A “Post-Third World City” or a neoliberal “City of Exception”?  
Rio de Janeiro in the Olympic era

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Abstract

This article considers processes of urban development within the context of mega-event preparations in Rio de Janeiro. We begin with a brief overview of these development processes, highlighting their connections to political and economic change in recent years. Proponents of these mega-event-led initiatives argue that Rio is undergoing a period of inclusive growth and integration: a perspective we call here a ‘Post-Third World City’ narrative of urban renewal. Critics, however, contend that urban officials are harnessing mega-events (e.g., the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games) to push forward a host of socially unjust policies benefitting the interests of capital and marginalising Rio’s poor and working-class residents (i.e., the “City of Exception” thesis, Vainer, 2011). In this article we explore the insights of these two perspectives and consider why they have grown popular in recent years. Though we side generally with the City of Exception thesis, we argue that important geographic and historical particularities must also be accounted for. Without carefully situating analytical perspectives empirically – and in particular, cases in which theoretical models are drawn from European and North American contexts – urban researchers risk concealing much more than they reveal in analyses of rapidly developing countries like Brazil.

Key words: Mega-events, urban development, Olympics, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, favela

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1) Introduction

There are few neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro that reflect the city’s peculiar development history over the last century quite like Morro da Providência (Providence Hill). Situated near the Port Zone in the centre of the city, Providência, as it is known today, could aptly be described as Brazil’s oldest favela community (informal urban settlement). First occupied by veterans of Brazil’s Canudos War in 1897, Providência earned the nickname “Favela Hill” from its original inhabitants. The nickname quickly caught on, and by the 1920s, “favela” became synonymous with informal housing settlements all across Rio de Janeiro (Perlman, 2010).

While Providência is certainly not Rio’s largest or best known favela neighbourhood, the community continues to lie at the forefront of important social and political changes. In 2010, a Police Pacification Unit (UPP) entered the favela to drive out the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) drug trafficking gang that had dominated Providência for decades. Although militaristic in their planning and tactics, UPPs have been deployed in a host of Rio’s favelas since 2008 with the aim of establishing a permanent police presence in favelas and thus putting an end to the cycles of violence accompanying the State’s hitherto dominant counter-insurgency doctrine (see Cano et al., 2012; Alves and Evanson, 2011).

As well as reducing violence, advocates argue that these public security methods will create the conditions necessary for positive social and physical change in favelas. Indeed, several new policies have followed the UPP occupation of Providência. These include UPP Social, a post-Pacification service improvement and integration initiative, and Morar Carioca (Carioca Living), an ambitious favela-upgrading programme intended to carry out major public works, most notably the installation of a new cable car and funicular train to improve mobility up the steep slopes. Meanwhile, the largest urban regeneration project in Brazilian history, Porto Maravilha (Marvellous Port), is turning the surrounding neighbourhood from a semi-abandoned industrial zone into a mixed-use business and residential district (Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013).
Perspectives that emphasize the benefits of these changes constitute what we define in this article as a “Post-Third World City” narrative. According to this narrative, Rio’s current transformation is belatedly getting to grips with historic problems of weak urban integration, patchy public service provision, and endemic violence. This transformation, according to advocates, is being assisted by the city’s decision to host the 2016 Olympic Games, which have encouraged collaboration and investment from across the public and private sectors that might not otherwise have been forthcoming. Rio de Janeiro is not becoming a “First World City”, but its transformation is moving the city beyond the First/Third World dichotomy that underpinned scholarly analyses of its development during the second half of the twentieth century. Providência and the Port Zone meanwhile, for so long bywords for inequality and exclusion, are to become the most potent symbols of Rio’s reinvention as a more integrated, more peaceful, more modern city.

By 2015, however, much of the optimism that once surrounded these reforms has dissipated. As in other favelas, residents of Providência have complained of abuses by UPP officers, and drug traffickers continue to operate in the area (Granja, 2010). Meanwhile, the infrastructure projects threaten to evict a large number of residents, with estimates that as much as one third of the population might be relocated (Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013: 137). To add insult to injury, many residents learned they were at risk of removal by returning to find the letters “SMH” (the acronym of the Secretaria Municipal de Habitação, or Municipal Housing Secretariat) painted on their outer walls. The opacity and inconsistency of the authorities have made it all but impossible for those affected to gain further information. And while the Porto Maravilha website argues the project “starts from the assumption that the current residents will remain in the port region”[1] (Porto Maravilha), this is unlikely given that most new housing in the port area is targeted towards high-income groups (Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013: 143-48). Instead, many who live in Providência could be sent to the distant edge of the city where the majority of new low-income housing is being built.

A growing body of critical academic literature, broadly following Carlos Vainer’s influential “City of Exception” thesis (Vainer, 2011), identifies such effects not only as inevitable, but as intended outcomes of the new
urban policies. Vainer and others argue that the Olympic Games have created a “state of exception” (Agamben 2005), permitting the circumvention of legal protocol and citizen/human rights in the interests of global capital. As a result, they claim, the urban impacts in areas like Providência will not be integration – as promised by the Post Third-World City narrative – but on the contrary securitisation and social cleansing of valuable and strategically important areas, creating a City of Exception urban landscape.

The purpose of this article is to critically interrogate and compare the Post-Third World City narrative and the City of Exception thesis. The former argues that Rio is undergoing a period of inclusive growth and integration (led by mega-event initiatives and urban renewal), while the latter contends that urban officials are harnessing mega-events to push forward socially unjust policies that further marginalize Rio’s poor and working-class residents. It should be noted that these two perspectives are not directly analogous: the Post-Third World City narrative is essentially a government discourse with a degree of public resonance, while the City of Exception thesis is an academic critique (which has also influenced the tactics and rhetoric of oppositional social movements).

Nonetheless we believe the exercise is a useful one that furnishes valuable analytical insights. Firstly, the two perspectives constitute the primary ‘big picture’ accounts that have sought to explain – and that have shaped public debates about – Rio de Janeiro’s current transformation, making them important in their own right. Secondly, both acknowledge Rio’s current “Olympic era” as a watershed moment, yet diverge significantly in how they interpret the effects of these changes. As such, they prefigure radically different futures for the city. Thirdly, the comparison opens into wider academic debates, both about the relationship between mega-events and urban transformation (Poynter and Viehoff, forthcoming), and about the applicability of theoretical frameworks developed in the context of the urban Global North to analysis of cities in the Global South (Roy, 2009; 2011; Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2011). We believe that pursuing this analysis can therefore help to untangle the complex interactions between State, market, social groupings and urban space in the twenty-first century, particularly in countries like Brazil that are developing rapidly.
We begin the article by providing general background and defining what we see as a loose but generally coherent “City Project” in Rio de Janeiro, before outlining the historical narrative, political language and policy influences that combine to form the Post-Third World City agenda. We then go on to review the emergent literature critiquing the City Project, with its emphasis on neoliberal economic strategies, competitive urban governance, and the catalytic role of global mega-events. The second half of the article offers an evaluation of these two perspectives and an elaboration of several important tensions and omissions that emerge from this. While we broadly side with the City of Exception critique, we argue that it fails to fully account for current processes of transformation in Rio de Janeiro. To achieve this we argue that three key factors must also be taken into account: (1) Elements of both complexity and continuity within the Brazilian State; (2) The uneven geographies of urban policy impacts; and (3) Long-term socio-spatial trends that are unfolding independently of the City Project.

2) A “City Project”?

The new generation of urban policies, including those intersecting in Providência, have appeared at a particular historical conjuncture. In 2003 Brazil emerged from recession and began a period of sustained growth, bringing an end to more than two decades of economic stagnation and instability. For Rio de Janeiro, which had fallen into relative decline since the 1960s – losing its capital city functions to Brasília and falling further behind São Paulo as a centre of business and finance – the turnaround was even more pronounced (Urani and Gambiagi, 2011). The city began to attract new national and international business investment as its tourism, retail and construction sectors boomed. This was further bolstered by the discovery of large offshore oil fields in 2006. Falling unemployment levels, combined with federal income-supporting policies like the minimum wage and the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer system, led to a marked fall in poverty during the first decade of the century, including in the city’s favelas (Rodrigues, 2013).

In the political arena, Rio also passed a major watershed in 2008 when Eduardo Paes was elected Mayor on the ticket of the centre-right Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Another PMDB member, Sérgio Cabral, had been in office since 2006 as Rio de Janeiro State
Governor, and the party was in coalition with then President Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva’s leftist Workers Party (PT) at the federal level (and remains so since the election of Lula’s successor Dilma Rousseff in 2010). As a result, Rio’s three tiers of government came into alignment for the first time since the return of democracy in the 1980s, with each holding a strong political mandate. In October 2009, less than a year after Paes took office, Rio won its bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games, with strong backing from both parties.

The successful Olympic bid provided extra impetus, resources and co-ordination to policies already being implemented at different levels, as well as permitting the development of entirely new ones. These policies cover the areas of housing, infrastructure, transport and security, and include those already mentioned as present in and around Providência: the UPPs, UPP Social, Morar Carioca and Porto Maravilha. There are also major new transport policies, like the creation of a light-rail system covering the port and city centre, a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) network focussed on the west of the city, and an extension of the city metro, also to the west. Significant federal infrastructure and housing programmes such as the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Programme, PAC) and Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life, MCMV) are being carried out on a large scale in particular zones of the city. There have also been major redevelopments of the Maracanã football stadium, which hosted the 2014 World Cup final, and the Autódromo Nelson Piquet in Barra da Tijuca, which will be the site of the future Olympic Park (please see Figure 1).

(Figure 1 about here.)

The appearance of such an array of new policies and projects in a relatively short period of time has led many to see the interventions collectively as part of a wider strategy to transform the city: what the Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas (Popular Committee of the World Cup and Olympics) describes as an Olympics-driven “City Project” (Comitê Popular, 2013). While it is admittedly problematic to lump all of these policies together as a single initiative – for example, some were launched before Rio won the Olympic bid and others are only tenuously connected to Olympic development [ii] – there are several factors, we feel, that give these various interventions a strong degree of unity and coherence.
First, although not all of these policies have been formulated or implemented in co-ordination with the others, there is a degree of institutional density and overlap that ensures that none is entirely separate from the rest. Second, these individual interventions have become increasingly focussed on delivering the mega-events. This has caused strategic priorities to shift, with some programmes being accelerated, others being shelved and many forced to co-ordinate their activities more intensely. And finally, perhaps the most significant reason for grouping all of these initiatives under the City Project banner relates to their political trajectories: to justify these different projects, Rio’s three tiers of government have mobilized a more-or-less identical discourse about the city’s history, its current problems, and the solutions that are required. This shared narrative has provided both the glue for Rio’s political alliance and the guiding principles that can be seen in the design of the policies themselves. In the next section we focus on the origins and development of this narrative, and then move on to consider a series of recent critiques that have been made against the City Project and its urban and social impacts.

3) The “Post-Third World City” narrative

While the Post-Third World City narrative has essentially been a government discourse, it also overlaps with some more popular interpretations about changes needed to address security, housing, and transport challenges in the city. In order to understand its initial political strength, it is therefore necessary to situate the historical moment of the mid- to late-2000s in the broader context of Rio’s modern history. Both the diagnosis and prescription it offered for the city relate to the enduring physical and social legacies of two earlier and deeply formative historical periods. During both, Rio was seen as paradigmatic of problems emerging in cities across the Global South, or the “Third World”, as it was commonly referred to in the language of the time, and as contrasting sharply with conditions found in the so-called “First World”.

The first of these periods was the era of rapid urbanisation, peaking in the 1950s when Rio’s population grew at an average rate of over 4% per year (Perlman, 2010: 55). Accelerating rural-urban migration along with endogenous population growth overwhelmed the public authorities,
which were unable to provide housing, infrastructure or services (including transport and policing) for large parts of the population. Unable to gain access to the formal housing market, much of this new population settled in favelas, which had a population growth rate of 10% per annum during the same decade (*ibid.*), and peripheral semi-formal subdivisions. Academics at the time theorized the “over-urbanisation” of cities across Latin America and the Third World, and the economic, social and cultural “marginality” of residents of informal areas (Perlman, 2010: 147-64). Such ideas found political expression in favela removal campaigns carried out on a massive scale in Rio and other Third World cities during the 1960s and ‘70s.

The second key period was the era of economic turmoil during the 1980s and ‘90s. During this time visible signs of urban dislocation became pervasive, including the degradation of public infrastructure and industrial areas like the Port Zone, and growing homelessness, unemployment, and informality (Gilbert, 1994). It also saw the emergence of heavily armed gangs who monopolized the city’s growing cocaine trade and established *de facto* control over many of its favelas. As rival factions competed for territory and Rio’s police adopted military-style tactics for combating them, many urban boundaries became effectively militarized. This included wealthy areas, which were increasingly fortified behind gates guarded by private security firms (Caldeira, 2000). Academic and popular commentators interpreted this as a process of urban fragmentation, with Rio described as a “divided city” (Ventura, 1994) whose favelas were controlled by “parallel powers” (Leeds, 1996). These processes certainly bore greater resemblance to contemporary trends in First World cities, such as deindustrialisation and rising inequality and crime. However, both in the underlying causes of its problems (eg. debt crises, uncontrolled inflation, institutional weakness), and in the extremity of its symptoms, Rio de Janeiro once again became a paradigmatic case of issues affecting the cities of the Third World more generally.

3a) *Post-Third World discourses and policy influences*

As can be seen in the discourses surrounding the new urban policies, the City Project claims to respond to legacies of rapid urbanisation and urban fragmentation, primarily by promoting *integration*.[iii] The policies targeted at favelas, namely the *UPPs, UPP Social and Morar Carioca*, are
all presented as means for bringing about the physical, social and institutional integration of favelas with formal areas. For example, *UPP Social’s* website states that its objectives are to “promote urban, social and economic development in the (pacified) territories; and to execute the full integration of these areas with the city as a whole” (*UPP Social*). *Morar Carioca*, meanwhile, is described as a “social revolution” that will “re-urbanize and socially integrate all the city’s communities, until the year of 2020 [sic]” (*Morar Carioca*). The major transport interventions like the BRT, meanwhile, are conceived as means for integrating larger areas of the city to one another: “The (BRT) express corridors [....] together with the light rail and other already existing means of transport will compose a new transport fabric interconnecting all the regions of the Olympic City”[iv] (*Cidade Olímpica*).

These different processes of integration are, at the same time, presented as being catalysts for modernisation, whether this is referring simply to urban infrastructure or to the social and cultural life of the city more generally. This is particularly clear in the claims made for *Porto Maravilha*. The *Porto Novo* consortium that is carrying out the project argues the following:

> Returning a historical treasure to Rio, and at the same time integrating areas with great housing, cultural and economic potential, which will be transformed into an example of modernity [....] The revitalization of the port area in Rio de Janeiro will reintegrate it with the city center as an example of sustainable urban development and productive social inclusion (*Porto Maravilha*).

The modernising discourse is seen in the way different policies are presented as embodying ‘new approaches’ to old and seemingly intractable problems. Many of these have been adapted from policies developed elsewhere. For example, *Porto Maravilha* has clear echoes of waterside redevelopment strategies used by many European and North American cities (Gaffney, 2013: 10; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008). The most notable example in Rio’s case is the “Barcelona model” of using the Olympics to regenerate run-down, post-industrial areas. As has been widely noted, Catalan consultants promoting this model have been involved in Rio’s history of strategic planning and mega-events bids since the early 1990s (Vainer, 2009; Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013: 133-34).
The BRT system, meanwhile, builds on a model developed in South America itself: first in the southern Brazilian city of Curitiba and then significantly scaled up in Bogotá, Colombia with the creation of the Transmilenio system in 2000 (Peñalosa, 2014). Though Rio’s unique geography and urban landscape share few commonalities with cities in the Global North, Olympic planners appear to be drawing on past development models in hopes of achieving a similar transport legacy in Rio (Kassens-Noor, 2013).

The favela-focussed policies also reveal an eclectic mix of influences and are similarly marketed on the basis of being “innovative”. For example, Morar Carioca builds upon the achievements of Rio’s Favela Bairro upgrading programme of the 1990s, though supposedly with greater sensitivity to specific local conditions through participatory planning processes and the favouring of architectural proposals that respond creatively to local infrastructure and mobility challenges. An example of the latter is the use of cable cars like the one being installed in Providência, which arrived in Rio as the result of a visit made by Governor Cabral to Colombia in 2007 (Freeman, 2012). In the city of Medellín the Metrocable system had been installed in a historically excluded informal settlement under the administration of reformist Mayor Sérgio Fajardo. The prior military incursion that had “reclaimed” this territory from guerrilla forces and the city’s subsequent “return to legality” policing programme were also key inspirations for the UPPs (Gutierrez et al., 2013), although the latter also built on Rio’s own Group Policing in Special Areas (GPAE) programme which was piloted in the early 2000s (Melício et al., 2012).

To sum up, the Post-Third World City agenda is a term that we employ in this article to describe an assemblage of policies and accompanying discourses constructed around a particular historical narrative. Specifically, the City Project is presented as an attempt to overcome the negative social and physical legacies of rapid urbanisation and urban fragmentation, which, it suggests, are the fundamental obstacles the city currently faces. It proposes to do so through innovative and locally sensitive policies that simultaneously upgrade and integrate different urban territories, with specific (though not exclusive) emphasis on the relationship between favelas and formal areas. Those innovative policies are frequently borrowed from other contexts where similar conditions or problems are deemed to prevail, or where it is believed that lessons
and models can be effectively adapted to the Rio context. The presence of policy influences from ‘Northern’ (i.e., American and European) contexts reinforces the argument that the City Project is collapsing the old distinction between ‘First’ and ‘Third World’ cities as Rio de Janeiro enters a new modern era.

4) Neoliberal urban governance, mega-events and the City of Exception thesis

It is a testament to the descriptive power of the Post-Third World City narrative that it achieved a kind of ideological hegemony between its initial development in years 2007-09, and the explosion of opposition from community and broader social movements in 2013. Nonetheless, over this period a counter-narrative did emerge that began to tell quite a different story about both the origins and long-term impacts of the City Project. This set of ideas, which can broadly be called the City of Exception thesis, is mainly found in academic writing. However, it has also percolated into the rhetoric of social movements and social media campaigning against mega-event policies (eg. Comitê Popular 2013). In this sense, although it is distinguished from the Post-Third World City narrative by both its greater intellectual depth and distance from government, the City of Exception thesis deserves to be seen as exercising influence beyond academic debates.

The theoretical co-ordinates of the City of Exception thesis are mainly drawn from critical Marxist geography, though with some interesting departures specific to the Rio context. Thus, for Vainer and others, the long period of urban crisis during the decades of the 1980s and ‘90s is conceived as a process of disinvestment, with global capital shunning Rio in favour of other more lucrative territories. This created a growing “rent gap” (Smith, 1979) between potential and realized land uses in the city as a whole, and in some hard-hit areas like the Port Zone in particular. As a result, when economic prospects improved in the 2000s, capital began to return to the city, seeking returns via “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003). That is to say it sought to reclaim territories previously abandoned to lower value use, like favelas, other areas of low-income housing, and public spaces and facilities catering to their residents.
At the level of urban governance, analysts also identify a significant transition during this period. In 1993 Rio’s Prefeitura (i.e., municipal government) signed into law the first strategic plan of any city in the Global South, in partnership with the city’s two leading private sector interest bodies (Vainer, 2011). Critics argue this marked the transition from a “managerial” to an “entrepreneurial” model of urban governance, with city authorities now focussed on competing for global capital flows rather than attempting to respond directly to the needs of residents (Ribeiro and Santos Junior, 2013; see also Harvey, 2001; Raco, 2014). Vainer (2011) describes the shift as the emergence of a new “hegemonic power bloc” of politicians and key business interests, including land developers. He argues that by mobilising a discourse of ‘urban emergency,’ this coalition was able, through a variety of semi-legal jurisdictions, to legally enshrine its own right to suspend legal norms and bypass political contestation in the ‘collective interest’ of the city.

Vainer brings the argument up to date by incorporating in his model processes associated with Rio’s mid-decade mega-events. Following Georgio Agamben (2005), Vainer suggests that mega-events like the Olympics can be harnessed by States to subvert legal protocol. So momentous are mega-events in the eyes of State actors that ensuring their success can trump due processes of municipal, state, and federal law. Thus, for cities playing host to mega-events, a “state of exception” is created when the State ignores established laws in order to push through mega-event preparations. Examples in Rio de Janeiro include the forced removal of local residents from Olympic venue sites, bypassing environmental assessment and regulation, and authoritarian public security measures carried out in public space. For Vainer, such tactics have become so commonplace that a permanent “state of exception” has been created in Rio, now making it a “City of Exception.”

These related processes of capital disinvestment/reinvestment and the shift from managerial to entrepreneurial governance may look familiar to critical accounts of neoliberalization processes in many other cities in the first decades of the twenty-first century. Indeed, researchers examining mega-events and mega-projects in other contexts have often arrived at similar conclusions (e.g., Haila, 2008; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008). In the City of Exception literature, however, two factors distinguish Rio as noteworthy (if not entirely unique). The first is that the
ruling political coalition has placed a disproportionate strategic emphasis on attracting capital through the hosting of mega-events and attracting tourism more generally. The second is that many of the exceptional measures taken have had unusually extreme impacts on the city and some communities in particular.

4a) Securitisation, social cleansing and pro-rich investment

Much of the growing international literature on mega-events and their urban impacts dovetails neatly with the City of Exception thesis (Haila, 2008; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008; Poynter and Viehoff, forthcoming). In the case of global sporting events like the World Cup and Olympics, special agreements are made between host countries/cities and the international sporting bodies to guarantee certain norms in areas such as branding rights, security and hospitality arrangements for the duration of the event (Gross, 2012). In more lasting ways, meanwhile, powerful entities with special legal status, like local organising committees and public-private partnerships of various kinds, are created to develop the new sporting and urban infrastructure that mega-events invariably require (Fainstein, 2008; Orueta and Fainstein, 2008). In many cases (and very clearly so in the case of Rio), these bodies become responsible for carrying out major, long-term transformations of the urban fabric while bypassing mainstream democratic institutions (Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013: 135-36). In this sense, mega-events can act as catalysts both for creating urban “states of exception” and as a means of reforming the urban environment in the interests of powerful actors.

In opposition to the claims of the Post-Third World City narrative – of expanded security and transport services, urban integration and pro-poor development – critics have thus identified processes of securitisation and social cleansing that are being carried out in the interests of rich and powerful private interest groups. Instead of modernising the city as claimed, some have identified the City Project as a step back towards Brazil’s authoritarian past, drawing parallels to the mass favela removal campaign carried out by the military dictatorship in the 1960s (Brum, 2013; Comitê Popular, 2013).

Differently from cities in the Global North, where mega-events and mega-projects provide catalytic moments for repressive State tactics
such ‘opportunistic’ moments are not necessarily required in Rio and other similar cities. Heavy-handed police measures are common with or without the looming deadlines of mega-projects and events (Garmany, 2014). Nonetheless, there is an inglorious history of intensified State violence in Rio during periods of increased international attention. There has been a tendency for mega-event security requirements to drive militarisation, from the military occupation of the Complexo do Alemão favela complex during the 1992 Rio Environmental Summit, to the 2007 “PAN massacre” in the same location, when an estimated 19 people were killed in police operations coinciding with the Pan-American Games (Gaffney, 2010).

With regard to pacification, the Comitê Popular argue that the programme is, in essence, a security strategy for the mega-events and the elite areas of the city where they will primarily take place (Comitê Popular, 2013: 82). Not all those pursuing the City of Exception line of argument would draw such a direct link. As stated previously, the UPP programme was unveiled prior to the Olympics announcement, and in any case mega-event arrangements cannot be the only determining factor, with other operational and political considerations also at play. Nonetheless, the securitisation of strategic parts of the city still fits into a broader underlying analysis about the socio-spatial logic of neoliberalisation. For example, Freeman (2012) argues that mega-events and pacification are connected in that they both result from the new dynamics of capitalist accumulation since Rio’s economic resurgence. Drug-trafficking gangs, he argues, have long dominated life in Rio’s favelas, but this problem has only been seriously addressed since it has come into conflict with “elite accumulation strategies” (Freeman, 2012: 97). The implication is that pacification constitutes a repressive and arbitrary means of controlling favela populations that threaten the realisation of these strategies, rather than an attempt to extend norms of public policing to areas where they had previously been absent.

Similar arguments have been developed regarding the equally contentious issue of favela removals. In 2013 the Comitê Popular estimated that over 4,000 families were under threat of removal,[vii] with close to 5,000 already evicted from their homes. They (Comitê Popular, 2013: 19-20) and Brum (2013) point out that the majority of favela residents threatened by removal are concentrated along frontiers
of elite regeneration and urbanisation processes in the centre and west of the city. In this respect the Olympic zones in Barra da Tijuca (the site of the Olympic Park) and the city centre (including Porto Maravilha and the Maracanã stadium) might be seen as exclusion zones that are being repurposed for the mega-events and the longer-term interests of capital: a future in which long-established favelas do not figure (see again Figure 1). Drawing on Smith’s (1996) concept of revanchist gentrification, Freeman (2012) interprets the repertoire of favela policies in these areas as a kind of ‘reclaiming’ of the city. He argues that for capital to achieve its aims in areas like the Port Zone, favelas must be removed, pacified, or otherwise ‘symbolically tamed’ with highly visible modern infrastructure like cable-cars, that at once diminish their otherness, while exploiting Rio’s exotic image to create an enticing Olympic spectacle.

As with security, housing, and infrastructure policy, many have also questioned the logic of the new transport interventions. Rio’s authorities emphasize that the principle extensions to the transport system are being targeted at currently underserved areas in the West Zone (metro extension and BRT), and also in the port area (light rail), with large low-income populations. Yet these are also the areas likely to experience major gentrification in coming years. Meanwhile, the greatest transport needs are focussed in the densely occupied North Zone and the sprawling suburbs and favelas of the Baixada Fluminense, which are being largely overlooked (Rodrigues, 2014). As a result, many have argued that, as with the UPPs, new transport initiatives are primarily aimed at the mega-events – facilitating the mobility of visitors between Olympics venues, tourist areas and the international airport – and not a serious strategy for easing Rio’s huge urban mobility problems (Comitê Popular, 2013).

In summation, critics of the City Project strongly contest the official claims outlined in the previous section. They argue that UPPs are primarily a tactic for controlling favela populations that threaten elite accumulation strategies, rather than an attempt to extend public security and citizenship to territories where they have historically been denied. Similarly, they dispute that housing, infrastructure and transport policies are disinterestedly pursuing the goals of integration and development for the benefit of the population as a whole and the poorest in particular. Instead they contend that investment is primarily
targeted at wealthy areas or otherwise designed to physically transform low-income territories so as to facilitate gentrification. Favelas standing in the way of such processes must, as a consequence, be securitized and symbolically tamed, or, even worse, removed from the urban landscape altogether.

5) Discussion: A Post-Third World City or neoliberal City of Exception?

Clearly the Post-Third World City narrative and the City of Exception thesis tell very different stories about both the origins and the impacts of the City Project. In part, this is because they must, by definition, speak in different registers. Proponents of the Post-Third World City narrative promote their policies based on “narratives of success,” adopting a discourse that all too readily drifts into unsubstantiated propaganda (Brownill et al., 2013: 113). The City of Exception thesis, by contrast, occupies the space where intellectual scrutiny and social protest intersect, and as a result tends towards critique and an emphasis on the “dark legacies” ignored by official discourse (ibid.). In this way it plays a vital corrective role, but can in some instances be unconstructive and even reductive in its criticism. Beyond these discursive aspects, however, there are more fundamental differences in the way the two narratives understand Rio de Janeiro’s history and current conjuncture.

At the heart of the Post-Third World City narrative lies the concept of a “divided city” (Ventura, 1994). Against this implicit framework it emphasizes geographically identifiable gaps in the provision of infrastructure and public services, both across the different regions of the city and in favelas generally. In this view both the State and the formal economy are seen as having been historically absent from large swathes of the city, allowing problems like drug trafficking to become entrenched. The implication is that Brazil’s economic upturn – and the new State activism emerging at different levels of government – presents an opportunity for expanding State services and formal economic activity to these areas. This highlights an important difference with mega-projects in the Global North, which are typically carried out in the name of revitalizing abandoned and run-down areas (Orueta and Fainstein, 2008). In cities like Rio de Janeiro, where large swathes of the city are characterized by informality and severe socio-spatial exclusion, mega-projects have the slightly different rationale of establishing a formal/State presence in ‘un-colonized,’ disconnected parts of the city.
The City of Exception literature tends to draw on a different theoretical tradition that dates back to debates over the role of the military regime in favela removals and other policies of “urban despoliation” in the 1960s and ‘70s (most notably Kowarick, 1980). This view, developed primarily by Brazilian urban sociologists, portrayed the State not as absent, but as an active agent in the production of urban inequalities through its wilful neglect and repression of low-income populations. In simplified terms – unlike research in the Global North (e.g., Harvey, 1973 Smith, 1979), which emphasized the predominante role of privately held capital – in Brazil the State was viewed as the proactive enforcement arm of the economic elite, holding down the cost of Brazil’s mass reserve army of labour and, where necessary, forcibly displacing it from valuable urban territory to facilitate capitalist accumulation.

Current critiques draw on some of the core ideas of this literature, highlighting important parallels with the situation today (eg. Brum, 2013). They have challenged the view that the State is a neutral actor, identifying the many ways in which its policies benefit key interest groups, not least the construction firms and utility providers that directly benefit from huge State contracts and new markets. Even more importantly, the City of Exception literature emphasizes the persistence of social, economic and political inequalities in shaping the design and implementation of the new policies. While the Post-Third World City narrative claims the urban reforms are utilitarian, or even pro-poor, the City of Exception literature points out that the primary benefactors are often elite interest groups and that low-income populations are suffering many negative impacts, including intensified policing and eviction. In these ways we believe the City of Exception literature offers a valid and incisive critique of the City Project.

Despite its strengths, however, there are also certain problems and omissions within the City of Exception approach itself that must be explored if a fuller understanding is to be reached. In the remainder of the article we focus on three issues in particular. Firstly, we argue that elements of both complexity and coherence within the Brazilian State must be given a more central place in the analysis. Secondly, we highlight the role of Rio’s uneven geographical development and the significant variations in policy impacts that this produces. Thirdly, we believe that more effort must be made to distinguish between impacts
that are the direct results of the policies we define as being part of the City Project and those that result from broader social transformations.

5a) Complexity and continuity in the Brazilian State

The first issue worthy of critique is the insufficient attention the City of Exception thesis gives to the internal workings of the Brazilian State. These touch upon broader questions about the applicability of neoliberalisation theory to the context of the urban Global South (see Roy 2009 and 2011; Parnell and Robinson 2011). As explained previously, the range of policies connected to the City Project is highly diverse, involving different levels and departments of government as well as non-State actors. The complex and frequently contradictory interactions between these different bodies and policies result from the complex and contradictory nature of the Brazilian State itself. Ribeiro and Santos Junior (2013) point out that while the municipal government, particularly since the accession of Mayor Eduardo Paes in 2008, has pursued a recognisably neoliberal policy agenda, it is perfectly possible for this to co-exist with “neo-Keynesian,” or neo-developmentalist, policies like PAC and MCMV at the federal level. At a deeper institutional level they offer a useful route forward by conceiving of the current urban coalition as a hegemonic, rather than unitary bloc. This encompasses multiple “grammars” of urban politics, such as corporatist, clientelist and patrimonialist structures, with which neoliberal actors must coexist and through which their policies must often be channelled.

The conceptualisation of the City Project as a hegemonic project held together by pragmatic political alliances and a shared policy narrative (and in the context of a highly fragmented institutional setting) has other analytical benefits. Crucially, it helps to explain the participation of progressive State and civil society actors in the more pro-poor policies like Morar Carioca and UPP Social, and also why these programmes were progressively hollowed out as the neoliberal wing of the coalition grew in confidence after 2009. It also sheds light on the contrasting reactions of different political actors to the mass protests in Brazil in June-July 2013, which in Rio were closely tied to opposition to the City Project.

Just as it reveals the complexity of the Brazilian State, however, the City Project also exhibits important aspects of uniformity and historical
continuity. This is particularly visible in the treatment of favela residents. For example, Rodrigues draws parallels between the UPPs and related social and infrastructure policies and the various attempts of the developmentalist State of the 1950s and ‘60s to “civilize” favela residents (2013: 13-14). Viewed in this way, pacification comes to look less like a neoliberal policy aimed solely at protecting capital flows, and more like a hybrid neoliberal/neo-developmentalist policy that also seeks to draw favela populations into national development processes. Brum (2013), meanwhile, highlights important similarities between current favela removals and the mass removal campaigns of the 1960s and ‘70s. Just as then, recent removals have resulted from co-ordinated action between the State and private interests, with support from the mainstream media and sections of the middle class (Brum, 2013: 199). Furthermore, although Rio’s Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH) is controlled by the leftist Workers Party, it has been complicit in removal policies in favelas like Providência. Such evidence of cross-party consensus in pursuing large-scale favela removal is all the more surprising in that it follows a period when on-site upgrading seemed to have won the day. This suggests a disposition towards favela removal within the governing elite that, to some degree, transcends party ideology and persists in spite of long-term political and institutional transformations.

In this light, it may be necessary to acknowledge aspects of a kind of Brazilian (or more accurately, perhaps, a Carioca) exceptionalism when analysing Rio’s City Project. This is most clearly visible in the way that globally mobile policies have been implemented and received compared to other contexts. For example, the UPP programme is supposedly based on principles of community policing, but has been given the name of “pacification” and is being carried out by a heavily armed military police force with exceptional powers and a history of abuse in favela territories. Likewise, cable cars and other new infrastructure have typically been installed in favelas with little or no consultation and frequently against the wishes of residents. This has led to a bizarre situation in which cable cars are widely resented in affected favelas and seen as cosmetic interventions designed to conceal persistent social problems from outside onlookers. By contrast, in Medellín, where they were first built, it was precisely that sense of symbolic inclusion that residents seem most to have valued, despite their practical and economic benefits being far less obvious (Brand and Dávila, 2011). Such
cynicism among favela residents seem to reflect the long historical relationship in Rio between urban beautification projects and the removal and repression of low-income groups (see Abreu, 1987).

These elements of, in the first instance, complexity and contestation, and in the second instance, continuity and consensus within the Brazilian State, support the argument that, when not applied with great care, urban neoliberalization theory can end up concealing as much as it reveals about cities of the Global South (Parnell and Robinson, 2012). Unlike in the Global North – where inequalities of capitalist development may often be tempered by State involvement (Fainstein, 2008) – in the Global South, greater State involvement by no means leads to more equal public benefits (see also Bezmez, 2008; Moncada, 2013). Yet on the other hand, the central role of the Brazilian State in processes of securitization and social cleansing and also in the provision of housing and infrastructure in lower-income areas makes it problematic to label these policies collectively as “neoliberal”. Therefore, while we do not dispute that there has been a process of neoliberalization of urban governance during Rio’s Olympic Era, this must be placed in the context of a complex State structure in which – for both political and deeper institutional reasons – neoliberalism must inevitably coexist with other logics of governance and power.

5b) Uneven development

Following on from questions surrounding the role of the State, a second area in need of scrutiny concerns the ways in which Rio’s unusually complex physical and social geographies confound any assumptions of uniform policy impacts across the urban territory. While the imbalanced macro-geographies of urban interventions have been discussed – eg. in the spatial distribution of UPPs, favela removals and new transport networks – this unevenness also plays out in less predictable ways at a more local scale. This has created relative winners and losers even amongst the favela communities and other low-income populations identified by the City of Exception thesis as the primary victims of Rio’s urban transformation. These variations are fundamental to understanding the different ways the City Project has been experienced locally and the varying attitudes this has generated across the city. Two examples from different parts of the city serve to illustrate this point.[5]
Perhaps the most high-profile and symbolic case of a removal process associated with Rio’s mega-events concerns favela Vila Autódromo in Barra da Tijuca. Autódromo lies on the edge of the Lagoa de Jacarepaguá, next to the old Autódromo de Nelson Piquet racetrack, which will become the site of the new Olympic Park (see again Figure 1). Although the community was granted an official certificate of possession in the 1990s, and despite the initial architects’ design of the Olympic Park not requiring evictions, Mayor Paes has shown a determination to remove Vila Autódromo, supposedly to ensure accessibility to the Olympic Park (Brum, 2013: 200). This has led to a drawn-out (and at the time of writing still unresolved) struggle with local residents who are resisting eviction. Similar threats hang over several small favelas a short distance to the north in Jacarepaguá, which lie on the route projected for the TransOlímpica BRT bus route (Rio On Watch, 2014).

In stark contrast to these cases, Asa Branca, a larger favela just one kilometre to the north of Vila Autódromo has had a far more positive experience (see Richmond, forthcoming). It received a major upgrading from the Prefeitura at the end of 2012, bringing paved streets, drains and streetlighting. Although carried out through the small Bairro Maravilha programme, rather than Morar Carioca or PAC, residents see the belated arrival of the State as a direct result of the Olympics and the greater attention this has directed towards favelas in the west of the city. The upgrading was certainly not participatory and was attained through traditional clientelist lobbying of the Prefeitura. Indeed, Asa Branca was due to receive a more comprehensive redevelopment from Morar Carioca, but now seems unlikely to, given the doubts surrounding the programme (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is not accurate to say that they have suffered directly from the mega-events, and indeed many residents would view their impact positively. What is perhaps more telling, as we explain in the next section, is that many residents believe that rather than the mega-events themselves, the uncontrolled speculative development unfolding in the surrounding area will ultimately threaten the community’s survival, not in the lead-up to 2016, but in the years that follow.

Another example of uneven impacts concerns the area surrounding the Maracanã stadium, where three favelas have been affected by the City Project in very different ways (Richmond, forthcoming). The smallest and closest to the stadium, Favela do Metrô, has been subjected to a
long and painful eviction process similar to that occurring in Vila Autódromo (Rio On Watch, 2013). There too the justifications for removal have continually been changed and the municipal government adopted a similar divide-and-rule strategy, making conditional offers of alternative housing that resulted in some residents being removed to distant locations. Residents who remained were left to live in a partially demolished neighbourhood that attracted new invasions from homeless squatters and drug users, as well as vermin. By contrast, Mangueira, a large hillside favela visible from the stadium and widely known for its historic samba school, has received large investments in monumental infrastructure and new housing through PAC as well as social programmes. Finally, Tuiuti, a little-known, medium-sized favela that is slightly further away and less visible has been overlooked by the City Project altogether.

In both the environs of the Olympic Park and the area surrounding the Maracanã, the policies of the City Project have been implemented very unevenly, even over very small distances. As argued by Freeman (2012: 106-9), this appears to be partly the result of plans to remould the surroundings of the key event venues to create a global spectacle. In the case of Favela do Metrô and Vila Autódromo, their proximity to the respective venues means that they must be removed in order to project the desired global image of the city. By contrast, Mangueira’s size and profile mean that removal is unviable, so spectacle can best be produced through monumental infrastructure that “symbolically transforms Mangueira from a dangerous threatening place into an exotic background” (Freeman, 2012: 108). Tuiuti, meanwhile, is far enough away that it is essentially invisible and requires no symbolic adjustment. However, spectacle does not account for Asa Branca’s upgrading, which will not be visible to the public. To understand the timing of its upgrading it is necessary to turn to more run-of-the-mill questions of how favela communities access policies through clientelist networks. Namely, while it is unlikely Asa Branca would have been upgraded without the Olympics, there was also no guarantee upgrading would have happened without effective political manoeuvring by its residents association.

A final point relating to uneven impacts concerns the way that variation in local social conditions can influence the perceived local effectiveness of policies. The one significant policy that has been implemented in
Tuiuti was the arrival of the UPP Mangueira-Tuiuti in late-2011 (Richmond, forthcoming). As in most cases, pacification failed to evict the local Comando Vermelho (CV) drug trafficking faction, instead simply driving it underground. This has created complications for residents who are still subject to trafficker influence. Nonetheless, many residents view pacification as a qualified improvement, largely due to its effects of reducing the visibility of arms and drug dealing in the neighbourhood. Whereas in other favelas stop-and-search procedures and arbitrary detainment have been widely used, and police and traffickers have engaged in shoot-outs, the social situation in Tuiuti since pacification has been relatively calm. This is because, unlike larger favelas and those more strategically important for the drugs trade, Tuiuti did not experience major conflict between factions, and only infrequent police incursions prior to pacification. In favelas like Tuiuti, the UPP programme’s primary aims of reducing gang-related violence without alienating the community seems to be more achievable than elsewhere, even if the more expansive aims of ending trafficking and guaranteeing residents’ citizenship rights remain elusive.

These examples emphasize the highly uneven ways in which current policies unfold across urban space. They suggest that while Vainer’s (2011) critique may offer a useful broad-brush understanding of such processes, greater nuance is needed when analysing specific empirical contexts. Logics of securitization and spectacle are clearly at play, yet they overlay pre-existing dynamics that can be decisive in determining where mega-event policies are implemented and with what consequences. Rather than exhibiting a singular and uniform mode of ‘exception’ throughout the entire city or even within special “Olympic Zones,” this suggests that there are in fact multiple and varying ‘states of exception’ that operate at different intensities and according to different geographies. As the examples of Asa Branca’s upgrading or Tuiuti’s relatively unobtrusive process of pacification suggest, it may be that deeper institutional power networks can themselves provide states of exception from states of exception. In this way, it may be useful to shift our understanding from a “territorial imagination of cores and peripheries” to one of “fractal geometries”, in which different systems of power interact across the city (Roy, 2011: 233).

5c) Social change
A final point to consider is how far the City Project departs from social trends already unfolding in Rio and other Brazilian cities regardless of the mega-events. Once again, the question of housing provides the clearest case for this. As discussed above, perhaps the most contested interventions of the City Project are those that supposedly necessitate the removal of favela residents. These cases are numerous and fit neatly with the City of Exception thesis, due in large part to the role mega-events play in creating a political climate conducive to the exercise of eminent domain. However, State-led favela removal is simply the most obvious manifestation of a much more extensive reorganisation effort within Rio and other cities under the dual dynamics of gentrification and suburbanisation (Gaffney, 2013).

As shown by the FIPE-ZAP index, the housing market across central Rio de Janeiro has boomed in recent years fuelling gentrification, rent squeezes and, frequently, displacement (FIPE-ZAP).[8] This has affected all levels of the market, most dramatically in favourably located favelas like Vidigal and Santa Marta and central working-class neighbourhoods like Lapa and Cidade Nova, but also middle-class and elite areas in the South Zone (Gaffney, 2013). Besides its direct role in driving gentrification in the Port Zone, the City Project has indirectly bolstered speculative investment and pushed up house prices through pacification and infrastructure investments (Frischtak and Mandel, 2012). Thus the mega-events seem primarily to have oriented and accelerated gentrification processes rather than producing them ex nihilo. Brazil’s continued economic growth in the aftermath of the global downturn and the apparent promise held out by Rio’s oil economy made the city’s prime property an attractive asset. In the context of weak institutional and legal architecture for combating property speculation, such conditions were always likely to produce dynamics of this kind, although in the absence of the Olympics the process would certainly have been slower and less geographically co-ordinated (Rolnik, 2013).

The gentrification of central areas is paralleled by the suburbanisation of lower-income groups, through both the property market and government policy. The huge federal social housing programme Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV), although “neo-Keynesian” (Ribeiro and Santos Júnior, 2013) in design, has an underlying market logic dictating that the vast majority of units must be built at the urban periphery where land values are cheapest (Cardoso et al., 2011). Along with the
different forms of gentrification occurring in central areas, this is encouraging a broad dynamic of social segregation at the city level. A third dynamic, however, blurs the picture somewhat: rising purchasing power at the lower end of Rio’s income scale, primarily thanks to job growth and an activist federal minimum wage policy (Rodrigues, 2013). This and increasing access to credit have created more demand for suburban housing within the private sector and made the periphery itself more socially diverse.

These different processes – gentrification, suburbanisation, and the diversification of peripheral areas – are also visible in other Brazilian cities and therefore cannot be reduced solely to the impact of the mega-events. As such they contradict the implicit claim of the City of Exception thesis that mega-events and the state of exception are crucial ingredients for social cleansing in Rio de Janeiro. Instead the city’s reorganization along more segregated lines appears to be a longer-term process, resulting from both its shifting position within the global capitalist economy and the (in some cases contradictory) social and geographical effects of federal housing and income-support policies.

6) Conclusion

This paper has argued that Rio de Janeiro’s City Project is a loosely connected set of urban policies designed and implemented by a diverse range of State and non-State actors in coalition. This coalition was sustained under the hegemony of a neoliberal municipal leadership, and mobilized what we describe as a Post-Third World City narrative. This offered a particular account of the city’s history – specifically emphasising the negative legacies of rapid urbanisation and urban fragmentation – and proposed a set of ‘innovative’ policy proposals for overcoming them. However, this narrative came to be challenged by a competing account of the City Project proposed by academic analysts and social movements, broadly defined here as the City of Exception thesis (Vainer 2011). This thesis proposes that rather than acting on behalf of the population as a whole, and historically excluded groups in particular, the new policies are using upcoming mega-events to create a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005) so as to securitize and socially cleanse key strategic areas in pursuit of narrow private and elite interests.
Our stance in this article, on one hand, is that the City of Exception thesis provides an insightful critique of the Post-Third World City narrative. In particular, it identifies continuing patterns of socio-economic inequality that characterize Rio’s urban development. On the other hand, however, we argue that it fails to provide a full account of both the origins and impacts of the City Project or of the various changes currently unfolding in Rio. For example, it struggles to account for similar processes of urban exclusion and State aggression prior to both processes of neoliberalization and to the “state of exception” provided by the mega-events, or for the implementation of “neo-Keynesian” policies during the Olympic era. To achieve this level of analytical nuance, we believe greater attention must be paid to the complexities and idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian State, to the uneven urban geographies of policy impacts, and to the interaction between policy and broader social change in Brazil.

Our exploration of these questions squares with broader concerns in the literature about both the role of mega-events in urban development processes and of the different theoretical frameworks needed for analysis of cities in the Global North and South. We have argued that important differences exist in the ways that mega-events and mega-projects are undertaken in cities like Rio de Janeiro. Unlike in the Global North, where such processes are often carried out under the banner of urban revitalization, in countries like Brazil the intent is more often to formalize informal space and take control of under-governed areas. Such tendencies offer a critique to mega-project analyses that suggest higher levels of State involvement often lead to increased public benefits (e.g., Fainstein, 2008): unlike in cities of the Global North, State oversight appears in many instances to worsen the social effects of mega-projects in Rio and other cities in the Global South (e.g., Bezmez, 2008; Parnell and Robinson, 2012). As Eduardo Moncada shows (2013), rapid urban redevelopment in such contexts may also produce ample opportunities for illicit and criminal networks, blurring the lines between formal and informal growth and helping, perhaps, to explain recent spikes in violence in many developing cities (see also Abello-Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014). This contributes to research that critically challenges the relationship between the State, neoliberalism, and globalisation (e.g., Robinson, 2011), and responds to calls for nuanced theoretical analyses of non-Western cities (e.g., Roy, 2009; 2011).
Still to be considered are a multitude of urban (re)development processes linked to mega-events and networks of globalisation. As Vainer (2011) and others point out, events like the Olympics can provide pivotal moments whereby urban transformation is not only fast and undemocratic, but also where changes to governance and processes of capitalist accumulation can be profound and longstanding. According to Mike Raco (2014), pressure to ‘deliver’ mega-events may in fact represent a fundamental change in State governance and function in the twenty-first century. Juan Pablo Galvis (2014) provides further insight from Latin America, showing how emergent community governance efforts work to further exclude marginalized groups from public space. Understanding these processes – and how they manifest in rapidly developing countries like Brazil – will be increasingly important for making sense of urban development and change in coming years. We hope this article contributes to these discussions, and helps to encourage critical perspectives useful for unravelling the connections between urbanisation, capitalist development, neoliberal governance, and processes of globalisation.
In addition to being implemented at different timescales and for different motivations, many policies are administered at separate levels and by individual government departments, each with its own aims, remit, budget and *modus operandi*. For further explanation, please see Sanchez and Broudehoux (2013).


Aside from Vainer (2011), other papers broadly following the city of exception analysis include Freeman (2012), Gaffney (2010), Sanchez and Broudehoux (2013) and Comitê Popular (2013; 2014). Although they expand upon or diverge from the analysis in important ways, Ribeiro and Santos (2013), Brum (2013), Brownill et al. (2013) and Rodrigues (2013) adopt a broadly similar approach.

See Freeman (2012) for a detailed application of this theoretical model to Rio.

Although calculations are extremely difficult given the authorities’ lack of transparency.

As explained by Klink and Keivani (2013), even this distinction does not fully explain the idiosyncratic tendencies of spatial development in Brazil in the twenty-first century.

Whereas President Dilma Rouseff expressed sympathy with the protestors, Sérgio Cabral and Eduardo Paes vehemently attacked them. These examples are based on qualitative research carried out in 2013 and are outlined in greater depth in Richmond (forthcoming).

Prices in peripheral areas have risen much less rapidly, and in some cases barely at all.
References


