From Risk to Society
Function, Form and Feedbacks in the Cambodian Labour Migration System

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Awarding institution:
King's College London

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From Risk to Society: Function, Form and Feedbacks in the Cambodian Labour Migration System
From Risk to Society: Function, Form and Feedbacks in the Cambodian Labour Migration System

A thesis submitted to King’s College London in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

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December 2014
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For Raenelda Mackie.

This is yours as much as mine.
Acknowledgements

I would first like to express my thanks to my primary supervisor, Professor Raymond Bryant for this support during the last three years of research. His advice and guidance have been greatly valued and have been instrumental in shaping the course of this thesis in its journey from inception to completion. In a similar vein, my second supervisor Dr. Debby Potts, has also been enormously important in helping me to transmute ideas from woolly conception to structured and rigorous academic thought.

Outside King’s college, I owe a great many thanks to my research assistant and old friend Ly Vouch Long, whose services I was lucky enough to enjoy between his other projects working with the World Bank and the UNDP. As he has always done during our years of working together, he helped to turn abstract methodological aims into efficient day to day tasks, all the while putting informants instantly at ease.

Finally, I would like to extend my thanks to those Cambodia based institutions who assisted this research. In particular, I owe much to the Royal University of Phnom, whose loans of equipment during the course of my fieldwork were almost as valuable as the advice of their senior staff, John Pilgrim and Chanrith Ngin. Moreover, I am very grateful to Karen Schelzig of the ADB and Kleang Rim of the ILO, who were kind enough to offer their opinions and expertise on the wider picture of migration and livelihoods in Cambodia.
Abstract

This thesis seeks to explore the linkages between the networks which facilitate the exchange of information and assistance regarding internal Cambodian labour migration, and the physical assets and social systems within which, it is held here, they are embedded. In doing so, it revisits the area of enquiry recently associated with the social capital literature, with a new set of methodologies designed to circumvent some of the shortcomings associated with that theory. This is undertaken first, through recourse to the quantitative methodologies associated with network theory, and second, to the literature on endogenous systems of risk mitigation in response to natural disasters and climate pressures. In order that these local responses are framed fully within their multi-scalar context, structural violence theory is utilised in a linking role.

Thus, labour migration is viewed herein as a lens through which to view the dynamic evolution of traditional Cambodian social systems. In particular, it is effective as a means of understanding resilience and response to the Kingdom’s contemporary environment, both in terms of its persistent vulnerability to natural disasters and climate shocks, and the rapid, but highly unequal, economic growth which has characterised the “economic miracle” of the previous decade. Indeed, the nature of the inequality which has characterised this period of rapid growth will be one of the primary foci of this study, which offers to the literature an account of how uneven distributions of social and physical assets and risks are entrenched in complex ways by the process of labour migration.
Chapter One

Introduction

In spite of the famous images of black-clad peasants toiling over communal farms and work projects having become firmly embedded in the foreign perception of Cambodia, ‘the tragedy of [its] modern history’ (Derks, 2008: 1) has tended to be downplayed in scale. The four hellish years of the Democratic Kampuchea period did not occur in historical isolation, but represented the culmination of years of radicalism and conflict. Moreover, although, ‘the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 marked the end of three decades of warfare in Cambodia’ (Baromey et al., 2012: 14), peace remained far from forthcoming. Rather, the subsequent decade of Vietnamese control came to be characterised by civil war and insurgency deriving from the Khmer Rouge controlled West, where ‘armed opposition to the government’ (Blunt and Turner, 2005: 76) was to persist throughout the three year period of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia and beyond. Indeed, it is an irony in keeping with the period that stability would only be achieved following a ‘violent coup’ (Ibid.) by the Cambodian People’s Party in 1997.

Some commentators have argued that this sustained period of conflict was merely the latest manifestation of ‘a heritage of violence’ built upon an emotionally restrictive culture in which ‘shouting is frowned upon and anger is swallowed’ (Prasso, 1994: 73). Prasso, for instance, has drawn parallels between the atrocities committed during Cambodia’s several decades of strife, and the abundant folk tales, dating from the Angkor “golden age” and before ‘in which Cambodians allow violent passions to overrule common sense’ (Prasso, 1994: 73). Whilst any analysis which traces an unbroken cultural thread through a millennium of national history must be viewed with a good degree of scepticism (Springer, 2009), she is far from alone in the attempt, with many writers on Cambodia appearing bound by an almost inescapable tendency to infer parallels, continuities and stases, and to apply labels of ‘tradition, conservatism, timelessness and changelessness’ wherever possible (Derks, 2008: 1).

As such, ‘history...is a central theme in the way the country is portrayed’ (Derks, 2008: 1), and has been bound up tightly with the national narrative of recovery in recent years. During that time, debates over whether the travails of the seventies and eighties had cut so deep as to leave Cambodian society permanently drained of trust have, in general, given way to a widening viewpoint that years of warfare have not in fact destroyed the numerous village-level organisations which are the historical lifeblood of the country’s social structure (Pellini, 2004; Baromey et al., 2012).
Community organisations, pagoda associations and, conversely, deep-rooted systems of patriarchy have emerged, under the searchlight of recent research, as broadly distributed and thriving. However, whilst it is increasingly apparent that Cambodian society is neither ‘mad…destroyed…[nor]…returning to a nostalgic past’ (Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002: 109), the nation’s contemporary social organisations, though similar in appearance to their predecessors, nevertheless reflect having emerged into a much more dynamic and open environment than that of pre-war Cambodia. As a result, the persistent discourse of the static and ‘gentle land’ (Vickery, 1984), which was arguably never appropriate for a country characterised by alternating and often burdensome vassalage to its neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand, must be finally abandoned in favour of a discourse befitting a nation beset by, and increasingly responsive to, economic dynamism and social change.

Indeed, a fresh conception is all the more necessary given the unrelenting series of climate shocks which, since the turn of the millennium, has led households to rely increasingly on alternative sources of income to the paddy staple. Where available, fisheries and NTFP collection represented a traditional recourse, but increasing integration into the market economy has seen migration emerge as a livelihoods strategy of great importance. As a result, not only the volume, but the character of labour movement began to shift, so that ‘while migrant labour had previously supplied temporary, short-term income, it now became a central strategy for many households’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 80).

Nevertheless, in spite of a generalised acceptance of the expanding volume of migration and its increasing importance as a rural livelihoods strategy (e.g. Oeur, 2012; Lim, 2007; Maltoni, 2006), research into population movement in Cambodia has tended to be characterised by foreclosure along the lines of the rural-urban dyad. Those studies which have been undertaken – and given the scale and importance of the phenomenon there are mystifyingly few – inevitably possess either a rural or an urban focus, usually incorporating an addendum which concedes the importance of the corollary, but which either presents no data generated in the migratory destination (as in Oeur et al., 2012) or conducts secondary research with a merely corroborative function in sender villages (i.e. Lim, 2007).

Anthropological studies undertaken in recent years have proved similarly imbalanced. Derks’ (2008) investigation of Khmer women migrants to Phnom Penh, for instance, whilst insightfully probing the cultural implications of urban work, fails to expand upon her nuanced analysis with any significant investigation of the rural aspect of migratory culture, although she frequently alludes to it via
informants’ accounts. Conversely, Uk (2006) and Hinton (1998a; 1998b) base their analyses squarely in the rural sphere, as does Pellini (2004) in his work on the re-emergence of social capital in Cambodia. Whilst such limitation of scope is to some extent understandable given the time and budget constraints of research, it is argued here that the continuing tendency to prioritise either the rural or the urban is also symptomatic of a failure to fully recognise the linkages between the two. Change in the rural sector has simply not been conceived of as running in parallel to the ostentatious dynamism of Phnom Penh, and has therefore been viewed as typologically incompatible in research terms.

This Ph.D. aims to redress this obfuscatory division via the application of an analysis focussed not upon the factors which promulgate labour migration, or the specifics of migrant livelihoods, but rather, as Resurreccion (2005: 34) describes it, the space ‘in-between’ urban and rural: migratory linkages themselves. As such, it will seek to move beyond an acceptance that these linkages are important conveyers of information and opportunity, as noted by numerous authors (e.g. Potts, 2010; Derks, 2008; Ressureccion, 2005; Gugler, 1991), towards an in-depth analysis of their relationship to non-migratory social networks; their heterogeneity in relation to physical resources and inequality; and their role in generating social change and discordance at both the rural and urban ends of the migrant continuum.

As such, whereas previous studies (e.g. Scott, 1972, 1985; Brocheaux, 1983; Platteau, 1995a, 1995b; Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) have investigated the formation of rural social systems, and others have investigated the functionality of social networks both generally (e.g. Putnam, 2000; 1993; Burt, 2001; Granovetter, 1977) and in the context of migration (Potts, 2010; Derks, 2008; Ressureccion, 2005; Gugler, 1991), the novelty of this study lies in its attempt to cohesively integrate rural, urban, and migratory social networks. Moreover, it has sought also, in a manner rarely attempted within the aforementioned literature, to generate further insights into the dynamic relationship between social networks, economy and ecology via the application of a network mapping methodology created for the purpose of this study.

In the pursuit of these goals, then, this thesis will seek to answer three core questions about social and migratory linkages in Cambodia. First, why do social networks operate as they do in Cambodia and to what extent are they related to the functional requirements of the household, such as the need to mitigate environmental risk or share labour? Second, how do migratory linkages differ in response to differing volumes and distributions of assets on the part of the rural household and
what role does this play in the translocation of inequality? Third, how does the migratory and non-
migratory social structure elucidated by questions one and two feed back into itself from the point
of view of social norms: how, otherwise put, does the social structure which facilitates migration
impact upon the norms which underpin its operation?

In answering these questions, a theoretical framework capable of integrating the environmental,
economic, and cultural dimensions of labour migration as far as possible into a single, systematic,
conception will be outlined in chapter two. Therein, a tripartite theoretical framework will be
delineated which argues first for a re-launch of Mabogunje’s (1970) migration systems theory, in the
manner called for also by Bakewell (2013) and De Haas (2010), before proceeding to outline the
theoretical addenda necessary to reformulate it for the aims of this Ph.D. Ergo, section two of the
framework will introduce an approach to social capital recast in the light of network theory, as well
as Bourdieu’s (1984) and Galtung’s (1969; 1991) work, in order to render it applicable to the multi-
scalar nature of labour migration. Having done so, the final section of the framework will address the
relationship between social systems and the physical and economic environment in which they arise.

As such, in view of the aims of this Ph.D., the theoretical framework set out in chapter two seeks to
frame the networks which underpin labour migration firmly within the socio-cultural and
environmental context from which they emerge. In doing so, this thesis’ framework will emphasise
that “traditional” social systems exist to constrain as much as to facilitate and that the ability to
participate in labour migration – as well as the manner in which that participation takes place – is
itself a function of initial asset distribution, as well as the dynamic systems which migratory
networks become once migration has begun to take hold. In this way, the conceptual basis laid out
here is ultimately directed towards the exposition of labour migration as a phenomenon which
occurs at the nexus of society, ecology, and economy.

Following on from this theoretical framework, chapter three will present the research methodology
used during the course of this study. In doing so, it will examine a variety of relevant philosophical
perspectives, before identifying a critical realist standpoint as the most appropriate for the
investigation of the causal structures which influence action in the communities in question. In this
respect, it will be predicated not only on Bhaskar’s (2008) and Yeung’s (1997) expositions of critical
realist methodology, but also upon the methodologies of those authors deemed theoretically central
to this study. In addition to Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1984) work, the importance of which has already been
noted, the methodology presented here seeks to incorporate the influence of Watts (1983),
Fafchamps (2005), Scott (1985; 1972), and Galtung (1969; 1990) among others in order to align the practical aspect of this thesis with the theoretical dimensions outlined in chapter two.

Having arrived, via the analysis of these and other key authors, at a mixed methodology capable of incorporating the diverse theoretical elements which underpin this thesis, chapter three will subsequently provide a detailed account of the research process. It describes a method split into four phases, the first of which comprised preliminary fieldwork, during which site selection and background data collection took place. Thereafter, a two part questionnaire survey, investigating physical and social assets respectively, occupied the second and third phases. A final phase of research, examining migrants’ urban livelihoods and networks via primarily qualitative fieldwork, brought the field-based investigation to a close.

With the methodology having been detailed in this way, chapter four provides the economic and historical background necessary to contextualise the development of the local social systems under investigation. It begins by explaining the origins of the Cambodian state in relation to its neighbours, before proceeding to sketch the economic conditions which came to generate and define the “golden period” of the Angkor Empire, and which subsequently contributed to both the Kingdom’s acquiescence to the French Empire, and the unprecedented population movement and upheaval of the 20th century. As such, this historical overview is intended to provide the context necessary to understand contemporary events in Cambodia and to assist in the elucidation of contemporary structures of power relations through recourse to the events which helped shape them.

As such, it will be argued in chapter four that the events of the past several centuries have generated a national history of dislocation from the land, creating what Kalab, in the late sixties called the ‘great mobility of the Cambodian peasant’ (Kalab, 1968: 525), even before such movement reached an unforeseeable pinnacle during the Democratic Kampuchea period of 1975 - 1979. It will also be shown that population movement in Cambodia is now entering a third phase, in which the future of rural Cambodians is becoming increasingly bound up with ability to extend social networks across long national and transnational distances in order to capture some of the fruits of modern sector growth.

Data relating to this premise will be explored across the three subsequent chapters, the first of which, chapter five, will explore the linkages between farming and social structure which are the subject of research question one. In so doing, this chapter seeks to demonstrate the dynamic and
practical aspects of rural social systems which, it will later be shown, also underscore rural-urban migration systems. The chapter begins with a detailed analysis of income and asset distribution within the research site – three neighbouring villages within Krang Youv commune, Kandal province – including land, livestock, and remittances amongst others, after which this survey of asset distribution is analysed in tandem with various social network maps and data relating to the social structure of the village system. Via this dualistic approach, chapter five seeks to demonstrate both quantitatively – through the use of graphical and statistical methodologies – and qualitatively, via informant accounts and focus groups, the embeddedness of specific social networks within the physical environment of the village.

Chapter six will then proceed to investigate research question two, in the course of which it will explore the manner in which migratory networks interact with patterns of rural asset distribution and urban income sources. This aim here is to present a picture of urban social activity as embedded not only in the local, urban environment, but also as firmly tied to the assets and liabilities of the rural household. As such, this chapter will explore the extent to which rural inequalities are transmitted across hundreds of miles to the city, and perhaps even enhanced by the divergent urban opportunities available to migrants from differing backgrounds.

Having investigated linkages between rural asset distributions and social structure in chapter five, and the implications of these structural inequalities for migrant livelihoods in chapter six, the final empirical chapter of this Ph.D. will address the third research question of this thesis. Ergo, it will extend the analysis of migrant networks to the realm of cultural norms, attitudes and social practice, in order to elucidate the bi-directional relationship between these phenomena and the migratory and non-migratory networks delineated up to this point. In particular, this chapter will investigate how the structures and processes outlined previously are not only rooted in “traditional” norms, but also feed back to them, changing the way in which assets are valued and cooperative action is viewed. As such, this chapter builds on the previous chapter’s empirical analysis by outlining the manner in which modern sector labour migration is serving to expand the distance between rich and poor culturally as well as economically by shifting norms to reflect the new distributions of opportunity and capital. Finally, the study’s main findings across chapters five to seven will be concluded upon in chapter eight, which will also briefly consider future research possibilities in light of the insights generated by this Ph.D.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

The movement of labour is, in almost all cases, an extremely complex process which produces winners, losers and myriad influential feedbacks. The logistics of migration alone, comprising transport, networks of information, household power dynamics, and savings behaviour (amongst numerous other factors) is itself a cross-disciplinary topic, even before cultural feedbacks, social change and demography are incorporated into a somewhat more holistic analysis. Migration is, simply put, a phenomenon which draws upon and feeds into all aspects of people’s lives.

With this in mind, any attempt to construct a totalizing theoretical framework of labour migration, even one tailored specifically to the conditions and realities of Cambodia, is bound to fail: a process with its roots as sited equally comfortably in both global economic forces and household scale “socio-ecology” (Nevins, 2003) cannot be holistically theorized a whole. Nevertheless, a heuristic framework, capable of elucidating some of the linkages and processes which inhere between these scales is an achievable target. This shall be the aim herein.

In pursuit of this aim, the theoretical framework of this Ph.D. shall be divided into three parts. The first of these will be concerned with the migration literature itself, tracing an analysis via the early development theoretic literature of the 1950s and 1960s to the recently renascent migration systems literature. Having argued for the relevance of a theory of migration rooted in Mabogunje’s (1970) classic systems framework, the remainder of this chapter will set about the task of reformulating that model in the light of the four subsequent decades of academic research into the migration process.

In this regard, it will be argued that the key shortcoming of Mabogunje’s original framework lies in its failure to engage fully with either the local specifics of labour movement, or the multi-scalar processes which drive migration. In seeking to remedy these limitations, section two will begin to elucidate a hybrid framework, which combines element of the contemporary social capital literature with Bourdieu’s (1984) and Galtung’s (1969; 1991) symbolic capital and structural violence theories respectively, as a means of contextualizing the social behaviour upon which migration depends at a variety of scales.

For reasons which will be discussed below, the selected theoretical addenda are well suited to ameliorate some of the shortcomings of the original systems literature. However, the advantages of these theoretical addenda are also their shortcoming in that the introduction of localizing lenses has the potential to inhibit some of the inherent advantages of a systems framework. Moreover, neither Bourdieu nor Galtung deals in the requisite level of depth with environmental factors, which lie at
the core of the aims of this Ph.D. In view of this issue, the chapter will close with a third section wherein a case shall be made for a renewed focus upon functionality, as a means of reconciling environmentally responsive and social behaviour at the level of the household, small groups and wider systems.
2.1 Migration

Research into population movement has a lengthy history, but it is nevertheless a field frequently characterised as secondary to the economic forces upon which, it has long been assumed, the movement of peoples is directly dependent. Classic studies devoted specifically to human mobility, in particular Zelinski (1971) and Lee (1966) have relied heavily on paradigmatic economic models such as Thompson’s Demographic Transition (1929), Rostow’s Stages of Growth (1960) and Lewis’s Dual Sector (1954), and it is only relatively recently that the study of migration has been freed from ‘economic conceptualisations that make no explicit references to development’ (Brown, 2002: 42).

This change in attitude has closely mirrored the shifting economic paradigms of development, with the modernisation (e.g. Rostow, 1960), dependency (e.g. Frank, 1967) and neoclassical models all having contributed means and attitudes by which to view peoples’ movements, which still persist in the migration literature. In recognition of their importance in this respect, the following sections will briefly explore migratory frameworks according to their association with these models, before turning to alternative conceptualisations, and finally to an exposition of the integrated framework which will inform this Ph.D.

2.1.1 Neoclassical Equilibrium and the Todaro Model

It may be viewed as something of a curiosity that the migratory models associated with the earliest economic paradigms of development, in particular the Lewis dual-sector model, have required only relatively minor adjustment to maintain a continued relevance in academic and policy thinking to this day. Indeed, perhaps most notably, neoclassical interpretations of migration tend to retain the assumption made by Lewis that labour will move from areas of low income to high income and that it does so “costlessly”, resulting eventually in what the classic Hecksher-Ohlin model terms ‘factor price equalisation’, or the homogenisation of wages and population across a given country.

Of the numerous pieces of evidence to undermine these propositions, that which arguably caused academics and policy-makers the most concern in the twentieth century was the problem of urban unemployment in the developing world, where by the mid-sixties it had come to be noticed that migration did not respond directly to income signals and that people continued to move in search of urban work even when unemployment was extremely high (De Haas, 2008). The Todaro model of migration (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970) purported to explain this apparently illogical behaviour by introducing a time-based analysis, wherein migrants are viewed as rational economic agents who migrate in the expectation of higher wages in the long term.
The Todaro model came to be highly influential for a number of years and arguably remains one of the bases of the persistent neoclassical equilibrium perspective (De Haas, 2008), but it has nevertheless attracted significant criticism in the intervening decades. In particular, it has been dismissed as ahistorical and eurocentric, and as sharing neoclassicism’s persistent inability 'to deal with constraining factors such as government restrictions on migration' (De Haas, 2008: 7). In addition, anthropological and geographical fieldwork in the developing world, some of which predates Todaro’s model, (e.g. Potts, 2010; Shah, 2006; Kuhn, 2003; Rigg, 2002; Mabogunje, 1970) has revealed an enormous variety of migratory patterns and practices, many of which are distinctly circular in nature, and which therefore refute one of Todaro’s fundamental assertions: that ‘material progress usually has been associated with the gradual but continuous transfer of economic agents from rural based agriculture to urban oriented industry’ (Todaro, 1969: 139)

Indeed, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the linear labour movement proposed by orthodox economic models may be the exception rather than the rule, with Skeldon (1990), for instance, having compiled an extensive body of information on labour movement during the period preceding European industrialisation, demonstrating that the peasantry, often supposed to have been tightly bound to feudal landlords, was anything but immobile. As he argues, despite the fact that ‘compared with the static landowning elites, the mobile poor ‘may have left less of a trace on history…population mobility clearly played as great a role in the spread of people and ideas and in the transformation of society in the pre-industrial period as it is considered to have done during the industrial period and into our own era' (Skeldon, 1990: 44). This insight fundamentally undermines mobility models based on multi-stage and dual-sector conceptions, demonstrating as it does that 'high levels of mobility are not a product of the industrial revolution' (Skeldon, 1990: 45) and hence that any conception of development inducing a change in migration patterns cannot be couched 'in terms of a simple shift from lower to higher mobility' (Ibid.).

In addition, evidence suggest that even where the linear in-migration described by neoclassical equilibrium models does take place on a large scale, it does not necessarily supersede other forms of mobility entirely. Indeed, the various migratory streams may operate quite independently of each other and respond to external signals in a variety of ways. A fall in real incomes, for example, may significantly decrease the numbers of long term migrants, but leave numbers of short-term, circular, migration unchanged (Potts, 2010). The implication, that migration is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon composed of discrete popular movements, undermines the above models further, to the extent that, as Potts (2010: 1) concludes, ‘the experiences of the last three decades have entirely undermined the utility of conceptualizing [migratory] processes in relation to unilinear models'.
A further criticism of such models relates not to their specific conceptions of migration but to their underlying methodological individualism, or, as Skeldon notes, ‘the basic assumption...that people are income maximisers who migrate to achieve this objective’ (Skeldon, 1990: 128). Whilst it is widely accepted, following numerous studies and surveys, that some degree of economic rationality figures in many mobility decisions (e.g. Rigg, 2002; Parnwell, 1993; Brown, 1991; Skeldon, 1990; Chambers, 1983), the fallacious inference drawn by Neoclassical models: that migration is consequently atomistic, or independent of the social environment, holds very little currency. At the very least, and as Parnwell (1993: 72) highlights, ‘migration decisions are seldom taken without due consideration of broader implications for the migrant's family, household, or community at large’.

Furthermore, in addition to their abrogation of the finer points of migratory motivation, the asocial, individualistic approach of such models ignores the mechanisms which facilitate population movement. In this regard, the pervasive influence of the invisible hand mentality has created a situation in which orthodox conceptions of migration not only fail to note the ways in which people move, but even ideologically dismiss them. It is, after all, only the response to market forces which is important, not the details of that response: the neoliberal economist cares little whether an individual walks, cycles or drives to obtain a lower price or a higher wage. As such, one of the principle weaknesses of models such as Todaro's is that they fail to note that 'entry into the labour force, rather than being the result of individual calculus, is tightly constrained by the social networks which have been created by previous mobility and by social responsibilities' (Skeldon, 1990: 144). These networks, and their significance, will be discussed in detail below.

2.1.2 Historical-Structuralist Views

Running counter to the methodological individualist viewpoint is what may broadly be termed the historical-structuralist perspective on migration. This view, first popularised by Frank (1967) and later forming the basis of world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1980) and more specifically migration systems theory (Mabogunje, 1970), takes issue with the idea of migration as the result of individualistic economic agency. Instead, historical structuralists argue that ‘rural-urban migration may appear to be the result of free choice, but the circumstances which faced the migrant may in reality have left little option but to move' (Parnwell, 1993: 24) – a viewpoint borne out by several decades of literature which highlights the long-term structural factors, such as the disparity in rural and urban investment (Parnwell, 1993: 75), as well as underlying apparently “voluntary” decisions such as land or asset sale (e.g. Chambers, 1983).
Nevertheless, whilst this perspective is instructive, to view migration purely through the prism of world systems is insufficient. The continued existence of differential sectors and “traditional” agrarian regions in any form demonstrates, after all, that 'the penetration of capitalism is not generally an all-powerful juggernaut that destroys pre-existing societies and economies in a single irresistible sweep' (Skeldon, 1990: 134). Indeed, in many ways, this view is just as much an obfuscation as the neoclassical models discussed earlier, ignoring as it does that in many cases, 'migration serves to reinforce the existing social structures rather than change them' (Stark in Portes, 2008: 16; Gugler, 1968; 1991).

Whilst such evidence does not necessarily undermine the historical-structuralist perspective, it nevertheless demonstrates that reality requires more nuanced systems of thinking. In this respect, historical-structuralism has been challenged in recent decades by the successful economic development of a number of countries, in particular the Southern European and Asian Tiger states, 'despite – or perhaps thanks to – their firm connections to global capitalism' (De Haas, 2008: 8). Whilst it may be justifiably argued that their success, especially in Asia, has been constructed according to a state-led model which has managed exposure to the free market, to argue that their recent relationship to capitalism has been adversarial would invite justified criticism.

Indeed, just as an atomistic preoccupation with individuals’ motivations and behaviour leaves much of relevance unexamined, ‘a shortcoming of the macro-level structural approach is that it tends to view migrants as an amorphous, homogeneous entity who appear to have little choice but to migrate', thereby neglecting the complex detail of the migration process (Parnwell, 1993: 75). As such, overly structuralist conceptions of migration risk the same elisionary failings as neoclassical models in that much as ‘the individualists ignore the constraints under which movers have to operate...the structuralist, in focussing on more macro-level variables, belittles the experience of the individual migrant' (Skeldon, 1990: 130). Given the mirrored shortcomings of each paradigm, the examination of “integrative” models will occupy the subsequent pages.

2.1.3 Transitional and Universalist Mobility Frameworks

The push-pull model, formalised and popularised by Everett Lee in 1966, remains one of the simplest and most enduring conceptions of migration. In outline, Lee argues that migration takes place when positives in the destination (such as higher wages and access to services) and negatives at the origin (such as landlessness, livelihoods shocks, enduring poverty) are sufficient to outweigh the financial and utility costs of moving, assuming that the specific obstacles to movement can be overcome. This framework remains highly influential, with the push-pull dichotomy having taken root in the
migration lexicon to the extent that the theory from which it derives arguably remains the conceptual default. Furthermore, its usage in a nuanced or specific manner remains popular, with Potts (2010: 9), for example, arguing that it 'still has considerable value as an organising framework for evaluating changing patterns of circulation'.

However, in spite of its intuitive simplicity, the push-pull model continues to divide opinion as to whether its underlying logic is either sparsely contingent or merely tautological. Skeldon, for instance, like De Haas (2008), places little stock in the framework, stating that 'it is but a platitude at best' (1990: 128) and that, in common with the neoclassical conception of migration, it lacks 'any explanatory power as to why there should be a difference between areas of push and pull in the first place' (1990: 126; De Haas, 2008). As such, although it functions successfully within its own somewhat shallow remit, the model is unable to process the subtleties of locality, the historical background to this socio-economic topography, or the mechanisms by which people migrate.

Thus, the argument over the validity of the push-pull model returns to some extent to the debate over individualism versus historical-structuralism, with proponents of Lee’s framework almost necessarily favouring the former to some extent. Indeed, whilst it is not impossible, as Potts has, to utilise the push-pull model as a tool within a wider, historically grounded conception of migration, it nevertheless remains at its core 'a functionalist gravity model' (De Haas, 2008: 11) which views individuals as atomistic, ahistorical and bereft of personal and cultural preference. As a result, the push-pull model, though not without utility as a basic conceptual tool, retains major shortcomings in terms of its explanatory power, not least in terms of its failure to note that the character of migration differs markedly between nations and regions, and that the nature of migration tends to evolve over time – a phenomenon first formalised into a practical model by Zelinski in 1971.

Zelinski argued that 'not only has there been a general and spectacular expansion of individual mobility in modernising societies, but also that the specific character of migration processes tends to change over the course of this vital transition' (De Haas, 2008: 12). He therefore hypothesised that 'there are definite patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernisation process' (Zelinski, 1971: 221). Zelinski consequently linked mobility to a Modernisation Theory conception of national economic development, allowing him to avoid some of the universalist inaccuracies of the push-pull model because his model need 'not naïvely assume an inversely proportional relationship between development and migration levels' (De Haas, 2008: 13) and is therefore able to account for at least some of the heterogeneity evidenced by empirical data on migratory trends.
Nevertheless, the Zelinski framework has been widely attacked for overreaching itself in attempting to account for all forms of historical and contemporary migration, with its historical model having been shown to be flawed in a number of studies (e.g. Potts, 2010; Kuhn, 2003; Skeldon, 1990). In this respect, much of the criticism levelled against it derives from the inaccuracies carried over from its “parent” theorem, the Rostow stages model, whose various fallacies, not least the myth of the pre-industrial “immobile peasant”, as debunked by Skeldon (1990), have been outlined above. As such, 'its universalist pretensions are not only its strength but also its main weakness' (De Haas, 2008: 13), with theorists on migration having made numerous attempts in the wake of Zelinksi’s work to eliminate its obvious shortcomings whilst retaining at least some of its universality.

This goal has been pursued both by a consolidation, via the empirical literature, of those aspects of migration which appear to be at least generally true, and a widening appreciation of the variety of factors which precipitate, influence and facilitate migration beyond the purely economic, which has become necessary following evidence that even countries with ostensibly similar economic and demographic characteristics ‘tend to show highly diverging migration characteristics' (De Haas, 2008: 18). To this end, De Haas (2008: 16) offers the following interpretation of the mobility transition, reduced in the scope of its universalism, but expanded in its appreciation of the factors involved:

'In the early stages of development, an increase in wealth tends to lead to a rise in migration, since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating...With increasing wealth and the establishment of migrant networks, an increasing proportion of the population is able to migrate, selectivity of migration tends to decrease, and this process of development initially tends to lead to an increasing diffusion of migration across communities'.

This conception follows Brown (1991: 50), who argues that this decrease in selectivity is reinforced by an institutional and technological transition from an initial period, when 'interpersonal contacts between family and friends are the primary source of information', to a later stage in which the information required to migrate is disseminated through modern media and institutional structures. However, whilst it is difficult to refute the tenet, as taken up by Brown and others, that there 'appear to be basic long term structural shifts which orchestrate the mass of individual [migratory] events', (Skeldon, 1990: 46), Brown’s conception arguably remains an essentialism too far to reflect the breadth of experience in reality. Skeldon, for instance, contests the proposition that migration is necessarily associated with a capitalist rationalisation of mobility and labour markets in the manner described above, positing instead that 'the nature of the society being incorporated' (Ibid.:133) is a significant factor in generating heterogeneous outcomes of modernisation.
The idea of capitalist development and traditional practice interacting is not a new one, having been expounded in the form of Migration Systems Theory by Mabogunje in 1970. As Mabogunje explains, ‘within the systems framework, attention is focussed not only on the migrant but also on the various institutions (sub systems) and the social, economic and other relationships (adjustment mechanisms) which are an integral part of the migrant’s transformation’ (Mabogunje, 1970: 5). These subsystems and adjustment mechanisms signify, in the former case, the family, household, community etc., and in the latter, the means by which livelihoods strategies can be adjusted to suit changing circumstances, for instance with respect to agricultural land usage - a conception which facilitates the investigation of the inception and effects of migration concurrently.

This holistic approach is concordant with the aims of this Ph.D. from both a theoretical and practical point of view, and serves, in particular, to underline the failings of a number of the models outlined above. Indeed, none of those previously explored takes account of feedbacks by migration to the environment in which migration takes place, resulting in their coming to reflect reality less and less over time because ‘the state of a system at any given time is not determined so much by its initial conditions as by the nature of the process...since open systems are basically independent of their initial conditions’ (Mabogunje, 1970: 13). Viewed thus, any model which fails to account for this dynamism is guilty of a fundamental logical oversight by 'drawing on the erroneous, sedentary notion that migration and development are substitutes, rather than complements' (Mabogunje, 1970: 9).

Furthermore, of particular relevance herein is Mabogunje's emphasis on the practical linkages between origin and destination areas. As he notes, and as numerous authors have done subsequently (e.g. Potts, 2010; Derks, 2008; Ressureccion, 2005; Gugler, 1991), these linkages tend to remain in place over time, being reinforced by cumulative migration flows and 'yielding an identifiable geographical structure that persists across space and time' (Mabogunje, 1970: 12). Furthermore, this ‘clustered morphology of migration flows...typically cannot be explained by employment...income and other opportunity differentials’ (De Haas, 2008: 22), indicating that the social connections between migrants may come to form a persistent and self-reinforcing edifice, with major ramifications for the manner in which migration takes place, and the outcomes derived from it, even 'over several generations' (Parnwell, 1993: 91).

As such, ‘the often coincidental choices made by pioneer migrants or labour recruiting employers tend to have a great influence on subsequent migration patterns’ (De Haas, 2008: 18), essentially representing a filter through which price signals and employment information are passed in the sense that migrants and potential migrants are less likely to be able to take advantage (or even
become aware) of modern sector opportunities to which they are not already socially linked in some way. Indeed, these networks are so important that their absence has been shown to represent a barrier to mobility in a number of studies (e.g. Resurreccion, 2005; Parnwell, 1993: 94; Kuhn, 2003; Mabojune, 1970).

Networks, then, are a constraining as well as a facilitating factor in migration, so that, as Kuhn argues, ‘urban-rural networks of social capital act as a form of credit, not merely as a resource that we can generally ascribe to all those who live in its midst’ (Kuhn, 2003: 25). The extent of this exclusivity remains open to debate, however, with it having been variously argued that they are characterised by ‘the promotion of mobility among certain demographic and ethnic groups and exclusion of others’ (Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler, 2003: 11), and on the other hand, that they have a tendency to spread through a community over time as a result of ‘falling costs and risks’ (De Haas, 2008: 20; Massey et al., 1990).

In accordance with Skeldon’s (1990) conception of migration as a resource which bolsters, rather than undermines, traditional social practice, an approach which admits the possibility of exclusion is adopted herein. Indeed, there is ample evidence to support this, with empirical research (e.g. Kuhn, 2003; Rogaly, 2003), having noted that rather than becoming ‘bridgeheads facilitating subsequent migration...[migrants]...may also become restrictive gatekeepers, being hesitant or unwilling to assist other migrants’ (De Haas, 2008: 20) – a phenomenon detailed at length in the Indian context by Kuhn who argues that migration has ‘not just added a new actor (the gatekeeper) in a new gravitational field...[but has]...added an entirely new form of gravity (modernity)’ (Kuhn, 2003: 11).

In spite of such evidence, there is an incomplete body of literature regarding the exclusionary role of migratory linkages. As De Haas (2008: 20) argues, this may be because ‘much empirical research on migrant networks tends to focus on the dependent (network) variable and is therefore potentially biased towards instances where such networks do play their ascribed migration facilitating and diffusionist role’. Furthermore, in addition to neglecting those who do not belong to the relevant network type, research of this sort often fails to link the incidence and development of networks to wider economic, political and social processes, an oversight which tends to obfuscate the nature of their distribution, as well as offering few clues as to the factors which might underwrite such exclusivity.

For instance, according to world systems theory, ‘regions that are dominated by a few industries may undergo a simple, single wave process of development, while a region such as Southeast Asia – ‘one of the most dynamic in the world (Resurreccion, 2005) – is likely to show much more complex
interrelated patterns with no clear overall phases of growth or stagnation' (Skeldon, 1990: 146). It follows, then, that we should anticipate ‘the relationship between business and product cycles and migration [being] complex and difficult to decipher; particularly so given the importance of chain migration and the fact that there are likely to be lag effects in information diffusing down the urban and social hierarchies' (Ibid.). As such, a greater degree of conceptual integration is necessary between local processes, such as social network behaviour, and world systems, in order that either be satisfactorily understood. Since no one framework is able to achieve this, the potential efficacy of an integrated portfolio of models must be explored below.

2.1.4 Towards an Integrative Theoretical Framework

The preceding selective analysis of migration theory has demonstrated the failure of any one theoretical model to adequately explain the highly complex and heterogeneous process of labour migration in the developing world. It has also shown, however, that the majority of those theoretical conceptions explored retain some explanatory value, even if it is a partial one. As such, the construction of an integrative framework would appear prudent, with it having already been noted by Potts (2010: 4), for instance, that ‘a combination of approaches yields the most satisfying results’. Indeed, it is the basis of this framework that results of some generalised significance are best attained using a combination of the approaches outlined above.

With respect to this aim, atomistic conceptions such as the Lee (1966) and Todaro (1969) models are generally too ahistorical and too shallow in terms of their examination of the mechanics of migration to be considered a viable addition to an integrated framework. Mabogunje’s migratory systems theory, by contrast, though superannuated to almost the same degree, retains significant promise in this respect, especially given its focus on the dynamic interaction between the migration process itself and the environment in which it takes place. Whilst the assertion that ‘open systems are basically independent of their initial conditions’ (Mabogunje, 1970: 13) requires some mitigation, given that migratory experience is not so heterogeneous as to make it impossible to find parallels in regions with similar initial conditions, this may be satisfactorily achieved through recourse to Skeldon (1990) and De Haas’s (2008) revisions of Zelinki’s (1971) mobility framework.

Finally, for the reasons outlined above, it is held here that the role of social networks is key to an effective understanding of the migration process, in which regard they function both as a ‘means of finding and maintaining a foothold in the urban location [and as] a fallback mechanism’ (Agergaard and Thao, 2011: 409). Nevertheless, it is not sufficient merely to accept their significance in the manner that Lee (1966), for instance, does; as part of a package of factors which may facilitate or
impede the natural working of wider economic forces. Rather, if these networks are to be placed at
the core of our understanding of migration, then their proper contextualisation within the wider
social environment is essential. To this end, the following subsection will outline a social capital
framework which is receptive both to the social institutions which influence migration, and the
networks which facilitate it.
2.2 Reformulating Social Capital

2.2.1 Conceptual Difficulties with Aggregability and Reductionism

Following a rapid rise to theoretical prominence from the 1980s onwards, recent years have seen widespread criticism that social capital theory has become a false panacea, whose breadth of influence and lack of an accepted definition has led to its becoming ‘all things to all people and hence nothing to anyone’ (Woolcock, 2001: 69). In response, social capital theorists have made various attempts to codify more precisely its inputs and outputs, with perhaps the most influential example of such clarificatory, or reductionist, work being Robert Putnam’s (1995) model, wherein the more nebulous elements – networks of trust, and social and moral obligations – are viewed as functions of the third component: institutions and associations. According to this conception, the level of benefit a community (or individual) may expect to receive from social capital may be accurately predicted by the numbers of institutions, from PTAs to ten pin bowling clubs, which are actively participated in.

This method has been used by Putnam to explain, for instance, why Northern Italy was able to pursue orderly and stable democracy while chaos reigned in the South following the 1976 governmental reforms (Putnam, 1993), as well as to suggest that social capital, thus conceived, may be two to three times more influential a schooling input than more traditional concerns such as educational budget or teacher-pupil ratios (Putnam, 2000). In practice, however, Putnam’s civil society has been criticised as being somewhat mono-dimensional (Siisiäinen, 2000), with major concerns remaining regarding the logical circularity of Putnam’s methodology, wherein ‘evidence of [social capital’s] existence leads to noting positive outcomes which, in turn, are proof that it exists’ (Bankoff, 2007: 338; Fine, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2010; Tarrow, 1996).

Dissatisfaction with this tautology underlies much of the criticism levelled against Putnam, who is widely seen as having failed to ‘offer an appropriate economic analysis...[to explain]...the mechanisms by which such measures of social capital lead to discernible differences at the economic level’ (Fine, 2001: 98). In this respect, Portes highlights two fundamental conceptual errors. 'First: starting from the effect (success/ wealth) and working retroactively' and second: failing to adequately note exceptions to his findings, such as the increase in associational activity in Southern Italy which was not associated with growth (Tarrow, 1996), and thereby reducing 'the logical space between cause and effect so that the final predictive statement is either a truism or circular' (Tarrow, 1996: 20).
Furthermore, in addition to the weaknesses in his economic model, 'definitional issues have become a cause of much concern, with definitions frequently being tailored to anticipate outcomes, demeaning their usage' (Fine, 2001: 101). Particularly problematic is the failure to distinguish between individualised social capital and social capital belonging to a community, with Putnam viewing the latter as the simple aggregate of the former in spite of the fact that, not only is such a methodology theoretically dubious in principle (Lin, 1999), but in practice the two may in fact be inversely correlated, for instance where 'social capital in the form of social control...[undermines]...social capital in the form of network mediated benefits...[because]...the latter consists precisely in the ability to bypass existing norms' (Portes, 2000: 15).

In this regard, Putnam’s reductionism has been shown to be somewhat problematic in a variety of real world contexts and whilst some authors, such as Pellini (2004) have identified a number of traditional associations which, as a composite, may be indicative of a generally higher level of social well-being than exists in their absence, it would be illogical to attribute all of the benefits of mutual cooperation to such bodies, or, indeed, to take their apparent presence or otherwise at face value. As Bankoff (2007) notes, the Putnamian tendency to seek out formal, single purpose civil society organisations in developing countries may potentially lead to the oversight of traditional, multi-purpose community organisations which exist, wholly or partially, in the form of norms rather than institutions and which, as he demonstrates in the case of community natural disaster responses in the Philippines, may become apparent only sporadically. As will be demonstrated below, however, such shortcomings are not inherent to the quantitative analysis of social systems, if applied with sufficient contextual care. What follows will examine and present those elements of social capital best suited to the analysis of this environment.

### 2.2.2 Migration and Social Capital in the Cambodian Context

It is already well established that 'migration is selective and provides greater returns to those better able to take advantage of the opportunity...[as a result of the]...costs and barriers associated with migration, which steer gains towards the better off' (De Haan, 1999: 103). However, whether such networks could become consolidated to the extent of developing Cambodia into ‘a country of insiders and outsiders’ (Hughes, 2001: 19), remains open to debate. Whilst migration theory has traditionally suggested otherwise, adopting a broad consensus being that ‘once the number of network connections in an origin area reaches a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating because migration itself creates the social structure to sustain it’ (Massey, 1990: 20), more recent ethnographic studies have emphasised the manner in which access to migration becomes a capital resource, to the extent that ‘an individual or family’s resource base and identity depend less on the
security of land ownership and more on the security afforded by rural urban social support relationships’ (Kuhn, 2003: 3).

Furthermore, the situation in Cambodia is unusual. Given the damage inflicted in the twentieth century to ‘the social foundations that traditionally serve as the girders for state building and cohesion’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000), numerous authors (e.g. Pellini, 2004; Colletta and Cullen, 2000) have noted that the social capital stocks which would usually facilitate an inclusive cumulative causation of migratory linkages were damaged during conflict. Nevertheless, as Ledgerwood and Vijghen note, Cambodian traditional society is not ‘mad, destroyed or returning to a nostalgic past’ (Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002: 109) and the re-emergence of traditional civil society organisations from the 1980s onwards, albeit with Khmer Rouge power structures having retained a foothold in some cases (UK, 2006), is testament to this (see e.g. Pellini, 2004a).

In attempting to investigate migration in this environment, the roughly thirty years of social capital theory represent an invaluable corollary to an ethnographic approach which, although undoubtedly illuminating, is unable to fully capture the generalised and repeatable trends which are an essential means of understanding development (Fine, 2001). Whilst the perspective as a whole, or its various strands, have not proved to be the world changing paradigms they once promised to become, they have nevertheless contributed to an advancement in our understanding of the power of social networks and norms to influence societies and developmental outcomes in the Global South. Indeed, ‘one of the achievements of the social capital literature is to demonstrate that there are resources out there in society that are not recognised as such because they do not directly take up some sort of commercial form’ (Fine, 2001: 27). Access to migration, and the ability to exchange information about it, is exactly one such resource.

Nevertheless, in utilising the theory, it is essential to understand the flaws carried forward from its inception by Coleman as the study of ‘expectations and trustworthiness, information channels, and norms and effective sanctions’ (Bounds, 2004: 109), in which respect Coleman’s work has been subject to considerable criticism, not least by Fine, who reproaches him for a ‘hopelessly ill informed’ (Fine, 2001:74) economic outlook based on a perfect market model expounded by Gary Becker, his colleague at Columbia, as well as a model whose elision of socio-historical factors leaves it ‘ridden with crudity and falsehoods’ (Fine, 2001:75). Furthermore, as Fine argues, the key underlying concept of social capital as expounded by Coleman – its fungibility with other forms of capital – is conceptually misinformed by this same perfect market assumption, which renders an otherwise crucial tenet of social capital theory manifestly unsuitable as a tool for understanding the idiosyncrasies of developing world socio-economic interactions.
Since its inauguration by Coleman, however, social capital theory has grown to encompass an enormous variety of additional approaches, with Pierre Bourdieu's conceptual model providing a particularly thoughtful and well developed theoretical starting point. Whilst Bourdieu rarely claimed any direct association with social capital theory in general (although he does utilise the term), he is frequently cited as a major contributor to the field as a result of a sociology which appears to share many of its aims. Indeed, as Bounds (2004: 109) explains, 'for Bourdieu, social capital is both the social relationships that enable access to the resources of a group or network and the volume and quality of resources possessed by network members of the group' – a conception which appears to mirror that of a number of social capital's other luminaries.

However, whilst some of the fundamental aims and premises are similar, Bourdieu's work in fact differs greatly from his peers in the social capital field, due not least to its roots being primarily in sociology and philosophy (and in the European tradition at that), as opposed to the more economically based oeuvre of Coleman, Putnam and Becker, for example. This alternative heritage manifests in numerous ways, but is primarily cited as being the basis for a much more complex and complete theoretical model of social capital which stands in contrast to those authors cited above, all of whom derive from 'the more empirically minded Anglo-Saxon tradition' (Fine, 2001: 53). Indeed, Bourdieu's theoretical retention of the social field, as opposed to the economically rational individual, as the fundamental driver of action is, as argued by Fine (2001) and Ray and Sayer (1999), one of the reasons the Frenchman has until recently been somewhat abandoned in the evolving social capital literature.

In this respect, rejecting the rational actor model of conduct espoused elsewhere as further evidence of the ‘ruinous’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 25) distinction between subjectivism and objectivism in social science, Bourdieu sees action as ‘patterned and interest orientated at a tacit, pre-reflective level of awareness that occurs through time’ (Schwartz, 1997: 67). This break with subjectivism led him to cast doubt on the validity of informant accounts which 'assume too much and are too general for the kinds of details needed by researchers to uncover the underlying principles of practices' (Schwartz, 1997: 57). As he argues, the structuring nature of society infuses subjective opinions and independent perspectives, rendering them merely (somewhat unreliable) reflections of the wider field:

‘The social order is progressively inscribed in people’s minds. Social divisions become principles of division, organizing the image of the social world. Objective limits become a sense of limits, a practical anticipation of objective limits acquired by experience of objective limits’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 471)
Rather than relying upon qualitative data then, he espouses the marriage of “actor perspectives” with a form of 'positivist social science...[which]...gives priority to macro structures, often in the form of statistical regularities, which are rarely visible to the engaged actors and must be constructed by the social scientist' (Ibid.). In this respect, Bourdieu outlines a specific conception of what constitutes an appropriate form of quantitative sociological data collection. Therein:

He 'maintains that the social sciences should deal with cultural and social relations just as modern geometry treats its subject matter. Just as points and lines in geometrical figures derive their significance from the relations that link them rather than from the intrinsic features of individual elements, so also the model of social life should be constructed' (Swartz, 1997: 62).

As such, Bourdieu's quantitative methodology 'has more in common with the growing use of network analysis than with regression techniques employed in status attainment research' (Ibid.), a point on which he has been criticised by Fine (2001), who argues that his approach is in many ways just as reductive as that employed in mainstream economic usage of social capital, for which he has an avowed distaste. Nevertheless, Fine concedes that Bourdieu’s historical and contextual attention to detail set his work apart from simpler incarnations of network analysis and that his chaining of quantitative data to a richly explored qualitative context via the principle that 'the various correlations...[produced through quantitative analysis]...are meaningless in the absence of an understanding of the correlates themselves' as well as his use of a 'methodology...[which]...involves the use of categories that are investigative in intent and only become systematic with use' (Fine, 2001: 62), largely protect him from accusations of hypocrisy in this respect.

In view of its commitment to the contextualised examination of networks, Bourdieu's methodology appears particularly well suited both to the investigation of migratory information flows themselves (e.g. Wong and Salaff, 1998), and their relation to the wider social environment (e.g. Erel, 2010). Indeed, the quality and density of social networks, both in migrant enclaves and their sender villages, has been found to be a major factor in livelihoods outcomes and varies markedly between cases (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014; RUPP-IDRC, 2009; Kuhn, 2003), suggesting that the study of linkages, nodes and connections in the manner Bourdieu describes, together with a detailed qualitative investigation of the context in which they take place appears to likely to produce instructive results. The theoretical implications of such an endeavour will be discussed below.

2.2.3 Network Theory and the Fungibility of Advantageous Positioning

Although network analysis, of the sort described above, has its roots in the early twentieth century sociography sub-discipline of sociology, the modern history of the field is bound tightly to Granovetter (1973: 1360), who viewed the discipline primarily as a solution to contemporary
Granovetter’s counterintuitive finding was that weak ties, defined as those relationships further down a linear scale of time invested, emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocal exchanges (Granovetter, 1973: 1361) are the more efficient components of a social system in terms of their ability to transmit information, because they are associated with less wastage, or repeated information exchange, than stronger ties to family or close friends. Otherwise put, the relationships which cost the most time, effort and (often) money to maintain, are less useful in terms of information exchange, and therefore less advantageous, than those which exist amongst acquaintances who communicate only occasionally.

In essence, then, although Granovetter tends to present his expositions of the theory at the level of small groups, ‘the theory is one of individual social capital, where people with more weak ties (i.e., more social capital) are more successful’ (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 4). What he fails to attempt, however, is an explanation as to how individuals so endowed may have arrived at this ‘serendipitous’ (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 4) situation, thereby casting the “nodes” who comprise social structure as essentially without agency in its generation. This perspective is disputed by Burt (1992; 2001), whose “structural holes” theorem promotes ‘a more strategic and instrumentalist view’ (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011: 4), wherein the focus is shifted to the gaps between social sub-groups, rather than the weak ties between them.

The consequence of Burt’s focal adjustment is to present the advantageous positions within social structures as opportunities, rather than endowments, which actors are able to become aware of and utilise for their personal benefit. As he argues, a structural hole is ‘like an insulator in an electric circuit’, halting the flow of information between two sub-groups in a manner which can be bridged by an interested agent (Burt, 2001: 35). Thus, because ‘individuals with contact networks rich in structural holes are the individuals who know about, have a hand in, and exercise control over more rewarding opportunities’ (Burt, 2001: 36), the structural holes theorem is essentially ‘the contextual
complement to human capital’ (Burt, 2001: 32) in that networks of this sort are an acquirable, and in some respects fungible, capital resource.

Indeed, the relation of network advantage to other forms of capital is a key tenet of Burt’s theorem, which is one of the few to satisfactorily advocate the embeddedness of social networks within wider structures of physical, financial and cultural wealth. As Salancik (1995: 346) explains, ‘Burt’s work puts network analysis squarely into the realm of resource dependence by recognising that...a network position can be a source of constraint as well as a source of goods and information’. Nevertheless, despite this recognition, the structural holes thesis retains some of the methodological shortcomings characteristic of other forms of network analysis in that, by focussing primarily on network positioning, it may often fail to note relationships which, though significant, are ‘idle’ and, to an even greater degree, may fail to note the significance of ‘relationships which don’t exist’ (Salancik, 1995: 346-7) between key individuals or groups.

As Lin (1999: 36) argues, this failing inheres, ‘either explicitly or implicitly’, in any network theory which views network positioning as the primary source of gain in a social system. For this reason, it emerges as necessary to adopt an alternative approach, which views social capital not as ‘mere social relations’ but as resources which are both ‘embedded and accessed’ (Lin, 1999: 37 [Emphasis added]). Thus, whilst ‘network locations are necessary conditions of embedded resources...[they]...should be treated as exogenous, rather than endogenous variables of social capital itself’ (Lin, 1999: 37), or, otherwise put, they are a resource which may be advantageous in the pursuit of other forms of capital, but which can often only be mobilised in the presence of other complementary assets.

As such, with respect to the aims of this Ph.D., the question of greatest significance is that of the relationship between migratory information networks, social capital and other forms of capital, physical and economic in particular. Like Burt (1992; 2001), Bourdieu (e.g, 1986) writes at some length regarding the fungibility of social capital, which he describes as a pragmatically utilised ““credential” entitling [the bearer] to credit, in the various senses of the word’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 86). Nevertheless, concerns do exist regarding Bourdieu’s conception of such “assets”, many of which derive from the microcosmic structure/ agency debate within social capital, with which, as the most notable proponent of structure, he is frequently associated.

Indeed, ‘for Bourdieu, social action is determined primarily by deeply sedimented dispositions and semi-conscious instrumental action’ (Ray and Sayer, 1999: 60), a position which allows him to
attribute a high degree of rationality and intelligibility to informal, social, transactions which might otherwise be classed as purely incidental. This is important because, as Portes (1998: 4) notes, "transactions involving social capital tend to be characterised by unspecified obligations, uncertain time horizons, and the possible violations of reciprocal expectations", characteristics which in practice make them hard for the outsider to see, and even harder to quantify or analyse.

This uncertainty creates ample space for theoretical debate. Sayer (1999: 60), for instance, first takes issue with Bourdieu's conception of fungibility, stating that 'whilst under certain conditions, these forms of capital may be converted to economic capital (and back), they can also function somewhat independently of money and wealth'. As he goes on to state secondly, 'Bourdieu's concept of capital...fails to distinguish between investment in goods – such as education, culture, social relations – from the point of view of their use value...and investments from the point of view of their exchange value' (Ibid.), thereby accusing the former of failing to create not only an accurate framework for quantification, but even an appropriate classificatory basis from which to begin such a task.

In answering the second of these concerns, it is useful to invoke what Kane describes as 'the venerable distinction between wealth and capital...[wherein]...wealth may be loved for itself, used for consumption or hoarded against some future calamity, but only when it is invested in some profitable enterprise for the sake of profitable returns does it become capital' (2001: 7). In terms of their flexibility, then, many of the social "capital" investments people make are in fact closer to Kane’s definition of wealth. For instance, the provision of free labour to a neighbour during harvest time may be redeemed in several ways: directly (through the reciprocal provision of labour at another time, or part of the harvest yield), indirectly (through the religious or social prestige associated with helping those in need, or the sharing of employment information for example) or in a manner unforeseen by the investor (such as the provision of oxen following the unexpected death of the lending households' livestock). In each of these cases, just as when a television purchased for consumption must be sold in an emergency, the ultimate outcome does not change the fundamental character of the investment.

Returning to the first of Sayer's concerns, however, rather than attempting to reject methodological individualism via the generalised sociological literature, it would appear prudent to appeal to fieldwork rooted in the empirical context in question. Geographical investigations of developing world livelihoods and migration have frequently identified the household as a crucial manager of resources (e.g. Potts, 2010; Rigg, 2002; Chambers, 1983), with both contemporary and historical
research confirming this to be the case in Cambodia (e.g. Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014, Diepart, 2009; RUPP-IDRC, 2009; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002; Ebihara, 1968).

This body of work indicates that the more economically based social capital frameworks promoted by Coleman, Becker and Putnam has neglected to take full account of the obligation which inheres alongside opportunity within social networks. Consequently, social capital frameworks constructed according to this schema have generally failed also to note that familial and patronage networks, and those norms of association which allow them to function, may impede, as well as facilitate interaction.

Indeed, until relatively recently, the field of social capital has been overwhelmingly limited to a discussion of its benefits, actual and potential, with respect to civil society and development (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000). Although some important work has emerged to counter this (e.g. Rubio, 1997; Portes and Landolt, 1996), its volume is still diminutive compared to the mainstream preoccupation with social capital as a constructive resource. As a result, considerations of violence through a social capital lens have tended to typify aggression and exploitation as taking place in ‘zones of social capital deficiency’ (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000: 390), rather than in spaces where the mechanics of social interaction have been utilised in a harmful manner.

That ‘there is little empirical evidence...either to prove or refute this assumption’ (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000: 391) is reflective, according to Fine (2001: 172), of the non-contextual manner in which the theory is utilised, so that the potential for violence and conflict is recognised only in ‘abstract definitional discussion’ and often ‘as a policy objective to be tempered’. This mainstream social capital framework is able to pay ‘scant attention to issues of power, inequality and social differentiation’ (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000: 392) primarily because it removes itself from the context in which social interaction takes place.

What follows shall seek to alleviate these shortcomings in two linked ways. First, it will utilise Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1984) work on the institutional production of field, before turning, secondly, to Galtung (1969; 1990), whose structural and cultural violence frameworks provide a useful means to conceptualize the multi-scalarity of both facilitating and restrictive social systems. Whilst each of these frameworks may be argued to have shortcomings (by e.g. MacGregor and Rubio-Correa, 1994 in the case of Galtung’s work in particular), their limitations are to a large extent mirrored: Bourdieu’s work has been accused of being overly rooted in the context of 20th century France (Shusterman, 1999), whilst Galtung’s framework stands accused of an ahistorical, global, and overly
conceptual approach. Their use in combination therefore constitutes an ideal theoretical buttress to the social capital literature.

2.4.2 Symbolic Violence and the Concept of ‘Field’

With respect to the aims of this Ph.D., which are dominated by a drive towards greater context in the analysis of Cambodia’s social relations, Bourdieu’s concept of field emerges as a logical means of interrogating the local socio-economic environment because of the manner in which it succeeds in navigating many of the contradictory universalisms of sociology through its firm basis in locality and specificity. Indeed, Bourdieu (e.g. 1984) views social relations as “violent” oppositions, which take place on a ‘field’ of social competition (Bourdieu, 1984: 244). The sides take in this conflict derive from ‘hierarchical “status”... [which]...is a function of its proximity to, or distance from, the “legitimate culture”...[which]... is permanently in play [and] is the object of a perpetual struggle’ (Weininger, 2005: 13).

As he goes on to argue, this uneven conflict is mediated primarily through two devices: the educational establishment and the realm of cultural communication, both of which conspire to ‘perpetuate the existing social pattern’ (Bourdieu, 1974: 32) via their interaction within the school system, where ‘they promote those students who enter equipped with cultural privileges and progressively eliminate others whose cultural capital differs significantly from that of the dominant group’ (Lakomski, 1984: 152-3). In this way, the educational establishment teaches pupils to ‘internalize the hierarchically organised patterns of norms, behaviours and values characteristic of the workplace’ (Ibid.: 151), mirroring the structure already adopted by their parents, in order to make ‘arbitrary power relations appear as legitimate authority’ (Ibid.: 153) and thereby make ‘a social gift’ appear to be ‘a natural one’ (Bourdieu, 1974: 32).

As such, in its exploration of the role of norms and (formal and informal) institutions in propagating social structure, Bourdieu’s work is highly relevant to this thesis. However, a limitation nevertheless remains in that whilst Bourdieu’s symbolic violence theory is instructive in its elucidation of objects, norms and inculcation as major drivers of action at the local level, it fails to fully appreciate the wider global-historical landscape in which such local responses take place. In view of the holistic and multi-scalar designs of this thesis, this shortcoming is a significant one. However, it is also one which has been mitigated effectively elsewhere by Galtung, whose theory of structural violence, proposed
initially by in 1969, provides a number of tools with which to adapt Bourdieu’s work to the aims herein.

In this regard, one of the key complementary advantages of Galtung’s work is his emphasis on interests of various parties, rather than the largely reproductive interpretation offered by Bourdieu. Indeed, the theory itself is an attempt to broaden the definition of violence from what he views as the limitingly ‘somatic’ conception descriptive only of ‘the deprivation of health...at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence’ (Galtung, 1969: 168) to include harm done by interested actors in the pursuit of their goals. Within this broad conceptualization, Galtung retains a number of sub-classifications, most significantly between violence which is negative and positive, and violence which is direct - ‘the type of violence where there is an actor who commits a crime’ - and indirect - ‘that violence where there is no such actor’. As such, the inclusion of negative violence aids the author in developing one of his primary propositions: that ‘structural violence is silent, it does not show...[and]...may be seen as about as natural as the air around us’ (Galtung, 1969: 173).

Despite the wide ranging influence of this position, opponents of Galtung’s framework have argued, in a notably similar vein to the accusations levelled at Mabogunje’s systems framework, discussed above, that his concept is devised outside of time and space’, rather than being ‘rooted within each concrete reality’ (MacGregor and Rubio-Correa, 1994: 45). However, unlike Mabogunje, Galtung has responded in an adaptive manner to his critics via the development of the ‘cultural violence’ concept, published some twenty years after his initial theorem. As he would argue therein, ‘those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence, exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimate direct or structural violence’ (Galtung, 1990: 291).

Viewed thus, the cultural bedrock which underpins structural violence need, in fact, have little to do with culture in the received sense. Rather, it is that set of paradigms which determine the longitudinal development of structure and which, in the twenty first century, owe more to Adam Smith than the idiosyncrasies of national culture. Indeed, Galtung sees the theory of comparative advantages, as postulated by Ricardo, and Hecksher and Ohlin, as a major component of structural violence, the consequences of which ‘in terms of today’s vertical division of labour in the world are visible for all to see’ (Galtung, 1990: 300).

In this respect, he is supported by Springer (2009: 309), who, whilst conceding that ‘violence is clearly not reducible to the simple suggestion that neoliberalism is exclusively to blame, nevertheless urges that we ‘at least open ourselves to the possibility that neoliberalism may foster
conditions that are conducive to the further manifestation of violence’. Thereafter, in accordance with the framework set out herein, Springer goes on to attack the notion that ‘market reforms can be implemented with equal efficacy regardless of history, culture and environment as ‘a spatio-temporal fiction’ in which ‘inherited structures either yield to, or resist the new, but can never produce it themselves’ (Ibid.).

The critical implication of this perspective is that, as both Bourdieu’s and Galtung’s work hold, quite the opposite is true. Institutions never simply overlay the environment in which they reside, but are shaped by the conditions in which they arise. Given, though, that in much of the developing world these conditions are determined in large part by the local natural environment (Cote and Nightingale, 2012; Constanza et al. 2007; Berkes and Folke, 2000) it emerges as vital to incorporate this additional dimension into the analysis of multi-scalar institutions, interests and inequality undertaken thus far.

Indeed, the natural environment and its resources must not be conceived of as existing outside the social systems they support, but as continually re-imagined cultural and material goods. Consequently, what is necessary is a ‘more broadly conceived violence...[viewed]...on multiple geographical scales’ in order to draw attention towards ‘the dialectical relationship between the socio-physical environment of victimised populations and how such violence weaves itself into the global political-economic fabric and its various expressions - such as the profoundly unequal power relations between rich and poor’ (Nevins, 2003: 697). Beginning with a small scale analysis of “traditional” social security systems, the following section will seek to elucidate as fully as possible this role.
2.3 Environmental Risk, Traditional Insurance, and Inequality

2.3.3 Overview of the Literature on “Traditional” Social Security Systems and Risk

Given the extent to which the livelihoods of the rural poor in the developing world are laid bare to the effects of climate shocks and environmental hazards, their very persistence is predicated on at least a basic means of social support. Especially for those whose living centres around farming or fishing, ‘income tends to fluctuate widely’ (Okamoto, 2011: 89) on a long and short term basis as the proceeds derived from them ‘can easily be affected by changes in the natural environment as well as by frequent fluctuations of prices’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, ‘It is now widely agreed that even without any formal insurance mechanism, average consumption is smoother than income even after certain shocks, suggesting that there are certain risk-coping mechanisms at work behind the scenes’ (Ibid.: 90).

The nature of these risk-coping mechanisms has long been the subject of debate and although their existence is borne out by a large body of empirical literature (e.g. Scott, 1972, 1985; Brocheaux, 1983; Platteau, 1995a, 1995b; Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007), so too is their heterogeneity. As will be discussed below, traditional insurance mechanisms have been variously characterised as pragmatic, altruistic, egalitarian, class-enforcing, anti-economic and economically rational, although in recent decades, the discussion has become to some extent polarised between those who argue that such social structures are exploitative, and those who view them as structural guarantors of minimum subsistence. This debate has become synonymous with James C. Scott and Karl Popkin, the skeleton of whose arguments will be addressed here.

In adapting E.P. Thompson’s (1971) ‘moral economy’ concept to the developing world, Scott sought to demonstrate how ‘the solidarity mechanisms of Southeast Asian peasants are reflected in their ethical values: the right to subsistence and the principle of reciprocity’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 147). According to this conception, intra-village economic affairs, such as they exist, are managed entirely according to a moral code of practice which has ‘been especially designed to cope with the threat of hunger and other kinds of contingencies’ (Platteau, 1991: 2). The cornerstone of this approach, then, is that each member of a community has the right to avoid starvation, but it is important to note that it is subsistence, not comfort, which is demanded: ‘village egalitarianism in this sense is conservative, not radical; it claims that all should have a place, a living, not that all should be equal’ (Scott, 1976: 40).
This fundamental tenet of Scott’s work was diametrically opposed by Karl Popkin, whose conception of a rational, income maximising peasantry, published some three years later, attacked the idea of mutual insurance both experientially and conceptually, highlighting first that individual strategies for risk avoidance, such as personal grain stores and savings, appeared far more common than the communal alternative, before proceeding to claim that because village-wide insurance is economically more efficient, its generalised absence must indicate its impossibility. In this regard, however, his analysis is ‘no less partial than Scott’s’ in that whilst ‘it is certainly correct to insist that traditional systems of social security and hunger insurance were imperfect and lacking in some respects...they were far from being simply absent’ (Platteau, 1991: 6-7), especially at the familial and sub-community level, where they are ‘well documented’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 147).

Furthermore, ‘the prevalence of household over village granaries or food stores cannot be taken, as Popkin has done, as decisive evidence that peasants are too opportunistic to make insurance schemes viable’ (Platteau, 1991: 27), but should instead be viewed merely as a reflection of the prevailing ecological conditions, in that ‘farmers living in an ecologically uniform area and carrying out activities which are similar from a risk point of view have little to gain by sharing or pooling their risks’ (Ibid.). As such, explicit risk-pooling arrangements are more likely to emerge in areas characterised by a low co-variance of risks, or, put another way, a high variance in agricultural conditions, such as might be found in more diffuse settlements, or ones in which several types of farming take place simultaneously. In the absence of such circumstances, ‘a technical reason alone – the high covariance of yields – accounts for the difficulty of providing insurance against collective risks’ (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, in spite of such weaknesses, it would be unwise to reject Popkin completely. Market activity does increasingly occur within villages, even if it is not necessarily to the benefit of the poorest members, as he appears to suggest. Rather, what must be recognised it that ‘there is no inherent opposition between a moral economy and a political economy approach, except on an intellectual plane’ and that a combination of both approaches is necessary in order to ‘produce an analysis that conforms with history’ (Brocheaux, 1983: 802). Moreover, as rural society is becoming more commoditized and ‘rural livelihoods increasingly integrated into wider systems of exchange’ (Rigg, 2001: 42), there are inevitable consequences for the system of social and economic relations therein, with numerous authors highlighting the manner in which changes to the realm of production have altered the structure of power relations in the developing world (e.g. Kuh, 2003; Platteau and Abraham, 2002, Rigg, 2001).
As a result of this progressive incursion, the poorer members of many recently marketised communities find themselves disadvantaged in accessing the fruits of market expansion by a system of reciprocity which has ceased to hold any significant benefit for them, but upon which, in the absence of an alternative, they must continue to rely (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Scott, 1985, 1972). This inequality does not, however, exist solely between, but also within the households, the dynamics of which also adjust in response to the opportunities and liabilities presented by changes within the social, physical and economic environment.

2.3.4 Changes within the Household: Function and its Externalities

Given the attention thus far afforded to the structure and meaning of inter-household social systems it remains necessary, before proceeding to outline a model of the functionality of such systems, to consider also the dynamism of intra-household social systems in response to the external environmental stimuli outlined above. Indeed, in addition to elucidating the mechanics of labour distribution and social organisation on a smaller scale than those which has thus far been the subject of investigation, this additional perspective holds the additional advantage of highlighting, from an alternative viewpoint, one of the key elements necessary with regard to the analysis of function: the unintended and subsidiary consequences of the pursuit of functionality.

By way of example, one of the major developments impacting on rural livelihoods in Cambodia, and the developing world more generally, in recent years has been the advent of mechanised farming—a change which, as Rindfuss et al. (2012: 100) highlight, ‘has dramatically reduced the need for labour during the rice harvest’. The consequences of this single technological development upon the value of that labour have been dramatic, rendering migration to the modern sector immediately more attractive as the value of seasonal wage labour declines. However, though widespread, the impact of this “progress” in agriculture has not been uniform, with individuals, even those from the same household experiencing ‘the “growth miracle” in uneven ways’ (Resurreccion, 2005: 32). Indeed, the simple recognition that not all labour is equal highlights the heterogeneity of impacts generated by what for many in possession of little capital has necessitated a major alteration in livelihoods, and especially in their distribution within the household.

In this regard, although age is an important factor in labour “quality”, the key ‘axis of differentiation’ tends to run along gender lines (Radcliffe, 1991: 130), contributing to a situation in which ‘women’s status in the labour market is usually of a very inferior nature’ (Chant, 1991: 63). This differentiation (which becomes relevant not only in response to long term technological change, but also sporadically, due to shocks at village or local level) means that it tends to be women, rather than
men, who are the first (or only) members of the household to migrate, or seek alternative earning strategies. As Kilkey and Perrons (2010: 240) have argued, under such shifting conditions, two processes are concurrently at play. First, the ‘economic and time efficiencies derived from the division of labour’; and secondly the re-evaluation of these different activities within the culture and socio-economy of the village (Ibid.).

In this way, ‘economic change intersects with sociocultural transformations’ (Tacoli and Mabala, 2010: 392) not only between, but also within households, as new conditions challenge the validity of old norms. However, how such change manifests is rarely predictable. Just as new economic opportunities such as those offered by labour ‘migration may challenge traditional gender roles’ (Jolly and Reeves, 2005: 19), they may serve also ‘to entrench traditional gender roles’ (Jolly and Reeves, 2005: 20), as different cultural norms emerge or change in importance to support the same values. For instance, as Derks has noted in Cambodian context, the ancient cultural practice of a bride to be “going into the shade” [joel mlup] for six months prior to their wedding has acquired a new relevance, as an increasing number of unmarried girls swap the fields for the factories before returning to their villages to marry.

As such, in addition to the emergence of ‘newer norms, that are more supportive of women’s migration’ (Locke et al., 2012: 13), older ones may be revived or changed in character in order to maintain the relevance of relationships within or outside the household. However, this is not to argue that economic and technological development leaves dynamics of power in households and communities unaffected. Rather, what is necessary is a recognition that they ‘are shaped by a great diversity of desires and expectations among their members and related power struggles’ (Tacoli and Mabala, 2010: 393). Consequently, norms and networks do not experience the economy directly, but via the prism of various interests, which are themselves determined in large part by culture viewed over a longer timeframe.

Indeed, ‘perhaps more important... [as regards the nexus of economic and cultural change]...are the socio-cultural transformations that underpin the changing aspirations of both young men and women’ (Tacoli and Mabala, 2010: 391). However, aspirational change of this sort is neither unilinear, nor appropriately conceived en masse: even on an individual basis the drivers of any such shifts are multifarious and rooted in more than one place. As Jolly and Reeves (2005: 20) argue, for instance, ‘migration entails a complex, often contradictory class positioning, whereby a migrant might experience social upward mobility vis-à-vis the place of origin but social downward mobility vis-à-vis the host environment’.
As such, in high migration countries such as Cambodia, the development of new cultural norms in response to economic stimuli is mediated by rural and urban environs which are dislocated but for the social networks which link them. Moreover, rather than being rooted primarily in the institutions and environment of either locale, ‘the socio-spatial context within which migrants re-work their gender identities is a linked rural-urban network’ (Silvey, 2001: 43). Consequently, many migrants come to experience what Samuels (2001) has called “stretched lifeworlds”, as they absorb influences and compete with interests originating in rural and urban areas concurrently.

This recognition lies at the core of the literature on multi-local livelihoods, which has sought to move beyond ‘one or two dimensional’ (Thieme, 2008: 326) conceptions of migration – comprising only remittances and urban working conditions – to an analysis which incorporates power relations within the community and household. As various authors within this field (e.g. Elmhirst, 2008; Thieme, 2008; Truong, 2008; De Haan and Zoomas, 2003) have noted, the economic and physical geography which determines the flows of people and remittances in a certain locality serve also to ‘re-inscribe’ social relations via ‘discursive and material struggles around livelihoods and natural resources’ (Elmhirst, 2008: 69).

From the point of view of this thesis, the key point to emerge from the multi-local and household literature more widely is that although the household operates as a manager of resources, it carries out this function according to a set of norms which are not fixed, but rather are malleable according to the interests of actors within and outside the household. Moreover, this focus on interests not only accords well with the structural violence element of this framework, but also helps to link the various scales of enquiry herein in an effective manner. Social networks viewed in this way are the predictable product of interest and opportunity; functionality and power, both at the macro-scale and at the level of the individual, whose choices need not be conceptually subsumed by economic forces.

Indeed, like much about the migrant experience, the manner in which the interests and influences which underpin the process of labour movement are experienced is unique to each migrant, being a product not only of shifting norms but also of household specific differentiation related to the activities in which the various members engage (Radcliffe, 1991). This uniqueness, however, does not obfuscate the matter, but renders the linkages between culture and economy intelligible. Indeed, as a result of the need to maximise the efficiency of livelihoods, ‘structured and predictable relations exist between household members which determine and shape the specific activities into which they are channelled’ (Radcliffe, 1991: 132).
Thus, as key mechanisms underpinning the distributions of household labour, social norms and household relations are both determined by culture and help to determine shifts in its course. Otherwise put, then, and as will be detailed throughout the empirical chapters of this Ph.D., the pursuit of functionality has unintended, but to some extent predictable consequences in the realm of culture. However, merely to elucidate the concept is of itself insufficient. Having already begun to outline the importance of inter- and intra-household norms and organisational mechanisms with respect to social and migratory networks, what follows will seek to integrate this perspective first into a model of community functionality capable of explaining the mutual interaction between local communities and global economic forces; and second, into a historically grounded framework.

2.3.5 Towards a Functionalist Interpretation of Rural Inequality

The speed and depth of Structural Functionalism’s collapse around the middle of the previous century may be deemed in no small part a reaction to the prior scale and impenetrability of the ‘Parsonian edifice’ (Alexander and Colomy, 1990: 33). Indeed, for decades, the breadth of Structural Functionalism’s influence was almost as totalizing as the theory itself. As Kincaid (1990) notes, for instance, the twentieth century apex of the theory was merely the culmination of a lengthy ascendancy. Prior to this, ‘mainstream sociological and anthropological theory for most of this century was dominated by functionalist theory. Not only Malinowski and Parsons but also Radcliffe-Brown, Durkheim and Merton were functionalists’ (Kincaid, 1990: 341).

Resultantly, as chinks appeared in the functionalist consensus, the universalistic pretensions of the theory began to work against it. The former total theory of society could not remain in a supporting role, once the previous ‘obstreperous challengers’ had become ‘the dominant theories in a new, if internally divided, establishment’ (Kincaid, 1990: 341). As such, Structural Functionalism was not only marginalized by the rise of Post-Structuralism, but obliterated, taking with it much of the interest in function and functionality from the social sciences at large.

In this respect, it may reasonably be argued that an awareness, if not an assumption, of functionality may have been something of a loss to social science in recent decades, during which time a hermeneutic appreciation of social systems has generally predominated. The key issue, perhaps, is that an overbearing concern with perspective and subjectivity is often at odds with that of respondents, whose world views are frequently constructed on a community basis and shared across social strata in many cases. Preferably then, ‘shifting our empirical focus away from the context of knowledge and towards the context of its production’ (Cote and Nightingale, 2011: 484) may help to
ameliorate this disjuncture and, in doing so, help to clarify ‘the role of power imbalances in adaptive systems’ (Cote and Nightingale, 2011: 484). Otherwise put, reintroducing a concern with the functionality of social practice may serve to elucidate the manner in which it contributes to the distribution of community power, inequality and exclusion.

For instance, throughout several decades of development interventions, ‘it has frequently been found that when offered the responsibility of village level resource distribution, elites tend to appropriate for themselves ‘whatever portion of the resources that they need and let the poor have the leftovers only’ (Galloso and Ravenstein in Platteau and Abraham, 2002: 105). Such ‘community imperfections’, as Platteau and Abraham (2002: 106) term them, are a pervasive feature of traditional, lineage-based, societies and represent a problem not only in such set-piece projects as participatory development efforts, but in terms of economic growth in general, with external gains derived from marketisation, technological modernisation and the state being almost inexorably redirected towards the top by local agents (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Scott, 1985).

Rather than viewing this phenomenon purely as exploitation, an explanation may be sought in a similar mode of analysis to that which describes the formation of mutual insurance systems, i.e. that the existence of wealthy individuals in a community ‘offers a form of protection that mutual insurance cannot substitute for’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 160). Viewed thus, their engagement ‘in the mutual insurance system enables it to operate as a mechanism of intertemporal consumption smoothing’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 160), with the patron-client relationships being viewed as ‘a formal way of organising the compensation of wealthy individuals for their continued participation in the solidarity system’ (Ibid.).

According to this conception, clients seek patrons because their wealth acts a form of insurance against village wide production shocks, which only accumulated wealth can satisfactorily mitigate; and patrons seek clients because ‘such relationships act, in one respect, as a form of labour insurance’ wherein not only is the local labour supply alive and in reasonable health, but at the ‘patron’s beck and call’ if need be (Fafchamps, 1992: 160). This last point is of particular relevance because it ensures that the patrons’ needs will always be prioritised, which over time may be expected to lead to the entrenchment of inequality. Thus, ‘the ability of wealthier individuals to turn the mutual insurance system into an instrument of exploitation - that is, of extraction of surplus – is the compensation they receive for continued participation in the system’ (Ibid.: 161).

In return for subsistence security, then, poorer villagers cede some agency to the elites, who create ‘an authority structure which imposes its rule, or its interpretation of the tradition’ on them
(Platteau and Abraham, 2002: 113). However, as Scott (1972: 7) points out, ‘in aggregate terms, the balance of reciprocity seems to depend largely on the relative bargaining position of the two parties; how much more does the client need the patron than the patron needs the client?’ As such, where labour is relatively scarce, the political balance between elites and non-elites is likely to be significantly more equitable, even where productive resources are distributed very unevenly, meaning that ‘concern is not with whether the exchange is lopsided, but rather with how lopsided it is’ (Scott, 1972: 10).

Scott’s recognition of the mutability of reciprocal systems under the influence of external (and internal) pressures allows Fafchamps’s explicitly functionalist approach to be reconciled quite effectively with the historical structuralist and dependency literature, as exemplified by Frank (1967) and Wallerstein (1980), for example. Indeed, Fafchamps’ interpretation not only survives the scrutiny of historical analysis, but adds an additional dimension to our understanding of the manner in which global political and economic machinations have impacted on peasant livelihoods. As will be discussed in the subsequent section, the successive incursions into village life made by colonialist, post-colonialist and contemporary economies and governments have directly impacted on peasant livelihoods by repeatedly shifting the balance of exchange between richer and poorer peasants, almost always to the detriment of the latter.

2.3.5 An Historical Account of Peasant Reciprocity

It is often claimed that in contrast to the contemporary reality, pre-colonial Southeast Asia possessed certain structural features which ‘tended to limit the extent of personal dependence and to prevent the balance of exchange from moving radically in favour of the patron’ (Scott, 1972: 7). In particular, the comparative lack of external backing for local patrons allowed non-elites to establish ‘longstanding defence mechanisms…to buffer elite demands on village production and manpower’ (Adas, 1981: 219) with the availability of unclaimed land also representing a safety valve, through which disgruntled labourers could, at least in principle, escape exploitation if necessary. As such, in spite of Rigg’s contention that ‘the traditional village was less harmonious and more differentiated than previously imagined’ (Rigg, 2001: 83), it emerges as an issue of the utmost importance that in those communities most affected by the influx of modernity, ‘the traditional economic connection between rich and poor - that is, wage labour and tenancy – has been all but surrendered’ (Scott, 1985: 124).

Nevertheless, the role of risk and reciprocity in shaping Cambodia’s social relations extends back in time far beyond the ‘advanced modernity’ to which Beck (1992: 19), for instance, traces a
connection. Rather, the ‘drastically unbalanced’ nature of contemporary patronage ties (Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002: 115) has arisen only following centuries of incursion by external forces and with ‘market penetration and the gradual rise of a modern state system [being] equally powerful factors in undermining traditional cooperative systems’ (Platteau, 1991: 45). In his analysis of this process, Scott (1972: 7-8) describes a generalised pattern, wherein an initial ‘process of social differentiation’ was followed by increasing pressure on peasant livelihoods through taxation and market fluctuations, and a concomitant diminution in the efficacy of mutual insurance as ‘the concentration of land ownership and the growing population made it possible for landholders to demand more and provide less to tenants and labourers’.

In the post-colonial era, the relative bargaining positions of rich and poor has been skewed yet further, as democratisation and modernisation have rendered the local populace increasingly irrelevant to the maintenance of local power bases. This is because, whereas previously power and prestige depended on the support of the largest possible retinue of clients (Platteau, 1995), ‘westernization and a greater shift towards urban ways of life place greater emphasis on material possessions and consumption luxuries’ (Scott, 1985: 658). It follows logically thereafter that ‘when the value attached to retinues of servants and political clientele decreases while that associated with tangible wealth increases, landlords reduce the number of their hereditary labourers and patron-client relationships become more exclusive’ (Scott, 1985: 658; Peek and Standing, 1979).

This, then, exemplifies Platteau’s assertion that ‘human institutions are determined by material constraints as well as by behavioural constraints’ (Platteau, 1991: 43) and that norms, as Popkin (1979) suggests, are malleable according to economic and environmental circumstances, so that the poorest lose much of their protective benefit during times of change, as patrons alter the rules of exchange to position themselves more favourably in light of local developments. For instance, while some new technologies, such as land augmentation, have the potential to benefit clients more than their patrons, ‘rather than opposing these changes (by preventing technical progress, or by expelling labourer households from the village) patrons will try their best to modify the distribution rules’ (Platteau, 1995: 659). In doing so, however, they succeed not only in capturing the marginal benefits of change, but, as Scott (1985) describes, affect this change in such a way that the livelihoods of the poorest – who have little choice but to continue to participate in this unbalanced system of reciprocity – are undermined (Brocheaux, 1983).

What Popkin and Platteau have failed to sufficiently note, then, is that that while ‘deeper and deeper penetration of market values’ may have the effect of ‘loosening the web of traditional social relations’ (Platteau, 1991: 47), not everybody is disentangled to the same extent. ‘Bargaining power
is not equally distributed’ (Kabeer, 1997: 263), so that whereas elites may be ‘freed’ from their obligations to their clients, those with the least assets are subject to the same pressures and risks as they have always been. With the relative bargaining positions of peasant clients having been ‘systematically undermined’ (Scott, 1972: 5), however, they are no longer able to call upon reciprocal exchange mechanisms to overcome these difficulties. Indeed, Scott argues that it is possible to examine this breakdown in a relatively quantitative manner, with ‘changes in the legitimacy of the elites, both collectively and individually [being] directly related both to changes in the balance of all goods and services transferred – the terms of trade – between them and the comprehensiveness of the exchange’ (Scott, 1972: 7; See also Fafchamps and Gubert, 2005).

As such, the increasingly unequal terms of exchange between patron and client may be not only observable in a general sense, but quantifiable in a specific manner using the tools of social capital analysis because, as Fafchamps notes, ‘in practice, solidarity does not really operate as a group insurance….[but rather]…operates as a network in which individuals are connected to a small number of other people, who, in turn, are connected to other people’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 158). These ‘interpersonal networks founded on geography, ethnicity, kinship, friendship, membership, patronage and clientage mould the human landscape’ (Rigg, 2002: 212) and understanding them is crucial in order to shed light on the manner in which economic and political processes may be filtered by traditional networks of reciprocity, mutual insurance systems and patron-client relationships.

That such social factors may be significant mediators of the direction of economic growth has not thrust them to the fore in economic thinking, however, and whilst ‘neo-classical economists have emphasised the deterrent effects of high levels of urban unemployment, the psychic costs of moving and the apparent lack of information…what they have signally failed to do is incorporate in their models of migration the prevailing social relations of production in rural areas’ (Peek and Standing, 1979: 747).

It is the aim of this thesis to contribute to rectifying this failure by combining the flexible and holistic social capital conception – the synthesis of which was outlined in section 2.2 – with a systems approach to migration. These two theoretical pillars, in conjunction with the historical-functionalist conception of social systems outlined in this section, will form the mainstay of the conceptual backdrop to this study. What remains in this respect, however, is to frame this localised model more fully within the Cambodian context.
2.4.5 A Brief Exposition of the Model in the Cambodian Context

Thus far, the theoretical framework of this Ph.D. has outlined three addenda necessary to assuage the limitations of social capital theory with regard to the aims set out herein. First, it has argued that social capital theory has generally failed to sufficiently note the normative neutrality of social relations, focussing unduly on their positive role. Second, it has contended that social capital, according to the formulation expounded by its major proponents (e.g. Putnam 2000, 1995, 1993, Woolcock, 2000, Coleman, 1989) has tended to direct insufficient attention towards either the local or multi-scalar context. Finally, it has argued for an explicit reprisal of the role of function in social relations, not least as a means to better understands the meaning of social networks from the point of view of those who participate in them.

With respect to the first of these propositions, Cambodia provides a rich vein of supportive evidence, not least of which derives from the descent into, and emergence from, the genocidal Democratic Kampuchea regime beginning in the 1970s. In this regard, Hinton (1998a) has argued that the atrocities of that period were facilitated in large part by the ability of their orchestrators to ‘draw on pre-existing cultural models to motivate their minions to kill’ (Hinton, 1998a: 96), with ‘the desire for honour and power’ being utilised to devastating effect by Khmer Rouge ideologists and cadres (Hinton, 1998a: 101).

As such, those cultural norms which, in respect of their ability to maintain the integrity of a stable social structure, might legitimately be referred to as social capital, have proved demonstrably malleable to highly anti-social purposes. As argued above, however, if our definition of violence is broadened, it is not only in extreme situations that an apparently stable socio-cultural milieu may result in negative outcomes for at least some of those involved. Indeed, ‘practice theorists have shown that because such social structures both constrain and constitute human action, they are frequently used to serve the interests of dominant political groups by legitimating their power, goals, and desired forms of social inequality’ (Hinton, 1998a: 96).

Hinton goes on to argue that ‘like other Southeast Asian cultures, Cambodian society is extremely hierarchical...[with]...relationships in Cambodia [tending to be] structured vertically in terms of power, status and patronage’ (Hinton, 1998a: 98). This perspective invokes the necessity of the second proposition outlined above: the necessity of combining the symbolic and structural violence models which form an integral part of the theoretical framework of this Ph.D., in order to capture the nature of a highly structured, multi-scalar hierarchy.
Indeed, Galtung’s conception of hierarchy is a useful one here, arguing as it does that any norms which support structural inequality must necessarily be culturally violent components of a structurally violent system. Moreover, in this respect, there is ample room, also, to attach the specific features of Bourdieu’s symbolic violence thesis: the manner in which Cambodian children are ‘enculturated’ into a system of hierarchical relations ‘through a variety of socialization practices’ begun by parents in infancy and intensified during formal education holds great relevance for example. During schooling, explicit ritual shaming and praise gives way to more subtle practices into adolescence (Hinton, 1998a: 105), many of which are mediated in much the sort of structural linguistic manner highlighted by both Bourdieu (1984; 1990) and Galtung (1969;1991). For instance, passing an exam is referred to as defeating [chneah] both it and those who didn’t (Hinton, 1998a), whilst failing is termed a loss [chan]: the same term used to denote the loss of a fight or a war.

Some authors, most notably Prasso (1994), have argued that inculcation in this manner has contributed to a ‘heritage of violence’ with respect to which the Democratic Kampuchea period is merely the latest manifestation. As she notes: ‘unlike in the West, or even in East Asian cultures, where there are emotional pressure valves to let off tension...to raise one’s voice in Cambodia is to be called “crazy”, and to call someone crazy is to use a provocation equal to the ugliest epithet imaginable in the English language’ (Prasso, 1994: 74). Prasso later posits that this tight socio-cultural constraint and lack of emotional outlet has led to a culture in which ‘anger seems to lurk just below the surface’ (Ibid.: 73), and in which ‘the deaths of strangers are met with what appears to be complete dispassion’ (Ibid.: 74).

Whilst it would be unfair to dismiss Prasso’s analysis as wholly baseless, sketching as it does some of the same cultural themes which are treated in a far more nuanced manner by Hinton, her ‘attempt to sew together violence throughout the ages by entangling its threads in a Gordian knot is tenuous at best’ (Springer, 2009: 312). Nevertheless, the perspective she expounds holds an unmerited level of influence over policy thinking in particular. Indeed, as Springer has noted, the ‘neoliberalisation’ process begun in Cambodia following its delivery to UN mandate by the Vietnamese government was based in no small part on ‘the notion that marketisation would bring rationality to “anomalous” Cambodian actors, quelling their supposed penchant for irrational violence’ (Ibid.:305). This ‘culture of violence thesis’ is, he argues, a fallacy built upon a misrepresentation of culture generally – and violence specifically – as being a product of a dislocated, endogenous, locality which does not exist except as a theoretical space into which the market can usefully expand. This ‘problematic discourse that underwrites the process of neoliberalisation’ (Springer, 2009: 306) is conceptually invalid in that whilst ‘certainly violence can be a cultural phenomenon that is shaped
by its specific context...the culture of violence thesis simplistically reduces this to a linear relationship where “culture” alone is viewed as the basis for violence in Cambodian society’ (Ibid.). This is a highly dubious proposition and one which overlooks the fact that ‘Cambodian culture underwent profound changes through the processes and associated violences of French colonization...[so that]...regardless of the upheaval of the Khmer Rouge period, it is absurd to suggest that Cambodian political culture has passed through 1200 years of history virtually unchanged’ (Springer, 2009: 314).

Indeed, the ‘adaptive’ dynamism of the structures which generate violence cannot be understated (Watts, 1983: 85) and this is nowhere more evident, or more important, than in the structural response to environmental risk, which, as contended by the third proposition of this Ph.D.’s theoretical framework, constitutes a dynamically functional element in social systems. However, as various authors have noted (e.g. Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Fafchamps, 1992; Scott, 1985) and as outlined also in the discussion of social functionality above, the nature of these village systems tends to direct any benefits derived from external economic or technological development towards social and economic elites.

This contention, alongside the two others outlined herein, have been directed towards demonstrating that such local social systems are not discrete but, rather, are linked into a wider socio-economic context, which may be analysed by investigating local responses to external forces. Furthermore, as has been discussed throughout this chapter, these social systems are not unified structures, but must instead be recognised as comprising numerous interconnected sub-systems, in the manner described by Mabogunje (1970), Bourdieu (1984), Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992). Thus, the tendency, associated in particular with social capital, to foreclose the analysis of social relations at either the individual or wider community level is an incorrect one. Just as each social system contains subsystems, so each community is, itself, situated within a wider socio-economic and environmental context.

Ultimately, then, the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter has been directed towards the effective elucidation of these nested and multi-scalar structures. Towards this end, the first part, concerning migration, sought to demonstrate the effectiveness of migration systems theory at bringing a concern with networks into the study of labour movement. Having established this conceptual foundation, the second section, which sought out necessary conceptual addenda to social capital theory, highlighted both the continued relevance of a focus upon the nexus of physical capital and social relations, and the need for any such investigation to be conducted in the holistic manner exemplified in particular by Bourdieu (e.g. 1984; 1990) and Galtung (1969; 1990). Finally,
section three highlighted the crucial role of the local socio-ecological environment in mediating the social relations which are the subject of this Ph.D.

Having established this conceptual framework, it is necessary, in turn, to consider in detail the nature of the methodology employed for this Ph.D. In so doing, it has been recognised that just as policy is, all research methodology is underpinned by concrete concepts, theories and assumptions, so that great care must be taken in paring the practice of research to theory. In view of this recognition, what follows will demonstrate that the methodologies employed for the purposes of this Ph.D. are at once practically appropriate, ethically sound, and theoretically concordant with this framework, before proceeding to outline the research process in full.
Chapter Three

Research Methodology

Whilst geographical practice has arguably always reflected prevailing philosophical paradigms, contemporary ‘doubt over the acceptability of previous research practices’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 3) has contributed to a high water mark of critical reflexivity in the twenty first century wherein research methodology in geography is increasingly bound up with ontological and epistemological debates regarding what it is possible to investigate, and how. This is a feature of a methodological environment in which, notwithstanding the continuing influence of cultural turn positionality, quantitative techniques have been far from abandoned in spite of the “positivist” philosophy which underpinned their rise during the quantitative revolution of the 1950s having ‘acquired a derogatory character amongst social scientists to such an extent that to declare an adherence to positivism carries overtones similar to a member of the general public openly declaring that he or she is racist or sexist’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 4).

It is argued here that the discrediting of positivism as a viable philosophical basis for methodology has led to the isolation of quantitative and mixed methodologies from philosophy. Since only qualitative techniques are completely compatible with the dominant post-structural philosophies of the cultural turn, this leaves quantitative approaches necessarily incomplete. Philosophy is the conceptual foundation which allows research output to productively interlink and its absence leaves non-qualitative studies deleteriously atomised. As such, the determination of a suitable philosophical foundation for the proposed study is presented here as a primary objective, in which regard critical realism has emerged as a suitable candidate.

Indeed, a realist approach is particularly attractive as a result of its application as the basis for two of the studies utilised in the theoretical framework in chapter two – Watt’s (1983) study of structural violence in Nigeria, and Bourdieu’s various sociological investigations of class structure (esp. 1979). Moreover, as a philosophy primarily concerned with the elucidation of hidden structures which influence action, it represents the ideal conceptual foil for the research objectives proposed herein, not least due to the pragmatism with which the realist is free to engage with multiple methods which ‘enhance capacities for interpreting meaning and behaviour...because the insight gained can strengthen confidence in conclusions by providing multiple routes to the same result’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 67). What follows shall further justify this theoretical basis, firstly through an examination of realism in philosophical context, and subsequently through a critical engagement with the usage of
both multiple methods and realist methodology in practice. The final section will outline the methodology arrived at in this way.

3.1 Methodology in Philosophical Context

Whilst scores of philosophical bases have been invoked during the previous century in order to justify, explain, or propose new attitudes to fieldwork and interpretation in geography, the broad sweep of the shifting methodological landscape roughly mirrors the rise and fall of positivism as a dominant theoretical ideology across the social sciences. Originally proposed by Auguste Compte in response to what he viewed as the mysticism and ontological hegemony of the church, early proponents of positivism ‘used the term “positive” to refer to the actual, the certain, the exact, the useful and the relative, rather than the imaginary, the undecided, the imprecise, the vain and the absolute’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 7). Further, positivist philosophy held that even the apparently intangible could be codified so that ‘in addition to providing laws of nature, Compte believed that there were laws of society and social relationships which, although more complex, could be discovered using the same principles’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 8).

Positivist philosophy came to be widely adopted in human geographical practice around the middle of the twentieth century and whereas ‘until the 1950s geographical studies had been largely descriptive and regional in nature…it was at this point that geographers…started to argue that research needed to become more scientific’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 8). Where this “quantitative revolution” differed from longstanding regionalist geographical practice was in its ‘normothetic ideal of building universal scientific laws from empirically observed particulars’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 5), the key implication of which is that ‘observation is the necessary starting point for research, because it lays the groundwork both for formulating hypotheses and for testing them’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 7). As such, positivist research practice, in its ideal form, is one in which the fieldworker derives all he or she shall subsequently find from the field, bringing with him or her only a selection of refined and universal methodologies.

This characteristic has been widely problematised by critics of the quantitative revolution and its associated methodologies because it fails to account for a researcher’s preconceptions, not least in that ‘it leaves unexamined the manner in which a researcher arrives at a research problem’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 7) or the manner in which he or she approaches its interpretation. Furthermore, positivist objectivism is conceptually extremely limited in that ‘strictly speaking [positivist] empiricists do not believe in unobservable entities or structures like, say, class or quarks, because they are not directly observable’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 19). Whilst positivist social scientists have
long attempted to circumnavigate this contradiction by arguing that the empirical observation and categorisation of action is sufficient to uncover any such structures which are substantial enough to matter, the philosophy nevertheless remains explicitly ill-suited to the investigation of the subjective and the intangible, making much of the work undertaken under its influence necessarily incomplete.

Such critiques gained an unassailable momentum during the 1970s and 80s – a period when geography is generally described as having taken a “cultural turn” towards an ‘ontological understanding of the world as meaningful and therefore textlike in the sense that its meanings must always be interpreted’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 22). As such, while ‘past generations of geographers have tended to regard the interpretation of data as… unproblematic…a broader span of attention is now required’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 32). Otherwise put, the geographer can no longer abstract him or herself from the research process. Any assertion of objectivity is moot given that the drive to ‘finally sever human geography from the supposedly baleful influence of positivism’ depends upon the undermining of any such claims to objectivity (Barnett, 1998: 387). The geographer sympathetic to the cultural turn must therefore evaluate his or her own interpretation with exactly as much regard for positionality as those of his or her research subjects.

A major implication of this is that there can be no true aggregation of geographical readings. One account may inform another but it cannot refine it because both are inherently subjective. Thus, ‘models of “progress” premised upon the refinement of theoretical understandings in relation to empirical work [have been] replaced by a new dynamic…[in which]… “theory” is a seemingly endless, expanding and self-referential field’ (Barnett, 1998: 387). As such, post-modern geography ‘abjures almost anything transcendental… so much so that fragmentation of both thought and theory has become excessively glorified’ (Rose, 1993: 162). This conceptual departure from the construction of a knowledge edifice towards an academic field in which ‘distinctive, individualised modes of authority are predominant’ (Barnett, 1998: 388) reifies the researcher in much the same manner as did early ethnographic geography; even more so, indeed, because his or her self-elision (as contrived as that process may have been) is prohibited.

The logical conclusion of this position is the proscription of constructive understanding. The researcher may not build upon his or her own work or that of others because each building block carries with it a set of relativistic baggage which makes it incompatible with the next one. As such, one of the features of the cultural turn has been a movement by certain geographers towards a postmodern interpretation of reality in which ‘there is no one absolute truth and…there is no truth outside of interpretation’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 16) – a proposition, it is argued here, which renders methodologies associated with those strands of geographical practice thus influenced
inappropriate for this study. What is necessary, then, is a philosophical foundation which avoids both the objectivistic fallacies of positivism and the radical subjectivism associated with some of the post-structuralist and hermeneutic philosophy which underpins a proportion of post-cultural turn geography. As will be discussed below, realism appears well suited in this regard.

As Kitchin and Tate (2000: 24) summarize, ‘realists argue that a “real” world exists regardless of our conceptions of it [and] that the people living in it have a material existence beyond what we think about the world’. However, ‘realists reject the positivist ideal of value neutral or theory-free observation’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 18), instead placing a particular ‘premium on the theoretical work of conceptualization’ (Ibid.), especially with regard to the categories into which objects, people and processes are placed. Otherwise put, the realist researcher accepts the value-laden nature of knowledge, both existent and nascent, but nevertheless holds that a rigorous approach to its interpretation allows this subjectivity to be minimised, in order to discern something approaching objectivity.

The realist position is particularly appealing with respect to this research due to its explicit concern with the disclosure of ‘ontologically necessary structures of causation’ - the social frameworks which influence, generate and sustain social action in the real world (Hoggart et al., 2002: 19). Methodologically, this manifests in ‘a combination of intensive research, designed to measure how widespread a phenomenon is, and extensive research, designed to identify through conceptual abstraction underlying causes for why and how it happens’ (Ibid.). As such, because, being ‘fully wedded to the notion of context’ (Rose, 1993: 163), it views the investigation of a given subject in both quantitative and qualitative terms as necessary for the holistic exposition of phenomena, realist research possesses a core commitment to mixed methodology, which inevitably leads to a degree of eclecticism in its interpretation.

This has proved problematic in terms of generating a critical understanding of realism in practice, with much of the criticism levelled against it tending to ‘rely largely upon cursory readings of different versions of “realism” presented in the geographical literature’ (Yeung, 1997: 54) and being consequently specific to particular methodological constructs. Indeed, whilst ‘perhaps the most vigorous and sustained attack has been on the unobservable character of entities postulated to exist in realist theory’ (Rose, 1993: 169), the veracity of this critique is heavily contingent on the subject of study, and the manner in which this is undertaken. As such, following Rose’s (1990) exemplification, the “invisible” mechanisms which determine a landlord’s level of rent extraction must be understood according to a variety of stimuli. In certain contexts, legislation and market pricing may
be sufficient, but in others, a more qualitative approach incorporating cultural and individualistic factors may be necessary.

Viewed thus, the extent to which a theoretical objection to the action-generating structures which are the subject of realist research can be sustained depends upon the specifics of the methodology employed to elucidate them. Whilst this had historically tended to leave realism as a somewhat diffuse methodological position, Roy Bhaskar’s interpretation of Critical Realism has helped to lay down some unifying principles in this respect, delineating, for instance, a clearer distinction between epistemology and ontology than has been in general use in the social sciences. Indeed, it is one of Bhaskar’s central tenets that ‘critical realism is an argument about the ontology of reality, not just another epistemological prescription’ (Yeung, 1997: 54) and that any philosophy which cannot be traced seamlessly to its own basis in ontology is doomed to failure for ‘precisely the reason [that] positivism and empiricism have [been]’ (Yeung, 1997: 55).

In this respect, Critical Realism is a philosophy which insists upon a concrete ontological reality but nevertheless accepts that this must be perceived through a value-laden epistemological position which must be satisfactorily accounted for at all times. As such, it is ‘as much against totalization as relativism...[in that]...to a critical realist all knowledge is fallible, but not equally fallible’ (Yeung, 1997: 54 [italics in original]). This places specific methodological concerns at the core of Critical Realist research practice in that whereas proponents of other philosophical positions have tended to elect particular types of research practice as the most appropriate in all or most cases, the Critical Realist researcher views it as his primary task to discern what method is most appropriate in a given context. What follows shall attend to this concern, turning first to a critical examination of the usage of multiple methods, before undertaking an analysis of two realist methodologies deemed especially pertinent to the study proposed herein.

### 3.2 The Application of Mixed Methodologies

In spite of the theoretical objections to the objectivism of quantitative research and the proliferation of qualitative work following the cultural turn, quantitative methodologies have retained a notably consistent presence in geography, to the extent that ‘at bottom, a continuity can be detected from the quantitative impulse in [late nineteenth century] survey work and the rise of geography as spatial science from the late 1950s onwards’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 19). Indeed, rather than the methods themselves, what has changed is ‘the idea that quantification would lead to the generation of universal laws (as in the natural sciences)’ – a proposition now generally recognised as impossible.
due to the complex and ephemeral nature of social systems (Marshall, 2006: 6). Thus, ‘[quantitative] techniques are now used to provide sufficient evidence that makes acceptance of a line of thought compelling’ (Ibid.). Moreover, this epistemological development has been associated with a shift in preoccupation from refinement to triangulation, often using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, so that ‘when faced with weaknesses in existing data resources and approaches, multi-method research may be deployed in preference to modification’ (Mckendrick, 1999: 41).

As such, much contemporary thinking holds that ‘research quality should be enhanced by multi-method investigations…because the insight gained can strengthen confidence in conclusions by providing multiple routes to the same result’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 67). However, as Bryman (2006: 7) has argued, this attitudinal proliferation has taken place with little typological regard for methodological combination, with there being ‘quite often a mismatch between the rationale for the combined use of quantitative and qualitative research and how it is used in practice’ (Bryman, 2006: 110). Especially problematic in this respect is a failure to address the data collection bias inherent in a given methodological combination, with one method’s corroborative power as regards another often being prioritised over their complementary reach. In particular, it is not uncommon to encounter confusion ‘over the difference between multi-method and multi-level analysis’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 66) – a conceptual failure frequently resulting in ‘the ecological fallacy of transposing conclusions from one analytical level to another’ (Ibid.).

Indeed, as Mckendrick argues, the difficulties inherent in composing a methodological portfolio whose components are theoretically compatible tends to have the effect of pushing researchers into a methodological corner defined by philosophy. From this perspective, ‘the survey questionnaire is particularly useful for the positivist, the interview is likewise useful for the realist…[whereas]…those working within a humanistic perspective would favour experiential fieldwork’ etc. (Mckendrick, 1999: 44). Whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach, and it is difficult to deny that ‘for each research tradition, some methods are more useful than others’ (Ibid. [Italics in original]) the philosophical foundations of methodology should be guiding rather than limiting and ‘should not preclude the application of other methods, most obviously for circumstances where data availability is a problem, but also for circumstances whereby “alternative” methods provide complementary insights’ (Ibid.).

Whilst McKendrick’s (1999: 43) argument that ‘deterministic conjunctions of epistemology and methodology hold sway’ is countered by Yeung, who posits that, on the contrary, ‘the methodological cart often comes before the theoretical horse in geographic research’ (1997: 51-52),
these positions are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they reflect a concern with the lack of consistency and rigour in the implementation of method, especially with respect to its linkages to both theory and philosophy. Thus, ‘the real need...is to achieve a dialectical mediation between philosophy (concerning ontology and epistemology) and the social sciences (concerning theory and methodology)’ (Yeung, 1997: 53), a task usefully undertaken by Yeung with respect to the realist practice of geography. As he argues, the realist geographer must ‘start at an empirical problem and proceeds to abstract the necessary relation between the concrete phenomenon and deeper causal structures to form generative mechanisms’ (Yeung, 1997: 58). In this respect:

‘Qualitative methods such as interactive interviews and ethnography are necessary to abstract the causal mechanisms of which qualitative/ statistical methods are obvious. It should not be expected that these abstract causal mechanisms can explain events directly...Quantitative methods, on the other hand, are particularly useful to establish the empirical regularities between objects. Although these concrete regularities are not causal relations, they can inform the abstraction of causal mechanisms’ (Yeung, 1997: 57)

As such, qualitative and quantitative data may be used in order to respectively abstract potential causal mechanisms, and to test the regularity and validity of those mechanisms. What should be evident from this is that ‘the realist method for theory construction is neither purely deductive, nor purely inductive’ (Yeung, 1997: 63). Rather, it operates ‘simultaneously in a deductive-inductive dialectic’ (Ibid.), meaning that it is able to simultaneously avoid the “deductive fallacy” of positivism, and the “inductive handicap” of rigidly post-structural approaches. Nevertheless, the consistent theme in Mckendrick’s and Yeung’s critiques of methodological practice in geography – that mixed-method typologies are inadequately defined and insufficiently inter-referential – has yet to be constructively addressed herein. In order to do so, it is necessary to frame the proposed methodology within relevant, critically assessed exemplars. To this end, what follows is an examination of realist mixed methodology, focussing on those methodological frameworks utilised in Michael Watt’s (1983) and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979) work.

3.3 Realist Methodology in Practice

The methodology for Watt’s study of Northern Nigeria begins with the determination of ‘a sampling frame through a village-wide population census and socioeconomic survey...[which]...could be compared directly to Kaita village tax records and a 1978 election census’ (Watts, 1983: 35). With this undertaken, he ‘was then able to stratify the population of householders...according to indigenous categories of economic status: namely the traditional elite...wealthy and successful farmers...farmers who are neither rich nor poor, and finally the poor and destitute’ (Ibid.). These two data sets represented the foundational framework of his investigation in that they ‘constituted the
two frames from which smaller samples [of ten or twenty percent] were taken to conduct intensive interviews on agronomy, drought, trade, and general economic activities’ (Ibid.).

Several features are relevant here, not least Watt’s use of a stratified sampling procedure - a methodological concession to practicality which is only philosophically acceptable from a realist (or socially nuanced positivist) position, because of the manner in which it sacrifices individualistic detail for a wider sketch of social structure. Indeed, if a realist researcher is relatively confident in the broad outline of the social system he is attempting to uncover, then such a sampling procedure may be undertaken, in theory, with minimal cost, as individuals occupying an equivalent position within that system may be expected to view it in the same way. To document two such viewpoints may even be seen as methodologically profligate – although this position must be tempered for at least two reasons. First, the researcher is unlikely to have discerned the full extent of the social structure to be investigated at the point of sampling, meaning that the additional detail provided by multiple sampling is necessary; and second, it is problematic to view individuals as merely the passive bearers of structure. Some allowance must be made for differing perspectives on the social environment.

A further notable feature of Watt’s sampling methodology may be found in his use of endogenous classification as its basis. This represents the deductive element in the ‘deductive-inductive dialectic’ referred to by Yeung (1997: 63) and helps to prove Watt’s method against criticism relating to excessive inference of the social environment. Indeed, approaching the identification of social stratification in such a manner makes an important concession to post-cultural turn perspectives in that it introduces an element of reflexivity to the research process by allowing the subjects to define their own parameters and classifications. Watts is, however, unclear about the specific informants utilised for this process and it is suggested here that in order to derive the maximum benefit of reflexivity, each sub-sample should be asked to provide their own perspective on the social makeup of the research environment. This approach would not only go some way to allaying criticisms relating to the post-modern contention that ‘there is no truth outside of interpretation’ (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: 16) but also represent a useful corroborative mechanism from a realist perspective given that ‘significant differences may exist between how individuals themselves might classify their own occupations and how this might be defined by “social superiors”’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 226).

In this respect, Watt’s use of multiple methods demonstrates a persistent desire to corroborate and substantiate the interpretations of his informants, especially because informants produced numerous inconsistencies in their respective accounts of certain aspects of village life. Indeed, he notes that ‘with respect to indebtedness and food sales, it quickly became clear that survey methods using sampling techniques were wholly inappropriate…[and]…reliable data could be obtained only
from a small number of individuals’ (Watts, 1983: 35). Watt’s solution to this - cross checking informant accounts both with each other, and village taxation and production records, demonstrates the utility of the mixed methods approach, but it also exemplifies the need to temper methodological subjectivity for practical purposes. Indeed, whilst the hermeneutic argument that no texts are objective or value free is a valid one, the idea that the values and perspectives they are associated with can be accounted for to some extent facilitates a level of investigation beyond that which is possible from a radically subjectivist standpoint.

This position is taken further by Bourdieu, whose methodology adopts a famously pragmatic approach to the use of statistics. In this respect, ‘while qualitative techniques of research play a major role in Bourdieu’s research, it appears that he is comfortable substituting statistical methods of research whenever qualitative research would be difficult or time consuming’ (Griller, 1996: 9). Thus, just as Watts (1983) found some issues impossible to reliably elucidate through individual interviews, so too Bourdieu experienced significant difficulties in obtaining accurate data on the practices and attitudes of his subjects. However, his use of statistics in place of qualitative data was not purely pragmatic, being also solidly underpinned by ‘his fundamental epistemological ideas…that [one] cannot use survey questions to determine why people behave in the way that they do…[because]…as the generative principle of practice, habitus is unconscious’ (Griller, 1996: 9-10).

As such, Bourdieu’s use of statistics is influenced by his theory of practice, wherein action is motivated by a structure internal to the individual, which is itself related to, and interlinked with, the structures within others because it is generated by external circumstances, many of which will be the same for most members of a given group. Thus, that many members of a particular class in a certain area may share attitudes and characteristics is understandable because these are shaped by the circumstances they have in common. That they do not all do so is also explicable, because their upbringings, roles and (particularly) those of their parents are not identical. Bourdieu described this philosophy ‘as being shaped by the objectivism of Levi-Strauss and the subjectivism of Sartre’ (Griller, 1996: 3-4) and argued that it revealed the subjectivist/ objectivist antimony as a false one because ‘each is faulty without the other’ (Griller, 1996: 5).

The methodological implication of Bourdieu’s position is that multiple methods in social research are not only tolerable, but in fact necessary in order to fully explicate causality, action, and social structure. For instance, Bourdieu ‘sneers at the use of statistics to determine causality’ (Griller, 1996: 9) but nevertheless requires their use, in conjunction with qualitative ethnography, because the habitus is invisible to the subject and must therefore be indirectly observed through actions, as well as thoughts and preferences. As such, with respect to its use of statistics and secondary sources in
order to overcome the perceived weaknesses of qualitative research, Bourdieu’s methodology evokes that utilised by Watts, although the two nevertheless diverge in the crucial area of classification. As noted above, Watts attempts to incorporate subjective reflexivity through the use of endogenous categories, a practice which Bourdieu’s epistemological position disallows. His methodology thus rests upon accurate classificatory work being undertaken by the fieldworker – a problematic proposition from a poststructural perspective, but one which he endeavours to solve through a process of reflexive examination on the part of the researcher himself.

Indeed, for Bourdieu, ‘the purpose of reflexivity is to objectify the scientist by placing the researcher as researcher rather than as an individual in the social structure...and to objectify his or her relationship to the objectified subject of the study’ (Griller, 1996: 13 [Italics in original]). Rather than presenting his research as the subjective interpretation of an individual social scientist, Bourdieu thus resolves the objective-subjective contradiction by including himself as an object of study. This is an attractively neat proposition and one echoed by Cloke et al. (2004: 231 [Italics in original]), who argue that ‘whilst postmodern thinkers may complain of the “positivist” logic of [classificatory] mapping, the reality is that an “identity map” in which phenomena are categorised and sorted is being generated (it cannot but be generated) in every conceivable research project’.

As such, any attempt to neutralise or reduce the position of the researcher, as undertaken arguably by Watts, is bound to fail: the researcher’s positionality must be incorporated into the study. However, as the above has sought to demonstrate, this does not preclude objectivity, but merely necessitates extra care in its discernment. In this respect, the above two methodologies are particularly useful as models of realist research because of the rigour with which they have addressed many of the concerns of post-cultural turn geography. What follows shall attempt to do the same for the study in question.

3.4 Account of the Methods Employed

Briefly summarised, the research set out in this Ph.D. has sought to produce a detailed and holistic picture of the networks which underpin Cambodian labour migration, so as to view them as fully embedded within the socio-economic and ecological context in which they operate. In doing so, it has sought to answer three core questions about social and migratory linkages in Cambodia. First, why do social networks operate as they do in Cambodia and to what extent are they related to the functional requirements of the household, such as the need to mitigate environmental risk or share labour? Second, how do migratory linkages differ in response to differing volumes and distributions of assets on the part of the rural household and what role does this play in the translocation of
inequality? Third, how does the migratory and non-migratory social structure elucidated by questions one and two feed back into itself from the point of view of social norms?

The investigation of these questions was undertaken using a mixed method approach which was held here to be particularly important given that, as has long been my own experience, rigorous research requires a level of methodological flexibility on the part of the researcher in order to accommodate the reality that data may not be gleaned at the rate or in the manner initially expected. As a result, ‘many human geographers now argue against the depiction of the research process as a simple linear sequence of pre-defined steps from problem specification through to writing up results’ (Clifford et al., 2010: 426). Thus, as I did, many of those ‘those deploying multiple-methods in multi-stage research...[in particular]...may find themselves writing up findings from introductory methods, while formulating research questions or supplementing their original research themes for the next stage of their research’ (Ibid.: 426-7). As such, ‘research design is a process rather than an event’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 40) and the usage of multiple methods from the outset was in part a means by which to establish a practical methodological emphasis derived from the findings of fieldwork, rather than relying entirely on methodological exemplars from comparative literature.

Furthermore, as Hoggart et al. (2002: 69) argue, in many research projects, especially those attempting either to implement new methodologies or utilise old ones in novel ways, ‘we can have more faith if researchers call on different types of data, use more than one investigator...interpret evidence through different theoretical lenses and use more than one data collection technique’. In respect of this position, this research took place in conjunction with two experienced local fieldworkers from differing academic backgrounds, with whom I already had a strong working relationship following my two years of fieldwork for the Royal University of Phnom Penh on an IDRC funded study into Cambodia’s migrant enclaves and systematic rural-urban labour migration. In addition, the strong association which I retain with the Masters in Development Studies course at the Royal University of Phnom Penh – through which the aforementioned project was run, and where I read my Masters degree – allowed me to solicit the advice of local and Western academics with experience in relevant fields.

Given the ‘enhanced effect’ of working with other researchers from different academic backgrounds (Hoggart et al., 2002: 69) this process added significant value to the research, especially with respect to ‘gaining access to the target population’, which is ‘a preliminary practical and ethical problem in any interview-based study’ due to the potential for overburdening informants (Winchester, 1996:
Local academics were able to minimise this risk by highlighting groups or persons to whom the time spent participating in research may be prejudicial, both in early office-based consultations and later, as they accompanied me in the field.

Indeed, my use, throughout the research process, of a field assistant was based in large part on a desire to minimise any difficulties or awkwardness my presence as a researcher might create. In particular, the benefit of working with my assistant Ly Vouch Long, a long time friend and colleague and professional researcher for the IDRC, UN and World Bank, meant that he was able – not only as an experienced researcher but also as a Cambodian – to take note of the subtle implications of potential informants words and actions in a way that I, despite speaking Khmer to a good level, cannot necessarily do. For instance, the nature of politeness in Cambodia is such that many rural people may not feel comfortable refusing a request for an interview even if they are too busy or do not wish to participate. Long was able to identify any such unwillingness and inform me of it, as well as occasionally guiding my line of questioning in such a way as to minimise potential offense.

Inevitably, the use of a field assistant in this manner carries with it certain methodological risks. In particular, the need to translate both questions and answers has the potential to lead to misunderstandings, inaccuracies, or the loss of nuance in qualitative research in particular. However, my knowledge of the Khmer language was a considerable advantage here, allowing me to supersede many of these difficulties simply because I could understand the questions asked and responses given. Long’s presence therefore served mainly as a “safety net”, helping me to understand the most challenging or colloquial responses and minimising the risk of offending or inconveniencing informants. Moreover, his knowledge of local dialects and cultural practices also allowed me to fulfil the first two of the KCL ethical requirements discussed herein, in that they complemented my own linguistic ability to ‘explain, in straightforward lay-language’ the aims of the study, and the procedures in place to safeguard the information gleaned through their participation.

Indeed, before questionnaire delivery could begin, it was necessary to obtain official, generalized consent from the three relevant village chiefs and the Krang Youv commune chief. Following a full explanation of my own the research’ aims, this was readily given. Individualized consent was later obtained from each respondent using the attached consent form (see appendix C) as a preliminary part of the interview process. Furthermore, as Winchester (1996: 124) advises, further essential safeguards were employed ‘that protect powerful and powerless alike are procedures for data handling and the maintenance of confidentiality and safety’. These included the use of a locked storage system for the safeguarding of completed questionnaires and an anonymizing process during data entry which will protect informants’ identity. Finally, as demanded from both an ethical
and methodological perspective, these arrangements were made known to all informants at the earliest opportunity so that ‘participants...[are]...assured that all the data collected will remain secure’ (Clifford et al., 2010: 111).

This process of securing permission for research was included as part of the field site selection process, which was undertaken in consultation with academics at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, during a six week period of preliminary fieldwork prior to the main seven month research frame. In particular, it was a priority during this period to ensure that a clear distinction be drawn between the research undertaken for the purposes of this Ph.D. and that earlier carried out under the auspices of the RUPP-IDRC project. With this in mind, the lack of migrant households encountered during the preliminary scoping study who knew of, or were associated with either the primary urban site of that project, Teuk Thla, or the key rural study site of Prey Veng, was an important factor in selecting it. Moreover, this period allowed for the piloting of the various methodologies proposed herein and their testing for suitability in the specific context of the selected field site. Moreover, in addition to the use of focus groups and key informant interviews to ascertain the social and physical endowments of the site, its early identification allowed for a rigorous examination of the administrative records which would be available for study.

As it transpired, the villages’ administrative records were very limited, necessitating a greater than expected reliance on informants recollection of dates and specific events in order to construct timelines pertaining to natural disasters and land sale/purchase. Beginning with the first of these areas of enquiry, a funnel method of questioning was utilised wherein informants were asked initial questions concerning bad years, pressures and shocks of various types. Where events in each category were indicated, dates were obtained and triangulated using key temporal markers, such as national elections, in order to ensure the accuracy of the recall-based data. As this method proved to be both readily intelligible to the informants in the study and an effective means of gathering proxy-longitudinal data, it was extended also to the construction of asset acquisition histories – concerning the purchase of productive and consumptive assets, livestock and land – for all of the core 72 rural households.

In accordance with research aim two, to investigate questions of risk and vulnerability to natural disasters and their relationship to the form and function of village society, the selected site had a historical vulnerability to such events. In particular, it was affected by the widespread 2011 floods, the oral and written records of which were therefore “fresh” and easily corroborated. This was an important factor in the proposed study, as, although dates may be recalled with reasonable accuracy using the methodology described above, there is inevitably ‘greater inaccuracy as time progresses
from an event’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 121). The relative temporal proximity facilitated a deeper and more extensive line of qualitative questioning, which permitted greater clarity when attempting to draw linkages between environmental risk and other aspects of village life.

This was particularly important because, as Hoggart et al. note, ‘the advantage of triangulation is not having different data sources as such but using complementary sources...[which]...should not just draw attention to the same human condition (at different geographical or temporal scales)’ (2002: 71). Furthermore, ‘in close embraces with research subjects, only the most myopic can fail to grasp the value laden nature of research enquiry’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 204) so that this project’s attempts at triangulation necessarily took into account not only the livelihoods and social circumstances of the various informants, but also retained a critical stance towards the ability of certain methods to answer certain questions at all. Indeed, ‘to be clear, intensive methods are not appropriate for tabulating the incidence of events, but are appropriate for exploring rationalities, implications and meanings’ (Ibid.).

As such, the use of triangulation employed during the course of this study was undertaken in as full a recognition as possible of these issues. Extensive quantitative data were used to challenge or corroborate the findings of more intensive methodologies and in turn, qualitative data were a key resource in determining the both the validity and potential causality of statistical correlations discerned during analysis of the results of the survey. In order to maximise the impact of this benefit, quantitative data were input and preliminarily analyzed during fieldwork in order that some of the early statistical findings could be investigated via interviews. An example of this is the correlation between labour sharing and natural disasters, which informant reports suggested was more likely to be due to households responding to pressures than successfully mitigating them.

A similar issue to that raised with regard to triangulation also applied to the use of cross-sectional data, a necessity given the proposed fieldwork time frame of less than one year, but one with the potential to generate misleading findings if utilised incorrectly (Hoggart et al., 2002: 70). Indeed, in a country and province especially selected for their economic dynamism, it was essential to avoid the fallacy of substituting cross-sectional for longitudinal data. Rather than attempting to disguise a static time-frame with as many (apparently) complementary alternatives as possible then, it was preferable merely to pay careful attention to those inconsistencies which arose. As such, the view was taken that ‘the key to making best use of multi-method approaches is not to assume automatically that a problem of method exists. This should be examined but should be approached as one of a number of possible sources of inconsistency’, alongside sampling, and categorization or “entitation” as Hoggart et al. term it (Hoggart et al., 2002: 73).
Indeed, although generally referred to separately (by e.g. Clifford et al., 2010; Cloke et al., 2004; Hoggart et al., 2002), the sampling process is the first stage of entitation, and perhaps the most crucial. Of particular importance was the delimitation of the field site – a task which gains an additional level of difficulty where the object of study is population movement across village and rural-urban boundaries. Nevertheless, my previous experience in Cambodia suggested that the village of origin is a strongly significant variable in determining migratory incidence and destination, and should therefore represent the point of conceptual departure in sampling terms.

This had the advantage of presenting a predetermined boundary in both population and spatial terms but, notwithstanding the practical and ethical convenience of such a sample frame (in that it would represent an immediately intelligible research area to communicate to participants), it would be disadvantageous to view this as an absolute delineation. Recent literature on Cambodian labour migration suggests that rural-rural migration remains significantly more prevalent than its rural-urban counterpart (e.g. Diepart, 2008, RUPP-IDRC, 2009) and it was therefore essential to be sensitive to short-term and local population movement into and out of the sampled village by following up potential respondents who were unavailable at the time of their identification either by phone or a later visit.

As such, and in keeping with the adaptive nature of the proposed methodology, site selection for urban research was delayed until the rural migratory survey was completed, at which point Sak te Bo, Andaing, and various locales within Phnom Penh were identified as key urban research sites. In the case both of these urban locales and the initial selection of the primary rural site, the early stages of the research process entailed a series of preliminary visits in conjunction with local researchers who have experience of the site in question to identify key informants as points of access to the site. These initial key informants were usually shopkeepers, landlords, trade union leaders, construction foremen, etc., who provided basic information about the research site as well as providing introductions to other migrants in the area.

Interviews with these key informants therefore complemented the primary sample of migrants from those rural householders already interviewed in the primary rural research site. From these two sources, a system of qualitatively supported snowball sampling of key informants provided a widespread sample of respondents from which to garner further data to the main sample of migrants captured by the primary network mapping methodology outlined below. In doing so, however, steps were taken to avoid unintended sample bias, in particular the usage of multiple sampling “gatekeepers” from different occupations and social statuses in order to maximise the diversity of the sample.
Thus, data collection began initially in the primary rural research site and took place according to three primary methodologies. The first of these, and the most time consuming, was the delivery of a comprehensive socio-economic questionnaire to 72 snowball sampled villagers originating from three initial nodes. These primary nodes were selected on the basis of their residence within each of three sub-sites, North Ampil, South Ampil and Go, and Jake, identified during initial focus group discussions as being, relative to each other, poor, average, and wealthy. Thereafter, subsequent nodes were chosen on the basis of their membership of the social networks of the previous informants, which were defined, following a period of initial methodological testing, as those people who informants see most regularly and felt closest to.

This combination of questions was found both to be the most readily intuitive to informants and to produce clear and tightly bounded groups which were involved in a number of activities (e.g. socializing, labour sharing, lending) together. However, one of the initial findings of this process of mapping social groups was that they appeared to be strongly, though by no means perfectly, correlated to gender. Given that the informant for both social and economic information at each point needed to be the node in question (rather than any member of the household) this might have raised issues concerning the overall distribution of gender in the sample, with all the concomitant methodological problems of balance and intra-household perspective which that might have brought. In order to avoid these, two of the initial nodes selected were female: one from a male headed household and the other from a female headed one.

In addition to the these concerns, the network mapping methodology employed raised a number of parallel issues in the research process, not least of which was the physical logistics of finding the individuals identified by each informant as belonging to their primary social networks. On occasion, target individuals lived close by, but were often too far away to be visually indicated. Under these circumstances, the help of a family member or neighbour was enlisted to walk to the houses in question, introduce myself and my assistant, and allow us to record their location via GPS for subsequent interview. This logistical approach was found to be an efficient and effective one, with its accuracy being later confirmed once the network had acquired enough density for certain nodes to be selected by more than one informant. At this point I was able to discuss the location of many individuals in terms of their neighbours (i.e. “Sol who lives next to Hon Ki?”) and thereby to avoid the need to enlist further help in finding them.

Having established a functional methodology of rural network mapping, another curiosity presented itself which necessitated a degree of conceptual adaptation of the project. Specifically, this pertained to the shape and extent of the social networks discerned by the mapping methodology,
which did not accord with official boundaries in the site. Although the possibility of extending the study site beyond the single village survey initially envisioned as the rural basis of this project had been raised during early stage qualitative data collection, Go village had not been included in the preliminary draft of the research site. The extent to which the networks of South Ampil and Go proved to be interlinked however, especially when compared with their mutual isolation from both North Ampil and Jake, necessitated a change of approach, wherein Go would be included in the study as part of the same categorical sub-location as Ampil.

Having identified both the sub-boundaries of the research site and a selection of relevant nodes, questionnaire delivery began. In delivering this survey, it was held that the approximately 27% of female headed households in Cambodia (World Bank, 2010) was sufficient to explore any inter-household gender differences in the data (see e.g., Rajaram, 2009). Similarly, the later, migrant focussed survey was designed to discern the nature of intra-household relationships and decision-making which may be missed by the former methodology. Indeed, the use of more than one survey method in this way helped to proof the study against the problems inherent in questionnaire data collection which ‘can be threatened by many factors’ (Harris and Brown, 2010: 2), but which are liable to suffer, in particular, from design flaws which may lead either to key trends being missed or to inaccuracies in the data set. Although it was impossible to immunize this study completely against such risks, the use of more than one methodology in parallel, as well as a willingness to redraft and re-administer questionnaires which produced conflicting or dubious results, was deemed here to be sufficient to avoid serious error.

With this in mind, the primary survey questionnaire was also divided into three partially interlocking sections, the first of which sought to ascertain the distribution of “productive” inter-household social linkages. In this respect, the questionnaire built upon Fafchamps (1992), Fachamps and Gubert (2005), Grootaert et al. (2004) and my own work with the aforementioned RUPP-IDRC project in seeking to map the social connections possessed by villagers by asking simple questions regarding who they had previously requested loans from or given loans to, with whom they have exchanged gifts and, in particular, the sources of any information or assistance relating to migration.

The second section of this questionnaire pertained to the assets possessed by the household and any transactions which had taken place throughout the duration of the household’s post-DK period residence in the village, especially with respect to land and livestock sales. A third section was designed to cover action taken as a response to natural disasters, including ‘an increased reliance on wage work’ in the local area, rural-urban migration, and asset sale (Pellini, 2012: 64; Fitzgerald et al., 2007). In order that such responses be satisfactorily disentangled from action motivated in other
ways, the delivery of this section was informed by a preliminary timeline of natural disasters and climate pressures, as well as the responses to section two.

The second methodology undertaken during the course of this research concerned mapping the agricultural land distribution within the primary rural research site. This was based initially on satellite imagery derived from Google Maps, which is available in high resolution for the nearest provinces to Phnom Penh; Prey Veng and Kandal, from where imagery has been collected as recently as 2011. Using a grid system superimposed over this satellite imagery, informants’ answers to questions concerning the distance and direction of their land from triangulated landmarks such as lakes and roads were spatially recorded for subsequent input to the Gephi spatial analysis program.

Having completed the mapping process and the delivery of the questionnaire to the primary rural site, and in the process garnered a comprehensive set of basic data regarding the village population, the fieldwork schedule then turned to the urban side of the research process. This aspect of the research was rooted in a list of all 34 internal migrants belonging to the households already interviewed using the primary questionnaire (of which 30 agreed to be interviewed), meaning that all of this study’s urban research sites are locales to which Krang Youv informants’ children have been tracked. Thereafter, however, migrants’ social networks were explored via the same methodology employed in Krang Youv – though this time examining only the first degree (or immediate) social networks of tracked out Krang Youv migrants – in order to examine the relationship between urban social networks and rural livelihoods. This “network sampling” phase, identified a further 20 respondents.

During this phase of urban interviews, migrants were interviewed, usually in person near to their urban residence but occasionally by phone if they preferred, in both a qualitative and quantitative manner concurrently. As such, basic questions concerning wages and remittances were followed by more open ended questions regarding respondents’ impressions of urban life and their interpretation of their own financial obligations. This flexible method, which reduced both the length of the interviews and the number of follow ups required, was necessary given the time constraints experienced by busy urban workers. However, beyond its role as a methodological compromise, the approach was ultimately found to be effective as a means of focussing informants upon the day to day realities of their lives which were the subject of interview.

The practicalities and difficulties of arranging interviews with busy urban migrants also meant that combining this phase of urban research with a second phase of rural data collection was the most efficient manner in which to proceed. As such, the research schedule was concurrently concerned
with a third rural methodology: the selection of informants for qualitative interviews and focus groups. The selection process, following an adapted version of Watt’s (1983) methodology, was based partly upon endogenous perceptions of wealth stratification as perceived by those comprising each wealth demographic. A parallel stratification also took place based upon informant location, so that each sub-location of the research site was given a more or less equal voice within the qualitative data.

This process was designed to capture the most appropriate possible base of informants for extended qualitative interview, as well as to foster an understanding of the (informant-informant and researcher-informant) power relations involved. It intended to account, as far as possible, for the influence of such hierarchies on the data collected in this manner - one of the primary problems of rigour in qualitative interviews (Baxter and Eyles, 1996) and, together with the corroborative function of mixed methodology (Baxter and Eyles, 1996), sought to minimise inaccuracies in qualitative data collection. As such, although key informants included several villagers holding administrative positions in the village, including the village chief, members of the pagoda committee, district administrator etc., in order to avoid elite bias, a selection of key informants not holding executive or ceremonial positions was made from each wealth stratum. Similarly, the four focus groups undertaken included groups of farmers/fishermen from each village and a mixed group of migrant workers from Krang Youv.

In this regard, as Hoggart et al. (2002) note, ethical issues are not merely a concern during fieldwork, but are ‘relevant to research, design, implementation and presentation’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 245). When dealing with these key informants, then, there was a need for ethical issues to be particularly explicit, especially given the ‘increasing use of audio-visual aids by geographers to record and analyze intensive research’ (Hoggart et al., 2002: 246). It has been noted that the presence of such devices may not only hamper the building of a productive rapport, but also raise concerns amongst informants as to the security and anonymity of the information they provide (Hoggart et al., 246). As a result, audio-visual devices were not used for qualitative or key informant interviews.

Throughout this study, ethical issues had important reflexive implications for the quality of data collected through interview, given that ‘the use of interviews and focus groups...cannot be assumed to be a collaboration of equals’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 164). Rather, it was assumed that this was not the case, in recognition of the ‘uneven distribution of social power in society as well as the particular relations of dramatic collusion which occur in the interview itself (Cloke et al., 2004: 165). Thus, in order to avoid the subsumption of informants’ interpretations of their environment, ‘a process [was necessitated] by which the balance of power of the emotional relationship in an interview [was]
transferred from the interviewer to the interviewee...creating the interview as a safe space in which deep, mutual and trustworthy interactions and understandings emerge’ (Cloke et al., 2004: 165). Moreover:

‘The key issue here is a combination of two related themes which permeate contemporary cultural geography. The first theme is that of representation, in particular of those deemed as ‘other’. Such representations necessarily have to be mediated through our own words, knowledge and experience. The second theme is the reading of texts, in this case, usually transcriptions of the spoken word.’ (Winchester, 1996: 125)

As Winchester goes on to note, however, the fostering of an ‘empathetic mode of interviewing appear[s] to offer at least a partial solution to the burning issue of representation’ (Winchester, 1996: 125-6) by allowing a dialogue to take place over the researcher’s interpretations, which serves to minimise the possibility of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The manner in which this fieldwork ultimately took place echoed Winchester (1996) in demonstrating that the best way to foster just such a productive environment is through the development of a persistent, key partnership with one or more informants within the field site. These affiliations not only yielded excellent and reliable information regarding the site itself, but also provided access to other groups and areas through endogenous connections.

My introduction through a known third party in this way greatly increased the immediate level of trust, but also helped to allay potential ethical issues by facilitating the communication of the project’s research aims and purpose though a recognised and trusted individual, to whom it is possible to address questions and concerns about the process. Furthermore, the presence of one or more fully informed and involved local individuals in such a manner concords with the central tenet of ethical practice in geography, in as much as it seeks, as far as may be possible ‘to protect those people, places and organisms affected by our research’ (Clifford, French and Valentine, 2010: 45) by facilitating a two way discursive mechanism between the researcher and those individuals from whom he seeks to learn.

3.5 Conclusion

The preceding chapter has sought to outline a methodology which was both philosophically grounded and committed to the exposition of structures of causation through a diverse range of complementary methods. In this respect, a positivist approach was dismissed as unsuited to such work, proscribing as it does the use of secondary sources and the productive examination and categorisation of qualitative resources – the opinion, conjecture and gossip upon which, as described by Bourdieu (e.g. 1984) the social structure rests. Conversely, it was also concluded that a
complete reliance on subjective data of this sort represented a needless methodological limitation, so that an overly post-structuralist methodology must be similarly rejected. Ultimately, it was concluded that a critical realist philosophical basis, which facilitates the use of multiple methods of investigation and corroboration constitutes the logical methodological grounding upon which to proceed.

The use of multiple methods in this way held both advantages and disadvantages. The research process was complex, comprising four interlinking phases spread across urban and rural research sites and presented a number of logistical challenges. In particular, the need to “track” both rural-urban migrants and rural network members occupied a significant proportion of the research timeframe and reduced the number of interviews that were possible each day. However, the use of GPS, enlistment of family members to assist in locating villagers, and tessellation of the four research phases succeeded in overcoming these challenges. As a result, the type of data necessary to fulfil the theoretical and methodological precepts set out in chapters two and three were by and large obtained: data well balanced between qualitative and quantitative material, and which genuinely bridges the rural and urban spheres.

Having now established the theoretical foundations of this thesis, as laid out in chapter two, and the methods employed during the period of fieldwork, this Ph.D. will now turn to the empirical results obtained. In Chapters Five to Seven, the data will be analyzed in light of the research questions that guide the Ph.D., before which Chapter Four will provide an essential empirical background on Cambodia, as well as the specific communities that will be the focus of an in-depth rural and urban study.
Chapter Four

Background to Cambodia

Figure 4.1 Timeline of major events in Cambodian history

Ever since Chinese merchants and diplomats set foot, early in the first millennium, in the peripheral rice-growing Kingdom they called Funan, Cambodia has been characterised as both ‘a gentle land’ (Vickery, 1984) and one resistant to change. Even in the aftermath of one of history’s most radical revolutions, it is a common pronouncement that the Angkor Wat civilisation ‘still defines the Cambodian soul’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677) and that past glories are intrinsically tied, in the Cambodian psyche, to an independence founded on rurality and rice. Consequently, it is argued, ‘the seemingly fixed structure of Cambodian inequality’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677), which has endured the efforts of ‘many besides Pol Pot’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677) to eradicate it, represents an edifice that cannot be dismantled.

In twenty first century Cambodia, there remains some truth to this perception, in that despite the remarkable economic gains made over the past decade and a half, Cambodia remains highly ‘conservative and elitist’ (Mehmet, 1997: 676); possessed of an inequality of land distribution which is ‘one of the worst in the region’ (Davies, 2010: 163); and overwhelmingly ‘dependent on subsistence agriculture’ (Davies, 2010: 164). Nevertheless, the analysis which tends to accompany this observation – that ‘little seems to have changed in the basic structure of Khmer society’ for several centuries (Mehmet, 1997: 677) carries little factual weight. Khmer society has undergone profound changes in terms of religion, ethnicity, society and economy since the days of Angkor, all of which have contributed to its current situation and which therefore must be considered in any analysis thereof.
Indeed, whilst in one respect, ‘Khmer history is [a] tragic’ account of brutal revolutions and burdensome vassalage (Mehmet, 1997: 677), in another there has been continuity in change. First, the religious reforms instigated by the revered twelfth century monarch, King Jayarvaman II, produced a ‘fatalistic’ (Vickery, 1984: 5) and deeply hierarchical social structure which retains an influential presence in the Khmer mindset. Later, the outward-looking economic shift towards the end of the Angkor era sowed the seeds for an urban-biased, foreign administrated society which, having been exacerbated to the point of caricature during French colonial rule, is as much responsible for Cambodia’s current inequality and human capital deficiency as the concentrated viciousness of the Democratic Kampuchea period, the influence of which is perhaps more keenly felt in terms of the huge waves of migration which accompanied it, and which have strained the ties between populace and land.

What follows, then, will delineate the most significant of these developments in light of their relevance to the Kingdom’s contemporary socio-economic endowments, thereby providing the necessary context for this Ph.D.’s investigation into Cambodia’s social systems, labour movement and economy. In doing so, this chapter will first outline the introduction and development of Buddhism and patronage, and the manner in which this interacted with centuries of economic change to produce the flexible hierarchy of patronage in evidence today. After considering the impact, particularly in terms of human and physical capital, of the DK period and the surrounding years, Part Two will discuss contemporary Cambodia’s endowments and challenges in terms of population mobility, environmental risk, and social change.

4.1 The Historical Evolution of Contemporary Cambodia

4.1.1 A Decade of Growth

From the point of view of those commentators seeking to assess Cambodia’s contemporary development from a primarily macro-economic perspective, the trajectory on which the formerly war-torn Kingdom now finds itself is almost unambiguously positive. Indeed, ‘following the end of decades of ravaging conflict in the 1990s’, Cambodia’s ‘impressive renaissance’ (Davies, 2010: 152) comprises a litany of economic accomplishments compiled with such breathtaking rapidity that – a mere two decades after becoming the UN’s most expensive mandate – the independent Cambodia Development Research Institute has forecast the attainment of middle-income status between 2016 and 2018 if current levels of growth are maintained (CDRI, 2012: 4). Furthermore, this transition has been managed with a long-term position in the international order kept firmly in mind, and ‘besides
political stability, economic growth and reducing poverty, the country [has] also reintegrated with the international community, joining ASEAN and the WTO’ (Davies, 2010: 152).

This metamorphosis ‘is a product of almost two decades of policy transformation from a “centrally planned” to a “market oriented” economy that favours investment, trade and private sector development’ at both regional and global levels, and which has delivered growth averaging ‘7 -8 percent between 1994 and 2010, lifted per capita income from USD 248 to USD 735 and changed the economic structure from an agrarian economy to a more balanced mix of agriculture, industry and services (CDRI, 2012: 1). As such, even accounting for the rapid population growth as a result of the baby boom of the late 1990s, ‘per capita GDP (on a PPP basis) increased more rapidly than almost all of Cambodia’s low-income peers’ (Davies, 2010: 153), in spite of having taken place in a region in which economic issues (i.e., the 1997 Asian Crisis, SARS) have impacted upon the progress of others.

Moreover, Cambodia’s economic growth has been set against a background of sustained poverty reduction, from 47 percent in 1994 to 35 percent in 2006 (World Bank, 2006), and with ‘the most recent poverty incidence data generated by the National Institute of Statistics’ Commerce Database [suggesting] further poverty reductions to 27.4 percent in 2009 and 25.8 percent in 2010’ (NIS cited in Davies, 2010: 2). Nevertheless, whilst poverty alleviation has occurred in both urban and rural areas, there is a disparity in the pace of change which is manifesting in ‘widening inequality’ (Davies, 2010: 2) – an internal discrepancy in the pace of economic expansion which is symptomatic of a key underlying issue in Cambodia’s growth pattern, in as much as it is characterised by a narrow, urban base, and an excessive dependency on certain externally oriented economic sectors, in particular construction, tourism and the garment industry.

This has been no accident. ‘Cambodia’s geographical position, in the heart of one of the most dynamic regions in the world, between two rapidly growing neighbours and well connected to China and India makes it ideally placed to take advantage of globalisation’ (Davies, 2010: 162), with the result that ‘Cambodia’s development strategies have regarded trade and investment liberalisation as key to ensuring inclusive sustainable economic growth that can contribute to poverty reduction and social development’ (CDRI, 2012: 2). However, whilst such an outward-looking economic ethos has fostered a rapid expansion in trade volume, with total trade between 1995 and 2009 increasing at an average annual rate of 17.02 percent (CDRI, 2012: 2), it has also been associated with a notable upturn in inequality in terms of Cambodia’s national Gini coefficient, from 0.35 in 1994 to 0.4 in 2004 (Davies, 2010: 154) and 0.43 in 2007 (CDRI, 2012: 2).
As such, although ‘Cambodia’s significant progress since emerging from conflict in the early 1990s has improved aggregate living standards markedly’ (Davies, 2010: 164), ‘the country still faces a number of challenges in achieving its longer term aspirations’ (CDRI, 2012: 7). In this respect, however, the structural base of the economy, whose ‘growth pattern is narrow based, making it extremely vulnerable to external shocks...[and therefore] unlikely to be sustainable in the long run’ (CDRI, 2012: 2) is more symptomatic than causal given the nation’s ability to diversify and to move up the manufacturing value-chain, in the manner of its Southeast Asian neighbours, is hamstrung by weak legal and administrative institutions, which ‘suffered heavily from the destruction of human capital during the Khmer Rouge era’ (Davies, 2010: 158).

Indeed, Cambodia’s emergence into the global economy has taken place upon an administrative platform of notable sparseness and crudity, especially with respect to those institutions required for the maintenance of a system of market capitalism. Whilst much of the blame for this may be pinned upon the ‘Khmer Rouge period and the subsequent period of central planning [which] meant that the broader institutions of governance for a market economy did not exist in the mid-1990s’ (Davies, 2010: 159), the Kingdom’s generalised dearth of human capital has its roots much further back in history. Indeed, even in the mid-nineteenth century, the ‘lopsided modernisation’ foisted upon the Cambodian quadrant of Indochina by the French in pursuit of a centrally controlled, extractive, ‘village-based economy’ (Deac, 2004: 23) was borne, in part, of a belief that Cambodia was unusually lacking in an endogenous administrative or mercantile class.

As Deac (2004: 17) notes, there was some truth in this assumption, with ‘the shift in economic emphasis’ from a rice-based to a trade economy which took place at the end of the Angkor period having attracted an influx of foreigners, especially Chinese, to ‘fill the void’ created by the fact that ‘the traditionally self-sufficient Khmers had little experience with trade’. It would, therefore, be erroneous to view Cambodia’s current structural endowments as primarily the product of its twentieth century travails. Rather, they must be understood in the context of a variety of historical and geographical causes and effects given that, in addition to government institutions and policy, ‘other factors also affect the rate and direction of development. These include how a developing society is structured, relations between different social groups, forms of political institutions and how power is exercised, systems of justice, and the kinds of freedoms enjoyed by citizens’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 169).

This is not to argue, as Prasso (1994) for instance has, that the deficiencies of Cambodian development are merely the latest manifestation of a socio-cultural system which has survived almost unchanged from Pre-Angkorean times. Indeed, to do so would, as Springer (2009) notes, be
manifestly suspect given the enormous breadth of political shifts, cultural influences, and economic transitions which have beset the region during the past centuries. Instead, what is called for is a recognition that whilst ‘culture is not fixed’, nevertheless, ‘no one escapes the history of their own society’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 169) and that, as a result, ‘markets’, and by extension the structural factors which support them, ‘cannot be understood apart from the power relationships and institutions in which they are located’ (Rodan et al., 2006: 7). The elucidation of these linkages between history, society and economy will occupy the following sections.

4.1.2 Cambodia’s Early History: The Genesis of a Conservative Nationalism

The ““changelessness” of Cambodian society’ (Chandler, 2000: 10) has been so frequently noted by Western commentators, as to have become something of a ubiquity in any piece of writing directed at describing the nature of a Kingdom in which, it is generally assumed, ‘traditions persist, continuity is maintained, and the deep beliefs of the people abide’ (Macdonald, 1958: 134). Indeed, this tendency is so ingrained that where any concession is made to the nation’s mutability in the face of a thousand years of global dynamism, it tends to be one suggestive of a slow, almost imperceptible decline – a double-edged recognition that whilst it may be ‘a smaller, less important place [,] In other ways it is the same’ (Macdonald, 1958: 134).

This perception of Cambodia as a happily anachronistic nation, living ‘day by day, poor but contented’ (Poorée and Maspero [1938] in Derks, 2008: 30) fitted perfectly with the ethos of those agents of the French Mission Civilitriste ‘who in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw themselves as introducing change and civilisation to the region’ (Chandler, 2000: 10). However, the French did not create this caricature of wilful backwardness, which has its roots in the ‘deep continuities [and] refusals’ of Khmer culture (Chandler, 2000: 247) and which induced Pol Pot to claim ‘that Cambodians were asleep or ensnared for 2000 years’ (Chandler, 2000: 10) in order to justify the violent foreclosure of the period. Despite their basis in Khmer culture, though, such ‘points of view ignore a great deal of evidence...[given that]...arguably the revolution of the 1970s was the fifth major one that Cambodia has undergone since prehistoric times’ (Chandler, 2000: 10), beginning with the long process of Indianisation which began at the turn of the first millennium, and continuing via the Cham’s capture of Angkor and King Jayarvaman II’s re-conquest, to the overthrow of the French, and finally Democratic Kampuchea.

Indeed, the early history of what is now Cambodia is a story of extinct empires, ‘each in turn succeeding its forerunner through a process of dynastic usurpation and conquest...[:]...First the state called Funan, then the realm of Chenla, and finally Kampucha’ (Macdonald, 1958: 35). The first
of these is known only through Chinese references to a notable kingdom in the south (Vickery, 2003), which provide very little detail as to its nature or internal organisation. What these sources do indicate, however, is that the state met its end in 616-617 (Vickery, 2003), when it was superseded by its former vassal state Chenla. Subsequently, after less than two centuries, the Chenla kingdom would itself fall to King Jayarvaman II who was to establish ‘Cambodia’s “golden age”, its claim to historical fame and national pride, the period of Angkor between 802 and 1431’ (Deac, 2004: 14)

Although the Khmer empire’s domination of Southeast Asia began to fade almost six hundred years ago, with respect to the aims of this Ph.D., this is a period of notable importance due to its influence on Cambodian nationalism, which, unlike that of its neighbour Vietnam, for instance, ‘has not generally pictured itself as a struggle against foreign invaders and advice. Instead, national identity, until recent times, was seen as the sum of social arrangements in effect inside Cambodia’ (Chandler, 2000: 13), recalling a time of regional pre-eminence which many of its neighbours have never enjoyed to the same extent.

This period of stable evolution would come to an end, however, as King Jayarvaman VII, soon after having defeated the Cham and recaptured Angkor in 1191, resolved, ‘at the pinnacle of his power, to break with the Khmer past and imposed, in a brutal and totalitarian way, a Hinduisation program on his people, forcing them to convert from the Mahayana to the Theravada variant of Buddhism’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677). This enormous cultural upheaval, which Chandler (1993) has likened to the Democratic Kampuchea period eight centuries later, represents a key turning point in Khmer history and is of particular relevance herein for two reasons. First, it established the ‘fatalist’ (Vickery, 1984: 5) Theravada doctrine which would come to underpin Khmer culture, and second, it set in motion the slow “decline” of the Angkor civilisation which would open Cambodia to external political and economic influence, and finally domination, in the succeeding years.

4.1.3 Cambodia in the Second Millennium: Buddhism, Trade, and Subordination

Although an analysis which focuses in detail upon the interrelationship of religious doctrine and Khmer society is beyond the remit of this thesis, it would nevertheless be remiss to exclude it entirely given that, as numerous authors have highlighted (e.g. Chandler, 2000; Kiernan, 1996; Vickery, 1984), the importance of Buddhism to the functionality and form of Khmer culture cannot be overstated. Stewart-Fox (2010: 173) for instance, argues that the generalized perception that ‘no one can escape Karma’s natural moral law…[and therefore that]…one’s deeds will inevitably be rewarded or punished, whether in this lifetime, or the next, or the next…is one reason why there is a
general lack of interest in Cambodia over the trial of Khmer Rouge leaders’. Indeed, ‘for the majority of people in Theravada countries, Buddhism shapes their worldview’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 173) to such an extent that social relations, of the sort this Ph.D. seeks to examine, should not be examined without prior reference to the religious foundations of inequality and structure. As Stewart-Fox (2010: 173) goes on to explain:

‘Rebirth and Karma imply that social position has been earned in previous existences. In other words the rich and powerful have a moral right to their wealth and power and to use it for their personal benefit. Of course, how they use them will have its own karmic repercussions, but that is their concern. Thus karma legitimises and underpins social hierarchy...[and also]...undermines the notion of equality. For Buddhists, people are evidently not born equal and karma explains why’

In addition, ‘the legitimising of power elites through social hierarchy received reinforcement from two other aspects of Theravada Buddhist political culture – the value accorded to social order and the use of patronage as the primary means by which to concentrate and exert political power’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 174). The first of these derives from the idea that a stable social order allows individuals to pursue their own spiritual paths, which is deemed to be separate to, and of greater importance than, the ability to make choices in other ways, so that ‘ideals of social order tend to override individual rights’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 174). This spiritually rooted social construct has a tendency to manifest in a relatively high level of conservatism, as mediated though the view that ‘what keeps society coherent’ is not equality or social guarantees, but ‘the proper observance of relationships between people’ (Chandler, 2000: 90).

Whilst it should be noted that external accusations of conservatism are a feature of most developing countries and that, in fact, ‘the idea of progress [in its Western, imperative, sense] is not especially widespread’ (Chandler, 2000: 90), the extent to which Cambodian culture has persistently reflected the principles of structured inequality is of great relevance to this thesis, especially given the social upheavals which beset the country during the twentieth century. Indeed, patronage, the second aspect of Theravada Buddhist political culture as noted by Stewart-Fox (2010), is arguably the most consistent and enduring aspect of a society where ‘all political regimes and parties have functioned, and continue to function, as patronage networks...[from]...Sihanouk and his Sangkum party [to] the Lon Nol Regime, and [even] the dominant Cambodian People’s Party today’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 175).

In the interim, ‘the Khmer Rouge regime provides a striking example of how deep the roots of the political culture of patronage and hierarchy really go’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 175), seeking as it did to ‘do away with Cambodian culture in its entirety [in order to] build a new revolutionary culture’ but
succeeding only in mirroring what it replaced in that ‘Angkar, the supreme authority, was a strictly hierarchical power structure, which, though it purported to act on behalf of the people, never consulted them in any way’ (Stewart-Fox, 2010: 175). Indeed, although ‘traditional forms of hierarchy were broken down during this period of radical change’ (Hinton, 1998a: 109), with the Khmer Rouge destroying ‘much of the old hierarchical system, status differences continued to be structured vertically in the Communist regime’ (Hinton, 1998a: 111), with Cambodian social organisation consequently retaining much of its character in spite of the inverted positions of old [peasant] and new [urban/ educated] people.

The persistence of such arrangements derives from their universality, which in turn is buttressed by the support they receive through wider Cambodian culture, especially language. Indeed, in contrast to English, ‘the Khmer language is replete with hierarchical terms which differentiate people’ (Hinton, 1998a: 99), with very few status-neutral words, such as “you”, “him”, or “her” available to facilitate social interaction outside of the formally structured system (Chandler, 2000: 91). Rather, Cambodians who wish to refer to “you” must choose from a list laddered from own [younger] to samdech [illustrious], with the terms for eating and various other activities being subject to similar gradation. Nevertheless, ‘because children are taught the terms at a young age, the conception of hierarchical difference implicit in these registers becomes natural to them’ (Hinton, 1998a: 99) and is supported by a range of other “enculturation” devices such as ritual praise and shaming during early education (Hinton, 1998a) so that ‘the rectitude and permanence of these relationships [is] drummed into everyone from birth’ (Chandler, 2000: 105).

These subtle socio-cultural devices represent the foundational girders to the system under investigation within this Ph.D. Indeed, as Chandler (2000: 105) argues, ‘the considerable structural consistency in each Cambodian village and family’ derives from the fact that ‘Cambodians always identified themselves in terms of their status relative to the person being addressed’. Furthermore, the process is multi-scalar, as ‘this identification locate[s] them for a moment at a particular, but by no means fixed, point in a flexible set of dyadic relationships extending downwards from the king and the sangka [district] through the graded bureaucracy of the capital and kampong [port town] to the villages and past them to the landless debt slaves and minority peoples living literally at the edge of the state’ (Chandler, 2000: 105).

As such, the incorporation of Theravada Buddhism into a society which had already absorbed social stratification to a significant degree during its millennium of “Indianization” served to entrench a system of inequality which is ‘structured like a Buddhist temple, in layer upon layer of groups and classes’ (Mehmet, 1997: 676) and which appears almost immutable given its persistence over ‘the
last 500 years... [during which]... little seems to have changed in the basic structure of Khmer society’ (Mehmet, 1997: 677) in spite of the enormous social upheavals of recent history. Nevertheless, although King Jayarvaman VII’s religious reforms would become a key foundation to an enduringly conservative social structure, he also ushered in an age of change, setting in motion the transition from rice-based subsistence economy to trading nation which characterised the second part of the Angkor period.

Despite the proportional influx of foreigners being small during this early period of trade, the effect on the social structure as a whole was significant given that, besides the ancient influence of India and the brief Cham invasion, Cambodia had experienced little exposure to external cultural influence and was thus unprepared for the ‘destabilising’ effect of a growing and increasingly foreign dominated mercantile elite (Kiernan, 1996: 5). Indeed, by the time the French arrived in the nineteenth century, ‘Cambodia nearly comprised two separate societies...one rural, producing for subsistence, the other largely urban, producing a few goods for the world market and consuming mostly international commodities’ (Kiernan, 1996: 5). The inequality of this arrangement, in which ‘rice growers provided food for the city dwellers, but the cities offered little for rural consumption’ (Kiernan, 1996: 5), would come to underpin the events of the twentieth century, during which urbanites were excluded from the very definition of Khmer. Whether, in the age of mass labour migration, this rural-urban divide is meaningfully or only apparently shifting, is one of the key themes of investigation within this Ph.D.

In this regard, it should be noted that this is not necessarily the greatest upheaval thus far. Indeed, ‘the two main features of Cambodia’s “middle period” were a shift of the capital from the rice-growing hinterlands of north western Cambodia, to the trade-oriented riverbanks in the vicinity of Phnom Penh, on the one hand, and the increasing importance of foreign powers in Cambodian internal affairs on the other’ (Chandler, 2000: 97). This macro-economic transition was reflected in a social, and to some extent ethnic, stratification at provincial level, as Khmer society came to be centred around ‘kampong – port-towns, which were relatively large and populated by Chinese or sino-Khmer people [and which] were surrounded, in a semi-circular arc, by rice growing villages’ (Chandler, 2000: 103 [emphasis added]) dependent on the kampong for defence, trade and administration. This ceding of key activities came increasingly to define Khmer society over time as, ‘not inclined to engage in business activities and lacking a middle class, the Khmers grew to rely on the Chinese as merchants and bankers and on the Vietnamese as craftsmen and small businessmen’ to such an extent that a fear of “cultural extinction”...coupled with fantasies of Angkorean greatness...ultimately bred distrust, resentment, nationalism and xenophobia’ (Deac, 2004: 18)
Moreover, whilst the economic “opening up” of Cambodia during the latter part of the Angkor empire was a significant event in itself, the economic and ethnic rural-urban divide was compounded by French Colonial practice, which, more so than other parts of Indochina (with the exception of Laos) viewed Cambodia initially as being of strategic and political, rather than economic, importance in the early part of its rule. As such, ‘under the French colonial system, Kampuchea became a peripheral area into which a great deal of development resources were not expended…[with the result that]…traditional [rural] society remained to a large extent intact’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 2). Even when the French began, belatedly, to ‘exploit the country’s natural resources by establishing plantations to produce rubber for export’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 2), as in pre-colonial times, ‘trade and enterprise were mainly in the hands of Vietnamese and Chinese’, with Vietnamese, in particular, being ‘recruited by the colonial administration to fill the gaps in the civil service and police force’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 2)

The overriding effect of French rule, then, was to accelerate the process of ‘transform[ing] the country’s primitive, self-sufficient economy into one [which was at once] dependent on the outside world’ and overwhelmingly ‘village-based’ (Deac, 2004: 23). This contradiction, which, much as Scott (1976; 1985) describes in Malaysia, left Cambodia fundamentally weak, continued to fester throughout the years of colonialism so that by ‘the latter half of the 1960s, Cambodia’s internal situation ensured that even without the Vietnam war, the nation was in trouble. Economic decline, exacerbated by the nationalization of various sectors of the economy, had not been reversed. Agriculture, the economy’s foundation, was stagnant. The historical gap between rich and poor, urban and rural, had broadened into a chasm’ (Deac, 2004: 54).

As such, ‘by 1970, there were two peasantries in Cambodia’ – one which was able to benefit from extra-village connections and a much larger one which was not (Kiernan, 1996: 7). Furthermore, an increasingly significant proportion was landless, with the percentage of those thereby afflicted rising from 4 percent in 1950 to 20 percent in 1970. The combination of this huge, disenfranchised peasantry – whose situation was not created, but deeply exacerbated by the carpet bombing of Eastern Cambodia as a result of the Vietnam “sideshow” – with the ‘mass of politically aware teachers and students’ produced by the educational reforms of the 1950s and 60s and ‘on whose grievances ‘the Paris educated Pol Pot group were able to capitalise’ (Kiernan, 1996: 6), would become the fuel for the subsequent Communist revolution.
4.1.4 The Democratic Kampuchea Period and Thereafter: Man and Land Divided

Whilst Cambodia today remains very much ‘marked by the genocidal regime of the Khmer Rouge…[whose]…brutal bid to turn Cambodia into a Maoist, peasant-dominated agrarian cooperative resulted in the death of an estimated 2 million Cambodians…between 1975 and 1978’ (Davies, 2010: 152-3), the extent to which the destruction of Cambodia’s human and physical capital, in spite of the belated attempts to reverse it, was well underway before 1975 tends to be underestimated. Thus, in order to fully understand the consequences of that brief, but catastrophic period for contemporary Cambodia, it is necessary to view it as the ‘open ended’ (Chandler, 2000: 227) central nadir of several decades of injurious national upheaval. Some of this has been outlined above, but it is a particularly worthy, and occasionally neglected, addendum that to the statistics of those who died as a result of murder or starvation under the devastatingly incompetent auspices of the Pol Pot regime must be added those whose deaths, displacement, and radicalisation during the Vietnam War, helped propel that regime to power.

As Kiljunen (1984: 5-6) summarises, whilst ‘the human and material losses in the Vietnam War in Kampuchea were enormous’, the social cost was far greater. ‘Massive bombing of the rural areas led to a flood of refugees who crowded into the cities under the control of the Lon Nol government [so that] by the time the war ended in 1975 an estimated over one third of the rural population – some two million people – had become refugees…[leading to]…a near complete breakdown of the traditional social structure’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 5-6). As a result, ‘the population of Phnom Penh alone, within five years rose from some 600, 000 to over two million’, with such large-scale rural flight combining with livestock and crop destruction to produce ‘actual famine’ in the cities’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 6).

Placed in this context, the forced evacuation of the cities which was the immediate action of the victorious Khmer Rouge forces upon taking Phnom Penh in 1975 appears somewhat more logical than it is often supposed to have been. Although it seems likely that the forced ruralisation of the country was at least partly an ideological attempt to ‘assert the victory of the CPK [and] the dominance of the countryside over the cities’ (Chandler, 2000: 2010), it was also to some extent a pragmatic necessity given the state of the nation in which the DK regime had come to power. Indeed, given the extent of the Capital’s dependence on American food aid during the preceding conflict, which had ‘destroyed crops…disrupted transport connections’ and resulted in the death of ‘75% of all domestic animals’ (Kiljunen, 1984: 6) the pressing need to maximise the only available agricultural resource – labour – is obvious.
Faced with this situation, the DK regime chose to instigate the second great wave of migration of the 1970s, with urban residents, many of them already essentially refugee farmers, being set along a road towards one of the seven zones into which the country was now divided. A third wave would begin on ‘Christmas Day 1978, [when] Vietnamese forces, numbering over a hundred thousand, mounted a major offensive on several fronts’ eventually capturing an abandoned Phnom Penh on January 7th the following year (Chandler, 2010: 223). Thereafter, ‘throughout 1979 and the first few months of 1980, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians criss-crossed the country looking for relatives, returning to their homes, trading, or seeking refuge overseas’ in an impromptu mass-mobilisation that ‘the civil authorities did nothing to prevent’ (Chandler, 2010: 229). Over a decade later, with the country having successfully completed its first independent elections, a final wave would occur, as ‘hundreds of thousands of people returned home from border camps’, predominantly situated in the East of Thailand (Lim, 2007: 7).

As such, the direct impact of the events of the 1960s and 70s was to exacerbate the nationwide dislocation between man and land which had its roots in the colonial and post-colonial eras, but which reached unprecedented levels as a result of the prolonged bombing of the Kingdom’s Eastern border and ‘DK policies...[which]...deprived peasants of three of the most cherished features of their lifestyle: land, family, and religion’ (Kiernan, 1996: 162). Resultantly, and perhaps uniquely for a nation of Cambodia’s economic and productive endowments, the majority of Cambodians over forty have experienced migration at some point in their lives. Coupled with the upsurge of youth migration in the late 20th and early 21st century, ‘the recent momentum [of which] is extraordinary’ (Lim, 2007: 19), recent Cambodian history details an unprecedented rupture of the bonds between the environment and its inhabitants. The contemporary implications of this, as reflective of the wider concerns of this thesis, will be discussed in the following sections.

4.2 Cambodia’s Contemporary Endowments and Challenges

4.2.1 Migration and Demography

Whilst the three huge movements of people which took place during the 1970s and 1980s have inevitably left their mark on Cambodian attitudes to migration, it would be unwise to assume that their legacy in this respect would necessarily be one of diminished insularity, or of a greater positivity towards the prospect and possibility of movement. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of pre-war accounts of Khmer village life (most commonly Ebihara, 1968) with those which have sought to describe the upheaval of the late 20th century has had the unintended consequence of painting immobility, and undifferentiated subsistence agriculture, as the longstanding norm from which
those events instigated a deviation. In fact, this static conception of the peasantry may never have been an appropriate one, with Skeldon (1997: 7-8), for instance, having criticised this ‘myth of the immobile peasant’ as a pervasive caricature of pre-modern Asian societies.

Certainly, there is evidence that the picture of the quiescent and immobile farmer is particularly inappropriate in Cambodia, where Kaleb (1968: 525) had spoken of ‘the great mobility of the Cambodian peasant’ in the pre-revolutionary era, but it nevertheless continues to hold considerable influence, as evidenced in a recent CDRI report (Lim, 2007: 7) which argues that ‘labour migration [in Cambodia] is still a relatively new phenomenon’. The primary problem with this conception is that the presumed novelty of labour migration carries with it an implied discordance between traditional household strategies and the phenomenon of labour movement, thereby helping to sustain the view that ‘Cambodian migrants’, undertaken almost exclusively by ‘poor and medium households’ (Lim, 2007: 14), at best ‘view migration as a short term strategy to cope with unexpected problems and not as a long- or medium- term process to improve the socio-economic status of the family’ (Lim, 2007: 8).

This representation of Cambodian labour migration, wherein migrants suffer jobs that ‘only allow them to maintain the status quo rather than improving their standard of living’ (Maltoni, 2006: 3), may be challenged on two grounds. The first of these is found in more recent research, which suggests that migration is by no means characteristic only of poorer and medium villagers, but in fact comprises a greater proportion of medium and rich households than poorer ones, who often lack the necessary financial and social capital to migrate (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014). Furthermore, although the CDRI report (Lim, 2007: 14) concedes that ‘the poorest find it difficult to migrate’, the assertion that ‘those who decide to migrate are driven from their home communities by an overwhelming predominance of push factors’ (Lim, 2007: 8) is contested by Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim (2014) who note that the aspirational nature of urban work has expanded beyond the garment sector, previously highlighted as a solitary “pull factor” to urban work by Lim (2007) and Maltoni (2006).

The second questionable assertion contained within the CDRI report (Lim, 2007) is that migration is both a novel and an emergency phenomenon in Cambodia. Indeed, whilst it may not be incorrect to argue that ‘the scope and scale of labour migration amongst young people has reached an unprecedented level, or even that ‘its recent momentum [driven by foreign investment and economic growth] is extraordinary’ (Lim, 2007: 19), as Diepart (2008) and RUPP-IDRC (2009) have noted, rural-rural migration is, and has historically been, a vital element in the livelihoods portfolios of most village wealth demographics.
Indeed, there are sufficient parallels to suggest that contemporary rural-urban labour migration should be viewed as part of a continuum alongside those traditional mobility strategies which persisted prior to Cambodia’s period of rapid industrial expansion and, further, that rural-urban labour migration is being incorporated into livelihoods portfolios alongside those alternative strategies, including NTFP collecting, seasonal fishing, and rural labour sale, which comprise the majority of yearly activities for the Kingdom’s numerous long term or temporary migrants, conservatively (and methodologically dubiously) estimated by the National institute of Statistics as comprising at least 35 percent of the population in 2004 (Maltoni, 2006).

Nevertheless, in spite of the discrepancies regarding the potential benefits of contemporary Cambodian labour migration, one aspect upon which there is little dispute is the growing demographic pressure on Cambodia’s rural areas, as a result of the baby booom which followed the end of the Pol Pol regime, generating population growth of 1.81 percent annually (Lim, 2007), and which is now reflected in a labour force expanding at a rate of ‘200,000 people or 4 percent a year’ (Sida in Davies, 2010: 154). Furthermore, ‘with around 60 percent of the entire population 24 years or younger, creating jobs for those young adults has proven a daunting task for the government…. [especially given that]…more than 80 percent of the population live in rural areas and engage mainly in agricultural activities, which normally offer only three to six months employment’ (Lim, 2007: 13).

As a result of this rapidly expanding labour force, ‘employment in urban areas, mainly in garment factories and construction sites, is the talk of rural villages’ (Lim, 2007: 13), especially given that since the early 2000s, the increase in modern sector employment opportunities has largely kept pace with demand, with 330, 000 workers being employed in the garment industry, up to 260, 000 in construction and 61, 000 in hotels and restaurants as of 2006 (Lim, 2007: 13). Indeed, even taking into account the global economic downturn of 2008, from which Cambodia’s export industries have largely recovered (CDRI, 2012), the rapidly expanding working age population has largely been catered for through a combination of urban employment opportunities, and improved agricultural productivity – from less than two million tons of rice in 1980 to 8.25 million tons in 2010 (CDRI, 2012: 51) – allowing the burgeoning labour force to make a substantially positive impact on growth, with estimates indicating it ‘contributed around 3.5 percentage points to annual GDP growth between 1995 and 2007’ (Davies, 2010: 154).

Nevertheless, the need to productively accommodate such a large number of new workers every year places Cambodia in a vulnerable position given that its ability to do so through growth depends largely on external private investment. Indeed, ‘except agriculture, which is a growth sustainer,
other drivers of growth were hit hard by the global financial crisis’ (CDRI, 2012: 2) and although competitive labour costs and working conditions relative to the region allowed the Kingdom to recover quickly, the year 2008 presented a microcosm of future economic perils, as ‘inflation reached a ten year high on the back of rising international prices and surging domestic monetary growth...[at the same time as]...external demand weakened in the crucial garment industry’ (Davies, 2010: 160).

As such, the ability to maintain growth rates as the labour base expands is a key issue for Cambodia, as, relatedly, are the low levels of human capital resulting from the events of the DK regime and the subsequent period of educational stagnation resulting from ‘very poor teaching standards’ during the Vietnamese occupation of the 1980s (Pellini, 2004: 65; Kiljunen, 1984). Whilst there are signs that the situation may be improving in this respect, given that ‘in 2004 the younger cohorts of the workforce had substantially more education than older workers’ (Sida in Davies, 2010: 154-5), the ability both to maintain this trend and to utilise a more educated workforce in such a way as to improve and expand the industrial base, represents a key determinant of Cambodia’s future development. As will be demonstrated subsequently, ‘this requires addressing the agricultural sector that supplies the bulk of the population with its livelihood’ (Davies, 2010: 163) and whose linkages to modern sector are the primary focus herein.

### 4.2.2 Agriculture and Vulnerability to Natural Disasters

As noted above, ‘Cambodia’s agricultural sub-sectors, particularly rice, have made remarkable progress in recent years in terms of production, which has significantly contributed to national food security and poverty alleviation’ (CDRI, 2012: 51). This improvement has come largely as a result of ‘fertiliser use, [which] has gradually increased [together with], modern farming equipment such as tractors, harvesters and threshers [having] been introduced, though traditional agricultural techniques are still widely used’ (CDRI, 2012: 51). However, although the gains made in this respect are notable, they have not been without cost as, much as Scott (1985) describes in Malaysia, wealthier farmers have been able, not only to capture much of the benefit of such improvements, but to utilise this advantage to impose further pressure on the livelihoods of the less well off. Furthermore, Cambodia’s agricultural development has also been associated with the widespread practice of land concessions, which has not only reduced the available stock of arable land, but removed the safety net provided to many poorer rural Cambodians by NTFP collection and fisheries (CDRI, 2012).
Running in parallel to these human-made pressures has been the associated challenges of climate change, which have the potential to directly ‘aggravate the situation as deforestation and land use change can cause top-soil erosion, subsequently impacting on agricultural crop production’ (CDRI, 2012: 52). Indeed, there is a significant body of evidence that, partly as a result of widespread deforestation (Global Witness, 2002; De Lopez, 2001; Le Billon, 2000), Cambodia is becoming increasingly vulnerable to the impact of climatic conditions as ‘increasingly irregular rainfall, commonly associated with climate change, has adversely affected agricultural production...[and]...the rising frequency of drought and flood, including flash floods, over the last three decades has damaged hundreds of thousands of paddy fields’ (CDRI, 2012: 52), thereby placing the ‘livelihoods of the majority of Cambodian people under threat’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 9).

Furthermore, since the turn of the millennium, the situation has degraded markedly, as a string of record breaking natural disasters has ravaged the Kingdom’s rural enclaves, bringing ‘the devastation of floods and droughts for five successive years’ between 2000 and 2005 (Oeur et al., 2012: 60). The first of these, ‘the flood of 2000-01 was considered the worst in 70 years, affecting 3.4 million people in 19 of the country’s 24 provinces and municipalities, and leaving 347 dead’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 60). This was quickly followed by the flood of 2001-2, which ‘affected 2.1 million people in many regions still recovering from the deluge of the previous year...[meaning that]...many rice farming households did not have sufficient rice seeds to plant [,] about one million of the flood victims suffered food shortages [and] a total of 62 people died’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 60). The following season, ‘In 2002-03, the country was once again ravaged by the combined effects of flood and drought...[with the government reporting that]...the drought experienced that year was the worst in two decades’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 60).

Whilst the climactic difficulties experienced during the following years were, in general, marginally less severe than the succession of three floods and a drought between 2000 and 2003, all of which rank amongst Cambodia’s ten worst natural disasters since 1900 (Duong et al., 2013), the impact of the recent floods of 2011 has been, if anything, more severe. Indeed, according to the Asia Development Bank (2012: 1), ‘the damage from the 2011 flooding is expected to exceed that of floods in 1996 and 2000, both in terms of loss of life and impacts on infrastructure and agricultural crops, largely because the water rose and receded three times...[and thereby]... not only prolonged the period of inundation but also hindered the initiation of meaningful remedial measures’.

This recent period of successive climate shocks has made Cambodia, whose vulnerability is exacerbated by high levels of rural poverty and a widespread reliance on subsistence agriculture,
‘one of the most disaster prone countries in East Asia’ (CDRI, 2012: 139), with the gathering intensity and regularity of such events suggestive of a nation beset by the worst effects of climate change. Indeed, ‘although a link to global climate change has yet to be established’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 61), ‘the Mekong River Commission has calculated that the average temperature in Cambodia increased by 0.8˚C from 1960 to 2005’ (MRC in CDRI, 2012: 62), with it being ‘projected that the mean temperature will have risen by a further 0.3˚ to 0.6˚C by 2025 and another 1.4˚C to 4.3˚C by 2090’ (CDRI, 2012: 62). Clearly, this carries devastating implications for an overwhelmingly rural nation, whose agricultural subsistence is ‘inextricably linked to the annual cycle of flooding’ taking place in a regular and manageable manner (Oeur et al., 2012: 61).

Whilst the combined effect of successive environmental disasters has had only a limited effect on the economy as a whole, reducing the World Bank’s growth forecast from 6.8% to 6% for the second half of 2011 in a response which was also reflective of a predicted slowdown in the E.U. and U.S. economies over the same period (World Bank, 2012), the impact on livelihoods has been severe and farmers have begun increasingly to recognise that ‘the damage caused to their farming in recent years is associated with climate related issues...[with]...local perception of these changes and market demand [having driven them] to use new early maturing (90 -100 days) varieties of rice seed and diversify their farming’ (CDRI, 2012: 6). As noted by Orlove (2005: 597), adaptive action of this sort is likely to be both environmentally and socially deleterious in the medium to long term, as adaptation under conditions of climate pressure has historically tended to ‘exacerbate rather than ameliorate vulnerability to climate fluctuations’.

Furthermore, as emphasised by Scott (1985), the ability to invest in new and diverse crop varieties is not available to all, especially given that ‘these events tend to hit the most vulnerable rural poor the hardest’ (CDRI, 2012: 65). Indeed, in a country such as Cambodia, to attempt to understand the outcomes of natural disasters in aggregate terms is a damaging reductionism. Rather, their impact is stratified in a variety of complex ways within regions, villages and households, as well as according to gender, wealth and the type of natural disaster in question. As CDRI (2012: 139) argue, for instance, ‘women are affected differently to men, and often more severely, by climate change and associated natural disasters such as floods, droughts, cyclones and storms’.

This is because ‘women’s conventional roles and primary livelihoods activities accentuate their vulnerability, making them more susceptible to shock and undermining their ability to cope with climate change impacts’ (CDRI, 2012: 139), with the result that ‘loss of rice crop was observed to be statistically significant between male- and female- headed households’ in Cambodia (CDRI, 2012:
Furthermore, and of particular relevance to this study, the manner of the response to natural disasters differs according to gender, so that ‘in times of flood and drought, finding paid work outside the village was a priority for female-headed households, while male-headed households were more likely to look for a waged job, both inside and outside the village’ (CDRI, 2012: 149).

As such, the impact of natural disasters, and indeed climate change more generally, cannot be separated from the social environment in which its impact is felt. Not only have human practices differentially worsened the effects on the local population, as a result of the natural resources base in certain areas being rapidly depleted through ‘over-exploitation by outside investors operating in collusion with powerful government officials, and by more people cutting wood, collecting non-timber forest products and fishing with illegal techniques’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 62; Le Billon, 2002), but they are also key to mitigating the effects of climate shocks, both in terms of prior planning and recovery. Indeed, recent studies have produced evidence of a wide range of such activities, with villagers helping each other to ‘evacuate family members, watch over animals, patrol residential areas, ferry children to school, distribute water and provide small rice loans’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 81).

Moreover, in the aftermath of natural disasters, it is often reported that the affected populations commonly ‘work together to repair community infrastructure such as canals, water gates, culverts, schools and roads’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 81), thereby helping to mitigate the effects of such shocks (Bankoff, 2003).

### 4.2.3 Social Capital and Social Change in the 21st Century

Community social resources are, then, a crucial factor in mitigating the severity of natural disasters, both at the individual and village level - all the more so because they extend beyond the village itself and are adaptive to the influx of the modern economy, thereby facilitating the uptake, by disaster-hit households, of loans of either cash or rice, and of urban, or other non-traditional jobs ‘through relationships with relatives, friends, neighbours and recruitment agents’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 81). As such, what Oeur et al. term ‘bridging networks of social capital’, defined as relationships between peers who are either resident in different places, or engaged in differing employment, not only provide a short-term solution to the shocks resulting from agricultural vulnerability, but have, to take a wider view, ‘helped households…respond to the broader demands of social change taking place in their lives’ (Ouer et al, 2012: 81).

As a result, kinship-based and familial strategies of the sort which facilitate migration continue to be essential in a country in which rural villagers consistently report ‘a severe lack of information on disaster preparedness’ (Oeur et al., 2012: 82) and in which ‘the flows of young migrant workers from
rural to urban areas are mainly through informal channels...[because]...a formal network is largely absent’ (Lim, 2007: 1). Nevertheless, whilst these networks may be informal, they are far from ad hoc arrangements. Although the initial linkages between rural and urban areas are generated in what might appear to be a random manner, as ‘pioneer migrants tend to end up in a range of destinations...[with]...only a small minority of such moves...eventually result[ing] in network migration’ (De Haas, 2008: 32), the linkages which facilitate migration over the longer term rapidly consolidate, to the point that they are now ‘very strong’ in Cambodia, just over a decade after rural-urban labour migration began to accelerate (Lim, 2007: 1).

The persistence and continued importance of networks of these sorts demonstrates that ‘in terms of structural social capital and its composition, post-conflict forms do not differ greatly from those that existed before the wars’ of the 1960s and 70s (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21). However, whilst ‘informal networks continue to be organised by kinship and affinity, just as they had before the fighting erupted’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21), there exists a broadening consensus that the Cambodian social structure is ‘increasingly beginning to be shaped by market forces...[with]...non-farm activities, particularly small businesses and trade [serving to promote] new networks that go beyond the circle of relatives and friends’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21). In the same way, ‘networks formally based on the concept of mutual aid are giving way to new networks based on rigid reciprocity and the need to earn cash income’ with the result that traditional modes of community asset management such as provas dei [communal labour exchange] are in decline in some areas’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21).

Thus, ‘informal networks are not dissolving as a result of the ravages of conflict but are changing in response to the power and permeating influence of external market forces’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 21). Although ‘the lack of formal institutions of secular authority remains a prominent feature’ of Cambodian village life’ (Hughes, 2001: 12) and one which has tended to leave informal, traditional institutions and modes of conduct as the primary drivers of communal action, the fact that ‘in Cambodian society, power, honour, and wealth are highly interrelated’ (Hinton, 1998a: 109) leaves these arrangements particularly susceptible to the influence of the market in a manner which, as Colletta and Cullen argue (2000: 22), is serving to repair the Kingdom’s stocks of “bridging” social capital which were ‘stunted during warfare’. Indeed, several years on, it may be argued that “bridging” linkages of this sort are proliferating sufficiently rapidly as to begin to alter the “shape” of Cambodian social relations. As Lim (2007: 22) describes:

‘In a traditional society like Cambodia, social networks are based in the village and spread out like a spider web, but with the migration of young adults from rural areas, a new linear
network, connecting rural and urban areas, has started to take root....While the traditional web-like network remains largely intact, albeit weaker, the new linear network has become stronger and stronger and played a very significant role in facilitating rural-urban migration. It is clear that those who remain outside this new network find migrating much harder’

The significance of this shift of practice is subject to some debate, with Colletta and Cullen’s (2000) interpretation of the market as a merely restorative influence tending to be challenged by those, such as Hughes (2001: 17), who posit the more culturally nuanced argument that ‘outside interactions and intrusions offer different cultural norms and standards, which can challenge the idea that particular conceptions of the good and the right are self-evident [and thereby dilute] the framework within which actors are judged by the village community’. Indeed, with respect to the most significant of these standards in Cambodia, the institution of patronage, ‘the impersonality of the money economy contrasts sharply with the highly personal nature of a social control achieved through the valorisation of particular conceptions of “a good name”’ (Hughes, 2001: 23).

Furthermore, labour migration has been noted as having a particularly corrosive effect on entrenched norms of status and entitlement given that ‘even if it is not the intended effect, the exposure to new places, ideas and practices which migrants experience often seems to lead to a questioning of existing forms of hierarchy, or a reinvention of the self’s place within the social order’ (Gardner and Ossella, 2003: 14). That this phenomenon is taking place in an environment dominated by the Theravada Buddhist doctrine that whilst ones ‘condition in the present life is the result of past conduct’, the karmic rewards of one’s actions are not necessarily set at birth (Vickery, 1984: 5) suggests that the traditional social structure may be particularly malleable to the influence of modernity and the cash economy.

As such, economic development, especially where it occurs with the rapidity evidenced in the Cambodian case, ‘involves a broadly based transformation of economic and social institutions...in which shifting and emergent groups and coalitions contend for favourable economic positions in a changing and uncertain social order and in which the very nature and extent of development is an outcome of social and class contestation’ (Deyo, 2001: 259). Whether or not ‘claims [such as those made by Lim, 2007] that Cambodia has developed into a country of “insiders and outsiders” in which those who maintain “connections” (ksae) with powerful patrons are able to prevail over their neighbours’ (Hughes, 2001: 19) is open to debate, given that the relations currently in evidence are in fact ‘a long-standing feature of society’ (Hughes, 2001: 19). Nevertheless, though it may represent only a shift in emphasis, social change is once more apparent in the Kingdom.
What follows will seek to preliminarily interrogate the nature and extent of such change in *Krang Youv* commune, the rural area of Kandal province which was discussed with reference to the methodological issues it raised in chapter three. In doing so, it will build upon this historical account of the Cambodian socio-economy with an account of the study site’s own history and development, in order that the broader social changes outlined hitherto may be understood with the full benefit of local context. Further details of the study site’s social and economic endowments will follow in chapter five.

### 4.3 Krang Youv: History and Contemporary Endowments

Figure 4.2 Map of Cambodia (right) and Kandal province (left). Krang Youv commune is marked with a thick black square.

(Source: VVOB Cambodia)

Situated just within the Kandal side of the border with Takeo, about an hour and a half south of Phnom Penh by car, Krang Youv commune’s lengthy history has, until relatively recently, been one of peripheral isolation, with regular flooding necessitating travel by boat to the nearest market for much of the year. Until the construction of a tarmac road in 1990 signalled the beginning of an age of rapid change for the area, this remoteness was reflected in a largely rice based village economy, with the difficulty in reaching buyers or sellers with any regularity generally restricting villagers to the consumption of locally produced rice, fish, and small quantities of fruit (Focus Group, 16/08/12)
The first village on entering Krang Youv commune from the north is Ampil, a settlement which in many ways typifies the change and development experienced by the area in recent years. Now a medium sized village of approximately 320 households, Ampil previously comprised three hamlets, *Ampil Kranhenh, Ampil Ama* [Bluebottle Ampil tree], and *Ampil Chongpoum* [Village-end Ampil tree]. Whilst these have now been amalgamated into one administrative unit, each of the sub-sections continues to function independently to some extent, each visiting the pagoda separately during religious celebrations (Deputy Village Chief, 16/08/12). Furthermore, this social dislocation is reflected in a wide geographic dispersal, which the Village Chief has deemed so impractical in administrative terms that she has applied to the commune council to formally bisect the village in the near future.

As shown in figure 4.2, this division is sufficiently important from a socio-economic perspective, that the two parts of the village have been categorically separated in forthcoming the analysis presented in chapters five to seven. However, the division within this community (henceforth referred to as North and South Ampil) is relatively rare within Krang Youv more generally. The commune has a recognisably homogeneous history, although since its beginnings precede its oldest current inhabitant, neither the village chiefs, deputies, nor any of the elders are able to recall even a rough date for its emergence as a settlement. Nevertheless, they are aware that Ampil village, for example, ‘was created a long time prior to [King] Sihanouk [crowned in 1941] – even before the French’ (Focus Group, 08/08/13) and that during this period the area was still ‘deep in the forest’ (Focus Group, 08/08/13). In common with much of Cambodia, the local wat [pagoda] provided the only education for the vast majority of the commune’s history, until a school was constructed in 1993 (Focus Group, 08/08/13).

This school, named in common with over a third of all schools in Cambodia after Prime Minister Hun Sen (often in combination with his wife Bun Rany), is situated almost directly in the centre of the Krang Youv study site shown in figure 4.2, below, and serves all three of three of the villages investigated herein. Moreover, the pagoda which, as described by Ebihara (1968) and Vickery (1984) for instance, serve as important social hubs for clusters of proximate villages, is similarly located. It lies across the road from the school, just to the south of Ampil and Go villages and about a kilometre north of Jake village. As such, although this tri-village area extends nearly three kilometres from north to south, it shares a close communal history which extends to long before the advent of the road which now connects them.
During this period, inhabitants of Krang Youv commune wishing to travel to the permanent market, in the small provincial town of Prey Touic which straddles national road number two would face a gruelling fifteen kilometre walk through paddy fields. Even during the dry season, this would usually take around five hours each way, a journey regularly undertaken by some older villagers who would ‘get up and leave at 4am, arrive at Prey Touic at 9 o clock and then sell things at the market until the afternoon and come home’ (Sruen, 07/05/13). Even this difficult and time consuming access to the outside world was cut off in the wet season, however, when floods made the fields and paths impassable for months at a time.

Nevertheless, given the small size of these settlements, and their general lack of economic diversification, a lack of market access was not the problem it would be today. Before French colonisation, each village possessed only about thirty or forty houses, home to ‘only a few people living far from the road and growing only rice’ (Focus Group, 09/05/13). Despite a reported complete absence of in or out migration (Focus Group, 09/05/13), the population of the area grew steadily over the subsequent century, reaching an estimated seventy households per village by the time of King Sihanouk’s accession. That period also saw the first small signs of modernisation, as some
villagers acquired bicycles and the first four or five inhabitants – specialist house builders, left for Phnom Penh in search of work (Focus Group, 09/05/13).

Although subject to relatively limited upheaval during the DK period as a result of its poverty and isolation, Krang Youv was not immune to the mass movement of people that characterised the era. As the older villagers describe, ‘Pol Pot took the rich people from this village – people who had a rice milling machine or a speaker...[after which they]... don’t know where they went and they never came back. [They] suspect that they died’ (Focus Group, 08/08/13). At around the same time, ‘some people from Prey Veng and Takeo’ were briefly housed in the village on route to other areas – residents of Ampil report this as the first notable in-migration of their history – houses and land were communalised and ‘big houses were broken down’ and replaced with smaller ones (Focus Group, 09/05/13). Furthermore, and of particular note herein, when the DK period drew to a close in 1979-80, agricultural land was reallocated equally by the Vietnamese administration, with each person receiving 7 Are [a commonly used land unit in Cambodia and other non-European Francophone countries, equating to 100m²].

Today, Krang Youv is characterised by high levels of migration, both to Thailand (although only four or five households have sent migrants internationally), and Phnom Penh. This labour movement is undertaken overwhelmingly by young people, with garment and construction work (attracting female and male migrants respectively) being the primary occupations taken up. According to the village chief of Ampil (29/04/13), migration of this type has not led to major wealth stratification, but rather ‘allows people to solve problems such as debt and illness’ (Ampil village chief, 29/04/13). The validity of this claim will be the subject of extensive investigation in the subsequent chapters.

However, one position made especially clear by the Ampil Village Chief, and corroborated by the Krang Youv Commune Chief (15/08/13), is that debt is a rapidly worsening problem in the area, having arisen almost entirely since the construction of the road in 1993, before which ‘there was little’ (Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13). They claim that this debt was accumulated primarily as a result of the cost of major social events, particularly weddings, and is generally owed to banks, rather than private moneylenders. Furthermore, they report a relatively high degree of inequality, describing a significant minority – nearly one sixth of the area – as ‘rich’ (Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13), as a result of selling substantial landholdings during a period of rapidly rising prices. The remaining residents described as being divided equally between a ‘medium’ strata, whose income is derived partly from their own rice fields and partly from local and rural-urban migration; and a ‘poor’ strata who have little or no land and who subsist almost entirely on wage labour, proportions which will be scrutinized in detail hereafter.
Crucially for the purposes of this study, the area is also prone to drought and other ‘common’ livelihoods shocks such as floods and pests. These necessitates a range of community risk mitigation behaviours including, for example, mutual lending schemes and recourse to alternative income sources such as fisheries (Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13). Furthermore, the presence of three lakes in the commune (see figure 5.1, below) results in sporadically consequent high water levels which frequently cut the area off from easy access to surrounding villages, thereby contributing to its historical isolation and agricultural self sufficiency. Although the construction of a road improved the situation, the severe flooding which ravaged much of the country in October of 2011 had a severe impact nonetheless, flooding parts of the area for long periods and seriously affecting local agriculture.

4.4 Conclusion

Contemporary Cambodia, and in particular the key themes under investigation: risk, inequality and social change, have been fundamentally shaped by two powerful historical forces: Buddhist systems of hierarchy and patronage; and the slow but inexorable process of economic “opening”, which has been a crucial factor in Cambodia’s rapid integration into the modern globalised economy, but which has been continually associated with widening inequality, urban-bias, and the ceding of executive agency to foreign powers, groups, and individuals.

Inevitably, ‘such cultural heritage may handicap a nation state in the face of international competition...but though they are slow to change, even core beliefs are not immutable and culture constantly evolves to take account of new technologies and patterns of consumption’ (Fox, 2010: 186). This has been the case in Cambodia, where a culture which developed an exceptionalist mindset during the Angkor period and the thousand Mayahana Buddhist years before (Deac, 2004), and whose ‘perennial and self-absorbed terms of reference [have] been part of its appeal to visitors and scholars for many years’ (Chandler, 2000: 247) has been called upon to endure successive external challenges for several centuries.

Indeed, although Cambodia continues to be characterised by ‘an inward-looking family oriented conservatism’ which has been integral to its ‘surviving the impact of the past and the incursions of foreign powers and ideas’ (Chandler, 2000: 247), Khmer culture has been pragmatic and flexible in its pursuit of stability. Just as ‘French attempts to change [entrenched systems of patriarchy] only added sophistication to the old ways’ (Deac, 2004: 20), so ‘Pol Pot’s revolution failed in part because so many Cambodians, finding its premises painful and irrelevant, were unwilling or unable to carry it out’ (Chandler, 2000: 247). The extent to which Cambodia succeeds in facing the challenges of an
open economy, climate change and corruption in the 21st century will depend, similarly, on the nature of the response.

Data and analysis pertaining to this reaction will be presented in the following three chapters, the first of which will concern the nature of migratory linkages as an embedded resource within the village socio-economy. Therein, the discussion will focus upon the relationship of these social linkages to strategies of resilience and risk mitigation, and the manner in which these co-exist with rural-urban migration as elements within the wider social structure of Krang Youv. Having established these linkages between migration, community and the environment, chapters six and seven will interrogate their role in fostering inequality and changing social discourses respectively.
Chapter Five

Function: Risk and Asset Distributions as Determinants of Social Structure

As a low lying and predominantly flat rice growing nation, Cambodia is a country long equated with the mitigation and management of risk. Nevertheless, the recent climatic, political and economic events detailed in chapter four have placed new pressures on old systems of coping. Successive years of floods and droughts, alternating or in tandem, between 2000 and 2003 set the tone for the new millennium and more than a decade later this theme shows little sign of abating. Every year the nation’s crops are beset, to a greater or lesser extent, by an increasingly uncertain climate, so that rice farming has begun to resemble more of a rich man’s gamble than a poor man’s staple. Wide ranging marketising reforms, which have taken place almost in tandem with this environmental process, have long been claimed to hold respite. However, how exactly it is that Cambodians have “succeeded” in circumventing the difficulties in their traditional livelihoods is little known.

Certainly, the “safety valves” of debt and migration are increasingly important means of mitigating environmental risk. There can be little doubt that climate pressures have contributed in part to the booming uptake of both. However, as this chapter will highlight, the relationship between pressure and response is not a direct one, but is mediated by the social relations in which those affected participate and vice versa. In response to various modalities of risk, linkages to patrons and peers are constructed or abandoned; and the prevalence of “traditional” modes of association such as informal loans and labour sharing rises and falls. In this way, the economic and natural environment shape patterns of association in Cambodia’s rural villages.

As such, this chapter seeks to explore the linkages between the increasing environmental risk to which rural Cambodians are exposed and the form and functionality of the social systems which are enacted, increasingly, amidst an atmosphere of change, movement, and uncertain livelihoods. Herein, it will be argued that in light of a growing body of evidence concerning the vital role played by norms and networks in smoothing consumption in other parts of the world, a greater appreciation of their embeddedness within the physical environment is necessary. In order to lay the groundwork for the examination of inequality transportation and changing cultural norms which will constitute the themes of chapters six and seven respectively, what follows shall begin to delineate a schema of rural life wherein functionality sits alongside tradition as the architect of social structure.
5.1 Spatial Distributions of Assets and Liabilities

5.1.1 Heterogeneity

The prevailing narrative of risk in Cambodia is a story of homogeneity and rice. The very words for the countryside, *srok srai* [rice country]; and for rural people, *neak srai* [rice people], are indicative of a nation for whom paddy is not only the staple but the soul. As such, when questioned on the risks faced by the inhabitants of Krang Youv commune, the administrative chief of the area had no hesitation in responding. ‘This year’, he continued, the people ‘met two main problems: mice and insects. 94% of people here are farmers’ (Commune Chief Interview, 15/08/13).

This perspective is widespread to the point of cliché both within and outside the Kingdom. The image of Cambodia as a land characterised by unending paddy fields and villages of farmers to work them is a much loved one in Khmer culture, especially given its association with the glorious Angkor era (Chandler, 2000). Neither does the World Bank’s (2009) estimation that around 86% of the country depend primarily upon agriculture suggest that the official statistics on Krang Youv are incorrect. All signs, it seems, indicate sameness over difference.

Nevertheless, if the prevailing wisdom ever told the whole story, population and economic growth, with their associated pushes and pulls away from a unitary household income, have played their part in dislocating this axiom from reality. On the basis of the quantitative livelihoods data collected during the course of this study, the following assessment, made by a man who, with land holdings of 35 hectares, was by some distance the richest encountered in the study, represents a far more accurate picture than that provided by the commune chief. As he explained:

‘In Krang Youv commune, there are sixteen villages, divided into four compass points. In the West part, most people depend on fishing. Here in the south, they depend on rice…Ampil is dominated by the market. Everybody is selling and trading things. The fishing part of the village is very poor. They rely on fishing and the rest of the time they just play cards (Pan Mon, 28/05/13).

This neatly summarised distinction constitutes a useful approximate typology of Krang Youv. In reality, though, these groupings are neither static, nor mutually exclusive. The three primary income sources overlap and interact amongst themselves and numerous others to the extent that even within the study site itself they constitute a merely heuristic classification. What they serve to achieve is to highlight ‘the great variety of income, including fishing and other businesses as well’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13) which exists even within relatively small geographic areas.

In order to capture this diversity in as comprehensive a manner as possible, the sampling methodology employed herein has been adapted to reflect the situation discerned during the course
of early stage and preliminary research. These data, obtained from a combination of village officials, key informants and ordinary villagers suggested that, from a network perspective, village boundaries are of little value. Furthermore, they indicated that villagers’ conceptions of locality were similarly unaffected by administrative borders, with questioning regarding relative wealth and zones of poverty or affluence drawing inevitable references to a wider area than the village in question.

As such, the initial single village sample frame was expanded upon in such a way as to include two other adjacent or nearby villages, comprising a “village system” across which networks extend and in relation to the whole of which respondents appear to compare themselves. Within this wider zone, three cross-cutting sub-locations were identified, via a succession of qualitative interviews, as distinct locales characterised by differing endowments and livelihoods. As shown in Figure 4.2, above, these were: North Ampil, described as poor and dependent on fishing; South Ampil and Go, described as being of average wealth and dominated by its market; and Jake, described as rich and successful in farming.

Unlike the commune chief, then, villagers throughout the sample frame had little difficulty in offering an economically disaggregated picture of their local environment, albeit in a generalised manner. Furthermore, that the three sub-locations remain to some extent spatially and conceptually linked makes them an ideal environment to study the relationship between natural resources and social practice. In particular, this will facilitate the exploration of research questions one and two, which pertain respectively to the role of social networks in the migration process, and the role of risk and natural resources in generating and shaping these networks. Before seeking to explore these linkages, however, the following section shall outline, as fully as possible, the endowments of the research site, both as a whole and in terms of its three component locales.

5.1.2 The Spatial Distribution of Income and Assets

Taking the village system as a whole, mean landholdings appear to compare favourably with those of Cambodia in general. The average plot size of nearly 1.3 Ha per household would place its holders well out of reach of most poverty indices, even allowing, in many cases, for the stockpiling of an agricultural surplus to serve as insurance against climate shocks and the associated risk of crop failure. A closer investigation of the statistics involved, however, reveals not only a highly unequal distribution of land, but also one which appears to be robustly linked to geographic location.
Table 5.1. Aggregate Land Area Statistics (own data).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate Land Area Statistics</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.286 Ha/ Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.5 Ha/ Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>0 Ha/ Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>35 Ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, when the differing patterns of landholding are understood in the context of their respective natural endowments, the picture becomes much clearer. The inhabitants of North Ampil are the closest of the three to the large lake towards the north of the study site and the only ones to be partially within its flood zone. Numerous informants during the course of the study reported frequent incidents of flooding of their house land in North Ampil, alongside associated dangers such as drowned livestock, snakes, or risk to infants and small children. Furthermore, the ‘difficulty of travelling’ (Kim Long, 03/06/13) around these areas during floods is doubly problematic, as the inhabitants of more isolated parts of the village report a persistent difficulty in obtaining government disaster relief payments, as in the case of Sim, a fisherman from North Ampil, who noted that ‘nobody helps me when natural disasters happen because my house is at the edge of the village, so it is difficult to reach during a flood. They just help people on the higher ground [to the south] (Sun Lim, 17/06/13).

By contrast, South Ampil and Go is far enough away from the lake to avoid such dangers, but nevertheless close enough for some of its inhabitants to own land on its edge, which, though completely flooded during the wet season is nevertheless a superior source of dry season rice as a result of its proximity to the lake once the waters have receded. Jake Village, finally, located some
two kilometres south of South Ampil and Go is positioned equidistantly from a large lake to the east and a much smaller, sickle shaped lake to the West. This location, where ‘the land is high quality and goes for a better price’ (Jan Win Si, 24/05/13) is high enough so that crops are ‘damaged only a little’ (Net Mom, 28/06/13) during floods, making Jake Village an ideal area for paddy farming.

Figure 5.2 Location of Land Owned by Residents of the Study Site (own data).

Indeed, the issue of the practicality of access to farm land has emerged as a significant determinant of the locations in which the three study sites’ inhabitants farm, as well as, relatedly, one of the primary reasons, alongside severe or chronic income shocks, for land sale. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Figure 5.2, although all three locations demonstrate a strong covariance between the location of their household and their riceland, this constraint diminishes from North Ampil to South Ampil and Go, and then further, to Jake Village, the inhabitants of which possess riceland spread across an area several times larger than those of North Ampil.

Although causality is difficult to determine, the data shown in table 5.2 suggest that this difference is may be related to the greater number of households possessing means of transportation in the more southern locations. The extent to which this increased sphere of practical farming constitutes a tangible benefit to those who possess it will be discussed in the following subsection. Currently,
though, it is sufficient to note that it co-varies with all other major indicators of wealth, including material assets, productive assets, and yearly wedding attendance expenditure, as well as total aggregated yearly income.

Table 5.2. Mean Assets and Income Disaggregated by Location (own data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Bicycles</th>
<th>Motorbikes</th>
<th>Televisions</th>
<th>Total Livestock Value</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Ampil</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>$311</td>
<td>$1368/annum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ampil and Go</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>$836</td>
<td>$2858/annum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jake</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>$1994</td>
<td>$10958/annum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, as the preceding statistics demonstrate, many of the assets surveyed are characterised by a robust covariance, both to each other and to geographic location. Aggregated income (shown here in Cambodia’s second official currency, US dollars, which, although generally used less extensively than Khmer Riel in the countryside, are nevertheless habitually used to refer to amounts more than 1 -2 million Riel [$250-500]) is generally higher towards the south, as are the numbers of all major asset classes. More southern villagers both consume more – both in terms of wedding spend and other consumptive assets such as televisions, radios, speakers and stereos – and hold a greater number of productive assets - whether viewed as land, livestock, farming machinery or any combination thereof.

Furthermore, those with rice land obtain a higher yield in terms of kilograms per hectare towards the south, although it is not clear whether this is due to the limited farming which can be achieved in the more flood prone areas of the north, the economies of scale available to villagers possessing a greater amount of land, the higher quality of farming inputs available to those with a higher income, or the higher levels of agricultural knowledge possessed by farmers in Jake Village, as indicated by a number of informants having received visits from agricultural NGOs to train them in improved farming methods. It appears most likely that the truth is a combination of all of these factors, although it is worthy of note that this superiority is a known source of self-congratulation in Jake Village, as articulated by one such villager:

‘This village is the best part of the commune because people take farming seriously. In other parts they get loans, but just spend them on buying other things. Here they buy [hand] tractors – even widows, who can’t operate a tractor, have one. In other places, they just sit around and drink and play cards’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13).

As such, the indicators outlined above, which constitute many of the most common measures of wealth and poverty in Global Southern locales such as Cambodia (Scoones, 1995), appear to bear out the view, earlier expounded by Pan Mon and supported by the village chief of Ampil, that it is
‘especially the fishermen’ (29/04/13) who constitute the most deprived group in the study area. Viewed in terms of income and assets, then, a picture has emerged of a linear progression of physical and economic capital from north to south. Via an analysis of liabilities, focussing on risk and debt, what follows will seek to demonstrate how such an approach is a necessary, but insufficient means of conceptualising the different socio-economies under investigation.

5.1.3 Liabilities and Environmental Risk

As noted recently by Bylander (2013), after a decade of destabilising vulnerability to natural disasters (Oeur et al., 2012; Davies, 2010) and miraculous growth (World Bank, 2012), the kingdom presents a unique opportunity ‘to study questions of the impact of the environment on migration’ (Bylander, 2013: 3). The contemporary vulnerability of Cambodian agriculture and fisheries has forced those who depend on them to think more than ever about risk, and to quicken the pace at which they conceive of and operationalise alternatives. Though always woven into the fabric of Khmer society, risk has now risen to even greater prominence as a motivator of social action and livelihoods decisions (Bylander, 2013).

In this regard, certain years emerge from the data as having been particularly disaster prone. As demonstrated in Figure 5.3, the most severe of these was the nationwide flood (and in some cases subsequent drought) of 1993. After this, the years 2011 and 2012, wherein widespread drought and flood respectively destroyed a significant proportion of the harvest and reduced yields elsewhere, emerge as having been notably problematic from an agricultural perspective. Furthermore, these dates display some similarity to nationwide statistics on displacement and damage due to natural disasters in Cambodia (EM-DAT, 2014), wherein 1993, 2000, 2003 and 2011 are particularly notable years.
Nevertheless, to view severe income shocks such as these in a homogenous manner is to elide a great deal of the subtlety of their incidence. Although certain years stand out as particularly difficult, it is worthy of note that even in 1993, a time still spoken about as an environmental nadir across the community, less than a fifth of all respondents reported having suffered lost income, or damage to their homes or property. Similarly, during the severe nationwide climate events of 2000 and 2003, highlighted by Oeur et al. (2011) as some of the most powerful of the successive waves of climate shocks suffered by Cambodians since the turn of the new millennium, less than ten percent of those surveyed complained of having personally suffered.

This is not to suggest, though, that Krang Youv commune, or any part of Cambodia, is insulated from such events. Indeed, more general questions and in depth conversations reveal a full appreciation of the scale and regularity with which the climate imperils the livelihoods of fellow villagers. Rather, it is to emphasize that ‘deprivation’, whether deriving from a lack of assets or their vulnerability, ‘is not a uniform process’ (Bryant, 1998: 85) and therefore that shocks such as these are individualised, rather than aggregate phenomena. Due to the location of their land, the type of farming they undertook, or the extent to which they possessed the means to compensate themselves for lack of income, neighbours living side by side may highlight entirely different years as the low points of their climate memory.

The type of recall based methodology employed to gather this information carries inevitable pitfalls. However, as noted in chapter three, significant efforts were made to supersede these inaccuracies. For instance, discussing climate events in temporal relation to national elections and significant village events, such as road construction, was found to be an effective way of improving accuracy.
Furthermore, triangulation with migrants’ accounts of these events gleaned largely corroborative results, suggesting that the trends observed in these data are valid ones.

These data are presented in Figure 5.4, which collates data concerning the climate shocks respondents have experienced and the extent of their losses at those times. The percentage of their crop lost on each occasion has been aggregated to generate a lifetime cumulative crop loss figure designed to reflect their long term vulnerability to shocks. The mean cumulative crop loss figure for each location is shown by the heavy black line on each boxplot, the box itself shows the middle fifty percent of data and the whiskers denote the range (excluding outliers).

As such, figure 5.4. shows that the three subsectors of the research site demonstrate notably different histories of crop loss in response to climate shocks. For instance, the poorer, fisheries dominated area of Northern Ampil report a historical loss of around four times less than the richer, high capital rice farmers of the north. Given that these loss figures correlate significantly with riceland area (Spearman’s = 0.357, p = 0.000), this is likely to be reflective, in large part, of the differing income distributions in the three sites. By extension, the nature of the methodology employed to collect the data, which asked questions related to environmental shocks, rather than chronic pressures or other types of shock, such as those connected to health, have likely contributed to the predominance of farming-related income shocks in the data.

Figure 5.4 Mean cumulative percentage crop loss disaggregated by location (own data)

![Figure 5.4](image)

With this in mind, the graphic is indicative of two things: First, that rice farming constitutes a high risk income source and second, that high risk does not equate to low income. Rather, as argued by Scott (esp. 1976), not only does a more compelling case exist for the obverse, but, furthermore, for a conscious obverse, wherein ‘individuals make risk averse decisions because of their uncertain and precarious economic situations’ (Henrich and McElreith, 2002: 1).

Certainly, for many farmers, there exists a degree of consciousness that the unpredictability of the climate makes rice farming, in particular, something of a personal lottery. It is not, for instance, a
given that rice crops are destroyed by floods – some seed types are suited to high water levels – whereas, for those with land next to large water sources a drought may represent a welcome period of security from flooding. What is necessary is either a correct anticipation of the conditions, a portfolio of land which spans more than one agro-ecological zone, or both where possible. Even for the better off, however, this can prove to be problematic, as highlighted by one wealthy farmer:

‘We have to be patient doing rice. Sometimes you make a profit, sometimes you make a loss. For instance, last time we expected the water level to be lower so we planted rice designed for that, but in fact it was very high so we lost a lot. A previous time, the opposite happened, compounded by a mouse problem (Pan Mon, 28/05/13)

Furthermore, this unpredictability of the conditions upon which Cambodian agriculture depends has a corollary in the creeping diminution in the quality of fisheries in the area. As two fishermen independently reported, ‘the quantity of fish is getting lower and lower...and also it is getting hotter and hotter, making the water levels low’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13). This has already resulted in ‘there [being] fewer and fewer fish to catch’ (Chuen, 08/04/13). However, as a neighbouring fisherman noted, the key issues faced by those involved in local fisheries have begun to compound each other, putting increasing pressure on fish stocks and forcing many to ‘use illegal equipment which kills all the fish’ (Run Tooks, 16/06/13).

He refers, in particular, to the masin chut, a jerry rigged device comprising a plastic fishing rod tied to a basket and hooked up to a car battery. From the tip of the rod, two small, stiff, wires extend a few centimetres apart which, when touched upon the surface of the water, discharge a current strong enough to electrocute any fish within a radius of a few feet. Compared with traditional fishing methods, which require not only a far greater level of skill, but also considerable time and energy, the yields are enticingly high. Some fishermen and their wives (who sell any surplus fish either at market or to middlemen but never fish themselves) reported a yield of roughly double the average obtainable without the device, although even this may be an underestimate according to data from Battambang province, in the Northwest of Cambodia, which suggests improvements of up to five times may be commonplace (Kurien, 2007).

Although such practices are illegal throughout Cambodia, whether they are making the difference between 10,000 ($2.50) and 20,000 riel ($5.00) per day, or 8,000 ($2.00) and 40,000 ($10.00), the incentive to circumvent such legal prohibition is evident. Furthermore, as Werthmann (2007) notes, the structure by which state legislation on fisheries is implemented tends to limit its efficiency. As he goes on to explain:

‘The Commune Fishery Office and the police are responsible for monitoring, exposing and fining the use of illegal fishing gears. Thus, the village head does not have the legal right to
fine the offenders, but he reports his observations to the commune head and the police. Because of the size of the water resource, offenders are seldom caught’ (Werthmann, 2007: 5)

In addition to such bureaucratic shortcomings, the simple fact that the fishermen of north Ampil and their wives are removed by some distance and well out of sight of the village chief, who lives around 200 metres south next to the main road through Ampil, may have contributed to a situation in which illegal fishing equipment is paraded with both ubiquity and apparent impunity. Whilst the ecological cost of such practices have yet to be accurately ascertained in Cambodia, it seems clear from the qualitative data that they are blamed by fisherman for putting further pressure on their rapidly deteriorating livelihoods.

Given, though, that those involved in fishing tend to have amongst the least assets available with which to move away from the use of deteriorating water resources – and in most cases also lack the money and social connections to migrate – the fishermen of Ampil village are left only with the choice between accruing formal debt for consumption, or, at an investment cost of only $30 - 40 (Kurien, 2007), the masin chut, and the short term prospect of a better life it offers. One villager, who charges the batteries used by the fisherman for a fee, explained that those involved in the practice have no other choice:

‘These batteries are for electrocuting mice, which are a major pest in the fields, but people also use them for fishing. Most of the people who use them to catch fish are poor people. The authorities have banned this [practice], but they continue because if they don’t do it they will have nothing to eat’ (Bo Simlai, 14/06/13).

Within the same village, then, and even more so within the broader area of the “village system” which constitutes the study site as a whole, different households experience the environment, and the difficulties and rewards it brings, in radically different ways. Although aggregate data on natural disaster losses is on some levels instructive, it does little to highlight the manner in which the same event may result in a web of cross-tessellating outcomes, as livelihoods are threatened, boosted, or shifted in response to the changing base of assets and liabilities. Under certain conditions a drought, the bane of many farmers, may be a welcome boon for fishermen, as fish are – they argue – drawn closer together by the lower water levels. Similarly, whilst a flood might impact most visibly upon the day to day livelihoods of the poorest, who are likely to reside in areas least protected from the elements, it may in fact have the greatest long term impact on medium, or richer individuals, who, as a result of their particular asset endowments, are more exposed to its effects in terms of income.

In his longitudinal analysis of a North-eastern Thai village over more than a quarter of a century, Rigg (2012) provides compelling evidence for this perspective. Specifically, he demonstrates that the
distribution of wealth in his site has been subject to such a significant “churning” effect that less than a handful have retained a place within the same quartile of village wealth between the study periods. Whilst some of this effect is attributed to structural factors such as the demographic dependency ratio of working ages adults to family members too young or old to work, a greater proportion is found to have resulted from ‘idiosyncratic’ (Rigg, 2012: 135) events, including climate shocks, natural disasters, and illness.

To a certain extent, however, any such medium to long term downturns in fortunes are likely to have been masked in Cambodia by the increasingly pervasive presence of household debt, which has resulted, in part, from the proliferation of microfinance organisations during the previous two decades. Especially for those households possessing larger landholdings, and thus a higher level of collateral, the availability of credit constitutes a means of mitigating or avoiding the effects of potentially chronic livelihoods shocks. For those less well endowed in this respect, alternative strategies – such as migration or informal loans – may be necessary, so that the distribution and type of credit utilised throughout the study site constitutes a structural backdrop to the social and risk environments therein. In furthering this Ph.D.’s concern with linking the social, economic and environmental spheres, what follows shall begin to delineate the nature of debt in Krang Youv.

5.1.4 The Geography of Debt

Although not initially selected as one of the primary areas of investigation herein, the role of debt in village life has emerged, during the course of the study, as one of the key features of the socio-economic environment. Indeed, although questions pertaining to debt were included in the primary quantitative survey, the collection of data is not an essential precursor to an appreciation of the scale of the issue in Cambodia. Gleaming, air conditioned credit offices flank dusty rural roads at regular intervals in Kandal province. Even within the villages themselves, until relatively recently isolated even from the nearest market for half the year due to annual floods, young men in immaculately fitted white shirts are frequently to be seen riding their company scooters between various appointments to collect, sell, or advertise debt.

In total, thirteen sources of credit were identified over the three sites, of which ten were MFIs. Indeed, although it was recorded as taking place, large-scale private lending appears, as noted below, to have declined rapidly and markedly as a result of the competition presented by MFIs, in particular, as does the tontin – a traditional system of credit saving practised in both rural and urban areas, as well as some migrant enclaves (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014). Therein, members contribute to a pot every month and draw lots to decide who may use the money each month ‘for
farming activities’ and ‘at a lower interest rate than the other banks’ (Chooen Moon, 29/05/13). As one such user related:

‘It is a ten person savings group into which everybody pays 2000 riel per month. I don’t remember very well, but some time ago I borrowed 400,000 riel [$100] as part of a group of five people. It was repaid over four months and the interest was 10,000 riel [$2.50]’ (Ton Truen Savoon, 13/06/13).

By some distance the largest single lender, however, was the emergent Cambodian financial behemoth ACLEDA, to whom 27 of the 60 debt holding households (from 72 surveyed in total) currently owed money. Unlike the majority of the other credit sources noted within the survey sites, ACLEDA is now a for-profit banking institution, following a ten year commercialisation process begun in 1998 and modelled on the success of Bolivia’s BancoSol (Phalla, 2004). The upper limit of loans from ACLEDA is much higher than those available via microfinance, making it a popular choice for those looking to ‘invest in rice farming’ (Chuen Hing, 06/05/13) in a profitable manner, or to move into an alternative business such as ‘becoming a mushroom middleman’ (Sirun Ji, 06/06/13).

Although its uptake was wide, however, informants at every scale would highlight the corrosive effect of debt on the livelihoods of those living within the commune, bemoaning the extent to which the availability of credit had proved deleterious to the poorest people in the commune so quickly since its emergence roughly ten years previously. However, as Dr. Karin Schelzig, Senior Sector Specialist of the Asia Development Bank’s Cambodia branch highlighted, the issue may be masking not only itself, but a host of other unresolved issues related to poverty and livelihoods. As she argued:

‘[Cambodian] people end up to their eyeballs in debt, taking out more and more loans to survive climate shocks. In all poverty figures, poverty has plummeted over the last few years, from around half the population to 20%. Even at the height of various [economic and environmental] crises, the government are explaining it as deriving from rising rice prices, but what about those who are net consumers of rice? Nearly half of the bottom income quintile have outstanding debt and a large proportion say that this is for household consumption. People are smoothing their consumption with debt’ (Karin Schelzig, 15/08/13)

This perspective was echoed, with a high degree of accuracy, by numerous informants within the research site, wherein it was a common pronouncement that ‘many people borrow from banks and microfinance organisations, but the people never escape their debt, even if they go abroad to try to earn something to send back’ (Focus Group, 09/05/13). Even more damningly, the village chief of Ampil sought to highlight the long term danger of easy credit availability for those with the least assets. As she stated, ‘previously [the poor] did not borrow from banks because there were no banks to borrow from. According to government policy, such banks should be helping to reduce poverty,
but in fact they are making people poorer and poorer. They eat today, but they get poorer and poorer in the future’ (Truen Ngum, Ampil Village Chief, 29/04/13)

Furthermore, as in many parts of the developing world (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Pretty and Ward, 2001), formal borrowing such as this tells only part of the story of credit in Krang Youv. Although only a handful of respondents reported having taken out a large, or semi-formal, loan with an individual moneylender, over half of respondents stated their involvement in ad hoc systems of informal credit with either their friends, neighbours, or both. The values and durations of these lending arrangements, disaggregated by sub-location, are shown in table 5.3.

The data therein demonstrate two things: First, both the volume of money exchanged in informal flows and the number of aggregated borrowing and lending “events” co-vary with the uneven North-South distribution of asset and income values observed elsewhere. Second, the ratio of borrowing to lending changes in the same manner. In the poorer North, for instance, reported borrowing considerably outstrips reported lending, a possible explanation for which is that its inhabitants borrow outside the close networks upon which these data are focussed. Conversely, in the richer Jake village, lending slightly outstrips borrowing, suggesting that its villagers may lend outside their close networks in addition to within them.

Although the scale and duration of such lending, usually ‘just for three to five days during the farming season’ (Soon Lom, 15/05/13), is small compared to that which takes place between individuals and institutions, it nevertheless appears to serve a vital role both in terms of smoothing consumption and the timely purchase of production inputs, such as ‘fertiliser and fuel for the pumping machine’ (Wun Tee, 03/06/13). Moreover, on the evidence of this study, it appears to be a genuinely reciprocal process, associated with no interest charges even where – as in North Ampil – the volume of borrowing considerably outstrips that of lending.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>North Ampil</th>
<th>South Ampil and Go</th>
<th>Jake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Frequency of Lending/ Year per household</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Frequency of Borrowing/ Year per household</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Total Transactions/ Year per household</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Value Lent/ Year per household</td>
<td>$12</td>
<td>$113</td>
<td>$109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Value Borrowed/ Year per household</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>$88</td>
<td>$101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3. Informal Lending Patterns Disaggregated by Location (own data).
Debt is not, furthermore, the only form of widespread reciprocity in Krang Youv. Additional evidence for the prevalence of informal cooperation is provided by the significant proportion of informants regularly (i.e., on at least a yearly basis) engaged in traditional labour sharing, or *provas dei* [lit.: lend a hand]. Over half of all respondents indicated that they did so, many ‘every year’ (Wun Tee, 03/06/13), a figure rising to sixty percent amongst those possessing at least 0.1 Ha of land. Although the minitiae of *provas dei* vary according to the case in question, from ‘helping each other to transplant and harvest rice’ (Jan Suen, 08/05/13) to ‘land preparation’ (Song Lyn, 09/05/13), or ‘pulling each others boats when their engines break’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13), the free exchange of equal amounts of assistance during busy periods is its undergirding principle.

Furthermore, as demonstrated in figures 5.5 and 5.6, the uptake of *provas dei* varies greatly according to location and, on a community basis at least, appears to be loosely covariant with wealth viewed in terms of gross yearly income. However, the above figures (5.6 and 5.7) are misleading. It is not in fact wealth, in the sense of income or assets, which drives the locational differences in productive social behaviour such as interest free informal lending and labour sharing, but land, risk, and a variety of other such environmental risk. What follows shall examine the extent to which the social capital conception of wealth derivation from social resources survives further scrutiny.
5.2 Socio-Physical Linkages

5.2.1 Social Capital or Risk Response?

At a somewhat simplistic level, the results outlined thus far appear well suited to the support of an orthodox, Putnamian, social capital argument, wherein the volume of social interaction, viewed as a quantitative abstraction based upon various simple indicators, constitutes a major determinant of the “wealth” of a given community (e.g. Putnam, 2000). Indeed, both of the key measures of social interaction explored thus far, provas dei and informal loan provision, behave in a sufficiently similar way as to support their amalgamation into a variable denoting “positive” social activity of the sort utilised throughout the social capital literature.

Nevertheless, such unexamined functionalist thinking is one of social capital’s theory’s weakest characteristics (e.g. Fine, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2010; Fischer, 2005). Performing a similar function, especially when this function is as nebulous as “positivity” or “benefit” should not, of itself, constitute the basis of a category. As such, recent work conducted within the field of social capital has seen a process of ‘opening up and broadening out’ (Franklin, Holland and Edwards, 2012: 5) the investigation of phenomena previously ‘squeezed under [a] single rubric’ (Fischer, 2005: 4).

In this regard, once people’s interactions have been typologically disentangled from what good they bring, they become open to analysis in terms of why they are done, a conceptual adjustment which serves to avoid many of the pitfalls of the Putnamian “broad functionalist” (Bjornskov and Sonderskov, 2010) approach to social capital. Thus, by utilising a narrower, more specific mode of analysis, social action may be viewed in terms of what it is intended to do, and what it may be a reaction to, so that the assumptions of perfect functionality carried forward from Parsonian Structural Functionalism may be avoided. Otherwise put, just as an investigation of dating behaviour which examined only those dates ending in marriage would miss much, so too does any enquiry into social practice which fails to examine reactive motivations and unintended or not specifically functional consequences.

The functionality of provas dei is one such narrow theme. Even when controlling for rice land area, which, as noted above, is significantly linked to a household’s exposure to natural disasters, the data also show a notable correlation between the cumulative percentage crop loss statistic and the incidence of provas dei labour sharing. Using a cumulative percentage crop loss measure derived from the summation of all reported percentage losses incurred during the informant’s working life, the following graphic (Figure 5.7) highlights the roughly fifty percent difference in cumulative losses between those who engage in labour sharing and those who don’t.
This cumulative crop loss statistic, like the disaster timeline above, is built from reported data on the three worst crop losses suffered during informants’ lifetimes and as such should be considered with a degree of care. However, it requires note that the figures were obtained via extended discussions of informant livelihoods and structured around events such as the acquisition of pumps, wells or new land. These background data permit a greater degree of confidence than might otherwise be appropriate if the figures otherwise obtained, so that broad and clear co-variances, such as that shown in figure 5.7 are, it is held here, valid for their intended purpose.

Moreover, although the statistical evidence of figure 5.7 alone cannot indicate causation, the qualitative data suggest that the extent to which mitigate crop may be mitigated by social activity is generally rather limited. Informant interviews indicate that any diminution in the effect of climate shocks is likely to be more a function of the location of a farmer’s land, in terms of elevation and proximity to a reliable water source, than to the success or otherwise of preventative action. Consequently, respondents’ participation in these sorts of mutual assistance groups may be hypothesised as being, at least over the long term, a reaction to their mutual perception of risk.

Indeed, the mutuality of these groupings is significant. They are viewed as an efficient mode of working and take many forms, including the sharing of agricultural machinery amongst wealthier farmers, rather than anything resembling assistance. When asked about their experience of people “helping” each other either in the wake of disasters or at any other time, almost nobody interviewed reported having been aided by their friends or neighbours to a significant degree. Instead, a frequent refrain noted that although ‘the CPP [Cambodian People’s Party] gave me around 20-30kg of rice and 20 -30kg of rice seeds...there was no help from my neighbours. They never help [in this way]’ (Gaw Wi, 18/04/13).
Notably this stated lack of assistance is not generally associated with an unwillingness to help, but is driven by the narrative that ‘everybody suffers the same’ (Pan Yuen, 30/04/13) during severe climate events so that people ‘mostly...need to help themselves’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13). More than one informant stated, for instance that ‘I can’t remember when the worst disasters were, but if you ask my neighbours I will say oh yes! The same for me’ (Net Took, 18/06/13). Even some landless villagers stated an affinity with the problems of the landowning farmers, noting that ‘there is less farming work around for us’ even though ‘it is less trouble than for the landholders’ (Pan Yuen, 30/04/13).

The quantitative data collected on natural disasters and crop loss, however (as presented in table 5.4), suggest that the nature of their experience is anything but homogeneous. Moreover, numerous farmers stated that they ‘have never suffered a natural disaster’ (Yen Mom, 29/04/13), either because their ‘land is amongst the highest in the village’ (Wun Tee, 03/06/13), or ‘there is a well close by’ (Wun Tee, 03/06/13). As a result of these and other factors, the total proportion of harvests lost during severe climate shocks varies enormously between households. Much like the myth of Cambodia as a land of unending rice fields, then, this appears to be a community narrative with limited basis in reality.

Nevertheless, it is representative of a general lack of organised community action. During the course of the study, only a handful of examples of active communal measures aimed at mitigating the impact of natural disasters were uncovered. One such example was the erecting of sand bags in anticipation of a flood, which ‘all of the local houses did together’ (Truen Ngum, 29/04/13). This was a rare exception, however. More commonly, when community initiatives did take place, they took the form of post-hoc responses to individual misfortunes, usually in the form of fundraising for bereaved families.

For instance, at the village chief’s behest, several members of the community contributed money to assist the family of a child ‘who died when his house collapsed in a storm and he couldn’t escape (Yan Yin, 22/04/13). This type of community response was also mentioned by the commune chief, who referred to a recent occasion when ‘the whole village raised 3 million riel [$750]’ to help the widow of ‘a man who was killed in a traffic accident’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13).

Although other villagers have confirmed that these events did take place in some form, that both of these stories originated from village officials, in whose interest it is to describe a strong and mutually supportive community is a necessary caveat even to this limited evidence of community action. Furthermore, in more than one case an opposite view was advanced, wherein rather than facilitating
community wide assistance, village officials, consciously or unconsciously, constrained the flow of assistance to within their own networks. As one villager stated:

‘There are organisations who can help the very poor people, however, when they ask the village chief to find the poorer people, she selects them based on their ability to pay for the selection’ (Yen Tac, 25/04/13)

Similarly, following a severe flood the previous year:

‘In this village, there was some assistance from Mr. Hun Sen [it is commonplace in Cambodia to personify government payments and aid in this way], but I didn’t receive any help. I don’t know why. Maybe they didn’t know that I had problems. Probably the people who received help were very close to the village chief, so that he knew about their problems’ (Ton Truen Savooen, 07/06/13)

As such, the evidence suggests that any concerted community-wide action is not sufficient to significantly mitigate the effects of climate shocks, leaving villagers to rely on reactive and prophylactic action at the level of small groups. Crucially, this conceptual position departs from that offered by social capital in that it views social action as being generated by external events, as opposed to the implicit autopoiesis which characterises much work conducted under the banner of that doctrine. Furthermore, from a social capital perspective, why those affected by natural disasters may wish to engage more readily in mutual labour sharing is unclear given that involvement in agricultural labour sharing arrangements fails to correlate significantly with any indicators of wealth, either in terms of income, or productive or consumptive assets.

Viewed through an alternative lens, however, the phenomenon has been noted, and explanations proffered, by a number of authors elsewhere (i.e. Okamoto, 2011; Scott, 1972, 1985; Brocheaux, 1983; Platteau, 1995; Fafchamps, 2005; 1992; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). What these studies suggest is that the uncertainty of the natural environment encourages the generation of informal sharing arrangements involving various types of resources and, as noted by Bankoff (2007), that these arrangements may change or become apparent only sporadically in response to certain events. The correlation between disaster loss and provas dei uptake (Spearman’s = 0.319, p = 0.017), shown also in Figure 5.7, is supportive of this argument.

As such, a convincing case may be made that the uncertain nature of income and expenditure which characterises rural livelihoods in Cambodia renders informal modes of cooperation characterised by flexible reciprocity and indeterminate timeframes, such as provas dei, particularly attractive. However, there is a wider significance here in that the evidence for this type of preferential behaviour may extend beyond the covariance of informal lending and borrowing into other social practices with ostensibly little relation to farming.
Indeed, as regards the role of risk in shaping the social structure of Cambodian communities, the nature of participation in wedding celebrations is particularly instructive. It is, for instance, common practice for wedding guests to present their hosts with a variable sum of money upon their attendance, amounting, in this study, to a median “gift” of $10 per household. This money is outwardly intended merely to cover the cost of the wedding, which in both rural and urban areas can be considerable and even for poorer households usually constitutes the hire of a sound system (or a live band for the better off), marquee, numerous costumes for both bride and groom, and food and drink for all invitees. From an alternative perspective, however, the reciprocity and variance in the size of these payments may potentially be indicative of a more complex social function.

Indeed, with regard, first, to reciprocity, numerous respondents noted that the amount they were expected to pay for their attendance included a strong element in this regard, as exemplified by several villagers bemoaning that ‘at the moment, the cost of going to weddings is higher because I have to repay those people who attended my children’s weddings’ (Li Li, 27/04/13). Similarly, a landless widow reported regular payments of up to $20 per wedding, far higher than the usual. She explained that this was ‘to pay back the other people who came to my weddings and paid me then’ (San Tai, 05/06/13).

San Tai’s participation in this process of reciprocity is part of a Khmer tradition wherein, as a research assistant explained, ‘people must repay slightly more than they received’ at their children’s weddings (Long, 19/06/13). When combined with a third informant’s suggestion that ‘nowadays I don’t really get invited to any weddings because all of my children are already married’, a picture emerges of wedding attendance as reciprocal social action, characterised by implicit agreements over indeterminate timeframes.

Despite being an unavoidable and highly ostentatious part of both rural and urban life in Cambodia, though, there exists little literature, beyond Ebihara’s classic study (1968), concerning the role played by wedding celebrations in Khmer society. To some extent, this may simply be due to the apparent self evidence of the social function sought by the holders of wedding parties: the demonstration of wealth. A family’s economic standing is denoted in every detail of a wedding ceremony, from the size of the tent (almost every wedding, and also funeral, is held in a temporary marquee), to a hierarchically ordered scale of alcoholic spirits, to the visibility and prominence of location, which must be “purchased” via relatively standardized payments to police. Furthermore, the inevitable corollary to this is that wedding attendance is also a subject of boasting amongst richer farmers, who like to claim that they are ‘invited to every event in the village’ (Soravanna, 27/04/13). Another large landowner proclaimed that:
‘I go to weddings very often, so I spend over a thousand dollars a year just on weddings. [During the wedding season] I go to a wedding at least once a day. Sometimes two or three times a day. (Pan Nol, 04/05/13).

Nevertheless, as highlighted in table 5.4, a closer examination reveals that it is the poorer and the poorest residents of Krang Youv who are most financially committed to engagement in rural social life. The data therein show that although mean wedding spend increases considerably with income, it does not remain proportionally the same. Although the inhabitants of Jake village reported spending larger gross sums, their much greater average income means that in proportional terms they spend just over a third of that reported in North Ampil, and South Ampil and Go, who report an expenditure of over a quarter of gross income on wedding donations. This was further reflected in statements of North Ampil residents, one of whom noted that ‘I spend a lot on both [weddings and ceremonies]. More than I spend on my house!’ (Ban Korn, 23/04/13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Total Income Spent on Weddings</th>
<th>Entire Site</th>
<th>North Ampil</th>
<th>South Ampil and Go</th>
<th>Jake Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entire Site</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$11.10 per wedding</td>
<td>$9.20 per wedding</td>
<td>$11.75 per wedding</td>
<td>$12.48 per wedding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would be wrong, however, to denote these costs purely as expenses. The gifts given to a couple’s family by their wedding guests are presented in named envelopes and recorded in a ledger so that the same amount may be returned when it is the giver’s turn to host. In this light, informal reciprocity involved in the provision of wedding gifts may, as suggested above in relation to the practice of provas dei, constitute a means of long term risk pooling. Even the poorest members of a community are likely to need to fund several weddings during their lifetimes. Under this scenario, the wedding “gifts” given at weddings may in fact be viewed by their givers as a means of ensuring that their own household will have the financial means to conduct the marriages of their own children regardless (or taking less consideration of) their individual circumstances at that point in the future.

This blurring of the lines between productive and consumptive social relations has important implications for the way in which social systems are constructed. Just as investments in physical assets may have a number of separate or overlapping functions, being variously or potentially useful as, for instance, savings, consumption, or as an indicator or social status, so too does a “social investment” have the potential to fulfil a number of different overlapping and intersecting roles. In building upon this understanding and in furthering the core aims of this Ph.D., what follows shall
explore the potential of network mapping as an additional means of understanding the role played by the distribution of various assets in structuring Cambodian social life.

5.2.3 Detecting Rural Hierarchies: Moving Beyond Assets as Measures of Patron-Client Relations

Cambodian society, in common with much of Asia, has tended to be characterised as deeply hierarchical in nature. Just as Brocheaux (1983) refers to vast pyramidal structures of power relations stretching from the bottom to the top of Vietnamese society, so too do Vickery (1984) Hinton (1998a; 1998b), Ledgerwood and Vijghen (2002) amongst many other evoke images of implicitly understood layers of authority rising from the rice fields like the tapering towers of a Buddhist stupa. This deeply entrenched hierarchy, assumed to be at once obvious in its effects and difficult, or indeed impossible, to discern with any degree of specificity by Western eyes, is viewed as an inescapable fact, and one which, not withstanding its occasional positive roles, lies at the root of many of Cambodia’s contemporary problems.

Nevertheless, despite an apparent consensus that the architecture of Cambodian society is a major factor in the functioning of all aspects of the Cambodian political economy, little or no effort has been made to move beyond a generalized appreciation of its existence towards a more specific understanding of the linkages between functionality and form. Although one exception to this may be found in Le Billon’s (2000) study of the influence of patronage networks on the logging trade, it is notable by its isolation. Rare though it may be, though, Le Billon’s (2000) study fulfils a vital heuristic role in highlighting the utility of focussing upon a single measure – here, logs – as a means of elucidating wider structures with broader implications. Otherwise put, it permits a snapshot of a structure that would otherwise remain hidden in its entirety.

Following Le Billon (2000), then, this study has adopted the principle that in seeking to move beyond generalised claims regarding the hierarchy and patronage, single measurements may reveal more than expected. In this case, however, the key variable was not a physical object but the somewhat less tangible resource of information and/ or assistance, both pertaining to migration specifically and to the maintenance of village livelihoods more broadly. Various means of measuring this valuable asset were instigated during the course of the study, some successfully and some with mixed results. Ultimately, though, the means which stood out as most effective were those which respondents found most intuitive: those based firmly in the everyday practicalities of sustaining and improving household livelihoods.
With this in mind, informants were asked to identify the people, beyond their nuclear household, to whom they felt closest and saw most regularly. After obtaining a list of names, varying in size between none and ten but averaging just over three across the entire sample, respondents were asked simple questions regarding the sharing of loans, information and labour within the group, and to indicate where group members lived in order that they could be interviewed subsequently. These secondary names were then followed up, as were their own groups, so as to establish a network based in three initial points and extended to the third degree.

Otherwise put, the friends, friends of friends, and friends of friends of friends of the primary nodes were mapped, although it should be noted that the volume of necessary interviews was considerably reduced by some nodes occupying multiple positions in the network. In this way, a picture of the social life of the study sites was built up which, although ostensibly both mono-dimensional and partial in the sense that it accounted neither for every person in the village, nor of the vertical linkages hypothesised by social capital theorists (e.g. Putnam, 2000; Portes, 1998) and alluded to by ethnographers of Cambodia (e.g. Vickery, 1984; Hinton, 1998a, 1998b; Hughes, 2001; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002) aims, as does Le Billon’s study (2000), to fulfil a microcosmic role.

Thus, despite the fact that the methodology accounted, in principle, only for the detection of “bonding” linkages between close friends, it has yielded a variety of instructive results, the relevance of which may extend beyond the single stratum of social life which that sub-classification would suggest. Indeed, the scope of relationships in evidence is sufficiently broad as to suggest that such rigid typologies are poorly suited to the Cambodian context, supporting instead a more fluid conception wherein individuals fulfil multiple roles concurrently. As such, what may, according to a snapshot view, be termed a typical patron-client relationship may in fact be complicated by the presence of a number of other roles. Whether an individual acts as patron, client, co-worker, or friend depends, it would seem, on the specific circumstances in question, so that they are better imagined, as Scott argues, as:

‘A shifting social landscape [in which] people move among structural categories, [and] in and out of particular relationships, repeatedly reformulating the parameters of their identities, communities and histories’ (Scott, 2009: 244).

The ability to link shifting functional arrangements and persistent hierarchies within the target communities is one of the key aims herein and constitutes a pre-requisite to the analysis of mobile inequality outlined subsequently, in chapter six. Ergo, in seeking to discern the social structural role played by the risk-led social practices thus far identified, various measures of network centrality emerge as promising tools, with eigenvector centrality, an established statistical tool for measuring
status positions within a network (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001), chief amongst them. The eigenvector measures the importance of a node to a network by assigning a value, between 0 and 1, based not only upon the number of connections that node has, but also the number of connections those connections have, and so on. As such, eigenvector centrality relies on the assumption that ‘in a communication network being connected to well-connected individuals adds more to one’s knowledge pool. Having popular friends adds more to ones own popularity’ (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2004: 1).

In accordance with this principle, the social network mapping methodology employed herein is directed primarily towards discerning this sort of social prominence, as well as the factors which are related to it, or cause it within a communication network extraneous to the individual - i.e. within the village social context as a whole in this case. By way of example, the following graphic shows the central part of the South Ampil and Go social network map, with name labels attached to the node with the highest eigenvector score in the tri-village sample, Soon Lom, and his immediate group of close associates. The selection of these individuals is intended to highlight some of the factors which may contribute to high eigenvector scores. However, it should be noted that this is not an egocentric map, but retains the geographical positioning of all nodes within the village system.

With this in mind, it may be observed that Soon Lom, marked in Figure 5.8 has the highest eigenvector score in the South Ampil and Go sub-location. He is a man of 47 and possesses 0.7 hectares of land, two cows, and an electric pump, making him one of the better off residents of the village, though by no means the wealthiest. As such, it is his network of close associates which distinguishes him. Though only four strong, the selection is varied and, crucially, comprises individuals who all require extensive networks to maximise their income. These include Theari, the popular dessert seller to whom customers from all over the village ‘come every day’ (07/05/13); Chuen Hing, one of the wealthiest farmers in the village with 1.5 Ha of riceland complemented by two daughters working in garment factories; Kaw Win, the owner of both a tractor and a harvester; and two farmers of lucrative chamkar [vegetable plots].
Part of Soon Lom’s eigenvector score is explained by his close friends’ high level of integration into the community. Indeed, his own score would be far lower if the other members of this group were less well connected themselves. However, this is not the only factor. As a village elder, as well as a well liked and highly respected member of the community, several villagers cited Soon Lom amongst their close friends whom he did not reciprocally cite. This also boosted his score and helps to demonstrate one of the more direct ways in which generalised esteem may manifest in a higher eigenvector centrality score.

As such, Soon Lom’s case demonstrates some of the socio-economic conditions conducive to high levels of personal integration into a social network. However, it has been the aim throughout this chapter, as well as one of the core aims of this Ph.D. more generally, to investigate the interaction of these sorts of social “assets” with the wider physical and economic environment. Ergo, in exploring these linkages at a larger scale, the following graphics are representations of each respondent positioned according to their geographic location (as determined by GPS) and with network lines demonstrating the linkages between various persons. The size and colour of the nodes which mark each individual’s position indicate the eigenvector centrality of that respondent: the larger the node, the more central the respondent according to this measure. Blue nodes are also more central than
red nodes, with the small selection of green nodes visible in North Ampil being the least connected individuals in the village system.

Figure 5.9. South Ampil and Go: Eigenvector (own data, n=84)
Figure 5.10. North Ampil: Eigenvector (own data, n=40)

With the graph having been divided into three parts according to study location, two features are immediately apparent. The first is the difference in the size of the three networks. Excluding isolated
outlying cases, the South Ampil and Go network (Figure 5.9) is considerably larger, at around 3.25km², than either Jake, at 1.2km² (Figure 5.11), or North Ampil, at 0.36km² (Figure 5.10), a difference which partly reflects the number of nodes in each network, but is also indicative of their respective geographical extents. Secondly, differing patterns of node size may also be observed. Eigenvector centrality in North Ampil and Jake Village is considerably more homogenous than in South Ampil and Go, which appears to contain more highly central individuals.

Given, then, that ‘the eigenvector is an appropriate measure when one believes that actors’ status is determined by those with whom they are in contact’ (Bonnacich and Lloyd, 2001: 199), the difference between Figures 5.9 – 5.11, showing eigenvector scores, and Figures 5.12 -5.14 displaying degree (raw number of connections), emerges as a significant indicator of hierarchical structures within the data. Indeed, there appears to be little difference in the volume of connections reported
as close friends either across or within the three locations. It is the way that they are distributed which differs.

Thus, what these data suggest is not that people in Ampil and Go have more connections to other people, but that they are less evenly connected, giving rise to pyramidal authority structures, in which one person has access to several independent groups (Bonnacich, 2007). Notably, these structures appear to fit comfortably within the typology of hierarchies noted throughout the literature on patron-clientism in Southeast Asia generally (e.g. Rigg, 2012, 2001; Scott, 1972), and Cambodia in particular (e.g. Vickery, 1984; Hinton, 1998a, 1998b; Hughes, 2001; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002). Ledgerwood (2002: 2), for instance, has chosen to emphasise the structurally individualised nature of such systems above all other features in her discussion of Cambodian conceptions of power. As she argues:

‘Clients are not united as a group; rather they are linked to the patron by personal obligation. This then works in a pyramid fashion, midlevel patrons know someone higher and they in turn know someone higher – up the social ladder. The only way to get something that is beyond your capacity is to attach yourself to a superior’.

Given the apparent systematic clarity of these structural clusters, though, and the means to detect them, the question remains as to the reason for their unequal distribution across the study site. Although both North Ampil, and Jake villages both exhibit some network inequality, with better connected individuals being discernible from those less so, they are fewer in number and smaller in centrality than the handful of “patron-like” individuals in South Ampil and Go, who appear to occupy such ostentatiously central positions in the social network of their villages.

With this in mind, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that social centrality of this sort is not directly covariant either with either wealth or political position. Although all of those with the highest eigenvector scores are relatively wealthy within the village, they are not necessarily the wealthiest and whilst the Village Chief of Ampil village, Truen Ngum, is not amongst the group with the highest centrality, the Village Chief of Go is amongst the very best connected.

This may be reflective of several factors, the first of which is that those who seek connections in pursuit of financial gain may not necessarily have achieved their objective at the time of investigation, or as Ledgerwood (2002: 3) has it, that ‘wealth follows power, not vice-versa’. Furthermore, as alluded to within the discussion of wedding behaviour above, wealth measured in terms of gross income is not the same as wealth from a social point of view, the latter of which, as
Scott (1985) highlights, must be visible in a way that modern sector income, or even large scale land rental, are not. At the very least, the principle that villagers are aware of each others’ physical assets was strongly supported by the research experience, wherein respondents would frequently be corrected by neighbours when relating their assets, or ask neighbours for help in remembering their own.

In addition, Scott’s perspective is further borne out by a significant correlation between eigenvector centrality and ownership of certain kinds of high value - and by extension high visibility – assets, specifically hand tractors (Spearman’s = 0.277; p=0.02). Practical considerations such as the need to share information on mechanical farming may therefore produce ostensibly similar effects to those instigated by expenditure on certain consumer durable. Ergo, centrality within a network may be the product, or externality, of a number of arrangements or circumstances.

For instance, a number of villagers complained that village officials controlled access to community aid and disaster relief offered both by government and NGOs, arguing that poor people must ‘pay for their selection’ (Yen Tac, 25/04/13) in this respect. Even those who praised the officials noted the importance of their role, explaining how it was necessary to ‘ask permission from the village chief to live near the lake’ as they had no other land (Pheap Son, 23/06/13). Furthermore, both the Go and Ampil village chiefs admitted that local ‘employers contact me to find labour from this village’ (Wat Yarm, 19/05/13). All of these arrangements create positions of power which are reflected in the network centrality of the officials in question, sometimes via mutual selection within each others’ networks and sometimes via unilateral selection of powerful individuals by many less powerful respondents. Nevertheless, formal authority is only one way in which such centrality may be achieved.

Indeed, fulfilling an economic role of some description is likely to be another. Within Ampil and Go, the only village system with an integrated permanent market and a consequently wider variety of non-agricultural income sources, certain individuals may have attained a degree of prominence as a result of their business. One such example is Theari, the roadside dessert seller in Ampil village who was amongst the very few to remark upon the social benefits of her work. As she noted, ‘because I’m a sweet seller, people come to my house every day. It is a good way to meet people’ (Theari, 07/05/13). Her reference to her own social integration is rare, however. The general tendency to self-identify as average in wealth terms was echoed in descriptions of village social life, with reference to which it is unusual to admit having any connections of note. ‘Everybody here’, they are wont to say, ‘is just simple. Nobody has ksai [social connections, lit.: string]’ (Khorum, 18/05/13).
Nevertheless, respondents’ social networks reveal a different story to that which they modestly put forward. Almost all of the respondents interviewed during the course of the study site were embedded within networks of close friends, whose regular meetings and durable association perhaps obscuring the usefulness of their association. Indeed, there is a significant homogeneity of occupational interests within these close knit “bonding” groups which is revealed only by further questioning as to the habitual conversations which take place at their regular gatherings. As one informant summarised, when they meet, ‘we just talk about work and how to find more income’ (Yarm Pan, 23/05/13).

Thus, just as the linkages involved in close knit social groupings are vital means of reducing risk in an uncertain ecological environment, alternative patterns of association may be necessary in order to mitigate different types of risk. Given that Ampil and Go has by some distance the highest percentage of “non-primary” household income (i.e. income derived from sources other than farming and fishing) amongst the three sites – a mean of 51% compared with 21% in North Ampil and only 6% in Jake – it is possible that the less agrarian risk profile therein may be partly responsible for the more uneven social structure the area appears to exhibit.

Indeed, the risk of lost income for a taxi driver or middleman, for example, cannot be mitigated effectively via the sort of close knit groups which are effective in hedging agricultural risk. However, as Burt (2001) has shown, individuals who bridge “structural holes” between two or more discrete groups have a significant advantage in terms of information acquisition. It therefore emerges as a plausible hypothesis that the need of the less agriculturally dependent Ampil and Go villagers to associate with people who are well positioned to know about opportunities, prices and trends outside the village may have notably increased the eigenvector calculated “popularity” of certain individuals.

In reality, it is likely that the specific social structures of North Ampil, South Ampil and Go, and Jake villages have emerged in response to these and a number of other factors in conjunction, some of which may not have been detected by the survey. Moreover, although this methodology, constructed primarily around “bonds of affection” has produced some significant results concerning the functionality and dynamism of social linkages between peers, it may have been less successful in detecting other types of vertical linkage. By way of example, the richest individual in any of the study sites was identified by only one person (also one of the wealthiest encountered) and, perhaps even more tellingly, himself selected nobody as a regular confidante. Instead he declared that: ‘I don’t have any close friends. I help myself. I know all the people in the surrounding villages. Everyone is
simple to me...I know every official: Commune chief, village chief etc. Sometimes they come to ask my advice’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13).

As the owner of thirty five hectares of rice land, two trucks, a full size (as opposed to the more common hand-) tractor, a new four wheel drive imported car and the only fully concrete house in the survey area, though, Pan Mon towers above his immediate and wider neighbours in wealth terms to such an extent that his disavowal of the kind of (at least partly) horizontal relationships sought by this study is largely understandable. As noted by one of the interpreters working on the study, he occupies the traditional Cambodian position of *dongkauv*, a wealthy and powerful individual of pre-eminent import within a rural village or district. Thus, he is by definition an outlier to the general picture of village social life, as demonstrated in figure 5.15, which compares the Jake village network with nodes sized by rice land holdings (above) and by eigenvector centrality (below).

![Figure 5.15 Comparison of Riceland Holdings and Eigenvector Scores in Jake Village](image)

As such, figure 5.15 demonstrates that in Pan Mon’s pre-eminence in land ownership is poorly correlated with his eigenvector score. Indeed, his network centrality is dwarfed by the group of
medium sized landowners to the right of the graphic, who possess a comparatively diminutive 0.8 – 3Ha per household. In this respect, he is something of an outlier from the data, wherein most wealthy individuals are also significantly above average in terms of eigenvector score. Nevertheless, despite his outlier status, he does serve as a useful example of the rationale underpinning the formation of the social groups discerned elsewhere. The manner in which Pan Mon differs from other wealthy villagers is not simply in the absence of obvious peers to associate with, but also from a lack of need to do so. Not only can he not share his risk with anyone even close to matching the scale of his agricultural investments, but as the owner of all necessary means of production and of the means to hire the labour to operate them, he simply does not need to associate with those around him in the same way as other rural Cambodians. Rather than the gradated linkages observed elsewhere, his endowments allow him to sit high atop the social milieu of the area.

This is, of course, not to suggest that the relationship between the natural environment and community structure runs only one way. Rather, in expanding upon the somewhat lopsided interpretation offered by the social capital theory, it serves to emphasize that ecological and economic conditions can just as readily impinge upon social functionality as the latter can facilitate catalytic expansions in the former. Over time, these practical, short term shifts in behaviour may manifest in more persistent social structures or cultural practices, but they are never fixed. As will be discussed in the subsequent section, traditional practices such as provas dei, informal lending and wedding behaviour remain subject to constant negotiation according to the needs of the social environment in which they occur.

5.2.4 Pragmatism Stratification

In the light of the data presented above, the concept of social capital generally proposed within the literature, wherein social resources, themselves the product of culture and history more than environment, constitute a catalytic means of maximising the available (individual or community) gains from economic opportunities emerges as an understandable error. The issue of causality has long been a weapon with which to attack the work of social capital practitioners and it would appear, on the basis of this data, that their opponents have the better of the argument. The evidence here is that the physical and economic environment, at both the historical and dynamic timescales, continually moulds the shape of social practice, rather than merely the obverse.

Indeed, what is sometimes implicitly overlooked in the examination of relatively “simple” societies is that, as highlighted by the data in the first section of this chapter, ‘livelihoods in many rural areas of
the world are complex and dynamic...[with]...perhaps the one constant [being] the day-to-day uncertainty of survival’ (Marshke and Berkes, 2005: 1). Under such circumstances, the persistent success of consumption smoothing noted here and elsewhere (e.g. Okamoto, 2011; Platteau, 1995) indicates that social arrangements must have developed in such a way as to reflect not only the prevailing ecology of a nation or region, but also the distribution of risk and availability of rewards on a much smaller scale.

In support of this proposal, two exemplars may be drawn from the data presented above, relating respectively to investment and risk mitigation behaviour. First, the overwhelming preference, within savings behaviour, for physical assets over interest bearing accounts or even cash holdings cannot be explained merely as ignorance or risk aversion. Throughout the study site, only a single individual, the village chief of Go, admitted to possessing some $250 of savings, ‘for emergencies, especially sickness and for joining weddings’ (Wat Yarm, 17/05/13). The many others, even amongst those possessing strong linkages to the modern sector possess essentially ‘no savings’, ‘although [they] may save short term to buy land’ (Pon Tow, 01/06/13). When this is unavailable, there remains an almost exclusive preference for asset based saving strategies despite a full awareness of the rapid depreciation in the value of assets such as cars or motorbikes.

Given the correlation, detailed above, between high value assets, such as tractors, and the Eigenvector measure of network centrality, it emerges as a potential hypothesis that their ownership may be viewed as useful in a manner which extends beyond their immediate utility. Indeed, possession of such items may be viewed as facilitating the additional benefit of improvement in accessibility to useful social networks which may in turn reduce risk or improve productivity. This need not, however, suggest that respondents consider this kind of social benefit to be an end in itself but rather, as Ledgerwood (2002) suggests, as a route to longer term social gains which may be complementary to the benefits of the tool or object in question.

Furthermore, a similar pattern may be observed with regard to risk mitigation behaviour, wherein a clear relationship is in evidence between the incidence of provas dei and historical percentage crop loss, even when controlling for both location and income. Given the small likelihood that labour sharing contributes to worse or more frequent agricultural losses, the remaining line of causality suggests that those whose livelihoods are more exposed to environmental risk are more likely to participate in social groups and networks which serve, in indirect ways, to pool it. Those with more
secure livelihoods have less need to engage in these sorts of social arrangements, as exemplified by one such low-risk farmer:

`I have never suffered a flood or drought which has damaged my land because my land is too high to be damaged by flooding and I have a well. Droughts are only a problem for people without wells...I never do provas dei, I just rent everything I need` (Tic Hong, 27/05/13).

Conceived in this way, activities which may be declared purely recreation, such as meeting to eat and drink `just for fun` (Pan Yuen, 14/05/13) may serve a dual social structural and functional role. Rather than being directed towards the acquisition of nebulous social “goods” such as prestige, standing, or integration, though, social activities may in fact be predicated to a greater extent upon local and household level assets and liabilities than is often suggested within the literature. Individuals and households may engage in labour sharing behaviour where necessary, for instance under conditions of high environmental risk, and later abandon it when less beneficial. Similarly, they may seek out more central networks as a means of obtaining better access to information, whether this pertains to farming methods, migratory information, or other economic opportunities.

Certainly, qualitative interviews combined with data on social practices appear to provide a strong body of support in this regard. Groups which might be viewed merely as reflective of social stratification or hierarchical reinforcement appear to have a specifically functional basis founded in communal interests of productivity and mutual insurance. In discussing his social activities, for instance, one farmer commented that he sees his close friends nearly every day, regularly meeting to drink or share meals, but that these activities are grounded in a need to share information and resources. As he put it: ‘we meet to discuss rice farming: How to produce it, take care of it, and how to manage pests’ (Port, 19/04/13).

Similarly, a second medium scale farmer from South Ampil stated that ‘when we meet, we talk about our job – how to increase our yield, do rice farming well, manage pests, and especially how to manage pesticides’ (Chuen Hing, 06/05/13). This overriding concern with productive activities contrasts to some extent with statements by residents of North Ampil, wherein farming jostled with debt and expenses as the major themes of the area. For instance, it was a typical pronouncement that ‘we usually meet up to talk about our worries, especially farming and weddings, but in particular how to repay the banks’ (Sin, 28/04/13).

Although only partially instructive in their own right, taken together, these statements appear to closely mirror the various resource distributions in evidence within the three sites. Furthermore, they serve to highlight a phenomenon which constitutes not so much wealth based stratification as
homophily on the basis of income type. As one larger landowner stated, ‘when we meet up it is to talk about work and how to make more money’ (Yarm Pan, 17/05/13). As another confirmed, ‘we meet each other when we go out to farm and then we meet each other again when we come home. Generally we just sit around and talk about rice farming and crop growing’ (Mooen Chun, 29/05/13).

Rice farming is not, however, a homogeneous enterprise. Different sizes of land present different issues for discussion, with larger plots often necessitating machinery or labour to harvest, or middlemen to convey the sale of large volumes of rice at a good price. These differing concerns may, therefore, constitute one of the factors which produces or entrenches social stratification, encouraging people to associate with others whose assets are similar for the practical informational benefits they are able to provide. This hypothesis is partly supported on a macro-scale by the skew of larger nodes, depicting riceland area, towards the left of Figure 5.16, which shows nodes arranged by their network proximity, rather than GPS location.

Figure 5.16 Nodes Sized by Riceland Area and Arranged According to Network Structure (own data, n=212)

As such, the oft discussed multi-layered hierarchy of Cambodian society appears predicated, at least from one perspective, not on income, consumption, or inherited conceptions of class or caste, but upon the rational logic of need, production and environment. Individuals not only relate to those who do similar things, but appear to actively seek them out as a mechanism of mutual benefit. In turn, these micro structures underpin the shape of the community as a whole, so that, as Fafchamps notes, ‘solidarity does not really operate as a group insurance…[but rather]…as a network in which individuals are connected to a small number of other people, who, in turn, are connected to other people’ (Fafchamps, 1992: 158).
The distinction, then, of society and community from everyday practical interaction, appears to be in many ways a false one. The quotidian realities of production, risk and livelihood, rather than operating upon a distinct plane from the more ‘nebulous’ (Rigg, 2006: 187) realm of culture, in fact constitute a structural trellis around which social networks emerge. As a result, culture and social structure are imbued with the needs of production. Thereafter, as Kirkvliet (2009) and Fafchamps (1992) have argued, it constitutes a conceptually vital adjustment to promote these inherently practical, everyday atoms of social life from their traditional depiction as largely incidental and subservient to the wider forces of political economy, to a leading role within the structure of communities. As the former posits, everyday forms of support for and compliance with...[social]...relationships and their roles in the production, distribution, and use of resources constitute the basis of rural politics.’ (Kirkvliet, 2009: 235)

Unlike the more rigid homophily based in ethnicity or kinship, preferential association of this sort cannot reasonably be labelled as “parochial” in the manner described by Putnam’s in reference to bonding linkages (Leonard, 2004). Nor, indeed, may it be viewed as either permanent or exclusive given their relationship to environmental risk, noted above. Even those with few assets and little income are prone to frequent adjustments to the type and location of their labour, rendering their communities ‘in constant flux, involving perturbations and shifts of people and resources’ (Marschke and Berkes, 2006: 13).

In this way, just as the reality of Cambodian livelihoods appears far more differentiated than is generally appreciated, so too is the Cambodian social hierarchy, famed for its anachronistic intransigence (Chandler, 2000; MacDonald, 1958), rather more fluid and pragmatic than is often supposed. Indeed, whilst the deep social inequality which the principle of hierarchy represents is no myth, its conception as a layered “stupa” of increasing exclusivity does not tell the whole story. Khmer rural society, though unequal, is characterised by movement, flexibility and pragmatism, enacted within a structure determined not only by history or class, but also by local endowments of risk and liability.

5.2.5 Conclusion

Analysis of Cambodian social relations tends to be limited, in general, to the emphasis of two structural forms: the ‘pyramid’ of hierarchical, patron-clientist linkages and a ‘net’ (Meas, 1999) or ‘web’ (Colletta and Cullen, 2000) of horizontally based linkages. In recent years, the latter of these has come to be viewed as performing a useful role in facilitating the exchange of information related to various resources and opportunities, whilst the former remains, in spite of scattered arguments to
the contrary (e.g. Platteau, 1995; Fafchamps 1992), cast as an instrument of iniquitous wealth extraction, as well as key impediment to bureaucratic rationality.

In spite of assertions, by Ledgerwood (2000: 2) in particular, as to the fluidity of a system wherein ‘clients may leave one patron and attach themselves to another, or may be attached to multiple patrons to access different kinds of resources’, the dichotomy of vertical patron-client ties, and horizontal linkages to family and peers, is rarely challenged in a comprehensive manner. Nor, indeed, has much headway been made in elucidating the relationship between the external conditions which cause individual ‘patrons to rise and fall in fortune’ (Ledgerwood, 2000: 2) and the more generalized impact of shifting resource availability on local social structures and their functioning.

To some degree, this is reflective of the relatively small amount of detailed research conducted in Cambodia in the post-war era. However, to a significant extent it appears also to be predicated upon the widespread notion, derived from Khmer culture and in common with numerous other societies throughout Asia, that ‘a gain in power for one person is a loss for someone else’ (Ledgerwood, 2000: 2-3), so that individual occupants of certain roles are subsumed by the patterned immutability of a structure which retains its shape irrespective of the fate of its constituent human parts.

The data presented herein appear to challenge this “zero sum” conception on several levels. To begin with, the variety of relationships uncovered via the exploration of what would nominally be termed bonding linkages suggests that the distinction between horizontal and vertical associations constitutes a poor delineation. In addition, they have highlighted the dynamic linkages between what people have, the risks they face, and the sorts of social groupings in which they participate. In doing so, they have also posited evidence concerning the functionality of those structures and their cultural accoutrements, which have emerged as more suited to the locally specific requirements of a variety of unpredictable environments than is generally suggested by the universalistic conception of Khmer society which has historically dominated the literature.

As such, in accordance with the themes outlined in research questions one and two, concerning the study of social networks and their relationship to environmental risk, this chapter has sought answers to two broadly defined areas of investigation: First, regarding the social structure of Khmer rural society and second, concerning the relationship between this social structure and the natural environment. As postulated throughout the theoretical framework which constitutes the second
chapter of this Ph.D., the data presented herein have shown the linkages between the natural and social environment are robust and bi-directional. Just as cultural practices shape the natural environment, so too do the practicalities of generating income in an uncertain natural environment influence which aspects of their culture people prioritize and engage with.

Furthermore, the landscape of natural endowments which influences social systems in the longer term, also appears to play a shorter term role, encouraging households and communities to rely upon each other more or less depending upon the risks they face. In this regard, robust correlations between simple social interactions, such as loans and labour sharing, and historical propensity to crop losses from environmental risk, have been complemented, within the data, by correlations between risk sharing behaviour and the network centrality which determines the hierarchical structure of the community. Village level co-variances have also been noted between non-traditional income sources and the equality of eigenvector distribution.

Finally, the linkages observed between the levels of engagement with traditional practices and environmental factors, for example expenditure on wedding gifts and rice paddy holdings; or the ownership of certain high value, high visibility goods such as motorbikes and hand-tractors, and network centrality, suggests that aspects of the cultural realm may themselves be connected, in complex ways, to ecology. As a result, even in a country characterised by apparent homogeneity and intransigence, Cambodian rural social structures, considered in the light of their relationship with risk and rural livelihoods, are far more diverse, dynamic and practically grounded than is often supposed. However, though rooted in the villages of Cambodia, their impact is not limited to the rural sphere. Rather, these pragmatically constructed networks and linkages form an integrated whole with the migratory networks which are the subject of this Ph.D. In seeking to elucidate this relationship, and its impact on urban livelihoods, the subsequent chapter will use a range of qualitative and quantitative data to investigate their facilitating and constraining role.
Chapter 6

Form: “Durable Inequalities” in a Changing Environment

The evidence presented in chapter five, which highlighted some of the ways in which pragmatic arrangements may give rise to hierarchical social structures, has laid the groundwork for the dynamic conception of inequality which will be the subject of this chapter. Indeed, one of the key assertions of Galtung’s (1969; 1990) structural violence framework – one of the conceptual addendums necessary to a systems framework of migration as discussed in chapter two – is that the inequality he views as inhering within the socio-political systems in which humans reside is, for the most part a ‘silent’ (Galtung, 1969: 173) force. Only during times of change does it become apparent, like ‘an enormous rock in a creek’ (Galtung, 1969: 173), as he puts it, impeding the progress of those less privileged and sweeping the beneficiaries of structured inequality into positions of power and wealth. What may before have seemed an incidental, even natural, distribution of resources is thereby revealed as a constructed permanence.

In this respect, throughout Cambodia’s most recent two decades, when foreign direct investment and rapid growth have contributed to an environment of insistent change and a much mooted expansion of opportunity for businesses and individuals alike, the Kingdom has, in common with several of its Southeast Asian neighbours, borne out Galtung’s predictions. There, as elsewhere in the region, ‘both employment and growth elasticities of poverty have declined despite accelerating growth rates’ (Palanival and Gul Unal, 2011: 39). The rock of Cambodia’s structural inequality, barely visible for decades beneath the still waters of economic stagnation and political brutality, has emerged to direct the current of opportunity.

By following out thirty migrants from the 72 households explored above, as well as a further twenty of their urban friends, associates and relatives, this chapter will explore how the persistence of inequality in this way is undergirded not only by long held historical advantage, but by small variations in the landscape of wealth, risk, and power. In doing so, it will highlight how subtle imbalances in an ostensibly equitable socio-economic field expand and coalesce, in times of change and opportunity, into “durable inequalities” (Tilly, 1998) with the ability to survive and bridge the gap between the rural and urban spheres. Otherwise put, this chapter is directed towards the exposition of a schema of labour migration wherein opportunity, rather than destabilising rigid hierarchies, acts as a catalyst to further (dis)advantage.
In so doing, this chapter builds upon the understanding of society as grounded in the physical environment outlined in chapter five. Whereas that chapter sought to highlight the functionality of social arrangements and the role they play in mitigating risk, however, this one will emphasize their restrictive role. As such, in accordance with research questions one, two and three of this Ph.D., concerning rural-urban migratory networks, socio-ecological linkages, and persistent inequality respectively, this chapter will explore the role of social networks in linking the rural natural environment and migrant livelihoods. Furthermore, by delineating the diversity of the migrant experience in this way, this chapter will lay the groundwork for the examination of new cultural narratives explored in chapter seven.

6.1 Equality and Difference in the Migrant Experience

During the final week of the fieldwork conducted for the purposes of this Ph.D., an interview with a local farmer and garment worker who had taken leave from his factory in order to harvest his rice crop encapsulated the inequality which had by then begun to emerge in the quantitative data, highlighting how keenly it is felt on a social level. ‘The problems here’, he opined, ‘are now only for poor people’, who are caught between the stringent demands of urban labour and the increasing impossibility of maintaining small agricultural crops in the face of worse and more frequent climate shocks and the rising price of the tools and equipment [such as water pumps and fertilizer] needed to ameliorate them. As he continued:

‘The relationship between the rich and the poor is torn, as if it has been pulled apart. Poor people rarely go to rich people’s houses. You can see now that if the rich people have a party, then so many people will come. If a poor person has a party, then only the poor will come’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13).

In Sok Tol’s eyes, rural inequality in Krang Youv is at its worst in living memory, as modern sector wages have begun drive up prices for key goods and push the less fortunate to the margins of survival. Nevertheless, Sok Tol himself, as a garment worker, is a beneficiary of this urban boom, raising the question as to how he could feel so marginalised by the economic development he participates in. The answer is that Sok Tol is not a garment worker, but a farmer engaging in garment work. His plot is small and his family young, and these challenges remain with him in the city, where he must satisfy only his barest subsistence needs in order to meet those of his rural household.

Rather than being an unusual case, Sok Tol’s persistent, primordial obligation to his rural livelihood encapsulates the undergirding truth of migration in Cambodia. The hoards of garment workers emerging from their factories at 4pm each day, though recipients of a roughly equivalent monthly wage, do not constitute a socially bounded group. Unlike much of the factory bound labour
movement undertaken by their European precursors (Williamson, 2002), Cambodian migration from the countryside currently constitutes neither a mass abandonment of the land, nor, usually, an individual one, with the majority of migrants returning within a handful of years to their villages of origin.

Furthermore, what little homogeneity may be read into the livelihoods of factory workers is even less relevant when applied to their peers in other occupations. Construction work, domestic labour, petty trade and garage work are all determined by the particularistic nature of the arrangement. Even within such categories, the difference between those construction workers who nightly pitch their hammocks amidst the mud of their construction site, and those who return home to the brick built urban houses of their families is such that it must be viewed as a distinction not only in degree, but in kind.

Thus, as discussed in chapter two, any typology of migration which attempts to separate occupation and location necessarily ignores the vital interrelationships between those factors which combine to comprise the migration experience. Nevertheless, the presentation of data renders some degree of categorical compromise essential. In seeking to preserve as holistic a view as possible of the Cambodian migration system, therefore, the data have been classified initially under three broad categorical umbrellas, which between them contain a considerable majority of the migrants tracked out from Phnom Penh: international migration to Malaysia and Thailand; the semi-rural factory enclaves of Sak te Bo and Andaing; and the periphery and centre of Phnom Penh.

6.1.2 International Migration to Malaysia and Thailand: Brokers and Illegal Cross-Border Labour

As large sections of the literature on migration have noted, both in the Cambodian context (e.g. Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014; Diepart, 2010; Kaleb, 1968) and elsewhere (e.g. Potts, 2010; Gugler, 1968, 1991), migration is a process dominated by informal social and familial linkages. Moreover, with respect to internal migration within Cambodia this is especially true: around 99% of internal migrations involve at least one family member (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014). When undertaken internationally, however, the logistical challenges of cross-border movement mean that relying upon known and trusted persons alone is not sufficient. Potential migrants and their families must place their faith in agents and middlemen they barely know, supported by little information, and underwritten by heavy debts in cash or kind.

As a result of such uncertainties, a significant proportion of international migrations end in failure, as a number of respondents highlighted during focus group discussions. These conversations brought
across a picture of a process characterised not only by illegality, but also fruitlessness, as highlighted by a villager from Ampil:

‘There are two kinds of international migration here: legal and illegal. Legal migration lasts for two years because those who do it have a passport and everything they need. Unfortunately people who take the illegal path tend to come back in three or four months’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).

The reasons underpinning failed international migrations take a variety of forms. Most commonly, however, the adverse outcomes which prompt a return take the form of gross exaggeration on the part of the initial broker, or *may kjal* (lit.: head of the wind), who entices potential migrants with tales of monthly salaries far higher than it would be possible to earn in Phnom Penh, let alone more locally. Having arrived, workers in this situation find that a large proportion of their wages are retained by the company for hidden transport and accommodation costs. Unable to save what they had anticipated, or even what they could in a domestic factory, those who find themselves in this situation often simply return home. For some, however, overt misdeeds on the part of employers force even legal migrants into a situation of reduced autonomy:

‘I know one worker whose passport was stolen by his boss in Thailand. He didn’t have the money to get home [illegally] without it, so he had to wait until he had saved 300,000 riel [$75] in this job until he could come back’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13).

The agents who facilitate moves to exploitative situations such as this, or more lucrative alternatives are, in practice, impossible to distinguish. They enter the village as lone salespeople, arriving to spread the word of the opportunities they offer one day and returning to discuss the details, logistics, and cost of the endeavour with any interested parties at a later date. Little or nothing is known about them and, as what they offer is often illegal, they are not expected to be acting in an official capacity for a company or organisation. Their word is all they offer and all that is taken as collateral for the young people of the villages they visit.

As one such migrant, to Thailand, explained ‘a woman came to our village one day. She said she was looking for labourers to work as illegal construction workers in Thailand. So we went.’ (Ton Truen, 06/06/13). Other villagers reported a similar story, explaining that:

‘Now and then somebody comes around looking for a certain number of workers [to take abroad]. He takes their names and arranges transport from here to the border. After they get these, somebody else picks them up on the other side and takes them to where they are needed.’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).

Drawn in by the promise of earning $200 to $300 per month in Malaysia or Thailand, some villagers take on more debt to fund the up front cost of the journey, only to find themselves working for far lower wages upon arrival. Stories of passport confiscation or even of being ‘robbed by the company’
Song Lyn, 09/05/13) are commonplace, though they usually end in the acquisition of even greater debt or land sale to fund the return journey, rather than long term wage slavery abroad.

In some cases, however, the inherent risks associated with the movement of the vulnerable into the unknown manifest in tragedy even for those families with some previous experience of the process. One such case is that of the elderly couple Ming and Ton Truen’s child Heng, who, having accompanied his seven brothers and sisters to Thailand on the latest of several trips to start work in a Thai garment factory at the age of sixteen, simply disappeared without explanation five years ago. As his mother explained, such occurrences are made even less bearable by the lack of closure they offer to the family:

‘Five years ago, he left here at sixteen years old to go to work in the factory in Thailand. I suspect that he has died, but it just doesn’t seem real to us because we still don’t know for sure’ (Ming, 06/06/13).

Perhaps worst of all, though, the family had to make the decision to continue with their regular journeys across the border to the Thai factory. Having ‘sold [their roughly 0.8 Ha of] land twenty or thirty years ago because [their] living standard was already so low and our daughter was seriously ill’ (Ming, 06/06/13), their status as a family for hire was confirmed as soon as the new owner of their family plot terminated the sharecropping agreement. As Ming explained, this happened ‘after two years because he had found enough freelance labourers to do the work’ for a wage that they themselves had been doing for a proportion of the yield (Ming, 06/06/13).

With agricultural labour in the village long insufficient to meet the needs of a large young family, Ming’s family’s long history of migration began even before this, however. Some thirty years ago, her husband, Ton Truen, travelled to Phnom Penh to work as a cyclo (rickshaw) driver. There he spent several days at a time transporting passengers on his hired cyclo, in which he would also sleep at night parked alongside several other similarly employed drivers, before returning home to see his family and fix bicycles for three days of each week, earning around 4-5000 riel [§1-1.25] per day.

Possessing only Ming’s sporadic agricultural wage labour to complement Ton Truen’s meagre earnings, this family is one for whom the avoidance of risk is a priority in permanent subordination to the pressing daily requirements of income generation. For them, the greatest risk is to earn no money in a given month, week or day. As such, the low opportunity cost and relative likelihood of employment associated with trusting a known international middleman perhaps explains their lengthy engagement with illegal cross-border migration, where domestic alternatives were generally available, but never completely certain. Only in the last month, five years after their brother’s disappearance, have all seven remaining children returned to take up work in Phnom Penh and Sak
Having been assured of the availability of work by family members already employed in those areas.

Moreover, the slowness with which Ming’s cohort of family migrants came to abandon the expeditions to Thailand even after they had cost the family a member demonstrates an undergirding truth about labour migration in Cambodia: that the endowments of the household determine to a large extent the manner in which it takes place. Landless families, or those whose debts are unmanageable without remittances, are unable to explore new economic avenues in the way that those with alternative sources of income can. As a result, they are more likely to remain in low paying or dangerous employment for longer, even as better opportunities arise.

Given these circumstances, this one family’s transition to domestic labour migration constitutes a small victory for government policy, which ‘wishes to discourage [international] labour migration according to sub-decree 190’ (Khleang Rim, ILO, 09/08/13) in recognition of a view that ‘illegal migration to Thailand is the biggest problem in Cambodia right now’ (Khleang Rim, ILO, 09/08/13). That it has taken Ming’s family so many years to abandon their illicit cross-border working patterns in favour of a completely legal, and in principle safer, alternative goes some way to demonstrating the extent to which such arrangements become subject to a degree of lock-in, however.

Indeed, the downside of a system of internal migration mediated at low, or no, cost via informal linkages is that those who lack the requisite connections can find themselves excluded from the process. In this way, entire households such as Ming’s are forced, for want of the requisite networks, into illegality and, perhaps the greater risk, persistent reliance upon strangers for the logistics of their journeys and subsequent work. Nevertheless, as what follows will seek to show, internal migration is neither the preserve of the privileged, nor free of risk itself. Rather, within Cambodia, just as it is outside, the migrant experience is characterised by a vast heterogeneity derived in large part from, and consistently feeding back to, rural livelihoods.
6.1.3 Sak te Bo and Andaing: Risk, Impropriety and Differentiation in a Salaried Environment

Located some fifteen kilometres from the outskirts of Phnom Penh and a further twenty from the initial rural study site of Ampil, Sak te Bo, and its slightly smaller neighbour Andaing, are communities which in the course of the past sixteen years have expanded from a collection of small riverside villages to two of the largest centres of garment work in Cambodia (CCHR, 2013). Now comprising a vast cohort of garment workers, the continued expansion of factories and the necessary accommodation for their staff has also attracted a significant volume of construction workers, as well as schools and medical centres to cater for themselves and their children, and a bustling roadside market economy selling foodstuffs, consumer durables and various other services. As a local rented room owner explained, since the first factory opened in 1997, the area has changed almost beyond recognition:

‘Since then, the houses around here have changed from palm leaves to concrete, and the young people in the area now have something to do. Local people get money to improve their houses by selling things to the workers in the factory and people also sometimes sell their riceland to the companies because you can get a good price...You can make a lot of money selling land: a hectare goes for [$]10k or 20k. It’s very expensive. [As a result], people don’t farm rice much any more, just vegetables and chamkar [non-rice agricultural plots which require little land].’ (Rented Room Owner Interview, 21/06/13)

Furthermore, this account of the physical changes to the local environment is borne out by satellite imagery, which, as demonstrated in Figure 6.1, shows a significant amount of development in only four years between the earliest and latest available images. In particular, the number of tin and tile roofed houses, which show up more brightly in satellite imagery than those constructed with wood...
or other traditional materials, appears to have expanded markedly, as has the number of rented rooms, which show up as longer, tin [i.e. blue] roofed buildings arranged tangentially to the road.

As regards the industry which drives such changes, not only has the cluster of factories to the left of the river expanded to incorporate new buildings, but so too has the area of chemically infused liquid waste and rainwater overspill, now a highly visible feature of the landscape from above. Though invisible from the main road, this encroachment has not bypassed the livelihoods of local people, many of whose farm land is flooded on a regular basis by liquid emissions from the factory. As a local shopkeeper explained, though, those affected have no recourse to authority:

‘I have a problem with the factory. My land is lower than the factory, which has a flood pipe coming out of the side of the building which floods my land completely in rainy season. I have asked the commune chief to intervene, but whilst they acknowledge there’s a problem, they don’t do anything. This has been going on for nearly twenty years, since the factory opened. As a result, I never farm in the wet season, just a very small vegetable crop in the dry season.’ (Shopkeeper Interview, 21/06/13)

Despite the damage done to local agriculture, however, the majority of residents claim to have gained from the presence of the factories, as a local economic boom fuelled by salaried garment workers, as well as the construction workers who build the factories which pay them, has led to marked benefits for much of the local community. Many of those who previously relied on rice and fishing based livelihoods have taken advantage of the rapidly expanding market for their produce, and especially the skyrocketing value of their land, to invest in alternative, high value crops, or commercial premises the better to further exploit the growing opportunity in the area. One such beneficiary is the same shopkeeper whose land is regularly flooded by the factories, who went on to explain that:

‘[Migrants] amount to about ninety percent of my business, because local people generally just do chamkar [vegetable plantations]. I also have rented rooms and regularly borrow from the bank to expand them...all of [my children] are vendors along this street.’ (Shopkeeper and Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13)

Furthermore, the (physical and economic) market has provided opportunities even for some of those who were landless or near landless prior to the influx of the garment industry. Low value items such as hair clips and nail varnish are cheap to purchase and can be sold at a small profit in great volumes during the 30-60 minute lunch breaks afforded by the factories to their workers, as well as before and after shifts. The predictability and brevity of these vending periods during the day has led several poorer informants to split their days between traditional activities such as fishing and agricultural wage labour, and daily periods of vending to migrants.
‘In the morning, we go fishing in the river, but in the afternoon I rent a space on the floor outside the factory gates for 3-4k for two hours. I move from factory to factory, all along the road, as well as several in Sak te Bo and Ta Khmao. I work with my wife every day, making a turnover of 50k and a profit of 10k. In the evening, I go to another factory, making another 10k. Around the time garment workers get paid, I earn a lot more. The most popular product, in general, is nail varnish, especially the red one.’ (Make up and Accessories Vendor, 08/07/13)

The importance of this market as a source of income to poorer and richer locals alike, together with the higher than average presence of local people in the factories themselves, means that migrants to Sak te Bo and the surrounding area tend to experience a significantly greater degree of daily interaction with “indigenous” locals than do those who move to other destinations, especially the more established enclaves encountered in certain parts of Phnom Penh, where migrant amenities are run, by and large, by migrants themselves. Moreover, this is reflected in the social life of the area, where migrants are far more likely than average to count locals amongst their friends, and the incidence of marriage between locals and migrants is considerably higher than elsewhere. As the case of a local informant exemplifies, household livelihoods in Sak te Bo are frequently split between migrant and non-migrant activities:

One of my children is a garment worker in Sak te Bo, another is a vendor in Toul Kork market, in Phnom Penh, another two work as chamkar farmers on my land, but also sell things in the market. My friends’ children also work in the factories (Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13).

Nevertheless, this somewhat higher level of integration has not prevented a good deal of generalised stigma accumulating in relation to migrants and their activities. Migrants are seen by many as pleasure seeking and anarchic, with boys drinking away their wages, ‘fights happening on average every two to three days’ (Shopkeeper and Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13), and girls opening their doors to lovers. Rented room owners – unlike in other sites, where they tended to adopt either a laissaiz faire approach or, more commonly, assert that their authority was respected – bemoaned a degenerative lack of respect for their advice, often stating that the migrants living in their property ‘never listen to me any more’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13).

In particular, sexual impropriety is viewed as endemic and as elsewhere in the region, ‘salacious stories circulate’ about the shameful behaviour of migrant girls and their partners (Elmhirst, 2002: 155). A local pharmacist’s claim that up to a third of the female migrants in the area had approached her for ‘abortion medicine’ (Pharmacist, 08/07/13) seem implausibly high, but is nevertheless matched or surpassed by the majority of locals questioned on the subject. As the owner of one accommodation block argued, his presence in the building does not deter girls and boys bringing
partners ‘who eat with them and have to be paid for’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/07/13) to live with them for extended periods or even, as another room owner noted, on a nightly basis. As he continued: ‘now the young girls always bring boys back to their room in the evening, who then leave in the early morning. Only about one in ten of them is good’ (Shopkeeper and Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13).

This culture of denigration, which relates in particular but not exclusively to female migrants, is especially relevant when viewed in terms of the “bridging” nature of migrants’ linked rural-urban networks (Silvey, 2001). Indeed, as noted in chapter two, the pressures placed upon migrant women to remit in a dutiful manner not only ‘bind’ them to their employment (Resurreccion, 2005) but also contribute to “stretched lifeworlds” (Samuels, 2001) in which the honour they gain in the rural sphere for helping their families is simultaneously undermined by a culture of denigration surrounding the behaviour of young migrants in the urban environment in which they work. They are, in the manner alluded to also by Derks (2008) at once honourable and dishonourable; lauded and looked down upon.

Moreover, in spite of an undergirding narrative which labels some migrants ‘good’ and many ‘bad’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13), their behaviour is rarely assessed on a personal basis. Indeed, it is viewed not as individual deviance, but rather as symptomatic of a more widespread submission to the forces of modernity [ka tomneup]. In this respect, the qualitative data indicate a conception which is both highly dichotomous and strongly normative, as noted also by Chandler (2000), wherein the traditional virtues of chastity and self sacrifice are contrasted with the modern “vices” of conspicuous consumption and pleasure seeking. Thus, to appear modern is implicitly to abjure not only moral but also financial responsibilities to the family, as highlighted by another local informant:

‘Some garment workers are able to save a lot of money for their families, others less because of modernity. People want phones and new clothes etc. Some girls and boys have partners in their rooms’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/03/13).

In this way, for female migrants in particular (Elmhirst, 2002), the ability to send money home is viewed not only as a practical, but a moral issue, to the extent that, subsistence permitting, for an unmarried factory worker to spend a higher proportion of their salary on themselves than they remit constitutes, in many cases, less transient self interest and more a fall from grace. Those occasional migrants who neglect to remit when it is expected are branded ‘lazy’ and ‘uncaring’ by their parents (Srawoon, 08/06/13). As a result, the proportion of wages remitted across all migrant occupations is extremely high, with the garment workers of Sak te Bo being no exception in spite of the supposed temptations of the local area. In order to afford such payments, all of the garment workers
interviewed undertook regular overtime work, although, as noted also by Jolly and Reeves (2005: 9),
the extent to which this reflects a “voluntary” arrangement is open to debate and, at the very least,
appears to vary from factory to factory.

On balance, the best interpretation would appear to be that rates of explicit compulsion have
deprecated from ‘the time they didn’t have labour laws, so the owners forced [the workers] to work
overtime’ (Srey Mier, 27/06/13). Nevertheless, the general desire on the part of employees to work
overtime when available appears to mask an implicit but firm expectation of its uptake. When
healthy, factory employees almost invariably claim to ‘take anything I can’ in terms of overtime (An
Songsi, 09/08/13), but sickness and family commitments occasionally create a conflict in this respect.
Most workers are aware that their supervisors would not take kindly to a rejection and some have
seen them becoming ‘angry’ under such circumstances before (Srey Ro, 18/07/13).

Indeed, although many workers expressed a degree of gratitude for the opportunity of higher wages
offered by the overtime arrangements, in particular some of those who were still working five years
after the 2008 global economic downturn hugely reduced the availability of additional hours
(Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014), the intractability of shift managers to workers requests for
brief (i.e. one or two day) periods of leave – either from overtime or regular work – was cited by
many former workers as a reason for leaving the factories in search of other employment and by
numerous current workers as a major disadvantage of the job. As one such worker, Virun from
Ampil, complained:

‘When I work I feel exhausted, but I have to follow the manager’s orders. When they order
me to do anything I have to do it, which feels very bad. There are really no good things about
working here. [My salary] is not really enough for me because I need to spend money on
rent, food and travel every day. It is difficult for me. What I have left is often not enough for
me to buy food, clothes, or anything else, although sometimes my parents send me rice,
fish, or money to help me. If I work every day in the month, without absences, then I receive
a $5-7 bonus. Even one absence and I lose this, though.’ (Virun, 13/08/13)

The bonus Virun refers to here is an institutionalised system of ensuring attendance which was
found to be in evidence across all of the factories included in this study. Although the terms vary
slightly in their basing of full attendance on either a six or seven day week, the draconian
implementation of its forfeit is remarkably consistent. A single absence, whether resulting from
illness, bereavement, or family crisis; requested in advance or otherwise, will see any additional
money removed from a worker’s salary package. Furthermore, in some cases, factories dock pay
beyond the attendance bonus, with $10 fines for ‘unauthorized absences’ being reported by some
garment workers (Garment Worker Focus Group, 21/06/13).
Over and above the various health threatening aspects of a garment factory's working conditions, which range, according to the workers themselves and the pharmacists who treat them, from exhaustion and associated colds and headaches, to rashes and bleaching of the skin brought on by the chemicals used in material production, it is this inflexibility which garment workers deplore. Rather than being merely a cultural predilection, though, born of a language containing ‘no value-neutral, or even non-pejorative word for “work for”’ (Vickery, 1984: 24), attendance to the needs of the family is, as with remittances, a question of honour. Earning urban wages does not, in principle, bring exemption in this respect.

In this way, the extent to which many migrants remain bound for years both to their urban employment and rural household commitments is a particularly notable feature in Cambodia, where almost everybody works within half a day’s travel of their rural households, and most considerably less. Consequently, the manner in which migrants produce or reproduce their identities within a linked rural-urban ‘socio-spatial context’ (Silvey, 2001) is an especially important question here, due to the proportional difference in the weighting of rural and urban. Whereas in large parts of other high migration countries such as Bangladesh, the majority of migrants workers live more than a day away (Kuhn, 2003), here the proportional difference varies hugely: from a few minutes to twelve hours and everything in between. Under such divergent conditions, the extent to which migrants’ identities are defined by their household inevitably vary from place to place.

Indeed, in spite of, or as a result of, the difficulties inherent in balancing the conflicting interests of rigorously controlled factory labour and the unpredictable callings of family duty, Sak te Bo and Andaing are sometimes viewed by its migrant residents as something of a “half-way house” of migration, ‘less dangerous and busy than Phnom Penh’ (Powim, 28/06/13). Moreover, many of its labourers come either from Kandal province itself or from one of its neighbours, Prey Veng, Takeo, or Kampong Speu. Of these, a significant proportion commute up to an hour and a half to and from work to their rural household on the numerous flat bed trucks which charge between 1000 and 2000 riel [$0.25 to $0.50] to as many passengers as can be squeezed, shoulder to shoulder, into the truck’s wooden pen.

Furthermore, even amongst those Sak te Bo and Andaing residents who occupy rented rooms in the area, proximity to home is viewed as a both a practical and emotional advantage, with many workers returning home on a weekly basis to see their families ‘from Saturday night to Sunday afternoon’ (Focus Group, 21/06/13). Furthermore, as highlighted by one such worker from the Krang Youv study site, who had left a well paid job in Thailand in order to work closer to her family, such advantages are prized highly enough to induce movement in pursuit of them:
‘After a year and a half I felt like I had to return as I missed my parents and family too much. Once I got back, I decided to work in Andaing...[where]...I receive only a medium wage, but live close to my brother and sister and can visit my parents on weekends or on holidays’ (Heng, 30/07/13).

In contrast to many of these workers, then, migrants to Phnom Penh experience a far greater physical detachment from their households, both receiving and undertaking fewer familial visits and often returning home only for the major national festivals of Pchum Ben [ancestors’ day] and Khmer New Year. Nevertheless, as the following section will explore, such circumstances do nothing to weaken the bonds between household and migrant. Whether undertaking skilled labour near the centre of the city, or unskilled construction work at its periphery, migrants remain fundamentally attuned to the needs of their household.

As highlighted in chapter five, risk, opportunity, and constraint are not experienced directly, but via the prism of familial livelihoods, rooting the hierarchies and dichotomies of urban labour firmly in the rural. In order to elucidate these differences, what follows shall initially re-focus the investigation of migrant livelihoods upon the upper and lower boundaries of income, freedom, and opportunity, all of which are visible within Phnom Penh. Thereafter, in accordance with research question three of this Ph.D.’s concern with the rural-urban transmission of inequality, the sample will be broadened to include all interviewed migrants. In the light of the qualitative evidence presented below, this will facilitate an additional statistical examination of the mechanisms which link urban conditions to rural wealth.
Home to over two million of Cambodia’s fifteen million inhabitants, Phnom Penh in the twenty first century is too large and too diverse to be considered a single destination. Even those rural farmers who have never and likely will never visit their nation’s capital tend to avoid the blanket claim that their sons and daughters are working in Phnom Penh in favour of a more specific answer: Boeung Trabek lake, Orrussey market, or the informal industrial suburb of Cham Jao are viewed, in many ways quite rightly, as having little to do with one another, other than their status as temporary homes to Krang Youv’s sons and daughters.

Nevertheless, it was not ever thus. The current situation is not the product of an historical, sprawling primacy, but of an untrammelled economic boom which has transformed a city described in 1998 as a member of those “fourth world” stragglers characterised by complete ‘structural irrelevance’ to the global economy (Shatkin, 1998: 378), into the vanguard of Cambodia’s “development miracle” (Madhur, 2013: 1) only fifteen years later. Political stability, under the three decade prime ministerial incumbent Hun Sen, teamed with an economy structurally adjusted to be one of the most
open in Asia (TRAC, 2013) has seen hitherto unprecedented growth, built on a basis of foreign direct investment (Ibid.).

Skyscrapers, Western tourists, and luxury cars aside, one of the most notable companions of Cambodia’s economic growth has been an exponential boom in the price of land across the Kingdom, and in Phnom Penh in particular. As a result, many businesses, foreign and domestic alike, have been shifted further and further towards the periphery of the city, where they have come to take on a degree of self-containment, their employees rarely venturing far from their place of work.

As the urban outskirts which garment factories and construction sites choose as their homes move further and further from the city centre, many ‘poorer migrants tend to be found towards the margins of the city’ (Karen Schelzig, ADB, 15/08/13), within cloistered occupational enclaves. One such locale is the garment factory cluster in the Meanchay district of Phnom Penh, to which several of the rural study site’s inhabitants had migrated. Another, deserving of greater elucidation, is the Cham Jao construction community, past Phnom Penh’s Pochentong international airport along national road number four, and a little distance prior to the Extraordinary Chambers in Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), which have been the site of the ongoing Khmer Rouge tribunal.

Situated in the midst of an expansive industrial park built upon scrub land and surrounded by paddy fields, this site is the home of the largest concentration of migrants from Krang Youv commune encountered during the course of the study. Furthermore, rather than being scattered throughout a large company workforce, the migrants in question appear to have agglomerated to the point that they now constitute a single construction shift, a group of workers from the same area, working and living together in the city.

Unlike most migrant workers, this group of Cham Jao migrants do not have the luxury of rented rooms, living instead in self-constructed bamboo and palm thatch huts arranged in two neat rows to form an ad hoc village arrangement. For those who do not arrive as the guests of somebody with a hut already in place, the usual arrangement is to make do with ‘putting up a hammock strung between posts in the dining and showering area’ (Karp, 14/07/13) – a block of showers with an extended roof and a long bench at the entrance to the Krang Youv community. One such hammock dweller explained that ‘I don’t have a house like the others, just a hammock that I string up in the kitchen. I make food for myself and do everything for myself as I can’t move my things closer to the “houses”. They’re not strong enough to hang my hammock’ (Ret Sonraat, 31/07/13).
Under such exposed conditions, in spite of efforts to keep the community close and mutually watchful, the fear of crime – from within or without - is never far away, as exemplified by one of the residents’ assessment that:

‘The city is okay for me. It is dangerous though, if I go for a walk at night time, I feel in danger. One of the problems is robbers, but also I am afraid to get into bad ways with my friends, who might push me to take drugs. Near my rented rooms there used to be a lot of teenagers taking drugs a lot. People do this here because generally people follow each other, so if they have friends taking drugs they will become addicts themselves (Construction Worker, 14/08/13)

This statement, by a 19 year old construction worker, in many ways encapsulates the perils faced by young migrants in particular, many of whom are just as aware of the dangers of temptation as their elders. Furthermore, given the community orientated nature of the Cham Jao construction worker community, which comprises far more familial linkages and a greater variety of ages than the Sak te Bo factory community outlined above, that young people still fear a descent into dishonourable behaviour casts the critical comments made by the local residents of the latter community in an even more plausible light.

Nevertheless, despite their concerns regarding a descent into wasteful hedonism, the proportion of income expended by migrants to Cham Jao on leisure of any sort is, both self-reportedly and as triangulated via the remittances their households report, generally extremely small. Many of those interviewed claimed never to spend anything during their free time, other than on the necessities of survival. Those who did admit some expenditure in this regard did so on a notably small scale, rarely exceeding a ‘walk to the coffee shop at the market, about two or three times per week, spending about 1000 riel [$0.25] each time’ (Heng Hein, 31/07/13).

Elsewhere in Phnom Penh, though, the story is a different one. Those migrants who, through family or social connections and, on occasion, an upfront fee of between $200 and $300 dollars, are able to secure an informal apprenticeship with one of Cambodia’s lucrative skilled trades are set upon a vastly different path to their former schoolmates and peers either in Krang Youv or less desirable urban employments. One such route is the acquisition of construction specific skills, such as electrical work, painting, or plumbing, from another worker via a shadowing arrangement wherein the potential learner solicits agreement from the chieng [literally more/ better, but here denoting a specialist] with gifts of money or social invitations. Such opportunities are highly prized, with young construction workers often claiming that the ‘best thing about working here is the opportunity to follow skilled workers and learn a skill so that I can become one one day’ (Ret Sonraat, 31/07/13).
In addition, more formal arrangements may be found in relation to certain roadside business types, in particular those necessitating a degree of technological knowledge, such as the phone refurbishment and resale shops, and pirated mp3 music stalls which are popular throughout Phnom Penh, and particularly in migrant areas. Such businesses entail a degree of startup and running costs – ‘about $80 per month for mobile phones and other stock’ (Meas, 16/08/13), but can ultimately be the basis of a profitable livelihood. Amongst the wealthier strata of Krang Youv, however, it is work as a mechanic which constitutes perhaps the most desirable vocation amongst those who can afford to be trained for up to several years with an amenable garage owner.

Such garage based apprenticeships, encountered in two sites within Phnom Penh and another in the crossroad town of Prey Touic in Krang Youv, almost always entail an entry fee, even for those with strong, even familial connections to the owner. Those which do not tend to be found in less desirable locations, with fewer opportunities to practice during the day:

‘I paid $300 to be taught this skill. At the first shop [I worked at], I didn’t have to pay anything, as the owner was my cousin, but there were very few customers….I left that one because I wanted to learn how to fix motorbikes fast, under pressure…This one is close to a lot of other shops and near the market.’ (Mom Mom, 10/07/13).

Beyond the upfront expense which such arrangements entail, though, is the scale of the opportunity cost required by the student, who is rarely paid and generally lives in his place of work alongside the garage owner. During the minimum two years apprentices are expected to work either for free or for a nominal wage generally less than sufficient to buy food, they are permitted almost no freedom and generally work at least twelve hour days, ‘from six am to six pm or sometimes later, if there are many motorbikes to fix’ (Soret, 25/06/13).

Despite the daily duration of the work and a lengthy unremunerated period, though, this is a far different prospect from the factory and mainstream construction work discussed above, wherein, as one garment worker commented, ‘there is no future. If I work…for ten years, I just have ten more years ahead of me’ (Powim, 28/06/13). Indeed, arrangements of this sort are much sought after due to the scale of the rewards for those who achieve the requisite level of competence. Entry level mechanics earn between $150 and $200 per month, but after gaining greater experience and skills, become able to solicit business and deal with customers themselves, in doing so getting access to tips offered in exchange for swift service which increase the total wage to a mean $311 per month, with one informant reporting a $700 monthly income.

This level of income, alongside the perceived security offered by the acquisition of skills in the long term sets migrants of this type far apart from their unskilled and semi-skilled counterparts. In
contrast to the generalized frugality evidenced in most other occupations, the mechanics encountered during the course of the study appear ostentatious in their sociability and the scale of their consumption, as evidenced by the following testimonies:

‘When I come to Phnom Penh, I call my friends in Phnom Penh. When I return home, I call my friends at home. I go out with my friends at least every week or two. The cost depends on who invited who, so generally I pay for everything, totalling about $50 to $60 each time’ (Karp, car mechanic, 21/07/13)

‘Sometimes we go to the riverside or Ta Khmao [a riverside conurbation to the south of Phnom Penh], twice a week after work on various days. We visit friends there, drinking and eating something together. It costs about 10k riel [$2.50] per time. Our friends are girls, who work as garment workers’ (Mom Mom, 10/07/13)

When compared with the qualitative data proffered thus far in relation to other migrant occupations, it initially appears logical to conceive of garage workers such as these as operating upon a rarefied and elevated plane out of reach of the potential livelihoods of most of their fellow migrants. However, this is to misconstrue the situation in a way that Mom Mom’s words merely begin to hint at. Just as these young men regularly share food and drink with garment workers, so an analysis of their social networks reveals a significant occupational diversity, including students, factory workers and street vendors in addition to others from their own line of work.

As such, high earning migrants are not a discrete set within the city. Viewed in terms of basic, or total, wage the constituent members of both Karp and Mao’s social networks are notable by their heterogeneity. Nevertheless, homophily of a different sort is in evidence. As will be demonstrated in the following section, migrants appear not to structure their association so much by urban income, but by the specific social and economic endowments and liabilities of their rural households.

What follows shall seek to elucidate the mechanisms by which the characteristics of rural poverty and wealth are transferred to the urban environment via the same social linkages and practices which, as demonstrated in chapter five, those households utilise to mitigate their risk. In this regard, remittances are key. The vast majority of migrants remit, but the scale and frequency of remittances varies greatly depending upon the specific rural livelihoods endowments of the household. Furthermore, in accordance with the dynamic model of rural sociability also outlined in chapter five, this is not a unidirectional process, but a dynamic one wherein the household’s long and short-term remittance requirements in turn determine the ongoing character of migrants’ urban lives.
6.2 The Role of Rural Assets and Liabilities in the Migrant Experience

6.2.1 Remittances: An Overview

In spite of the heterogeneous nature of the Cambodian migration experiences described above, certain commonalities emerge from the data as being highly generalised characteristics of migrants. Chief amongst these is the propensity to remit, which, it is argued here, may have been underplayed within the literature in two interrelated ways. First, the scale of rural-urban remittance flows, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of income has yet to be fully appreciated; and second, the role played by remittances in reinforcing inequalities, rather than merely bolstering livelihoods, has been sparsely touched upon therein.

In attending to the first of these concerns, table 6.1 presents data on mean remittances disaggregated by occupation. Although the percentage varies, it is on average a large one, with migrants, taken as a whole remitting an average of 36% of their total monthly income (after overtime), a figure which includes the quarter of migrants in the study who do not remit to their parental household. Taking only those migrants who do remit, the figure is very close to half of gross income.

As demonstrated in table 6.1 then, certain types of migrant workers remit nearly half of their gross salaries after overtime, leaving them roughly $65, or $2 per day remaining for their own subsistence. Of this, workers generally report that each of their three meals costs an average 2000 riel ($0.50), with their rent – although this varies quite significantly due to the number of workers living in one room – amounting to a further ten to fifteen dollars per month on average, almost the entirety of what remains. Taking the mean figures alone, then, migrant workers appear to subsist at the limits of their income, with almost nothing in reserve in case of illness or other unforeseen expenses. Indeed, a lack of personal security resulting from such maximal remittances was a frequent refrain during interviews, as evidenced in the following testimony:

‘I don’t make enough to send money home [easily]. Every month I can send only $70 or $80, which isn’t enough for the people back home. It’s never enough because my parents have a
debts from paying for my mother’s hospital treatment. She had something wrong with her throat and needed an operation to take it out. [I know some people but] we only meet each other at the factory every day. I never go anywhere to eat or drink anything because I need to save money and don’t want to go anywhere I can spend it. (Virun, 13/08/13)

Virun’s testimony is emblematic of the second of the concerns to be addressed herein. As he clearly explains, the compulsion to remit a large proportion of his salary leaves him with no disposable income, thereby preventing him from integrating into the migrant community in a meaningful manner. Similarly, Chim, a garment worker from Boeung Thom Poon, Phnom Penh, explained that:

‘My father is already retired and so doesn’t rent any livestock any more. He has divided all of his land between his children and lives only on what they send him. [Now though], it is only me sending money because the others are either married with families or studying....As a result, I rarely go out because I have to look after three people – my father and two sisters [who are studying]. Generally I don’t go anywhere’ (Chim, 22/07/13).

Although such workers are physically present in the city, they remain conceptually annexed to their rural households. As such, their testimony – which are just two amongst a great many – contrasts markedly with that of some wealthier migrants, who expect not only a degree of freedom in the city, but also the opportunity to invest on their own behalf. As Karp, a car mechanic, outlined, his situation is one characterised by financial self determination, familial support and clear prospects for the future:

‘I never send money to my parents because they say there is no need. They have enough money. I am saving for two things: getting married and to open a shop of my own. This will cost about twenty thousand dollars and with my parents help with half the cost, I will be able to do it next year’ (Karp, car mechanic, 21/07/13)

Similarly, a female non-remitter commented that:

‘My family at home generally don’t need any money from me, because they have other children working too. They rarely ask for anything from me. I save the money I don’t spend and now have about two months salary. I’m going to use it to buy jewellery and when I get married I will use this money to make more money so that I don’t have to rely on my husband’ (Paor, garment worker, 01/08/13)

Both of these accounts highlight the ability the respective informants possess to save and invest their salaries. What is notable, though, is the difference in their urban occupations. Although the first of these informants is one of the highest earners in the sample, a car mechanic with a monthly salary exceeding $500 after “tips”, the second is a garment worker, earning a basic salary of $75 per month and only $115 after overtime. On this basis, the implication is that the wealthiest and most secure rural households are not necessarily able to gain access to the highest paid employment, an
impression borne out by the quantitative data, which demonstrate no correlation between rural household income and urban migrant income.

Nevertheless, though urban income may diverge, strong correlations are in evidence between urban livelihoods and lifestyles, and rural wealth. Despite many of them boasting no greater earning capacity than their counterparts from poorer rural households, migrants from wealthier families spend, as highlighted by the qualitative data above and below, significantly more on investment and savings, and considerably more on leisure whilst resident in the urban space. Though perhaps intuitive, this variance in economic behaviour has wider implications for the social structure of migrant communities, demonstrating as it does that migrants whose families depend less (or not at all) upon their remittances enjoy economic freedoms sufficient to mark them out as a financial elite in spite of the general parity of wages in some industries.

Such migrants are able to pursue a variety of investment strategies, most commonly either the purchase of ‘gold, especially jewellery and rings’ (Sok Mieng, 01/08/13) or short term money lending to other migrants, who are not able to subsist on their post-remittance salary until their subsequent pay check. However, it is in fact the apparently non-invested consumption spending on leisure which may be of greatest benefit to them in terms of bringing both occupational security and opportunity in the urban environment. ‘Small parties in rented rooms with drinks and food’ (Bun Chi, 21/05/13), ‘visits to the market about once a month to buy clothes, spending about thirty dollars each time’ (Sopi, 25/06/13), day trips to local leisure sites ‘whenever we have a holiday’ (Sopi, 25/06/13), and a variety of other social activities are a crucial means of building the social linkages which allow migrants to maximise their access to information and, by extension, urban opportunity.

Without such connections, migrants are forced to attempt to bridge these divides alone when their personal or rural household circumstances require a change in working practices, such as the need to work on a more flexible basis arising from parental illness, or lack of labour to attend to the family crop, or the birth of a child which can make it ‘difficult to work for [a factory]’ (Chraan, 21/07/13). As will be dealt with in detail below, although migrants are sometimes able to supersede these issues, doing so is likely to be more expensive, lengthy and difficult than for those who possess the requisite connections, as well as often resulting in poorer outcomes for the former.

This, though, is to depict only the broadest of linkages where in fact the character of connections between rural and urban Cambodia is a far more intricately structured affair. Migrants from richer households do not simply have a “better” migration experience en masse. Their advantages are not generalised but the result of a number of specific relationships between elements of the rural asset
base and urban behaviour. In accordance with the commitment, outlined in research questions two and three, to exploring the livelihoods impact of rural-urban linkages, what follows shall outline both the opportunities and constraints these networks offer.

6.2.2 Remittances, Debt, and Dependency: Linking Urban and Rural Livelihoods

Within the literature, various commentators on the relationship between migration and inequality (e.g. MacKenzie and Rappaport, 2007) have taken their cue from Kuznet’s (1955) classic “inverse u” theorem, wherein migration only initially increases inequality, ‘before subsequent migration lowers it’ (MacKenzie and Rappaport, 2007: 3). As such, Mackenzie and Rappaport’s (2007), as well as Massey et al.’s (1990) classic model is predicated upon the assumption that even though economic opportunities may fall initially to elites, the relatively free (compared with economic capital, for instance) movement of information in a community then instigates a widening of access thereafter.

As this process is viewed as essentially frictionless, however, no account is taken of what Wong and Salaff (1998: 362) describe as ‘the dark side of network capital’ wherein those afforded privileged access safeguard their advantage through sanctions and social conservatism. Whilst such behaviour may not result in a permanent entrenchment of access to migration amongst the elite, it does mean, as noted in chapter five, that information tends to be shared via the reciprocal arrangements of bounded groups, rather than flowing directionlessly through social networks. Viewed thus, an analysis of inequality and migration predicts an opposite long term outcome: a ‘u-shaped trajectory for inequality’ (Jones, 1998: 9).

Models such as this highlight the potential scale of the role played by remittances in entrenching rural economic and social inequalities. Nevertheless, Jones’s (1998) allusion to their potentially negative role is largely isolated within the literature, as a result both of the difficulties inherent in conducting research into migration which genuinely bridges the rural-urban divide (e.g. Paerregard, 1998), and the highly generalised positivistic treatment of remittances within the literature (e.g. Sophal, 2009; Jampakly and Kittisuksathi, 2009; Derks, 2008), wherein they are viewed almost universally as household assets (albeit ones which are sometimes not optimally utilised) rather than an obligation on the part of the migrants who send them. What is rarely noted is that households in many cases utilise them as a means to repay debts undertaken as a result of migration itself, or that migration occurs in response to pressing debts derived from health or climate shocks and thereafter serves little more than to keep up with interest payments. Those migrants who must service such debts lead vastly different lives to those who need not.
Indeed, there are few more distant pairings in Cambodia than the young mechanics described above, unburdened by remittances or debt, and an ailing domestic worker, beholden to rural debts, who ‘no longer [has] the strength to work in a garment factory’ and whose repeated requests for a pay rise from $60 per month are ‘always refused’ (Win Bun, 04/07/13). Furthermore, it is in fact unnecessary to cross the occupational divide in this way to encounter such difference. The young garment worker who ‘always go[es] out every weekend with her friends’ (Lin Da, 30/07/13) in order to shop for the latest trends, is a class apart from the one who, approaching middle age and with no end in sight, works seven days a week in order to send her aged mother and young children everything they will need for the coming month, leaving no option but to pass her few hours of leisure ‘staying alone in [her] rented room’ (Win Bun, 02/07/13).

Though in these latter two cases the salary may be the same, their distinction is categorical. The networks which link origin and destination are conveyors not merely of information, or even of money, but also of privilege and deprivation. In material terms, this process of de-leveling an ostensibly even financial playing field is a two way process. Inverse remittances in the form of rice, vegetables, fish, or meat constitute a significant improvement in migrants’ livelihoods, but these are not the privilege only of the wealthy. Sending primary produce to the city reduces the drain on a migrant’s income caused by their own subsistence needs, thereby freeing a greater proportion to be remitted. Aside from the poorest, landless migrants, such “care packages” are common practice across all wealth strata.

Thus, even setting aside the extreme cases of total rural dependence and independence highlighted above, migrants’ urban livelihoods remain intimately connected to the resources enjoyed by their sender households. Migrants whose families are unable to obtain the requisite income for smooth annual consumption possess significant claims on their wages before their own needs have even been considered. On an aggregate basis, this results in a significant negative correlation between total household income and the percentage of urban wages remitted so that, as demonstrated in Figure 6.3, proportional remittances co-vary with rural household income.

The findings presented in this figure (in conjunction with the lack of a statistical relationship between remittance size and household income type when controlling for rural income) suggests that, as regards the data gleaned from this study, the role played in determining the size of a remittance burden by the composition of a sender household’s livelihoods portfolio is ultimately subordinate to that household’s gross yearly earning capacity. Nevertheless, given the strong correlation between gross income and income type in rural areas, this does not signify the lack of a relationship: the poorest rural households in Krang Youv are predominately involved in fishing
related activities, whereas the richest – as will be outlined in greater detail below – tend towards large scale owner and rentier agriculture, meaning that a meaningful, if indirect, relationship exists between village level livelihoods and migrant remittance burdens.

Moreover, as highlighted by the case of Sok Tol (12/08/13) – a smallholding garment worker-farmer – there is more than merely a financial element to equation. Different livelihoods operate according to different patterns throughout the year, generating divergent pressures on the migrant workers who provide remittances. Remittances to small holding households may therefore reach an almost unmanageable peak at various times of the year, prompting both additional migrations and increased remittances. By contrast, migrants from households involved in commercial activities or land rental may structure their yearly remittances according to a smoother and more manageable remittance flow, but, as exemplified by Lay Sin’s testimony below, face the risk of years of high remittances in the event of a ‘failure in business (Lay Sin, 13/08/13).

Figure 6.3 Rural household income as a factor in percentage of salary remitted (own data)

As such, what distinguishes those who must endure migration from those for whom it constitutes an opportunity to flourish is the intangible, but nevertheless pivotal “baggage” they carry with them from the village in the form of the networks they possess, and the specific needs of their household. As will be outlined subsequently, the interrelated factors of household remittance dependency and the benefits afforded to those embedded within a large and varied social network, above and beyond location, occupation, or gender, are the primary determinants of the character of migration in Cambodia.

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With respect to the former of these constraints, household remittance dependency, the data indicate a clear correlation between the ratio of debt to yearly sender household income (hereafter termed the household debt burden) and the percentage of migrants’ total salary remitted (hereafter termed the migrant remittance burden). This suggests that those households which are forced to place themselves in compromising positions with respect to the acquisition of debt are likely also to require their migrant workers to endure impoverished working conditions in order to service not only debt repayments but also the household’s subsistence needs, as a local vendor to Cham Jao construction workers herself highlighted:

‘People come here due to very bad conditions in their home villages, especially related to debt. However, they often have to borrow money to come here in the first place, so after sending back repayments they often have nothing left at the end of the month, even to eat’ (14/08/13)

Households such as these are therefore the most likely to demand that the bulk of a migrant’s salary be remitted within a few days of the date of payment, leaving the migrant themselves a minimal sum, usually facilitating only the barest subsistence and incorporating almost no contingency for ill health or ‘for buying anything other than food’ (Am Sang, 31/07/13). Although this arrangement does allow for “inverse remittances”, usually in the form of money or food, to be returned to the sender in times of need, a combination of time delays and pressing rural financial need means that migrants who participate in this arrangement are often forced to resort to high rate borrowing from local moneylenders. Often, these lenders are migrants with smaller remittance burdens themselves, or ones such as Sopi, the daughter of one of the wealthiest farmers in the rural sample, who have been able to secure a job which effectively or actually increases their wage. As she herself explained:

‘I send home about $100 per month, but it’s no problem because I still have $30 to $50 per month to spend on things I need. I also lend some money to other people for interests. Usually $5 to $10 at 20% to people who run out of money at the end of the month. I am able to spend less than them because my factory provides three free meals a day for people in the auto machines section. It’s a good job because you can just watch the machines and watch everybody else working’ (Sopi, 25/06/13)

As such, the manner in which rural households ensure their continued ability to service high debt burdens in many cases serves to compound their financial liabilities, as migrants are forced to take on personal debt as an indirect means of repaying that owed by their household, usually at higher rates than those offered by the financial institutions which appear to have generally superseded private moneylenders in rural areas such as Krang Youv. Such a situation is clearly sub-optimal from either the household’s or the migrant’s point of view, but, as focus group discussions have highlighted, may result from a greater willingness on the part of microfinance institutions to lend
against migrant wages, and against garment workers’ wages in particular. As one such informant stated, although the absence of collateral is a barrier for some poorer potential borrowers:

‘If people have a family member in a garment factory, then they will take out a loan and use the remittances to pay it back every month. It is very easy to get a microfinance loan if you have a family member in a garment factory’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13)

Thus, the perception of migrant wages being secure and reliable sources of income appears to have survived the 2008 economic downturn. Resultantly, the easy accessibility of microfinance debt to families with migrants now constitutes a further pressure on migrant workers from poorer households. Furthermore, in addition to the strain placed on existing migrant workers, debt appears also to be one of the mechanisms by which poorer or more poorly connected households (as noted in chapter five these categories are neither co-variant nor mutually exclusive) are able to meet the opportunity cost of migration in the absence of the familial or social networks which underpin the majority of migration decisions. As Pan Mon explained, however, undertaking migration in the absence of such social safety nets runs the risk of ruinous consequences for the household if events do not transpire as intended:

‘Before people decide to migrate, they always borrow money from [the preeminent Cambodian bank] ACLEDA for the transportation and to get started. Sometimes this becomes a problem if they cannot find a job to repay. For example, one household had to sell their land because they couldn’t find work in the city and needed to repay their debt.’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13)

Whilst migration with so much at stake is often a last resort, it is not, in fact, exposure of rural livelihoods to the vagaries of migration and remittance payments which is the unusual factor here. In fact, a heavy reliance on remittances is very much the norm, to the extent that across all households surveyed in the rural study site containing at least one migrant, remittances accounted for just under 37% of total income, with several households, usually headed by elderly widows, relying entirely upon the receipt of urban wages for survival. Rather, what is unusual about the case raised by Pan Mon is not that the household was especially poor, or that it relied too heavily on potential urban earnings, but that unlike the vast majority of such ventures, their migration failed.

Indeed, given the logistical challenges faced by rural villagers and their children seeking to affect a move to a place they have likely never seen, in order to locate, secure, and perform a job they have usually never done, it emerges as potentially surprising that such a small proportion of such endeavours end in a failure to obtain employment. No such cases were identified during the course of the quantitative survey, with the data obtained being largely anecdotal and pertaining to the ‘one
or two’ (Focus Group, 08/08/13) households who had thus suffered. Almost all who attempted labour migration were therefore able to obtain a job of some description for a period at least.

This is not, of course, to suggest that the movement of labour is, as propounded implicitly by Neoclassical doctrine, a relatively straightforward affair involving supply, demand and little else. On the contrary, whether viewed in terms of an inability to service debt, the safety of the household members involved, or the need to mitigate ‘very bad conditions in the home village’ (Cham Jao Shopkeeper, 14/08/13), the consequences of a failed migration are simply too high to face unhedged. As a result, just as the migration process is intimately linked to household resources and debt, it is interwoven, too, with as many social resources as are available, in such a way as to maximise financial and physical protection against the perils of labour movement to environments viewed as ‘fast and loose’ (Karin Schelzig, ADB, 15/08/13) at best, and unambiguously ‘dangerous’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13) at worst.

As such, the manner in which migrants interact with each other in their urban environments, and the social networks they consequently create and reside in, appear to be determined to a large extent by their household specific profile of resources and risks. Furthermore, the data indicate that it is not only migrant behaviour which adapts to reflect the household, but also household behaviour which adapts in accordance with migrancy. This finding allows the model of dynamic pragmatism in social systems, outlined in chapter five, to be expanded to encompass both rural and urban areas concurrently. Ergo, in pursuit of evidence relating to research questions one and two of this Ph.D., what follows shall utilise a selection of statistical and graphical measures to elucidate the dynamic relation of these social systems to resources, risk, and rural inequality.

6.3 The Role of Networks: A Symbiotic System of Exchange

Labour migration is, all too often, viewed implicitly as something of an osmotic process. The balance of motivations, constraints, push factors and pull factors tends to be pored over at a variety of scales, but the physical logistics of moving from one place to another for work garners far less intimate attention. Thus, information flows, as a factor within economic equations, are sometimes mentioned, but sleeping arrangements, pastoral care and transport are, in general, much less so. Furthermore, though the arrangements for such quotidian requirements are undertaken via informal networks, they are not conducted on an ad hoc basis. Almost every move is meticulously planned in such a way as to test the limits of the social and familial networks in which the planning household resides.
In this respect, although cohabitation with a family member is strongly preferred, and lauded by those able to do so as freeing them from ‘having to worry about anything’ in the city (Srey Mom, 08/07/13), alternatives do exist, for instance in the form of high densities of migrants from the same village. The Cham Jao construction community, discussed above, is one such example, but even in the midst of much bigger and more centrally urban locales, migrants often comment upon the security they gain from small residential agglomerations of this type. As one garment worker, resident in Phnom Penh, explained, ‘I feel safe living here [on my own] because all of my neighbours in the rented rooms near me are from my home village’ (Poa, 11/07/13).

Nevertheless, with certain honourable exceptions (see e.g. Derks, 2008, Kuhn, 2003) the importance that migrants attach to these networks, the security they offer, or the complex socio-familial mechanics of labour movement are rarely considered, in part due to an under appreciation of the mechanisms through which the organisation of such matters takes place in the global south. Indeed, organisation in these matters takes place not at the level of ‘firms, governments, schools, and similar formal, hierarchical structures…[but at that]…of well-bounded clusters of social-relations’ (Tilly, 1997: 9). The household is one such cluster, but it is overlapped and interlinked with many others, from rural savings groups to urban colleagues, friends or roommates, which together come to form the highly structured and yet dynamic network within which migration is undertaken and persists.

As such, what follows aims to build upon the platform established above, which emphasises the role played by household asset profiles in determining the character of migration, by investigating the additional dimension of the social networks which influence and constrain the process of labour movement. In doing so, it will turn first to the analysis of the familial networks within and across which migration takes place, before moving to the investigation of social networks, comprising friends encountered either in the sender village or in the urban environment. Thus, in accordance with the commitment to explore the socially and ecologically embedded nature of migratory networks, delineated in research questions one and two of this Ph.D., this section shall be concerned with elucidating the role of (rural and urban) social assets in the nature and trajectory of the migration process.

In this regard, the following graphics (tables 6.2 and 6.3) demonstrate two things. First, that migrants rely upon a wide variety of people to facilitate labour movement and second, that if the data are aggregated into moves achieved via social and familial linkages, then the latter appear to be the more widely utilised of the two simplified typologies. Indeed, with familial help – not only from the nuclear but also the extended household so as to include uncles, aunts and cousins – being the
primary source of assistance in nearly fifty percent of all moves, a sturdy case may be made for viewing migratory information as a primarily familial resource.

Table 6.2 Assisters of Migration and their Prevalence (n=50) (own data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Source of Information and/or Assistance in Labour Movement</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncle/Aunt</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend from Home Village</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend Met in the City</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour in the City</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousin</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother/Sister</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Information</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Moved Location</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3 Simplified Typology of Migration Assistance (n=50) (own data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Source of Information and/or Assistance in Labour Movement (Simplified)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the qualitative data strongly support this conclusion, including as they do numerous examples of migrants whose households and extended families contain several migrants, using their family members’ assistance as a means to switch between places and occupations. Linkages of this sort appear to expedite the process of movement a great deal, as well as reducing the risk involved, to the extent that migrants are far freer to pursue alternative earning strategies according not only to their households’ but also their own needs and preferences. Additionally, as evidenced by the testimony of one such garment worker, generously endowed in terms of her familial network, such linkages even extend to facilitating international migration. As she explained:

‘When I worked in Prey Touic, I received only a low wage, so I decided to follow my sister to Thailand where I worked as a[n illegal] farmer, growing corn and other crops. There I received a much better wage, but after a year and a half I felt like I had to return as I missed my parents and family too much. Once I got back, I decided to work in Andaing…[where]…I receive only a medium wage, but live close to my brother and sister and can visit my parents on weekends or on holidays’ (Heng – 30/08/13)
Moreover, not only does the rural household appear to be an important facilitator of moves, but also a significant determinant upon the decision to move itself. This is evident in a number of ways, with migrants frequently citing changes in their rural households’ circumstances, especially serious illnesses, climate shocks, and failures in business, as prominent factors in their movements. For instance, as the garment worker daughter of an elderly widow related:

‘[I came here because] I have debts to pay for the medical treatment of my father, who has now died, as well as my mother, who is currently ill and also requires hospital treatment. In total, this amounts to about $60 per month in interest only debt repayments...Any extra money I make goes to the home village. For instance, after overtime I may make $200 this month, so I will send it all home’ (Rueng Win Si, 02/07/13).

Aside from medical treatment, failed ventures or investments undertaken by better off households are another common motivator of migration, as in the case of Lay Sin, whose family had previously owned three hectares of rice land but had to sell it. She attributed this to bad luck and a lack of business acumen on the part of her father. In her words:

‘We had to sell our land because my father failed in business. Previously he raised ducks, owning up to a thousand at one point, but they all got sick and died. When he started again, the same thing happened, so we had to sell our rice land. After the ducks [and with the remaining money from the land sale], we bought a large threshing machine for around $12,000, but it continually broke down and was expensive to repair. After a while we couldn’t afford to keep repairing it and had to sell it for a cheap price...Now we have a debt of $4000, so I came here to work and send money home’ (Lay Sin, 13/08/13).

In spite of the many and varied events which might influence the decision to migrate, however, a common theme is that the movements and activities of poorer migrants are far more closely determined by the household than their wealthier counterparts. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the shocks which promulgate migratory movement does not prevent such trends from becoming visible in the form of clear statistical correlations between the rate and incidence of movement between migrant occupations, remittance behaviour and household wealth.
Indeed, the data not only suggest a negative correlation between total rural household income and number of urban moves, as shown in Figure 6.4, but also between the rate of occupational movement and the percentage remitted by migrants, as highlighted below, in Figure 6.5. Taken together, these findings suggest, first, that migrants from wealthier households tend to move less than their poorer peers and second, that this is likely to be due to the reduced necessity to remit. Simply put, then, even lower paid work may be deemed sufficient if a migrant is able to keep their entire wage, whereas a heavy remittance burden is likely to result in a protracted search for higher wages and/or more flexible conditions in order to satisfy the needs of both individual and household, as one such garment worker explained:

‘I left the first factory to return home because I got sick. Then I heard about a nearby factory opening. However, that factory only opened for seven months each year. Because my family was having a difficult time [with her father’s illness] my mother asked me to change to a factory where I could work all year. [I did that but] a year later I had to follow my cousin to Sak te Bo to another factory because the last one only worked eight hours per day so my basic salary was only $50-$60 per month. I needed more money, so I had to come to Sak te Bo.’ (Soki, 09/08/13)

As such, just as Ming’s family, described above, were forced in large part by their lack of land to continue their involvement in illegal cross border migration, so too are migrants from differently endowed households subject also to similar constraints. Indeed, as noted earlier in relation to Sok Tol’s hybrid garment worker-farmer livelihood, ownership of a small plot may place even greater demands upon migrants and their households. Indeed, migrants from smallholder households often face dual pressures: on both their time and the level of their remittances, which relate directly to the needs of their household at a given time of year.
Nevertheless, as highlighted both within chapter five and the discussion of remittance behaviour above, the analysis of household resources in a purely economic manner fails to capture the social-structural linkages between familial and social, as well as rural and urban, in their entirety. Indeed, these connections, and the opportunities and obligations they bring, should not, as in social capital theory, be viewed as entities in and of themselves. Rather, they are the mediators of, and responses to, resources and risk. They emerge in response to the distribution of assets and liabilities in both rural and urban areas.

By way of example, the rate at which migrants move correlates significantly with the percentage of salary remitted to the household (Spearman’s = 0.359, p = 0.023). Moreover, it combines with household eigenvector centrality to produce a model with an R Square value of 0.496, demonstrating statistically that, as indicated by the qualitative data above, access to networks of information and the extent to which the sender household remains dependent upon the migrant’s urban wages are major factors in the migrant’s urban experience. In the light of the additional evidence alluded to above, and presented in detail in chapter five, a convincing perspective may therefore be found in the argument that, as with provas dei [labour sharing] and informal lending behaviour, network centrality is viewed as a means of mitigating the household’s exposure to the risks inherent in a dependency on modern sector remittances.
Table 6.4 Separate and Combined Effects of Factors Influencing Move Rate (own data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvector Centrality</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Remitted</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, given that, as shown in Table 6.4, above, over 70 percent of moves are predicated upon information or assistance mediated via informal networks, better access to rural social networks emerges as an effective means of obtaining superior knowledge regarding urban employment opportunities. In this way, just as rural households who have previously experienced a greater degree of crop loss demonstrate a tendency to engage in the sharing of labour and loans, so, in a similar manner, do those rural households which are more exposed to the modern sector in the sense that it provides a higher proportion of their income, seek to mitigate their risk via engaging in the sharing of information.

Of equal significance, this correlation may be found, in inverted form, in the urban sphere, where migrants from wealthier households tend to be more central to their urban networks, as evidenced by the correlation between their eigenvector scores and their sender household income shown in Figure 6.6, above. As highlighted in section 2, this is likely to be due to the reduced burden of remittance payments foisted upon richer migrants, who are therefore able to use their salaries to engage in a greater degree of social activity in the city.
Rather than merely improving the experience of migration, though, these social relationships serve a vital functional purpose. The linkages they create between individuals in possession of a relatively large amount of money, and relatively high levels of education and skills, are an invaluable resource in the transmission of opportunity and advantage, both for their constituent members and their families. Across networks such as these, apprenticeships are shared, money is invested, and vital information ‘about business’ (Jan Narun, 24/06/13), money, and the urban environment, circulated. Indeed, as the case of one such migrant demonstrates, the information they carry often serves to determine the long term trajectory of a migration:

‘I came here to study English and Chinese at Pannasastra [university] where I paid $60 for a three month course. When I was there, though, I met a friend and fellow student who told me about working as a phone renovator. He told me I could learn this skill at the Basae Market near Thom Poon lake. I paid $100 and initially I didn’t get any salary, but after three years I saved enough to open my own shop this year’ (Meas, 16/07/13).

From these data, then, a cohesive picture of rural-urban social relations begins to emerge whereby migrants from poorer households remit a higher proportion both of their own and their household income. In turn, in order to mitigate the risk of their greater exposure to the modern sector, rural households seek to cultivate more central network relations within their village. In contrast, migrants from wealthier households, whose families are less dependent upon their remittance payments tend to expend some of their additional income on developing more beneficial social networks in their urban environment, whilst their sender households are generally less central to village social networks.

Otherwise put, sender households associate (and thereby become central to networks) in order to mitigate their risk, whereas migrants themselves, given the chance, associate in order to cultivate opportunities for future gains, usually in terms of higher level employment opportunities. Although participation in either camp occurs in practice along a spectrum rather than in a binary sense, this nevertheless in many ways constitutes the fundamental migrant cleavage. Migrants and their households may therefore be divided into those for whom the urban space is a long term opportunity, requiring the setting down of roots and substantial (economic and social) investment, and the many and varied others for whom the duration and type of urban labour is dependent to a much greater degree upon the varying requirements of rural household livelihoods.

For these latter migrants, modern sector labour is an undertaking characterised by a lack of direction and often with no end in sight. Obliged by the needs of their household to ‘work every day without stopping’ (Powim, 28/06/13), such workers are vital to their family’s livelihoods security, but envisage ‘no future’ (Powim, 28/06/13) for themselves. Unlike their wealthier counterparts, they
have neither time nor money to integrate into the city, let alone take advantage of, or invest in the opportunities it offers to some. In this way, the inequalities of rural life are not mitigated, but magnified by the city, which offers a lucrative urban life to the secure, but grinds the vulnerable between the three great cogs of climate, debt, and exploitative labour.

6.4 Conclusion

The preceding chapter has sought to demonstrate that migration in Cambodia is a highly heterogeneous phenomenon, characterised not merely by “insiders and outsiders”, or “elites and non-elites”, but by myriad systematic responses to the challenges faced by household livelihoods. As such, the migrant experience has been shown to depend more upon the assets and liabilities possessed by the rural household than the employment in which migrant workers find themselves. Furthermore, just as it emerged as a major factor in the shaping of rural social and livelihoods structures in chapter five, risk has been highlighted as a key determinant in the migration process.

Thus, whilst wealth, and thereby the ability to “absorb” (Lipton, 1980) migratory difficulties is a major factor in the migration process, it is far from the only one. Risk may be conceptualised in a great many ways, of which wasted financial expenditures in the short term is only one. Added to this must be risks which manifest over a longer time horizon, such as a lack of agricultural labour during an extended migration, or the greater debt burden which often accompanies a household member’s acquisition of employment in the formal or semi-formal sector, thereby raising the stakes of job loss considerably, even if the loan in question is productively invested.

In this regard, the nature and outcomes of migration are strongly predicated upon not only the physical, but also the social resources possessed by both household and migrant. Poorer migrants move faster, with less (or no) help from less reliable sources, and hence take on considerably more risk. Wealthier migrants, by contrast, move more slowly, with assistance from more reliable sources and hence into jobs better suited to their own needs and wants, and those of their household. Even more notably, their reduced need to remit facilitates the building of new urban linkages which in turn further reduce risk, both for themselves, in terms of their ability to retain their current job or find a new one, and their household, which is able to allocate labour and capital in the knowledge that remittances will continue to be available if necessary.

Taken together, these discrete advantages amount to more than the sum of their parts. Far beyond an improvement in the urban livelihoods of the migrants thus endowed, or the ability to plan for more lucrative remittances, resulting from education or training, over a longer time frame, the superior apparatus with which better off households and their migrants utilise the city constitutes a
durable and persistent mechanism by which inequality is transmitted from the rural to the urban environment. Furthermore, in doing so, it serves the additional function of ensuring that the rural household is able to maximise its long term modern sector income, minimise its risk and thereby entrench the rural power base which remains the basis of its urban advantage.

Furthermore, beyond financial risks, there exists an additional dimension of social and cultural risks to migration. Migrants and their families alike worry about illegitimate pregnancy, drug and alcohol use, and crime. Although, unwanted pregnancy aside, the data here suggest that these dangers are more keenly perceived than their prevalence warrants, the lack of margin for error possessed by some migrants means that such factors must, nevertheless, be included in any analysis concerning the calculus undertaken by migrant households of the risks and rewards of migration. Indeed, taking into account these inherent “opportunity costs”, alongside the benefits and pitfalls derivable from migration across a variety of timeframes, a picture of migratory inequality has been constructed which is suitable for systematic analysis, above and beyond the blanket conceptions which characterise the debate concerning ‘trajectories’ of inequality (e.g. Williams, 2001; Kuznets, 1955).

As such, this chapter has sought to bring across two key findings concerning the nature of migratory linkages in Cambodia. First, it has demonstrated that the networks which facilitate migration constitute part of the same social system as the pragmatic networks of livelihoods production and risk mitigation detailed in chapter five. Second, it has highlighted the consequences of these linked rural-urban systems: network benefits in the village and the city work synergistically with higher levels of capital to produce long term advantage for rural elites and long term disadvantage for the rural poor. Such findings contribute to answering questions one and two, concerning the function and form of migratory networks and their relationship to rural assets and risk. However, question three – concerning feedbacks to culture and norms – has thus far been only partially addressed. What follows shall therefore investigate the socio-cultural impact of the systematic behaviour thus far explored.
Chapter Seven

Feedbacks: Risk Response and Inequality in the Production of Cultural Narratives

As long ago as the year 2001, barely five years after the first international garment factories had begun to transform the landscape of quiet riverside villages such as Sak te Bo, Caroline Hughes posed the question as to whether migration and modernity may be splitting Cambodia into a country of ‘insiders and outsiders’ (Hughes, 2001: 19). Her concern in this regard was a pertinent one, heralding the arrival of divisive inequalities of opportunity long before they became clearly apparent. However, though the question remains valid, its binary typology is not.

Rather than experiencing a simple bifurcation, Cambodia today is being carried upon multiple different trajectories simultaneously. The gap between richest and poorest is indeed widening rapidly, but it is between and beyond these economic extremes that the bulk of change is occurring. In the two decades since the Kingdom opened its doors to the world’s investors, the very meaning of labour, wealth, and even gender, have shifted: where once the rich were defined by their land ownership, now many rent vast swaths instead; where once foreign lands were the workplace only of the elite, they are now also a last resort for the poorest.

These changes have not, however, been swept in upon a tide of modernity but originate, in large part, from within the village itself. Indeed, as this Ph.D. has sought to demonstrate hitherto, those social groupings which arise, as shown in chapter five, from pragmatic calculations of assets and risks may, as detailed in chapter six, manifest in durable inequalities which extend to the city, rather than the obverse. What has yet to be addressed is how the norms which undergird these associative networks adapt in response to the new economic stimuli they are exposed to. Thus, in seeking to answer research question three of this Ph.D., which is concerned with feedbacks from migration to rural culture, this chapter shall explore the importance of norms and attitudes to the persistence and development of social structure in Krang Youv.

7.1 The Internal: Understanding the Rural-Urban Divide

As noted in chapter five and as demonstrated graphically in figure 5.2, the mean distance between respondents’ homes and their farmland differs substantially between the three research sites. Those residents of North Ampil who own rice land very rarely have more than a kilometre to travel to tend it. Those from South Ampil and Go often travel much further and many residents of Jake village habitually journey a further multiple of this when necessary. To appropriate Platteau’s (1991: 27) assessment of the great Scott-Popkin debate discussed in chapter two, ‘a technical reason alone’ is sufficient to explain this. A greater proportion of the inhabitants of the more southern villages are
able to afford vehicles, in particular motorbikes, which allow them easy access to further, more fertile, and higher land than they could conveniently access on foot.

This freedom to travel further goes beyond the merely technical, however. Indeed, as Bourdieu (1984) reveals, it is imbued with a deep symbolic significance. That wealthier villagers experience less stringent barriers to their movement and therefore have a greater knowledge of affairs beyond the village is a source not only of respect but of distinction. Furthermore, the value of this intangible asset has been historically increased by its scarcity. As matters long stood, only those few with political or economic business external to the village itself would possess such information. Today, under the conditions of mass labour migration in which Cambodia currently finds itself, not only the volume of travellers but also the distance travelled has increased with widely noted alacrity.

Nevertheless, as highlighted with reference to Wong and Salaff (1998) in chapter two, intangible, socially embedded assets such as these tend to adapt to protect their own value in times of change. Thus, although the means to cross great distances may be spread throughout the village relatively easily via the profusion of money and migratory information, it is far harder to expand the mental horizons of those who undertake these movements. The children of traditional elites are far likelier to have had contact with the outside world, either as a result of their parents’ economic or village-level political engagements, or due simply to their possession of motorized transport. Furthermore, they are implicitly aware that their margin for error is much greater than their poorer counterparts. A single misjudgement can less easily ruin a wealthy family.

For these elites, the city is a place not only of opportunity, but of exploration, wherein it is possible ‘to go to the riverside...visit friends and drink and eat something together’ (Soki, 09/08/13) or to hire a motodop for the ‘30km ride to Phnom Sa’aang on holidays’ (Sopi, 25/06/13). The rest, however, are to varying degrees bound not only by the financial commitments detailed in chapter six, but also by the psychological constraints of poverty. Their heads are almost invariably filled with concerns about the dangers of the city and their actions, conservative and generally directed towards an expedient return, reflect this.

For many, furthermore, it is neither theft nor violence that perturbs them, but the corrosive influence of urban society. Modernity, drugs and immorality are, many believe, the truly pressing concerns, to the extent that some parents forbid their children to have a mobile phone, forgoing the chance of communication for months on end in order that they ‘don’t get into bad ways and have boyfriends’ (Sin, 28/04/13), for example. Many migrants themselves echo their parents concerns,
expressing fear that ‘because some of my friends take drugs it will lead me to drugs too’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13).

This culture of fear by no means extends to all parties, but it is nevertheless sufficiently widespread to influence the character of migrant settlements. Migrants feel vulnerable and consequently desire protection from the wider city, rarely or never venturing far from the safety of their rented rooms. Furthermore, they feel most comfortable amongst people from their home province, around whom ‘everything is simple’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13), creating agglomerations of migrants from the same village, district or commune, such as that seen in the Cham Jao construction community described in Chapter Six. Under such circumstances, migrants essentially inhabit an annex of their rural homes.

However, despite the perceived danger associated with the urban environment and its inhabitants, the safety and security of migrant enclaves is arguably one of their more notable features. Only one respondent reported having been a victim of crime during their urban residence and even that incident, wherein ‘some people stole my whole salary’ (Pon Tin, 27/06/13) occurred almost ten years previously. Amongst all other cases, migrants made only occasional references to feelings of insecurity, stating for instance that ‘the city is okay for me. It’s dangerous though. If I go for a walk at night time I feel in danger’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13). Additionally, a former resident of Phnom Penh stated that:

‘Sak te Bo is better for me because it is more secure. When I worked in Phnom Penh, there were many gangsters always fighting near my rented room. They never hurt me or stole anything from me, though’ (Pon Tin, 27/06/13).

As such commentaries indicate, the general lack of crime against migrants is not due entirely to a lack of potential criminals. Rather, it is dealt with prophylactically via two key mechanisms: mutual vigilance and community amongst neighbours, and the physical and symbolic barriers imposed by rented room owners around their own domain. Of this pairing, the first refers to the culture of assistance which characterises some migrant enclaves. Their inhabitants frequently allude to the help and support they feel they receive from the co-residents of their own and nearby rooms, stating for instance that ‘when I’m feeling sick or not working for some reason, my neighbours visit me to ask about my situation and to look after me’ (Focus Group, 21/06/13).

As noted in chapter six, these networks of information and assistance are a key element of Cambodia’s migration systems, the elucidation of which is the goal of research aim one of this Ph.D. In seeking to more fully embed these networks within the socio-economy of the village, however, as called for in research aims two and three, the nature and structure of power in migrant communities is arguably even more significant. Within their confines, migrant power structures transposed
directly from the village, related to family and age for instance, intermingle with work related hierarchies, but it is non-migrants who hold meaningful authority, presiding over an implicit separation which moulds migrant attitudes to the city.

Indeed, the statement offered by an urban deputy village chief, that ‘rented room owners are the most important people in the community’ (Deputy Village Chief of Teuk Thla, cited in Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014: 12), rather than being merely a narrative of delegation refers instead to the genuinely patriarchal role played by many rented room owners. As one such owner described: ‘Some of the people in my rooms have been with me for sixteen years now...The parents [of others] ask me to look after them while they work here, so I speak to them and ask them not to spend too much of their salary [on themselves]’ (Rented Room Owner, 21/06/13).

Furthermore, in addition to the largely pastoral role undertaken by rented room owners, their domain is protected, also, on a physical level. Many blocks, generally excluding only a selection of the cheapest available, are gated and locked by the owner each evening, thereby creating a tangible boundary to the “territory” of the patron-like owner, as well as a durable constraint upon the behaviour of the inhabitants, who are sometimes afforded no means of unlocking these security measures by themselves.

The combination of this separation – both symbolic and actual – from the wider Phnom Penh population, with the strong sense of community which binds blocks of neighbours together at the micro-scale, results in low levels of crime amongst migrants, but it also enforces their separation and distinction from the wider urban community. Whilst in the city, they are protected, but they are also constrained and their experience of urban life, though rich, is foreshortened. Only the wealthiest few, as noted in chapter six, are able to engage with a life outside the confines of their enclave and their workplace. For the rest, who either ‘stay at home every day’ (Lay Sin, 13/08/13) or, at best, ‘just talk to each other, sometimes in one room, sometimes in another’ (Srey Chantup, 06/08/13) urban life rarely extends beyond the confines of a migrant enclave.

As such, in conversation with wealthier migrants in particular, it is essential to avoid conflating aspirations to urbanity with genuine urban integration. A case in point is that of three sisters, living and working amongst a concentration of migrants from Krang Youv, but originally from Kratie province in the central northeast of the country. All three run a hair and beauty shop near to the Orrusey market, in close proximity to a number of garment factories. Their clothes, hair, and makeup are modern, as, to an even greater extent, is their admission of ‘having only boyfriends, but no family’ in the city (Beautician, 02/07/13).
Nevertheless, despite the modernity of their appearance and habit, they are not urban. As one sister explained, ‘we like this business and don’t want to do anything else, so we can’t go home as there are very few customers for this sort of work. When we get older, though, we hope to go back as we don’t have a home in the city’ (Beautician, 02/07/13). Although an aspiration to return or retire to one’s place of birth need not by definition detract from one’s urban status, a lack of urban roots is – perhaps surprisingly for a country whose urban population contains only a tiny proportion born in cities prior to 1975 – of definitional importance here.

Indeed, one of the most common phrases used to refer to rural urban migrants by non-migrants is, alongside the more literal alternatives of neak jamnak srok [rural-urban migrant], or neak srok [country person], is neak srai [rice person] – a term also noted for its prevalence in the diverse migrant enclaves of Phnom Penh by Derks (2008). In spite of the proud historical connotations of Angkorean dominance and self-sufficiency, built upon paddy rice and referred to endlessly in the popular songs happily intoned by urban karaoke-goers, this term is laced with pejorative connotations. As a Phnom Penh native confirmed, to be a rice person in the city means a lack not only of wealth, but of refinement, so that a clear ‘difference’ may be ascertained between migrants who ‘talk all the time about useless things…or money’ and those genuine urbanites who ‘never talk like this’ (Cham Jao Shopkeeper, 21/06/13).

As alluded to above, migrants to the city are generally not so much poorly treated as ignored by their urban neighbours, who tend not to interact with them at all unless their business interests rely upon it. Even formal authority figures such as urban village chiefs have been noted (by Parsons, Lawreniuik and Pilgrim, 2014) as delegating all responsibility for the legions of migrants, who swell the population under their jurisdiction to many times its intended size, to the owners of the rented rooms who house them.

In large part, this segregation is based in spatial as much as social factors. Urban migrant enclaves, in Phnom Penh in particular, tend to be fairly well defined and are often located in newer or more peripheral areas of the city where fewer non-migrants live. Even relatively long standing and well developed migrant areas such as Teuk Thla, or Thnaout Chrum – discussed in the previous chapter as home to several Krang Youv migrants – though now well within the boundaries of the city, comprised largely farmland as recently as the eighties and early nineties. This makes the density of “native” urbanites in such areas much lower than might be expected, as well as blurring the lines of distinction between migrants and non-migrants yet further.
Nevertheless, this distinction is not by any means absolute. Streets are shared at the boundaries between migrant locales and the wider city and certain blocks may house students, interns, or young teachers, in addition to their migrant majority. In terms of shops and services, though, a notable divide appears to exist between those catering to the migrant and “local” populations. Some local shopkeepers or pharmacists, even those whose businesses are situated in close proximity to migrant enclaves, baulk at questions regarding migrants, professing to ‘not know anything’ about migrants because ‘they don’t come here at all’ (Pharmacist, 24/07/13). Given the location of these shops, often more or less opposite large blocks of migrants housing, the surprise affected by those questioned implies a desire not to be associated with migrants, unless necessary for business reasons.

For a proportion of urban shopkeepers, however, it is, nevertheless, commercially necessary to target a largely migrant clientele. Alongside rented room owners, these individuals – or more commonly households, as the majority of small customer facing businesses in Cambodia involve at least part of a nuclear household in their operation – are the main point of contact between migrant and non-migrant urban residents. As such, they constitute a valuable source of information and opinion on migrants and migration from an urban perspective, the character of which tends towards a degree of denigration, tempered by an understanding of the urban and rural circumstances faced by their customers.

Indeed, even those stallholders who gain up to ‘ninety percent of [their] custom’ from migrants, such as the builders’ merchant in Sak te Bo (Shopkeeper and rented room owner, 21/06/13) are wont to criticise their customers’ behaviour, complaining that ‘only about one in ten are good’ (Shopkeeper and rented room owner, 21/06/13). Similarly, a local shopkeeper in Cham Jao, whose business vends exclusively to migrant construction workers from Krang Youv, explained that they can sometimes be untrustworthy, but that this is generally due to their poverty, rather than their rurality of itself:

‘People come here because of very bad conditions in their home villages, especially related to debt. However, they often have to borrow money to come here in the first place, so after sending back [these extra] repayments they often have no money left at the end of the month, even to eat...Already [in the last three months] two people have cheated me by borrowing money and escaping. Nevertheless, there are a lot of migrants round here and they are generally okay’ (Cham Jao Shopkeeper, 14/08/13).

Nevertheless, the attitude of city people to the migrants who live amongst and beside them is infused with a cultural discourse which extends beyond a suspicion of poverty, desperation, or distrust. The deprivation of many migrant backgrounds is often associated with culturally disparaged
traits, such as gossip, greed, and an explicit concern with money, which are viewed as not directly related to their financial circumstances, but as indicative, also, of a poor character and upbringing which sets them apart from their urban neighbours:

‘The difference between Phnom Penh people and migrants is that migrant people talk a lot...behind each others’ backs. My family and I never speak like this’ (Cham Jao Shopkeeper, 14/08/13).

As such, non-migrants are often at pains to emphasize their distinction from the newcomers to the city. And yet, upon returning home, migrants are often described as behaving ‘differently’, or of ‘wearing different, more modern clothes’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13). Reports that migrants shun their former friends upon returning are not uncommon and they are often said to ‘act like city people’ (Sun Lim, 17/06/13) in their wealth, attire and manner. The contradiction, however, is that these “city people” are the same “rice people” who spend their periods of migration at an arms length from urban life per se. They exist in a middle ground, having seen something of the urban world without having truly been a part of it.

Thus, any tensions brought back to the villages by returning migrants are not enacted across a dividing line as clearly defined as, for instance, rural and urban, traditional and modern, or “inside and outside”. Rather, they reflect the cleft cultural environment straddled by migrant workers, whose fundamental rurality, though by no means subsumed, is nevertheless subtly altered both by their experiences and, to a much greater degree, the difference in their different perspectives within the structure of rural power relations.

Indeed, the changes taking place in rural society must not be viewed merely at a cultural level. Alterations to clothing and taste, though clearly visible and commented upon by respondents (e.g. Construction Worker, 14/08/13), are superficial in the sense that they are not the driver of change. Most villagers visiting their homes in Krang Youv do not return with an immediate feeling of superiority, or seek to distance themselves from those who have not yet, or will never, migrate. In fact, as the Krang Youv commune chief attested, returns are often characterised ostensibly by celebration, generosity and community:

‘Whenever the migrants come back, they always make a party for everybody in the village. They hire speakers and sing and dance together. I think that migrants are very close with the whole village’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13).

Furthermore:

‘I think that the poor also benefit [from migration]. When the migrants go to work and come back, they always give money to the poor families related to them. Also, when families have
problems, or somebody dies, they always give money for the ceremony and rice for the families’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13)

Behind each of the commune chief’s examples of the closeness and mutual assistance with which village life continues to operate, however, the spectre of power relations looms large. Within each anecdote of alms bestowed by migrants on those poorer than themselves, lies an implicit declaration of directionality, underpinned by the knowledge that such “kindnesses” invariably flow downwards within the village social structure.

However, this changing positionality is far more complex than the subsumption by migrants of non-migrants given that, as highlighted in chapter six, migration can just as well denote the deepening of poverty as the accumulation of wealth. This is especially true for international migration, whose peaks and troughs extend far above and below the best and worst in domestic migration. However, due to face saving efforts on the part of migrants and their families, this hierarchy is often poorly distinguished, casting even debt bonded labour in Thailand and Malaysia in the reflected light of migration to their richer, East Asian neighbours. The cultural implications of foreign work (and its alternatives) have, in this way, fed back in complex ways to the economic decisions made by migrants and their families, serving as new norms to underpin the distribution of household labour.

7.2 The External: The Wider Context of Migration

As noted above, household wealth is a question not merely of opportunity, but of outlook. Wealthier migrants in general have a wider sense of what (and where) is possible and a greater sense of personal freedom in response. Nevertheless, it is the intention of this chapter to proffer a conception of distance rooted more in place then space. Foreign and domestic agents now routinely visit Cambodia’s villages in search of labour, facilitating lengthy international journeys which may be highly lucrative for those who can afford to travel, or akin to incarceration for those who expenses must be offset against future wages.

Nevertheless, these two typologies of foreign labour are insufficiently distinguished in the minds of many potential migrants. The allure of the foreign is continually bolstered both by the visible gains made by better off international migrants, in the form of houses, motorbikes, cars and tractors; and by the proliferation of advertising campaigns quoting huge salaries for international work. For instance, one the best known offers Korean language training in Phnom Penh, followed by a guaranteed job in South Korea, reportedly paying “over $1000 per month” (Khmer International Radio, 09/08/13), upon completion of the three month programme. No elaboration is offered as regards the type of employment into which such courses might facilitate access, but given the
predominance of ‘agriculture, fishing and construction’ (Tunon and Rim, 2013: 6) as migrant employers in Korea, it seems likely that any employment provided would fall into this category.

The influence of such schemes has been felt keenly in Krang Youv, where villagers report that ‘now some people send their children to study Korean in Phnom Penh so that they are able to work in Korea’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13). For those able to do so, the rewards are significant and often ostentatious. As one villager related, ‘by now, some families have got rich as a result of having relatives in Korea. They can buy cars, or even trucks with that money’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).

Furthermore, for those able to afford the initial educational investment, ‘estimated to be around US$950 for the costs of a passport, air ticket, medical examination, pre-departure training, and administrative expenses, among others’ (Tunon and Rim, 2013: 6), there is a degree of ‘government help’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13) on offer. Although this assistance does not extend beyond expediting the process of acquiring documentation, it nevertheless contributes to a sense that international migration ‘is different’ from any other type of opportunity (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). The evidence on show in the village, together with the perception of ‘very high wages’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13) outside of Cambodia, induces many to undertake poorly understood risks to share in the reflected prestige and half imagined salaries of international work.

However, given the high entry costs and complex administration associated with securing work in countries, such as China and South Korea, that are viewed as very wealthy, their emergence into the consciousness of rural Cambodians, primarily via the media of television and music, has not resulted in mass emigration to those particular destinations. Instead, the prestige and mythology of wealth surrounding international migration has been transferred to more achievable targets, encouraging up to half a million Cambodians (Lim Siv Hong, Asia Foundation, personal correspondence, 19/05/14) to cross the border to Thailand and a smaller but nevertheless significant number making the longer journey to Malaysia.

In seeking to curb this trend, the government has sought increasingly to make legal alternatives – both international and domestic – available to potential migrants who might otherwise rely on the illegal services of informal middlemen. In some places, this strategy seems to have met a degree of success. However, the potential “choice” of taking the legal route is equally often discounted on the grounds of cost, with the completion of the correct paper work and authorised travel across the border costing up to ten times that of the cheaper and quicker illegal alternative, as a group of villagers explained:
‘International migration from here is possible both legally and illegally. It depends how much you want to pay. Legal migration [to Thailand] costs about $250, whereas illegal migration costs only about $25. To do it the illegal way you have to pay your own transport costs, though.’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).

Indeed, Khleang Rim’s (ILO, 09/08/13) assertion that ‘many migrants move through informal networks’ underplays the situation. It is generally accepted that ‘to migrate you must know somebody in the local area, like a friend or relative who knows about the local need for workers’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13), a prerequisite which underpins at least three quarters of all moves and close to one hundred percent of initial moves. As a result, it is not only cheaper but also ‘much quicker to go to Thailand illegally [rather than via the formal routes], especially if you have informal networks (Khleang Rim, ILO, 09/08/13). The RGC, however, is seeking to combat this:

‘Government policy is now to encourage people to return or to prevent them from moving outside the village by building small garment workshops within villages and communes. A lot of people have now returned to work here’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13).

These small, roadside buildings are vastly different from the monolithic, imposingly gated factories which characterise the landscape of garment work in Phnom Penh and Sak te Bo. They are single story constructions, often partly open in order to circulate the air, and their capacity is rarely more than a few dozen workers. Even within villages themselves, they are springing up in increasing numbers, changing the landscape of modern sector work and as highlighted also by Rigg (2002; 2012), blurring the boundaries between modern and traditional, rural and urban.

The incursion of the garment industry into the heart of rural Cambodia has not, however, had the impact perhaps anticipated by the officials seeking to curb the rising tide of migrants. The relative isolation of these rural industries increases transportation costs of both materials and finished products, as well as reducing the agglomeration economies which the factories of Sak te Bo or Phnom Penh, for instance, enjoy. As a result, the wages they pay are considerably lower than those on offer in more well developed centres of garment work, a disadvantage which serves to maintain the allure of longer distance labour movement for those able to take it up, as the Krang Youv commune chief explained:

‘[Government policy on labour migration] has not been so effective, however. If they open a small shop here [in the village] it is generally good only for an old woman who is too weak to go to Phnom Penh. If people have the strength and skills to migrate, then they will go to Phnom Penh for a higher salary as the wages here are comparatively low. A construction foreman can earn $250 per month there!’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13).

Thus, rather than keeping migrants who might otherwise have participated in cross-border or rural-urban migration in the villages, the arrival of manufacturing opportunities close to home appears, according to the commune chief, to have had the effect of expanding the demography of garment
work to include those too old, sick, or weak to undertake more lengthy migrations. Whether or not this was the intention of the policy, the picture he paints is unambiguously positive:

‘Nowadays, the poor people who can’t afford to go out to the city to work, work here in the local industries, so that nobody is unemployed any more. Even the old people who can’t go anywhere can bring some clothes to their homes and make money that way. I know a lady of about sixty who does that, making a little money in her free time’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13)

If the commune chief is to be believed, then, rural industry such as this has gone a long way to solving the centuries old problem of rural underemployment in Cambodia by creating opportunities for ‘free members of families to...go somewhere and earn money to help the household to farm’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). Even for landless families, such opportunities facilitate a far better living standard than would be available from subsistence on sporadic rural labour alone. Nevertheless, the extent to which Krang Youv’s rural garment industry is establishing itself as a meaningful economic alternative to its urban counterpart is called into question by the quantitative data, which yielded only two factory workers employed within their home commune, both of them women in their twenties, out of a total of seventy two rural households surveyed.

Furthermore, as what follows will seek to highlight, the recent influx of rural factories should not be viewed, as the commune chief appears to do, as simply an addition to the existent, largely traditional livelihoods base. Over fifteen years of labour migration, occurring in ever increasing numbers and becoming increasingly central to rural as well as urban areas, has shifted the balance of the rural economy. In response, new cultural attitudes have arisen which have altered the perception not only of migratory work, but also non-migratory labour and the absence of employment. Thus, in seeking to holistically explore the feedbacks of migration to rural livelihoods, as outlined in research question three, what follows shall focus on cultural attitudes towards rural non-migrants.

7.3 The Micro: Crime and Conflict in the Village

Given the ubiquity with which Cambodia’s rural areas are idealised, in the Western literature and Khmer cultural consciousness alike, as the bedrock of ‘a gentle land’ (Vickery, 1984), one of the more surprising complaints amongst residents of all three of the villages surveyed was the prevalence of, and nuisance created by rural “gangsters” in the community. As a number of residents noted, these young men are characterised primarily by violence amongst one another and theft from ordinary locals:

‘In this village, there are many gangsters who are always either fighting each other or gangsters from other villages. They fight each other all the time, not killing each other but often getting
injured. When there’s a party in the village they don’t come to it with the same purpose as everybody else, they only come to fight.’ (Focus Group 09/05/13).

In addition to violence, though, these young men – not organised criminal gangs as such, but more loosely defined groups of youths in their teens and early twenties engaged in anti-social and usually illegal behaviour – are prone to frequent and repeated theft of various items. In this regard, their favoured targets include pet dogs ‘to be sold in Phnom Penh’ (Focus Group, 09/05/13), motorbikes (Srawoon, 08/06/13; Yan Yin, 22/04/13) and fishing equipment (Net, 20/06/13) in particular, which ‘just go missing in the night’ (Yan Yin, 22/04/13).

As a small house-front vendor and fisherwoman indicated, certain “hotspots” of gangster activity can be identified in the local area, but the problem is endemic, having spread across all of the villages surveyed and beyond:

‘I know that most of the robbers come from the 500 village [poum pram roy – to the north east of Northern Ampil], where people regularly gamble and play cards. In that village there are a lot of gangsters. Not only do they steal our fishing nets, but they also go out to catch dogs, chickens and ducks every night.

However, it’s not only that village. There are also a few in our village too. Nowadays, there is a bit of gangster behaviour in every village. They are free, so they play cards, gamble, play pool and drink. They always cause conflicts.’ (Net, 20/06/13)

In light of the widespread prevalence of reports concerning gangster activity, it is difficult to dispute that they are at the very least perceived as a pervasive problem. Neither are they an invisible threat, removed from the community. The young men involved in such activity may be seen passing the time by playing games such as pool or cards during the day with tattoos of varying prominence on their bodies, and even necks in some cases.

Although tattoos are not uncommon in Cambodia, these designs differ markedly from the traditional markings which soldiers, in particular, have long used to ward off evil spirits and bad luck. In contrast to the densely structured pointillism of those Angkorean patterns, the more modern designs of the rebellious youth of Krang Youv district depict dragons and lions in a manner reminiscent of their East Asian counterparts. Furthermore, with the exception of the traditional designs, usually applied for spiritual or protective reasons, Cambodians are generally extremely hostile to marking the body in this way, making their application a considerable statement. As an urban informant summarised, ‘I know that many Westerners like tattoos, but if a Cambodian person gets them, everybody will hate him, really hate him.’ (Long, 19/06/13).

On this basis, it would perhaps be expected that the “gangsters” of 500 village and the surrounding areas were social outcasts, but this is not the case. Most of them reportedly remain living in their
parental households, and thus linked to the traditional resources and inequalities of the village. As a result, anti-social behaviour and rural livelihoods become intertwined both spatially and culturally, with gangsters becoming associated with certain places and activities. These, in turn, share in the denigration of the gangsters.

For instance, the 500 village, like North Ampil, which also reports high levels of theft and even intimidation (Net, 20/06/13), is poor and dominated by fishing. Both villages have a pool table, used for gambling, which is the focal point for young people to gather, and both display high levels of public drinking in the day time. Indeed, on any given day it is not uncommon to encounter several groups already drunk by midday or even earlier. For many in the poorer villages, this is daily behaviour, with the ready availability of cheap, locally produced palm wine, making it ‘just a hobby for them’ (Raksmey, 28/06/13).

Such conduct earns the fishing communities to the north of the commune a degree of infamy in the surrounding villages, where it is claimed that they ‘just drink and play cards all day’ and that they are lazy and disinterested in farming compared to more southern villages, such as Jake (Pan Mon, 28/05/13). Net (20/06/13), however, herself from North Ampil, offers a somewhat greater insight in stating that this behaviour derives not from laziness as such, but from ‘being free’ of work that needs to be done.

Net’s perspective holds more than a kernel of truth. Rice land holdings amongst the fishing communities are lower than elsewhere, commerce scarce and fishing is usually done only in the morning to avoid the intense heat of the day. People in these poorer areas, as a result, have more time to spend on leisure than their counterparts better endowed in terms of assets. As is so often the case, however, this lack of work is readily interpreted as a distaste for it, with cause and effect becoming inextricably intertwined in relation to poverty and anti-social behaviour. In this way, a recognition of the poverty of the area does not exonerate those with limited work from the character flaws traditionally associated with indolence:

‘These kind of people [gangsters] don’t migrate because they need to be free and they don’t want to live under other people’s pressure. They are difficult people. (Net, 20/06/13)

Furthermore, just as poverty of rural resources does not excuse inactivity on the part of the poor, nor either do limitations on extra-village work. Thus, as Net (20/06/13) sees it, the errant youths of the area are simultaneously unwilling and unable to seek work outside the village when none presents itself at home:
‘Also, most factories don’t want to hire men because men do demonstrations when people want to appeal for higher wages. Men are stronger personalities in demonstrations, so this is why the factories don’t want to hire them.’ (Net, 20/06/13)

In the current climate of widespread, opposition party driven, factory worker unrest (see e.g. Phnom Penh Post, 03/01/2014) this appears to be a plausible explanation. Whatever the underlying reason, though, it is clear that men are significantly disadvantaged in terms of their ability to obtain factory work compared with women, for whom there is an ‘increasing demand’ in the garment sector in particular (Tunon and Rim, 2013). Furthermore, the high proportion of total labour migration which is associated with garment work in Cambodia (Maltoni, 2010) means that the volume of work available to men is notably smaller than that for women.

With these non-migrants, especially those from poorer households, having little to do for much of the year and surrounded by unequal but increasing wealth, the emergence of male-dominated theft and extortion, noted also in relation to migration in the Indonesian context (Elmhirst, 2007) is in one sense unsurprising. Indeed, as Silvey (2001: 41) notes, such behaviour derives from dual cultural impulses: in the first place, a strong sense of shame at their ‘defeat’ in the realm of the modern sector work force and in the other, an undiminished sense of entitlement rooted in historical gender roles.

Nevertheless, the behaviour of those left behind, whether idle or illegal, contrasts sharply with the predominantly female (70%, see table 7.1) migrant cohort, to the extent that women and girls are departing from, or remoulding, their traditional social paradigm of domesticity (Brickell and Chant, 2010), to be seen as increasingly important breadwinners within the household. This is due not only to their perceived superiority in terms of remittance payments, but also indirectly, as a consequence of the tendency on the part of MFIs to agree loans to those with family members working in the factories (Focus Group, 03/06/13). The combination of these factors has come to promote a view, in some quarters, that ‘girls are the only ones who can really help the household’ (Poum Pith Lea Village Chief, Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014: 16).

Table 7.1 Data on Remittances by Gender (own data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Remitters</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Remittances per Month ($)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Remitted</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Monthly Wage ($)</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Pith Lea Village Chief’s claim is partly supported by the data, which indicate that (taking only those migrants who remit to their sender household) female migrants do indeed remit more on average than their male counterparts. Nevertheless, as indicated in table 7.1, the proportion remitted is almost exactly the same for both groups. This suggests that there is a degree of truth in the position of local microfinance institutions on the matter, but that it is underlain not by the widely perceived idea that young men are more likely to waste their money drinking and fighting (Shopkeeper and rented room owner, 21/06/13), but by lower wages (when viewed on a monthly or yearly, rather than daily basis) derivable from the migrant employments available to the majority of men.

Thanks to pressure from NGOs and the international community, garment workers are some of the few migrants with contracts and consequently some of the few with anything approaching job security. Their wages may not the highest on offer, but the near certainty of a monthly pay check reduces the risk associated with remittance and investment. The work may be ‘exhausting’ (Virun, 13/08/13), but the returns are at least reliable.

As such, the narrative of female superiority in buttressing the household economy is not without foundation. However, the gendered stereotypes of feminine frugality, enshrined in the traditional Khmer doctrinal code for women, the chbap srey [woman’s law], and masculine drunkenness and fighting reported by various informants (e.g. Pon Tin, 27/06/13; Shopkeeper and rented room owner, 21/06/13) appear to be less important factors in this respect than the pragmatic reality that the steady income offered by factory work is more readily available to women.

That the general feeling reported by migrants upon their return of being ‘more respected now’ and ‘having more of a say in the household’ (Lin Da, 20/07/13) is therefore also distributed in favour of women, may appear at first as something of a boon for rural gender relations. However, as Karin Schelzig highlights, it manifests also in long term disadvantage:

‘School enrolment rates are equal between genders, but drop out rates are far higher for girls. Anecdotally, people say they are going to the factories to work. These jobs are seen as much more valuable in the medium term than education.’ (Karin Schelzig, ADB, 15/08/13).

What those statistics demonstrate is that economic opportunities are mediated via a variety of cultural perceptions, so that, ultimately, labour is not a neutral but a gendered process’ (Piper, 2004: 217). Rightly or wrongly, the perception of men as liable to incite unrest disbars most of them from entry to certain relatively lucrative employments. As a result, their reduced ability to remit compared to women invokes some positive cultural paradigms, i.e. “dutiful daughters” (Derks, 2008) and other negative ones, for instance of men being ‘lazy’ and ‘uncaring’ (Srawoon, 08/06/13).
In this way, as demonstrated above by Net’s account of gangsters and their motivations, economic conditions and cultural narratives become intertwined. As ever, though, wealth, and land in particular, remains at the centre of the picture. Thus, in accordance with the core aim of this Ph.D. – which runs through all three research questions – to elucidate the dynamic relationship between ecology, economy and society in the migration process, what follows will make use of the insights on the production of culture gleaned throughout this chapter in order to demonstrate how even in this new and varied economic milieu, the ancient economic and cultural predominance of rice continues to underscore structured inequality in Krang Youv.

7.4 The Macro: Economic and Cultural Aspects of Social Change

As the villagers of Jake highlighted during an extended focus group discussion, the wealth which migration has brought to the villages is partly misleading in its appearance. Since migration, as a viable and widespread livelihoods strategy, began to take hold in earnest in Krang Youv commune, large houses have appeared, high value machinery purchased, and symbols of wealth and urbanity such as private toilets constructed (Commune Chief, 15/08/13). The temptation is to view these developments as having been swept in from the city on a tide of modern sector remittances, but whilst this is true in part, it nevertheless misses the core reality of Cambodia’s rural development: that those ‘houses were built with money earned from rice’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).

As such, the conspicuous consumption which has changed the face of villages like Jake is not, at its heart, the product of successful migrations, but large and successful harvests collected from the same acres of high yield, low-risk land which has traditionally defined Cambodia’s rural rich. What has changed is that migration now provides funds for investment in additional farming inputs such as better seeds, greater mechanisation and, increasingly commonly, land hire from wealthy individuals unable, or unwilling, to arrange the necessary labour and machinery to work the fields themselves. As one such rental-farmer explained:

‘I have two plots of my own land, 0.5 hectares of low and 0.3 hectares of high land. Now though, I also hire 15 hectares of land to do rice farming. We have been doing it for three years already and plan to continue...We do it twice a year and it costs about $8-9000 for fertiliser, gasoline and weed killers. We rent it from a neighbour who has a lot of land: nearly 100 hectares in one place’ (Win Si, 20/05/13)

As Win Si’s account demonstrates, the investment cost of hiring land on this scale is sizable, available only to those with a significant amount of rice land to use as collateral, but the returns are even greater. For his family’s investment and labours, Win Si has thus far been rewarded with 1800 75kg sacks of rice each year in which he has undertaken this endeavour. Sold in this volume, he is forced to accept a discounted price from the usual 1000 riel [0.25 cents] per kilogram, but even at 750 riel
[19 cents] per kilo his annual income from farming exceeds $25,000, leaving a profit margin of over $16,000.

Given that the gross income from his own farm land amounts to less than $1000, it becomes apparent that the scale of the profit available to those who invest in this way dwarfs almost any other available avenue. Income from fishing (including fish used for household consumption) generates an average of $1592 per household per year and the majority of migrant occupations cannot provide a great deal more. Garment workers, for instance, make an average of $1500 per year after over time, of which roughly 49% is remitted to the rural household. Other occupations (with a mean of 36% remitted for all occupations excluding garment work) tend to send back less.

The scale of return from Win Si’s investment is not due only to his nous, however. His ability to undertake such lucrative activities is based partly on his ownership of a reasonably sized [0.8Ha] plot of rice land, diversified between low and high land, but perhaps to an even greater extent on his membership of networks in which others are doing so. As he notes, ‘I am close to so many people in the village, but especially the friends who farm rice near to me. We help each other with fertilising and lend pumps and ploughs’ (Win Si, 20/05/13). Viewed thus, it seems little coincidence that all of the close friends he mentions hire land as he does, in addition to farming their own plots.
Furthermore, in the light of the persistent and vital role of rice land amongst the wealthier strata of Krang Youv, it comes as no surprise that recent years have seen an increasing rate of transfer and consolidation of land in the hands of fewer large scale farmers, as demonstrated in Figure 7.1, which shows the number of land purchases reported per year by the survey population. In addition to highlighting a general increase in the volume of land transferred over time, the figure also displays peaks during some of the worst natural disasters of recent years, 1993, 2005, and 2011, reinforcing the linkage between climate shocks and land sale ‘because of crop failure’ (Soravanna, 18/04/13) which is also apparent in the qualitative data.

Nevertheless, the relationship between land sale and the environment is a complex one. Transactions are often undertaken between family members, sometimes in response to personal requests, with the price of land varying enormously depending on the relationship between buyer and seller. It is particularly common, for instance, for land to be transferred between family members, one of whom has either grown too old to farm their own land, or has encountered financial difficulties. Under these circumstances, the land in question is generally sold at a discounted, or even nominal, rate.

This transfer type has been described on numerous occasions by informants, in conversation with whom it emerges that intra-familial purchases are often couched in the language of favour and entreaty. Net Yuan, for example, a petty trader and fisherwoman in North Ampil related how when
she had no land on which to build a house nearly thirty years ago, her sister had ‘sold me 0.3 hectares for only fifty riel [just over one cent in today’s money] which was such a low price it was really a gift’ (Net Yuan, 20/06/13). Not long afterwards, she was involved in another familial land transaction: ‘I used to have 0.25 hectares of rice land but had to sell it to my other sister [to pay for medical treatment] 19 years ago when my son got malaria and had stomach problems for a long time after. This time I sold it for 900,000 riel [$225’].

Arrangements such as Net Yuan’s inward and outward land transfers are a common aspect of village life, being frequently utilised by poorer members of extended families including one or more better off members either to provide assistance or to ensure a decent price for the goods on sale. However, favourable engagements of this sort are by no means limited to those who most need them. For instance, the following account was given by the wife of one of the largest landowners in the village, whose new two story house, amongst the most sizeable and luxurious in the village system, has recently been completed:

‘I inherited over one hectare from my parents. A little bit of high land and the rest low land, but three years ago, I bought another five hectares from my cousin, who sold it because he felt was getting too old to farm. It cost 3 million riel [$750] for all five hectares. I didn’t have to borrow from a microfinance organisation, just 1 million riel [$250] from my parents and the rest I raised from selling pigs and rice, and from my savings’ (Net Mom, 28/06/13).

In both of these cases, although the deal agreed upon was somewhat more favourable to one of the two parties, it was undertaken with the full assent and approval of the other. As a result, Net Yuan has been able to avoid large amounts of debt other than what she requires for the maintenance of her petty trading business and enjoys a livelihood of reasonable quality and stability in spite of her lack of paddy land. Where such transactions must be undertaken via non-familial means, the outcomes are rarely as equitable. Few people sell land to non-family except in times of dire need and this is well known by potential buyers, who are able to buy at well below market value as a result. Pan Yuen, who ‘sold all of my land in 2009 due to my husband’s, as well as my parents’ illness’ (Pan Yuen, 28/04/13) is one such example, as is Sruen, who described her situation in greater detail:

‘When my husband first got stomach cancer, we went to a hospital in Phnom Penh. We only had $150 though and the doctor said that scans and monitoring would cost more. We asked him to reduce the price, but he refused so we returned to the village. When the disease worsened, we sold 0.2 hectares [out of a total of 0.3 Ha] and went to Vietnam and Kampong Cham for treatment. By that time it was too late, though’ (Sruen, 29/04/13).

As Sruen was forced to sell outside the family, the price she received was relatively low and what money she raised was expended long before her husband’s death. Her loss, though, was the gain of one of those landowners who either by luck, judgement, or a combination of the two, have money
available to purchase discounted land when the opportunity arises. Although family illness is a frequent cause of sales, consecutive years of crop failure often produce the same result. As Soravanna (28/04/13), the current owner of six hectares, explained: 'I inherited two hectares, but bought four more between 1986 and 2003. It came from four or five villagers whose crops had failed for two or three years in a row'.

Natural and somatic shocks are not, however, the only motivations for land sale in Krang Youv. As alternatives to paddy farming become available, those farmers whose land is inconveniently spread or carries a low yield appear increasingly to be selling to those seeking to acquire it. Krang Youv’s largest landowner, Pan Mon (28/05/13), for instance, claims to have accumulated the entirety of his 35 hectares in this way, ‘from thirty or forty people whose land was too spread out to be convenient for them’. Similarly, a second farmer purchased 3 hectares in 1995 ‘from two different villagers, who sold their fields because they were too far away from their houses (Pan Nol, 09/05/13). Yet others stated that the previous owners of their land ‘had decided to move away from farming’ (Ban Korn, 23/04/13), or ‘to find work outside of the village instead’ (Moon Heng, 07/05/13).

As such, the natural ebb and flow of land sale resulting from health and climate shocks appears, in recent years, to have been catalysed by the additional factor of alternative income sources. The increasing instability of the environment in which paddy cultivation takes place, highlighted in chapter five, which induces even the largest farmers to admit that ‘with rice farming, sometimes you win and sometimes you lose these days’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13), makes it increasingly unattractive to smallholders in comparison with the extra-village income streams provided by migrant labour or petty trade.

Furthermore, the case of Pan Mon, in particular, demonstrates that with a concerted effort, opportunistic land acquisitions such as these, undertaken over a sustained period, can lead to an exponential expansion as the cash reserves generated by previous purchases are used to fund future acquisitions. As landholdings expand, investments in yield improvement become possible. Farmers well endowed with land may purchase hand tractors or harvesters, or involve themselves in networks ‘where we always share each others machines’ (Win Si, 20/05/13).

On an even larger scale, at the time of interview, Pan Mon had recently finished the construction of an irrigation channel running several kilometres from north to south, and to the west of the three study sites. In addition to serving his own land, other nearby farmers are each charged a fee which when combined are sufficient to cover the running costs of the entire channel in terms of maintenance and electricity. Nevertheless, in spite of the advantages conveyed to the owners of
these increasingly concentrated land resources, one production factor, labour, is reportedly becoming increasingly scarce.

Indeed, although the purchase of labour saving machines such as tractors and harvesters hugely reduces the need for hired labour, the small and fragmented paddy fields from which large land portfolios are composed, usually bordered according to their original ownership by banks of mud constructed to retain water, are not in all cases suitable for mechanised farming practices. In such cases, the traditional methods of hand picking, planting, and transplanting must be used. However, finding workers to do so is increasingly difficult.

Although the fields of Krang Youv have been tended for centuries by human hands, the same modernising forces which facilitate their mass acquisition are also at play in reducing the stock of those available to tend them. As the Commune Chief (15/08/13) explained, the pioneers of migration were those wealthy enough to afford labour saving devices:

‘People first started to migrate when they started to get two-wheeled [hand] tractors because it allowed them to replace their labour. It meant they didn’t need people to help with transplanting and planting and harvesting’ (Commune Chief, 15/08/13).

Decades later, the pressure placed on smallholders and the landless by a lack of rural wage labour has proved a factor in the volume of migration expanding to the point that even the limited supply required by larger landholders is no longer available.

Beyond the economic shift that this entails, attitudes towards agricultural wage labour appear to have transcended its scarcity, manifesting in a burgeoning cultural perception that it is a lowly undertaking. Certainly, the relative ‘comfort’ and ‘coolness’ (Lin Da, 30/07/13; Srey Dara, 08/05/13) of migrant labour compared with that undertaken in the fields is cited often as a point in its favour, but the superiority of wages that can be earned inside is underpinned, by deeper cultural mores. As noted by Derks (2008), garment work in particular has a resonance related to the protracted ceremony of “going into the shade”, wherein engaged girls spend six months of daytimes indoors prior to their wedding in order to lighten their skin.

Even migrant work undertaken largely outdoors is associated with an inherent social superiority. Motorcycle taxi drivers in particular, but also those construction workers whose labour is sufficiently light (such as foremen), very commonly grow the nail of their little finger to an ostentatious length of one or two centimetres. This, they say, is to ‘show that I don’t work in the fields’ (Vishal, 20/07/13) and have therefore graduated to a level above those that do. It may be taken either as a cultural irony, or a socioeconomic backlash, that due to the very high proportion of migrants – over 80% (Parsons, Lawreniuk and Pilgrim, 2014) – who contribute agricultural labour to their households
during key periods, those who maintain such a feature on a year round basis are likely to be from landless households.

On the rural side, that agricultural wage labour is undertaken in relatively small numbers and then only by the poorest villagers is supported by the data, with the survey having encountered only a handful of respondents who cite it as an element in their portfolio of incomes. Of these, all were considerably older than usual migrant age and the overwhelming majority were female, suggesting that involvement in hired farm work is an option amenable only to those unable to take on extra-village alternatives.

Indeed, larger landowners report an increasing unwillingness to undertake rural wage labour ‘because people are embarrassed to be seen working for others in the village’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13). As a result, Pan Mon in particular complains that he has had to raise the wages he pays for wage labour to unprecedented levels and still cannot fill his quota of labourers on a regular basis:

‘I myself need a lot of workers to do a large farm. I pay $7 per day plus three meals per day, but still many people don’t want to work for me because they are shy and ashamed to work for someone else in the same village, so they go elsewhere. It is very difficult to find enough workers here. It is difficult even to find workers for mouse catching. Even though the extra ten kg of rats would fetch 25k riel [on top of the daily wage he pays] and requires only that a trap be set, making the [total] over $10 per day, they still don’t want to try’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13).

Whether this is a phenomenon unique to Jake village is, however, not entirely clear, and given that the rates of rural wage labour uptake are considerably higher towards the poorer north of the commune, it seems likely that this reticence is related at least in part to the wealth of a given community. What is more widespread, however, is the increasing tension between rich and poor, in a war of words which appears increasingly to be dividing rural communities. With increasing frequency, from the north to the south of the commune, the poor are derided for their indolence by the rich in this village, who argue that ‘there are many things you can do to earn money: collecting firewood, or fish, helping with farming, but people don’t want to because they are lazy’ (Pan Mon, 28/05/13).

In response, those on the receiving end of this elite denigration shoot back, albeit in private or in whispers, with equal venom. One such respondent, himself a migrant to a garment factory in Sak te Bo, but crucially lacking a sizeable enough income from rice land or other sources for that pay check to facilitate even a secure rural livelihood, let alone investment, vented his frustration at the divisions he perceived in village society:
‘Now the relationship between the rich and the poor is getting further and further apart. Now the rich act as if they are bosses, ordering the poor about. Also, there is no negotiating with them. If the rich say 15k [US$3.75], then the price is 15k.’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13)

As he continued:

‘Rich people go outside the village to migrate just the same as poor people, but still there is something different. Rich people always migrate together with other rich people, whereas poor people just go with other poor people. Then, when they come back, they still stay separate.’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13)

In broad terms, Sok Tol’s sentiments echo those of a construction worker in Cham Jao, who asserted that ‘generally the children of rich people just leave the village to study whereas the poor people go to work. Also, rich people tend to open their own businesses, such as shops selling all kinds of things in the village’ (Construction Worker Interview 14/08/13). Most importantly, though, both highlight the manner in which subtle rural inequalities not only result in benefits for, or detriments to, migrants in the city, but how those advantages in turn entrench the rural social and economic differentials which gave rise to them. As a result, much like the divergent trajectories of labour migration described in chapter six, the ever present inequalities of assets in Cambodian rural life are being ‘stretched’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13) by the inequalities of opportunity which emerge from them.

Viewed thus, the issue of debt emerges in an even starker light, accelerating the upwards trajectory of those who already have possession of a secure livelihood and hastening the downwards spiral into dependency of those who do not. Indeed, of all the changes and developments shifting the social landscape of Krang Youv in the 21st century, it is the differentiation in the usage of debt within the community which is most widely and readily remarked upon. Like the houses, roads and cars which modernity has brought, these divergent paths are clear for all to see:

‘Microfinance is not good for the village. People replace private debt with microfinance debt, but if they don’t have someone in the garment factories and they might lose their land. [As a result] there are very few people who do well from microfinance. Only the rich are able to take out a loan to expand a business. The poorer people just borrow from Microfinance institutions to expand their house and so on.’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13).

Such comments, like those of the Ampil village chief, who noted that debt was ‘the biggest problem in the village’ and ultimately ‘make the poorest poorer and poorer’ (Truen Ngum, 29/04/13), demonstrate a strong local appreciation of the different uses and outcomes of debt, and the downside of its usage by those who can ill afford to borrow. Above and beyond this appreciation, though, the above comments emphasize the holistic manner in which the various modern influences in the village are conceived, with consumption, debt, farming, and migration all viewed as interlinked.
As such, each element in the rural livelihoods portfolio leads into and out from another. A general awareness within the village that the usage of debt – and the ability to gain from it – depends upon landholdings and assets is complemented by a systematic conception of the relationship between borrowing and migration. As they see it, migration may be either the subordinate or dominant factor in the hierarchy of needs, opportunities and change:

‘If a family is badly affected by debt, then they will find a member to migrate and work off the debt. When it is paid off they will come back, as it is very hard work. Nevertheless, if people have a family member in a garment factory, then they will take out a loan and use the remittances to pay it back every month. It is very easy to get a microfinance loan if you have a family member in a factory’ (Focus Group, 03/06/13)

As highlighted, furthermore, by the argument that it is ‘money from rice’ that builds the new houses and buys the cars that are the icons of modernity in Krang Youv (Focus Group, 03/06/13), it is clear that villagers in all three of the study sites recognise the undergirding role of traditional rural assets and risk in determining the trajectories of change upon which households find themselves. Land and environmental risk, rather than being marginalised in the village economy remain, therefore, at its core. As a result, traditional ideals of thrift, hard work and the avoidance of over reaching one’s means or status have a continued relevance for some.

Traditional Cambodian folk tales are replete with warnings and advice in this respect, highlighting all manner of situations wherein deference is the preferable course. For example:

\[
\text{Khlun teap kom taong dai khley kom chhong aop brava phnum}
\]

\[
\text{Small one, don’t stand up so tall;}
\]

\[
\text{And you with the short arms,}
\]

\[
\text{Don’t try to embrace the mountain.}
\]

[Khmer Proverb warning against the perils of ambition (Fisher-Nguyen, 1994)]

To these may be added a further axiom, intoned by an elderly inhabitant of Jake village. Having lived through all of the key events of Cambodia’s twentieth century history in his eighty years, he saw fit to bemoan, above all, the culture of immediacy, overspending, and greed, which he viewed as having replaced a more responsible and frugal community character embodied by a proverb from his boyhood:

\[
\text{Tok touic pin bom poong, chong chong konlah k’hait}
\]

One drip in the tube, squeeze, squeeze, all gone

(Focus Group, 03/06/13)
As he explained, proverbs such as this were once universal reference points in Cambodian culture, forming part of a set of norms which were mutually applicable to rich and poor alike, allowing Khmer people both to ‘subjugate’ foreign lands and ‘work together with’ their neighbours (Village Elder Interview, 03/06/13). Today, however, the multiple overlapping aphorisms of traditional Cambodian culture are increasingly becoming rods with which to beat the divergent strata of Khmer society. The poor are ‘lazy’ (Net, 20/06/13; Pan Mon, 28/05/13); the rich ‘act like bosses’ (Sok Tol, 12/08/13); migrants are ‘aloof’ (Construction Worker, 14/08/13); and the debt ridden are ‘greedy’ (Village Elder Interview, 03/06/13).

Of course, divisions such as this have always existed in Cambodia, but, as with the increasing economic inequality described in chapter six, what once were cracks are rapidly becoming chasms. Labour migration may be the catalyst in this respect, but the villages are not being reshaped by novel, urban, ideas and ideologies. Rather, an old and adaptable culture is responding to a new environment, as an increasing lack of unity forces the inhabitants of Krang Youv commune to define themselves not only by what they are, but by what they are not.

7.5 Conclusion

Far from the static, unified, image of its folk tales, Cambodia today is a land of numerous trajectories. As modernity has encroached ever deeper into its rural heartlands, small differences in wealth, assets and risk have been magnified by the new opportunities available to those able to seize them. On the other side of the coin, the lower boundaries of poverty and dependency have sunk deeper, as the ready availability of debt continues to drive the net assets of the poorest far below what was available from traditional moneylenders, and even further away from what they might hope to repay.

The result of such changes is not, however, simply a departure from the traditional agricultural livelihoods bases of rice, fish and vegetables, but a revision of their role, distribution, and symbolism. Where once the relationship between land and labour formed the basis of rural society, the case today is more fragmented. The fruits of progression may in many ways still be measured in sacks of rice, but the key to their accumulation lies outside the village. Only the modern sector is able to provide the necessary income to both insure against the risks and invest in the expansion of rice farming in contemporary climate.

Identity and the place of individuals within this hierarchy, once tightly defined by assets visible to the community (Scott, 1985; 1972), are now cleft in multiple ways. Many of the younger generation are no longer wholly rural, but nor either are they meaningfully urban. Male primacy has been partially
eroded by the influx of foreign factories, which have also attached a new set of values to rural work. In this new environment, agricultural wage labour, once the quotidian bulwark of a durable patrimonial society, is now sometimes shunned in favour of risky cross-border migrations.

However, this is not, ultimately, a question of insiders and outsiders. Everybody now is “inside” the process of modernisation, livelihoods fragmentation, and uneven wealth agglomeration. Rather, the rumbles of discontent, shunned former friendships and tattooed extortionists, are the hallmarks of a society travelling in multiple different directions at once.
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

The research set out in this Ph.D. has investigated the nature and functionality of the networks which facilitate labour migration in Cambodia. In doing so, it has focussed, in particular, on understanding the relationship between migratory networks and the social structures in which both migrants and their households are embedded. However, it has sought also to move beyond the narrow focus of the social capital literature by embedding these networks firmly within their physical and cultural context. Thus, rather than merely seeking to emphasize the importance of these linkages, this thesis has sought to elucidate their emergence and development, as well as the role they play in binding capital to culture in Cambodia’s rural and urban areas alike.

In attempting to draw coherent linkages in this regard, the research presented herein has examined the relationship not between social relations and capital, but between social relations and livelihoods. Risk has entered the equation, as has debt, to sit alongside income and assets as potential influences on community structure. Viewed thus, clear correlations emerge from the data between the manner in which households seek to manage their livelihoods and the company they most regularly keep. The need to minimise risk and maximise opportunity therefore constitutes a constraint on people’s closest relationships, which appear to be grounded in functional groups concerned with sharing labour, loans, or information.

As such, the data strongly suggest the social structures of Cambodian villages as a whole are related to the specific asset and liability profiles of the households which compose them. However, they are equally clear in demonstrating a secondary role of these functional groupings: social stratification. Although individuals enter willingly and productively into sharing arrangements, their ability to do so is determined primarily by what they have. The owner of one hectare of rice land would be unwise to do provas dei with other farmers holding two, as his labour would not be returned in full. Similarly, a farmer with no hand tractor can offer little to a group of those who have; one who raises no pigs may have difficulty in gaining access to the rearing knowledge of those who do.

Furthermore, the stratification which these functional associations perpetuate is not limited to rural communities. Though they may be hundreds of miles from their respective villages, the behaviour of rural-urban migrants, with regard not only to remittance payments but also to patterns of association in the urban space, is intimately related to what their household has and does not have. Migrants whose families, as a result of illness or climate, find themselves with high debts or low incomes prior to migration, may become stranded in the urban employment, unable to plan a
By contrast, those whose rural households possess a more secure rural income base are able to train, advance, and embed themselves in productive urban social networks. Incorporating these extremes and everything in between, Cambodia’s rural inequalities are both mirrored in, and magnified by the city.

The complex realities of rural livelihoods and migrant labour are, in this way, shaping the evolution of a social structure no longer, if ever, suited to the dichotomies of rural/urban, rich/poor, or farmer/non-farmer, amongst others. Always far more heterogeneous than tends to be acknowledged in either the Khmer popular consciousness or the academic literature, this enhancement of inequality and difference is creating new cultural narratives to replace the norms associated with an isolated rural enclave, rooted in the production of primary produce. In many such locales for instance, intra-village trade, traditionally being ‘akin to a state of war’, was viewed with a degree of repugnance (Platteau, 1991: 7). The incursion of the market has forced this and many other norms to adapt to changing circumstance.

As such, the cultural cornerstones of Khmer society: gender, duty, community and hierarchy, are themselves beginning to shift. Where once women, for instance, were confined to their house prior to marriage, now many are sent to factories, thereby transmuting the principles of obedience and separation to a new and more relevant form. Similarly, as those most able to help with farming, sons once held the keys to earning merit and influence within the family. Today their sisters increasingly possess that advantage. Where once land was the currency of familial assistance, today it is channelled increasingly to an elite whose position is entrenched by well developed bonds the city.

As this chapter will demonstrate, the findings derived from this thesis make a contribution to three interrelated clusters of literature. First, it has built upon previous network theoretic (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011; Burt, 2001; Granovetter, 1977) and social capital related work (Bjørnskov & Sønderskov, 2013; Portes and Landholt, 2007; Bourdieu, 1984) in establishing a new network mapping methodology capable of incorporating income, assets and the effect of the natural environment into the analysis of social structure. As such, this aspect of the thesis builds both upon recent work on the use of eigenvectors in social network analysis (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2011; Bonacich, 2007;) and a longer history of research into mutual insurance (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Fafchamps, 2005; Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Platteau, 1991; Scott, 1985), with regard to which the key finding is that “bonding” linkages – or bonds of affection as they are sometimes called – play both a functional role related to resource maximising and an important structural, stratificatory, role.
Leading on from the findings on network functionality outlined in chapter five, the role of personal networks in undergirding social and economic inequality was further explored in relation to labour migration and remittances in chapter six. Therein, several findings were outlined regarding the relationship between household livelihoods and the livelihoods of urban migrants, with both the quantitative and qualitative data highlighting the extent to which urban wellbeing and opportunity are shaped by rural advantage. In the sense that they constitute a new national case study of “inequality transportation”, these findings contribute both to the existing household literature (Locke et al. 2013; Tacoli and Mabala, 2010; Resurreccion, 2005, Silvey, 2001) and the growing body of literature on remittances and inequality (Betroli and Marchetta, 2014; Lindley, 2009; Jones, 1998).

Moreover, by highlighting the crucial role played by rural and urban bonding networks in transporting inequality, an underexplored dimension has been developed within these literatures.

The final set of findings, outlined in chapter seven, relate to the manner in which labour migration is shifting rural cultural norms in Cambodia. The results presented therein constitute a response to the call by Hughes (2001) and Colletta and Cullen (2000) to explore further the specific cultural changes underway in response to economic development and labour migration in the Kingdom, as well as contributing to and replenishing the high quality but sparse ethnographic literature (e.g. Bylander, 2013; Ledgerwood, 2007; Ledgerwood and Vijgen, 2002; Hinton, 1998a, 1998b). Additionally, however, it has sought to draw out more clearly the specific linkages between migration and social change in a similar manner to that undertaken by Elmhirst (2007) in the Indonesian context. These developments, as well as their implications for answering the research questions set out in this thesis, will be discussed in greater detail below.

### 8.1 Function

Following the collapse of the Structural Functionalist edifice in the 1970s, the language of functionality regarding social systems, communities, or groups, had all but disappeared. The seminal works of Foucault (1995), Bourdieu (1984) and others have convincingly put forward the case that society is not the integrated, rational, obelisk of the mid-twentieth century, but a collage of perspective, power, and inequality. More often than not, it has been shown, the structures and substructures of society work less like a machine and more like a “field” upon which competition is played out (Bourdieu, 1984).

Aside from an abortive re-examination of functionalism in the light of post-structural developments during the early 1990s (see e.g. Alexander and Colomy, 1991; Kincaid, 1990), one of the ways in which this recognition has re-emerged in the literature in recent years has been within the social
capital literature. Nevertheless, this new wave of interest in the functionality of social systems admitted little debt to its theoretical forebears in network theory (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973) and sociology (Simmel, e.g. 1971). Instead, it constructed its own parentage, with Putnam (2001) and Farr (2004) tracing unbroken threads from their own work, via the celebrated American thinkers Dewey (1904) and Hanifan (1916), to Adam Smith.

By short-circuiting its own theoretical heritage in this way, social capital theory was able to obfuscate, for a time, its latently functionalist character. Later, though, under the spotlight of fierce, post-millennial criticism (e.g. Fine 2001, 2003, 2010; Radcliffe, 2004), this perceived shortcoming has become one of the most effective sticks with which to beat the theory and its adherents. Nevertheless, as Bjornskov and Sonderskov (2010) pertinently highlight, it is not social capital’s concern with function which is the problem, but the lack of examination with which it is undertaken therein. Questions such as functional how and for whom have generally been left unasked and unanswered in the recent literature, but nevertheless occupy a central position within the research questions of this thesis.

The first of these questions was addressed in chapter five of this Ph.D., which sought to elucidate why social networks operate as they do in Cambodia and the extent to which they are related to the functional requirements of the household, such as the need to mitigate environmental risk or share labour. Therein, the data gleaned from Krang Youv highlights that the relationship between wealth and social linkages, which lies at the core of social capital theory, is indeed a significant one, but that this is not a bi-variate relationship. The various network structures in evidence within Krang Youv do not determine the wealth of those who reside within them in any simple sense. Nor are these social constructions autopoietic, or determined exclusively by cultural norms. Rather, as suggested also by Bankoff (2007), they appear to arise in response to both opportunity and (perceived and actual) risk.

Indeed, both communities and households which have historically experienced a higher level of crop loss as a result of natural disasters are considerably more likely to participate in certain types of social groups, in particular those related to labour and credit sharing arrangements. Engagement in social activity of this sort is inherently functional: it serves in the first instance to pool risk to some extent between members and in the second to smooth consumption related to unpredictable income. Neither should there be any controversy in describing it as such. When the function itself is specific, i.e., “minimising agricultural risk” as opposed to the rather more general state of “wellbeing” implicitly favoured by much of the social capital literature, the how and for whom lead naturally from it.
Nevertheless, the purpose of chapter five was not merely to emphasize that groups in Cambodia perform functions. Although this point has fallen somewhat from favour within the Geographic and Sociological literature, it has nevertheless retained a discernable presence, in the work, for instance of Platteau and Abraham (2002), Fafchamps (1992; 2005), and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). Rather, the aim herein has been to move beyond a discrete awareness of function, towards an appreciation of its role in contributing to the structure of communities. In particular, the various methodological innovations employed herein, including the embedded network mapping methodology outlined in chapter three, have been constructed with a view to embedding social structures within their environmental and geographic context, so as to draw specific, rather than merely heuristic linkages between risk, assets, and association.

The results suggest, in accordance with Cote and Nightingale (2011) and Constanza et al. (2007), amongst others, that functional social responses to the biophysical environment made at a household level are some of the key building blocks of communities and sub-communities. The decision to share labour with a neighbour in order to mutually reduce risk, or to attach oneself to an influential member of the community in order to maximise access to information about the city are not discrete actions. Rather, they are mediated and intertwined with cultural norms of interaction to produce a communal social structure, forged from the shifting assets and liabilities of its members.

In the 21st century, however, this system appears to be changing. As the cultural and economic influences of modernity have gradually extended into rural Cambodia, the motivations for collective action have necessarily diversified to reflect their influence. Just as networks and cooperative action appear malleable according to the changing profile of environmental risk faced by the household, so too does this principle extend to the risk faced by households dependent on migrant remittances. However, unlike their counterparts seeking to mitigate their losses from possible crop failure, whose behaviour tends towards engagement in small groups offering mutual assistance, households whose income depends on the city are, as demonstrated in chapter five, more likely to associate with high status individuals, whose knowledge and connections offer the insurance of information in times of need.

As with labour sharing groups, these arrangements fulfil both a primary and a latent role, on the one hand facilitating access to a degree of information for those who depend upon rural wages and on the other, re-moulding the aggregate structure of social relations in response to this new imperative. Indeed, this study has provided empirical – albeit cross sectional – evidence of the social structural changes hypothesised by Colletta and Cullen (2000) in response to migration. Specifically, the small, horizontal groupings characteristic of labour sharing may be in the process of being replaced with
wider networks incorporating key nodes whose access to urban information marks them out. Nevertheless, as Platteau and Abraham (2002) note elsewhere, this loosening of the relationship between society and rice is not likely to see traditional, land-based, elites cast aside. Rather, as Chapter 6 and 7 sought to show, the covariance and fungibility of social and physical wealth offers traditional elites ample opportunity to entrench and enhance their position in the face of such change.

8.2 Form

Where migrants to Cambodia’s urban centres are afforded consideration, it is almost invariably en masse and primarily with reference to the paucity of their living standards. Garment and construction workers, it is often argued, are exploitatively underpaid (e.g. Nishigaya, 2002) and subject to injurious health risks in many cases (Phnom Penh Post, 2012). The relative homogeneity of wages offered by modern sector employers underpins this perspective, encouraging commentators to analyze migrant labour in Cambodia at the firm, or even industry level.

The theoretical and methodological positions employed herein have sought to challenge this assumption. Just as Cambodia’s rural villages contain a wider variety of livelihoods than even local administrators, such as the Krang Youv commune chief (15/08/13), tend to appreciate, or admit, so too is the Kingdom’s migrant population a highly diversified and complex arena. Migrants to rural factory clusters such as Sak te Bo and Andaing are likely to meet a quite different experience from those who arrive in Phnom Penh. Similarly, the lives of construction and garment workers are often poles apart.

Nevertheless, although broad occupational and rural-urban boundaries delineate notable differences, they also mask those which are most significant. The real heterogeneities exist within Phnom Penh, within Sak te Bo, and within their factories and construction sites, rather than between them. Each migrant carries with them a portfolio of advantage and obligation which moulds their time in the city. They may have connections, they may not. They may have money, they may not. They may have large debts, they may not. They may bear the burden of crippling remittance payments, or like some of their wealthier counterparts, they may not. In this way, each migrant carries the indelible stamp of their household situation with them for the duration of their time away from home.

These mechanisms, by which rural inequalities are transferred so effectively to new and sometimes distant arenas, are clearly visible to the literature, but, with the exception of Lindlay (2009), have rarely been considered in exactly this light. Commitment to the household, mutual visitations and
remittances are viewed as instruments of rural development (Tacoli, 2003; 2010, Deschingkar and Grimm, 2005) and “safety nets” (e.g. Silvey and Elmirst, 2003; Smith, 1998) throughout the Global South. In Cambodia specifically, they are credited with playing a ‘remarkable role’ in ameliorating the effects of the global economic downturn (CDRI, 2012), at which time, despite the garment sector alone being forced to absorb a loss of over 53,000 jobs between 2008 and 2009 (Arnold, 2013: 3), the anticipated livelihoods crisis did not materialise (CDRI, 2012). Employment returned to pre-crash levels by the beginning of 2012 (Arnold, 2013: 3).

These persistent linkages, through which money, information and assistance flow, are indeed worthy of the praise they receive. Many households or communities who may otherwise have faced destitution are now able to rely upon regular remittances. With reliance, however, comes inevitable obligation and this corollary is all too rarely considered. The simple observation that poorer households are forced to make heavier financial demands upon their migrant members begins merely to hint at how two equivalent salaries may be differently spent by migrants from divergent rural circumstances. Once this line of enquiry is opened, moreover, a whole array of knowledge on remittances may be turned upon its head: significant financial flows become crippling burdens and transmitters of inequality; much smaller ones may denote long term advantage and investment.

In addition, that rural-urban linkages are conveyers not only of money, but also of information (see, e.g. Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Levitt, 1998) is a stylized fact and one well supported by the evidence herein. Nevertheless, how divergent qualities and quantities of information may affect the migrants who receive it is a question generally un-raised. This thesis has therefore sought to complement the largely econometric literature (e.g. Betroli and Marchetta, 2014; Jones, 1998) – again, excluding Lindley (2009) and other ethnographic studies such as Derks (2008) who tackle the topic indirectly – with a network perspective highlighting the inter-relationship between financial and informational constraints. As demonstrated herein, rural household wealth means the difference between a stable job with a chance of progression, and a nomadic, indeterminate search for employment which can reconcile the needs of household and migrant. Lower remittances occupy a synergistic role in this respect, allowing greater freedom to socialise in the urban space and thereby to build the networks which lead to safety, security and long term advancement. As a result, the evidence here points to a direct correlation between rural wealth (measured either in terms of assets or income) and social integration within the migrant environment.

As such, in answering research question two of this thesis, which sought to explore what role rural household resources have in determining the formation and effectiveness of migratory networks, this chapter has presented a range of quantitative and qualitative evidence to demonstrate the
significance of this relationship. As shown therein, the difference between those migrants who have the resources to build such networks and those who do not, is one not of degree, but of kind. For those whose remittances are the only, or the primary, source of income for their household, there is often no end in sight to an isolated urban life, bereft of all but the smallest self-indulgences. For others, migration may be only a short episode of their lives, used as a means of saving money, acquiring skills, or of beginning a new life away from the fields. Each of these paths diversifies migrant livelihoods further, accelerating the acquisition conditions of the elites, whilst tightening the bondage of the poorest to their debts, their obligations, and the factory floor.

8.3 Feedbacks

The final research question guiding this thesis has been whether or not the process of migration is feeding back into the systems and social structures which support it, altering norms and shifting roles in the light of changing circumstances. In this regard, the answer was unequivocal: Cambodia today is a land changing in multiple ways. The historical checks and balances on the power of capital and labour are, as noted within the Malaysia of previous decades by Scott, (1985; 1972), being progressively dismantled by the ability of rural elites to acquire labour saving machines, or to invest beyond the village in trade or the pursuit of modern sector wages. In place of the old certainties of rural labour sale, debt – led at first, and still justified by microfinance, but now to some extent superseded by the private banking behemoth ACLEDA – has stepped in, smoothing the consumption of the poorer at the same time as it bolsters the investment power of the richer.

The incursion of ACLEDA into the depth of Cambodia’s rural areas serves as a formalisation of the duality of debt use therein. Where previously richer and poorer alike were reliant on microfinance, today it is usually the preserve of those who intend to utilise their borrowings for subsistence, consumption, or repair. Those planning to invest tend to favour the larger loans available from private banking, knowing that the higher interest rates will be mitigated by profits and swift repayment.

This pattern of division is not, furthermore, limited to debt. Migration, once the preserve of the elite and referred to by Colletta and Cullen (2000) as a key source of cultural capital rooted in traditional esteem for those with knowledge of the outside world, has now itself been sub-divided into strata of unequal merit, each affecting its own “distinction” (Bourdieu, 1984) upon its bearers. Knowledge of and work in the city no longer stands atop the ladder of prestige within Cambodian villages, having been supplanted by access to more lucrative international opportunities. Even work abroad, though,
has its own hierarchy, with China and South Korea now the preserve of the wealthiest villagers, whereas the poor must make do with riskier and less lucrative trips to Thailand or Malaysia, often on an illegal basis.

These alternative modes of migration are each associated with divergent, and often discordant, cultural narratives which reinforce the inequality of wages. Although almost all remitting migrants are dutiful, for instance, those whose remittances may be used in the purchase of a motorbike or improve the family home are viewed from outside the household as more so. Similarly, those who are able to boast of entertainments enjoyed in the city or abroad, generally as a result of a reduced need to remit, enjoy a higher status than their colleagues who have seen only their workplace and the walls of their rented room. Where previously wealth meant lighter work and less worry, now it increasingly means experience of things not only inaccessible, but unknowable to the less wealthy.

However, although it has been something of a refrain throughout this Ph.D. to emphasize the continued advantage of traditional elites, this is not intended to suggest that nothing has meaningfully changed. This new landscape of wealth, income, debt and poverty in evidence in rural Cambodia has not installed itself, unaltered amidst the old social realities. Rather, as the bases of wealth have shifted, so too have the bases of prestige and denigration. Employments and activities which were once the privilege only of the better off have now been overlaid by a degree of nuance as access to them widens: certain jobs within a factory are more sought after; it is better to be a chieng [specialist worker] than a kamakor samañ [ordinary worker]. This process, underlain by the nexus of pragmatism and traditional cultural mores has caused fundamental roles of both people and assets within society to be re-evaluated.

Moreover, this thesis supports for the Cambodian case the view proffered elsewhere by Rao and Hossain (2012), Resurreccion (2005) and Silvey (2001) amongst others, that even the nature of gender relations has been caught up in this process of change, as the preference on the part of garment factories for female workers has bolstered their role in rural society, affording them a greater degree of influence in household and community matters alike. As Kabeer (1997: 263) has hypothesised, this is likely to reflect the changing relative strength of household members’ respective ‘fallback positions’. However, the network dimension of the work undertaken herein, and its concomitant implications for inequality transmission, facilitates the additional insight that households possessing different levels of rural wealth may experience divergent changes in the structure of their internal relations.
Moreover, in accordance with Elmhirst’s (2007) work in Indonesia, it has been shown that as the star of women rises, another inevitably falls. The emerging discourse of family duty, linked increasingly closely to migration, has served also to create a culture of denigration surrounding male non-migrants. For some, the response to these changing circumstances has been open conflict: anti-social behaviour and organised delinquency. For others it has manifested in breaking with the past, via a refusal to take up the rural wage labour which supported their fathers and forefathers. For all, the meaning of wealth, honour and success have shifted.

The overarching goal of this Ph.D. has been to make explicit some of the mechanisms by which these cultural changes, long hypothesised (by e.g. Hughes, 2001; Colletta and Cullen, 2000), come to manifest themselves in Cambodia’s rural heartlands and urban fringes. The picture that has emerged has been one of flexibility and pragmatism on the one hand, and persistence and strength on the other. The key social norms of hierarchy, obligation and mutual assistance have become the fixed reference points around which rural society adapts to a rapidly changing environment. Even as the incursion of the market sees patrons and clients selected and discarded, distorting and disaggregating rural hierarchies, the language of patronage and community remains, at base, the same.

8.4 Suggestions for Future Research

In relation to its goal of elucidating the processes which link assets, liabilities and social practice, the research undertaken during the course of this Ph.D. has uncovered a number of promising avenues of further enquiry. Some of these relate to aspects of Cambodia’s socio-economic environment which were not focussed upon by this study, but which have nevertheless emerged as playing an unexpectedly significant role. Others have emerged as a result of the new opportunities offered by the methodologies tested herein.

Of the first group, the role of debt in the socio-economy of contemporary Cambodia appears to have been somewhat underestimated both during the planning stages of this study and the literature more widely. On the somewhat rare occasions that household debt is mentioned (Bylander, 2014; Ir et al., 2012; Damme et al., 2004), it tends only to be done in relation to other, primary factors, such as health, migration, or climate shocks. Whilst this study has shown that these are indeed important reasons for the acquisition of debt, they are not the only, or even the major ones. Indeed, village-wide generalizations are unhelpful here. Households belonging to different wealth strata exhibit
notably different behaviour in terms of the size of loans acquired, the type and source of loans undertaken, and the uses to which the debt in question is put.

Furthermore, as this study has sought to show using the limited data collected on debt by a methodology not set up specifically to capture it, borrowing and lending money is not external to the social relations of a village. Even formal debt, a relatively recent arrival to Cambodia in its current incarnation and scale, plays a divisive role in the structure of rural society by allowing wealthier households to invest and multiply their incomes, whilst poorer ones borrow to subsist, thereby reducing their future incomes with interest payments. Informal debt is equally important, with small loans being one of the mechanisms by which groups are formed and bonded. In this respect, the literature is notably thin, with Phlong’s (2009) doctoral thesis perhaps the only in-depth study of the linkages between formal and informal debt. It is therefore recommended that research be undertaken to extend this literature on debt systems and to better understand its role in social change.

The prevalence of informal lending is, however, only one of many types of social relations characteristic of Cambodian villages. Pye (1999), for instance, discerned at least 19 organisations and traditional practices which had survived the Khmer Rouge era intact, all of which may be worthy of investigation in terms of their relationship with risk, inequality, social change and the wider biophysical environment. Following Bjornskov and Sonderskov’s (2010) and Fischer’s calls for a more nuanced and disaggregated approach to social capital research, this study focussed primarily upon what is described in the social capital lexicon as bonding linkages and found notable correlations with risk and wealth, as well as evidence of a flexibility which, with some exceptions (e.g. Ledgerwood, 2007; Ledgerwood and Vijghen, 2002), tends to be underplayed within the literature. The investigation of other modes of association, such as the pagoda association or the coffee shop, may produce results of the same or even greater relevance to the network theoretic and social capital literature.

Additionally, a fruitful area for further investigation may be found simply in widening the scope with which the network mapping methodology employed herein is administered. This study began sampling from three independent points in close proximity and found notable differences in the structure of the communities delineated via the mapping of bonding linkages. Although these different structures appear to be related to various factors, including gross community income, or market integration, the geographic scope of this sample is insufficient to state with confidence.
whether those factors which appear most influential in Krang Youv remain the key agents of social change in other parts of the country.

Further research should therefore aim towards answering these issues with a greater degree of certainty. In particular, it is recommended that embedded network mapping of this type be extended to areas with a variety of different income portfolios in order to discern the differences resulting from the volume of migration and the extent of non-farm activity, for instance. In addition, the role of risk in shaping social relations has been shown to be notable. However, obtaining detailed information on long term changes to the environment and the specific social responses to these was one of the biggest challenges in this research, which was ultimately forced to rely on percentage crop losses and recall based methodologies. In order to supercede such problems, it is recommended that future work be linked to existent longitudinal studies of local disaster liability. This, in conjunction with a greater variety of environmental risk profiles, spread across a number of sites, would help to clarify the manner in which the type and level of risk to which households are exposed determines the patterns of association they practise at a community level.

One of the significant findings of this thesis was that the corollary to these types of social interaction, which though not directed towards the pursuit of community benefit nevertheless play a vital role in bolstering the cohesion of the village, is the prevalence of anti-social groups, described as “gangsters” by the inhabitants of Krang Youv. These sub-cultural groups, characterised, in particular, by their engagement with inter-gang violence and theft, as well as extortion in some cases, have been only recently noted within the literature. Following Elmhirst's (2007) exposition of migration-gangster linkages in Indonesia, Czymoniewicz-Klippel (2011) is one of the very few authors to highlight the phenomenon of rural gangsters in Cambodia and provides a useful account from a sociological perspective. However, the relationship between socio-economic and cultural changes deriving from migration and economic development remains underexplored. Future research would benefit from the pursuit of further insights into the “dark side” of these and other social processes.

Relatedly, a final field of enquiry would concern behaviour in migrant enclaves which runs counter to traditional norms. In particular, the sexual impropriety described by various informants in Sak te Bo, which raises further questions about the nature of Cambodian gender relations, appears worthy of further investigation. Evidence from this study suggests that many migrants enter into romantic relationships of various sorts during their migration, a rare and culturally illicit phenomenon in rural villages. Given the growing number of inter-village and inter-provincial marriages resulting from
labour migration in Cambodia (Yakura, 2012), the idea that migrant communities in Cambodia may therefore constitute zones of relative freedom and escape from rural or parental norms, as postulated by Kuhn in Bangladesh (2003), deserves investigation.

Indeed, in this regard the literature remains thin. Although Derks (2008) has investigated cultural deviations in migrant communities to some extent, her study, published some six years ago, chooses to focus exclusively on women, where attention to the changing behaviour of both men and women might provide further insight into women’s relational role in this new type of Cambodian community. Given that changing masculinities in relation to economic development ‘have come under less scrutiny’ than their female corollaries (Elmhirst, 2007: 225), whether women are the drivers of new attitudes towards sexual and gender relations requires investigation, as does the question of the role of this change in the wider processes of Cambodia’s socio-economic development, within which they are ‘imbricated’ (Chant, 1998: 6).

Effective examples of this sort of work have already emerged from countries other than Cambodia, as part of the literature related to the household, gender and multi-local livelihoods in particular. Rao and Hossain (2012), (Elmhirst, 2008), Thieme (2008), Jolly and Reeves (2005), Resurreccion (2005), and Piper (2008) have all utilised a gender lens to analyse social changes arising from migration in a manner which might be used to build upon the more holistic approach adopted here. Their findings in this regard have informed the theoretical background to this thesis. However, the detailed analyses they offer could not be matched herein, due to the need to maintain a broad scope of enquiry incorporating environmental risk, economic change and social network behaviour.

Nevertheless, in spite of inevitable limitations to this approach, the broad based analysis undertaken here has produced a valuable set of tools for further development. Further research into the nexus of migration, economic development and changing social structures may therefore prove useful in developing transferable frameworks and methodologies suitable for usage in other national contexts. Should these tools be constructed in an inductive and research led manner, then they may go some way also, to retaining academic interest in the nexus of economic and social processes which has been, for authors such as Bourdieu (1984) the key meaning of the term social capital. If this is to be satisfactorily achieved, however, it must be undertaken in an entirely different spirit to much of the work which has thus far preceded it. Rather than a totalizing framework, smaller, tightly focussed, contextually embedded studies constitute the best available means of progression.
Indeed, it has been a consistent theme throughout the course of this Ph.D. to emphasise the need for an holistic and embedded view of the many processes, structures and norms which underpin the structure of society in Cambodia. Not only women and men, but risk and inequality; gender and remittances; gangsters and land sale, have proved fruitful pairings for concurrent investigation. As such, this thesis has sought to draw together those divergent aspects of social practice which have tended to be isolated from each other within the literature, and thereby to explore the nature of their interaction. In doing so, Cambodian labour migration has been shown to exist as a sub-system nestled amongst multiple others, pertaining to farming and face; status and survival. “Modernity”, as with any external influence, is mediated and transformed by this multi-faceted and evolving structure, so that any meaningful separation of the pragmatic and cultural aspects of Cambodian 21st century livelihoods is not only undesirable, but impossible.
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Appendix A: List of all Interviews and Focus Groups Quoted within this Ph.D.

1. Focus Groups

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<td>09/05/13</td>
<td>Focus Group with North Ampil villagers</td>
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2. Individual Interviews

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<td>25/04/13</td>
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<td>Dr. Karen</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Senior Sector Specialist at ADB Cambodia branch</td>
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<td>Lim Siv Hong</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation, Response to an emailed request for information</td>
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</table>
Appendix B: Risk Assessment Approval Form

9th August 2012

Laurie Parsons
Department of Geography

Dear Laurie,

REP(GSSHM)/11/12-32 ‘Cambodian Labour Migration: Environmental Risk and Social Capital.’

I am pleased to inform you that the above application has been reviewed by the GSSHM Research Ethics Panel that FULL APPROVAL is now granted.

Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247).

For your information ethical approval is granted until 09/08/14. If you need approval beyond this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to this explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will not be necessary unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your approval is for one year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse.

Ethical approval is required to cover the duration of the research study, up to the conclusion of the research. The conclusion of the research is defined as the final date or event detailed in the study description section of your approved application form (usually the end of data collection when all work with human participants will have been completed), not the completion of data analysis or publication of the results. For projects that only involve the further analysis of pre-existing data, approval must cover any period during which the researcher will be accessing or evaluating individual sensitive and/or un-anonymised records. Note that after the point at which ethical approval for your study is no longer required due to the study being complete (as per the above definitions), you will still need to ensure all research data/records management and storage procedures agreed to as part of your application are adhered to and carried out accordingly.

If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the Research Ethics Office.

Should you wish to make a modification to the project or request an extension to approval you will need approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx

The circumstances where modification requests are required include the addition/removal of participant groups, additions/removal/changes to research methods, asking for additional data from participants, extensions to the ethical approval period. Any proposed modifications should only be carried out once full approval for the modification request has been granted.
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to the approving committee/panel. In the event of an untoward event or an adverse reaction a full report must be made to the Chair of the approving committee/review panel within one week of the incident.

Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time to ascertain the status of your research.

If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your panel/committee administrator in the first instance (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/contact.aspx). We wish you every success with this work.

Yours sincerely

Daniel Butcher
Research Ethics Officer
Appendix C: Information Sheet and Consent Form

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

REC Reference Number: REP(GSSHM)/11/12-32

YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET

Cambodian Labour Migration: Environmental Risk and Social Capital

We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.

This research is intended to further understanding of Cambodian labour migration and its effect on your village, as well as the way in which natural disasters and other economic risks have impacted on your community. Whilst there may be no immediate benefits to your participation, it is hoped that the information gleaned here will have a positive effect on academic understanding of Cambodian development in the long term.

This survey will include all household heads in your village who are willing to participate and will require your participation in an interview lasting no more than an hour, for which you may choose a location which suits you. Please note that the researcher may return to ask further questions if you indicate that you are willing to allow this but that if you wish to discontinue the interview at any time, or to have no further part in the research you are free to do so.

All questionnaires and contact details will be stored securely and anonymously. However, should a participant indicate that they wish the data they have provided to be removed, the participant’s anonymous code will be retrieved and any information obtained from them destroyed.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the research, please contact me: Laurie Parsons, at laurie.parsons@kcl.ac.uk

It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

Title of Study: ___________________________________________

King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:________________

Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

- I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to the point of publication [OR insert date if stated on Information Sheet].

- I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998.

- I consent to the researcher returning to conduct follow-up interviews with me in the future

Participant’s Statement:

I ____________________________________________

Please tick or initial
agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves.

Signed  Date

DELETE IF NOT APPROPRIATE

Investigator’s Statement:

I ________________________________

Confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the proposed research to the participant.

Signed  Date
General Delivery Questionnaire (Quantitative)

Section One: General Information

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Section Two: Assets and Debts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Type</th>
<th>Number (or size)</th>
<th>Date Obtained</th>
<th>Cost (Rate for Debts)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farming Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Household Items</td>
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Farm Yield

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<tr>
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<th>Annual Yield</th>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Usage</th>
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### Section Three: Livelihoods

#### Occupation

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<th>Feb</th>
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<th>July</th>
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</table>

### Section Four: Social Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to Self</th>
<th>GPS Code</th>
<th>How Known</th>
<th>Frequency of Meetings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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#### Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attendance at Weddings and other Celebrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

#### Loans Given

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans Received</th>
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</table>

#### Provas Dei (Agricultural Labour Sharing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance with Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
# Section Five: Climate Shocks

## Shock Record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Damage and Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

## Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Groups Assisting</th>
<th>Assistance Given</th>
<th>Individuals Assisting</th>
<th>Assistance Given</th>
<th>Map Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

# Section Six: Risk Mapping

*Please indicate your perception of the following as a percentage*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Detriment to Household</th>
<th>Potential Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Storm</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Crop Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serious Injury</td>
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</table>

# Section Seven: Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member Code</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>Remittance Spending</th>
<th>Reverse Flows</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Money</td>
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</table>

239
General Delivery Questionnaire (Qualitative)

Networks and Groups

What groups or organisations are there here?

Who has *ksai* and *knorng* and who doesn’t? What does it do for them?

What do your connections help you do? Are you well connected?

Since people started migrating, have you tried to make connections with different people?

Power

What kinds of people are more powerful here?

Who are the most powerful individuals in the village?

Since people started migrating, are the powerful people still the same as before? Who has more power than before? Who has less?

Inequality

Who (and where) are the poorest people in the village? Who are the richest?

Do you feel like there is a big difference between rich and poor here? Has this changed due to migration?

Has the distribution of land and other resources changed here?

What do the rich do to look after the poor?

The Natural Environment

What are the most important natural resources to you as a household?

Since people started migrating, what is more and less available?

Risk

What risks concern you most?

If your household suffered a natural disaster, who would help you?

Do you feel more or less at risk since a lot of people started migrating from this village?

Migration

How has migration, or lack of it, affected you as a household?

What effect has migration had on this village generally?

Who do you think has benefitted most from migration?

Has migration made life worse for anybody? How?

Additional Questions

What proverbs or advice have helped you to live your life here?

What are your hopes for the future?
Quantitative Questionnaire 2: Rapid Administration Assets Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
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</table>

1. Land Holdings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural Land</th>
<th>Residential Land</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Location Code:</th>
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2. Income Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Source</th>
<th>Income Amount</th>
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</table>

3. Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Date Purchased</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household</td>
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</table>

4. Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Date of Migration</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</table>

5. Shock History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Damaged Sustained</th>
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</table>
Questionnaire Three: Migrant Delivery Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Migrant’s Name</th>
<th>Rural Household Informant’s Name</th>
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### Urban Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earnings:</th>
<th>Basic Wage</th>
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<th>Overtime</th>
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Do you think this wage is high enough?

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<tr>
<th>Remittances:</th>
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Do you find it a strain to pay these remittances? In what way?

Has your wage ever been increased during your time working here?
If so, what did you do with the money?

### Social Networks

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<tr>
<th>Co-inhabitants of Rented Room</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name + Relationship</td>
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</table>
**Close Friends**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>GPS Code</th>
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**Migratory History**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Migration</th>
<th>Helper</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Location of Helper</th>
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</table>

**Do you ever go out in your free time? What do you do?**

*With whom?*

**Why did you leave the sites of your previous migrations?**

*Which of these has been the best and worst? Why?*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Type</th>
<th>Number (or size)</th>
<th>Date Obtained</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Livestock</td>
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<td>Farming Equipment</td>
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