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Brazil: analysis of a rising soft power

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Abstract
Rising powers gain economic and political clout and challenge the post-Cold War world order. Located in a relatively peaceful region away from global conflict zones, Brazil has fought no war with its neighbours in 150 years, and with limited military capabilities, Brazil differs from its BRICS peers as a non-militarised emerging power. Based on Nye’s soft power concept, this article examines Brazil’s soft power characteristics (preference for diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution, use of force as a last resort; actions as agenda-setter, bridge-builder, Southern interests’ supporter, pro-multilateralism, etc.). This paper compares Brazil’s role conception to its role performance to conclude that Brazil projects itself as a soft power broker.

Keywords: Brazil; rising power; military strength; soft power; role theory

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Introduction
The diffusion of power to a range of different actors, the emerging of several newly powerful states from the South, and their growing international role are the main features of the current world order, one that is being remodelled towards what Huntington (1999) characterised as a ‘uni-multipolar’ system’. In this context, Brazil’s ‘emergence’ since the 2000s as an important international actor is well known and an accepted fact in the academic literature and in policy-circles, the country coming to be widely thought as an emerging power. In fact, Brazil sought to assert itself as a player at a truly global level, and sustainably began to consistently operate with a global horizon, reflecting its growing political ambitions as an increasingly relevant power (Engstrom 2012, p. 835, Stavridis 2012, p. 133, Nadvi 2014, p. 146, Abdenur 2015, p. 50, Destradi and Jakobeit 2015, p. 61, Kenkel and Stefan 2016, p. 52). Brazil has been rising to become an increasingly influential actor on the global scene, by successfully profiling itself as a benevolent power, due to its foreign policy’s effectiveness to advance its global status through soft power (Marthoz 2010, Soares Castro 2013, p. 29). Has Brazil emerged as ‘a country of global stature’, as former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota, claimed? (Adams 2013) Or is it still the ‘eternal country of the future’? Actually, the picture is not as clear-cut as depicted by The Economist covers, which successively represented the Corcovado rocket taking off in 2009 and crashing in 2013, running as headline the question ‘Has Brazil blown it?’

In a region where interstate conflicts scarcely occurred, Brazil has benefited from a unique geostrategic situation, consolidated diplomatically. Brazil has a border in common with most countries in South America; yet, it was rarely involved in armed conflict and has not been involved in a war with its neighbours since the end of the nineteenth century. As such, Brazil has undergone a ‘benign international insertion’, and has not employed hard power to play an international role. Among other examples, Brazil is the only BRIC with no nuclear weapons; its military capabilities are limited compared to those of traditional powers or the other BRICs; deterrence, cooperation and development are drivers of Brazil’s defence organisation. In this
context, Brazil, which neither seeks nor exerts military power on a global level, and is not destined to play a prominent role on the strategic military road, owes its international projection above all to its soft power (Almeida 2007, p. 9, Casanova and Kassum 2014, Théry apud Oualalou 2014). In this sense, Green and Luehrmann (2016, p. 261) detailed:

Brazil is modernizing its defences, but it is by no means a conventional military power (and it walked away from a nuclear capability) … It is not seeking to compete in that category (but) to be a new kind of global presence … Brazil’s choice not to compete when it comes to hard power actually augments its stronger suit: soft power. (What makes Brazil unique is that it) is different from so many other up-and-comers, because it is not seeking to rise to global stature by playing the hard power game … Brazil thus wins with soft power.

For Grix et al. (2015, p. 467), arguably due to its relative lack of military capacity, Brazil has become particularly adept at leveraging its soft power. Brazilian Army Colonel Sales Bonfim remarked: ‘I believe Brazil has soft power … this is what we have that has most value in the International System’ (IS) (Rodriguez 2013, p. 132). As Brazil naturally exercises soft power and national authorities have frequently used the concept, Brazil is both ‘a good example of what is called soft power’ and ‘the state where soft power plays a primary role’ (Nye apud Pinto 2012, Bruk 2013, Dytz Filho 2014, Théry 2014). In this sense, Brazil appears as a suitable candidate from a soft power perspective, since it has looked to attain international standing through the mechanism of soft power. In fact, Brazil favours the resolution of conflicts through diplomatic means and stresses that force should be considered as a last resort solution. Brazil advocates for more inclusive forms of governance by calling for more representative and legitimate international institutions, and presents itself as defending the interests of developing nations, in trade or climate change negotiations. A long-lasting and active member of international institutions, Brazil encourages compliance with international law and respect for international treaties. By resorting to the possibilities offered by the promotion of its soft power at an international level, Brazil has strengthened its external action and increased its global influence, establishing itself as a ‘rising soft power’ (Dytz Filho 2014). In light of traditional principles of Brazil’s foreign policy, this paper examines President Lula’s two mandates and President Rousseff’s first mandate (2003–2014), a period marked by continuity in foreign policy guidelines despite variation in external dynamism, mainly due to different internal economic contexts and the presidents’ (more or less) enthusiastic interest for international affairs. Relying on role theory, this article compares Brazil’s role conception to its role performance. In the study of international relations (IR), roles are ‘persistent patterns of a state’s foreign policy behaviour’, and national role conceptions (NRCs) are ‘domestically held political self-views or self-understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s state in the international arena’. Providing long-standing guidelines or standards for behaviour, NRCs constitute the ‘image’ of the foreign policymakers’ appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward or in the external environment. NRCs are based on a set of norms and beliefs (reflecting geographic position, size or historical experiences) policymakers are committed to and that correspond to the expected planned action-orientation. Role performance refers to an actor’s behaviour when performing a role. It is the actual foreign policy of a government, including patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions undertaken and commitments to other states (Holsti 1970, pp. 245, 246, 1987, p. 7, Wish 1980, p. 547, Krotz 2008, p. 2, Harnisch et al. 2011, p. 9).

This article provides a case study analysis of Brazil, through an examination of Brazil’s role conception (how foreign policy makers envision their state’s action or function) as defender of diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of conflict, bridgebuilder, agenda-setter, promoter of multilateralism, protector of international law, advocate of Southern interests, etc. In parallel, this paper assesses to what extent such criteria correspond to the country’s role performance (how the state actually acts). As such, the main findings provided by this analytical perspective are that, during the studied period, Brazil has made significant strides in consolidating a set
of policies and postures matching (yet not always fully or precisely) its own role objectives as a global soft power, and can thus be considered an important epicentre of soft influence in the global system.

Brazil: not an emerging military power

Acknowledging that historically, military power has been key to assessing a country’s power, Gardini (2015, p. 4) stated that Brazil showed no appetite to become a military power. For Roberto Unger, former Strategic Affairs Minister, Brazil is a unique case in modern history of a country of such dimensions rising without reigning and commanding (TVAfifa 2015).

Ambassador Azambuja (2009, p. 5) underscored that:

compared with other regions of the globe, the American shore of the South Atlantic remains a quiet and largely uneventful and strategic backwater … Brazil enjoys a comfortable geopolitical situation (and) identifies no actual or potential rivals or adversaries in South America or in the South Atlantic basin.

In this respect, consensus exists in the literature about the ‘peaceful nature of IR’ in the region, where states have enjoyed a protracted period of intraregional interstate peace. In fact, the scarcity of wars, with few interstate conflicts especially during the twentieth century, led South America to be regarded among the planet’s most peaceful regions; within the South Atlantic, Brazil faced few traditional security threats. Hence, Brazil benefits from a rather tranquil neighbourhood and peaceful security environment (Martín 2006, p. 177, Herz 2010, p. 602, Battaglino 2012, p. 141, Bertonha 2013, p. 123, Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014a, p. 5).

According to Hakim (2010), Brazil has the atypical advantage for a large and powerful country not to face serious hostilities from its neighbours or any other country, as it is located at a large distance from severe armed conflicts and is not involved in any of them. Brazil faces fewer and less dangerous international strategic threats than other rising powers, especially as it has no persisting tensions related to border issues, or territorial disputes with its neighbours (Stuenkel 2010a, p. 103, Rothkopf 2012). Brazil constructed a ‘geo-strategically enviable’ position through diplomatic work (the Brazilian space was consolidated a long time ago, with almost all of Brazil’s borders established through negotiation or arbitrage); Valladão (2013, p. 99) evaluated that pacifism and the idea that interstate conflicts should be solved by diplomacy and arbitration are part of Brazil’s national character. Brazil has not been at war with its neighbours for nearly 150 years, which is an ‘exceptionally long time’, while it shares borders with ten South American countries out of twelve (except Chile and Ecuador). In this sense, Brazil has virtually no record of aggressive military actions against neighbouring states (Dirceu 2011, Bertonha 2015, p. 7).

Hence, Brazil is in a sui generis position: ‘it doesn’t threaten anybody and is not threatened by anyone’ (Valladão, 2014, p. 148). The Paraguayan War (1864–1870) was the last interstate conflict in which Brazil participated in South America, and Brazil’s last serious military engagement occurred during the Second World War (Armijo and Sotero 2007, Abdenur 2015, p. 53). Former Minister Unger expressed: ‘no country in the modern world, of dimension comparable to ours, is less belligerent than Brazil’ (Müller Filho and Souza 2008).

Brazil suffers from high and widespread domestic violence despite a largely peaceful external environment (Kenkel 2012, p. 11). Herz (2013, p. 34) defended that the division between a peaceful international realm and a violent domestic sphere undergirds the idea of a peaceful Brazil, as its international relations are characterised by the absence of the use of force. Thies and Nieman (2014, p. 3) found little evidence in identity and militarised conflict lending credence to the notion of an overly aggressive Brazil emerging into higher status. In this context, while Malamud (2011, p. 167) affirmed that ‘Brazil is not, and has no intention of becoming, a military power’, Flatjord (2015) underscored that ‘the Brazilian power profile is characterised by relatively limited military capability’.

When compared to major powers and rising powers, including the other BRICs, Brazil’s military capabilities are limited. Brazil is the only BRIC with no nuclear weapons and its Constitution limits nuclear activities to peaceful purposes. To ensure the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Brazil’s vicinity, nuclear
weapons free zones were created throughout Latin America in 1967 with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and in the South Atlantic in 1986 with the formation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). Brazil and Argentina eliminated the ‘ghost of nuclear competition’, when both countries agreed to abandon this type of weapon and to implement an exemplary mutual control system (Bertonha 2010, p. 109, Valladão 2014, p. 149).

Brazilian diplomat Cozendey stipulated: ‘Brazil has a particular characteristic in relation to other power poles of not being a large source of military power … Hence, it does not have the vocation for important military actuation’ (Rodriguez 2013, p. 131). Although among the fifteen largest worldwide, Brazil’s military spending is low compared to those of the US or other BRICs. Amounting to US $31.7 billion in 2014, Brazil’s military expenses represent 5.2% of US spending, 8.29% of the BRICs total military expenses, and 1.8% of world share, while the US and China respectively equal 34 and 12% of world spending. In the last decade, whereas China’s military expenditures grew by 167%, those of Brazil increased by 41%. Brazil’s military spending represents 1.4% of GDP (68th worldwide); those of several major powers or emerging powers range from 2 to 4.5%. Also, Brazil’s armed forces (335,000 men) are the fifteenth largest worldwide and account for 24.3% of those of the US and 6.96% of the BRICs total troops. Categorised as ‘Tier 2 producer’, Brazil’s defence industry was the 23rd largest globally over 2010–2014 (0.2% of world share), far below the largest exporters (IISS 2015/2016, Vucetic and Duarte 2015, p. 408, SIPRI 2015, p. 407).

Consequently, Brazil’s defence apparatus has never been very relevant as a wedge of influence (Alsina 2009, p. 183). Air Force Brigadier Delano Menezes commented: ‘we are incapable of doing anything. Our capacity is fictional. Should we go to war, we would not have the condition to sustain the fighting for one day. Effectiveness to defend Brazil is zero’. In other words, Brazil’s armed forces ‘are not really prepared for a real confrontation’. Due to the lack of imminent security challenges (in contrast with the other BRICs), the mistaken association of defence matters with the military’s historical role in internal affairs and the persistence of socioeconomic challenges, defence issues in Brazil are not a priority. Mandatory outlays on salaries, pensions and benefits, accounting for around 70–80% of the Brazilian defence budget, are viewed as excessive. Over 2000–2011, Brazil allocated only 14% of its defence budget to material investment and acquisition vs. 30% for China and India, while Brazil’s investments in military R&D are modest.

In this context, the majority of Brazil’s defence forces utilise out-dated defence equipment and weaponry, which causes the impossibility of a prompt response (Rizzo de Oliveira apud SEEP 2012, Rodriguez 2013, pp. 133–145, Quéau 2014, Gouvea 2015, p. 140, IISS 2015/2016, p. 368).

Yet, former Minister Amorim (2013, p. 135) declared: ‘a peaceful country is not synonymous with a defenceless country. The complement of a peaceful foreign policy is a robust defence policy’. In this sense, there is no incurable contradiction between Brazil’s constructed ‘peaceful tradition’ and increasing investments in defence, especially regarding resources for deterrence (Belém Lopes apud Lima 2015, pp. 53, 54). Consequently, ‘the South American giant, wanting to avoid being seen as a politico-military dwarf, embarked in a re-equipment strategy aimed at reducing its vulnerability with regards to the new and old powers’ (BBC 2010).

Indeed, due to vast and porous land borders, separating Brazil from nearly all the other South American countries, and coastline, where most of the demographic and industrial centres are located, Brazil’s territory is exposed. Focusing on two strategic areas, the Amazon and the ‘Blue Amazon’, Brazil looks to preserve its vast reserves of natural resources – agricultural products, freshwater, oil, minerals, etc.

In this context, Brazil’s defence policy closely associates defence, cooperation and development (Ramalho 2016, p. 2016). Brazilian General Rocha Paiva (2012, p. 320) appraised: ‘deterrence, strategy or effect, is a less aggressive option than action, therefore more coherent with Brazil’s pacifist profile and history in international relations’. Though Brazil should surely not practice acts of aggression, the country should demonstrate its defensive capacity, and react to (or deter) any
threats to its security or interests. In this sense, Brazil looks to obtain a credible military base for defence purposes, as deterrence consists in ‘discourag(ing) the enemy from any military action, demonstrating a cost and risk perspective, where losses surpass the gains’ (Proença and Diniz 1998, p. 3). Also, General Rocha Paiva (2012, pp. 331–334) pinpointed that Brazil has adopted a posture of cooperation and non-confrontation, particularly in its vicinity, and has turned to a growing military cooperation strategy. Brazil looks to stimulate collaboration around defence issues, both in South America and the South Atlantic (e.g. Brazil initiated the creation of the South American Defence Council). Lastly, Abdenur and Souza Neto (2013, p. 10) affirmed: ‘one of the top defence priorities is the promotion of Brazil’s defence industry’.

Brazil wants to strengthen its defence industry to contribute to its economic development and expand autonomy regarding defence material production, through technology transfers (e.g. the nuclear-powered submarine with France or Gripen fighter-jets with Sweden’s Saab).

In sum, unlike global powers, which employ military power to play a role in shaping the international order, Brazil’s power does not rest on military means, distancing itself from the role of a hard power broker, while primarily relying on soft power (Blix apud Calasans and Maranhão 2012, Trinkunas 2015). Ambassador Ricupero (2010) stated: ‘Brazil, which is neither a nuclear power, nor a conventional military power, has almost no hard power, but has soft power, giving Brazil power of influence and example that the country would never attain through arms’.

Evaluating Brazil’s ‘soft power’ potential

While assessing that Brazil certainly belongs to the group of emerging powers, Gardini (2015, pp. 3–5) confirmed that consensus exists on the essentially soft nature of Brazil’s power. Marsili (2015, p. 77) and Satana (2016, p. 134) argued that Brazil exercises its soft power in an effort to carve out a leading role in world politics, and has thus manoeuvred to achieve its goal to be a global player through soft power.

Depicting the Brazilian viewpoint on soft power, former Minister Amorim underscored the ‘use of culture and civilisation, not of threats. It means believing in dialogue, not force’ (Lustig 2010). Marcelo Neri, former Minister of Strategic Affairs, added: ‘Brazil has a natural vocation for diplomacy and dialogue. It is impossible to avoid the Brazilian spirit. The Brazilian (is) the mediator of conflict led by diplomacy’ (Giraldi 2012). In this sense, Brazil’s international role is sustained by the soft power expressed in its powers of persuasion, mediation and capacity for dialogue with several countries. Brazil’s attempt to play a mediation role by issuing the Tehran Declaration with Iran and Turkey constitutes a significant example of its approach to global security, which emphasises political advocacy and dialogue to solve international problems. Supporting negotiated solutions and non-punitive actions on the international stage, Brazil believed diplomacy was the least damaging option with Iran and sought to reduce US strategies emphasising threats and costs, which reflects its soft power credentials. Indeed, Brazil is sceptical about the efficacy of sanctions, and generally opposed to their use as an international policy tool to enforce compliance on states flouting international norms, because sanctions are likely to radicalise their positions. Even though Brazil’s policy towards Iran’s nuclear programme suffered from strong criticism and major powers (especially the US) ignored the fuel-swap deal negotiated with Iran, Brazilian policymakers viewed the Tehran Declaration as underlining the inefficacy of sanctions as an instrument to obtain Iran’s cooperation and had shown that dialogue and persuasion could do more than punitive actions (Marques 2005, p. 62, Jesus 2010, p. 556, Christensen 2013, p. 282, Thakur 2014, p. 1795, Viotti apud Amorim 2015, p. 87).

Brazil also wanted to participate in the creation of the necessary conditions for the establishment of constructive dialogue and peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine (Muxugato 2016, p. 97). Former Minister Amorim (2010, p. 214) stressed: ‘we are a peaceful country. We choose to settle our disputes diplomatically – and we encourage others to act the same way’. In what he termed his ‘mission of peace’ and estimating that the peace process required ‘someone with neutrality’, President Lula was the first Brazilian President to officially visit Israel and the
Palestinian territories in March 2010, after declaring the US was incapable of negotiating a resolution of conflict and should step aside in favour of other actors. When Brazil recognised Palestine along the 1967 borders in December 2010, President Lula stated: ‘Brazil has historically defended, particularly during my administration, the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a cohesive, safe democratic, and economically viable state coexisting in peace with Israel’ (Datz and Peters 2013, pp. 48, 49). As Hurrell (2010, p. 13) explained, Brazil’s ‘diplomatic soft power has depended on the claim that it can act as an interlocutor with many different kinds of states and political systems’.

Brazil strongly contemplates security in the context of peaceful conflict resolution, and posits that force should only be employed in last resort after the exhaustion of all non-military alternatives. In this sense, Brazil’s careful position regarding Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) emphasises Pillar One and Pillar Two (primary state responsibility and development of cooperation measures to help in prevention), which should not be diminished in relation to the ‘most controversial’ Pillar Three, allowing action by the international community including force. Brazil has thus been supportive of the potential role of development within an RtoP framework, while shying away from approximation to elements related to the use of force. Ambassador Viotti, then Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, declared: the third pillar is subsidiary to the first one and a truly exceptional course of action, or a measure of last resort. Among the two pillars directly related to the international community, the one regarding assistance and capacity-building must certainly concentrate our attention and energy. (Kenkel 2012, p. 25, Kenkel and Rosa 2015, p. 334)

In this perspective, Brazil proposed the notion of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) to complement the concept of RtoP. This proposal leaves no doubt about to the dubiousness Brazil entertains regarding the effectiveness of military means for conflict-resolution; Garwood-Gowers (2015, p. 16) confirmed: ‘scepticism about the efficacy of force is a central theme in Brazil’s RwP concept note’. As such, its merits lie in making a strong case for conflict prevention, the exhaustion of diplomatic avenues, and sharpened instruments to implement RtoP, so as to avoid the aggravation of conflicts, leading to civilian suffering.

For Reid (2014), Brazil stepped up its tradition of participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and has thereby made an effort to deploy soft power. Kenkel (2013, p. 282) affirmed that the availability of military force is not the most important element of Brazil’s peacekeeping effort, as its ‘soft peacekeeping’ paradigm correlates peace, security and development to solve conflicts and their deep causes (focusing on integrated socio-economic development and peace-building over peace enforcement). Academic and political circles have frequently referred to the idea of Brazil leading a distinct peacekeeping type, allowing Brazilian soldiers to play a role in resolving conflicts and enabling Brazil to showcase its perceived added value regarding its expertise on stabilisation, and its record on development and conflict mediation (Fernández and Gama 2016, p. 74). Kenkel (2013, p. 285) enumerated several components: cultural affinities easing communication difficulties with local actors; close contact with local populations; exportation of successful domestic socioeconomic policies, like combating poverty, hunger and underdevelopment; focus on developing peacebuilding aspects rather than security, using a South–South cooperation rhetoric and solidarity diplomacy to differentiate from the Western liberal paradigm. The result of Brazil’s stance may be evaluated in diverse material produced by the media reflecting deep commotion among local civilians in Mozambique, Angola and East Timor, at the Brazilian troops’ departure from those countries, or exemplifying the Haitians’ affection for the troops partaking in the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (Aguilar 2012, p. 220). As Hédi Annabi, then Secretary General’s Special Representative to Haiti, stressed: the Brazilian contingent and the exceptional Force Commanders have made an invaluable contribution to the stabilisation process … It corresponds to the ideal of UN peacekeeping, according to which peace cannot ultimately be imposed through force, but must be consolidated by winning hearts. (Chagas 2010, p. 719)
Brazilian undertakings, including the country’s participation in UN PKOs, engagement with RtoP and participation in the Tehran declaration, evidence Brazil’s desire to develop its global standing as a committed and responsible actor through its serious attempts to become directly involved in tackling high-level global peace and security challenges, usually handled by major powers. If one considers that international leadership requires concrete actions beyond just denouncing imperfections in current international affairs, Brazil moved away from simply criticising the ‘West’ and remaining a sceptical observer on such ‘hot issues’ (Brimmer 2014, p. 135).

Concerning Haiti, former Minister Amorim commented: our participation comes from the principle that peace has a price. This price is that of participation. To be absent or to avoid having an opinion or acting when faced with a situation of crisis can mean exclusion from the decision-making process. (Chatin 2013, p. 12)

Furthermore, Brazil has shown ‘thought leadership’ and positioned itself as an agenda-setter; it has sought to establish itself as an international norm-entrepreneur regarding its notion of RwP and its efforts to reform Internet governance. Though RwP received a lukewarm reaction from the international community, at least initially, and Brazil failed to follow through and proved unwilling to assume leadership in the matter, Brazil called for a more careful approach to military interventions than the older RtoP principle and took on a role of norm-entrepreneur through RwP (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014b, p. 3, Engstrom 2014, p. 22, Kenkel and Rosa 2015, p. 327).

Following revelations of the National Security Administration’s surveillance of Brazilian targets, President Rousseff denounced the US massive collection of personal information on Brazilian citizens (including her) and economic espionage targeted at the country’s key industries. In her speech at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2013, she announced that her country would ‘present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet and ensure the effective protection of data travelling through the web’. Brazil sponsored, together with Germany, a UN Resolution to promote the right of privacy on the Internet, helping to create new momentum for the global discussion on digital privacy, a step toward stigmatising indiscriminate global surveillance as a wide-scale violation of human rights. Ambassador Patriota said: ‘through this resolution the General Assembly establishes, for the first time, that human rights should prevail irrespective of the medium and therefore need to be protected offline and online’. Ronaldo Lemos, one of the creators of the Marco Civil da Internet (Brazil’s law regulating the use of the Internet), commented that the US had lost ground in the debate on the Internet, and the responsibility of moving forward on this had fallen to Brazil. Brazil claimed a degree of leadership in proposing solutions and placed itself at the forefront of the international debate on Internet governance. In parallel, Brazil hosted and led the NETMundial, a multistakeholder international conference on cybersecurity in April 2014, ‘successfully demonstrat(ing) how a global multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance policy-making could work’, as well as the 2015 Internet Governance Forum. Also, at a domestic level, Brazil took an extremely important leadership step by enacting the Marco Civil, which safeguards citizens’ digital rights on key fronts, including the right to privacy and free expression online, and serves to reinforce the application of the rule of law in the digital sphere. This law establishes Brazilian support for net neutrality as a guiding principle for future Internet developments. The Marco Civil, which represents a victory for democracy through its concern with public interest, can potentially serve as a model for other nations seeking to enact legislative measures that enshrine the protection of human rights online, and counters the negative global trend of governments restricting the Internet user’s digital activity within national borders (Canineu and Donahoe 2014, Pinheiro 2014, Ruvolo 2014, Lemos apud Tozzetto 2014, Abdenur and Gama 2015).

Enabling the country to act as a bridge-builder, Brazil has opened itself to nontraditional partners and developing regions, expanding the ability to maintain diplomatic relations with all kinds of states and political regimes; in fact, Brazil is
one of the few countries worldwide to maintain relations with all UN members and its observers. Hence, the rationale behind the idea that ‘it is the great skill of Brazil to be everybody’s friend’ is that, by valuing the establishment of non-excluding partnerships, the country can be flexible enough within its foreign policy to pursue ties indiscriminately and to engage and deepen ties with players from the entire spectrum of international actors (Amorim apud Lustig 2010, Burges 2013, Casanova and Kassum 2014). Yet, Brazil’s refusal to exclude certain states based on a priori notions of compliance or ideological compatibility and its relations with states viewed by global powers as non-compliant or ‘rogue’ generated some controversy and even tensions with the US and its allies (Abdenur 2015, pp. 59–72). For Sandal (2014, p. 701), Brazil’s foreign policy agenda was diversified to fully reflect its soft power agenda. Several examples can illustrate this policy of ‘autonomy through diversification’ (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007):

• Brazil overtook the UK as regards the number of embassies in Africa (their number increased from 17 to 38 from 2003 onwards), and reciprocally, 17 new African embassies were opened in Brasilia since 2003, bringing the total to 33 diplomatic representations (Souza Neto 2011, p. 78, Stolte 2014, p. 7).

• President Lula was the Head of State, among the BRIC leaders, who travelled the most of Africa over 2000–2009, and Africa was the third most visited region over 2003–2014. Also, President Lula was the first Brazilian Head of State to officially visit the Middle East.

• The Middle East, Asia and Africa were regions more cited by President Lula than President Cardoso, while Europe had been more referred to by the latter (Vilela and Neiva 2011).

• Alterations in the Itamaraty’s administrative structure were made: the Department of Africa and the Middle East was divided in two separate departments, dedicated to the respective regions (Miyamoto 2011, p. 124).

• The Africa-South American Summit (created in 2006) and the South American–Arab countries Summit (of which Brazil proposed the creation in 2003 and hosted the first summit in 2005) are mechanisms demonstrating Brazil’s prioritisation of South–South relations.

Though some claimed that President Lula’s government opened too many fronts of actions, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recognised: ‘Brazil is positioned in a strategically very good position to make consensus between the developed and developing countries’ (UN News Centre 2013).

Presenting itself as a good partner, Brazil’s international actions and views are grounded in an attachment to non-intervention and national sovereignty. Expressing discomfort with the idea of a donor-recipient hierarchy, Brazil resists the label of donor, rejects hierarchical or vertical relationships, and insists that its international development assistance is distinct from the Northern model. Brazil has consistently attempted to dissociate itself from the paternalism, conditionality and political interference in domestic affairs, often linked to traditional donors’ image, and proposes assistance that is not based on conditionalities (viewed as interference in domestic affairs and a way to advance donors’ interests rather than foster recipients’ development). Also, claiming to enter cooperation with no pre-set agendas, Brazilian policymakers underscore that Brazil proposes an on-request form of aid, which is thus the result of the recipient’s request and not that of a donor’s offer, with the recipient being the sole decision-maker regarding a project’s relevance, allowing more space and autonomy for recipient countries. Brazilian authorities highlight that commercial interests do not drive their country’s assistance, which is presented as a means to practice solidarity. Also, Brazil’s development assistance represents a ‘partnership in development projects’, based on mutual benefits and transfers of knowledge and capacities (rather than direct money transfer) (Bry 2014, Esteves and Assunção 2014, p. 1781). Originating from countries that received Brazilian assistance, participants in Bry (2014) research have, for the most part, confirmed that such features do indeed characterise Brazil’s cooperation. While those values are embedded in Brazil’s political and juridical cultures, there has been some adaptation in relation to these principles. Particularly exemplified by
RwP, Brazilians broke their non-committal silence and began to engage in earnest with RtoP, coming to accept its moral underpinnings when needing to act beyond borders to respond to grave violations of human rights and international law. Initially referring to non-indifference to explain Brazil’s participation in a Chapter VII mission in Haiti, while Brazil has traditionally favoured participating in PKOs under Chapter VI, President Lula declared in 2004: ‘we do not believe in external interference in internal affairs, but we do not seek refuge in omission and indifference that affect our neighbours’ (Wehner 2011, p. 48). Providing a ‘humanistic’ justification for action, Brazil, which is not ‘indifferent’ in a situation of crisis, should contribute to conflict-resolution and demonstrate ‘active solidarity’, once its involvement has been solicited. Also, Brazil was careful to emphasise continuity with Brazil’s traditional attachment to national sovereignty, as all references to non-indifference in Brazil’s official discourse were followed by the notion of non-intervention (Almeida 2014, pp. 39, 40).

Brazil, which has regularly emphasised the rule of international law as a crucial aspect of its international outlook, has been a strong defender of such values and assumptions to regulate the IS (Tourinho 2015, p. 92, Vieira 2015, pp. 118–123). Brazil disapproved of the 2003 intervention of Iraq by a multi-national military coalition led by the US, since it lacked authorisation from the UN Security Council (UNSC), a position derived from ‘an unconditional respect of the UN Charter and international law’ (Christensen 2013, p. 274, Santos 2014a, p. 198, Brazil 2015). Brazil also criticised the alleged excesses committed by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) states during the implementation of Resolution 1973, reinterpreting its purpose and turning it from a mission to protect civilians into a mission for regime change in Libya, overstepping and distorting the UNSC’s mandate (Stuenkel 2015, p. 134). Ambassador Viotti (2011) warned: ‘we must avoid excessively broad interpretations of the protection of civilians, which could … create the perception that it is used as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change’.

Brazil has shown its concern at the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament initiatives, insofar as nuclear weapons states and global denuclearisation represent a guideline for Brazil’s overseas actions; for instance, Brazil has been an active member of the New Agenda Coalition and contributed, among other initiatives, to the ‘Thirteen Steps’ (practical steps for the systematic and progressive effort to implement nuclear disarmament) (Patti 2010, p. 196, Jesus 2012, p. 376). Ambassador Azambuja (2009) underscored the ‘conviction held in many quarters in Brazil that the nuclear powers have not lived up to their pledges to promote meaningful negotiations toward nuclear disarmament and have failed to fulfill their commitments under Articles V and VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)’, determining nuclear states’ obligation to dismantle their arsenals. Nonetheless, Brazil’s silence on Russia’s Ukraine/Crimea policy was puzzling for some outside observers, insofar as Brazil has traditionally been a fierce defender of sovereignty and non-interference (Trinkunas 2015).

Labelled as a ‘good multilateralist’, Brazil has firmly awarded a place of honour to and relied heavily on multilateralism and showed a willingness to work inside the system (Mantzikos 2010, Abdenur and Gama 2015, p. 463). Ambassador Fonseca (2015, pp. 359–364) declared:

one of the defining features of our international attitude has been the defence and promotion of multilateralism. We developed as an essential characteristic of our foreign policy, a real multilateral vocation … To give prestige to multilateralism is a direct manner to widen the Brazilian diplomatic space.

Indeed, ‘international Institutions’ were among the themes most cited by President Lula (and President Cardoso beforehand). Brazil demonstrated broad adhesion and was a founding member of the principal organisations (the UN, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) most prominently). Brazil sat ten times as non-permanent member in the UNSC since the UN’s creation and was thus the country most elected together with Japan; Brazil has the prerogative to open the UNGA Annual General Debates, and President Rousseff was the first Brazilian Head of State to make a speech at the UNGA every year during her mandate,
depicting the importance of multilateralism in Brazilian foreign policy. Holding leadership positions in the WTO and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) constitute the most recent examples of the relevance Brazil has attributed to multilateral forums, and the pull of its soft power in the multilateral arena (Vilela and Neiva 2011, Mello 2014, p. 109, Casarões 2015, p. 32, Mares 2016, p. 251).

Yet, Brazil demonstrated more confrontational behaviour towards the non-proliferation regime: it only ratified the NPT in 1998, refuses to sign the Additional Protocol (allowing extra inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to check for undeclared material inside a country) and in 2004, denied IAEA inspectors full visual access to the Resende uranium enrichment facility (Stuenkel 2010b, p. 540, Jesus 2012, pp. 377–379). Hence, while for Kyrous (2014, p. 18), ‘Brazil’s multilateral agenda … complements the long list of Brazilian soft power resources’, and for Saraiva (2014a, p. 66), ‘President Lula’s government consolidated its soft power initiatives through reinforced multilateralism’.

Brazil, which envisions itself as the most active in the IS (least as a ‘bystander’) in a group of countries selected by Wang and French (2013, p. 993), has shown a predisposition for multilateral action. Taking an active role in multilateral institutions and arenas has been an important component of Brazilian foreign policy; commercial multilateralism has thus been the option preferred by Brazil’s foreign policy community for its international insertion. As such, Brazil ranks fourth among the most active users of the WTO Disagreement Settlement System, having used it 29 times; in fact, the degree to which states affirmatively employ the WTO system is an important metric for assessing participation in the organisations (Oliveira 2010, p. 26, Bosco and Stuenkel 2015, p. 24, Mares 2016). Most of Brazil’s complaints were directed at developed countries, ten against the US, seven against the EU and three against Canada. Burges and Daudelin (2011, p. 3) posited that Brazil’s success in operating within the WTO’s institutional mechanisms to achieve important and enforceable trade victories against the US and the EU helped establish the global trade body as something other than a simple instrument for perpetuating the existing global order. Also, as a peacekeeping contributor, Brazil has favoured participation in peace operations under the auspices of the UN. Former Minister Amorim explained: ‘multilateralism encounters in the UN its legitimate expression … Its large degree of legitimacy is derived from its universal vocation and the representativeness of its composition … the UN is better equipped than whatever individual country to promote international peace and security’ (Uziel 2010, pp. 102, 103).

Conceiving itself as a regime deepener, Brazil does not intend to overturn and subvert existing international institutions, but to reform and expand them to make them more representative, participatory and legitimate (so as to improve their efficiency), while working to occupy spaces and positional advantages. Hirst (2005, p. 100) and Lima (2010, p. 3) characterised Brazil’s foreign policy as ‘soft revisionist’. Doctor (2015, p. 12) confirmed that Brazil is highly unlikely to push for radical changes in global governance structures, but rather to strongly advocate for their revision, so as to create a more inclusive IS and to adapt them to negotiate Brazil’s ascension and to increase its influence. In fact, Brazil is among the countries most referring to the reform of global governance structures in Wang and French’s study (2013, p. 993). President Rousseff (2011) claimed: governance structures need to change accordingly, to reflect the world as it is today, in particular the (UNSC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Developing countries need to have their voices heard, and their concerns and contributions taken into account. Brazil has defended a revision of global governance institutions, including the UNSC, which occupied a prominent position during President Lula’s government, maintained with less impulse by President Rousseff. Together with India, Germany and Japan in the G4, Brazil presented its accession to a permanent UNSC seat as a ‘natural’ component of any meaningful reform, exemplifying the country’s effort to make itself more present on the global scene. Brazil also exercised a considerable role in turning the G20 into the main economic forum instead of the G8 (Lins and Silva 2011, p. 27, Saraiva 2014b, p. 29, Hirst 2015, p. 362). Brazil has voiced
strong support for the implementation of the IMF and World Bank reforms, since advanced economies are overrepresented in these institutions, while developing and emerging countries are underrepresented; considering the deadlock of reform, Brazil has worked with its BRICS peers to establish the New Development Bank (NDB) and a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). NDB’s Vice President Nogueira Batista argued that none of the BRICS wanted to break with the World Bank or the IMF, but they did not meet sufficient understanding from countries like the US regarding the changes that took place in the world. In this sense, the BRICS went out of their way to emphasise that the NDB and CRA will ‘complement’ existing institutions (Stuenkel 2013, Gandra 2014). For Saidi (2014), the BRICS institutions mark ‘the delayed shift of ‘soft power’ from the ‘West’, from the US and Europe, to emerging economies confirming the shift in economic and financial weight’.

In the Global South, Brazil was seen as a role model of economic prowess. Brazilian authorities claim that Brazil, as a successful story of a country rapidly transitioning from high-levels of inequality to a model for promoting social equality and empowerment, is much better placed than advanced economies to advise on the development strategies of other developing nations (Fernández and Gama 2016, p. 74). Marco Farani, former Director of Brazil’s Cooperation Agency (ABC), explained:

because of similarities in social and economic realities and challenges to be faced in many areas, partner countries can absorb knowledge resulting from exchanging experiences with Brazil, which are more easily adapted and applied to real cases if compared to solutions offered by traditional partners. (Cabral and Shankland 2013, p. 5)

In fact, developing countries are confident in turning to Brazil, and in its ability to understand realities, local peculiarities and needs better than Western powers. Also, the Brazilian socioeconomic model’s success during President Lula’s administration prompted its adoption in other countries, encouraged by example and technical assistance; as Brazil’s successes in addressing development issues has made its assistance highly attractive, Brazilian foreign policymakers have consciously desired to build soft power by showing the world the success of Brazil’s development as a reference model and by exporting its programmes as examples to be followed. Indeed, Brazil’s cooperation has been based on its ‘areas of national excellence’ and domestic policy programmes that ‘have attained considerable success’ and ‘sparked the interest of other developing countries’ (Cabral and Weinstock 2010, p. 6, Burges 2014, p. 368, Saraiwa 2014a, p. 66). For Gardini (2015, p. 5), Brazilian cooperation has been a model for emerging powers thanks to Brazil’s domestic policy achievements and their perceived success. Brazil acts as a collective actor defending the developing world’s interests, evidencing its role as a pan Southern leader (Burges 2013, p. 582). For example, Brazil, which asserts its strategic need to develop and master technology, identified with Iran’s needs and demands to enrich uranium for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, respecting and defending Iran’s right according the NPT’s concessions – considering restrictions cannot be imposed on NPT signatories’ use and production as long as they meet their obligations. As such, the first clause of the 2010 Tehran Declaration recalled ‘the right of all State Parties (to the NPT), including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel-cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination’.

Brazil donned the mantle of spokesman for developing countries’ interests, while taking on a role as G20-T leader at the WTO (Stephen 2012, p. 293). For Narlikar (2010, p. 721), greater weight and voice for Brazil in trade governance have given development concerns unprecedented importance in trade negotiations, auguring a more development-friendly WTO; development remains central to the Doha Development Agenda, partly because the WTO has major developing countries at its helm. Also, under Brazil’s leadership, agriculture was made the Doha Round’s central focus, constructing agricultural subsidies as a critical development and global poverty issue, in which developing countries were pitted in a struggle against rich countries. As such, the G20-T is frequently characterised as successfully projecting
the global South’s interests and development concerns onto the international stage. Epitomising a Southern diversification process, Brazil became an eminent player in the negotiations, definitively entering the WTO’s high-levels of decision-making and occupying a prominent role in the multilateral trade area, as it acted as a representative of the developing world by leading the G20-T, which operated as a ‘launching pad’ for Brazil’s integration into the WTO power structures. Brazil helped developing countries to have the boldness to withstand developed countries’ pressures, refusing to accept pre-cooked deals and decisions exclusively taken by the US and the EU, and showing it was impossible to advance proposals without the developing countries’ participation (Bello 2005, Efstathopoulos 2012, p. 283, Hopewell 2013, pp. 611–615, Schor and Onuki 2015, p. 215). In 2008, the Brazilian and Indian Foreign and Trade Ministers declared: ‘one thing that we can celebrate is that rules here are no longer made by rich countries. They have to take us into account, and that will continue to be so’ (Narlikar et al. 2012, p. 261).

Brazil has long been a central player in global environmental politics and a negotiation leader among the global South’s nations on environmental issues; as such, Brazil’s developing country solidarity can explain Brazil’s influence in climate change governance, because it appears to draw together the developing world’s interest in climate talks (Bratman 2015, pp. 93–99, Edwards and Roberts 2015, p. 77). Brazilian policymakers defend this principle, arguing that solving environmental issues can happen only if the threats related to climate change are faced under the realisation that we all have common, yet differentiated responsibilities. To preserve developing countries’ interests, Brazil has defended the existing international climate change regime, especially its ‘differentiated’ architecture, distinguishing the obligations of developing countries from those of developed countries, which should take the lead in combating climate change and its adverse effects due to their ‘historical’ contribution to global warming, as well as providing financial and technical assistance to developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Brazil has promoted the protection of the developing world’s right to pursue socioeconomic development, parallel to the fight against climate change, which should thus not hinder their central priority of advancing economic development (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012, p. 469. Vieira 2013, p. 373, Casanova and Kassum 2014). ‘Environmental protection must be planned as a means to promote development and not as an obstacle to the rising expectations of the underdeveloped world’ (The Economist 2011). Yet, playing down its own environmental role in the world stage could cast doubt on Brazil’s ability to represent the small and poor developing countries and island states, which will suffer most acutely from the global warming’s impact and thus have misaligned interests (Thakur 2014, pp. 1797–1799). In consequence, Brazil seems to have recognised that a more constructive engagement in climate change, and new flexibility in the negotiations, would be more advantageous to its soft power credentials and foreign policy objectives, and the country has thus sought to take responsibility on global environmental issues. For instance, Brazil has announced, in 2009 and 2015, concrete and quantitative mid-targets to mitigate its emissions, displaying its readiness to take voluntary action to address the climate change problem; Brazil has also aimed to establish itself as a leading and responsible voice by hosting significant environmental events (UN Summit on Sustainable Development in 1992 and Rio+20 Summit); domestically, Brazil’s improving deforestation rates and investments in renewable energies are laudable environmental achievements (Bratman 2015, pp. 99–127).

For Mares (2016, pp. 167–261), Brazil is an example of ‘soft power emerging power’, for which soft power is key to realising its leadership aspirations; Brazil represents the soft power path to achieving acceptance in leadership positions of the international order. In this perspective, this article showed, through the analysis of Brazil’s soft power potential in comparison to its military capacity, that the country has made an increasingly significant and constructive global contribution, in particular thanks to its soft power characteristics.

Conclusion
President Cardoso (2011, p. 49) claimed: ‘the important contribution Brazil has to give to the construction of the current international order should occur through soft power’. This article aimed to evaluate Brazil’s soft power potential and determine whether, through its soft power line of conduct, rather than its military capabilities, the country could live up to its historical ambition of ‘greatness’. Relying on role theory and the ideas of role conception and role performance, this article analysed the case of Brazil and studied its limited military capacities and its foreign policy. Brazil often puts forward its ‘peaceful country in a peaceful region’ character. As of now, Brazil does not aim to become a military power and its military capabilities are limited: unlike the other BRICs, Brazil does not possess nuclear weapons; its defence spending is low compared to those of the US or the other BRICs, and most of its expenditures go to personnel rather than weapons procurement; its military equipment is obsolete. Yet, Brazil looks to modernise its military competence, with deterrence, cooperation and development as defence thinking objectives. As Brimmer (2014, p. 136) suggested, ‘Brazil has eschewed exerting military power – instead, it touts soft power propelled by diplomatic prowess to gain international stature’. In fact, Hirst and Lima (2006, p. 21) affirmed that Brazil’s desire to obtain international influence and to be considered a major player has been understood principally in terms of its soft power. As such, Brazil has aimed to fulfil its role as soft power broker through what Vieira (2013) characterised as its ‘softpower mix’, which includes the country’s peaceful, conciliatory, multilateral and legalist traditions, and a social-economic dimension. The country encourages the peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic means, including mediation, dialogue and ‘bridge-building’, as illustrated by its participation in the Tehran declaration, and its offer to solve the Israel-Palestine conflicts. Brazil stresses that force should only be used as a last resort, as shown by its participation in UN peacekeeping and its approach to RtoP. Brazil’s RwP proposal and the steps taken regarding Internet governance establish Brazil as an agenda-setter. Brazil also condemned the intervention in Iraq without UN authorisation; it accused NATO of surpassing the mission’s mandate in Libya and bringing about regime change; Brazil requests that nuclear powers dismantle their nuclear arsenals and comply with the terms of the NPT. Showing a strong commitment to multilateralism and a steady presence as a member of international institutions, Brazil prefers to ‘work inside the system’: it is among the most active users of the WTO disagreement settlement system and it favours contributing troops to PKOs under the auspices of the UN. Additionally, Brazil, which works to strengthen and legitimise international institutions, calls for their reform. A ‘Southern power’, Brazil acts as a role model, sharing its expertise through development cooperation based on nationally successful programmes. The country presents itself as a good partner, favouring principles like non-intervention and national sovereignty, and defending developing countries’ interests. For example, Brazil participated in the Tehran declaration and stressed the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy authorised by the NPT.

Considering Brazil’s performance in light of its intended role as a soft power broker, this article establishes that, beyond some discrepancy between objectives and accomplishments, Brazil has indeed relied on soft power to realise its ambition of global political influence, and consolidated its position as a global political soft power-player in the international political arena (Santos 2014b, p. 68). Far from implying that hard power, in the form of military might is now ‘insignificant’ in IR, this paper attempted to provide a case study that opens new perspectives on the potential of an emerging nation attaining international standing through soft power.

Notes
1. The acronym BRICs refers to Jim O’Neill’s original concept.
2. In 2011, just 53 of the Navy’s 100 ships and two out of five submarines could navigate; not even half of the Air Force’s aircrafts could fly and most had over fifteen years of use; only 60% of the Army’s armoured vehicles were usable (Monteiro 2011).
3. Brazil’s ‘traditional’ partners are the US, the EU and South America.
4. The US has 49 embassies in Africa, China (48), Russia (38), Turkey (31) and India.
Brazil’s diplomatic network has been evaluated as ‘overdimensioned’ and ‘underutilised’ (some embassies operate with half of the expected number of employees, and are unable to pay the bills). For ex-Minister Lampreia, it made no sense opening embassies in countries having little relations with Brazil and/or a small diplomatic/commercial expression, considering political/commercial interests and investments justify creating embassies (Stolte 2012, Freitas 2013). The new Foreign Minister José Serra requested a study to analyse the cost and utility of diplomatic representations opened over the past three mandates to eventually close some of them.

The US and Russia, with by far the largest nuclear arsenals, have only made timid efforts to dismantle their nuclear arsenals.

The League of Nations and GATT prior to those. On the contrary, after its expulsion from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China joined the WTO in 2001 and Russia joined in 2011.

The Rousseff government was the first in three decade during the course of which Brazil was not elected for a non-permanent UNSC seat, and the country has not yet negotiated its return (Casarões 2016). Also, Brazil is now the second largest debtor to the UN, after the US.

Behind the US, the EU and Canada.

Some view Brazil as seeking to reform existing institutions to confront the prevailing system; Patrick (2010) characterised Brazil as an ‘irresponsible stakeholder’ and Schweller (2011, p. 295) argued Brazil was ‘the most revisionist of all emerging powers … a rising spoiler’.

For Smith (2015, p. 28) and Milani (2015, p. 42), while rising states demand reforms for a more equitable form of multilateralism, based on a discourse of global justice, they primarily use multilateral institutions to promote their interests, meaning change does not necessarily entail a ‘democratisation’ of governance, but their inclusion in the process from which they are excluded.

The reform of the IMF quota/voting shares were on-hold until the ratification of the 2010 proposal by the US Congress in late 2015.

Yet, due to budget constraints and President Rousseff’s little interest in foreign affairs, Brazil struggles to complete development projects (delayed and undergoing difficulties), concentrating on concluding the already begun projects. Sombra Saraiva signalled frustrations in Africa, due to unfulfilled promises: ‘Brazil promised, particularly to developing countries in Africa, to contribute to their development, and it is already known, in African capital cities, that Brazil does not have the means to achieve this diplomacy’ (Dias Carneiro 2015).

Brazil suffered from analogue pressures from the international community to abandon its nuclear ambitions, achieving uranium enrichment despite international opposition. The US Congress even imposed sanctions on Brazil in the 1980s, when Brazil’s military regime pursued nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology (Patti 2010, p. 190, Stuenkel 2014, p. 2). For Parsi (2012, p. 174), Brazil’s own programme was at the heart of the matter; as a non-nuclear weapons state, with an advanced nuclear fuelcycle capable to enrich uranium, Brazil might come under scrutiny and have its right to enrich denied.

Yet, Brazil came to the Doha Round seeking significant gains on agriculture; Hopewell (2016) expresses doubt on the potential benefits gained by developing countries from agricultural liberalisation and the elimination of subsidies.

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