A Study on the Possibility of Agency Theology

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A Study on the Possibility of Agency Theology

By

Seung Gyu Lee

A Thesis Submitted to the
King’s College London
For the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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School of Art & Humanities
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This thesis presents a possibility of agency theology. In order to research this issue, the notion of agency is investigated and interpreted objectively. First, the thesis looks closely at German philosophers who have enabled the notion of agency to be embodied, especially Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, who carried out extensive research into agency as a linking factor between subject and object. Then, it examines agency theory, as used by modern philosophers to analyse the nature of human beings, mentality, self and action, which are difficult to construe scientifically.

However, these philosophical attempts cannot resolve the connection between religious, transcendent domains and actual domains. In particular, Barth argues that the divine realm cannot be understood by the rational efforts of human beings. Thus, Barth criticizes the human-centred theology of the 18th and 19th centuries, which states that all yardsticks originate from human beings. However, modern scientific theologians and natural theologians have opened up the possibility of discovering the connecting point between God, humans and the created world through scientific research.

The contradiction between the ability of reason and divine self-attestation demands synthesis. This thesis argues that these philosophical and theological approaches can be synthesized in missiological aspects. However, the history of imperialism has tainted
mission, leading to the argument that mission is now of questionable value. Given the stigma associated with mission, there are difficulties in the mediation and reconciliation of God and people outside of God.

Therefore, as an alternative, this thesis presents agency theology, which links God, human beings and the world. Agency theology is a theology of connection, an action theology which acts to solve concrete problems in the world, and an apostolate theology, which works continuously to transform the world with apostolicity.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my mother, Yeon Keum Park (1931-2013) and my wife Young Lan Lee and my sons Ha Min and Ha Bin.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACC</td>
<td>All Africa Conference of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Christian Conference of Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Church Dogmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Missionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICWE</td>
<td>International Congress on World Evangelism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWMA</td>
<td>Korean World Missions Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAE</td>
<td>National Association of Evangelism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCK</td>
<td>National Council of Churches in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCK</td>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPCK</td>
<td>Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Society for the propagation of Gospel in Foreign Parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Student Voluntary Movement for Foreign Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSCF</td>
<td>World Student Christian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMC</td>
<td>World Missionary Conference</td>
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Presentation of a Problem and Overview of the Study

The effort to connect scientifically and logically the gaps between subject and object, transcendence and immanence and abstract and actuality is fundamental to philosophy and theology. The issue is one of elucidating a moving process between the two extremes. More specifically, it is the task of explaining how human being was formed, and by whom. It extends beyond academic explanations of connections between theology and the world, to involve questions on how current politics, economics, culture and religions are shaped. These issues are central to this thesis. While there may be various methods and approaches to resolve them, I argue that out of many alternatives, ‘agency’ is key.

The term ‘agency’ has been widely used with different definitions and meanings. The key meaning of agency is connection, which implies the presumption that the world should not be understood in isolated compartments. Human beings and the world are always connected into something. Through these relationships and connections, we can identify what is happening in our lives and in our environment. In other words, through the agency that inter-connects the subject and the object, the identity of the subject and the content of the object are revealed. The same relationship can be observed when subject and predicate in a sentence are connected by copula in order to transfer specific meaning. Another meaning of agency can be interpreted by the use of the verbs ‘do’ and ‘perform’.1 In order to find out who the subject is, the subject must be expressed by actions. The

specific actions that present the subject (called Action 1 [A1], [A2], [A3], [A4] … [An]) are the agencies of the subject. The agent is the performer who practices the will and presence of the subject by taking actions. Therefore, scholars who research actions will encounter logical problems if they seek to explain those actions without acknowledging agents. Thus, the materials or properties of action are elucidated by the agency theory.²

Thirdly, agency originates from the subject, and is sent to a particular context where it can perform the will of the subject. Having completed that task, agency then returns to the subject. Therefore, there is no agency without subject and if agency diverts from the will of the subject, it loses its meaning. However, agency is related not only to subject, but also to object. Having been sent by the subject it becomes object and establishes a close relationship between subject and object.

The term ‘agency’ is widely used in various areas of academia. The concept of agency has played a significant role in sociology.³ It is also actively studied in philosophy,⁴ ethics,⁵ education, and psychology.⁶ If the studies of agency are understood accurately and applied properly with regard to the Christian mission, this will open the door to a new

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identity of mission theology. However, the notion of agency has not been extensively applied in Christian mission studies. Of course, the co-relationship between Christian mission and church, missionaries, para-church, mission policies, culture, art and Christian documents are often regarded as examples of God’s agency, and some research articles and books do deal with these forms of agency. For example, in Bruce J. Nicholls edited book entitled The Church - God’s Agent for Change, the church is regarded as God’s main agent, with a key role in the Christian mission.\(^7\) Robert King, in his book The Meaning of God, illustrates ‘agency’ in ‘the dimension of systematic theology’.\(^8\) In addition, we can find research on agents in the field of cross-cultural ministry; for example, in Agents of Transformation: A Guide for Effective Cross-Cultural Ministry, Sherwood G. Lingenfelt regards Christian cultural workers as agents of transformation ‘who bring the good news of the gospel to members of a community’.\(^9\) When we seek a theory of agency consistently applied and embedded into concrete contexts, we can draw on Laurent W. Ramambason’s thesis, Missiology: Its Subject-Matter and Method - A Study of Mission-Doers in Madagascar,\(^10\) but this work, too, does not provide us with an ‘agency theology’ as part of mission theology.

However much we widen our search, it is hard to find comprehensive studies on agency theory in Christian mission studies, albeit, as mentioned before, the notion of ‘agent’ or ‘agency’ does appear in a number of mission studies related researches. Hence, this vital theme requires further investigation, not only to illuminate elements of missiological

\[\text{\textsuperscript{7}}\text{ Bruce Nicholls, The Church (Exeter, UK: Published on behalf of the World Evangelical Fellowship by the Paternoster Press, 1986).}\]


\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\text{ Laurent W. Ramambason, Missiology: Its Subject-Matter and Method (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 1999).}\]
direction, methodology, and theory, but also, as indicated by the title of this thesis, potentially as an important theory of Christian theology.

If the concept of agency could be applied in theology with precise and extensive terminology, theology would become a more elaborated and systematic academic study, with less logical leaps and bounds. Of course, theology uses speculative and metaphysical concepts, hence will rarely give hard evidence, but with a deepened thinking about core terms like ‘agency’ we may also deepen missiological and theological discourses.

The term ‘agency’ can connect logically heaven and earth, the transcendent and the finite. First, agency theology creates a bridge between theology and people. It enables human beings to interpret the world and disclose their true identity, which is the ultimate task of theology. Otherwise theology would fail to demonstrate the relationship between God and human being logically and academically; it would become a vague area, full of abstract words. Secondly, agency theory gives a clear explanation of the holistic content of theology, and facilitates a connective theology by building a bridge between God and human being. Therefore, while considering agency theology as one category of theology, this thesis aims to establish the possibility and potential of an agency theology that connects God, humanity, the world and church.

1.2 The Methodologies and Limits of the Study

11 Herb Gruning tried to disclose the relationship between God and His activity through the notion of agency (Herb Gruning, “Divine - Cosmic Interaction Some Contemporary Alternatives” [Doctor of Philosophy diss., McGill University, 1998]).
In order to move into a new area of ‘agency theology’, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of agency. The term is widely used in diverse areas. This thesis does not aim to analyse every detail or present every definition; nor will it attempt to explain all existing agency models or the concepts of mediation that connects the transcendent world with the finite or the individual with society. The major focus of this thesis is to introduce the concept of agency in placing it into its philosophical history as a kind of preparation for a theoretical foundation of agency theology. It cannot provide a developed agency theology itself. To achieve the rather modest purpose, the main task is to analyse and interpret the concept of agency as presented in the works of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx.

Here, the choice of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx as main interlocutors is guided by the fact that their key ideas relate to the topic of ‘connection’, and they acknowledge the important role of the agent to solve the problem. Throughout his philosophy, Hegel examined how consciousness and absolute spirit are specifically connected to citizen, society, culture and politics. Considering the nature of human being as the starting point for specifying religion and theology, Feuerbach identified the issue of connection between the human, religion and nature. Then, according to his belief that the connection studied by these two scholars was far distant from actuality, Marx expanded the concept of connections into politics and economics. He considered human agency, the proletariat, as the key power to correct and solve the problems of isolation and contradiction. The intellectual inheritance of these main interlocutors provides a foundation to elaborate the theories of modern agency scholars.

Hence the thesis adopts the method of literature review, with reference first to the works of these three philosophers who provided the foundation of agency theory, and then to
the writings of other scholars who have interpreted and structured their ideas. In order to strengthen understanding of the foundation of agency theory, this study will include the background and contextual information of how the philosophers developed their ideas, and will therefore draw upon much apparently indirectly related content. Rather than finding solutions to specific issues or questions, the scholars’ quotes about agency will be explained and discussed. Then, their concept of agency will be examined and compared to the ideas of modern agency scholars. The comparative analysis will help to establish the concept of agency broadly and clearly.

Agency means building a bridge between I and thou, I and the world, religion and society, transcendent being and finite being, or subject and object. Therefore, in order to study the meaning and content of agency, this study adopts the dialectic approach.

Following the philosophical review of agency, the thesis adopts the method of theological review. In particular it examines the ideas of Barth, who criticized 19th century humanism and humanistic theology. Barth clearly pointed out the problem of regarding ‘human’ as the absolute being, showing the limitation in the concept of humanistic and reasoning-oriented agency. In his historical analysis of Protestant theology of the 19th century he used the term ‘the Living Man’, to argue that while ideas, arts, books and philosophers have passed away, they remain alive as a ‘living voice’. Barth was certain that this living voice could be analysed, because the voice is the subject matter of history. Hence, he shows that Protestant theology of the 19th century can be analysed and explained as academic study, and can be a guide for modern theology. Barth insisted that human beings acquire knowledge of the transcendent world and understand God only when God reveals Himself. The statement ‘God reveals Himself’ implies that God is Himself the agent.
Jesus Christ incarnated in order to become the agency connecting between human and God. Jesus Christ ‘the Word’ came to the world as the Word of incarnation and revelation. In Barth’s work the concept of God’s agency is clearly shown to mean that ‘God needs to reveal Himself’ in order for humanity to understand Him.

In the analysis of history, Barth emphasized the role of God, particularly to connect God and the human. His approach was markedly different from the humanistic main interlocutors considered here in terms of connections between abstract and actuality, transcendence and immanence. In fact, the reason for choosing Barth as the anti-thesis to those humanistic interlocutors is that he analysed and reflected their ideas. Then, he clearly presented a new study about faith beyond humanistic boundaries.

From the philosophical perspective, the concept of connect (agency) is ‘thesis’. From the perspective of Barth, God’s agency is ‘anti-thesis’. These two notions are connective concepts from completely opposite points of view. Therefore, in this study, it is necessary to devote considerable discussion to the ideas and theological positions presented by Barth. Taking Barth’s position, the argument of this thesis is that the synthesis of the two positions creates mission theology, a context wherein various theological positions are practiced. In response to the limitations pointed out by critics of mission theology, agency theology is suggested as an alternative means of possible synthesis between thesis and anti-thesis. Thus, the overall structure of this study consists of dialectic structures taking Hegel’s approach of thesis-antithesis-synthesis to explain agency and agency theology. Using the deductive method, the meaning and content of agency theology will be explained in a wide dialectical frame. As Barth made clear the relationship between God...
and human and between subject and object, the possibility and potential of agency theology will be explained in terms of the analogy of relation.

1.3 Outline and Plan of the Study

In order to establish the possibility and potentiality of agency theology, it is necessary to examine the meanings of agency in different contexts, and to investigate how agency theory became specified as an academic theory. Those scholars who have applied problem-solving methods to the concept of agency have limited their investigations to particular side issues. For example, Michael E. Bratman and Margaret S. Archer focus on how the intentions, ego, wills and desires of human beings are expressed through their actions, while sociologists examine the structure and responsibility of agency as the connection between human and society. In other areas (e.g. ethics), agency is associated with the question of how responsibility and justice can be practiced in the world. Such specific issues are not sufficient to build the foundation and concepts of agency theology.

If agency is the connective concept within a relationship, this implies fundamental questions, such as ‘what are connected to what?’ Here, the first task is to find philosophical answers regarding how the ideal world is connected to reality, and how the transcendent world is connected to the world of senses. Therefore, Chapter 2 introduces the German philosopher Hegel, and his explanations of how consciousness becomes reality and how absolute knowledge becomes specific academy, culture, citizen society and nation. The investigation in Chapter 2 demonstrates Hegel’s notion of Entäußerung, as presented in his publications, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, Philosophy of Rig-
The concept of Entäußerung is an important connecting point which enables people to express themselves through labour, and to build human society. This study clarifies Hegel’s view of agency by acknowledging that Entäußerung has become the agency which connects the subject and the object. Although Hegel’s idea of agency attempts to specify and solve the abstract ideas in religion, it is still impossible to completely comprehend the religious mysteries in the world of metaphysics. Therefore, Chapter 3 focuses on Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel, in which he argued that ‘the mystery of religion and theology lies in the essence of human being’. While studying the relationship between religion and humanism and the relationship between God and human, Feuerbach discovered the phenomenon of reversal between the subject and the object, whereby human (the subject) has become the object and religion (the object) has turned out to be the subject. Feuerbach arrived at this discovery with the help of Hegel’s concept of Entäußerung and dialectic approach. However, he made it clear that religion, which is projected by the essence of man, is actually an isolated form of human nature. Therefore religion, God and theology (the object) should be closely examined based on the essence of human being (the subject). In other words, religion, theologies and gods take the role of the agency which describes the essence of man.

One of the major problems in the concept of agency explained by Hegel and Feuerbach is the lack of connection between theology and the specific context of the world and human life. The key elements of the human world are economy, politics, culture, and social structures. The question of how human beings can live without isolating themselves from the world, fulfilling their ability by their labours, is clearly presented in Marx, and Chapter 3 also considers his question of how human alienation appears in the world. Based on publications such as Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr
1844, *Die deutsche Ideologie, Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, and *Das Kapital*, the chapter examines Marx’s ideas about agency.

Chapter 4 examines key theories about agency as presented by several scholars. Connective theory is closely examined in terms of the structures, meanings, and content of agency theory.

However, there are limitations to explaining theological issues using scientific knowledge. Here, we need to consider Barth’s argument that in order for humans to understand Him, God must reveal Himself. As Wittgenstein acknowledged in the later stages of his philosophical career, there are mysteries that cannot be explained by reasoning or science. Barth’s theology departed from the prevailing reasoning-oriented understanding, taking a totally different approach in order to show who the agency is, and how that agency guides the human being to understand the transcendent area. According to Barth, God Himself is the one who reveals His world and His will and He is the agency. Through the process of agency, humans can reason and understand God. Furthermore, human beings can understand the transcendent world through God’s self-revelation. This is the way in which the infinite God relates to finite humanity, what Barth called ‘the knowledge of faith’.

Hence, Barth’s theology needs to be extensively investigated in terms of the concept of agency. Chapter 5 examines how Barth understands the notion of agency, and how he applies it in works such as *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, Natural Theology: Comprising ‘Nature and Grace’ By Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply ‘No!’ By Dr. Karl Barth* and *Church Dogmatics*.

In the history of mission, the issue of agency has remained a constant throughout the periods of emergence, growth and decline of Christianity. Chapter 6 presents the trends
of mission theology from the perspective of agency. In particular, Bosch recommends ecumenical mission as a new mission paradigm. After reviewing Bosch’s ideas, the chapter presents important debates about agency, focusing on the relationship between church and mission. The debate is categorized into several trends of mission theology. While examining the limitation of each trend, agency theology will be presented as an alternative idea to mission theology.

1.4 The Aim and Contribution of the Study

The purpose of this thesis is to establish the possibility of agency theology as an alternative to mission theology. In other words, the aim is to reconceptualize mission theology as agency theology. There are two main reasons for this. First, the term ‘mission’ is heavily criticized today, and has been abandoned by many. It is seen by an increasing number of scholars as being misused or stigmatized, tainted by the expanding imperialism that accompanied missionaries over past centuries. In fact, we are faced with frequent calls for a ‘mission moratorium’ and a radical rethinking of mission. Jeff Cox is probably the most outspoken scholar to have highlighted the close connection between colonialism and mission, in his book *The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700*. For instance, Cox notes that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts

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13 The main officially published calls were by Emerito P. Napil and John G. Gatu. Addressing the National Council of Churches Department of Overseas Ministries in New York, Gatu stated that all missionaries should return home and withdraw completely from their mission fields for at least five years in order to solve many problems in Mission. (John G. Gatu, “Missionary, Go Home”, *International Documentation* 63, [July 1974], 70).

(SPG), and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge\(^\text{15}\) (SPCK) managed slave farms in order to raise mission funds. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) is also implicated in involvement in slavery.\(^\text{16}\) In the early nineteenth century, it was common for slave farms to be given to mainstream mission boards as a donation when the Christian owners returned to Britain. The mission boards did not free the slaves, but kept them, using the income as missionary funds. This example shows that, whether intentionally or not, the imperialist colonialist policies and the mission boards were closely related.

The second reason for the reconceptualization is related to the development of the latest communication facilities and means of transportation, which have caused exponential alterations to the global village.\(^\text{17}\) Since the content of ‘mission’ has changed, it seems anachronistic to keep the same terminology. However many times David Bosch refers to the paradigm shift in mission, can rational human beings who are entangled with the form of language really create a new paradigm? In other words, we should have found another more appropriate word for ‘mission’ but have so far failed to do so. Jesus’ words ‘Neither do men put new wine into old wine-skins: else the skins burst, and the wine is spilled, and the skins perish: but they put new wine into fresh wineskins, and both are preserved’ (Matthew 9:17),\(^\text{18}\) reinforce the importance of what needs to be done.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 36-37, 44-47.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 88. Cox indicates that “the CMS secured passage of the two men to Sierra Leone in 1804. One of them became government chaplain, and the other disgraced the mission by becoming involved in the slave trade.”


This thesis does not propose ‘agency’ as a replacement for ‘mission’, since it highlights only the specific element of transmission, leaving aside numerous other aspects which have been and are covered by mission studies. Nevertheless, our focus on a critical reflexion of the communicative moments of ‘mission’ may enhance our understanding of related areas. Before starting to work out the breadth of the notion of ‘agency’ in mission studies, one has to face the problem that the term is used without much questioning, both in that field and in the wider area of theological studies.

To gain an insight into the semantics and epistemology of agency, we must first make a ‘detour’ to its prominent use in philosophical intellectual history. Three names come instantaneously to mind when we approach ‘agency’ in the history of ideas: Georg Wilhelm Hegel, his pupil Ludwig Feuerbach, and his adept Karl Marx. That is why we attempt to assemble Hegel’s, Feuerbach’s and Marx’s important notions of agency, before we add the thoughts of modern scholars who study agency and, to some extent, consciously or unconsciously deploy earlier philosophical concepts. This approach leads us, of course, beyond the boundaries of mission theology in the modern era, but it creates a philosophical-theological basis for developing an agency theology.

In summarizing the various definitions of agency, we find twelve main types:

1. The agency shares objective and subjective identity as an executer (reflection): Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

2. The agency is the mediator of the object and the subject (dialectic): Hegel, again.

3. The agency excludes self-consciousness and is embodied in culture or Zeitgeist (actuality): Hegel, too.

4. The agency reveals hidden secrets as a discloser (projection): Ludwig Feuerbach.
5. The agency transforms from “I” to another “I” or “thou” or “the object” (objectification): Feuerbach, again.

6. The agency is the transformer of history, the proletariat that activates self-activity (transformation): Karl Marx.

7. The agency is a process of self-creation of the subject as self-activity (objectification): Marx, again.

8. The agency is a logical tool which explains the embodiment of human beings’ volition, desire and intention (causation, reduction): Margaret S. Archer, Michael E. Bratman.

9. The agency is the self and person which triggers certain action and behaviour (causation): Alvin I. Goldman.

10. The agency is the author, the root and the initiator of act (agent-causation and event-causation): Goldman, again.

11. The agency connects human beings with God, Jesus Christ and Holy Spirit. Inside Jesus Christ lie the qualities of God and humans: He is the absolute connector (Kenosis: incarnation): Karl Barth.

12. The agency are churches, missionaries, religions and the world: contemporary missiologists.

In what follows, all twelve types will be looked at. The first three will be dealt with in the chapter on Hegel, the fourth and the fifth will be discussed under Feuerbach, the sixth and the seventh under Marx, and the eighth to the tenth in relation to contemporary agency theories; the eleventh will bring us back to Karl Barth in Chapter 5. The twelfth will be investigated agents in mission by evangelical scholars and ecumenicals.

This thesis will present the historical frame, definition and content of agency theology. In doing so, it will discuss the possible benefits of agency theology. As pointed out earlier,
first, agency theology offers a new paradigm to overcome the problems and limitations of the existing mission theology. Secondly, agency theology points to various aspects of agencies of God, which connect God, humanity and the world. As a theology of acceptance, it does neither exclude nor undermine other stances. Thus, agency theology has significant implications for the ecumenical movement, encouraging people to understand, take part in dialogue with and support all those who undertake the responsibilities of agency. It has potential to become a dynamic theology like public theology\textsuperscript{19}, which links to specific real contexts of our plural world.

CHAPTER 2
ALIENATION AND AGENCY IN HEGEL

2.1 Introduction

The ultimate enquiry of philosophy is about human being. Given the complexity and diversity of humanity, and our still limited knowledge, it is difficult to establish any clear definition of what human being is. Jerome M. Segal believes that ‘human beings are inherently fragmented into two modes of being - facticity and transcendence’.\(^\text{20}\) As a result of such transcendental factors, knowledge on human being needs a premise and a condition. In fact, all theories of knowledge have either presuppositions or conditions, as explained in detail by Keith Lehrer.\(^\text{21}\) Yet, how can we prove \textit{a priori} arguments, given their intrinsic presuppositions and conditions? On the other hand, not every statement is based on presuppositions, regardless of claims to be truthful and academic. Interestingly, according to some analytic philosophers, the subject of humanity is dissociated from the academic domain. Connecting the ‘death of God’ with the ‘dissolution of humanity’, Margaret S. Archer argues that the dissolution has been brought about by ‘social imperialism and linguistic terrorism’,\(^\text{22}\) which she criticizes as key factors of


\(^{21}\) Keith Lehrer, \textit{Knowledge} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p.9, 12, 13. He maintains that “The first condition of knowledge is that of truth. The second condition of knowledge is belief. The third condition affirms the need for justification, and thus requires explication of the manner in which our claims to knowledge are justified. The fourth condition is justification without falsity.” He replaced the word ‘belief’ with ‘acceptance’ as the second condition of knowledge in his extended book, \textit{Theory of Knowledge} in 1990.

\(^{22}\) Margaret S. Archer, \textit{Being Human: The Problem of Agency} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.22-34. Archer explains that “the postmodernist denies human subjects any form of external mastery over society’s development and form” (\textit{Ibid.}, 24), and “humanity was increasingly turned into an entity constituted by language - movement from subject to subjectification and subjugation” (\textit{Ibid.}, 25).
postmodernism. In other words, the metaphysical and holistic human being disappeared from the philosophical domain, and the human being came to be seen as a material which is and can be moulded by social power, structure and ideology. Philosophers have either opposed or supported this postmodern trend, with supporters demanding that opponents elucidate the reason for their opposition in rational and academic ways. Against the trend seen in Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard’s dissolution of humanity and Althusser’s ideological interpretation of humanity, Archer argues that ‘postmodernism cannot dispense with the human being’;23 she believes that the interplay between humanity and practical reality, for which the analytic philosophers offer no solution, should be examined. Roger Trigg, in his own criticism of the dissolution of humanity by linguistic terrorism, argues that ‘when everything is linguistically constructed, language itself will collapse’.24 Analytic philosophers and postmodern scholars, such as Wittgenstein, Foucault, Derrida, Levi-Strauss, Althusser and Lucan, demolish the anthropocentric subject-concept of the Enlightenment because they believe that ‘all forms of humanism are considered to be “ideological” since they distortedly take our wholly superficial subjectivity seriously’.25

In the face of analytic philosophers’ attack on the notion of metaphysics and religious or ethical concepts under the cloak of scientific verification, Archer and Bratman present the agency theory as a way to solve the transcendent and philosophical puzzles of human being. Undoubtedly, there have been efforts in the psychological and philosophical domains. Whilst psychologists have studied the self and analysed human beings as objects

23 Ibid., 50.
of social economics, philosophers have tried to analyse human being. Nevertheless, it seems that with the emergence of agency theory, there was a resurgence in the holistic research on human being. In the philosophical domain, the theory of agency seems to be an important toolbox for clear disclosure without giving up the important factors of human being.

In order to rebuild an agency theory and apply it to the theological sphere, I will focus, above all, on investigating the relationship between the notions of agency and ‘alienation’, since if we are to capture the philosophical meaning of agency, we cannot ignore the philosophical notion of alienation. This is because the notion of alienation can elucidate not only the relationship between the subject and its object, but also how dialectic is related to actuality and agency. Then, I will examine human nature and agency theory. In doing so, I will suggest that agency theory could be a solution to mediate the extremes in philosophical domains.

One of the most difficult problems in the philosophical sphere is that philosophers attempt to verify scientifically and logically issues of the metaphysical world. If such philosophers remove metaphysical issues from the domain of a science, we will lose much of our spiritual heritage, which exists in the process of history or culture even if it cannot be verified. It seems that Hegel never abandons issues of the metaphysical world, just as he never ignores the actuality of the physical world.

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26 Here, I use this term as a paradoxical thesis, by which I mean paired concepts such as ‘God and Man’, ‘relativism and absolutism’, ‘past and present’, ‘infinite and finite’, ‘transcendent being and being-facticity’. The two entities form a paradoxical contradiction but also need each other logically, because if we relinquish one extreme in order to emphasize the other extreme, we would not construe both of them.
Before embarking on a definition in terms of the relationship between agency and alienation in Hegel’s thought, the two notions of alienation and agency will be investigated individually.

The term agency has been used in various ways, from theoretical reflexions to practical domains. In particular, it seems to me that the term is a key tool for construing the concept of mediation between a subject and its object. In addition, if we intend objectively to know or analyse a self-activity or the process of an activity between a subject and its object, where mediation is part of this activity, there we are prompted to the concept of agency. Interestingly, some scholars consider this concept of agency as deeply associated with the concept of alienation, as reflexion and mediation presuppose a form of distancing.\(^{27}\) In particular we find this reflecting on the notion of alienation in Hegel’s *Entäußerung*, Feuerbach’s *Gegenständlichkeit* and Marx’s *Entfremdung*. Through a comparison of how these scholars understood the notion of alienation, I will suggest how the concept of agency made its way into the philosophical and theological domains.

2.2 The Concept of *Entäußerung* and its Relevance to Agency Theory

2.2.1 Introduction

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Entäuβerung is one of the central concepts of Hegel’s philosophy, particularly in his books, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) and *Rechtsphilosophie* (1822). Hegel uses this term to disclose how humans’ Geist and Bewußtsein work in the real world. In his view, Entäuβerung is the crucial key to explain humans’ core activity. Accordingly, I will investigate how Hegel employs this term. Among the English translations, John Findlay and A. V. Miller render Entäuβerung as ‘externalization’, whereas, for example, Georg Lukás translates it as ‘alienation’. The latter English term, however, is reserved by Findlay and Miller (at least most of the time) to translate Hegel’s Entfremdung. How difficult the translation of Hegel’s language and concepts is, can be learned from a round-table debate on the translation of the terms Entäuβerung and Entfremdung. In the year 1910, J. B. Baillie translated Entäuβerung as ‘relinquishment’ and Entfremdung as ‘estrangement’. More recently, Kenley R. Dove rendered Entäuβerung as ‘alienation’ and only occasionally as ‘externalization’. The variations are not solely signs of different language usages, but reveal fundamentally different philosophical viewpoints. It seems that the translation ‘alienation’ for Entäuβerung is the more comprehensive, as it includes externalization. We will return to this matter in detail in the next chapter.

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30 Howard P. Kainz, “Round-Table Discussion on Problems of Translating Hegel”, 256.
To the above mentioned terms *Entäußerung* and *Entfremdung* we have to add a third, no less complex, namely *Gegenständlichkeit*. In Hegel’s dialectic, *Gegenständlichkeit* indicates how the subject or the spirit extends its object or the actual world. Hegel made use of these terms, especially in his examination of practice, world and culture. Hence they have a particular relation to our question of agency.

### 2.2.2 Development of the concept of *Entäußerung*

Hegel did not coin the term *Entäußerung*, but he uses it frequently\(^3^4\) to elucidate absolute spirit, absolute knowledge and the relationship between subject and object. Although we cannot establish the exact origin of the term, the concept represented by *Entäußerung* is widely used in the following historical texts:

First, the concept of *Entäußerung* can be found in the Old Testament. According to Erich Fromm, prophets of the Old Testament used the notion of alienation as a negative judgement of idol worship.\(^3^5\) More concretely, he suggests that idolaters bow, pray and sacrifice in front of the idol which they have made themselves. In this way, idolaters project all their own power onto the idols, which is then reflected by their alienated forms.\(^3^6\)


\(^3^5\) In the Old Testament, Prophets often warn idol worshippers (Hosea 14:3, Jeremiah 10:10, Isaiah 44:12-19, Psalms 115). If we accept his view, the alienation concept can be traced back to before B.C.8C.

Second, alienation can be found as a concept in the Stoics Cicero and Seneca. In this, often legal, environment, the term indicates selling commodities and also a loss or transfer of properties and rights.\textsuperscript{37} The same idea has been used in the Gnostic tradition to describe the divine’s power kenosis into a substantially unrelated and different or alien world. ‘Light [is] seen as entering the alien world on this side, going through it, and leaving it.’\textsuperscript{38} Gnostics also use the term ‘alienation’ as the salvific liberation of the divine spirit or light from its estranged dwelling in this cosmos.\textsuperscript{39}

Third, among the middle- and neo-platonic Gnostics, the concept of alienation re-appears in Plotinus’ works (205-270). It has been suggested that it can be traced back to Plotinus’ emanation theory, which has been translated into Latin using the term \textit{alienatio}. According to this emanation theory, an indefinable entity or first principle came down to form finite beings, with the undivided One reaching out and descending from the heavens into the last resort of the created world. Hence, Plotinus assumes a fundamental connection that is not suspended by alienation. Plotinus also regards alienation as a state of the culmination’s contemplation that the finite being is exalted from its own world to a much higher one, hence describing the neo-platonic return from this bodily world into the spiritual realm of the intellect. The Latin term \textit{alienatio} corresponds to the Greek \textit{ἐκστασις}.\textsuperscript{40} Accordingly, Plotinus ‘always characterized alienation as a state of elevation (\textit{elevatio})’ not as ‘a distortion of the human realm’.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, 23.
\textsuperscript{39} See \textit{ibid.}, 24.
\textsuperscript{40} Nathan Rotensteinreich, \textit{Basic Problems of Marx’s Philosophy} (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 146.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}
These early concepts of alienation encompass a common denominator, a certain transfer from the subject to the object, a concept of an emergence of a subject that concretizes itself into an object or objects, or a move from singularity to plurality, but also, as we have seen in Plotinus, from bodily, cosmic plurality back to the singularity of subject and being.

These various uses of alienation were later adopted in the broader neo-platonic Christian (and one could also add non-Christian) tradition, for example by St Augustine (354-430), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327). Similar to Plotinus, St Augustine and Meister Eckhart regard alienation as a state of kenosis of the divine into the world, and a removal from this world into the divine realm.\textsuperscript{42} Alienation, therefore, is one of the foundational transcendental agents in the medieval period, and serves as a criterion for a mystical understanding that does not dissolve or negate a discursive reasoning.\textsuperscript{43} Thomas Aquinas inherited the concept of alienation from a historically and culturally key connection between Plotinus and Augustine, to which we also have to add Plato’s \textit{theologia} and Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics. Meister Eckhart, with his creative powers, developed Aquinas’ suggestions further.\textsuperscript{44} Apparently, for Meister Eckhart, alienation is the precondition for reaching true life, and is the method whereby

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{42} See Markus Vinzent, \textit{The Art of Detachment (Eckhart: Text and Studies)} Vol.1 (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 6-52.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.} Ludz explains more concretely that Thomas Aquinas uses the alienation concept not only as “a preparatory stage for the real, the experience of God” but also as a connection with ecstasy: “\textit{Extasis enim quondam alienationem impotara videtur}” (‘\textit{Summa Theologica},’ I/II, q. 28 a. 3 ab.1). In the ‘\textit{Summa Theologica}’ he essentially deals with alienation as ‘\textit{alienatio a sensibus}’ (II/II, q. 173 a. 3 e). ‘\textit{Alienatio a sensibus}’ can mean, for example, that the ‘spirit’ of the prophet is illuminated by the light.”
\end{itemize}
God ‘gives himself and enters in with all that he is’.\textsuperscript{45} In this respect, at least for Eckhart, alienation would show the process of flux through which God reveals his properties to human beings and, conversely, how the soul in this world is re-discovering and recovering what she became in the very beginning, an alienation from God Himself, a real being which, despite all alienations experienced in her exposure to body and world, she has never lost.

Scholars have shown that what is called German Idealism has been influenced by the medieval tradition of alienation. When God alienates Himself to reveal His nature for Himself, a concept of theological kenodoxia (Philippians 2:3) inspired by Luther and developed mainly by Fichte and Schelling, and which Hegel sometimes employs in his concept of \textit{Entäußerung}, with further influences from J. J. Rousseau, it becomes clear that God, as in Plotinus, Augustine, Thomas and Eckhart, has a relationship with the world and His creatures through God’s \textit{Entäußerung} of Himself.

Hegel observes concisely the dialectic with which Jean Jacques Rousseau tends to fill the gap between \textit{la volonté générale} (the general volition) and \textit{la volonté particulière} (the particular will), while he also criticizes Rousseau’s key notion of natural philosophy\textsuperscript{46} using the concept of \textit{Entäußerung}. Although Hegel based his notion of \textit{Entäußerung} on Rousseau’s work, which gives him an anthropological and social broadening of the metaphysical medieval detachment, in both his \textit{Philosophy of Right} and the


Phänomenologie des Geistes he goes far beyond a purely intellectual concept of alienation.

On the question of how far Hegel’s notion of *Entäußerung* is connected with the concepts of contemporary philosophers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Hegel makes clear his position in *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie* (1801). In this work, Hegel criticizes their *Identitätsphilosophie* on one hand, while on the other hand he establishes his philosophical system through the *Entäußerung* under their influence.\(^{47}\) Hegel criticizes both the *Identitätsphilosophie* of Fichte, which is based on a subjective Subject-Object, and that of Schelling, which is based on an objective Subject-Object. He argues that they cannot re-establish the identity between a subject and its object because ‘the principle of identity does not become principle of the system; as soon as the formation of the system begins, identity is abandoned’.\(^{48}\) Here, why must Hegel introduce the system, when he is explicating identity between the subject and its object? It is because, according to Hegel, identity cannot be expressed by the application of a mathematical maxim, but only by the creation of the system (*durch die Darstellung des Systems*) in respect of the relationship between the subject and its object. In this respect, Hegel distinguishes his philosophical system from Fichte’s and Schelling’s *Identitätsphilosophie* by combining the two into his own concept, whereby the subjective Subject-Object needs the objective Subject-Object, and conversely the objective Subject-Object needs the subjective

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\(^{47}\) Schelling often complained that Hegel and his followers “ate my bread”, meaning that Hegel’s thought and his followers’ philosophical systems were affected by Schelling’s philosophical system. (Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983], 106.)

Subject-Object. To verify this, we should check whether the whole system is working in the course of movement between the subject and its object. The reason is that Hegel considers the truth as the result which is realized in the form of a system. Hegel presents the norm of judgment in terms of the truth as a system which is actually developed in a completed process between the subject and its object. However, according to Rosen, the problem in Hegel’s system is ‘that the system does not attain validity at its point of completion’, because the system itself cannot be regarded as the complete something or the Absolute, but only as a logical connecting between the whole and parts of the concept. In spite of this, Hegel insists that the science of the Absolute or the Idea must form a system, and throughout his works he never abandons the idea of a system which is a principle of a particular and the universal of philosophy.

2.3 Hegel and the Meaning of Entäußerung

Hegel is one of the towering figures of 19th century philosophy, and undoubtedly influenced later philosophical thinking, especially with his core idea of alienation. His scholarly systems are enormous and to capture the precise meaning of such a crucial term is far from easy. How did the notion of Entäußerung develop in his works?

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Georg Lukács (1885-1971), who, of course, has a particular Hungarian Marxist reading of Hegel, maintains that the term Entäuβerung represents a key notion in Hegel’s philosophy, in particular in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.\(^5\) According to Lukács, Hegel often uses Entäuβerung, Entfremdung and Gegenständlichkeit as terms to embody the activity of consciousness of the spirit.

In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* the notion of Entäuβerung re-occurs time and time again.\(^6\) Among the different cases, the meaning of the term can be seen to be divided into three aspects: dialectic movement, mediation between the subject and its object and Dingheit or Gegenständlichkeit. What we observe in these three aspects is a crucial clue to establish agency theory in association with the notion of Entäuβerung. For Hegel, Entäuβerung can explain the movement of dialectic. In his philosophy, dialectic is a key philosophical methodology which recognizes the transcendent world, a genuinely human existence and the actuality of things in history. In other words, while we observe the process and the result whereby the world of spirit reveals the real world via Entäuβerung, we can use dialectic as a key tool to dissolve the gap between the world of spirit and the actual world. Hence, the principle of Entäuβerung’s movement would be dialectic, which dissolves or connects with the gap between actuality and reason via labour.


According to Hegel, what he calls dialectic is the moving principle of notion which produces and melts the particularizations of the universal.  

He explains dialectic more exactly by indicating positive content as well as negative operation, maintaining that it is this positive content and outcome of the determination which makes it ‘a development and an immanent progress’. Here, we can see not only the function, but also the possibility of dialectic. For Hegel, dialectic can construe the moving principle of thought and actuality. Moreover, by exposing the process of consciousness with a logical system, dialectic holds the possibility to elucidate the spirit of the times in the world.

Furthermore, Hegel argues that ‘this dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but it is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically’. Apparently, Hegel recognizes that the dialectic would explain logically the system of the world and the Entäußerung of the spirit.

However, the use of dialectic in Hegel remains controversial, criticized on the grounds that it ignores the Western philosophical tradition, which distinguishes dialectic and logic. More specifically, some scholars disapprove of the fact that Hegel denominates his dialectic as the science of dialectical-logic. In other words, there is sharp criticism where Hegel uses dialectic as logical regulation. For example, Kierkegaard criticizes that

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Hegel’s logic is ‘an experiment in thought’, which is practiced for mere entertainment. In addition, Theodor W. Adorno argues that Hegel’s dialectic is wrong, on the grounds that reason can be reduced precisely to the actuality of things.

If reason cannot capture or be reduced to the essence of things, and if there is no ring of connection between things and rational thought, how do we explain these relationships? Hegel’s dialectic suggests a new possibility for metaphysics and abstract regulations without abandoning a factor of science. Presumably, analytic thinking has a limitation in construing transcendent domains, so naturally dialectic is needed. Analysis of an object can show how the subject transfers from a natural thing to the form of rational thought. Accordingly, if we capture the holistic actuality of an object, our rational thought needs to reunify with an abstract definition, which comes from the analytic results of an object. To accomplish this reunification properly, we need to elucidate rational definitions in terms of the inner ground of its unification. However, it seems that this elucidation is outside the area of rationality. Thus, the cognition that is caused by analytic thought does not reach the actuality of an object, but only its externality. In *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hegel often mentions that mathematical objects cannot reach actual things, because the objects of mathematics do not exactly correspond with the actuality of things. In other words, analytic thought cannot reach an object itself and its actuality,

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but only its phenomena and shadow. In this sense, dialectical thought starts when analytic thought cannot go beyond an object itself, or arrives at the area of limitation in understanding the externality of an object. Thus, abstract regulations such as the substance of history and the entity of nature cannot be caught or verified by reason without dialectic.

In order to understand how dialectic forms the basis for an agency theory, we need to add the notion of *Entäußerung* and in particular to see how Hegel resolves the actuality of *Entäußerung* through the labour of mediation or the mediation of labour.

Because dialectic and *Entäußerung* are both moving principle of concept, they share a logical connection. The relationship between them is such that they are able to collaborate directly or logically with each other to expose the relationship between the subject and the essence of things or its object. For Hegel, dialectic makes it possible to transform from a form of thought to a thing itself through the *Entäußerung* of the spirit. More precisely, it becomes clear that dialectic is a principle of movement or activity of the entire being rather than of the *ratio* alone. The movement, as Aristotle notes, could be understood as the process of logic, which means its effect of movement that comes from its cause, but it does not exist in the non-physical sense. Hume criticizes that the existing principle of ‘cause and effect’ has a limitation in explaining all movements on the ground of the priority’s principle, which depends on which events occur first, second and last.\(^{61}\) In particular, while Hume observes the phenomenon of billiards, in which a ball comes to

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the first, the second, or the last in space-time, he recognizes that the existing principle of ‘cause and effect’ needs to complete something in order to explain all movements. More specifically, it is necessary to supplement the existing principle of ‘cause and effect’ with the dialectic or the principle of priority in order to understand more correctly the movements of the subject’s Entäußerung, because different results can occur depending on which action acts first or second, in both the physical and the noetic realms.

Dialectic, therefore, is not only the subject that reveals quantitative, mathematical or logical aspects of its Entäußerung in the appearance of things; it also connotes its Entäußerung’s qualitative aspects in the world of spirit. When the subject reflects or activates itself into things, its object will emerge in different results or unexpected figures, because some movements do not take place in accordance with ‘cause and effect’ but would be affected by the contingency of complex movements or the change of actual situations. How can these phenomena be sufficiently explained? The dialectic would open a possibility of accessing whole areas of the world just at this point; more concretely, these movements of its Entäußerung would extend into the realms of education, ethics, civil societies and states. Hegel suggests that dialectic would take a key role in disclosing concretely the actuality of the world through the relationship between the subject’s Entäußerung and Bildung.

Finally, dialectic encompasses both negation and affirmation of movement, in which emerge the substance of things and abstract thought through their Entäußerung. In other words, in dialectic logic the use of negation of negation guides to affirmation, while the use of affirmation of affirmation could reach towards a transcendent level, beyond the limitation of reason. The notion of negative dialectic was picked up by Walter Benjamin.
and further developed by Adorno, even if Adorno had a specific interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic. They consider Hegel’s dialectic as negative dialectic. In particular, Adorno insists that Hegel’s dialectic is dialectic not of Identität, but of Nichtidentität, because he believes that it is toward not an identical unity but a non-identical unity between being and thought, or between the subject and the object. According to Buck-Morss, ‘Adorno internalized Benjamin’s philosophy in an act of Aufhebung, in all three senses (preserving, negating, going beyond) in this Hegelian term’, Hegel’s dialectic cannot remain within the world of the subject, but is oriented toward its other, and encompasses ‘a larger process toward systematic completion’, especially in the Phänomenologie des Geistes. It seems that Adorno’s argument captures the core of Hegel’s dialectic, because Hegel observes precisely the relationship between the master and the slave in his dialectic, ‘Lordship and Bondage’. When we look at that relationship on the basis of Phänomenologie des Geistes, the slave produces and labours not for himself but according to the master’s will and purpose, while the master has strong self-consciousness as he chooses death if there is not any room for freedom. However, the master himself cannot become a free being as long as he does not allow the slave to be a free being, because the master’s consciousness is limited by the slave’s service and labour. The appearance of unlimited freedom is false; the master cannot know real

63 Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, Rolf Tiedermann, Fünfte Auflage, Band 6, Negative Dialektik, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996), 148-149. He insists that Hegel’s dialectical logic is destructive. See the German text, “Ihre Logik ist eine des Zerfalls: der zugerüsteten und vergegenständlichten Gestalt der Begriffe, die zunächst das erkennende Subjekt unmittelbar sich gegenüber hat. Deren Identität mit dem Subjekt ist die Unwahrheit. Mit ihr schiebt sich die subjektive Präformation des Phänomens vor das Nichtidentische daran, vors individuum ineffabile.” (Ibid., 148.)
64 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 170.
65 Ibid., 63.
freedom, but understands himself as free through the fact that he is not slave. Because the master does not admit the slave’s freedom, not only does he dedicate himself to enjoying the product of the slave’s labour and service; he also commits all his own labour to the slave. For this reason, the stronger the right of the master over the slave, the more the master becomes subordinate to the slave. In other words, the labour of the slave is demanded both by the thing, the commodity that is created from the materials via that labour, and by the master; both restart their new roles with the changed condition through the slave’s labour. When the bondsman produces commodities through labour, he finds an embodied internalization of himself in its product. In other words, the slave reflects his inner being from products, and this elevated inner being projects into his products. This process repeats again and again, so he acquires an obvious self-consciousness. Thus the labour is essentially spiritual, and the products, although products of Entäußerung, are in reality products of Verinnerlichung or spiritualization, with the spirit of freedom being embedded in the slave’s product and the master’s orders becoming slavish. This means that the labour is a small creation of God. In other words, as the theistic idea alienates in nature, human beings disclose their inner being to the actual world through their labour. In the first step, a bondman has a simple relationship with his master through the thing; gradually he grasps the spirituality in the thing and this simple material relationship transfers to a spiritual relationship with the master. Accordingly, Hegel maintains that: ‘Through this recovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own.’\footnote{Ibid., 149: “Es wird also durch dies Wiederfinden seiner durch sich selbst eigner Sinn, gerade in der Arbeit, wohin es nur fremder Sinn zu sein scheint.”} When we look at the relationship between the slave and the master in historical actuality, there is a real possibility that the slave produces or keeps
continuously the same status of slave, while the master maintains his own circumstance unchangeably as a master. However, Hegel believes that the slave is getting more freedom in terms of natural things through his labour, while the master is no longer a free man because he cannot sustain his life without the slave’s service. Ultimately, the slave becomes a master of all natural things via his labour, but the master transfers his free will to the state of bondage and will be a slave in terms of natural things. This phenomenon of spirit’s Entäußerung emerges into the lives of both master and slave through the dialectic movement in the whole system of history.

In this example of master and slave, what we should notice is that the relationship between dialectic and Entäußerung points to the actuality of the world and the importance of mediating stages, such as labour, history, culture and education within societies, states or nations.

In conclusion, through the investigation of the relationship between dialectic and Entäußerung as a movement not only of spirit, we can adumbrate the philosophical world and the actual world as a system of history. Hegel never ignored the fact that dialectic is a principle of the movement of Entäußerung, but he progressively extended the idea that the tool of dialectic could clarify Entäußerung’s movement of spirit in a universal sense. In addition, the dialectic would be dissolved if it did not bridge the gap between historical actuality and the abstract world through labour of self-consciousness.

2.4 Actuality and Dialectic
As we observed above, for Hegel’s dialectic actuality is a core notion in elucidating the relationship between thought and an object, as dialectic indicates that the subject orients its object to (the) other(s) and (the) other(s) to the subject beyond any pure logic. Such bridging he conceptualizes using the term ‘actuality’.

In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel states that ‘What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.’68 This idea encompasses how, in an encounter of rational thought and object, they interact with each other. Hegel emphasizes that thoughts are deeply associated with *Dasein*; the thoughts and *Dasein* seek unity, but are unable to achieve it because they are in a dialectical process.69 As seen Adorno’s negative dialectic, thought and actuality cannot identify each other, but the proper self-sublation can bring about a development and progress of philosophy in dialectical process. Hegel provides the insight that in the process of history or spirit reality and reason do not have to be the same, as in a mathematical formula. Here, the question is how to translate the term *wirklich*, whether by ‘real’, or by ‘actual’. For some interpreters, the difference between ‘actual’ and ‘real’ is a sharp one, 70 and the translation of *wirklich* as ‘real’ has even been called

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68 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 10: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig”, (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke in Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft*, Klaus Grotzsch und Elisabeth Weisser-Lohmann, vol. Band 14,1, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821) [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009], 14); cf. S.W. Dyde translates this sentence as “What is rational is real; And what is real is rational.” (Georg Wilhelm Fridrich Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, S.W. Dyde [London, George Bell and Sons, 1896], xxvii.) However, it seems to me that Knox’s translation is more acceptable and more valid.

69 See the explanation of Louis Dupré, “The identity of thought and reality, by which the real reveals itself in thought and thought realizes itself in reality, is not static: it is a dialectical process which is never completed.” (Louis Dupré, *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966], 42.)

70 See T. M. Knox in: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), vi. Hegel maintains that “if reflection, feeling, or whatever form subjective consciousness may take, looks upon the present as something vacuous and looks beyond it with the eyes of superior wisdom, it finds itself in a vacuum, and because it is actual only in the present, it is itself mere vacuity.” (*Ibid.*, 10).
scandalous.\textsuperscript{71} In \textit{Philosophy of Right}, Hegel insists that ‘rationality enters upon external existence simultaneously with its actualization’.\textsuperscript{72} It is clear that by \textit{Wirklichkeit} Hegel means not reality but actuality, because the notion of actuality is quite different from the concept of reality. For instance, in explaining ‘actuality’ Hegel refers to Aristotle’s metaphysics, in which ‘existence in act is the full realization of the form in the sensible object’.\textsuperscript{73} Why does Hegel so explicitly refer to Aristotle in this context? The reason is that Hegel regards himself ‘as occupying in his own polemic against Kant’.\textsuperscript{74} Accordingly, Hegel’s position is closer to Aristotle than to Plato, because he considers that ‘there is no “intelligible” world of the beyond to oppose to the “sensible” world, because the sensible world is the thought itself, or “transformed into thought”’.\textsuperscript{75} However, Hegel does not regard actuality as reality like Aristotle does. In Hegel’s perspective, thought transforms thoroughly all things into abstract notion, and does not form \textit{materi\ae prima} into actual reality. In Hegel, thoughts form reality, \textit{Wirklichkeit}, in all its concrete forms.\textsuperscript{76} Clearly, Hegel does not regard \textit{Wirklichkeit} simply as reality, but considers rather that in the encounter between thoughts and things they interact with each other through the process of a dialectic movement.


\textsuperscript{73} Béatrice Longuenesse, \textit{Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics}, 112.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, 113.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.}
If Hegel distinguishes actuality from reality, what then does he mean by actuality? In the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel states that ‘the content of philosophy is actuality’. In other words, philosophy encompasses actuality of the world and things. This is because philosophy has to be produced and to produce its content in the territory of the spirit, as well as to elucidate the content in the outward and inward domains of consciousness. Thus, the content of philosophy is deeply connected with humans’ logical thought, and the actuality which expresses Hegel’s logic and diverse philosophical spectrums. In other words, for Hegel actuality is deeply connected with human thought because only then is it possible for the rational, logical thought or reflection to capture nature, substance and a system of knowledge.

Secondly, Hegel looks the function of actuality as a unity between essence and existence. He argues that: ‘Actuality is the unity of essence and Existence; in it, formless essence and unstable Appearance, or mere subsistence devoid of all determination and unstable manifoldness, have their truth.’ In fact, the tasks of philosophy include to elucidate logically the relationship between essence and its manifestation, and to construe the connecting point between being itself and rational activity. Hegel’s actuality can be defined as the essence which reveals ‘its innermost being through external manifestation’

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and as the noumenon which discloses ‘its nature in the phenomenal’.\(^{80}\) Here, Hegel regards the actual as the essence or the noumenon because actuality unifies essence and its manifestation, or synthesizes logically the inner and outer world of consciousness. Thus, it is not correct ‘to conceive the inner as the actual, and the outer as merely the phenomenal, the fleeting, the unreal’.\(^{81}\) Actuality is the immediateness, the form of the spirit and unity of the outer and the inner.

Thirdly, Hegel sees actuality as the movement of a dialectical process. That is, he regards the actuality not as a fixed concept but as the dialectic of possibility. As we can see in his \textit{The Jena System II, 1804-5}, Hegel understands actuality as a dialectical structure: thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis.\(^{82}\) Dialectical movement transfers from a possibility of thing to a concreteness of thought. This process encompasses the movement of reflection. Thus, the movement of reflection causing the manifold to be unified is actuality. As a result, the appearance no longer needs to be opposed to essence as a territory of being-in-itself. This is because the movement of essence and forms that reflection produces by thought determines the appearance.\(^{83}\) Dialectic has a meaning when the essence of things is caught logically by thought and when the thought is redisplayed into the system of science by the process of dialectic. For this reason, dialectic is not a method but rather an intrinsic structure, a development of the subject-matter itself in the process of \textit{Entäußerung}.\(^{84}\)

\(^{81}\) \textit{Ibid.}  
us from the inner potentiality or possibility to the outer externality through the activity of thought which, in fact, is not notional, but, on the contrary, concrete and actual. Viewed in this light, the dialectic movement is a form of transition from a pure factual potential to a conceptualized actuality or embodiedness. 85 Only through actuality can we understand an external face of what previously has been hidden as unrecognized potentiality, so that we meet the dialectical process in its inner move from potentiality to an external appearance of actuality. 86 This process gives us the power of cognition, which captures actual reality without the process itself being an agent, actuality within which actualization is the agent.

In conclusion, Hegel uses actuality as the content of philosophy, the unity of essence and existence in a dialectical process. In this case, the key question is whether, and if so how, it is possible to connect ‘actuality’ and ‘the content of philosophy’, if actuality is already the content of philosophy. Another main issue is how it is possible to regard ‘actuality’ as ‘the unity of essence and existence’ if actuality seems more in line with existence rather than with essence. The final core issue is whether it is possible to consider ‘actuality’ as ‘the dialectical process’ if actuality is the dynamic realization of the dialectical process. The following subchapter will show that Hegel resolves these questions by understanding ‘actuality’ as a radical externalization of it, or, in his own words, as embodied activity or labour.

2.5 Entäußerung and Labour

85 John Grier Hibben, Hegel's Logic, 98.  
86 Ibid., 99.
As we have seen in the previous section, tasks remain with regard to the ‘in between’, to the relation between dialectic and actuality, between actuality and the content of philosophy, between actuality and the unity of essence and existence, and between actuality and dialectical process. Following Hegel, I suggest that labour is the power of the connection as well as the key to the movement of Entäußerung.

In the first place, Hegel presents the notion of Entäußerung in order to explain his dialectics. He insists that ‘seine Substanz ist also seine Entäußerung selbst, und die Entäußerung ist die Substanz, oder die zu einer Welt sich ordnenden und sich dadurch erhaltenden geistigen Mächte’.

From this we can see that if its substance is also alienation itself and if its alienation is its substance, actual beings must exist through their alienation.

Then, how can the self-consciousness transfer from an abstract idea to concrete shapes of things through alienation? Interestingly, Hegel suggests labour (die Arbeit) as the answer to this question. In fact, labour is a form of activity that shapes actual human beings and society. Hegel regards labour as a step or a process of subject-object dialectics. In other words, Hegel sees labour as one of the mediators between a subject and its object. Through labour human beings would both transform nature to humanistic nature, and regularly unify between nature and humanistic nature. In this unification, a subject

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87 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes, Johannes Hoffmeister (Bamberg und Würzburg: bey Joseph Anton Goebbhardt, 1807; Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1952), 348. There are two different translations in English. First, A. V. Miller translates: “Its substance, therefore, is its externalization, and the externalization is the substance, i.e. the spiritual powers ordering themselves into a world and thereby preserving themselves.” (G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, A. V. Miller [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977], 295). Second, J. B. Baillie has: “Its substance is thus just its relinquishment and the relinquishment is the substance, i.e. the spiritual powers forming themselves into a coherent world, and thereby securing their subsistence.” (G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind II, J. B. Baillie [London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910], 489).
recognizes that he unifies with his object through the self-alienation or the objectification which he expresses in his object through labour.

In Hegel’s philosophy, labour can give form and shape to the subject’s idea of a thing; it is the link between subject and object. According to Hegel, somebody becomes conscious of what he truly is through labour. Furthermore, he insists that ‘die Arbeit hat auch die umgekehrte Bedeutung’, and ‘gegen die erste der ‘Entäußerung’ und der fremden Ehre’. By elucidating this association between alienation and labour, Hegel attempts to reveal the process of dialectics and the actuality of the thing in the world.

Lukács was one of the interpreters to pick Hegel up on his notion of Entäußerung as labour (die Arbeit), which is associated with social and economic activity, and has a complicated connection with the relationship between the subject and its object. Heinrich Popitz also interpreted the notions of Entäußerung and Aneignung through the angle of Arbeit. Both these philosophers emphasize Hegel’s notion of Entäußerung as an embodied actuality, mediated by Arbeit to the actual world. Accordingly, the notion of Entäußerung and Arbeit as expression of dialectical process exposes the actual world. Henry Silton Harris argues that: ‘It is this ‘made thinghood’ of self-consciousness itself that is the deepest significance of the repetition of the dialectic of Perception; and this is the most fundamental import of Hegel’s concept of Arbeit.’ All three interpreters of

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88 Ibid., 148.
89 Ibid., 501. In English, “The work has a meaning the reverse of the first, which was that of alienating and glorifying something alien.” (Trans. A. V. Miller, 435).
91 Heinrich Popitz, Der Entfremdete Mensch, Zeitkritik und Geschichtsphilosophie des jungen Marx (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), 111.
Hegel emphasize the concreteness and bodylines of the dialectical process which is not only leading to, but which by its own nature and content is radical self-negation of, conceptuality, by being exposed through labour. This leads to the discussion in the next section and links back to our outset, namely the need for the agent of such bodylines, a dialectical process which cannot occur in the void.

2.6 Hegel’s Notion of Entäußerung and Agency

2.6.1 Introduction

In the previous section, we observed the possibility of connecting metaphysical thought to actuality, the transcendent substance to the actual world, through dialectic and Entäußerung as an academic science. However, something more is needed in order to resolve the gulf between the existing ‘I’ and the becoming ‘I’. Dialectic and Entäußerung need ‘the mediation of a third term that comprises both thesis and anti-thesis’. Here, the key point is to find out what this third term is, and how it can resolve the impossibility of synthesis. Certainly, neither Fichte’s ‘I am I’, nor Schelling’s ‘absolute self’, can be the third term, because dialectical synthesis must not be a tautological unity between thesis and anti-thesis. Moreover, the term itself must not be vague.

We also need to consider the ‘I’ and who the real ‘I’ should be. One of many reasons is that self-consciousness reveals the second ‘I’ or the third ‘I’ or the multiple ‘I’ in the

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course of world history. However, the ‘I’ in ‘I am a human being’ is not reducible simply to the second or the third or the multiple ‘I’, because the actual ‘I’ intertwines with the external world, its surrounding situations and cultures. To offer a definition approximately congruent with the holistic ‘I’, we would suggest some major characteristics which reveal the objective or actual ‘I’, but this is not exactly the real ‘I’.

If we believe that the actual ‘I’ reveals the real ‘I’, we need to analyse and to synthesise the process of the existing ‘I’ and the becoming ‘I’. For Hegel, it is obvious that this subjective ‘I’ reveals the objective ‘I’ through its Entäußerung in the objectifying process. Here, the question is how to secure a representative of the real ‘I’.

Hegel introduced the term Wirkende, which can be translated as agent, but is better understood as agency. However, the latter term should not be taken as abstract, but as a notion that is as concrete as agent, albeit one that encompasses not just a singularity of one agent or a multitude of agents, but means any agent taken in the broadest sense. Such agency is a third term that provides an answer to the first question, and by being representative of the multiple ‘I’ also answers the second question. This notion of agency can be used not only to connote both the movement of dialectic and the process of self-consciousness’ Entäußerung, but also to resolve the gulf between the two extremes. In addition, it is more reasonable to present the agency than the second or third or multiple ‘I’ in order to define the real or the holistic ‘I’, because the notion of agency more widely encompasses the existing ‘I’, the becoming ‘I’ and ‘pure beings’ than does the multiple ‘I’.

Thus, I will investigate agency as the third term and as a representative of the holistic ‘I’. In particular, as we have seen in the previous section, I will observe the meaning of dialectic, actuality, mediation and externalization in association with agency and Entäußerung. More specifically, I will elucidate the content of agency: 1) the agency as
a performer, executant (Wirkende); 2) the agency as a mediator, and 3) the agency as an externalizer.

2.6.2 Entäußerung and agency as a performer

As we have seen in the previous section, the spirit produces many kinds of concepts through the process of its Entäußerung in association with movements or the subject’s intentions and actions. Thus, in the process of its Entäußerung, we can see dialectic, actuality, mediation, labour, externality and agency as the principle of movement. Here, I intend to consider the agency as performer or executioner that not only makes the contents of the existing ‘I’ embody the actual ‘I’, but also makes the actual ‘I’ affect the existing ‘I’ through the process of the subject’s Entäußerung. In that case, the real ‘I’ is made by the process of dialectical interaction between the existing ‘I’ and the actual ‘I’. All of these ‘I’s indicate the becoming ‘I’. In fact, in The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysic, Hegel mentions that actuality (Wirklichkeit) is produced by the agency (Wirkende).94

Below is a series of three diagrams illustrating agency’s Entäußerung of Self-consciousness as a performer.

Figure 1

The agency’s EntÄusserung of self-consciousness as a performer

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As Figure 1 indicates, the holistic ‘I’ is not a static state but is a movable process of dialectical Entäußerung of agencies; it is not a single person but a mutual relationship between persons and many kinds of the ‘I’. If so, they (he or she) do (does) not exist for themselves (for himself or for herself) except God and transcendent entities. Rather, we know many kinds of information and knowledge or multiple ‘I’s through emerging agencies in the concrete circumstances.

What does the agency as performer mean, here, for Hegel’s philosophy, particularly in association with his Entäußerung? Specifically, what does the agency perform in the philosophical domain? As I mentioned in the previous section, actuality is regarded as ‘the content of philosophy’, ‘the unity between essence and existence’ and ‘the movement of a dialectical process’. This actuality is emerged or made concrete by agency. In that case, the agency performs these tasks which would not be without being performed.
First of all, the agency as performer transforms from the possibility of things to the actuality of things. According to Hegel, self-consciousness reveals actuality of things through labour or Entäußerung of spirit, which gives and takes in interaction with many kinds of external substances. In other words, the agency is a doer of conflicting relationship between being-for-self and being-for-other. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for the self-sufficient agency in the conflicting structure. In particular, immediate knowledge accompanies self-sufficient knowledge, such as ‘sense-certainty, perception and understanding’. And even if knowledge were self-sufficient, without those embodied mediations it would not be what it is. Knowledge, therefore, can never be entirely self-sufficient, unless self-sufficiency is understood as a dynamic process of self-production. All claims to knowledge, therefore, even to self-sufficient knowledge, ‘are best understood as historically situated forms of social practice in which agents seek to affirm for themselves that the structures of their own thought and practice really match up with the way things are, or have to be’. Any agent – and knowledge is essentially and even more existentially, as we have learned, agent – reflects environments, forms of life and social practice as well as a whole range of thoughts, desires and universal self. For that reason, we need to use many kinds of agent to disclose hidden consciousness or emerged consciousness, individual agent, conscious agent, rational agent, independent agent, human agent, modern agent, Faustian agent, practical agent, virtuous agent, inauthentic agent, free agent, organic agent, willing agent, particular agent and self-determining agent. In using these terms, we distinguish Hegel’s terms, that is: ‘An agent who understands himself as part of an “ethical life”, of Sittlichkeit, will also come to

96 Ibid., 20.
understand himself as a “universal self”; his personal point of view on himself and the world will come to be fully congruent with his impersonal point of view on the same things.\textsuperscript{97} However, how have agents been constructed, and what kind of relationship is the one between agents and \textit{Entäußerung}?

When we investigate agency in its various forms, for example in different forms of literature, such as ‘tragedy, comedy and the romantic novel’, which feature in Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit},\textsuperscript{98} we discover the role of agency as performer more clearly in its ‘retrospectivity and theatricality of action and of the possibility for an action's forgiveness’.\textsuperscript{99} In \textit{The Phenomenology of Spirit}, Hegel’s notion of agency has three aspects. First, action might be defined from a voluntarist viewpoint, ‘on which the construal of responsibility ordinarily considers separately two items: an agent's prior intention (or “will”) and the deed that causally resulted or was put into play, as it were, by the agent’.\textsuperscript{100} Second, action might be explained from a corrigibilist perspective, which implies three important factors: retrospectivity, socially mediated character or theatricality of the context, and the construal of a practical identity with forgiveness. With respect to this, thought or self-consciousness develops dialectically into various forms of life because thought or consciousness is reflection, and this reflection ‘always marks a return of a subject into itself’.\textsuperscript{101} Third, an action might be disclosed from a causalist point of view.\textsuperscript{102} The causal account of agency would be much broader, closely relating

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 124.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{102} Allen Speight, \textit{Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency}, 5.
the individual to the action; thus an action might be expressive of an agent. The dialectic of expressivity, then, might be understood as oscillation ‘between impersonal and personal sides of agency’, and agents, in relation to other agents, must be situated in the background of certain actions.\footnote{Ibid.} Agency is a doer to actualize from the possibility to actuality, of things or of the forms of thoughts, because actuality is ‘a self-grounded reality’,\footnote{Alfredo Ferrarin, \textit{Hegel and Aristotle} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 138.} best exemplified by Hegel in literature.

In conclusion, agency as performer means that all agents embody actuality in the road of history. In other words, any actuality of history and culture does not exist without the intervention of agents. If we investigate the appearance of different kinds of consciousness, spirit and idea in culture, civilization and society, we will recognize the actuality of things and history, emerged through the performance of agency. In other words, the actuality is shown clearly by what agents are there at that time. Presumably, all agents reveal their entities not just anatomically but also holistically, which encompasses the subject and its object through the \textit{Entäußerung} of spirit and consciousness within a concrete world of actions.

### 2.6.3 \textit{Entäußerung} and agency as a mediator

What the subject itself presents through \textit{Entäußerung} of his (or her) spirit or mind is another subject or its object. The problem of how the subject is connected to its object has become a key issue among German Idealists since Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. This
problem is whether we accept dualism or look for a connecting point or mediation between the subject and another subject, as well as discovering the mediation that has simultaneously features of both the subject and the object, because then we can see the actual connection between the two extremes. Agency becomes a possibility of the rejection of dualism, as duality ‘makes it impossible to think the unity of the Self and so to determine the form of a personal experience’.\textsuperscript{105} For Hegel, the agency can be a mediator between the subject and its object. In fact, Hegel considers the relationship between the subject and the object as externality within logic. More specifically, Hegel’s science of logic can be divided into two main parts: 1. Objective Logic: the doctrine of Being and essence 2. Subjective Logic: the doctrine of notion.\textsuperscript{106} Thus, I will investigate agency as a mediator between the subject and its predicate, between the subject and its object. I will suggest that Hegel sees the notion of \emph{Entäußerung} as a tool of mediation between the subject and its object. This path of mediation, \emph{Entäußerung}, connotes crucial factors of both subject and object.

Following John Macmurray, we can present four propositions to construe these relationships, as follow:

1. The Self is agent and exists only as agent.
2. The Self is subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be subject only because it is agent.
3. The Self is subject in and for the Self as agent.

\textsuperscript{105} John Macmurray, \textit{The self as Agent: being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in 1953} (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1956), 84.
4. The Self can be agent only by being also subject.\textsuperscript{107}

The first proposition implies that ‘the Self is no longer a substance, but an organism’.\textsuperscript{108} This definition is the existential property of the self. More specifically, Macmurray does not see the logical form of thought as mathematical or analytic, but as a dialectical or synthetic structure,\textsuperscript{109} as in Hegel’s view. The second proposition explains how knowledge relates to action. It implies that ‘there cannot be a pure subject, since this is the pure negation of agency, and a self which does not act cannot exist’.\textsuperscript{110} The third proposition means that any knowledge cannot develop without a prior knowledge. The fourth proposition indicates that ‘there cannot be action without knowledge. Yet action is logically prior to knowledge, for there can be no knowledge without an actual activity which supports it; but there can be actual activity without knowledge.’\textsuperscript{111} Here, what Macmurray reveals through his propositions is how the subject relates and connects to agency, because the subject cannot exist without its action, predicate and object. In the case of Hegel, the above statements are based on the viewpoint of subjective logic, which is a pure self-development. Malcolm Clark sees this self-development as ‘the free, independent and self-determining subjective’.\textsuperscript{112} From this subjective viewpoint, according to Hegel, the subject is regarded as the in-itself and predicate; however, also as determinate being. If subject were without predicate, it would be a thing that is empty without any quality and would show only the Appearance: the thing-in-itself, lacking any

\textsuperscript{107} John Macmurray, \textit{The self as Agent}, 100-103.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 34.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 100.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 102-103.

\textsuperscript{112} Malcolm Clark, \textit{Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from "Vorstellung" to Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).
actual entities. In other words, Hegel insists that the subject is expressed by the predicate in notion because ‘the individual and the particular are contingent determinations in the subject; it is their absolute possibility’.\textsuperscript{113} In this combination of the subject, the predicate and the notion, the question arises as to what the copula is. According to Hegel, ‘the \textit{copula} indicates that the predicate belongs to the being of the subject and is not merely externally combined with it’.\textsuperscript{114} He goes on to explain that ‘if the \textit{is} of the copula were already \textit{posited} as the above determinate and pregnant \textit{unity} of subject and predicate, as their \textit{Notion}, it would already be \textit{the syllogism}.’\textsuperscript{115} This copula as a mediation has a similar character to agency in respect of the connexion between the subject and the predicate, between the subject and its object. Here, Pinkard maintains that the agent as the subject is aware of himself from the standpoint of objective logic on the world.\textsuperscript{116}

Another consideration is that in the objective world, for Hegel, being and essence are elucidated from the standpoint of objective logic. The objective logic that shows the actual figure of being and essence has a deep relationship with agency, due to the fact that agency is mediator of how being has become being and where essence originated from. According to Hegel, objective logic has replaced the role of metaphysics, which in terms of thought alone was supposed have been a scientific construction of the world.\textsuperscript{117} In other words, objective logic is the true critique of former metaphysics,\textsuperscript{118} because ‘every transition from one concept to the next is driven by the effort to elucidate further, not only the content of the concept (what is thereby thought), but the nature of its relation to “being” (in Part 1, Book 1 of the Science of Logic, Being), to something “actual” (in Part

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Ibid.}, 629-630.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid.}, 63.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, 64.
Accordingly, Hegel’s logic is developed from Being to Essence, from things to relations. These transitions can show that ‘there is nothing other than appearance, nothing beyond appearance’. Hence, logic is to be understood as acquiring its concrete meaning only from the perspective of human agency and in the context of human action, or conversely, the ‘agent’s relation to the sensuous objects of the world is therefore primarily practical and not primarily theoretical’.

2.6.4 Entäuβerung and agency as an externalizer

In *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel uses *Entäuβerung* to disclose the spirit. This *Entäuβerung* of self-consciousness embodies the externality or externalization of the spirit. Rodney Livingstone, in his translation of Georg Lukács’ *The Young Hegel*, renders Hegel’s term, *Entäuβerung* as ‘externalization’. In this translation, the term is close to ‘externality’. In fact, Hegel observes the actual world which is made from *Entäuβerung* of spirit or self-consciousness, and then insists that ‘the Spirit of self-alienation has its existence in the world of culture’. Hegel considers the content of philosophy as an elucidation of how the actual world and the current culture or civil society are embodied.

More precisely, the *Entäuβerung* of spirit embodies the externality of the world. This externalization is made possible by an externalizer. For Hegel, the externalizer is

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120 *Ibid.*, 7
122 Terry Pinkard, *Hegel’s Phenomenology*, 49.
objective spirit and subjective spirit. In a wide meaning, this externalizer is agency, which encompasses his subjective spirit and objective spirit, because the agency can make us cognize thinghood or thingness through its appearance by externalization. According to Jean Hyppolite, this thingness that is disclosed by alienation of self-consciousness has three dimensions: a thing in general (sensuous certainty), the thing with relation (perception) and an interior of the thing (essence, the force of understanding). The self recollects this thingness or thinghood in the process of these successive alienations of self-consciousness. Here, Hyppolite observes the circular action whereby ‘being has been resolved into self’ and then ‘self has posed itself being’. Accordingly, the alienation of self shows that ‘self itself poses thingness’ and this alienation ‘unveils the truth of the thing to be the self’.

Lukács also regards Entäußerung as thinghood (Dingheit) or objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit), so he insists that ‘there is a broad philosophical extension of the concept “externalization” which then comes to be synonymous with “thinghood” or objectivity. This is the form in which the history of objectivity is portrayed: objectivity as a dialectical movement in the journey of the identical subject-object on its way back to itself via “externalization”.’

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126 *Ibid*.
127 *Ibid*.
To sum up, Hegel’s views about the subject-object relationship become a foundation of his science of logic. Hegel’s thought clearly has a system of knowledge with objective logic and subjective logic. Thus, Pinkard insists that: ‘In this way, the agent understands himself as the truly independent member of the relation between “subject” and “object”.’

Through externalization of the subject, the individual accomplishes his (or her) existence and purpose. Accordingly, Hegel insists that this Entäußerung of spirit ‘is at once the means, or the transition, both of the [mere] thought-form of substance into actuality, and, conversely, of the specific individuality into essentiality’ (Trans. A.V. Miller, 298). This mediation between a subject and its object through die Arbeit often emerges in capitalistic form. According to Lukács, the capitalistic form of Entäußerung is what Karl Marx, in Das Kapital, was to call fetishism. This matter will be investigated in the next chapter.

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129 Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 50.
CHAPTER 3
AGENCY IN FEUERBACH AND MARX

3.1 Introduction

The ideas of Karl Marx, which elucidate a gap between human nature and the actual world, have had an enormous influence on philosophy, social systems and politics from the mid-19th century to modern times. His own thought was influenced by many earlier and contemporary philosophers, in particular by Hegel and Feuerbach.

The previous chapter presented Hegel’s notion of Entäuβerung in association with the agency theory. In this chapter, I will begin by exploring Feuerbach’s notion of Gegenständlichkeit, and then look at how Marx explores his own concept of alienation. It is through Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel that Marx overcomes Hegel’s Idealism. Feuerbach’s terms, Gegenständlichkeit and Vergegenständlichkeit, can open the way for the researching of agency in more depth. Another reason is that Marx presents agency as creating the actual world, living culture and the essence of religion. Thus, the thought of Feuerbach and Marx will be investigated more specifically with regard to these points.

3.2 Ludwig Feuerbach’s Notion of Gegenständlichkeit and Agency
3.2.1 Introduction

Feuerbach is prominent among the scholars who have investigated nature, religion and human being. In particular, his notions of *Gegenständlichkeit* and projection are deeply related with agency theory, so I am going to discuss his agency theory. Here, Feuerbach exposes how the essence of human being can be exemplified in historical actuality or religion. In particular, he uses the terms *Gegenständlichkeit* and *Vergegenständlichkeit*, which represent the notion of nature, religion and history as a tool of logic. In addition, these terms are basic concepts of the movement which construes the extension of knowledge and the relationship between the subject and its object. As noted above, this idea of Feuerbach affected Marx’s notion of alienation. Therefore, in this chapter, I will investigate Feuerbach’s concept of *Gegenständlichkeit*, which is used to observe the relationship between religion and human beings as a genus. Then, the problem of connecting the subject with its object will be examined. Finally, the notion of *Gegenständlichkeit* will be explored in association with agency theory.

3.2.2 *Gegenständlichkeit* and Ludwig Feuerbach’s essence of humanity as a genus

Human being as a genus, or more specifically genus essence, is a key notion in the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach. In establishing a new philosophy he argues that human being should be the starting point, the sole, universal and primary object, including nature, which is a foundation of human being.132 Here (at least in the later Feuerbach), the

human being does not mean an individual or particular person, but Humanity, a genus essence, the universal being that has desire, feeling and a basic conviction (die Gesinnung) as a sensible person. In other words, a universal character of human consciousness is found by a genus character of human beings, originated from feeling, which is produced by history. This raises the question of how the essence of human being becomes religion, and whether or not there is a logical leap. In addition, this chapter will investigate whether Marx’s criticism of Feuerbach’s thesis is justified.

Feuerbach’s famous declaration that ‘the secret of theology is anthropology’ indicates how the essence of man is transformed into all areas. In other words, according to Feuerbach, the essence of every concept, and hence also ‘the essence of religion reveals and expresses nothing other than the essence of man’. The focus of this section is not to investigate whether this statement means Feuerbach is an atheist, as Hans W. Frei argues in his article, ‘Feuerbach and Theology’. Rather, it is to explore how Feuerbach makes the essence of man transform the essence of everything, including religion. To do so, it is necessary first to explain the meaning of essence.

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135 Ibid.
136 Hans W. Frei, "Feuerbach and Theology", Journal of the American Academy of Religion (Oxford University Press) Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1967), 250-256. Here, Hans W. Frei looks into two types of atheism in the nineteenth century: first, theistic notion or language is meaningless (253); second, “man is in principle nothing more than a collocation of atoms, like the rest of the material world” (251).
For Feuerbach, the ‘essence’ is key to the criticism of rationalism, the critique of religion and a rejection of all metaphysics. By essence, Feuerbach means a censor of philosophy and religion. Thus, the essence is not only a particular philosophical text, but one that is written in a particular time. According to Marilyn Chapin Massey, the essence is created under the circumstance of censorship. Accordingly, Massey argues that Feuerbach’s language is a compound of rhetorical and philosophical elements. However, it seems that Massey’s argument is not sufficiently persuasive, because the notions of essence, consciousness and species occur frequently in the language of German Idealism of that period, as Massey herself notes. Moreover, Feuerbach’s arguments include severe criticisms of the contemporary Christianity; he himself stated that: ‘I was seized - I myself do not know how - by the spirit of German censors.’ For Feuerbach, the essence is the first principle and the actuality of cosmos, history, and nature. He develops his arguments with the essence as the starting point. For instance, the essence of human being as a species projects the essence of religion. Feuerbach gives the example of the circulation of the blood to explain the relationship between the essence of man and the essence of religion:

As the action of the arteries drives the blood into the extremities, and the action of the veins brings it back again, as life in general consists in a perpetual systole and diastole; so is it in religion. In the religious systole man propels his own nature from


138 Ibid., 174.

himself, he throws himself outward; in the religious diastole he receives the rejected nature into his heart again.\(^{140}\)

The idea expressed here is that the human being projects his spiritual life and social volition into religion, which is reflected by human beings’ desires. In particular, the phrase ‘perpetual systole and diastole’ is important in this context, because it reveals how the essence of man interacts with biological necessity with the essence of religion. Feuerbach regards the life of religion as a process of circulation, repeating continuously from fractions to integers, from the real to the ideated, and from thought to sensuous perception unless the body which is constituted a blood vessel has heart trouble or dies. In other words, in Feuerbach’s thought there are no dualistic extremes, but a monistic process to the exclusion of transcendent spheres. Thus, we can call him a monistic dialectician or monistic materialist, because he unites the two extremes, God and human beings, with love or the property of humanity.\(^{141}\)

Feuerbach classifies Hegel’s philosophy as ‘a circle of circles’, which is ‘the symbol and the coat of arms of speculative philosophy’.\(^{142}\) He wants to revise this philosophy to add that the circle should be the symbol and the identity of sensuous perception or sensuous


\(^{141}\) See Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, George Eliot, 41. Love is the middle term, the substantial bond, the principle of reconciliation between the perfect and the imperfect, the sinless and sinful being, the universal and the individual, the divine and the human. Love is God himself and apart from it there is no God. Love makes man God and God man ... Love is the true unity of God and man, of spirit and nature (Feuerbach, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, Erster Band vols 101-102).

philosophy.\textsuperscript{143} This is why Feuerbach reveals the secret idea or transcendent entities as the actuality of history, culture and religion. Accordingly, Feuerbach discloses a secret of religion and a substance of abstract regulation on the basis of the essence of man. For this reason, he argues that the course of religious development, as a development of the essence, begins with the human being, goes to the centre with the species being, and finishes with the human genus.\textsuperscript{144} In order to prove this, he presents many kinds of phenomena which describe in particular the transition of the God of the Jews and the incarnated Jesus Christ in Christianity. In the former case, Feuerbach illustrates that when man lives in nature, his God is a simple nature-God. When the Israelites lived a nomadic life, their God also dwelt among nomadic tribes. Where human beings inhabit houses, they also enclose their God in a temple.\textsuperscript{145} Finally, he declares explicitly that the God of the Jews was made by their volition or desire in the actual world. In the latter case, according to Feuerbach: ‘The Incarnation is nothing else than the practical, material manifestation of human nature of God.’\textsuperscript{146} He insists that ‘the incarnated God is only apparent manifestation of deified man; for the descent of God to man is necessarily preceded by the exaltation of man to God. Man was already in God, was already God himself, before God became man, i.e., showed himself as man.’\textsuperscript{147}

In both cases, Feuerbach thoroughly rejects transcendent entities or gods if the entities or miracles have nothing to do with the essence of human beings. He considers any god that

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{145} Ludwig Feuerbach, \textit{The Essence of Christianity}, 17.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 43.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
does not correlate with man as meaningless. Thus, he attempts to remove God from religion, while emphasizing humanity. Finally, Feuerbach establishes the foundation of the philosophy of the future, of the human being, by the human being and for the human being with the essence.

Thus, in Feuerbach’s philosophical sphere, we see only human nature, be it religion or gods. This fact will lead us further into a consideration of the relationship between the actual world and the imitated world, between perceivable nature and the hidden essence. The consideration here is whether the essence of man can be identified with the essence of religion, and whether the real being can be identified with the ideated notion. Recently, Sarah Sentilles, in her article ‘Misreading Feuerbach: Susan Sontag, Photography and the Image-World’, has discussed whether photography can be identified with its real world. According to Sentilles, ‘like Feuerbach, Sontag argues that human beings have mistaken the copy for the thing itself and, as a result, have created a false division between the copy and the “real,” devalued both the copy and the thing itself, and overlooked the profound ways images affect the world.’148 She explains that:

For Feuerbach, religion is a projection of what belongs to the human species onto God; his task is to use religion to return what rightfully belongs to human beings. For Sontag, photography is a projection of the reality of the world onto an image; her task is to use photography to return our sense of what is real, to force viewers to claim the image as theirs, to recognize that what is ‘out there’ is actually what is right here.149

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149 Ibid., 50.
The problem that arises here is whether religion can reduce the essence of human genus and whether photography can reduce the real world, as the above indicates should be their tasks. From the example of Sontag’s photography, in the case of Feuerbach the statement that ‘the secret of religion is anthropology’ may be persuasive rhetoric. However, my argument is that the whole realm of religion cannot replace the essence of human beings. If Feuerbach regards the essence of the human species as religion, he should verify whether transcendent domains of religion actually exist, and whether the human species is correctly identified with the divine dimension. If Feuerbach cannot logically or scientifically verify this, he ought rather to criticize contemporary religion on the basis of the humanist or materialist viewpoint. For this reason, his religious arguments or theses were criticized by both theologians such as Karl Barth and Hans W Frei and contemporary materialists such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

However, the methodology and notion that Feuerbach employs from Hegel is worthy of further investigation.

### 3.2.3 Feuerbach’s methodology and alienation

In *The Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach intends to show that ‘the true sense of Theology is Anthropology’.\(^{150}\) In addition, in 1848 Feuerbach noted that: ‘All my writings have just one aim, one plan and one object. This is just religion and theology.’\(^{151}\) These fundamental concerns are constant throughout Feuerbach’s works. Here, the key question

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is how Feuerbach can persuasively elucidate such statements. Therefore, I will investigate Feuerbach’s methodology associated with dialectic and with his special terms ‘alienation’, ‘projection’ and ‘objectification’. These three terms of religious consciousness, which are placed at the core of the Hegelian dialectic, are central to Feuerbach’s methodology. They represent very complex concepts in his work, and are interwoven with one another in order to disclose that the secret of theology or the esoteric of religion is anthropology. As Van A. Harvey points out, ‘just as the concept of projection or objectification is related to the formation of the concept of the species, so is the concept of alienation’. 152 It seems reasonable to consider this issue through terminological observation on: 1) projection and objectification, 2) alienation, and 3) dialectic and reductionism.

1) Projection and Objectification: Feuerbach rarely uses the German term, Projektion, but in the English translation by George Eliot, the German terms vergegenständlichen (to objectify), and Vergegenständlichkeit (objectification) are frequently rendered as ‘to project’ or ‘projection’. 153 According to Harvey, projection is a technical term which connotes ‘its associations and logical connections with other concepts in a theory’. 154 For Feuerbach, the term projection encompasses the idea that religion is established not only by objectification of the species but also by self-consciousness or self-knowledge of man. That is, he uses projection as objectification of the species or self-awareness. More concisely, in The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach insists that: ‘Man - this is the mystery of religion - projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an

152 Van Austin Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 32. 104.
153 Ibid., 32.
154 Ibid.
object to this projected image of himself, thus he is converted into a subject; he thinks of himself as an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another being than himself.' As Feuerbach notes, if projection is regarded as objectification, there is no projecting without the object. Furthermore, the process of projection is the same as the process of objectification. Through projection, man could develop his essence and his nature into religion or theology, which is his object. In addition, in elucidating the progressive process of man’s self-awareness or self-consciousness, Feuerbach uses projection as alienation. Strictly speaking, projection means that man throws himself into things or some substances, which conduces to internalization; but alienation, for Hegel, means that man produces his product with things or with subject matters through supplying his labour, which conduces to externalization. These two terms, projection and alienation, indicate different directions, but Feuerbach uses them both as descriptors of man’s essence. If Feuerbach’s use of ‘alienation’ is different from Hegel’s, how then did Feuerbach intend to use this notion?

2) Alienation: First, Feuerbach uses alienation to mean loss of species’ consciousness. He maintains that ‘religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself’. Undoubtedly, Feuerbach’s notion of alienation is deeply connected with Hegel’s, but in his case, unlike that of Hegel, it is not closely related to

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155 Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), George Eliot (Mineola: Dover Publications, INC., 2008), 25; *Christentum*, 75. Here, Eliot translates the German term, ‘vergegenständlicht ’ as ‘projects’. For further details of this translation, see the following German text: “Der Mensch – dies ist das Geheimnis der Religion – vergegenständlicht sein Wesen und macht dann wider sich zum Gegenstand dies vergegenständlichten, in ein Subjekt, eine Person verwandelten Wesens; er denkt sich, ist sich Gegenstand, aber als Gegenstand eines Gegenstands, eines andern Wesens.”


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civilization or culture (*Bildung*), which ‘is the alienation of immediate self’,\textsuperscript{157} but, rather, to the loss of species being, which is ‘emergence of the self as an individual within the species and the subsequent loss of unity with that species by virtue of the projection of the species attributes onto God’.\textsuperscript{158} In addition, Feuerbach uses alienation to explain the gap between essence and existence.

Feuerbach, unlike Hegel, does not regard alienation as the process of actuality that is ‘the unity of essence and existence’.\textsuperscript{159} Rather, he perceives it as a gap between the essence of man and his (or her) existence, which ‘occurs when the distinctive human predicates are attributed to a deity believed to be a separate, transcendent being’.\textsuperscript{160} Furthermore, Feuerbach also uses alienation as rejection of the I-thou structure. He explains that ‘I am an “I” for myself and simultaneously a “thou” for others. This I am, however, only as a sensuous being.’\textsuperscript{161} For Feuerbach, if the ‘I’ has self-knowledge as a moral being or as a thinking being, there must be the ‘thou’ in objectification which is the means of alienation. Thus, Feuerbach insists that the essence of human being is accommodated solely in the community and unity of human being with human being.\textsuperscript{162} Here, Feuerbach constructs a bridge which connects between the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’ or ‘community’ through alienation or objectification. Finally, Feuerbach uses alienation as a relinquishment of

\textsuperscript{157} Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 377. Here, Hyppolite translates the German term *Bildung* as ‘culture’, *Entäußerung* as ‘alienation’.

\textsuperscript{158} Van Austin Harvey, *Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 107.


\textsuperscript{160} Van Austin Harvey, *Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion*, 107.


\textsuperscript{162} *Ibid.*, 71. Here, Feuerbach believes that “solitude is finiteness and limitation” but “community is freedom and infinity”.

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predicate. He insists that: ‘To exist is to man the first datum; it constitutes the very idea of the subject; it is presupposed by the predicates. Hence man relinquishes the predicates, but the existence of God is to him a settled, irrefragable, absolutely certain, objective truth.’\textsuperscript{163} In this case, the notion of alienation is a bearer between the subject and the predicate.

3) Dialectic and Reductionism: Here, Feuerbach’s dialectic and reduction will be explored in association with Hegel’s. As we observed before, Hegel’s dialectic is a key tool or methodology which elucidates essence of things, the actual substance of history, culture and civil society through objectification, alienation and actuality. According to Allen Wood, therefore, Hegel’s dialectic is the lifeblood of his system of philosophical logic, but can also be regarded as a highly novel theory of speculative paradoxes: ‘where and why philosophical thought runs into them, what they mean, how to deal with them’.\textsuperscript{164} However, for Feuerbach, this function of dialectic is reduced by predicates and time. In fact, Feuerbach uses the term ‘dialectic’ far less than Hegel. He simply insists that ‘the true dialectic is not a monologue of a solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialogue between I and Thou.’\textsuperscript{165} The transition from ‘I’ to ‘thou’ or from ‘subject’ to ‘object’ is exposed by time, space and predicates. Feuerbach clearly states that Hegel’s dialectic is not the medium of connecting opposites or contradictories; rather, time is the medium that connects them through explicating obscure predicates between God and human


beings.\textsuperscript{166} Here, Feuerbach explains more specifically that ‘only in the realm of sense, only in space and time, does there exist a being of really infinite qualities and predicates’.\textsuperscript{167} Feuerbach tends to keep some distance from abstract regulations or metaphysics because these are notions that cannot exactly expose the actual world, so he takes actual beings and things within space, time and predicates. He uses the term ‘predicates’ frequently, to expose the contents of the subject within logical regulations. That is, if the subject is the predicate, the subject should be defined by predicate. Hence, ‘the necessity of the subject lies only in the necessity of the predicates’.\textsuperscript{168} In other words, he explains: ‘What the subject is lies only in the predicates: the predicate is the truth of the subject – the subject only the personified, existing predicate, the predicate conceived existing. Subject and predicate are distinguished only as existence and essence.’\textsuperscript{169} If this statement is true, there is an unchangeable presupposition that all predicates must reduce faultlessly their subject. Feuerbach uses reduction, analogy and logical regulation in order to elucidate the relationship between the subject and its predicates. In this case, naturally, the necessity of dialectic is weakened. In fact, Feuerbach’s methodology, as Marx W. Wartofsky notes, is reduction or rendering from the imaginary or supernatural form of religious consciousness to natural terms.\textsuperscript{170} Wartofsky notes two aspects of Feuerbach’s methodology: first, what emerges about ‘man’ in religious consciousness, and second, ‘how it is revealed, in specific forms of

\textsuperscript{166} Ludwig Feuerbach, \emph{The Essence of Christianity}, 19.
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Ibid.}, 16.
\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Ibid.} In \emph{The Essence of Christianity}, p.17. Feuerbach applies this issue to God and human nature as follows: “A God who has abstract predicates has also an abstract existence. Existence, being, varies with varying qualities. The identity of the subject and predicates is clearly evidenced by the progressive development of religion, which is identical with the progressive development of human culture.”
\textsuperscript{170} Marx W. Wartofsky, \emph{Feuerbach} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 198-199.
religious thought, and in the ‘false’ reflection on this thought (i.e., theology).\textsuperscript{171} In such a methodology, where reduction is revealed through the relationship between the subject and its predicates, is there any room for dialectic to act? According to Wartofsky, although Feuerbach does not make frequent use of the term ‘dialectic’, his ideas or arguments are developed dialectically in his works. However, Wartofsky insists that in his interpretation of the Phenomenology of Hegel, the subject of Feuerbach’s dialectic is ‘not the idea, but rather man as a species being’.\textsuperscript{172} In other words, Wartofsky believes that the summit of Feuerbach’s dialectical phenomenology is the human being’s self-recognition as a species being.\textsuperscript{173} Stephen P. Thornton agrees with Wartofsky’s argument in this respect, and maintains that while Feuerbach made brilliant use of Hegelian dialectic as a general framework for expressing his own thought on religion and philosophy, he also became progressively more disenchanted with it.\textsuperscript{174}

To sum up, this section has presented the methodology employed by Feuerbach to express his thought. The starting point of the Feuerbachian dialectic is ‘the existing individual, the concrete and particular organism’.\textsuperscript{175} Although this dialectic is considerably weakened when compared to Hegel’s, it nevertheless elucidates clearly the essence of man and the essence of religion. Through it, Feuerbach creates his thesis that the essence of man is religion, and the essence of religion is anthropology. That thesis is elucidated by concepts such as projection, alienation, objectification and reduction, and dialectics. As indicated above, Feuerbach’s thought is based on Hegel’s logic and the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{171} Ibid, 199.
  \item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 206.
  \item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Marx W. Wartofsky, \textit{Feuerbach}, 199.
\end{itemize}
phenomenology of spirit, and he develops his idea from this starting point. Accordingly, Feuerbach uses both dialectic and the alienation of consciousness as employed by Hegel, particularly in order to elucidate the essence of man. Religion is the alienated form of man’s recognition of his own nature. Theology, on the other hand, is the theoretical alienation of man’s nature, as not yet his own. Feuerbach’s self-appointed task is to translate the alienated form of man’s recognition of his own nature into unalienated, human terms. However, this also requires that he repudiate, on theoretical grounds, theology’s alienation of man’s nature as not his own, by a critique of the ‘contradictions’ in theology. Although he transferred from Hegel’s absolute knowledge to the essence of man, we cannot ignore that he also intends to construe how the world of human spirit connects with its object world or the revealed phenomena of nature and religion. According to Thomas E. Wartenberg: ‘One of the problems here may be a certain self-satisfaction in Feuerbach’s thought. In his attempt to demonstrate that religion and philosophy are forms of human self-alienation, Feuerbach fails to fully answer one very significant question, namely, why such a self-alienation is necessary.’

Here, the key point is an agent that connects the two extremes. It is crucial for Feuerbach to find a concrete contact point between the ‘I’ and ‘thou’, between the essence of man and religion. The central issue of this task should be to investigate ‘agency’, which is both an externalizer and an internalizer, because for Feuerbach, like Hegel, the agency is a core theme of his philosophy to elucidate the relationship between the subject and the object.

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176 Ibid., 200.
between the internal and external world of man. Therefore, the next section presents the central issue of ‘the agency’.

### 3.2.4 Gegenständlichkeit and agency

This section will investigate the notion of agency with specific reference to Feuerbach. Throughout his works Feuerbach looks into the essence of human being in order to elucidate the essence of Christianity and the essence of religion. Thus, we see that Feuerbach’s agency between human beings and God or religion, between human beings and nature, is crucial to explaining the real essence. I will begin by investigating Feuerbach’s definition of agency and whether his agency can be connected by the predicates. Then, I will look at the research on how this notion of agency can develop into religion and nature.

First of all, I conduct an inquiry into the possibility of agency in Feuerbach’s philosophy. Feuerbach states that ‘man transforms his thoughts and even his emotions into thoughts and emotions of God, his essence and his viewpoint into the essence and viewpoint of God’.  

This argument indicates that the relationship between the subject and its predicate or its object is reversed, and Feuerbach criticizes that the true subject disappears in the area of religion or speculative theology. In other words, Feuerbach maintains that humanity as a species is not the predicate of religion or gods, but is the true subject of actual world, nature and religion. He aims to reconstruct or restore this relationship, and

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then position the essence of human being in the original place occupied by religions or
gods everywhere throughout the world. Undoubtedly, for Feuerbach, the absolute subject
is man; he is the starting point of society and actual history, so the actual world is formed
by man. Here, Wartofsky notes two issues, first, ‘what is revealed, in religious
consciousness, about its immediate subject matter, man’ and ‘second, how it is revealed,
in the specific forms of religious thought, and in the “false” reflection on this thought (i.e.
theology)’. 179 These questions are associated with agency, which is revealed by the
essence of man. More specifically, for Feuerbach, the agency is originated from the
essence of human beings. Man projects his essence into religion, theology or gods, so if
we want to acquire our true essence, we should look into the phenomena of religion. In
other words, agency stands as a mediator or bearer between the essence of man (the
subject) and religion, theology or gods (its objects). Feuerbach regards this agency as a
man who executes his volition or his essence, while Hegel considers agency as the self,
which is composed of spirit, consciousness and idea with actuality. For Feuerbach,
agency is something embodied by the essence of man, which is a more obscure or more
inclusive essence than Hegel’s. Although Feuerbach criticizes Hegel’s abstract notion or
metaphysic and presents the essence of man as an actuality, his alternative proposal too
is controversial. It must be asked what the essence of man means exactly, and whether it
is possible to reduce religion or gods and theology into the essence of human beings, even
though Feuerbach explains both the essence of man and the essence of religion minutely
in his work ‘Lectures on the Essence on Religion’. Feuerbach insists that theology
reorganizes the essence of man into the system or dogma of Christian religion. Hence he

179 Marx W. Wartofsky, Feuerbach, 199.
sees theology and gods as an agency of the essence of man, embodied into Christianity and world religions.

To conclude, first, the agency of the essence, for Feuerbach, is embodied in religion, gods and theology, which are occupied by the essence of man through his alienation, projection and objectification. Thus, the task of philosophers is to disclose the essence of religion candidly and accurately to reduce from the phenomena of religion, gods, and theology to the essence of man.

Secondly, if religion, gods and theology are agency of man, how does Feuerbach verify this? As seen in the section above, Feuerbach uses projection, alienation and dialectic for this reduction, projecting the essence of man into society, religion and the will of God. Accordingly, the projection of essence guides the agency where to go or to move. Here, we can see the form of the essence through projection, and then we can analyse the form of religion by agency. This is the process of development whereby the essence transforms into religion and the will of God. Agency reveals to the essence where it is to move through the process of essence’s transformation. A further consideration is that if the essence of man becomes religion and actuality of society by alienation, we can see the origin or source of agency. Thus, agency cannot exist in any form without the essence of man, which is the starting point. In addition, Feuerbach uses dialectic as reduction of the essence, and this shows how actual history and actual religion are embodied through agency, albeit an alienating agency. As discussed in the previous section, the true dialectic, for Feuerbach, ‘is not a monologue’, but ‘is a dialogue between I and thou’.180 We will

examine through the following quotation how to connect between ‘I’ and ‘another I’ or ‘thou’:

The notion of the object is originally nothing other than the notion of another ‘I’; thus, man in his childhood comprehends all things as freely active and arbitrary beings; therefore, the notion of the object is generally mediated by the notion of the ‘thou’, of the objectified ‘I’. An object, that is, another ‘I’, is given – to speak Fichtean language – not to the ‘I’, but to the ‘not-I’ in me; for only where I am transformed from an ‘I’ into a ‘thou’, where I am passive, does the conception of an activity existing apart from me, that is, objectivity, arise. But only through the senses is an ‘I’ a ‘not-I’.181

This statement indicates that dialectic, for Feuerbach, is a tool to connect between ‘I’ and ‘thou’ or another ‘I’, qualifying the ‘I’, however, as passive. Hence, if the ‘I’ were self-empowered, self-acting, and not passive, it could be itself without objectivity, it would fully remain subject. Accordingly, agency is seen critically, an alienating cause with the effect of transforming the ‘I’ to another ‘I’ or ‘thou’ or ‘the object’ through dialectic. Hence, Feuerbach analyses and synthesizes religious phenomena, which comprise the object outside of ‘I’ by using dialectic, and then insists that this dialectic embodies the activity of this particular agency.


In investigating the notion of *Gegenständlichkeit* I have suggested that agency, for Feuerbach, is religion, theology and gods, which are occupied by the essence of man. His thought was affected by Hegel’s notion of *Entäußerung*. In particular, for Feuerbach, the essence of man is displayed through man’s objects, specifically religion, theology and gods, and the contents of these objects are systemized, alienated and projected by the essence of man. Feuerbach often criticizes the notion of abstract, but his arguments do not escape the same problem. Even though he insists that the essence of man discloses the abstract of religion and theology, the notion of humans’ essence is itself abstract and vague. If we remove the abstract notion from all science, is it possible to disclose the fact of history and the truth of religion? In fact, the abstract notion can enable us to think or embody the object logically, and to think realistically of the world beyond ‘I’.

Nevertheless, while Feuerbach analyses the object outside of ‘I’ (what he calls, ‘thou’, ‘religion’ and the essence of man) his surprising discovery is how to connect between the subject and the object, between the abstract and the actuality and between ‘I’ and ‘thou’. He attempts to explain how the subject connects to the world outside of the subject by presenting the notion of agency in critical terms. It is clear that Feuerbach’s notion of *Gegenständlichkeit* is a footboard for Marx’s notion of alienation. Therefore, the next section will examine Marx’s notion of *Entfremdung*, which features throughout his works.
3.3 Marx’s notion of Entfremdung and Agency Theory

3.3.1 Introduction

Marx’s thought has been hugely influential on subsequent philosophy, political structures and economic systems. However, his ideas appear to be diverse and inconsistent. One reason for this is that his thought developed through the various stages of his life. Another is that there exist hermeneutic differences among Marxist scholars. According to T. L Oizermann, in general, scholars are divided into two groups in their understanding of Marx.\textsuperscript{182} Some argue that his thought remained consistent throughout his whole body of work, while others insist that there is a big gap between the young Marx and the older Marx.

In my view, Marx did develop and change his ideas over his lifetime, particularly in the notions of alienation and agency. For example, his notion of alienation took on different forms, such as objectification, thinghood and fetishism. Accordingly, the main purpose of this section is to investigate the notion of agency based on the 4 main books: Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844), Die deutsche Ideologie (1846) (German Ideology), Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1857-1858) (Karl Marx’s Outline of the Critique of Political Economy, 1857), and Das Kapital (1867) (Capital: a Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production).

3.3.2 Alienation and agency in Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844

The notion of *Entfremdung* is a major theme for Marx. He considers Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s concepts of alienation as the principles of their philosophy, and observes it critically in two works: with regard to Hegel in *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844*, and to Feuerbach in *Die deutsche Ideologie*.

With reference to *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844*, this section will begin by investigating how Marx criticizes or amends Hegel’s notion of alienation; then, it will ask what relationship emerges between private property and alienation, and finally, it will examine how this alienation connects with agency.

Marx’s notion of alienation was thoroughly related to that of Hegel, and even came most directly from him. Nevertheless, Marx criticizes Hegel’s dialectic on the ground that it is deeply associated with the notion of alienation. In general, Marx accepts Feuerbach’s critique on Hegel’s dialectic, which starts from the alienation of substance, namely religion and theology, and then sets actuality, sensuous things and the particularity of beings while the infinite is sublated, before returning to the abstract, the infinite and religion while sublating actuality of being and nature. Marx observes this process of dialectics which circulates in thought forms. Accordingly, Marx criticizes Hegel’s alienation, which is nothing but abstract and philosophical thought when Hegel comprehends wealth and the power of the state as an alienated essence from human

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However, Marx appreciates the greatness of Hegel’s dialectic, which grasps ‘the moving and producing principle’ with the negation of the negation.\textsuperscript{186} In other words, according to Marx, ‘Hegel conceives that the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man - true because real man – as the outcome of man’s own labour.’\textsuperscript{187} In addition, Marx regards the root of alienation as a contradiction in economic structure, whereas Hegel insists that contradiction expresses the dialectic of pure thought. Later, in \textit{Das Kapital}, Marx also criticizes that Hegel’s dialectic stands upside down, and his actuality is nothing but external phenomena of thought forms.\textsuperscript{188}

While criticizing Hegel’s dialectic on the ground that it is limited within the boundary of abstract terminology and does not progress into reality, Marx nevertheless accepts it as providing the way to understand political and economic realities and the true picture of history through labour of self-consciousness.

Marx also criticizes Hegel’s notion of labour, which is deeply associated with his \textit{Entäußerung}. According to Marx, Hegel regards the subject of labour as the spirit and sees that the essence of man identifies with self-consciousness, so his notion of labour is nothing more than the alienation of self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{189} Accordingly, Hegel’s labour

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\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Ibid.}, 385-386.

\textsuperscript{187} Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844", \textit{Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works}, 332-333.

\textsuperscript{188} Karl Marx, \textit{Marx Engels Werke}, Band. 25, \textit{Das Kapital I} (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), 27.

\textsuperscript{189} Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844,” 333-334.
\end{flushright}
is achieved through the contradiction of subject-object and the subjugation or sublation of alienation within the world of thought or abstract.

Furthermore, Marx criticizes Hegel’s notion of mediation as the Entäußerung that mediates between spirit and nature. This is because, in using this term, Hegel regards the notion of mediation as connection between essence and actuality, spirit and actual things. Thus, Marx insists that, for Hegel, thinghood originated from the Entäußerung of spirit is nothing but imaginary actual thinghood.

Through these criticisms, Marx ensures that dialectic and Entäußerung can be used to elucidate the contradiction of actual history and can be applied to reveal the distortion of actual human situations.

In investigating the relationship between private property and alienated labour, Marx aims to reveal the substance of political economy. He understands that: ‘Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labour by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labour) and production.’\(^{190}\) Thus, Marx observes what alien labour embodies, and presents four aspects of such alien labour, as shown below in Figure 2.
First, the relation of worker to product is the same as ‘the relation to the sensuous external world, to the object of nature’.\textsuperscript{191} The reason is that the labourer cannot produce something without the object of nature or sensuous external world.\textsuperscript{192} As examined in Figure 2-1, Marx exposes the substance of an alien labour in the relationship between workers and their products, getting at the heart of the product which is produced by the worker and alienates the worker from the product of his labour. Second, in analysing the

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 275.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid. 273.
relationship between the worker and the activity of production within the labour process, Marx argues that the worker is alienated from his labour activity because that activity ‘is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him’. As we can see in Figure 2-2, Marx points to the activity of production as the ground of alienated labour within the process of production. He deduces the character of alienated labour from the fact that ‘if estrangement is manifest in the result of production, this means that production itself must be alienating, the activity of alienation, the alienation of activity’. Third, Marx investigates man as the species being, which is revealed through the alienated labour. Here, how does Marx’s notion of species being differ from that of Feuerbach? Unlike Feuerbach, Marx regards the life of species being as the productive life, which means ‘life activity; and free, conscious activity’. However, as demonstrated in Figure 2-3, Marx insists that the species being should realize the productive life by labour, but cannot realize his or her free, conscious life by alienated labour. Thus, alienated labour estranges the worker, who should be most natural when he works as a species being. From these considerations Marx draws the conclusion that: ‘An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species-being is the estrangement of man from man.’ Through this analysis and research, Marx finds that the root of alienation, which comes from the alienated labour, is private property. Thus, Figure 2-4 indicates that alienated labour creates private property which can divide various classes, causing alienation of

193 Ibid.
196 Ibid., 277.
man from man. As he explains: ‘Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labour, i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labour, of estranged life, of estranged man.’ 

This private property is then converted into universal value and a tool for exchange, ‘money’. In the analysis of general issues in the foundation of political economy, i.e. labour, the products of labour, exchange, redundant value, capital and money, Marx presents ‘communism’ as a solution to the problems of social class, alienated labour and species being.

In investigating Marx’s analysis of alienated labour, private property, money and capital, we need to ask exactly what he considers agency to be. In order to answer the question, we must examine Marx’s ideas about the starting point of the reality, and what elements of agency connect with each other. In Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844, Marx’s starting points are the human being as subject and the materials of labour which confront the human being. He analyses the political and economic structure of capitalism in terms of the relationship with products produced by labour, private property, capital, commercial products and money. When the process of production is analysed based on the human and labourer (the subject) as starting point, the agency is the self-activity of labourers. That is, the self-activity is the agency which fulfils the desire and lives of labourers. Marx insists that: ‘The direct relationship of labour to its products is the relationship of the worker to the objects of his production.’ However, he discovers that the self-activity of the labourer does not bring self-actualization or fulfilment, but results in self-loss, which ends in unhappiness. In exploring the

\[197\] Ibid.
\[198\] Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844”, in: Early Writings, 348-349.
\[199\] Ibid., 349.
\[200\] Ibid., 326.
components of alienated labour Marx presents the following explanations, a close examination of which can provide us with the specific frames and contents of agency.

Firstly, the fact that labour is *external* to the worker, i.e. does not belong to his essential being; that he therefore does not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence the worker feels himself only when he is not working; when he is working he does not feel himself. He is at home when he is not working, and not at home when he is working. His labour is therefore not voluntary but forced, it is *forced labour*. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself. Its alien character is clearly demonstrated by the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists it is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Finally, the external character of labour for the worker is demonstrated by the fact that it belongs not to him but to another, and that in it he belongs not to himself but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, the human brain and the human heart detaches itself from the individual and reappears as the alien activity of a god or of a devil, so the activity of the worker is not his own spontaneous activity. It belongs to another, it is a loss of his self.201

Jerome M. Segal regards agency as self-activity, and specifies Marx’s alienated labour into the elements of phenomenological aspect, behavioural dispositions, motivation,

201 Ibid., 326-327.
relation to his identity, effects, and external relation. The phenomenological aspect of self-activity means that the labourers are not content; they are unhappy and feel themselves only outside their work; in their work the workers feel outside themselves.\textsuperscript{202} Behavioural disposition refers to the fact that where there is no compulsion, the labourer will not choose to do the work.\textsuperscript{203} Motivation of self-activity (agency) is replaced by the coercive element of the work and the fact that it does not in itself satisfy a need, but is necessary to satisfy other needs.\textsuperscript{204} Or in other words, the subject as agency and agency as subject has become under threat. Alienation does not introduce the need for an alienating agency, as in Feuerbach, but agency itself is alienated in Marx. The element of relation to identity concerns the fact that the labour is not part of the worker’s essential being, and that in doing the work, the labourer denies his true self.\textsuperscript{205} Effects of self-activity is related to the workers’ inability to develop their physical and mental energy, to the mortification of their bodies and the ruin of their minds.\textsuperscript{206} Finally, the external relation of self-activity is that it belongs not to the workers, but to someone else. In it they belong, not to themselves, but to another.\textsuperscript{207} As presented above, Segal provides a clear picture of agency by explaining how labourers live their lives and how they relate to the social context through their labour. In his understanding, through the six structural webs just described, ‘self’ and ‘activity’ are linked and mediated by agency which has now become a forced agency or an alienated agency of force. It seems reasonable to suppose that the alienated worker is no longer his own self, his own agent of activity and that he

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{203} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{204} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{205} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{207} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
experiences alienation in the performance of work.\textsuperscript{208} Hence, the alienated labourer in capitalism is no longer a proper agent, and agency no longer that of self-activity.

Next, it is necessary to explain money, which is one of the stable agents for alienated people in capitalism, and takes the most influential role in capitalistic society. Marx reveals the characteristics of currency through quotations from Goethe’s \textit{Faust} and Shakespeare’s \textit{Timon of Athens}.\textsuperscript{209} He explains that the greater power money has, the more power I have. The characteristics of money are my characteristics and my power. Thus who I am and what I can do are not dependent on my personality:\textsuperscript{210} I am ugly but I can buy beautiful women. I am crippled but money can give me 24 legs like Faust’s six stallions. Money is the supreme virtue; it can make an evil person an honourable one. The analysis shows that money (the object) has become the agency of human (the subject) but it overpowers the subject. Marx emphasises how money can bring great power in capitalistic society. Accordingly, he insists that ‘money, insomuch as it possesses the property of being able to buy everything and appropriate all objects for man, is the object most worth possessing. The universality of this property is the basis of money’s omnipotence; hence it is regarded as an omnipotent being.’\textsuperscript{211} His argument shows that the bond between money (as agency) and people (the subject) is extremely powerful. In ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844’, he discusses what determines the greatness of human being (the subject). Through the alienated labourer, privatization becomes the instrument for universal value (e.g. currency) and forms capital. Agency, therefore, is not only removed from the subject, or rather strips the subject of its subject-

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\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Ibid.}, 248. \\
\textsuperscript{209} Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosopchic Manuscript of 1844”, in: \textit{Early Writings}, 376. \\
\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Ibid.}, 377. \\
\textsuperscript{211} \textit{Ibid.}, 375.
\end{flushright}
self and replaces him, rendering him an object, the new agency subject is also a de-individualized subject. It is an institution, a medium, and as such a universal or global phenomenon. This powerful medium, the agent of capital, determines the greatness of the capitalist and gives the status of emperor to the person who is no longer what it is, but what it looks like, based not on the person’s self, but on money. In particular, as we can see in Figure 2, Marx interprets alienated labour in four aspects: alienation between the worker and the product; alienation from the relation of labour to the act within the labour process; alienation as species being, and alienation between man and man. Thus he indicates the alienation of many dimensions of work. In other words, the agencies of workers are labour, products, process of production, means of production, private property, capital and commodity. Thus capitalism is unable to fulfil the essence of human being through labour and causes alienation and isolation for human beings. Marx points out that: ‘If money is the bond which ties me to human life and society to me, which links me to nature and to man, is money not the bond of all bonds? Can it not bind and loose all bonds? Is it therefore not the universal means of separation? It is the true agent of separation and the true cementing agent, it is the chemical power of society.’

These comments introduce some issues upon which he focuses more specifically in *Die deutsche Ideologie, Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, and *Das Kapital*.

### 3.3.3 Alienation and agency in *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845-46)

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In this book, Marx criticizes the German Ideology, represented at that time by Feuerbach, B. Bauer (1809-1882) and Max Stirner (1806-1856) in particular. Here, Marx elaborates on the notion of history that can become a foundation of alienation. Anthony Giddens insists that, in Die deutsche Ideologie, ‘alienation must be studied as an historical phenomenon’. Marx argues that the history of nature and the history of man are limited by each other unless the human being is extinguished. He insists that the history of nature is nature science, which is not problematic for us, but the history of man is a problem awaiting solution, because most ideologies originate from mistaken interpretations of, or abstractions about, history. Here, the question is whether Marx considers the history of man as the foundation of alienation. If so, this raises the question of how he uses the notion of agency.

In answer to the first question, i.e., whether Marx considers the history of man as the foundation of alienation, Marx argues that history should be interpreted by the concrete circumstance that surrounds human life. He insists that the grasp of history should be accomplished by ‘ascending from earth to heaven’ not by ‘descending from heaven to

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213 Allen W. Wood explains Marx’s three senses of Ideology: 1. historical idealism - “the world is ruled by ideas, that ideas and concepts are determining principles. ‘Ideologists’ are philosophers who hold and teach this doctrine. In this use, ‘ideology’ means the same as ‘idealism’ …For the sake of a convenient terminology, I will call ‘ideology’ in this sense ‘historical idealism” (Allen W. Wood, Karl Marx, Second edition [London: Routledge, 2004], 119); 2. functional ideology - “When Marx describes jurisprudence, politics, religion, art, philosophy or morality in general as ‘ideological’, he means that most of the socially prevalent and influential thoughts that occupy people’s heads and fall under these rubrics can be so explained (Ibid., 120); 3. ideological illusion - “…a belief or form of consciousness or illusion must be unaccompanied by any awareness of its own economic basis. Ideology following these passages is consciousness which is ignorant of its own real social and historical significance. Let us call ideology in this third sense ‘ideological illusion’ (Ibid.).


earth’. Accordingly, Marx starts from concrete actuality and historical man, arguing that ‘we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and therefore, all of history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to “make history”’. Here, Helmut Fleischer insists that ‘history cannot be logically deduced from premises about the human “essence”’. The reason is that Marx regards the first historical act as the production of the means and the production of the material life itself, and insists that ‘the satisfaction of the first need leads to new need’, which is created by the first historical act, and then men ‘recreate their own life, begin to make other man, to propagate their kind’. This process of history shows how human beings have a relation with production in order to survive and to create their history. More concretely: ‘The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in production, now appears as a twofold [13] relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relation - social in the sense that it denotes the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what condition, in what manner and to what end.’ Marx sees that the products and the means of production take a threatening attitude to the worker in the process of history, so he argues that the force of production determines

216 Ibid., 36.
217 Ibid., 41. In German, “Wir müssen bei den voraussetzungslosen Deutschen damit anfangen, daß wir die erste Voraussetzung aller menschlichen Existenz, also auch aller Geschichte konstatieren, nämlich die Voraussetzung, daß die Menschen imstande sein müssen zu leben, um „Geschichte machen” zu können.” (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ausgabe der Werke von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels (1845-1846), Marx-Engels-Lenin-Institut, dritter Band, Die deutsche Ideologie (1845-46); Kritik der neuesten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Repräsentanten Feuerbach, B.Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1958], 28).
219 Karl Marx, "The German Ideology", 42.
220 Ibid., 42-43.
aggregately the condition of society. Accordingly, he insists that ‘the history of humanity must always be studied and treated’ by the relationship between the history of industry and the history of exchange. More particularly, the products and the means of production that serve humans’ needs, in turn take advantage of men, using and consuming the worker. Marx sees that this phenomenon is concretely embodied by the division of labour, so he analyses the division of labour as a private property,222 which can reduce the human being to just a labour tool or a labour machine. Through this analysis, Marx reveals that the division of labour produces not only the contradiction between the individual interest and the common interest of all individuals,223 but also the force of private property. This is because all ‘individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their common interest’.224 In other words, since a cleavage is continuously produced by the division of labour between the particular and the common interest, the worker’s activity of production is not voluntary but becomes as alien power opposed to his own need, ‘which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him’.225 What we can recognize from this explanation is that private property and alienation come from the division of labour. Accordingly, the workers are dissatisfied and lose their sense of self-realization the more they labour in their place of work. When Marx sees private property as the root of alienation, he tries to look for the point of solution on this matter in the process of history. Ultimately, he insists that private property should be abolished, and simultaneously the alienation of workers should be sublated by communism or the

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222 Marx maintains that “division of labour and private property are, after all, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.” (Ibid., 46).

223 Ibid., 46.

224 Ibid., 47.

225 Ibid.
communistic society, so ‘Marx and Engels no longer call their doctrine “real humanism” but communism, communist and also practical materialism’.226

For Marx, the object of communism is defined in three ways: ‘1) to safeguard the interests of the proletariat as against those of the bourgeoisie; 2) to do this through the abolition of private property and its replacement by community of goods; 3) to recognise no means of carrying out these objects other than a democratic revolution by force’.227 Therefore, Marx regards history as the process of alienation. In order to solve the problem, he presents the importance of the proletariat’s role and responsibility as the subject of history in abolishing private property.

With regard to the second question, i.e., how Marx uses the notion of agency, Marx regards human beings as the agents of making history through workers’ labour and their production activity. Helmut Fleischer insists that ‘just as practical subjectivity is the agency of self-legislation for what is to prevail, so is the potential of demand and the ability to put it through as it exists at any one time its own executive agent’.228 However, the problem remains as to whether Marx considers agents as the living man or woman and practical subjectivity (even if alienated and replaced by an agent like money), or as a tremendous mechanical law of history in the respect of ‘making history’. According to Perry Anderson, when human beings ‘make history’, there are three different kinds of agency in their activity. The first is the most typical form of activity, where an individual pursues his private life through a decision and act such as marriage, cultivation of a plot

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227 Ibid., 358.
228 Helmut Fleischer, Marxism and History, 78.
and maintenance of a home.\textsuperscript{229} The second kind of agency, like the first, performs within a general structural framework of existing social relations, including ‘public’ goals, such as ‘political struggles, military conflicts, diplomatic transactions, commercial explorations’\textsuperscript{230} The third kind is the ‘unprecedented form of agency’ and the collective agency that first appeared in the American and French Revolutions, but ‘they still remain at a great distance from the manifestation of a full popular agency’\textsuperscript{231} because those revolutions could not bring new ideal social conditions, but have acquired full expression ‘with the emergence of the workers’ movement and revolutionary Marxism’.\textsuperscript{232} For Marx, the transformers of history are people ‘making history’, and the proletariat that has a practical willingness in collective projects of social transformation. People who are ‘making history’ and proletarians are acting as a full popular agency. Marx and Engels argue that the whole of history cannot be made by abstract force or the absolute idea, but only by an actual agency of a full popular agency and proletarian revolution which will abolish the contradictions of history, made by an unjust political-economy. In other words, in \textit{Die deutsche Ideologie}, Marx gives us a convincing insight about the forward-looking proletariat, in which, ‘scientific communism alone indicated the real way for the social emancipation of the working class, a way the proletarians were spontaneously impelled to take by the development of the antagonistic contradiction of capitalism’.\textsuperscript{233} For Marx, the agency of history is the global social transformer and proletariat that is creating new social conditions, ‘to understand the process of past and present, to produce a

\textsuperscript{229} Perry Anderson, \textit{Arguments within English Marxism} (London: Verso, 1980), 19.
\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{231} \textit{Ibid}., 20
\textsuperscript{232} Alex Callincos, \textit{Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory} (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1-2.
\textsuperscript{233} T. I. Oizerman, \textit{The Making of the Marxist Philosophy}, 362.
premeditated future’. In this book, Marx uses the term ‘historical materialism’ for the first time. In the historical process, he believes that the alienated labourers and distorted economic structures can be reformed into new ones by the work of these agencies.

3.3.4 Alienation and agency in Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1857-58)

In this book, Marx provides new illumination on the theme of alienation observed in Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 and Die deutsche Ideologie. Here, he re-establishes the notions of ‘alienation’, ‘objectification’, ‘universal individual’, ‘dialectic method’ and ‘commodities’. Scholars such as David McLellan, Iring Fetscher, Carol C. Gould and Predrag Vraicki argue that in this work, which remained unpublished until 1941, Marx’s thought is more clear and consistent. For instance, McLellan insists that in the Grundrisse, Marx demonstrates the notion of alienation that takes root firmly in the process of history. Vraicki also argues that this Grundrisse has a key role in connecting Marx’s early stage ideas with those from his later stage.

In this section, Marx’s concepts of alienation and objectification are discussed, followed by examination of the relationship between alienation and agency in association with dialectic and objectification.

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234 Perry Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism, 20; cf. Hans Barth, who also shows that “whereas Hegel finds this world law written in the course of human history, Marx abstracts it as a rule determining future history. For him, world history has not come to an end because the social agent of an unfinished secular movement, the proletariat, is still in the process of formation.” (Hans Barth, Truth and Ideology, Frederic Lilge [California: University of California Press, 1976], 113).

According to Marx, the first meaning of objectification as production reveals that its subject is the man or the woman and its object is nature.\(^\text{236}\) In other words, an actual man objectifies himself in his products through concrete labour. The relationship between the subject and its object emerges frequently in the process of objectification, because labour is an activity of objectification. Generally speaking, in fact, Marx has taken the model of objectification from Hegel, and ‘follows Hegel in construing objectification as a process of self-realization of a subject through its transforming objects’.\(^\text{237}\) However, for Hegel, the notion of objectification is already included or implicit in the subject, and is ‘the dialectical elaboration of what is already present’, whereas for Marx, objectification as labour is creative activity and purposeful activity.\(^\text{238}\) Accordingly, for Hegel, ‘every objectification of subject is an alienation, since the other is nothing but the subject itself in its objectified form, and the other initially appears to the subject not as its own other but as an external object’.\(^\text{239}\) For Marx, in contrast, ‘objectification is the intrinsic character of every productive activity and is alienated only when the relation between the subject and the object becomes an external one. That is, objectification is not alienated when the object produced by the subject’s activity is related to the subject as its own.’\(^\text{240}\) This difference between Hegel and Marx shows that Marx recognizes the problem of circulation from the subject to the object and from the object to the subject under the political-economic system of capitalism. Thus, Marx often argues that the key features of capitalism are the form of alienation, and this alienation has to be abolished by

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\(^{238}\) *Ibid.*, 47.


overcoming separation or dichotomy between living labour (workers) and dead labour (capital) or objectified labour.\textsuperscript{241} Accordingly, Marx more specifically investigates capital-profit and labour-wages and the cost of lend-ground-lent in order to sort out the problem of circulation between the subject and its object because, as McLellan indicates, these three figures of capitalism would be ‘the trinity formula which comprises all the secrets of the social production process’.\textsuperscript{242} To sum up, Marx regards the alienation of the subject as a contradiction of capitalism which comes from the process of objectification, so he tries to deal with the contradiction by catching and tracing or analysing the substance of the alienated labour.

Now, the remaining task is to analyse how Marx uses agency and alienation in association with his dialectic method in \textit{Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie}. Marx’s dialectic method is the direct opposite of Hegel’s. According to Marx, for Hegel, the real world is just the external form of the idea under the name of the idea, but for him, ‘the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by human mind and translated into forms of thought’.\textsuperscript{243} We know that Marx uses the dialectic method as a tool of elucidation of the actual, material and external world. However, according to Hegel, the actual world is nothing other than the phenomenal world of the spirit, emerged from alienation of self-consciousness. In fact, for Marx, the notion of alienation shows ‘not only the attitude of the person towards his activity, but also his attitude towards the object which represents the product of activity’.\textsuperscript{244} In this product of activity, action and

\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Ibid.}, 49.
\textsuperscript{243} \textit{Ibid.}, 457.
creation of the labourer are formed by the causality as agency. According to Carol C Gould, ‘this is based on Marx’s account of what he calls the simple production process, as well as on his remarks concerning the nature of activity.’ As shown above, ‘labour for Marx is process of objectification in which an agent forms objects that embody his or her intentions or purposes and in doing so also forms him or herself’. While Gould observes the agent in this process of objectification, he insists that in the *Grundrisse* Marx considers the agent as a social individual or social individuals. Accordingly, he interprets Marx’s social ontology as the role of agent under the illumination of individuality and community. That is, while agents as social individuals create new objects in order to realize their purposes or intentions, they transform and create themselves through labour in the process. In addition, agents act to develop their new capacities and work to recognize these new abilities in themselves. Hence, Gould maintains that ‘labour as a process constituting the world is at the same time a process of self-constitution’ by social agents.

More specifically, Gould explains agents as the fundamental nature of causality. He suggests three kinds of agency, which he believes are very important to understand Marx’s social ontology. To explain in detail, first, Marx regards labour as cause-and-effect in four senses: ‘final, efficient, formal, and material’. The purposes of agents are embodied by the objects which the labourer produces. Accordingly, these purposes

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246 Ibid., 74.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid., 75.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid., 76.
are their final causes as transformative activity and as efficient cause, because ‘what brings about changes in things – is inseparably bound up with its purposiveness or with final causality’. 251 Second, Gould insists that Marx regards labour as ‘the active connection or mediation between final and efficient cause, between a purpose and the action that realizes it’.252 This connection or mediation is a synthetic activity of labour which gives unification to ‘these dimensions of purpose, agency, form and objective conditions’.253 Third, Gould analyses that what Marx calls labour is rightly regarded as causal, which one may properly call only human agency,254 because ‘the relation of agents to circumstance is not symmetrical or reciprocal, but rather asymmetrical. Thus causal efficacy lies only with agents’.255

In summary, in the Grundrisse Marx uses agency as causality of labour, as synthetic connection or mediation of labour and as causal efficacy, especially in the association with objectification (alienation). Marx regards objectification as ‘a process of self-creation of the subject, in which an agent realizes and changes him or herself through changing the world… namely, in order to realize his or her purpose, the agent is efficiently or productively causal by a formative activity that shapes conditions’.256

3.3.5 Alienation and agency in Das Kapital (1867)

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251 Ibid., 77.
252 Ibid., 76
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., 76, 81.
255 Ibid., 83.
256 Ibid., 84.
According to Marx, political-economy is scientific thought about the system of economy that exists in most countries. Marx argues that the anatomy of society should be found in political-economy. However, it is difficult to analyse society and to reveal the concealed structure of production because the capitalistic structure and the process of production collaborate complicatedly with its inner connection; hence this task needs considerable analytical examination. Another reason is that economy is not static, and political-economy does not analyse fixed things, but rather the dynamic relationship of living people, ultimately the relationship between the classes. This relation is always connected with living and personalized things which emerge to manipulate human beings. Therefore, here, I will investigate aspects of alienation as explained in Das Kapital. Next, I will consider alienation and fetishism, followed by Marx’s ideas about agency and alienation.

Marx uses the term Entfremdung 11 times in Das Kapital. Generally speaking, the notion of Entfremdung comprises four aspects. First, Marx uses it to describe the relationship between workers and means of production or labour. In explaining the grave situation of struggle between labourer and machine, he shows the brutality of the production structure and of means of labour which kill labourers cruelly. According to Marx, the force of the machine is everlasting, because the machine’s hold on the domain

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260 Marx uses ‘Entfremdung’ just 4 times in *Das Kapital* I: 455, 596, 635, 674; and 7 times in *Das Kapital* III: 25, 95, 96, 274, 610, 825, 838.
of new production is total and endless.\textsuperscript{261} Of course, the form of capitalistic production always becomes independent from labourers and bestows alienated form upon them. Eventually, the alienated situation is developed into confrontation between workers and the machine. Labourers put up strong resistance against the machine or the means of labour because the means of labour kills labourers.\textsuperscript{262} In this process of capitalistic production, the means of production is the means of exploitation, because the means of production, which is occupied by the unchangeable capital, represents the money of the capitalist and adheres closely to the capitalist. Then, in the process of actual production, the labourers are treated simply as a value of use, as a means and source of labour that can produce many products.\textsuperscript{263} In this process of actual labour, labourers use the means of production that belongs to the capitalist, and transform it into the form of valuable products. However, the means of production takes advantage of the labourer in the sense that private property increases.\textsuperscript{264} In the capitalistic society, the means of production emerges as the existence of capital against living labour. Furthermore, it is shown that accumulated labour or dead labour controls the living labour. Thus, Marx clarifies that the living labour is completely controlled by the machine, the means of production that is produced by his or her labour in the light of \textit{Entfremdung}.

Second, Marx focuses on the relationship between workers and the capitalist because he recognizes \textit{Entfremdung} through this relationship. According to Marx, the process of production transforms wealth into capital and the means of pleasure, while the labour of

\textsuperscript{261} Karl Marx, \textit{Das Kapital} Vol. I, Marx and Engels Werke, Band 23 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), 455.
\textsuperscript{262} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{263} Karl Marx, \textit{Das Kapital} III, 95.
workers objectifies endlessly into others’ products, and the process of production continuously changes the products of workers into goods or capital. On the other hand, this process itself is consumed by the capitalist.\textsuperscript{265} Here, we should notice that the capitalist’s \textit{Entfremdung} is emerged by personalized capital, and the labourer’s \textit{Entfremdung} is emerged by personalized labour.\textsuperscript{266} As Marx indicates, while the capitalist who is rooted by the process of the \textit{Entfremdung} is satisfied in his or her products or the means of production, from the start of the labour activity, the labourer who is sacrificed by the process of \textit{Entfremdung} stands against the products or the means of production.\textsuperscript{267}

Third, in association with surplus value and alienation, Marx shows how the process of capitalistic production exploits the worker. He recognizes that all methods to elevate the productive capacity of labour within the capitalistic structure accompany the labourer’s devotion with the sacrifice of an individual worker. In other words, all means to grow the productive capacity of labourers degrade the means to control workers and transform the means to exploit, so workers becomes deformed as partial human beings and the dignity of workers is degraded; they are considered something attached to the machine. In addition, labourers come to reify the contents of work, or the worker’s spiritual ability is alienated in the process of objectification.\textsuperscript{268} In Marx’s view, all alienation, including workers’ spiritual alienation, emerges from the capitalistic structure. Thus, in the level of manufacture the worker himself or herself exists only as the property of the machine, because the labour of workers is degenerated into an automated equipment in the work

\textsuperscript{265} Karl Marx, \textit{Das Kapital} I, 596.

\textsuperscript{266} Karl Marx, \textit{Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses}, 17.

\textsuperscript{267} \textit{Ibid.}, 18.

\textsuperscript{268} Karl Marx, \textit{Das Kapital} I, 674.
place. This means that workers are restricted to the machine or working hours without freedom, because they are exploited by the capitalist class, who execute the accumulation of wealth with such methods. Moreover, the labourers are not only alienated by the accumulation of wealth, but they themselves begin to develop as the means of accumulation. Accordingly, whether they earn more or less money, the lives of workers deteriorate as the accumulation of capital increases.\textsuperscript{269}

Fourth, Marx embodies the relationship between the worker and capital using the notion of alienation. He notes that bourgeois economists compliment the achievement of dead labour because past labour always disguises capital: the passive voice of A.B.C. … labourer disguises the active voice of X non-labourer. Furthermore, Marx insists that past labour becomes increasingly significant in the process of living labour. This is because the past labour, which embodies the form of capital, controls living labour and makes workers alienated.\textsuperscript{270} According to Marx, capital is like Dracula, able to live by sucking out the work of living labour: the more capital controls the living labour, the more capital can live on as dead labour.\textsuperscript{271} Marx insists that while the slaves of Rome were bound with shackles, wage-labourers are bound by their owners’ invisible rope.\textsuperscript{272} He shows how dead labour, namely, capital, brutally controls or exploits the living labour, and describes how the dead labour makes the living labour thoroughly alienated.

Next, let us investigate alienation and the phenomenon of fetishism in capitalistic society. Marx observes the relationship between commodity and money in the first part of \textit{Das

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 675. \\
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid., 635. \\
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 247. \\
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 599.
Kapital. Needless to say, commodities and money are key factors in capitalistic society. Marx discloses the fetishism of commodities through the observation of commodity and money. That is, the fetishism of commodities shows that the commodity encompasses the social character of labour, but that fetishism demonstrates a totally different image from its original one between people and people.\(^{273}\) In other words, commodity may seem a trivial factor, but analysis of the secret of commodity in the economic structure of capitalism shows it to be curious indeed. This is indicated more clearly in the following passage:

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from external object to the eye.\(^{274}\)

The figure of commodity is not just the product of labour itself; rather, it reveals the social character of workers’ labour, which means the value of exchange or social relationship between the ability of workers and capitalistic markets. In the process of exchange, the fetishism of commodities emerges in the capitalistic structure of economy. Marx regards the fetishism of commodities as an inverted phenomenon between human being and commodities. In other words, the products or commodities which are made by the workers

control their creators and also regulate their destiny. According to Rubin, the reason why Marx turns from the theory of alienation to the theory of commodity fetishism is that he had to make a way from the negation of the real world in the name of an ideal to the establishment of actual history and further development of concrete society, ‘from Utopian to Scientific socialism’, because utopian socialism does not recognize limits upon its science, but holds the delusion that it has the knowledge needed to organize a utopian world, whereas scientific socialism makes people understand the proletarian movement within existing society. However, it is difficult to find direct evidence in Das Kapital for Rubin’s argument that Marx transforms the notion of alienation to the thought of commodity fetishism. Contrary to Rubin, Rosental insists that Marx draws a new notion about commodity fetishism, different from the notion of alienation presented in Das Kapital, albeit that the two notions are deeply related to each other. The difference between them, according to Rosental, is that commodity fetishism makes the workers transfer from the social relationship to the material relationship under a particular condition, while alienation expresses the confrontation between the capitalist and the worker, and reveals the separation of the labourer or producer from the working condition or the product of labour.

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278 Ibid., 277-278. See the German text: “Die Begriffe der Entfremdung und des Fetischismus unterscheiden sich voneinander dadurch, daß die Hauptsache in der Entfremdung nicht der Fetischismus, nicht die Tatsache ist, daß die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse unter bestimmten Bedingungen als Verhältnisse von Dingen erscheinen, sondern daß sie den Gegensatz zwischen dem Kapitalisten und dem Arbeiter, die Scheidung der Arbeitsbedingungen von der Arbeit, die Löstrennung der Arbeit und ihrer Früchte vom Produzenten ausdrückt. …. Was jedoch die Entfremdung, vor allem ihre Hauptform, die
In spite of this difference, Richard Schmitt insists that in Marx’s thought this commodity fetishism results from alienation, because the worker’s alienation from the product of their labour expresses the circumstance of individual labourers, where commodities control their creators.

To clarify, commodity fetishism consists in humans’ thinking and acting, while the notion of alienation encompasses ‘not only the attitude of the person towards his activity, but also his attitude towards the object which represents the product of the activity’. Marx uses both concepts in Das Kapital. They are united with each other in the political-economic system but they perform different functions of agency.

In conclusion, Rubin insists that Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism did not have an important position in the Marxist economic system when he established his theory of value. However, this theory itself, in association with the notion of alienation, is a basic foundation of the whole Marxist economic system. In fact, Marx’s research is not limited to elucidating the notion of alienation, but is expanded to expose the social character of alienation, which encompasses the distorted social relation between the workers and commodity fetishism. In addition, throughout his work, he demonstrates how the notion of alienation changes or develops. It is clear that Marx uses commodity fetishism to

Entfremdung der Arbeit, betrifft, so ist sie das Los der Arbeiter. Das heißt nicht, daß die Entfremdung überhaupt nicht die Besitzer der Arbeitersbedingungen betrifft.”

280 Ibid., 117.
elucidate the phenomena of alienation, and in *Das Kapital* he sometimes replaces alienation with commodity fetishism.

Finally, I will investigate how Marx uses the notions of agency and alienation in *Das Kapital*. In his study of the economistic system, Marx’s notion of alienation has been changed to employ other key terms. In particular, in *Das Kapital* Marx brings into sharp relief the idea of commodity fetishism, because this fetishism more clearly explains the alienation of workers and the distorted relation of production or the capitalist exploitation within the structure of capitalism. What made it possible for this to happen? What kind of agencies emerge in his last work? There are many kinds of agencies in capitalism, but here, particularly, I suggest three key types: capital, machine and workers.

First, for Marx, capital is a deputy or agent of capitalists or capitalism. Marx regards the commodity as the elementary form of the bourgeois society that is the starting point of capital’s development, so he construes commodities as products of capital. As mentioned in the previous section, for Marx, capital as accumulated labour and dead labour is a hidden hand which controls the visible economic world and living labourers. More directly, Marx states that capital is dead labour or vampire-like labour, which sucks out the work of living workers. The more work it sucks, the longer it lives. His comments demonstrate how violent the power of capital is in capitalistic society and how it exploits and impoverishes the lives of labourers. Because the central position of capital is occupied by capitalism, capital as an agency acts to build the capitalistic structure and

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capitalism. In *Das Kapital* I, Marx observes how money or commodity transforms into capital. In analysing the commodity, he arrives at the universally equivalent form of commodity, ‘money’. This transformation from a particular commodity to the universal equivalent form can be accomplished by the action of society and by ‘the agency of the social process’.\(^{285}\) In other words, capital as an agency of capitalists can turn the natural form of commodity into the socially recognized equivalent form.\(^{286}\) Terrell Carver explains Marx’s agency of the social process and shows how capital takes the key role in capitalism. According to Carver, ‘Capital presents a fully developed inter-relationship of money and commodities as capital, and analyses this in a formal and abstract way, attributing it to “societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails”.’\(^{287}\) He goes on to insist that ‘Gold as coin has a “price form”, and the universal equivalent has become money.’\(^{288}\) Thus we can see that it is impossible to build a capitalistic system, its structure and its contents, without capital as an agent in capitalism. When Marx analyses that the capital transforms from the form of commodity to value and use-value, he reaches the conclusion that: ‘The difficulty lies not in comprehending that money is a commodity, but in discovering how, why and by what means a commodity becomes money.’\(^{289}\) In order to solve this difficulty, Marx looks at the circulation from commodity to money or from money to commodity, and insists that ‘the circulation of commodities is the starting point of capital.’\(^{290}\) As seen in footnote 289, the circulation


\(^{286}\) *Ibid*.


\(^{290}\) *Ibid.*, 247. Marx explains the circulation of commodities: M-C-M, “the transformation of money into commodities, and re-conversion of commodities into money; buying in order to sell. Money which describes the latter course in its movement is transformed into capital, becomes capital, and from the point of view of its function, already is capital” (*Ibid.*, 248). And C-M-C, “the transformation of
of commodities as money between C-M-C and M-C-M can convert to the circulation of money as capital. The circulation of capital is ‘an end in itself, for the valorization of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The movement of capital is therefore limitless.’ Here, Marx argues that the owners of money, who are conscious bearers of this movement, become capitalists in a capitalistic society.

In short, capital plays a crucial role as an agent of capitalism, in constructing capitalism and in making its contents. It is clear that, for Marx, capital as an agency embodies the idea of capitalism and takes on dynamic force. When we analyse the agency as capital, we can see the actual capitalism, its structure and its direction. As shown above, if agency takes a key role in establishing the identities of the subject, the phenomena and realities in the modern capitalistic society are the outcomes of agencies’ activities.

Second, Marx considers machinery as crucial tools to intensify capitalism. Machinery takes a main role in the development of capitalism and the success of the industrial revolution in England. Thus, Marx insists that: ‘Machinery also revolutionizes, and quite fundamentally, the agency through which the capital-relation is formally mediated, i.e. the contract between the worker and the capitalist.’ For Marx, the machine is an agent of capitalists to increase their private property and wealth as well, as it is an agent of workers to reduce labourers’ burden. After much consideration about machinery, however, Marx sees not only this positive aspect, but also the negative functions of commodities into money and the re-conversion of money into commodities: selling in order to buy” (Ibid., 247). And “the money is in the end converted into a commodity which serves as a use-value; it has therefore been spent once and for all” (Ibid., 249).

291 Ibid., 253.
292 Ibid., 254.
293 Ibid., 519.
machinery as an agent. He argues that while the machine functions to make many products and reduces workers’ efforts or sacrifice, the function as agent of capitalists reversely exploits and even destroys workers’ lives in the actual world. Marx explains the negative effects of machine production in terms of the worker as follows: First, male workers who are skilled in their profession are driven out of the workplace, and women and children are employed at a much lower wage. Secondly, although one would expect that the working day of an average worker would be reduced as machines are introduced, in fact, because production levels are stepped up relatively more than the efficiency of machines in reducing the time of production, the working day increases in length. In addition, due to the capitalists’ desire to maximize profits, they want to use the machine continuously and beyond its limits, so the intensity of labour increases. In analysing these phenomena, Marx notes that ‘the machines strike down the labourer’. He gives the example of the demolition and burning of machines in various parts of Britain, a protest against the use of machines against labourers. The machine had broken apart families and adversely affected the workers. These phenomena demonstrate an extreme example of how agency, instead of actualizing the identity of the subject, can actually destroy the life of the subject.

To sum up, for Marx, machinery as an agency in the capitalistic production process manifests many negative aspects in free society and among free human beings. Marx points out that: ‘Family slavery resurfaces in Capital, though in an economically

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294 Ibid., 517-526.
295 Ibid., 526-533.
296 Ibid., 533-542.
297 Ibid., 559.
298 Ibid., 554.
determined context, not in one determined by “nature” and the beginnings of culture’. According to Marx’s analysis, the machine is the key factor to change workers’ economic lives and cultural atmosphere, and plays a significant role as a faithful servant of the capitalist. Thus, the machine as agency between the labourer and the capitalist performs negatively to expose the actuality of capital-relation in large-scale industry.

Finally, Marx regards the worker as human agency to embody the capitalistic structure. As Marx investigates more deeply into the worker’s situation in the process of production, he insists that, in the beginning, the labourer as a free agent sells his own labour-power, and then the worker as a slave-dealer sells his spouse and children to ensure the survival of his family in a society that is run by large-scale industry. Marx regards a worker as a free agent and states that a human being should not be a passive slave, but the creative subject in history. However, there is contradiction between a free agent and a passive slave in historical or economic circumstance. Hence, Marx states that ‘men are made by circumstances’ on the one hand, and on the other hand ‘men change their circumstances’. This is a controversial issue when interpreting Marx’s perspective on the subject in history. However, as Andrew Collier notes, in any case, ‘it is as if

299 Terrell Carver, The Postmodern Marx, 227.
300 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes, 519. See a different English translation: “Taking the exchange of commodities as our basis, our first assumption was that capitalist and labourer met as free persons, as independent owners of commodities; the one possessing money and means of production, the other labour power. But now the capitalist buys children and young persons under age. Previously, the workman sold his own labour power, which he disposed of nominally as a free agent. Now he sells wife and child. He has become a slave-dealer.” (Karl Marx, “Karl Marx: Capital, Vol. I, in: Karl Marx Frederik Engels Collected Works, Volume 35, trans., Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling [London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996], 399).
humankind is the agent in history, and it alienates itself, that is, the alienating is its action. Yet it is very much the action of some people against others, and of the structures which allow some people to oppress others.302 In the process of alienating action, Marx sees the worker as the subject and the object in the capitalistic economic structure. If the labourer is subject, he or she can be autonomous agent. If the labourer is individual as object, the person can be socially determined or constructed agent. When an individual is analysed using economic categories, he/she appears as the bearer who represents a particular social class and its interest.303 Those bearers are the agencies in the capitalistic world. According to Marx, those labourers are passive agencies because they adjust to the social and economic structures of capitalism and conform to the demand of the society. Interestingly, he does not take the structures itself to become agencies of capitalism, although he comes close to a structuralist view. On the other hand, there are labourers who are willing to reform the society into communism, with the zeal of the proletariat. They are defined as autonomous agency. John Roemer believes that the autonomous agencies are established among the working class, and argues that these agencies are very similar to those Marx presented in the relationship of the owners of the products and markets.304 Yet despite this, the concept of ‘the individuals who are formed by society’, is vague. In addition, agencies take only a passive role in the evolution of the modes of production, which results in private property. Also, the proletariat, the autonomous agency that aims for communism, has a limited role in the emergence and development of capitalism. Therefore, as Carver argues, ‘while Marx’s account shows the utility-maximiser presupposed by rational-choice theory to be a social construction, some further

concept of agency still lurks within his conception of the individual’. Due to the vague concept of the individual (i.e. subject and object), it is problematic to definitely conclude that the human agency is the creative subject in history. Thus, for Marx, the important issues are how to solve the gap between ‘the determination of individual or social determination’ and ‘creativity of individuals’; and how to build autonomous agency to overcome the determinism. Carver argues that agency is distinguished by characteristics such as creativeness and connection between subject and object. Thus he considers that the concept of agency ‘does not present humans as necessarily conforming to some biological or psychological form of inherent “rationality”’. He argues that the human being is species-being and the root of human agency is critical and creative reasoning. The creative human agency makes a bridge between ‘the way that the mode of production of material life conditions the general social, political and intellectual life process’, and ‘the claim that proletarians and communists could exercise the sort of agency that the overthrow of capitalism would require’. However, it is ‘not least through the sheer necessity it imposes on us to be agents of the utility-maximising type’. The way encompasses the contradictions between use-value and value and presents an inherent conceptual structure to solve the dilemma of capitalism in the production of commodities. The claim is that human agencies with creative and critical thinking should increase through inductive arguments and deductive analysis of the dilemma of capitalism presented by Marx; those agencies predict the breakdown of capitalism and attempt to transform and renovate the system. Recognizing the positive roles of human agency

305 Terrell Carver, The Postmodern Marx, 56.
306 Ibid., 57-58.
307 Ibid., 58.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
in Marx’s *Das Kapital*, Carver presents creative human agency as demonstrating a significant clue to how labourers, the proletariat, confront key agencies of capitalism (e.g. capitalist, product and machine, money), and how the human agency establishes scientific communism by critical thinking and creative reasoning.
3.4 Conclusion

So far, Marx’s analysis on the status of labourers has been examined based on four publications (from the early work to his final book). This section has examined how violent capitalism drives labourers into inhuman circumstances. Also, it has explained how capitalism alienates the lives of labourers and its impact on the concept of ‘agency’.

The idea of alienation presented in Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 is the key theme explored in the early work of Marx. He states that alienation is the outcome of private property and division of labour, and identifies that ‘self-activity’ cannot be the agency of labourers, due to alienated labour. Currency (money) becomes a constant and universal agency for alienated people. However, money overpowers the subject and reverses the order of the subject and the object. In Die deutsche Ideologie, Marx presents how private property, one pattern of alienation, has been transformed into capital and has formed capitalistic society; and how capitalism has become ideology and settled in world history. This section has reviewed his argument that people are the subject or initiator in creating history but are also sometimes created or influenced by the structures of history and ideology. Marx considers that agencies are those who actively create communism in history, such as the proletariat. In Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 and Die deutsche Ideologie, Marx criticizes both Hegel’s concept of Entäußerung and Feuerbach’s notion of Gegenständlichkeit, on the grounds that neither philosopher was able to apply the concept of alienation to the real context of human history. Thus, Marx describes the characteristics of agency in Grundrisse zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie as follows: causality of labour when the subject objectifies itself; a synthetic connection or mediation of labour; and a causal efficacy. In Das Kapital, Marx examines the key agencies of capitalism such as capital and the
machine. He identifies the dilemmas of capitalism and the proletariat and concludes that the proletariat, which attempts to solve the problems by achieving communism, are the human agency with critical thinking and creative ability. His analysis presents specific agencies that manipulated the capitalist society in those days. He does not limit his argument within theoretical rhetoric, but demonstrates practical methodology and directions to achieve a new society.
CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARS ON AGENCY

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have construed the notions of alienation and agency that emerged from Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. The concept of agency allows scholars to open the door between actuality and possibility, between the abstract and actual things, and between recognition and beings. In addition, agency theory has been embraced by sociological inquiry and metaphysical scholars, because analytical philosophy requires the application of scientific methodology and verification to unscientific statements such as metaphysical thoughts, moral categories and theological notions. In the previous chapter, I reviewed how Marx analyses politics, economics and capitalism using the term ‘agency’ in order to expand his theory. Interestingly, agency and its role are often considered and applied in areas of modern economics such as business and finance.\(^{311}\)

This chapter will investigate how human nature and human action can be reconstructed and explained scientifically. B. F. Skinner has argued that if we perform scientific examination and investigation about the organic structure of bodily actions correctly, the internal elements of humans, such as human nature, can be properly understood.\(^{312}\) In other words, in explaining humanity he refuses to separate human nature and behaviour


dualistically. Rather he connects the two by presenting several psychological agents, such as inner agents, the inner man and the layman. However, there remain many controversial issues regarding agents or agency theory. Therefore, I will begin by investigating how agency theory can construe vague human nature in a scientific manner without a logical leap, and then look at how agency can explain action scientifically. Finally, I will suggest agency as the doer of action and the embodiment of self-activity.

4.2 Human Nature\textsuperscript{313} and Agency

Human nature is one of the most important themes in the field of philosophy, because it is crucial to the examination of human being. Consequently, human nature has been the centre of much discussion and dispute, in various fields of study. Philosophy, morality, culture, sociology, and politics have all used human nature as a main ground for justifying and developing their issues. According to Keith Horton, there has been a trend in recent research to consider human nature as setting limits on moral endeavour.\textsuperscript{314} In some areas of modern science, developments such as the potential for gene manipulation, sex change surgery, and the creation of human-animal embryos\textsuperscript{315} require understanding of another

\textsuperscript{313} Aristotle explains that ‘Nature’ means: “(1) The genesis of growing things, a meaning… (2) The primary immanent element of a thing, which is starting point of its growth. (3) The source from which the primary movement in every natural object is present therein in virtue of the object’s own essence. (4) The primary matter, shapeless and unchangeable from its own potency, of which any natural object consists or from which it is produced. (5) The essence of natural objects. There are, for instance, those who say that ‘nature’ is the primary synthesis: thus we have Empedocles’ statement: Nothing that exists has a nature, But only mixture and dissolution, and ‘nature’ is only a man-made name for these.” (Aristotle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ed. John Warrington [London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1970], 8-9).


\textsuperscript{315} Mark Henderson, “We Have Created Human-Animal Embryos Already, say British Team”, The Times (U.K.), Wednesday April 2 2008, 2. “A team at Newcastle University announced yesterday that it had successfully generated ‘admixed embryos’ by adding human DNA to empty cow eggs in the first experiment of its kind in Britain.”
dimension on human nature. Under this circumstance, many different opinions have emerged on the definition of human nature and on its usage and development. Because paying attention to all of these definitions could lead this thesis in an unexpected direction, in the following sections the writer will focus on four of them in turn.

4.2.1 Human nature as the description of man

First of all, some consider human nature to describe the human being; without human nature, the human being does not exist. As mentioned in footnote 312, Aristotle understood ‘nature’ as the primary immanent element or the primary matter: the starting point from which something can develop. Therefore, human nature is the starting point from which the human can develop. Human soul, mind, self, instinct, desire, will, consciousness or unconsciousness, faith, hope, love, reason and feeling are all properties of human nature that can be used to explain what humanity is. In his *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas applied theological analysis to human nature, insisting that ‘Human nature demands distinct theological treatment precisely by virtue of the soul, not of its bodily character, except so far as soul bespeaks embodiment.’ He began by examining the essence of soul, then advanced toward its power of acting or abilities. Finally, in examining the activity of the soul he attempted to explain what human nature is, in order to clarify what ‘human’ is. The soul that is internalized in human nature has metaphysical

content which cannot be verified scientifically, but can explain and describe what human is.

The argument that humanity can be explained by the detailed description of soul, mind and self, or the intention, desire, thought and will that are internalized in human life is a persuasive one. However, the question of whether the element of human nature can be scientifically explained and analysed raises a number of issues. This is because discussion of human nature requires an assumption that it really exists and can be verified using certain scientific tools. It is no easy task to define scientifically what soul, mind and self are, still less to analyse and anatomize them. The assumption that transcendence beyond facticity is internalized in human nature has resulted in controversy. Complexity and extremes are always key issues in explaining human nature.

Therefore, rather than applying scientific explanation and analytical philosophical perspectives, Aquinas’s approach, which explains human nature rationally, logically and philosophically based on biblical explanations about Creation and the nature of man, is thought to be more realistic. Feuerbach’s approach, which perceives religions as humanity, may be persuasive because he thought that theologically hidden human nature should be identified in order to understand human nature holistically. Another, more scientific and objective, approach to the investigation of human nature stresses the necessity of describing the important elements of that nature realistically, even though it may be individualistic and subjective. All of these approaches attempt to understand human nature by explaining its properties, interpreting and describing the phenomena.
It is dangerous to be cynical about efforts to synthesize, analyse and interpret human nature using all possible methods, and we will not progress if we limit ourselves within subjective and intuitive arguments. Moreover, the question regarding the complexity of human nature needs further investigation in order to overcome the limitations and solve the problems in an academic manner.

### 4.2.2 Human nature as actuality and transcendence of being

The complexity referred to earlier results from the two opposite aspects of human nature: transcendence and actuality. Jerome M. Segal regards human being as two modes inherently fragmented by the facticity and transcendence of human beings.\[317\] The duality in human nature can be either separated or vaguely mixed. According to John Locke, simple ideas can be transformed by combination into complex ideas, or notions\[318\] “because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together, as united into one idea …”\[319\] Among the properties of human nature are mixed modes such as clear and vague, perceivable and unperceivable and movable and immovable. Depending on which perspective is taken, the understanding of human nature can be different. In his three books *Understanding, Passions* and *Morals*, Hume explained human nature in terms of three areas.\[320\] He argued that if human nature itself is to be established academically, it must be based on certainty.\[321\] Therefore, Hume insisted that

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philosophers investigating the ultimate principles of soul should not consider theirs to be an academic work about true human nature. Rather, such pursuits are based on assumption and speculation rather than universal principles and certainty. Furthermore, ‘any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical’. Although Hume tried to explain academically the complexity of human nature, it is certain that most philosophers regard it as something unverifiable. Although the transcendence and morality in human nature can be examined with certainty, the subject is beyond the boundaries of scientific judgement and verification. Therefore, the following section will investigate key themes such as whether human nature can be analysed and explained scientifically.

4.2.3 Human nature and its flexibility

As noted above, Aristotle defined human nature as potential or primary matter that is unchangeable. However, this thesis will gather a wider range of views, in order to expand the discussion. Aspects such as instinct, reason, will, volition, and intention can all be included in human nature. These things can be changed. According to W. E. Hocking, ‘human nature is undoubtedly the most plastic part of the living world, the most adaptable, the most educable’. Indeed, in many discussions on human nature it is a common denominator that human nature can be changed. As already noted, today the biggest factor that can make this change possible seems to be the fast pace of technological

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322 Ibid., xvii-xviii.
323 Ibid., xvii.
development. Indeed, in his article ‘Human Nature: How normative might it be?’ Kurt Bayertz claims that human nature could become technologically contingent.\textsuperscript{325} He argues: ‘In a word, the “nature of the human being” is identical with his body, i.e., with the outer figure and the inner functions of the biological species \textit{homo sapiens},’\textsuperscript{326} His view is more comprehensive than W. E. Hocking’s definition of the nature of human being as instinct and self,\textsuperscript{327} because we cannot simply examine human nature in our innermost being. He presents a persuasive argument, citing three reasons:

This interpretation seems adequate for several reasons: a) it corresponds to our intuition, since we associate a physical being with the concept ‘human’. . . b) The human body is part of nature in its entirety: historically it is the product of evolution, is subject to the laws of nature and is bound to external nature as regards the fulfilment of its needs. c) And finally, in the present context, it is about the ethical evaluation and limitation of biotechnological actions: these directly target the human body (even where they -indirectly - target the mind).\textsuperscript{328}

It is, however, hard to say that his opinion properly defines human nature. If his claim is reasonable, human nature can be academically analysed with accurate observations, recordings, and experiments on the human body. As long as this kind of view is accepted as sound, we can get a narrow understanding on human nature classified as natural reason, will, the self, and mind. In fact, it is difficult to prove this view of human nature academically, and for that reason it is excluded from some academic domains. Hence, it is very important to find a way to explain this in a more intellectual manner, with the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{326} \textit{Ibid.}, 134.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{327} William Ernest Hocking, \textit{Human Nature and its Remaking}, 42.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{328} Kurt Bayertz, “Human Nature: How Normative Might It Be?”, 134-135.}
\end{footnotes}
understanding that human nature is a whole being composed of inner world and external body. Accordingly, it is now essential to clarify the properties of hidden human nature accurately, intelligently and logically. If we abandon efforts to study the properties of human nature academically, the result will be vagueness of definition and continued misunderstanding. Furthermore, it is impossible to mention the science of man without scientific examination of human nature. Therefore, the agency argued by Hocking and the opinions of modern scholars will be examined in order to reconstruct the nature of human being.

4.2.4 Agency as the remaking of human nature

The key task in this section is to investigate whether it is possible to answer philosophically the question about the complex and mixed nature of human being. Wittgenstein, who set the foundation of analytical philosophy, stated that ‘what we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence’\(^{329}\), and remained silent about human nature. In fact, however, Wittgenstein demonstrated that human being can be expressed and formed by language.\(^{330}\) He noted how close is the link between language and life, since ‘to imagine a language means to imagine a life-form’.\(^{331}\) However, he made no specific mention of human nature per se, which is impossible to solve.


\(^{331}\) *Ibid.*, 7c. In German, “eine Sprache, die nur aus Fragen besteht und einem Ausdruck der Bejahung und Verneinung.”
Under this situation, agency theory brought the significance of human being into the academic field. In his book *Human Nature and its Remaking* W. E. Hocking uses the term agency or agent with regard to the understanding of human being. He insists that the fundamental and universal thing in terms of conscience ‘is the principal inner agency for the remaking of human nature; hence it must stand as a critic over against everything that is to be remade, and so over against all instincts’. As used by Hocking, agency seems to be merely an appropriate term for the remaking of human being, because he neither theorized the term more widely, nor expanded the advantage of the theory. Nevertheless, the fact that Hocking used agency as an important tool to identify the properties of human nature (something unfixed and unpredictable) indicates that human nature can potentially develop into the foundation of moral philosophies. Keith Horton also expressed that human nature affects moral standards and has a function to build moral theory. Such considerations concerning human nature are ‘internal to moral thinking itself about the apparently unlimited demands that may be placed on agents by certain moral theories’.

As noted by W. E. Hocking, if we regard self, conscience and instinct as the properties of human nature, agency could be one of the most effective toolboxes for the explanation and reconstruction of these. For example, let us examine agency and ‘self’. First of all, from the ontological perspective, we need to see whether ‘self’ really exists. According to Hume, some philosophers accept ‘self’ as existing in our imagination. In fact, we can never catch ‘ourselves’ at any time without our own perception. This is because we

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cannot prove where the self exists in the body. Robert Nozick explains Hume’s argument in detail. He argues that ‘self’ entails three problems from an ontological perspective. First, the self cannot be found in any part of our body. Second, it is difficult to imagine the self without also imagining it as entangled in something. Finally, it is difficult to envisage the self without identifying it with some particular material form. Thus, Nozick does not find ‘the view of the self as a property sufficiently illuminating, clarifying’ in this instance. Yet while Nozick considers those opinions about ‘self’ as insubstantial, he does not give up the investigation. This is because the self is a crucial subject of meta-philosophical considerations. According to Michael V. Wedin, Nozick suggests that reflexive self-synthesis is ‘among the most salient features of full selfhood and that the notion of the self best explaining the feature is the notion of something that constitutes itself in the very act of reflexively referring to itself’. Wedin states that Nozick’s point is very similar to the explanation of mind, one of the properties of human nature. Nozick explains how ‘The self synthesizes itself not only transversely, among the things existing only at that time, but also longitudinally so as to include past entities, including past selves which were synthesized.’ From an epistemological perspective, one finding from Nozick is the fact that the agent of ‘self’ enables ‘self’ to synthesize itself.

336 *Ibid.*, Nozick explains that “On an Aristotelian view of a property as existing in entities that possess it, and not floating free as a separate entity or object, we would understand why the self must be instantiated in some stuff, however wispy.”
Taking a different stance from that of Nozick, Jay F. Rosenberg pays attention to the ‘perception’ of Hume’s arguments. He points out that ‘self’ does not exist as an object of experience but as subject. In other words, according to Rosenberg, ‘the self which is in question here is that self which is the subject of all its experiences but the object of none of them’.342 The fact that Rosenberg perceives the ‘self’ as thinking subject shows that he knows himself through ‘inner sense’, when he thinks of himself as ‘thinking’.343 Furthermore, as mentioned in the footnote above, Rosenberg’s Cartesian approach shows that ‘self’ exists ontologically as complex inner states. Let us examine the different opinions about agent with regard to ‘self’, no matter whether it exists ontologically or epistemologically. In examining how ‘self as agent’ relates to ‘self as subject’, John MacMurray argues that the former is the negation of the latter.344 As noted in the chapter on Hegel with regard to the relationship between self and agent, ‘it must be impossible to represent the same Self as at one and the same time both Agent and Subject. For when it is Agent it will not be Subject; and if this were actually the case, then the Self could never know that it was Agent, nor could it ever act with knowledge.’ Self and Agent cannot appear at the same time as logical process. Such an idea may conflict with Hegel’s dialectic characteristics of actuality, which argue that agency can have both subjectivity and objectivity. This demonstrates how contrasting are the positions of Hegel and those of other scholars, such as Kierkegaard, who criticized Hegel’s dialectic approach.

343 Ibid., 220. Rosenberg explains Descartes’s statement, “I am a thing which thinks, *a res cogitans*”: “*Res cogitans*, then, is not a species of the genus *res*, distinct from *res extensa* and only problematically in ‘interaction’ or ‘communion’ with it. I am but one entity – *res extensa et cogitans*. Descartes notwithstanding, the thinking self is a ‘corporeal substance’. Yet, although I am but one entity, I can ‘know myself’ in two quite different ways. I am indeed *res extensa et cogitans* But when I speak of myself as ‘extended’, I ‘know myself’ through a shared and X-objective epistemic, and I describe myself as a propertied matter-of-factual object.” (Ibid., 219-220).
344 John MacMurray, *The Self as Agent: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in 1953*, 96.
However, as Hegel expressed in *Philosophies of the Law*, an argument that agency enters into the object with subjectivity and establishes ‘actuality’ (stable and concrete condition) through dialectic method, is an explanation completely different from the approach with mathematical formulas. Therefore, the agent of ‘self as subject’ is the actor who objectifies into concrete objects with subjectivity. In other words, agency, which is involved in the overall process of ‘self’ and delivers the characteristics of subject to object, can be an important tool to connect the subject and object and solve the mysteries of human being.

To summarize, agency is an important tool to explain the countless properties of human nature. This section has reviewed how the agent reorganizes self and resolves the human existence, while examining the different opinions on self, one of the properties within human nature. The following section will investigate human behaviour and agency while considering how human action can be explained philosophically.

**4.3 Action and Agency**

It is a difficult philosophical task to demonstrate how the various properties in human nature construct the life style of the human and are expressed in human behaviours. Modern behaviour psychologists have presented psychological and behaviour analysis through extensive examination and investigation of the relationship between the properties of human nature and behaviours. Their work has now established an academic area. However, the purpose of this section is to investigate whether it is possible to reconstruct our behaviour philosophically and scientifically. In particular, the specific
roles of agency will be investigated in terms of how it provides a connection with the overall process of behaviours.

4.3.1 Properties of human being - action and agent

Philosophical investigation about motion and action has been a continuing endeavour through the centuries. Explaining human motion in philosophical terms is a particularly important task in this area. According to René Descartes, motion is ‘the action by which a body travels from one place to another’,\(^\text{345}\) or in more detailed terms ‘the transfer of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies’.\(^\text{346}\) In the light of these definitions, Descartes examines and explains how the motion appears in complex form, insisting above all that: ‘God is the primary cause of motion; and he always preserves the same quantity of motion in the universe.’\(^\text{347}\) However, since too broad a hypothesis will be impossible to prove specifically, we must focus solely on explaining and solving the problem. Therefore, the task of demonstrating scientifically the origin of movement and action may be considered secondary. As pointed out by B.F. Skinner, human behaviour is a difficult subject matter, which cannot be understood easily. This is because human behaviour appears as one process and contains


extremely complex content which cannot be easily observed. However, he does regard behaviour as a subject matter that can be observed and explained scientifically.

To explain human motion correctly, we need to find the identity of movement and action. In order to do so, we must examine what properties are contained in the action and how these properties are demonstrated in the action. Let us take the following example. In the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, Yuna Kim, South Korean Figure Skater, performed a 3-minute short program and a 7-minute free program. During the performance, she demonstrated a high level of artistic performance with balance and power, including technically proficient jumps and spins and footwork. The spectators responded with warmth and enthusiasm. In analysing the properties of actions in this example, let us assume that the results are the following:

1) **Rational role**: In order to transfer the whole performance into artistic motions, she integrated music with her movement and carefully planned her performance.

2) When she was young, she watched other skaters who performed with artistic beauty. She had dream, desire and free will that enabled her to become an outstanding figure skater.

3) **Nationalism or Patriotic sentiment**: She had intention to show the world about her country through her performance.

4) **Mentality**: In addition to gain high marks by keeping regulation and command, she did her best to satisfy herself with her own performance.

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349 Ibid., 14.
5) **Morality**: she maintained sportswomanship and entered the competition with confidence.

6) **Perseverance**: In order not to make mistakes in advanced techniques, she engaged in extensive practice according to the program.

7) **Inspiration**: Her performance inspired the spectators and received great applause.

How can we analyse the movement and actions of the subject, Yuna Kim, in her 10-minute performance? How can we explain scientifically and academically the fact that the properties of action described above are connected in time and space and have resulted in her current performance and actions? In order to express the subject clearly, the properties in the action of the subject need to be extended to the external world of the subject and outwardly demonstrated. Agency undertakes this role. For this reason, Judith Jarvis Thomson regards agency as a verb, to ‘do’ and ‘perform’ something in order to disclose the will of the subject.\(^{350}\) In other words, agency shows the properties of the actions of Yuna Kim’s performance as follow: intention, organizing, planning - rational roles; volition, desire, belief, dream, satisfaction, love - emotional factors; regulation, command – lawful indications; duty, promise, responsibility - moral requests; mentality, free will, personality etc. We can draw a conclusion here. The performance of Yuna Kim is undertaken according to the rational guidelines of the subject and her motions include regulations and moral requirements. Her performance artistically elaborates those elements including emotional factors. The emotional elements of the subject can express every moment of her actions. Her emotional expression can connect and transfer to the emotion of other people. However, sometimes that emotional expression is demonstrated

in response to rational guidelines and moral regulation. Thus, the agent which connects the subject and the action of the subject is the description of the subject and subject matters that are scientifically observable and reconstruct the subject. As shown in the example of Yuna Kim, such a relationship of subject matter can be explained logically by the notion of agent. Carol Rovane insists that agents ‘can engage in the agency-regarding relation’,\(^{351}\) which is ‘an omnibus one and hides many possible interpretations’.\(^{352}\) Yuna Kim’s 10-minute performance includes both easily perceivable actions and actions that cannot be observable. This is because some properties of actions are mysterious. According to Irving Thalberg, these mysterious elements include desires, intention and brain, and such complex emotional actions are difficult behaviours to study.\(^{353}\) A question may be raised as to whether those body responses to emotional elements can be regarded as actions. Describing human behaviours, Richard Taylor states that some bodily motions are not actions.\(^{354}\) For example, breathing and stopping breathing cannot be regarded as behaviours. However, if such body motions are separated from the category of ‘action’, we may ignore the energy of life which triggers behaviour and actions. In fact, even the flow of blood through the veins or of air in the respiratory system, and the connections between muscles or between veins show motions and behaviours through organic association.\(^{355}\) The purpose of this section is not to investigate whether body exercise can be analysed through the notion of agent (that accompanies the motion) from a medical or biological perspective. However, it is certain that agent can show the

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\(^{352}\) Ibid., 74.


relationships of the properties of human actions. S. C. Coval and P. G. Campbell classify properties of action into three broad categories: supports of singular reference and predication, informational contents, and causation. They present four theories using agent in order to analyse those properties, as follows:

The objects of the competing causal theories all qualify as possible supports of singular reference: the object which consists only of the causal intentional state of the agent (Cause Theory); the object which consists of the event directly caused by the intentional state of agent (Single Effect Theory); the object which is the chain of events initiated by the intentional state of the agent (Chain Effect Theory); and the object which is the chain of events which begins with the causal intentional state of the agent and ends with the goal event (Relational Theory).

The common factors in the four theories are ‘the intentional states of agent’. Intention is one of the most controversial issues for establishing behaviour theory, and it should be borne in mind that in explaining intention academically there are many possibilities to discuss, because it includes inner motivation. Bratman is one of many scholars to regard intention as a core factor of behaviour. In his latest book, *Structure of Agency*, he explains behaviour through intention and planning theory, and also extends his agency theory. He embodies intention within planning agents because he believes that ‘intentions are elements of a planning system, one that has fundamental roles in the coordination and

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358 Michael E. Bratman, *Structures of Agency*, 239. He explains: “According to the planning theory, we understand intentions, and intention-like attitudes, largely in terms of their roles in cross-temporal and social coordination. According to the intention-based theory, then a kind of valuing that is at the heart of self-governance consists in policies (that is, general intentions) of giving weight or other forms of significance to certain considerations in practical reasoning and action.”
control of action’.\(^{359}\) Intention, one of the triggers for behaviours, makes plans according to its nature and is an important factor for the human, the subject, to determine his or her behaviours.

Of course, when humans have wrong beliefs in their intentions, they demonstrate complex behaviour. In that case a problem may arise as to how non-confident intentions and false beliefs are recognized in behaviour and whether the planning agent can control its behaviour. Bratman holds that instrumental rationality is a necessary criterion for the analysis of complex behaviours, and that this can be achieved through the reflection of practical reasoning.\(^{360}\) Accordingly, he states that ‘any reasonably complete theory of human action will need, in some way, to advert to this trio of features - to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception of our agency as temporally extended’.\(^{361}\) Here, temporally extended agency includes non-human agents, which cause many actions. Thus, he maintains that ‘we are planning agents; our agency extends over time; sometimes at least, we govern our actions’.\(^{362}\)

These kinds of works seem to contribute greatly to explain and interpret behaviour logically, but the theories are unable to explain behaviours without any intention. The next section will investigate how the notion of agent can explain the behaviours that are demonstrated by the analysis of their properties.

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\(^{360}\) Ibid., 31-36.

\(^{361}\) Michael E. Bratman, Structures of Agency, 21.

\(^{362}\) Ibid., 3.
4.3.2 Causation of human action and agents

We can analyse logical structures within the behaviour of agents that connect subject and object. In general, motions and behaviours are triggered by something, which can be the cause and effect of the behaviour. In the example above, there are many reasons why the subject, Yuna Kim, could demonstrate a high level of technique and performance without making mistakes, and elaborate every motion to an artistic level. Let us consider how this can be explained causally or logically in terms of agent.

First of all, the properties of behaviour should be related to a causal statement in order for the behaviour (demonstrated by physiological process) to be understood and explained as causal relationship. Sydney Shoemaker insists that ‘the generality of causal propositions stems from the generality of properties’. 363 In establishing the relationship between causality and properties, he argues that ‘the identity of property is completely determined by its potential for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it’. 364 Based on these statements, we need to ask whether there is any problem in explaining behaviour with causal relationship. According to Michael Morris, if we want to explain behaviour scientifically as causal relationship, two conditions need to be satisfied: the ‘Independent existence requirement’ (IE) and the ‘Non-\textit{a priori} requirement’ (NAP). 365 Morris considers an explanation in the form of ‘\(p\) because \(q\)’, and here he establishes two conditions, inspired by Hume: NAP- ‘It is not possible to know \textit{a priori} that \(p\) on the basis of knowing that \(q\), or vice versa; IE- the replacements for \(p\) and \(q\) are true in virtue of

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364 \textit{Ibid.} 253.

facts about states or events e and c’.\textsuperscript{366} The two conditions are needed because we can analyse behaviour correctly only when certainty is firmly based. The agent of behaviour expressed here is not vague, so it is possible to make objective judgement. For example, the subject, Yuna Kim’s performance such as jumps, spins and six triples, was analysed and marked in terms of objective marking schemes. The outward behaviour can be analysed and explained. However, certain behaviours are based on faith, the identity of which it is problematic to discover. This is because this believing has two factors, which ‘are Immanent causes with respect to reactions generally, but Transcendent with respect to almost every interesting sub-category of reactions’.\textsuperscript{367} Morris calls this the Diverse Independent view (DI-view), and presents its main characteristics as follow. First, if the DI-view is right, different mental states require different treatment.\textsuperscript{368} Second, ‘If we adopt the DI-view, we will need to be cautious in talking about the spatio-temporal location of believings.’\textsuperscript{369} Third, the DI-view denies that beliefs are essentially internal in any more metaphysical sense, as opposed to being overt.\textsuperscript{370} Fourth, ‘there is a room for a position intermediate between instrumentalism and realism’.\textsuperscript{371} Fifth, ‘the DI-view is compatible with some form of physicalism, but it denies at least one thesis which is plausibly seen as a central motivation for most physicalists’.\textsuperscript{372} ‘Finally, we should make something of a reassessment of behaviourism.’\textsuperscript{373} According to Morris, if the DI-view satisfies the six explanations, the causality of behaviour can be clearly identified. His argument assumes that the statement is correct, and in this article he does not explain how

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 13-14.  
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., 30.  
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., 31.  
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid., 32.  
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 33.
the behaviours appear with causality. However, scholars such as Richard Taylor, Roderick M. Chisholm and Alvin I. Goldman point out that agent and event are closely related to each other in the analysis of factors of behaviours. Taylor argues that ‘the word “cause” in such contexts has not the ordinary meaning of a certain relationship between events, but has rather the older meaning of efficacy or power of an agent to produce certain results’.\textsuperscript{374} Taylor recognizes that the concept of agent which triggers the behaviour is essential in order to analyse correctly the structure of each event. Accordingly, he regards an agent as ‘something that originates things, produces them, or brings them about’.\textsuperscript{375} Similarly, Chisholm regards the agent as cause and notes that ‘sometimes a distinction is made between “event causation” and “agent causation” and it has been suggested that there is an unbridgeable gap between the two’.\textsuperscript{376} He does not ignore the fact that agent causation can be defined in the observation and analysis of events appearing in our behaviour. Thus, he insists that ‘if we take the standard concept of “event causation” – the concept of one event contributing causally to another – along with the concept of undertaking, or endeavouring, then we can say what it is for an agent to contribute causally to the occurrence of an event or state of affairs’.\textsuperscript{377} Finally, Goldman too considers the agent as an entity which triggers certain action and behaviour. Hence, in his view, materials such as stones and pieces of wood that cannot trigger behaviour cannot be agents. Rather, an agent is any individual or human who is the subject of the behaviour, because these beings are the originators or starting points of their own

\textsuperscript{374} Richard Taylor, \textit{Action and Purpose}, 112.
\textsuperscript{375} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid.
activities. Goldman admits that ‘there are occasions on which agents cause acts without any state or event of the agent being an event-cause of these acts’. However, he notes that it is difficult to know how there are such occasions. Goldman points out both the validity and the invalidity of Taylor’s opinion that ‘acts are not uncaused; they are caused by agents’, stating that while this might be correct the real problem is how ‘to distinguish absence of causation from causation by agents’. Thus, Goldman insist that ‘the notion of agent- causation unconnected with event- causation is bound to be a mysterious and obscure notion’. However, Taylor’s ‘notion of agent- causation, of the conditions under which an agent causes an act’, is not problematic. In the analysis of behaviour, there are countless factors that trigger certain behaviours. Some behaviours have mixed properties, with complex reasons. Goldman explains agent- causation, event- causation and agents by suggesting that faith, wants and desires can cause intentional actions. Taking agent into consideration in the behavioural analysis, he argues that: ‘As long as the act is caused by the wants and beliefs of the agent, then he is the author, the source, the originator of the act.’

If then, agent is the author, source, and trigger of behaviour, let us examine what kind of identity is formed by humans through their behaviours.

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4.3.3 Identity\textsuperscript{385} and agency

Agency is a tool that clearly demonstrates the identity of human being. If this statement is true, human nature and behaviour need to be synthetically analysed. It is impossible to discover the true identity of human beings by behaviour or nature alone. Rather, human nature and behaviour need to be understood as having an organism relationship. Both agency (which shows human nature) and agent (as the author, the source and the originator of behaviours) must be essentially synthesized. Here, the relationship between identity, agents and their roles will be reviewed based on mental action and self-activity out of the important connections that link human nature and behaviours. This is because, among the key factors of human identity, mental action and self-activity are thought to play the most important roles.

4.3.3.1 Mental action, identity and agency

Mental action is crucial in establishing identity of the actor and demonstrating the reasons for behaviour. As Matthew Soteriou insists, ‘mental action can contribute to our understanding of a range of different issues and themes’\textsuperscript{386}. Whereas some mental actions are easily observed, analysed and understood, others consist of complex


properties that are hard to understand. Therefore, the agency which shows these mental actions is explained in two parts. Pamela Hieronymi establishes two kinds of agency, of which ‘the first does not display the most familiar and prominent feature of agency, while the second might involve an exercise of agency over of the first’. As argued by Hieronymi, observing both agency (which contains the reason for behaviour) and the process of behaviour (which is performed by agency), intention and belief within human mentality can be identified scientifically. Thus, she establishes the premise whereby ‘certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions’. In order to prove the premise, agency performs, showing intention and belief in distinct ways. The first of these Hieronymi calls ‘exercising evaluative control over the attitude’, and the second, ‘exercising managerial or manipulative control’. Hieronymi’s point has dualistic characteristics in the analysis of behaviour. As examined by E. J. Lowe, interactive dualism exists between physical causal closure and mental causal factors. Lowe argues that interactive dualism cannot be proved by science, so mental action has to be solved by a priori metaphysical argumentation. Similarly, Bernard Williams describes dualistic problems that arise in mind and body: First, ‘there are general issues concerning the relations between a subject’s mental states and his observable behaviour’. Second, ‘there are questions concerning the relations between a subject’s mental states and certain internal states of his organism’. As we have observed, mental action is one of many

388 Ibid.
389 Ibid., 161.
391 Ibid., 78.
spheres that are difficult to explain academically, because the subject matter of mentality belongs to the properties of human nature. However, according to Jennifer Hornsby, mental action is the ‘one facet of the phenomenon of mentality’ that expresses the action of ‘the phenomenon of agency’.\(^{393}\) If complex mental action appears as physical action through various agencies, it is possible to explain mental action logically by agent-causation and agent analysis. According to Hornsby’s argument, agency theory is an important tool to overcome the limits of dualism. This emerges clearly in the work of John MacMurray, as cited in the review of Hegel’s concept of agency in Chapter 2. Therefore, we need to pay attention to Hieronymi’s academic effort to identify mental actions by agency. She has shown ‘how certain complex exercises of agency over our minds’, including what she calls ‘reflective control, might be modelled in terms of these somewhat simple forms of agency’.\(^{394}\)

A key issue in the connection between mental action and physical behaviour is that of identity. As mentioned in Williams’ first problem statement, identity theory may appear between the subject’s mental states and behaviour.\(^{395}\) The issues of personal agency and personal identity will be raised in the analysis of the process of how mental states are externalized into behaviour. Williams considers that personal identity causes problems for two reasons. The first is the argument that self-consciousness is the consciousness of human beings about self-identity in a special sense.\(^{396}\) Williams sees a big difference between ‘I think’ and ‘I think regarding which I think something’. When he attempts to


\(^{395}\) Bernard Williams, *Problems of the Self*, 64.

prove this, he uses the formula: ‘imagining myself doing, being, etc., such and such’.\textsuperscript{397} The second reason is that questions about personal identity cannot be clearly answered because it is the decision made by the identity of a certain physical body.\textsuperscript{398} According to Williams, ‘Identity of body is at least not a sufficient condition of personal identity, and other considerations, of personal characteristics and, above all, memory, must be invoked.’\textsuperscript{399} Therefore, when we explain how mental states and physical states appear in our behaviour without confusion, we are eventually able to define each personal identity.

However, Lowe insists that ‘the identity conditions of mental states would appear to be thoroughly unlike those of physical states – as unlike them as the identity conditions of physical objects are unlike those of natural numbers’.\textsuperscript{400} Consequently, Lowe considers the statement that mental states and physical states are the same to be unintelligible. What we find in the statement that mental states and physical states are different is the idea that there can be difference between something partially revealed and something potentially hidden. Sometimes we can infer the whole thing by some parts, but this cannot be justified as the true picture. While fully acknowledging this, David Lewis argued that identity cannot be understood by some parts in mental states, but must be perceived as a composition of parts and whole.\textsuperscript{401} He considered mereology (which interprets things in the relationship between parts and whole) to be ontologically innocent,\textsuperscript{402} and mereological relations, ‘the many-one relation of composition, the one-one relations of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{397} \textit{Ibid.}, 44. He explains the formula to avoid a confusion of two modes of the imagination as follows: “that of imagining with regard to a certain thing, distinct from myself, that it is such and such; and that of imagining being such and such”.
\textsuperscript{398} \textit{Ibid.}, 1.
\textsuperscript{399} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{401} David Lewis, \textit{Parts of Classes} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 82.
\textsuperscript{402} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{footnotesize}
part to whole and overlap’, as remarkably ‘analogous to ordinary identity’. While regarding identity as a composition of part and whole, Lewis thought of it as a one-one or one-many relation, because the nature of identity has survival, connectedness and continuity. Thus, Lewis notes that ‘what matters in questions of personal identity is mental continuity or connectedness, and that might be one-many, many-one’. Peter van Inwagen criticized Lewis’s extreme model realism on the ground that it is originated from strong analogy: ‘Similarly, those who reject Mereology will regard the strong analogy between composition and identity that is a consequence of Mereology as a defect in Mereology, since (they will say) composition lacks many of the features that a statement of the analogy attributes to it.’

In order to avoid this critique, Lewis would have had to solve the problem of how mental states in mental action connect both part and whole using agent, and form personal identity as one composition. In other words, he did not overcome the limit of metaphysics because he ignored the role of agent and its function in identity and depended on strong analogy.

4.3.3.2 Self-activity, identity and agency

Personal identity is related to human behaviour and self-activity. Moreover, a key concern of philosophy is to investigate and reflect personal identity and human action. In his

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403 Ibid., 83.
405 Ibid., 57.
examination of identity in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke states that when we perceive and sense an event, self is essential; it is what enables us to see, hear, smell, taste and sense. Locke considers self as a conscious thinking thing that is ‘sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends’. Self and identity are closely related. More specifically, Locke explains how self as thinking thing forms identity (which differentiates the self from others) through behaviour and thought over the period of past and present.

For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person, it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that action was done.

Harold W. Noonan, who researched the relationship between personal identity and self-consciousness, pointed out that Locke’s statement is problematic because it is based on an assumption that ‘person’ conveys a criterion of identity that serves only for a self-conscious creature. In other words, ‘Locke’s assumption that “person” is an ultimate

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sortal term’ cannot be justified. In fact, for Locke, identity is sometimes united with the same self and criteria of personal identity, while he also states that through the same consciousness, it can be separated to another man’s self. For Locke, such fission and fusion of persons are decisive for the formation of personal identity because ‘any part of our bodies, vitally united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of ourselves: but upon separation from the vital union by which that consciousness is communicated, that which a moment since was part of ourselves, is now no more so than a part of another man’s self is a part of me’. Brian Garrett explains the criteria of personal identity in sortal terms, and attempts to clarify identity using physical and psychological criteria. Identity requires clear answers to complex and vague questions. Taking as an example ‘the puzzle of the ship of Theseus’, Robert Nozick has presented the Closest Continuer Theory:

The planks of a ship are removed one by one over intervals of time, and as each plank is removed it is replaced by a new plank. The removal of one plank and its replacement by another does not make the ship a different ship than before; it is the same ship with one plank different. Over time, each and every plank might be removed and replaced, but if this occurs gradually, the ship still will be the same ship. …. It turns out that the planks removed had not been destroyed but were stored carefully; now they are brought together again into their original shiplike configuration. Two ships float on the waters, side by side. Which one, wondered the Greeks, is the original?  

411 Ibid., 170-171.  
412 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), 466.  
414 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanation, 33.
In this example, Nozick presents the evidence of identity which explains the self. In the case of the ship, there are two very important relevant properties: ‘spatio-temporal continuity with continuity of parts’ and ‘being composed of the very same parts’.\footnote{415} In this complex case, responses about which ship is the closest form to the original entity are important not as metaphysical truth but ‘as a component of a psychological explanation’.\footnote{416} Therefore Nozick emphasizes that the Closest Continuer Theory is an essential condition to demonstrate identity.\footnote{417} Like Nozick, David Wiggins also considers that continuity is important in constructing identity. However, with regard to personal identity he emphasizes continuity within the spatio-temporal area, because it is: ‘(i) a perfectly clear criterion of personal identity, (ii) a criterion which might very easily clash with the memory-criterion, and (iii) a criterion which is generally or always to be preferred to the memory criterion’.\footnote{418} In Wiggins’ view, the memory criterion of identity does not differ from the bodily criterion of identity in spatio-temporal continuity. However, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Reid question in what way the memory criterion and bodily criterion can be the same, and how their identity-criterion can be spatio-temporal.\footnote{419} Wiggins answers these questions by insisting that:

\ldots we cannot specify the right concept without mention of the behaviour, characteristic functioning, and capacities of a person, including the capacity to remember some sufficient amount of his past. It is this characteristic functioning

\footnotesize{\textit{\begin{tabular}{l}
\footnote{415}{Ibid.}\\
\footnote{416}{Ibid., 34.}\\
\footnote{417}{Ibid.}\\
\footnote{419}{Ibid., 45.}
\end{tabular}}}}
which gives the relevant kind of spatio-temporal continuity for the kinds of parcel of matter we individuate when we individuate persons.420

The Spatio-temporal Continuity Theory suggested by Wiggins to establish identity appears to be similar to Lewis’s argument that mental properties can explain identity only when they have survival, continuity and connectedness. However, in his book Sameness and Substance Renewed, published 30 years later, Wiggins hardly used the concept of spatio-temporal continuity for understanding identity. Rather, he intensively researched and developed the absoluteness of sameness, a theory of individuation and sortal concepts.421

Other scholars seek to understand identity from an ontological perspective. Focusing on ‘what it is’, they endeavour to find proofs through either metaphysical analysis or mathematical and scientific experiments. Also, identity formation needs to be examined in terms of how the group (unit) and individual have relationships and can be categorized in the process. For instance, Frege has demonstrated mathematical explanations of identity. He notes that ‘Locke and Hesse seem to use unit and one to mean the same’.422 Eli Hirsch also explains the concept of identity ontologically and metaphysically. The scholar argues that ‘these criteria of identity have typically been regarded as essentially comprising two kinds of elements: an element of continuity, and an element of sortal-

420 Ibid., 45-46.
coverage’. Such understanding and investigation of identity and human action has provided intellectual benefits in various ways. With regard to self-activity such as mental action, the focus has been on what made this analysis possible and how personal identity was formed. The answers to these questions can be achieved only when the agent in mental action and self-activity is properly understood. In his consideration of personal identity, Locke understands person, self and agents as actors who specify personal identity. Thus, he takes ‘person’ as the name for the self, and states that wherever a man finds what he calls himself, so too another may say that there is the same person. It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery.’

Although he did not form a specific theory or present an in-depth study, he does point out the important role of agent in the development of personal identity, which is formed through the self or a person’s action.

Harry G. Frankfurt, among the leading researchers of human behaviour, analysed the problems in human behaviours and stressed the importance of the agent, because ‘There are numerous agents besides ourselves who may be active as well as passive with respect to the movement of their bodies.’ Therefore, Frankfurt insisted that ‘we must be careful that the ways in which we construe agency and define its nature do not conceal a parochial bias, which causes us to neglect the extent to which the concept of human action is no more than a special case of another concept whose range is much wider’.

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explanation of autonomy, which is one of the properties of human action, Frankfurt showed that terminologies such as self (auto) and principle or law (nomy) are united with each other.\footnote{427} He argued that the notion of autonomy is deeply related with that of self-government, and that individuals are autonomous to the extent that they govern themselves;\footnote{428} that is, an autonomous agent is governed by himself or herself alone.\footnote{429} J. David Velleman raised a problem in Frankfurt’s idea that self is a single entity which consists of personal identity as well as autonomy,\footnote{430} pointing out that self is a term widely used in many philosophical contexts to express ‘the coincidence of object and subject, either of a verb or of the activity that it represents’\footnote{431}. Defending his own position, Frankfurt claimed that Velleman had misunderstood his definition of self, taking the statement that the self has boundaries to mean that the self is a singular entity. Frankfurt explained that he did not describe the self as an entity with ontological implications.\footnote{432} The conclusion from the controversy is that self and person have the same role as agent to demonstrate personal human identity.

In his careful examination of self,\footnote{433} Jerome M. Segal argues that self-activity (which demonstrates human identity) is an agency. Segal regards the self as the integration of

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.\hspace{1em}] The self is not inherent. It is something that emerges in the life of a person.
\item[2.\hspace{1em}] The self is self-constitutive. It is the person himself or herself who brings the self into existence.
\item[3.\hspace{1em}] The self is brought into existence through “acts” of identification.
\end{itemize}
personality that ‘persons engage in throughout their lives’. Unlike other agency scholars, Segal examines how human behaviour explains human being in the specific context of life. His argument is persuasive because he explains agency by combining self and activity. There are several reasons why Segal understands agency as self-activity. First, ‘the agency is a web of relations that constitute the presence of the self in the activity’. The second reason is that Segal wants to avoid ‘any need for occult senses of agency’, but does not want ‘to exclude as cases of agency much that is interesting in human activity’. Finally, Segal intends to elucidate the identity of human beings in capitalistic society, so he clarifies the relation of self-activity and alienation or alienness of labourers in the perspective of Karl Marx. As examined in the chapter on Marx, labour is the tool for self-actualization of labourers and self-activity is the agent for the labour. Segal maintains that alienness is the distorted form of self-activity which actualizes the identity of the labourer. He expresses the alienation experienced by labourers as follows:
1. ‘I feel as if I am not the agent of my actions.’
2. ‘I feel as if my actions are not really mine.’
3. ‘I feel as if I never really do anything.’
4. ‘I feel as if everything just happens to me.’
5. ‘I feel as if everything I do is done by something else.’

These statements show that the self understands agency as an alienated presence which goes beyond its boundary. Therefore Segal expresses his agency theory in the statement: ‘X is the agent of some activity A if and only if A is an activity of X and X is not alienated from A.’ He argues that when alienation is considered in the relationship between the self and activity, agency

In the account that he offers, each of these three claims is reflected, but they are held in a weaker form. (Jerome M Segal, *Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human Presence* [U.S.A.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991], 58).


435 Ibid., 117. Segal explains more concretely: “In making agency a matter of self, agency is as variable as the self is, and the sense of agency as variable as the sense of self.” (Ibid., p.119).

436 Ibid., 118.

437 Ibid., 134.

438 Ibid., 140.
is opposite to the notion of alienation.\textsuperscript{439} As examined by Marx, the alienation of labourers destroys their self-identities and denies their behaviour as something that does not belong to them. That is why alienation and agency as analysed by Segal can be opposite to each other. The alienation of labour destroys the true identity of labourers, but agency as self-activity establishes their identities. In a structural relationship between the self and an activity, identity is established by agents. In other words, true identity of labourers is formed by agency, which ‘can be viewed as a complex structural union between actions and the self’;\textsuperscript{440} Segal expresses the complex structural combination as something like the web of structural relations. In his view, ‘Agency is not a single simple relationship. It is not a matter of exercise of some irreducible power of agent causality, nor is it a matter of the general existence of a single causal thread that connects volition or desire with physical movement.’\textsuperscript{441}

In short, Segal regards agency as a complex and systematic union, connecting self with action, and the web of structural relationship. Agency that shows the true identity of the man through human behaviour goes beyond alienation and presents the possibility that enables the human to become the subject of life and the subject of history. In addition, the way to understand properties that are very difficult to grasp in human nature is by reference to the agency. As Segal and Hornsby have noted, a person is an agent of his actions when and only when his self and his mentality are present in them. In other words, agency is a performer that carries behaviours, which happen by the properties of human

\textsuperscript{439} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{440} Ibid., 99.
\textsuperscript{441} Ibid.
nature such as wants, will, consciousness, beliefs, instinctive needs, volition, desire and emotions, to the diverse context of life.

4.4 Summary and Conclusion

Studies regarding the human (as a whole being) and connections between subject and object are important, despite criticisms from researchers. While analytic philosophers’ criticisms of fields of study that are academically unverifiable have affected scholarship regarding human nature and human action, in philosophy, ethics and psychology, it seems that agency presents a way of overcoming the weakness inherent in the view of human being as disjointed parts rather than a holistic whole. We can rethink the dissolution of human being as the subject through agency theory, although Michel Foucault ends his book, *The Order of Things* by insisting that ‘then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’.442 Those criticisms have expanded and developed agency theory as the reconstruction of human nature, allowing philosophical investigation on agency theory to progress. Humanity or human being, as Archer notes, is seen as the linchpin of agency in general,443 because this is one of the most important tool-boxes to explain the properties of human nature: the self, mentality and person, which are the core of human being.

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This chapter began by critically reviewing scholars’ opinions about human nature, and suggested how agency theory can prove its properties. Next, the chapter demonstrated that agency theory, a key focus of human behaviour research, can explain self-activity, personal and mental action, and is an important tool for understanding personal identity. It is often thought that external properties such as social status, wealth and occupation are the best indicators of someone’s identity. However, more fundamental factors are the mental actions and self-activities that have led to current conditions. Through these agents, personal identity is formed and expresses the standards of behaviours.

To conclude, agency theory has been an important subject for those philosophers who study human nature and action. It has also been the centre of much controversy, as detailed in Agency and Action, published in 2004. Nevertheless, agency theory is noteworthy not only because it gives a clue that could fill the gap between a doer and actions, and help to connect between transcendent reality and the finite world, but also because it says that an individual has his or her own agency representing himself or herself. In addition to this, agency theory can be an important tool to construe human nature, actions and self academically, placing human being as the subject in the world and within society. The theory can play a decisive role to construct and restore the whole of human being, which had hitherto been demolished by analytic philosophers. We can find a crucial key for future systematic theological investigation of agency in Segal’s statement that: ‘Agency has to be conceived as a kind of webbing, as a connectedness

between self and activity that has no particular specification. It might be thought of as analogous to the webbing that supports suspension bridges.\textsuperscript{445}

\footnote{445 Jerome M Segal, \textit{Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human Presence}, 101.}
CHAPTER 5
AGENCY IN KARL BARTH AND CONTEMPORARY NATURAL THEOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

Within the academic sphere there have been various attempts to find a method or solution that can encompass two extremes.\(^{446}\) As we have seen in the previous chapters, many philosophers have presented valid theories in order to solve the problems of two extremes from the point of view of philosophy. In their dependence on reason and scientific methods these attempts share a common approach, and all have had limitations in the effort to find a bridge between God and human beings. Indeed, as we find in Kant’s thought, reason will not capture entities beyond the world of aesthetics and senses unless it is based on something that is inborn in reason itself; nor can it trustworthily bridge and pass judgement upon anything that is beyond the world of appearance. The connection between God as inborn in reason and humans in this world is, therefore, beyond reasonable judgment; there is no secure bridge between God and man, between infinite entities and finite beings. So, what is left for the world of theology?

In the following the problem of the potentially impossible bridge between the two extremes is investigated within the post-Kantian theological sphere with special reference to Karl Barth. As we know, not only Barth, but many theologians have persistently tried to solve the problem in various theological areas, and of course their viewpoints have

\(^{446}\) Here, I use this term as a confrontation thesis. By this I mean paired concepts such as ‘God and Man’, ‘relativism and absolutism’, ‘past and present’, ‘infinite and finite’, ‘transcendent being and being-facticity’. The two entities form a contradiction but also need each other logically, because if we relinquish one extreme in order to emphasize the other, we would not construe both of them.
changed considerably. For instance, the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner extends and expands his theological point on the basis of Thomas Aquinas’ natural theology in order to suggest the contact points between man and God. John Hick, a Protestant scholar, also considers that transcendent beings and mysterious events are mediated by symbols and metaphors to human beings. Amongst other scholars, Raimundo Panikka, Paul Tillich, Paul Knitter and Robert King have expounded various positions in this area. Although it would be fruitful to research their arguments and theories in order to see how they develop these contact points between God and man and whether and in what form they develop agency theories, one of the most powerful topics from the time of early Christianity, I would like to focus on the most paradoxical theologian, who by the very nature of his theology both addressed and somehow developed an agency theory in principle, only to deny the very possibility of its existence. That is why we will focus on Karl Barth, one of the most influential theologians in history, who wanted to solve this problem of two extremes without appealing to or depending on reason, focusing on revelation of the divine alone. Furthermore, Barth’s theological argument will be re-illuminated in relation to agency theory.

5.2 Karl Barth’s Theology and Agency

5.2.1 Barth’s diagnosis on the two extremes

5.2.1.1 Starting point: living man

It is important as a starting point to discover the linchpin between the two extremes, between God and man, between transcendent being and being-facticity, between
absolutism and relativism, between subjectivity and objectivity. As we indicated in the previous chapters, reason occupies an absolute position in the philosophical inquiry of two extreme concepts. The reason why there is a problem of two extremes is based on the complexity of reason itself, because, as Tillich says, ‘the polarity of the static and dynamic elements of reason produces a conflict between absolutism and relativism of reason’. 447

On the other hand, it is worthwhile noting that Karl Barth places the starting point for diagnosing the two extremes with something or somebody. In fact, the viewpoints of scholars can appear differently depending on which of their many books are consulted. Some theologians maintain that Barth could start from revelation, the Word of God and God’s grace to arrive at the connecting point between human beings and God. This would not be wrong if they depended on Barth’s Church Dogmatics to solve the two extremes and to seek through dialectic the Word of God. 448 However, it would be problematic if they based their ideas on Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, one of his most philosophical books, in which he suggests a starting point of diagnosis of the two extremes, because Barth suggests the living man as the connecting point between two opposites such as past and present, absolutism and relativism.

In fact, there is logically no problem of two opposites in God Himself, regardless of verification of whether God exists. If we wish to find the place where the problem of the two extremes occurs, we could give attention to the phenomena of human beings. Barth evidently knows this, so he makes clear the theological matter in the history of Christianity. Specifically, he insists that the problem of theology in Christian history is

the subject-matter of theology. In the centre of this subject-matter he places living man, who has the key to the problem of both extremes.

However, this subject-matter needs to be clarified in order to demonstrate its distinctiveness from the social sciences and from the relatively recently established branches of theology. Two questions are crucial in historical interpretation and analysis. First, what is the main event which forms a period? Second, who is the creative subject of history? The centralization of man shows that the construction and reconstruction of the subject-matter which composes history are very important. What, then, does the historical material say? According to Barth, it says that its subject-matter is living man because, as he indicates, history is made up of living men whose work is handed over upon their death. If we can know what kind of meaning is made by living man in a particular period, then we can understand the main events of that time. Then, we will be in a position to move on to answer the second question. Barth explains the Church and theology as follows:

The Church does not stand in a vacuum. ... As regards theology, also, we cannot be in the Church without taking as much responsibility for the theology of the past as for the theology of our present. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Schleiermacher and all the rest are not dead, but living. They still speak and demand a hearing as living voices, as surely as we know that they and we belong together in the Church. ...Our responsibility is not only to God, to ourselves, to the men of today, to other living theologians, but to them. There is no past in the Church, so there is no past theology, ‘in him they all live’.

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449 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & History, Brian Cozens & the Staff of SCM Press and John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1972), 16.

450 Ibid., 17. In German, “Im Raum der Kirche sind wir nicht in einem leeren Raum. · · · Wir Können auch hinsichtlich der Theologie nicht in der Kirche sein, ohne der Theologie der Vorzeit so gut
Here, we see Barth’s amazing insight. According to him, we can reconfirm that theological matter in history is subject-matter. He also regards living man as subject-matter. This living man ceaselessly connects the past and the present, speaks with a live voice passing over a number of regions and generations, and creates development and change in every period. Hence, we can understand how human beings can know transcendent being, and at the centre of his theology there is a connecting point between that being and the human. The living man is commonly known as the things in history that exert influence upon current times through language and thought. That makes historical interaction a possibility, and encourages a reflection of the times through books and other works.

It is necessary to differentiate this from Feuerbach, who also made humans stand in the centre of religion and historiography. By doing so, Feuerbach tried to make human beings substitute for divine things. He stood upon the major premise that human beings are at the beginning of religion, in its stages of development, and even in the last phase of religion. If human beings are the beginning, the development, and the end, we can reach the conclusion that God is created by human beings and that God should exist for human beings. Hence, a study of religion should not only start with, but should also finish


451 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence Of Christianity, Trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 20-32. He explains that “religion is that conception of nature of the world and of man which is essential to, i.e., identical with, a man’s nature”.
with the concept of human beings, and human beings would be the core of it. The fact we
cannot overlook is that if a transcendent entity is replaced by a human one, theology is
changed into anthropology. In other words, Feuerbach’s idea demolishes the place of
theology or would be considered as humanistic theology.

Accordingly, there are considerable differences between the essence of a genus that
indicates essence of religion, and living man who is the subject-matter of history.

Here, living man who is the subject-matter of history and the bridge over the gap between
the past and the present is a very interesting and worthwhile concept to re-establish one
of Barth’s theological methods. In addition, the reason why Barth places the word ‘living’
in front of ‘man’ is considerably important to reconstruct his thoughts.

First of all, Barth creates five columns to analyse and to re-illuminate the spirit of the
times.

   It should have five columns: the first for entering the most important dates of
world history in general; the second for the most noteworthy events in the history
of culture, art and literature; the third for church history in general; the fourth for
the dates of birth and death of the most prominent theologians of the period; and
the fifth for the years in which their most important books were published.452

452 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & History, 25-
26. In German, “...mit einer ersten Spalte, in die die wichtigsten Daten der allgemeinen Weltgeschichte
einzutragen wären, einer zweiten für die bemerkenswertesten Ereignisse der Kultur-, Kunst-
und Literaturgeschichte, einer dritten für die allgemeine Kirchengeschichte, einer vierten für die Geburts- und
Sterbejahre der namhaftesten Theologen der Zeit und einer fünften für die Erscheinungsjahre ihrer
wichtigsten Bücher” (Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, 11-12).
Living man is deeply rooted in the centre of these five columns. Through the process of seeing, observing and establishing in these columns the subject-matter of history, such as living men like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lessing, Kant, Herder, Novalis, Hegel and Schleiermacher in the eighteenth century, and Wegscheider, De Wette, Marheineke, Baur, Tholuck, Menken, Feuerbach, Strauss, Schweizer, Dorner, Müller, Rothe, Hofmann, Beck, Vilmar, Kohlbrügge, Blumhardt and Ritschl in the nineteenth century, Barth would reveal the whole picture of Protestant theology in the nineteenth century to multi-generations who have the eyes to be able to see them. In other words, Barth, as a bearer of their theological thought from the past to the present, reconstructs and re-illuminates Protestant theology in the nineteenth century for subsequent generations. The reason why Barth discusses the living men who are the subject-matter of history is that those people are regarded as the connecting bridge between the past, present and future generations. However, Barth often construes this living man as existing man, thinking man and acting man who is absorbed in the actuality of his existence. So he maintains ‘that only the doer of the Word is real hearer, for it is the Word of the living God addressed to the living man absorbed in work and action of his life’. Barth’s insight shows that the meaning of living man can apply in various circumstances.

In summary, the living man as a starting point gives us considerable insights into how Barth re-established Protestant theology in the nineteenth century. First, the two extremes are not in God Himself, but in the category of human beings. Secondly, the appearance

453 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I/2, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 792.
454 Ibid. In German, “Nur der Täter des Wortes ist sein wirklicher Hörer, und das darum, weil es das Wort des wirklichen Gottes an den wirklichen, d.h. an den im Wirken, in der Tat seines Lebens begriffenen Menschen ist.” (Karl Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik I/2 Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes [Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1945], 886).
of both extremes is not only to escape human beings’ limitation, but also to establish absolute power of reason. Finally, as both these extremes are based on the living man, we should recognize the limitation of men as connecting points between God and human beings.

5.2.1.2 Conflicts of the two extremes

There has been no perfect solution to the conflict of two extremes that would close the gap between God and human beings in the political, cultural and theological spheres. Generally speaking, in many areas this gap broadened more in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than in medieval times, when the Church and God held absolute power, surpassing human authority and reason. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a transposition from Theo-centric to Man-centric theology, so that man took over the throne of absolute power and the conflict of two extremes emerged.

Barth recognizes this and investigates absolute man as an aspect of the living man who emerged in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. For him, the concept of absolutism is key\(^{455}\) to elucidating the spirit of the age of the eighteenth century, indicating ‘a system of life based upon the belief in the omnipotence of human powers’.\(^{456}\) He divides the concept into two parts, political absolutism and Enlightenment, in order to disclose absolute man, who was hidden in various areas of

\(^{455}\) Karl Barth, *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & History*, 37.

science and culture and who emerged into politics, science, music, and styles of architecture during that period. He concludes that:

Man, who discovers his own power and ability, the potentially dormant in his humanity, that is, his human being as such, and looks upon it as the final, the real and absolute, I mean something ‘detached’, self-justifying, with its own authority and power, which he can therefore set in motion in all directions and without any restraint - this man is absolute man.

In this passage he makes clear that human beings have become a yardstick for judgment. This man does not have to depend on revelation, the Bible and the authority of the Church in order to meet transcendent beings or God. This represents an escape from limitations of human abilities that can neither obtain the knowledge of God nor know God without revelation and God’s grace. According to Barth, during the eighteenth century there was established an ideal of science of history and of natural science, and the pursuit of knowledge without presupposition was a standard of judgment in various fields.

Furthermore, it was a maxim of those days that absolute man would do everything and be all-conquering. In other words, the term ‘absolute’ was undergoing a process of transition from God to human beings. This appears to be the spirit of the age, and it affects a formation of theology, especially liberal theology, in the eighteenth century.

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457 Ibid., 33-79.
458 Ibid., 36. In German, “Der Mensch, der seine eigene Kraft, sein Können, die in seiner Humanität, d. h. in seinem Menschsein als solchem schlummernde Potentialität, der sie als Letztes, Eigentliches, Absolutes, will sagen: als ein Gelöstes, in sich selbst Berechtigtes und Bevollmächtigtes und Mächtiges versteht, der sie darum hemmungslos nach allen Seiten in Gang setzt, dieser Mensch ist der absolutistische Mensch.” (Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, 19).
Where reason and capability of human beings substitute for the place of revelation and divine power, there is a humanizing of the problem of theology. According to Barth, this humanization emerges first of all in politics,⁴⁶⁰ where the Church and Christianity become identified with the state.⁴⁶¹ Secondly, humanization of theology leads to a particular morality and bourgeois theology, which in his view represent a deterioration of Christianity, which takes on a pietistic or a rationalistic colouring.⁴⁶²

Another consideration is that the humanization of theology created a philosophical and scientific transformation of Christianity, which extended its influence and increased participation.⁴⁶³ Finally, this humanization causes the deepening of inner pietism and individualism, whereby the mystery of the down-to-earth forms of pietism becomes domesticated, rather than the true Christian mystery.⁴⁶⁴ Barth points out that ‘it is no argument against the individualistic character of the undercurrent that the Christian and non-Christian Enlightenment dissociated themselves on occasion in very strong words from mysticism, enthusiasm and theosophy as against expressions of the irrationality that they so hated’.⁴⁶⁵


This tendency of humanization of theology opened the possibility that God could be illuminated, divided and even removed through human reasoning. Yet to Barth, it is a mistake to overlook the limits of science, because concepts of human being and absolute power cause frequent conflicts and highlight discrepancies in terminology. Barth knows that the reason both extremes exist in many areas of human life is because of the vulnerable and contradictory nature of human reason and capability.

Paul Tillich rightly captures this, pointing out that both absolutism and relativism can be seen in reason. He claims that: ‘Essentially, reason unites a static and a dynamic element. The static element preserves reason from losing its identity within the life-process. The dynamic element is the power of reason to actualize itself rationally in process of life.’

There is a conflict between absolutism and relativism, caused by the polarity of the static and dynamic elements under the conditions of existence. In Tillich’s view, this leads to a ‘quest for the concrete absolute’, which he considers as the perfectly concrete as well as the perfectly absolute, i.e., the paradoxically united logical form. How then is this possible? Tillich posits that the conflict between absolutism and relativism has never been resolved by criticism, neither in the past nor the present, since the concrete absolute is required to overcome this problem. For this reason Tillich requests the advent of revelation, which is Jesus Christ as the Ultimate Reality. According to Tillich, this Ultimate Reality becomes known to us through symbol and analogy because the sentence,

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467 Ibid., 83.
468 Ibid., 89.
‘The being of God is being-itself’ is both a symbolic statement and at the same time not symbolic. The reason why it does not indicate anything beyond being-itself is that it is not symbolic. Yet because it is not able to say anything about God without symbolizing, it is symbolic. In fact, in Tillich’s theology, the symbol is a crucial factor to reach the reality of God. He explains the symbol as follows:

Religious symbols are double-edged. They are directed toward the infinite which they symbolize and toward the finite through which they symbolize it. They force the infinite down to finitude and the finite up to infinity. They open the divine for the human and the human for the divine.

Here, as we can see, a symbol does not always indicate something beyond itself, but also opens the Ultimate Reality which cannot be captured within our capability. Tillich needs symbols to deal with the problem of the gap between God, the Ultimate Reality and human beings. He also, like Barth, considers revelation as the key solution for the dilemma between ‘absolutism’ and ‘relativism’. However, unlike Tillich, Barth does not change revelation and the Word of God into the Ultimate Reality; nor does he depend on symbols for solving the problem of the two extremes.

5.2.1.3 Karl Barth’s diagnosis and agency theory

As we have seen, Barth defined the absolute man who is the origin of the problem of the two extremes and thus indicated the humanization of theology and liberal theology in the

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469 Ibid., 235.
471 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, 240.
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. By doing so, he was able to look for a clue to the problem in human beings, but he would not and could not find the key to the connection between the two extremes. Instead, he focused his attention on the revelation and grace of God. Undoubtedly, Barth believed that although living man as subject-matter is the starting point of the connection between the two extremes, the living man cannot be the subject to reconcile or overcome those extremes. He recognized that because of the limit of human ability or reason the contradiction between two completely different qualities cannot be solved.

Barth’s recommendation to resolve the extremes led to the emergence of agency theory, which gives us considerable insights. In terms of agency, Barth’s teaching has been quoted by a number of scholars, and the idea that his thought is close to the concept of agency has been both criticized and supported. First of all, King investigates an agency model that would give us the meaning of God. He mentions the opinions of both Barth and Farrer, and summarizes their position as one in which God can be conceived only as agent, known only through His action.\(^472\) Although this viewpoint is widely held, it has become controversial both within and outside theological circles. According to King, critics of theology argue that application of an agency model to God is equivocal.\(^473\) In other words, when theologians use God as agent, the concept of agency is not clear and can be interpreted in various ways. However, as already alluded to in the previous chapters, the terminology of agency gives us a possibility to bridge two extremes, such as subject and object, God and human beings, absolutism and relativism.

\(^{473}\) *Ibid.*
In fact, Barth established a vast structure of systemic theology which involves the triune God, revelation, incarnation, election and reconciliation between God and sinful man. Through the large system of theology extracted from the scriptures, Barth explores the procedure of divine omnipotence and its relation to creaturely agency.\textsuperscript{474} McDowell recognizes this and focuses particularly on ‘Barth on Nothingness’,\textsuperscript{475} i.e., ‘While the intrusion of \textit{das Nichtige} is ontologically unfounded, it can be referred to only in the bizarre acts of agents’,\textsuperscript{476} which makes it ‘an extremely foolish and irrational act’.\textsuperscript{477} Of course, it is not only the negative aspects of agents that are innately sinful in nature, but also the anthropocentric positions.

In terms of human agency, some moral theologians, in particular James Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas, argue that Barth’s thought is too narrow to expand or maximize the concept of human abilities. This is because human moral agency acts with a ‘passive conformity of human activity to God's activity’.\textsuperscript{478} However, Werpehowski comments that this view stems from too narrow a reading of Barth’s works\textsuperscript{479} Whether this criticism is valid or not, the concept of human agency is widely employed as the mediating role between God and human beings.

\textsuperscript{475} Barth argues that “the existence, presence and operation of nothingness are also objectively the break in the relationship between Creator and creature”. These “are not only the frontier which belongs to the nature of this relationship on both sides and which is grounded in the goodness of the Creator and that of the Creature” (Karl Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics}, G.W. Bromiley & T.F. Torrance, Vol. III/3, \textit{The Doctrine Of Creation} [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961], 294).
\textsuperscript{476} John C. McDowell, “Much Ado about Nothing: Karl Barth's Being Unable to Do Nothing about Nothingness”, 331.
\textsuperscript{477} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{478} William Werpehowski, “Command and History in the Ethics of Karl Barth”, \textit{Journal of Religious Ethics} Vol. 9, 81 (Fall 2001), 298.
\textsuperscript{479} \textit{Ibid.}
On the other hand, Barth’s thought also encompasses an emergence of divine agency as the connection of the two extremes. Therefore, according to Colle, consideration ‘of the union between divine essence and human nature must account for how the consciousness of God in the mediating role of Jesus and in the Holy Spirit differ’.\(^{480}\) In this indication, the triune God as agent would participate in each other or in human beings, \textit{viz.} the covenant-partner of God in the world. Colle’s explanation of divine agency and causality is directly implicated in this differentiated consciousness of Christ and the Spirit.\(^{481}\)

Here, we can find a key feature of Barth’s theology with regard to the aspect of divine agency. Generally speaking, there are four positions in relation to the doctrine of agency which are associated with the triune God, i.e., Christological doctrine of agency, God-centric doctrine of agency, Pneumatic doctrine of agency and Spirit Christological doctrine of agency. Theologians of the Christological doctrine of agency would include Paul Tillich, T. F. Torence,\(^{482}\) Dorothe Sölle\(^{483}\) and David Ford. The God-centric doctrine of agency would be represented by John Hick, Karl Rahner, Paul Knitter and Robert King.\(^{484}\) The third group, theologians of the Pneumatic doctrine of agency, would be Ralph Del Colle,\(^{485}\) John Thompson\(^{486}\) and Peter Ward.\(^{487}\) Finally, theologians of the


\(^{481}\) \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{482}\) Thomas F Torrence, \textit{The Mediation of Christ} (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992).


Spirit Christological doctrine of agency include G.W.H Lampe, Oliver D. Crisp, Paul Newman, Roger Haight, James Mackey, Michael Lodahl, Barry Strong and James D.G. Dunn.

Barth was to develop and apply all four aspects of the doctrine of agency in the theological sphere in order to attain justification for theology as an academic subject. Barth’s cognition of God will be investigated in the next section.

Another consideration is the importance of culture as a connecting point between God and human beings. In particular, Barth mentions the musician, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, whose works open the eyes of his audience to be able to see transcendent entity; ultimately, through listening to works such as The Magic Flute and Don Giovanni, people could meet the divine entity or God. Gouwens describes Barth’s vision of Mozart’s music in terms of ‘the turning from shadow to light’. In fact, Barth notes the free expression which is not only at the heart of Mozart’s music but would in his opinion also be the core of God’s attribution. Therefore, he distinguishes Mozart from contemporary musicians such as Bach, Handel and Haydn, who were ‘children of their century’, because he regards their music as reflecting ideology or dogma of their time, labelling it

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493 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 63.73.
495 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 73.
'the music of absolutism’.\textsuperscript{496} It is very interesting that he differentiates between Mozart and contemporary musicians on the basis of full musical freedom. What draws Barth to Mozart is Mozart’s exceptional capacity to see almost perfectly and to praise the glory of God’s creation.\textsuperscript{497} It is clear from this that Barth considers culture, including music, as a medium or agency between the transcendent entity of God and human beings. Palma also notes that Barth’s theology of culture reveals freedom as the core qualifier of culture.\textsuperscript{498} For Barth, free culture is a parable or analogy of the kingdom of God. However, Palma argues that even though Barth apparently regards human work and culture as agency of bearing God’s will, God’s chosen means and agents, he does not place sufficient value upon them.\textsuperscript{499} Of course, Barth does not state that culture itself has the capacity to reach the entity of God’s freedom, but through analogical interpretation of Barth’s theology of culture, culture would be the connecting point between transcendent entity and finite beings.

Now, the question remains as to how culture would encompass or mediate the two extremes. Here, it is worth noting Niebuhr’s comment that in Barth’s theology of culture there is no road from man to God, but there is a road from God to man.\textsuperscript{500} He regards the central doctrine of Barth’s theology as God’s act, whereby ‘God has taken, is taking and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{496} Ibid., 72.
\item \textsuperscript{499} Robert J. Palma, \textit{Karl Barth’s Theology of Culture}, 32.
\end{itemize}
will take this road’.\textsuperscript{501} He argues that for Barth, Christian action is neither parallel nor counterpart-action to God’s action; rather, it is ‘response to the divine activity which precedes, accompanies, and awaits human action in history’\textsuperscript{502}. This viewpoint is acceptable in part, if we look at analogy on the basis of Barth’s \textit{Church Dogmatics}, but it needs to be modified from a standpoint of free culture. In this way, free culture would become a pathway or agency connecting God and human beings.

Let us look at the problem from a different aspect of culture associated with the agency of God’s creation, one that is able to support natural theology composed of the key features of rationality and nature. Here, the concept of nature needs to be specified, because its definition can vary between scholars. It is important that a criterion of elucidation should be established in order to interpret nature properly. In this respect, McGrath’s explanation is helpful, because he says that culture would determine both the materials and the phenomenon of nature. In addition, not only is rationality itself formed by cultural factors, but it is also embedded in tradition as well as in nature.\textsuperscript{503} Eventually, according to McGrath, ‘such a natural theology would thus be shaped by the contingencies of history and culture, rather than resting on the alleged universality of “necessary truths of reason”’.\textsuperscript{504} Whether nature and reason can become a mediation or encounter between God and human beings is a very controversial issue when interpreting Barth’s thought. This will be the subject of the section 5.2.3 below.

\textsuperscript{501} \textit{Ibid.}, 121.
\textsuperscript{502} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{504} \textit{Ibid.}, 168.
To sum up, Barth’s thought with regard to solving the problem of the two extremes is close to agency theory, with its tripartite division into human agency, divine agency and cultural agency. Human agency is associated with living man, who is not only subject-matter in Christian history but also connects the past and the present and bridges past and present generations. Divine agency is related to bridging the triune God to each other. In addition, God’s agent could overcome the qualitative gap between human beings and God. Finally, the concept of free culture includes human beings’ relatedness, religion, art and nature. Freedom is the key feature in free culture, as well at the core of God’s attribution.

5.2.2 Barth’s epistemology regarding God and agency

In this section the aim is to investigate a little further into Barth’s epistemology when considering the association of agency theory. Generally speaking, some scholars argue that Barth regards the solution to the two extremes to be revelation, grace and divine reconciliation, whereas others maintain that Barth also recognizes creatures, through which God’s will and glory can be revealed. These two positions often conflict with each other in the interpretation of Barth’s theology. However, this conflict is reasonable, because there may be various views on the hermeneutical aspects of Barth’s theology.

Here, let us concentrate our attention on three aspects of Barth’s epistemology regarding God: ‘The Self-attestation of God as the ground of cognition’, ‘Revelation and God’s Word’ as the subject-matter of cognition, and ‘Faith as the possibility of cognition’.
5.2.2.1 Self-attestation of God and grace

Barth’s view is that God is known from the relationship between God and human beings, instigated by God, and that these two entities have qualitative differences. Humans cannot connect with God. In fact, to overcome or to reduce the gap between humans and God, many theologians have continually adjusted various aspects of their theories. It appears that, according to Barth, there is only one principle for reaching an understanding of the level of Godhead, which he expresses in his epistemology as ‘God is known only by God’. In other words, God is known only by divine agency, which is Himself. From this principle, we can analogize a foundation of epistemology regarding God which comes from God’s agency alone: even a Christological agency is still a God-centric agency, and the same is true for a Pneumatic agency or a Spirit Christological agency. There is no lack of attacks against this statement from both rationalists and the Continental Group, because it implies that the object of cognition is beyond the boundary of human thinking. In general, the object is very important in epistemology, because cognition without an object induces false knowledge. Thus, Descartes’ cognition,


506 Schilling divided the Continental Protestant theologians of the 1960s into three main groups as follows:


‘2.Theologians who are influenced decisively or conspicuously by existentialist modes of thinking’, i.e., Rudolf Bultmann, Friedrich Gogarten, Gerhard Ebeling, Ernst Fuchs, Knud E. Løgstrup, Emil Brunner, etc.

‘3.Theologians who find either in the Lutheran confessions or Luther himself definitive guidance in interpreting the faith of the Scriptures’, i.e., Peter Brunner, Edmund Schlink, Wilfried Joest, Walter Künst, Ernst Kinder, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Gerhard Gloege, Theobald Süß, Regin Prenter, Gustaf Wingren and Nils A. Dahl, etc.

*cogito ergo sum*, reflects that certainty of the object is a core of thought and a point of departure when practising philosophy.

Barth’s statement that ‘God is known only by God Himself’ is a controversial one for his antagonists. The objections can be roughly divided into three standpoints. First, Bartley, a rationalistic theologian, regards Barth as being as rational as possible, while maintaining an ultimate and irrational commitment to the above statement; i.e. he considers Barth to be providing a rational excuse for an irrational commitment,\(^{507}\) and he objects to an ultimate commitment not because he thinks the commitment itself is illegitimate or irrational, but because it is not subject to criticism and revision.\(^{508}\) In other words, Bartley argues that any commitment that is an absolute principle should allow criticism and revision.

Secondly, some theologians of the Continental Group criticize Barth’s theology because it weakens dialectical theology in respect of overcoming the gap between a transcendent entity and finite human beings. In other words, they focus on the dialectical method, in order to solve the problem of the qualitative difference between the infinite entity and the finite entity. The question of whether Barth relinquishes the dialectics from his scholastic study will be investigated in the next section.

\(^{507}\) W.W. Bartley, *The Retreat to Commitment* (London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1984), 38, 72. Bartley regarded Barth as a neo-orthodox theologian. Subsequently, this term has been used in the English speaking world to describe Barth.

Finally, Barth’s critics argue that his axiom, ‘God is known only by God’ should present a clear answer to his opponents. In other words, his argument needs to prove what the divine agency is and how human beings cognize it.

Barth has carefully considered what the entities of human beings are, and whether the realm of reason is able to go beyond this boundary. In his commentary on the ‘Epistle to the Romans’, he presents more concretely the possibility of recognition of God. Recognition is possible when God reveals Himself to human beings and also when Man can recognize the relationship between God and human beings on a dialectical level. In this way, he examines how we can deal with the problem that produces a dualistic polarity and parallelism in the two extremes. In his commentary, Barth construes ‘the Old Man’ who lives without God as well as ‘the New Man’ who stands before God. The first is the existing man who lives in this world without regarding God and the latter is the man who lives in the new world. More importantly, he explains the nature of the New Man who is created by God’s grace as follows:

Upon the threshold of my existence there appears, demanding admittance – the New Man of the new world, the New Man in Christ Jesus, justified and redeemed, alive and good, endowed with attributes which are not mine, have not been mine, and never will be mine. This New Man is no visible figure in history, no metaphysical phantom of my imagination; he is no other, second person, with whom I may be compared; he claims to be me myself, my existential, unobservable, Ego.\footnote{509 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (1922), trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, Sixth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 229. In German, ”Diese Beziehung bedeutet, dass ein gerechtfertigter und erlöster, ein guter und lebendiger Mensch, der neue Mensch der neuen Welt in Jesus Christus Einlass fordernd an der Pforte meines Daseins erschienen ist – wobei alle jene Attribute das besagen, was ich nie war, nicht bin und nie sein werde! –, und das mit dem begründeten Anspruch, keine historische Größe, kein Metaphysisches Gespenst, kein Anderer, Zweiter neben mir zu sein, sondern – ich}
Above, we have already clarified the concepts of the New Man and the new world on a theological level. However, from this citation, the remaining question is how these concepts can be justified. First, what Barth understands as the concept of the New Man is neither the second person of real ‘I’, nor a metaphysical shade of his imagination.510

Here, if Barth regarded the New Man as the second person and the objectified being of real ‘I’ metaphysically, the New Man would be reduced to real ‘I’ without any logical leap. From this context, what we know is that the New Man cannot be analysed within reasonable boundaries, is not one with whom the ‘I’ may be compared. Secondly, if this New Man can be analysed cognitively, there needs to be something new which is beyond human reason. Barth maintains that this is the grace of God. In other words, the grace of God can reveal God to this New Man on a theological level, because grace is the power of the Resurrection to transform the Old Man into the New Man, from the status which is conditioned by visible or invisible sin to the new status which is justified by the act of God.511  Furthermore, he defines grace as ‘the power of the Resurrection’, which is ‘the knowledge that men are known of God, the consciousness that their existence is begotten of God, that it moves and rests in Him, and that it is beyond all concrete things, beyond the being and course of this world’.512  Another consideration is whether grace is one of the attributes of God or one of the natures of God. Scholars apply the terms ‘attribute’

510 Ibid.

511 Ibid., 190-191.

and ‘nature’ in different ways. In his book, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, Barth examines these terms more specifically and distinguishes them from each other. He notes that nature is cognized in and through attributes.\textsuperscript{513} If recognition of nature is true, the attributes come from the nature. In this respect, Barth regards all the determinations of attributes of God as determination of His nature, and regards each as itself identical with the divine nature.\textsuperscript{514} After all, grace is not only an attribute of God, which is revealed by the divine act, but also God’s nature, which is revealed by the divine attributes. If this is true, how can we reveal the divine attributes? In answering this question Barth presents Deus Dixit to sinful man.\textsuperscript{515} That is, only God’s self-revealing and self-attestation can bring us close to the level of God as preaching of His Word. He would consider this as God’s grace, His love and the freedom of God. In other words, God is not an abstract object which exists only in scholars’ thought, but He reveals, gives access to and speaks Himself to human beings through His grace, through His freedom, with His love. The key point is that the grace of God comes from His nature,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{514} Ibid., 380.
\item \textsuperscript{515} Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics, 45-68. Here, Barth explains Deus Dixit as six levels:
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item It is an address (Ibid., 58).
  \item “Revelation means disclosure” (Ibid.).
  \item “The Deus Dixit means a here and now” (Ibid., 59).
  \item “The concealed and unique address that we call God’s revelation is qualified history” (Ibid., 60).
  \item “God is always the subject, and God the subject, in this concealed and singular address which is not in continuity with other events” (Ibid., 61).
  \item The process of God’s self-revealing is a dicere, its content is Word (Ibid., 62).
\end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}
because, as Barth notes: ‘God is gracious and continuous gracious even where there is no grace.’

To summarize, the self-attestation of God as the ground of cognition comes from His essential attributes, such as grace, love and freedom, hence His own nature as being the God of revelation.

5.2.2.2 Revelation and the Word of God

The key issue is how Barth can recognize revelation and God’s Word as subject-matters of cognition. In the first place, we have to inquire how to solve the paradox that it is possible to recognize God, who is beyond the boundary of our human cognition. Barth ponders this problem and maintains that ‘the possibility of the knowledge of God springs from God, in that He is Himself the truth and He gives Himself to man in His Word by the Spirit to be known as the truth’. This immediately makes clear that for Barth there is no human cognition of God, unless the possibility of cognition is moved from man to God, a cognition that we call revelation. In other words, although human beings bear the imago Dei (the image of God) in reason, which is a gift from God, sinful man himself cannot arrive at the world of God. If Barth’s argument is right, there remains a second question: how can we know the nature of God, if human beings cannot recognize God’s entity for themselves? As mentioned above, the incapability of man needs God’s

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517 Ibid., 63.
intervention to reduce the gap or break down the barriers between sinful man and God, because otherwise there is no possibility of encountering God.

Barth often maintains that God reveals Himself to His people. Here, a fundamental problem arises and provokes a dialectical issue, that according to Barth’s argument no contact point between God and human beings remains or can be found. Thus, some scholars criticize that in his Church Dogmatics Barth neglects the use of human reason or his capability in response to God’s revelation and absoluteness, and he reduces the use of dialectic. A prominent historian of World Christianity, Werner Ustorf, shows that Barth was not invited by the Continental Group, which met twice at Basle, Switzerland in 1930 and 1932, in order to adumbrate on a faith relevant to modern knowledge.518 Pointing to a letter from Visser’t Hooft to Oldham, Ustorf shows that the reason why Barth did not receive an invitation is that in his theology there is no room for dialectic in any specific sense.519 However, we might question whether those scholars who criticized Barth’s theology were justified, because Barth developed his theology dialectically in the historical situation of his ministry. Barth recognizes that although ‘the revelation of which theology speaks is not dialectical’,520 dialectic is a key factor in arguing and explaining the revelation of God’s Word. For instance, while he regards Christian preaching as a human task, he wants to look at the dialectical relation between God’s Word and Christian preaching.521 This indicates that the limitations of human ability demand the emergence

518 Werner Ustorf, Sailing on the Next Tide: Missions, Missiology, and the Third Reich, Vol. 125 (Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 2000), 104.
519 Ibid., 105. Visser’t Hooft maintains that there is not only one-sidedness in Barth’s theology, but also no connecting point between God and the actual situation of the world.
520 Karl Barth, “Church and Theology” (1925) in Theology and Church, Translated by Louise Pettibone Smith (London: SCM Press, 1962), 299.
of dialectic in order to find a contact point with God. More concretely, he suggests the importance of dialectic in theology as follows:

Theology is not only ectypal (ἐκτυπος) and the theology of wayfarers (viatorum); it is also, according to the further analysis of our elders, theology after the fall (theologia post lapsum). And that means that it is conditioned in its basic assumptions by human misery. And such conditioning involves the impossibility (... ) of rejecting with a gesture of irritation the dialectical character of theology.522

Barth strongly emphasizes and depends on a dialectical method that overcomes the incapability of human beings to connect with the revelation of God. On this basis, we would maintain that Visser’t Hooft’s interpretation of Barth’s theology was not correct. Probably, he had some other reasons for refusing to invite Barth to the Continental Group meeting.

In conclusion, Barth believes that human beings cannot reach a knowledge of God through reasoning or recognizing without God’s own intervention. Only when the gracious God gives us the Word and revelation that cognizes the attributes of God’s nature, are humans enabled to recognize God’s revelation and Word with the method of dialectics, which, however, uses reason, but reason that has first been informed by God’s grace.

5.2.2.3 Faith as rendering the possibility of cognition

This section will investigate on a theological level faith as the necessary condition for any possibility of human cognition of God.

Generally speaking, if it is impossible to cognize God through reason itself, what possibility is there with which the knowledge of philosophy can be compared? Barth investigates the human-centric theology which seems to have been, in the eighteenth century, always right, scientific and a yardstick of judgment. He criticizes the trends that places scientific knowledge in a higher position than the knowledge of faith. As mentioned above, because reason itself not only cannot go beyond human boundaries, but also does not reach at knowing God, Barth employs God’s grace, love, and freedom as well as God’s Word and revelation in order to overcome the limitation of human cognition with regard to God. In this situation, Barth complements an analogy of faith with dialectics in order to explain the possibility of cognition of God. The question remains as to why faith is thought to be important in bridging God’s attributes on the side of humans, and why reason is not chosen to connect between the nature of God and human beings. Barth clearly does not want us to depend on rational acceptance, rational manifestation or rational excuse, but appeals instead to acknowledgment, recognition and confession of faith. These acts of faith indicate a form of knowledge which desires its object as its origin. Faith encompasses the attributes of reason, or even precedes reason. Barth uses

523 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 90.
524 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Geoffrey William Bromiley & Thomas F. Torrance., Vol. IV/1, The Doctrine of Reconciliation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), 758.
reason deliberately in developing his *Church Dogmatics* from a positive aspect and perspective, because he believes that ‘Christian faith is the illumination of the reason in which men become free to live in the truth of Jesus Christ and thereby to become sure also of the meaning of their own existence and of the ground and goal of all that happens’. In his PhD thesis, ‘The Use of Reason in Karl Barth’, Wilson argues that Barth never acknowledges a conflict between reason and faith. This argument is reasonable because Barth never uses faith as a contrary concept of reason; however, even so, reason cannot usurp the unique position of faith. In his thesis, Wilson maintains that Barth expands a dialectic conception of reason, and that he does not have to reconcile faith and reason, because he never admits that these are incompatible with each other. In other words, he recognizes that there are two different levels not only in both knowledge of faith and knowledge of reason, but also in the roles of faith and reason to reach the level of God’s existence.

Although Wilson is correct in pointing out that Barth does not play faith against reason, Barth clearly sees an epistemological order of the two. He employs and reconstructs St Anselm’s thought, where he finds several stages of reason, and he considers Anselm’s theology as a model whereby theology could become a science. Anselm pursues not only rational knowledge under the insight of faith, but also faithful knowledge under the illumination of reason. G. R. Evans understands correctly the two different levels of knowledge. He argues that Anselm’s theological thinking is based on ‘the recourse to reason within a context of faith’, and enters deeply into the question of the relation

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527 Ibid., 1-2.
between faith and reason. In his book, *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, Barth investigates whether these two levels of knowledge are in harmony and interaction with each other, so that Anselm constructs theology as a science, but a science of faith.

According to Anselm, the theological scheme is made up of five factors: the necessity for theology, the possibility of theology, the condition of theology, the manner of theology and the aim of theology. Barth ponders this theological structure and attempts to make a blueprint for theology. First, Barth wants to construe Anselm’s theological approach in order to construct a bridge that would connect the two extremes. Second, as we mentioned before, Barth knows that dialectic is not sufficient to reach the knowledge of God. Accordingly, he needs a new tool or approach, which is the analogy of faith he discovers in Anselm’s works. Of course, it is a controversial issue whether Barth develops his dialectic method continuously throughout his works. It seems, however, that although he shifted emphasis from a dialectical thinking to that of the analogy of faith, the dialectical approach still underlies all of Barth’s works, even after he had published the study on Anselm in 1931. In particular, Bruce L. McCormack, in his book, *Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936*, enumerates the many theologians who have interpreted variously Barth’s theological development.

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529 Ibid., 96. Evans maintains that “The reason functions as God has designed it to do and faith ensures that it does not go astray.”


531 Ibid., 15-72.


He maintains that von Balthasar’s formula, ‘a turn from dialectic to analogy’, which evoked a considerable response in Barth’s *Denkbewegung*,\textsuperscript{533} is not the only way to read Barth. McCormack sees four principal problems with von Balthasar’s formula: First, the term ‘dialectic’ is not clear and definite.\textsuperscript{534} Second, the analogy of faith is an inherently dialectical notion.\textsuperscript{535} Third, ‘dialectical method’ is not on the same plane as ‘analogy of faith’: while the former is a conceptual tool, the latter ‘refers to the result of a divine act over which human beings have no control’.\textsuperscript{536} By using these concepts as if they were on the same plane, von Balthasar’s formula is guilty of a category error.\textsuperscript{537} The final problem is that the formula cannot escape from dialectic or analogy, so we cannot penetrate deeply into Barth’s theological development.\textsuperscript{538} After examining the problem of von Balthasar, McCormack suggests an alternative plan. He explains the importance of what he calls ‘Karl Barth’s critically realistic dialectical theology’ in construing epistemologies of theology as follows:

It should be noted that the choice of the phrase ‘critically realistic’ was not made out of a desire to establish a comparison between Barth’s theology and those contemporary schools of philosophical reflection which have also found in the phrase something apt for describing their own epistemologies. No such comparison was intended, for it is doubtful that it can be made for two reasons.

First, as the phrase has been used here, it describes a strictly theological epistemology. ‘Critical realism’ here has the significance of a witness to the mystery of the divine action in revelation. …

\textsuperscript{533} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{534} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{536} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{537} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{538} Ibid., 19.
Second, as has been argued throughout the book, to the extent that Barth concerned himself with philosophical epistemology at all, he was an idealist (and more specifically, a Kantian). All of his efforts in theology may be considered, from one point of view, as an attempt to overcome Kant by means of Kant; not retreating behind him and seeking to go around him.539

As McCormack explains in the above passage, critical realism becomes the immediate background with regard to Kant’s thought. In other words, Barth would confirm Kant’s position of a limitation of reason and he would divide knowledge into two levels: the knowledge of reason and the knowledge of faith. From what we have said before, the knowledge of faith, informed by God’s grace, becomes the transcendental ground for the knowledge of reason: faith is the necessary condition for any potential knowledge of God. Paul La Montagne, in his PhD thesis, ‘Barth and Rationality: Critical Realism in Theology’, supports McCormack and explains that critical realism has two main features: ‘First, knowledge is understood to be mediated. … Second, and almost as a consequence of the first, there must be some sort of critical theory about the limits of reason or of knowledge which is used to make judgments about knowledge and knowing process.’540

How do humans get to the level of transcendent knowledge? To Kant this was of no concern, as he categorically excluded knowledge of the divine from pure reason. For Barth, however, rational knowledge comes on the basis of faithful knowledge. For this reason, Barth concentrates on Anselm’s ‘Fides quaerens intellectum’, because God is not only ‘that thing than which nothing greater can be thought’541 (Et quidem credimus te

539 Ibid., 464-465.
esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit), but also ‘something greater than it is possible to think about’\textsuperscript{542} (\textit{sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit}). In construing Anselm’s \textit{Proslogion} 2, Barth considers the Name of God as the \textit{aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit} and the \textit{quo maius cogitari nequit}, which would be the presupposition of the proof of God’s existence.\textsuperscript{543} Furthermore, he argues that the ‘Existence of God which is accepted in faith is now to be recognized and proved on the presupposition of the Name of God likewise accepted in faith and is to be understood as necessary for thought’.\textsuperscript{544} McCormack supports Barth’s argument that Anselm uses the \textit{aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit} and the \textit{quo maius cogitari nequit} ‘as a key by which to explicate the meaning of God’s existence. And that is what “proof” finally means, as Barth understands it: it means \textit{explicatio}.’\textsuperscript{545} Thus, the analogy of faith is the dialectical precondition to capture God who is beyond reason in Anselm’s \textit{Proslogion} 2, 15.

More specifically, God needs Himself as the sole agency to expose His nature and attributes to His creatures. Without this, nobody can reach the point of contact between God and human beings, let alone the level of God’s knowledge. In this case, divine agency would act, as Austin Farrer put it, ‘omnipotently on, in, or through creaturely agencies without either forcing them or competing with them’.\textsuperscript{546} On the other hand, a human agency could only postulate analogy of faith and dialectics to reach the level of God’s knowledge. Faith is the intersection of two axes: a horizontal axis at the level of human

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{542} \textit{Ibid.}, 257.
\item \textsuperscript{543} Karl Barth, \textit{Anselm : Fides Quaerens Intellectum}, Jonn McIntyre & Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1960), 73-77.
\item \textsuperscript{544} \textit{Ibid.}, 78.
\item \textsuperscript{545} Bruce L. McCormack, \textit{Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936}, 432-434.
\end{itemize}

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agency, and a vertical axis on the level of God’s agency, with the latter coming first. Farrer provides a good illustration of how the two different arguments go together, with two agencies on different levels ‘taking effect in the same finite action, the finite agency which lives in it, and the infinite agency which founds it. On any theistic hypothesis, such founding action is a mode of God’s active existence.’ 547 Barth regards the act of faith as the basic Christian act; it is ‘a cognitive event, the simple taking cognisance of the preceding being and work of Jesus Christ’. 548

In conclusion, it is clear that Barth’s epistemology is divided into three parts. First, the self-attestation of God is the ground of cognition. Barth suggests that ‘God is known only by God’. 549 In other words, God is known solely by divine agency and divine activity. Second, ‘revelation and God’s Word’ comprise the subject-matter of cognition with regard to God. Through this subject-matter, human beings can cognize the attributes or nature of God with the method of dialectics, using reason. Third, faith is the possibility of cognition regarding God. Faith is the agency between God and humans through dialectic method, analogy of faith, analogy of relation and God’s creation.

5.2.3 Natural theology and agency

547 Ibid., 159.
548 Karl Barth, CD IV/1, 758.
549 Karl Barth, CD II/1, 179.
In the previous chapter, we observed Barth’s theological position of the possibility of a cognition of God with regard to an agency theory. Natural theology, which will be investigated in this section, is one of the most disputed areas in the reconstruction of Barth’s theology. In particular, the controversy between Barth and Emil Brunner regarding natural theology affected the theological direction of Protestantism after the year 1934. In addition, the development of Barth’s theology with regard to natural theology presents us with myriad agencies.

Therefore, in what follows we will try to identify the core issue of the debate between Barth and Brunner regarding natural theology, and whether or not Barth retains the consistency of his argument on natural theology in his Church Dogmatics. In addition, we present a comparison between natural theology and agency theory.

### 5.2.3.1 Barth’s argument with E. Brunner on natural theology

In general, natural theology could broadly be considered as a theological approach which intends to give us a new possibility of cognition of God on the human side; that is, it assumes the capability of human reason to reach the level of knowledge of God. Most natural theologians believe that the *imago Dei* (the image of God) has not totally been destroyed by sin but that part remains, so that the attributes of God can be recognized by reason. The debate between Barth and Brunner focuses specifically on the choice of whether theology should or should not be a natural one.

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Under the title, ‘Nature and Grace’, Brunner outlines what he considers to be Barth’s false conclusions. He condenses them into six main problems, which we will explore while also taking consideration of Barth’s responses.

We should bear in mind that both Barth and Brunner were greatly dissatisfied with existing approaches to natural theology. Alister E. McGrath indicates that like Barth, Brunner explicitly does not accept a self-sufficient rational system without an intervening revelation between God and human beings to reach the level of God’s knowledge. Yet despite this common ground, in 1934 the dispute between Barth and Brunner was sharp and rigorous.

In the first place, Brunner maintains that the *imago Dei* has to be regarded in two ways, one formal and one material. He rejects the term ‘remnant’, which would be a questionable concept in construing the *imago Dei* as well as suggesting a quantitative approach that would bring to the fore the relative concept of sin. In addition, he explains that the *imago*, in the formal sense, retains the *imago Dei* irrespective of the sinfulness of human beings, whereas in the material sense the *imago* is totally lost, because human beings are sinners, and nobody is not at least tarnished by sin.

It seems that his attempt to divide the *imago Dei* into two is persuasive and reasonable, because this division would open the possibility for a mediation between God and human beings.

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beings. But it is precisely this possible crossover, or link between the divine and the human, that Barth cannot accept. To Barth, Brunner’s argument is completely inconsistent, since it states on the one hand that human beings have ‘the capacity for revelation’ because of their ‘likeness to God’, while at the same time it asserts that man cannot do anything for his salvation by himself.\textsuperscript{555} Brunner’s strength of bridge-building seems to Barth the lethal handicap in discriminating between God’s grace and humans’ role for salvation. Philip Edgcumbe Hughes also evaluates that Brunner’s distinction, matter and form, is inescapably divisive and questionable because ‘if the “matter” is lost, there is no content for the “form”’.\textsuperscript{556}

Barth, furthermore, declares that Brunner’s argument does not indicate clearly the distinction between the formal and material \textit{imago}.\textsuperscript{557} In response to this criticism, Brunner tried to re-construe the \textit{imago Dei}. In his book, \textit{Man in Revolt}, he employs the concept of the formal and material \textit{imago} from the Platonist-Aristotelian-Stoics, in particular the Aristotelian view.\textsuperscript{558} Accordingly, Brunner cannot find an answer to Barth’s question directly from Holy Scripture.\textsuperscript{559} However, because Brunner cannot give up the point of contact between God and human being formulated through the \textit{imago Dei}, he restates the \textit{formal imago Dei} in man which has remained a certain ‘relic’ through

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{555} \textit{Ibid.}, 79.
\item \textsuperscript{556} Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, \textit{The True Image: The Origin and Destiny of Man in Christ} (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1989), 69.
\item \textsuperscript{557} Emil Brunner & Karl Barth, \textit{Natural Theology}, 87.
\item \textsuperscript{559} Emil Brunner, of course, explains and interprets more minutely the meaning of the \textit{imago Dei} from the Old Testament and New Testament. However, it seems to me that he does not sufficiently answer Barth’s question in terms of the \textit{material imago} and \textit{formal imago} on the basis of the Holy Scripture. Cf. Emil Brunner, \textit{Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology}, Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), 82-167.
\end{itemize}
God’s gift, despite the image having been totally destroyed by sin.\textsuperscript{560} In order to make a reliable argument, Brunner investigates many theologians, in particular, Irenaeus,\textsuperscript{561} Augustine, Calvin and Luther. Finally, he states that his ‘concept of the formal imago is formed on the analogy of this concept of formal freedom’.\textsuperscript{562}

Secondly, Brunner regards the creation of the world as the revelation and self-disclosure of God. Therefore, he reproaches Barth for being a blind advocate of the Bible, because he does not accept the revelation that is hidden inside creatures of God.\textsuperscript{563} For his part, Barth criticizes Brunner’s God and his revelation as being not of Christianity but of a transcendental illusion or product of philosophy.\textsuperscript{564} It seems that Brunner finds the object of revelation in the created world, while Barth does not, highlighting instead that there is a qualitative difference between humans’ reason and the revelation of God in regard to the history of God’s salvation. Nevertheless, in his \textit{Church Dogmatics} Barth develops progressively his perspective on the creation of the world.

Thirdly, Brunner considers that preserving grace would encompass all creatures and all human acts, even though men have sinned against God.\textsuperscript{565} Barth generally accepts his view with regards to preserving grace, but not another special grace which precedes the grace of Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{566}

\textsuperscript{560} Ibid., 95, 102-105.
\textsuperscript{561} According to Brunner, Irenaeus insists that “God Himself is Reason proper, hence the rational nature of man is a participatio Dei.” Cf. Emil Brunner, \textit{Man in Revolt}, 504.
\textsuperscript{562} Ibid., 513.
\textsuperscript{563} Brunner & Karl Barth, \textit{Natural Theology}, 25.
\textsuperscript{564} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{565} Ibid., 28-29.
\textsuperscript{566} Ibid., 83.
Fourthly, Brunner maintains that although all ordinances of creation can be perfectly understood in faith, all these things can be retained for the believer by divine ordinance of nature.⁵⁶⁷ For this reason, natural theology would be needed for the phenomena of natural life.⁵⁶⁸ However, Barth wonders what yardstick we have for measuring these sociological ‘ordinances of creation’.⁵⁶⁹

Another consideration is that Brunner presents the formal *imago Dei* as the point of contact between human beings and God because we can hear the Word of God, even though our material *imago* completely disappears because of sin. Accordingly, he maintains that the formal *imago* cannot be destroyed by sin. He explains that this receptivity to the formal *imago* is not associated with whether or not we can accept the Word of God, but means that God can address human beings as a purely formal possibility.⁵⁷⁰ However, Barth poses a problem as to the relevance of the formal possibility and of the ability to make decisions as a ‘capacity’ that exists in man anterior to divine revelation.⁵⁷¹

Finally, Brunner takes a vague position in terms of the formal *imago*. For instance, he argues that the material *imago* was totally destroyed when the first Adam died by sin. That does not mean that the formal *imago* would never be affected by this event.⁵⁷² Rather, he maintains that ‘it is not possible to repair what no longer exists. But it is

⁵⁷² In the same book, Brunner interprets Gal. ii. 20. as evidence that “the formal personality continues beyond the death of the material” on the one hand, “but together with this restrictive statement about the formal element we get … an opposite statement concerning the material element: yet not I but Christ … in me” on the other hand. In his argument, we can see that the personal God meets man personally.
possible to repair a thing in such a way that one has to say: this has become quite new.'\textsuperscript{573}

In other words, although the formal \textit{imago} has been affected by sin, the \textit{imago} still remains and then repairs new beings by faith. However, Barth interprets this argument as stating that the death of Adam cannot destroy the formal \textit{imago}, but only the material \textit{imago}. Although Brunner tries to prove the formal \textit{imago} as a point of contact or a capacity for revelation, and he re-interprets Gal 2:20 or I Cor. 2:10f, his reading of Gal. 2:20 suggests that the formal \textit{imago} has a lasting personality that is able to meet God’s personality. The problem with this interpretation is that it shows not continuity, but discontinuity between the ‘existing I’ and the ‘new I’ in verse 20. Furthermore, Brunner’s statement that ‘it is not possible to repair what no longer exists’ is problematic, because he poses the power of God on the same level as that of human beings. For this reason, Barth confesses that Brunner’s statement makes him ‘flabbergasted’.\textsuperscript{574}

To summarize, in the debate Barth seriously attacks Brunner’s core of natural theology. He denies the juxtaposition of natural theology and revelation theology in order to avoid any assumption of a point of contact between human beings and God.

Natural theology is a crucial theme for Barth, because he tries to overcome two extremes through faith alone. However, he recognizes that natural theology concentrates more on human reason than on the revelation of God and God’s grace in order to seek the contact point between God and human beings. Therefore, as Thomas F. Torrance indicates, for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{573} \textit{Ibid.}, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{574} \textit{Ibid.}, 93.
\end{itemize}
Barth it is not enough to establish just independent natural theology without the theology of revelation.\textsuperscript{575}

5.2.3.2 Barth’s viewpoint on natural theology in his \textit{Church Dogmatics}

As we observed above, Barth strongly rejected natural theology in the 1934 controversy, which was able to affect the decline of revelation theology because rationalists often place reason more highly than revelation. In this section, I investigate whether Barth’s position remained consistent with regard to natural theology during the period between 1932 and 1967, as revealed in his \textit{Church Dogmatics} (I-IV).

In general, Barth maintains that natural theology cannot give us a point of contact between human beings and God. However, there are slight differences and developments in his position on natural theology during the period.

In the first place, in \textit{Church Dogmatics} I and II/1, Barth’s position on natural theology is thoroughly negative, because he insists firmly on the revelation of God alone. The ground of knowledge of God does not spring from \textit{analogia entis}, but from God’s self-attestation or \textit{analogia fidei}. Barth marks out the foundation of ‘the knowability of the word of God’ as follows: ‘no \textit{finitum} is \textit{capax infiniti}, no \textit{peccator} is \textit{capax verbi divini’}.\textsuperscript{576} Accordingly, he denies Brunner’s argument that the \textit{formal imago} of man would be a point of contact between God and human beings because Barth believes that the real point of contact between God and human beings is formed solely by God Himself through the

\textsuperscript{575} Thomas F. Torrance, \textit{Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian} (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1990), 147.

reconciliatory work of Jesus Christ. Just as a rainbow does not need land in order to
stand on the ground, truth does not need humans’ support to make truth stand out.
Therefore, Barth objects to *analogia entis*, which acknowledges the point of contact
between God and human beings without the revelation of God. However, Pannenberg
interprets Barth’s view differently with regard to *analogia entis*. He maintains that
Barth’s critique is not based on the ontological aspect of the analogy, but that he uses the
analogy in its epistemological aspect. According to Pannenberg, Barth had taught
*analogia entis* between the Creator and the creatures on the basis of creation until the year
1930. However, human beings cannot recognize by themselves the analogy between
Creator and creature. Barth requires revelation of God in order to mediate between
Creator and His creatures. Although Pannenberg might be right in his interpretation,
the problem remains that Barth may not have objected to *analogia entis* in its ontological
aspect, because his objection equates God with idols sprung from this capacity. Barth
insists that ‘it is a construct which obviously derives from attempts to unite Yahweh with
Baal, the triune God of Holy Scripture with the concept of being of Aristotelian and stoic
philosophy’. Thus Barth obviously objected to both the ontological and epistemological aspects of *analogia entis*, and in his CD1 and CD2-1 suggested instead
*analogia fidei* as both his ontological and epistemological principle.

578 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, Vol. II/1, *The Doctrine of
God* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 81. Barth explains the concept of *analogia entis* of the Roman
Catholic Church as a possibility that would recognize God without mediation of the revelation of God.
138f.
Secondly, in CD2-2 and CD3, Barth’s use of the term *analogia fidei*, developed against natural theology, changes considerably. In these volumes, Barth often uses the term *analogia relationis* instead of the *analogia entis* or *analogia fides*. Balthasar and Brunner suggested that Barth’s epistemology during this period expanded significantly, and that in CD3 Barth had possibly accepted some concepts with regard to natural theology which he had earlier rejected.\textsuperscript{581} They interpreted the term *analogia relationis* in the light of *analogia entis*. However, this reading was based on a misunderstanding, caused by Barth’s comment on Gen 1: 26-31. According to Barth, ‘the *analogia relationis* as the meaning of divine likeness cannot be equated with an *analogia entis*’.\textsuperscript{582} He regards the *imago Dei* of human beings not as an image that is intrinsically possessed, but as a relationship between male and female, between God and human beings. In other words, the *imago Dei* of human beings in an ontological aspect is still regarded as destroyed totally, whereas it is regarded as being retained in the aspect of *analogia relationis*. At this point, it seems that Brunner and Balthasar misread Barth’s comment on the *imago Dei*. Apparently, Barth insists that ‘all creation aims at the confrontation of God and man and the inconvertible I-Thou relationship between Creator and creature . . . which is the true and sole motive of the cosmic process’.\textsuperscript{583} His understanding of *analogia relationis* does not highlight any correspondence or similarity between divine being and man on the basis of the *imago Dei*, but contrasts them, the ideal and its destroyed state, a relation that is to be described as a confrontation.


\textsuperscript{583} Ibid., 194.
To clarify our debate, we need to distinguish Barth’s use of *analogia relationis* from Brunner’s *formal imago*. There are three distinctions between Barth’s view of the *imago Dei* and that of Brunner. First, Barth seeks to deduce the image of God from the human nature of Jesus Christ. The human nature of Jesus Christ is not directly identified with the *imago Dei* but indirectly corresponds to it. In contrast, Brunner seeks the *imago Dei* from the *formal imago* of human beings. Second, Barth believes that the divine being cannot be compared with human beings on the basis of ontology but only within a logic of relationship, because the qualitative difference between God and human beings cannot be overcome with respect to their natures and their attributes. Finally, Barth considers that the divine prototype creates His archetype and His agency on the basis of an *analogia relationis* within the created world. He insists that ‘the relationship between the summoning I in God’s being and the summoned divine Thou is reflected both in the relationship of God to the man whom He has created, and also in the relationship between the I and the Thou, between male and female in human existence itself.’

As we observed above, *analogia relationis* is not ontologically given through the creation of God, but newly occurs through the grace of God. We have to verify that in Barth’s CD3, the *analogia relationis* becomes important for the mediation between the divine being and His creatures. Above all, Barth focuses on God’s existence in relationships and fellowship, and then he insists that *analogia relationis* encompasses the correspondence and similarity of the Creator-creature. According to Barth, the two relationships are established not by human beings but by the Creator, because the nature or attributes of the Creator reveals His unlimited freedom and His eternal love, whereas

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the *imago Dei* of human beings cannot make any point of contact between Creator and creature without God’s intervention, because that *imago Dei* has been completely destroyed.

Thus, in CD3 Barth develops the two relationships into a possibility of God’s knowability through *analogia relationis*. Certainly, Barth insists that the correspondence and similarity of the Creator-creature relationship is established by the Creator on the basis of an *analogia relationis*. However, he still rejects the point of contact in an ontological aspect, and therefore maintains that there is no similarity and correspondence between the Creator-creature relationship in *analogia entis* and *analogia fidei* based on an ontological concept.

Thirdly, we will investigate Barth’s perspective on natural theology in CD4/3. In general, in CD4/1 and CD4/2 Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation is concentrated on the work of Jesus Christ, while in CD4/3 he focuses on the bearers of reconciliation, which would be people of God or the created world. In fact, the development of Barth’s theological thought makes room for gradual encompassing of some issues of natural theology. Barth

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586 *Ibid.*, 220. Here, Barth gives a full explanation of how *analogia relationis* is possible, as follows:

There is an *analogia relationis*. The correspondence and similarity of the two relationships consists in the fact that the freedom in which God posits Himself as the Father, is posited by Himself as the Son and confirms Himself as the Holy Ghost, is the same freedom as that in which He is the Creator of man, in which man may be His creature, and in which the Creator-creature relationship is established by the Creator. We can also put in this way. The correspondence and similarity of the two relationships consists in the fact that the eternal love in which God as the Father loves the Son, and as the Son loves the Father, and in which God as the Father is loved by the Son and as the Son by the Father, is also the love which is addressed by God to man. The humanity of Jesus, His fellow-humanity, His being for man as the direct correlative of His being for God, indicates, attests and reveals this correspondence and similarity. … Hence the factuality, the material necessity of the being of the man Jesus for His fellows, does not really rest on the mystery of an accident or caprice, but on the mystery of the purpose and meaning of God, who can maintain and demonstrate His essence even in His work, and in His relation to this work.
has confessed that Jesus Christ is the sole word, light and the truth of the world. However, he admits that there are important human words, lights and truths in association with the event of reconciliation outside the circle of Holy Scripture and the Church.⁵⁸⁷

If there are lights, words and truths that would notice or reveal Christ’s reconciliation outside the boundary of Holy Scripture and the Church, we have to investigate whether Barth would accept a natural theology in order to understand the reconciliation between God and the world and creatures. Barth poses a question as to why the world should not have its diverse prophets and apostles, because he cannot ignore that there are worthwhile words, shining lights and great or little revelation in the created world.⁵⁸⁸ Of course, it is not true that these valuable words, lights and truths serve as a bridge between the Creator and the creature, between the divine being and the being of man, although they do reconcile human beings with the transcendental being to some extent.⁵⁸⁹ For this reason, Barth makes clear that such things ‘must be in the closest material and substantial conformity and agreement with the one Word of God Himself and therefore with that of His one Prophet Jesus Christ’.⁵⁹⁰ Accordingly, he argues the need for criteria to distinguish between them and other words which ‘do not derive from the light which lightens the darkness but from the darkness itself, so that they can only be regarded as untrue words’.⁵⁹¹

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⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.
⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., 107.
⁵⁹⁰ Ibid., 111.
⁵⁹¹ Ibid., 126.
Thus, we can see that Barth’s position on natural theology is considerably softened and adapted in CD4/3-1 when compared with CD1, CD2/1 and CD3. However, Barth still insists that ‘God is known by God Himself’, and ‘Jesus is a yardstick for all judgment’.

Finally, we investigate Barth’s epistemology regarding the known God and the unknown God in CD4/4 (1967). In this volume, Barth ponders over the universal knowledge of God outside the circle of the Church, and it is clear that here he accepts many elements of natural theology. In particular, he argues that God is known objectively by Himself in the created world and through the history of the world.592 According to Barth, all that Christianity can do is to run after God’s work, in order to spread widely the Word of God in our world.593

Barth argues that God announces Himself to the created world in three ways. First, God reveals Himself through the works of believers and members of the Church.594 However, he recognizes that God would be restricted, distorted and dimmed by the limited knowledge of the Church.595 Second, God announces Himself objectively to the created world through His attributes, because the created world praises its Creator ceaselessly. He explains that every blade of grass and every snowflake reveal the glory of their Creator596 because ‘God’s own glory as Creator is accompanied by his glorification by his creature’.597 Third, God gives us Himself through Jesus Christ. Accordingly, Barth

593 Ibid., 121.
594 Ibid., 119.
595 Ibid., 120.
596 Ibid., 121.
597 Ibid., 124.
insists that the created world encompasses the grace of Jesus Christ because Jesus Christ is the ground and purpose of the creation of the Creator. Yet although God reveals Himself objectively to his created world, and although He does not remove the objective knowledge in order to watch His wisdom, endurance and peace, the announcement of God is suppressed by the great darkness that encompasses the blindness of man, the deficiency of subjective cognition and the indifference of human beings with regard to the Creator, because ‘the world is at fault for existing in the ambivalence of objective knowledge and subjective ignorance’.

We have observed the development of Barth’s theological thought in association with natural theology in his *Church Dogmatics* I-IV. In 1934 Barth strongly rejected natural theology, but in CD3/1, CD3/2 and CD4/4 he accepted certain elements of it, in particular the doctrine of creation.

Barth never loses sight of his Christological yardstick, but he allows us to see the possibility of natural theology under certain conditions. In other words, his perspective on natural theology develops gradually without the abandonment or weakening of his own revelation theology.

### 5.2.3.3 The re-illumination of Barth’s natural theology through agency

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Barth’s insight on natural theology expanded considerably throughout the course of his life, as we observed above. Now we will focus on the role of agency theory in re-illumination of Barth’s theological thought. In particular, we will investigate specific aspects of natural theology, such as the problems of the *imago Dei*, the point of contact, and the relationship between the Creator and creatures.

The *imago Dei* is one of the most controversial issues in the search for a point of contact between God and human beings. First, Barth argues that the *imago Dei* cannot be a point of contact between the Creator and human beings in the ontological aspect, but that it is able to establish the true identity of human beings in comparison with their Creator.\(^{600}\) Barth regards the man as the *imago Dei* which ‘is not created to be’ God’s image, but which ‘is created in correspondence with’ His image.\(^{601}\) Second, Daniel L. Migliore suggests that Barth’s idea of the *imago Dei* is connected with the concept of ‘the co-existence of man and woman’.\(^{602}\) In other words, Barth does not seek the point of contact under the destroyed image of God, but seeks a possibility of the relationship or the co-existence between the Creator and human beings, between male and female in their particular sexual identity.\(^{603}\) The reason why he focuses not on an *analogia entis* but on an *analogia relationis* of the *imago Dei* is because human beings have no possibility to cognize the transcendent God directly for themselves or through their current images.

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\(^{600}\) Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, III/4, 133.

\(^{601}\) Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, III/1, 197.


\(^{603}\) D. L. Migliore insists that “Barth makes three fundamental assertions in his elaboration of this theme: that human beings are either male or female and are called by God to affirm their particular sexual identity; that human beings are male and female and are called to find their human identity in mutual coordination with their sexual counterparts who are both similar and yet also irreducibly different; and that human beings as male and female coexist in a definite and irreversible order.” *Ibid.*, 146-147. This quotation comes from Barth’s works, CD III/4, 149-181.
without the revelation of God and God’s grace. This means that we can rightly understand the world, human beings and their real existence only through the relationship with the First Cause, the Creator and Providence. When we use the term ‘agency’, the relationship between the subject and the object, between the Creator and creatures, is already connoted. Among relation concepts, the term ‘agency’ places more weight on a doer or a representative or ἀποστόλος than on a master or the self-existing or the Creator. Thus, in this case agency theory is a crucial tool to explain how Barth deals with the intention and contradiction between two extremes, God and human beings.

Secondly, Barth argues that there are many points of contact between the Creator and His creatures in the world, but he cannot admit that the point of contact is made by reason and human beings’ capability. He never gives up the necessity of the revelation of God and Jesus Christ in order to cognize the knowledge of God. As we investigated in the previous chapter, there are various levels of agency in Barth’s thought: i.e. divine agency, human agency, nature agency and culture agency. God uses all of these to reveal His Will, His Love and His Providence to all creatures, according to Barth. More importantly, each agency should rightly understand its limitation and its place, and should avoid the temptation to reach towards the place of God. For instance, the Son of God, Jesus Christ, as the agent of God does not take his Father’s place. When Jesus prays at Gethsemane, he says ‘O my father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt.’

Let us investigate in more detail the three levels of agencies. First, Jesus Christ as the agent of God mediates between God the Father and His creatures. According to John Thompson, the divine agent in Barth’s theological thought comprises both Jesus Christ
and the Holy Spirit. Thompson maintains that ‘the Son is with the Father, the agent of creation just as the Father and the Holy Spirit cannot be dissociated from the Son in the work of reconciliation’;\textsuperscript{604} while the Holy Spirit is ‘the source and power of our hope impelling us forward as the first-fruits and foretaste of eternal salvation’.\textsuperscript{605} Thompson notes that in Barth’s view, Jesus Christ’s role of reconciliation is central to ‘the revealing activity of God in the Son’.\textsuperscript{606} Thus, both the Son and the Holy Spirit as the agent of God reveal the Father’s attributes to the creatures, so this level of agency is reducible and is the same as the Father. Second, Barth considers the Christian community as God’s agent. This community should exist for others, just as Jesus Christ exists not for Himself but for the world,\textsuperscript{607} and it should consider ‘Jesus Christ as the basis of its existence’.\textsuperscript{608} He argues that the community ‘cannot be its own meaning and telos, nor can it rest content with its own being as such’.\textsuperscript{609} In addition, the community should find its task, i.e., the mission, ministry and witness of the Church, because the community rises, destroys, flourishes and falls with its relation or with its correspondence. Therefore, the Church as the agent of God should confess continuously before God her omissions, her sins and her indifference to the world; hence this level of agency is irreducible and is not as same as her Master. Third, God would use all nations outside the Christian community as His agents, ‘either to execute His judgments, or, as in the case of Cyrus, as the instruments of His faithfulness and goodness’.\textsuperscript{610} Because these agents are taken from outside the


\textsuperscript{605} \textit{Ibid.}, 25.

\textsuperscript{606} \textit{Ibid.}, 22.


\textsuperscript{608} \textit{Ibid.}, 791.

\textsuperscript{609} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{610} \textit{Ibid.}, 691.
Church, this level of agency is untouchable, unknown and undecided without the intervention of the divine Providence.

Finally, Barth argues that the creatures reveal the Creator’s glory in creation. If we look at the attributes of creatures as the basis of cognition regarding the knowledge of God, many points of difficulty remain. However, if we consider the creatures as myriad agencies, it is naturally accepted that ‘God’s own glory as Creator is accompanied by his glorification by his creatures’. In other words, many agencies would reveal objective knowledge of their Master or the Creator in the world, as proven by the fact that the triune God is known throughout world history, in the non-Christian as well as the Christian world. However, according to Barth, although God does not revoke this objective knowledge from the creatures, this knowledge cannot reveal completely the Creator and the unknown God as a fact. Accordingly, we can only trust, according to ‘an approximately corresponding subjective knowledge of God that is proper to the world and mankind’. Hence knowledge of God in the world would be achieved objectively for God, but subjectively for man. Finally, Barth postulates Jesus Christ as a yardstick to distinguish the true agent of God from myriad agencies of God.

In conclusion, we have investigated Barth’s theological thought on natural theology under the light of agency theory. Different levels of agency reveal God’s will, love and purpose. As Thompson summarizes, it is therefore appropriate that the Holy Spirit, ‘who is the

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612 Ibid., 119.
613 Ibid., 122.
614 Ibid., 122-123.
615 Ibid., 123.
union of the divine life, who is union of God and humanity in Jesus Christ, who is the agent of our reconciliation, should be the agent of the divine coming into our life”.  

5.3 Issues of Contemporary Natural Theology and Agency

The issues of contemporary natural theology can be investigated in association with agency theory. Nowadays, the place of natural theology is extended to the real world of nature beyond the fundamental question of whether the ground of epistemology regarding God is reason of human beings or the revelation of God. In particular, the pollution of the natural world and the destruction of an ecological system would demand ecological theology. Another perspective investigates whether nature would become a point of contact with God. McGrath argues that if Barth were living in current circumstances, he would accept contemporary natural theology. When Barth considered the situation of the German Christians, in particular, the Nazi revolution in 1933, he had to reject the natural theology that supported Nazi policy of anti-Semitism in his perspective of the revealed theology. Of course, this does not mean that all problems would be resolved if Barth were to accept completely the current position of natural theology. Accordingly, in this section, the critiques of some scholars regarding Barth’s natural theology will be considered in more depth. The section will be divided into three parts: terminology of natural theology and theology of nature, the points of contact, and Polkinghorne’s natural theology and agency.

616 John Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth, 50.
5.3.1 Terminology of natural theology and theology of nature

When we look for the point of contact between God and His creatures, natural theology can play a crucial role. As mentioned previously with regard to Barth’s debate with Brunner, the traditional perspectives of natural theology are derived from two stems: Aquinas’ rational thought and Augustine’s divine grace. The differences between these perspectives have often triggered disputes between the two camps. Nowadays, however, with the pollution and devastation of our environment, the problem of nature is becoming a key issue. Scholars in various areas of the sciences argue that the significance of nature must be considered and its destruction prevented through global action. In the theological domain too, nature is a frequently re-emerging issue. However, the terms ‘natural theology’ and ‘theology of nature’ are often used interchangeably and without distinction. Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate clearly between them. The distinction is explained by Hermann Dembowski’s article, ‘Natürliche Theologie und Theologie der Natur’. First, he argues that natural theology should accomplish its task, which is the understanding of the reality of God, through the reality of the world. Here, he posits two presuppositions: On the one hand, God reveals Himself in His work, which is the reality of the world. On the other hand, human beings have the ability of insight coming from God, which penetrates the reality of the world.619 Secondly, Dembowski maintains that theology of nature starts from the revelation of God, which is based on the Bible.620 In other words, he argues that theology of nature does not inquire about the reality of God from the reality of the world, but investigates the cognition and acts of human beings.

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620 Ibid., 32, 45.
from the revelation of God. Accordingly, he insists that the aim of theology of nature is to recognize nature rightly and to preserve the value of nature.

After distinguishing the terms clearly, Dembowski argues that natural theology would not only be incompatible with the natural science that is the core of the Enlightenment, but would also be problematic in relation to the revealed theology that is based on the Bible. In addition, natural theology would not provide a ground for ecological theology, which could help to solve the crises of environmental destruction. However, he argues that theology of nature would be compatible with natural science and revealed theology, and would support the building of a ground for ecological theology. It seems that his theological position stands in the same line as Barth’s thought. The difference between them is in their different theological foci; i.e., Barth focuses on revealed theology while Dembowski focuses on ecological theology. In fact, ecological theology should have a theological foundation, whether that is natural theology or a theology of nature. It would be problematic to emboss or strengthen ecological theology on the basis of natural theology, which is rooted in reason and natural philosophy. For instance, the power of science and reason have devastated the natural environment in the name of development. We can see this phenomenon in many countries, in particular, in China and in the Amazon of Brazil. Thus, it seems to me that Dembowski presents a theology of nature which should be rooted by revealed theology on the basis of an evangelical position. Similar to Dembowski’s view, Sallie McFague insists that natural theology stands in contrast to a theology of nature, and that theology of nature ‘will express divine goodness and

621 Ibid., 57.
power, as well as our place in the scheme of things in terms of the view of reality coming
to us from contemporary science, a view we have characterized in terms of the organic
model’.

That is, McFague regards the universe or nature as the body of God, which
can be construed by the organic model.

In contrast, Moltmann does not distinguish theology of nature from natural theology,
because division between two theological approaches is misleading. He argues that all
natural theology starts from the creation of God, manifested in nature, while all ‘theology
of nature’ illuminates nature within the light of God’s self-revelation. In Moltmann’s
understanding, these theologies are one, because God is one. He notes that the
separation between revealed theology and natural theology cannot be overcome, so that
the world is the promise of the kingdom of God, within the light of the Messiah. Thus,
for him, revealed theology is natural theology under the condition of history, while natural
theology is revealed theology under the condition of the Messiah; hence, ‘natural
theology was the preparation for revealed theology’. According to Moltmann,
natural theology is 1) ‘the general presupposition for specifically Christian theology’,
2) ‘the consequence and the eschatological goal of historical and Christian theology’,

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623 Ibid., 66.
625 Ibid., 57.
626 Ibid., 59.
627 Ibid., 58.
628 Ibid., 59-60.
629 Ibid., 58.
630 Jürgen Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology*,
631 Ibid., 65.
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid., 79.
In Pannenberg’s study of the history of natural theology, he suggests that its first expression is found in the work of Panaetius, who was a founder of Middle Stoism.\footnote{Wolfhart Pannenberg, \textit{Systematic Theology}, Vol. I., trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd, 1991), 76. Cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I (Göttingen: 1959) 191-207.} Pannenberg differs from Moltmann in stating that for St Augustine, ‘natural theology was not a preparatory stage for Christian theology’, but that its purified form was identical with the Christian doctrine of God.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 80-81.}

Moltmann is a great admirer of Barth, but he recognizes that Barth’s revelation theology is too transcendental, even to the point of irresponsibility, and cannot provide an eschatological vision. As Pannenberg has argued, the revelation of God is not perfect from its start, but reveals the perfection at the end of history.\footnote{Wolfhart Pannenberg, \textit{Metaphysics and the Idea of God}, trans., Philip Clayton (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1988), 141.} Moltmann appeals to the importance of ecological theology, and explains it as one category which binds natural theology, a theology of nature and revealed theology. This is persuasive, but if we accept Moltmann’s argument we risk the loss of Barth’s evangelical heritage, whereby man cannot recognize God through natural theology without the illumination of revealed theology. When we engage in theological thinking, each theology, i.e., natural theology, theology of nature and revealed theology, can expand our theological understanding. The distinction is very significant, because the focus of debate would be changed from God and human beings to nature, without concentrating on the question of the ground of cognition regarding God, whether revelation or reason. In addition, through this division, we can state nature herself the way that she is in herself, freely without the burden of
finding whether the point of contact is the revelation of God or reason. Thus, Dembowski’s disclosure of the relationship of interaction and distinction between natural theology and a theology of nature is useful. If Dembowski’s argument has validity, it raises the questions of how we can look for the point of contact between God and creatures, and how we can investigate the meaning of materials or the natural world from the standpoint of natural philosophy and natural science.

5.3.2 The point of contact regarding nature

Since the debate between Barth and Brunner, the issue of the point of contact for cognition of God has been continuously discussed among scholars. Advances regarding nature and the point of contact between God and His creatures have been made both in philosophy and through scientific investigation. In this section we will investigate nature, the world and God through Alfred North Whitehead’s nature philosophy.

Whitehead, a mathematician and natural philosopher, regards nature not as a lifeless thing but as a live process.637 He does not examine the attributes of nature itself but inquires into human beings’ cognition and understanding when confronted with nature. In other words, he defines nature not only as something external and grasped by our experience, but also as causal nature, which is beyond our cognition.638 Through this division, he analogizes the terms ‘extension’ and ‘region’, which are basic forms of nature. He establishes an extensive connection as a fundamental form of physical world and regions

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638 Ibid., 31.
and as ‘the things which are connected’. Whitehead understands space and time as ‘simply abstractions from the totality of prehensive unifications’ of sense-objects. For Whitehead, the totality and each prehension share the same reality; nature is conceived as ‘a complex of prehensive unifications’ in a continually evolving process of expansive development, a process which is itself the reality. He explains the organic nature as follows: First, ‘the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the meaning of “process”; the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of organism’. Second, ‘each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm.’ He observes how God is recognized by philosophical thought on the basis of understanding of nature. In the process of history, God is the beginning and the end. According to the Bible, God is ‘the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End’ (Revelation 21: 6a). Here, Whitehead does not interpret ‘beginning’ as meaning the first thing in the historical past; rather, God is the beginning and the end because His nature is dipolar. In this case, the problem is how God has a point of contact with His creatures. Whitehead suggests that: ‘God’s nature is constituted by his conceptual experience.’ Thus, according to Whitehead, the dipolarity of God’s nature, i.e., a primordial nature and a

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641 Ibid., 90.
642 Ibid.
644 Ibid., 215.
647 Ibid.
consequent nature, has self-contradictions in relation to the world, as can be seen in the following quotation:

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent.

It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many.

It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual eminently, as that, in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently.

It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.

It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God.

It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.\(^{648}\)

For Whitehead, the understanding of God and the world is metaphysical. He regards the metaphysical principle of God as the saving from collapse, i.e., religious and moral elements or intuitions.\(^{649}\) From this perspective, he tries to solve the problem of the two extremes of the world through elucidating God’s dipolar nature, and insists that ‘the perfection of God’s subjective aim, derived from the completeness of his primordial nature, issues into the character of his consequent nature’.\(^{650}\) In other words, God is both the principle of embodiment of the world from the perspective of His primordial nature, and His judgment on the world in view of His consequent nature, which is ‘composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization’.\(^{651}\) Whitehead’s analogizing

\(^{648}\) Ibid., 348.

\(^{649}\) Ibid., 343.

\(^{650}\) Ibid., 345.

\(^{651}\) Ibid., 345-346, 350.
of the metaphysical formation and construction of the world from God’s dipolar nature suggests that ‘God is the infinite ground of all mentality, the unity of vision seeking physical multiplicity’, and ‘the world is the multiplicity of finite actualities seeking a perfected unity’. Whitehead often uses this balanced notion regarding God and the world because God does not exist without the world, just as the world does not exist without its Creator. Therefore, God and the world are mutually necessary to each other.

It is possible to interpret as pantheism Whitehead’s interpretation of the relationship between God and the world as mutual supplementation, because his argument gives us the feeling that God is the world, and the world is God. However, in his comparison of the worldview of Whitehead and the Russian theologian Nicolas Berdyaev (1874-1948), Charles Hartshorne insists that Whitehead’s viewpoint regarding God and the world is not pantheism, but panentheism, and cites both etymological and historical reasons for this. According to David A. Pailin, the term ‘panentheism’ was coined in the early 19th century by the German thinker K. C. F. Krause, ‘to draw attention to the intimate and all-inclusive relationship between God and the world’. While this point would also apply to Berdyaev, his thought differed from that of Whitehead in that he saw the creative process as taking place outside of time, in eternity. He insisted that God does not depend upon the world, and that the process is accomplished in God.

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652 Ibid., 348.
653 Ibid., 348-349.
654 Ibid., 348.
657 David A. Pailin, God and the Processes of Reality, 76.
What then, for Whitehead and Berdyaev, is the point of contact with God? For Whitehead, that point of contact is, first, organic nature and the world that is originated from God’s primordial nature. Man can recognize the actuality of God through metaphysical philosophy about organic nature and the world, because ‘philosophy tends to oscillate between the point of view belonging to the infinite and to the finite’.\(^659\) Second, the contact point with God is in the process of history, because ‘the sense of historic importance is the intuition of the universe as everlasting process, unfading in its deistic unity of ideals’, and ‘the Deistic influence implants in the historic process new aims at other ideals’.\(^660\) Finally, this point of contact with God is only in metaphysical thought, because he does not conceive of God as an ontological reality, but in modes of thought. Otherwise, he would have to verify the existence of God. However, he notes that ‘proofs are the tools for the extension of our imperfect self-evidence’.\(^661\)

For Berdyaev, on the other hand, the point of contact with God is the two-fold nature, the divine-humanity of man. In orthodox theological tradition, Jesus Christ alone is God-man, and many scholars would attack any suggestion that this two-fold nature might apply to all men. However, Berdyaev insists that ‘man is a manifold being; he bears within him the image of the world, but he is not only the image of the world, he is also the image of God’.\(^662\) As is made clear in his book, *Solitude and Society*, the dominant idea in Berdyaev is man or man’s image, and in his view, any consideration of man is also a

\(^{659}\) Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1938), 71.
\(^{660}\) *Ibid.*, 142.
consideration of God. Yet this should not be interpreted as implying a pantheistic identity, because: ‘God and man are not external to each other, not outside one another; neither are they identified, the one nature does not disappear in the other.’ Thus, what Berdyaev presents in relation to God, man and the world is theo-pantheism rather than pantheism. For him, the point of contact between God and man is the divine-human nature of man in a Christological and metaphysical perspective.

5.3.3 Polkinghorne’s natural theology and agency

Nowadays, scientific research on nature and the cosmos means that the significance of natural theology is growing. As we observed above, Whitehead did not try to investigate nature herself scientifically, but rather he construed nature, God and the world metaphysically, via reason. However, Polkinghorne, who is both a scientist and a theologian, believes that the world of creatures and the cosmos are carved out by the Creator. John Leslie and P. C. W. Davies also investigate the assumption that the Creator’s mind is present in His creatures. Through the results of such research, we can analogize the Creator’s attributes from creatures. Polkinghorne terms this the new natural theology, which is investigated scientifically in terms of the creation of universes, compared with the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas and Emil Brunner. He notes that the new natural theology constitutes a new form or point of contact through scientific

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Although he indicates the limitation of science, which cannot verify that God created the world and the cosmos, he asserts that science can help us to understand the Creator Himself, or the cosmos, through explanation of why the world is so understandable, intelligible, and subtle. For him, natural theology can offer only limited insight, since it rests on broad ideas about the world, which are too general to lead us to God Himself. Therefore, he proposes that the new natural theology should not be seen as a rival or alternative to science, but as complementary to it. Moreover, unlike the old-style natural theology which looked for proofs of God’s existence via reason, the new natural theology looks instead to the existence of God to help understanding of things in the physical world. Polkinghorne recognizes the difference between natural theology and a theology of nature, and knows the limitations of science and reason; hence he suggests the new natural theology, which is similar to a theology of nature but differs slightly from revealed theology. Thus, Polkinghorne modestly revises natural theology to the new natural theology which can offer a scientific explanation that is ‘intellectually satisfying insight rather than logical proof’, and which is itself revised by revealed theology.

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Let us now look at Polkinghorne’s use of agency in order to elucidate scientifically about God and the world under the light of the Creator’s creation. Polkinghorne uses agency to explain how God creates and acts in the physical world. He believes that the God of the gaps between God and His creatures is a theological mistake, so he presents agencies to resolve the problem. He notes that ‘our modes of agency, therefore, could be expected in this case to be of little analogical significance in the search for an understanding of divine action’. Even though God creates the world and universes, the divine action regarding creation cannot be easily caught by our reason or scientific examination.

Polkinghorne presents two sorts of causality to explain the physical world in association with God’s interaction: top-down, and bottom up causality. He explains that bottom-up causality is ‘inputs of energy, described by conventional physics in terms of the behaviour of the parts because this involves localized interaction with constituent bits’, whereas top-down causality is ‘a new kind, at least as far as physics is concerned – inputs of pattern formation (‘information’ is the technical word used for it), described in terms of the overall behaviour of the whole’. Scientists, in particular bottom-up thinkers, explain causality of the physical world to ‘proceed from the basement of phenomena to the superstructure of theory’. Accordingly, their method is ‘analogia entis rather than analogia fidei’, and they appeal to experience and reason rather than to faith and revelation. However, top-down thinkers explain causality of the physical world as proceeding from God’s will to concrete phenomena of divine agencies. In particular,

674 John Polkinghorne, *Belief in God in an Age of Science*, 70.
676 John Polkinghorne, *Belief in God in an Age of Science*, 84.
677 Ibid., 85.
Polkinghorne notes that, ‘since our own actions are the form of agency best known to us, it has been natural to seek to exploit a possible analogy between human and divine agency’.\footnote{John Polkinghorne, \textit{Science & Theology}, 87.} In other words, the divine agency, for top-down thinkers, is a key factor in studying the physical world; it interacts with creatures, i.e., human beings, the physical world and universes, indicating God’s activity, which is active input of information from above and the process of accomplishing creation. Hence, divine agency is a bearer of divine active information within the physical world.\footnote{John Polkinghorne, \textit{Belief in God in an Age of Science}, 71-72.} Here, Polkinghorne indicates some problems with this idea of top-down agency. First, it is necessary to bridge the gap ‘between the ineffable mystery of the claim presented by the idea of primary causality and the unacceptable reduction of the Creator to an invisible cause among competing creaturely causes’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 72.} Second, ‘if it is the unpredictabilities of physical process that indicate the regions where forms of holistic causality can be operating, then all such agency, including divine Providence, will be hidden within these cloudy domains’.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}.} In addition, ideas of divine consistency and of God’s faithfulness will lead us to expect that certain predictable aspects of the natural process will remain undisturbed,\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 73.} and that God will act in comparable ways in comparable circumstances, and yet the human condition is infinitely variable.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}.} Finally, if we accept the idea of the physical universe as a constantly evolving process, and if we conceive of God as knowing the world in its temporality, this could imply that God cannot know the future. This would not necessarily

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
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\bibitem{678} John Polkinghorne, \textit{Science & Theology}, 87.
\bibitem{679} John Polkinghorne, \textit{Belief in God in an Age of Science}, 71-72.
\bibitem{680} \textit{Ibid.}, 72.
\bibitem{681} \textit{Ibid.}.
\bibitem{682} \textit{Ibid.}, 73.
\bibitem{683} \textit{Ibid.}.
}
\end{thebibliography}
be contrary to the idea that there can be no imperfection in the divine nature, since the future does not yet exist to be known.684

Notwithstanding these difficulties, and even though the divine agency or top-down agency cannot be caught easily by scientific tools or human reason, Polkinghorne uses many kinds of agencies in order to explain God, the created physical world and the Creator’s creation.

5.4 Summary and Conclusion

Contemporary natural theology differs from the old natural theology of Anselm, Aquinas, Barth and Brunner, which asks whether God can be recognized by reason and created creatures. The task of the new natural theology is focused on preserving the nature that is created by the Creator rather than on developing it, and hence it can be termed a theology of nature. Whitehead elucidates God and the world logically from the perspective of process philosophy. In this view God, who is the beginning and the end, has two natures: the primordial nature and the consequent nature. For Whitehead, while God is complete in the perspective of primordial nature, with regard to the consequent nature God is a judge. This elucidation regarding God and the world in this process is not scientific proof, but metaphysical examination. For this reason, Whitehead insists that proof is not a necessary and sufficient condition in science. According to Dembowski, natural theology cannot be compatible with a theology of nature, ecological theology and natural science. Polkinghorne too criticizes the old natural theology and Whitehead’s metaphysical

684 Ibid.
theology, and suggests a new natural theology that is a theology of nature. This natural theology is not against scientific explanation, but complements and is complemented by it. He believes that the physical world is made by the Creator and revealed by divine agency. However, there is a limit to construing the physical world by divine agency, just as scientific examination is limited in verifying the created world. Nevertheless, he suggests human agency and divine agency as the best tools to capture theological God and the world. Using these agencies he explains scientifically the possibility of the creation of God within the physical world, but he resists ‘the subordination of theology to science’. His explanation regarding new natural theology, divine agency and human agency is a crucial clue to elucidate how God and the physical world and man interact with one another.

685 Ibid., 86.
CHAPTER 6
THE AGENCY THEORY AND PARADIGM SHIFTS IN MISSION

6.1 Introduction

The agency theory has been closely examined in the previous chapters, in relation to the profound philosophies of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. There, the main concern was how the ideal world and the actual world can be scientifically linked to each other by reasoning. Moreover, through the agency theories of current scholars, it has been explained how sociological issues, ethical controversies, and human nature and desires can be scientifically verified without extensive prerequisites and major premises. In addition, the theology of Barth has been looked at. He investigated the world of human beings in depth, and was convinced that knowledge of faith is as important as knowledge of science. Barth argued that when knowledge of faith is established as prerequisite, human beings can understand domains of knowledge beyond their limitation. In the light of these inquiries and research, the agency theory can be applied to practical circumstances in order to connect the differing opinions between these philosophers and the theologian, Barth.

Here the main question is this: What can synthesize the humanistic dimension and knowledge of faith as the connector of the extremes: actuality and abstract, transcendence and immanence, God and human beings? In other words, the main task is to establish the context of philosophical and theological connection within agency theology. In order to
solve the problem, Stephen B. Bevans’ work, *Models of Contextual Theology: Faith and Cultures*, provides important insights. In his book, Bevans presents connection as an important characteristic of contextual theology. He explains that if we do not want to forget past experiences, those experiences must be reflected and re-examined in the context of the present.686 More specifically, past events that have been sustained and maintained in tradition, and events recorded in the Bible, need to be brought back into the middle of ‘personal/communal experience, culture/social location and social change’ and their meanings readaddressed.687 According to Bevans, theology can become contextual theology owing to factors both external and internal. External factors are historical events, intellectual currents, cultural shifts and political forces.688 Internal factors are the incarnational nature of Christianity, the Sacramental nature of reality, understanding of the nature of divine revelation as being, the Catholicity of the church and Christianity; he also argues that trinity should be considered.689 By considering these elements in context and taking them as a model of connection, theology can overcome the limitation of metaphysical theology.

Then what is theology as dynamic practical context, where text and context are continuously connected with each other and synthesize the issues arising from them? Bevans presents subjects which can bring the content raised from the contextual theology model into specific contexts. He notes that this content can be more elaborated in mission. In a later work, *Constants in Context: A Theology of Mission for Today*, co-written with

687 Ibid. 5-7.
688 Ibid. 9-11.
689 Ibid. 12-15.
Roger P. Schroeder, Bevans presents a theology of mission alongside six models of contextual theology, namely the translation model, the anthropological model, the praxis model, the synthetic model, the transcendental model and the countercultural model.\textsuperscript{690} More specifically, agency theology will be applied here in an attempt to answer the question of how mission theology can be extended beyond its limitations to solve the problems in its current context. I will also briefly outline a definition of agency theology to suggest it as a possible alternative that could overcome the limitations of mission theology. To achieve these aims, first of all, the paradigm in mission examined by the influential David Bosch will be observed and critically reviewed. Secondly, there will be presented a historical account of the relationship between Church and mission from the perspective of agency. I will conclude this chapter by suggesting the possibility of agency theology as an alternative idea to mission theology.

6.2 Agency and David Bosch

The key issue explored in this section is the paradigm shifts in mission. David J. Bosch asserts that these paradigm shifts have taken place over the six epochs of Christian history as defined by Hans Küng: ‘the apocalyptic paradigm of primitive Christianity; the Hellenistic paradigm of the Patristic period; the medieval Roman Catholic paradigm; the Protestant (Reformation) paradigm; the modern Enlightenment paradigm; the emerging Ecumenical paradigm’\textsuperscript{691}


On this basis, Bosch develops his own argument of the Christian history of paradigm shifts in mission. In what follows, I will investigate whether his argument is appropriate to explain these paradigm shifts.

6.2.1 The issues of paradigm shift and David Bosch

First of all, Bosch carefully employs Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory\textsuperscript{692} within the frame of theology. Although Kuhn had limited his theory to the natural sciences,\textsuperscript{693} and had excluded social science, Bosch nevertheless believes that it provides a beneficial tool to understand and explain the division of epochs in terms of theology and mission theology. He presents the paradigm shifts in the process of mission history as follows: ‘the Missionary Paradigm of the Eastern Church; the medieval Roman Catholic Missionary Paradigm; the Missionary Paradigm of the Protestant Reformation; mission in the Wake of the Enlightenment; the emergence of a Post-modern Paradigm; the Emergence of an Ecumenical Missionary Paradigm’.\textsuperscript{694}

Bosch insists that the paradigm shifts of natural science are considerably different to those of theology, on the basis of Küng’s interpretation of Kuhn’s paradigm theory.\textsuperscript{695} Generally speaking, in the natural sciences the new paradigm clearly substitutes the old one. For instance, Bosch suggests that the Newtonian scientific revolution meant that the cosmos would no longer be understood in terms of Ptolemaean and Copernican

\begin{itemize}
\item David J. Bosch, \textit{Transforming Mission}, 184.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 187-188.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 185-186. See also, Hans Küng, \textit{Theologie im Aufbruch: Eine ökumenische Grundlegung} (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987), 157.
\end{itemize}
categories. However, in theology, the old paradigm continues to exist alongside the new one. Hence, on the basis of Küng’s argument, Bosch insists that ‘the Hellenistic paradigm of the Patristic period still lives on in the spirit of the Orthodox churches, the medieval Roman Catholic paradigm in contemporary Roman Catholic traditionalism, and the Protestant Reformation paradigm in twentieth-century Protestant Confessionalism, and the Enlightenment paradigm in liberal theology’. According to Bosch’s observation, paradigm shift does not occur suddenly, but progresses gradually as the old paradigm overlaps the new one and guides it to a new epoch.

Here, the question is whether the application of Kuhn’s paradigm to theology is sufficiently justified. According to Kuhn, in natural science there would be a complete change of paradigm because an unverified hypothesis can be destroyed by new experiment or verification, and an old hypothesis is no longer useful. However, in the case of social science, there remains a common denominator of life, culture and religious belief in each of the six epochs. We therefore need to ask whether it is possible that various thoughts and diverse culture can be standardized into one paradigm to represent the spirit of a particular time. To categorize the paradigm of an era in that way is to ignore the actual social relationship, culture and structure of the phenomenology of the spirit. Therefore, the argument that each period displays one uniform paradigm needs to be reconsidered, to see whether the contents of the six epochs can be overlapped. In addition, Küng and Bosch note that the features of all the paradigms could fall into one period.

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order to overcome this phenomenon, they set some premises whereby the paradigm is applied differently for theology than for natural science.

Of course, if a paradigm is allocated and characterized for each period, the thoughts that were prevalent in each epoch can be summarized into a simple structure, making it easier to understand the complicated ideas existing in a particular generation. However, such generalization and standardization could lead the paradigm to seem oppressive, because particular situations and minority cultures would be overlooked. Therefore, we must overcome this uniformity in order to use the paradigm structure. As an alternative idea, Bosch and Küng argue that the paradigm of theology would overlap in each period.701 The two scholars apply the paradigm differently from the way Kuhn adopted. If we accept their arguments, would this resolve the problem? To answer this question, we need to ask whether their subdivision of eras is correct. For instance, both Bosch and Küng state that the current era is characterized by the emergence of an ecumenical (missionary) paradigm. However, there are many different opinions on and interpretations of ecumenism in the modern history of mission. Evangelists and Church-centred scholars see mission as expansion or growth of the Church and as support for a ‘Church-centred ecumenical movement’. Others regard the Church as a mere tool for mission, and consider that mission is God’s work; this stance supports the idea of ‘mission ecumenism’. A third position maintains a ‘secular ecumenism’ that eliminates the barrier between the Church and the world because mission does not occur only under the influence of the Church. Finally, the perspective of ‘ecumenism of religious pluralism’ considers religious struggle and conflict and holds that the Church should destroy the walls between different religions

701 Ibid., 186.
and unify them as a whole. These different positions have raised strong controversies over the subject of ecumenism for the past forty to fifty years. The question is whether these different opinions and interpretations must be standardized into one single language of ‘ecumenical mission’ that can represent the paradigm of the modern time or whether a plural world does not ask for differentiate views on mission.

6.2.2 Bosch’s ecumenical missionary paradigm and mission moratorium

Bosch specified ecumenical mission as a new paradigm in modern mission. As pointed out above, Bosch’s paradigm based on mission history was easy to understand because it clearly categorized the characteristics of each time period. However, his simplification of the various contexts of each period meant that minor elements could be missed out. Considering the issues raised by mission history, and discussion in the WCC and meetings, Bosch presents 13 elements of an ecumenical mission paradigm which is currently progressing and will continue to progress.702 In the last chapter of his book Transforming Mission, he asks, ‘Whither Mission?’, and concludes that the barriers to mission are Western imperialism, mission moratorium and mission as the selfish war.703

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703 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission, 518-519.
In fact, mission moratorium is thought to have been the impetus for Bosch to establish the contents of the new paradigm in mission.\textsuperscript{704} He considers the mission moratorium suggested by Gatu at the 1973 Bangkok conference from three positions. The first position supports Gatu’s argument. Here, Western mission is regarded as closely related to colonialism, a point particularly relevant to African mission.\textsuperscript{705} Therefore it is necessary that mission moratorium should encourage younger churches to be independent from Western missionaries and to have more autonomy.\textsuperscript{706} The second position holds that the idea of moratorium is unrealistic and an unfair judgment on missionaries who were never involved in colonialist mission. According to this position, moratorium is an anti-Christian perspective which intends to disturb mission.\textsuperscript{707} In particular, those arguing from an evangelical approach criticize the idea of moratorium as a short-sighted perspective that is both unfair and irresponsible with regard to three billion non-Christians.\textsuperscript{708} The third position argues that the terminology of moratorium cannot be applied to every mission field. Thus moratorium does not mean the end of all mission,


\textsuperscript{706} Ogbu U. Kalu, ‘Not Just New Relationships but a Renewed Body’, International Review of Mission, Vol. LXIV, No. 254. April 1975, 147. Kalu insists that ‘The moratorium call is even more radical than those who have reacted so defensively to it have realized. It is no less than a call, not to new forms, but to a new Covenant, not of new relationship but to a renewed Body.’


\textsuperscript{708} See Donald A. McGavran, ‘The Dimensions of World Evangelization’, in Let the Earth Hear His Voice: International Congress on World Evangelization Lausanne, Switzerland (Minneapolis: World Wide Publications, 1975), 111.
but only of bad mission: ‘Moratorium is intended to advance mission and is not aimed against it; what it does not call for is another definition of mission.’\textsuperscript{709} Bosch notes that: ‘In moratorium at its deepest the issue is the cry “Listen to us!” It is the yearning for an entirely new relationship between older and younger churches.’\textsuperscript{710}

In fact, moratorium as suggested by the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) is a criticism by the African nations against those Western missionaries who compromised with colonialism and imperialism. It is an argument about how the means of control have shifted from swords and guns to capital, organizations, personnel and resources.

As examined in the Introduction, historically Western mission was progressed alongside imperialism and colonialism. Specific evidence can be found in England’s 300 years of mission history. Jeff Cox points out that English mission organizations such as CMS, SPCK and SPG once possessed slave farms or were linked to the slave trade in the name of fund raising for missions. Moreover, missionaries from major mission organizations had connections with slave merchants.\textsuperscript{711} Consequently, mission was seen as overlapping with imperialism and perceived as a tool for expanding the system. For the same reason, Stephen Neill argues that colonialism and Christian mission are closely related, that missionaries are ‘the tools of governments and that missions can be classed as one of the instruments of western infiltration and control’.\textsuperscript{712} Taking one example, Neil refers to the writing of Mr K. N. Panikkar, who criticized mission from an Indian perspective: ‘First the missionaries; then the traders; then the gunboats.’\textsuperscript{713} As examined by Werner

\begin{footnotes}
\item[710] Ibid.
\item[713] Ibid. 13
\end{footnotes}
Ustorf, a well-known scholar of African mission, if mission is related to exploitation by imperialism, if it intends to destroy aboriginal communities and lives by planting Western culture, there may be doubt as to whether it should continue. According to Ustorf, that kind of mission is an ideology that is related to capital. He points out that following the Bangkok Conference of 1972/3, the mission moratorium declared by Gatu became an official slogan among third world actors, articulating the view that Western missionaries, mission resources and money should not manipulate African Christianity. Similarly, Carl E. Braaten acknowledges that the identity of mission in the modern world is in crisis. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, there is an outpouring of opinion that Western mission should be stopped. Sometimes the mission of the Western Church is even seen as an enemy distorting the gospel. Braaten points out that debates about this colonialist mission have caused hatred between the evangelical and ecumenical camps. There is a huge gap between the two positions, and neither can accept the other. Consequently, the identity of mission has collapsed.

Indeed, after examining the many problems arising due to colonialist mission, it is necessary to ask, ‘What is the true meaning of mission and missiology?’ Ustorf argues

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716 Carl E. Braaten, The Flaming Center: A Theology of the Christian Mission (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 82-92. Braaten quotes Paul Verghese: ‘The mission of the Church is the greatest enemy of Gospel’ (Ibid., 83). He also presents the voice of Latin America expressed in ‘the Declaration of Barbados’: ‘the suspension of all missionary activity is the most appropriate policy on behalf of both Indian society as well as the moral integrity of the churches involved’ (Ibid., 84).

717 See Werner Ustorf, ‘The Philanthropy of God and Western Culture’, in Mission in a Pluralist World 97, eds. Aasulv Lande & Werner Ustorf (Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 1996), 113-114. Ustorf insists that ‘Mission is not simply the expansion of the known forms of Christianity. … The philanthropy of God is rigorously ecumenical, inclusive and incarnate,’ and ‘Missiology is not simply the study of the
that the term ‘mission’ is neither Hebrew nor Greek. Strictly speaking, it is not a biblical word. Even worse, the same term was used by Hitler to express his Weltanschauung and to practice his political scheme. According to Ustorf, ‘Hitler’s missiology was symbolically efficient.’ Furthermore, that missiology was ‘the reflected response of a missionary of a post-Christian and violent political religion to a situation of great tension’.

Thus mission became stigmatized, it became the major theoretical frame for Hitler to practice his scheme, and lost its authenticity. Yet in spite of the problems, mission cannot simply be dismissed, due to the value of its key content and the identity of Christianity within it. Then, is there any other frame or terminology different from mission that would allow us to practice its genuine content and identity? Must we stubbornly continue to use the term ‘mission’? Jesus told us to put new wine into new wineskins. Is it time for theologians to prepare a new wineskin, a new paradigm that can bring out perfect reflection and regeneration of mission?

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718 Werner Ustorf, Sailing on the Next Tide: Missions, Missiology and the Third Reich. 125 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), 34.
719 Ibid.
720 Ibid. 51. Ustorf explains Hitler’s missiology as follows: ‘1. It “wrote” contemporary German context with its traumas and confusions into the larger picture of God’s cosmic conflict with evil (a racial world drama!) and it defined friend and foe (divine race/ecclesia and satanic counter-race/synagoga); 2. It made the Volk, not by an extension of hope, but by battle and eugenics, the subject of its own salvation (in contrast to biblical apocalyptic thought; but see item 4!); 3. It answered not only the old question of who the people God really were (the Aryans), but also why they were the chosen people (because they participated in the divine substance of the pure racial origin); 4. It responded to the divine/human problem by a panentheistic model according to which the transcendent God was present in the collective of the (Aryan) Volk and, not so much in the individual, but rather in the collective psyche and in the blood – this is why incarnation or transubstantiation may be the appropriate term here; 5. By participating in the divine substance, modern consciousness was allowed to escape the almost gravitational pull of God’s otherness.’
721 Ibid. 52.
Another factor prompting consideration of these questions is that today, incorrect practice in mission becomes known immediately; criticism and bans are activated without delay.

The situation whereby information on the mission field was shared only after a generation had passed by is now long gone. Because of the development of technology and mobile networks, nations are interconnected like a spider’s web; the world resembles one huge global village. Sebastian Kim and Kirsteen Kim explain various types of globalization, namely religious, economic, political, and cultural globalization, ideas originally inspired by Roland Robertson. Supporting these ideas, Peter Berger and Samul Huntington entitled their own book *Many Globalizations*. Considering contemporary world Christianity as one form of globalization, Kim and Kim perceive world Christianity as an agent of globalization. They argue that communion, the Bible, spirituality and mission are world Christianity and global meeting points. They believe that globalization and mission need to have *koinonia* with evangelical and ecumenical Christianity and the Catholic Church, with ecumenism as the starting point. By doing so, mission can begin the necessary advance toward global mission. In a similar vein, Ogbu U. Kalu explains that ‘globalization may be imaged as an external force or change agent that has elicited a variety of local responses and thereby created a dynamic

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723 Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: SAGE, 1992), 96. According to Kim, ‘Robertson’s work shows that there may be many cultural globalization processes going on, arising from multiple centres, and interrelating with one another.’ (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim, *Christianity as a World Religion*, 12).


726 Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim, *Christianity as a World Religion*, 219.
cultural force that has reshaped both Christianity and its mandate to mission’.\textsuperscript{727} As the world is globalized, it is inevitable that local cultures, ethnic groups, life styles and mission are influenced by it. Anthony Giddens makes the point that ‘Globalisation is restructuring the ways in which we live, and in a very profound manner. … Globalisation also influences everyday life as much as it does events happening on a world scale.’\textsuperscript{728}

This is because globalization appears widely in political, technological, cultural, and economic phenomena.\textsuperscript{729} According to Giddens, however, ‘It is wrong to think of globalisation as just concerning the big systems, like the world financial order. Globalisation isn’t only about what is “out there”, remote and far away from the individual. It is an “in here” phenomenon too.’\textsuperscript{730} Moreover, globalization is not a single process, but a complex set of processes. In these complex processes, globalization creates views that may be pessimistic or optimistic, because there are both winners and losers.\textsuperscript{731}

We should not overlook the fact that colonial types of the past imperial period may reappear in the modern globalized world wearing political, economic, or religious masks. The term ‘mission’ is known to be associated with colonialism and imperialism. Thus we

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\textsuperscript{727} Ogbu U. Kalu, ‘Globalization and Mission in the Twenty-first Century’, in Mission after Christendom: Emergent Themes in Contemporary Mission (Louisville: WJK Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 42. Kalu explains ‘different genres of history of globalization’ as follows: ‘(1) the archaic globalization of the fifteenth century, symbolized by the Iberian voyages of discovery; (2) the protoglobalization that followed the intensified commercial rivalry and mercantilist theory of the eighteenth century; (3) the modern globalization of the nineteenth century, with its imperial instrumentalization of power; and (4) the postcolonial globalization after the World Wars’ (Ibid., 25).


\textsuperscript{729} Ibid. 10.

\textsuperscript{730} Ibid. 12.

\textsuperscript{731} Ibid., 15. Giddens explains that ‘A pessimistic view of globalisation would consider it largely an affair of the industrial North, in which the developing societies of the South play little or no active part. It would see it as destroying local cultures, widening world inequalities and worsening the lot of the impoverished. Globalisation, some argue, creates a world of winners and losers, a few on the fast track to prosperity, the majority condemned to a life of misery and despair.’ He adds, ‘Rather than a global village, one might say, this is more like global pillage’ (Ibid., 16).\end{flushright}
have a problem to solve: how can mission overcome the stigma, deliver Christ-centred identity into the world and practice genuine gospel in specific contexts?

Given these problems in definition, and the stigma and prejudice that surround the idea of mission, it is questionable whether the term ‘mission’ can still properly transfer the meaning of ‘shift’ or ‘transformation’. Therefore, I argue that in order to provide a new direction for mission, it would be helpful to replace or at least complement mission theology with agency theology.

6.3 Agency in the Relationship between Mission and Church

In this section, the relationship between the Church and mission is investigated from the perspective of agency. First, we explore the question of who is the agency in the Christian mission. Secondly, we focus specifically on the problems surrounding the Church-centric mission theology and the mission-centric Church. Finally, moving away from the relationship between the Church and mission, we investigate the emerging secular ecumenical mission theology, which believes in the rigorous application of theology in the world.

6.3.1 The ‘agency’ in the Christian mission
Who the agency is and who has carried out God’s work in the history of the Christian mission are interesting questions. First of all, agency was revealed through the Old Testament in the form of Israelites, prophets, ordinary people such as farmers, shepherds, merchants, and even ‘all nations outside of Israel’\footnote{See, Old Testament, Isaiah 45:1}. In the New Testament, the incarnation of the Logos progressed and changed into the secularity of the Word. Theories such as incarnation, kenosis and world-orientation appeared as a connection between the sacred and the secular. This raises the question of how such theories have been embodied in our world, and one possible answer is provided by agency. The concept of agency has expanded to embrace the culture and context of Christians’ lives.

After its early success in performing Christian mission, many scholars regarded the Church as God’s agent, the body of Christ as the incarnated tool of the divine Logos. The Church as a sacred organ or organization had carried out her mission over a long period, and had rapidly expanded throughout the world since the approval of Christianity as the religion of the Rome Empire by the Emperors Constantine to Theodosius and Justinian. From Cyprian onwards to the medieval period, the Church was considered as the sole agency of God, so that there was no other salvation outside the Church. According to J. Ratzinger, ‘Kirchen bleiben und doch eine Kirche werden’; being churches, but aiming to become one single church,\footnote{Joseph Ratzinger, Die Kirche und die Kirchen, in: Reformatio, Jg. 13, 1964, 105.} he suggests that the Churches in their numbers should be centred on one faith. In the name of God’s agent, the Church (or the Churches in their respective regions) had control over many areas of societies and cultures. Subsequently, however, many problems arose. Some people suspected the authenticity of their Church, which had taken the initiative in performing mission and carrying out God's will, and they

\footnote{See, Old Testament, Isaiah 45:1} \footnote{Joseph Ratzinger, Die Kirche und die Kirchen, in: Reformatio, Jg. 13, 1964, 105.}
argued that their Church was not the only agent of God. As a result, some people not only looked for Jesus Christ outside their Church, but also rejected the Christ who seemed to be a construct of the various, not seldom conflicting Churches. If this agency had carried out God’s will more fairly and more humbly, the Church would probably have sustained her position for a long time. In post-ecclesiastical circumstances, God’s agency can mean mission boards, good Samaritans instead of Israelites, and even culture and arts created by human beings.

When we look at the various opinions of scholars on the agency in Christian mission, we find many evangelical scholars who consider the Church as the only institution for undertaking God’s work. Most of the Catholic scholars, D. McGavran and his followers, and even those scholars who are labelled evangelists conform to this viewpoint. Evangelical ecumenists such as Johannes Blauw, Stephen Neill, Orlando E. Costas and David Bosch have also claimed that the nature of the Church is mission and the Church is absolutely vital in mission, whereas J.C. Hoekendijk and J.E. Lesslie Newbigin urged that the agency of mission is laities and congregations, and emphasized their indispensability in mission. For instance, according to J.C. Hoekendijk, ‘a layman is a representative of God’s mission people’, but ‘a clericalized layman is unsuited for the apostolate’. Of course, Hocking also emphasized that laymen play a key role in mission. Similarly, L. Newbigin noted that ‘the only answer, the only hermeneutic of the gospel, is a congregation of men and women who believe it and live by it’, but ‘the Church

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is not so much the agent of the mission as the locus of the mission’. According to Barth, we may think of the agency that accomplished God’s work as theologians, culture and arts and books.

Undoubtedly, the extension of the concept of agency in mission opens more fully the possibility of showing the right path and task of Christian mission.

6.3.2 Emergence of God’s mission from the conflict with Church-centred mission

In the history of mission, the statement ‘mission is Church’ implies that mission is regulated by the Church and exists for the Church. This is the opinion of Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676) explanation of the content of mission as ‘Church planting or planting of churches’, mission as an expansion of the Church. Their core aim is to draw people who have not been redeemed into the Church, convert them into Christians and lead them to redemption.

Opposing the Uppsala Conference definition of mission as ‘humanization’, Donald McGavran argued that it is an incorrect exaggeration to regard mission as everything that the Church needs to do and everything that God wants the Church to do. In addition,

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737 Jan Jongeneel states that Voetius regards mission as calling the nations (vocatio gentium), church planting or planting of churches (plantatio ecclesiae aut ecclesiarii) and missions (missiones). See, Jan A.B. Jongeneel, *Philosophy, Science, and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Part II. Band 106 (Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 1997), 83, 97.

738 In the Uppsala Report, we can see the key concept of the new humanity as “Renewal in Mission”. (Jörg Müller, *Uppsala II. Erneuerung in der Mission: Eine redactionsgeschichtliche Studie und Dokumentation zu Sektion II der 4. Vollversammlung des Ökumenischen Rates der Kirchen, Uppsala 1968* [Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1977], 212. “God’s redemptive mission culminates in the coming of Christ, the true man, the head of new humanity. …. Today the fundamental question is much more that of true man,
according to McGavran, perceiving evangelism as a way of changing social structures can be nonsense, and does not accord with the principles of the Bible. For him, the most important and urgent task is mission, and the most important priority for world evangelization is preaching the gospel. Through evangelization, churches should be planted and grow continuously.\textsuperscript{739}

Therefore, churches stand firmly as the only agent that practices God’s will. The Church, as Christ’s body, judges right and wrong in the world on behalf of God. However, this standpoint risks forgetting the status and mission of the Church as agency, and making it instead the main part or subject in mission.

In response to the Church-centric tendency, which holds the position that the Church is God’s only agent and determines everything, the notion of God’s mission has emerged. This became a core issue at the 1952 Willingen Conference of the International Missionary Council (IMC), where Church-centred evangelism came under criticism and it was argued that the subject of mission is not the Church, but the Holy Trinity.

Here, I will begin by investigating whence the concept of God’s Mission originates, and the meaning of it. Then, I will study further the theological background that introduced the theme of God’s mission at the Willingen Conference.

First of all, how and why is the term, Missio Dei used? In general, it is supposed that the terminology originates from Georg F. Vicedom’s book Missio Dei. He stated that the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{739} Donald A. McGavran, Understanding Church Growth, Third ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 286-287. Here, McGavran insists that dynamic mission begins from well-organized church planting.}
Church is only a tool of God, and the result of God’s actions of sending His son and salvation.\textsuperscript{740} Furthermore, he explained that the notion of Missio Dei, God’s mission, was adopted as the core issue of the 1952 Willingen conference of the IMC in order to clarify the concept of mission.\textsuperscript{741} However, David Bosch insists that the idea of Missio Dei was first presented by Karl Barth at the Brandenburg Missionary Conference in 1932, and that Karl Hartenstein also used similar terminology.\textsuperscript{742} In addition, Bosch indicates that Barth’s argument strongly influenced the new declaration of Missio Dei at the Willingen Conference.\textsuperscript{743}

Even though Gisbertus Voetius makes the foundation of God’s mission secure, insisting that God is the first cause of mission, his thought is still limited within the Church-centric tradition. Therefore, Bosch considers Karl Barth as one of the first theologians to initiate the new paradigm of God’s mission. However, a similar concept can be found in Karl Graul.\textsuperscript{744} A century before the Willingen Conference, Graul wrote that mission is not ‘the apostolic road from Church to Church, but the Triune God moving into the world’.\textsuperscript{745} In fact, the notion of God’s mission is a necessary conclusion that is compatible with the


\textsuperscript{741} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{743} Ibid., 390.

\textsuperscript{744} Karl Graul is one of the founders of the Leipzig, Neuendettelsau and Hermannsburg Missionary Societies (cf. J.C. Hoekendijk, Kerk en Volk in de Duitse Zendingswetenschap [n.d. (1948)], 62-75).

Bible: God becomes a missionary for Himself and He is the Incarnation on earth. God sends out His agents to fulfil His will in the world.

Secondly, it is necessary to consider why Missio Dei was raised as a significant issue at the Willingen Conference. The reason was the conflicts between Church and mission. Bosch may be correct when he indicates that ‘for understanding of the shifts in Protestant thinking regarding the relationship between Church and mission, the contributions and articles of the World Missionary Conferences are of primary importance’. More precisely, the main issue of the Edinburgh Conference (1910) was the absence of missionary zeal in Western churches. Thus the purpose of the Conference was to motivate and equip Western churches for mission. According to Rodger Bassham: ‘Edinburgh saw that mission is the task of the whole church.’ The Tambam, Madras Conference in 1938 also emphasized the role of churches for mission, setting up the Church as God’s agent for mission and stressing the witness-bearing character of the Church. Yet while Bosch and Bassham estimate the relationship between Church and mission as positive, E. Stanley Jones, V. Chakkarai and J.C. Hoekendijk criticize the central position of the Church for mission. The Whitby Conference in 1947 presented partnership between the older churches and the younger churches. The prevailing view, as expressed by Feliciano V. Carino, was that: ‘Churches as the bearers of the missionary obligation are

747 Rodger C. Bassham, Mission Theology: 1948-1975. Years of Worldwide Creative Tension Ecumenical, Evangelical, and Roman Catholic (California: William Carey Library, 1979), 17. Bassham indicates that the Edinburgh Conference was a meeting of “the 1200 delegates (all Western with the exception of 17 Asian Christian) from 159 missionary societies” (Ibid., 15).
748 Ibid., 23.
in a missionary situation wherever they are.”

According to this view, the Church as agent of God takes a strong position in the field of mission.

These trends of IMC conferences led to the notion of Missio Dei at the Willingen Conference of 1952. In other words, God’s mission emerged from the search for a ground to overcome the problem of conflict between Church-centred mission and mission societies-centred mission.

According to Vicedom, the core statements of Missio Dei are first, that mission is God’s work; second, that mission is done by God, so God sends His Son and furthermore the Father God and the Son Jesus Christ send the Holy Spirit to the world, and third, that mission is God’s action and dispatch for salvation by proclaiming gospel of salvation.

God’s mission acknowledges that mission is an activity that belongs to God and that He initiates mission. The mission activity in which we participate as one body is originated from the God of the Holy Trinity. Therefore, use of expressions such as Church’s mission or our mission should be minimized. The prime mystery of mission is that God sent His Son and the Father and the Son sent the Holy Spirit. That is how mission revives and grows. The Willingen Conference represents a great transformation from the mission of previous periods. The emergence of a new theological evangelism paradigm, God’s mission, is an epoch-making event. However, mission activities originated from this transformation are diverse, and so too are the evaluations of those activities.

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751 Georg F. Vicedom, Missio Dei, 12.
752 Ibid., 13-14.
753 Ibid., 15-16.
6.3.3 Agents in trends of *Missio Dei*

This section examines further the theological trends in God’s mission. These can be divided into three main groups. The first believes that ‘the nature of the Church is mission’, the second considers that ‘Church is mission’ and the third group excludes the Church’s role in mission. The first group includes in particular those who hold evangelical ecumenical perspectives, such as Johannes Blauw,754 Charles Van Engen,755 Thomas F. Torrance, David J. Bosch, Orlando E. Costas, Gerald H. Anderson, and Stephen Neill. Scholars who perceive the Church as mission hold an ecumenical stance, and include Lesslie Newbigin, J.C. Hoekendijk and Georg F. Vicedom. They maintain that all work of the Church should be regulated and determined by mission. The third group includes secular and religious ecumenicalists, who tend to see mission and world as one; in this view the Church may be included or excluded as non-essential. Representative scholars of this group include Richard Schaufl, Ludwig Rüti, and M.M. Thomas. The following sections will examine each of these three trends in turn.

6.3.3.1 Agent in ‘the nature of the Church is mission’

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There are distinct theological differences between the statements: ‘mission is the nature of the Church’ and ‘the nature of the Church is mission’. In other words, mission is determined according to the meaning of ‘the nature of the church’.

This standpoint is shared by most evangelical ecumenicalists. Of course, scholars with a Church-centred viewpoint maintain that mission is the Church. This means that mission is regulated by and plays an important function in the Church. Therefore, there exist huge analytical differences between the stance of Church-centric scholars and ecumenical evangelical scholars.

According to Bosch, the notion of mission-centric Church started with scholars such as A.A. van Ruler, Hendric Kramer, J.C. Hoekendijk, and E. Jansen Schoonhoven. They regard mission as the apostolate that is ‘an essential characteristic of the Church’. Scherer indicates that the representatives of the Whitby Conference ‘felt obliged to renew the call and vision of a universal mission as the supernational task of all churches’. Likewise, the reason why the apostolate was considered as a fundamental feature of the Church is that mission approaches the world with universalistic characteristics rather than particularism. In other words, in the Missio Dei, God’s mission, the Church is sent by God as an apostle and the Church is the agency of God. The Church as the people of God needs to have the apostolate as agent. However, depending on how this apostolate is understood and applied, agency shows completely different features. Emil Brunner

759 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 176.
760 Ibid.
illustrates three reasons why Church (the people of God) needs to understand the apostolate. First, the apostolate is endowed with authority. Apostles are ambassadors of Jesus, and they are not rulers but servants in the world (Philippians 2: 7, 8).\textsuperscript{762}

Secondly, Brunner shows that in Paul’s writing about various spiritual gifts, the term ‘government’ is used to indicate ‘the gift of apostles’. The term refers not to any kind of authority in hierarchical structure, but to the apostolate, as the Lord establishes His reign by humbling Himself.\textsuperscript{763}

Finally, Brunner explains about the apostles of the first Jerusalem Church, described in Acts (Acts 15: 6-21). The apostles did not solve problems using their primary status. Rather, they ‘submitted to the sway of truth’. In other words, ‘the privilege of priority linked to this place vanishes completely’.\textsuperscript{764} Church as God’s people and agency should understand the apostolate of Church properly, so that it can perform the role of God’s mission humbly. Thus Thomas F. Torrence considers that Jesus Christ is an apostle sent by God in order to carry out the mission of God’s love in the world. Jesus Christ has demonstrated His body, His image and His Word to the world.\textsuperscript{765} God’s people (the Church) are identified with God’s agent. Thus Torrence is convinced that the mission of the apostolic Church refers to the personal work of Jesus Christ Himself in the place called ‘the Church’.\textsuperscript{766} The Church as agent and God’s people and Christ are united as one body.

\textsuperscript{763} \textit{Ibid.}, 33.
\textsuperscript{764} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{766} \textit{Ibid.}, 131.
by the power of the Holy Spirit. Based on the unity of the apostolate, he argues that mission is the nature of the Church. Thus, we can analogize that mission occurs in the place where the intention of the sender and the one who was sent encounter one another. We call this God’s mission. The apostolic agent is considered as mediator who demonstrates the nature of the Church. The one who was sent is mediator who unites with God and the world. If the agent moves independently of the sender (God), this shows that the apostolate is not seen in the nature of the Church and is not the nature of the Church. Therefore, Newbigin also insists that ‘a Church which has ceased to be a mission has lost the essential character of a Church, so we must also say that a mission which is not truly a church is not a true expression of the divine apostolate’.

This researcher argues that all characteristics of the Church, God’s agent, need to be characterized by the apostolic mission and the practice of God’s will, the sender, in the world. Edward R. Dayton and David A. Fraser stated that the Church is sent by God in order to bring God’s kingdom on earth, and the Church is a co-worker with God. This means that the Church sent by God is God’s agent and has active and passive will for the fulfilment of God’s will on earth. Therefore, as argued by Dayton and Fraser, it is necessary to investigate God’s mission in order to explain and determine the nature of the Church, God’s agent. The mission of the Church is regarded as participation in God’s work of grace and redemption on earth. Dayton’s point shows that the mission of Church,

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767 Ibid., 134.
768 Ibid., 141.
771 Ibid., 556.
God’s agent, originates from the Creator, the Holy Trinity. God’s agent (Church) plays a very significant role in God’s mission.\(^\text{772}\)

This argument encourages those who undermine Church dogmatics and deny the function of mission in the Church to recognize the statement: ‘the nature of the Church is mission’. However, the statement ‘mission is the nature of the Church’ conveys a somewhat different meaning. As well as oneness between Church and mission, it also means that mission should be determined by the nature of the Church. This viewpoint places more emphasis on the Church and regards mission as of secondary importance. As a result, the Church becomes a single agent, which dominates mission. If the Church dominates beyond its boundary, the will of God (delivering and loving the world) will be undermined and shame will be brought upon His name. This has happened frequently in the history of Christianity. Therefore a new argument, ‘Church is mission’, has appeared in order to clarify the status of the Church in mission. The next section presents the alternative argument in detail.

### 6.3.3.2 Agent in ‘Church is mission’

This section focuses on the argument of Newbigin and Hoekendijk, who strongly support the statement ‘Church is mission’. In doing so, it addresses the question, ‘what is an agent?’

First of all, the statement ‘Church is mission’ conveys different meanings depending on different interpretations. Those who attempt to identify Church with mission match the subject and the predicate in the two statements: ‘mission is Church’ and ‘Church is
mission’. However, from the perspective of God’s mission, this interpretation risks identifying the agent with God Himself. Of course there is an exception: In the mission of God, the Holy Trinity, He became agent Himself and incarnated as mediator between humanity and the world through the word of revelation.

However, identifying the one who is sent by God with the sender, God, may lead to Feuerbach’s conclusion that: The essence of human being is religion and the essence is projected to God.773 If the statement ‘Church is mission’ leads to the statement ‘Church and mission are one’, it causes a logical error. Advanced interpretation can be found in Edmund Clowney, who explained that in the 1960s, because the WCC developed the theology of the servant, the Church strongly believed that ‘Church does not have mission’ but rather that ‘Church itself is mission’, meaning that the Church exists only for mission.774

What is the true meaning of ‘Church exists only in (for) mission?’ The WCC Geneva Conference in 1967 stated that ‘the Church exists for the world’. Basham presented a more advanced interpretation, whereby the Church is perceived as the function of mission, but this does not mean that mission is perceived as the function of the Church. His interpretation is viewed as being more acceptable, because if the statement ‘Church is mission’ is true, it means that Church is determined by mission. Among the scholars holding this viewpoint, Vicedom and Newbigin highlighted the positive use of the Church by mission, but Hoekendijk strongly criticized the overall work of the Church as mission.

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The former two scholars viewed both mission and Church as God’s tools. As God’s kingdom is established on earth, Church and mission should be renewed and developed continuously. Hoekendijk on the other hand proposed that Church needs to be thoroughly evaluated based on mission. This section presents the two arguments in detail.

In the first place, according to Newbigin, the statement ‘Church is mission’ means that Church should not be referred to without mission also being mentioned, or vice versa. Newbigin interprets the statement as indicating the close relationship between mission and Church. However, if one looks closely at the logic of the statement, it does not necessarily imply a close relationship between the two.

In order to demonstrate an equal and close relationship between Church and mission, the statement ‘Church is mission’ would have to be followed by ‘mission is Church’. Therefore, Newbigin’s interpretation needs further explanation. First of all, Newbigin warns that when the Church institutionalizes and possesses absolute power in the system, it loses its own status and becomes proud. Accordingly, Newbigin insists that ‘the Church is not and can never expect to be the bearer of God’s cause in the sense that it is the agency through which God’s order is established within history. That is the Constantinian dream.’ His viewpoint does not explain the Church with dogmatic form, but describes the identity of the Church in reality. He asserts that, as evidenced by the New Testament, the Church has been frequently reprimanded and warned from the very beginning.

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776 Ibid., 59. Specifically, Jesus’ address to Peter, “You are Peter, on this rock I will build my church”, is followed immediately by a terrible rebuke, “Get behind me, Satane (Matthew 16: 18, 23). Similarly, Paul’s letters are relentless in exposing the sin of those very communities which in the same letter he hails as the temple of God (I Cor. 3:16-17) and the body of Christ (I Cor. 6:15). The same dark shadow plays across the scene in the upper room when Jesus solemnly foretold his betrayal by one of his chosen friends, and “the disciples looked at one another, uncertain of whom he spoke” (John 13:22; cf. Mark 14:19): where the disciples “[began] to say to him one after another: ‘Is it I? I?’”
Consequently, Newbigin shows that the Church is not a perfect and ideal community, but is a mission community that is imperfect and needs repentance and renewal. He declares that, ‘if the Church is the bearer of the presence of the kingdom through history, it is surely not as the community of the righteous in a sinful world’.\footnote{Ibid.}

Next we can ask how the sinful Church can take the role of mission. Newbigin makes it clear that mission does not belong to either the Church or human beings, but belongs to God: \footnote{Ibid., 72.} ‘Mission is not essentially an action by which the Church puts forth its own power and wisdom to conquer the world around it.’\footnote{Ibid., 66.} In addition, Newbigin points out that McGavran’s argument contains an error, because he understood mission as the expansion of the Church.\footnote{Ibid., 153.} According to Newbigin, the sinful Church as well as sinful world needs to be changed by mission.

Now the question is how Church and world can be transformed into something that God wants. To answer this, Newbigin explores the concept of mission through the Bible and argues that mission belongs to the Holy Trinity God and originates from God.\footnote{Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Geneva: WCC Publication, 1991), 118, 134-135.} This means that God changes the world and the Church.

While Newbigin regards the Christian mission as an analogous logical structure, he insists that mission is an activity from a fundamental belief embodied in the statement that ‘God has revealed himself as Father, Son, and Spirit’.\footnote{Lesslie Newbigin, The Open Secret, 31.} Therefore, Newbigin suggests that the
Christian mission has three modes: as the proclaiming of the kingdom of the Father; as sharing the life of the Son; and as bearing the witness of the Spirit.\footnote{783} In the relationship with the missionary Holy Trinity, Church can discover its own place and be continuously re-formed by the God of mission. After the Willingen conference, the notion of God’s mission was used too radically, so that it excluded the role of the Church in the mission field, and in the most extreme case did not even include Jesus Christ. Newbigin points out that this was due to a misunderstanding of the concept of God’s Mission.\footnote{784} If the Church exists for itself and is only concerned about its own expansion, then it actually works against the gospel. The real role of the Church is as an agent to help people glimpse God’s kingdom.\footnote{785} The only way that sinful Church shows the righteousness of God in history is by carrying out the same tasks that Jesus performed. Through the salvation of Jesus Christ, who is the way, the truth and the life, through baptism and communion, and through God’s word and sermon, the Church is united and qualified to represent God’s righteousness. In other words, the Church is qualified to be agent to show God’s grace.

Newbigin presents the dynamic work of God in mission. In particular he shows the role of the Holy Spirit, who changes the world and the Church, and always goes before the Church on the journey of mission. The fact that Church starts on the foundation of mission means that it is progressed by the activity of Holy Spirit and God’s authority. As examined earlier, Newbigin believed that mission can change the Church as well as the world.\footnote{786} Therefore, when Newbigin states that ‘Church is mission’, this statement has

\footnotesize{\textit{\begin{itemize}
\item 783 \textit{Ibid.}\footnote{783}
\item 784 Lesslie Newbigin, \textit{The Gospel in a Pluralist Society}, 135.\footnote{784}
\item 785 \textit{Ibid.}, 136.\footnote{785}
\item 786 Lesslie Newbigin, \textit{The Open Secret: Sketches for a Missionary Theology} (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1978), 66.\footnote{786}
\end{itemize}}}
to be extended and applied widely. His extended concepts are introduced in his various publications. In *The Other Side of 1984*, Newbigin strongly criticizes culture and points out that Church needs to stand firm on the stance of New Testament apocalyptic eschatology in order not to fall into the Constantinian trap of making the Constantinian alliance with countries.  

According to Newbigin, mission is God’s action which promotes the power of Holy Spirit in order to enable Christ’s work of deliverance to be accomplished.

Newbigin’s argument ‘Church is mission’ is located in the middle of the spectrum between fundamental evangelistic ecumenism and secular ecumenism. Therefore, it is not welcomed by those who want to rigorously apply the concept of God’s mission to the Church. Newbigin’s viewpoint cannot avoid the criticism, because it does not completely separate mission from the influence of Church. Therefore, Hoekendijk, who held a more critical position than Newbigin with regard to ‘Church is mission’, will be examined in order to study his viewpoint of Church and mission and the meaning of God’s agent.

According to Hoekendijk’s concept of ‘Church is mission’, the Church is regulated by mission and is the function of mission. This is similar to Douglas Webster’s point that the Church is the instrument of mission. According to Roger C. Bassham, ‘Hoekendijk opened a sharp attack on the “Church-centric” view of mission which he considered had prevailed in much missionary thinking.’ Such arguments required reconsideration of

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788 Ibid.
all the work initiated by the Church; in particular, examination of who is the initiator in mission raised the important theme of ‘God’s mission’ and made Church step down from the main stage of mission. The main reason for this was that ‘Church-centric missionary thinking is bound to go astray, because it revolves around an illegitimate center’. Another reason was the misuse of evangelism, which was deeply connected with imperialism and cultural colonialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. For example, Hoekendijk shows that before Moravian missionaries evangelized, they tried to establish a Christian style of civilization. He also quotes Karl Graul, who believed that a nation needs to become Christian before individual conversion and evangelization; and drawing upon 19th century theologians from Schleiermacher to Troeltsch, he points to mission activities based on the idea that converting individuals is impossible except by the expansion of western Christian civilization. He concludes that this idea played a significant role in combining Christian colonialism and mission, and suggests that this stemmed from a misunderstanding of biblical concepts about evangelism. Hoekendijk points out that, in the Bible, evangelizing pagans is possible only in the era of the Messiah. He makes it clear that the Messiah is the initiator or subject of evangelism and the purpose of evangelism is something that Israel expected of the Messiah, that is, the establishment of peace. Therefore he regards evangelism as the Kerygma, Koinonia, and Diakonia of shalom. He is convinced that this kind of inclusive evangelism is required all over the world. However, he rejects the idea of using evangelism for Church propaganda, because the essential character of propaganda is a

792 Ibid., 15.
793 Ibid., 18.
794 Ibid., 19.
795 Ibid., 23.
lack of hope and an absence of humility: “The propagandist has to impose himself and tries to make exact copies of himself.”796 He also rejects the notion of Gisbertus Voetius that the purpose of evangelism is the planting of the Church (*plantatio ecclesiae*).797 Here, the question is whether the rejection of these ideas and methods of evangelism can be justified in mission. Tormod Engelsviken poses the problem as follows: ‘Why should this, or the concept of shalom itself, be played out against the planting of the church, when the church is the “institution” - to use a word with some negative connotation - that should have exactly these functions?’798 However, Hoekendijk insists that the notion of Church-centred mission values the Church too highly, and tends to regard it as God’s secure bridgehead or ark in the world.799 As a result, it leads to the misunderstanding that mission is something that moves from Church to Church, passing on an incorrect message to the next generations of mission and making them circle around Church like a merry-go-round.800 According to Hoekendijk, Church-centred mission makes the whole ground of mission the Church and makes it difficult for missionaries to overcome the boundary of the Church. As a result, the world loses its meaning and is regarded as just a training ground for Church. God’s kingdom is minimized or underestimated as something that can be experienced and imagined only within the boundary of Church.

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801 *Ibid.*, 38. Hoekendijk explains that: “Church-centric missionary thinking is bound to go astray, because it revolves around an illegitimate center.”
To overcome Church-centred mission, Hoekendijk raised the importance of the apostolate.\textsuperscript{802} Bosch summarized Hoekendijk’s apostle theology as follows: ‘We shall never understand what the apostles taught unless we do what the apostles did, namely, mission. Apostolicity without apostolate is not apostolicity but apostasy.’\textsuperscript{803} Therefore, according to Hoekendijk, the apostolate is an activity beyond the boundaries of Church for the purpose of mission. That is how the Church becomes true Church. If mission activities centre within Church, this indicates that the Church gives up its own identity and moves astray from the apostolate.\textsuperscript{804} Here it is necessary to note that Hoekendijk perceived Church and the world only as one function of the apostolate.\textsuperscript{805} He explained that the Church and the world should be regulated and interpreted by the apostolate, indicating that the boundaries between the Church and the world had fallen down.\textsuperscript{806} The true ground of Church lies in preaching God’s kingdom to the world. If the Church understands this, it does not limit itself in mission but accepts that the Church is mission. The statement ‘Church is mission’ is his direct expression of ‘there is no Church without mission’. As pointed out by Bosch: ‘Van Ruler’s thesis that “mission was a function of the Church” was inverted by Hoekendijk: the Church was a function of mission.’\textsuperscript{807} Church is an instrument of evangelism. However, if the Church functions as mediator or ark of salvation, it means the apostolate has disappeared from the Church. That is why Hoekendijk stated that the organization of evangelism tries to exclude itself from something related to the Church.\textsuperscript{808} This idea originates from his understanding of our

\begin{footnotes}
\item[802] Ibid., 41.
\item[803] David J. Bosch, \textit{Witness to the World}, 199.
\item[804] J.C. Hoekendijk, \textit{The Church Inside Out}, 41.
\item[805] Ibid., 42
\item[806] Ibid., 41.
\item[807] David J. Bosch, \textit{Witness to the World}, 176-177.
\item[808] J.C. Hoekendijk, \textit{The Church Inside Out}, 52.
\end{footnotes}
God as not being limited in one place of the world like Baal. Our God is the Lord, the king of world history and the head of the Church. Here, Hoekendijk introduces an order of ‘God-World-Church’, not ‘God-Church-World’, in order to explain that Church exists not for itself but for other people. That is how Church proves its own justification and manifests its own value. In other words, he highlights that just as the Messiah does not exist for Himself, Church does not coexist with the world but exists to serve other people and the world.

Hoekendijk’s statement, ‘Church is mission’ raises the important questions of who is the subject of mission, who is the agency, how should the agency undertake the mission and what is its status in mission compared to the subject? The theological answers to these questions are investigated in the relationship between Church and mission, considering evangelism which is the demand of mission. Furthermore, the features of God’s mission are investigated in terms of the apostolate. Bosch argues in Missio Dei that the subject and source of mission is God. Agencies such as Church and human cannot be the author of mission or responsible initiator. In other words, Church and missionaries are only the tools and functions for mission and particular areas in mission. In fact, Hoekendijk emphasizes that the most practical agents in the mission that responds to the requests of Church (God’s people) and evangelism are laymen and the house churches. The laymen are the bearers of God’s mission and the representatives of God’s mission people.

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809 Ibid., 68.
810 Ibid.
811 Ibid., 68-69.
812 Ibid., 70.
813 David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission, 392.
814 J.C. Hoekendijk, The Church Inside Out, 83-84.
because they are in the best position to carry God’s love which gives His Son to the world and shows his faith to the secular people, and the house churches have the best status to show God’s love towards the world and reveal God’s love through its committed life. Not only is the Church God’s people, but people belong to the world; laymen and the house church are the representative agents of God for the world. Hoekendijk points out that institutionalized Church has lost its identity and reason for being, because it is preoccupied by managing and administering that Church. Therefore, the most ideal system is suggested to be one of house churches, as with the early Church.\footnote{Ibid., 89-90.} In response to this point, Hoekendijk’s critics have claimed that he ignores the role of Church as agency in mission and excludes the Church in God’s Mission.

### 6.3.4 The agent beyond the relationship between mission and Church

In the previous sections, the two statements, ‘the essence of Church is mission’ and ‘Church is mission’ have been examined based on world mission conferences and several scholars of mission, such as Bosch, Newbigin and Hoekendijk. We were able to find church-centred Catholic churches and evangelical circles that view church as God’s only agent. In addition, the perspectives of mission-centred ecumenists were reviewed. They argue that the nature of church is mission: church is simply a tool for mission, and should submit to mission entirely.

In this section, we go beyond the issue of the relationship between the Church and mission to investigate the viewpoints of secular ecumenicals and religious ecumenicals, in order
to identify the agency in God’s mission. Secular and religious ecumenists turn controversy over ‘mission or church’ into a discussion of other things (such as world and other religions). They believe God’s mission event should take place in the world. However, the world contains violation of human rights, political and economic oppression, injustice and structural evil. Therefore, the main task is to achieve God’s kingdom through solidarity and joint protest to gain true humanity and liberation. This view does not regard other religions as Satan and evil to be demolished. Instead, it perceives them as God’s creation and as objects of mercy, and tries to find opportunities for conversation. Specifying ecumenical stances into secular and religious ecumenical approaches, Bosch criticizes their positions. Following Bosch’s categorizations, the present writer intends to identify what agent means.

In doing so, it will be possible to answer conclusively the question that has endured throughout the history of mission, namely: ‘Who are the agents in God’s mission?’

6.3.4.1 The agent and secular ecumenicals

817 See, Amos Yong, “From Demonization to Kin-domination: The Witness of the Spirit and the Renewal of Missions in a Pluralistic World”, in Global Renewal, Religious Pluralism, and The Great Commission: Towards a Renewal Theology of Mission and Interreligious Encounter, eds. Amos Yong & Clifton Clarke (Lexington: Emeth Press, 2011), 157, 162, 170. Yong mentions that “What I find remarkable is that whereas much of the history of Christian missions has demonized pagans and barbarians of the world, in this text (Acts 28), Paul and his fellow missionaries receive the generosity of their Maltese hosts instead.” (Ibid., 162.) Thus, he insists that “This common humanity … means that rather than a demonization of the (religious) other, we must move beyond the failed task of Christianization and work for the kin-domination of Gospel of Christ, with others, even across religious lines, to the level that is possible.” (Ibid., 170.)
Among secular ecumenicals, the world created by God is an important agenda.\textsuperscript{818} Hence, the order ‘God-World-Church’, as proposed by Hoekendijk, has been established, emphasizing the notion of the world as a place lived in by people loved by God. Bosch mentions Manfred Linz, who, in his article ‘Anwalt der Welt: Zur Theologie der Mission’, analysed the sermons of German preachers between 1900 and 1960. According to Bosch, Linz criticized those descriptions of the world that treat it only as a geographical entity but do not recognize its theological definition and significance.\textsuperscript{819} Bosch summarizes Linz’s arguments as: ‘The world has to be moved from the periphery to the centre. Mission should become “Anwalt der Welt” advocate for the world.’\textsuperscript{820} This statement is representative of the wide recognition of the requirement for the new perspective, in which the world is understood as context of mission theology.

This emphasis on the world is frequently found in recent thinking in ecumenical circles. According to Richard Shaull, the fundamental crisis in mission is caused by the fact that: ‘Church, by and large, has not kept up with the ongoing influence of Christ in history.’\textsuperscript{821} In order to solve the crisis, Shaull considers that the focus of mission needs to be changed from the Church to the world, and that it should deliver a significant message for the world.\textsuperscript{822} The ultimate contribution of God’s people to the world is to devise new strategies for salvation, yet our religious institution, the Church, has lost its Messianic power to change and reform the world. Therefore, Shaull suggests that ‘our concern as

\textsuperscript{818} The Uppsala Assembly issued the statement: “The world provides the agenda.” (David J. Bosch, \textit{Witness to the World}, 38).

\textsuperscript{819} David J. Bosch, \textit{Witness to the World}, 36.


\textsuperscript{822} \textit{Ibid.}, 83.
Christians is to have a secular rather than a Christian religious self-identity. In other words, focusing too much on building Christian culture to find our own identity is no longer desirable. Instead, it is necessary to enter the secular world and witness Christ’s power. This world holds countless conflicts, from basic human needs to political conflicts, civil war, religious war, ideological and social revolution, and economic injustice. Shaull reminds us that God works dynamically for ‘the humanization of life’ in the middle of the complicated world. He suggests that the younger generation may be uninterested in the traditional features of God, such as His Otherness, His Sovereignty and complex debates about dogmatics and eschatology. However, they can participate with genuine interest in the work of God’s people for ‘humanization’, and will be attracted by an apocalyptic perspective. For Shaull, the agent that attempts to apply God’s mission in the world is surely God’s people. Then, why does Shaull exclude the institutionalized Church from being God’s agent? If that institutionalized Church were to devote itself to the creation of the ‘new humanity’ with God’s Messianic character, then certainly it could be God’s agent. However, Shaull argues that most of our religious organizations have lost that power. Therefore, he insists that ‘the Church testifies to God’s work of renewal by its freedom to die, whenever and wherever that is called for, and to kill old institutional forms that no longer meet the needs of the present’. While not being accepted by the conservative evangelical Church, this argument that the Church

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824 *Ibid*.
needs to go to the world and undertake the Messiah’s mission has strongly inspired the ecumenical movement.

The emphasis on God’s mission to the world based on the ecumenical position can also be observed in Ludwig Rütti, who was strongly influenced by Hoekendijk’s ideas. In his book Zur Theologie der Mission, Rütti presents dilemmas in mission such as reality and requests and the problems of Church-centred mission, and emphasizes the world as the context of mission. Rütti understands God’s mission as the action of God in the world. Therefore, mission is not something private that comes from the inner world of the individual, nor is it an event occurring inside Church. Mission is something that takes place in the world and in human life. Similar to Hoekendijk, Rütti argues that the specific content of mission found in the context of specific human life is ‘shalom’. Therefore, Rütti views God’s mission as planting shalom in the midst of specific human society, where it is filled with conflicts, hostilities and battles. According to Rütti, shalom means presenting ongoing criticism and thus taking part in a social development process that would lead to reform of society; this process is something universal, so it needs to be spread to every part of life and the world.

If God’s mission is incarnated in the midst of the world and God’s shalom is established, then we need to ask how shalom in the world is different from shalom in the Church, and

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830 Ibid., 188. In German, “Diser Ort ist weder die private Innerlichkeit des einzelnen noch der von der profanen Welt abgegrenzte Raum der Kirche - sei es als Heilsanstalt oder als Gemeinschaft -, sondern die konkrete Lebenswelt des Menschen.”

831 Ibid., 188-189.

832 Ibid., 189. In German, “Als solcher ist der Prozeß des Schalom universal; er soll sich auf alle Lebens-beziehungen und Weltbezüge ausweiten.”
what standard separates the Church from the world. Here, Rütti insists that it is meaningless to separate Church and the world at an abstract level.\textsuperscript{833} If God’s word and His will are specifically incarnated and secularized in the midst of the world by mission of shalom, there is no need to divide the world and the Church. This is one of the significant features of ecumenical circles, which define secularization as a vague division (overlap) between Church and the world. Bosch disagreed with the extreme tendency of this position. In particular he criticized the argument of the central committee of the World Students Christian Federation (WSCF), which rejected terms such as ‘Church’, ‘evangelization’ ‘witness’ and ‘mission’, because these focus on one-sidedness and do not consider others’ circumstances. Also, the terms demand people to leave their familiar environment and belong to a Christian group. Sometimes, such a position demands religious obsession in return for eternal life. Thus it eventually destroys the life of the whole being.\textsuperscript{834} Bosch also strongly criticized a representative at the 1973 Bangkok Conference, who stated that all traditional language in the Church is meaningless, noting that ‘he became atheist by His grace’.\textsuperscript{835} This trend makes the Church redundant, and puts up barriers. As Bosch argued:

\begin{quote}
The centuries old \textit{extra ecclesiam nulla salus} (no salvation outside the Church) has gradually made way for \textit{extra ecclesiam multa salus} (ample salvation outside the Church), and occasionally here and there already tends towards \textit{intra ecclesiam nulla salus} (no salvation inside the Church).\textsuperscript{836}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{833} \textit{Ibid.,} 274. Rütti insists that “Die abstrakte Unterscheidung von Kirche und Welt ist letztlich nichtsagend.”
\textsuperscript{834} David J. Bosch, \textit{Witness to the World}, 38.
\textsuperscript{835} \textit{Ibid.}, 39.
\textsuperscript{836} \textit{Ibid.}
The trend of secular ecumenism progresses out of the Church and away from the traditional perspective of mission. Of course, ‘closeness of Church’, ‘the domination of Church as judge’, and ‘Church’s inability to solve problems in the world’ may all be reasons for this perspective.

For secular ecumenicals, who is the agent? What fulfils God’s will in the world of God’s mission and becomes mediator of salvation? At the Bangkok Conference, the term ‘agency’ was used frequently. Church and mission agencies are sometimes used to indicate God’s agency. However, the concept extends widely to cover all issues in the world, and salvation in modern times refers to deliverance from particular political, economic and social problems. Therefore, the notion of God’s agent extends to any men, women or organizations working for today’s salvation. Consequently, for secular ecumenicals, it is meaningless to separate Church and the world. Anyone who practices God’s justice and peace in the world can be agencies working for God’s deliverance.

6.3.4.2 The agent and religious ecumenicals

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The term ‘religious ecumenicals’ is used by Bosch as frequently as ‘secular ecumenicals’.

Religious ecumenicals try to find common ground between different religions. Instead of hostilities and feuds, their main concern is conversation and building mutual relationships. To achieve the purpose, they approach other religions and seek for universal values. Newbigin, representative of mission scholarship, attempts to approach and have conversations with other religions, while maintaining a Christian identity. In his view, this is the only way to evangelize people of other religions. First of all, he acknowledges that there exists ‘the light’ in other religions. Thus, he does not view ‘the finality of Christ’ from the perspective of exclusion of other religions, but as the need for Christ’s participation to solve problems in the context of our history. Identifying three positions toward other religions, namely pluralism, exclusiveness and inclusiveness, Newbigin explains why he supports, but also disagrees with, all of them.

The position which I have outlined is Exclusivist in the sense that it affirms the unique truth of the revelation in Jesus Christ, but it is not Exclusivist in the sense of denying the possibility of salvation of the non-Christian. It is Inclusivist in the sense that it refuses to limit the saving grace of God to the members of the Christian Church, but it rejects the Inclusivism which regards the non-Christian religions as vehicles of salvation. It is pluralist in the sense of acknowledging the gracious work of God in the lives of all human beings, but it rejects a pluralism

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838 David J. Bosch, Witness to the World, 38.
839 Lesslie Newbigin, The Open Secret, 198.
840 Lesslie Newbigin, The Finality of Christ, 45.
841 Ibid., 64.
which denies the uniqueness and decisiveness of what God has done in Jesus Christ.  

Thomas, another ecumenical mission scholar, stated that a more inclusive attitude and more respect are needed to approach other religions. As a past chairman of the WCC, he took as his starting point ‘the new humanity in Christ’.  

However, according to Newbigin, ‘the new humanity in Christ’, in Hindu society for example, can be a vague and challenging idea that brings about misunderstanding. Several years later, Thomas elaborated his ideas into four categories: ‘the reality of man as created in the image of God’, ‘the reality of man as a fallen creature’ ‘the reality of the Crucified and Risen Jesus Christ as the true man and as the source of renewal of human nature and through it of all things’, and ‘the reality of man and society in the light of the consummation of their Absolute future in the Kingdom of God’. Here, the first and second categories are general statements that can be found in the work of Reformed theologians. However, the third category needs further explanation. According to Thomas, the ‘new humanity’ begins with the death of Christ on the cross and his resurrection, but Church is not the only place where ‘the new humanity’ manifests. The Church itself is not ‘the new humanity’ and does not have ability to open itself to secular societies and demonstrate this ‘new humanity’. Thomas believes that the ‘new humanity’ must manifest in the

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844 Ibid., 219-220.
846 Ibid., 196.
847 Ibid., 198
848 Ibid., 202.
struggles of societies where people have secular human fellowship,\textsuperscript{850} and in those who believe in other religions, particularly in Hinduism.\textsuperscript{851} He explains that someone who adheres to another religion can have faith in Christ and commit their life to Him. However, this does not necessarily mean that they have decided to isolate themselves from their religious communities and belong to Christian society.\textsuperscript{852} Rather, they will reform the structures and values in the societies, cultures and religions to which they currently belong, establishing the fellowship of Christ-centred faith in them. Thomas’s idea shows the universality of God-in-Christ working beyond Church and Christianity, extending to other religions, the people of Asian revolutions and cultures.\textsuperscript{853} This proposed theology eventually leads to a declaration of Christ-centred syncretism. In the fourth category, Thomas suggests that the ‘new humanity’ enables us to hope for the kingdom of God: this is possible by the power of the Holy Spirit who was sent by the resurrected Jesus Christ. In this world of injustice and corrupt political and economic structures, Thomas argues that only the spirit of ‘Suffering Servanthood’ enables us to become ‘the new creation within Christ’ and move forward with the hope of the kingdom of God and His justice. In his view ‘it calls for active dialogue with other faiths to build up a syncretism of spiritualties oriented to the Messianism of “the Suffering Servant” symbolised by the centrality of the Crucified Jesus and prophetic diakoina of the Church’.\textsuperscript{854} This conversation with other religions and ideologies enables us to see something different that we may not find in Christianity, which represents syncretism of spiritualties.\textsuperscript{855} Thus,

\textsuperscript{850} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{851} Ibid., 219.
\textsuperscript{852} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{854} M.M. Thomas, \textit{A Diaconal Approach to Indian Ecclesiology} (Rome: Centre for Indian and Inter-religious Studies [CIIS], 1995), 82.
\textsuperscript{855} Ibid.
Thomas’s idea of mission aims towards Christ-centred syncretism, which integrates everything into the universal Christ, who assists mankind to achieve the ‘new humanity’.

Alongside Thomas, there are various discussions and debates about religious pluralism and the paths toward a theocentric Christology. Writings such as John Hick’s book ‘The Myth of God Incarnate’\textsuperscript{856}, ‘The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man’\textsuperscript{857} by Raymond Panikkar and ‘Living Faiths and the Ecumenical Movement’\textsuperscript{858} by Stanley Smartha are useful to understand the issue of conversation between religions. In addition, Karl Rahner, a Catholic scholar, argues that there are various ways leading to salvation, and that one norm (way) exists in the Catholic Church.

Who then, for religious ecumenicals, are God’s agents? In that tradition, the attempt to have conversation with other religions and to relativize Christianity reflect the assumption that God’s agent also exists outside of Christianity. Just as secular ecumenicals view the new world outside Church as the place where God works, and present a wider perspective that whoever practices God’s justice and love, including non-Christians, are God’s agent, so religious ecumenicals argue that God’s agent exists in other religions, outside Church and Christianity. According to Bosch, the religious ecumenical perspective has blurred the distinction between Christianity and other religions.\textsuperscript{859} Consequently, as argued by Thomas, this perspective can lead to the conclusion that mission does not necessarily require Hindus to come into the structure of Christianity. Therefore Bosch asks, if evangelism is not conversion of other religions into Christianity, what the direction and

\textsuperscript{857} Raymond Panikkar, \textit{The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon-Person-Mystery} (New York: Orbis Books, 1973)
\textsuperscript{858} Stanley J. Samartha, \textit{Living Faiths and the Ecumenical Movement}, ed. Stanley J. Samartha (Geneva: World Council of Church, 1971)
purpose of Christian mission should be.\textsuperscript{860} Charles W. Forman also criticizes the idea that ‘Christians should adapt toward the followers of other faiths’.\textsuperscript{861} In this context, Gregory Baum suggests that current theological tradition should be re-evaluated from the perspective of religious ecumenism. Baum proposes the direction and purpose of mission theology as follows:

Theologians must examine the possibility that the Church’s missionary message exercises its salvational power where people in fact are, in their own cultural environment, enabling them to cling more faithfully to the best of their religious tradition and live the full personal and social implications of their religion more authentically.\textsuperscript{862}

If this direction of mission is accepted, then according to religious ecumenicals, agents can be every kind of organization, people and religion that work for the restoration of the ‘new humanity’, including other religions. For this tradition, one of the main tasks of agents is to ensure that nominal Christians or Buddhists, and false Hindus or Moslems, should be true adherents of their religions, through embodiment of the new humanity.

\textbf{6.4 Conclusion}

This section has investigated the question of who has been considered God’s agent over the history of mission. Agency has been a crucial issue in that history, producing various

\textsuperscript{860} \textit{Ibid.}, 39.


\textsuperscript{862} \textit{Ibid.}, 86.
theories and trends of mission theology. To summarize, in the theories based on the relationship between Church and mission, first, there is a viewpoint that Church is the only agent that declares and delivers God’s will and carries salvation. This stance is commonly agreed among evangelical Church-centred scholars and the Catholic Church. The declaration that ‘mission is Church’ implies that mission is only one aspect of the functions of the Church, and Church is the subject of mission. However, this idea resulted in the phenomenon of Church-centeredness, whereby the Church became oblivious to its own status and accepted and indirectly assisted colonial violence and injustice. Criticism of this idea reasons that as the Church became institutionalized and powerful, it fell into ‘the trap of Constantine’ and became a helpless being, so that it could no longer be God’s agent. As a reaction against the idea of Church-centred mission, the alternative notion of ‘God’s mission’ has been strongly argued by ecumenicals, who believe that God calls the world as His agent and practices His justice and love in human history. While evangelical ecumenicals argue that ‘Church and mission are the same and Church without mission is nonsense’, ecumenical scholars argue that the nature of Church is mission. A will to fulfil God’s calling for mission led to the establishment of the WCC as an agency of God, and to the birth of the ecumenical movement. Subsequently, different ideas and voices have been raised in the area of mission theology. Criticisms against Church (e.g. Church is incapable of solving the problems in a world that is filled with social sins, injustice and political violence), and the question of who is God’s agent to resolve injustice and tragedy in the world, have extended the concept of agent beyond the Church. Finally, the statement that ‘Church is mission’ is a public declaration that the Church should take only one part of the role in mission, and is not the key agent of God. As secular agencies have taken on tasks that had previously been undertaken by the Church, the concept of God’s agency has spread widely throughout the world. Furthermore, religious ecumenicals
argue that if the Church excludes other religions and performs mission in an aggressive way, it will be hard to integrate other religions into universal Christ in the world of coexistence. Therefore, holding the more inclusive and integrated perspective of religious pluralism, they are convinced that God’s agent can be found in other religions, not just Christianity.

The conclusion so far is as follows: mission is activated based on three frames (church, world and other religions) and connects them with God; mission means agency that is sent by God as apostle and practices God’s will. Without mission, the three frames (church, world and other religions) cannot be agencies that deliver God’s will. Only through agency that is ‘mission’ can they be the communities that embrace God’s will. Only by mission can church, world and other religions be indirect agencies that deliver God’s will. Therefore, the reason modern mission scholars such as Bosch, Newbegin, Hoekendijk, Ustorf and John Hick examined how mission was related to the three frames and expressed was because, when looked at from a microscopic perspective, various agents appeared; however, from a macroscopic perspective, mission is the agency which performs God’s will.

As explained above, various perspectives of mission theology have appeared, depending on the view of who the agent is in the history of mission. Yet while the concept of ‘agent’ is an important one, it has not been established as theory in the frame of mission theology.

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Instead, it is underestimated as one theological trend, or sometimes confused with mission societies or agencies. To fill this gap, the following chapter presents the definition, content and methodology of agency theology, while organizing the updated research on ‘agency’. In doing so, it will present the Conclusion to this thesis on whether an agency theology can be established.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: A POSSIBILITY OF AGENCY THEOLOGY

7.1 Introduction

Can theology make a bridge between God and humanity - world, society and people - crossing over subject and object? How might it be possible? What are the criteria to determine such a possibility? These questions present the motivation to find out what agency is and how agency connects the two extremes. Therefore this chapter outlines the meanings, definition, justification and methodology of agency theology, focusing on the role of agency in theology.

To establish or maintain theology as an academic discipline, reasons are required to show why theology is necessary and how it can work on rational grounds. Frame, structure and content are needed to support the reasons, while methodology is required to advance and develop the content. In order to examine whether it is possible to establish agency theology as an academic means, the foundations of the theory have been reviewed based on representative German idealistic philosophers such as Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. In addition, the key content presented by modern agency scholars who attempt to explain human identity, nature and behaviours through agency theory has been discussed. The work of Barth, whose thought differed from that of the agency theorists, has also been explained. Unlike those researchers who have tried to solve problems through human reason, Barth considered God’s revelation and His self-attestation as essential to connect the transcendent dimension. Modern major natural theologians’ explanations about God, nature and human beings have also been presented. The thesis has pointed out that the
concept of agency has become the major factor for emerging diverse trends of mission theology with regard to the relationship between Church and mission. This chapter will reflect upon the concepts that have been presented so far in the study, while also considering the possibility of an agency theology.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will present the meaning, definition and purpose of agency theology. Second, I will construct and classify the frame and the content of agency theology. Finally, I will suggest how agency theology is embodied and actualized through its methodology.

7.2 Suggestion: A Possibility of Agency Theology

7.2.1 The sketch of agency theology

Through the philosophical investigation and theological examination undertaken up to now, we have arrived at the point of asking the fundamental question: ‘What is agency theology?’ Therefore, the important task of this section is to develop the agency theory in a theological context. To accomplish this task, the concepts of agency suggested by Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, agency scholars, Barth, natural theologians and missiologists are summarized in seven tables. Only Table 1 (called T1) is presented here; the remaining six are in the appendix.
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**Table 1 Hegel’s Agency (Called T1)**
As examined in Section 1.4 of the Introduction, and in Table 7, we can summarize agency using key words such as connection, action, self-attestation, and real identity. As connector, agency includes mediator (T1, T2), bearer (T2), copula (T1), self as the subject (T1), commodity (T3), capital (T3), means of production (T3), machine (T3), causality (T4), instinct (T4), conscience (T4), intentions (T4), living man (T5), human agency (T5), divine agency (T5), Jesus Christ (T5), the Holy Spirit (T5, T7), nature (T6), culture (T5), Christian community (T7), Church (T7), world (T7), and religions (T7). As doer, agency has performer (T1), actuality (T1), a doer (T1), labourer (T1, T3), alienator (T2), executer (T2), expressivity (T1), self-activity (T3, T4), proletariat (T3), causality of labour (T4), objectification (T3), a verb (T4), properties of action (T4), mental action (T4), the act (T4), bottom-up causality (T6) and top-down causality (T6). Also, agency has elements of real identity such as incarnation (T7), kenosis (T7), self-attestation (T5), evangelism as mission (T7), Church’s mission (T7), God’s mission (T7), God’s word (T7), new humanity (T7), layman (T7), shalom (T7), the apostolic church (T7) and house church (T7).864

If we want to develop the key words into agency theology, the following three aspects should be considered. First, agency theology covers every issue of connection between Holy Trinity God (the subject) and His creation (the object). Secondly, agency theology presents codes of practice in faith in order to reform the individual as well as community and society. Agency theology considers process, methods and evaluation of how the subject’s will is transferred into object. Finally, agent such as self-attestation and identity should be based on apostolicity to connect between Holy Trinity God (the subject) and the object (world, people, politics, economics and cultures). Thus, agency theology can

864 See Appendix, Table 2 (T2) to Table 7(T7).
be defined in terms of three dimensions, as a theology of connection, of action, and of the apostle. These three areas take as their agenda God the Trinity, the world, and human beings. All of these have meaning for existence and can be clarified by agency theology. The three definitions of agency theology are examined in detail as follows.

First, agency theology is a theology of connection.\(^{865}\) The term ‘connection’ has a range of meanings. It can refer to communication or to fellowship, and may imply reconciliation and mediation. In each meaning, there is a presumption of relationship. As seen in Hegel (T1), Feuerbach (T2) and Marx (T3), connection means building a bridge in the relationship between subject and object; actuality and abstract world; essence and existence. The ultimate meaning of connection is to synthesize and unify parts and whole (T4). As shown in Hegel’s explanation of actuality (T1), the agency that connects subject and object must have both subjectivity and objectivity. This is similar to the fact that Jesus Christ must partake of both divinity and humanity in order to connect human and God so that He can mediate between the two (T5).

Accordingly, as a theology of connection, agency theology understands correctly the connection between subject and object.

Therefore, the content of agency theology also includes questions such as: How are the subject and the object connected? What are the connecting points? What other issues are related to the connection? Mereology, the study conducted by agency scholars who investigate the relationship between part and whole in order to explain identity, can be the major research area for agency theology (T4). The content must include investigation

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\(^{865}\) See Section 1.4, twelve main definitions of agency - 2, 8, 11.
of how to understand correctly the connection between God the Trinity and the created world (T5); what kinds of human agencies exist to connect subject and object between God and His creation; and the roles, responsibilities and limitations of agencies. In addition, the content must contain specific strategies and programmes of how to care for and develop human agencies.

Agency theology takes as its important agenda God the Trinity, the world and human beings. It is based upon three presumptions: God is God of connection; the world is the place where connection takes place; the human being is the one connected to Divine agency. In fact, the key ideas of John Leslie and Paul Davies relate to the mind of God, as reflected in created things or the physical world (T6). In particular, Davies notes that ‘this agency is creative in the sense of being somehow responsible for the laws of physics, which govern, among other things, how space-time evolves’. McFague also regards the created world as God’s body (T6). These studies attempt to find the point of contact or connection between God the Creator and His creatures. Similarly, in his research regarding whether God intervened in the formation of this world, looking at the big bang theory and chaos theory, Polkinghorne attempts to find a connection between God and the world and human beings (T6). As he argues, ‘the God of the gaps was actually a theological mistake’. Rowan William also maintains that ‘theology needs

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to make connections to search out and display unities or analogies … to try with overall outline.⁸⁶⁹

Therefore, agency theology is a theology that connects subject and object; the ideal world and actuality; the Creator and His creatures; religion and human; human and human; human and world, culture and history (T1, T2, T3, T5, T6). To take the human body as an example, problems will arise if the veins are not connected properly or are blocked by something. Likewise, problems in the world often come from isolation. Disconnection such as tyranny and self-righteousness, radical fundamental dogmas and religions may frequently cause problems between countries and societies as well as within a nation. As a theology of connection, agency theology can provide a breakthrough towards the solution. Therefore, the term ‘connection’ in agency theology expands the major issue of theology to a higher level, in order to consider how to communicate in international strife and political relationships, in the relationship between capitalism and labour, and in the ecological relationship between God, nature and humans.

Secondly, agency theology is a theology that establishes self-identity through action.⁸⁷⁰

The term ‘action’ involves a presumption that there is a factor to trigger the behaviour (T4). As explained in Chapter 4, analysis of human behaviour has demonstrated that its causes originate from mental properties such as intention, desire, volition and self. The behaviours are made known through human agency. From the perspective of theology, action is not a careless movement such as a simple reflex. Rather, action is labour that

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⁸⁷⁰ See Section 1.4, twelve main definitions of agency - 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10.
intends to deliver something from the potential dimension to the actual world (T4). That is why modern agency scholars explain the matter of identity through investigation of actions. In addition, action means that someone practices his or her responsibilities and transforms something by his or her labours. Therefore, agency theology is not limited to abstract theory, but is a theology of labour, action, practice and transformation (T4). It is through these activities that the theology demonstrates human beings and their God, and the world in which people live.

Accordingly, agency theology as theology of action must clarify what human beings can do and what human beings must do. It needs to indicate how humans build relationships in the areas of societies, politics, economics and religions, and how they should act. In other words, the principles of action, reason, direction and purpose can be content of action theology (T4). There may be various reasons for showing a particular action. The reasons for religious actions may come from God the Trinity as subject, from His creation, the natural environment, or from the human being. The criteria for deciding whether any behaviour is right or wrong can be decided based on the Bible. The method, evaluation and appropriate ways of actions can be established depending on culture, tradition and sociological understanding of the context.

As mentioned already, the agenda of agency theology are God the Trinity, the world and human beings. God the Trinity is the God of action and the world is where actions take place. It is through actions that human beings reveal self-identity, the world and God. As noted by Wittgenstein, our language is the picture of the world. He implied that our language is the action of drawing something from our mind into specific reality. Therefore, agency theology is a theology of action, which clearly demonstrates its identity through action (T4).
Finally, agency theology is a theology of the apostle. In other words, it is theology of ‘being sent’. Hegel regards agency as an externalizer of the subject (T1) which encompasses his subjective spirit and an objective spirit. Therefore, apostolicity is the major characteristic and key content of agency theology (T7). As examined in Hoekendijk’s work, apostolate means ‘being sent’ to the world with mission, based on Christ’s words ‘as the Father sent me, so I am sending you’ (John 20:21). He considered that the reason why God the Father sent His son was to establish the world of shalom. The word ‘sending’ indicates preaching the gospel of shalom, sharing fellowship of shalom and giving service of shalom (T7). The term ‘shalom’ means taking as our model Christ who came to the world to sacrifice Himself on the cross, and putting His vision into practice by our actions.

Accordingly, considering apostolicity as the main topic, the content of agency theology (as theology of the apostle) includes apostolate and God, apostolate and the world, and apostolate and human beings (T7). As mentioned earlier, apostolicity means sending to the world (T7). Modern mission theologians sometimes consider mission as the theology of sending, and missionaries as the people who are sent. ‘Being sent’ means ‘going’. The basic feature of ‘being sent’ is to go somewhere beyond boundaries, whether of geography, language, ideology, culture or religion. However, ‘being sent’ also includes anything related to Christ’s shalom, such as going to the world with gospels of shalom, fellowship of shalom and service of shalom (T7).

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871 See Section 1.4, twelve main definitions of agency – 7, 12.
Starting from the presumption that the agenda of agency theology are God the Trinity, the world and human beings, it is clear that God is the God who sends. In other words, as seen in the Creeds, the Father God sent His son; again both of them sent the Holy Spirit. This world is the place of God’s apostolate. Human beings should not be limited in fixed dogma, but are apostles who are sent to the world.

7.2.2 The various types of agency theology and their methodology

This section examines what the content and methodology of agency theology should be. First of all, the definition and purpose of agency theology have already been described, and provide specific content. Therefore, God the Trinity, the world and human beings can form the foundations of agency theology. By interpreting these in relationship with each other, agency theology can offer a reasonable perspective of theology.

Depending on which perspective is taken with regard to the content, different kinds of agency theology may appear. It is nonsense to argue one particular agency in our diverse world. This may be the religious self-righteousness seen in fundamentalists. Agency theology does not seek for one-sidedness, but opens the possibility that various types of agency theologies can be developed from various theological perspectives.

The next section demonstrates how various categories can appear in agency theology. Hegel stated that agency produces ‘actuality’. This actuality is a key concept of agency theology, and is explained in terms of three elements: ‘the content of philosophy’, ‘the unity between essence and existence’ and ‘the movement of a dialectical process’ (T1). What then is the possible content? First, it is the idea of Church-centred agency theology:
Church is God’s agency and takes a key role in mission, as a Noah’s ark representing salvation. In a previous chapter, I stated the premise that agency theology is an alternative theology that may substitute for mission theology. According to Bosch, the emerging paradigm in mission theology today is ecumenical mission theology. Missio Dei is a key issue in ecumenical theology. Therefore, secondly, agency theology might be regarded as ecumenical mission theology (T7). Another consideration is that the triune God is the subject of mission and God incarnates for mission as an agency for Himself in the world. This notion of agency in the perspective of Barthian theology is considerably important for evangelical scholars and theologians of Missio Dei. Here, we should note that this agency has both subjectivity and objectivity. If agency theology focuses only on the subject as suggested by Barth, God should be the agent (T5). God should reveal and prove Himself so that human beings understand Him (T5). However, as examined earlier, Hegel pointed out that both subjectivity and objectivity need to be included in agency, so that we can understand it logically and academically (T1). This means that God as an agent is both subject and object in mission. If God were only subject, this would cause many problems in our understanding. If God were only object in mission, we would have to speculate as to what would be the subject. The fact that Holy Trinity God is both subject and object in mission means that God’s characteristics can be fully portrayed in His character of agency. God as an agent is a mediator who reveals humanity, nature and the creation to us (T5). The concept of mediator is logically consistent when things are interrelated within the concept of Holy Trinity God (T5). It is the key content representing the existing mission theology, and the concept that indicates the major direction of current ecumenical mission theology.
As discussed earlier, of the several issues in ecumenical mission theology, the question of who is agent resulted in strong controversy in various world mission conferences, causing division among churches and damage to the ecumenical movement, which seeks for unity. In the debate as to who is the key agent of God, the argument that the Church is the only agent caused a backlash, because of the power that gave the Church to manipulate everything in mission (T7). The new argument holds that God is the subject and the mediator in mission; depending on different interpretations, it accepts every secular agent, which undermines the key role of Church as the instrument of revealing God (T7). Furthermore, this argument extends to religious pluralism, which considers that God works in other religions (T7). As a result, it has attracted hostility from fundamental Christian organizations, which consider it to be unacceptable, pagan, or even Satanic. This phenomenon was apparent at the WCC in Pusan, South Korea in 2013.

Because agency theology encompasses within its theological frame such diverse aspects, it enables each individual to recognize his or her own position among these categories and allows various mediators to open almost every area and advance toward mutual understanding and consideration. Hence, it can be categorized as follows:

1. Church-centred agency theology - the Church is the only way as God’s agency.
2. Mission-centred agency theology - the mission-doers are God’s agency.
3. Holy Trinity agency theology - God Himself has become the agency and we know God by His revelations.
4. Cultural agency theology – interculturization, inculturation, cross-culturation, free culture.\footnote{See, Werner Ustorf, The Cultural Origins of “Intercultural” Theology, in Intercultural Perceptions and Prospects of World Christianity. 150, eds. Richard Friedli / Jan A. B. Jongeneel / Klaus Koschorke / Sundermeier /Werner Ustorf (FrankFurt am Main, 2010), 81-104.}

5. Secular agency theology - emphasizes the world because God reveals Himself as Creator among unlimited creation.

6. Natural theological agency theology - the created world can show God’s divinity and God’s love.

7. Religious pluralism agency theology - God is not limited to within Christianity so all religions on earth can be God’s agency.

As shown above, each stance in agency theology takes a key role in a certain area and does not exclude or undermine other stances. Therefore, agency theology can be characterized as a theology of acceptance, encouragement, and support for one another.

On the other hands, agency theology embraces various methodologies. Agency is the connection between subject and object. The connection can be explained by externalization of mind and the mind can be described by the principles of dialectic movement. Therefore, the first major methodology of agency theology is dialectic theology (T1). Dialectics include anything related to deductive and inductive logic and use both negation and affirmation. In addition, as seen in modern agency theologians, agency theology reflects how to connect part and whole. Analogy, commonly employed in explaining mereology, is an important methodology in this theology. According to Barth, analogia entis is not an appropriate methodology for humans to perceive God. Instead, analogia relationis, in which the starting point is that the created image of the
human being has the image of God, should be applied (T5). Secondly, modern agency theologians have presented agency to explain human actions. These agencies would be mental action, self and person (T4). Therefore, agency theology can develop its mission by using causality, which can explain logically the meaning of existence. In addition, the theory of sortal terms, used to explain the identity that appears through action (T4), is a tool to demonstrate what identity to have and how to live among God the Trinity, the world and human beings. Thirdly, reductionism, which identifies whether subject can be transformed into object and object into subject, is an important method in agency theory. This is because agency becomes object by embracing the will of subject. It is no longer agent if the object is something irrelevant to the subject. Of course it is true that some scholars, who argue that there is no such transformation that can make subject and object become identical, like a mathematical formula, prefer a dialectic approach to reductionism. In that case, agency theology can evaluate and reflect to what extent the object is close to the subject. Fourthly, agency theory sometimes delivers the will of subject to object by projection. This method was used by Feuerbach in order to discover the secret of subject by examining object. In other words, since religion is the projection of human nature, understanding religion leads to true knowledge of human nature. Projection can be an important tool to explain the logical relationship between subject and object (T2). In agency theology, projection helps us to understand logically the relationship between the Trinity God, the world and human beings. Furthermore, projection of agency theology (as theology of connection, action and apostolate) enables us to understand clearly its identity and mission.

The major methodologies described above must be applied appropriately according to specific theme and context. Agency theology is a tool for solving and explaining the problems in transcendent and finite, ideal and real, hidden and revealed areas. Therefore, it is risky to depend on only one particular method to develop agency theology. The
various methodologies presented here are all essential elements in the establishment of agency theology and advancing it to a higher level.

7.2.3 The crucial issues and prospect for agency theology

So far, we have given an outline of agency theology. This raises several questions. First, in what way is agency theology distinctive and different, and how can it be an alternative to mission theology? Secondly, how does agency offer a new paradigm to overcome the problems and limitations of mission theology? Finally, what is the role of the Trinity - God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit? Continuous discussion of these questions will enable the development of agency theology to a deeper level, and provide the evidence to justify it.

On the first question there are diverse opinions, but it is clear that agency theology encompasses much of the content of mission theology, and shares similar issues. Therefore, as argued in the Introduction, agency theology is suggested as an alternative to mission theology. However, there are differences, mainly in language. According to Wittgenstein, language is a specific picture of something it wants to express. As we examined earlier, there have been sharp criticisms against mission, and it is in crisis; it carries stigma and is weighed down by doubt. Therefore, if we intend to reflect upon and reform the many problems in mission, it may be beneficial to substitute the word ‘agency’ for ‘mission’. Doing so will revitalize the declining area of mission. The term ‘agency theology’ presents a different picture from the content expressed by the word ‘mission’. Moreover, agency theology does not carry any stigma, but has a dynamic and appealing public image. Secondly, in addition to referring to the Bible, agency theology can be

developed academically and in cooperation with those philosophers or philosophical theologians who reflect upon other areas, such as philosophical ideas on actuality, politics and economics. Agency theology is not an isolated area. Instead, it opens academic discussion and is established as public theology at the centre of academia. Agency theology can be an answer to the argument made by analytic philosophers that academia without hard evidence or with only potential presumptions is inadequate as scientific study, and that those involved in such studies may investigate their issues within their own circles, but should resign from the ivory tower. Finally, mission theology focuses on issues such as world evangelism, church growth, social justice and inculturation, while agency theology focuses on connections or communication that enable those tasks to be accomplished. As examined above, the main concerns are how the will of God (the subject) can be specified, and how the gaps can be resolved in the contexts in which people live - such as religion, society, culture and academia. A main element is specific method, process and evaluation of how the will of the subject can be practiced with action in life. For instance, a theology of liberation comprises theological codes of practice for the oppressed in order to solve vicious circles such as political violence and killing in the dictatorships of Latin America.\textsuperscript{874} Minjung theology regards Jesus (the subject) as the Minjung who were oppressed by the Korean dictatorship. It views sorrows and oppressions, and has developed theological codes of practice, from the perspective of the Minjung.\textsuperscript{875} Agency theology includes guidelines from various contexts and creates comprehensive codes of practice in faith to connect the gaps between God (the subject) and human (the object). It also takes appropriate action. Apostolicity is the foundation to justify and evaluate the comprehensive code of practice. We have examined how apostolicity was argued and developed by several mission scholars (T7). However,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See, Nam Dong Shu, “Towards a theology of \textit{한} (Han)” in Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia (ed.), \textit{Minjung Theology: People as the subjects of History} (London: Zed Press, 55-69).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
apostolicity is like the rudder of a boat, determining the direction and justification for connection and action in agency theology.

To summarize then, the focus of agency theology differs from that of mission theology in the three aspects described above. Importantly, however, agency theology does not overlook the important elements of mission theology.

On the second issue, I agree with Bosch, who identified ecumenical mission as a new emerging mission paradigm. His suggestions regarding 13 mission subjects of an ecumenical mission paradigm can be summarized into the above three elements of agency theology. As pointed out by Pannenberg, if someone can see God’s work in the secular world, he (or she) can know the will of God in the history of the world.876 Our history demonstrates that ‘the combination of radical nationalism and religious ideologies’877 has resulted in countless innocent victims in many countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Syria, and Iraq. Does God want such killings? Is it the only way to guard and preach the truth? In fact, one of the important tasks for ecumenical mission would be to find solutions to relieve such extreme conflicts.

In mission theology, there are divisions between evangelical and ecumenical camps. The former highlights individual spiritual salvation, while the latter is concerned with social salvation focusing on social responsibility. The two stances remain in opposition, each arguing its own perspective. Contrastingly, agency theology is closer to the key topic of ecumenical mission, a new emerging mission paradigm. This is because connection is the main topic; the major concern is with specific actions to deal with injustice and

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dehumanization. Apostolicity as self-identity is the foundation to decide what is right or wrong. As examined earlier, the starting point of agency theology is to accept and respect various stances without losing its essential identity.

Finally, there are issues about divine agency which cannot be proved by hard evidence but can be found only by knowledge in faith (T5, T6 and T7). In particular, emphasis has been placed on the Holy Spirit as agent: the Holy Spirit has been the major influence on the birth of global Christianity. There is no controversy over the traditional position that regards Jesus Christ as agency sent by the Father God. That is because Jesus has the dual nature of God (subject) and human (object); He is able to connect God and people as intercessor. There is no logical problem in this (T5). In other words, Jesus is the ideal connector or mediator to relate infinite God to human, because He holds the two natures within Him. Historically it has been overlooked that the Holy Spirit too is an agent to connect the subject with the object (world and people), since the Holy Spirit has the natures of the Father God and of His Son. However, the connecting role of the Holy Spirit has recently been emphasized in areas such as mission theology, citing the Pentecostal event. In particular, Pope John Paul II referred to the Holy Spirit as ‘the principal agent of mission’, quoting Acts 1: 8, Matthew 28: 18-20, Mark 16: 15-18, Luke 24: 46-49 and John 20: 21-23. Interpreting those verses, he argued that mission does not


depend on human power but on the Holy Trinity God. In particular, he noted that the Holy Spirit not only guides the mission of church but also makes the mission complete. In his book The Church in the Power of the Spirit, Moltmann argues that the messianic mission of church covers Christ’s messianic mission and the Holy Spirit’s charismatic sending, which is poured into everybody. He states that the goal of messianic mission ‘is not the glorification of the church but the glorification of the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit’. In his view the Holy Spirit gives authority to Christian communities to undertake mission and gives energy to undertake ‘diakonia’. The Pentecostal event in Acts 2 shows that church was born as the result of the Holy Spirit’s coming. Therefore, it is clear that the Holy Spirit plays an essential role as agent in the church’s mission.

Roelf S. Kuitse regards the Holy Spirit as source of mission and as an agent of connection, so he maintains that ‘the Spirit is not only brought in in connection with natural or created order; the Spirit is also linked to human creativity, to human culture’. He believes that the Holy Spirit (agent of mission) uses, controls and changes cultures for the purpose of evangelism.

John V. Taylor makes it clear that the Holy Spirit encourages and intervenes in mission. He notes that ‘the chief actor in the historic mission of the Christian church is the Holy

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880 Ibid., 17.
881 Ibid., 17-18.
883 Ibid., 294, 295.
885 Ibid., 123.
Taylor regards the Holy Spirit as ‘dynamic communicator and Go-Between operating upon every element and every process of the material universe, the immanent and anonymous presence of God’. According to him, the Holy Spirit intervenes, acts and labours for mission of church. Taylor’s comments on the Holy Spirit show very important insights about agent.

Kirsteen Kim shows the key roles of the Holy Spirit in the specific context of mission. She lists examples to explain how several spirits have affected mission in Korea: the Minjung theology (Nam Dong Suh); the pentecostal theology (Yong Gi Cho); and the religiocultural theology (Ryu Dong Shik). She highlights that the role of the Holy Spirit as agent is very important in the secular world and religious pluralism.

To summarize, these arguments have demonstrated that the Holy Spirit is an agent for mission who connects, acts and clearly reveals His identity. The emphasis on the Holy Spirit as divine agency enables us to reflect on various issues of agency theology in today’s global and interconnected world. It also shows the universal power that includes diverse societies in one unified concept.

So far, we have examined three common issues regarding agency theology. Continuous reflection upon and study regarding these questions will enable agency theology to gain dynamic power to undertake its dynamic role. The prospects are good that agency theology can be an alternative to mission theology.

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887 Ibid., 64.
888 Kirsteen Kim, The Holy Spirit in the World: A Global Conversation, 103-139.
7.3 Summary and Conclusion

So far, I have suggested the possibility of agency theology. In order to specify agency theory I have investigated the concept of ‘alienation’ employed by Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. Using their widely-recognized mathematical formulae, they attempted to show something beyond scientific principles. Rather, they have provided a significant clue to solve the problems of opposites: ideal world and actuality (nature, culture, human beings, society and history), infinite and finite, transcendence and sensual world. Through Hegel, it was clearly shown how self-consciousness becomes embodied in concrete contexts in order to become culture and science. Agency is a performer and the process of externalization. It embodies the actuality that is the content of philosophy, connects subject and object, and reveals the historical reality we live in as a concrete form of culture. Feuerbach considered these Hegelian observations too idealistic to explain religion, which represents the nature we live in and different life systems of human beings. Through reviewing Feuerbach’s theory of objectification, which states that nature and religion project the essence of human being that is outside Hegel’s interest, we have explained that he used agency theory as a tool to reveal the hidden secret of religion. In Marx’s view, the ideologies of Hegel and Feuerbach are limited in explaining the specific reality and circumstances of human beings. This is why Marx focused on the relationship between ‘property’ and ‘labour’ as key factors in human society, and explained it through the notion of ‘alienation’. He defined the labourer, the proletariat, as creative agency of history who embodies self-activity into labour, and insisted that history progresses by the individual agency who reforms the world rather than by the elites who are responsible for interpreting the world. The opinions of these three eminent scholars provide us, who are living in both the idealistic and the specific actual world, with a prominent notion of
agency. However, nowadays, scholars who study agency focus only on how our consciousness and phenomenon of spirit, intentions and actions, can be scientifically and logically elucidated. As a consequence, they give no attention to Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, who are rich sources of knowledge about the notions of agency. Thus, disappointingly, they do not investigate or elaborate in great detail upon agency. What their efforts do show is that there exist links between human nature or mental properties and action, between consciousness and phenomenon of spirit, and these phenomena allow us to have information of the outside world, information that is interlinked like a spider-web. However, their explanation cannot embody the divine and transcendent domain of the world in our reasoning.

Of course, as explained by Hegel, the emergence of absolute knowledge and the usage of agency for recognizing the Absolute is localized and limited to human beings’ self-consciousness. Moreover, as Barth indicated, it is knowledge that lies within the boundaries of anthropocentricity. Consequently, Barth maintained the existence of agency that has the form of direct revelation or of incarnation where Divinity shows Himself. These disputes with regard to the transcendent level have continued without solution for a considerably long time.

Agency theory, which enables us to see the resolution to the problem of two extremes not only in the rational domain, but also with regard to the transcendent, has been applied in this thesis specifically to the area of mission. I have shown how, historically, colonialism was a notable feature of Western mission. Furthermore, David Bosch’s idea that ‘the new paradigm of current Mission is Ecumenical’, has been investigated. Ecumenism is not new, but has survived in the history of mission through building up relationships between
people of different theological and religious backgrounds. If it is the new paradigm, what is the most important thing we attempt to change? We live in an era when mission is in decline, a result of self-contradiction where mission abused its power. Therefore, as argued by the well-known mission scholar, Werner Ustorf, in his analysis of the African mission, the assertion that mission should be continued just because of its traditional significance is not persuasive.\textsuperscript{889} If that is the case, the frame of mission definitely needs to be changed, and the stigma associated with mission eradicated. Alternatively, a new terminology is needed to expand the main content. The most appropriate theory to fulfil this request is the so-called agency theology, which provides the theoretical and practical foundation to expand the important area of mission. Certainly, the attempt here has limitations, in that it can only be fragmentary. However, in spite of the limitations, I believe that this thesis creates a significant contribution in explicating the identity of Christianity as a new mission paradigm. Moreover, I have highlighted the importance of ‘agent’ in the establishment of the actual world and the coherence of society.

The logical structure of this thesis is dialectic. More precisely, Chapters Two to Four focus on building the agency theory, which can offer the possibility of connecting the transcendent and the immanent, the abstract and actuality, subject and object, in a philosophical and rational approach. However, in Chapter Five, I investigated how, for Barth, between the realm of God and the realm of humans there lies a border line that cannot be breached. That is, human beings cannot cognise God without a self-revelation or self-attestation of God. Here, Barth clearly insisted that for humans to cognise God,

faith is needed. In other words, I investigated the possibility of acquiring knowledge of God though divine agency, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit. Thus, if Chapters Two to Four comprise thesis, then Chapter Five is anti-thesis. In Chapter Six, the synthesis of the two positions creates mission theology. Therefore, the overall structure of the study is dialectic; that is, in order to explain agency and agency theology, it adopts Hegel's approach of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.

To extend this research, the next project should establish a more concrete system and content of agency theology. It should also apply that system and content specifically to mission theology. If that is accomplished, it will be possible to see the dynamic agency theology that permeates the entire missiological domain.
**APPENDIX**

*Table 2: Feuerbach’s Agency (Called T2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who/what/meaning/definition</th>
<th>Contents/What are connected what?</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEUE RBER ECH</td>
<td>- A mediator/a bearer/executer</td>
<td>Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion, theology, Gods.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- is between the essence of man and religion, gods, theology</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- embodies their essences into the Christianity and World Religions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A cause and result of activity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A person who projects</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- is how to transform from “I” or “thou” or “the object”</td>
<td>Causality/Dialectic/Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- is objectification of the species or self-awareness</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- is the process of objectification</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alienator</td>
<td>Reductionism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A bearer</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alienate</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- is loss of species’ consciousness</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- is gab between essence and existence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- is relinquishment of predicate/ the subject and the predicate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- is rejection of I-thou structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- bridges the “I” and “thou”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>A monistic process</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- connects God to human beings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- acts a perpetual systole and diastole</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The true dialectic</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Predicate</td>
<td>Analogy of relation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- is not a monologue of solitary thinker with himself</td>
<td>Logical regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- is dialogue between I and Thou</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- exposes contents of the subject within logical regulation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The essence of Man</td>
<td>Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- transforms his thoughts and even his emotions into thoughts and emotion of God.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- transforms his essence and even his viewpoint into essence and viewpoint of God</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who/what/meaning/definition</th>
<th>Contents/What are connected what?</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Self Activity of laborers</strong></td>
<td>-fulfils the desire and lives of labourers -are linked and mediated by agency which has now become a forced agency or an alienated agency of force</td>
<td><strong>Dialectic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self and Activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Dialectic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Money/Capital</strong></td>
<td>-is one of the stable agents for alienated people in capitalism -plays a crucial role (as an agent of capitalism), in construing capitalism and in making its contents -acts to build the capitalistic structure and capitalism -embodies the idea of capitalism and takes on dynamic force -is visualized subject. It is an institution, a medium, and such as a universal or global phenomenon -can turn the natural form of commodity into socially recognized equivalent form -is limitless -is an end in itself for the valorisation of values takes place only within this constantly renewed movement</td>
<td><strong>Materialistic dialectic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private property/</strong> Capital/ commodity**</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Materialistic dialectic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The movement of capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Materialistic dialectic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The circulation of capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Materialistic dialectic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour/</strong> Products/** process of production/** means of production**</td>
<td>-is not only removed from the subject, or rather strips the subject of its subject-self and replaces him, rendering an object, the new agency subject is also a de-indicator</td>
<td><strong>Dialectic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global social transformer</td>
<td>-is creating new social conditions, to understand the process of past and present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>-is creating new social conditions, to produce a premediated future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>-embodies the capitalistic structure.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>-is a free agent and states that human being should not be a passive slave but the creative subject in history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social individual(s)</td>
<td>-realizes and changes him or herself through changing the world</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-is efficiently or productively causal by a formative activity that shape conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-create new objects in order to realize their proposes or intentions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-transform and create themselves through labour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-act to develop their new capacities and work to recognize these new abilities in themselves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Fundamental nature of causality | -are embodied by the objects which the labourer process |
| The purpose of agent | |
| Casualty of labour | |
| Synthetic connection or mediation of labour | |
| Objectification | -is a process of self-creation of the subject |
| Machinery | -is to increase capitalists private properly, wealth |
| | -is to reduce labourer’s burden |
| | -is key factor to change worker’s economic lives and cultural atmosphere |
| | -is key factor to play a significant role as a faithful servant of the capitalist |
| | Between the labourer and the capitalist performs negatively to expose the actuality of capital-relation in large-scale industry |
### Table 4 Agency Scholars’ Agency (Called T4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Who/what/meaning/definition</th>
<th>Contents/What are connected what?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOCKING</td>
<td>Self/conscience/instinct</td>
<td>-could be one of the most effective tool boxes for the explanation and reconstruction of human nature and moral theories. -is to identify the properties of human nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOZICK</td>
<td>Agent of self</td>
<td>-enables ‘self’ to synthesize itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOMPSON</td>
<td>A verb/ the properties of action</td>
<td>-is to do and perform something in order to disclose the will of the subject and to show the properties of the action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRATMAN</td>
<td>Intentions</td>
<td>-are as elements of a planning agents and can control its action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAYLOR</td>
<td>The concept of agents</td>
<td>-triggers the behaviour -is as something that originates things and events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLDMAN</td>
<td>Individual/human beings</td>
<td>-are the originators or starting points of their own activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The act</td>
<td>-is caused by the wants beliefs of the agent, then he is the author, the source, the originator of the act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERONYMY</td>
<td>Mental action</td>
<td>-does not display the most familiar and prominent feature of agency -might be involve an exercise of agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORNBY</td>
<td>Mental action</td>
<td>-is the ‘one fact of the phenomenon of mentality’ that expresses the action of ‘the phenomenon of agency’ -is an important tool to overcome the limits of dualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAMS</td>
<td>Personal agency/personal identity</td>
<td>-will be raised in the analysis of the process of how mental states are externalized into behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>-may appear between the subject’s mental states and behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>-cannot be understood by some parts in mental states, but must be perceived as a composition of parts and whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigg-Ins</td>
<td>Personal identity</td>
<td>-needs continuity within spatio-temporal area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke</td>
<td>Person, self &amp; agents</td>
<td>-are actors who specify personal identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>Mereology</td>
<td>-interprets things in the relationship between parts and whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>Mereological relations</td>
<td>-connects part and whole in mental actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank-Furt</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>-are autonomous agents who governed by themselves alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velle-Man</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>-is a term widely used in many philosophical contexts to express ‘the coincidence of object and subject, either of a verb or of the activity that it represents’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segal</td>
<td>Self-activity Agency</td>
<td>-the self as the integration of personality that ‘person engage in throughout their lives’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segal</td>
<td>Agency theory</td>
<td>-actualizes the identity of the labourer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Segal</td>
<td></td>
<td>-is a web of relations that constitute the presence of the self in the activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segal</td>
<td></td>
<td>-X is the agent of some activity A if and if A is an activity of X and X is not alienated from A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5 Karl Barth’s Agency (Called T5)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who/what/ definition/ meaning</th>
<th>Contents/What are connected what?</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BARTH</th>
<th>Living man</th>
<th>-as a subject matter is starting point of the connection between the two extremes but the living man cannot be the subject to reconcile or overcome those extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAHR</td>
<td>Human agency</td>
<td>-is widely employed as the mediating role between God and human beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTH</td>
<td>Divine agency/ the triune God</td>
<td>-1. Christological doctrine of agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture/human work</td>
<td>-2. God-centric doctrine of agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE-BUHR</td>
<td>Culture for Barth</td>
<td>-3. Pneumatic doctrine of agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARTH</td>
<td>Free culture</td>
<td>-4. Spirit Christological doctrine of agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-attestation of God</td>
<td>-would be the connecting point between transcendent entity and finite beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revelation/Word</td>
<td>-there is no road from man to God, but there is a road from God to man</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>-would become a pathway or agency connecting God and human beings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jesus Christ</td>
<td>-God is known solely by divine agency and divine activity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Holy Spirit</td>
<td>-comprise the subject-matter of cognition with regard to God</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Christian community</td>
<td>-is possibility of cognition regarding God</td>
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<td></td>
<td>All nations</td>
<td>-as the agent of God mediates God the Father and His creatures</td>
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<td></td>
<td>creatures</td>
<td>-as a yardstick to distinguish the true agent of God from myriad agencies of God</td>
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<td>Contents/ what are connected what?</td>
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<td>DEM-BOW-SKI</td>
<td>Natural theology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-God reveals Himself in His work, which is the reality of God</td>
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<td>-Man has the ability of insight coming from God, which penetrates the reality of the world</td>
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<td>McFague</td>
<td>Theology of nature</td>
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<td>-starts from the revelation of God, which is based on Bible</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nature</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-will express divine goodness and power</td>
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<td>WHITE-HEAD</td>
<td>God’s dipolar nature</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-is not as lifeless thing but a live process</td>
<td>Analogical</td>
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<td>-is conceived as a ‘a complex of prehensive unifications</td>
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<td>-a primordial nature and a consequent Nature</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-God is the principle of embodiment of the world from the perspective of His primordial nature, and His judgment on the world in view of His consequent nature</td>
<td>Dialectic</td>
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<tr>
<td>BER-DYAEF</td>
<td>Divine-humanity of man</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-to draw attention to the intimate and all-inclusive relationship between God and the world</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-man is not only the image of the world, man is also the image of God</td>
<td>Analogy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-in order to explain how God creates and acts in physical world</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL-KING-HORNE</td>
<td>Bottom-up causality</td>
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<td>-is inputs of energy, described by conventional physics in terms of the behaviour of parts because this involves localized interaction with constituent bits</td>
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<td>-is a new kind, at least as far as physics is concern –inputs of pattern formation, described in terms of the overall behaviour of the whole</td>
<td>Causality</td>
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<td>Table 7 Agency in Mission Theology (Called T7)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Who/what/definition/meaning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Contents/ what are connected what?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>OT</td>
<td>Israelites/ prophets/ ordinary people: farmers, shepherds, merchants</td>
<td>-connects between God and his people or all nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>All nations outside of Israel</td>
<td>- as in the case of Cyrus (Old Testament, Isaiah 45:1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGavran</td>
<td>Incarnation of Logos/ kenosis Church</td>
<td>-appeared as a connection between the sacred and the secular</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VICE-DOM</td>
<td>Mssio Dei</td>
<td>-is the only institution for undertaking God’s work and salvation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TORRENCE</td>
<td>The mission of Apostolic church</td>
<td>-as Christ’s body, judges right and wrong in the world on behalf of God</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEW-BIGIN</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>-the Church is only a tool of God, and the result of God’s actions of sending His son and salvation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOE-KEN-DIJK</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>-the Church is regulated by mission and the function of mission</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evangelism as mission Apostle theology Laymen</td>
<td>-is regarded as the Kerygma, Koinonia, and Diakonia of Shalom</td>
<td>-We shall never understand what the apostles taught unless we do what apostles did, namely, mission. Apostolicity without apostolate is not apostolicity but apostasy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAU-LL</td>
<td>New humanity</td>
<td>-are bearer of God’s mission and the representative of God’s mission people</td>
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<td>-have the best status to show God’s love towards the world and reveal God’s love through its committed life</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-God works dynamically for ‘the humanization of life’ in the middle of the complicated world</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-If that institutionalized Church were to devote itself to the creation of the new humanity with God’s Messianic character, then, certainly it could be God’s agent</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Rütli | God’s mission | -is as the action of God in the world
- is not something private that comes from the inner world of the individual, nor is an event occurring inside Church
- is something that takes place in the world and in human life
- is as planting shalom in the midst of specific human society, where it is filled with conflicts, hostilities and battles |
| Secular ecumenicals | God’s word/ His will Worker for today’s salvation | -are incarnated and secularized in the midst of the world by mission
-Anyone who practices God’s justice and peace in the world can be agencies working for God’s deliverance |
| M.THOMAS | New humanity | -must manifest in the struggles of societies where people have secular human fellowship, those who believe in other religions
- enables us to hope for the kingdom of God: This is possible by the power of the Holy Spirit who was sent by the resurrected Jesus |
| Religious ecumenicals | Other religions | -God’s agent exists in other religions
- these agents can be every kind of organization, people and religions that work for the restoration of the new humanity |
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