Political grammars of mobility, security and subjectivity

Claudia Aradau
Department of War Studies, King’s College London, UK

Abstract

The ‘new mobilities paradigm’ and critical security studies share vocabularies of mobility, circulation and security. Yet, there have been only limited intersections between these approaches. This article explores the relation between mobility and security by developing a series of epistemic-political distinctions between motion, circulation and mobility. It argues that different political grammars of mobility have emerged historically and that we need to attend to the particular articulations of these grammars today, which conjugate mobility to security and subjectivity. The article starts by placing the semantics of motion and circulation, on the one hand, and of mobility, on the other, in historical context. It shows that motion, circulation and mobility are entwined with the production of particular governmental subjects and objects of (in)security. Finally, it explores how grammars of mobility shape political responses in contemporary site of intense securitisation – the UK-French borderzone at Calais.

Keywords: mobility, security, circulation, subjectivity, Foucault, borderzones

Introduction

Michel Foucault’s analysis of the emergence of a dispositif of security filtering ‘good’ and ‘bad’ circulation has inspired numerous debates about the connections between security and mobility. In critical security studies, liberal security is conceived of as a ‘dispositif of freedom of circulation imposing mobility on the majority and sorting out those who are banned and detained before being sent back’ (Bigo 2008). However, despite the centrality of circulation to recent debates in critical security studies (e.g. Aradau and Blanke 2010, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, Voelkner 2011) and the security implications of the production of mobilities/immobilities (Sheller 2014, Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, Sheller and Urry 2006), the intersections between the new mobilities paradigm and critical security studies have received only limited attention (see the Introduction to the special issue). This might be partly due to the respective disciplinary homes of these approaches. The ‘new mobilities paradigm’ has drawn together debates in sociology, geography, anthropology, and science and technology studies, while critical security studies have started within the disciplinary homestead of international relations.

Yet, security and mobility are inextricably entwined in these literatures and both approaches interrogate the social, political and ethical effects of practices, power relations, and modes of resistance and agency. Moreover, mobilities scholars have reflected upon the role of security in modernity, even when security is implicitly rather than explicitly problematized. In connecting security and mobility, they have often invoked Foucault’s reflections on vagrancy and disciplinary power. In his seminal analysis of mobility, Tim Cresswell (2006, 12) highlights the close connection between vagrancy and mobility, as
vagabonds symbolised an unpredictable form of movement. As noted by Foucault, Bauman, Negri and others, the vagabond is a key figure of anti-production, the crystallisation of the internal social enemy in the eighteenth century as ‘any person hostile or opposed to the rule of the maximization of production’ (Foucault 2015, 52). The production of the working class depends on the war against the mobility of vagabonds and vagrants. The contemporary production of ‘uneven mobilities’ (Sheller 2015) continues to be mediated through security practices, which make possible distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous, risky and non-risky bodies. This entwinement of mobility and security becomes most visible in highly securitized sites of mobility such as airports or borders (Adey 2008, Amoore 2006, Bigo 2014, Salter 2008, Vaughan-Williams 2015).

How do different forms of mobility matter for security practices? In critical security studies, mobility and circulation are often used interchangeably, both equally modulated by security in processes of governance. In the mobilities literature, when mobility and motion are distinguished, it through a differentiation between social construction and physical movement. For instance, Cresswell (2001, 2) sees mobility as ‘socially produced motion’, while movement refers to ‘an act of displacement that allows people to move between locations’. This binary is problematic inasmuch as mobilities are always ‘socially differentiated and unevenly experienced’ (Adey 2009, 92). More recently, scholars working at the intersection of debates about security and mobility have drawn attention to the constitution of different modes of mobility. Mark Salter (2013, 16) has asked for a re-orientation of mobilities research around circulation in order to account for ‘processes of control hidden or minimized by the relational mobility/immobility paradigm’. Drawing on the governmental interventions of the Fire and Rescue Service in the UK, Nat O’Grady (2014) has also drawn attention to the bifurcation of movement into mobility and circulation.

This paper makes a two-pronged contribution to the mobilities literature. On the one hand, it answers the call for more nuanced understandings of mobility. On the other, it argues that distinctions between motion, circulation and mobility are articulated within intersecting political grammars of mobility, security and subjectivity. I use the metaphor of ‘political grammars’ here to indicate that the relations between mobility, security and subjectivity are historically articulated, have rules of formation, but are also subject to modification. To understand how political grammars of security, mobility and subjectivity are differentially enacted, the paper sets motion, circulation and mobility in the historical context of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. In a first section, it traces the differentiation of motion and circulation in the shift from Hobbes’s political theory of the state to Quesnay’s political economy. Secondly, it highlights the rearticulation of mobility from capability for motion to a political subject of the mobile vulgus or the mob. It argues that three distinct political grammars emerge around motion, circulation and mobility, which are inflected through different modes of subjectivity and objects of security. Finally, it shows how these grammars are enacted in a contemporary site of intense securitisation – the UK-France borderzone at Calais.

**Inflections of mobility I: motion and circulation in modernity**

‘I began to think whether there might not be a motion as it were in a circle’ (William Harvey, *De motu cordis*, 1628).

The often-interchangeable use of mobility and circulation is perhaps not surprising as analyses of mobility from Hobbes to Quesnay draw on the analogy between motion and William Harvey’s theory of blood circulation to explain the role of mobility in modernity. A friend of Hobbes and known to Quesnay through the latter’s training as a surgeon, Harvey’s blood circulation is thought to be at the heart of both Hobbes’s political theory and Quesnay’s political economy (e.g. Christensen 1989). Thus, continuity is often established between Harvey’s medical writings, Hobbes’ reading of motion and the physiocrats’
emphasis on circulation. In this reading, circulation is extended backwards from Quesnay’s focus on circulation to Hobbes’s ‘infatuation with motion’ (Spragens Jr 1973, 5) so that it comes to constitute ‘the principle of order(ing) in respect to the human body as well as the body politic’ (Ansems de Vries and Spiker 2009, 456).

I argue that the concept of circulation and its uses by Quesnay mark a change from Hobbes’ political theory grounded in a monistic view of matter as motion. While many scholars agree that Hobbes indeed placed mobility at the heart of his political theory (see e.g. Cresswell 2006, 14), it is motion rather than circulation that is used by Hobbes. There is hardly any mention of circulation in Hobbes’ Leviathan or in De Cive, the works where both concepts of ‘motion’ and ‘multitude’ are central to the imagination of politics, order and sovereignty. If readers of Hobbes agree that he saw ‘motion as the key to understanding the world’ (Slomp 2010, 23), motion is extended from Galileo’s laws of motion and Harvey’s circulation of blood.

The Hobbes-Galileo-Harvey connection has been deployed in the mobilities literature to draw attention to the role of mobility in modernity, as opposed to feudal societies. Cresswell sees a direct link between Hobbes and William Blackstone’s argument, two centuries later, that mobility ‘was an absolute right of man’ (2006). However, this continuity raises an unexpected problem for critical engagement with technologies of government. The centrality of mobility for Hobbes (and Harvey), morphing into the centrality of mobility for modern citizens, risks diluting the constitutive role that Hobbes’s absolutism played in his political theory. Therefore, a reading of mobility as a political concept with transformative effects in modernity limits the possibilities for developing a critique of governmental regimes emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe. To enable such critique, I propose to trace inflections of mobility by attending to the differentiation of motion and circulation, on the one hand, and of the meanings of mobility itself, on the other.

While Hobbes has been often described as ‘the theorist of movement and circulation’ (Ansems de Vries and Spiker 2009, 455), the absence of references to circulation and Hobbes’s profuse invocations of motion – even when referring to Harvey’s theory – would seem to suggest that the distinction between motion and circulation needs to be explored further. This distinction is particularly important given the predominance that the language of circulation acquires with the physiocrats and eighteenth-century political economy. Unlike the physiology of blood circulation, Hobbes’ invocation of motion is distinctly mechanistic:

> For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? (Hobbes 1985, 7)

The invocation of the clocks allows Hobbes to extend motion and artifice from the body and the individual mind to collective being. Everything in Hobbes’s epistemic and political theory becomes a derivation of motion understood simply as ‘change of place’ (Hobbes 1985, 423). Leslie Dale Feldman (2001) has also argued that, despite readings of Hobbes that emphasise circular motion, Hobbes described the individual in terms of inertia and perpetual motion. Thus, the terms that Hobbes uses are all composites of ‘motion’ – motion, commotion, immobility – rather than variations of circle, circuit, or circulation (Hobbes 1985). At only one point in the Leviathan does Hobbes compare money with the circulation of blood; yet, the circulation of money here is simply a form of ‘nourishment’ of the commonwealth (Hobbes 1985). Ultimately, it is the sovereign that is the spring of all motion, ‘giving life and motion to the Commonwealth’ (Hobbes 1985, 205). Even where the language of circulation
is used, circulation is a derivation of motion rather than a particular form of circular, self-propelling movement. For Hobbes, motion was mobilized to inform a clear departure from Aristotelian understandings of ‘movement’ as finite and teleological:

Natural movement is no longer a striving to attain, but rather a simple continuation. The direction of the motion is not formal and substantive but vectorial. Movement is not structured by a goal, but is wholly guided by a preceding concatenation of motions. The basic characteristic of motion, therefore, is not to grow, or develop, or reach fulfilment, but to persist, to continue ad infinitum. (Spragens Jr 1973, 66-67)

Motion ad infinitum, without telos and without rest, poses a political problem for Hobbes, which he subsequently solves through the artifice of sovereign power. In Hobbes, the political grammar that is predicated on motion articulates sovereign power as a principle of security and the instruments of civil law as devices of ordering.

With the physiocrats, circulation is indicative of a different political grammar. Circulation now acquires a singular meaning as it expresses the ‘rule of nature’. Rather than reading Quesnay’s writings in physiological terms, Jessica Riskin has contended that the physiocrats’ model of circulation was less like Harvey’s physiological model of blood circulation and more like Benjamin Franklin’s electricity:

Their wealth was a fluid more like Benjamin Franklin’s electrical fire, which did not act mechanically, but instead pursued its own goals and tendencies, preferring, for example, water and metals to air and glass, and striving above all to maintain itself in a state of even and harmonious distribution. (Riskin 2002, 113)

With the physiocrats, circulation was neither anthropomorphic-teleological movement nor mechanically produced motion: it displayed its own goals and striving for balance.

In the eighteenth century, the epistemic-political role of circulation was articulated particularly through the work of Francois Quesnay (Foucault 2005 [1966]). The physiocrats embraced the motto ‘laissez faire, laissez passer’, as the economy was a self-righting mechanism striving towards equilibrium. Quesnay developed an analysis of this ‘natural’ state in his Tableau économique, which analysed circulation between three classes: the productive (agricultural class), the landed nobility and the sterile class (urban handicraft and small industrial production). With the physiocrats, circulation named the circuits of economic exchange. According to Foucault,

Quesnay and his disciples analyse wealth on the basis of what is given in exchange – that is, on the basis of the superfluity that exists without any value, but that becomes value by taking part in a circuit of substitutions, in which it must remunerate each of its movements, each of its transformations, with wages, food, and subsistence, in short, with a part of that surplus of which it is itself a part (Foucault 2005 [1966], 212).

Foucault then remarks that, in the classical episteme, ‘circulation becomes one of the fundamental categories of analysis’ (Foucault 2005 [1966], 194). While he rightly notes the emergence of circulation as a category of analysis, the distinction between the different epistemic-political vocabularies of motion and circulation is effaced in his discussion of the classical episteme defined specifically through movement in a circuit of substitutions. Foucault’s broad sense of circulation as encompassing ‘movement, exchange, and contact, as form of dispersion, and also as form of distribution’ (2007, 92) is ultimately inattentive to the differential inflections of mobility through motion and circulation.

The distinction between motion and circulation is also mediated by different conjugations of security. The Hobbesian sovereign is not just ‘creating’ conditions of predictability that minimise fear and allow rational cooperation’ (Williams 2005, 40). For
Hobbes, sovereign power is needed to direct and order motion to avoid friction. With the physiocrats, such artificial intervention is flawed as ‘Perfect government is not of human institution’ (Quetsnay quoted in Riskin 2002, 113). In the physiocrat use of circulation, what needs to be addressed are ‘blockages’ to circulation, as circulation tends to a state of equilibrium. If motion and circulation are entwined with different security meanings, they also foster particular subjectivities. The next section turns to these inflections of subjectivity in grammars of mobility.

Inflections of mobility II: Mobile vulgus and subjectivity

Mob – short for ‘mobile’, from Latin mobile (vulgus), fickle crowd (Oxford English Dictionary)

For Hobbes, the political subject that emerges through his theory of motion is the people. According to Paulo Virno (2004), Hobbes detested the multitude, which cannot be a political subject, as it ‘cannot promise, contract, acquire Right, convey Right, act, have, Possesse, and the like, unless it be every one apart’ (Hobbes 1998, 38). Rather, the political subject is the people, the transformation of the plural multus into the unity of unus. The political grammar of motion entails the transformation of the multitude into a unitary political subject – the people. This transformation of the problem of motion was mediated by sovereign power and the promise of security: against the disorganized movement of the multitude, sovereign power orders and directs motion.²

With the physiocrats, the subject of circulation is the population, a multiplicity divided into social classes according to the ‘rule of nature’. What defines the population is equilibrium rather than the unity of the people. Security and circulation are redefined through the equilibrium of different bodies within the state (Sakata 1972). In the article on Hommes intended for the Encyclopédie, Quesnay makes use of the political arithmetic of the time to show that population birth, mortality and growth are dependent upon the production of wealth. The population appears here as ‘a new collective subject absolutely foreign to the juridical and political thought of earlier centuries’ (Foucault 2007, 65). Yet, just as the grammar of motion enacts the transformation of the multitude into the people, securing circulation relies on the correction or elimination of population’s ‘others’: vagabonds and mendicants. Vagabonds and mendicants are not integrated within the categories of class that make up the population – moreover, they are a danger to the peasant populations, who risk being transformed themselves into vagabonds. A 1764 tract on the measures to be taken against vagabonds and mendicants by a key figure of physiocrat thought – Guillaume le Trosne – develops an economy analysis of delinquency that also renders the vagabond as an ‘enemy of society’ (Foucault 2015). While the population has no will of its own, but only internal tendencies (Brighenti 2014, 35), it can be undone by the vagabond who becomes a key figure of the internal enemy.

In the late seventeenth century, the semantics of the people-multitude and population-vagabonds are supplemented by the emergence of a new subject of mobility. The meaning of mobility shifts from the capacity for motion to that of a collective subjectivity – a derivation of mobile vulgus, the citizens-discontents marshalled by the Whigs for political processions and rallies (Seidel 1972). The term was introduced into English language to replace the more passive term ‘rabble’ and induded, according to the novelist Henry Fielding, not just the rioters, but everyone in London’s lower classes who was present in the streets (Shoemaker 2004, xi). The Restoration lawyer Roger North who is credited with using it first traces the usage of the term through contraction of the Latin mobile vulgus (see Harris 1990). At the same time, mobility was also coined in opposition to nobility. Yet, this etymology has become increasingly opaque as mobility was gradually contracted to the ‘mob’.
The etymology of mob/ility draws attention to formations of being-many in politics, which are not reducible to either the people or the population. Understood as mobile vulgus, mobility introduces a relation of force into the political terrain through a mobilisation of numbers into collective political subjectivity (see Aradau and Huysmans 2009). Mobility names the emergence of an excessive and disruptive collective political subject, which ‘moves’ in the realm of politics. The political grammar of mob/ility emerges out of a seventeenth-century problematisation of the street as a space of collectivity, numbers and protest (Shoemaker 1987). Mob/ility does not mean simply numbers as the sum of individuals – the rabble, the multitude, or a vagabond crowd – but numbers that are on the move, that are excessive to the political arithmetic of the population and the unity of the people. The mob does not enter a transition towards the unity of the people as the multitude did and it challenges the order of population categorisations. The mob is also not simply an accumulation of individuals as Hobbes saw the multitude:

> whatsoever therefore is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the Multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing (Hobbes 1998 Chapter vi).

However, the mob shares with the multitude the attribute of being numerous: ‘Multitude signifies: plurality — literally: being-many — as a lasting form of social and political existence, as opposed to the cohesive unity of the people’ (Vimo 2004). Like Hardt and Negri, Vimo reclaims the multitude as a collective political subject. Yet, the reclaimed multitude is also distinguished from the mob who ‘cannot act of its own accord’ (Hardt and Negri 2004, 100).

In Michael Seidel’s reading of the mob in Restoration England, ‘the mob or mobile vulgus included all the democrats and dissenters, the city quacks and frauds, the brawling “prentices”, and the seditious hacks of the time’ (1972, 431). The mob thus captures numbers in action, the populace protesting, rioting, striking. The mobile vulgus did not ‘correspond to the static-abstract picture of the “mob” presented by hostile contemporary witnesses or later historians’ (Rudé 1959, 13).

The grammars of mobility discussed here inflect political subjectivities in relation to objects of (in)security. For Hobbes, the necessity of motion is unquestionable and therefore the dangers that are associated with the multitude are addressed through sovereign power and civil law. For the physiocrats, the population as a mode of being solves the question of individual misery and suffering. The population is understood on an aggregate model, which implied ‘men’s necessary subjection to the natural order and their aggregate efforts to reproduce agricultural profits. Societies rested on such overall results so that it made perfect sense to subsume individuals into blocks of “landowners”, “farmers”, or “artisans”’ (Vardi 2012, 67). The physiocrats’ antipathy towards representational assemblies can also be understood through this reconfiguration of political subjectivity that subordinates the new science of economics and the equilibrium of circulation. The population was challenged by the vagabonds and the crowds of discontents who rebelled against physiocrat policies of free trade in grains. Within the physiocrat political economy, governing circulation entailed the integration of populations within productive circuits of capitalism and the proscription of ‘mobs’ that were not part of the processes of capitalist production and circulation.

The political grammars of mobility discussed here do not replace one another, but are often articulated in tension. Contra Virno’s (2004, 26) declaration that the multitude is ‘the prevalent mode of being today’, these political grammars bring to light the production of varied and often antagonistic ways of being-many: people, multitude, population, crowds or mobs. The epistemic-political distinctions between motion, circulation and mobility are translated into specifications of political subjectivity, which are predicated upon security.
The next section explores the rearticulation of political grammars of mobility, security and subjectivity in a contemporary site of intense securitization – the UK-France borderzone at Calais.

Rearticulating security and mobility in borderzones

A well-engineered and fit for purpose security fence can act as a great mediator – it doesn’t take sides, it’s apolitical and it does not get angry or react in frustration. It simply is what it is – a barrier to unauthorised access to an area. If it performs no more than that function with complete reliability, [...] it will reduce the risk of exposure to serious injury or worse to migrants and police officers, which benefits all parties (Jackson 2015).

Thus wrote the CEO of Jacksons Fencing in commenting upon the situation in Calais over the summer of 2015. His comments echo the understanding of sovereign power as enclosure, as boundary setting in the world. The fence is a modulated interdiction of movement, as Jackson echoes Hobbes’s view of laws as hedges that need to direct people’s motion ‘as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or indiscretion’ (Hobbes 1985: 213). In his rendition, the Calais migrants are primarily a multitude whose motions need to be steered in a different direction. The proliferation of fences, walls and enclosures has become a key feature of global bordering practices, a spectacle of sovereign protection and impotence at the same time (Brown 2010).

The political grammar that articulates security, directed motion and multitudes has been the most spectacular and most debated one. Yet, a complex grammar of circulation, governing populations and security has simultaneously shaped responses to the Calais borderzone. A bare two months earlier, the UK government had decided to send 2 miles of security fencing to Calais to ‘protect’ lorry drivers from migrants trying to find a way through the Eurotunnel. This second export of fences to Calais came at the height of the Mediterranean crisis in summer 2015, in response to perceived growing numbers of migrants at Calais and the effects on the circulation of commodities towards the UK. The export and deployment of fences is part of an increased security response, which includes ‘thermo-detection security cameras, extra perimeter fencing, and vehicle-scanning equipment to detect people hiding in lorries, tankers and refrigeration vehicles’ (Home Affairs Committee 2015a).

The circulation of fences follows the economic circuits of exchange that render securitization mobile – fences are meant to protect lorry drivers and the circuits of commodity to and from the UK. A report by the Home Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons details the status of Calais as a key node in the circulation of people and commodities towards the UK:

Calais is the closest entry point to the UK from Europe, with frequent ferry services to Dover, the Eurotunnel Shuttle service to Folkestone, and direct passenger trains to London St Pancras. About 10 million passengers and about £89 billion worth of UK trade pass through the port of Calais every year. A further 20 million passengers pass through the tunnel on Eurostar or the Shuttle (Home Affairs Committee 2015a).

Securing the circulation of people and commodities entails the simultaneous attribution of subjectivity. The Calais borderzone gains meaning through the grammar of circulation, where migrants are turned into a governable populations through the production of social groups. The population as a subject of circulation is divided into social classes: asylum seekers, refugees, and lorry drivers. Moreover, the population of asylum seekers is again sub-divided into women, unaccompanied children, and young men. In this grammar, walls and barriers govern populations by filtering, channeling and stopping depending on social
differentials (Pallister-Wilkins 2016, Vaughan-Williams 2015). Fences do not just divide lorry drivers from migrants, but also zone the camps according to sub-divisions between women, (unaccompanied) children and young men.

In opposition to the importance of commodity circulation through Calais and the rendition of lorry drivers as a social class, migrants’ transient movements appear out of place and threatening. Both in the UK media and parliamentary debates, migrants are seen to come from countries affected by war or unrest and are rendered as unruly, disordered, and dangerous. The media reiterates the language of the ‘jungle’ at Calais and military associations of migrants’ mobility with armies (Moodley 2015). In a recent intervention before the House of Commons, the Conservative MP David Davies depicted the situation in Calais as the continuation of violence among nation-states, expressed in separation along national lines so that ‘the Iraqis were in one area, the Pakistanis in another and other people somewhere else.’ (House of Commons 2015 Column 240).

These renditions of Calais migrants veer between the representation of a multitude plagued by violence and the image of dangerous vagabonds. Richard Burnett, Chief Executive of the UK Road Haulage Association, tells the Home Affairs Committee that hauliers and lorry drivers need to cope with what has been described as almost ‘civil war’:

Put yourself in the position of a driver driving a vehicle and he is surrounded by 10 or 20 migrants trying to get in, and they are bolt popping, tearing hard cords off, they are taking locks off. They are actually getting in through the roofs of trailers. They are opening powder tankers and getting into powder tankers as well (Home Affairs Committee 2015b).

What emerges during the inquiry is that the interruption of circulation is not understood only in terms of ‘civil war’ but as a more insidious disruption of the circuits of exchange that create surplus value: ‘Because of the infiltration into loads by immigrants whole loads are written off because of the fear of contamination’ (Home Affairs Committee 2015b).

The grammar of circulation also entails the transformation of the migrants into a social group, which can be integrated within a population through identification and integration into the asylum system. Rather than fences, and high-security perimeter protection, the logic of circulation is that of security through the creation of population groups. Yet, the Calais migrants do not translate their movement into circuits of exchange and do not follow the paths of directed movement prescribed by the Dublin Agreement in Europe. They refuse to claim asylum in France and continue to try and make their way to the UK. In an incomprehensible move for the UK authorities, they also do not plan to claim asylum in the UK as noted by the Director of the UK Border Force, Sir Charles Montgomery, before the Home Affairs Committee: ‘I think it is important to recognise that many of these clandestines are not seeking to gain asylum. They are in many cases seeking to avoid detection all the way through the system, so when some of them get to Dover they seek a return back to France’ (Home Affairs Committee 2015a, 9). For Montgomery, the Calais migrants aim to avoid detection by the system at all costs – being detected at Dover would imply traceability through the asylum, which in his view migrants refuse.

At the same time, an even earlier export of fences to Calais reveals a third grammar framing governmental interventions. Over the past few years, more and more kilometres of fencing have been set in place to stop migrants from gaining access to the UK. Security fencing had already been high on the UK government’s agenda, as Zaun Ltd, the company who had built security fencing for the London Olympics and the 2014 NATO summit in Cardiff, was called upon to offer advice on perimeter security in Calais. Developed in collaboration with the Metropolitan Police in London, the fencing systems for the London Olympics were not simply designed to resist the impact of a vehicle – as detailed by scenarios of terrorist attack – but also to prevent protesters from chaining themselves to the panel. 4 Thus, the close mesh used in Zaun’s high security fencing is almost impossible to cut
through.
The design of fences through the alliance between counter-terrorism experts, the police and private companies materialises mobility as the ‘mob’. ‘NATO offers security fence to help Calais tackle migrants’, titled BBC News on 7 September 2014, just days after the NATO summit. The so-called ‘Ring of Steel’ for the purposes of the NATO summit was the fence built for the London Olympics by Zaun Ltd. The magazine Professional Security reported that

the summit generated its share of protests, but news channels including the BBC, ITV and Sky News reported that ‘people are trying unsuccessfully to tear down the fence’ and that ‘paper planes and pieces of wood are occasionally being thrown over the cordon’ (Professional Security Magazine Online 2014).

Migrants escalating fences activate the grammar of mobility as the organised movement of a ‘mob’. Martina Tazzioli (forthcoming) has aptly noted that the lengthened presence and increased visibility of migrants in borderzones has led to a shift from the language of migration flows to that of mobs and crowds, partly due to their continued presence and quasi-immobilisation in borderzones. The grammars of mobility outlined here suggest that various languages and logics of relating mobility, security and subjectivity co-exist and create frictions with each other.

The language of the Calais ‘mob’ transpires in the UK tabloid media (Taylor 2015), but other depictions of the situation are not far from the implications of excessive and subversive mobility, as the media reiterates the language of ‘marauding mobs racing around, opening doors, cutting trailers, climbing into the back’ (Siddique 2015). Lorry drivers’ testimonies gathered by the Road Haulage Association reactivate grammars of disorderly motion compounded by the spectre of the mob/ility:

At this time I felt my own trailer begin rocking and saw that I was engulfed by dozens of immigrants swarming up onto the trailer despite the panels I have fitted to my ladders in attempt to avert such a situation. I was completely helpless to defend both myself, my property and my load. I was almost in fear of my life as I am well aware that the immigrants often carry offensive weaponry and are often aggressive towards drivers (Road Haulage Association Ltd 2015).

Different subjectivities – from population groups to armies and from multitudes to disorderly mobs – are produced by inflections of mobility and security. For instance, circulation is articulated for the purposes of security and UK populations, but it is not imagined for the Calais migrants. The circulation of fences to stop migrants and protestors from crossing borders, alongside the removal of blockages to the circulation of commodities needs to be read in conjunction with the European Commission’s earlier projects for ‘circular migration’ what would allow for ‘some degree of mobility back and forth’, while reducing ‘the temptation to overstay’ (European Commission 2007). Circular migration, thus defined, attempts to govern migration through the circuits of exchange.

The three political grammars developed here shed light on intersections of mobility and security in borderzones. The Calais ‘jungle’ camp is made intelligible as a borderzone where grammars of mobility, security and subjectivity intersect and become entangled. Reading the securitisation of the Calais borderzone from the perspective of different grammars of mobility moves us away from the discussions of camps and exceptionalism (e.g. Agamben 2005, Diken and Laustsen 2005). It also moves us beyond the impasse between the poles of border control or migrant agency (Vaughan-Williams 2015). If the camps at Calais are not simply spaces of abjection, but also spaces of community making, solidarity and activism (Rygiel 2011), the political grammars of mobility could also help shed light on
the possibilities and limits of migrant agency in the Calais borderzone.

Conclusion

This article has proposed an encounter between critical security studies and the mobilities literature in order to develop analytical devices to research the complex entanglements of mobility and security in contemporary politics. While mobility and circulation have often been used interchangeably, I have argued that their distinctions between motion, circulation and mobility have emerged within complex political grammars, where they conjugate security and subjectivity. Therefore, analyses of mobility and security are simultaneously attributions of subjectivity: people, multitudes, populations, social classes, vagabonds, and mobs. The paper has located the emergence of these political grammars in the seventeenth and eighteenth century: motion through Hobbes’s analysis of the sovereign state, circulation through Quesnay’s and the physiocrats’ theorisation of the rules of political economy, and mobility through the forgotten names of 18th century urban citizen-discontents recorded by Roger North. Finally, the paper analysed the rearticulation of these grammars in the Calais borderzone.

The political grammars of mobility, security and subjectivity render migrants thinkable and speakable in different ways. Starting from the ‘export’ of UK fences to the Calais camp, I have shown how fencing is differentially understood and deployed through motion, circulation and mobility. These epistemic-political distinctions depend upon specifications of subjectivity, which are predicated upon security. These specifications of subjectivity through the dynamics of one/many supplement the dynamics of self/other that has underpinned critical analyses of mobility and security. Developing further intersections between mobility and security studies will need to address the question of the ‘many’ in social and political governance. Or to quote Virno (2004), ‘such reflection must confront some harsh problems: above all the logical problem (which needs to be reformulated, not removed) of the relationship of One/Many’.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Monika Büscher, Mimi Sheller and David Tyfield for their invitation to address the intersections of mobility and security and their careful critical comments on several drafts of this article. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers for their generous reading.

Notes

1 For an extensive and conceptually rich engagement with mobility in critical security studies, see Vicki Squire (2011).
2 Mikko Jakonen (2013) is an exception to the literature that analyses the relation between multitude and the people in Hobbes, as he argues that the multitude expresses the ‘political problem of motion’.
3 Being-many does not necessarily imply large or massive numbers, but a representation of collective movement. As Tazzioli (forthcoming) notes, there can be ‘dearth mobs’ and scant numbers which are represented as dangerous mobs.

References


Moodley, K (2015) 'Somebody Is Going to Get Killed:' British Haulage Officials Warn of Mounting Trouble in Calais; Road Haulage Association Chief Executive Richard Burnett Said Some Migrants Have 'Metal Bars, Knives and, in One Incident, a Gun Was Pointed at a Trucker.'. The Independent, 6 July 2015.
