Rethinking Security at the crossroad of International Relations and Criminology

Abstract: This article aims to introduce an in-depth conversation between International Relations (IR) and criminology about security practices and security studies. Too often each discipline has ignored the possibility of a dialogue, or has just borrowed ideas from the other discipline, unreflexively. This has created even more difficulties. But, it is possible to decolonise the topic of security from these traditional approaches, by connecting critical approaches on both side as they share an episteme based on an understanding of the practices of (in)security and the experiences lived by human beings. This is particularly the case of the convergence between the PARIS school of liberty and security analysing (in)security practices and critical criminologists interested in “everyday practices of security”, once they realise on both side that the internal and external security dimensions they study, are neither two different phenomena, nor the very same one, fusional and globalised at the same moment, but a set of differentiated practices that are nevertheless connected along a Mobius strip.

Keywords: security-insecurity-critique-international relations- international political sociology- speech act- Paris school- Mobius strip- experience- practice
Shaking disciplinary walls, analysing (in)security as a Mobius strip

For many years International Relations and Criminology were seen as two very different domains of knowledge dealing with different phenomena, war and external security or crime and internal security. Nowadays some people consider that they can fuse together without any problems because war and crime have now merged into global crime and terrorist jihad as a form of global civil war. Both conceptions are wrong. What we need is neither a wall between disciplines or their fusion into one meta-narrative but their articulation and a reflexive statement about their objects and conditions of production of knowledge. This is what an International Political Sociology focusing on sociology and anthropology of practices of the everyday, i.e. the Paris School, is arguing and this is also what a contemporary criminology represented in the UK, Canada and Belgium whose background is Foucauldian and whose focus is lived experiences, is claiming too. The shaking of the disciplinary walls is therefore necessary, but cannot be built on the illusion of the pure eradication of disciplines in humanities. A no-border social science for a no-border world led only to various colonising moves from each local discipline. IR and criminology have therefore the tendency to pretend to have the aleph of the Borges ’novel, a specific local point permitting nevertheless to have access to a full view of the global and to entertain from there a universal and complete point of view (Borges 1977). Decolonising research from both disciplines supposes therefore to realise that their framing of the world is partial and is very often in homology of positions with the institutional interests and values of the actors they analyse; IR reproducing largely the doxa of military, intelligence services and foreign affairs while criminologists see the world along the frames constructed and projected by police organisations and justice, even when they discuss critically their policies (Bigo 1994). Hence the convergence towards IR and criminology is neither a purely autonomous phenomenon of knowledge nor the result of a merging of war and crime, but the mediation of this “convergence” by different academics in their own field of research of social sciences where the struggles and competitions as well as the common sense resulting from the actors competing around the definition, grammar and pragmatic of security and insecurity are translated into competition, distinction and fame around the forms of knowledge which are the most “useful” to tackle violence and to explain security. At the roots of the misunderstanding of
the initial mutual ignorance of the two disciplines and the current entrepreneurial expertise that tries to fuse them, is therefore their own “unawareness”; unawareness or voluntary misrecognition that they try to project on the “world” itself as if this process of convergence between war and crime, inside and outside, police and military forces was emerging spontaneously from an objective change of delineation of what is security, protection, resilience and what is insecurity, violence and freedom; the process of veridiction (of truth-claim) is therefore described by these social scientists as if academics were seeing the world neutrally and “objectively” (Foucault et al. 1991). Refusing the dualist reality created by IR and criminology, as well as the illusion of objective borders given by the world as it is, while refusing the reverse idea of a boundary-less form of world and knowledge allows for a difficult renewal of a mature dialogue, which is sometimes of course irritating, between specific segments of each discipline. But it creates the opportunity to understand the internal politics of each academic position and the fact that these recognitions of the academic’s own struggles have the investigative power to produce more positively a transversal knowledge specifying the moment and conditions of possibilities of the articulation of military and police practices with the definitions of (in)security. The reflexivity on the relations of power and knowledge between the fields of social sciences and security professionals is therefore central. This is in my view the way to understand for what reason the actors partakes inside from outside, police from military, crime from war not as an objective factor, but as the product of a boundary-making which can be understood as an intersubjective dispute, not around the existence of a differential border itself, but as a controversy about where inside and outside are located in a specific configuration, a little bit like in the topology of a Mobius strip where a surface has only one side but has a border (see figure and conclusion).

This way to conceptualise the relations between IR and criminology, war and crime, military and police contends that the militarisation of policing led to a subordination of police to a military strategic context, or that an international policing has transformed and humanised war. Both are partial and incorrect statements that reveal first and foremost the status of the researcher and its discipline of origin. More importantly a proper reflexive analysis of the connection and involution has to undermine the traditional boundaries of policing and military forces and the use of metaphors regarding a merging of war and crime, to explain instead the rise of status of intelligence services and
technologies of surveillance that transform the field of practices of (in)security and the forms of knowledge mobilised to frame it.

The “detour” by the history of each discipline regarding the other one is therefore not really a detour but the pre-condition for a reflexive understanding of both the regime of justification of the actors when they compete around the definitions of security, with the way in which they translate it into the academic domains and enact other forms of struggles, perhaps more palatable and less dangerous but often nonetheless ferocious when some experts try to invade the territory of others. Between IR and criminology, it can be said that the relations have evolved from a mutual ignorance and an absolute distinction with a pretence of superiority of IR into the emergence of experts that have tried to place themselves as intermediaries between the discipline by strategizing the everyday and by inventing a geopolitical reasoning applied to any individual moving on earth, creating first a series of prejudice against these people, constructing stereotypes, and creating terminologies that evoke a fusion, an indistinction between crime and war, and justifying by return their own position. But, as we will see in a second part, from the margins of each discipline, critical scholars have deconstructed these positions, especially when they have focused on lived experiences of the victims of the process of (in)securitisation.

Security Studies inside International Relations: a tradition of monopolising security as international security.

It is necessary to remind ourselves that the disciplines we are speaking of are far from stabilised and are often under strong difficulties to be recognised as such by more stabilised form of knowledge and more established disciplines. International Relations is quite new in terms of discipline and is very often considered not as a discipline but as a sub field of political sciences emerging from a US approach of rational choice theory. However, International Relations has always been very ambitious and has set up an understanding of the world where IR specialists have at the same moment a qualified objective domain of investigation different from sociology and governmental studies, but one which is also nonetheless superior because of the higher level of understanding and reach with an international point of view capable of subsuming the trends even if details
may disappear, i.e. individual lived experiences. International Relations has therefore been conceived as dealing with states and an international system of states, but not really with individuals. David Singer insisted on the different levels of analysis to push IR to concentrate on the first two levels (Singer 1961). For him, only a macro perspective based on indicators and correlates could understand war and security as a major phenomenon, a systemic one. Individual experiences of death, violence, insecurity were not relevant. He succeeded with this idea of levels to empower IR and to convince his colleagues that IR possessed a specific domain with a specific method. The interest for criminology was equivalent to null, especially when, at the same moment, criminological studies were defining themselves as a sub field of legal and penal studies or as a psychological understandings of crime, analysing mainly criminal behaviour related to specific individuals. The question of security as “fear of crime” was therefore centrally a national question of law and order, implying criminal justice and policing, but very rarely international relations. Criminology was fighting to be accepted against other important disciplines: law, anthropology, sociology of policing, and was not succeeding very well in many places. So, it was only in the seventies and through a painful break with the past of the forties and the socio biology of the sixties that criminology built a different form of legitimacy organised along managerial logics, risk approaches, and future oriented strategies of prevention- prediction (Bigo and Bonelli 2015). Marginally, certainly, some topics were discussed from the fifties to the seventies between the two disciplines regarding charismatic leaders becoming tyrants and criminals, about the profiles of war criminalsand about piracy and mafia (Schafer 1971, Kelly 1972, Homer and Caputo 1974). But, at that time, it was more the specialists of international criminal law which were playing with the boundaries of international and internal security, than the criminologists themselves (Verdross 1966, Dubner 1980, Ferencz 1980, Lemkin 1947).

Throughout this entire period, in International Relations, security was about “survival” and was about strategic studies. It was the time of a splendid isolation and the belief to be the only discipline dealing with security, to the point that they invented security studies as a sub field of International Relations and called it strategic studies. They did not think it was important to distinguish international security studies from other (internal) security studies. They considered that they had a monopoly. Security was not about individual death, or even the destruction of some places. It was about the destruction of a collectivity: the (nation) state by another (nation) state.
Turmoil, demonstrations, even civil wars were not at the heart of the discussion, they were peripheral and became important only when they were instruments of major powers. Despite all the controversies that have emerged, the current geopolitics of crime and terror continue to rely on this so-called superiority of IR coming from the fifties, and maintain or even reinforce the idea of “survival”; now seen more as survival of civilisation, of values and of freedom than a state centric vision, but the continuity is still in a belief that a geopolitics allied with a criminology assessing the causes of crime permits to “societise” the interstate vision, and to answer the questions of global jihad as though it were a global crime (Kirshner 2013, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Hamilton 2006, Rongved 2008). Researchers on the development of IR have advanced definitive critics of this “obsession” with the terminology of “survival”, and its transfer to a “societal object”, but politicians and journalists are still immune from these critics and continue their narratives as if they were not existent (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993, Buzan 1993, Waever 1993).

To understand how IR has given a so specific and so powerful definition of security and has imposed its own definition as “the” definition, it is necessary to look back at the link between security, deterrence, and a bipolar world where only a couple of great powers have an effective capacity to impose their will of power by the massive retaliations they were ready to do, including killing millions of innocent civilians (Brodie 1958, Snyder 1959) (Snyder 1961). The main discussions of the late 1950s by what international relations has called the “realist school” (Edward Hallet Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, Robert Gilpin, Kenneth Waltz, Samuel Huntington) were about the use (or not) of nuclear weapons, the possibility of deterrence through a reformulated Clausewitzian approach, and an applied form of “game theory” coming from a branch of the sociology of organisation and decision, privileging the view of rational choice over beliefs, ideologies, and emotions (Griffiths, Roach, and Solomon 2008). This was a struggle that was won against behaviourists by a group of scholars and practitioners (often generals) who were interested in reassuring people that the nuclear war was not for tomorrow, that reason would triumph with the help of deterrence and strategic thinking, negating the idea of a successful first strike.

Security or strategic studies were established to promote stability, order, certainty, even the status-quo. This was a “serious” game of convincing both the enemy and the population that the status quo was the best they may get. Raymond Aron coined the
situation as “neither war nor peace” and Morgenthau approved (Morgenthau 1967). This is why security was also a topic in the debates regarding subversion and counter-subversion, the development of indirect strategies to by-pass the European theatre and the means to counter them, the analysis of small wars and derivative guerrillas of the third world as by-products of bipolarity, and the ways to contain or roll back the real agents behind the scene (the soviets). But actions of terrorism were considered merely as tactics into a strategic game, mafias and organised crime were considered as non-political. Stephen Walt was very clear in the 1990, repeating the argument of David Singer of forty years before: security is different from law and order. Security is a question for military forces, not police forces or justice (Walt 1991). They are at two different levels, and these levels do not have the same weight. One can be solved by an increase of force because a certain monopoly exists inside of a state to the benefits of a government, but within the international realm, nobody has this monopoly, even the most powerful and we live in a structural anarchy, which nevertheless is not pure chaos, as diplomatic mechanisms and games of alliance block the possibility of an “imperium” by one state.

The discussion on security spanning more than forty years (1950-1990) was therefore framed inside a specific context - the Cold War- which was seen as a permanent state of the interstate system, both for the present and for the foreseeable future. Military and civil strategists were in strong opposition about the means and some of the goals, but they accepted the bipolar framework as evidence of “something” specific called ‘international security’, which had its own agenda, mechanisms and specialists, ones radically different from the problems of “law and order”. Security studies focused on strategic studies had been considered at that time as a sub-field of IR without much debate coming from other disciplines. It differentiated itself inside IR when the dominance of the realist school began to retract to defence, strategy and foreign affairs, while more and more IR specialists focused on behaviourism, the world economy, international organisations and collaboration between states. The building of a disciplinary boundary for external security as the knowledge for survival against danger of war was not so much an effect of the situation of nuclear deterrence than an effort of this pessimistic and conservative cynics calling themselves realist to defend the domain of security against the liberal internationalists invading international relations on the economic and social sides of it. External security was the way to define a new border in order to keep part of the IR discipline under their control.
Nicolas Guilhot (2008, 2010) has explained very clearly how the retreat from dominant positions by the realist school has transformed security into their last stronghold in the IR discipline and how they have fought, and still do, to preserve it, and to keep this activity under their monopoly. The key move here was to (re)define regularly security as “national security”, and national security as the security of the state (as an apparatus and as a collectivity of citizens), by emphasising the necessity to consider security as a means for peace and order, and as a modality of power in the hands of the state. National interest was therefore the driver of national security. But in each period of these forty years, national interests were redefined as governmental interests or the interests of the alliance of Nato, or the interests of a benign hegemon. National security was not really blended with private security, and even less with the safety of the individual, but it was functioning analogically in the same way at a different “level” of analysis; a more ‘important’ and ‘serious’ one. The boundaries of the “concept” of national security were set up as “strong” and “narrow” for good reasons, Stephen Walt claimed after the attacks that the end of the cold war has destroyed the claims of strategists to have a monopoly on security (Walt 1991).

**Security studies beyond International Relations: expanding the agenda and meeting criminologists “en route to the global”.

Some “peace researchers” and polemologists have challenged from the seventies this assumption that security was the equivalent of an absence of war and conflict by illuminating the role of state repression, genocide, and war without a formal declaration of war. They insisted also that security needed to begin from the lived experiences of human beings and they were insisting that the distinction between international and internal conflicts had not taken into consideration the metamorphoses of violence and its relation to transnational actors invading the realm of interstate relations (Bigo and Hermant 1991, Bigo 1986) (Galtung 1981). But they were a minority existing in the Nordic countries and a little bit in France and Belgium. They clearly did not reach the core of the US think-tanks that were melting together key politicians, generals, strategists, and civil servants, and who wanted to promote the spirit of national defence and security. Academia was also at this time rather marginal and the field of strategic studies was
populated by multi-positioned individuals who had previously been in charge of politics, and were in an academic career, by default (as they were too old or have been sent back into the opposition because of political changeover). Nevertheless, as is well known, by the turn of the 1990s, the field of security studies had attracted its own critics (R.B.J Walker, 1993; Jutta Weldes, 1999; Peoples and Vaughan Williams 2010). These political theorists were not well received. They were considered as ineffective or even subversive when they argued that the narratives of necessity, freedom and security, as well as the divide between an internal and an external world of the state (transforming it into a Janus god), were not in phase with political theorists’ subtle accounts of the problems of modernity. Realists were betraying their sources and had not really understood Machiavel, Hobbes or even Clausewitz. Some voices from the realist school had already anticipated some of the critiques and insisted that the concept of international security had to be “enlarged” in order to cope with changes in the wider world, especially after the fall of the Berlin wall. Barry Buzan (1983) had already pleaded for an extension of the security agenda to political, economic, environmental and societal – rather than just military – sectors. He argued that each area had its own form of security, and that in some cases the state was not the main actor, but he maintained the unity of the notion of security by claiming that all forms of security were related with a specific “existential threat” and that survival (of the referent object) was at stake in all cases (Buzan 1983).

Although the first edition of his book was not really discussed beyond a narrow circle of specialists, it became, after the end of bipolarity, a mantra for many security professionals who were afraid that the peace dividend narrative was diminishing both their budgets and their legitimacy (Bigo 1995; 2002).

In such a context where the cleavages between the strategists and military personnel were almost homologous to the cleavages of the academic field of IR security studies; the second edition of the book by Barry Buzan in 1991 became a battlefield for an inner struggle between on one side the “classics” regrouping for once the traditional military and civilian strategists, plus some retired professionals of politics giving them strong voices, and on the other side, the “neo-moderns” who extended the security role to any risk management in need of speed and discipline (the so-called quality of the army). This extension included all the “small wars” - fighting counter-insurgency and terrorism, and “pacifying” so-called ‘failed states’ - and international policing – surveillance of international trade routes for drug dealers and organised crime, plus illegal migrants -
obliging the military forces to work more with intelligence services, to develop private forms of engagement, and, if absolutely necessary, to collaborate with police organisations or even with NGOs; the result was a forming of competitive networks of transnational guilds associating these diverse experts (Olsson 2009., Bigo and Tsoukala 2008).

Even if some networks tied to the “classic” view were not supportive of UN international policing, the argument that security ought to be defined in broader terms than traditional military confrontations was finally accepted. However, the “neo-moderns” won more quickly in academia than in politics and the practical security fields. Civilian ‘protection’ became a key word to justify intervention against natural catastrophes (and the environment) or against warlords and criminals at the head of “failed” states, in order to rebuild their “societies” and to introduce freedom. ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was presented as a peace and protection engagement mobilising the idea of a pastoral power that the UN Security Council could lead. This “enlargement” of the terms of reference for security created emotional discussions about the boundaries of international relations and reactivated the notion of “human” security with an agenda to create links between development and security, or more exactly under-development, fragility and threats to the security of other nations (Kaldor 1999, 2000; Newman, this volume). It obliged a further rethink about the relation between “inside” and “outside”, of international security and domestic law and order. The Cold War was a different epoch, another age, and security could become a positive project globally. But to do so, it was necessary to have a grip on the internal formation of societies and to enter into the realm of police, urban studies, geography, ethnology and criminology. In some ways, part of the strategists who specialised in Kremlinology reinvented themselves as ethnographers of the Middle East or Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, it was not a great success, as they maintained and applied their strategic views of ‘the enemy’ to phenomena far more complex (and often without any clear ‘enemies’). The idea of multiple, interconnected threats worked here as a substitute for any identifiable, serious enemy, and without the USSR, it became necessary (and useful) to worry about the importance of rising crime, the dangerousness of cities, and the “fact” that migrants were more violent and more likely to be criminals, with the conclusion that transversal threats were permeating states, that identity and ‘otherness’ were at stake, that internal order was transformed into internal disorder, and that security had to be globalised in order to stay
civilized. In this logic, security was transmuted into a global common good, more important than peace or freedom. It was the birth of a “security first” argument (Etzioni 2007). But the security first argument was recognising the prevalence of internal security, vulnerability of infrastructures, of lives of people as key values, reorganising centrally security as a form of “protection” of people inside against the very different forms of risks and uncertainties that may happen “globally” and “locally”. The image of enmity was certainly continuing to be central, but its definition can be fuzzy and moving along time very quickly. The uncertainty of the analysis was transferred to the vision of the world itself and the world was therefore chaotic by itself, and uncertainty became a quality of strategy, moved into a risk management profile; at the same moment the individualisation of life in order to maintain the argument of protection of “each” individual (on one side) was put under the label of a “humanitarianism” of security where humanity as the global collectivity and humanity as each individual separately were connected together, relativizing the centrality of national(state) security. Policing internationally by military means was nevertheless an action of policing, not a war. Managing lethal force to the minimum became a mantra. External security involutes towards internal security. A different series of regime of justification was necessary in order to rebuild external security as a logical follow up of internal security, as the continuity of the same phenomenon abroad. The separation was forgotten, the interstate was demised, but the global as an expanded internal logic where society and the world society are synchronised, became central.

Security as internal security, security as a common global good fighting against global crime: the reverse “expansion”.

At the moment where IR was profoundly destabilised by its pretence to be scientific and predictive globally and its incapacity to see the structural changes in the USSR that geographers, demographers and sociologists has identified many years before, and in order to rebuild a new vision of security and war, the IR specialists needed unconventional allies that they found in the mainstream of criminology dealing already with the so-called transnational organised crime and irregular migrants as sources of crime and fear of crime. This encounter between the two disciplines in the 1990s was unfortunately based on the false assumption of an objective merging of war and crime permitting to the two disciplines to have a direct connection around the criminalisation
of war and the transnational organisation of crime. Far from being productive in terms of knowledge, the epistemological move to adjust to a new post bipolar reality by abandoning the idea of a divide between internal and external security in favour of the idea of a fusion, of a merging of military and police as answers to war and crime, which were blending, has created a kind of “doxa”, which had spread over in a geopolitics of crime and illegal migration fantasising the millions of individual decisions of travellers as if they were the fifth column of groups afar trying to strike a country too easily receiving people, refugees, migrants, tourists. Almost twenty years after its emergence, this discourse of the fusion of war into crime and of crime into war is still with us.

Despite precise case studies that have shown both the possibility that in some very rare occasions clandestine groups have used the route of smugglers and people fleeing their countries, and the false generalisations in terms of statistics coming from these examples, the mediatisation in popular press of this mixing of a reasoning of geopolitics with polls concerning individual feelings and convictions concerning “others” has in fact allowed stereotypes constructed by the alliance of a backward imperialism and a criminology inspired by socio biology as well as neuro sciences, to circulate more and more freely regarding the migrants as a structural danger, or a potential enemy within.

Consequently, we have seen the emergence of a strategisation of the everyday via the argument of such a merging, following often institutional practices and discourses of justification elaborated by politicians who wanted to intervene with military means abroad but without engaging into a semantic of war conflict in a UN world prohibiting aggression between states.

The sociology of contemporary security and the analysis of its practices, it is contended here, have been much more developed in the sociology of policing, criminology, economics, risk management, and in migration studies than in IR. The label “internal security”, or alternatively “law and order” and “feelings of insecurity” have generated very important strands of research, including a sociology of transnational policing and a sociology of transnational organised crime or border migrations. But as we have seen they have not been taken into consideration in the narratives of IR specialists, which have preferred to present their new justifications as if they have reached a “new continent” of security domains and have discovered recently a “societal” security for which they are the only ones that can provide a global approach encompassing all forms.
of security. The “indigenous” researchers of internal security have thus been transformed into informers, a situation they did not like and that they still combat nowadays.

The war on terror discourse post 2001 reinforced this post 90s logic and is still a powerful argument in terms of counter terrorism against a so-called global jihad and the radicalisation of youth over the world via propaganda on internet messages, even if the terminology of war on terror has been abandoned. The question of the boundaries between internal and external security has been re-opened for a while, but the mind-set to see them as two different questions continues for many topics, or moves on the opposite direction and creates under the label of global, major intellectual confusions that grasp only stereotypes of other disciplines, instead of working in a transdisciplinary framework (Bigo 2001b, Loader and Sparks 2002, Aas 2013)(Loader and Percy 2012).

Criminologists have partly resisted this “imperial” move of the IR specialists, but in some ways they have agreed to fight for the same stakes: who will have the right to settle the boundaries of security, who will become the specialist of both war and crime, of these “new wars” that are also forms of crime that can be fought by international policing justified by a responsibility to protect? Who will be the voice of the rise of the arguments of preventive wars against terrorism? Who will succeed to justify a discourse which is not anymore about deterrence and escalation between adversaries, but about the psychology of unknown enemies that self-radicalised at home and are often petty criminals? The connection between, on the one side, political discourses on foreigners as unwelcome and, on the other side, statistics of crime and prisons - where foreign nationals are supposedly represented in a higher number than their percentage in society- has been the bedrock of justifications for excusing previous economic policies, especially their failure to sustain employment, social benefits and health, while blaming the arrival of foreigners in the national soil and the habits of their children. Along the line of different narratives, the idea of what a foreigner is, has been reframed in such a way that instead of being the opposite of a national citizen, they have been associated with ethnicity and even racism by the emergence of a notion of “third countries nationals” (rather than European citizens), without this being defined substantially. Foreigners have been divided in many categories from legitimate to abnormal, and the connotations associated with migration have been set up under the terminology of “immigrants”, of outsiders coming inside and trying to
overstay. The move from foreigner to migrant has in turn opened the door for connotations regarding the illegality and criminality of foreigners, or at least a certain group of them. If it was still outrageous in the seventies to construct such connections, in the name of the realism of the ethnicity of foreigners coming from beyond the EU, a strong normalisation of the associated language - with the appearance of “migration” studies in connection with “criminological” studies - has modified the way crime, (dis)order, (il)legality and (in)security have been thought about and assembled (Bigo 2006). Crime and migration have thus been forged as a unique problem within the realm of “internal” security in many countries, and this 1980’s move has been exploited both nationally and for the constitution of a European space of internal or societal security (renamed the ‘area of justice and home affairs’ - the terminology of internal security acting too much as a reminder of McCarthyism in the English language).

But this idea of an internal security or “European home affairs” obliges countries to cooperate, pushing their Ministries of Justice and Interior to concentrate their efforts around the theme of the “protection” of the EU borders, for the sake of an “European society”. The criminalisation of migrants, the “crimmigration” of the justice system, and the rise of far right rhetoric have been analysed in relation to the set of practices converging against foreigners, including the change from ‘law and order’ to ‘internal security’ and intelligence-led policing.

Some authors have insisted that the term security has arrived in criminology in relation to a different managerial approach insisting more on preventive measures concerning crime, situational analysis, and development of a mapping of urban spaces to detect the correlates of crime with specific neighbourhoods. Against the idea of the connection of crime with specific societal dimensions such as class, poverty and inequality, these criminological security narratives have insisted on “opportunities” and “risks” for the potential criminal, and his rational calculus of the profit to be taken from the action. The language of “insurance” is saturating the one of security. Simultaneously the “private security industry” complex is a subject where geographers, management specialists, urban planners, and economists dispute the IR knowledge on this topic. And through this line of thought, they have considered that criminologists have for once a better grip not only of internal security but also international security, and they tried to reverse the move of the specialists of IR to become themselves the “global” experts.
For some of them, if one wants to understand the contemporary practices of (in)security, it is as important to analyse this transformational move of regrouping under internal security the themes of crime, migration, asylum and circulation of persons, as it is to decipher the change of strategic studies after the end of the Cold War. It is crucial to come back to this period in order to understand the impact that this label of internal security had in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and also in France. It has brought together a preoccupation in public policy with forms of academic knowledge, which were previously quite dispersed. Statisticians, demographers, geographers, urban planners, criminologists, psychologists, economists, risk analysers, ethnographers and sociologists of minorities have come to work together, not for the sake of knowledge, but to tackle a political problem constructed as the risk of riots, internal seditions, and the rise of racism by the so-called natives; the “real”-citizens, the one having the state and blood identity and the proper behaviours. This so-called re-emergence of the enemy within and its subversion of national identities has been seen by the professionals of politics in some countries as a threat at least equivalent to the risk of war, and involving a hidden geopolitics between states using their diasporas as tools against the “receiving” countries. The connection between migration, identity and danger of destabilisation of such a “societal” identity of the “nation” or of “Europe” has been pushed forward in many political parties, providing different answers, but accepting the frame of the discussion. Institutional bodies focused on and concerned with internal security have mushroomed, as have grants concerning the research on migrants and diasporas. Even more importantly, a “market” of internal security concerning private property, thefts, and incivilities has permitted a recycling of knowledge of military or policing activities in the work of selling protection under the name of internal security to a certain class of citizen.

**Critical criminology, critical border studies and surveillance studies: the mediators needed to understand (in)security today**

Against this fusion-acquisition by a series of experts on the geopolitics of global crime and their ethnic mafias connected to irregular migrants, who are erasing any form of articulated knowledge in order to justify a certain kind of conservative politics related to “others” as useful enemies, serious research on global crime has on the contrary tried to articulate the analysis coming from international relations and criminology on their critical constructivist sides. They challenged the doxa of the prevent-predictive argument
by showing the articulation through which everyday practices are embedded into
dynamics of fields of power which give authority to some actors to authorise themselves
in a specific academic discipline, as transversal experts, or as practitioners, to construct -
volutarily or not- a series of interconnected politics of fear, anxiety and unease. This
politics made of narratives, post facto justifications, untold practices and even revelations
of these events years later, is therefore not an objective explanation, but what frames de
facto the (in)securitization process and its evolutions.

Therefore, far from believing in a chaotic world in the making justifying more
“preventive” approaches, they have insisted that prevention in a criminal justice system
is more dangerous than a coercive approach as the former is based on uncertainty,
suspicion and important risk against habeas corpus. They have then warned of limiting
the use of the argument of predictive policing for terrorism though it may work at best
for repetitive, cyclical forms of crime by large groups that repeat their actions because
they are quite insensitive to police actions, it does not work for intelligence anticipation
against forms of irregular and tactical forms of clandestine violence by small groups that
avoid repetition. They have also criticised those who want to put into a continuum of
similar practices the questions of narco trafficking, piracy on high sea or along the coasts,
of trafficking of persons and smuggling of irregular migrants and of help to asylum
seekers in the name of a merging of war and crime. On the contrary they have shown that
if a merging exists, it is not in these differentiated practices but in the colonising frames
of different security institutions who want to be the prime coordinator of “joint
operations” between military, intelligence, police and border guards and try to use their
specific professional characteristics as the key element to receive more funds and more
power into the asymmetric relations of a forced collaboration created often to please the
argument of prevention and prediction. The (in)security continuum is therefore a move
that aims to transfer the legitimacy of the fight against a certain type of identified enemy
against suspected ones, against collateral victims of security operations reframed as
helping the potential enemy, against minorities identified as potential supporters of
clandestine actions. It works only if one believes in the eradication of all the boundaries
of war and crime, and is clearly a fantasy when one has the possibility to show how these
discourses forget the structural articulations of power and knowledge between the
professionals of security. This is why we need a critical move against this idea of a chaotic
world generating a global social war and justifying the subordination of criminal justice to a preventive logic led by intelligence services and their intrusive techniques.

The politics of unease and fear as a way to govern populations has been criticised strongly by a strand of literature coming from the works of critical criminological thinkers with Robert Reiner on one side, David Garland, Richard Ericson on the other (Reiner 1993, Garland 2001, Ericson 2000). Contrary to the mainstream of international relations thinkers that have allied with the criminologists supporting this vision of a global chaotic world, they have shown the expansion of national strategies of crime control internationally through police collaborations and the fact that these ways to govern crime were justified not under the label of law and order but under the label of security. They have also insisted on the role of the private into the framing of security as a commodity that can be sold and its commercialisation including in terms of expert service providers and not only prolongation of the military industry by an industry of surveillance. It has profoundly reframed what security does and means because security is dependent on the understanding of the hybridisation of public and private bureaucracies and the reformulation of what a state apparatus means if it is not any more a purely national, territorial apparatus commended by one national political class. The Weberian and Westphalian categories of thought organising the idea of security are at stake. Consequently it is not an extension of International Relations or even a critical knowledge on security which is needed to analyse these para-private security complex, but a full reconfiguration of the relations between these partial disciplinary forms of knowledge that we can label (in)security assemblages or (in)security processes whose dynamics are organised along the different field of power (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009), (Leander 2005).

Taking into account the different research literature on internal security and sociology of surveillance (Anderson, Walker, Loader, Sheptycki, Bigo), Lucia Zedner in her very short but excellent book, aptly entitled “security”, has explained that if security has been considered as the province of international relations, international law and war studies, this is not anymore the case: “criminologists talk of ‘governing security’, ‘governing through security’, ‘selling security’, ‘civilising security’, ‘imagining security’” (Zedner 2009: 1)(Ericson and Stehr 2000, Crooke et al. 2004). And she is doing for criminologists in an abridged version what Gros and Delumeau (Delumeau 1989, Gros 2013) have done for history. As she said: “Linguistically, security is a slippery and
contested term... The resultant ambiguity about what is promised, provided, sold, or sought when security is involved, is a form of licence” (Zedner 2009:10). Playing with the notion of “licence”, she shows very convincingly that the deployment of universalist terms as security (or sécurité, or sichereit) creates superficial similarities and masks the tensions of the varying usages across jurisdictions as well as the work of “translation” involved in the circulation of the terminology of security between national and professional cultures. This series of oppositions between language and materiality, between norms and practices, are irrelevant. Translations are central. Discursive practices are material. Language is essential because it is a material activity, which makes sense only relationally. In this logic, security is for something and is material including in the symbolic or theatrical spectacle of politics it provides.

William Walters, Alessandro Dal Lago, and Nicholas de Genova among others have developed this notion of a security spectacle that Murray Edelman had initiated around the political spectacle (Walters 2002, Dal Lago 2003, De Genova 2013, Edelman 1988). Nicholas de Genova has used the notion of border spectacle to show this specific connection between symbolic politics, theatrical gesture and the rise of biopolitical technology of control as well as digital surveillance. Security at the borders has been one of the best sites to reflexively think about the boundaries of security and instead to go on a global encompassing and maximal security of the inside and the outside; the discussion has shown the limits of security, its incompletude, and its dependence towards the notion of freedom.

As a result of state-borders studies by critical criminologists and geographers, security finally has been partially detached from its previous meanings of international security, and concentrated (even precipitated) into the border practices and the mechanisms of control and surveillance. The discussion of the relations between security and freedom, security and equality, security and justice, security and democracy, have been on the other side relaxed, as if security was not anymore propelling inequality in everyday routines of work and consumption, suspicion in anticipative logics of punishment before trial, surveillance in apparent logics of freedom of movement, limitations of the space of possible options in a democratic public debate (Wood and Dupont 2006, Ranciere and Heron 1995, Wood and Shearing 2007). As a result, most of the discussion in legal theory has been framed regarding the relation between security and data protection-privacy or between security and cases of torture as well as the
gravest violations of human rights, but not much about all the gradients where security, far from balancing freedom to find a new equilibrium regarding danger, is reframing the very notion of freedom by fragmenting its meanings and by wearing some of its clothes (Bigo et al. 2010).

The fact that security may have an effect on the shores of democratic politics has been further discussed by some of the French political theorists (Ranciere 2006, Balibar 2004) and has achieved an important success in challenging the discourse of a global security running preventively, but it has also often been accepted too quickly as the very transversal definition of an act of security that has no border any more, and is always in “excess” (Butler 2002). But this may be also a problem in following this last line of enquiry, which puts too much emphasis on performative language, and insists too little on the socio-history of the fields of power and of their variations in time, or is too inattentive to the diverse translations of security between different universes of practices; for example health and security (Howell 2011). Changing words, changing language via academic performativity is not a solution and a form of possible desecuritisation. The lived experiences makes sense into the fields of forces and power in which they are inserted. They are what inform the “assemblages” of (in)security.

**Thinking in transdisciplinary terms to understand (in)security experiences and their different scripts.**

To proceed to the decolonisation of security means to change focus and to refuse both the disciplinary distinctions between International Relations (IR), dealing with external security, and criminology, dealing with crime and internal security, as well as the globalist approach erasing all the boundaries between the different forms of knowledge in order to superimpose a political and often conservative argument of a chaotic world. It requires us to think about the processes of (in)securitisation, which affect the world as transversal practices that have different dynamics, different lengths (in terms of their chain of interdependencies), and different implications for places and the people living there.

All security claims, even the most benign, imply a struggle around the legitimacy of some ambiguous practices involving violence or control of an actor’s behaviour.
Certainly, many practices, which we call security or protection in everyday life, are not, as such, an object of direct contestation. Often these practices are seen as forms of freedom. For instance, in my home country it seems that I can choose what to eat, drink, wear, as well as where I want to go, or what I publish on the internet about myself. But these practices can become a security issue when they reach the boundaries of somebody else’s freedom, for example because of scarcity, lack of equality and redistribution, forms of property, beliefs in primordial identities. Why? Because the temptation is to refuse to change the previous practices when they are contested, and to continue by claiming that they are vital to assure security, that they are a legitimate reaction versus a danger, a risk, a threat, and are *de facto* justified. The claim may also be used to mobilise support in favour of previous actions, which themselves were considered illegitimate. This logic operates at the personal level, but also with regard to collectivities and their identities. Politicization and creation of social movements which contend power comes often from the initial disputes about the boundaries of security that diminish forms of freedom, and do not diminish at all insecurities, but on the contrary develop them by escalating the violence or by creating the image of a perpetual emergency.

As explained by Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson in their article in this issue mapping the contours of everyday security is a central task to avoid the strategisation of the everyday by being careful to keep the agency of each actor instead of generalising too fast, and this is why this critical criminological approach which insists on the anthropological dimension and precise ethnographies meets the Paris school of International Political Sociology. Both consider that the struggles for the definition of what (in)security is or is not is important for the professionals of security and the academics who analyse logic of controls, but the questions about how security is understood, articulated and experience is even more central, as the forms of resistance or/and autonomy that the actors-targets-victims of an (in)securitisation process engage with are not just answers to the logics of control and the assemblages they organise, they have also their own logics and specific political imagination, which often destabilise the so-called preventive technologies of security. These resistances are not only the rare cases of citizen right claims and the public events where they contest their status of illegal, they are also inscribed in the ways the logics of escaping are configurating new life styles, a way to live for many years in “limbos”, the capacity to become “undetectable” or to blur their many quasi-statuses when they are illegal but not expellable for example. They
invent a life style. Their lived experience is not one of a permanent victim, against a certain Agambenian vision of their situation, and they are not either the new revolutionaries of the world. They are caught in the subjectification of their lives, with their joys, their difficulties, but also this politics of the everyday, which is a form of hidden transcript that they oppose to both the security professionals and most of the academics reducing them to a specific status of criminals, victims, or heroes.

The lived experiences of the agents in all its complexity is therefore the central goal of the script that an international political sociology has to elaborate, and that is why the everyday life is so important for this approach, but the everyday experience cannot be conceived under a methodological individualism that considers the individual as the only engine of its combination of reason and emotions, as this position disregards the objective relations of distinction and mimesis that structure de facto the so-called free will or spontaneous performativity of the actor. Consequently the international political sociology approach entails the privileging of, against an individualistic approach opposing the individual to society, a relational process in which individuals are always indivuals, positioning themselves in relation to others, in a society characterised by a chain of interdependences always in transformation (Elias and Schroeter 2001). The social has therefore to be simultaneously analysed as a heritage, a patrimony of dispositions, but also as a fragile present always in the making and never certain. Critical and pragmatist sociology can be combined in a coherent way, as it is explained by Luc Boltanski (Boltanski 2009).

In conclusion, from the margins of both IR and criminological studies came a powerful counter-discourse challenging the hegemonic approach of so many institutions. Against a very common functionalist approach that both criminology and IR share, we have to realise that far from being an “answer”, a “freedom from” fear and violence, the field of professionals of security produces through the competitions of the multiple actors, a way to frame the difference of legitimacy between legitimate and illegitimate violence and defines also what is (in)security, what is protection and what is fate. Many researchers engaged into the analysis of how institutions think and act, now have the possibility to work on more reflexive grounds and to propose different alternatives, avoiding the reductionism which destroys the articulation of police and military practices by analysing them as an answer to a fusion of war and crime, and a proposal to merge criminology and IR into a new discipline analysing radicalisation, illegal migration...
through the lenses of a geopolitics of the everyday. This supposes, as we have seen, first to deconstruct this common sense under which security and insecurity are international questions reserved to political scientists specialised on International relations and to bring to the fore a conversation about what contemporary (in)security is. Second, it is important to recognise that criminologists, sociologists of policing and minorities, have as much to say on this topic as IR specialists, but that they have to do so, by knowing the contemporary trends of International Relations instead of relying on old forms of knowledge repeating a mainstream in rapid extinction. And this article has tried in some ways to give a form of decryption of what is at stake in IR for criminologists that often rely only on the mainstream narrative and their self-justifications. Third, it is crucial also for a future research agenda to see how such a transdisciplinary framework can emerge from the in-depth discussion between what had been called critical criminology on one side and critical security studies on the other side, especially when both strands of research are more and more interested about the practices of the individuals and their lived experiences and this is why I invite readers to know more about what has been called a PARIS problematisation, which insists on the Mobius strip of international and internal security that looks like two faces of the same continuum of practices while they are in fact the very same dimension whose topology creates intellectual controversies about boundaries and limits of phenomenon; limits that are not dependent from an objective truth of the "real" world, but from intersubjective forms of inversion of boundaries that nobody want to recognise as it endangers the primary assumption of security: i.e. to be an answer to violence. The walk of the researcher along the strip of the Mobius topology is therefore a way to understand this half twist joining the ends of the strip to form a loop which has only one side and one boundary made by the inner struggles of the actors that frame a so-called outside of violence shaping and reshaping their identities, and not at all by an answer to what they say they are struggling against (Bigo 2001a, Bigo and Walker 2007).

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