The Linear Voting Model

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Abstract

We study voting models on graphs. In the beginning, the vertices of a given graph have some initial opinion. Over time, the opinions on the vertices change by interactions between graph neighbours. Under suitable conditions the system evolves to a state in which all vertices have the same opinion. In this work, we consider a new model of voting, called the Linear Voting Model. This model can be seen as a generalization of several models of voting, including among others, pull voting and push voting. One advantage of our model is that, even though it is very general, it has a rich structure making the analysis tractable. In particular we are able to solve the basic question about voting, the probability that certain opinion wins the poll, and furthermore, given appropriate conditions, we are able to bound the expected time until some opinion wins.

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1 Introduction

Graphs are very popular as a simple model of the complex environment in which individuals interact. In this paper we focus in voting models on finite graphs, in which vertices of a given graph have opinions and by interacting with their neighbours they change such opinions. Voting models can be used to mimic real-life situations such as the spread of opinions or infections in a society, the evolution of species or models of particle interaction in physics.

While many models has been proposed in the literature, we do not aim to propose a new particular model, but to unify some of the existing models in a tractable way. With this in mind, we propose a general model of voting, called the Linear Voting Model. This model subsumes several models proposed in the past, including, for example, the push model and the very popular pull model.

Even though the voter model has been widely studied in the case of infinite structures, one of the first rigorous studies on finite structures was made by Donnelly and Welsh [4]. In that work, the authors studied a continuous-time version of the pull voting model and, under the name of infection model, the push voting model. In the continuous time version, each vertex has an exponential clock and when it rings, the vertex selects a random neighbour and pulls its opinion (in the case of pull voting) or pushes its opinion on the neighbour (in the

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1.1 Our model and results

Let $G = (V, E)$ be a graph with $|V| = n$. Define a configuration of opinions as a $n \times 1$ vector $\xi \in \mathbb{Q}^V$, where $\mathbb{Q} = \{0, 1\}$ for the two party model, or $\mathbb{Q} = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ if we want to allow more parties.

Let $\mathcal{M}(V)$ be the set of all $n \times n$ matrices indexed by the elements of $V$, with exactly one 1 entry per row and all other elements 0. Also, define $\Pi(V)$ as the set of probability measures on $\mathcal{M}(V)$. If no confusion arises, we will just write $\mathcal{M}$ instead of $\mathcal{M}(V)$ and $\Pi$ instead of $\Pi(V)$.

Let $l \in \Pi$ be a distribution over matrices in $\mathcal{M}$. Given an initial configuration $\xi$, we define the process $(\xi_t)_{t \geq 0}$, with $t$ running over the non-negative integers, as

$$
\xi_t = \begin{cases} 
\xi, & \text{if } t = 0, \\
M_{t-1}\xi_{t-1}, & \text{if } t > 0,
\end{cases}
$$

where $M_t$ are i.i.d matrices sampled from $l$, and $M\xi$ is the standard matrix-vector multiplication. The above process is called a linear voting model with parameters $(l, \xi)$ and it
is denoted by $(\xi_t) \sim \mathcal{LM}(l, \xi)$. Clearly, $\xi_t(v)$ represents the opinion of vertex $v$ at round $t$. Consider $M \in \mathcal{M}$ and $\xi' = M \xi$, then if all vertices have different opinions, we have that $\xi'(v) = \xi(w)$ if and only if $M(v, w) = 1$. Since $M$ has only one 1 in each row, the voting is well-defined in the sense at every round each vertex adopts the opinion of only one vertex (including itself). Examples of linear voting models include the pull voting (asynchronous or synchronous) and the push voting model.

We proceed to present our contribution. Theorem 1 of this paper gives the probability a particular opinion wins. This generalises the approach used in [6]. Theorem 2 gives an upper bound to the expected consensus time. Our technique is qualitatively different from the approach of previous authors which depended on a detailed dualisation of the voting process, indeed, we follow an approach similar to Levin et al. [7, chapter 17] or Berenbrink [1].

Let $l \in \Pi$ and define the mean matrix $H$ of $l$ as

$$H = H(l) = \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} l(M) M.$$  

From Lemma 4 we have that $H$ is the transition Matrix of a Markov Chain with state space $V$. We denote by $\mu$ the stationary distribution of $H$ (if any). Define the consensus time $\tau_{\text{cons}}$ as the first time all the opinions are the same, i.e., there exists $c$ such that $\xi_{\tau_{\text{cons}}}(v) = c$ for all $v \in V$. Observe $\tau_{\text{cons}}$ is a stopping time and that $c$ is the final opinion of the vertices. We have the following theorem about the winning probability.

> **Theorem 1.** Let $(\xi_t) \sim \mathcal{LM}(l, \xi)$ be a linear voting model with mean matrix $H$ with $\xi \in \{0, 1\}^V$. Assume that $H$ has a unique stationary distribution $\mu$ and that $\tau_{\text{cons}} < \infty$, then

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{opinion 1 wins} | \xi_0 = \xi) = \sum_{v \in V} \mu(v) \xi(v).$$

The above theorem solves the winning probability problem under reasonable conditions, so we focus on the consensus time problem.

Consider the two party model and let $S_t$ be the set of vertices with opinion 1 at the beginning of round $t$. Denote $\mu(S_t) = \sum_{v \in S_t} \mu(v)$, where $\mu$ is the stationary distribution of $H$, and $Z_t = \mu(S_{t+1}) - \mu(S_t)$. Let $\mu^* = \min_{v \in V} \mu(v)$. Define the quantity $\Psi$ as

$$\Psi = \mu^* \min_{S \subseteq V} \frac{\mathbb{E}(|Z_0| | S_0 = S)}{\min\{\mu(S), 1 - \mu(S)\}},$$

where the minimum is over all $S \subseteq V$ except $S = \emptyset$ and $S = V$. Using the above definitions we prove the following theorem.

> **Theorem 2.** Let $(\xi_t)_{t \geq 0} \sim \mathcal{LM}(l, \xi)$ with $\xi \in \{0, 1\}^V$ be a voting model with $\Psi > 0$ then

$$\mathbb{E}(\tau_{\text{cons}}) \leq 64/\Psi.$$  

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and give some examples to gain some intuition and demonstrate the flexibility of the model. In Section 3, we introduce the necessary notation to prove Theorem 1. In Section 4 we prove Theorem 2.

**Notation.** $G = (V, E)$ stands for a simple graph. We assume $|V| = n$. For $v \in V$ we denote by $N(v)$ the neighbourhood of $v$ and define $d(v) = |N(v)|$. Moreover, given $X \subseteq V$, we define $d(X)$ as the sum of the degrees of the vertices in $X$. We use the notation $v \sim w$ to say that $v$ and $w$ are adjacent vertices. $Q$ stands for the set of possible opinions, in general
\(Q = \{0, 1\}\) or \(Q = \{1, \ldots, n\}\). We denote by \(\mathcal{M}\) the set of \(n \times n\) matrices with exactly one 1 in each row and 0 in the other positions. Let \(\Pi\) be the set of probability distribution on \(\mathcal{M}\), and \(l \in \Pi\) be a given probability distribution over matrices in \(\mathcal{M}\). \(M^\top\) denotes the transpose of the matrix \(M\).

## 2 The linear voting model.

Recall the definition of a linear voting model. Given \(l \in \Pi\) and \(\xi \in Q^V\) we say \((\xi_t)_{t \geq 0} \sim \mathcal{LVM}(l, \xi)\) if \(\xi_0 = \xi\) and \(\xi_{t+1} = M_t \xi_t\), \(t \geq 0\), where the \(M_t\) are i.i.d. samples from \(l\). The following models are examples of linear voting.

(a) **Synchronous pull model.** At each round each vertex samples a random neighbour and adopts the opinion of such neighbour.

(b) **Asynchronous pull model.** At each round one vertex \(v\) is selected at random, then it samples a random neighbour and \(v\) adopts the opinion of this neighbour.

(c) **Asynchronous push model.** At each round a vertex \(v\) is selected at random, then it samples a random neighbour and the neighbour adopts the opinion of \(v\).

(d) **Abusive push model.** At each round one vertex \(v\) is selected at random and the whole neighbourhood adopts the opinion of \(v\).

(e) **Pull-push model.** At each round one vertex \(v\) is selected at random, and two neighbours \(u_1, u_2\) are selected randomly (with replacement). Then at the same time, \(u_1\) adopts the opinion of \(v\) while \(v\) adopts the opinion of \(u_2\).

▶ **Remark.** To be precise, the changes in the opinions happen at the end of a round \(t\), prior to round \(t + 1\). In particular if \(v\) adopts the opinion of \(w\) at round \(t\), it means that at round \(t + 1\), vertex \(v\) has the opinion of \(w\) at round \(t\).

▶ **Lemma 3.** The five models defined above are linear voting models.

**Proof Sketch.** We just prove it for the first and second model. For the other models the proof is similar. Let \(\xi_t\) be the configuration of opinions at round \(t\). In the synchronous pull voting at each round each vertex \(v\) samples a random neighbour \(w(v)\) and then \(v\) adopts the opinion of \(w(v)\). Call \(\xi_{t+1}\) the new configuration of opinion. We check that \(\xi_{t+1} = M \xi_t\) where the (random) matrix \(M\) is given by \(M(v, w(v)) = 1\) for all \(v \in V\), and 0 for the others entries. It is straightforward to check that \(M(\xi_t) = M(v, w(v)) \xi_t(w(v)) = \xi_t(w(v)) = \xi_{t+1}(v)\) and also that \(M\) has only one 1 in each row and thus \(M \in \mathcal{M}\).

For the asynchronous pull model, observe that only one vertex \(v\) is selected and then \(v\) adopts the opinion of a random vertex \(w(v)\), while all other vertices keep their opinions unchanged. Call \(\xi_{t+1}\) the new configuration. Define \(M\) as \(M(v, w(v)) = 1\), \(M(u, u) = 1\) for all \(u \neq v\) and 0 for all other entries (\(M\) is like the identity matrix, except in the column of \(v\)). It is not hard to check that the random matrix \(M\) mimics the asynchronous pull model, i.e. \(\xi_{t+1} = M \xi_t\), and that \(M \in \mathcal{M}\).

Remember we define the mean matrix of \(l \in \Pi\) as \(H = H(l) = \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} l(M)M\). Since most of the models are described by rules rather than by giving the explicit distribution \(l\), it might be hard to compute \(H(l)\). Nevertheless, the following lemma helps us to compute \(H\) without exhibiting \(l\) explicitly.

▶ **Lemma 4.** For any distribution \(l\) over matrices in \(\mathcal{M}\), the matrix \(H = H(l)\) is the transition matrix of a Markov chain. Moreover, for every \(t \geq 0\), and \(v, w \in V\),

\[
H(v, w) = P(v \text{ adopts the opinion of } w \text{ at round } t).
\] (3)
The most basic question in any voting model is, ‘who wins?’ In order to answer this question we select a random vertex and then we adopt the opinion of a random neighbour. That happen with probability $\frac{1}{d(w)}$. Then the event $\{v \text{ adopts the opinion of } w \}$ is equal to $\{\xi_{t+1}(v) = 1\}$. Thus, from equation (4)

$$P(\xi_{t+1}(v) = 1|\xi_t) = E(\xi_{t+1}(v)|\xi_t) = (H\xi_t)(v) = \sum_{w \in V} H(v, w)\xi_t(w) = H(v, w).$$

Let $P$ be the transition matrix of a simple random walk on $G$, $A$ the adjacency matrix of $G$ and let $I$ denote the identity matrix. Let $L = D - A$ be the combinatorial Laplacian where $D$ is the diagonal matrix containing the degree sequence of $G$. Moreover, let $F$ be the diagonal matrix defined by $F(v, v) = \frac{1}{d(v)}$. The next theorem gives the matrix $H$ for the linear voting models used in our examples.

\begin{theorem}
The mean matrix of the synchronous pull, asynchronous pull, push, abusive push, pull-push models are, respectively, $H_a = P [6]$ and

$$H_b = \frac{n-1}{n} I + \frac{1}{n} P, \quad H_c = I + \frac{1}{n} P^\top - \frac{1}{n} F, \quad H_d = I - \frac{1}{n} L, \quad H_e = \frac{1}{n} (P + P^\top) + \frac{n-1}{n} I - \frac{1}{n} F.$$

\end{theorem}

\begin{proofsketch}
We compute $H_a$. Observe that $H_a(v, w)$ is the probability that $v$ adopts the opinion of $w$. That happens only if the random neighbour selected for $v$ is $w$. Then $H_a(v, w) = \frac{1}{n(d(v))} \mathbb{1}_{v \sim w}$, concluding that $H_a = P$. For $H_b$, remember that in asynchronous pull we select a random vertex $v$ and then $v$ adopts the opinion of a random neighbour $w(v)$. Observe that for a vertex $u$ we have $H_b(u, u)$ is the probability that $u$ adopts the opinion of $u$, i.e. the probability that $u$ does not change the opinion. That happen with probability $\frac{n-1}{n}$, On the other hand if $w \sim v$ then we have $H_b(v, w) = \frac{1}{nd(v)}$ because $v$ has to be initially selected and then $v$ has to select $w$ from its neighbourhood. We conclude that $H_b = \((n-1)/n\)I + (1/n)P$. The other cases are similar.

\end{proofsketch}

### 3 Winning probability

The most basic question in any voting model is, ‘who wins?’ In order to answer this question we use some martingale arguments. Assume the two-party model, $Q = \{0, 1\}$. Since the mean matrix $H$ of a linear voting model is a transition matrix, then all its eigenvalues lie in $[-1, 1]$. We order the eigenvalues in decreasing order, i.e. $1 = \lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \ldots \geq \lambda_n$. Let $\lambda$ be an eigenvalue of $H^\top$ ($H$ and $H^\top$ have the same eigenvalues) with corresponding eigenvector $f$, that is $H^\top f = \lambda f$. Given $f, g \in \mathbb{R}^V$, we denote $\langle f, g \rangle = \sum_{v \in V} f(v)g(v)$ the standard inner product. Observe that $Q \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, so if $\xi \in Q^V$ and $f \in \mathbb{R}^V$, the inner product $\langle f, \xi \rangle = \sum_{v \in V} f(v)\xi(v)$ is well-defined.

\begin{lemma}
The process $(\langle f, \xi_t \rangle / \lambda^t)_{t \geq 0}$ is a martingale with respect to $(\xi_t)_{t \geq 0}$

\end{lemma}

\begin{proof}
Since $\langle f, \xi_t \rangle$ is bounded, we can check that $\mathbb{E}(\langle f, \xi_{t+1} \rangle | \xi_t) = \lambda \langle f, \xi_t \rangle$ and divide both sides by $\lambda^{t+1}$. By linearity of (conditional) expectation and equation (4) we have

$$\mathbb{E}(\langle f, \xi_{t+1} \rangle | \xi_t) = \langle f, H\xi_t \rangle = \langle H^\top f, \xi_t \rangle = \lambda \langle f, \xi_t \rangle.$$

\end{proof}
Since $H$ is a transition matrix, if the associated Markov chain is recurrent and aperiodic then the Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution. Denote this stationary distribution by $\mu$. It is a classic result of the theory of finite Markov chains that $\mu$, interpreted as a vector, is the unique eigenvector of $H^\top$ with eigenvalue 1. We assume the vector $\mu$ is scaled so that $\sum_{v \in V} \mu(v) = 1$. Since, among all eigenvectors, $\mu$ is the most important we denote by $m_t = \langle \mu, \xi_t \rangle$ the martingale associated with the eigenvalue 1, and we call this martingale the voting martingale.

**Proof of Theorem 1.** Denote by $1$ and $0$ the vector where all components are 1 and 0 respectively. Since $(\xi_t)_{t \geq 0}$ always reaches consensus, it converges to 1 or 0 and thus $(m_t)_{t \geq 0}$ converges to 1 or 0. Moreover, $0 \leq m_t = \sum_{v \in V} \mu(v) \xi_t(v) \leq 1$ for every $\xi_t \in \{0, 1\}^V$, so $(m_t)_{t \geq 0}$ is a bounded martingale. These two properties of $(m_t)_{t \geq 0}$, together with the fact that $\tau_{\text{cons}}$ is a stopping time, allows us to apply the optional stopping theorem [5] to conclude $E(m_0) = E(m_{\tau_{\text{cons}}}$. Since $\xi_0 = \xi$ is a deterministic quantity then $E(m_0) = m_0$. Moreover

$$E(m_{\tau_{\text{cons}}}) = \langle \mu, 1 \rangle P(\xi_{\tau_{\text{cons}}} = 1|\xi_0 = \xi) + \langle \mu, 0 \rangle P(\xi_{\tau_{\text{cons}}} = 0|\xi_0 = \xi) = P(\xi_{\tau_{\text{cons}}} = 1|\xi_0 = \xi).$$

Hence $P(\xi_{\tau_{\text{cons}}} = 1|\xi_0 = \xi) = m_0 = \langle \mu, \xi \rangle$, therefore

$$P(\text{opinion 1 wins}|\xi_0 = \xi) = \sum_{v \in V} \mu(v)\xi(v).$$

**Corollary 7.** Assume the same conditions of Theorem 1 but consider $Q = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. Suppose that $\xi \in Q^V$. Then the probability that $k \in Q$ wins is

$$P(\xi_{\tau_{\text{cons}}} = k|\xi_0 = \xi) = \sum_{v \in V:\xi(v)=k} \mu(v).$$

**Proof.** Replace opinion $k$ by opinion 1 and all other opinions by opinion 0, and then use Theorem 1.

**Theorem 8.** Let $G$ be a connected graph. Let $A$ be the set of vertices whose initial opinion is 1. Then, given that the models reach consensus, the probability $p$ that opinion 1 wins is

(a) synchronous pull model: $p_a = d(A)/d(V)$
(b) asynchronous pull model: $p_a = d(A)/d(V)$
(c) push model: $p_c = (\sum_{v \in A} d(v)^{-1})/(\sum_{v \in V} d(v)^{-1})$
(d) abusive pushing model: $p_d = |A|/n$
(e) pull-push model: $p_e = |A|/n$.

**Proof.** We apply Theorem 1. For that we need to find the stationary distribution of the above models. The stationary distribution of $P$ is $\pi(v) = d(v)/d(V)$, that gives us the result for synchronous pull. Observe that $(n-1)/nI + (1/n)P$ is a lazy version of the random walk of $P$, then it has the same stationary distribution, giving us the result for the asynchronous pull model. For the push model we just guess the stationary distribution and check it. Let $C = 1/(\sum_{v \in V} d(v)^{-1})$ and let $\pi'(v) = C/d(v)$, then as $F = F^\top$

$$(H_c^\top \pi)(v) = ((I + \frac{1}{n}P - \frac{1}{n}F)\pi')(v) = \pi'(v) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{w \in V} P(v, w)\pi'(w) - \frac{1}{n} F(v, w) \pi'(v)$$

$$= \pi'(v) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{w: w \sim v} \frac{C}{d(v)} d(w) - \frac{C}{d(v)n} \sum_{w: w \sim v} 1/d(w) = \pi'(v)$$

proving that $\pi'$ is the stationary distribution of the mean matrix of the push model. For the abusive pushing model observe that as $I - (1/n)L$ is a symmetric matrix, its stationary distribution is uniform. $H_e$ is also symmetric, giving the result for the push-pull model.
\section{Consensus Time}

In this section we assume the two-party model with opinions \( Q = \{0, 1\} \). Let \((\xi_t)_{t \geq 0} \sim \mathcal{V}(l, \xi)\) be a linear voting model. Assume \( H = H(l) \) has a unique stationary distribution and let \((m_t)_{t \geq 0}\) be the voting martingale defined in Section 3. We use the following convenient notation. Let \( S_t \) be the set of vertices with opinion 1 at the beginning of round \( t \), let \( \mu(S_t) = m_t = \langle \mu, \xi_t \rangle \), and let \( Z_t = \mu(S_{t+1}) - \mu(S_t) \). Note that, since \( \mu(S_t) \) is a martingale, \( \mathbb{E}(Z_t | S_t = S) = 0 \). The random variable \( Z_t \) gives us information about the change in the measure of the set \( S_t \). A larger value of \( |Z_t| \) implies voting finishes faster.

Let \( \eta(S) = \min \{ \mu(S), \mu(S^c) \} \), where \( \mu(S^c) = 1 - \mu(S) \). Denote by \( \eta_t \) the process \( \eta(S_t) \). Since \( \mu(S_t) \in [0, 1] \) we have \( \eta_t \in [0, 1/2] \). Recall that \( \mu(V) = 1 \) and \( \mu(\emptyset) = 0 \). Note that \( \eta_{t+1} = \min \{ \mu(S_t) + Z_t, \mu(S_t^c) - Z_t \} \). Noting that if \( \eta_t = \mu(S_t) \), i.e. \( \mu(S_t) \leq \mu(S_t^c) \), then

\[ \eta_{t+1} \leq \mu(S_{t+1}) = \mu(S_t) + Z_t = \eta_t + Z_t, \]

and if \( \eta_t = \mu(S_t^c) \), the same applies by noticing that \( \mu(S_{t+1}^c) - \mu(S_t^c) = -Z_t \), i.e.

\[ \eta_{t+1} \leq \mu(S_{t+1}^c) = \mu(S_t^c) - Z_t = \eta_t - Z_t, \]

then in both cases we get

\[ \eta_{t+1} \leq \eta_t + \rho_t Z_t, \]

where \( \rho_t = \rho(S_t) = 2 \mathbb{1}_{\{ \mu(S_t) \leq \mu(S_t^c) \}} - 1 \). Observe \( \rho_t \in \{-1, +1\} \). We are going to study the process \( \sqrt{\eta_t} \), in particular, \( \mathbb{E}(\sqrt{\eta_t}) \). Define \( \Upsilon(S) \) by

\[ \Upsilon(S) = \mathbb{E} \left( Z_t^2 \mathbb{1}_{\{ \rho_t Z_t < 0 \}} \big| S_t = S \right) \]

and define \( \Upsilon = \min \frac{\Upsilon(S)}{\eta(S)} \), where the minimum is over all \( S \subseteq V \) but \( S \neq \emptyset \) and \( S \neq V \). With these ingredients we are ready to prove a technical lemma, which is fundamental for the proof of Theorem 2.

\begin{lemma}
Let \((\xi_t)_{t \geq 0} \sim \mathcal{V}(l, \xi)\) with \( \xi \in \{0, 1\}^V \) be a voting model with \( \Upsilon > 0 \) then

\[ \mathbb{E}(\tau_{\text{cons}}) \leq 32/\Upsilon. \]

\end{lemma}

\begin{proof}
We borrow part of the argument from \cite{1}. Let \( S \subseteq V \) but \( S \neq \emptyset \) and \( S \neq V \). By conditioning on \( S_t = S \), from equation (5) we have \( \eta_{t+1} \leq \eta_t + \rho_t Z_t = \eta(S) + \rho_t Z_t \) (we replace \( \eta_t \) by \( \eta(S) \) as \( S_t = S \) is fixed). Then, by taking expectations

\begin{align}
\mathbb{E}(\sqrt{\eta_{t+1}} | S_t = S) & \leq \sqrt{\eta(S)} \mathbb{E} \left( \frac{1 + \rho_t Z_t}{\eta_t} \big| S_t = S \right) \\
& = \sqrt{\eta(S)} \mathbb{E} \left( \frac{1 + \rho_t Z_t}{\eta_t} \mathbb{1}_{\{ \rho_t Z_t \geq 0 \}} \big| S_t = S \right) \\
& + \sqrt{\eta(S)} \mathbb{E} \left( \frac{1 + \rho_t Z_t}{\eta_t} \mathbb{1}_{\{ \rho_t Z_t < 0 \}} \big| S_t = S \right). \tag{7}
\end{align}

Let \( x = \rho_t Z_t/\eta_t \). It can be checked that \( x \geq -1 \). Indeed, from equation (5) we have \( \rho_t Z_t \geq \eta_{t+1} - \eta_t \geq -\eta_t \), concluding \( x \geq -1 \).

For $x \geq -1$ the following partial Taylor expansions are valid,

$$
\sqrt{1 + x} \leq 1 + \frac{x}{2},
$$

$$
\sqrt{1 + x} \leq 1 + \frac{x^2}{2} - \frac{x^3}{8} + \frac{x^4}{16}.
$$

To upper bound (7) use (9), and for (8) use (10). Recall that, since $\mu(S_t)$ is a martingale, then $E(Z_t | S_t = S) = 0$. After some rearrangement, we obtain

$$
E(\sqrt{\eta+1} | S_t = S) \leq \sqrt{\eta(S)} - \sqrt{\eta(S)}E\left(\left(\frac{(\rho_t Z_t)^2}{8\eta^2} - \frac{(\rho_t Z_t)^3}{16\eta^3}\right)1_{\{\rho_t Z_t < 0\}} \bigg| S_t = S\right)
$$

$$
\leq \sqrt{\eta(S)} - \frac{\rho_t^2}{8\eta} E\left(1_{\{\rho_t Z_t < 0\}} \bigg| S_t = S\right)
$$

$$
= \sqrt{\eta(S)} - \frac{1}{8\eta} \sqrt{\eta(S)}^{3/2} \leq \sqrt{\eta(S)} - \frac{1}{8\eta} \sqrt{\eta(S)}^{1/2}
$$

(11)

In the second inequality we used the fact that we are working in $\{\rho_t Z_t < 0\}$ and after that we used the definition of $\Upsilon(S)$ from (6) and $\Upsilon = \min(\Upsilon(S)/\eta(S))$. Remember that $\eta(0) = \eta(1) = 0$, then

$$
E(\sqrt{\eta+1}) = \sum_{S \subseteq V} E(\sqrt{\eta+1} | S_t = S)P(S_t = S) = \sum_{S: S \neq \emptyset, V} E(\sqrt{\eta+1} | S_t = S)P(S_t = S)
$$

$$
\leq \sum_{S: S \neq \emptyset, V} \left(\sqrt{\eta(S)} - \frac{1}{8\eta} \sqrt{\eta(S)}^{1/2}\right)P(S_t = S)
$$

(12)

$$
= E(\sqrt{\eta}) - \sum_{S: S \neq \emptyset, V} \left(\frac{1}{8\eta} \sqrt{\eta(S)}^{1/2}\right)P(S_t = S | \tau_{cons} > t)P(\tau_{cons} > t)
$$

$$
= E(\sqrt{\eta}) - \frac{1}{8} E\left(\sqrt{\eta} | \tau_{cons} > t\right)P(\tau_{cons} > t),
$$

(13)

where (12) follows using equation (11). As $1/x$ is convex for $x > 0$, apply Jensen’s inequality to the random variable $x = \sqrt{\eta}$, to obtain

$$
E\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{\eta}} | \tau_{cons} > t\right) \geq \frac{1}{E\left(\sqrt{\eta} | \tau_{cons} > t\right)} = \frac{P(\tau_{cons} > t)}{E\left(\sqrt{\eta}\right)}.
$$

(14)

The last equality holds because the event $\{\tau_{cons} \leq t\}$ implies that the vertices reached consensus, then $S_t = \emptyset$ or $S_t = V$, hence $\eta_t = 0$, and then

$$
E(\sqrt{\eta}) = E(\sqrt{\eta} | \tau_{cons} > t)P(\tau_{cons} > t) + E(\sqrt{\eta} | \tau_{cons} \leq t)P(\tau_{cons} \leq t)
$$

$$
= E(\sqrt{\eta} | \tau_{cons} > t)P(\tau_{cons} > t).
$$

By substituting (14) into (13) we obtain

$$
E(\sqrt{\eta+1}) \leq E(\sqrt{\eta}) - \frac{1}{8} \frac{P(\tau_{cons} > t)^2}{E\left(\sqrt{\eta}\right)}
$$

then as $\eta_t \in [0, 1/2]$

$$
\frac{1}{8} P(\tau_{cons} > t)^2 \leq E(\sqrt{\eta})E(\sqrt{\eta+1}) - E(\sqrt{\eta+1}) \leq \frac{E(\sqrt{\eta}) - E(\sqrt{\eta+1})}{\sqrt{2}}.
$$
We compute \( E \)
\[ \Upsilon = \min \] we conclude that we reach consensus. As the probability the process does not finish in 
Proof of Theorem 2.
\[ Proof. \]
\[ \] Let \( S \)
\[ \] Recalling the definition of \( \text{Lemma 10} \) in equation(16), gives 
Note that \( E \)
\[ \] Observe that if \( X \)
\[ \] We proceed with the proof of Theorem 2
\[ \] We apply the above theorems to our examples. We use the following notation. Given 
\[ S \subseteq V , \] denote by \( E ( S : S^c) \) the number of edges going from \( S \) to \( S^c \). Denote by \( d_S(v) \) the number of vertices of \( S \) adjacent to \( v \). Observe that \( E ( S : S^c) = \sum_{v \in S} d_S(v) = E_1(S) \). We denote the graph conductance by \( \Phi(G) = \min_{S \subseteq V} E ( S : S^c) \) where \( 0/0 = \infty \).
Example 11. Consider the asynchronous pulling model on a graph $G$.

$$E(|Z_t||S_t = S) = \sum_{v \in S} \frac{d(v)}{d(V)} \frac{1}{n} \frac{d_{S^c}(v)}{d(V)} + \sum_{v \in S^c} \frac{d(v)}{d(V)} \frac{1}{n} \frac{d_S(v)}{d(V)}.$$ 

The above equation holds because with probability $1/n$ we select vertex $v$ and this vertex selects a random neighbour $w$ with probability $1/d(v)$, and adopts its opinion. The stationary distribution of $v$ is $\mu(v) = d(v)/d(V)$. If $w$ has the same opinion as $v$, then $Z_t = 0$, but if $w$ has the opposite opinion then $|Z_t| = d(v)/d(V)$. Then

$$E(|Z_t||S_t = S) = \frac{1}{nd(V)} \left( \sum_{v \in S} d_{S^c}(v) + \sum_{v \in S^c} d_S(v) \right) = \frac{2E(S : S^c)}{nd(V)}$$

(17)

Hence we conclude that $E(\tau_{\text{con}}) = O(nd(V)/d_{\text{min}}\Phi)$. This gives a consensus time of $O(n^2)$ for expanders, which is optimal up to a constant. For the cycle, $O(n^3)$ optimal as well.

Example 12. Consider the push model on a graph $G$. Let $C = (\sum_{v \in V} d(v)^{-1})^{-1}$.

$$E(|Z_t||S_t = S) = \sum_{v \in S} \frac{C}{d(v)} \sum_{w : v \sim w, w \in S^c} \frac{1}{nd(w)} + \sum_{v \in S^c} \frac{C}{d(v)} \sum_{w : v \sim w, w \in S} \frac{1}{nd(w)}.$$ 

The above equation holds because to change the opinion of a vertex $v \in S$, the push model needs to select a vertex $w \in S^c$ adjacent to $v$ and then $w$ needs to push its opinion on $v$. That happens with probability $1/(nd(w))$. In such case, the change in $|Z_t|$ is $\mu(v) = C/d(v)$. The same applies if $v \in S^c$. Then

$$E(|Z_t||S_t = S) = \frac{2C}{n} \sum_{v \in S} \sum_{w \in S^c} \frac{1_{v \sim w}}{d(v)d(w)}.$$ 

(19)

By using the notation $J(S) = \sum_{v \in S} d(v)^{-1}$ and that the stationary distribution is $\mu(v) = C/d(v)$ we have

$$\Psi = \frac{2C}{nd_{\text{max}}} \min_S \frac{\sum_{v \in S} \sum_{w \in S^c} \frac{1_{v \sim w}}{d(v)d(w)}}{\min\{J(S), J(S^c)\}}.$$ 

The parameter $\Psi$ does not seem related to the classical graph parameters.

Example 13. We continue with the abusive push model on a graph $G$.

$$E(|Z_t||S_t = S) = \sum_{v \in S} \frac{1}{n} \frac{d_{S^c}(v)}{n} + \sum_{v \in S^c} \frac{1}{n} \frac{d_S(v)}{n}.$$ 

The above equation holds because with probability $1/n$ we sample a vertex $v$. Then $v$ pushes its opinion on all its neighbours. Since the stationary distribution for this model is $\mu(v) = 1/n$, then the change in $|Z_t|$ is $d_{S^c}(v)/n$ if $v \in S$ and $d_S(v)/n$ if $v \in S^c$. Then $E(|Z_t||S_t) = \frac{2}{n^2} E(S : S^c)$. Then it holds that

$$\Psi = \frac{2}{n^2} \min_S \frac{E(S : S^c)}{\min\{|S|, |S^c|\}}.$$ 

(20)
The parameter \( \min_S \frac{E(S, S^c)}{\min(|S|, |S^c|)} \) is very similar to the graph conductance, indeed, for \( d \)-regular graphs \( \min_S \frac{E(S, S^c)}{\min(|S|, |S^c|)} = d \Phi(G) \). In such case we have that

\[
E(\tau_{\text{cons}}) = O\left( \frac{n^2}{d \Phi} \right).
\]

That gives us a \( O(n^2/d) \) time for regular expanders, which is optimal when the degree is constant. For the complete graph it gives us \( O(n) \), which is far from optimal, since the abusive push model finishes in just one round on the complete graph. For a cycle it gives us a \( O(n^3) \) time which is optimal.

► Example 14. Our final example is for the pull-push model. In this model the stationary distribution is uniform. Then the only way to produce a positive change in \( |Z_t| \) is that when the random vertex \( v \) is chosen to pull and push, it selects one neighbour in \( S \) and the other in \( S^c \). In that case, the change in \( |Z_t| \) will be of \( 1/n \), then

\[
E(|Z_t| | S_t = S) = \sum_{v \in V} \frac{d_{S^c}(v)d_S(v)}{d(v)^2}.
\]

Then

\[
\Psi = \frac{1}{n^2} \min_S \sum_{v \in V} \frac{d_{S^c}(v)d_S(v)}{d(v)^2} / \min\{|S|, |S^c|\}.
\]

Once again \( \Psi \) does not seem related to the classical graph parameters.

5 Discussion

In this paper we introduced and studied the linear voting model. The model can be seen as a generalisation of many models of voting. Despite its generality, the process is tractable and we can compute the probability that a given opinion wins. Moreover, by using a suitable potential function we were able to provide a bound for the expected consensus time.

Furthermore, applying this bound in specific cases led to classical graph parameters, such as conductance, as well to other less familiar, or even new, parameters.

Future work includes the study of particular models on interesting graph families, like expanders, transitive graphs or random graphs, as well as the development of new techniques to analyse the model.

References


