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Accomplishing professional jurisdiction in intensive care: An ethnographic study of three units

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COVER PAGE

Title: Accomplishing professional jurisdiction in intensive care: an ethnographic study of three units.

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1 ABSTRACT

2 This paper reports an ethnographic study examining health professional jurisdictions within three
3 intensive care units (ICUs) in order to draw out the social processes through which ICU clinicians
4 organised and delivered life-saving care to critically ill patients. Data collection consisted of 240
5 hours observation of actual practice and 27 interviews with health professionals. The research was
6 conducted against a backdrop of international political and public pressure for national healthcare
7 systems to deliver safe, quality and efficient healthcare. As in many Western health systems, for the
8 English Department of Health the key to containing these challenges was a reconfiguration of
9 responsibilities for clinicians in order to break down professional boundaries and encourage greater
10 interprofessional working under the guise of workforce modernisation. In this paper, through the
11 analysis of health professional interaction, we examine the properties and conditions under which
12 professional jurisdiction was negotiated and accomplished in day-to-day ICU practice. We discuss
13 how staff seniority influenced the nature of professional interaction and how jurisdictional
14 boundaries were reproduced and reconfigured under conditions of routine and urgent work.
15 Consequently, we question theorisation that treats individual professions as homogenous groups
16 and overlooks fluctuation in the flow and intensity of work; and conclude that in ICU, urgency and
17 seniority have a part to play in shaping jurisdictional boundaries at the level of day-to-day practice.

18

19 KEYWORDS

20 UK; division of labour; intensive care; professions; ethnography; interprofessional working; Abbott

21

22 INTRODUCTION

23 Despite policy reports, recommendations and research on improving the delivery of safe and quality
24 healthcare (Department of Health, 2009; 2014; Vincent, 2001; 2009; Hogan *et al.*, 2012), public
25 enquiries into hospitals over the past decade have demonstrated that progress is variable (e.g.
26 Kennedy, 2001; Francis, 2013; Keogh, 2013). Key policy reports from the Institute of Medicine (IoM)
27 in the USA, the Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI) and the Department of Health (DH) in the UK
28 argued that interprofessional collaboration and coordination of health professional work is essential
29 in driving up the quality of care (IoM, 1999; 2001; DH, 2000a; 2008; CPSI, 2011).

30 Within the social sciences, interprofessional working is viewed as problematic due to the
31 implications for reconfiguration of professional boundaries, which professions can resist (Martin *et*
32 *al.*, 2009; Finn *et al.*, 2010; Powell and Davies, 2012). Martin *et al.* (2009), drawing from Abbott
33 (1988), argue that professions tend to defend their jurisdictions fiercely, and respond to incursions
34 by reasserting the legitimacy of existing boundaries, although there are also instances where it is
35 more beneficial for professions to also shed tasks deemed to be less prestigious. They note,
36 however, that the majority of literature on the health professions concentrates on potential rather
37 than actual shifts in professional boundaries, echoing calls for more detailed case studies of micro-
38 level processes in the context of specific challenges to the professional division of labour. In this
39 paper, we respond to this call by reporting an ethnographic study that examined health professional
40 work in ICUs in the context of DH (2000b; 2005) policies for the modernisation of the ICU workforce.

41 Our data suggest that official positions in the ICU hierarchy, those of doctors and nurses specifically,
42 did not determine the decision-making process in the way much of the literature had assumed. In
43 ICU, nurses did not always follow medical instruction; there were also situations in which doctors
44 acceded to what nurses suggested for patient care. We discuss how staff seniority – referring both
45 to rank as well as the combination of experience and expertise – influenced the nature of
46 professional interaction and how jurisdictional boundaries were reproduced and reconfigured under

47 conditions of routine and urgent work. Consequently, we conclude that in ICU, urgency and seniority
48 have a part to play in shaping jurisdictional boundaries at the level of day-to-day practice.

49 Next, we situate the research within the policy context of health workforce modernisation and
50 research of ICU nurses and doctors at work. The theoretical position of the paper follows, as does
51 the method of the current study. We then examine our findings presenting field note extracts and
52 interview quotes to illustrate our points. Finally, we critically discuss our findings in relation to
53 existing research and theory on the division of labour.

54

55 **BACKGROUND – The policy context of workforce modernisation**

56 A way through which patient safety and quality of care concerns are addressed in many Western
57 health systems is workforce modernisation. Modernisation is used to describe a number of health-
58 policy initiatives calling for changes to the provision of public services in welfare states from the late
59 1990s onwards (Green *et al.*, 2011). Among other drivers, such as external audit, professional
60 performance indicators, introduction of market principles and user empowerment, modernisation
61 calls for changes to the governance style towards interprofessional working (Waring and Currie,
62 2009).

63 The NHS Modernisation Programme in the UK was an example of these kinds of policy changes
64 (Hyde *et al.* 2005), through which health professional work was reframed around concepts such as
65 teamwork and multi-disciplinarity (Lewin and Reeves, 2011; Martin *et al.*, 2009). The case of
66 intensive care was indicative of such workforce changes where policy called for the modernisation of
67 the ICU workforce through role extension and expansion for nurses; for example, through the
68 creation of nurse consultant posts (DH, 2000b; 2005). Consequently, ICU nurses gained legitimacy to
69 extend their influence on medical decision-making blurring the boundary with medicine; although
70 actual changes to the division of labour were confined to ad-hoc, local arrangements rather than
71 legal agreements (Green *et al.*, 2011).

72 This is an example of state intervention that has the potential to compromise certain professionals'
73 jurisdictional claims over distinct areas of practice while at the same time creating new
74 opportunities for aspiring professional groups, such as ICU nurses. Commentators agree that while
75 much has been written about this topic, less attention has been paid to the consequences of such
76 policy reforms for the nature of professional boundaries and relationships between healthcare
77 professionals (Nugus *et al.*, 2010; Kirkpatrick *et al.*, 2011; Kroezen *et al.*, 2014). Kroezen *et al.*'s
78 (2014) analysis of jurisdictional control over prescribing in The Netherlands is a notable exception,
79 although their focus on one jurisdiction that transcends all clinical specialisms limits the
80 transferability of lessons learned to the rather distinct setting of intensive care.

81

82 **LITERATURE REVIEW – Modernisation in the context of intensive care**

83 Within the context of intensive care, little research has considered the effects of modernisation
84 policy on health professional work and its division of labour. In an interview based study with 45
85 intensive care staff in England examining their perceptions of the ICU modernisation programme,
86 Green *et al.* (2011) identified that staff reported modernisation had led to better functioning teams.
87 Nurses in particular spoke of more collaborative team-working between them and ICU doctors
88 following the modernisation policy. Based on these findings, it would appear that in ICU the shift in
89 professional jurisdictions brought about by the modernisation agenda did not lead to attempts from
90 professionals to defend their boundaries; rather modernisation appeared to be a mutually beneficial
91 professionalising strategy (Green *et al.*, 2011).

92 Green *et al.*'s findings may be explained, in part, by the unusual context of the ICU specialism
93 compared with other hospital areas. In particular, ICU is a relatively recent specialism that continues
94 to evolve rapidly. The complex nature of ICU patient conditions and reliance on one-to-one nurse-to-
95 patient ratios means the ICU has been inherently multidisciplinary. However, this explanation
96 glosses over the ways in which professional role changes and redistribution of responsibilities are

97 actually managed by ICU professionals in day-to-day practice and does not illuminate the conditions
98 and processes through which professional jurisdiction is accomplished in the ICU setting. Clinicians'
99 and policy makers' ability to learn from the ICU to inform future decision-making is hindered in this
100 and other clinical settings as a result.

101 At an international level, Paradis *et al.* (2014) undertook a comprehensive literature review of 23
102 ethnographic studies in ICU, out of which 11 addressed aspects of the nurse-doctor boundary. They
103 found little evidence of collaborative working as most studies reported conflict, and concluded that
104 nurses and doctors in ICU have unique professional approaches to healthcare work that are not
105 always compatible (Paradis *et al.*, 2014). Further examination of these studies reveals key challenges
106 and contradictory findings, discussed next.

107 In an ethnographic study of three British ICUs Coombs (2004) identified that despite good working
108 relationships, with respect to decision-making nurses perceived doctors to be domineering; they
109 reported difficulties in having their contributions accepted, considered or validated by doctors and
110 thus felt excluded from the decision-making process. Similarly, ethnographic work consisting of
111 observations and interviews with staff in an Australian ICU argued that doctors tended to use nurses
112 only to supplement information and provide extra details about patient assessments (Manias and
113 Street, 2001), which led nurses to report difficulty in participating in ward rounds and care
114 discussions. More recently, ethnographic work in four North American ICUs (Reeves *et al.*, 2015)
115 confirmed that typical hierarchical relations continued to prevail between doctors and nurses.
116 Interactions between them were brief and serendipitous in nature, while medicine dominated
117 decision-making.

118 In contrast, in an ethnographic study of three British ICUs involving observations and interviews with
119 doctors and nurses, Carmel (2003; 2006) argued for a professional allegiance towards a common ICU
120 project through which collaboration was fostered and boundary tensions avoided. Carmel (2006)
121 argued that the physical and organisational separation of the ICU from the rest of the hospital

122 served to reify the ICU team, as doctors and nurses worked closely to respond to clinical challenges.
123 Carmel's study was undertaken at a time when modernising the ICU workforce was a key policy
124 priority in England, which may partly explain his findings. The extent to which Carmel's findings are
125 enduring or contained in that time period remains unclear.

126 Alexanian *et al.* (2015) reported from an ethnography of two North American ICUs that staff talked
127 about there being a broad and inclusive notion of a health professional team in those ICUs, partly
128 supporting Carmel's conclusion. However, in contrast with Carmel, what was observed in practice
129 was more complex with non-medical professionals operating on the periphery of the medical team,
130 causing them to feel frustrated and excluded. The only exception to this was during crisis situations,
131 such as cardiac arrests, where all professionals seemed to come together as a team to resolve the
132 crisis; a finding also supported by an interview-based study with nurses, doctors and respiratory
133 therapists in a North American ICU (Piquette *et al.*, 2009). The notion of ICU professionals working as
134 a tight team was also supported through a recent North American ethnography of one unit where
135 staff referred to examples of collaborative working arrangements (Rodriguez, 2015). However, the
136 focus of that paper was on family member involvement, rather than professional interaction.

137 Existing ethnographic work yields useful insights on the social organisation of health professional
138 work in ICU, although findings from different studies seem contradictory with some giving evidence
139 of conflict while others of collaboration. However, the extent to which such boundaries were clearly
140 demarcated, settled, and the processes through which these were accomplished in day-to-day
141 practice, has not been the focus of in-depth examination.

142

143 **THEORETICAL POSITION – The division of labour**

144 The analysis presented here is informed by an interactionist perspective of the division of labour,
145 drawing its main inspiration from the work of Hughes (1928), who argued that the division of labour
146 implies interaction because it consists not merely of the different kinds of work people do, but

147 because the different tasks so divided are parts of a whole product to which people contribute. He
148 argued that the logic behind the division, and combination, of activities and function into
149 occupations, and of their allocations to people in various systems of work, should not be assumed as
150 given. This perspective was elaborated and complemented by Strauss, who shifted attention from
151 Hughes' macro ecology to the microcosm of everyday interaction, which he identified as operating
152 within a negotiated order. Strauss *et al.* (1964) saw the division of labour not as a set of disembodied
153 standards but as human arrangements subject to negotiation. Allen (2001) developed Strauss'
154 position further by clarifying that formal organisational structures can be modified even in the
155 absence of face-to-face negotiations, and therefore proposed the division of labour as continuously
156 accomplished rather than negotiated.

157 While both Hughes' and Strauss' insights are relevant to the clinical microsystem within which health
158 professionals work, the division of labour is framed within a wider context influenced by both
159 external and internal pressures, as promulgated by Freidson (1976) and most significantly by Abbott
160 (1988). Freidson argued that the forces of social organisation are inseparable from the empirical
161 division of labour since these can influence the number of occupational roles, the selection and
162 distribution of individuals through them, and even the content of those roles. For the majority of
163 time, the limits to interaction posed by such forces are sufficiently broad and permissive that a
164 variety of bargains are possible for the participants, and it is precisely within this bargaining space
165 that Freidson sees the division of labour as a process of social interaction.

166 Abbott consolidated and elaborated the above ideas into a more contemporary framework of the
167 social organisation of work, arguing that it is the content rather than the structure of professional
168 work that is changing; and it is control of work that brings the professions into conflict with each
169 other. He identified the professional task area as the unit of analysis, and in particular the links
170 between a profession and its work, which he referred to as 'jurisdictions'. Since none of these links is
171 absolute or permanent the professions make up an interacting system, an ecology, affected by wider
172 social pressures, such as health policies, which open and close areas of jurisdiction. Therefore, it is

173 the interaction between professions in the workplace as they compete for control over work
174 jurisdiction that is critical and the proper focus of investigation. By employing the concept of
175 jurisdiction Abbott provides the link through which social structure enters and conditions everyday
176 professional interaction, which in turn may influence social structure through the mounting of
177 jurisdictional claims that can be used to advance professional status.

178 Abbott's work is important here because it brings together interactionist elements of the division of
179 labour, such as Strauss' concern with everyday interaction and negotiation, but sutures them within
180 the wider system of social relations between professional groups. In this way, Abbott builds on
181 Freidson by emphasising the interdependence of different groups. Abbott's approach therefore
182 offers greater explanatory capabilities to research on the division of labour by incorporating and
183 linking together both structural and interactionist concerns. This theorisation opens up the
184 possibility of a more nuanced and complex matrix of relationships in which jurisdictions between
185 different professions are in flux.

186

187 **METHOD**

188 Fieldwork was undertaken over one year, between April 2008 and May 2009, in three purposefully
189 chosen ICUs situated in two hospitals in England. These are given the pseudonyms Cityview,
190 Riverview South, and Riverview North. They reflected units of different staff numbers, patient
191 capacity, geographical location, older and newly built units. These were typical of ICUs in urban
192 teaching hospitals in England, which employ a large number of nurses and have high turnover of
193 staff. In the first instance, the manager and senior nursing and medical staff of the three units were
194 approached to participate in the research through email, followed by an informal visit by the first
195 author to introduce the study. A multi-site approval from the National Research Ethics Service and
196 R&D approval from individual hospitals was gained. Participant information sheets were distributed
197 to all staff in the units, inviting their voluntary participation. Additionally, at first face-to-face

198 encounter the first author confirmed staff were happy to be involved; nobody refused to participate.
199 Posters informing staff of the researcher's presence were also in place throughout the observation
200 period.

201 Data were collected by the first author, a former ICU nurse, through non-participant observation
202 (240 hours) and interviews with 27 health professionals (table 1). The sites were not previously
203 known to the researcher. In order to contain risks associated with selective data collection and the
204 researcher's own sensitivities, observations were made at different times of the day and night, both
205 on weekdays and weekends; these included shadowing different health professionals in the ICUs for
206 the duration of their shift, including bedside nurses and medical consultants, and attending
207 interprofessional patient discussions during medical rounds. Fieldnotes were made
208 contemporaneously in a journal, in a chronological fashion, and in as raw a format as possible (Allen,
209 2010) paying attention to thick description. Both formal and informal interviewing techniques were
210 used (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Informal interviewing occurred in the ICU, usually following
211 an incident about which clarifications were sought, and were conversational in approach. Formal
212 interviewing occurred outside the unit, mainly with senior staff (consultants, nurse managers). These
213 interviews followed a topic guide to enable a level of consistency; this included the interviewee's
214 role in the ICU team, their views on interprofessional working, the way they perceived ICU work to
215 be organised and delivered, as well as their views on possible influencing variables. All interviews
216 were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Reflective notes were kept in a journal throughout
217 the study and fieldwork was regularly discussed in meetings between all three authors.

218 TABLE 1

219 Data were analysed iteratively by the first author following standard approaches involving thematic
220 coding, categorisation and abstraction (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).
221 Coding was undertaken using NVivo 10 (QSR International) and involved reading of fieldnotes and
222 interview transcripts to note segments of text on areas of thematic importance. Both open and

223 focussed coding was used, employing professional 'jurisdiction' and 'boundary' as 'sensitising
224 concepts' (Blumer, 1954:7) to gain conceptual leverage on the data (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973).
225 Instances of doctor-nurse interaction were compared and contrasted to examine the ways in which
226 these differed, and in so doing uncover the conditions under which different interactional
227 approaches were exhibited; this revealed seniority and urgency as key influencing variables, as our
228 findings below demonstrate. Analysis of data paid attention to the means and methods whereby
229 health professionals organised and performed ICU work, as well as the more tacit rules and norms
230 that guided their practice. Moreover, health professional interaction was analysed both in terms of
231 professionals' exhibited behaviour and their informal conversations, bearing in mind that through
232 everyday talk people also perform social actions (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). Analysis was iteratively
233 discussed and sense-checked between all three authors; any disagreements were resolved through
234 consensus.

235 We present findings under three thematic headings: boundaries reproduced, obscured and
236 suspended. Under 'boundaries reproduced' we discuss the typical nature of professional boundaries
237 between doctors and nurses in day-to-day practice under instances of routine work, and argue that
238 these were unproblematically reproduced. Under 'boundaries obscured' we reveal instances in
239 which nurse and doctor seniority had a shaping role in the nurse-doctor boundary becoming
240 obscured. Under 'boundaries suspended' we examine how under conditions of urgency professional
241 boundaries were temporary suspended.

242 In the context of the ICUs studied, seniority (i.e. rank) was inextricably linked with, and a reflection
243 as well as combination of, staff's experience and expertise. Staff's experience is one of the criteria
244 used for promotion to a senior nursing or medical post in addition to demonstrating relevant
245 expertise. Given the nature of ethnographic research and non-participant observation, it was not
246 possible nor appropriate to attempt to disaggregate staff seniority – which was identified through
247 staff lists and staff's name badges – from years of ICU experience or level of expertise. We
248 acknowledge that in other organisational contexts outside healthcare seniority may not encapsulate

249 experience and expertise in the same way. In our findings below, we use junior doctors to refer to
250 qualified doctors in training towards becoming consultants, also known as medical residents; ICU
251 training for junior doctors is at least two years, so the junior doctors in this study had less than two
252 years of ICU experience. We use junior nurses to refer to those with typically less than two years'
253 ICU experience; senior nurses are those with at least two years' ICU experience, a requirement for a
254 senior nursing post in the ICUs studied.

255

256 **FINDINGS**

257 For the purpose of this paper, we discuss findings relating to the nature of the interprofessional
258 boundary specifically between ICU nurses and doctors. While typical doctor-nurse boundaries were
259 largely reproduced under routine work conditions, we also identified instances in which these were
260 obscured and others in which these were suspended. These findings point towards a model of
261 professional work in which typical boundaries are reproduced during routine work, and when junior
262 staff are involved, but become gradually obscured as staff seniority and work urgency builds up
263 (figure 1).

264

FIGURE 1

265

266 **Boundaries reproduced**

267 In common with previous research (e.g. Coombs, 2004; Carmel, 2006; Alexanian *et al.*, 2015; Reeves
268 *et al.*, 2015; Rodriguez, 2015) expected professional boundaries between doctors and nurses were in
269 the main reproduced in the ICUs studied, particularly under conditions of routine work. This was
270 especially the case when examining interactions between consultants and junior nurses. Medical
271 consultants held jurisdiction over deciding the patient care plan and nurses were responsible for
272 executing this. When a junior nurse was asked to comment about how she planned her daily work,
273 she responded:

274 *It's important to know the medical plan of the day and where we are going. So your nursing*
275 *plan is based around that **grand plan** and you have to adapt to what's going on.*

276 (Interview Cityview ICU: Patricia, junior nurse)

277 Patricia's choice of words here ('*grand plan*') signifies her perceptions concerning the primacy of the
278 medical plan over the nursing plan for ICU patients. In this context medical consultants held ultimate
279 jurisdiction over ICU patients' treatment plans and consequently over intensive care work. This
280 served to reinforce consultants' powerful position in the division of labour, which also enabled them
281 to claim overall leadership of the ICU, as a medical consultant at Cityview ICU highlighted in
282 response to an interview question about their role:

283 *I am basically a consultant covering the intensive care unit and when I'm on, I'm basically **in***
284 ***charge** of the ICU.*

285 (Interview Cityview ICU: Mark, medical consultant)

286 ICU nurses accepted that the treatment objectives for patients were set by consultants, with the
287 minute-by-minute decisions on aspects of basic care remaining within the jurisdiction of the bedside
288 nurse. Characteristically, a junior nurse at Riverview North ICU commented:

289 *The aims and objectives are set by, the key ones, are set by doctors, because it is their job;*
290 *and smaller, like hour-to-hour basic stuff, like when patients are going to get out of bed into*
291 *the chair, that would be decided by nurses.*

292 (Interview Riverview North ICU: Louise, junior nurse)

293 Junior nurses observed in this research also attempted to influence the medical ward round and the
294 decisions reached. This influence was exerted tactfully, although overtly. Typically, junior nurses
295 would attempt to influence decision-making by asking the medical consultants about possible
296 changes to treatment. Some typical questions nurses asked at ward rounds across ICUs included:

297 *-“can I start feeding?”*

298 *-“can I stop antibiotics?”*

299 *-“can I hold fluids?”*

300 (Fieldnotes Cityview, Riverview North and South ICUs)

301 The consultants' responses to such questions were typically either approving of the nurse's
302 suggestion or tentatively permissive of the nurse to proceed only on the condition that the situation
303 was re-evaluated. A typical consultant reaction encountered across ICUs was:

304 -*'why don't you try that and see how it goes?'*
305 (Fieldnotes Cityview, Riverview North and South ICUs)

306 This style of interaction suggests that in the ICUs studied there were still traces of Stein's (1967)
307 doctor-nurse game, described as an elaborate ritual involving the nurse providing subtle cues to
308 guide doctors in their decision-making while avoiding overt confrontation. This finding also aligns
309 with Coombs' (2004) finding of consultants dominating the decision-making in ICU with nurses
310 remaining in a subservient position. Indeed, where a junior nurse made more overt suggestions
311 about treatment decisions, rather than providing subtle cues, consultants were hesitant and
312 defensive. For example, the following interaction was noted at Riverview South ICU between a
313 medical consultant and a junior nurse:

314 *Rachel (junior nurse): 'He's (patient) been having hallucinations. Maybe you would like to*
315 *review his methadol (for pain)?'*
316 *Mary (medical consultant): 'Hmm... fine.'*
317 *Rachel: 'About metoprolol (for blood pressure), because his blood pressure can get quite low,*
318 *are you not worried about it?'*
319 *Mary: 'He is young, **he can take it!** If you're really concerned you can ask us again.'*
320 (Fieldnotes Riverview South ICU)

321 In response to the nurse's first suggestion the consultant was initially hesitant to alter the
322 prescription, but ultimately conceded. Here, the consultant seemed to acknowledge the nurse's
323 knowledge of the patient's condition and response to the particular drug (*'He's been having*
324 *hallucinations'*) as a legitimate argument; however, was dismissive of the nurse's concerns about the
325 patient's blood pressure, deferring the decision to later. While the consultant's argument for this
326 was rather vague (*'he can take it'*), the junior nurse did not challenge this or ask for further
327 clarification.

328 Junior ICU nurses' interactions with consultants in particular were rather reserved. While the
329 previous instance indicates that some did attempt to inform a consultant's decision, most were
330 noted to simply report descriptive facts about patients' conditions with minimal interpretive effort
331 or recommendations. In this context, the typical professional boundary between nurses and doctors
332 was reproduced in the ICUs studied. This was achieved through nurse-doctor interactions during
333 day-to-day practice, in which medical consultants worked towards maintaining their leadership and
334 authority over ICU work, clinical decision-making about patient treatment in particular; the
335 consultant director at Cityview ICU commented in an interview:

336 *You have to encourage discussion and debate and arguments in order to have a chain of*
337 *command. So while it may sound dictatorial, it actually pulls the team together if they think*
338 *they have a say, even if they are overruled at the end.*
339 (Interview Cityview ICU: Alan, medical consultant)

340 The above quote shows the consultant wanted to maintain the appearance of collaboration rather
341 than accommodate competing viewpoints, especially if these conflicted with his own plan of action,
342 as signified through his choice of words (*'think they have a say'*). The ICU consultant viewed the
343 *'chain of command'* as something he had to accomplish in interaction, rather than something that
344 was accepted unquestionably. In this context, the consultant's openness to other professionals'
345 input was a strategy aimed at reinforcing his own position in the ICU and reproducing typical doctor-
346 nurse professional boundaries.

347

348 **Boundaries obscured**

349 The above data are typical of the kind of examples previous ethnographies drew from to argue that
350 ICU nurses were being excluded from clinical decision-making (Coombs, 2004), becoming 'mini
351 interns' (Zussman, 1992) and increasingly subsumed within ICU medicine (Carmel, 2006). However,
352 our data also revealed instances where the boundary between the doctor and the nurse was less

353 clearly demarcated. To illustrate this point, below we examine interactions at different seniority
354 levels between consultants, senior nurses, junior doctors and junior nurses.

355 *Consultants and senior ICU nurses*

356 In contrast with much of the recent literature (e.g. Reeves *et al.*, 2015) our data include examples
357 involving senior ICU nurses discussing openly and confidently with medical consultants about making
358 patient care decisions. Such interaction was recorded during a field visit at Cityview ICU:

359 *With the ward round at bedside four, Mark (medical consultant) stated that the patient*
360 *would be kept off sedation for fear of renal failure.*

361 *Charlotte (senior nurse): 'She (patient) is also on amoxapine (sedative) if we're worried about*
362 *that (renal failure).'*

363 *Mark: 'What can we do about that?'*

364 *Charlotte: 'She's on 60, prophylactic dose is basically 40.'*

365 *Mark: 'Let's do that.'*

366 (Fieldnotes Cityview ICU)

367 In the above instance, the senior nurse and consultant discussed possible treatment options for the
368 patient openly, with the consultant also asking for the bedside nurse's opinion ('*What can we do*
369 *about that?*'). Here, the interaction was collaborative although the final decision still needed to be
370 taken by the consultant.

371 Experienced ICU nurses were seen to be actively drawing from their intricate knowledge of their
372 patients' conditions, progress and reactions to drugs to contribute to medical decision-making. This
373 intricate patient knowledge was acknowledged by doctors in this study. For example, during a field
374 visit at Riverview South ICU the following interaction was noted between a senior nurse (Tim) and a
375 medical consultant (Mary):

376 *Mary: How is he (patient) doing?*

377 *Tim: He is doing great actually.*

378 *Mary: Is he on dextrose?*

379 *Tim: Yeah, and actrapid (for glucose). He hasn't had his bowels open. His NG (nasogastric*
 380 *tube) just gave 125ml until this morning. They've aspirated him but nothing aspirated. And*
 381 *now it looks like 25 since six this morning.*

382 *Mary: So we can start feeding him?*

383 *Tim: Yeah.*

384 *Mary: He needs to be more awake I think for extubation...*

385 *Tim: We'll try to stir him up a bit more.*

386 *Mary: Sinus rhythm?*

387 *Tim: Yeah, he went into AF (arrhythmia) last night but when his electrolytes were*
 388 *supplemented he went to sinus and stayed that way.*

389 (Fieldnotes Riverview South ICU)

390 Typical nurse-doctor boundaries became obscured in ICU when interactions included experienced
 391 nurses; here, doctor and nurse were seen to discuss the patient condition as equals and jointly
 392 deciding on the patient care plan. On other occasions consultants would openly seek senior nurses'
 393 input in making a patient care decision, for example about patients' readiness to be extubated:

394 *John (medical consultant): 'What happens if you wean fentanyl (anaesthetic)?'*

395 *Jo (senior nurse): 'He gets agitated, we tried yesterday.'*

396 (Fieldnotes Riverview North ICU)

397 *Christian (medical consultant): 'Do you think you can turn down sedation or is she (patient)*
 398 *not tolerating the tube?'*

399 *Danni (senior nurse): 'I can try [and see how it goes].'*

400 (Fieldnotes Riverview South ICU)

401 Senior ICU nurses perceived this characteristic of their role (intricate and up-to-date knowledge of
 402 patient condition) to be their distinctive feature compared with other health professionals, and ICU
 403 doctors in particular. The key difference between ICU nurses and other hospital areas lay in the
 404 provision of exclusive and intensive one-to-one patient care. Each ICU nurse was allocated a
 405 particular patient for whom they provided exclusive care for the duration of their shift. This enabled

406 the ICU nurse to develop familiarity with a patient and use that intricate knowledge of the patient's
407 condition, and their responses to particular treatment interventions, to contribute to care decisions.
408 As a senior nurse argued during an interview:

409 *Alice (senior nurse): Because you are the one, there, by the bedside, 24 hours a day, you*
410 *know the patient inside out.*

411 (Interview Cityview ICU, Alice senior nurse)

412 Consequently, this in-depth knowledge conferred a sense of nurses' authority and jurisdiction over
413 the detailed operationalisation of clinical decision-making. In turn, this enabled senior nurses to
414 engage with medical consultants more confidently and contribute overtly to patient care decision-
415 making. In this way our data contrast with previous assumptions of ICU nurses lacking a unique
416 contribution to, and being excluded from patient care decision making (e.g. Manias and Street,
417 2001; Coombs, 2004; Paradis et al., 2014).

418

419 *Junior doctors and ICU nurses*

420 Both senior and junior ICU nurses exhibited greater persistence in their interactions with junior
421 doctors, often providing overt instruction. Junior nurses in particular, while they were seen to be
422 reluctant to engage with medical consultants, were more direct when interacting with junior
423 doctors. In this context, the typical nurse-doctor boundary was obscured with nurses holding an
424 equal, if not superior, standing to junior doctors in the division of labour. For example, ICU nurses
425 would often ask junior doctors to change a patient's prescription based on their own assessment of
426 the patient condition:

427 *Diane (junior nurse): 'Would you mind changing the haloperidol to PRN (when necessary). He*
428 *doesn't really need it.'*

429 *Damon (junior doctor): 'Yes, I agree. He is much better.'*

430 (Fieldnotes Riverview North)

431 ICU nurses frequently asked junior doctors to sign forms or prepare documentation for their
432 patients. Nurses often completed forms requesting blood tests or x-rays for their patients and then
433 asked junior doctors to sign these:

434 *Janet (junior nurse): 'Jacob (junior doctor), could you sign a chest x-ray for me?'*

435 *Jacob nodded affirmatively.*

436 *Janet: 'I'll get it ready and then I'll call you.'*

437 (Fieldnotes Cityview ICU)

438 Junior doctors were not noted to resist or question such requests from nurses. This may have been
439 due to them accepting nurses' greater experience and familiarity with consultants' preferences, in
440 addition to their aversion to paperwork.

441 The manner in which nurses made such requests varied according to whether nurses were more
442 junior or senior. In particular, while junior nurses mainly used an inviting tone in their requests,
443 senior nurses were often more direct:

444 *Kathryn (senior nurse) while at bed space one called to Susan (junior doctor) who sat at the
445 nurses' station. Susan walked up and approached Kathryn.*

446 *Susan: 'What do you need me to do?'*

447 *Kathryn: 'Just a discharge summary.'*

448 *Susan: 'Yeah, I can do that.'*

449 (Fieldnotes Cityview ICU)

450 Junior doctors in ICU were particularly attentive to senior nurses. While this may have been a
451 response to senior nurses' position in the nursing hierarchy, this also suggested junior doctors
452 appreciated senior nurses' experience and expertise.

453 ICU nurses also challenged junior doctors' medical authority if they perceived their actions to be
454 questionable or unsatisfactory. For example, in her interview a junior nurse at Cityview ICU
455 described her frustrations with a particular incident on the ICU involving a deteriorating patient for
456 which she felt the junior doctor did not take appropriate action:

457 *Yesterday we had a man who was on Vapotherm (type of respiratory support) and needed*
458 *more oxygen and they were going to try and put non-invasive ventilation on him, but he was*
459 *refusing. And he had a huge abdominal surgery, and he started to feel sick. The first thing*
460 *that I did was give him an anti-emetic, and I was giving him that through his cannula, but he*
461 *was saying that was really painful and so I couldn't give him the proper medication. The*
462 *doctor, I had already told him that he needed a major gastric tube, so I was going to give him*
463 *an anti-emetic first, then he needed a major gastric tube. Well, as soon as I couldn't give all*
464 *the anti-emetic I went straight back to him and said 'Okay, he needs better access, because*
465 *he's deteriorating, he's vomiting and he's needing more oxygen, so come and put a line in*
466 *because we need to give him something to stop him vomiting. And I was quite forceful*
467 *because he was sort of sitting around going, 'Oh yes do.' But he wasn't really offering any*
468 *suggestions.*

469 (Interview Cityview ICU: Tracy, junior nurse)

470 In the above instance, the nurse's narrative indicates she perceived her interaction and assessment
471 of the patient as legitimate ground upon which to base her claim about the required intervention;
472 suggesting that as her interpretation of the junior doctor's action was found to be wanting, she
473 became more assertive and instructive. While such an assertive approach was indeed observed in
474 interactions between nurses and junior doctors, it was not an approach mentioned or observed in
475 interactions with consultants.

476 Senior nurses were also often seen to informally teach junior doctors. Such teaching could be about
477 atypical or infrequent interventions as well as more routine clinical skills. For example, the following
478 incident was witnessed at Riverview South ICU:

479 *While at the ward round the consultant asked one of the junior doctors (George) to change*
480 *the patient's peripheral IV line. George got ready and approached the patient, but he*
481 *appeared unsure and hesitant. George turned to the senior nurse at the bedside and asked:*

482 *'Ehm, how, ehm, where do I stand?'* The nurse approached George, stood next to him and
483 *whispered some instructions.*

484 (Fieldnotes Riverview South ICU)

485 Together, these examples lend support to the argument that senior ICU nurses' knowledge over
486 tasks that were typical for them was superior to junior doctors' knowledge in that area. The
487 permanence of nursing staff in hospital settings affords nurses the knowledge over local policies and
488 practices which augments their influence over doctors (e.g. Mumford, 1970; Hughes, 1988; Coombs,
489 2004). However, the extent to which this finding applies equally to both senior and junior nurses has
490 not been clarified in previous work. In the current study, it was senior nurses who mostly adopted a
491 direct approach in their interactions with junior doctors, often issuing them with instructions. In
492 contrast, junior nurses assumed an indirect manner in interacting with junior doctors, often eliciting
493 advice or offering suggestions. This may be in response to junior nurses lacking the experience and
494 local knowledge that would have enabled them to approach doctors with explicit instructions rather
495 than suggestions.

496 Senior ICU nurses used different interactional approaches and techniques to legitimise their claims
497 over patient treatment decisions, depending on whether they interacted with consultants or junior
498 doctors. When interacting with consultants nurses drew on their unique insight and familiarity with
499 the patient rather than questioning the consultant's authority, experience or knowledge base.
500 However, when interacting with junior doctors, whose role in the ICU was transient and less
501 established, they would overtly draw from their own clinical experience and knowledge to influence,
502 resist or initiate a particular medical decision.

503

504 **Boundaries suspended**

505 In contrast to instances of routine work, during situations that required urgent intervention medical
506 consultants were less defensive of their position in the ICUs as ultimate decision-makers; and both

507 senior and junior nurses less hesitant to act. However, the approach consultants assumed depended
508 heavily on the seniority, and by extension the skills and experience of the nurse involved in the
509 incident. When a senior nurse was the bedside clinician involved, medical consultants assumed a
510 more detached and supervisory role. In particular, they allowed ICU nurses take initiative while they
511 oversaw from afar. For example, during a visit at Riverview South ICU the following incident was
512 noted:

513 *As the ward round moved to bed space 22, Jacob (senior nurse) in bed space 19 noticed his*
514 *patient's blood pressure dropped drastically. The monitor alarm went off and Jacob rushed to*
515 *the bedside cabinet and pulled out a bag of fluids (gelofusine -increases blood volume). John*
516 *(medical consultant) took notice and approached the bed space; he glanced at Jacob, and*
517 *then moved to stand in front of the patient's monitor which he looked at intensely. Jacob*
518 *prepared a fluid-giving set and quickly connected it to the patient's IV line; he squeezed the*
519 *fluid bag while looking at the monitor. John turned to look back at Jacob, they exchanged a*
520 *look, and then both looked back at the monitor. The monitor alarm silenced as the patient's*
521 *blood pressure rose. John moved back from the monitor to the bedside computer station,*
522 *brought up the patient's notes and prescribed the fluid just administered.*

523 (Fieldnotes Riverview South ICU)

524 The consultant in this instance, although not called by the bedside nurse to assist, approached the
525 bed space and assumed the role of overlooking the nurse's intervention and patient's responses.
526 Despite assuming a supervisory role, the consultant did not explicitly issue any instructions to the
527 bedside nurse nor did he challenge any of the nurse's actions. The nurse, in taking the initiative to
528 intervene and rectify the patient's condition, crossed the expected nursing boundary. In particular,
529 the nurse made an assessment of the situation, decided on a treatment option and initiated this
530 without a medical prescription or instruction. Although most ICU nurses do receive training in
531 advanced life support, intervention in such events should still be guided by a doctor, particularly
532 with regard to the administration of intravenous drugs. The urgency of the situation created a space
533 that allowed the jurisdictional boundary to be temporary transgressed, but with implied permission.
534 The administration of drugs has been previously identified as an area for 'de facto boundary

535 blurring' (Allen, 2001) between medicine and nursing, although the precise conditions under which
536 this is acceptable have not been explicated. In ICU, it was the interplay of seniority and urgency that
537 enabled such transgressions to manifest, as further illustrated below.

538 ICU consultants were not always present in the unit during sudden patient deteriorations as they
539 rarely stayed for long once the ward round was complete. Therefore, during such instances junior
540 doctors were often the medical professionals involved who, unlike consultants, assumed less of a
541 supervisory position and took a more active role with hands-on clinical care. The following incident
542 noted at Cityview ICU demonstrates such a situation:

543 *While sat at the nurses' station making notes, I heard an alarm from the direction of bed*
544 *space four and looked up. The patient on bed space four self-extubated, and was waving his*
545 *intratracheal tube over his head. Kathryn (senior nurse) tried to take hold of the patient's*
546 *arm while Trisha (senior nurse) moved in from the next bed space and tried to keep the*
547 *patient still by holding him from his shoulders while saying to the patient:*

548 *Trisha: 'It's OK, OK'.*

549 *Graeme (junior doctor) noticed the activity and rushed next to Kathryn who pointed out the*
550 *ventilation mask to him. Trisha managed to keep the patient still and Graeme positioned the*
551 *mask over the patient's face. Kathryn picked up an intubation set from the bedside cabinet,*
552 *placed it on a trolley and pushed it next to Graeme. She then moved to draw the curtains*
553 *around the patient (blocking the view). A few minutes later Trisha opened the curtains; the*
554 *patient was re-intubated and appeared calm.*

555 (Fieldnotes Cityview ICU)

556 Unlike instances of non-urgent work, in which senior ICU nurses often held a higher standing to
557 junior doctors, during the incident described above doctor and nurse worked together
558 collaboratively to secure the patient's airway and restore ventilation. In typical non-urgent work
559 mode, senior nurses were seen to openly instruct junior doctors, however in the above incident the
560 senior nurse only discreetly directed the junior doctor in the actions to be taken, which she
561 coordinated with her own. Here, the division of labour between nurse and doctor was neither

562 discussed nor openly negotiated; during that moment, the boundary between them was no longer
563 clear and concerns over jurisdiction were temporary suspended.

564 Under urgent conditions nurses assumed roles according to their perceived level of skill and
565 experience. This was largely in response to particular patient situations, rather than on the basis of
566 traditional boundary concerns. This was revealed in nurses' own talk about their response to such
567 situations. For example, when asked during an interview to comment about her role during
568 situations in which urgent action was needed, Tracy, a junior nurse at Cityview ICU, stated:

569 *Now I think about it, if something happens like that, people assume roles, they're not told,*
570 *'You do this, you do that' necessarily. I think when you learn to do say, life support, normally*
571 *there should be someone who's more experienced, should say, 'Right, you do this, you do*
572 *that, you do that' and they should be told what the roles are, but actually when it's*
573 *happening, that doesn't really happen. It'll more sort of come up, Oh, this or that needs*
574 *doing. Say if something happens there are certain roles that I am comfortable to take*
575 *because I know them, so I'll often go towards those roles and be in control of those roles. I*
576 *like to leave certain harder roles to people whom I feel, who have more experience. But if*
577 *nobody else steps up then I will step up and do those roles if I need to, because someone*
578 *needs to do them."*

579 (Interview Cityview ICU: Tracy, junior nurse)

580 As the above quote illustrates, under conditions of urgent work, nurses believed jurisdictional
581 concerns made way for work processes that needed to be undertaken. Specifically, the nurse
582 recalled that under urgent conditions health professionals focussed on what '*needs doing*'; although,
583 this also depended on the other health professionals present and their level of skill and experience.
584 More knowledge or technical skill-demanding interventions, the nurse argued, were left to those
585 most senior, while those more junior assumed actions closer to their skill repertoire. ICU
586 professionals' seniority, encapsulating experience and expertise, was perceived by nurses to be a
587 determining factor in calibrating responses under urgent work conditions.

588

589 **DISCUSSION**

590 Our data suggest that official positions in the ICU hierarchy, those of doctors and nurses specifically,
591 did not determine the decision-making process in the way much of the literature has assumed. In
592 ICU, nurses did not simply follow medical instruction but there were also situations in which doctors
593 acceded to what nurses suggested for patient care. In this sense our data question recent
594 arguments, largely from North America, concerning the incompatibility of approaches between ICU
595 doctors and nurses (e.g. Paradis *et al.*, 2014), peripheral participation (e.g. Alexanian *et al.*, 2015),
596 prevailing hierarchies and medical domination (e.g. Reeves *et al.*, 2015). British ICUs, on the whole,
597 have a higher patient acuity level, stronger intensivist control over admissions, and higher nurse-to-
598 patient ratios compared with many ICUs in North America (Sakr *et al.*, 2015); the extent to which
599 such organisational features have a bearing on these findings can be ascertained through future
600 multi-site, comparative research.

601 Whether our unique findings are as a direct consequence of the DH's ICU workforce modernisation
602 policy (2000b; 2005) could not be reliably captured through our data. We concur with Freidson
603 (1976) that the conditions posed to professional interaction by such policy forces are broad and
604 permissive, so that a variety of bargains are possible at the level of the workplace. A comparison
605 with pre-modernisation ICU work (e.g. Coombs, 2004) suggests that modernisation policy served to
606 legitimise nurses' pushing for a greater say in the care of their patients, although the possibility that
607 it also served to validate practice that was already occurring should not be ignored. Based on our
608 data, and reflecting on the findings of previous work, there has clearly been a shift at the level of
609 everyday practice likely as a result of a 'habituation period' (Kroezen *et al.*, 2014) following the
610 introduction of the DH policies. Modernisation policies, however, were not visible in the workplace
611 nor were these mentioned or referred to by staff. We conclude that policy was diffused at the level
612 of day-to-day practice but that it served to create a bargaining space for interprofessional
613 interactions, the outcomes of which were influenced by professional seniority and work urgency.

614 Abbott (1988) argued that in the workplace jurisdictional boundaries can be settled in three ways:
615 professions can have full control of work jurisdictions at times, while at others can have part or
616 shared control, or control subordinate to another profession. In the example of ICU, our data show
617 certain areas of jurisdiction, concerning patient care planning in particular, were at times shared and
618 others contested between medicine and nursing; with nurses attempting to, but only sometimes
619 being successful in, claiming a say. However, medical consultants were not equally resistant to all
620 nurses; they were found to more easily accept input from senior staff. In this sense, medical
621 consultants did not treat all nurses as equal but were more content to share jurisdictions with those
622 more senior. This finding indicates that Abbott's (1988) theorisation of professions as homogenous
623 groups is limiting, at least in healthcare; instead, professional seniority and the context of clinical
624 specialisms should be taken into account in such analyses of work.

625 The findings presented here also open up the possibility for an additional dimension to Abbott's
626 (1988) theoretical model by illustrating how the tensions surrounding jurisdictional boundaries play
627 out in day-to-day practice, especially when work is conducted under urgent conditions. Our findings
628 indicate that the urgency of the situation left little room for professionals to express the kind of
629 jurisdictional concerns proposed by Abbott. In addition, we found little signs of negotiating activity
630 (Strauss *et al.*, 1964) even when nurses stretched their typical jurisdictional boundaries. This finding
631 lends support to Allen's (2001) argument about the non-negotiated order of healthcare practice,
632 which however has not been linked with variations in the intensity of work. This additional
633 dimension extends the reach of Abbott's and Allen's work into critical and urgent environments
634 highlighting conditions under which jurisdictions can shift and be suspended.

635 While previous research suggested that ICU doctors tended to exclude nurses from clinical decision-
636 making (e.g. Manias and Street, 2001; Coombs, 2004), our data include instances of doctors both
637 including and excluding nurses from the decision-making process. They included nurses by inviting
638 them to comment on their patients' progress, responses to treatment and readiness to be
639 extubated; and they excluded nurses by rejecting their concerns over patients' medication regimes.

640 Doctors solicited nurses' views on matters they perceived to be within nursing jurisdiction and
641 expertise, but excluded them on matters they believed to be outside of nurses' legitimate claim.
642 Therefore, contrary to previous assumptions, exclusion and inclusion of nurses in ICU decision-
643 making was not a *de facto* position but related to perceived areas of professional jurisdiction.

644 This study was designed to investigate how professionals accomplished jurisdiction during everyday
645 practice within the ICU; it was not possible to follow discussions at hospital board level or trace a
646 path through DH policy to everyday practice. It was also outside the scope of this study to map out
647 differences in the legal responsibilities between the two professional groups, especially since these
648 are not clearly laid out within existing legislation. Following Abbott (1988) the study focussed on
649 professional work, as distinct from the work undertaken by non-professional groups. We however
650 noted that a range of other staff, such as support workers and technicians, can also make a
651 meaningful contribution to ICU work. These are potential areas of investigation to follow; to clarify
652 the links between different levels of the legal and workplace arenas. Moreover, our data were
653 drawn from three large metropolitan ICUs with a typically high staff turnover, which meant that
654 more prosaic sociological explanations for our data, such as trust and professional familiarity, did not
655 readily apply. While our data do not exclude the presence of such individual notions as trust or even
656 confidence, we argue these should not detract from investigating the everyday conditions of
657 workplace interaction, seniority and urgency in particular.

658 We acknowledge that using ICU seniority as a concept encapsulating experience and expertise, limits
659 transferability of our findings in non-ICU organisational settings in which, unlike ICU, seniority,
660 experience and expertise may not be as strongly linked. We also appreciate that while doctors may
661 hold senior nurses' input in higher esteem, especially if doctors are junior, it is still doctors who are
662 ultimately responsible for patient treatment. In this context, while occupational boundaries may
663 become obscured, shaped by the interplay of seniority and urgency, doctors retain legal
664 responsibility; therefore, the leverage nurses gain on medical decision-making can be more
665 borrowed than owned. Finally, while our data point towards the interplay of seniority and urgency

666 as factors shaping the context of professional interaction, we do not argue for these to exclusively
667 explain our findings. We call for future research to build on, elaborate and examine the resonance of
668 our findings with other settings.

669

670 **CONCLUSION**

671 Our data showed that work urgency and staff seniority had a part to play in shaping health
672 professional boundaries in day-to-day ICU practice. In particular, we found that the less urgent a
673 decision or care task was, and the more junior the staff involved, the more typical professional
674 boundaries and interactions were; and that these became gradually obscured as seniority and
675 urgency built up.

676 These findings raise implications for planning the composition of the ICU workforce, with an
677 appropriate mix of senior and junior medical and nursing staff in shifts. This can also foster ongoing
678 discussions between the medical and nursing profession about the shape of the ICU division of
679 labour; especially given that senior medical professionals have a determining role in providing a
680 space within which interprofessional working can be achieved.

681 Based on our findings, ICU policy makers would do well to consider following through the
682 introduction of future policy with forging clear links between the legal and workplace arena in order
683 to support the implementation and habituation of policy initiatives. Our data do not lead us to make
684 arguments around causality, but we encourage future research to investigate seniority and urgency
685 as variables in the study of patient and organisational ICU outcomes.

686 This study demonstrated the potential of workplace research that pays attention to the full
687 spectrum of work from routine to emergency, and to differing levels of professional seniority. With a
688 view to developing theory and adding to the knowledge base with regard to the social organisation
689 of healthcare work, we issue a call for future research to pay closer and more sustained attention to

690 the conditions and properties of work, seniority and urgency in particular, as they play out in day-to-
691 day practice.

692

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

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
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791 **Table 1: Summary of data collection**

Research site	Duration of fieldwork	Observation sessions	Interviews
Cityview ICU	Four months	114 hours collected over 19 separate observation sessions	Ten interviews with: Two junior nurses ¹ Four senior nurses ² One nurse manager One medical consultant One physiotherapist One pharmacist
Riverview South ICU	Three months	78 hours collected over 13 separate observation sessions	Ten interviews with: Three junior nurses Two senior nurses One medical consultant One junior doctor ³ One consultant physiotherapist ⁴ One consultant pharmacist One junior pharmacist ⁵
Riverview North ICU	Two months	48 hours collected over 10 separate observation sessions	Seven interviews with: Two junior nurses Two senior nurses One junior doctor One senior physiotherapist One junior physiotherapist
<p>¹We used junior nurses to refer to those with typically less than two years' experience in intensive care.</p> <p>²Senior nurses were those with typically more than two years of experience, whose role also included overseeing junior nurses as well as shift management.</p> <p>³Junior doctors were qualified doctors in training towards becoming a consultant, also known as medical residents.</p> <p>⁴Consultant physiotherapists and pharmacists were those who were dedicated to critical care, and held relevant ICU qualifications.</p> <p>⁵Junior physiotherapists and pharmacists were qualified staff on rotation to critical care as part of their training.</p>			

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793 **Figure 1: Urgency and seniority influencing professional boundaries**



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Research highlights

- We studied the conditions and processes of accomplishing professional jurisdiction
- We found jurisdictional boundaries among professionals dynamic and context dependent
- We question theorisation that treats professions as homogenous groups
- Future research should pay closer attention to fluctuation in the intensity of work
- Seniority and urgency have a part to play in shaping health professional boundaries