Intelligence and British decolonisation
The development of an imperial intelligence system in the late colonial period 1944-1966

Davey, Gregor

Awarding institution:
King's College London

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Intelligence and British decolonisation: the development of an imperial intelligence system in the late colonial period 1944-1966.

By

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2014

96,573 Words
Abstract:

This thesis seeks to explain the development of an ‘imperial intelligence system’ connecting Whitehall and the colonies. The system had two roles; to collect information and process it into intelligence for policy and decision making and to provide machinery to coordinate and implement covert action in support of policy. The ‘system’ consisted of parallel information channels; interconnected, coordinated, and directed by committees at various levels. Analysis was mainly conducted in Whitehall departments. The system reflected the split between ‘security’ and ‘foreign’ intelligence and the ‘information gathering’ and ‘covert action’ roles in the British machinery. The system paralleled the British professional intelligence machinery headed by the JIC and this division prevented information from being fully integrated with other consumers in Whitehall.

The system was shaped by four major factors: threats; experience; the nature of the administrative system; and the development of professional agenda in both the administration and security organisation (the Security Service and Colonial Police Service) which dictated the points of reform and development over time. Before the Second World War information gathered by ‘police’ and ‘administrators’ was used to manage a colony’s internal politics. The end of ‘colonial isolation’ during the 1930s and 1940s meant colonial problems affected the British state’s international prestige and later its ability to fight the Cold War. To counter this, Whitehall departments sought information to increase their control over colonial affairs, despite the opposition of the Colonial Office which was used to a degree of autonomy. The Colonial Office was more closely coordinated into Whitehall. Colonial and metropolitan intelligence systems were connected and common practices and product formats adopted. Whitehall tried to use ‘counter subversion’ to shape colonial politics. Security intelligence became increasingly important in the last stages of decolonization because, it was the last source of information handed over and consequently it shaped Whitehall’s reactions to events. The machinery also assisted the British to maintain their influence in new states after independence.
Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank: the Staff at the Freedom of Information Section of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who responded to my requests for the opening of intelligence files with speed and generosity; the staff of the National Archives of the United Kingdom; various correspondents who served in the Colonial Police Service and British South Africa Police and who have communicated with me over the years most generously but whose identity it would not be appropriate to publicise; colleagues in the Open University including Clive Emsley, Bernard Waites, Chris Williams, Georgina Sinclair and Stuart Mitchell who were all most encouraging during my period of research; my family, particularly my mother Leath Davey and my aunt Bibi Calf, who paid in various ways; my friend Anna Sheffield whose ability to cope with my oddities and obsessions is incredible and whose calm counsel has made much possible; my friend Mary Fotheringham who provided constant encouragement; Andrew Trevillian who ensured I survived to write it. Finally I would like to acknowledge my father, the late Brian Davey who would, I think, despite our differences, be proud I stuck it out. Any mistakes are, of course, my own.
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<td>Assistant Superintendent of Police</td>
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<td>British Defence Coordination Committee</td>
<td>BDCC</td>
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<td>British Military Administration</td>
<td>BMA</td>
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<td>British South Africa Police (Southern Rhodesia)</td>
<td>BSAP</td>
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<td>Cabinet Office</td>
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<td>Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
<td>CIO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Security Committee</td>
<td>CENSEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
<td>COS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
<td>CO</td>
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<td>Colonial Police Service</td>
<td>CPS</td>
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<td>Commissioner of Police</td>
<td>COMPOL/ Comsr</td>
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<td>Commonwealth Relations Office</td>
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<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
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<td>Defence Intelligence</td>
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<td>Director Intelligence Bureau (India)</td>
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<td>East Africa Command</td>
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<td>Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau</td>
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<td>General Headquarters</td>
<td>GHQ</td>
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<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
<td>GOC</td>
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<td>General Staff Officer</td>
<td>GSO (Grade)</td>
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<td>Government of India</td>
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Head of the Secret Intelligence Service  C
Home Office  HO
India Office  IO
Inspector General of Colonial Police  IGCP
Intelligence Adviser  IA
Intelligence Bureau (India)  IB
Information Research Department (FO)  IRD
Intelligence and Security Department (CO)  ISD
International Relations Department (CO)  IRD (CO)
Jamaica Constabulary Force  JCF
Joint Intelligence Committee  JIC
Joint Intelligence Organisation  JIO
Joint Intelligence Staff  JIS
Kenya Police  KP
Local Intelligence Committee  LIC
Metropolitan Police (London)  MP /MET
Metropolitan Police Special Branch  MPSB
Middle East Command  MEC
Military Intelligence  MI
Military Intelligence Officer  MIO
Military Intelligence Liaison Officer  MILO
Northern Rhodesia Police  NRP
Nyasaland Police  NP
Oversea Defence Committee  ODC
Permanent Under Secretary’s Department (FO)  PUSD
Police  POL
Police Headquarters  PHQ
Police Mobile Force  PMF
Political Intelligence Officer (Trinidad)  PIO
Political Office Middle East Command  POMEC
Provincial Intelligence Committee  PIC
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Royal Hong Kong Police  RHKP/ HKP
Royal Irish Constabulary  RIC
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<td>Superintendent</td>
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Introduction

Intelligence and British decolonisation: the development of an imperial intelligence system in the late colonial period 1944-1966.

This thesis seeks to examine the development of ‘imperial’ intelligence machinery within the Colonial Office (CO) and empire in the context of the development of the British government and intelligence machinery during the period of decolonisation which ran concurrently with the Cold War.

Intelligence:

Herman argued that the British definition of ‘intelligence’ was secret information collected by secret organisations; however intelligence was defined more widely by the American intelligence community as machinery for the assessment of ‘all source’ information.¹ Davies also followed this approach.² The term can describe ‘information’ collated with other information or analysis of information to create a ‘product’ for particular consumers. It can also refer to the machinery for collecting, assessing or co-ordinating ‘information’ or ‘intelligence’.

These definitions have specific implications for the study of the ‘imperial’ intelligence machinery in the British Empire. Scholarly analysis of the ‘imperial’ intelligence process has tended to concentrate on the collecting and co-ordinating machinery in the colonies or Britain.³ The ‘interface’s between the collecting and co-ordinating machinery and between the secret intelligence machinery and the departmental consumers: the areas most prone to

³ For example Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (London: Harper Press, 2013), concentrated on the role of the ‘collecting agency’ MI5 and Rory Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2013) concentrated on the co-ordinating machinery of the Joint Intelligence Committee although he referred to the conflicts between the JIC and the Colonial Office.
intelligence failure are little explored.\textsuperscript{4} The process by which information was absorbed, processed, consumed, and incorporated into colonial policy inside Whitehall is consequently little understood. This thesis consequently widens Herman’s definition of intelligence\textsuperscript{5} to include the ‘assessing’ and ‘consuming’ departments of state because the culture and practices of the machinery had their greatest effect on policy formulation during the assessment and consumption phases. Analysis is further complicated by developments during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The older administrative intelligence machinery, which consisted of the ‘departments of state’, was supplemented and partly superseded by new, ‘professional’, intelligence machinery. Each had different internal practices for processing information and the application of information to policy making.

Some definitions of intelligence are related to the function. The terms ‘political intelligence’ and ‘security intelligence’ were used in Whitehall to describe both products and the machinery to deal with them. Unfortunately these terms were not clearly defined and were inherently misleading because in fact the products normally consisted of collated ‘information’ rather than assessed and analysed ‘intelligence’. Both information and intelligence had been processed but this was not always clear to consumers. ‘Political intelligence’ was information; much of it gathered overtly, which underpinned administrative action by the departments of state and colonial governments. It included information about political developments, including the development of ideas, parties, and movements, tribal politics, economic conditions, weather, and agricultural results. ‘Security intelligence’ was more limited. It included both overtly and covertly obtained information, gathered by police and security organisations, on subversion, counter espionage, and crime. Unfortunately the two definitions overlapped; security information always had a political context. This was particularly true in the case of the colonies where political and security intelligence overlapped, but was gathered by different parts of the intelligence machinery. To add to the complications in Indian government practice the term ‘Political Intelligence’ was used at an operational level to describe political and security information, and processed intelligence products.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{4}Michael Herman, \textit{Intelligence Power in Peace and War}, pp.227-239.
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid. pp.1-2.
Yet ‘political’ and ‘security’ intelligence were also frequently defined in opposition to one another. These opposing concepts came to be used by departments with different functions. ‘Political’ intelligence for example was associated with the ‘administrative’ information gathering machinery in the departments of state, whilst increasingly ‘security’ intelligence (along with military, strategic, and other forms) was associated with the ‘professional’ intelligence machinery such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Security Service, and the police. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was in a category of its own since it collected material which could be defined in a number of ways.7 There were also departmental variations on the definitions. As a soldier Templer, saw intelligence as a secret activity providing ‘forewarning’ of attack and did not fully understand the complexities of the CO’s uses of the term. The differences are important because the thesis will argue that the CO fitted into an older ‘administrative’ form of intelligence activity and tended to place importance on ‘political’ intelligence partly because its role meant that security intelligence was predominantly a local activity. This placed the CO in ‘functional’ opposition to the British machinery which was becoming more professional and was interested in a technical form of intelligence which crossed the boundary between political and security intelligence.

There were also a number of definitions of intelligence which related specifically to the technical characteristics and means of collection of information. Most ‘political’ and ‘security’ intelligence was based on a mixture of human intelligence (humint) and signals intelligence (sigint). The latter was used to intercept communications between anti-colonial groups. These definitions slip easily between one another in the historical record. Consequently it is essential to be clear in the thesis which particular meanings are being used so the following definitions will be used.

**Intelligence machinery:**

The ‘British intelligence machinery’ and ‘British professional intelligence machinery’ can be distinguished from the imperial machinery. A key analogy is the ‘domestic’ and ‘imperial’ capacities of Parliament in constitutional and legal matters. The British intelligence

machinery consisted of the departments of state (in their role of target setting and assessment), cabinet committees and the British professional intelligence machinery. The British professional intelligence machinery consisted of the co-ordinating machinery in the JIC and the Joint Intelligence organisation (JIO) and the collecting machinery including, the Security Service, the SIS, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the service intelligence organisations. Both can be differentiated from the imperial machinery because of their narrower focus on British rather than British and imperial interests.

The term ‘imperial intelligence machinery’ is used rather than the term ‘colonial intelligence machinery’ because of the way in which the British intelligence machinery interacted with different ‘local’ intelligence systems. Six departments of state in Whitehall had intelligence relationships with the empire: the CO, Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), Foreign Office (FO), India (and Burma) Offices, the Central Africa Office (CAO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The administrative divisions of empire split the intelligence machinery and its records into discrete parts. The FO dealt with Sudan, the India Office with the Indian empire and the CRO with the dominions. The CO headed the imperial intelligence hierarchy in Whitehall in opposition to the JIC dominated British professional machinery. The ‘imperial intelligence machinery’ can be distinguished from the ‘British’ machinery because it also had responsibilities to ‘colonial governments’. It was not a hierarchy reporting to, and controlled by the British intelligence machinery, although this eventually happened in the final stages of empire, but rather a series of institutions which could intercommunicate with each other.

The imperial system was a series of parallel but interlinked information channels between the ‘territorial’ governments and their administering departments. Territories had varying degrees of autonomy. Constitutionally they ranged from self governing dominions, and ‘semi’ dominions like Southern Rhodesia, through the Indian empire to the crown colonies, and to protectorates with both direct and indirect rule. The degree of autonomy affected the relationship between each territory and its administering department and the forms of intelligence used. Each channel had a series of internal ‘hubs’, which communicated locally and regionally. The CO was the main hub for the transmission of colonial information into Whitehall, although there was a ‘technical’ route through the Security Service and service

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8 MOD had existed since 1945 but 1964 it unified the service departments and their intelligence machinery and their role in empire.
intelligence. The CO had some responsibility for managing intelligence although most responsibility lay with colonial governments which gathered information for internal governance.\(^9\) The CRO was the hub for the dominions. It only managed intelligence from the High Commission Territories and progressively became more of a ‘diplomatic’ service. The structure of the colonial government determined the shape of the local intelligence machinery. Self governing territories communicated with Whitehall through their viceroy and later through direct links between security intelligence agencies.

There were also regional hubs at ‘territorial’ level. The Government of India and some other large territories built up their own collection and assessment machinery and became the ‘lead’ intelligence service in a region. They absorbed British and local ideas and good practice and formulated their own model which was shared outwards to other services in the region. This sometimes caused the creation of a local pattern of machinery and practice, which might reflect the time at which the greater colonial intelligence model was absorbed.

The time scale of 1944-1966 was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly the pressures which led to decolonisation built up significantly during the Second World War and the CO focussed on the process of development in the same period. Secondly the start of the Cold War can be dated to 1944. The problems posed by the Cold War and decolonisation interacted with each other and affected the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. The end of the period was determined by the closure of the CO in 1966 although elements of it continued as the Dependent Territories Division of the Commonwealth Office until 1968. The year 1968 saw the end of a separate intelligence hierarchy dealing with colonial affairs and the treatment of all intelligence activity as the province of the professional intelligence machinery under the control of the Cabinet Office. The period was divided by a series of information panics at both colonial and Whitehall levels which resulted in periods of development of the intelligence machinery. Panics in 1948, 1953, and 1955/6 were particularly important in shaping developments at the Whitehall level.

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New insights:

The thesis considers new subject matter, the CO’s intelligence machinery, and adopts new approaches to examine it. It is the first attempt to examine the CO’s intelligence machinery, dealing with both its ‘information gathering’ and ‘covert action’ aspects and to compare the differences between the CO’s and the British intelligence machinery. The thesis takes a new approach. Rather than examining the ‘secret’ machinery, it explores the interface between the administrative and secret machinery. The administrative machinery functioned as the first intelligence machinery, and after the separation of intelligence and administrative functions as they became more specialised, it remained the consumer of intelligence products and information. The administration set the ‘targets’ for intelligence activity. It incorporated information and intelligence into wider policy and decision making. The thesis consequently widens the definition of ‘intelligence machinery’ to include the administrative machinery in Whitehall and at colonial level. The thesis goes further and argues that the police and the intelligence machinery were a specialised and developed form of the administrative machinery. As police and intelligence functions broke away from the mainstream of the ‘normal’ administrative development they developed their own professional agenda which helped to create professional identity and to spread good practice. The ‘ordinary’ administrative machinery developed its own professional agenda. The various professional agenda interacted with each other, causing both individual and collective chains of development. This was complicated by the links between the police and intelligence machinery and between their professional agenda in Whitehall and the colonies. In particular developments in the Whitehall intelligence machinery were passed down to the colonial machinery and colonial experience was passed up. These longer term developments need to be seen in the context crises in both foreign countries and the empire which had the effect of advancing and retarding the pace and nature of the process of development.

There were general tendencies which formed the context for the development of the intelligence machinery. Domestic, imperial, and foreign problems events caused ‘information panics’ and led to the need to reform and develop the machinery. In the colonies the panics were related to emergencies, whilst in Whitehall the panics were related to both Cold War problems and colonial emergencies. Changes in the administrative machinery drove changes and development in the intelligence machinery. There was a general tendency towards the centralisation of organisation and policy making activity in the British government under the
aegis of the Cabinet Office machinery. A professional agenda developed within the British intelligence machinery, led by the JIC and the Security Service, which was transmitted to and shaped the development of the colonial machinery. Finally the system absorbed local experience and incorporated it in different ways and shared it. These factors shaped and were shaped by institutional cultures.

Conversion of the Colonial Office’s imperial intelligence machinery:

During decolonisation between 1944 and 1966 the British and colonial governments sought to obtain greater quantities of both ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’ from their intelligence machinery in order to inform their decision and policy making processes. Yet this proved hard to obtain. The system was designed to maintain security in individual colonies, and to keep the CO informed of such activity, not a system designed to allow the Cabinet and Whitehall to manage the colonies. The process of conversion was affected by events and professionalization and interdepartmental conflicts over the right to control the machinery.

The CO headed a semi autonomous, intelligence system different to that used by the rest of Whitehall. Its machinery and practices had evolved prior to the advent of the professional intelligence machinery. The CO focussed on its own variant definition of intelligence i.e. it sought ‘political’ intelligence, indeed political knowledge, rather than ‘security’ intelligence in order to maintain its constitutional relationship with both colonies and parliament. It was less inclined to centralise information collecting because of its constitutional and administrative relationships with the colonies. As a result the colonial governments possessed a wide variety of forms of intelligence machinery. The CO had had a formal relationship since 1931, with the Security Service, an element of the British professional machinery with imperial duties. It did not have direct control over elements of the professional intelligence machinery including representation on the JIC or its own intelligence service.

The differences were crucial in the development of the British and imperial machinery because, as the British machinery was absorbed into a professional coordinating system under the JIC and eventually into the Cabinet Office committee hierarchy, conflict developed between the CO and the professional intelligence machinery in Britain which lasted at least until the CO was fully coordinated into the British machinery in 1956-7. During this time the CO’s lost much of its policy making autonomy and was absorbed into a much more
centralised system and its intelligence machinery had to adapt to this change. The CO resisted assimilation. The CO’s internal machinery was affected by a combination of external pressures from other parts of Whitehall, internal debate and pressures, and experience gained from below. The periodisation of the process of development can be linked to the issue of CO circulars on intelligence but also linked to the process of development of the British machinery.

**The problems of writing intelligence history:**

Writing intelligence history poses a number of problems. The first is the nature and number of the sources. The second is the best way of establishing the limitations of the source and applying the appropriate techniques for extracting the maximum information. The third is the difficulty of establishing the context of intelligence evidence. The process of analysis is complicated because of the way in which government controls the releases of information and the extensive vetting of material before it is released. In Britain the government seeks to control the interpretation of the evidence and positively suggest narratives which suit their own political and professional agenda. As Richard Aldrich shows there was a deliberate central policy of controlling information about British intelligence activity from the end of the Second World War until the 1990s. Whilst much greater numbers of documents have been progressively released: the case of the Hanslope Park ‘Migrated Archives’ demonstrates how this process continues.

The field of ‘intelligence studies’ is multi disciplinary. The purposes of the activity range from professional objectives related to developing intelligence practice and theory, and critiquing intelligence practices to the academic interest of establishing an understanding of intelligence history and its effects on the understanding of other histories. The different disciplines involved have developed different methodologies for interpreting and using the material. P.H.J Davies for example, argues that any scholar working in the field should

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triangulate a triad of, official sources, secondary material and oral testimony in order to achieve the most effective results.\textsuperscript{13} Some non historical methodologies are potentially useful for historical investigation. Even within historical methodologies there are a number of different approaches which can help the historian to read source material against the grain in order to extract as much as possible from the available material. Davies for example, uses a sophisticated analytical approach derived from business studies to analyse the organisational structure of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in order to establish its capabilities.\textsuperscript{14}

These problems affect this thesis. The sources were, and are, subject to direct political intervention and to redaction by professional intelligence officers seeking to maintain security, and conceal errors made by the intelligence services and government.\textsuperscript{15} The other files series used were subject to the same kind of treatment. The thesis has sought to triangulate different sources both published and primary and it has sought to examine evidence of organisational development to understand the processes and personnel involved. It has also sought to explore the institutional and personal cultures of the officials involved where evidence of these exists.

The intention of this thesis is limited to establishing the chronology of development, an outline of the organisation and the definition of the channels through which information flowed in order to determine the cultural lenses which affected the government’s view. The thesis does not seek to apply these insights to analyse individual intelligence products to show how they shaped policy and decision making. It will provide a basis for future attempts to achieve this aim and thus to illuminate the management of decolonisation and the understanding of the outlines of the ‘missing dimension’ of policy making.\textsuperscript{16}

Whilst the thesis does not seek to draw lessons on the strategic use of intelligence in contemporary world there are aspects of it which might have this potential use. In particular the material on counter-subversion offers historical insights which might affect current

\textsuperscript{14} P.H.J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying, op. cit.
consideration of ‘upstream intervention’ in order to maximise British influence embodied in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) July 2011.\(^\text{17}\) This has resulted in a special edition of *Small Wars and Insurgencies* and an article on the subject by the author.\(^\text{18}\) These intentions limit the kind of sources used.

**Sources:**

This thesis is based on information drawn primarily from official sources in the National Archives; notably the Colonial Office (CO) files on the CO 1035, CO 1037, CO 537, and CO 968 file series and the Security Service’s KV series. The research was undertaken prior to the release of the Hanslope Park/Colonial Administrations Migrated Archives and takes no account of material revealed in them. The documents in the CO 1035 file series were released at the author’s request under Freedom of Information legislation but in a more closely regulated environment than the FCO 141 series which were released after government secrecy had been undermined in the courts so the levels of redaction are likely to have been higher.

The files in the National Archives present a number of problems. The author focussed on the CO and Cabinet Office files, rather than the files of the colonial administrations held in their respective national archives, or of other departments in Whitehall, because he obtained significant new file releases from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The research consequently concentrates on the perspective of the CO and internal debates which shaped the relationship between the CO and other departments in Whitehall, without fully investigating the perspectives on intelligence held by other departments in Whitehall. The conclusions must therefore remain tentative. The source of the ideas behind the reforms and developments were sometimes found in Security Service files, particularly those relative to organisation and training. The thesis however, also relies upon new secondary studies,

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notably by Philip Davies\textsuperscript{19} and Rory Cormac\textsuperscript{20} to understand wider developments in the British intelligence and professional intelligence machinery in Whitehall.\textsuperscript{21}

Not all of the files created by the CO have survived. Only relatively short ‘runs’ of material on particular colonies exist and this factor affects the understanding of the relationship between the CO and colonial governments particularly during ‘controversial periods’. It was necessary to make certain assumptions about the connections between the CO and the colonial governments. It was necessary to assume that that the CO was following standard approaches on intelligence matters towards all of the colonies. This assumption enabled gaps in the record to be filled by assuming a similar process of development in the relationship with other colonies where evidence for missing periods does exist. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that this is a valid approach but it has weaknesses.

The official record contained in Whitehall files records the production of ideas within a relatively closed environment and thus does not represent ‘reality’ but rather the perception of reality at a particular point in time, by a particular group of people possessing a strong corporate culture.\textsuperscript{22} Understanding of the process is further skewed by limited number of files released out of the original numbers created. It has a tendency to ascribe events a neat development although occasionally there are files which contain useful information demonstrating the officials trying to interpret the ideas demands and needs of their political superiors. It has a tendency to see the development of imperial affairs from the ‘top down’. The documents reflect the concerns of the department in Whitehall rather than the colonial institutions, although the unique role of CO means they can provide insight into the latter’s views.

The CO files were dominated by the work of a few senior civil servants from Principal to Permanent Under Secretary. Much of it was produced by Assistant Under Secretaries. There were some strong personalities involved in intelligence production, notably Juxon Barton, N.D. Watson, and C.Y. Carstairs. The thesis is in consequence dominated by the views of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} P.H.J Davies, \textit{Intelligence and Government in Britain and America}, Vol. 2 \textit{op. cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Rory Cormac, \textit{Confronting the Colonies}, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Michael Warner, ‘Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence’, p.20.
\end{itemize}
senior personnel and by the more vocal voices within that group. This raises real questions of bias. The collective civil service mentalité included a distaste for spying but there were more ‘intelligence and security’ minded staff. It also raises the issue of how far the intelligence machinery in the CO was integrated into the activity of the CO as a whole or whether it was a peripheral activity to the CO’s administrative activity. On the other hand the material is a record of the behaviour of senior officers who made decisions and to some extent illuminates the considerations which affected the development of the process. The mechanisms by which colonial government and local practice informed the development of Security Service’s ideas and the role played by the CO is much less clear. Local experience was absorbed and transmitted although it did not always lead to greater efficiency. This is the kind of information which may lie in the migrated archives.

The thesis examined Cabinet Office and Prime Minister’s Department files which were mentioned in CO discussions, or dealt with issues which caused pressure to be placed upon the CO, in order to determine the wider implications of issues considered important by the CO. The examination of Cabinet Office papers may have led to greater significance being given toward the importance of ‘top down’ reforms in the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. This might be a risky assumption. Previous work on the colonial police, for example has suggested that colonial police were not always directly conscious of the Whitehall agenda and used their own pragmatic approach to solve local problems. This could look as if they were following a central agenda.

**Private papers:**

Using peripheral information in the form of files from other Whitehall departments, private papers, and oral accounts provide ‘adjacent records’ which can help to define the general outline of the ‘missing dimension’ and provide a general check on the conclusions.

The thesis uses material obtained from the Oxford Development Project and private papers held in the Rhodes House Library at the University of Oxford. The personal papers of colonial police officers including senior officers, like Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, reveal vital evidence about the culture of the colonial police and administrative service officers, their attitude to espionage,

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and the divisions between them which help to contextualise the evidence in official papers. The Head of Special Branch or Commissioner of Police was normally a member of the Local Defence (LDC) and later of the Local Intelligence Committee (LIC) and had a role in intelligence co-ordination and assessment. Colonial police officers were involved in Special Branch (SB) work collecting information and undertaking covert action. Their testimony provides evidence about how reforms enforced from Whitehall and local modifications to the intelligence machinery were implemented in colonial settings. The thesis argues that the colonial police developed a professional agenda which affected the development of the police as a whole including the Special Branch.

**Oral Testimony:**

It was originally intended to use colonial police material to cross check official records. A number of oral accounts were obtained from ex-colonial police officers who subsequently withdrew them because they feared prosecution as a result of precedents set by the ‘Mau Mau’ trials at the High Court.

**American Documents:**

In order to check the British account of the motivation and practice of covert action, particularly counter-subversion, some American documents from the State Department archive have been used.²⁴ They demonstrate the differences between British and American concepts of counter-subversion. State Department files demonstrate how the British and imperial intelligence machinery had to adapt to American pressure in both Singapore and British Guiana. American intelligence directly intervened in colonial affairs at Whitehall and at colonial level. The intervention caused modification of the British professional and imperial intelligence machinery and consequently it is important to take American evidence into account.

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**Methodological Issues:**

As previously mentioned, this thesis makes no pretence to trying to achieve any wider approach than an historical one. It takes a qualitative approach predominantly based upon official sources. The qualitative approach makes it difficult to assess the relative importance of particular factors in causing specific developments in the machinery despite the attempt to triangulate the sources.\(^{25}\)

In this thesis there has been a conscious attempt to look at information from the perspective of both ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ explanations of development. This is complicated because of the process of administrative centralisation which lessened the degree of autonomy held by colonial governments. This has probably tended to reinforce the impression that the process was ‘top down’ particularly given that it has not provided possible to ascertain the degree of autonomy of the colonial intelligence machinery and specialist local approaches because of the withdrawal of colonial police testimonies. It has proven possible to compare the British material on counter-subversion with American documentation.

Initially there appeared to be a relatively neat periodisation to the development of the intelligence machinery which suggests that a series of crises resulted in a series of circulars. Each circular modified the intelligence machinery from the ‘top down’. Deeper research has shown a much more complex process with circulars being issued well after crises and codifying reforms initiated at both colonial Whitehall levels. Each circular represented a complex and long winded process of compromise between the CO, colonial governments, the Security Service and other departments in Whitehall.\(^ {26}\)

The thesis concentrates on documents drawn from the Defence, Intelligence and Security, and Police departments in the CO which may cause the thesis to over emphasise the degree of CO resistance to the rest of Whitehall. There is for example, material indicating close cooperation between the CO and other departments on matters other than intelligence. The thesis attempts to overcome these methodological issues by consciously trying to examine the evidence from a number of perspectives simultaneously, in particular it compares the way in

\(^{25}\) Christopher Andrew and David Dilkes, *Missing Dimension* p.4.

which combinations of the same evidence could support the top down and bottom up perspectives simultaneously.

**Review of Literature:**

**Cultural issues:**

People, organisations, and their cultures had a major effect on the shape and approach taken by intelligence institutions both in the centre and at the periphery. At the periphery the use of ‘information’ was used as a means of acquiring power over an indigenous society. The intelligence machinery contributed to the creation of ‘lenses’, affecting communication between metropole and periphery, which shaped the British perception of colonial societies. These questions have been explored in relation to India and the Middle East after the First World War and more recently to the Sudan. The insight has not however been applied to the intelligence machinery elsewhere in the empire. The importance of cultural spectacles in the information gathering system is intrinsic to understanding all colonial situations where the British interacted with ‘subordinate’ and different societies.

Useful intelligence might be defined as information which enabled officials to ‘know’ colonial people and societies most effectively and therefore understand and anticipate how they were likely to behave. To be successful intelligence officers required the ability to access and understand the society they were seeking to penetrate and an awareness of the features of their own society likely to inhibit their ability to achieve this. Such knowledge and self awareness was difficult to achieve in organisations which: were trying to deal with global problems; held strong preconceptions about the importance of a single factor, communism; whose personnel wore ‘cultural spectacles’; were handicapped by a lack of language skills; relatively short term exposure to societies they were seeking to ‘know’; and had limited knowledge of influential people in the target societies.

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The origins of personnel in the British machinery (and consequently their personal beliefs and cultural conditioning) have been explored in new histories of the Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service. They reveal changes in the type of people recruited before and after the Second World War and link the changes to the issue of professionalization of the services. There are a number of works on the Colonial Service and studies of groups and individuals, which also reveal similar issues.

Organisational culture and practice were important because they explained the considerable friction between administrative and intelligence personnel. There are a few investigations of the effect of personal and corporate culture on the development of intelligence machinery in the empire which are useful for highlighting the cultural causes of inefficiency. The thesis will contribute to understanding of this area by investigating the internal conflicts between: members of the British central intelligence machinery and departments; administrators and police in the colonies; between security advisers and civil servants assigned to security related departments; and between the geographical and technical departments within the CO. These conflicts reveal cultural divisions which affected development of the British and colonial machinery.

The effect of the British machinery on the colonial machinery from the ‘top down’:

Other relevant literatures may be divided into those which described ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ influences on the imperial intelligence machinery. The majority of the work focussing on the British intelligence machinery tends to concentrate on the Cold War, actions against the Russians and the effects of intelligence products on British policy making and the

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development of British intelligence organisation. Only a few studies explore the colonial dimension in detail. Little work has been carried out on the ‘interface’ consisting of the CO, other Whitehall departments with colonial interests and the channels through which colonial and British intelligence communicated. Rory Cormac deals with the divisions between the CO and the JIC but in a very limited timescale. The CO is seen as a Whitehall department able to ‘task’ British collecting machinery/organisations but having a reputation for being awkward about co-operation with the JIC rather than the subject for detailed investigation in its own right.

The Colonial Office:

There is no single history of the CO covering its whole period of existence. There is work on the development of its policies during the Second World War and a large body of work on the CO’s role in decolonisation. In discussion of intelligence matters, however, the CO often appears peripheral in relation to other departments, such as the FO. The CO’s role in the British and colonial intelligence machinery remains little explored although scholars have considered the role of intelligence in the process of colonial control and handover. The thesis will therefore contribute to the understanding of the organisation and role of the CO during decolonisation, on how it fitted into Whitehall more generally, and provide a basis for future comparison of the influence of the ‘civil’ and ‘security’ sides when making colonial policy. The thesis will also argue that the CO formed a distinct element of the British intelligence machinery, different from the British professional intelligence machinery.


British intelligence:

Until recently the system of imperial information gathering was a lacuna in British intelligence history. This lacuna has now been filled by studies by Cormac, Walton, Andrew and Jeffries. All of these deal with different aspects of the development or role of the British machinery in the empire, particularly Security Service which had a formal role consequently they demonstrate the ‘top down’ influence of the British machinery.

Rory Cormac examines the role of the JIC in decolonisation including the JIC’s relationship with the CO. He points out that the CO and the JIC were in different intelligence hierarchies which were in competition with one another. The conflict was reflected in interdepartmental turf wars between the CO and the JIC. Gradually, over time, the JIC became the predominant professional co-ordinating and management body and the CO was forced to conform. Cormac argued that CO resistance in 1954-55 was responsible for the decision to move the JIC from the COS organisation into the Cabinet Office. Cormac charted the development of the intelligence machinery within the CO from 1948 until the 1960s as part of his argument. His focus, however, is on the way in which the JIC participated in this process rather than on the approaches taken in the CO and the historical precedents which shaped them. Cormac demonstrated that professional intelligence machinery was becoming progressively more important as a source of information and intelligence for the British government.

Calder Walton considers the role of the intelligence machinery in decolonisation but in practice he concentrates on the role of the Security Service. He was interested in the ‘missing dimension’, the role of the British intelligence machinery in the formation and application of colonial policy in the period. He has a fundamentally metropolitan view of the machinery which implicitly accepted the notion that colonial machinery developed as a result of ‘top down’ intervention by the Security Service. The approach plays down the long tradition of political policing and security work in empire which included the export of Indian intelligence practices to other colonies and to Whitehall and the sharing of ‘practice’ as a result of other emergencies. Walton approaches the Indian experience through the way in

41 Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies*, pp. 6-15.
43 Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew, ‘British Intelligence and the Historiography of British decolonisation’ in Patrick Major and Christopher R Moran, eds, *Spooked: Britain Empire and Intelligence since 1945* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), pp.73-97, 81, especially 76; Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, pp.70-81.
which the Security Service absorbed Indian officers at various points rather than examining it in its own right. Like Andrew, Walton looks at the way in which the Security Service dealt with local affairs, in particular the role of the Security Liaison Officer (SLO). More emphasis could have been placed on the way in which the Security Service influenced higher organisations and specific policy decisions. Importantly Walton does not deal with the implications of split command of the intelligence machinery for empire or the detail of how the Security Service, as an interdepartmental organisation, acted as a distribution point for colonial information passing into Whitehall in the period before the JIC took over this duty. On the other hand he does point to the importance of the service as a technical advisor to the CO and an important element in spreading standardised intelligence models approved by the CO.

Christopher Andrew and Calder Walton worked together on the official history of the Security Service and the two works are closely connected in the general line of approach – in particular the emphasis on the ‘missing dimension’ the way in which the British metropolitan intelligence machinery was left out of explanations of decolonisation. Andrew however did not examine the position of the Security Service within the JIO or the minutiæ of the manner in which the service liaised with the CO like Davies or Cormac. Defending the Realm however does have a large quantity of background information about the service’s role in the colonies and the mentalité of its members consequently it provides a great deal of useful information which provides a context to Davies’ and Cormac’s work.

Philip Davies by contrast, wrote a comparative analysis of the development of the American and British intelligence machinery which deals with some aspects of its relationship with the CO. More widely he argued that there was a ‘cultural’ difference between British and American concepts of intelligence which caused the two sets of machinery to develop in different ways; the Americans towards competition and the British towards consensus. He emphasises the American concentration on ‘all source’ intelligence organisations. He argued that the British machinery underwent a process of centralisation under the JIC/JIO under the aegis of the Cabinet Office and examined the development of the coordinating machinery in

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44 Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, p.333.
45 Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew, *Spooked*, p.76
Importantly he provided a periodisation for the development of the British machinery which can be correlated with development of the imperial intelligence machinery.

Davies excludes the CO from the intelligence machinery because he agreed with Herman that the intelligence machinery in Britain is secret machinery dealing with secret information. His argument about cultural differences between national approaches however can be used to help to examine the CO as an intelligence machine. If the CO is seen as being an organisation for assessing ‘all source information’, effectively operating like an American organisation, it may help, amongst other factors, to explain the depth of the division between the CO and the British professional intelligence machinery. The competition between the CO and other Whitehall departments and the British professional intelligence machinery seems to have some similarity to the American experience in a way which is interesting in a set of machinery otherwise geared to achieve consensus. This thesis will suggest that the CO was part of the intelligence machinery and in fact had, in a diluted form, a role similar to that which came to be held by the JIC for other British intelligence machinery.

Davies, Cormac, and Walton are all focussed on the British end; all comment on the closeness of the Whitehall village, the importance of consensus, and the conflicts within that village. This is useful because there is evidence that the CO consistently defended its ‘turf’ when external reforms of the intelligence machinery were proposed. It also opposed Whitehall on other security related issues, such as the importance of the definition of communist terrorism.47 None of these historians has really engaged with the CO as an individual institution in the longer term.

Whilst the SIS had no official role in the empire it had long links with it. SIS shared the anti-communist focus of the Security Service which made it aware of communism in the empire. During the Second World War SIS had gathered some information in the empire. There was also some cross fertilisation between the two services. Keith Jeffrey’s official history of SIS is a major study although it is peripheral to the question of the imperial intelligence machinery because of SIS lack of jurisdiction within empire.48 The study only deals with the period up to 1949 and consequently does not deal directly with the activity of the service

during the later stages of decolonisation. What it does suggest however was that during the Palestine Crisis a more centralised method of dealing with colonial crises was starting to emerge in Whitehall and this included the strategic use of covert action by SIS to deal with the international ramifications of colonial problems such as that in Palestine.49

Like Jeffrey’s work on SIS, the scholarship about the signals intelligence (sigint) organisation has also expanded to cover certain aspects of the work with colonial implications. Although sigint is not directly germane to this thesis, the importance of sigint and electronic intelligence (elint) in the Cold War and the necessity for listening stations in colonial territories provided a useful lever for the British government when it sought to defend the empire against American pressure.50

Collectively therefore the scholarship about the British and colonial intelligence machinery has now evolved to show what organisations existed and how they were organised but the detail of the relationships between them still needs further development. The CO and CRO are almost absent in Davies analysis of the development of the JIO and this thesis will play a role in helping to fill the gap. Cormac’s’ work concentrates on the JIC and does not set it clearly in the context of the development of the Cabinet Office machinery or consider the development of the machinery in the CO in the longer terms. This thesis will support some of his conclusions about the imperial machinery based on analysis of the JIC documentation but question others suggesting they need modification in the light of longer term analysis of CO practice.

**British intelligence and imperial failure:**

Most historians have argued that the intelligence machinery at the centre and periphery largely failed in the empire; without examining the part played by the CO or CRO in detail. Andrew,51 Townshend,52 French,53 and Walton,54 amongst others have pointed out that

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49 Ibid. pp 688-697.
various governments failed to obtain the information they needed to manage the process of ‘decolonisation in the wider context of the Cold War and British ‘decline’. Walton\(^55\) demonstrated that the Security Service had successes and Cormac\(^56\) showed that particular counter-insurgency campaigns did feed in to the development of the JIC. This thesis will argue that different parts of the machinery had different roles and consequently the picture of failure is a complex one. Machinery was being converted from one use to another. Problems were exacerbated by an attempt to build a global counter-subversion system, which required excellent personnel and substantial financial resources and diverted effort away from information collection.

**Coordinating Covert Action in Empire:**

There has been little scholarship on the coordination of counter-subversion in the empire. There is some material on attempts to ‘export’ counter-subversion through regional defence pacts.\(^57\) Philip Murphy suggested that the negotiations in Whitehall which accompanied the formation of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies and Foreign Office Counter Subversion Committee in 1956 were connected with the start of SIS operations in areas which were normally considered the preserve of the Security Service.\(^58\) South Arabia has received attention.\(^59\) Rory Cormac examined the development of co-ordinating machinery in Whitehall as a result of experience in South Arabia in the early 1960s.\(^60\) He argued a Joint Action Committee had to be set up in order to take ‘active measures’, which suggests that the Counter Subversion Committee was concerned with co-ordinating and financing propaganda programmes created by the Information Research


\(^{60}\) Rory Cormac, ‘Co-ordinating Covert Action’, *op. cit.*
Department of the Foreign Office (IRD). The weakness of his analysis is that he doesn’t examine the origins of the co-ordinating machinery before the early 1960s. This thesis argues, despite limited evidence, that it may be possible to discern continuity in the counter-subversion co-ordinating machinery from 1948 through to the 1960s and that the machinery had deeper roots in the imperial intelligence system. There were continuities of approach between the Anti Communism (Overseas) (AC (O)) and Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies and the Counter Subversion Committee.

The effect of experience at the periphery; ‘Bottom up’ influences:

It is now necessary to turn to literature which deals with the imperial intelligence machinery seen from below. Martin Thomas argues that intelligence activity was an essential element of the nature of the colonial state. He explored the nature of the relationship between information gathering, the application of violence, and colonial rule within colonies.61 His analogy of the colony as a playing field on which competing interests fought for influence and the government used intelligence to manipulate affairs was important for understanding the relationship between the colonial authorities, their collaborators, and anti-colonial groups. It is also important for understanding the purpose of the colonial intelligence machinery. Thomas also developed insightful ideas about the relationship between colonial governments and metropolitan powers. In later work he emphasised the connections between violence, economic activity, and colonial order.62

Counter -Insurgency:

An important strand in the development of the ‘bottom up’ literature has been the creation of a distinct, professional, literature about ‘counter-insurgency’ for the guidance of the armed forces, much of it based on the Anglo-Malayan experience. This professional literature has attracted analysis from historians using two approaches. Some have contributed by providing analysis of particular campaigns and offering insight into the basic operational principles; others have taken a more historical approach examining the development of policy and the activity of states involved in conducting it. Some historians have argued that the British

61 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, pp. 1-32.
government used counter-insurgency campaigns as part of a strategic policy to retain British international influence by holding ex-colonies in the Commonwealth. The second, wide, approach was important because it placed campaigns within a strategic context. It focused on central control and intervention from the centre in the colonies rather than simply analysing actions at the periphery. A recent debate is concerned with the question of how far the British state, was committed to ‘hearts and minds’ or to violence as a general policy of management. Many studies were geographically specific and did not consider how information from the colonies fed into any higher formation than military commands. The CO was seen merely as a political institution operating ‘somewhere’ above the campaign.

The literature of counter-insurgency has developed a debate about the importance of a counter-insurgency model based on the Malayan experience promulgated throughout the empire. Intelligence was identified as one of the key factors to be managed in the ‘idealised’ British model of counter-insurgency. The experience was transferred to inform the development of intelligence machinery in other colonies. Recent scholarship has, however, suggested that there was in fact no learning curve and no developed Malayan model. Commentators have pointed to intelligence failures and their effect on the well known campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and South Arabia. Later work about Ireland, Palestine, and the disturbances in India has followed a similar line. The case of British Guiana has not yet been fully explored. The criticisms of the performance of the machinery include the failure to pick up on warning signs of problems and threats and to respond by creating intelligence machinery rapidly. The machinery failed to learn from mistakes, unpreparedness; and insufficient allocation of resources. In these works scholars have commented on the transfer of ideas, techniques, and persons from crisis to crisis. Indeed

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64 David French, The British Way in Counter Insurgency, pp. 4-9.
69 Patrick French, Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division (London: Harpercollins, 1997), pp.256-274.
some have argued that a ‘counter-insurgency model’ evolved but others have argued that the process was inefficient and ideas and lessons were not transferred, leading to an ineffective management of such campaigns.

In this thesis it will be argued that the development of a Malayan counter-insurgency model was accepted at the time and is consequently a valid tool for analysis even if it tended to be a set of organisational precedents and practices used in an uncritical way. This collection of precedents was closely linked to the development of a ‘colonial intelligence model’. The Malayan experience was ‘mined’ for precedent, not always to the best advantage. Karl Hack and Leon Comber provided accounts of the development of the intelligence development in Malaya which provide a basis for understanding the historical development of intelligence organisation and practice over time which provide a basis for understanding when they became transferable to other colonies in particular forms. As the precedents were spread to other colonies with problems the model evolved. Precedent was then re-transmitted to other colonies in the region; experience from Kenya for example, was sent to Central and East Africa.

Colonial police and the intelligence machinery:

Scholars of intelligence have tended to ignore long term trends in the development of policing which had influenced the CO and which tended to push colonial police forces into a more ‘British’ approach. These were important because the police provided an important element of the information collecting machinery. The impetus for this set of changes came from officers on the ground and the CO rather than elsewhere in Whitehall. Recent literature on the development of the colonial police needs to be considered because the ‘professional element’ of the colonial intelligence machinery operated within the police machinery. Much of the discussion of the colonial police has concentrated on the

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73 Leon Comber, *Malaya’s Secret Police: The Role of Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency 1945-60* (Singapore; Melbourne: ISEAS; Monash Asia Institute, 2008), pp.1-22.

development of models and their relative influence. There is a dispute for example, about whether the Metropolitan Police/English civil model or the so called RIC model (now generally regarded as a set of precedents rather than as a model as such) were more influential; a debate raised in Sir Charles Jeffries seminal work. The debate considers the importance of ‘sub nodes’ such as India, Ceylon, Palestine and Kenya in promulgating particular models. Georgina Sinclair has considered the effect of the nature of the settlements also affected policing. The police forces which generated the models of development discussed in discussion of the colonial police are important because each of these forces had information gathering machinery. It is, consequently, possible to directly apply some of the discussion of police models to the development of intelligence machinery. This is not an area which has been considered by other historians and is new to this thesis. Indeed the thesis will argue that eventually a colonial intelligence model emerged in Circular 458/56 which was enforced by a system of inspection and was based largely on English practice (although the origins of Special Branch lay in Ireland) and was advocated as part of a professional agenda by the Security Service. These ideas are supported by a limited number of ‘single service’ intelligence histories especially about the Far East and Malaya, which deepen understanding of developments in specific places.

**Change of role in the imperial intelligence machinery:**

The weakness of the existing literature is that it does not engage with the CO as an institution with its own information needs over a long period. In consequence it does not see the CO’s machinery as conceptually and organisationally separate from, although connected to, the British machinery. The ‘imperial’ system was initially merely a way of the colonial machinery corresponding with the British machinery in its colonial role on matters of mutual interest not a system to support direct management. The different roles affected the nature of the products. When the colonial machinery had to be converted to support direct management it was necessary to create new co-ordinating machinery at all levels and change the purpose.

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79 Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies*, pp. 56-59.
and content of the products. The changes occurred in the context of inter-departmental ‘turf wars’ in Whitehall in which the CO was forced to become a conduit for information to feed collegiate decision making in the Cabinet and Cabinet Office. The CO was in competition not only with the FO and CRO but with the MOD and Chiefs of Staff (COS). Rory Cormac picks up the story from 1948 arguing that the CO resisted integration into the intelligence machinery, failed to co-operate fully with JIC, and resisted some aspects of the Security and Secret Intelligence Service’s ideas about the empire. Cormac however does not examine the longer term development of and practices of the CO and consequently does not fully appreciate the motivations of the CO or the degree and nature of the CO’s resistance to intervention from the rest of Whitehall.

Without professional intelligence machinery the CO had to use its own and the colonial administrative machinery, to collect information. The machinery was staffed by men with largely similar attitudes. The imperial system produced the kind of information the CO thought it needed. In theory it could absorb ‘security information’ from the colonial police and transmit it in a useful form to London but this was not done consistently. The CO’s intelligence machinery consequently had a different world view to that in the rest of Whitehall which tended to concentrate on security matters. There were a number of other contexts to these changes which complicate the picture further. Change took place in the context of a centralisation of the British government policy making. This was accompanied by a centralisation of the JIO within the Cabinet Office.

Other contexts:

Peaceful v. violent decolonisation:

There has been little scholarly comparison of development of intelligence machinery in colonies with insurgencies and the developments in ‘peaceful’ colonies. This is an important omission because the existence of ‘peaceful’ colonies and transitions to self government might be explained in terms of successful intelligence activity, opening an interesting point of comparison with violent ‘decolonisations’. The development of a global counter-subversion programme and the machinery for implementing it might be seen as a means of avoiding

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colonial conflict by dealing with problems in advance. The failure to differentiate between violent and peaceful ‘decolonisations’ tend to obscure the British government’s response to anti colonial challenges across the empire as a whole and the part played by intelligence machinery within that response.

**India and Palestine:**

Until recently the effects of the Palestine and Indian experience on the development of the intelligence machinery have been largely left out of discussion of the colonial intelligence machinery, although some later studies have identified their place in the development of counter-insurgency. The Indian and colonial experiences are generally dealt with in separate studies despite the cross fertilisation which had occurred during the period. This tendency may be due to academic boundaries and the separation of archives. This thesis will point to the importance of Indian personnel and experience in determining colonial intelligence practice.

**The role of the Secretary of State for the Colonies:**

The evidence used in this thesis does not provide very much evidence about the role of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the development of the intelligence machinery. A certain amount can be ascertained. Some elements in the Labour party had a long term suspicion of the intelligence machinery, despite a more pragmatic approach being taken by labour cabinet ministers including Bevin the Foreign Secretary as a result of increasing concerns about communism. George Hall (1945-46), Arthur Creech Jones (1946-50) and Jim Griffiths (1950-51) had not had military or intelligence experience. Jones had been a conscientious objector. All were ‘idealistic’. Given this background it is understandable how they supported the officials in the CO’s bid to retain its autonomy and

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82 French, Patrick, *Liberty or Death*, op.cit.
not to create new intelligence machinery in the period 1945-51. The Conservatives who followed mostly had military experience; some had also worked in departments such as the War and Foreign Offices or had been associated with the intelligence machinery. Others had directly worked in intelligence during the war. There were splits between the liberal and more right wings of the party. Oliver Lyttelton (1951-1954),\textsuperscript{87} Alan Lennox Boyd (1954-59),\textsuperscript{88} and Duncan Sandys (1962-64)\textsuperscript{89} were more conservative than Ian Macleod (1959-61)\textsuperscript{90} and Reginald Maudling (1961-62)\textsuperscript{91} and intelligence development during their periods of office seems to have had a slightly higher priority although Lennox Boyd did seek to exert his department’s autonomy during negotiations over the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies. Calder Walton demonstrates that Lennox-Boyd was well aware of intelligence activity. He visited a Security Service course for senior colonial service personnel for example, and he was kept aware of the ruthless treatment of nationalists in various colonies.\textsuperscript{92} Secretaries of State were aware of colonial emergencies and atrocities associated with them. They saw intelligence material and they were involved in the interdepartmental rivalries in Whitehall so it is likely they played a greater part in the process than the sources used in thesis suggest.

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Intelligence development in a context of police development and administrative centralisation:

This thesis seeks to understand the development of the imperial machinery in the context of more general trends toward: administrative centralisation in Whitehall and the colonies and the professionalization of the intelligence machinery and police, both British and imperial. The development of the imperial intelligence machinery therefore needs to be placed in the context of historical models which seek to describe the development of administration,
policing, and bureaucratic practice in Whitehall. ‘A model in this context is a standardised set of organisational patterns, practices, and a system of record keeping which have set, rational, relationships or connections with one another. It may evolve over time. The model may or may not be affected by local inputs when it is moved from place to place, such inputs might be important to its effectiveness in different contexts. A model can be difficult to distinguish from a ‘selection’ of accumulated precedent. Accumulated precedent by contrast is not a set combination of factors connected on a rational basis but rather a selection of a wider group of precedents for dealing with a local problem.’ It may be argued that it is possible to see the evolution of models relating to the development of administrative structures, police structures, the co-ordinating machinery and the structure of the specialist intelligence machinery. All of the models affecting the development of the imperial intelligence machinery can be seen as being either ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’. This section therefore will examine firstly how the contextual factors of administrative structure and professional administrative and professional agenda affected the development of the intelligence machinery. These are discernible although they have not generated their own literature.

Administration and information collection in the colonies:

In most colonies the most important role of information collecting was to enable small numbers of Europeans to manage the colonies with minimal resources by exploiting internal social and ethnic groups. There were differing systems models of colonial administration which formed the context for the specific relationships between the intelligence machinery and the structures of government. There were two basic models of administration. Older ‘plantation’ colonies used a variation of the English ‘county system’ based on Justices of the Peace (JP). These generally had representative institutions for Europeans and the magistracies were held by local European landowners. These systems were able to rely upon local knowledge held by the European ‘planters’ who had local control over land and people. This kind of colony, notably those in America and in the West Indies, were frequently resistant to reforms developed in Whitehall and difficult to ‘keep in line’ because of the influence of local elites. Later systems of administration used a form of government in which the governor was not bound by representative institutions and had direct control over directly employed, ‘professional’ generalist administrators, both at the centre and in the outlying districts and

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provinces. This system also emerged out of the county system but had developed in a different way due to local conditions. Typically, for example, the European official held both judicial and administrative roles, like the JP, and directly controlled the local population. A variant of this system allowed ‘indirect rule’ in which the European administrators worked through native authorities. In both cases the administration was dependent on local knowledge regularly reported to the secretariat. The native authorities such as local rulers, chiefs, local elders, and so on were vitally important because they could be used both as a source of information and as a means of enforcing administrative decisions.

**Administrative Intelligence Co-ordinating machinery:**

The nature of the central administrative organisation in each colony was also important; sometimes it was very small and flexible and consequently many decisions and policies were made informally with administrative officials corresponding directly with the Chief Secretary. Over time however, as central administrative institutions developed, there was a tendency to adopt departmental structures on the British pattern which could lead to responsibility for native affairs, security, defence, and intelligence passing to individual departments rather than to the Chief Secretary. This process often led to larger differences between police and administrative intelligence activity.

Police forces evolved later in colonial development. The early colonies relied upon watchmen, parish constables, and in extreme cases on the army or militia. In the colonies police forces had different jurisdictions with some providing coverage of the whole colony. In some colonies the police were an urban phenomenon with rural policing being carried out by ‘Court Messengers’, ‘District Messengers’ or ‘Tribal Police’ who were directed by administrators. In the middle were colonies where the police in rural areas acted under the orders of the local administrator outside of their internal chain of command. These variants clearly affected the level of coverage that police and administrators had for intelligence purposes and limited the opportunity to collect information in a standardised way. As independence approached the administration was indigenised first; so that information gathering increasingly fell to the police.
Co-ordinating administrative and police intelligence:

It can be seen that the purpose and structure of colonial administration and the way in which it was co-ordinated differed from colony to colony and had a profound effect on the organisation of the intelligence machinery which supported it. Over time the development of professional police forces introduced a new element into the mix and which were to eventually form the professional element of the colonial machinery. Finally the idea of coordinating intelligence underwent change with a movement from collecting information in a ‘passive’ bureau to actively targeting indigenous targets using active Local Intelligence Committees (LIC). In some colonies the intelligence co-ordinating machinery was entirely informal and ‘ad hoc’. The Chief Secretary and the Police Commissioner or Head of Special Branch met with other officials as needed and carried out targeting and assessment, whilst in others there was formal machinery. In many cases the tendency was to passivity.

During the Second World War most colonial governments set up either a standing ‘security’, or a ‘defence’ committee. These committees managed the colony’s defence including intelligence, however the members were not trained intelligence officers although the committees could target, co-ordinate, and assess information coming in. By contrast the Local Joint Intelligence Committees, later called Local Intelligence Committees (LIC), were intelligence committees structured to both assess information and manage local intelligence activity. LIC personnel generally included many of those found on the defence or security committees i.e. the Chief Secretary or his representative, Commissioner of Police or Head of Special Branch, local Military Commander, a professional secretary (a senior administrator) and, where appointed, the SLO. Other officials could be brought in as required. By the stage the LICs were coming to maturity some of their members had probably been trained by the Security Service, often these included the Head of Special Branch, SLO and the Secretary. The form of the output required by the CO and Whitehall had been set and many of the processes involved standardised. In the final stages of British rule a secret intelligence section made up of a sub group within the larger machinery was sometimes situated in the Governor’s or Deputy Governor's Office. It is difficult to argue therefore that they were an entirely new development.
Colonial police:

As well as administrative models, specific police models were important to the development to the imperial intelligence machinery. The British treated political deviance as a ‘crime’; and therefore a matter for the police. Police practice was affected by their professional development. It has already been shown how research carried out into the development of the colonial police shows that the police were consciously modelled on two different British traditions of policing and that these merged eventually into a distinctive colonial police model encouraged by the CO. Colonial police structures were important because they contained the professional intelligence machinery. At colonial level it is probably correct to suggest that there was a ‘British /Metropolitan police model’ used by colonial police forces which gradually developed into a discrete colonial police model but that the so called ‘RIC model’ was actually a collection of precedents, which provided a grab bag of useful ideas for paramilitary police activity.94 Different intelligence models were associated with each police model.

The Metropolitan Police and RIC Special Branches developed in different ways. The RIC predominantly relied upon information collected by uniformed police which was collated by a small body in district and national headquarters, although there were Special Branch staff attached at different levels of the hierarchy whilst the Metropolitan Police developed a specialised detective body and the political police emerged out of the Criminal Investigation Department system, as did the Dublin Metropolitan Police’s G Division.95 Both of these systems had connections with the Irish Chief Secretary’s Office (CSO) and the British Home Office (HO) respectively, through which information fed into government more widely. The role of uniformed police was a major difference between the two models.

Distinct, standardised, colonial police and colonial intelligence traditions emerged during the twentieth century, which were formalised into models propagated by training, and inspection. The ‘Malayan Experience’ was a particularly important influence on police counter-insurgency and intelligence practice but Indian, Ceylonese, Palestinian, Kenyan, and Cypriot experience also played a part.

94 Richard Hawkins, ‘The ‘Irish’ Model, pp. 18-32; Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line, pp.10-36.
In the colonial intelligence machinery much was standardised including the organisation and records keeping structures so that an officer moving from one force to another would have no trouble adapting. There were still however local differences due to local administrative and police structures. British police precedents were transmitted through the use of advisers appointed by the CO and colonial governments. Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, for example, was used by the CO in the interwar years as an unofficial adviser. In 1948 a Police Adviser (PA) was appointed in the CO who was directed specifically to improve the colonial intelligence machinery. This system of transmission worked well because the CO had a tradition of using advisers for various purposes. The development of the colonial police into a body of men following British practice was a personal interest for a number of civil servants in the CO notably Sir Charles Jeffries, this internal agenda often clashed with those pursued in the rest of Whitehall. There is evidence that the CO preferred to work with the Metropolitan Police Special Branch rather than the Security Service.

There was a transfer of ideas and precedents but this did not necessarily mean that it made the machinery more effective. The process of development and professionalization of the British intelligence machinery was an evolving model which was actively transferred to the colonies at differing times. Whitehall and the CO also developed wider, standardised, approaches to dealing with emergencies and to the process of handover of the intelligence machinery each of which had an effect on the timing and scale of changes.96

The Colonial Office and its ‘administrative’ intelligence machinery:

From 1909 professional interdepartmental intelligence machinery became a permanent feature of the British government. The CO, unlike the other departments of state with overseas or domestic security roles in the British machinery, did not have its own ‘professional’ information collecting agency although it had a formal link to the Security Service, consequently the CO retained older conceptions of intelligence and its collection. It is necessary therefore to explain why this particular variation of practice occurred.

Up until the end of the Second World War the CO relied on the older administrative conception of information gathering. Its approach was similar to the activity of the HO prior

96 Frank Furedi, Colonial War and Third World Nationalism, pp. 1-16.
to the early 1920s and the intelligence machinery inside the Irish CSO. The CO, like these offices, collected, assessed, and co-ordinated information gathering activity for its own needs. Unlike the HO or CSO, the CO’s position was complicated because it did not directly control or have a direct relationship with a police force having a security/political role. Rather the CO’s departments dealt with colonial governments which contained the information collecting machinery. There was an additional administrative layer between the collecting agencies and the CO. The CO also worked with the Security Service and SIS.

As mentioned earlier arguably this difference made the CO an all source, analytical, intelligence organisation; more akin to the American conception of intelligence machinery. This difference in role may partly explain why it was in conflict with other elements of the British intelligence machinery. It also meant that the professional intelligence culture which evolved in the course of the twentieth century was less developed and understood in the CO than in other departments in Whitehall. The CO’s position was comparatively weak because of the tradition of allowing colonial governments considerable autonomy to run their own affairs, using their own finances. In consequence the CO only interfered when the colony could no longer cope. When this occurred the CO suddenly needed much greater quantities of information than it usually received. The CO’s machinery for processing it was inadequate. When the British government wanted to manage colonial situations directly it needed even more information in particular forms and the system could not supply this.

As head of the colonial intelligence hierarchy the CO functioned as a conduit to pass imperial ideas and influences up to the British machinery and British ideas influences downwards. It had its own ideas on what constituted the kind of intelligence it needed and this material shaped its policies and world view. Internal divisions in the CO shaped its intelligence practice. The ‘geographical’ departments were the guardians of the ‘old ideas’ on intelligence, the defenders of CO autonomy, and the main sources for the CO’s localised worldview. ‘Technical’ or ‘subject’ departments were seen as subordinate within the COs organisational culture but became increasingly influential from the late 1930s. The technical departments concerned with security took two lines. Civil servants concerned with intelligence also emphasised ‘local’ threats whilst the Police Adviser/IGCP and the Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA) (from 1954), as professionals, could see a wider view. The

defence/security departments liaised with the British intelligence machinery and gradually became a gateway for personnel from the Security Service to penetrate the CO’s defences and bring in ‘global’ ideas about intelligence. The resistance of the CO and in particular its geographical departments, substantially slowed the adoption of new machinery focussed on British government needs. As the defence and security departments evolved they became a conduit for ideas about intelligence to reach the colonies directly, and received colonial experience. As the link with the Security Service they also fed into the British professional intelligence machinery. The Security Service was small in numbers so it relied upon input from the CO.

The Security Service was an interdepartmental body which eventually ended up under Home Office sponsorship in the 1950s. The empire was not its main focus. It had worked for the CO since the First World War but internecine struggles between the HO, Special Branch (SB) and the Security Service over control of domestic intelligence activity, meant that its responsibility to the Secretary of State for Colonies was not formalised until 1931. The Security Service did not normally conduct operations overseas. It was largely passive and relied upon a series of correspondents in colonial police forces and secretariats to keep it informed. It did however supervise the surveillance by Special Branch of colonial students studying in Britain. As central, professional, control of the central intelligence machinery developed in Britain the Security Service was incorporated into it. As the JIC became an intelligence management organisation it worked with the Security Service to offer advice and assistance to the CO. The Security Service provided a ‘technical’ channel to send ‘top down’ reforms to the CO and the colonies, however the Security Service also worked with the CO to absorb colonial experience and process it and incorporate it into British practice.

II

Counter insurgency and colonial intelligence models:

The existence of a Malayan model has already been discussed; it now necessary to look in more detail at how it will be used in the thesis. The Malayan ‘counter-insurgency model’ has sometimes seen to be based on the application of six principles: the coordination of

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government; defeating the insurgency not the insurgent; minimum force and application of
the law; clear and hold not search and destroy; intelligence led operations; success lay in
achieving a political settlement. Recently however there has been extensive criticism of this
model based on actual practice applied in particular the level of violence applied.99

The idea of a transmitted model based on Malayan practice has been criticised by a number
of commentators notably David French100 and David Charters.101 French pointed out that
lessons were not learnt and that much of the CO’s guidance was vague and contradictory
leading to numerous versions of the Malayan system.102 The Malayan experience had
negative effects on development. The Malayan Security Service (MSS) was the only
example of a ‘national’ intelligence agency in the colonial empire until 1948 and its problems
and limitations probably had the effect of encouraging the Security Service to prefer police
Special Branches as the model for other colonies.103

The thesis uses a much more limited definition. It simply uses the term ‘Malayan model’ to
refer to a selection of organisational structures and practices in the colonial administration,
police, and intelligence which may or may not have been effective manifestations of the
greater principles. Nor does it attempt to consider whether the points were valid or effective
per se. Many of them were in fact developments of practices used in other colonies
previously. It is possible to see how these specific points were developed and codified in
Malaya and then circulated by a combination of administrative action in the CO and the
movement of people to other colonies and formed the basis of practice elsewhere. These
included the development of the co-ordinating LIC and its subordinate committees at lower
levels; the development of the role of Director of Intelligence (DofI); the creation of a
particular form of Special Branch with an investigative capacity and representation at each
level of police administration which conducted covert operations aimed at penetrating and
manipulating target organisations. The machinery was linked to the Security Service through
the SLO system. These basics were supported by the development of specialised Counter-
Subversion machinery to co-ordinate covert operations. These elements of the machinery
however could be linked together in different ways.

100 David French, The British Way in Counter Insurgency, pp. 2-9, 16-34.
101 David Charters, ‘Counter Insurgency Intelligence: The Evolution of British theory and Practice’ Journal of
Conflict Studies 29 (2009), para. 2, 32, 42.
102 David French, The British Way in Counter Insurgency, pp. 16-34.
103 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, pp. 447-450.
Whilst the ‘model was promulgated from the ‘top down’ it incorporated Malayan and colonial experience at different times. The same trend can also be seen in the development of the police and led to the development of a ‘colonial police model’.

Whilst there are problems with creating a precise definition of a Malayan ‘model’, it is still a useful concept for considering the development of the intelligence machinery because it was accepted at the time. In 1948 the CO recommended that other colonies consider adopting Malayan practices. After 1948 ideas and practices were spread by; inspections by the Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP) and Security Service officers, the transfer of experienced officers between colonies, visits of inspection by interested police officers and through training courses and conferences. In 1955 the Templer Report was based largely on Templer’s experience in Malaya and ideas which had emerged from the Malayan experience. The reason for the recommendation is not clear but it may be that the scale of the Malayan Emergency had led to rapid development of the intelligence machinery and provided a precedent or that the inter war reputation of the police in Malaya and Singapore for intelligence work survived. Far Eastern police officers had been used to advise other forces during the war on intelligence and policing practice and this probably affected their prestige with the CO. The CO recognised that the forms would have to be adapted to suit local constitutional structures. The existence of a federal system, for example, affected the ability to transfer the Malayan institutions and experience to non federal colonies.

The Malayan ‘model’ developed out of earlier colonial experiences in a number of colonies. Then the Malayan models of policing and intelligence organisation and activity emerged over time and consequently elements were transmitted to other colonies at different points in the process of their development in Malaya. As new ideas about intelligence organisation and practice were tried out in Malaya successful innovations were transmitted piecemeal, to other colonies, although the CO issued circulars to try to keep all colonies to a standard pattern.


105 TNA, CO295/627/5 Trinidad Police Force: report by Major R.H. Onraet, Police commission to the British West Indies on behalf of the Colonial Office regarding the proposed reorganisation and training of force March 1942.

Sometimes these innovations in turn started off different local patterns of development which sometimes became regional models. Malayan ideas on intelligence practice and organisation, for example were transferred to Kenya as they stood in 1952, by the Security Service. Police officers from Central and East Africa visited Kenya and deliberately took the ideas to their own territories a process encouraged by the IGCP and the Security Intelligence Advisers.

The Chronology of the development of the Malayan intelligence model:

It is important to have a clear chronology of the development of the Malayan intelligence machinery so that the chronology of the process of transfer to other colonies can be established. Karl Hack showed how the development of the Malayan intelligence machinery could be divided into four phases.

Intelligence Failure:
Stage 1 March-June 1948

The intelligence machinery in Malaya was unique. During this period ‘political intelligence’ (which included security intelligence) was gathered by Malayan Security Service (MSS) rather than by a police special branch. The structure was caused by precedent set before the war and the way in which Malaya had been reoccupied after it and had similarities with aspects of Indian practice. MSS was urban based and small scale. It transcended local administrative boundaries and although manned by police officers was separate from the local police forces. It was effectively an intelligence bureau which relied on information collected from local police. It was still trying to reorganise and make up its number after the disruption caused by the war. The MSS was led by an idiosyncratic leader, who had considerable impact at an operational level. He was an expert in Kuomintang (KMT) and Malay nationalism but failed to pick up on the change of policy in the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to adopt the tactics of revolutionary warfare. He was not effective at communicating his findings to consumers. The Head of MSS also angered other intelligence

107 TNA, CAB21/2922 Overseas Defence Committee Guidance to Colonial governments on the Presentation of Intelligence containing Despatch No5 from the High Commissioner of Malaya ODC(49)43, 10 August 1949.; TNA, CO822/445 The Organisation of the Intelligence Service in Kenya 1952. Reorganisation of Intelligence Services Kenya, from Intelligence Adviser, A.S. Macdonald, 4 March 1953.
109 See also Leon Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police 1945-60., pp. 24-57.
agencies leading to a conflict with the Security Service which led to his dismissal. As a result MSS was overwhelmed by the declaration of emergency and its structures and practices became a dead end in the development of a colonial intelligence model.

**Intelligence Reform:**

**Stage 2 August 1948-August 1950**

In August 1948 MSS was dissolved and political intelligence collection transferred to the Singapore and Malayan Special Branches (SB). As in India the Special Branch was a subsection of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Reforms were made to allow political intelligence from the administration to be compared with police intelligence but this was done in an operations room rather than in committee. There was no SB training programme at this point.\(^{110}\)

**Intelligence Reform:**

**Stage 3 April 1950-November 1951:**

In April 1950 there were a number of developments to the intelligence machinery. Briggs was appointed Director of Operations. Co-ordination was improved by a number of means. A Federal Advisory Committee set up with help of Morton, Head of Security Intelligence (Far East) (SIFE). War Executive Committees were created (WEC) and by June 1950 subordinate intelligence committees had been created to support the WECs.\(^{111}\) Morton advised the Malayan government to appoint Sir William Jenkin as Intelligence Adviser. In May 1950 Jenkin, late of the Intelligence Bureau in India, was appointed Intelligence Adviser to Malayan SB/CID. He expanded the Special Branch and appointed indigenous officers and Military Intelligence Officers (MIO) for liaison purposes. In August 1950 Jenkin was appointed Director of Intelligence with executive power over the CID. SB could only coordinate police not military intelligence. May 1951 Jenkin reformed CID/SB into an Intelligence Bureau presumably as a result of his Indian experience. Jenkin refocused the IB on emergency duties. He changed his chain of command from Commissioner of Police to High Commissioner. In October 1951 the Commissioner returned and seized control of the IB and placed it back under the overall control of the CID but intelligence duties concentrated in the SB.

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Reforms after Templer:

Stage 4 April 1952-:

In January 1952 Templer was appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations and commenced a series of reforms. In April 1952 Arthur Young was appointed Commissioner of Police. He reorganised Special Branch under its own Senior Assistant Commissioner and formed into a separate department within the police organisation. SB was now allowed to set its own agenda. SB absorbed many experienced CID officers. Morton, Head of SIFE, was appointed DofI. He was responsible for coordinating all intelligence both police and military. The DofI no longer had executive control of SB but was given direct access to Templer and seat on the Director of Operations Committee. The DofI undertook co-ordination of all intelligence both police and army. The Head of SB (SAC) undertook operational control of SB on a day to day basis. In 1952 additional MIOs were appointed and SB representatives appointed to military headquarters. In August 1952 a formal SB Training programme was set up.\(^{112}\)

Hack summarised the developments:

‘This period thus saw the solution to a central problem of intelligence in low intensity warfare, that of no single authority capable of coordinating all agencies. At the top Templer as Director of Operations, being also High Commissioner and an intelligence expert, ensured coordination of all military and civil agencies. He now had responsible to him a non-executive DOI who had authority to coordinate all intelligence. The DOI himself was served by a small Combined Intelligence Staff to prepare reports. At the executive level, 'Planning' Committees ranged from a SB Federation Intelligence committee chaired by Morton, down to SB committees at police contingent levels (that is, police headquarters in each state) and below. So an efficient system was in place - centred on SB coordination, but with the attachment of MIOs at all levels - to ensure

\(^{112}\) Karl Hack, ‘British intelligence and counterinsurgency in the era of decolonisation ’pp.130-146, 173-196.
coordinated collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, and prioritization of resources.'

The Elements of the Malayan Model:

A model of intelligence machinery was emerging in Malaya which had a number of features which could be modified for different conditions in other places. There was a police Special Branch with a covert role, separate from the CID. Committees were developed to ‘fuse’ intelligence collected by the administration, army and police, at each administrative level. A colony wide committee was developed to oversee these activities. The post of DoI was created.

The first example of the dissemination of Malayan ideas was related to the formation role and command of Special Branches. Special Branches were encouraged in the CO’s Circular of 1948 however the separation of SB into a separate section of the police was not uniformly applied. Many colonies continued to keep SB a section of the CID. SB not only collected information and had a role in collating it but also became the executive element in conducting covert operations. SB handled the operational aspects of covert action. It actively sought to penetrate and manipulate target organisations. It used passive and active methods of collecting all source intelligence including: surveillance; and mail and communications intercepts (in Malaya this included intercepting the Communist Terrorist (CT) message system); and informers. It actively bribed and coerced people into co-operation and tried to ‘turn’ Surrendered Enemy Personnel. This included encouraging them to join ‘pseudo gang’ units tasked with actively killing insurgents. SBs worked closely with Information Services which ran the propaganda campaigns which were the other side of covert warfare.

113 Ibid. p. 131.
The CO’s initial assumption seems to have been that SBs should be part of the local CID. This was not in fact the most effective organisation because it interposed a layer of the police hierarchy i.e. the Officer in Charge of CID between the Head of Special Branch and the Commissioner. The arrangement hindered the Head of Special Branch’s role as adviser to the Chief Secretary. The final Malayan arrangement in Stage 4 of Hack’s summary separated the SB from CID under its own Senior Assistant Commissioner who was Head of Special Branch. The Head of Special Branch in Malaya emerged as the executive director of police intelligence and adviser to the Chief Secretary but his relationship to the Director of Intelligence was not completely formalised.

The new organisation encouraged the professional development of SB officers who needed agent handling skills different to the informant handling skills used in the CID. Special Branch activity was sometimes illegal and this created friction with ‘ordinary’ police officers. Separation improved security because CIDs and SBs had often shared accommodation. Ironically, given the fate of the Malayan Security Service, the Malayan SB developed into a body similar to the Security Service but with the addition of executive powers.

The second area of Malayan influence was in the development of intelligence command, control, and coordination machinery. This was a complex process because there was experimentation in Malaya and different colonies copied the developments thereat different times. It took time for the implications of the roles of the DofI, adviser, executive director, or a co-ordinator, to emerge. The final version of the role involved strategic direction whilst day to day activities were carried out by the Head of Special Branch. In Malaya the DofI had a place on the Director of Operations Committee, which enabled him to get his ideas approved if conflicts of interest occurred. Not all colonies needed a DofI except those involved in counter-insurgency campaigns. The first DofI in Malaya was a Security Service officer and former Head of SIFE. The Security Service was the source of many DofI throughout the empire thereafter. A precedent was set which enabled the Security Service, a British service, to take on executive roles in colonies and consequently to increase its influence.

116 Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, p.450. Jack Morton ex head of SIFE and Director of Intelligence Malaya recommended Special Branch separation from the Criminal Investigation Department.

As discussed previously most colonies, but not all, adopted the central LIC and the system of lower level co-ordinating committees for co-ordinating and analysing intelligence, matched to administrative levels. Local JICs had initially been set up in the Far East in 1948. In Malaya in June 1950 intelligence committees paralleling the ‘War Executive Committees’ which managed the war at a local level were set up. There was cross membership between the Malayan committees. The system culminated in a territory wide intelligence committee with the power to co-ordinate intelligence activity, set priorities, and analyse higher level activity. In Malaya this was a Federal Intelligence Committee. The committees were rapidly adopted elsewhere. Kenya, for example, adopted them in 1952-1953. By 1953 the Permanent Undersecretary at the Colonial Office, Sir Thomas Lloyd, had issued a letter recommending the use lower level committees elsewhere in the empire although this no longer seems to exist. Clearly however the complex federal structure of Malaya led to complications not always necessary elsewhere.

Each of these developments showed that there were a number of possible ways of organising and co-ordinating the machinery at every point of development and a certain degree of experimentation was undertaken. During this process of experimentation ideas and practices were already be circulated so potentially the particular form of the machinery at a given point could be adopted in other colonies.

**Colonial personnel in the metropole:**

The colonies had an effect on the metropole as well. Colonial personnel were incorporated into the British intelligence collecting machinery, in particular the Security Service. Petrie who was Indian Police and later Sillitoe who was an ex colonial policeman from Northern Rhodesia were both Directors General. Numerous ex-colonial officers served in subordinate roles. Experience in the colonies was spread between colonies by the movement of personnel which included officers from influential colonies India, Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus to other areas. Ideas and practices were absorbed and promulgated in; CO circulars; the inspections of the Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP) and Security Intelligence Advisers (SIA); and in Security Service training packages.

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118 TNA CO537/4321 Security Arrangements: Far East Local Joint Intelligence Committees, 1949.
The effectiveness of standardisation of organisation and practice can only carry a system so far and other factors played a part. Colonial governments resisted reform for financial and cultural reasons (i.e. beliefs of the administrators) until it was too late to develop the network of agents and the records that could make them truly effective. The situations in colonies differed and transferring officers between colonies could carry ideas which were irrelevant to local conditions. More frequent postings also reduced the ability to develop local language skills which excluded police officers from understanding the local situation and thus being forced to rely upon local interpreters.

III

Counter subversion and covert action machinery:

The USSR and its intelligence agencies sought to subvert other countries in the twentieth century by providing: support for local communist parties; involvement in the activities of left wing organisations like trades unions, youth organisations and the labour movement; through propaganda, both overt and covert; through espionage; the penetration of foreign governments; and through left wing journalists and media. Subversion resulted in the development of British and American counter-subversion programmes.

Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, who was involved in the central intelligence machinery, defined counter-subversion as:

[… ] clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or operations, directed against communism or, in the Colonies, subversive forms of nationalism […]

Other Commonwealth states were involved. The Australian government’s five point counter-subversion programme was based on British ideas.

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119 The National Archives, Prime Minister’s Department, hereinafter abbreviated to TNA. PREM; TNA, PREM 11/1582, Minute to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 28 November 1955, para. 2.
Counter–subversion activity is the ‘missing dimension’ of ‘counter-insurgency’. Counter-insurgency has received most professional and scholarly attention partly because of the practical benefits of establishing a ‘template’ military solution, partly because fighting generated news, partly because the counter-subversion programme was less obvious to the public, and finally because scholars have tended to see the two as separate phenomena. Counter-subversion as a concept appears to come to fruition during the Cold War as a result of the perception of the success of subversion as a means of warfare by senior figures in the British government and the perception of the benefits of political warfare in Britain during the war.  

In Britain imperial experience affected the way in which Whitehall dealt with the Cold War. The government already had precedents for dealing with global political problems such as ‘Pan Islamism’ and ‘Communism’. The British government used surveillance to identify the people and organisations involved and ‘carrots and the sticks’ to manipulate the situation achieve a solution acceptable to British interests. The Indian government, for example, had kept Islamic groups under surveillance but also facilitated the visits of Indian pilgrims by providing diplomatic representations and practical support for their journey to Mecca. The idea was to both control and improve conditions for pilgrims and thus to limit the development of radicalism. Interwar interventions were co-ordinated by administrators in departments of state in relation to both foreign and imperial areas. The Interdepartmental Committee on Eastern Unrest (IDCEU) had similar characteristics to those of the JIC. It involved representatives of the intelligence services and the departments of state. It created threat assessments which overlapped imperial and foreign areas (much to the dislike of the FO). It also possessed the capacity to encourage particular departments to undertake counter-subversion work within their particular remit.

[121] The Journal of Contemporary British History 13:2 (1999) was devoted to a series of articles about various personalities and reveals the existence of this clique.
[123] John Fisher, ‘The Interdepartmental Committee on Eastern Unrest and British Responses to Bolshevik and Other Intrigues Against the Empire during the 1920s’ Journal of Asian History (2000, 1-34.)
The involvement of the British intelligence services in counter-subversion varied. At the extreme end British intelligence services had been involved in major operations within Russia. Normally the British services supplied individual officers with local expertise who used native personnel they recruited themselves or obtained from native rulers prepared to collaborate with the British. In ‘formal’ colonies they could draw upon from a variety of agencies including the police, customs, post office, and administrative services. Intelligence work was becoming a professional activity and so collecting, assessing, and co-ordinating machinery had to be created to achieve on a long term basis.

The development of Counter-Subversion after the Second World War:

Counter-subversion was a wider concept than the concept behind the interwar campaigns. It could be carried out in territories which were self governing, foreign, or no longer under direct rule. It involved ‘lip service’ to social, educational, and economic development, even if the resources available to put these kinds of reforms into operation were insufficient to carry it out. Like its imperial antecedents counter-subversion consisted of a mix of covert and overt activity and a range of activities from police and military action to political negotiation, propaganda, educational programmes, economic aid, training courses, and the provision of technical expertise. Counter-subversion was undertaken by a variety of individual British departments of state but it was increasingly co-ordinated at operational level by Cabinet Committees of various levels (although some departmental committees such as the Russia Committee also had an important role) and implemented by the Whitehall departments and the intelligence services with the support of a variety of other organisations including political parties and the Trades Union Congress.

The British intelligence services had a role in counter-subversion; however their resources were very limited. The SIS and Special Air Service (SAS) had para-military capability to conduct special operations, controlled radio stations and had the capacity to conduct ‘black’ propaganda operations, predominantly in the Middle East, but it also used colonial territory to broadcast into target countries. The Security Service only provided advice and liaison to local security forces in the colonies. In some colonies it did not have a permanent representative. In

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125 John Fisher ‘Major Norman Bray and Eastern Unrest in the Aftermath of World War 1’ Asian Affairs 31:2 (2000) 189-187,
the Middle East it had more resources. It was involved in operations in Palestine between 1945 and 1947 and it appointed liaison officers to the police and military forces of independent governments in the region.126

Counter-subversionary measures also had to be implemented at local level. Some colonial governments set up formal ‘counter-subversion’ organisations of their own, notably Singapore and Malaya,127 but most used their police Special Branches and administrative resources to apply the ideas and resources generated in Britain and locally. These included the activity of the Post and Telegraphs, Customs, Public Works Department, Education Department, and Native Affairs Departments. Organisations such as local trades unions, local employer organisations, local political parties, educational trusts and British bodies such as the British Council were all utilised. The result of this history is that the historiography is fragmentary, split across those of education, politics, and military history rather than being subsumed under a single ‘global’ literature.

The thesis will argue that there were two strands affecting the precedents for counter-subversion and counter-insurgency. Counter-subversion was shaped by ideas about political warfare and the appreciation of Communist subversion tactics which emerged during the Second and early Cold War. The British developed specialised agencies to carry out counter-subversion and some capacity remained after the war.128 After the war the initiation of the Cold War led to a rapid development in the concept of and the means of delivering counter-subversion. Nonetheless there were imperial influences.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with all of the implications of counter-subversion but it is necessary to examine how the CO became involved in the secret, intelligence machinery which was created to co-ordinate it. Counter-subversion was secret and from 1948 it was carried out by committees in the cabinet structure and the FO notably the Anti Communism Overseas Committee (AC (O)) which had a global remit to deal with communism. From an imperial point of view, the techniques of anti-communist counter-subversion were seen to be directly relevant to the suppression of anti-colonial nationalism as

127 TNA, CAB130/114 Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies, 1956.
well so AC (O)’s anti communist remit was gradually altered until it was abolished and replaced by the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies, a cabinet committee, and the counter-subversion committee in the FO. These two committees seem to have grown together by 1963 in practice when a single Counter-Subversion committee took over co-ordination of the British effort in this field. The process of development of the coordinating machinery shows how imperial intelligence machinery was changing to become an organisation for implementing policy rather than merely informing it.

IV

The structure of the thesis:

Taking into account these models and debates the thesis will attempt to explain the development of the ‘imperial intelligence machinery’ on a global scale.

Chapter 1 will examine the development of the CO and the way in which it interacted with the imperial intelligence machinery between the beginning of 19th century and the end of the Second World War.

Chapter 2 will focus on the development of the intelligence machinery in the CO between 1944 and 1950. In particular it will examine the process by which external forces such as the PM and Foreign Secretary (and behind them the Cabinet Office) pressed for the creation of ‘professional’ intelligence machinery focussed on the communist threat and able to support the FO’s propaganda warfare activities in the empire against the Cold War communist threat. In particular it will examine the idea of the Political Intelligence Section (PIS) and debates about its potential use and efficacy. Instead it will be shown how the CO entrenched its existing approaches to intelligence assessment and co-ordination for its own purposes. It will show how the CO dealt with external requests to modify the colonial intelligence machinery to meet the ‘new communist threat’ and how the experience in Palestine, Malaya, and India influenced this process. Overall it will argue that the CO was able to resist change, but was forced to make some concessions.

Chapter 3 will examine the same themes in relation to the period 1949-1956. In this period there was continuing external pressure from the rest of Whitehall, and the Cabinet Office was
becoming more and more important in centralising both Cabinet policy making and the British intelligence machinery. The CO somehow managed to partially avoid intervention into its activities. It will discuss the ‘settling down’ of the changes made in 1948-49, the abortive implementation of a PIS in 1953, the effects of the Templer Report and its recommendations, and the creation of the Intelligence and Security and Police departments within the CO. These were all ‘top down’ reforms which were largely driven by the development of professional agenda and the process of centralisation of administrative and intelligence notably the co-ordination and assessment machinery of the JIC and JIO by the Cabinet Office and the attempts both political and professional to get the CO to work within this frame work. Particular colonial and Cold War events however did cause acceleration and retardation of the process. Developments in the British machinery caused changes in the empire. At the same time the developing professional intelligence agenda was driven in part by the assimilation of experience in the empire which was fed back in the development of the machinery, not always effectively, by the JIC, and the Security Service.

Chapter 4 will explore the way in which the imperial machinery was adapted to maintain British interests during and after the handover process in the context of a ‘spectrum’ of different kinds of handovers from ‘friendly’ to ‘hostile’. It examines the development of bureaucratic models for handover of the intelligence machinery. It also shows how the local intelligence machinery was modified according to a developing bureaucratic model to enable British control of the final stages of handover.

Chapter 5 will deal with the question of covert action from 1944 to 1966. It will take a rather different path to that in other chapters. Firstly it will suggest that there was a long term practice of covert action as part of the process of colonial management but that immediate precedents were set during the First World War in Russia and the Second World War by organisations like SIS and SOE. These represented a new strand in the intelligence machinery which was a change from gathering information and processing it to implementing policy which like the air offensive and SOE action in the Second World War was the only way of carrying out the Cold War without inviting nuclear retaliation. In the colonial empire this process had to work in a different way to that which it had worked in Britain. A large amount of it had to be carried out by colonial governments under the general direction of Whitehall. The majority of covert action was Special Political Action (SPA) rather than Special Operations (SO); i.e. a mixture of propaganda and police activity carried out against
Communists and anti-colonial nationalists who were seen as closely associated with them. This process came in time to be co-ordinated into a much wider plan or concept of counter subversion which was an attempt to co-ordinate all resources to avoid trouble breaking out in the colonies by positive action in the form of propaganda, social educational and economic development and police and military activity. This resulted in the need for co-ordinating machinery in Whitehall and a variety of bodies in the colonies ranging from counter-subversion organisations to colonial information services and a mixture of British and colonial. The chapter will also examine how the imperial machinery became increasingly directly affected by American intervention.

Conclusion:

The thesis will argue that the development of the imperial intelligence machinery was driven by the development of the administration and the British professional intelligence machinery and their respective professional agenda over time. The process was advanced and retarded by historical events and trends. In Chapter 1 the thesis explores the connections between administration and professional intelligence machinery and their interrelationship and the emergence of distinct professional identities. In Chapter 2 these insights are applied to the development of the imperial intelligence machinery between 1944 and 1954. It will point to the importance of interdepartmental conflict and internal conflicts in shaping the development of machinery in the CO and the colonies. In Chapter 3 the way in which the British professional machinery and other departments in Whitehall intervened to deal with what was perceived as the CO's failure to develop an adequate system of early warning and information to enable centrally coordinated action to be undertaken during emergencies in terms of colonial police generally. In particular the Templer report copied the machinery and practice of the imperial machinery. In Chapter 4 the thesis will show how the general trends continued to have an impact but also how administrative and intelligence preparation was made to enable the final stages of British control and to maintain methods of acquiring information to meet Britain's long terms needs. Finally in Chapter 5 the thesis will show how the development of ideas about covert operation in the 20th century by the intelligence services fed back into the administration causing it to develop new methods of coordinating large scale covert operations, in particular counter subversion.
Chapter 1


This chapter seeks to examine the historical development of the Colonial Office (CO) and its involvement in intelligence activity. It explores the relationship between the CO’s administrative structure and practices and its methods of dealing with both information collecting on its own behalf and the way in which it interacted with the British professional intelligence machinery in order to explore the connections between administrative and intelligence practice and their respective professional agenda in a long term context of events over the period from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the Second World War. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the CO and the second with the CO’s interaction with the developing British intelligence machinery.

I

The Colonial Office 1800-1944:

It is necessary to examine how the CO developed its role as head of the imperial machinery with its different conception of intelligence and its unique dual role and reliance upon the colonial governments for information collection. The origins of the CO date back to the 1660s. Responsibility for colonial affairs lay with the Boards of Trade and Plantations (a committee of the Privy Council) in 1695 and the Southern Department until 1768, and the American Department from 1768 until 1782 when the secession of the American colonies, which constituted most of the empire, meant the remaining duties could be handed over to the HO. In 1801 colonial affairs were handed to the War Office and a War and Colonial Office was created under its own Secretary of State. In 1825 the colonial duties were given greater prominence under its own Permanent Under Secretary for the Colonies. In 1854 a separate CO was created to deal with increasing amounts of business. In 1907 a Dominions division

129 India was initially the responsibility of the East India Company from 1600 to 1784 when the British government instituted a standing board of control to supervise the Indian policies which lasted until 1858, after the Indian Mutiny when the India Office was created to manage relations between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy of India.
was created within the CO which lasted until 1925 when a separate Dominion Office (DO) with its own Secretary of State, was created to deal with increasing correspondence with self governing territories. In 1947 the DO was amalgamated with the India Office to become the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) until 1966, when the CO was amalgamated with it and it became the Commonwealth Office. Finally in 1968 the Commonwealth Office was amalgamated with the FO to become the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Despite this plethora of organisational changes the nature of the CO’s work and its practices did not change greatly during the period until the 1930s except to allow for greater or lesser number of colonies.

The CO did not directly administer colonies; it was a secretariat for the Secretary of State. Colonial rule was implemented by Governors, the origins of whose powers lay in the Royal Prerogative, but because of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty had also had a responsibility to the Secretary of State for Colonies (SofS) to implement the Colonial Regulations which went back to the 1837. Initially these were applied strictly although they were relaxed for colonies with representative institutions.\(^{130}\) The regulations covered specific areas. The Governor answered to the SofS for members of the Colonial Service who were appointed under the patronage of the SofS. The SofS also had overriding disciplinary authority for them although they were employed and paid by colonial governments. The CO acted as the headquarters of the service. The CO also had to check regulations governing public finance and annual estimates which had to be approved by SofS. These were fixed, the governor could not alter salaries or number of officials, and the SofS could veto expenditure. The CO also dealt with petitions. Finally all legislative acts had to be approved and some kinds of legislation had to be submitted in draft. Essentially this supervision although strict was negative, Governors and CO consulted, approving actions by Governors rather than suggesting them.

The result of this system was that the CO was organised geographically until 1925 when the first subject or technical departments made their appearance. As a secretariat the CO was in its essence an information collecting and processing body but the nature of the relationship (as discussed in the introduction) was to leave matters in the hand of Governors and not to attempt to manage them directly from London. This was in part because distance meant it

was impracticable to try to manage colonies directly up until the early 20th century. It could take months for correspondence to make its way from the colonies to London and vice versa. In the longer term these precedents explained the importance of the geographical departments in internal office politics. It also meant that it was very difficult to ‘professionalise’ intelligence because the consumers in the CO had very clear and limited uses for intelligence material.

Control of the colonies was limited by the CO having no funds to govern colonies. The first time the British parliament made any British money available for colonial governments was in 1929 and the Colonial Welfare and Development Acts did not appear until 1941. Colonial governments relied on their own finances. The CO acted as a conduit for colonial governments to request assistance from British departments dealing with defence and foreign relations. Generally speaking money for defence either came from the War Office (or other service departments) or the colonial government for internal security. Some colonies had local military forces which were paid for locally and were primarily for internal security. In the interwar years some military forces were managed by the CO in partnership with the War Office (Kings African Rifles and West African Frontier Force).

These realities explain why the CO had different information needs to other British government departments. As long as the colonial government could cope it carried out its own intelligence activity gathering information about local affairs, assessing it, and using it for the purposes of managing its internal affairs. The CO and colonial government were in regular correspondence about the four areas covered by Colonial Regulations. Most governors kept the CO informed of important matters but the CO was not responsible for managing colonies directly. When additional support was needed the CO’s geographical departments with their long serving civil servants probably had a good overview of the colonial government’s position from the correspondence and the CO could ask for additional support from the WO, Admiralty, or Air Ministry, or other Whitehall departments if events went beyond its control. In colonies where there were bases the service intelligence departments also played a role in keeping Whitehall informed. The WO intelligence division in particular, had an important role in this until 1900.

Geographical departments could communicate with other departments in Whitehall at an official level directly. They could also communicate with Whitehall through Permanent
Under Secretaries and interdepartmental or cabinet committees. Strangely geographical
departments did not receive specialised despatches or regular intelligence reports although
Governors did write to the CO about any sensitive issues. This was because political
intelligence could be gained through administrative provisions and security information was a
local responsibility. In certain cases the CO asked the colonial government to forward Special
Branch or CID reports to it directly. The system meant that the geographical departments had
proprietorial feelings about their role in political management and resented increasing
interference by specialists.

The General Department dealt with internal establishment matters and by the Second World
War dealt with a number of technical subjects. Defence for example was placed in the
General Division in 1939 because its remit was empire wide. By 1955 the subject
departments had grown greatly in number and specialised Intelligence and Security (ISD) and
Defence Departments were in operation. Defence did have an intelligence role however this
was specifically related to military matters and liaison with the British intelligence services
however geographical departments could approach these services directly themselves. The
result was that all security intelligence matters were handled by the administrative machinery
with civil servants attending interdepartmental committees where necessary.

There was one exception. A system of official and contracted advisers had developed at both
CO and colonial government levels. These were experts who advised the SofS or the colonial
Governors on technical issues such as tropical medicine, forestry, and economic
development. In the security intelligence field during the 1930s and 1940s, a number of
colonial police officers such as Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, (Ceylon Police) \(^{131}\) Sir David Petrie
(Indian Police and Intelligence Bureau), \(^{132}\) Sir Charles Tegart, and Rene Onraet \(^{133}\)
(Singapore Police Special Branch) visited various colonies to provide advice on setting up
security organisations. Dowbiggin was particularly influential. He had served in the Ceylon
Police which was regarded as a model force. \(^{134}\) Petrie was an Indian police officer who
worked for the departments of Criminal Intelligence (later Intelligence Bureau) and set up the
Indian government’s intelligence networks in the Far East during the First World War. He

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\(^{134}\) Rhodes House Library Dowbiggin MSS.MSS.Idn.Ocn.s.10-19
then became director of the Intelligence Bureau. He assisted Tegart to reorganise the
Palestine Police and, after retirement he advised East African governments on the set up of
Special Branches. In 1941 he became Director General of the Security Service. Tegart had
been in the Indian Police. In 1937-38 he was offered the post of Inspector General (IG) of the
Palestine Police by the CO which he refused, but then he advised on reforms.135 Onraet
visited the West Indies and may have been connected to the Security Service. He then
returned to Malaya where he became Police Adviser and supported the recreation of MSS.136

These advisers concentrated on the creation of civil ‘British’ or English model police forces
with access to the latest police scientific forensic developments but security was not
neglected.

The degree of threat in the different regions had an important effect on how much effort was
put into developing political police. In the interwar years security police were built up in
India, the Far East, and Palestine. In the years just before the Second World War Petrie
advised a number of African governments on setting up Special Branches.137 These experts
were generally hired by the colonial governments facilitated by the CO. Dowbiggin, for
example, although employed by the Ceylon Government until 1937, was commissioned by
the CO to advise on the Cyprus and Palestine police. He made extensive tours of inspection
between 1935 and 1937 and seems to have had considerable opportunities to travel and
inspect other colonial police forces.138

The Security Service was made directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
in 1931; however it acted mainly as a record keeper and source of advice. It also undertook
surveillance of colonial subjects in the United Kingdom until it started appointing Defence
Security Officers (DSO) responsible for the security of bases in the colonial empire in the
latter part of the 1930s. Even then only a few ran networks of agents for themselves and
relied upon liaison with the local police. Senior officers such as the Director General, Holt
Wilson conducted international inspections in the late 1930s.139

136 He supported the idea of MSS rather than Special Branches.
137 TNA, CO533/507/8 Kenya Police Department Staff: Formation of a CID Special Branch 1939; TNA,
CO691/172/8 Formation of a Security and Intelligence Bureau in the Police Department (Tanganyika 1939.
March 2014.
The CO acted as a conduit for sharing British information with the colonies in the Second World War copying regular telegrams from Whitehall to the colonies and facilitating through the Defence and Geographical departments, the activity of British intelligence organisation in the colonies.

The CO was involved in combating ongoing threats to empire including communism Islamism and fascism. It facilitated the work of the Security Service in empire and became involved in the appointment of advisers on security matters. Various colonies had periods of unrest some of which had international ramifications such as violence in Palestine. The CO was involved in various Whitehall security initiatives on an ongoing basis. Yet these situations seem to have been managed without the creation of specialised intelligence machinery in the CO. The activity of the Geographical departments seems to have been sufficient for the purpose of the CO. Geographical departments appear to have managed the offices information needs effectively and to have conducted any liaison necessary with the rest of Whitehall without requiring specialised machinery.

The CO had to manage information demands and pressures from Whitehall the CO in the interwar and wartime years. The CO had responsibility for the collection of information from empire and its passage to other consumers in Whitehall. Why didn’t the CO create some high level machinery particularly during the war, after the intelligence machinery had been co-ordinated by the JIC? Was this because worldwide threat was being handled by the FO, JIC, and the armed forces machinery? There appears to be no direct answer to these questions in the files. It may be that the CO personnel felt that the existing machinery worked adequately for the kind of information they required and the colonial governments were holding their own, or that there were other issues which were more important and required resources. It may be that the CO’s staff were ‘not intelligence minded’ there is some evidence that the CO’s personnel were essentially liberal minded and interested in colonial development.

It might be that the CO’s perception of threat within the colonies carried on with the ideas of the interwar years when the threat was twofold. The first was Soviet/Nazi German espionage which could be handled by the Security Service and colonial police working directly together

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at a technical level. Counter-subversion in the colonies could be handled by local governments thus meaning the CO had no direct role in such activity.

CO entered the Second World War with its ‘administrative intelligence’ machinery based on the activity of the geographical departments largely intact however the range of duties the department undertook were steadily expanding. Geographical departments had responsibility for all activity in their territories and for providing Whitehall with information/intelligence about colonial affairs but were supported by ‘technical/subject’ departments and there were often tensions between them. Technical departments required different kinds of information from geographical departments to function.

There were a number of organisational alterations to the CO during the war which affected various aspects of intelligence organisation. The most important was the creation of new technical departments. The Defence Department was created by a merger of elements of the General Department and the old Military Department in 1939 to handle the CO’s defence responsibilities. The Defence Departments handled, inter alia, colonial forces and liaison with the armed forces and the intelligence services. The Defence Department became responsible for technical liaison with the military intelligence system and on general matters of security but the geographical departments could still liaise directly with the Security Service and other elements of the British machinery. In 1942 ‘Information Services’ was formed to deal with publicity about the colonies in Britain and abroad, and to create propaganda in the colonies in favour of the war. Later it was used to conduct a propaganda war against communism and anti-colonialism. The development of Information Services was part of the development of an early form of political warfare which had covert elements its activity was co-ordinated with that of wider British information structures. In 1944 an International Department was created to handle the relations between British colonial governments, international organisations, and the governments of colonial territories belonging to foreign states. The CO co-operated with foreign colonial powers on matters of

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142 Anne Thurston, Records of the Colonial Office, p. 314.
143 Ibid. p. 317.
mutual security against anti-colonial nationalism. In 1948-49 there was a proposal to set up a political intelligence section within the CO and this was raised again in 1953. In 1954 a Security Intelligence Adviser was appointed to the Secretary of State and in 1955-56 separate ‘Intelligence and Security’ and ‘Police’ departments were set up as a result of the Templer Report.

II

In the introduction the thesis examined the links between the administration, the intelligence machinery, and the respective professional agenda in the context of events and developed a conceptual linkage between them. It is now necessary to examine the development of the relationship between the CO and the British professional intelligence machinery in the light of events. The CO interacted with the intelligence machinery in a number of different ways. The CO played a part in working with other Whitehall departments in relation to policy making and its implications for the intelligence machinery. The CO also worked directly with elements of the British professional intelligence machinery. The CO also managed its own internal machinery for dealing with intelligence matters in the empire. Finally the CO had a relationship with the colonial intelligence machinery at local level. These relationships evolved over time with various elements having differing amounts of influence over the development of the imperial machinery at different times. In each group of relationships there was a certain amount of information transfer in each direction. In order to understand some of the interactions between the CO and various parts of the administrative and British professional and colonial intelligence machinery it is necessary to look at an overview of the connections.

The emergence of the British conception of intelligence machinery:

The British intelligence machinery emerged from the administrative machinery. The earliest examples of this lay in the British intelligence machinery created to deal with the Napoleonic Wars. The newly formed Foreign Office (FO) needed information from overseas gathered

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146 TNA, CO537/2760, Minute May 1948.
initially though diplomatic means and later through a centrally organised overseas information collecting service.

Domestic law enforcement became the function of the ‘new’ Home Office (1782- Present) which supervised local ‘county’ and ‘parish’ institutions. Subsequently the process of law enforcement became a separate professional activity with its own professional agenda. Once police had emerged the idea of criminal investigation developed firstly through the institution of detective branches and finally through the creation of Criminal Investigation Departments (CID). From these in turn, developed specialised political policing bodies, special branches, based on a mixture of English and Irish experience. A number of departments dealt with intelligence matters in Whitehall. The Home Office and Chief Secretary’s Office (CSO) dealt with internal security in England and Ireland respectively and with the various police forces who kept tabs on subversion and espionage. The situation in Ireland was frequently a catalyst of the development of internal security intelligence machinery in both England and Ireland. The Deputy Secretary and later the G Division DMP and the RIC took an active role actively infiltrating target organisations and trying to manipulate them, although the RIC’s ‘Crime Special’ was largely a collating rather than an operational body. The internal security machinery communicated regularly with police forces throughout the UK and empire and even maintained overseas intelligence networks in places like New York to keep an eye on Irish nationalists. These developments and ideas about machinery were transmitted to the colonies where they were superimposed upon local police colonies. The India Office represented the government of India and its intelligence needs in Britain and from the early twentieth century the Indian political intelligence worked in England and Europe India also acted as a major hub for intelligence activity in the Far and Middle East. Each colonial government also had the role of maintaining its own security and working with

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148 Padraic Kennedy ‘The Secret Service Department: British Intelligence Bureau in Mid Victorian London September 1867-April 1868’ Intelligence and National Security 18:3 (2003), 100-127 (pp. 103-4).
151 Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp.10-34.
the CO to pass information when necessary to Whitehall where the CO distributed it as necessary.

In addition to domestic security intelligence and foreign intelligence there was a need for military intelligence. During the nineteenth century the War Office and the Admiralty ran their own intelligence machinery. In the latter part of the 19th century the War Office Intelligence Division was set up which had worldwide, especially imperial strategic interests and sometimes acted as an interdepartmental coordinating body to advise other departments in Whitehall.153

The India Office had a particularly important role. British ideas about administrative and police machinery had been imposed in a complex way on existing Indian machinery.154 After the creation of the Indian police system, CIDs emerged within it. These contained both criminal and political special branch sections which reported to Department of Criminal Intelligence (later the Intelligence Bureau) which reported to the Indian Government Home Affairs department. The machinery concentrated on internal security intelligence. The CIDs took an active role actively infiltrating target organisations and trying to manipulate them.155

The IB was not an investigative body in its own right but a collating body and this structure was an important precedent which clashed with the later development of Local Intelligence Committees which had a more active role. Indian ideas and personnel moved around the empire affecting the development of machinery elsewhere especially in the Middle and Far East but also in Africa. It set up Indian Political Intelligence in London to work with MI5 to keep nationalists under surveillance.

In each case the department of state was an integral part of the intelligence machinery although in India there were also two levels of local government which played an important part in the process of collection assessment and coordination. The departments were involved in targeting and setting requirements were the consumers of the information, conducted assessment, and shared it within Whitehall where necessary.

155 Richard Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, pp. 321, 328.
The CO was rather different. Because it did not directly control the colonies it did not develop its own information collecting machinery it relied upon despatches and information passed from governors/colonial governments which were processed in the geographical departments although it could obtain information and provide information to firstly the War Office machinery and later to the Secret Service Bureau with MI5, (one of the bureau’s successors), gaining a special responsibility to the CO in 1931.

The British intelligence machinery in the 19th century lacked a single central co-ordinating body although sometimes there was temporary machinery set up for a particular crisis. Coordination of government was achieved by general direction from the Cabinet but even the Cabinet was not backed up by its own administrative machinery. Special standing committees, like the Committee on Imperial Defence, were set up from time to time and interdepartmental committees and direct correspondence was the normal route for coordination. There was no formal assessment body or indeed a formal assessment stage. Information was collected and informally processed during the collection process as a result of the collecting targeting parameters and the concerns and corporate mentalité of those involved. This information was then passed to the departments of state where it was circulated and information extracted by departments and individuals without imposing any formal parameters on the process. This made the process subjective. Finally the process of information collection was largely based on Human Intelligence (humint) and increasingly on Signals Intelligence (sigint). The domestic collection machinery was generally self tasking and investigative because of its counter espionage and counter subversionary role than the foreign intelligence collection machinery. The domestic machinery was also subject to development in crisis and then subsequent reduction although some elements of it did survive in the interim periods.

In these contexts the CO developed its autonomy as the specialist departments dealing with the colonial empire and developed as the head of its own intelligence hierarchy like the other departments with an external role. It cooperated with other departments in the intimate Whitehall village on matters of mutual concern, but it also developed some interdepartmental rivalries with the FO, the WO and the India Office which were to last throughout the twentieth century and have an important impact on the development of the British professional intelligence machinery.
In the twentieth century the ‘modern’ British intelligence machinery started to emerge. The process started with the development of interdepartmental collection machinery, and then the pressure of warfare led to further administrative and intelligence development which in turn led to a much closer system of co-ordination and assessment and their centralisation in the Cabinet Office structure.

In 1907-09 a committee recommended the creation of a Secret Service Bureau. It was interdepartmental although its personnel were drawn from the army and navy and its concern was espionage. It was designed to provide a professional screen between the administrative departments and the practical aspects of espionage and counter espionage. It soon split into a domestic and a foreign section which became Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service in due course. MO5 (as MI5 was then known) started to develop an extensive registry to support its operations in Britain. Counter-Subversion remained a responsibility for the Special Branch which fed into the Home Office machinery and the G Division of the DMP and the Crime Special Branch of the RIC which fed into the Irish Chief Secretary’s Office.

During the First World War there was much tighter administrative co-ordination of the national effort under the War Cabinet after 1916. The War Cabinet did not include the Colonial Secretary (or many other departmental ministers) being controlled by non departmental ministers. The Cabinet Office was created from other machinery of the Committee on Imperial Defence. From its inception it started to manage the records of not only cabinet but also the committee system which co-ordinated government business. After the war the process of centralisation continued and consequently started to erode the autonomy of the CO although the process of centralisation was slowed after the war.

At an operational level Cabinet committees were set up to run theatres and military commands including GHQ on the Western Front coordinated the war effort and associated

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156 Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), Chapter 1, pp. 29-52
intelligence activity in each area. These structures clearly had an impact on empire as well. MI5\(^{158}\) and MI6 were greatly expanded. MI5 undertook security work\(^{159}\) and some of it overlapped with the counter-subversion function of the Special Branch. MI5 and MI6 started to operate under the direct control of GHQ in France\(^{160}\) but they also spawned units in other parts of the world was well. MI5 also developed an advisory role and liaison role in relation to the colonies and imperial possessions.\(^{161}\) The development of correspondence between MI5 and the CO in relation to the colonies was important. It enabled surveillance of the increasing number of colonial subjects who lived or studied in Britain and on potential agitators moving from colony to colony. In addition the service intelligence machinery grew as well. Theatre commands developed an intelligence function on a world wide scale and At this point covert action was being used to carry out British policy in Russia and the Middle East Intelligence led to covert action in Russia.\(^{162}\) Intelligence activity also occurred in the empire. The Indian government for example, worked with Indian and British intelligence to conduct surveillance of Indian nationalists on a worldwide basis.\(^{163}\)

**The CO during the First World War:**

During the war the CO had to coordinate the recruitment of personnel and the production of material in the colonies it also had a role when the war occurred in colonial territories such as the war in East and Central Africa. The CO had a role managing colonial military forces such as the WAFF and KAR. The CO also passed information gathered by colonial governments to Whitehall and vice versa and arranging the cooperation of colonial authorities where necessary.

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\(^{158}\)The National Archives, Security Service, hereinafter abbreviated TNA; TNA, KV; TNA, KV1/15 Imperial Overseas Intelligence 1921; TNA, KV1/16 Imperial Overseas Intelligence 1915-1919 appendices 1921; TNA, KV1/17 Imperial Overseas Intelligence Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau 1921; TNA, KV1/18 Imperial Overseas Intelligence 1918 Cyprus Section and appendices 1921; Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*: p. 85.


\(^{161}\)Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, pp. 53-84, 93-94.

\(^{162}\)A.J. Plotke, *Imperial Spies Invade Russia*, pp. 31-35.

\(^{163}\)R Popplewell, *Intelligence and Imperial Defence*, pp. 216-219.
The interaction between the CO and the rest of Whitehall and the various elements of the intelligence machinery made the CO more aware of the British professional intelligence machinery. The CO acted as a conduit for ideas and information to pass from Whitehall to the colonies and vice versa and for providing a conduit for ideas about how intelligence should be organised and practiced by colonial governments and police forces. It did not however, unlike the FO, try to setup a central political intelligence section rather it relied upon its geographical departments and its military department and this meant that its outlook remained focussed on administrative intelligence.

The Interwar Years:

Towards the end of the war the War Cabinet set up a Directorate of Intelligence under the Home Office. It was developed from the Special Branch to deal with the revolutionary situation caused by the war and the Russian revolution. Its function overlapped with that of MI5. It not only had domestic intelligence duties but it also deliberately took an imperial role countering ‘bolshevism’ on an imperial level. The situation led to a series of disputes between the various intelligence organisations. In particular the Director clashed with the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police and MI5 and this eventually led to the disbandment of the Directorate and the reconstitution of the Special Branch, which had a feeling that and this resulted in a series of meetings of the Secret Service Committee. The dispute was finally settled by making the Security Service responsible to the CO and colonial governments and police forces for imperial affairs in 1931. This created an important direct relationship between the CO and the Security Service which lasted until the CO was disbanded.

165 Keith Jeffrey, MI6, pp. 42-162; F.H. Hinsley and CAG Simkins, British Intelligence, pp. 5-7; TNA, HO 45/22901 Police: National Intelligence Service: scheme for forming, and for incorporating the police, 1917-1923; TNA, KV4/128 Division of duties between Home Office Director of Intelligence Scotland House and the Security Service Papers relating to the period when responsibility for subversion lay with the Metropolitan Police, 1919.
At this point there were a number of crises which affected the empire as well as the rest of
Whitehall. The situation led to the CO working in two ways with intelligence machinery. The
CO participated in Whitehall activity on a global scale. Secondly the CO had to liaise with
colonial governments to both ensure that local disturbances were suppressed and the
communist activity was monitored and suppressed as well.

The Irish rebellion (1916-1922) led rapidly to a state of civil war. The Irish administration
and its intelligence machinery were no longer effective. Once the armed forces were
committed there were seven bodies collecting intelligence and no overall system of co-
ordination.168 At the same time the Irish Republican Army closed down the RIC intelligence
system by driving police out of their local barracks in the countryside. It also neutralised G
Division in Dublin and penetrated its record system. Much of the period was spent by the
British trying to recreate an effective intelligence system with coordinating and assessment
machinery which was just coming into effect as the war was lost by the British. This involved
colonial input from officers from India and Egypt.169 Ideas about how to counter insurgency
and how to organise the necessary intelligence machinery were then transmitted throughout
the empire. Irish policemen moved in a body to Palestine and other colonies. The CO played
a number of roles in this process. It was responsible for the Palestine administration (despite
disputes with the FO) and for a short while for relations with the Irish Free State.

Other problems affected Britain and the empire. The Bolshevik revolution in 1917 had
created a scare which was affected the empire as well as Britain itself. This was followed by
a period in which the British and Americans sought to contain Bolshevism. This brought in
both the CO and the India Office whose territorial responsibilities bordered the new
Bolshevik empire. These departments co-operated in organisations like the Interdepartmental
Committee on Eastern Unrest to try to provide some overall coordination to an anti Bolshevik
programme.

The CO was involved in building security intelligence capacity in individual colonies. This
occurred by encouraging the development of police forces and criminal *intelligence* divisions.

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pp. 31, 41-2, 50-51, 82-91, 125-128, 169, 205.
and Singapore police officer G.C. Denham were sent to Ireland on an abortive mission to reorganise the Irish
intelligence system.
To complicate matters there were strong regional patterns to this kind of security activity. In the Far East the Indian government formed a regional hub to protect its own security and it had important responsibilities in the Middle East as well so the Indian police and IB had strong links to forces in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, and Egypt.

The Far East became the site of intelligence reforms because Indian experience was transferred as part of the process of keeping overseas Indians under surveillance and because the local colonies were relatively wealthy and subject to local disturbances, organised crime and Soviet espionage which involved an overall British interest. Local police and colonial government co-operated with each other in India, Malaya, Singapore, Shanghai, North Borneo, Brunei, Hong Kong, the British China treaty ports, like Wei Hai Wei, and Sarawak. This provided both the impetus and the resources to develop sophisticated surveillance and penetration practices which would set precedents copied elsewhere in empire. The notion of Criminal Intelligence (as opposed to Criminal Investigation) Departments seems to have emerged in India and was transferred to Malaya, Singapore, and Nyasaland.

Local disturbances, which in some cases were seen as being connected to ‘bolshevism’, occurred in the West Indies. Police forces there had always had an interest in labour control. The police were armed and local employers were allowed to employ estate

170 Ban Kah Choon, Absent History, pp. 7, 9, 12-13, 25-2666-67, 69; TNA, CO323/887/41 Straits Settlements: British Indians proceeding to colonies and protectorates Minute from Director of Intelligence, July-October 1922; TNA, CO537/893 Establishment of a Civil Intelligence Branch (Straits Settlements) (WOS50432), 1920; TNA, CO537/904 Organisation of a Criminal Intelligence Department (Straits Settlements) (Gov58156), 1921; TNA, CO537/905 Political Intelligence Reports (Gov4954/1922), 1921; TNA, CO537/906 Annual Report of the Political Intelligence Bureau (Gov 61252), 1922; TNA, CO537/907-938 Political Intelligence Bureau Monthly Bulletins, 1923-1925.

171 Richard Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, pp. 326-328.

172 Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, pp. 250, 315, 322-4,327,329; Ban Kah Choon, Absent History, pp. 133-134.

173 Ban Kah Choon, Absent History, pp. 66-67, 69; TNA, CO323/887/41 Straits Settlements: British Indians proceeding to colonies and protectorates Minute from Director of Intelligence, July-October 1922.

174 Ban Kah Choon, Absent History, pp. 132-134.

175 TNA, CO273/534/1-CO537/534/22 Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence, 1926; TNA, CO273/535/11 Malayan Bureau of Political Intelligence No’s 44-53 October 1926-September 1927, 1926-1927.

176 TNA, CO537/893 Establishment of a Civil Intelligence Branch (Straits Settlements) (WOS50432), 1920; TNA, CO537/904 Organisation of a Criminal Intelligence Department (Straits Settlements) (Gov58156), 1921; TNA, CO537/905 Political Intelligence Reports (Gov4954/1922), 1921; TNA, CO537/906 Annual Report of the Political Intelligence Bureau (Gov 61252), 1922; TNA, CO537/907-938 Political Intelligence Bureau Monthly Bulletins, 1923-1925.


police. The police had CIDs but they did not generally seem to have found it necessary to set up separate Special Branches, perhaps because in small societies the general duties police and CID had a good idea of what was happening, and numbers and resources were limited. Nonetheless the West Indian colonial police and governments did share information of general concern and co-operated with each other. The West Indies also had a regional importance such as sharing personnel with West Africa.

In the Middle East Palestine was a League of Nations mandate which presented a number of problems. The mandate had to be secured under British control which required an ongoing military and police commitment and then the development of the ability to keep local politics under surveillance. The conflicts in Palestine had regional impacts in the Middle East. From the perspective of the CO this was a complex situation. It had international implications for the British Empire and was monitored closely in Whitehall meaning the CO had to operate in a more interdepartmental setting than it normally did. It led the CO into conflict with the FO. From an intelligence perspective it involved the Security Service and Army, Admiralty and Air Ministry intelligence. The Palestine intelligence machinery was linked to the police forces in Egypt, Aden, India and Iraq. Later when the Arab rebellion became significant in the late 1930s the British intelligence machinery and army intelligence became involved. In consequence in Palestine, like the Far East, there was a perceived ‘national’ threat which meant that a number of departments and both British and colonial intelligence machinery was involved in the process of colonial management and the CO had to work with other departments.

Africa, except for South Africa, was much less developed so most problems were localised and regional issues were not so important until the Second World War but there was a constant stream of local disturbances. There were, however, regional groupings of colonies which affected the threat to empire and thus the intelligence machinery required. In West Africa political feeling was developing and the level of educational attainment allowed the operation of a powerful native press. In East Africa there was less political consciousness so the intelligence and police machinery could be correspondingly less organised. 180 In Central

Africa, like East Africa, there were labour problems and emergent nationalism. These problems were managed by local police and colonial governments without the need for central intervention from the CO.

Towards the end of the interwar period the CO recognised that another world war was likely and encouraged colonial governments to undertake preparation for it. This was co-ordinated between the CO’s Defence Department (1939) and the geographical departments. In Malaya the Malayan Security Service was set up which was not only inter colonial but also interdepartmental. In Singapore there was a reorganisation of the Special Branch. In East Africa the CO encouraged colonial governments to set up Special Branches focussed on the substantial expatriate European populations of Germans and Italians resident in them. Similar preparations were made in Central Africa.

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Right time: Policing the End of Empire (London; New York: Radcliffe Press, 1996)., pp. 17-19, 22; Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80, Studies in Imperialism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 192-193; TNA, CO535/79/1 Intelligence reports by the King’s African Rifles, Italian Somaliland, 1926; TNA, CO535/82/1 Intelligence Reports by the King’s African Rifles on Italian troops 1927-1928. These reports cover the period until the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.


Replaced the older Military Department.

Richard J Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 20-24, 36-40; TNA, CO273/657/18 Director of Criminal Intelligence: Police Department; regarding of post. (Straits Settlements), 1939.

Ban Kah Choon, Absent History, p. 135.

Tim Wright, The History of the Northern Rhodesia Police, (Bristol: British Empire and Commonwealth Museum, 2001), pp. 219-222, 225, 263; Edward Horne, A Job Well Done, pp. 159-162, 235-236; TNA, CO533/507/8 Police Department Staff: Formation of CID Special Branch: Kenya, 1939; Michael J. Macoun, Wrong Place, Right time: Policing the End of Empire (London; New York: Radcliffe Press, 1996)., pp. 17-19, 22; Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line; Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80, Studies in Imperialism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 192-193; TNA, CO535/79/1 Intelligence reports by the King’s African Rifles, Italian Somaliland, 1926. TNA, CO535/82/1 Intelligence Reports by the King’s African Rifles on Italian troops 1927-1928. These reports cover the period until the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.

Anthony Clayton, Khaki and Blue; pp. 67-68; Tim Wright, Northern Rhodesia Police, pp. 227-228, 235; Timothy Stapleton, African Police and Soldiers, pp. 6, 78, 201-202.
The Second World War:

The Second World War also had considerable effect on the precedents of the British professional intelligence machinery which were to later impact on the CO. The war allowed the Cabinet Office to become much more important once again as the government sought to coordinate its own activity. The CO’s role developed. The Defence Department coordinated the CO’s relationship with the military authorities and managed the CO’s responsibilities for the military activities of the colonial governments. New forms of intelligence gathering became important. Signals intelligence had become important during the First World War and signals intelligence stations had been set up around the empire during the interwar years but during the Second World War it became very important because of the ability to crack German codes. This encouraged a centralised intelligence system in Britain and this in turn meant the development of a centralised system of intelligence coordination and management and was a major factor in causing the development of the importance of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Security Service expanded in numbers and jurisdiction. It set up a network of DSOs in the colonies which stared just before the war. These worked with the CO. The nature of the Security Services activity also changed from investigating espionage and subversion to running active penetration activity in the Double Cross system. SIS also expanded. The UK became involved in political warfare. Special Operations Executive was set up and complex ideas about subversion and counter subversion started to develop.

A network of regional institutions was set up across empire each of which had intelligence machinery including the West African Council and the East African Governor’s

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189 TNA, KV4/303 Intelligence in Gibraltar including liaison with the police –role and responsibilities of Defence Security Officer Gibraltar; S.W.S. Stephenson, British Security Coordination, pp. 150-153, 188-189, 232; (Later the Overseas Branch and then E Division under different reorganisations).
191 Sir Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 95, 274; CAB163/8 JIC Administration 1948-57; The success of the JIC system in wartime spurred the development of colonial level ‘Local JICs’ which acted as co-ordinating bodies for intelligence activity and provided analysis. They provided precedent for the Local Intelligence Committees (LIC), which were eventually to be imposed between the collecting machinery and the colonial governments in most colonies. The LIC concept grew to include professional direction collation and analysis and the planning of operational matters in the colonial intelligence machinery.
conference. In other words the intelligence machinery started to become directly involved in the implementation of government policy. New precedents and practice were created in the Second World War which affected the professional development of the intelligence machinery and the administration.

After the war there was a certain amount of cleaning up to do as a result of the war itself. But there were also a number of colonial problems which were emerging. After the Second World War there was nationalist activity at a time when police forces and security machinery was run down. The situation was worst in the Far East where Japanese occupation had broken down British colonial institutions and India where the British were in the process of losing control of the Indian intelligence machinery. The run down machinery was a factor in leading to the failure to see the outbreak of a series of emergencies.

**Conclusion:**

In conclusion, during the interwar years the United Kingdom’s vital interests started to change. The colonies became less isolated and there was greater international scrutiny of imperial affairs. The Americans were already hostile to the British Empire and this was to have practical effects during the war on the relationship. The empire increasingly threatened the British government’s international prestige and reduced its strategic resources. There were different forms of threat to the empire. There was internal subversion by anti-colonial organisations and the threat of covert foreign intervention to encourage subversive activity. The colonial territories also faced threats from foreign powers during the war and peace through espionage and military action. Finally colonial governments needed to be able to defend their assets.

Much of the intelligence machinery constructed between the wars was dedicated to the surveillance of Russian espionage and communist subversion but during the war this was expanded to deal with Axis espionage. Subversion within a colony posed a limited threat to the British government but provided an opportunity for hostile powers such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Germany, Italy and Japan to intervene against British

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193 Ibid. pp. 175, 184.
194 TNA, KV4/18 Report on the Operation of Oversea control in connection with the establishment of DSOs in the British colonies and liaison with security authorities in the Dominions 1939-45; TNA, KV4/169 Functions of Overseas Control 1941-46. Written by John Curry an ex Indian Police officer with security experience.
interests which was much more serious. Subversion also used military resources needed elsewhere leading to conflicts between Treasury, Defence/Chiefs of Staff, the CO and the FO.

Pressure tended to exacerbate tensions between the CO, the FO, and the DO. During the war the influence of the COS and the Services became much greater. This set the scene for interdepartmental conflict during and after the war. By 1944 the COS had come into conflict with the FO.\textsuperscript{195} The pattern of interdepartmental conflict was to have an important effect on shaping the development of the intelligence machinery and the relative influence of different departments.

There were considerable differences between the British and colonial/imperial intelligence machinery despite similarities. Local administrative structures and practices, based on those of eighteenth century practice, provided the context for the development of the intelligence machinery. The development process was also shaped by the financial resources of the colony, the organisation of the police, the level of threat, and the indigenous culture. Professional developments in policing and information gathering in Britain were copied in the colonies but the colonial machinery also developed local practice and experience.

Differences in departmental approach were important. The India Office (IO), for example, was more ‘intelligence minded’ than the CO. This was due to the Government of India and Indian Police Service being more centralised organisations and consequently the IO was able to manage them more effectively despite the huge variety of cultures and local problems at lower levels. The nationalist threat was long standing and the IO and the Government of India had forty or so years of experience of serious disorder and consequently had more experience of administration in the face of threat than the CO. The personnel of the Indian Civil Service like the Colonial Service often saw themselves as superior to Indian Police personnel and wanted to keep control over the information gathering and processing systems but were challenged by security professionals as threat increased. Despite departmental differences many Indian personnel moved into British and colonial governments spreading that experience.

The personnel of the CO tended, as individuals, to have wider personal interests in the development of the territories. They saw intelligence primarily as a tool for territorial governments to manage local affairs. They resisted interference in departmental affairs from other departments in London. Administrators in the Colonial Service were ‘pro’ intelligence in some territories in the Far East like Malaya and Singapore but also resisted attempts to build local police intelligence systems in others notably in Africa. This may have been due to the regional divisions of the empire in which some administrators and police worked most of their careers in a series of geographically linked colonies creating regional norms for themselves. The regional pattern was to be broken in the last years of empire as personnel moved between vastly different territories.

The period of development clearly demonstrates the importance of the precedents affecting the organisation of imperial and British intelligence machinery. The intelligence machinery was closely associated with the administrative structures in use. Reforms in the administrative system frequently affected the intelligence machinery. As the administrative machinery became more specialised, police developed to carry out law enforcement functions and the development of detectives provided machinery which could be adapted for political surveillance and control. There was a tendency to develop such machinery for particular tasks and roles and then to adapt them to others as necessary. Frequently this meant multiple agencies existed and these were coordinated informally by individuals operating within the administrative system or by the use of co-ordinating committees. Another mechanism was to set up bureaux which merely collected information from other agencies and collated and processed it for government use. The systems had a particular mentalité. There was real resistance to ‘active measures’ from personnel in the administrative machinery consequently such measures were frequently not employed where they might have been useful. Intelligence officers were frequently social and intellectual eccentrics. The systems collected information and the consumers, generally administrators, analysed and used it. The process militated against the development of professional analytical techniques or organisations.

At the end of the war the Security Service and intelligence machinery had grown. There were two trends. Firstly there was a trend towards greater central control in the context of the greater threats including direct intervention by the CO and other departments in colonial security problems which meant more intelligence was needed in Whitehall. The JIC had developed a global role and the CO was becoming less important. The other tendency was the
development of two strands in intelligence work: information gathering to inform administrative action; and covert operations designed to manipulate and control situations. This was set in the context of the ebb and flow of the relative importance of Whitehall and the colonies. The precedent of active intelligence led covert operations set by the SOE and the experience of ‘Double Cross’ operations to the Security Service changed the way in which intelligence operated in Britain and set precedents which were relevant to the Cold War and colonial disturbances. The concept of subversion used by the PWE was central to the concept of ‘liberation’ operations in countries like Albania and Yugoslavia and set useful precedents for counter subversion operations in the colonies. These concepts and operations also built on earlier experience held by intelligence officers who had served overseas in the Middle and Far East and colonial police officers who had experience of India and Far Eastern counter subversion operations during the 1920s and 1930s in the Far East. Finally colonies were important as sites for signals intelligence gathering, which meant they needed to be secured and in the Cold War this role helped to divert American hostility to empire.

The CO worked with other departments in Whitehall in a number of other ways. Firstly it responded to decisions made by Cabinet. Secondly it worked in interdepartmental committees on matters of mutual interest with other departments. Thirdly it communicated with other departments individually on its own business. These methods of communication affected its relationships with the intelligence machinery during the 19th and early 20th century. It still had considerable autonomy however and a strong departmental voice in Cabinet discussions and interdepartmental negotiations. The CO worked with this machinery in a number of ways. It passed and received information between the various parts of the intelligence machinery and the colonial governments. It contributed its personnel and ideas to interdepartmental bodies dealing with larger threats. It pressed colonial governments to take security action where necessary and shared the relevant aspects of higher level activity with governors. It also provided advice on the development of policing and administrative practice to the colonial governments.
Chapter 2

The CO and post-war intelligence development 1944-1950.

Chapter 1 demonstrated that there were two concepts of intelligence developed in the British Empire; administrative/political and secret/professional. Different organisational structures developed to deal with each; because of specific events, the administrative matrix in which they operated and professional development. Historical precedent encouraged particular patterns of organisation and practice (rather than alternative possibilities) in the collection, assessment and co-ordinating machinery. The individual and corporate culture of the personnel was also important.

The chapter showed how the Colonial Office (CO) retained an intelligence system based on the older administrative conception of administrative intelligence whilst other departments tended towards a more professional approach although they retained some features of the older concepts of intelligence such as a departmental role in the assessment and targeting processes. The chapter showed how the two conceptions of intelligence and the machinery to implement them separated and came into conflict. These features continue to be evidence in the development of the intelligence machinery in the post war period but the machinery was also modified because of events, interdepartmental conflict, the development of professional agenda and administrative centralisation.

Events had an impact on development. Colonial problems which could affect the alliance with the United States, cause trouble in the United Nations or affect the security of Britain could cause a more centralised pattern of management to be imposed on a colony. Palestine, was a threat to the United Kingdom’s for example, had negative implications for the relationship with the US. Palestine was a Mandate of the League of Nations and subsequently as a United Nations responsibility which had implications for the international prestige of the United Kingdom (UK). Finally Jewish terrorists operated in the United Kingdom. As a result of these factors the British intelligence machinery operated directly in the colony. On the other hand the British intelligence machinery was withdrawn from many other colonies, notably in the Caribbean during in the period as their wartime importance declined.
In 1947-48 there were two parallel crises. There was a collapse of intelligence about Russians and there were also a series of crises in the empire. The British machinery under the JIC concentrated on the Cold War partly because it remained part of the Chiefs of Staff machinery (COS). The CO, which headed its own hierarchy, did not have a seat on the JIC until 1948 and did not become a ‘charter member’ until 1956.

The empire gradually became seen as a source of weakness (although until the mid nineteen fifties there were plans to use the empire as a source of resources). Imperial crises diverted resources and attention away from the Cold War. As a result the professional British intelligence machinery came into conflict with that of the administrative intelligence machinery under the CO because the CO had failed to provide adequate warning of colonial problems. The CO’s machinery was not set up to provide intelligence of the type needed by the COS, the Foreign Office (FO), and the Cabinet Office. An information panic resulted. From 1948 to 1956 there was a period of conflict between the two systems and their intended uses in which the CO’s administrative intelligence machinery was gradually assimilated into the more centralised, professional, British machinery and the CO and colonial machinery underwent modification to achieve this. The CO however resisted strongly for a variety of reasons and retarded the process. The British intelligence machinery in this period was deeply affected by administrative developments. The Cabinet Office led a process of centralisation and professionalization of Whitehall administrative machinery. The British professional intelligence machinery had to evolve to service the changing central administrative system and to adapt to its experiences during the war.

After the Second World War the development of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to co-ordinate all war time intelligence fundamentally changed the way in which the British intelligence machinery operated. Philip Davies argued there were two phases to the development of the British intelligence machinery in this period. Firstly there was the ‘Formalisation of Improvisation 1945-47’. Improvised war time organisation and practices, including the idea of central national co-ordinating and assessing machinery (JIC) were assessed and retained in the longer term. Between 1947 and 1956 there was a process of ‘Coordination and elaboration’. During this period the JIC became increasingly important and

197 Ibid. pp. 139-162.
the intelligence machinery was gradually simplified and co-ordinated. The process was driven by a combination of Cold War events, professional inputs (including organisational and technological advances) and administrative developments, particularly centralisation. Whilst the CO resisted these administrative and intelligence developments; the chronology of intelligence development within the CO and colonial governments can be correlated to them. The dating of CO circulars suggests linkages with central reforms. The CO issued circulars in 1948, a letter (copy unavailable) in 1953 and another circular in 1956. The period between 1948 saw the centralisation of the CO machinery and 1956 its assimilation into the British machinery for purposes of control. Thereafter the CO’s machinery gradually withered away as decolonisation continued and the British machinery was centralised. Davies refers to this period as ‘the Great Centralisation 1956-1966’. There is evidence consequently for a high degree of correlation between the development of the imperial intelligence machinery, the CO’s experience and the professional development of the UK machinery and the rise of the importance of the Cabinet Office as a controlling mechanism which supports the idea of ‘top down’ intervention. The degree of local autonomy was important. In Ceylon the method of collecting information, for example, followed a process similar to that which had occurred in the ‘white’ dominions. There was local control of the intelligence machinery but information was passed as necessary to the CO by the Governor. Traditional CO intelligence practices came under attack as there were a series of crises unforeseen by the CO which required the Chiefs of Staff (COS) to deploy troops.

There was a fundamental difference between CO and Whitehall thinking. The CO often saw problems as ‘local’ whilst the rest of Whitehall concentrated on the ‘global’ communist threat. The pressure was mainly directed at the colonial governments and only indirectly at the CO. The CO itself had no specialist intelligence co-ordinating or assessment machinery and relied largely on officials in geographical departments to deal with political intelligence and the Defence Department for security intelligence. In other words it continued to operate in the older ‘administrative’ intelligence tradition. In 1948-49 the CO started reforms, such as the abortive Political Intelligence Section (PIS) and the appointment of a Police Adviser (PA), and the development of Special Branches in every territory to assist intelligence development. If colonial governments were aware of problems they would pass information to the CO. The CO remained the channel through which this would pass to other

198 Ibid., pp. 163–201.
199 Later Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP))
departments in Whitehall. In addition there was a ‘technical’ channel of communication between the colonial police and the Security Service and Special Branch in London might have been expected to facilitate the flow of information on colonial problems into the British machinery.

The CO was not a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC); rather it headed its own intelligence hierarchy. The CO was asked to participate in the JIC on 23 September 1948 however this was resisted because the CO had no rights to set the agenda of the JIC and because it did not seem an effective use of manpower. Unfortunately the CO found all kinds of excuses to avoid participating. It argued that the JIC was a largely military body, focussed on the Cold War and its staff concentrated on military issues. The CO believed that the focus meant it was not worth having a permanent representative.

The chapter will deal with the development of the CO’s intelligence machinery between 1944 and 1948. The first section will suggest that there were two parallel processes of intelligence development. The first continued largely within pre-war intelligence precedents and was applied in colonies without security problems. The second started to emerge as a response to the development of insurgencies and consequently the need to interact with other parts of the intelligence machinery within the colony and in Britain. The second section will examine the relationship between the CO and the JIC and the British intelligence machinery. The third will examine intelligence reforms of 1948 in the CO; examining the appointment of the Police Adviser (and peripherally the development of Special Branches in the colonies); a series of new reports on colonial matters demanded by consumers in Whitehall. The fourth section of the chapter will deal with the culture and motivations of Whitehall departments and of the CO’s administrative intelligence system. The chapter will refer to processes in the development of the events, professional developments in the British intelligence machinery which facilitated this process. Finally the chapter will briefly consider the post 1950 development of the CO’s intelligence machinery and that in the colonies.

200 P.H.J. Davies, Intelligence and Government, p.146.
Two approaches to intelligence development in the empire:

Immediately after the war major problems facing the CO were preparing for the independence of Ceylon (which was related to Indian independence, a major concern for the British government as a whole) and the revolt in Palestine. In Ceylon the CO had to deal with a colonial ‘handover’ and in Palestine with large scale direct intervention in colonial affairs by the British government and the British intelligence machinery. In the other colonies the CO had to rebuild local police and administration which had been starved of European manpower and funds during the war.

Indian experience was to be important in determining the Whitehall and the CO’s approach to intelligence matters despite the fact that India was administered by its own Whitehall department. Experience gained in the Indian handover showed the necessity of retaining control of the intelligence machinery in the final stages of handover. It has been argued that a major factor in causing the onset of Indian independence was the failure of the intelligence machinery in Delhi. India offered precedents for the management of colonial records, the selection of successor personnel, and ways to maintain intelligence contact after independence. The handover of India freed officers with intelligence experience to take over emergency roles in the colonies.

The CO was aware of Indian intelligence arrangements but its intelligence organisation was very different to that in India. There was no single equivalent to the Indian Intelligence Bureau and no equivalent to the Indian Political Intelligence organisation, which liaised directly with the Security Service and the India Office in Whitehall. No individual colony had a security intelligence apparatus on the scale of the Indian Intelligence Bureau and provincial CID/Special Branches. No colonial government had the same degree of technical intelligence expertise as the Government of India until the Government of Malaya expanded the Malayan Special Branch with the help of ex Indian officers.

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201 Patrick French, Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division (London: Harpcollins, 1997), pp. 256-257.
Ceylon was a largely peaceful handover. Representative institutions and universal suffrage had existed since 1931 and internal security was handled by the Ceylon Home Affairs Department and the Ceylon Police. The CO relied upon personal correspondence from the Governor for its understanding of security matters in the colony. This approach followed the pattern established in Canada and Australia prior to 1931. In 1931 British High Commissioners took over the intelligence role previously played by the Governors General in the dominions and this experience set precedents for the handover of colonies with representative institutions and local control.

By contrast Palestine presented a different set of problems. The British intelligence machinery intervened directly in the Mandate through Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) and the local Defence Security Officer (DSO)/Security Liaison Officer (SLO) who reported through it. There was a local SLO in Palestine who, unusually, ran his own network of agents. British signals intelligence units were deployed. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) deployed in Palestine and operated outside it to prevent Jewish refugees from reaching it. The British intelligence machinery was used to cultivate Jews in the Jewish Agency and in Britain to gain intelligence about what was happening in Palestine. The British government and the JIC took a direct interest in what was happening there. As a consequence of these experiences precedent for direct central intervention in the colonies had been established. It was a more interventionist approach to colonial government than that normally exercised by the CO. The result was that the British professional intelligence machinery was directly involved in a colony. The situation in Palestine provided precedent for a much more centralised control of a colony. Because of the international implications of the situation for British prestige and the alliance with the United States the Cabinet was involved and the CO’s autonomy limited. Palestine thus set precedents for the management of major colonial crises later in the period of decolonisation and demonstrated some of the problems of coordination and control needed in a multi agency environment.

The unprecedented increase in the scale and importance of intelligence activity and its detailed incorporation into government activity stimulated the professional agenda within the British intelligence services. At a colonial level the Security Service, partly at the behest of

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the JIC, was seeking to maintain its system of representatives overseas and drive professional standards in police forces and their special branches. This process will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis. Police officers in the colonies were wedded to a process of reform, which included ‘civilianisation’ based on British practice.\textsuperscript{204}

II

The CO’s relationship with the JIC and its regional offshoots:

At this point before turning to the question of the reforms at colonial level it is necessary to examine the CO’s relationship with the JIC in more detail. Unfortunately because of its process of institutional development the JIC Charter made no reference to colonial territories, to the need to provide global forecasts of trouble, or provide any executive powers to ensure compliance by other elements of the intelligence machinery.\textsuperscript{205} It had to rely upon input from the local intelligence machinery in the colonies but was not in the same reporting hierarchy.\textsuperscript{206} In Malaya this failed.\textsuperscript{207} The JIC had functional role in three areas: warning and assessment; assessment of the severity of the threat; and management of the overseas intelligence apparatus.\textsuperscript{208}

The JIC had a military ethos because it had been created to support the COS machinery. It concentrated on military threats and came to see colonial problems through the prism of the Cold War and the global problem of communism.\textsuperscript{209} The military personnel in Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) drafted material focussed on the military threats in the Middle East and Europe and often ignored the preoccupations of civil departments.\textsuperscript{210} This tendency was exacerbated in Malaya by the failure of local intelligence machinery to provide adequate alternative explanations for both structural and cultural reasons.\textsuperscript{211}

\textsuperscript{204} Georgina Sinclair, \textit{At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp. 10-16, 63.
\textsuperscript{205} Rory Cormac, \textit{Confronting the Colonies}, pp. 30,37.
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 33-37.
\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Ibid}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 53-55.
\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Ibid}, pp.27-28, 30.
\textsuperscript{211} \textit{Ibid}, 33-34 40-41, especially 40-41.
The JIC’s regional offshoots also had problems due to confusing charters and lack of manpower. There were problems with identifying both their chains of responsibility and channels of communication. The example of Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) (JIC (FE)) brings in the question of the role of JICs in the empire. In theory they had a strategic role to keep Whitehall informed of threats in the region. A distinction however was made between local intelligence responsibilities of colonial government, the Security Service, and the CO. The Security Service could have been the link between the two systems but wasn’t.\(^{212}\) In addition in Malaya and South East Asia there were inter-service disputes between the JIC (FE), SIFE (MI5), and SIS. Security Intelligence (Far East) (SIFE), for example, criticised both JIC (FE) and the BDCC.\(^{213}\)

Literature about the development of the British intelligence machinery has demonstrated a teleological approach which sees the centralised JIC system as the end point rather than seeing a number of alternative possible outcomes for the development of the British intelligence machinery. Approaching the intelligence problem from the CO’s perspective creates a different picture. The CO was the lead agency and the Security Service was its professional intelligence collecting body.\(^{214}\) The CO had limited interest in communism, security intelligence, and the Cold War. Its information gathering and assessment system had evolved to perform wider functions. The JIC was a recent specialised innovation originally designed to co-ordinate and assess intelligence for war time military situations. Its ascent to a national co-ordinating and analytical body was to some extent serendipitous. It is also forgotten that the majority of the colonies did not undergo insurgency. Decolonisation is often seen through the prism of a defining series of insurgencies whilst many colonies suffered at most local violence which was relatively easily confined. This suggests that either a global threat did not exist, that the security systems in many colonies were adequate, or that the chronology of the development of violence was different for local reasons and the process of reform was sufficient to improve local security intelligence prior to the point where insurgency broke out.

The CO tended to see events in each colony as being predominantly due to local sometimes regional issues and emphasised local agency in the development of events. This perspective

\(^{212}\) Ibid. pp. 30-39.
\(^{213}\) Ibid. pp. 34-6.
\(^{214}\) Ibid. pp. 56-57.
was partly created by the importance of the geographical departmental structure and the relatively limited importance of subject or technical departments in relation to analysis of political events, but also because the Cold War and communist global threats were of less importance in the empire. By contrast the Defence Department was more attuned to seeing the importance of Communism although this was less than other security related organisations in Whitehall. Investigation showed that in most areas local communists were weak and external intervention very limited. The problem affecting the JIC was that it perceived everything through European eyes in a Cold War prism and consequently found it difficult to see the local problem.\textsuperscript{215}

\section*{III}

The 1948 reforms in an interdepartmental context:

The national anti-communist Cold War programme had implications for the CO and the development of its intelligence machinery. The Prime Minister (PM) does not seem to have been a major influence in the development of anti-communist policy. Interdepartmental conflict had an important role in shaping the development of the national programme. The COS had identified the Soviet threat as early as 1944 so it is possible to argue that the Cold War started as early as this.\textsuperscript{216} Bevin and the officials in the FO sought to create a more anti-communist, anti-Soviet policy in order partly to marginalise Attlee’s internationalism. The officials included Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Christopher Warner, and others who were to remain influential in anti-communist policy making and the intelligence community. They had influence on the committees which implemented anti-communist programmes like the interdepartmental Russia Committee sponsored by the FO. The FO quickly developed the capacity to conduct anti-communist operations. On the 8\textsuperscript{th} January 1948 for example, the Information Research Department of the FO (IRD) was formed to develop propaganda and subversion campaigns against the Soviet Union and sought information from the CRO and

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid. pp.39-40.
the CO on which to base its propaganda.\textsuperscript{217} The SIS was already involved in such activity having absorbed SOE in January 1946.\textsuperscript{218}

Officials in the FO also seem to have tried to retain control over foreign policy in the face of long term centralisation. Cabinet Committees such as the Overseas Defence Committee and the Anti Communism Overseas Committee AC (O), formed in 1949, showed how organisations falling under the Cabinet Office were becoming more important in developing and implementing foreign policy and limiting the FO’s influence. The role of the Cabinet Office was not obvious in these discussions. The Cabinet Secretary from 1947 was Sir Norman Brook who had a great deal of influence in administrative and intelligence circles. The Cabinet Office controlled the secretariat for the committees such as the Overseas Defence Committee which provided further influence. There is contextual evidence that the Labour government adopted a more co-ordinated approach to government activity using numerous committees so the invisibility of the Cabinet Office at this stage is not necessarily an indication that it was not becoming increasingly involved in co-ordinating and controlling the intelligence machinery.\textsuperscript{219}

Overall there was considerable departmental ‘in-fighting’ between the FO, COS, CO, and other departments and within departments about the appropriate policies to implement. There was a general recognition of the communist threat and of the need to organise a central response to it. The CO had contributed to the debate and become involved in various ways. The CO had sent representatives to the Russia Committee and as early as May 1946 was involved in Kirkpatrick’s anti Russian propaganda campaign.\textsuperscript{220} The CO retained however a different perspective.

\textsuperscript{218} P.H.J. Davies, ‘From Special Operations to Special Political Action: the ‘rump’ SOE and SIS post war covert action capability’ \textit{Intelligence and National Security} 15:3 (2000), 55-76 (pp. 55, 57-60).
\textsuperscript{219} P. Hennessy, and A. Arends, “Mr Attlee’s Engine Room:” Cabinet Committees and the Labour governments 1945-51, (Glasgow: Department of Politics, University of Strathclyde, 1983).
The immediate cause of imperial intelligence development:

An escalation of the Cold War occurred in 1948 in parallel with the outbreak of a series of colonial emergencies, which were seen, not always accurately, as being communist inspired. In January 1948 the JIC requested the intelligence services to undertake a worldwide review of communism.\textsuperscript{221} The Security Service found that there was a shortage of information on Africa and South America and contacted the CO.\textsuperscript{222} It is unclear whether this was a professional initiative or a response to political pressure. There is no record of what happened but presumably the CO supplied the information.

Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, had identified a Soviet threat to the colonies as early as January 1948 and a series of crises in the Malaya and the Gold Coast midyear reinforced his ideas despite local differences. Bevin became seriously alarmed by autumn 1948 by the potential for a Soviet attack on Britain’s colonial territories and on the 18\textsuperscript{th} September submitted a memo arguing for CO participation on the JIC.\textsuperscript{223} The PM and Foreign Secretary pressed the CO to make security and intelligence reforms at a number of levels. Generally the pressure in 1948 came from the top down. At Whitehall level the first demand was for ‘reports on communist subversion’ in the colonies and for the development of machinery capable of creating the kind of security related intelligence reports required. The first reforms in the CO were initiated because by May 1948 Bevin had asked the CO for Fortnightly Reports on Communism, which may have been intended to meet the needs of the newly formed IRD.

Creech Jones appointed a Police Adviser (PA) who had been an Inspector of Constabulary in England (HMIC), and who had been recommended by head of the Security Service, to carry out inspections starting on 1 November 1948. He had initiated special intelligence reports and a Fortnightly Review of Communism for the FO. He had arranged closer association with the JIC. Propaganda had been prepared contrasting British aims and method in the colonies with those of the Russians. He had sent propaganda material to the colonies; some of which had been prepared by the FO. He had put forward proposals for development of a Colonial Broadcasting Service to counter Soviet propaganda and provided one million pounds funding.

\textsuperscript{222} TNA, CO537/2628 Minute Sir Marston Logan to Wallace. Gorsuch, Boudell, Acheson, and Marple, 12 March 1948.
\textsuperscript{223} P.H.J. Davies, \textit{Intelligence and Government}, p.146
from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds. Finally he had carried out research into the nature of the emergency powers in each colony, which were considered adequate. The letter is most defensive in tone. Strangely Creech Jones did not specifically mention the Circular on Intelligence issued on 5 August 1948 or the accompanying Secret and Personal letter issued on 20 August 1948 despite the fact it would have seemed a logical action to share the specific details of his advice to colonial governments.

**Political Intelligence Reports:**

The CO may already have been interested in some form of intelligence reports for its own purposes prior to Bevin’s intervention. It was already aware that colonial governments had been dealing with labour disputes in Singapore and Malaya and other countries towards the end of 1947. Regular reports from the colonies were new although regular reports had been submitted by Palestine in 1946-47 and Trinidad and Barbados from 1947. By March 1948 Andrew Cohen of the CO’s African departments had requested regular ‘political intelligence’ reports from the African governors. The initial rationale was probably the Accra riots in the Gold Coast, but the request for information by the Security Service may also have been a catalyst. Cohen sent out a request for regular reports and outlined the machinery, which would receive them. By early April the West Indies Department had also sent a copy of Cohen’s letter out to West Indian governors. In the West Indies action may have been

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224 TNA, CAB2922 Letter, Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2nd November 1948.
225 TNA, CAB2922 Letter from Arthur Creech Jones, Colonial Secretary, to Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 2 November 1948. (refers to a letter dated 28 September 1948 from Bevin to the Colonial Secretary ).
229 TNA, CO537/2247 Barbadian Affairs: Intelligence and Situation Reports, 1947; TNA, CO537/4314 Communism in the Colonies: West Indies, 1948.
230 TNA, CO537/3824 West Indies Monthly Intelligence Reports, 1948. Letter A.B. Cohen to the African Governors, 15 March 1948 and an almost identical letter to West Indian governors was then prepared by 15 April 1948 this is on the same file; Frank Furedi, *Colonial Wars*, pp. 89-100.
231 *Ibid.* Minute A.B. Cohen to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary and Mr Rees Williams, Minister of State, 15 March 1948.
accelerated by the withdrawal of the DSOs in December 1947 and the subsequent reorganisation of intelligence co-ordinating machinery.\textsuperscript{233}

Prior to 1948 regular ‘intelligence’ reports, as opposed to ongoing correspondence were, strangely, not required from colonial governments. This may reflect the CO’s expectation that Governors should manage their own internal politics and security and only refer problems to the CO for advice and additional resources when necessary. ‘Normal channels’ of correspondence were consequently sufficient. Previously when the CO asked the colonial secretariats for material they tended to send reports originally written for the purposes of internal management, sometimes adding a covering note from the governor or, sometimes they sent Special Branch reports direct.\textsuperscript{234}

In the late 1940s ‘cultural’ issues became important. The CO was attuned to ‘political’ intelligence obtained for the general purposes of administration rather than ‘security’ intelligence which was material used for security management within the colony. In particular the CO was interested in local politics in the representative institutions rather than detailed knowledge of subversive organisations. Frequently even the colonial governments did not have detailed information on this kind of problem. Individual police officers probably had an idea but most colonies did not have large formal political policing structures capable of reporting this to Whitehall. The first ‘Political Intelligence Summaries’ dated the 5 June 1948 (as opposed to ‘Fortnightly Report on Communism’) were superficial in content merely describing local, overt, political manoeuvres.

**Reports on Communism:**

In May 1948 Bevin, the Foreign Secretary asked the CO for reports on communism.\textsuperscript{235} The request appears to have been a separate requirement from the demand for information made by the Security Service and the CO’s internal demands. From mid 1948 the geographical departments compiled fortnightly summaries on Communism from reports made by colonial governments which, in turn, were compiled into a ‘worldwide’ summary. The world wide summary was then released to the FO and other interested departments. At some point, it is

\textsuperscript{233} TNA, CO537/2687, West Indian Security Arrangements, 1948.
\textsuperscript{234} TNA, CO537/1728, Palestine Weekly Intelligence Reports 1946; TNA CO537/2294 Palestine Weekly Intelligence Reports 1947.
\textsuperscript{235} Frank Furedi, *Colonial Wars*, pp. 89-108.
unclear when, the two reports, the ‘political intelligence’ and ‘Fortnightly Review of Communism’ seem to have merged, probably in October 1948. ‘The Colonial Intelligence Summary’ made its first appearance in 1948.236

‘The Fortnightly Review of Communism’ was compiled in the CO for the FO. By November 1948 it was being circulated inside the CO as well; it would seem in part because heads of department found it a useful summary of activity occurring outside their areas of responsibility.237 The CRO was included on the circulation list but it expunged some material from the versions received by particular dominions.238 The FO requested the permission of the CO to circulate ‘The Fortnightly Review of Communism’ to the FO’s missions overseas. The CO agreed subject to amendments.

In addition to the requests for information about the situation in the colonies there was pressure from Whitehall, and the COS in particular, to establish a system for collecting information of a different kind i.e. that needed to predict threats needing the deployment of troops and to monitor communist activity. The concern was driven by the need to control military resources of both men and money needed in Europe.

**Internal reforms in the CO:**

The demand for information led to reorganisation of the intelligence machinery in the CO and the colonial governments. There were a number of appointments at both the CO and colonial level. Within the CO the increased workload led to the appointment of Sir Marston Logan239 as part time co-ordinator for defence, security, and intelligence information in the Defence

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236 TNA, CO537/2676 Colonial Political Intelligence Summaries 1948, Minute by Sir Marston Logan, Defence Department, Colonial Office to Trafford Smith, CO, 16 November 1948.

237 TNA, CO537/2677 Colonial Intelligence Summaries 1948, Minute from George Seel, CO, to J. Beckett, 18 November 1948; Ibid. Minute by George Seel, CO, 20 November 1948 Distribution 1 Copy to Ministers, 1 copy to Deputy and Assistant Under Secretaries for circulation 1 copy retention 1 copy to Foreign Office; TNA, CO537/4325 Political Intelligence Reports from the Colonies: Methods for Dealing with, 1948.

238 TNA, CO537/4325 Political Intelligence Reports from the Colonies: Methods for Dealing with 1948.

and General Department.  He had experience of colonial government, including intelligence, as both Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia and Governor of the Seychelles. His main job was to compile summaries of the reports submitted to the geographical departments. The Defence Department carried out liaison with the British intelligence machinery.

The Secretary of State appointed William Johnson, an English police officer, as Police Adviser (PA), to reorganise policing and intelligence. His appointment was made easier by the existence of precedent for technical advisers in the CO. In the meantime Sir Percy Sillitoe, Director General of the Security Service, had already started ‘ad hoc’ inspections of the colonial intelligence machinery because the Security Service was tasked with inspecting, training, and reorganising intelligence machinery. In November 1948 the PA immediately started the ‘Review of Colonial Police and Security Forces for Communist Infiltration’. His reports started to become available to the CO and colonial governments in 1949. Initially there was an annual, later a triennial inspection.

The circumstances surrounding the appointment of the PA showed how even at this early stage how the CO resisted external intervention. Although the PA was part of the reforms demanded by the PM and Foreign Secretary the CO’s senior personnel ensured that the PA could only advise colonial governments on police matters although he requested the power to direct them to comply and this limited the effectiveness of the reforms in colonies. The FO and COS wanted the CO to force colonial governments to build the police intelligence

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240 TNA, CO967/44 Proposal for a Political Intelligence Section, 1949. Minute, L.H. Gorsuch (?) Principal, West African Department, to Philip Rogers, Establishment Department, 14 January 1949.  *The system adopted in this Department is each Territorial Principal collects information during the month from telegrams and other communications received from Colonial governments, newspapers, Press summaries and talks with officers on leave. This information is channelled to one collating principal. We also receive periodical PI reports from each government, but in fact not much of the information in these reports is used in our political summary. The reports are useful for supplying greater detail and supplementary information, but they are rather old when received and by far the greater part of the content of our monthly summary comes from the day to day flow of papers. Once a month there is a departmental meeting at which information collected is sifted and put into perspective.*


243 TNA, CO537/5439 Review of Colonial Police and Security: Coordination of Police Advisers Report: Report by Minster to Secretary of State 1949-50 Note of a Meeting Held by the Secretary of State on Colonial Police Forces Friday 13 January 1950 in Secretary of State’s room. para.7-8
machinery but the CO was more interested in police reform. The first PA had been directed to build up police intelligence machinery but he was a ‘Home Service’ police officer who saw the colonial police forces through an English ‘prism’. He felt that ensuring the loyalty of the indigenous police officers was important, so his reports dealt questions of: police pay, conditions, housing, organisation, career opportunities, and training. These objectives crossed over with longer term agenda to reform colonial police forces on British models within the CO, pursued with particular vigour by Sir Charles Jeffries, the Deputy Under Secretary of State and a noted liberal and reformer within the CO. Jeffries, a committed Anglican and a liberal with particular interest in the success of the Ceylon independence process was committed to positive commonwealth relations. He believed that the English model of policing i.e. unarmed officers protecting the lives and property of the citizen was the desirable end rather than armed forces used by the administration to maintain control. He sought to encourage developments in this direction. He had been involved in the creation of the colonial service and the colonial police service in the 1930s and had sought unsuccessfully to create an Inspector General of Colonial Police at this time to further that agenda. Although he does not specifically address this question logically acceptance of this model meant acceptance of the Special Branch idea as used in London.

Co-ordinating intelligence in colonial governments:

The external forces pressing for reform were largely silent on how the co-ordinating and analytical machinery in the colonies should be organised. The Circular of 5 August 1948 merely suggested that intelligence should be overseen by a senior officer. Davies argued that the JIC was used as the model for co-ordinating committees. Local JICs were to be implemented in the Far East in 1949. There are alternative explanations however, for the development of co-ordinating committees, during the war individuals, sections or ‘Defence’ or ‘Security’ committees in the colonial secretariat had undertaken intelligence and security co-ordination. These were executive committees rather than professional intelligence bodies and had no formal analytical capacity or professional skills. In East Africa a local Director of

Intelligence had been appointed during the war and was retained afterwards. Some colonies like Gold Coast already had ‘central’ security committees but these do not seem to have the role of setting intelligence targets and encouraging professional development; a major feature of the LIC model. The use of Defence Sections for intelligence co-ordination ensured that the administrative staff retained control over security intelligence machinery. When LICs were created they often contained the same personnel who had formed the Defence or Security committees. Local Defence Committees were generally chaired by the Chief Secretary and had the head of ‘native affairs’, police commissioner or head of Special Branch where one existed. DSOs where they had been appointed could attend so the LIC was in many ways an amended version of existing machinery. ‘Local’ JICs by contrast only appear to have been introduced in the Far East in 1948-49. They were professional intelligence bodies carrying out analysis and co-ordination. They became the dominant form of machinery for analysis and coordination of intelligence in the colonies by the mid 1950s when they were made part of the formal intelligence model in the Templer Report.

The CO advised the colonial governments to set up Special Branches. In 1948 some governors were already setting up Special Branches within their Criminal Investigation Departments (CID) others dragged their feet. The PA, officials and politicians, including the Secretary of State and the Minister of State for the Colonies were biased towards ‘Special Branches’; they do not appear to have considered alternative intelligence models such the ‘Political Section’ inside the local CID, or a separate security intelligence service. The reason is difficult to ascertain but may relate to a concern with ‘British’ practice; the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was a system understood by officials elsewhere in Whitehall. There was a traditional resistance to ‘political’ policing in Britain and, as Georgina Sinclair has pointed out, civil policing and ‘Britishness’ were closely associated. The Security Service model used in the Malayan Security Service (MSS) may have been seen as ineffective after problems in Malaya in 1946-48.

From the examination of the run of reforms it is possible to see the outlines of the machinery but examining the debates over certain parts of it provides a much clearer idea of the perceived roles and importance of particular elements and interdepartmental struggles.

247 TNA, CO537/2686 Political Intelligence Reports East Africa, 1948.
249 Georgina Sinclair, *At the end of the line*, p. 85.
involved. The debate over the issue of CO guidance to the colonies governors on the experience in Malaya, for example, serves to highlight the different views in Whitehall. In particular it serves to highlight the different conceptions of intelligence held by the CO and the JIC as head of the central intelligence machinery and between the CO and the JIC on the form and purpose of particular intelligence institutions.

**Colonial Office guidance and visits by experts to the colonies:**

The first example of the CO consciously promulgating the Malayan experience of intelligence development was Secret Despatch No.5 from Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner of Malaya, on 30 May 1949. Gurney was a long time Colonial Service officer imbued in traditions of the service and committed to existing practice. His advice proved controversial and initiated a long winded argument between the professional intelligence machinery and the CO. Discussion of the reforms reveals fundamental differences in the conceptions of the intelligence machinery. In particular paragraphs 9 and 10 resulted in much correspondence lasting through until 1950.

In Paragraph 9 Gurney argued that the Special Branch should be both a ‘collecting’ and an ‘assessing’ organisation. High quality senior police officers were needed to manage this system. All intelligence material was collated in the Special Branch including material from ‘native’ affairs and the labour department. In Paragraph 10 he argued that the JIC model was a military one unsuitable for the management of local crises. He had resisted JICs in both Palestine and Malaya because he saw intelligence assessment as the duty of a specialist local officer in conference with other local officers. He advocated flexible conferences rather than a standing committee. This approach supported the CO’s existing prejudice against the JIC system and machinery.251

Despatch No. 5 was read by the Overseas Defence Committee and then referred to the JIC for comment. Unsurprisingly the JIC took a rather different view to Gurney. The JIC advocated the use of Local Intelligence Committees in opposition to Gurney’s ideas on co-ordinating machinery. Davies saw the adoption of the LICs as a manifestation of the JIC system imposed from the top and Despatch No.5 would seem to suggest that this is how the CO saw

251 Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies*, pp. 57-59.
it as well. The JIC thought its own system should be imposed and redrafted the paragraphs under discussion. The JIC argued that the Malayan experience was not directly applicable to all colonial situations, in particular they argued that:

‘Para 9: [...]despatch could be read to meant one of the functions of Special Branch of the Colonial Police is to appraise political intelligence and draw the right conclusion from it. While we recognise that for certain purposes it may be desirable that senior police officers should be expected to perform these functions it is our view that when an appraisal of political intelligence is required as the basis for the formulation of civil policy the responsibility for such an appraisal should rest with Governor advised by the Colonial Secretary and in appropriate cases by the Local Intelligence Committee if and when established.

The JIC’s comment is interesting because in many colonies which lacked a LIC and possessed a Special Branch, and in which the police had a colony wide jurisdiction, the Governors and Chief Secretary’s actually did receive information which had been appraised in the police machinery. It was however particularly true in Malaya and Singapore where the police had an important role in intelligence activity and less so in other colonies. In effect the JIC was attacking one of the CO’s accepted systems. The JIC then discussed its approach to intelligence organisation and the role of the JICs.

Para 10

2. In considering the relationships between local intelligence bodies and the Joint Intelligence Committee it is desirable to explain in more detail the working of the JICs.

3. A JIC serves a British Defence Co-ordinating Committee (BDCC) or a Commanders in Chief Committee of an area for the purpose of co-ordination all intelligence within a certain area. It consists normally of the representatives of the FO, three services, Security Service, SIS and Joint Intelligence Bureau where the area of responsibility of the JIC covers colonial territories it is desirable that its membership should also include an officer competent to advise on and to assess political intelligence collected from the territories Thus the JIC (London) includes a representative from each of the Colonial Office, and a member of Colonial Affairs side of the Commissioner General’s

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252 TNA CAB2922 JIC (49)82 Final 20th October 1949 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Intelligence Committee, Intelligence Organisation in the Far East, Comments on Despatch No.5 30 May 1949 circulated under JIC/1559/49.
organisation sits on the JIC(FE). Further JICs can and do call in expert opinion which requires special knowledge. LICs are organisations partly for the purpose of coordinating all intelligence within a particular territory for the guidance of Governor and local Service Commanders and partly to provide a properly constituted body with which the JIC can exchange views. LICs are not necessarily subordinate to Local Defence Committees (LDC) but might be responsible directly to the Colonial Governor himself whilst cooperating freely with the JIC.

The regional JIC’s responsibility was to British regional administrative and military machinery not to colonial governments. Regional JICs fed information back directly to the JIC in London allowing it to carry out its role as a proto-national assessing and co-ordinating body and avoided the bottleneck of the CO. The JIC’s views on LICs were also interesting because they stressed the importance of ‘a properly constituted body with which the JIC could correspond’. The comment about the Local Defence Committees (LDC) showed that the JIC was seeking to bypass the existing machinery. A professional agenda was probably important as well as a political one; the LDCs and other machinery in the colonial governments seldom had professional intelligence input. It is also necessary however to remember that the situation in Malaya was different to that in many other colonies

4. Circumstances in the Federation of Malaya are peculiar to that territory and other arrangements for the collation and assessment of political intelligence may be found appropriate in areas which have an administration of the normal colonial pattern. It is worth noting that among other places where LICs have been established are Singapore and Hong Kong.

5. We consider that except in rare cases due to special reasons to the contrary [...] it is desirable that there should be an LIC with a suitable permanent membership drawn from those officials most likely to be concerned with intelligence matters, Such a committee should be under the chairmanship of a senior officer of the colonial government and should contain representatives from the services and of any departments of the colonial government (police and Native Affairs) who by their knowledge and experience are in a special position to assist the LIC in making assessments.

There was a certain tension in the JICs recommendations. Fundamentally JIC’s, as military bodies, were interested in political intelligence as it affected security. Squeezing the Special
Branch with its 'security' focus out of involvement in intelligence assessment in favour of wider administrative/police machinery seems counter-productive. It may demonstrate a lack of understanding of the internal balances between administration and police in many colonies.

6 In our opinion the advantages to be gained from a LIC are that:

(a) the Governor of a colony receives valuable information from a permanent body who are constantly assessing intelligence and are also available to obtain advice on any particular subjects from experts and;

(b) By exchanging intelligence with a JIC the LIC is able to keep the governor informed of matters outside the immediate purview of his particular colony and the JIC is able to keep Commanders in Chief and BDCCs where they exist advised when necessary on matters affecting the individual colonies’

This argument went part of the way to satisfying the CO because it emphasised CO primacy in colonial intelligence collection and assessment but it also sought to provide a rationale for incorporating the CO and its machinery into organisation which could at least communicate with the JIC and contained professional personnel.

In 1950 discussion of the matter was still ongoing. The CO, FO, Admiralty, War Office, and Security Service accepted that not all colonies needed LICs; only those with major problems, and those where the armed forces were deployed. The FO was initially split. On the one hand Bevin was anti communist so he was personally keen to see intelligence improved but at the same time he was aware of the influence of the COS and their tendency to interfere in foreign policy. The FO consequently followed a mixed approach sometimes siding with the CO and sometimes with the COS. In the discussion Juxon Barton laid out a clear explanation of the CO’s position on intelligence:

‘It was the responsibility of the Colonial Office to ensure that timely and adequate intelligence affecting the deployment of the Armed Forces was passed to the Service Departments in London and that is was also the responsibility of the CO to ensure that such intelligence was obtained from Governor’s concerned. In cases where this committee on regional JIC required intelligence appreciations affecting particular
colonies where LICs had not been established such appreciations could always be obtained from Governors concerned through the CO.’\textsuperscript{253}

In these scenarios a system based on the CO’s local focus might have been more effective than an integrated system focussed on the importance of communism and the Cold War. The discussions and developments ‘on the ground’ indicate that the British government needed to adopt a more co-ordinated approach as emergencies developed. The CO always pressed to retain its autonomy and resisted the pressure applied to it. The major sources of pressure were from the service departments who were concerned about early warning and the need to deploy scarce resources.

IV

CO ‘Culture’ and the Proposed Political Intelligence Section:

It is now important to consider the ‘culture’ of the CO and its affect on intelligence activity. The culture is demonstrated in discussions about a proposed Political Intelligence Section (PIS) in the CO. Ministers intended the PIS to enable the CO to contribute to the British intelligence machinery but the proposal was carefully altered by the CO’s staff into a system for doing the opposite. By examining the responses of the various departmental heads to the proposal it is possible to find out how the CO’s decision makers thought about intelligence, information, and the role and nature of the CO’s own intelligence machinery.

A central PIS was proposed in late 1948.\textsuperscript{254} Officially the pressure came from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary but in reality it seems to be Bevin who was pushing. By the 18 October 1948 discussions were underway between the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Creech Jones), the Minister of State (Listowel) the Parliamentary Under Secretary (Rees Moggs), the Deputy Under Secretary, and the Assistant Under Secretaries.\textsuperscript{255} The

\textsuperscript{253} TNA, CAB 2922 JIC (50) 30\textsuperscript{th} Meeting16/3 1950 Organisation of Intelligence within the Commonwealth: Local Intelligence Organisations previously Reference JIC (4/) 76 Meeting Minute 6(3).

\textsuperscript{254} Calder Walton, \textit{Empire and Secrets}, p.152. He points to the simultaneous creation of a secret section in the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1948 which received information from SIS, MI5 and GCHQ under the control of Sir William Jenkin. This may be the origins of the CRO’s Communications Department.

\textsuperscript{255} TNA CO537/2767 Notes of a Meeting in Secretary of State’s Room, 18 Oct 1948.
African Studies Branch, which had been operating for a number of years within the CO and the Ministry of Food were suggested as precedents. Calder Walton suggests that a secret section was also set up in the CRO at the same time under Sir William Jenkin to coordinate information received from SIS, Security Service and GCHQ. The meeting dealt with four points which included: a programme of military and police organisation; development of machinery in the CO for the collation of political and security intelligence and for advising ministers on the political economic and other repercussions in colonies of events in the Commonwealth, and foreign countries; to consider both positive and negative approaches to communism, and to put in place a programme of propaganda. Discussion then turned to the creation of gendarmeries before turning to intelligence organisation within the CO. Clearly this showed that a ‘national’ rather than departmental approach to reform was desired.

The discussion suggested that the P.M., Foreign Secretary, and ministers wanted the PIS to integrate CO activities with the central intelligence machinery. This would seem to suggest that the PIS was intended to link the CO and the rest of Whitehall. It is clear however that within the CO there were a number of different visions of its role. Some of this discussion suggested the PIS was seen, within the CO, as an organisation for feeding external information into the CO’s own imperial intelligence machinery from elsewhere in Whitehall. The CO’s vision of the PIS maintained and reinforced the idea that the CO was the autonomous lead agency in imperial intelligence matters. Another ‘vision’ in the CO saw the PIS as a research organisation for the benefit of ministers. Yet another saw it as a method of dealing with some aspects of the international relations of the empire; the latter proposal would have trespassed on the FO’s coverts. Strangely officials in the CO do not seem to have emphasised the PIS as a security intelligence department and none of the proposals seem to suggest that it should manage intelligence activity rather it was a bureau for collating information obtained by other parts of the organisation. The discussion was about assessment, not about liaison with security and political intelligence bodies elsewhere in Whitehall. The discussion would suggest that the CO needed to know about the global threat posed by communism (and other external global ‘isms’) in order to act with its own resources in the

256 TNA, CO967/44 Proposals for a Political Intelligence Section 1949, Minute to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary, CO, from P. Rogers, Establishment Department, CO, 24 February 1949.
258 Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 152.
empire; i.e. it meant that the CO remained responsible for imperial intelligence activity. The discussion also suggests an essentially passive approach. Security and its cost were a local responsibility, not a British one.

Sir Marston Logan and Trafford Smith, who produced the Fortnightly Review of Communism and Political Intelligence Summary, were to be the core of the new machinery in the CO. The collation of the Political Intelligence Reports was to be continued within Defence Department. Overall a much larger organisation would be needed and it would be necessary to work out the relationship between it and the geographical departments. The meeting agreed that the collation of incoming information about communism required some kind of wider intelligence organisation which might be based on a research department in the International Relations Department. At this point the focus seems to be on using the security and defence orientated intelligence element of the CO to perform the new duties but there was uncertainty about the new machinery’s focus. Yet very soon the emphasis was to swing back to a political administrative focus. The discussion explains the practices for dealing with various types of intelligence within the CO but raises many questions. Security intelligence and liaison with the British intelligence services were seen as minor, niche activities, to be left to the Defence Department. The Political Intelligence Reports were not seen as fitting into this niche, despite Marston Logan’s role in summarising them. The Reports on Communism were also clearly seen as having wider relevance than a being mere defence matter.

A meeting held in the Permanent Under Secretary’s room on the 2 November 1948 provides more detail about the view on the intelligence machinery held by senior officials in the CO. The meeting was chaired by Sir Thomas Lloyd, the Permanent Under Secretary. The personnel who attended this meeting were the officials who formed the ongoing ‘mind’ of the Colonial Office because of their seniority and role as departmental heads. In consequence their decisions were likely to reflect their vision of the department’s role

‘The meeting discussed the idea of having a section of the Office which could diagnose and analyse political trends in the Colonial Empire as a whole, forecast probable developments in the political sphere and draw attention in advance to the possible affects in the colonies of outside events which may on the surface have no direct relevance to colonial affairs, and prepare appreciations for the information of
minister’s. Associated with this was the desirability of having a section of the office which would analyse information received in respect of Commonwealth and Foreign territories and disseminate it to the departments of the office concerned and to colonial governments.²⁵⁹

In many ways this sounds something like machinery used to distribute the FO’s TONIL telegrams during the war. It would be connected with the compilation of political reports on communism received from colonial governments in the Defence Department and work done by International Relations Department in the reception and dissemination of political intelligence from foreign colonies. The first proposed duty; ‘diagnosing and analysing political trends in the empire as a whole’ was an attempt to look globally at problems like communism and its likely affects on imperial development rather than relying up the local and regional perspectives of the geographical departments. The second duty was about seeing the empire in a global context. This could be interpreted as meaning that the PIS was to be a means of carrying the FO’s ideas into the CO or, alternatively, as attempt to widen the CO’s role into external affairs and thus to confirm the unique identify of its intelligence machinery. The section would act as an entry portal for information about the global British interests and circulate these around the office. Finally the section was going to produce research briefs for ministers although it was, ‘agreed that a political appreciation of position in each colonial territory or region must remain with the responsibility of the geographical departments and through them the colonial governments’,²⁶⁰ i.e. the system was not focussed on passing up colonial information.

The intention appears to have been to create a ‘fusion centre’ at the heart of the CO in which external and internal imperial information was amalgamated. What appears to be emerging from the ‘smoke’ of these discussions is not a method of extending the reach of the JIC into the CO to aid centralised control of colonial policy from Whitehall but rather machinery which would help the CO to perform the kind of assessment task undertaken by the JIC i.e. making the CO a parallel organisation to the JIC and retaining the CO’s independence from the central machinery. Given that the pressure was being placed on the CO to become involved in the JIC this approach might represent a ‘counter blast’ by producing an

²⁵⁹ TNA, CO537/2676, Note of a Meeting held in Sir Thomas Lloyd’s Room, 2 November 1948.
²⁶⁰ Ibid. Note of a Meeting held in Sir Thomas Lloyd’s Room, 2 November 1948.
organisation to perform the same kind of work as the JIC without the military preoccupations although unfortunately this kind of rationale is not explicitly stated.

The meeting then examined:
(a) Analysis and dissemination of political information from Commonwealth and foreign countries and
(b) appreciation of trends in the colonial empire as a whole particularly as affected by the events outside the colonial empire which would be brought to notice under (a)
(c) Scope for useful work under (a) extra staff needed work done by International Relations Department in the field was of use but might need to be disseminated within the office and to colonial governments.

It was agreed that central organisation set up to prepare a general appreciation would have to seek regional appreciations from the appropriate geographical department and through it from the colonial governments. This seems to suggest that the role proposed was actually rather similar to that of the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), i.e. the PIS was intended to be a drafting body to inform the higher level work of ministers. The section would best placed inside the CO’s International Relations Department (CO-IRD) however the CO-IRD might need to be split and in order to determine how it should be structured it was necessary to obtain academic advice. Sir Thomas Lloyd suggested Professor Harlow.²⁶¹ He also suggested that Martin should talk to Galsworthy on the possibility of a new section as an expansion of the IRD. It would be necessary to consult the CO’s Organisation Committee.²⁶²

This discussion was confusing because it seemed to envisage two separate sections, a security focussed element and a research element and it is not clear how these fitted together into one section. To summarise –the CO proposed to keep its existing methods of handling intelligence coming in from the colonies and therefore the way in which they were disseminated. Defence would continue to deal with security information because of its liaison with security organisations. The new section would research outside information coming in and global trends within empire including longer terms trends and advise ministers so that

²⁶¹ Professor Vincent Harlow. British Empire historian. Ministry of Information, 1939-45; Rhodes Professor of Imperial History King’s College London,1938-48; Beit Professor of Commonwealth History Oxford 1949; Adviser to the CO Secret Committee on Smaller Colonial Territories, British Guiana Constitutional Committee, Sudan Constitutional Amendment Commission 1950-51.
²⁶² TNA, CO537/2676, Note of a Meeting held in Sir Thomas Lloyd’s Room, 2 November 1948.
valuable material could be disseminated. Again this appears to be a reform essentially intended to improve the CO’s assessment process and to allow it to continue its largely autonomous course; not a way of improving the flow of information to the rest of Whitehall.

It is now necessary to examine the reforms to reveal the mentalité of the civil servants involved, particularly the CO’s AUS the conflicts between them, and the way in which they sought to subvert external pressure on the CO in relation to intelligence matters. In particular they reveal the views of Assistant Under Secretaries in charge of groups of departments and some Assistant Secretaries and principals about intelligence reform consequently it demonstrates the CO’s overall position on the issue of reform both within the CO and Whitehall. The impetus for the proposed PIS came from outside the CO but its proposed organisation and role was the hands of the civil servants in the CO.

Clearly these ideas were those held by high level officials at the time and this group may not be representative of all CO civil servants. An examination of their records of service also shows that all were administrators with their main backgrounds in the geographical departments. Most had started their service before the widespread creation of technical departments. This preponderance may explain why the influence of the geographical departments was so important and why the proposal to create the PIS was not implemented. It also serves to exclude other influences which affected CO decision making. There was for example, a varying degree of ‘anti-communist’ thinking. Calder Walton for example, points to Harold Ingrams of the Information Departments as being a particularly anti-communist official, but a general anti communism was the norm at this time. Finally they had remarkably homogenous backgrounds. Most were privately educated, many had university degrees, and a substantial number had served in the First World War. From their educational profiles most appear to have been Anglicans. This combination of factors served to create a homogenous body of men who approached problems, including intelligence problems in a similar way. It is interesting how despite initially advocating the section officials like Seel recanted when faced with opposition from the other AUS.

263 Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 158
Divisions within the CO over the role of the Political Intelligence Section:

The proposed PIS found some supporters within the CO. Generally technical departments supported the idea and geographical departments opposed it. Technical /specialist departments took a ‘global’ view of events because they provided expertise across the empire; consequently D&G could accept the idea of a global communist threat more easily than Geographical Departments which saw events as having ‘local’ or ‘regional’ causes. The attitudes of individuals could change. Some civil servants in D&G, for example, had come from geographical departments but seemed to adopt their new department’s approach. Civil servants subverted the machinery to achieve departmental goals in the CO.

The process of negotiation started when Sir Thomas Lloyd, the Permanent Under Secretary, sought ideas from departments. This took place some months after the meeting on the 2nd of November 1948. In that time there seems to have been some developments in thinking about the organisation’s purpose. It is not clear what perspective Lloyd had on the PIS himself although his views on the CO’s role were conservative. Philip Rogers, an establishment officer, was placed in charge of drafting the proposal. Rogers worked with Emanuel from Economic Department (the original intention was to make the section responsible for economic as well as political information although the CO’s Economic Department withdrew at an early date) and Trafford Smith from D&G and

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264 TNA, CO967/44 Proposals for a Political Intelligence Section, 1949. Minute to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary, Colonial Office, from P. Rogers, Establishment Department, CO, 12 January 1949; TNA, CO537/2676. Note of a Meeting Held in Sir Thomas Lloyd’s room, 2 November 1948.


266 TNA, CO967/44 Proposals for a Political Intelligence Section, 1949.


270 TNA, CO967/44 Proposal for a Political Intelligence Section, 1949. Minute A. Emanuel, Economic Department to Philip Rogers Establishment Department, CO, 13 January 1949.
George Seel, an Assistant Under Secretary for Eastern, General and West Indies Departments. All of these officers were to have an ongoing influence over intelligence development in the CO and they recommended that the creation of the section. Seel and Trafford Smith, head of D&G, may have been wanted to lessen Defence and General Department’s workload. The matter was then passed to other heads of departments for discussion.

More detail emerged in early January 1949. Seel minuted Sir Thomas Lloyd that there was a need for a section to work with Geographical Departments, International Relations Department (IRD-CO) and the Economic General Department. He believed security work and ‘communism’ should remain with D&G with opportunities for liaison with the proposed PIS. There was discussion of whether or not the two intelligence summaries the ‘Fortnightly Review of Communism’ and the ‘Political Intelligence’ reports ought to be merged. Seel did not consider it necessary to combine the general ‘Political Intelligence Summary’ with the ‘Communist Summary’. J.M. Martin from IRD-CO agreed. Blackburn of Information Services and Trafford Smith of D&G were not certain about amalgamation of the two products, but thought they should be compiled within the same section.

The memorandum was then circulated to Assistant Under Secretaries and some principals concerned with defence matters. The commentary on the form and role of the proposed PIS provided by the Assistant Under Secretaries is illuminating because it provides evidence of

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273 TNA, CO967/44, Minute, Philip Rogers, Establishment Department to Mr Seel, Assistant Undersecretary of State for Eastern, General, and West Indies and Sir T Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary of State, CO, 12 January 1949.

274 Ibid. Minute Mr Seel, Assistant Undersecretary of State for Eastern, General and West Indies to Sir T Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary of State CO 12 January 1949

275 Ibid. Minute J.M. Martin, Assistant Undersecretary of State International Relations and Mediterranean to Sir T Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary of State, CO, 13 January 1949
departmental viewpoints but also of some confusion.\textsuperscript{276} The key problem was the relationship between the ‘secretariat’ (the PIS) and the ‘geographical’ departments. The suggested aims of the secretariat were threefold: to study external trends affecting empire; to gather and collate intelligence from the colonies themselves; and to provide a research service to evaluate it.

J.B. Sidebotham, the AUS responsible for ‘Pacific Department’, agreed that there was a requirement for a section but was uncertain about the precise division of duties.\textsuperscript{277} He questioned whether it was a machine for collecting information for summaries or giving advice to departments on the political repercussion of events in contiguous territories. He asked what relationship the PIS would have to International Relations Department. Would a direct link between geographical departments and International Relations remain? Would a new department inform geographical departments of political events in contiguous territories or would direct links between geographical departments and external departments like the FO remain? He was concerned that the proposal might slow down work and make it less effective.\textsuperscript{278}

Sidebotham was clearly concerned to keep as much independence for his department as possible. His interest in International Relations department and external contacts with the FO probably related to the issue of Anglo-French relations in the Pacific particularly in the New Hebrides, which was ruled under an awkward condominium arrangement, which made an effective relationship with the FO essential. Inserting machinery between Pacific Department and its external contacts would have slowed work down and led to confusion.

By far the most important concern of the departments about the creation of a PIS however was that it would break the direct link between the geographical departments; wherein lay the COs detailed knowledge of particular locations and regions, and the upper echelons of the CO and with the rest of Whitehall because it would insert an additional level of machinery.

\textsuperscript{276} TNA, CO967/48 Proposals for a Political Intelligence Section, 1949.
\textsuperscript{278} TNA, CO967/44. Memo J.B. Southam, Head of Pacific Department (?) to P. Rogers, Establishment Department, CO, 13 Jan 1949.
J.M. Martin, responsible for Mediterranean and Middle East, wrote to Sir Thomas Lloyd pointing out that although IRD-CO was overworked the view within Mediterranean Department was ‘[…] to maintain the principle that political intelligence with respect to any Colonial Territory is the prime responsibility […] of the Geographical Department […]’. L.H. Gorsuch who dealt with West Africa was strongly opposed to the PIS. He believed the PIS might cause potential delays; duplication of work; and the loss of an overview of West African politics because it would add an extra level between his department and the higher officials. He pointed out that if a new system was implemented the geographical department would have to supply a finished product because an officer who was not working with day to day correspondence would not fully understand the context. He did not want West African Department, which worked with regional organisations like West African Council and the SLO West Africa, to be bypassed. West Africa, like the Pacific region was a complex area for both internal and external reasons. Internally the colonies had highly developed local politics; externally there was the need to manage relationships with the French government and the United Nations over mandates like Cameroon. From a security perspective the British maintained regional machinery and co-operation consequently it is possible to see the point of Gorsuch’s objections.

By contrast to these objections Eastern Branch replied to Philip Rogers in the Establishment Department:

[…] It will undoubtedly be useful to have a section collating information concerning foreign countries but I must insist that any suggestion that the new section should be in any way interposed between geographical departments and their contacts in the Foreign Office, C.R.O., etc., must be squashed from the outset. It must be the responsibility of the Geographical Departments to deal direct with the F.O. etc when any matters arise in foreign countries directly affecting the Colonial Territories.

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280 TNA, CO967/44, Memo Sir John Martin, Assistant Under Secretary of State responsible for Mediterranean and Middle East to Sir Thomas Lloyd Permanent Under Secretary of State for Colonies, 14 January 1949

281 Ibid. Minute, L.H. Gorsuch (?) Principal, West African Department, to Philip Rogers, Establishment Department, 14 January 1949.

282 Ibid.
I am rather alarmed at the suggestion that an Assistant Secretary should be put in charge of since this in itself is bound to give the section a status to which it would not my mind be entitled if it is to fulfil the functions I have in mind. No self-respecting Assistant Secretary could be expected to be content that his department should be a pure collating agency and post office […]\textsuperscript{283}

The Far East like the Pacific and West African regions was a complex area with British regional machinery, foreign colonies, and independent states all of which required liaison with the FO. Eastern Branch’s comments also demonstrate that the geographical departments could interact with other Whitehall departments in a horizontal way rather than going through formal channels between departments. They show that the CO could not always have adopted a collective, departmental perspective when dealing with Whitehall, because individual departments within the CO could negotiate directly with external departments on matters occurring within their regions.

Many of the minutes raise the question of the purpose of the PIS. There was clearly considerable difference between collating reports from the colonies and ‘researching’ the empires foreign relationships and this was felt to impinge on the geographical departments’ role. C.J.J.T. Barton, a Principal who had just moved from the IRD-CO to the Commercial Relations Department, provided a detailed critique of the proposal.\textsuperscript{284} His perspective is important because between 1953 and 1957 he took over the task of compiling the ‘Colonial Intelligence Summaries’ and the annual intelligence review from Sir Marston Logan and became deeply involved in intelligence activity.

The object of the proposal seems to be (quite rightly) to stimulate a more regular and more searching appreciation of what is happening, of the trends which are perceptible

\textsuperscript{283} Ibid. Minute, PN (?) Eastern Department to Philip Rogers, Establishment Department
in the colonies as a whole or in groups of Colonies, and of where we might be going. This badly needs doing. But in my view a worthwhile appreciation (as distinct from a bald factual summary) can only be produced either by people who are doing the work (Geographical Departments) being given the time and encouragement to stand back and consider what they are getting at, or by somebody working in the very closest touch with them, or by both together […]

It would not be true that to say nobody else could do it; but I think it is true to say that nobody else can do it for us –and if the appreciation is going to lead to action, it is surely the “us” that has to be got at. I recognise that it is proposed that the Political Intelligence Section should work closely with the Geographical Departments. But I do not believe it will be possible to achieve the degree of intimate touch necessary with eight or more Geographical departments covering the whole colonial world. Indeed I doubt very much what significant trends there are which are common the whole colonial Empire (apart from question of external relations which I would regard as with the IRD ambit); the significant trends are to be sought mainly by large regions.  

Barton’s suggested answer was to adopt full scale ‘regionalisation’ of the CO with regional studies branches and regular co-ordination meetings with the highest levels of officials.

Beckett of the West Indian Department had discussed his ideas with Messrs Morgan, Kennedy and Mackintosh.

[ […] the proposal would not achieve a great deal as, except in relation to small number of subjects-chiefly communism, and to a lesser extent racial questions and questions of constitutional development – reports containing political intelligence from any of the well defined Colonial regions would gain little or nothing by collation and could for most purposes be best used in regional reports rather than incorporation into a single document, which could do little more than repeat them one after another with little or no change in the form in which they were submitted by Geographical Departments.  

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285 TNA, CO967/44, Minute, C.J.J.T. Barton, Commercial Department, CO.
286 Ibid. Minute, H Beckett, West Indian Department to Philip Rogers, Establishment Department,
Beckett’s minute is again very revealing. His comments suggest that the minister’s major concern was with the Cold War and intelligence related to security issues. It also clearly points to the CO’s civil servants in both geographical and defence departments, belief that local issues were the most important and that the Cold War was not a major issue in many regions. These beliefs help to demonstrate the collective mentalité of the CO’s personnel and how it differed from that in other departments in Whitehall.

Andrew Cohen was responsible for the African Departments and an influential reformer in the CO. He was a progressive who believed in careful research and took a regional approach to the activities of his department. He had set up the African Studies Branch to study regional problems. Cohen however argued:

I agree that it is desirable that adequate arrangements should be made for (a) the collection and collation of political intelligence, and (b) assessments to be made of the effect which developments in Commonwealth and foreign countries may have in Colonial Territories. But I do not agree that (b) should be the function of a general Political and Security Section [...].

Because Cohen already had the African Studies Branch, he had less need of a PIS carrying out a research function a departmental level.

At the close of the exercise Seel wrote to Sir Thomas Lloyd recommending that the proposal be dropped on the ground of general opposition within the department. This seems to suggest that the PUS was able to use departmental opinion in order to justify not taking any action over the PIS when dealing with his ministers and by extension the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. This suggests that the Secretary of State was able to convince Bevin that he had taken sufficient action perhaps because of the CO’s new but limited role in the JIC. The department was opposed to seeing intelligence as a special field and the geographical departments should continue to handle it. Seel disagreed with some by accepting that there were general trends affecting the empire. Contributors argued for a variety of solutions: the maintenance of the ‘status quo’ i.e. the responsibility of the Geographical Departments; or

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288 Ibid. Minute, George Seel, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Eastern, General and West Indian to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary of State, CO, 22 February 1949.
some form of the PIS; a general ‘political’ structure within the CO; or a regionalised system based on the African Studies Department. A major criticism, which showed the ‘departmental’ viewpoint, was that the plan for the PIS imposed a layer of officials between the geographical departments and their contacts and caused delay.

The salient points in this discussion are very revealing. It was clear that the geographical departments within the CO did not have an absolutely clear idea of what the proposed PIS was intended to do but equally that they were committed to retaining as much autonomy for the CO and their individual sections of it as possible. Ideas, demonstrated in the minutes, ranged from a section collating political or security information for ministers, essentially a security function, to a research department dealing with global trends affecting the empire, essentially an international relations responsibility. It does not seem to have been envisaged as an organisation to co-ordinate security and intelligence activity; rather as a body designed to collate analyse and interpret information received from the new reports. This role may also apply to the abortive PIS proposed in by Sir Thomas Lloyd the PUS in 1953 but of which little record has survived. Nonetheless the PIS was clearly intended to be influential because it was to have its own Assistant Under Secretary. The proposed role of the PIS does appear to be different from the role to the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) eventually introduced after the 1955 Templer Report reforms discussed in Chapter 5. ISD had a managerial and analytical rather than a strictly analytical role and it contained security professionals rather than the civil servants and academics proposed in 1948-49.

The question of precedent is interesting. Cohen’s African Research Branch was an analytical research body dealing with African affairs. The ‘secretariat’ in the Ministry of Food was suggested as a precedent. It is not clear however what it did but it may have been a collating body. The intention of the Foreign Secretary was probably to push the CO to set up an organisation, which had similarities with the Permanent Under Secretary’s Department (PUSD) of the FO. PUSD managed the relationship with the SIS probably including acting as a conduit for passing material to intelligence consumers in geographical departments in the FO who had posed questions for SIS to answer. PUSD was to be consciously used as a model in 1954-55.

289 Anne Thurston, Sources for Colonial Studies, Vol I, p.318. In 1953 there were more discussions about a PIS and this was contemporaneous with similar discussions in the CRO
The discussion showed something of the institutional culture of the civil servants, their concern for administrative primacy, and their resentment at external interference. The reforms showed that the CO had chosen collectively to slow down and subvert the interference in its internal affairs from the rest of Whitehall. It also showed that divisions between geographical and technical departments played an important part in internal politics within the CO. Traditional administrative information gathering and processing machinery was preferred to intelligence professionalization. The ‘victory’ was only temporary, however, hard experience in the colonies and the increasing threat was to gradually remove the CO’s autonomy and force it to act within a centralised and co-ordinated Whitehall as Chapter 3 will show. The dispute does however identify the forces within the CO who wished to slow down intelligence reform and this knowledge is important when surveying the subsequent development of the 1948 system.

There were important differences in the understanding of what constituted ‘Political Intelligence’ and its relationship with ‘security intelligence’. Political intelligence was seen as ‘superior’. Civil servants believed only the Geographical departments were able to understand the complexity of the material and should remain the most important element of the CO, including the right to liaise with Whitehall departments. Geographical departments’ views were ‘localist’ and ‘regionalist’. Some officials, however, recognised there was a global view. The emphasis on political intelligence meant the CO was unable to provide the Service Departments and the COS with ‘security’ information needed to plan troop deployments in advance a purpose for which political intelligence was too diffuse. It also helped the CO to resist Whitehall’s emphasis on links between communism and nationalism. Officials recognised the differences between ‘British’ and imperial interests. Most colonies, however, did not have local communist parties and whilst Soviet espionage did exist in some colonies it was limited in scope in late 1940s and early 1950s.

‘Nationalism’ was clearly a very important influence on developments in the empire but there were other influences of importance. In some territories ethnic (Chinese in Malaya) or tribal identities (Somaliland), religion (Brunei), or other local realities were as important if not more so. Nationalist movements had existed for decades in many colonies. Frequently however nationalist ideas were closely associated with elite educated groups within colonial societies and so had limited impact on the security of colonial governments. Over time ethnic, religious and economic factors became more intertwined with nationalism sometimes giving
it a specific character. The CO was well aware of these complexities because it surveyed the way colonial governments manipulated local conditions to maintain control. This array of anti-colonial factors increasingly became lumped under the term ‘nationalism’ after the Second World War by other departments in Whitehall. By contrast ‘Communism’ had been seen as a separate threat which operated in the colonies by creating tensions and setting up local communist parties some of which were in conflict with more conservative nationalists. There were a number of reasons why Whitehall conflated the two one of which was that ‘nationalist’ politicians sometimes operated within ‘labour’ movements which used the rhetoric of class warfare. The response of the CO was mixed. Geographical departments, although starved of funds, continued to place more emphasis on social and economic reforms than security. The CO, like the British government, was capable of pursuing conflicting policies simultaneously.

V

Alterations to the CO’s machinery post 1948:

The Security Intelligence Adviser:

The next major point in the development of the CO’s internal machinery was the appointment of the Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA) in 1954. In 1952 the Kenyan government asked for support to rebuild the Kenyan Special Branch which had failed early in the emergency. Like the intelligence machinery in Malaya it had been starved of resources. The police had small numbers in the rural areas and Special Branch was small and urban based despite the fact that the Commissioner was O’Rorke who had served in the RIC in the 1920s. In 1947 the Security Service had recommended reforms but these were not implemented by the Kenyan government. As a result the government was taken by surprise. Initially the Governor approached Sir Thomas Lloyd, the CO’s PUS, who approached the Home Office (HO) for support. An officer from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was provided by Sir Frank Newsam, the PUS of the HO. Sir Percy Sillitoe, the Director General of the Security Service, however heard of the request and offered to provide a Security Service

291 Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets, pp.242-246
292 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line, pp.75.87, 205.
officer. Eventually he managed to convince Sir Evelyn Baring, the governor, to accept his offer. Alexander MacDonald, late Indian Police, who had experience in Malaya, was appointed to carry out the reforms.

The response to these actions demonstrated divisions within the CO. Lloyd and Jeffries were infuriated by Sillitoe's actions. Clearly they preferred a ‘police centred’ rather than a ‘security intelligence centred’ approach, drawing on the resources of their allies in the Home Office. No doubt they did not appreciate the embarrassment either! The incident shows how the Security Service was taking a more active role in the colonies. In 1952 Sillitoe and MacDonald reorganised the Special Branch and MacDonald was left in Kenya as Director of Intelligence to supervise the implementation of the reforms. In 1954 the Colonial Secretary appointed MacDonald his SIA in the CO and by November MacDonald was involved in advising Templer on colonial intelligence for his report. The files on Kenya show that the system developed and expressed by MacDonald formed the basis of his recommendations for the Colonial model as a whole. The Kenyan incident demonstrates that the Security Service had gained influence over the development of the professional influence on the colonial police. This looks like an afterthought and needs further integration

Conclusion:

The war created a new international situation in which the position of Great Britain was much weakened. The UK was economically weakened. The United States alliance during the war became a key stone of British policy and the United States followed an anti imperial policy. The creation of the United Nations increasingly provided a forum in which other states could criticise the British Empire and keep British colonial practice under surveillance.

During the war the nature of British government had undergone considerable development. There had been a tendency to centralisation. Departments had become much more interventionist. Associated with this was an emphasis on ‘planning’ in both the external and internal spheres. The relative importance of different parts of the British government had changed. The COS for example, had become much more important whilst the SoS for Colonies was not a member of the War Cabinet although Attlee represented the dominions as

Deputy Prime Minister. The British government also undermined the degree of autonomy of colonies by appointing Minister’s Resident and creating regional military and administrative structures.

The nature of intelligence machinery and its relationship with the government had also changed British intelligence machinery had become central to the war effort in part because of the central importance of signals intelligence and the code breaking capacity developed which for the first time gave the British government almost ‘real time’, accurate, intelligence to assist in decision making.

The international situation and the changes in administrative structure and relative importance had had their effect on the relative importance of the British intelligence machinery which became central to government decision and policy making. There was extension of the scale, an increase in the degree of central control and the gradual development of the JIC as the centre of the co-ordinating machinery. The collecting agencies were also expanded greatly; the Security Service undertook overseas activity like SIS. The service intelligence organisations expanded and developed new systems of intelligence collection including image intelligence.

**CO responsibility in other territories:**

Palestine had an effect on subsequent counter-insurgency operations but not the same impact as Malaya. This is in a sense rather strange; it was a large scale ongoing crisis which had directly involved the British government and significant military forces. It did however have some specific effects on the development of the colonial police. Palestine personnel were sent all over the world although their influence in Malaya was limited by the internecine strife within the police force that their arrival created. Palestine officers had an impact on the development of the colonial police model. In particular towards the end of the mandate the idea of general duties police backed up with a paramilitary element for emergencies and an extensive intelligence organisation based on Special Branch became the norm in the colonies. Ex-Palestine Police officers entered the Security Service practically all colonial police forces. Some Palestine officers became the peripatetic experts like Sir Richard Catling and John Fforde who advised the CO and Whitehall on counter-insurgency and intelligence matters.
The chapter has also demonstrated how the Cold War created external pressure on the CO from Whitehall to integrate it into the wider British intelligence machinery under the JIC but also how the CO resisted this process and why it resisted. It has also explained why the CO was organised on an older pattern of intelligence machinery. It has examined the attitudes to intelligence work in the geographical departments and consequently helped to examine how the personnel in the CO saw the world and the intelligence crisis of 1948 and how they resisted interference in their autonomy including their autonomy as head of their own intelligence hierarchy.

The next chapter will deal with the Templer Report and how it affected the imperial intelligence machinery in both the CO and the colonies arguing firstly that it marked an end to the CO’s autonomous role as head of its own intelligence hierarchy and that secondly much of the report codified existing good practice rather than radically changing the system.
Chapter 3


In the previous chapter it was demonstrated how despite pressure being placed on the CO it fought a campaign of resistance against external intervention in its intelligence and security machinery. The Templer Report and the subsequent second round of reform within the CO’s intelligence machinery in 1954-56 did not emerge out of nowhere. Rather reform drew on experience gained in the intervening years since 1948, both in the colonies and in Whitehall. There were a number of reasons for reform. External pressure was placed on the CO as a result of the perception by other departments that the CO had failed to provide intelligence to prevent a further series of emergencies. Experience gained in various counter-insurgencies was assimilated to varying degrees. A professional ‘colonial’ model of intelligence organisation and practice was developed, largely by the Security Service and the JIC, which reflected developments in the British machinery in the same period. Dissatisfaction with the CO’s performance in providing intelligence to predict trouble led to the Templer report. It was not really concerned with new ideas but rather a codification of ideas which had developed in the intervening years.

Whilst the factors examined in previous chapters continued to be important one of the new features of this period was the imposition of professional intelligence models on the CO and this chapter will seek to understand how this process occurred. The Security Service and JIC created a preferred model of colonial intelligence organisation which was imposed on the Kenyan government in 1952 and in 1956 was recommended as the standard form for use in colonies. To ensure its input in Kenya the Security Service had ‘seen off’ a Metropolitan Police Special Branch candidate supported by the Home Office (HO). Likewise the appointment of a Security Intelligence Adviser by the CO, prior to the Templer Report placed a Security Service officer inside the CO and so created a professional figurehead for intelligence work in the CO. The Templer Report later forced the CO to create a department modelled on the Permanent Under Secretary’s Department (PUSD) of the Foreign Office (FO) and designed to link the CO much more directly into the British machinery. This chapter will examine the events which led to the set up of Templer’s Report. It will examine the provisions of the report and how they affected the structure and practice of the CO. Then it will examine the effect of interdepartmental conflict on the process.
The reasons for setting up the Committee on Security in the Colonies:

The need for a review of colonial security seems to have come from Macmillan during his time as Minister of Defence 1954-55. The ostensible rationale was to consider the position of colonial forces in British defence planning and their redirection to security work, hence the need to develop the security intelligence apparatus in the colonies. Macmillan’s memorandum ‘Internal Security in the Colonies’ indicated that the main military interest in colonial intelligence was related to obtaining adequate warning of the need to deploy military manpower. It also, however, identified a number of other motivations.

This was partly driven by the re-focussing of British defence on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces. The need to cut defence spending was another major factor. Pressure was also created by the military perception that the CO could not control colonial governments or get anything done during emergencies.

A fear of communist subversion by senior government personnel played a large part in causing the review. Templer had strong views on the effectiveness of communist subversion and wanted to use the techniques of subversion against the Soviet Union. Harold Macmillan had similar ideas when he was Minister of Defence 1954-55 and continued to be interested in them as Foreign Secretary in 1955. Macmillan and Templer for example advocated a central organisation for dealing with subversion which was to come to fruition in 1956 as the Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies. Both men were closely associated with Patrick Dean the Chairman of the JIC, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick in the Foreign Office, and the Chiefs of Staff who also saw the benefits of such an approach. They were aware of the threat subversion posed in Britain and the colonies. Dean, for example,

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294 TNA, CAB21/2922, Memorandum from Minister of Defence, Harold Macmillan, C (54) 402 29 December 1954, para. 3-7.
295 TNA, CAB21/2922 Memorandum on Cabinet Defence Policy C (54) 329 3 November 1954.
296 TNA CO1035/116 Minute CY Carstairs, AUS, CO, to Sir Thomas Lloyd, PUS, CO, 28 November 1955. recounted involvement of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, FO, Sir H Parker, PUS, MoD, Sir George Turner, PUS, War Office, Sir Gerald Templer, CIGS.
297 TNA, PREM11/1582 Minute Counter Subversion Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister undated; TNA, CAB21/2925 Pt.2 Note CY Carstairs, CO, Anti-Communist Propaganda, 8 February 1955; TNA, CAB21/2925Pt.2 Subversive Influences Among Colonial Students in the United Kingdom and Abroad; TNA, CAB21/2952 Pt.2, Note Mr WEP Ward, CO, Colonial Education and Communism 7 March 1955; TNA, CAB21/2925 Pt.2, Federation of Malaya Chinese Schools, 23 March 1955.
personally intervened in counter-subversion activity in Singapore and Malaya in 1955-56. The CO by contrast was able to find little evidence of communist threats, at least in the form of organised communist parties, in most of the colonies. They had a much more nuanced and complex view of anti-colonial agitation.

Templer had other radical ideas too which grew out of his perception of the best methods of dealing with subversion. He wanted to hand over colonies as quickly as possible so that indigenous people could have experience of government whilst it was still possible to provide British assistance and supervision. He specifically warned British expatriates to be aware of their arrogance when dealing with indigenous people which he argued adversely affected British interests overseas.

Templer’s ideas about the development of the colonial intelligence machinery need to be seen in this ‘active’ context. He was concerned both to protect colonies against subversion but also prepared to consider an active policy to achieve this. As an ex coordinator of SOE in Europe (1945) an ex-Director of Military Intelligence (1946-48) and with his experience in Malaya (1952-54) he tended to see the importance of intelligence from the perspective of providing forewarning and guidance for military operations. He was used to the idea of covert operations. He was very conscious of CO failures to provide early warning to the armed forces. His definition of intelligence and his views on the machinery for creating intelligence recommendations were likely therefore to be fundamentally opposed to the CO’s.

**The Committee on Security in the Colonies 1955:**

As a result of these pressures the Committee on Security in the Colonies was set up in the orders of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in January 1955. It was tasked to ‘review the

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298 TNA, CO1035/123 Organisation for Counter Subversion in Singapore 1954-56. Note on Counter Subversive Organisation in Singapore February 1956 para. 1-5; Top Secret Record of a Meeting on Counter Subversion at Government House Singapore 2 February 1956 Present: Governor Sir Robert Black, Mr PH Dean, Chairman of the JIC, Mr Goode, the Counter Subversion Officer and also Secretary of the Defence and Internal Security Committee. Mr Broome Deputy Counter Subversion Officer and Assistant Secretary of Defence and Internal Security Committee and Assistant Counter Subversion Officer.


300 CAB2923 Note to Lord Chancellor from DA Scott, Cabinet Office Secretary to GEN485 17 January 1956 para3 (e) ‘The Committee agrees on the importance of incubating a more responsible attitude towards indigenous peoples by all British living in overseas territories. The Report to the Cabinet should include some reference to positive action being taken to achieve this.’
existing organisation of Armed Forces, Police and Security Services in Colonial Territories’ and produce a report. Its members included the Colonial Secretary, Minister of Defence, Secretaries of State for War, and Air, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Financial Secretary of the Treasury. It was initially chaired by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Swinton who had extensive intelligence experience. Presumably his role as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations was considered relevant as his department was assuming responsibility for the self governing colonies and relations with ex-colonies, but his ideas may have been affected by interdepartmental rivalries between the CRO and CO. He was later replaced by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir. It was provided with two secretaries from the Cabinet Office, Sir George Young and D.A. Scott.

By the 18 January 1955 it had been decided to appoint General Templer, recently returned from Malaya, to write an interim report before taking up his post as chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). Templer was also supported by a JIC working group whose records do not appear in CAB 2922 but may indicate that the JIC saw an opportunity to do a little ‘empire building’. His appointment was made in the context of the anti communist programme. Young wrote to General Sir Neville Brownjohn, the Chief Staff Officer at the MOD, asking whether Templer should be formally introduced to the Anti Communism (Overseas) (AC(O)) committee because of its role in ‘[...] stimulate and co-ordinate- under the general supervision of ministers all anti-communist activities (including related to information ) overseas. Brownjohn disagreed however he pointed out that Templer had been one of AC (O)’s founders. Templer recognised that the main threat was in two parts firstly anti British groups and secondly the potential of Russian support for them but in practice was to concentrate on the communist threat.

Templer then visited a relatively small number of colonies, notably Cyprus, and discussed matters with various officials from interested departments including the CO as he wrote the report. Templer submitted the report on 23 April 1955 and implementation of its recommendations had started by the 23 July 1955. Cabinet ordered the Colonial Secretary to

302 TNA, CAB21/2922 Letter GP Young, Secretary of Committee on the Military Implications of General Templer’s Report, to General Brownjohn, Chief Staff Officer, Ministry of Defence, 20 January 1955.
carry out the reforms.\textsuperscript{304} The Committee on Security in the Colonies was left in being, and a ‘Subcommittee on the Military Implications of General Templer’s Report’ was formed to oversee the reports implementation. By January 1956 however many of the reforms had still not been implemented.\textsuperscript{305} A crisis in Aden in April 1956 when the CO failed to inform the COS and JIC of problems, resulted in a ‘counterblast’ from the Minister of Defence who discovered that the appointment of Deputy Inspectors General of Colonial Police (DIGCP), Deputy Security Intelligence Advisers (DSIA) and the issue of guidance to local intelligence committees had not yet been achieved.\textsuperscript{306}

Clearly the CO was not pleased with the report which would effectively remove much of its autonomy. It had set up the ISD and Police departments by the end of 1955 but it sought to slow things down in other ways. It did not get around to issuing the circular on intelligence requested by the report until April 1956, after a number of reminders. It also sought to attack the JIC and JIS in detail pointing out that the JIC and JIS lacked members with colonial experience, and most papers were irrelevant to the CO and thus did not warrant the attendance of a CO representative.\textsuperscript{307} This ‘counter blast’ was to lap over into debates about the JIC and the need to move it to the Cabinet Office discussed in detail by Rory Cormac.\textsuperscript{308}

The COS expressed its dissatisfaction with CO’s provision of intelligence a year after the Report had been submitted. The COS said ‘[...] Colonial Office representation on the JIS was inadequate and there was little opportunity for discussion on matters affecting the colonies. This would present a good opportunity for the Minister of Defence to emphasise the unsatisfactory state of intelligence in Aden and Colonial Office representation on the Joint intelligence Staff.’ It was noted that the CO had not passed information on a crisis in Aden to the COS and the first COS heard of it was in a telegram from the British Defence Coordination Council (Middle East). He also noted that the CO had still not issued guidance to

\textsuperscript{304} TNA, CAB21/2923 Note to Lord Chancellor from D.A. Scott, Secretary to GEN485, 17 January 1956, Quotes Cabinet Paper (55) 89 and Cabinet Minute (55) 26\textsuperscript{th} Conclusion, Minute 6, Conclusion 5.

\textsuperscript{305} TNA, CAB21/2923 Note to Lord Chancellor from D.A. Scott, Secretary to GEN485, 17 January 1956, para. 3 (a), (b).

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid. Note to CWB Rankin, Lord Chancellor’s Office, from Commander John Eardley-Wilmot, Central War Plans, Cabinet Office, 12 April 1956

\textsuperscript{307} TNA,CO1035/1 Templer Report Security and Intelligence Aspects 1956. Minute on Colonial Office Representative on the Joint Intelligence Staff by Juxon Barton, Colonial Office, 2 January 1956; Minute on CO’s Circular despatch by Juxon Barton, CO, 2 January 1956; Minute to Sir Thomas Lloyd, PUS,CO, from C.Y. Carstairs AUS,CO, 21 January 1956.

governors on Local intelligence Committees (LIC) a year after the event. The CO issued Circular 458/56 on 28 April, presumably in response to this pressure. In July 1956 the appointment of DIGCP, DSIA, and police housing was still outstanding issues. These examples clearly show that the COS’ need for forewarning of emergencies in the empire was not being met even after the report. It also demonstrates how the personnel in the CO were continuing to hold on to their autonomy and practices. It is clear then that the context of the report was the centralisation of both administration and professionalization of the intelligence machinery under the auspices of the Cabinet Office and the JIC and that the CO was very isolated in Whitehall, facing a determined attack from the MOD, and the Service departments. The CO resisted the defence establishment and disputed the recommendations of the Templer Report although in practice much of the report codified existing practices rather than introducing new ones. The report’s recommendations and this resistance caused a run of correspondence which casts more light on the CO’s intelligence machinery and its relationship with other departments and the JIO and also the conflicts which had led to the setting up of the Committee on Security in the Colonies.

II

Interdepartmental differences and the co-ordination of the CO’s intelligence machinery into the British machinery:

In addition to the specific pressure of events on the defence establishment, there were also long term pressures leading to administrative centralisation. As government became increasingly complex, the role of the Cabinet Office in the British government was increasing for a number of reasons. The Cabinet Secretary had an overview of both policy and an understanding of the machinery involved. In certain cases he also acted as a committee chairman at official level and the Cabinet Office oversaw the implementation of the Cabinet’s decisions in Whitehall. The two Cabinet Secretaries in this period Sir Norman Brook (1947-62) and Sir Burke Trend (1963-1973) were both interested in intelligence work especially Trend.

309 TNA, CAB21/2923, Note from Eardley-Wilmot, Central War Plans, to Rankin, Lord Chancellor’s Office, 12 April 1956, Para 1 (a), (b) and Para 2.
Sir Norman Brook was particularly influential because he held a number of key roles in the civil service. These included the duties of Cabinet Secretary from 1947 and from 1956 the role of Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, and Head of the Civil Service. This combination of duties enabled him to facilitate intelligence activity. He was very close to the various Prime Ministers he served and consequently an important adviser at the highest level. The Cabinet Secretary had a number of roles in relation to intelligence activity. He was, for example, a member of the Permanent Under Secretaries’ Committee which controlled the allocation of funds to the intelligence services. Brook was involved in a range of intelligence related activities ranging from the selection of the Director General of the Security Service, Sir Dick White, to head the SIS in 1956 to the implementation of the national counter subversion programme in 1955-56. In 1956 his correspondence about the Official Committee on Counter Subversion demonstrates how he played off the various secretaries of state against one another and sought to settle the CO’s ruffled feathers whilst ensuring its integration into the wider British machinery.

The Cabinet Secretary and the Cabinet Office were responsible for the Cabinet Agenda, setting up Cabinet Committees and the official committees which serviced them and circulating paperwork between interested parties. Increasingly the Cabinet Office managed and oversaw organisations like the Defence Committee and the Colonial Policy Committee (later the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee). The Cabinet Office had become increasingly important as the British government was centralised as a means of transmitting Cabinet decisions to the departments of state and supervising their implementation. In the process it had become an increasingly important element in the British central intelligence machinery and after 1957 the JIO was included in its ambit. The Committee on Security in the Colonies’ was administratively supported by the Cabinet Office which supplied General Templer with a secretary, but the committee used the Ministry of Defence for other administrative support. This allowed the Cabinet Office to liaise with Templer and keep an eye on his work.

311 Ibid. pp.156,186
312 TNA, CO1035/116 Proposal by Harold Macmillan Foreign Secretary for directing counter-subversion in the colonies 1955-56. Minute Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 21 October 1955 para.3-4,7-8; Ibid. Minute Sir Norman Brook ,Cabinet Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 28 October, para.7-8.
Interdepartmental conflict after Templer report:

Apart from the JIC and the CO, other departments played a part in the process. The Cabinet and Cabinet Office had an interest in incorporating the CO into more co-ordinated government machinery. The Secretaries to the Committee on Security in the Colonies provided a commentary on the disputes between various departments as they co-ordinated the committee’s work which demonstrated the ongoing tensions. Their notes show the anti-CO attitude in the War Office, MOD, and COS. The notes also point to internal differences showing that the military establishment was not a monolithic entity.  

On 10 April 1956 Commander Eardley-Wilmot, Central War Plans, Cabinet Office, who acted as the Secretary to the Official Committee on the Military Implications of General Templer’s Report, wrote to C.W.B Rankin, Lord Kilmuir’s secretary in Lord Chancellor’s Office, discussing the need to wind up the Committee on Security in the Colonies more widely. Eardley-Wilmot voiced Whitehall’s negative opinion of the CO:

‘There is something to be said however, for the committee remaining in operation until the end of the century to ensure that the Colonial Office face up to their responsibilities. If the committee is wound up in six months time present indications are such as to justify the assumption that it would have to be reinaugurated in about three years as more colonies become the scene of strife owing to lack of intelligence and the wrong priorities.’

Whilst Eardley-Wilmot was a serving officer his views do not seem radically different to those expressed by D.A. Scott and Sir George Young suggesting that this was a widely held view in both the Cabinet Office and Whitehall more generally. All of the material demonstrates the desire to incorporate the CO intelligence activity with the British professional intelligence machinery.

313 TNA, CAB21/2922 Part 2 Discussion of the West India Regiment. Note to General Templer from Sir George Young, 17 February. ‘This seems to be the old story of Colonial Office failure to chase governors [...]’
314 TNA, CAB21/2923 Note to Rankin, Lord Chancellor’s Office, from Commander Eardley-Wilmot, Central War Plans, Cabinet Office, 12 April 1956, para 3.
The existence of the committee and the associated interdepartmental conflicts demonstrate that Whitehall was concerned with the CO’s handling of colonial affairs generally and there was pressure on the CO to integrate its activities more closely into a more co-ordinated approach.\footnote{CAB2923 Letter Commander Eardley- Wilmot, Central War Plans, Cabinet Office, from Rankin (for Financial Secretary), Treasury, 14 April 1956 refer to COS(39) 10 April 1956.} In this case the evidence relates primarily to intelligence and military forces, but there appear to have been wider interests. The existence of the Cabinet Committee on Security in the Colonies could be seen as an example of a tendency to centralise power under the Cabinet Office. It is interesting that the committee’s two secretaries both evinced an anti-CO feeling. This may reflect in part the secretaries’ appreciation of Templer’s views but there is also a sense that the CO simply did not respond to ordinary requests.

One of the major features of Templer’s report is that he criticised the CO’s conception of its own role. He saw the CO as an ‘information’ addressee and not as an ‘action’ addressee. It is clear from various comments that Templer had been made aware of the constitutional limitations of the role of the CO and the way in which it operated to ‘advise and caution’ rather than to ‘direct’ so his criticism reflected a criticism of its very constitutional role in Whitehall. For a soldier like Templer (and presumably for other Whitehall departments with the possible exception of the CRO) the constitutional limitations were difficult to accept. The conception of the role of the CO and its effects on the form of the intelligence machinery has already been discussed in previous chapters but here we see a graphic example of how this caused interdepartmental discord and made co-ordination of effort and information extremely difficult. Templer found it difficult to conceive how the CO’s system worked consequently he recommended structural changes.\footnote{TNA, CAB21/2925 Pt1, The Templer Report, Para. 42-45}

IV

The Recommendations of the Templer Report:

The CO and the JIC and JIO:

It is now necessary to turn to the relationship between the CO’s intelligence machinery and the JIC’s intelligence machinery. Prior to 1956 the CO had disseminated imperial information
and intelligence products in a number of different ways. The Secretary of State might, in important cases present information at cabinet meetings, information might be passed between officials from different departments either in committee or individually. The CO might pass information to the JIC but it was a constant complaint from the JIC that the CO didn't pass relevant information on. The CO had a long tradition of resistance to working with the JIC.

The decision to integrate the CO into the JIC system fully made sense in terms of ‘national objectives’ but it also affected the internal balance of power in Whitehall. If the JIC and COS gained power the CO lost it. The specifics of the reforms to the CO-JIC relationship were three fold. Firstly the CO was made a charter member of the JIC; i.e. the Secretary of State for Colonies had the right to place items on the agenda of the JIC. This presumably was to address the CO’s objection that it had no input to the JIC. The second two developments were more profound. The CO was requested to send permanent representatives to contribute to the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) at two levels. The first was the Heads of Section meeting at which various departments from across Whitehall had their input to the machinery and there was wide ranging discussion. The second was at the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) where representatives from the CO had the opportunity to contribute to drafting papers to be seen by the JIC itself.317 There were two parts to the JIS a senior team and a junior one. Both consisted of relatively junior military officers who wrote up submissions and prepared briefs for the JIC. The composition of the JIS (as well as its place in the COS’ machinery) ensured there was an institutional bias towards a military perspective within the JIC.

The JIC’s view of the CO on these points emerges through its correspondence with the COS whilst it was still a part of the COS machinery. The JIC produced a brief on the situation on 25 April 1956,’ Colonial Office Cooperation with the JIC: Brief on the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies’. The brief specifies the areas in which the CO was not cooperating with the JIC a year after the Templer Report. It also provides a sense of ‘tone ‘which is remarkable in a government document.

JIC dissatisfaction came through very clearly in Para. 7-8:

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317 TNA, CAB21/2933 Confidential Brief: Colonial Office Cooperation with the JIC: Brief on the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the colonies (Preliminary Brief from the JIC to Minister of Defence via Chairman COS 25 April 1956), para. 2-9.
’However representation is not enough. No matter how many Colonial Office representatives attend either of these meetings, nothing will be achieved unless there is a change of heart and a new approach to the concept of Joint Intelligence by the Colonial Office. There appear to be two basic faults:

(a) Failure to realise that cold war is global and simultaneous

It does not appear to be appreciated in the CO that what happens, say, in Egypt today, can happen in the Gold Coast tomorrow.

(b) Resentment of what is thought to be interference in their exclusive area of responsibility.

As a result their approach to Joint Intelligence work is dogmatic and insular. It is true they contribute but this generally consists of tabling a written statement on which they are not prepared to admit of discussion or amendment.

Para 8 Thus whilst the Colonial Secretary can rightly claim that his departments contribute, it cannot be said to co-operate in the work of the Joint Intelligence Organisation. Not only this in every possible way the Colonial Office seek to avoid the tabling of papers or discussion of subjects pertaining to the Colonial Territories with the Joint intelligence Structure and appear to make it a point of principle, when interdepartmental discussion of a colonial subject is inevitable, to do this specifically outside the Joint Intelligence organization. 318

Clearly the members of the JIC were not impressed with the CO’s position and wished matters to change. By implication the document also demonstrates the degree of autonomy and freedom held by the CO and its intelligence machinery outside of the Joint Intelligence Organisation. Tensions led to a conflict between the CO and the JIC between 1955 and 1957.

Rory Cormac has examined the situation from both the CO and JIC’s perspectives. 319 The difficulty with his explanation is that he approaches the situation from the teleological

318 Ibid. para. 7-8.
position that the JIC was the correct way forward in order to provide national intelligence co-
ordinating and analytical machinery for the United Kingdom. 320

‘These various channels of communication allowed the JIC to be kept updated of
colonial developments but notably did not allow the committee to take an active role.
The JIC was restricted merely to passive updates which somewhat negated the JIC’s
potential response in a situation where they were theoretically well placed to offer
useful input. Colonial disturbances and the subsequent counterinsurgency operations
often crossed the boundaries of traditional policy spheres by intersecting the foreign
and colonial policy domains, as well as the military and political, and the local and the
regional. The JIC, being inter-departmental committee assessing all-source intelligence,
was well placed to offer input on such issues that could not be resolved by the CO
alone.’ 321

By approaching the debate from the JIC’s position with a sense that the JIC did become the
national intelligence machinery he fails to fully appreciate the CO’s position or consider
whether or not the CO’s machinery had the capacity to fulfil the needs of the other
departments. The CO’s officials had been annoyed by pressure from the JIC and COS to
implement the recommendations of the Templer Report. 322 The CO was particularly annoyed
by the JIC’s military bias and concentration of communist subversion which the CO believed
did not do justice to the complexities of the colonial situation. 323 From the CO’s perspective
there was already a working system in place for transferring information and intelligence
which suited its own needs and was based on older precedents. It must be remembered that
CO officials were limited by both their perception of the CO’s constitutional role and
committed to maintaining the prestige and autonomy of the CO for a complex series of
reasons; political and social.

The Secretary of State for Colonies provided information to Cabinet and cabinet committees,
officials from geographical departments could communicate directly with those from other
departments or work in interdepartmental committees. When there were colonial crises the
traditional method was for the CO to act as the lead agency and to co-ordinate the overall

320 Ibid. p.251.
321 Ibid. p.251.
322 Ibid. p.254.
323 Ibid. p.254.
response from Whitehall. This generally occurred on a regional or individual colony basis and operational command of the situation, political, military, administrative, was generally delegated to that level. The passage of information followed this process. From this viewpoint the Cabinet Office was fundamentally a ‘secretariat’ for the Cabinet, rather than a ‘controller’ of subordinate specialist departments. The JIC was a specialised military intelligence committee to support the Chiefs of Staff, not head of ‘national’ intelligence machinery. 324

For the CO information collecting and processing was an intrinsic part of the administrative process rather than a specialised area of activity. The CO’s definitions of intelligence particularly ‘political intelligence’ demonstrated this. Templer described the conceptions of intelligence involved in the colonies but this had it has equal validity for the CO itself.

‘Briefly what is wrong with the existing “intelligence” reports is that they tend to be too much like Situation Reports, dealing with things that have happened instead of being forward-looking documents, dealing with what looks like happening next, and drawing the necessary conclusions. This has of course, been largely because those responsible for their production were primarily interested in political reporting, and not in the collection, appreciation and use of security intelligence. It is almost impossible to draw a hard line between political and security intelligence material and it is indeed the duty of Governors to combine the two in a balanced appreciation. The two streams should, as recommended in the Colonial Office paper (GEN485/5), be joined together as close to the source as possible; the security intelligence, provided by whatever source, should be considered in the light of the political intelligence produced by the representative of the Secretariat, or the Labour Department, or whatever it may be. , but there should be a clear distinction between “reports” which are primarily political and those which are primarily “intelligence”. At present the “Intelligence Report” is more often than not a “political monthly summary”; this is indeed more often than not this the LIC has been told to produce. This is wrong. The LIC product should be first and foremost an intelligence document; it should be kept quite separate from any monthly political summary the Governor may be called upon to produce. The LIC products should be

324 TNA, CO1035/1 Note C.Y. Carstairs, AUS, CO, to Sir Thomas Lloyd, PUS, CO, 12 May 1956; TNA, CO1035/1 Brief for the Secretary of State for the Colonies Undated, (late April early June 1956) Para 9. The paragraph provides a particularly clear explanation of the CO’s understanding of the role of the administrative intelligence machinery.
written for and received by, the new Intelligence Department of the CO (paragraphs 78-40; the political report would continue to be received by the geographical departments each would of course be copied to other departments.\textsuperscript{325}

The paragraph demonstrates major differences in the conception of intelligence between the CO and the rest of Whitehall which go to the heart of the difference between ‘administrative/political’ and ‘professional/security’ forms of intelligence and explains why the two were incompatible. The importance of degree of incompatibility is then further emphasised:

‘[… ] in the Colonial (and other) civil services […]”intelligence” is often considered being a narrow if sensational function of the police. The administration is apt not to concern itself closely with the machinery for its collection and appreciation, or with its relation to security in the broadest sense. As a result security intelligence has come to be regarded as a kind of spicy condiment added to the secretariat hot pot by a supernumerary and possibly superfluous cook, instead of being a carefully planned and expertly served dish of its own’ \textsuperscript{326}

In consequence of these beliefs the CO’s relationship with the JIC was passive: it issued a monthly review of intelligence; communicated directly with service directors of intelligence; and contributed to War Office (WO) situation reports. Its representative on the JIC could update JIC members, but frequently did not attend JIC Heads of Section meetings, meaning the updates were frequently delivered after the event.\textsuperscript{327} When pushed by the JIC, COS, and FO in 1956 the officials in the CO urged the Secretary of State to attack the JIC directly. It did not like being forced to reform, and in particular to introduce a new department, the ISD, by a JIC which it regarded as internally flawed.\textsuperscript{328} The CO regarded ISD as a department which affected the constitutional relationship between the CO and colonial governments.\textsuperscript{329} Templer’s criticism of the CO helps to explain the CO’s conception of intelligence, i.e. political administrative and the way in which the CO headed a hierarchy which lay outside

\textsuperscript{325} TNA, CAB21.2925 Pt.1., Templer Report, Para. 67
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid. Para. 42.
\textsuperscript{327} Rory Cormac, \textit{Whitehall Showdown}, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{328} TNA, CO1035/1 Templer Report: Intelligence and Security Aspects 1956.Minute to Sir Thomas Lloyd from CY Carstairs, 26 April 1956; Rory Cormac, \textit{Whitehall Showdown} p.254-256.
\textsuperscript{329} TNA, CAB130/108 Committee for Security in the Colonies, Minutes 27 June 1955 GEN485/4\textsuperscript{th} Meeting. Quoted in Rory Cormac, \textit{Whitehall Showdown}, p. 259.
the JIC’s area of authority. This was an attempt to push the professional security based organisations out of central policy and decision making.

Philip Davies also picks up on the differences between the CO and the central intelligence machinery. The Suez crisis of 1956 provided the impetus for change to the JIC’s role. The JIC remained a COS committee working through the Minister of Defence until 1957. The members of the JIC sought to move the JIC into the Cabinet Office to reach the right decision makers. There were however objections from the CO. In February 1956 Carstairs argued that the proposed change posed ‘complicated problems for his departments ‘His concern was that the Colonial Office already had him and his departments to handle political intelligence as it affected defence whilst a more general political intelligence was the affair of the political departments i.e. geographical departments of the CO.330 This would also mean the Cabinet Secretary would be able to influence matters even more partly through his membership of the PUSC on Intelligence.

IV

The CO’s Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) and the Foreign Office’s Permanent Undersecretary’s Department (PUSD):

Templer most important recommendation was that the CO should create two new departments: the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) and the Police Department to replace the single individual working in this area within the Defence Department. The structure of the ISD was to be based on the PUSD of the Foreign Office which handled liaison between the FO and the intelligence services.331 The analogy between the ISD and the PUSD is a very important one. It demonstrates that Templer either did not fully understand the implications of the CO’s role and information gathering system or that he wanted to utterly change it. The problem was that the FO and the CO were very different despite a superficially similar system of geographical and technical departments. The geographical department were the paramount analytical bodies incorporating both political and administrative intelligence. The CO did not have its own intelligence service providing core

330 TNA, CAB159/26 Organisation of Intelligence confidential Annex to JIC(57) 16th Meeting 16 February 1957 quoted in P.H.J. Davies Intelligence and Government Vol.2., pp.168-169. A Cabinet Office committee would compete with the CO’s own departmental judgements.

331 TNA, CAB21/2925, para. 74-80
information about it primary role. (Although it could use the Security Service they did not control it in the same was that the FO controlled the SIS). Because the empire was regarded as an extension of domestic territory it was only given security intelligence organisations which were very different to those providing external intelligence services. SIS was tasked by other departments whilst the Security Service was largely self tasking in Britain and only provided limited services in the empire in the form of advice, liaison and training. Finally it demonstrated a lack of understanding of the devolved nature of the core structure of the empire in which local issues were handled locally and the CO only intervened when matters were beyond local control. These differences meant the problem of controlling intelligence was very different in the two departments. It is necessary to look in detail at the differences between the two structures.

PHJ Davies, quoting the ‘Departmental Allocation of Work in Foreign Office 1955’ described the duties of the PUSD as:

' [...] maintain liaison with the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff; represent the Foreign Office on certain Inter Service Committees, in particular the Joint Intelligence and Joint Planning sub committees of the Chiefs of Staff. Coordinate exchange of scientific information. Provide the secretariat of the Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) which consists in the main of the Under Secretaries of the Foreign Office and has as its ongoing object to consider long-term questions of foreign policy and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State when appropriate [...]’ 332

The PUSD did the multiple duties of managing FO relations with the intelligence community. It represented the interests of the intelligence machinery in the FO. It also used intelligence to consider long term policy. The PUSD machinery consisted of sub committees working to the PUSC including C Committee, which handled SIS, and an overseas planning staff which took over the Russia Committee's paramilitary planning work.

The FO in this period had a much clearer focus than the CO. Its major conception of national interest was focussed on the Cold War and the threat of communism. Foreign intelligence was mainly focussed on this single and easily definable threat. By contrast the CO saw many

different local and regional threats in addition to the communist one and had other interests such as an interest in development which was not merely an adjunct to a counter subversion programme. The PUSD’s role in the integration of intelligence into policy in the FO was similar to those considered for the proposed PIS in the CO in 1948-49. In the CO the differences between regions and colonies meant that the Secretary of State and PUS were better off going directly to the geographical departments rather than dealing with a section simply collating material from those departments. Although the ISD compiled annual reviews of communism and other security trends and played a role in the reception and circulation of reports from the colonies there was no equivalent imperial interest. The FO focussed on communism but the CO had a much wider view of what affected ‘trends in empire’.

The PUSD authorised politically hazardous intelligence collection operations. The FO could veto such operations and this was vitally important after 1952 when covert operations carried out by SIS failed. In May 1952 approvals in principle were ended. ‘Requests for the approval of operations were made through the JIC Chairman as Supervising Under Secretary of the PUSD. PUSD cleared activity with FO geographical departments before submission to the Permanent Secretary. Originators had to certify the Chiefs of Staff already knew about the plans. An FO Adviser was established in the SIS to approve and supervise plans there. By contrast until the later stages of empire operational decisions were made at local level in the colonial government because it was their resources which were being used. They could seek advice from the CO but were generally left to get on with it. Clearly given the size of the empire direct control of the operational level of activity on a global scale would have been a major task for any department in the CO.

It is important to distinguish between the PUSD’s duties and those of the JIC. The JIC could receive intelligence reports direct from the SIS. The PUSD liaised between the Foreign Office and the Secret Intelligence Service and its structures. The PUSD funded SIS and approved or passed for approval certain operations. It acted as a ‘cut out’ between covert activity and the bureaucracy of the FO. The PUS also sat with other PUS’ on the Permanent Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security (PSIS). It seems that the PUSD also

334 Ibid. pp.49-51, 58. This committee answered to the Ministerial Committee on Security and Intelligence. It was chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and eventually included the Chairman of the JIC, Intelligence Coordinator, Permanent Secretaries of the FCO, Defence, Home Office, and Treasury. Although it was above the JIC it
passed intelligence reports from SIS to other departments in the Foreign Office. By contrast the CO tended to combine aspects of the JIC and PUSD’s role in its own internal management structure based on the geographical departments.

It is necessary to consider the allocation of duties to the ISD and its successors over the period in order to chart the approach taken by the CO to these issues. The allocation of duties to the ISD was described in the Colonial Office List. It is apparent that they changed over time as intelligence police and defence duties of the office were combined in different ways. In 1956 the ISD was to provide general guidance to Colonial Governments on handling of liaison with security intelligence bodies in the UK and protective security except in the CO. In 1958 intelligence from colonial territories, intelligence organisations in colonial territories were added. In 1959 it became the Intelligence, Police and Security Department (IPSD).

From 1959-1960 the IPSD’s duties included: intelligence organisations and security training in colonial territories; colonial police questions, civil defence, liaison with the Home Office on police matters, emergency regulations; liaison with security and intelligence bodies in UK, protective security except in the CO; general liaison with military authorities. In 1961 liaison with HO on police matters and protective security were added.

In 1962-1963 IPSD and Defence departments were merged into the Defence, Intelligence, and Security Department (DISD) whose duties were: ‘intelligence and security matters in colonial territories, colonial police questions, civil defence, emergency powers, and liaison with security and intelligence bodies in the UK. General liaison with military authorities on colonial intelligence, colonial defence, colonial forces, military flights over colonies, visiting forces, colonial military legislation, military land, Overseas Defence Committee, censorship, war histories, and disarmament.

In 1964-65 DISD became the Defence Intelligence and Hong Kong Department (DIHK). They continued with the duties above but added security aspects of immigration and travel control, liaison with Chiefs of Staff and Joint Planning Staff, Hong Kong, civil defence,

seldom convened and thus was most important when setting budgets which was responsible for funding the secret vote overall.

liaison with security and intelligence bodies in UK disarmament. The addition of ‘geographical duties for the colony of Hong Kong may suggest either that the departments was seen as less important or reflect the fact that Hong Kong had major signals intelligence facilities which were tied into GCHQ. Finally in 1965 it was renamed the Defence and Intelligence Department (DI).

Although no doubt incomplete, these allocations of duties demonstrate some of the differences between PUSD and ISD in practice. The ISD was focussed on security intelligence issues. It had much wider liaison duties than the PUSD because it the CO did not 'own' the Security Service. Its personnel did not exclusively handle CO representation in the British intelligence machinery with other departments; these could be handled by geographical departments as well. It handled intelligence material. It is interesting that despite the changes of name and allocations of duty over time it was still being referred to as ISD colloquially in the department throughout suggesting that there was a core element which remained identifiably the same.

The CO, the Security Service, the FO, and the SIS:

The relationship between the Security Service and the CO was not the same as that between SIS and the FO. The FO had direct responsibility for the Secret Intelligence Service in a way that was very different to the Security Service’s relationship with the CO. The FO provided the chairman of the JIC. It had responsibility for Britain's overseas relationships with independent countries and it largely relied upon diplomacy and influence which made its role more difficult than that of the CO in colonial territories where a degree of co-operation from the colonial security apparatus might be expected. The FO and the SIS had an active role in the Cold War from the beginning. Bevin had approved active measures against the Soviet Union in Special Operations (SO), Special Political Action (SPA), propaganda and a number of other areas. The FO was in consequence directly involved in planning and approving paramilitary operation and counter subversion operations against foreign states. It controlled the Information Research Department (IRD) which was actively involved in creating in creating black, grey and white propaganda with the SIS. In other words it had a role in the direct management of such activity. By contrast the CO relied upon the colonial governments

to use their police, military forces, information services and administration to carry out any campaigns. Colonial governments retained a degree of autonomy about how they did this. Secondly the CO did not directly control or task the Security Service. It did not need to finance all of its operations directly. Security Service operational assets could be managed by colonial governors with minimal problems. They worked within formal government structures reducing the overall political risks. Their main role was to provide advice, liaison and training; whilst operations were carried out by local Special Branches. The Security Service’s approach was not generally risky so the ISD was more concerned with liaison than control. Because the CO had a world view which stressed the ‘local nature’ of most threats it generally did not see it as necessary to contemplate centrally organised global campaigns such as the ones which the British government started to develop against communism. Despite its views the CO became increasingly involved in Counter-Subversion but in practice it did not have its own machinery. Technical/specialised input was received from the IRD for example. Therefore ISD had less of a managerial role than the PUSD.

The use of the PUSD as an example to be copied in the CO raised difficulties because of the differences between the departments. Did Templer merely mean to give the CO an organisation which could be a ‘one stop’ organisation on intelligence matters providing advice, liaison, training and possibly some degree of assessment or did he have a wider ambition? Did he simply misunderstand the role of the PUSD and the CO and fail to see that the departments would need to be very different? Was the CO to conduct operations as a proxy for the central organisations or was it merely to be made more effective in managing its own intelligence machinery? Was it possible that he envisaged the CO developing a much more active role in counter subversion? Templer was interested in subversion and counter subversion and acutely aware of the limited military resources available. Certainly in his report he rails against the passivity of the CO in the empire generally and part of his intention was to make it easier to ‘act’ in security and intelligence matters.

There is evidence of the CO’s machinery being adapted for counter-subversion. Templer had suggested grouping particular departments under a single AUS and this appears to have been implemented. An examination of the 1955 organisational table could be interpreted as creating a central core of organisations capable of implementing some centrally controlled approach to global communism similar to that in the FO. Templer had suggested that the CO place the Defence, Police and ISD under a single Assistant Under Secretary of State
In 1955 the AUS responsible for these departments also obtained responsibility for Information Services in the Colonial Office. The result was that the CO ended up with an organisation which looks as if it could have been designed to facilitate counter-subversion. Confirmation of this suspicion however must wait upon examination of the files of the CO’s Information Services.

At the same time it is clear at this time that the CO was being integrated into greater Cabinet structures dealing with counter-subversion. In 1956 the decision to create an Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies showed how the CO was being integrated. Although it was under the general control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies the CO was forced to accept membership from the FO, CRO and the intelligence services whilst the FO was allowed to have its own committee with no intervention from other departments. There was also an intention to integrate the committees by using the same personnel. Brook had hoped that Dean who had a number of other roles would be Chairman but recognised that this would upset the CO so he took over the Chairmanship himself thus lessening the CO’s role whilst leaving the Secretary of State a ‘fig leaf’ of control.

The other clear influence on Templer’s ideas of how intelligence should be managed came from his time in military intelligence as a consumer, as Director Military Intelligence, and from his time as High Commissioner in Malaya. In Templer’s eyes the ISD was supposed to operate in clear command hierarchy dealing with ‘security’ intelligence particularly ‘forewarning of threat’. Cormac comments on how Templer’s acceptance of dual threats, local nationalism and the possibility of Russian intervention in its support but in practice Templer slipped into a concentration on the larger communist threat.

**Differences between the ISD and PIS:**

The Intelligence and Security departments also seems to be a different concept to the Political Intelligence Section (PIS) which had been proposed in 1948-49 and again in 1953. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 there were a number of different views about the role of the proposed PIS. The main idea however was to have a section receiving information relevant

338 TNA, CAB21/2925 Templer Report, para. 78.
to empire from elsewhere in Whitehall and to process this a way which helped to develop
colonial policy i.e. in a way it was a little like an internal JIC. Other views saw it as a body
for collating intelligence from empire for the benefit of ministers and the rest of Whitehall. It
might have been conceived as a small study body reporting direct to ministers or as a
collating cell but there no mention in the discussion of liaison with British intelligence and
security bodies or management of colonial intelligence as a whole, which were probably seen
as being the responsibility of the Defence Department in its various incarnations.

VI

The Templer Report, the CO, and the Security Service:

The Security Service had a direct responsibility to the Secretary of State for Colonies for the
provision of advice liaison and training through the provision of staff to colonial
governments. The relationship between the CO and the Security Service took place at two
levels. In Whitehall the CO liaised directly with the Security Service on imperial matters. All
departments in the CO could approach it directly on matters of concern.

In 1954 before the Templer Report a Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA) from the Security
Service had been appointed to the CO whose task was to travel the empire inspecting colonial
intelligence machinery and providing advice and liaison Templer recommended that this
system was strengthened by giving the SIA a number of deputies (DSIA) to improve his
capacity. The appointment of the SIA was very important because it placed a Security
Service officer inside the CO itself and gave the Security Service the opportunity to
implement its professional agenda in both the CO and the colonial governments. This
development might almost be described as a professional colonisation of the CO’s own
intelligence machinery. Yet the appointment of the SIA does not seem to have generated the
opposition inside the CO that the Templer Report’s recommendations and JIC’s ideas did.
Perhaps this was because the Security Service had a duty to the CO.

Templer made recommendations on the role of the Security Service in the empire. He made
specific recommendations about the role of the Security Liaison Officers (SLO) when
supporting colonial governments. He advocated a model of intelligence machinery in each
colony where the Security Service would supply a Director of Intelligence (DofI). This
appears to have fallen flat in part because the Security Service did not have the manpower to supply every colony with such a figure and because the costs would have to have been born by individual colonies. Nonetheless certain colonies did adopt such a position. This was a complex area and there was a considerable debate about the role of the DofI which had originated in Malaya. He discussed the role of the SLOs and advocated that they be developed into ‘Security Service Representatives’ (SSR) with a more interventionist role, actively advising Governors on intelligence matters. Whilst these were not adopted the SLOs did become progressively more important where they existed. There were however, some surprising omissions such as British Guiana which was managed by the SLO from Trinidad.

It is clear that he was advocating the Security Service’s view of what constituted good practice, in the colonies. Indeed the appointment of the SIA and the adoption of the Kenya model machinery demonstrated the success of direct Security Service intervention in the CO’s organisation. It is interesting however that the Security Service was partially effective because its intervention was framed in a way which reflected existing practice in the CO; the SIA was an Adviser and there was precedent. The advisory post of PA/IGCP had been a relatively recent creation which directly influenced the creation of the SIA. It is clear that Templer agreed with these reforms since he used it to produce the standard model he recommended in his report.

VII

The Police Department:

Templer also recommended the creation of a police department to improve the quality of colonial police forces. The CO’s police professionalization agenda was important because the police formed the matrix in which the Special Branch, the colonial professional intelligence machinery, sat and from which its personnel were largely recruited. Prior to Templer, police matters had been handled in the Defence Department and predominantly by the Police Adviser/ Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP). The IGCP was merely an adviser although making him a ‘director’ of the police service had been discussed in 1948-49. It was decided that a central director of colonial police was unconstitutional because of the role of the colonial governments and local governors. The IGCP toured the empire inspecting forces on a triennial basis. He made a report on each which was submitted to both the Governor and
the CO geographical departments concerned. The Governor decided on what recommendations to implement after consideration of local finances. The geographical departments then corresponded with both and the whole process could take years.

**Existing trends in the development of police forces:**

A colonial police model started to emerge. Whilst there was a long term trend in official thinking in the CO which wanted to move towards British/Metropolitan practices it was recognised that colonial policing operated in a violent context. Armed paramilitary groups were recommended in most colonies i.e. forces were generally armed, but they also contained specialist bodies organised along military lines and equipped with transport, communications, and heavier weapons like the General Service Unit in Kenya. Special Branches were seen as a way of managing political violence although surprisingly not all colonies possessed them.

The CO had created a Colonial Police Service in 1936, based presumably on the Indian model, in which expatriate gazetted officers became part of a service under the control of the Secretary of State. After the appointment of the PA /IGCP this system was used to gain control over the appointment and promotion of senior officers. The system gave the CO an important tool for controlling police development and for minimising the local control of police forces on technical matters. Technical channels also favoured the development of Whitehall centralisation since they bypassed the administrative machinery with its loyalties to the CO. No equivalent of the discretionary HO grant, which was such a potent tool for centralisation, existed for colonial police forces but after the Second World War the CO sometimes used colonial development funds and later special subventions from the Treasury to reform police forces when the colonial governments did not have the necessary resources. The CO corresponded with the HO over police reforms. It recruited British officers to inspect colonial forces with the assistance of the HO. These developments were intended to fix what Templer described as ‘lack of intelligence mindedness’. Templer specifically described the process of receiving and collating information in the geographical departments and then circulating it to subject departments and finally reabsorbing it. This process was exceptionally slow and meant that even though advisers had tried to reform colonial institutions that it could take years before the appropriate course of action were recommended.
One of the ways in which the colonial police model was promulgated was by visits of inspection by experienced police officers acting as police advisers (PA). The first permanent PA appointed in 1948 was appointed to improve the efficiency of the police in internal security roles. The IGCP and the new SIA seemed to work harmoniously at a professional level. The IGCPs role in security intelligence did not entirely disappear when the SIA was appointed in 1955. There were some tensions. Sir Thomas Lloyd and Sir Charles Jeffries both would have preferred the Kenyan review to be carried out by the Metropolitan Special Branch in liaison with the Home Office whilst the Governor preferred in the end to ask for Security Service support. The ICGCP had an important influence over intelligence development because had responsibility for selecting expatriate police officers for appointments in the colonies although he did consult with the SIA on Special Branch appointments. As a career manager his views had weight with ambitious colonial police officers. He had an increasing input to training. As an inspector and training planner he could shape ‘good practice’.

Templer’s decision to model the CO’s Police Department on the HO’s Police Department raises more questions. The Home Secretary in England had three powers. Firstly he had the power of the purse; English and Welsh police force received half their budges from central government when they were adjudged to be ‘efficient by His Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary (HMI). The HO also controlled the HMI who made the necessary inspection. The HO could also make regulations covering discipline, terms of service, and pensions. This was an interesting precedent. Scholarship about the development of the British police tends to suggest that the HO consistently sought to centralise control of the police from the nineteenth century. This was achieved in a number of ways. Firstly the HO controlled the discretionary element of police budgets and the process of inspection by HMI of Constabulary which determined ‘efficiency’. The HO had partial control of the purse. Secondly the HO started to consult directly with police commanders on matters of state security, avoiding the watch committees. Systems for police forces to support each other in

the event of mass unrest existed prior to the First World War and such measures were extended during it. The HO could alter police structures in war time and these reforms, which generally reduced the number of police forces, generally remained in force afterwards. War planning created direct links between Chief Constables and central government imposed administrative districts or regions to deal with war time regulations. Between the wars the HO also acted to encourage the development of shared resources such as wireless stations and forensic activity and the HO directly controlled the Metropolitan Police and consequently the Special Branch. Indeed for a short time after the First World War they set up a HO Directorate of Intelligence which directly competed with the Security Service. If Templer fully understood the nature of the HO’s Police Department then it seems he wanted the CO’s Police Department to centralise control of the colonial police in administrative and logistical ways. This would improve police morale and loyalty and make it a more effective force for carrying out security duties. In 1956 the duties of the CO’s Police department were: General Colonial Police questions including relations between Police and Administration; problems affecting police forces in constitutionally advanced territories; civil defence. In 1957 liaison with Home Office on police matters was added and in 1958 colonial police questions, civil defence liaison with Home Office on police matters and emergency regulations. In 1959 it was merged into the Intelligence, Police and Security Department.

VIII

The CO and the collecting end:

Templer’s report not only discussed the change needed in the CO itself but also laid out a standardised model for the colonial intelligence machinery. The model consisted of a Local Intelligence Committee (LIC) to replicate the function both managerial and in terms of assessment-making to advise the Governor and a Special Branch to carry out collection. The LIC replicated the functions of the JIC in Britain and provided assessment for the colonial government and managed intelligence gathering within the colony. This was sometimes supported but not always by a series of lower level committees which matched those of the administrative and police hierarchy. These normally were developed at District and
Provincial level. Each of the lower level committees was associated with the local war executive committee where an insurgency existed but were intended to act as collection points and fusion cells and in which information needed for local activity was collected and other information passed up to the central intelligence committee.

The development of the colonial intelligence machinery has been much more frequently discussed in scholarly work but there appear to be some specific points about Templer’s reforms which were to have a special effect on the CO. Firstly the new machinery was designed to produce information suitable for Whitehall management of the security problem rather than for the CO or colonial government’s management. The LIC’s reports focussed on the military need for forecasting political development. As such they represented a major change in the purpose of the intelligence machinery. This was a direct attack on the role and form of the machinery the CO and the colonial governments advocated. The new reports met the needs of the COS and to a lesser extent the needs of the JIC. It also represented a strengthening of the ‘professional’ intelligence machinery with its police and security bias and thus altered the internal balance of the various elements within the CO itself. Finally standardising the intelligence products used on a regular basis (and it must not be forgotten that there were other products such as ‘studies’ which have not survived) tended to focus their content in a specific way.

These LICs were manned by Colonial Service and Colonial Police personnel for the most part, with the occasional SLO or Director of Intelligence from the Security Service and the British armed forces. This composition allowed the CO to resist reform to some extent. Governors like Hugh Foot for example bypassed the LIC by submitting their own reports to the CO in advance of the LIC ones.

Administrators tried to retain primacy over the proceedings but were limited because of the tendency to rely more and more upon the local SB for information especially as the administrative staff was indigenised. The SB was the subject of Security Service training courses and advice which tried to make them separate from the CO and in some ways independent. The Colonial Service was also very short of manpower so the ideal of attaching a long term administrative officer trained by the Security Service, as secretary to the LIC, was not often achieved. This may have left more and more of the business of these committees in the hands of intelligence professionals. It is interesting that not only were SB
officers circulated around empire on posting but that many of the more able one s were absorbed into the Security Service.

More and more information was gathered through Special Branches as the specialists in ‘security’ information and it became more and more important as indigenisation grew- this meant that the information reaching the CO for its various purposes was becoming more security orientated. Templer was much more specific about what the ideal form of a SB should be. Previous guidance had asked colonial governments to create SBs rather than relying upon CIDs to perform political duties. Here there was a clash of models, practices, and language of which it is necessary to be careful. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch (the main model) had existed within the CID. Indian Police CIDs had had either a political section or a SB within the CID (there was a range of variations). The Security Service’s preferred option, which had emerged out of the Malayan experience, was a SB completely separated from the CID in terms of its personnel, command arrangements, and physical location. When Templer spoke about SBs he meant a separate agency under its own Assistant Commissioner of Police reporting directly to the commissioner yet, and this is the strange part, the control of these duties was still considered to be a police activity. The Security Service model was not exported but it is not entirely clear why. In England the Security Service used the SB to make arrests and to carry out some of the investigations although its B Branch also had investigators and intelligence officers who ran agents. The Security Service model had only been exported to Malaya in 1938-39 largely to prepare for the security issues which were likely to occur as a result of war.

The Head of Special Branch’s duties were not mentioned directly but he had a seat on the LIC and did not necessarily report operationally through the commissioner of police. He was responsible for the internal working of the Special Branch itself and under the Templer model he must have been considered the conduit for implementing the LIC's targets. Presumably however he also had considerable input to the targeting process. The police, as a uniformed force, seem to have been more security intelligence ‘minded’ and were to play a large part in creating the kind of products Templer wanted.

Finally Templer targeted the administrators who traditionally had an anti intelligence bias. This was not true of all, some individuals, such as the Chief Secretary of Palestine, Sir John Shaw, were intelligence minded from practical experience, but many were relatively liberal
and disliked security activity. Templer recommendations about the relationship between the LIC and Governor meant that the professionals had a voice in intelligence matters and could submit dissenting reports to the governor and administrators. Templer also wanted administrators serving as secretaries of LICs to undergo specialised training with the Security Service although this was not always possible. The LIC system thus became a way of impressing intelligence mindedness on colonial governments.

Once Templer reforms were formally circulated to colonial governments in Circular 458/56 dated 28 April 1956, the main shape of the colonial intelligence model had been established and only minor development was considered. Further Circilars modified the basic system by instituted additional reports such as Periodical Reviews of Local Intelligence which essentially assessed the local priority of threats.\(^{345}\) There were also modifications to the system to incorporate military intelligence officers into the overall machinery.\(^{346}\)

**Conclusion:**

The Templer Report was initiated as a result of a number of different pressures including interdepartmental conflicts and events. The armed forces and FO were able to force the CO to adopt a similar definition of intelligence but there reforms were not completely adopted and CO resistance continued. Some of the reforms demonstrated that the initiators did not understand either the role or the internal workings of the CO. They wished the CO to adopt a very different role which fitted in with their own view of what it should do. When recommendations were made they often failed to fully understand the administrative context in which they would have to operate as the role formation of the ISD demonstrated clearly.

Templer’s recommendations were not entirely new; they drew upon the collective experience of the Security Service and the colonial police. They were intended to change the intelligence system from one which suited the CO to one which suited the rest of Whitehall. This included integrating the CO hierarchy of machinery into the hierarchy headed by the JIC altering the

\(^{345}\) TNA,CO1035/149 Periodical Reviews of Local Intelligence 1963-65, Circular 64/60 22 January 1960, Periodical Reviews of Local Intelligence; Circular 60/65 15 February 1965; Circular 169/65 14 April 1965; Circular 248 15 June 1965.

\(^{346}\) TNA,CO1035/156 Employment of Military Intelligence Officers 1963-65 Circular 980 1 November 1961 The Intelligence and Security Aspects of Emergency Planning; Terms of Reference for Military Intelligence Officers in the Colonial territories ISD 55/165/03; Circular 129/64 Intelligence in Internal Security Operations, 23 March 1964; Note by J.P, Morton SIA, CO, 30 August 1963.
balance between the professional intelligence element and the administrators in both the colonial governments and the CO. Templer was driven by his professional experience and the needs of the military establishment which shaped his personal view of the purpose of the machinery.

New problems, however, were developing as the machinery was prepared to perform two roles after colonial independence. Firstly it had to provide internal security for the new state it supported and secondly it had to continue to provide the British with information relative to its national interests and Cold War problems. This had to be achieved during a handover process which the British needed to control until the last possible minute. The process of handover will be the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 4

The development and hand over of the ‘imperial’ intelligence machinery 1956-1966

The Colonial Office, Whitehall, the British and colonial intelligence machinery:

After 1957 the Colonial Office (CO) continued to resist intelligence reform but in a more muted way. The CO was gradually incorporated into a more centralised colonial policy which incorporated more of the intelligence produced by British professional intelligence machinery. The main focus for the development of the intelligence machinery had changed. It was now to develop machinery to secure British intelligence needs in the longer term, to prevent communist intervention in the colonies, and to secure local governments from communist subversion rather than providing information to enable the CO to supervise colonial governments. These aims had to be implemented by developing processes for handing over the machinery and by creating British machinery to deal with British needs. During the transitional phase of decolonisation it was necessary to modify the intelligence machinery at all levels and responsibility for British intelligence needs moved between a number of agencies. During this period the security elements of the CO now advocated intelligence ‘models’ whilst the civil sections continued to seek to limit and modify them.

During decolonisation the intelligence machinery had to be prepared for handover to the successor state. The British also had to ensure ongoing intelligence liaison and this required modification of structures. This process was complicated by a number of factors. There were changes in the British professional intelligence machinery to reflect changes in the British administrative structure which included the amalgamation of the Colonial Office (CO), Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), and Foreign Office (FO) into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) by 1968. The British professional intelligence machinery was also affected by professional and technical changes. Both affected the development of the imperial intelligence machinery and provided a developing context for its development. Finally the CO and the rest of Whitehall became progressively more directly involved in the management of the colonial intelligence machinery. Special intelligence machinery was created to parallel that due to be handed over to ease the process of handover and maintain control until the last possible minute. The first section will deal with developments in the
British administrative and professional intelligence machinery and consider its implications on the process of intelligence management. The CO (and its successors) and the Security Service had to work out a standardised process for handover of the local intelligence machinery. This was different in ‘friendly’ and ‘hostile’ decolonisation processes. The chapter will examine the ‘friendly’ process in Ceylon, Malaya, and Gold Coast, the complex and less friendly handover in Northern Rhodesia, and the hostile handover in British Guiana from the perspective of the CO and Whitehall. Finally the chapter will examine how the process of handover in British Guiana had much wider implications for understanding the development of the imperial machinery.

I

The development of the British administration and British intelligence machinery:

As the administration in Whitehall developed there was a re-arrangement of the British machinery for dealing with intelligence matters. The gradual absorption of the CO and CRO via the Commonwealth Office into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) led to different approaches to intelligence collection. The FO, the dominant partner in the merger, had its own intelligence history, approaches, and precedents which were firmly entrenched in the British professional machinery such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and SIS. Intelligence co-ordination and management at a national level however was increasingly moving to the Cabinet Office. This office had its own approach, shaped in part by the personalities of the Cabinet Secretaries Sir Norman Brooke and Sir Burke Trend. The Cabinet Office (CAB) machinery was developed into three interlocking hierarchies: intelligence; policy; and planning. In 1957 the JIC was integrated into the Cabinet Office machinery. With administrative amalgamation the membership of the JIC changed; the CO lost its seat on amalgamation with the CRO in 1966 and later the Commonwealth Office (which had had a predominantly diplomatic focus and thus some synergy with the FO) lost its seat in 1968 to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in which the former FO’s influence was predominant. The process continually lessened the residual influence of the CO’s officials and their specific worldview. This meant that over time the imperial machinery reported to different bodies in the British administrative machinery although in practice the CO personnel dealing with intelligence matters moved to the Commonwealth Office and the
Security Service took back the SIA but kept him dealing with the same duties providing a greater degree of continuity than might be expected.

**The centralisation of the intelligence and policy making in the Cabinet Office:**

The thesis has already examined the role of the Cabinet Office in relation to the Templer Report and accepted Cormac’s argument about the way in which the CO played a part in causing the JIC to move from the Chief of Staff (COS) machinery to the Cabinet Office machinery in 1957. The move made the JIC more responsive to civil departments and a maker of national rather than military assessments. The JIC continued to build its influence over the colonial machinery by providing technical advice and liaison. Very soon after 1957 the Cabinet Office intelligence and policy making machinery was reformed which gave the Cabinet Office an even more powerful position in the British machinery.  

By the mid 1950s Cabinet Office contained three interlocking hierarchies for intelligence, security and policy making.

At the top of the intelligence hierarchy was a Ministerial Intelligence Committee. Under this were the Permanent Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security Services (PSIS). PSIS was chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. Under this came the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) and the JIC secretariat. The FO chaired the JIC. Both the CO and the CRO had seats on the JIC along with Defence and the intelligence services. In 1965 the JIC Charter was again amended by Sir Burke Trend.

The security machinery consisted of the Ministerial Committee on Security supported by an Official Committee on Security (S (O)). The official committee had representatives of the Home Office, FO and Defence and JIC members (including Security Service and SIS). It was chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and attended after 1968 by the Intelligence Coordinator.

The policy machinery consisted of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee from October 1963 (formed from an amalgamation of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committees), consisted of a ministerial committee supported by an Official Committee on

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Overseas Policy and Defence (OPD (O)). The ministerial committee was chaired by the Prime Minister and the Official Committee by the Cabinet Secretary.\textsuperscript{350} There was an Overseas and Defence Policy Staff. The chairman of the JIC sat on OPD (O) as did the Intelligence Coordinator from 1968.\textsuperscript{351} Under this was the Joint Action Committee to deal with covert paramilitary operations.\textsuperscript{352}

The Cabinet Secretary worked closely with the Prime Minister and was able to intervene in a large number of areas. This was one of the most important informal factors in causing the growth of the Cabinet Office’s influence. Both Sir Norman Brook\textsuperscript{353} and Sir Burke Trend\textsuperscript{354} were powerful and well informed figures personally interested in the intelligence machinery. The Cabinet Secretary chaired various pivotal committees including: the Permanent Secretaries Intelligence and Security Committee (PSIS) committee, which financed and later from 1968 set intelligence priorities at a national level; the Official Committee on Security, S(O), which performed the same function for security matters. The Intelligence Coordinator appointed in 1968 was a Cabinet Office official.

As the policy making activity of the British government was centralised the Cabinet Secretaries and the Cabinet machinery had more influence over colonial activity. Sir Norman Brook served on the Official Committee on Communism Overseas and chaired the Colonial Policy Committee and the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies amongst many others.\textsuperscript{355} This development shows how Cabinet Office influence waxed whilst that of other departments waned. Tom Bower argued that many senior officers in the Civil Service such as the PUS of the Home Office, Sir Frank Newsam, took little direct interest in the activity of the intelligence machinery preferring to deal with the machinery at arm’s length.\textsuperscript{356}

\textsuperscript{352} P.H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence and the Machinery of Government, pp. 35-37.
\textsuperscript{353} Tom Bowers, The Perfect English Spy, pp. 161.
\textsuperscript{356} Tom Bowers, The Perfect English Spy, pp. 146-7.
The integration of the CO and CRO and their intelligence machinery:

There were a number of changes in the Colonial and Cabinet Offices in this period which may have affected the CO’s approaches to intelligence work. The Cabinet Secretary changed from Sir Norman Brook to Sir Burke Trend in 1962. There were three Colonial Secretaries in the key period: Macleod from October 1959-October 1961; Maudling from October 1961 to July 1962; and Sandys from July 1962- October 1964. Macleod was a centrist and ‘supported decolonisation. Sandys was of the conservative right and a staunch anti-communist and, as the situation in Aden demonstrated, was inclined to interventionism. Ministerial enthusiasms were however limited by the permanent officials. The Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) of the CO changed in this period from Sir John Macpherson August 1956-August 1959 to Sir Hilton Poynton from 1959 August to 1963. Both were long term CO officials familiar with its policies and likely to have kept departmental world views alive.

The machinery for dealing with colonial affairs at departmental level was also undergoing alteration and development. The Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) took over the duties of the Colonial Office (CO) as colonies came to self government. During the period of self government both departments undertook liaison to smooth the transition. The relationship between the two departments was acrimonious, particularly in relation to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Discussions about a potential amalgamation of the CO and CRO started as early as 1954 but did not come to fruition until 1966 with the creation of the Commonwealth Office.357 In addition certain activities were handed from the CO to the Department of Technical Development, later the Ministry of Overseas Development. In 1966 when the CO and the CRO were amalgamated into the Commonwealth Office the problem was handled by dividing the new office into two divisions the Commonwealth and Dependent Territories Divisions.358 The amalgamation of departments of state altered the context in which the imperial intelligence machinery operated. Firstly the amalgamations changed the ‘traditional’ departmental approaches to colonial and intelligence policy. Secondly the intelligence structures themselves were altered necessitating amendment of channels of communication and the hierarchy in which information was passed, collated, and analysed.

As previously discussed the CO had headed its own semi-autonomous intelligence hierarchy until 1956 when it was incorporated more closely into the British machinery as a ‘Charter Member’ of the JIC. Even after this, the CO was still prone to be ‘difficult’ about colonial affairs with other departments in Whitehall and with foreign powers like the United States.  

The CO needed to work more closely with the CRO as colonies moved to self government. This change resulted in the incorporation of the CRO more firmly into the British intelligence machinery. The CRO obtained a seat on the JIC in 1955. The internal structure of the CRO was essentially ‘functional’ rather than ‘geographical’. Traditionally it had dealt with intelligence matters by receiving despatches from Governors and Governors General. During the interwar years it started to receive despatches from the network of British High Commissioners and information from direct liaison with dominion High Commissioners appointed to London. The CRO’s intelligence machinery was split over a number of areas. The CRO's Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Divisions dealt with the foreign and internal affairs of the dominions respectively. Military issues, and later liaison with the Joint Intelligence Organisation, were handled by the Defence and Principal Staff Officer’s Departments. Communism and the Trades Unions were dealt with firstly in Political Affairs until 1953-54 when they became the responsibility of the, oddly named, Communications Department led by Cyril Grove Costley-White. As mentioned previously this probably grew out of the section set up in 1948 by Sir William Jenkin.

Communism was a major area of interest because of the Cold War. Costley-White corresponded with the British High Commissioners over matters such as the distribution of IRD propaganda and about Britons spying for Russia in Australia. The CRO seems to have operated on the behalf of the FO in these matters. In the case of Australia the British High Commissioner spoke directly to the Minister of External Affairs R.G. Casey and the Prime Minister’s Department. Costley-White was very anti SIS and was apparently a very

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difficult individual, perhaps because of pain from a medical condition which kept him in a wheel chair.\textsuperscript{364} The CRO was very pro ‘Commonwealth’ and consequently supported the Attlee Doctrine which meant the Security Service was the lead intelligence agency and SIS was kept out of the dominions.\textsuperscript{365}

This particular development meant that between 1956/7 when the first colonies achieved self government and 1966 when the CO was absorbed, the responsibility for intelligence machinery and duties at the ‘receiving end’ were split between two competing departments and then between two divisions of the same department. The way in which the intelligence functions were amalgamated in the new Commonwealth Office is unclear. It is probably that the various elements simply continued to exist as they stood given the very short time before the Commonwealth Office was amalgamated with the FO, but now worked within a single departmental structure. The CO retained the Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA), and his deputy and the Inspector General of Colonial Police /Police Adviser (IGCP) who by this stage worked out of a department which combined defence, police, and intelligence duties which had responsibility for liaison with the British machinery.\textsuperscript{366} The SIA moved back to the Security Service in 1965 but continued to perform the same duties from there.\textsuperscript{367}

The remaining colonies now sent LIC reports to the geographical and ‘defence’ departments in the CO for consideration until 1965/66 when remaining colonies reported to the Independent Territories Division of the Commonwealth Office. Once self government was granted, self governing colonies ‘copied’ the reports to the CRO as well. From 1965/66 given the incomplete absorption of the CO this probably continued. The CRO appointed an adviser/liaison officer to work with the colonial government and governor. At colonial level administrative activity was split and some functions were retained under British control a similar to the system of diarchy used in India and different departmental objectives and cultures obviously complicated the intelligence production process.

\textsuperscript{364} Tom Bowers, \textit{The Perfect English Spy}, pp. 223-4
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid. pp. 223-4.
\textsuperscript{367} J.A, Cross, \textit{Whitehall and the Commonwealth}, pp. 71-72. This was probably because the amalgamation of the two offices had been proposed for July 1965 but due to a change of government took place in August 1966.
To add to the complications the role of the Commonwealth Office now overlapped with that of the Foreign Office. After the Plowden Report in 1965 it was decided to unify overseas personnel of the CRO and the FO into HM Diplomatic Service.\textsuperscript{368} Whilst the withdrawal of the Security Service’s Security Liaison Officers (SLO) from colonies and Commonwealth states in 1966 appears to have been driven by their cost, the general process of administrative centralisation may well explain the decision to make the empire the responsibility of the SIS. These administrative changes affected the British and imperial intelligence machinery because responsible ministers, the civil servants dealing with intelligence and the reporting lines for the colonial intelligence machinery changed. More importantly the mentalité and preoccupations of the officials concerned also changed as new officials took over consequently the information demanded by consumers also changed. The changes in the administrative structures and their intelligence machinery also flowed down to affect the role of the British intelligence services working in the empire.

**The role of the British machinery in the empire 1956-1966:**

As has been demonstrated the Security Service was the main British security intelligence agency in empire and the provider of intelligence advice and liaison but its role evolved from the mere provision of advice and liaison to the CO and colonial governments by the provision of an SLO, to providing the direct intelligence link between the British and local intelligence machinery. This meant the Security Service had to liaise with both CO and CRO. The Security Service undertook surveillance of colonials on their visits to the United Kingdom and maintained extensive records for example on figures such as Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana. There were still some colonies like Malta, where SLOs ran their own networks of agents and informers.\textsuperscript{369}

The Security Service had its own general policy towards it duties in the Commonwealth. It dealt with matters which affected the security of the realm as a whole; rather than local problems. The general position of the service including E Branch which handled liaison with the empire and commonwealth, was that the focus should be on communism rather than on

\textsuperscript{368} *Ibid.*, pp. 72-79.

\textsuperscript{369} TNA, CO1035/192 Intelligence Organisation in Malta, 1963-65. Minute from JNAAS 9 October 1963. Meeting held between Mr Morton, Mr Harrison (MI5) and Mr Jenkins on the question of setting up a Special Branch in Malta.
local problems, although in practice a great deal of information was collected on both. The Security Service also wanted to continue to co-operate with new states on the communist threat after self-government. It worked therefore with local agencies in an overt manner; it did not operate its own covert networks or investigations.

In order to develop anti-communist co-operation the CO and the Security Service had to work together to prepare for self-government and independence. The Security Service, worked closely with the JIC on developing the professional colonial intelligence model to be transmitted to the colonies. This model was promulgated in CO Circular 458/56 28 April 1956 and formed the criteria upon which the CO’s Security Intelligence Adviser’s (SIA) inspections were based although it was modified by subsequent Circulars 1135/59, 64/60, and 960/61. The Security Service and the CO needed to indigenise the local intelligence machinery. They needed to prepare an organisation to maintain information flow during handover, introduce the new politicians to the SLO and the local intelligence machinery, and try to convince the local politicians of the need to keep the intelligence machinery politically neutral.

**Handover of intelligence duties from the Security Service to the Secret Intelligence Service:**

After independence SLOs worked under the control of the local British High Commission and were generally embedded in the local intelligence machinery. They continued to be allowed to attend LIC meetings and frequently had office space within the host government’s facilities. The Security Service however did not long hold its authority over intelligence matters in the Commonwealth, between 1965 and 1968 the SLO network was closed down and the SIS took over. Leaving the Security Service in charge of imperial intelligence links had been partly due to established precedent and the excellent established links with successor services but may also have been partly due to inertia but it was probably also due to the CO and CRO’s distrust of the SIS and its ‘dirty tricks’.

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371 TNA, CO1035/149, Note to Mr Russell, CO, from J.D. Higham, CO, 24 March 1965

372 Philip Murphy, *Commonwealth Intelligence Culture*, pp. 134. See also Tom Bowers and Christopher Andrew
Whilst the SIS did not traditionally operate in the colonial territories they did have a presence in the SIME and SIFE organisations at regional level in the Middle and Far East although not in Africa. The SIS was concerned that the CO and CRO were insufficiently worried about Soviet subversion and that there were no covert networks to keep Britain informed if for some reason overt liaison failed. SIS had conducted its first covert reconnaissance of Africa in 1956.\textsuperscript{373} In 1960 the SIS involvement in the Congo Crisis led it to try to expand its activity to the empire despite opposition from the CRO in particular.\textsuperscript{374} Thereafter it seems to have had an increasing presence in empire until in 1968 after the withdrawal of SLOs the SIS took over responsibility.

**Military Intelligence in the Empire:**

The service intelligence machinery was involved in the process of development in a number of ways. Military intelligence supported any troops deployed into a colony and attached liaison officers to work within Special Branch Headquarters. As decolonisation progressed it became more difficult to recruit ex-colonial police officers who were taking advantage of the retirement packages being offered. In consequence it became necessary to use Military Intelligence Officers (MIO) to reinforce some colonial police forces and their Special Branches. As the European dominated administrative and police machinery was handed over the CO and CRO’s grip on the information collecting machinery loosened. In a number of colonies this period occurred at a point where disorder was growing and consequently the military intelligence machinery of the local garrison became involved in providing imperial intelligence.\textsuperscript{375}

Some colonies became strategic bases in which case military intelligence was deployed to support the operations for the bases and to liaise with the local colonial intelligence machinery. This was an aspect of the British intelligence machinery and so marked an interim phase in some colonies in the process of the imperial machinery being converted into the British machinery. Aspects of this can be seen in the cases of Kenya, British Guiana, and

\textsuperscript{373} *Ibid.* pp.134, 143-44
\textsuperscript{374} Tom Bower, *The Perfect English Spy*, pp. 223-4.
\textsuperscript{375} TNA, CO1035/156 Policy of Attachments of Military Intelligence Officers to Colonial Special Branches 1963-65Note by JP Morton , SIA CO, Misunderstanding of the role of Military Intelligence Officers in Swaziland, Bechuanaland and Zanzibar 30 August 1962; Circular 129/64 Intelligence in Internal Security Operations 23 March 1964; Circular 980, 1 November 1961 Internal Security Schemes: The Intelligence and Security Aspects of Emergency Planning
Aden. In the Middle East SIME, although associated with the Security Service, was primarily a military organisation designed to support Middle East Command but for reasons both of geographical necessity and historical precedent it worked closely with both imperial territories and countries where Britain had influence. For part of the period British regional machinery continued to operate with a different focus to that of the previous period.

Apart from these major developments there was also a need to continue to provide intelligence support to the residual colonies. Once the reforms of the imperial intelligence machinery were in place in the CO and the colonies after 1956 there were no major developments to them except for ‘tweaks’ required by the change in administrative departments in Whitehall, internal developments in the CO (loss of colonies leading to a general reduction and amalgamation of functions within internal departments) and the development of local machinery to met changing political conditions. The SIA at the CO however did continue to suggest technical improvements. In particular in the period from 1960-1965 local governments were continually reminded by the CO to implement an ongoing process of review of their own intelligence needs through their LIC. Clearly this series of circulars was not much regarded as the CO had to send continual reminders out to colonial governments! This complex and changing situation in Whitehall inevitably affected the process of handover because it altered reporting chains and the relative importance of departmental positions on aspects of colonial affairs.

II

The problem of ‘handover’:

At colonial level two things needed to be achieved in order to hand over the intelligence machinery. Firstly ongoing British intelligence interests including both the need to maintain internal security and to maintain long term anti-communist liaison needed to be safeguarded; essentially that meant the provision of SLOs to prevent the spread of communist influence.

377 Chikara Hashimoto, ‘Fighting the Cold War or Post Colonialism?’ pp. 4-8.
378 TNA, CO1035/149 Periodical Reviews of Local Intelligence 1963-65, Circular 64/60 22 January 1960, Periodical Reviews of Local Intelligence; Circular 60/65 15 February 1965; Circular 169/65 14 April 1965; Circular 248 15 June 1965
Secondly the intelligence machinery needed to be prepared for handover in order to maintain local security for the successor government. Because the SIA remained in the CO until 1965 and the Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP) remained in the CO and was amalgamated into the CRO, there was a degree of continuity in the intelligence relationship between the colonial and later independent governments and the Whitehall machinery in intelligence matters.

Preparation for handover involved a number of elements. The process was gradually standardised into a bureaucratic process with formal advice being issued by the CO to colonial governments on how to implement handover of the intelligence machinery in the final stages. Unfortunately the advice does not seem to have survived so it is necessary to piece it together by looking at a number of examples. Whilst most were relatively straightforward, certain cases were more complex. The process of handover involved three functions: provision of British advice and liaison; records management; and indigenisation and the provision of temporary British ‘dual’ machinery. The process of providing British advice and liaison has already been covered in Section II so the question of records will be addressed first and then indigenisation.

Records were a major issue for the British and colonial governments and the police at a number of levels particularly where there had been a controversial emergency or counter insurgency before independence. The driving influences in the process were the need to protect and maintain: British international prestige by preventing the opening of controversial material; secrecy about British ongoing policy; British intelligence processes; British security; and to protect indigenous people who had worked or were working against the anti-colonial nationalists. Some files were necessary to the ongoing activity of the successor government and this material became known as ‘legacy’ or ‘heritage’ material to be handed over.

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379 TNA, CO1035/149 The State of Our Intelligence and Measures to Improve it 1963-65. Note to Mr Russell from J.D. Higham, CO, 24 March 1965. The note refers to the SIA, Morton’s imminent departure and lists the major Intelligence circulars- 458/56, 1135/59, 64/60 and 960/61.

380 TNA, CO1035/187 Organisation of Intelligence: Kenya, 1963. Letter F.D. Webster, Colonial Office, to Sir Eric Griffith-Jones, Deputy Governor, Kenya, 30 May 1963. The letter refers to a Memorandum ’The Intelligence Organisation in a Colonial territory during the Period of Transition to Independence.’ Unfortunately this memorandum is not attached to the letter and it has not proven possible to find a copy.
The result was three kinds of action: destruction of incriminating material of little ongoing value to British policy; the removal of material of ongoing significance to Britain itself; and the handover of ‘legacy’ material. As can be imagined this was a complex process and given the time and resources available a patchy one. A great deal was burnt. Surprising amounts of material were left in the archives of successor states. Finally it has recently emerged that significant numbers of files were transferred to Britain and kept undeclared in the FCO archives. Significant files also seem to have been transferred to the Security Service, especially personal files on significant nationalists and anti-colonial leaders.  

Indigenisation was a complex process. The degree of indigenisation differed from colony to colony and region to region. In some colonies such as Malaya, the West Indies and West Africa for example, the number of ‘educated’ local people educated was relatively high and the administration and police were already partly indigenised.  

There was a greater pool of people with the requisite skills to carry on the process in the short term. In other colonies such as those in East Africa, far fewer educated personnel were available and the local prejudice against indigenisation seems to have been higher.

From an intelligence perspective however indigenisation was complicated by the need to maintain information flows during the final stages of self government. The amount of information available to the British varied over time due the process of handover and this periodisation needed to be taken into account. Lack of intelligence after 1946 had proved a crucial problem in India when Congress politicians seized control over the intelligence machinery too early for British interests and blinded the Viceroy during the final negotiations. This meant the British lost both control of the administration and knowledge of what was going on and thus the situation caused a major loss of British prestige. In addition there was a timescale to the process of handover.

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Information/intelligence was collected and collated by both administration and police. Different elements of the government were handed over at different times. Generally the lower levels of the administration were indigenised first and then the general duties police. The SLO was then ‘declared’. The intelligence co-ordinating machinery and the Special Branch were handed to responsible ministers as late as possible. The gradual handover meant senior British officials and the British government became progressively less able to understand and shape events as the hand over progressed. The British consequently created ‘dual’ machinery. The local co-ordinating machinery was duplicated by creating a Governor’s or Deputy Governor’s Office in which senior European personnel from the Special Branch were able to provide input in case the Governor needed to use his reserve powers. In certain cases the handover was relatively straightforward and the British were not worried about internal problems, as in Malaya, and relied upon embedded British personnel who were serving after independence and Security Service liaison to maintain their flow of information. The second problem caused by this process was that there was progressively more reliance on ‘security’ intelligence with its emphasis on political violence. The lack of independent networks of agents outside of the official structures was however to prove a hindrance where the host organisation was not aware itself of political development and when there was a need to build up an undeclared SIS presence in some countries. There is some anecdotal evidence that some SB informers were kept on the payroll in some independent states and consequently passed on to successor British agencies.

The CO’s geographical departments, the Defence /Intelligence Department, the IGCP, the SIA, the Governor and the Chief Secretary\(^{384}\) liaised to establish the best local arrangements within the frameworks imposed by precedent and experience.\(^{385}\) In some cases there was also discussion with local politicians on at least the overt elements of the reforms. The arrangements were implemented by the colonial government.

There were complications in the process of hand over in some colonies for structural, constitutional, reasons and in others because the new governments were ‘hostile’ to British interests. American intervention in colonial affairs also required modification and development of the imperial machinery during handover. Each of these problems required

\(^{384}\) Chief Secretaries tended to be the direct managers of intelligence matters in colonial governments.

\(^{385}\) CO1031/5043 British Guiana Emergency Staffing: Deputy Governor 1963-65, Telegram Sir Ralph Grey Governor of British Guiana to Secretary of State for Colonies 16 June 1963. Liaison over the potential appointment of David Rose as Deputy Governor.
modification of the bureaucratic process. The handover in the colonies which had formed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for example, was complex because of the necessity to firstly uncouple the local intelligence co-ordinating machinery which had been partly integrated with that of the Federal government and secondly because it occurred in the context of increasing hostility between the government of Federation (and later Southern Rhodesia) and the British government. British Guiana was very complex because it was both a ‘hostile’ decolonisation process and a colony in which the United States intelligence services were directly involved. This meant it was necessary to have a more complex version of the machinery for supporting the use of the Governor’s Emergency powers than was usual and it was necessary to retain control of the Special Branch by splitting it into sections dealing with local and British interests.

III

‘Friendly’ and ‘neutral’ hand over processes: Malaya, Gold Coast, Kenya.

The processes of hand over in Malaya and Gold Coast both involved ‘indigenisation’ processes. Malaya was a ‘friendly’ decolonisation. During the Emergency substantial numbers of indigenous personnel had been recruited and promoted in administration and police. In particular Chinese personnel had been recruited to Special Branch. Indigenous officers were also involved in the intelligence co-ordinating machinery. Substantial numbers of European personnel remained in place in key positions. Indigenous personnel were cooperative and a friendly successor government which shared British concerns with communist influence was happy to continue to supply information needed by the British.

The situation was made even easier because of the ongoing existence of regional British intelligence machinery; Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE) continued to operate from the British High Commissioner’s Office. British training programmes and technical assistance continued to both Malayan and Singapore Special Branches helping to keep alive personal

Incidentally Malayan decolonisation freed many Europeans with intelligence experience to serve elsewhere in empire. Because it was one of the first ‘decolonisations’ the Malayan model provided precedent for subsequent CO activity. The Malayan Special Branch played a very important part in supplying intelligence to underpin both security and policy making but seems to have gained control of the local situation by the time of political hand over. Special Branch appears to have taken a ‘wide’ view of its duties and officials kept any eye on what was happening suggesting that the police did not ‘skew’ the information reaching government too much, perhaps because its consumer was a sophisticated administrative structure.

Gold Coast provides a detailed picture of the indigenisation and the handover of the intelligence co-ordinating machinery. It is particularly interesting because it was the first African ‘handover’ and provided precedents to the CO for use in the rest of Africa. Intelligence developments needs to be seen in the context of a developing constitutional and administrative structure in which the Secretariat evolved into a departmental system, political power was devolved and the system of local administration was changed from a ‘personal’ system based on the Chief Commissioner –Governor relationship to a formal system of local control. Whilst the administration was handed over relatively quickly, European control over Special Branch was retained for as long as possible and continued to report to the Governor and Whitehall on the activities of local ministers.

The development of the intelligence co-ordinating machinery in Gold Coast had occurred rapidly after 1948. In 1948 a ‘Security Committee’ co-ordinating internal security and an ‘Intelligence Coordinating Committee’ were set up. In 1949 a Local Security Liaison

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390 TNA DO 183/138 Intelligence Reports: Northern Rhodesia 1962-64 Minute to Mr Downie, CRO, from J.P. Morton, SIA, CO, 7 April 1964.
393 Richard Rathbone, ‘Political intelligence and policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s’ p.85. Quotes Letter from Scott, Colonial Secretary, Gold Coast, to Chief Commissioner Ashanti, Butler, 13 April 1948 from correspondence in the Ghanaian National Archives.
Officer was appointed. Defence which included internal security had been retained under the previous constitutional arrangements. In 1956 the Governor explained how he intended to organise and hand over the co-ordinating machinery. The organisation of intelligence in Gold Coast was rather more complex than in some other colonies. The Defence Committee, which co-ordinated defence and internal security and dealt with intelligence, had been partially indigenised with the aim of making it responsible to ministers. The Central Security Committee (CENSEC) and Local Intelligence Committee were subcommittees of the Defence Committee and these committees were also indigenised although this took longer because senior police officers and administrators were expatriates. A Deputy Governor, (the previous Chief Secretary), provided the intelligence machinery for British control in the final stages through an ‘Office of the Governor’ and received the reports from senior expatriate SB officers. The SLO was ‘declared’ to ministers in October 1955. The SLO was to continue attending the committee after independence when appropriate. The SLO maintained close contact with Special Branch; the army; the Minister of the Interior; and the Governor. The SLO continued to advise the Governor as well through the parallel structure of the ‘Office of the Governor’.

The Ghanaian experience showed how the CO and colonial governments undertook handover. The ongoing presence of Europeans in key positions seems to have been the key factor in providing ongoing control during the final phases. Ministerial committees were handed over before official committees as they were in Northern Rhodesia. Care was taken to ensure that only committees controlled by expatriate officers obtained all of the information.

396 The committee included the following personnel: the Governor; Prime Minister; Deputy Governor; Minister of State; Minister of Finance; Minister of the Interior; Minister of Local Government; Commander Gold Coast Military Forces Commissioner of Police and its secretary was the Secretary for Defence.
397 Membership was: the Governor; Deputy Governor; Commander GC Military Forces; the Commissioner of Police; its secretary was the Secretary for the Interior.
398 TNA, CO1035/36, Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clark, Governor Gold Coast, to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 June 1956. Reply to Circular 458/56, 28 April 1956, para. 3.
399 Members were: The Secretary to the Governor; Permanent Secretary to Minister of the Interior; OIC Special Branch, Gold Coast Police the Security Liaison Officer; GSO (III) Gold Coast Military Forces and its secretary Assistant Secretary Ministry of the Interior.
400 TNA, CO1035/36 Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clark, Governor, Gold Coast, to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 June 1956. Reply to Circular 458/56 28 April 1956, para. 2.
401 Richard Rathbone, ‘Political intelligence and policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s’ pp.89-92.
402 TNA, CO1035/36 Letter from Sir Charles Arden Clark, Governor Gold Coast, to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 June 1956, Reply to Circular 458/56, 28 April 1956, para. 2-10.
and the situation in Malaya was specifically referred to in various minutes.\textsuperscript{402} It was unusual because the higher level of organisation and channels of communication were more complicated than in most colonies.

The effects of this process in Gold Coast were complex. Whilst intelligence machinery was strengthened in the crucial period of 1949-51 the new Governor, Arden-Clarke, seems to have placed great importance on developing a working relationship with African politicians and ‘thrashing out’ political solutions. He seems to have opposed the pessimistic views of European administrative and security personnel. Given these high level pressures it is difficult to see whether the administrators took much notice of negative intelligence input although reports were circulated.\textsuperscript{403} Walton however argued that Arden Clarke consulted constantly with Overseas Division of the Security Service.\textsuperscript{404} It is also unclear how far the Special Branch assisted the governor in by providing him with detail of the political position of African politicians.

It is clear that precedent was examined by both CO and colonial governments when working out how the administration and intelligence machinery could be handed over. The importance of the Malayan precedent has already been noted but by 1963 there was actually a memorandum covering the subject.

In 1963 the Kenya handover was guided by a ‘Memorandum: The Intelligence Organisation in a Colonial territory during the period of Transition to Independence.’\textsuperscript{405} It is possible to reconstruct some of its salient recommendations by examining other evidence about the handover of intelligence. In the Kenyan case other surviving documents suggest that the document probably covered: the importance of the Governor’s Office; the destruction of records; and the declaration of the SLO.\textsuperscript{406} In 1963 security and political intelligence were in the hands of the Deputy Governor. It had been hoped to supplement the intelligence despatches from Kenya to the CO and CRO with a ‘UK Eyes Only’ element but this proved

\textsuperscript{402} TNA, DO183/138 Intelligence Reports: Northern Rhodesia 1962-64, Minute to MR Downie, CRO, from J.P. Morton, SIA, CO, 7 April 1964.
\textsuperscript{403} Richard Rathbone, ‘Political Intelligence and Policing in Ghana’, pp. 88-91.
\textsuperscript{406} \textit{Ibid.}, Minute to Mr Kittcat from J. Downie, 5 July 1963; \textit{Ibid.} Note of conversations with Mr Kenyatta and R.H. Hollis, 11 October 1963
impossible. In August 1963 the Kenyan responsibility for answering ‘military’ queries from Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), Joint Intelligence Committee Middle East (JIC (ME)), and Political Office Middle East Command (POMEC) was moved to the General Officer Commanding East Africa (GOC East Africa). The Deputy Governor and the Director of Intelligence would provide assistance as long as they could but such assistance was no longer guaranteed.

The creation of a standardised model for intelligence handover tended to ensure that the strengths and weaknesses of the process were transferred throughout empire. In the case of Northern Rhodesia, it is clear from various references that precedents used during internal self government in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and the Federation of Malaya were examined to provide guidance on how to hand over the intelligence and security machinery. The inclusion of the Malayan experience suggests that this was an imperial process rather than a regional one and emphasises the role of the CO as a source of advice.

‘Neutral’ handovers:

Northern Rhodesia and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were the subject of complex internecine battles within Whitehall. Both the CO and CRO had interests leading to the intervention of two different departmental intelligence machines. Under the complex federal constitution the component colonies retained responsibility for internal security and their own police forces and intelligence machinery on the standard colonial pattern. The Federal government was responsible for defence and ‘national security’. It had created the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau to co-ordinate intelligence at Federal level. The FISB was merely a collating bureau relying upon material submitted to it by local Special Branches in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and from the Security Branch of the British South Africa Police (BSAP) in Southern Rhodesia. The FISB supplied liaison officers to each. The Security Branch BSAP strangely was merely a co-ordinating bureau for information gathered by CID and general duties police. The Northern Rhodesia Special Branch had an important part in compiling the LIC’s report to London and content of reports

408 TNA, DO183/138 Intelligence Reports: Northern Rhodesia, 1962-64. Minute to Mr. Downie, CRO, from V.R. Wilson, CRO, 16 March 1964.
409 Philip Murphy, Intelligence and Decolonization: The Life and Death of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau 1954-63 Imperial and Commonwealth History 29:2 (2001), 101-130.
from 1962-64 suggests that this caused a concentration on the internal security aspects although it is not clear how far this affected policy making.

Before hand over of the intelligence machinery could take place the Northern Rhodesian machinery had to be separated from the Federal machinery and then indigenised.

In Northern Rhodesia the LIC was called the Central Intelligence Committee (CIC). There were lower level committees at each administrative level on the Malayan model. In September 1963 the members of the CIC were European. The FISB and the Federal Army were both represented on the committee. The Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia controlled the committee. The first step on breakup of the federation was to remove FISB liaison officers from the Northern Rhodesian machinery. Indigenisation however was slow. In January 1964 committee membership was still European but Federal personnel no longer had seats. In February 1964 the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office, A.W. Gaminara, a European, became a member as a step towards ministerial control. The SLO (Central Africa) was still present. The intelligence co-ordinating machinery was controlled by Europeans for as long as possible during the eight months of the handover until October 1964. Indeed Gaminara remained as an adviser until 1965. This was particularly important because the final stages of British rule and the initial stages of independence were violent and confused due to the intransigence of the United National Party (UNP).

Northern Rhodesia also provides information about the indigenisation of the lower levels of the co-ordinating machinery which were handed over more quickly but still reluctantly. The

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410 TNA, DO183/138 Intelligence Reports: Northern Rhodesia, 1962-64. Members Present at Meeting of the Central Intelligence Committee, Northern Rhodesia, September, 1963: F.M. Thomas Esq., C.M.G. Chief Secretary, Chairman; E.L. Button Esq., M.B.E., Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Native Affairs; P.F. Murch Esq., Acting Assistant Commissioner, Special Branch; J.G. Doolley Esq., Acting Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour; Major D.E. Mullen, Representing Commander Northern Rhodesia District. B.M. de Quehen Esq., C.B.E., M.V.O., Director, Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau. Security Liaison Officer, Central Africa; R.A. Hill Esq., M.B.E., Ministry of Chief Secretary, Secretary.

411 TNA, DO183/138 Intelligence Reports: Northern Rhodesia, 1962-64. Members Present at Meeting of the Central Intelligence Committee Northern Rhodesia, January 1964: His Honour F.M. Thomas, Esq., C.M.G., Deputy Governor, Chairman; G.F. Tredwell, Esq., Acting Permanent Secretary, Deputy Governor’s Office; E.H. Halse Esq., Commissioner of Police; E. Leighton Assistant Commissioner, Special Branch; Security Liaison Officer Central Africa; E. Dunlop, Esq., M.B.E., D.F.C., Under Secretary Ministry of Labour and Mines; Major General G.S. Lea, DSO, M.B.E, General Officer Commanding Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Forces; Colonial TNS Read C.B.E., Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Northern Rhodesia Army; Group Captain W.A. Griffiths D.F.C. Royal Air Force, Officer Commanding the Northern Rhodesia Air Force; W. Baxter Esq., Deputy Governor’s Office, Secretary

412 Ibid. Members Present at Meeting of the Central Intelligence Committee Northern Rhodesia February 1964

organisation of the Northern Rhodesian system with mixed administrative and intelligence membership committees at each level had proved successful. In January 1964 however, it was feared that during internal self government extremists would be appointed as Provincial and District Commissioners. This raised the potential problem that information from the lower intelligence committees might be used to seize power.\textsuperscript{414}

The Governor proposed that the committees should become “Information Committees” sharing sanitised material.\textsuperscript{415} The Central Africa Office (CAO) (a short lived department answering to the British Home Secretary but employing ex CO personnel) was concerned that ending SB participation would make the committees pointless. It is clear from various references that precedents used during internal self government in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and the Federation of Malaya were examined but the paperwork showing how these were used has not survived.\textsuperscript{416} The SIA was asked for advice and recommended that the system to be used after independence should be adopted and the “Information Committee” idea was dropped.\textsuperscript{417} The post independence machinery included the LIC/CIC and the Special Branch but it is not clear if the lower level committees were continued or not. If political appointments were made, the SIA suggested that the permanent civil servant should provide advice. It was hoped that new appointments would come from the ranks of African civil servants with their bureaucratic loyalties rather than less ‘reliable’ politicians.

It is not possible to break down the contents of the intelligence reports from the LIC into material gathered by police and administration in order to see the relative influence of each however the content is definitely skewed more towards the security side the closer the colony got to independence. It is clear that SB had an important part in compiling them. What is not clear however is how important these were to administrators at the time.

These examples show that as early as 1956 the problems of transforming intelligence machinery were being addressed and that a ‘handover’ model was being used to plan for future problems, within the constraints caused by the structure of administrative systems. The Security Service was deeply involved at a number of levels in this process both

\textsuperscript{414} TNA, DO183/138 Intelligence Reports: Northern Rhodesia, 1962-64. Minute to Messrs Lord and Tennant, Central Africa Office from G.W. Jamieson Central African Office, 19 October 1962.
\textsuperscript{415} Ibid. Minute to Mr. Downie from J.P. Morton, Security Intelligence Adviser, and 7 April 1964.
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid. Minute to Mr. Downie from V.R. Wilson, 16 March 1964.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid. Minute to Mr. Downie from J.P. Morton, Security Intelligence Adviser, 7 April 1964.
technically and politically. The importance of the SLO network in successor states was clear. The CO and the Security Service were keen that territorial machinery should follow British guidelines and structures in order to maintain levels of cooperation and information sharing. The CO was working in a more co-ordinated way with other United Kingdom departments in the British interest. The material also helps to demonstrate the global concerns with potential and actual problems involved in the handover especially the use of the intelligence machinery for party political ends. This concern was also addressed in the CO’s recommendation that Public Service and Police Committees should be interposed between the local ministers and their officials. Such institutions fell from a police perspective, within the remit of the Inspector General of Colonial Police.418

IV

Hostile handovers: the complexities of international co-operation in a colonial setting:

The CO had a particularly hard task in British Guiana. It was committed to preparing the colony for independence with a functioning and moderate government and working political and administrative institutions. The British government had no longer term interests in British Guiana after independence. The American government however, was concerned that the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) was a communist organisation and was seeking to work with Cuba to make the Caribbean communist. It was felt in Whitehall that it was in the wider British interest to allow American intervention in the colony. Interdepartmental conflicts in Whitehall which affected such co-operation were directly affecting not only the process of decolonisation but also Britain’s international position. The American government already actively intervened in British intelligence activity and it was considered necessary for the Director General of the Security Service and the Chief of SIS to keep the Americans directly informed of a number of aspects of British intelligence activity. By 1963 the American government was exerting extreme pressure on the British government as a whole to adapt to its requirements over British Guiana. The effect of the international implications was that the handover process was complicated by the need to create machinery to co-ordinate the British and American intelligence input in the situation and to juggle the interests of at least three different levels of policy needs in the colony.

Because of the complexity of the situation it is possible to read the paperwork ‘against the grain’ to establish a surprising amount of information about: the policies of the CO and other Whitehall departments; about the role of the British professional intelligence machinery; and about the co-ordinating machinery necessary to ensure international co-ordination with the intelligence service of another country. This may be of wider significance than is obvious at first because the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was close to SIS and both wanted to intervene in colonial affairs against the wishes of the CO. The CIA also wanted to establish a presence in number of formal and informal colonies.

Initially the CO’s approach seemed to be an attempt to isolate the PPP and force it into a more moderate position between 1953 and 1961, combined with an interest in decolonising as quickly as possible without US interference. This changed to an acceptance of a wider British need to respond to US demands to remove Jagan, although the CO generally seemed to argue Jagan was not a communist and that his government was becoming more moderate.

The US government saw the CO as a hindrance to the implementation of its policies and attempted to pressure the FO and the PM to force the CO to alter its policies. SIS also wanted to end the ‘Attlee doctrine’ and assist the CIA. The SIS approach was in stark contrast to the Security Service which disapproved of covert action in Commonwealth countries. These differences continued despite the move of Sir Dick White from the Security Service to the Secret Intelligence Service in 1956. The Security Service perceived that British Guiana was a local problem and thus outside its remit and did not want to engage in covert operations in British Guiana. Their interest may be gauged by the fact that British Guiana was a major problem in Anglo-American relations; the SLO was based in Trinidad and only visited British Guiana occasionally. SIS by contrast wanted, despite White, to adopt a more interventionist and anticommunist approach generally although we have no specific information about British Guiana. American intervention in British Guiana was carried out by the CIA which was used to close liaison with the SIS but not the E Branch of Security Service.

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419 Christopher Andrew, *Defence of the Realm*, pp. 459-461; Chikara Hashimoto, Fighting the Cold War or Post-Colonialism? Britain in the Middle East from 1945-1958: Looking through the records of the British Security Service’ *International History Review* iFirst (2014) 1-26 (p. 11) discussed the implications in relation to SIME.

The decolonisation process in British Guiana:

Decolonisation in British Guiana can be divided into a series of phases. Between 1948 and 1953 there was a gradually worsening security situation leading to a new constitution. The 1953 elections led to a PPP’s government which was hostile to the British. The British declared an Emergency in 1953. There was an attempt to stabilise the situation by splitting the anti-colonial parties on ethnic grounds. The PPP split and many of its members of African descent joined the Peoples National Congress (PNC). In 1957 there was a new constitution and elections. Between 1957 and 1961 there was a process of discussion about handing over administration, police and security except defence and external affairs. In 1960-61 the PPP tried to ‘pack’ the membership of such bodies.

The Americans became involved in supporting the PNC and UF. The British started to handover between 1962 and 1964, when the majority of US covert intervention occurred, leading to the imposition of a constitution based on proportional representation. These phases also affected the development of the intelligence machinery in particular the development of machinery for dealing with counter-subversion, the point where it was necessary to deal with CIA intervention and the point where it was necessary to split functions between the ‘heritage’ machinery and the machinery for ongoing British control. The American government saw their intervention as ‘counter-subversion’ so it will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

The intelligence machinery in British Guiana followed the standard pattern of Special Branch and LIC, however the administrative element was weak because it was a mixture

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of elected local councils in some areas and appointed district administration in others. The former were not suitable for collecting information. The colony’s administration was regarded as weak; consequently the police were the major intelligence gathering organisation. Whitehall and the CO needed to continue to control of the important parts of the intelligence machinery in the colony and they did this in two ways. They split duties in the Special Branch, they tried to keep a core of European officers in important positions using underhand means to subsidise their salaries and they created specialist co-ordinating machinery. These approaches fitted within the precedents from Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.

The British Guiana government tried to develop alternatives to the PPP using the techniques of counter-subversion from 1953. It has been argued that the British government tried to deal with anti-colonial activity in British Guiana by isolating it, splitting their opponents on ethnic grounds, and finally obtaining a pro-British, or at least neutral government. The intelligence machinery became involved in political surveillance; the penetration of political parties; immigration control; and the use of Information Services to put the British line. In 1956 for example, The Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies in 1956 recommended using the Trades Union Council (TUC) to support the development of Trades Unions. British intelligence services used ‘tame’ British Trades Unionists to advise and support local unions against communism.

The local intelligence machinery, including Special Branch, was indigenised from an early stage. Local officers were trained in London and in the West Indies. The British saw the role of the Special Branch and LIC as protecting state security; not as a mechanism for PPP control consequently they attempted to guarantee police officers political independence.

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Furedi, Frank, Colonial Wars, pp. 1-16.


through a Police Service Commission. They also had the effect of leaving personnel selected and trained by the British in place after independence which helped to entrench British influence.

In 1961 the Guianese Home Affairs minister, was ‘indoctrinated’ when he was informed of the existence and role of both the LIC and the SLO. The police, including Special Branch, were placed under ministerial control in 1961 after a handover period under a Police Council. In April- May 1962 J.P. Morton, the SIA, suggested that the Special Branch be reformed and strengthened but insufficient funds were available to make all the suggested reforms. The intelligence machinery was being prepared for ‘heritage’ duties (i.e. maintaining security in the new state rather than supplying Britain with information), but the service had to continue to respond to local problems in the British interest. The Special Branch, however, continued to keep political parties, including government ministers, under surveillance. They reported only what was of ‘general interest’ to the PPP ministers. This suggests that some kind of internal division had been created in the Special Branch or the coordinating machinery. This raises the question of; ‘How much did the Governor know about operations?’ In theory the Security Service had to keep the Governor informed of its operations and this is a caveat which would appear to be necessary in the case of the SIS as well. Grey had had direct discussion with the US Consulate General over time. In 1963 Grey believed that the Head of Special Branch was not keeping him informed and was uncertain whether this was deliberate or due to incompetence. Cuban stowaways suspected of being intelligence officers had been discovered after a ‘tip off’, probably from the CIA. The governor had asked for information about the situation and the CIA’s sources of information. The official answer was that the Police Commissioner had received the material from the CIA based on information from a single informer, and had waited to pass it to the Governor until he had checked it.

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433 TNA, CO1037/172 Letter from Ian Macleod, Secretary of State for Colonies, to Sir Ralph Grey, Governor, British Guiana, 3 August 1961.
435 TNA, CO1035/194, Letter to RW Piper, Colonial Office, from Sir Ralph Grey, Governor, British Guiana, 8 April 1965
Parallel intelligence and security machinery:

In 1963-64 matters came to head and in June 1964 another emergency was declared. At the same time the Americans pressed for the re-imposition of direct rule by the British. There was a general strike and extensive violence which posed problems for the police. Special Branch was needed to conduct surveillance and penetrate local political organisations and to produce intelligence for the police and the Governor, and consequently for Whitehall, but by this stage the police had been officially handed over to ministerial control. The problems involved however had been anticipated since 1962. In 1963 a Governor’s Office was set up and the Chief Secretary became the Deputy Governor. An Emergency Intelligence Committee (EIC), which had been created in 1953, was still in existence in 1964. In 1964 it operated alongside the LIC. There are few clues as to the rationale for this doubling up. It may have been a subsection of the LIC streamlined to allow handling of intelligence in times of emergency or it could have been a conscious attempt to produce a parallel intelligence committee answering only to the Governor. With the SLO, and senior European members of the Special Branch this organisation might have provided machinery for securing British interests whilst the PPP government took control over other parts of the government. Military Intelligence Officers (MIO) supported Special Branch in areas where army units were operating and may have unofficially formed additional reliable European manpower for the Special Branch. A police ‘Special Force’ was raised for internal security, answerable to the Governor rather than to ministers.

The SIA had made recommendations about increases in the strength of the police and Special Branch which could only partially be implemented due to the lack of funds. The proposals were driven by the need to regain and maintain control and to provide for British interests. Piper of the West Indies Department in the CO described Special Branch’s role:

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437 Ibid. Letter to E.S. Donohoe, CO, from SLO Trinidad, 3 November 1965, para. 9. Emergency Intelligence Committee.
438 TNA, CO1035/156 Military Intelligence Officers: Attachment to Special Branches Policy 1963-65.
440 TNA, CO1035/173, Extract from the SLOs letter dated 20.8.63.
'[..]Morton went on to point out that the British Guiana Special Branch was not intended to be more than (in your own words) a good Special Branch from the point of view of a reputable Government of British Guiana and to suggest that we look to other sources for more delicate intelligence[...]'  

It is clear that keeping the British supplied with the information they needed required more effective institutions than the ‘residual’ intelligence machinery used in the final stages of hand over. Either the Special Branch was acting independently of the PPP government or a section of it, probably under the control of expatriate European officers, was dealing with matters important to the British government. The LIC and Special Branch continued to write reports for the British Government and create other forms of intelligence product. It is clear that such measures were being closely monitored and co-ordinated between the Government of British Guiana and the various departments in the CO.

The role of SIS:

Piper’s minute suggests that there were ‘other’ intelligence assets operating. It was not normal practice for the SLO to run local agents and there is no suggestion in papers in the National Archive or in Defence of the Realm that the SLOs were doing any more information gathering than discussing matters with local politicians. The minute implies that the SIS was operating or assisting the CO. In 1963 an SIS officer, a Mr. Breeze, was appointed to the Governor’s staff. His purpose is not clear from the documentation. It is possible that his role was to penetrate Venezuela or Brazil. SIS normally operated from a ‘second’ state against a ‘third’ and the normal diplomatic cover did not yet exist because of the lack of a High Commission in Georgetown thus the cover of the station chief could have been a post on the Governor’s staff. It would have been very unusual for SIS to operate against a local political party in a British colony. It would have taken time for an SIS station to develop the networks of informants to penetrate the PPP, unless there was a hand over of informants/agents by the Special Branch direct to SIS. Breeze was accompanied by his family and the

442 Ibid. Folio 54 original head of document withheld. States ‘friends’ should take over Military Intelligence Officer Vacancies and that the officer concerned was Mr Breeze a FO official. The army was immune to any local pressure being an ‘imperial asset but still had access to operational intelligence being gathered by Special Branch. It is interesting that the Metropolitan inspectors were also used under a military cover. ; Ibid. Draft letter from R.W. Piper, CO, to Sir Ralph Grey, Governor, British Guiana, 4 June 1963.
presence of his family could have put him at risk although SIS wives did live in operational theatres in the Middle East. The most logical scenario is that he was the Governor’s liaison officer with CIA. SIS also assisted the CO and British Guiana governments to transfer funds to allow the appointment of expatriate police officers to reinforce the Special Branch British Guiana Police. By this stage the local government was responsible for the appointment of police officers and one way it achieved control was to limit the salaries to a very low level making it difficult to attract British applicants. The Commissioner and the Governor still retained a role in selecting suitable personnel. It appears that the CO asked the SIS to provide fund through the Secret Vote to top up police salary packages making it possible to appoint a British officer.

Local attempts to undermine the local intelligence machinery:

A major difference between the situation in British Guiana and other colonies was the existence of a political opposition to British rule which at times held political office thus having some capacity to intervene in the intelligence and security machinery. The PPP struggled with the governor for control of the control of the Special Branch from 1961 at a time when preparations were being undertaken by the governor to re-impose direct rule and possibly declare an emergency. In the 1960s the response of Guianese ministers to British and American intervention was to limit the number of Europeans in the police, and thus in the intelligence services, by opposing the permanent appointment of Europeans and keeping pay scales low. Both measures made it difficult to attract effective colonial police officers, consequently British funds were channelled through SIS funds to ‘top up’ police salaries in British Guiana. This enabled new expatriate personnel to accept Guianese rates of pay.

The importance of the matter is demonstrated by the CO’s close interest in the administrative issues involved. Colonial Police Service officers were a ‘Secretary of State’s service’ but were individually employed by colonial governments. In practice this boiled down to the IGCP offering posting to individual officers who would then be accepted by the colonial government. It was normal practice to allow such posts to be indigenised once self government had been granted but the situation in British Guiana meant that the British needed ongoing access to and control over Special Branch operations. In the period 1963-65

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there was an attempt to replace the Head of Special Branch, A.J.E. Longden with Harvey Ryves, who had been a Head of Special Branch in Malaya. 444 Longden had been replaced by a Mr Martin between 1962 and 1963 when Longden took over again. 445 Mr Sobers, a Guianese, had been selected to replace Martin but the emergency in 1963 led the governor to seek ways to appoint another expatriate head. The governor undertook complex manoeuvres to ensure that there was no opportunity for the ministers to protest such an appointment.

The Relative Importance of Security v. Administrative intelligence:

Discussions between the Governor Sir Ralph Grey and R.W. Piper at the Colonial Office centred on how to use Special Branch to support the United Kingdom’s intelligence needs rather than those of the PPP ministers of the British Guiana government. 446 There appear to have been two major problems. The first was the lack of information flowing to the British government and the second was the failure of Special Branch to effectively support military operations against local terrorists. In the process, however, the files deal with a series of subsidiary issues such as the relationship between the CO and the security intelligence services, 447 other departments and the JIC, 448 the way in which self government affected the powers and needs of the Governor in the final stages of independence and the changing nature of the intelligence system itself. British interests were being affected by a lack of intelligence on which to base policy. The Head of Special Branch was working for two masters and the local ministers were not aware of all of his activities.

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445 It has proven difficult to pin down the exact dates.
[...] tasks to be expected of a Head of Special Branch. They fall into three broad classes:

(A) The “overt” work for the Government of British Guiana. We have genuinely tried to build for future Governments of this country a Special Branch firmly established on proved lines to look after the interests of an independent Guyana. We must continue to try to hand over in due course as good a Special Branch as we can, even if it no longer possible to hope for the sort of organisation that Morton had in mind when he wrote his report which was forwarded with his letter SIA/101/JPM of 29 May 1962.

(B) The “agency” work that the Head of Special Branch does for the Security Liaison Officer in Trinidad.

(C) The work that the Head of Special Branch does in gathering and assessing information of the kind needed by HMG to determine policy and action in British Guiana up to Independence.

447 TNA, CO1035/195, J.D. Higham, CO, to Governor, British Guiana, 9 November 1964, for example shows how the ‘friends’, presumably MI6, would find a temporary slot for Jenkins.
‘[…] The sad fact is that our apparatus here for getting information needed by H.M.G. is just not equal to our needs, even in the present circumstances. Unless it were strengthened it would be even more inadequate if the results of the decision to be taken by Mr Sandys “not later than October” were to be extremely unpopular to one or the other of the major political parties. I shall try to get both Owen and Martin to see the need for more information and the worth of it. Indeed there is a real danger that by pressing too hard I may do more harm than good. […]’ 449

‘[…] 2. Even when Sobers (who has been identified as prospective Guianese Head of Special Branch) has been trained and returned I do not think he should be asked to do H.M.G.’s work as well as his Special Branch work for the British Guiana government. Unless there was to be a return to direct rule it is unthinkable we could insert another expatriate officer as Head of Special Branch. […]’ 450

In February 1964 the Head of Special Branch, sought to resign. Janet Jagan, the minister dealing with police matters wanted Superintendent P. Britton, a Guianese, to stand in but the Governor did not believe he could be relied upon to provide for the intelligence needs of both Britain and British Guiana. Jagan did not want to bring in an expatriate. The Governor suggested the appointment of a colonial police officer, a military intelligence officer or an intelligence officer working under the cover of a military officer to the CO because of the possibility of return to direct rule. 451 Increasing use of the armed forces in internal security roles in British Guiana may have allowed the Governor a way of circumventing ministerial control because military appointments were not funded by British Guiana. 452

The context for the particular need for such action may be provided by an American perception that the Cuban intelligence services were becoming directly involved in British Guiana. The US pressed the UK government to introduce Proportional Representation (PR) in 1964 and this led to the victory of the PNC-United Front Coalition supposedly a friendly group although the leader of the BGTUC which supported the PNC was Richard Ishmael,

450 Ibid. Telegram Secret and Personal, Personal No. 93, From Sir Ralph Grey Governor BG to Secretary of State for Colonies, 11 February 1963.
451 TNA, CO1035/194 Letter Sir Ralph Grey Governor, British Guiana, to R.W. Piper, CO, 20 February 1964
described by the British Guiana Police as a terrorist. The PPP however protested and the radical part of its leadership, possibly Janet Jagan the General Secretary may have taken control of the party. This may have led to the PPP gaining Cuban Intelligence support to train, arm, and fund party revolutionary cadres and consequently the need for more effective British intelligence gathering.453

**Conclusion:**

The chapter has explored the way in which new factors, namely the need to adapt to changed conditions, affected the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. Firstly the machinery had to be adapted to administrative changes in the United Kingdom as Whitehall departments were amalgamated and processes had to be worked out to handle administrative change in the colonial governments. Since these occurred in the context of differing levels of resistance and threat the response of the British government, the CO and the CRO had to take local problems into account whilst still fulfilling British requirements. The case studies show how standardised processes were worked out and promulgated. They show how elements within the CO both worked more closely with the British intelligence machinery but how others attempted to moderate and direct such influences in ways which reflected long term concerns. The process of change was also influenced by the gradual appearance of a younger generation of CO officials more concerned with ‘communism’ and prepared to work more closely with security intelligence organisations. In particular the case study of British Guiana shows how CO officials felt they had to act covertly and duplicitously because of the wider United Kingdom objectives and the nature of their relationship with the local politicians.

The analysis of material about the handover of the intelligence machinery casts light upon the activity of the CO. Initially it took time to develop a standardised approach to meet the split need to transfer intelligence and security machinery to the new governments and at the same time to safeguard long term British intelligence interests but eventually a standardised, formal, process was worked out.

Both the geographical departments and the ‘intelligence’ and ‘police’ departments in the CO worked much more closely together as time went on to manage the process of handover. The

CO worked much more closely with other Whitehall departments (particularly the CRO), the Security Service and sometimes the SIS in order to implement handover. The papers suggest a much more closely co-ordinated process as time went on. The standard ‘hand over’ model had to be adapted to reflect local conditions. This was particularly important in the more complex situations caused by the breakup of a federation or the case of direct foreign intervention in a colony (admittedly unusual) or where the government taking over was essentially hostile to British interests and the British could not get out because of external pressure. There is evidence of closer co-operation with the JIC. Interdepartmental differences however did remain and could hinder co-operation in particular colonies.

The normal process of handover consisted of indigenisation programmes- supported by training programmes and leaving British ‘contract’ officers behind to ensure that this was a pro-British process. The creation of temporary co-ordinating machinery or the splitting of existing intelligence machinery to support the Governor during handover became normal. To ensure that the British long term interest was maintained in valuable territories SLOs were appointed. Records had to be managed by culling and transfer of certain files back to Britain. Local assets such as informers had to be either retained or handed over. Sometimes additional coordinating machinery was created at various levels to ensure co-operation with foreign services such as the CIA.

Indigenisation meant that during the progressive handover of government assets that security intelligence became a progressively more important element of British knowledge. Indigenisation was intended to ensure that British trained and ‘friendly’ local people were appointed and their neutrality in local politics ensured by the existence of Public Service or Police Commissions. In the final stages of handover it also meant that there was an order to the handover of the intelligence machinery. Administrative collecting elements went first then the ordinary police and ‘normal’ co-ordinating machinery of the LIC and its sub committees was indigenised whilst British interests were managed by temporary expedients such as the Office of the Governor or Deputy Governor. There may also have been European section manned by expatriate officers within the Special Branch to ensure that information kept on flowing in the final stages. In British Guiana there was greater interference in security by a hostile political party in government and this led the CO to protect British interests by such expedients as ensuring the continued appointment of expatriate officers by subsidising their salaries.
**Unexpected issues associated with the intelligence emphasis during handover:**

The process of phased indigenisation had unexpected effects on the process of decolonisation from a British perspective. The police became more and more important in the intelligence collection process as self-government progressed. This had an important ‘cultural’ effect, increasing the emphasis on ‘security’ intelligence during the final phases of handover and thus potentially affecting the British government’s perspective of events in the colonies. It is not possible to measure this effect precisely but it is possible to make some tentative conclusions. The effect was most noticeable in ‘hostile’ de-colonisations such as British Guiana where security intelligence was practically the only source of information for the Governor and British government. In less hostile 'decolonisations' the effects probably varied.

In Malaya intelligence was already integrated into government at many levels and the machinery and personnel appear to have had a sophisticated understanding of the problems and a variety of forms of information were considered. In Gold Coast the importance of such information probably increased during the period 194-1951 but after this the Governor’s personal relationship and commitment to self-government may have made him consciously choose not to listen to the intelligence machinery with its rather negative view of the situation. In Northern Rhodesia the governor seems to have relied upon the police to a considerable extent but administrators and police had liaison machinery at each level so the collection process whilst skewed towards security intelligence probably had adequate input from elsewhere.

Various subterfuges were used by the British government, through the CO, to protect the flow of information to support British interests. Apart from the creation of temporary machinery which was not subject to indigenisation expatriate officers were used in sensitive positions. Special sections were formed within existing institutions to support British interests. The CO was aware of SIS officers operating in the colonies and the CIA intervention in British Guiana. The CO kept an eye on CIA activity throughout empire including the movement of Americans in Kenya. Such subterfuges and general co-ordination involved both the geographical and intelligence related departments.

The CO and the Security Service were in close contact during the period however officially the Security Service preferred to keep itself aloof from clandestine activity preferring liaison
with the successor government rather than becoming involved with covert operations or with maintaining local networks but this does not seem to have been an entirely consistent policy. The Service seems to have been aware of SIS involvement in British Guiana and to have disapproved of its activity.
Chapter 5

Counter-subversion and covert operations 1945-1966.

Previous chapters have examined the development of the machinery used to collect and assess information and turn it into intelligence products to support the formation of policy. In Chapter 4 the thesis examined the process of handover and in the process showed how some decolonisation processes, notably that in British Guiana, but also that in Malaya, were shaped using the techniques of ‘counter-subversion’. In this chapter the intention is to examine the part played by new elements of the intelligence machinery in implementing British policy. In particular it will deal with the part played by the Colonial Office (CO) in the development of machinery for carrying out ‘covert operations’ in the empire. The new machinery consisted of co-ordinating machinery in Whitehall within the Cabinet Committee system and a variety of organisations in Whitehall and the colonies to implement it.

The previous chapters have also shown how elements within the CO acted to resist change and to moderate changes they were forced to accept. These forces can also be seen at work in relation to the implementation of colonial policy by covert action. The development of new intelligence functions however, inevitably meant major changes to the machinery for implementing such operations, firstly in the coordinating machinery at the Whitehall end and secondly in the machinery for implementing and coordinating it at the colonial end. These developments drew on relevant precedents from the experience of imperial governance which posed some of the same problems. The problem was exacerbated by direct United States interference which meant external liaison machinery had to be created. Since handover and the implementation of covert policy implementation occurred in the same period developments discussed in Chapter 4 need to be remembered as the discussion in this chapter develops.

At a strategic level covert operations were used in a number of ways, normally in conjunction with overt activity. They were used as an integral part of implementing British foreign (and later colonial) policy and diplomacy. British ‘foreign’ policy in this period was handled by three major departments; the Foreign Office (FO) which dealt with foreign countries, the Colonial Office (CO) which dealt with the colonial empire and the Commonwealth Relations
Office (CRO), which dealt with the dominions. Each department had different objectives but each used diplomacy and political negotiation, military activity and aid of various kinds, political, military, economic, and social to achieve them. Sometimes it can be difficult to distinguish between special counter-subversion and ordinary aid programmes. The complexity of the different objectives of the various departments dealing with foreign affairs could seriously affect the development of the programme of covert operations. Covert operations came in different forms including one off operations and longer term counter-subversion programmes.

The counter-subversion programme grew out political warfare in the Second World War but also out of long experience of dealing with communist and anti-colonial subversion and espionage in Britain and the empire. There was precedent for centrally co-ordinated counter-subversion and subversion activities, mostly in war time. In 1917-20, for example, British intelligence was involved in military intervention in Russia after the revolution. Strategic military intervention was carried out to ensure the continued flow of information. During the Second World War the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) carried out such activities through Europe. These precedents affected the development of a new Cold War counter-subversion programme in the colonies and fed back into policy and decision making in Whitehall. Counter-Subversion developed into a centrally co-ordinated global programme however as a result of the specific threats of the Cold War. During the Cold War senior personnel became deeply impressed by their perception of the success of Soviet subversion.

Covert operations fell into a number of classifications during the Cold War: paramilitary support of resistance movements in the Soviet Bloc; subversion in communist occupied and other hostile territories; counter-subversion to prevent the spread of communist subversion in friendly countries and colonies, and covert activity associated with counter-insurgency campaigns. These forms overlapped considerably. Counter-Subversion consisted of both covert and overt activity and covered a range of activities from police and military action to political negotiation, propaganda, educational programmes, economic aid, training courses, and the provision of technical expertise. Counter-insurgency can be seen as an extreme form of counter-subversion involving the addition of military action on a large scale in the face of

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large scale violence. Counter-subversion was undertaken by a variety of individual British
departments of state but these programmes were increasingly co-ordinated in Britain by
Cabinet Committees of various levels (although some departmental committees such as the
Russia Committee also had an important role) and implemented by the Whitehall departments
and the intelligence services with the support of a variety of other organisations including
political parties and the Trades Union Congress.

Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, who was involved in the central intelligence
machinery, defined counter-subversion as:

[...] clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or operations, directed against
communism or, in the Colonies, subversive forms of nationalism [...] 

Powerful figures involved in Whitehall and the intelligence machinery including Sir Gerald
Templer, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, and Sir Patrick Dean advocated the use of subversion and
counter-subversion. This inner group of senior civil servants and British military officers
came to the conclusion that subversion could be turned against the Soviet Union. They also
believed that a study of communist subversion would identify the methods for defeating it.
The idea was aggressive without running a large risk of generating open war. There is
evidence that they set out to implement counter-subversion in the friendly states and
subversion in unfriendly ones.

The British government also encouraged counter-subversion activity by other states in the
Commonwealth. The Australian government’s concept of counter-subversion was based upon
British precedents and is worth quoting in full as a clear description of what was involved.

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455 The National Archives, Prime Minister’s Department, hereinafter abbreviated to TNA. PREM; TNA, PREM
11/1582, Minute to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 28 November
1955, para. 2. For further discussion see Thomas J. Maguire ‘Counter Subversion in the Early Cold War: The
Official Committee on Communism (Home); the Information Research Department; and ‘State-Private

456 The Journal of Contemporary British History 13:2 (1999) was devoted to a series of articles about various
personalities who were involved in these activities during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

457 Christopher Waters, ‘A failure of imagination: RG Casey and Australian plans for counter subversion in Asia
Submission 241, 5 January 1955 and Cabinet Decision 262, 7 January 1955 .Cabinet Secretariat C1147,
C4940/1AA ; Daniel Oakman, ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid; Counter Subversion and the Colombo Plan 1950-
pp.13,18 35-72; Christopher Waters, ‘A Failure of’ Imagination : R.G. Casey and Australian Plans for Counter-
‘In early 1955 the Menzies government gave Casey [Australian Minister of External Affairs] the responsibility for organising the non-military response of Australia to the cold war in Asia. The Cabinet declared that the response of Australia to communist subversion in Asia was a matter of the utmost importance and it made five specific decisions. First, it decided to give Casey responsibility for ministerial coordination of cold war planning. Second, it called for plans to be drawn up for expanding the activities and technical facilities of Radio Australia. Third, cabinet agreed that Australia would be prepared to exchange with other South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) members’ information on communist activities and on the means needed to counter communist subversion. The specific measures of counter subversion included assistance in the training of member countries’ security forces, a contribution to propaganda and other information activities designed to combat communism, and assistance in eliminating communist influence and promoting democratic and pro-western influences in schools, trade unions and youth organisations in the region. Fourth, it requested that proposals be drawn up to expand the teaching of Indonesian, Malay and other Asian languages in Australia. Fifth, cabinet asked Casey to arrange for officials “to look into the question of combating subversive communist propaganda domestically...”

These documents show that Communist ‘Subversion’, i.e. the indoctrination of ‘states’ outside Soviet control with Marxist ideas was considered a particular issue in the Cold War. Subversion was achieved by the USSR and its intelligence agencies: by providing support for local communist parties; involvement in the activities of left wing organisations like trades unions, youth organisations and the labour movement; through propaganda, both overt and covert; through espionage; the penetration of foreign governments; and through left wing journalists and media.

Subversion led to the development of counter-subversion. The British intelligence services had a role in the process; however their resources were very limited. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) had the para-military capability to conduct ‘special operations’, controlled radio

stations and had the capacity to conduct ‘black’ propaganda operations, predominantly in the Middle East, but it also used colonial territory to broadcast into target countries. Increasingly the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) undertook the paramilitary operations on behalf of the intelligence services. The Security Service only provided advice and liaison to local security forces in most colonies; indeed in some it did not even have a permanent representative. In the Middle East however it had more resources. It was operationally involved in Palestine and its liaison officers were appointed to the police and military forces of independent governments in the region.

Counter-subversionary measures also had to be implemented at local level. Some colonial governments set up formal ‘counter-subversion’ organisations of their own, notably Singapore and Malaya, but most used their police Special Branches and administrative resources to apply the ideas and resources generated in Britain and locally. These included the activity of the Post and Telegraphs, Customs, Public Works Department, Education Department, and Native Affairs Departments. Organisations such as local trades unions, local employer organisations, local political parties, educational trusts and British bodies such as the British Council were all utilised.

There has been little scholarship on the co-ordination of counter-subversion, as opposed to counter-insurgency in the empire. Philip Murphy suggested, in passing, that the negotiations in Whitehall, which accompanied the formation of the Official Committee on Counter-Subversion, were connected with the start of Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) operations in areas which were normally considered the preserve of the Security Service. Chikara Hashimoto has written about the role of the Security Service in counter-subversion operations in the informal empire in the Middle East, suggesting that the main interest of British and regional intelligence bodies was communism and that local matters were best left to local authorities. There is also some material on attempts to ‘export’ counter-subversion through

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458 TNA, CAB130/114 Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies, 1956.
regional defence pacts. South Arabia has received considerable attention. Rory Cormac examined the development of co-ordinating machinery to manage counter subversion in Whitehall as a result of experience in South Arabia in the early 1960s. His analysis provides the interesting point that in order to take ‘active measures’ as opposed to using propaganda, a new organisation, the Joint Action Committee (JAC), had to be set up which suggests that the Counter Subversion Committee was predominantly concerned with co-ordinating propaganda programmes which were created by IRD and seeking financial resources to carry them out rather than co-ordinating covert paramilitary activity. The weakness of his analysis, as in his analysis of the Templer Report, is that he doesn’t explore the co-ordinating machinery before the early 1960s. Whilst the amount of information about the co-ordinating structure is limited this thesis argues it may be possible to discern continuity in the counter-subversion co-ordinating machinery from 1948 through to the 1960s in various shapes and forms and suggest that the machinery discussed by Cormac had much deeper roots in the imperial intelligence system.

Definitions:

In order to understand the active element of counter-subversion it is necessary to understand the terminology used by the intelligence services relating to covert actions. Using British SIS terminology, covert operations at operational level may be divided into two forms. ‘Special Operations’, (SO) were essentially paramilitary operations, normally in support of foreign resistance groups. The other form of covert activity was ‘Special Political Action’, (SPA) which was mainly concerned with political manipulation through propaganda and the manipulation of people. ‘Special Operations’ and ‘Special Political Action’ were not strictly intelligence gathering operations but rather means of implementing foreign policy. The

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463 Rory Cormac, ‘Co-ordinating Covert Action: the case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency’ Journal of Strategic Studies (2012), 1-26 iFirst article.
collection and assessment of information through the intelligence machinery guided policy making. The nature of the machinery also made it a useful tool for secret diplomacy and implementing policy.\textsuperscript{465} Counter-subversion mainly used SPA to achieve its ends.

This chapter will firstly seek to examine the development of co-ordinating machinery for counter-subversionary activities in Whitehall and the relationship between the machinery and the CO. As in the previous chapter it will become apparent that there is a fundamental uncertainty about the CO’s attitude to communism or subversion. On the one hand there is evidence of both the CO and the colonial governments taking an authoritarian stance, but on the other there is also evidence of libertarian tendencies which led the CO to resist police and security initiatives.\textsuperscript{466} The chapter will argue that there was a direct connection and some degree of continuity of approach between the initial co-ordinating machinery for operations the Committee on Communism Overseas AC (O) set up in December 1949, the later Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies and its twin the Foreign Office’s Counter Subversion Committee and the Counter Subversion Committee set up in 1963. It will also suggest that the concept of a Joint Action Group (JAC) identified by Clive Jones, Rory Cormac, and P.H.J. Davies was conceptually a development of the operational co-ordinating machinery in the AC (O) even though it fell outside the British intelligence hierarchy. It will show how the development process demonstrated some of the major inter-departmental differences between the CO and other Whitehall departments and confirms the differences between departments suggested by Cormac in relation to the role of the JIC. This will demonstrate some of the major differences between the CO and other departments about the efficacy of covert action. The chapter will also consider the question of how far the CO lost authority over colonial affairs to other departments as a result centrally co-ordinated counter subversion activity. Finally the chapter will make reference to some aspects of counter-subversion in the colonies and the importance of American intervention. The chapter will examine the development of central machinery for undertaking covert action especially counter subversion and then examine how the machinery developed in the imperial setting.


The development of the Whitehall machinery for co-ordinating counter-subversion and other covert activity to 1956:

The machinery used by Whitehall to conduct counter-subversion during the Cold War and decolonisation may be divided into two parts: the ‘co-ordinating’ and the ‘implementing’ elements. These were further subdivided into the machinery for carrying out two different functions ‘coercive’ and ‘supportive’. Supportive activity included information and propaganda, economic development education and welfare and coercive activity included investigation raiding and internment the suppression of seditious literature.

The co-ordinating machinery in Whitehall developed over time. The central machinery consisted of a mixture of cabinet, official, interdepartmental and departmental committees each of which handled an aspect of counter-subversion as discussed in the development of the Cabinet Office machinery in Chapter 4. The Cabinet Defence, Colonial Policy, and Overseas Policy committees all had general interests in the subject matter. In 1948 the most important however were the Committee on Communism AC (M) and its official committees, the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) and (Home) (1948-1956) which managed anti communist activity both at home and overseas. In 1956 the AC (O) was abolished and the Colonial Policy Committee (1955-1956) and its Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies (and its twin the FO’s Counter Subversion Committee) took over both anticomunist and anti-colonial activity. In 1963 a special operational co-ordinating body, the JAC was created within the policy implementation structures of the Cabinet Office to address the perceived clumsiness of the other co-ordinating machinery.

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468 Thomas J. Maguire, ‘Counter Subversion in the Early Cold War: The Official Committee on Communism (Home), the Information Research Departments and ‘State-Private Networks’ *Intelligence and National Security (First article, pp.2,6-10,121-15.
Some commentators suggest that the JAC was a new development; however there was earlier precedent for covert action and consequently a system of management would have been required. During the early 1950s covert action had already become an important strand in British activity, notably in Iraq, and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{470} From 1945 to 1956 there was a series of offensives by Whitehall involving propaganda,\textsuperscript{471} security measures, and covert operations against communist occupied territories.\textsuperscript{472} Various committees and departments in Whitehall including the IRD of the FO had a hand in the development of covert action which mixed propaganda and covert warfare. Some of this activity was co-ordinated and financed through the Official Committee for Countering Communism (Overseas) AC (O), which was formed in 1948/49\textsuperscript{473} and AC (H) its equivalent which operated in Britain.\textsuperscript{474} AC (O)’s membership included representatives of the FO, COS and the head of the SIS.\textsuperscript{475} It was set up at the suggestion of Ernest Bevin and COS for the co-ordination and initial of anti-communist measures including propaganda by IRD and covert paramilitary operations by SIS. Members included the Chairman of the JIC, Chief of SIS, representatives from the MOD and the COS chaired initially by Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the Permanent Under Secretary’s Department (PUSD) of the FO. It was under the supervision of the Ministerial Committee on Communism AC (M) and paired with another official committee AC (H).\textsuperscript{476} These two committees answered to the Ministerial Committee on Communism AC (M).\textsuperscript{477} The intention seems to have been a way to limit the influence of COS and their push for the adoption of more aggressive policies in the Cold War and developing ideas about clandestine operations


\textsuperscript{472} Richard Aldrich, \textit{The Hidden Hand}, He identifies these trends in Chapters 4 MI5: Defectors, spy trials and Subversion, Chapter 5, the counter offensive: from CRD to IRD and Chapter 6, The Fifth Column of Freedom: Britain embraces Liberation, Chapter 7 Liberation or Provocation? Special Operations in the Eastern Bloc.

\textsuperscript{473} TNA, PREM11/1582, Minute, Alan Lennox Boyd, Colonial Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 15 November 1955, para.8; Peter Hennessy, \textit{The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War} (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 20. quotes TNA, PREM 8/1365 Proposed Activities Behind the Iron Curtain’, Brook to Attlee, 30 November 1950, and TNA, PREM 11/174 Request by Prime Minister for List of All Committees in Whitehall”, Brook to Churchill 20 November 1951. Both quote committees called Communist (Home) and Communist (Overseas)


\textsuperscript{475} TNA, PREM11/1582, Minute Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 21 October 1955, para.7-8.

\textsuperscript{476} Chikara Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East’, pp. 851-2.

\textsuperscript{477} \textit{Ibid}. (p. 851).
against ‘communism’.⁴⁷⁸ The key thing was that the AC (O) seems to have actively co-ordinated and resourced operations. Hashimoto suggests that it co-ordinated propaganda warfare from IRD in the FO and the paramilitary activity of the SIS.⁴⁷⁹ Maguire demonstrated that it was a planning and co-ordinating body pointing out that the AC (O) had an ‘Overseas Planning Section’.⁴⁸⁰ Its membership included the intelligence service, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and MOD which suggests AC (O) was a committee for co-ordinating ‘SPA’.⁴⁸¹ The duties of AC (O) seem to foreshadow the development of the JAC in 1963 in a number of ways. In terms of operational practice the committee appears to have operated in a similar way to the later Counter-Subversion committees i.e. the committee obtained studies of particular problems and geographical areas from the relevant departments and then allocated resources to each.⁴⁸² Action was presumably carried out by the intelligence services. AC (O) was also involved in a whole range of activities designed to retain friends, build British prestige, destroy enemies and convert neutrals.

AC (O) was disbanded in 1955-56 on the recommendation of Sir Norman Brook who noted that it gave the COS too much power to follow aggressive policies and that its terms of reference were too narrow and consequently that it was unable to move to problems beyond Communism i.e. anti-colonial nationalism and subversion. Strictly speaking AC(O)’s remit had not included the empire and the CO was not a charter member, however AC(O) was interested in the Middle East as a key British interest and this particular theatre overlapped with British interests in East Africa the Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa. The COS’ representatives on the committee were aggressive and the committee offered a forum in which the COS could press for covert action which could affect CO interests. The perception in the mid nineteen fifties that Communist subversion was a growing threat in both formal and informal empires, a view point held by the FO as well as the COS, meant that the AC (O) had a legitimate cause for expanding its remit. Certainly when the impact of the Templer report was being assimilated the connections between the AC (O) and the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies were recognised and its activities provide insight into

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⁴⁷⁸ TNA, PREM11/1582, Minute Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 21 October 1955, para.7-8; Ibid, Minute, ‘Counter subversion’ Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, Undated para.4. Brook wanted to get rid of AC (O) as an unproductive forum for COS to ‘needle’ the FO over policy.
the practice of counter-subversion, which also offer insight into activity in the colonial empire.

There were also cabinet and interdepartmental committees which dealt with the ‘soft’ aspects of counter-subversion. The Cabinet Economic Policy Committee for example had a general role in producing economic conditions to improve living standards in both British and colonies which was regarded as a key element in limiting the appeal of communism both internally and externally. More specifically there was a CO committee on the Welfare of Colonial Students formed in 1947. As a result of the administrative complexity it is difficult to follow the chains of command and the channels through which information flowed and consequently to perceive all of the aspects of the policy of counter-subversion and its implementation.

The management of Counter-Subversion in the empire was the responsibility of the CO and the colonial governments. Initially the CO’s geographical departments had a role in working with the colonial governments to counter the spread of communism but the local authorities actually carried it out.

Counter subversion and the mechanics of colonial rule had many similarities since both were concerned with the control of anti British and anti colonial activity. As communism and other political ideologies became threatening in the interwar period action was taken against them. Inherent in counter-subversion, colonial rule, and later counter insurgency was the concept of both the ‘carrot and the stick’. The carrot included allowing some local elites special privileges providing they supported British rule. The process in Nigeria is probably typical of that across empire in the period. The colonial government had allowed moderate nationalism to develop within certain bounds and sought to conciliate moderate nationalists. The Nigerian government had kept communism under surveillance throughout the interwar years. Colonial governments also undertook their own counter-subversion campaigns. They issued propaganda, seized seditious literature, controlled education, and improved labour conditions, wages, and opportunities. Most surveillance of nationalist agitators took place

within the colonies but the Security Service and Special Branch undertook surveillance of students and travellers in Britain.

The development however of ideologies with international implications in the interwar period meant that the British government feared global communism, fascism, and Islamism which meant that it undertook international surveillance of the movements. As we have seen in Chapter 1 the creation of global ideologies led to the creation of interdepartmental committees in Whitehall, notably the Interdepartmental Committee on Eastern Unrest, to coordinate the activity of the CO and other departments. The Security Service undertook an imperial role in this wider activity. It kept records, undertook the surveillance of colonial subjects in Britain and provided advice and liaison to colonial police and governments. During the Second World War this assistance was expanded by the creation of the Security Service’s DSO network throughout the world.

During the Second World War surveillance, propaganda, and the improvement of political economic and social conditions were used to try to keep the colonial subjects loyal. Nigeria provides a useful case study of this process although as always it is necessary to be tentative about arguing that experience in West Africa was similar to that in other regions.\(^{485}\) The techniques and activity were further increased in the face of the communist threat posed by the Cold War, which led to the redevelopment of ‘imperial machinery’ to supervise and encourage anti communist activity in the colonies.\(^{486}\) The simultaneous advent of the Cold War and colonial disturbances however caused anti colonial activity to be conflated with communism and thus a national as well as an imperial threat which blurred the edges between the three activities.

Cold War counter-subversion activities in the empire were co-ordinated in Whitehall through the CO. The geographical departments, the Defence Department and the Information Services machinery worked together to achieve this. The trajectory of the development of the counter-subversion machinery was to follow a similar pattern to the CO’s intelligence machinery with increasing attempts to centralise and co-ordinate it with the British machinery. The CO implemented counter subversion in the colonial empire through its own


machinery in the same way that it headed its own intelligence hierarchy, although in 1948/49 it started to use propaganda material provided by the Central Information Office and the IRD in the FO. In late 1947 the CO and the FO started to look at propaganda but in late 1948 there was still no formal interdepartmental machinery for co-ordinating activity.\textsuperscript{487} The CO encouraged colonial governments to develop their intelligence machinery and it used its central and regional information departments to start a propaganda campaign against communism.\textsuperscript{488} Colonial information campaigns and activity were carried on through the early 1950s. In some colonies conditions became so bad that counter-insurgency was necessary. It was early recognised that suppressive action on its own was insufficient and so more positive aspects which came to be called hearts and minds were also tried although the effectiveness has been challenged in recent literature.

The implementation of counter-subversion programmes:

Counter-subversion programmes consisted of a number of activities carried out by specific elements of the intelligence machinery; information services, political action and propaganda and military and covert activity.

The ‘carrot’ was very important. Propaganda and information services were an intrinsic part of counter-subversion and a very important part of the conduct of ‘political warfare’ during the Cold War. Information services dealt with overt activity essentially providing a positive view of Britain and the West. Propaganda and political warfare had played an important part in the Second World War.\textsuperscript{489} Government recognised the benefits of maintaining the system after the war.\textsuperscript{490} Some scholars have argued that as a result of the disbandment of the Ministry of Information that Britain did not have central propaganda machinery, however L’Etang has demonstrated that new management was integral to British government policy implementation both at home and overseas.\textsuperscript{491} After the war there was a series of

\textsuperscript{487} Ibid. p. 50. Quotes TNA CO537/2758 Minutes by Trafford Smith and Rees Williams, 11 October 1948.
\textsuperscript{488} Ibid. p. 50.
investigations into Information Services. Implementation of the propaganda /information campaigns of the British government, after the demise of the Ministry of Information was carried out by the Information Services within each Whitehall department assisted by the Central Information Office. During the Cold War the Central Information Office concentrated on maintaining British prestige by emphasising British political freedom and economic success. The CO and the CRO both had Information Services as did the individual colonial governments.

In addition to overt information campaigns the British government also used propaganda which was created and disseminated covertly. Much of this covert anti communist material was created centrally in the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department or the SIS. The FO co-ordinated liaison with the SIS through its Permanent Under Secretary’s Department (PUSD). The FO’s Information Policy Department oversaw the Information Research Department (IRD) and the Cultural Research Department (CRD). These organisations worked in co-operation with the FO’s geographical departments. SIS handled ‘black’ propaganda whilst IRD dealt with both ‘white’ and ‘grey’ propaganda. The process was supported by the IRD of the FO for white and grey propaganda but black un-attributable propaganda remained the role of the SIS. Black propaganda included the use of inserted articles, which could be misleading for political purpose and the ownership of radio stations and newspapers and news agencies which could be used to put out a particular line without it being clear it was generated by the British intelligence services. Implementation of the propaganda policies and materials used in counter -subversion generally lay with departments responsible so in the colonial empire the CO disseminated IRD material.

Whilst counter subversion campaigns offered carrots they also relied upon the use of the stick. The development of British propaganda and cultural campaigns in the Cold War was

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492 From 1946-1948 both ministerial and official committees considered Overseas Information Services on an ongoing basis. Between 1948 and 49 there was an Anti Communist Propaganda Committee. In 1952 there was a Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Services. In 1953-54 the Drogheda enquiry argued that the Information Services and propaganda were ineffective. From 1953-54 there was a Committee dealing with the implementation of the Drogheda Report. In 1954 there was another committee on Information Services. In 1956 there was a Ministerial Committee on Overseas Broadcasting. Clearly propaganda and information services were a major issue for the British government.

493 Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53*, pp. 82–86


495 Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53*, pp. 73-77.

complemented by special operations. ‘Special Operations’ (SO) were paramilitary operations supporting local resistance movements from Soviet Occupied territories or émigré groups wishing to return to occupied countries. Special Operations involved military training and the supply of arms and communications equipment to guerrillas with the aim of destabilising foreign governments. These were often run by the SIS’s Directorate of Warfare.\footnote{497} At the same time the British became concerned that operations might lead to the to break out of a third world war and so they decided to concentrate on using propaganda demonstrating the advantages of the British way of life.\footnote{498} The way in which the counter-subversion ‘stick was applied in foreign territories can be seen in the Middle East and in this area there were similarities with the way in which it was used in the colonial empire.

The approach taken by the FO and COS to the problem of security against communist subversion in Arab states is illuminated by the appointment of security and police advisers to the Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan in the period 1950-1958. The Security Service, for example, through SIME, was involved in supporting counter subversion through the appointment of security advisers to governments and police forces. These approaches had considerable similarities to those used in the colonial empire. The focus of the counter-subversion programme was on human intelligence. Personal contacts were vital; in Iraq for example, the Defence Security Officer (DSO) worked very closely with the Director General of the Iraq Police and the Director of the CID. In Lebanon the Chef du Sûreté Générale was provided with security adviser initially an ex chief of the Sudan Police, at British expense. The Chef du Sûreté Générale later liaised with the Security Service Security Liaison Officer (SLO) for Lebanon and Syria. In Jordan British influence over the Arab Legion was assisted by the fact that it was commanded by a British officer, Glubb Pasha until 1956. Coghill the Director General of Intelligence, Arab Legion which undertook security work for the whole of Iraq was also British and brought together Lebanese, Iraqi, and Jordanian intelligence in a way which prefigured the Bagdad Pact/CENTO arrangements. The CO played a role in this foreign activity despite its distrust of the concentration on communism in Whitehall. It helped to find personnel with colonial experience for Security Adviser jobs. It found for example, an ex-police Commissioner from Hong Kong to fill a Security Adviser ‘slot’ in the Middle East.\footnote{499}

\footnote{497} P.H.J. Davies, ‘From Special Operations to Special Political Action’, pp. 65-68. 
\footnote{498} Ibid, pp. 68-9. 
\footnote{499} Chikara Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East’, pp. 853-869.
The Middle Eastern evidence also offers insight into some of the precedents that shaped the Security Service’s approach to the colonies after independence. Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) assisted the Lebanese and Iraqi governments through their networks of SLOs and DSOs. The Joint Intelligence Committee Middle East (JIC (ME)) felt, for example, that the Iraq CID was the best source of knowledge about what was happening in Iraq for British needs. The British Defence Co-ordinating Council Middle East (BDCC (ME)) tasked the Security Service DSO to collaborate directly with the Director of the Iraq CID on security planning for war. Similar activity was carried out through SIFE in the Far East the SLOs appointed to some colonies also reported to regional British intelligence machinery although SIME was more interested in preparation for war than the Security Service in Britain.

Despite the fact that the AC (O) had no colonial responsibility, the basic features of the developing model of colonial counter-subversion and the response to colonial emergencies showed similar characteristics to AC(O)’s overall approach. In the colonial empire the CO co-ordinated counter subversion activity using its own resources. It passed on external propaganda resources received from other departments. It could provide specialist personnel with security and propaganda experience. Like the Middle Eastern client states the colonial governments were expected to maintain their own security. The colonial governments used their own police and information services to manage the local situation but could expect advice and liaison from the Security Service and Whitehall. SLOs in some colonies, such as Kenya and Aden, like the Security Advisers in the Middle and Far East also reported to the regional security intelligence machinery. SLOs focussed on the defence of the whole realm rather than specific individual colonial security situations which were carried out by local police. Personal contacts remained the ‘bread and butter’ activity of SLOs in colonies and former colonies and allowed them to have more influence and access to information than the formal arrangements warranted. The British regional machinery also had a role in formal colonies, so it is possible to argue that there was a common approach. The SLOs in the Middle East also worked with local police forces some of which, like Jordan and Iraq had long term colonial police connections and administrative connections as well which included Indian input to the structure and training. The FO relied at least partially on personnel with colonial experience to act as advisers.

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500 Ibid.
Counter Subversion, Colonial Rule and Counter-Insurgency and the Colonial Office:

It is now necessary to examine the detail of the ways in which the CO managed counter-subversion programmes and to compare them with the management of counter-insurgency and other emergencies and the normal process of colonial rule.

The global programme of counter-subversion was seen as necessary by the majority of other departments in Whitehall in particular the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence (MOD), and FO. Generally however, the CO did not accept the centrality of the communist threat in the empire and consequently its personnel had their own perception of the nature and value of the counter-subversion programmes in the empire. As discussed in the previous chapter, the CO possessed a group of technical departments which included Defence and General (later Police and Intelligence and Security departments were created after 1955 outside Defence). This group also included the CO’s Information Services. Geographical departments had the predominant responsibility but were expected to work in harmony with the technical departments. The CO also had international relations and economics departments which handled softer aspects of British counter-subversion policy and liaised with the governments of the colonies of foreign powers. The CRO dealt with aspects of counter subversion in the dominions and self governing colonies it tended to accept the importance of the communist threat. The CRO by contrast with the FO and CO, was organised on a functional basis and counter-subversion fell within the remit of a number of departments including Defence, Labour Relations, and Trades Unionism. Communism was dealt with by the Communications department.

A number of the activities which comprised counter-subversion were also used in other activities such as counter-insurgency and colonial rule. This makes analysis of counter subversion very complex because it can be difficult to establish whether a particular activity was intended to support one activity or a number of the three simultaneously. The techniques of colonial rule were akin to counter-subversion. The ‘carrot’ of reforms and benefits were used to develop support from particular groups seen as allies and the ‘stick’ of force was used against others who were not. Whilst there was no need to hide such action in the colonies themselves it was often politically convenient to undermine the anti-colonial nationalists and other political opposition by using underhand methods. The degree of autonomy afforded colonial governments meant that such activity might be conceived and carried out by colonial
governments, their security apparatus, and information services and merely reported back to Whitehall.

The Cold War and the emphasis on global subversion by a foreign power rather than local actors meant that counter-subversion activities in the empire were initiated from Whitehall as part of a British policy although they often overlapped with local initiatives. The British government provided support to develop the ‘stick’ of the security and intelligence machinery, it also provided the ‘carrot’ of propaganda and information and pressured colonial governments to develop economic and labour measures to improve the lot of local people. Special organisations were set up in some colonial governments notably Malaya and Singapore to co-ordinate such activities.\(^{501}\) Finally when affairs were left to develop too far the same mix of activities with a marked increase in the security and military activity were used to counter insurgency.

II

Managing Counter-Subversion from 1956:

In late 1955 the Prime Minister [Eden] suggested the creation of a new ‘ad hoc’ official committee to deal with counter subversion.\(^{502}\) Finlayson shows that in 1955 a number of departments were concerned about lack of information from the CO about colonial developments. The result was that Brook suggested that formation of the Colonial Policy Committee (CPC) was formed to deal with this problem although the Official Committee met only ten times between 1956 and 1962.\(^{503}\) Simultaneously the Ministerial Committee on Security in the Colonies commissioned General Templer to report on the colonial security situation both military and intelligence. This Committee on Security in the Colonies lasted from 1955 and 1958 and has been discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

In 1955 the COS and the Ministry of Defence carried out a study of threats posed by the Soviet Union noting that the threat of thermo-nuclear war had dropped but that the government of the Soviet Union was taking the opportunity to spread its ideas by subversion.\footnote{TNA, CO1035/116, COS (55) 262, Covert Aggression, 12 October 1955.} The study saw different threats in different areas and advocated co-ordinated secret counter-subversion measures. Simultaneously the SIS was developing it ideas on how to develop ‘SPA’.\footnote{P.H.J. Davies, ‘From Special Operations to Special Political Action’ pp. 69-71.} ‘Counter subversion’ was seen by the armed forces as a new form of warfare to deal with changed nature of the threat. The COS wanted to manage counter-subversion throughout the world through the AC (O) Committee.\footnote{TNA, CO1035/116, Minute, C.Y. Carstairs, CO, 4 November 1955 ‘[…] A.C.(O) committee should become authoritative and executive and not at present a consultative body which makes proposals the responsibility for action on which lies elsewhere […]’} Defence and the COS working in concert with the FO had already managed to force the CO to make reforms as a result of Templer Report.\footnote{TNA, PREM11/1582 Minute from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to the Prime Minister ‘Counter Subversion’, Undated, para. 6.} Then they sought to co-ordinate the CO’s activity through the JIC.

The rationale for the appointment of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies appears to have been complex. The COS had become interested in the success of communist subversion and the possibilities of subversion and counter-subversion as tactics in the Cold War and were pressing the Prime Minister to implement these ideas. AC (O) was an official committee of an interdepartmental nature which dated from the period of labour government and dealing with these kinds of issues although its terms of reference did not permit it operate in empire. It answered to the Cabinet Committee on Security. The COS had considerable influence on the AC (O) indeed it had been partially created to neutralise them by providing an alternative forum to that in which decisions were made by the FO.

It is also necessary to consider the administrative context.\footnote{John M. Finlayson, The Cabinet Committee System pp. 33-38, 40, 50-57.} The Cabinet Secretary, Brook, took an important role inconsideration of the idea of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the colonies. He was interested in both the management of the cabinet machinery and colonial affairs. It appears that Eden was having a general clear out of old committees. Brook felt that AC (O) was too aggressive and anti-communist and recognised that the Committee also gave too much power to the COS. Brook wanted to balance the principle of ministerial responsibility and the efficiencies of the Cabinet Committee structure
and also balance the influence of the civil against the military departments. His solution was to officially affirm ministerial responsibility the FO was allowed to form its own departmental Committee on Counter Subversion and to control the activity of the SIS in this role. The colonial situation was more complex. Other departments were unsatisfied with the CO’s input on a number of fronts including constitutional development. The result was that whilst Brooke affirmed the official responsibility of the Colonial Secretary in fact, unlike the FO’s committee, the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies was a Cabinet Committee and was interdepartmental in nature. The CO resisted interference in its autonomy.\(^{509}\)

The Official Committee contained representatives of the CRO, FO, COS, Security Service and SIS. This meant that the CO had to take account of the views of other departments and may be seen in this way as part of the process of ‘taming ‘ or lessening the authority of the CO over colonial affairs and centralising management. It was limited however by being an ‘ad hoc’ committee and had a limited number of meetings between 1955 and early 1958.\(^{510}\)  

This suggests that like AC (O) the committee identified strategic priorities and then allocated limited financial resources (it appears that 25,000 pounds were available), to colonial governments and the intelligence services to carry them out. This suggests that it was different to the later Joint Action Committee which may have undertaken direct management of covert action however there is no doubt that such activity continued and there may be connections between this committee and the later counter subversion committee.

The history of the development of the committees provides evidence of the interdepartmental conflicts within Whitehall over intelligence. The creation of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies generated a commentary on events by Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, for the Prime Minister which makes the disputes between the FO and CO clear. The decision to form the committees was, in part, a response to both the need to widen the scope of the anti-communist campaign carried out by AC (O) to include anti-colonial nationalism, but also to lessen the COS influence on this committee. Both the FO and the CO were in favour of limiting the influence of the COS, however they fought between themselves over the chairmanship of the committee. Brook had hoped, for example, that Sir Patrick Dean from the FO, who also chaired the JIC, might chair the Official


\(^{510}\) CAB 130-114 List of meeting of Gen 520 shows 8 Meetings were held ending in April 1957.
Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies but the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not want the additional influence to go to the FO. In the end Brook chaired the committee himself a decision which potentially made the committee very powerful. His personal interest in intelligence meant that he took more than an academic interest in the committee’s activities. There is no doubt that the end result was negative from a CO perspective although the Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies answered to the Colonial Policy Committee and the Secretary of State for the Colonies because the CO was forced to act in concert with a number of other departments. The committee had representatives from the CRO, FO, Security Service, and SIS. By contrast the FO’s Counter Subversion Committee only had representatives from the FO and the SIS. The result was that FO and CRO influence over imperial affairs was increased.

The CO’s other problem was the COS. The COS’s desire to undertake aggressive covert action worried the ‘civil’ departments which felt that counter-subversion was part of the normal policy-making process not a form of warfare and consequently not the sole preserve of the COS. Brook was concerned that the COS also wanted to control the SIS and its covert action programme. The FO had supported the COS in forcing reforms on the CO for its own ends but now it swapped sides and supported the CO and the CRO against the MOD and COS.

511 Brook’s intimate knowledge of the intelligence machinery was shown for example in PREM11/1582 Minute from Sir Norman Brook to P.M., 28 November 1955, which also recorded Brook’s dislike of regional intelligence structures like SIME.
512 TNA, CO1035/116, Minute to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary, from N.D. Watson, CO, 21 February 1956 para.2.; TNA, CO1035/116, Minute C.Y Carstairs, CO, from N.D. Watson, CO, 24 November 24 November 1955.
513 TNA, PREM11/1582, Minute Counter Subversion’, Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, undated, 1-2 ‘[…]the Chiefs of Staff have sometimes seemed inclined to view covert operations in isolation from policy[…]There have been some signs that the Chiefs of Staff would like to control ‘C’’s organisation[…]’
514 Ibid. Memorandum from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Prime Minister ‘[…] the best choice (for Chairman) would be Mr P.H. Dean (Foreign Office) in his capacity as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It is just conceivable, however, that the Colonial Secretary, may feel that Mr Dean had too much to do with the recommendations in the Templer Report […]’
515 TNA, CO1035/116, Minute to Sir Thomas Lloyd, PUS, CO, from N.D. Watson, CO, 21 February 1956 ‘[…] should receive the support of the Commonwealth Relations Office and now also (to judge from recent remarks by Mr Dean to Mr Carstairs) of the Foreign Office […]’
The origins of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion:

PREM 11/1582 contains a detailed discussion between the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary and in order to understand the forces shaping the creation of the Official Committee on counter Subversion in the Colonies and its terms of reference it is necessary to follow the argument in the file in detail in order to understand the process. Macmillan, then Foreign Secretary, started the administrative action which led to the committee when he wrote a memorandum on counter-subversion. This seems to have picked up on the points made in an existing COS paper although Brook described Macmillan’s memo as more nuanced. The input of the COS and senior military figures was. The COS and Templer aggressively advocated their ideas about covert action through Macmillan to the FO and then to the Prime Minister. The personnel of the CO felt this was likely to undermine their position and undertook research into the source of the ideas in Macmillan’s memorandum. C.Y. Carstairs, a senior official in the CO and the Assistant Under Secretary responsible for the ‘defence group’ in the CO and the CO’s representative on the JIC, reported to the Permanent Undersecretary of the CO, Sir Thomas Lloyd, on the source of the problem and its authors.

‘[…] I learn (from the W.O.) that the actual occasion for the Foreign Secretary’s minute was an after dinner discussion between Sir I. Kirkpatrick, Sir H. Parker, Sir G. Turner and the CIGS- the general subject having shortly before been discussed by the C.O.S. Ctee whose report was not, however, sent to the Minister. It is of interest that Sir G. Templer was, I am informed, head of S.O.E. at the time of the transaction referred to in the first part of para. 3 of my memorandum […]’

516 TNA, PREM 11/1582 Memorandum from Harold Macmillan, Foreign Secretary to Anthony Eden Prime Minister, dated 19 October 1955.
517 Ibid. Minute to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 21 October 1955.
518 TNA, CO1035/116 , Proposal by Harold MacMillan, Foreign Secretary, for directing counter subversion in the colonies 1955-1956; Ibid, Minute CY Carstairs, Assistant Under Secretary, CO, to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary, CO, 28 November 1955.
519 Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, PUS, Foreign Office, had served in Military Intelligence in GHQ France in the First World War
521 Sir George Wilfred Turner, born 1896; Boy Clerk, War Office, 1911-1914; Grenadier Guards, 1916-1919; returned to Civil Service, 1921; Private Secretary, 1929; Assistant Secretary, 1938; Ministry of Supply, 1939-1948, culminating in becoming Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, 1949-1956; retired, 1956; died, 1974.
The whole process illuminated the ongoing interdepartmental tensions over intelligence. C.Y. Carstairs of the Colonial Office noted that Sir Dick White, then Director General Security Service and within the year to become ‘C’, Head of the SIS, had opposed the creation of the committee. The opposition to the committees revealed schisms within the SIS. The Prime Minister, Eden, sought the advice of the Colonial Secretary on Macmillan’s proposal. Sir Norman Brook subsequently managed the negotiations between the FO and CO ‘playing off’ the two secretaries of state against each other and providing his own commentary on the situation for the Prime Minister. Brook sought to control the development of the counter-subversion machinery. He wanted to limit the influence of the COS and to ensure that ‘counter-subversion’ remained under the control of ministers. Brook intended to achieve his goals in a number of ways. Firstly he argued that it was necessary to abolish the AC (O) committee which covered the same area but on which the COS had influence. The next method was to try to ensure that the committee was chaired by Patrick Dean (FO) which would have tied it into the United Kingdom’s civil intelligence machinery because of Dean’s role in the JIC. Brook, however, recognised that Dean’s history of placing pressure onto the CO from his position in the JIC might mean it was too much to expect the Colonial Secretary to accept Dean as Chairman. This evidence supports Cormac’s arguments about the CO’s attack on the JIC and the JIO. In the end Brook himself became chairman, a move which tended to weaken the COS’s position and strengthened that of the Cabinet Office.

Then Brook advised the Prime Minister to make ‘C’s’ organisation, the SIS, responsible for the active element of counter-subversion because the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister

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522 TNA, CO1035/116 Minute by C.Y Carstairs, Colonial Office, 24 November 1955. This raises a number of interesting problems. Tom Bower noted that White was a security man with a very different world view to the ‘barons’ who ran the Secret Intelligence Service. A.C. (O) had been dominated by COS, FO, and SIS and may have been involved in some of the operations White found problematical. See Tom Bower, Sir Dick White: A Perfect English Spy. It was also presumably imbued with the generally anti CO position of the COS and FO.

523 TNA, PREM11/1582 Minute Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 21 October 1955. 3-4, 7-8.; Ibid. Minute Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 28 October 1955 para.7-8.

524 TNA, CAB 130/114 Committee on Counter Subversion in Colonial Territories 1956.GEN 520 1st Meeting Minutes of a Meeting held in Sir Norman Brook’s Room, Cabinet Office, Great George Street, S.W.1 on Friday, 16 March, 1956 at 3.00p.m.

525 TNA, PREM11/1582 Minute to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Ministers from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 28 November 1955, para. 6.

526 Ibid. Memorandum from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to the Prime Minister ‘[...] the best choice (for Chairman) would be Mr P.H. Dean (Foreign Office) in his capacity as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It is just conceivable, however, that the Colonial Secretary, may feel that Mr Dean had too much to do with the recommendations in the Templer Report [...]’

527 Rory Cormac, ‘A Whitehall ‘Showdown’? (pp.69-71)
controlled the organisation, consequently control of the SIS could be kept out of the hands of the armed forces. The decision to use SIS strengthened the position of the FO within Whitehall. This reform was also important because it was the first formal redefinition of the geographical division of responsibilities between the Security Service and the SIS since the Attlee agreement, and the point where the SIS started to operate within empire. Because the independence of many colonies was imminent the CRO needed to be represented on the committee and the FO and the SIS also needed to have seats. As colonies became independent the CRO became a more important ‘player’ in Whitehall. As we have seen the CRO had gained a seat on the JIC in 1956. The allocation of a seat on the Official Committee on Counter Subversion allowed it to influence activity in what was otherwise the CO’s jurisdiction. The CRO also gained influence over the CO because the CO needed its assistance to restrain the FO’s attempts to gain control of all of the counter-subversion machinery and to support the civil departments’ attempts to control the COS.

Brook supported the view that responsibility needed to remain with the respective Secretaries of State in order to maintain civil control and that the committees should not have executive powers and consequently argued for two separate committees. In foreign areas whether ‘free’, or under the control of communists, the FO was the appropriate organisation to administer counter-subversion. The FO could continue to use its own resources (presumably including the Information Research Department and the SIS) without reference to other departments in ‘foreign’ countries. Brook’s approach is interesting. It has been argued that Brook did not like regional ‘professional’ intelligence organisations like SIME in which the COS had an important role in consequence Brook preferred an organisation answering to

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528 TNA, PREM11/1582, Memorandum from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 28 October 1955.
529 TNA, PREM 11/1582, Minute to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 28 November 1955, para. 6.
530 Ibid. Memorandum from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 November 1955, para. 2.; TNA, PREM11/1582 Memorandum from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for Colonies, 28 November 1955, para. 6.1.
531 Ibid. Memorandum from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to the Prime Minister; Minute Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister; CO1035/116 Minute to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under Secretary, CO, 29 November 1955.
533 TNA, PREM 11/1582, Minute to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 28 November 1955, para. 1-2.
The empire had specific problems so it was appropriate that the CO held official responsibility.

The Prime Minister, after pressure from COS and the FO, accepted the idea and decided it was necessary to coordinate ‘counter-subversion’ from Whitehall in the ‘United Kingdom’ interest. The purpose of the committee was to co-ordinate United Kingdom and imperial resources for ‘counter subversion’. Because of this role the committee provides an example of how British and imperial intelligence was co-ordinated, demonstrated aspects of the developing professional agenda and marked the start of intervention in the colonies by the SIS.

The negotiations over the composition of the counter-subversion committee also provide evidence of the development of the professional agenda in intelligence. Templer had sought to place the CO firmly into the British JIO. He tried to link the CO more closely to other intelligence machinery by creating an intelligence department within it to liaise with the Security Service, JIC, and SIS. He also sought to ensure that the professional agenda of the JIC and the Security Service found its way down to the territories. The development of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion continued that process. Whilst the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was acknowledged, the CO was forced to accept representatives of other departments in the planning process. By contrast the FO was allowed to control its own counter-subversion activity without having representatives of other departments. This meant that SIS became responsible for a FO led programme of counter subversion. Interestingly the SIS carried out a programme of visits and assessments of colonial territories in 1956 but concluded that it would wait until the colonies became independent to intervene. This suggests that the jurisdictional boundaries were being eroded and the British professional intelligence machinery was becoming more influential.

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534 Chikara Hashimoto, ‘Fighting the Cold War or Post Colonialism?’ pp. 9-11. Quotes PREM 11/1582, Minute to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 28 November 1955, para. 6
535 TNA, PREM 11/1582, Policy for Countering Subversive Activities throughout the World 1955-1956, Minute by Harold Macmillan, Foreign Secretary, to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 19 October 1955, para.12.
537 TNA, PREM 11/1582, Minute to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, 28 November 1955, para. 2.
538 TNA, CAB 163/8 Joint Intelligence Committee: Administration 1948-1957. History of the JIC.
539 TNA, PREM 11/1582 Minute from Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Anthony Eden Prime Minister, 28 November 1955 para. 2.
All of these reforms were designed to improve technical efficiency, and make it easier to manage colonial threats centrally.

**The implementation of counter-subversion from Whitehall and the CO:**

How was counter-subversion implemented? Evidence about the activities of the machinery derives from three major sources: there are the minutes of the Cabinet Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies 1956; a series of files from the CO about the studies involved; and there are files about the counter subversionary activities of the FO. The FO’s ‘counter subversion’ activity seems to have continued into the 1970s in the Middle East, South America and South East Asia.

In 1956 the Official Committee on Counter Subversion called for papers to identify areas in which covert activity might be useful. The first areas examined were Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the Caribbean and the Central African Federation. The first study for the committee was on the situation in the West Indies. The CO’s West Indies Department argued that the first targets should be the leadership of the Progressive Peoples Party (PPP) in British Guiana.

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541 TNA, CO1035/116 Minute to N.D. Watson, CO from CJJT Barton, CO, 27 March 1956. This included ‘training’ for counter subversion personnel from outside the colonies; TNA, FO371/121-283-FO371/287 Activities of the Counter Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact 1956; TNA, FO371/169532 Employment of the Counter Subversion Fund in Turkey, 1963; TNA, FO371/168561 Counter Subversion, 1965; TNA, FO371/173549 Counter Subversion Fund, 1960; TNA, FO371/123245 SEATO; counter subversion research service centre, 1956; TNA, FO371/116929Joint meeting of civilian and military experts on counter subversion: establishment of agenda 1955; TNA, FO371/116932 Information and Counter Subversion work: Australian proposal for eight power steering committee 1955; TNA, FO1110/1816 Commonwealth Relations Office: distribution of IRD material, IRD staff in various countries and counter subversion Committee, 1964-65.

542 TNA, CO1035/119 Minute to Mr Cox from R.L. Baxter, 17 May 1956.

543 TNA, CO1035/119 Minute to Messrs Baxter and E.M. Hall, Colonial Office, from WST Cox 13 April 1956.

The situation revealed cultural fault lines within the CO and the Colonial Service. There was a traditional dislike of spying and espionage. There was also a feeling amongst some personnel that covert operations could be counterproductive. Furedi argues that colonial service personnel were less concerned with the threat than personnel in the CO. He argues that the CO was concentrating on repressive action but that it realised that this could have a political approach rather than a purely military one and that Renison was appointed to implement this approach. Renison, the Governor of British Guiana, were very concerned about the negative effects of covert operations.

‘[…] I sincerely trust that your counter subversives (or whatever they are called) are not allowed to interest themselves in the [indecipherable] of open constitutional opposition to government which Mr Barton describes […] Cox had noted earlier ‘[…] the role of the Brook Committee to argue against counter subversion as well as for it […]’

The context of this document needs to be considered however. Renison had recent experience in British Honduras of dealing with a radical political party and seems to have attributed some of his success to constitutional behaviour. Furedi argues that in 1956/57 Renison had developed a constitutional model which was involved in capturing the PPP and forcing it to work within guidelines acceptable to the British. At the same time Renison’s initial experience had been gained in Ceylon where there was a considerable degree of self-government. Seen in this context covert action could have undermined the progress made to date in British Guiana. At the same time these arrangements were not complete so

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547 TNA, CO1035/41 Organisation of Intelligence in the Colonies: British Guiana 1954-56, Circular No.458/56 Organisation of Intelligence, 28 April 1956. Letter to P Rogers, West Indies Department, Colonial Office from Sir Patrick Renison, Governor British Guiana, 26 September 1956.
549 TNA CO1031324 Sir Patrick Renison, Governor British Honduras to Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for Colonies, 24 November 1953; TNA CO1031/1361 Governor Sir Patrick Renison to Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for Colonies, 10 June 1953.
550 Frank Furedi *Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*, pp. 185-187.
information which would enable a deal to be forced upon the leadership of the PPP would have been useful.

The West Indies department also wanted the committee to investigate the situation in Trinidad where there were labour problems. The West Indies Department recommended assistance from British Trade’s Union officials and Labour politicians in the formation of political parties. In this case we can see that covert operations were an extension of normal political practice. Given that the British Trades Unions were prepared to work with the government it was only necessary to use covert operations to give the Trades Unionists greater credibility with indigenous labour movements and people and by providing an outlet for discontent to reduce radicalism. This evidence shows that firstly there was a concern in the CO to use political methods where possible and only use covert methods where necessary.

The CO attempted to keep control over the process of counter-subversion even after the Committee was in operation. The CO, for example, laid down the process of writing papers for the committee in strict terms specifying who was to see material and in which order showing that senior civil servants wanted to maintain control over the process of counter-subversion.

‘[…] Geographical Departments to prepare a first draft on the political situation in the territory, and for this draft to be passed through Mr Barton for his annotations on the security aspect, to me for writing up for the Committee.[…]’

The ‘Brook Committee’s’ activities raise a number of issues. What action resulted after the formation of the committee and who carried it out? Did it become a permanent way of coordinating covert action as an ongoing policy? Was the application of counter-subversion a policy, in itself, designed to achieve UK interests in the longer term or was it merely part of the machinery of civil policy making? The records of the Committee do not show what action resulted from the country studies.

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551 TNA, CO1035/125, Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies, Caribbean Area, 1956 Letter to Stacpoole, West Indies Department, CO, from J.B. Hunt, Cabinet Office, 8 February 1957.
552 TNA, CO1035/119, Minute to Messrs Baxter and E.M. Hall, Colonial Office, from W.S.T. Cox, 13 April 1956.
553 Ibid.
The most important point is that the SIS seems to have become more involved in covert action in the empire in a reversal of the usual practice. There are a number of letters from SIS (Gold Coast) (Central Africa) which suggests that SIS had conducted reconnaissance of the territories concerned and that they had appointed an officer to ‘cover’ Africa. In a letter on a file on the Gold Coast SIS decided that action in 1956 was not necessary but wanted to take action to prepare for the time at changeover when defence internal security and external affairs were handed over and the Soviet Union and its satellites were free to influence the new indigenous government.

III

Counter- subversion after 1956:

It appears that the counter-subversion machinery continued to develop. The original Official Committee on Counter Subversion apparently existed from early 1956 until early 1957. ‘Counter subversion’, however, definitely continued after that date. A counter-subversion committee reappears on the record in 1962-1963. Hence whilst the documentary record is sparse it is likely that the FO’s Counter Subversion Committee created in 1956 continued to operate until at some point prior to, or in the year 1963 when its status was changed to reflect the changing responsibilities of the Whitehall departments involved in foreign affairs. In 1964 the Counter Subversion Committee became an Official Cabinet Committee chaired by the Foreign Office with representation from the CRO, CO, Defence and the two intelligence services. In March 1965 the membership of the committee was specifically amended to allow the Information Research (IRD), Economic Relations, and Permanent Under-Secretary’s (PUSD) Departments, of the FO to be represented. The Counter

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554 Philip Murphy, ‘Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture’, pp. 144-45.
555 TNA, CO1035/120 Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies: Gold Coast 1954-56. Letter, 3/5/5174 to C.J.T Barton, CO, from SIS, 16 April 1956.
556 TNA, CAB130/114 Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies, Cover sheet to Minutes of Meetings 16 March 1956-30 April 1957; TNA, CAB134/2544 Counter Subversion Committee, 1965; CAB134/3326 Counter subversion Committee 1966.
557 TNA, CAB134/2544 Counter Subversion Committee 1965.
558 References in TNA, CAB134/2544 refer to the records for the last year ‘as a Cabinet Committee’ and financial statements discuss budgets going back to 1963 suggesting a degree of continuity possibly as FO and CO committees.
559 TNA, CAB134/2544 Counter Subversion Committee, Revised Composition and Terms of Reference (SV (65)5), 17 March 1965.
Subversion Committee answered to the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee. The relationship between this Committee and ‘DOPC/OPD (O) Joint Action Committee’ mentioned by Davies is uncertain.\(^{560}\)

The Counter Subversion Committee reforms in 1965 are better documented than the 1956 reforms. The committee’s purpose was now:

‘To keep under review threats and potential threats, by subversion, to British interests overseas, and, where necessary, to recommend and co-ordinate action to combat such threats (SV (64)1)’.\(^{561}\)

This is interesting because no distinction was now being made between the empire and external countries so far as counter subversion was concerned. The composition and role of the Counter Subversion Committee had changed:

‘It has also helped to promote closer coordination between Whitehall Departments particularly where the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), the Foreign Office (FO) and the Colonial Office (CO) have interlocking interests’.\(^{562}\)

In 1958 there were still an FO and an official cabinet committee handling counter-subversion. By 1965 a single committee had this role. This leaves open the question of how the coordination of counter subversion was handled in the empire between 1958 and 1963. It may simply have been handled internally by the CO using the geographical departments and ISD to manage the necessary relationships with the British professional intelligence machinery and the colonial governments.

The Counter Subversion Committee in the early 1960s considered general counter subversion policy. The Committee made recommendations to the responsible departments such as the FO, CO, and CRO, and assisted in the co-ordination of action between departments but responsibility for policy and executive action rested with the ‘political departments’. The

\(^{560}\) Philip H.J. Davies, Intelligence and the Machinery of Government: conceptualising the Intelligence Community Public Policy and Administration (25:1) (2011) 29–46 (pp. 35–37).

\(^{561}\) TNA, CAB134/2544 Counter Subversion Committee, Draft Progress Report to Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee after 1 year as a Cabinet committee, 1965, para. 2.

\(^{562}\) TNA, CAB134/2544 Counter Subversion Committee, Draft Progress Report to Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee after 1 year as a Cabinet Committee, 1965, para. 7.
Committee advised the Interdepartmental Review Committee, which was responsible for resourcing activity, annually on the quantity of unattributable and covert propaganda needed in the following year. The main committee met quarterly. It supervised a series working groups and collated and supported their recommendations. The committee also considered how propaganda needed to be adapted to reflect geographical and functional realities in the area of operation.\(^{563}\)

The detailed work of planning counter subversion was carried out by Working Groups organised on a geographical basis.\(^{564}\)

‘The major instruments of counter measures form the subject of recommendations by Working Groups, include economic and technical aid and technical assistance, military and security advice, information and cultural activities including sponsored visits, administrative and educational as well as other activities of an unattributable and covert nature.’ \(^{565}\)

The close relationship of the Committee to the covert operations element of the FO is noticeable. Material created by working groups was sent for approval to the agencies which carried them out.

‘Departmental drafts of Country Studies should be sent to the friends, the Secret Service [sic] (Security Service/SIS?) and Foreign Office IRD for clearance rather than through working groups or the main committee […]’ \(^{566}\)

The significance of the direct connection between the counter-subversion machinery and the executive agencies demonstrates how counter-subversion was probably being planned centrally and carried out using British rather than colonial assets. There is evidence about some specific examples of counter subversion activities managed directly by British assets. The evidence includes, ‘A study of the development of Sino-Soviet Influence in Black Africa’ and the ‘Reports on the Activities of Working Groups and ad hoc meetings’ presented to each quarterly meeting of the main committee. The materials are fairly explicit about the


\(^{564}\) *Ibid.*, para. 3.


\(^{566}\) *Ibid.*, para. 3.
nature of counter-subversion measures.\textsuperscript{567} They included economic and technical aid, technical assistance, military and security advice, information and cultural activities administrative and educational advice and assistance and covert activity. Trades unions were an important element in counter-subversion activity. It was believed that diverting labour activity into trade unionist activity through British influenced unions and the provision of government labour officers was a good way of defusing labour conflict and preventing communist infiltration.\textsuperscript{568} The provision of defence attaches,\textsuperscript{569} advice on police matters,\textsuperscript{570} and the surveillance of Commonwealth students studying abroad were also used.\textsuperscript{571}

It is impossible within the ambit of this thesis to consider all of the activities used in counter subversion. Some aspects of covert activity however, can be discerned. One of the most important covert measures in counter-subversion was the provision of ‘unattributable propaganda’. In the mid 1960s unattributable propaganda was intended to directly influence opinion in target groups in order encourage them to undertake specific actions. It was closely associated with more general ‘messages’ comparing the democratic British way of life with repression in communist societies and similar ideas were used openly by British agencies. The messages were carried overseas in BBC broadcasts on radio and television;\textsuperscript{572} and by setting up of television networks in developing countries.\textsuperscript{573} In the early 1960s the IRD and the FO prioritised propaganda needs by comparing vulnerabilities and priorities.\textsuperscript{574}

The key point about unattributable or black propaganda was the necessity to give it the gloss of ‘respectability’ consequently it had to be accepted by ‘independent’ media without them questioning the source of the material. This could be particularly difficult in some territories and the SIS set up its own outlets. SIS ‘[…] controlled news agencies and commercial

\textsuperscript{567}Ibid. Counter Subversion committee The Implications of Sino-Soviet Penetration in Black Africa Note by FO 19 January 1965.
\textsuperscript{568}Ibid., Counter subversion Committee Reports on the Activities of Working Groups and Ad Hoc Meetings for Counter subversion Committee 17 February 1965, p. 2. Such reports were compiled for each meeting
\textsuperscript{569}Ibid. Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 11 August 1965 African Country Studies para. c
\textsuperscript{570}Ibid. Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 11 August 1965 African Country Studies para. a
\textsuperscript{571}Ibid. Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 9 August 1965 para7
\textsuperscript{572}Ibid. Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 11 August 1965 African Country Studies para. n
\textsuperscript{573}Ibid, Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 11 August 1965 African Country Studies para. f
\textsuperscript{574}Ibid. Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 9 August 1965 para2
\textsuperscript{575}Ibid. Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 26 May 1965, para. 4, Unattributable Propaganda FO notes (SV(65)7) amending (SV(64)11) Secretaries Note (SV(65)10)
publishers continue to be effective media of covert and unattributable propaganda which could profit us […]’

Covert activity to support specific, individual, British operations was undertaken in addition to propaganda campaigns. This included bribing individual politicians. It may be assumed that other pressures, including blackmail over sexual peccadilloes and the threat of violence, may also have been used but there is no evidence to prove this. The existence of bribery is explicitly revealed in a 1965 document written by the FO about Soviet and Chinese penetration of Africa.

‘18 In a continent where political influence depends more perhaps than anything else on personalities, we should not overlook the possibility of a concentration of financial and other support on particular individuals. Bribery is still an accepted and ‘respectable’ practice in Africa. African leaders are often ready to be rewarded by those who wish to be their friends. We could do ourselves more harm than good if we imitated the cruder efforts of the Chinese and others to ‘buy’ individuals with outright offers of money for their personnel use; whatever they may say Africans expects different standards from the West. But we might, on occasion, achieve much the same objectives by the more material forms of flattery, involving coveted prestige gifts, specially lavish hospitality and other tokens of personal attention, all inexpensive to ourselves, but of disproportionate value to the recipient. At the same time we must remember the personal factor in Africa works both ways; there is no continent which better repays Western care in selecting diplomatic and other representatives who can make their impact because of the force of their characters and to just because of the importance of their principals.’

Paragraph 20 of the same note also states that up and coming politicians should be identified and that the British must not be trapped into supporting the ‘status quo’. This may reflect experience in the Middle East where the US supported new movements whilst the British supported established regimes which worked to British disadvantage.

575 Ibid. Counter Subversion Committee Meeting 26 May 1965, para. 4, Unattributable Propaganda FO notes (SV(65)7) amending (SV(64)11) Secretaries Note (SV(65)10)
It is now necessary to turn to the development of the methods of coordinating and implementing counter-subversion have to be seen in the context of British administrative and intelligence developments during the period 1956-1966. The JIC, for example, developed until it had outgrown its original purpose as a military committee and the structure of the Cabinet Office had to be developed to absorb it. The Cabinet Office machinery also acquired ‘Joint Action Committees’ and later an Intelligence Coordinator. In the CRO various aspects of security information were handled by the Communications, Political Affairs and Defence departments. These departments within the CRO liaised with the new governments but shared the Security Intelligence Advisers (SIA) and Inspector General Colonial Police (IGCP) with the CO which provided continuity. The SIAs were abolished in 1965 however the same personnel continued in the same role in the Security Service. The IGCP became the Overseas Police Adviser and ended up in the FCO. The FCO and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) became responsible for all overseas intelligence activity except security intelligence training. The growth of SIS responsibilities was a victory for the FO and the SIS over the Security Service and was due in part to financial stringencies. British High Commissions and SIS staff then took over intelligence liaison.\textsuperscript{577}

IV

The modification of the imperial intelligence machinery in Singapore and British Guiana to facilitate American intervention:

It is now necessary to place the British counter–subversion programme into the context of the American counter-subversion programme. It is important to do this because the two programmes overlapped and because the development of the American programme caused changes to the British machinery as the Americans intervened in a number of colonies directly to achieve their own objectives. The American government had pressed the British government to allow the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate in British colonies but generally this had been resisted by the CO and CRO which wished to keep the ‘status quo’. SIS however seems to have become progressively more integrated with the CIA which does not seem to have hesitated to have pressured the government and the SIS to co-operate as Britain’s power waned. There seems to have been a determined effort to intervene in the early

\textsuperscript{577}Christopher Andrew, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, pp. 468-471.
1960s in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (and later in Southern Rhodesia) in Singapore and in British Guiana.

It has been argued that the Cold War was driven by two ideologies. The United States’ vision was a world shaped on American ideas with free markets and a capitalist ideology. These ideas emerged in the course of nineteenth century and helped to shape American intervention in the world in the post world period. This did not initially involve supporting American business directly. Russian ‘communist’ ideology was in conflict with the capitalist ideology of the United States. Americans conflict with Russian ideas helped to convince the Americans to move away from isolationism to intervention. This brought the United States directly into conflict with the colonial powers after the Second World War. It believed that the way to achieve stability was to reform ex colonies on American lines. Americans divided the colonial powers into two groups. The British who were prepared to decolonise quickly and used localised institutional structures and the French, Dutch, and Portuguese who wished to hold onto their empire in the longer term and like the Americans preferred assimilation. In the process the Americans created the idea of the Third World. Ideology helps to explain the ambivalent American view towards Britain and the British Empire. In the post war world Britain was seen as colonial power were prepared to meet American needs by decolonising rapidly especially in South East Asia. American ideas were modified in the early 1950s by the reality of the Cold War. America became expansionist and interventionist. The Americans wanted to Americanise regimes but in the context of the perceived ‘left wing’ nature of many local political movements and the perception that such regimes were either supported by or would seek the support of the Soviet Union they were prepared to intervene. The situation and strategic concerns associated with the policy of containment resulted in the Americans frequently encouraging reliable non ideological military regimes and allowing the British a certain amount of manœuvre room over matters of empire.

579 Ibid. pp.24-25.
581 Ibid. pp.24-25.
582 Ibid. pp.75-76, 112-113.
583 Ibid. pp.75-76.
584 Ibid. pp.118-119.
585 Ibid. pp.79-81, 114.
It is important to take this background into consideration when considering the development of ‘counter-subversion’ policies. The British and the Americanisms were both involved in counter-subversion but with different long term intentions. Both governments wanted to limit the spread of Soviet influence and create stable states. Fundamentally however there were major differences in the ideological rationale for such a process the British wanted to hold onto as much power and prestige as they could and were not interested in the ‘American mission of recreating American society internationally. The British had already involved spread a version of their society and ideas through a number of mechanisms in colonial territories.

Methods were required to achieve these objectives. The British had experience of colonial rule which at a local level required techniques of both reward and coercion, sought to identify local allies, and to manipulate local conflicts to the colonial power’s advantage. The Americans had to develop such a process. They had experience of colonial rule in the Philippines and of influencing states in South America and the Caribbean. Despite these fundamental differences of intention and understanding the outlines of counter-subversion process were remarkably similar.

The development of counter-subversion in the colonies was part of a wider global trend caused by the Cold War consequently it is necessary to see the development of the machinery for carrying colonial counter-subversion out in that context. Singapore was an interesting case because it was both a colonial possession and a strategic base for the projection of British power which the British wished to retain. The American government was worried about communist subversion in the colony and the region and had its own ideas about counter-subversion. The case of Singapore reveals some of the tensions and differences between the two allies. Singapore also has to be seen in the wider context of regional development particularly the development of SEATO. Singapore was undergoing decolonisation contemporaneously with the development of the British counter-subversion machinery and may have played a part in causing the British machinery to develop. Singapore underwent relatively ‘hostile’ decolonisation in which the British lost control of

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the process of handover once Marshall had been elected premier in April 1955. Marshall was weak politically, but sought to speed up decolonisation.

This section will deal with American intervention in British counter-subversion operations. The way in which the Americans intervened in Singapore may provide insight into their approach in British Guiana. In order to do this it will examine: the US ability to use the interdepartmental rivalries and British national priorities to achieve its own national ends; the machinery created to allow US/UK co-operation in the empire; the American perception of counter-subversion which overlapped with but also differed from British concepts; the way in which the US government carried out counter-subversion covertly in British colonies.

As previously discussed the British government reformed its counter-subversion programme in 1955 and 1956 by creating co-ordinating committees. Counter-subversion was becoming increasingly important element of British policy implementation. South East Asia was a vital area of interest for the British government. There was greater co-operation between Whitehall departments than was normal in imperial matters in Asia. Counter-Subversion in South East Asia was also a priority for the United States government making its implementation important in maintaining the alliance. The UK and the US were co-operating on counter-subversion operations in South East Asia through South East Asia Treaty Organisation from 1955 after the French lost Indochina and the Bandung Conference led to some states becoming non-aligned. Co-operation revealed differences in approach to counter-subversion between the two allies.587

The US government recognised British interests in theory, but in practice regularly interfered in Singapore and Malaya, and possibly elsewhere as well, in its own interests. 588 It is clear from the titles of some withheld files from the CO1035 file series that the CO was aware of United States National Intelligence estimates and of the presence of the CIA in various colonial settings.589 P.H. Dean, the Chairman of the JIC, the Governor of Singapore and the

589 CO1035/14 United States National Intelligence Estimate on Conditions and Trends in Africa 1954-56; CO1035/67 Activities of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Colonies 1954-56;CO1035/70 CIA (United States Intelligence Organisations Regional substation in Cyprus 1954-56;CO1035/72 Activities of US Intelligence organisations in Hong Kong 1054/56.
Counter Subversion Officer for Singapore referred directly to American intervention in 1955-1956.\(^{590}\)

The US government had the following resources in Singapore and possibly in other British colonies, such as Jamaica, which could be used independently of British control. In British colonies the US government was represented by a Consul General who reported to the State Department. In Singapore the US had a CIA station co-located with British Intelligence (JIC FE and SIFE) in the Commissioner General’s regional headquarters at Phoenix Park. They also had a US Information Service office in the city. Official liaison was carried out between the Consul General and the Governor and also directly at an official level but the Americans did not disclose everything they were doing to the Governor and the colonial government.

In addition to working with official organisations the US government worked with the International Confederation of Free Trades Unions which had split from the World Federation of Trades Unions (WFTU) in 1949 to implement it counter-subversion programme. In Singapore, for example, there was an American labour organiser from the American Federation of Labour-Central Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO) who was working to develop the Singapore Trades Union Council (one of a number of unions in the colony) against more left wing unions.\(^{591}\)

The Americans became seriously alarmed about communist subversion in Singapore following the election of Marshall in April 1955. The US believed in direct action against communist activity. It wanted new states to ‘sign up’ with the West but its actions were influenced by an underlying anti-colonial ideology. The Americans sold their conception of culture and democracy as the alternative to communism. The US modified its anti-colonial message in return for bases and resources in the Cold War. By contrast the British wanted to maintain as much power as they could, and incorporate as many ex colonies as possible into a Commonwealth structure. They were prepared to accept neutrality, ideally pro Western

\(^{590}\) CO1035/123 Organisation for Counter Subversion in Singapore 1954-56. Note on Counter Subversive Organisation in Singapore February 1956 para. 1-5; Top Secret Record of a Meeting on Counter Subversion at Government House Singapore 2 February 1956 Present: Governor Sir Robert Black, Mr P.H. Dean, Chairman of the JIC, Mr Goode, the Counter Subversion Officer and also Secretary of the Defence and Internal Security Committee. Mr Broome Deputy Counter Subversion Officer and Assistant Secretary of Defence and Internal Security Committee and Assistant Counter Subversion Officer

neutrality, on the part of new states. There were however splits amongst different British departments over the exact way in which this process should be handled and what the most important aspects were.

The local representative of the State Department, the Consul General for Singapore sent a series of alarmist reports to Washington. As a result of these fears the organisation for coordinating US covert operations, especially psychological operations, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) became involved. Its working committee consisted of representatives of the State Department, CIA, US Information Agency (USIA), International Development Administration, Defense, and a number of presidential special advisers. They recognised two American interests: one was about preventing subversion and the other was avoiding in being seen as supporting colonialism, but despite USIA opposition counter-subversion action was considered more important.

The State Department sought to pressure the British into action through personal contact, through official level contact in London and through local pressure in Singapore. The State Department recognised the CO’s opposition to American intervention and pressured the Foreign Secretary and the FO to control/influence the CO. The British were split internally over what approach to take. The security and intelligence aspects were considered in discussions in 1956-57 which makes the major divisions of opinion on this matter clear. Some thought that ongoing constitutional development was the way forward. They were opposed to covert intervention; this group appears to have included the Governor and some officials in the CO. The FO and COS were concerned about the security of the base as a base for projecting British power in the region. The FO recognised the need to respond to American concerns even where they did not share them. The Americans had identified a group of officials in Whitehall who wanted to hold Singapore. This group were prepared to use the threat of communist subversion in the colonies to justify repression. The US Department of State, however, thought that the British did not have sufficient forces to hold

593 CO1035/8 Intelligence and Security Aspects of Singapore Constitutional conference: possible non handing over of the internal security organisation 1956-57.
the colony and that time was running out to use long term counter-subversion techniques. The perspective demonstrates the different motivations of counter-subversion policy.

It is probable that it was American pressure that caused P.H. Dean, the Chairman of the JIC, to travel to Singapore to discuss counter-subversion with the Government of Singapore including co-operation and liaison with the Americans.\(^{595}\) Dean started by outlining the London position on using counter-subversion and ‘the increasing importance which was attributed to such means in order to implement the wider policy of Her Majesty’s Government’. In discussion the FO recognised the importance of responding to American pressure but was annoyed at the interference.\(^{596}\) The Governor Sir Robert Black argued against covert action because Marshall was not a communist, and if covert activity was discovered, particularly if it was seen to be carried out by UK forces for UK benefit, it would undermine the authority of the Singapore government amongst the general population.\(^{597}\) The Governor’s view represented that of some officials in the CO but not all.

The organisation for carrying out counter-subversion in Singapore was secret. It consisted of two co-ordinators, both members of the Defence and Internal Security Committee, theoretically answerable to the Council of Ministers through a working committee but in practice under the oversight of the Governor whose responsibility was to ensure that they met both Singapore and UK needs.\(^{598}\) The committee was undertaking three kinds of activity: ‘[...] i counter propaganda; ii positive and productive work by Government departments; iii unattributable clandestine activities [...].’\(^{599}\) The note made it clear clandestine activity was considered extremely important because time in the local situation did not allow for the success of longer term measures dealing with trades unions and education.

There was however general agreement between the British and Americans about technical aspects of counter-subversion. The State Department raised four heads: Labour; Education; Press/ Propaganda; and General points in a circular to be discussed with the British. Both repressive and positive approaches were recommended to achieve each objective. Labour should be protected by better work legislation and free trades unions should be encouraged.

\(^{595}\) CO1035/123, Top Secret Record of a Meeting on Counter Subversion held at Government House Singapore, February 1950.

\(^{596}\) Ibid.

\(^{597}\) Ibid. para. 2.

\(^{598}\) Ibid. Note of a Meeting Counter Subversion Activity by P.H. Dean, Chairman, JIC, 8 February 1956.

\(^{599}\) CO1035/123 Note on Counter subsersive Organisation in Singapore, February 1956, para. 3.
Western employers, like Canadian Ford in Singapore, should be pressured to deal with problems. The ICFTU should be encouraged but left wing unions should be forced to re-register on an annual basis. Educational provision at all levels should be improved. Educational provision emphasising Chinese culture and technology should be encouraged however schools should be reorganised to weaken the ‘communist’ management structure and teacher's curriculum and text books should be controlled. (The British were actually doing this). A ‘free’ Chinese vernacular press should be encouraged but Communist left wing papers ought to be controlled by using building regulations to shut down presses and denying the publishers news print. Generally repressive power should be used to protect anti-communist forces and crush communist organisations. These objectives changed slightly over the next couple of years however they do give a sense of what the Americans wanted.

Whilst the US was seeking to pressure the British there are some indicators that there was cooperation at a working level. The State Department’s ideas were partly based on correspondence with the US Consul General who communicated with colonial officials. The British were already intervening in the supply of school textbooks. The British Counter Subversion Officer had denied foreign currency to a newspaper proprietor to induce him to change his policy. The Americans also seem to have been aware of the covert duties of the Counter Subversion Officer.

Whilst it is clear is that a substantial element of the pressure for intelligence reform in the CO and the colonies was the result of interdepartmental pressure from other departments in Whitehall. It is also clear that from late 1955 there was substantial American pressure on the British government and the CO about counter-subversion operations in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. The pressure started in December 1955 when the State Department, after receiving an assessment on problems in Singapore and Malaya by the Consul General, Eric Koch, decided to place pressure of the British government to take action against

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601 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, 23 May 1956. Efforts to Establish Working Level Consultation with the UK on Subversion in Malaya and Singapore. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d459 Accessed 8 April 2014. This document summarises the contacts with the UK to date.
subversion in Singapore.⁶⁰² The OCB (a committee of the National Security Council) directed
the State Department and other agencies to work out a detailed plan for intervention.⁶⁰³ The
US proposals included the operation of US resources inside Singapore and Malaya and
support for the development of British information campaigns. The only dissenting voice was
that of the United States Information Service (USIS) which argued that it did not want be
seen supporting colonialism, that it did not have a budget, and that the British should develop
their own campaign.⁶⁰⁴

The US government placed pressure at three levels. It used personal contact between Dulles
the Secretary for State and the British Foreign Secretary. It used the US Embassy to place
pressure on UK ministers and directly onto UK departments, predominantly the FO at an
official level. It also used the US Consul Generals in the various colonies involved to place
pressure directly on the Governor and British officials in the colonies concerned. The OCB
and State Department came up with a nine point detailed plan⁶⁰⁵ and the State Department
promulgated this as a very detailed five phase plan covering a mixture of both carrots and
sticks under the major headings: Labor, Educational Institutions, Press, Propaganda, and
General which covered a detailed expensive and intrusive set of points to be carried out by
the British.⁶⁰⁶ The issue of counter-subversion was raised on Eden’s visit to Washington in
January 1956 but the Americans faced opposition. The British Ambassador, Sir Herbert
Graves, and Archibald Campbell the Colonial Attaché were co-operative but reserved. At this

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⁶⁰² Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Washington, 9 November 1955. Subversion in Singapore and the
Federation of Malaya http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d446 Accessed 8 April
2014.

⁶⁰³ The Operations Coordinating Board was established in 1953 by Eisenhower and abolished in February 196
by Kennedy when it was replaced by the Special Group It coordinated covert operations except for operations
which involved military action. It had a special emphasis on the psychological warfare. Chaired by Under
Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director Foreign Operations Administration, Director CIA,
Presidents Special assistant for Psychological Warfare. The President’s Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs and the Director US Information Agency could also attend. Executive Order 10483, September 2 1953,

⁶⁰⁴ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Under Secretary of
State (Hoover)Washington December 5 1955, OCB Consideration of Subversion in Malaya State  in urgent
cooperation with United States Information Agency (USIA), International Cooperation Administration
(ICA),Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Defense http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-
57v22/d447 Accessed 8 April 2014.

⁶⁰⁵ Staff Study Prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee for the Operations Coordinating Board Washington
December 14 1955 Summary of the Communist threat to American Interests in Singapore and Malaya and
2014.

⁶⁰⁶ Circular Instruction from Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consulates Washington
January 14 1956 CA-5294 Detailed Suggestions of Possible British Action to Counter Subversion in Malaya
point the local authorities in Singapore approached the US Consul General asking what his reaction would be to the re-imposition of direct rule. The State Department agreed to American support subject to the British considering other action implementing counter-subversion programmes and seeking the support of friendly Asian nations. Whilst Sir Hubert Graves and the Colonial Attaché were soon discussing practical issues with the State Department including the detail of liaison with various levels of government. Soon however it became apparent that there was considerable resistance at each level of British government to the American intervention.

The CO resisted American pressure in a number of ways. It promised action and then deliberately prevaricated to waste time before failing to make good on its promises. The Governor and British colonial officials also failed to act. The State Department responded by placing pressure of the FO to make the CO comply. Talks were conducted in detail, for example at one set of discussions in Singapore the Governor and a representative of the JIC (FE) met with the US Consul General, Dubrow, to discuss intelligence related material. The US Consul General argued that the dominant faction in the British government and colonial authorities did not want to implement counter-subversion because they felt they could rely on armed force and the greater the threat of subversion the more excuse they had for hanging on to Singapore which they wanted as a base.

This series of documents provide a great deal of useful information about the relationship between British colonial and American intelligence machinery, which it might be argued, is useful for understanding not only the situation in Singapore and Malaya but also offers

607 Memorandum from the Director of Office of Philippines and Southeast Asian affairs (Young) to Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Asia (Robertson), Washington, February 17 1956. Political Situation in Singapore http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d454 Accessed 8 April 2014.
609 Memorandum From the Director of the Office for Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs (Robertson), Washington, 23 May 1956. Efforts to Establish Working Level Consultation with the UK on subversion in Malaya and Singapore Chronological Summary of British Resistance http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d459 Accessed 8 April 2014.
610 Memorandum From the Director of the Office for Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs (Robertson), Washington, 23 May 1956. Efforts to Establish Working Level Consultation with the UK on subversion in Malaya and Singapore Chronological Summary of British Resistance http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/d459 Accessed 8 April 2014.
611 Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, July 9, 1956. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v22/460 Accessed 8 April 2014.
insight into the later situation in British Guiana. The Americans were clearly used to intervening directly at a number of levels in colonial situations utilising a multi-level diplomacy to push their ideas on the British.

The documents also provide a great deal of information about the American concept of counter-subversion activity. These points can be compared with those considered by the British in the discussion of their counter subversion departments in both Singapore and Malaya.\(^6\) The Americans went on to operate in Singapore until the early 1960s without keeping the British fully informed. The experience in Singapore demonstrates how the Americans used internal divisions in Whitehall and the British need for American support to pressure the British and colonial governments on internal affairs. It also shows how closely the British and American intelligence machinery co-operated. There were direct contacts at working level in London and the colonies. Undoubtedly when time came to manage covert activity in British Guiana the same structures and practices would have been used.

V

The co-ordination of British, American, and imperial intelligence structures in Britain, Malta, and British Guiana:

The Americans were used to working with the FO, SIS, and the Security Service on Cold War problems but not with the CO and Security Service on imperial issues.\(^6\) The Security Service, for example, had been held directly to account by the American government on a number of occasions. Sir Dick White, for example, was summoned to FBI headquarters to explain British security breaches.\(^6\) SIS had also been subject to direct interference.

Co-ordination took place at different levels: inter-ministerial; at official level with the US embassy in London; (a process made easier by the presence of CIA officers working closely with SIS in London) and locally in British Guiana. There was also contact between officials of the British Guiana government and the United States Consul General. US Consulates

\(^6\) CO1035/123 Activities of the Counter Subversion Organisation of Singapore 1956; CO1035/124 Activities of the Counter Subversion Organisation of Federation of Malaya 1956.


\(^6\) *Ibid.*
General were bases for the United States Information Service (USIS). The FBI worked through US Consulates General but was not based in them in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{615}

There is evidence from Malta which provides a snapshot of some of the liaison arrangements between the British and Americans which provide additional insight.\textsuperscript{616} The UK High Commissioner in Malta worked closely with the US Consul General but it was decided that the Defence Security Officer (Malta)’s sources should not be revealed to the US Consul General, only to Washington.\textsuperscript{617} The provision of information about specific intelligence assets indicates a very intimate level of co-operation. The Security Service kept the CIA London Station directly informed of events in Malta, although CO officials pointed out that keeping the Americans informed was not strictly an intelligence matter but one for the CO and FO. There was regular liaison between the CO’s Mediterranean Department and the US Embassy in London. The Secretary of the JIC suggested to the CO that it should let the British Embassy in Washington know what was being discussed. The fascinating thing about this source is that the CIA and American Embassy seem to have had intimate access to British and colonial governments at an official level in a way analogous to that enjoyed by Commonwealth High Commissioners and did not hesitate to criticise and pressure British officials.

The Americans also intervened in the colonies by using the CIA. From the mid 1950s, for example, the CIA had kept the situation in British Guiana under surveillance,\textsuperscript{618} but American intervention in Guianese politics from late 1961 changed the nature of intelligence co-operation and the role of its various participants.\textsuperscript{619} In August 1961 the UK and US governments signed a formal intelligence agreement to allow the CIA to operate in British Guiana. The agreement was expanded on 28 April 1962.\textsuperscript{620} In 1961-62 the Colonial Secretary

\textsuperscript{615} David Godfrey Make hi talk about the Caribbean and some other places (Kingston: University of West Indies Press, Undated), pp.25, 27, 35, 44, 48, 64. A copy of the Jamaica LIC report was sent directly to US Consul General,p.24. The CIA mounted operations in Jamaica using the cover of the Vice Consul p. 27; Initially CIA did and FBI not represented in Consulate General, before it became an embassy. p. 44. The US Consulate General did have a covert CIA officer under cover of cultural attaché, p. 44. Copy of report went to Commissioner of Police and to SLO p. 35. SLO involvement. p. 48. MI6 involvement. pp. 48, 64.

\textsuperscript{616} TNA, CO1035/154 Liaison with the Americans: Malta 1964, Note from J.D. Higham, CO, to Mr Kisch, Mediterranean Department, CO. 22 May1964; Ibid. Letter J.D. Higham, CO, to Mr J.A. Harrison, Security Service, 14 May 1964.

\textsuperscript{617} Ibid. Liaison with the Americans: Malta 1964 Letter J.D. Higham, CO, to Mr J.A. Harrison, Security Service, 14 May 1964.

\textsuperscript{618} Ibid. p. 335.

\textsuperscript{619} Tom Bower The Perfect English Spy. p. 332.

participated in the process which led to permission being given by the British government for
the CIA to operate in British Guiana. It is clear that the US government found the CO
difficult so they placed pressure on the FO with the aim of getting the Prime Minister (PM) to
overrule the CO by arguing that British Guiana was a significant threat to Anglo-American
relations. The Colonial Secretaries Ian Macleod and later Reginald Maudling were
certainly aware of the negotiations with the United States government but there was CO
resistance nonetheless. Some personnel in the CO, probably the SIA who was a Security
Service officer, the Defence, Intelligence and Police Department who liaised with the British
professional intelligence machinery and senior personnel in geographical departments might
also have known of CIA intervention. These groups knew about the SLO and the system of
security intelligence liaison and increasingly provided liaison between the CO and the SIS.

CIA Intervention in British Guiana:

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated clandestinely in British Guiana as they
had in Singapore, through the Central Industrial Organisation (CIO), an American trade union
organisation. Financed by the CIA the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the CIO
advised and supported the British Guiana Trades Union Council (BGTUC) and its unions and
the PNC with funds, propaganda, and liaison officers. When the Jagan government sought
to control the CIA’s union, the Guiana Workers Industrial Union (GWIU), it resulted in a
major strike and riots in 1963. The CIA may have provided weapons and explosives. The
most intense period of American pressure was between 1962 and 1964. In 1963 the
Americans pressurised the British to take direct control of the colony again but the British
resisted. This led to preparation in the CO and in British Guiana in case the Colonial
Secretary agreed to this. The CIA tried to influence Guianese voters using radio broadcasts
and ‘false stories inserted in local newspapers. This suggests the collusion of newspaper

621 The US government had a number of situations where it found the CO unhelpful see Counter Subversion in
Singapore and Malaya in 1956: Telegram from Department of State to Embassy, United Kingdom, Washington,
August 11, 1961 7.14pm contains text of a letter from Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to Lord Home (Foreign
Secretary) http://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v12 accessed 3 April 2014; Telegram from
Department of State to Embassy United Kingdom June 21 1963 7.03 pm from Dean Rusk Secretary of State to
April 2014.
Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: University North Carolina, 2005).
owners, editors, and journalists or at least their ‘unwitting’ use of ‘black ‘propaganda.’ Again this had similarities with American intervention in Singapore.

A liaison system between local British and American intelligence agencies in British Guiana was necessary but the details surviving are sketchy. There were already a number of existing mechanisms elsewhere for liaison between the Security Service, FBI, SIS and the CIA. Various sources suggest that both the Governor and the SLO knew of CIA intervention. Intelligence liaison in British Guiana may have been through David Rose in the Deputy Governor’s Office. At a practical/professional level it seems likely that the Commissioner and Head of Special Branch would need to know about CIA operations if only to prevent local police interfering with them accidentally.

At a local level there was diplomatic contact between the US Consul General, the Governor and the government of British Guiana, and local politicians. In addition officers from the Department of State visited the Governor. The CIA and AFL/CIO operated in the colony. The British SLO based in Trinidad knew of CIA intervention as did the Governor and senior officers in the colonial government such as the Chief Secretary and the Head of Special Branch, however clearly the PPP Ministers could not be trusted with information about US involvement. This meant that British intelligence activity had to be split into two parts. The ongoing preparation for handover and the security needs of the new government and the ongoing needs of the British which included hiding American involvement.

624 Ibid. p. 335
Conclusion:

The chapter has demonstrated that when it became important to add covert policy implementation to the list of the duties of the intelligence machinery, that the same long term factors which affected the development of the information collecting machinery remained important. The new machinery drew on old imperial and later Second World War precedents. It reflected the much greater centralisation of colonial policy making under the control of the Cabinet and its machinery and the wider needs of British national policy. These needs resulted in important modifications to the intelligence coordinating machinery in Whitehall and the creation of some specialised machinery in the colonies. A surprising aspect of the development of the machinery was the need to modify it to liaise directly with American organisations which were directly interfering in a number of colonies and the way in which the Americans used interdepartmental conflicts within Whitehall for their own purposes. This appears to have been necessary because of resistance by the CO and officials from other departments who resented American interference.

The experience of ‘political warfare’ during the Second World War and the fear of Communist subversion during the Cold War raised the importance of covert action, in the form of propaganda, economic aid and secret military activity, as a means of ‘fighting’ which were less likely to cause the outbreak of a nuclear holocaust. In Britain such action had been carried out by a separate covert machinery during the war but whilst the FO, the sponsor of the Political Warfare Executive continued to operate. The Ministry of Economic Warfare and Special Operations Executive (SOE) had been amalgamated into the SIS after the war consequently the British information collecting/ intelligence machinery incorporated the covert policy implementation machinery. Covert action became progressively more important over time. It consisted of a mixture of propaganda and repressive activity / covert military operations carried out in the context of overt activity. As the programme became more important it needed co-ordination at higher levels. Whilst the counter-subversion was useful in an ideological conflict like the Cold War it also had uses in imperial interventions. Covert action reduced damage to British global prestige and allowed the Americans to provide support without losing their anti-colonial reputation.

Internally these developments weakened the CO’s autonomous role in the intelligence machinery. Not only did British departments, like the COS and FO, push for their own
interests, they also wanted to protect the American alliance which gave them greater leverage in reducing the CO’s freedom of action. The Americans were aware of the internal divisions in Whitehall and used them to achieve their own objectives.

As a ‘national’ programme counter-subversion was co-ordinated at the highest levels and the intelligence machinery had to be adapted to achieve this as well. This facilitated the growth of Cabinet Office influence and the centralisation process in Whitehall’s intelligence machinery. AC (O) and later the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies and the FO’s Counter Subversion Committee were created to co-ordinate such activity and appear to have been later amalgamated. This machinery developed a role in empire as well as in Europe. The CO generally stood out against covert action preferring overt activity where possible but its resistance to such activity seems to have been worn down over time as it was more deeply incorporated into the Whitehall centralised machinery. The CO's freedom of action was further curtailed and it was forced to co-operate in such activity despite internal divisions about its effectiveness and its objectives.

The development of counter-subversion machinery also had the surprising effect of appearing to be a mechanism by which United State's pressure could be applied directly to the British and imperial intelligence machinery and to allow the US government to intervene directly in imperial issues. The British intelligence machinery was forced to develop liaison mechanisms to allow direct American intervention in some colonies at a working level. In the CO the senior officers and the ISD (and its successor departments) were aware of the pressure and kept records on American activity. It is not absolutely clear whether the ISD officials directly liaised with the Americans but it seems likely. This affected the intelligence practices in these colonies as officials worked directly with American consular and intelligence officials.
Conclusions:

The conclusion seeks to assess the case for determining the most important influences on the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. It evaluates the importance of administrative development and precedents, constitutional role, interdepartmental conflict, historical context, and institutional culture, and in shaping the development of the imperial intelligence machinery.

The thesis has demonstrated that the concept of an ‘imperial intelligence machinery’ and a wider definition of the intelligence machinery, is a valid conceptual framework to explore the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. It is a useful concept which helps to explain the development of machinery which was initially a combination of organisations, but was centralised over time to gather and assess information about the empire.

Initially it appeared that historical events were the most important influence on development. Cold War and colonial crises placed pressure on the British government. In turn government placed pressure on the Colonial Office and other departments to develop intelligence machinery to provide forewarning of potential trouble. The intention was to minimise the pressure on military resources needed for the Cold War and to keep the United States government on side. A neat series of administrative circulars chronicled how machinery was set up in the CO and colonial governments in response to pressure from the rest of Whitehall. Closer examination however revealed a much more complex story. If the definition of intelligence is expanded beyond the purely ‘secret’ machinery it is possible to see how the intelligence machinery was an extension of the administrative machinery.

It is clear that the long term development of the administrative, military, and police machinery in Britain and the colonies provided an important input to the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. The development of a professional bureaucracy in Whitehall from the end of the 18th century, based on models of central and local administration which emerged during the Tudor period, and their associated professional agenda, provided ongoing inputs to the development of the intelligence machinery. The administrative basis of the intelligence machinery, for example, helps to explain, why there were periods when there did not appear to be ‘formal’ intelligence machinery in Britain or the colonies. The
administrative machinery gathered the necessary information and processed it into intelligence. The administration formed more specialised organisations when faced with information crises and got rid of them when their activity was no longer necessary.

Police forces also originated in the judicial and administrative machinery. Political deviance fell under the jurisdiction of the police. Police forces developed their own sense of professional identity which resulted in professional agenda which included ideas about political policing. The police agenda differed from that emerging in the administrative structure. This had a fundamental effect on the way in which security information was collected and the machinery developed to perform these functions in the colonies. Police forces increasing provided the professional intelligence machinery in the colonies. This development tended to emphasise that intelligence was a separate specific professional activity rather than an administrative concern.

The process of intelligence development was complicated by constitutional practices and structures. The constitutional structures of the empire duplicated English institutions. Local contexts affected how these developed. Constitutional structures dictated administrative structures and the shape of the intelligence machinery. Ireland, for example, showed how English administrative and intelligence institutions were adapted to local conditions and in the process developed a different trajectory of development. In India, the Government of India had its own intelligence structures which were directly linked to the India Office. A similar process can be seen in the colonies. The relationship between the local government and its intelligence machinery in Ireland and India was direct.

The CO by contrast had no constitutional responsibility to directly control colonial governments. It was a secretariat for the Secretary of State. This unusual role had implications for the intelligence machinery. The CO formed an intermediate level between Whitehall and the colonial governments which separated security and political intelligence gathering. Security intelligence machinery was a colonial responsibility. The CO by contrast was only structured to deal with political intelligence. The location of security intelligence gathering in the colonial police and administration, however, meant that it was a local responsibility except where a case needed to be made to obtain more security resources from the British government. This in turn isolated security intelligence from the administrators at
all levels. The lack of an imperial intelligence organisation undertaking operations directly for the CO limited the CO’s commitment to and understanding of, security intelligence.

The creation of the British professional intelligence machinery in 1909 did not affect the CO’s fundamental intelligence role either. The British interdepartmental intelligence machinery had split into functional areas soon after 1909. Both foreign and counter-espionage services quickly developed corporate cultures and practices and their own professional agenda. The Security Service, whilst responsible to the Secretary of State for Colonies from 1931, only provided advice, liaison, and centralised records to colonial governments and watched colonial subjects in London. It relied upon input from its correspondents into colonial governments and police forces to obtain information. The Security Service only operated in a few colonies with military bases and through a network of Defence Security Officers DSOs from the late 1930s. It also had responsibilities to other departments notably the Home Office which took operational priority. The foreign intelligence service, SIS, quickly became responsible to the Foreign Office and was largely excluded from involvement in empire. These developments meant that the CO’s concept of intelligence and role in the intelligence machinery largely went unchallenged until the mid 1940s and consequently the CO intelligence machinery did not develop in the same way as that in other parts of Whitehall. It did not develop the kind of machinery that would be needed, in the different conditions after the Second World War, to keep the rest of Whitehall informed.

Administrative precedent made certain kinds of developments easier to implement. It shaped the way in which reforms were undertaken and assimilated in the intelligence machinery. The appointment of advisers, rather than directors, within the CO, for example, to oversee intelligence development was due to long term constitutional ideas and the precedents which had emerged during the 1930s when the first advisers were being appointed in other areas. In 1948-1949 external pressure led to the appointment of the police adviser, the system of biennial inspection and the greater development of special branches even though the political intelligence section was not adopted. Events in the early 1950s in the colonies led to the appointment of a Security Intelligence Adviser in 1954. Dissatisfaction with the CO’s performance led in part of the Templer Report in 1954-1955 which in turn led to major changes in the CO’s organisation which would otherwise have taken much longer to achieve,
even though many of its recommendations in fact were a codification of the reforms which had been working their way up from below.

This haphazard process of development made the machinery prone to a number of other features. It was vulnerable to interdepartmental conflicts and the existence of different institutional cultures in other Whitehall departments. In particular rivalries existed between the CO and the FO, on the civil side, (later rivalry was to develop with the CRO) and with the Service departments and the COS, on the military side. The FO needed information to manage the American relationship and the COS needed warning of crises which would affect their extremely tight military resources. Neither received information of the kind they needed and consequently they tried to pressure the CO into reform.

There were interdepartmental rivalries within the CO. The CO underwent a process of administrative development in which it changed from a geographically organised department to include specialist technical departments with global rather than regional functions. The divisions were not strong enough to produce outright conflict but encouraged the development of different administrative and security world views internally. Each of these internal departments had differing objectives and the situation was complicated by the existence in the CO security departments of professional police and intelligence officers who brought with them the professional agenda which existed in their parent services.

Finally the administrative structure of Whitehall dictated the routes through which information flowed, the places in which it was assessed, and how it was consumed. As the administrative structures changed after the Second World War the Cabinet Office became more important the JIC developed an important role and the responsibility for colonial affairs changed gradually from the CO to the CRO (and other departments) the machinery to serve the needs of these departments also change. In the process new personnel became involved and the professional intelligence personnel and the CRO's intelligence personnel took an ever greater role.

It is clear than that administrative structure and its long term development lay at the heart of the shape and practice of the imperial intelligence machinery but historical events also played a part in causing administrative and intelligence development. Historical events were important both from the point of view of ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ influences on the
development of the imperial intelligence machinery. The Second World War, and later the Cold War, caused centralisation of policy making under the Cabinet Office in Whitehall. As government dealt with the problems posed by warfare there was a need for central management information to inform cabinet on policy making. This process also applied to colonial policy making and the CO lost much of its autonomy. The process we advanced and retarded by information crises in 1948, and throughout the early 1950s which seriously affected the ability of COS to fight the Cold War.

Centralisation of government during periods of war also affected the British intelligence machinery. The JIC the British professional intelligence coordinating machinery had evolved from military machinery and its areas of interest were quite different to those of the CO. The coordinating machinery was focussed on security intelligence. It is not clear why the Security Service did not bridge the gap between the CO and the JIC as the service extended its activity into the empire. Probably it did not have sufficient manpower to undertake its own intelligence gathering. It relied on colonial governments and the CO for information and these had predominantly administrative cultures. The process of imperial intelligence development was further complicated because the British professional intelligence machinery upon which the imperial machinery relied for professional advice was undergoing development and centralisation; particularly its coordinating machinery. It also had to undertake simultaneous, ongoing, operations against the main enemy, the Soviet Union. These developments meant that the transfer of professional ideas and models was complex and difficult to the CO and the colonies, and there was no part of the machinery which was not in a state of flux.

Throughout this period the CO undertook a sophisticated campaign of resistance against administrative and intelligence developments in the rest of Whitehall until its intelligence machinery was fully connected to the British intelligence machinery in 1956-7. Even after this however, the CO could prove recalcitrant, but the trend was towards a higher degree of cooperation with the rest of Whitehall. There is no doubt that the process of resistance definitely slowed down the implementation of centralised machinery dealing with imperial matters and acted to limit and deflect it from the line of development advocated by the British professional intelligence machinery.
The CO also had to deal with a number of colonial emergencies from the late 1940s which caused developments from the ‘bottom up’. Each emergency provided practical problems which caused the modification of the colonial and CO machinery. The emergencies also gave ammunition to other departments in Whitehall which blamed them on ‘communism’ rather than on the variety of local factors identified by the CO itself and caused them to press for the machinery to have a foci which accepted their vision of the threat. The change of focus was important in shaping the form and focus of the imperial intelligence machinery.

Developments in the empire led to a colonial intelligence model emerging over time, which was closely associated with the development of police models. The model drew on a number of administrative, police, and intelligence precedents. This model was unsophisticated, essentially a template which contained a preferred organisational structure of coordinating committees, a central intelligence committee, a director of intelligence, and a special branch although it also included more sophisticated ideas about the penetration and manipulation of target organisations. The model was recommended by the CO in various circulars and enforced by the process of police and intelligence inspections which grew up by the advisers after 1948. The template drew on long term precedents before the Malayan experience but reached its final form between 1948 and 1952 as a result of experience there. The model thus became the ‘preferred solution’ of the technical personnel in the CO and the JIO. In this sense it does not matter that the CO did not carry out a full study of the various colonial disasters to create a fully developed system of dealing with these emergencies or that it was not necessarily the most effective system. As the system was transferred to other colonies by inspection, recommendation, the transfer of personnel and through the training programmes of the Security Service, it arrived at different times. The forms current in Malaya at the time of transfer was adopted but modified to fit local constitutional and structures and cultural forms. Sometimes a process of regional development was set off. This process was notable in East Africa and in Central Africa, West Africa developed in slightly different way. The development of the colonial machinery showed how historical events, administrative and intelligence reforms and cultures interacted to cause a process of development to occur.

The process of handover during decolonisation was an event which was important in causing developments to the imperial intelligence machinery both in terms of producing short term reforms to operate during the handover itself and in terms of altering the machinery to provide for British needs in the longer term. Eventually in the period 1966-1968 the imperial
intelligence machinery was absorbed back into the British professional intelligence machinery and accepted its interests and priorities becoming merely an aspect of Britain’s foreign intelligence collection effort.

An extremely important external pressure on the development of the imperial intelligence machinery was the emergence of a new role, i.e. that of the covert implementation of policy. Imperial and Second World War precedents shaped covert policy implementation and directly caused the development of new machinery to implement it. The development of British covert action machinery was closely associated with the development of US covert action programmes. The US alliance was considered so important that the PM and Cabinet pressured the CO, and the British intelligence machinery, to develop liaison mechanisms to allow the US intelligence services to operate in certain colonies despite the obvious loss of sovereignty involved.

The thesis has not attempted to quantify the relative importance of each of these influences however from a qualitative perspective the constant references to administrative precedent suggest that it was extremely important. Administrative practices also drove the development of institutional culture and vice versa. Institutional culture played a part in shaping the way contemporary administrators thought about and conceived ‘intelligence’ and thus played an important role in causing the CO to resist other departments. If the CO’s personnel had accepted the importance of timely intelligence of the kind required by the COS and the FO needed to manage their functions, there would probably have been far less pressure upon their other activities from the rest of Whitehall. Intelligence could have been shared relatively easily by creating an external facing PIS or even wholeheartedly cooperating with the aims of the JIC. It was the CO’s culture that also caused it to think that the emphasis on communism in the rest of Whitehall was wrong when explaining trouble in the empire and tended to drive the two sides further apart. Institutional culture played an important role in driving interdepartmental rivalry although the particular problems posed by the Cold War made these conflicts more important than they might have been otherwise.

Institutional culture also affected the development of long term professional administrative and intelligence agenda. These had an extremely important effect on the imperial machinery. The process of administrative influence on the colonial police agenda of development and professionalization has already been described but the development of a professional
institutional culture played back into the process. In Britain Special Branch and the Security Service worked closely so there was precedent cooperation between colonial police and Security Service. External lines of communication between the two could bypass the colonial government which was dominated by administrators. Professional advisers in the CO from the colonial police and the Security Service fitted into this wider security culture and provided means by which the advisers officially without the power to direct could influence development. In this the control of the IGCP over police appointments at gazetted level was particularly important. The way in which the Security Service promulgated its vision of the appropriate intelligence machinery through training courses, advice, liaison, and the provision of directors of intelligence ensured that the process worked. Culturally social differences between police officers and administrator in colonial governments probably reinforced the importance of a professional culture in shaping the intelligence machinery.

Overall the weight of evidence suggests that the long term influences were the most important in shaping the machinery and its practices and probably militated against its effectiveness and ability to adapt. Nonetheless the impetus to change did come from a series of short term crises which demonstrated that more information was needed to support the centralised control of colonial policy needed in the specific context of the Cold War.

**Implications for understanding the management of decolonisation:**

Because the machinery was developed away from the administrative towards the security intelligence side in order to benefit the COS and MOD and the FO’s attempts to maintain British alliances and prestige the ‘cultural spectacles’ of the imperial intelligence machinery became more and more focussed on security intelligence. By the early 1960s the machinery was focused on the ‘communist’ threat and its suppression. The security perspective could blind government to the realities of colonial situations. In both Singapore and British Guiana the problems faced by the British were less about Soviet subversion and more about legitimate local needs. The picture being created probably made it more difficult to distinguish between legitimate and proportionate needs for reform and revolution. This may have contributed to the tendency of the British to concentrate on backing conservative elements which did not retain power in the longer term.
The thesis assists in understanding the way in which the process of decolonisation was managed. Overall it suggests that information gathering and covert policy implementation played a more extensive part in decolonisation across the empire than previously realised. Firstly as the intelligence machinery became increasingly important in providing Whitehall with the information it used to understand what was happening in the colonies and this became more and more interested in security rather than political information the ‘cultural spectacles’ became more confining and more focus appears to have been placed on internal security which affected the management process. The imperial machinery also provided the British with specific information relating to the internal political positions of anti colonial groups engaged in negotiating independence, so it may have acted to make the negotiations easier with a clearer sense of what was acceptable.

The thesis confirms that covert policy implementation was an important element of British activity. There was a clear attempt to achieve means of control which meant that the British government could prevent or control communist activity in the post independence estates and consequently maintain longer term British influence and prestige. Indeed for number of years the level of intelligence involvement in some ex colonies was so intimate that for many purposes it was if the British were still in occupation although involvement declined rapidly after 1966 with the withdrawal of the SLOs.

The thesis provides insights into the way in which the intelligence machinery was structured and how it operated, which opens the possibility of reassessing the information contained in intelligence reports and thus the understanding of events more effectively. Because the British perception of what was happening was more important in terms of British action, than what was actually going on, it may lead to a better understanding of British action during the period.

**Additional areas of research:**

The study has identified a number of additional areas for historical investigation. There is obviously a need to reassess the content of the many intelligence reports which are available with a clearer understanding do the process involved in making them and thus assist in reading them against the grain. This may allow the reinterpretation of specific incidents.
There remains the need to examine other elements in the imperial intelligence machinery and link them into the developing picture. To understand the longer term development of the imperial intelligence machinery it is necessary to link its development to that of the Irish and Indian administration and intelligence machinery. This is a difficult task because of the archival separation of Indian from colonial archives. There has been some work on the effect of Indian intelligence in India and the Far East but its influence on the colonial machinery through the transfer of personnel would make the relative influence of influence on the imperial machinery clearer. The intelligence machinery in the India Office and the Indian intelligence machinery also need to be examined in more detail and their activities linked to intelligence activity in the informal empire in the Middle East and the formal activity in the colonial empire. The importance of Indian precedents, despite the administrative separation of India from the colonial empire, seems very important not only in the post 1900 period but also in the period immediately after the granting of Indian independence when the nature of the impact of Indian experience on other colonial situations changed. The way in which the Indian intelligence machinery was absorbed into the Security Service and the India Office was absorbed into the CRO would benefit from scholarly attention.

It is also necessary to research the intelligence machinery in the CRO and the Commonwealth Office in the context of the information about the British professional intelligence machinery and the CO revealed by this thesis. The increasing role of the CRO and the Commonwealth Office in the final stages of decolonisation and its direct control over the High Commission territories and the consequent intelligence arrangements need to be integrated into the study of the imperial intelligence machinery as a whole. The role of the CRO also needs to be examined in relation to the intelligence relationships with the self governing dominions, in the context of the parallel JIC system, and the relative importance of the two intelligence hierarchies properly assessed. The research then needs to be set into the context of the development of the British intelligence machinery in order to fully understand both systems.

Finally there is also a need to further examine the direct intervention of the US intelligence machinery in the empire, the machinery needed to facilitate this and its relationship with the imperial intelligence machinery. The extent to which the US agencies operated in British territories and their aims and objectives needs research.
Appendix A: Organisation of Intelligence: United Kingdom
Appendix B: Organisation of the Joint Intelligence Committee
Appendix C: Organisation of the Colonial Office
Appendix D: Organisation of Defence and Security Group: Colonial Office
Appendix E: Organisation of Intelligence: Ireland.
Appendix F: Organisation of Intelligence: India
Appendix G: Organisation of Intelligence Government of India
Appendix H: Organisation of Intelligence in Palestine

Figure 1 from Steven Wagner

## Top Secret Intelligence Organisation in the Far East (1948)

### Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) (J.I.C.F.E.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Area of Responsibility</th>
<th>Responsible to</th>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) (J.I.C.F.E.)</td>
<td>An area including North Borneo, Brunei, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Sarawak.</td>
<td>British Defence Coordinating Committee Far East (B.D.C.C.F.E.)</td>
<td>To advise BDCC Far East on all matters of intelligence and security intelligence except that purely military intelligence remains with Commander in Chiefs Committee.</td>
<td>1 Commissioner General’s Deputy for Foreign Affairs (Chairman) 2 Representative of Deputy for Colonial Affairs 3 Chief of Naval Intelligence Staff FE 4 Senior Intelligence Officer on Staff of CinC FARELF 5 Chief Intelligence Officers Staff of Air CinC ACFE 6 Head of SIFE 7 JIB 8 Redacted (But probably SIS) 9 Observers by invitation: Australia Representative</td>
<td>JIC(48)10 Annex to (33) on 14349/17/48 as amended by COS(48)85(42A) on 14349/7/48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Intelligence Staff (J.I.S.F.E.)</td>
<td>As Above</td>
<td>J.I.C.F.E.</td>
<td>To prepare appreciations and reports as required by JICFE</td>
<td>1 Navy Army and Air Force Representatives 2 J.I.B. Representatives Singapore 3 Representative of Commissioner General’s Office 4 Other Departments as required</td>
<td>Para 3 of Annex (33) 14349/7/48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Intelligence Bureau Singapore Representative (J.I.B.)</td>
<td>As Above</td>
<td>JIB London</td>
<td>In relation to JICFE: To provide intelligence for JICFE on subject for which JIB responsible i.e. on economic and commercial matters</td>
<td>JIB Representative Singapore</td>
<td>Para 6 of (33) on 1349/7/48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Intelligence Far</td>
<td>British Territory</td>
<td>MI5 London</td>
<td>In relation to J.I.C.F.E.:</td>
<td>Head Office Singapore</td>
<td>2 on14349(48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East (SIFE)</td>
<td>To provide information regarding subversive or illegal activities in British Territories</td>
<td>Defence Security Officers in Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LOCAL JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES FAR EAST Proposed for Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei ? in operation in Federation of Malaya and Singapore In Hong Kong</td>
<td>1 Local Area 2 Border areas of contiguous territory</td>
<td>Local Defence Committee and JICFE Draft Charter 1 To advise Local Defence Committee 2 To coordinate intelligence and security intelligence within its area of responsibility 3 To furnish Local Defence Committee and JICFE with joint intelligence reports and appreciations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Branches of Police Forces Singapore Federation of Malaya North Borneo Proposed for Sarawak</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local Police Normal Special Branch Duties In Federation of Malaya and Singapore S/B’s are being built up in substitution for Malayan Security Service</td>
<td>Draft Charter at (2) 14340/17/48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Notes on Intelligence Organisation in the Far East

1. Service Commanders have Intelligence Staffs who are represented at their respective levels on the Joint Intelligence Committee Far East and on the Local Joint Intelligence Committee where established.

2. The Agencies responsible for the collection of information are:

   1. Special Branch
   2. SIFE
   3. Service Commanders
Appendix J: Organisation of Intelligence: Kenya
Appendix K: List of Colonial Office Circulars on Intelligence Machinery

Mr Creech Jones, Secret Circular Despatch of 5.8.48

Mr Creech Jones, Secret and Personal Letter of 20.8.48

Mr James Griffiths, Top Secret Circular Despatch of 11.7.50

Circular Saving Telegram of 16.10.52

Sir Thomas Lloyds, Top Secret and Personal Letter of 29.4.53 (Unable to locate)

Secretary of States, Top Secret Circular 458/56 28.4.56

Circular 1135/59 (Unable to locate)

ISD 55/010 Circular 64/60 Periodical Reviews of State of Local Intelligence, 22 January 1960

In 1963 the JIC adopted this procedure and requested that other departments contribute
JIC (63)63 (Revised Terms of Reference) 19 July 1963

Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee, The State of Our intelligence Note by the Secretary

Circular 980/61 (Unable to locate)

Circular 60/65 Referred to the need for a review at twelve monthly intervals of the local state of intelligence coverage.

Circular 169/65 Periodical Reviews of the State of Local Intelligence, 14 April 1965.
Periodical Review of State of Local Intelligence

Circular 248/65 15th June 1965
Periodical Review of the State of Local Intelligence
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Air Ministry:
AIR 5: Air Ministry: Air Historical Branch: Papers, Series 1, files,

AIR 23: Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Royal Air Force Overseas Commands:
Reports and Correspondence: Iraq Command: Air Staff Intelligence, Air H.Q., Iraq,
23/433.

Cabinet Office:

CAB 21: Cabinet Office: War Cabinet, Cabinet, Committee of Imperial Defence: Registered
Files, files,
21/2504, 21/2750, 21/2923, 21/2952, 21/2952, 21/2992, 21/4041, 21/4371, 21/5003, 21/5004.
CAB 93: War Cabinet and Home Defence Committees: Minutes and Papers, files,
93/5.

CAB 124: Records of Non Departmental Ministers attached to War Cabinet and Cabinet
Office: Lord President of the Council, files,
124/80.
CAB 130: Cabinet Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers (GEN, MISC and REF Series), files, 130/114, 130/115.


CAB163
163/8.

CAB165
165/432, 165/433.

**Colonial Office:**

CO 28: Colonial Office: Barbados Correspondence, files, 28/319/8, 28/324/11.

CO 67: Colonial Office: Cyprus Correspondence, files, 67/290/8.

CO 137: Colonial Office: Jamaica Correspondence, files, 137/856/1, 137/856/2.


CO 295: Colonial Office: Trinidad: Original Correspondence, files, CO295/627/5.

CO 321: Colonial Office: Windward Islands Original Correspondence, files,

CO 323: Colonial Office: Colonies General: Original Correspondence, files, 323/887/41.

CO 525: Colonial Office: Nyasaland Original Correspondence files, 525/183/17, 525/183/19.


CO 535: Colonial Office: Somaliland Original Correspondence, files, 535/79/1, 535/82/1.

537/5250, 537/5251, 537/5279, 537/5297, 537/5300, 537/5301, 537/5411, 537/5414,
537/5420, 537/5421-537/5442, 537/5783, 537/5784, 537/5820, 537/5826, 537/5856,
537/5874, 537/5893, 537/5900, 537/5939, 537/5972, 537/6075, 537/6104, 537/6109,
537/6117, 537/6123, 537/6128, 537/6135, 537/6143, 537/6150, 537/6157, 537/6243,
537/6773, 537/6780, 537/6781, 537/6783, 537/6784, 537/6785, 537/6791, 537/6939,
537/6941-537/6955, 537/6958, 537/6961-537/6963, 537/7245, 537/7369, 537/7370,
537/7401, 537/7370.
CO 583: Colonial Office: Nigeria Original Correspondence files,
583/174/1

CO 691: Colonial Office: Tanganyika Original Correspondence, files,
691/172/6, 691/172/7, 691/172/8.

CO 733: Colonial Office: Palestine Correspondence, files,
733/396/5, 733/415/11.
CO 820: Colonial Office, Chief Clerk’s and General Department: Original Military
Correspondence: King’s African Rifles, files,
820/4/1.

CO 822: Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence, files,
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