The role of the demonic in the Political thought of Eusebius of Caesarea

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King's College London

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THE ROLE OF THE DEMONIC IN THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF EUSEBIUS OF
CAESAREA

Hazel Anne Johannessen

Submitted for the degree of:
PhD Classics
This thesis explores how Eusebius of Caesarea’s ideas about demons interacted with and helped to shape his thought on other topics, particularly political topics. In doing so, it builds on and complements recent work on early Christian demonology by scholars including Gregory Smith, David Brakke and Dayna Kalleres, as well as Stuart Clark’s work on early modern demonology. Eusebius’ political thought has long drawn the attention of scholars who have identified in some of his works the foundations of later Byzantine theories of kingship. However, Eusebius’ political thought has not previously been examined in the light of his views on demons. Moreover, despite frequent references to demons throughout many of Eusebius’ works, there has, until now, been no comprehensive study of Eusebius’ views on demons, as expressed throughout a range of his works. The originality of this thesis therefore lies both in an initial examination of Eusebius’ views on demons and their place in his cosmology, and in the application of the insights derived from this to consideration of his political thought. As a result of this new perspective, this thesis challenges scholars’ traditional characterisation of Eusebius as a triumphal optimist. Instead, it draws attention to his concerns about a continuing demonic threat, capable of disrupting humankind’s salvation, and presents Eusebius as a more cautious figure than the one familiar to late antique scholarship.
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## Abbreviations

### Abbreviations for works by Eusebius

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Contra Hieroclem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Commentarii in Isaiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Contra Marcellum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPs</td>
<td>Commentarii in Psalms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Demonstratio Evangelica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De eccl. theol.</td>
<td>De ecclesiastica theologia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecl. Proph.</td>
<td>Eclogae Propheticae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr.Luc.</td>
<td>Fragmenta in Lucam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEI</td>
<td>Generalis elementaria introductio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Historia ecclesiastica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>De laudibus Constantini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mart. Pal. [SR]</td>
<td>De martyribs Palaestinae [Short Recension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mart. Pal. [LR]</td>
<td>De martyribs Palaestinae [Long Recension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onom.</td>
<td>Onomasticon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Praeparatio Evangelica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>De sepulchro Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoph.</td>
<td>Theophania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Vita Constantini</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Other abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td><em>American Journal of Philology</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICS</td>
<td><em>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td><em>Classical Quarterly</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCS</td>
<td>Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRBS</td>
<td><em>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTR</td>
<td><em>Harvard Theological Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBL</td>
<td><em>Journal of Biblical Literature</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JECS</td>
<td><em>Journal of Early Christian Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEH</td>
<td><em>Journal of Ecclesiastical History</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHS</td>
<td><em>Journal of Hellenic Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td><em>Journal of Roman Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTS</td>
<td><em>Journal of Theological Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCL</td>
<td><em>Loeb Classical Library</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRSV</td>
<td>New Revised Standard Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td><em>Revue des études latines</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPA</td>
<td><em>Transactions of the American Philological Association</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNW</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS

Translations from Greek and Latin are my own, unless otherwise indicated. For many of Eusebius’ works, translations already exist in a number of modern European languages and I have consulted several of these at various points. Any translations consulted are listed in the bibliography. For those of Eusebius’ works which survive only in a Syriac translation, such as the Theophania and long recension of the De martyribus Palaestinae, I have been entirely dependent on the translations of S. Lee and H.J. Lawlor and J.E.L. Oulton, both of which are listed in the bibliography. For biblical texts I have, for the most part, adopted the NRSV translation, except in those cases where the Septuagint text quoted by Eusebius calls for a slightly different translation. Modern language translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

I have attempted as far as possible to include the original language text of any translations. Eusebius’ sentence structure is, however, frequently long and convoluted. To avoid over-crowding the footnotes with Greek, I have therefore been forced in many cases to excerpt particular clauses from their wider context. In these cases, I have indicated omissions with ellipses.
NOTE ON CITATIONS

There is some variation in the citation style for Eusebius’ works. For the sake of clarity, I outline here the style I have adopted, which differs between his works. Where possible, works are cited according to book, chapter and section number, as appropriate. Where this is not possible, they are cited according to page and line number in the relevant edition. Those works which have not been edited into a modern critical edition are cited according to their volume, column and line number in Migne’s Patrologia Graeca.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c.260-65</td>
<td>Eusebius born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290s</td>
<td><em>Canones Evangelicae</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before 303</td>
<td><em>Chronicon</em> begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303-312</td>
<td>‘Great Persecution’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307-10</td>
<td><em>Apologia pro Origene</em>, co-authored with Pamphilus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before 313</td>
<td>1st edition of the <em>Chronicon</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.310</td>
<td><em>Generalis elementaria introductio</em> (<em>Eclogae Propheticae</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.311</td>
<td>Long recension of the <em>De martyribus Palaestinae</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.312</td>
<td><em>Contra Hieroclem</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.313</td>
<td>1st edition of the <em>Historia ecclesiatica</em> (books 1-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.313</td>
<td>Eusebius becomes bishop of Caesarea Maritima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.313-320</td>
<td><em>Praeparatio</em> and <em>Demonstratio Evangelica</em> written</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315</td>
<td><em>Oration on the Church at Tyre</em> (<em>HE10.4</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.315-320</td>
<td><em>Quaestiones Evangelicae</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>324</td>
<td>Constantine achieves sole rule of Eastern and Western parts of the empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after 324</td>
<td><em>Onomasticon</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>Council of Nicaea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after 325</td>
<td><em>Commentarii in Isaiam</em>, <em>De solemnitate Paschali</em> and <em>Theophania</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after 326</td>
<td><em>Commentary on the Psalms</em></td>
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</table>

This table summarises the conclusions reached in Chapter I concerning the dates of Eusebius’ works. For the dating of key events in Eusebius’ lifetime, I have followed the conclusions of T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>335</td>
<td><em>De sepulchro Christi</em> delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336</td>
<td><em>De laudibus Constantini</em> delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336-338</td>
<td><em>De ecclesiastica theologia</em> and <em>Contra Marcellum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>337</td>
<td>Death of Constantine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>337-339</td>
<td><em>Vita Constantini</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339</td>
<td>Death of Eusebius</td>
</tr>
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</table>
INTRODUCTION

To many scholars of late antiquity, Eusebius of Caesarea (d.339) will seem a familiar figure. His Historia ecclesiastica is one of the most important sources for the history of the early Christian church\(^1\) — likewise his Vita Constantini and De laudibus Constantini are invaluable for those studying the reign of Constantine.\(^2\) The Praeparatio Evangelica contains extensive quotations, preserving lengthy fragments of earlier works that would otherwise have been lost.\(^3\) Alongside these texts, Eusebius also left several works of biblical scholarship and exegesis, as well as of theological polemic — all written in a period of dramatic political and religious upheaval.\(^4\) In consequence, it is hardly surprising that he has long attracted the attention of scholars, or that work on Eusebius continues to flourish today.\(^5\) The reader might therefore be forgiven for wondering what this present study can add to an already considerable body of scholarship.

The answer is simple — until now, there has been no comprehensive study of the role played by Eusebius’ ideas about δαίμονες (demons) in shaping his thought. The following study will highlight the prominent place occupied by demons in Eusebius’ cosmology. In doing so, it will shed fresh light on Eusebius’ ideas about human agency and moral responsibility, salvation history, and the role of a

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\(^4\) On Eusebius’ works and their context, see Chapter I below.

Christian emperor. With the exception of Eusebius’ views on moral responsibility, which, as I will show in chapter IV, merit rather more attention than they have hitherto received, these are topics that have long been of interest to Eusebian scholars. However, by examining these subjects through the prism of Eusebius’ ideas about demons, this study will offer a very different interpretation of Eusebius from that with which late antique scholars are familiar. It will present a Eusebius far less at ease in his world than is generally assumed and will suggest that we need to reconsider the common belief that Eusebius was a complacent optimist.

First, however, it is necessary to set this study in the context of existing scholarship. Each of the following chapters will discuss the literature directly relevant to the topic under consideration there, and this introduction will therefore only be concerned with broad trends in the study of Eusebius. Following this general survey of the scholarship, I will outline in more detail the particular contribution of this study. Finally, I will offer a brief overview of the structure and contents of the remainder of the thesis.

Previous Scholarship

Scholarship on Eusebius can be seen to fall broadly into two main categories – that which uses Eusebius’ works as a source of information about the events they describe, and that which manifests an interest in Eusebius’ ideas in their own right. The first approach has a long history and has frequently been linked to scholars’ desire to understand the religious views and motives of the emperor Constantine. This trend in the scholarship can be seen as far back as the work of Jacob
Burckhardt,\(^6\) and arguably reached its peak over a century later in the comprehensive study of Timothy Barnes.\(^7\) Despite their similar interest in using Eusebius’ works to assess the figure of Constantine, these two scholars held directly opposite views of Eusebius himself. For Burckhardt, he was ‘the first thoroughly dishonest historian of antiquity’,\(^8\) while Barnes, by contrast, suggested that Eusebius’ works reveal his ‘evident care and honesty’.\(^9\)

Unsurprisingly, this led to very different characterisations of Constantine. According to Burckhardt, Constantine was a canny politician, whose attitude towards religious matters was one of ‘political expediency’,\(^10\) yet Barnes, relying heavily on Eusebius’ own portraits of the emperor, presented Constantine as a committed Christian.\(^11\) Barnes, of course, was not uncritical of Eusebius – he notes that there are ‘serious chronological errors’ in Eusebius’ *Historia ecclesiastica*,\(^12\) and also points out that Eusebius often paraphrased and shortened his quotations in a way that might ‘misrepresent’ the original material.\(^13\) Nevertheless, Barnes preferred to attribute such misquotation to scribal error,\(^14\) rather than asking how Eusebius may have deliberately presented his sources in a way that would support his own interpretation of events.\(^15\) Barnes’ primary interest thus remained, not in

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\(^{8}\) Burckhardt, *Age of Constantine*, 283.

\(^{9}\) Barnes, *C&E*, 141.

\(^{10}\) Burckhardt, *Age of Constantine*, 283.

\(^{11}\) Barnes, *C&E*, especially 275.


\(^{13}\) *Ibid.* 141.

\(^{14}\) *Ibid.* 141.

\(^{15}\) As some more recent scholarship has done – for example: S. Inowlocki, *Eusebius and the Jewish Authors: His Citation Technique in an Apologetic Context* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
the analysis of Eusebius’ views and preoccupations in themselves, but in the use of Eusebius’ works to produce a picture of Constantine.\textsuperscript{16}

This question of Eusebius’ ‘reliability’ recurs frequently as part of this first strand of Eusebian scholarship. Although it has been shown that at least one of the contemporary documents Eusebius quotes in his work was reported accurately,\textsuperscript{17} this cannot, as Averil Cameron has pointed out, prove the accuracy of all the similar sources which he cites.\textsuperscript{18} At times, Eusebius has received a rather negative assessment from modern historians hoping to find in his works an approach to historiography similar to their own.\textsuperscript{19} This approach to Eusebius – using his works as more-or-less reliable ‘sources’ for the reign of Constantine – has, however, been challenged in more recent scholarship. Focusing in particular on the acutely problematic \textit{Vita Constantini},\textsuperscript{20} Cameron has argued that Eusebius’ works are ‘unsuited to positivist critique’ of the kind adopted by Barnes.\textsuperscript{21} Elizabeth Clark has similarly noted the difficulty of using early Christian texts, such as the works of

\textsuperscript{16} See the review of A. Cameron, ‘Constantinus Christianus’, \textit{JRS} 73 (1983), 184-90.
\textsuperscript{18} Cameron, ‘Constantinus Christianus’, 188.
\textsuperscript{21} Cameron, ‘Construction’, 135. For further critique of Barnes’ approach, see: A. Cameron, ‘History and the Individuality of the Historian: The Interpretation of Late Antiquity’, in C. Straw and R. Lim, eds., \textit{The Past Before Us: The Challenge of Historiographies of Late Antiquity} (Turhout: Brepols, 2004), 75.
Eusebius, as ‘sources of social data’, arguing instead that we need to treat them ‘first and foremost as literary productions’. As a result of this critique of the traditional approach, the past two decades have seen a flourishing of further work on Eusebius – work which, in highlighting the value of studying Eusebius’ ideas in their own right, falls firmly into the second category of scholarship on Eusebius.

Of course, while study of Eusebius as a thinker and writer has received a new impetus and new direction in recent years, interest in Eusebius’ thought is not entirely a phenomenon of the past two decades. In particular, scholarly interest in the past has tended to focus on Eusebius’ political thought and his ideas about kingship and empire. For many scholars, Eusebius’ so-called ‘Constantinian’ writings – the *Vita Constantini*, *De laudibus Constantini* and later books of the *Historia ecclesiastica* – can be said to have laid the foundations of later Byzantine theories of kingship. Following the work of E. Peterson, there has also been a tendency to characterise Eusebius as a ‘political theologian’, whose theological views were moulded to support an idea of divinely appointed supreme monarchy.

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accounts, Eusebius appears as little more than a mouthpiece of the emperor Constantine. More sympathetic readings have denied that Eusebius’ theology bent to fit his political views and have suggested instead that Eusebius’ existing theological views predisposed him to welcome the Constantinian regime and to justify it in the manner he did.

Recent scholarship has tended to move away from this servile characterisation of Eusebius and from a preoccupation with his political writings by turning to examine some of his previously neglected works. These include works of exegesis and biblical commentary in which references to the empire and emperor occupy a less prominent place. This has led scholars more recently to stress the considerable importance of the church in Eusebius’ thought and to focus on the way in which his theological views underpinned much of his thinking, even on high political topics. No doubt this appreciation of a more independent Eusebius has also been facilitated by the recognition, following the work of Barnes, that Eusebius was not a ‘court

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29 For criticism of the older approach and the need to pay greater attention to Eusebius’ theological views, see, in particular: M.J. Hollerich, ‘Religion and Politics in the Writings of Eusebius: Reassessing the First “Court Theologian”’, *Church History* 59 (1990), 309-25.
31 For example: Hollerich, ‘Religion and Politics’; Hollerich, *Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah*. 
theologian’ or close adviser of the emperor Constantine.\textsuperscript{32} Rather, he could not have met the emperor more than a few times and was unlikely to have had much, if any, private conversation with him.\textsuperscript{33} It is important to emphasise this point, for echoes of the older presentation of Eusebius as a religious advisor to the emperor remarkably continue to surface even in some of the most recent scholarship.\textsuperscript{34}

In shifting its focus to the lesser-known areas of Eusebius’ oeuvre, recent scholarship has also begun to look far beyond Eusebius’ ideas about sovereignty and kingship to explore other aspects of his thought. Aaron Johnson, for instance, has established the importance of ideas of ethnicity in Eusebius’ presentation of Christian identity.\textsuperscript{35} In this, Eusebius’ apologetic approach can be seen to correspond to that of other early Christian thinkers.\textsuperscript{36} Further work has explored Eusebius’ attitude towards other religious groupings of pagans and Jews,\textsuperscript{37} or has looked more closely at his theology and his role in the doctrinal disputes of his time.\textsuperscript{38} Alongside this, the past two decades have also produced a number of studies of Eusebius’ scholarly background and literary technique, which have done much to


\textsuperscript{33} Barnes, C&E, 266.


\textsuperscript{35} Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument.


improve our understanding of his approach. Eusebius’ early biblical scholarship, in the context of the scholarly environment of Caesarea, has been highlighted by Anthony Grafton and Megan Williams. Andrew Carriker’s careful survey of the contents of Eusebius’ library at Caesarea has been invaluable in clarifying which sources Eusebius might have had access to, and which writers he would have known. It revealed that the library was particularly well-stocked with works of Middle Platonic philosophy, as well as holding the majority of works by Philo and Josephus. The library appears to have contained remarkably few works in Latin. Furthermore, our awareness of how Eusebius used his sources has been greatly improved by studies of his citational and apologetic technique. We are thus much better able than previous scholars of Eusebius’ political thought to situate Eusebius in his broader intellectual context.

It is widely agreed that this intellectual context included the influence of Origen. Although the two writers did not have any direct contact, as Origen died in c.254, scholars have long recognised the profound debt that Eusebius owed to Origen, who founded the library at Caesarea which provided the basis for

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41 Ibid. 311.
42 Ibid. 312.
45 See, for example: Barnes, C&E, 94-95; Berkoff, Die Theologie, 125; C. Kannengiesser, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea, Origenist’, in H.W. Attridge, and G. Hata, eds., Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 435-66; Grafton and Williams, Christianity and the Transformation of the Book; I.L.E. Ramelli,
Eusebius’ admiration for Origen is evident from the ‘biography’ of Origen which appears in Book 6 of the Historia ecclesiastica, and E.C. Penland has shown that Eusebius sought to present himself and his scholarly circle in Caesarea as the inheritors of Origen’s legacy. Unsurprisingly, Carriker’s study of the Caesarean library found that it held an excellent collection of Origen’s works. However, it should not be imagined that Eusebius was slavishly dependent on Origen and recent work has increasingly begun to highlight areas in which Eusebius also sought to distance himself from Origen’s ideas.

This Study

In focusing above all on Eusebius’ thought, this study falls firmly into the second category of scholarship on Eusebius. Its aim is not to explore the religious beliefs of the emperor Constantine, or to establish how rapidly the ‘Christianisation’ of the empire took place; it is rather to shed fresh light on key aspects of Eusebius’ thought. In doing so, however, it is by no means ignoring the kinds of historical question that have for so long preoccupied scholars of the later Roman empire, such as the question of how Christianity came to achieve a position of dominance. As Averil Cameron has shown, the growth and spread of Christianity owed at least as much, if not more, to the language and ideas adopted by early Christian thinkers as

46 Carriker, Library, xiii.
49 Carriker, Library, 311.
it did to the kinds of social, political and economic factors traditionally emphasised by historians.\textsuperscript{51} As a result, Cameron argues that any attempt to understand the spread of Christianity must involve the study of its teachings and of the language and texts in which they were expressed.\textsuperscript{52} Examining the views of Eusebius, who was a prominent church leader in this period of transition, can therefore provide considerable insight into some of the many changes that marked the early fourth century.\textsuperscript{53}

In addressing questions relating to Eusebius’ political thought, this study is building on a long tradition of interest in Eusebius’ political ideas. However, unlike earlier work on this topic, which has often tended to focus upon the ideas of kingship and imperial sovereignty presented in later works like the \textit{Vita Constantini} and \textit{De laudibus Constantini}, this study will adopt a broader understanding of what may be termed ‘political’. Looking beyond those of Eusebius’ works which directly discuss Constantine and the high political affairs of the empire, it will examine Eusebius’ views on topics such as human agency and responsibility, and the purpose and direction of human history. In influencing Eusebius’ understanding of how individuals related to each other, society and even the wider universe, such views are inherently relevant to ‘political’ questions about the best form of government for Christians and the most suitable style of leadership. Clear connections between these various topics will emerge over the course of this study.


\textsuperscript{52} Cameron, \textit{Christianity and Rhetoric}, 32, 46.

This broad perspective, exploring the complex network of ideas that underpinned Eusebius’ high political speculation, is one new contribution that this study can offer to scholarship on Eusebius’ political thought.

A further, more significant innovation lies in the decision to approach Eusebius’ thought through the lens of his ideas about demons. Despite prolific references to the demonic throughout many – although not all – of his works, dedicated studies of Eusebius’ demonology are almost non-existent. Eusebius’ references to demons are at times noted in passing by scholars, but for the most part are subjected only to the most fleeting, if any, analysis.⁵⁴ The only work which has focused primarily on Eusebius’ ideas about demons until now is Sharron L. Coggan’s PhD thesis.⁵⁵ This, however, restricts itself primarily to Eusebius’ discussions in the Praeparatio Evangelica and is principally concerned with how Eusebius took over and adapted the earlier Greek terminology of the δαίμων as part of his apologetic effort. Coggan therefore does not explore how Eusebius’ ideas about the demonic interacted with his thought on other topics. The brief remarks of Aaron Johnson, contained as part of his study of Eusebius’ ideas about ethnicity and

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Christian identity, are also worthy of mention.\(^{56}\) Once again, however, Johnson’s focus is restricted to the *Praeparatio Evangelica* and to the place of demons within Eusebius’ apologetic argument. There has hitherto been no study of how Eusebius’ ideas about demons, expressed throughout a range of his works, influenced and interacted with his thinking on other subjects.

This tendency to overlook Eusebius’ references to the demonic is unfortunate for, as work on other historical periods has demonstrated, examining writers’ discussions of demons can reveal a great deal about their views on other subjects. In particular, Stuart Clark’s work on early modern demonology has shown how intellectuals of this period could ‘think with’ demons, using their ideas on this subject to develop their views on other, most notably political, topics.\(^{57}\) Clark’s approach to ideas about the demonic has, however, been the subject of some criticism in more recent scholarship. Ellen Muehlberger, whose work on angels emphasises the reality of these spiritual beings for late antique thinkers,\(^{58}\) is particularly dismissive of such an approach, arguing that it implies a ‘utilitarian motive’ for ideas about angels and fails to allow for this strength of belief.\(^{59}\) A similar note of caution towards Clark’s approach has also been sounded by Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe.\(^{60}\) Such concerns are justified. Clark’s characterisation of demons as an ‘intellectual resource’ makes little allowance for the very real fears about demons which many people in the late antique period must have had and is thus unhelpful,

\(^{56}\) Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 163-70.
\(^{59}\) Ibid. 20.
\(^{60}\) S. Lunn-Rockliffe, *Thinking with Satan: Diabolical Inspiration and Human Agency in Late Antiquity*, unpublished paper delivered at the Political Thought and Intellectual History Research Seminar, University of Cambridge, 1st November 2010.
at least for writers of Eusebius’ era. However, in acknowledging the reality of
spiritual beings like angels and demons for thinkers like Eusebius, we do not need
to follow Muehlberger in dispensing with the idea that they could be ‘good to think
with’. Rather, this thesis combines both the idea of demons as ‘good to think with’
and the more recent scholarly recognition of the strength of late antique beliefs
about demons, highlighted by the work of G.A. Smith, in order to understand
Eusebius’ thought.

Finally, this study is comparatively unusual in adopting a broad perspective,
which embraces a wide variety of Eusebius’ works. While this is by no means
unprecedented, Eusebius’ output was so large that scholars, particularly those
interested in Eusebius’ thought, have tended to limit themselves either to one
specific work, or to a narrow range of his works. Such an approach, although
often very fruitful, would not have been appropriate in this case. In order to gain as
full and accurate a picture as possible of Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic, it
is necessary to adopt a broad perspective. Eusebius’ apologetic concerns in works
such as the Praeparatio Evangelica mean that they often offer only a partial picture of
Eusebius’ thinking about demons. This is evident from the earlier discussions of
Coggan and Johnson, both of which focus principally on the evidence of the

61 Clark, Thinking With Demons, viii. The physical reality of demons for late antique thinkers has been
highlighted by: G.A. Smith, ‘How Thin Is a Demon?’, JECS 16 (2008), 479-512. On Eusebius’ concerns
about demons, see Chapter II below.
62 As Lunn-Rockliffe’s work shows: Thinking with Satan.
63 Smith, ‘How Thin?’.
64 For example: Barnes, C&E; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea.
65 For example: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument; S. Morlet, La
Démonstration Évangélique d’Eusèbe de Césarée: Étude sur l’apologétique chrétienne à l’époque de
Constantin (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2009); M. Verdoner, Narrated Reality: The Historia
Ecclesiastica of Eusebius of Caesarea (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011).
66 Sirinelli, Les vues historiques.
This restricted focus, as I will show in Chapter V, leads them to overestimate the impact that Eusebius believed the incarnation to have had on demonic power and, consequently, to misinterpret the place of demons within Eusebius’ cosmology. Of course, references to demons are more plentiful in some of Eusebius’ works than in others; inevitably, it is those works which contain the most detailed accounts of demons that appear most frequently in this study. Works such as the *Praeparatio Evangelica*, *Demonstratio Evangelica*, *Historia ecclesiastica* and *Vita Constantini* have proved particularly fruitful for my examination of Eusebius’ ideas about demons and, for that reason alone, will dominate the remaining chapters.

Such a broad perspective brings challenges as well as benefits, raising the question, for instance, of how far we can generalise about a writer’s thought from works so different in style and form and often written many years apart. This is a question which I will address more fully in Chapter I. Nevertheless, it is surely the case that, if we are to understand Eusebius’ thought in all its variety and complexity, we need to have a combination of both detailed studies of individual works and broader surveys, since each can reveal different aspects of his thought.

This thesis thus adopts a new approach to an old issue – the nature of Eusebius’ political thought. In doing so, it reaches conclusions about Eusebius’ outlook and attitude towards the events of his lifetime that challenge what appears to be one of the most ingrained assumptions of Eusebian scholarship – namely, that he was a triumphal optimist, who viewed the events of his lifetime as the climax of human history. This view seems to be almost universal, even amongst the most

*Coggan, Pandaemonia; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument*, 163-70.
recent scholarship on Eusebius.⁶⁸ For Barnes, Eusebius’ outlook was characterised by ‘unrestrained optimism’;⁶⁹ his works represent ‘a celebration of the success of Christianity’.⁷⁰ More recently, Johnson has suggested that ‘triumphalism is a consistent feature of nearly all his works’.⁷¹ J. Moreau believed that Eusebius saw Constantine’s reign as ‘the fulfilment of world history’.⁷² This is echoed by Dale Martin, who considered that, in Eusebius’ view, ‘world history has reached its culmination in the triumph of Constantine’.⁷³ The only question appears to be, not whether Eusebius was an unreserved triumphalist, but when he became so.⁷⁴ Yet this characterisation of Eusebius does not sit comfortably with the picture of hostile and threatening demons which this study identifies as a feature of many of his

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⁶⁹ Barnes, *Ce&É*, 186.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 105.


works. This study will therefore argue that this traditional characterisation of Eusebius needs to be modified in the light of his views on demons.

Recognising that an understanding of Eusebius' attitude towards the demonic can have a dramatic impact on how we read other aspects of his thought also has implications for the wider study of Christian demonology in the fourth century. Scholarly interest in this feature of early Christian culture has been growing in recent years, particularly following the publication of David Brakke's monograph *Demons and the Making of the Monk*, which highlighted the role of ideas about demons in the development of the idea of the Christian monk.\(^75\) This has since been followed by studies which explore late antique ideas about the physicality of demons\(^76\) or the role of demons in works of hagiography, such as the *Vita Antonii*, and literature relating to the lives of desert saints.\(^77\) With few exceptions,\(^78\) however, scholars have appeared reluctant to explore the role of demons in the thought of the educated, intellectual Christians who held positions of leadership in urban communities. This discrepancy has previously been highlighted by Dayna Kalleres' exploration of the demonology of Gregory of Nazianzus.\(^79\) By showing the importance of ideas of the demonic in Gregory's work, Kalleres also challenged the traditional view that the rich and complex demonology of Evagrius Ponticus should

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\(^{76}\) Smith, ‘How Thin?’.


be traced to his later ascetic experiences, rather than his earlier training under Gregory.\textsuperscript{80}

This problem also reaches much further than Evagrian scholarship, as some comments of Ramsay MacMullen illustrate. Discussing the place of Christian accounts of miracles and exorcisms in encouraging conversion to Christianity, MacMullen suggests that accounts of demonic exorcisms such as those found in Athanasius’ \textit{Vita Antonii} would have had the most impact ‘among the simple folk illuminated by ascetic experience’.\textsuperscript{81} He implies, by contrast, that such accounts would have had little effect on ‘the learned and intellectual’.\textsuperscript{82} Once again, we see a divide being created between ‘learned’ Christianity on the one hand and ‘simple’ or ‘ascetic’ Christianity on the other. For MacMullen, it appears, beliefs about demons can only be understood in the context of this, supposedly uneducated Christianity.

In focusing on the works of Eusebius, a prominent bishop and leading scholar of the time,\textsuperscript{83} this study therefore goes some way towards filling a gap that presently exists in scholarship on early Christian demonology. It also demonstrates some of the benefits that can result from analysing, rather than dismissing, ideas about demons in the works of educated fourth-century Christian leaders. In doing so, this study echoes that of Kalleres in highlighting the need for further exploration of references to demons in the writings of intellectual Christian elites.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. 187-88.
\textsuperscript{81} MacMullen, \textit{Christianizing the Roman Empire}, 112.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Eusebius’ prominence is clear from the fact that he delivered speeches on important religious and imperial occasions – see, for example, \textit{VC} 1.1.1, 4.33.1-2, 4.45.3-46.1. Constantine’s request that Eusebius provide him with fifty copies of the Bible for churches in Constantinople suggests that Eusebius’ scholarship was highly regarded at the time – see \textit{VC} 4.36.1-4.
Finally, brief mention of questions of translation and terminology must be made at the outset of this study. I refer throughout to ‘demons’ rather than the alternative ‘daemons’ or ‘daimons’, which represent more neutral translations of the ancient Greek δαίμων. Scholars working on late antique demonology have differed in their choice of the best translation for this word. Coggan adopted ‘demon’ when referring to Jewish or Christian uses of the term, and ‘daemon’ for the more traditional Greek usage. This, she suggested, accurately reflected the different moral connotations which these different writers attached to the term. 84 Such an approach, however, has rightly been criticised by Dale Martin on the grounds that it might convey the false impression that late antique writers were themselves using different terms. 85 We therefore need to make a choice between the different English terms and must use the same term consistently, regardless of the religious views of the writer under discussion. Martin’s own preference for ‘daimon’ makes perfect sense in the context of a book which is, for the most part, concerned with earlier Greek uses of the word. 86 It would not be appropriate here, however. Like Brakke, who also studied early Christian ideas about demons, I have therefore opted to use the English ‘demon’. 87 This more accurately reflects the negative character of these beings for Eusebius than would the more neutral ‘daemon’.

84 Coggan, Pandæmonia, 3.
85 Martin, Inventing Superstition, xi.
86 Ibid. x.
87 Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk, 5.
Chapter Outline

The following study is divided into six chapters. The first of these gives an overview of Eusebius’ ouevre, addressing, as necessary, any questions of dating and authenticity. This chapter attempts to situate Eusebius’ various works in relation to each other and to set them in the context of the political and religious developments of the time. In the second chapter we will turn our attention to Eusebius’ ideas about demons. Benefitting from recent work on early Christian demonology, particularly by G.A. Smith, this chapter will show that demons were far more than merely a useful rhetorical tool for Eusebius. On the contrary, it will demonstrate that Eusebius had a strikingly physical understanding of the demonic and also believed firmly in the reality of demonic power and their ability to cause harm. It will therefore argue that we need to move beyond readings of Eusebius’ demons simply as metaphors.

The third chapter will explore the implications of Eusebius’ understanding of demons for his broader cosmology. It will show that Eusebius’ belief in a stark divide between the benevolent Christian God and the malevolent demons was reflected in a series of further polarised divisions in his thought. As a result, this chapter will ask and answer the question of whether or not Eusebius’ cosmology should be characterised as ‘dualistic’.

From the fourth chapter onwards, we will begin to engage with those aspects of Eusebius’ thought that may be seen as more obviously ‘political’. The fourth chapter itself will offer an unprecedented study of the language of agency and responsibility in Eusebius’ works. It will move beyond an anachronistic

88 Smith, ‘How Thin?’.
terminology of ‘free will’ to demonstrate the importance of the concept of προαίρεσις (loosely translated ‘choice’) in Eusebius’ understanding of moral responsibility. In consequence, we will see the great importance which Eusebius attached to the development of personal virtue in order to resist demonic attacks and achieve salvation. This chapter also sheds new light on Eusebius’ presentation of the problematic figure of Licinius.

The fifth chapter will address the role of demons in Eusebius’ view of salvation history. Eusebius’ understanding of the purpose of history has long been regarded as central to his perception of the events of his lifetime, particularly to his view of the Roman empire. This chapter will suggest, however, that Eusebius’ outlook was rather less ‘sanguine’ than scholars have generally believed. Where scholars have suggested in the past that Eusebius considered all demonic power to have effectively ceased with the incarnation, this chapter will find evidence that Eusebius believed demons still to be active in his own time. This will lead to a reconsideration of Eusebius’ presentation of the role of the church and the empire in his works.

Finally, the sixth chapter will turn to those questions of sovereignty and imperial virtue that have traditionally dominated work on Eusebius’ political thought. Rather than focusing on Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine, however, this chapter will be primarily concerned with Eusebius’ presentation of tyranny. It will show that Eusebius believed non-Christian rulers to be enslaved to malevolent

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89 The nuances of this term, and the difficulty of translating it, will be discussed below, in Chapter IV.
90 See, for example: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 168-89; Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 236-58, 242.
91 Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 91.
demons, making them, in his view, incapable of governing. Moreover, it will suggest that, as a result of a multi-layered process of μίμησις (imitation), Eusebius believed impious tyranny to be, not merely unpleasant in practical terms, but morally corrupting and therefore damaging to human salvation. Lastly, it will consider the implications of Eusebius’ understanding of tyranny for his presentation of Constantine.

Each chapter will explore a slightly different aspect of Eusebius’ thought, although clear connections between these various elements will emerge over the course of the study. Moreover, a clear picture of Eusebius will develop over the following chapters. It is a picture that is at odds with the present scholarly consensus on Eusebius’ optimistic outlook. While not wishing by any means to dismiss the positive elements of Eusebius’ thought, or to deny the profound relief with which he must surely have greeted Constantine’s patronage of the church, I would suggest that this side of Eusebius has been somewhat over-emphasised in the scholarship so far. It is time to rebalance our characterisation of Eusebius by recognising that he also had doubts, fears and hesitations. In the shifting political and religious climate of the early fourth century, such a figure is surely far more credible than the ‘unreserved optimist’ we have been presented with in the past.
CHAPTER I

EUSEBIUS’ WORKS

Before turning to a full examination of Eusebius’ ideas about demons, it is important to give some consideration to the nature of – and challenges posed by – the material in which those ideas were expressed. Eusebius was a prolific writer and a large number of his works survive, either in full, or in large parts. We also have extensive fragments of other works, and ancient translations of some of his writings which are now lost in the original Greek. Besides this, the titles remain of several further works that have been entirely lost. Eusebius did not mention demons in all of his works, and even some of those which do refer to δαίμονες contain only brief, passing references. To take only a couple of examples, the Contra Marcellum (CM) contains no uses of the term δαίμων, while the De ecclesiastica theologia (De eccl. theol.) briefly mentions δαίμονες once, and contains one further reference to ‘demonic activity’. To an extent, these gaps may be the result of the different purposes and audiences of Eusebius’ various works. A text such as the Onomasticon (Onom.), an account of scriptural place-names, offers little scope for discussion of the demonic and, unsurprisingly, contains only one, passing mention of Christ’s healing of those possessed by demons, in reference to the location of Gergesa in Mark 5:1. Lengthy discussion of demons would quite simply have been out of place in such a text.

93 De eccl. theol. 1.12.4.4 and 1.12.10.6 (ἐνεγείρῃ δαίμονις). For the sake of consistency, I have opted throughout to use the standard Latin titles for Eusebius’ works, as given in CPG, where these exist. Where there is no standard Latin title – for instance, with some lost works – I have opted for a Greek or Latin title based on the account of either Photius or Jerome.

94 Onom. 74.13: ἐνθὰ τοὺς δαίμονιστας ὁ κύριος ἰάσατο.
Nevertheless, demons appear in enough of Eusebius’ works both to
demonstrate that they formed an important part of his understanding of the
universe and to provide a sound basis for study. Moreover, they are not confined to
one particular ‘genre’ of Eusebius’ works, but appear throughout a range of
writings, composed at various points throughout his life. This is significant, for
some scholars have attempted in the past to tie apparent changes in elements of
Eusebius’ thought, such his eschatology or his political ideas, to external political
and religious developments.\textsuperscript{95} Scholars such as D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, for instance,
posited a decline in Eusebius’ interest in ‘conventional’ apocalyptic eschatology as
the earthly success of the church increased with the patronage of Constantine.\textsuperscript{96} The
fact that demons are prominent even in works written towards the end of Eusebius’
life, most notably the \textit{Vita Constantini (VC)} and \textit{Oratio de laudibus Constantini (LC)},
means that it is impossible to make a similar argument concerning Eusebius’ ideas
about demons.

Simply owing to the fact that demons appear more frequently in some of
Eusebius’ works than in others, there are certain texts that will feature particularly
heavily in this thesis. The \textit{Praeparatio Evangelica (PE)} and \textit{Demonstratio Evangelica
(DE)} contain lengthy descriptions of demons, their origins and activities. The
\textit{Historia ecclesiastica (HE)} and \textit{VC} show demons at work in human history. It is
therefore these works that will be discussed most often, supplemented as

\textsuperscript{95} For example: Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’; W. Tabbernee, ‘Eusebius’ “Theology of Persecution”: As
Seen in the Various Drafts of his \textit{Church History}, \textit{JECS} 5 (1997), 319-34; Schott, \textit{Christianity, Empire and
the Making of Religion}, 155; Twomey, \textit{Apostolikos Thronos}, 5, 7; R.M. Grant, \textit{Eusebius as Church Historian
}(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 1. Arguing for development, although by no means rupture, in
Eusebius’ understanding of history, see: Cameron, ‘Rethinking’.

67} (1974), 63. This view has, however, been challenged in particular by: F.S. Thielma, ‘Another Look
appropriate by references to other works by Eusebius, particularly the *Contra Hieroclem (CH)* in chapter IV and the *LC* in chapter VI. These six works, which are most relevant to the remainder of the thesis, will be the main focus of this chapter, although there will also be some brief discussion of Eusebius’ other works, in order to help set them in context.

It is important to consider how Eusebius’ various works fit together, as in many cases the date, ‘genre’ and purpose of Eusebius’ writings have been the subject of considerable uncertainty and debate. At times, even the authenticity of particular works, especially the *VC* and *CH*, has been disputed. Questions of dating are made still more complex because in several cases Eusebius himself appears to have undertaken considerable revision of his work, producing more than one edition of the same work. This is most famously the case with the *HE*, in which we have been left with different variations clearly composed before and after the defeat and disgrace of Constantine’s former co-emperor Licinius. Since the question of a work’s date can affect our interpretation of its purpose and character, it is necessary to establish at the outset which date appears most convincing for each work. Alongside this, this chapter will also explore questions of the ‘genre’ and original audience of these works in order to see how this may have influenced what Eusebius had to say about demons on different occasions.

First, the chapter will begin by briefly discussing issues of ‘genre’ and, more specifically, how far Eusebius’ works may be regarded as works of ‘apologetic’. This will be followed by a survey of some of the debates surrounding Eusebius’ various works, beginning – in tentative chronological order – with those works which are discussed most often in this thesis, and progressing to a brief discussion of some of
Eusebius’ other works. Finally, the chapter will conclude by considering a methodological challenge posed by Eusebius’ works. In view of the variety within Eusebius’ oeuvre, I will ask how far it is possible to discuss Eusebius’ thought – political, historical, demonological, and so forth – without imposing false coherence onto a diverse range of texts.

The Question of ‘Genre’

The question of the ‘genre’ of many of Eusebius’ works has proved particularly intractable for scholars and is therefore worth briefly addressing upfront. The debates surrounding the ‘genre’ of some of Eusebius’ most famous works, most notably the VC and HE, make it clear that many of Eusebius’ works cannot be straightforwardly assigned to separate categories. Eusebius is often regarded as something of a literary innovator – indeed, he claims as much for himself. If Eusebius was attempting to produce new and innovative works, this might explain the difficulty of assigning his writings to particular ‘genres’. Yet Eusebius’ originality should not be overstated. As David DeVore has noted in the case of the HE, ‘it is a priori doubtful that the Ecclesiastical History either fell from the sky,


98 For example: Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 26; R.W. Burgess, Studies in Eusebian and Post-Eusebian Chronography, with the assistance of Witold Witakowski, Historia Einzelschriften 135 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999), 73; Johnson, ‘Introduction’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 11; Verdoner, Narrated Reality, 1, 4; Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 82; Cameron, ‘Form and Meaning’, 72.

99 For example at: HE 1.1.3; LC Prol.2; PE 1.3.5.
distinctively formed and alien to the classical tradition, or that its lines of participation in Greek historiographical genres are untraceable’. The same could be said of many of Eusebius’ other works as well. However hard he strove to be original, Eusebius could not help but be influenced by existing works and the prior expectations of his audience. As a result, the VC has been described as ‘a literary hybrid’, while even DeVore’s attempt to encourage a more considered discussion of the ‘genre’ of the HE resulted in the conclusion that this text combines elements of ‘heresiology, apology… martyr drama… [and] national, war, and intellectual historiography’, demonstrating the difficulty of describing the ‘genre’ of such works with any precision.

Moreover, for some scholars, Eusebius’ works have far too much in common to allow them to be assigned to separate ‘genres’. Sharron Coggan, for instance, felt that Eusebius ‘seems always to be engaged in apologetics’. Michael Frede similarly questioned why, on a broad understanding of the term ‘apologetic’, a treatise such as Eusebius’ Quaestiones Evangelicae should not be classified as an apology. In large part, this surely reflects more widespread scholarly uncertainty about where to draw the boundaries of an ‘apologetic genre’. Recent scholarship has come to see the traditional understanding of Christian apologetic as directed

100 DeVore, ‘Genre’, 19.
101 Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 27.
103 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 17.
105 For some expressions of this uncertainty, see the contributions in Edwards et al., eds., Apologetics in the Roman Empire. For analysis of this volume in particular, as well as the question of ‘apologetics’ in general, see: A. Cameron, ‘Apologetics in the Roman Empire – A Genre of Intolerance?’, in J.M. Carrié and R. Lìzzi Testa, eds., ‘Humana Sapit’: Études d’antiquité tardive offertes à Lellia Cracco Ruggini (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 219-27.
primarily at a hostile external audience in defence of the Christian position as unhelpfully restrictive. Indeed, several scholars have denied the existence of a clear-cut ‘apologetic genre’ altogether.106 Averil Cameron, for instance, suggested that apologetics represent, ‘not a genre but a tone or method of argument’.107 Frances Young likewise distinguished between the ‘surface-genre’ and the ‘apologetic character’ of various works written in defence of the Christian faith during the second century, similarly implying that ‘apologetics’ should not be seen as a fixed genre.108

This, indeed, is in line with Eusebius’ own use of the term ἀπολογία (apology). As Frede noted, while Eusebius’ use of the term at times appears to refer to a narrow group of works addressed to Roman emperors and governors in defence of Christianity, in other cases, he adopts a broader understanding of the term.109 For instance, Frede notes that the only one of Eusebius’ works which he himself expressly referred to as an ‘apology’, the *Apologia pro Origene*,110 is ‘not an apologetic writing even in an extended sense, since it does not involve a response to an attack on Christianity, or on a Christian on account of his Christianity’.111 Thus it appears that in Eusebius’ usage ἀπολογία could refer to a range of texts far wider than that traditionally classified by scholars as Christian apologetics. We should therefore avoid trying to identify particular features of an ‘apologetic genre’, but

108 Young, ‘Greek Apologists of the Second Century’, 82.
110 Although the Latin title is not, of course, Eusebius’ own, he does describe the work as an ἀπολογία at HE 6.33.4. This text was not exclusively the work of Eusebius, but was written in conjunction with his mentor Pamphilus during the latter’s imprisonment. For more on this, see below, p. 74-75.
111 Frede, ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 225.
recognise instead that for early Christians works of a variety of different literary forms could share a common apologetic purpose.

As the validity of the concept of an ‘apologetic genre’ has been questioned, so too has the assumption that the purpose of apologetics was exclusively a defence against hostile external attacks. Cameron suggested that ‘one function of apologetic has clearly to do with the search for identity and self-definition’, arguing that the writing of apologetic did not cease with the apparent triumph of the church under Constantine, but continued long into the fourth century in the genres of biblical commentary and exegesis. Aaron Johnson has similarly argued that early Christian apologetic literature was ‘fundamentally about the formation of identity’, and has expertly highlighted the key role played by questions of ‘ethnic’ identity in one of Eusebius’ major ‘apologetic’ writings, the PE. Thus, as Young has argued, apologetics could have in view an audience as much of ‘insiders’ as of those hostile either to Christianity or to a particular version of it. When we adopt this broader understanding of the nature and purpose of apologetic literature, it becomes clear that Coggan and Frede were right to see much of the Eusebian corpus as sharing a common apologetic thread.

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113 Cameron, ‘Apologetics’, 226.
114 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 1.
Even so, noting the similarity of purpose between Eusebius’ works, whilst valuable, only takes us so far.\textsuperscript{117} To appreciate Eusebius’ thought, we need also to recognise that, in order to achieve his apologetic goals, Eusebius produced a variety of very different works. These were often apparently aimed at slightly different audiences and made slightly different points, albeit in support of overarching goals of shaping Christian identity and promoting the Christian message, as it appeared to Eusebius. These differences could have an effect both on what Eusebius chose to say in each work, and on how he chose to say it. As Averil Cameron and Stuart Hall noted, Eusebius was capable of using a particular ‘language and literary manner’ in order to appeal to different and varied audiences.\textsuperscript{118} There are therefore clear differences of emphasis between many of his works. We can only begin to appreciate what effect such differences might have had on his presentation of his political and demonological ideas if we acknowledge the differences between his various works, as well as their similarities.

In order to highlight both the connections and the differences between Eusebius’ various writings, I will first survey in tentative chronological order those of his works which are most important to this thesis. This will then be followed by consideration of Eusebius’ other remaining and fragmentary works. The reader is also directed to the chronological table on p. 12-13 for a summary of my views on the – often contested – dating of various works.

\textsuperscript{117} As Frede recognised: ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 224.
\textsuperscript{118} Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 34.
Contra Hieroclem

The CH, a short, one-book treatise, has been variously dated by scholars anywhere from before the beginning of persecution in 303 to its end in 313.\footnote{Before 303: T.D. Barnes, ‘Sossianus Hierocles and the Antecedents of the “Great Persecution”’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 80 (1976), 240-41. Around 311-13: Quasten, Patrology iii, 334; Carré, Library, 38; Ulrich, Euseb und die Juden, 52, n.105; É. Des Places, ‘Le Contre Hiérocles d’Eusèbe de Césarée à la lumière d’une édition récente’, Studia Patristica 19 (1989), 38. The most recent editions of this work are: Eusebius, Contre Hiérocles, ed. É. Des Places, trans. with intro. and notes by M. Forrat, Sources Chrétiennes 333 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986) and the version in Philostratus, Apollonius of Tyana, vol. 3: Letters of Apollonius, Ancient Testimonia, Eusebius’ Reply to Hierocles, ed. and trans. C.P. Jones, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). In citing this work, I have followed the division into chapters and sections adopted by Jones.} Often classified in catalogues of Eusebius’ works as an ‘apology’,\footnote{120 For example: Quasten, Patrology iii, 333-34; CPG ii, 269; Moreau, ‘Eusebius von Caesarea’, 1067.} it in many ways conforms to the traditional understanding of apologetics.\footnote{As Frede noted: ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 223.} The CH was written in response to a work by Hierocles, a high-ranking imperial official, and persecutor of Christians,\footnote{On Hierocles’ career, see M. Forrat, ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius, Contre Hiérocles, ed. É. Des Places and trans. M. Forrat, Sources Chrétiennes 333 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986), 11-18.} entitled either The Lover of Truth or The Truth-Loving Discourse.\footnote{For a discussion of this title, see: T. Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth and Eusebius the Sophist’, Symbolae Oloenses 67 (1992), 138-50.} Since this work no longer survives, its contents can only be reconstructed from references in Eusebius’ CH, as well as in Lactantius’ Divine Institutes, which also mentions Hierocles’ treatise.\footnote{Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 140; Lact. Div.Inst. 5.2.12.} It seems, however, that Hierocles’ work consisted of a lengthy comparison between Jesus and Apollonius of Tyana, which Eusebius used the CH to refute.\footnote{S. Borzi, ‘Sull’autenticità del Contra Hieroclem di Eusebio di Cesarea’, Augustinianum 43 (2003), 400-01.}

Some scholars have questioned whether Eusebius was really the author of the CH; their arguments, however, fail to convince. The question of the authenticity of the CH was first raised by Tomas Hägg,\footnote{Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 147-50.} whose doubts later found support from...
Timothy Barnes,¹²⁷ and, most recently, from Aaron Johnson.¹²⁸ However, Hägg’s arguments are far from convincing and have been challenged by both C.P. Jones and S. Borzi.¹²⁹ Hägg suggests that the style of the CH, which demonstrates familiarity with the techniques of the Second Sophistic movement, is unlike that of Eusebius’ other writings.¹³⁰ However, in separate articles both Jones and C. Smith have identified the influence of the Second Sophistic in other works by Eusebius, the authenticity of which has never been doubted. Jones notes several parallels between the language of the CH and book 6 of the PE,¹³¹ while Smith points to Second Sophistic techniques in the panegyric on the dedication of the Church at Tyre which is preserved in book 10 of the HE.¹³² Borzi likewise drew attention to the similarity of theme and expression between chapters 45-47 of the CH, and book 6 of the PE¹³³—a point reinforced by the study of Eusebius’ ideas of moral responsibility in chapter IV below, which also finds much in common between book 6 of the PE and the later chapters of the CH.

A further point raised by Hägg is that Eusebius, unusually, does not quote from the Bible in the CH;¹³⁴ however, Eusebius did not use direct biblical quotations

¹²⁷ T.D. Barnes, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea’, Expository Times 121.1 (2009), 1. To avoid confusion with other articles, I will refer to this article throughout as Expository Times 121.1 (2009).
¹²⁸ A.P. Johnson, ‘The Author of the Against Hierocles: A Response to Borzi and Jones’, JTS 64 (2013), 574-94. Here, Johnson is modifying his earlier position, in which he found Hägg’s arguments ‘insufficient to reject its [the CH’s] authenticity’: ‘Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica as Literary Experiment’, in S.F. Johnson, ed., Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 68, n.11.
¹³⁰ Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 147-49.
¹³⁴ Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 147.
in his LC either and scholars have remarked on the largely classical language of that oration.\(^{135}\) Eusebius was therefore perfectly able to adapt his style to suit his audience and this absence of biblical citation should certainly not be taken as proof that the work is not Eusebian. Thirdly, Hägg notes that Eusebius does not refer to the CH, or quote from it, in his other works.\(^{136}\) Although Eusebius tended to refer back to his other works where relevant, this is hardly conclusive, and must be set against compelling arguments in favour of the work’s Eusebian authorship. As Hägg recognises, these include the fact that all the manuscripts attribute the work to Eusebius.\(^{137}\) In consequence it seems clear that the CH should be accepted as a genuine work of Eusebius.

This leaves only the question of the date of the CH. Barnes, before he rejected the work’s authenticity, placed it before 303, partly on the grounds of style, and partly because it does not refer to Porphyry’s Against the Christians,\(^{138}\) for which Barnes suggested an unusually late date of c.300.\(^{139}\) Yet there are several good reasons for preferring a date later than 303 for the CH instead. These include the fact that Lactantius suggests that Hierocles’ treatise was not published until after

\(^{135}\) For example: Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 79; Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 29.

\(^{136}\) Ibid. 147.


\(^{139}\) T.D. Barnes, ‘Scholarship or Propaganda? Porphyry’s Against the Christians and Its Historical Setting’, BICS 39 (1994), 53-65; cf. T.D. Barnes, ‘Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and Attribution of Fragments’, JTS 24 (1973), 442. The date traditionally given to this work is c.268-75 – see, for example: R.M. Grant, ‘Porphyry Among the Early Christians’, in W. den Boer et al., eds., Romanitas and Christianitas: Studia I.H. Waszink (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1973), 181-87; A. Cameron, ‘The Date of Porphyry’s ΚΑΤΑ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΟΝ’, CQ 17 (1967), 382-84. It should be noted, however, that Barnes’ dating of the CH and Against the Christians tends towards circularity, with the dates he gives to each work dependent in part on his dating of the other. See, for example: Barnes, ‘Scholarship or Propaganda’, 59.
beginning of the persecution. Although Barnes suggested that Lactantius, who heard the work in Nicomedia, was not aware that it had earlier been published in the east, where Eusebius would have encountered it, this is purely speculative, and Lactantius’ remark remains a point in favour of a later date for the CH. Moreover, in his De martyribus Palaestinae (Mart. Pal.), usually dated to c. 311, Eusebius refers to Hierocles as a persecutor, yet he makes no mention of the CH, as one might expect if he had already written the work. This suggests that Eusebius wrote the CH after the Mart. Pal., putting it in late 311 at the earliest. It is, however, difficult to believe that Eusebius would have written this small apology at the same time as he was working on the enormous PE and DE, on which work is generally believed to have begun around 313. As a result, the most likely date for the CH seems to be c. 312, and this is the date suggested in the most recent editions of the text.

**Historia Ecclesiastica**

Next in chronological order comes the first edition of what was to become arguably Eusebius’ most famous work, the HE. This work appeared in several editions –

140 Lact. Div. Inst. 5.2.2.
141 Barnes, ‘Sossianus Hierocles’, 242-43. Forrat, in contrast to Barnes, suggests that Lactantius, based in the capital of Nicomedia, would have been aware of Hierocles’ work before Eusebius, who, she suggests, is unlikely to have encountered it earlier than 311: ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius, Contre Hiéroclès, 25-26
142 See discussion below, p. 65-66.
144 See below, p. 51-53.
the exact number is disputed – over the course of at least a decade, but for the sake of convenience the various editions of this work will be discussed together here.

The HE, which survives in an edition of ten books, covers the history of the church from its beginning with Christ to the events of Eusebius’ own lifetime. It is often regarded as a ground-breaking work, the beginning of a genre of ecclesiastical history that would be continued by Eusebius’ fifth-century successors. In his preface to the work, Eusebius emphasised that he was attempting to produce something new, describing himself as ‘the first to set upon this purpose’. The first seven books cover the period up to Eusebius’ lifetime, including an extended discussion of the life of Origen in book 6. Book 8 describes the events of the persecution that began in 303, overlapping significantly in terms of content with another of Eusebius’ works, the De martyribus Palaestinae. In three of

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151 HE 1.1.3: …πρώτοι γίνον τῆς ύποθέσεως ἐπιβάντες…

152 Eusebius’ biographical presentation of Origen in HE 6 has been excellently analysed by Cox, Biography in Late Antiquity, 69-101. Cameron has highlighted the similarities between Eusebius’ approach to writing the biography of Origen, and his later approach in the Vita Constantini: Cameron, ‘Construction’, 153.

153 Barns, C&E, 149-50.
its manuscripts, book 8 also contains a section known as the Appendix,\textsuperscript{154} which covers the gruesome deaths of the persecuting emperors. In book 9 the work addresses the end of the persecution, the defeat of the persecutors, and the victory of the Christian emperors Constantine and Licinius. The final book celebrates the success of the church following this victory and consists in large part of a speech which Eusebius delivered at the dedication of the Church at Tyre in 315,\textsuperscript{155} as well as a variety of documents showing Constantine’s favour towards the church. The later chapters of this book were evidently added after Constantine’s defeat of Licinius in 324, as they outline the actions which Eusebius suggests had brought Licinius to destruction.\textsuperscript{156}

The final, revised edition of the HE was clearly completed shortly after Licinius’ defeat in 324;\textsuperscript{157} however, the question of the date, and length, of its first edition has proved much more controversial. There are two main camps into which scholars divide on this issue. The first, adopted by E. Schwartz in his edition of the text, argues for a first edition in eight books, appearing in c.312,\textsuperscript{158} while the second puts a first edition of seven books much earlier, before the outbreak of the persecution in 303.\textsuperscript{159} The most notable champion of an early date in recent years

\textsuperscript{154} The Appendix is found in manuscripts AER: T. Christensen, ‘The So-Called Appendix to Eusebius’ Historia Ecclesiastica VIII’, Classica et Mediaevalia 34 (1983), 177-209.
\textsuperscript{155} HE 10.4. For the date, see: Barnes, C&E, 162.
\textsuperscript{156} HE 10.8.2-10.9.5.
\textsuperscript{157} As is widely acknowledged by, for example: Verdoner, Narrated Reality, 38; F. Winkelmann, ‘Historiography in the Age of Constantine’, in G. Marasco, ed., Greek and Roman Historiography in Late Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 23; Barnes, C&E, 150; Carriker, Library, 40; A. Louth, ‘The date of Eusebius’ Historia Ecclesiastica’, fTS 41 (1990), 111; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 39; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 2.
\textsuperscript{159} A brief, if now somewhat outdated, summary of the two positions can be found in Quasten, Patrology iii, 315.
has been Barnes, putting the first edition before 300. However, the arguments in favour of an early date have been convincingly disproved in recent years by the work of R. Burgess and A. Louth, and there are several compelling reasons for believing that the first edition consisted of at least eight, if not nine books, and was published shortly after the end of the persecution, around 313. Indeed, even Barnes now accepts that Burgess and Louth have disproved his theory of an early first edition.

The content of the first eight books of the HE suggests that they were written after 303, for there are several references in the first seven books to the events of the persecution, including in the preface to book 1 when Eusebius states that he will refer to the ‘martyrdoms of our lifetime’. Although these could be later additions, this would imply extensive revision of the first seven books, for which there is no evidence. Moreover, the biography of Origen which occupies most of book 6 appears to be based on the largely lost Apologia pro Origene, which Eusebius helped his mentor Pamphilus to complete during the latter’s imprisonment in 308-10.

Crucially, however, there is simply no manuscript evidence for an edition of 303,
making its existence purely speculative. Consequently it appears most likely that
the first edition of the HE was written in response to the events of the persecution
and appeared c.313 in eight or nine books. The tenth book can only have been
added after 315, since it is made up largely of a speech which Eusebius delivered in
that year. This book was then extended sometime after 324 to address the defeat
of Licinius.

Establishing even a broad outline of the dates of these editions is essential to
any assessment of the purpose and character of the HE, as many of those involved
in these debates have recognised. Giving an early date to the first edition of the
HE allowed Barnes to present it as ‘contemporary evidence for the standing of the
Christian Church in Roman society in the late third century’, revealing ‘the
optimistic assumptions of a Christian writing in the reign of Diocletian before
persecution threatened’. By contrast, the later date of c.313, after the persecution,
sets the work in a completely different context and forces us, in Burgess’ phrase, to
look at it ‘in the light of… propaganda and apologetic, not of confidence, peace and
pure scholarship’. Burgess is by no means the only scholar to have identified a
strong apologetic element in the HE, with A.J. Droge suggesting that Eusebius used
his version of history to defend the church against the attacks of its opponents. In
line with the broader understanding of ‘apologetic’ outlined above, Marie Verdoner

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167 Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 484.
168 Barnes, C&E, 162.
169 Louth, ‘The date’, 123; Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 496; T.D. Barnes, ‘Some Inconsistencies in
170 Barnes, ‘Some inconsistencies’, 471.
171 Barnes, C&E, 146.
172 Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 496.
also recognised that the HE played a role in ‘shaping… the self-understanding of the Christians’,\textsuperscript{174}

\textit{Praeparatio Evangelica and Demonstratio Evangelica}

The \textit{PE} and \textit{DE} clearly merit combined discussion.\textsuperscript{175} Although both works can stand independently – and, indeed, have received independent treatment from scholars\textsuperscript{176} – they were expressly envisaged by Eusebius as part of the same larger project,\textsuperscript{177} originally running to thirty-five books in total. The \textit{PE}, of which we have all fifteen books intact, has been described as ‘the culmination (though by no means the end) of the apologetic tradition’.\textsuperscript{178} Together with the \textit{DE}, of which only the first ten books, together with fragments of the fifteenth book, survive from an original total of twenty books,\textsuperscript{179} this work was clearly an enormous undertaking. Although the date of these works is generally placed between \textit{c}.313 and \textit{c}.325, the date of the Council of Nicaea,\textsuperscript{180} there is considerably more disagreement about their purpose and audience.

\textsuperscript{174} Verdoner, \textit{Narrated Reality}, 1.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{PE} 1.1.1: Τὸν Χριστιανισμὸν, ὅ τι ποτὲ ἐστιν, ἔγονεμον τοῖς ὑμῖν εἰδὸς παραστῆσασθαι διὰ τῆς προκειμένης προγραμματεῖας τὴν εὐαγγελικὴν ἀπόδειξιν περιέχειν ἐπαγγελλομένης…
\textsuperscript{177} Johnson, \textit{Ethnicity and Argument}, 11.
\textsuperscript{178} Moreau, ‘Eusebius von Caesarea’, 1068. The original number of books for the \textit{PE} and \textit{DE} is given in Phot. \textit{Bibl.}, 9-10.
Barnes believed that the combined work was intended as a ‘systematic and definitive refutation of Porphyry’, whose treatise, *Contra Christianum*, represented a serious attack on Christian belief.\(^{181}\) As such, Barnes considered the *PE* and *DE* to have been aimed primarily at an audience of ‘sympathetic pagans’.\(^{182}\) More recent work has challenged this, however, arguing that it is wrong to see the *PE* and *DE* primarily as a response to the work of Porphyry.\(^{183}\) As noted above, Johnson’s insightful work on the *PE* has revealed that these works may have been intended as much to help shape Christian identity among those already within the church as to refute attacks from those outside.\(^{184}\) This certainly corresponds to Eusebius’ declaration at the start of the *PE* that he envisaged this first part of the work as being most suitable for ‘those who have just come to us from the nations’, while the *DE* would provide further instruction for those who had either just read the *PE*, or who already had a more advanced understanding of Christianity from other sources.\(^{185}\) This suggests that both the *PE* and the *DE* were aimed, at least in part, at an internal audience, perhaps of recent converts.

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\(^{182}\) Barnes, *C&E*, 178.

\(^{183}\) S. Morlet, ‘Eusebius’ Polemic Against Porphyry: A Reassessment’, in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., *Reconsidering Eusebius*, 125-26; Morlet, *La Démonstration Évangélique*, 628; cf. A.P. Johnson, Review of: Sébastien Morlet, ‘La Démonstration évangélique d’Eusèbe de Césarée: Étude sur l’apologétique chrétienne à l’époque de Constantin’, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2010.11.47. Kofsky felt that, while ‘Porphyry was a key figure behind the work’, the *PE* and *DE* were not intended primarily to refute his *Contra Christianum*, but were more broadly directed against opponents of Christianity: *Eusebius Against Paganism*, 313.


\(^{185}\) *PE* 1.1.12: ...καὶ τοῖς ἐς ἱθῶν ἄρτι προσποιοῦσιν ἐφαμέττοντα.
Barnes’ description of the PE as ‘the most majestic and disdainful of all polemics’ hardly does justice to the complexity of either the PE or its companion work, the DE. As Johnson has noted, the PE appears to combine two different genres – apology, and introductory instruction manual. Its purpose therefore seems to be less about defence and more about instruction – Eusebius is providing recent converts with the means to understand their new faith in relation to their former religion, culture and education. Likewise, Sébastien Morlet has suggested that the DE should be regarded as primarily a ‘work of instruction, conceived as a confirmation of the faith and an aid to argumentation’. As such, both these works should be viewed as trying to shape the collective identity of those already within the church and to respond to attacks from outside.

Oratio de laudibus Constantini

It is now widely accepted that the work traditionally known as the Oratio de laudibus Constantini, which was transmitted as part of a lengthy appendix to the VC, in fact consists of two entirely separate speeches. These are the true De laudibus Constantini, consisting of chapters 1-10, and a second oration in chapters 11-18. The

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186 Barnes, C&E, 175.
188 Morlet, La Démonstration Évangélique, 80: ‘une œuvre d’enseignement, conçue comme une confirmation de la foi et une aide à l’argumentation’.
189 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 15.
191 See, for example: Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 30-45; Barnes, ‘Two speeches’; Kannengiesser, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea, Origenist’, 453; Attridge and Hata, ‘Introduction’, 34; C.T.H.R. Ehrhardt, ‘Eusebius and Celsus’, Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 22 (1979); Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 75; Kofsky, Eusebius Against Paganism, 48-50; R. Farina, L’impero e l’imperatore Cristiano in Eusebio di Cesarea: La prima teologia politica del Cristianesimo (Zurich: Pas Verlag, 1966), 14. For the older view, see: Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 44. To make clear the distinction between the two works, I will adopt the practice suggested by Drake of referring to the two speeches by separate titles, the De laudibus Constantini (LC), and De sepulchro Christi (SC), although this is not universal practice.
arguments in favour of seeing this work as two different orations have been convincingly set out by H.A. Drake and Barnes and will only be summarised here.\textsuperscript{192}

A key point raised by Drake is the length of the supposed oration. As one work, Drake suggests that it is far too long to have been delivered as a single speech – a problem which disappears once it is seen as two separate orations.\textsuperscript{193} Drake acknowledges the possibility that the speech might have been rewritten and extended for publication, but doubts that Eusebius would have had the time to enlarge the work so substantially between delivering the speech in 336 and his death in 339, given the amount of other work, including the \textit{VC}, which he was producing at the same time.\textsuperscript{194} Furthermore, in several of the manuscripts of the orations there is evidence of a gap between chapters 10 and 11,\textsuperscript{195} while some manuscripts only contain the first part of the orations.\textsuperscript{196} These two parts are clearly distinct in terms of style and content, with each part comfortably able to stand alone as an independent work.\textsuperscript{197} Finally, a reference in chapter 11 suggests that these later chapters were delivered in Jerusalem,\textsuperscript{198} whereas the \textit{De laudibus Constantini} was, we know from the \textit{VC}, delivered in the imperial palace in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{199}

Consequently it is clear that the two parts of this manuscript should be treated as separate works. The first part is the \textit{De laudibus Constantini}, delivered in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Drake, \textit{In Praise of Constantine}, 30-45; Barnes, ‘Two speeches’.
\item Drake, \textit{In Praise of Constantine}, 30.
\item \textit{Ibid}.
\item Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 341.
\item Drake, \textit{In Praise of Constantine}, 30.
\item Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 341.
\item Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 342; SC 11.2: …πόλεως τε τῆς, ἐνθὲν ὁ σωτῆριος λόγος ἄσπερ ἀπὸ τιθης εἰς πάντας ἀνωμέρησεν ἀνθρώποις…
\item \textit{VC} 4.46.1; Drake, \textit{In Praise of Constantine}, 173, n. 4.
\end{thebibliography}
celebration of the emperor’s tricennalia, most likely in July 336. The second part has been identified instead as the speech which Eusebius gave at the dedication of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in September 335, and labelled by Drake the De sepulchro Christi. As two different speeches, these works would clearly have had different audiences. The audience of the SC would surely have consisted in large part of the bishops and other lay Christians who might be expected to have attended the dedication of a new church and Drake suggests a largely clerical audience on the basis of references at SC 17.6 and 17.11. The possibility that the audience might also have contained important pagans cannot be discounted either. As Drake has noted, however, the internal situation within the church in 335 was ‘theologically charged’, with the dedication of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre closely following the Council of Tyre, at which Eusebius’ opponent Athanasius had been excommunicated. As a result, even if speaking mainly to Christians or even to clerics, Eusebius need not have been addressing an entirely sympathetic audience.

200 Drake and Barnes both reject the traditional dating of July 335 in favour of delivery at the closing festivities of the tricennial year, in July 336: Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 343; H.A. Drake, ‘When was the De Laudibus Constantini delivered?’, Historia 24 (1975), 345-56. The most compelling reason for opting for the later date is Eusebius’ reference in the LC to ‘four Caesars’ (LC 3.4). This means that Dalmatius must already have been made Caesar at the time when the oration was delivered. Since Dalmatius only became Caesar in September 335, that puts the LC at the earliest sometime after then: Drake, ‘When was the LC delivered?’, 347.
201 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 31; Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 343. Eusebius refers to this speech at VC 4.46.1, the same passage in which he promises to attach a copy of his tricennial speech to the end of the VC.
203 Ibid. 36.
204 Ehrhardt suggests that the audience of the SC would have included both ‘influential pagan members of the imperial service’ and ‘recent and superficial converts’: Eusebius and Celsius, 41; Cameron suggests a largely pagan audience: ‘Rethinking’, 78. Johnson argues that it was addressed mainly to ‘critics of Christianity’: Eusebius, 154-55.
205 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 36.
For the LC, delivered at the imperial palace in Constantinople,206 the audience would arguably have been more religiously diverse.207 The audience for this speech certainly included Constantine, and therefore probably many senior officials. The question of the religious balance at Constantine’s court, and how far Christianity had penetrated the ranks of the aristocracy by this point is very much contested.208 However, Cameron and Hall’s suggestion that ‘court circles contained people of all persuasions as well as many who prudently kept their own counsel’ seems perfectly reasonable.209 As such, Eusebius most likely delivered the LC to an audience containing not just Christians and those sympathetic to Christianity, but also to those who were possibly wary of, or even hostile towards Christianity.

This question of the audience of the LC has been used by some to help explain what appears to be a curious feature of the speech.210 The LC does not mention Christ, or Christianity, by name, referring instead to the ‘Logos’.211 One possible reason for this is that Eusebius may have been trying to make his arguments appeal to as wide an audience as possible, including to pagans at Constantine’s court.212 Drake rejects the idea that Eusebius was simply following the conventions of classical rhetoric by omitting Christian language in this speech, on the grounds that, as a bishop, he would have been more interested in expressing his Christianity than

206 VC 4.46.1.
207 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 52; Cameron suggests that it was aimed at a partly pagan audience: ‘Rethinking’, 81.
209 Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 34.
210 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 51-52; Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 78-82.
211 It should be noted, however, that the SC does refer to Christ by name: Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 46. See, for example: SC 16.3, 16.5.
212 Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 81.
Yet, by expressing his ideas in terms that would have been familiar even to non-Christians, Eusebius might have hoped to make his views more easily understood by his audience, and hence more appealing. As Cameron and Hall have noted in connection with the VC, using ‘a language and a literary manner which conform at least in general terms to classical expectations’ would have allowed Eusebius to appeal to an audience of varied religious sentiments.214

*Vita Constantini*

While the debates surrounding these two orations have tended to concern questions of date and audience, the problems that have attended the study of the more famous VC have been rather different.215 For many years the authenticity of the VC was questioned by scholars reluctant to attribute it to Eusebius.216 This was made possible by Jerome’s failure to mention the VC in his catalogue of Eusebius’ works.217 Yet this is far from conclusive, especially since Jerome did not claim to be giving an exhaustive list of all Eusebius’ writings, ending with a reference to Eusebius’ *multa alia* works.218 Indeed, the VC may have appeared far less significant

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214 Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 34.
216 See, for example: W. Seston, ‘Constantine as “Bishop”’, *JRS* 37 (1947), 127-31; H. Grégoire, ‘Eusèbe n’est pas l’auteur de la “Vita Constantinii” dans sa forme actuelle et Constantin ne s’est pas “converti” en 312’, *Byzantion* 13 (1938), 561-83. For a full survey of debates over the authenticity of the VC, see: F. Winkelmann, ‘Zur Geschichte des Authentizitätsproblems der *Vita Constantini*’, *Klio* 40 (1962), 187-243.
217 Jerome *Vir. Inl.* 81; Seston used this as a reason to doubt Eusebius’ authorship of the work: ‘Constantine as “Bishop”’, 127.
218 Jerome, *Vir.Inl.* 81.
to Jerome than it has done to later scholars, for, as Cameron and Hall have shown, the VC was not widely known in the centuries immediately after its publication.\textsuperscript{219} 

To a large extent, scholarly doubts about the authorship of the VC can be traced to a misunderstanding of its nature.\textsuperscript{220} Scholars who wished to find an honest and reliable historian in Eusebius were understandably reluctant to attribute this work, which has been described as ‘fraudulent’ in its presentation of events,\textsuperscript{221} to Eusebius. Indeed Henri Grégoire, who argued strenuously against the Eusebian authorship of the VC, even pointed out that his approach was ‘very fortunate for Eusebius’ memory. For decidedly it is necessary to acquit him of the accusation… of having deliberately falsified history.’\textsuperscript{222} Grégoire’s argument rested in the main on supposed ‘factual inaccuracies’ in the work, and he singled out for particular criticism the discussion of the causes of Constantine’s war against Licinius.\textsuperscript{223} Eusebius suggests that this conflict arose as a result of Licinius’ persecution of Christians, a claim which Grégoire felt Eusebius would have known to be false.\textsuperscript{224} As a result, he attributed the VC to the work of a later forger.\textsuperscript{225} 

However, as Cameron and Hall recognised, the VC is ‘a highly apologetic work’,\textsuperscript{226} one of the aims of which is to support and enhance Constantine’s reputation.\textsuperscript{227} This would have involved defending Constantine’s actions in

\textsuperscript{219} Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 48-49. Cf. Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 74. 
\textsuperscript{220} Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 4-9, 46; Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 8. 
\textsuperscript{221} Elliott, ‘Eusebian Frauds’, 163. 
\textsuperscript{222} Grégoire, ‘Eusèbe n’est pas l’auteur’, 578; ‘Mais dans le présent article, nous nous sommes bornés à un cas… très heureux pour la mémoire d’Eusèbe. Car décidément, il faut l’acquitter de l’accusation… d’avoir délibérément faussé l’histoire.’ 
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid. 582. 
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid. 578. 
\textsuperscript{227} Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 7. Cf. Cameron, ‘Construction’, 152.
attaining sole rule of the empire, particularly the civil wars against fellow emperors like Licinius. Cameron and Hall therefore suggest that the account given in the VC of the war between Constantine and Licinius should be understood in this apologetic light.\footnote{Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 7. \textit{Cf.} Cameron, \textquoteleft Construction\textquoteright , 149-50.} Consequently it is unnecessary to see the presentation of this war as arising from the misunderstanding of a later writer, as Grégoire had imagined.\footnote{Grégoire, \textquoteleft Eusèbe n’est pas l’auteur\textquoteright .} Moreover, Cameron and Hall refute the idea that parts of the VC were the result of later interpolation by pointing to the consistency of the work\textquoteleft s style, noting as well that it is difficult to believe a later writer could have imitated Eusebius\textquoteleft distinctive tone so successfully.\footnote{Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 8. \textit{Cf.} Cameron, \textquoteleft Rethinking\textquoteright , 74.} There remains, finally, the fact that in all its manuscripts the VC is consistently attributed to Eusebius.\footnote{Cameron, \textquoteleft Rethinking\textquoteright , 74.} As a result, the Eusebian authorship of this work is now generally accepted,\footnote{Cameron, \textquoteleft Rethinking\textquoteright , 74.} and discussion has turned instead to questions about its \textquoteleft genre\textquoteright and purpose.

Much of this debate has concerned the manner in which the work was composed. The fact that the VC contains several repetitions and in places appears poorly structured has led many scholars to believe that the work was left unfinished when Eusebius died.\footnote{For example: Barnes, \textit{C&E}, 401, n. 66; Drake, \textit{In Praise of Constantine}, 8-9; Elliott, \textquoteleft Eusebian Frauds\textquoteright , 171; Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 4; Cameron, \textquoteleft Constantinus Christianus\textquoteright , 187; Cameron, \textquoteleft Rethinking\textquoteright , 75; Cameron, \textquoteleft Construction\textquoteright , 146, n.5; C. Dupont, \textquoteleft Décisions et texts constantiniens dans les oeuvres d’Eusèbe de Césarée\textquoteright , \textit{Viator} 2 (1971), 2; Moreau, \textquoteleft Eusebius von Caesarea\textquoteright , 1073-74; Winkelmann, \textquoteleft Zur Geschichte\textquoteright , 242; Farina, \textit{L’impero; Ulrich, Euseb und die Juden}, 55, n.122.} The chapter headings at least were most likely the work of a
later editor, who assembled the work and the speeches appended to it for publication after Eusebius’ death. The varied style of the VC, combining elements of panegyric and biography, together with the extended quotation of documents so characteristic of the HE, has led Barnes to conclude that the VC as we have it was in fact a conflation of two different works, hastily and clumsily assembled by Eusebius. Barnes has even suggested that ‘every sentence of the Life can be assigned with ease to one of its three constituent elements’, which he identifies as ‘an unfinished basilikos logos’, ‘a continuation of the Ecclesiastical History’, and ‘the additions of the editor’. This claim, however, has been rightly criticised by Cameron and Hall, who, while accepting that the work was a ‘literary hybrid’, argue that it cannot be so easily divided into various parts. Even if it were possible to identify two separate drafts of the VC so precisely, it is difficult to see what benefit that would bring, for in combining the two drafts, Eusebius would surely have been intending to create a new work, which is best understood on its own terms. It therefore seems more sensible to consider the work as the whole which it was on its way to becoming, rather than trying to break it apart into its constituent pieces.

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239 Cameron noted that attempting to distinguish between the various revisions of the VC can prevent us appreciating its ‘overall ideology’: Cameron, ‘Construction’, 146.
240 This is the approach recently adopted by Johnson, Eusebius, 146.
The composition of the VC is generally dated to the last two years of Eusebius’ life, between the death of Constantine in 337 and Eusebius’ own death in 339.\textsuperscript{241} Although it has been suggested that Eusebius may have begun research into the project before 337, perhaps as early as 335,\textsuperscript{242} the majority of the writing was most likely carried out during the uncertain years which followed Constantine’s death.\textsuperscript{243} This was a time both of considerable political upheaval and of theological controversy within the church.\textsuperscript{244} The question of the imperial succession remained unsettled, particularly during 337, a year which saw dynastic murders, and led to the division of the empire between Constantine’s three remaining sons.\textsuperscript{245} Meanwhile, 337 also saw Athanasius recalled from exile, meaning Eusebius, who had presided at the Council of Tyre which had excommunicated Athanasius two years earlier, was called upon once again to defend his theological views.\textsuperscript{246} Shortly before, or at around the same time as writing the VC, Eusebius was also working on two treatises intended to refute the views of his theological opponents, the \textit{Contra Marcellum} and \textit{De ecclesiastica theologia}.\textsuperscript{247} In the VC, Eusebius therefore had much to gain from associating himself, and particularly his theological views, as closely as possible with those of the late emperor.\textsuperscript{248} It has therefore been suggested that the

\textsuperscript{241} This dating has been accepted by scholars including: Barnes, \textit{C&E}, 278-79; Carriker, \textit{Library}, 41; Pasquali, ‘Die Composition’ (who, however, mis-dated Eusebius’ death to 338), 386.
\textsuperscript{243} Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 3, 9-12; Pasquali, ‘Die Composition’ 384-86.
\textsuperscript{244} The importance of considering the VC in the context of these wider events has been highlighted by Cameron: ‘Construction’, 153-55.
\textsuperscript{245} For an overview of these events, see: Barnes, \textit{C&E}, 161-63.
\textsuperscript{246} Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 11; Cameron, ‘Construction’, 153-54.
\textsuperscript{247} Cameron, ‘Construction’, 153-54. See below, p. 69 for a discussion of these works.
\textsuperscript{248} Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 11-12; Cameron, ‘Construction’, 167-68; Drake, ‘What Eusebius Knew’, 32.
VC should be seen as a ‘mirror for princes’, encouraging Constantine’s sons to pursue a policy towards the church which Eusebius favoured.  

Other Works

Having examined the debates concerning those of Eusebius’ works which figure most prominently in this thesis, it will be worth briefly considering Eusebius’ other works. Some of these works are referred to on occasion in the chapters which follow, but even those that are not can help to provide an idea of the context in which Eusebius was writing, and of the topics which most interested him. These will, once again, be discussed in tentative chronological order, with the proviso that, as above, many of these works can only be dated quite roughly. The focus first will be on those works which survive mostly intact. Eusebius’ more fragmentary and lost works will then be surveyed separately.

Among Eusebius’ earliest works are the *Canones Evangeliorum*. Dating the *Canones* is difficult, but they are regarded by Barnes as an early work on the grounds that they do not discuss the disputed last twelve verses of the gospel of Mark, which Eusebius was less inclined in later life to reject outright. Following Barnes, Andrew Carriker placed the work in the 290s and suggested that the *Canones* might be ‘a product of Eusebius’ collaboration with Pamphilus’. Described by Jeremy Schott as one of Eusebius’ ‘innovative biblical study aids’, the

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251 Barnes, C&E, 122.
253 Ibid. 16.
Canones presented parallel passages of the gospels laid out in clear tabular form, and were adopted in many later manuscripts of the New Testament. Eusebius outlined the system he had adopted in his Epistula ad Carpianum, which also survives.

The date of the next work to be considered, Eusebius’ Chronicon, has proved particularly controversial in the past, with questions about its date frequently entangled with debates about the various editions of the HE. Barnes, the most vocal recent champion of an early date for the HE, also gave the first edition of the Chronicon an early date, before 295. More convincing, however, as even Barnes has since admitted, is the dating of Burgess, who suggests that the Chronicon was not completed before 311. The Chronicon was undoubtedly written in some form before the HE, since it seems to provide the chronological basis for the history. Moreover, a reference at HE 1.1.6 implies that the Chronicon was already published before the HE was written. This means that the Chronicon must have passed

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255 Grafton and Williams, Christianity and the Transformation of the Book, 198.
256 Nestle, ed., Novum Testamentum Graece, 32*-33*.
257 Eusebius, Chronicorum canonum quae supersunt, ed. A. Schoene, 2 vols (Zurich: Weidmann, 1866, 1875; repr. 1967). This work has been comparatively well-studied and there is an extensive body of secondary literature. Highlights include: Barnes, C&E, 111-20; A.A. Mosshammer, The Chronicle of Eusebius and Greek Chronographic Tradition (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1979); R.W. Burgess, Studies in Eusebian and Post-Eusebian Chronography, with the assistance of Witold Witakowski, Historia Einzelschriften 135 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999); W. Adler, ‘Eusebius’ Chronicle and its legacy’, in Attridge and Hata, eds., Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism, 467-91; Grafton and Williams, Christianity and the Transformation of the Book, 133-77.
258 See, for example: Barnes, ‘The editions’; Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’.
259 Barnes, ‘The editions’, 193; Barnes, C&E, 113.
260 Barnes, Expository Times 121.1 (2009), 5.
261 Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 496.
263 ἤδη μὲν οὖν τούτων καὶ πρότερον ἐν ὑψίστημα ἐπιτιμήθη κατεστημάθη...
through more than one edition, since it reached Jerome in a version that ran until Constantine’s *vicennalia* in 325, long after the first edition of the *HE* was published. Since a date c.313-14 is the latest usually allowed for the first edition of the *HE*, it is clear that an early edition of the *Chronicle* must have been written during the first decade of the fourth century, if not before. The work would surely have taken considerable effort to research and assemble. It therefore seems likely that Eusebius had already embarked on the project before the persecution began in 303, and must have finished it before the first edition of the *HE* in 313.

The *Chronicon* originally consisted of two books, the first of which survives only in an Armenian translation, while the second was translated and extended in Latin by Jerome. Some Greek fragments also survive, alongside two Syriac epitomes of the work. The first book summarised and explained the manner in which Eusebius had combined earlier chronologies to produce the *Chronici canones*, which comprised the second book. This second book then synchronised these various dating systems in parallel columns to produce an overview of the chronology of the human past. Scholars have identified various motives behind Eusebius’ composition of this work: Burgess saw it as an attempt to ‘correct’ the chronology offered by Porphyry in his *Contra Christianum*, while W. Adler suggested that its target might actually have been opponents within the Christian

264 Adler, ‘Eusebius’ *Chronicle*, 481.
265 See discussion above, p. 46-51.
266 On this point I agree with Mosshammer that it is difficult to believe Eusebius would have been able to carry out such difficult and intricate research in a period when Christian communities were disrupted by the persecution: Mosshammer, *Chronicle*, 32.
267 Quasten, *Patrology* iii, 312; Barnes, *C&E*, 112.
268 Barnes, *C&E*, 112.
271 Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 496
community, regarding it as motivated by a desire to refute the millennialist assumptions inherent in the earlier Christian chronographies of writers like Julius Africanus.  

Belonging to a similar period to the first edition of the *Chronicon* is the *De martyribus Palaestinae*, another work which has been discussed in connection with the *HE*. This work, mistaken by some for ‘a full list of all the martyrdoms of the Great Persecution’ in the province of Palestine, is in fact, as Barnes recognised, simply an account of those people Eusebius knew who were martyred between 303 and 311. Eusebius himself stated that his aim in the work was ‘to speak of those with whom I was personally conversant’. It survives now in two versions, the ‘short recension’ in Greek, and the ‘long recension’ in a Syriac translation and some Greek fragments. Much of the material used in the *De martyribus Palaestinae* is also found in book 8 of the *HE*, with two passages in the *HE* identical to ones in the short recension. Barnes has argued convincingly that Eusebius wrote the long recension around 311, since it does not cover events after that date, while the short recension was originally part of the first edition of book 8 of the *HE* in c.313. In a later edition, possibly when he added book 10 of the *HE*, Eusebius seems to have

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277 Quasten, *Patrology* iii, 318.
rewritten Book 8, replacing what is now known as the short recension.\footnote{281} Although the long recension of the De martyribus Palaestinae appeared before the HE, the greater length of the history makes it likely that Eusebius would have been researching and writing both works at a similar time.

The dating of the Onomasticon,\footnote{282} an account of biblical place-names arranged in alphabetical order, has also become linked to debates about the dating of the Chronicle and the HE because of Jerome’s statement in his translation of the Onomasticon that it was written after these two works.\footnote{283} As a result, by arguing for an early date for the Onomasticon, Barnes was able to find further support for his early dating of the HE and the Chronicle.\footnote{284} However, Barnes’ dating of the Onomasticon to before 300 has been described as ‘not very secure’,\footnote{285} and has not been widely accepted, with the majority of writers giving the work a date in the 320s.\footnote{286} Barnes rested his case in part on his belief that it was ‘not plausible’ for Eusebius to have written the Onomasticon either during the persecution, or during the 310s, when he was occupied both by his duties as bishop, and with the composition of the enormous PE and DE.\footnote{287} Yet, given the amount of research that

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{281}{Barnes, ‘The editions’, 200-01.}
\item \footnote{282}{Eusebius, Das Onomastikon der Biblischen Ortsnamen, ed. E. Klostermann, Eusebius Werke III.i, GCS (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1904; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966).}
\item \footnote{283}{Jer. Onom. 3.1-7. See, for example: T.D. Barnes, ‘The composition of Eusebius’ Onomasticon’, JTS 26 (1975), 412-15; Barnes, ‘The editions’, 193.}
\item \footnote{284}{Barnes, ‘The editions’, 193; Barnes, ‘The composition’, 415.}
\item \footnote{285}{Louth, ‘The date’, 118.}
\item \footnote{287}{Barnes, ‘The composition’, 415.}
\end{itemize}
must have been required to produce the work, if this is so, it should surely point to a later date, in the 320s, rather than an earlier one in the 290s.

Louth has offered two compelling reasons for a later date for the *Onomasticon*. Firstly, Jerome’s comment that the *Onomasticon* was written after the *HE* specifically mentions an edition of ten books, which puts it most likely after 324, or at the earliest after about 315. Secondly, the *Onomasticon* is dedicated to a Paulinus, who is described as a ‘holy man of God’. This was most likely the same Paulinus, Bishop of Tyre, to whom Eusebius also dedicated the tenth book of his *HE*. Since this Paulinus most likely became bishop shortly after the persecution, this suggests a date for the *Onomasticon* of no earlier than 313. As this was the period in which Eusebius began work on the *PE* and *DE*, it seems that the *Onomasticon* was in all probability a work of the 320s. Dating the first edition of the *HE* to c.313 is therefore perfectly compatible with Jerome’s statement that this work preceded the *Onomasticon*. A late date for the final publication of the *Onomasticon* does not, however, preclude the possibility that Eusebius was working on compiling it for some time before that.

Usually dated slightly later than the *Onomasticon*, the next work to consider is Eusebius’ best-preserved biblical commentary, the *Commentarii in Isaiam*. This has received excellent treatment in recent years from Michael Hollerich, benefiting

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288 Taylor suggests that its composition ‘would have involved a huge amount of research, both in libraries and on the road’: ‘Introduction’, 4.
289 Louth, ‘The date’, 118.
290 Louth, ‘The date’, 118; *Onom.* 2.3-4: ...ιερεὺς θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος Παυλῖνε... 
291 Louth, ‘The date’, 119; *HE* 10.1.2: ...σοὶ τούτων ἐπιγράψομεν, ἰερώτατός μοι Παυλίνε... 
293 Wallace-Hadrill also added to his dating of the *Onomasticon* the caveat that it would have made use of research done ‘over a number of years’, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 56-57.
294 Hollerich, *Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah*. 


from a new critical edition published in 1975. Hollerich dates the CI to the period between 325 and 328, on the basis partly of internal references to other works, particularly the Onomasticon, and partly of its avoidance of language and terminology which would have been problematic in the immediate aftermath of Nicaea.

Like the CI, the Theophania, a work in five books, can be dated to the later 320s at the earliest, although there has been considerable disagreement about when, precisely, it was written, with some placing it as late as the 330s. For Wallace-Hadrill, it represents ‘a last word’ on Eusebius’ views, taking the form of a retractatio. The work certainly relies heavily on his earlier apologetics, the PE and DE, as well as demonstrating considerable overlap with the SC. There is, however, some dispute about whether the Theophania was written before or after the SC. It is widely agreed that the Theophania was written after Constantine’s defeat of Licinius, yet Quasten was prepared to date it only to the period after 323. Barnes was more precise, opting for 325/26, and suggesting that Eusebius simply re-used sections of the Theophania when he composed his SC in 335. Johnson has similarly placed the Theophania before 335, and hence before the SC, although he refused to commit to a date more precise than ‘the 320s or early 330s’. By contrast, Wallace-Hadrill

296 Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 26.
297 For these, and other compelling reasons to assume a date in the mid to late 320s, see the discussion in Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 19-26.
298 Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 55. This view is shared by Kofsky, Eusebius Against Paganism, 276.
299 Quasten, Patrology iii, 333; Attridge and Hata also refuse to commit themselves to a date more precise than ‘after 324’: ‘Introduction’, 34.
300 Barnes, C&E, 278.
301 Ibid. 249.
302 Johnson, Eusebius, 20.
placed the *Theophania* in 337, after the SC.\(^{303}\) It survives only in a Syriac translation and a few Greek fragments.\(^{304}\)

Towards the end of his life, most likely in the years 336-38,\(^{305}\) Eusebius produced two treatises directed against one of his theological opponents, Marcellus of Ancyra, who had been deposed from his see at the Council of Constantinople in 336.\(^{306}\) These works, the *Contra Marcellum* in two books, and the *De ecclesiastica theologia* in three books,\(^{307}\) demonstrate the extent to which Eusebius continued to play an active role in theological controversies throughout his life. Moreover, since Eusebius was composing these works at a similar time to his work on the *VC*, they are an important reminder that the *VC*, in which accounts of theological disputes are often brief, does not present a full picture of Eusebius’ interests and concerns at the end of his life.\(^{308}\) They show instead that, even at the very end of his life, Eusebius found himself once again having to defend his theological position. The supposedly triumphalist *VC* was not written in isolation from these wider concerns.

Lastly, it is important to mention also the oration *Ad sanctorum coetum*,\(^{309}\) which Eusebius promised to append to the *VC*\(^{310}\) and which appears in some


\(^{306}\) Barnes, *C&E*, 241-42.


\(^{308}\) Cameron, in particular, has drawn attention to the importance of viewing the *VC* in the context of these more theological works, and the disputes to which they contributed: ‘Construction’, 153-54, 167-69.


\(^{310}\) *VC* 4.32.1.
This speech is attributed by Eusebius to Constantine, but both its date and its authorship have been much disputed by scholars. Some have even suggested that it was at least partly the work of Eusebius himself, although this appears unlikely in view of Eusebius’ own claim that it represents a translation of a Latin original. Although not a work of Eusebius himself, Eusebius deliberately chose to include this speech as an illustration of Constantine’s piety. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that Eusebius would not have felt uncomfortable with the theological views expressed in the speech. As a result, it can give us some insight into how Eusebius wished the theology of the emperor to be perceived.

**Fragmentary Works**

Alongside these works, which survive largely intact either in the original Greek or in ancient translations, there remain besides several more works, the condition of which is far more fragmentary. Dating these works is particularly problematic, and many continue to lack critical editions. Of these works, the most intact are the manuscripts of this text. This speech is attributed by Eusebius to Constantine, but both its date and its authorship have been much disputed by scholars. Some have even suggested that it was at least partly the work of Eusebius himself, although this appears unlikely in view of Eusebius’ own claim that it represents a translation of a Latin original. Although not a work of Eusebius himself, Eusebius deliberately chose to include this speech as an illustration of Constantine’s piety. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that Eusebius would not have felt uncomfortable with the theological views expressed in the speech. As a result, it can give us some insight into how Eusebius wished the theology of the emperor to be perceived.

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311 Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 51.
313 Davies, ‘Constantine’s Editor’, 616-18.
314 VC 4.32.1. Edwards, who accepts the attribution of the speech to Constantine, outlines several other compelling reasons why the speech cannot be regarded as a composition of Eusebius: Edwards, ‘Introduction’, xviii-xix. Even if Constantine’s authorship remains in doubt, it is clear that the speech should not be counted among Eusebius’ writings.
Generalis elementaria introductio (GEI),\textsuperscript{315} the Commentarii in Psalmos (CPs),\textsuperscript{316} and the Quaestiones Evangelicae.\textsuperscript{317} There are also substantial portions of a treatise or speech De solemnitate Paschali, the Apologia pro Origene, a defence of Origen’s views which was co-authored with Pamphilus, and, perhaps, a further set of Commentarii in Lucam. In addition, several of Eusebius’ letters survive, usually in fragmentary form.

Eusebius refers to the GEI at HE 1.2.27 and questions about its date are therefore linked to debates about the date of the HE. Accepting a date for the first edition of the HE of c.313 makes it unnecessary to follow Barnes’ early dating of the GEI to c.303,\textsuperscript{318} and makes Johnson’s suggestion of a date c.310 far more plausible.\textsuperscript{319} As Johnson has shown, the GEI ought to be considered in part as an educational work, since it shares many of the features of an εἰσαγωγή, an introductory teaching manual.\textsuperscript{320} The majority of the GEI has been lost, with only books 6 to 9 remaining under the title Eclogae Propheticae (Ecl. Proph.).\textsuperscript{321} Even these books contain large lacunae, and the work continues to lack a modern critical edition.\textsuperscript{322} It has, however, been suggested by Wallace-Hadrill that some of the surviving Eusebian fragments

\textsuperscript{316} PG 23.66-1396; 24.9-76.
\textsuperscript{318} Barnes, C&E, 167-68.
\textsuperscript{319} A.P. Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator: The Context of General Elementary Introduction’, in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., Reconsidering Eusebius, 100. A later date of c.310-13 is also favoured by: Carriker, Library, 38; Kofsky, Eusebius Against Paganism, 52.
\textsuperscript{320} Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 99-118.
\textsuperscript{322} Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 100.
on the gospel of Luke may have come from the lost tenth book of the *GEI*. The *Eclogae Prophetae* consist of a selection of Old Testament passages and seek to demonstrate that the prophecies contained in these books have been fulfilled in Christ. On the basis of these surviving parts of the work, Johnson has suggested that the *GEI* may have been far more than merely an introductory study-aid, arguing that it represents an attempt to establish ‘a rival pedagogy to that of Porphyry’. Thus, the *GEI* can also be seen as serving an apologetic purpose and contributing to debates between Christians and their opponents, leading both J. Quasten and Barnes to rank it among Eusebius’ ‘apologetic works’.

The *Commentarii in Psalmos* survives in a far worse state than Eusebius’ other Old Testament commentary, the *CI* and, perhaps in consequence, has received only limited scholarly attention. Hollerich has dated it to some time after 326 at the earliest, as it contains references to buildings which were constructed in Jerusalem at some point between 326 and 333, putting its composition some time after that.

Surviving mainly in the catenae, it is often unclear how far the text has been edited by later scholars, or even misattributed. The *CPs* continues therefore to lack a critical edition, and it remains doubtful how much of the material preserved in Migne’s *Patrologia Graeca* is genuinely Eusebian. Nevertheless, it is clear that the

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324 Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 117.
325 Quasten, *Patrology* iii, 328-29; Barnes, *Expository Times* 121.1 (2009), 8.
326 Exceptions include the work of C. Curti, much of which is collected in: C. Curti, *Eusebiana I: Commentarii in Psalmos* (Catania: Università di Catania, 1987); and, most recently, Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ *Commentary on the Psalms*, 151-67.
327 Hollerich notes references in the *CPs* to buildings which were constructed in Jerusalem between 326 and 333, putting its composition sometime after that: Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ *Commentary on the Psalms*, 154, citing PG 23.1064a.
328 Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ *Commentary on the Psalms*, 151-52.
329 Hollerich suggests that at least 60 per cent is by Eusebius: ‘Eusebius’ *Commentary on the Psalms*, 152. Since the attribution of much of the material in the *CPs* remains disputed, I have opted to follow the
CPs was a substantial work – Hollerich suggests that it is ‘probably the longest book he [Eusebius] ever wrote’.\textsuperscript{330} If nothing else, its existence demonstrates the continuing importance which Eusebius attached to biblical scholarship throughout his life.

Eusebius’ fragmentary works include as well the \textit{Quaestiones Evangelicae}, which Claudio Zamagni, the work’s most recent editor, thinks was quite possibly based on the earlier \textit{Canones evangeliorum}.\textsuperscript{331} The \textit{Quaestiones} were most likely composed at a similar time to the \textit{DE},\textsuperscript{332} since both works contain references to each other.\textsuperscript{333} The \textit{Quaestiones} survive only in substantial fragments, preserved in a Greek epitome, as well as in catenae in a variety of ancient languages.\textsuperscript{334} Originally three books long, the \textit{Quaestiones} consisted of two separate parts, two books of \textit{Quaestiones ad Stephanum}, and one book of \textit{Quaestiones ad Marinum}.\textsuperscript{335} Of these, sixteen questions and answers to Stephanus are preserved in the Greek epitome, but only four to Marinus. The \textit{Quaestiones ad Stephanum} deal with issues relating to Jesus’ genealogy, and those to Marinus with questions about his resurrection. In each case, Eusebius

\textsuperscript{330} Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on the Psalms’, 151.
\textsuperscript{332} That is, most likely between c.315 and 320.
\textsuperscript{333} The \textit{Questions to Stephanus} at least must have been written at this time, for that is the part that contains the cross-references. C. Zamagni, ‘Introduction’, 42-43, citing \textit{Qu7 to Stephanus}, and \textit{DE} 7.3.18.
\textsuperscript{334} For a discussion of the difficulties involved in assembling a full and reliable edition of this text, together with a list of all manuscripts hitherto identified as containing fragments of the \textit{Questions}, see: C. Zamagni, ‘New Perspectives on Eusebius’ Questions and Answers on the Gospels: The Manuscripts’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., \textit{Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations}, 239-61.
attempts to resolve tensions or contradictions between the different Gospel accounts.

Eusebius’ active part in theological and doctrinal disputes is illustrated by his treatise on the date of the Easter festival, the *De solemnitate Paschali*. Only fragments of this text remain,\(^{336}\) and it is unclear what the original form of the work was, with Barnes regarding it as a homily.\(^{337}\) A more recent suggestion, however, is that it was a treatise written in response to opponents of the decision of the Council of Nicaea to enforce a single date for the observance of Easter throughout the empire.\(^{338}\) Eusebius mentions this work in the *VC*,\(^{339}\) and Mark DelCigliano has even suggested on the basis of this reference that the treatise may have been written at the request of Constantine himself.\(^{340}\) However, we already know that Eusebius’ self-presentation in the *VC* was frequently tendentious,\(^{341}\) and it is therefore best to be wary about accepting too readily any of Eusebius’ claims of intimacy with the emperor.

The *Apologia pro Origene* is, in its surviving form, hardly a work of Eusebius at all, but his involvement in its composition nevertheless makes it worthy of mention here. It appears that Eusebius assisted his mentor Pamphilus to write this defence of Origen’s views between 307 and 310, during Pamphilus’ imprisonment.\(^{342}\) Only the

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\(^{336}\) *PG* 24.693-705.
\(^{338}\) See the discussion in M. DelCigliano, ‘The Promotion of the Constantinian Agenda in Eusebius of Caesarea’s *On the Feast of the Pascha*’, in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., *Reconsidering Eusebius*, 39-68. DelCigliano’s essay also includes the first English translation of the remaining fragments of the treatise: 59-68.
\(^{339}\) *VC* 4.34-35.
\(^{340}\) DelCigliano, ‘The Promotion’, 47.
\(^{341}\) Cameron, ‘Construction’, 166-69; Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 77, 86; Barnes, C&E, 270.
first book out of an original six survives, and this only in the later Latin translation of Rufinus.\textsuperscript{343} The first five of these books appear to have been primarily the work of Pamphilus, while Eusebius added a sixth book of his own after Pamphilus’ death.\textsuperscript{344} Although Eusebius’ contribution to the work is lost, his participation in its composition nevertheless demonstrates his interest in preserving the legacy of Origen, and shows that he was active in theological controversies even before he became bishop.

In addition, some fragments remain from what might have been a set of Commentarii in Lucam.\textsuperscript{345} These were preserved in Nicetas of Heraclea’s catenae on Luke, but their origin remains disputed, and they continue to lack a critical edition.\textsuperscript{346} Wallace-Hadrill argued that the surviving fragments come, not from an independent commentary, but rather from the lost tenth book of another work, the Generalis elementaria introductio.\textsuperscript{347} Wallace-Hadrill’s doubts have been echoed by Hollerich, who has pointed out that the fragments suggest a different approach to the biblical text from that found in Eusebius’ other commentaries on Isaiah and the Psalms.\textsuperscript{348} In these commentaries, Eusebius dealt with the entire book, whereas in the fragments on Luke, he appears to have addressed only certain verses or chapters of the book, and also made use of quotations from other books, such as

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid. 12.
\textsuperscript{345} Barnes, C&E, 200.
\textsuperscript{346} PG 24.529-606. Since I do not accept that the case for an independent commentary has yet been proved, I will refer throughout, not to a commentary, but to the Fragmenta in Lucam (Fr.Luc.).
\textsuperscript{347} Johnson, ‘The Ends of Transfiguration’, 191.
\textsuperscript{348} Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 8. Quasten makes no mention of a Commentary on Luke, suggesting that ‘there is no indication’ that Eusebius wrote commentaries on New Testament books: Patrology iii, 337.
Matthew and the epistles of Paul. More recently this view has been challenged by Aaron Johnson, who has argued for an independent commentary on the grounds that the fragments on Luke are incompatible with both the style and the expressed aims of the Generalis elementaria introductio. However, while Johnson has shed considerable doubt on Wallace-Hadrill’s thesis, he has not proved that the fragments come instead from a full commentary on Luke, and has not addressed Hollerich’s points about the different style of the fragments on Luke. Thus, the existence of a full commentary remains uncertain, and all we can safely say is that there remain several fragments of Eusebius’ discussion of the gospel of Luke from an unidentified work.

Lastly, a small number of Eusebius’ letters survive, although they surely represent only a tiny fraction of those he must have written over the course of his life. These letters include, most famously, the Epistula ad Constantiam augustam in which Eusebius appears to reject the empress’ request for an image of Christ. This letter has received attention largely because it figured prominently in later Byzantine disputes over the use of religious images and indeed it survives only in fragments preserved in works produced during the controversy. However, since the letter does not appear in any manuscripts dating from before the eighth-century iconoclast controversy, its authenticity is open to question. Also worthy of note is

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351 PG 20.1545-49.
353 C. Murray doubts that the letter is genuine: ‘Art and the Early Church’, JTS 28 (1977), 328; Gero feels it is more likely to be genuine, but acknowledges the doubts that must be raised: ‘True Image’, 462-63, 469-70. T.D. Barnes opts for a genuine original with substantial later interpolations: Expository Times 121.1 (2009), 11 and ‘Notes on the Letter of Eusebius to Constantia (CPG 3503)’, Studia Patristica 46
Eusebius’ Epistula ad ecclesiam Caesariensem, in which Eusebius sought to explain and defend his position at the Council of Nicaea to his congregation.

Lost Works

Extensive as the body of surviving Eusebian writings is, there was undoubtedly much more that has been almost entirely lost. An exhaustive account of all the possible works associated by scholars with the name of Eusebius is unnecessary here, but a brief glance at some of the references to Eusebius’ missing writings can help to provide a sense of Eusebius’ interests. Jerome’s catalogue of Eusebius’ works mentions twenty-five books of a work Contra Porphyrium and three books of a De vita Pamphili. Besides this, Eusebius’ own works contain various references to his other writings, not all of which survive. These include a treatise addressing questions about the large families fathered by the biblical patriarchs, mentioned briefly by Eusebius in his PE and DE. Eusebius also mentions a speech, presumably similar to the De laudibus Constantini, which he delivered on the occasion of the emperor’s vicennalia celebrations. The HE refers to a work in which Eusebius brought together accounts of earlier martyrdoms, which Barnes has suggested formed part of Eusebius’ early scholarly activity in the library of Caesarea, when he was still working under his mentor Pamphilus. The catalogue of Photius, ninth-century bishop of Constantinople, also mentions two editions of a


355 Jerome, Vir.Inl. 81.

356 DE 1.9.20; PE 7.8.29. See: Quasten, Patrology iii, 339.

357 VC 1.1.1.

358 HE 5.praef.2.

359 Barnes, C&E, 94.
two-book ‘ἐλέγχου καὶ ἀπολογίας’ directed against opponents of Christianity,\textsuperscript{360} and two works called the ‘ἐκκλησιαστική προπαρασκευή’ and ‘ἐκκλησιαστικὴ ἀπόδειξις’.\textsuperscript{361} In addition to those lost works for which we can recover the titles, Eusebius doubtless wrote much more that has left no trace. We have, for instance, very few of his letters, and remarkably little preaching.\textsuperscript{362}

Obviously very little is known about these works. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of them in order to help to set in context some of Eusebius’ works which do survive. The fact that Eusebius devoted so much space to refuting Porphyry’s views in a dedicated treatise Contra Porphyrium suggests, for instance, that we should be cautious about seeing the PE and DE as primarily a reaction to Porphyry’s work.\textsuperscript{363} Moreover, these lost works give some indication of the kinds of topics that interested Eusebius. He was concerned to defend Christianity against external attacks in works like the Contra Porphyrium and the ‘ἐλέγχου καὶ ἀπολογίας’, but also appears to have wanted to answer questions that might have been raised within the church, for instance in his treatise about the size of the families of the patriarchs. We can only speculate about why these works failed to be transmitted – in the case of the missing books of the DE, for instance, J. Ulrich suggests that it may be because some of the ideas they expressed appeared ‘unorthodox’ to later church authorities.\textsuperscript{364} We cannot recover what these ideas may

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{361} Phot. Bibl. 11-12. Frede, following Schwartz, suggests, however, that these may in fact have been part of the GEI: ‘Eusebius’ Apolgetic Writings’, 230.
\bibitem{362} Although Eusebius’ homilies do not survive, C. Bandt notes that passages of the CPs have a homiletic tone, and might reveal something of ‘the preacher Eusebius’: ‘Some Remarks on the Tone of Eusebius’ Commentary on the Psalms’, Studia Patristica 66 (2013), 149.
\bibitem{363} As Johnson and Morlet have already suggested: Morlet, ‘Eusebius’ Polemic Against Porphyry’; Johnson, Review of Morlet.
\bibitem{364} Ulrich, Euseb und die Juden, 35.
\end{thebibliography}
have been, but keeping in mind the selectivity of the transmission of Eusebius’ works is an important reminder that we do not have a complete picture of his interests. Even so, the range of Eusebius’ lost works testifies, if nothing else, to the variety and scale of his output. Furthermore, if the reason for the loss of some of Eusebius’ works was that later scribes found their contents uncomfortable, the repeated appearance of demons in those of his works that do survive makes it clear that speculation about demons was not a cause for embarrassment in later antiquity.

Some Methodological Considerations

The above discussion has highlighted, if nothing else, the extraordinary variety to be found within the Eusebian corpus. Eusebius’ works not only spanned a remarkably lengthy chronological period, but also took a range of forms, addressing different audiences in different ways. This poses an undoubted challenge to anyone seeking to understand his thought. There remains a danger that, in trying to extract Eusebius’ ideas from a range of texts that may originally have had very different purposes, we may be tempted to overlook or smooth over inconsistencies in order to produce a coherent picture of his views.

This challenge is hardly unique to Eusebius. It has already been raised by scholars in relation to other late antique writers.365 Peter Brown noted the importance of terminology when discussing the thought of ancient writers, preferring the term ‘attitude’ to refer to Augustine’s views on religious coercion,

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rather than ‘doctrine’, which might imply a more carefully formulated set of ideas. Similarly, when describing Eusebius’ views, the language of ‘thought’ and ‘ideas’ is surely preferable to the older terminology of ‘political philosophy’ adopted by scholars like Francis Dvornik. Eusebius did not write works of kingship theory, nor, as far as we can tell, was he seeking to develop a coherent ‘political philosophy’. Where ‘philosophy’ or, even worse, ‘theory’ implies a deliberate and developed scheme of thought, a more flexible terminology of ‘thought’ and ‘ideas’ recognises the fluid and often nebulous nature of Eusebius’ thinking on political subjects. A judicious choice of terminology can therefore go some way towards mitigating this problem.

Yet there remains the question of how to avoid, not only implying, but also imposing false consistency on Eusebius’ ideas. There is no straightforward solution to this, although being alert to the difficulty is undoubtedly the first step towards managing the problem. It is perhaps, above all, a question of managing our own expectations, and of being prepared, where necessary, to accept that Eusebius does not provide us with answers to all of our questions. Again in the case of Augustine, Brown recognised that a ‘historian… must resign himself, as best he can, to living with this ambivalence’. There are lacunae in Eusebius’ thought just as there are in his works, and we must not try to fill those gaps.

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367 Dvornik, Political Philosophy II.
369 Cf. Lunn-Rockliffe, Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology, 4-5.
Brown also drew an important distinction between seeing a writer’s ‘thought as a whole’ and trying ‘to make it seem consistent’.\textsuperscript{371} This will be a crucial distinction for this thesis. By surveying the ideas put forward by Eusebius in a range of works composed over a number of years, we are attempting to form a full picture of his thought in all its variety. That is very different from trying to pull together his different ideas and mould them into an intellectually satisfying ‘political philosophy’. There are areas of consistency in Eusebius’ thought – we shall see, for instance, that his belief in demonic hostility appears to have altered very little – but there are also tensions and apparent contradictions, as when Eusebius appears in one work, the \textit{PE}, to imply that all demonic power has ceased, while in others, such as the \textit{VC}, he appears to suggest that the demonic threat continues into his own time.\textsuperscript{372} Recognising this can be of enormous value, for, by highlighting areas of tension between Eusebius’ works, rather than avoiding them, we may in fact discover unexpected emphases in his thought or new avenues to be investigated.

Overall, the approach taken in this thesis, of focusing in particular on Eusebius’ notions of demons, leads us to join those scholars who have argued that Eusebius’ basic outlook was little altered by the dramatic political changes of his lifetime.\textsuperscript{373} We find little sign of a waning interest in demons, nor of a decline in Eusebius’ concern about the threat they might pose. Eusebius’ basic cosmology does not appear to have been altered by the changing situation of the church. Yet, rather

\textsuperscript{371} Ibid. 108.
\textsuperscript{372} On this, see Chapter V below.
\textsuperscript{373} For example, Barnes, \textit{C\&E}, 164; Johnson, \textit{Ethnicity and Argument}, 156 (‘Eusebius maintained to the end a firm vision of Rome’).
than joining these scholars in seeing Eusebius as a perennial triumphalist, the conclusions drawn below will suggest to the contrary that it is time to reassess our assumptions about the optimistic mind-set of this, supposedly familiar, figure. The following chapters will reveal instead a more cautious figure, arguing that Eusebius continued to demonstrate concern about potential challenges to the ‘orthodox’ teaching of the church or about the possibility of Christians straying from the path of virtue.

CHAPTER II

THE REALITY OF THE DEMONIC THREAT

A study such as this, which seeks to explore the role played by Eusebius’ ideas of the demonic in other areas of his thought, must be based on a reasonably firm understanding of what those ideas were. However, despite frequent references to demons in a range of Eusebius’ works, there has as yet been no thorough study of his discussions of the demonic throughout the entire corpus of his works. While Eusebius’ evident interest in the subject of demons has not entirely escaped the attention of earlier scholars, previous work on the topic is either clearly outdated, or extremely limited in scope. Sharron Coggan’s PhD dissertation, for instance, which is by far the most sustained examination of Eusebius’ attitude towards the demonic, takes as its primary focus only the PE. Although Coggan does include some discussion of relevant passages from the HE, potentially valuable references to the demonic in other works such as the VC and LC are largely overlooked. Moreover, Coggan’s work was written too early to benefit from many of the insights of the most recent scholarship on early Christian demonology. One such insight, which, as I will show, may fruitfully be applied to Eusebius, has been greater recognition of the physicality of demons in the eyes of late antique writers. However, despite suggesting in her concluding chapter a variety of ways in which

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377 Coggan, *Pandaemonia*.
378 Particularly at *ibid*, 170-73, 175, 185-87.
379 Smith, ‘How Thin?’. See also the recent work of Ludlow, who has recognised the importance of applying Smith’s insights to the work of fourth-century urban Christian writers: ‘Demons, Evil and Liminality’, 200-01.
we might read Eusebius’ demons – including ‘cosmological, locational, theological, psychological and ethical’ readings – Coggan does not pay attention to Eusebius’ demons as a physical reality.\textsuperscript{380}

Among more recent work, Aaron Johnson’s remarks on the topic of demons in Eusebius are regrettably brief, despite his evident recognition of the importance of this theme in the \textit{PE}.\textsuperscript{381} Moreover, like Coggan, he too fails to look much beyond the \textit{PE} in his discussion of Eusebius’ views of demons. His focus is Eusebius’ suggestion that demons lie behind the oracles and cults that formed the basis of civic religion in the Greek \textit{poleis}.\textsuperscript{382} While this was certainly an important feature of demonic activity in Eusebius’ eyes, it is, as we shall see, by no means a full picture of Eusebius’ understanding of the nature and activity of demons. Similarly, while Sébastien Morlet recognised that ‘demons play a fundamental role in Eusebius’ theology’, he devoted barely a page of his book on Eusebius’ \textit{DE} to the subject.\textsuperscript{383} Elsewhere, although Dale Martin looked further than either Coggan or Johnson in exploring Eusebius’ ideas about demons, his work on Eusebius forms just one chapter of a broader survey of ideas about ‘superstition’ (\textit{deisidaimonia}) throughout Greek and Roman antiquity.\textsuperscript{384} Martin’s interest therefore lies primarily in determining how Eusebius’ ideas fit into longer-term trends in ancient demonology, rather than in an extensive exploration of those ideas in themselves.

\textsuperscript{380} Coggan, \textit{Pandaemonia}, 200.
\textsuperscript{381} Johnson, \textit{Ethnicity and Argument}, 163-70.
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{383} Morlet, \textit{La Démonstration Évangélique}, 470: ‘Les démons jouent un role fondamental dans la théologie d’Eusèbe’.
\textsuperscript{384} Martin, \textit{Inventing Superstition}, 207-25.
Even the earlier discussion of Jean Sirinelli, who did at least acknowledge the
potency of demons for Eusebius,385 is limited by the overall scope of his work,
which focuses only on those of Eusebius’ works written before the Council of
Nicaea.386 While this does allow for some brief discussion of the *HE*,387 in practice
the majority of Sirinelli’s references are to the *PE* and *DE*.388 This may be
understandable, since these works contain by far the fullest and most detailed of
Eusebius’ descriptions of demons,389 but it is nonetheless unfortunate, for such a
heavy focus on these apologies leads to an imbalanced picture of Eusebius’ thought
in this area. For instance, Sirinelli was led to suggest that ‘Eusebius’ demonology
has no other function than to explain pagan error’,390 as we shall see, however,
Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic involved far more than simply an
explanation of the origin of the pagan cults.

In order to achieve a full and balanced picture of Eusebius’ views of demons,
it is therefore necessary to look beyond the discussions of the *PE* and *DE* and to take
into account references to demons throughout a range of his works. A thorough
examination of Eusebius’ ideas about demons, benefitting from recent
developments in scholarship on late antique demonology, is therefore not only an
essential foundation for the remainder of this study, but also in itself a much-
needed contribution to our understanding of Eusebius’ thought.

386 Sirinelli devotes two sub-sections of his chapter on ‘spiritual powers’ to demons, so, once again, he
offers only a comparatively brief discussion: *Les vues historiques*, 312-26, 337-38.
387 Ibid. 337-38.
388 Ibid. 312-26.
389 Particularly in Books 4, 5 and 7.16 of the *PE*, and Book 4 of the *DE*.
390 Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 317: ‘la démonologie d’Eusèbe n’a d’autre function que d’expliquer
l’erreur païenne’.
Yet even when adopting a broader perspective which encompasses a variety of Eusebius’ works, it remains a challenging task to establish with any clarity what Eusebius’ view of demons was. Despite the abundance of references to the demonic throughout Eusebius’ works, he in fact provides us with little in the way of a coherent or systematic ‘demonology’. Heidi Marx-Wolf has described the writing of demonology in late antiquity as a process of ‘systematisation’, in which intellectuals sought to impose order on the wide range of popular beliefs about the demonic.  

This idea that demonology was about systematising and classifying the demonic can also be found in studies of later demonologies – for instance, the idea that demonology was about asserting control through ‘a structure of classification’ forms a key part of David Frankfurter’s understanding of the term.  

While it is open to question how far any demonological writings were ever purely systematic explorations of the nature of the demonic, on this understanding of the term ‘demonology’, none of Eusebius’ works could accurately be described as purely, or even primarily ‘demonological’. As Sirinelli recognised, attempting to find such a systematic account in Eusebius’ works would therefore be a serious ‘error of perspective’. It is essential to remember that Eusebius’ accounts of demons in the PE and DE were included in support of an overall apologetic goal – clearly set out at the beginning of the PE – of demonstrating why Christians had

393 Stuart Clark noted that, shortly after beginning his research into early modern demonology, he ‘rapidly discovered that there was too much demonology embedded in… books of all kinds and on many subjects – for it to be attributed to one kind of writer’: Thinking With Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), viii-ix.  
394 Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 301: ‘Ce serait une erreur de perspective que d’en retrace une tableau systématique qu’il n’a jamais cherché à donner.’
made the correct decision in choosing to abandon the traditional cults of Greece and Rome.\textsuperscript{395} It is therefore necessary to supplement the lengthier discussions in these works with numerous additional remarks about demons to be found in other works such as the \textit{HE} and \textit{VC}, in which Eusebius’ focus was different. Even brief and scattered references to demons can reveal a great deal about Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic – for instance by showing some of the ways in which he believed them to act.

In speculating about the nature and activities of demons, Eusebius was far from alone. Demons played a prominent role in the works of many early Christian writers, yet they were by no means an exclusively Christian concept, and thinking about the demonic had a long history among both Greek and Jewish writers.\textsuperscript{396} The extensive quotations on the subject of demons in the \textit{PE} and \textit{DE}, which have been drawn from a variety of thinkers,\textsuperscript{397} attest both to the strength of this tradition of thinking about demons, and to the range of possible influences on Eusebius’ own views about the demonic. Early Christian writers were able to draw on the Platonic idea of \textit{δαίμονες} as morally ambiguous spiritual intermediaries, passing messages

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{395} \textit{PE} 1.5.11-13.  

\textsuperscript{397} Including, for example: Porphyry (\textit{PE} 4.15.1-2), Clement of Alexandria (\textit{PE} 4.16.12-13) Plutarch (\textit{PE} 5.16.1-17.12), the Book of Isaiah 10:13 (\textit{DE} 4.9.2).}
between the gods and men, as well as on the stories found in biblical and apocryphal literature of a far more morally reprehensible kind of demon, often acting in the service of ‘the satan’, God’s spiritual adversary. Christians writing in Greek may have shared their key term ‘δαίμων’ with their pagan contemporaries, but their understanding of these beings, under the influence of Jewish ideas about demons and angels, was often very different.

For early Christian thinkers, demons were usually unambiguously evil creatures, whereas even among those earlier Greek philosophers who, like Plutarch, appear to have allowed for the possibility of maliciously inclined demons, there was no suggestion that all demons were wicked. This tension between Platonic and Christian understandings of the demonic can be seen in Eusebius’ PE, where he discusses the accounts of demons put forward in particular by the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry. It is evident from these discussions that Eusebius’ own views of the demonic were broadly in line with those of his Christian predecessors. There are nevertheless some areas of his thought that are distinctive. He shows, for instance, very little interest in the concept of a ‘personal’ demon or angel which can be found in writers of the Platonic tradition and, more

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401 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 216-24. For further discussion of Plutarch’s demonology, particularly the controversial question of whether or not he believed that there could be wicked demons, see: F.E. Brenk, “‘A Most Strange Doctrine’: Daimon in Plutarch”, Classical Journal 69 (1973), 1-11, and Martin, Inventing Superstition, 93-108.

402 Coggan even goes so far as to suggest that ‘Eusebius’ treatment of the term [δαίμων] is a kind of classical representative of Jewish and Christian perspectives: Pandaemonia, 182.
importantly in view of his heavy influence on Eusebius, in Origen.403 Such differences may be slight, but they can nevertheless help to highlight particular emphases of his thought.

Overall, when remarks about the demonic throughout Eusebius’ works are taken into consideration, a reasonably clear picture emerges of his views. Of course there are gaps, and even at times apparent contradictions – this is hardly surprising given that Eusebius’ aim was not specifically to elaborate his views of demons. Even so, the frequency of Eusebius’ references to the demonic is enough to demonstrate the important role that they occupied in his understanding of the world. This chapter will show that Eusebius saw demons as a real and dangerous presence in the universe, that he believed them to live in close proximity to humankind and to be a force for evil, seeking to derail human salvation. In the past, some scholars have regarded Eusebius’ references to demons as little more than a useful literary or rhetorical device.404 By contrast, this chapter will suggest that such an approach underestimates the significance of the demonic threat for Eusebius. Like many of his era, Eusebius appears to have believed firmly in demons as an active, physical reality. Consequently it is only by acknowledging this that we can come to appreciate fully the role which demons played in his thought. This chapter will first explore Eusebius’ views on the physical nature of demons, before moving on to consider his opinion of their moral character, and his understanding of their

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403 For discussion of the idea of ‘internal’ or ‘personal’ demons among Platonic writers, see: Timotin, La démonologie platonicienne, 243-322. On Origen, see: Timotin, La démonologie platonicienne, 272-73; Muehlberger, Angels, 98-99; C. Blanc, ‘L’angéologie d’Origène’, Studia Patristica 14 (1976), 103-04.

404 For example: Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 59-60, 128.
powers. It will argue that, for Eusebius, demons represented a potent threat, against which all Christians needed to remain constantly on their guard.

Physical Demons

As G.A. Smith has shown, modern scholars have often dismissed late antique and early Christian references to demons as little more than ‘figures of speech’, brushing aside the many discussions of the physicality of demons which appear in these texts.\textsuperscript{405} However, as Smith’s article demonstrates, recognising this aspect of late antique speculation about the demonic has much to offer our understanding not only of late antique demonology, but also of other topics, such as late ancient ideas about physics and biology.\textsuperscript{406} It is therefore essential, he suggests, to treat references to the demonic in late antique works ‘as literally, as physically, as possible’.\textsuperscript{407} Previous work on Eusebius’ ideas about demons, however, has consistently overlooked his discussions of the physical nature of the demonic. It is clear from his remarks on this subject that Eusebius considered the realm of the demonic to be closely connected to the human world. Demons, in his view, were corporeal, albeit invisible, beings, which participated in events in the earthly realm. Demons were thus not abstract ‘personifications’,\textsuperscript{408} or even a distant and obscure element of the universe for Eusebius. Rather, they were a real and active presence in the recognisable everyday world which he and his readers inhabited. In order to understand Eusebius’ attitude towards the demonic, and in particular in order to

\textsuperscript{405} Smith, ‘How Thin?’, esp. 479-83.
\textsuperscript{406} Ibid. 496.
\textsuperscript{407} Ibid. 483.
\textsuperscript{408} Chesnut suggested that demons in Eusebius’ works were the ‘personification’ of φθόνος: First Christian Histories, 128. The problems with this view will be discussed in more detail below.
appreciate the severity of the demonic threat in his eyes, it is necessary to highlight
this aspect of his thought on the subject.

In holding the view that the demonic realm was capable of interaction with
the human world, Eusebius was far from alone among his contemporaries. Indeed,
ever since Plato, it had been widely held that one of the functions of demons was
to act as messengers or intermediaries, bridging the divide between mortals and the
transcendent divinity. By the time Eusebius was writing, as Smith has shown,
speculation about the demonic had developed even further, and discussion of
demons’ physical form, habitat and bodily needs was widespread among writers of
the second to fifth centuries CE. Among both earlier Christian writers, and
Neoplatonist philosophers like Porphyry, there appears to have been a common
belief that demons ‘had bodies’, which lived in the lower part of the atmosphere,
and which required nourishment. This nourishment, it seems, came principally
from sacrifices: Origen described demons ‘nourishing themselves with the meaty
smells and bloods and vapours of sacrifices’, while Porphyry similarly suggested
that the smoke of sacrifices could enhance the demons’ ‘pneumatic and corporeal

409 The key text was Plato’s Symposium 202d-e, in which the character of Diotima described both ὁ
dαίμων and πᾶν τὸ δαίμονιον as being ‘μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ θανάτου’, and described their main
activity as being to deliver messages between the gods and mortals.
410 Within Middle Platonism, the idea of God’s transcendence and distance from the mortal realm was
key, with demons and other intermediate spiritual beings therefore providing the necessary link
between the two realms: Dillon, Middle Platonists, 47, 84, 217.
411 Smith, ‘How Thin?’.
412 Ibid. 479.
413 Ibid. 483. There was a widespread belief among ancient Greeks that the atmosphere was divided
into different layers, with the dense air nearer the earth changing into a finer ‘aither’ at higher levels.
In Homer, this higher part of the atmosphere was considered to be the part inhabited by the gods (e.g.
414 Orig. Cel.7.35: …τούτους δαίμονας ὅντας, τρεφομένους κνίσσαις καὶ αἴματι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν
θνητῶν ἀναθυμιάσει… For discussion of Origen’s views on this, see: Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 483-85.
part’. With such views about the physicality of demons apparently widespread in this period, we should not be surprised to find that Eusebius also considered demons to have a very real and physical existence.

Although Eusebius did not discuss the nature of demonic bodies to the same extent as, for instance, Origen had done, it is clear, even from his few scattered references to the subject, that he shared many of these assumptions about the physical nature of demons. In the VC, Eusebius refers to sacrifices as ‘demonic festivals’, and elsewhere describes ‘those wicked demons which, lurking in images and sunk into dark corners, covet the libations and fatty smoke of sacrifices’. Crucially, Eusebius also believed these physical demons to live in places very close to humans. Demons, he asserts, ‘are near the earth and subterranean, and wander about the heavy and misty air about the earth and… are fond of inhabiting the tombs and memorials of the dead’. Although people cannot see these demons, Eusebius suggests that ‘spreading great error, chthonic and demonic beings, invisible to us, are flying about the air around the earth, unknown and indistinct to men’. Thus Eusebius’ demons effectively surround human beings, inhabiting the spaces above, below and among them. The human and demonic realms are envisaged as existing in close proximity to each other.

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415 Porph. de Abst. 2.42.3, cited in Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 486: Οὔτως οἱ χαίροντες “λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε” δὲ ὄν αὐτῶν ὢν πνευματικὸν καὶ σωματικὸν πιαίνεται.
417 SC 13.4: …τοὺς ἐμφυλολύσατας τοῖς ἔκσανως σκοτίωσε τοὺς μυχοὶς ἱγκαταδεδυκόσι δαιμοὶς πονηροῖς ἀμφὶ τὰς τῶν θυσιῶν λοιβὰς τε καὶ κνίσας λιχνεύουσιν… Cf. PE 5.2.1.
418 PE 5.2.1: Οὐδὲ γοῦν περίγειοι τινες ὄντες καὶ καταχθόνιοι τὸν τε ἐπὶ γῆν βαρῶς καὶ ξαφνῶς ἀέρα περιτολούντες καὶ… τάφος νεκρῶς καὶ μνήμασι… ἐμφυλολύσατας…
419 DE 4.8.4: πολυπλανῶς ὑπαχροσθεὶς τῆς ἀοράτου ήμιν ἀμφὶ τὸν περὶ γῆν ἀέρα παπομενῆς χθονίου καὶ δαιμονικῆς σκοτίας ἀγνόστου τε καὶ ἀδιακριτοῦ ανθρώπου… This is perhaps a reference to the ‘ruler of the power of the air’ (τὸν ἀρχοντά τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος) in Eph. 2:2 – I am grateful to the audience at the King’s College London Classics Department Research Seminar, 13th December 2011, for raising this possibility.
As well as situating demons within a recognisable human world of graves, temples and sacrificial rituals, Eusebius also firmly roots his demons within historical time. In his accounts of the human past, Eusebius gives demons an active and intimate role in the events he believed to have unfolded. He suggests, for instance, that traditional Greek and Roman polytheistic worship is to be attributed to the malign influence of demons. In this, of course, Eusebius was hardly original among early Christian writers. The idea that the pagan gods were in reality demons appears in the Psalms – in his own discussion of demons, Eusebius quotes the idea found in Psalm 95(96).5 that ‘all the gods of the nations are demons’. A similar idea recurs in the letters of Paul, who wrote that ‘what pagans sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God’. Picking up on this scriptural idea, we find several Christian apologists making the same point. Like Eusebius, Origen had earlier drawn attention to Psalm 95(96), while Justin Martyr wrote that, in the past, people ‘not understanding that they were wicked demons, called them by the name of gods’. In suggesting that traditional pagan cult was offered, not to truly divine beings, but rather to malevolent demons, Eusebius was therefore following a strong early Christian tradition.

Moreover, Eusebius’ description of the process by which he believed polytheism to have become established is far from vague, and he had clearly given

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421 πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν δαίμονια. In this case, I have not followed the NRSV translation, which, translating the Hebrew rather than the Greek Septuagint, has ‘idols’ instead of ‘demons’. Cited by Eusebius at: PE 4.16.20.

422 1 Cor. 10:20, NRSV trans: ...ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἂθυσαν, δαίμονια καὶ οὐ θεῶ…

423 Orig. Cels. 3.2.

424 Justin 1 Apol. 5.2: ...μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι δαίμονας εἶναι φαύλους θεοὺς προστέανομαξον… Cf. Tatian, Orat. 8, 18.
the topic some thought. In the *DE*, Eusebius suggests that polytheism had not been the original form of worship, even among people who had not been capable of recognising the true God.\textsuperscript{425} Rather, Eusebius suggests that God had set up some of his angels to watch over these people, permitting them a simple form of astral worship instead.\textsuperscript{426} This, Eusebius suggests, was intended to bring them as close to true worship as was possible for them, by allowing them devotion to the most beautiful elements of God’s creation.\textsuperscript{427} However, this early human state was then, in Eusebius’ view, undermined by the activity of the devil and his demons, who drew these people away from the worship of the stars towards a less moral and less pious polytheism.\textsuperscript{428} As part of this historical sketch, Eusebius shows humankind as suffering the effects of a higher, cosmic battle between God and his demonic adversaries: the demons challenge God by undermining his plans for humankind. Their rebellion against God takes the form of subjugating humankind to their own rule, thereby jeopardising humankind’s salvation.\textsuperscript{429}

Likewise, when Eusebius writes of the beginnings of a decline in demonic power in the *PE*, he again places it firmly within a recognisable historical framework. Describing the end of the practice of human sacrifice, which he considered to be a manifestation of demonic influence, he even goes so far as to give it a precise date in the reign of Hadrian.\textsuperscript{430} This date appears to be based on a reference at *Porphyry’s de Abstinencia* 2.56.3, which Eusebius cites at *PE* 4.16.7.\textsuperscript{431}

\textsuperscript{425} *DE* 4.6.9-4.9.12.
\textsuperscript{426} *DE* 4.6.9, 4.8.1.
\textsuperscript{427} *DE* 4.8.2-5.
\textsuperscript{428} *DE* 4.9.5-8.
\textsuperscript{429} *DE* 4.9.1-12.
\textsuperscript{430} *PE* 4.15.6, 4.17.4; cf. *Theophr.*, 3.16; *SC* 16.10.
\textsuperscript{431} Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 169.
Here Porphyry mentions a statement by the writer Pallas, working in the reign of Hadrian, who claimed that the practice of human sacrifice had been almost entirely abolished by that time. Eusebius picks up on this claim, but finds a new significance in the timing, pointing out that during the reign of Hadrian ‘like a light, the teaching of Christ was already shining through every place’.  

A similarly deliberate pin-pointing of the decline of demonic power occurs at *PE* 5.17.13, where Eusebius dates the ‘death’ of a demon, supposedly described by Plutarch,  to the reign of Tiberius. Once again, the choice of this date is not Eusebius’ own, but is based on references to Tiberius within Plutarch’s story. However, at *PE* 5.17.13, Eusebius does draw particular attention to what he considered the significance of this date to be – the fact that the reign of Tiberius was the time of Christ’s activity on earth. In both cases, Eusebius makes a connection – entirely absent from these earlier sources – between the spread of Christianity and the decline of demonic influence. Describing both the emergence, and the decline of demonic influence, Eusebius therefore places them within a structured, linear historical framework. Eusebius’ interweaving of cosmic and human stories is not left in the abstract; rather, Eusebius firmly grounds cosmic events in what he considered to be traceable human history.

It is further worth noting that the demons in Eusebius’ works are consistently depicted as an external force. This is significant because, while demons were often

432 *PE* 4.15.6: ₋φωτός δίκην ἥδη διαλαμπούσης ἐπὶ πάντα τόπον τῆς τῆς Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίας.
433 Eusebius quotes Plut. *De Defect. Orac.* 418E-419F to support his point (*PE* 5.17.1-12). For a detailed discussion of Eusebius’ treatment of this passage of Plutarch, see: Coggan, *Pandaemonia*. Coggan’s thesis focuses on the way in which Eusebius used this passage as part of his apologetic attack on traditional pagan religion. Using this passage effectively as a case study, she considers the way in which Eusebius altered the meaning of traditionally ambiguous terms such as Πάν and δαιμόν to make their meaning exclusively negative.
434 Plut. *De Defect. Orac.* 419D.
envisioned in very physical terms, especially in later antiquity, this was not the only way in which they might be conceived. As Andrei Timotin has recently shown, speculation on the nature of Socrates’ δαίμον, as described by Plato, led Middle Platonists like Plutarch and Apuleius to develop the notion that the philosopher might be guided in leading a virtuous life by a higher, more spiritual, ‘demonic’ part of the soul – in effect, a ‘guardian’ demon linked to the individual human soul. Among early Christian and Jewish writers of the first three centuries CE, this idea began to encompass the notion of two personal demons, one good and one bad, which were continually vying to control the direction of each person’s life.

This idea emerges particularly clearly in Origen’s *Homily on Luke*:

Unicuique duo assistunt angeli, alter iustitiae, alter iniquitatis. Si bonae cogitationes in corde nostro fuerint et in animo iustitia pullulaverit, haud dubium, quin nobis loquatur angelus Domini. Si vero malae fuerint in nostro corde versatae, loquitur nobis angelus diaboli.

Two angels, one of righteousness, the other of injustice, stand by each one of us. If there are good thoughts in our heart and righteousness grows in our soul, no doubt it is an angel of the Lord who speaks to us. If, indeed, bad thoughts are moving in our heart, it is an angel of the devil who speaks to us.

In this context, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that writers might have been using the notion of demons or angels to understand or describe aspects of human psychology. Nor was such a use of the concept of the angel or demon

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436 Ibid. 271-72.
438 Orig. *Hom. In Luc.* 12.4. Origen’s 39 *Homilies on Luke* survive mainly in the Latin translation of Jerome, with only a few Greek fragments remaining. Although the translation has been criticised in the past, F. Fournier, one of the editors of the *Sources Chrétiennes* edition, found that, where the Latin translation could be compared with the remaining Greek fragments, it was largely accurate and suggested that Jerome ‘exprime bien les idées du maître d’Alexandrie’: F. Fournier, ‘Introduction II: Les Homélies sur Luc et leur traduction par S. Jérôme’, in Origen, *Homélies sur S. Luc: texte latine et fragments grecs*, ed. and trans., H. Crouzel, F. Fournier, and P. Périchon, Sources Chrétiennes 87 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1962), 85-87.
incompatible with a more physical view of the demonic realm as well, for as we have seen, Origen also entertained strikingly physical ideas about demons’ bodies.\textsuperscript{439} However, this idea of personal or guardian demons is not one that we find emphasised in Eusebius.

This contrasts with the position adopted by Ellen Muehlberger, who recently suggested that Eusebius did believe all Christians to have a permanent, guardian angel.\textsuperscript{440} Her argument is based on a passage in the DE, in which Eusebius writes: ‘so that men on earth would not be without leaders and inspectors like irrational creatures, [God] established heavenly angels as their guardians and curators, like leaders of a herd and shepherds’.\textsuperscript{441} However, this appears to be a misreading of the passage. For one thing, Eusebius does not mention ‘Christians’ at all here, rather he refers more broadly to ‘the men on earth’ (οἱ ἐπὶ γῆς ἄνθρωποι). More importantly, Eusebius’ reference to angels acting like ‘shepherds’ suggests that he envisaged the angels watching over large groups of people, rather than being assigned to each individual. Finally, this passage is immediately followed by a quotation of Deuteronomy 32:7-9, in which, according to the Septuagint version, it is said that God divided the human nations between the ‘angels of God’ (ἀγγέλου Θεοῦ).\textsuperscript{442} This passage should therefore be read as a reference, not to the notion of ‘guardian demons’, but rather to the idea of the ‘angels of the nations’, also found in Origen,

\textsuperscript{439} See above, p. 91, and Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 508.
\textsuperscript{440} Muehlberger, Angels, 118.
\textsuperscript{441} DE 4.6.9: ...ὡς ἀν μὴ ἀναχωκαὶ ἀνεπιστάτητοι θρεμμάτων δίκην ἄλογον εἶν οἱ ἐπὶ γῆς ἄνθρωποι προστάτας αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιμελητάς, ἀσπερ τινὰς ἄγελαρχας καὶ ποιμένας, θείους ἀγγέλους κατεστήσατο...
\textsuperscript{442} DE 4.7.1.
according to which God had arranged for different angels to supervise the various human nations.\textsuperscript{443}

Since Eusebius accorded the notion of personal demons such little attention, despite its appearance in the work of Origen, we should be particularly cautious before attempting to read Eusebius’ demons in any ‘psychological’ or ‘internal’ way. Eusebius’ emphasis is on demons as a physical, external reality and, as a result, this is how we must principally attempt to treat them.

Wicked Demons

For Eusebius, demons are not simply a physical reality, but a dangerous one too. That all demons are a threat to be both feared and if possible avoided is central to Eusebius’ conception of the demonic. In the \textit{PE}, the point about demons which Eusebius makes most insistently is that there can be no such thing as a good demon,\textsuperscript{444} thereby distancing himself from the view of contemporary non-Christian philosophers like Porphyry.\textsuperscript{445} On this point, he makes it clear that there is no room for doubt, asserting that ‘our divine sayings never name any demon at all as good’.\textsuperscript{446} As Coggan has shown, Eusebius’ discussions of the demonic in the \textit{PE} effectively serve to ‘redefine’ the term \textit{δαίμων} and to remove from it any of the ambiguity which had traditionally been attached to the word.\textsuperscript{447}

\textsuperscript{443} Blanc, ‘L’angelologie d’Origène’, 88-92, citing Origen \textit{Cels.} 5.30; \textit{Hom in Luc.} 35.8; \textit{De Princ.} 3.2-3. This is also how Johnson reads this passage: \textit{Ethnicity and Argument}, 166-67.
\textsuperscript{444} See, for example: \textit{PE} 4.10.4, 4.14.10, 4.15.3-4, 4.16.20, 4.16.23, 4.17.5-7, 4.17.10, 4.21.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.16, 5.3.8, 5.4.4, 6.6.1.
\textsuperscript{445} As, for instance, very deliberately at: \textit{PE} 4.15.3-9.
\textsuperscript{446} \textit{PE} 4.5.4: τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρ’ ἐμὶν θεὶα λόγια οὐδ’ ἄλως ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν’ ὀνομάζειν δαίμονα…
\textsuperscript{447} Coggan, \textit{Pandaemonia}, iii. Coggan’s thesis focuses on the way in which Eusebius transforms the meanings of the words Ἐλαν and \textit{δαίμων} as part of his apologetic approach in the \textit{PE}. Cf. A.
This attempt to undermine the traditional Greek understanding of the nature of the demonic can be seen most clearly in the alternative etymology for the word δαίμων that Eusebius proposes at PE 4.5.4. Demons, Eusebius informs us, ‘are fittingly called demons, not, as it seems to the Greeks, because they are knowledgeable (δαήμονας) and skilled, but for fear (τὸ δειμαίνειν), since they fear and cause fear.’ It seems likely that Eusebius took his ‘traditional’ etymology of the word δαίμων from Plato’s Cratylus, in which the character of Socrates suggests that Hesiod named the demons δαίμονες ‘because they were prudent and knowledgeable (δαήμονες)’. Although Eusebius does not name his source here as Plato, this is most probably because Eusebius usually prefers to quote Plato approvingly, as support for his understanding of the demonic, whereas here, Eusebius is seeking to distance himself from the Platonic idea. Significantly, Plato’s etymology occurs in the context of a discussion about how the names of natural creatures and objects might come from ‘a more divine power than the power of men’, and thus reflect something essential to their nature. In the course of this discussion, Socrates and Hermogenes agree that ‘the good are also the prudent’, before progressing to associate the name δαίμων with the qualities of


448 PE 4.5.4: …τοὺς μέντοι δαήμονας… οὐκ ἦπερ Ἕλληνι δοκεὶ παρὰ τὸ δαίμονας εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονας, ἀλλ’ ἢ παρὰ τὸ δειμαίνειν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκφοβεῖν, δαίμονας τινὰς προσφύσων ὀνομάζεσθαι.

449 Plat. Cra. 398b: …ὅτι φορύμικα καὶ δαήμονες ἦσαν, δαίμονας αὐτοὺς ἐνόμισεν. As Riley also noted: ‘Demon’ in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., *Dictionary of Deities and Demons*, 445. Riley, however, believes that the ‘most likely’ etymology of the word δαίμων is not that of either Plato or Eusebius. Instead, he suggests that it came from the word δαίω, meaning ‘to divide (destinies)’, and thus referred to ‘the spirit controlling one’s fate’, 445. Clearly, however, neither Plato nor Eusebius had this in mind, but instead found etymologies for the word that best suited their own understanding of the nature of demons.

450 Eusebius expresses his general admiration for Plato, albeit with some reservations, at PE 11.Praef.5, 13.13.66.

451 Plat. Cra. 397c: ἐσα γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ θεωτέρας δυνάμεως ἡ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑτέρη.
knowledge and prudence or understanding. As such, an acceptance of the traditional etymology of the term δαίμων might also be taken as an acceptance of the essential goodness of their nature. Thus, in redefining the word as he does, Eusebius is making clear to his readership the distance that lies between the traditional Greek view of the demonic and his own, recognisably Christian view. At the same time, he is also drawing attention to one of the most significant aspects of his view of the demonic – the idea that they are to be feared.

To support his argument about the malevolence of demons in the PE, Eusebius draws, as so often, on the works of earlier writers, exploiting areas of common ground, but also at times using their own arguments against them. In his discussion of demons in book 4 of the PE, Eusebius makes particularly extensive use of some of Porphyry’s works, most notably the de Abstinentia. With its condemnation of the practice of animal sacrifice, the de Abstinentia contains several areas in which Eusebius might easily find himself in agreement with Porphyry, and Eusebius in fact brings these to the reader’s attention. Introducing his discussion of the de Abstinentia, Eusebius even goes so far as to suggest that Porphyry had been ‘moved by correct reason’ in his basic argument against sacrifice, and later agrees with Porphyry that sacrifice is ‘profane, unjust, and hurtful’.

Yet, having established this area of common ground, using lengthy quotations from Porphyry’s own text to condemn sacrificial practices, Eusebius then launches an immediate challenge to the part of Porphyry’s argument with which he...

452 Ibid. 398b: Οἱ δ’ ἄγαθοι ἄλλο τι ἐφόσον μοι;
454 PE 4.10.1: …οὐδὲν λογισμῷ κινοῦμενος…
455 PE 4.14.10: ἀνόσιον γὰρ καὶ ἁδικὸν καὶ ἐπιβλαβὲς…
disagrees: the suggestion that sacrifices are offered to ‘demons, either good or bad’, rather than to the gods. Eusebius then uses Porphyry’s own arguments about the unholy nature of animal sacrifice to suggest that no good being would require such a practice. As such, Eusebius argues, sacrificial cults could never have been demanded by good demons, but only by the wicked. Rather than condemning Porphyry’s views outright, and thereby perhaps asking his readers to reject entirely the ideas about demons which they might have held prior to their conversion to Christianity, Eusebius instead uses these views as a foundation on which to build his own arguments. His focus is on highlighting the key area of difference between the Christian view of the demonic and the Neoplatonic view expressed by Porphyry – that is, the moral character of demons.

Eusebius’ uncompromising belief in the malevolent character of demons can also be found reflected in a range of his other works, and is particularly evident in his description of the demonic as μισόκαλος (good-hating), or φιλοπονήρος (evil-loving). These terms, particularly μισόκαλος, can be found in many early Christian texts, describing not only demons, but also the devil. Eusebius’ use of these terms therefore points to another important feature of the demonic in his eyes – their relationship with the devil. The repeated occurrence of these words in

456 PE 4.15.1: …δαίμοσιν δὲ, ἀλλ’ ἦτοι ἀγαθοὶς ἤ καὶ φαῦλοις.
459 Ibid.
460 Cf. on Justin Martyr: Reed, Fallen Angels, 186.
461 E.g. HE 4.7.1, 5.21.2; PE 7.10.14.
462 E.g. HE 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2. Cf. HE 4.7.10: …τὸν ἐπιχαιμεωτικον δαίμονα…
464 On which, see below, p. 110-16.
Eusebius’ discussions of the demonic has already been noted by Glen Chesnut.\footnote{Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 128; cf. Coggan, *Pandaemonia*, 185.} In Chesnut’s view, Eusebius’ characterisation of demons was linked to an exploration of deeper psychological concerns, and his descriptions of demons in this negative way should be seen as part of an attempt to understand ‘the dark part of the human personality’.\footnote{Ibid. 128.} Such an explanation, however, leaves much to be desired.

In suggesting that demons were, for Eusebius, little more than a tool with which to explore human psychology, Chesnut crucially fails to recognise the reality of the demonic for Eusebius. Moreover, Chesnut also risks downplaying the significance of this characteristic for Eusebius’ understanding of the danger posed by demons. Although Chesnut does note that the idea of a hatred of goodness acting as a ‘motivating emotion’ would have seemed ‘perverse indeed’ to pagans, he fails to point out that this characteristic significantly reinforces the sense that demons are a force to be feared.\footnote{Ibid. 128.} Creatures considered to be invariably ‘good-hating’ would pose a particularly serious and unpredictable threat, since their actions against human interests would require no provocation in the form of human transgression.

Demons and Envy

This sense that demons are universally wicked is further reflected in the association which Eusebius draws between demons and the characteristic of envy. There are three terms which Eusebius uses in this context: φθόνος,\footnote{E.g. *PE* 7.10.15; *DE* 4.9.1, 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2; *VC* 1.45.3, 2.73.1.} βασκανία\footnote{E.g. *PE* 7.10.14; *DE* 4.9.1; *HE* 5.21.2; *VC* 2.73.1, 4.41.2.} and
As P. Walcot has shown, there was considerable overlap in meaning between these terms in classical Greek texts, and it is clear that this continued in Eusebius’ use of the terms. At times, they appear almost synonymous for Eusebius. At DE 4.9.1, for instance, Eusebius combines the terms φθόνος and βασκανία in his description of the demons’ fall, thereby suggesting that envy was seen by Eusebius as characteristic of demonic activity from the very beginning of their existence:

... φθόνῳ τῆς ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίας τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶλκεν, παντοίας κακίας μηχαναίς πάσι τοῖς ἐθνεσιν καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ κυρίου κλήρῳ βασκανία τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπιβουλεύοντα.

... through envy of the salvation of men they took the opposing side, scheming by all kinds of wicked means against all the nations and against the Lord’s lot itself through their jealousy of the good.

In his oration on the dedication of the Church at Tyre, Eusebius similarly combined φθόνος and ζῆλος in his description of ‘the evil-loving demon’ (τοῦ φιλοπνήρου δαίμονος). Nor was Eusebius the only fourth-century writer to use these terms at times almost interchangeably – in Basil of Caesarea’s homily On Envy, we likewise find all three terms employed to describe a nexus of negative envious emotions associated with demonic evil. It therefore seems that in the fourth century the meaning of these three words was similar enough to allow them to be used synonymously, or to be combined for emphatic effect, as by Eusebius at DE 4.9.1.

Nevertheless, the three terms did have slightly different connotations, which it is important to recognise. Of these terms, ζῆλος stands out as being able to convey, on occasion, a positive connotation. Walcot suggests that, for earlier writers

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470 E.g. HE 10.4.57, cf. ἀντιζήλος at HE 4.15.40 (a quotation from the Martyrdom of Polycarp).
472 HE 10.4.57.
473 For example: PG 31.380.3-10, where all three terms appear together in quick succession in the same passage. On this homily, see: V. Limberis, ‘The Eyes Infected by Evil: Basil of Caesarea’s Homily, On Envy’, HTR 84 (1991), 163-84.
like Aristotle and Plutarch, φθόνος and ζηλος might be distinguished in a similar manner to the English ‘envy’ and ‘emulation’, with the latter regarded as a positive, rather than a negative emotion.\textsuperscript{474} Similarly, among early Christian authors, ζηλος could be used to refer to the imitation of God by humankind, or even to describe God himself.\textsuperscript{475} Indeed, even in the works of Eusebius, we find forms of ζηλος also applied to a more positive emulation, such as the attempt to live up to the example of the virtuous patriarchs like Abraham and Joseph.\textsuperscript{476} Yet ζηλος is also the term which Eusebius applies least often to the demons.\textsuperscript{477} This is surely connected to the fact that it could, in certain circumstances, be open to a more positive interpretation. In association with demons, Eusebius preferred to use another word for ‘envy’, one which had an unambiguously negative meaning – φθόνος.

Their association with φθόνος would not only have marked Eusebius’ demons as wicked, but also as distant from true divinity. Plato, in a passage of the \textit{Timaeus} that was widely discussed in antiquity,\textsuperscript{478} had stressed that ‘in one who is good no envy is ever possible regarding anything’.\textsuperscript{479} This claim occurred in the context of a discussion about the nature of the Demiurge, the world’s creator, in which the character of Timaeus was made to suggest that the creator was so good, and so free from envy that ‘he wished very much that everything might come into

\textsuperscript{474} Walcot, \textit{Envy}, 14, citing Arist. \textit{Rhet.} 1387b-1388b and Plut. \textit{De fraterno amore} 487a-b.
\textsuperscript{475} \textit{PGL}, s.v. ζηλος.
\textsuperscript{476} For example: \textit{PE} 7.8.24, 7.8.25, 7.8.32, 11.4.5. \textit{Cf. HE} 2.17.5.
\textsuperscript{477} In the \textit{HE}, for example, Eusebius uses ζηλος only once to describe demons (\textit{HE} 10.4.57). In the same work, Eusebius associates the demons with βασκανία once in his own voice (\textit{HE} 5.21.2), and once in a quotation (\textit{HE} 4.15.40). Demons are associated most often with φθόνος, which appears three times in connection with demons in the \textit{HE} (\textit{HE} 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2).
being similar to himself’ and that ‘as much as possible all might be good and
nothing wicked’. As such, in Platonic thought, envy was seen as an emotion
totally incompatible with the ultimate divinity; in fact, a key characteristic of this
divine creator was the very absence of envy. This was clearly an idea that held
particular appeal for Eusebius, since he quoted this line from the Timaeus on several
occasions. On one occasion in the PE, Eusebius’ quotation of Plato’s line occurs in
the context of his own discussion about ‘the essence of the good’, in which
Eusebius asserts that according to Scripture ‘the good itself is nothing other than
God’. For Eusebius, then, just as for Plato, there is a clear association between
goodness, divinity, and freedom from envy. By describing the demons as envious,
Eusebius is therefore highlighting several ways in which they are distant from the
true God. A division is established between goodness, a lack of envy, and true
divinity on the one hand and wickedness, unrestrained envy, and a lack of divinity
on the other.

Likewise, in the early Christian tradition, φθόνος was seen, not simply as
incompatible with the divine, but even as directly opposed to it. In the New
Testament, φθόνος appears as a fault among humans, at times lined up for
criticism alongside other vices such as licentiousness, deceit and wickedness.
Crucially, however, φθόνος was also associated by early Christians with the devil.

According to the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, it was ‘by the φθόνος of the devil’

480 Plat. Tim. 29e: τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὃ τι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἐαυτῷ;
  ibid. 30a: ...ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλάῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν...

481 See: PE 11.21.2. 15.5.2; CH 6.4.
482 PE 11.21.1: ...τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ σοι... εἰσίνα...  
483 Ibid: ...ἀντὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἶναι ἡ θεόν...

484 Matt 27:18; Mark 15:10; Gal. 5:26; Phil 1:15;  
485 Rom. 1:29; Gal 5:21; 1 Tim. 6:4; Tit. 3:3; 1 Pet. 2:1. Note, however, the use of φθόνος at Jas. 4:5,
referring to God, which appears to be an entirely anomalous use of the term.
that death had first come into the world.\textsuperscript{486} This idea was repeated in the first epistle of Clement,\textsuperscript{487} and Eusebius also cites this passage in the \textit{PE}.\textsuperscript{488} Clement of Alexandria denied the possibility that God could feel envy, since God was untouched by the passions.\textsuperscript{489} Instead, in a possible, oblique reference to the devil, Clement suggests that ‘the one who is envious is another, one who has been approached by passion’.\textsuperscript{490} By characterising the demons as motivated by φθόνος, Eusebius is therefore hinting at a connection between demons and the devil which he elaborated most fully in the \textit{PE} and \textit{DE}.\textsuperscript{491} It is striking that Eusebius draws such a close link between demons and φθόνος, encouraging us to see this vice as characteristic of the demonic. More than once in Eusebius’ works we find φθόνος and a ‘wicked demon’ working in combination.\textsuperscript{492} Furthermore, Eusebius also characterises φθόνος as μισόκαλος, the same designation that he sometimes gives to demons.\textsuperscript{493} This suggests that φθόνος is so characteristic of Eusebius’ demons that the noun φθόνος could even be used in works such as the \textit{VC} to stand in place of a reference to demons.

The close relationship between Eusebius’ demons and φθόνος in particular has previously been noted by Chesnut, who suggested that the demons in Eusebius’ works were the ‘personification’ of this emotion.\textsuperscript{494} Although Chesnut evidently recognises the importance of this link for Eusebius, his analysis does not provide

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{486} Wisdom 2:24: φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον.
\textsuperscript{487} 1 Clem. 3:4, citing Wisd. 2:24.
\textsuperscript{488} PE 13.3.38.
\textsuperscript{489} Clem. Alex. Stro. 7.2.7.2.
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid.: ἄλλος δὲ ὁ φθονόν, οὐ καὶ πάθος ἡψατο.
\textsuperscript{491} See the discussion below, p. 110-16.
\textsuperscript{492} E.g.: HE 10.4.14, 10.8.2; VC 1.49.1-2, 2.73.1.
\textsuperscript{493} E.g.: VC 1.49.2, 3.1.1, 4.41.1; HE 10.4.14, 10.8.2. On demons as μισόκαλος, see above, p. 101-02.
\textsuperscript{494} Chesnut, \textit{First Christian Histories}, 128.
\end{footnotes}
the most helpful way of characterising the relationship between demons and envy.

In particular, Chesnut’s argument again risks downplaying the reality of the demonic in Eusebius’ mind by implying that Eusebius’ demons were little more than a way of overcoming an historiographical problem. Chesnut points out that the idea of the jealousy of the gods and their resentment of human prosperity was an essential part of traditional Greek thought, and a feature of non-Christian historiography which the earliest Christian historians, including Eusebius, struggled to reconcile with their idea of a benevolent God. Chesnut suggests that these historians were able to overcome this problem by ‘reinterpreting’ the jealousy of the gods as the jealousy of demons. Although it is true that references to demonic envy are more numerous in Eusebius’ arguably more ‘historical’ works, the HE and VC, similar references can also be found elsewhere. In the DE, where there is no historiographical or narrative need for a replacement for the ‘jealousy of the gods’, demons are still closely linked with the emotion of envy. At DE 4.9.1, demons are not simply linked loosely to envy, but the object of their jealousy – the salvation of humankind – is identified, and given as a reason for their initial fall. It therefore seems that this characteristic was far more important to Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic character then Chesnut’s analysis allows.

It is also significant that, as Chesnut admits, the φθόνος of Eusebius’ demons is significantly more serious than the ‘petty jealousy’ or ‘displeasure at human arrogance’ of the mythological gods. As D.L. Cairns has argued, the traditional φθόνος of the Greek gods ‘presupposes at least a minimal notion of human

495 Ibid. 59-60.
496 Ibid. 60.
497 Ibid. 128.
offence’, the φθόνος of Eusebius’ demons, by contrast, required no such
provocation. In Eusebius’ works, the φθόνος of the demons is regularly linked to
other demonic traits, such as their hatred of the good, and their love of evil, as when
Eusebius writes of the ‘good-hating envy, even the evil-loving demon’ resenting the
prosperity of the church. Eusebius is thus able to create a closely linked group of
key negative associations for the demons. This suggestion that demonic envy might
arise simply from a ‘hatred of the good’, rather than as a response to some form of
human transgression served once again to make the nature of their threat seem far
more unpredictable. It also made it clear that the φθόνος of the demons, unlike that
of the traditional gods, did not contain any element of divine justice, but was itself
unjust and indiscriminate in its targeting of humankind.

Like φθόνος, the characteristic of βασκανία is unambiguously negative for
Eusebius. Traditionally, the verb βασκαίνω had referred not only to being jealous,
but also, significantly, to the idea of ‘casting the evil eye’ upon someone. As
Vasiliki Limberis has shown in the case of Basil of Caesarea, some early Christian
writers sought to bring popular fears about the power of the ‘evil eye’ (βάσκανος
όφθαλμος) into the remit of the church, by suggesting that envy and the evil eye
were the work of demons and the devil, to be combatted through the pursuit of

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499 HE 10.8.2: ...τῷ μυκαίλῳ φθόνῳ τῷ τε φλοστονήρῳ δαίμονι... Cf. HE 10.4.14, 10.4.57; VC 1.49.1-2.

virtue.\textsuperscript{501} It is possible that we see Eusebius similarly attempting a Christian explanation for the power of $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\iota$, when he suggests in the $HE$ that ‘the good-hating demon’ is ‘jealous in his nature’.\textsuperscript{502} For Eusebius, it seems that $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\iota$ is naturally demonic, and may be explained as a product of demonic activity. Although clearly very closely connected to $\phi\theta\omicron\omicron\nu\varsigma$ for Eusebius, $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\iota$ perhaps represents for him the active, harmful product of the demonic characteristic of $\phi\theta\omicron\omicron\nu\varsigma$.

Moreover, the characteristic of $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\iota$ would further have hinted at the connection between demons and the devil for early Christians, as one of the several possible meanings of the term $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma$ was ‘slanderous’.\textsuperscript{503} In older Greek texts, such as Aristophanes and Plato, the word used by Christians for the devil, $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\beta\omicron\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, usually had the meaning simply of ‘slanderous’.\textsuperscript{504} It is therefore striking that at $DE$ 4.9.1, where the demons are said to be driven by their ‘jealousy of the good’ ($\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\iota\tau\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\omicron\nu\varsigma$), this emotion is described as so extreme that they even act ‘against the Lord’s lot itself’ ($\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\kappa\lambda\iota\rho\omicron\omicron\nu$). By ‘the Lord’s lot’, Eusebius is doubtless referring those who are virtuous. Shortly before this passage, Eusebius offers an interpretation of Deuteronomy 32.7-9, in which ‘the Lord’s part’ ($\mu\epsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma\ K\upsilon\rho\iota\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon$) is named as ‘Jacob’.\textsuperscript{505} Glossing this passage, Eusebius explains that ‘Jacob’ refers to that part of humankind which displays ‘clear-sightedness’ ($\tau\omicron\ \delta\iota\omicron\omicron\alpha\omicron\alpha\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\nu\upsilon$) and is ‘pious’ ($\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\epsilon\omicron\zeta\beta\iota\varsigma$).\textsuperscript{506} Thus the implication is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{501} Limberis, ‘The Eyes Infected’.
\item \textsuperscript{502} $HE$ 5.21.2: …τῷ μισοκάλῳ δαίμονι $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma$ ὀντι τὴν φύσιν…
\item \textsuperscript{503} LSJ s.v. $\beta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma$.
\item \textsuperscript{504} G.J. Riley, ‘Devil’, in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons, 463, citing Aristophanes, Eq. 45 and Plato Apol. 37b.
\item \textsuperscript{505} $DE$ 4.7.1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{506} $DE$ 4.7.2.
\end{itemize}
that piety and insight bring a person closer to God. More specifically, for Eusebius, these virtues bring people closer to Christ, for he makes it clear in his interpretation of Deuteronomy that he understands ‘Κύριος’ to refer to Christ. These virtues would also draw people away from the demons, standing in sharp contrast to the ‘jealous’ and ‘good-hating’ character of the demons. As a result of their βασκανία, the demons are thus set up in opposition to Christ and the goodness associated with him, and are tied instead to the devil. For Eusebius, envy (φθόνος) and the malignant jealousy that accompanied it (βασκανία) were essential characteristics of demons, which not only helped to reinforce the sense of their malevolence, but also established them as opponents of God, and allies of the devil.

Demons and the Devil

This relationship between demons and the devil was clearly of considerable importance for Eusebius, since his account of the origins of the demons in the _PE_ links them closely to the devil. At _PE_ 7.16, where Eusebius offers by far his fullest account of the origins of the ‘opposing power’, he suggests that the wicked spiritual beings known, amongst other things, as demons were, in his view, originally angels. That Eusebius should have chosen to elaborate on this particular story is of considerable significance, since it was not the only explanation of demonic origins in circulation among early Christian writers. For some, such as Justin Martyr, and Eusebius’ Latin contemporary Lactantius, demons were not angels, but rather the maliciously inclined spirits of the giants, which were

507 _Ibid_.
508 _PE_ 7.16.1: ...τῆς ἑναντίας δυνάμεως...
509 _PE_ 7.16.2, 7.16.9; cf. _PE_ 13.15.1.
themselves the deformed and malevolent offspring of a forbidden union between fallen angels and human women.510 This story was most likely drawing on the account found in the Enochic Book of the Watchers, according to which the angels sent to watch over humankind had fallen from heaven as a result of their lust for human women.511 Their offspring, the giants, were then said to have spread terror and destruction on earth until they were destroyed at God’s command. However, while the giants and the fallen angels themselves were supposed to have been confined by God, the spirits of the giants were allowed to remain free on earth, continuing to cause trouble as demons.512

Eusebius was no doubt aware of the Enochic story, yet we find only faint traces of it in the PE – as, for example, when Eusebius tells us that, while some of the fallen angels were confined in Tartarus, others were allowed to remain free on earth.513 Similarly in the Commentary on Isaiah, quoting directly from Genesis 6:2 rather than from its elaboration in 1 Enoch, Eusebius offers two alternative explanations for the origins of wicked spiritual powers:

τὰς μὲν οὖν δυνάμεις τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἣτοι γιγάντων οὕτως ψυχὰς ἡ τῶν ἔξ, οὐρανοῦ κατελθόντων ἁγγέλων, ἐξ ὑπὸ ὧν ἂν γίγαντες ἐγεννήθησαν, ὧν καὶ ἡ Μωσέως μνημονεύει γραφὴ λέγουσα·

511 1 Enoch 6-11.
513 PE 7.16.7-8.
And so the adverse powers are either the souls of the giants or the angels fallen down from heaven, from whom come ‘those descended of the giants’, of which the writing recorded by Moses says: ‘The angels of God, seeing that the daughters of men were fair, took them to themselves as wives out of all the things which they selected’.

Here we find both possibilities raised: the wicked powers might be either fallen angels, or they might be the remnants of the giants. Eusebius does not appear to see any apparent contradiction between the two explanations, and, in a biblical commentary, the aim of which was not to elaborate on the nature of demons, we should not expect Eusebius to adjudicate between them.

Nevertheless, Eusebius’ evident familiarity with the story of the giants makes it particularly striking that, in his longer explanation in the PE, he chose to focus on the story of the fallen angels. The hints of the story of the giants that appear in the PE make it clear that Eusebius was already aware of this version when he wrote this work; it is not a later discovery made between the composition of the PE and the CI. Rather, it seems that Eusebius deliberately chose to emphasise the original link between demons and angels, claiming that the demons have fallen directly from the ‘blissful and angelic choruses’. This has the effect of drawing a much closer link between the demons and the figure regarded as their leader, the devil, for it appears that Eusebius also saw the devil as a fallen angel.

In both the PE and the DE, Eusebius describes the initial fall of a clearly diabolical figure, identified with the fallen day-star of Isaiah 14:12. This figure,

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514 CI 95.21-25.
515 PE 7.16.7: …μακαρίοις καὶ ἄγγελικοῖς χοροῖς…
also labelled in the *PE* as a ‘dragon’ (δράκων) and ‘snake’ (ὄφις),\(^{517}\) in line with the description of the devil in Revelation,\(^ {518}\) is said to have fallen directly from among ‘the better’.\(^ {519}\) Moreover, he is said to have fallen for similar reasons to the demons, whose offences are described as ‘equal’ (παραπλησίοις) to his.\(^ {520}\) Crucially, in the *DE*, this figure is labelled as a ‘great demon’ (μεγαλοδαίμων).\(^ {521}\) Thus, according to Eusebius’ account of their origins, the demons and their leader are the same kind of being – the devil is not just the leader of the demons, but a demon himself, albeit a ‘great demon’.

Moreover, this figure is described as ‘responsible for the departure from the better which happened both to himself and to the rest’.\(^ {522}\) As to precisely what the cause of this fall may have been, Eusebius offers at least two possible options in the *PE* and *DE*, likely reflecting the fact that a number of different understandings of the devil’s fall were current among Christian writers of the first few centuries.

Sirinelli identified two main views that were prevalent at the time: the first, which he attributed to writers including Tertullian, Athenagoras and Lactantius, placed the devil’s fall after the creation of humans, and considered it to stem from the devil’s envy of humankind.\(^ {523}\) The second view, advocated by Origen, saw the cause of the devil’s fall as pride, arising independently of the creation of humankind.\(^ {524}\)

\(^{517}\) *PE* 7.16.3.

\(^{518}\) Rev. 12.9.

\(^{519}\) *PE* 7.16.3; *DE* 4.9.5.

\(^{520}\) *PE* 7.16.7.

\(^{521}\) *DE* 4.9.1-2.

\(^{522}\) *PE* 7.16.3: ...αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἐτέρως τῆς τῶν κρειττών ἀποστασίας γενόμενων αἰτίων...

\(^{523}\) Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 305.

\(^{524}\) *Ibid.*, 306. More recently, however, this idea that early Christian views on the cause of the devil’s fall can be neatly divided into two camps – one favouring pride and the other envy – has been rightly criticised by S. Lunn-Rockliffe, who has demonstrated that many writers held far more complex understandings of the devil’s fall: ‘The Diabolical Problem of Satan’s First Sin: Self-moved Pride or a Response to the Goads of Envy?’, *Studia Patristica* 63 (2013), 121-40.
In Sirinelli’s opinion, Eusebius followed Origen in ascribing the devil’s fall to
the sin of pride.\textsuperscript{525} This is certainly the impression conveyed at \textit{PE} 7.16, where
Eusebius blames the ‘boastfulness and battle against God’ of this diabolical δράκων
for his fall.\textsuperscript{526} A quotation from Ezekiel, suggesting that God had told this figure that
he was cast out of heaven because ‘your heart is proud, and you have said “I am a
god; I sit in the seat of the gods,’” further reinforces the sense that it was pride and a
desire to be like God that brought about this initial fall.\textsuperscript{527} However, in a shorter
account of the fall of the wicked powers at \textit{DE} 4.9, we also find a prominent role
being allocated to envy of humankind,\textsuperscript{528} with particular emphasis placed on the
actions taken by the μεγαλοδαίμων to undermine God’s plans for humanity.\textsuperscript{529}
Thus, rather than straightforwardly adopting one view of the fall of the
μεγαλοδαίμων, or suggesting that his – and the demons’ – evil behaviour had just
one cause, Eusebius combines a range of influences to produce a picture in which
pride and envy become the defining characteristics of the demonic forces opposed
to God.

Recognising the close relationship between demons and their diabolical leader
is crucial to understanding Eusebius’ attitude towards the demonic. Eusebius
envisaged a cosmology in which the supreme God was opposed by a hostile
‘rebellious power’ (ἀποστατικής δυνάμεως),\textsuperscript{530} variously described as the

\textsuperscript{525} \textit{Ibid}.\textsuperscript{526} \textit{PE} 7.16.7: ...δι’ οἰκείαν μεγαλαυχίαν καὶ θεομαχίαν...\textsuperscript{527} Ezek. 28:2, NRSV trans., cited at \textit{PE} 7.16.5. Eusebius also cites Ezek. 28:12-15, 28:17, and Isa. 14:13-14
at \textit{PE} 7.16.4-6.\textsuperscript{528} \textit{DE} 4.9.1.\textsuperscript{529} \textit{DE} 4.9.1, 4.9.3.\textsuperscript{530} \textit{DE} 4.9.1.
διαβόλος,531 and the μεγαλοδαίμων,532 identified with the fallen day-star of Isaiah 14:12,533 and named as Beelzebul.534 The link between this figure and the demons is made explicit in several places – the supporters of the μεγαλοδαίμων are described as the ‘demons and worse spirits’,535 while a clearly diabolical figure is called ‘the beginner of their [the demons and wicked spirits’] fall’,536 and the ‘ruler’ (ἄρχων) of the demons.537 Not only is there a clear link, but the relationship is evidently envisaged as hierarchical – the devil leads, and the demons follow.

While Eusebius was by no means the first Christian writer to consider demons as subordinates and followers of the devil, this Christian position did mark a significant departure from that of earlier Greek philosophy. According to Origen’s report, Celsus had found the idea that the supreme god might have an adversary to be ‘most impious’ (ἀσεβέστατα),538 and had further considered all demons to be ‘of god’ (τοῦ θεοῦ).539 Even when Plutarch acknowledged that some demons might cause harm to humans, the source of their misbehaviour was seen as their susceptibility to passion.540 There was no suggestion that they might be acting as part of a wider hostile force, with an identifiable leader. Thus, the demons we find

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531 PE 11.26.5.
532 DE 4.9.1.
533 DE 4.9.4; PE 7.16.4.
535 DE 4.9.1: τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀντιπάλου καὶ ἀποστατικῆς δυνάμεως εἰτε δαιμόνων εἰτε καὶ χειρόνων ἄλλων πνευμάτων...
536 PE 7.16.3: ...κατάρξαντα τῆς πτώσεως...
538 Orig. Cels. 6.42.
539 Orig. Cels. 8.24. For discussion of Celsus’ criticisms of Christianity, see: S. Benko, ‘Pagan Criticism of Christianity During the First Two Centuries AD’, ANRW 2.23.2 (1980), 1101-08.
540 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 217. See Plut. De Fac. Lun. 944c-d.
in Eusebius’ works appear to be considerably more co-ordinated and deliberate in their threat than the occasional rogue demons of earlier Greek philosophy.

**Demonic Power**

The preceding sections of this chapter have shown that Eusebius held demons to be a hostile force, opposed both to the Christian God and to those virtuous humans who followed him. The following section will demonstrate that Eusebius also believed firmly in the reality of demonic power. Although he makes it clear that the demons’ power could not match that of the truly divine Christian God, he nonetheless allows them a level of ability and knowledge considerably beyond that of humans, further enhancing the sense of the threat that they posed. At *PE* 5.2.1, Eusebius stresses that demons have the power to inflict considerable suffering on their human victims, describing how demons would send illnesses to afflict people, which they would then proceed to ‘cure’ in order to gain worship. Here, Eusebius is suggesting that the demons possessed considerably greater power than humans, but is at the same time restricting the scope of that power. In curing an illness which it had itself caused, a demon would not be demonstrating truly divine power. Moreover, the idea that the demons might deliberately cause human suffering simply in order to claim worship as gods points once again to their malevolence.

This belief in the power of the demons also emerges particularly clearly from Eusebius’ discussion of oracles and divination in the preface to the fifth book of the *DE*. Questioning whether the traditional Greek oracles are the work of demons or of true gods, Eusebius suggests that ‘it seems that the oracles were of demons, applicable to the detection of a thief, or the destruction of a utensil, or other such
things, of which it was not improbable that those haunting the air around the earth
should have some small knowledge’. Eusebius does not attempt to deny that the
traditional oracles might have revealed information that was hidden to humans,
attributing the demons’ greater knowledge to their ontological superiority.
However, he is at the same time quick to stress the limitations of their power,
immediately contrasting these oracles with the predictions of the ‘Hebrew
prophets’, such as Moses. While the traditional oracles dealt only with the ‘small
and lowly’, the divinely inspired prophecies of the Jewish and Christian
scriptures ‘contributed to great things’. As such, even while accepting some
degree of demonic power, Eusebius carefully positions it within a wider hierarchy
of power and ability, in which the Christian God, as always, takes the higher
position.

This belief in the existence of some demonic power was clearly of
considerable significance for Eusebius, since in his discussions of oracles in the PE
he deliberately dismisses an alternative explanation for the traditional oracles that
would have downplayed the extent of the demons’ power – namely, that they were
the result of human fraud. Introducing his discussion of oracles in book 4 of the PE,
Eusebius acknowledges that some writers might choose to argue against the
validity of the traditional oracles by suggesting that ‘the whole thing is a deceit and

541 DE 5, Praef. 17: ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς ἐοίκει, δαιμόνιοι ἐν μαντεία, μέχρι κλέπτου φοράς ἢ σκέψεως ἐπιλείπεις ὠς τῶν ἄλλων τοιούτων φθάνοντα, ὃν οὐκ ἀπεικότας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ περὶ γῆν ἀεί τὰς διαπραβάς ποιομένους τὴν ἐνδέχεσθαι...
542 A similar claim that demons’ apparent knowledge of the future arose, not from any sort of divine
insight, but rather from the fact that the nature of their bodies allowed them to travel quickly through
the air occurs in the Vita Antonii of Athanasius (31.2–6): Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 508.
543 DE 5, Praef. 20: ...τοῖς Ἑβραίων προφήταις...
544 DE 5, Praef. 22: ...σομκρόν καὶ ταπείνων...
545 DE 5, Praef. 21: ...ἐπὶ μεγάλοις συνεπελεῖτο.
the contrivances and misdeeds of human sorcerers’. However, Eusebius prefers the alternative explanation that the oracles were the result of demonic influence, as the demons attempted to draw people away from the true God, towards a life of immorality. The furthest Eusebius is prepared to go in allowing a role for human fraud in oracular predictions is in his suggestion that the priests of various oracles might have conspired alongside the demons to create the impression that the oracles were more powerful than was in fact the case. Even here, however, Eusebius attributes the initial impetus behind the oracles to the demons, writing that ‘again the wicked demons themselves began the instruction of these matters to their attendants’, and describing the demons as ‘responsible for establishing the sorcery that was the root of wickedness for all the life of men’. Thus, Eusebius appears to have been firmly wedded to the view that the demons did have a role in the operation of the traditional oracles. There were alternative explanations for oracular predictions available to him, and he was fully aware of these. However, he deliberately chose not to use them, consistently downplaying the role of human fraud, and stressing instead the malign influence of the demons.

In fact, the idea that demonic power was real, but at the same time considerably weaker than that of the truly divine Christian God was of central importance to Eusebius’ apologetic argument in the PE and DE. Although Coggan

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546 PE 4.1.8: …πλάνην εἶναι τὸ πᾶν καὶ γοητὴν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώπων λωτούς τῆς ἡμέρας τοῦ θεοῦ… Cf. the full discussion at PE 4.1-2.
547 See especially: PE 5.21.6, where Eusebius criticises Oenomaus for suggesting that oracles are the result of human fraud, rather than admitting that they come from demons.
548 See, for example: PE 4.4.1-2, 4.14.10, 5.18.4-5, 6.6.3-4.
549 PE 5.2.5.
550 Ibid.: …τῆς καὶ τοιῶν διακολασίας αὐτῶν πάλιν τῶν φαύλων δαμάσκων τοῖς θεραπεύοις προκαταρκτικῶν.
551 Ibid.: …τῆς υφειδακίας γοητείας παντὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ καταστήσας αἰτίων…
and Johnson have previously noted that Eusebius’ discussions of demons could serve an apologetic purpose in the *PE*,\(^{552}\) with Coggan suggesting, for example, that Eusebius turns the story of the ‘Death of Pan’ into ‘a testimonial to the power of the Christian saviour’,\(^{553}\) they did not emphasise the way in which Eusebius’ defence of the power of Christ depends upon a belief in the power of demons. Eusebius was able to contrast the extent of the demons’ power with that of Christ, which he considered to be much greater, by suggesting that the struggle between Christianity and the polytheistic cults on earth was simply a manifestation of the more significant cosmic conflict taking place between the demons on the one hand, and Christ on the other. In fact, Eusebius even poses his readers the direct question of why the supposed ‘gods’ of paganism have failed to stop the spread of Christian teaching:

> εἰ δὴ ὁ μὲν θνητός, ὡς ἀν φαίειν, ἄνθρωπος (τάχα δ’ ἀν εἴποιεν ὅτι καὶ πλάνος), οἱ δὲ σωτήρες καὶ θεοί, τι δήτα τοῖνυν πάντες ἀθρόοις αὐτῷ Ἀσκληπιῶ νεφεύγασιν, τὰ νῦτα τῷ θνητῷ καὶ πάσαιν ἔξως ὑπαχείριον τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα τῷ μηκέτ’ ὁντι, ὡς ἀν εἴποιεν αὐτοί, παραδεδωκότες;\(^{554}\)

Indeed, if he is a mortal man, as they may say (perhaps even a deceiver, they may say), but they are saviours and gods, why indeed have they all fled in crowds, even Asclepius himself, their backs towards this mortal, and why have they handed over all humankind in their control, one after another, to this one, who, so they say, no longer exists?

Eusebius finds ‘evidence’ for the supposed decline of pagan oracles and the civic cults in discussions drawn from non-Christian writers like Porphyry and Plutarch about cases of failed or abandoned oracles.\(^{555}\) He then contrasts these with the


\(^{553}\) Coggan, *Pandaemonia*, ii.

\(^{554}\) *PE* 5.1.12.

\(^{555}\) See, for example: *PE* 5.1.9-10, 5.17.13.
spread of Christian teaching, and the success of the Christian church.\footnote{See, for example: \textit{PE} 5.1.13-15.} At times, Eusebius makes his case for the greater power of Christ even more explicitly, remarking that ‘our saviour, undertaking his teachings among men, is described as having driven out the whole race of demons from the life of men, so that already some of the demons fell to their knees and supplicated him not to give them up to the Tartarus that was waiting for them.’\footnote{\textit{PE} 5.17.13: …ο ἡμέτερος σωτήρ τάς σων ανθρώπως ποιομένους διατιθέας πάν γένος δαμάνων ἐξελαύνειν τοῦ τῶν ανθρώπων ἀναγέγραπται βιον-ώστε ἤδη τινάς τῶν δαμάνων γυνιπετείν αὐτὸν καὶ ἱκετεύειν μὴ τῶν περιμένοντι αὐτῶς Ταρτάρου παραδοῦναι. Cf. \textit{DE} 6.13.8. The question of exactly what effect Eusebius believed the incarnation to have had on demonic power will be discussed in more detail below, in Chapter V.} Here Christ is depicted as stronger than the demons – his power is so far superior to theirs that they are reduced to the position of mere suppliants, forced to appeal for mercy. Acknowledging the reality of demonic power thus allows Eusebius to argue for the reality of the power of Christ as well. Depicting the Christian God as the strongest of a variety of equally real spiritual powers could provide valuable support to Eusebius’ claim in the \textit{PE} and \textit{DE} that the Christians had acted sensibly in turning away from the old civic cults towards Christianity. By suggesting that the power of Christ has overcome the power of the demons, Eusebius is implying that the Christians have chosen the protection of a stronger divinity than those of the old pagan civic cults, as Dale Martin has argued.\footnote{Martin, \textit{Inventing Superstition}, 225. Martin joins Ferguson in suggesting that a substantial part of Christianity’s appeal lay in the protection it claimed to offer from the harm that demons were widely believed to cause: Martin, \textit{Inventing Superstition}, 243; Ferguson, \textit{Demonology}, 129.} If the demons had not been regarded as exercising genuine power, albeit of a limited kind, it would have made Christ’s supposed undermining of that power appear considerably less impressive. The fact that Eusebius sought to construct part of his defence of Christianity on the basis that demons exercised real...
power illustrates how deeply not only he, but also his intended audience, believed in the reality and immediacy of the demonic presence in their world.

**Conclusions**

Overall, this survey of Eusebius’ discussions of the demonic throughout a range of his works has revealed a remarkably consistent picture of demons. It has shown that Eusebius held demons to be an active and hostile presence in the universe. In league with the devil, demons ranged themselves against God and his virtuous followers. Although Eusebius was adamant that their power could not match that of the true God, it was nevertheless strong enough to enable demons to interfere considerably in human existence, either by causing physical harm through the infliction of illnesses, or moral harm through the encouragement of polytheism. It therefore appears that for Eusebius the demonic threat was both potent and real. In consequence, while Eusebius may at times have chosen to emphasise particular features of demonic activity in certain of his works for apologetic ends,559 we must be careful to avoid reading Eusebius’ references to the demonic simply as part of a convenient apologetic strategy. Rather, we need to acknowledge his genuine concern about the danger which demons might pose. The depth of this concern can further be seen from the way in which Eusebius’ idea of a stark divide between the good Christian God and the wicked demons manifested itself in a series of further polarities in Eusebius’ thought, expanding into a picture of a universe

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559 Such as, in Johnson’s suggestion, arguing against the power of the oracles in order to undermine the ‘political theology’ of the Greek poleis: Ethnicity and Argument, 163-70.
fundamentally divided between hostile spiritual opponents. This, however, will be
the subject of the following chapter.
CHAPTER III

A DIVIDED UNIVERSE

Previous work on demons in Eusebius has returned repeatedly to the idea that demons were associated above all with polytheistic cults and oracles, and deployed primarily to attack the foundations of traditional Greek and Roman religion.\textsuperscript{560} However, this was only one aspect of the demonic presence for Eusebius, albeit the one that emerges most obviously from a reading of the \textit{PE}. To focus exclusively on this aspect of the demonic therefore does not do justice to the full range of Eusebius’ views on this topic. More seriously, it risks implying that Eusebius’ ideas about demons were neatly partitioned from other areas of his thought, capable of being deployed only at such convenient moments as best suited Eusebius’ apologetic argument. Such an approach fails to appreciate the physical reality of demons for Eusebius. It also shows little awareness of the extent to which Eusebius’ ideas about demons permeated and helped to structure his understanding of the universe more generally. Throughout Eusebius’ works we repeatedly find the fundamental opposition between God/Christ on the one hand and the devil/demons on the other reflected in a series of extreme polarities, demonstrating how Eusebius’ ideas about demons underpinned his thought more broadly.

Although both Sharron Coggan and Dale Martin have previously highlighted the fact that Eusebius’ conceptual universe was one of polarised extremes,\textsuperscript{561} their resulting analyses do not adequately acknowledge the potency of the demonic for Eusebius. Coggan, for instance, suggests that Eusebius makes use of an extreme


\textsuperscript{561} Coggan, \textit{Pandaemonia}, 183-87; Martin, \textit{Inventing Superstition}, 221.
terminology of good and evil in order to transform the meaning of the term δαίμων from the ambiguous ‘daemons’ of the classical tradition to the thoroughly wicked demons of early Christian thought.562 In this analysis, Eusebius’ treatment of the demonic appears as little more than an intellectual exercise, implying an astonishing level of detachment from his subject. In light of Eusebius’ views on the physical reality and wicked nature of demons highlighted in the previous chapter, such an approach cannot be maintained. This chapter will therefore propose an alternative reading, taking full account of the depth and sincerity of Eusebius’ belief in demons, in which it will be suggested instead that Eusebius’ understanding of malevolent demons as the opponents of the benevolent God led him to view the universe as fundamentally divided. This basic division then found expression in a range of other terminological and conceptual extremes.

Elsewhere, Martin’s recognition that a ‘basic dualistic opposition rules Eusebius’ entire corpus’ represents a much more felicitous reading than that of Coggan in acknowledging the way that Eusebius’ many polarisations reflect the fundamental structure of his thought rather than acting simply as an apologetic device.563 In tracing the root of these divisions, however, Martin’s emphasis is misplaced. Martin suggests that ‘the basic theological opposition in Eusebius’ writing… is between monotheism on the one hand and polytheism… on the other.’564 Although he recognises the division between ‘God-Christ’ and ‘Satan-daimons’ as one of several ‘oppositions’ within Eusebius’ thought, it appears only sixth in his list of such divisions – a list headed by the divide between monotheism

562 Coggan, Pandæmonia, 183-87.
563 Martin, Inventing Superstition, 221.
564 Ibid.
and polytheism. This suggests that Martin significantly underestimates the importance of the opposition between the divine and the demonic in structuring Eusebius’ thought. We have already seen that Eusebius believed demons to lie behind the polytheistic cults. Polytheism for Eusebius was the creation of demons, as they sought to win divine honours for themselves. Polytheism was thus the result of a prior opposition between the divine and the demonic and therefore cannot be seen as the most ‘basic opposition’ in Eusebius’ thought. Rather, the essential opposition in Eusebius’ thought, from which all others stemmed, was between the Christian God on one side and the devil and his demons on the other. A fresh and full analysis of the divisions in Eusebius’ universe is therefore necessary at this point.

The present chapter will explore how Eusebius’ demons are associated in his works with a series of further negative concepts. Demons are not only excluded from goodness, but are set up in direct opposition to anything which might be presented as good or virtuous. The result is a universe of hostile, even warring, extremes, in which there is no middle ground and, it appears, little room for reconciliation. This raises the question, already implied in Martin’s reference to the ‘dualistic opposition’ in Eusebius’ thought, of how far Eusebius subscribed to a dualistic view of the universe. Although at times Eusebius appears to come very close to dualism in his suggestion of an absolute cosmic divide, I will nevertheless show that he consistently resists placing the demonic powers on an equal footing with the divine.

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565 Ibid.
566 PE 7.16.10.
Demons and Angels

The extent to which Eusebius saw the universe as starkly divided between good and evil can clearly be seen from his presentation of another group of spiritual beings, similar to demons in terms of physicality, but fundamentally opposed to them in their moral character – that is, the angels. Eusebius’ benevolent spirits, described as the ‘angels of God’ (οἱ ἀγγέλοι τοῦ θεοῦ), are characterised by light as opposed to the demons’ association with darkness. Throughout Eusebius’ works, darkness is a frequent attribute of the demonic. At one point, he even describes ‘the wicked demon’ as ‘belonging to darkness’, suggesting that he saw darkness as fundamental to the demonic character. Moreover, in the course of their fall, demons are said to have ‘taken darkness over light’ (σκότος τε ἀντὶ φωτός ἀλλαξαμένην). This is in clear contrast to Eusebius’ angels, who are described as ‘shining’ (φωτεινὴν), and likened to the ‘stars in heaven’ (τῶν κατ’ οὐρανὸν δίκην ἀστρῶν). These contrasting associations for Eusebius’ demons and angels help to tie these two groups to their respective leaders – the devil and God – by reflecting the language in which these two figures were also regularly described. Echoing terms common to descriptions of the devil and demons both in the New Testament,

567 It is surprising that, despite recognising the extreme polarisation of Eusebius’ universe, neither Coggan nor Martin displays much interest in his opposition of demons and angels: Coggan, Pandaemonia; Martin, Inventing Superstition.
569 See, for example: PE 1.5.1, 5.2.1, 7.16.7-9, 13.15.7; VC 1.49.1; HE 10.4.13. This association is also noted by Strutwolf, Die Trinitätstheologie, 214.
570 DE 5.Praf.26: ...τὸ μὲν πονηρὸν δαιμόνιον, οἷα σκότου οἰκεῖον...
571 PE 7.16.2.
572 PE 7.16.1. For other examples of angels being associated with light, see: Theoph. 1.38; VC 3.26.1.
and in other earlier Christian writers, Eusebius drew a connection between darkness and an identifiably diabolical figure described as the ‘dragon’ (δράκων) and ‘snake’ (ὄφις) – terms which had already been applied to the devil in Revelation. Stemming from this, darkness was also associated for Eusebius with other negative concepts, such as distance from God or ignorance of correct religion.

When discussing the fall of this diabolical δράκων, Eusebius even goes so far as to describe this figure as ‘the maker (ποιητής) of darkness and irrationality’, showing how closely Eusebius associated the wicked spiritual powers with these negative characteristics. Eusebius’ choice of the word ‘ποιητής’ here is particularly striking, since this was a term that Eusebius also applied to God. This hints at a tension within Eusebius’ thought. Although, as I will show below, Eusebius avoided attributing equal power to the wicked powers and to God, we nevertheless sense here Eusebius’ discomfort with the idea that God might be responsible for the creation of evil. Describing this diabolical δράκων as a ποιητής in his own right helps to absolve God of responsibility for the creation of negative things. It also highlights the extent to which Eusebius viewed the universe as starkly divided.

By contrast, God and his Logos are, for Eusebius, characteristically associated with light. Christ, for instance, is described as ‘a sun of intellectual and rational...
souls’, while God is ‘inexpressible light’. By linking his angels with light, Eusebius is thereby also stressing their proximity to God. Eusebius’ demons are established as the opponents of benevolent spiritual forces and his universe becomes polarised between two hostile groups. For Eusebius, two opposing figures in the universe – God and the devil – are each joined and supported by their own followers, which are equally opposed to each other. Eusebius makes it very clear that in his view these opposing spiritual forces are entirely incompatible when he poses to his readers the question: ‘how could the bad at any point become a friend to the good, unless it were to be said that it is possible for light and darkness to become one combination?’ Eusebius’ characterisation of demons and angels by the contrasting associations of darkness and light highlights the fundamental – and seemingly unbridgeable – division which he envisaged between the two.

Eusebius was not alone among Christian writers of this period in holding that there was a clear distinction between ἀγγέλοι and δαίμονες, and in seeking to demonstrate in his works the difference between Christian and non-Christian

1.1-2, 6.20. As Strutwolf also noted: Die Trinitätslehre, 214. In this, Eusebius was again echoing Biblical language, where light is frequently evoked as a characteristic of both God and Christ. See, for example: 2 Sam. 22:29; Job 29:3; Ps. 4:6; Ps. 18:28; Ps. 27:1; Isa. 2:5; Mic. 7:8; Tob. 3:17; Bar. 5:9; Lk. 2:32; Jn. 1:4-9; Jn. 8:12; 1 Jn. 1.5; Rev. 22:5. An association between light and the divine or the Good was also common in Platonic philosophy: J. Dillon, ‘Looking on the Light: Some Remarks on the Imagery of Light in the First Chapter of the Peri Archon’, in C. Kannengiesser and W.L. Peterson, eds., Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 229; J.F. Finnamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’, in H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark, eds., The Divine Iamblichus: Philosopher and Man of Gods (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993), 57.

580 PE 2.5.2: …τις νοερῶν καὶ λογικῶν ψυχῶν ἡλιος…
581 DE 4.3.3: …ἀφῃτου φωτός...
582 PE 4.17.11: πῶς γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο ποτε τῷ ἄγαθῳ τῷ φαύλῳ φίλον, εἰ μὴ καὶ φωτός καὶ σκότους κρατῶν δύνασθαι μίαν φιλίαν τις ἂν γενέσθαι; This question echoes that of Paul at 2 Cor. 6:14, where he asks: ‘what partnership is there between righteousness and lawlessness? Or what fellowship is there between light and darkness?’ NRSV trans., (τίς γὰρ μετοχὴ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἁμαρτίας ἢ τίς κοινωνία φιλία πρὸς σκότος;). The incompatibility of light and darkness was a recurring theme among early Christian writers – for example: Iren. Adv. Haer. 2.12.5; Clem. Alex. Stro. 5.9.57.5 (quoting 2 Cor. 6:14).
understandings of the terms. As with the word δαίμονες, early Christian writers shared the term ἀγγέλοι with their non-Christian contemporaries. Although the word was frequently used to refer to ordinary, human messengers, from the second century onwards non-Christian authors were also using ἀγγέλοι to describe spiritual messengers, acting as intermediaries between the divine and human realms. However, while pagan and Jewish philosophers saw little difference between angels and demons, early Christian writers were insistent on separating the terms. The Hellenised Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, for instance, had considered that ‘souls and demons and angels are names carried from one to another, but on the same one foundation’. Yet Origen deliberately differentiated between angels and demons on the grounds that, while angels, like humans, could be either good or bad, demons were without exception wicked. Eusebius makes his division between angels and demons even clearer than that of Origen, by placing his angels fully on the side of the good, while demons remain firmly on the side of the wicked. The complete polarisation of these two groups would have served to reinforce Eusebius’ claim that there could not be any good demons. It also illustrates the extent to which Eusebius’ universe was fully split between the cosmic forces of good and those of evil.

That Eusebius should have considered these two groups of spiritual beings to be so fundamentally divided is all the more striking because of the similar origins which he appears to have envisaged for both angels and demons. Eusebius suggests

584 Ibid. 3-4.
585 See ibid. 4-11 for discussion of Origen and Augustine.
586 Philo, De Gig. 16: Ψυχὰς οὖν καὶ δαίμονας καὶ ἀγγέλους όνόματα μὲν διαφέροντα, ἐν δὲ καὶ ταύτων ὑποκείμενον...
587 Cline, Ancient Angels, 6, citing Orig. Cels. 8.25.
in the *PE* that demons were originally angels when he informs the reader that the
demons and wicked spirits have apostatised from ‘the choruses of the better’,588 and
have in the process ‘taken darkness over light’.589 Moreover, demons and angels
seem to have remained ontologically similar beings for Eusebius, since, in the
*Theophania*, he groups both beneficent and maleficent spiritual beings together as
‘incorporeal and invisible powers’.590 Yet despite this, Eusebius places demons and
angels at different positions on a clear spiritual hierarchy: the ‘refined and good
powers’ are far below ‘the unoriginated God, their own maker’,591 but they are also
significantly above the ‘depraved race of the demons’,592 occupying a position
somewhere between the two. Despite their similar origins, it seems that the moral
differences between angels and demons were enough to require that they be seen as
different kinds of spiritual beings.593 Eusebius’ categorisation of angels and demons
is thus based primarily on moral criteria.

At the heart of this distinction between Eusebius’ angels and demons there
lies the crucial issue of choice: that is, the original decision of the demons to depart
from the company of ‘the better’.594 Explaining why he feels that demons and angels
should not be given the same name, Eusebius asserts that ‘it would be most
unreasonable of all that one and the same name should be fitting for things which
are similar neither in their choice (τὴν προαίρεσιν) nor in the nature from their

588 PE 7.16.2: ... τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων χορείας... Cf. PE 7.16.3.
589 PE 7.16.2: ...σκότος τε ἀλλαξαμένην... Cf. PE 13.15.1.
590 Theoph. 1.38, trans. S. Lee.
591 PE 4.5.4: τὰς δὲ ἀστείας καὶ ἀγαθὰς δυνάμεις... πολλῷ τὸν ἀγένητον καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιητὴν
θεόν ἀφοσιώτερον... 592 PE 4.5.4: ...τοῦ τῶν δαιμόνων μοχθηροῦ γένους...
593 PE 4.5.5.
594 PE 7.16.2.
behaviour (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου φύσιν). Eusebius’ use of the word προαιρέσεις here is significant, for, as I will demonstrate below, Eusebius considered the concept of προαιρέσεις to be closely linked to issues of moral responsibility. In this, Eusebius was not alone among early Christian writers. In Tatian’s Oratio Ad Graecos, it was προαιρέσεις, and specifically ‘freedom of προαιρέσεις’ (τῇ δὲ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς προαιρέσεως), that allowed punishments and rewards to be justly meted out to humankind. Thus, προαιρέσεις carried with it, at least among early Christian writers, the sense of responsibility for one’s actions. Eusebius’ remark about the different ‘nature from their [the demons’] behaviour’ is also worthy of note, for it suggests that their wicked nature is not innate, but is rather the product of their behaviour and actions. Since these actions would stem from the demons’ προαιρέσεις, this phrase emphasises once again that demons are to be held responsible for their own wickedness.

This idea that the demons were ultimately responsible for their own separation from the angels is reflected throughout the PE. The fall of the demons’ diabolical leader is described as ‘self-determined’ (αὐθεκούσιος), and, similarly, it is the demons’ ‘own wickedness’ (δι’ οἰκείαν φαυλότητα) that leads them to follow him. It is this fundamental moral choice – to follow God, or to oppose him – that ultimately separates Eusebius’ angels and demons. In his method of distinguishing between good and bad spiritual beings, Eusebius therefore differed significantly even from those Greek writers who had allowed for the possibility of

595 PE 4.5.5: ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντων ἂν εἴη παραλογώτατον τάς μητέ μήν τὴν προαιρέσεις μήτε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου φύσιν ὁμοίας μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμίας αξίων.
596 See Chapter IV.
597 Tat. Orat. 7.
598 PE 7.16.3.
599 PE 7.16.2.
maliciously inclined demons. While Plutarch’s bad demons may have been acting under the influence of the passions, there was no sense that they had deliberately chosen evil.\footnote{Dillon, Middle Platonists, 217-18. In Dillon’s view, while Plutarch did suggest that some demons were capable of wicked actions, he did not believe in ‘primally evil [demons], such as one finds in Zoroastrian or Gnostic systems’, 218. However, Dillon notes a possible anomaly in Plutarch’s De Isiride et Osiride, which ‘tends far more towards the postulation of inherently evil daemons’ than Plutarch’s other works, 218. This, however, appears to be an exception, based perhaps on the fact that Plutarch was attempting in this work to explain the nature of the Giants and Titans, 218.}

By contrast, Eusebius’ demons, having voluntarily embraced evil, appear far more threatening. The line was drawn at the moment of the demons’ fall between those spiritual beings that chose God, and those that chose the devil. Again, there is a clear polarisation within Eusebius’ cosmology between good and bad spiritual beings.

\textit{Further Polarities}

This basic opposition between benevolent and malevolent spiritual forces in the universe can be seen to extend into a series of further polar opposites associated with these two groups. One of the most important of these is the distinction which Eusebius makes between rationality (λογικός) and intellectual reasoning (νοερός) on the one hand,\footnote{As Frede has pointed out, there was considerable overlap in ancient texts between a variety of words such as these which might loosely be translated into English as signifying the concept of ‘rationality’ or ‘reason’. Frede writes of ‘a certain wavering in terminology between logos, to logikon, nous, hegemonikon, mens, ratio, and other terms’: M. Frede, ‘Introduction’, in M. Frede and G. Striker, eds., \textit{Rationality in Greek Thought} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 3.} and irrationality (ἀλογός) and madness (μανία) on the other.

Throughout Eusebius’ works, the activity of demons and the devil is frequently associated with the spread of irrationality – people he considers to be in the power of demons are described as mad or irrational,\footnote{For example: \textit{HE} 7.31.1, 10.8.9-10; \textit{VC} 1.45.2-3; \textit{LC} 7.7, 9.13; \textit{SC} 13.6; \textit{Theoph.} 1.78, 2.1.} while at the time of their fall, the
wicked powers are themselves considered to be acting in a way that was mad.\textsuperscript{603} Importantly, however, despite the irrationality of their behaviour, Eusebius does not present demons as, in essence, irrational beings. Instead he directly asserts that ‘the demons are rational’ (λογικοὶ οἱ δαίμονες) as part of his criticism of older Greek philosophical explanations of demonic origins.\textsuperscript{604} That Eusebius’ demons possessed the capacity for rational thought but failed to act accordingly is significant, since, as rational beings, they would have been able to exercise προαιρεσία, reinforcing the sense that they were responsible for their own fall and subsequent actions.\textsuperscript{605}

This association between demons and irrational behaviour is further reflected in Eusebius’ frequent portrayal of demons, and those in their power, as ‘wild beasts’.\textsuperscript{606} In a vivid passage from his panegyric on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius likens the ‘good-hating envy and the evil-loving demon’ (τοῦ μισοκάλου φθόνου καὶ φιλοπονήμου δαίμονος) to a ‘fighting dog’ (κυνὸς λυττῶντος), which had turned its ‘savage madness’ (τὴν θηριῶδη μανίαν) towards the persecution of the Christian church.\textsuperscript{607} The combination here of an adjective drawn from the word for ‘beast’ (θῆρ), with the word for ‘madness’ (μανία) emphasises the close connection which Eusebius saw between animals and irrationality. As Richard Sorabji has shown, the idea that animals lacked rationality was reasonably common in

\textsuperscript{603} \textit{PE} 7.16.3-4; \textit{Cf. DE} 4.9.12.
\textsuperscript{604} \textit{PE} 13.15.6.
\textsuperscript{605} On rationality as essential to προαιρεσίας for Eusebius, see below, chapter IV, p. 172-74.
\textsuperscript{606} For example: Demons as beasts: \textit{PE} 4.17.9, \textit{VC} 1.49.1; \textit{HE} 10.4.14; \textit{DE} 10.8.73; \textit{Theop}h. 3.13, 3.55; people as beasts: \textit{PE} 7.2.6; \textit{DE} 3.3.7, 4.10.2; \textit{LC} 9.13.
\textsuperscript{607} \textit{HE} 10.4.14. \textit{Cf. LC} 9.13 on the enemies of God, although not specifically demons, as behaving like dogs.
antiquity, although by no means universal. Aristotle and the Stoics had considered that only humans possessed the ability to reason, although their view was challenged by many within the Platonist tradition. Even among early Christians there was considerable disagreement on this point: Origen had considered animals to lack reason, yet Eusebius’ Latin contemporary Lactantius took the opposite view.

On this topic, Eusebius clearly shared Origen’s view. According to Eusebius, animals were most emphatically not rational: in the PE he states clearly that beasts were ‘irrational according to nature’, and animals or beasts are often referred to as ἄλογα throughout Eusebius’ works. As such, by associating demons and those he considered to be in their power with wild animals, Eusebius was drawing attention to their intellectual shortcomings. Coggan has suggested that Eusebius’ presentation of demons as savage animals is so extreme as to become almost a ‘caricature’, which serves to ‘trivialise’ the demons. Although Eusebius’ presentation of the demonic is certainly invariably negative, the suggestion that this lack of balance in any way downplays the extent of the demonic threat is far from accurate. In fact, Eusebius’ portrayal of demons as beasts serves as a regular reminder of the kind of threat that Eusebius considered the demons to pose to

609 On Aristotle, see ibid. 12-16; on the Stoics, ibid. 20; on various Platonists, including Plutarch and Porphyry, ibid. 178-79, 182.
610 Ibid. 200, citing Or. Cels. 4.74.
611 Ibid. 90, citing Lact. Div. Inst. 3.10 and 7.9.10.
612 PE 3.5.3: …πῶς αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως ἄλογη θητία... Cf. PE 7.18.3; DE 1.10.1-13, where Eusebius explicitly challenges those Greek philosophers who had suggested that animals shared the human capacity for reason, and therefore ought not to be sacrificed. He stresses that the Old Testament does not condemn animal sacrifice, and presents animals as more akin to plants than to humans.
613 See, for example: PE 1.4.9, 2.5.4, 4.15.5, 4.15.9, 7.4.2, 13.3.44; DE 1.1.15, 3.2.42, 3.3.8, 3.3.16, 5.Praef.19, 5.Praef.30, 5.3.14.
614 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 178.
humans. It was a threat that consisted, above all, in drawing people away from the true God and thus away from the better part of themselves.

For Eusebius, God, in contrast to the demons, was pre-eminently associated with the spread of rationality. Eusebius describes Christ as ‘intellectual light’ (φώς νοερόν), combining this attribute of rationality with his common association of the divinity with light. Eusebius also presents Christ as rescuing people from a prior state of irrationality by offering them improved understanding through his teaching. Moreover, in Eusebius’ view it was the rational human soul that brought humankind closest to God, since he interpreted the reference in Genesis to God making man in his own image as describing, not the human body, but the soul:

ψυχή μὲν οὖν λογική καὶ άθανάτος καὶ νοερής ἀπαθής ἐν άνθρωποις φύσει εὑ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοιωμένη ἀποσωφρένη θεοῦ, καθ’ όσον ἄνλος καὶ ἀσώματος νοερὰ τε καὶ λογικὴ τὴν οὐσίαν συνεστήκην…

And so it seems to me that, in the nature of man, the rational and immortal soul and the passionless mind are well said to keep safe an icon and resemblance of God, insofar as in their substance they are both immaterial and incorporeal, and intellectual and rational.

Thus, in associating the demons with irrationality, Eusebius was not only highlighting their opposition to God, but was also suggesting that they could deprive people of access to the best part of themselves, the part that was nearest to God. It is striking that Eusebius, claiming to follow the teaching of Moses, regards the ‘true man’ as that located in the soul and sharing in ‘intellectual, incorporeal

615 DE 5. Pref. 33. Cf. PE 2.5.2: … τις νοερόν καὶ λογικῶν ψυχῶν ἕλιος…
616 See, for example: PE 1.4.12-13; DE 7.3.34.
617 Gen. 1:26-7. Eusebius was by no means the only early Christian writer to adopt a non-physical interpretation of this idea that humankind was the image of God. See, for example: Orig. De Princ. 1.1.7; Clem. Alex. Prot. 10.98.4.
618 PE 3.10.16. Cf. PE 7.4.3, 7.10.9, 7.18.3, 13.3.44; DE 4.6.6.
and rational substance’. Therefore, by drawing people into irrationality, demons were not only drawing them away from God, but were also robbing them of their full humanity.

In the light of this, it is surely also significant that Eusebius described those who practised polytheistic or astral worship as being ‘like children in their souls’ (οἷς νήπιοι τὰς ψυχὰς), once again implying that they were in a less intellectually developed state. Therefore, in making a connection between demons and irrational animals, it hardly seems that Eusebius would have been trying to ‘trivialise’ the demons, since the effect of this association is rather to highlight yet another feature of the demons that not only separated them from God, but also made them a threat to humans.

There was a widespread sense in Greek philosophy and Roman law that children were, if not entirely without reason, at least not as rational as adults. Plato had denied that children possessed reason, while the Stoics held that children only became rational as they grew older. Eusebius’ use of the childhood simile does, however, convey the impression – missing from the imagery of irrational animals – that this state of irrationality might not be permanent, and that it might, with the correct education, be possible to escape from the power of demons. This is reflected elsewhere in the PE, where recent converts are described as being ‘like children in their souls’ (ὡς ἂν τὰς ψυχὰς νηπίως), in contrast to those who have

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619 PE 7.10.9: ...ἐν ψυχῇ μὲν ὄριζεται τὸν ἀληθὴν ἄνθρωπον, νοερὰς ὑποστάσις καὶ ἀσομάτων καὶ λογικῆς μέτοχον ὡς ἀν κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ δεδημουηγημένον.
progressed further in their understanding of the scriptures.\footnote{PE 12.1.4.} A similar idea is found in some of Paul’s epistles, where the metaphor of childhood could similarly imply the possibility of progress, particularly progress towards God.\footnote{Garnsey, 	extit{Ideas of Slavery}, 181-82.} In Galatians, Paul compared Christians before the coming of Christ to slaves, who, through Christ’s teaching, have been converted from slaves to children, ‘and if a child then also an heir, through God’.\footnote{Gal. 4:7, NRSV trans., cited in Garnsey, 	extit{Ideas of Slavery}, 181. On Paul’s use of the term νήπιος, see also the relevant entry in: G. Kittel, ed., 	extit{Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament}, vol. 4: Λ-Ν (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1942), 918-22.} In suggesting at \textit{PE} 1.6.3 that the earlier generations of humans who worshipped the stars rather than the true God were ‘like children’, Eusebius perhaps had in mind the idea found in Galatians that such children might, with the coming of Christ, be able to progress to a state of greater knowledge and understanding.

This distinction between rationality and irrationality appears to have been fundamental to Eusebius’ understanding of the difference between the forces of good and evil in the universe, and it is also a polarity that underpins the whole of the combined apologetic of the \textit{PE} and \textit{DE}. It is a central aim of these works to demonstrate that Christians have chosen their new beliefs, not irrationally, and out of blind faith, but as a result of ‘judgement and temperate calculation’.\footnote{DE 1.1.17: …κρίσει δὲ καὶ σώφρονι λογισμῷ… Cf. \textit{PE} 15.1.12.} This was in part a response to accusations previously levelled against Christians that their beliefs were based on ‘irrational and unexamined belief’.\footnote{PE 1.1.11: …ἀλόγῳ δὲ πιστεὶ καὶ ἀνεξέτάστῳ…} As many scholars have noted, Eusebius’ apologetic technique throughout these works consists of attempts to ‘prove’ the validity of Christian doctrine by drawing on the ‘evidence’ both of

\footnote{\textit{PE} 1.1.11: …ἀλόγῳ δὲ πιστεὶ καὶ ἀνεξέτάστῳ…}
historical events and of non-Christian writers. The association which Eusebius saw between the demons and irrationality therefore not only suited, but arguably influenced, his broader apologetic stance in these works.

As well as irrationality, Eusebius also associated demons with another concept that was traditionally viewed in a negative light by his society: the idea of tyranny. For Eusebius, demons were tyrannical rulers, who enslaved and oppressed those in their power. At times, Eusebius makes this association between demons and tyranny perfectly obvious, as when he describes how, in the past, ‘the demons ruled all the nations as tyrants’ (τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀπάντων κατετυράννουν οἱ δαίμονες). The use of the verb κατατυράννω draws attention to what Eusebius evidently considered to be the oppressive nature of demonic power. Likewise, at PE 4.21.2, Eusebius describes how people have been saved by Christ from their ‘ancestral slavery’ to demons, again showing the demons as oppressive. This association between demons and tyrannical power also permeates Eusebius’ works at a less obvious level, reflected in the similar language which Eusebius uses to characterise both tyrants and demons, and in the verbs which he uses to describe their actions.

At times, some of the figures whom Eusebius portrays as tyrants in works like the HE are also, like demons, described as ‘good-hating’ (μισόκαλος); likewise, both demons and human tyrants can be found characterised by madness (μανία). Significant parallels also occur in the verbs that Eusebius uses to describe the

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629 On this, see further, chapter VI below.
631 ...παλιωτάτης δουλείας...
632 See, for example: *HE* 9.2.1, 9.6.4.
actions of demons and tyrants. Demons, like tyrants, are said to ‘enslave’ (δουλόω) their subjects,⁶³⁴ and even where Eusebius does not use exactly the same word to describe the manner in which demons and tyrants act, his choice of vocabulary nevertheless represents them behaving in similar ways and is generally suggestive of oppression. Verbs such as καταδυναστεύω, καταδουλόω and κατατρύχω are used of demons,⁶³⁵ while tyrants are described in similar terms with the verbs κατατυραννέω and καταπονέω.⁶³⁶ Not only are most of these verbs linked by a shared sense of power or oppression, they are also connected by the repeated use of the prefix ‘κατα-’, meaning ‘down’ or ‘below’. In some cases, this serves to intensify the already negative meaning of the verb, as with ‘τυραννέω’; in others, it turns an otherwise relatively neutral verb like ‘κρατέω’, which could have either a positive or a negative meaning, into an unquestionably negative verb. Either way, the regular use of this prefix helps to associate demons firmly with ideas of tyranny and subjugation. By drawing such parallels between demons and concepts that were already viewed in a negative light by much of his audience, Eusebius was once again reinforcing his argument that demons were to be viewed as unremittingly negative figures. In contrast, Eusebius associates the Christian God with freedom (ἐλευθερία), presenting Christ as offering people the chance of liberation from the demonic tyranny to which they had been subject.⁶³⁷ Christ, we are told, ‘called the entire race of men out from impious and Egyptian idolatry under wicked demons

⁶³⁴ See, for example: HE 8.12.3, 8.14.6; VC 1.13.3; PE 4.17.4; DE 3.6.34, 4.9.8.
⁶³⁵ DE 4.10.13; DE 6.20.11; PE 1.5.1.
⁶³⁶ HE 10.9.3; VC 1.12.2. See also: HE 10.2.1: …τῆς τῶν τυράννων καταδυναστείας…
⁶³⁷ See, for example: PE 1.4.2, 7.16.11; DE 3.1.2, 3.2.9, 9.10.7.
into freedom’. Thus, once again, we find God and the demons associated with contrasting concepts, this time of liberty and tyranny, further reinforcing the sense that Eusebius held these powers to be separated by a great gulf.

This idea that both non-Christians and people in the pre-Christian era were in some way enslaved was by no means original to Eusebius – it first occurs in the Pauline notion of ‘slavery to sin’, according to which Christian converts, having previously been enslaved to sin, have, through the teaching of Christ, ‘been set free from sin, [and] have become slaves of righteousness’. For Eusebius, Pauline slavery to sin appears to have been replaced by a more tangible form of slavery to demons. Nevertheless, sin and demons remained closely connected for Eusebius, since he in turn linked the oppressive influence of the demons to the spread of immorality. This was then contrasted with the moral benefits which Eusebius suggested had been brought about by Christianity. In making his argument that demons were associated with immoral practices, Eusebius selected examples of activities and behaviours that would have been widely regarded as reprehensible within his society. These included ‘sexual impurity’ (πορνεία) and indulgence in ‘shameful and intemperate pleasure’ (τῆς αίσχρας καὶ ἀκολάστου ἡδονῆς), with Eusebius suggesting that the demons had caused people to submit to ‘the

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638 DE 3.2.9: καὶ Ἰησοῦς δὲ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸ τοὺς πολλοὺς δαιμονίων καὶ ἰδιωτικῶς εἰδολολατρείας εἰς ἐλευθεριαν τὸ πάντων ανθρώπων γένος ἀνεκάλεσθαι.
639 Rom. 6:18, NRSV trans.: ἐλευθερώθητες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἑδονωθῆτε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, cited in Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 183. On this, see ibid. 183-86.
640 See the discussion in chapter VI below.
641 As, for instance, at DE 4.10.1-4; PE 1.4.5-6, 7.2.3-6.
642 For example at PE 1.4.6, 5.1.8.
643 PE 7.2.4. Referring to πορνεία, Eusebius quotes Wisd. 14:12 (Ἄρχη γὰρ πορνείας ἐπίνοια εἰδολολατών), thereby emphasising the idea of a direct connection between polytheistic worship and immorality.
impassioned portion of their soul’ (τὸ παθητικὸν αὐτῶν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς).644
Under the influence of demons, we are told, Greeks and ‘barbarians’ alike were
‘instructed in and executing the orgies and unholy mysteries only of shameful and
intemperate pleasure’.645 In addition, Eusebius mentions incest and cannibalism as
practices encouraged by demons,646 but it is the practice of human sacrifice to which
he returns most often in his search for examples of demonically inspired
immorality.647

In part, Eusebius’ choice of human sacrifice as his main example of such
immorality may have been based on the fact that he was able to find several texts by
non-Christian writers which described reported instances of human sacrifice.648 As
such, Eusebius had plenty of supposedly objective proof that the practice had been
widespread. Yet, still more importantly, the example of human sacrifice also
enabled him to reiterate his point that the pagan ‘gods’ were, in reality, wicked
demons. After citing a story of human sacrifice found in Diodorus Siculus, Eusebius
concludes:

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡγούμαι διὰ τούτων ἀπεληλέγχθαι σαφῶς δαιμονικὴν
tina γεγονέναι τὴν παλαιάττην καὶ πρώτην τῶν ξυλάνων ἱδρυσιν, καὶ
πάσαν τὴν εἰδουλικὴν τῶν ἑθῶν θεοποιίαν καὶ δαιμόνων οὐκ
ἀγαθον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μοχθηροτάτων καὶ φαύλων.649

For by these things I think it has been plainly shown that the oldest and
first establishment of images was demonic, and all the idolatrous

644 PE 7.2.2. Cf. the discussion below, p. 267-68, on the idea of enslavement to passion.
645 PE 7.2.4: …μόνης τῆς αἰσχρᾶς καὶ ἀκολαστοῦ ἡδονῆς τὰ ὁργία καὶ τὰς ἀσέμνους τελετὰς
μυούμενοι τε καὶ τελούντες...
646 As, for example, at DE 5.Praef.14, and PE 1.4.6.
647 See, for example: PE 1.4.6, 4.10.4, 4.15.4-5, 4.15.8-9, 4.16.21-27, 4.17.3-6, 4.17.9, 4.19.5-6, 4.21.1, 5.1.8,
5.4.6, 5.26.6.
Hist. 20.14.4-6 (PE 4.16.19); Porph. De Abst. 2.54.1-56.9, 2.27.2 (PE 4.16.1-10); and a fragment of Philo
Byblius’ Phoenecian History (PE 4.16.11). He also quotes examples from the Christian writer Clement of
Alexandria, Protr. 3.42.1-43.1 (PE 4.16.12-13).
649 PE 4.16.20. Cf. DE 4.10.3.
making of gods was the work of demons that are, not good, but entirely
depraved and wicked.

Eusebius is making the point that no truly divine being would have required such
an abhorrent form of worship. Indeed, he even questions why, if there had been any
good demons, they had not ordered people to put a stop to such practices, thereby
reinforcing once again his claim that no demon was ever good.\textsuperscript{650} It is important to
note that, in focusing on the immorality of such practices, Eusebius was not
attempting to impose new moral categories on his audience. Human sacrifice, as
J. Rives has shown, had long been used by Greek and Roman writers to define ‘the
other’, and to distinguish between ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’.\textsuperscript{651} Indeed,
Christians had themselves been accused by their opponents of practising human
sacrifice, and even cannibalism.\textsuperscript{652} Instead, Eusebius was simply redrawing an
existing boundary between ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’, such that Christianity,
rather than Hellenism, now represented the civilising force.\textsuperscript{653}

This can be seen most clearly from a passage in the first book of the \textit{PE}, in
which Eusebius credits the teaching of Christ with bringing to an end the practices
of cannibalism and incest which had purportedly been common among the
traditional enemies of the Roman Empire, such as the Persians:

\begin{quote}
...ἐκ μόνων δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ φωνῶν καὶ τῆς ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην
dιαδοθείας διδασκαλίας αὐτοῦ εὑ τὰ πάντων τῶν ἑθνῶν νόμιμα
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{650} \textit{PE} 4.16.21; cf. \textit{PE} 4.5.4, 4.14.10-4.15.4, 5.4.4.
\item \textsuperscript{651} J. Rives, ‘Human Sacrifice Among Pagans and Christians’, \textit{JRS} 85 (1995), 68.
\item \textsuperscript{652} Such accusations are mainly reported by the Christian apologists who sought to refute them, although Pliny, in his famous letter to Trajan about the treatment of Christians, also remarked that the Christians only eat ‘harmless’ food, perhaps suggesting that reports of such behaviour were widely known: R.L. Wilken, \textit{The Christians As the Romans Saw Them} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 17-21, citing Pliny, \textit{Ep.} 10.96; Minucius Felix, \textit{Octavius} 9.5; Atheng., \textit{Leg.} 3.1. See also: \textit{Martyrs of Lyons} 1.14; Orig., \textit{Cels.} 6.27. A reference by Eusebius to rumours that Christians partook of ‘unholy food’ (αὐτοῖς... τροφαῖς) demonstrates that these accusations continued to concern Christian writers even in the early fourth century: \textit{HE} 4.7.11.
\item \textsuperscript{653} As Johnson also noted: \textit{Ethnicity and Argument}, 217.
\end{itemize}
...but, from only his speech and his teaching, which is spread across the entire inhabited world, the customs of all the nations, including those which were previously wild and barbarian, are well laid down, such that the Persians who are his pupils do not any longer marry their mothers, nor do the Scythians practise cannibalism on account of the word of Christ, which has even come as far as them...

Christianity is here represented as the force of morality. Later in the *PE*, Eusebius raises the question of why supposedly ‘good’ demons did not intervene to prevent such practices.  

By contrast, in this passage from the very beginning of the work, Eusebius makes it clear that he considers Christ to have acted where other supposed deities had not. Christianity, he suggests, has successfully brought about moral improvement. Eusebius does not allow his audience to lose sight of this association between Christianity and morality, more than once linking the teaching of Christ and his disciples with the decline of practices like human sacrifice in the *PE*. As a result, while Eusebius ties the demons to a range of behaviours that were considered alien and abhorrent, he associates Christianity with the spread of a moral code that would have been highly valued in Hellenic society.

However, in order to suggest that Christianity alone represented the force of civilising morality, while other religions were connected with barbarism, Eusebius effectively had to collapse any distinction between different forms of pagan worship, as Coggan noted. The idea that ‘paganism’ was in any way a monolithic or co-ordinated system of beliefs is, as modern historians have increasingly come to

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654 PE 1.4.6.  
655 PE 4.16.21.  
656 As at *PE* 4.15.6, 4.17.4. On Christ’s teaching as bringing about a decline of other immoral practices, see, for example: *PE* 1.4.11; *DE* 3.3.1, 3.6.32.  
recognise, highly inaccurate; rather, the very idea of ‘paganism’ was a creation of Christian apologists like Eusebius. Eusebius presents polytheistic worship in the *PE* not merely as inspired by demons, but as being originally alien to Greek society. The myths about the gods and the rituals of polytheistic worship, Eusebius suggests, initially came to Greece from the Phoenicians and Egyptians. It is these nations, he tells us, which ‘first began the error’. This allowed Eusebius to present all polytheistic worship as being essentially the same and therefore correspondingly all equally flawed. Moreover, it suggested that polytheistic worship, with its associated myths and rituals, was not necessarily to be associated with the ‘civilising’ values of Hellenic society, since its origins were ‘barbarian’. Reflecting this association between ‘barbarism’ and the polytheistic worship that he saw as demon-inspired, Eusebius even described demons as ‘those other barbarians’ (ἄλλων τουτών βαρβάρων) in the *LC*. Here, Eusebius suggests that the physical attacks of earthly barbarians were paralleled in the invisible attacks of these demonic barbarians against human souls, through the spread of polytheism. As such, in turning away from traditional Greek religion, Christians need not be seen as simultaneously rejecting either Greek morality, or, indeed, Greek culture.

In associating demons with a series of other negative concepts, from irrationality, through tyranny and darkness, to immorality, Eusebius was amply demonstrating how he could reach the conclusion that all demons were bad.

Eusebius’ demons are unambiguously wicked, malevolent not by creation, but – far

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659 PE 1.6.1-4, 1.9.19, 3.4.5.
660 PE 1.6.4: …ἀπαξαξαμένων τῆς πλάνης.
661 LC 6.21.
662 LC 7.1-2.
worse – by choice. That Eusebius’ demons should so completely lack any form of redeeming feature is striking, but hardly unusual among early Christian writers. What is, however, particularly noteworthy about his presentation of the demonic is the way in which his demons appear to form an essential part of a cosmos that is completely polarised between the hostile opposing forces of good and evil. Not only are demons portrayed as wicked, they are consistently contrasted with, and shown as hostile to, everything that was good in the universe. This division between good and evil provided in turn the basic structure that underpinned Eusebius’ broader thought. Throughout Eusebius’ works, we find every negative concept repeatedly tied to the demonic realm, while everything good and every benefit to humankind is associated with God. Recognising that Eusebius’ thought is dominated in this way by his perception of a complete division, even a battle, between the forces of good and evil in the universe can help us towards a better understanding of other areas of Eusebius’ thought.

A ‘Dualistic’ View?

The sharp divisions that recur throughout Eusebius’ thought in a variety of forms raise the question of whether his view of the universe may reasonably be seen as ‘dualistic’. A note of caution is needed at the outset over the use of the term ‘dualism’, since this was not coined until the early eighteenth century, initially to describe ancient Persian religion.663 It is therefore not a term that Eusebius would have applied either to his own thought, or to anyone else’s. Nevertheless, more

recent scholarship has adopted a much broader view of ‘dualism’ and it can be a useful term for describing particularly polarised systems of thought. A dualistic religious or philosophical system is usually considered to consist of two irreconcilably opposed groups or powers, one good and one evil, with no middle ground and no possibility of compromise between them. Yet, even within this broad definition, dualistic beliefs may take a variety of forms, as scholars of dualism have been keen to emphasise. Moreover, dualistic views may also appear beyond the fields of theological and philosophical speculation, with S. Laeuchli also identifying forms of ‘social’, ‘psychological’, and ‘ethical’ dualism.

Dualistic belief systems were not uncommon in the ancient world, and, even among early Christians, Eusebius would not have been alone in displaying a tendency towards dualism. Several, although by no means all, of the texts discovered at Nag Hammadi display clearly dualistic elements, while the views of some early Christian groups later deemed heretical, such as the Marcionites and the Valentinians, were condemned by their ‘orthodox’ opponents for positing more than one god. Yet, even within the canonical Gospels, there are passages, such as

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664 Fontaine, in his multi-volume survey of dualism in the ancient world, offers the following definition of ‘dualism’: ‘two systems or concepts or principles or groups of people that are utterly opposed and cannot be reduced to one another; they exist alongside each other, without any intermediary term; one of the two is always thought to be of a much higher quality than the other’: Light and Dark (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1986), vol. 1, 263. Cf. S. Laeuchli, ‘Mithraic Dualism’, in Laeuchli, ed., Mithraism in Ostia: Mystery Religion and Christianity in the Ancient Port of Rome (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 61, who nevertheless considers such a definition of dualism to be unnecessarily restrictive.

665 Laeuchli, for instance, noted the differences between the ‘dualistic elements’ present in the thought of Plato and Valentius, and the ‘ultimate dualism’ of the Manichaean system: ‘Mithraic Dualism’, 61.

666 Ibid. 61-62.


668 Pagels, Origin of Satan, 169; Pagels, Gnostic Gospels, 28-29. Such claims were, however, not necessarily accurate, at least in the case of the Valentinians, since Valentinian texts discovered at Nag Hammadi, such as the Gospel of Philip, display no evidence of dualism: Pagels, Origin of Satan, 171-77.
those dealing with Christ’s struggles with Satan in the wilderness, or his exorcisms of demons,\textsuperscript{669} that could lend themselves to dualistic interpretations.\textsuperscript{670}

Nevertheless, we should be extremely cautious about seeing some form of absolute, cosmic dualism, with two equal and opposed divine powers, in Eusebius’ thought. Eusebius, after all, strongly condemned dualistic groups like the Manichaeans,\textsuperscript{671} and considered himself part of the ‘orthodox’ tradition which proclaimed a faith in one, benevolent creator-God.\textsuperscript{672} Furthermore, as we have seen, Eusebius repeatedly emphasises, not only the moral inferiority of the demons, but also his belief that their power and insight were not equal to those of the true Christian God. As such, Eusebius avoids outright cosmic dualism, despite the wide polarities which he sees in the universe. Yet there remains an unresolved tension within his thought, between his belief in a benevolent and all-powerful God, and his view of demons as an evil and dangerous force openly operating within the cosmos.

Of all the conceptual divisions within Eusebius’ thought, the most obvious is surely the moral divide between good and evil, manifested in a range of further distinctions between light and darkness, morality and immorality. As such, one might perhaps be justified in speaking of a ‘moral dualism’ within Eusebius’ thought. Yet despite this stark moral divide, Eusebius does not consider the representatives of these two moral poles – on the one hand God, and on the other the devil and his demons – to be entirely independent of each other. In fact,


\textsuperscript{670} Pagels has suggested that a form of ‘modified dualism... characterises the great majority of Christian teachings, based... on the conviction that God’s spirit constantly contends against Satan’: \textit{Origin of Satan}, 177.

\textsuperscript{671} \textit{HE} 7.31.1-2.

\textsuperscript{672} On which, see: Pagels, \textit{Gnostic Gospels}, 28-29.
according to the logic of Eusebius’ account of the demons’ origins, not only demons, but also the devil must have been part of God’s creation. For Eusebius, as we have seen, demons were originally angels, who had fallen from their blessed state into a state of wickedness. Eusebius also makes it clear that God was the ‘maker’ (ποιητής) of the angels. As such, God must also be the ‘maker’ of the demons, and their leader, the devil.

Nevertheless, this leaves unasked the somewhat problematic question of why an omniscient and benevolent deity would knowingly create beings capable of bringing suffering into the world. After all, Eusebius, as we saw above, elsewhere uses the same term, ποιητής, to describe the relationship between the diabolical leader of the demons and darkness. These wicked powers may be the immediate ‘makers’ of darkness, but if God is, in turn, the ‘maker’ of the demons, then one might wonder what this means for the relationship between God and darkness. Given the primarily apologetic aims of the majority of Eusebius’ works, it is perhaps unsurprising that he fails to address this question directly. Yet in spite of his reticence, there are some tantalising hints in his works as to how he may have been able to reconcile his belief in the continuing presence of such wicked creatures in the universe with a belief in a just and merciful God.

One such hint occurs in Eusebius’ discussion of the origin of the demons in book 7 of the PE. Here, after describing how some of the fallen angels were confined

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673 PE 7.16.1-11.
674 PE 4.5.4; cf. PE 13.15.9-10.
675 Above, p. 127.
676 PE 7.16.3.
to Tartarus by ‘the just decision and sentence of the great God’, Eusebius asserts that:

وذن βραχύ τι και μικρὸν ἀπόσπασμα, γυμνασίου χάριν τῶν εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν αμφί γῆν καὶ τὸν ύπό σελήνην αέρα καταλειφθέν, τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολυθέου πλάνης κατ’ οὐδὲν ἀθεότητος διαφερούσης συναιτίον γέγονε.

Of these, a petty and small remnant, left behind around the earth and the air below the moon for the sake of training the athletes of piety, became jointly responsible for the error of polytheism, which is in no way different from atheism, among men.

In its suggestion that different groups of fallen angels had different fates, this account is somewhat reminiscent of the Enochic story of the Watcher angels, in which, while the fallen angels themselves were imprisoned in darkness at God’s command, the spirits of their offspring, the giants, remained free on earth to torment humankind. This passage therefore shows the influence on Eusebius’ thought of just one of the many accounts of demonic origins that were in circulation at the time. The crucial point here, however, is the implication that above these wicked demons stands a greater power, which is capable of restraining them, but which for whatever reason has chosen not to do so. By using the passive of the verb καταλείπω, Eusebius manages to avoid naming the power responsible, but following on from the previous sentence, in which it was God who had confined some of the fallen angels to Tartarus, we must infer the unnamed subject of the verb to be God. Eusebius’ use of the passive suggests that he was perhaps not entirely comfortable with the notion that his benevolent God might effectively be licensing...
the demons’ behaviour on earth, since it allows him to avoid making such an accusation explicit.

Nevertheless, there is also some indication here of how Eusebius may have been able to see such an action as corresponding to God’s benevolence, when we are told that the reason some demons ‘were left behind’ was ‘for the sake of training the athletes of piety’ (γυμνασίου χάριν τῶν εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν). This is clearly a reference to the Christian martyrs of the persecutions. The portrayal of martyrs as victorious ‘athletes’ and contestants in the Greek athletic contest, or ἀγών, was common in much early Christian martyr literature,680 including Eusebius’ own. Throughout the De martyribus Palaestinae, as well as in the accounts of persecutions in the HE, Eusebius regularly applied such terminology to the martyrs.681 In using the phrase ‘the athletes of piety’, it is therefore evident that he had in mind the events of the persecutions. Moreover, as N. Kelley has pointed out, the use of such language represented martyrdom not only as a spiritual victory, but as ‘an enterprise which required training’.682 In suggesting that the role of the demons was in part to ‘train’ these ‘athletes of piety’, Eusebius is therefore perhaps suggesting that the struggle against these hostile figures might in some way serve a morally improving purpose. By contributing to the moral exercises of these Christian


681 See, for example: Mart. Pal. [SR] 3.1, 4.4, 6.6, 9.3, 11.4, 11.18, 11.22, 11.23, 13.1, 13.11; HE 1.1.2, 7.12.1, 8.3.1, 8.6.5, 8.7.1, 8.8.1.

682 Kelley, ‘Philosophy as Training for Death’, 727.
athletes, the demons would unwittingly be helping to prepare them for the ultimate spiritual fulfilment – the victory – of martyrdom. This sense that the role of the demons might in this case ultimately be beneficial is further reinforced by Eusebius use of the word χάριν here, since this word had generally positive connotations, conveying a sense of goodwill, or favour. As such, the implication is that, in supplying the demons as a means of moral training for the pious, God is in fact demonstrating his benevolence, helping people towards salvation. It is important to note, however, that it would only be by successfully resisting the hostile actions of the demons that this beneficial effect might be achieved.

There is, of course, no suggestion that the demons might consciously be working for the benefit of humankind; rather, they would at best be the unwitting agents of God’s greater plan for human salvation. Moreover, the structure of this sentence leaves intriguingly open the question of God’s role in permitting the demons to encourage polytheistic worship. The reason why they are permitted to remain on earth is given as ‘training the athletes of piety’; however, once they have been allowed to remain, Eusebius suggests that they then proceed to encourage the development of polytheism. Eusebius seems willing to allow that persecutions and martyrdoms might have had a potentially corrective or improving aspect, without being able to see any similar benefit in the existence of polytheism. Eusebius does not make it clear whether he believed that the demons, once they had been allowed to remain for one, ultimately benevolent, purpose, had then effectively exceeded their mandate and begun to work other kinds of evil, or whether he felt that all demonic activity must, in some obscure way, be serving God’s greater plan. Either

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683 LSI, s.v. χάρις. Cf. PGL s.v. χάρις.
way, this one brief phrase demonstrates that, however polarised Eusebius’ cosmos, he avoided outright dualism by placing the demons ultimately under God’s power.

Although this suggestion that God might at times use the demons to serve his own ends is rare in Eusebius, this is not the only place where we find him allowing for the possibility that God might sometimes permit human suffering in order to achieve an ultimately positive goal. Once again, it is only in the context of the persecutions that Eusebius seems prepared to entertain this possibility. Describing an abortive attempt by the emperor Aurelian to persecute the church, Eusebius suggests at HE 7.30.20-21 that he was prevented by God, demonstrating, in Eusebius’ view:

...ὡς οὔποτε γένοιτ' ἀν ἡσστώνῃ τοῖς τοῦ βίου ἄρχουσιν κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκκλησίων, μὴ σύχι τῆς υπερμάχου χειρὸς θεία καὶ σύρανϊ κρίτη παιδείας ἐνεκα καὶ ἐπιστροφής... τοῦτ' ἐπιτελείσθαι συγχωρούσης.684

...that at no point would it be easy for the rulers of this life to come down against the assemblies of Christ, unless the hand fighting on our behalf, in godly and heavenly judgement for the sake of education and correction... should order this to happen.

While the phrase ‘the rulers of this life’ (τοῖς τοῦ βίου ἄρχουσιν) is ostensibly a reference to earthly emperors such as Aurelian, it is also reminiscent of Paul’s famous remark that ‘our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness’.685 As such, we once again find Eusebius implying that the enemies of the virtuous, be they earthly or demonic, might take action against the church only

684 HE 7.30.21.
685 Eph. 6:12, NRSV trans.: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἢ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς, πρὸς τὰς ξοιπηγίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου.
when God allowed. In this case, Eusebius suggests that God in fact intervened to prevent the persecutions, by bringing about Aurelian’s death; however, slightly later, we find God permitting persecutions to go ahead, by removing his protection from the church. Eusebius leaves us in no doubt that he considers this to be entirely justified by the growing dissensions and conflicts within the church at that time: he sees it as a ‘godly judgement’ (ἡ θεία κρίσις), and considers that God was simply ‘conducting his supervision’ (τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπῆν ἀνακίνει). Quoting from Psalm 88(89):42, Eusebius goes even further, claiming that during these persecutions, God not only removed his protection from the church, but even ‘exalted the right hand of his foes’ (ὕψωσεν γὰρ τὴν δεξιὰν τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτοῦ).

Eusebius is thus offering a slightly different interpretation of the persecutions here, in which they are not simply the work of hostile and malevolent demons, inflicted on an innocent population, but rather an instrument of God’s justice. Their purpose, however, is not simply punitive; instead, Eusebius suggests that God might have allowed this suffering for the essentially merciful purpose of correcting human error, thus leading people back to the path of virtue and salvation. Eusebius’ use of the word παιδείας at HE 7.30.21 is suggestive: God wishes to ‘educate’ people, to help them to improve themselves. Even his punishments might thus, in Eusebius’ view, ultimately be seen as evidence of his benevolence.

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686 Cf. HE 8.1.6, where Eusebius asserts that God’s protection prevents a ‘wicked demon’ (δαίμων πονηρός) from undermining the prosperity of the church.
687 HE 8.1.7-9.
688 HE 8.1.7.
689 HE 8.1.9, NRSV trans.
Conclusions

It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, there was ultimately only one power in true control of events in the universe, and that power was the benevolent Christian God. Thus, while we must see demons in Eusebius as a powerful force, capable of disrupting human salvation, enslaving the gullible and drawing people away from God, there was clearly no doubt in Eusebius’ mind about who the eventual victor in this greater cosmic conflict would be. The power of the Christian God far outweighed that of the demons, who were, ultimately, only part of God’s creation. Eusebius’ presentation of the demonic thus leaves a number of questions tantalisingly unanswered. There remain a number of inherent tensions in his thought, which we cannot hope to resolve here. For instance, while Eusebius appears tentatively to find possible benefits lying behind the persecutions, he does not offer a similar explanation of why his benevolent God might have permitted the demons to encourage polytheism, with its attendant suffering and immorality. Eusebius’ unmistakable view of demons as a hostile and terrifying force to be feared, combatted, and condemned therefore sits at times rather uncomfortably with his faith in the supreme power and benevolence of God.

In view of Eusebius’ primarily apologetic aims, we should not expect to find a solution to these tensions in his works, since at no point was his purpose principally to outline or explain the function of demons within the universe. Moreover, we should certainly not attempt to smooth out any inconsistencies, or to look for intellectually satisfying answers to questions that Eusebius may not even have asked himself. This would be to run the risk of distorting Eusebius’ thought. Instead, we must simply accept this complex – at times, almost paradoxical –
cosmology as the structure which underpinned his thought on other issues. While some of the theological nuances of this system remain obscure to us – indeed, they might have been obscure even to Eusebius himself – the basic outline of Eusebius’ cosmology is unmistakable. Eusebius envisaged a universe structured and energised by a fundamental division between the cosmic forces of good and evil. Ideas about demons, as the representatives of one of these poles, cannot be neatly excised from other areas of Eusebius’ thought, any more than his ideas about God or Christ can be set aside by scholars who wish to understand his views. Thus, in order to appreciate Eusebius’ thought on any topic, including his political thought, we must remain constantly alert to the presence of demons in his work, remembering to see them as a hostile and consistently threatening force, against which the virtuous must constantly struggle. By recognising the importance of demons for Eusebius, I will show in future chapters that we can gain valuable new insights into key areas of his thought – his ideas of moral responsibility, his understanding of history, and his view of Constantine.
Although they have rarely received the attention they deserve in studies of Eusebius’ works, questions of human morality, of virtue and vice, and the responsibility for evil lie at the heart of many of Eusebius’ most pressing concerns as a writer. As an apologist and church leader in a period when Christians were adjusting to a new position of imperial favour, he was able to offer instruction in what he felt it meant to be a true and virtuous Christian, and how such virtue might be achieved. As an historian, he faced the challenge of explaining the apparent injustice of earlier persecutions in a manner consistent with a belief in a just and omnipotent God. Writing of Constantine’s career, there was the issue of Licinius’ transformation from virtuous Christian hero to vicious persecutor to address, and finally, as the champion of his own doctrinal views, he had to engage with those ‘heretics’ he considered to have strayed from the route to virtue and salvation.

Issues of human moral responsibility therefore had both a theological and a practical significance for Eusebius, occupying a central place both in his understanding of salvation and divine justice, and also in his vision of Christian identity.

Few scholars, however, have chosen to examine these issues in much detail. Jean Sirinelli, for instance, touched briefly on the role of human ‘free will’ in Eusebius’ works, finding it to be ‘the key to Eusebius’ thought’. He did so, however, not in order to explore Eusebius’ views on moral responsibility, but rather...
as part of a discussion of Eusebius’ understanding of divine providence.\textsuperscript{691}

Moreover, Sirinelli paid no attention to the many problems involved in applying a
term such as ‘free will’ to thinkers of this period,\textsuperscript{692} and failed to looked much
beyond Eusebius’ most strident statements on the subject of external necessity and
human responsibility in the \textit{PE}. Although this work undoubtedly contains
Eusebius’ most comprehensive discussion of many of the issues surrounding
human responsibility and accountability, most of Eusebius’ statements on the
subject, particularly in book 6, occur in the context of a broader rebuttal of the
doctrine of an all-powerful Fate. As a result, they cannot be said to provide a
complete picture of Eusebius’ understanding of these issues. By restricting his focus
in this way, Sirinelli therefore missed the opportunity to reach a more nuanced
understanding of Eusebius’ views by comparing them with the examples of human
virtue and vice found in some of Eusebius’ other works, such as the \textit{HE} and \textit{VC}.

Similarly, while J.R. Lyman devoted a brief section of her book on \textit{Christology
and Cosmology} to Eusebius’ views on ‘human nature and will’, she too focused
mainly on the longer discussions of the subject in the \textit{PE, DE} and \textit{Theophania}.\textsuperscript{693}
Elsewhere, although Aaron Johnson has rightly drawn attention to the way in
which Eusebius’ works helped to shape an emerging sense of Christian identity,\textsuperscript{694}
his particular focus on discourses of ethnicity means that he largely ignores
questions about human responsibility and the attainment of virtue – questions
which would surely have been crucial in forming a shared understanding of what it

\textsuperscript{691} Ibid. 339-63. Chesnut similarly focussed on the relationship between human ‘free will’ and divine

\textsuperscript{692} On which, see below, p. 160-63.

\textsuperscript{693} Lyman, \textit{Christology and Cosmology}, 100-06.

\textsuperscript{694} Johnson, \textit{Ethnicity and Argument}. 
meant to be a ‘good’ Christian. A full examination of the issue of human moral responsibility in Eusebius’ works is therefore long overdue.

In particular, it is essential to explore how Eusebius presents the relationship between demons and humans when assessing his views on human responsibility. Eusebius’ works provide countless examples of interaction between demonic and human agents, notably in the commission of wicked acts and vicious behaviour, which have been ignored in previous scholarship. These examples can provide a fresh perspective on Eusebius’ understanding of human freedom of action and moral accountability. They take us beyond the more theoretical discussions of the PE and allow us to observe his views ‘in action’, bringing to the fore questions about the balance between external influence and human free choice. They show how people might succumb to wickedness and thus, conversely, provide an insight into how Eusebius felt people might avoid evil. Moreover, observing how Eusebius presents the relationship between humans and demons can also help to shed light on how he pictured the opposite relationship, between humans and the divine.

Above all, the role of the demonic in encouraging human wickedness ought to be examined simply because a threatening demonic presence was central to Eusebius’ understanding of the universe. As David Brakke has noted, early Christian ‘ethical life… took place within the context of cosmic struggle’ against the devil and the forces of evil.\textsuperscript{695} For Eusebius, questions about how and why humans might be drawn to sin cannot be separated from questions about precisely how demons, as part of their battle against God, act with or upon their human victims. The issue of

\textsuperscript{695} Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk, 10.
human moral responsibility is inseparably connected in Eusebius’ works with questions about demonic responsibility for wickedness.

It is important to note at the outset, however, that even when approaching Eusebius’ understanding of human responsibility from this new perspective, there will be aspects of his thought that remain frustratingly obscure. At times, Eusebius’ ideas might appear somewhat vague or circular – Sirinelli considered Eusebius’ discussion of the relationship between human ‘free will’ and divine providence to be ‘fragile’ and ‘inadequate’. Moreover, the challenges involved in dealing with subjects as complex as human freedom of action and moral responsibility are not small. Ancient and modern terminologies rarely correspond in this area. For instance, as with many ancient thinkers, the issue of moral responsibility is discussed by Eusebius mainly in terms of praise and blame, or reward and punishment, and we should therefore not expect to find a clear and consistent term for ‘moral responsibility’ in Eusebius’ works. Similarly, a term such as ‘free will’ has become so heavily burdened with the concerns of centuries of later philosophers as to pose particular problems for anyone attempting to understand earlier debates. As a result, any attempt to understand Eusebius’ thought in this area must begin, not with modern terms and later concerns, but with close attention both to the expressions which Eusebius favoured and to the debates of his own time with which he was engaging.

Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 362: ‘…la fragilité ou plutôt l’insuffisance de la thèse soutenue par Eusèbe.’

It is therefore only by treating Eusebius’ thought on its own terms, and paying attention to a wide range of his works that we can hope to reach a proper understanding of his views on human agency and moral responsibility. This approach makes it clear that, for Eusebius, as for many early Christians, maintaining human accountability was of central importance to his conception of salvation. The belief that people were responsible and therefore answerable for their decisions, both good and bad, allowed for the administration of justice, particularly divine justice, and meant that the reward of salvation could be seen as fairly bestowed. Yet it also reveals that, despite the heavy emphasis on human responsibility in his works, Eusebius did not believe that people always acted entirely independently. His understanding of human behaviour allowed considerable room for external influence, for better or worse, without, however, removing people’s ultimate responsibility for the actions they carried out. In Eusebius’ view, human virtue and vice were each a partnership between humans and an external spiritual power. Such a view may be characterised as simultaneously empowering and dispiriting – Eusebius’ understanding of human responsibility allowed people a role in securing their own salvation, but at the same time placed considerable obstacles in their path, most notably in the form of threatening and hostile demons.

Background

Discussions of the issues of human agency and moral responsibility – particularly among early Christian writers like Eusebius – are frequently approached by
scholars in terms of a question of ‘free will’. There are, however, considerable risks involved in applying this term to ideas expressed in the early fourth century. Although for many years scholars assumed that free will was such a basic and fundamental concept that all people, including those in the ancient world, must have shared it, recent scholarship has come to recognise instead that ‘free will’ is in fact a ‘technical, philosophical notion’, one that was developed by philosophers and gradually changed over time. As a result, scholars have pointed out that early Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and the early Stoics make no reference to a concept of free will, and have tried instead to determine when the notion was first articulated, by tracing its gradual development through the debates of Classical, Hellenistic and early Christian philosophy. Although some have detected elements of a notion of will as early as the Stoic Epictetus in the second century CE, others feel we must wait until Augustine in the late fourth and early fifth century to find the concept expressed in anything even approaching its modern

Moreover, even if Augustine found a means of expressing an idea of ‘free will’ in Latin, it does not necessarily follow that the concept was similarly available in Greek, and some scholars have indeed suggested that it was not until Maximus the Confessor in the seventh century that a standard Greek term for will (θέλησις) appeared. Wherever one chooses to locate the origin of the concept of ‘free will’, however, the problem with applying the term to a writer like Eusebius is clear. Since ‘free will’ is not a fixed, universal notion, but rather a shifting, invented concept, gradually changing and developing over time, applying it to Eusebius’ works risks imposing an alien, anachronistic idea on his thought.

The difficulty with using the concept of free will to approach ancient thought is further exacerbated by considerable terminological confusion. A wide range of Greek words and phrases, including among others ἡ προαιρεσίς, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἡ βούλησις and ἡ θέλησις have all been translated as ‘will’ or ‘free will’, yet it is clear that such a variety of expressions must each have had particular connotations, if not entirely different meanings, which might easily be lost in haphazard translation. Scholars, however, who try to find just one word for ‘free will’ face falling into the trap of implying that there was one set concept which people would generally have understood by that particular word. The fact that

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704 As Dihle noted: *Theory of Will*, 143.


706 As Frede noted: *A Free Will*, 102. Eliasson’s work on Plotinus similarly highlights the need to ‘avoid translating different terms relating to different issues by one and the same modern term’: *That Which Depends On Us*, 15.
scholars have come to completely different conclusions about the appropriate Greek term for ‘free will’ serves only to illustrate the confusion which might arise from such an approach. Thus, rather than trying to find an expression for ‘free will’ in Eusebius’ works, and thereby perhaps distorting his ideas, it will be far more helpful to try to consider his thought on its own terms, by paying careful attention to the vocabulary which Eusebius actually employed. Since the purpose of this chapter is not to determine how far Eusebius may have shared a modern notion of free will – if such a notion even exists – but rather to gain greater insight into his understanding of human responsibility and morality, both the concept and the terminology of ‘free will’ will be best avoided here.

However, acknowledging that it can be inappropriate to apply the concept of ‘free will’ to ancient writers does not mean denying that these writers were interested in questions of moral responsibility and the attribution of praise and blame, which might, to a modern reader, seem to fall within the scope of a ‘free will problem’. Michael Frede insisted on the importance of distinguishing between ‘the belief in a free will and the ordinary belief that at least sometimes we are responsible for what we are doing’, arguing that the latter belief could exist without

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707 For instance, Kahn considered *autexousion* to be the best Greek ‘technical expression for free will’, yet, according to Frede, ‘the standard Greek term for the will is *prohairesis*’: Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will’, 250; Frede, *A Free Will*, 8.


709 Cf. Eliasson, *That Which Depends On Us*, which similarly rejects the unhelpful terminology of ‘free will’ for the study of τὰ ἔφ᾽ ἕμιν in Plotinus.

710 Huby identified two historical ‘free will problems’: firstly the relationship between free will and predestination, which he saw as ‘mainly theological’, and secondly, the relationship between free will and determinism, which might raise questions of human moral responsibility: P. Huby, ‘The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem’, *Philosophy* 42 (1967), 353.
Certainly when we look at the works of ancient and early Christian authors, we find that many of them were greatly exercised by issues of moral responsibility and accountability. Particularly from the second century CE onwards, the desire of philosophers of other schools to oppose what they saw as the universal determinism of the Stoic doctrine of fate (ἐμαρμένη) brought to the fore the question of the relationship between external forces and human freedom of action. Although, as C. Stough has pointed out, the Stoic position was frequently misrepresented, or misunderstood by its critics, the Stoic notion of fate appeared to many of their opponents to undermine the basis of morality and systems of justice. The Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias in the second century CE criticised the deterministic notion of fate partly on the grounds that the idea ‘offers nothing apart from an advocate for those who are bad’. For Alexander, it seems that maintaining human freedom of action was a matter of considerable ethical importance.

However, Robert Wilken has suggested that, while the issue of human freedom of action was seen by classical philosophers primarily as a matter of ethics, for early Christians, it became, above all, a ‘theological problem’. Although this

711 Frede, A Free Will, 4.
712 Dihle, Theory of Will, 107-13. For example: Orig. De Princ. 3.1.1-6; Tatian Orat. 7; Justin 1 Apol. 43.7-8; Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.8.69.1; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 19.190.1-5.
714 C. Stough, ‘Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility’, in J.M. Rist, ed., The Stoics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 207. Indeed, the Stoics themselves maintained that their determinist system was entirely compatible with a belief in human moral responsibility, and Frede has even suggested that the Stoic approach to this issue provided the basis for Christian ideas about free will: A Free Will, 89.
distinction is overly simplistic, since ethical considerations remained central to many early Christian discussions of the issue,\textsuperscript{717} including those of Eusebius,\textsuperscript{718} it is nevertheless true that Christians faced the additional problem of theodicy when addressing this question. For Christians, the need to reconcile their belief in a benevolent divine providence with undeniable examples of human wickedness and suffering in the world made questions of the origin of evil and human responsibility matters of pressing theological significance.\textsuperscript{719} Moreover, as a result of their belief in divine providence, early Christians also found themselves accused of determinism by their opponents.\textsuperscript{720} The Octavius of Minucius Felix records the accusation that Christians have simply replaced a belief in fate with a belief in God.\textsuperscript{721} This is immediately followed by the further criticism that, as a result, the notion of a final judgement is inherently unjust, since it would punish people for actions over which they had no control.\textsuperscript{722} Perhaps partly in order to rebut such accusations, many early Christian writers argued strongly against a determinist view of the universe.\textsuperscript{723} Opposing the idea of ‘fated necessity’ (εἰμαρμένης ἀναγκήν), Justin Martyr argued instead that people possessed ‘free choice’ (ἐλευθεραίπροαιρέσει) over their actions.\textsuperscript{724} The only kind of ‘fate’ which Justin was prepared to admit was that both the good and the wicked would inevitably receive the reward or punishment which

\textsuperscript{717} See, for example: Justin Martyr, 1 Apol. 43.1-5; Orig. De Princ. 3.1.5-6, Tatian, Orat. 7.
\textsuperscript{718} See, for example: CH 45.1-2.
\textsuperscript{719} S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 411. Bobzien notes that Platonists also faced a similar problem within their philosophical system, unlike Stoics and Peripatetics, whose systems were ‘internally coherent’ and who thus avoided this particular ‘free will problem’, 411.
\textsuperscript{720} Wilken, ‘Free Choice and Divine Will’, 126.
\textsuperscript{721} Min. Felix Oct. 11.6, cited in Wilken, ‘Free Choice and Divine Will’, 126.
\textsuperscript{722} Ibid.: igitur iniquam iudicem fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem.
\textsuperscript{723} Wilken, ‘Free Choice and Divine Will’, 126.
\textsuperscript{724} Justin Martyr 1 Apol. 43.1-4. Cf. 2 Apol. 6 (7).4-5, in which Justin explicitly names the Stoics as his opponents.
their actions merited.\textsuperscript{725} Tatian likewise argued that people possessed freedom of action, which allowed for the distribution of both praise and blame.\textsuperscript{726} For both Tatian and Justin, defending human freedom of action was linked both to a defence of divine justice and simultaneously to the maintenance of system of ethics. Discussions of human freedom and responsibility from both an ethical and a theological standpoint were thus widespread among both Christian and non-Christian thinkers in the centuries before Eusebius was writing.

Eusebius was clearly both aware of, and deeply engaged by, these debates, and his most extensive discussions of the issue of human responsibility, which are to be found in book 6 of the \textit{PE} and chapters 45 to 48 of the \textit{Contra Hieroclem}, occur as part of broader refutations of a determinist doctrine of fate or necessity.\textsuperscript{727} Eusebius’ arguments contain echoes of both Christian and non-Christian approaches to the topic. He cites Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise at length in the \textit{PE},\textsuperscript{728} while his claim that a determinist view of fate or necessity would remove all basis for praise and blame is also reminiscent of the arguments of Tatian and Justin.\textsuperscript{729} For a writer like Eusebius, who frequently uses examples of divine punishment and reward as evidence of the power of the Christian God, maintaining the justice of such divine interventions would have been of paramount importance. Yet it is also clear from his suggestion that belief in an all-powerful fate would lead to indolence and undermine the need for such valuable pursuits as philosophy and

\textsuperscript{725} Justin Martyr \textit{I Apol.} 43.7: Ἀλλ’ εἰμαρμένην φαμέν ἀπαράβατον ταύτην εἶναι, τοῖς τὰ καλὰ ἐκλεγομένους τὰ ἄξια ἐπίτιμα, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντία τὰ ἄξια ἐπίχεια.

\textsuperscript{726} Tatian, \textit{Orat.} 7.

\textsuperscript{727} Particularly \textit{PE} 6.6, which is headed: ‘Refutation of the argument concerning fate’ (Ἀνασκευαστικὰ τοῦ περὶ εἰμαρμένης λόγου).


\textsuperscript{729} \textit{CH} 45.1-2.
piety that this was not simply a question of theodicy for Eusebius.730 In his view, asserting human responsibility over external necessity or compulsion was also a matter of practical ethics and earthly justice.

As a result, it is hardly surprising that Eusebius should argue so strongly in favour of human responsibility in works such as the *PE* and *CH*. However, it is essential to bear in mind the broader context of this debate when examining Eusebius’ statements in these works. The polemical nature of these sections provides little scope for a nuanced or complex exposition of Eusebius’ views on human freedom of action. Instead, we find mainly forthright assertions of the responsibility of rational creatures for their behaviour.731 Although it is, of course, undeniable that Eusebius consistently sought to maintain human responsibility, looking beyond these sections of his apologetic works to the examples of human virtue and vice that appear in some of his more historical works suggests that there was rather more to his views than his straightforward assertions of human responsibility might imply.

At *VC* 3.26.1, for instance, Eusebius states that ‘at one time impious men, or rather, the whole race of demons through them, eagerly brought about the transmission to darkness and a forgotten place’ of Christ’s tomb.732 Similarly, in the *HE*, Eusebius suggests that accusations of magical practices levelled against Christians were ultimately the work of the devil, asserting that ‘it was through the activity of the devil that such magicians took on the name of the Christians to

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730 CH 48.1; PE 6.6.5-6, 6.6.17.
731 For example: CH 48.1; PE 6.6.20-21, 6.6.72.
732 ἄνδρες μὲν γὰρ ποτὲ δυσσεβεῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ πάν τὸ δαιμόνιον διὰ τούτων γένος, σπουδὴν ἔθεντο σκότῳ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοῦναι τὸ θεσπέσιον ἐκεῖνο τῆς ἀθανασίας μνήμα...
slander zealously the great mystery of piety with magic and, through these means, to disparage the doctrines of the church’. In both of these cases, Eusebius appears to suggest that responsibility for the wicked act in question might not lie exclusively with the human beings who carried it out. These examples bring the question of the relationship between personal responsibility and external influence intriguingly to the fore. Examining such cases of interaction between humans and demons can therefore help to shed more light on Eusebius’ understanding of human moral responsibility, by showing if, where, and how Eusebius set any limits to human responsibility.

Responsibility and Προαιρεσις

Clearly it is unhelpful, if not inappropriate, to apply the concept of ‘free will’ to Eusebius’ thought. Rather than restricting our discussion of Eusebius’ views by imposing on his works a concept which there is no evidence to suggest Eusebius possessed, it will be more helpful to consider what Eusebius may have meant by some of the terms he did use. Although translators of Eusebius’ works have, in the past, turned a range of words and phrases, such as τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, ἡ προαιρεσις, and τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, into ‘free will’, a careful examination of Eusebius’ use of these

733 HE 3.26.4: ἡν δ’ ἀρα διαβολικὴς ἐνεργείας διὰ τοινῦν χοιρίων τὴν Χριστιανὸν προσηγορίαν ύποδομεμένον τὸ μέγα τῆς θεοσεβείας μυστήριον ἐπὶ μαγεία στοιχάσα διαβάλειν διαστήραι τε δι’ αὐτῶν τὰ... ἐκκλησιαστικὰ δόγματα. The fact that one of the activities of these magicians was ‘to slander’ (διαβάλειν) the church further connects them and their actions to the devil, since the Greek word for the devil (διαβόλος) was derived from the verb διαβάλλω. On the etymology of this word, see: Riley, ‘Devil’, in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons, 463. Here, Eusebius is picking up on an idea expressed by Justin, who had suggested that Menander was driven to practise magical arts by demons. Eusebius cites the relevant passage of Justin (1 Apol. 26) at HE 3.26.3.

734 Gifford’s translation of the PE is particularly generous in its use of ‘free will’, using it to translate a variety of expressions. The Preparation for the Gospel, trans. with intro. E.H. Gifford, 2 vols. (repr. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981): προαιρετικὴν (PE 5.9.12), i.214; τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (PE 6.6.29), i.265; τὸ αὐθεκούσιον (PE 6.6.33), i.265; τὸ τῆς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως (PE 6.6.34), i.266; προαιρέσεως.
terms reveals the most important concept in his understanding of moral responsibility to be προαιρεσις, which might loosely be translated ‘deliberate choice’. Frequency of appearance alone suggests that, of these terms, προαιρεσις was the most significant for Eusebius. Eusebius uses forms of the word προαιρεσις almost 40 times in the PE alone, with a further 18 appearances in quotations. By contrast, forms of αυτεξουσιος and αυθεκουσιος appear only 31 times in total in the PE, of which 10 are in quotations. Setting aside quotations, then, in the PE Eusebius uses προαιρεσις almost twice as much as αυτεξουσιος and αυθεκουσιος combined. In Eusebius’ view it was προαιρεσις, the capacity for people to choose between right and wrong, that allowed praise and blame to be assigned. As a result, discovering what Eusebius considered the conditions of προαιρεσις to be is essential to understanding how and where he felt moral responsibility could be attributed.

It is in the CH that we find Eusebius’ clearest statement of the significance of προαιρεσις – for him, it is προαιρεσις that leads a person into either virtue or vice. At CH 47.1-2, Eusebius argues that, as a result of both divine law and human nature, people are ultimately responsible for themselves, describing the human soul as ‘self-governor and judge, leader and lord of itself’. Yet he does not suggest that this autonomy is without limit; rather, it extends only as far as τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (‘the

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735 Thesaurus Linguae Graecae search for προαιρε-, αὐτεξου-, and αὐθεκου-.

736 CH 47.1: ...αὐθεκοσιων τε τῇ ψυχῇ ὅρος αὐτοκράτορα τε καὶ κριτην, ἤγεμον τε καὶ κύριον αὐτῶν ἑαυτοῦ...
things which are up to us’), a phrase which had long been used to describe human agency in debates about moral responsibility. These ‘things which are up to us’ are then further defined by Eusebius as ‘those things which happen according to choice (προαιρέσιν) and action’. In associating προαιρέσις with that which is ‘up to us’, Eusebius was conforming to a long philosophical tradition reaching back to Aristotle. Aristotle had argued that, while we might wish (βούλησις) for impossible things, choice (προαιρέσις) was not concerned with things that were impossible (τῶν άδυνάτων). As a result, Aristotle concludes that ‘it seems that προαιρέσις is about the things which are up to us (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν)’. Moreover, for Aristotle, προαιρέσις had been closely connected with the attainment of virtue. Similarly, Eusebius makes it clear that, in his opinion, the things which are ‘up to us’ include matters of virtue and vice, asserting that ‘out of the things which are up to us, each person acquires by choice itself an impulse towards one or the other of virtue or wickedness’. For Eusebius, then, the concept of προαιρέσις was inseparable from questions of virtue and vice, and thus from his understanding of moral responsibility. People were in his view responsible for the things that were in their power to control, including the choice between good and bad.

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737 Ibid.
738 Bobzien, ‘Stoic Conceptions of Freedom’, 72. See, for example, Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 12.
739 CH 47.2: ...δὲ γενοιτ’ ἀν κατὰ προαιρέσιν τε καὶ πράξιν...
740 See: Frede, A Free Will, 19-30, on the significance of choice in Aristotle. Προαιρέσις also occupied a particularly prominent place in the thought of the second-century CE Stoic Epictetus, who also associated it with τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν and the issue of responsibility: Sorabji, Emotion, 332-33, citing Epictetus, Discourses 1.22.10.
742 Ibid. 3, 1111b21-22.
743 Ibid. 3, 1111b30-31; ἄλως γὰρ ἐσιχν ἡ προαιρέσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι. Cf. 3, 1113a9-12.
744 Ibid. 3, 1111b6.
745 CH 47.2: τῶν δ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὴν ἐπὶ θάτερα ὀμοίων ἀρετῆς τε καὶ κακίας ἐκαστὸς ἐν αὐτῇ κέκτηται προαιρέσει.
The significance of προαίρεσις in determining whether a person was virtuous or wicked is reflected in Eusebius’ description of the demons’ initial fall from heaven in the *PE*. Here, as we have seen, the key distinction drawn between the demons and their angelic counterparts is one of προαίρεσις. Demons and angels should not, in Eusebius’ view, bear the same name as each other, even though ontologically they are essentially the same, primarily because they are different ‘in their choice’ (τὴν προαίρεσιν).\(^{746}\) It is, above all, their προαίρεσις of good or evil that defines each of these groups. Thus, while the focus in the *CH* is on the προαίρεσις of human beings (ἄνθρωποι),\(^{747}\) it seems that Eusebius felt προαίρεσις to lie at the heart of the responsibility of other rational creatures as well, be they human, angelic, or demonic.\(^{748}\) This means not only that Eusebius’ discussions of demonic responsibility can help to shed light on his views of the responsibility of other rational beings, but also that any situation in which the προαίρεσις of different rational creatures interact to produce either vice or virtue must raise questions about where he believed moral responsibility principally to lie.

Crucially, Eusebius suggests that it was above all their προαίρεσις that made people vulnerable to the attacks of demons. The devil, Eusebius informs us, rapidly discovered that people could ‘fall into evil with ease from their own thoughts through their self-determined choice (προαίρεσιν)’.\(^{749}\) This is in spite of the fact that Eusebius also held that the soul – the home of προαίρεσις – was by nature inclined

\(^{746}\) *PE* 4.5.5. See the discussion above, p. 130-31.

\(^{747}\) *CH* 47.1.2.

\(^{748}\) It is essential to remember that, in spite of the heavy emphasis which Eusebius placed on the irrationality of demonic behaviour, he nevertheless considered them to be rational creatures: *PE* 13.15.6.

\(^{749}\) *DE* 4.9.5: … πρόχειρον ἐξ οἰκείας γνώμης τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐμπτῶσιν δὲ αὐτεξούσιον προαίρεσιν…
to follow a virtuous path.750 Such a view would surely have meant that Eusebius considered any person who went against this natural inclination to be even more deserving of condemnation.751 Nevertheless, for Eusebius it was this very ability of the soul to choose the worse as well as the better path that made possible the attribution of either praise or blame, as appropriate.752 Προαιρεσις was therefore at the heart of Eusebius’ ethical thought; it also appears to have served an important role in his theodicy, helping to absolve God of responsibility for evil. At PE 6.6.47, Eusebius declares that ‘the source of wickedness’ (τῆς κακίας πηγή) is to be found ‘only in the self-chosen movement of the soul’ (ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοπροαιρέτῳ κινήσει). The role of the soul’s προαιρεσις in the generation of evil is then reinforced a few lines later, when Eusebius remarks that wickedness ‘is a work of choice but not of nature’ (προαιρέσεως ὃν ἀλλ’ ὦ φύσεως ἔργον).753 Eusebius is thus able to pin the blame for evil on God’s creatures, rather than on God himself. In the light of this, it would be difficult to over-state the significance of προαιρεσις in Eusebius’ thought. For him, it was what determined virtue or vice, praise or blame and, thus, ultimately, reward or punishment.

Προαιρεσις, however, was not a capacity shared by the whole of creation; rather, Eusebius held that it was exclusive to rational beings and linked it repeatedly to the reasoning powers of the soul. For Eusebius the human soul was characterised above all by its rationality, which was not only a gift from God, but

750 PE 6.6.47-9.
751 PE 6.6.51.
752 PE 6.6.49.
753 PE 6.6.51: φαύλως δὲ ὅτε πράττει, οὐ τὴν φύσιν αἰτιατέον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ αὐτὴ γίνεται τὸ φαύλον, προαιρέσεως ὃν ἀλλ’ ὦ φύσεως ἔργον. In this, Eusebius was echoing the opinion of Origen, who had similarly blamed προαιρεσις rather than nature for the generation of evil: Orig. Comm. in Matt. 10.11.38-40.
also the means by which humankind could be said to bear the image of God.\textsuperscript{754} By locating προαίρεσις within the soul, Eusebius was therefore associating it closely with rationality. Indeed, Eusebius went so far as to combine ‘reason (λογισμὸν) and the choice (προαίρεσιν) which is up to us’, declaring them to be ‘by nature of the soul’.\textsuperscript{755} By contrast with this, those ‘things not up to us’ (τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) – things unconnected with προαίρεσις – were said to be ‘without soul and irrational’ (ἄψυχά τε ὄντα καὶ ἄλογα).\textsuperscript{756}

This sense that rationality was a key condition of προαίρεσις for Eusebius is further strengthened by the striking distinction which he draws between the soul and the human body, even describing them at one point as ‘opposites’ (ἐναντίων).\textsuperscript{757} Although Eusebius explicitly denies that the material body is evil,\textsuperscript{758} he presents it as distinctly inferior to the soul. Where the soul is rational and immortal, the body is irrational and subject to death and decay.\textsuperscript{759} When Eusebius connects προαίρεσις and the ‘things which are up to us’ to the soul, he also makes it clear that the ‘things not up to us’ are those which ‘concern the body and external things’ (περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός).\textsuperscript{760} The irrational body thus lies outside the realm of rational προαίρεσις. Indeed, Eusebius even suggests that it might be necessary for προαίρεσις, characterised by reason, to act directly counter to the

\textsuperscript{754} For example: \textit{PE} 3.10.6: ψυχή μὲν οὖν λογικῆ καὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ νοῦς ἀπαθῆς ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει εὗ μιᾷ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἀποικώζειν θεοῦ, καθ’ ὅσον ἀνίκη καὶ ἀσώματος νιερά τε καὶ λογική τὴν οὐκίαν συνεστήκεν... Cf. \textit{PE} 7.4.3; 7.10.9; 13.3.44, and the discussion in Chapter III above, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{755} \textit{PE} 6.6.29: γένοιτ' ἂν οὖν τὸν ὄντων ἐν ἡμὶν τὰ μὲν κατὰ λογισμὸν καὶ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐφ' ἡμῖν γιγνόμενα, οία τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς...

\textsuperscript{756} \textit{CH} 47.2.

\textsuperscript{757} \textit{PE} 6.6.26.

\textsuperscript{758} \textit{PE} 6.6.47.

\textsuperscript{759} \textit{PE} 6.6.26: ...καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀλόγου, τῆς δὲ λογικῆς τυγχανούσης, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μὲν φθαρτοῦ, τῆς δὲ ἀφθάρτου, καὶ θατέρου θνητοῦ, θατέρας δὲ ἀθανάτου...

\textsuperscript{760} \textit{CH} 47.2.
body, arguing that ‘προαίρεσις, persuaded by wise arguments... strikes away the
nature of the body’. This opposition between προαίρεσις and the irrational body
reinforces the idea that rationality was central to Eusebius’ understanding of
προαίρεσις and thus of responsibility. Yet in associating προαίρεσις so closely with
the capacity for reasoning, Eusebius leaves open the question of where
responsibility might lie in cases where rationality is lacking.

A second key condition of προαίρεσις for Eusebius was that it should be free,
and unconstrained. Eusebius describes humankind’s ‘more divine part’ (τῇ
θειότερᾳ μοῖρᾳ) – the soul, and home of προαίρεσις – as possessing its ‘own
freedom’ (τὴν οἰκείαν ἐλευθερίαν). This is in contrast to the ‘nature of the body’
(φύσις σώματος) to which it seems people are enslaved. Eusebius suggests that
people must ‘be slaves to’ (δουλεύουν) the body, and further describes people as
‘both slave and free’ (καὶ δούλον εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐλεύθερον) in relation to
their body and soul respectively. For Eusebius, it seems that this human freedom
consisted of two main kinds: freedom from external constraint, and freedom to make
an alternative choice. The idea that προαίρεσις must be free from external
constraint is emphasised by the contrast which Eusebius draws between
προαίρεσις and ‘external necessity’ (τῆς ἐξωθεν ἀνάγκης). For him, the two

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761 PE 6.6.35: ...ἡ δὲ προαιρεσις λόγους σώφροσιν ἀναπειθείσα... παρακρούεται τὴν τοῦ σώματος
φύσιν...

762 CH 47.2.

763 PE 6.6.26: ...τοτε δὲ τῇ θειότερᾳ μοῖρᾳ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀσπαζόμενον ἐλευθερίαν.

764 Ibid.: ως καὶ δούλον εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐλεύθερον, τοιαύτῃ τινὰ παρὰ τὸν θεοῦ...
κεκληρωμένον ψυχής καὶ σώματος ἐπιμείξαν.

765 PE 6.6.11. Cf. PE 5.5.13.
stand in opposition to each other, since acting under the constraint of necessity or fate would in his view remove any grounds for praise or blame.766

This is further reflected in Eusebius’ frequent use of words such as αὐτεξούσιος, αὐθεκούσιος and ἐλευθέρος to describe either προαίρεσις, or related words for choice, such as αἱρεσις. At DE 4.1.4, for instance, Eusebius asserts that God created ‘the souls of men supplied by nature with unconstrained freedom (ἐλευθέρον) of self-determined choice (τῆς αὐθεκουσίου αἱρεσιώς) between the good and the opposite’.768 Although in modern translations of Christian authors, including Eusebius, the term αὐτεξούσιος is sometimes rendered as ‘free will’,769 its original meaning among Greek philosophers was simply ‘in one’s own power’.770 This meaning reflects Eusebius’ insistence that προαίρεσις relates only to τὰ ἑφ’ ἣμίν, those ‘things which are up to us’, further reinforcing the sense that προαίρεσις in Eusebius is possible only for things lying within a person’s control, and thus must be free from external compulsion. For Eusebius, what this freedom from external constraint means, it seems, is that people should have the opportunity to make an alternative choice. Eusebius argues that because of ‘self-determined freedom’ (τῆς αὐτεξούσιου ἐλευθερίας), it is possible to praise someone for their ‘choice of the better’ (τὴν τῶν κριττόνων αἱρεσιν), since they also possess the

766 PE 6.6.5-6.
767 For example: PE 6.6.41, 6.6.63, 6.6.72, 7.18.8; HE 10.4.57; DE 4.1.4, 4.9.5, 4.10.1; De eccl. theol. 3.15.
768 ...προσέτι δὲ ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων ἁφέταν καὶ ἐλευθερόν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐθεκουσίου περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τοῦντιν αἱρεσιῶς τὴν φύσιν ἐπαγομένας...
770 See: Frede, A Free Will, 75; Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will’, 250.
freedom to choose ‘the opposite’ (τὴν ἐναντίαν). Thus, in Eusebius’ view, προαιρέσεις, and consequently moral responsibility, are dependent not only on a person’s rationality, but also on their freedom to choose between at least two alternative courses of action.

Yet, while Eusebius believed freedom to be a necessary condition of προαιρέσεις, he also suggests that this freedom could, at times, be compromised or challenged. One source of these challenges was the human body, subject, as it was, to passions and desires. This, however, was not the main challenge, for Eusebius argues that it ought to be possible for προαιρέσεις to overcome the weaknesses of the body. More intriguing is Eusebius’ suggestion that a person’s προαιρέσεις might be influenced, for better or worse, by other, external προαιρέσεις. Eusebius argues that, while the body is affected by external needs and desires, ‘so sometimes also προαιρέσεις, troubled by numberless external προαιρέσεις, is persuaded by its self-determined opinion to deliver itself up to external things and sometimes it ends up better and sometimes worse. For just as being with the wicked makes one bad, so again on the other hand the company of the good makes for improvement.’

Although Glen Chesnut read this as referring simply to the influence of ‘a general

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771 PE 6.6.49: …διὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δεδομένης αὐτεξουσίου ἐλευθερίας τὴν τῶν κρείστων αἰών μὲν ἐπαίνου καὶ ἀποδοχής αἰῶν ἀποφήμας γερον τε καὶ μειζόνων ἐπαθλῶν τῶν ἐπί τοῦ κατορθούμενος, ὅτι μὴ βεβαιομένος, γνώμη δὲ αὐτεξουσίως κατωθοῦν, παρὰν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐλευθαί. Cf. PE 6.6.51; DE 4.1.4. This notion that προαιρέσεις must be a choice of alternatives was a comparatively recent development. As Frede has shown, it is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato, in which praise and blame are connected with the ability to choose the better or worse of two options (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 12; Frede, A Free Will, 100), but for earlier philosophers, such as Aristotle, this had not necessarily been the case. Frede suggests that ‘the choice one makes in Aristotle is not, at least necessarily, a choice between doing X and not doing X, let alone a choice between doing X and doing Y. It is a matter of choosing to do X, or failing to choose to do X, such that X does not get done’: Frede, A Free Will, 28-29.

772 PE 6.6.34-35.

773 PE 6.6.42: …οὕτως ἦστιν ὅτε καὶ προαιρέσεις ὑπὸ μνήμην ἐξωθεὶν ἐνοχλουμένη προαιρέσεων, αὐτεξουσίων γνώμη πενθεῖσα, ἐαυτὴν τὸν ἐξωθεὶν ἐπαϊδώσακας τοτὲ μὲν βελτίων, τοτὲ δὲ χείρων ἀποτελείται, οίδε γὰρ συνοπτία φαύλη κακέων, ἰσοπερὶ αὐτοῦ τούταντὸν ποιεῖν ἀμείνους τῶν καλῶν ὑμίλια.
and pervasive social pressure’,\textsuperscript{774} it is unlikely, given Eusebius’ strong belief in the threat posed by demons, that he would have been thinking solely of other human προαίρεσεις here. Indeed, in the \textit{LC}, Eusebius suggests that while human enemies direct their attacks against the body, invisible, spiritual enemies focus their attention on attacking the invisible soul, where προαίρεσις was located.\textsuperscript{775} This suggests that we should see this reference to external προαίρεσεις as referring as much to spiritual, as to other human προαίρεσεις. It therefore seems that, in Eusebius’ view, it was possible for demons to compromise the independence of human προαίρεσις, raising the question of where responsibility for wickedness might lie in such cases.

\textit{Demonic Influence}

For Eusebius, then, any discussion of the issue of responsibility must be approached primarily in terms of προαίρεσις. It was προαίρεσις – a choice which must be both free and made by a rational being – that in his view determined between virtue and vice, and thus whether a person deserved punishment or reward. Yet this close association between προαίρεσις, rationality and freedom leads inevitably to questions about how and if Eusebius believed responsibility should be assigned in situations where one, or both, of the conditions of προαίρεσις were not met – in other words, where either rationality or freedom was compromised. This issue is of particular relevance for Eusebius’ discussions of the relationship between demons

\textsuperscript{774} Chesnut, \textit{First Christian Histories}, 82; cf. Chesnut, ‘Fate, Fortune, Free Will and Nature’, 178. See also Berkhoff, who suggested, presumably on the basis of this passage, that Eusebius believed a person’s free action could be compromised by ‘the free will of other people’ (‘durch den freien Willen anderer Menschen’): \textit{Die Theologie}, 104.

\textsuperscript{775} \textit{LC} 7.1.
and humans, since he so often presents those humans he believed to be in the power of demons as irrational, and even, at times, as enslaved to demons. We must therefore ask whether Eusebius believed that this demonic influence in any way lessened people’s responsibility for their sins.

In spite of Eusebius’ insistence in works such as the CH and PE that people must bear responsibility for their own actions, there is nevertheless some suggestion in his other works that those acting at the instigation of demons might merit sympathy as much as condemnation. In the VC, Eusebius suggests that Constantine’s response to the behaviour of schismatic congregations in Africa – congregations which Eusebius believed to lie under demonic influence – was less one of anger than of pity, reporting that the emperor ‘grieved excessively (ὑπεραλγοῦντα) at the senselessness of the mentally injured’. Similarly, Eusebius claims that Constantine believed the Donatists ‘should be pitied rather than chastised’, because they were ‘either entirely deranged or stung into madness by the wicked demon’. The suggestion seems to be that, deprived of their rationality by demons, the human agents in this case were no longer responsible for their crimes.

776 For example: HE 7.31.1, 10.8.9-10; VC 1.45.2-3; LC 7.7, 9.13; Theoph. 1.78, 2.1; PE 4.17.3.
777 For example: LC 5.3; PE 4.17.4; DE 4.9.8; VC 1.13.3. This appears to have puzzled J. Robertson, who noted that Eusebius seems to deny the loss of ‘free will’, despite presenting some humans as the slaves of demons: Christ as Mediator: A Study of the Theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra and Athanasius of Alexandria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 63.
778 Eusebius repeatedly suggests in the VC that divisions within the church, including the Donatist schism, were the work either of a ‘wicked demon’ or of ‘envy’, which, as we have seen, often characterised demonic activity in Eusebius’ works: VC 1.45.2-3, 2.61.3-4, 3.4.1, 3.59.1-2.
779 VC 3.4.1: ...ὑπεραλγοῦντα τὶς τῶν φενοβλαβῶν ἀπονοιας.
780 VC 1.45.3: μὴ γὰρ σοφρονοῦντες εἶναι ἀνδρῶν τὰ ταλμύρεια ἄλλ’ ἢ πάντη παρακοπτόντων ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονας οἰστρογένειον: σὺς ἐλεεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κολαξεῖσθαι χρήσαι. Cf. HE 7.17.1, in which the Christian senator Astyrius is reported to have felt pity for the non-Christian citizens of Caesarea Philippi when he observed one of their festivals, since he believed that they were deluded by the influence of demons.
However, as H.A. Drake has shown, in spite of Eusebius’ attempts in the VC to tie Constantine’s religious views to his own, there are several hints in this work that the two were not in complete agreement on theological matters. In particular, Eusebius appears to have felt that Constantine was too lenient in the standards of piety and ethical behaviour required of new Christian converts. At VC 4.54.2-3, for instance, Eusebius comes closer than at almost any other point in the VC to criticising Constantine directly. Here, Eusebius refers to people who ‘crept into the church and falsely assumed the name of Christians’, clearly describing those who had converted since Christianity had found imperial favour. He suggests, however, that Constantine was too trusting of these people’s ‘outer form’ (τῷ σχήματι), implying that he thought Constantine ought to have required more of those wishing to convert than simple profession of the Christian name. This apparent discrepancy between the attitudes of Eusebius and Constantine also illustrates that, in his concern with virtue and justice, Eusebius was not thinking only on a cosmic scale, but was motivated by the practical challenges facing the church as it met a new wave of converts. It thus seems that Eusebius and Constantine may have differed in where they chose to set the parameters of virtue and vice. Moreover, Eusebius’ use of the verb ὑπεραλγύνω at VC 3.4.1, with its suggestion of excessive grief, implies that he believed the emperor to have taken his sympathy rather too far. We should therefore be cautious about reading these references to Constantine’s reaction as representative of Eusebius’ own views. Nevertheless, it does suggest that there was

782 VC 4.54.2: ...τῶν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ὑποδομένων καὶ τὸ Χριστιανῶν ἐπιπλάστως σχηματιζομένων ὄνομα.
783 VC 4.54.3.
more than one acceptable response to the issue of human transgression in this period.

The idea that those committing wicked acts might not be entirely culpable for their actions, but might instead merit sympathy did have some precedent in earlier Greek thought. In the *Timaeus*, Plato had made the striking claim that it was wrong to blame the wicked for their actions, since wickedness arose, not voluntarily, but rather ‘the one who is bad becomes bad through some wicked habit of the body and uneducated rearing’. Thus wickedness might be seen to have, in part, a physical cause, but also to arise from a failure of education – that is, arguably, from unsuitable external influence. In consequence, Plato suggests that ‘the parents are always more responsible than the children, and the ones doing the educating more than those educated’. In other words, it seems that Plato is suggesting that those who encourage, or at least fail to check, wickedness in others are more at fault than those actually committing wicked deeds. At the very least, he is challenging the view that a wicked person is entirely responsible for their crimes.

Although, as Christopher Gill has pointed out, such a view was certainly not representative of Greek philosophy more broadly, and was not even much repeated in Platonic thought, Plato’s further claim in the *Timaeus* that ‘no one does wrong voluntarily’ was much more widely shared. Plato made similar statements

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785 Plato Tim. 86e: …διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἐξὶν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός…

786 *Ibid.* 87b: ὅν αἰτιατέον μὲν τοὺς φυτεύοντας αἰεὶ τῶν φυτευμένων μᾶλλον καὶ τοὺς τρέφοντας τῶν τρεφομένων…

throughout a range of his works, and this view became characteristic of much Greek thinking about human action and responsibility. In essence, this idea seems to have been that, since moral failings were as harmful to the wicked person as to others, such a person must be acting in ignorance of his or her true interests, and therefore involuntarily. This person ought therefore to be pitied rather than blamed. Although Eusebius does not directly quote this section of the *Timaeus*, the widespread currency of this idea in Greek thought makes it highly unlikely that he would have been unaware of it. Indeed, as T.D.J. Chappell has argued, the notion that wickedness must be involuntary posed considerable problems for early Christian writers who, like Eusebius, were also steeped in the traditions of Greek philosophy, since it was flatly contradicted by Scripture. As a result, the question of how human sin might occur was a pressing one for Christian writers. Moreover, it is clear that, within the philosophical tradition, outright condemnation was far from being the only possible reaction to those perceived to be acting in an immoral way.

It is significant, therefore, that the emphasis throughout Eusebius’ works remains very heavily on the punishment of wrongdoers, including those he presents as acting at the instigation of demons. For instance, Eusebius suggests in the *VC* and *LC* that those of Constantine’s imperial predecessors who persecuted Christians were in some way enslaved to demons, surely implying that they must

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788 Gill, ‘The Body’s Fault?’, 62, citing Plato *Prot.* 345d-e; *Gorg.* 509e; *Laws* 731c, 734b.
791 Ibid. 156.
792 Chappell, *Aristotle and Augustine*, 177-78.
793 LC 5.3; VC 1.13.3.
lack the freedom necessary for προαιρεσις. Similarly, he frequently presents these figures, and others he felt to be in the power of demons as acting irrationally, or as in the grip of a form of madness,\textsuperscript{794} again apparently denying them one of the necessary conditions of προαιρεσις. Yet this did not prevent him describing in graphic detail some of the punishments supposedly inflicted on these people as a consequence of their actions.\textsuperscript{795} Since Eusebius held that these punishments came directly from God, he presumably felt them to be entirely justified, meaning that he must still have considered these people to be to a large degree responsible for their actions. It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, if not necessarily for Constantine, the suggestion of external demonic influence was not enough to remove responsibility from the human wrongdoer. We must therefore ask how Eusebius was able to reconcile his evident belief in the culpability of his human sinners with the suggestion that they were not acting entirely independently.

First, it is essential to note that, for Eusebius, the demonic threat to humankind did not consist solely or even primarily in the kind of demonic possession which he believed could be cured through exorcism. The gospels famously contain various accounts of Jesus performing an exorcism to free a man from the control of demons.\textsuperscript{796} Here the possessed man is not presented as being to blame for his predicament; he is not punished or held to account for his actions whilst under demonic control. Rather, on being released from the demons he appears to have returned to his true state, and his reaction is one of gratitude. This kind of demonic attack therefore involves causing immediate harm to a person,

\textsuperscript{794} HE 7.31.1, 10.8.9-10; VC 1.45.2-3; LC 7.7, 9.13; SC 13.6; Theoph. 1.78, 2.1; PE 4.17.3.
\textsuperscript{795} VC 1.57.2, 1.58.4-59.1; HE 8.16.3-5.
\textsuperscript{796} Matthew 8:28-34; Mark 5:1-20; Luke 8:26-33.
who is depicted as a victim of the demons. This idea that bad demons might bring physical harm in the form of sickness or natural disasters was also shared with non-Christians. Eusebius was undoubtedly familiar with this view of demons, and we can find echoes of the gospel exorcism stories in his own works. Eusebius even suggests that exorcisms using Jesus’ name to drive out demons continued to be effective in his own time.

Similarly, in his discussion of oracles in the DE, Eusebius appears to suggest that some of those making oracular predictions may have fallen so completely under the influence of demons that they were ‘like a corpse’ (οἷα νεκρὸν) and were no longer capable of acting for themselves. Such cases, however, are extremely unusual in Eusebius. Even in this case, Eusebius was making a point about the fallibility of pagan oracles, rather than about the nature of the demonic threat in general. Moreover, Eusebius suggests that the name of μαντεία given by the Greeks to this state indicates that it was ‘like a madness’ (ὡς πέτο τινὰ μανίαν). In the suggestion that μαντεία may be comparable to, but is not identical with μανία, it is clear that Eusebius believed that madness could also take other forms. Thus, when Eusebius describes those he believed to be in the power of demons as mad or irrational, he would not necessarily have had in mind the kind of complete demonic possession outlined here or in the gospel exorcism stories. In fact, overall, Eusebius’ concern about the demonic threat appears to have focused less on this kind of complete possession than on a more insidious form of attack, which, in leaving

797 For example: Porph., De Abst. 2.40.1.
798 For example: PE 5.17.13; CI 95.18-19.
799 CH 4.2.
801 Ibid.
human responsibility intact, posed a threat not only to the present well-being of humankind, but also to its future salvation.

Eusebius rarely presents demons as in any way coercing their human victims. Demons are associated with trickery and deceit, but there is little suggestion of force – an omission which is of considerable importance in maintaining human responsibility. For Eusebius, demonic influence is most often characterised in terms of πλάνη and ἀπάτη, both of which meant ‘error’ or ‘deceit’. In particular, Eusebius suggests that demons used their limited powers to create the false impression that they could predict the future, or cure diseases, thereby tricking people into worshipping them, rather than the true God. They are not shown as forcing people to worship them, but adopt more subtle tactics instead. In fact, Eusebius is so far from suggesting that demons compel people to act that he even argues that some humans might at times be capable of coercing demons. Discussing the practice of magic, Eusebius claims that some demons may be ‘dragged down and constrained by vulgar men’. When this happens, the demons are said to be acting ‘by force and necessity’ (βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ). Eusebius raises this point in order to argue that such demons are not truly divine, rather than as part of a broader discussion of responsibility, and he therefore does not elaborate on how blame for any wickedness might be apportioned in such a case. Nonetheless, it suggests that, for Eusebius, in spite of humans’ ontological inferiority, the demons

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802 See, for example: ἀπάτη: PE 4.21.6, 5.2.1, 6.6.3, 6.11.82, 7.10.15, 7.16.10; DE 9.14.7; SC 13.6; HE 7.17.1; CI 130.21. πλάνη: PE 4.14.10, 4.15.6, 6.6.3, 6.11.82; DE 4.9.8, 5.4.2, 6.20.12, 9.1.7; SC 16.3; CI 107.7; 263.6-7; 266.5; 273.10-11; HE 7.17.1; Fr.Luc., PG 24.553.25; CPs, PG 23.821.6.
803 PE 5.2.1; VC 3.56.1.
804 PE 5.9.10: ὅτις τυχόντον ἄνθρωποις ὑποσύρεσθαι καθέλκεσθαι...
805 PE 5.9.13.
806 PE 5.9.12.
did not necessarily have the power to coerce people into sin. Yet this should not be seen as decreasing the severity of the demonic threat; rather, it is surely their failure to compel humans that makes demons so dangerous. External compulsion would have removed one of the necessary conditions of προαίρεσις, and thus have removed human responsibility for sin. With that human responsibility intact, on the other hand, demons could not only torment people in this life, but might also lead them to act in a manner that would jeopardise their ultimate salvation.

Rather than compelling people to serve them, it seems that Eusebius believed that demons acted on existing human weaknesses in order to lure people into sin. In the PE, Eusebius agrees with Porphyry’s suggestion that wicked demons ‘excite the desires of men’ (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκκαίειν), in order to encourage people to follow them. Rather than implanting into people a wickedness which is not already there, it would seem that demons take advantage of natural human weaknesses, such as the inclination of the inferior body towards passion, in order to incite people to sin. This idea is reflected in one of Eusebius’ most detailed descriptions of how a soul might fall into the power of demons, where the emphasis is again very strongly on the role of passions in leading to wickedness. In his speech on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius describes how ‘by the envy and jealousy of the evil-loving demon, it [the soul] became of its self-determined choice a lover of passion and a lover of evil.’ Immediately below, Eusebius shows how this fallen soul was then subjected to still more demonic attacks, as ‘a destructive demon and savage

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807 PE 4.21.6; Cf. Porph. De Abst. 2.40.3.
808 PE 6.6.35.
809 10.4.57: ἀλλὰ γάρ φθόνῳ καὶ ζήλῳ τοῦ φιλοπονήσαντος φιλοπαθῆς καὶ φιλοπόνηρος ἐξ αὐτεξουσίου αἰρέσεως γενομένη...
mental beasts... light a fire beneath it with their passions, as if burning it with the missiles of their own wickedness’.  Demons have a role to play in encouraging wickedness and vice, but Eusebius is careful to stress that this encouragement does not remove human responsibility, by pointing out that the choice remains ‘self-determined’ (αὐτεξουσίος). For Eusebius the demonic threat therefore seems to involve exploiting a person’s existing weaknesses in order to lead them to make a flawed choice for which they must then bear responsibility.

This is reflected in Eusebius’ description of the ‘savage beasts’ which attack the fallen soul in his speech on the Church at Tyre as νοητός. Eusebius’ frequent association of demons with wild beasts makes it clear that by ‘savage beasts’ he is again referring to demons. His use of the word νοητός suggests that he may have held a view of demonic influence similar to that found earlier in the works of Origen. For Eusebius, things which were νοητός were incorporeal and rational, associated with the mind rather than with the physical senses. This therefore corresponds to Eusebius’ claim that demons mount ‘invisible’ attacks, and further fixes these attacks in a mental or intellectual, rather than a physical sphere.

This is reminiscent of Origen’s suggestion that demons generate wicked thoughts to encourage people into sin. Yet Origen is clear that this external influence does not remove human responsibility. Drawing on the Stoic idea of ‘first movements’, in which it was held that a person must choose to assent to an initial

810 HE 10.4.58: ἀλλὰ τις φθοροποιὸς δαίμων καὶ θήρες ἄγεινος νοητοί, οἱ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν οἷα πεπερασμένοις τῆς οἰκὸς κακίας βέλεσιν αὐτὴν ἐξυφάσαντες...
811 HE 10.4.57.
812 AS, for instance, at VC 1.49.1; HE 10.4.14; Theoph. 3.13, 3.55. See the discussion above, p. 133-34.
813 PE 11.7.1, 11.9.3.
814 LC 7.1-2.
815 On Origen, see: Sorabji, Emotion, 346-47, citing Orig. De Princ. 3.2.4.
impression from outside before it could become a full internal emotion, or passion. Origen insists that such thoughts are only ‘an inducement, provoking us either to good or to evil’. According to Origen, it is quite possible for people to ‘throw the vicious suggestions away from us’. Although Eusebius does not explore this issue in the same depth as Origen, given his familiarity with Origen’s works, he would undoubtedly have been aware of this idea. In his suggestion that the demonic threat is concentrated mainly in mental, rather than physical attacks, Eusebius appears to be echoing this idea. Temptation and trickery, rather than compulsion, lie at the heart of Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic threat, thus leaving human responsibility intact. Nevertheless, the process that Eusebius is describing in these passages from the speech on the Church at Tyre still refers to a soul in which the conditions for προαιρεσις are met: the soul is both rational, and it is able to act independently. It is only once this initial choice has been made that the soul then falls more fully under the power of demons. As a result, this description tells us little about how Eusebius felt human responsibility might be maintained even in those cases where a soul is said to be entirely in the power of demons.

It was due in large part to the significance which he attached to this initial προαιρεσις of wickedness that Eusebius was able to maintain the responsibility even of those people he saw as enslaved to, or acting irrationally under the

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816 On Stoic ‘first movements’, see Sorabji, Emotion, 66-75; on the adaptation of these ideas by early Christian thinkers, particularly Origen and Evagrius Ponticus, see ibid. 343-71.  
817 Orig. De Princ. 3.2.4: …incitamentum provocans nos uel ad bona uel ad mala, in Rufinus’ Latin translation.  
818 ibid.: …abiceret nobis prauas suggestiones…  
819 HE 10.4.55-56.  
820 HE 10.4.57.
influence of demons. This emerges most clearly from some of Eusebius’ comments in the VC and LC. Even while describing Constantine’s non-Christian predecessors as the slaves of demons, Eusebius is in fact subtly presenting them as partners in their own enslavement. At LC 5.3, Eusebius suggests that a non-Christian ruler would have ‘stamped (τετυπωμένος) on his soul (τη αυτου φυχι) numberless falsely drawn icons of demons’, and thereby have ‘attached himself to numberless embittered masters’ (ὁ μυρίους καθ’ έαυτού πικρους δεσπότας ἐφειλκυσμένος). Here, the participles used – τετυπωμένος from τυπόω, ‘to stamp, form, or engrave’, and ἐφειλκυσμένος from ἔλκω, ‘to draw or drag’ – are both given in the middle voice. Since the middle voice generally carried the sense of a reflexive action – that is of an action performed on or for oneself – the use of this voice here gives greater agency in this process to the unnamed rulers than the use of the plain active participle would have done. The implication is that these rulers were actively involved in bringing about their own enslavement to demons – they have effectively handed themselves over to the demons. In the case of ἐφειλκυσμένος, this is further reinforced by the use of the reflexive pronoun ἐαυτοῦ (himself).

Similarly, when describing Constantine’s predecessors in the VC, Eusebius claims that ‘by means of the mix-up of the evils of lawless idolatry, they first enslaved themselves and afterwards all of their subjects to the errors of wicked demons’ (και οἱ μὲν συγχύσει κακῶν εἰδωλολατρείας ἐκθέσμου σφάς αὐτοῦς πρότερον κάπετα τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἀπαντας πονηρῶν δαμαμῶν πλάναις

821 πῶς δ’ ἂν τὸ μύμημα τῆς μοναρχικῆς εξουσίας οἰός τε ἂν εἰη θέρειν ὁ μυρίας ἐφειλκυσμέναις δαμαμῶν εἰκόνας τή αὐτοῦ φυχή τετυπωμέναις; πῶς δ’ ἄρχον καὶ τῶν ἀλών κυρίως ὁ μυρίας καθ’ έαυτοῦ πικροὺς δεσπότας ἐφειλκυσμένος...
822 Lunn-Rockliffe has highlighted the need to pay greater attention to grammatical agency in early Christian discussions of agency and sin, particularly in relation to the devil’s fall: ‘Diabolical Problem’.
κατεδουλοῦντο...). Once again, the verb – κατεδουλοῦντο – is given in the middle voice, providing the same sense of an action performed to or upon oneself. These emperors are thus also shown as participating in their own enslavement; they are not passive victims of the demons. It would seem, therefore, that even those humans who were enslaved to demons must bear some of the responsibility for their situation, and thus for their subsequent actions, since their enslavement was not involuntary or imposed on them from outside. Rather, Eusebius stresses that they made an initial choice to put themselves into the power of demons. Whether or not their freedom to act, and even their rationality, was compromised thereafter, their initial choice of wickedness had met the conditions of responsible προαίρεσις.

Thus, even in cases where Eusebius presents his human wrongdoers as having fallen entirely under the influence of demons, he is not removing their responsibility, but presenting almost a partnership of wickedness, in which the human as much as the demonic agents have chosen to participate. Whether or not Eusebius would have agreed that such people deserved pity, he certainly felt that they also merited punishment, since, in his opinion, responsibility occurred at the moment of the initial προαίρεσις of wickedness. In this way, Eusebius was able to maintain the justice of divine punishments directed even against those he held to be under the influence of demons.

Escaping Demonic Influence

For Eusebius, the fact that human moral responsibility was maintained, even among those whom he considered to be acting under the influence of demons, was key to

823 VC 1.13.3.
the nature of the demonic threat. Rather than simply causing harm in the present life, demons were also able to lead people to act in a way that, because of human προαίρεσις, would jeopardise their salvation in the next life. As a result, from Eusebius’ perspective, it would have been crucial for people to secure themselves against this demonic threat. As scholars have recognised, many early Christians believed that their faith provided them with protection from the attacks of hostile demons. Indeed, this belief is said to have formed part of the new faith’s appeal.

To an extent, Eusebius clearly shared this view. There is no doubt that he held the power of the Christian God to be much greater than that of the demons, and he makes it clear that invoking the name of Christ could be used to drive out and destroy demons in cases of demonic possession. However, when it came to the more insidious and ultimately more harmful demonic challenge to human salvation, Eusebius’ works suggest that simple, passive acceptance of the Christian faith was not, on its own, enough to ensure a person’s safety. While Eusebius was adamant that God would support and protect his followers, he also implied that people must somehow earn this protection. For Eusebius, ensuring security from demonic influence required active engagement on the part of humankind, largely through the cultivation of virtue.

There remains, of course, a strong sense in Eusebius’ works that God could, and frequently would, intervene in earthly affairs in order to protect his followers from harm. After all, as several scholars have observed, the active involvement of

824 Ferguson, Demonology, 129; Martin, Inventing Superstition, 238.
825 Ferguson, Demonology, 129.
826 See, for example: PE 5.17.13.
827 CH 4.2.
God in the affairs of humankind was of considerable importance to Eusebius’ understanding of history. While this involvement is often seen in Eusebius’ works in the form of divine punishment of human wrongdoers, at times Eusebius also shows God acting in advance to protect the church and promote Christianity. In the HE, Eusebius suggests that the emperor Aurelian, on the point of initiating a persecution of the Christians, was prevented from doing so by ‘godly justice’ (θεία δίκη). Hence, it seems, Christians could expect their God to offer them some protection from their enemies.

Nevertheless, Eusebius makes it clear that this protection was conditional and could be removed at any point. In particular, it seems that it was only by maintaining high standards of virtue that people could hope to secure God’s protection. Describing the soul’s fall into wickedness and sin as part of his speech on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius notes how, once the soul had embraced passion and wickedness, ‘God withdrew from it such that it was deprived of a guardian’. At this point, deprived of the support of God, the soul is said to have fallen easily and completely under the influence of demons. By abandoning virtue, the soul had also lost God’s protection. This sense that divine protection was conditional upon the maintenance of high standards of behaviour is further reflected in Eusebius’ presentation of the persecution of the church. For a while, Eusebius suggests that the church was able to grow and prosper, since ‘no envy held it back,

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828 For example: Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 83; Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 168-89.
830 HE 7.30.21.
831 Ibid.
832 HE 10.4.57: …ὑπαναχωρήσαντος αὐτῆς τοῦ θείου ὡς ἀν ἔρημος προστάτου…
833 HE 10.4.57-8.
nor did some wicked demon malign it or hinder it with the plots of men, as long as
a divine and heavenly hand protected and watched over its own people, as a thing
that was indeed worthy’. However, when the standards of piety within the
church began to slip and Christians turned to ‘weakness and indolence’
(χαμότητα καὶ νοθώριαν), Eusebius declares that God removed his protection
and permitted the demonic and human enemies of the church to begin the
persecutions. For Eusebius, then, we can see that, both at the level of the
individual soul and on a broader scale for the entire church community, divine
protection was available only where it was merited. Simply to be a member of the
Christian church was not enough, unless one also abandoned such vices as passion,
laziness, and complacency.

It was therefore not sufficient, in Eusebius’ opinion, simply to rely on the
protection of God in order to secure oneself against the demonic threat. In order
both to earn this protection in the present life, and, just as importantly, to ensure
one’s salvation in the next life, a person needed to play an active role in resisting
demonic attacks. For Eusebius, these attacks took two main forms, each focusing on
a different way of straying from the path of salvation. In the DE, Eusebius identifies
two principal ways in which a person might put their salvation at risk: either by
embracing false doctrine, be it heresy or polytheism, or by adopting a vicious
lifestyle. Eusebius interprets the prophecy concerning the division of the Mount of
Olives at Zacharias 14:4, in which it was warned that the mountain would split in

834 HE 8.1.6: …οὐδεὶς ἄνειργεν θάνατος οὐδὲ τις δαίμων πονηρός οίος τε ἔνας τρίας οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπον ἐπιβολαίς κωλύειν, ἐς ὅσον η θεία καὶ οὐρανίως χεῖρ ἐσκεπεν τε καὶ ἔφροσει, οία δὴ ἄξιον ὄντα, τὸν ἐαυτῆς λαόν.
835 HE 8.1.7.
836 HE 8.1.7-9.
four directions, as representing ‘the cracks and heresies and ethical falling away in life which have happened and are still happening now within the church of Christ’.837 Two of these divisions, Eusebius suggests, represent ‘two types of behaviour in turn among those who fall off from the church – one which is mistaken in ethics and another which drops off from healthy and correct knowledge’.838 Later on, Eusebius reiterates this division of wickedness into two identifiable kinds, when he describes ‘two groups of unseen enemies and wicked demonic foes, waging war in various ways against the whole race of men, one of them always and in every place encouraging among men idolatry and false teachings in our doctrines, while the other is working towards the destruction of souls in their ethics’.839 In order to obtain salvation people would therefore need to combat demonic attacks on two fronts, by avoiding both moral and doctrinal error. While embracing the ‘orthodox’ Christian faith would surely have been enough in Eusebius’ view to avoid the latter fault, the equally important question of how virtue was to be achieved in the face of demonic encouragement of vice was considerably more difficult.

For Eusebius, it appears that the key to escaping demonic influence was the condition of a person’s soul. As we have seen, Eusebius believed demons to direct their attacks primarily against the rational human soul and he also suggested that it was the quality of a person’s soul that determined the kind of spiritual being that might be able to gain access to it. According to Eusebius, ‘it is not possible for them

837 DE 6.18.28: ...τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἑκκλησίας γενόμενα τε καὶ εἰσείς τούς γινόμενα σχέσιμα καὶ τὰς αἰρέσις τές τὴ ἠθικάς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀποτίωσεις...
838 DE 6.18.31: ...τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκκλησίας ἀποπυπτόντων δύο πάλιν δηλούσθαι τρόπους, τῶν τε κατὰ τὸ ἠθος ἀμαράντων καὶ τῶν τῆς υγιός καὶ ὀρθοδόξους γνώσεις ἐξολοθραίνοντα...
839 DE 7.1.103: ...δύο στήριξιν ἀκήρουν ἐχθρῶν καὶ πολεμίων δαιμόνων πονηρῶν, τοῦ πάνω ἀνθρώπων γένος διαφόρως πολεμοῦσαν, ἐν μὲν τῶν τάς ἐν ἀνθρώπως ενεργοῦσαν οἴα καὶ πάντοτε εἰσολοθραίας καὶ τὰς ἐν δόγματι ψευδοδοξίας, θάτερον δὲ τῶν ἐν ἠθεῇ ψυχῶν διαφθοράν κατεργαζομένων...
[the demons] to draw near to a pure soul on account of the dissimilarity between them. By contrast, a soul which has been ‘cleansed of every mark and all defilement, and ordered both by moderation and justice and by other virtues’ would be ready to receive a ‘godly spirit’ (Θείου πνεύματος). As a result, the best defence against the temptations and deceits of the demons was a pure soul.

In outlining how a person might set about achieving purity of soul, Eusebius’ dichotomy between the body and the soul is once again very much in evidence. Eusebius argues that, while the body ‘rejoices according to nature in all pleasures’, the προαίρεσις, ‘out of a desire for virtue, is glad of a life of hard work and roughness’. Bodily nature is thus shown as incompatible with the attainment of virtue, which belongs to the προαίρεσις of the soul. In order to achieve virtue then, the soul must overcome ‘the nature of the body’ (τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως), with its desires for sex, food, and drink. Once again, this is a matter of προαίρεσις – a person must independently (αὐθεκουσίως) choose to heed ‘ascetic exhortations’ (ἀσκητικὰς προτροπὰς) towards ‘abstinence from food’ (ἀσιτίαις) and ‘steadfastness’ (καρτερίαις), ignoring the needs and temptations of the body. For Eusebius, then, attaining virtue was the concern of προαίρεσις, and, as such, a matter of personal responsibility. A virtuous lifestyle began with controlling the body, and evidently necessitated self-discipline and moderation.

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840 PE 4.21.4: καθαρὰ γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι ψυχῇ πλησιάζειν διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον...
841 PE 5.15.4: ...παντὸς ύπουκο καὶ τάσης κηλίδος κεκαθαρμένη σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς κεκοσμημένη.
842 PE 5.15.5.
843 PE 6.6.35.
844 PE 6.6.36:
845 Ibid.: ...ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις λόγοις σωφροσύνην αναπειθεῖσα καὶ τινὰς ἀσκητικὰς προτροπὰς αὐθεκουσίως αγαπήσασα, πολημέρους ἀσιτίας καὶ καρτερίας παρακρούεται τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν, ἀρετὴν λογισμὸν κρίνασα τούτο καὶ ἔλομένη.
Resisting the temptations of the body was, however, only one of the challenges facing those who wished to achieve virtue; there was also the problem of malign external influence to contend with. As we have seen, Eusebius felt this too could tempt people away from a life of virtue. In order to combat this, Eusebius advocates practising ‘philosophy’ (φιλοσοφεῖν). Eusebius does not immediately offer any explanation here of what such a practice might involve; however, by taking account of a range of statements from elsewhere in the PE, we can see that Eusebius regarded the practice of philosophy as a combination of pious contemplation of the divine with ascetic self-discipline. Later in the PE, Eusebius notes that some rational souls – those of the demons – succumbed to ‘the opposite of the good’ because of their ‘neglect’ (ὀλιγωρία) of their ‘study of the greatest one’. Since Eusebius had earlier grouped together ‘philosophy’ (φιλοσοφία) and ‘piety’ (εὐσέβεια) as two of the valuable pursuits which would have no place in a universe governed by fate, we may conclude that he considered philosophy to include in large measure the contemplation of the divine.

It would, however, be wrong to suggest that Eusebius considered philosophy to be simply an intellectual pursuit. Towards the end of PE 6.6, Eusebius notes that Christian converts value a philosophy that is not comprised of doctrines (λόγοις), but of actions (ἔργων). When taken together with his statements earlier in the same chapter about the need for people to heed ‘ascetic exhortations’ in order to
resist bodily temptation, this statement suggests that, for Eusebius, passive acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Christian God was not, on its own, enough to provide effective protection from malign influence. Rather, a combination of active contemplation of the divine with self-discipline and personal moderation was required.

This sense that an active and engaged form of piety was particularly to be valued can be seen in Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine. Eusebius’ pious emperor prays regularly, consults theological advisers, and takes a lively interest in matters of theological significance. By contrast, Eusebius has a low opinion of those recent converts at Constantine’s court who appear to him to be less sincere in their faith. Moreover, we know from the DE that Eusebius considered the ascetic lifestyle to be of considerable merit. At DE 1.8, Eusebius describes how Christians have been instructed in two distinct forms of piety – a more advanced form, in which all worldly ties are renounced, and a slightly lower form, in which involvement in worldly pursuits such as marriage and politics is permitted, as long as some time is still set aside for the study of the divine. For Eusebius, it seems that the maintenance of virtue was an active process, requiring, at the very least, considered engagement with Christian teaching and, as far as possible on top of this, the self-moderation of an ascetic lifestyle.

For Eusebius, then, resisting the attacks of demons was an on-going task, calling for constant vigilance. Indeed, he even warns his readers that ‘it is necessary

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851 PE 6.6.35.
852 VC 4.22.1.
853 VC 3.1.5.
854 For example: VC 2.63.1, 4.29.1-5, 4.41.2-4.
855 VC 4.54.2.
856 DE 1.8.1-4.
throughout everything to be watchful against the fraudulent wicked arts’ of demons and the devil.\textsuperscript{857} In combating this threat, Eusebius evidently felt that the cultivation of virtue had a large part to play. For this, however, people largely had to take responsibility themselves. They could not rest complacent in the assumption of God’s protection. Moreover, it is notable that Eusebius’ understanding of how virtue might be attained appears to involve more than one rather circular process. For Eusebius, virtue and purity of soul are the best defence against demons. Yet, in order to build this defence, it is first necessary to resist the attacks of demons by living virtuously. Similarly, God can offer protection from demons, but will do so only for those who have already successfully resisted demonic attempts to draw them into wickedness. As a result, it seems as though virtue for Eusebius must be almost a self-sustaining state. The same would appear to be true of vice: the fallen soul of \textit{HE} 10.4.57-58 loses the protection of God because it has chosen wickedness over virtue. This then leaves it fully under the influence of the demons, thereby encouraging further wickedness.

This sense that virtue and vice could be self-perpetuating might appear to suggest that Eusebius held the view that a person’s moral disposition was essentially fixed and unchanging. This is certainly how Drake reads Eusebius’ presentation of character in the \textit{VC}.\textsuperscript{858} Such a position would also reflect a view common to many schools of ancient philosophy, in which a state, at least of true virtue, once achieved could not then be lost.\textsuperscript{859} However, the events of Eusebius’

\textsuperscript{857} \textit{PE} 7.10.15: …χρὴναι διὰ παντὸς ἐγκηδεύειν πρὸς τὰς τοῦ δηλωθέντος κακοτέχνους ἐκδοχυγίας.
\textsuperscript{858} Drake, ‘What Eusebius Knew’, 34.
\textsuperscript{859} Frede, \textit{A Free Will}, 29.
lifetime would surely have made a static view of moral character difficult to maintain. The persecutions alone would have provided numerous examples of people renouncing their faith, thereby in Eusebius’ view moving from a virtuous state to one of wickedness and jeopardising their salvation in the process.\footnote{HE 8.2.3. Here, although he refuses to dwell on them, Eusebius does make passing reference to those who had ‘completely shipwrecked their salvation’ (τῶν εἰς ἀπον τῆς σωτηρίας νεκταρικάς) in the persecutions, showing that he was fully aware of this difficulty.} Sure enough, the overall impression created by a range of examples in Eusebius’ historical and biographical works contradicts the notion that the human character must remain permanently set in either virtue or vice. In the \textit{HE} in particular, we find examples of people turning, not merely from vice to virtue, which non-Christian philosophy had been prepared to accept,\footnote{Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 470, 478-82.} but crucially also from virtue to vice.\footnote{For example: vice to virtue: \textit{HE} 8.17.1-2, describing Galerius’ decision to end the persecution; virtue to vice: \textit{HE} 10.8.1-19, describing Licinius.} In bringing about these transformations, Eusebius implies that external influence, either divine or demonic, was heavily involved. Despite his ideas about how virtue might be maintained, it therefore seems that Eusebius did not in fact believe virtue to be a secure or a permanent state.

The basis of Drake’s reading of Eusebius’ view of the human character is, at best, fragile. It is built on little more than the belief that most ancient writers ‘had an essentially static conception of personality and character’, and on the claim that no alternative evidence has been put forward to suggest that Eusebius diverged from this supposed ancient consensus.\footnote{Drake, ‘What Eusebius Knew’.} However, as Gill has shown, the idea that ancient writers had an entirely static view of character is misleading, and arose from
a misunderstanding of the nature of ancient biography. Gill suggests that, while many ancient biographies are largely silent on the process by which a personality might develop, the notion that character was constantly being formed, even throughout adulthood, was in fact central to their purpose. For Plutarch, for instance, one reason to write biography was to provide examples, either to emulate or to avoid, in order that the reader might improve their own character. Rather than reflecting the view that character was fixed, Gill suggests that the failure of ancient biographers to engage with questions of character development was a result instead of the desire of these writers to present their audience with fully formed exemplars on which moral judgements might then be passed. Moreover, as Gill points out, the idea that people in the ancient world had little idea that character might be subject to change is at odds with the concerns of much philosophical writing, in which considerable attention is paid to questions of moral and ethical improvement. Thus it seems that ancient writers were quite comfortable with the idea that a character might develop from a state of vice to one of virtue.

Admittedly, Drake’s assertion that Eusebius believed character to be fixed is based not on examples of wickedness, but rather on the virtuous example of Constantine. The notion that a person who had truly achieved virtue might have been capable of falling back into vice was undoubtedly considerably more

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865 Ibid. 476.
868 Ibid. 469. Alexander of Aphrodisias in fact criticises his determinist opponents for writing works designed to bring about improvement in their readers, since if a person’s actions were predetermined by fate then there would be no point in trying to change their character: De fato 18. Alexander clearly expected his audience to agree that the purpose of such works was to bring about change through persuasion, suggesting that a belief that people were capable at least of change for the better must have been fairly widespread.
problematic for ancient thinkers. Many schools of philosophy maintained that a virtuous person could only act virtuously. Hence once a person had achieved virtue, it was no longer possible for them to return to a state of wickedness or ignorance. As a result, Gill acknowledges that some—although by no means all—ancient biographers, most notably Plutarch, were troubled by examples of ‘degeneration of character in adult life’, because this conflicted with their understanding of what it meant to be good, rather than because they considered character to be permanently fixed. Even so, Drake’s focus on the VC is hardly conducive to drawing a balanced picture of Eusebius’ views on character. As has been widely recognised, Eusebius was not seeking to provide an accurate representation of what he saw as Constantine’s personality in the VC, but rather to produce a paradigm of a virtuous Christian ruler. There was therefore good reason for Eusebius to present Constantine as consistently virtuous, regardless of his views on whether or not personalities might change. It is therefore necessary to look further than the example of Constantine in order properly to appreciate Eusebius’ understanding of character. Moving beyond the VC, it becomes clear that Eusebius did acknowledge the possibility of a character changing from a state of virtue to one of vice.

The career of Licinius, outlined in the HE and VC, provides Eusebius’ most striking example of a character perceived to have turned from virtue to wickedness. Here we see a figure, initially lauded by Eusebius in book 9 of the HE as the

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870 Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 479-82, quotation at 482.
871 For example: Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 195; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 12; Cameron, ‘Construction’, 164.
virtuous partner of Constantine and pious champion of God, transformed into a
demon-worshipping persecutor. Of course, Licinius’ complex portrayal in the HE
owes much to the changing circumstances in which this work was written –
Licinius’ defeat by Constantine made it politically inexpedient for positive
references to Licinius to remain unaltered. Even so, Eusebius’ presentation of
Licinius’ change for the worse is consistent between the VC and HE, and
demonstrates how he may have believed such a change of character could occur.
In both works, Licinius’ turn towards wickedness is characterised above all as a
descent into madness and irrationality, thereby associating him with demons,
which are also frequently characterised in this way. Moreover, in the VC, Eusebius
presents the conflict between Constantine and Licinius almost as a conflict between
their rival deities – with Constantine’s Christian God triumphing over Licinius’
demonic spirits. As such, it appears that for Eusebius, Licinius’ change of
character involved exchanging the beneficial influence of God for the harmful
influence of demons.

Of course it could be argued that, rather than representing a dramatic change
of character, this was simply an example of a consistently wicked character finally
being revealed. Such a theme was not unknown to ancient biography and can be
found in both Suetonius’ and Tacitus’ treatment of Tiberius. Eusebius does in fact
suggest that Licinius was capable of deception in his dealings with Constantine, in

872 HE 9.10.1-3; 9.11.8.
873 HE 10.8.2-19.
874 On the composition of this work, see above, p. 46-51.
875 HE 9.9.1, 9.9.12, 10.8.2, 10.8.9, 10.9.2; VC 1.50.2, 1.56.1-2.
876 VC 2.4.1-2.10.2. As M.S. Williams has also previously noted: Authorised Lives in Early Christian
an attempt to disguise his true intentions. However, the idea of previously hidden wickedness does not sit comfortably with Eusebius’ earlier suggestion that God had supported Licinius to his military victories. It might, in Eusebius’ view, have been possible for a person to conceal their vicious character from other people, but surely not from God. Indeed, according to Eusebius it was God who had revealed Licinius’ deception to Constantine. Moreover, when describing Licinius’ transformation, Eusebius states that he ‘left off the imitation of the good and pursued instead the depravity and wicked ways of the impious tyrants’. This not only indicates a definite change, but also suggests that this change occurred as a result of swapping the influence of virtuous external προαίρεσεις for wicked external influence, in a manner consistent with that outlined by Eusebius at PE 6.6.42. This sense that Licinius underwent a definite change of character is echoed at VC 2.1.1, where Eusebius describes how Licinius ‘threw himself down to the depth of those who fight against God’. This phrase, with its idea of movement, similarly suggests an unmistakable change. In the case of Licinius, Eusebius therefore presents a example of a character changing from virtue to vice, largely as a result of a change in the external forces influencing it.

Thus it seems that, for Eusebius, even the most dramatic change of character could be explained. Crucially, it appears that by allowing a role for external influence, particularly demonic influence, in shaping people’s choices, Eusebius was able to provide an explanation for a phenomenon that classical philosophers had

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878 HE 10.8.5.
879 HE 9.10.3.
880 HE 10.8-6.
881 HE 10.8.2: …μιμήσεως μὲν τῆς τῶν καλῶν ἀπελμιπάντο, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἁσεβῶν τυχάννων μοχθηρίας ἐξῆλθο τὴν κακοποτίαν…
882 …ἐπὶ τῶν θεομάχων βραδὸν κατεκρημνίζετο…
struggled to understand – the transformation of a previously good character into a state of wickedness. While this was something of a departure from classical views of virtue, Eusebius was not alone among early Christian writers in suggesting that goodness was not a permanent state, at least for humans. Tatian had insisted that only God was unchangeably good, while the humans, angels and demons he had created, possessing a changeable nature, were left free to choose between good and evil. Origen had similarly insisted that people were not permanently set by nature in a state of either goodness or wickedness. Thus, for Origen, as for Eusebius, even a soul which had reached the peak of virtue was still at risk of falling back into wickedness.

The implications of this are significant. For Eusebius, no one, even the most virtuous, could ever secure complete immunity from the attacks of the demons. At no point was salvation guaranteed. However, while this might seem a rather pessimistic view, other examples in Eusebius’ works present a more optimistic picture. While the malign external influence of the demons provided a constant challenge to the virtuous, Eusebius also suggests that the beneficent influence of God might guide people towards virtue. As a result, a person need not be trapped, even in a state of the deepest sin, forever.

This emerges most clearly from Eusebius’ presentation of the deaths of some of the persecuting emperors in the HE. In Eusebius’ more historical works, particularly the HE, there is a strong connection drawn between a person’s end and

883 Frede, A Free Will, 120, citing Tatian, Orat. 7.1.
885 Orig. Comm. in Matt. 10.11.67-78. See: Frede, A Free Will, 121-22.
the standard of their behaviour.\textsuperscript{886} Constantine’s father Constantius, an emperor who, in Eusebius’ reports, favoured the Christians, is the only member of the imperial college permitted a peaceful and pain-free death in the \textit{HE}.\textsuperscript{887} The deaths of his imperial colleagues who are said to have persecuted Christians are, by contrast, preceded by extreme physical suffering.\textsuperscript{888} Yet in dwelling on the obvious, graphic punishments of the persecutors, it is easy to overlook the fact that in at least two cases, the emperors involved had ended the persecutions before their deaths. Both Galerius and Maximin are said to have issued edicts in favour of Christians shortly before their deaths. In both cases, this final change of heart is reported to have resulted in an immediate reward. Maximin, we are told, ‘suffered less than he should have suffered’, in spite of the considerable physical pain he is supposed to have endured.\textsuperscript{889} Meanwhile Galerius, whose divinely sent punishment is said to have encouraged his change of heart, was ‘at once, although not for long, delivered from his sufferings’.\textsuperscript{890} His reward was to be relieved of his pain, albeit through death. For these two figures, it appears that a single, virtuous προαίρεσις has been rewarded, although it is not enough to cancel out completely the punishment for their many, earlier wicked προαίρεσεις. In Eusebius’ view, each προαίρεσις, whether good or bad, mattered. Each would be recognised and duly rewarded or


\textsuperscript{887} \textit{HE} 8.App.4.

\textsuperscript{888} \textit{HE} 8.App.1-4.

\textsuperscript{889} \textit{HE} 9.10.13: ...’ἐπεὶ τὸν ἢ παθεῖν αὐτῶν χρῆν δήπου πάθων...

\textsuperscript{890} \textit{HE} 8.App.1: ...αὐτίκα καὶ οὐκ εἰς μακρὸν τῶν ἀληθιοῦν ἀπαλλαγεῖς...
punished by God. By changing their προαιρεσεις, a person might thus free themselves from sin.

Eusebius’ belief in the value of every choice for determining a person’s path is further reflected in his attitude towards those Christians he would have considered to have ‘lapsed’ from the faith. In the light of his insistence on the punishment of wrongdoers, it might appear surprising that Eusebius is tolerant of Christians who had recanted their faith during the persecutions, but who had later repented.

Discussing the Novatianist schism of the third century, in which the followers of Novatus had refused to admit such Christians back into the congregation, Eusebius is highly critical of the Novatianist stance, calling it ‘brother-hating and very anti-human’. Instead he applauds those ‘orthodox’ bishops who excommunicated Novatus and declared that any lapsed Christians who repented should be welcomed back into the church. Eusebius was not, of course, condoning their sins, but he insisted that these people should be ‘healed and treated by the medicines of repentance’. For Eusebius, then, repentance could have healing properties, helping to undo the damage caused by previous sins. Since each individual decision mattered, a person could change at any point.

Moreover, the idea that people were capable of changing for the better appears to have been central to Eusebius’ understanding of the purpose of divine punishments. For Eusebius, the punishments sent by God to the wicked were not simply retributive, but, far more importantly, corrective. Eusebius insists that God cannot create any kind of evil, and that even his punishments, which might appear

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891 HE 6.43.2: ...τῇ μυσαδέλφῳ καὶ ἀπανθρωπωτάτῃ γνώμῃ...
892 Ibid.: ...ίασθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῖς τῆς μετανοίας φαρμάκοις.
harmful, are in fact intended ‘not for the harm of those being punished, but for their benefit and use’. As a result, Eusebius likens God’s punishments to a doctor’s treatment of his patients – he may offer ‘painful and sharp treatments’ but these are ultimately intended to cure the patient. This can be seen in the example of Galerius, whose divinely sent physical suffering is eventually said to have led him towards a more virtuous path, by causing him to end his persecution of the Christians.

Perhaps even more significant for Eusebius, however, was the role that such punishments might play in deterring future wrongdoing by others. Eusebius suggests that the difference between the deaths of virtuous emperors like Constantine’s father Constantius and those of the persecutors demonstrates the way in which God will reward virtue and vice. More than once, he criticises Licinius for failing to take heed of the many examples of the punishment of persecutors. It seems that, for Eusebius, Licinius’ wickedness was compounded by the fact that God had supplied him with many examples to guide him towards making virtuous choices, leaving little excuse for his failure to do so. Eusebius’ understanding of divine justice was thus underpinned by his belief that people were capable of moral improvement by improving the choices they made. For those who chose to follow it, Eusebius believed that God would provide guidance to help people to achieve virtue and salvation.

893 PE 13.3.39: ...οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβη τῶν τιμωρουμένων, ἐπ’ ὁφελεία ἔδε καὶ συμβέβηκεν...
894 Ibid.: ὡσπερ ἄν ἢτορός ἐπὶ σωτηρία τῶν κακῶν κακά νομίζοιτο προσφέρειν τὰς ἀλγείναις καὶ πικρὰς θεραπείαις.
895 HE 8.17.1.
896 VC 1.17.1.
897 HE 10.8.2; HE 10.8.9; VC 1.59.2.
The boundary between virtue and vice was thus a porous one for Eusebius. People did not possess a fixed nature or pre-determined character, but rather shaped their own path through the choices they made. Moreover, the significance of every single choice meant that, for Eusebius, virtue and vice were never permanently set. Yet in his understanding of how people might switch between these two opposing states, Eusebius did not only have room for human freedom of choice. While this was undoubtedly crucial in his view to maintaining human moral responsibility, he also assigned a prominent place to external influence. If wickedness for Eusebius was a partnership between humans and demons, then goodness was likewise a partnership between humans and the divine, whenever people welcomed God’s guidance and correction. In Eusebius’ understanding of salvation we therefore find a combination of God’s grace with human freedom and responsibility. Salvation might be dependent on a person achieving virtue in their own right, but Eusebius did not believe that God left people without any guidance on how that virtue was to be achieved.

Conclusions

Recognising the importance of προαιρεσις in Eusebius’ thought is crucial to understanding his views on moral responsibility. It was this concept that enabled him to absolve God of responsibility for the evil of the persecutions, allowing him to place the blame squarely with humankind instead. Moreover, rather than a cruel and merciless punishment, the persecutions thus become a generous and merciful remedy, which, thanks to people’s ability to change their προαιρεσις, can lead people back to salvation. Similarly, the notion of προαιρεσις helped to explain the
dramatic and troubling change of character seen in the figure of Licinius. For Eusebius, humankind’s freedom to exercise προαίρεσις meant that people could slip between states of virtue and vice. Eusebius has previously been characterised as an optimist as a result of his belief in human progress,⁸⁹⁸ and, to an extent, this assessment is justified. His message that, as a result of their free choice, even the most depraved sinners might attain redemption is certainly a positive one. Yet the associated idea that everyone, even the most virtuous, remains capable of falling back into sin as a result of this same free choice leaves little room for complacency or triumphalism.

For προαίρεσις was not only the key to salvation in Eusebius’ thought, it also lay at the centre of his conception of the demonic threat. Eusebius’ demonic threat did not focus primarily on physical or earthly harm, but rather on attempts to derail the progress of the church, and undermine human salvation. For Eusebius, it was προαίρεσις that made this aspect of the demonic threat possible. By allowing humans to be held responsible for their sins, even those committed as a result of external temptation or under malign influence, human προαίρεσις gave demons the opportunity to lead people to jeopardise their own salvation. Clearly, as Lyman recognised, Eusebius saw salvation as the result of co-operation between divine grace and human free choice,⁸⁹⁹ yet to focus only on this positive aspect of Eusebius’ understanding of moral responsibility risks distorting his views. Eusebius believed his audience to live in a world populated by a variety of spiritual forces, many of

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⁸⁹⁸ Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 123; Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 119.
⁸⁹⁹ Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 99.
which he saw as malevolent in intent. The risk of slipping into sin as a result of malign external influence was thus one that could not be ignored.

This understanding of the relationship between προαιρέσις and the demonic threat also helped to shape Eusebius’ ideas about Christian identity, and about the standards of behaviour required of those who wished to be identified as virtuous Christians. Given the importance which Eusebius attached to correct belief in securing salvation, membership of the ‘orthodox’ church would have been the first of these requirements. Yet, whilst it is clear that, for Eusebius, salvation could not be secured outside the body of the church, passive and unthinking adherence, even to orthodox doctrine, was not by itself enough either to indicate or to ensure a person’s virtue. In Eusebius’ view, the pursuit of virtue and hence of freedom from demonic influence was a struggle that must be undertaken at the level of the individual soul. In this, people would receive help, both from their God-given inclination towards goodness, and from the guidance which God supplied in the visible world through the administration of divine justice. They would also, however, face the challenge of demonic temptation. Membership of the church must be supplemented by the cultivation of a pious and virtuous lifestyle in order to ensure that people did not fall into the power of demons. Thus Christian identity for Eusebius was tied not merely to membership of the church community, but to the continual struggle against the demons, in which each individual soul had an important role to play.
CHAPTER V

DEMONIC ACTIVITY AND HISTORICAL PROGRESS

Eusebius’ great value to later historians arguably lies to a significant degree in his position as a witness to the dramatic religious and political changes of the early fourth century. Eusebius lived through periods of uneasy toleration for the Christian church, of direct persecution, and, finally, of official recognition and imperial patronage, and many of these changes are recorded in his works. Yet Eusebius’ presentation of these events is rarely straightforward. While the accusations of outright fraud levelled against Eusebius by earlier scholars like Jacob Burckhardt are somewhat unfair in seeking to judge Eusebius by the standards of later historiography, there can be no doubt that, as many scholars have noted, Eusebius’ attitude towards the developments of the period – particularly the political developments – was heavily shaped by his perception of how these events fitted into the broad sweep of history as a whole. According to Glen Chesnut, Eusebius used his ‘theory of history to justify both the power of the Roman state and the authority of the emperor’. More than this, however, Eusebius’ ideas about history also influenced his reading of the role of the church and its leaders and were closely linked to his understanding of how salvation might be achieved. Consequently, an understanding of Eusebius’ views on the nature, purpose and overall direction of history is essential to an accurate appreciation of his presentation of the events and leading figures of the Constantinian era.

Yet, despite long-standing interest in Eusebius’ ideas about history, there remain several substantial problems with the existing interpretations of his views on the subject. First and most serious is the fact that scholars, almost without exception, present Eusebius as a triumphant optimist, so dazzled by the prosperity of the church in his later life that he was led to unrestrained celebration of present political and religious circumstances. There is therefore a tendency to suggest that Eusebius saw the events of his lifetime as falling at the very end of history, and representing both its climax and pinnacle. In D.S. Wallace-Hadrill’s view, Eusebius felt that he stood at ‘the peak to which all human history had been moving’. However, this optimistic picture of Eusebius’ thought is somewhat undermined by the repeated appearance of hostile and threatening demons throughout a range of his works. Even in some of Eusebius’ latest and arguably most triumphalist works, such as the VC and later books of the HE, demonic activity continues to feature, yet scholars arguing for Eusebius’ triumphalism have so far failed to engage with such references to the demonic threat. When demons are restored to their proper place in Eusebius’ historical vision it becomes clear that this traditional portrayal of Eusebius as straightforwardly optimistic cannot be so easily maintained. As a result, our understanding of how he interprets the events of his own day also requires some refining.

903 Important monographs include: Chesnut, First Christian Histories; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques; Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian.
906 For example: VC 1.13.3, 1.49.1, 2.73.1, 3.55.2-3; HE 8.1.6, 8.14.5, 10.8.2.
Stemming from this first problem, there is a second, related difficulty, which is that some scholars have tended to try to distinguish between Eusebius’ view of the ‘Church’ and that of the ‘Empire’. Yet, as Drake has argued, drawing such a clear division between the two in this period is ‘dangerously and profoundly misleading’. Having made this distinction, they have disagreed about which of these bodies Eusebius supposedly held to be more important. Believing that Eusebius saw his own time as falling at the very end of history, several scholars have argued that he held a form of ‘realised eschatology’. This phrase, which is, of course, a modern imposition with no parallel in the ancient sources, is used to describe the idea that Eusebius believed God’s ‘kingdom of promise’ to have been already fulfilled – or ‘realised’ – in the present time. This is felt to be in conflict with more ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ eschatology, in which the promised kingdom is said to await the virtuous after the second coming of Christ and the last judgement.

Such a straightforward distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘realised’ eschatology is, however, difficult to maintain, particularly for the early centuries of

907 Hollerich, for instance, distinguishes between the ‘institutional church’ and the empire: Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 201.
909 The expression is used to describe Eusebius’ thought by: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 196-97, 201; by B.E. Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 77; by Martin, Inventing Superstition, 224; and, in German (‘realisierte Eschatologie’), by Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 253. It is not, however, exclusively used of Eusebius. Daley also uses the expression to refer to elements of the thought of Cyprian and desert fathers including Antony: The Hope, 43, 71.
910 Daley, The Hope, 78. This view of Eusebius’ eschatology is widespread, even where the precise expression ‘realised eschatology’ is not used. See, for example: H.-G. Opitz, ‘Euseb von Caesarea als Theologe’, Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 34 (1935), 14; Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 482-83; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 173, 187; Farina, L’impero, 83; G.H. Williams, ‘Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth-Century’, Church History 20:3 (1951), 17; and the discussion in Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 196-201.
911 For example: Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 188-89.
the current era. Daley’s survey of eschatological thought in the first five centuries CE highlights such a variety of views that it is difficult to see how one can reasonably speak of a ‘conventional’ doctrine.\textsuperscript{912} Moreover, Daley suggests that one of the few over-arching features of early Christian eschatology was its ‘realism’, the sense of an intimate connection between this world and the promised kingdom.\textsuperscript{913} This must lead us to question just how much more ‘realised’ Eusebius’ eschatology was than that of other early Christian thinkers. Indeed, scholars seem to vary in their assessment of what was involved in Eusebius’ ‘realised’ eschatology. While the older view suggests that Eusebius’ eschatology involved largely downplaying ideas of a second coming and final judgement,\textsuperscript{914} Hollerich finds a continuing belief in such events to be completely compatible with a ‘realised eschatology’.\textsuperscript{915} A contrast between ‘traditional’ and ‘realised’ eschatology therefore has considerable potential to mislead and confuse.

Yet following the suggestion that Eusebius saw the eschatological kingdom realised in the present, scholars have sought to locate that kingdom more precisely in either the Christian church or the Roman empire. The older view, put forward by scholars such as Eger, is that by the end of his life Eusebius had come to see God’s prophetic promises as being fulfilled in the newly Christian empire under Constantine.\textsuperscript{916} Such an interpretation clearly owes far more to Eusebius’ later panegyrical works on Constantine, the \textit{VC} and \textit{LC}, than to some of his earlier

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{912} Daley, \textit{The Hope}.
\textsuperscript{913} Ibid. 218.
\textsuperscript{914} For example: Wallace-Hadrill, \textit{Eusebius of Caesarea}, 188; Sirinelli, \textit{Les vues historiques}, 472, 481.
\textsuperscript{915} Hollerich, \textit{Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah}, 201.
\end{footnotesize}
apologetic and exegetical works. More recently, however, this view has been challenged by scholars such as Hollerich and Johnson who have stressed by contrast the continuing significance of the church in Eusebius’ works. As a result, Hollerich suggested that it is the church, rather than the empire that should be seen as the locus of Eusebius’ ‘realised eschatology’.

However, while this work has been invaluable in challenging traditional assumptions about Eusebius’ attitude towards the empire, it not only continues to perpetuate the idea that Eusebius’ interest lay principally in either the church or the empire as separate and clearly identifiable bodies, but also suggests that the two must in some way have been in competition for him. Even if there is no suggestion of an outright tension between the two, some form of competition is implied by the idea that attributing greater importance to one must mean downplaying the significance of the other. If, however, in recognising the continuing role of demons in Eusebius’ historical vision, we dismiss the idea that Eusebius saw the kingdom of God as already fulfilled on earth, we no longer need to determine whether Eusebius believed that kingdom to be located in either the church or the empire. This leaves us free to explore instead how Eusebius viewed the events of his lifetime within the broad sweep of history as a whole. When we do this, we can see that Eusebius was not interested in either the church or the empire as impersonal

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917 As Hollerich noted: *Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah*, 202.
918 Hollerich, *Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah*, 201; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 184-85, 193. It is worth noting that Hollerich and Johnson focus on, respectively, the exegetical CI, and the apologetic PE, rather than on works like the VC and LC, which are more concerned with the figure of the emperor, perhaps explaining this difference of emphasis.
919 Hollerich, *Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah*, 201.
920 While denying that Eusebius saw the church as a ‘rival’ to the empire, Hollerich nevertheless suggests that, in comparison with the church, the empire was only ‘a secondary phenomenon, a reality of a lesser order’: *Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah*, 33.
‘institutions’, but rather in their leaders as a united group of virtuous Christian exemplars, guiding their followers on their individual journeys away from demons and towards God.

The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. First, by drawing attention to the continuing role of hostile demons in Eusebius’ understanding of history, it will challenge traditional assumptions about Eusebius’ triumphal interpretation of the events of his lifetime. Second, it will propose an alternative approach to Eusebius’ understanding of these events, suggesting that they are best viewed, not as standing at the culmination of history, but rather as forming simply one stage in an on-going process of salvation within history. Moreover, it will show that, since history had not yet reached its climax for Eusebius, any celebration of present prosperity was tempered in his works by warnings against complacency.

The Role of Demons in History

For Eusebius, demonic activity was an inescapable feature of history, observable not only in the distant past, but also in more recent events, up to and including the events of his own lifetime. Although several scholars have already noted that, for Eusebius, history was not driven exclusively by human activity,921 they have tended to focus on the role of the divine in directing events and have overlooked the important role also played by lesser spiritual beings, such as demons and angels, in Eusebius’ historical scheme. Lyman, for instance, has outlined how Eusebius felt historical events to be the result of free human action working under the guidance

921 For example: Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 86-87; Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 83; Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 168-89; Coggan, Pandaemonia, 62.
of divine providence through a process of synergeia, or co-operation, yet she did not give any consideration to the question of how demonic activity might also fit into this framework. Even where scholars in the past have noted the importance of demons within Eusebius’ understanding of history, they have rarely made more than passing reference to the subject, and have not attempted to explore in any detail what this might mean for our understanding of Eusebius’ interpretation of the past.

Rather more seriously, some scholars have been led, largely on the basis of comments in the PE, to the erroneous conclusion that Eusebius believed demonic activity to have ceased altogether long before his lifetime. Thus, even if demons are seen to have had a role in Eusebius’ understanding of some historical periods, their activity is held to be safely confined to the distant past. This only contributes further to the sense that Eusebius’ attitude was one of gloating triumphalism, since it suggests that he believed a once-potent threat to have been effectively neutralised. This picture, however, is based on only a partial reading of Eusebius’ works and cannot be sustained when comments from some of Eusebius’ other works, like the VC and later books of the HE, which deal with events from Eusebius’

922 Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 99, 102. Lyman uses the term ‘free will’ without specifying to which Greek term she is referring, but it seems clear that she has in mind the kind of unconstrained choice which Eusebius saw as central to moral responsibility. Cf. Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 82, 84, 86-87; Chesnut, ‘Fate, Fortune, Free Will and Nature’, 180.
925 Even Coggan, who is prepared to admit that in Eusebius’ view demons ‘may still exist cosmologically’, suggests that they were held to have been already defeated, suggesting that ‘their power to dominate… has been broken in the Christian power of salvation’: Pandaemonia, 198.
own lifetime, are also taken into consideration. What we see when we look at 
Eusebius’ works as a whole is that in his view the struggle of pious humans to 
escape from demonic influence was an on-going feature of all historical time, 
including his own time. It was, moreover, crucial to his understanding of salvation.

Early human history for Eusebius was the story of a rapid decline into 
ignorance and barbarism, followed by a slow and difficult progress back towards 
God. These changes in the human condition were linked, moreover, to the waxing 
and waning of demonic influence among humankind, as demonic tyranny was 
gradually replaced by the beneficial instruction of the Logos. In part, of course, 
human free choice was also responsible for the initial fall of humankind away from 
God – in the PE, Eusebius describes how humans lost their original place ‘in a 
paradise of the good, among the divine choruses’, as a result of their ‘self-
determined choice’ (αὐθεκουσίῳ αἰώνει). It appears that Eusebius is thinking 
here of the fall of Adam, which saw humankind descend into a state of mortality. 
Overall, however, Eusebius shows remarkably little interest in this initial fall,

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926 For a summary of Eusebius’ views, see: HE 1.2.17-23 and DE 8.Praef.5-11. In his discussion of the idea of progress in Eusebius’ works, Johnson argues, in line with his interest in ‘ethnic argumentation’, that ‘historical progress was a nation-specific affair’ for Eusebius. Johnson suggests that, while most nations are presented as having been subject to decline, the ancient Hebrews are said to have enjoyed progress – this, he feels, removes any apparent tension between the themes of decline and progress in Eusebius: Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 237-39. However, while it is certainly true that Eusebius presents different nations as suffering decline and experiencing progress at different rates and in different historical periods, all nations at some point are said to have experienced both. Yet, by recognising that, for Eusebius, human decline and progress were the result of fluctuations in an on-going cosmic struggle between demons and the Logos, it is similarly clear that there was no contradiction between ideas of decline and progress for Eusebius.

927 DE 4.9-10.

928 PE 7.18.7: λέγει δ’ οὖν τα λόγια ὡς ἁ μα τὴν πρώτην άνθρωπον φύσιν δυνάμει θείας καὶ ὁμοιώσει θεοῦ κοσμήσας ο παμβασιλέας ἀρμόδιον ως εδωρήσασε τὴν πρώτην ἀπεκλήρουσε διατριβὴν τοῦ βίου ἐν γαθῶν παραδείγματος, χορείας συγκαταλέξας θείας.

929 PE 7.18.8. Cf. HE 1.2.19 (τῆς... αὐτοπροκατάκειτο κακίας).

930 PE 7.18.7-8.
devoting far more attention to what happened to humankind once it was in this mortal state.

It was following this initial fall that the detrimental influence of the demons became crucial for Eusebius. In the period immediately after the fall, human beings are still not said to have sunk to their lowest point. Instead, we are told that God, in his benevolence, ‘established heavenly angels as their guardians and curators, like leaders of a herd and shepherds’. Since they were unable to recognise the true God, these angels encouraged the humans under their protection to worship the stars, sun and moon instead, as the best alternative. That humans then sank still lower, into a state of complete wildness and irrationality was, for Eusebius, the result of demonic and diabolical plotting. The devil and his demons, envious of God’s care for humankind, succeeded in overthrowing the governance of the angels, as the devil ‘dragging down the cities from better places, and the souls of many to every kind of wickedness with the enticements of pleasure, and omitting no manner of contrivance, with shameful stories of the gods and licentious narratives, put before his captives pleasing things and pleasure, through the cunning deceit of the demons’. This suggestion that demons used ‘shameful stories of the gods’ to draw people away from the true, Christian God would appear to be a reference to the argument, common among early Christian apologists and

931 DE 4.6.9: ...προστάτας αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιμελητάς, ὃσπερ τινὰς ἀγελάρχας καὶ ποιμένας, θείους ἁγγέλους κατεστήσατο...
932 DE 4.8.1.
933 DE 4.9.6: ἐστει δήτα τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττῶν στάσεως τὰς πόλεις, καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἠθοποιίας δελέασιν ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰδὸς φαινόμενις τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατεστάπα ψυχὰς, οὐδένα τε μηχανής καταλιπών τρόπον, μεθοί περὶ τεῶν αἰσχροῖς καὶ διηγήμασιν ἀκολούθως ἑντέχνων δαιμόνων ἀπάτης προσβάλλετο.
fully endorsed by Eusebius,\textsuperscript{934} that demons lay behind and inspired pagan worship. It also recalls Eusebius’ earlier dismissal of the ‘widespread and more legendary’ (πανδήμου καὶ μυθικοτέρας) theology of the Greeks in the \textit{PE}.\textsuperscript{935} Here Eusebius criticises the mythological stories of the traditional gods and heroes for associating the divine with actions that would be considered criminal if conducted by humans.\textsuperscript{936} He notes that even some Greeks had felt so uncomfortable about these stories that they sought to explain them away with allegories.\textsuperscript{937} Thus we find demons being associated with the spread of classical mythology, which had led, in Eusebius’ mind, not only to impiety, but also to immorality.

For Eusebius, the moral and religious history of humankind was thus inextricably linked to the greater cosmic struggle taking place between God and his angels and the devil and his demons. Humankind’s descent into barbarism was the consequence of demonic deceit; their salvation depended upon them freeing themselves from the influence of these tyrannical overlords. In this process, however, humankind was not alone. Their relentless fall was in Eusebius’ view arrested only by the benevolent intervention of the Logos, who ‘shone some short and faint rays of his personal light through the prophet Moses and through the god-beloved men who came before him and after him’ in order to help people improve their condition.\textsuperscript{938} These early seeds of virtue and understanding were spread at first

\textsuperscript{934} See Chapter II above, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{935} \textit{PE} 2.5.1.
\textsuperscript{936} \textit{PE} 2.4.1-3.
\textsuperscript{937} \textit{PE} 2.4.4-6. Here Eusebius appears to have in mind earlier Greek philosophers, particularly Plato – see \textit{PE} 2.6.21-24.
\textsuperscript{938} \textit{DE} 4.10.4: …εἰκότως ἔκείνος ὁ θεός λόγος, ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ουσία... τέως μὲν βραχείας τινὰς καὶ ἀμφότερής τοῦ ἱερού φωτὸς ἀκτίνας διὰ προφήτου Μωσέως τῶν τε πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν μετ’ αὐτῶν θεοφιλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔξελαμπεν...
through the Hebrew prophets, only gradually filtering through to the other human nations. It was only once enough progress had been made that the time became right for the incarnation. At this point, humankind made a great leap forwards, as the Logos ‘mastered with great and divine power’ the demons who had been largely in control until that point. The incarnation was thus clearly an important historical turning-point for Eusebius and a crucial event in the weakening of demonic power. It should not, however, be seen as the end of the story.

Unfortunately, however, this is precisely how some scholars have chosen to read Eusebius’ accounts of demons in the PE and DE, arguing that the incarnation marked a fundamental change in Eusebius’ view of the demonic. According to Johnson, the incarnation and the period immediately following it saw the complete ‘destruction of demonic power’ in Eusebius’ view. This argument is based mainly on Eusebius’ discussions of demons in the PE, and on three passages of this work in particular. Two of these discuss the apparent ending of the practice of human sacrifice, while one describes the ‘death’ of a demon. At PE 4.15.6, Eusebius suggests that ‘the filth of polytheistic deceit’, which he believed to have been

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939 Ibid.
941 DE 8.Praef.9-12.
942 DE 4.10.13: τός δὲ γε πάλαι ἁμφὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπων διατυπάς πωτωμένους, ἁμαρτάνον καὶ ἔμφανός τον ἐπί γῆς καταδυναστεύοντας δαίμονας ἀλιτηρίως καὶ πνευμάτων ἀγίων καὶ ἄπτων γένη, τὸν τε ἐν τούτοις τῆς κακίας ἐξάρχοντα, τὸν δεινὸν ἐκείνον καὶ ἀλάστορα, μεγάλη καὶ ἐνθεὶς δυνάμει τροπούμενος ἐχειροῦτο...
943 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 168. A similar view was also expressed by Peter Brown in his recent Nicolai Rubinstein lecture: Brown, ‘Eusebius, Constantine and the Future’. Cf. A.J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1989), 184. Likewise, while Coggan accepts that Eusebius and other Christians of his time did not believe all demonic activity to have ceased with the incarnation, she nevertheless suggests that the incarnation was believed to have fundamentally changed the way in which Christians interacted with the demonic: Pandæmonia, 194.
944 PE 4.15.5-6, 4.17.4.
945 PE 5.17.1-14.
encouraged by demons, was ‘slackened and reduced at no other time than that of Hadrian, when in the manner of a light Christ’s teaching was already shining on every place’. However, it is important to note that what Eusebius is describing here is, at most, a reduction in polytheistic worship, which was in fact only one of the various methods by which he believed demons might try to draw people away from God. Thus, even in the most generous interpretation, this statement cannot be taken to imply the ending of all demonic power.

Moreover, when this claim is examined in the context of the passage as a whole, it becomes clear that Eusebius is discussing, not even the end of all polytheistic worship, but merely of what he felt to be one of its worst features – human sacrifice. Immediately before his remarks at PE 4.15.6, Eusebius asks how anyone could imagine that good demons, let alone true divinity, would require the ‘most profane’ (ἀσεβεστάτη) and ‘most unholy’ (ἀνοσιωτάτη) practice of human sacrifice. He follows this by arguing that ‘some offered their sons, others their daughters, and others even themselves to the sacrifices of the demons’. Eusebius’ remarks about the decline of polytheistic worship therefore occur in the context of a discussion of human sacrifice and refer only to the supposed elimination of this practice. A similar statement at PE 4.17.4, when considered in the context of the surrounding discussion, can likewise be seen to refer only to the ending of human sacrifice, rather than to the destruction of all demonic influence. Thus, while these

946 φέρ’ οὖν ἐλέγξωμεν καὶ ἀποδείξωμεν ὅτι οὐκὶ οὗτοι ἢ τῆς πολυθέου πλάνης λύμη τοῦ βίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸ τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν εὐαγγελικῆς διδασκαλίας ἐκράτει. Ἀναγίγνεται γὰρ αὐτήν καὶ καθήρβηθαι συν ἀλλοτε ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἁδρανοὺς χρόνους, ἕφορος δικὴν ἢ διαλεμπούσης ἐπὶ πάντα τοὺς τῆς τοῦ χριστοῦ διδασκαλίας.
947 PE 4.15.5.
948 PE 4.15.9: ...οἱ μὲν ἔφαν, οἱ δὲ θυγατέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ σφάς αὐτοὺς ταῖς τῶν δαμόνων καθήρουν θυσίαις.
passages can legitimately be taken to indicate a weakening, or at least a change, in
demonic power in the wake of the incarnation, they do not suggest that demonic
power had ended completely.

The second passage that has been taken by some scholars to indicate
Eusebius’ belief in the ending of demonic power is found at PE 5.17.1-14. Here,
Eusebius cites a lengthy passage from Plutarch’s De defectu oraculorum, in which
Plutarch relates the story of the death of the god Pan. Once again, however, it is
essential to consider this passage in the broader context of the work as a whole. The
PE had a strongly apologetic purpose and sought to demonstrate to its readers that
Christianity was superior to pagan forms of worship. It therefore served
Eusebius’ apologetic argument well to suggest that the power of the pagan demon-
gods was no match for the truly divine power of the Christian God and his Logos.
As Coggan noted, Eusebius used this story about the death of Pan as ‘an apologetic
weapon’ with which to attack pagan religion. By suggesting that demons could be
subject to death, Eusebius was demonstrating that they were not fully divine.

Moreover, Eusebius glosses Plutarch’s passage with the comment that this
death took place during the reign of Tiberius, when Christ was ‘undertaking his

949 Johnson further supports his argument by citing Eusebius’ brief references to demonic death at PE
5.5.4 and 5.16.4: Ethnicity and Argument, 168. However, the key passage is the one at PE 5.17.1-14, on
Plutarch’s story of the death of ‘Great Pan’, which has also been used to support the view that
Eusebius believed demonic power to have ended or at least to have been drastically reduced by both
Coggan and Peter Brown: Coggan, Pandaemonia, iii, 194; Brown, ‘Eusebius, Constantine and the
Future’. Of the two additional passages which Johnson cites, one simply directs the reader forward to
the discussion of the death of ‘Great Pan’, which follows immediately afterwards, while the other is a
reference to a slightly different passage of the same work by Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum. As a
result, neither really adds any weight to Johnson’s claim.
951 As Eusebius himself suggests: PE 1.5.11-12, and as both Coggan and Johnson recognise: Coggan,
Pandaemonia, 17-18; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 11.
952 Coggan, Pandaemonia, iii.
teachings among men’ (τὰς σὺν ἀνθρώποις ποιούμενος διατριβὰς). Eusebius thus directly links the death of this particular demon with the effects of Christ’s work, thereby again demonstrating the greater power of Christian divinity. There can be no doubt that Eusebius wished to suggest here that demonic power was considerably weakened at the incarnation of Christ and even that some demons may have died. However, in view of the fact that this argument suited Eusebius’ apologetic aims so well, we should be very cautious about suggesting that this passage on its own can provide a full and accurate picture of the effect Eusebius believed the incarnation to have had on demonic power. Whatever his feelings on the subject, Eusebius’ argument would have been much less forceful if he had taken the time to explain at length that only some demons had died or suffered a reduction in their power. However, if we look elsewhere in his works, and even elsewhere in the PE, we find that this is exactly what Eusebius appears to have believed.

Even within the PE itself, we can find hints that Eusebius did not consider all demonic power to have ended at the incarnation. At PE 4.16.22, he points to certain supposedly demon-inspired cult-practices that he claims are still occurring ‘even now’ (εἰσέτι νῦν) – indeed he even claims that these practices are similar in nature to earlier human sacrifices. Similarly, in the De solemnitate Paschali, Eusebius refers to demon-sent illnesses occurring ‘εἰσέτι καὶ νῦν’. Such statements suggest that Eusebius must have viewed any weakening of demonic power as fairly limited. Moreover, when we broaden our perspective beyond the PE to consider Eusebius’

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953 PE 5.17.13.
954 ὅμως γὰρ τάῦτα ταῖς ἀνθρωποθυσίαις.
955 PG 24.697.20.
statements in some of his works which deal more thoroughly with the post-incarnation history of humankind, such as the HE and VC, we encounter unmistakable evidence that Eusebius felt demons continued to pose a significant threat well into his own lifetime. Throughout these works we find Eusebius suggesting that demons and the devil were responsible for attempts to undermine the progress of the Christian church, either by inciting persecutions, or by encouraging the spread of alternative doctrines which Eusebius considered to be heretical.\textsuperscript{956} In the HE, persecutions of the past are regularly tied directly to the malign influence of demons. Here, we are told that it was the ‘envious’ (βασκάνω) and ‘good-hating demon’ (μισοκάλω δαίμονι) who encouraged accusations against Christians during the reign of Commodus,\textsuperscript{957} while slightly later Origen is said to have received particularly brutal treatment under persecution at the instigation of the ‘wicked demon’ (τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονος), who ‘drew up all his troops in contention with the man, and with every contrivance and power attacked him, falling especially upon him of all those against whom he was then making war’.\textsuperscript{958}

In this passage we can see the way in which Eusebius envisaged persecutions as being inspired principally by the devil, ably supported by the demonic ‘troops’ he commanded.

Yet this activity should not be seen as confined safely to the distant past, for Eusebius also shows demons at work in the persecutions of his own lifetime. In his panegyric on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius attributes the recent persecutions to the

\textsuperscript{956}See, for example: HE 4.7.1-2, 6.39.5, 10.4.14; VC 1.49.1, 2.73.1.
\textsuperscript{957}HE 5.21.2.
\textsuperscript{958}HE 6.39.5: ...τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονος ἐφαμίλλως τάνδρῃ παντοτεταξια̉ν πάσῃ τε μηχανῇ καὶ δυνάμει κατ’ αὐτὸν στρατηγήσαντος παρὰ πάντας τε τοὺς τηνίαδε πολεμθέντας δωσιωμένως ἐπισκηπήσαντος αὐτῷ...
activity of the ‘evil-loving demon’ (φιλοπονήρου δαίμονος). Similarly, in the VC, Licinius’ measures against Christians in the eastern provinces – measures which Eusebius would have personally experienced – are said to have been encouraged by a ‘wicked demon’ (τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονος). This demonic activity is, moreover, directly linked to the growing prosperity of the church. The demon encourages Licinius to persecute the church partly at least because of resentment at the benefits being enjoyed by the church in the west under Constantine’s patronage. Thus, not only did Eusebius believe demonic activity to be continuing, it is clear that he did not consider the current prosperity of the church to provide any security from demonic attack. Indeed, it might even have the opposite effect of driving the demons to redouble their efforts.

This sense that the earthly success of the church could not be depended upon is also seen in the HE, where Eusebius suggests that the persecutions were in fact permitted by God after the church fell into complacency and dissension as a result of its growing success. For Eusebius, prosperity for the church in one period did not necessarily mean long-term security; it was certainly no excuse to relax one’s guard against the potential attacks of the demons. Thus, success for the church did not mark the end of history for Eusebius; instead, it brought with it a new set of demonically inspired challenges, which needed to be fought in new ways.

That the demonic threat remained ever-present for Eusebius, even after the unification of the empire under Constantine, can further be seen from the way in

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959 HE 10.4.14.
960 VC 1.49.1.
961 VC 1.49.2. Cf. HE 5.21.1-2, where the demon is likewise driven to incite persecution by the period of relative calm which the church had been experiencing.
962 HE 8.1.7.
which he attributes the spread of supposedly heretical doctrines to demonic and diabolical influence. In the *HE*, the heresies which Eusebius discusses are mainly those of previous centuries: Mani, the founder of Manichaeism, is described as the leader of a ‘demonic heresy’, or ‘sect’, and portrayed as the instrument used by demons and the devil to thwart human salvation. Similar language is also used of Menander, a follower of Simon Magus, and his disciples. The repeated association which Eusebius draws between heretics and demonic influence in the *HE* makes clear the strength of his belief that heresies were ultimately the work of the devil and his demonic associates.

Moreover, as with his discussions of the persecutions, demonic encouragement of heretical beliefs is as much a feature of Eusebius’ own lifetime as of the past. In the *VC*, we find similar language being applied to the spread of heresies throughout Constantine’s reign: ‘an evil demon’ (πονηροῦ τινος δαιμόνος), we are told, lies behind the Donatist schism in Africa. Similarly, the Council of Tyre is said to have been called in an attempt to resolve disagreements that Eusebius considered to be inspired by the ‘good-hating envy’ (μισόκαλος φθόνος), which, as we saw above, was characteristic of demonic activity for Eusebius. Even when imperial persecution had ceased, then, Eusebius continued to see demonic activity at work undermining the church. In fact, Eusebius even

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963 *HE* 7.31.1: Ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ὁ μανεὶς τὰς φρένας ἐπώνυμος τῆς δαιμονώσεως αἰρέτους τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ παρατροπὴν καθωπλίζετο, τοῦ δαιμόνος, αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ θεομάχου σατανᾶ, ἑπὶ λύψιν πολλῶν τὸν ἄνδρα προβεβλημένου.
965 As Pagels has shown, the idea that ‘heretics’ were acting under the influence of demons or the devil was commonplace among early Christian writers. As early as Paul, those spreading alternative doctrines had been attacked as the ‘ministers’ (διάκονοι) of Satan (2 Cor. 11.13-15), while in the second century, Irenaeus of Lyons in his *Adversus Haeresis* had frequently associated his opponents with the devil (For example: Iren. *Adv. Haer.* 1.27.4, 5.26.2): Pagels, *Origin of Satan*, 149-78.
966 *VC* 1.45.2.
967 *VC* 4.41.1.
suggests that the ending of the persecutions, far from marking the end of demonic attacks against the church, might simply lead the devil and demons to adopt a new strategy. In the HE, Eusebius remarks that, when persecutions were not an option, the demons would turn to spreading false doctrine instead:

... πάλαι μὲν τοὺς ἐξοθέν διωγμοίς κατ’ αὐτῆς ὑπελίγετο, τότε γε μὴν τούτων ἀποκεκλεισμονος, πονηρῶς καὶ γὰρ σκόπεσαν ὠστερ τιοιν ὀλεθρίοις ψυχῶν οργάνοις διακόνοις τε ἄπωλείας χρῶμενος, ἐτέχαις κατεστρατήγει μεθόδους, πάντα πόρον ἑπινοῦν, ὡς ἃν ὑποδύντες γοητες καὶ ἀπατηλοὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ δόγματος ἡμῖν προσηγοριαν, ὁμοῦ μὲν τῶν πιστῶν τοὺς πρὸς αὐτῶν ἄλλοκομένος εἰς βυθὸν ἄπωλείας ἀγοιν, ὁμοῦ δὲ τοὺς τῆς πίστεως ἀγνώστας δι’ ὅν αυτοὶ δρόντες ἐπιχειροῖεν, ἀποτρέποιντο τὴς ἐπί τον ὑπερηφάνον λόγον παρόδου.\footnote{HE 4.7.1-2}

... previously he [the ‘good-hating demon’] armed himself against it [the church] with persecutions from outside, but, being now shut out from this, using wicked men and sorcerers like ruinous instruments and messengers of destruction for souls, he waged war by other means, contriving in every way that sorcerers and cheats might insinuate themselves into the same name as our belief, and at the same time both lead into the depth of destruction those of the faithful caught by them, and turn away from the approach to the saving word those unaware of the faith, by the things which they did.

For Eusebius, it seems that this alternative form of attack might pose even more of a threat than the persecutions had done, since it served the dual purpose both of discouraging new converts, and of leading existing Christians away from what Eusebius felt to be a ‘correct’ understanding of the divine. The idea that any historical event – be it the incarnation, the ending of persecution, or Constantine’s patronage of the church – had already brought humankind to a state of complete security, in which the demonic threat had been effectively neutralised, is therefore clearly foreign to Eusebius’ thought.
Instead, Eusebius presents the threat posed by demons as continually evolving and adapting to changing circumstances. In works such as the *PE* and *DE*, which deal at length with the pre-incarnation history of humankind, the emphasis is principally on the role of demons in encouraging polytheism and its associated vices. This contrasts with the *HE* and *VC*, where the discussion focuses almost entirely on events following the incarnation, and the role of demons in encouraging either persecution or heresy is more heavily stressed. This suggests that Eusebius may have considered the nature of the demonic threat to have changed following the incarnation, rather than ceasing altogether. As we have seen, Eusebius held that there were two principal means by which demons might divert people from the road to salvation – either by encouraging vice or by encouraging false belief, be that polytheism or heresy. For Eusebius, it seems that even as the influence of polytheism waned, the demons were finding new ways to encourage false belief.

The encouragement of polytheism became the encouragement of ‘heresy’. With the growing success of the church, the demons were adopting new tactics, rather than retreating from the battle. Eusebius’ suggestion in the *PE* and *DE* that the pagan cults were in decline and that the demons of these cults were dying should therefore not be taken as an indication that he believed the demonic threat to lie

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969 Sirinelli suggested by contrast that ‘la démonologie d’Eusèbe n’a d’autre fonction que d’expliquer l’erreur païenne’, *Les vues historiques*, 317. However, Sirinelli’s focus on Eusebius’ views in the period before the Council of Nicaea means that the *VC* is necessarily excluded from his study and, although the *HE* would qualify for consideration, in his treatment of Eusebius’ views of demons Sirinelli focused almost exclusively on the *PE* and *DE*. As a result, the emphasis of Eusebius’ discussion would certainly appear to be primarily the role of demons in encouraging polytheism. Coggan similarly felt that ‘the key aspect of Eusebius’ demonology is its utilisation as part of his apologetic polemical program against pagan religion’: *Pandaemonia*, 189. As with Sirinelli, Coggan’s exclusive focus on the *PE* leads her to miss some of the broader applications of Eusebius’ demonology which clearly appear in his other works. The conclusions of Coggan and Sirinelli on this point demonstrate the importance of looking at a range of Eusebius’ works in order to achieve a balanced picture of his views.

970 See Chapter IV above, p. 192-93.

safely in the past. Rather, as Eusebius saw it, the demons in his own time were simply developing new and different challenges for the virtuous, most notably the spread of ‘false’ doctrine and dissension within the church.

For Eusebius, then, human history was characterised – driven even – by the struggle between the demons and the Christian God or his Logos for human souls, a struggle which Eusebius saw as continuing throughout his lifetime and doubtless beyond. This was not, however, a struggle in which human beings were merely passive pawns; rather it was a struggle for salvation in which humankind was actively involved. Eger, one of the few scholars to have acknowledged – albeit cursorily – the prominent role of the demonic within Eusebius’ view of history nevertheless struggled to appreciate precisely how demons operated within Eusebius’ historical scheme.972 Eger identified two potential driving forces in Eusebius’ understanding of history: one was the development of free human action, the other the struggle between divine and demonic power. These he appears to have seen as incompatible, suggesting that Eusebius emphasises each of these at different points in the HE.973 However, as we have seen, human προαιρεσις meant that people were in fact drawn into this greater cosmic conflict and able to choose sides within it.974 It was partly by exploiting human προαιρεσις that demons maintained their struggle against God. Thus the distinction which Eger drew between these two historical forces is unnecessary and even misleading.

Moreover, from the human perspective, the choice of whom to follow in this cosmic struggle would directly affect their salvation: a person’s damnation would

973 Ibid. 102 n.34.
974 See Chapter IV above.
result from their choice to associate with demons, while their salvation would be secured only by active co-operation with the divine.\footnote{Lyman has noted the importance of co-operation between human and divine ‘will’ to Eusebius’ historical scheme, and particularly to his understanding of salvation: \textit{Christology and Cosmology}, 99, 102-03. Cf. Chesnut, \textit{First Christian Histories}, 86-87.} In the \textit{DE}, Eusebius notes how the Logos acted against demonic influence, ‘setting loose and altering those who placed their dependence on him from a licentious to a moderate life, from impiety to piety, from unrighteousness to righteousness, indeed even from the power of embittered demons to godly apprehension of true piety’.\footnote{DE 4.10.14 (my emphasis): …\textit{μεθετούσιν τε καὶ μεταβάλλων τοὺς αὐτῶν προσανέχοντας ἐκ μὲν ἀκολούθως ἐπὶ σωφρονία βιών, ἐκ δὲ ἁσβείας ἐπὶ εὐσβείαν καὶ ἔξ ἀδίκιας ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐκ τῶν πικρῶν δαιμόνων δυναστείας ἐπὶ τὴν ἔνθεον κατάληψιν τῆς ἐλπιδού εὐσβείας…} While the promise of salvation offered by the Logos was open to all, Eusebius suggests here that it remained a matter of individual human choice whether or not to take advantage of that offer. Similarly, in his discussion of fate and divine providence in the \textit{PE}, Eusebius notes that providence directs everything that happens, including things that occur as a result of human action, not by dominating or diminishing human free choice, but rather by ‘working together and acting together with the things which are up to us’.\footnote{PE 6.6.45: …\textit{συνεργοῦσα τε καὶ συμπράττουσα ταῖς ἔθ’ ἡμῖν…} Thus, for Eusebius, human embodiment and participation in historical time were not to be seen as a punishment, but rather an opportunity.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Theoph.}, 1.69.\footnote{Lyman, \textit{Christology and Cosmology}, 100-02. Cf. Young, \textit{Nicaea to Chalcedon}, 22-23.\footnote{PE 7.18.9-10.}}}

Indeed, as Lyman has argued,\footnote{Lyman, \textit{Christology and Cosmology}, 100-02. Cf. Young, \textit{Nicaea to Chalcedon}, 22-23.} earthly history in Eusebius’ view was the sphere in which human beings might achieve salvation by striving to live a virtuous and pious life.\footnote{PE 7.18.9, Eusebius writes that ‘it is especially fitting to strive above all for piety and to correct the first mistake with the second opportunities, and to hurry towards the ascent and restitution (ἀποκατάστασιν) of what is right.}
For the end of the nature of man is not thus on earth, not turning downwards into
destruction and perdition, but there from where the first man strayed’.981 This
suggests that in his understanding of what salvation entailed, Eusebius held a view
very similar to that of Origen. For Origen, salvation meant the return of humankind
to its original state with God.982

Eusebius’ use of the term ἀποκατάστασις here should not be taken to imply
the idea of the universal salvation of all creatures, including demons and the devil,
such as is often associated with Origen.983 Although Ilaria Ramelli has recently
shown that Eusebius in many respects shared Origen’s understanding of
ἀποκατάστασις, her discussion focuses on the salvation of humans and notes that
the destruction of evil was seen as an essential prerequisite for human
ἀποκατάστασις by Eusebius.984 The context of the passage at PE 7.18.9 makes it
clear that Eusebius is referring only to humankind and it therefore seems that he is
using the term in an older, less technical sense. As Morwenna Ludlow has shown,
even by the time of Gregory of Nyssa later in the fourth century, the term
ἀποκατάστασις had not yet acquired the exclusive meaning of universal salvation,
and retained a broader sense of ‘restitution’ or ‘restoration’.985 This is clearly how

981 διὸ καὶ μάλιστα προσήκειν εὐσεβείας ἐν πρώτως ἀντιποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ πρώτως πλημμεληθὲν
dευτέρους αἰσθης ἐπιδιορθοῦσθαι σπεύδειν τε ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀναδρομὴν τε καὶ
ἀποκατάστασιν. εἶναι γὰρ τέλος ἀνθρώπου φύσεως οὐχ ὡδὲ ἐπὶ γῆς οὐδ’ εἰς φθορὰν
καταστρέφον καὶ ἀπώλειαν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖν ὅτεν καὶ ὁ πρώτος ἀπέσφηλε.
982 Daley, The Hope, 58, citing De Princ. 1.6.2; 3.6.1.
983 As Daley points out, however, while the idea that all creatures, including the devil and his demons,
would eventually be saved was often attributed to Origen both by his theological opponents and by
later scholars, Origen was by no mean unequivocal in his adoption of the idea: The Hope, 58-59.
984 I.L.E. Ramelli, ‘Origen, Eusebius, the Doctrine of Apokatastasis, and its relation to Christology’, in
Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 307-31; and, on the links between Origen and Eusebius’ views of apokatastasis,
see also: Berkhoff, Die Theologie, 161-62.
985 M. Ludlow, Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner
Eusebius is using the term here – to indicate the idea that salvation was a journey back to an original state that had been lost. In this passage, Eusebius appears to have in mind a state prior to the fall of Adam – this, as we have seen, was, for Eusebius, a state of immortality, among the ‘divine choruses’ close to God. Thus, for Eusebius, it seems that humankind was not meant to achieve fulfilment on earth, but rather to use its time there in order to strive for the greater, spiritual rewards that awaited the virtuous among the ‘divine choruses’ of heaven.

That this striving for virtue and hence salvation meant, for Eusebius, constantly fighting against the demons is evident from his description of the struggles of the martyrs in the HE. Here, Eusebius describes one of his aims as being to announce ‘the resistance of the athletes of piety and their much-enduring courage, and the trophies taken against demons, and the victories over the invisible enemies and the crowns over all these things’. For Eusebius, the victory of the martyrs is won over the demons – those demons, presumably, which were attacking the virtuous by means of the persecutions. However, as we have seen, persecution was simply one of several methods by which Eusebius thought the demons might try to derail human salvation. The martyrs might provide the most dramatic example of virtuous Christians achieving victory over the demons and thwarting their plans, but it seems logical that, for Eusebius, other pious humans, whether by maintaining a virtuous lifestyle in the face of the temptations of pleasure, or by

986 PE 7.18.7-8.
987 HE 5.Praef.4: …τῶν εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν τὰς ἐνστάσεις καὶ τὰς πολυτλήτους ἀνθρείας τρόπαια τε τὰ κατὰ δαμόνων καὶ νίκαις τὰς κατὰ τῶν πορέτων ἀντιπάλων καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἑτεράνους εἰς αἰώνιον μνήμην ἀνακηρύξατον.
avoiding ‘heretical’ doctrines, were similarly fighting off the demons to secure the salvation that victory would bring them.

In this struggle against the demons, however, human beings were by no means alone. Instead, Eusebius repeatedly suggests that humankind was led away from demons and towards the life of virtue that would earn them salvation by divine guidance and instruction. As many scholars have noted, the idea of the Logos-Christ as a teacher appears to lie at the core of Eusebius’ soteriology, and is particularly important in his understanding of the incarnation.988 This is not to suggest, of course, that Eusebius felt teaching to have been the only purpose of the incarnation.989 More than once, Eusebius shows that he was familiar with some of the different theories of the incarnation and crucifixion that were widespread among early Christian writers.990 These included the idea that the crucifixion represented a sacrifice to the devil to redeem humankind from his power,991 as well as the – not entirely compatible – notion that the crucifixion was necessary to demonstrate to the demons that Christ was superior to death.992 Yet, while Eusebius was happy to list these various theories, his references to them are little more than cursory, and he shows little interest in discriminating between them. Overall, the repeated references to the beneficial effect of Christ’s teaching, found throughout a

988 For example: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 64; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 102; Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 83; 122; Young, Nicaea to Chalcedon, 18; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 185; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 279.
989 As Robertson noted, this would be to misrepresent Eusebius’ views: Christ as Mediator, 65.
990 See, for example: SC 15.9-11; Theoph. 3.57-60, 4.9; DE 4.12.6-9, 10.Praef.2-7, 10.8.37; De solemnitate Paschali, PG 24.696.23-27. As Lyman recognised: Christology and Cosmology, 122. On some of the various early Christian explanations for Christ’s incarnation and passion, see: Burton Russell, Satan, 83-84.
992 Theoph. 3.57.
variety of Eusebius’ works, leave a much stronger impression, and suggest that, in his view, this was by far the most important feature of the incarnation.993

In particular, Eusebius often links the spread of divine teaching to a decline in demonic influence. In the PE, Eusebius credits Christ’s preaching with freeing people from their long-standing enslavement to demons.994 Similarly, in the DE, we are told that ‘when our saviour was brought bodily into the land of the Egyptians... the wicked powers living there before were likely not a little moved by his inexpressible power and agency, and especially (μάλιστα) when, through his teaching afterwards, a countless number of those living in Egypt, fleeing from the deceits of the demons, still even now agree that they know the one God of all’.995

The use of μάλιστα here suggests that Eusebius may have seen Christ’s teaching as being even more effective in undermining demonic influence in Egypt than his physical presence in the territory as a child had been.

For Eusebius, it seems that there were two principal aspects to this divine teaching. First, it served to counter false belief – early in the PE, Eusebius notes that as a result of ‘our saviour’s teaching’ people of various nations have abandoned their traditional belief in multiple gods and have instead come to recognise only the one, Christian God.996 Second, it also brought about a moral improvement. Eusebius claims that, as a result of divine instruction, people no longer practise such vices as

993 See, for example: PE 1.4.1, 1.4.6, 2.2.64; 2.4.1, 2.4.6, 3.5.5, 4.15.6, 4.17.4, 5.1.1, 6. Praef.1, 7.16.11; DE 1.1.8, 1.6.1, 1.10.35, 3.6.35; Theoph. 5.18; Ecl. Proph. 125.20-24, 225.27-28; Cf. 279.4-9; SC 14.5, 14.12, 16.10.
995 DE 9.2.6: πλήθος ἄλλα καὶ σωματικῶς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἐπικοινωνίσθη τῇ Αἰγυπτίων χώρᾳ... ἀποφθέγμα δυνάμει καὶ ἐνέργεια τὰς αὐτόδικας ποιητικὰς δυνάμεις εἰκὸς οὐ μικρῶς κεκινήθαι, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτε διὰ τῆς μετέπειτα διδασκαλίας αὐτοῦ μυρίων ἀποφυγόντα πλανήσεως, ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν τὸν τῶν ὅλων ὠμολογεῖ μόνον εἰδέναι θεόν.
996 PE 1.4.9: τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν διδασκαλίας... Cf. PE 1.1.10.
cannibalism, incest and human sacrifice.\textsuperscript{997} Instead, those who have turned towards the Christian God have learnt to relinquish passion and to live according to a more exacting standard (ἀκριβῶς).\textsuperscript{998} This apparent dual focus of divine teaching corresponds to Eusebius’ belief, highlighted above,\textsuperscript{999} that demons had two main means of diverting people from salvation – the encouragement of vice, and the instigation of false belief.\textsuperscript{1000}

Moreover, divine instruction for Eusebius did not begin and end with the incarnation. We can also see it in the improving influence of the Logos which Eusebius felt had prepared humankind for the incarnation.\textsuperscript{1001} Crucially, however, it is clear that Eusebius also believed this teaching to have continued long after the incarnation in the preaching of the apostles and those who came after them.\textsuperscript{1002} In the \textit{HE}, we learn that people were also freed from demonically inspired polytheism ‘by the power of Christ through the teaching of his disciples and their wonderful works.’\textsuperscript{1003} Thus, while the incarnation had a part to play in Eusebius’ understanding of salvation, it was not, for him, a completely definitive event. For Eusebius, salvation and the defeat of the demons were gradual processes, in which the long-term instruction of humankind in virtue and piety, rather than any particular one-off event, was key.

As a result, Eusebius’ interpretation of the events of his later life, however much he might have welcomed these developments, cannot be seen as quite so

\textsuperscript{997} \textit{PE} 1.4.6.
\textsuperscript{998} \textit{PE} 1.4.9.
\textsuperscript{999} See Chapter IV above, p. 192-93.
\textsuperscript{1000} \textit{DE} 6.18.31, 7.1.103.
\textsuperscript{1001} \textit{HE} 1.2.21-3.
\textsuperscript{1002} See, for example: \textit{DE} 1.1.8, 1.8.1, 3.6.32, 4.12.9; \textit{HE} 3.37.1.
\textsuperscript{1003} \textit{HE} 2.3.2: …πρὸς τὴν Χριστοῦ δυνάμεως διὰ τῆς τῶν φοιτητῶν αὐτοῦ διδασκαλίας τε ὁμοῦ καὶ παραδοξοποιίας…
straightforwardly triumphalist as has often been the case in the past. This new focus on the role of the demonic in Eusebius’ view of history thus supports the challenge to the traditional reading of Eusebius’ attitude which was launched by Thielman in his 1987 article on Eusebius’ eschatology,1004 but which has rarely been pursued in more recent scholarship.1005 Against the traditional argument of scholars including Wallace-Hadrill and Sirinelli that Eusebius was so delighted by the success of the church under Constantine that in later life he lost interest in ideas of a second coming of Christ and a future, spiritual kingdom of God,1006 Thielman demonstrated that, throughout his works, Eusebius continued to emphasise the greater importance of spiritual over earthly concerns.1007

Thielman therefore suggested that Eusebius continued throughout his life to anticipate a future spiritual fulfilment for the virtuous and argued moreover that the idea of a second coming and associated final judgement served an important function in Eusebius’ thought, allowing him to explain and to endure the evident deficiencies of earthly systems of justice.1008 The above discussion reinforces this view, by showing that, for Eusebius, salvation meant the restoration of a greater, spiritual state, while life in the earthly realm was merely a transitory stage in the

1005 Hollerich does, however, note that Thielman was right to ‘stress the more conventional aspects of Eusebius’ eschatology’: Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 196, n.115. Johnson has also suggested that his reassessment of the date of Eusebius’ Fragments on Luke would support Thielman’s argument that Eusebius continued to maintain his interest in the second coming and last judgement far beyond his early works, although this is by no means the main purpose of Johnson’s article: ‘Tenth Book of Eusebius’ General Elementary Introduction’, 160; cf. more recently, Johnson, ‘The Ends of Transfiguration’, 201-02, where Johnson again briefly questions scholars’ tendency to attribute a ‘realised eschatology’ to Eusebius.
1006 Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 173, 187; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 482-83. Thielman also, a little unfairly, attributes this view to T.D. Barnes: ‘Another Look’, 226. It is unclear precisely how Thielman drew the conclusion that Barnes felt Eusebius to have little interest in the second coming, since Barnes makes it very clear that at least some of Eusebius’ works do contain discussion of the second coming; Barnes, C&E, 172-73.
1008 Ibid. 233-34.
process of achieving that salvation. Moreover, Eusebius’ continuing concerns about
the potency of the demonic threat show that he cannot have seen his own era as the
triumphant climax of the human struggle for salvation. Consequently, we cannot
continue to accept the suggestion that Eusebius saw either the church or the empire
as the fully realised kingdom of God on earth and we must therefore consider
afresh how Eusebius viewed the events and people of his time.

The Significance of Christian Leadership

Clearly Eusebius did not consider himself to be standing triumphantly at the climax
of history, but felt instead that humankind remained caught up in a dangerous
struggle to gain freedom from demonic influence. Achieving this freedom, as we
have seen, was in Eusebius’ view greatly facilitated by the spread of divine teaching
and instruction, whether that was carried out by the divine Logos, the incarnate
Christ, or his disciples. Just as the struggle against the demons was not seen by
Eusebius as lying in the distant past, so the divine instruction necessary to securing
salvation was also held by him to continue into the present day, facilitated now, not
by the apostles, but by a new generation of virtuous Christian leaders. For Eusebius,
real significance therefore lay, not in either the church or the empire, but rather in
the figures of their leaders, the bishops and the Christian emperor.

He presents these figures as teachers, instructing their followers in ‘correct’
doctrine and a godly lifestyle in order to free them from the demons and increase
their chances of achieving salvation. They are shown as continuing the teaching of
Christ, modelling themselves on his example and thereby spreading the saving
Christian message. The conversion of Constantine and his patronage of the church
were undoubtedly significant for Eusebius, yet this significance lay, not in the fact that it marked the end of a historical struggle for salvation, but in the fact that, as part of this on-going struggle, it greatly strengthened the position of the virtuous. For the first time, political and religious leadership were united in Christian virtue. No longer would citizens of the empire be pulled in two different directions – away from demons if they followed the Christian bishops, but towards them if they chose to imitate their emperor. This would both facilitate the salvation of greater numbers of people and hasten the further decline of the demons. However, in order for these benefits to be maintained, it was necessary for Christian leaders to adopt both a high standard of virtue and a united front against the demons. Thus, even in a work which on the surface appears unshakably triumphant, like the *VC*, we see Eusebius repeatedly emphasising the importance of unity and the need to set high standards of virtue.

In order to understand Eusebius’ attitude, it is important to note that, while Hollerich’s discussion in particular focuses on a division between the ‘Christian Church’ and ‘Roman Empire’,\(^{1009}\) thinking of Eusebius’ concerns primarily in terms of such impersonal institutions or structures is actually somewhat misleading. Throughout Eusebius’ works, the emphasis is often far more on the role of leaders, and particularly on their moral qualities, than on political or administrative structures and events.\(^{1010}\) For Eusebius, as the *HE* reveals, the Christian church may be largely identified with the episcopal hierarchy of which he was a part. The *HE*

\(^{1009}\) For example: Hollerich, *Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah*, 15, 201.

\(^{1010}\) As Eusebius himself claims at the opening of the *VC*, when he declares that he will not focus on Constantine’s military activities, laws or peacetime government, but only on the character of the emperor himself: *VC* 1.11.1.
opens with a promise to record, among other things, ‘the successions from the holy apostles’ (τὰς τῶν ἱερῶν ἁπαστόλων διαδοχας),\(^{1011}\) which it does primarily by listing the successive bishops of various major sees,\(^{1012}\) attempting where possible to make a connection between the first bishop of each see and one of the apostles.\(^{1013}\) As Grant has highlighted, this idea of an unbroken succession from the apostles – and hence from Christ himself – serves to underscore for Eusebius the validity of the doctrine endorsed by the church, in opposition to both ‘heretics’ and pagans.\(^{1014}\)

Of course, Eusebius was not the first Christian writer to place such emphasis on this idea of ‘apostolic succession’. As Brent has shown, earlier writers including Irenaeus of Lyons and Clement of Rome had similarly argued that ‘correct’ Christian doctrine had been transmitted uninterrupted from the apostles by the succession of Christian bishops and teachers.\(^{1015}\) However, Eusebius’ emphasis on the important role of church leaders is not confined solely to the \(HE\) or to the idea of ‘apostolic succession’. Hollerich has drawn attention to the prominence accorded to bishops in the \(CI\), to the extent that Eusebius even suggests that the hierarchical distinctions of the church will be replicated after the second coming in the heavenly kingdom.\(^{1016}\) Elsewhere, Eusebius repeatedly stresses – perhaps for somewhat pragmatic personal reasons – the respect that Constantine accorded to the

\(^{1011}\) \(HE\) 1.1.1.

\(^{1012}\) See, for example: \(HE\) 3.13.1-15.1, 3.34.1-35.1, 4.1.1, 4.4.1-5.5, 4.19.1-20.1, 5.6.1-5, 5.9.1, 5.12.1-2, 5.22.1, 6.10.1-11.1, 7.2.1.

\(^{1013}\) For example: \(HE\) 3.2.1, 3.4.3, 3.36.1-2, 4.5.3-5. For discussion of Eusebius’ attitude to the idea of ‘apostolic succession’ in the \(HE\), see: Grant, \textit{Eusebius as Church Historian}, 45-59.

\(^{1014}\) Grant, \textit{Eusebius as Church Historian}, 46.


\(^{1016}\) Hollerich, \textit{Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah}, 169, 186-88, citing \(CI\) 405.25-29, 161.17-18, 161.32-36.
For Eusebius, bishops are the indispensable heart of the church, preserving and promoting the ‘true’ doctrine that he held to be essential for salvation. Consequently, asking what Eusebius believed the role of the church to be is, to a large degree, to ask what he considered his own role, and that of his peers, to be.

In view of the heavy emphasis which Eusebius places on the role of Christian instruction and ‘correct’ doctrine in bringing people to salvation, it is important to remember that the role of the bishop within his community would have involved a large element of teaching. Through their preaching, the instruction of catechumens and, it might be hoped, the example of their own lifestyle, bishops and other members of the clergy were in a position to demonstrate to their congregations how best to develop Christian virtue. Although Eusebius’ homilies have been largely lost, it is clear from his surviving works that he took his role as a Christian teacher very seriously. Many of his writings, such as the *Quaestiones Evangelicae*, or the now-lost treatise addressing the question of the large families fathered by the biblical patriarchs, served an obviously explanatory purpose, responding to particular questions that either had been, or might be, raised about matters of doctrine or the interpretation of the scriptures. Some, like the *Generalis elementaria introductio* demonstrate many of the features of a genre of pedagogical literature common to both pagan and Christian education – the *εἰσαγωγή*. Others are more subtly instructive – the *PE* and *DE* seek to answer the question of who the

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1017 See, for example, VC 1.42.1, 3.6.1, 3.15.1, 4.27.2, 4.46.1.
1018 On which, see the excellent recent discussion of Johnson: *Eusebius*, 51-83.
1019 Mentioned at DE 1.9.20 and PE 7.8.29.
1020 On the *GEI* as an *εἰσαγωγή* and its relationship to a similar work by Porphyry, the *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, see: Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 99-118. On the educational aims of Eusebius’ works, see also the recent discussion of Johnson, *Eusebius*, 51-83.
Christians are, while the *HE* also helps to instruct Christians in how they should view themselves, by providing them with an understanding of their past as a community. In the *VC*, Eusebius expresses the hope that in this work ‘the mention of tales beloved of God may furnish study not without benefit but of great use for life for those well prepared in their soul’.  

Moreover, in the *HE*, Eusebius often lists the writings left behind by the earlier church leaders whose lives he records, carefully assessing their value and praising or critiquing the ideas they expressed, as he felt appropriate. Often, such documents appear to be the most significant contributions of the bishops Eusebius lists. By contrast, Eusebius shows little interest in the development of any administrative or institutional structures. This corresponds to Brent’s suggestion that, for earlier Christian writers, the idea of an episcopal ‘apostolic succession’ was drawn at least in part from the idea of teaching successions within Greek philosophical schools, such as those outlined by Diogenes Laertius in his *Successions of the Philosophers*. For Irenaeus, Brent suggests, it was correct teaching, rather than any priestly or ritual significance, that was preserved by the succession from the apostles. Similarly, it seems that for Eusebius the role of a bishop, as a successor to the apostles, was, if not exclusively then at least substantially, that of a teacher.

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1021 *VC* 1.10.4: ἡ δὲ γε τῶν θεοφιλῶν διηγμάτων ὑπόμνησις ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἄλλα καὶ σφόδρα βιωφέλη τοῖς τὴν ψυχήν εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις πορείται τὴν ἐντευξιν.
Likewise, Eusebius’ interest, especially in the VC and LC – which have done so much to fuel the idea of Eusebius’ ‘realised eschatology’ – is not in the abstract notion of a Christian empire, but rather in the figure of Constantine himself, the Christian emperor. There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between Eusebius’ view of the Roman empire itself, particularly the pre-Constantinian empire, and his view of Constantine as a Christian leader who could, in his own way, be seen as fulfilling a role not unlike that of a bishop. That Eusebius, like Origen and Melito of Sardis before him, held the Roman empire to have had a providential role in God’s historical design has long been recognised. For Eusebius the Roman empire had facilitated the growth of Christianity by bringing peace between previously hostile nations, thereby making travel easier and enabling the spread of the Christian message. To Eusebius, it was no coincidence that Christ had been born at the same time as the empire was established by Augustus; rather, it was evidence of God’s benevolent providence at work in history.

However, as Johnson has noted, Eusebius’ presentation of the Roman empire, particularly in works written before Constantine’s conquest of the east, is not unequivocally positive. At times, Eusebius suggests that Christianity flourished in spite of the Roman empire and its rulers, rather than because of them, arguing in the DE that the persecutions made it clear that ‘the confirmation of the word came

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1025 Melito of Sardis, cited at HE 4.26.7-11; Origen, Cels. 2.30.
1027 DE 3.7.30-33.
1028 DE 3.7.30-33; PE 1.4.4.
1029 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 176-85.
not from the design of men, but from the power of God’. Even when the persecutions are said to have fulfilled the ultimately beneficial purpose of correcting the errant church, Eusebius is quick to stress that this does not remove the need to punish the Roman persecutors. In Johnson’s view, references such as these allow Eusebius to draw a distinction between Christianity and the Roman empire, and to highlight the primary importance of the church, rather than the empire, in facilitating the spread of Christianity. However, they also demonstrate that for Eusebius the character of the empire was shaped largely by the character of its leaders. In spite of his evident sense that Christianity had benefitted from the existence of the Roman empire, Eusebius refused to celebrate the empire itself unreservedly as long as its leadership remained hostile to Christians.

This, of course, changed with Constantine’s accession to sole rule – a development that led to the passing of legislation in favour of the Christian church, as well as to practical financial support enabling the building of new churches, and in some cases to the destruction of pagan shrines. These measures are famously celebrated in the VC. However, Eusebius’ emphasis in this work, as well as in the LC, is not exclusively on these official actions of the emperor. Just as or even more important were Constantine’s personal qualities, which allowed him, in Eusebius’ view, to fulfil the role of a Christian teacher. Eusebius makes this point quite

1030 DE 3.7.36: …ὅτι μὴ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἐνθαλῆς ἄλλ’ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως ἡ τοῦ λόγου σύνταξις. See Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 179, for discussion.
1031 HE 8.16.3.
1032 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 179, 193.
1033 See, for example: VC 1.42.2, 2.20.1-22.1, 2.44.1-45.1, 3.54.2-56.3, 3.58.1-4, 4.28.1.
1034 Constantine’s personal piety and virtuous behaviour are stressed at, for example: VC 1.9.1, 2.14.1, 3.2.2, 4.15.1-18.1, 4.22.1-3, 4.29.1, 4.33.1-2, 4.48.1. On Constantine as a teacher, see, for example: VC 1.4.1, 1.5.2, 3.58.2, 3.59.3, 4.18.1, 4.29.5, 4.55.1. Averil Cameron has pointed to the presentation of Constantine as a teacher in the VC as ‘one of the more striking features’ of the work, suggesting that
explicitly, suggesting in the LC that Constantine ‘expounds to those ruled by him the godly knowledge of the greatest king, as though they were the students of a good schoolmaster’. Similarly, in the VC, Eusebius claims that Constantine’s soldiers ‘admitted the emperor as their teacher in the ways of piety’. Throughout both the VC and the LC, Constantine is praised for his piety, his modesty and his recognition of the greater importance of spiritual over earthly matters. As a result of his exemplary lifestyle, Eusebius suggests that Constantine has become ‘a lesson and example of piety to the mortal race’ (διδασκελίαν θεοσεβούς υποδείγματος... τῷ θνητῷ γένει). A virtuous Christian emperor, it seems, can, simply by his existence, act as a teacher and help to spread the divine message by setting an example of good behaviour.

More than this, however, Constantine is also presented as actively seeking to instruct his subjects in the Christian faith. We are told in the VC how he would deliver sermons on religious and moral issues to his court, while the LC suggests that soldiers in the army received similar instruction. The importance which Eusebius attached to this aspect of Constantine’s role is further indicated by the fact that he chose to attach what he claimed was one of the emperor’s own speeches on Christian doctrine to the end of the VC. In fact, Eusebius likewise suggests that

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1035 LC 5.8: ...τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν αρχιμένοις ὡς ὑπὸ διδάσκαλῳ παιδειμένοις ἀγάθῳ τήν τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέας θεοσεβεῖς προβαλλόμενος.
1036 VC 4.18.1: ...βασιλέα διδάσκαλον θεοσεβῆν ἐπεγράφοντο τρόπων...
1037 For example: piety: VC 2.14.1, 3.2.2; LC 2.6; modesty: VC 1.39.1-3, 4.48.1; LC 5.6; spiritual concerns: LC 5.5, 5.8.
1038 VC 1.4.1; cf. VC 1.5.2.
1039 VC 4.29.1-5.
1040 LC 9.10.
1041 VC 4.32.1. It should be noted that the authenticity of this speech has been widely questioned; however, for our purposes the important point is that Eusebius felt it necessary to emphasise and,
Constantine’s letters to his subjects on religious matters had the specific effect of ‘keeping those he ruled away from the deceit of demons’. Even Constantine’s actions against paganism are said to have had an instructive function – when Constantine orders the destruction of pagan shrines and the statues of the gods are stripped of their precious metal exteriors, people are said to have realised the error of their previous religious practices and to have laughed at the demons they had once worshipped, rather than fearing them. Thus it seems that, for Eusebius, Constantine’s significance lay principally in his role as a teacher of Christian piety and virtue. Just as with the bishops, by actively spreading the Christian message, Constantine was working to undermine demonic influence and hence helping to forward the divine historical plan. As Christian teachers, both bishops and the emperor could be seen as performing a similarly crucial role in leading people to salvation.

This idea that Eusebius, or even Constantine himself, might have seen a parallel between the role of bishops and that of the Christian emperor is hardly new to Eusebian scholarship. Eusebius’ report at VC 4.24.1 that Constantine described himself as ‘a bishop of those outside’ (τῶν ἐκτός... ἐπίσκοπος) the church, together with a similar comment by Eusebius that Constantine was like ‘a shared bishop’ (τις κοινὸς ἐπίσκοπος), has long been the subject of scholarly debate. This debate, indeed, prove through the inclusion of this document that Constantine performed a role in instructing his subjects. Whether or not the speech was in fact written and delivered by the emperor, its inclusion nevertheless reinforces Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine as a teacher. For a summary of the debates surrounding the speech’s authenticity, see chapter I above, p. 69-70.

1042 VC 2.61.1: ...δαιμονικῆς μὲν απείρουν τοὺς ἀρχομένους πλάνης...
1043 VC 3.57.1; cf. LC 8.8.
1044 VC 1.44.1.
1045 See, for example: C. Rapp, ‘Imperial Ideology in the Making: Eusebius of Caesarea on Constantine as “Bishop”’, JTS 49 (1998), 685-95; W. Seston, ‘Constantine as a “bishop”’, JRS 37 (1947), 127-31; D.
however, has tended to focus on what these comments might reveal about either Eusebius’ or Constantine’s attitude towards the relationship between the church and the empire as separate and even opposed organisations, rather than on what they can show about Eusebius’ understanding of the duties of bishops and the emperor in their own right. For Johnson, Constantine’s remark, at least in Eusebius’ interpretation, if not in Constantine’s original intention, is ‘an expression of the doctrine of the separation of Church and State’. Yet Eusebius’ designation of the emperor by the same term, ἐπίσκοπος, used to denote the bishops of the church surely suggests unity rather than separation. Of course, this parallel enhances the position of the bishops by suggesting that they are, in their own way, equivalent to the emperor, but it also further strengthens the position of both bishops and emperor by highlighting their privileged relationship with the divine. In particular, it suggests that Eusebius saw these earthly leaders as imitating the instructive, supervisory role of the Christ-Logos.

In a parallel which has not previously been explored by scholars, Eusebius often uses various forms of the word ἐπισκοπέω (oversee), from which ἐπίσκοπος is derived, to describe divine activity on earth, particularly that of the Christ-Logos. In the VC, for example, Eusebius suggests that it was only ‘the supervision of God (θεοῦ τις ἐπισκοπή), and the fear of the emperor’ that prevented rioting in

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1047 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 195.

1048 See, for example: VC 1.15.1, 3.59.2; LC 6.9; DE 4.10.15, 8.2.5, 8.2.112, 8.2.113, 10.4.17; HE 3.7.9, 8.1.7, 9.8.15, 9.10.3.
While Rapp has demonstrated how Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine as an ἐπίσκοπος was tied in part to his portrayal of the emperor as a ‘type’ of Moses in the VC, she gave little consideration to this further parallel with Christ. Rapp pointed out that, since Moses was considered by many early Christian writers to be a ‘prefiguration’ of Christ, the parallel between Constantine and Moses could suggest a further parallel between Constantine and Christ; however, she overlooked the fact that this link was also made more directly through the use of term ἐπίσκοπος. Moreover, since ἐπίσκοπος was also used to designate bishops of the church, they too could be drawn into this parallel. In Eusebius’ works, the supervisory role of an ἐπίσκοπος is thus exercised in common by the Christ-Logos, by Constantine, and by the bishops of the church. It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, Christian leaders, whether bishops or the emperor, stood almost in the place of the Christ-Logos, performing a similar role of instruction and guidance to lead people to divine truth.

This sense that Christian leaders were acting almost as representatives of the divine on earth is reflected in the kind of language which Eusebius uses to describe them. Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine as a mimetic image of Christ on earth in the LC and VC, and his claim that the emperor had taken the divine likeness into his soul have often been noted by scholars, who have at times suggested that this represents the ‘sanctification’ of the imperial office by Eusebius. Yet Eusebius did

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1049 VC 3.59.2.
1050 Rapp, ‘Imperial Ideology’.
1052 For example: Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 152; Thielman, ‘Another Look’, 227; Barnes, C&E, 254; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 35.
1053 Trompf suggests that, in its descriptions of Constantine, the VC is ‘virtually sanctifying but never divinising’: Early Christian Historiography, 138.
not reserve such language exclusively for the emperor. There are clear parallels
between the terms which Eusebius uses of Constantine in the LC, and his earlier
description of bishop Paulinus of Tyre in the panegyric which he delivered at the
dedication of the new basilica at Tyre in around 315.\footnote{On the date of this speech, see: Barnes, C&E, 162. This similarity of language was also noted by Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 43-44.} In this speech, Paulinus is said to ‘carry in his own soul the impression of Christ in whole, the word, the
wisdom, the light’,\footnote{\textit{HE} 10.4.26: …δόει Χριστοῦ όλον, τὸν λόγον, τὴν σοφίαν, τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτῶς αὐτοῦ ἀγαλματοφορὸν ψυχῇ…} and to have created as far as possible earthly images of
heavenly ‘models’ (ἀρχετύποις) and ‘patterns’ (παραδείγμασιν) through his
actions.\footnote{\textit{HE} 10.4.25.} Thus it seems that for Eusebius, Christian ἐπίσκοποι, whether men of the
church or the emperor, act at their best as representative images of the Christ-Logos
on earth.

Yet, while Eusebius was evidently quite comfortable transferring the language
of divine mimesis that he had once used of bishops like Paulinus to the new figure
of the Christian emperor, this should not be taken as an indication that the emperor
had displaced the bishops in Eusebius’ eyes. The fact that in the VC, one of his last
works, Eusebius drew a deliberate parallel between Constantine and the bishops
through his description of Constantine as an ἐπίσκοπος demonstrates that the
importance of the bishops was not diminished for him by the existence of a
Christian emperor. Rather, in the VC, Constantine is shown as adding himself to the
number of the existing bishops. Hence, when Constantine is said to have claimed
that he was also a bishop, we are told that this comment was made while the
emperor was receiving other bishops at a banquet, reinforcing the sense that he is
simply one bishop among equals. Similarly, when Eusebius describes Constantine as being like a ‘shared bishop’, the emperor is said to have ‘sat in the middle as though one of many’. Eusebius allows for no distinction between bishops of the church and the emperor – in terms of their importance in God’s salvific design, they are equal.

Thus, in dismissing the idea that Eusebius believed himself to be standing at the very end of historical time, we are led to reassess the view that he must have invested particular significance in either the church or the empire. Instead, when we look anew at Eusebius’ works, freed from misleading assumptions about his understanding of history, we can see that, for him, real significance lay in the kind of virtuous Christian leadership that might be displayed either by the bishops of the church at their best, like Paulinus of Tyre, or by an exemplary Christian emperor, like Constantine. This significance stemmed from the role of these leaders in God’s plan for salvation. As teachers and models of virtue, they could provide the kind of instruction in piety that would enable their followers to resist the malign influence of the demons and turn instead towards the true Christian God. As such, what Eusebius celebrates in his later works is not the fulfilment of God’s kingdom on earth in either the church or the empire, but rather the unification of political and religious leadership in Christian virtue and the role which that might play in furthering God’s historical plan for salvation.

1057 VC 4.24.1.
1058 VC 1.44.2: …καθήσθω τε καὶ μέσος ὡσεὶ καὶ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς…
Conclusions

While Eusebius undoubtedly welcomed many of the events of his later life, particularly the new political and religious circumstances after the Council of Nicaea, it is important not to confuse this generally positive attitude with a sense of naïve triumphalism. For all his celebration of Constantine’s patronage of the Christian church, Eusebius was by no means blind to the challenges that continued to confront the virtuous. In the VC, much as he sought to downplay internal disagreements within the church, like the Donatist schism in Africa, or the dispute over the date of Easter, Eusebius could not completely avoid referring to them. Moreover, his remarks make it clear that he held such disputes to be the work of demons. Even in a work that was meant to be celebratory and triumphal, then, we find Eusebius still disturbed by the lingering demonic threat. Throughout the VC, there is repeated emphasis on the importance of unity within the church. Having seen that, for Eusebius, it was the unity and consistency of virtuous Christian leadership that was so important for encouraging salvation, we can recognise that for Eusebius such calls for unity were particularly pressing. Unless Christian leaders were able to maintain the high standards of behaviour necessary to imitate the divine, and the level of unity that would allow them to present a strong front in the fight against the demons, there remained the danger that the...

1059 VC 1.45.2, 2.61.1-5, 2.62.1, 2.73.1, 3.4.1, 3.5.1-3, 3.23.1, 3.59.1-2, 4.41.1-4.
1060 Some of these disputes are attributed directly to demonic activity (VC 1.45.2-3); others more obliquely to the work of ‘envy’ (VC 2.61.3, 3.1.1, 3.59.1, 4.41.1), which, as we saw in chapter II, was immediately identifiable as a characteristic of demons for Eusebius. Some are attributed to both at once: VC 2.73.1. At VC 3.5.3, the dispute is said to be the work of an ‘unseen enemy’ (ἀφανοῦς ἐχθροῦ) of the church, in what is surely another reference to demonic activity.
demons – always present and always active – might find a way to regain some of their influence.

There can be no doubt that Eusebius was alert to this possibility. Modern scholars view Eusebius’ works with the benefit of hindsight, aware that after Constantine there would be a largely unbroken succession of Christian emperors. But Eusebius had no such knowledge. The example of Licinius, who had switched from toleration of Christians to outright persecution, was hardly promising. Indeed, the very existence of the VC, often read as a ‘mirror for princes’, designed to instruct Constantine’s heirs in the requirements of virtuous Christian monarchy,\textsuperscript{1062} demonstrates both the importance in Eusebius’ eyes of ensuring that future emperors maintained high standards of virtue, and his awareness of the fact that such continuity could not be guaranteed.

Nor was the unreliability of imperial Christian virtue the only potential problem for Eusebius. As we have seen, Eusebius considered ‘heresy’ to be the work of demons and the last years of his life saw him actively involved in theological disputes. Even as he was preparing the VC, Eusebius was also composing polemical works directed against the teaching of Marcellus of Ancyra, the Contra Marcellum and De ecclesiastica theologia.\textsuperscript{1063} Thus, even at the end of his life, Eusebius was troubled by and actively participating in the kind of dispute that he felt to be the work of demons. In attempting through his writings to ensure the widespread acceptance of ‘correct’ doctrine, Eusebius would surely have seen himself as actively resisting demonically inspired attacks. For Eusebius, the struggle

\textsuperscript{1062} Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 195; Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 250; Cameron, ‘Construction’, 154; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 12; Cameron, ‘Form and Meaning’, 73.

\textsuperscript{1063} On the dating of these works, see Barnes, C&E, 263, and the discussion above, p. 69.
against the demons was real and continuing. There was thus no room for complacency in Eusebius’ understanding of history and little space for triumphalism, which, from his perspective, would have been premature.
CHAPTER VI

DEMONIC TYRANNY AND VIRTUOUS KINGSHIP

Eusebius’ ideas about kingship represent one of the most heavily studied aspects of his thought. His presentation of Constantine and the understanding of sovereignty which underpins this portrait have long drawn the attention of scholars, who have identified in some of his later works, particularly the VC and LC, the beginnings of Byzantine and western medieval theories of kingship. However, despite extensive study, the picture we have of Eusebius’ ideas in this area remains both incomplete and in parts confused. For some scholars, Eusebius’ understanding of sovereignty reflects little more than a superficial ‘Christianisation’ of earlier Hellenistic theories of kingship in which Eusebius simply adopted and expressed in Christian terms several ideas which had long been current. Such a picture undoubtedly owes much to a focus on the LC in particular – a speech in which the absence of overtly Christian language has long been noted by scholars. Yet for others, Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine, particularly in the VC, is striking for its use of Christian imagery and typology.

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1064 See, for example: Dvornik, Political Philosophy, II.616; Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian Empire’; Farina, L’impero, 257; Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 133; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 34; J.R. Lyman, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea’, 327; Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’, 115; Young, Nicaea to Chalcedon, 14.
1066 Chesnut, for instance, claims that in the LC ‘one sees the typical emphases of Romano-Hellenistic political theory’: The Ruler and the Logos, 1331. Dvornik similarly suggests that parts of the LC ‘sound like passages from some treatise on kingship by a Hellenistic writer’: Political Philosophy, II.619.
1067 For example: Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 29, 46-60; Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 79.

As a result, we are presented on the one hand with a speech in which, we are told, Constantine is presented as a typical Hellenistic king, and, on the other, with a biography in which he appears as an unmistakably Christian sovereign. Moreover, Eusebius’ ideas about sovereignty are not confined solely to those works which focus on the figure of Constantine. The later books of the \textit{HE} also discuss the political affairs of Eusebius’ own lifetime and mention a variety of different rulers, both positive and negative.\footnote{Including, as negative figures: Maximin (\textit{e.g.} \textit{HE} 8.13.15, 9.1.1) and Maxentius (\textit{e.g.} \textit{HE} 8.14.1-6); and as positive figures: Constantius (\textit{HE} 8.13.12-13), Crispus (\textit{HE} 10.9.6), and, of course, Constantine himself. Licinius appears as both positive and negative at different points in the narrative. On Licinius as positive, see \textit{e.g.} \textit{HE} 9.9.1, and as negative, see \textit{e.g.} \textit{HE} 10.8.1-19.} Even in the \textit{DE}, we find occasional, brief references to the role of the Roman empire and its rulers in relation to the spread of Christianity.\footnote{For example: \textit{DE} 3.7.30-39, 6.20.20-21, 7.2.22.}

However, even where scholars have taken account of a range of Eusebius’ works and have attempted to reconcile the various influences on his thought, the resulting analysis has been far from satisfactory. Glen Chesnut, for instance, identified two streams of influence on Eusebius’ thought – the Hellenistic and what he terms the ‘apocalyptic’ or the ‘Hebraic’.\footnote{Chesnut, \textit{First Christian Histories}, 134.} Chesnut analyses each of these in turn, arguing first that Constantine was, for Eusebius, a virtuous Hellenistic king, and second that he was an eschatological leader and saviour-figure in line with
apocalyptic ideas drawn from Jewish traditions. Chesnut suggests that this second presentation of Constantine, in which the emperor is said to have been raised to his position by God for the benefit of humankind, bears little relation to earlier Greek understandings of the role of divine activity in history. However, while suggesting that these two approaches to the figure of Constantine ‘were linked together firmly’ by Eusebius, Chesnut does not really offer an adequate explanation of how Eusebius may have combined these two sets of influences into a coherent picture of kingship.

Moreover, Chesnut’s suggestion that Eusebius viewed Constantine as an eschatological figure, ruling over the final ‘Kingdom of Peace’ on earth, fails to address the continuing presence of hostile demons in Eusebius’ understanding of the universe. It is hard to believe that Eusebius can have felt Constantine to have been presiding over a Kingdom of Peace, when he also believed that hostile demons were continuing to challenge and mislead humankind. A similar problem is raised by Michael Williams’ suggestion that Eusebius presented Constantine as a figure ‘who had overcome the old order and led his people into a world they seemed set to dominate’. As a result, we need to find a new way of understanding Constantine’s place in Eusebius’ thought and to reassess Eusebius’ presentation of the role of a Christian sovereign in the light of his concerns about the continuing demonic threat.

1073 Ibid. 133-66.
1074 Ibid. 162.
1075 Ibid. 156.
1076 Ibid. 160-61. Cf. the similarly problematic formulation of Farina: L’impero, 162.
1077 Williams, Authorised Lives, 42.
To do so, this chapter will approach the question of Eusebius’ ideas of kingship from an angle rather different from that usually adopted. Previous scholarship has tended to focus above all on Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine as the paradigm of virtuous sovereignty.\(^{1078}\) Yet there is just as much to be learnt about Eusebius’ understanding of the role of a good sovereign by considering his references to the opposite figure – the tyrant. This chapter will therefore devote at least as much attention to Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine’s opponents and predecessors, usually portrayed by Eusebius as vicious ‘tyrants’, as it will to his presentation of Constantine. In those works which deal most thoroughly with matters of earthly sovereignty – the \textit{VC}, \textit{LC} and \textit{HE} – we find bad rulers repeatedly linked with demons or the devil.\(^{1079}\) Eusebius presents tyrannical and vicious rulers as being under the influence of, indeed, enslaved to, demons.\(^{1080}\) He argues as a result that they are unfit to rule, and incapable of meeting the criteria required of a good monarch by traditional Hellenistic kingship theory. Consequently, he is able to present Constantine’s actions against his former co-rulers as entirely justified and praiseworthy.

More than this, Eusebius’ ideas about sovereignty are underpinned by his continuing concern over the on-going demonic threat. He suggests that, by a process of \(\mu\imath\iota\mu\iota\nu\iota\varsigma\), or imitation, such tyrants pose a threat not only to their subjects’ earthly well-being, but also to their spiritual health, and hence to their salvation. Tyrants would lead their subjects towards demons and hence, in order to combat

\(^{1078}\) See, however, the brief remarks at Johnson, \textit{Eusebius}, 167-68 and the largely descriptive discussion of Farina, \textit{L’impero} 224-34.

\(^{1079}\) See, for example: \textit{HE} 8.14.5, 8.14.8; \textit{VC} 1.58.3; \textit{LC} 5.2-3, 7.6-7.

\(^{1080}\) For example: \textit{LC} 5.2-3, \textit{VC} 1.13.3.
the demonic threat, a virtuous Christian sovereign, free from the influence of demons, is essential. Thus, for Eusebius, Constantine was important, not as the triumphant eschatological figure envisaged by Chesnut, but rather as a key figure in the on-going battle to secure people from demonic influence.

‘Thinking With’ Tyranny

Before progressing further in our examination of Eusebius’ representation of the tyrannical in his works, it is important to give some consideration to the concept of tyranny in the ancient and late antique world more broadly. For several centuries before Eusebius was writing, tyranny had ceased to be a neutral designation for a particular kind of political constitution. Rather, from as early as the fifth century BCE, it had become a weapon of invective, laden with negative connotations. In Aristotle’s definition of various possible political constitutions in his *Politics*, tyranny had represented the negative, inverted form of monarchy. Moreover, the figure of the tyrant had been a staple of classical Greek tragedy and in the process became associated with a further series of negative behaviours and characteristics. By the time it passed from Greek to Roman political discourse, characteristics such as arrogance, lust, and cruelty were considered standard in the

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1081 Dunkle suggests that, in its original meaning, the term *tyrannos* simply designated ‘a ruler who had gained power by usurpation and did not necessarily signify that the ruler was oppressive’: J.R. Dunkle, ‘The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic’, *TAPA* 98 (1967), 152.
figure of a negative ruler,\textsuperscript{1085} as the traditional Greek tyrant became assimilated to
the hated figure of the Roman \textit{rex}.	extsuperscript{1086} Thus, to label someone a ‘tyrant’ was to
condemn not only the quality of their rule, but also their character and lifestyle.\textsuperscript{1087}
Polybius had even suggested that it was hard to find ‘a greater or more pungent
charge’ to make against a person, on the grounds that the charge of tyranny
‘encompasses a meaning of the greatest impiety and brings together every injustice
and unlawfulness in man’.\textsuperscript{1088}

Among early Christian writers, the concept of tyranny developed still further,
with the ‘tyrant’ acquiring yet another negative association – the persecution of
Christians.\textsuperscript{1089} Justin Martyr and Tertullian do not go quite so far as to label current
emperors as ‘tyrants’, but they come close. Both writers suggest that to persecute
Christians is to act in a violent and tyrannical manner, while Tertullian argues that
persecution fails to respect the law.\textsuperscript{1090} These writers thereby urge the emperors and
their subordinates to refrain from prosecuting Christians. This connection between
the persecution of Christians and tyranny is one that would later also appear in
Eusebius.\textsuperscript{1091}

\textsuperscript{1085} Dunkle, ‘The Greek Tyrant’, 151-52.
\textsuperscript{1086} Ibid. 158.
\textsuperscript{1087} Ibid. 156.
\textsuperscript{1088} Plb. \textit{Hist}. 2.59.6: ταύτης δὲ μείζω κατηγορίαν ἢ πικροτέραν οὐδ’ ἂν εἰπεῖν ὡς δύναιτ’ οὐδεὶς.
αὐτὸ γὰρ τούνομα περιέχει τὴν απεβεβαιαὶν ἐμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληθε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας.
\textsuperscript{1089} T.D. Barnes, ‘Oppressor, persecutor, usurper: the meaning of \textit{tyrannus} in the fourth century’, in G.
Bonamente and M. Mayer, eds., \textit{Historiae Augusta Colloquia}, ns 4 Colloquium Barcinonense MCMXIII
(Bari, 1996), 58; and A.E. Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts in the Fourth-Century AD’,
\textit{Historia} 33 (1984), 223.
\textsuperscript{1090} Justin Martyr \textit{1 Apol}. 3; Tert. \textit{Apol}. 2.13-15.
\textsuperscript{1091} See, for example: \textit{HE} 8.14.8-9, 9.2.1, 9.4.2; Mart. Pal. [SR] 4.8, 6.6, 8.5, 11.7; \textit{VC} 1.12.2, 2.2.3. This is
noted as a significant theme of the \textit{VC} by Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 38; cf. Farina, \textit{L’impero},
231.
Recognising the power that the label ‘tyrant’ held in the ancient world, a number of scholars have stressed in recent years that the concept of tyranny could be ‘good to think with’, providing a means by which people could explore what was necessary in a good leader or political constitution through consideration of its opposite.\textsuperscript{1092} In consequence, there was a long literary and philosophical tradition, reaching back to the earliest Greek historians, of contrasting the vices of a tyrant with the equivalent virtues of a good sovereign.\textsuperscript{1093} This is a strategy which Eusebius also employs to considerable effect in the \textit{VC} and \textit{LC}.\textsuperscript{1094} Yet the vices associated with the figure of the tyrant were not fixed, but might be added to by different writers as they saw fit.\textsuperscript{1095} For instance, Christian writers’ belief that persecuting Christians was characteristic of tyranny would not necessarily have been shared by non-Christian authors. Thus tyranny was, in Sian Lewis’ assessment, ‘a malleable construct’, which could change according to circumstances.\textsuperscript{1096}

Previous work on the idea of tyranny in late antiquity, however, has tended to focus less on this idea of the tyrant as a concept to ‘think with’, and more on the question of legitimacy. It has been suggested that the meaning of the term ‘τύραννος/tyrannus’ changed during the fourth century, coming to mean specifically ‘usurper’, and to say more about the legitimacy of a person’s position


\textsuperscript{1094} For example: \textit{VC} 3.1.1-8; \textit{LC} 5.1-4.

\textsuperscript{1095} Lewis, ‘Introduction’, 6.

\textsuperscript{1096} \textit{Ibid.} 6.
than about the character of their rule. Yet the question of what constituted ‘legitimate’ rule in this period is far from straightforward. As Alan Wardman has pointed out, for the fourth century it ‘is very difficult to issue a satisfying judgement on the way or ways in which emperors proper were lawfully made’. This is a problem which Gilbert Dagron has argued continued into the later Byzantine period, when he suggests that the lack of a clearly established system for arranging the transfer of imperial authority led contenders for power to base their claims on the competing grounds of inheritance and merit. Both of these claims can similarly be found in panegyrics from early in Constantine’s reign, while the same collection of panegyrics also contains several attempts to link the emperor in question to some form of divine patron or ancestor. This suggests that, both in the fourth century and beyond, there were a range of ways in which rulers might attempt to justify and strengthen their position. Indeed, the development of the Tetrarchy under Diocletian can only have made this question of ‘legitimacy’ more complex. The creation of a hierarchy of multiple emperors ruling in east and west meant that the defeated imperial rivals branded as ‘tyrants’ could now include, not only those who had never held imperial power, but also, as in the case of Licinius, someone whose rule had been recognised by his co-emperors for some time. This makes any attempt to associate the language of tyranny with a particular understanding of ‘legitimacy’ extremely problematic. Rather, since it appears that ideas of ‘legitimacy’ were constantly being negotiated, we need to look instead at

1097 For a valuable summary of this debate, see Barnes, ‘Oppressor, persecutor, usurper’.
1098 Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 225.
1101 For example: Pan. Lat. XI (III).2.4; XI (III).3.8; VI (VII).8.5 and X (II).2.1.
how emperors, and those writing in their honour, sought to justify their actions and to persuade people that they were the best possible ruler.

Moreover, as Barnes sensibly recognised, the apparent proliferation in the use of the term ‘tyrant’ in the years following Constantine’s defeat of Maxentius in 312 was surely a result of the fact that the word had not yet lost its negative connotations, rather than a sign that it had become a neutral designation for an illegitimate ruler. For an imperial victor looking both to justify his past actions and to secure his future position, the figure of the tyrant could prove invaluable. Labelling a defeated rival a ‘tyrant’ served simultaneously to undermine the reputation of the loser and to enhance that of the victor, by presenting him as the liberator of his subjects. Thus it appears that, at least in the early fourth century when Eusebius was writing, the idea of the ‘tyrant’ remained loaded with negative connotations. Since tyranny was not a fixed and neutral designation for a particular political constitution, but rather a constructed and negotiable idea, it is important to pay close attention to Eusebius’ use of the term in order to determine what he understood by the concept.

Throughout those works in which Eusebius is concerned with matters of earthly sovereignty – the VC, LC and later books of the HE – he repeatedly describes Constantine’s imperial predecessors and rivals using the vocabulary of tyranny. In the VC, the Tetrarchs, with the exception of Constantine’s father, Constantius, are

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103 Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 223.
104 For example: HE 8.14.1, 8.14.7, 9.1.1, 9.9.3, 9.11.2, 10.9.2; VC 1.12.2, 1.26.1, 1.27.1, 1.49.2, 2.4.2, 2.18.1; LC 5.2.
labelled as ‘tyrants’⁴¹⁰⁵ and Eusebius is careful to emphasise that, despite being raised in the households of these men, Constantine did not share their moral character.⁴¹⁰⁶ Thus, even before he is emperor, Constantine is depicted as antithetical to the tyrants – for Eusebius, it seems, it was not simply the manner of a person’s rule that would determine whether or not they were to be called a tyrant, but their entire way of life. Similarly, in the *HE*, the label of ‘tyrant’ is once again applied to Constantine’s predecessors and rivals as emperor,⁴¹⁰⁷ while, in the *LC*, it is clear that Eusebius wishes to associate earlier emperors with a tyrannical style of government. In the *LC* we do not find any specific individuals accused of tyranny; rather, Eusebius refers obliquely to those ‘thought at some time to rule with tyrannical force’.⁴¹⁰⁸ This, however, is more likely a reflection of the conventions of late antique panegyric than of any uncertainty on Eusebius’ part about who was to be labelled a tyrant, for it was usual in this period for speakers to avoid naming an emperor’s defeated rivals in their orations.⁴¹⁰⁹ It is also perfectly clear from the way in which Eusebius repeatedly contrasts Constantine’s rule with that of his predecessors that Eusebius intended his listeners to identify earlier emperors as bad rulers or tyrants.⁴¹¹⁰ Moreover, in all three works the negative associations of tyranny are clearly in evidence.⁴¹¹¹ There is no suggestion at any point of any positive connotation for the term. Even in places where the terms ‘tyrant’ or ‘tyranny’ are

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¹⁰⁶ VC 1.12.2-3.
¹⁰⁸ LC 5.2: ...κάν νομίζηται ποτε τυραννική βία κρατεῖν...
¹⁰⁹ Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 222.
¹¹⁰ LC 5.1-4, 7.12, 9.13-14.
¹¹¹ For example: LC 5.3; VC 1.33.1, 1.35.1-36.2, 2.2.3, 3.1.1-8; HE 8.14.1-18.
used without further elaboration, the degree to which they are elsewhere associated with negative characteristics and behaviours makes it impossible to read these words simply as neutral descriptions. It therefore seems clear that, in using these words, Eusebius was seeking to tarnish the reputation of Constantine’s rivals.

This, then, is one way in which the concept of tyranny functions within these works – it allows Eusebius to undermine the authority of Constantine’s competitors for imperial power. Constantine, by contrast, is presented as a liberator and any questions about his own – less than straightforward – route to sole rule are tactfully obscured by this comprehensive attack on the character of his enemies.1112 Yet this is not the only role which the idea of the tyrant played in these works, for, as we have seen, tyranny was a concept ‘good to think with’. The vices attributed by Eusebius to his tyrants help to highlight key features of his virtuous sovereign as well. In this way, Eusebius’ presentation of tyranny contributes to creating his picture of the good ruler. It also enables him to exert some influence over the actions of future sovereigns by suggesting that anyone who acts in a vicious manner would become a tyrant rather than a king. Thus, by studying the negative associations of tyranny in these works, we can learn something of what Eusebius wanted from future rulers.

In many cases, there is considerable overlap between Eusebius’ tyrannical vices and those found in the works of earlier non-Christian writers, yet Eusebius also added

1112 On Constantine as a liberator, see, for example: HE 9.9.2; VC 1.26.1, 1.37.1, 1.39.2, 1.41.2. This also appears to have been a feature of Constantine’s own self-presentation – Eusebius records an inscription of Constantine in which he described his liberation of the city of Rome: VC 1.40.1-2. Constantine’s route to sole rule of the Roman empire involved wars against several of those who had previously ruled as his colleagues – on these various conflicts, see: Barnes, C&E, 28-43 and 62-77. According to Wardman, Constantine’s route to power was such that ‘however paradoxical it may seem, Constantine was certainly a usurper’: ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 232.
to these another negative association that reflects the influence of his Christian beliefs. This was the idea of a link between human tyrants and wicked demons.

**Demonic Slavery**

In an earlier chapter, we saw that Eusebius associated demons with an oppressive and tyrannical style of rule; it is clear from his descriptions of earthly tyranny that he likewise saw human tyrants as firmly linked to the demonic. Both kinds of tyrant – demonic and human – are said by Eusebius to govern in a manner that ‘enslaves’ their subjects. Of course, this association between tyranny and slavery was not new to Eusebius; as far back as Aristotle, it had been suggested that a tyrant might be equated to a δεσπότης, or ‘slave-master’. Similarly, Herodotus wrote of the Milesians that they ‘were in no way eager to accept another tyrant in their territory, having experienced freedom’, making it clear that tyranny was held to be incompatible with liberty. Within Roman society, P.A. Brunt has suggested that, whilst there had been provision in the earliest, archaic Roman law for a citizen to be enslaved for debt, such a sale would, by law, have had to take place outside Roman territory, implying that it was considered to be incompatible with romanitas.

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1113 See above, p. 138-40.  
1114 For example, human tyrants: VC 1.13.3, 1.36.2; HE 8.14.6, 9.9.3; demons: VC 1.13.3; LC 5.3; HE 8.12.3 (τῇ τῶν δαιμόνων δουλείᾳ). As Martin has also previously noted: *Inventing Superstition*, 220.  
1116 Hdt. 6.5.1: ἐν τῷ τῶν τεχνών δεινοῖς ἀλλον τύραννον δεκεσθαι ἐς τὴν χώρην, οὐ ἐλευθερίας γεγονόμενοι.  
Indeed, Aristotle had set out in his *Politics* a theory of slavery in which the condition of slaves was presented as almost less than human,\(^\text{1118}\) claiming that some people deserved to be slaves because they lacked the capacity for reasoning necessary for freedom.\(^\text{1119}\) Once again, this was connected to the idea that slavery was not to be imposed on Greek citizens, for Aristotle identified the characteristic of being ‘irrational in nature’ (ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστος) as one which would be found primarily among ‘far-off barbarians’ (οἱ πόρρω βαρβάροι).\(^\text{1120}\) Both law and philosophy therefore presented slavery as a barbarous condition, which would be degrading for a Greek or Roman citizen. The idea that tyranny, in effectively enslaving a population, was a barbarous form of government is reflected in Eusebius’ *LC*, where Eusebius suggests that rulers he elsewhere characterises as tyrants are themselves barbarians. Demons, often presented by Eusebius as tyrannical, are described in the *LC* as ‘roug\(\overline{h}\)er than all barbarians’.\(^\text{1121}\) Slightly later in the speech, Eusebius also suggests that Constantine has ‘defeated that dual barbarian nation’ of both demons and godless humans, suggesting that Eusebius also held human tyrants to be barbarous.\(^\text{1122}\)

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\(^{1118}\) Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 113, citing Arist. *Politics* 1256b20-25 and 1280a31-35. For full discussion of Aristotle’s views on slavery, see Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 107-27. Although Aristotle’s ideas of slavery are usually studied using both the *Politics* and the *Nicomachian Ethics*, Garnsey suggests that there are several differences between these two works, and argues the theory of ‘natural slavery’ is in fact only found in the *Politics*: 107-08.


\(^{1120}\) Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1149a10-12: …οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ἑοντες ὑμιὸδες, ὧςπερ ἐν γενι τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων… Garnsey cites this passage, but suggests that Aristotle was not in fact thinking of the ‘natural slave’ in this instance: *Ideas of Slavery*, 114. However, it is easy to see how by combining Aristotle’s suggestion that natural slaves are deficient in reason with his claim that ‘barbarians’ are also deficient in reason, his audience might have been led to consider slavery as a condition fit only for non-Greeks.


\(^{1122}\) *LC* 7.13: …τὸ δὲ εἰκόν ἐκεῖνον βαρβάρων ἐνίκα γένος…
However, for Eusebius earthly tyrants were not simply slave-masters in the manner envisaged by Aristotle, but also slaves themselves. We find this expressed most fully in the LC, where Eusebius makes it clear that he believed vicious sovereigns to be enslaved to demons. In this case, as we saw, Eusebius is not discussing the example of a particular tyrant, but, more generally, those figures who might be ‘thought at some time to rule with tyrannical force’, showing that he considered this enslavement to demons to be characteristic of all human tyrants. Here, Eusebius poses his audience a question: ‘How,’ he asks, ‘can a ruler and lord of the whole world be someone who has attached himself to numberless embittered masters, and who is a slave of dishonourable hedonism, a slave of intemperate madness for women, a slave of unjustly acquired riches, a slave of anger and rage, a slave of fear and terrors, a slave of murderous demons, a slave of deadly spirits?’

The repetition of the word δοῦλος (slave), which appears seven times in this one sentence, makes it clear that Eusebius wishes to emphasise the enslaved condition of the figures he is describing.

Moreover, in parallel to this emphasis on slavery, Eusebius also finds room for many of the traditional tyrannical vices, familiar from earlier Greek literature.

Yet the construction of the sentence ensures that the greatest emphasis is placed, not on these vices, but on the tyrannical ruler’s relationship with demons. Concluding

1123 LC 5.2: ...κἂν νομίζηται ποτε τυραννική βία κρατεῖν...
1124 LC 5.3: πώς δ’ ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κόσμων ὡς μυστικάς καὶ ‘ἐναύτου πικρούς δεσπότας ἐφεκτησμένος, καὶ δοῦλος μὲν αἰσχρὰς ἡδονὰς, δοῦλος δ’ ἀκαλλάσσον γυναικομανίας, δοῦλος χρημάτων ἐξ ἀδίκου πορισμένων, δοῦλος θυμοῦ καὶ ὀργῆς, δοῦλος φόβου καὶ δειμάτων, δοῦλος μυσσόφορον δαιμόνιον, δοῦλος ψυχοθρόφοις πνευμάτοις;
1125 Herodotus, for instance, claimed that envy, indiscriminate murder, rape and a lack of respect for the law were characteristic of tyrants: Hdt. 3.80.4-5; Euripides associated tyrants with the illegal acquisition of wealth, hedonism and lust: Eur. Supp. 444-55; Plato characterised the tyrannical character (in this case not restricted to those who occupied positions of leadership) as disposed to theft, murder, impiety and corruption: Rep. 9.575b.
the sentence with the emphatic pairing of wicked demons and spirits ensures that it is these malevolent spiritual forces which linger longest in the audience’s minds. It is surely also significant that this list of traditional vices is framed here by opening and closing references to ‘embittered masters’, ‘murderous demons’ and ‘deadly spirits’.\(^{1126}\) This implies that these traditional characteristics and behaviours of the tyrant are in fact a product of their enslavement to demons.

In developing this idea of spiritual enslavement, Eusebius drew on a long tradition of earlier thought. It was widely accepted in both Greek and Christian thought that it was possible for a person who was not legally a slave nevertheless to be enslaved in a moral sense. Most famous is the Stoic doctrine of moral slavery, elaborated at length in Philo of Alexandria’s *Every Good Man Is Free*.\(^{1127}\) This formed only half of a longer two-part work, which originally included the counterpart *Every Bad Man Is a Slave*.\(^{1128}\) In the surviving part of this treatise, Philo explicitly distinguished two kinds of slavery, one which related to ‘souls’, and another to ‘bodies’.\(^{1129}\) For Philo, who suggested that a soul might be enslaved to ‘wickedness and passion’,\(^{1130}\) it was slavery of the soul, rather than legal slavery, that was most important and hence most worthy of a philosopher’s attention.\(^{1131}\) In the Stoic view,

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\(^{1126}\) It is clear that Eusebius is thinking of demons in his initial reference to ‘numberless embittered masters’, for in the sentence immediately before this, Eusebius had referred to the same person having similarly associated himself with ‘numberless falsely drawn icons of demons’ (*LC* 5.3: ...ὁ μυρίας ἑψυχηγορήσαντας δαιμόνων εἰκόνας...).

\(^{1127}\) On Stoic ideas of moral slavery, see Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 131-33. Sources for early Stoic ideas of slavery, as for much of early Stoicism, are limited and it is only from the first and second centuries CE onwards that we have full discussions of the subject from Stoic philosophers: *ibid.* 129-31. On Philo’s ideas of moral slavery, see: *ibid.* 157-63.

\(^{1128}\) Philo, *Probus* 1.

\(^{1129}\) Philo, *Probus* 17: δουλεία τούτην ἢ μὲν ψυχῶν, ἢ δὲ σωμάτων λέγεται.

\(^{1130}\) *Ibid.*: δεσπόται δὲ τῶν... ψυχῶν δὲ κακία καὶ πάθη.

\(^{1131}\) Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 158.
it was only by exercising a high level of self-control in order to defeat these passions that a person could be said to be truly free.\textsuperscript{1132}

Moreover, this idea had already found Christian expression in Paul’s language of the slavery of sin. At Romans 6:12, Paul instructs his audience not to ‘let sin exercise dominion in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their passions’.\textsuperscript{1133} Elsewhere, he describes how ‘with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin’.\textsuperscript{1134} As Peter Garnsey has observed, this Pauline language of enslavement bears considerable similarity to the earlier Stoic notion of moral slavery, with slavery to sin replacing slavery to the passions.\textsuperscript{1135} There can be no doubt that Eusebius would have been very familiar with Paul’s letters – indeed, he quotes passages from the epistle to the Romans on many occasions.\textsuperscript{1136} We also know that he was aware of Philo’s discussions of slavery. Andrew Carriker has demonstrated that Eusebius would have had access to both parts of Philo’s treatise on moral slavery through the library at Caesarea,\textsuperscript{1137} and Eusebius, in common with many other early Christian writers,\textsuperscript{1138} did not hesitate to express his admiration for Philo.\textsuperscript{1139} The lack of direct quotation from either writer in Eusebius’ discussions of the slavery makes it

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[1132] \textit{Ibid.}, 133.
\item[1133] NRSV \textit{trans.}: μὴ ὁμοιόμοιον ἠμαρτίαν ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν.
\item[1134] Rom. 7:25, NRSV \textit{trans.}: ὄρα ὅπως ἀὑτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοεῖ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἠμαρτίας.
\item[1136] For example: \textit{PE} 3.13.4, 6.6.37, 11.8.1, 12.27.6, 12.52.34, 13.7.5.
\item[1137] Carriker, \textit{Library}, 170, 174-75. Eusebius refers to both parts of Philo’s treatise on slavery at \textit{HE} 2.18.6.
\item[1139] \textit{HE} 2.18.1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
impossible to prove direct influence, although it is highly probable that he developed his own ideas in the context of these earlier writings.

A further possible influence on Eusebius’ ideas about the enslavement of tyrants to demons can be found in the work of earlier Christian apologists, particularly Justin Martyr. Several Christian apologists writing in times of persecution had suggested that bad rulers were acting under the influence of demons. For instance, in his *Apology*, a work which Eusebius appears to have known, Tertullian wrote to the Roman provincial governors that ‘there might be a power hidden in concealment which directs you against the form and against the nature of judgement, and also against the laws themselves’. For Tertullian, attacks on the Christians were so perverse that they could only be attributed to the malign inspiration of wicked spiritual powers, although Tertullian did not specifically use the language of enslavement here. We do find the vocabulary of slavery in Justin’s *Apology*, however. Justin does not go as far as Eusebius in claiming that the emperors actually are already enslaved to demons; rather, he frames his suggestion of an association between bad rulers and demons in the form of a warning. He urges his addressees – including the emperor Antoninus Pius and

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1140 Eusebius does quote from Philo’s *Every Good Man is Free* at *PE* 8.12.1-19. However, the passage which Eusebius quotes is a description of the community of the Essenes and the context of the quotation is not a discussion of slavery, but rather an attempt to prove the superiority of the ‘Hebrew’ lifestyle. Thus, while it proves that Eusebius had read at least some of Philo’s treatise, we cannot use this quotation to determine how far Eusebius was influenced by Philo’s understanding of moral slavery.

1141 For discussion of this theme in the works of the early Christian apologists, including Justin, Tertullian, Clement and Athenagoras, see: Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists’, 301-25.

1142 Eusebius quotes from the *Apology* five times in the *HE* (HE 2.2.5-6, 2.25.4, 3.20.7, 3.33.3, 5.5.7) and Carriker suggests that this was probably the only work by Tertullian to which he had access, most likely in a Greek translation: Carriker, *Library*, 261-62.

1143 Tert. *Apol.* 2.14: *Suspecta sit vobis ista perversitas, ne qua vis lateat in occulto, quae vos adversus formam, adversus naturam iudicandi, contra ipsas quoque leges ministret.*

1144 It appears that Eusebius also had access to both parts of Justin’s *Apology*, for he includes them in a list of Justin’s works at *HE* 4.18.1-2. See Carriker, *Library*, 220-23.
his heir Marcus Aurelius\textsuperscript{1145} – to be on their guard against the deceitful attacks of the demons, who, he claims, seek to make the emperors their ‘slaves and servants’\textsuperscript{1146}. Justin raises the idea that rulers might be enslaved to demons as a dangerous possibility; Eusebius, in writing about previous emperors rather than the present ruler, was free to make the connection more explicitly.

Thus, in developing his ideas about the relationship between bad human rulers and demons, Eusebius had a range of different sources upon which he could draw. Eusebius appears to have combined well-established ideas of moral slavery with a long Christian tradition of associating bad rulers with demons to produce the idea that ‘tyrants’ were enslaved to demons. In searching for the cause of a soul’s enslavement, either to sin or to the passions, and in identifying that cause as an initial enslavement to demons, Eusebius firmly grounds the notion of moral slavery in physical reality. In this, his understanding of moral slavery differs from that of both Philo and Paul. For these writers, the idea of slavery to the passions remains metaphorical – we are not led to envisage a physical master external to the moral slave. In Eusebius’ thought, however, we find the moral slave placed firmly in the power of external beings – the demons. These, as we have seen, were as real and as physical for Eusebius as any external human master would have been\textsuperscript{1147}. Eusebius draws a distinction between the kind of slavery to vice and immorality discussed by Philo and Paul, and a prior slavery to demons. As we have seen, at \textit{LC} 5.3, Eusebius implies that the vicious character of the bad rulers under discussion is at least partly

\textsuperscript{1145} Justin 1 \textit{Apol.} 1.

\textsuperscript{1146} Justin 1 \textit{Apol.} 14: ...ἀγωνίζονται γὰρ ἔχειν ὑμᾶς δούλους καὶ ὑπηρέτας... As Pagels notes, Justin concludes his two-part apology with the suggestion that he is actually acting in the emperors’ own best interests by trying to divert them from demonic influence: Pagels ‘Christian Apologists’, 307, citing Justin 2 \textit{Apol.} 15.

\textsuperscript{1147} See above, p. 90-98.
a result of their enslavement to wicked demons. Eusebius is therefore not only accusing these figures of being morally corrupt, he is actually denying their independence.

As a result, Eusebius is able to suggest that these figures are incapable of ruling. By framing his suggestion that bad rulers are the slaves of demons as a rhetorical question, Eusebius is encouraging his audience to note the striking paradox in the idea that a 'lord of the whole world' might also be a slave. He implies that a person's enslavement to demons makes it impossible for him to rule. This is contrasted with Eusebius' suggestion that Constantine alone may be described as ‘truly lord of himself’ – clearly Constantine has the level of independence necessary to make an effective leader. Eusebius was certainly aware that there were other ways, beyond claims to virtue, by which a ruler might seek to justify his position, for he deploys some of them in support of Constantine. However, by suggesting that vice is in fact evidence of a ruler's enslavement, Eusebius effectively over-rides these other claims to authority. From Eusebius' perspective, a moral slave simply cannot be an emperor; consequently, it

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1148 This suggests a similar relationship between tyrants and demons to that found in Tertullian, who suggests that the actions of the persecutors are so wrong-headed that they can only be the result of demonic influence: Tert. *Apol.* 2.14, and see above, p. 269.

1149 *LC* 5.3.

1150 *LC* 5.4: ...ἀὐτοκράτωρ ἀληθῶς...

1151 In particular, Eusebius stresses that Constantine inherited his position from his father: *HE* 8.13.12-13, 9.9.1; *VC* 1.9.1, 2.22.1-2. Williams has noted that ideas of inheritance were particularly important to Constantine and his sons, arguing that the Constantine’s father Constantius appears in the *VC* ‘above all to show that Constantine was a legitimate ruler’: *Authorised Lives*, 52. Cf. Farina, *L'impero*, 169. Although Williams' terminology of 'legitimacy' is unhelpful, it is nonetheless evident that Eusebius wished to avoid giving the impression that Constantine owed his position exclusively to his virtue. I will demonstrate below, however, that the question of virtue remained the most important requirement for sovereignty for Eusebius, even in the case of the Constantinian dynasty (see discussion below, p. 291-92).
little matters whether such a person had gained his position through inheritance, or
even whether he had been widely acknowledged as the ruler.

This sense that even someone who, in being acknowledged by others, was in
all outward appearance the emperor might not in fact be a true sovereign recurs
throughout the LC. In this work, Eusebius sets up a contrast between the outer form
and inner reality of a tyrant’s position. Eusebius introduces this distinction to his
discussion of sovereignty in the prologue to the LC, when he announces that what
will concern him in this speech is the nature of the difference between ‘the exemplar
of kingship in our time and the fraudulent impression (τὸ χάραγμα
κεκιβδηλευμένου)’.1152 The phrase which Eusebius chose to describe the opposite of
his model king is worthy of note, since it is powerfully resonant of counterfeit
coinage. The word ‘τὸ χάραγμα’ could refer generally to official, stamped
documents, but also, importantly, to stamped money or coinage,1153 while
‘κιβδηλος’, from the verb ‘κιβδηλεύω’ (‘to adulterate’), was used of adulterated
coinage.1154 With this phrase, Eusebius is thereby equating the opposite of the model
sovereign to a counterfeit coin, with all its associated connotations of falseness. Such
a ruler may thus be seen as just as worthless and, potentially, just as socially
damaging as counterfeit coinage. Crucially, however, Eusebius is drawing attention
to an important distinction between appearance and reality: a counterfeit coin may
‘look the part’, just as a tyrant may dress, act and even be treated like a sovereign. In
reality, however, both are base, and without worth.

1152 LC Prol.5: ...τοῦ τε καθ’ ἡμᾶς βασιλικοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ τοῦ τὸ χάραγμα
κεκιβδηλευμένου...
1153 LSJ, s.v. χάραγμα.
1154 LSJ, s.v. κιβδηλεία.
Having established this important distinction at the very start of his oration, Eusebius is then able to pick up on this idea again later on. At LC 5.2, Eusebius makes his point explicit, saying that an emperor of this kind ‘might be thought at some time to rule with tyrannical force, but he will at no point be called king in true speech’.\textsuperscript{1155} Finally, at LC 7.6, Eusebius describes the rulers of the past, those who were enslaved to demons, as ‘those thought to rule’.\textsuperscript{1156} Once again, Eusebius makes an important point about the reality of these men’s sovereignty – it is deceptive, existing only in appearance but not in reality. As a result, Eusebius is able subtly to suggest that Constantine, as the true sovereign, did nothing wrong at all in attacking men such as Licinius, for, while they may have appeared to be his co-emperors, the reality was very different.

For Eusebius, a tyrant’s vices thus become evidence of a deeper problem, only the outer manifestation of his inner condition. Of course these vices are troubling in themselves – in many cases they are characteristics that would prove unpleasant or even dangerous for a ruler’s subjects. Yet Eusebius is more concerned with the bad ruler’s enslavement, which, far more than his propensity for vice, is what really disqualifies him from ruling. Eusebius’ interest in the tyrants’ vices as evidence of their relationship with demons reflects his understanding of how demons might draw people away from salvation. As we have already seen,\textsuperscript{1157} Eusebius felt that the encouragement of vice was a key weapon in the demons’ arsenal. However, this was not the only means by which Eusebius believed the demons could lead people

\textsuperscript{1155} LC 5.2: ...κἀν νομίζῃ τοῦτο τυραννικὴ βία κρατεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἀληθεῖ λόγω χρηματίσει βασιλεὺς οὗτος.
\textsuperscript{1156} οἱ... κρατεῖν νομισαμένοι...
\textsuperscript{1157} Above, p. 192-93.
to damnation; he also stresses their role in promoting false belief.\footnote{DE 7.1.103.} Thus, since Eusebius suggests that vice, as a manifestation of demonic enslavement, disqualifies a person from ruling, we might also expect a similar suggestion that ‘incorrect’ belief be seen as a distinguishing feature of the ‘tyrant’.

Sure enough, in Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine’s predecessors, we find repeated emphasis on the error of their religious beliefs.\footnote{As Farina noted: \textit{L’impero}, 225-26, 231-32.} Their faith in the pagan demon-gods, and particularly the folly of trusting in these lesser spiritual beings instead of the true Christian God is highlighted in Eusebius’ descriptions of the various civil wars between the Tetrarchs. When describing both the war between Licinius – at this point still presented as a virtuous sovereign – and Maximinus in the \textit{HE} and that between Constantine and his erstwhile ally Licinius in the \textit{VC}, Eusebius reminds his audience that the ‘tyrants’ placed their faith in the wrong spiritual forces and were defeated accordingly.\footnote{\textit{HE} 9.10.2-4; \textit{VC} 2.4.1-12.2.} Indeed, as several scholars have previously recognised, the war between Constantine and Licinius is re-imagined in the \textit{VC} almost as a ‘battle of the gods’, in which the Christian God is shown as victorious and therefore stronger.\footnote{Williams, \textit{Authorised Lives}, 39. Cf. Cameron and Hall, \textit{Life of Constantine}, 202-03 on the war between Constantine and Maxentius, and 231-34 on the war between Constantine and Licinius; Farina, \textit{L’impero}, 232.} For good measure, Eusebius further associates his tyrants not only with traditional civic worship, but also with other practices that would have been widely considered abhorrent, including by non-Christians. Maxentius, for example, is said to have cut open a pregnant woman as part of a magical ritual.\footnote{\textit{VC} 1.36.1; \textit{HE} 8.14.5.} This is a practice which we also find condemned later in the
fourth century by the pagan historian Ammianus Marcellinus. Licinius is similarly condemned for having recourse to magical practices. For Eusebius, tyrants are thus characterised both by vice and by religious error, both of which, in his eyes, are manifestations of their enslavement to demons and hence are evidence that they are unsuited to positions of leadership.

Moreover, the kind of ‘false’ belief encouraged by demons was not, for Eusebius, restricted to pagan practices, but also encompassed ‘heterodox’ Christian belief. This is less heavily emphasised as a feature of tyranny by Eusebius – unsurprisingly, given that Eusebius was mainly describing the ‘historical’ tyranny of Constantine’s predecessors, who were, of course, pagans, rather than Christians of any persuasion. Yet, in Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine we do find it clearly implied that, not just Christian belief, but ‘orthodox’ Christian belief was essential in a true sovereign. When discussing Constantine’s attitude towards God, Eusebius uses a range of different words which might loosely be covered by the English term ‘piety’, or ‘pious’, including ‘φιλόθεος’, ‘θεοσέβεια’ and ‘εὐσέβεια’. Of these, the ones that appear most frequently in connection with the emperor are ‘θεοσέβεια’ and ‘εὐσέβεια’. The meaning of these two words is very

\[\text{1163 Amm. Marc. 29.2.17.}\]
\[\text{1164 VC 2.4.2, 2.11.2. Cf. on Maximinus HE 9.3.1.}\]
\[\text{1165 For example, φιλόθεος: VC 1.22.2, 3.29.2, 4.64.2; θεοσέβεια: VC 1.3.4, 1.4.1, 1.8.2, 1.41.2, 4.52.1; εὐσέβεια: VC 1.5.2, 1.6.1, 1.8.4, 1.9.1, 1.12.3, 1.22.2, 1.39.3, 3.29.1, 3.54.6, 4.18.1, 4.24.1, 4.52.1.}\]
\[\text{1166 Eusebius uses forms of the word θεοσέβεια and εὐσέβεια over ten times each in the VC to describe either Constantine or the kind of attitude which the emperor sought to encourage in his subjects and his sons. By contrast, forms of φιλόθεος are applied to Constantine or the state of his soul only three times in the VC. My calculations discount references in quoted documents and in chapter headings, where the wording is not Eusebius’ own. (On the fact that the chapter headings are not to be attributed to Eusebius, see Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 24.)}\]
similar and they often appear to be used almost interchangeably by Eusebius.\textsuperscript{1167}

Both words, with their basic meaning of ‘piety’ or ‘belief in God’, contrast favourably with the ‘δυσσέβεια\textsuperscript{1168}’ (impiety) of tyrants like Licinius and Maxentius. However, they also have a secondary meaning which was surely significant, for they could both refer, not just to piety in general, but to ‘correct belief’ more specifically.\textsuperscript{1169} Religious devotion alone was not enough for someone to be described as ‘\(\theta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\)’ or ‘\(\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\beta\eta\zeta\)’; rather, that piety had to be correctly directed. The possibility that Eusebius wished to exclude from ruling those Christians whose views he regarded as heterodox cannot be ignored.

Early in the \(\text{\textit{VC}}\), when describing the kind of example which Constantine provides to his subjects, Eusebius repeatedly describes him as a model of ‘\(\theta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\)’.\textsuperscript{1170} Here, forms of the word appear three times in only eight lines of Winkelmann’s edition of the text, and this rapid repetition helps to emphasise the importance of this particular virtue. Moreover, on its second appearance here, it is further described as ‘\(\alpha\pi\lambda\alpha\zeta\ \theta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\)’, or ‘undeceived piety’\textsuperscript{1171}. The use of this adjective, which, as we have seen, appears frequently in Eusebius’ presentation of the demonic, was surely deliberate. Eusebius seems to be emphasising the importance of Constantine’s orthodoxy here: Constantine’s view of God has not been led astray by the demons who inspire both ‘heresy’ and polytheism. By using these words ‘\(\theta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\)’ and ‘\(\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\beta\eta\zeta\)’ more often than ‘\(\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\epsilon\omicron\zeta\)’ to describe

\textsuperscript{1167} Farina suggests, however, that \(\theta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) is a more specific virtue that may be encompassed within the broader \(\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\beta\eta\zeta\), which he rightly identifies as one of the most important virtues of the ‘true emperor’ (‘del vero Imperatore’): \textit{L’impero}, 211-12, 216.
\textsuperscript{1168} \(\text{\textit{VC}}\) 1.33.1; 1.49.2.
\textsuperscript{1169} \textit{PGL}, s.v. \(\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\beta\eta\zeta\); \(\theta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\).
\textsuperscript{1170} \(\text{\textit{VC}}\) 1.4.1.
\textsuperscript{1171} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{1172} See above, p. 184.
Constantine, it therefore seems that Eusebius meant to deny the possibility of ruling to ‘heterodox’ Christians, as well as pagans.

For Eusebius, a tyrant cannot be a true sovereign because he is a slave of demons. A tyrant may be identified for Eusebius either by his vicious lifestyle or by his false belief. Thus, both virtue and ‘orthodox’ Christianity become the primary qualifications for sovereignty in Eusebius’ view. Of course, as we have seen, Eusebius was not the first Christian writer to imply – however obliquely – either that earlier, pagan emperors were tyrants, or to suggest that they might be acting under the influence of demons. Pagels argues that scholars have frequently underestimated the subversive core of earlier Christian apologists’ political message by disregarding their discussions of demons.1173 The same might be said of scholars’ treatment of Eusebius’ political thought.

Of course Eusebius celebrates Constantine as the model of a virtuous Christian king,1174 but in doing so he also establishes strict criteria for determining who should be considered capable and worthy of ruling.1175 At root, it was essential that a ruler should be free from the influence of demons. In view of the demons’ role in encouraging both vice and ‘false’ belief, Eusebius has therefore found a straightforward way of identifying a tyrant, or potential tyrant. Any ruler who inclined either towards vicious behaviour, or towards religious beliefs with which Eusebius did not agree, would be demonstrating that they were closer to the demons than to God, thereby disqualifying themselves from government. This is a

1173 Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists’, 314, 323.
1174 As scholars have long recognised – for example: Farina, L’impero, 10; J.M. Santerre, ‘Eusèbe de Césarée et la naissance de la théorie “césaropapiste”’, Byzantion 42 (1972), 137, 155. 1175 As Johnson has also previously noted: Ethnicity and Argument, 194. As Johnson has elsewhere pointed out, this was a key element of the ‘mirror for princes’ literature of which the VC at least is often said to be a part: Eusebius, 166-69.
particularly striking message if we remember that Eusebius wrote at least one of his most ‘political’ works, the VC, not, for the most part, under Constantine, but under his sons.\textsuperscript{1176} Since these new emperors had already recalled one of Eusebius’ theological enemies, Athanasius of Alexandria, from an exile imposed by, among others, Eusebius himself,\textsuperscript{1177} we may conclude that Eusebius was not entirely comfortable with the religious direction being taken by the new regime. It may have been couched in the language of praise for a Christian sovereign, but Eusebius’ message that an unacceptable ruler was enslaved to demons was potentially no less subversive than Justin Martyr’s earlier suggestion that the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Antoninus Pius were at risk of losing their independence to the power of demons.\textsuperscript{1178}

*Divine and Demonic Μίμησις*

For Eusebius, however, this idea that tyrants and demons were linked was not simply a useful means of exerting some degree of moral influence over the emperors; rather, the idea that a ruler could be serving the forces of evil had considerable cosmological significance for Eusebius. In Eusebius’ view, a ruler’s relationship with either the divine or the demonic would have a particularly profound impact on the progress of the on-going struggle against the demons. Where earlier authors like Justin had urged the pagan emperors to turn to the

\textsuperscript{1176} On the dating and composition of the VC, see: Barnes, *C&E*, 263, 265, and Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 9-12, as well as the discussion above, p. 57-62.

\textsuperscript{1177} On the return of Athanasius, see: Barnes, *C&E*, 263-64; on Athanasius’ prior exile by the Council of Tyre, see: *ibid.* 235-40.

\textsuperscript{1178} Justin, *I Apol.* 14.
Christian God for their own benefit, Eusebius did not consider a ruler’s religious beliefs to be a purely personal matter. Instead, he suggests that a sovereign’s decision to follow either the divine or the demonic had the potential to affect not only his capacity to rule, but also the salvation and spiritual wellbeing of his subjects. This was because Eusebius believed that, by a process of μίμησις, or imitation, a ruler’s religious beliefs were likely to be adopted by many of his subjects. Thus, a ruler’s choices would affect not only his own salvation, but that of many of his subjects as well. As a result, while a Christian sovereign would lead his subjects away from demons, a non-Christian tyrant would encourage his subjects to turn towards the demonic, strengthening the position of the hostile forces in the continuing cosmic battle.

The concept of μίμησις was a long-standing and prominent element of Hellenistic kingship theory and its adoption by Eusebius has long been noted by scholars like Chesnut. Yet, in focusing on Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine as the mimetic image of the Christ-Logos, scholars have overlooked the fact that, in a non-Christian ruler, this spiritual μίμησις might take a – from Eusebius’ perspective – far more troubling form. The idea that a good sovereign was an image or imitation of the divine was well-established in Hellenistic thought, to the extent that Chesnut described it as ‘simply part of the general intellectual atmosphere’ of the period. As far back as the second century BCE, writers had argued that a

1179 Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists’, 307, citing Justin 2 Apol. 15.
ruler’s virtues came from the gods and were a reflection of divine virtues. By the first century CE this idea was widespread: it can be found in the work of both Plutarch and Philo, among others. Plutarch’s statement that ‘a ruler is an icon of god’ in his treatise To An Uneducated Ruler neatly encapsulates this theory. The crucial element of this idea, as Plutarch expressed it, was that it was chiefly through mirroring the virtues of the divine that a ruler would be able to become in some measure semi-divine himself. Plutarch asserts that ‘through virtue he [the sovereign] establishes a resemblance to god’. This appears to have been an extension of the earlier belief that self-control was essential for a good sovereign, since it would allow him to govern effectively and virtuously.

Eusebius was clearly influenced by this tradition when developing his own understanding of virtuous sovereignty, as many scholars have recognised. In the VC, for instance, Eusebius suggests that Constantine has been given ‘the icon of his [God’s] sole power’. Indeed, throughout both the VC and the LC, the concept of μίμησις occupies a prominent place in Eusebius’ articulation of his ideal of sovereignty. Eusebius introduces the idea early in the LC:

1184 Plut., To an Uneducated Ruler 780e: …άρχον δ’ εἰκών θεοῦ…
1185 Ibid.: …ἄλλ’ αὐτός αὐτὸν εἰς ὑμεῖς ὑπ’ ἀληθείας καθήσῃ…
1186 Hahm, ‘Kings and Constitutions’, 463.
1188 VC 1.5.1: τῆς δ’ αὐτοῦ μοναρχικῆς ἔξουσίας τὴν εἰκόνα δούς…
αὐτὸς δ’ ἀν εἰ ὁ τοῦτο τοῦ σύμπαντος καθηγεμών κόσμου, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πάσιν ὄρθωμον τε καὶ ἀφανεῖσιν ἐπιποθεμόμενος τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, παρ’ οὐ καὶ δι’ οὐ τῆς ανωτάτως βασιλείας τὴν εἰκόνα φέρων ὁ τῷ θεῷ φίλος βασιλεύς κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ κρείττονος τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀπάντων τοὺς οἰκας διακυβερνών ἰθύνει.  

And this is the one who rules the whole of this universe, who is above everything and through everything and in everything, both seen and unseen, the penetrating Logos of God, by whom and through whom the king who is a friend of God, carrying the icon of the highest kingdom, as an imitation of the best one [i.e. God], steering the ship, directs as a guide all things on earth.

Here, Eusebius appears to have picked up on several of the essentials of this idea as expressed by earlier Greek writers, including the notion that the good sovereign carried the ‘image’ of the divine and that he ruled ‘as an imitation’ of God. The idea is also expressed in terms with which even non-Christians in Eusebius’ audience would have been familiar. It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that Eusebius was therefore simply using the concept in order to appeal to an audience whose sympathies lay more with Hellenistic philosophy than with Christianity, for similar ideas also run through the more overtly Christian VC. Here, in his description of Constantine’s vicennalia celebrations, Eusebius writes that the occasion ‘seemed as if it were an imagined icon of Christ’s kingdom’. In this case, the idea of μίμησις is expressed in unmistakably Christian terms. As a result, it is clear that this idea of the ruler as an image of the divine formed an important part of Eusebius’ understanding of virtuous sovereignty.

1189 LC 1.6.
1190 For similar ideas, see: Plut. To an Uneducated Ruler 780e-f; Epiphant. On Kingship 245.5, 272.13-14, 274.14-16; Diotog. On Kingship 265.8-12; Sthenid. On Kingship 270.14-17. The treatises of Epiphantus, Diotogenes and Sthenias, preserved by Stobaeus, are cited here by their Hense page and line numbers. Baynes, in particular, highlighted the similarities between these three treatises and the LC of Eusebius: Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian Empire’, 168-72.
1191 VC 3.15.2: Χριστῷ βασιλεῖας ἐδοξεν ἀν τις φαντασιοῦσθαι εἰκόνα...
However, despite these similarities, in suggesting that Eusebius ‘simply took over’ earlier Hellenistic ideas on the topic of divine μίμησις, scholars like Chesnut overlook an important difference between these earlier views and those of Eusebius.\(^{1192}\) Crucially, in Eusebius’ version of the theory, it was not only μίμησις of the divine, but also μίμησις of the demonic that was possible. In earlier kingship theory, a failure on the part of the sovereign to mirror effectively the virtues of the divine would undoubtedly mean that he would not be a good ruler, but it did not mean that he would imitate instead an alternative, evil spiritual power. For Eusebius, by contrast, it appears that a ruler must be imitating some sort of spiritual power, and if that was not the true Christian God, then it could only be the wicked demons who tried so often to usurp the true place of God.\(^{1193}\) As a result, for Eusebius, the failure of divine μίμησις became not simply a regrettable lapse, but a dangerous error of choice, in which the ruler came to side with the forces of evil against goodness, virtue and piety.

That Eusebius held μίμησις of the demonic to be a worrying possibility is made clear in the \(LC\), in a passage which contrasts the soul of the virtuous sovereign with the souls of his tyrannical enemies. Eusebius begins his discussion with what appears to be a fairly standard expression of the theory of divine μίμησις – Constantine is praised for ‘having admitted into his soul the outpourings from there [\(i.e.\) from God]’, and is therefore said to share in God’s wisdom, goodness, justice, and courage.\(^{1194}\) Yet Eusebius rapidly switches his attention to the unnamed tyrannical ruler, who is said to have ‘taken the disfigured and dishonourable into

\(^{1192}\) Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1332.

\(^{1193}\) On the demons’ desire to usurp God’s position and honours, see: \(PE\) 7.16.10.

\(^{1194}\) \(LC\) 5.1: …\(\varepsilon\)\(\varepsilon\)\(κ\)\(ε\)\(ί\)\(θ\)\(ε\)\(ν\) \(\alpha\)\(π\)\(ο\)\(ρ\)\(ρ\)\(ώ\)\(μ\)\(α\)\(ς\) τ\(η\) \(ψυχ\)\(ή\) \(κα\)\(τ\)\(α\)\(δ\)\(ε\)\(δ\)\(ε\)\(γ\)\(μ\)\(έ\)\(ν\)\(ό\)\(ς\)…
his soul’.\textsuperscript{1195} This, Eusebius makes clear, is because this tyrant ‘has stamped (τετυπωμένος) on his soul numberless falsely drawn icons of demons’.\textsuperscript{1196} The contrast with the good sovereign, who has the image of God in his soul, is obvious. It is equally clear from Eusebius’ juxtaposition of these two figures that he considered the relationship between the tyrannical ruler and the demons to be an inverted form of mimetic relationship between the virtuous king and the truly divine Christian God. This is made still clearer by Eusebius’ suggestion that the bad ruler ‘has taken the rage of a savage wild-beast in exchange for kingly gentleness’.\textsuperscript{1197} Unrestrained rage may have been a traditional feature of a bad ruler,\textsuperscript{1198} but the reference to a ‘savage wild-beast’ immediately brings to mind the demons which Eusebius elsewhere describes in similar terms.\textsuperscript{1199} It seems that, for Eusebius, the bad ruler, in forming the image of demons in his soul, has also adopted some of their other characteristics.

Of course, Eusebius was not the first writer to express an interest in the contents of a tyrant’s soul – Plato had suggested that a human tyrant might have an inner tyrant residing in his own soul.\textsuperscript{1200} Yet for Plato it was ὁ ἐρως (passion/desire)

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1195} \textit{LC} 5.2: …ἀμορφίαν δὲ καὶ αίσχος ἄναλαβὼν τῇ ψυχῇ…
\item \textsuperscript{1196} \textit{LC} 5.3: …ό μυρίας ἐψευδογραφημένας δαίμονας εἰκόνας τῇ αὐτῷ ψυχῇ τετυπωμένος; We have already seen (above, p. 187-89) that the tyrant may be held to account for his association with demons, since he submits to them through his own free choice.
\item \textsuperscript{1197} \textit{LC} 5.2: …θηρὸς μὲν ἄγριον θυμὸν βασιλικῆς ἡμέρας ἀντικαταλαξάμενος…
\item \textsuperscript{1198} See for example: Hdt. 1.73; Philo \textit{Leg. ad Gaium} 366. For further examples, and a discussion of this theme in Greek and Roman literature, see: W.V. Harris, \textit{Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 229-63.
\item \textsuperscript{1199} See, for example: \textit{PE} 4.17.9, \textit{VC} 1.49.1; \textit{HE} 10.4.14; \textit{DE} 10.8.73; \textit{Theoph.} 3.13, 3.55. Cf. \textit{LC} 2.3 on ‘the rebellious powers’ (τὰς ἀποστατικὰς δυνάμεις).
\end{itemize}
that tyrannised the tyrant’s soul. In making the force dominating a tyrant’s soul an external, spiritual power, Eusebius opens up the possibility that the tyrant may also be engaged in a negative process of μίμησις in a way that Plato had not. Thus, while scholars generally focus on the idea of Constantine’s μίμησις of the divine in Eusebius’ works, there can be no doubt that he also allowed for the more dangerous possibility of μίμησις of the demonic.

Moreover, Eusebius’ use of the verb τυπάω (to stamp) to describe how the tyrant acquires the images of demons in his soul is a reminder once again that a bad ruler was not a passive victim of the demons, but rather an active participant in their wickedness. This word is found in earlier Stoic psychology, appearing in Diogenes Laertius’ account of Zeno to describe the way in which an external impression (φαντασία) makes a mark on the human soul:

Τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ τοῦ ὅνοματος οἰκείως μετενημεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ύπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινομένον.  

A phantasia is a moulding on the soul, fittingly taking its name from the impressions which are brought about by a signet ring in sealing-wax.

Yet, for the Stoics, receiving such an impression in the soul was not an entirely passive process; rather, it also involved actively accepting the impression. Thus people also had a role to play in forming impressions in their souls. This is best illustrated by Philo, who wrote in his Legum allegoriae:

ιὴ μὲν οὖν φαντασία συνύσταται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐκτός πρόσωπον τυπούντος νοῦν δὲ αἰσθήσεως, η δὲ ὁμή, τὸ ἀδελφὸν τῆς φαντασίας, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ τονικὴν δύναμιν, ἴν τείνας δὲ

1201 Ibid. 574e-575a.
1203 D.L. 7.45.
αισθήσεως ἀπτεται τοῦ ύποκειμένου καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ χωρεί
gαλιχώμενος ἐφικέσθαι καὶ συλλαβεῖν αὐτό.\textsuperscript{1205}

And so phantasia is composed from the approach of an external thing
moulding the mind through sensation, while impulse, the brother of
phantasia, is composed from the stretching power of the mind, which,
stretching out through sensation, fastens on to the thing before it and
travels towards it, longing to attain and come together with it.

Although Philo’s philosophy was by no means exclusively Stoic,\textsuperscript{1206} A.A. Long
suggests that, in this particular case, Philo’s discussion largely reflects Stoic ideas.\textsuperscript{1207}

This passage shows that, in the Stoic view, forming an impression on the soul or on
the mind was an active process, in which the human being had to participate. Of
course, in this case Eusebius is discussing images of demons, rather than φαντασίαι
in general, but it is hard to believe that he would not have had this Stoic idea of
active participation in mind when selecting the verb τυπόω. We know that Eusebius
was familiar with Philo’s Legum Allegoriae, for he mentions it in his catalogue of
Philo’s works in the HE.\textsuperscript{1208} Once again, Eusebius subtly conveys the idea that these
bad rulers have chosen to collaborate with the demons by allowing these false
images to be stamped on their souls.

This idea that bad rulers might be engaged in active μίμησις of the demonic
has further implications for Eusebius’ understanding of the capacity of a non-
Christian to rule. No one enslaved to demonically inspired religious error, be that
polytheism or ‘heresy’, could hope to be a virtuous sovereign, for as far as Eusebius
was concerned they have chosen the wrong model to imitate. As long as they do not
recognise the ‘correct’ divinity, they cannot meet the requirement of Hellenistic

\textsuperscript{1205} Philo \textit{Leg.} 1.30.
\textsuperscript{1206} On the variety of different influences on Philo’s thought, see, most recently: L. Kerns, ‘Soul and Passions in Philo of Alexandria’, \textit{Studia Patristica} 63 (2013), 141-54.
\textsuperscript{1208} \textit{HE} 2.18.1; Carriker, \textit{Library}, 165.
kingship theory that the good sovereign should imitate the divine, for they have chosen the wrong exemplar upon which to model themselves and their behaviour. By contrast with the tyrants, whose enslavement to demons is so heavily emphasised, Eusebius in the VC describes Constantine as a ‘slave’ (δοῦλος) and a ‘servant’ (θεράπων) of God. Moreover, Eusebius makes it clear in the same passage that Constantine is happy to describe himself in these terms. If tyrants, by enslaving themselves to wicked masters, have made a fundamental error of judgement by choosing the wrong spiritual model to copy, Constantine, as a slave of the true God, has selected the correct model to follow and might therefore be able to achieve the level of virtue necessary to govern in the divine image. Eusebius is thus able in the VC to set up a contrast between the ‘good’ slavery of Constantine and the ‘bad’ slavery of the tyrants, thereby helping to emphasise the wide gulf that separates them.

At first sight, it might appear somewhat contradictory that Eusebius is able in one work, the VC, to describe Constantine as a ‘slave’, and in another, the LC, to refer to him as ‘truly self-ruling’. Yet this does not in fact represent any inconsistency in Eusebius’ thought; rather, it demonstrates the variety of different traditions which influenced his manner of expression. In the Greek and Roman tradition, particularly from the third century onwards, a ruler would often be presented as a friend or companion of the divine. It is this metaphor of friendship that Eusebius employs extensively in the LC, although he also describes Constantine

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1209 VC 1.6.1, 1.46.1.
1210 VC 1.6.1.
1211 Ibid.
1212 LC 5.4: ...ἀὐτοκράτωρ ἄληθῶς...
in these terms in the VC and other works.\textsuperscript{1214} At the same time, however, there was also a tradition in Jewish literature of describing the pious, particularly prophets and kings, as ‘slaves of God’.\textsuperscript{1215} Philo, combining Greek and Jewish influences in his thought, had shown himself, like Eusebius, to be familiar with both possible metaphors for describing this relationship with God.\textsuperscript{1216} Although Philo appears to have preferred the metaphor of friendship to that of slavery, arguing that someone who was wise should be described as a friend of God rather than a slave,\textsuperscript{1217} he was nevertheless prepared to use the verb δουλεύω (to be a slave) to describe a pious person’s relationship to God.\textsuperscript{1218} For Eusebius’ understanding of ‘good’ slavery, however, it was more likely the epistles of Paul that proved most influential. This notion of slavery to God as a positive condition, even a source of pride, is extremely prominent in Paul’s letters.\textsuperscript{1219} Paul regularly describes himself either as δοῦλος Θεοῦ or δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ.\textsuperscript{1220} Moreover, it is a term that he also applies to the recipients of his letters.\textsuperscript{1221} Thus, within Christian thought, it was perfectly possible to be enslaved in a positive sense, provided that enslavement was to God, and God alone.

For Eusebius, then, these separate ideas of tyrannical enslavement to demons and of μίμησις combined to suggest that anyone who was not an ‘orthodox’ Christian was incapable of ruling as a virtuous sovereign, according to the

\textsuperscript{1214} For example: LC 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 5.1, 5.4; VC 1.3.4, 1.52.1; HE 10.8.6, 10.9.2. Cameron regards this as ‘a translation of [the motif] of the emperor as divine comes’: ‘Construction’, 157-58.
\textsuperscript{1215} C. Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 327, citing Mal. 3:22; 2 Sam 3:18; Ps. 18:1; 1 Kgs 11:13; Ezek 34:23-4.
\textsuperscript{1216} Philo, De sobrietate 55, cited in Heszer, Jewish Slavery, 330.
\textsuperscript{1217} Philo, De cherubim 107, cited in Heszer, Jewish Slavery, 330.
\textsuperscript{1218} Paul develops a distinction between ‘slavery to sin’ and ‘slavery to God’ in his letters, the former being a bad condition, while the latter is good: Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 183-86.
\textsuperscript{1219} See, for example: Romans 1:1; Philippians 1:1; Titus 1:1.
\textsuperscript{1220} For example: Colossians 3:24: τῷ κυρίῳ ἔργῳ δουλεύετε.
requirements set out by long-standing theories of kingship. Yet Eusebius also envisaged a second level of μίμησις, which led him to see the tyrant’s enslavement to demons as a problem of cosmological significance. This was because, in Eusebius’ view, demonic error might spread through the figure of the ruler to infect the entire state. Eusebius’ statement in the VC that Constantine’s ‘tyrannical’ predecessors had ‘first enslaved themselves and afterwards all of their subjects to the errors of wicked demons’ makes this process clear.\textsuperscript{1222} As a result of the ruler’s mistaken faith in demons, his subjects have also been drawn into the power of the demonic. In this, Eusebius was once again drawing on earlier ideas. According to earlier Greek philosophy, the good ruler, by imitating the divine, could lead his subjects towards the divine, encouraging them to imitate a lifestyle of godly virtue and rationality.\textsuperscript{1223} Philo had written that ‘the obscure are the emulators of those who are esteemed and, that which they [the esteemed] seem especially to reach out for, towards such things do they [the obscure] extend their own impulses’.\textsuperscript{1224} In the context of a tyrannical ruler, this meant that ‘whenever a leader starts to revel in luxury and to decline towards a luxurious life, practically all his subjects also fan up the desires of the stomach and others besides those of the stomach, over and above what is necessary’.\textsuperscript{1225} In other words, Philo argued that the majority of a ruler’s subjects would seek to imitate their leader’s behaviour, for better or worse. For Eusebius,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1222} VC 1.13.3: ...σφάς αὐτοῖς πρὸτερον κάπετα τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἀπαντας πονηρῶν δαιμόνων πλάνως κατέδουλαῖντο...
\item \textsuperscript{1223} Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1312.
\item \textsuperscript{1224} Philo, \textit{De Vita Mosis}, 1.160: ...ὅτι ἐξελπτοι τῶν ἐνδόξων οἱ ἀρανεῖς εἰσι καὶ, ἃν ἀν ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστ’ ὀργεῖσθαι δοκῶσι, πρὸς ταῦτα τὰς αὐτῶν ἀποτείνουσιν ὀρμᾶς.
\item \textsuperscript{1225} Ibid.: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔγεμον ἀδέσποτον καθήκοπαθεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀβραδίατον ἀποκλίνειν βίον, στέιμαν ἄλλων δεῖν τὸ ὑπῆρχον τὰς γαστρῶς καὶ τῶν μετὰ γαστέρα προσαναρρήγγειν ἐξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιθυμίας...
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
however, it was not simply the tyrants’ behaviour that people would imitate, but – far more worryingly – their devotion to the demons.

This would have deep implications not only for the salvation of those concerned, but for the progress of salvation history more broadly. Non-Christian rulers could slow, if not reverse, the decline of demonic power by ensuring that the majority of people continued to turn to the demons in imitation of their emperors. Indeed, in the *DE* Eusebius is explicit about the fact that, for much of its history, the Roman empire had done little to assist the spread of Christianity.\(^{1226}\) Eusebius suggests that the anti-Christian measures put forward by earlier emperors were permitted by God in order to demonstrate the power of the Christian message. It was important, he argues, that Christian worship should ‘not be thought to have endured because of the acquiescence of the rulers’.\(^{1227}\)

The significance of this idea that subjects would imitate a ruler’s religious beliefs and practices to Eusebius’ thinking on kingship is further reflected in his presentation of Constantine. In contrast to the tyrants, Constantine in the *VC* is ‘a clear model of a pious life to all men’,\(^{1228}\) while, in the *LC*, he ‘calls up the entire human nation to the knowledge of the best one [i.e. God]’.\(^{1229}\) The crucial point is that, in the figure of Constantine, God has provided people with the correct model of virtue to imitate. Eusebius’ use of the verb ἀνακαλέω (to call upwards), with the prefix ἀνα- indicating a positive movement upwards contrasts strikingly with the kind of language that he uses of tyrants and demons. For these rulers, Eusebius\

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\(^{1226}\) *DE* 3.7.36-38. As Johnson similarly noted: *Ethnicity and Argument*, 179.

\(^{1227}\) *DE* 3.7.36: Πάλιν τε αὐ τὸ ἡς μὴ νομισθείη κατὰ συγχώρησιν τῶν κρατοῦντων διαρκέσειν·

\(^{1228}\) *VC* 1.3.4: ...ἐναρχὲς ἀπαῖν ἀνθρώπως παραδείγμα θεοσεβοῦς... βίοι.

\(^{1229}\) *LC* 2.4: ...πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τήν τοῦ κρείττονος ἀνακαλεῖται γνώσιν...
prefers to apply the prefix κατα- to verbs describing their style of government, suggesting a negative, downwards movement.1230 Where Constantine leads people into a better condition, a non-Christian ruler would encourage people to fall to a lesser state. A ruler like Constantine, with ‘correct’ religious beliefs, is able to guide his subjects towards God, while a ruler enslaved to demons would lead them down and away, thereby endangering not just his own salvation, but that of his subjects as well.

Conclusions

Eusebius is often presented as a pillar of the political establishment, an imperial sycophant who ‘placed himself and his pen unconditionally at the service of the Emperor’.1231 According to Chesnut, Eusebius’ political and historical thought was established ‘as the official ideology of the Christian empire’.1232 Yet our examination of the role which Eusebius believed demons could play in the political system suggests that Eusebius would not be unreservedly supportive of the political establishment. On the contrary, Eusebius had strict requirements of those wishing to considered ‘true sovereigns’, in which both virtue and faith featured heavily. Of course, Eusebius was not quite as subversive as those earlier thinkers studied by Pagels. Pagels suggests that writers like Athenagoras had adopted a radically egalitarian approach, in which all people, or at least all Christians, were to be considered equal.1233 Eusebius does not go nearly so far. Indeed, we know from the

1230 See, for example: HE 10.2.1, 10.9.3; VC 1.12.2, and discussion above, p. 139.
1231 Quasten, Patrology, iii.319. Cf. Brown, World of Late Antiquity, 86.
that he believed that different Christians would exercise different levels of virtue, to the extent that he envisaged two different paths towards God for these different groups.\textsuperscript{1234}

Eusebius is certainly a long way from suggesting that just any Christian would be capable of ruling. His works consequently offer some other possible justifications for imperial rule, alongside those of virtue and religious belief.\textsuperscript{1235} Of these, the most prominent is the idea of inheritance. In both the LC and the VC, Eusebius stresses the continuity between Constantine and his sons as rulers of the empire. In the LC, this consists of a brief reference to Constantine sharing the rule of the empire with his sons as Caesars.\textsuperscript{1236} However, it is stressed much more strongly in the VC, where the idea of the imperial throne descending from father to son appears both towards the beginning and the end of the work.\textsuperscript{1237} This serves to frame Constantine’s reign with the idea of a smooth transition of imperial power. At VC 1.9.2, Eusebius describes how ‘the throne of the empire’ (ὁ θρόνος τῆς βασιλείας) passed from Constantius to Constantine and then on to his own sons, stressing the idea of continuity. Here, Eusebius likens the empire to ‘an inheritance’ (τις πατρώφος). This word is used again towards the end of the work, when Eusebius discusses how Constantine divided the empire among his three sons ‘as if allocating something in the nature of an inheritance to those most dear to him’.\textsuperscript{1238}

\textsuperscript{1234} DE 1.8.1-4.
\textsuperscript{1235} Farina suggests that Eusebius combines ‘the principle of the divine origin of power’ (‘dell’origine divina del potere’), with that of the ‘elective’ (‘elettivo’) and ‘hereditary’ (‘ereditario’) origins: L’impero, 169.
\textsuperscript{1236} LC 3.1.
\textsuperscript{1237} Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 334.
\textsuperscript{1238} VC 4.51.1: …οἷα τινα πατρωφίαν οὐσίαν τοῖς αὐτοῦ κληροδοτῶν φιλτάτοις.
This is a striking word to use, as if to suggest that the empire belongs by right to Constantine’s family.

Yet there remains a sense that this inheritance is a gift of God: in the LC it is God who appoints Constantine’s sons as Caesars. Moreover, this is said to be just one of an increasing number of rewards which God gives to Constantine, ‘in exchange for his holy acts towards him [God]’. Indeed, while the word πατρώος traditionally referred to something which was inherited from one’s father, among Christian writers the word could also refer to something which belonged to God, as the Father. As such, Eusebius’ language here also hints that the empire in fact continues to belong to God, and remains God’s to give away or to entrust to a chosen ruler. Therefore, while the importance of inheritance is undoubtedly stressed, this remains at root a reward for Constantine’s piety towards God – further evidence of the fact the his religious beliefs are the ‘correct’ ones. In consequence, it is also an inheritance that might be removed in the case of a failure of piety on the part of one of Constantine’s successors.

Eusebius’ first loyalty therefore lies with God in the battle against the demons, rather than with the emperor and the imperial family. Any failure, either of virtue or of faith, would, according to Eusebius’ understanding of sovereignty, see a figure disqualified from government. If Constantine’s actions against Licinius, who had at one point been presented by Eusebius as a sovereign appointed by God and rewarded for his faith, were valid and justifiable on the grounds of Licinius’ later

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1239 LC 3.1: ...ἀμοιβαίως ταῖς εἰς αὐτὸν ὀσίας...
1240 LSJ, s.v. πατρώος.
1241 PGL, s.v. πατρώος.
turn towards the demons, then future action against other emperors who similarly failed to remain true to the Christian God might be similarly justifiable.

As a result of the foregoing analysis of Eusebius’ understanding of the broader cosmological significance of the ruler, we are also able to locate the figure of Constantine more precisely within Eusebius’ historical and cosmological vision. Chesnut suggests that Eusebius identified the *pax Romana* with the final, eschatological ‘Kingdom of Peace’ and envisaged a brief future of not more than a few centuries, during which the Constantinian dynasty would rule as eschatological saviour-figures.\(^{1242}\) This seems implausible in view of the fact that Eusebius ended his life theologically on the defensive, eying a future in which it was by no means certain that Constantine’s descendants would share Eusebius’ precise understanding of Christian truth, and hence remain free from demonic influence. Eusebius certainly considered Constantine to have a role to play in bringing people to salvation and driving forward the defeat of the demons as a result of a process of μιμησις. This role was significant, however, not because Constantine represented the concluding figure of human history, but rather because he was operating as part of a finely poised and closely fought battle against the demons. Constantine’s importance for Eusebius is best understood in the context of the continuing struggle against demonic influence.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this study has been to explore the ways in which Eusebius’ ideas about the demonic influenced and interacted with his thinking on a range of other subjects that comprised his political ideas. It began with a survey of Eusebius’ oeuvre that sought to situate his surviving writings in the context of the political and religious upheavals of the era. This was followed by an essential examination of Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic, filling a gap in previous scholarship on Eusebius. This showed that Eusebius believed firmly in the reality of demonic power, regarding these beings as a hostile, active presence in the universe. A further chapter demonstrated how Eusebius’ belief in malevolent demonic forces helped to structure his thought, resulting in a cosmology of starkly divided, warring opposites.

With the role of demons in Eusebius’ cosmology clearly established, the fourth chapter began to examine how these ideas helped to shape other areas of Eusebius’ thought. This chapter looked at the interplay between demonic influence and human free choice in Eusebius’ descriptions of wicked activity. It revealed the importance of the concept of προαιρεσις in Eusebius’ understanding of moral responsibility and showed that Eusebius regarded the maintenance of high standards of virtue as essential to securing salvation. The fifth chapter examined the role of demons in Eusebius’ understanding of history, challenging the widespread scholarly view that Eusebius believed all demonic power to have ceased with the incarnation. This showed that Eusebius considered virtuous, exemplary Christian leadership – of both church and empire – to be essential in an on-going struggle to resist demonic influence. Finally, the sixth chapter turned to examine Eusebius’
presentation of imperial sovereignty and the figure of Constantine. It revealed that Eusebius was by no means unconditional in his support for the Roman emperor; rather, he demanded a particularly high standard of ‘orthodox’ piety from those wishing to be seen as the true ruler. Only in this way would the emperor be able to perform the essential role of leading his subjects on the journey towards salvation.

Taken together, the conclusions of this study are striking, compelling us to reassess the common conclusion of scholars that Eusebius was complacently triumphalist in his vision of history and his understanding of the position of the Christian church. At each stage Eusebius has been revealed as far more cautious than his usual characterisation suggests, deeply concerned about a continuing threat to human salvation from malevolent demonic forces. This concern led him to lay great weight on the importance of a virtuous Christian lifestyle in order to avoid the deceits of the demons and remain on the path to salvation. For Eusebius, complete Christian triumph still lay in the future and was dependent upon the maintenance of virtue by all Christian souls.

Of course, this study is not the first to reassess the traditional caricature of Eusebius as a servile imperial sycophant, who ‘placed... his pen unconditionally at the service of the Emperor’. Aaron Johnson has already presented us with a far more independent Eusebius, whose ambivalence about the role of the Roman empire persisted even after Constantine’s unification of east and west. Michael Hollerich has likewise suggested that the importance of high political concerns in shaping Eusebius’ thought has been over-emphasised in the scholarship and has

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1243 Quasten, Patrology iii, 319. Cf. Brown, World of Late Antiquity, 86.
1244 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 153-97.
highlighted the importance of his thinking on the role of the church. Other long-standing assumptions about Eusebius’ outlook have similarly been challenged: F.S. Thielman questioned the notion of Eusebius’ ‘realised eschatology’ and in the process perhaps came closer than anyone to querying the triumphalist interpretation of Eusebius, although he stopped short of directly challenging this view.

In questioning this further, longstanding assumption about Eusebius – that he should be characterised as a triumphal optimist – this study therefore has strong foundations in recent scholarship. Nevertheless, it leaves us with a picture of Eusebius that is strikingly different even from that found in the most up-to-date work on Eusebius. It is a more nuanced picture, in which Eusebius’ outlook might be better described as cautiously positive than complacently triumphalist. By focusing on Eusebius’ ideas about demons, this study has revealed a new side to Eusebius. It has also highlighted several possible avenues for future research.

It has not been possible in the space available to examine fully the sources of and possible influences on Eusebius’ ideas about demons. We have observed a range of possible influences, from the works of Plato and Porphyry, to Jewish apocalyptic writings such as 1 Enoch, but further work on this might reveal more both about Eusebius’ own intellectual background, and about trends in Christian demonology in the late third and early fourth centuries. Eusebius’ profound

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1245 Hollerich, ‘Religion and Politics’; Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah.
1246 Thielman, ‘Another Look’.
intellectual debt to Origen has often been highlighted by scholars; recently, however, some have started to question the extent of Eusebius’ dependence on Origen and to focus instead on areas of difference between the two writers. Origen’s works contain a rich and intriguing demonology and a comparison between the views of Origen and Eusebius on demons might therefore offer a valuable new perspective on this debate.

Work on the reception of the Enochic story of the Watcher angels suggests that, by the late third and early fourth centuries, this interpretation of Genesis 6:1-4 was falling out of favour among Christian writers, to be replaced by an interpretation in which the references to ‘angels’ were reinterpreted to describe pious humans, who had strayed from their virtuous lifestyle. Lactantius is cited in this scholarship as the last significant writer to adopt the angelic interpretation of Genesis 6, yet, as we have seen, hints of this story can also be found in some of Eusebius’ works. Examining the traces of this account in Eusebius’ writings could therefore prove instructive for those wishing to trace the decline of this interpretation among Christian authors.

From a broader perspective, this study has also demonstrated the importance of analysing ideas about demons in the works of urban, intellectual Christians of

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1250 For example: Cels. 1.6, 1.67, 2.51, 3.2, 3.29, 3.37, 4.32, 4.92-93, 7.6, 7.35, 7.67-70, 8.30; De Princ. 3.2.1-7.
1252 VanderKam, ‘Enochic Motifs’, 84; Reed, Fallen Angels, 206, 218-21.
1253 Ibid. 84, citing Lact. Inst. Div. 2.14-17.
1254 p.111-12 above.
this period – a need previously highlighted by the work of Dayna Kalleres.\textsuperscript{1255} As bishop of a leading city and centre of learning,\textsuperscript{1256} few writers could be seen as closer to the heart of urban Christian culture at this time than Eusebius, and demons, as we have observed, occupied a prominent place in his writings. Overlooking these references to demons has led scholars in the past to form a distorted picture of Eusebius’ ideas, over-emphasising the optimistic elements of his thought to the neglect of his concerns about the maintenance of high moral standards. Recognising the significance of Eusebius’ views on the demonic has led us to revise our picture of Eusebius’ overall outlook, illustrating the value of studying references to demons where they have previously been ignored. This thesis thereby complements the recent work of Kalleres and Morwenna Ludlow,\textsuperscript{1257} while also highlighting the gap that still remains in our understanding of fourth-century Christian demonology. Further research on ideas about demons in the works of other urban Christian intellectuals of the period is urgently needed. Despite the efforts of Kalleres and Ludlow, there remains scope for much further work on Cappadocian demonology. The homilies of John Chrysostom and other preachers of the era also call for a similar approach.

Finally, the exploration of Eusebius’ ideas about agency and moral responsibility in chapter IV has not only helped to clarify Eusebius’ thought on this subject, but has also revealed a wider problem in scholarship on early Christian ideas about agency. It is not only scholarship on Eusebius that persists in using the

\textsuperscript{1255} Kalleres, ‘Demons and Divine Illumination’.
\textsuperscript{1256} On Caesarea Maritima in this period, see: J. Patrich, ‘Caesarea in the time of Eusebius’, in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., \textit{Reconsidering Eusebius}, 1-24; on the city and its library, see: Carriker, \textit{Library}, 1-36.
\textsuperscript{1257} Kalleres, ‘Demons and Divine Illumination’; Ludlow, ‘Demons, Evil and Liminality’.
terms ‘will’ and ‘free will’ without adequate definition. Rather, it is possible to find scholars from various backgrounds – historical as well as theological – casually referring to an early Christian author’s ideas about ‘free will’, without in any way acknowledging that ancient views on agency were expressed in an entirely different vocabulary. This problem is particularly noticeable in some theological scholarship. Richard Swinburne, for instance, wrote that ‘all Christian theologians of the first four centuries believed in human free will in the libertarian sense’, disregarding the fact that debates concerning libertarian or compatibilist free will are a more modern development. C.J. Eppling’s attempt to determine what early Christian writers ‘meant when they spoke of free will’ fails to note that these writers would not have spoken – or written – about ‘free will’ at all, but rather about το αὐτεξουσιον, ἡ προαιρεσις, and τὰ ἐφ’ ἠμιν, or their Latin equivalents.

Although the problem is less acute in the work of historians, references to an ill-defined notion of ‘free will’, such as those of Denise Kimber Buell or Antigone Samellas, nevertheless prevent us appreciating the complexity of early Christian ideas about agency. In order to improve our understanding of early Christian debates about agency, freedom and responsibility, examinations of the vocabulary and grammar of agency similar to that in Chapter IV will be needed for other authors of this era. The significance of this thesis therefore lies in its contribution

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1261 Buell, *Why?*, 123; Samellas, ‘Experience, Freedom and Canon’. I do not mean to suggest that either of these authors is particularly affected by this problem. Instead they are simply representative samples of a more widespread problem, chosen precisely because they are representative of the unthinking way in which the term ‘free will’ is often deployed.
not only to our understanding of Eusebius’ thought, but also to scholarship on early
Christian demonology and discussions of agency.

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**Unpublished Material**


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