibit the subject’s self-control and determination.

\(^{17}\) Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, 128-132

\(^{18}\) Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, 135-140

\(^{19}\) Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 72-73
categorical imperative, to determine how the subject’s freedom emerges, Hegel instead develops a richer and more concrete account of freedom. Unlike Kant, according to Hegel freedom is formed by the three moments of will and actualized by the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state. In that sense freedom for Hegel can only be seized within the community and the practice of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), rather than the individual alone. Moreover, Hegel’s conception of freedom, takes a considerably more accommodating stance towards the agent’s contingently given desires and inclinations than is usually thought. As Patten adds, Hegel thinks that the Kantian view of freedom underestimates the ethical significance of various emotions and feelings. One aim of the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is to integrate dispositions such as love, honor in one’s estate and patriotism into a theory of freedom and ethics.\(^{20}\)

To be rational, self-determining and free in the Hegelian sense, an agent must strive to integrate his choices into a rational harmony with his desires. According to Hegel there are particular dispositions, feelings and motivations that it is necessary for an agent to have in particular situations. Thus, Hegel lays emphasis not exclusively on reason but on dispositions too. This is a just requirement as it signifies that these dispositions or desires ought to be essentially our own, that we as subjects are supposed to have identified ourselves with their content. The member of an estate, a corporation, should have dispositions such as rectitude, honor and loyalty, whereas the citizen should be motivated by patriotism and civic virtue. Hegel rejects Kant’s proposition that a moral action should be motivated by reason or duty alone rather than an inclination or desire of the agent. Hegel thinks that doctrine of the ‘duty for the duty’s sake’ not only makes it difficult to understand how there could be any action at all but also seems to underestimate the ethical significance of certain emotions and dispositions.\(^{21}\) For Hegel only when an agent performs the right action with the right disposition (not any contingently given desire) does the agent obtain an awareness of the rationality of his activity and becomes a rationally self-determining free subject.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{20}\) Patten, *Hegel’s Idea of Freedom*, 45-48

\(^{21}\) Patten, *Hegel’s Idea of Freedom*, 54-59

\(^{22}\) Patten, *Hegel’s Idea of Freedom*, 69
As Franco notes Hegel’s anti-Kantian thesis is clearly expressed in the *Nuremberg Philosophical Propaedeutic*. Hegel argues there that the freedom of man, regarding the natural impulses, consists not in the disposal of such impulses altogether and thus striving to escape from his nature; but in his recognition of them as a necessity and as something rational. In realizing them accordingly through his will, he finds himself constrained only in so far he creates for himself accidental and arbitrary impressions.\(^{23}\)

Franco stresses that Hegelian third moment of will is the unity of abstract universality and particularity. In this moment, we are not one-sidedly within ourselves but willingly limit ourselves with reference to another while acknowledging ourselves in this limitation. In simpler terms, Hegel’s idea of ‘being with oneself in another’ encapsulates his revision of the Kantian idea of freedom as rational autonomy. The Kantian emphasis on self-dependence never successfully incorporates the otherness or particularity. Hegel’s concept of freedom aims to redress this Kantian defect after breaking down the opposition between self-dependence and otherness or determinacy. As Hegel puts it, the freedom within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*) is a process, not merely an absence of dependence on the other won outside of the other but won within the other and actualized within the state.\(^{24}\)

Previously, after stressing the differences between Kant’s and Hegel’s approach to freedom, it was argued that Hegel’s analysis was able to overcome the shortcomings of Kantian thought, after incorporating the understanding of freedom within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*). Kant’s self-determining account of subjectivity and the empty formalism of the categorical imperative was rectified through Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom that is actualized in the state and formed within a particular community via his notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). The next part elaborates on the contribution of Hegel’s understanding of freedom and subjectivity after exposing how certain scholars nurture a problematic conceptualization of freedom in the field of IR thought.

\(^{23}\) Franco, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom*, 167  
\(^{24}\) Franco, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom*, 160-162
II. How Hegel’s Insights Expose the Non-Emancipating Effects of Freedom in IR Thought and the Nourishment of Liberal Ideals

Introduction

The concept of freedom is not extensively analyzed in the field of IR theory. On the contrary it appears that the term freedom is applied uncritically without prior elaboration. Recent work of Chandler, Sen and Frost refers to freedom, however their approaches promote a defective understanding of freedom, the flaws of which are easily detected from a Hegelian perspective.

Chandler attempts to rethink agency and freedom via Amartya Sen’s understanding of ‘development as freedom’. Sen promotes the conceptualization of freedom as capabilities in order to challenge the liberal-economical conceptualization of development. Nevertheless, Hegel’s insights on free will, allow us to understand that Sen’s and Chandler’s understanding of freedom does not only fail to emancipate but also assists the promotion of liberal ideals.

Regarding Frost, although his approach is influenced by the Philosophy of Right; he dismisses the metaphysical aspects of this work and ignores Hegel’s account of free will. Frost’s point of departure is the reconciliation of the individual with the community but unlike Hegel, Frost’s understanding freedom is not attributed to the development of the subject’s self-consciousness via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in the state within the realm of Spirit (Geist). According to Frost freedom stems from the the double anarchy formed by the Global Civil Society and Society (GCS) of Sovereign States (SOSS). Frost dismisses freedom as a process of acquiring self-consciousness and identifies freedom in the form of agency that emerges from the individual’s acquisition of human rights, promoted by the GCS and the SOSS. However, from the Hegelian perspective of free will, Frost’s understanding of freedom reflects solely the second moment of will which is not emancipating since the options that form agency are beyond the subject’s control. Moreover, since these options are a product of a particular understanding of GCS, they rest on democratic liberal ideals and Frost’s understanding of freedom perpetuates them. Thus, Frost develops an account of subjectivity which obstructs free will but instead promotes democratic liberal ideals and an non-
emancipating account of freedom. At the next chapter it will be analyzed how exactly Hegel overcomes the non-emancipating and coercive effects of liberalism after re-approaching certain liberal traits, such as the market economy and private property from the perspective of Spirit (Geist).

The Shortcomings of Sen’s and Chandler’s Understanding of Freedom From The Hegelian Perspective of Free Will

Although Hegel’s detailed elaboration of free will is found in the Philosophy of Right, it was already argued that the Phenomenology of Spirit should be treated as the point of departure in order to comprehend Hegel’s understanding of free will within the realm of Spirit (Geist). This helps us understand that the subject as a theorist cannot operate in abstraction from the particularity of the object of analysis and in this regard, the understanding of freedom cannot be founded on abstract ideals. In our case, this does not only imply that the theorist is necessary implicated in international politics, but also that the theory is inherently political.

Therefore, Hegel after treating freedom as a process within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which entails the three moments of will, he associates the actualization of freedom with the state. The main themes of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right are the discrimination of the three moments of will and the development of freedom within the realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which is the customary morality of the community. Hegel proceeds to the distinction of the will in three moments -universality, particularity, individuality- as well as the realm of society in three parts; family, civil society and the state.

Again, it is stressed that Hegel’s objective is neither descriptive nor prescriptive and he is certainly not putting forward a regulative theory of interstate relations from an observer’s point of view who wishes to provide rectifying directions.25 Hegel’s insights are applied here to underline the shortcomings of certain scholarly perspectives which promote a non emancipating account of freedom, informed by self-determining subjectivity or arbitrary will that leads to subjection and the triumph of liberal ideals.

Finally, the previous part revealed that Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*) underscores the limits of Foucault’s and Kant’s conceptualization of freedom. Foucault and Kant rest on a self-defeating understanding of freedom which occurs when: i) the subject is perceived as a relativistic or a self-determining individual which reflects Hegel’s incomplete moments of will; and ii) freedom is understood as an unobstructed choice-making capacity. What this understanding of freedom misses is the failure to acknowledge that a subject’s ‘free’ options emerge from a particular domain, which is beyond the subject’s control. These remarks will be useful to expose the shortcomings of Sen’s, Chandler’s and Frost’s approaches which are inspired by Kant’s and Foucault’s insights.

Sen promotes the conceptualization of freedom as capabilities in order to challenge the liberal-economical understanding of development. He holds that the expansion of a person’s capabilities, enhances the individual’s agency and freedom which ultimately triggers development. Chandler is in accord with Sen’s approach whereas he appears to be attributing to Sen’s theory, a richer conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity. Instead, it is argued that both Sen’s and Chandler’s approaches entail flaws according to a Hegelian perspective as their conceptualization of freedom is not emancipating and assists the promotion of liberalism.

For Sen, un-freedom can arise either from inadequate processes (violation of voting principles or other political or civil rights) or inadequate opportunities (capability to escape premature mortality or involuntary starvation). Sen’s analysis of development treats the freedoms of individuals as the basic building blocks. Attention is paid to the expansion of the capabilities of persons to live the kind of lives they value and have reason to value. These capabilities can be enhanced by public policy. The direction of public policy can be influenced by the effective use of participatory capabilities by the public. Sen’s understanding of development is associated with the individual’s agency as a member of a public and as a participant in the economic social and political actions.26

Sen’s analysis presents the idea that the enhancement of human freedom is both the main object and the primary means of development. The objective of

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development relates to the valuation of the actual freedoms enjoyed by the people involved. Sen insists that individual capabilities crucially depend on, economic, social and political arrangements. In making appropriate institutional arrangements, the instrumental roles of distinct types of freedom, providing both adequate processes and opportunities, have to be considered. The ends and means of development, call for placing of freedom at the centre of the stage. People have to be actively involved, not as passive recipients of the fruits of development programmes. On the contrary the state and society should strengthen and safeguard human capabilities which permit them to be actively invoked.\(^\text{27}\)

Sen’s conceptualization of ‘development as freedom’ emerges in an effort to evaluate development. Freedom as capabilities, provides Sen a more complete measure to evaluate development. Sen identifies a general approach that concentrates on the capabilities of people to do things – and the freedom to lead lives – that they have reason to value. In this sense the capability approach has a breadth and sensitivity that gives itself a very extensive reach, beyond the current liberal or economical conceptualization of development which limits the evaluation of development in terms of civil rights or financial figures. Thus for Sen, a person’s ‘capability’ refers to the alternative combinations of functioning that are feasible for an individual to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom which allows an individual to achieve alternative functioning combinations.\(^\text{28}\)

Such an understanding of freedom as capabilities, assists in promoting an active form of agency according to Sen. Individuals are not seen merely as patients to whom benefits will be dispensed by the process of development. Responsible adults must be in charge of their own well being, deciding themselves on how to apply their capabilities. However, the capabilities that a person has is not entirely depended on the individual but on the nature of social arrangements too.\(^\text{29}\)

Sen concludes that the acknowledgement of the role of human qualities in promoting and sustaining economic growth, tells us nothing about why such economic growth is sought in the first place. If instead the focus is on the

\(^{27}\) Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 53  
\(^{28}\) Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 77  
\(^{29}\) Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 288
expansion of human freedom to live and the kinds of lives that people have reason to value, then the role of economic growth, in expanding these opportunities, has to be integrated in that more foundational understanding of the process of development as the expansion of human capability to lead more worthwhile and more free lives.\textsuperscript{30}

Chandler’s article is less concerned with critiquing development as an economically driven policy discourse and control. His approach seeks instead to consider Sen’s work in a broader context of the understanding of human subject itself, particularly as it is articulated at the limits of liberalism. For Chandler, Sen’s approach assists in highlighting how these limits are articulated on the metaphysical terms of the inner life of the subjects of international development policy interventions. Chandler agrees with Sen that development does not have a fixed external or a particular materialistic form of measurement, whereas he adds that as freedom looses its materiality, becomes relocated to the interior life capabilities of the individual.\textsuperscript{31}

Chandler is in accord with Sen again regarding the critiques of the market based liberal conception of the rational autonomous individual who is capable of assuming responsibility for its own development. For Sen the individual is the only agent of development but the individual is a vulnerable subject needing the enabling or empowering of external agency. Thus, development -understood in terms agential capabilities- cannot be measured materially because these capacities are internal to the individual. In that sense, Sen’s understanding of development as freedom necessitates an appropriate environment for a subject to seize reason and freedom. Chandler argues too that the subject of development rests entirely on internalization judged on the basis of the individual’s development and the use of reasoned agency. Thus development for both Chandler and Sen is measured within the individuals inner achievement of ‘freedom’ where freedom is treated as a continuum, the goal of which is never reached. Therefore, they both claim that ‘development as freedom’ promotes an

\textsuperscript{30} Sen, \textit{Development as Freedom}, 291

understanding of freedom which is not liberal as it does not rest on autonomy, self-government or democracy.\textsuperscript{32}

For the capabilities approach of freedom, there is no such thing as the universal liberal subject. Here the subject is autonomous but not free. The subject is autonomous as a choice making actor, but never truly capable of making a free and reasoned choice. Freedom -as choice making capacity- needs to be expanded constantly. Therefore, Chandler argues that the agent-centered approach of Sen is conceptualized not in political legal terms but in terms of social empowerment, contending that a lack of freedom can exist as much in a wealthy liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{33}

Nevertheless, as Chandler notes, according to Sen, political freedom and market economic competition are to be valued because they help facilitate individual choice-making capacities and enable their expression.\textsuperscript{34} The assumption is that without development individuals will not be free. Here none of us are free from the need for development. Development is the process of altering the social milieu which shapes our capacities and capabilities for free choices. Therefore, the goal of policy-making becomes the enabling and the empowering of this subject, of expanding its capabilities and capacities. Expanding capabilities infinitely is tied with Chandler’s conceptualization of subjectivity that lacks fixity. Therefore according to Chandler, the capabilities approach dismisses a fixed conceptualization of the subject.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Challenging the ‘Emancipating’ Effects of Development as Freedom}

Before exposing the shortcomings of ‘Development as Freedom’, an important distinction needs to be made between Sen’s conceptualization of the free agent and Chandler’s conceptualization of the free subject he attributes to Sen. Chandler appears to be attributing to Sen a richer conceptualization of

\textsuperscript{34} Chandler, ‘Human Centered’ Development? Re-thinking ‘Freedom’ and ‘Agency’ in Discourses of International Development’, 18
freedom and subjectivity. According to Chandler, Sen’s subject can be perceived beyond the limits of liberalism. As freedom too is no longer conceptualized in the formal liberal sense, freedom appears as a continuum, a non-finite process which lacks external measurement or determination while it appears to be influenced by the subject. Chandler stresses that development can only be measured within the individual’s inner achievement of ‘freedom’. Freedom here is not defined in terms of autonomy, democracy or in a liberal sense. Chandler’s conceptualization of freedom, he attributes to Sen, empowers the human subject and places freedom under its control. However, it is doubted here that Sen promoted such an understanding of freedom and subjectivity. According to Sen the individual is the building block of freedom as capabilities. Sen never appears to have approached the subject from a deep philosophical perspective in terms of its self-determination or self-consciousness while associating that to freedom.

From a Hegelian perspective, both Sen’s and Chandler’s approaches entail flaws since their conceptualization of freedom is not emancipating. Sen’s interpretation of freedom as the expansion of the subject’s capabilities, allows the individuals to live the kind of lives they value. Enhancement of human freedom is the main object of development. Sen, insists that individual capabilities crucially depend on, economic, social and political arrangements as unfreedom stems from inadequate political processes or inadequate social opportunities. Moreover Sen stresses that the state and society should strengthen and safeguard human capabilities which permit them to be actively invoked. The capabilities that a person has don’t entirely depended on the individual but on the nature of social arrangements too. However, it should be noted that Sen later admits that, the role of economic growth is important in expanding the opportunities which relate to the expansion of human freedom in terms of living and promoting the kinds of lives that people have reason to value. Moreover, Chandler stresses too that Sen contends that political freedom and market economic competition are to be valued because they help facilitate individual choice-making capacities and enable their expression.

In brief, Sen’s analysis involves the set of flaws which according to Hegel form an incomplete conceptualization of subjectivity and freedom that allows the promotion of liberal ideals. It is reminded that these flaws are associated with: a) The treatment of subject as an independent self-determining
unit; b) The non-emancipating understanding of freedom which emerges when freedom is perceived as an unobstructed choice-making capacity formed either by the undetermined will or the self-determining subject’s; c) the determination of ‘free’ options by a particular domain which is beyond the subject’s control.

As it was previously argued, the treatment of freedom as a form of unobstructed choice-making within a domain of predetermined options is not emancipating. The exercise of such freedom which forms a subject within a particular domain beyond the subject’s control, does not contribute to the development of the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom. An agent is not necessarily free when choosing without obstruction as his actions are not always a product of self-determination. As Hegel notes, the defect of this conception is that it stops at something given from the outside: it stops at motives whose content is determined not by the agent but by an external domain. An enquiry on what constitutes freedom should go beyond the notion of unobstructed choice. If we bear firmly in mind that the content of what one wills is a given one, it follows that he is determined by it and in this very respect he is no longer free.

Moreover, the conceptualization of freedom as capabilities has an additional weakness. Taylor, while criticizing the limits of Foucault’s understanding of freedom, brings to our attention an important theoretical insight which applies here too, as it challenges the emancipating effects of ‘Development as freedom’. Taylor stressed that the prerequisite of elaborating a specific domain where the individual is given the opportunity to exercise his freedom, acts in fact as a domain the individual submits himself under control. According to Taylor the whole idea of defining freedom and subjectivity within a domain turns to be a strategy of causing control. A similar parallel could be drawn here to argue that the promotion of ‘development as freedom’ and freedom as capabilities -defined from a particular domain- turns out to be a strategy of control in the name of development as ‘freedom’.

Regarding this matter, the first annual UN Human Development Report refers to the way development enlarges peoples choices. ‘Development is more than GNP growth, income, wealth and producing commodities. Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical of

36 Taylor, ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth, Political Theory’, 159-167
these wide ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated, to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional choices includes political freedom, human rights and personal self-respect. 37

Although the emphasis of these choices is not solely on an economic ground, it is clear however that what is promoted as options are values stemming from the democratic liberal state paradigm. Thus the enlargement of people’s choices is not necessarily emancipating, as these options emerge from a particular domain which serves to promote the influence and amplification of particular (western liberal) values. Again, it is reminded that Sen admits that the role of economic growth is important in expanding the opportunities which relate to the expansion of human freedom. Moreover, Sen contends too that political freedom and market economic competition are to be valued because they help facilitate individual choice-making capacities and enable their expression.

On the other hand Chandler treats ‘Development as Freedom’ as an ongoing process of empowering the individual. This empowerment is not measured in external outputs but internal such as the capability of free choice via a wide spectrum of options. As the capabilities cannot be measured from external outputs, freedom for Chandler becomes infinite, undetermined, a goal that is never reached. Therefore, both development and the process of achieving freedom become internal processes within the subject. The subject, argues Chandler, becomes autonomous as a choice making actor but never truly capable of making a free and reasoned choice because freedom -as a choice making capacity- is infinite. On that score, he agrees with Sen that freedom is a quality that might be missing to everyone, regardless the politico-economic background. Thus, Chandler treats the human subject as an entity lacking determination, bearing an infinite freedom with unlimited capabilities beyond measurement. However, Hegelian insights disclose that the subject which emerges from Chander’s reading of ‘Development as Freedom’ is not free. The notion of an infinite freedom which lacks determination is not emancipating. Chander’s understanding of infinite freedom echoes Hegel’s first moment of indeterminate will. According to this moment such indeterminacy is responsible for nourishing the absence of subjectivity. Hegel contends that a will -or in Chandler’s case a

conceptualization of both subjectivity and freedom— which is infinite or lacks restriction and purpose, is neither liberating nor capable of forming a subject as a free agent. Therefore in this case too Chandler’s reading of ‘Development as Freedom’ fails to promote an emancipating form of freedom.

Chandler’s indeterminacy is perilous as the indeterminate will nourishes the absence of subjectivity and does not prevent subjection. In this moment, although freedom as well as the capabilities which form it, are not subject to any restriction, the real question for Hegel is what is the content of these capabilities. If such content is influenced by external factors—beyond the control of a self-conscious subject—then such freedom is not emancipating. Here, Chandler’s freedom is content-less, informed by unlimited capabilities, but what determines the content of these capabilities? If their content is beyond the individual’s self-conscious determination then it runs the risk of being informed by the dominant liberal paradigm. Although it is not suggested that Chandler necessarily promotes a liberal understanding of development as freedom, however his treatment of freedom as indeterminate is perilous, since nothing forbids liberal values to permeate the domain of capabilities.

Moreover it needs to be added how Chandler’s understanding of indeterminate freedom might lapse to relativism. Again it is reminded how valuable is the inclusion of universality and particularity as well as the association of freedom with the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state within the realm of Spirit (Geist) that Hegel’s philosophical system promotes, which incorporates historicism without lapsing to relativism. Hegel’s insights although they do not provide a prescriptive account of subjectivity and freedom, yet they helps us trace the shortcomings of certain approaches and warn us how they might unintentionally assist the promotion of liberal ideals as in Sen’s and Chandler’s case.

**The Shortcomings of Frost’s Understanding of Freedom From a Hegelian Perspective**

Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity, exposes the shortcomings of Frost’s thought. Although, Frost’s thought is loosely
inspired by Hegel’s, yet Frost’s conceptualization of freedom is completely different from Hegel’s and ends up promoting liberal ideals.

Let us remind that the previous part stressed how Hegel’s discrimination of the three moments of will disclose that a self-defeating understanding of freedom occurs when: i) the subject is perceived as a relativistic or a self-determining individual which reflects Hegel’s incomplete moments of will; and ii) freedom is understood as an unobstructed choice-making capacity. Frost’s constitutive theory is inspired by Hegel’s insights without taking into consideration his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). Frost celebrates the reconciliation of the individual with the state, but unlike Hegel, he argues that the maintenance of the sovereign state system is compatible with the individual’s rights. However, this is exactly where the limits of Frost’s thought commence. The shortcomings of Frost’s theory could be summarized as follows: a) Frost perceives the subject as an independent self-determining unit, acknowledging as subject the individual holder of rights. This notion of subjectivity reproduces Hegel’s second (incomplete) moment of will as determination which fails to formulate the subject’s free will; b) Frost’s subject reflects only the second (incomplete) moment of will that treats freedom as an unobstructed choice-making capacity, the options of which are not controlled by the subject; c) The options which constitute Frost’s notion of freedom are determined by the Global Civic Society and the Society of Sovereign States which are beyond the subject’s control and rest on liberal ideals.

Thus, Frost’s approach after neglecting Hegel’s notion of free will that is actualized in the state within the realm of the Spirit (Geist), develops an alternative conceptualization of freedom. Frost dismisses Hegel’s three moments of will and instead praises the anarchy formed by the Global Civil Society (GCS) and the Society of Sovereign States (SOSS) as responsible for constituting the individuals as free subjects of rights. Having already stressed that Frost’s notion of subjectivity is problematic, below it will be showed how Frost’s understanding of freedom is not emancipating. Frost’s notion of subjectivity is associated to the self-determining individual as a bearer of civic rights and liberties whereas his perception of freedom rests on the individual’s privilege of unobstructed choice making capacity. However, Hegel’s insights make clear that
these choices which stem from a predetermined domain, namely the anarchy of GCS and SOSS, in fact restrict the subject’s freedom and annul free will.

**Frost’s Conceptualization of Anarchy, Global Ethics and Freedom**

As Frost himself summarizes, he sets out a theory of IR which is: 1) Holistic, assuming that individuals are participants in two major global social practices, the Global Civil Society (GCS) and Society of Sovereign States (SOSS); 2) analyses that from an internal point of view, focusing on ourselves as participants in these practices and comprehending our own actions and those of others insofar as we understand their ethical dimensions. For Frost, international relations are always ethically informed, but this aspect is often hidden. In order to participate in the international domain, then an actor, has to be what one might call ‘ethically literate’. In order to participate, one has to understand the terms of ethical debate in the practice within which one finds oneself.

Frost contends that an engagement with ethics is not an option for participants but a pre-condition for their participation. He acknowledges as participants the states and individuals, understood as entities that are constituted as actors of a certain kind within specific global social practices. For Frost, these constitutive practices are themselves underpinned by thick sets of ethical values which constrain in severe and complex ways the actions of the actors. Engaging in international relations requires making ethical claims for oneself and to recognize the ethical standing of others. A practice of such engagement exists where we find individuals or states offering to one another explanations and justifications for what they do by referring to a commonly accepted set of ‘rules of the game’.

According to Frost what distinguishes his constitutive theory from other forms of social theory is that one cannot make sense of human action and interaction without paying attention to the social practices within which they take place. In order to do this an insiders perspective is necessary to understand the

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40 Frost, *Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations*, 19-23
criteria actors use in interpreting and criticizing their actions and those of others. What is involved, according to Frost, is paying attention to the forms of reciprocal recognition that we encounter within social practices. These criteria determine who is to count as a participant and what would count as adequate reason to expel a participant from practice.\footnote{Frost, \textit{Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations}, 28-29}

According to Frost anarchy is an important feature towards constituting these global practices and the formation of ethics. The GCS and the SOSS are ethically justified as they form a double anarchy which establishes an arrangement that promotes diversity and pluralism. The value here is the relationship of free states to one another and the diversity it makes possible. As the values of liberty, pluralism and diversity are promoted within the realm of the anarchical SSOS and GCS, this has far reaching consequences for what actors in this anarchy are entitled to do. They are required to do what advances these values and refrain from doing what undermines them. In pursuit of their policies, the actors of anarchy are only entitled to use those means which nurture and protect liberty and diversity.\footnote{Frost, \textit{Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations}, 60-65}

In a few words, Frost argues that the GCS and the SOSS form a double anarchy. This form of anarchy promotes pluralism and diversity which constitutes the participants as free agents. The free actors are understood as subjects of rights. Anarchy does not indicate that individuals or states interact without adhering to any social rules. In anarchical societies, the actors are strictly constrained by the rules of social practice within the anarchy. Frost argues that there good reasons in support of institutions which are anarchical in shape. Namely, he provides three reasons in support of anarchy and the anarchical form of GCS and SSOS: Firstly; within this form the participants are constituted as free actors. In GCS, rights holders adhere to set of social rule which specifies that they grant to one another a set of fundamental rights. It seems reasonable to assume that rights holders value the anarchy for precisely the reason that in it they are constituted as having a specific set of freedoms.\footnote{Frost, \textit{Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations}, 81-82}

Secondly; in anarchical society, the participants as rights holders, are each free to pursue their own vision of the good. According to Frost, the impact
of anarchy is positive in two ambiguous dimensions which relate to the nature of diversity and pluralism; a) Diversity often triggers antagonisms as agents often promote their particularity, thus anarchy provides the rules of co-existence for a number of actors who, without that set of rules, might soon fall into violent and on-going conflict; and b) anarchy promotes tolerance towards diversity and pluralism, encouraging agents to exercise their freedom by pursuing diverse life plans. Thirdly; anarchical societies promote free agency by nurturing pluralism. Anarchy encourages the emergence of a diverse universe of actors while attributing freedoms to them. As each actor decides how to exercise such freedoms is precisely what according to Frost forms free agency within the realm of anarchy.  

The Defects of Frost’s Freedom From A Hegelian Perspective

From a Hegelian perspective, Frost’s theory and his emphasis on anarchy ends up promoting a form of freedom and agency which is not emancipating. Once again we came across the same flaws which consists of: a) The conceptualization of the self-determining subject as bearer of rights and freedoms (echoing Hegel’s incomplete second moment of will); b) The conceptualization of freedom as an unobstructed choice making capacity; and c) The emergence of ‘free’ options formed from a particular domain, which in this case stem from a particular conceptualization of the anarchic structure of GCS and SOSS. Below it will be supported that these flaws stem from Frost’s non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s thought. Moreover, it will be analyzed how Frost’s account of freedom fails to emancipate the subject and serves the promotion of liberal ideals.

Regarding the first point (a), Frost’s treatment of the subject as self-determining undermines, portrayed by the individual as a right holder nourishes a non-emancipating account of freedom. The understanding of freedom as a subject’s unobstructed choice-making capacity, brings us in mind Hegel’s second moment of will as determination which undermines the subject’s free will. Hegel notes that an agent is not necessarily free when is choosing without obstruction, as his actions are not always a product of self-determination. The

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44 Frost, *Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations*, 83-85
defect of this conception is that it stops at something given from the outside: it stops at motives whose content is determined not by the agent but by an external domain. An enquiry on what constitutes freedom should go beyond the notion of unobstructed choice. If we bear firmly in mind that the content of what one wills is a given one, it follows that he is determined by it and in this very respect he is no longer free. In Frost’s case, the content of agency is determined and limited by the individual’s human rights and civic liberties.

According to the second point (b), Frost’s understanding of anarchy as a form which establishes co-existence via diversity and pluralism, promotes a conceptualization of the agent’s freedom, as the exercise of a subject’s unobstructed will. Frost’s subject is perceived as the individual holder of human rights that reflects an autonomous and self-determining perception of subjectivity. Therefore, the notion of freedom that emerges from the double anarchy of the GCS and the SOSS, spawns a self-determining understanding of subjectivity that acknowledges as subject the individual right holder. The third point (c), is reflected when Frost equates freedom the individual’s rights that emerge within the specific domain of anarchy formed by GCS and SOSS. Frost, ends up promoting a form of freedom, the options of which are beyond the control of the agent; failing ultimately to transform this agent into a self-determining and free subject. Below it will be examined why Frost’s (supposedly) Hegelian influenced theory ends up promoting a form of freedom and agency which nourishes liberal ideals and is not emancipating.

The roots of Frost’s flawed account of freedom and subjectivity is to be found in his earlier work the Ethics in International Relations. In this work Frost explicitly states that ‘the outline of a constitutive theory given below draws heavily on Hegel’s political philosophy, but it is what may be termed a secular interpretation of his theory [...] constitutive theory does not require us to understand or accept Hegel’s metaphysical system’. Here it is argued that it is inconsistent -if not self-defeating- to adopt Hegel’s philosophical arguments without his metaphysics. The rejection of Hegel’s metaphysics ends up promoting a non-emancipating conceptualization of subjectivity and freedom.

45 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 141
Frost’s theory, just like Hegel’s, attempts to reconcile the individual with community. Particularly, Frost’s constitutive theory reconciles those settled norms relating to the preservation of the system of sovereign states with those norms connected to the notion of individual rights. Constitutive theory, unlike contract theory, does not seek to show that the sovereign state is a device which protects pre-existing rights. It holds that rights are not things possessed by individuals prior to entering into social and political relationships. Rather it contends that a person is constituted as a rights holder within the context of a specific social relationship. Constitutive theory starts by asserting that a person only has value qua individual in a relationship of mutual valuation with another person or other people within a community.46

Just like Hegel, Frost asserts too the transformation of an individual into free a social agent via the family, civil society and the state. A person who is not recognized within a family as an autonomous individual will not be able to develop into a free individual within the higher institutions of civil society and the state. As Frost argues, within the family, what individuals gained was consciousness of themselves as members of the whole. Within civil society the individuals gained consciousness of themselves as independent persons distinct from the whole. In civil society they experienced the law and other people’s competitive cooperation as necessary for the promotion of their own aims. Although civil society depends on the mutual recognition by the participant of one another as rights holders, the others on whom a person’s recognition depends are not experienced as co-determining a person’s individuality. They feel alienated. It is this tension between the individual and the whole which is resolved in the state. Within the state, people participate in the whole as members: as citizens. As citizens, they are accorded a form of mutual recognition by their fellow citizens, something which they lacked within the competitive and atomized civil society. As citizens, people know themselves to be constitutive parts of the whole and they are conscious that the whole of which they are part is constituted by them together with their fellow citizens. The state is the creation of its citizens and yet it is only in the state that an individual can be actualized as a citizen. The state is not to be confused with civil society. Frost notes just like

46 Frost, Ethics in International Relations, 137-140
Hegel, that citizenship of a good state is not an option for a free person but is rather a precondition for the existence of a free person.47

However what Frost’s ‘Hegelian’ analysis is missing is the contribution of Hegel’s metaphysics towards the formation of freedom and subjectivity. The Hegelian three moments of will substantiate how the free will and the self-consciousness of the subject is formed within the interplay of family, civil society and the state. Frost’s failure to incorporate the metaphysical aspects of Hegel serve to promote a flawed understanding freedom and subjectivity based on the double anarchy of the GCS and on the SOSS that acknowledge as free the subject of rights.

Here the concept of reflective identification is the key which Frost’s non-metaphysical ‘Hegelian’ approach misses. This reflective identification is based on the three moments of will and is responsible for the emergence of the free subject within the community via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Hegel contends that a self-conscious subject is formed through what Hardimon describes as reflective identification. Hegel’s reflective identification assists in conceiving of oneself as independent and of distinct from one’s social roles obtained within society in the sense that one thinks of oneself as having the capacity to abstract from any given social role. A person steps back from a social role when he considers how he relates to it. Stepping back is to question or evaluate it. One comes to conceive of oneself as a self by grasping that one has the capacity to step back from one’s social roles and by coming to form a general conception of oneself. In order to conceive oneself as a subject of consciousness, involves regarding oneself as an independent source of moral assessment and evaluation. It involves regarding oneself as having the capacity and right to access courses of actions on the basis of one’s own private, subjective judgment.48

Hegel substantiates the compatibility of individuality and social membership through reflective identification. The act of abstraction contains within itself a moment of reflective separation between oneself and the role. Reflective identification is a form of identification. It is reflective in that it proceeds through the reflective actor of stepping back from a social role and

47 Frost, Ethics in International Relations, 143-147
48 Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 146-151
evaluating it from a position of indetermination. Towards this step the first moment of will prevails. Additionally, *reflective identification* proceeds to the second moment of will since identifying reflectively with one’s social role is to identify with such role as the *self*. *Reflective identification* provides a reflective means of bridging the gap between the self and its roles provided from the realm of community via the family, civil society and the state. Hegel thinks that one can be a perfectly good family member or citizen without reflectively identifying with these roles. However, he maintains that *reflective identification* formed via the three moments of will, represents something like the highest stage of social membership. In *reflectively identifying* with these roles (family, civil society, citizen), one absorbs these roles into one’s subjectivity, thereby actualizing one’s social membership through one’s individuality. Hegel’s conception of individuality and social membership can be thought of as a conception of individual social membership. Such an understanding of individual social membership which emerges from *reflective identification* contributes towards the development of the individuals self-consciousness, subjectivity and freedom.  

However, *reflective identification* depends on Hegel’s metaphysics (that Frost rejects) and cannot be examined separately from Hegel’s concept of Spirit (*Geist*). Hegelian philosophy takes the form of a system which describes how the forms of consciousness evolve historically - upon which *reflective identification* depends - and promote an instructing process within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*). For Hegel, the evolution of the forms of consciousness, contribute to human self-knowledge which serves as a means upon which of the Spirit’s (*Geist*) ‘actuality’ rests. According to *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the development of history and consciousness, reveal a teleological process which serves a goal.  

This goal is seized once the subject acquires freedom via the development of her self-consciousness. The Hegelian philosophical system is tied with the concept of Spirit (*Geist*), challenging the treatment of the subject as self-determining individual. Instead, Hegel promotes a notion of subjectivity that rests on the subject’s development of free will which is only actualized in the state via a

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49 Hardimon, *Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, 164-173  
particular ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) that serves as an instructive process within the realm of the Spirit (Geist).

Another defect of Frost’s thought which stems from the rejection of Hegel’s metaphysics, associates to the shortcomings of his understanding of inter-state recognition. Although Frost’s implicates inter-state recognition as a form which encourages the diversity and pluralism among states within anarchy; instead Hegel’s insights unveil that Frost’s understanding of recognition ends up undermining this diversity and pluralism and annulling his conceptualization of freedom. Here, it is suggested that Frost’s notion of inter-state recognition promotes an ideological subjection.

Frost, by ignoring the notion of *reflective identification* draws emphasis on a form of freedom stemming from anarchy and inter-state relations. Frost dismisses the acquisition of self-consciousness as freedom and identifies the agent’s freedom as the unobstructed will formed in terms of the individual’s rights which emerge by the double anarchy of the GCS and the SOSS. Frost’s underscores the importance of the GCS and SOSS for the flourishing of the subject’s individuality and subjectivity. According to Frost, within the autonomous state all individuals are constituted as free citizens. But their citizenship can only be actualized once their state needs to be recognized by other states as autonomous. Frost’s constitutive theory claims to be projecting an alternative approach of recognition which is not biased as the colonial approach of recognition. Frost reject’s the colonial approach according to which colonies are not free, because their political entity is not recognized as autonomous. Instead, Frost argues that the notion of recognition of his constitutive theory is different. Due to the nature of anarchy which accommodates a set of social practices, recognition must be understood with reference to an individual’s or a state’s adaptability to these practices. Thus Frost claims that his recognition is not one of a ‘gate-keeping’ (recognizing one’s credentials to enter or being rejected and denied validity). Recognition as gate-keeping raises a barrier according to which specific conditions need to be meet before entering. Frost’s recognition as he explicitly mentions ‘involves a commitment on my part to educate you in that practice [...] For your part, you recognize me as one who can
do this and you indicate your willingness to learn in any number of ways.\textsuperscript{51} However, Frost’s understanding of recognition is spurious and below it will be stressed how it paves the way to subjection and the promotion of liberal ideals.

Frost’s conceptualization of recognition within the realm of anarchy undermines his celebration of anarchy as a neutral domain which promotes diversity and pluralism. This self-defeating form of anarchy’s neutrality, echoes Taylor’s criticism against Foucault’s ‘neutrality’ of power that lapses into the Doctor-Patient relationship. As it was previously mentioned, in the \textit{Discipline and Punish}, Foucault treated power as a neutral force, responsible for the production of subjectivity. Similarly, Frost treats anarchy as a neutral domain which liberates and forms the subject as an individual right holder. Taylor argued that Foucaultian power cannot be neutral as that the Power-Subject relation is founded on the presumption that one knows (Doctor/ power) and that the other (Subject/ Patient) has the overwhelming interest in taking advice.\textsuperscript{52} A similar Doctor/ Power relation is entailed in Frost’s understanding of recognition according to which certain ‘politically correct’ states are called to educate and consult the rest. Thus, Frost’s conceptualization of anarchy as neutral, promoting diversity and pluralism is self-defeating. Surprisingly, as Sutch notes, Frost alludes to an example of an experienced chess player with a novice one to mark the interaction between developed and non-developed states. Frost, portrays the development of international relations as the progressive education by developed states of (willing) quasi-states that involves an initial recognition of the quasi-states’ sovereignty until the novice becomes fully initiated in the rules of international relations.\textsuperscript{53} In Frost’s terms this is described as follows: ‘my concern is prompted by the fact that what I ultimately want is for you to become a fully competent player. That you want this too, is indicated by the fact that you actively seek to play with me’.\textsuperscript{54}

However as Sutch contends, Frost’s argument’s besides being presented in an abstract theoretical form, they have immediate practical relevance. They lead to the assertion that not all states (or people) deserve recognition as such and

\textsuperscript{51}Frost, \textit{Ethics in International Relations}, 150-154
\textsuperscript{52}Taylor, ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’, 165-168
\textsuperscript{54}Frost, \textit{Ethics in International Relations}, 155
that actors who do not receive this recognition (principally because they do not conform to the norms of international justice); may be legitimately challenged by the forces of international community. This is quite a claim as the first principle of prescriptive international relations, as promulgated by such bodies as the UN, is state sovereignty and this notion is coupled with a refusal to distinguish between different kinds of states. Any attempt to distinguish between those states who have earned the rights to autonomy and those that have not is totally unacceptable.  

This discrimination, becomes even more clear when Frost argues that for our individuality and freedom to be fully recognized we require both a fully developed state and recognition of that state by the international community. By a fully developed state, Frost means one in which the people recognize each other as citizens in terms of the law which they in turn recognize as being constitutive of them as citizens. The basic idea here is that the concept of sovereignty and what we now see as the correlative notions and individuality makes no sense to autocratic states. In that sense Frost promotes a particular understanding of individuality, freedom and state sovereignty that rests on democratic liberalism. At the next chapter, it will be elaborated how exactly Hegel differentiates from such a coercive understanding of democratic liberalism after situating certain liberal traits, such as the market economy and private property, in the realm of Spirit (Geist), attributing to them educating effects which contribute to the formation of the subject’s free will within the state.

Therefore, Frost’s understanding of recognition confirms the remark made earlier, that the ‘free’ options which stem from the domain the double anarchy formed by the GCS and the SOSS; are not emancipating and promote liberal ideals. Firstly, Frost’s conceptualization of the subject as self-determining; secondly, his understanding of freedom as the individual subject’s unobstructed choice-making capacity; and thirdly, his elaboration on the subject’s ‘free’ options which stem from a domain beyond the subject’s control; violate the Hegelian principles of free will.

Frost’s dismissal of Hegelian metaphysics ended up promoting a flawed understanding freedom and subjectivity. Instead of considering the notion of

55 Sutch, ‘Human Rights As Settled Norms: Mervyn Frost and the Limits of Hegelian Human Right’s Theory’, 216
reflexive identification within the realm of Spirit as the basis of free will; Frost portrayed the development of freedom as the outcome of the individual’s rights which stem from the double anarchy of the GCS and the SOSS. However, Frost’s treatment of anarchy as neutral while implicating the inter-state recognition as a form which encourages the diversity and pluralism among states; in fact undermines this diversity and pluralism while promoting a subjecting understanding of freedom.

To be precise, Frost’s notion of recognition fails to promote diversity, pluralism and freedom since the agents can only secure their participation in the anarchical system of GCS and SOSS after complying to specific social practices. These social practices in spite of the fact that they emerge from an anarchical realm, they cannot promote the agent’s freedom. The options of this freedom are predetermined and not neutral as they stem from a particular conceptualization of the anarchic structure of the GCS and the SOSS that rests on liberal democratic ideals. Therefore in Frost’s context, freedom is seized only within this particular domain of anarchy that is not neutral but influenced by the democratic liberal institutions which exercise control via the process of recognition. Therefore, Frost promotes a form of freedom that, although it stems from consent, it is not emancipating as the ‘free’ options provided are beyond the control of the agent.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that Hegel’s attempt to conceptualize subjectivity and freedom without arbitrary or transcendental means, promoted an alternative understanding of free will as a process which stems from the development of the state’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Unlike Hegel, the Foucaultian notion of power and the Kantian conceptualization of the subject rest on transcendental premises which contribute to a self defeating understanding of subjectivity and freedom. The first part unveiled how Hegel’s conceptualization of free will exposes the shortcomings of Foucautian and Kantian thought. After elaborating on Hegel’s three moments of will, the limits of Foucaultian conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity were easily detected. For Hegel, the three moments of will are interconnected and form a process which contributes to the subject’s free will
within the state. In that respect, the Foucaultian understanding of freedom which
echoes one of the three moments fails to promote the subject’s free will.

Specifically, Foucault treated freedom as power’s tool and ended up
establishing the control of power over the subject. Also, it became clear that the
treatment of Foucaultian power as neutral and the succession of the power
regimes as purposeless, contributed to the perpetuation of power’s control over
the subject. Hegel’s insights disclosed that since the Foucaultian subject’s
formation is tied to these (purposeless) power regimes, it is deprived of the
ability to develop self-consciousness and becomes relativistic. The Foucaultian
subject’s relativism, echoes Hegel’s first moment of will as indeterminacy which
fails to form the subject as a free agent. Also, since the options of Foucault’s
freedom stem from predetermined domains (such as disciplinary, sexuality etc);
this deprives the subject of the ability to control these options and acquire self-
consciousness. Thus, just as Hegel’s account of free will suggests, an agent of
unobstructed choice-making ability is not free when the options provided are
predetermined and beyond the control of the subject. In this sense the domains
which form the Foucaultian subject (disciplinary, sexuality etc) provide the
subject with a range of ‘free’ choices beyond its control which undermine the
subject’ consciousness process and negate free will.

Unlike Foucault, Kant does not equate freedom to the capacity for
unobstructed choice. Nevertheless, Hegel’s insights suggest that the Kantian
notion of freedom fails to promote free will too. Unlike Kant, for Hegel free will
cannot be determined by the individual subject alone but instead it evolves as a
process within the realm of Spirit (Geist), implicating the notions of ethical life
(Sittlichkeit) and the State. Thus, from a Hegelian perspective, Kant’s
conceptualization of freedom is founded on two problematic themes: Firstly, the
Kantian subject is perceived in the form of a self-determining individual; and
secondly, Kant’s notion of freedom is seized when the subject’s actions are not
determined by sensuous impulses but when they comply to the categorical
imperative which represents an abstract and vacuous basis of duty and moral
obligation. In that sense, Kant’s notion of freedom rests on an abstract principle
which reproduces an empty formalism. On the other hand, Hegelian thought
overcomes the flaws of Kant’s understanding of freedom after putting forward an
alternative account of subjectivity and freedom which is not abstract but
implicates the notions of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state. Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) represents the actualization of freedom as self-consciousness within the state, reconciling the individual with the community via the family, civil society and the state. Thus, Hegelian freedom is neither vacuous nor founded on abstract universal principles; but formed via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in accordance to the customary ethics of particular social institutions within state.

In that respect Hegel’s attempt to examine reality without transcendental or arbitrary means triggered an alternative conceptualization of subjectivity and freedom which is superior to Kant’s and Foucault’s. The critique of Kantian and Foucaultian thought revealed a triptych which is responsible for promoting a self-defeating conceptualization of freedom, the implications of which are met in IR thought too. This triptych is comprised of the following flawed perspectives: a) The conceptualization of the individual subject as a self-determining unit; b) The understanding of freedom as an unobstructed choice-making capacity formed either by the undetermined will or the egotistic subject’s determined will; c) The emergence of a subject’s ‘free’ options from a particular domain, which are beyond the subject’s control. These remarks contributed towards exposing the shortcomings of Sen’s, Chandler’s and Frost’s approaches.

The second part elaborated on the contribution of Hegel’s understanding of freedom and subjectivity after exposing how certain scholars nurture a problematic conceptualization of freedom in the field of IR thought. Chandler, Sen and Frost all refer to freedom, but their approaches promote a defective understanding of freedom. Chandler attempts to rethink agency and freedom via Amartya Sen’s understanding of ‘development as freedom’. Sen promotes the conceptualization of freedom as capabilities in order to challenge the liberal-economical conceptualization of development. Nevertheless, Hegel’s insights on free will, allow us to understand that Sen’s and Chandler’s understanding of subjectivity and freedom do not only fail to develop the subject’s self-consciousness but also assist the promotion of liberal ideals they aspired to critique. The promotion of ‘development as freedom’ and freedom as capabilities echoes (c) since freedom is defined from a particular domain which (just as Foucault’s theory) turns out to perpetuate the control of the subject in the name of development as ‘freedom’. Such freedom is acknowledged as an unobstructed choice making capacity whereas the options which comprise it are derived from
a domain which is beyond the control of the subject. To be more precise, the options of ‘development as freedom’ are also found in the UN annual *Human Development Report* which are inspired by a liberal democratic rhetoric. Thus, it becomes clear that since Sen’s perception of the subject as a self-determining individual [echoing (a)] and Chandler’s treatment of freedom as an unobstructed choice-making capacity [echoing (b)], negate free will.

Regarding Frost, although his approach is loosely inspired by Hegel; he ends up promoting a notion of freedom that fails to emancipate the subject. As Frost dismisses Hegel’s notion of Spirit (*Geist*), he inevitably ignores the three moments of will and contributes to a non-emancipating account of freedom. Thus, Frost’s rejection of the three moments of will is responsible for his flawed account of freedom which echoes certain aspects of the triptych. Frost treats the subject as a self-determining bearer of rights [echoing (a)]. However Frost’s subject capacity to will without obstruction does not render the subject free as the ‘free’ options stem from the double anarchy of the Global Civil Society and the Society of Sovereign States. Therefore such notion of freedom is not emancipating as it stems from a particular conceptualization of the anarchic structure of the Global Civil Society (GCS) and the Society of Sovereign States (SOSS) that rests on liberal democratic ideals. In that respect, Frost’s approach to freedom is far from neutral. On the contrary such approach to freedom suits the states’ which support the democratic liberal institutions of the GCS and exercise control via the process of recognition. Therefore, Frost promotes a form of freedom that is not emancipating since the ‘free’ options are beyond the control of the agent. Such promotion of freedom [echoes (c)] fails to emancipate the subject since the ‘free’ options are restricted within the democratic liberal domain of the individual’s rights.
CHAPTER 4: Hegel’s Contribution Towards an Alternative Conceptualization of Citizenship

Overview

This chapter elucidates Hegel’s contribution with regard to the conceptualization of citizenship. His method of immanent critique as well as his notion of Spirit demonstrate that the distinction between the universal and the particular dimension of citizenship is misleading. Let us recall that the introductory chapter analyzed how immanent critique allow us to avoid the separation between: i) the subject and the object of knowledge and ii) the universal and the particular dimension which nourishes an empty formalism and vacuous supranational norms. This chapter explains how the points (i) and (ii) are associated to the shortcomings of the approaches to citizenship which separate the universal from the particular dimension.

Specifically, the current chapter tackles the following questions:

1) How does the method of immanent critique reveal the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship which ignore the particular dimension?

2) How do the insights stemming from Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) overcome the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship?

3) How does Hegelian thought enrich our understanding of citizenship?

These questions suggest that the current chapter elucidates how Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) promotes an alternative understanding of subjectivity and ethics with regard to the state and the public sphere which enriches our understanding of citizenship after accommodating the universal and the particular dimension. Immanent critique treats the incorporation of these dimensions as the key which allows us to reconsider reality not with arbitrary or transcendental means but with norms which are part of the reality itself. In that
respect, the notion of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to promote an alternative account of patriotism, ethics and subjectivity premised on the reality of our empirical world after reconsidering the effects of market economy and private property. Thus, Hegel’s insights contribute to a more complete approach to citizenship without transcendental premises after accommodating the universal and the particular dimension.

Therefore this chapter after scrutinizing the universalist approaches to citizenship unveils the contribution of Hegel’s immanent critique while explaining in theoretical terms why it is necessary to consider the philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) and the notion of Absolute. Both i) the subject and the object of knowledge; as well as ii) the universal and particular dimensions, are embodiments of the Absolute which should not be separated. The combination of these dimensions is equally essential for the self-realization of the Absolute. This becomes clearer in Hegel’s conceptualization of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Hegel contents that the subject seizes self-consciousness and freedom via the development of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the realm of history and the state.

The following analysis affords insight into how Hegel’s approach incorporates both dimensions of universalism and particularism – dimensions which dominant perspectives on citizenship maintain as separate. However, it is stressed here that such a distinction between the universal and the particular is misleading. After analyzing the pitfalls of approaches to citizenship which adopt just one of these two dimensions, an alternative account will be proposed, as influenced by Hegel. The Hegelian approach incorporates both particularism and universalism and this contribution stems from the fact that his theory neither promotes a descriptive nor a prescriptive account of citizenship. Instead, Hegel’s insights assist in understanding citizenship by elaborating on how the individual is reconciled with the social institutions through the development of a particular ethical life (Sittlichkeit).

This chapter entails two parts. The first one stresses the flaws of the approaches which adopt solely a universal dimension addressing to the first (1) and second (2) question. The second part addresses to the third (3) question and describes how a Hegelian-influenced approach rectifies the theoretical flaws of this incomplete understanding of citizenship after accommodating both the universal and the particular dimension.
I. The Shortcomings of Ignoring the Particular and Universal dimension of Citizenship

How Immanent Critique Unveils the Limits of Universalist Perspectives on Citizenship

Introduction

This part is divided into into two sections. The first section analyses how immanent critique exposes the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship. As Buchwalter stressed, ‘immanent critique evaluates reality not with alien principles of rationality but those intrinsic to reality itself’.1 With this insight in mind, an analysis of certain universalist approaches to citizenship takes place which examines whether the theoretical premises of these approaches are transcendental or immanent. It will become clear that the cosmopolitanism of these approaches rests on certain norms and values such as equality, freedom, human rights and morality which are portrayed as universal. However an immanent critique of these approaches, undermines their theoretical vigor after challenging the ‘universalism’ of the norms and values these approaches convey. An immanent critique of these approaches reveals that these norms and values are founded on purely transcendental grounds which are detached from reality. Therefore these approaches promote a misleading set of values and norms which are transcendental and lack a particular empirical content. Such an understanding of norms and values promotes a prescriptive understanding of citizenship which is misleading as it stems from the separation of the subject-theorist from the object of theory since the subject-theorist is perceived as a self-determining and autonomous.

In that respect such universalist accounts of citizenship tend to identify the citizen as a self-determining, rights-holding unit where rights are acknowledged as universal due to the promotion of supranational values, such as equality and liberty. Immanent critique reveals that; firstly, the values and norms

1 Andrew Buchwater, Dialectics, Politics and the Contemporary Value of Hegel’s Practical Philosophy (Abington: Routledge, 2012), 42
of these universalist approaches have transcendental premises which ignore the empirical reality; and secondly, these cosmopolitan scholars fail to realize that what they portray as universal is in fact a universally projected particularity which triggers social exclusions. These scholars, after treating the subject as a self-determining agent, adopt a prescriptive understanding of citizenship which takes uncritically for granted the transnational and impartial status of these universal values and norms.

The first section challenges the universality and transnationalism of such values both in theory and practice, undermining the universal status of citizenship based on human rights and cosmopolitan values. In terms of theory, a critique leveled at a number of approaches, certainly not exhausted here, which emphasize solely a universalist dimension of citizenship. The universalist approaches which will be scrutinized here are those of Held, Archibugi, Kaldor and Habermas. Works by Archibugi, Held and Kaldor focus on democracy and individual rights (liberty and equality) in order to support a cosmopolitan approach to citizenship on the basis of the ‘universality’ of human rights and democracy. However, these scholars take for granted the concepts of rights, equality, liberty and their universal effects without further elaboration, attributing them an unchallenged supranational status. However from the perspective of immanent critique, this supranational status is misleading since: i) it stems from separating the universal from the particular dimension and nourishes an empty formalism which renders these supranational norms vacuous; and ii) these approaches seize a prescriptive theoretical dimension which separates the subject from the object of knowledge, acknowledges the subject-theorist as a self-ascribed authority while projecting a subjective-particular perspective as objective-universal with socially excluding effects. Therefore, the following analysis contends that the ‘universalist’ concepts of (human) rights, equality, liberty require a thorough examination. The supranationalism and impartiality of human rights, equality and freedom will therefore be challenged not only theoretically (by quoting Marx), but also practically through reference to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, thereby exposing the socially-exclusive effects of human rights.

The second section focuses on Habermas’s Kantian inspired approach and demonstrates the contribution of Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit
which unveils the limits of Kantian freedom and ethics. In that respect this part tackles the second question and reveals how Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) overcomes the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship. Initially, it is argued that although certain parts of Habermas’s thought implicate particularism, universalism ultimately supersedes them. While at times Habermas stresses the importance of nation-states, his argument ultimately appears to be promoting the formation of a global civil society constituted by universalist-based norms. Furthermore, this section demonstrates that Habermas advances his universalist argumentation by employing only specific parts of Kantian thought, in spite of the fact that Kant does not necessarily support universalism at the expense of the (nation) state’s sovereignty. Neglecting a holistic approach to Kant, Habermas appears to be applying only certain Kantian ideas (for example, the categorical imperative) which serve his universalist argument. Habermas therefore bases the potential for universal citizenship on a global civil society formed by universal norms that are founded on a Kantian understanding of subject, duty and freedom.

However, as Hegel notes, the categorical imperative is a vague universal duty which is not premised on empirical reality. Therefore, Hegel’s insights show that Kantian thought, promotes a particular understanding of freedom which sustains a self-determined form of subjectivity, alienated from society and the state. Hegelian freedom as formed by ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state, overcomes the alienation of the (Kantian) self-determining subject which nourishes the tension between the individual and society. Ultimately, Hegel forms a more balanced approach to citizenship which incorporates both universalism and particularism and reinstates the importance of state and nation.

On The Universalist Approaches of Held, Archibugi and Kaldor

Certain conceptualizations of citizenship, in the discipline of International Relations, although by no means related in full here, emphasize purely the universalist dimension of citizenship. Among them, Archibugi, Held and Kaldor focus on democracy and individual rights (liberty and equality) in order to support an exclusively universalist approach. On the contrary, it will be argued here that universalist approaches simply adopt the concepts of ‘democracy’ and
‘individual rights’ along with the values of ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’, without further elaboration or interrogation. Instead, the definition of these concepts needs to be examined thoroughly. Here, the projection of human rights as universal will be challenged after questioning the impartiality of (liberal) freedom and equality. The exclusive implications of (liberal) freedom and equality will likewise be exposed by citing Marx.

Archibugi’s cosmopolitan system envisages not only the existence of universal human rights, protected by the states, but also the creation of a mandatory core of rights that individuals may claim, alongside a set of duties in relation to global institutions. In terms of these rights, world citizens undersign certain duties which enable global institutions to perform a function of temporary replacement and substitution in relation to national institutions. This cosmopolitan model thereby entrusts civil society to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. Through cosmopolitan democracy, Archibugi argues, it is possible to build a world-order fully capable of providing democracy. Accordingly, he maintains that a cosmopolitan institution could coexist together with the sphere of the states, but would override states in certain realms of activity. The term ‘cosmopolitan’ here succeeds in capturing the dual reference to the citizens of the world and those of the existing states.

Kaldor, on similar terrain of cosmopolitan law and rights, also seeks to legitimize intervention. For Kaldor, the key to this lies in ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’—a concept located somewhere between soldiering and policing. Kaldor uses the term cosmopolitan in a broad sense, referring to notions such as tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy, and treating them as universal and capable of forming a body of cosmopolitan law. Such approaches promote an exclusively universalist understanding of citizenship.

Held in turn contends that at the heart of such a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship, is the idea that citizenship can be based not on exclusive membership of a territorial community, but on general rules and principles such as democracy and human rights. Building on the fundamental rights of equality

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4 Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, (Stanford University Press, 2010), 124-126
and freedom of all human beings, cosmopolitan citizenship underwrites the autonomy of each and recognizes their capacity for self-governance.\textsuperscript{5}

Towards Undermining the Impartiality and Transnationalism of Human Rights, Liberty and Equality

At this point attention is turned to the so-called ‘universalist’ rights of liberty and equality. These are often seen as universal, impartial and undiscriminating values which form the cornerstone of human rights and liberal democracy. Accordingly, advocates of universalism such as Archiburgi and Held, utilize the terms liberty and equality to project their universalist argument without elaborating on the definition of these concepts. Rather, their conceptualization is taken for granted. Liberty and equality are treated uncritically and their universalist effects are based on their supposedly impartial and undiscriminating characteristics. Contrasting this is the analysis of Marx who was among the first to challenge the impartial origins as well as the undiscriminating effects of equality and liberty.

In the \textit{Grundrisse}, Marx reveals the social implications of so-called ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. He argues that these two notions in fact serve the purposes of the market and maintain social inequalities alongside the unfreedom of the individual. After acknowledging the exchange value\textsuperscript{6} system as liberty’s and equality’s particularist point of departure, Marx argues that liberty and equality are not impartial values. Instead, they are principles which service market imperatives and paradoxically, generate results which are the antithesis of those they declare. Therefore, the ignorant individual, under the illusion of being

\textsuperscript{5} David Held, ‘Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!’, \textit{New Political Economy}, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 2006, 173

\textsuperscript{6} What is the exchange value system? Every commodity is the objectification of a given amount of labour time. The value of the commodity is different from the commodity itself. The commodity is a value (exchange value) only within exchange; value is the commodity’s specific exchangeability. Considered as values, all commodities are qualitatively equal and differ only quantitatively, hence can be measured against each other and substituted for one another. Two commodities such as cotton and oil, are different by nature, have different properties, are measured by different measures. Once they are considered as values they cease to be incommensurable. ExchangeValue is their social relation, their economic quality. See, Karl Marx, \textit{Grundrisse}, (London: Penguin, 1993), 140-141
free and equal, voluntarily participates and contributes to the unfree and unequal *exchange value* system.

According to Marx, the transaction of exchange values via money is the real source of notions of equality and freedom – notions which in practice promote inequality and unfreedom. For Marx, (in)equality and (un)freedom are rendered possible when each individual owns the product of her labor, and is transformed into a proprietor and a worker at the same time. Money and the attendant notion of ‘exchange value’ becomes the social mediator connecting unsocial individuals. As Marx notes, individuals are simply and singularly conceived of as exchangers. As subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality. The two exchangers might hence appear in the different roles of buyer and seller. A worker who buys commodities for X money, appears to the seller in the same function, in the same equality (i.e. in the form of X money), just as would the king who performs a similar purchase. All social distinctions between them are extinguished. Where *money* here appears as the general commodity of contracts, all distinction between the contracting parties is extinguished. It is impossible to find any trace of distinction once the commodities which they exchange become equivalent as exchange values.

Marx criticizes (in fact he goes so far as to characterize as fools) the proponents of the *exchange value* system who treat it as a system of universal freedom and equality. Marx contends that a proper response to this delusion is the argument that the *exchange value* or the money system is in fact the system of equality and freedom that in effect perpetuates inequality and unfreedom. The imposition of such an exchange value system upon the individual leads to his very unfreedom. The reality that the individual has an existence only as a producer and a proprietor of exchange value implies the whole negation of his natural existence.

Marx’s analysis is significant as it challenges the impartial and undiscriminating effects of liberty and equality taken for granted by Archibugi, Kaldor and Held. Against these thinkers, Marx exposed equality and freedom as instruments of the market that in fact succeed in promoting inequality and

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8 Marx, *Grundrisse*, 239-241
9 Marx, *Grundrisse*, 243-246
unfreedom. Thus, Marx’s insights unveiled the non-universal effects and characteristics of equality and freedom by arguing that they serve as mediums of the (liberal) capitalist exchange value system which undermines their treatment as universalist and socially-undiscriminating values. This final point is again reflected in the French Declaration where a particularist conceptualization of rights and citizenship is portrayed as universalist, triggering socially-exclusive outcomes.

**How the Universalism of Human Rights is Perverted in Practice: the Shortcomings of the French Declaration**

The supposed universalism of rights will be challenged here both in theory and practice through reference to the shortcomings of the ‘French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789)’. This document is widely regarded as the theoretical cornerstone of human rights’ universal status. However, the French Declaration’s universal and undiscriminating character will be challenged here on the same basis as Archiburgi, Kaldor and Held’s argument. Similarly, it will be argued that the French Declaration’s treatment of equality, liberty and rights as universal and undiscriminating, in practice promotes inequality, exclusion and oppression.

According to Marx, the ‘universality’ of rights as expressed in the French Declaration does not permit the formation of a universal community. Quite conversely, the declaration promotes the importance of individual rights with the effect of perpetuating discrimination and social inequality.

Marx, in the essay *On the Jewish Question*, argues that liberty is the right to do and perform everything which does not harm others. The limits within which the individual can move without harming others are determined by law, as the boundary between two fields. Liberty as regarded here is that of the individual as an isolated monad who is withdrawn into herself. As Marx notes, the right to freedom is not based on the association of individual with individual, but rather on the separation of between them. It is therefore the right of separation, the right of the individual restricted to herself. Further, he argues, the practical application of the right of the individual to freedom is the right of the
individual to private property. The latter consists in the right to enjoy and dispose of one’s resources as one wills, without the regard of other individuals and independently of society; that is, the right of self-interest. In this matter, equality is constituted by the fact that the law is the uniform for everyone. Equality simply connotes equal access to the liberty described above. Individual freedom, together with this application of equality, thereby forms civil society. The formation of civil society in turn leads each individual to see in others not the realization, but the limit of her own freedom. The so-called ‘rights of man’ thus serve the egoistic individual - that is, the individual as bourgeoisie and as the member of civil society.10

In this respect, when examining Article Eight of the French Declaration, it becomes evident that the notion of security pervades civil society. This therefore suggests that civil society exists only to guarantee the preservation of its members’ property and rights. As Marx previously noted, the so-called ‘rights of man’ do not extend beyond the egoistic individual as a member of civil society. For Marx, such an individual withdrawn into herself, her private interest and private desires separated from her community. Thus the ‘rights of man’ become individualist, self-centered and opposed to community. Such an understanding of rights promotes a fragile notion of social coherence, as the only bond cohering citizens is that of natural necessity - need, private interest and the conversion of individual property.11

Contemporary scholars such as Balibar, Douzinas and Kouvelakis refer to similar exclusive effects promoted by this understanding of community. These exclusions relate to the repercussions of ethno-national as well as domestic social exclusions. Below it is argued that the content of the French Declaration’s key terms ‘Man’, ‘Citizen’ and ‘Rights’ nourishes such exclusions. These emerge where rights are given a particularist reference point, associated with national sovereignty and individual property, instead of a more universal definition. More precisely: i) it should be noted that although the French declaration treats ‘Rights’ as universal, contemporary scholars such as Balibar, Douzinas and Kouvelakis, contest this universality. On the contrary, they argue that the implementation of rights is associated with a particularist and exclusive

11 Marx, *Early Writings*, 230
tendency. Kouvelakis approaches rights from a Marxist perspective, emphasizing the repercussions of property. He observes that Marx examines four natural rights: equality, liberty, security and property, or the rights of the ‘egotistic’ individual, and argues that they can all be reduced to the concept of property.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, the importance of property is evident in Balibar’s work. After quoting Florence Gauthier, Balibar observes that a rupture occurred in the French revolution between: a) the Jacobins (who focused on the pursuit of universal egalitarianism and the promotion of freedom as a universal right) and b) the Thermidorians (who focused on the reciprocity of rights and the untouchable character of private property which substitutes the determinate social foundation for the natural, universal foundation of citizenship). Therefore, as Balibar notes, the problem of the French Declaration is reflected in the distinction between the Jacobins and the Thermidorians which suggests that the French revolution was realized jointly by the bourgeoisie and the non-bourgeoisie masses as an ongoing relation of alliance and confrontation.\textsuperscript{13}

ii) With regard to the term ‘Man’, Kouvelakis contends that the ‘Man of the Declaration’ refers in fact to the property owner. ‘Man’ is therefore interpreted in an exclusive manner by the architects of the declaration itself. For if the ‘Man’ of the declaration is the property owner, it follows that the person without property is revealed as a lesser entity, with fewer privileges and rights.\textsuperscript{14} According to Marx, the term ‘Man’ which the French declaration implicates to found a notion of citizenship does not reveal the truth of ‘Man’ but instead, conveys social discrimination and exclusion as it is devoted to the materialism of the bourgeoisie society.\textsuperscript{15}

iii) After noting articles One and Three of the French Declaration\textsuperscript{16}, Douzinas focuses on the notion of the ‘Citizen’ as bearer of human rights. Douzinas observes that rights are declared on behalf of the universal ‘Man’, but that the real recipients are the members of the newly-emerging nation states. The

\textsuperscript{12} Stathis Kouvelakis, ‘The Marxian Critique of Citizenship’, \textit{The South Atlantic Quaterly} 104:4, Fall 2005, 709
\textsuperscript{14} Kouvelakis, ‘The Marxian Critique of Citizenship’, 710
\textsuperscript{15} Kouvelakis, ‘The Marxian Critique of Citizenship’, 712-713
\textsuperscript{16} Article 1: Men are born and remain free and equal in their rights; Article 3: The source of all sovereignty lies in the nation.
subject of natural rights appears to be an individual who is born in freedom and equality and enjoys a list of abstract entitlements—a person without history, tradition, gender, colour, religion, needs or desires. However, as Douzinas observes, metaphysics cannot legislate for the world and it is instead the national assembly which does so. Rights and legislation are the concrete result of decisions by citizens and law-making power belongs to the people. Birth into the human race generates certain binding entitlements under the principle of autonomy, but it is the privilege of citizenship and its expression in national popular sovereignty that makes these entitlements real. Although the French declaration sets out the universality of rights, its immediate effect was to establish the power of the national state and its laws. As Douzinas argues, despite claims of universal rights and indiscrimination, the French Declaration was founded on the local sovereignty of the nation state and thereby perpetuated the exclusion of stateless or nation-less population groups such as immigrants.

Like Marx previously, Balibar, Douzinas and Kouvelakis today observe that the promotion of the universality of rights and citizenship does not guarantee social equality, inclusion and stability. On the contrary, it entails exclusion. The analysis of the French Declaration’s shortcomings reveals that in practice, human rights and the understanding of universal citizenship were products of the bourgeoisie and therefore promote a liberal understanding of rights with excluding implications. Thus, the supposed human rights of equality and liberty fail to prevent either discrimination or social exclusion, undermining the impartial qualities they proclaim.

**A Critique of Habermas’ Civil Society Approach: Does Universalism Indeed Supersede Particularism?**

Universalist conceptualisations of citizenship have so far been restricted to those of Held, Archibugi and Kaldor. Until this point, exclusively universalist conceptualizations of citizenship advocated the feasibility of a global civil society, prioritizing democracy and (human) rights. However, the theoretical basis to these approaches is not especially resilient and its lacks the philosophical

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17 Costas Douzinas, *Human Rights And Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (New York: Rutledge, 2007), 89-95
depth of Habermas’ more detailed argument. The latter thinker by contrast develops an elaborate philosophical argument which is heavily influenced by Kant. Although Habermas refers to the particularity of constitutional patriotism, he seems to overemphasize the predominance of universalism via the key concept of democratic legitimacy. This legitimacy is for Habermas founded on communicative action that ultimately upgrades the importance of global civil society. However, Habermas’ pro-universalist argument is arises from a particular understanding of freedom and reason. This interpretation of freedom and reason stems from the Kantian conceptualization of the self-determining subject. Habermas projects this particular understanding of subject, freedom and duty as the basis of the formation of universal civil rights and duties. As Balibar notes, Habermas’ understanding of “universalism” can be described as a community without a community. According to Balibar, this understanding of universality is in fact pseudo-universal; it is founded on a particular understanding of reason and duty and a number of supposedly “common” values or norms (liberal bourgeoisie) which take the form of “all or nothing” and whose logic is assimilating.  

Although Habermas’ work is influenced by elements that promote particularity (nation-state) as well as elements that promote universality (global civil society), it will be argued below that universalism ultimately prevails in his thought. Specifically, Habermas contends that the formation of a universal civil society and citizenship is feasible only via the key concept of democratic legitimacy.

Principally, Habermas argues that democratic self-determination emerges only if the state is transformed into a nation of citizens. It is the transition into the democratic state which transforms the subjects into citizens. National consciousness stands as the driving force of this transition. For Habermas, only national consciousness (turning the citizens into members who feel responsible for one another) can appeal in this context, over the comparatively dry and abstract rhetorical ideas of human rights. This, according to Habermas, leads to a double-coding of citizenship, as the term civil rights also implies membership of a culturally-defined community. Political mobilization depends on such cultural

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18 Ettiene Balibar, We, the People of Europe: Reflexions On Transnational Citizenship, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 65-67
Cultural symbolism henceforth secures its own particular character (commonalities of descent, language, history etc.). Only the symbolic construction of a ‘people’, argues Habermas, makes the modern state into a nation state. Constructed through the medium of modern law, this territorial state depends on the development of a national conscience to imbue it with the cultural substrate for a civil solidarity. While remaining strangers to one another, members of the same nation feel sufficiently responsible for one another that they are prepared to make sacrifices (e.g. military service, redistributive taxation etc.).

In spite of the fact that Habermas refers to the necessity of national consciousness to forming civil solidarity, he simultaneously insists that the background to certain principles (such as the commitment to legal agreements or freedom) is universal as it does not presuppose any particularist (ethnic-national) elements.

Habermas thus contends that citizens may be patriots who understand and uphold their constitution as an achievement in the context of their country’s history, yet nevertheless interpret the freedom of the nation in cosmopolitan terms. This practice reflects what might be called a ‘universal patriotism’. However, according to Habermas, a cosmopolitan understanding of the nation must be accorded priority over an ethnocentric interpretation. By universal terms, Habermas implies the authorization and (Kantian) duty/obligation to enter an agreement establishing a balance of interests with other nations within the framework of a federation. This concept is associated with that of Habermas’ democratic legitimation which is attained through the legal citizen and not via the nation. According to his radically-democratic theory, the legitimacy of political authority can only be secured through broad popular participation in decision-making. Habermas considers that there exists a simple universal basis for the agreement on general normative principles resulting from the role of ‘communicative action’ in regulating and producing social life and the identities of social actors. Citizens thereby exercise their political autonomy as legal

20 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 62-65  
21 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 111-114  
22 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 62-65
(rather than ethnic) subjects. A legal code thus becomes necessary to provide the communicative presuppositions of a communicative/discourse-will formation. According to Habermas, the democratic legitimation of decisions may be envisaged beyond the schema of the nation state. He stresses that the democratic process no longer draws its legitimizing force only from the individual’s political participation and expression of will. Rather, it is also derived from the general accessibility of a deliberative process whose structure (beyond the nation state scheme) grounds an expectation of rationally-acceptable results.

Unveiling Habermas’s Contrived Selection of Kantian Ideas

Here, it will be argued that Habermas utilized specific elements of Kantian thought (eg. the categorical imperative) which served his universalist argumentation, while neglecting a more holistic approach to Kant. Contrary to this approach, Kantian theory does not necessarily favour a universal approach to citizenship at the expense of a particular state-centric one. Kant instead focuses on the importance of the state and its nation throughout his work, whereas he makes a distinction between categories of citizenship.

As Balibar observes, Kant maintains that not all individuals are able to embrace citizenship. Thus, Kantian thought is not necessarily in harmony with an impartial universalist conceptualization of citizenship based on human rights. In his texts Kant draws a distinction between, ‘active citizens’ and ‘passive citizens’. According to this view, to become an active citizen, it does not suffice to be a party to a contract. Those who work in the service roles, as well as minors, children and dependents in general, lack civil personality as they are subjected and not truly independent.

Moreover, Habermas is not consistent with Kant insofar as he treats duty and the practice of honoring agreements as purely universal in order to support his argument and stress the supremacy of global civil society. According to Habermas’ understanding of Kant, compliance with norms and voluntary commitment to legal agreements emerges from a universal sense of moral duty.

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23 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 116-118
24 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 109-112
25 Mike Hill and Warren Montag, Masses Classes and The Public Sphere (London: Verso, 2000), 111-112
motivated by reason. However, as Balibar stresses, any universalist theoretical attempt that qualifies the formation of universal laws and duties via the predominance of reason in fact neglects Kant’s ‘subjective moment’. For Kant meanwhile, the ‘subjective moment’ relates to the law’s distinguishing of human actions into two classes; the legal and illegal. Yet this distinction can make sense only because individuals have the capacity to determine themselves by themselves and the ability to exercise choice. Thus, for such decisions to be made, a subjective and particular moment is necessary: that of the comprehension of juridical rules and the decision to apply them. This does not, however, accommodate adequately for a universalist treatment and instead necessitates this particular ‘subjective moment’.26

Furthermore, the idea of the nation and its state assumes a primary position in Kantian thought and there is nowhere to be found a suggestion which implies their substitution by a supranational institution or society. In his essay Towards Perpetual Peace, the state is projected as fully sovereign. Moreover, Kant argues in favour of a federation of states, where each state maintains its distinctiveness. For Kant, each state or nation is unique and must be respected. Therefore, foreign nations or states must not interfere with or coerce in order to influence the domestic sphere of others.27 He suggests that the right of nations should be based on a federation of free states.28 So too, his understanding of international right presupposes the idea of existence of many separate, independent states or nations. Nature guides states through their difference of language and religion, just as it leads men to natural hatred and conflict. However, just like man’s gradual evolution and cultural progression, this conflicted circumstance will lead gradually to agreement, mutual understanding and peace. Nature will thereby guarantee perpetual peace. This idea of ‘unsocial sociability’ which rests precisely on the differences among men and the nation states they inhabit and which later paves the ground for their co-operation, is also found in his essay Idea of a Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Intent.29

26 Hill and Montag, Masses Classes and The Public Sphere, 117-118
27 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 109
28 On the issue of multinational states, Kant mentions that this contradicts our assumptions. He instead supports that we should weight the rights of nation in relation to one another rather than fusing them into a single nation
29 Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, 124-125
Here, Kant defines the antagonistic traits which often characterize men via the notion of ‘unsocial sociability’. This concept refers to the inclination to enter into a society linked with the general repulsion at such entrance, which constantly threatens to break up the society just entered. On the one hand, it produces a society of selfish individuals united and instantly divided by interest. The outcome of ‘unsocial sociability’ is the emergence of a moral reaction to this pathological society where the state intervenes to neutralize these passions. The state is thus for Kant the master of all masters as it is the only actor that may at once constrain and legitimate by virtue of its very conception.\textsuperscript{30} Despite Habermas’s Kantian-inspired approach which promotes universalism and the supremacy of global civil society, a more detailed examination of Kantian thought subsequently reveals that Kant in fact stresses the importance of the sovereign nation state.

\textbf{Undermining the Universalist Effect of the Categorical Imperative from a Hegelian Perspective}

This section, addresses to the second question of this chapter and demonstrates how the consideration of Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) and the notion of Absolute challenges the universal dimension of Habermas’s Kantian-inspired approach after revealing the limits of Kant’s conceptualization of reason and duty.

Let us recall that Hegel’s notion of the Absolute accommodates the universal and the particular dimension and in that respect provides a content to the empty form after reconciling empiricism with idealism. Hegel’s notion of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) and his conceptualization of the Absolute allows him to treat reality as immanent and bridge the gap between what is ideal and what exists. Reality for Hegel is the unity of essence with existence. Moreover, after acknowledging the interplay of the subject with the object of knowledge, Hegel avoids a prescriptive transcendental approach which projects a particular perspective as objective-universal with socially excluding effects after treating the subject as a self-determining unit.

On the other hand, Habermas’s approach utilizes the Kantian notion of

\textsuperscript{30} Hill and Montag, \textit{Masses Classes and The Public Sphere}, 125-127
categorical imperative in order to support the feasibility of universal norms on the basis of a particular understanding of duty, subjectivity and reason. However, Habermas’s Kantian-inspired understanding of reason is founded on a flawed understanding of subjectivity, according to which the subject is self-determining. Such a notion of subjectivity disassociates the subject from the object of knowledge and encourages a prescriptive theoretical approach which downplays the impact of the empirical reality. Moreover, this Kantian inspired, prescriptive approach treats the subject as a self-determining unit and perceives citizenship in a transcendental vein based on an abstract notion of human rights and duties which disassociates reason from reality. Thus, such a prescriptive approach to citizenship downplays the interplay between reality and reason and projects a transcendental perspective as rational and universal which in reality triggers social exclusion. The impact of Kant’s transcendental treatment of reason, freedom and duty which stems from the perception of the subject-theorist as self-determining, prevents the scholars from acknowledging that their Kantian inspired approaches not only convey liberal ideals but also promote a socially excluding form of universalism which in fact undermines cosmopolitanism they support. The following paragraphs elucidate the shortcomings of Habermas’ universalist dimension which rests on the Kantian notions of duty, reason and freedom.

The Habermasian notion of the universality of norms stems from a particular (Kantian) understanding of reason, according to which only the use of reason (freed from desires and senses) allows us to determine law for ourselves and thus to become free. According to Habermas, the formation of global civil society is based on Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan’ sense of duty which is able to promote universal norms. This Kantian sense of duty is the categorical imperative. Habermas’s primary problematic is the question of how the individual overcomes the contradiction between private rights and public rights. He argues that the individual sacrifices her private rights in order to comply with a coercive legal order after submitting herself voluntarily to it. What secures this voluntary submission is the categorical imperative which also serves as the guide for such decision.

In *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant argues that moral law must be a general formula, applicable in all situations and commanding actions
which stem from pure motives. Habermas takes this general formula to be universal and employs it to form his global civil society argument. In Kantian words, the categorical imperative is to ‘act only in such a way that you could want the maxim of your action to become the universal law’. The basis of Kantian (universal) moral law relates to the application of reason which sets men free. When we follow the demands of need, desire or circumstances, we are in a state of ‘heteronomy’ - our desires are not self-determined. Yet once we follow the categorical imperative, prioritize reason and choose maxims that might be universal laws, then we find ourselves in a state of ‘autonomy’. The use of reason allows us to determine our own law, and thus become free.\(^{31}\) At this point, Habermas utilizes the categorical imperative to promote the notion of a universal moral law and analyze citizens as purely legal subjects.

The universalist dimension of Habermas’s argument becomes clear where he argues that citizens exercise their political autonomy as (universal) legal subjects and not as a result of their membership of a (particular) national community.\(^{32}\) In *Inclusion of the Other*, Habermas clearly states that there exists a universal basis for the agreement on general normative principles based on law and morality. To be precise, Habermas substantiates the universal basis for the agreement on norms as the outcome of the role of ‘communicative action’ in regulating and producing social life and the identities of social actors. For Habermas, the legitimacy of a political authority can emerge from such communicative action, which requires popular participation and democracy. Habermas links law, morality and legitimacy in order to stress the universalist dimension of norms. Habermas acknowledges that law provides rights via a coercive legal order. At this point, morality becomes necessary as it encourages citizens to submit themselves voluntarily to such a coercive order. This sense of duty stems from morality. However, Habermas adds that without the (liberal) private rights, citizens would not submit themselves voluntarily.\(^{33}\) These rights


\(^{32}\) “Citizens exercise their political autonomy as legal subjects. A legal code is necessary to provide their presuppositions of a communicative will formation [...] to establish this legal code it is necessary to create the status of legal persons who as bearers of of individual rights belong to a voluntary association of citizens” Habermas, *The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays*, 117

\(^{33}\) Democracy, this is how he associates the functional dimension of his theory
that emerge from a coercive legal order cannot be implemented without broad popular participation and consent.\textsuperscript{34} This voluntary consent, as Habermas notes, emerges from morality, and thus law presupposes morality as morality presupposes the law.\textsuperscript{35} The categorical imperative therefore proves to be an ideal tool for Habermas with which to combine law with morality and to provide a universalist dimension to norms, thereby downplaying the impact of states (particularism) on the formation of norms.

However, from a Hegelian perspective, the categorical imperative is treated as an empty formalism which is inadequate to form universal moral or legal principles. Hegel instead introduces an alternative conceptualization of reason and freedom. In the \textit{Philosophy of Right}, freedom is approached as a process emanating from the three moments of will, found respectively in the three social institutions of the family, civil society and the state. The interplay of these three institutions is responsible for the development of the ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}). Ethical life \textit{Sittlichkeit} is a form of morality, the content of which is derived from the social institutions (family, civil society, state). Thus, the subject’s emancipation occurs once it reconciles itself with community within the realm of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) which is actualized in the state.

Hegel attempts to promote an alternative understanding of freedom via his interpretation of the subject. In this manner, he provides a conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity which is more complete than Kant’s. In accordance with the categorical imperative, Kant equated the subject with a self-determining individual and argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than senses or whims. The application of the categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a sense of duty which is in turn emancipating. However, the content of such sense of duty is vague in Kant’s thought.\textsuperscript{36} Hegel gives a more concrete content to this seemingly abstract requirement of freedom. Where the categorical imperative sustains an incomplete form of subjectivity and alienates the subject from the community whilst

\textsuperscript{34} This is why he is recognises the positive aspects of the state as the social political formation, which develops its citizens political mobilisation which is depended on a prior cultural integration and social cohesion.

\textsuperscript{35} Jurgen Habermas, \textit{The Inclusion of the Other}, (MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1998), 124-127

\textsuperscript{36} Timothy C Luther, \textit{Hegel’s Critique of Modernity}, (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009, 128-132}
promoting a flawed account of freedom, Hegelian freedom overcomes these shortcomings. Kant’s self-determining understanding of subjectivity which nourishes the tension among individuals is countered by Hegel’s promotion of an alternative understanding of freedom which incorporates the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state.37

The preceding analysis has served to expose the implications of Habermas’ contrived selection of Kantian ideas, as well as the limits of the categorical imperative. Habermas utilized the categorical imperative in order to support the feasibility of universal norms on the basis of a particular understanding of duty, subjectivity and freedom. However, Habermas’s Kantian-influenced understanding of freedom is founded on a flawed understanding of subjectivity, according to which the subject is perceived in the form of the individual ego that is autonomous and self-determining. Such notion of subjectivity nourishes a flawed account of freedom based on the empty formalism of the categorical imperative and assists the promotion of liberal ideals as will be analyzed below.

Moreover, from a Hegelian perspective, Habermas emphasis on the categorical imperative, dissociates the subject from the socio-political community while perpetuating a vacuous moral sense of duty. Upon this moral sense of duty, Habermas founds his understanding of the public sphere that rests on abstract universal norms, superseding history and ignoring the particularities of diverse social institutions. In other words, the universality of Habermas norms is founded on a particular understanding of subjectivity and reason which as Taylor argues, is too laden with western cultural influence (Kantian thought) to be universally applicable. Habermas abstract formulation of universal duty and morality meanwhile fails to substantiate a motivation on behalf of the agent.38

Finally, Frazer’s analysis undermines the universality of Habermas’s approach by describing how the void of Habermas ‘universal’ norms (which determine the ‘universality’ of the public sphere) ultimately assist the promotion of particular bourgeois interests and liberal ideals, and thereby of social exclusions.

37 Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, 135-140
From the outset, Taylor objects to Habermas’ essay *Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?*. In this essay, Habermas suggests that one can formulate concepts like universal justice, normative rightness and a moral point of view, independently of any vision of the good life, a concrete form of life or particular society.\(^{39}\) Habermas then discredits Hegel’s notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), arguing that it is unsurprising that the positions which proceed from the ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) of such concrete forms of life as the *polis* or the state have difficulty generating a universal principle of justice. On the contrary, Habermas suggests that this problem is less troublesome for discourse ethics, since the latter presumes to justify the universal validity of its moral principle in terms of the normative content of communicative presuppositions of *argumentation* as such.\(^{40}\)

However, Taylor emphasizes that the abstraction of Habermas’ discourse ethics fails to tackle the problem of the agent’s motivation. Specifically, Taylor notes that as an actor, the individual can always question why she should actually proceed according to a particular norm, namely, rationally. Why must she not deny this norm? This question can only be answered through ‘strong subjective valuations’ which in turn reinforces the neglected dimension of particularity. Habermas, however, wishes to limit himself to a purely proceduralist ‘universal’ ethics. We strive, according to his underlying principle, to reach a ‘universaly’ rational understanding. We must endeavour to replace non-rational mechanisms of action coordination with rational forms of reaching understanding. Yet, as Taylor notes, this demand also confronts the question of why the individual should strive for this. One might instead have other aims or other interests. Why then should she elect this rational understanding?\(^{41}\)

Moreover, as Taylor contends, Habermas’ particular understanding of reason undermines the universal validity of his theory. As Taylor observes, according to certain modern western theories (notably Kantian ones), the rule of right can be distinguished from people’s conceptions of happiness (Kant) and given a different, more secure foundation. This foundation might be in reason

\(^{39}\) Habermas, *Morality and Ethical Life*, p.205

\(^{40}\) Habermas, *Morality and Ethical Life*, p. 214

itself, or the commitments involved in discourse. But this distinction is internal to one historical view. As DeSouza observes, Taylor’s critique of Habermas’ discourse theory of morality thus amounts to an accusation that it claims universal validity even though it depends on terms and distinctions that are ‘internal to one historical view’. Examples of such terms and distinctions include a particular conception of rationality and a decentered understanding of the world– a western-centric understanding linked to the development of Western rationality. Habermas’ appears to confirm this when he admits his agreement with Max Weber, in particular, a version of his thesis on the universal cultural significance of Occidental rationalism. Thus, Taylor considers Habermas’ approach to be erroneous as it fails to acknowledge the extent to which his approach is affiliated with the particularity of the modern west and determined by the western rationalism (as opposed to by universalism).

Fraser’s approach reflects some of the points of Taylor’s critique by stressing Habermas’ attempt to neutralize the social differences of public sphere which ultimately promotes social exclusions and the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie. Frazer calls into question Habermas’ assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket status differentials and to deliberate ‘as if’ they were social equals. That is, the assumption that social equality is not a necessary condition for political democracy. However, she doubts whether these social differences can be effectively bracketed. Instead, Fraser argues that: ‘the discursive interaction within the bourgeois public sphere was governed by protocols of civic traits and decorum that were themselves correlated and markers of social status […] these inequalities functioned informally to marginalize women and members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them from participating as peers’.

Fraser adds that misplaced faith in the efficacy of bracketing implies another flaw of Habermas’ public sphere. As she explains, his conception of the

43 DeSouza, ‘Models of Moral Philosophy: Charles Taylor’s Critique of Jurgen Habermas’, 65-68
45 Fraser, *Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy* in Craig Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 63
public sphere assumes it to be a space of zero-degree culture; so utterly bereft of any specific ethos as to accommodate with perfect neutrality and equal ease interventions expressive of any and every cultural ethos. But this assumption is false, notes Fraser. In stratified societies, unequally-empowered social groups tend to develop unequally-valued cultural styles. The result is the development of powerful informal pressures that marginalize the contributions of members of subordinated groups, both in everyday life contexts and in official public spheres. As Fraser observes, participation in the public sphere means being able to speak in one’s voice, thereby simultaneously constructing and expressing one’s cultural identity through a particular idiom and specific social traits. Moreover, public spheres themselves are not spaces of zero-degree culture, equally hospitable to any form of cultural expression. Rather, they exist in culturally-specific institutions. These institutions may be understood as culturally-specific rhetorical lenses that filter and alter the utterances they frame; they can accommodate some expressive modes and not others.46

In this regard, Fraser quotes a number of scholars, such as Landes and Eley, who explain how Habermas’ approach in fact idealizes the liberal public sphere and promotes social exclusions, despite claims of the universalism and neutrality of the public sphere. According to Landes perspective, Habermas public sphere, notwithstanding the rhetoric of publicity and accessibility, is constituted by a number of significant exclusions. For Landes, the key axis of exclusion is gender. She argues that the ethos of the new republican public sphere in France was constructed in deliberate opposition to that of the more woman-friendly salon culture that the republicans stigmatized as artificial, effeminate and aristocratic. Consequently, a new austere style of public speech and behavior was promoted - a style deemed rational, virtuous and manly. In this way, the masculinist gender constructs were built into the very conception of the republican public sphere, as was the logic that led Jacobin rule to formally exclude women from political life.

Fraser notes that Eley extends Lande’s argument to support the thesis that exclusionary operations were essential to the liberal public sphere, not only in France but also in England and in Germany. In all these countries, gender

46 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy in Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere., 64-69
exclusions were linked to other exclusions rooted in processes of class formation. The soil that nourished the liberal public sphere was civil society, doing so via the emerging new congeries of voluntary associations that arose at the time. As Fraser maintains, this network of clubs and voluntary associations — philanthropic, civic, professional and cultural — was anything but accessible to all. On the contrary, it formed the arena, the training ground and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeoisie men, who were coming to see themselves as a ‘universal’ class and preparing to assert their fitness to govern. Thus, the evolution of a distinctive culture of civil society and of an associated public sphere was implicated in the process of bourgeois class formation. Its practices and ethos were therefore markers of distinction, ways of defining an emerging elite intended to displace the old aristocratic elites and rule the various popular and plebeian strata.47 Finally, Fraser observes an irony regarding Habermas’ account of the rise of the public sphere. Specifically, she highlights that: ‘a discourse of publicity touting accessibility - based on rationality - and the suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed as a strategy of distinction […] however, the relationship between publicity and social status is more complex than Habermas suggests since the bracketing and neutralization of status distinctions is not sufficient to neutralize the effects of these distinctions’.48

It was previously explained that the universalism of Habermas’ public sphere rests on a sense of duty that draws on Kant’s categorical imperative. Although scholars such as Taylor and Fraser questioned whether Habermas’ approach was genuinely universalist, Hegel’s insights reveal that the failure of Habermas thought lies in his flawed account of subjectivity and the limits of Kant’s categorical imperative. Specifically, the categorical imperative promotes a flawed understanding of subjectivity according to which the subject is perceived in the form of the autonomous and self-determining individual. Furthermore, the categorical imperative rests on the development of an empty formalism which does not take into serious consideration the empirical world. The vacuity of the categorical imperative from which the public sphere’s ‘universal’ sense of duty emerges explains how this void is filled by the ‘neutral’

47 Nancy Fraser, *Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy* in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 59-60
48 Nancy Fraser, *Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy* in Craig Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 61
rhetoric of (human) rights which itself serves the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie.

In other words, what we encounter here is a universally-projected particularity. Habermas’ Kantian-influenced understanding of the public sphere, despite its universal and neutral declarations which rest on the categorical imperative’s sense of duty, entails an excluding logic. As has been discussed, this logic is founded on western understanding of rationality and ultimately promotes liberal bourgeoisie interests and influence. Habermas’ failure to fulfil his universalist declarations is inherently linked to the categorical imperative which forms a public sphere that promotes particular interests, excludes and neglects to politically-emancipate participating citizens. As noted in the previous chapter, Kantian reason and subjectivity contribute to a non-emancipating understanding of freedom. It has been argued above that an incomplete account of freedom is erected when Hegel’s three moments of will and notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) are overlooked. A non-emancipating understanding of freedom emerges when: a) the individual subject is perceived as a self-determining unit; b) the understanding of freedom is founded on the self-determining subject’s will; and c) the supposedly ‘free’ options stem from a particular domain which remains beyond the subject’s control.

In Habermas’ case, freedom is conceptualized via the communicative action of the ‘universal’ public sphere. However, as it has already been argued, this public sphere is influenced by the principles of the bourgeoisie liberal democracy. Thus, the freedom this particular public sphere rests on is formed via a conceptualization of the subject as a private, self-determining individual. The ‘free’ options which stem from the notion of ‘universal’ (human) rights are thus informed by liberal bourgeoisie objectives. Habermas ‘universality’ of the public sphere therefore depends on; firstly, the subject’s ‘voluntary’ submission that draws on the vacuous duty of the categorical imperative; and secondly, the particular notion of (human) rights. This framework fundamentally undermines the universality of the Habermas’s global civil society and subjects its participants to the control of the liberal bourgeoisie. His understanding of global civil society subsequently fails to meet its universalist claims where its approach rests on a western (Kantian)-inspired understanding of subjectivity and freedom that nourishes liberal bourgeois principles and promotes social exclusions.
The preceding analysis highlighted that the universality of Habermas’ norms was determined by a particular understanding of subjectivity and reason founded on the categorical imperative. It was noted that the categorical imperative triggered a vacuous sense of duty which failed to substantiate the agent’s motivation and self-consciousness. Moreover, it was emphasized that the void in Habermas’ universal norms promoted particular bourgeoisie liberal interests, and that these contributed to social stratification and the alienation of citizens (among themselves and from the state). Hegel’s analysis overcomes the shortcomings of Habermas’ approach by introducing the notion of patriotism which will be further analyzed in the following sections. This of patriotism emerges when Hegel incorporates an economical dimension into his understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which nevertheless neither lapses into materialism nor reproduces liberal bourgeoisie ideals or the civic alienation of citizens.

As Dickey observes, in the mid-1790s Hegel discovered political economy via the Scottish enlightenment and the thought of Ferguson, Steuart and Smith. Hegel’s reading of the Scottish scholars convinced him that a notion of ethical life cannot be formed only through religion. Religious creeds alone could not function as a motivational and cultural ideal as long as they failed to take account of the role of economy in shaping modern life. After 1794, Hegel treats ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as an ideal that must be situated within a historically-specific constellation of socioeconomic forces. Nevertheless, Hegel’s objective was to rectify the bourgeoisie socio-economic implications associated with a purely materialistic approach to economy that lead to the promotion of liberal ideals and the alienation of citizens. As Dickey argues, Hegel resisted the Scotts who insisted on treating individuals as social beings whose nature was essentially economic. So while he admired the Scotts for their materialistic sense of history, he aimed from the outset to alter their arguments, especially those who celebrated the materialism of the collective life.49 Hegel challenged not only the overly-economized bourgeoisie conception of ethical life, but also a purely religious conception of ethical life. Thus, Hegel’s conception of ethical life upon which citizenship rests is essentially formed through the interplay between the

moral and economic aspects of his thought. From this perspective, Hegel’s concern with values such as pride, courage and the notion of patriotism aim at redressing the purely-economic-materialist approach that produces egotistic citizens alienated from their state.\textsuperscript{50}

Hegel had been committed from the mid-1790s to showing how the political dimension of the notion of citizenship emerged from the economical dimension. Just as Rousseau earlier drew a distinction between the terms citoyen and bourgeois, similarly, Marx in the essay \textit{On the Jewish Question} argued that the rights of man reflect the bourgeoisie egotistic individual, withdrawn into herself and disassociated from the state.\textsuperscript{51} Hegel likewise employed the same distinction between Burger as citizen and Burger as bourgeoisie. However, the novelty in Hegel’s thought lies in his refusal to present this opposition between citoyen and bourgeoisie in excluding terms. Instead, he attempted to reconcile these two concepts by suggesting how the former emerges from the evolution of the latter. As Dickey contends, Hegel offers the idea of courage and patriotism as the key to this conversion process from bourgeoisie into citoyen that highlights the political notion of the citizen reconciled with the state. As Dickey observes, Hegel employed another term for courage - the word tapferkeit. This substitution is extremely revealing for it signals the very specific political connotation Hegel wished to assign to ethical life (Sittlichkeit). In Hegel’s work, tapferkeit had its roots in the material dimension. Unlike for the moral formalists, Hegel’s tapferkeit did not emerge as a force or entity that was independent of this material dimension from its inception. Hegel instead presented tapferkeit as an empirically-rooted disposition. Here, tapferkeit comes into play precisely at the point at which individuals were obliged for ethico-political reasons to move beyond the materialist realm. Thus, although tapferkeit had a natural origin, it was not naturally essential to individuals except insofar as they came to see politics as a way of developing their personalities beyond what was given to them – that is, by the purely materialist dimension. In this sense, the end of tapferkeit is an ethico-political creation that somehow emerges from the material dimension.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} Dickey, \textit{Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807}, 280-281
\textsuperscript{51} Marx, \textit{Early Writings}, 230
\textsuperscript{52} Dickey, \textit{Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807}, 223-227
Hegel had argued that the bourgeois conception of ethical life was politically null as it was devoid of non-materialist qualities. The bourgeois understanding of citizenship was seen as promoting political nullity since it failed to acknowledge the values of courage and patriotism. As Dickey argues, Hegel’s criticism to the bourgeois system was designed to change its sociocultural rather than its socio-economic orientation toward life. In that respect, Hegel’s critique was concerned less with encouraging individuals to preserve a socio-economic pattern of historical development than with providing them with a new sociocultural perspective within which economic development and commercial expansion might be pursued in both a civil and an ethical manner. Hegel had defined his philosophical task as one which gave new direction to the conception of ethical life. This new direction oriented away from the bourgeoisie materialist system of reality towards a system in which individuals might extend a political dimension to an identity that was being formed within both a socio-economic and sociocultural framework. Thus, Hegel’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) becomes an economico-politico-ethical ideal proposed as an alternative to the socioeconomic forces of the period.53

II. A Hegelian-Inspired Understanding of Citizenship Which Incorporates
Universalism and Particularism

Overview

This part addresses to the third (3) question posed earlier namely how Hegel’s thought enriches the conceptualization of citizenship. The previous sections underscored the limits of universalist approaches to citizenship. These shortcomings were linked to the unexamined universalist treatment of rights and values such as equality and liberty. Similarly, the weakness of Habermas’s universalism appeared to be associated with the categorical imperative. From a Hegelian perspective, the categorical imperative reflects an empty formalism and rests on a self-determining account of subjectivity. Specifically, Habermas’s application of the categorical imperative evokes a particular understanding of duty and reason which forms a public sphere that promotes liberal bourgeoisie

interests and triggers social exclusions. Habermas’ approach thereby projects a particularist understanding of the public sphere as universal. This part elucidates: i) how Hegel’s approach overcomes the shortcomings which emerge after conceptualizing citizenship without accommodating the universal and the particular dimension; and ii) how Hegel informs our understanding of citizenship.

Below, it will be argued that Hegelian philosophy allows us to move beyond the shortcomings which emerge from this delineation of citizenship. For now, it is sufficient to note that Hegel’s thought, as a result of an alternative conceptualization of freedom, permits the incorporation of the universal as well as the particular dimensions, giving rise to the notion of patriotism. This concept, tied to Hegelian freedom will be used to promote an alternative understanding of citizenship which reconciles the universal with the particular and the individual with the state.

Before elaborating on his notion of patriotism, it will be elucidated how Hegel incorporates these exact dimensions of universality and particularity. It will subsequently be argued that the accommodation of universality and particularity is possible due to Hegel’s philosophical system which conceptualizes the development freedom via the three moments of will and the actualization of freedom within the state. Hegelian philosophy is linked to the concept of Spirit (Geist) and forms a theory which is neither prescriptive nor descriptive. This understanding of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to develop an alternative understanding of the will, duty, civil society and the state which overcome certain limits of Kantian and Rousseauian theory. Where the shortcomings of Kantian theory were described in the previous section, emphasis will here fall on Hegel’s formation of an alternative understanding of will, freedom, duty and state in order to overcome Rousseau’s flaws. These Hegelian insights inform an account of patriotism which is treated here as a more complete approach to citizenship, incorporating the universal and the particular.
The Implications of Spirit (Geist) for Hegel’s Alternative Understanding of Freedom, Subjectivity and Ethics

*What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational*

Georg W. F. Hegel

Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) reconciles universality and particularity and thus helps overcome the theoretical shortcomings of approaches to citizenship which separate these two dimensions. Broadly, the Hegelian notion of Spirit (Geist) contributes to an alternative conceptualization of the terms freedom, subjectivity, actuality and rationality. The fresh understanding of these terms permits Hegel to transcend the limits of previous approaches and instead:

a) put forward a theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive after rejecting abstract *a priori* principles and normative claims; b) form an understanding of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) which overcomes empty formalisms, values or abstract behaviourism, while reconciling universalism with particularism; and c) develop a sense of duty which is not coercive but emancipating as it reconciles the individual with the community and the state.

The first two points (a) and (b) have already been analyzed above, whilst criticizing the shortcomings of the particularist and universalist approaches to citizenship. Below, some additional remarks on these points will be made which stem from a more extensive citation of the *Philosophy of Right* and from the insights of Boucher’s and Taylor’s work. However, the third point (c) is also crucial here as it hints at describe Hegel’s understanding of patriotism; a term upon which the Hegelian-inspired conceptualization of citizenship rests.

With regard to the first point (a), as Taylor notes, Hegel dismissed the motionless tautology of ‘I = I’. According to Hegel, rationality and self-consciousness are not innate, but qualities the individual arrives at. Moreover, for Hegel, as is clearly indicated in *The Philosophy of Right*, the evolution of self-consciousness is inspired by social institutions (family, civil society and state) which ultimately contribute to the development of freedom within the realm of community.\(^{54}\) Thus, Hegel’s understanding of freedom is not associated with the

individualist notion of a self-determining subjectivity, but formed through an ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) within the state.

Hegelian thought, as is noted in the *Philosophy of Right*’s preface, does not attempt to provide instructions on how a state ought to be. Rather, Hegel intends to show how the ethical universe within the state is to be understood. The task of philosophy is, according to Hegel, to assist in the comprehension of actuality, or ‘what is’. In order to comprehend ‘what is’, reason is necessary since ‘what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’.\(^{55}\) Moreover, Hegel stresses that regardless of what happens, every individual is a child of her time. It is just as absurd to fancy that philosophy can transcend its contemporary world, he argues, as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap her own age. If a philosopher attempts to go beyond the world as it is and to build an ideal one as it ought to be, this world would exist only in her regard, as an insubstantial element where anything one willed may be built.\(^{56}\)

Instead, the concept of Spirit (*Geist*) allows Hegel to pursue a philosophical enquiry which is neither predictive nor prescriptive. The Spirit (*Geist*) assists Hegel to exhibit the rationality or reason which has informed the development of history. However, this rationality exhibits a capacity for real novelty and therefore its future course cannot be predicted. According to Hegel, it is thus not the objective of philosophy to construct ideals or to put forward a prescriptive theory, but to understand what is actual. The philosopher must not accept actuality as she finds it. Instead, her objective is to exhibit the underlying rationality or reason that has informed the development of history or the progress of Spirit.\(^{57}\) As Boucher notes, for Hegel the philosopher should not be satisfied with the empirical finiteness of the given, but must bring to the comprehension of the subject a conception of the unity and overall coherence exhibited in it. Only in relation to the whole can the phenomenal aspect of the subject reveal the reason immanent in it. Thus, Hegel’s understanding of actuality does not relate to an empirical account of facts. Actuality for Hegel is a technical term, not co-extensive with existence. What is truly actual has an existence that is necessary.


\(^{56}\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 11-12

\(^{57}\) David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 330-332
Without the unity of the universal and particular nothing can be actual, even if it may be assumed to have existence.\textsuperscript{58}

With regard to the second point (b), Hegel’s notion of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) assumes the unity of the universe without denying its diversity and reconciles universalism with particularism. From this starting point, it is not necessary for Hegel to reconcile differences or overcome dualisms. It is not therefore with minds independent of their objects or with thoughts severed from the thinker that Hegel concerns himself, but with the process of thinking itself. Hegel dismisses knowledge stemming from self-ascribed authorities based on the perception of the subject as a self-determining unit. It is only through a critical description of the phenomena of knowledge that their validity can be revealed. In other words, an account of knowledge is not to be given in terms of its conformity to a pre-existing formula, but instead as it actually emerges and develops. The purpose of this is to dispense with Kant’s mistaken dichotomy of knowledge between things as they appear to us and things-in-themselves. Therefore, the notion of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) is responsible for a Hegelian account of theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive.\textsuperscript{59} According to Hegelian philosophy, the subject is not an independent self-determining unit that treats the object of analysis as passive. Rather, Hegelian thought promotes an account of knowledge which allows a critical description of the phenomena beyond pre-existing formulas as they actually emerge and develop within the realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist}).

Thus, Hegel’s puts forward the conceptualization of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) which overcomes empty formalisms while accommodating universalism with particularism, in order to overcome the flaws of Kantian thought. The latter’s self-determining account of subjectivity is responsible for a problematic sense of duty and freedom which form an abstract set of norms and moral values. As Hegel observes in paragraph 135 of the \textit{Philosophy of Right}, Kant argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than senses or whims, in accordance with a sense of duty he terms the categorical imperative.\textsuperscript{60} However the content of this sense of duty is in fact an empty

\textsuperscript{58} Boucher, \textit{Political Theories of International Relations}, 333-334
\textsuperscript{59} Boucher, \textit{Political Theories of International Relations}, 334-337
\textsuperscript{60} Kant affirms the existence of an absolute moral law via the categorical imperative. The application of categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a
formalism, argues Hegel.\textsuperscript{61} He instead provides a concrete content to Kant’s seemingly abstract requirement of freedom via the ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}).

The third point (c) reflects Hegel’s effort to develop an alternative sense of duty which is emancipating whilst reconciling the individual with the community and the state. In the respect, Hegel’s intention was to overcome the limits of Rousseau’s thought according to which the will is associated with the individual, self-determining subject.\textsuperscript{62} This, argues Hegel, transforms Rousseau’s general will into nothing more than an association of individual wills which fails to promote a strong sense of cohesion in the state, while the sense of duty which emerges from the general will appears coercive and non-emancipating. The enriched understanding of will which informs Hegel’s concept of patriotism is crucial here as it assists in the promotion of an alternative account of citizenship.

According to Rousseau, upon entering into the social pact, each individual agrees to subject herself to conditions that apply equally to all. Here, Rousseau suggests that no member of the political community consequently has an interest in making conditions burdensome to others, since these conditions would become equally burdensome to the member herself. In that manner, David James interprets Rousseau’s statement ‘by giving himself to all, gives himself to no-one’ as follows: although each individual makes herself dependent on the collective body established by means of the social pact and law, at the same time she avoids becoming dependent on the arbitrary will of any particular individual or group of individuals within society.\textsuperscript{63} Nevertheless, when Rousseau refers to the implications of necessity and dependence among men, he alludes to the inequality and lack of freedom that emerges in society. The example of a voluntary form of association allows some obvious scope for free choice, yet the condition of interdependence which is triggered by the natural necessity and artificial needs which develop in society generates various social constraints.\textsuperscript{64}

For Rousseau, the development of new artificial needs increases the degree of dependence on other human beings, since each individual becomes

\begin{footnotes}
\item[61] Hegel, \textit{Hegel’s Philosophy of Right}, 89-90
\item[62] Hegel, \textit{Hegel’s Philosophy of Right }, 33
\item[63] David James, \textit{Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependance and Necessity}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 20
\item[64] James, \textit{Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependance and Necessity}, 21
\end{footnotes}
unable to produce the means of satisfying her needs by means of her own activity. Rousseau clearly considers that this loss of independence involves the transformation of dependence on things into dependence on other human beings. This second form of dependence is mediated by the dependence on objects that are taken to represent means of satisfying natural needs or the artificial needs that have taken on the appearance of needs. Rousseau argues that such dependence is responsible for the generation of inequality. Moreover, ever-increasing material inequality, according to Rousseau, represents a loss of freedom. As human beings become dependent on others for the satisfaction of their needs, at the same time, this dependence has come to assume one-sided forms, giving some individuals more power than others, and thereby generating inequalities.65

Therefore, Rousseau locates the origins of political society in natural necessity. In the *Social Contract*, Rousseau suggests that the social pact itself is a result of necessity. Since men are no longer able to preserve themselves by means of their own powers, and in this sense to remain self-sufficient, human beings are forced to reach some kind of agreement with one another in terms of cooperation so as to preserve their lives and to satisfy their material needs. In this way, Rousseau argues that natural necessity determines the formation of political society in the shape of the basic conditions of human survival. The social contract in *Second Discourse* is likewise a product of necessity, born from the desire to overcome the state of war which arises in circumstances of material inequality. Hence, for Rousseau, necessity and rational deliberation go together, with some individuals successfully employing the capacity to reason in an instrumental fashion so as to secure their own lives and property in the face of dangers.

Hegel launches his counter-argumentation against Rousseau in the *Philosophy of Right*, primarily in paragraphs 29 and 258. In paragraph 29, as James argues, Hegel objects to Rousseau’s treatment of will. Rousseauian will is not perceived as rational or having a being in and for itself within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*). Instead, the will is perceived as the particular will of the individual, the single will. As James notes, Hegel argues that the definition of right, especially popular since Rousseau, is supposed to be the will of a single

65 James, *Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependance and Necessity*, 34-36
person in her own private self-will, not the absolute or rational will. For Hegel, a treatment of will as a private self-will is superficial and devoid of any speculative thinking. Against this, paragraph 258 is particularly engaging as Hegel both praises and criticizes Rousseau. He is praised for elevating the will to a principle of state. Yet subsequently, Hegel again argues that Rousseau considers the will only in the determinate form of the individual will and regards the universal will not as the will’s rationality in and for itself, but as the common element arising from the sum of individual, private wills.

As Hegel argues in the *Philosophy of Right*, if the state is confused with civil society and its specific end is laid down as the security and protection of property and professional freedom, then the interest of individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of this association. It follows then that membership of the state is optional. Yet Hegel stresses that the state’s relation to the individual is to be distinguished from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual herself can achieve objectivity, genuine individuality and an ethical life. Unification is the true content and aim of the individual whose destiny is universal life within the state. Hegel then describes that rationality consists in the thorough-going unity of the universal and the particular. Specifically, he notes that the rationality of the state regarding its content and form respectively consists of the unity of objective freedom (freedom of the universal will) and subjective freedom (freedom of each individual in her knowing and her volition of particular ends).

It has been previously noted that Hegel objected to Rousseau’s treatment of the will as the individual’s private will, according to which the universal will took the form of a ‘general will’ which proceeds from the individual will. The result is that he reduces the union of individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to a concept based on their arbitrary wills. In this manner, individuals’ opinions and capriciously-determined actions promote a sense of consent and abstract reasoning which destroys the absolutely divine principle of the state. At this point, Hegel criticizes the outcomes of the French revolution’s era of terror which stems from the application of abstract reason. In Hegel’s words: ‘when

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66 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 33
67 James, *Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependance and Necessity*, 143-146
68 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 156
these abstract conclusions came into power, they afforded for the first time in human history the prodigious spectacle of the overthrow of the constitution of a great actual state and its complete reconstruction on the basis of pure thought alone, after the destruction of all existing material. The will of its re-founders was to give it what they alleged was a purely rational basis, but it was only an abstraction that was being used, the idea was lacking and the experiment ended in the maximum of frightfulness and terror.  

In the *Philosophy of Right* (paragraphs 20 and 21), Hegel claims that abstract universality which is indeterminate in itself finds its determinacy in reflection which bears on impulses estimated, compared with one another and with a sum of satisfaction. Reflection invests this material with abstract universality. Abstract universality via reflection is transformed into a self-determining universality. In having universality, the will is free not only in itself but also for itself.

Through reference to the French terror as the outcome of abstract reason (universality), Hegel argues that the will becomes free not only in terms of its form (universality), but also in terms of its content (particularity). The content of will, he argues, aims at the general good of all by securing the conditions of free agency in the world. Freedom for Hegel consists in obeying certain objectively-valid norms or by acting in accordance with the legal or institutional embodiments of these norms within the state. Hegel describes how this compatibility between the self-determining will and the notion of constraint does not appear as contradictory, but as complimentary with the state. In the *Philosophy of Right* (paragraph 149), Hegel argues that a binding duty can appear as a limitation only in relation to indeterminate subjectivity or abstract freedom where arbitrary will and natural drives prevail. However, Hegel contends that the free individual finds her liberation in duty. It is through this argument that Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) as emerging from the state via family and civil society is developed. Accordingly, ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) inspires the transformation of individual needs to reflect the whole, rather than merely the self. Ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) shapes the individual’s

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69 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 157  
70 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 29  
71 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 107
fundamental interests into a whole which then determines the function of laws and institutions. These are in turn viewed as rational, despite ultimately serving the individual’s interest. Thus, ethical life as informed by Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of free will acknowledges the purpose of duty and state (institutions) as emancipatory, rather than coercive.72

Hegel does not reject the individualism of civil society, but regards it as a necessary yet contingent element of the actualization of the subject’s free will within the state. He views civil society as a sphere of mutual-dependence and influence in which human beings are educated towards a more universalistic standpoint by means of the practical constraints to which they are subject, though not necessarily conscious of. Hegel thus focuses on the economic and social forms of necessity that determine human thought and action. Necessity is regarded as performing an educative function. Hegel further offers a defense of civil society as against Rousseau’s critique, highlighting its role in educating the individual toward universality. According to Hegel, civil society is integral to an account of human perfection, whose final goal is the seizure of free will.73

Thus, Hegel envisions a form of freedom that consists in the sense of absence of constraint which comes from being able to identify oneself with something other than oneself. It is arguably this idea of freedom that he alludes to when describing the disposition that he considers to characteristic of the modern form of patriotism. This form of patriotism is premised on individual’s ‘particular interests’ that fall under the more general concept of welfare and form a part of the interest of the state as a whole. It is an individual’s belief that this is indeed the case which subsequently produces a feeling of trust towards the state.74

To summarize, Hegel’s theoretical contribution lies in his overcoming the pitfalls which emerge from the distinction of citizenship between the universal and the particular dimension. Firstly, Hegel’s concept of Spirit (Geist) promotes an alternative perception of knowledge which exposes the methodological shortcomings of the universalist and the particularist accounts. Hegel puts forward a theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive and rejects abstract

72 James, Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependance and Necessity, 148-152
73 James, Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependance and Necessity, 154
74 James, Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependance and Necessity, 162-163
a priori principles or normative claims. In this way, he stresses the importance of form and content which permit him to incorporate the universalist with the particularist dimension. Secondly, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) which informs his understanding of freedom via the three moments of will, allows him to transcend the flaws of Kantian and Rousseauian thought. Hegel’s alternative understanding of freedom (actualized in the state via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit)) unveils the limits of the Kantian sense of duty and morality upon which certain universalist approaches of citizenship rely. Hegel makes clear that neither a sense of duty nor moral values can be based on abstract universal principles, empty of content. He illustrates the perils entailed in such approaches by referring to the emergence of terror during the French revolution. With respect to Rousseau, Hegel objects to the former’s treatment of civil society which assumes a coercive state and a non-emancipating form of duty, thereby alienating the individual from the community. Hegel, after putting forwards his alternative conceptualization of free will, stresses that the state and social institutions gradually contribute to the individual’s seizure of self-consciousness and freedom while reconciling the individual’s interests with those of his fellow citizens’ and the state. Patriotism is the disposition which according to Hegel contributes to this reconciliation and reinforces the bonds of the individual with the community and the state.

In the remaining part of this chapter it will be argued that Hegel’s patriotism serves as an ideal concept to encapsulate citizenship as it overcomes the flaws stemming from the division of citizenship. Hegel’s patriotism which incorporates both the particular and universal dimensions enables us to rectify a number of intellectual flaws which stem from the separation of these two dimensions. Hegel’s insights bring to our attention that these flaws are associated to: a) the treatment of subject as an independent self-determining unit; b) the non-emancipating understanding of freedom which stems from the individual self-determining subject; c) the application of abstract principles as normative truths which dictate and disorientate knowledge; and d) a problematic understanding values, ethics and duty stemming from relativism or empty formalisms. In other words, Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom which informs his notion of patriotism constitutes a remedy for the
methodological flaws which limit the universal and particular approaches of citizenship.

**How Hegel’s Patriotism Promotes a More Complete Understanding of Citizenship**

Previously, it was described how Hegel promulgated a richer account of will comprised of three moments and actualized in the state in an effort to overcome Rousseau’s concept of general will. Hegel’s account of free will promotes a perspective in which: a) the individual is reconciled with the community and state; b) the duty and the state institutions cease to be perceived as coercive or as mediums of the individual’s unfreedom, but instead as means which provide freedom by integrating the interests of the individual with the community’s within the state; and c) civil society, market and material necessities are not treated as undesirable social interactions which establish inequality and unfreedom, but as educative processes towards the individual’s seizure of free will within the state. These benefits of Hegel’s perspective derive from the concept of patriotism.

Hegel uses the term patriotism in a manner that has limited resemblance to our contemporary use of the word. He describes the term as a disposition and denies that it relates to sacrifice, claiming instead that it contributes to an agent’s freedom. As he notes in *The Philosophy of Right* (paragraph 268) ‘patriotism is a political disposition, based on truth and a volition which has become habitual. As such it is merely a consequence of the institutions within the state, a consequence in which rationality is present just as rationality receives its practical application through action in conformity with the state’s institutions. This disposition is in general one of trust, or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interests are preserved and contained and in the interest and end of another. In this way, this very other is immediately not another in my eyes, and in being conscious of this fact, I am free’.  

As Moland explains, far from suggesting that the individual should surrender his individuality to the state, Hegel’s patriotism in fact suggests that

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75 Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 163
one’s individuality, as a free self-conscious will, is in fact nurtured and protected by the state. Analyzing Hegel’s statement in depth, it becomes clear that patriotism is both a habit and a disposition; not a mere disposition, but a political disposition in the sense that, ‘the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of another’. Patriotism is thus the truth that one’s interest is preserved and furthered in the greater project of the state - ‘a disposition that habitually recognizes that the community is the one’s substantive work and end’. 76 This disposition does not take the form of participating in a social contract as a calculated exchange of favours, but of an attitude that promotes ‘wholehearted’ action. The transformation of this political disposition into a wholehearted action becomes possible where individuals seize their freedom via the ethical life which is itself developed within the limits of state.77

Hegel’s patriotism is not, however, loyalty to the state. In his Lectures on Rechtsphilosophie, patriotism is associated with the role it plays in citizens’ freedom. The idea of patriotism contributes to an extension of the individual’s interest to include the community’s interests. Unlike Rousseau, who treats civil society (private property, market etc.) in a negative way, Hegel argues that individuals cannot develop an interest in the greater good unless they are allowed to own property and pursue their own particular interests in civil society. Interestingly, he speaks specifically of the individual valuing common good through property and the pursuit of individual interest.78

In particular, Hegel stresses the educative function of the economic market and private property, as will be elaborated below, after reformulating civil society via the realm of Spirit (Geist). This reformulation serves the objectives of the patriotic political disposition which is the reconciliation of the individual with the state through the cultivation of free will.

77 Moland, Hegel On Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism, 49-52
78 Moland, Hegel On Political Identity: Patriotism, Nationality, Cosmopolitanism, 55-59
On The Economic Market

Hegel’s concern appeared to be that of reconciling private freedom with public interest. However, his perception of civil society has not been well understood as it depends upon an approach to freedom as an evolutionary process advancing through the realm Spirit (Geist); another of Hegel’s concepts which is poorly perceived. Against liberals who treat civic duties toward the state as coercive, the Hegelian approach to freedom allows us to overcome the shortcomings of this method. From a liberal perspective, citizenship may resonate as burdensome as the state restricts certain private freedoms. However, a Hegelian account of freedom reveals how the private freedom of members of the civil society can be transformed into the kind of citizenship that concerns itself with common good.\(^{79}\)

In this manner, Hegel succeeds in synthesizing private freedom with public interest or common good. According to Hegel’s argument, the state in fact contributes to the real freedom that he identifies in the market system, against the libertarian idea that the state is a necessary evil. For Hegel, the development of freedom is not something that occurs automatically; it is a long-term project, an intellectual and practical effort. It is the state that completes the real freedom that Hegel identifies in the market system, contrasting the libertarian conception of the state. According to Hegel, one can be with oneself in the other with whom one identifies in such way that one feels no need to distinguish in terms of priority or importance. The citizen’s actualization of freedom reflects her interaction with others within the state, thus the individual is not the sole source of her own actualized freedom.\(^{80}\)

Hegel recasts the political economy model in such a way as to radically alter its significance. In doing so, he reveals how individuals are formed and educated by their economic interdependence through the market process. Hegel makes it clear that he has learned a great deal from the political economists of his day. In the Philosophy of Right (paragraph 189) he refers to Adam Smith and

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David Ricardo, whose conception of the economy he more or less adopted, fusing it to the other two social realms (the family and the state).\(^{81}\)

Hegelian civil society does not take on a model of purely self-interested market behaviour which might well be inherently and permanently incompatible with his own notion of the state. Instead, he recasts the political economists’ free market model in a way that dramatically revises its significance from the outset. Hegel perceives the free market as one moment in the citizen’s educational and evolutionary process. What Hegel sets out to show is that individuals are ‘formed’ or ‘educated’ by their economic interdependence. That is, that individuals are dependent on each other for the satisfaction of their self-interested needs through the market process.\(^{82}\)

Hegel contends that such ‘education’, although it experienced as the operation of (economic necessity) upon the individual, is itself a process of liberation. This is the case firstly, because it makes increasingly clear that what the individual experiences as needs in fact reflect social attitudes and expectations rather than brute nature. Secondly, the individual’s involvement in the market system enables her in turn to participate in the world. Therefore as Hegel notes in the *Philosophy of Right* (paragraphs 187-195) the way in which individuals conceive of their needs and develop their understandings and skills is governed by the way they participate in the economic system.\(^{83}\) The market becomes a mean enabling the individual to consider that her needs, expectations and participation in the world are also socially-determined, where an understanding of freedom and subjectivity ceases to rest on self-determination.

**On Private Property**

According to Hegel, alongside the market system, private property also serves as a means of the citizen’s education and evolution. Private property entails characteristics parallel to the ‘three moments of will’ which contribute to freedom and promote a non-individualistic or self-determining understanding of personhood. Hegel treats private property as a means to stress the communitarian dimension of personhood through the recognition it entails by others, as well as

\(^{81}\)Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 126-127  
^{82}Wallace, ‘How Hegel Reconciles Private Freedom with Citizenship’, 427-430  
^{83}Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 123-129
its contribution to evolutions of self-consciousness which thereby promotes freedom. However, Hegel’s claim is not that property enhances (private) freedom as it broadens our opportunities. His claim is rather that property is necessary for the self-consciousness and mutual recognition that is integral to freedom. Private property is associated with exclusivity, usefulness and transferability. These characteristics of property are reflected in practices of taking possession, private use and alienation of property and bear resemblance to the three moments of will, which in turn contribute to formation of the individual’s self-consciousness and freedom. Private property thus helps constitute the individual’s self-consciousness through exclusivity, usefulness and transferability as these actions encourage one to seize self-determination, to ‘make something’ of oneself and to objectively examine the self. Private property becomes a necessary element of freedom as it permits similar appraisals of the self as required for self-determination. According to Hegel, as we acquire, use and alienate property we work on the self in a manner that demonstrates our freedom, both to ourselves and to others. Moreover, the freedom that private property promotes is that which requires us not merely to think of ourselves as different, but to identify that particularity in a public medium (goods held as property) which permits our recognizability by others.\textsuperscript{84}

**Patriotism, Nation, Freedom and State**

The previous analysis of Hegel’s view of the market and private property indicates how his alternative formulation of civil society via the realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) and his enriched understanding of will helps to promote an alternative conceptualization of the state and citizenship in a way which overcomes the flaws of previous approaches. Hegel’ reformulation of civil society, paves the way for the individual’s acquisition of freedom within the state which ultimately reconciles the citizen with the community and social institutions. From that perspective, state institutions and the emerging sense of duty appear emancipating rather than oppressive. Patriotism reflects the political disposition formulated by these educational processes which in turn assists the cultivation of free will and promotes the individual’s reconciliation with the state. Patriotism’s

\textsuperscript{84} Dudley Knowles, \textit{Hegel and the Philosophy of Right}, (London: Routledge 2002), 114-117
emancipatory dynamic emerges when Hegel describes it as a disposition which is rational, but which has become habitual. This argument may initially resonate as contradictory. For how can a habitual disposition which is unreflective be at the same time rational?

Hegel explains this rational habit through reference to education. In the Philosophy of Right (paragraph 151A), Hegel notes that: ‘education is the art of making men ethical. It begins with pupils whose life is at the instinctive level and shows them the way to a second birth, the way to change their instinctive nature into a second, intellectual, nature, and makes this intellectual level habitual to them. At this point the clash between the natural and the subjective will disappears, the subject's internal struggle dies away. To this extent, habit is part of ethical life as it is of philosophic thought also, since such thought demands that mind be trained against capricious fancies, and that these be destroyed and overcome to leave the way clear for rational thinking.  

Hegelian habitual education involves this integration of practical reason and instinct. This produces a transformed and spiritual behavior in individuals. As Gordon notes, the development of a rational habit has three key elements: 1) the teaching and practice of good habits; 2) critical reflection on those habits in the light of practical knowledge, 3) the resulting development of a consciously-rational capacity for judging and acting rightly. Hegel conceived a disposition which united action with intention in the form of patriotism, in which a citizen has a truthful and rationally-grounded devotion to the state. Patriotism is a consequence of the institutions within the state - a volition which has become habitual.

Hegelian patriotism is grounded in freedom, but not of liberal individualistic kind. The freedom Hegel conceptualizes is the free will which reconciles the individual with the community and the state. Hence, Hegel claims that patriotism is the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of another (the state) and the latter’s relation to me as an individual.

85 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 108-109
So too, Hegel argues that the conscious acknowledgement of the interdependence of state institutions with individual freedom emerges when ‘this other state immediately ceases to be another for me and in my consciousness of this, I am free’.\(^{87}\) We are liberated from the struggle against the state by acknowledging it as a necessary instrument to preserve and secure our individual self-consciousness as freedom. By acknowledging the interdependence of state institutions and individual liberty, we create the ground for the free acceptance of law and order. The state develops ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of the citizen. This means freely exercising choice as an act of will, a volition, to live with others in a constitutional state that embodies the irreducible collective elements of free life. Thus, the guarantee or basis of freedom and order in Hegel’s state is a freely-endorsed legitimacy, a free will embodied in patriotic habits rather than in force or coercion. Representational thought often imagines that the state is held together by force, but what it holds together is simply the basic sense of order which everyone wills. Hegel does not view the state as an instrument of centralized coercion. He notes that the state is based on the self-consciousness of citizens’ readiness to cooperate with each other that calls for increasingly less coercion. Here, neither coercion nor fear make citizens social and free. Rather, this is served by habit, volition and rationally-grounded truth, embodied in the irreducibly-collective institutions and practices of a modern state, like the rule of law’.\(^{88}\)

This understanding of freedom is reflected in the decision of citizens to fight for their country. As Gordon argues, Hegel counters the traditional idea that patriotism is revealed in the performance of extraordinary sacrifices for the state through his claim that patriotism is a volition which has become habitual. The basic sense of order that manifests this free acceptance of free life in a community is deeply connected to the unique institutions and practices of that community. In war, these institutions, practices and structures are threatened. Thus, by raising the ‘nullity’ of these entities to consciousness, war brings the habitual conditions of individuals’ ethical relations to consciousness. The citizens’ choice to fight for their country is not simply the result of unreflective

\(^{87}\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 163

\(^{88}\) Gordon, ‘Modernity, Freedom and the State: Hegel’s Concept of Patriotism’, 305-310
indoctrination but rather the unique opportunity to discover the rationale for a particular practice which produces a genuine capacity for practical judgment.\textsuperscript{89}

In this sense, Hegel’s view of the patriotic impulse to sacrifice for one’s country does not stem from a nationalist or chauvinist sentiment. Hegel desires to differentiate patriotism from nationalist dispositions by rejecting the newer nationalist strain of patriotism. This cannot become clearer then when Hegel criticizes Fries’ actions in the preface to \textit{The Philosophy of Right}.\textsuperscript{90}

As Avineri comments, the immediate cause of Hegel’s wrath was Fries' participation in a student festival in Wartburg. Because the student fraternities - the \textit{Burschenschaften} - which organized the Wartburg festival were later ruthlessly repressed by the German governments, their actions received a posthumous halo of sanctity in the eyes of latter-day liberals. The truth of the matter, it is argued, was that the ideology and actions of these fraternities pre-figured the most dangerous and hideous aspects of extreme German nationalism. As Avinery observes, to present their aim as agitation for German unification is therefore simple-minded when in fact they were the most chauvinistic element in German society. It has been noted that, they excluded foreigners from their ranks, refused to accept Jewish students as members and participated in the anti-Semitic outbursts in Frankfurt in 1819. So too, at the Warthurg festival they burned a huge pile of books by authors to whose work they objected.\textsuperscript{91}

This context provides us with hints that Hegel’s understanding of nation was not merely identified in terms of ethnicity, but instead incorporated both dimensions of universality and particularity. Hegel’s understanding of nation is informed by his concept of freedom within the realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist}). In \textit{The Philosophy of Mind} (paragraph 544) Hegel stresses that one sole aim of the state is to prevent a nation coming into existence as a mere union of independent private persons.\textsuperscript{92} Instead, Hegel argues that a state will be well-constituted and internally powerful if the private interest of its citizens coincides with the general end of the state, so that the one can be satisfied and realized through the other. As Hegel notes (paragraph 308), this unity is achieved within the nation-state.
and accommodates both the universal and particular dimensions. The member of the state is a member of particular groups (e.g., a social class) and her characterization in this objective way occurs only when considering dealings with the state. A citizen’s character as universal implies that she is at the same time both a private person and also a thinking consciousness - a will which wills the universal. This consciousness and will, however, lose their emptiness and acquire content and a living actuality only when they are imbued with particularity, and particularity means determinacy as particular.93

This again recalls the unity between content and form which reflects the moments of will. Hence, the single person attains her actual and living destiny for universality only when she becomes a member of particular corporation, class, society, nation and so forth. The incorporation of the universal and particular dimension is important as it provides a content and living actuality to the sense of duty, rights, ethics and justice. Duty and rights acquire this content once the individual is reconciled with the state and is no longer acting through coercion or as the result of contract, but as the result of free will. In the Philosophy of Right (paragraph 261), Hegel argues that: ‘in the process of fulfilling her duties, the individual must somehow attain her own interest and satisfaction or settle her own account, and from her situation within the state […] A right must accrue to her whereby the universal cause becomes her own particular cause. Particular interests should certainly not be set aside, let alone suppressed; on the contrary, they should be harmonized with the universal, so that both they themselves and the universal are preserved’.94 Hegel further notes (paragraph 260) that substantive freedom is actualized in the state, claiming that: ‘concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition for their right but they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal. The result is that the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the cooperation of particular knowing and willing’.95

93 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 200-201
94 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 161-162
95 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 160
These points underscore how the concepts of right and duty require a content and a form, entailing respectively the dimensions of particular and universal. Both dimensions are accommodated through the actualization of freedom in the Hegelian state. Patriotism becomes the appropriate disposition to assist the individual to seize freedom in the state within the realm of Spirit (Geist). This analysis affords insight into how Hegel’s approach overcomes the limits of Kantian and Rousseauian theory. Hegel’s moments of free will associate the actualization of freedom with ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in the state, providing a concrete content to Kant’s abstract sense of duty and morality. Moreover, Hegel’s free will via the notion of patriotism succeeds in incorporating the universal and the particular dimension, while reconciling the individual with the community and the state by identifying duty and social institutions as emancipatory rather than coercive. From this perspective, civil society, the economic market and private property acquire the form of educative processes which assist the individual to acquire free will within the state by integrating the individual with their fellow citizens, social institutions and state. In distinguishing the three moments of will and the three social institutions of family, civil society and state, Hegel does not aim to treat each moment of will or social institution separately, but as complementary in the form of an evolutionary process. Such complementary treatment contributes to viewing each moment of will and each social institution as partaking in a process which leads to the actualization of the individual’s subjectivity and freedom within the state.

Finally, Hegel’s concept of patriotism assists in forming an alternative understanding of citizenship which incorporates the universal and particular dimensions, overcoming the limits of prior accounts that distinguish between the two dimensions. Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of the will, freedom and the state within the realm of Spirit thereby avoids: a) the treatment of the subject as the a self-determining unit; b) a non-emancipating approach to freedom; c) the application of abstract principles as normative truths; d) a problematic understanding of values or ethics stemming from empty formalisms; and e) an understanding of duty or the state in a coercive manner.
Conclusion

This chapter after putting forward three questions stressed that the conceptualization of citizenship without incorporating the universal and the particular dimension is misleading. Specifically the chapter was divided into three sections each of which addressed to one of the three questions.

The first section demonstrated how immanent critique reveals the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship which ignore the particular dimension. Immanent critique which rests on Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) and the Absolute prevents us from separating i) the subject from the object of knowledge and ii) the universal from the particular dimension which nourishes an empty formalism and vacuous supranational norms. Immanent critique helps us acknowledge the interplay of the subject with the object of knowledge and bridge the gap between what is ideal and what exists. This in turn prevents us from adopting prescriptive approaches which trigger social exclusions after projecting a transcendental perspective as universal with socially excluding effects. Universalist approaches customarily identify the citizen as a self-determining rights-holder unit. Here, the approaches of Archibugi, Held, Kaldor and Habermas were analyzed. Archibugi, Held and Kaldor acknowledged human rights as universal by virtue of the promotion of supranational values, such as equality and liberty. However, it was argued that these approaches lacked an in-depth analysis of the concepts of right, duty, equality and liberty. So too, the supra-nationalism and impartiality of human rights, equality and freedom was challenged not only theoretically (by quoting Marx), but also practically by referring to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen to expose the exclusive effects of human rights.

The second section revealed how Hegel’s notion of the Absolute and the Spirit (Geist), allows us to overcome the shortcomings of the Kantian inspired universalist approaches to citizenship. Therefore, considerable attention was given to analysis of Habermas’ who is influenced by Kant. From a Hegelian perspective, the weakness of Habermas’s conceptualization of a global civil society appears to arise from the categorical imperative as well as the understanding of reason and duty. Moreover, Taylor and Fraser challenge
Habermas’ universalism by noting that it rests on a particularist (western) understanding of reason and duty that is projected as universal and thus promotes liberal bourgeoisie ideals which in turn trigger social exclusions. Hegel’s insights make clear that Habermas’ theory lapses to a liberal account of universalism where the conceptualization of universal norms is based on the Kantian sense of duty – a duty which is in itself vacuous and rests on an individualistic, self-determining understanding of subjectivity.

The last section revealed how Hegelian thought enriches our understanding of citizenship. This part contends that Hegel’s approach enables us to surmount the pitfalls which emerge from the distinction of citizenship into the universal and the particular dimension. By contrast, a Hegelian-inspired account of citizenship incorporates both universal and particular dimensions. It is Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom which permits this accommodation. Hegelian freedom (actualized in the state) does not rest on the self-determining subject but is perceived as a process within the realm of Spirit (Geist). According to Hegel, it is via the state that the previously empty, Kantian sense of universal duty acquires a particular dimension, actualizing through the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of a community. Such an understanding of subjectivity and ethics as developing within the limits of particular (national) communities ultimately succeeds in reconciling the individual subject with social institutions and bridging the gap between the universal and particular.

Once Hegel approaches freedom as an evolutionary process that forms the subject, not as private individual unit but as an entity acquiring its self-consciousness through the communal institutions of family, civil society and state, then the understanding of free market, property, nation and state is altered. As was noted above, the concept of Spirit (Geist) helps us to approach this actuality, not as a finite account of empirical facts, but as the underlying rationality informed by the development of history or the progress of Spirit.

Ultimately, this Hegelian-inspired conceptualization of citizenship makes a significant theoretical contribution as it allows us to overcome: a) the treatment of subject as an independent self-determining unit; b) the application of abstract principles as a priori truths which dictate and disorientate knowledge; and c) a problematic understanding of values, ethics and duty stemming from empty formalisms. In other words, Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) and
his notion of the Absolute overcomes the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship after accommodating the universal and the particular dimension while considering too the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge.
CHAPTER 5: An Empirical Analysis of Hegel’s Conceptualization of Citizenship: On the Alternative Implications of Economy and the Market in Singapore

Overview

The previous chapter analyzed theoretically how Hegel’s insights enrich our conceptualization of citizenship after incorporating the universal and the particular dimension. This chapter demonstrates the explanatory strength of Hegel’s approach to citizenship in empirical terms through a case study. The addition of a case study also reveals the non-transcendental dimension of Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) which reinterprets the conjunction of reason and reality with norms which are part of the reality. These norms are portrayed via the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which emerges from the state and forms a self-conscious, patriotic subject. Thus, Hegel perceives citizenship as an immanent process which stems from the development of the subject’s consciousness and freedom within the ethical realm of the State. As the Spirit (Geist) actualizes via the subject’s self-consciousness, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) contributes to the actualization of Spirit within reality, bridging the gap between idealism and empiricism while accommodating the universal and the particular dimension. This chapter is divided into three parts.

The first part focuses on Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) stressing how it neither separates the universal from the particular nor the subject from the object of knowledge after considering the interplay between the market and the economy with the particular sociopolitical institutions in Singapore. Singapore is referenced as a case study since the island-state clearly reveals how Hegel incorporates certain liberal institutions such as the primacy of private property and of the market economy without holding them responsible for alienating the citizen’s interests from those of the state. Therefore although Hegel’s theory is informed by certain liberal traits yet it overcomes the tension between the private and the public sphere that liberal approaches nourish after
sharing the same traits. It is also emphasized that Singapore is not treated as a model state but as an example which exposes the impact of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) on the development of Singapore’s citizens consciousness and freedom. Via ‘the system of needs’ and the notion of ‘recognition’ Hegel does not divorce the economy and the market from ethics, bridging the gap between empiricism and idealism and ultimately renders the private sphere compatible with the public sphere. In that respect, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) portrays an alternative conceptualization of citizenship as a process which highlights the transformation of the citizen into a self-conscious patriot who seizes freedom within the state.

The second part commences with a critique of a Foucaultian inspired approach to citizenship. This part demonstrates the superiority of Hegel’s conceptualization of freedom after revealing the explanatory limits of Foucaultian freedom with regard to Singapore’s citizens. Although the flaws of Foucaultian freedom were theoretically explored in the third chapter, this part exposes them too empirically, after criticizing the Foucaultian approach of citizenship in Singapore, from a Hegelian perspective. The point of reference of this Hegelian inspired critique is Terence Lee’s Foucaultian analysis of Singaporean citizenship. Terence Lee contends that the Singaporean government functions via coercion and argues that through the politics of governmentality the Singaporean citizens are ‘freely’ subjecting themselves to the state in return for social order, cultural control and economic prosperity. This Foucaultian sense of freedom will be challenged here not only theoretically from a Hegelian perspective but also empirically after showcasing examples which illustrate the lack of free/voluntary subjection in Singapore.

In the third part it is noted that most scholars stress how the prioritization of materialism and economic capitalism in Singapore results in the government’s failure to establish social cohesion after nurturing self-centered, materialistic and opportunistic citizens. However, these deterministic effects of the economical and materialist dimension are challenged empirically and theoretically from a Hegelian perspective. It is emphasized that the Philosophy of Right entails too a materialistic and an economic dimension which assumes an educative role that assists the development of the citizens’ self-consciousness and freedom. Hegel after perceiving market economy and materialism within the realm of Spirit
(Geist), he attributes them an educative effect which contributes to the reconciliation of the citizens with their state. Nevertheless, Hegel does not dismiss the idea of private property, economic market and civic rights but reinterprets their effects from the perspective of the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the realm of Spirit (Geist). In that respect it is argued that Hegel’s approach, successfully differentiates from the liberal perspectives on citizenship after overcoming the dichotomies between the private and the public sphere as well as the tensions between the citizen’s interests and the state. Here, the inclusion of a case study adds value to these points since the Singaporean government without being liberal, prioritizes the promotion of materialistic welfare based on the capitalist market economy but it would be inaccurate to suggest these policies form citizens who are exclusively self-centered, materialist and disinterested towards their state. On the contrary, a number of examples suggest that a civic awakening emerges in Singapore that gradually affects the Singaporean’s self-consciousness which serves to reconcile them with their society, affirming Hegel’s approach.

I. On Sittlichkeit and The Implications of Associating the Economy With the Sociopolitical Institutions

Introduction

This chapter after introducing the case study of Singapore reveals the superiority of Hegel’s approach to citizenship in empirical terms, based on his notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). It is stressed that Singapore is neither treated as a model state which echoes the type of state Hegel portrayed in the Philosophy of Right, nor does the Singaporean society represent an ideal type of ethical type (Sittlichkeit). Instead, Singapore is used as a case study which empirically exposes the contribution of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as a process which enriches our understanding of citizenship. Singapore serves as a topical example which exposes the impact of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) on the development of the Singaporean’s self-consciousness after attributing an alternative understanding to the economy and the market. Moreover, the application of a case study also
demonstrates that although Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is tied to the notion of Spirit (Geist), yet he conceptualizes citizenship without arbitrary or transcendental means but with norms which are part of the reality.

The following paragraphs demonstrate that the superiority of Hegel’s approach to citizenship: i) rests on accommodating the universal and the particular dimension; ii) without separating the subject from the object of knowledge. These two insights - unlike empiricism and liberalism - prevent Hegel from divorcing economics from a cultural socio-political dimension which separates the public from the private realm, overcoming the flaws of prescriptive and descriptive approaches to citizenship. Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) conveys the aforementioned insights and enriches our conceptualization of citizenship.

The significance of these two insights becomes clearer in the third part of this chapter which reveals the explanatory limits of certain perspectives on citizenship which ignore these insights and celebrate the deterministic effects of the liberal market economy. These approaches misleadingly contend that the capitalist market economy in Singapore has transformed the Singaporeans into materialist driven, antagonistic agents with limited social cohesion who are alienated from their state. However these approaches downplay the interaction between the economy and the sociopolitical institutions in Singapore, ignoring the economy’s educative effects on the civic awakening of the Singaporeans.

Since Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) entails both insights - (i) and (ii) - Hegel’s conceptualization of citizenship blends the private with the public realm as well as the universal with the particular dimension without separating the economy from the particular sociopolitical institutions of the state. The Hegelian treatment of ‘economic action’ which rests on ‘the system of needs’ and the notion of ‘recognition’, demonstrates how ethical life (Sittlichkeit) entails both the first (i) and second (ii) insight. These insights insulate ethical life (Sittlichkeit) from the shortcomings of descriptive and prescriptive approaches to citizenship which convey liberal ideals and a misleading absolutism based on natural law which separate the public from the private realm and divorce the sociopolitical dimension from the economical.

As Dickey argues, Hegel noted how the systems of political and civil law had historically grown up around the idea of property with the result that patterns
of socioeconomic relations were finding sanction in the sociocultural and the political sphere. According to Dickey, Hegel divided ethical life (Sittlichkeit) into physical and spiritual needs, arguing that as a real historical force, political economy has created a system of universal mutual dependence in relation to physical needs and labour. Dickey highlights the phrase ‘a system of universal mutual dependence’, because it implies that through the universal dynamic of economic production and consumption, men form patterns of interaction, forming a particular notion of social solidarity within the state.¹

Therefore Hegel did not only bridge the gap between universalism and particularism but also the gap between empiricism and idealism after putting forward an understanding of citizenship which underscores the interplay of reason with the natural needs and dispositions.

Hegel just like Rousseau, employed the same distinction between citizen as citoyen and the citizen as bourgeois. The first one (citoyen) highlights the agent’s political dispositions whereas the second one (bourgeois) underscores the agent’s prioritization of materialistic needs. Instead, of separating them Hegel attempted to reconcile these two concepts by suggesting how the former emerges from the evolution of the latter. As Dickey contends, Hegel offers the idea of courage (Tapferkeit) and patriotism as the key to this conversion process from bourgeois into citoyen. In Hegel’s work, Tapferkeit had its roots in the material dimension. Tapferkeit comes into play precisely at the point at which individuals were obliged for ethico-political reasons to move beyond the materialist realm. Thus, although Tapferkeit had a natural origin, it was not naturally essential to individuals except insofar as they came to see politics as a way of developing their personalities beyond what was given to them – that is, by the purely materialist dimension. In this sense, the end of Tapferkeit is an ethico-political creation that somehow emerges from the material dimension.²

Hegel had argued that the bourgeois conception of citizenship - on which empiricist and liberal approaches rest - is politically null. For Hegel the bourgeois notion adopts just the universalist dimension, lacks a particular content and conceptualizes citizenship as politically null since it failed to acknowledge

² Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807, 225-227
the values of courage and patriotism. Hegel’s alternative account of knowledge, as perceived within the realm of Spirit (Geist), allows him to bridge the gap between empiricism and idealism and rectify the flaws of the liberal and empiricist approaches. Locke’s liberal argument that society exists for the sake of the protection of property, tells us more about the structure of Locke’s own society than the actual origins of society. Hegel’s objection to the empiricism reflected in Locke’s liberal theory is that it is caught in self-contradiction. The contradiction enters when empiricism is no longer willing simply to leave itself as an anti-philosophy but aspires to become a philosophy. As Smith stresses, an empirical philosophy is an oxymoron.\(^3\) For if it remains true to itself, an empirical attitude would have every right to assert itself against theorizing and philosophizing and to treat the mass of principles, ends, laws, duties and rights as not absolute but as distinctions important to the culture which its own vision becomes clear to it. But if empiricism expects to generate findings that have more than limited validity, it will have to import principles that cannot be discovered in experience alone. Thus, despite the empiricists’ claims to have build their theories of natural rights on the simplest and most elementary needs, their methods of determining these needs are already ‘theory loaded’.\(^4\)

As Dickey argues, Hegel’s criticism to the empiricist bourgeois system was designed to change its sociocultural rather that its socio-economic orientation toward life. In that respect, Hegel’s critique was concerned less with encouraging individuals to preserve a socio-economic pattern of historical development than with providing them with a new sociocultural perspective within which economic development and commercial expansion might be pursued in both a civil and an ethical manner. Hegel had defined his philosophical task as one which gave new direction to the conception of ethical life. This new direction oriented away from the bourgeoisie materialist system of reality towards a system in which individuals might extend a political dimension to an identity that was being formed within both a socio-economic and sociocultural framework.

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\(^3\) Steven B. Smith, *Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 68

\(^4\) Smith, *Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context*, 69
Thus, Hegel’s ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) becomes an economico-politico-ethical ideal which reconciles idealism with empiricism.⁵

As Hermann-Pillath and Boldyrev note, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (*Geist*), which permits the reconciliation of empiricism and idealism, enriches our approach to economy and citizenship. For Hermann-Pillath, the majority of the liberal economists subscribe to the standard model of individual rationality which rests on the self-determining subject, dismissing the interaction between the subject and the object of knowledge. Therefore these economists adopt a descriptive axiomatic approach which is generates the criteria of truth based on biological mechanisms and natural needs, downplaying the impact of the sociopolitical dimension. However, as Hermann-Pillath notes the forms of human social life in modernity have become increasingly independent from the biological mechanisms or physical needs whereas human individuals are free to create whatever forms of life they chose, such as gender roles that are independent from biological sex. However these creations of human spirit are not based or arbitrary individual whims and desires but reflect the historical evolution of political communities within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*).⁶

For Hegel what is rational and universal is not epistemological but a social achievement of a historically grounded and institutionally actualized form of life. Hegelian thought challenges natural law theories or liberal inspired approaches to economy and citizenship which adopt abstract criteria for institutions like social welfare or happiness. Instead, Hegel is seeking a historical explanation of institutional evolution blending idealism with empiricism. Hegel does not treat rationality as a norm imposed from an abstract external authority but as a historical progression within the realm of Spirit where the rationality and freedom of the subject evolves within the state. Indeed what is rational and universal for Hegel is not an epistemological characterization but a social achievement of historically grounded and institutionally actualized forms of life. Hence his approach avoids abstract normativity.⁷

Therefore the sociopolitical institutions determine our actions as much our biological forces and needs. According to Hegel, what is real and

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⁷ Hermann-Pillath and Boldyrev, *Hegel Institutions and Economics: Performing the Social*, 16
ontologically relevant in action is not immediate. Nor is the full awareness of the intention associated with the action itself. Although the preferences are endogenous to these actions they cannot be seen as causes of action. The full awareness of the intention that is associated with the action is gradually unfolding. In the economic context, all human agents are learning in the process of action and the preferences must be conceptualized as endogenous to this process. They cannot simply be seen as causes of action because actions cause preferences in the course of action mediated learning. We cannot define the economic action merely as a choice of means to pursue given ends since the ends and the preferences only emerge and evolve within and through the action. The action becomes what the subject self-consciously wills by transforming (the universal) immediate desire or intention and putting it into the social space (particular) where it needs to be recognized.8

As Hermann-Pillath argues, individual learning is impossible outside of a particular social milieu – that is all human learning is social. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel referred to individual action in such a way that an individual has an existence in the form of ‘the will of others’. This means that the subject’s free will is only possible as a relational fact whereas the action involves a social categorization of its purposes. Thus, the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom is: Firstly, an achievement of certain institutional forms; and secondly, it is both historically and systematically mediated by these forms. Hegel refuses to postulate certain types of rational behavior a priori as is often done in contemporary economic analysis but rather traces the evolution of modern subjectivity, thus making individual rationality endogenous and depended in its evolution upon the whole system of modern economic and political institutions.9

Hegel’s conceptualization of (economic) action blends sociopolitical institutions with the economy whereas this interaction is attributed to the ‘system of needs’ and ‘recognition’. The ‘system of needs’ and ‘recognition’ contributes to the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which nourishes the development of the subject’s self-consciousness within the state. According to Hegel, socioeconomic organization shapes consciousness. As Dickey notes, since humans are initially

8 Hermann-Pillath and Boldyrev, Hegel Institutions and Economics: Performing the Social, 17-20
9 Hermann-Pillath and Boldyrev, Hegel Institutions and Economics: Performing the Social, 19-20
bonded together for the sake of their physical well being and because this arrangement afforded them material comfort, they define their social interaction in economic terms or what Hegel termed as ‘the system of needs’.\textsuperscript{10} Hegel acknowledged labour as crucial for men in two ways: Firstly, labour was central to the constitution of the ‘system of needs’ in a physical sense. One can preserve herself by cooperating with others. Therefore, labour becomes a crucial tie between the satisfaction of individual needs and the goal of social action. Secondly, Hegel claimed that labour was social in another sense, via the system of recognition. The validation of one’s objective social-being depended on receiving recognition (eg legal privileges and rights) from others for what one earned from one’s labour.\textsuperscript{11}

Therefore, Hegel’s notion of ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) allows us to acquire a more complete understanding of citizenship after blending the economical with the sociopolitical dimension which reconciles the private with the public realm. Moreover, ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) does neither separate empiricism from idealism nor universalism from particularism after acknowledging the interplay between the subject with the object of knowledge. In that respect, Hegel’s approach to citizenship is neither prescriptive nor descriptive and certainly not transcendental, in spite of the fact that ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) is associated with the notion of Spirit (\textit{Geist}).

The following paragraphs introduce the case study of Singapore in order to expose empirically that ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) is an insightful concept which is not transcendental despite its association with the Spirit whereas its contribution lies in considering the interplay between the economy and the state’s sociopolitical institutions. This interplay allows us to take notice of the civic awakening that takes place in Singapore which the descriptive (liberal) approaches to citizenship failed to notice, after separating the public from the private realm while treating the subject of knowledge as a self ascribed authority which examines empirical facts via transcendental norms. In that respect Singapore is not cited as an example of a model state compared to the one portrayed in the \textit{Philosophy of Right}. Singapore is used as an example which empirically demonstrates how our understanding of citizenship is enriched when

\textsuperscript{10} Dickey, \textit{Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807}, 242
\textsuperscript{11} Dickey, \textit{Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807}, 246
we consider the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which accommodates the universal and the particular dimension without separating the subject from the object of knowledge, affording an understanding of reality without transcendental norms.

On Spirit, the Interplay of the Subject with the Object and the Case of Singapore

Singapore is referenced as an example which demonstrates empirically the dynamism of Hegel’s understanding of knowledge via the notion of Spirit (Geist), suggesting that that his approach is not transcendental. The examination of Hegel’s conceptualization of citizenship via the case of Singapore signifies the dynamism of his understanding of knowledge in regard to the civic transformation of the Singaporean citizens. Also the case of Singapore allows us to analyse how exactly Hegel differentiates from the liberal approaches and overcomes their limits. As Weil notes the Spirit, upon which Hegel’s understanding of knowledge is founded, is not transcendental but complemented by the empirical reality which allows the Spirit to externalize and mark its progress. Hegel argues in the Philosophy of History that the Spirit’s trajectory and movement is not a simple repetition of itself but the changing exterior which the Spirit creates for itself in its ever-changing forms. This trajectory is essentially progress. The Spirit by sublimating and preserving reality, attains at the same time the essence, the thought, the universal of what it was a mere existent. Weil observes that Hegel repeats something similar in the Philosophy of Right arguing that the completion of a process in which the Spirit apprehends itself, is at the same time its externalization and the act by which it rises higher.12

Just as the functioning of the Spirit (Geist) necessitates its externalization and its trajectory which is reflected on reality; here the empirical case study of Singapore is introduced in order to examine how the implications of Hegel’s understanding of the citizen’s progress and transformation are reflected on reality. This case study further helps us to approach the Hegelian account of knowledge within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which is contingent, evolutionary

12 Eric Weil, Hegel and the State (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 113
and bridges the gap between idealism and empiricism after providing a (particular) content to empty (universal) forms.

However, the application of Hegel’s theory neither serves to describe nor to prescribe how citizenship in Singapore is ought to be. As Weil observes, the trajectory of the Spirit signifies that the old form is obsolete because it is understood, because it could be understood, because it has given all that it could give, because it reached its final stage and it forced its way to reality. Hegel stresses the implications this has upon the understanding of knowledge, at the beginning of the Philosophy of Right, in a passage which - as Weil mentions - is probably the most quoted of all his texts but yet one that readers often fail to comprehend. According to this passage Hegel argues: ‘Let us say one more word about this habit of giving recipes [instructing on] how the world is ought to be. Philosophy in any case, always arrives too late. As the thought of the world, it appears only when reality has finished its process of formation and is all done. When philosophy paints its grey on grey a form of life must have grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated with grey on grey; it can only be understood. The owl of Minerva spreads it wings with the fall of dusk’. According to this passage Hegel argues: ‘Let us say one more word about this habit of giving recipes [instructing on] how the world is ought to be. Philosophy in any case, always arrives too late. As the thought of the world, it appears only when reality has finished its process of formation and is all done. When philosophy paints its grey on grey a form of life must have grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated with grey on grey; it can only be understood. The owl of Minerva spreads it wings with the fall of dusk’.

Hegel, after refuting the theorist’s self-certain consciousness, attempted to indicate the dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object which dismisses any pre-determination or fixity on behalf of the subject and ceases to treat the object of analysis as passive. Thus from Hegel’s analysis it becomes clear that a self-determining subject is detached from the empirical world, alienating the form from its content. Or in Hutchings’ words, a non-dynamic subject-object relation uses as a point of departure abstract normative claims formed by the subject and provides a fixed descriptive account of theory which seizes universality but dismisses particularity. As it was analyzed in chapter two, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) re-establishes the dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object which ceases to be treated passively. However it is recalled that the evolution of the Spirit necessitates its externalization as the Spirit’s trajectory is reflected on reality. Similarly, as it

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13 Weil, Hegel and the State, 114
was noted earlier in order to stress the dynamism of Hegel’s conceptualization of citizenship, the case of Singapore will be analyzed below which reflects the transformation of the Singaporean citizens’ with regard to the public sphere and the state.

The case of Singapore in particular was chosen on two grounds. Firstly, Singapore poses a unique case study which is easily analyzed. Specifically, the analysis of Singaporean citizenship becomes much easier to examine given Singapore’s small size and the very local nature of national discourse (4 million people live on a island of 680 square kilometer) as well as the state’s limited history, restricted media outlets and means of political expression.\(^\text{17}\) Also, the understanding of the civic discourse is easily followed after focusing on the domestic frameworks, including political speeches or statements, newspapers and popular culture. Given this framework, our analysis of citizenship in Singapore is be grounded not only on academic literature but also prominent policies, public documents, national debates and examples of civic activism which shape Singapore’s citizenship and illustrate the country’s contingent national identity.

Secondly, Singapore poses as an interesting case study whose distinctiveness renders it beyond comparison. Singapore was selected as it is a non-western state where capitalism is successfully embedded without sharing the traits of liberal democracies. On the contrary, as Mutalib argues, Singapore is an illiberal democratic state which is governed by the same political party since the country’s independence but yet boasts a corruption-free government which has been efficient in securing high standards of living and welfare for the Singaporean citizens.\(^\text{18}\) Just as Hegel’s approach espouses certain liberal traits such as the significance of both private property and market economy without celebrating liberalism; similarly Singapore is an illiberal capitalist state where private property and market economy is embedded. Thus, as will be argued below, Singapore becomes a case study which stresses the limits of the liberal approaches while verifying the insights of Hegel’s approach to citizenship. This


becomes clear after illustrating the progressive civic transformation of the Singaporean citizens into non-individualistic and non-materialistic utility maximisers who gradually appear more willing to sacrifice their private interests. This transformation, which Hegel’s approach explains more effectively than a liberal one does, appears to overcome the tension between the private and public sphere which the liberal approaches sustain.

Key Historical Facts of Singapore

Before we engage with Terence Lee’s Foucaultian inspired approach; it is important first to bring into attention certain historical elements regarding Singapore. The historical and socioeconomic conditions under which Singapore seized independence, influenced both the decision-making as well as the power monopoly of the People’s Action Party (PAP) which governs until today. The PAP focuses on the concepts of pragmatism and meritocracy which dominate Singapore’s political scene.

Many analysts stress the challenges of economic survival that Singapore had to face as a young independent state due to the scarcity of resources and the island-state’s multinational population synthesis. Long before Singapore’s independence, the state was facing problems of economic survival due to the lack of natural resources as well as the island’s small and multi-ethnic population. It was widely believed that these problems would intensify on the event of political independence, therefore initially the Singaporean government sought merger with Malaysia.\footnote{Bilveer Singh, \textit{Politics and Governance in Singapore: An Introduction}, McGraw-Hill Education, 2012, p.24}

The problems of economic survival and security intensified a few years later when Singapore was forced out of the Federation of Malaysia and reluctantly gained independence in 1965. Also, the British unilateral announcement and action of pulling out the military bases in 1971 instead of 1974, served both as two unexpected events which surprised the PAP government. In order to cope with them the PAP engaged to a determined
attempt to industrialize urgently in an effort to secure Singapore’s economic survival.\(^\text{20}\)

On another matter, Singapore’s multi-ethnic population has always been recognised as a source of potential unrest by the government, therefore attempts were made to tone down ethnic bias. Chinese cultural assimilation was recognised as non viable, as Singapore is situated in the Malay archipelago. Furthermore, an economic development which would guarantee Singapore’s economic survival, required a relatively long period of political stability and a secure environment. This was the only possible way to attract foreign investments by ensuring investors and skilled workers that it was safe to make long term plans with a minimum of uncertainty. There appeared no other choice but to tone down the cultural elements in order to enhance the state’s socio-political stability.\(^\text{21}\)

PAP’s government argued that due to the peculiarity of Singapore’s historical and social conditions the, prioritization of survival via the state’s economic growth was the sole political option. If Singapore were to survive, the population was to be transformed into a tightly organized and highly disciplined citizenry all pulling to the same direction with a sense of public spirit-ness and self sacrifice.\(^\text{22}\) The achievement of economic growth was estimated to promote high standards of living, political stability and racial harmony ensuring Singapore’s survival and success.\(^\text{23}\) Thus, Singapore’s interests, according to the PAP were defined within the discourse of the state’s survival. The discourse on survival was fed by an amount of uncertainty triggered by elements such as: a) economic viability; b) the state’s self-perception as fragile Chinese enclave in the Malay sea; c) Domestic difficulties in employment; d) poor public health and housing conditions.\(^\text{24}\)


\(^{21}\) Quah, *In Search of Singapore’s National Values*, 11

\(^{22}\) Beng Huat Chua, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore* (London: Routledge, 1995), 18

\(^{23}\) Quah, *In Search of Singapore’s National Values*, 20-21

\(^{24}\) Chua, 1995, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, 108
Is PAP’s Rhetoric of Pragmatism Neutral or Coercive?

The prioritization of survival in Singapore promoted a ‘pragmatic’ policy, which according to PAP is neutral and ideologically free which aims at maximizing economic growth and security in Singapore. Although, Beng Chua Huat and Kenneth Paul Tan critically argue that pragmatism functions as ideology, this it is not necessarily acknowledged by the PAP government. A number of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s statements provide us the impression that Pragmatism is treated by the PAP as a neutral, non-ideological political approach, in the sense that it beyond stratifications such as right or left, liberal or socialist. Thus, this ‘pragmatic’ attitude which places itself beyond ideological stratifications is considered by the PAP government as a neural and ideologically-free position which permits itself to be flexible. As mentioned earlier, Lee Kuan Yew’s and PM Lee Hsien Long’s statements serve as a constant reminder of pragmatism’s ideological-free content as well as PAP’s undisputed alignment with Pragmatism:

‘(our beliefs are) empirical, pragmatic and practical rather that grounded in ideology. If a policy did not work, it was changed. The most we would try, was three years. Then we cut loose and changed. That’s the story of 35 years, one of never ending learning. What works and what doesn’t work.

‘We are pragmatists. We do not stick to any ideology. Does it work? Let’s try it and if it works fine. If it doesn’t work toss it out try another one. we are not enamoured with any ideology. Let the historians and PhD students work their doctrines. I am not interested in theories per se’.

‘PAP is a pragmatic party, ready to take in all good ideas’

26 Melanie Chew, Leaders of Singapore (Singapore: Resource Press, 1996), 139
28 ‘PM Lee: Government is planning beyond 2020’, Asia One News, Apr 5th 2011 (accessed on 14th June 2012)
Certain scholars such as Mutalib, argue that PAP’s monopoly of power on the basis of survivalism and pragmatism, give the impression that the government in Singapore often adopts policies which often end up coercing the Singaporeans. However, Terence Lee challenges this approach, arguing that governmentality in Singapore is exercised by the PAP in a manner that does not coerce but on the contrary nourishes the Singaporeans’ consent towards the government’s actions. According to Lee, Singaporean citizens have been co-opted and disciplined to vocalize ‘freely’ their cultural and political support for the acceptance of the status quo as formed by the PAP.

On the contrary, as Mutalib’s arguments provide the impression that PAP’s exercise of political power, often becomes coercive. Specifically, the idea of democratic elections which represent the foundational stone of the citizen’s active and unobstructed civic participation has been openly challenged by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew in the past. The following quotes provide sufficient proof:

‘with a few exceptions, democracy has not brought good government to new developing countries [...] What is good government? This depends on the values of the people. What Asians value may not be necessarily what the Americans or the Europeans value. Westerners value the freedoms and liberties of the individual. As an Asian of Chinese cultural background, my values are for a government which is honest, effective and efficient in protecting its people and allowing opportunities for all to advance themselves in a stable and orderly society where they can live a good life and raise their children to do better than themselves’

‘I say without the slightest remorse that we could not be here, would not have made the economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters – who your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit (or where you spit),

29 Terence Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore (London: Routledge, 2010), 148
or what language you use... it was fundamental social and cultural changes that brought us here’.  

Moreover, Lee Kuan Yew is both sceptical and critical of the electorate body’s ability to think clearly and vote according to the best of its interest. After 1984 elections, when for the first time PAP lost parliamentary seats since 1963, Lee signaled his despair with the one man one vote system, hinting that he wished to see the system changed. During a speech in 1884 Lee mentioned that, if there is a ‘freak election’ result and the coalition forms a government, all the reserves are available at their disposal. In such case, he argued that twenty five years of work, savings, will be unwisely spent within five years and then we are another broken back country. This stood as the rationale for the introduction of the Elected Presidency institution in 1991 after revising the constitution. The Elected Presidency institution can be better understood if we link it with the broader characteristics of Singapore politics and PAP’s objectives. The PAP’s goal of preserving its political worldview and principles relating to the economical management of Singapore. PAP seems unprepared to allow the opposition or the general populace to decide on what is best for the long term survivability and stability of the state.  

Furthermore, media control in Singapore by the PAP does not leave room for completely unrestrained political expression. Especially, when it comes to the mass media, PAP exercises a far-reaching influence upon newspapers or TV broadcasts. The media monopoly under the Singapore Press Holdings can’t help but provide the impression of the Singaporean press as a guided press. After the 1958 general election, the new government initiated many new measures to ensure that its political opponents do not exploit the media to disrupt its management of the country. The PAP argued that the mass media influence is powerful and that such an influence should be tailored and channeled towards the nation building process. According to Lee’s statements, the press must be subordinated to the primacy of purpose of an elected government, it is not possible to sustain the moral fibre of society if everything goes. The role of the

32 Mutalib, Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore, 22
33 Mutalib, Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore, 341-346
media is to inform people of the government policies, not to encourage them to oppose government.\textsuperscript{34}

However, such media control often triggers a social fear of unrestricted political expression, especially during the past. Such fear sometimes often leads to what Mutalib describes as ‘caution syndrome’. For Mutalib the caution syndrome provides an additional factor that may help to explain the relatively low degree of political participation. The sources of such syndrome are many. One of them is the Internal Security Act (ISA). By this Act the government is empowered to arrest and detain people without trial in order to prevent domestic political and destabilising threats. It has often been invoked to arrest political opponents or ‘leftist activists’.\textsuperscript{35}

Another example of the ‘caution syndrome’ relates to the politics of General Elections. Despite government’s assurances that votes are secret, the existence of serial numbers on the first cop of the ballot papers continues to worry segments of population. This system enables the government to know the voting patterns of voters residing in HDB blocks. As Mutalib argues, half the strength of the PAP comes from the strength it has instilled in the minds of the people. Dr Chee Soon Juan general secretary of the SDP referring to the powers of the Internal Security Department, characterises it as secret police. Dr Chee Suan Soon argues that the ISD is empowered to arrest anyone who is not acting in the manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore’.\textsuperscript{36}

Nevertheless, if one wishes to remain impartial, it is noteworthy and important to mention that such governmental control ceases to exist when it comes to accessing internet-resources and academic research or publications, as many Singaporean academics have admitted.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34}Mutalib, \textit{Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore}, 295-300
\textsuperscript{35}Mutalib, \textit{Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore}, 353-354
\textsuperscript{36}Mutalib, \textit{Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore}, 355-356
\textsuperscript{37}Personal interviews held with Dr Kenneth Paul Tan on 29th May, with Professor Beng Chua Huat on 1st June 2012 and Dr Terence Chong 15th June 2012
II. A Foucaultian Approach to Citizenship in Singapore

Unlike Mutalib, Terence Lee argues that PAP’s political power is not necessarily coercive but on the contrary manages to secure the Singaporean’s consent. According to Lee, the Singaporean citizen body has been formed and disciplined to express ‘freely’ their cultural and political support for PAP’s state of affairs. However, our main concern here regarding Lee’s approach is expressed with the following question: Is a Foucaultian approach of citizenship - as founded on governmentality - adequate to explain the formation of the necessary social cohesion which triggers the citizens’ reconciliation with the state and among themselves?

Terence Lee contends that the common view of Singaporeans as frightened or fearful of authority, is no longer accurate. He argues that there may have been some elements of fear enabled by the coercive powers of the founding by PAP government but this is arguably no longer the case. In a society that has been centrally managed and culturally controlled via the discursive application of technological auto-regulation which ensures ‘the automatic functioning of power’, citizens provide a non-coercive and free political support for the PAP. What this means is that Singaporeans have chosen and accepted overtly or tacitly, but nonetheless ‘freely’ to be subjected to the principles of subjectivity among Singaporeans which unifies them while prescribing their personal lives, their ethical systems as well as their political evaluations; while providing them the impression that their actions are free. For Lee, governmentality promotes a political and cultural control which forms Singaporean citizenship as the majority of the individuals residing in the city-state recognise and buy into the principles of governmentality. With the politics of governmentality, and cultural control the Singaporeans should be seen as neither as self-censoring nor self-regulating. Instead Singaporeans have learned to automatically subject themselves to the rationality of governmentality in return for social order, cultural control and economic prosperity.\(^\text{38}\)

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\(^{38}\) Lee, *The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore*, 148-149
To be more precise, Lee puts forward the Foucaultian inspired idea of cultural citizenship and applied it on the Singaporean context. He suggests that it is more productive to consider the impact of culture and how Singapore’s authoritarian or illeberal ‘success’ has much to do with the regulation of culture. He aim is to make sense of what might be perceived as governmentality in Singapore by rationalising the links between democratic ideals and authoritarian practices both of which claim to govern in the name of freedom/ democracy. Lee emphases on the cultural regulation and control of citizenry in Singapore. Governmentality is an activity that aims to shape, guide or affect the behavioural or cultural conduct of the person. The governmental goal is to get members of populations to behave and conduct themselves in ways which fit the determinations of what has been prescribed as desirable by the government.39

Lee adopts Miller’s definition of cultural citizenship, according to which citizenship is an open technology a means of transformation ready for definition and disposal in disperse ways at dispersed sites. It is a technology that produces a ‘disposition’ on behalf of the citizens not to accept the imposition of a particular form of government passively but to embrace it actively as a collective expression of themselves.40 Thus, culture becomes for citizenship an apparatus of rule and political legitimacy. Administration of culture serves as a mean of controlling the social and political dimensions. This would be done via the regulation of behaviour, the actions of citizens who are publicly positioned as free individuals. However, these individuals are perceived by their administrators as incoherent in respect to their social, cultural and political choices. Hence the need for well-crafted governmental strategies and programmes are aimed in ‘automizing and normalizing the individual to manage oneself via self-regulation’. The government of oneself, which minimizes the need for direct political intervention, is enabled through the invasion of an array of what Foucault calls ‘technologies’. Government is a contact point where the technologies of power (determine the conduct of individuals and submits them to certain ends) interact with the technologies of the self (permits individuals to effect by their own means or autonomy or via means of technologies of power a

39 Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore, 22-23
certain number of operations on their own bodies, thought, conduct etc.) to bring individuals into subjection and subjectification.41

**Governmentality, Pastoral Power and Cultural Citizenship**

Lee adds that the governing of the self as a cultural citizen is done through the technologies of truth. Governing is really about normalizing specific state and governmental objectives, so that they are seen as rational, logical, popular and morally desirable. Ultimately, these governmental objectives are seen as truths. When such technologies of truth become available to the state, they are both individualizing and totalizing. This ability to produce a universalizing truth is known as pastoral power.42 It is reminded here that Foucault introduced the concept of pastoral power in the journal article *The Subject of Power*. According to Foucault, this form of power categorizes the individual, marks her by her own individuality, attaches her to her own identity, imposes a law of truth upon her. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects.43

Lee clearly focuses on sections which describe the interplay among power, governmentality and individuation found in the *Subject of Power* without alluding to Foucault’s notion of power relations. In that respect, for Lee (Foucaultian) power is less a confrontation between two adversaries, but more a question of government.44 ‘Government’ did not refer only to political structures but to the government of children, of souls, of communities, families, the sick etc. To govern is to structure the possible field of action of others. Consequently, according to Foucault, ‘government’ does not entail confrontation between power and freedom but a complicated interplay. In this game, freedom, may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted.45

Terence Lee refers to examples of such freedom, granted by the PAP government in Singapore. These examples relate to expression of freedom;

41 Lee, *The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore*, 28
42 Lee, *The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore*, 30
43 Michel Foucault, *The Subject of Power*, *Critical Enquiry* 8 (Summer 1982), 783
44 Foucault, ‘The Subject of Power’, 787
45 Foucault, ‘The Subject of Power’, 788
firstly, in the form of creativity within the cultural domain and secondly in the form of feedback by the Singaporean citizens regarding their satisfaction over PAP’s governance within the political domain. This reflects the government’s effort to promote active citizenship and convince the public that there is political freedom of expression.

To be more precise, regarding cultural policy in 1988 PAP formed the Advisory Council on the Culture and the Arts and developed a report according to which culture and arts give a nation its unique character. Immediately after that the Ministry of Information and Arts was founded with the mission to help, inform and educate as part of a national goal to build a society that is economically dynamic, socially cohesive and culturally vibrant. There are many examples of new public places that were designed to reflect state aspirations. Singapore’s grandest performing Arts Venue Esplanade opened in October 2002 amidst a multi-million dollar fanfare. The esplanade comprises of a series of top rated latest and best performance halls and art spaces. The Esplanade quickly became Singapore’s most conspicuous demonstration that a cultural sector exists in Singapore and that the government envisioning of Singapore as a cultural bridge to the world. Lee admits that Singapore’s cultural policy has everything to do with staying on top as a focal node in the late capitalist world system of the new millennium.46

Regarding the freedom of political expression PAP launched on 19th October 1997, the project ‘Singapore 21’. This was an attempt to redefine citizenship as embodying a sense of ownership. It seeks to enhance the citizens participation in public affairs. It has been depicted as a large-scale exercise involving 6,000 ordinary Singaporean in the form of a survey commissioned by the authorities to gauge public opinion and reinforce freedom of expression in Singapore. In fact Lee suggests that feedback makes policy formulation in government a more informed process ensuring above all that is relevant. It also makes policy implementation a more effective process as it enhances public receptiveness based on a better understanding of the government’s actions.47

46 Lee, *The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore*, 51-54
47 Lee, *The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore*, 56
The Shortcomings of a Foucaultian Account of Citizenship in Singapore

However the question posed here is whether this form of freedom - promoted in the form or artistic creativity and political expression - is actually emancipating and if it promotes a sense of social cohesion among Singaporeans as well as a reconciliation between themselves and their State. In other words does a Foucaultian account of cultural citizenship guarantees an efficient form of citizenship in Singapore?

As it has been previously argued, from a Hegelian perspective Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity and freedom is problematic as it does not emancipate the subject. It has already been noted that in the Subject of Power it appears as if Foucault ‘invents’ freedom out of necessity. He treats freedom as power’s ‘tool’, incorporated to accommodate the government of power relations via the development of a domain which renders possible the subject’s ‘agency’ and simultaneously permits the exercise of power’s control upon the subject. In that sense, Foucault’s freedom becomes nothing but a tool, utilized by power which allows just a set of (predetermined) options dictated within a specific domain, permitting -if any- a very limited form of agency. Paradoxically, Foucault’s ‘freedom’ becomes a means of controlling rather than emancipating the subject.

Moreover, let us remind that as Taylor suggested the projection of power regimes as neutral and purpose-free succession of power regimes is a process which does not necessarily liberate the subject. As Taylor notes, elaborating a specific domain (in our case the ‘Singapore 21’ feedback and the domain of artistic creativity) where the individual is given the opportunity to exercise his freedom, acts in fact as a domain where the individual submits himself under control. The Power – Subject relation takes the form of a Doctor – Patient respectively. Such relation is founded on the presumption that one knows and that the other has the overwhelming interest in taking advice. Therefore, a Doctor-Patient power relation cannot be neutral because although both parties

48 Foucault, ‘The Subject of Power’, 781-782
are constrained, there is a domination on the part of the Doctor/ Power which restricts the subject’s agency and freedom.49

Terence Lee in fact admits indirectly that the limits of this domain of freedom are predetermined by the government. Regarding the domain of culture and arts, Lee argues that the Renaissance City Report appears less interested in the development of culture and arts in Singapore from an exclusively artistic standpoint. Rather it is more attuned to the economic activity and political longevity of Singapore in an increasingly competitive global era. The monumental cultural hall Esplanade serves a kind of duality that has two aspects, one aspect is to promote the cultural policy of the government. The function is to support the Government’s cultural policy such as arts festivals and the other is to promote commercial cultural events. Thus, the freedoms of artistic creativity are limited to serve the objective’s of government whereas the scope of ‘free’ artistic options are determined by the PAP’s agenda of maximizing commercial and economic success.50

Similarly regarding the freedom of political expression, ‘Singapore 21’ served as a domain which determined the limits of such expression. Lee suggests that Singapore 21 is deemed an exercise of pseudo-participation. The PAP in what could be seen as tacit collaboration with the local government controlled press ‘Straits Times’, interpreted the feedback as encouraging and instructive. The concept of feedback is understood quite simply as the expression of one’s views of public policy. However, this feedback is designed not so much to replace a top-down mode of rule but to manage dissenting voices or public dissonance. Lee adds that this new rhetoric about cultivating civil participation in Singapore and active citizenship is in effect a public relations exercise aimed at establishing a credo that endorses the existence of political boundaries. As a result the political and cultural boundaries that govern political exchanges and debates in Singapore termed as Out of Bound Markers (OBM) remain firmly itched in the minds of many Singaporean citizens and observers.51

An example worth mentioning which designates the effect of OBMs and the limits of ‘free’ political expression is the Catherine Lim case. Her political

50 Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore, 57-58
51 Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore, 89-93
commentary in the form of feedback on 20 November 1994, in ‘Straits Times’, contended that Prime Ministers Goh Chok Tong promise of an open, consultative and consensual leadership style had been abandoned in favour of the authoritarian style of his predecessor Lee Kuan Yew. Goh reacted the following day arguing that Lim went beyond the pale. Goh argued that political commentators should expect strong rebuttals from the government if they attacked specific politicians or policies. Specifically, he mentioned that ‘if a person wants to set the agenda for Singapore by commenting regularly on politics, the government’s view has been that the person should only do this in the political arena. If people believe that the contestant’s policies are right, when the government knows they are wrong, the contestant is not there to account for the policy’. By invoking the concept of the OBM the government is able to restrict public participation and filter commentary on any aspect of politics deemed problematic. The effect is that any feedback or political viewpoint that gets through government controlled and mediated sensors, real or imagined, is un-debated and poorly considered. Under these circumstances the freedom of expression is curtailed whereas ‘Singapore 21’ and the OBM’s mark the domain of this limited free political expression.

On Foucault’s ‘Freedom’ and ‘Neutral’ Exercise of Power in Singapore

It appears that the whole idea of providing freedom within the limits of a previously determined domain, paradoxically turns out to be a strategy of power which allows itself to perpetuate control in the name developing a ‘free’ subject or in Singapore’s case a citizen that ‘freely’ consents to PAP’s actions. Terence Lee already provided certain hints regarding PAP’s provision of limited freedom as an instrument to amplify social control. Here the Foucaultian understanding of citizenship which is based on a problematic account of subjectivity, freedom and power will be further undermined. More specifically below will be shown that PAP in Singapore: a) nourishes a non-neutral form of Power which serves to perpetuate the government’s control while negating the emergence of ‘free’ subjectivity; and b) forms a predetermined domain of ‘free’ options which is

52 Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore, 95
53 Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore, 96
responsible for nourishing the egotistic subject that is un-free as it lapses to Hegel’s second moment of will as determination since it associates free will with the individual. Such understanding of subjectivity echoes Hegel’s critique that Rousseau’s general will as the collectivity of individualist wills can not secure a reliable form of reconciliation between the state and the citizens as well as among the citizens themselves, the sum of all the individualist subjects’ wills.

Thus, below it will be argued that a Foucaultian account of citizenship ends up undermining: a) the social cohesion among the citizens, something which is obvious in Singapore; and b) the reconciliation between the Singaporean citizen and the state.

Regarding the neutrality of power, it was already suggested that PAP’s political leaders insisted that pragmatism is politically a neutral concept and flexible as it accommodates a revisionist conduct of politics which is reflected on the political contingency over the content of the Singaporean National values. However, an empirical analysis of scholars such as Beng Chua Huat and Kenneth Paul Tan, reveals that the conceptualization of pragmatism is dictated by a purely economical dimension, transforming pragmatism into a product of materialist and capitalist foundations.

For Beng Chua Huat, the government attempted to develop a policy which accommodated both multiculturalism and multilingualism which prioritized Singapore’s survival. According to PAP pragmatism guided the party’s political objectives, forming a ‘non-ideological identity’. In selecting the values that would express the Party’s and Singapore’s identity, the choice has fallen that it would appear as non-ideological. The government’s claim is that the strategies form the logic of the needs of a developing Singapore and are thus eminently practical rather than based on any ideological claims. Against internal and external threats the government has one solution: economic development.\(^5^4\)

As Beng Chua Huat stresses, the origins of PAP’s pragmatism are at once historical, material and conceptual. The historical and material constraints were determined by the domestic economic situation which emerged after Singapore’s independence. The government of the newly emerged country identified its survival in purely financial terms. The economic is privileged over the cultural,

\(^{54}\) Chua, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, 42-45
because economic growth is seen as the best guarantee of social and political stability, necessary for the survival of the island-state. PAP continues to argue that continuous economic growth is the wellspring of Singaporean life, thus all aspects of policy conduct are harnessed to this endless pursuit. This instrumental rationality, dictated by economical thought, forms the kernel of PAP’s policy. As Beng Chua Huat summarizes the substance of PAP’s pragmatism is founded on: a) The nature of Industrial relations which according to 1968 Industrial Relations Act, prohibited unions from bargaining or protesting against the minimum standards set by the Act, in order to stabilize the labour costs and promote the attraction of foreign investments; b) emphasis on education as human capital; c) the embedding of multiculturalism; and d) finally the promotion of meritocracy which is held responsible for allocating the appropriate positions in the complex division of labour of the industrial work place.55

Christopher Lingle even describes PAP’s political governance as authoritarian capitalism. He argues that there are many government obstructions, interferences and involvements in domestic commercial activities. The government is extensively involved in real estate markets, including a massive public housing program. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) pursues active foreign exchange interventions to guide exchange rates, as much to sustain an export oriented industrialization policy in order to held inflation check. Foreign banks are allowed to incorporate in Singapore but they are not licensed to compete in domestic banking.56 According to Lingle, this solely economical conceptualization of Pragmatism, which is based on PAP’s authoritarian capitalism, urges Singaporeans to behave like the economical man dictated by material considerations according to which consumerism is celebrated.57

Kenneth Paul Tan is another scholar who associates PAP’s pragmatism with capitalism. In Singapore, ideology is disguised via pragmatism whereas pragmatism is substantiated within a purely capitalist framework that prioritizes the attraction of foreign investments. The rhetoric of pragmatism has been constructed and reconstructed. It has adapted to cope with internal contradictions. It is argued that the one party dominant state is the result of

55 Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, 58
56 Christopher Lingle, Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism, Barcelona: Edicions Sirocco, 1996, pp. 62-69
57 Lingle, Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism, 96
'pragmatic’, continuous and flexible policy conduct rather than the outcome of fixed ideologically restrained ideas. The rhetoric of pragmatism links Singapore’s impressive and yet fragile success with the island-state’s diachronic success of attracting global capital. In turn, attracting global capital relies on maintaining a global political system dominated by an experienced, technocratic and meritocratic PAP government. The government, consolidated its power as a highly interventionist and entrepreneurial state by luring foreign investors with generous tax incentives, industrial infrastructure and political stability. The PAP has for the most part enjoyed high levels of political legitimacy based on economic policies that have delivered growth and provision of material well being for the state’s citizens in conditions of permanent vulnerability. At the logical level, PAP government has been able to manage the hegemonic discourse of survival and success, producing slogans that remind the citizens how Singapore developed.58

PAP has effectively propagated, the idea that it is more important for a small country with limited resources and talent to have a meritocratic, pragmatic and economically oriented government than one that is limited by principles of accountability, checks and balances. By promoting meritocracy and pragmatism for creating the right conditions for economic success, the PAP government has been able not only to justify its democratic deficit but also to produce ideological resources and an authoritarian structure for the maintenance of the one party dominant regime. In ‘pragmatic’ terms, Singapore’s considerable economic success is justification enough for PAP’s authoritarian means.59

HDB Housing Project, Education and Social Control in Singapore

The previous analysis showed that the pseudo-neutrality of pragmatism serves to perpetuate PAP’s control over the citizen body. Other means which exacerbate this social control are associated with the public housing project (developed by Singapore’s Housing and Development Board - HDB ) and education.

59 Tan, ‘The Ideology of Pragmatism’, 71
For PAP the development of public housing was essentially a process of physically putting people in their places. According to Tremewan, during the first period of PAP’s government (from approximately 1950 to 1966), the opposition leaders put in prison while mostly the labour and lower middle classes were forced into public housing to improve their standards of housing but also to isolate them from political mobilization. In the second period from 1966 to 1978, housing estates were rapidly expanded. PAP focused on social control by keeping these classes in their flats and blocking all alternative forms of subsistence. Finally, the main task during the 80s was to neutralize new forms of protest arising from more than a decade of industrialization and intensified labour exploitation and inequality of Singapore’s industrial boom. The emphasis of social control moved to welfare, especially housing and education, as the PAP sought to nourish political obedience and consent of the Singaporeans. According to Tremewan the public housing project acted as a powerful regulatory mechanism of obedience and control. The institution of the public housing succeeded in undermining PAP political opposition after providing to their potential source of electoral power - the labour and lower middle classes - public housing and cultivating their dependence upon the PAP to secure accommodation and paying of the mortgage. Moreover, political resistance was further by tying housing to loyalty to the PAP-state.\(^60\)

For Tremewan the political function of public housing became one of the main mechanisms which the PAP cemented its political supremacy, disrupted the social base of political opposition and guaranteed labour power for its economic strategy. Housing resettlement gained greater urgency already before Singapore’s independence from the Malaysian Federation when the PAP’s schism took place in 1961. When the leftist members of the PAP where dismissed by the party Leader Lee Kuan Yew, the ousted members formed the Barisan Socialis party that acted as PAP’s political opposition. Thus, the PAP had to undermine both the traditional urban and rural bases of the left in order to survive politically. The Lee faction came to realize the value of forced resettlement in state controlled housing after destroying the traditional social organization which could never

hope to control. The public housing programme indeed coincided with a genuine need for substandard housing to be replaced but the need was met by the PAP in such a way as to neutralize opposition and induce political loyalty. The main political effect of the housing policy was the production of a working class dependent on the PAP state for housing and dependent on wage labour to pay for it. The former was achieved through the physical destruction of all other forms of cheap housing and through forced resettlement. The latter was achieved through the elimination of the traditional means of housing and the imposition of a comparatively HDB rental.  

As Tremewan stresses, the PAP after putting the Singaporean citizens in their places physically, the government had to ensure that they stayed there. The PAP made sure that there was no alternative housing for the middle and the labour class which comprised the majority of the population. Moreover, by means of the land acquisition act 1966, the PAP state gave itself the power to expropriate private rights in land titles. The PAP state could acquire land not just for specific public purposes but for any residential, commercial or industrial places. The HDB ownership ended up in politicizing the acquisition of public housing because it did not lead to greater independence for householders but less. For instance, the HDP imposes limitations on the number and family status of people who can live in the units, has to approve their renovation, rental and resale, forbids the conduct of business in the units and has the right to evict residents found guilty of morally inappropriate behaviour even without compensation. This fear and the mechanisms which tie people into it have become one of the central pillars of the PAP state’s social control via the HDP public housing scheme.

Moreover, Hill’s and Kwen Fee’s argument adds a biopolitical dimension to the HDB project. In its policy of allocating flats, the HDB attempted to institutionalize what was declared the traditional family model. According to PAP the provision of public housing is only available to households. Young single individuals and divorcees are excluded and even in the case of older single people who are presumably never going to marry, eligibility to rent depends on

61 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 45-49
62 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 53
63 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 57-58
agreement to share with another person. A potential reason for this might be related to the avoidance of welfarism on behalf of the government. However, another reason for this may be related to PAP’s attempt to exercise further social control over population via the institution of family. This dimension underlines a biopolitical exercise of control by the PAP as the satisfaction of a basic need - that of accommodation - is determined by the individual’s decision to form a family while such a housing scheme assists the promotion of family ties.64

According to Tremewan, Singapore’s educational system has been another mean of PAP’s exercise of coercive control. After Singapore’s independence, PAP subjected education under a centralized educational system and adapted it according to the needs of foreign capital. English, the language of foreign capital would be indisputable and sole language of merit. Facilities in English would be the ostensible neutral criterion for placing Singaporean to their social places. But since English was the language of the Chinese and Indian middle or upper classes, an educational system which promoted English would reinforce the connections between the elites regardless class, language and race. English would unite the middle and upper classes across ethnic divides while excluding the working class of all races. Moreover, mathematics, science and technical subjects were emphasized by the PAP state as the basis of education for nation building and industrialization. In 1966 mathematics and science were required to be taught in English. To this end Singapore’s educational system deprived all except the elites a formal education in their own cultural and linguistic traditions. Communal factors or race and language were systematically correlated with class position throughout the bilingual policy, while emphasis was placed on science and technology. It cannot be easily doubted that the Singaporean government makes a deliberate use of the education system for purposes of social engineering.65

According to Tremewan, the PAP emphasizes on the principles of equality of opportunity and meritocracy in order to mask the social inequalities and control which the educational system of Singapore nurtures. The principles of equality of opportunity, theoretically serve to neutralize the differences among

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65 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 95-96
races, religion, class or linguistic heritage. What an individual did with this opportunity was dependent on personal merit. There was constant emphasis on merit as the criterion for upward mobility and privilege. According to this reasoning, equality of opportunity logically leads to social inequality since individual abilities differ. According to PAP the recognition of individual merit leads to a just society. Thus, a just society is an unequal one.66

However, as Kenneth Paul Tan adds, the value of meritocracy assumes a very important role as pragmatism’s crutch. Meritocracy ensures that the appropriate people seize the right positions in order to secure a prosperous administration and ensure Singapore’s continuous economic growth. For Tan, meritocracy can be transformed into pretense to promote inequality and elitism, justifying—in the case of Singapore- authoritarian government and its pro-capitalist orientations. Meritocracy contains inherent contradictions. According to the principle of non-discrimination: a selection must be blind to race, gender, sexuality age or class differences. However ignoring these differences may serve to deny their real influence on the prospects of the candidates. Meritocracy, in trying to isolate merit by treating people with fundamentally unequal backgrounds as superficially the same, even conceals the real advantages and disadvantages that are unevenly distributed to different segments of an inherently unequal society, a practice that perpetuates this fundamental inequality.67

Meritocracy is less interested in giving everyone a chance to earn the right to a job but more concerned to reveal the best person for the job. In that sense, meritocracy is a mechanism for resource allocation: it is not a matter of equality of opportunity but of finding the right persons for the job and paying them salaries that they deserve. However the ‘winners’ of the contest that meritocracy promotes though initially convinced of their deservingness to win, may grow secretly diffident and begin to misdirect their energies on preserving their positions by eliminating competitors. This may in fact promote negative characteristics such as arrogance, mistrust, deceit and vanity. The dangers of such meritocracy in the case of Singapore are also evident in the political field. As the politicians’ wages are very high, the intentions behind the motives of individuals who wish to involve in politics may vary. The idea that money will

66 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 98
67 Tan, ‘Meritocracy and Eliticism in a Global City: Ideological shifts in Singapore’, 7-10
draw the ‘best’ people into politics and give them fewer reasons to be corrupt ignores the possibility of people going into politics for the wrong reasons. The lure of personal prestige and monetary gain can produce a dangerously intelligent and self-interested class of political elites who will readily compromise the national interest to satisfy their own needs and who will have the unchecked power to do this indefinitely perpetuating their power.68

**On the Approaches which Predetermine the Negative Civic Effects of Materialism and Economy in Singapore**

The previous sections undermined pragmatism’s neutrality while indicating how the public housing, education and the values of multiculturalism and meritocracy in fact assist the perpetuation of the PAP’s elite exercise of power and social control. In other words, exposing pragmatism’s materialist and capitalist background which signifies its lack of neutrality, while arguing how public housing and education serve as the means of PAP’s coercive exercise of power, in fact undermines Terence Lee’s Foucaulian approach of ‘free’ Citizenship.

Below reference will be made to a number of approaches which attribute the lack of strong social cohesion in Singapore to PAP’s prioritization of materialist and economic objectives. A number of scholars predetermine that the embedment of the economic and materialist dimension is responsible for undermining the social cohesion of the Singaporean citizen body and for failing to establish the reconciliation of the Singaporeans with their state. However, in contrast to what is being stated in this section, the second part of this chapter elaborates how Hegel promoted an alterative understanding of materialism and economy within the realm of Spirit (Geist). Hegel after taking into consideration the Spirit (Geist), he treats market economy and private property as the means of an educative process which in fact gradually contribute to the Singaporeans’ social cohesion and reconciliation with their state as certain events suggest.

Unlike Hegel, not only academics such as Ortmann, Kluever and Weber but also politicians such as the previous prime minister Goh Chok Tong, attribute to materialism and economy Singapore’s fragile social cohesion.

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At first, Ortmann argues that PAP’s materialist driven policy of Pragmatism nourishes an individualist centered subject, a phenomenon which is locally described as kiasuism. Ortmann stresses that it is not surprising that 83% of Singaporeans consider materialism a national trait (in contrast, only 63% considered the fair treatment of fellow citizens to be a part of the national culture). This materialism has found its expression on the concept of kiasu or its offspring kiasuim, often described as the national fixation in Singapore. Meaning ‘the fear of losing out to others’ it refers to the prevalence of materialism and rapid individualism in Singapore. Kiasu is a Hokkien term and designates a sense of competitive anxiety among Singaporeans. Kiasuism is generally associated with hyper-individualism and hyper-competition despite the PAP’s official pronouncements on the virtues of communitarianism. It is increasing the object of soul of younger Singaporeans. Moreover kiasuism is also reflected in the aspirational (materialistic) desires of Singaporeans often described as the 5 C’s (Cash, Credit Cards, Condominiums, Country Clubs, Cars). The Singapore dream - especially among young Singaporeans - has always been about the 5 C’s. This pursuit of material wealth combined with the kiasuism’s originating need to be No1 has created the competitive and individualist-centered Singaporean. Everything that revolves around the Singaporean ego is measured in terms of costs and benefits, the ‘what I will gain by doing this’. Such mentality informs the contemporary Singaporean kiasu psyche.

As Ortmann argues, the overwhelming materialism and individualism in Singaporean society, indeed concerned Singaporean government. He distinguishes two phases which determined Singapore’s national values. Interestingly, during the second phase PAP made an effort to promote an alternative set of communitarian values via moral education, in order to reinforce a stronger sense of Singaporean identity and boost social cohesion. The first phase commences with Singapore’s independence in 1965. PAP promoted pragmatic values which were geared towards economic growth, stressing the necessity of Singapore’s integration to the global economy. The government then introduced measures which promoted a sense of national identity and social

70 Ravinder K Sidhu, Universities and Globalisation: To Market, To Market (New Jersey: Lawrence Elrbaum Associates, 2006), 234-240
cohesion via materialist centered welfare means. The idea of a harmonious society that was collectively working to achieve prosperity, along with the massive public housing scheme (HDB), the promotion of national symbols like (flag, national anthem) and the annual national day celebrations. The party even came to be called the national party and its leaders tied PAP’s achievements to the national development. For Ortmann, PAP’s pragmatism based on ‘survivalism’, materialism and economic development, stresses the lack of Singapore’s social cohesion.  

Similarly, Kluver and Weber note, it is not surprising that the national identity forged on economic progress, would have little emotional or motivational hold on the populace. Indeed this very economic progress and the values of entrepreneurship and the opportunism within the framework of pragmatism, contributed to the undermining of national cohesion in Singapore and a trend to emigrate. 

The perception of high emigration rates (there is a lack of statistics) suggests that the attachment which young educated Singaporean’s feel toward their homeland is very small. Indicative is the Quitter-Stayer debate as described by Singapore’s previous prime minister Goh Chok Tong. The Quitter – Stayer Debate began when Goh Chok Tong, criticized whether the Singaporeans who enjoyed the good economic times would quit the country during the economic downturns. One of the critical issues facing the government then was a ‘public relations’ battle for the hearts of a crowd that is able to pack their bags and get a job and house outside Singapore, should they feel unhappy with what their country has to offer. In a front page report with title ‘PM: Asks young Singaporean will you help?’ Goh Chok Tong expressed his concerns against well educated young Singaporeans who become self-centered and refuse to give a helping hand when the country faces severe challenges. Yet, as Kluver and Weber stress, PAP’s value of meritocracy is self-defeating regarding the promotion of social cohesion in Singapore. It is the very same government that rewards merit, projects multiculturalism and labels Singapore as a global city who is responsible for nurturing less loyalty to the country it represents. From *kasuist* 

71 Ortmann, ‘Singapore: The politics of Inventing National Identity’, 25-26
73 Ortmann, ‘Singapore: The politics of Inventing National Identity’, 34
individualist perspective of Singaporeans, dictated by PAP’s meritocratic ethical
code of conduct, Singapore’s talents are doomed to emigrate and go where the
opportunities exist since meritocracy links talent to success. Thus this myth of
economic progress based the materialism of pragmatism and meritocracy
undermines the Singaporeans social cohesion and loyalty to the state.74

III. Revisiting the Implications of Materialism and Economy On
Singaporean Citizenship From Hegel’s Perspective

Introduction

The previous part challenged theoretically and empirically a Foucaultian account
of citizenship in Singapore. Such a Foucaultian driven approach does not provide
sufficient theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that the PAP’s exercise
of governmentality nourishes a non-coercive sense of consent which transforms
the Singaporean citizens into ‘free’ subjects. Moreover, it was stressed how
PAP’s pragmatism, founded solely on materialism and economic capitalism,
nurseries an individualist, materialist and opportunist form of citizenship which
undermines the citizens’ social cohesion as well as their reconciliation with the
state. As it was already argued such a portrayal of the Singaporean citizen is
defined in academic literature with the term kiasuism, whereas in the PAP’s
rhetoric in terms of the ‘Quitter-Stayer’ debate. Therefore, Singaporeans are
often stereotyped in academic literature as kiasuist self-centered citizens who do
not (supposedly) care about a more open society but the for the bigger flat and
bigger car.75 These social traits are considered to be perilous by the PAP and
were reflected in the ex-prime minister’s Goh Chok Tong’s concerns, that these
Singaporeans would potentially quit the country during the economic downturns
after enjoying the good economic times.

75 Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance Singapore: Economy Culture and Politics (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2007), 98
Many scholars tend to accuse the government’s prioritization of economic and materialistic policies as responsible for nurturing these individualistic \textit{kiasuist} traits of the Singaporean citizens which undermine Singapore’s social cohesion. In other words it appears that these scholars often attribute to PAP’s economic and materialist driven policy, a deterministic effect upon the formation of an individualistic, materialist and opportunistic subject that refrains from questioning the PAP’s governance. However this begs for the following question:

Do empirical facts verify this deterministic impact of the PAP’s materialist and economic prioritization upon the formation of such an individualist, materialist and opportunist Singaporean subject?

If certain empirical facts fail to verify that, how does Hegel’s systematic philosophy allows us to re-interpret the impact of PAP’s policies and undermine the pre-determinism of the materialistic and economical dimension upon the formation of the subject as purely opportunistic and self-centered. Just like Rousseau, Hegel too includes a materialist and an economic dimension in the \textit{Philosophy of Right}, via the system of needs, the market and private property. However, Hegel’s understanding of these notions is not based on liberal premises. Instead, he ascribes an alternative impact to economy and materialism, after incorporating the system of needs, the market, and private property within the realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist}), attributing to them an educative effect which arouses the subject’s self consciousness and freedom. Thus, the question that is raised here is the following:

How is that reflected in Singapore?

After elaborating further on Hegel’s economic and materialist dimension of his philosophical system within the realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) it will be argued that the stereotypical treatment of most Singaporeans as \textit{kiasuist} or ‘quitters’ is inaccurate. Below, after providing sufficient empirical and theoretical evidence from a Hegelian perspective, it will be argued how the PAP’s materialistic and economic driven policies do not necessary form an individualist, materialist and disciplined Singaporean. Empirical evidence will be provided to suggest that there are forms of political and cultural resistance in Singapore which are selfless, communitarian and materialist-free as they aim to critically awake their fellow Singaporean citizens and intellectually emancipate them.
Revisiting the Implications of Material Needs and Economy Via Hegel’s Notion of Spirit (Geist)

In this part, any deterministic theory of the effects of economy and materialism upon the formation of the subject will be challenged. The materialist and economic dimensions are not responsible for solely nourishing an individualist, opportunistic citizen lacking communitarian values. Below, Hegel’s perspective unveils an alternative set of implications associated with the economic and materialist dimension. For Hegel, after incorporating economy and materialism, within the realm of Spirit (Geist), these dimensions serve as a medium of educating the citizens in a process which assists them to acquire self-consciousness and seize a form of subjectivity that helps them reconcile with their fellow citizens and the state. In other words, an understanding of the Singaporean citizen beyond the kiasuist or ‘quiter’ interpretation as certain empirical evidence suggest too.

Via the concept of Spirit (Geist), Hegel dismisses pre-existing formulas and prescriptive or descriptive theoretical approaches. In the same manner, prescribing or predetermining the impact of economy and materialism upon citizenship and subjectivity are challenged from a Hegelian perspective. Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) signifies a process and an evolution and as such economy and materialism serve as mediums which can assist the development of the subject’s self-consciousness while simultaneously reconciling her with the fellow citizens and the state. Hegel incorporates the system of needs, the market, and private property within the realm of Spirit (Geist), attributing them an educative effect which arouses the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom. The previous chapter analyzed in detail how Hegel’s alternative treatment of materialism, private property and the economy emerged after taking into consideration the notion of Spirit (Geist).

Let us recall that according to Hegel the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom is tied to citizenship and the state. For Hegel, self-consciousness is neither something that happens automatically, nor something that the subject’s is capable of aquiring by herself. For Hegel, the subject’s self consciousness is a
long term project, an intellectual and practical effort which is formed via ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) in the State. The state completes the real freedom that Hegel identifies in the market system, in contrast to the libertarian idea of the state. The economic market assists the citizen’s actualization of freedom via the interaction with the others within the state, thus the individual is not the sole source of his own actualized freedom.\(^{76}\) Hegelian civil society, has not taken over a model of purely self-interested market behaviour which is incompatible with the state. What Hegel sets out to show is how individuals are ‘formed’ or ‘educated’ by their economic interdependence.

Economic interdependence encourages the subject to overcome her self-centeredness as it helps the subject to realize that (material) needs in fact reflect social attitudes and expectations whereas the subject’s involvement in the market system, enables her to participate in the world.\(^{77}\) For Hegel, private property too is treated as a means to stress the communitarian dimension of personhood and its contribution towards self-consciousness which promotes freedom.\(^{78}\) In that respect, Hegel’s understanding of property is fundamentally anti-utilitarian and anti-liberal as he challenges self-determining subjectivity, permits state intervention and acknowledges the educative effects of the market and property after incorporating them within the realm of Spirit (*Geist*).

The previous paragraphs stressed how the materialist and economic dimension of Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (*Geist*) seeks to overcome the self determining understanding of subjectivity after distancing itself from the liberal economic and materialist perspective. The first part of this chapter elucidated that after approaching from the perspective of Spirit (*Geist*) the system of needs, the market and private property, they assume an educative role which informs the state’s ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) and contributes to the development of the subject’s self-consciousness. The analysis below, attempts to confirm empirically the implications of Hegel’s alternative role of the economy, market and private property. Hegel’s insights are applied to explain the civic transformation of the Singaporean citizens beyond their stereotypical treatment as self-centered, materialistic and opportunistic individuals.


\(^{77}\) Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 123-129

\(^{78}\) Dudley Knowles, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*, (London: Routledge 2002), 114-117
Challenging the Deterministic Effects of Materialism and Economy
Upon Singaporean Citizens

Below, an analysis takes place which challenges empirically the approaches which celebrate the predetermining effects of the economy and materialism. The previous part elaborated how certain scholarly approaches tend to stereotypically associate PAP’s economic and materialist policies with a form of citizenship that is materialist, individualist and opportunist. This understanding of Singaporean citizenship is often met in academic literature with the terms ‘kiasu’ while in political argumentation is reflected via the ‘quitter-stayer’ debate.

After referring to these stereotypical approaches which attribute the individualism and opportunism of (kiasu) Singaporeans to their government’s economical and materialist priorities; empirical evidence will be applied to undermine them and confirm from a Hegelian perspective how economy and materialism do not have a predetermining effects upon citizenship formation. Instead, after taking into consideration the notion of Spirit (Geist), it will be suggested that it is more accurate to treat the economy and its materialist dimensions as means of a process with indeterminate results. Moreover, from a Hegelian perspective it is argued here that these dimensions may potentially serve as educative means which assists the formation of a self-conscious subject within the limits of the state, who is reconciled with the community, does not hesitate to take risks in order to promote the community’s interests at the expense of her private benefits. Examples of cultural resistance and civic forms activism tend to suggest how despite the embedded materialism and economic priorities of the Singaporean government and society, these traits have actually contributed to gradually awake civically some Singaporeans as Hegel’s approach suggests. Examples like that undermine the stereotypical treatment of the Singaporean as purely kiasu and the determining negative civic effects of economy and materialism.
On PAP’s Materialist Driven Policies of Economic Survivalism

Below takes place a brief overview of PAP’s policies which were dictated by the objectives of materialism and economic survivalism. It will be explained how these policies led certain academics perceive Singaporeans as *kiasuist* citizens who are only concerned about materialistic benefits and private interest and how some surveys verify these conclusions regarding a part of Singapore’s population. Yet, it will be suggested here that it is misleading to argue that PAP’s materialistic and economic survivalism driven policies have necessarily the determining *kiasuist* effect upon Singaporeans. In this regard, reference to a number of examples will take place which implies how a number of selfless and civic oriented forms of cultural resistance and civic activism emerged which aspire to critically awake Singaporeans from their materialist lethargy. It is interesting to see how the stereotype of the Singaporean *kiasu* doesn’t apply to the protagonists of these forms of resistance and activism who often act in peril of prosecution; but also to the rest of the population, as a part of it supports such unconventional reactions.

The previous part - after quoting Huat, Mutalib and Tan - unveiled how PAP’s political rhetoric of pragmatism is not neutral but has instead materialistic and capitalist economic foundations. Below a description of PAP’s policies during the 80s, 90s and the last decade will be provided in order to describe how their materialist and economic premises, nourished among the academic and political circles the narrative of the *kiasuist* Singaporean which fueled the ‘quitter-stayer’ debate.

Previously reference was made to Ortmann, Kluver and Weber, according to whom the PAP’s prioritization of economic survivalism and materialism has contributed to the lack of a particular Singaporean identity, nourishing citizens who are materialist and opportunistic. Velayutham notes too, that the PAP government’s creation of a cosmopolitan global city, rationalized in economic terms, reflects this managerial and opportunist intent. In that respect it is often argued that as Singaporeans aspire to achieve greater economical upward mobility through the material advantages of financial globalization that PAP embraces, their cultural identity appears weak to anchor them home and prevent
them from seeking opportunities elsewhere. These fears were expressed politically in the form of the ‘Quitter-Stayer’ debate as the Singaporeans may easily flee while seeking greater materialistic advantages. The Quitter - Stayer Debate began when Goh Chok Tong asked whether the Singaporeans who enjoyed the good economic times would quit the country during the economic downturns. Goh Chok Tong expressed his concerns against well educated young Singaporeans who become self-centered and refuse to give a helping hand when the country faces severe challenges.80

As Velayutham suggests, PAP’s policies through the last decades have been formed in respect to an economical and materialist dimension.81 However, a few years later, not only the Asian values were abandoned but also any cultural attempt to develop a distinctive cultural identity in Singapore. After the 1997 Asian financial market crash, the discourse on the promotion of Asian values in Singapore was no longer seen as a fruitful basis for Singapore’s own economic growth and social development since Asia became associated in the global economy with nepotism, corruption and economic mismanagement. While Singapore escaped the crisis the question of identity re-emerged. The government’s anxieties this time were not so much the erosion of cultural traditions but had more to do with sustaining the Singapore’s viability as a nation state in its attempt to plug into the global economic system. After that, the question for PAP became is how to produce effective citizens in the era of economic globalization while retaining its benefits.82

After the 90s a number of policies followed while PAP was making efforts to tackle the issue of how to form Singapore as a global city while being a home to its citizens and keeping them committed. ‘Singapore 21’ and ‘Renaissance Singapore’ emerged as two policies which aspired to change the character of Singaporean-ness. As Velayutham stresses both of them were premised on economic capital accumulation and materialism.83

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79 Selvaraj Velayutham, Responding to Globalisation: Nation, Culture and Identity in Singapore, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 206
81 Velayutham, Responding to Globalisation, 76-77
82 Tan, Renaissance Singapore: Economy Culture and Politics, 26
83 Velayutham, Responding to Globalisation, 112
How Certain Surveys Perpetuate the Perception of the Self-Centered and Materialist Singaporeans

Beyond the perspectives of certain scholars who treat the Singaporean citizens as individualistic and opportunist, certain surveys stress too the Singaporeans’ materialism and lack of civic virtues. According to a survey Velayutham puts forward, in response to the question ‘Do you feel Singapore is your home?’ most respondents suggested that Singapore was home simply because it was their country of birth, where their family and friends are and where they had grown up and spend most of their lives. However, on deeper reflection, a more complex story emerged when respondents spoke about the sorts of factors which contributed to their identity and belonging to the Singapore nation. With remarkable consistency, most respondents in the survey indicated that Singapore’s economic achievements and progress, its political stability and efficiency as compared to Singapore’s Asian neighbor’s, its standard of living and the clean, safe and green living environment, were the factors contributing most to their sense of identification as a Singaporean. Also, respondents frequently remarked upon Singapore’s comfort, modern conveniences, high standard of living, economic and political stability. Singapore urban infrastructure and public programmes speak volumes in terms of efficiency, cleanliness and comfort. These materialist indicators generated among Singaporeans a deep sense of pride and provided a point of identification with the Singapore’s materialistic achievements rather than cultural traits.\(^{84}\)

Moreover, the Singaporeans orientation towards material embetterment is evident, according to the same survey, to the tendency of emigration among some of them due to the limited opportunities of upward social mobility in terms of status and lifestyle choices. The tendency to emigrate on such grounds indicates that some Singaporeans lack a sense of moral obligation towards the nation. For other Singaporeans the motivation to leave is primarily dictated by the anticipation of the high costs of running a car or medical care in Singapore. For others, the prospect of a new and relaxed lifestyle or the desire to experience something different in terms of a new job, career opportunities and a lower cost

\(^{84}\) Velayutham, *Responding to Globalisation*, 170-174
of living. Also some interviewees placed much importance on material possessions (such as owing a house and two cars) which are more affordable elsewhere, as the reason behind their emigration.\textsuperscript{85}

For most scholars, the findings of such surveys suggest that while the materialist economical achievements of the nation can function as a source of pride, materialism can never be a key ingredient for the emergence of a deeper affective nationalism in Singapore. Instead, it is argued that the embedded materialism and economic rationale, nourishes citizens who celebrate materialism and opportunism just as the findings on the reasons behind Singaporean’s emigration suggest. The conclusions of such analyses and surveys serve to proliferate the perception of the \textit{kasuist} Singaporean.

However how accurate is it to describe the Singaporeans as individualist and materialist? Here is it argued that most approaches which acknowledge the Singaporeans as solely \textit{kasuist}, materialistic and opportunistic are based on the perspective which stresses the deterministic effects of Singapore’s economic survivalism and materialism. In contrast to that, below an analysis take place on the issue areas of culture, arts and civic activism in order to undermine the perspectives which advocate the deterministic effects of economic survivalism and materialism upon the citizens. In that manner, Hegel’s insights on the economic and materialist dimension within the realm of Spirit (Geist) become relevant as he dismisses their predeterministic effect and treats them as means to an evolutionary processes which allows the citizens to seize self-consciousness and ultimately free will.

\textbf{Contested Approaches Regarding Culture’s Implications in Singapore}

In this part it will be shown how the debate on culture is a contested field as certain scholars suggest how arts are manipulated by the PAP in order to promote financial benefits for Singapore. Unlike the previous scholars, some other argue that art is a medium which contributes to the Singaporeans’ social and critical awakening - overcoming their opportunistic and individualistic \textit{kasuist} traits - after criticizing the shortcoming of PAP’s policies indirectly but efficiently.

\textsuperscript{85} Velayutham, \textit{Responding to Globalisation}, 176-179
Lily Kong, Brenda Yeoh and Velayutham are scholars who contend that the field of culture and arts in Singapore contributes to the promotion of economic or materialist related values and benefits. The first two argue that initially the PAP neglected arts. Currently the PAP uses arts as a mean to assist Singapore’s Economic development, regional prestige and nation building. Kong and Yeoh claim that culture is under the control of the state and serves the means of the state as the PAP ends up controlling the artists while tampering with their creativity and free expression.\(^{86}\) For Kong and Yeoh during the 1990s the PAP engaged in more rigorous policies took place in order to harness the economic potential of the arts. Government initiatives in terms of industrial & cultural policy, cultural tourism policy, urban cosmetics policy were initiated in an effort to make Singapore more attractive to tourists and visitors who might end up staying and bringing in investments with them.\(^{87}\)

Velayutham, argues too that after 1990 the policies of ‘Singapore 21’ and ‘Renaissance Singapore’ treated art related services as economic activities in their own right. For Velayutham especially ‘Renaissance Singapore’ appeared to prioritize an economic rationale while utilizing culture to serve this objective. The aim to become a cosmopolitan global city had according to PAP the following objectives: a) to attract global capital and to be seen as the kind of place that can do business creatively and well in the new global economy; b) to produce a class of cosmopolitan and creative professional Singaporeans who can operate successfully in the global economy; c) to attract the best foreign talents, to come and work in Singapore; d) to attract more tourists; e) to create a place of identification and affective attachment among Singaporeans, especially the cosmopolitan professional class. In that respect, for Velayutham, ‘Renaissance Singapore’ utilized the dimension of arts and culture to promote or brand Singapore as a cultural hub for the international public opinion.\(^{88}\)

So far it was stressed, according to certain scholars, that the PAP used art as a medium for the perpetuation of Singapore’s financial profits. Kong, Yeoh and Velayutham exacerbated the deterministic effect of economy upon the form of art that is nourished in Singapore, a form of art that tampers with the

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\(^{86}\) Lily Kong and Brenda S A Yeoh, *The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 173

\(^{87}\) Kong and Yeoh, *The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore*, 175-179

\(^{88}\) Velayutham, *Responding to Globalisation*, 148
Singaporean artists’ creativity while killing any attempt to express freely and criticize the government. However, below it will be argued how certain artistic groups and companies have emerged in Singapore, the members of whom develop provocative performances which aspire to critically awake the Singaporean despite the risks of prosecution and censorship. Such Singaporean artists certainly don’t fit the description of the opportunistic, individualistic and materialist Singaporean, as they took advantage the dimension of art’s economic globalization in Singapore in order to form international collaborations and perform plays which aim to raise civic awareness and indirectly criticize PAP.

On Arts and Civic Awareness

Unlike Lily Kong, Brenda Yeoh and Velayutham for Alvin Tan arts in Singapore are neither strictly under the PAP’s control nor promote the party’s political objectives. As Alvin Tan argues, political theatre challenges the dominant ideology that sustains the way things are in Singapore. For art to be effective it must be challenging established or reductive perceptions and mind-sets. It needs to transgress social mores or more conventional forms. Singaporean government strategically censors art of this kind. In effect, censorship creates an atmosphere of fear that limits the people’s capacity to think outside of the box. To escape the state, artists often look for new ways of creating art. Since ‘realistic’ theatre is highly accessible and therefore highly susceptible to censorship, many artists in Singapore have turned to avant-garde and interdisciplinary theatre. For the professional theatre company, ‘The Necessary Stage’ (TNS) which was founded in 1987, this type of postmodern and avant-garde performances became the key to challenge the Singaporean established norms while attempting to harness the dynamics of globalisation. In this regard, creating indigenous work from the scratch would seem to be unproductive. In the Singaporean context, the ‘exotic’ foreign element adds value to productions, easily justifies higher ticket prices while ensuring full houses. TNS quickly realised that internationality ensures quality, drawing recognition and economic capital which then secures the sustainability of a theatre company.89

89 Alvin Tan, Theatre and Cultures: Globalising Strategies, in Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance Singapore, 185-186
Every year in March since 1997 TNS organizes its own arts festival sponsored named youth explosion which eventually became one of Asia’s largest international fringe festival. This festival aims to bring the best of contemporary, cutting edge and socially engaged works to the Singapore audiences’. TNS reaches out to co-producers or venue presenters in the region, creating works that are socially engaged, innovative and yet accessible at regional and international levels. Having worked for over two decades with Singaporean actors from different backgrounds, TNS has developed a working methodology which that integrates multiple languages and cultures whilst using different artistic disciplines. Examples of such performances which aspired to critically awake Singaporeans after intriguing their civic awareness while inviting to think beyond an individualist and materialist perspective are the following: *Completely With/Out Character, Mobile* and *Elena’s Nightmare*. In 1999, *Completely With/Out Character* was an amono-drama that featured a late AIDS patient. The performance included a live interactive question and answer session which involved the participation of the audience. Moreover this interaction was not limited in the theatre but extended to emigrant Singaporeans from other parts of the world who communicated with the actors and the audience via a real time chat room. This popular performance after involving the participation of the audience, attempted to bring into public attention the problem of social exclusion of HIV patients, the civic responsibilities towards them while stressing the PAP’s failure to cope with that problem.90

*Mobile* poses as another good example of how TNS has dealt with this problem of enriching the artistic process through international collaboration. *Mobile’s* script is about Thai and Filipino women who are employed as foreign domestic workers or prostitutes in both Japan and Singapore and revolves around the social and cultural implications of this. The examined issues include, the cultural displacement, the need to support families back home and the discrimination they face due to economic disparity which goes mainly unnoticed both in Singapore and Japan. TNS organized field-work trips in Bankong and Chiang Mai in order to tackle with these issues more efficiently.91

90 Alvin Tan, *Theatre and Cultures*, in Kenneth Paul Tan, *Renaissance Singapore*, 188-190
91 Alvin Tan, *Theatre and Cultures*, in Kenneth Paul Tan, *Renaissance Singapore*, 190
Elena’s Nightmare was another performance based on a real event which escaped public attention in Singapore. The plot is about a Filipino domestic worker, who discovered she was pregnant when she arrived in Singapore and was asked by the agency to go for an abortion or else she should be sent home. Plays like these certainly draw attention to the lack civic protection which affects a certain group of immigrants in Singapore.  

As Alvin Tan notes, this vision of global theatre moves away from some of the ideals of political theatre as it does not involve direct confrontation with the government, but their objectives are similar. For example TNS theatrical performances avoid directly commenting on party politics. Instead through ingenuity and creativity TNS’s global theatre can deal indirectly, though no less efficiently, with issues that are potentially confrontational or controversial. Such globalized form of art in Singapore tends to face less constraints when their works implicate many artists from different countries. But working together helps these artists to invent new devises to communicate or transmit sensitive issues and taboo subjects. Also the collaboration of this kind can enable suppressed voices to escape censorship by staging such works in partner countries away from the violence of local censors.

For Alvin Tan the benefits of TNS globalizing art are many. After taking advantage of the globalization of theatre and arts, TNS managed to attract greater (international) audience, something which also assist to attract more Singaporean audience as in Singapore an artist’s value rises with greater internationalization in the estimation of the Singaporeans. Alternative performances such as the Mobile and Elena’s Nightmare, allow the artist and the audience to explore the effects of immigration and trade agreements on the quality of everyday life in countries of the Asian region and uncover the stories of ordinary people that have been silenced by official governmental accounts. TNS through fieldwork research, interviews, role-playing improvisation and methods of interactive theatre which includes the participation of the audience, seeks to intrigue critical awareness. Via the critical debates with audience in the Completely With/Out Character performance, after a voice is given to ordinary people’s stories, the

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92 Alvin Tan, Theatre and Cultures, in Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance Singapore, 191
93 Alvin Tan, Theatre and Cultures, in Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance Singapore, 194-196
audience itself transforms from passive recipient to an active commentator on civic matters. These are examples of how TNS plays raise the spectators’ critical awareness after unveiling socially intriguing real stories while asking the audience to participate, think critically and raise their voices via experimental interactive performances. Although this might not reinforce directly a more civic minded Singaporean account of citizenship, yet it serves as an attempt to reconcile the Singaporeans with their society and think beyond an individualistic and opportunistic manner. This critical social exercise echoes Hegel moments of self-consciousness where the subject is gradually dismissing its self-determining characteristics and assumes a more complete account of consciousness which incorporates the other as well as the (social) environment. Hardimon describes this Hegelian process of the consciousness evolution as reflective identification. Reflective identification is based on Hegel’s -the three moments of will - which comprise a necessary process before a subject is able to seize self-consciousness and ultimately freedom within the sphere of the community and the state. Hegel’s moments of will are indetermination, determination and the combination of both assumed via the formation of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state.

Hegel’s reflective identification assists in conceiving of oneself as independent distinct from one’s social roles obtained within society. In that sense one can think of oneself as having the capacity to abstract from any given social role. A person steps back from a social role when he considers how he relates to it. Stepping back is to question or evaluate it. One comes to conceive of oneself as a self by the capacity to step back from one’s social roles and by coming to form a general conception of oneself. In order to conceive oneself as a subject of consciousness, involves regarding oneself as an independent source of moral assessment and evaluation. It involves regarding oneself as having the capacity and right to access courses of actions on the basis of one’s own private, subjective judgment. This process includes the interplay of indetermination and determination. Hegel substantiates the compatibility of individuality and social membership through reflective identification. The act of abstraction contains

94 Alvin Tan, Theatre and Cultures, in Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance Singapore, 198-200
95 Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 144
96 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 146-151
within itself a moment of reflective separation between oneself and the role. Reflective identification is a form of identification. It is reflective in that it proceeds through the reflective actor of stepping back from a social role and evaluating it from a position of indetermination. Towards this step the first moment of will prevails. Additionally, reflective identification proceeds to the second moment of will since identifying reflectively with one’s social role is to identify with such role as the self. Reflective identification provides a reflective means of bridging the gap between the self and its roles provided from the realm of community via the family, civil society and the state.\footnote{Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 164-173}

Although the Singaporean state currently tends to resemble more to the Hegelian civil society of the individual centered subject, it is reminded that for Hegel this is not a finite situation but part of a process. TNS’s efforts are not characterized by an individualist self-determining form of subjectivity but one which renders individuality and social membership compatible. TNS cannot form ethical life (Sittlichkeit) by itself. Nevertheless TNS via successful performances such as Completely With/Out Character is efficient in reconciling the Singaporeans with their social environment and its shortcomings while asking them to question their role and intervene. The interactive nature of theatrical performances which encourage the audience to switch from the passive role of the spectator who contemplates on the event to the active one of a commentator who seeks to participate and intervene. This process echoes Hegel’s interplay of indetermination-determination which is portrayed by the reflective identification. Again it is stressed that although this can not form ethical life (Sittlichkeit) by itself; yet it is a useful medium of social exercise which helps Singaporeans reconsider social problems from a different angle after revising their earlier perspective which stemmed from a fixed and deterministic understanding formed by their particular social role or position.

The TNS artists, some of whom faced censorship and threats of prosecution from the government, as well as the audience of avant-garde performances are certainly not portrayed by the stereotypical image of the opportunist, self-centered and materialist Singaporean. The art scene in Singapore was able to evolve into this avant-garde and critical stance only after a
materialist development had taken place which secured Singaporean’s welfare. Singapore’s financial development paving the way for the appropriate infrastructures which allowed artist to express themselves in forms varying from commercial to alternative ones which aspire to raise social awareness. Therefore as Dickey’s suggests echoing Hegel, this material dimension of social existence, afforded the Singaporeans an opportunity to reconsider their true telos in the sense that it provided them with a ‘reflective moment’ which allows them to think critically and choose just what kind of citizens they wish to become and what form of state is appropriate. 98

On TalkingCock.Com and Civic Reaction

Beyond the sphere of arts, other forms of political reaction evolved which often confronted PAP’s objectives. The very popular satirical blog TalkingCock.Com certainly challenges the distinction of the Singaporeans between ‘Heartlanders’ and ‘Cosmopolitans’ as well as their opportunistic and materialist traits. The efforts of the TalkingCock.Com crew were characterized civic awareness and risk taking as they often openly challenged certain PAP’s policies like the restriction of Singlish.

The name ‘talking-cock’ is a Singlish phrase which means ‘to engage in a idle banter or to talk nonsense’. Everyone who works on TalkingCock.Com related events does not get paid. Most of the Singaporeans who got involved had never done these things before. As Goh notes Singaporeans taking risks and for nothing but the fun of it something which is strange as often Singaporeans are portrayed as opportunists.99 The academic and political narrative in Singapore has it that the majority of the Singaporeans share the characteristics of the individual-centered and materialist Singaporean. However, for the TalkingCock.Com crew clearly there is a mismatch in experiences after getting involved with politically marginal social commentators like taxi drivers, various actors, crew members musicians and writers could not be described as apathetic. While many of them could easily be characterized as of a lower education and

98 Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807, 188
99 Woo Yen Yen Joyceln and Colin Goh, Caging the bird: TalkingCock.com and the pigeonholing of Singaporean Citizenship, in Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance Singapore, 97
socioeconomic status, they nevertheless demonstrated a creative mind capable of acquiring, sharing, applying, and creating new knowledge. A connection with their roots in engaging with activities whose objectives were unrepentantly selfless while prioritizing the benefit of Singaporean community. While it is not denied that bourgeois political dilettantes and materialist monomaniacs exist, Goh and Joyceln believe that gross generalizations and polarizing labels hinder, rather than help. Singaporeans who were demonstrating vital citizenship traits might nevertheless find themselves bumping up against existing cultural policies. For the TalkingCock.Com crew a more constructive approach is to ask how we can make the space for citizenship performance more inclusive and ensure a diversity of expression.\textsuperscript{100}

Goh and Joyceln believe that TalkingCock.Com gave the opportunity for marginalized Singaporeans to express themselves on political issues which the system had denied, indicating that their portrayal as civically indifferent or \textit{kasuist} is inaccurate. The PAP set up over the years in order to remedy the image of inefficiently consultative via ‘the feedback unit’, the ‘Singapore 21 committee’, ‘the economic review committee’ and the ‘remaking Singapore Committee’. Serving on or speaking before government initiated committees is considered the pinnacle of citizenship contribution. However, committees present significant barriers to the participation of ordinary Singaporeans. Average Singaporeans views cannot be heard since these Singaporeans are unlikely to sit on such committees. They are generally unable, according to the PAP, to access the required substratum of data to meet the demand of ‘having a good understanding of the issues at hand before they can sensible take part at the discussions’ and may be impaired by their lack of efficient command with the English language. Then one must think what alternative channel exists for the Singaporeans to express themselves? In that manner, for Goh and Joyceln, the contribution of that TalkingCock.Com was invaluable and the fact that ‘TalkingCock.Com–The movie’ film made it into the screens suggests that alternative channels are available.\textsuperscript{101}

The TalkingCock.Com crew was also deeply aware that the history of Singaporeans constitutionally protected right to free speech was capricious at

\textsuperscript{100} Joyceln and Goh, \textit{Caging the bird}, in Kenneth Paul Tan, \textit{Renaissance Singapore}, 99-101
\textsuperscript{101} Joyceln and Goh, \textit{Caging the bird}, in Kenneth Paul Tan, \textit{Renaissance Singapore}, 102-104
least. Also the case of Catherine Lim and the threatening words of Minister Lee Kuan Yew ‘everybody now knows that if you take on the PM, he will have to take you on’ were taken into serious consideration. Yet the TalkingCock.Com team took the risk and carried on with this effort. TalkingCock.Com was formed partly as a response to the governments anti-Singlish stance. Goh said that if Singlish were allowed to proliferate the nations global competitiveness would be affected. In that respect, television and radio programmes were vetoed for Singlish and naturalistic dialogue was attempted to be eradicated by the PAP. The TalkingCock.Com team decided to make Singlish the cornerstone of this activist project. The battle with the government begun when the ‘TalkingCock - The Movie’ was submitted to the censors. The Film Publications Department (FPD) demanded one scene to be cut and that the film should bear a rating of NC 16 preventing Singaporeans below 16 to watch it. Ultimately, although the film was projected at the cinemas it was not allowed to be released on VCD and DVD. Moreover, as the Singlish restriction continued to be enforced, the film was denied airing on TV because of excessive Singlish.102

The conclusion which can be drawn from TalkingCock.Com’s civic intervention is that the stereotypical treatment of most Singaporeans as materialists, opportunistic and civically indifferent or purely kasuist is inaccurate and misleading.

For the TalkingCock.Com team the assumption that the Singaporeans are by nature politically apathetic must be deconstructed. Considerable research on citizenship in international settings support Carole Pateman’s argument that it is wrong to suggest that certain segments of society – especially the citizens of the lower socio-economic status as naturally politically apathetic. Instead there are structural reasons for that feeling that it is not worth being active. The PAP portrays as civic liberation policies the recent relaxation of restrictions on casinos, bungee jumping and bar top dancing. However these are hardly activities that will change the landscape of civic participation in Singapore, because they only invite Singaporeans to be consumers rather than engaging in meaningful acts of self-expression. The Singaporeans might strike as naturally apathetic because there are not efficient practices of citizenship participation and

102 Joyceln and Goh, Caging the bird, in Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance Singapore, 105-108
expression. Moreover, as the PAP limits the scope of cultural resources available to us for expression via censorship or the restrictions against Singlish, this undermines civic participation and enjoins Singaporeans to be embarrassed by our own cultural resources. When citizens have been denied self-designed forms of citizenship performance, when their own languages is restricted from the public sphere and when they have never experienced how their views can have an influence, they cannot justifiably be characterized as politically and civically indifferent.103

**On The working Committees and Civic Intervention**

Beyond the civil reaction triggered by the *TalkingCock.Com*, the ‘Working Committees’ serve as another example of civic interference on behalf of the Singaporeans. As it has already been noted, both examples serve to undermine empirically the stereotypical treatment of Singaporeans as materialist, opportunist and civically indifferent citizens. The outcome of the Marxist Conspiracy event often prevented many social groups from civic intervention. In 1997 some members of the Geylang Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers who campaigned to improve the working conditions of foreign workers were detained under the draconian Internal Security Act. This episode has come to be known as the ‘Marxist Conspiracy’ because the detainees were accused by the state of conspiring to turn Singapore into a Marxist state. The memory of these events has since festered in the minds of civil society activists as the source of culture of fear. Nevertheless, such fears did not stop the a group of Singaporeans to form the Working Committee (TWC) and Working Committee 2 (TWC 2).104

TWC and TWC 2 despite the fear of the government and other barriers to civic activism are presented as creative forms of civil society engagement and political risk-taking in contrast to the PAP’s warnings. The TWC was formed in late 1998 as a network of individuals and civil society organizations. Its chief aim was to build up networks in civil society’s so as to contribute to civic participation and intervention. Contrary to the governments’ statements that citizens who want to participate in politics should join a formal political party,

103 Joyceln and Goh, *Caging the bird*, in Kenneth Paul Tan, *Renaissance Singapore*, 109
TWC was trying to make the point that citizens could participate in politics as citizens, without needing formal affiliation with the traditional political machinery. Fully aware that the question of TWC’s legitimacy would be problematic due to its legal status, TWC’s founding members went as far as they could to maintain transparency, frequently through the use of the internet. They believed that doing so would prove that TWC had nothing to hide.\textsuperscript{105}

TWC2, unlike TWC, was chaired by a nominated member of parliament NMP Braema Mathiaparanam and was structured in a clearly defined and hierarchical fashion. While focused on the issue of foreign domestic workers, members were also cognizant of the need to empower civil society and hence develop a workable model of activism that could deal with some of the more controversial issues of governance in Singapore. The founding members were therefore eager to create a model that was also open and fluid in an organisational sense, welcoming volunteers from almost all walks of life to take part in such activities.\textsuperscript{106}

Foreign domestic workers could also take part indirectly. TWC2 chairperson Mathiaparanam, had already been an established public figure and vocal critic of the state since her days as a journalist in the Straits Times. Popular among civil society activists and Singaporeans from many segments of society, she was well known for her hard hitting approach and was much respected for it. It was a good strategy to capitalized on her popularity to gain access to policy makers and stakeholders that would have otherwise been denied. TWC2 astutely recognized that the key to improving the situation for foreign domestic workers laid in constructively engaging other more powerful stakeholders. Numerous private dialogues and meetings have taken place with representatives from the Bangladeshi, Indonesians, Filipino communities, the ministry of Manpower, employment agencies and other NGO’s and voluntary welfare organizations. The aim of these dialogues was to establish more channels of communication among the stakeholders with a view to improving the welfare of foreign domestic workers. Although no laws were actually made or changed, TWC2 maintained legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the state, effectively raised public and government awareness on issues regarding the violation of

\textsuperscript{105} Rui, \textit{The Working Committees}, in Kenneth Paul Tan, \textit{Renaissance Singapore}, 204-205

foreign domestic workers’ rights while encouraged official intervention to resolve these problems.\textsuperscript{107}

It becomes clear how not only arts but also activist groups circumvent governmental fear and gradually contribute in order to stimulate the Singaporean public’s civic awareness while providing channels of alternative civic expression and participation. All these examples serve to undermine the academic and political treatment of the Singaporeans as individualist, opportunistic and materialistic subjects who are civically indifferent after failing to reconcile with their community.

\textbf{On the AWARE Saga and its Social Implications in Singapore}

Previously, it was noted that most scholars contend that the prioritization of economic and materialistic objectives transformed Singaporeans into a \textit{kiasuist} society or what Hegel defined as civil society which is comprised of the egotistic, individualistic and self-determining subjects. However for Hegel, civil society comprises a part of a process which ultimately contributes to the development of the ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) within the realm of Spirit (\textit{Geist}) that allows the reconciliation of the citizens among themselves and with their state. Clearly the TNS, the \textit{TalkingCock.Com}, the Working Committee and the Working Committee 2 although they do not pose as strong cases which can contribute to the emergence of Singapore’s ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}), nevertheless they served as mediums and channels which allowed Singaporeans to contemplate on civic matters and develop perspectives beyond a \textit{kiasuist} and self-centered point of view. Here, it is suggested that these mediums encouraged Singaporeans to think in communitarian terms, reconsider or debate about controversial social issues and participate in civic affairs against government positions, often putting their personal interests at stake. These civic activities cannot be dismissed as deeds of a disaffected minority of intellectuals, artists or activists. Instead, they should be treated as actions that gradually paved the way for greater civic participation and public criticism against sensitive issue areas like ethics and religion which until recently were under strict governmental

control and the formation of public opinion was dis-encouraged, if not prosecuted.

Below, it is argued that what is described by the scholars as the ‘AWARE SAGA’ is a social event in Singapore which reflects an evolution of the public participation regarding public matters of great importance such as religion and ethics. The Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) is an NGO which promotes gender equality and the succession of its executive committee triggered a chain of social events in Singapore. This chapter contends that the AWARE saga designates a ‘spill-over’ effect of the previous civic activism efforts regarding social ethics and religion to a greater extend in Singapore which triggered significant public participation, media coverage but surprisingly a mild governmental intervention. After describing what the AWARE Saga is and its social implications upon Singapore, it is argued that for the first time the Singaporean public was actively involved to an incident about religious and ethical matters which until recently the Singaporeans where not allowed to critically intervene on such matters. Moreover, what is important about the AWARE saga is the level of social interaction among the supporters of the competing religious and ethical perspectives which reflect an intense social struggle within the Singaporean public sphere over the right of the Singaporeans to debate and define the values of their nation.

Thus, the AWARE Saga represents a culminating point in the history of civic activism in Singapore which designates the gradual interference of the Singaporeans towards the formation of public ethical and religious issues which signify an exception from the typical materialist and individualistic behavior. Here, the AWARE saga represents an example which undermines the deterministic implications of economy and materialism which transform the subjects into egotistic, materialistic and opportunistic citizens. Instead, the AWARE saga appear to confirm Hegel’s approach according to which the economic domain constitutes a foundation upon which a more complex system of socio-cultural values can be erected that contributes to the formation of ethical life (Sittlichkeit).

As Chong argues, on the 28 March 2009 a group of Christian women took over the country’s most well known women’s rights group sparking a chain of events that no only impacted the nation but also forced many to re-examine
the way they viewed civil society politics in Singapore. There were already signs that it was not going to be another routine evening when an unexpectedly large number of people attended the annual meeting of the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) many of whom were new faces having only joined the NGO in recent months. Of the 12 available seats on the executive committee (Exco), the new members captured nine, leaving the so-called old ‘guard’ shocked and confused. The new members of the Exco, six out of nine of them, attended the same church, the Anglican Church of Our Saviour (COOS). In addition, the local media, found them to hold anti-homosexual and anti-abortion views. Dr Thio Su Mien, came forward to introduce herself as the mentor of the new Exco. Thio, also a member of COOS, told the reporters that she encouraged the women to take over AWARE because she felt it had shifted its focus from gender equality to the promotion of homosexuality and lesbianism. She also challenged the AWARE’s sex education syllabus, under the Ministry of Education’s sex education programme, for encouraging local students to see homosexuality in neutral terms in stead of negative.108

In the meantime, the Singaporeans begun to take sides as the saga attracted attention via extensive media coverage. An online ‘Save AWARE Campaign’ petition was formed to urge supporters to attend the extraordinary general meeting (EGM) scheduled for 2 May to consider a vote of no confidence on the new Exco. A variety of blogs accused the new Exco of orchestrating a hostile takeover to further their own agenda which is affiliated to fundamentalist churches. Members of the public contributed to the debate on several levels. Some questioned the role of the media in playing up the saga, some supported the new Exco’s agenda but condemned the way it came to power, some celebrated the public interest the saga attracted as a demonstration of civic passion, while others deplored the old guard’s neutral stance on homosexuality as symptomatic of society’s eroding moral values. Overall, the saga triggered a diversity of approaches among the Singaporean public not only in terms of the AWARE’s take over but also regarding issues about religion and ethics broadly. Due to the media coverage, by the time of the EGM, AWARE’s membership had soared from 300 before the saga to 3,000 just before the EGM, with both camps

urged its supporters to join up and make their voices heard. At the end of the EGM the motion of no confidence was passed 1,414 votes to 761.\textsuperscript{109}

The debates that the AWARE saga sparked where intense, controversial and stimulated the participation of the Singaporean citizens opinion on sensitive public matters. The aftermath of the AWARE saga triggered public discussions ranging from the place of religion in civil society, gay rights, the processes of citizenry mobilization, the activist role of the media and the undeniable liberal voice in contemporary Singapore. As Chong observes ‘never before had a single event ushered so many issues into the public sphere and lured the Singaporeans to actively contemplate and participate in the determination of sensitive public issues’.\textsuperscript{110}

Unlike Chong, Chua treats the AWARE saga strictly as the triumph of the liberal values and of the social classes which promote them, understating the broader civic effect the saga had in Singapore. For Chua, the AWARE has always been a liberal institution. While the PAP government appeared to grand legitimacy to AWARE’s gender equality, the AWARE has undoubtedly upset the conservatives who insist on ‘men at work and women at home’ and who are unable to publicly voice their objections in the face of a liberalizing culture in Singapore. Chua appears to be identifying the public participation stemming from the AWARE saga as purely liberal. He argues that the logic of meritocracy which promotes liberal economic individualism and the liberal individual rights were heavily restricted by the laws of the Singaporean government which govern race and religion. The AWARE saga, according to Chua, made this liberalism visible which was previously diffused and veiled by the obsessive criticism of the PAP’s authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{111}

However, Chong does not treat the AWARE as the triumph of liberalism. According to Chong, what escapes Chua’s attention is the transformation of the PAP state’s political objectives. Initially, the PAP ever since it seized the power, governed as a morally conservative state that guarded the Singaporean population against the ills of the pornography, liberal sexual attitudes and individualist lifestyle values. Such a morally conservative state valued the ideals

\textsuperscript{109} Chong (ed.), \textit{The AWARE Saga}, 4-6
\textsuperscript{110} Chong (ed.), \textit{The AWARE Saga}, 8
\textsuperscript{111} Chua Beng Huat, \textit{Making Singapore’s Liberal Base Visible}, in Chong (ed.), \textit{The AWARE Saga}, 21-24
of cultural conservativism, dominant heterosexual values, traditional institutions like the nuclear family unit as well as the patriarchical structures. Nevertheless, as Chong observes, the PAP’s policies regarding moral issues changed. In 2007, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s speech indicated that the PAP state no longer desired to play a leading role when it came to issues of morality. In the PM’s words ‘when it comes to issues like economy, technology, education we better stay ahead of the game, watch where people are moving and adapt faster than others but on the issues of moral values we will let others take the lead, we will stay one step behind the front line of change; watch how things work out elsewhere before we make any irrevocable moves’.

This speech suggests that the moral agenda in Singapore is no longer strictly determined by the government but on the contrary it invites broader public participation. In that respect, the debates on ethical and religious issues are not necessarily monopolized by liberal perspectives. Instead the public sphere in Singapore, appears to accommodate contending approaches on matters which affect ethics and religion. As Chong argues, within Singapore’s public sphere, both the moral conservatives and the liberals alike have sought to make themselves heard. In fact he treats the AWARE saga as a competition between moral conservatives and liberals. Thus, Chong concludes that the previous understanding of Singapore’s civic society may no longer be adequate to accommodate the emerging contours of cultural forces and identity politics that are setting the scene for a more confrontational and uncompromising inter NGO as well as society-state relations.

Moreover, another argument which suggests that the outcome of the AWARE saga does neither reflect a triumph of the liberal middle classes nor the triumph of the liberal objectives has to do with the PAP state’s indirect intervention. To begin with, the fact that the PAP state still indirectly intervenes undermines any argument which suggests that liberal values have permeated Singapore.

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113 Lee Hsien Loong, Parliamentary Speech on Section 337A (23 October), Singapore: Hansard, 2007
114 Terence Chong, *Compensating for the Abdication of the Moral State* in Chong (ed.), *The AWARE Saga*, 31
The media sparked the government’s attention regarding the rationale behind the take over of the AWARE which triggered later PAP’s indirect intervention. When the Singaporean media begun to focus on the new guard’s anti-homosexuality position, the media circulated the information that information that Thio identified AWARE’s comprehensive Sexuality Education Programme (SEP) for schools as a key factor that motivated the new guard and its supporters to join the AWARE and influence the organization. The programme had elements in the trainer’s guide which suggested that homosexuality was perfectly normal, a fact then unknown to the Ministry of Education which had originally accepted the SEP. Ghani and Koh argue that the government was skeptical and considered a crossing over of religion into secular space in this instance would set a precedent for other faith groups to do likewise in the future. The PAP government chose to intervene: Firstly, by annulling the SEP; Secondly, by choosing intervene indirectly via the National Council of Churches (NCCS). The chairman of the National Council of Churches, Archbishop Dr John Chew, making what is now widely seen and commended as a timely and pivotal intervention he stated that the NCCS did not condone churches getting involved in the saga for pulpits to be used to mobilize and support or form secular organizations. As Ghani and Koh contend, it is clear that the government would be willing to adopt a light tough and not proceed to direct intervention at the first sign of trouble. It would make the pre-emptive behind the scenes strike if religion were perceived to be involved in political mobilization.115

The previous paragraphs described why the AWARE saga portrays a transformation of the civil society and of the government in Singapore regarding the sensitive public issues of ethics and religion. This transformation is more appropriately deciphered by Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) rather than a liberal perspective which treats the saga as a mere struggle for the promotion of liberal freedoms by a particular class. Again, from a Hegelian perspective, the dimensions of economy and materialism, within the realm of Spirit (Geist), serve as mediums of educating the citizens in a process which

115 Azhar Ghani and Gillian Koh, Not Quite Shutting Up and Sitting Down: The Singapore Government’s Role in the Aware Saga, in Chong (ed.), The AWARE Saga, 40-44
assists them to acquire self-consciousness and seize a form of subjectivity that helps them reconcile with their fellow citizens and the state.

As Chong stresses the AWARE saga is the very child of economic growth and of the social classes it has engendered. Over forty years of mass education, economic progress and world travel have nurtured an increased attentiveness to one’s personal rights and heightened sensitivity to encroachments on progressive values. It would be wishful thinking to expect a sophisticated and cosmopolitan minded polity to display the same manner of political faith their parents did especially when ethical and religious issues strike so deeply into matters of identity. In this widened civic space, which the PAP government is becoming gradually sympathetic, the diverse social classes are expected to express themselves politically through the prism of identity politics like religious values, notions of morality, sexual politics and ideological worldviews. Chong argues that religion, race and ethics are no longer treated as sacred sites in multicultural Singapore or out of bounds from external critique. This allows identities, values and ethics to form without challenge while the greater leeway granted to more liberal spheres like local theatre and the arts to articulate sexual politics and alternative lifestyles, serving as sites a site where intellectual energies may converge. Such sites have allowed identity politics to develop and mature and have become crucial spaces for mobilization and activism. And the AWARE sage should be understood in that context. Not as a one off aberration of a middle class ready to push the political envelope but as a specific condition of the whole Singaporean society where the identity politics offers an alternative to party politics in the effort to influence public policy.\textsuperscript{116}

Chong’s remarks on the implications of the AWARE saga appear not only to resemble but also to confirm Hegel’s insights regarding the emergence ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) within the State. From the perspective of Spirit (\textit{Geist}), economy and materialism are mediums which gradually assist the promotion of the subject’s self-consciousness in the State. This process of acquiring self-consciousness is reflected in the ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) which is formed within the limits of the state. In the Singaporean context the AWARE saga serves as a leverage which precisely demonstrates an attempt to gradually formulate a

\textsuperscript{116} Chong (ed.), \textit{The AWARE Saga}, 8-10
particular ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in Singapore resting on the intervention of both the Singaporeans and their state. This participation of Singaporeans in the public sphere in terms of ethical and religious issues, challenges the stereotypical treatment of the Singaporean as materialist, civicly indifferent and individualist citizens. Moreover this civic participation paves the way to a greater civic transformation in Singapore since the Singaporeans will be able to reconcile further with their state and among each other within their public sphere as they are actively encouraged by the state to participate and formulate it.

**Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrated empirically the contribution of Hegel’s insights with regard to the conceptualization of citizenship in Singapore. Singapore was neither cited as an example which resembles to the state portrayed in the *Philosophy of Right* nor as an ideal example of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Singapore was used as a case study which demonstrates how Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) can enrich our understanding of citizenship. The first part elucidated that the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) allows us to enrich our understanding of citizenship after: i) accommodating the universal and the particular dimension; and ii) without divorcing the subject from the object of knowledge. The first insight encourages the interplay between empiricism and idealism which most approaches separate and blends the economic with the sociopolitical dimension. The second insight prevents the treatment of citizenship with prescriptive or descriptive terms and overcomes the shortcomings of the approaches which treat the theorist as a self-ascribed authority who examines reality with abstract norms. These approaches to citizenship rest on an abstract notion of economics which dictates the citizens’ actions. Such approaches contend that the capitalist market economy in Singapore has transformed the Singaporeans into materialist driven agents with limited social cohesion who are alienated from their state. Unlike these approaches, Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) allows us to acquire a more complete understanding of citizenship after blending the economic with the sociopolitical dimension, attributing to the market and the economy an educative civic effect. Hegel’s notion of citizenship rests on the notion of patriotism which
stems from ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and assists the subject to acquire self-consciousness and freedom after reconciling the private with the public realm within the state.

The second part challenged theoretically and empirically a Foucaultian account of citizenship which rested on Foucault’s notion of governmentality and freedom. Terence Lee promoted a Foucaultian approach of citizenship in order to argue that the PAP state’s exercise of power is not coercive as it cultivates a sense of social consent among Singaporean citizens. However, such a notion of consent, which is founded on Foucault’s understanding of freedom and subjectivity, was challenged from a Hegelian perspective. Hegel’s insights helped us to show that the idea of providing freedom within the limits of a previously determined domain, paradoxically turn out to be a strategy of power which allows itself to perpetuate control in the name of developing a ‘free’ subject. Therefore, Foucault, treats freedom as power’s ‘tool’ the limits of which are restricted by a particular domain, determined by power. Thus, Foucaultian ‘freedom’ becomes a means of controlling rather than emancipating the subject. Indeed, in the Singaporean context, the PAP’s provision of ‘freedom’ within a predetermined domain of the arts and the ‘Singapore 21’, ended up as a means to control Singaporean citizens.

Beyond the shortcomings of Foucaultian freedom and subjectivity, Hegelian thought showed too that a Foucaultian account of neutral power fails to promote an understanding of citizenship which secures the necessary social cohesion among the citizens. It was noted that, the projection of Foucaultian governmentality as a neutral form of power, was neither neutral nor contributed to the emancipation of the subject. In the Singaporean context, the PAP’s governance, as founded on ‘neutral’ pragmatism, has in fact materialist and capitalist foundations. Many scholars such as Ortmann, Kluever and Weber argued that PAP’s pragmatism - which prioritizes materialism and the capitalist economical development in Singapore - is responsible for undermining the social cohesion and the reconciliation of the Singaporeans with their state. In that respect, these scholars predetermine the negative civic implications of economy and materialism after attributing the emergence of kasuism to PAP’s ‘pragmatic’ governance. For Ortmann, Kluever and Weber the embedment of materialism and individualism in the form of a national social trait termed as kiasuism,
undermines the Singaporeans’ social cohesion. It is not surprising that politicians, judging from the emigration tendencies, expressed publicly their concerns via the ‘quitter-stayer’ debate in Singapore. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong repeatedly criticized the Singaporeans who after enjoying the good economic times would potentially quit the country during the economic downturns.

The third part challenged from a Hegelian perspective both empirically and theoretically the deterministic effects of economy and materialism on the Singaporean citizens. Academic literature on Singapore, tends to stress how PAP’s pragmatism which is founded solely on materialism and economic capitalism, nurtures an individualistic, materialistic and opportunistic citizen. Such a stereotypical portrayal of the Singaporean citizens which stresses their self-centeredness and materialism holds them responsible for the loose social cohesion among the Singaporeans themselves and with their state. Most scholars tended to accuse the government’s economic and materialistic policies of nurturing these individualistic traits which undermine Singapore’s social cohesion. The terms kiasuism and ‘quitter’ tend to monopolize the debate, stressing the Singaporean’s opportunistic and materialistic traits. Thus, the economic and materialist dimension is treated by most academics as having a deterministic impact upon the formation of a particular subject that is civicly indifferent and being characterized by such opportunistic and materialistic traits.

However, these deterministic effects of the economical and the materialist dimension were challenged here empirically and theoretically from a Hegelian perspective. Hegel includes too the dimensions of economy and materialism in the Philosophy of Right. Yet, he ascribes an alternative impact to economy and materialism, after incorporating them within the realm of Spirit (Geist), attributing to them an educative effect which arouses the subject’s self consciousness and freedom. Hegel’s theoretical insights were enriched with empirical evidence which undermined the stereotypical kiasuist treatment of the Singaporeans as materialistic and self-centered or as opportunistic ‘quitters’. This empirical evidence was extracted after designating examples of civic activism and indirect government criticism which stemmed from the avant-garde arts, internet blogs and NGOs. It became clear how The Necessary Stage (TNS), TalkingCock.com, The Working Committee (TWC) and Working Committee 2
(TWC 2), after circumventing governmental fear, intrigued civic awareness and provided channels for civic participation, rendering the image of the individualist, materialist and opportunistic Singaporean citizen inaccurate.

However, what is fascinating about these instances of civic activism is how they gradually led to a more significant event which attracted greater civic participation regarding religious and ethical issues. This event was described here as the ‘AWARE saga’ and its importance lies on encouraging the public to scrutinize certain religious and ethical issues which were previously excluded from public criticism. After the AWARE saga, the government permitted the public to scrutinize these sensitive issues, paving the way for the transformation of the civic sphere in Singapore after encouraging greater public participation. Thus, the AWARE saga marks a transformation of the civil society and of the government in Singapore. This is more successfully described by Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) rather than a liberal perspective which treats the saga as a mere struggle for the promotion of civic freedoms. The civic evolution in Singapore can be paralleled to Hegel’s alternative treatment of the material and the economical dimension as Spirit’s (Geist) educative means which promote the subjects’ self-consciousness through their affiliation with society.

Hegel substantiated the compatibility of individuality and social membership through the development of the ethical life (Sittlichkeit). The emergence of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which contributes to the subject’s emancipating form of self-consciousness within the state, initially rests on the material and economic dimension of social existence in civil society. It remains to be seen how things will evolve in Singapore as the subject’s transformation into a free self-conscious citizen who is reconciled with the state and the community is an on-going process. As Hegel stresses in the Philosophy of Right, philosophy arrives too late and cannot be applied to prescribe or to describe. According to Hegel, philosophy helps us to understand only after the course of events played out. Therefore we cannot predetermine or guess the course of Singapore’s evolution, only understand it.

117 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 10-12
EPILOGUE

The Relevance of Hegel Today

More often than not the question is posed why do Hegel’s perspectives on political philosophy which date back to the early 19th century, still matter today when examining current political affairs? Before summarizing the contribution of this dissertation, a number of contemporary examples will be put forward which stress a series of contradictions and undesirable effects that from a non-Hegelian perspective remain paradoxical and unresolved.

For instance, how does humanitarian aid or anti-terrorist aid exacerbate poverty and terrorism? Moreover, which were the deeper motives which urged young British to flee from Britain and become jihadists and how does morality may serve as a smoke screen for immoral actions? From a non-Hegelian perspective the following four examples seem to puzzle and appear paradoxical.

Firstly, on 6th May 2013 the documentary Fatal Assistance was released. It did not take as its subject the 2010 earthquake in Haiti that left 250,000 dead but the misdirected international relief efforts. Haiti, despite the humanitarian aid remains a symbol of unfixable misery and the Fatal Assistance casts some light on the damage done by international aid agencies ‘whose well meaning but ignorant assumptions turned a nightmare into an unresolvable tragedy’. This documentary illustrates that the problem lies on the fact that the promised aid was never allowed to be controlled by the Haitians themselves. Haiti’s reputation for corruption, is one reason NGOs and foreign aid government officials insist on doing everything themselves. The well-meaning young internationals from various relief agencies flooded the country, convinced their fresh ideas would save the island, despite their fundamental ignorance of the place and its people.

This documentary describes how the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), co-chaired by former president Clinton, appears to be criticized by another IHRC member, Suze Percy Fillipini, who blasted the commission for ignoring the 12 Haitian members, whose voices were rarely consulted. This

documentary illustrates how the misapplication of financial aid has the opposite results and fails to promote welfare.

Secondly, an analysis published at the Boston Review on 11th June 2014, contends that Obama’s 5 billion Counterterrorism Fund will actually support terrorism. President Barack Obama announced a $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, which will allow US military to train, build capacity, and facilitate partner countries on the front lines. This counterterrorism policy aspires to disengage U.S. troops from foreign entanglements and fill the gap by supporting the efforts of America’s local allies to fight terrorist groups. However, as Alex de Waal contends, this approach makes the world a more dangerous place. From West Africa to Central Asia, American money has been poured into funding, training and equipping counter-terrorist special forces. This in turn has contributed to corruption, conflict, the growth of police states and a more complicated and deeply entrenched terrorist threat. In aid-recipient states where terrorism is present but the threat is low, providing economic and security assistance to combat terrorism based on the presence of terrorists, or the severity of its threat, actually risks increasing the expected future level of terror in that target state. As De Waal explains, firstly, the government receiving the funds may manipulate counter-terror operations for its own political purposes; secondly, with militarized counter-terrorism: violence antagonizes the local people and local young men flock to extremists from desperation or revenge; thirdly, Generals, security chiefs, and their political masters become addicted to these funds, which foster a “deep state” that is beyond the reach of public scrutiny and democratic accountability; and finally, the national ruler who is receiving the funds finds them so useful that he cannot afford to defeat terrorist groups, because that would deprive him of national budget. In that respect, De Waal’s analysis stresses that anti-terrorist aid contributes to the spawning of terrorism.²

Thirdly, a video was released on 20th June 2014 with title ‘There is No Life Without Jihad’ featuring three British men with distinctly English accents, sitting before the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The three men in the recruitment video directly appealed for other westerners to join

them fighting Jihad and stated their intention to join the war in Iraq. One man, Abu Bara Al Hindi insists that joining the group will cure the stress and depression of living in the west. He cries ‘are you willing to sacrifice the job you have got, the big car you have got? […] to all my brothers living in the west, I know how you feel from when I used to live there. In the heart you feel depressed. The cure for the depression is Jihad. All my brothers, come to jihad and feel the honour we are feeling, feel the happiness we are feeling’. One may wonder what (or the lack of what) drove the three young men to radicalize and adopt the Jihadist ideals, judging from their testimonies?

The last example is set on 11th April 1961 during the course of Eichmann’s trial, the Nazi war criminal. Arendt notes that during the trial’s session num. 105, as Eichmann was attempting to justify his acts, he remarked that he was simply acting out of respect for the principle of the Categorical Imperative arguing that his principle was such that it can become the principle of general laws. Upon further questioning he explained that from the moment he was charged with carrying out the final solution he had ceased to live according to Kantian principles and he had consoled with the thought that he was no longer the master of his deeds and he was unable to change anything. As Arendt comments, although Kant never intended to say something of the sort, yet she contends that the ambiguity of the categorical imperative triggers misunderstanding and misapplication.

The previous examples from a non-Hegelian perspective strike one as paradoxical, irrational or odd. The unfavorable effects of humanitarian and anti-terrorist aid, the ambiguity of a moral sense of duty and the difficulty in comprehending the drives which urged the young men to abandon their states and fight for a religious cause abroad, suggest that the way we conduct politics and theorize on political and international affairs is incomplete. From a Hegelian perspective, these examples suggest that any attempt to acquire knowledge, theorize and form policies from the perspective of a self-ascribed authority or a fixed notion of agency is misleading. Moreover, the description of these examples reflect the shortcomings which emerge when a policy is formed

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without considering both the universal and the particular dimension of the sociopolitical issues a policy intends to tackle. Similarly, these examples also make clear that when the ideals or values which drive these policies or decisions espouse only the universalist dimension, the result is an empty formalism which contributes to an incomplete account of knowledge and a misleading ethical conduct. As Beiser observes, for Hegel the universals exist only in particular things.\(^5\) Any universal concept or value such as reason, ethics or nation is embodied in the culture and language of a community at a specific place and time.\(^6\) This demonstrates the perils of projecting policies, values or ethics as cosmopolitan from a purely universalist perspective.

In particular, regarding the first two examples, these foreign aid and anti-terrorism policies do not take into consideration the domestic particularities of the countries they are addressed to. In the first case the Haitian government is ignored and in the second case an attempt takes place to replicate US war dictums and tactics to foreign armies without paying attention to particular socio-political contexts or the domestic civil-military-government relations. If an analysis or a policy formation is based on abstract universalist ideals while neglecting the particularities of the domestic sphere, then the conduct of interventionist policies is incomplete and misleading. As Hegel describes in the _Phenomenology of Spirit_, the knowledge which stems from the subjects as self-ascribed authorities who treat object of study as passive from the perspective of abstract categories or principles is incomplete and misleading. Trying to implement policies or draw decisions based on (abstract) universalist political, social or military principles is misleading since these policies and decisions rest on an _a priori_ sense of rationalism or values which are disassociated from the empirical dimension, divorcing the form from its content. In that regard, the undesired effects of antiterrorist and humanitarian aid stem from the fact that this particular dimension is neglected.

The same applies to the case of Eichmann. As Smith argues with respect to Eichman ethical behavior consists solely in the willingness to act out of an abstract principle. This allows one to see in a particularly stark form the lengths to which acting ‘for the sake of duty’ without any particular specification might

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\(^5\) Frederick Beiser, _Hegel_, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 22
\(^6\) Frederick Beiser, _Hegel_, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 23
be put. However, from a Hegelian perspective, the Kantian sense of duty is misleading since it rests on a self-determining perception of subjectivity and an abstract (universal) notion of reason and ethics, detached from social institutions. Kant’s self-determining subject forms an incomplete notion of will which is not necessarily free or moral since the subject is not self-conscious and thus not in control of the motives behind her ‘free’ actions or decisions. In that regard, according to Hegel, an understanding of self-consciousness and freedom which is based on the abstract universalism of the Categorical Imperative is misleading and detached from social institutions. As Smith notes, the implications of the categorical imperative are alarming and promote this one-sided attention to the individual’s independence from the will of the others and from external authority.\(^7\) On the other hand, Hegel’s notion of freedom which is actualized in the state via the ethical life (\textit{Sittlichkeit}) and the notion of patriotism, overcome the limits of Kant’s approach and reconcile individuals with the society and state, accommodating both the universal and the particular dimension.

Hegel’s notion of freedom and patriotism which reconciles the individuals with their state, casts some light on the motives of the young Brits. The young Brits felt alienated from their society in a community which prevented them from seizing their consciousness and free will. Their contempt for the western life style which prioritizes a big car and a good job, reflects Hegel’s civil society which nourishes an incomplete moment of will; the will of the self-determining egotistic subject who is not free but subjected to her individual-centered drives and desires. The young Brits’ despair, which transformed them into jihadists, stemmed from their way of life in Britain which focuses on materialist ideals that nurtures an antagonistic society of selfish individuals who fail to control their will, contributing to depression. This lack of selfless ideals and communitarian values was filled by radical Islamic ones which encourage them to dismiss their individualism and identify themselves within a greater cause. The use of the plural pronoun ‘we’ when the young Brit

says ‘come to jihad and feel the honour we are feeling, feel the happiness we are feeling’; 8 stresses this communitarian dimension.

Hegel’s notion of patriotism reflects similar communitarian ideals, stressing that the sole aim of the state is that a nation should not come to existence as a mere union of private persons or private wills. 9 For Hegel a state is well-constituted and internally powerful when the private interest of its citizens coincide with the general end of the state. For Hegel, patriotism nurtures selfless values which reconcile the citizens with their community and the state. The state contributes to the formation of the subject’s self-consciousness since the acquisition of free will is a process achieved within the realm of a particular community, permitting the incorporation of universality with particularity while providing a content to the empty form. Hegel’s notion of patriotism assists an understanding of the deeper motives behind the young jihadists. Blaming radicalization is inadequate. Radical Islamists exploited the citizens’ disassociation from the state and society as well as the void of self-less values and attempted to fill it. The young Brits frustration of the British life-style, the big cars and the good job suggests that such a materialist environment which lacks selfless ideals is antagonistic and un-hospitable and fails to promote their self-consciousness and free will.

On The Contribution of this Dissertation: How the Exercise of Hegel’s Immanent Critique Reveals the Shortcomings of Certain IR Approaches

The analysis of these examples designated that the conduct of policies which disassociate the particular dimension from the universal while depending on empty formalistic values and principles without content, rest on a misleading way of acquiring knowledge. Separating the subject from the object of theory, triggers an inaccurate account of knowledge which relies on an incomplete understanding of subjectivity, self-consciousness and free will.

8 Haroon Siddique Jihadi Recruitment Video for Islamist terror group Isis Features three Britons, The Guardian, Saturday 21 June 2014
The shortcomings of these examples demonstrate that separating: 1) the subject from the object of theory; 2) the universal from the particular dimension; and 3) rationalism from empiricism as a method of acquiring knowledge, lead to an inaccurate evaluation of socio-political events which trigger inappropriate policies and actions. The exercise of Hegel’s immanent critique revealed the limits of certain approaches to IR, citizenship, security and ethics which conveyed the aforementioned separations and promoted a misleading understanding of the sociopolitical reality based on arbitrary or transcendent norms. Specifically, the criticism of Foucaultian and Kantian inspired IR approaches which ended up examining reality with arbitrary or transcendent means, demonstrated the superiority of Hegelian thought and the value of immanent critique. The five chapters of this dissertation unveiled the contribution of immanent critique which rests on the consideration of Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist). The exercise of immanent critique scrutinizes the theoretical basis of certain IR approaches and demonstrates that they rest on an inaccurate understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, freedom, reality and reason.

To be more specific, the first chapter stressed that the exercise of immanent critique allows us to understand how an inaccurate understanding of subjectivity, leads to an incomplete account of knowledge. The implications of such a misleading understanding of knowledge and subjectivity were examined from the perspective of interstate relations, war and security. This chapter revisited previous Hegelian inspired IR approaches and promoted an alternative understanding of Hegel’s ideas on interstate relations and security after treating the Phenomenology of Spirit as the point of departure. Driven by Hutchings’ approach it was suggested that the Phenomenology of Spirit should be used as the point of departure to comprehend the Philosophy of Right. From that perspective it became clear that Hegelian thought is not celebrating Realist ideals. Following Hegel’s thought as developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit it was clear that an inaccurate account of knowledge emerges from a flawed understanding of subjectivity. Then, Hegel’s insights from the Phenomenology of Spirit were applied to the issue area of security studies. Hegel’s understanding of subjectivity as a process portrayed by the evolution of the forms of consciousness within the realm of Spirit (Geist), paved the way to argue that the subject should not be separated from the object of theory. The separation of the
subject from the object of theory accommodates only a descriptive or a prescriptive approach to knowledge which treats the subjects as a self-ascribed authority who evaluates reality based on transcendental or arbitrary norms. Such evaluation nourishes a misleading account of knowledge and reality. In particular, the exercise of immanent critique revealed that the (neo)realist, the Copenhagen and the Critical school of security studies reproduce a problematic account of knowledge due to their: a) flawed understanding of subjectivity; and b) problematic treatment of the theorist-object of theory relation.

The second chapter revealed the limits of appropriating Foucautian thought to IR. After delineating the debate between the approaches which promoted the application of Foucaultian thought to IR and those which challenged such application, Hegel’s insights revealed that the Foucaultian inspired IR approaches undermine the formation of the subject’s self-consciousness and negate free will. Pasha, Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat celebrated the contribution of Foucault to IR thought, arguing that Foucaultian ideas provide an alternative understanding of (a non-liberal) subjectivity, war mobilization, human rights and power. On the other hand Neil, Debrrix and Richmond contended that the adaptation of Foucaultian thought to a particular discipline - such as the IR - violates the contingency of Foucault’s theory. Selby and Chandler even observed how Foucaultian inspired post-structuralists promoted liberal cosmopolitan ideals instead of undermining them. Although the contribution of the scholars who challenged the application of Foucault’s ideas to IR is invaluable, yet these scholars failed to trace the limits of Foucaultian thought itself.

On the other hand, Hegel’s immanent critique unveiled that Foucault unsuccessfully attempted to reconsider reality without transcendental means via the notion of power and formed a flawed account of subjectivity which renders knowledge and subjectivity relativistic. The relativism of Foucault’s notion of power is guilty of nourishing a problematic account of subjectivity and freedom since it fails to promote the self-consciousness of the subject. Foucault’s treatment of power as neutral and contingent ended up controlling the subject after rendering it relativistic. This relativism which stems from Foucault’s transcendent form of power as well as the purposeless succession of power regimes forms a subject that lacks self-consciousness and free will. In that
respect Foucaultian IR thought fails to promote a free agent who self-consciously: mobilizes to conduct war, resists to power regimes and overcomes the coercive implications of the (liberal) human rights regimes.

The third chapter elaborates how Hegel’s immanent critique unveils that Foucaultian, Kantian and IR thought promote a self-defeating understanding of freedom which rests on transcendental premises. Unlike Kant and Foucault, Hegel’s alternative understanding of freedom as a process, does not rest on transcendental premises but stems from ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of the state. Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which nourishes the subject’s free will, accommodates the universal and the particular dimension without separating the subject from the object of knowledge, disclosing how the non-emancipating effects of Foucaultian and Kantian freedom emerge. For Hegel, free will is a process which emerges via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state. According to Hegel each moment of will promotes an incomplete idea of freedom. Foucault’s and Kant’s understandings of freedom and subjectivity proved to be self-defeating as these reflect one of these incomplete moments of Hegelian will. The previous chapter described how the purposeless succession of power regimes nurtures a relativistic subject, whereas this chapter stressed that Foucault’s notion of power is responsible for portraying as ‘free’ the options stemming from power’s predetermined domains (such as disciplinary, sexuality etc). Thus, since these options are beyond the control of the subject, power regimes serve to restrict rather than emancipate the subject. The Kantian account of freedom fails to emancipate the subject too. Kant’s treatment of the subject as self-determining separates the subject from the object of knowledge whereas the notion of the Categorical Imperative - upon his motion of freedom rests - is vacuous and lacks a particular content as it relies only on the universal dimension. For Hegel, free will cannot be determined by the subject alone but instead it evolves as a process within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which implicates the notions of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the State. Hegel’s Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state are abstract or universalist but represent the actualization of freedom within a particular state, filling the vacuity of Kant’s sense of duty and ethics.

Additionally, Hegel’s insights revealed that certain IR approaches promote too a non-emancipating understanding of freedom. Specifically, this chapter analyzed how Chandler’s, Sen’s and Frost’s treatment of freedom is
defective and assists the promotion of liberal ideals which lead to social exclusions. Sen’s and Chandler’s promotion of ‘development as freedom’ reproduced the limits of Foucaultian freedom, failing to emancipate the political agents. Their conceptualization of freedom, just like Foucault’s, predetermines the subject’s ‘free’ options (alluding to the options which are compatible to the liberal democratic values). Frost too, although he is inspired by Hegel’s thought, nevertheless he dismisses the notion of Spirit (Geist) and promotes a non-emancipating form of freedom. Frost argues that freedom stems from the international anarchic state system. However, Hegel’s insights reveal that Frost does not perceive international anarchy as neutral but under the influence of democratic liberal institutions which necessitate the agents compliance to a liberal domain of individual’s rights.

The fourth chapter stressed how an immanent critique of certain universalist or cosmopolitan perspectives on citizenship unveiled their transcendental theoretical premises. In that respect that chapter underscored that a conceptualization of citizenship which does not take into consideration the universal and the particular dimension is incomplete. The immanent critique of Archibugi’s, Held’s and Kaldor’s universalist theories on citizenship revealed that their approaches examined reality from a transcendental perspective. Archibugi’s, Held’s and Kaldor’s approaches rested on the universalism of human rights and the transnationalism of values such as equality and freedom. However, the universalism of these perspectives was challenged after arguing that these values and (human) rights are neither transnational nor impartial but transcendent and excluding. After criticizing Archibugi, Held and Kaldor, Habermas’s flawed universalism was exposed too. Hegel’s insights made clear that Habermas’s theory - which rests on Kant’s categorical imperative - conceptualizes the universal norms based on the Kantian sense of duty which is vacuous and rests on a self-determining understanding of subjectivity. This notion of subjectivity, separates the subject from the object of knowledge, perceives reality with transcendent norms and promotes a misleading account of knowledge. In that respect Habermas’ approach promotes a liberal driven notion of universalism with excluding rather than universal effects.

Unlike the previous approaches to citizenship, this chapter stressed that Hegel’s conceptualization of citizenship incorporated the universal and the
particular dimension. Hegel’s notion of patriotism is a disposition which assists the subject to develop her self-consciousness and free will within the state. Hegelian freedom is actualized in the state and does not rest on the self-determining subject but on ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) which emerges from a particular community within the limits of a state. In that respect Hegel’s alternative understanding of citizenship which associates with ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) succeeds in reconciling the individual subject with the social institutions and ultimately bridge the gap between the universal and the particular dimension.

The previous chapters stressed the implications of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) and Spirit (*Geist*) on Hegel’s alternative understanding of subjectivity, freedom and ethics and citizenship. The last chapter is significant as it demonstrated that Hegel’s notion of Spirit (*Geist*) is not transcendental. This chapter stressed that Hegelian thought combines idealism with empiricism and accommodates the universal with the particular dimension which in turn transforms our understanding of knowledge. The case study of Singapore was introduced in order to demonstrate the empirical dimensions of Hegel’s alternative understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, patriotism and citizenship. Singapore is not used as a model state which portrays the state of the *Philosophy of Right*. The case study of Singapore was added in order to expose empirically the contribution of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) as a process which enriches our understanding of citizenship after attributing an alternative understanding to the economy and the market. Unlike the liberal inspired analyses on citizenship, Hegel’s notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) reveals that economy and the market do not necessarily alienate the Singaporeans from their state. According to Hegel’s understanding of citizenship the implications of the economy and the market can explain the civic transformation of the Singaporeans which reconciles them with their state. Thus, Hegel’s insights challenge the shared perspective of most scholars who argue that the social cohesion in Singapore is undermined due to the government’s prioritization of the capitalist economy and materialism.

A Hegelian inspired perspective on citizenship challenges the predetermining effects of economy and materialism that are often held responsible for the formation of materialistic, self-centered and opportunistic citizens. Hegel includes too the dimensions of economy and materialism but after
incorporating them within the realm of Spirit (Geist), he attributes to them an alternative impact which has educative civic effects to the citizens. In order to reinforce this point, empirical evidence was introduced which undermined the stereotypical treatment of the Singaporeans as materialistic and self-centered (kiasuist) individuals. This empirical evidence designated examples of civic activism and indirect government criticism which stemmed from the avant-garde arts, internet blogs and NGOs. However, it is described how these instances of civic activism led recently to a more significant event. The event known as the ‘AWARE saga’ encouraged public scrutiny over certain religious and ethical issues, paving the way for the transformation of the civic sphere in Singapore. Thus, the ‘AWARE Saga’ marked a transformation of the government and the Singaporeans beyond the stereotypical kiasuist characteristics. This transition more closely reflects Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) than the liberal perspectives which treats the ‘AWARE Saga’ as a mere struggle for liberal rights. This civic evolution in Singapore appears to justify empirically Hegel’s alternative treatment of the economy and the market, demonstrating the educative civic effects they have on Singaporeans. Instead, it was clearly demonstrated that Hegel’s understanding of knowledge which avoids the separation of the subject from the object of theory and accommodates the universal with the particular dimension, forms a more complete account of citizenship that is tied with the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit).

In that respect, the objective of this dissertation was to reinstate the contribution of Hegelian thought to IR, after undermining the previous intellectual efforts which treated Hegel as a proto-realist thinker. Here, it was stressed that Hegel’s insights regarding the understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, free will, ethical life and the state can add much value to IR thought and overcome the limits normative or critical approaches which are often inspired by Kant’s and Foucault’s thought. Unlike Foucault and Kant, Hegelian thought not only accommodates both the universal and the particular dimension but also avoids to separate the subject from the object of theory which forms self-ascribed authorities that promote misleading prescriptive or descriptive approaches.

The exercise of immanent critique revealed the shortcomings of Kantian and Foucaultian thought. It has been noted that the application of Kantian
thought in order to support the universality of certain norms and (human) rights was based on a vacuous sense of duty which contributed to the promotion of liberal ideals with socially excluding effects. Similarly, the application of Foucaultian thought as a mean to promote the particularist dimension, nurtured a relativistic account of subjectivity and knowledge which (intentionally or not) paved the way to the permeation of liberal ideals. The shortcomings of Foucault’s and Kant’s thought relate to the separation of: i) the universal from the particular dimension; and ii) the subject from the object of theory which promote a misleading understanding of knowledge and reality that rests on transcendental or arbitrary norms. The contribution of immanent critique rests on disclosing this problematic conceptualization of reality and knowledge found not only in Foucaultian and Kantian thought but also in the normative and critical approaches which ignore the interplay between idealism and empiricism. Thus, this dissertation highlighted that the superiority of Hegelian thought lies on considering the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge, as well as the combination of the universal with the particular dimension which most normative or critical IR approaches to security, ethics and citizenship separate.
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