Plastic Resistance
A Psychopolitical Analysis of Beethoven Historiography

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King's College London

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Plastic Resistance:  
A Psychopolitical Analysis of  
Beethoven Historiography  

Jun Zubillaga-Pow  

King’s College, London  

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Doctor of Philosophy  

2015
For Daryl, Luciano, Patrick, and Rui
Abstract

Based on historical and musicological texts and acts from the nineteenth to twenty-first century, this thesis proposes the concept of plastic resistance as an epistemological method to analyse the psychical and political perceptions of Beethoven’s life and music. Relying on the philosophy of Fichte and Lacan, I contend that the psychopolitics of this reception/resistance history is predicated critically on the musicians’ and listeners’ ability and affect to posit musical semantics unconsciously. I further argue that, during the negotiation of mastery, autonomy and subjectivity, the musical acts of composing, analysing and performing are influenced by psychical and political aesthetics. These affective resistances are buttressed by the psychoanalytical structures of neurosis, psychosis and perversion.

The thesis is divided into five chapters with the first two chapters setting the historical and theoretical backgrounds to various subjective actions and reactions that have created or destroyed musical meaning. The rest of the thesis place specific focus on more recent approaches to Beethoven’s piano sonatas and string quartets, as well as the plastic properties of their material resistance. In the first chapter, I trace a macrohistory of Beethoven reception in Western Europe and the United States from the nineteenth century to the present day. After an explication of the theoretical constitutions of the psychical resistance and the musical unconscious, I apply the ideas of inclusive and extractive resistances to show how the different attitudes towards Beethoven’s music result in creative and destructive institutions of musical hermeneutics. I reinforce the thesis of plastic resistance in the subsequent three chapters.

First, the act of notation as embodied in sketch processes traverses the imaginary, fantasmatic and hysterical phases, but only a mode of critical mastery can direct listeners towards sound musical knowledge. Second, the dialectical nature of musical meaning readily predetermines the psychotic capacity of the analytic act; analysts arguably become occupied with negotiating their semantic uncertainty with chance operations. Finally, musicians embody a form of performative perversion by externalising their plastic intimacy through affective gestures and subjective speech acts during rehearsals, interpretations, and performances. In conclusion, plastic resistance has exerted a significant psychopolitical force and transformed the epistemologies of Beethoven historiography.
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[Beethoven is] the quintessential great master of music. This is, after all, the culture in which hard work was once prized above all and labour rewarded; you weren’t born to greatness, but were suppose to struggle to achieve it.
– Bruno Nettl

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Introduction  Beethoven in the Age of Plasticity

With Beethoven, music first began to find the speech of pathos, of the impassioned will, of the dramatic vicissitudes in the soul of man. – Nietzsche

Dressed in their most festive attire, a hundred Indonesian school students armed themselves with racks of bamboo rattles shaking out the opening movement of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony punctuated by occasional bangs on the timpani. Such exotic melodies composed on a faraway land from a distant past became etched firmly in their minds as the heptatonic tapestry began to reverberate through the aisles of the concert hall in Bandung, West Java. These melodies were not heard on strings or trumpets, not even on the koto or the valiha, but were resonating powerfully on the Sundanese angklung. Elsewhere in Japan, 168 women gathered in the city of Tokyo and, with their eyes firmly closed, they played a boogie version of Beethoven’s Ode to Joy on theremins contained within palm-size Matryoshka dolls. Further across the Pacific Ocean, five white guys decked out in tracksuits were rehearsing another arrangement of Beethoven’s Ode to Joy in Michigan. They were neither a wind quintet nor an a cappella group, but percussionists who used plastic tubes to drum out the melodies and accompaniment. They are bringing an abridged rendition of Beethoven’s masterpieces on tour around major universities in the United States.

Through these musical transformations mediated by Asians and Americans, Beethoven’s Viennese creations become imbued with multiple layers of meanings and affects. The aura of the Beethoven myth immediately takes on an ambivalent quality by transforming the musical score into objects of varying semantic resistance. One reason why audiences in East Asia and the United States could experience heightened enjoyment is their earlier awareness of the original versions for orchestra (or one of

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2 Beethoven - Symphony No. 5 in C Minor Op. 67 (Angklung version), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zN-7zTRzeMM (last accessed 14 June 2014)

3 “Symphony No. 9, Boogie”, by Matryomin Ensemble “Da”, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BzEHItuTMHM (last accessed 14 June 2014)


Liszt’s transcriptions for the piano). Such musical pleasure is no less a result of the combined effects of late capitalism and unilateral globalisation in the decades following the end of the Cold War that allowed musical meaning and value to render themselves multiple and superfluous. This plurality of semantics have affected recent musicological research, which are venturing towards the uncovering of the re-invention of Western European medieval music in the twentieth century, the misrepresentation of African music by modern Western scholarship, and other revisionist projects.

Yet, even before the recent waves of geopolitical and economic ebbs and flows that shaped the changing world order, the imperial and industrial revolutions have been shaping the history of musical meaning. With the onset of musical modernity, musical temporality was ‘straightened’ from the cyclical to the arrowed around the year 1750, while dissident forms of musical expression continued to simmer during decades of political disorder eventually exploding in the first half of the twentieth century. After the modernist and colonialist crusades, the age of technology and terrorism held the reign. While scientific advancements have enhanced the overall musical experience, the misuse of technological warfare has fabricated torturous weapons out of music.

Where then do we situate Beethoven in the global soundscape? Beethoven’s ethical values have been interrogated with each subsequent performance at ‘epochal’ ceremonies and celebrations worldwide, as well as being accused of afflicting violence albeit anachronistically when used as film soundtracks or propaganda. Beethoven’s music was also borrowed and refashioned in newer and popular music, or even used to

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structure the format of television shows. How are we to undertake a comprehensive and coherent account of the current production and development of Beethoven perspectives and paraphernalia? Following on from Scott Burnham’s critical reception history in his *Beethoven Hero*, I propose to comprehend the ever-expanding field of Beethoven reception using psychoanalytic theory as part of what I call the ‘listening turn’ within Musicology.

Psychoanalysis as a critical method that is most succinct to intellectual thought has become relatively popular amongst humanities scholars especially at the end of the Cold War, and has its fair share of devotees and critics. However, as a less determinist method that thwarts the historicist ‘return of Beethoven’ (a phenomenon resembling the ‘return of the repressed’), the central tenet of psychoanalysis transcends the singularity of a reified meaning by widening the semantic possibilities of musical signification. An underlying political agenda is thereby inevitable with the constant arbitration and transformation of musical meaning by different subjects. In order to apprehend the issue of infinite musical interpretations, which is a monumental problem in current Beethoven studies, the intersection of the psychical and political aspects of psychoanalysis will be imperative. Apart from the different ways of listening explicated in each chapter – masterly, natural or perverted – the psychopolitical concept of plastic resistance will sustain the main line of reasoning through this thesis.

Plastic resistance is a dynamic theory that arises from and relies upon an unconscious operational system. The concept is a combination of the two ontologically opposing phenomena of plasticity and resistance. In this thesis, plasticity is defined as the political ability to generate formal creation and destruction, while resistance denotes the psychical ability of an agent in not being affected by anything that is undesirable. Coupling ‘plastic’ as an adjective to ‘resistance’ results in the semantic transformation of both terms; the intensities of being flexibly plastic and firmly resistant are diminished. Plastic resistance in short engenders a *transformability of affect* whether by the musical

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object or the musicking subject. Matters or meanings that are fixed or static are not plastic, while those that are entirely fluid and permanently unstable are not resistant. The significance of this portmanteau known as plastic resistance is its role as a conceptual tool to reassess current historiographical discourses vis-à-vis the changing reception of Beethoven’s music in and beyond the longue durée.

In addition, plastic resistance can be understood as the transformative tensions between two or more parameters within a musical act. By musical acts, I refer to the actions and events involving tangible objects such as the musical notations and the scholarly writings on the composer, as well as the intangible matters like the analyses and audition of sounds and thoughts evoked by the composer or the musician. These psychopolitical effects generated by Beethoven’s music also intersect semantically, affectively and physically. Such multi-sensorial effects are induced during the acts of composing, analysing and performing, and are transmitted via different experiences – which could be momentary or mundane, qualitative or quantitative – for the countless number of people who come into contact with the music. All in all, the idea of plastic resistance becomes a unifying trope to comprehend the affective politics of musical meaning.

Along these epistemic trajectories, the reception history of Beethoven’s music is perceived as a form of resistance history, whereby subsequent appropriations of Beethoven’s music and thoughts inevitably become antagonistic to the accumulation of musical and historical knowledge since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This resistance history itself already bears an agential plasticity for musical historiography in general or in particular for the composer, the listener, and the performer. In their respective subject positions, these musicking subjects, as I aim to argue in this thesis, participate in the pathological or plastic structures of neurosis, psychosis and perversion. The overall research conducted herein is therefore critical and imperative as a semantic revision of the recent state of historical scholarship that mostly situates musical masters and masterpieces in situ or as contemporaneous material, where plastic resistance would be ineffectual.  

This is not to say that scholarship contextualising people and performances within historicized timeframes is not relevant, but that a reflexive awareness of the coeval proximities and geopolitical boundaries would reveal the inevitable colourations that living scholars have ascribed to their material and methods. Plastic resistance provides allowances for both scholars and their objects of study to postulate certain non-resolvable problems and tensions, which need to be held for discursive criticality. That is, determinist research would never accommodate plastic resistance. In contrast, plastic resistance is pertinent to the fine balance between the prevalent musicological currency of analysing micro-history and the study of macro-history.\(^{18}\) The affordance to situate and juxtapose history upon different scales, especially on a longer and global one, is itself privileged on a singular comparative thematic – in this case, that of plastic resistance – that coheres across disparate spaces and times.

That said, this conceptual possibility should not be assumed to be epistemologically and aesthetically universal. It is precisely based on these caveats that the historical and analytic writings from the late twentieth century can be juxtaposed contingently with the political and philosophical theories from earlier in the century. Hopefully, this project will not only coagulate the psychoanalytic aspects of musical reception with the historical and structural dimensions within the already vibrant field of musicological thinking, but such a conjunctive methodology can also reinvigorates musical interests among philosophical and psychoanalytic scholarship.\(^{19}\)

The main structure of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Based on the psychoanalytic perspective, I will work through the various musical activities of notating, analysing, performing, and listening via the three clinical schemas, namely, neurosis, psychosis and perversion. Substantive comparisons between these Lacanian concepts are made with the ontological and aesthetic perspectives of Theodor Adorno, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Jacques Rancière in the subsequent chapters. Thematic material will be drawn from the active and reactive subjectivities expressed towards or against Beethoven’s chamber music as musical objects – his piano sonatas and string quartets.

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\(^{19}\) One of the initial forays in this direction can be found in the special issue on ‘Music and Philosophy’, edited by Martin Scherzinger, *Contemporary Music Review*, 31(5-6), 2012, where most of the leading contemporary French and German philosophers have been included, except for Jacques Lacan himself.
In the first chapter, I review the reception of Beethoven’s music over the past two hundred years and historically contextualise these experiences according to the socio-political events and sentiments of the times. Retaining the traditional musicological practice of narrating historical facts in a chronological manner, I reinstate and inspect several overlooked Beethovenian encounters from the United States and Western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These micro-historical appropriations of Beethoven and his music include those by the New English transcendentalists, the German musicologist Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht and the French composer André Jolivet during WWII. There is also the infiltration of ‘unconventional’ music scholars into musicological history as represented in this thesis by the record producer Maynard Solomon and the classical pianist Charles Rosen. The most recent controversy on the fabrication of a historical dualism between the Teutonic and the Italianate aesthetics has also received a British-American transference regretfully with little involvement and no resistance whatsoever by proponents from the associated cultures. The geopolitical quadrille that ends with a polemic flourish nonetheless signals towards the performative and receptive aspects of Beethoven studies, both of which are clearly newer areas of research than analysis and sketch studies.

The second chapter focuses on the plastic phenomenon of psychical resistance, as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the ability not to be affected by something undesirable’. The notion of resistance is often perceived in musicology as the political or analytical reaction against the current regime of aesthetic and material rule. Resistance has been observed in protest music or songs of heightened emotions – love, melancholy or patriotism; it also bears the function of stylistic or formal deviance, such being the case of the seconda pratica or the dodecaphonic ‘emancipation of the dissonance’. However, the coinage ‘plastic resistance’ used in this thesis is defined specifically as the transformability of affect, that is, the affective transformation of everyday musicking which is psychophysical and socio-political.

The three clauses within the definition of resistance – ability, affect, and desire – will be deliberated with Fichtean and Lacanian discourses. Further, the double negation – the ‘not’ and the ‘un’ – in the definition may benefit in the first instance from the Freudian perspective, but changing the subjective orientation to the objective one as ‘the affectability of the undesirable’ has resulted in a materialist stalemate due to the noumenal property of the object. Instead, the vicissitudes of plastic resistance operates

20 For the most recent examples, see the special issue on ‘Resistant Materials in Musical Creativity’, edited by Bennett Hogg and Sally Jane Norman, Contemporary Music Review 32(2-3), 2013.
most effectively within the musical unconscious, which I suggest partakes in the effects of both the psychical unconscious and the aesthetic unconscious. A critical case study, where the institutionalisation of Beethoven’s music in early nineteenth-century British musical arena is reassessed with current economic theories of extraction versus inclusion, propounds the presence and efficacy of plastic resistance as a psychopolitical apparatus.

The following three chapters put theory to practice by reviewing particular musical activities in historical and theoretical depth. Given that the act of composition is mostly carried out by the writing down or notating of one’s musical imagination and fantasies, the third chapter deals with the neurotic reflexes of fantasy and hysteria discerned in recent scholarship on the renewed interests in Beethoven’s sketches. I argue that the compositional process resembles a resistance between musical thought and text. In the opening sections of the chapter, Lacanian psychoanalytic discourses are applied as a psychopolitical method to analyse and reveal the psychical processes behind Beethoven’s chamber music. Framed around the neurotic structures of fantasy, hysteria and mastery, I suggest that the creative subject undergoes a developmental trajectory by grappling with different musical objects and their infinite auricular and musical meanings, or what I have coined in this thesis as the soneme. In contrast to the psychological reactions during an act of improvisation, Beethoven’s creativity is measured as a case of plastic resistance where sketches from his three periods are compared chronologically to account for the developmental processes of thinking, notating and composing. Because musicologists since the turn of the nineteenth century have dedicated more research in uncovering Beethoven’s compositional habits, the semantic desire to trace and detail the musical thoughts and texts can now be assessed.21

Such a psychopolitical method of analysing epistemological resistance between Beethoven studies and musico-analytic research will furnish academics and the general public with an understanding of Beethoven and his musical contributions as mundanely human, that is, one that hovers between the fantasmatic and the hysteric. Unlike their socially-constructed connotations, the musical fantasy and hysteria considered figuratively are neither pathological nor pejorative. Rather, Beethoven’s psychical resistances I argue are driven contingently through plastic transformations from the infantile stage to the subjective and hysterical phases.

21 Cf. That said, while the fallacious correlation between biography and composition has been amiably settled, the question of genius and heroic qualities in the composer and his music has remained contentious among Beethoven scholars such as Burnham and Dahlhaus. See Mina Yang, ‘From Hagiography to Pathography’, in her Planet Beethoven: Classical Music at the Turn of the Millennium, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2014, 39-57.
Based on this developmental hypothesis, I propose that the psychical mediation between musical fantasy and hysteria needs to be superceded by the conventional teleology of musical mastery as espoused by Schenker, Schoenberg and Subotnik, to name but a trio. As a case study, I contrast Dahlhaus’s dualist epistemology with that of categorical autonomy within musicology, and propose master listening as an infinite auricular process that does not delimit the listener’s subjectivity. From the viewpoint of Fichtean idealism, the critical act of semantic autonomy will be able to thwart any conscious or unconscious dogmatic habits of the listening subject. Although a couple of musicologists have suggested emotional states such as melancholy and sympathy to serve as epistemological antidotes, the presence of affect as an imaginary, rather than symbolic, agent of resistance would not prevent musicians and listeners from separating empirical self-consciousness qua experience from musical knowledge qua interpretation.

In the penultimate chapter, I apply Lacan’s perspectives on psychosis to decipher how music analysts apprehend the semantics behind a single work or the entire output of a single composer. Beethoven’s music has always been a mainstay in analytic musicology since his own time. For one, Ian Bent’s selection of historical hermeneutic approaches from the nineteenth century devotes at least a third of the two volumes to Beethoven’s music, while more recent forays into sonata form(s) and (neo-)Riemannian theory have dedicated lesser attention on Beethoven than the composers before and after his time. Eventually, the analyses of metric and geometric manipulations have left Beethoven’s music as either contingent to the common practice or barely essential to new theoretical propositions. Rather uncritically, these analytic theses drew mostly upon pieces that were composed within the narrow decade between 1798 and 1808. Only two out of the nine essays dealing with Beethoven’s music in Bent’s anthology focused on music from the 1820s: the Ninth Symphony premiered in 1824 and the Opus 132 String Quartet in 1825. When William Caplin, Hepokoski and Webster came

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22 Ian Bent (ed.) *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century Volumes One and Two*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; James Hepokoski and Darcy A. Warren have an index of three pages for Mozart’s music, and a little more than one page each for those of Haydn and Beethoven in their *Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata*, 2006. For Rehding, Riemann’s analysis of, say, the opening of Beethoven’s ‘Waldstein’ sonata ‘is little more than a specimen of a more universal musical structure’, see his Hugo Riemann and the Birth of Modern Musical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 39; so it is good to see Schubert, Brahms and Franck being set in contention with Riemann’s implicit biasness for Beethoven in Edward Gollin and Alexander Rehding (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of neo-Riemannian Music Theories*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

together for a discussion on formal theory, the pieces they chose were likewise from around the same period: the symphonies (First and Sixth), the overtures (Egmont, King Stephen and The Ruins of Athens), and the Sonata in D, Op. 10 No. 3 respectively.24

Furthermore, to claim that the Schenkerian Ursatz or ‘fundamental line is closely linked to Beethoven’s music’, as Burnham has associated with the heroic style, is most certainly an overstatement.25 The assumption that the Schenkerian analytic entreprise is based entirely on the Fifth and Ninth Symphonies becomes part of the institutional myth-making engineered by Burnham himself in his 1995 monograph.26

Between 1904 and 1910, Schenker had written three earlier treatises on ornaments, harmony and counterpoint which, in addition to Beethoven, also used Bach, C. P. E. Bach, Haydn, Mozart and other composers for theoretical illustrations.27 There is thus no reason to aggrandise the role of Beethoven’s music in the founding of the Schenkerian ‘goal-orientated traversal’, lest music analysts prefer to continue indulging in the comfort of ‘prejudiced understanding’.28 Akin to the analytic history of Beethoven reception, as well as the disparate analyses of the opening of Beethoven’s Opus 132 by Kofi Agawu, Eric Clarke and Michael Spitzer that I will be discussing, Beethoven is merely one among numerous other plastic figures for theoreticians to shape their analytic regimes for the purpose of systematic affirmation and objective coherence.

In this particular chapter, I appropriate what the British analyst Philip Tagg has coined as a semiotic unit of music, or the museme, to compare three relational aspects of hermeneutics: the intra-musemic, inter-musemic and extra-musemic. Instances of such interpretations include how certain musical characteristics are understood as motivic, mimetic or militant respectively. Based on this semiophilic paradigm, I identify the epistemological foundations – topical, ecological, metaphorical – on which analysts at the turn of the twenty-first century have used to comprehend Beethoven’s chamber music. From the ontological perspective where nature mediates musical meaning

25 Burnham, Beethoven Hero, 90.
through the act of analysis, I propose that the analyst’s unwillingness or inability to obliterate any element that bears semantic dissemblance – such as the C♯ and C♭ in Beethoven’s Third Symphony and Op. 130 respectively – is a distinct symptom of epistemological psychosis. This proposition will be contended from the philosophical standpoint of the ontological assumption that genealogies are predicated solely on subjective/objective or natural/cultural dualist positions. For Adorno, the structuralist hypothesis rests on the subject’s negotiation of self-consciousness by assuming objective moments, and vice versa where objects acquire subjective moments in the form of creative and destructive plasticity. Lacan’s culturalist position by comparison bears upon the anti-natural and the dissembling order whereby a symbolic ontology is grounded on the contingency of the accidental instead of the natural. As an outcome of these theoretical investigations, I will categorise the different methods used in recent analyses of Beethoven’s Op. 132 by extrapolating half a dozen types of aleatoric operations discussed by Freud and Lacan. These structuralist attempts in making sense of the Beethovenian oeuvre may seem to form a genealogical epistemology, but they are resisted plastically by Beeethoven’s own adeptness at transforming late eighteenth-century philosophical conventions of form and order into his second nature.

In the final chapter, the focus is shifted onto the realm of performing, which I contend to be an act of linguistic and psychical perversion. From a historical perspective, plastic resistance can be discerned from the performance practice and interpretations of Beethoven’s symphonies and string quartets. The rise and decline of Wagnerian performative aesthetics – that include orchestral rescoring and speed changes – have also been part of a provocative perversion of musical meaning. The resistance that is determined by the affectability of the undesirable is virtually absent in the hands of an authoritative musician. Regardless of how undesirable the music can be, a good performer who understands the act of perverting the composer’s intention would be able to steer the hermeneutic destiny of the music. Such a transgression has been exemplified, to name but two successful interventions, by George Bridgetower’s premiere of the Op. 47 violin sonata and Joseph Joachim’s posthumous rendition of the violin concerto.

A more recent discussion of musical perversion can be found in Kenneth Smith’s reading of Skryabin’s Fourth Piano Sonata, which beseeches listeners to feel an ‘[imagined] satisfaction’ embodied in its musical teleology. Based on the Lacanian idea that the pervert always imagines that he or she is aware of the desire of the other,

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Smith deduces that Skryabin qua pervert seduces listeners with his imaginative chromatic vicissitudes. Yet the resistance against the eventual tonic revelation is, for Smith, uncontrollable leading the listener to a timeless ‘brink of ecstasy’. The latent ability of the performative for Skryabin or Wagner to pervert the music remains destructive. In contrast, I argue that performance as an extractive institution espouses a plastic resistance that changes the semantic form of the musical material. This psychopolitical approach compares performers’ expression to the ritualistic or pornographic phenomena, which are irresistible acts of semantic perversion given their performative grammar and rhetoric.

Otherwise, ethnomusicological interests on Western classical genres have already exposed the plastic mechanisms generated during musicking. In one case, qualitative empirical work with solo violinists established the utility of bodily and metaphorical gestures towards a better understanding of musical expression. In another case, technological comparisons between live and recording situations have disproved performative consistencies. Yet, these research findings have themselves relied on experimental interventions, and are mostly exemplified by randomly selected musical extracts without accounting for historical contingency and cultural contexts. The responses are also objectified and oblivious to social asceticism and personal liberties.

From a more critical perspective, I propose that mediated and rehearsed interactions among professional Beethoven players are structurally a form of auto-ethnography, which is predicated on the psychical states of self-representation and self-positioning. Although the ‘conversational’ formats amongst chamber musicians past and present have been ascertained, the psychopolitical articulations, or the lack thereof, as an effect of psychical reactions and reflections have remained understudied. These verbalised thoughts can be treated as a kind of sociolinguistic notation and carry with them an externalised agency beyond the musical unconscious. Similar to the composer’s

32 Smith, 44; my reading of Skryabin as performative differs from that of Smith, who, despite identifying Fichte’s influence on Skryabin, does not render the composer a solipsist. In other words, Smith deems Skryabin a pervert, while I posit that only his act of performance is perverted.
transformation of musical thought to musical text, the things that performers say can also hover about the fantasomatic and hysterical spectrum.

In this final chapter, I loosely construct a macrohistorical overview of the performative perversions vis-à-vis Beethoven’s music and its interpreters. I propose that performers are engaged in a constant struggle that perverts the meaning of the music or becomes perverted by the music. This phenomenon reveals a plasticity of performative affects, which determine the amount of semantic resistance evinced by the performer and the performance. Precisely because of the controlled sensibilities of the performers, I coined the concept of plastic extimacy as a counterforce juxtaposing the expressed intimacy and the semantic transformations that occur simultaneously in the performer’s unconscious. Building on Hegelian ideas of habituation, this plastic extimacy effuses both the desirable and undesirable aspects of the performer’s habits and expressions.

As an extensive case study, I analyse how linguistic metonymies, such as emotional adjectives and personal pronouns, can embody intimate relations of selfhood and subjective positioning. I argue that the musicians’ verbal articulations constitute a psychopolitical resistance against the meaning behind Beethoven’s string quartets, as well as construct a linguistic epistemology of the semantic effects exerted by the soneme on musical thoughts across different stylistic milieus. All in all, the agency of plastic resistance between the performing self and the auto-ethnographic act, I contend, is therefore negotiated between the affectability of undesirable transformations on and by the performer and the commingling of performative perversion and notational fantasy/hysteria. In short, the musician-musicologist comes to occupy the neurotic-perverted subject position.

Correspondingly, the accelerated rate at which Beethoven’s music has been perverted is significant. The rearrangements of his music for tubes, theremins and bamboo rattles sounding across the globe are disparate instances of plastic resistance in practice. For Nicholas Cook, ‘Beethoven occupies as prominent a place in Japanese culture as in German, British, or American [ones]’.36 But is Cook’s Beethoven the selfsame Beethoven rendered by the others? Before we inspect the affective listening turns in Beethoven studies, let us uncover and review some of the epistemological resistances espoused by different groups and individuals throughout the longue durée of Beethoven scholarship.

Chapter 1  Whose Beethoven?

The field of Beethoven studies is a vast and illustrious enterprise. Beethoven’s own contemporaries, such as his secretary-turned-biographer Anton Schindler, have analysed and critiqued his output including the many self-reflections shared by the composer himself.\(^1\) It is furtive to provide the long list of scholars, some of whom we will encounter in this thesis, but the handful of female intellectuals working in the Anglophone historical circles, such as Bathia Churgin, Martha Frohlich, Elaine Sisman, Rita Steblin, and the late Ora Frishberg Saloman, deserve special recognition for overcoming what Susan McClary has acknowledged as the masculinist episteme. In adherence to this feminist spirit, Beethoven studies itself is in need of such an epistemological emancipation. The current field is no doubt vibrant and burgeoning with source studies, analytic research and performance practices, but the critical introspection of Beethoven historiography has hitherto not been discussed at length.

This thesis aims to fulfill such a purpose and bridges the lacunae between method and methodology specifically from a psychoanalytic perspective.

Since the time of his passing, Beethoven literature have been in constant currency appearing mostly either in the newspapers, such as the *Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung* and *The Musical Times*, or in monographs by individual learned authors.\(^2\) Collections of scholarly contributors arrived only in the last quarter of the twentieth century in the form of *Beethoven Studies*, *Beethoven Forum* and *Beethoven Newsletter/Journal* before evolving into an annual congregation at the International New Beethoven Conference as well as an online portal known as the *Beethoven Gateway*. As is well-known, musical history is affected inevitably by the social and political dynamics of the times, and likewise for musicological endeavours. The enthusiasms and regrets expressed at the start and close of each venture are always affective indications of countless milestones achieved by the contributors.

Yet, Beethoven scholarship has been resilient and *plastic*. The spirit of reaping what one has sowed has encouraged subsequent generations of intellectuals to renew the musicological devotion to the alleged Beethoven myth. Thereby, here arises an urgency to review the methodologies prevalent within the field in the past two centuries with particular attention on the exegeses of Beethoven’s music published after the end of the


\(^2\) As an aside, the name of *The Musical Times* is obviously borrowed from the British daily *The Times*, which also inspired the colonial founding of *The Times of India* and *The Straits Times* around the same revolutionary decade.
Cold War. That is, the objective of this chapter is to perform a metacritique, or a critique of Beethoven criticism by selected authors in the past two hundred years. Given the recent ethnographic turn within musical-historical studies, contemporary research focus has become centred on the positionalities of the musicians and music scholars themselves. The following five sections serve the function of reviewing the critics’ subject positions and rejoining the epistemological formations of Beethoven and his music with the psychopolitical transformations within the modernising milieu, which has been demarcated as coming after 1750 by Karol Berger or 1780 by Charles Rosen, a historical discrepancy I will return to in the fourth section. I will substantiate the well-known fact – that Beethoven historiography since the nineteenth century is socio-politically driven – with my contention that Beethoven and his music especially have inversely influenced the social politics and psychology of our times, that is, the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. Instead of the conventional writing of Rezeptionsgeschichte or reception history, I propose a plastic reformulation of doing historiography in the form of a Resistanzgeschichte or resistance history. Musical resistance I contend is what historians have always practised.

1.1 Imperatives for Beethoven Studies and Beyond

In his brief history of Beethoven reception since the composer’s passing, Scott Burnham considers Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht’s representation of Beethoven historiography as ‘underwrit[ing] the last stage in our [musicologists’] own trajectory’, one that objectifies Beethoven as ‘a product of cultural and ideological forces’. While the consequent of this statement may be sound, I counter that there is actually a further stage in the deconstruction of how musicologists, and correspondingly musicology, have charted Beethoven’s musical historiography. While Eggebrecht has revealed the constructed nature of the Beethoven myth as invented by music historians and performers, the final apprehension of musical understanding is the process of what I would call a plastic transformation of we ourselves vis-à-vis the Beethovenian object.

Equally applicable to other modernist historiographies and exegeses, the concept of plasticity is most appropriate to frame this formative phenomenon. Instead of the materialist plasticity propounded in sound studies, I borrow the idea of plasticity from

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the dialectical neologism coined by the French post-structuralist Catherine Malabou to refer to a political force that is capable of giving and receiving form, creating and destroying a structure. Acts of listening and analysing are very much plastic operations that change the shape and meaning of the musical sound and text. The writings of Alexander Thayer, Alan Tyson, and others can offer us a glimpse into how plasticity is applicable, but I will turn to less iconic examples such as André Jolivet, Maynard Solomon, and the Oxbridge elites in the next few sections. As for the plasticity of Beethoven historiography, a dynamic and reciprocal epistemological structure is fundamental. While Burnham’s thesis on the heroic has revealed the political and philosophical forces that have shaped Beethoven and his creative objects via the imagination and representation of analysing, composing, and listening, the reciprocal psychological effects of Beethoven’s deeds and music on the musicking subject have not been explicated amidst the larger historical narrative. In this chapter, I will illustrate this reciprocal transformation process between the musicological subject and the musical object based on half a dozen Beethoven authorities mentioned in Burnham’s 2000 essay dealing with Beethoven reception between 1827 and 1970, and correspondingly update the history to the present day in the last three chapters.

Foremost, the authors cited by Burnham are drawn mostly from the cultural elites of their respective societies. E. T. A. Hoffmann was a respectable Berliner lawyer, author and music critic, who advocated the rise of German romanticism and a progressive historical evolution of the arts. His sculpturing of a triumvirate hierarchy among Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven subscribed neatly to the model of the holy trinity within the Christian religion, which was reasonably tolerated under the Napoleonic regime despite the onset of the Enlightenment. On a personal level, Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony in 1810 has to be re-read within his own biographical context. His child died in infancy two years earlier and his administrative career with the Prussian government was interrupted by the Napoleonic wars. At 33 years of age, Hoffmann’s musical and literary compositions have not gained much headway and he was fired after a year as theatre manager. Hoffmann was subsequently employed as the music critic of the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung albeit on an anonymous capacity. All these factors need to be taken into consideration to understand the circumstances in which the review was conceived.


Even if being a journalist had brought about a change in his fortune, Hoffman according to recent scholarship has neither heard the Fifth Symphony nor followed the conventional format of a musical review.\(^7\) For someone who only grasped the music from its score, he had the audacity to state that the Fifth Symphony ‘irresistibly sweeps the listener into the wonderful spirit-realm of the infinite’, to quote but one of many verbose sentences.\(^8\) While other musicological literature also alludes to how Hoffmann has transformed Beethoven’s classical or modernist leanings into the romantic realm, almost none suggests the agency of Beethoven’s music within Hoffmann’s own psychopolitical agenda. Hoffmann could very well be the first ‘statesman’ to use Beethoven for propaganda purposes. Prior to this, we have been informed about how the aristocratic courts in late eighteenth-century Vienna have used Beethoven’s musical presence to heighten their prestige, therefore the conjecture of Hoffmann affecting Beethoven’s music rather than vice versa bears strong veracity.\(^9\) Not only have the politics of early nineteenth-century Europe provoked Beethoven and his music, but they have also invoked the fervent spirits – Idealist, Christian, or nationalist – of the listeners and the few fortunate readers of the score, establishing a fully plasticised relation.\(^10\)

At Beethoven’s funeral in 1827, the popular Viennese dramatist Franz Grillparzer was tasked to pen the eulogy. Almost in a melodramatic style, Grillparzer’s oration was an affective response to Beethoven’s music, specifically the symphonies, the Missa Solemnis and Fidelio, as well as the homosocial relation between the two Geisters during their creative venture.\(^11\) Instead of the common narrative of Beethoven being enthroned with a heroic ‘superhuman will’, whose music remained difficult but

\(^{10}\) Stephen Rumph has raised many of these spiritual associations in his article, ‘A Kingdom Not of This World: The Political Context of E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Beethoven Criticism’, *19th-Century Music* 19(1), 1995, 50-67. However, by relying on texts written by Hoffmann after the 1810 review, Rumph’s essentialist analyses of Hoffmann’s political stances and anti-French sentiments appear to be anachronistic and far-fetched to the extent of distorting the historical context of the review. While it is clear that Hoffmann’s Geisterreich or ‘spirit-realm’ has been derived from the ideas of Fichte and Hegel, his use of the word ‘Ich’, for one, has been mistranslated by Rumph; ‘Ich’ in Idealist and Freudian terminologies are ‘I’ and ‘Ego’ respectively. For another, Rumph’s situation of twentieth-century historical consciousness onto nineteenth-century texts and events is misleading. Barry Cooper has already addressed other fallacies in Rumph’s Beethoven After Napoleon: Political Romanticism in the Late Works in his review of the book, which includes the barely unaltered 1995 article, in *Music and Letters* 86(4), 2005, 636-638. For a better interpretation of Beethoven’s music with Fichtean thought and naturalism, see the second and third chapters of this thesis.
sublime, I posit that Beethoven’s music has evoked merely an equal and reciprocal reaction from the listeners of his time. That is, all of Grillparzer’s talk about ‘nature’s struggling forces’ and ‘a taste for the engaging, the robust, the overpowering’ are but symbolic affects evoked in the listeners, and not exactly any permanent or prevalent characteristic of Beethoven’s music or his misanthropic personality.  

My arguments for this reading are based on the psychopolitical resistance harboured by Grillparzer himself. While most of the scholarly exegeses have focused on the text itself, the circumstances from which the playwright was chosen as the speechwriter, as well as his personal appraisal of Beethoven’s music, have hitherto not been questioned. From his diary entries, we learnt that Grillparzer found Beethoven’s music before 1809 chaotic and was hesitant to collaborate with the composer on an opera when approached in 1822. He was unable to withstand Beethoven’s ‘stormy, emotional symphonies’, and even went to the extent of trying to influence the composer’s music by demanding that ‘an ever-recurring melody, short, soft, and enticing’ be used as a leitmotif in the opera. Being given the task to write Beethoven’s eulogy, Grillparzer had obvious reservations, but he relented under social obligation and adhered to the requests of Counts Moritz Dietrichstein and Moritz Lichnovsky, one of whom also happened to be Grillparzer’s commissioner for the operatic collaboration after having heard Fidelio. In addition to Grillparzer’s controversial epitaph for Schubert’s tomb the year after, these politically motivated events clearly resonate with Eric Clarke’s idea of the cross-cultural and transhistorical affordance of musical material that transcends beyond the reality of Beethoven’s music and persona.

A similar semantic ecology was being formulated concurrently across the Atlantic Ocean by a group of New English settlers in the city of Boston during the late 1830s and early 1840s. A handful of journalists and music critics had taken on the initiative to promote modern German music, especially those of Beethoven, to the New England working classes. Unlike Hoffmann who relied solely on the score, the proponents of Beethoven’s music had the privilege of attending performances of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Symphonies in either Boston or New York. These real-time  

auricular encounters most likely triggered off an impetus for them to incorporate their personal socio-political agenda onto the musical aesthetics of the times. On the one hand, the jurist William Wetmore Story (1819-1895) treated Beethoven’s music as an imaginative, ‘positive force against mundane materialism of society’ and associated each movement of the Seventh Symphony with the Orpheus narrative. The Unitarian minister Christopher Pearse Cranch (1813-1892) subsequently extended such allegorical characterisations by deeming Beethoven’s unity of the aesthetic with the technical as prophetic coming of national and social harmony. On the other hand, the transcendentalist and historicist Margaret Fuller (1810-1850) preferred an authoritative apprehension to Story’s subjective or Cranch’s comprehensive ways of understanding Beethoven’s compositions, and stood in full opposition to how the Brook Farm utopianist John Sullivan Dwight (1813-1893) had advocated an ecumenical reconciliation of the sacred and secular, the individual and communal in Beethoven’s orchestral works.

From these biographical and deontological approaches to Beethoven’s music, we can readily sense a theoretical divergence away from the contingent and developmental methods of musical understanding propagated under the Germanic formalists’ regime. The analytic frameworks of Heinrich Christoph Koch and Adolf Bernhard Marx would not figure in the Bostonians’ epistemology. Even if Dwight has perused the latter’s earlier writings, their methodologies diverge at the basic point of utilitarian resistance. For Marx, the individual beings of the composer, the critic, and the musical work must be grasped throughout their respective entireties rather than a piecemeal application of the parametric morphology. This particular position differs from Dwight’s approach – such as that used in his 1843 essay ‘Academy of Music: Beethoven’s Symphonies’ – which is one stemming from what Nattiez calls the ‘aesthesis’ instead of Marx’s ‘poietic’ perspective.

17 Ibid. 153, 159 and 177.
18 Saloman has briefly distinguished the nuances between Dwight’s didacticism and Marx’s autonomy with respect to their Beethoven criticisms in her Listening Well, 184-87. For a more elaborated account, see her Beethoven’s Symphonies and J. S. Dwight: The Birth of American Music Criticism, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995. On Marx’s developmental stances (such as Erziehung and Bildung), see Scott Burnham, ‘The Role of Sonata Form in A. B. Marx’s Theory of Form’, Journal of Music Theory 33(2), 1989, 148 [247-71], and Scott Burnham, ‘Criticism, Faith, and the “Idee”: A. B. Marx’s Early Reception of Beethoven’, 19th-Century Music 13(3), 1990, 184 [183-92]. Also, for Koch’s formalist readings of Haydn’s symphonies, see Felix F. Diergarten, ‘“At times even Homer nods off”: Heinrich Christoph Koch’s Polemic against Joseph Haydn’, Music Theory Online, 14(1), 2008.
In contrast to what would be conceived much later as aesthetic autonomy, Dwight remained interested in the humanistic and uplifting qualities of the music that generated immense social pleasure and an exuberant spirit overcoming the stress and insecurity of everyday life, no less, in a democratic, expansionist United States.\textsuperscript{20} Beethoven’s symphonies, in Dwight’s ears, do not adhere to Hoffmann’s Romanticist paradigm, but rather exhibit a real structural unity of the singular with the universal; Dwight’s Beethoven espouses effectively an artistic leadership that overcomes misanthropic isolation.\textsuperscript{21} From such utilitarian rhetoric adapted for the purpose of popular education, certain socialist political ideologies can be discerned to be inherent within the transcendentalist milieu.

That said, these progressive attitudes should also not be viewed in isolation amidst the atrocities of the Indian removal act of the 1830s and the perpetuation of African slavery throughout nineteenth-century United States. While Dwight’s influence on Alexander Wheelock Thayer’s biographic revisions have been acknowledged, the complicities that Beethoven’s music has come to be enlisted have not hitherto been raised, except for the little anecdote concerning the African-American leader of the abolitionist movement, Frederick Douglass (c.1818-1895). When Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation arrived by teletype in Boston on 1 January 1863, Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ filled the Faneuil Hall.\textsuperscript{22} Douglass, who is himself an amateur violinist and owner of a Stradivarius, would not have anticipated that his liberationist resistance would have had the by-effect of producing generations of African-American classical musicians from Leontyne Price to Kazem Abdullah.\textsuperscript{23}

With the psychopolitics stirring up the New World, it is not surprising for Beethoven’s music and its significances to be tussled about amongst the Bostonian elites in the decades after his passing. The Anglo-Americans had achieved independence from the British and were desperate to establish a ‘national music[al]’ culture themselves.\textsuperscript{24} The symphonies of Beethoven proved themselves to be ideal models to be appreciated and emulated in the settler colonies. The structural and material innovations in Beethoven’s symphonies appealed to the erstwhile English

\textsuperscript{20} Saloman, \textit{Listening Well}, 170, 174 and 181; the United States went on to colonise the territories of Texas and all of the western regions in the 1840s.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. 173, 175 and 187.
\textsuperscript{23} James M. Gregory, \textit{Frederick Douglass: The Orator}, Springfield, Massachusetts: Willey & Co., 1893, 211.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. 155.
diaspora, who had probably been exposed mostly to the music of Purcell, Handel and their American counterparts of the First New England School. Beethoven’s music therefore bestowed transformative effects on the thoughts and deeds within and beyond the transcendentalist movement until the late 1850s or early 1860s. As much as Beethoven has posthumously wedged an epistemological resistance across the Atlantic between the United States and the German Confederation, the various auditors have also become enveloped by their transcendental experiences and shaped their musicological outlook with accord to their own psychopolitical circumstances.

Returning to the prevailing social ambivalence across the musical milieus in late nineteenth-century Austria and Germany, the multiple connotations afforded by Beethoven’s music provide the impetus for a new theory of musical composition. Not only did A. B. Marx standardise Beethoven’s music, especially his piano sonatas and Third Symphony, but he also set down a creative deontology of musical composition based on ‘Biedermeier’ depoliticised asceticism. Thirty odd years later in 1870, this artistic conservatism was completely thwarted by Wagnerian nationalism and religious myth-making. Beethoven’s music, specifically his String Quartet Op. 131, took on the guise of spiritual redemption for the German people, and united the consciousness of their inner essence with that of the outer world.25

In addition to associating the cyclical nature of Beethoven’s Quartet as emblematic of the Christian diurnal, Wagner was constantly obsessed with Beethoven’s expansive symphonic and contrapuntal techniques.26 To be sure, Wagner’s genotypical stance was not only Schopenhauerian, but smacked also of Germanic world-making, whose colonial forays began after Wagner’s death.27 Between Marx and Wagner, Beethoven’s music generated a trope that represented the psychopolitical propriety of the Biedermeier and Bismarck eras. Beethoven’s semantic and affective plasticity gives rise to the good and evil of the German people, and these deeds and thoughts are certainly not inherent within Beethoven’s biography. The formation of what Burnham calls ‘a powerful transhistorical force’ lies in the music’s plastic quality, that of the musical object transforming the musicking subject transforming the musical object.28 The epistemological tension and resistance that arise within everyday knowledge as well as within musical scholarship is precisely the result of this reciprocal plastic effect.

27 Ibid. 152.
Without reflexive criticism, this driving force of epistemological revision persists into the twentieth century. Beethoven’s personality comes to be imbued with a sense of morality and militancy depending on the particular piece of music retrieved onto a historicist consciousness. While the fervent affects of the nineteenth-century Zeitgeist have waned off during the inter-war decades, the publication of Arnold Schmitz’s four treatises on Beethoven in the middle of the Weimar Republic’s ‘Golden Twenties’ affirmed the ascetic resistance against topical associations. Despite how Schmitz’s account of Beethoven’s life and music has been salvaged as objective and formalistic – that is, ‘free from national pathos and German demarcation’ – there remain the occasional ‘historico-critical’ discrepancies with Beethoven’s religiosity and the enlightened will mentioned by his posthumous biographers from Paul Bekker to Jan Swafford.\(^{29}\) The reason that these multi-generational controversies are discernible in present-day historiography debates shows the very effects of a hermeneutic plasticity. No wonder the mythogenesis of Beethoven and his music remains a multi-lateral, generative process oscillating between the musicological subject and the musical object, producing complex epistemological and affective resistances within the discipline.

1.2 Eggebrecht: The Politics of Beethoven’s *Rezeptionsgeschichte*

One such instance of plastic resistance within Beethoven historiography concerns the ‘resistible rise’ of the German musicologist Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht. Until recently, his theory of *Rezeptionsgeschichte* or reception history formulated as part of Beethoven’s bicentenary has been fairly influential within Germanophone musicology. In contrast, the historiographical framework has barely impressed upon Anglophone scholars, who have instead diverged into what could be known as the ‘listening turn’.\(^{30}\) Listening to Beethoven throughout music history is for Eggebrecht the gradual distancing of music history from the real Beethoven himself. Eggebrecht thinks that the reception of Beethoven in the early twentieth-century, such as those by Romain Rolland and Arnold Schmitz, is invested in a rather mythological construction of the composer that certain ontological ‘constants’ have been pre-determined. These tropes include the


need to suffer, the overcoming of adversities, timelessness, utopia and heroic authority (under which Eggebrecht also includes the role of the Führer). Based on this conception, Burnham thinks that Eggebrecht’s proposition relative to his predecessors is more vehement: ‘If Schmitz’s prevailing agenda was to get at the real Beethoven by *cleansing* his image of the intervening reception tradition, Eggebrecht argues that there is no “real Beethoven” waiting beneath the accretions of history’. 

This conclusion is puzzling because historical evidence obviously states the definite existence of Beethoven the composer, and his perpetual legacy is a result of the very ambition each generation has invested in to present the real Beethoven to the next generation. There must clearly be a ‘real Beethoven’ without cleansing off any imaginary defilement. Who in the name of historical truth would want to embellish those biographical constants with falsehoods, much more obliterate the ‘real Beethoven’?

Exactly a decade after Burnham’s comment, the psychopolitics of transforming Beethoven historiography interrupted the musicological establishments when the young German musicologist Boris von Haken made a public claim in December 2009 that the late Eggebrecht had in fact been an accomplice of the Nazis during the Second World War. This controversy could most probably account for Eggebrecht’s epistemological interests to efface the ‘real Beethoven’.

Triggered by the article in *Die Zeit*, musicologists, historians and journalists debated in both public and academic presses over the possible roles Eggebrecht had in the Jewish homocides during the Crimea campaign of 1941. Given that Eggebrecht passed away in 1999 with his military history kept fairly discreet, the verdict of the extra-judicial discussions remained inconclusive. The acute irony of the entire posthumous defamation however seems to be that Eggebrecht’s musicological legacy has been sidelined from the historical and legal controversies pertinent to the disclosure. Even at the special session held at the American Musicological Society Annual Meeting in 2010, only Christoph Wolff raised the issue of using specific details of his musical pedagogy and scholarship as testimony against his wartime and post-war conduct. Otherwise, any isolated treatment of the case would posit the musicological organisation and its associates as rather myopic and self-deprecating.

In order to square the circle, I argue for a *musicological* justification to the subjective politics through Eggebrecht’s extensive contribution to the scholarship of reception history, musical revivalism and musical understanding. Precisely because the

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32 Burnham, ‘The four ages of Beethoven’, 288 (my emphasis).
semantic and affective dynamics of Beethoven’s music are relatively plastic, such a contentious episode therefore presents an equitable resistance against any attempt to eclipse the significances of Beethoven’s Nazi heritage. In this particular section, I propose to reassess Eggebrecht’s writings on Beethoven and the organ movement with reference to the published facts before discussing the relevance of a few weighted responses regarding future prospects of Beethoven historiography.

To summarise Eggebrecht’s case in a nutshell, the eminent musicologist had served in the military police during the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. He was a member of the troops stationed in Simferopol and Sevastopol, where thousands of Jews were murdered in December that year. Two significant pieces of musical information alert us of his frequent visits to a German family home in Simferopol to practice on their grand piano, which eventually culminated in two radio recitals in July 1942. The radio has been instrumental for the National Socialists as a ‘medium of mass influence’ (Massenbeeinflussungsmittel), and throughout the Nazi period lectures on Beethoven’s music have been broadcast within and beyond German borders. Just as the Jewish Culture League was banning performances of Beethoven’s music in 1937, radio lectures were widely broadcast and published, including those on Beethoven given in Stockholm in 1938 and Bonn in 1942. From the perspective of Beethoven historiography, the Nazification of Beethoven creates an epistemological problem implicating his music within the history of the Holocaust, which in turn critically affects the wider history of Beethoven reception in the long twentieth century.

Therefore, increased scepticism in using Eggebrecht’s scholarship for music history and historiography in general would be most ethical for such a situation is not unlike the numerous cases of textbooks and other pedagogic activities whereby missionaries solely perpetuate the good of European colonialism or racial supremacy. We would be doing musicological justice a disservice if we were to confine the discussion to the episodes concerning Beethoven’s reputation. Instead, the gravity of the

33 Boris von Haken, ‘How Do We Know What We Know about Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht?’, German Studies Review 35(2), 2012, 299-309.
34 The same piece was also featured in the Nazi propaganda film Wen die Götten Lieben (Whom the Gods Love), which was produced as a revisionist Mozart biopic in November 1942. See Erik Levi, Mozart and the Nazis, 185.
35 The lecturers were Arnold Schering and Ludwig Schiedermair respectively; Pamela Potter, Most German of the Arts: Musicology and Society from the Weimar Republic to the End of Hitler’s Reich, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998, 22, 119 and 130.
matter would be better delineated with further scrutiny of Eggebrecht’s epistemic radicalism.

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<th>Title</th>
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<td>Die Orgelbewegung</td>
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<td>Zur Geschichte der Beethoven-Rezeption: Beethoven 1970</td>
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<td>Versuch über die Wiener Klassik: die Tanzszene in Mozart’s „Don Giovanni“</td>
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<td>Die Musik Gustav Mahlers</td>
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**Figure 1.1 A selected chronology of single-authored books written by Eggebrecht**

The first case in point was shared by the Bach scholar Christoph Wolff in his public response to the Eggebrecht controversy in 2010. Wolff hinted at how an earlier advice he gave to Eggebrecht was ignored because it could possibly hint at his own biography.⁶⁶ In Eggebrecht’s 1967 essay on the organ revival movement, one of the criteria he has identified is that of Verschuldung or what Wolff translates as ‘guilt’. Eggebrecht argues that the historical revival of ‘ancient’ music since the 1920s is an act of repaying a historical debt due to the failure to understand the ‘historical conditions’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He thinks that this revival qua resistance is a regression to assigning a fixed historical value and normalising the past.⁶⁷ To the extent that Eggebrecht has thwarted the restoration enterprise in a single stroke, the French reviewer of his book in the subsequent year was equally cunning by retorting that ‘it is not Nazism, or murder to believe that there are principles that constitute the essence of the organ and that certain epochs have also been neglected.’⁶⁸

Given that this particular thesis on the organ revival movement marks a turning point in his musical and ideological thinking – that is, his dissent from musicological positivism towards subjective hermeneutics – all subsequent texts by Eggebrecht,

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including those which responded to his, deserve to be re-read with sceptical lenses. Essentially, the problem with plastic hermeneutics is their destructive effects. Because the issue has affected so many who survived and lived on afterwards, any act of paraphrasing – as both a verb and a gerund – of their reactions become complicit with ethnographic censorship. As much as is possible, a more ethical means of discussing present-day sentiments would be through immediate quotations, such as the poignant admission by Christopher Browning, an American historian of the Holocaust,

that artists and musicians can also be killers, and the performance of music was viewed by at least some German officers at that time not as standing in opposition to the killing but rather as a means to sooth the perpetrators so they could continue it. In the inverted moral world of the Nazis, sadly, even performing the piano sonatas of Mozart and Beethoven for radio broadcast to German troops in the Crimea was not entirely innocent.  

In addition to his writings on Beethoven, Eggebrecht, as a Nazi perpetrator, performed Beethoven’s ‘Moonlight’ Sonata in a bid to ‘cleanse’ away memories of the atrocious genocide that happened barely half a year earlier. Such an action is analogous to the German musical colonisation of Crimea. Correspondingly, now that Beethoven and the Sonata in C♯ minor have been stained with homicidal intentions, how are we to listen to it? If we were to do ignore its Nazi’s connection, would we not be reinforcing Eggebrecht’s annihilation of the ‘real Beethoven’? The German-American musicologist Anne Shreffler recognises that “[f]uture encounters with Eggebrecht’s writings will necessarily have a “double” character; readers will engage with his texts, while not being able to forget the allegations about his past.”

Similarly, the British music theorist Arnold Whittall, in a recent review of an English translation of another book by Eggebrecht, ponders over the discursive necessity to engage with Eggebrecht’s distinction between aesthetic and cognitive understanding on hindsight of the turn of events. How much scepticism would be needed when reading Eggebrecht’s scholarship in general and specifically on Beethoven,

Bach, or Mahler? From a psychoanalytic perspective, is it more reasonable to locate possible repressed affects in his writings now? For Whittall, ‘the bottomless pit of Lacanian psychoanalytical theory will loom large in this context; [even though] it does not figure at all for Eggebrecht’ himself.\(^{42}\) This doublespeak might very well cause some creative resistance, or be severely misinterpreted as if bearing certain nationalist and anti-Semitic undertones against the Lacanian enterprise.

Returning to the deliberate turn to reception history, Eggebrecht’s suggestive erasure of a ‘real Beethoven’ should have aroused epistemological suspicion. Was Eggebrecht trying to erase the history of Beethoven reception during the Nazi era by placing emphasis on the plasticity of musical meaning? If it is true, this manoeuvre could very well be perceived as a duplicitous denazification of musical history, that is, a deceptive covering up of real facts in the style of a warped history ‘written by the losers’. With the exposure of his involvement in the Holocaust, the real intention of Eggebrecht’s agenda to subsume composers and their music under any category or structure whatsoever becomes less opaque. His post-war thesis represents not only a historical reconstruction, but also a historiographical revision especially with respect to Burnham’s appraisal, which can now be interpreted with murderous connotations of factual annihilation.

Did the ‘real Beethoven’ need to suffer or to overcome his fate in the same manner as how innocent Crimean Jews had to be ‘cleansed’ away by the ‘smoking gun’ of Eggebrecht’s reception-centred scholarship? Only Dahlhaus has defended Eggebrecht by suggesting that his compatriot has simply affirmed the ‘truth content [of] the same topoi’ because of their persistent recurrences.\(^{43}\) For better or worse, Eggebrecht’s clarification only appeared in the mid 1990s in the revised edition of Beethoven where he thinks that, despite how subsequent generations of critics and scholars have established the topical constants, these selfsame constants are neither subjective nor contingent, but are already inherent within Beethoven’s own articulations, musical or otherwise.\(^{44}\)

In conclusion, the curious case of Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht epitomises both the plasticity and resistances of musicological scholarship with its epistemological and affective vicissitudes. While Boris von Haken was the first to alert the world on the factual discrepancies, the overtly emotive and counter-productive reactions that

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Carl Dahlhaus, *Ludwig van Beethoven und Seine Zeit*, Laaber: Laaber-Verlag, 1987, 308. I thank Michael Fend for alerting me to this comment on Eggebrecht’s text; the translation is otherwise my own.

followed in Germanic Europe and North America seemed to reflect the decorum of our musicological milieu. Subsequent investigations and testimonies were published by a group of professors based mostly in Hamburg, but these hasty redemptions also resulted in some documents being misinterpreted or even censored deliberately. The firm resistances from Eggebrecht’s family members and colleagues triggered emotional confessions from descendants of Jewish émigrés across the Atlantic. From the perspective of a collective effervescence, to use Durkheim’s term, the ‘Eggebrecht problem’ has rekindled not only communal relations, but also their political and intellectual impasses, such as those explicated here.

Genealogically within Eggebrecht’s oeuvre, the historiography of Beethoven’s life and music I argue has to be juxtaposed with his theories of musical understanding and revivalism. Perhaps if Eggebrecht had not written a treatise on Beethoven or played the piano in Crimea, Beethoven and his reception would not have been implicated in this scandalous turn of events in such an intimate way. Unfortunately, in the midst of the wraths and woes lies Beethoven’s ‘Moonlight’ Sonata as a totemic object. It is as if the sounds of harmonic suspensions and melodic outbursts were imbued with a shamanic effect, causing the Sonata to be plasticised with renewed semantics, and becoming one of the many ‘kitsch objects’ identified by Burnham that undermine the heroic myth. Akin to the challenges of decolonisation, the denazification of Beethoven is almost impossible after the Eggebrecht controversy. Rather, the Beethovenian myth continues its wait for an ethical restoration as a new generation of musicians and scholars wrestle less with the Rezeptionsgeschichte, the history of its reception, than with the Resistanzgeschichte, the history of its resistance.

1.3 Jolivet: Beethoven in War-time Paris

Most of the scholarly forays of the 1990s and 2000s, including Burnham’s history of Beethoven’s reception mentioned earlier, have however neglected scholarship done outside the English and Germanic musical worlds, which can themselves reveal a

45 See ‘Der Fall’ Eggebrecht: Noch Einmal, Musik & Asthetik 17(67), 2013.
diversity of alternative epistemological approaches. Inevitably, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explicate Beethoven’s reception history across the vast temporal and spatial span, as well as to embark on a comparative critique of what the present hotchpotch of scholarship has sidelined. Instead, having reviewed how the Germans in the likes of Hoffmann, Grillparzer, Wagner and Eggebrecht have established significant moments within the Resistanzsgeschichte or resistance history of Beethoven’s music and the socio-political situations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I will reinforce the plastic resistance and transformative nature of musical knowledge through another such contentious episode situated outside the Anglo-Germanic hegemony.

Switching sides from the Axis to the Allies, the Beethovenian passion was similarly reinvigorated in the imagination by a French composer living in wartime Paris. As a founding member of the musical collective La Jeune France, André Jolivet offers his readers a unique hermeneutics of Beethoven’s music, one which not only supplements the Anglo-Germanic hegemony of Beethoven reception history, but also transforms the perception of Beethoven into someone who is vested in the pious, the exotic and the occult. Instead of the conventional tropes of overcoming and heroism, Jolivet’s framing of Beethoven’s music within naturalist and humanist categories is most probably a result of his personal interests as well as the political situation in German-occupied Paris. However, when these disparate arguments are grouped as a single thesis, certain nationalist and colonialist ambivalences surface with his exegesis. One immediate reason for this problematic stance could be due to the limited resources Jolivet consulted in 1943 for the monograph, which consisted mostly of French books published in the first four decades of the twentieth century. There is distinctly no reference to the German or English texts of Marx, Schmitz or Thayer in his writings. Perhaps some context of the conception of the book would clarify the underlying reasons for Jolivet’s interpretations.

A year before Jolivet started work on the biography, Richard Masse, the publisher of La Revue musicale and biographies of artistic personalities such as Gide, Malraux, and Proust, approached Jolivet to pen a book on Beethoven, after Florent Schmitt and Arthur Honegger both declined. Jolivet undertook the project with enthusiasm. Beethoven’s compositions have served as a pedagogic model for Jolivet

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48 Another case in point is Dahlhaus’s Ludwig van Beethoven, which neglects contemporaneous English, French and Italian influences, and relies only on German sources from Heinrich Christoph Koch to Christian Gottfried Körner, from C. P. E. Bach to J. A. P. Schulz. See his Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to His Music, translated by Mary Whittall, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

49 Jolivet has a Jewish wife and has held strong left-wing viewpoints since the 1930s.

50 Ibid. 642.
during his earlier apprenticeship with Varèse, who himself studied at right-winger Vincent d’Indy’s Schola Cantorum but befriended the left-winger Romain Rolland, who happens to be so well-known a Beethoven scholar during the French Third Republic that even the Chinese have been reading him via a Shanghainese translation from as early as the 1930s.\(^{51}\) For Jolivet, there is no doubt that Varèse’s teachings had a major influence in his framing of Beethoven as someone who transformed music from the ‘inner ear’ (oreille intérieure) into a ‘projection of sound’ (la projection du son). That said, Jolivet’s rendition of Beethoven biography was tellingly stretched between the polemic politics of the mentalités, as well as the Catholic religiosity and colonialism-nationalism embraced by the French during the belle époque.\(^{52}\)

In addition to their fervent musical idolisation of Beethoven, especially his symphonies, the fin de siècle scholars have also constructed rather dissimilar historiographical orientations about Beethoven’s life.\(^{53}\) While most fin de siècle biographers including Jean Chantavoire and Julien Tiersot posit Beethoven as a liberationist authority and revolutionary republican, d’Indy’s and Rolland’s portraits diverge markedly between the sacred-secular divide.\(^{54}\) Rolland introduces Beethoven as a grimacing and hateful sufferer who transforms his inner creative will into emancipatory joy, whereas d’Indy presents Beethoven as an ordinary patriot devoted to the love of nature and intuitive contemplation of God.\(^{55}\) Jolivet relies on all of the abovementioned resources for his monograph, but his implicit focus on the human, natural and exogenous aspects becomes problematic from a political perspective. Precisely because Jolivet has been known to adopt the mystical and magical elements from world cultures into his music, his conservative portrayal of Beethoven could have resulted in an artistic censure amongst the left-wing factions that he was a part of.\(^{56}\)

\(^{51}\) On the political divide amongst the fin-de-siècle composers, see Jane F. Fulcher, *French Cultural Politics and Music: From the Dreyfus Affair to the First World War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. The 1903 biography of Beethoven was the first book by Rolland to be translated into Chinese. The translation by Fu Lei, the father of Fou T’song, was published in several issues of a ‘translation newspaper’ in 1934 and subsequently reprinted in British Hong Kong and Republican Taipei.


\(^{55}\) Huebner, ‘D’Indy’s Beethoven’, 96, 98 and 103-104.

\(^{56}\) For example, see Caroline Rae, ‘Myth and Mysticism in Jolivet: Musical Magic Realism?’, *Cahiers rémois de musicologie* 2, 2004, 139-71.
In addition to the distinct identification of the human, natural, and supernatural factors, it is not uncanny to also locate three conflating musical characteristics that dominate Jolivet’s compositional style – pantheist mysticism, colonial exoticism, and renewed primitivism – in his reading of Beethoven and his music.\(^{57}\) In order to show these semantic plasticities, each of the characteristics will be delineated in this section via a contextual analysis of Jolivet’s interpretations. First, Jolivet presents Beethoven as an ordinary, emotional person whose music and life developed and matured over both the short and long term. Commenting on the First Symphony, Jolivet thinks that the development section of the opening movement is more interesting than the characterless opening themes; the minuet with its nervous quality on the other hand already anticipates the spirit of the scherzo.\(^{58}\) Beethoven’s melodies for Jolivet take on a profound human meaning.\(^{59}\) Such is the case of the anonymous hero of the Third Symphony who represents the entire individual, who lives intensely, filling a life with love, pain, strength and conflicts.\(^{60}\) Other than an impromptu, wandering dreamscape contrasted in the Vivace-Adagio of Opus 109,\(^{61}\) Jolivet also possesses a keen eye, or rather ear, in detecting melancholic moments in Beethoven’s piano sonatas, and professes his curiosity in Beethoven’s private relations with the female dedicatees of several sonatas by mentioning terms like ‘l’affectueuse compassion’ and ‘d’ordre sentimental’.\(^{62}\) All these are instances of Jolivet’s representation of Beethoven’s everyday human conditions, which include the composer’s expression of personal and musical affections.

Second, Jolivet uses naturalist language to describe the symphonies and piano sonatas. For instance, the opening motif of the Fifth Symphony sounds like a birdsong from the Mödling woods and its Scherzo streams a gush of dazzling rays out from the sun.\(^{63}\) Jolivet goes on to suggest that Beethoven’s compositions reach beyond these nature-related meanings which are associated to the spirit of the landscape, and manifest their own natural elementary character from within the very essence of Beethoven’s


\(^{58}\) André Jolivet, Écrits Volume 2, Sampzon : Delatour, 2006, 693.

\(^{59}\) Ibid. 690.

\(^{60}\) Ibid. 694.

\(^{61}\) Ibid. 730.

\(^{62}\) Ibid. 723: Jolivet’s cites an excerpt from the musicologist Jacques-Gabriel Prod’homme based on Schindler’s biography, which has been proven recently to be controversial. Correspondingly, the word ‘melancholy’ appears on pages 725, 727 and 736; on Jolivet’s brief exposés of Beethoven’s private affairs, see pages 725-28.

\(^{63}\) Ibid. 696-97.
personality. In other words, Beethoven the person is transformed into being a part of nature, and produces music that bears the richness of all nature. Eventually, the human and natural aspects converge in the case of the First Razumovsky String Quartet, in which Jolivet recognises a pastoral character with anguished complaints and lonesome laments.

Without going into recent debates between naturalism and decadence in fin-de-siècle European music, we can readily observe certain plastic resistance imposed by Jolivet on the musical meaning of Beethoven’s oeuvre. The Fifth Symphony deviates from Anton Schindler’s clamour of Fate and the BBC’s proclamation of military victory; the First Razumovsky is transformed into a down-to-earth and poignant private resignation instead of a lunatic’s patchwork of dramatic music for public ‘theatrical’ indulgence as is commonly perceived. Through his idiosyncratic ways of listening, Jolivet offers his readers a renewed imagery of Beethoven and his music. Under Jolivet’s disguise, Beethoven is neither the genius struggling for heroic recognition, nor the aurally-challenged creator of revolutionary musical monuments. Jolivet’s Beethoven is a complete human being abiding by the virtues of universality and religiosity. In retrospect, Beethoven’s music has significantly influenced and expanded Jolivet’s own understanding of the world, musical or otherwise. In an interview published in 1961, Jolivet considers Beethoven as someone serving more of an aesthetic inspiration than a stylistic model for his music.

Finally, I contend that what has generally been recognised as Jolivet’s exoticism or primitivism can be translated as the composer’s search for an alterity, that is, an alternative to the French musical self set down by a gamut of composers from Rameau to Ravel. Following on from his nationalist setting of part of the Jeanne d’Arc oratorio in 1941, Jolivet’s taxonomy of foreign elements in Beethoven’s music not only essentialises the Teutonic foundation of Beethoven’s aesthetics, but also uncovers both

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64 Ibid. 725.
65 Ibid. 723.
66 Ibid. 735.
of their selfsame desire to represent the other in and outside the French Empire. Several musicologists have raised the issue of such Orientalist representations as constructing a method to resist the other within oneself. The late Stuart Hall sums up such subaltern consciousness as the affirmation of the colonizer themselves ‘having’ to know who they are not in order to know who they are. Alongside his visits to the Exposition coloniale and frequent travels to Algeria and Morocco in the 1930s, Jolivet’s musical imagination of certain exotic elements becomes a form of mimicry that asserts the disciplinary authority of the colonial discourse. In contradistinction from the postcolonial framing of Beethoven, I propose that one reason for Jolivet’s Orientalist stance lies in how his desire for the other manifests itself in what psychoanalysts would call a form of counter-transference resistance. In simpler terms, the foreigner invents a method of communication in order to observe oneself interacting with the native. Regardless of one’s ability to differentiate between aesthetics and temporalities of the other, this alterity which is always already imagined takes on a symbolic façade of psychopolitical resistance.

In order to contextualise this plastic internalisation of the other within oneself, I will point out a few of Jolivet’s objectifications of specific folk ideals in Beethoven’s music. First, he highlights certain characteristics of village dances in the Sixth Symphony, such as the motifs in the opening and closing movements which he deems identical to those of popular Slavic dances; the alternation between binary and ternary rhythms in the Scherzo also reminds him of old Austrian dance music. Jolivet also thinks that the finales of both the Seventh and Eighth Symphonies were inspired by Hungarian country dances and melodies with the fugue from the Seventh evoking the czardas. Finally, the theme of the rondo in the ‘Waldstein’ Sonata for Jolivet conveys the simplicity of a popular song, though he does not state its origin. Jolivet’s analytic method of deciphering these localised sound objects in Beethoven is considerably a matter of cultural distinction, which to be sure prevailed in the art of Machaut’s ballades

75 Jolivet, Écrits, 698.
76 Ibid. 699-700. Lewis Lockwood in contrast thinks that the Seventh Symphony finale has been influenced by an Irish song instead, see his Beethoven: The Music and the Life, 231.
77 Ibid. 726.
and Monteverdi’s Vespers of 1610. The marked correspondences between musical and cultural connotations create an affective resistance between the listener and the music, and might alienate the listener from the real essences of music. I will return to resolve this complex phenomenon later in the third chapter.

Another distinct process of alterity formation that sustains Jolivet’s fascination with Beethoven would be their shared religiosity and spirituality. Similar to the obsession with foreign objects and culture, a staunch belief in an otherworldly being becomes a process of differentiating oneself from the divine. According to certain theological traditions, such as those of Aquinas and Spinoza, there can be no human existence without the recognition of God. For the case of Jolivet, who like Beethoven is Catholics by birth, his devotion to religion is less fervent than, say, those of Messiaen and Schoenberg. Given that there are only a few works from his compositional output, such as the masses and liturgical suite, that give explicit evidence of his faith, Jolivet’s writings on Beethoven could be used as one amongst several non-creative sources to uncover his Christian piety. Take, for example, the case of Jolivet asserting Beethoven’s public charisma through his symphonies.

The crowds recognised [Beethoven], whose orchestral works were singing for them, from all the breath of his great religious soul with all the unanimous fervour in the brotherly communion of man in great enthusiasm.

Jolivet situates Beethoven amidst an imaginary mass of listeners, who bestow upon the composer a prophetic persona of which everyone is given the chance to express themselves via his orchestral music. In the sense of Beethoven’s music becoming a medium of pious communication, Jolivet has appropriated the mostly secular music from a century before his time into the congregational fraternity. Referring to the finale of the Ninth Symphony later in the text, Jolivet’s evangelical message becomes more apparent when he advocates the idea of mutual love being fully realised in God alone as central to the ‘symphony with chorus’. Instead of the conventional focus on freedom or universal humanity, Jolivet places the agency of divinity as the focus of his

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79 Jolivet, *Écrits*, 691: ‘Les foules ont reconnu Celui qui dans ses œuvres orchestrales, avait chante pour elles, de tout le souffle de sa grande âme religieuse (de re-ligare, entre-liet) avec toute sa ferveur unanimité en la communion fraternelle des hommes dans un idéal enthousiasme.’
80 Ibid. 701.
interpretation; music becomes the sole means of religious bonding. Jolivet goes further by proclaiming the string quartet, over the might of the symphony or the intimacy of the sonata, as the art form with the highest *spiritual* significance.\(^8\)

Because of the demands of these works [string quartets], [Beethoven] had the total dedication of some groups [of musicians] placing their religious admiration and devoting all their activities... [They] took a character of communion with the ineffable.\(^2\)

Certain words in the first sentence – ‘dedication’, ‘religious’ and ‘devoting’ – could be read as secular metaphors to describe the diligence and effort invested by the musicians. However, when placed together with the subsequent statement, these terms gradually regained their sacred connotations. That is, Jolivet’s musicians have submit themselves to the service of God, coming together in a musical communion and using Beethoven’s string quartets to conjure up the non-linguistic spirit. If we were to juxtapose Jolivet’s creative aesthetics in the 1930s and early 1940s with his perspectives of Beethoven’s music, his account of Beethoven’s religious allegiance could very well be a justification for his own level of commitment to his faith.

And then, if [Beethoven] was practicing, if he was reluctant to express his religious convictions, the spirit in which he constructed these works, and the works themselves show us enough that he was Christian; with fervent.\(^3\)

The case of Jolivet assuming the role of such Christian apologetics in defence of Beethoven’s spiritual distance could be perceived as an excuse for his own aesthetic deviation. In the context of French Republicanism, the composer who treats music as religious propaganda and religion as musical inspiration is akin to a shaman conducting a mundane ritual. He or she returns to a primordial and conservative way of life under the populist effervescence of the listeners. On the other hand, the additional emphasis on the intense affect of fervency could be attributed to what Philip Weller has identified

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\(^8\) Ibid. 734.  
\(^2\) Ibid. 736: ‘Pour que ces œuvres s’imposent, il fallut le dévouement total de quelques phalanges leur portant une religieuse admiration et leur consacrant tout leur activité... [Ils] prenaient un caractère de communion avec l’ineffable.’  
\(^3\) Ibid. 705: ‘Et puis, s’il était peu pratiquant, s’il répugnait à faire étalage de ses convictions religieuses, l’esprit dans lequel il construisit cette œuvre, et l’œuvre elle-même nous prouvent assez qu’il était chrétien; avec ferveur.’
from the La Jeune France manifesto of 1936 as the music’s ‘spiritual violence’. That is, ‘a mode of resistance, a way of confronting the experiences of life idealistically, yet at the same time pragmatically, not in bitterness, but with resilience and in a state of possible hope.’

Jolivet’s portrayal of Beethoven as an ordinary composer who is human and evokes the natural not only reifies the conventional ideals of the heroic, but also erects an alterity that essentially alienates others, who become foreign and impious under such differentiations. One can only offer a conjecture that Jolivet’s conservative and nationalist outlook was a result of an artistic repression under the Vichy regime. Beethoven became for Jolivet a symbol of psychopolitical resistance during the Second World War; the Viennese composer has been armoured with qualities of a primitive naturalist, a humanist exoticist, and a spiritual cult figure. Under Jolivet’s wartime aesthetics, Beethoven appears to have undergone a plastic makeover, which may not have weathered well with the anti-Enlightenment and anti-humanist factions of the French left-wingers. If not for this contentious worldview, the delayed publication of the Beethoven monograph a decade after its completion could be attributed to Jolivet’s affected reputation after 1945 being involved in the anti-Neoclassical scandal and his appointment as director of the Comédie Française. Notwithstanding the increasing laïcité and eventual loss of Algeria, Jolivet’s Beethoven can be considered to be less of an intellectual revision, but a historical appropriation of secondary sources for one’s personal and political interests.

Simultaneously, Beethoven and his music became imbued with an affordance for hope and resistance during wartime Europe, as we have seen earlier with the case of Eggebrecht on the German front. In addition to these two examples from Crimea and Paris, recent scholarship has also unearthed the resistance history of Beethoven much further away. Rachel Beckles-Willson reveals two oscure cases of Germanic promotion of Beethoven’s sonatas and symphonies in Palestine in 1865 and 2004, and sandwiched between these dates, the Russian pedagogue Heinrich Neuhaus (1888-1964) not only

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84 Philip Weller, ‘Messiaen, the Cinq Rechants, and ‘Spiritual Violence’’, in Christopher Dingle and Robert Fallon (eds.), Messiaen Perspectives I: Sources and Influences, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, 299. [279-312]
85 The musical and political group, La Jeune France, was dissolved in 1942, the year before Jolivet started work on the Beethoven text. On the musical scene during wartime Paris, see Nigel Simeone, ‘Making Music in Occupied Paris', The Musical Times 147(1894), 2006, 23-50.
86 For the scandal evolving around Messiaen, see Peter Hill and Nigel Simeone, Messiaen, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, 152-4.
87 On the plausibility of composer being intellectuals, see Jane F. Fulcher, The Composer as Intellectual.
cultivated a pride of Beethoven interpreters in Moscow, but also left a legacy of virtuosic performance techniques for the late twentieth century and beyond.\textsuperscript{88}

1.4 Solomon and Rosen: Driving Styles across the Atlantic

Anglophone scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a turn to source studies, including Beethoven’s own sketches and correspondences. Between 1974 and 1982, the British musicologist Alan Tyson compiled three volumes of essays related to Beethoven’s epistolary relations and compositional behaviours.\textsuperscript{89} After an English edition of Beethoven’s letters, journals, and conversation books was republished in 1984, an exposition on Beethoven’s sketchbooks was also introduced to English readers shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{90} Before all these activities however were two books that became most influential for the subsequent decades of international scholarship.

Co-incidentally, they were both written by academics, who were not trained in Musicology, and were also the very first publication for both Charles Rosen, an international pianist with a doctorate in French, and Maynard Solomon, a country music producer with Marxist beliefs. It is not surprising to discover that, akin to the biographies of Grillparzer, Eggebrecht, and other writers on Beethoven, the scholarly tone and direction taken on by these ‘East Coast’ writers acutely reflect their socio-cultural interests and statuses in 1970s New York. My criticism is that no attempt was made to engage with Adorno’s theories of pathology or style even after the much publicised demise of Adorno in 1969; this section takes Solomon and Rosen to task.

The distinct feature of Solomon’s biography of Beethoven’s life is his reliance on Freudian psychoanalytic theories to explain certain character traits and personal crises of the composer. The integral application of Freud to music and musical lives has appeared most prominently in Adorno’s \textit{Philosophy of New Music}, although Solomon neither referenced nor compared the work with his own.\textsuperscript{91} Given that Freud has


\textsuperscript{91} Maynard Solomon cites a couple of essays by Adorno in his \textit{Beethoven}, New York: Schirmer, 1977, 512-514, but not Adorno’s \textit{Philosophy of New Music}, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis:
stipulated the unconscious as the base structure that drives the libidinal economy, Solomon’s base structure of the Beethovenian vital economy would have to be that of resistance, musical or otherwise. Resistance is a trope that is prevalent in much of Adorno’s writings; it can be found in the discussions on Beethoven, Schoenberg, Stravinsky as well as jazz and popular music. While competition amongst small niche groups and struggle against traditional audiences are everyday challenges faced by musicians, Solomon covers none of these matters historically or psychoanalytically.

In contrast, he depicts Beethoven in perpetual resistances against his family members, romantic desires and musical decisions. In his psychoanalytic reading of the composer’s life, Solomon identifies Beethoven to be in a state of mental disorder. When he is neglected by his parents, Beethoven becomes narcissistic; when he faces hostility from his sister-in-law, he dwells in denial and affectionate contradictions. Beethoven’s Fidelio and familial obligations represent contra-Oedipal enactments of the rescue fantasy, while his Seventh and Eighth Symphonies, which come without a traditional slow movement, are possessed by the ‘festal character’ quasi a totemic ‘infringement of [formal] prohibition’. To order to overcome his personal and familial crises, Beethoven for Solomon develops a neurotic form of musical resistance so as to regain his ‘psychological and creative equilibrium’.

While Solomon’s exegesis has made the heroic Beethoven ‘more believable, more truly human’, criticisms have also sounded rather spiteful and anti-collegiate. For instance, the German feminist Marie-Elisabeth Tellenbach went so far as to deem Solomon’s biography hypothetical and a falsification of facts, and condemn psychoanalysis in general as a method that should be confined to living subjects who can still be analysed. The publication of the rebuttal resulted in Solomon’s resignation from the advisory board of the Ira F. Brilliant Centre for Beethoven Studies. From these psychopolitical reactions, Beethoven’s life seems to be formed and deformed through contradictory interpretations and their respective disagreements. Judged unfairly, the methods of analysis, psychoanalytic or otherwise, also become complicit with revisionist attempts to understand Beethoven’s life and music. The occurrence of

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92 Solomon, Beethoven, 21 and 237.
93 Ibid. 199 and 213.
94 Ibid. 231 and 358.
such personal and institutional conflicts can only be attributed to the metamorphic effects of epistemological resistance, where musical knowledge becomes embroiled in the plastic process of being created and destroyed.

Likewise, such plastic transmutation of Beethoven’s music as a derivative of his socio-political history can be found in the invention of ‘the classical style’ by the late Charles Rosen in his 1971 publishing debut. Rosen’s idea of a shared harmonic language among Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven has widely influenced subsequent generations of scholars and performers. However, the corresponding criticisms – most prominently from the American musicologist James Webster – concerning Rosen’s periodic myopia of Haydn’s music before 1780 and his structural biasness for Mozart’s operatic ensembles and finales have hitherto not gained substantial clout. Although Rosen has defended himself in the expanded new edition of the volume, several more general and specific blind spots in his conception of the ‘classical style’ need to be pointed out.

In a supplementary chapter on Beethoven’s structural kinship with Haydn and Mozart, Rosen regurgitates the theory of conventional harmonic progression as proposed by Heinrich Christoph Koch more than two centuries ago in 1791. Almost in a naïve tone using words like ‘fascinating’ and ‘extraordinary’, he discovers the stereotypical harmonic trajectories moving towards the relative minor and subdominant keys in the development and recapitulation respectively. Rosen strips down a section of Beethoven’s Op. 110 to its melodic skeleton and ignores other aspects, such as the dynamics and accompaniment, to assert his case. Musing about the opening of Op. 10 No. 3, he argues that Beethoven’s extensions into the then non-existent tessitura of the keyboard are ‘innovations’ that stretch the listeners’ imagination or the players’ affective threshold, instead of accounting for the unidiomatic writing based on the composer’s melancholic mood. Critics have recognised Rosen’s hermeneutics smacking of Wagnerist and modernist nuances, and it is not less accurate to charge him for propagating hegemonic and fictitious genealogies.

100 Rosen, The Classical Style, 488-89.
Readers of Rosen must pay heed to his self-proclamation that his project ‘is a fiction, an attempt to create order, a construction that enables us to interpret the change in the musical language without being totally bewildered by the mass of minor composers’. Exposed through the lucidity of his analytic language is also the political chauvinism of his demeanour. An elitist attitude is revealed through his marked distinction between artistic language and everyday language as well as that of the ‘musical vernacular’ against his ‘classical style’, which for him is a ‘purification of the irrelevant residue of past traditions’. Such rhetoric disregards historical and societal facts. In his rebuttal to Mark Evan Bonds’s critique concerning structural norms, Rosen assumes erroneously that listeners during and after Beethoven’s time have the chance to listen to his music more than once and prefer stylistic changes to habitual traditions.

The most crucial fabrication which has gone largely unnoticed is the very conceptual category of ‘the classical style’. Rosen describes ‘style’ as ‘a way of exploiting and focusing a language, which then becomes a dialect or language in its own right [making] possible what might be called the personal style or manner of the artist’. The use of language as a metonymy with style is highly problematic because language is inherently social, while style is established through individual expression. Without the imitation of one’s style by another, there can no musical language. In fact, a reason why the music of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven share the same level of comprehensibility with those of Clementi, Gyrowetz, and other ‘minor composers’ is due to their identical musical style in all of their personal contributions to the repertoire. Contrary to Rosen’s division of style into the periodic and the communal, the ontology of style itself is always already singular. Otherwise, stylistic correspondence and recognition would be impossible.

What Rosen says about style as ‘a mode of understanding... the history of musical taste and appreciation’ is also confusing when his entire book revolves mostly around his understanding of the tonal layout in music composed by the imaginary triumvirate. How the decisions made by merely three out of hundreds of composers during the late eighteenth century can encompass a reception history of those times is indeed bewildering. Perhaps Rosen was referring to his personal taste and appreciation of Viennese classical music in the late twentieth century, and how he has isolated certain musical characteristics under his stylistic canonisation. This observation is most

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103 Rosen, The Classical Style, 22; my emphasis.
104 Ibid. 21-22.
105 Ibid. xviii.
106 Ibid. 20.
107 Ibid. 19-20.
likely to be congruent to his thesis of style as ‘represent[ing] a synthesis of expression’, except that the bricoleur is not any of the composers but Rosen himself.\textsuperscript{108} To the extent that Rosen disagreed with Adorno’s view of late Beethoven as fragmentary, the same judgment of Rosen ‘want[ing] a Beethoven that resembled him’ can be applied onto his synthetic classicism of Beethovenian unity with Haydn and Mozart.\textsuperscript{109}

Most importantly, the appendage of the ‘classical’ as an adjective to ‘style’ creates an oxymoron, because the ‘classical’ consecrates an act or a thing as traditional, while ‘style’ engenders the modification of it. ‘The classical style’ thus means a traditional way of shaping music, which is certainly not true of Haydn, Mozart or Beethoven, who invented their own ways of creating music. In aggregate, there is no stylistic strand binding the music of the abovementioned composers. Instead, Rosen’s ‘classical style’ is a plastic act of\textit{ analysis}, one imbued with the conscious or unconscious agenda to give and take analytic form to and from selected works without any cogent reasoning on Rosen’s part. As much as Rosen sees himself being part of another oxymoronic movement he calls ‘classical modernism’, Webster has been too kind to associate Rosen as a modernist living ‘in a state of continual tension with postmodern sensibilities’.\textsuperscript{110} From a historical perspective, my contention remains that Rosen has merely adopted a\textit{ neoclassical} style of musical analysis reviving stances which have been prevalent since the late nineteenth century under the lead of A. B. Marx, Heinrich Schenker, Hermann Abert, and others.\textsuperscript{111}

One prominent school of thought which Rosen has mostly ignored until his 2002 review essay is Adorno’s notion of ‘late style’. Expressing little empathy for the embattled life history of the German philosopher and sociologist, Rosen mistakenly conflates Adorno’s late style with all of Beethoven’s late works. He also maligns Adorno for ‘attempt[ing] to unite art and society with a facile metaphor’ as well as ‘neglecting the tradition of Viennese classicism’.\textsuperscript{112} In addition to his ‘facile metaphor’ of style, the parochialism belongs in fact to Rosen geographically and generically. Rosen remains adamant that Beethoven’s music should be traced back to Haydn in his bid to subsume all late Beethoven under his invention of the ‘classical style’. On the

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid. 20.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.; James Webster, ‘Rosen’s Modernist Haydn’, 285.
\textsuperscript{111} In his defence against Richard Taruskin’s criticism of his work as ‘Cold War propaganda’, Rosen remained defiant framing the Cold War years as ‘a time of hope and looking forward’, and obliterating the atrocities inflicted by the U. S. Army during the Korean and Vietnam Wars; Rosen, \textit{Freedom and the Arts}, 246.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. 256.
contrary, Adorno was already comparing Beethoven’s late style in his *Philosophy of New Music* to a larger European region from Bach’s Leipzig to Stravinsky’s Russia and the wider philosophical and literary traditions of Hegel and Goethe. Yet, Rosen does not acknowledge or rejoin Adorno’s differentiation between classical Beethoven from his late style whereby meaning for Adorno is ‘no longer mediated by appearance as a totality.’¹¹³ If Rosen had dealt with these structural dialectics between meaning and appearance, he would have discovered the key distinction between his and Adorno’s aesthetics to be that of the text-event dichotomy prevalent within musicological circles in the latter half of the twentieth century, an imaginary ideology that I will further explicate in the next section. This opposition can readily be sensed from how Adorno refers to, vis-à-vis Beethoven’s late style, as ‘compression’ in contrast to Rosen’s ‘laconic’ perception.¹¹⁴ Instead, Rosen attributes Adorno’s subjective intuitionalism to the influence of the German historian Oswald Spengler. He also alludes to Dahlhaus’s criticism of the epistemological disparities ‘between the formal-analytically individualizing and the sociologically generalizing procedure’.¹¹⁵ The irresponsibility of Rosen to nitpick denies him and his devotees the opportunity to find a point of reconciliation precisely between these two methods.¹¹⁶

For example, Rosen claims that Beethoven is unlikely to have known Bach’s Mass in B Minor during the composition of his *Missa Solemnis*.¹¹⁷ This hypothesis has actually been disproved by Martin Zenck in 1986 and seconded by Lewis Lockwood in his 2003 biography of the composer. Yet, Rosen did not address the discrepancy when his 2002 review was republished in 2012.¹¹⁸ His obstinacy of tracking Beethoven’s poietic kinship solely down to Haydn’s *The Creation* does not thwart the possibility of a Bachian genealogy. The hastiness in sanctifying an imaginary trinity, around which ‘minor composers’ revolve, sets up an immediate resistance to other theories. No

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 159, Rosen, *Freedom and the Arts*, 256.
¹¹⁶ W. Dean Sutcliffe has adroitly dismantled Rosen’s method in the case of William Kinderman’s comparison of two quintets in E-flat by Beethoven (Op. 16) and Mozart (K. 452), and countered ‘the classical style’ with ‘the galant style’. See his review in Burry, Gable and Marshall (eds.), *Variations on the Canon in Music and Letters* 91(4), 2010, 589. Subsequent scholars have uncritically relied on Rosen’s theoretical eugenics and passed over proper investigations into specific phenomena. For example, see Lockwood’s refuted accounts of kinship from Bach and Schubert to Schumann and Chopin in his *Beethoven*, 303, 380 and 398, and also Mirka Danuta’s *Metric Manipulations in Haydn and Mozart: Chamber Music for Strings, 1787-1791*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 91 and 115.
wonder Rosen’s enterprise has been described as a ‘thoroughly normative orientation’ of style that casts not only Beethoven, but also Haydn and Mozart within a creative straitjacket.\textsuperscript{119} As we will learn in the final chapter of this thesis, a performative perversion would be the best historiographical description of Rosen’s stylistic resistance.

1.5 Dahlhaus and Dualismus

Unfortunately, the situation within German and American historiography since then has barely moved beyond the trappings of binary epistemology. At various times, the controversies would surround Carl Dahlhaus’s portmanteau, \textit{Stildualismus}, that pits Beethoven against Rossini, or Carolyn Abbate’s opposition between drastic and gnostic aspects of the musical work.\textsuperscript{120} Otherwise, they would involve persistent \textit{bonnes polémiques} such as those between Barry Cooper and William Kinderman concerning their Beethoven biographies, and those between the translatability of Adornian text and thought from the Germanic milieu to the Anglo-American one.\textsuperscript{121} However, the most contentious issue within historical musicological scholarship remains the ‘special relationship’ between researchers associated with the British ‘style’ and those with the United Statean ‘style’. The failure of the discipline as it now stands with or without Beethoven lies not just in being unconscious of the nationalist duopoly, but also in the maintenance of such complicit hegemony. The argument becomes more poignant when one reviews \textit{The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini} edited by Benjamin Walton and Nicholas Mathew. All of the contributors are associated with institutions in the United States and United Kingdom. This is not to say that their revision of the scholarship paradigm is self-serving, but the selection of authors has reinforced the very dichotomy of \textit{Stildualismus} in every aspect of the project.

That said, the text-event binary is instrumental especially in the form of an analogy and a transition to subsequent critiques. For Richard Taruskin, allowing Rossini

\textsuperscript{119} Other than an excellent rebuttal to Rosen’s normative perceptive of musical conventions, pitting Haydn as ‘the most frequent victim’, W. Dean Sutchilfe’s repetition of ‘normative’ six times in his four-page review is indicative of Rosen’s systematic tendencies. See his review of Rosen’s \textit{The Classical Style in Music and Letters} 79(4), 1998, 601-4.


and the operatic genre into musical historiography is itself an act of canonic expansion albeit remaining on the level of the thesis-antithesis binary and hegemony. While this ontological position, which I will discuss in the third chapter, belongs to the Fichtean positing of the self within oneself, those writers, who maintain the ‘two styles’ or ‘two cultures’, continue to subscribe to the eighteenth-century, pre-Kantian school of historiography. On the other hand, the Hegelian approach towards, say, a ‘Germanic’ or ‘performative’ synthesis is also possible and has been put forth by James Webster and James Hepokoski. In their readings, neither the pairing of Rossini and Beethoven nor that of text and performance is set in opposition, but rather in association. Out of this structural assumption, Hepokoski goes further to suggest four alternative hermeneutic genres, namely, (1) to demystify orthodox narratives of music history by challenging music’s complicities with power structures, (2) to reconsider repertoire by subsuming events as texts and explicate them in their own right, (3) to treat individual performances of a score as legitimate works in their own right, and (4) to appreciate the spontaneity of the performance situation with the experience of being there (or of performing oneself).

As encouraging as these propositions sound, they are in fact still dialectical and rather dated in the age of plurality and plasticity. Recent scholarship within literary criticism has moved far beyond Foucauldian and postcolonial theories into the affective and neurological fields; ethnomusicology and practice-based research are already in their ‘golden ages’, that is, until the War on Terror led by the United States and United Kingdom no less swung musicological historiography onto a global, read: imperialist, trajectory. The hegemony of musicological inquiry within the United States and United Kingdom qua epistemic centres needs to be interrogated. As a minor detour, I propose in the first instance to maintain the method of correspondence within a closed system so as not to distract the investigation from external power structures, such as class, race, and gender. By way of reflecting critically on Dahlhaus’s impact on Anglophone

122 Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, Vol. III: Music in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 8: ‘A historiography of early nineteenth-century music that allows itself to be completely dominated by Beethoven is one that has deliberately read his antithesis out of the canon. Kiesewetter’s recognition of Rossini as a counterweight to Beethoven is first of all an acknowledgement of opera’s continuing importance, indeed its dominance, among musical genres, which accounts for Rossini’s dominance among composers.’ The emphasis is mine.

123 James Webster, ‘Beethoven, Rossini – and Others’, in Nicholas Mathew and Benjamin Walton (eds.), The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini: Historiography, Analysis, Criticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 62: ‘I have noted that Kiesewetter’s treatment of Rossini does not unmediatedly oppose him to Beethoven, but links them, through their shared participation in a “Germanic” instrumental tradition; and have alluded to the critique of the absurdly one-sided notion that Rossini’s view of his own operas was exclusively “performative.”’

scholarship, I appropriate Hepokoski’s method of contextualising Dahlhaus’s output within his milieu, and apply the selfsame method as a meta-critique of Hepokoski’s own influence within and beyond the expanding Anglophone musicological community.

Figure 1.2 Index of ‘Dahlhaus’ in all publications from RILM Abstracts 1962-2013

In an earlier article from 1991, Hepokoski ‘attempts a rudimentary mapping of the geography of Dahlhaus’s “extra-musicological” concerns’ by situating two of the latter’s books – *Foundations of Music History* and *Nineteenth-Century Music* – in the political upheavals of 1960s and 1970s West Germany.\(^{125}\) In addition to aligning Dahlhaus’s hermeneutic orientation with the anti-objectivity of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Robert Jauss, Hepokoski parallels Dahlhaus’s writings with the pragmatic *Tendenzwende* aesthetics most pronounced in the literary fiction of his contemporaries.\(^{126}\) As a result, the rising popularity of Dahlhaus’s ideas since the English translation of *Nineteenth-Century Music* in 1980 took an immediate about-turn and pummelled into the intellectual abyss in less than three years (See Figure 1.2; note the sudden increment due to Dahlhaus’s passing in 1989). Even the concerted initiative of organising a ‘review symposium’ in the second volume of *Beethoven Forum* in 1993 as well as including translated essays by a handful of German scholars in the 1994 issue

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\(^{125}\) Hepokoski, ‘The Dahlhaus Project and its Extra-Musicological Sources’, 222.

of *19th-Century Music* failed to create any ripples across the linguistic and oceanic divides.\(^{127}\) It appears to be business as usual; even the corresponding English versions of Beethoven’s biographies by William Kinderman and Barry Cooper left Dahlhaus very much out of the picture, save for a couple of *figurant* cameos.\(^{128}\)

The subsequent pressure to re-evaluate Dahlhaus’s scholarship might have been overplayed within the Anglophone circuits for one among many reasons that Dahlhaus was most probably writing for seine Zeit, that is, his own time, and would not expect his work to be translated and read within a wider transnational context. Therefore, a historicist framing, such as that offered by the Berkeleyan Germanist Chantelle Warner, is crucial to understand as well as situate Dahlhaus’s thinking within the *Neue Subjektivität* literary movement of the 1970s.

On one hand, the stories they tell serve to inform the broader reading public about the group-specific experiences of a previously under-represented set of individuals; on the other hand, because collective rather than individual experiences are emphasized – either in the text itself or in its public reception – they also actively encourage an identificatory sense of solidarity with a certain subset of their readers.\(^{129}\)

Grounded as a *Verständigungstexte*, Dahlhaus’s inclusion of the Italianate and other nationals within his historiography exemplifies an endeavour to *inform* as well as *interact* with the targeted consumers of his text, for whom we can safely assume to be readers interested in Germanic history, literature and philosophy. As straightforward as it seems, none of the contributors to *The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini* has realised Dahlhaus’s personal *Tendenzwende* in his musicological interests that connect Schoenberg and Wagner to Beethoven and Rossini. The text-event dichotomy that Dahlhaus was most familiar with, even before reading Raphael Georg Kiesewetter’s thesis, would have already been embodied, unconsciously or otherwise, by the Schoenberg-Wagner pairing. Dahlhaus who subsequently discovers Kiesewetter’s

\(^{127}\) *Beethoven Forum* 2, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993; ‘Brahms – Liszt – Wagner’,  *19th-Century Music* 18(1), 1994. Otherwise, a quick count of writers citing Dahlhaus, albeit briefly, remains on the average of three persons per volume of *Beethoven Forum* published in the 1990s, or more precisely, 3, 3, 4, 2, 4, 2, 3, 3 in the first eight volumes; other than the review symposium of 1993, only Janet Schmalfeldt’s essay in the fourth volume from 1995 engages most critically with Dahlhaus’s analyses.


formula from 150 years before can then traced the Schoenberg-Wagner genealogical roots back to the Beethoven-Rossini origins. If the names of Schoenberg and Wagner were to substitute those of Beethoven and Rossini in the following quotation, we would quickly apprehend the rationale behind Dahlhaus’s longitudinal and synthetic historiography vis-à-vis the relation between an operatic Wagner and an instrumental Schoenberg invented in his earlier essays and monographs, which would otherwise be read separately.\(^{130}\)

Beethoven’s symphonies represent inviolable musical “text,” whose meaning is to be deciphered by means of interpretations. By contrast, a Rossini score is a mere guideline for a performance, which, as the realization of a draft… constitutes the decisive aesthetic authority.\(^{131}\)

In fact, Dahlhaus was already moving Wagner onto the realm of performance-as-research when he proposes in 1971 that musicologists focus on the Bayreuth productions by Wagner’s grandson instead.\(^{132}\) Surely, this is contingent to what Hepokoski meant in his third hermeneutics of 2013(!) to represent each performance as legitimate for musicological inquiry. Therefore, my contention is that Dahlhaus’s term *Stildualismus* deserves to be read in an open-ended, plastic manner, where the neologism can refer not only to a stylistic binary or opposition, but also to a division between various styles. That is, like the other three aforementioned composers, Beethoven espouses a compositional style that divides, separates, and splits the other aspects of potential musical confluences. In all sense of the word, his musical styles are a priori divisional. Between the heroic and the political, the classical and the late, the linear and the cyclical, the text and the event, Beethoven’s music dissect and divides itself and others in multifarious intersections. There are more meanings, symbolic and imaginary, to *Stildualismus* than those offered by the authors.

So, who would have expected Dahlhaus’s ideas to eventually be circulated within the New World Order of the United States and the United Kingdom, and be misappropriated as a historiographical authority in the determination of the canon? If

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\(^{131}\) Translated by and quoted in Webster, ‘Beethoven, Rossini – and others’, 58.

Dahlhaus has never figured anywhere in the revolutionary movements of Fred Lerdahl’s generative theory of 1983 or David Lewin’s Neo-Riemannian theory of 1987, why was there an almost unmediated effort to keep his work at bay and off the Anglophone musicological and theoretical radar in the 1990s?\textsuperscript{133} If some of the scholarship had continued to discuss Dahlhaus’s propositions rather than merely quote his words, the recent debate over his \textit{Stildualismus} project would not have gone awry. Readers of \textit{The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini} will certainly encounter or, even worse, experience for themselves a posthumous and anachronistic treatment, nay, attack on an idea seeded by Dahlhaus in 1980 West Germany and revived dogmatically by Taruskin in 2005 California, that, is a quarter of a century apart. Even from amongst the scholars, one can sense a trend of split-mindedness, or schizophrenia, judging from a statistical count of discreet definitions of the concept of \textit{Stildualismus} within the 2013 publication (See Figure 1.3; note that none of these keywords appears in the book’s index).

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\textbf{Figure 1.3} Keyword counts in \textit{The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini} (2013)

From the table, the keywords with the highest number of occurrences are ‘binary’ and ‘two styles’; these are followed by the keyword ‘opposition’. In contrast to the root word ‘oppose’, the total number of words derived from the root word ‘divide’ is the lowest of all, and it will be of significant epistemological value to investigate these marked differences. Finally, ‘dualism’ and ‘duality’ occur mostly as mere statements or translations of the German term without much deliberation by the writers themselves. As we will observe in the final chapter on the psychopolitical interaction amongst chamber musicians, a quantitative tabulation of word use in collaborative research and processes can similarly reveal the socio-historical plasticity or resistances of the

participants as individuals within an exclusive grouping. The detailed analysis of keyword usage within the larger intellectual and historicised contexts will also be instrumental in eking out the contingent meanings inherent within such groupthink.

Fortunately or unfortunately depending on one’s forbearance, the problem set down by Mathew and Walton as co-editors seems to typecast all the contributors as having an axe to grind and wielding their intellectual dexterity to resolve the conundrum. The well-knitted collection of essays eventually takes on a negative dialectics of its own with every writer attempting to disprove the concept of stylistic duality from various perspectives, rather than the conventional approach of proving a theoretical premise within a selected repertoire. So many pages and so much emotion are spent over what fundamentally became an outdated and uncritical viewpoint. Right on the opening page in the book’s synopsis, the editors have already established the problem of a binary opposition between Beethoven and Rossini and what they have come to represent. The co-editors’ agenda is set by ‘unpicking the origins, consequences, and fallacies of the opposition’.134

As the book progressed, some authors suggest that the opposition is ‘perceived’ (in nineteenth century urban contexts)135 or ‘supposed’ (between development and repetition),136 while others asked for it to be ‘defus[ed]’,137 or ‘deconstructed’.138 Ironically, Hepokoski in the opening chapter has already deemed the ‘deconstruction of the hierarchically opposed binaries [as] rendered complete’.139 A couple of writers understood that neither Kiesewetter nor Dahlhaus claimed any opposition between Beethoven and Rossini.140 If the two composers were not the focus of the duality, the stylistic tension would be extended onto their associated national and generic aspects. The co-editors think that early nineteenth-century German and Italian cultures were ‘absorb[ed]’ into the opposition,141 although, ‘from a historical perspective, a binary opposition of Italy and Germany was not self evident’142 and has ‘only arose after the

134 Mathew and Walton (eds.), The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini, i.
136 Emanuele Senici, ‘Rossinian repetitions’, in Mathew and Walton (eds.), The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini, 238.
fact’. Yet, only the German side of the case was heard from Kiesewetter’s contemporary and translator, Robert Müller, who contrasted the intellectual German from the sensual Latin, and A. B. Marx, a staunch devotee to Beethoven. The Italianists remained caught up in their self-deprecation or debased comparison such as the nonsensical analogies spelling out a ‘schematic opposition between simple and dulcet Italian melody and complex and noisy German harmony’ of the nineteenth century, or condemning ‘how problematic Rossini’s success could prove to any efforts to contain his operas on their own side of a solid division’.

Otherwise, various strategies were invented to move beyond Beethoven and Rossini. Some substituted either of the composers: Carl Maria Weber for Beethoven, and Spontini and Salvatore Vigano for Rossini. Others replaced their associated national characters creating ‘cross-breed’ binaries such as the Germanic and the romantic, or the cosmopolitanism and the Italianate. Other than the opposition between the work-concept and the event-concept, there were also syllogistic extrapolations in the form of agency, effect and scale, say, between the autonomous and the social, the ‘presence effect’ and the ‘meaning effect’, and the figural and the thematic respectively. In addition to alluding to earlier constructed duos such as those between Wagner and Verdi, and Schoenberg and Stravinsky, some writers proposed to intervene with a third term in the form of Schubert, or ‘popular music’. Somewhat problematic is that the conclusion has already been offered in the

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143 Webster, ‘Beethoven, Rossini – and others’, 59.
144 Kreuzer, ‘Heilige Trias, Stildualismus, Beethoven’, 72-73 and 84.
145 Martin Deasy, ‘Looking north: Carlo Soliva and the two styles south of the Alps’, in Mathew and Walton (eds.), The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini 144.
146 Benjamin Walton, “More German than Beethoven”: Rossini’s Zelmira and Italian style’, in Mathew and Walton (eds.), The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini, 170.
147 Ibid. 171.
149 Kreuzer, ‘Heilige Trias, Stildualismus, Beethoven’, 84; and Braunschweig, ‘Schopenhauer and Rossinian universality’, 289.
151 Ibid.
155 Nicholas Mathew, ‘On being there in 1824’, in Mathew and Walton (eds.), The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini, 183-84.
156 Braunschweig, ‘Schopenhauer and Rossinian universality’, 284-75.
158 Suzannah Clark, ‘Rossini and Beethoven in the reception of Schubert’, in Mathew and Walton (eds.), The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini, 98.
159 Roger Parker, ‘Two styles in 1830s London’, 133.
first two chapters of the book, considering that, if ‘the once-supposedly superior term is overturned by the lower one’, the binary opposition is fundamentally flawed’, and so ‘what good is it?’

The lines of strongest and weakest resistance seem to stem from the same author who dealt with this challenge via the origins and effects of musical modernity. Julian Johnson pinpoints the inherent tension as that between ‘the abstract logic of absolute music and the direct communication of the human voice’. However, his attempt to weave the Beethovenian object into the equation commits the very selfsame reductionist manoeuvre that many contributors have lambasted on Dahlhaus and Taruskin.

Johnson alludes to Joseph Kerman’s hypothesis that Beethoven’s ability for ‘direct communication’ lies in the vocality of his late string quartets. The contradiction between practice and theory is glaringly exposed if we bring Adorno’s and Rosen’s arguments back into the debate. That is, Beethoven’s late classical style is always fragmentary and expressionless. In contrast to the middle quartets’ theatricality which better supports Johnson’s purpose, the late quartets (and sonatas) resist the conventional punctuations of classical form and its sentences and periods, and rely instead on the development of motivic and polyphonic constructs. I will discuss this particular issue in greater depth in the fourth chapter, but to return to Johnson’s critique, the trope of categorical opposition can only be an ideal. Later in his essay, Johnson offers an epistemological binary between the literal and the dialectical that is potentially more contingent to the social history of nineteenth-century Western Europe:

Read literally, and reified into an absolute opposition, the idea of two styles is hopelessly reductive. It takes an opposition derived from a politicized reception and risks conferring upon it something essential. But read dialectically, precisely as an idea, it remains productive – less as a way of dividing composers or genres, far more as a way of understanding the social and aesthetic tensions of the nineteenth century, out of which were woven quite different kinds of music.

His recommendations however appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Many of his fellow contributors to the publication persistently cite historical evidence of cases where one

161 Webster, ‘Beethoven, Rossini – and others’, 63.
163 Ibid. 278.
composer or genre is distinguished from the other, or mention such lack thereof.\textsuperscript{164} In addition to the co-editors’ own definition of \textit{Stildualismus} as ‘a division between the thematic density of instrumental music and melodically driven opera’,\textsuperscript{165} one writer finds Robert Müller dividing the period between 1800 and 1830 by genre, while another acknowledges his failure to locate any divide between Beethoven and Rossini in the ‘common parlance’ of 1830s London. Instead, the divisions mentioned in \textit{The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini} deviate widely from the domain of the stylistic; that is, the arguments become totally irrelevant to Dahlhaus’s initial idea. For instance, these divisions exist in ‘performance, being the practical issue of composition’ as observed by a London journalist in 1837, as well as those between art music and popular music within the Biedermeier and modernist Germanic cultures.\textsuperscript{166} On the latter viewpoint, the proto-universal truth is that both art music and popular music can share exactly the same style; Beethoven’s appropriation of folk melodies in his Opus 59 string quartets and the phenomenon of his symphonic music becoming popular anthems are clear examples of stylistic congruency.\textsuperscript{167}

Based on the mixed method of qualitative and quantitative analyses, the various perceptions of \textit{Stildualismus} as oppositional or divisional, stylistic or social, becomes relatively commonplace at least within the Anglophone historical musical unconscious. Other significant dualities not mentioned at all in the book include the possibilities of Beethoven’s C minor moods being countered by the affects of, say, E♭ major in the Third Symphony and Fifth Piano Concerto, or the perceived masculinity of Beethoven’s music becoming thwarted by feminine elements in \textit{Egmont} and \textit{Fidelio}.\textsuperscript{168} In other words, Beethoven and his music have created an impetus for semantic resistance to take over the epistemological reins.

How then did this historiographical plasticity between asceticism and aestheticism in the discipline come about? Just as Hepokoski has attributed Dahlhaus’s scholarship to his political orientation, one of the main reasons for the current state of

\textsuperscript{164} Kreuzer, ‘\textit{Heilige Trias, Stildualismus}, Beethoven’, 70; and Parker, ‘Two styles in 1830s London’, 124.
\textsuperscript{165} Mathew and Walton, ‘Introduction’, 3.
\textsuperscript{166} Parker, ‘Two styles in 1830s London’, 130; and Walton, ‘“More German than Beethoven”’, 177; the latter phenomenon is best exemplified in the ‘great divide’ between high art and popular entertainment as invented by the Germanist scholar Andreas Huyssen; cf. Senici, ‘Rossinian repetitions’, 253.
\textsuperscript{167} On the totalitarian exploitation of Beethoven’s symphonies for opposing versions of universalism, see ibid. 316. On the Russification of Beethoven’s Opus 59, see Mark Ferraguto, ‘Beethoven à la moujik: Russianness and Learned Style in the “Razumovsky” String Quartets’, \textit{Journal of the American Musicological Society} 67(1), 2014, 77-124.
Beethoven-related research lies in the global political economy between the United States and the United Kingdom. There is no surprise that scholars based in continental Europe were largely absent from the 2008 conference and subsequently the 2013 publication of *The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini*, despite the intensive coverage of German and Italian histories. This is not to say that the invited scholars are less deserving or able to participate in the topic at hand, but surely there are Europe-based scholars, who are equally well-read and well-versed in speaking and writing in the English language about Dahlhaus and his controversial influences. The most apparent reason for this discriminatory phenomenon, in the sense of how Karol Berger has observed within academia in the United States or elsewhere is the current state of transatlantic and global politics.

I have no intention to criticise the meticulous and creative work of the writers or to generalise the recent trend in incorporating the political turn within the discipline, but we can make inferences from how certain events have unfolded in the opening decade of the twenty-first century in order to contextualise the critical consciousness of the arguments presented therein. Writing on the Iraq War initiated by the United States, Slavoj Žižek thinks that there is in actual fact no leeway for structural dissidence. The United States qua imperialist has settled on a non-negotiable position way before bringing their proposals to the table. In other words, these are the actions they have undertaken and we would have to abide by them if we want to be their friends (For a popular analogy of this position, just listen to the Spice Girls’ *Wannabe*).

Applied onto musicology, that would be an adamant insistence on European scholars to study and cite, say, Richard Taruskin’s *Oxford History of Western Music*, which to be sure rehashed the Beethovenian myths concocted by Rosen and Dahlhaus; that these are the works in the musical canon, and these are the texts in the

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169 The conference ‘Beethoven and Rossini: Crossing Musical Cultures’ was held on 23–25 May 2008 in Cambridge; although Prof. Emanuele Senici is now based at the University of Rome, he was for a decade based at the University of Oxford.


171 Slavoj Žižek, *Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle*, London: Verso, 2003, 14: ‘[W]hile the USA should seek to build *ad hoc* international coalitions for such attacks, it should reserve the right to act independently if it does not receive sufficient international support. So, while the USA presents its domination of other sovereign states as grounded in a benevolent paternalism which takes into account the interest of other nations and their people, it reserves for itself the ultimate right to define its allies’ “true” interest. The logic is thus clearly formulated: even the pretence of neutral international law is abandoned, since, when the USA perceives a potential threat, it formally asks its allies for support, but the allies’ agreement is actually optional. The underlying message is always “We will do it with or without you” (in short, you are free to agree with us, but not free to disagree).’
musicological canon. There is no alternative avenue out of the geopolitical intersections between the national and the institutional. Concerning *The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini*, one is left wondering why major Beethoven (and Rossini) specialists have been left out: Kofi Agawu, Mark Evan Bonds, Daniel Chua, Barry Cooper, William Kinderman, Lewis Lockwood, Michael Spitzer, and the handful of female scholars listed right at the top of the chapter. The uncanny aspect of *The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini* is its reproduction of the very nationalist and linguistic divides set up by Dahlhaus and Taruskin. To do justice to the Dahlhausian conundrum, an inclusive stance that incorporates analysts, performers, and listeners has to be adopted cohesively, and this is what my thesis is set out to achieve.

### 1.6 Conclusion: Geopolitical Beethoven

In the Indoensian anti-colonial novel, *Belenggu (Shackles)* by Armijn Pane, a geopolitical resistance is represented acutely by the love rivalry between a pianist who plays Beethoven and a popular Kroncong singer. Geopolitics as a field of study, in spite of its vibrancy, has hitherto made much foray in musicological discourse. Although music has been a prominent instrument for geopolitical mediation for a long time, its application has yet to be examined critically. Otherwise, the handful of scholars who has managed to identify the geopolitical exploitations of music has mostly focused on the popular music of specific regions, such as the modern-day Levant and Aboriginal Australia. Strangely, the two mentions of Euroclassical music used for geopolitical purposes are associated instead with cinematic accompaniment: the music of Beethoven and Dvorak in Jean-Luc Godard’s *Prénom Carmen* (1983) and *Scénario de Passion* (1982) respectively, and that by Philip Glass in Errol Morris’s *The Fog of War* (2003). That said, it is apparent from this chapter that the geopolitics of Beethoven’s music could be found discreetly in different state polities during at distinct historical

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moments within the longue durée. From the German Empire to New World Americas, from fin de siècle France to the Cold War apartheid, the life and music of Beethoven the composer have been appended or associated with various social and political ideologies.  

Beethoven as a musical entity becomes geopolitically plastic, that is when an object, which has its meanings created and destroyed, shaped and reinvented by different political subjects, gains epistemological agency. By looking at his biographies, we could consider Beethoven’s reception/resistance history to bear parallels to world history.

However, these geopolitical subjects are significantly distinct from the popular reception and resistances observed in, say, the Eurovision contests. Instead, the geopolitics that revolve around the musical semantic of Beethoven belong to the order of the institution. The geographers Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby have identified three types of critical geopolitical knowledge, namely the formal, the practical and the popular. While the source material dealt with in this chapter and the larger thesis are neither informed by the popular census nor derived from official administrative archives for practical everyday functions, the information amassed and analysed herein fit most succinctly to a kind of formal, institutional geopolitics produced by academics and intellectuals. The critical writings of the Northern American and Western European authorities I contend in this chapter are, to a large extent, dogmatic instructions in musical meaning for their readers and their respective imagined musical communities.

We must remember that in 1810 Hoffmann’s appraisal of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony in Saxon Leipzig was set up to rival other reviews coming out from Prussian Berlin and Austrian Vienna. When Beethoven died in 1827, Grillparzer as a provincial dramatist in his thirties was vying for the attention of the European elites, who travelled from near and far to attend the funeral procession. From the a recent translation of *Beethoven*, we also know that Wagner was not satisfied to only placate the audiences in Munich and Berlin with his music and performances of Beethoven’s symphonies. He travelled and conducted in numerous European towns and cities including Paris in 1860.

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and Venice in 1882, charming the musicians and changing the performance styles along the way.\textsuperscript{180} Musical geopolitics have also stretched further afield to New England with the pressures of economic competition after the Louisiana Purchase as well as effects of the ongoing industrial revolution. These larger geopolitical issues certainly influenced the musical aesthetics espoused by the transcendentalists, such as John Sullivan Dwight and Margaret Fuller. Needless to say, Beethovenian aesthetics under Nazi-occupied Crimea and Paris, where Eggebrecht and Jolivet had been, would have been subjected to the type of institutionalised psychopolitical transformations endorsed by the erstwhile doctrines.\textsuperscript{181} Like a sedimentary rock, these musical meanings abrade against one another until the understanding and appreciation of Beethoven’s music are transfigured to the current state apprehended and propagated by contemporary musicians, writers, and listeners. Notwithstanding the popular biographies by John Suchet and Jan Swafford, Maynard Solomon, Charles Rosen, Carl Dahlhaus, and the living cohort of card-carrying musicologists are equally complicit in conjuring a geopolitical plasticity of Beethoven semantics. The movements of the triumvirate and dualist epistemological structures of Hoffmann and Dahlhaus across the Atlantic and their reciprocated resistances are certainly neither popular nor practical, but a plastic form of institutional geopolitics.

In the next chapter, I will ground these semantic resistances within a macrohistory of Beethoven studies and contend that the persistent changes in musical meanings are predicated on the psychical effects of a musical unconscious. This charge rests on two premises: (i) that the psychoanalytic method of understanding resistance is the most comprehensive for exploring various possibilities of not being affected by undesirable matters, and (ii) that the function of the musical unconscious is derived from the hybridised effects of the psychical unconscious of the musicking subject and the aesthetic unconscious of the musical object. Founded upon these theoretical foundations, the attitudes and events held in Western Europe and the United States over the past two hundred years become a matrix of knowledge/power that sustains an institutionalised psychopolitics that was in fact germinated from the disparate geopolitical agenda presented in this chapter. Against the historicist approach, this


thesis continues in the quest to defend the psychopolitical explanation of musical semantics.\(^{182}\)

Chapter 2  Beethoven with Lacan

The inertia of established rules has enormous power of resistance, and who knows whether such toughness is to be deplored or welcomed? Traditions... must not be condemned altogether on the ground that some might be obsolete and some even false.
– Artur Schnabel¹

Figure 2.1 Cover Image of Jacques Lacan’s Le Séminaire Livre 1: Les écrits techniques de Freud, Paris: Seuil, 1975

We do not need an extended thesis to quilt the history of the piano to that of European colonisation. Not only did Europeans impose a twelve-tone harmonic temperament upon the Africans, Americans and Asians, but their use of ivory in piano-making since the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has also endangered Asian and African elephants.² Since then, the change in using plastic instead of ivory as material for piano-making and music-making parallels the socio-political history of modernisation and decolonisation. Uncannily, the image of an elephant appearing as the cover for the first book of Jacques Lacan’s Le Seminaire series provides a useful analogy and starting point for my thesis (Figure 2.1). First, the elephant is an object of colonial resistance. Unlike humans, it is an animal that refuses to adapt to the temperate climate, and puts

up a fierce struggle when its life is taken away in an unfair exchange by ivory traders. Musical historiography and its corresponding material become always already correlated to the death of not just composers and musicians, but also the unnatural death of animals and plants, as in the case of wood used for making instruments.

Second, the elephant is an object of French resistance. Babar, the fictitious character created by Jean de Brunhoff in 1931, has been imagined during WWII as a ‘freedom-fighting French elephant’ against the Axis powers. Lacan aptly made use of the French appropriation of the elephant in his seminar a decade later as an allegory to explain how both the word and the object have entered into the French consciousness without the real object being present during the seminar or being in close physical contact. For Lacan, ‘the moment of resistance’ is determined by ‘the topic of the imaginary.’ That is, psychical resistance against an object or event, such as imperialism or musicking, is always situated within the imaginary order and deters the subject from attaining rational, symbolic meaning. Resistance very much remains as an illusion of the individual’s intention or desire. Taken together, a musical historiography that is imbued with the perpetual desire to apprehend an event or object in order to historicise it is always coeval with the imaginary moment of musicological resistance.

This, I contend, is the basic drive behind the listeners’ tendency to imagine and express preference or disgust after hearing some sounds or music. The reason behind such auricular response has often been attributed to generic or experiential differences. Some people might think they cannot understand experimental music, while others fail time and again to appreciate music of a different localised culture. Yet, this inability to grasp musical differences could most likely be a result of something more psychologically innate than the mere phenomenology of value and taste. Accordingly to Kantian philosophy, aesthetic judgments ‘must be based on cognitive capacities shared by all, yet [also] by a condition of those faculties that is pleasurable because it is not constrained by rules’. In other words, the act of making sound choices relies on the

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normative functioning of one’s ‘cognitive capacities’ or experiential senses and the variable criterion of receiving ‘pleasure’. A physical sign of good judgment, in the Kantian sense of the word, would be how an uninterrupted sensibility provides the capacity for cognitive responses to attain maximum amount of psychical and psychological pleasure.

Correspondingly, it is not difficult to associate this human phenomenon with what Freud calls the pleasure principle, or the persistent want to obtain pleasure and avoid displeasure. However, cognitive perception is not reducible to a single criterion of pleasure. The psychoanalytic mechanism, at least, works on a multitude of levels and orders, and in applying it onto the perception of hearing in general or musical cognition in particular requires a more in-depth examination of the phenomenon. From a historical perspective, aural perception has produced and continued to generate a vast amount of scholarship in subjects as diverse as philosophy and psychology. Although researchers of the latter discipline have contributed important work to the empirical understanding of musical cognition, it will be of interest to substantiate the epistemological lacunae within musicology with the psychopolitical method.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to establish resistance and the unconscious as the ontological pillars of psychoanalysis and its musicological franchise. In order to situate any presence of psychical resistance, or the lack thereof, among the macro-historical trajectory of musical events involving Beethoven and his music, the theories informed by psychoanalysis are juxtaposed with two different but related schools of thought: Fichtean idealism and Freudian inductionism. These ideologies as derived from Germanic philosophy of the long nineteenth century will serve the second objective as theoretical foundations used to reassess two cases of resistance in the early nineteenth-century history of British musical institutions.

With the overall agenda to posit plastic resistance as the first principle of musicological psychoanalysis, this chapter is divided accordingly into two theoretical sections and an analytic section. The first of the two theoretical sections deliberates the various definitions of resistance as a philosophical and psychoanalytic phenomenon based on Fichtean and Lacanian ideas concerning subjectivity. The subsequent section is devoted to charting the genealogical evolution of the musical unconscious drawing upon the combined effects of the psychical unconscious and the aesthetic unconscious.

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Taken in tandem, I argue that musical resistance itself is a plastic process that transforms musical material creatively and/or destructively from within the musical unconscious. These couple of sections that focus on theoretical underpinnings are significant in that they also serve as technical background to the musicological discussions carried out in the analytic section, which foreshadows the proposed application of plastic resistance onto what I call the resistance history of Beethoven reception in the subsequent three chapters of this thesis.

In this analytic section, I investigate the different ways of reading and representing Beethoven and his music within the local polities of Scotland and England in the early nineteenth-century. I propose that these revisionist semantics have enabled an imagined or imaginary politics of plastic resistance to influence the subsequent turns of events in a Napoleonic Europe. The publishers’ strategic dealings with Beethoven in early nineteenth-century Britain effectively exemplify the psychopolitical vicissitudes of resistance. Grounded on the economic and political differences between extractive and inclusive resistance, this chapter argues that plastic resistance as a dynamic force advances a psychopolitical epistemology that is trans-historical and contingent, one that prevails across temporal periods and cultural contexts.

2.1 The Principle of Plastic Resistance

Resistance as an everyday phenomenon exists on many levels and in different domains. Its connotations could be drawn from social, biological and even electrical processes. In this thesis, resistance is considered specifically as an effect of the psychical discourse. Resistance within the psychoanalytic tradition is predicated on the nature of the transference relation, which lies between the analyst’s interpretation of the narrative and the analysand’s acknowledgement of the interpretation. To understand this inter-psychical relation, the definition of resistance, one that is based on the transcendental and idealist interpretations of the words ‘ability’, ‘affect’, and ‘desire’, will be scrutinised. In addition, the Freudian concept of denegation and the Lacanian concept of extimacy are also intrinsic hermeneutic devices used to expose the disabled, the unaffected and the undesirable.⁸ There are herein contingent to the discussion of musical semantics. At the end of this section, the psychical structures of neurosis, psychosis and perversion will be introduced as formal determinants of musicological resistance and meaning.

The notion of resistance can be understood best from its definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, that is, a person’s ‘ability not to be affected by something undesirable’. The three clauses – the ability of a person to undertake an action, the affect of the subject, and the agency of desire – explain the psychical factors of psychophysics, feelings and intimacy respectively. Within the context of analysing auricular and musical resistances, they stand as effective indicators of how intense and plastic the auricular and performative resistance can be. Appropriate to the psychical process of musical signification, the first clause relates resistance to the psychophysical capability of a person to act or to do things. The psychoanalytic deed which includes the relation between the psychical stimulation and the physical sensation is accounted for by the time and consciousness of both the actor and the subject or object that provokes or intervenes in the action.⁹

Such a deed of acting is a reflexive process of the self, that is, the positing of one physical self by the psychical self. Such a placing or displacing of one entity by another selfsame entity lies at the heart of an Idealist ontology, one that is contingent on the Lacanian psychoanalytic act of ‘working through’ before being subjected to critical analysis. In order for the subject to avow for his or her action, the Idealist philosophy of Fichte stipulates that one’s action is determined solely by one’s consciousness of oneself, that is, in the form of an act of self-positing (sitzen). Yet, Fichte’s formulation nonetheless varies from Lacan’s discourse analysis with the former’s grounding of the first principle of all philosophy as that of deed-action (Tathandlung) instead of the latter’s principle of signification (signifiance), which is a contra-diction and negation of conscious awareness.¹⁰

In other words, a psychical interpretation is meaningful if the modulation from the genesis of the subject’s actions within the unconscious to the revelation in the conscious mind is accounted for. This psychical movement from the unconscious to the conscious is in essence a form of self-positing. It is a conscious deed of situating an initially unconscious self. This reflexive act occurs bilaterally. First, during the process of self-awareness; that is, when one becomes aware of the existence of oneself before any psychical action is performed on one’s consciousness; it also arises when one’s consciousness is being acted on before realising the existence of one’s self. At once

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¹⁰ Fichte’s principle also poses a more pervasive alternative to his contemporaries Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s principle of consciousness (Bewusstseins) and Gottlob Ernst Schulz’s principle of contrast (Widerspruch), see Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ‘Review of Aenesidemus’ in *Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings*, translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, 59-77.
correlative and simultaneous, the original unity of the empirical *acting* self and the intellectual *knowing* self sustains the practical reasoning process and becomes instrumental for critical understanding.\(^{11}\)

When this logic of self-positing is juxtaposed with Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse, the reflexive act is equated to the process of signification: signifying or associating one entity with another. This method of free association refers contents that are already made conscious to those still unconscious. This reflexive act is in adherent to both the principle of deed-action and the semantic signification. To the extent that the aim of psychoanalysis is to locate meaning in the different physical or speech acts, the ‘possession’ (*besitzen*) of a single meaning by a single act is analogous to Fichte’s positing (*sitzen*) of the I by oneself. To put it another way, the ‘quilting’ (*capiton*) function of signifying what the I is or is becoming models upon the positing of the I as a reflexive act. An a priori process of signification presupposes almost all interpretations of the action. In short, to act is to signify, and to signify is to act: a reflexive process.

Inductively, an act of listening can also be understood as a Fichtean reflexive act, whereby the subject assumes the position of the listener when he or she performs the act of listening, and subsequently realises oneself as a listening self. For example, when someone is listening to chord sequences, this is an empirical action. When the same person posits himself or herself listening to musical harmonies, this form of knowledge creation becomes known as an intellectual deed. While one phenomenon is correlated to the other, that is, one has to listen to know and to know to listen, both phenomena occur within the single subject or the one self. To recognise or determine oneself as a listening self is to adopt the principle of original unity between the empirical and the theoretical consciousness of a listening self. This psychological duplicity unveils itself when one becomes aware of oneself as both a subject of the act of listening and a subject of the deed of listening; that is, I am listening and the I is listening.\(^{12}\)

From another perspective, an ‘objective self’ can be deemed both subjective and objective, because the self is already the subject from an objective viewpoint.\(^{13}\) Listeners who comprehend musical meaning objectively constitute their subjectivity in

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\(^{11}\) Although Fichte has also deliberated on the idea of the ‘original duplicity’, it is overtly philosophical for our purpose here; see Gunther Zoller’s ‘Original Duplicity: The Ideal and the Real in Fichte’s Transcendental Theory of the Subject’ in *The Modern Subject: Conception of the Self in Classical German Philosophy*, Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma, Albany: State University of New York, 115-30.


both the object and themselves qua subjects. In other words, these listeners understand the auditory aspect of themselves in conjunction with an external object by subjecting their comprehension of the external object upon their selves. Such a self-consciousness is a reciprocal process where the subject is enacting a self-positing of one’s thought. Appropriately, applying this philosophical notion of self-reflexivity onto music psychology can yield greater musicological scope in exploring the phenomenon of listening. When the listening self arrives at the transcendental moment, which is when the sonic or musical object performs its function as a signifying catalyst, semantic changes are induced in his or her listening behaviour via the act of self-positing. The subjectivity of the listening self is thereby plastically affected.

Going a step further, this relational process takes place on what Lacan considers as the symbolic order. Whether the initial element is a sign, signal, signifier, symbol or symptom, the analytic task of interpretation gives meaning to these entities. Apropos to the listening act, the effect evoked or sustained by the listening subject inevitably deviates from the intended stimulation and results in a quasi-deceptive, dissembling effect. This effect could be attributed to the emotions conjured up during the act of listening, which are by themselves not aligned to any musical semiotics. While this insight is congruent to what earlier theorists have deemed as the polysemic and absolutist expression of musical meaning, emotions are themselves extrinsic and extraneous to musical meaning; that is, they vary from person to person and from time to time. If these feelings forms a resistance against interpretation, the affects evoked would generate a power for the subject to not act or engage physically or linguistically in the symbolic process, which is otherwise necessary for the meanings behind the action to be ‘worked through’ [durcharbeitet].

With such an object cause of desire as formal hindrance, both the act of self-positing and meaning-making or signification are interrupted. To be emotional is to remain in the unconscious and to be indifferent to the divisions between the I and the not-I. Based on this psychical understanding, the musical or other object thereby becomes a dissembling force with its own plastic nature – creative and destructive – that disrupts and defies the self-positing principle of the supposedly-emotionless Fichtean subject. A person’s ability to act is henceforth determined by the ability to posit oneself

without affect as agency. The psychoanalytic act, in contrary, includes affect as one of the main components in the negation and positing of the self, conscious or otherwise.\textsuperscript{15}

Affect is correspondingly the second clause in the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of resistance. The affects of the subject and the analyst contribute significantly to the transference resistance against interpretation.\textsuperscript{16} Affects are in general dissembling and deceptive, except for anxiety which reveals more of the real thing.\textsuperscript{17} Affects according to Lacan are mere signs of analytic content and not the actual signifiers that possess the truth qua knowledge.\textsuperscript{18} While unconscious signifiers remain repressed, an affected subject is liberated; affects are defenders of the imaginary nature of human emotion.\textsuperscript{19} In other words, signifiers and affects exist on opposite sides of the unconscious-conscious system. Being non-conducive to psychoanalytic interpretation, affects are themselves more imaginary than symbolic, and would increase the structural resistance against knowledge formation and transformation. For this reason, affects need to be always contextualised within the social or historical circumstances.

To bring the discussion back into Fichtean philosophy, affect partakes in the properties of what Fichte calls the \textit{Anstoss}, instead of the more common translation of \textit{Affekt}. Within the idealist tradition, the function of the \textit{Anstoss} vis-à-vis the reflexive self is twofold. First, it is an element that checks and limits the activity of the self or the I; second, it is an a priori self-induced ‘prime mover’ \textit{[erstes bewegendes]} or stimulus that ‘sets in motion’ the objectivity of the I’s activity.\textsuperscript{20} In explaining the phenomenon of self-consciousness, the term \textit{Anstoss} is often translated as a ‘check’ or an ‘impetus’ that interferes in the self-positing process. When feelings occupy the place of the \textit{Anstoss}, they are generated from without in response to the subject’s cognitive senses as an inter-subjective phenomenon. They can also exist innately within the I as an intra-subjective entity but remain extraneous and foreign. The paradox between the inter-

\textsuperscript{15} Lacan elaborates his ideas on ‘the psychoanalytic act’ in his unpublished Seminar XV of 1967-68.
\textsuperscript{16} There is an intellectual movement stemming from Deleuzian ideas of affect, but since it is derived from a different trajectory from the Lacanian school of thought, it will not be discussed herein. See Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (eds.), \textit{The Affect Theory Reader}, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010.
\textsuperscript{17} Dylan Evans, 1996, 5.
\textsuperscript{19} Lacan, \textit{Écrits}, 598.
\textsuperscript{20} Daniel Breazeale, ‘Check or Checkmate? On the Finitude of the Fichtean Self’, in \textit{The Modern Subject: Classical German Idealist Conceptions of the Self}, edited by Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, 94: ‘[Feelings] are subjective states of the I (and in this sense, all feelings are, at least originally, ‘Selbstgefühle’) and they possess a determinacy that is not freely determined by the activity of the I. Hence they can also exercise the dual functions ... found to be essential to the Anstoss.’
subjective and intra-subjective phenomena generates a psychical tension with the feelings that are conjured up during the act of self-positing.

According to the Fichtean line of argument, these ‘feelings serve to constrain or to check the free, outward striving, practical activity’ of the self. The self, who is engaged in the act of listening and musicking, naturally encounters this force of this resistance. While feelings or emotions are experienced or elicited when we are listening to music or other sounds, the determination to cognise musical meaning is thwarted by the very consciousness of these feelings for the listening subject. This sensorial check becomes an epistemological obstacle to the self-positing of the listening self. The listening subject is affected or limited by the affects, and resultantly develops the impetus to understand the music. Especially for listeners who are not musically-trained, feeling the music could be the preferred mode of accumulating musical experience as opposed to understanding the music. Moreover, the limitation of one’s ability becomes more pronounced with the intensification of the Anstoss. The listening subject, who is affected by this plastic resistance, produces a desire to transcend what Fichte calls the Nicht-können or inability to be affected; that is, he or she acquires the ability not to be affected by the music.

The production of desire brings us head-on with the last clause of the definition of resistance. Explaining the ‘undesirable’ is most straightforward, because the Fichte Anstoss has already been deemed homologous to the Lacanian object cause of desire.

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21 Breazeale, ‘Check or Checkmate?’, 88 and 94.
22 Cf. Fichte, Science of Knowledge, translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982[1794], 254: ‘The two [drive and reflection] together yield the manifestation of a compulsion or inability. An inability entails a) a continuance of striving; for otherwise the thing I cannot do would have no existence for itself; it would be altogether out of my sphere. b) limitation of real activity; hence, real activity itself, for what does not exist cannot be limited. c) that the limiting factor should lie (or be posited), not in me, but outside me; for otherwise there would be no striving. We should then have, not an inability, but an unwillingness. So this manifestation of inability is a manifestation of equilibrium. The inability, as manifested in the self, is called a feeling.’; in German, see Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, Part 3 §7 Viertel Lehrsatz: ‘Beides [Trieb und Reflexion] vereinigt, gibt die Äusserung eines Zwanges, eines Nicht-könnens. Zum Nicht-können gehört a) ein Weiterstreben; ausserdem wäre das, was ich nicht kann, gar nichts für mich; es wäre auf keine Art in meiner Sphäre. b) Begrenzung der wirklichen Tätigkeit; dennmacht wirkliche Tätigkeit selbst, denn was nicht ist, kann nicht begrenzt werden. c) Dass das begrenzende nicht in mir, sondern ausser mir liege (gesetzt werde); ausserdem wäre kein Streben da. Es wäre da kein Nicht-können, sondern ein Nicht-wollen. Also jene Äusserung des Nicht-könnens ist eine Äusserung des Gleichgewichts. Die Äusserung des Nicht-könnens im Ich heisst ein Gefühl.’
Based on the logic of dividing the subject, the object that induces desire in the subject performs a similar function with the deceptive feelings and disassembling affects. Contingent to the psychical impulses in the unconscious, the desirable object and its associative affects becomes undesirable and forgettable with the onset of resistance. In order to offset the resistance, the subject needs to express the undesirable affects through physical or verbal actions which by themselves have been intimate to the unconscious. This externalisation of the undesirable is akin to what Lacan calls the extimate relation between the subject and the object. The condition of ‘extimacy’ for Lacan is fulfilled when an unintended or anti-social matter is externalised. The extimate is thereby parasitic and plastic; it changes the receptacle as well as the reception of the matter. To illustrate the meaning of ‘extimate resistance’, I will mention a couple of comparative examples before applying the concept of extimacy to listening and performative acts in the final chapter.

The first example is a comparison between the respective absence and presence of desire in the Troubadours’ courtly love songs and the modern operatic inventions. The medieval Lady is thought to be posited as the inaccessible object depriving herself and others of enjoyment, whereas the dramatic soprano, according to Žižek, ‘puts herself entirely into the voice’ and partakes in the act of jouis-sense, where the ‘sheer self-consuming enjoyment of the voice eclipses meaning’; during this moment of surplus enjoyment, the dramaturgy embodies desire. The figure of the feminine hysteric – be it Poppea, Kundry or Cressida – arose from this extimate feeling of excess and meaning, and became an epitome of the division between the I and the not-I. The second case is a comparison of the hand as an extimate object in Shakespeare’s Macbeth and Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club. When Lady Macbeth expresses joy and guilt by rubbing her hands during her hallucinations, these feelings reveal the extimate relation between her psyche and her actions. Similarly, the insomniac in Fight Club is fighting

27 Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Women and Causality, London: Verso, 1994, 156-57: ‘she has it in herself, objet petit a, the voice-object, the cause of desire’.
with a self-beating hand against his double, which, being a ghostly and imaginary entity, is not merely externalised by the protagonist, but also extimate with himself.\(^{29}\)

From these unconscious and repetitive actions, feelings qua Anstoss trigger the resistance that differentiates between the able and the not-able. This resistance, whether as check or impetus, does not exist on the intra-subjective, psychological level, but arises during the intervention of interpretation.\(^{30}\) Precisely because of the inter-subjective nature of the psychoanalytic act, the extimate feelings represent themselves as a form of ‘surplus enjoyment’ or plus-de-jouir. This surplus enjoyment reproduces an affect that makes the subject resist the positing of one self. Vis-à-vis the Fichtean principle of deed-action or Tathandlung, the obsessive-compulsive actions of Lady Macbeth’s self-rubbing hand or the narrator’s self-beating hand extimately induce a surplus of guilty pleasure for the subject in question. In other words, since Anstoss generates resistance on one level and emulates the object-cause of desire on another, resistance thereby exists syllogistically on the very same psychical trajectory as the object cause of desire. That is, the subject’s resistance to something is caused by the subject’s desire for the very same thing, and vice versa.\(^{31}\) Ultimately, if the speech act or the physical act, as mediated by the voice or the hand respectively, appears as an extimate symptom, the psychical resistance – in the form of a double force between affect and the cause of desire – will be reduced significantly.

Returning to the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of resistance as ‘the ability not to be affected by something undesirable’, this resistive force therefore works in double negation as an equal and opposite force to that which is affected and desirable.\(^{32}\) The resistance is transformed by this surplus enjoyment qua affect as well as the object cause of desire. The convergence of Fichtean theory of knowledge and Lacanian cultural critiques ascertains that psychical resistance is correlated to the object cause of desire. That is, the reason why subjects come to develop a desire for something is a result of a resistance to the very object. Extrapolating from Freud’s definition of resistance as that which ‘disturbs the progress of [analytic] work’, the act


\(^{31}\) Lacan, Seminar Book II, 159: ‘analytic symptoms… always encounters the double resistance of… the ego of the subject and its image. So long as these two interpositions offer a sufficient resistance they clarify each other.’

\(^{32}\) This formulation abides by Newton’s Third Law of Motion.
of desiring is disturbed, because the unconscious refuses or fails to reveal itself. Given that the primary task of psychoanalysis is to uncover the resistance that displaced the subject’s original intention by an object cause of desire, the analytic focus rests not on the object relations, but on the deed-action of desiring and resisting.

For Lacan, ‘what’s important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this [unconscious] desire into existence’. Therefore, resistance in its plastic guises cannot be framed inversely as ‘the affectability of the undesirable’. By taking such an ontological turn, the undesirable partakes in the plasticity and efficacy of the resistance since its origins cannot be known. Because resistance is always antagonistic to the subject’s ability to be affected by desire, the first rule of any psychoanalytic study is to strategically ground resistance upon knowledge of the unconscious, musical or otherwise. Before proceeding to the next section where I discuss the philosophical genealogy of a musical unconscious, I would like to clarify how the principle of resistance takes on a plastic nature with respect to the three nosographic structures.

The conception of the psychopolitical method, of which resistance is a part, is discursively contingent on the three clinical structures of neurosis, psychosis and perversion. I propose that these psychical orders act not as nosographic pathologies but as symbolic metaphors for the acts of listening and musicking. To the extent that scientific verifications of these phenomenon have arisen in nineteenth- and twentieth-century medical history, my understanding of these terms are more figurative than actual representations of the diagnostic values attributed to these clinical structures. I counter that these alleged psychical pathologies produce a form of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter calls creative destruction. Creative destruction establishes a dynamics of the new substituting the old. As an economic term, the phenomenon of renewal is itself also economical. In other words, the clinical structures preserve what has come before alongside their transformations. These structures perform creative destruction differently from other critical structures, such as heterotopia or mimesis, which either allocate the new side-by-side the old or exchange the old apparatus with an exact imitation respectively. Instead of being set in a mould, these structures are constantly in dynamic flux, easing and resisting the transformations of musical meaning.

36 Joseph Schumpeter, quoted in Darren and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 84.
A plastic resistance is thereby a significant property of these three analytic structures, which by themselves remain more or less exclusive but not oppositional.

Neurosis is caused by the subject’s uncertainty over his or her identity and existence. While Lacan’s formulation of neurosis is predicated on the subject’s struggle over a phallic entity, a musical subject’s dilemma surrounds the meaning of the sonic object, a topic that will be explicated in the next chapter. Especially during the process of composition, the creation and permutation of musical meaning come face-to-face with material and psychical resistance. The notating subject only becomes a composer when he or she participates in the symbolic act of semantic production with the musical material. In short, the musical subject exists only if there is a tangible musical object. These neurotic conditions – fantasy, hysteria and mastery – form a significant impetus towards the compositional and improvisatory acts.

Psychosis, in contrast, occurs when musical meanings are multipliable and plural. Musical resistance is weakened and reduced to the imaginary order in which the musical signifier is affixed with infinite connotations even to the extent of rendering it meaningless. The act of music analysis is an imaginary one since new terms and meanings are constantly being created and redefined as if music analysts are ‘inhabited’ or ‘possessed by language’. Certain psychoanalytic techniques can be used to expose the psychotic mechanisms behind extensive analyses of a single musical work, and to reveal the inherent psychopolitical aesthetics that are incorporated unconsciously into disparate analyses of Beethoven’s symphonic and chamber music.

Perversion is defined as the structure in which the subject makes himself or herself the object of another’s will. A perverted form of musical resistance can be found in the practice of musical expression, which makes the act of performing the most relevant to this particular psychical structure. The performer’s ‘will-to-enjoy’ culminates in becoming the means of achieving musical jouissance for other subjects. This form of performative perversion also takes place before and after the performance, such as during moments of the rehearsal or mediated reflections in the guises of radio interviews or blogposts. I will return to these perverted resistances in the final chapter. If these clinical structures formed the superstructures of the resistance mechanisms, the unconscious would be where the base of the resistance lies.

2.2 The Institutionalisation of the Musical Unconscious

What pins these grand psychical schematics to the unconscious, or what I will formulate in this section as the musical unconscious, is the affect evoked by the musical aesthetics. The aesthetic affect reveals itself as different types of psycho-musical effects, which are usually not perceived as proper reactions to the music. These could take the form of, say, hypnosis or euphoria. Rancière, for instance, considers such aesthetic affect to be contingent to the aesthetic experience, albeit stemming from an observation of responses to paintings and sculptures. 39 Working against resistance, the aesthetic affect negotiates with the cause of desire to elicit artistic pleasure. For both the musician and listener, these psychical effects transform the semantics of the artwork ontologically and epistemologically. The aesthetic affect subsists by displacing the musical object and the subjective experience, and such an action-reaction dynamic in the unconscious creates a transference resistance, which prevails across the analytic structures of neurosis, psychosis and perversion.

These three structures do not themselves exist in a psychical vacuum, but are driven by the plastic forces of the unconscious. Like all philosophical concepts, the idea of the unconscious has developed and in turn been modified by several generations of thinkers before and after Freud. In this section, I will show that the musical unconscious reproduces the amalgamated effects of the psychical unconscious and the aesthetic unconscious. This means that the musical unconscious inevitably partakes in the socio-historical schema of psychopolitical institutionalisation. The musical unconscious is prescribed equally by the politics and cultures that founded the aforementioned theories of the unconscious. It is therefore essential that the two philosophical institutions of psychical unconscious and aesthetic unconscious be interrogated in a bid to understand the musical unconscious as a psycho-aesthetic entity.

First and foremost, Freud’s role as the founder of psychoanalysis, one that incorporates ideas of the unconscious, cannot be read separately from his position as an implicated Jewish person. Scholars from Peter Gay to Richard Bernstein have shown that Freud’s theory of the unconscious, among other ideas within the psychoanalytic discourse, is in a tightly-knitted correlation between his Jewish ancestry and his

scientific endeavours. A theory of the musical unconscious needs to be based on this background to gain epistemological credibility. For a start, the genealogy of Freud’s formulation of the unconscious has been traced, albeit on physical instead of metaphysical terms, from Herbart’s ‘law of the threshold’ [Schwellengesetz] to Schopenhauer’s ‘will to life’ [Wille zum Leben]. The unconscious has also been formulated succinctly as a master-servant relation between the ego and the id. Yet, the work of two other leading sources – those of Eduard von Hartmann and Ernst Brücke – must be considered to discern their absolute influence on the Freudian project.

In his magnum opus Philosophy of the Unconscious, von Hartmann conceives three criteria of the unconscious as bearing (i) a teleological metaphysics of nature, (ii) a synthesis of the logical reason and the illogical will, and (iii) an adherence to a positivist world-view of an anti-materialist naturalism. The theoretical coherence between von Hartmann and Freud is obvious, despite Freud’s scattered mentions of the philosopher in his texts. It is apparent from the subtitle of von Hartmann’s thesis, ‘Speculative Results According to the Inductive Method of Physical Science’, that the epistemologies of the two theses are both based on the method of induction. This first inference will be instructive for our purpose towards crystallising an inductive theory of what the musical unconscious is or can be.

While both philosophers believe in the psychical continuity of the immanent will or irrational drive as a dynamic force hovering between the unconscious and its conscious representations, Freud parts way with the pessimism of von Hartmann on the idea of the dream process as a wish-fulfilment mechanism. From the creative viewpoint, Freud acknowledges that von Hartmann is partially right to claim that the enjoyment of the arts and the sciences – as a criterion to be a cultivated person – does not appear in dreams. This point is critical to define music’s position vis-à-vis dreams and its association with the unconscious, because caution has to be taken to disclaim the idea that every form of musical experience can be accounted for by dreams or by the musical unconscious. If Freud’s notion of the pleasure principle is contingent on this

43 Ibid. 182.
claim, his proposal of the talking cure as an active, albeit tendentious, free association process would encounter a metaphysical limit. This is because what is pleasurable does not necessarily return to the unconscious. Instead of drawing allegiance to one or the other strand of the argument, the philosophy of a musical unconscious will have to contend with these differing viewpoints of the unconscious empirically.

Correspondingly, the ontological parallels of the Freudian unconscious with certain aspects of histology and archaeology also deserve a critical review. Freud’s early internship with Brücke’s histological research in the magnetic dynamics in fishes and crayfishes taught him that the physical-chemical forces active in living organisms can only be generated by attracting \(\text{anziehende}\) or repelling \(\text{abstossende}\) components. If we are to situate such ontological forces within a coherent theory of the musical unconscious, music being both an objective art form and a creative expression of the living organism must show signs of such push-and-pull factors. Akin to the transcendental moments, these active components can be assumed to be synonymous to the forces of resistance discussed in the previous section.

Likewise, archaeological pressures also figure in Freud’s analogy between a historical city and a psychical entity that bears a long and varied past: both form a stratified system for human activities. Analogous to the layers of ruination made present via archaeological excavations, the ‘persistent expenditure of force’ exercised by the repressed against conscious recall must, according to Freud, be balanced by an ‘unceasing counter-pressure’ that renders the formation of dreams and other unconscious components possible. Contingent to the principle of energy conservation, any musical force expended by the composer or performer should inductively be received or perceived in an equal and economical capacity by the analyst or listener.

This analogy of epistemological thresholds between psychoanalysis and geology is in fact more coeval than coincidental from a historical perspective. While Freud, adhering Herbart, did not hesitate to compare unconscious phenomena to the psychophysical function, his socio-historical milieu coheres structurally with the geophysical hypothesis of his contemporary Alfred Wegener, whose theory of

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45 Freud’s argument is in line with his teacher’s, Franz Brentano’s, critique of von Hartmann. On Freud’s indebtedness to Brentano’s ‘perception as misconception’, see Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi and Roberto Poli, *The School of Franz Brentano*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996, 13.
continental drift suggests a centrifugal force transporting matters between an interior mantle and an exterior crust through an active fault. The evidence of imprints and fossils in the mountains and flatlands indicates a natural force of material repression in anticipation of revelation. With the juxtaposition of diverse species of plants and ammonites on a single tablet, this is the site where a ‘commingling’ of time and space occurs. Their meanings are being deciphered simultaneously quasi a geological return of the repressed. The structural similitude between the Freudian unconscious and the Wegenerian supercontinent is hereby congruent with von Hartmann’s philosophy of the unconscious, that is, one akin to a style of thought that perpetuates the positivism of a teleological epistemology. The posterior invention of the musical unconscious as part of a structuralist phenomenon is consistent with the psychical criteria set forth by von Hartmann as well as the laws of psychoanalysis and geology.

In this sense, the musical meta-history presented in the previous chapter is to a considerable extent a commingling of different moments in the past. The historiography of each narrative is placed not side-by-side, but repressed upon each other. Henceforth, such acts of repression, or how the latent contents come to be repressed, must be accounted for. Not only does Freud direct the repressed as the prototype of the unconscious, but he also reasons that such acts of repression and resistance cannot become conscious, lest losing their efficacy as forces within the unconscious. This rationale for an irreducible unity of the unconscious attributes in aggregate to the monism of the ‘All-One Unconscious’ as the ‘ultimate unity of will and representation’ within the empirical world.

In other words, the historically repressed must remain in its place within the unconscious and be in constant resistance against consciousness. This observation uncannily reflects recent undertakings in the writing of Beethoven’s biography and music, where Cooper, Kinderman and Lockwood amongst others have mostly omitted

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50 From the historical and political context of early twentieth-century Vienna, it is not uncanny to draw systematic parallels between this geological hypothesis with the Judeo-Christian revelation.
52 For instance, the exegeses of Jolivet and Dahlhaus are predicated on those of Rolland and Kiesewetter, just as those of Solomon and Rosen have been influenced by the transcendentalists and Hoffmann respectively.
54 Sebastian Gardner, ‘Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious’, 181.
Such epistemological limits demarcate a valid criticism and justification for a theory of the musical unconscious that extends beyond the borders of a Eurocentric epoch and a Teutonic focus. That said, the migration of Freud’s theories into Francophone and Anglophone regions further complicates the issue at hand resulting in disparate understanding and misunderstanding of the seminal concepts, such being the case of the unconscious. From this viewpoint, a thorough examination and rigorous critique of other types of unconsciousness is required in order to build a strong theoretical foundation for the musical unconscious.

Instead of a chronological unfolding of the concept’s metaphysical trajectories, I adopt a geopolitical modus operandi in the form of a localised comparison amongst different representations of the unconscious and its properties in late twentieth-century Paris. This method of critical analysis – which oscillates between the hermeneutic evolutions from within a longer German language tradition and an instantaneous reading by a Parisian – resembles an alibi that thwarts the accurate grafting of ideas across space, time, and tongue. Throughout this thesis, I contend that the aesthetic and epistemic schemas are shaped by the socio-historical milieu of each musicking subject, and the selfsame theory applies to the rejoinders offered by Jacques Rancière against selected motions proposed by Lacan and his disciple Jean Laplanche. These theoretical exchanges allude to the fact that Freud’s interventions in the unconscious are not as unique as has been assumed.

First, Rancière proposes that an aesthetic unconscious precedes the psychical unconscious. The disciple of Marxist historical materialism argues that the literary and plastic material used by Freud for his formulation of the psychical unconscious are already embedded with an aesthetic unconscious. In contradistinction, Lacan and Laplanche isolate the signifying function of language, spoken and written, as symptoms of psychical resistance respectively. What then differentiates Rancière from Lacan and Laplanche is his definition of aesthetics as the study of ‘things of art’ as ‘things of

57 Lacan’s 1957 article ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious’ was written during the Algerian War, while Laplanche’s two seminar series between 1977 and 1979 reflect the revolutionary spirits of the May 1968 protests. Rancière’s two lectures on the aesthetic unconscious in 2000 coincide with Israel’s golden jubilee alongside the popular debates around Freud and the German-Jewish dilemma. Contingent to present argument, Rancière’s starting position has always been a rejection of Jewish exceptionalism, see Gabriel Rockhill and Philip Watts (eds.), Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics, Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
thought’. That is, the artistic object itself is always already the thought of the artist as opposed to the process or product of that very thought. For Rancière, aesthetic material, including speech and text, is already philosophical. When set on a chronological linearity, these perspectives clarify that the agency of the unconscious has been circulated from Freud’s soma to Lacan’s speech, from Laplanche’s text to Rancière’s thought.

Second, Rancière identifies the tropes of trace and details as the two major characteristics of the aesthetic unconscious. While it is possible to risk an alignment of the two aesthetic traits with Schopenhauer’s will and reason respectively, I contend that it is Rancière’s privileging of the latter upon Freud’s reading of the statue of Moses by Michaelangelo that exposes his misguided conception of the Freudian unconscious. Here is a quote in which a fundamental error in Rancière’s critique of Freud’s unconscious can be discerned:

Freud adds [meaning] in the name of rational interpretation in which the man who is master of himself wins out over the servant of the jealous God. The attention to detail in the end serves to identify Moses’ position as testimony to the triumph of the will.

There is an inherent contradiction in Rancière’s understanding of Freud when he thinks that the psychoanalyst creates meaning through a rational method. It is true that Freud has relied on induction as his epistemological method, but the method is not necessarily rational, but more fantasmatic. Rancière states that Freud’s ‘attention to detail’ is being used to apprehend Moses’ will, but Rancière has not taken into account Freud’s own will in the interpretation of this particular formulation of the unconscious. How is Freud’s method reasonable when the primary ‘triumph of the will’ does not figure or apply to Freud’s and Rancière’s arguments, but merely reserved for Moses’s relations to God? Any theorisation of will and reason will have to be validated by the subject, the object as well as the analyst. As such, the unconscious for Freud is not a unilateral operation, but one entwined in a Hegelian dialectic between the will and reason. In other

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59 Comparison between Rancière’s contemporary aesthetics and Mark Evan Bonds’s historical thesis on Beethoven’s symphonies as philosophy might be contingent to the arguments presented herein. Refer to the opening pages of the introduction.
61 Ibid. 66-67.
words, the unconscious cannot exist with a provable differentiation between affect (God’s jealousy) and intellect (man’s mastery). Regardless of the position of the analyst or the analysand, an element of fantasy in correlation with one’s quests for mastery will always be present.

I will expand on this polemic trajectory between the musical fantasy and auricular mastery in the third chapter, but Laplanche can offer us a temporary solution to the problem in hand. In contrast to Rancière, Laplanche diagnoses any psychical illnesses and anomalies as ‘marks’ of deception [décevante] from the conflict between one’s will and reason. He identifies the wishes, compromises and substitutions during one’s psychical struggles as a revelation of the unconscious itself and its meaning. In this sense, we can infer that musical and other irregularities are psychical deceptions on the part of the composer or the musician and pose as plastic resistance for the analyst and the listener.

Finally, Rancière also diverges from Freud in his adoption of schematic actions akin to the Aristotelian dramaturgy to evoke the unconscious. While Freud’s initial goal for his metapsychology was to ‘represent psychical processes as quantitative determinate states of specificable material particles’, Rancière opposes data and other attributes of positivism. Instead, he appropriates drama – specifically the oedipal archetype – as the epistemological revolution. However, Lacan counters that the primordial effects of the unconscious should not be confused with the unconscious itself. In order to determine the psychophysical threshold between the subject and the object, it is obligatory to rely on the signifier, musical or otherwise, as an important agent when eliciting information from and about the unconscious. In other words, the auricular ‘return of the repressed’ vis-à-vis concrete musical elements will be best determined by the signifying synthesis of the illogical will and intellectual reason. The musical unconscious therefore operates on a synthesis of the scientific and the dramatic. Not only does the acquisition of musical knowledge include the mental and sensorial rearrangements of sounds tending towards the non-natural aspects of reality, but a

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62 Jean Laplanche, The Unconscious and the Id, London: Rebus Press, 1999, 270-71. Laplanche is using the old definition of the word décevante instead of the modern meaning of being disappointed, even though this connotation is equally applicable.

63 Ibid.

64 Rancière, The Aesthetic Unconscious, 18.


66 Lacan, Écrits, 428 and 434: ‘the unconscious is neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier’.
positivist appraisal can also yield information on the unconscious that is equally substantial for the purpose of forming sound, as opposed to value, judgment.

If we were to adhere to this idea of unconscious contents as inert and sensations as deceptive, the musical object by itself would not be able to uphold the unconscious without the involvement of the subject.\textsuperscript{67} Musical expressions, like fossils and other paleontological vestiges, are necessarily objectified in time, and for these expressions to be emancipated from their ineffableness, the work of repression needs to be situated accordingly within the context of the sonic or musical object.\textsuperscript{68} Following on from Rancière’s proposition, I suggest that this repression reveals itself in the material quality of the traces and details already inherent within the musical work. Whether inscribed as written notation or aesthetic affect, the signification which gives rise to various musical meanings is in fact stimulated during the act of performing or listening. Situated within a similar epistemological system, recent musicological practices also revolve around the text and act. Music theorists are positing music from within the domains of the alogogenic or non-linguistic to those of the metaphysical or non-sensible.\textsuperscript{69} Since the musical unconscious cannot partake in a function by and of itself, the visual and physical representations become mnemonic or ‘mnemic traces’ of those within the unconscious, where the meaning of the structural elements are obtained from the subject’s specific infantile experiences rather than from the signifying universal of musical morphemes.\textsuperscript{70}

Through the study of how scientists and philosophers before and after Freud review the unconscious, the dynamic forces of repression and resistance as well as the tropes of trace and details become essential characteristics of the unconscious, musical or otherwise. While von Hartmann’s method of induction has been instrumental in identifying the meaning-making processes that operate in the unconscious, it was less useful for spotting the absence of things that evoke pleasure. Instead, the unconscious reveals its deceptive nature in that which is not pleasurable or in excess. The geophysical and geological analogies of ammonites and ancient ruins provide structural parallels within the intellectual milieu of Freud’s times. Such a conjunction of socio-historical events and systematic methods has elucidated the scientific principles on

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. 431.
\textsuperscript{70} Laplanche, \textit{The Unconscious and the Id}, 37 and 99.
which the unconscious has been founded upon. The actions and reactions occurring within and without the unconscious are therefore predicated on these actual phenomena.

Likewise, the invention of the aesthetic unconscious is entangled with the problematic of its psychical counterpart. Yet, in spite of its shortcomings, the aesthetic unconscious as formulated by Rancière acts as an impetus for the possibility of a musical unconscious. Like its predecessor, the musical unconscious has to therefore negotiate with the temporal correlations between the psychical and aesthetic unconscious, the rationality and irrationality of any interpretations, as well as the prioritisation of drama over data, or vice versa. Such a conception that coagulates the psychical and aesthetic unconscious will entail an inevitable institutionalisation of musical meaning and its resistance. These repressive operations inherent in the musical unconscious thereafter conjure up a politics of plastic resistance due to the rising tensions amongst the practitioners as guardians of musical knowledge.

In the next section, I question how personal tensions are triggered by the affectability of the undesirable between Beethoven in Vienna and the British polities during the early nineteenth century. This was a time of aggressive Napoleonic imperialism and industrial capitalism whereby musicians and publishers were negotiating terms of trade in precarious situations. While past research has focused on the material and economic relations between the buyers and sellers, the psychological and political aspects of these exchanges have hitherto not been explored. The theory of the musical unconscious is apt for the purpose of evincing certain psychical nuances concerning how monetary and musical decisions are made to compromise on the taste and competence of the British middlebrow. The actions and reactions undertaken not only transform the musical contents of the pieces and give a plastic quality to the ‘composer’s intention’, but also produce a resistant dynamics between personal desires and institutional barriers within and without the transnational publishing industries. As a determinant of contemporaneous aesthetics, the psychopolitical concept of plastic resistance is therefore pertinent to the political economy of meaning-making amongst the early nineteenth-century musical communities.

2.3 The Case of Early Nineteenth-century British Institutions

This section analyses Beethoven’s business transactions with his British publishers in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Based on Georgina Born’s notion of the ‘musically imagined community’, this research is a response and continuation of the
new historicist approaches championed by Stephen Rumph and Nicholas Mathew within Beethoven studies. The relationship between Beethoven and the British publishers, and correspondingly the British public, is contextualized via the psychopolitical concept of plastic resistance. Contrary to any presupposed docility, the British, as did the French and German, has intervened directly in the creative process of the composer’s life and music, most notably weathering the political and economic embargos during the Napoleonic Wars. These publishers, who distributed Beethoven’s arrangements, sonatas, and string quartets, include George Thomson in Edinburgh, Muzio Clementi, Robert Birchall, and the administrators of the Regent’s Harmonic Institution in London. Given that Beethoven’s relationships with the first two publishers have been chronicled more extensively than the others, I will analyse them to support my argument of these business dealings as emblematic of the phenomenon of plastic resistance. Because the cases of Thomson and Clementi pertain mostly to their economic transactions, even though some artistic influences or demands cannot be discounted, I appropriate the binary concepts of extractive and inclusive institutions from the economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson to differentiate the respective political outcomes of destructive and creative resistances as propounded by the actions of Thomson and Clementi.

Between 1810 and 1820, George Thomson commissioned Beethoven for more than a hundred piano arrangements of British folksongs and variations with and without flute accompaniment. However, their commercial relations were not always cordial. In addition to discrepancies in the monetary negotiations, the artistic compromises on the part of Beethoven were also not readily accepted. Thomson’s persuasion towards selling more facile works suitable for the limited British market was met with stark resistance from Beethoven, who insists that his work must be up to his own, that is Viennese aristocratic, standards. Several initiatives to publish the violin sonatas and string quintets were aborted, while most of the published themes and variations resulted in more losses than profits for Thomson. Eventually, Beethoven himself breached their business agreements in allowing the Austro-Germanic publishers, Artaria and Simrock, to peddle the rejected variations as Opus 105 and Opus 107 respectively.

72 Ibid. 20.
73 Ibid. 18 and 23.
74 Ibid. 22.
From Beethoven’s interpersonal relation with Thomson, we witnessed both parties equipped with the ability not to be affected by the undesirable, and transforming the thorny situations to their advantages. Beethoven’s music was either too dear or difficult for the Scottish publisher so much so that Thomson has to invent ways of coaxing the famous artist to submit simpler music. For instance, he renamed a work ‘Six Simple Variations on an Original Melody’ (WoO 77) or, falling short of good aesthetic taste, compiled a selection of Beethoven’s many variations according to his judgment of what would suit the British middlebrow. Thomson’s plastic resistance against Beethoven’s bourgeoise stances works towards the economic hegemony of what Georgina Born calls the ‘musically imagined community’.  

Such a musically imagined community in Britain was entirely a construct made up by George Thomson. His economic and pragmatic resistances not only present Beethoven with a parochial worldview of the British performance capabilities, but also frame Beethoven as a common or even popular composer to the British public. Such a reverse syllogism, which also reflects the implications of a plastic resistance, is sound because Born’s invented term, the musically imagined community, is mostly derived from the social research of popular music around the world. As a form of musical geopolitics between mainland Europe and its maritime communities, Beethoven’s music, or at least the British impression of them, has irresistibly been ‘popularised’ by Thomson’s plastic transformation of his creativity. Thomson has concealed specific aspects of Beethoven’s artistry which he felt to be undesirable as well as hindered the musical and auricular development of his fellow compatriots. Pertaining to the exceptional case of George Thomson as well as the psychopolitical phenomenon in general, the restriction of a musical community to the folk or the popular will only constrict their affective responses to the arts within a narrow sublimated range. This statement can be substantiated by a reassessment of the original genesis of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, which remained highly popular amidst British communities till the present day.  

75 Georgina Born, ‘Music and the Social’, in Martin Clayton, Trevor Herbert and Richard Middleton (eds.), The Cultural Study of Music: A Critical Introduction (Second Edition), New York and London: Routledge, 2012, 269; in addition, it would be a point of misinformation to think that the British public were less capable or less well off than the French or the Germans given the ongoing economic transitions from the African slave trade that ended in 1833 to global colonial gains from the Napoleonic Wars, such being the case of the British invasion and pillage of Java in 1811 and 1812. See Syed Hussein Alatas, Thomas Stamford Raffles, 1781-1826, Schemer or Reformer?, Singapore: Angus and Robertson, 1971.  

76 An distinct example is given in how Richard Middleton reads the function of the main chorus theme in a standard Tin Pan Alley 32-bar structure as ‘to absorb these worries and sublimate the emotion into a quasi-religious ecstasy’, in his Voicing the Popular: On the Subjects of Popular Music, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 70.
The masterpiece originally commissioned by the Philharmonic Society of London after Beethoven’s experiences with Thomson and other publishers was conceived most probably with a British listenership in mind. Despite the lack of evidence, I argue that Beethoven’s prior celebrity status with the British bourgeoisies would have informed the composer of the aesthetic desires of such a musically imagined community. Therefore, my contention is that recent propositions to associate the Ninth with the exoticism of the Turkish style or the popularism of the English choral tradition are historically misaligned. During the late 1810s, Beethoven was desperate for money and his aim was to sell to both local and international performers and auditors. While the general message advocates the transcendence over the individual communities onto universal brotherhood, the antithesis which often escapes the Orientalist ears presupposes that Beethoven has ‘provincialised’ the symphony in order to suit the popular aesthetics of the times. Instead of the hundreds of unsold folksong arrangements put out on the petty market by George Thomson, Beethoven had placed his wagers on the genre of the symphony. This impetus is evident from Beethoven’s ambition to assimilate the vocal monody with a sonata-styled chordal texture that according to Thomson would be beyond his customers’ ability. Beethoven’s Ninth evokes the very geopolitical resistance within the semantic boundaries of the symphonic structure using the multiple meanings of the popular and the exotic in order to thwart his European auditors’ ability not to be affected by these undesirable elements.

Tracing an extended trajectory through Thomson’s requests for folksong arrangements in 1810 to the completion of the Ninth in 1824, the effects of plastic resistance can be detected on both socio-cultural and musical terms. There remains, however, another missing link in the historical narrative that has yet to appear, and that is Beethoven’s other English publisher, Muzio Clementi and his business partners in London. The working relation between Beethoven and Clementi’s company lasts from 1804 to 1823, and is considerably the longest amongst all of the other publishers. What

77 Willett, *Beethoven and England*, 45-46. Note that the premiere of the Ninth in Berlin was not due to interest in the work specifically but in Beethoven the cult figure per se.
79 Beethoven having retained the custody of his nephew was in desperate need of money at that time. The handsome commission of the Galitzin quartets might have allowed him freer rein in shaping his compositional aesthetics, but late Beethoven was definitely more of a capitalist than the middle-period political activist.
is again revealing of the plastic dynamics of the musical economy lie in the correspondences between the two parties, which first began around April 1807.

While Clementi has agreed to publish a collection of music, notably the three opus 59 quartets, an overture, the Fourth Symphony, the Fourth Piano Concerto, and the Violin Concerto, for the total price of 200 pounds, the cunningness of his economic acumen surfaces in his tactic to adapt and publish the string quartets and Violin Concerto as piano transcriptions. We can instantly sense the plastic resistance at play between Beethoven and Clementi: Beethoven resisting the small-scale niche and exclusive attention by the Viennese aristocratic community, and Clementi resisting making too much of a loss at the expense of Beethoven’s eclectic compositional style as well as the risky venture of receiving manuscripts during wartime. Beethoven obviously wanted to expand his economic worth beyond the continent and the mere appreciation of his piano music, and Clementi went all his way out to persuade the Germanic genius to cater to the middlebrow British musical milieu. These interpretations can be deduced readily from Clementi’s specific request for two additional piano sonatas (Opp. 78 and 79) and a piano fantasy (Op. 77) for a further sixty pounds. Clementi was obviously aware of Beethoven’s mastery in variations and improvisation. Yet, Beethoven was not duped either: Opus 78 exists only in two movements, one of which containing no development(!), and Opus 79 has been considered an ‘easy sonata’ for the British musical simpletons.

On top of all these pre-meditated manoeuvres undertaken by both composer and publisher, what was Clementi actually thinking when he agreed to include both the string quartets and Violin Concerto in his catalogue given that these pieces, which I will also discuss in the final chapter, have fared rather badly with the Viennese critics? I contend that the impetus and resistance of the musical unconscious must have played an active part in his eventual decisions. Clementi could probably be thinking beyond the single transactions of these manuscripts, because he suggested in his private missive to his business partner that they be transcribed for the piano. From an economic viewpoint, he could hire a few scribes and raise the price of the piano transcriptions, since his company would have then held exclusive rights to both the chamber and piano versions.

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82 Willett, *Beethoven and England*, 29-30: ‘Remember that the violin concerto he will adapt himself and send it as soon as he can. The quartets, etc., you may get Cramer or some other very clever fellow to adapt for the P-forte [sic].’; For a more detailed analysis, see Barry Cooper, ‘The Clementi-Beethoven Contract of 1807: A Reinvestigation’, in Roberto Illiano (ed.) *Muzio Clementi: Studies and Prospects*, Bologna: Ut Orpheus, 2002, 337-353; Nancy November on the other hand makes no mention of the transcriptions in her *Beethoven’s Theatrical Quartets: Ops 59, 74 and 95*.

albeit within the British borders. On the other hand, his delegation to Beethoven to transcribe the Violin Concerto was very much of a miscalculated move given that the composer’s own adulteration, except for the improvisatory cadenza, turned out more incompetent than satisfactory. All these actions and decisions show the plastic resistance of business strategies and musical manipulations correlated with one another; what has been undesirable for one person became the trump card for the other.

Plastic resistance subscribes contingently to the notion of an unconscious creative destruction of meaning and acts as an underlying mechanism driving the three musicological structures of notating, analysing and performing, all of which will be explored in greater detail in the next three chapters. With the musical migration and transformation as a form of creative destruction, the same quartets, concerti and sonatas are being renewed as well as being resisted. In contrary to developmental economics that plot to eradicate the traditional with the modern, the best evidence to substantiate this insight can be derived from the persistent fascination to situate the authentic and the original versions of a piece of music, or its parts thereof. The availability of a possible trace back to the less desirable stage of the musical work reveals the process of plastic resistance at work between the musicking subject and the creative object. One straightforward example can be drawn from the performative ambiguities of the espressivo indications between the English and Viennese editions of the Opus 74 string quartet, where it is not clear if the tempo rubato is to be executed by all four parts, the first violin, or only the outer voices. If this movement were to be transcribed by Clementi for the piano, how would the performer convey the exact expression marking?

Plastic resistance permeates the production, distribution and consumption of the musical material. What differentiates Thomson’s approach from Clementi’s, however, is their institutional construct of the publishing market. Thomson’s and Clementi’s strategies could be classified using what economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson have theorised as the extractive and inclusive economic institutions respectively. Accordingly, how these institutions operate corresponds essentially to the two properties of plastic resistance. Institutions that are extractive instigate a form of destructive resistance, whereas their inclusive counterparts engender a form of creative resistance. From the historical evidence made available, Thomson’s relation with Beethoven has been an exploitative and destructive one especially when the publisher chooses and rejects the settings and variations as he sees fit. As a musical ombudsman,

85 Nancy November, Beethoven’s Theatrical Quartets, 188.
Thomson has indirectly hampered the artistic standards of his consumers as part of a musically imagined community. Running his publishing firm as an extractive institution that ‘extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset’, Thomson has made the musical capital of both composer and musicians more impoverished with his own resistance against losses, real or imaginary.87

The social phenomenon associated with this system of economic operation results in an imagined community, and specifically for Thomson’s case, a musically imagined community that is itself always already an extractive political institution.88

The selfsame geopolitical circumstances become institutionalised overtime within the musical communities in which Thomson and Beethoven operate in. Not only are the economic prospects extractive, but the political relations also become subsumed into the extractive mode with the British market domineering over the continental other, or vice versa. This theory can readily be proven by the couple of instances when the political contexts of Opuses 91 and 97 have been overtly tailored for the English market. While the former, the Battle Symphony, was rearranged by Birchall for the piano in order ‘to capitalize on current national feeling, and to make money’, the dedication of the latter, the ‘Grand Piano Trio’, was ‘to carry the archduke’s [Rudolph] name informally to posterity’.89 Both of these geopolitical tactics simultaneously de-pluralise musical meaning within each musically imagined community in, say Britain or France, but create a pluri-versality of musical meanings beyond the real ones existing within the Viennese musical communities. Such is the case of how an extractive political institution functions with respect to the classical music industry in early nineteenth-century Western Europe.

87 Ibid. 76.
88 Musically imagined communities cited in Georgina Born’s essay include the unequal arbitration of musical aesthetics between the South African white sound engineers versus their black musician compatriots, the identity reiterations when genre theory is applied to various American musics, and how Indian classical musicians become entangled in a self-contradictory hierarchy between Muslim practitioners and Hindu nationalists, amongst others. See her ‘Music and the Social’, 263, 270 and 273. The Euroclassical example of an extractive imagined community par excellence would be the institutionalization of the musical avant-garde via the IRCAM at the height of the Cold War and the May 1968 aftermath when the priorities of a group of elite modernists took precedence over those of the proletariat and the unemployed. See Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995.
89 Lockwood, Beethoven: The Music and The Life, 339 and 308. Nicholas Mathew disagrees with such reception of the Battle Symphony and upholds Beethoven’s sincerity to the Prince Regent; see his Political Beethoven, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 28-29. The dedication of Op. 97 appears to have such long-lasting effect on the English audiences that between 1895 and 1915, the piano trio was performed 25 times in the London suburbs, a number significantly higher than any other of Beethoven’s chamber pieces, which were heard less than eight times. See Alan P. Bartley, ‘Chamber music concerts in suburban London, 1895-1915: aspects of repertoire, performance and reception’, PhD Thesis, Oxford Brookes University, 2004.
In contrast, Clementi’s publishing ethos is based on how inclusive economic institutions operate, which is to ‘allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish’. Clementi is willing to take on as many pieces as Beethoven can provide and skillfully includes the labour of his colleagues, William F. Collard and Johann Baptist Cramer, in the process. By publishing, for example, both the Violin Concerto and its piano transcription, Clementi performs the creative destruction of a less desirable commodity and transform it into a more affective utility. In Marxist terms, the use value of an erstwhile worthless piece of music is increased many times after certain plastic alterations, thus enabling the maximal enjoyment of and minimal resistance to the musical object.

The politics of plastic resistance within an inclusive musical institution propagates the multiplication of economic and political values. This method can be seen again from how Clementi negotiated the contract of 1807 with Beethoven. Firstly, Clementi agreed to offer the equivalent of 200 pounds in the Viennese currency as his payments instead of the outmoded guineas, the production of which had already ended in 1799. Most probably for political reasons, the couriers set for London went via Russia instead of Paris (although only the second of two packages arrived safely). In such precarious situations, Clementi took his own initiatives to placate Beethoven by meeting the composer in Vienna and hastening the publishing and payment processes in spite of his own bereavement. As far as a comparative account allows for, this inclusive attitude stands in stark contrast to that espoused by Thomson, who was still making estimates in shillings when dealing with Beethoven three years later.

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90 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 74.
91 Willett, Beethoven and England, 30.
92 Cooper, ‘The Clementi-Beethoven Contract of 1807’, 346. Thomson on the other hand was no wiser to request for his manuscripts to be sent on a longer detour via Malta.
93 Ibid. 344-345.
In this section, I have extensively argued that the institutional approaches undertaken by Thomson and Clementi when conducting their economic dealings with Beethoven are respectively extractive and inclusive. While Thomson projects a musically imagined community that possessed restricted skills and wealth, Clementi, by publishing the full scores and piano transcriptions, casts a wider net to capture the interests of both the aristocratic institutions – public societies and libraries – and the bourgeoisies in private rooms. Having differentiated the inclusive musical institutions that buttress the creative destruction of skills and values from the imagined institutions that extract innate capital off a large mass of individuals and crippling their futures, we will be able to assess on a case by case basis how plastic resistance operates against the Beethovenian material qua undesirable. As part of the early nineteenth-century mentalités, they are either inclusive or imagined for different musicking subjects.

Further, the epistemological vicissitudes of previous Beethoven scholarship have also been shown to be founded consciously or unconsciously on plastic resistance. While most of the critics and historians sustain an extractive resistance vis-à-vis the Beethovenian material in order to establish an imagined community and an imagined institution that besieged beyond their community – such as the global and posthumous influences from Thayer to Dahlhaus, few scholars practise a method that sustains an inclusive resistance along the lines of a creative destruction of erstwhile knowledge. The perspectives of women, the subaltern and people belonging to different cultures remained excluded and inaudible. That said, the unbalanced power/knowledge structure within and without the longue durée is indicative of the plastic resistance of present-day historiography whether specific to Beethoven or in general.

2.4 Conclusion: Towards a Psychopolitics of Plastic Resistance

The theory of plastic resistance espouses a political agenda. It is a concept defending against the persistent impositions of a fixed meaning for every artwork. Precisely because aesthetics is politics and has always been political, there needs to be an equal and opposite force to counter the signifying power of the arts.\textsuperscript{95} The resistance that is

\textsuperscript{95} There is a current resurgence in the notion of ‘political aesthetics’, although the term itself is rather tautological because Rancière (and other philosophers) has already claimed in his Aesthetics and its Discontents, Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2009, that aesthetics is in essence politics. For an application of Rancière’s ideas to music studies, see Jean-Christophe Sevin, ‘The aesthetic politics of two decades of techno-movement in France’, https://www.opendemocracy.net/jean-christophe-sevin/aesthetic-politics-of-two-decades-of-techno-movement-in-france (last accessed 30 September 2014).
most creative and destructive, or most inclusive and extractive, reproduces itself through the affect. Appropriately, the aesthetic affect, for Rancière, is already quilted to the impropriety of art as part of an aesthetic contingency. That is, the affect instigates a violation of the real semantics, whether ontologically or epistemologically. The aesthetic affect dissents against both the artistic object and the subjective experience and drives towards the annihilation of the psychical undesirable. Any psychical resistance is being propped up by the aesthetic affect within the musical unconscious and allowed to prevail across the three institutionalised structures of neurosis, psychosis and perversion. This theory succinctly sums up the psychopolitics of estimate resistance.

When Susan McClary first declares all music to be highly political more than twenty years ago, she forgot to include her unconscious aesthetics into the act. The blind spot was quickly rectified in Philip Bohlman’s later recognition of musicology as a political act. The very recognition of aesthetic contingency, whereby the aura of the artwork extends beyond the actual contact with the artwork, therefore posits all musicking subjects in the public sphere. A good example of this situation is the use of drones and other forms of sonic warfare, where the sounds are translated to most people via linguistic mediation – that is, texts and speech acts – instead of personal auricular experiences. To be able to posit oneself is then to resist one’s affect, and this in itself is always already a political act. The vicissitudes of plasticity and resistance are therefore determined by one’s affect that acts as the psychical mediator before any intervention by language or history. The impetus of the Anstoss as a transcendental force, which overcomes the Nicht-können or inability of self-positing, accounts effectively for the subjective deviations that have been deemed to be clinical.

In the first part of this chapter, the definition of resistance has been deliberated with accord to Fichte’s concepts of self-positing, the Anstoss, and the psychoanalytic phenomenon of the estimate. I argued that the principle of plastic resistance should be the psychical basis upon which all ability and affectability against the desirous and non-


desirous predicate. I subsequently invent the musical unconscious that bears strong institutional backing from histology, archaeology and geology. The repressed material reveals themselves via the coeval commingling of trace and details. These hypothetical generalities are musically concretised in the specific case of Beethoven’s entanglements with early nineteenth-century British publishers, who practised an extractive or inclusive form of psychopolitical resistance. In comparison with other theories of materialism – democratic, dialectic, historical, and new – the concept of plastic resistance captures the multiple semantics of what Beethoven and his music have come to signify as witnessed in the macro-historical case studies discussed in the previous chapter.

As an extrapolation of the phenomena of creative and destructive plasticity, I propose that Fichte’s original duality of empirical action and intellectual deed not only thwarts the dogmatic approach to subjective listening, but also refutes the synthetic welding of empirical consciousness with pure consciousness. That is, the affective aesthetic in the form of an object cause of desire stands always already in a dialectical correlation with the psychical resistance of knowledge production. Regardless of the musicking subjects’ background, the ability not to be affected by something undesirable – as well as the ability to be affected by something desirable – would have to be determined by the notational mediation between thought and text. This neurotic phenomenon will be examined in the next chapter.
Chapter 3  Phantasmal Notations

A fantasy is, in effect, quite bothersome, since we do not know where to situate it due to the fact that it just sits there, complete in its nature as a fantasy, whose only reality is as discourse and which expects nothing of your powers, asking you, rather, to square accounts with your own desires. – Jacques Lacan

As early as 1923, the British musicologist Ernest Newman suggested that Beethoven possessed an unconscious technique of composition, one that relies on the three-note melodic ascent. In 1966, this idea was superseded by Warren Kirkendale’s coinage of the musical ‘pathotype’, where a falling diminished seventh is sandwiched between two semitonal ascents. One distinct example belongs to the melodic sequence of the opening notes of Opus 132, which have fascinated several theorists and will be analysed in greater detail in the next chapter. Most recently, Joseph Straus suggests in his 2011 monograph on musical disabilities that Beethoven’s harmonic negotiations in his Third Symphony and elsewhere signify a desire to overcome the pathological discords caused by his hearing impairment. Taken all together, the idea of musical notation – that is, the writing down of musical thought – becomes a psychopolitical act that transforms the signification of psychical thought into the semiotics of the text, and vice versa. These ontological transformations evince a force of plastic resistance between not only the mind and the material, but also their respective meanings.

In the previous chapter, I investigated plastic resistance as a psychopolitical force that determines the institutionalization of the musical unconscious in theory and in the practice of early nineteenth-century British publishing. In this chapter on musical notation, I deliberate upon the composer’s and listener’s ability to negotiate the semantic limits of rendering musical thought as text and musical text as thought. While the currently performative turn within British musicology has been intellectually productive, the psychology behind the acts of notating music and hearing notated music has yet to be fully understood. Despite the common knowledge of writing as an act that propounds the ideology of recognition and redistribution via repetition and reproduction

respectively, the unconscious mechanisms that control or condition writing and listening have yet to be explored. Through the psychoanalytic phases of fantasy, hysteria, and mastery, I will first situate the composer’s desire to notate music or musical thoughts as a plastic form of musical objectification. That is, through the written representation of the musical meaning, music is not only *formed* by the symbolic ordering of its imaginary aspects, but is also *deformed* against the original intention of the composer or the authentic meaning of the music.

On the one hand, the creative processes that composers experienced are part of the psychical resistance that goes against symbolic conventions. On the other hand, the listeners themselves also encounter the symbolic resistance of the notated material as well as the re-creative nature of the musical *soneme* through their personal experiences and capabilities. Musical knowledge is thereby determined contingently by the composer’s and the listener’s ability to resist. The plastic transformation of subjective abilities with respect to the three aforementioned neurotic phases – fantasy, hysteria, and mastery – will weaken the symbolic resistance of the object and the object cause of desire, which in itself is always already imaginary. As theorised in the previous chapter, this object cause of desire is understood here as the aesthetic affect evoked by the musical object and its meaning, or what I call, its *soneme*. A psychopolitical resistance occurs immediately when the notating or listening subject posits oneself in relation to the musical text qua the object of desire in the attempt to concretize musical knowledge qua musical thought. The most apparent evidence of the writer’s psychical and political agenda can be found in his or her sketches and autographs, and those by Beethoven will henceforth be the focus of this investigation since vast research work has been dedicated to uncovering the creative processes behind his compositions especially after the reunification of Germany in 1989.

Throughout the five sections of this chapter, I will trace the psychopolitical trajectory experienced by notating and listening subjects, who have to master the skill of resisting both objective dogmatism and subjective fanaticism. The first section sets the caveat for dogmatic score listening practices to be relinquished lest the Fichtean fatalities – annihilation of the subject and obliteration of the object – distort musical thought and knowledge. The subsequent two sections apply the Lacanian concepts of fantasy and hysteria to C. P. E. Bach’s treatise on improvisations and Beethoven’s sketches from all three periods of his output. In the penultimate section, lessons on affective resistance in musical creation and epistemology are exemplified using selected scholarly work by Schenker, Schoenberg and Subotnik. Reverting to the listening
subject, the final section argues for perceptual autonomy to be based on the critical criterion of self-positing, that is, a repositing of the self through the pure consciousness of genetic and natural abilities as predicated on practical empiricism. Consequently, musical training and mastery are proposed as the best means of strengthening the listener’s epistemic resistance in order to gain proper musical knowledge. The multiple forms in which psychical resistance can counter the listeners’ empirical consciousness make resistance a plastic force, thereby accounting for the efficacy of psychoanalytic theory to prevent further misrecognition of *sonemes* against their aesthetic affects.

### 3.1 Dogmatic Fatalities: Mirror, Misrecognition, and Mastery

‘Mirror, Mirror, on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?’ The trope of mirroring is used so often in both fiction and academic writing that the connotations of reflection and identification have often been taken for granted. Just as actors, ballerinas, clowns and drag artists stand in front of the mirror and seek for mastery of their art, composers and listeners too require some sort of mirror to differentiate one from the other. The identification of certain musical traits is normally based on similarities, but differentiation in times of modernisation and colonisation has made relative the nature of an erstwhile monadic epistemology. For instance, it is thought that the Celtic-inspired music of Henry Cowell epitomises an Orientalist model where ‘non-Western music provide a mirror that allows Western music to reconsider itself’.

Or, a musicological journey into a ‘hall of mirrors’ has given Paul Attinello the chance to reflect on the personal experiences behind his ‘interpretation, speculation, and subjectivity’. That said, the incorporation of a Lacanian understanding of the ‘mirror stage’ as a psychical phase where aspects of the projected image are misrecognised has altered the common perception and utility of the mirror as a figurative trope within musicology. From David Schwarz’s literal reading of Schubert songs and their text-settings to Richard Middleton’s critical extrapolations of socio-cultural contexts in selected songs by Nina Simone, scholarship informed by psychoanalytic theories tend to envelop what Kaja Silverman calls an ‘acoustic mirror’ of meanings and representations around and

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beyond those of the scores and sounds. As much as these interpretations aim to substantiate alternative realms of musical understanding, they have mostly and immediately objectified the subject in question. If the Lacanian philosophy of personal misrecognition is applicable to all reflections, then the musicologists mentioned above have hitherto not realised the cunning of the rule. That is, even their literary mirroring is in reality a misrepresentation of the music, and correspondingly, these criticisms of mine are probably a misreading of Beethoven too. How then can we escape this infinite cycle of misconstructions otherwise perceived as an imaginary sense of mastery?

I believe a return to the thinkers of eighteenth-century German Idealism can provide us some clues to avoid such dogmatic thinking. The integration of German Idealism within applied musicology is considered relatively radical, but the philosophy of Fichte has yet to weigh in sufficiently on recent discussions of musical aesthetics. Although the philosophy of taste and that of beauty have had a robust history, the aesthetic inferences of Fichte and his immediate nemesis Friedrich Schelling, both sandwiched between the Idealist giants of Kant and Hegel, have surfaced only recently in philosophical debates. Part of the aim of this thesis is to bridge the scholarly lacuna by investigating Fichte’s pre-synthetic application of transcendental idealism upon the empirical act of listening. Instead of the widely founded dialectics of Hegelian musicology, this chapter will investigate the psychical implications on the listening subject’s self-consciousness within a Fichtean framework. Based on a reappraisal of the controversy stemming from Dahlhaus’s institutionalisation of the Beethoven-Rossini binary in the opening chapter, I will first refute the dogmatic turn that grounds the dualist listener on his or her objective aesthetic experiences. The listening subject’s critical act of meaning-making being an irreducible form of autonomous subjectivity is subsequently argued as a more effective way to posit oneself and consolidate one’s musical understanding. As a supplement to the recent incorporation of Schelling’s aesthetics into musicology by Bowie and others, I propose that the mastery of musical aesthetic and knowledge subsists on the ‘deed-action’ of the self and the autonomous resistance of the ‘I’ – both necessary mechanisms within the Fichtean critique.


3.2 C. P. E. Bach and Beethoven: Fantasia and Hysteria

In this and the next sections, I will illustrate how Beethoven qua master of hysteria deviates from C. P. E. Bach qua master of the fantastic. The genre of the keyboard fantasy appears exceptionally unpopular in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and only a handful – those by Mozart (K475), Beethoven (Op. 77), Schubert (D940), Schumann (Op. 17), and Chopin (Op. 49) – have been published although rarely performed. Otherwise, the most famous fantasies within the keyboard repertory are undeniably those by Bach. In addition to being the most prolific composer in the genre, Bach has also provided instructions for composing and improvising the fantasia using a couple of his own models in C minor (H75.5) and D major (H160). One will realise, after reading the closing chapters of Bach’s Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments from 1753 and 1762 as well as scholarship from the past twenty years or so, that the fantastic elements exist not only within the composer’s creative process, but also in his everyday life. For a start, the genre of fantasy is widely believed to have been derived from the Italian invention of the stylus phantasticus, and became more recognisable in the oeuvres of Frescobaldi, Froberger and Biber. Yet, from the theoretical perspectives of eighteenth-century analysts, including Athanasius Kircher and Johann Mattheson, the definitions and meanings of the term have varied from a form of imaginative counterpoint to the display of free expressivity.

The psychical fantasy, in comparison, is considered by psychoanalysts to be the subject’s imaginative construction of unconscious desires, which Lacan has theorised as the subject’s ($) desire for the real or actual object (a). Being imaginative does not mean that the subject necessarily resides in the imaginary order. If the fantasist is someone who can articulate his or her fantasies in a way comprehensible to the others, this subject is considered to have progressed into the symbolic order. Without the ability to be understood, the subject needs to be assisted by the analyst to constitute the subject’s objects. The analogy is equally appropriate for the music analyst, whose tasks are to identify the composer’s desires and situate them in the textual or sonic expressions. Because Lacan sees the fantasy as a ‘protective’ form of defence

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9 Thomas Schmidt-Beste has however perceived some eighteenth-century fantasias to be virtuosic transformations of the sonata’s ‘learned style’ in his The Sonata, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 182-86.
mechanism, the analysis should be directed towards locating the object that the subject is fending off. In recent musicological literature, Kenneth Smith has identified the tonic chord as Skryabin’s fantasmatic object, while J. P. E. Harper-Scott, following the Heidegerrian ontology of ‘tranquility’, associates fantasy with the failure of symbolization in both the literary and musical work of Chaucer and Walton respectively. Harper-Scott has isolated love as the ‘tranquilizing’ (beruhigend) force that traverses the fantasy, but, as I have argued in the previous chapter, all aesthetic affects hinder in the neurotic resistance against the fantasmatic object. Epistemologically contingent to these psychoanalytic readings in recent musicological research, Bach’s instructions in free improvisation are representative of the fantas working through such creative desires. I will fortify my thesis with three conditions from Bach’s Essay before segueing to Beethoven’s more hysterical circumstances. Foreshadowing the Riemannian fetish of the triad, Bach’s first signifier is the diminished seventh. Bach identifies instances of articulating musical desire via the sounding of a seventh chord; the various inversions and positioning of the chord as part of the harmonic rhythm are effective in implementing an abrupt vanguard against the perpetuity of the prevailing tonality. Propagating the characteristic of the Empfindsamer sensitive style, Bach wants to steer his imagination towards ‘the most distant keys more quickly’ and this desire could only be unconscious during the improvisation. However, the oxymoron, ‘agreeable suddenness’, indicates that an attempt is made to remain on the symbolic order so that the listeners grasp hold of and are ‘in agreement’ with the modulations. With the diminished seventh, the fantas would have successfully defended the persistence of the tonic.


14 There appears to be a stark contradiction here with Harper-Scott’s reading of Heidegger’s ‘tranquility’ with those of two Heidegger specialists, who believe tranquil effects as unaffected ones, in such cases as the everyday busyness in idle talk (Gerede), curiosity (Neugier) and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) as cited by Heidegger himself in §38 of Being and Time. See Mark A. Wrathall and Max Murphey, ‘An Overview of Being and Time’, in Mark A. Wrathall (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 14.

15 ‘As a means of reaching the most distant keys more quickly and with agreeable suddenness no chord is more convenient and fruitful than the seventh chord with a diminished seventh and fifth, for by inverting it and changing it enharmonically, a great many chordal transformations can be attained,’ quoted in Douglas A. Lee, ‘C. P. E. Bach and the Free Fantasia for Keyboard: Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Mus. Ms. Nichelmann 1N’ in Stephen L. Clark (ed.) C. P. E. Bach Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 182.

16 Kenneth Smith has directed the tonic chord to be the object cause of desire in songs by Charles Ives, but it remains to be seen if his theory is applicable to other compositions. See his ‘The Tonic Chord and Lacan’s Object a in Selected Songs by Charles Ives’, Journal of the Royal Musical Association 136(2), 2011, 353-98.
The subsequent clause asks for infinite creative possibilities: ‘A free fantasia consists of varied harmonic progressions which can be expressed in all manner of figuration and motives’. In order to fulfill an insatiable need, the fantast demands a variety of musical forms and shapes from the unlimited battery of inventible signifiers. With abundant imagination, the improviser is free to manoeuvre in both axes of musical time and space. Based on these plastic transformations, a contemporary of Bach could not help noticing the ‘cloud shapes’ in Bach’s C minor Fantasia, where the harmony is ‘not even coercible into meter and rhythm and [is] moving around through all realms of modulation’. The historical configurations of pulses and their subdivisions are overridden by a creative demand for the harmonic movement to be more liberal. However, this technique in the ‘sensitive style’ has resulted in artistic discrepancies to arise between proponents of the ascetic and that of the affective. While the former has criticised the musical contrasts for causing ‘uncertainty and confusion’ for the listeners, who are being manipulated without ‘a proper succession of feelings, […] as if in a dream’, the latter contends that the alternation ‘from one passion into the opposite e.g. from the calm to the stormy, from tenderness into cruelty’ in a single piece is fair. The acknowledgement of this possibility, already in Bach’s own milieu, implies the presence of a psychological resistance on the part of the listener against the fantast’s harmonic, rhythmic and metrical changes, whether sudden or gradual.

A third trick up the sleeve of the fantast is the logical positioning of the ‘principal key’. In his advice, Bach takes into account the temporal factor in the listening experience. Bach is concerned with entraining the listener to settle aurally into the principal tonality of the fantasy. This could be the first moment when the subject is induced to relate to the object cause of desire. With respect to Lacan’s theory of logical time between hesitation and certitude, this moment resembles the ‘instant of the glance’ with an initial phase of acquaintance. When the highly modulatory music draws to a close, Bach as if in anticipation of Lacan’s teaching ensures a substantial amount of ‘time for comprehending’ the array of tonalities passing throughout the fantasy. With the principal harmony being re-established, this technique of slowing

19 The criticisms made respectively by the eighteenth century writers Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Christoph Friedrich Nicolai are quoted in Tobias Plebuch, 2006, 25-26.
20 ‘At the start the principal key must prevail for some time so that the listener will be unmistakably oriented. And again before the close it must be well prolonged as a means of preparing the listener for the end of the fantasia and impressing the tonalities upon his [or her] memory,’ quoted in Lee, ‘C. P. E. Bach and the Free Fantasia for Keyboard’, 182.
down the harmonic rhythm reduces the ‘temporal tension’ during the act of artistic judgment. The ‘moment of concluding’ the harmony would not be hastily objectified for the purpose of impressing upon the listener’s memory. Instead, a defence mechanism against desubjectification vis-à-vis the music prevents misrecognition and increases comprehensibility. While this line of argument does not pose any revisionist stance towards Lydia Goehr’s integral ‘work-concept’ on one extreme or Jerrold Levinson’s ‘moment-by-moment’ theory of concatenation on the other, it supplements more or less Adorno’s proposition that, as part of a mechanism of repression, musical quality is ‘mediated by professional expertise’, that is, the metier of the master in having his idea ‘articulated down to the last note’. Uncannily, Bach’s Berliner notion of ‘impressing’ tonalities upon the listener’s memory is readdressed in Fichte’s philosophy on the ‘idea of harmony’ which is revealed more than forty years later in Jena, that the harmony exists not in the music or the instrument, but in the psyche and affect of the listener, as we have seen in the previous chapter.

As for the physical relationship between harmonies and vibrations, we can allude to a comparison from theology, Hegelian or otherwise, where ideas, impressed and expressed, are correlated. In brief, the master musician needs to ensure the vibrancy of the musical ideas and impress them upon the listeners so that the harmonies, whether aesthetic or ideological, can achieve an expression registered in and recognised by the listeners. A vivid example can be drawn readily from a 1898 concert review of Beethoven’s C♯ minor String Quartet in London, from which the critic asserted that ‘Dr. [Joseph] Joachim has, so to speak, impressed his idiosyncrasy on his fellow executants, and they play literally as “one man”.’ Once the master has impressed his idiosyncratic ideas, the other performers and presumably the listeners will all be playing and listening in harmony with the master.

However, an effective functioning of the subject’s memory is also critical for ideas to gain an expression. While one may execute the Fichtean act of self-positing, the recognition of an impressed idea would be thwarted if one’s memory is faulty. Bach might have been one of the more organised and obsessive composers in eighteenth-

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century Prussia, but his memory had also failed him at least on one occasion when he was preparing an index of his works in 1775 and left the Fantasia in E♭ (H348) out of the catalogue. While a straightforward explanation for this omission is an unconscious repression of the composition dating from 1749, the American musicologist Douglas A. Lee writing more than two centuries later associates its absence with Bach’s own ‘conscious suppression’ of the fantasia and other pieces, due to his ‘assessment of public reception more than from his interest in them, or his regard for the musical substance of such works’. In other words, the master composer felt that the ideas in this fantasia – perpetual modulations and the sequence of sevenths in the recitatives – have not been impressive enough for the Prussian musically imagined communities to form an adequate musical expression and defence mechanism against his inner desires.

Whether read as a conscious or unconscious form of masterly self-negation, the manner in which the Bach specialist Annette Richards has paraphrased a review of Beethoven’s Choral Fantasy, Op. 80, also appears to be on par with a psychoanalytic reading of the Bachian Empfindsamer style.

Taking for granted the way in which the fantasia entices, disorientates and bewitches the listener, the critic went on to present Beethoven’s Choral Fantasy as a fabulous quest, a journey from darkness into light; but this is not just any old circuit through contrasting affects – rather, it is the elaborate embodiment of a mystical journey of self-discovery, from the vaguest mass of unnameable feelings to the purest and most glorious self-consciousness. The freedom of the fantasy is conceived here as the ultimate artistic liberty to express the most ‘personal, private feelings’; indeed, were composers only to relinquish their dependence on form and trust to the ‘spirit’s emancipation in the realm of freedom’ then every fantasy would constitute a ‘true autobiography’.

Indeed, composing a fantasy piece resembles a musical ethnography of oneself, where the personal and the affective get revealed through the nooks and crannies of the masterwork. Yet, if the master loses the control of his desires, the result would become the product of a hysterical discourse, and this plastic transformation of the fantast to the hysteric will form the focus of the next section. In this section, I have argued that

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Bach’s three criteria of the diminished seventh chord, the position of the principle key, and the infinite variations are illustrative of a fantasmatic musical production.

### 3.3 Beethoven Hysteric: A Psychoanalytic Study of Sketch Processes

While the identification of genius and heroic qualities in the composer and his music have been amiably settled by Beethoven scholars, including Scott Burnham and Stephen Rumph, the fallacious correlation between biography and composition remains contentious.\(^{26}\) As an epistemological intersection between Beethoven studies and psychoanalytic research, my research proposes the latter as a structural method that explains the development and transformation of the former. By revisiting the analyses of his sketches, I suggest that Beethoven’s artistic development unfolds plastically through the infantile, subjective and hysterical phases. That is, the understanding of Beethoven and his various compositional styles can be explained not from the mythical standpoint, but from a mundanely human perspective.

To be sure, Beethoven has invested ‘enormous efforts’ in his compositional act as he struggles through a ‘systematic way’ of revising and refining his initial ideas into masterpieces. The British musicologist Barry Cooper admits that Beethoven pays close attention to details and does not thrive on the amount of sketches and sketch paper, which grew at an erratic velocity.\(^{27}\) Beethoven’s neurotic character also reveals itself with the chronologically ‘continuous sequence’ of pocket and desk sketchbooks. Not only are there ‘substantial gaps’ in between these sketchbooks, they also do not overlap each other.\(^{28}\) As evident from this well-preserved historical resource, the uncanniness of the logistical teleology and gaps of silences shows that the composer is not exactly a Benjaminian mechanical reproducer of repetition. Otherwise, an obsessive and compulsive behaviour is discerned from how Beethoven made sketches for almost all of his music: the large-scale and long pieces, as well as the simpler and minor works. Some of these remained incomplete, or were revised again and again, and others were


\(^{28}\) Ibid. 34.
eventually abandoned or reused years later.\textsuperscript{29} Further, the mixture of numbers, figures, abbreviated words and musical notation frequently converges around a single stave of music. The increment of ‘continuity drafts’ from a couple for the early works to around a dozen for the late works also supports the thesis that there is a gradual hystericisation of the compositional process, especially when the composer ‘backtrack[s]’ onto earlier drafts.\textsuperscript{30} Finally, alterations and cancellations do appear and contradict themselves at both the autograph phase and the performance stage. Such ‘plastic surgeries’ occur during the production of the Second Piano Concerto, the Fifth and Sixth Symphonies as well as the overture to the opera \textit{Fidelio}.\textsuperscript{31} All of these peculiarities, though also found in the working processes of other composers, when considered together with Beethoven’s other creative habits objectify him as a neurotic, hysterical person especially during the latter half of his life.

However, such a perception is not without its developmental foundation. A comparison of Beethoven’s creative process between the early and middle periods can foreground how his initial infantile misrecognition matured into a subjective self-positing. For instance, sketches for the Piano Sonata in D major, Op. 28 show the young composer grappling with structural proportions and melodic style, such as the switch from the Minuet to the Scherzo.\textsuperscript{32} According to the Israeli musicologist Martha Frohlich, phrasal regularity and thematic continuity within and between the movements have been Beethoven’s main concerns during the sketch process of the Sonata.\textsuperscript{33} These preoccupations readily parallel the mirror stage in psychoanalytic discourse where, by composing music that was structurally and stylistically similar to those by Haydn and Mozart, Beethoven was imagining a musical image of the traditional ‘parental’ forms and contents. In contrast, Beethoven entered the mature, subjective phase during his middle period, which includes the five symphonies between the Third to the Eighth inclusive, the Rasinovsky string quartets and the ‘Waldstein’, ‘Les Adieux’ and ‘Appassionato’ piano sonatas.

In the last of these pieces, Frohlich proves how the desire for contrast and continuity became Beethoven’s primary concerns. Firstly, the composer ensured melodic ‘connection’ and harmonic ‘flow’ between various sections of the opening

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\textsuperscript{29} Ibid. 35-36.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 37-38.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. 39-40.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. 125 and 131.
movement as well as among the three movements of the Sonata.\textsuperscript{34} For these to be effective, Beethoven’s faculty of memory and recognition must be in sound neurological order. Also, there were countless alterations and revisions to the musical material that demonstrate the subjective operations working in Beethoven’s mind.\textsuperscript{35} Other than his frequent dilemmas concerning modulations, the most significant decisions that reveal Beethoven’s mastery is his technique of rhythmic and metrical manipulation. For instance, there are metrical inconsistencies in the sketches of the first movement with the three themes set in 4/4 and the transition and coda passages in 12/8, even though Beethoven has intended the entire movement to be set in the latter. He had it fixed in the final version.\textsuperscript{36} Another neurotic gesture, perhaps due to the composer’s desire to achieve more proportionate speed increments, is the change in rhythmic acceleration within the second movement; while the initial version is sketched as a progression from semiquavers to triplets to demisemiquavers, the final version sets the acceleration from quavers to semiquavers to demisemiquavers.\textsuperscript{37} In addition, the decisions taken to begin a motif on the second beat, adding upbeats to a theme, or other techniques of metonymic displacements illustrate Beethoven’s psychical control of temporality in his middle period.\textsuperscript{38}

Another psychoanalytic characteristic that uncovers the subjective nature of the composer’s working process is how various musical materials have been shifted around and repositioned. Beethoven would move a melody or motif to a different dynamic or pitch register, an earlier or later section, or even another work several years after the conception of the musical idea.\textsuperscript{39} In contradistinction to the fantasmatic improvisation, these arrangements and re-arrangements are part and parcel of the compositional process as mediated by the material act of writing. A relevant case in point is Beethoven’s completion of the development section before inserting the secondary theme into the first movement. The lyrical major-key melody has been discovered as an actual idea that came much later because Beethoven had not reserved any space for the music. Frohlich accounts for Beethoven’s supplement to the otherwise mono-thematic structure as the composer wanting a ‘more spacious environment’ that provides the

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. 58-59; Joseph Kerman and Sieghard Brandenburg have also revealed a similar character trait in Beethoven’s sketches from the early and late periods respectively.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. 117-18. Other examples of acceleration and deceleration are found in ibid. 61, 68, 73 and 103.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. 67 and 121.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 67, 73, 80, 94, 95, 98, 100, 105, 107, 109, 113, 117 and 121.
necessary ‘relief from the surrounding tension’.\textsuperscript{40} From this tempered organisation, the human or subjective aspects of Beethoven’s psyche surface from the allegorised heroic myth. Taking into account more than a dozen rejected passages from the sketches, Beethoven’s masterly practice of balancing semantic logic for each and every musical material used is secured in the final presentation, attributing to the ‘work’ the status of a ‘masterwork’ that is typical of a middle period output.\textsuperscript{41}

Finally, ‘kinship’ is the term often mentioned by Frohlich to describe specific sketches for the coda section of the first movement. The usage reveals the presence of familial relations within and between Beethoven’s initial ideas and the final product. Whether similar figures are compared between the beginning and the conclusion or between the draft and the autograph, there exist the formations of ‘kinship’ in Beethoven’s creative process.\textsuperscript{42} From a Lévi-Straussian perspective, Beethoven exercises a quasi-social ‘principal of reciprocity’ in his sketches.\textsuperscript{43} The musical discourse of affiliation is appropriated as musical material are engaged not in a ‘derivative relationship’, but in a ‘reciprocal’ one, such being the case of the second movement where thematic motifs are exchanged and shaped at the same time as the variations are being worked through.\textsuperscript{44} This form of musical interaction is not only confined within a single piece, but elemental alliances can also be formed with music from the later period. The phylogenetic tracing of an imitative motive and its eight variants in the Opus 57 sketches onto similar material in the ‘pathotypical’ quartets – Opuses 131, 132 and 133 – establishes a relation of pathotypical kinship.\textsuperscript{45} This is an instance when the pathotype becomes ‘internalised’ into Beethoven’s psyche and causes the act of composition to become hysterical. In psychoanalytic terms, the pathotype occupies the role of the master signifier ($S_1$) in which Beethoven the split subject ($) is investing to satisfy the imaginary desire of his patron Prince Galitzin or of a wider listenership in the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{46}

However, such neurotic characteristics are not totally novel within musicological literature on late Beethoven. Cooper has discovered more eccentricities in the composer’s later output, including the large amount of intense sketching for a brief

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. 63 and 70.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. 53, 79, 94, 96, 103, 105, 108, 109, 113, 118, 119 and 121.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. 101 and 105.
\textsuperscript{44} Frohlich 1991, 117.
\textsuperscript{46} A similar proposition can also be argued regarding the fetishistic kinship with the \textit{Dies Irae} for late Rachmaninoff (\textit{The Isle of the Dead, Rhapsody on a Theme by Paganini}, Third Symphony and \textit{Symphonic Dances}) as well as the composers before and after him.
bagatelle in Opus 119, the sixth piano concerto being converted into the Eighth Symphony, and how Opus 130 ‘grew to a size much larger than intended originally’ resulting in the birth of Opuses 133 and 134. Cooper’s revelation of Beethoven’s changing perception of spatiality in his late string quartets also contributes to the hysteria thesis.

Previously, his sketches had normally occupied only one or two staves for each bar, but now he started regularly using four staves per bar…. Only rarely are all four staves completely filled, but the extra space that became available enabled him to develop what he himself called a new kind of part-writing, in which all four instruments are allocated important melodic lines in a sort of polyphonic harmony. His earlier sketches, by contrast, tend to imply that only one or at most two melodic strands are important at any one time.

By focusing on harmony and texture, Cooper’s interpretation readily refutes Daniel Chua’s statement on melody being the most significant element for the Galitzin quartets. Otherwise, these musical representations, especially that of the empty spaces, instigate a review of Beethoven’s psychical conditions at the time of composition.

In addition to the analyses by Frohlich mentioned above, the concrete overviews of the Opus 131 sketches by the American musicologist Robert Winter have ascertained the neurotic processes going on behind the scenes. More extensive than the sketches from the early and middle periods, the substantial corrections and cancellations confirm the haste and uncertainty in the composer’s mind. The irrational density of experimentation and improvisation proliferated in the creative process with frequent modulations and repetitive sequences becoming second nature to Beethoven. Because Beethoven has been so meticulous to the extent that ‘no voice was immune to alteration’, Winter’s otherwise allegation of the composer’s ‘failure of nerves’ is aligned with the psychoanalytic thesis presented here. Including his reclamation of the contrapunctus and tierce de picardie in the last of the pathotype quartets, the Grosse Fuge, and the multi-fragmentary schema of opuses 127 and 131, Beethoven was at the

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47 Cooper, Beethoven and the Creative Process, 26, 121 and 127.
51 Ibid. 114, 127, 142 and 144.
52 Ibid. 124 and 217.
peak of a hysterical phase. In the words of Stephen Rumph, the senior composer was ‘in both form and theme… probing the dialectic of flux and permanence, time and eternity’. Late Beethoven is not the Kantian genius, who is a subject with ‘the free use of his cognitive faculties’; he is in reality a hysteric in defence of music to be liberated from the reified history of musical meaning and signification.

Framing this developmental trajectory within a Lacanian philosophy, hystericsisation is an attempt to undermine musical infantilism and fantasy (see Figure 3.1). The Lacanian discourse of the hysteric is engendered via an accidental and plastic shift in the cause of desire from the object (a) to the divided subject ($). In short, the subject has ‘internalised’ the desire of the other, and now aims to generate a single prime signifier ($1$) for the other. In the case of musicking practice, the composer occupies the position of the split subject, while the role of the other is constituted by the listeners, both imaginary and symbolic. That is, the hysterical composer becomes shackled to a constant demand to satisfy the desire of the listener by inventing a master signifier ($1$) from his limited wealth of musical knowledge ($2$); the hierarchy between $1$ and $2$ is represented by the bar (/). In summary, the discourse of the hysteric is the relation between the fantast ($/a$) and the battery of signifiers ($1/2$).

$$\begin{align*}
$ & \rightarrow $1 \\
a & \rightarrow 2
\end{align*}$$

Figure 3.1 The Lacanian discourse of the hysteric

Judging from the longitudinal development of his sketch processes, Beethoven’s compositional processes have progressed from their infantile beginnings into the fantasmatic stage, and his late works signify a semantic transformation from the heroic style into the hysterical one. From the perspective of a listening subject, the manner of appreciating music from each period must also correspond to the semantic resistance evoked in each stage of the composer’s development. For instance, if a thematic motif qua master signifier ($1$) is not being understood with accord to whichever period or piece it appears in, its musical meaning will become fetishized. Whether we are dealing

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53 William Kinderman points out that Beethoven has initially sketched six and seven movements for opuses 127 and 131 respectively in his review of The “Galitzin” Quartets of Beethoven by Daniel K. L. Chua, Intégral 10, 1996, 167-75.
with a Beethovenian symphony or a Wagnerian opera, the motif can only be established after the listener managed to attain auricular signification. Akin to the literary devotees of Sade’s eroticised fiction, listeners of Beethoven’s chamber and symphonic music are resigned to ‘square accounts with [their] own desires’ in order to arrive at a proper understanding of the music.\(^{57}\) In the next two sections, I will discuss three perspectives of musical mastery, before providing some suggestions as to how listeners as ‘readers’ of musical text can resist the composer’s fantasy or hysteria and achieve their own mastery of auricular perception and appreciation.

### 3.4 The Discourse of Musical Mastery

For many musical theorists in the twentieth century, the path towards a critical self-positing is to gain mastery of one’s production of structure or meaning. Thereby, the self and its mastery have become implicit in recent discussions of romanticism and Werktreue, especially around Lydia Goehr’s revision of the work-concept and its ‘imperialistic tendency’.\(^{58}\) Yet, despite the intriguing deliberations mostly over the historical moment of ideological change, so much of these quibbles have focused on the ‘work’ *qua* object in the ‘masterwork’ that core aspects of how the ‘master’ *qua* subject has come to be constituted in history have very much been sidestepped. Here, I propose that musicology enlists some theoretical insights from Lacan, who has a simple formula of how a master has been institutionalised within a ‘universal’ historiography.

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S_1 \rightarrow S_2 \\
$ \quad a
\]

**Figure 3.2 The Lacanian discourse of the master**

While knowledge is generated with the signifier \((S_1)\) attaining a range of possible meanings from the ‘battery of signifiers’ \((S_2)\), the subject becomes divided or separated \((\$)\) while *under*-going such a rational action, which subsequently produces a surplus enjoyment originating from an object cause of desire \((a)\). To eschew dogmatic misrecognition, a musical subject must gain knowledge via the act of representation. This procedure for Lacan splits the subject into individual selves; for the case of music, these include the analysing, composing, listening and performing selves. On the other

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hand, the process also adheres to the Hegelian plasticity as mentioned in the previous chapter where the subject satisfies the *jouissance* of the other; for musicians and musicologists, this other is none other than the listener. To become a master of music within the Lacanian discourse is therefore to separate (*séparer*, also *se parer*, to show off) oneself vis-à-vis the musical object that causes auricular desire. For Lacan, this desire, and correspondingly for the effected enjoyment, is always already in excess.

Equipped with a Lacanian perspective, we can now compare a few perspectives of musical mastery including the objective, the compositional, and the analytical. Given the scope of the topic, I will rely on three brief examples representative of the conceptual trope. Between 1925 and 1930, Heinrich Schenker published three volumes of analytic theses with the title *Das Meisterwerk in Der Musik* (*The Masterwork in Music*).\(^59\) Using the term normally associated with painting and literature to refer to a ‘work of outstanding artistry or skill’, Schenker exemplifies the mastery of Bach, Scarlatti, Chopin and the three composers of the First Viennese School with his *Ursline* principle.\(^60\) In his foreword, the Austrian theorist considers that by achieving formal perfection and fulfilment, the masterwork sustains the longevity and timelessness of the triadic idea as a creative concept. When Schenker says that perfection is ‘achieved by transforming one sonority into many by means of voice-leading prolongations’, this particular action abides by the signifying process (*S*₁ – *S*₂) the master-composer ($) *under*-takes so as to set up or produce the triad in the music and reproduce the listener’s satisfaction as *jouissance*.\(^61\) The symbolic agency of the triad could be represented by the object cause of desire (*a*).

However, there is no master without a follower. Among those who have thought about such a division of labour, the most precise definition remains that the *idées-maîtresses*, or the main ideas of the master, are those which each generation inherits from the preceding one and passes on to the next.\(^62\) Likewise, Julie Brown in a recent chapter on Schoenberg’s Christian inclinations evokes the master-and-disciple hierarchy of the artistic-intellectual circles around the German lyric poet Stefan George.\(^63\) While Schoenberg’s masterly role to Berg and Webern was mostly unconscious,


\(^{60}\) The definition of masterwork is from the Oxford English Dictionary.


of himself as a composer is revealed in the two George settings in his Second String Quartet, where the music for the final verses of the poems – *Litany* and *Rapture* – are indicative of the master’s ($) influence by affect (*a*).64

*Töte das Sehnen, schliesse die Wunde!* Kill the longing, close the wound!
*Nimm mir die Liebe, gib mir dein Glück!* Take my love away, give me your joy!

*Ich bin ein Funke nur vom heiligen Feuer* I am only a spark of the holy fire
*Ich bin ein Dröhnen nur der heiligen Stimme.* I am only a roar of the holy voice.

While *Glück* (joy) is set on the same note but an octave lower than *Töte* (kill), *Liebe* (love) is given the highest and longest pitch within the couplet. Likewise, *heiligen Stimme* is heard on the highest and longest pitches amongst the singer’s melodic line in that movement. Also, the G pitch classes of *Töte* and *Glück* are placed at false relations to the G♭ in the string accompaniment, creating an affected dissonance resembling an act of killing joy. In the multiple readings of the music with or against Schoenberg’s biography, the adept self-positing of George’s poetry with his own failed romance, as well as being an artistic-religious master to his disciples already show the splitting of Schoenberg into various individuals ($). As will become the theme of the next section, the fantasy object of love (*a*) is impeding the protagonist (and composer) to be given joy qua jouissance.

Meanwhile, Rose Rosengard Subotnik’s notion of the master departs radically from the historical perspective. Following earlier ideas of structural listening, she feels that the current analytic impetus preaches a rejection of formal unity and attunement. Acknowledging the impossibility for both analysts and composers to fully control their deed-actions, Subotnik appeals to music scholars to renounce the teleological concept of mastery as an epistemology, and practise more self-reflexivity in apprehending the limits of creative, theoretical and historical mastery.65 If Subotnik’s arguments were to be framed within Lacan’s discourse of the master, the object cause of desire (*a*) has been foreclosed by the musical subject whilst being separable individuals – either as an

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64 Schoenberg has also set George’s texts in the first of his Two Lieder Op. 14 and *The Book of the Hanging Gardens* Op 15; how Malian musicians perceive the master as a hero of action with ‘esoteric power’ and ‘life force’ is also of comparable interest here. See Lucy Durán, ‘Ngaraya: Women and Musical Mastery in Mali’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 70(3), 2007, 570.

active analyst or a passive listener, or both. That is, the analyst has taken the meaning of the musical object – the score, the triad or the musical form – for granted and posited their limited knowledge ($) as integral. As shown in Lacan's discourse of the analyst (see Figure 3.3), the music theorist has presupposed the biographical and historical batteries of signifiers ($S_1$ and $S_2$). Obviously, this orientation is different from the Lacanian reading of Schenker’s conception of the master presented earlier.

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\begin{array}{c}
\text{a} \\
\rightarrow \$
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
S_2 \\
S_1
\end{array}
\]

**Figure 3.3** The Lacanian discourse of the analyst

Whether these practitioners stand as disciples with or dissidents against Subotnik, music analysis, as I will contend in the next chapter, exists as the psychotic order of musical epistemology. Yet, one misguided point that demands immediate clarification here concerns how Subotnik has characterised, for better or worse, music analysis as a defence mechanism where the theorist appropriates control from the listener.\(^{66}\) Defence mechanisms, existing in the form of jokes, negations or reversals, are forms of neurotic resistance within the creative process. If Subotnik were to make use of this psychical intervention, music analysts would be accused of re-composing the masterwork. Music scholars in the long twentieth century – in the generation that spans Schenker, Schoenberg, Subotnik, Agawu, Spitzer and Clarke – have re-orientated how listeners apprehend musical meaning. However, being historically informed and situated will preserve the creativity (and re-creativity) of the masterwork, whatever the term has now come to signify. Otherwise, the way that John Deathridge described Wagner’s vision of *Die Walküre* might be more congruent than Subotnik’s misrecognition of the composition process.

… a perversion of Greek tragedy, but something entirely different, deliberately poised, albeit precariously, between supreme beauty and musical mastery on the one hand and, on the other, at the most intimate level, the tragic modern conflict of human beings in a disenchanted world.\(^{67}\)

\(^{66}\) Ibid. 290.
Like an opera that epitomises the Lacanian discourse of the master and his masterwork, the composition as both creative process and finished artefact introduces the irreconcilable split ($). In negotiating between beauty and mastery, the composer enters into an intimate dialectic between the self and the universe. Similar to Fichte’s notion of metaphysical hovering or in suspension, this intimacy, which is at once poised but precarious, becomes the object cause of desire ($a$) whereby the masterwork does not exist anymore as tragedy, but as estimate farce. No wonder what Subotnik and her associates have wished for as the unity of interpretation, or musical knowledge, with experience, or the listener’s empirical self-consciousness, becomes a form of plastic ‘melancholia’. 68 This melancholia within musicology is no less due to the loss of the object cause of desire, or the desire for the object – Schenker’s concept of the triad, Brown’s adherence to biographical history or Goehr’s and Subotnik’s respective treatment of the ‘work’ and its control of and by people. 69 Musicology becomes plastic because neither has the ‘work’ been relieved of its imperialistic tendency nor has the ‘master’ been analysed for neurotic tendencies, and these findings become more or less the foundations of these epistemological resistance.

Perhaps the best response to date comes from the late Joseph Kerman at the close of his most well-known essay, where he beseeches music analysts to ‘enlist sympathy’, because only then can musical notations and exegeses embody the imaginary signifier, $\varphi$, and transform the active/dogmatic act of ‘I am listening’ to the passive/critical act of ‘I is listening’. 70 Based on the Lacanian discourse of the analyst qua listener (see Figure 3.2), the soneme ($a$) as that which is resisted by the battery of signifiers ($S_2$) remains separated on the imaginary order acting as an imaginary signifier, $\varphi$. Expressed as a Lacanian matheme, $a/S_2 \rightarrow \varphi$. For the soneme to exist on the symbolic order as an object cause of desire is for musical meaning to be driven by desire itself, but that can never be the case because any attempt to understand the object cause of desire through melancholy, sympathy or other affect is always already foreclosed.

In this section, I have illustrated how mastery can be thought of as a discursive trope from the different perspectives of the musical object, the composer and the analyst. The function of musical mastery is to build an epistemological counterforce against the psychopolitics of plastic resistance. Because musical understanding remains our final goal, the awareness of estimate resistance needs to be complemented by a proficiency in

epistemological mastery. The next section, which frames the analyst as a master listener, deliberates on the critical effects of listening to musical notations to show the contrast between the dualist way of listening and the autonomist method.

3.5 The Resistance of the Master Listener

In the previous section, the disparate mastery of apprehending musical meaning has been reviewed. The multiple vicissitudes evoked by the listener’s psychical resistance reconfigure the epistemic construction of a master composer and a masterwork. Similarly, the concept of plastic resistance pertains intrinsically to the psyche of the master listener as an epistemic category. In order to gain mastery of the semantics behind the musical text, the analyst or listener of musical notation needs to equip oneself with the ability not to be affected by undesirable elements. In this final section, I compare two specific ways of listening – the dualist and the autonomous – as musical parallels of the Fichtean dichotomy of dogmatic and critical reasoning respectively. Auricular mastery through the critical imperative is conclusively that which fortifies the master listener with the utmost resistance.

For Fichte, the understanding of oneself should be derived from one’s self-consciousness, that is, idealism, and not from the mere objective perspective over things-in-themselves or objects on the noumenal order, that is, dogmatism. As a disciple of Kantian thought, Fichte, who believes the transcendental system of thought, considers the dogmatic procedure of using pure reason to be inferior to the critical use of rational justification. 71 Applied onto musicology, the imperative here is to comprehend not only the reception of musical objects, but also the production of their psychical meanings, that is, the soneme. Modelling after the Fichtean thesis, the psychical act of listening is predicated upon (a) the musical thing-in-itself, (b) the automatic criticism of music after one’s empirical experience, and (c) the synthesis of the subjective and objective positions. Correspondingly, musical knowledge is posited upon (a) the immanence of the soneme, where music takes an externalised position with relation to the self, (b) the objectification of the soneme within oneself, where music only achieves its status upon comprehension, otherwise it remains as merely sound or

71 For an exposition, see Breazeale’s ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and other Writings, 1979-1800, xxii, and also Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, London: Penguin, 2007[1781], B xxxv. For further clarifications, see Fichte: Historical Contexts/Contemporary Controversies, edited by Daniel Breazeale and Karl Ameriks, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1994.
noise, and (c) the internalisation of the soneme, where music becomes personified and conversely, the subject becomes musically-inclined.

While the synthetic proposition (c) is tantamount to the dialectical positions of Schelling, Hegel and Adorno, the dualist proposition (a) and the autonomous proposition (b) have yet to be applied to musical aesthetics. Fichte himself is straightforward in contending against proposition (a) and claiming that general knowledge has to be grounded on the critical evaluation of empirical experiences. Rooted on an aesthetic position that privileges the psyche, the critical listeners (as proto-disciples of structural listening) ground, say, the ‘idea of harmony’ not within the artwork or its inherent parameters, but in their minds. They stand apart from the dogmatists, who hear instrumental forces without any self-consciousness of the harmony or other musical parameters. Real epistemological mastery can only be attained with the critical act of practical reasoning instead of a materialist prioritisation of the musical things-in-themselves without rationalising the self and the sonemes.

To contextualise these philosophical manoeuvres in the context of Beethoven’s resistance history, I will justify, using the Dahlhausian controversy explored at the end of the first chapter, the necessity of a critical act of listening for a sound musical epistemology and historiography. A critical reading stipulates that Beethoven should be listened as itself and Rossini as itself; neither ought to be placed on par against each other nor with any other for these comparisons would have been individuated selections. In other words, it cannot be assumed that all listeners are fully aware of the relational presence of Beethoven and Rossini, a position which would otherwise be perceived as dogmatic. This dogmatism is supported by an acquired habit of adhering repeatedly to the figure-ground hierarchy – figure represented by Rossini, the operatic, the Italianate, and so on, and ground represented by Beethoven, the symphonic, the Germanic, and so on – as the only epistemology of understanding historical semantics. Foremost, the dualists would have ‘misrecognised’ their positions as listening subjects who are supposed to ‘unify the manifold in themselves’. That is, they misunderstand the musical event not only by being empirically conscious of its multiple meanings, but also by

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72 Empirical consciousness is distinguished from pure consciousness where the former is experienced via the sensible, while the latter belongs to the realm of the mental faculty, which is the supersensible. The Idealist agenda is to elevate our empirical consciousness onto pure consciousness so that knowledge of the external world can be grasped.

73 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge [Wissenschaftslehre]*, translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982[1794], First Introduction, Section 6, 437: ‘The analogies the dogmatists present to make their system intelligible – that of harmony, for example, which arises out of the concord of several instruments – actually make its irrationality apparent. The concord and the harmony are not in the instruments; they are only in the mind of the listener who unifies the manifold in himself; and unless such a listener is supplied, they are nothing.’
apprehending the relation of the music to one’s self based on a pure and intellectual consciousness. Dogmatic understanding, for Fichte, is strictly a system of determinist philosophy, which leads its devotees to ‘fatalism’. Dogmatic listening results in the eventual reification of the *soneme* and the listening self, because the generic, the national, or other justifiable socio-musical relations have been fetishized. This practice stems from an antagonistic stance of the dualist problematic, and foreshadows the post-Hegelian negative dialectics as propagated by Adorno and Bowie in their respective aesthetics.74

On the other hand, auditors who listen critically practise a form of autonomous appreciation of the musical object. Not only have David Clarke and Lydia Goehr, to name but two proponents, proclaimed the definitive existence of ‘autonomous music’, but they have also institutionalised or even reified such autonomy as having strong/dispersed or single/double-sided characteristics.75 The Fichtean stance however is an integration of these synthetic binaries, because music, which subsists always already on a creator, can itself never be autonomous. I contest that any autonomy is posteriorly derived from the listeners’ ability to resist the dogmatic apperception of music and adhere to the critical, transcendental approach. That is, the autonomistic understanding of music presupposes the absolute quality of both the musical object and the listening subject. This discursive position allows for a critical hermeneutics of the listening experience as well as the simultaneous process of meaning-making.

Judging from the vectorial difference between the responses of the dualists and those of the autonomists, the acculturation of a subject’s method of listening can vary to a large extent that dualist listeners become ‘denaturalised’ from their phylogenetic abilities.76 These listeners have to resist against their dependence on objective dogmas by rejecting dogmatic ways of listening. After being emancipated from the relational matrix, the listener will regain a subjective autonomy from the erstwhile finite objectivity. Although sceptics might question the deontology of Idealist philosophy on psychology, this Fichtean system of critique is instrumental in exposing the asceticism of the listening act. Instead of dogmatically following the essentialist coupling, this

74 For discussion on the criticisms of methodological ambiguities by the young Hegelians, such as Hölderlin and Novalis, see Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity* (Second edition), Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.
thesis advocates that every musical and socio-historical parameter should be appreciated in a subjective and autonomous manner, aligning the listening self with one’s pure consciousness. A critical listener comprehends musical meaning vis-à-vis autonomous subjectivity, and posits the latter upon the former in a critical and reflexive manner.

Further, another reason why a dogmatic listener cannot wholly be an objective listener is because they have already foreclosed the applicability of their subjectivities upon themselves. That is, the dualist listeners have aligned their listening habits solely to the musical ‘thing-in-itself’ and are restrained by the material limits. The subjective remainder, analogous to the Lacanian object-cause of desire, is essential to the critical act of self-positing, that is otherwise already repressed. Although the dualist listeners do possess the ability to critically separate themselves (the site of the imaginary Beethoven and Rossini) from the things external of themselves (the site of the symbolic Beethoven or Rossini), this dogmatic misrecognition hovers (schweben) about the transcendental moment when listening subjects posit themselves as subjects against the soneme, thereby creating an intra-subjectivity that is between the subject as a subjective listener and the subject as an objective listener. This attempt at a first synthesis (Aufhebung) with the soneme as catalyst could account for the confusing figure-ground hierarchy that is socially constructed by the American and English scholars debating over Dahlhaus’s assertions.

Instead, I propose this intra-subjective hovering between subjective listening and objective listening as the initial development of musical mastery. Mastery is an advanced form of ability and, drawing from the definition of resistance discussed in the previous chapter, a strong resistance is attributed to one’s firm mastery and sensible management of affects and desires. Musical training therefore provides the musical ability to resist dogmatic listening as well as the sole reliance on empirical consciousness. Such psychopolitical difference between dogmatic and critical orientations buttresses the process of developing subjectivity which, borrowing from Schelling’s conception, involves a ‘denaturalisation’ of human nature. Dogmatic listening habits coerce the subject’s nature into an objective inability. One way to liberate the dogmatic listener is to inculcate musical training and mastery, not of the musical object, but of the developing subject via a self-positing, self-reflexive method where the autonomous comprehension of the soneme can generate a critical musical knowledge. By comparing the responses of autonomists and dualists in this section, epistemological mastery and psychical resistance can buttress the critical conception of the listening habits as well as the intra-subjective mastery of the listening self.
3.6 Conclusion: The Mastery of Resistance against Notations

The topic of musical mastery hovering between the listening subject and the notated object remains essential to the understanding of musical meaning. Mediated by musical notation, the transformations of musical thought to text and musical text to thought presuppose a psychical resistance against objectivity. Different forms of resistance between the notating subject and the soneme qua object cause of desire could be generated by rotating the Lacanian discursive matrices of the fantast, the hysteric and the master. Due to the nature of such semantic plasticity, the mastery of signifying or quilting the classical triad, the biographical allusions, or the control and autonomy of the work and its concept have faltered. Henceforth, the drive around fantasy and hysteria are two epistemological alternatives Lacanian psychoanalysis can offer sketch studies and other aspects of musicology beyond the teleology of compositional mastery.

In this chapter, I have identified Bach’s agency of the leading chord, his motivic figurations and harmonic temporality as three ways the fantast work through psychical desires. In addition, Beethoven’s sketches also progress through the plastic increment of resistance (via structural and melodic contrast and continuity) and the reduction of resistance (via permutation and reciprocity of the musical material). The post-structuralist discourses of fantasy and hysteria are critically resistant against the epistemological mastery of Schenkerian or Subotnikian theories, because the composing subject juxtaposes the psychopolitical aspects of notational practice alongside the neurotic structures to form a plastic resistance against the dogmatic limits of the formalised methods. In order for the listener to apprehend the three phases of the creative process – thinking, notating and composing, an autonomist way of listening would be critical than a dualist method. Having introduced masterly listening as the first of three epistemological techniques, I go into greater detail in the next chapter to introduce the semantic order of nature, or what I call the epistemology of natural listening, and explain the psychotic act musical analysts engage in to elicit musical meaning.
Chapter 4     Psychotic Nature

[Chromaticism] replacing the centred forms of continuous development with a form that constantly dissolves and transforms itself... The couple of matter-form is replaced by the coupling material forces. – Deleuze and Guattari

In this chapter, I will consider Beethoven’s piano sonatas and string quartets alongside the philosophy and psychoanalysis of Adorno and Lacan. I introduce the idea of natural listening as an epistemological opposition to symbolic listening. I contend that nature itself possesses a form of plastic resistance that mediates against the dialectics between the listening subject and the musical object. By proposing an analytic epistemology that posits the soneme as a priori deceptive, Adorno’s ontology of semblance is transformed creatively and destructively into Lacan’s dissemblance. Because of the pluralist affordance of music analysis, I argue that the phenomena of inventing new terminologies and needing mutual complicity are part of a psychotic delusion of apprehending musical objects and trans-historical knowledge. After explicating how three theorists – Kofi Agawu, Eric Clarke, and Michael Spitzer – interpret the opening of Opus 132, I situate these methods within the taxonomy of chance, which itself depends on the perspectives of the subject, the object, and nature, and therefore always already exists in disparate guises. Finally, the spotlights are turned back on the composer’s personal expression. These musical rhetorics as indicated by the finalised notations are posited as an epistemic counterforce to the aleatoric affordance of music analysis. The duality between multivalence and authenticity is hereafter reconsidered on the symbolic order against the concept of plastic resistance.

As mentioned in the introduction, plastic resistance operates at the structural intersection between psychical and musical semantics. To make sense of a sound object, a psychical desire for its meaning has to be present. This desire is developed when an analyst demands his or her musical knowledge to be recognised by another person, setting up or off a semantic resistance. This transference resistance from the imaginary to the symbolic perception is what I will call the sonemic effect. While Schaeffer’s idea of the objet sonore or sonic objects could also occupy the role of the hitherto

2 The Austrian psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich differentiates ‘transference resistance’ from ‘character resistance’, which deals only with structural analysis. Lacan criticises the latter for its symbolic materiality that denies the analysand ‘the desire to have his desire recognised’. See Écrits, translated by Bruce Fink, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006[1966], 343.
meaningless or phonemic sounds, my understanding of the soneme is derived from Philip Tagg’s coinage of the museme, which is a distinctive musical semantic unit yet to have a fixed meaning.³ In this sense, the soneme, like the museme, bears the objective potentiality of effecting semantic desire and resistance when perceived in the larger context of an auricular epistemology.⁴ Akin to the phoneme, the soneme shares acute hermeneutic coincidences with the museme, although one minor but important difference between Tagg’s neologism and mine is that these mnemonic traces exist within the unconscious, and are contingent upon Freud’s teleological movement between perceptive responses and motor reactions.⁵ Musical resistance is henceforth always already sonemic vis-à-vis the creation and destruction of musical meaning. Precisely because musical resistance lays at the thresholds of meaninglessness and meaningfulness that semantic transformations are highly plastic. But before meaning can be symbolised by humans, it is already mediated by nature. Therefore, we will first need to consider the a priori phenomenon of natural listening.

4.1 Natural Listening

Since prehistoric times, music has been a significant part of everyday lives in both agricultural and industrialised societies. In comparison to other activities, the musical act can be considered nothing less than a natural evolution. As the needs and wants of human beings and their everyday living conditions change, the role of music is also altered over time. For instance, peasants and farmers from the Andean highlands in Bolivia as well as the Sundanese plains in Indonesia play their respective musical instruments – drums, pipes and rattles – during the planting or harvest seasons.⁶ Within the shorter history of European art music, music shows its capacity to imitate nature as a

³ A few music analysts, including Nicolas Meeûs, have deliberated upon the musicological applicability of such a linguistic structure, but the theoretical complexity in trying to articulate meaning between the musical works and the musical system has been tenuous. See Nicolas Meeûs, ‘Musical Articulation’, *Music Analysis* 21(2), 2002, 165.
⁴ No reviewer has to my knowledge delineated the (post-)structural biases, such as the tropes of irrationality and acousmatic reception, inherent in the recent auricular history by Veit Erlmann in his *Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. James Kennaway attempts a similar history albeit discussing the musical reception by blacks, Jews, queers, and women from the pathological angle, but misses the blind spot for obtaining his sources mostly on secondary prescriptions by upper-class, straight, white men. See his *Bad Vibrations: The History of the Idea of Music as a Cause of Disease*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, and my critical review of the book in *Music and Letters* 95(4), 2014, 681–684.
⁵ Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 542ff.
mode of personal impression or communication. As evident from the Baroque rhetoric of word-painting and the programmatic representations in Romantic tone poems, composers have for centuries practised an act of musical mimicry.

Past and present listeners of these masterpieces have also associated the melodies with sounds from their own surroundings or experiences. However, the instrumental works of Beethoven and other composers have posed certain challenges to these hermeneutic conventions due to what could be considered as mechanistic and unnatural qualities of the music. In comparing the Adornian and Lacanian schools of thought, this chapter aims to work through and understand the relation between music and nature. I attempt to find out the reasons why the ephemeral ontology of music could be compatible with nature’s ubiquity. This hypothesis presumes music as a solely human phenomenon that co-exists with the Aristotelian definition of nature as a principle of motion and rest vis-à-vis matter and form. Ultimately, I am interested to reassess how musical knowledge has been dissembled from their historicist vantage points from the structural, sociological and ecological positions.

From Lacan’s early writings, the prioritisation of the signifier over the thing is a clear indication of his anti-naturalist stance. In fact, the object of psychoanalysis is posited immediately as always already working against nature. As evident from the scientific objectives of psychoanalysis as well as the persistence of cultural implications, the practice of psychoanalysis remains resistant to nature’s ecology. Given that the Lacanian worldview is firmly grounded on physics and mathematics, it is therefore not absurd to assert that nature does not exist. Correspondingly, anything musical or manmade, be it signs or scales, would be situated outside the realm of nature as long as the signifying act remains the means to knowledge, musical or otherwise. Music

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8 For instance, Carolyn Abbate considers that ‘[n]owhere is the machinelike status of human beings more clear [sic] than in a musical performance in which someone plays (is played by) someone else’s work’; *In Search of Opera*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001, 195.
12 The philosopher John Sallis affirms that ‘What is remarkable is that such music achieves its effect by the most unnatural means. In the case of purely instrumental music, even the remnant of naturalness that might be accorded to singing has vanished. In Beethoven’s famous Andante [from his Sixth Symphony], incomparably evocative of nature, there is almost nothing natural. Nearly the entire movement is purely musical without any direct imitation of natural sounds that would be heard at a scene by the brook.’ John
theorists in general perform this signifying act between human and music, and thereby obliterate the agency of nature within the study of semantics. Whether structural or post-structural, topical or ecological, the standardisation of theory for the purpose of apprehending musical meaning from within the Western classical canon has objectified or even reified musical meaning to the extent that the relation between the signifier and its possible meanings becomes limited and rigid.

If music were a material entity, these socially constructed analyses would result in the ‘Fichtean’ annihilation of the listening subject, because the number and kinds of connotations one can append onto the musical object is infinite. Otherwise, how is it that popular music has generally had a quicker turnover or shorter legacy than that of classical music regardless of its cultural contexts? When Lacan says that ‘the more the signifier signifies nothing, the more indestructible it is’, there is a certain sense of truth for non-vocal and non-programmatic music to be relieved of its historical and political contexts and become an empty signifier open to plurisignification. That said, the a priori physical and rational differentiation between subjects and objects has already presumed the division between the human and the musical.

Lacanian thought is hereafter irrelevant for the purpose of understanding musical perception if the human subject objectifies the musical object totally. If we were to insist on the objective-subjective correlation as an epistemological determinant, it becomes impossible to analyse the subjective elements within the order of the symbolic without knowing enough about the objective ones. This is the fallacy of much present-day music theories, which merely reinforce the myth of musical rhetoric with respect to the ability of music to resemble things and re-assemble people. A more persuasive ontological argument will require more than just the combined effort of the objective and the subjective as epistemological agents. I herein propose that a third term in the form of nature be used to clarify the dialectic between these opposing viewpoints. I will discuss this relation of natural resistance from the listener’s perspective before moving on to that of the analyst.


15 In his closed dualist system, Adorno maintains that the statutory experiences and momentum are between and within subjects and objects only. His opinions are that ‘subjective qualities in the object are all the more an objective moment’ and, if the object ‘lacked subject as a moment, then its objectivity would become nonsense’. See Adorno’s Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Subject and Object’, *Negative Dialectics*, translated by E. B. Ashton, London: Routledge, 1990[1966], 250 and 257.
Given that music could be defined as sounds produced and organised by one or more human beings, or as an expressive artform, there is every possibility to psychoanalyse the musician, as has been the case of the composer in the previous chapter. However, the treatment is less straightforward for the impressionable listener. Unless the listener speaks or gestures, musical knowledge is restricted within the person and flows only in a unidirectional information field. Within the practice of psychoanalysis, we can consider the listener to be someone without the signifier. Based on Lacan’s argument on the inefficacy of the signifier in nature, the listener who does not signify is always already a part of nature. The listener is passive or is engaged in what Hanslick calls a pathological form of listening. Because there is no auricular law or imaginary code to abide by in the first instance (in other words, because language is always already symbolic), the listener in relation to the composer and performer can only be deemed as a priori plastic. As explicated in previous chapter, the plastic listener, as someone who hovers between the dogmatic and critical ways of listening, will be working against nature if he or she wants to attain a more symbolic disposition that is similar to Hanslick’s aesthetic form of listening. As Lacan has made clear, the subject’s ‘awakening’ towards a subjectivity that is currently in the void can only be written off by a counter-natural force, which is not surprisingly comparable to Lévi-Strauss’s idea of the cultural.

At its most basic, listening to music is thus a natural phenomenon that continues to confound intellectuals. Considering the act of listening as a plastic phenomenon can relieve listeners from their ineffable nature. In the first instance, listeners will have to refrain from what Lacan calls the act of ‘nature worship’ that fetishizes the function of the Freudian drive or the Schopenhauerian will. Instead of the symbolic signification that assures pluralist articulations, searching for the natural in music becomes a futile exercise of musical hermeneutics, because music is manmade and what is manmade is not natural. At the other extreme, the forthright or outright display of human understanding in its totality — a typical mode of expression for analysts — is also frowned upon by Lacan, who perceives this exhibition as a psychotic phenomenon. Such declaration is deemed a manifestation of the unconscious, where all possible

meanings become so blatant that no psychoanalytic intervention is plausible. Instead, an psychopolitical analysis of the listening subject would be to equip him or her with the tools of semantic mastery. With the critical skills, the listener is induced into the symbolic order, which exists in between the unknown realm of nature and the all-knowing unconscious. While Lacanian philosophy has enabled us to identify the limits of the natural, an important caveat for the listener (and the analyst) is not to misrecognise the particular for the whole or the whole for the particular. Such an epistemological imperative is pertinent to the Lacanian worldview of nature.

In nature, there is something of the thing… which is presented with an edge. Everything that we can conquer in it, which simulates a knowledge is never anything more than detaching this edge and not to make use of it, but to forget it in order to see the remainder which, a curious thing, finds itself completely transformed by this extraction…

Through this technique of detaching and forgetting, the retention of a part object allows critical knowledge to be crystallised. The object is transformed via the act of forgetting, that is, a relegation of the edge from nature back into the unconscious. This act of forgetting is not only a psychical transformation of the subject and object, but also a process of plastic resistance. Lacan’s scission of the thing into an edge and its remainder is itself an act of natural plasticity, while the psychical resistance comes in the act of forgetting.

On musical terms, the meaning of the sound object is analogous to the objective ‘edge’ that is meant to be forgotten, while the musical material is the remainder that generates knowledge via empirical or other means. Natural listening or listening in nature is thus the total reception of the musical object, while the listener remains ambivalent about all musical meaning. There are at least three examples to illustrate natural listening. First, the Bolivian and the Indonesian communities, for instance, had no word to describe or name music before the arrival of the European imperialists and colonisers. Second, music in most primitive cultures was not meant for entertainment purposes, but performed to appease the gods or to placate oneself: the singing of hymns, the chanting of mantras, the beating of gongs and drums, and so on. Third, even as

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music became the object of (dis)enchantment, it was linked, especially so in eighteenth-century Europe, with the unnatural impressions of divinity, genius and creativity. Natural listening is therefore resistant to symbolic listening; it denies the listener access to his or her psychical unconscious.

Inversely, symbolic listening as a means to the unconscious is antagonistic to nature and harmony. For Lacan, ‘knowledge of the unconscious is completely contrary to instinct, namely to what presides, in short, not simply over the idea of nature, but over every idea of harmony’. On musical terms, the desire to gain knowledge of the musical unconscious is to go against the harmonic equilibrium amongst possible meanings of the sound object, the listening subject and the natural world. The soneme, the listener and the musical nature are inter-dependent, but a complete knowledge of the three entities will be impossible without the psychical stability of the unconscious.

In this same sense, Lacanian philosophy situates the listener’s experience not in the Hegelian-Marxist form of a conscious ‘surplus enjoyment’, but as an unconscious ‘ecstatic enjoyment of existence itself’. Lacan is however not referring to the Romantic definition of ecstasy as ‘an overwhelming feeling of happiness or joyful excitement’, but the Greek meaning of ekstasis, meaning ‘to stand outside oneself’. The listener who posits oneself outside his or her own nature experiences the ecstatic enjoyment of symbolic listening. In fact, this empirical state is aligned with Heidegger’s structure of ecstatic time, where the listener qua subject is constituted outside the harmonic balance of music, nature and time, and engages in an aesthetics that is plastic and less resistant to meaningful significations.

4.2 Musical Semblance and Dissemblance

At this juncture, I am going to rotate the fundamental discursive position from the listening subject to one where the soneme is centred between human discourse and constituted nature. While nature continues to resist the instinctual forces of signification, a human discourse is charged with the goal of assembling fixed meanings through the Wittgensteinian method of logical positivism, whereby thought is the significant proposition of truth function. From the objective viewpoint, a musical theory can only

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be determined by either the natural principle of change or the empirical means of fixity. However, music as a semblance – that is, as a human object of scrutiny – is primarily ephemeral and poses a challenge to sensible, visual and aural ontologies. Relying on the method of logical deduction, Lacan concludes with the rainbow and thunder as examples that there can be no semblance of discourse, because discourse is always already determined by natural signifiers that are themselves semblances by first principles. In other words, discourses are unsuitable as explanation for semblances because discourses are constituted with semblances in the first instance. What this ontology implies for musical theory qua discourse is the inadequacy of theory and its constitution to be used as a referential framework to account for any abnormality or irregularity.

With the aim of achieving a coherent set of sonemes or musical meaning, I will consider these musical discrepancies as musical dissemblance. The Latin derivative of the verb ‘to dissemble’ is relevant here; the word indicates the absence and presence of a part of an object. In musical terms, the meaning of the musical object is present but being concealed from the analyst. This phenomenon of dissemblance encompasses not only the objective ‘edge’ – that, instead of being integrated psychotically into the discourse, is meant to be forgotten and returned to the unconscious – but also the harmonious triangulation of music, nature and the human within an ecstatic existence. With at least one of the three entities posited outside of the discourse, the musical dissemblance can play its role of semantic deception and satisfaction. In aggregate, because there is no semblance of discourse, but only dissemblance of the object, musical or otherwise, the agency of semantics is always already an ecstatic experience of semblances: assemble, dissemble and resemble. As part of this plastic ontology, music theory stands outside of what Lacan calls ‘the kernel of being’ as an eccentric ‘ex-sistence’ or an externalised existence.

Like semblance in nature, musical objects qua dissemblance have either a part hidden from analysts or not been integrated completely. They are in disarray, partial and dissembled. Positing the meaning of these musical objects as priority, music analysts possess the fervency to construct systems of identification and differentiation to unlock the meanings behind these ex-sisting materials and partake in an ecstatic enjoyment in

27 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVIII, translated by Cormac Gallagher, 26. From an anthropological viewpoint, the rainbow and thunder can bear different meaning for different people at different times.
the activity. The discovery of certain harmonic relations or structural transformations leads onto a gratifying revelation – or some form of psychical eccentricity – that is in fact a disguise of semantic foreclosure. Given the psychoanalytic treatment earlier, music analysts should understand that there will be parts of the soneme that will remained concealed as a result of predetermined transference resistance between the musicological discourse and the semblance of the musical objects.

This predication is critical to our purpose here in order to understand the psychotic way of listening and musical understanding. Because music theorists, who rely on the structural and post-structural methods of analysis, select certain aspects of the musical object as its yardstick, the sub-discipline is already more ontologically docile to the authority of the discourse than to the discursive nature of the musical object.\(^\text{30}\) Precisely because the semblance of the discourse does not exist, the arrival of a discourse marks the finite limits where all semblance and dissemblance of the musical object cease; the musical object becomes objectified in this transmedial resistance. This process of meaning-making is a psychical phenomenon where there is a pretension by the analyst or listener to integrate the dissemblance into an otherwise eccentric consciousness. That is, the listener is engaged in a psychical pre-tension against the self and the soneme. The multiple resistances that take place on the symbolic order are part of an auricular structure, which I will call psychotic listening. In contrast to natural and symbolic listening, psychotic listening evokes an epistemological tension between the analytic self and the soneme that is satisfying but deceptive. Psychotic listening immediately thwarts natural listening, whose ontology is non-deceptive.\(^\text{31}\) In a later part of this chapter, I will illustrate the structure of psychotic listening with a few contrasting analyses of Beethoven’s Opus 132.

Hereafter, I wish to add a parenthetic note concerning Lacan’s version of the semblance, which lies beyond form and matter.\(^\text{32}\) Lacan insists that semblances are not only the interpellators of jouissance or ‘the ecstatic enjoyment of existence’, but also the symbolic placeholder of love.\(^\text{33}\) That is, semblances achieve signification not only from within the semantic threshold of a discourse that evokes auricular ecstasies, but


\(^{32}\) As a disclaimer, this thesis makes no attempt to compare Lacan’s ideas of the semblance with Adorno’s concept of Schein.

they as partial objects also fill the void of an analyst’s love of music. Because the semblance, for Lacan, is homonymous to *sens blanc* (or blank meaning in French), it becomes a depository for meaning.\(^{34}\) The psychosis arises when the analyst infuses the semblance with multiple significations. Because of the analyst’s profession of love for the semblance of the *soneme*, the erstwhile ‘ontological void’ of the placeholder is now foreclosed.\(^{35}\) As much as its occupant enjoys the process of musical signification, the deceptive effect of the dissemblance results in a psychotic position. It cannot be more obvious how congruent an aficionado’s musical knowledge can be mapped onto the suggested psychoanalytic model. Between natural listening and psychotic listening, the listener either is at a loss for words or has too much to say.

I am going to give one brief illustration to support my proposition. The following is how Lynne Rogers, the ex-President of the Society for Music Theory, describes her attitude towards her sub-discipline: ‘(In the interest of full disclosure, I feel compelled to add the related “because it’s fun” and “because it’s enjoyable,” which might better remain in the closet in the current climate.)’\(^{36}\) Standing in stark antinomy to her erstwhile position as president and writing in the leading analysis journal from the United States, I detect a first hint of the ‘return of the repressed’ when she made the conscious decision to bracket her pronouncement within parentheses. What I find more peculiar is her preference to discount the experiences of pleasure and joy in doing music analysis, as if these affects are secondary to the technical interpretation of musical objects. Read one way or another, music analysts are not hysteric or perverts who manage their subjectivity in confined isolation; analysts are the eccentric psychotics who, according to fellow theorist Marion Guck, possess ‘a strong attraction to music’ and make use of analysis for the purpose of ‘intensifying one’s own relationship to and experience of’ the musical work.\(^{37}\) Analysts treat musical pieces as placeholders for interpretations and self-representations. In line with the Lacanian philosophy of nature and semblance, music analysis is an anti-natural act of eliciting musical knowledge from the semblance of the *soneme* without regard for its dissembling edge. The very reason for the potpourri situation that music analysts have lately found themselves in

\(^{37}\) Quoted in ibid. 209
could well be their prior omission of the unconscious as an intrinsic part of the natural world.\textsuperscript{38}

Analysts for most of their practice have been isolating specific parameters in their analyses, while ignoring the micro-historical and psychopolitical contexts of the pieces. It might appear futile if the agencies of theory and material were to be switched so that the respective arguments could still stand. Take for example the structural dialectics of suspended cadences and rests in Beethoven’s Third Symphony, or the narratological framing of the tremolos and repetitions in his First Piano Trio, where the gap between the dates of these compositions themselves spans a decade.\textsuperscript{39} Are the meanings of these musical devices already fixed or can they be transformed within different philosophical or performative moments? Any meaning of the work that pretends to have been emancipated from the authentic singularity becomes uncritical and sustains the affordance of psychotic interpretations. Yet, if we remember how Beethoven negotiated with his British publishers or reused and rearranged his sketches, Beethoven’s music has never really been mono-semantic. It is no wonder that Beethoven’s compositional style has been alleged as artificial and unnatural, because the disciplinary search for single rather than multiple meanings is always already an inevitable positioning of musical objects within the natural realm.\textsuperscript{40} In the next section, I will exemplify this particular psychotic resistance by showing how a single movement from Beethoven’s Op. 132 have been analysed in more than twenty different ways.

\subsection*{4.3 The Psychosis of Analysing Beethoven’s Op. 132}

In his 1948 appraisal of Beethoven’s A minor String Quartet, Adorno distinguishes the late Classicist from his contemporaries by describing the developmental material of the opening movement as being ‘hinted at’ or ‘non-committal’.\textsuperscript{41} Such ambiguous descriptions, at least for esteemed music analysts of the late twentieth-century, could be dismissed for at least two reasons. First, Adorno’s argument lacks the analytic rigour in deciphering the compositional mechanics behind the masterpiece, and second, the thesis

\textsuperscript{38} Jacques Lacan, \textit{The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XXIII}, 4: ‘To call nature what you exclude in the very act of taking an interest in something, that something being distinguished by being named, nature, by this procedure, only runs the risk of being characterised as a potpourri of what lies outside nature.’


\textsuperscript{40} Michael Spitzer, \textit{Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style}, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2006, 25 and 269.

\textsuperscript{41} Adorno, \textit{Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music}, 132-33.
fails to pinpoint parametric similarities and differences within such a structural unit. Instead, what the sociologist has been referring to is the emotive subjectivities of his quasi-historical interpretations: the music’s ‘shattered quality’, the second subject’s ‘ailing quality’, or a purported ‘Chinese effect’ evinced by the strings playing an octave apart. Can we suggest that these socio-cultural metaphors constitute a preceding version of topic theory, since they exist as a standardised analytic thought and resemble the institutionalisation of the mimetic approach? Or are these metaphors an ontological misinterpretation of the musical object and its meanings due to Adorno’s own experiences as a political exile in the United States? Equally true of his perspectives on Wagner, Mahler and the Second Viennese School, Adorno’s analytic treatment of Beethoven appears congruent with a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical trajectory. If at all, his faculty of musical analysis shows a strong structural and psychopolitical relation with the agenda of historical materialism. In essence, I wonder if Adorno could have been projecting his personal irreconcilable subjectivity onto the synthesis of the structural differences between musical form and content. Otherwise, we can only be certain that Adorno has been trying to amalgamate specific ‘new music’ under a universal rubric of an aesthetics theory that has now itself been as reified as structural listening.

Casting these grand hypotheses as foundation, this section questions whether music analysis is a deluded act of psychical psychosis. I am keen to find out the reasons why a single work or part thereof could possibly acquire multiple meanings. By assuming a trans-historical stance where musical meaning remains coeval with respect to the auditor, I frame the act of music analysis from a clinical standpoint. A psychotic perception of matter indicates the existence of an epistemological disruption, where fixed points of signification are lacking. In the musical contexts, certain musical meanings have become fixed while others have been displaced. Depending on the perspective of the listener, we can say that certain meanings or semantics have become prioritised or marginalised. This semantic allowance has resulted in a spectrum of ontological positions. On the one hand, musical semantics has become, in the words of Kofi Agawu, pluralistic and multivalent; on the other hand, the original intentions of the composer once assumed by historians as the ‘Truth’ of the musical work have caused

42 Ibid. 133. Susan McClary regurgitates Adorno’s sentiment when she describes the very same work as one of ‘shattered subjectivity’ in her Conventional Wisdom: The Content of Musical Form, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000, 119.
43 The classic discussion of this particular way of listening is Rose Rosengard Subotnik, Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
other possible interpretations to be foreclosed. In between this couple of positions – one or all – is a plethora of alternative explanations for the musical facts and events. These interpretations are often reduced to an imaginary socio-historical reflection (hereby denoted as imaginary) as a result of the lawlessness within one’s symbolic mapping and trans-historical understanding of the musical work (hereby denoted as symbolic). When situated within the dynamics of the erstwhile authenticity debates, such a semantic order would posit the music analyst as always already antagonistic to the composer’s intentions, which are often cast in the singular as opposed to the analyst’s pluralist affordances.

Two additional characteristic traits of analytic psychosis considered by Lacan are the need for recognition and certitude. Foremost, there is the tendency for prolonged tasks of construction, deliberating upon one’s isolated experience as objective discourse in order to gain professional recognition by others. To put it crudely, this process is what we term in academia as one’s desire for membership through ‘peer review’. Of subsidiary import, the psychical conflict between reality and certainty of oneself persists; the analyst’s certitude remains as an issue of ambivalence for the psychotic. That is, the psychotic is always uncertain. Evidently, the first psychotic trait can be detected from the enormous amount of lexicons and jargons produced by analysts, such as the tables of sets and topics, or in particular Robert Hatten’s extensive listing and exposition of, say, gestural principles and their respective differentials.

The second behavioural trait is discerned from the analyst’s desire to invent neologism, allusions or other ‘verbal forms of delirious interpretations’ to ascertain one’s theoretical validity and individuality. This appraisal is equally true for Harald Krebs’s metrical taxonomies as well as Hatten’s plastic analytic hybrids of correlation, markedness, plenitude, troping and so on. That said, a disclaimer concerning any Lacanian evaluation of current analytic practices is that there is primarily a psychical norm without which whatever remains that the subject – the music analyst qua Lacanian

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psychotic – would, in Lacan’s own imagery, ‘construct himself a world and... situate himself within it’.\(^{51}\) It is only upon such an ontological prerequisite that the psychoanalytic assessment of music analysis can subsist.

While music analysts may express reservations on the basis of putting their scholarly positions through a Lacanian framework, I propose to interpret the topical, ecological and metaphorical workings within the unconscious acts of symbolic and psychotic listening. In reverse, this structural reassessment of the analytical methods will also cast light on the efficacy of a Lacanian musicological discourse as well as how the specialists of our times have come to comprehend European art music. Similar to how James Johnson and Matthew Riley have endeavoured to expose the attentive agency of music analysts from the French and German Enlightenment, my ethnography grounds itself on the psychoanalytic nature of contemporary music theorists. Sifting through a survey of about thirty different approaches to understanding the first movement of Beethoven’s Op. 132 String Quartet, I single out the workings-through (\textit{Durcharbeiten}) of Kofi Agawu, Eric Clarke and Michael Spitzer to support my current thesis, that is, musical analysis is a psychotic form of aural perception. At this juncture, however, a brief historical contextualisation is necessary to render ‘socio-political recognition’ to the representative case studies.

In addition to the three large-scale structural theories aforementioned, there are at least two other prominent forms of musical epistemologies – the historicist and the motivic, or, following after Philip Tagg’s \textit{museme} as ‘minimal unit of expression’, the categories of the inter-musemic and intra-musemic respectively.\(^{52}\) The historicist approach compares across musical styles, notably derived from Beethoven’s recent past, such as the use of modal harmonies,\(^{53}\) the positioning of the recitative,\(^{54}\) and other generic stylistics of contrapuntal texture or dance meters.\(^{55}\) The other approach is on a


smaller scale and is based on the cellular. It traces the musical progression in a schema called ‘moment-by-moment’. This approach is characteristic of Schoenbergian gestalt analysis where semi-tonal dyads or four-note motifs, such as G#-A-F-E, are singled out. While these inter-textual and intra-musemic perceptions may offer listeners historical and technical contexts of Beethoven’s music, these methodologies can be criticised as rather parochial in comparison to the extra-musemic approaches, such as analyses that account for abrupt dissemblance by cross-referencing Mallarmé’s ‘empty spaces’ and Adorno’s ‘sound of nothing’. Pursuing a similar line of enquiry, I will now examine in critical details three other extra-musemic methods.

If Lacan’s formulation of the imaginary refers to the subject’s identification with something that has come before, then Agawu’s topical analysis, complicating Ratner with Schenker, would be akin to an imaginary way of listening. Within this model of mirroring oneself or another, the collated list of metaphorical topics – cadenza, aria, gavotte etc. – signifies an incongruent collection of stylistic artefacts. The topical method of analysis is predicated on the mapping of similar characteristics among numerous tropes onto different musical parameters, and is grounded on material that are standardised by culture. This particular method could be criticised for being essentialist and being overly reliant on the analyst’s or listener’s association or familiarity with the supposedly common devices and gestures of Euroclassical music. For example, marked differences exist between the arias of the English and Italian styles, or between sixteenth-century French gavottes and those from the eighteenth century. Further, this process of identification is exclusionary across both time and space, and conveys a sense of alienation that is constitutive of the imaginary order. Such a binomial signifying procedure reveals a constrained epistemological practice so much so that

Agawu has to seek the adjunctive support of Schenker’s harmonic prolongations in order to justify his ‘referential-semiotic analysis’.60 However, for psychoanalysts, the imaginary is always already enshrouded with semantic misrecognition. This phenomenon gains prominence especially from recent literature on Beethoven’s late music. Already in the opening movement of the A-minor String Quartet, Agawu admits that there exists topical ‘disjunction’ as well as ‘defective’ harmonic cycles as a result of the incomplete circle of fifths.61 If the musicological onus is on an accurate understanding of Euroclassical music, the practice of imaginary listening can be ineffective and delusional.

I will next discuss how the application of the theory of affordance to understanding musical meaning might also be considered a psychotic act. In his recent work, Eric Clarke revives Agawu’s topical theory and refashions the stylistic topics as ‘sentic’ or emotional topics.62 He cites a psychological experiment that tests the auricular validity of Agawu’s topical theory with the same String Quartet as control. Based on a selective affordance of what Clarke has described as ‘Cornell university students with variable amounts of prior musical experience’, the findings ascertain the structural reality of Agawu’s culturally-specific topics, and that the ‘distinctive characteristics (such as tempo, rhythm, melodic figures)’ of the piece also affirm the parallel psychological functioning of the listening subjects.63 That is, Clarke has not only managed to account via empirical justifications for the ecological approach and subsume topical analysis under its methodological umbrella, but he has also substantiated the psychological correlation between topics and affect.64

The efficacy of Clarke’s theory is pertinent to our psychoanalytic evaluation for two reasons. First, by incorporating sentic elements into Agawu’s supposedly objective analysis, Clarke realigns topical logic with the psychical production of feelings, which in Lacanian discourse is considered as already deceptive and veers away from the ascetic objectiveness of the discipline. In this sense, Clarke’s holistic treatment of the

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61 Ibid. 121.
64 This very empiricist justification of a quasi-objective cultural theory resonates strongly with Lacan’s reading of the psychotic in his The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III, 1956, 78. He says that the lawyer Schreber ‘wrote this enormous work [the Memoirs] so that nobody would be unaware of what he experienced and, even, so that when the opportunity arose learned scientists would verify the presence in his body of the feminine nerves that had gradually penetrated him, in order to objectify his own unique relationship with the divine reality. This certainty looks like an effort to be recognised.’
listener betrays Agawu’s and much of good music analysts’ devotion to textual factuality. Second, the actual inclusion of affect with music analysis transmutes the latter onto the symbolic order of musical perception. This is proven when the music psychologist discovers that, in addition to topical sentience, the emotional response of her test subjects enhances their perceptibility to recognise and remember the musical topic. Seconded by Clarke, the music psychologist concurs that ‘emotional emphasis is given to the memorable musical figure’, but stopped short of determining its memorability lest revealing a fetishization of the soneme.\(^6\) Structurally, this particular systematic turn to the symbolic is enacted through a triadic organisation of musical knowledge, namely that of the Schenkerian Ursatz, the Ratnerian topic and the Gibsonian affordance of musical comprehensibility. In psychoanalytic terms, such an epistemology of musical meaning demands the constant quilting and un-quilting of the signifiers and the signifieds within an ecological signifying chain.

\textbf{Figure 4.1} Beethoven’s String Quartet in A Minor, Op. 132, First Movement, Bars 1-11

However, there is no need to overreach the argument to detect an imminent onset of psychosis at work. Clarke’s and Agawu’s epistemological models are quickly being thwarted by the contradictions inherent between their interpretations of

\(^6\) Krumhansl, 133, quoted in Clarke, \textit{Ways of Listening}, 172.
Beethoven’s Opus 132. While Agawu has identified bars 9 and 10 of the Quartet’s opening as an imaginary of the classical cadenza, which can be associated with a liberated expressivity coming after a strict period of ‘learned style’ (see Figure 4.1), Clarke instead feels an invocatory sense of ‘anxious and frenetic uncertainty’ citing the unresolved leading-note harmony, the rhythmic rapidity, loud dynamic and disjunctive melodic contour.66 While a classical cadenza may be intricate and of intense volume, the emotions generated should differ from person to person as exemplified already in the cases between Agawu and Clarke. I attribute this phenomenon to the plastic act of symbolic listening where Beethoven’s music, as neither its written notation nor performed rendition but its nachträglich, or deferred meaning, becomes the musical thing for semantic re-signification. This meaning of the musical object is what I call the sonematic.67 If these sonemes or ‘minimal units of meaning’ have affected Agawu, Clarke and other listeners, it is due to the allure of obtaining musical pleasure or satisfaction from some form of social and mutual recognition. To theorise this sentic movement within psychoanalytic discourse is to posit the Beethovenian soneme as the object-cause of desire, that is, the desire for enjoyment and recognition. Because Lacan has acknowledged that the object-cause of desire is both the object of anxiety as well as one in excess of jouissance, the initial meaninglessness of the soneme is in fact the object-cause of semiotic and semantic desire.68 One can sense acutely this congruity between music and psyche from the amount of ecstasies and anxiety the soneme has garnered from within and without the societies for theory and analysis.

Last but not least, if one reviews the ontological essence of topical theory as a metaphorical signification of musical meaning, then the psychical forces of the soneme during the process of symbolic listening would be implicated within a wider and natural worldview. While it is clear that a linguistic metaphor navigates the passage between the signifier through to the signified, Michael Spitzer believes a similar operation can be applied to the musical metaphor. After the eighteenth-century philosopher Johann Georg Sulzer, Spitzer is convinced that the ‘musical metaphor is found at the goal of the [poetic] process, in the expressive articulation that interrupts formal regularities’: ‘poetic’ here refers to a quality of emotional intensity.69 That is, Spitzer assumes an a

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66 Clarke, Ways of Listening, 176.
67 For the definition of Nachträglichkeit, see Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, translated by James Strachey and Anna Freud, New York: Basic Books, 2009[1895].
69 Spitzer, Metaphor and Musical Thought, 235.
priori dialectic between form and content during the spontaneous moments when musical meaning and/or affect are being generated. If, at one point or another in his critical narrative of the metaphor, Spitzer concurs that the terms ‘symbol’ and ‘metaphor’ have been used interchangeably during the period of Goethe and Jean-Paul, that is, the early nineteenth-century, a Lacanian symbolic listening with its discursive characteristics would parallel Spitzer’s metaphorical listening. However, this is far from the case.

While both ideologies may be predicated upon a systematic unity, without which the individual musical events would remain meaningless, the comparative agency of the metaphor between the Lacanian symbolic listening and Spitzer’s metaphorical listening quickly becomes a plastic opposition. Where it is clear that Freud’s analytic symbolism serves as the foundation of Lacan’s philosophical trajectory, it is Goethe’s analogical thinking that Spitzer summons for his theory of hermeneutic density. (But isn’t the criterion of density already a remnant of a psychotic ontology?) Under the purview of Lacanian thought, Goethe’s logic of the analogy as bearing the advantage of not being foreclosed to the whole chain of signification is a scion from the dubious tradition of natural philosophy. In other words, Lacan dislodges the metaphor from the analogy, for the latter can only subsist in a natural system whereas the former resigns to being either raised or sublated as second nature. At this stage, it must be emphasis that the object of psychoanalysis is a priori ‘contra-natural’ [contre-nature], and that an inductive faculty would be more appropriate in deciphering the metaphor of the symbolic order than working analogically relying on a positivist mode of what Goethe calls ‘delicate empiricism’ [Zarte-empirie]. Before additional critique, I will show via a brief case study how Spitzer’s analysis of the path between the first and second subject groups resembles such a psychotic process of metaphorical signification where the soneme embodies the function of Lacan’s object-cause of desire.

In the first movement of Beethoven’s Opus 132, Spitzer identifies bars 30-35 as a march (with material derived from bars 11-15), followed by four bars of cadenza/fanfare hybrids, which are then interjected by a gavotte in D minor. While this harmony obviously bridges the tonic key of A minor with the F major of the second

70 Ibid. 313.
group, Beethoven still has to negotiate a topical conundrum through what Spitzer has symptomatised as a ‘blocked assimilation… towards ever-increasing hermeneutic density’. Spitzer illustrates this movement from the periphery of the first group into the centrality of the second group using the evidence of the aria of the second subject as a ‘disguise’ of the cadenza/fanfare hybrid. At the moment of dissemblance, the cadenza, normally a marginal trope, is ‘turned into lyrical material – the very body of music’. By showing how Beethoven’s blocked assimilation ‘occurs between pitch, the privileged domain of motivic logic, and the secondary and topical parameters’, Spitzer argues metaphorically that ‘hermeneutic density [has been] achieved chiefly in the second half of the exposition, which constitutes a critical variation on the first half’.

In psychoanalytic terms, Spitzer’s project, when read on the symbolic order of the listening act, could be considered as analytically psychotic. First, his method of ‘high density’ necessitates a persistent semantic slippage between the musical signifiers produced by Beethoven and their interpretations qua signifieds. This perceptual resistance returns listeners to the imaginary order of Agawu’s topical theory. Albeit stabilising the metaphoric nature of the soneme, this process of signification appears psychotic and plastic for being both symbolic and imaginary at the same time. Second, if Spitzer’s main thesis (with or without cross-referencing the conventional exposition structure) is a metaphorical movement from the periphery to the centre, then the listener’s drive to obtain pleasure or recognition can only take a circular path around the Beethovenian soneme as the object-cause of semantic desire. Because Spitzer has assumed movement as a fundamental element of music, his analytic methodology inevitably renders natural listening, which is momentary and instantaneous, meaningless.

Third, Spitzer’s multivalent ‘body of music’ as a plastic metamorphosis of the Beethovenian soneme, when aligned with Lacan’s object-cause of desire, acts as a natural edge, which is something the analyst treats a priori as dissemblance. Since Spitzer perceives the second group as a primary goal as well as a secondary deviation, the analogical meanings afforded by the second group are not detached and forgotten,

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73 Spitzer, Metaphor and Musical Thought, 111.
74 Ibid. 125.
75 Ibid. 122.
77 Spitzer quotes the nineteenth-century philosopher Hans Georg Nägeli, says that ‘Bewegung ist das Grundelement der Musik’ in Metaphor and Musical Thought, 305.
but the semantic uncertainties that wield against the plastic resistance of the *soneme* are rigidly held onto. Spitzer’s hermeneutic density, akin to Agawu’s plurisignification and Clarke’s affordances, induces anxiety and *jouissance* into both the meaning-making process and the meaning of the musical object. This results in the musical object becoming a Lacanian object-cause of desire. In aggregate, it is within the semantic movement of semblance and dissemblance in a sentic ecology of meaninglessness and lawlessness that psychotic perceptions strive.

4.4. The Aleatoric Ontology of Music Analysis

Alongside the human and contra-natural schema of aleatoric taxonomies, the three different extra-musemic approaches to music analysis are also related to one another within a system of aleatoric ontology. Because chance happens or operates without an intended cause, the act of music analysis, one that is often predicated on chance discoveries, is a subject suited to psychoanalytic explications. Besides, the semantic signification by analysts and listeners is always a deferred action [*Nachträglichkeit*] being determined only after the setting of the musical form and content that a similar epistemology of aleatoric workings-through [*Durcharbeiten*] is needed to connect and make sense of the three analytic theories discussed previously. Given the temporal difference between composing and analysing, the best means of understanding this correlation between signification and action would be through the ontological theory of chance. At the start of this chapter, I discussed the tripartite resistance of the subjective, the objective and the natural. When aleatoric operations are considered in tandem, the system of chance ontology that revolves about these three positions becomes institutionalised and more epistemologically resistant (See Figure 4.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective (Freud)</th>
<th>Natural (Lacan)</th>
<th>Objective (Malabou)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signified (greifen)</td>
<td>Automaton</td>
<td>Creative Plasticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental (vergreifen)</td>
<td>Clinamen</td>
<td>Destructive Plasticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic (real)</td>
<td>Tuché</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Den</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4.2 Table of chance ontology from different perspectives*

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According to Freudian psychoanalysis, chance appears in the real and not in the psyche. Chance is posited in the external reality and not in the interior of the mind. Freud believes that the ‘future shaping of reality’ occurs by chance unless intercepted by one’s own ‘mental life’. Similar to a dissemblance, this ‘shaping’ is concealed from the self. In other words, an event will always occur by chance unless it is being grasped [greifen] by one’s mental activity. For a neurotic person, a chance event is internalised via mental processes and is not motivated by external circumstances. Mutatis mutandis, a psychotic person holds the opposite – that chance bears an external consequence – to be true. With respect to the notion of chance, the psychotic and neurotic perceptions of chance are comparable to ideas which are religious or superstitious and those which are not respectively. That is, a believer participating in an act of psychotic worship would think that a chance event from the past or in the future is the result of one or more external factors. The non-believer, on the other hand, is able to form proper signification.

Ideologically, Freudian practice stems from a scientific perspective that advocates the internalisation of psychical relations so that chance can be accounted for and objectified. In contrast to that which is grasped or signified, the accidental is perceived in mundane situations as what Freud calls ‘action carried-out erroneously’ [vergreifen]. Finally, the chance events within the real persist as and when they are symptomatic of actual events, and are subdivided into those actions that occur habitually and the isolated cases. One of the latter has been identified by Freud himself as bearing a ‘plastic will’, albeit in the German definition of the word meaning graphic and vivid. In summary, it may be possible to summarise a Freudian ontology of chance consisting of the signified (greifen), the accidental (vergreifen), and the real.

Returning to Aristotle’s theory of nature, the rhetorician sets chance as the antithesis to nature. Chance is distinguished between the automaton which is an event without a rational, final cause and the tuché which is an event considered with a human decision. Lacan incorporates the Aristotelian theory of fortune into psychoanalysis, and differentiates automaton as ‘the network of signifiers’ and tuché as ‘the encounter

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83 Ibid. 64 and 273; cf. Catherine Malabou, ‘Plasticity and Elasticity in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, *diacritics* 37(4), 2007, 78-86.
with the real’.\(^{85}\) In contrast to the periodic or habituated occurrence of the *automaton*, the *tuché* or encounter with the real is a form of traumatic repetition and is mediated by the pleasure principle. In this theory of chance, Lacan includes a third category in the form of the *clinamen*, which are instances of reality *en souffrance*, that is, in suspension (but also suffering in pain).\(^{86}\) From the fantasy to the trauma, Lacan counters the *tuché* against the *clinamen* with the latter acting as a form of double resistance of the accidental.

In parallel to the poetic aesthetics of Boulez and Mallarme, I further suggest that the act of music analysis operating within the phenomenon of chance has always been an unconscious method of musical understanding. By extrapolating the different categories of aleatoric operations from Freud and Lacan, we can frame the aforementioned ways of listening adopted by music analysts as a plastic resistance between nature and the analysing subject (See Figure 4.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways of Listening</th>
<th>Analysts</th>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Subjectivity</th>
<th>Chance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Spitzer (+Riemann Schenker/Marx)</td>
<td>Metaphor theory</td>
<td>signified <em>(greifen)</em></td>
<td><em>automaton</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imaginary</td>
<td>Agawu (+Hatten/ Monelle/Ratner)</td>
<td>Topic theory</td>
<td>accidental <em>(vergreifen)</em></td>
<td><em>clinamen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td>Clarke (+Adorno/ Chua/Rumph)</td>
<td>Ecological theory</td>
<td>plastic <em>(real)</em></td>
<td><em>tuché</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.3** Structure of chance ontology in musical and psychoanalytic methods

Spitzer’s theory of the metaphor is itself a natural form of musical listening. His method will always grasp the meaning of the form and content in an automatic fashion with least resistance vis-à-vis the causes and effects to musical semantics. The topic theorists


\(^{86}\) Ibid. 56 and 63. Most continental philosophers have observed the coincidence between Lacan’s and Deleuze’s reliance on the *clinamen* or inclination; Lacan arrives by way of Democritus and Deleuze via Lucretius. While Lacan traverses Aristotelian grounds, Deleuze instantly installs the *clinamen* or the objective swerve of atomic material as vectorial and accidental. For Deleuze, the late twentieth-century is significant for being the particular historical juncture in European philosophy that chance becomes reinstated. Their opposing viewpoints of chance and other related concepts as divided between the positivist and negativist camps have persisted since the 1960s when chance for Deleuze is a sensible gestural change, while Lacan perceives chance as an action negated by a psychological suspension. See Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974*, translated by Mike Taormina, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004[2002], 270, and Alain Badiou, *Theory of the Subject*, translated by Bruno Bosteels, London and New York: Continuum, 2009[1982], 58. To not complicate the argument further, I have not mentioned the category of *den*. Otherwise, philosophical discussions about Lacan and chance is a relatively recent phenomenon as shown in Mladen Dolar, ‘Tyche, clinamen, den’, *Continental Philosophy Review* 46(2), 2013.
engage in an imaginary way of listening with their invented tropes and gestures, which bear inclinations towards an identitarian rhetoric. Their hermeneutics, which deviates from the composer’s intentions, can be summarised as an accidental subjectivity where the erstwhile erroneous significations form a coherent cultural system as proven by the experiment mentioned in Clarke’s monograph. Finally, ecological listening is a form of symbolic aesthetic that provides *sonemes* their objective affordances. This way of listening has the highest level of plastic allowance where the listening subject mediates between the pleasure and pain of locating a logical meaning with least resistance. Symbolic listening gives rise to a very human encounter with the music and can be an experience that is both creative and destructive to the self and to the music. In light of these aleatoric analytic ontologies, we need to return to the creative subject and examine how Beethoven’s music qua musical object has imposed a stylistic and strategic rejoinder on these analyses. As argued earlier, objects also have their innate plasticity to resist and destabilise the natural order and some of these transformative dialectics can be discerned from the symbolic efficacy of Beethoven’s piano sonatas.

**4.5 Formal Analysis and Beethoven’s First Nature**

Speaking of order in everyday society, it is inevitable to make reference to the law and the policing authorities. For the purpose of maintaining social order, a structural hierarchy of rules and regulations are encased and a class of people are conscripted to ensure its compliance. Applying the sociological allegory onto the community of music analysts bears similar consequences in regulating a sense of musical logic and formality. Upon this boisterous background of ongoing disputes – most dealing with structural functionality and dialectic antagonism – I propose the following arguments with respect to the form and contents of Beethoven’s piano music from the middle period.

Before assigning a definitive concept of form and content, it is necessary to reflect upon Walter Benjamin’s opposing stance to historicism in countenance to the prevailing ontological privileging of form and content. In a single stroke, Benjamin extinguishes the utmost effort on the part of art historians in charting a historicity of artistic accomplishments from the early ages to the twenty-first century. However, he clarifies that all along it is not the history of the present canon, but the ontology of

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87 Walter Benjamin, ‘Letter to Florens Christian Rang’ in *Selected Writings Volume 1*, edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, 388: ‘there is no such thing as art history … current pre-occupations of art history all amount to no more than the history of forms or contents, for which works of art seem to provide merely examples or models.’
forms and contents that historians have choreographed. Therein, when Alfred Brendal says that ‘For Beethoven, form is the triumph of order over chaos’, he could very well be making a similar generalisation about other composers – Haydn, Mozart or Schubert – whose individualistic compositional techniques have been shaped into a category called ‘the classical style’ that could possibly, nay, actually be reproduced at another musical time and space within real historical studies.88

As a disclaimer, the focus of this thesis cannot be centred solely on Beethoven the composer per se, which would otherwise neglect the conceptual tools used by formalist analysts to signify Beethoven’s music. Such epistemological instruments induce a plastic resistance that transforms and reduces subjective chaos into objective order. That is, music analysts who are convinced of an a priori Hegelian Aufhebung assume an anti-natural agenda in their work. These claims become acts of structural policing and appropriating these laws eliminate what Benjamin has identified as the ‘moment of danger’ from Beethoven’s natural or irrational treatment of his thematic materials.89 In one sense, these stances are most likely unconscious manoeuvres to pacify Beethoven’s position alongside those of, say, Rossini and Schubert. Therefore, analysts, in the name of traditional laws governing form and content, are able to proclaim a triumphant victory over the rationalisation of Beethoven’s music.

To return to the definition of form, Carl Dahlhaus proposes a sound definition that as a ‘history of processes’ consisting ‘on the one hand the idea of a “source subject”, which generates the musical development, and on the other hand that of a “goal-directed lawfulness”, which underlies the course the development takes’.90 This way of understanding form, for Dahlhaus, stands in contradiction to the ‘history of event [or content that] starts out from a number of relatively mutually independent subjects’, which is how the Classical style and Romantic style have been inscribed into the discipline.91 The methodology propounded by the ‘stylists’ does not regard historical event as the result of a goal-directed development. Such a distinction between the history of processes and the history of events can perhaps be drawn to illustrate the

89 See Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ in Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn, London: Pimlico, 1999, 247: ‘Historical materialism wishes to retain that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at a moment of danger. The danger affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers.’
91 Ibid.
disparities between the musical epistemology of Beethoven and that of Mozart respectively.

For instance, Beethoven, as identified by Adorno, knows how to build a powerful climax with the dynamics of small figures that are derivative of a single germ-motive, stimulating the musical idea throughout the work.\(^{92}\) This particular technique can be seen in the opening movements of Beethoven’s *Appassionato* and *Hammerklavier* sonatas, which develop in a mono-thematic and a triadic manner respectively. On the other hand, the themes of Mozart, for Adorno, are invested in the principle of contrast akin to a history of events where the majestic first theme and lyrical second theme in the C minor sonata (K.457) position themselves onto the traditional schema of the sonata-allegro form without ambiguity.\(^{93}\) In this regard, formal structures for Beethoven are fundamentally as Wagner would term ‘the pillars of a building’, which Beethoven ‘the architect cannot move around … at will’.\(^{94}\) The immediate question here is: how did Beethoven manage to achieve order and unity with such a limiting formal outline such as the tripartite sonata form? The answer can be drawn from Adorno’s reassessment of the sonata form as schematically partial and ‘objectively prescribed’.\(^{95}\)

In the first movement of the *Hammerklavier* sonata, Beethoven becomes an ambivalent, thereby ideological, buttress to Adorno’s conception. Within the archetypal (as opposed to the varied or extended) sonata form, formalism is imposed upon the composer to fill in the matrix, where this process has been theorised by Adorno as the objectification and reification of the composer’s invented ‘source subject’. In the *Hammerklavier*, Beethoven’s basic idea is a melodic germination of the interval of a third. The very first melodic contour that shapes the introduction projects an upwards


\(^{93}\) Ibid. 60.


\(^{95}\) Adorno, ‘Total Development’, 61: ‘The schema of the sonata contains parts – the thematic and developmental parts – which are already aimed at the subject and which can accommodate the particular, and others in which, by virtue of the schema itself, conventional generalities emerge, like death in tragedy and marriage in comedy. These are fields of tension … and, especially, fields of dissolution … However, the dialectic between subject and object in music stems from the relation between these schematic formal moments. The composer has to fill the space set aside for invention in, precisely, an unschematic way in order to do justice to the schema. At the same time, he must so conceive the themes that they do not contradict the objectively prescribed forms.’
leap from B♭ to D over four octaves; imminently in contrast, the next thematic motion in bar 4 is a mere stepwise ascent from B♭ to D.\textsuperscript{96}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.4.png}
\caption{Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op.106, First Movement, Allegro, Bars 0-5}
\end{figure}

Hereby, the opening bars clearly support Adorno’s critique on the reification of the B♭-to-D interval. For the sake of delineating motivic development, Beethoven succumbs to periodic contrast where the same motif is directed to differing intervallic treatment. In this sense, the subject has already in the opening bars been objectified or, to use Adorno’s term, internalised into the sonata structure and lost its quintessential subjectivity. However, it is not primarily the responsibility of the subject’s plasticity in allowing itself to be overcome. Here lies the law of ‘convention’ which Rose Rosengard Subotnik relates as ‘the impervious, unyielding … aspect which the subject cannot alter, obscure, or efface, even through the creation of an artistic surface’.\textsuperscript{97} This promptly regurgitates Adorno’s point that the schema ‘are already aimed at the subject’ and waiting for the soneme to fall into its own trap.

On the other hand, the establishment of general conventions means that the manner in which subjects are moulded in a work of art is determined by the enforced rules and regulations, such as performing death in tragedy and marriage in comedy. This is how Adorno cross-referenced music’s formalism with Hölderlin’s “calculable law” of tragedy and comedy, which is ‘the moment when subjectivity intervenes in the formal structure.’\textsuperscript{98} Thus, the high predictability of the climax in the music, like the death of Macbeth or the conquests of Hercules, re-evaluates itself into an anticlimax that manifests without arbitrariness the process of reification. For Beethoven, this inevitable ‘triumphant’ moment presents itself in the first movement of the \textit{Appassionato} sonata.

\textsuperscript{96} If we remember, the three-step ascent has been identified by Ernest Newman as Beethoven’s lifelong unconscious motif. See his \textit{The Unconscious Beethoven: An Essay in Musical Psychology}, London: Gollancz, 1968[1923].


\textsuperscript{98} Adorno, \textit{Philosophy of Modern Music}, 64.
In bars 78-80, the main theme is relegated to the bass for the first time with a semiquaver tremolo accompaniment two octaves apart, and is injected with an abrupt dynamic change to announce the anticlimax. This decision stands in stark contrast to the conventional ‘treble-dominated texture’ of most of Beethoven’s other sonatas, and signals a clear intention of plastic resistance against the classical part-writing.\(^{99}\)

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\(\text{Figure 4.5 Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op.57, First Movement, Allegro Assai, Bars 76-79}\

In the above two cases drawn from Beethoven’s middle period, formal structures are made to negotiate with the logic of the subject’s movement. Against his psychotic will, Adorno is unable to reconcile with Beethoven’s plastic resistance, and reclaims that subjectivity is ‘not … by breaking through form, as rather, more fundamentally, by creating it.’\(^{100}\) However, the position of Beethoven contra Adorno is imminent, because the composer would time and time again empower his subjects to ‘break through’ [\textit{durchbrochenen}] archaic forms such as the fugue and variation in his late works. Such epistemic irregularity lies not in the Beethoven’s creative process, but in the psychotic refusal to recognise the dissemblance of the \textit{soneme}. Despite the mastery of numerous other composers, music analysts adhering to Adorno’s materialism have foreclosed the possibility of a ‘formless’ analysis.\(^{101}\)

Hereafter, despite Brendel’s assertion that ‘classical [and baroque] form defines boundaries’, Subotnik proposes that Beethoven not only interferes, but also reconstructs ‘the perception of coherence in structural and syntactical elements’ so as to do justice to the form and content of the music.\(^{102}\) For Beethoven, I suggest that this is also the point where the Hegelian subject gains its self-consciousness and seeks to be emancipated.

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\(^{100}\) Adorno, \textit{Essays on Music}, 565.

\(^{101}\) Adorno’s vision of a \textit{musique informelle} or formless music has inspired Julian Johnson to suggest an idea of \textit{analyse informelle} or formless analysis in his ‘Vers une analyse informelle’ in A. Nowak and M. Fahlbusch (eds.) \textit{Musikalische Analyse und Kritische Theorie}. Tutzing: Schneider, 2007, 157-168.

from the conventional objective order. The Beethovenian subject is no more the ‘observed’, but the ‘observer’ of its own movement. The subject has taken control of its self and refuses to be objectified or encased into formal order. This results in the dialectic between the subject (Beethoven’s basic idea) and the object (the conventional developmental structure), where the function of the development section in a late Beethoven sonata is to incubate this resistance.

Adorno aptly dissects the bipartite nature of the development as ‘a non-binding fantasia section and a strictly motif-based part brought about by a resolution’ which bears ‘the function of a retransition (in being derived from the head motif of the main theme).’ This ‘retransition’ section, which is also the point of intervention of the Hegelian subject, is evident from the low F# in the Hammerklavier (Allegro; bar 212), where the main theme explodes in the bass register into polyphonic texture without any anticipatory warning. The Beethovenian subject has freed itself from the shackles of the conformist structure and resolves the negative dialectics between subject and object, content and form. In this case, form is being defeated by the very subject that determines its existence.

Almost a kind of deontology, music analysis is encumbered with the reparative agenda of fitting Beethoven’s music back within the frameworks of an alleged classical form. Whether of the Marxist or Freudian archetype, such a fetishization of formalities betrays the desire for semantic plurality. Sweeping generalisations, such as Scruton’s ‘tonality … provides us with a paradigm of musical order’ and Hoffman’s ‘it is particularly the close relationship of the themes to each other which provide unity’, are posed as discursive facts. The analysts’ urgency to adhere to a conformist ontology does great disservice to Beethoven’s compositional and creative expertises. I defend this accusation with another example from Donald Tovey’s insistence on the presence of a second subject in the Hammerklavier (Allegro; bars 62^4-66). The melodic contour of this subject is made up of descending thirds, resembling an ‘antithesis’ to the first subject discussed earlier. Is this not merely another variant of Beethoven’s main tertian idea? I contend that Tovey’s restriction of our musical understanding to the

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103 In his Phenomenology of the Mind, Hegel proposes a twofold position of the ‘mind’ as both subject and object, where in this case, the Beethovenian subject, or main idea, has taken the place of Hegel’s ‘mind’.

104 Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 63.


106 Donald Francis Tovey, A Companion to Beethoven’s Pianoforte Sonatas, London: The Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, 1935, 228.
conventional formula of the bi-thematic sonata form is a formalist adherence to an inflexible judging criterion of an ordered and cohesive artwork.

To this end, the law of ‘convention’ is again brought upon to explain the *nature* of Beethoven’s compositional processes. Equally applicable to other composers, the Frankfurt School’s understanding of nature categorised as first nature and second nature can elucidate the problem here. The first nature of being human is natural, inborn and organic, while his or her second nature is unnatural, external and prone to be shaped by his or her environs.\textsuperscript{107} Drawing parallels with aesthetics, we can follow Lydia Goehr by erecting an epistemic system where the poietic procedures undertaken by an artist can be extrapolated from his or her ‘first nature’ as spontaneous processes taking after mimetic and inert qualities, and from his or her ‘second nature’ as ordered and goal-directed products infused with artistic qualities (See Figure 4.7).\textsuperscript{108}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST NATURE</th>
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**Figure 4.6** Natural qualities of the human and the musical

![Triangle Diagram](image)

**Figure 4.7** Proportion of first and second nature for composers from the Classical period

\textsuperscript{107} Max Paddison has summarised Adorno’s concept of ‘first nature’ as ‘static, timeless [and] unchanging’ and Georg Lukás’s concept of ‘second nature’, which Adorno adopted as the ‘world of convention’ and ‘reified history’. For a detailed hermeneutic reading, see Max Paddison, ‘Constellations: towards a critical method’ in *Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 29-34.

Thereafter, when we learnt that for ‘Mozart and Schubert, their spontaneity was possible only because it was articulated within an extremely formalised linguistic system which had become … almost a second nature’, we can equate Mozart’s and Schubert’s first nature and second nature as having attain equal status.\(^{109}\) This is however not the case for Beethoven, who has to resolve the negative dialectic between his volatile first nature and the music’s formalistic second nature. He has to make, using Adorno’s historicity of the phrase, a ‘difficult decision’ whether to allow his (first) nature to be suppressed by the musical tradition that came before him, as did Haydn and Clementi.\(^{110}\) In this sense, Beethoven has to subject his inborn spontaneity onto the regimental and manipulative Classical matrix so that his first nature – his individual mode of self-expression and his personality – is able to resist and surmount the alienated superficiality of Classical and Baroque forms in order to achieve compositional success.

For Brendel to proclaim once again that Beethoven has gained ‘triumph of order over chaos’ is to indicate the composer’s decision to use ‘form as the product of a combination of pre-ordained schemata with the specific formal idea of each particular work’.\(^{111}\) Being able to balance his ever-changing, plastic nature with the constructive externalities of musical structures is to invent a new style of artistic and human expression that is ‘both subjective and objective’.\(^{112}\) Roland Barthes tells us that Beethoven is ‘in search of his [natural] ‘truth’ and this quest forms an order in itself’.\(^{113}\) The harvest that Beethoven’s labour reaps today is not without struggle; the many dilemmas he has deliberated upon – from the antagonisms between subjective chaos and objective order – give rise to an epistemic utopia that Beethoven teaches analysts and musicians, instead of the other way round.\(^{114}\) Not only has Beethoven won the battle between order and chaos, form and content, but he might have also won the crusade of his music over the psychotic analyses with his plastic resistance.

### 4.6 Conclusion: The Psychotic Nature of Beethoven Analyses

In this chapter, I have argued for an aleatoric ontology that posits music analysis against the meaning of musical objects within the wider ecosystem of nature. The epistemic


\(^{110}\) Adorno, ‘Total Development’, 64.

\(^{111}\) Ibid. 60.


\(^{114}\) Ibid. 154.
movement away from the subject/object binary reveals the dissembling properties of the soneme. While music as organised sounds is taken as a priori human and anti-nature, the recognition and subsequent forgetting of the ontological edge will provide an effective symbolic understanding of musical meaning. In this sense, symbolic listening resists natural listening. However, the act of analysis, when not being controlled by an inter-musemic semantics, becomes psychotic and results in an array of methods that hover between authenticity and plurisignification. The necessity to invent and gain accreditation is simultaneously implicated. Otherwise, I have shown from the three extra-musemic case studies – the topical, the ecological and the metaphorical – that music analysis is intrinsically an epistemological system of chance operations. Eventually, the composer’s voice will return to assert a plastic resistance against these analyses through the first and second orders of nature. Returning to the Idealist aesthetics in Beethoven’s own time, even Hegel’s philosophy of plasticity succinctly correlates analysis of the morpheme, visual or otherwise, via the psychotic agency of chance:

[Painting] does not confine particularity of character to the ideal but develops precisely the whole variety of even accidental particulars, so that now we see confronting us not those plastic ideals of gods and men but particular persons in all the accidents of their particular character.115

That is to say that artistic character or characterisation is aleatoric and the ideal is always being misrecognised. If such an unintended misrecognition were to be expressed, the semantic nature becomes exteriorised. The perception of plastic ideals as intimate is a clear paradox, because the accidental that leaches on the idealised centre is a parasitic psychical component. This affective phenomenon is known as an act of extimacy, where the real appears within the symbolic.116 In comparison to the aleatoric occurrences in music analysis, these estimated particulars are also discernible from the act of performing, which stands in both as the receptacle of musical meaning as well as develops or transforms the reception of the meaning itself. Often playing the simultaneous roles of analyst and performer, the musician embodies congruently the idealised character of plastic extimacy. Such a perverted character of the performer will be theorised as the last of three clinical structures in the next chapter.

115 Hegel, Aesthetics, quoted in Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 117; my emphases.
Chapter 5  Perverse Nomenclatures

*Beethoven is usually so simple and direct in his appeal that it is sheer perversity to choose [to perform] a thing like that [Op. 111], which, if anything, disturbs.* – E. M. Forster

![Online photo of Prince Harry. Source: www.tmz.com](image)

**Figure 5.1** Online photo of Prince Harry. Source: www.tmz.com

To perform is to carry out an action. When the action becomes impressive, the performance resembles an entertainment. To pervert performance is correspondingly to change the form or meaning of that action so much so that it becomes more or less impressive and entertaining. Perversion is therefore both an act of resistance and a plastic structure, which performance engenders socio-historically and psychopolitically. However, performance is only tenable with the presence of a viewer or auditor resembling the role of an ethnographer. If ethnography were the observation and description of actions in verbal or written articulations, then the perversion of the performing act must inevitably be mediated by the neurosis of the notating act. I have investigated the act of notation in the third chapter, but before I integrate and exemplify the plastic resistance between musical thoughts and texts from the performative perspective, I will illustrate this psychopolitical theory using the responses received from a naked photo of HRH Prince Harry, who is seen above to be negotiating an

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antinomy between impressing his companion through an exhibitionist performance and the concealment of his private parts as a conscious act of modesty (Figure 5.1).

The baring of one’s self through performance is akin to the baring of one’s soul, with the exception of knowing where to draw the line between decency and perversity.3 On the other hand, if we were to take the viewpoint of the audience as perverts ourselves, an alternative perspective that substitutes the consumers of performative meaning for the producers would ‘normalise’ the performance via a reduction of its ethical and semantic resistance.4 It is uncanny that the contemporaneous interests in pornography studies and the authenticity movement in the late 1980s have established a discursive structure to think objectively about performative and receptive resistances.5 For instance, the following questions reveal an epistemological coincidence: ‘is the performer displaying a certain stylistic physicality with his or her body movements?’, ‘is the performer executing certain artistic rhetoric to impress and entice?’, or ‘is the performer doing certain tricks of the trade to hide his or her inadequacies?’ Inversely, the viewer with a tendency for perverse criticism would also try to detect any inauthentic or unnatural actions executed by the performer. In other words, the study of musical performance shares with that of pornography similar inquiries on theatrical reception, which is semantically psychopolitical as shown earlier in the cases of Eggebrecht, Rosen and Wagner.

Subsequently, when the British tabloid, The Sun, was accused of disobeying the agreement of the UK press regulators, the managing editor, David Dinsmore, rebutted that it would have been ‘perverse’ not to publish photos of a naked Prince Harry because they ‘are now in the public domain in every country in the world’.6 For the editor, perversity is attributed to the act of not publishing, that is, a non-performance. Accordingly to his logic, if one is not performing, one is perverse. If one is performing, one is also perverse, because an oft-understated accomplishment of a performer is to conceal certain things like technical flaws from the audiences and impress them with other things such as intense expressivity. The role of the performer is thus to situate a musical message and transform it in order to entertain the audiences. On the one hand, the performer is himself or herself also transformed in the process of performing the

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3 Beethoven’s muse told him to ‘make the attempt [to] just put down on paper the harmonies of your soul!’ Quoted in Barry Cooper, Beethoven and the Creative Process, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, 19.
music. On the other hand, the listener is also transformed in one way or another when or after hearing the music, and these effects are akin to the phenomenon of plasticity – that is, the ability to receive form and give form. Having learnt in the previous chapter that music is always already a human construct, I argue that the performer’s ability to transform socio-cultural and psychopolitical meaning as well as the semantic allowance for its own meaning to be transformed qualify musical performance as an act of plasticity.

In the previous two chapters, I illustrated how the processes of notating and analysing are analogous to the psychoanalytic orders of hysteria and psychosis. We witnessed how the psychopolitics of plastic resistance are mediated between the subject and the object as well as by material and natural forces. The prevailing techniques of composition and analysis have generated distinct auricular and semantic responses to the *soneme*. In this chapter, I turn the attention on the activities of performance – interpretation, rehearsal, and reflection – as adhering to the structure of perversion as formulated by Lacan. In the first section, I compare historical and psychological resistances from musicians who performed Beethoven’s music in his own time as well as in the present. As a theoretical climax of this entire thesis, I propose ‘plastic intimacy’ as a psychopolitical concept to understand performers’ auto-ethnography as an affective form of perversion plus neurosis. Hegelian theories of habituation are substantiated by self-reflections from Daniel Barenboim and members from three different string quartets. Accordingly, an extended case study on the usage of pronouns during rehearsal talk among professional chamber musicians reveals the selfsame extimate resistance vis-à-vis the semantic plasticity of Beethoven’s string quartets. Centred on the idea of the *soneme* as a performative apparatus, I contend that the unconscious processes behind ethnomusicology and performance are in fact plastic acts of structural resistance and perversion of both the human psyche and musical meaning.

5.1 Performance as Perversion

Performance studies as a field of investigation has developed rapidly over the past thirty years since the rise of the ‘authenticity’ movements and historically informed performance to recent work done on the economies of recordings and taxonomies of performative creativity. Not only has performance become an epistemological entity that affects semantics and signification, but performance has also provoked new perspectives in social relations between the expressive and the receptive aspects of
everyday life. While earlier scholarship has identified the invented and/or perverted statuses of performance styles in the latter half of the twentieth century, debates on the categorical possibility of a ‘modernist performance’, versus a historicist or postmodernist one for that matter, remain in latency.\(^7\) Instead of relying on a temporal and linear structure, a phenomenological approach stipulates that performers themselves already possess a performative stance that belongs to a relational structure of lived experience shared and shaped by the composer and audience.\(^8\) The research in this final chapter builds upon these current theoretical underpinnings by isolating the affective resistances that arise between the (re)production of music and meaning. Before framing recent reception of Beethoven’s music through the affective and auto-ethnographic turns, I will show that the phenomenon of performative perversion has more or less prevailed within the performance practices of Beethoven’s music over the past two hundred years.\(^9\)

In his own time, Beethoven has been less innovative and esoteric with performance styles than, say, C. P. E. Bach or Hector Berlioz. Notwithstanding the extended durations and dynamics \((ppp – fff)\) of his pieces, Beethoven remained pragmatic in his choice of articulation and orchestration, restricting himself within the conventional instrumental genres of his time.\(^10\) Any performative perversion, similar to the cases of his biographies, only surface after the fact. Evidently, it was the historical tussles between the Romantic aesthetics and the classicism of the Biedermeier adherents in the long nineteenth century that more or less shaped Beethoven performance practice. By the fin de siècle, objective formations appeared to have triumphed over subjective expressions. The logocentric exegesis largely influenced the interpretation of the symphonies with musicians and critics advocating their preference for the Mendelssohn-Toscanini-styled, à la lettre reading, while the Wagnerian-Furtwanglerian school of rescoring and ‘rubato’ performances eventually fell out of fashion, especially

\(^9\) See, for example, Bryan Gilliam (ed.) *Music and Performance During the Weimar Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 47. That said, research on the postmodern appropriations of Beethoven’s music, for instance in Ron Cowen and Daniel Lipman’s TV series *Queer as Folk* (in episodes 114 and 306) to Agnieszka Holland’s film *Copying Beethoven* (2006), goes beyond the space allowed for this thesis.
with the rise of ‘historically informed’ performance practice in the final quarter of the twentieth century.¹¹

A specific example is Beethoven’s Violin Concerto, which remained poorly received and overlooked until the prowess of Joseph Joachim, Henri Vieuxtemps, and Eugene Ysaÿe propelled it as one of the great concerti of the grand repertory.¹² Yet, the utmost curiosity in the resistance history of the work, which even Robin Stowell’s meticulous inspection of its performance trajectories has passed over, is that these performers derived not from the German or Russian schools of violin-playing, but belonged instead to the Rode-Viotti or Franco-Belgian traditions.¹³ Sharing the Francophone kinship with the two Romances, Opp. 40 and 50, the posthumous acceptance of the Violin Concerto into the standard repertoire clearly indicates the transnational influence in Beethoven’s creative thinking as a form of performative perversion. That the aesthetics of composition can be enhanced or marred by the aesthetics of performance is exemplary of the inherent plastic resistance of the artwork. To the extent that Beethoven’s music has largely steered clear of the ‘authenticities’ debates in post-war Anglophone discourse, despite being core repertoire for several period ensembles, prove the resistance of his wit and his craft.¹⁴ Other than the historical contingencies of applying flexible tempi, re-orchestration, and rhythmic alterations, Beethoven appears to be a composer who mostly gives form to performers and listeners as opposed to one who takes form from the extra-poietic.

Instead of relying merely on critics’ reviews or scholarly reappraisals of recordings, performers’ anecdotes have become one among many resources which is deemed epistemologically perverse. For instance, a certain pianist believes that Beethoven’s music provides him mastery over himself and a sense of his self:

By playing Beethoven, Romantic Beethoven, I sense myself – my authentic, essential self. And if you happen to be there, I help you sense myself as well.

¹² Leopold Auer, Violin Playing: As I Teach It, New York: Dover, 1980[1921], 93 and 97.
(We may of course try to make sense of that self, to comprehend it, to read it programmatically, but need not, and perhaps should not, do so in order to appreciate its expression.) Or, rather, we both sense my authentic, essential, sexual self, sexual identity being the touchstone of post-Romantic subjectivity.\textsuperscript{15}

The mastery of the pianist’s corporeal sense organs creates a plastic meaning that does not belong to Beethoven, but more to the interpreter himself. In this case, Beethoven’s piano music gives form to the ‘authentic, essential, sexual self’ of the musician, perversely transforming the classical or modern interpreter into a post-Romantic subject.

A similar manner to discern such sensorial experiences is via the physical movement of the performer. The psychologist Jane Davidson argues that both the somatic and the kinetic aspects of the performing body play a role within musical communication, that is, meaning-making.\textsuperscript{16} Using the examples of the fortissimo in a Beethoven sonata and a single-hand passage in a Beethoven bagatelle, Davidson contends that both the physique and gestures of the performer are significant determinants of how expressive intentions are being conveyed.\textsuperscript{17} That said, the syllogism of affordance can also be reversed by asking how Beethoven’s music has transformed the performer’s body, expressivity, and subjectivity with and without respect to the presence of a listener. While it cannot be denied that these phenomena – performing, listening and understanding – are always experiential and therefore temporal, the strongest form of semantic resistance lies ironically in the verbal aspect of musical communication.\textsuperscript{18}

Conversation analysis has been used by a handful of researchers in the twenty-first century to decipher various musical and social facets of chamber music-making. Two distinct features of this approach as a form of ethnomethodology are the examination of turn-taking and relational reparation. Observers account mainly for the differences between verbal and illustrated – that is, sung or gestured – expressions as well as those between embedded and exposed corrections that occur during the


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. 217 and 221.

\textsuperscript{18} Ian Cross, ‘Music and meaning, ambiguity and evolution’, in Dorothy Miell, Raymond MacDonald, and David J. Hargreaves (eds.), \textit{Musical Communication}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 34: ‘Meaning is elicited based on the listener’s previous experience of Beethoven’s music, or lack thereof.’
conversations.\(^\text{19}\) Other than conversations which happen between the conductor and the orchestra, there are also discussions among chamber musicians during the practice and rehearsal periods. One analytic observation that involved the Guarneri Quartet pertains to their ‘sensitized’ hearing of Beethoven’s string quartets. In contrast to the score-based musical analyses which have been interrogated in greater depth in the fourth chapter, the musicologist Jeanne Bamberger discovers the importance of directionality, harmonic or otherwise, in Beethoven’s music through the musicians’ conversation. For instance, in a section from the op. 59, no. 2, the cellist makes a sensible decision to play the G natural on the C string given that it is part of the G♯ minor tonality, while the same note is played later on the G string as being a part of the C major tonality.\(^\text{20}\)

Such are the perversing nuances of semantic transformations and resistances that are being negotiated between the performer and the composer, as well as between the score and the sound. Conversation analysis not only reveals the musicians’ intuitive responses in terms of instrumental techniques, but also deciphers their extra-musical associations, such as the case of the Kreutzer Quartet using descriptive adjectives to understand certain musical effects beyond the written notation and performance technique.\(^\text{21}\) In addition, conversations traced over an extended duration enable musicologists to witness the changing dynamics of the group vis-à-vis the music. For instance, Elaine King ascertains that the gradual familiarisation process between players involved in both new and established chamber duos is due to the discernible correlations between social kinship and musical solidarity in the foundation of any intimate working relationship.\(^\text{22}\) Based on these prior investigations, I advance that performative perversion are inherent to semantic resistance for both individual and group musicians.

The macrohistorical study of Beethoven performances is challenging terrain for he is always caught in the bind between the early and the modern, or the past and the future. Notwithstanding the temporal plasticity, the agency of Beethoven’s music erects an epistemological resistance between the musical object and performing subject. The semantic nuances are difficult to pinpoint exactly to the extent that the epistemological discords of the past remain etched within contemporary scholarship. Genetic


incongruities continued to be found amongst living scholars as they take sides with the quarrels of the dead patrons; one such case being the historical events behind the severance of the *Grosse Fuge* from Opus 130. In conclusion, the discursive dialectics between the critics’ representations and the performers’ self representations more often than not result in a perversion of the *soneme*. The fundamental corrective is for performers to gain self-awareness and recognise their perversion of the musical object. In order to enact such realisations, the performers will have to observe and speak about their practice themselves. Before I analyse how members of the Juilliard Quartet interpret three string quartets from Beethoven’s early, middle and late periods, vis-à-vis the frequency and function of their use of pronouns during rehearsal talk, I will deliberate over the psychopolitical theories pertinent to the framing of performative habits as a form of auto-ethnography.

### 5.2 Plastic Extimacy: The Auto-ethnography of Performance

In the first two chapters of this thesis, I define plasticity as a psychopolitical force that gives and receives form, and extimacy as the externalisation of elements and affects that are undesirable. Plastic extimacy can be defined hereby as the transformative effects resulted from the very externalisation of the undesirable. In other words, the intimacy between the subject and the object is structurally transformed through the exposition of the undesirable. For instance, when performers speak about themselves, the intimacy they share with the *soneme* becomes an extra-musical connotation and results in a plastic transformation of the intimacy into a form of extimacy. Because the act of connoting, in parallel with that of notating, is a fantasmatic one, this semantic process that mediates the performers’ musical thoughts with his or her verbalised text is an act of plastic extimacy. At the same time that the performer transforms musical meaning by articulating his or her negative desires, the *soneme* transforms the performer himself or herself.

Juxtaposed onto my earlier argument of performance as an act of semantic perversion, plastic extimacy becomes the neurotic articulations of these performative perversions. The performer-qua-pervert cum musicologist-qua-neurotic thus holds the utmost plastic resistance in transforming musical meaning and semantics. Paraphrasing

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Lacan’s deductive logic, the notion that ‘there is no music without the musicologist’ is instrumental to understand the practical and psychopolitical function of musicology.\(^{25}\) Discounting the recent phenomenon whereby performance and musicological scholarship are carried out by separate groups of people, I argue that the recent performative turn within the discipline is in fact an anthropological study of the performer-musicologist. In this sense, any self-representations by the performer-musicologist himself or herself become an auto-ethnography. In the rest of this section, I will use Hegelian philosophy of habituation to situate plastic extimacy as a form of performative perversion, and provide a handful of examples to illustrate the resistive stances.

Hegel distinguishes a mature person, who is more capable of recognising ‘the essential nature of the world already in existence, completed’ from his younger counterpart. It is through work that the mature man can ‘find his place in the world of objective relationships and becomes habituated to it and to his tasks’.\(^{26}\) In this respect, Hegel’s anthropological model befits an analysis of performative habituation of musical labour that undergoes psychical and political changes in past and contemporary history. Subsequently, Malabou’s insight of habit as ‘a process whereby the psychical and the somatic are translated into one another’ reflects ‘a genuine plasticity’ of habituation.\(^ {27}\) In other words, the repetitive synaptic exchanges between the brain and the body cause the form of the brain and that of the body to become malleable and create a resistive effect of both the psyche and the body. While some practitioners may prefer the term ‘muscle memory’, it may be more epistemologically accurate to classify the phenomenon as plastic extimacy. In a musical context, the location and position of the nerves and limbs are affected by the desires of the musical notations, even as the contents of the brain and the body remain constitutional. Within a Lacanian framework, these psychosomatic events would be perceived more as demands than desires.\(^ {28}\)

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\(^{26}\) Georg Hegel, *Philosophy of Spirit*, §407-408 and §409-410; cf. Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, 1784; Hegel’s deduction is ontologically contingent to Durkheim’s position in *The Elementary Form of Religious Life*, where the French ethnographer explains his epistemic preference for aboriginals with a more developed social structure for the purpose of accumulating vital and critical information; Durkheim believes that individuals and societies developed and transformed through labour and habit; see his *The Elementary Form of Religious Life*, translated by Carol Cosman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008[1912], 109.


\(^{28}\) Reading plastic extimacy as demands would better frame Martin Stokes’s psychopolitical perception of musical affect than the banality of cultural intimacy; see his *The Republic of Love: Cultural Intimacy in Turkish Popular Music*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
Correspondingly, if these so-called performative perversions become estimated or are taken out of socio-ethical and psychopolitical contexts, then the habituated performances of these musical acts would cause the undesirable affects to become dissembled.\(^{29}\) Malabou returns to Hegel’s anthropology to consider ‘the “exemplary individuality” which is man “sculpted” by habit discloses, as if in a Greek statue, the unity of essence and accident’.\(^{30}\) Here, we return to Rancière’s tracing and detailing of the unconscious, where each person is an individual for the very reason that he or she is being formed through habit, through the gradual alignment of his or her essence with the accidental; the latter is a condition I have discussed at length in the previous chapter. Accordingly, the habituation of an act such as performing or talking about music engenders the perversions of Beethoven historiography. Plastic extimacy becomes negotiated overtime through socio-ethical normalisations and psychopolitical resistances.

I will illustrate this theory with five instances of auto-ethnography by members of the Belcea Quartet and the Elias Quartet. In a radio interview, the violist Krzysztof Chorzelski describes his psyched-up affects on performing Beethoven’s *Grosse Fuge* as follows: ‘We want to convey the incredible fierce force of madness, feeling that we are on the brink of insanity, which is really the spirit of this music... in a kind of animalistic way.’\(^{31}\) The plastic extimacy is embodied in the ferocity and lunacy of his state of mind. These are emotions that seldom accepted in social decorum and are even appended with social stigma. Associating Beethoven’s music with these estimate feelings transforms the musical meanings behind both the performance and the notation of Beethoven’s musical thoughts. Similarly, in another extract from the same radio interview, Chorzelski elaborates on the plastic extimacy of the musicians’ understanding of both the work and of themselves.

I cannot tell you what [the *Grosse Fuge*] did to us. I think we are all deeply moved by this music every day. And every day, we discover more and more, and it encourages [and] pushes us. There is something about this music [that] invite total honesty with *yourself*.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{29}\) Here, I diverge from Stokes’s reliance of the Deleuzian concept of ‘assemblage’ as a discursive trope, and prefer the idea of dissemblage for both the Turkish and European performers. See Stokes, *The Republic of Love*, 6.


\(^{31}\) Violist Krzysztof Chorzelski of the Belcea Quartet on BBC Radio 3, 13 June, 2012.

\(^{32}\) Ibid. My emphasis.
The use of the verbs such as ‘move’ and ‘push’ indicate a dynamic sense of plastic extimacy with respect to both the bodily and affective aspects of musicality and formality. There is a socio-ethical dimension where the music demands a moral standard on the performers themselves. The psychopolitical intimacy is being externalised in the speech and simultaneously constructs and destroys different meanings of the piece for the performer and the listener. A similar effect of plastic extimacy can be evinced from the following excerpts taken from Sara Bittloch’s blog. The first violinist of the Elias Quartet comments after each rehearsal of the Grosse Fuge that leads up to a concert at the end of the week.33

19 October 2011: The first gesture could be really tender … as if some weight had suddenly been lifted off the music.

21 October 2011: You need both a really good bow control and a clear image in your head of what you want it to sound like.

23 October 2011: The sheer physicality of the music… are such powerful emotional statements that I almost can’t believe I ever doubted it.

25 October 2011: physically demanding experience … as if Beethoven had read into some of human nature’s most hidden universal truths and put them into music

This performer speaks of ‘gesture’, ‘control’ and ‘physicality’ as indications of the corporeal plasticity from playing Beethoven’s music. Instead of the conventional muscle memory, these are in fact effects of plastic extimacy that has transformed the performer’s psychical relation with her body. The almost random association of the music with ‘human nature’ and ‘universal truth’ may be tainted by an Adornian inflection, but these ideological interpretations are the very effects of the psychopolitics of plastic resistance at work between the performing subject and the musical object. Continuing to espouse plastic extimacy, Bittloch relates her personal interaction as ‘self-perpetuating’ a week later.

1 November 2011: Although it is a huge work and there are so many difficulties – technically, musically, physically, stamina-wise… – there is something about how much Beethoven gives to me as a performer which actually creates new

energy. As it’s being used up, it’s at the same time being fed back into me through the music, in a kind of self-perpetuating way.\textsuperscript{34} The regenerative idea of performative plasticity is kindled here through Bittloch’s experiences of renewed energy. The psychopolitical structure constitutes the performer’s initial energy used to create the music, which then reinvigorates her with a further bolt of energy to produce more music as her energy depletes. The energy that is constantly being created and destroyed sustains the semantic intimacy between the 

\textit{soneme} and the performer, who is arbitrating the various ‘difficulties’ as symptomatic of performative perversion. Bittloch’s comments after the performance also represent an expression of plastic extimacy that is fantasmatic and resistant. By recalling her experiences in such a habituated manner, Bittloch is notating her psychical reactions to her own performative actions in the form of an auto-ethnography.

On a similar level, Daniel Barenboim has also enunciated a communal form of plastic extimacy when he confesses in the amount of ‘courage and energy’ needed to interpret the sudden changes in dynamics in Beethoven’s middle-period symphonies.\textsuperscript{35} When performer-musicologists articulate their desires, they transform the meaning of the musical object and also get themselves transformed psychically and physically. This plastic event represents the phenomenon whereby perversion and fantasy/hysteria occur at exactly the same moment. The psychopolitical effects of plastic extimacy thereby engender the perpetual metonymy between performative perversion and auto-ethnographic fantasy to the extent that musical meaning becomes imbued with plastic resistance.

\textbf{5.3 Perverting Beethoven: The Estimate Subjectivity of Pronouns}

Turning from the mediated reflections of the observer to the unmediated psyche of the observed, this section examines in more specific details how performers articulate their understanding of Euroclassical music from within their own socio-cultural milieu. From a psychopolitical perspective, I suggest that professional musicians unconsciously espouse a plastic form of musical extimacy. I will allude briefly to a recent film aptly entitled \textit{A Late Quartet} (or \textit{Performance} in Australia; directed by Yaron Zilberman in

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Daniel Barenboim and Edward W. Said, \textit{Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society}, London: Bloomsbury, 2003, 143: ‘Beethoven was really the first composer who used the effect of a very long \textit{crescendo} and then a \textit{subito piano}, a drop in the dynamic. It requires a lot of courage and energy to really go with the \textit{crescendo} to the end…’
where the underlying political friction among the musicians is aggravated psychologically when one of the quartet members is diagnosed with a terminal illness and personnel changes become inevitable. While the players agree with each other on musical terms, they use the adjectives ‘childish’, ‘obsessive’, and ‘self-loving’ (that is narcissistic) to describe one another’s personalities. The members also associated the piece which they were rehearsing and teaching – Beethoven’s String Quartet in C# minor – with their personal affects ranging from ‘death’ to ‘real happiness’. All these psychical states are part and parcel of the performers’ musical experiences and they give all kinds of ontological and epistemological meaning to the *soneme* even before any sound is made or any music is heard. Such phenomena are the unconscious work of plasticity at play; the affects and associations with the music changes the form of the *soneme* and creates a kinship and resistance between the musician and the music. Therefore, similar to what children say when they are growing up, what performers say when they are preparing for a performance is symbolic of their psychical understanding not only of the music, but also of themselves as human subjects and collaborators.\(^{36}\) I will illustrate this claim by singling out the pronouns from a series of interlocutions conducted with a professional quartet with a long working history.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{37}\) Elaine King has shown that performers’ relationships can varied depending on the length and familiarity with each other. See her ‘Social familiarity: styles of interaction in chamber ensemble rehearsal’ in *Music and Familiarity: Listening, Musicology and Performance*, edited by Elaine King and Helen M. Prior, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013, 253-70.
When Lewis Lockwood published a series of conversations with members of the Julliard String Quartet in 2008, reviewers praised the book for its wide-ranging coverage of the socio-cultural contexts of the string quartets and how the performers overcome the challenges of giving a historically-informed interpretation of the music. Criticisms were mainly attributed to their masking of opinions as facts in certain analyses and performance directions. The purpose of the scholarly intervention into the rehearsal process is to understand how performers often include their personal musical and life experiences into the execution of the pieces, and that each performance is in fact rather dissimilar to another. On closer inspection, the conversations amongst the four musicians and the musicologist reveal more information than the musical insights. Alongside the exchange of musical knowledge, we can also enunciate a theory of pervasive subjectivity from the inter-personal relations and interactions. Numerous dialogical nuances can be evinced from the transcribed text, and these include how often and how much each person has contributed to the forum as well as the subjective references they have used to refer to themselves or to others.

The originality of this thesis lies in the application of what ethnomusicologists have termed as musico-linguistic onto everyday language used by string quartet players to convey their musical ideas amongst themselves. The rehearsal process becomes a form of musicking in the sense of what Steven Feld and Aaron Fox have classified as discourse or ‘language about music’. Feld and Fox have identified the abstract and pragmatic ways musicians articulate about music, and I would like to suggest a pervasive way that mediates between the two. Because musicological discourse is often conducted on the abstract level distant from the pragmatic means performers get round to talking about their interpretation of the musical notations or instructions, the epistemic intermediary when one actor meet the other becomes perverted by the very language itself, which as current literature reveals include corporeal interactions and social agreements. The specificities of the spoken language itself have hitherto been studied. In my research, I will focus on the musicians’ use of five specific pronouns. As a unique class of words used in everyday language, the function of pronouns serves not


40 Amanda Bayley, ‘Ethnographic research’ and Elaine King, ‘Social familiarity’.
to describe but to identify referents.\(^{41}\) They direct the matter of the subject onto a thing or a fixed entity around which the event circulates. But because the critical agency of the referent is correlated to the increased usage of the respective pronouns, the referent is determined and thereby limited by the frequency and emphasis of the pronoun. This semantic relation is highly pertinent to how musicians communicate among themselves. In this section, I will aim to prove that this particular method of ethnographic analysis is instrumental to uncover how personal musical understanding is mediated by social interaction and familiarisation via linguistic behaviour.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Subjects)</th>
<th>(ego)</th>
<th>(object)</th>
<th>(other)</th>
<th>(superego)</th>
<th>(real)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opus</td>
<td>I/my/me</td>
<td>it/its</td>
<td>you/your</td>
<td>we/us</td>
<td>he/him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 No. 1/I</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 No. 1/I</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130/I</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.3** Table of pronoun occurrences during conversation with the Julliard String Quartet

If the number of times the different pronouns heard were tabulated (Figure 5.3), distinct correlations can be made between the three periods from Beethoven’s output and the musicians’ preference for certain pronouns during the conversation. The pronoun that appears most often in the late quartet is the ‘I’, while the pronouns ‘you’, ‘we’ and ‘he’ are used most in the early quartet as well as amongst the three quartets. In aggregate, the highest and lowest occurrences overall are ‘you’ and ‘it’ respectively. It is not coincidental that these statistics show certain acute relations between the performers’ psyche with respect to Beethoven’s compositions. While the late quartet has allowed the musicians to assert their personal take on the music via an egoistic perspective, the presence of the other, the collective and the external are the strongest for the earliest work. Inversely, these observations can also mean the works from Beethoven’s early and middle periods are representative of the socio-cultural milieu of early nineteenth-century Europe, while Opus 130 and probably pieces from the same ‘hysterical’ period are more individualistic so much so that performers gain or are given the semantic space to personalise their interpretation of the music.

I as the positing of the self

If we remember from the third chapter Fichte’s notion of positing the I as a performative deed-action, then the use of ‘I’ when the musician expresses himself or herself becomes both a deed of asserting one’s presence and an act of positing or standing oneself in good musical stead. The use of the pronoun ‘I’ demarcates a hierarchy between the speaker and the listener as well as provides an awareness and assurance to the articulated self. The most common presentation of the self in the rehearsal process follows in the guise of ‘I guess’, ‘I think’, ‘I’m sure’, ‘I said’, ‘I believe’ and so on. On other occasions, the ‘I’ can perform a role that is more marked or authoritative. The ‘I’ can play the part in making decisions, such as choosing the repertoire, executing certain performance directions, and persuading a certain form or way of thinking. Also, the ‘I’ can bear a sign of the speaker’s superiority in the past and at present. These interventions from the ‘I’ bring about change to the music and the musicians and belong very much to a plastic process towards the eventual performance.

However, these observations do not mean that the opposite sense of doubt is absent. The semantics of the ‘I’ is equally accommodating for the expression of uncertainty. The musician may offer his or her fellow players a less developed idea, or retract a stronger opinion made earlier. Also, the subject may err on the side of caution and reflect on his or her own approaches towards performing or teaching. If all else fails, the ‘I’ is relatively instrumental in rekindling past experiences with the phrase ‘I remember’ or when coupled with a verb in the past tense. Naturally, these moments of recollection can be extracted from recent or distant memories. The following proclamation for musical profundity is a vivid example of how the ‘I’ posits itself and its affects in the present by recalling experiential and emotional episodes from the past.

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42 Lockwood and Julliard String Quartet, 225: ‘so when I came to the chair and they said, “Which late [quartet] do you want to do this year?” I said “131.”’
43 Ibid. 55: ‘This is certainly a place where I would have them take out the subito piano.’
44 Ibid. 122: ‘I count four bars as one bar. I mean, harmonically one would count it that way.’
45 Ibid. 144: ‘I talk about all the time with my students…’ and ibid. 209: ‘This is something I talk about when I coach, too.’
46 Ibid. 59: ‘I throw this out just as a hypothesis that I don’t even advocate, but just as a jumping-off point.’
47 Ibid. 60: ‘I’m of a different mind than I was one moment ago.’
48 Ibid. 43: ‘I know I’m very careful at all moments to give that kind of [sings opening motif of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony] feeling to this motif, and that’s what’s behind the bowing.’ and ibid. 226: ‘I wasn’t so confident about coaching pieces, and I thought, “What should I say?”’
49 Ibid. 223: ‘For example, last week I heard a group… I asked them afterward about the march [from opus 132], because there was something I thought they missed about the way they played it.’
I was listening to this piece and I thought: “My God, I have never heard anything so complex in my life.” We’re inside when we play it, but I was sitting there listening and thinking, “How can anybody understand it?” and I looked at the audience, and people were transfixed. Everyone was getting their own understanding. And these were not musicians. I was experiencing how complicated it was and how complex, and as I was looking around I thought… I watched and nobody was breathing.\(^{50}\)

The musical self is split among the ‘I’, who listens, thinks, plays and feels. Each ‘I’ influences one another and is influenced by another. The circulation of the ‘I’ is a clear plastic mechanism where the subject in question is hovering between the forces of resistance and motion. The musical sonemes induce thoughts, but the thoughts halt the understanding of the sonemes. The dynamics of the resistance result in the physical reactions of looking around and feeling confounded. The musician is in search of semantic equilibrium and tries to identify a part of his self with his fellow quartet musicians (‘we’) and his fellow audience members (‘they’). From this short excerpt, the ‘I’ is not singular but multiple; he is not only a performer, but also a thinker, a listener and an affected person. Finally, the ‘I’ can also be passed from one subject to another, which is most prominent in situations of agreement and disagreements, such as the following discussion on whether to repeat the exposition in the first movement of Opus 130:\(^{51}\)

\begin{quote}
\textbf{JS} Well, actually I have a problem with that repeat myself… I have a hard time with that repeat. I find it very difficult to bring off because of the alterations of the movement.

\textbf{JK} I feel it very difficult to bring off that repeat also. I feel that I shouldn’t even try. \textit{[laugh]} But it sure changes the piece an enormous amount if you don’t take the repeat.

\textbf{SR} I agree.

\textbf{LL} It needs the length.

\textbf{RC} It does.
\end{quote}

\(^{50}\) Ibid. 217.

\(^{51}\) Ibid. 227.
In this brief extract, the first three speakers assume the subjectivity of someone caught in a difficult dilemma. With one person agreeing with the sentiment of the previous person, the position of the ‘I’ gains a strong agency of uniting the three individual musicians into a single performative unit vis-à-vis the *sonemes* or the musical material. However, when Lewis Lockwood interrupts the trajectory of the ‘I’, the focus of the conversation shifts from the subjective to the objective, which disorientates the fourth member of the quartet and causes his ‘I’ to lose agency. Surrounded by performers, the ‘it’ articulated by Lockwood becomes symptomatic of an analyst who is often more interested in the musical object than the human subject. In contrary to common belief, my review of the conversation shows that the performers rely less on objective analysis than subjective interaction.

As much as some performers have acknowledged their focus on analysis as a way of obtaining musical knowledge, my observations indicate otherwise. Of course, musicians do talk about musical objects, but these *sonemes* are most often framed as objective pronouns than subjective pronouns. Throughout the eighty-odd pages of transcribed dialogue among the Julliard Quartet, the pronoun ‘it’ appears as a subject only for about thirty times. That is, the relation between the I-as-subject and the it-as-subject is very much hierarchical and unequal. After the deliberations of Hegel and Lacan discussed in the previous chapter, the musical nature of performance is fairly subjective vis-à-vis the multiple symbolism of the I-as-ego and the we-as-ensemble. The ‘it’ as a musical subject is to a large extent objectified by the human subject. Here are a handful of cases where the *soneme* as a musical object appears to gain agency.

Basically we’re talking about one motif but the motif has various endings to it. It has one note [mm. 1-2], it has a swell [mm. 13-14], and then it has sforzando [m. 22].

One more comment about making the difference between forte and fortissimo and piano and pianissimo in a piece like 18/1 that’s this fast, this electric, this will – it gives it that breathless quality. It could very easily flatten out and not have that.

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52 Ibid. 44.
53 Ibid. 66.
And then, although you feel the pulse continuing, because of the material it doesn’t continue at such an agitated rate. It’s a little bit calm there for a moment… It is in groups of two bars and not in single bars.\textsuperscript{54}

It’s not that it’s spaced out, it’s greatly motivated… It’s not piano, it’s pianissimo.\textsuperscript{55}

While the ‘it’ in the first and third excerpts refer to the different endings of a motif and contrasting metrical settings respectively, the ‘it’ in the second and fourth cases point to the physical effects of dynamics variations. As contradistinction to how analysts would place these musical parameters as subjects of scrutiny, such objective orientation of the \textit{soneme} among performers is considered less commonplace. In the context of a rehearsal where we witness how performers come to perceive music in all sense of the word, a clear demarcation between the ego and the thing surfaces infrequently. By referring to the \textit{soneme} as a subject pronoun in the form of an ‘it’, the speakers is setting up an ontological distance between the self and the object. That is, the \textit{soneme} lies outside or is differentiated from the consciousness of the performer. As far as musical meaning can be affixed, there is a constant resistance between the performer and the music if he or she does not perceive the \textit{soneme} with multiple significations. In juxtaposition with how the performer dominates his or her musical orientation with the ‘I’ that has been examined earlier, the performer can be considered as having perverted the plural semantics of the \textit{soneme} to his or her own interpretation. How the ‘it’ becomes a collective force can be observed in the final example below where a single \textit{soneme} – the meaning of a theme – despite being considered by the different musicians is negotiated via a mode of plastic resistance by each one of them.\textsuperscript{56}

\begin{verbatim}
JS     It’s an important moment, until finally the piece decides where it wants to go. And where it wants to go is, of course, very interesting.
SR     Also he comes up with this theme in the cello that’s like the second theme yet it’s something new \[m. 106\].
RC     Right, it is new material.
JK     It’s something new.
SR     It’s warming and inspiring, like the sun coming out.
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. 129.  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. 138.  
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 215.
I’m thinking second theme, but aside from what forces it to be new, what the hell is a second theme doing in this context? It feels like the strangest thing.

The struggle to find an adjective to describe the musical object is apparent in this excerpt. At first, the theme is compared with the second theme. Then, it is given the identity of something new, and two other players echo in docile agreement. Finally, we hear metaphors of opposing connotations: from something ‘warming and inspiring’ to something strange. Judging from the different adjectives, the particular phenomenon of musical signification coheres directly with a perversion of musical meaning. The semantic disregard for the intended context of the soneme is almost second nature to the work of a performer. More often than not, the performer seems obliged to be creative or, what the British pianist Imogen Cooper terms, ‘re-creative’. With respect to the soneme, performers are always perverting the organic nature of musical meaning. This discourse analysis provides a strong justification for the failure in grounding a singular performative aesthetic, such being the case of the authenticity movements of the 1970s and 1980s. The main reason could very well lie in the perverted resistance within the unconscious psyche of the performer.

You as symbolic other

Within the dynamics of quartet interactions, the calling out of someone else in the form of a second person pronoun, ‘you’, appears to be fairly common. Throughout the entire length of the conversation among the musicians and the musicologist, the word ‘you’ recurred at the highest rate of 167 times in comparison to other pronouns. Other than using ‘you’ to address one another in the conversation, ‘you’ is made to refer not only to audiences, students or musicians in general, but also to the written and performed music in particular. This phenomenon of multiple connotations for a single word is unusual and requires some close examination. The versatility of ‘you’ in its modern usage is its compass of referring to the other, either singular or plural, formal or informal, and the general or the particular. Within the rehearsal context, the most straightforward reference of the ‘you’ is to a fellow member of the string quartet, such as the following.

question: ‘You did start it piano, so is there some possible implications?’ There is also the habit of creating an epistemic relation or getting someone’s attention by saying ‘you know’. Otherwise, the ‘you’ is occasionally used as a metonym for the listener or the composer but in rather different contexts.

Yeah, we make sure that you hear it. We clobber you with it. [laughter]… This goes way back to before Beethoven even, but slow movements often function as problem-solving movements in some way. You slow things down so that you can examine them and solve them.

In the first extract, ‘you’ is a stand-in for the listener, who forms an auricular relation with the performers. In the second one, the speaker imagines the ‘you’ as the composer at work during the creative process. In the following example, the ‘you’ is used in continuous speech as a reference to three different roles concerning the performance of specific music and the corresponding affects.

Again, it’s the sort of thing where you would have the student play that bar… and say okay, how do you get to the next bar? Because, as Ron says, the time you are going to take isn’t for comfort.

The first ‘you’ denotes the teacher in a pedagogic relation to ‘the student’, who is then represented by the second ‘you’ learning to overcome the musical challenge. Once conquered, the performer displaces the student over the definition of the ‘you’ and becomes objectified after being able to experience the ‘discomfort’ behind the musical process. The metonymy of the ‘you’ reveals the subjective relation the pronoun has with the process of music-making. Of course, the ‘you’ can also be interpreted as a subject and an object, such being the case in this one sentence.

You see this in Bach[‘s] dance movements where you’re moving from tonic to the dominant…

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58 Lockwood and the Julliard String Quartet, 45.
59 Ibid. 213 and 217.
60 Ibid. 62.
61 Ibid. 211.
The ‘you’ in the antecedent is contrasted to that in the consequent with the former being the reader of the score and the latter being the player of the music or even the music itself. In this sense, the two ‘you’ connote different meanings and need to be distinguished. Another instance of shifting subjectivities is when the subject is engaged in the tasks of listening and playing either simultaneously or at a different time. In the following case, the ‘you’ refers to the performer as listener and as someone who reacts to what he or she hears. Listening, in the symbolic sense of the word, is then a role and a process.

Depending upon, for example, where we are in performance, on how much sound there is on the stage and what you’re hearing, you want to disconnect this in a way but you want to connect it in another way.\(^{62}\)

The second and third ‘you’s are also related upon temporal terms, where one action is executed after another. That is, the pronoun is not restricted to a fixed moment in time, but is ‘disconnected’ and ‘connected’. The second ‘you’ points to a performer in the past, while the final ‘you’ stands in for the performer in the future, who wants to do something different from the performer in the past has done. Abiding by this temporal logic, ‘you’ as the subject’s being is determined by the subject’s action. This instance aligns with Fichte’s principle of the deed-action that posits the self as itself. Another example of the temporalised variation of the ‘you’ can be found in the following statement, where the ‘you’ is located not only in both the early and late moments within a single work, but also at the coeval time of witnessing a nineteenth-century composition in the twenty-first century.

Actually, if you look specifically at the coda, it is very much presaging the Grosse Fuge, because the Grosse Fuge is syncopated, and here you have this emphasis on 2s and 4s, as you will have them in the Grosse Fuge – in 218, 220, and 222.\(^{63}\)

Within the entirety of opus 130/133, the two ‘you’s signify the syncopations which appears in both the coda of the first movement as well as those in the Grosse Fuge. The meaning of the ‘you’ is thereby made to straddle between a musical present and future

\(^{62}\) Ibid. 64.  
\(^{63}\) Ibid 213.
as indicated by the words ‘here’ and ‘will’ respectively. In addition, while the second and third ‘you’s in the above statement refer to historical moments firmly etched in 1825 and 1826, the first ‘you’ marks the present instant whenever someone ‘looks’ at the written score. This particular ‘you’ could have meant whenever someone listens to the coda, but the verb ‘to look’ restricts the compass of the pronoun to the sense of sight. Finally, the ‘you’ can also transcend intentional and analogical conditions. In the following example, the performer is involved in the first instance in ‘playing’ the music, while another part of his self ‘wants’ to execute the music differently.

And the point is that when you play a variation of something you want to play it as though you are ornamenting, being inventive, creating, improvising.  

The intention to want something is merely a symbolic expression of one’s desire because the pronoun ‘you’ provides the semantic possibilities of shaping that manifested desire against its latent version. In other words, there is a plastic relation between the metonymy of the word ‘you’ and the pleasurable subjectivities of the performer’s wants. This second ‘you’ is desirous and desiring a possible rendition of the music at a later moment. On the other hand, the third ‘you’ of the performer is situated in the metaphorical. The use of the simile ‘as though’ posits the speaker in the imaginary realm, where the performer is pretending to do something else – ornamenting, inventing, creating, improvising – instead of merely ‘playing’ the music as the original deed-action. From this and the previous statements, there is something more of the self that is revealed. With the repeated appearances of the ‘you’, there is an other, a symbolic other, that leaches onto ‘you’ as the main signifier. Musical interpretation is then a perverted act of doing something else or being someone else, that is rather similar to the analogies given by one of the musicians, such as going on a mountain trip or enacting a love scene. Putting all these together, if we were to attempt to convert the following articulation into a form of reported speech, it would not be surprising that the ‘you’ would come to take on very different subjects and objects, as I have indicated within parentheses below.

Addressing the performance of any of the opus 18s, you’re [the performer] walking a tightrope, stylistically. In other words, you’re [the composer] coming  

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64 Ibid. 133.  
65 Ibid. 127.
from the world of Mozart and Haydn and you’re [the composer] entering a world, of course, politically which has changed so radically and so you’re [the music] moving out of the royal court and into the street, to some extent. And there is a great awareness that when you [the performer] play this music you’ve [the performer] got to be able to move between two styles… You [the score-reader] would not necessarily see that in Mozart. Let’s address one [example] which we constantly are talking about. If you [the score-reader] look at bar 97 [Op. 18/1/I], you [the music] have again four sforzandos resulting in a fortissimo, which poses the question of how much crescendo are you [the performer] going to make. But then you [the music] have the cadence in fortissimo…

The signified entities include the performer, the composer, the score-reader and the music or musical style of the piece concerned. Despite the repetitive use of ‘you’ in this speech act, the ‘you’ changes meaning upon every sentence or sub-clause depending on the musical, historical, temporal and semantic contexts. In this extract, ‘you’ is given the connotations of being able to move, to possess, to see and to make music by different actors and across various long and short periods. Inherently, there will be resistance between each and every of these actors, especially if they are all represented by a single ‘you’ to the reader or listener of these conversations. The semantic challenge in identifying the correct actor for each of these ‘you’ is a resistance in itself from the musicological reader or listener against the numerous sonemes within the musical work. Each soneme creates a semantic space for the musicians to articulate their opinions – in this case, using the pronoun ‘you’ – and for the readers and listeners to determine the plasticity of their own signifying act. This ambiguity is attributed to the inherent perversion of the performer that results in a psychical resistance on the part of the reader and listener against an effective understanding of the music. Rather than implying any moral judgment on this observation, I believe this textual analysis has made listeners realise the plastic nature of the listening act, and that its signification and enjoyment are in fact not within their control at all.

We are the superego

The use of the pronoun ‘we’ most often implies a reference to the speaker and one or some of the others. The subject of discussion is simultaneously being imposed as a form

66 Ibid. 51.
of including the others’ opinions. This particular linguistic phenomenon is very much aligned with the act of the Freudian superego, which commands the others to adhere to what one is saying regardless whether the others concur or not. By using the pronoun ‘we’ within a musical context, the individual speaker assumes the musical opinions of the other members in the quartet. Musical analyses and interpretations are introduced with the pronoun ‘we’ to explain the synchronised nature of the actions or musical movement that the quartet members have earlier or instantly agreed upon, which cohere with the diachronic form of the pronoun itself. However, when pronouns are coupled with gestures, they become forced into a synchrony. For example, the ‘we’ used in the following statements indicate the coordination of bow markings or musical expressions by all members of the quartet.

\[
\text{we play the last note of the motif, the first beat of bar 10, down-bow. We used to play that up-bow but we decided that… So in other words, we start with the very simple and then we go to an espressivo in bar 14, and then [sings violin 1, m. 22] and that to me dictates the character of how we play these things, and then we have the sforzandi.}
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In the first excerpt, the pronoun ‘we’ informs readers that the decision to change bow directions has been agreed by all four players. Not only does the first ‘we’ signify the unison bow motion, but the subsequent ‘we’s, now coupled with verbs in the past tense, show that the decision to change has been made as a collective. In the second extract, the ‘we’ justifies the obligation for each quartet member to follow through every musical expression with the ensemble as a single unit in order to build the character of togetherness. The ‘we’ acts quasi an imperative that the performers must adhere to the composer’s commands of, say, espressivo or sforzandi to the extent that there is a form of peer pressure towards bringing out the necessary affects. The second excerpt is also interesting in that the speaker actually sang a certain passage during the conversation instead of describing the musical material or expression involved. Within a single period, the ‘we’ assumes epistemic progression of understanding the music as ‘very simple’ to an expression of ‘espressivo’ and finally to a state where the melody is allowed to be sounded. Does this not represent a plastic process of how musical forms get shaped with the mediation of the pronoun ‘we’? I believe it is the extimate relations

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67 Anju Saxena, ‘Pronouns’.
68 Lockwood and the Julliard String Quartet, 43 and 44.
the speaker has with his fellow players that enable such a plastic resistance of the music or its inherent sonemes to garner agency.

Further, by comparing the first extract with the second, the different ‘we’s also become situated or spread across a range of time periods. For the first extract, the ‘we’s are posited in the short term duration when the performers execute the motif and when the audience witness the directions of the bowing. In comparison, for the musicians and listeners to concur on the ‘we’s in the second extract, prior musical and theoretical knowledge is required to fully comprehend what semantic capacities the musical expressions such as expressivo or sforzandi can encompass. The time period for a group of musicians to acquire the information or to attain such aesthetics is relatively longer than that for an individual player. How we can verify this is to understand the function of the reflexive pronoun ‘to me’ used in the second excerpt. The speaker begins with the collective pronoun ‘we’ and interrupts the sentence’s ensemble trajectory by positing himself or his thought back as a clause in the middle of the sentence. This phenomenon is akin to Fichte’s notion of self-positing except that the musician has taken the ensemble into consideration and this internalisation dictates his personal and subjective position. In other words, his musical knowledge of himself is determined by what he thought the others have done. In this particular case, the ‘we’ here acts as the superego within the speaker’s unconscious operations. The ‘character of how we play’ becomes an instruction from the various social pressures discussed above as coming from fellow musicians, listeners, the established theoretical framework and also the limits of language used for musical description. The articulation of ‘we’ marks the appearance of the superego in imposing a certain regiment into the art of musical interpretation and expression. The following two excerpts are good illustrations of the function of the superego via the pronoun ‘we’ to express personal preference towards or reservation against the music as being generally consensual.

If I say it, everybody is going to say it’s true, that we are a little more fond of the development section in the first version… I would even go further and to say that very frequently what we tried to do, in sitting down to mark the scores, was to capture the most common experience that we have. But we realise that in doing this we seem to imply that there is only one way we play this. And I suspect that’s not quite the truth. 69

69 Ibid. 49 and 63.
The first extract is straightforward in the sense that the collective liking for an earlier version of the movement is aligned with the ‘I’ of the speaker. This sentence and the next reveal a resistance between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’, between the ego and the superego. Similarly for the second extract, the ‘I’ assumes a tentative reservation whether the quartet performs a certain passage consistently as well as executes that passage as a cohesive unit. There is also no affirmative acknowledgement from the other three members whether they concur with what the ‘I’ has said, but readers would have to take the pronoun ‘we’ at face value and decide whether this advice belongs to one person or the quartet as an integrated whole. In this sense, the reader also encounters a plastic resistance against the transcribed text and its veracity. No wonder that, whether the speaker expresses his preference for a musical passage or the decision of a fixed notation, a sense of scepticism is reflected over the singularity of truth. I contend that not only are the performers themselves uncertain about their subjective positions, but we as readers or students might also need to apply some form of rational criticism to appraise each and every musical situation so as not to fall prey to the super-egoistic demeanour of the ‘we’. As much as the ‘we’ provides a collective pressure to conform and concur, it may or may not be possible to imitate every musical articulation executed by one or the other performer. Performance is undoubtedly always already perverse because it is the outcome of a plastic resistance between the ego and the superego represented in the music that a listener receives in the here and now. No one performance is exactly the same as the next one. I will return to this symbolic phenomenon in the next section when several interpretations of a single work are analysed using digital technology.

In addition, a person speaking with the pronoun ‘we’ is relating his own experiences and thoughts with members in various types of group formations other than the specifics of the Julliard String Quartet. Apparent from the following excerpts, these group categories include teachers, listeners, performers in general, and quartet musicians respectively.

At the same time, we’ve all run into students who will deal with that by playing… I think your point is to get people to enunciate this in such a way that we listeners hear it.\(^70\)

\(^70\) Ibid. 55.
But if as performers we try to take time, it usually creates some kind of dissipation of tension.\textsuperscript{71}

As quartet players of all this music from the mid-eighteenth century through today, we get very accustomed, because we play together all the time, to making certain kinds of shapes. In other words, when we look at a piece of music, we make very quick decisions and united decisions, or discussed decisions, about what shape every note should be.\textsuperscript{72}

The symbolism of the pronoun ‘we’ is extended in these cases to other musical roles. For readers who identify themselves as listeners, they are told to ‘hear it’, while performers are told to ‘take time’ and quartet players are told to make decisions and shape every note. All these imperatives bear the performative function of the ‘we’ in incorporating everyone who has or wants to adopt one of the abovementioned positions. In retrospect, the organised vocations also enable the ‘we’ to attain the strength of the superego in dictating the individual acts and thoughts of the musical egos. Once the reader has learnt to differentiate the distinct connotations of the ‘we’s, we can decipher tricky passages such as the following with critical insight.

\textbf{We} wanted to make sure that this symbol [for subito piano] didn’t go into the book as something that would be obvious in and of itself, but rather as something that might point to an event to be enunciated. I think Beethoven often uses the subito piano partly to create a resistance to the easy flow of time. And so our task as performers is to realise that particular resistance – in that particular harmonic and dramatic context – and not simply to take time.\textsuperscript{73}

The extract begins with a ‘we’ that represents the collective voice of the Julliard Quartet discussing their determination in ensuring that their invention of a graphic shorthand for a musical dynamic mark is symbolic rather than static. The ‘we’ is interrupted by an ‘I’ from the speaker who refers to his own opinion on the composer’s original intention in using that particular dynamics. The final pronoun in this extract is the possessive version of ‘we’, but it does not refer to the quartet musicians themselves. Instead, the ‘our’ here belongs to performers in general who experience one or other forms of

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. 62.  
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. 63.  
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. 58.
resistance. The interchange of pronouns throughout the elocution is therefore a plastic process both of language and of the mind. There are more semantic nuances that can be detected than the mere technical contents within these spoken texts. Finally, the recurrence of Beethoven’s name during the conversation deserves some investigation no less.

*He is real*

There is something uncanny when performers utter statements on behalf of the composer, whether the latter is still living or has long passed away. Performers often express their own opinions as if these belonged to the composer. This internalisation of the composer as a public persona appears to have allowed performers an appropriated authority to speak on behalf of the composer. In contrary, composing is often done in solitude as a private activity. Other than the composer who also performs, the musician in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries became the spokesperson for the composer. In the conversations with the Julliard String Quartet, I have detected that the performers have been able to convey the thoughts and decisions formed and made by the composer. The musicians also reveal the emotions that accompanied the composer’s actions and reactions. Each of them would then inform readers of how Beethoven composes, how he directs material, how he questions and even feels about the musical material.

From the score of examples (see Appendix), readers are told that Beethoven was ‘unsatisfied’, ‘dazed’, ‘finding his way’ and needed to do ‘something else’ about the music.\(^{74}\) The performers explain that, as part of the compositional process, changes to the dynamics and tempi were made by Beethoven in order to increase or decrease musical tension especially for the first movement of Opus 59 No. 1.\(^{75}\) The musicians account for this alterations thinking that Beethoven needed to create space or to resolve the movement.\(^{76}\) The performers uphold the authority of the composer by using action words like ‘shows’, ‘brings’, ‘reminds’ and ‘wants’.\(^{77}\) In fact, what the composer ‘wants’ has been a prime concern to the musicians with their self-assurance felt throughout the conversations.\(^{78}\) On interpreting the three quartets, the string players seem to have internalized the intentions and even the personality of the composer. If we remember that symbolic relations are formed by the presence of alterity within oneself, then the

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74 Ibid. 45, 131 and 140.
75 Ibid. 131 and 142.
76 Ibid. 142-145.
77 Ibid. 144-145.
78 Ibid. 54 and 207.
musicians’ expression of the composer and the composition becomes a strong case of real extimacy. There is inherently a perverse form of conveying one’s own thoughts as belonging to the composer. The following remark is a good example of a musical extimacy between the nineteenth-century composer and the twenty-first-century performer.

It’s also possible the way he wrote the recap, when he put in those keys, he realized: “Gee, I don’t really have to sit around writing accidentals all day long. I can make life easier for myself.” He learned. [laughter]79

The performer here engages in an act of role-playing, pretends to be Beethoven and posits himself in the creative thoughts and labour of the composer. The pronoun ‘he’ becomes internalised as ‘I’ and the symbolic musician appropriates the modern day slangs of ‘gee’ and ‘all day long’. On the psychoanalytic order of the real, perversion reveals itself through the laughter at the end of the disguise. The metonymic displacement of the composer by the performer becomes a return of the repressed, where the performer really wants to be creative instead of re-creating what the composer has notated. In summary, I have shown in this section how the musicians’ usage of pronouns to describe musical interpretation and performance is part and parcel of an unconscious process of working through extimate relation with other associated entities. Each interaction whether expressed or personalised is encroached in agreement and antagonism, which are forms of psychical resistance that are plastic and tangible to sociolinguistic forces.

5.4 Conclusion: Performative Beethoven

In this chapter, we have analysed the semantic negotiations performed by chamber musicians with respect to their psychical and social positions. Their perspectives of Beethoven’s musical meanings, which have been adopted unconsciously, differ drastically from those of the composer himself and those of the analysts. Instead, the intimacy expressed through their physical and spoken language shows a performative perversion of conventional semantics. From the auto-ethnography of the Belcea, the Elias and the Julliard string quartets, we can pinpoint distinct instances of plastic extimacy. I have suggested that the musicians’ concerted ability to verbalise their

79 Ibid. 211.
psychical experiences is a result of the habituation of these corporeal affects as well as the transformation of musical thoughts into spoken text qua notation.

Buttressed by the material maturity of Beethoven’s music, the performer’s habituated form of plastic resistance could be traced not only from the performer’s ‘gift of the gab’ or linguistic capability to articulate desirable and undesirable affects, but also from their preference for and frequency of different pronouns used during their conversations, which are fairly intimate socially and psychologically. Whether the musicians are expressing their views during rehearsals or on social media, the developed habits of psychical perversion and externalised intimacy evince a plastic extimacy from both the performing subject and the musical object. The metonymic displacement of sonemes – whether as sounds, words or gestures in all of the aforementioned cases – creates a psychopolitics between the act of performing and that of meaning-making. On an unconscious level, the plastic resistance arising from the musician-musicologist, who is both a performing subject and a notating subject, establishes an epistemology that transforms the historiography of the composer’s life and music from that which is practised by his biographers. This alternative form of musical knowledge reveals the resistive effects of a performative perversion.
Conclusion: Beethoven Plastic

Music has the power to give its makers and auditors alike a profound sense of their own identities, to form a kind of precious materialization of their most authentic selves, in the mode of both personal and group identity. But at the same time music has the power to alienate the sense of both types of identity by carrying its makers and auditors across thresholds of difference that unsettle the sense of identity and may even undo it altogether.- Lawrence Kramer¹

Music has the ability to give identity to both its makers and auditors. At the same time, music also bears the plasticity to undo the selfsame identity materialised in the process. In this transformative operation, music embodies an inherent resistive quality to create and destroy identities as well as the meanings associated with the identities. What authenticates or alienates the musicking self would then be the transformability of aesthetic affects by the musical unconscious. Unlike its material or digital counterparts, the musical unconscious, as an entity that combines the effects of the psychical unconscious and the aesthetic unconscious, has hitherto not been explored within musicology.² As an original concept, the musical unconscious takes its detailed and dramatic characteristics after the physical dynamics of archaeology and geology as well as the forms and contents of aesthetic foundations. The various methods of psychical and political analyses in this thesis have been crucial to eke out the repressed meanings attributed unconsciously to the musical object by the musicking subject.

In order to carry out these analyses, I have isolated the agency of resistance as the object of scrutiny. Resistance has been interrogated for its ability, or lack thereof, not to be affected by the undesirable. Accordingly to this particular definition, the ability to resist is correspondingly inversely proportionate to that of being affected. Affect, via the Anstoss and extimité in the Fichtean and Lacanian schools of thought, is a form of deceptive impetus acting as a cautionary catalyst against the powers of resistance. The presence of such an emotive element, whether in the psychical or aesthetic guise, subsists on the operation of the unconscious, thereby giving rise – aufheben – to a psychopolitical context of meaning-making. In other words, resistance

that is caught up with the affective is not only political, but also psychopolitical. With the self-positing of one’s affects, resistance always begets resistance.

Resistance in both its psychical and aesthetic states interrupts or disrupts the work of analysis, which, in the case of music studies, can be extrapolated to include performative and auricular analyses in addition to textual analysis. As argued in this thesis, composers, analysts and performers all exhibit certain amount of resistance through their respective sketches, schemas and speech-acts. When these three and other modes of expressions are commingled in tandem vis-à-vis a single composer’s oeuvre or a single piece of music, each of these resistances imbues a certain plastic quality to the signifying process. In short, musical semantics is also affected. Not only does musical meaning change in the hands of the musicking subject, but its resistances also become creative and destructive, inclusive and extractive at the same time. More than a mere relation, a plastic resistance becomes the cause and effect between the individual and the institution from which musical meanings are negotiated.

An epitome of this phenomenon can be observed in the business interactions between Beethoven and his British publishers mentioned in the second chapter. In their socio-economic dealings, the decisions of the composer, the publishers as well as the musicians who purchased and performed the music act as the determinants of creative and destructive plasticity. Inherent between the aesthetic negotiations of musical topics and technicalities are the affectability of – and the ability to be affected by – potential economic and reputational losses. The risks undertaken as preventive measures against these losses are often the undesirable aspects of the business exchanges. The music composed, distributed or performed therefore has been vetted or censored by the unconscious resistances from different individuals. There is therefore no singular version of Beethoven’s music even within the shortest distances and fleeting moments. Not excluding the geopolitical implications of the Napoleonic Wars, such a revisionist account of musical events in early nineteenth-century Britain should highlight how psychopolitical causes and effects have been neglected in previous historical writings.

That is, beyond the reductive notions of musical commodification and its commodifiability (vis-à-vis its production and profitability), psychical and aesthetic resistances amongst human interactions and knowledge formation, political or otherwise, have been overlooked. Whether these resistances are plastic or provisional, the

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3 As a disclaimer, these discussions pertain mostly to the contemporary ‘developed world’ and are completely disjunctive with historical and non-urbanised cultures. Will Straw, ‘Music as Commodity and Material Culture’, *Repercussions* 7-8, 1999-2000, 147-172; Timothy D. Taylor, ‘The Commodification of Music at the Dawn of the Era of “Mechanical Music”’, *Ethnomusicology* 51(2), 2007, 281-305.
epistemological trajectories that direct the unfolding of history are very much predicated on psychosocial experiences that are capable of being represented or even imagined. If one had not experienced the psychological responses to, say, the delicate timbre of the harpsichord or fortepiano, or the versatility of the string instruments in different places and times, one’s history and philosophy of music would be deemed more imaginary and parochial than empirical. Henceforth, what remains pertinent to our study is the critical ethics of discerning the epistemological limits Beethoven scholars past and present have used to shape historiography.

At the core of this research is fundamentally what I propose as the psychopolitical theory of plastic resistance. This is a politics that is persistent on the transformability of affects – physical, metaphysical and textual. As illustrated in the last three chapters, the methodologies adopted by musicologists and performers have tremendously influenced how Beethoven and his music come to be understood in the past twenty years. I contend that the frameworks used to contextualise Beethoven’s music engender a structural resistance against something undesirable, which, in the signifying process, transforms and makes plastic the meaning of Beethoven’s music. When contemporaneous and later readers of the sketches or the scores come to apprehend these unique circumstances, an epistemological psychopolitics arises with respect to an Adornian authenticity of the musical truth content or the meanings musicologists and musicians derive from their personal acumen and experiences. As argued in the third and fifth chapters, these ontological tensions generated from the aesthetic affects can be intimate or extimate, implicit or explicit, direct or indirect. There is no alternative resolution but to understand the discursive ambivalence via an epistemological mastery against plastic resistance.

Instead of adhering to the critical practice of masterly listening, the auditor who listens awry enacts a psychopolitical act that situates musical meaning against the generic and objective grains. In his treatment of modern German musical culture, Schwarz oscillates meaning between the private and the public, the authentic and the aesthetic, and the text and the context. Such an analytic approach embodies the semantic plurisignification in trying to be inclusive, but resistant at the same time. In the

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6 David Schwarz, Listening Awry: Music and Alterity in German Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006, xii.
fourth chapter, I have suggested that the proper act of musical analysis is analogous to a psychotic act that misrecognises or misidentifies oneself for the other – the affective, ethnic, or sensible others in Schwarz’s cases – despite the persistent attempts to fix a signified to the signifier. Such a resistance is highly plastic where each and every identity is thwarted and transformed by the very next one. Even if we were to listen naturally, there exists no singular Beethoven, but many competing versions of Beethovens. By way of a conclusion, I will suggest some possible directions this research could go by expanding on the macro-historical narratives from the first chapter.

From as early as 1800, Beethoven’s music and reputation have been exposed beyond Vienna across the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, when reading E. T. A. Hoffmann’s anonymous review of 1810, readers of the music review from the past, or any news articles for that matter, should err on the side of caution when lifting words out of social, linguistic and historical contexts, because it must be highlighted that the author himself might have neither the musical sensibility nor communal popularity at this moment in time. Hoffmann, recently hired to write for the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung periodical (and as neurotic as to adopt Mozart’s middle name as his own), would most likely have sung high praises to Beethoven and his masterpiece in exchange for some respectable foothold within and beyond the aristocratic literati of Kenneren and Liebhaberen. This response could be solicited regardless of how undesirable the music might have been for him. Whether his proposition stemmed from a pro-Germanic nationalist standpoint or a triumvirate ‘world-making project’, Hoffmann was at least unconsciously trying to establish an imagined institution of musical criticism via his prestigious editorial position.7

Given the international popularity of the Italian Luigi Cherubini and the French George Onslow, to name but two talented and contemporaneous non-German composers, what certitude can we attribute to Hoffmann’s appraisals of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony? Calling Mozart and Haydn the ‘creators of modern instrumental music’, Hoffmann’s plastic resistance appears to work against the inclusive agenda by exaggerating the Romanticism or even the supremacy of the imagined Viennese trio.8

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Hoffmann could have invented his own aesthetic world-making, including and excluding musical substrates as his social imagination allowed for. An argument against this stance could be that Hoffmann’s ideas have been influenced communally by the discussions that were taking place at the semi-public salons and other private gatherings. However, the magazine’s wide regional influences as well as the unethical fabrications about Mozart’s life by Friedrich Rochlitz, the erstwhile editor of the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung, strongly buttress the institutionalisation of a proto-Germanic canon. Whether these actions have been undertaken as self-defence or plastic resistance against the Napoleonic forces, more psychopolitical investigations are required.

Further, the publication acted as a mobile distribution of secondary knowledge, mediating the music through the text and the sounds through the script. Whilst only a few fortunate people, excluding Hoffmann himself, had the opportunity to hear the Symphony performed live, several others were able to read or hear about it in words. That said, literacy in late eighteenth-century Germanic states was not as widespread, plus harsh criticisms against Beethoven’s music and the romantic usage of the language had prevailed, therefore Hoffmann was in fact facing a relative strong resistance in bestowing such flattery on Beethoven’s music. Precisely because the experts displayed their disagreements blatantly while the musical and literary subalterns harboured their reservations unconsciously, the resistances surrounding Hoffmann’s critique of the Fifth Symphony are socially plastic.

In stark contrast, the public eulogy written by Grillparzer and delivered by the actor Heinrich Anschütz in 1827 was a public oratorical performance without institutional resistance. Although as many as twenty thousand people are believed to have attended Beethoven’s funeral, the oration performed at the gates of the Währing cemetery was certainly audible to a much smaller group of people. For the audiences caught within what Durkheim would call the collective effervescence of the Beethovenian deity, the orator was acting in the form of a shamanic agent to mourn on their behalf. The mediator conflates the psychoanalytic subject, that is, the real Beethoven who has died, with the mythogenic subject, that is, the imagined Beethoven

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9 Strangely, why was the music of the Prussian C. P. E. Bach left out of the appraisal? It is most likely that music of living composers were more highly prized in the nineteenth century than those who had already died; moreover, the composer who does not perform or conduct is more of a recent phenomenon in the history of Western music.


who lives on in the people’s hearts and minds. These two entities emphasize the very
division of the corporeal from the structural aspect of the subject. Beethoven’s body,
vital and musical, ‘cannot be represented, [and] is not of the order of fantasy’; what has
been articulated does not reflect but resist against it.\textsuperscript{12} The opposite is thereby true; that
the contents of Grillparzer’s eulogy – the denial of Beethoven’s misanthropy and apathy
as well as his acclaims towards the composer’s affinity for the sublime and the
superhuman – are completely imagined, sheer fantasy.

In a similar fashion, the many diaspora across the Atlantic in contemporaneous
New England were devotees of the transcendentalist ideology of individualism. As
mentioned in the opening chapter, the congregations helmed by John Sullivan Dwight,
Margaret Fuller, and Christopher Pearse Cranch, amongst others were formulating their
unique interpretations of the symphonies autonomously. Each person was constructing
their narrow worldview of the music in accord to their personal agenda. Historicised as
a utopian zeitgeist, this ‘semiophilic’ community could be perceived as espousing an
extractive resistance against the meaning of Beethoven’s music. Precisely because each
individual could develop a different semantic strand out of the exact same piece or
performance, an individuated sense of musical re-composition could be achieved. This
manner of semantic plasticity, I contend, corresponds to the psychical structure of
hysteria where, unlike the fantasm who invents ex nihilo, the subject rearranges existing
material to construct new perspectives and values. This is an act of interpreting awry
when such hermeneutical excesses became rife.

The opposite of this generative effect of meaning-making could be evinced from
Eggebrecht’s performance of Beethoven’s ‘Moonlight’ Sonata in Crimea during the
Second World War. Amidst the sounds of soldiers shouting and victims sobbing,
Beethoven’s early composition was broadcast through the geopolitical borders of
German-occupied Simferopol. The juxtaposition of performance and place results in an
affective politics of plastic resistance. Eggebrecht qua a war-time ‘shamanising subject’
conjures up a destructive resistance against the imaginary romantic intentions of the
composer as well as a creative resistance against what Kinderman considers to be the
real ‘unremittingly tragic character’ of the Sonata’s cohesive semantics.\textsuperscript{13} That is,
Eggebrecht’s broadcasts subsumed under the military contexts pervert musical meaning
to the extent of foreclosing all other interpretations of the work. The selfsame general

\textsuperscript{13} Kinderman, Beethoven, 81-82.
consequences are also applicable to the events occurring before and after the performances.

With the rise of the biography in the early twentieth century, a definitive set of semantics became institutionalised and standardised to fit Beethoven’s life and music around the socio-political happenings of the times. While Jolivet’s Beethoven of 1943/1955 grew out of the affects of the French resistance against Nazi occupation, Rosen’s legacy derived from the ‘classical style’ in the 1970s was most certainly a by-product of American imperialism. Through his monograph, Jolivet managed to manipulate the affectability of the Germanic Beethoven qua the undesirable amidst a wartime atmosphere of anti-German sentiments. Jolivet’s naturalist and alterist perspectives induced an auricular propensity that shaped the epistemological resistance against Beethoven and his music, especially in the late symphonies and the Missa Solemnis. Likewise, Rosen’s fantastic and piecemeal analyses from a performative consciousness erected a structural resistance that changed the readers’ perceptions of the piano sonatas and concerti. In both of these semiophilic cases, Beethoven whether as hero or hysteric has been shaped through the affects and abilities of an individual – translated philosophically as the subjective ‘will’s and the objective ‘can’s.

While the affective turn has very much been influenced by the notion of the musical will as derived from Schopenhauer and Deleuze, the ablest discourse on the Euroclassical repertory has hitherto not been examined critically. What has thus enabled Jolivet and Rosen to resist the desirable and undesirable aspects of Beethoven’s music is their ability to act, reflect, and posit oneself with respect to the sound object and its meaning. This is the psychical phenomenon that I have discussed throughout this thesis. However, that which is supporting the plasticity of their deed-actions lies in the agency of the political. Jolivet and Rosen were without doubt benefactors of Western imperialism on the parts of the French and the United Statean governments respectively. Along with the rest of their intellectual counterparts, they remained perpetrators of the imperial-capitalist imposition of knowledge upon the rest of the Francophone and Anglophone world.

14 I know this because, as a music student in 1990s Singapore, I was at the receiving end of such indoctrination.
Along a similar historicist trope, old debates have been revived and transformed across geopolitical and linguistic boundaries since the Tendenzwende of the Germanic milieu in the final decades of Dahlhaus’s life. Taruskin’s eventual ignorance or misrecognition of Dahlhaus’s historiographic conservatism received its due resistance in the intellectual rejoinders from the Oxbridge affiliates in The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini. Strangely, none of the specialists in the long reception history of Beethoven’s music has been asked to contribute to the debate. In this thesis, I have re-instated them in their rightful positions as the contemporary inventors of Beethoven and his historiography: Kofi Agawu, Barry Cooper, Martha Frohlich, Lewis Lockwood, Michael Spitzer, Robert Winter, and also the Belcea, Elias and Julliard Quartets. On their own terms, they join the long list of writers and performers in enacting the plastic resistance surrounding the Beethoven myth.

In one way or another, these sculptors of contemporary Beethoven historiography are entangled in the plastic resistance of knowledge production themselves. The scholars working on Beethoven’s sketches are restricted not only by the materiality of their objects – the paper, the ink, and the glue – but also the institutional access available to them so that they can analyse and distribute their findings through the publication of facsimiles, for example. Barry Cooper, Martha Frohlich and Robert Winter, amongst others, have transformed the erstwhile extractive institution of historically ‘authentic’ movement into an inclusive field of archival musicological studies. Based on their meticulous comparisons of Beethoven’s creative process, the poetics of musical mastery, fantasy and hysteria have been revealed via the composer’s neurotic alterations and permutations of his initial musical ideas. To the extent that there exists a linear developmental trajectory of psychical creativity accounted for by Lacanian psychoanalytic discourses, Beethoven’s compositional process is itself a psychopolitical act of resistance against the reified techniques and material stemming from the Baroque and Classical traditions. Such an aesthetic system has inevitably increased the plasticity of musical semantics for auditors over the past two hundred years, regardless of their musical training and mastery.

That said, the analysts who have relied solely on the notated text practise a different form of psychical resistance that objectifies the meaning of the individual pieces more than diversifying its semantics. The topical, ecological and metaphorical methods as preached by Agawu, Clarke and Spitzer respectively are predicated on the plasticity of hermeneutic possibilities. The ability to create and destroy the epistemological forms of the soneme, or the meaning of a musical object, is itself a
semantic resistance, one that I have argued as espousing the effects of psychosis. In the same chapter, questions pertaining to the (anti-)natural order of Beethoven’s late style have been posited in contention with the accidental resemblances of the analysts’ interpretations, which are at times prescribed as coherent systems in music history. Such acts of dissembling knowledge are plastic and psychotic at the same time, and often manifest themselves within the extractive institutions of musicology.

Finally, the act of performing further complicates the politics of meaning-making. As explicated in the last chapter, each performer himself or herself bestows a different psychical understanding of Beethoven’s string quartets. While certain allowances have been given consciously or unconsciously by the composer for a more personal interpretation of the music, it is often the case whereby the performer partakes in utmost liberty to communicate himself or herself in tandem with or without the composer’s intentions. Such a performative resistance against the notated text is itself always already a perversion of the musical discourse. The conventional ‘conversational’ model is therefore not restricted amongst the musicians themselves, but is mediated in a plastic fashion with the composer as well as the audiences. The auto-ethnographic analysis of how members of the Julliard Quartet use pronouns as one among many parameters of musical communication reveals the perverted character of the performative act during the rehearsal process. The intimist performer transforms his or her relation with the music into an extimate display of musical personification and perversion, and establishes multiple plastic resistances against the printed text, the self-positing self, and the auditory others.

The theory of plastic resistance has been instrumental in uncovering and describing the psychical and political agenda behind the various acts of notating, analysing and performing. Spanning from the early nineteenth century to the opening decade of the twenty first century, the intellectual history of Beethoven studies has been encapsulated within the psychopolitical concept of plastic resistance. Via their personal creation and destruction of musical meanings, the different groups and individuals have engendered a transformation of affects and effects. This ability to embrace and resist that which is undesirable is thereby predicated on the plasticity of not only the musical unconscious, but also the meaning of the musical object. ‘Beethoven plastic’ as a musicological neologism would definitely demarcate an appropriate line of resistance against the ever-changing historiography that has affected Beethoven and his music.
GLOSSARY

**Affect:** emotions and feelings which are dissembled and deceptive on the symbolic order

**Anstoss:** check and impetus to the critical practical act of the I; feelings

**Deed-action:** the original unity of self-consciousness as the product of the selfsame I as both fact and act

**Extimacy:** an external entity internalised by the subject and exhibited as desire; a plastic intimacy

**Imaginary:** one of three psychoanalytic orders; functioning as ego-formation in the domain of the image, imagination and deception

**Museme:** the basic unit of musical expression which in the framework of one given musical system is not further divisible without destruction of meaning

**Object cause of desire:** an imaginary part-object of alterity otherwise known as objet petit a that drives desire and resembles a form of surplus enjoyment

**Plastic:** the capacity to give and receive, create and destruct forms

**Resistance:** the ability not to be affected by something undesirable; ‘whatever that disturbs the progress of the work’

**Self-positing:** the self-limiting act of the I positing the self as an I

**Soneme:** unrepeatable unit of psychical meaning of the sonic or musical object

**Symbolic:** one of three psychoanalytic orders; structured by linguistic laws that govern relations (kinship) and reciprocity (alterity)

**Unconscious:** a base structure where repression and resistance of meanings occur
Appendix: Usage of the Pronoun ‘he’

Beethoven, Opus 18, No. 1, First Movement, Allegro con brio

45: But it’s something also that evolved in his mind, obviously, because in the first version the sforzandos are still swells – and so he was unsatisfied with the way that was played and he realized that something else needed to be done at that moment.

47: Another factor that’s involved with a lot of the omissions that he made in the final version was that he had in his mind, or at least he evolved in his mind, a much faster tempo.

49: But I think it also speaks to what he was demanding of himself, and what he really felt he needed to do and was compelled to do was to take this work and give up some really wonderful, imaginative writing in order to gain something else.

54: He probably heard people struggle with it and it slowed them down. He wanted more of a flow to the piece, a faster tempo, and he just altered it… / And if you look as he goes along throughout his career, it becomes very obvious to him what he should do with the quartet because he could never do it anywhere else.

58: Did Beethoven conceive of the phrase with the subito piano when he actually composed it, or did it come to him afterward?

66-67: As I said before, part of the reason for streamlining the piece and making the events more playable is because he felt it in a faster tempo. When he came to metronomize this, much later on in his life after the metronome was invented and he realized its importance, of course by then he was deaf, pretty much. He didn’t hear the actual sound, just what was in his head. He came to 54-to-the-bar for this movement. And that, as with many of his marks, is very fast.
123: **He** didn’t want the cello to go directly to the first violin. / Originally, yes, but **he** changed it later. / **He** was trying, I think, to avoid a squareness to that periodic structure.

131: With the buildup to that [m. 85], it gets so frenetic that in a way **he** gets to a point where **he** has to break the tension – where is **he** going to go from the two bars preceding it? **He’s** dazed in a way from this madness, and then **he** is able to gather **himself** together and make a cadence, after that. And that’s kind of how I see it.

139: But you get the feeling that **he** is culminating in something… There’s the sense that it’s growing and growing, and **he** just turns the corner.

140: …that one is finding one’s way as **he** was finding his way. The piece itself maybe is describing **his** own sense of composing it.

142: Why is there a G-6-5 chord in measure 352? All it really is: **he** is trying to raise the tension and **he’s** doing it by raising the bass line. The bass line goes up in steps and **he** could have gone to a B-flat – **he** wants to get to **his** C pedal-tone, right? So the question is: is **he** going to write a B-flat or a B-natural?

142-43: But it’s not only the strong aspects of the theme that is realized here; it’s also the dolce aspect of the theme, which **he** still has to do, and **he** has to create space to realized that later… Finally **he** lets [the coda] make the piece disappear, and puts an end on it.

144-45: One thing that’s quite lovely in terms of **his** resolving the movement: The first time, as you pointed out, that we ever heard [sings motif from m. 94], which was this little variation – it’s how **he** closes the movement… It’s still around. In other words, **he** shows us [sings the opening tune] in 387 and [sings the motif from m. 389] and that’s how **he** brings us in a way to this restful quality of F major which **he** tags the final cadence onto. It’s a lovely memory. **He** reminds you how you got there… I think [the tenuto is] a defensive marking. I think **he’s** saying don’t hit these notes… In other words, **he** wants a melodiousness. In the context of staccato, I think **he’s** saying soften the attack. So that’s how I interpret it.
Beethoven, Opus 130, First Movement, Adagio ma non troppo

207: He wanted to hear the adagio. He didn’t want the allegro at the same tempo, but he wanted it slower.

209: He puts out a couple of ideas and he makes this texture, this kind of tapestry out of them.

211: It’s also possible the way he wrote the recap, when he put in those keys, he realized: “Gee, I don’t really have to sit around writing accidentals all day long. I can make life easier for myself.” He learned. [laughter] … So why didn’t he put in the fifth accidental?

223: But in all of [the late quartets] it has a lot to do with trying to understand his point of view, his circumstances.

224: how could he write a march like that? What did he have in mind? Why did he write that?

228: But he agreed to change it, nonetheless?

229: Also the ability to think abstractly: because the man, removed from his world by deafness and writing for his most abstract medium, which is the quartet, contributes to an expression which levitates in terms of abstraction.
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