‘Over, under and through the walls’
The dynamics of public security, police-community relations and the limits of managerialism in crime control in Recife, Brazil

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‘Over, under and through the walls’:
The dynamics of public security, police-community relations and the limits of managerialism in crime control in Recife, Brazil

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**Table of Contents**

Table of tables and figures ...........................................................................................................5  
Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................................6  
Abstract .........................................................................................................................................7  
Key words .......................................................................................................................................7  
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction .............................................................................................................8  
1.1 Homicide and violence at the margins .....................................................................................9  
1.2 Security ....................................................................................................................................12  
1.3 Contribution to criminology and Brazilian public security studies .....................................17  
1.4 Outline of the chapters ............................................................................................................20  
CHAPTER 2 – The Background ....................................................................................................23  
2.1 Context .....................................................................................................................................24  
2.2 Violence and marginalisation .................................................................................................30  
2.3 Violence, crime and poverty nexus: mistaken theories .......................................................32  
2.4 The adaptation of criminological theories from the Global North .....................................35  
   The genesis and theoretical rationale of PPV ........................................................................36  
2.5 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................42  
CHAPTER 3 – The criminological study of public security in Brazil ...........................................44  
3.1 Brazil’s internal knowledge production inequalities .............................................................45  
3.2 State building and the monopoly of violence .........................................................................46  
   Gender .......................................................................................................................................47  
   Youth .......................................................................................................................................49  
3.3 Absence of the State? ..............................................................................................................50  
3.4 Some reflections on democracy and security ........................................................................53  
3.5 Issues of public security ..........................................................................................................56  
3.6 The dynamics of public security as object of study ...............................................................59  
3.7 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................65
CHAPTER 4 – Methodology ................................................................. 67
4.1 Research design ........................................................................... 69
4.2 Interviews .................................................................................... 71
4.3 Focus groups .............................................................................. 72
4.4 Participant observation ................................................................. 73
4.5 Ethnographic methods and a feminist approach ......................... 75
4.6 The politics of representation ...................................................... 78
4.7 Case study research and neighbourhood cases ......................... 82
4.8 Final methodological remarks ..................................................... 86

CHAPTER 5 – Police reform ............................................................... 88
5.1 Overview of public security reforms ............................................. 90
5.2 The views of state actors: alleged achievements and challenges ... 94
5.3 The limits of current modes of control and of the discourse of success .... 101
5.4 Hyper-incarceration .................................................................... 110
5.5 Zero tolerance ........................................................................... 120
5.6 Prioritising managerial reforms over the training and structure of the police . 123
5.7 Theoretical implications and conclusions ...................................... 125

CHAPTER 6 – Institutional self-critique .............................................. 128
6.1 Blaming the poor: crack, social class and violence ....................... 129
6.2 Silencing the poor? .................................................................... 136
6.3 Ethnic, gender and class discrimination ....................................... 138
6.4 Rolling out policing .................................................................... 143
6.5 Soldiers ..................................................................................... 145
6.7 Conclusion .................................................................................. 151

CHAPTER 7 – Public perceptions of crime, safety and policing: The case study communities ................................................................. 153
7.1 Demographics .......................................................................... 154
Table of tables and figures

Table 1: Household income per capita by section of the population ........................................26
Table 2: Population of Brazil’s metropolitan regions. ...............................................................28
Table 3: Largest Brazilian metropolitan regions. ................................................................. 28
Figure 2: Map of informal settlements in RMR. Source: IBGE (2011) .....................................29
Table 4: Homicide rate with firearms .....................................................................................65
Table 5: Number of homicides in three cities .......................................................................65
Figure 3: Research groups ....................................................................................................70
Table 6: Pernambuco’s prison population (2005-2012) .........................................................113
Figure 4: Prison population in Pernambuco (2005-2012) ....................................................113
Figure 5: Rate of incarceration per state June 2013 (inmates per 100,000 inhab.) ...............114
Figure 6: Tourinho*, Pernambuco, October 2013 .................................................................155
Table 7: Demographics of Tourinho .....................................................................................156
Table 8: Demographics of Vitoria .......................................................................................156
Table 9: Police work rating ..................................................................................................166
Figure 7: Main street in Vitoria*, July 2013 ..........................................................................171
Figure 8: PPV’s meeting room at SEPLAG .......................................................................194
Table 10: Number and rate (per 100,000) of Intentional Lethal Violent Crimes (CVLI) in
Pernambuco (PE), Recife’s metropolitan region (RMR) and Recife (2007-2014) ..............209
Figure 9: The army patrolling an upper-class neighbourhood, Boa Viagem, Recife, May 2014.
..................................................................................................................................................213
Figure 10: The army pointing rifles at ordinary citizens while patrolling a low-income
community in Recife, May 2014. ..............................................................................................213
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Abstract

This dissertation contributes to Brazilian public security studies from the perspective of critical criminology. It examines public experiences of insecurity and the social impacts of security programmes that aim to address violence in one Brazilian city: Recife. Between 1982 and 2007, Recife had one of the highest homicide rates in Brazil. Between 2008 and 2012, homicide rates declined in Recife in tandem with the implementation of a public security intervention entitled Pacto pela Vida or Pact for Life (PPV). However, few studies have examined this programme, the relations between urban marginalised communities and the public security system in Recife, or how the daily experiences of the urban poor in Recife are affected by violence and public security provision. This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature drawing on ethnographic methods to examine existing interactions between residents of low-income communities and institutions of the public security system, especially the police and the prison. The research is based on data gathered through interviews, observations, focus groups and secondary sources, such as official data about levels of incarceration and homicide. It poses questions about the social effects of existing security policies, arguing that the emulation of mainstream criminological theories of crime control from the Global North produces large-scale perverse effects in the context of countries of the Global South. The findings are based on interviews with the police and data gathered in two low-income communities, one of which is located around a large prison. The data show that managerial police reforms and security programmes have not addressed long-standing issues of sexism, racism, classism and brutalising training in the police force. Moreover, through the increasing use of policing and hyper-incarceration as methods of crime control, security programmes have failed to inhibit diverse forms of violent and organised crime and exacerbated existing inequalities affecting the most marginalised populations.

Key words
Violence; public security; inequality; prison; police; Brazil.
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction

‘We have tightened security inside and outside the prison. We discovered sixteen tunnels connecting the prison to the outside and we closed those. The problem used to be people throwing parcels over the walls, so as we increased surveillance around the walls, prisoners started to build tunnels. Now, as we found the tunnels, they started to blow up the walls.’ (Delegado, 27th January 2016, government meeting at the secretariat of planning and management)

During my last visit to Recife, the capital city of the state of Pernambuco in the northeast of Brazil, prisoners used explosives to blast a hole in one of the walls of the Complexo do Curado prison, leading to the escape of forty prisoners on 23rd January 2016. One of the largest prisons in Latin America, the Complexo do Curado currently houses approximately 7,000 inmates (four times its capacity). A few days before the explosion, on 20th January 2016, over fifty prisoners had escaped from another prison in the state of Pernambuco. The police recaptured many escapees and killed some, raising concerns about the routine disrespect for human rights in overcrowded prisons and in Brazilian society more widely. The prison breaks increased public fear, feelings of insecurity and doubts about the sustainability of the existing public security system.

During a government meeting, attended on 27th January 2016, the delegado quoted above expressed his concern, arguing that the way to solve the situation would be to build more prisons, as long as they were smaller and more manageable: ‘we need smaller prisons but it is going to take years to build enough prisons for all the inmates we already have’. Perhaps because I was trained as a critical criminologist, to me this seemed to be a catch 22 situation: whatever the police tried to do, the police-criminals pursuit would be unending. Incarcerating suspects and increasing surveillance did not seem sustainable or efficient methods for creating or maintaining public safety, especially when deeper structural, institutional and societal problems are inadequately addressed.

I start with the anecdote about the prison escapes because it illustrates and epitomises some of the limits of managerialism in crime control and the limits of policing and incarceration in Brazil’s context. It is one anecdote on the salient
symptoms of multiple failures to generate and implement meaningful and transformative public policies.

Most prisoners in Brazil are incarcerated for drug-related offences rather than violent crime. Studies show that less than 10% of cases of violent crime, such as homicide, are even investigated. Prisoners and organised criminals in overcrowded inhumane conditions continue to operate over, under and through the prison’s walls. Many young people are faced with a highly competitive employment market, precarious work and living conditions, inadequate opportunities, poor schooling and, among other issues, ontological insecurities. Some of the young people facing these problems will continue to be attracted to the power and income that can be obtained with a gun, through the drug trade or dealing with organised criminals inside and outside prisons. In light of this, the central research question of this thesis is: how do public security policies aimed at reducing violence affect young people in Recife’s low-income communities?

This thesis makes a contribution to criminology and public security studies in Brazil, arguing that existing public security programmes in Pernambuco have not been the panacea to crime problems. Existing or ‘new’ security programmes perceived as a success and aimed at reducing violent crime have not inhibited diverse forms of violence and crime. Instead they have exacerbated the inequalities that affect the most marginalised populations through the increasing use of policing and hyper-incarceration as methods of crime control. Moreover, managerial police reforms and new security programmes have not addressed long-standing issues of sexism, racism, classism and brutalising training in the police force. The model of policing has remained relatively unchanged despite the implementation of new security interventions, insofar as the police continuously fail to adopt democratic principles, such as equality before the law and accountability, especially when interacting with people in low-income communities. Young people and residents in these communities are under-protected, exposed to organised criminals and security racketeers, and continuously treated as suspects and criminals by the police.

1.1 Homicide and violence at the margins

A significant literature has begun to emerge identifying the issue of youth violence in poor urban communities around the world (Feltran 2011, Hagedorn 2007, Hagedorn,
Davis, and Ebrary 2008). These communities, described in Brazil as favelas and periferias (‘peripheral areas’), are typically neighbourhoods far from the city centre, perceived as undesirable places in which to live. Periferias (the plural is used to indicate heterogeneity) are known in Brazil as working-class neighbourhoods, the spaces where workers such as labourers, service-sector employees, domestic workers and housewives live. They are seen as communities in which family, hard work and social mobility are valued, and as neighbourhoods replete with community associations, organisers and leaders (Feltran 2011). Yet, they have come to the attention of some analysts and the wider public as very violent places, known for their high murder rates and cinematographic images ingrained in public consciousness from films such as City of God (2002) and Elite Squad (2007).

Sometimes this violence is associated with ‘gangs’ (Jones and Rodgers 2009, Fernandes 2013), or with other forms of organised crime – especially drug dealing and trafficking (Arias 2006, Bourgois 2003, Denyer Willis 2015). Sometimes it takes the form of political or community resistance (Scheper-Hughes 2004, Davies 2006). Sometimes violence is perpetrated by young people, but often it is perpetrated against them, by police and security agencies (Arias 2006, Chevigny 1995, Huggins 1997, Zaluar 2010).

Since the 1980s both the homicide rate and the use of firearms in homicides have been rising in Brazil. The country has the highest homicide rate among the 12 most populous countries in the world (Waiselfisz 2013). In 2010, the rate of youth homicide (15-29 years old) with a firearm in Brazil reached 42.5/100,000 of the population, as compared with 9.1/100,000 (ibid 2013, 13) in 1980: almost a fivefold increase in thirty years. Overall levels of lethal violence continue to grow, although at a slower rate in recent years. Brazil’s overall homicide rate grew by 1.6% between 2000 and 2009 (Souza et al, 2012).

There is, however, an unequal distribution of deaths in the country, with the North and Northeast regions seeing much higher increases. The southeast region of the country (e.g. Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo) was the only region to register a drop in the homicide rates. In the Northeast, the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants went from 19.4 in 2000 to 33.5 in 2009 (Souza, Ribeiro, and Valadares 2012, 52). While there is a geographical aspect to this phenomenon, there are also gender, ‘racial’ and class dimensions to it. According to a large-scale national survey (Waiselfisz 2011), the violent mortality problem disproportionately affects young, non-white males. The
likelihood of death for a young, non-white man aged 15-25 in 2008 was 127.6% greater than for a white male in the same age bracket (ibid, p. 60).

Pinheiro (2006, XVIII) suggests that our failure to listen to young people has led to a failure to respond to their needs. Thus this research proposes to examine how urban violence and insecurity affect young people’s daily life in Recife’s ‘at risk’ communities. How do residents of these communities employ practices and discourses to comprehend, explain and live in a context of high violence and insecurity? And, ultimately, what role does the State and its policies play in the fluctuation – continuation, expansion or reduction – of violence in the most socially excluded communities?

Neocleous (2000) criticises the discipline of Criminology for leaving out the theorisation of the State, despite its crucial importance for understanding control over the exercise of force. As he puts it:

‘The history of the police is the history of state power, and the overlapping consensus that this power is rooted in the control of the exercise of force – a consensus stretching from Hobbes to Webber – should suggest that the police as one of the institutions which has been granted the right to exercise this force, needs to be understood in the wider context of the State. As a consequence, any theory of police must involve a theory of state power; conversely, any theory of state power must necessarily consist of a theory of police’ (Neocleous 2000, xi)

The State is a blurry and contested category. It can be constructed as an abstract imagined category as well as a real entity that manifests itself in multiple spheres of social life (Gupta 2006). It is not intended here to equate the State with the government. Governments shift and change in periodical intervals (at least in democracies), and govern populations in delineated territories and nation states. This difference helps delineate some of the boundaries that separate members of the government from other state actors, such as the police. The police are state actors but are not the government or the State itself. Brenner et al. (2003) deploy the metaphor of a container to define the State, with a geographical focus, as a territory or spatial entity differentiated from other States by the borders that they patrol, which divide domestic politics from international relations. While this definition emphasises the
importance of spatiality to state theory, it leaves out the significance of a key function of the State, as defined by Max Weber. For Weber (1946), the State is an entity that ‘claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a territory’ (78).

Both frameworks have relevance with different foci, one on the territorial aspects and the other on the attempt to legitimately monopolise the use of force (whether successfully or not). But rather than discussing its contested definitions, this thesis focuses on how the State affects populations. In line with Neocleous’ (2000) critique of criminology, this thesis considers the role of the State by asking how state actors, security policies and practices affect young people in poor communities.

The stereotype of the favelas and periferias portrays their residents as homogenous, uncivil and violent, requiring repression or a tough approach on the part of the authorities. In popular stereotypes, violence is often simplistically explained as an outcome of poverty or individual ‘evil’ (Caldeira 2000). However, ethnographic studies have begun to reveal profound heterogeneity in the causes and political meanings of violence in these regions (Feltran 2011). A key aim of this research is to explore the heterogeneity in the dynamics of security practices and the relations of violence within which young people in the periferias are often involved.

1.2 Security

Studies conducted in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have indicated that policing and security, especially private security, are often provided in rich and upper-class parts of the city, while in low-income communities policing tends to be sporadic and reactive rather than preventive, with police responses limited to periods of crises (Arias 2006, Cubas 2002, Soares 2000). Security policies have continuously changed in different parts of Brazil, often this depends on the ethos of the state (as opposed to the federal) government in place; and results in diversified outcomes.

For instance, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, a programme known as pacifying police units (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora or UPPs) has been implemented in recent years. The programme, which has already been studied by other researchers (Machado da Silva 2010, Menezes 2014, Torresan and Cunha 2013, Wolff 2014), has marked differences to security programmes elsewhere in Brazil and its effects are contested. The UPPs intervention is centred on the notion of ‘policing by proximity’, which means foot patrols, the attempt to develop positive or non-adversarial
relationships between the police and the community being policed, and the permanent occupation of favelas by the police. A new security intervention, an innovative programme known as Fica Vivo (Stay alive), was also implemented in the state of Minas Gerais in the 2000s. Brazilian researchers have evaluated Fica Vivo (Andrade and Peixoto 2007, Beato Filho 2013, Silveira et al. 2010), which is a programme that combined methods of social crime prevention with criminal justice and policing interventions, drawing on the famous American violence reduction programme ‘Operation Ceasefire’ (Beato Filho 2013, 1). Unlike the security programmes in other parts of Brazil, the Fica Vivo intervention offered central roles to methods of social crime prevention, such as conflict resolution, youth sports activities and workshops.

The effects of violence reduction programmes are hard to measure. Lethal violence and fear fluctuate according to place, reducing, increasing, and sometimes remaining stable. In some communities residents feel more marginalised and criminalised by these programmes, while in others they have welcomed interventions. Sometimes the impact of security interventions relates to speculation and rumours about reduction in local income and the negative effect on local economies or to new insecurities with ‘changing patterns of crime and conflict’ (Menezes 2014, 675). These are not homogenous or omnipresent outcomes. It is also important to state that this dissertation is not focused on understanding or evaluating homicide reduction programmes across Brazil. The point made here is that there is much heterogeneity in different communities, in security policies and in their social effects, which needs to be studied, and contextualised. This is a task that a number of researchers have undertaken, as illustrated above.

Various organisations and institutions, such as the State, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and churches, have at times assumed an active role with the aim of reducing violence, occasionally working together in partnership. In some communities, drug traffickers control local organisations, such as residents associations and local NGOs, thus directly impacting political life in the area. In some cases, communities have become complicit with the drug trade through coercion; in others trafficking has become a welcome source of financial support. In others, militias formed by ex-policemen have influenced the governance of the area, sometimes with the double-edged effect of reducing local theft while increasing mortality rates (through killings of petty criminals) and practising extortion for the supply of services (e.g. charging residents for security). Thus violence, security
policies and interventions have taken distinctive forms and have had diverse effects in different parts of Brazil.

Large sporting events, such as the football World Cup of 2014 and the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, have led many Brazilian states to take a more proactive role in the field of public security in low-income communities. Some researchers have begun to examine the effects of new security programs and policies in Rio de Janeiro (Monteiro 2013, Torresan and Cunha 2013) and in Salvador (Gledhill 2013). These changes and new policies have generated new concerns and revived some old ones, such as: the provision of services to slum or informal communities (e.g. sanitation, access to health and education), which in some cases has accompanied the security agenda; the issue of land title, housing and gentrification of ‘securitised’ communities; and the impact of increased policing on the country’s already large prison population. It remains to be seen whether recent changes in public security policies will be durable and sustainable or if they will fall into the traditional Brazilian pattern of fragmentation and politicisation (Macaulay 2007, Pereira 2008).

In terms of security and violence, this study grasps some of the heterogeneity of the situation in Brazil, and the differences that exist between different communities and regions. In particular, it focuses on case studies in the northeast of the country, on which fewer Brazilian and foreign academics have focused. Brazil is a continental-sized country; it has different histories, cultures and socio-economic contexts within each of its regions. Furthermore, numerous paradoxes permeate Brazilian society in different ways. The return to democracy in 1985 progressed in parallel with debt crises, the restructuring of production, and the winding down of industrialisation in cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Perlman 2010, Feltran 2011).

Yet, in some parts of the country, such as the Northeast, industrialisation and job creation have become more intense in recent years. In some regions the expansion of credit has occurred alongside the stagnation of salaried employment, the upsurge of neo-Pentecostalism, the consolidation of low-income communities in peripheral urban areas, rising crime and increasing incarceration rates (Feltran 2011). Despite this changing context and differences, most studies have focused on the peculiarities of places like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, which are unlikely to be representative of all of Brazil (Garmany 2011b, 45-46). Each region of the country has developed differently and thus there is much diversity that needs to be accounted for. Some
policies and interventions can be unanimously applied to the benefit of the country’s population (e.g. expanding education), while others can have contradictory effects or simply not succeed in different locales.

Since the 2000s Brazil has seen a reduction of labour informality (Comin, Barbosa, and Carvalhaes 2012) and poverty (Barros et al. 2010, Neri 2009). These improvements have been fuelled by new state interventions and policies, including increased spending on education, health, conditional cash transfers and increases in the minimum wage. These advances have been particularly noticeable in the north and northeast of the country. Paradoxically, there has been a reduction in the number of victims of homicide in the southeast of Brazil and an increase in homicides in the north-eastern region of the country (Pita 2012). This suggests a need to look beyond the hypothesis of ‘State abandonment’ (Wacquant 1996, 2003, 2008) often applied to the poorest communities in the region. The State is often part of the problem (Arias 2006, Gledhill 2013). Instead of examining ‘State abandonment’ per se, it might be preferable to look at the State’s sporadic interventions and analyse how they take place, their dynamics, the barriers that are faced, and ultimately, how they are interpreted and experienced by those at the receiving end.

Some ethnographic research in the northeast has pointed to the link between growing violence and the establishment of the crack-cocaine trade (Garmany 2011a). This is similar to developments in the US, as documented by anthropologist Phillippe Bourgois (2003) in his study of crack dealers in the 1980s-1990s in East Harlem. Bourgois showed how neoliberal policies of free trade and insecure precarious work impacted local social dynamics by contributing to the establishment of underground economies, such as the drug trade and its accompanying cycles of violence. In his US study, policies of free trade led to deindustrialisation and the relocation of manufacturing jobs to other parts of the world, and the rise of a service economy (e.g. customer services, call-centre work) perceived as the ‘feminisation’ of jobs, which became increasingly temporary, part-time and insecure. All these changes contributed to a ‘crisis of masculinity’. Some of the most disadvantaged, socially excluded and marginalised men were attracted to the underground economy – in search of ‘respect’, some form of income and a position of relative power.

Although this was the case in the US, much is yet unanswered about what is taking place in Recife. The Brazilian context bears some similarities to the US, but also presents some paradoxical differences. For example, one of the state
government’s mottoes in Pernambuco, where Recife is located, is *Pernambuco está em obras* (my translation: ‘Pernambuco is under construction’), meaning there is much economic growth and development taking place.

What are the impacts of recent political and socio-economic changes? What can be learned about violence and its context, causes, lessons, alternatives, facilitators, consequences and cycles? Few international and ethnographic studies have focused on Recife, one of Brazil’s largest capital cities. This study proposes to examine what ethnographic methods can contribute to our thinking about violence and security in one contemporary Latin American city.

While homicide rates were going up in most of Brazil, especially in the states of the north and northeast, the state of Pernambuco in the northeast of Brazil, where Recife is located, experienced declining homicide rates from the second half of the 2000s (Ratto, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, Waiselfisz 2014). In the media and even in some academic circles, this decline was attributed to a programme of public security and police reform called the ‘Pact for Life’ (Pacto pela Vida – PPV), created and implemented during the administration of state governor Eduardo Campos (2007-2014), who was re-elected and subsequently became a candidate in the presidential elections in 2014. A large part of Campos’ campaign was based on his success in ‘saving lives’ or reducing homicide rates through the PPV.

By and large, the PPV was based on influential mainstream ideologies and theories of crime control developed in the Anglo-Saxon world, such as situational crime prevention, deterrence through incarceration, and police performance technologies such as the controversial New York COMPSTAT. The details of the PPV as a programme of securitisation, and the narratives of professionals involved with or exposed to its implementation, are examined in more detail in Chapter 5, alongside a theoretical critique of the theories on which it is based. For now, it suffices to say that this thesis poses challenges to the ways in which dominant or mainstream criminological theories developed in the Global North have been emulated and adapted by crime-fighting institutions in the Global South. This thesis explores the impacts or effects of the adaptation of security agendas in the lives of people who are most exposed to their methods, namely, young people living in low-income communities and the marginalised spaces of large cities in the Global South. In doing so, this study explores the hidden perspectives of the north-eastern marginalised, who have been largely neglected in the context of emerging public
security interventions by the Brazilian literature on public safety and by the international criminological literature.

1.3 Contribution to criminology and Brazilian public security studies

The most prominent topics of interest to criminologists, namely crime, crime policy, prevention, policing and punishment, have come to impact and interrelate to major social transformations of our time (Garland and Sparks 2000, 189). As a result, criminologists of a sociological tradition, with which I identify, have sought to develop analyses that transcend disciplinary boundaries to develop nuanced understandings ‘beyond the confines of criminology’ (ibid, 190). Situating this thesis within criminology, a field of inquiry that is inter-disciplinary, requires an engagement with a variety of subjects, not least social anthropology and urban studies, and an examination of two conflicting branches of criminology – mainstream criminology and critical criminology. It also necessitates an examination of the meaning of these schools within criminology, and of the main critiques directed at them.

Mainstream criminology refers to academic criminological theories that focus on State-defined conceptualisations of crime, criminals and criminal justice (for example Bratton 2005, Clarke and Felson 2004, Wilson and Kelling 2013). Mainstream works often focus on establishing causal relationships adopting a pathological or deficit approach in which either an individual, a context or a situation are seen as the cause of crime – especially those categories of crimes that the State tends to focus on. These studies do not challenge power relations, social inequalities or authority. It is a version of criminology that justifies, enables or is made to fit in with the State’s definitions and purposes.

As argued by David Sibley (1995) in Geographies of Exclusion, power relations determine the ideas and the types of knowledge that gain value, define what is accepted as knowledge and exclude what is seen as threatening. In line with this, the mainstream school of thought tends to deploy quantitative methods in a very narrow way, to suit State practice and dominant State definitions of deviance, and to theorise and justify them, oversimplifying social phenomena by selecting data to fit favoured models or interpretations (see Young 2011 for a wider discussion). This is
not to say that criminology does not need numerical analyses, but rather, as Young (2011) puts it, it should not be ‘restrained and defined by them’ (224).

The managerial trend in policing observed in Pernambuco in the 2000s has been seen in the Anglo-Saxon world – for instance in the United Kingdom – since the 1980s, and directed at all of the public sector, the police especially from the 1990s (Loader 1996) aiming to make these institutions more ‘business-like’. In this framework, the problem of police accountability has been superseded by a focus on effectiveness via the establishment of performance targets (ibid). Loader’s (1996) study of youth-police relations in Edinburgh critiqued the impacts of this managerialist turn:

‘The managerialist turn – in policing and elsewhere – is part of a process in which the values associated with democratic citizenship such as justice, equality, representation and participation are marginalised, and public services are restructured and relegitimated according to administrative criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (22)

Loader revealed the implications of this trend for the democratic character of policing and for social groups who are marginalised from channels to influence police practice. He depicted the deterioration of youth-police relations, the under-protection of highly victimised groups of young people, and the excessive control of those groups. However, while Loader’s study in Edinburgh unveils an important critique of criminological developments – and the significance of police practices such as moving young people on from street corners due to petty disturbances and nuisance – it presents a situation that is markedly different from Brazil and the experiences of young people in Recife’s poor communities. This thesis examines the Brazilian case in detail and address gaps in the criminological literature, such as that pointed out by Loader (1996, 26) when he argued that the criminological literature had largely been concerned with studying juvenile delinquency and youth as trouble, and had little to say about young people as victims and as recipients of a public security service. Criminological literature has also, for the most part, neglected the developments, context, regional differences and the people of the Global South. The hierarchy of criminological knowledge production, like the social sciences more generally.
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti

(Connell 2007), has privileged ideas, theories, concepts and assumptions grounded in the particularities of the Global North (Carrington, Hogg, and Sozzo 2016).

This thesis critiques mainstream criminological ideologies and theories and builds on a radical branch of criminology known as ‘critical criminology’, which emerged in opposition to mainstream, managerial or standard criminology. Critical criminology moves away from State-defined conceptualisations and narratives about crime, questioning official discourses and statistics or the ways in which data are created, defined and deployed for narrow purposes. It challenges dominant analyses of crime and criminal justice and is influenced by the work of socialist historians such as E. P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill and Sheila Rowbotham (Young 2011), who emphasised the importance of ‘writing from below’ by voicing the material experiences of ordinary people instead of the hegemonic discourses and narratives from above. It focuses on the significance of voices from below and on scrutinising the discourses of the powerful.

Critical criminology, also known as The New Criminology (Taylor, Walton, and Young 2013), was influenced by C. Wright Mills’ work The Sociological Imagination (1959), which stressed the importance of critical thinking, social structure and historical context. As argued by Young (2011), it developed the notion of the dyad, that is, the need to further knowledge beyond explaining deviancy, and also to theorise the reactions against deviance. The new criminology stresses the significance of the ‘silences’, the unspoken ideas hidden in the technocratic rhetoric of much criminological theory (ibid). It is a counter-narrative to conservatism, deconstructing rigid definitions, and narrow understandings in the field of criminology. The flourishing of critical criminological produced works too numerous to mention, but some examples are Stuart Hall’s Policing the Crisis (1978); Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972); Nils Christie’s Crime Control as Industry (1993); David Garland’s The Culture of Control (2001); Nicholas Rose’s essay Government and Control (2000); Loic Wacquant’s Prisons of Poverty (2009); Jayne Mooney’s Gender, Violence and the Social Order (2000); John Lea’s Crime and Modernity (2002).

This thesis contributes to this critical school of criminology by extending its debates to the Global South and by: 1) presenting a critique of the importation/exportation and adaptation of mainstream criminological theories; 2) addressing gaps in the literature, namely the fact that criminology has little to say
about policing and criminal-justice issues outside the Anglo-Saxon world and even less to say in relation to the lives and perspectives of young people in poor communities and how security issues and the security apparatus (not just the police but also informal extortion groups) affect and interact with them; 3) engaging with literature produced in Brazil that is of interest to criminologists and related to this research.

As such, this thesis questions whether theory can be extrapolated from one region of the world to another, and it argues that while theory does ‘travel’ (particularly mainstream approaches), it does not necessarily make for a good guest – it might not prove to be very useful upon arrival – at least not in the case of Brazil. This story builds on a body of work about the increasing importation of political ideas and criminal justice policies from abroad (Garland 2001, Wacquant 1999), which is referred to as ‘policy transfer’ and is more widely used by political scientists (Jones and Newburn 2007). Criminological debates about policy transfer have focused on the US-European experience and to a lesser extent on Australian and Canadian cases (ibid), with few researchers focusing on the Latin American case (Blaustein 2016, Macaulay 2013). However, rather than focusing on the study of policy-making, or the process of policy transfer, this dissertation focuses on the effects or unintended consequences of these imported ideas on the field of crime control in Brazil. It is argued that the application of mainstream theories developed in the North have been counterproductive and detrimental to existing problems in Brazil, such as police violence, prison overcrowding, and the symbiotic relationship between prisoners and organised crime.

1.4 Outline of the chapters

The chapters that follow provide an initial scientific enquiry into the effects of new public security policies and the problem of violence in Recife. The chapters are outlined in the following way. Chapter 2 provides the background for the thesis, focusing on three key themes: the structural context of the study; the theoretical misconceptions of any direct connection between crime and poverty; and the theorisation of marginalisation. It also discusses the genesis and theoretical rationale of new security interventions in Pernambuco. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on drugs and violence that centralises institutional issues. Chapter 4 examines some of
the methodological approaches and their dilemmas. It explains the methods of data collection, including observations, interviews and focus groups with residents in two case study communities; and with police officers, public officials, and community activists across the city. Chapter 5 examines the promises, alleged strengths and weaknesses of Pacto pela Vida (PPV) by analysing documental and secondary data about its interventions and first-hand data from interviews with state actors directly involved with the implementation of PPV, including police officers and state officials (e.g. policy-makers, practitioners). While interviews with high-ranking government officials and high-ranking practitioners tended to elicit positive accounts of PPV, this section also begins to highlight police critiques of the programme and indeed some self-criticism on the part of the police themselves.

Critiques of the security apparatus and its methods were most evident in interviews with low-ranking police officers explored in Chapter 6 and with civil society experts (such as community activists), explored in Chapter 8. Chapter 6 focuses on this self-criticism by the police, highlighting issues around the inadequate and brutalising training and treatment of low-ranking officers. Chapter 7 provides some background information about the case study communities and examines themes emerging from interviews conducted at ‘the receiving end’ with young people and residents of low-income communities about security. These interviews focused on the impact of public security policies, insecurity, violence and perceptions of the police. This section epitomises the counter-arguments of resistance and disaffection with government policies and practices. Several contradictions, dilemmas and uncertainties permeate the narratives provided by the research participants.

Chapter 8 further discusses some of the common themes emerging from both case study communities, including the coexistence of the drug trade with repressive policing; the existence of protection rackets and death squads; and the lack of police accountability and oversight. Chapter 8 explores these issues from the perspective of community residents and community activists, who were also interviewed, due to their knowledge about PPV and their role in mediating between the public (e.g. residents and young people in low-income communities) and state officials. These interviews focused on the development, practices, effects of and challenges to Pacto pela Vida.

Chapter 9 offers some conclusions. It argues that security and public safety are contested fields of inquiry. Public safety and security interventions are experienced
and perceived in diverse ways, depending for example on one’s gender, social class and ethnicity. These diverse perceptions and experiences are rooted in existing and enduring social inequalities. It is salient that there are a number of disparities between what experts claim and what people in low-income communities say about security interventions. While government technocrats and academics associated with the development of PPV perceived the statistical reduction in homicides as a success, evidence from low-income communities showed a diverse set of problems with this project of state building\textsuperscript{8}. Some issues were connected to the silences of the policy in relation to violence that does not necessarily lead to death, such as violence against women and rape, but also in connection to the type of policing that is provided in low-income communities. The police’s practices and approach remain militarised, with residents complaining of abuses of human-rights abuses and disrespect; managerial reforms have not addressed long-standing issues related to the democratisation of policing; and youth and community relations with the police have not improved. Paradoxically, poor communities want more policing, just not the type of policing that they currently receive.
CHAPTER 2 – The Background

Since the 1980s Brazil has seen a significant growth in urban violence, which placed the nation in the ranking of countries with the world’s highest homicide rates (Adorno and Salla 2007, Arias 2006, Goldstein 2003, Rangel and Bourgois 2005, Ratton et al. 2011, Wacquant 2003, Zaluar 1998). This growth of lethal violence and of the fear it provokes have been one of the most alarming and devastating changes for Brazilian society since the 1980s. This thesis examines how public security policies aimed at addressing this violence have impacted on marginalised communities and poor young people in Recife. To contextualise the research, this chapter examines two significant sets of debates: (1) the literature about the concept of marginality and crime, and (2) the debates about violence that influenced the developers of new public security interventions. It argues that the genesis of the new security agendas is partly influenced by the context of high levels of armed violence in Pernambuco (mostly affecting marginalised groups) and partly by debates at times implicitly, at times explicitly, influenced by criminological theories of the Global North.

Half of the world’s people under the age of 25 live in developing regions, such as Latin America, the region with the highest levels of youth homicide in the world (Pinheiro 2006). In 2004, Brazil’s rate of 27 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants placed it in fourth position out of 84 countries; and the homicide rate among adolescents and young people was much higher, at 57.1 homicides per 100,000 (UNESCO 2013). Homicide has become the leading cause of death in Brazil for young people and indeed the country ranks as the sixth most dangerous in the world for the young (Waiselfisz 2011). Murder accounts for approximately one in every three deaths of young people in Brazil (Rangel and Bourgois 2005). Even more concerning, is the disproportionate percentage of black and mulato (mixed ethnicity) young people who are murdered. In 2002, the state of Pernambuco had the second highest homicide rate of black and mulato youth in the country: 71.4 per cent of victims of homicides in the state were young (aged 15-24) and not white (Waiselfisz 2004, Rangel and Bourgois 2005). Although by 2012 the rate of homicide among black and mulato youth had declined by over 30% from 161.6/100,000 in 2002, it was still high at 112.2/100,000 (Waiselfisz 2014).
Low-income communities have been disproportionately affected by this violence and by the drug trade. These communities have become attractive locales for the drug trade, providing spaces for large shipments to be broken down into smaller packages before either being sold locally or trafficked to other parts of the globe. This is because of their narrow alleys and multiple hiding spaces, alongside a high proportion of unemployed and out-of-school young people – all of which make an ideal setting for the establishment of underground economies (Arias 2006, 53, Perlman 2010). According to sociologist and former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, thirty years ago the main fear in the lives of people living in informal communities (e.g. favelas) was fear of displacement and eviction. Now, they mostly fear for their lives, ‘never knowing when they may be caught in the crossfire of drug gang violence or shot indiscriminately during a police raid’ (see Perlman 2010, X).

This chapter begins by examining the socioeconomic context in which these phenomena take place. Second, the chapter scrutinises some of the theoretical connections made between marginality and violence. Third, it synthesises key analytical debates about the relationship between poverty and crime in Brazilian public security studies. The final section of this chapter examines the ways in which the local material context coupled with broader discourses about crime control influenced the emergence of a new public security programme in Pernambuco.

2.1 Context

A large part of Brazil’s population lives in squatter settlements, in conditions either of poverty or extreme poverty (Perlman 2010). However, in the 2000s, the country experienced drops in poverty and extreme poverty. The proportion of people living below the extreme poverty line (R$70, seventy Brazilian reais per month per capita, equivalent to $1.25 per day) fell from 4.2% in 2011 to 3.6% in 2012, when 6.5 million Brazilians lived in this situation (IPEA 2013).

In a recent study IPEA considered 4 different poverty lines: two refer to the UN Millennium Development goals (US$1.25 and US$2 per person per day) and the other two refer to the income that entitles a person to conditional cash transfers in Brazil (R$70 and R$140 monthly, from July 2011). According to these four lines of measurement poverty declined between 1992 and 2012, as shown in the graph below:
Percentage of the population living in poverty, 1992-2012

Source: IPEA (2013, 17). The four categories are: blue – poverty defined as living on under $1.25 a day; red – living on under $2 a day; green – extreme poverty; black – overall poverty.

The north and northeast of Brazil are widely known to be the poorest and least developed parts of Brazil, with higher concentrations of poverty. These are significant socio-economic aspects when situating a study conducted in under-studied regions (Garmany 2011b). As Garmany points out, while most Brazilian studies and Brazilian theories are developed in the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo corridor, these cities are the exception and have contrasting contexts in comparison with the majority of Brazil. The theories developed outside Brazil and in the more developed southeast of the country are not necessarily representative or applicable to the northeast context. The state of Pernambuco, where the fieldwork for this study was conducted, has deeper structural issues than the southeast, with larger proportions of its population living in poverty and low incomes. Data from the World Bank illustrate this issue:

‘Despite being the second largest economy in Northeast Brazil, Pernambuco lags behind the rest of the country. In 2010, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was US$ 5,411, half the national average, and the share of the population below the poverty line was twice that of Brazil as a whole.’ (World Bank 2013)
Income inequality also remains widespread throughout Brazil. According to Rocha (2003), in the 1990s, the richest quintile of Brazil’s population earned thirty times more than the poorest fifth. Although there have been improvements insofar as this ratio has become less unequal (in 2007 it reduced to 20 instead of 30 times) income inequality remains high and half of the country’s total income is concentrated in the pockets of the richest ten per cent of the population (Perlman 2010, 48-49). Brazil continues to be one of the most polarised countries in the world in terms of income (ibid, 151). So even though the country experienced mild declines in income inequality in the 2000s, inequality remains high (IPEA 2013, 9). While the richest 1% in Brazil earned R$10,891 reais per month per capita in 2012 (approximately £2,871), the monthly income of the poorest 40% was R$241.81 per capita (roughly £63.54) (see table 1 below). The latter income, R$241 reais per month, is simply insufficient to cover basic needs, such as adequate shelter, food, health, education and transport costs for one person.

Table 1: Household income per capita by section of the population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average income in Reais (R$)</th>
<th>Annual income variation (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richest 1%</td>
<td>6,217.01</td>
<td>8,133.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 5%</td>
<td>3,070.02</td>
<td>4,075.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorest 40%</td>
<td>101.25</td>
<td>130.31</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Rural areas in the north region were excluded (except for Tocantins)

Another important socio-economic concern, as illustrated by Kingstone and Comin (2013), is deindustrialisation in Brazil. Scholars have argued that some Brazilian cities have moved from a manufacturing based economy to a service and knowledge-based system (e.g. Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, see Perlman 2010; Feltran 2011). According to these academics, this has had large implications for the unskilled population, who have become increasingly reliant on the informal economy, not only because of decreasing industrial jobs, but also because they face discrimination when
competing for jobs and lack the education and skills necessary to compete for service sector jobs.

Added to the problems of poverty, inequality, and labour informality is inadequate public education provision. The quality of public education provided especially in low-income communities has been an enduring problem in Brazil (Marschner 2013). Most Brazilians are well aware that the quality of State-provided education is a far cry from what is necessary to obtain approval in university entrance examinations. In this context, private school becomes ‘the gateway to university and professional jobs’ (Perlman 2010, 4). This places severe barriers to the social mobility of, and access to professional and high skilled jobs for those most economically disadvantaged populations who cannot pay for private schooling, making underground economies more appealing or accessible as a source of income. This context is a defining factor in analyses of violence and security in these places (Feltran 2011, Perlman 2010).

This thesis is as much about the impact of public security policies on poor youth, as it is about urban life at the margins in the Global South. Most of Brazil’s population lives in cities and large sections of this urban population live in informal communities. The country has one of the world’s highest urban populations, its cities account for 90% of GDP and contain half of its poor (WorldBank 2006). Recife, one of the largest Brazilian metropolitan regions, has followed the rapid urban growth trend seen in most of Brazil with high growth rates in the post-World War II period followed by a gradual decline in growth from the 1970s to the present. Recife’s population more than quintupled in the latter part of the twentieth century (see Table 2 below).

Data from the 2010 census show that nearly 11.5 million people (11,425,644 people) live in informal settlements in Brazil (5.57% of the total population). The vast majority of this population (59.3%, a total of 6,780,071 people) is concentrated in the metropolitan regions of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belém, Salvador and Recife. This study was conducted in two low-income communities, considered informal settlements in the official government discourse, in Recife’s metropolitan region. These settlements are located in areas prone to significant geographical and spatial disadvantages that cause difficulties in residents’ lives and in the provision of security.

<table>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>17,099</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>19,226</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>10,803</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>11,381</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>4,659</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>4,925</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>3,505</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>3,897</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>2,968</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>3,599</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortaleza</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasilia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2,746</td>
<td>76.28</td>
<td>3,508</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curitiba</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>3,125</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Population of Brazil’s metropolitan regions.

Largest Brazilian metropolitan areas. Source: IBGE (2011) censo 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>19,889,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>11,902,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>Minas Gerais</td>
<td>5,397,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>4,200,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Recife</td>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>4,150,004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Largest Brazilian metropolitan regions.

Most of the Recife’s Metropolitan Region (RMR) is flat and has a tendency to high rainfall, so floods are not uncommon and residents in these communities often face difficulties in moving around the city, with some of them even loosing their homes during the rainy season. There are few hills in the RMR, but those areas also suffer during heavy rain, for example, from the risk of mudslides. Around 45% of the households can only be accessed on foot, by bicycle or by motorbike through alleyways; an environment often disliked by police patrols. However, unlike in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (where most studies about violence and security have been focused), the vast majority of these communities in Recife’s metropolitan region are
concentrated in small and medium-sized geographical areas (IBGE 2011, 77), as shown in the map below (Figure 2), which somewhat facilitates access to these communities.

Inadequate housing is one of the most visible social problems in urban Brazil. At the federal and state level, housing programmes have been limited and recent interventions such as the programmes *Favela-Bairro* and *Minha Casa Minha Vida* have made a very small dent in terms of addressing the housing gap (McCann 2008, 67-68). Informal settlements that have existed for over a century, since the end of slavery (Zaluar and Alvito 2006) remain one of the main forms of housing for a large proportion of Brazil’s population. Whichever way these communities are labelled (low-income communities, *periferias*, or favelas) they are difficult to pigeonhole, classify and define.

For Perlman (2010), the single most salient distinction between favelas and the rest of the city is the stigma attached to the people who inhabit them. This stigma is associated with living in a space that is defined as undesirable: a place where the quality of schools and education is precarious, where many people report having no leisure activities and where access to services is insufficient to fulfil basic social needs (Perlman 2010, 104). Furthermore, favela residents are increasingly
criminalised, portrayed as ‘bandits’ and persecuted by police, although often merely on the basis of criminal stereotypes (Feltran 2011).

Unsurprisingly, residents describe well-grounded mistrust of government and public institutions. There has not been a sustained commitment to promoting peace and public services in favelas (Perlman 2010, 118), and so residents have had to come up with creative responses to adversity, including through political bargaining via community associations (Arias 2006), the few benefits of precarious employment and the provision of a variety of informal, sometimes illegal (e.g. drugs), products and services (Zaluar 2004a). The next section examines the existing debate about the interconnections of marginalisation, violence and security.

2.2 Violence and marginalisation

High levels of violence, the associated marginalisation of stigmatised territories and greater fear of violent death are three of the most dramatic changes in Latin America post-democratization. A recent ethnographic study by Saunders-Hastings (2013) shared familiar themes with studies conducted in Brazilian cities (cf. Perlman 2010; Zaluar 2010 in Rio de Janeiro). Saunders-Hastings (2013) argued that violence and extortion in Guatemala have become more widespread and unpredictable. Gangs have become more established in the country, and firearms have become more easily accessible. As a consequence, residents of the most affected communities have found it harder to deploy strategies to avoid violence. They describe a loss of trust and social unity in the community. They also face discrimination, stigma, reduced job opportunities outside the community and decreased economic opportunities within it. All of these factors perpetuate the cycle of violence by encouraging more young people to seek protection and financial gains in gangs and in the criminal economy.

The inability or unwillingness of the Brazilian state to provide public security in favelas has led to a deterioration of trust, community unity, freedom of movement and social capital (Perlman 2010). Perlman’s original ethnographic book, The Myth of Marginality (1976), challenged the dominant ideology that conflated poverty with criminality and that portrayed the urban poor as only ‘marginal’, outside or irrelevant to the system of production. The book was a critique of development theories of the 1960s that had deployed the concept of marginality in academic and public policy discourse to depict the poor as immoral, deficient, responsible for their own poverty
and unable to become integrated into the formal labour and housing markets. In the 1970s, this victim-blaming ideology had been deployed to justify favela removal and today in Brazil the term ‘marginal’ is still commonly used to mean ‘criminal’. Perlman (1976, 2010) contested this pathological view of the poor, that is, the notion that they are socially disorganised breeding grounds of crime, violence, prostitution and family breakdown. Nevertheless, even some academics still deploy the term ‘marginal’ to refer to offenders, for instance see the evaluation of the security programme Fica Vivo by Beato Filho (2013, 7-8). Thirty years after her original study, Perlman (2010) relocated and re-studied her original random sample of participants and found some dramatic changes, many of which were fuelled by the increase in violence. People were not ‘marginal’ to the system but they felt more marginalised than ever.

Since the time of these original critiques in the 1960s and 1970s, the term ‘marginality’ has been deconstructed, re-constructed and returned to academic discourse in the 1990s, starting with an article by Wacquant (1996). Wacquant developed the concept of ‘advanced marginality’ to describe how global capitalism in recent years has provoked the warehousing in prisons and territorial segregation of groups of the population who are seen as irrelevant to the city. In the United States, for the most part this refers to the black ghettos and in Europe to impoverished and migrant communities. Wacquant argued that this new form of marginalisation that emerged in post-industrial societies, symbolised by the interfaces of colour, class and place, generates new stigmas, forms of dependency on welfare, long-term joblessness and territories of urban relegation. He argues that the current dynamics of global capitalism enable social inequality to persist in a context of economic prosperity. His thesis is that in the time of neoliberal capitalism, social welfare has been rolled back while punitive and criminalising aspects of the State have been rolled forward.

However, as a case study, Brazil does not fit neatly into Wacquant’s concept of advanced marginality for a variety of reasons. Brazil never had a well-developed welfare state that could be rolled back. In fact in recent years, there has been an increase in state investments in welfare, particularly in the form of conditional cash transfers such as Bolsa Família (Hall 2008, Molyneaux 2008). Despite these recent improvements, Brazil has suffered from high levels of inequality over decades (pre and post-neoliberalism). Deindustrialisation has been geographically uneven; some European and North American countries have seen the outward migration of
manufacturing industries, while the countries referred to as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have received an influx of investment and industrial development in recent years (Naudé, Szirmai, and Lavopa 2013). Furthermore, most households in favelas contain active people in the labour market (Perlman 2010). Thus Brazilian favelas are not the jobless ghettos that they may appear to be.

Wacquant proposes that ‘advanced marginality’ is characterised by spatial and racial segregation, the stigmatisation of territories and a diminishing sense of community life. While some of these characteristics are visible in Brazilian favelas, particularly the stigmatisation of residents and a diminishing sense of community life as a result of the fear of violence (Perlman 2010, Zaluar 2013), it is important to note that favelas, the peripheries and/or low-income communities in Brazil are highly heterogeneous places. For example, in Rio de Janeiro favelas are racially mixed, with almost half of all residents identifying themselves as white, 30% as mulato (mixed ‘race’) and 20% as black (Zaluar 2013). This is not to say that these demographics are matched in the rest of the city, but they do indicate that favelas are not racial ghettos. Furthermore, although there is a higher concentration of low-income communities in Brazilian peripheral urban areas, favelas in cities like Rio and Recife are spread across the city instead of being concentrated in one area.

Perlman’s conclusions support a conceptualisation of marginalisation as a state of exclusion, human tragedy and limited opportunities for a fulfilling life. The lives of the poor have been increasingly devalued in the context of drug and arms traffic, their mortality rates are far higher in comparison with the rest of the city and this new violence is ‘the ultimate manifestation of the marginalisation of the poor, the reality of marginality’ (Perlman 2010, 162). It is in this sense, that this thesis deploys the terminology marginalised. Yet while the terms ‘trapped’ and marginalisation convey some of the living realities of many Brazilians, they fail to allow for an analysis of agency and heterogeneity. These are some of the aspects of the dynamic interactions in neighbourhoods of relegation that this study captures in the context of Recife.

2.3 Violence, crime and poverty nexus: mistaken theories

Much of the discussion about violence in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s was centred on the debate about the correlation between poverty and crime. A review of this
Brazilian literature can benefit from a discussion of the work of key academics, such as Alba Zaluar, Michel Misse and Luis Eduardo Soares – all of whom have conducted research in Rio de Janeiro. It is important to examine some of the theoretical frameworks that have already been developed in this field, including the causes of violence and its potential connections— or lack of – with poverty, so as to make possible an analysis of public security interventions that are intended to address these problems. Moreover, this thesis shows that these debates about the connections between poverty and crime remain central in the public sphere and in the narratives of members of the public security system as seen in Chapters 5 and 6.

There is a body of research that shows an implicit connection (albeit not a casual connection) between poverty and crime, insofar as it reveals that homicide rates are higher in low-income communities and that most victims of homicide are poor young black and mixed-race males (Waiselfisz 2014, Zaluar 1999). However, most Brazilian academics rejected the thesis that poverty and crime or poverty and urban violence are directly correlated or even that there is a causal relationship between poverty and violence¹⁰ (Adorno and Bordini 1989, Coelho 1978, Misse 1995, 2011a, Paixão 1982, 1983, Zaluar 1994, 2004a).

These academics argue that there are no empirical grounds for explaining violence as the consequence of poverty per se. They suggest that the popular discourse that associates violence with poverty is based on a stereotype of poor populations, which criminalises poverty. This does not mean that there is no connection between poverty and crime, or that the connection is only a stereotype. Moreover, they rightly point out that crime happens among all social classes, although there is historical evidence that certain populations tend to be targeted and designated as ‘criminal’. Causality is difficult to establish and there are numerous compounding factors that cannot always be accurately controlled for (e.g. gender, accessibility of firearms, opportunities to commit crime). The paradox of rising crime, for instance, in the 2000s when economic conditions have improved and poverty levels decreased in Brazil, although not central to this thesis, illustrates the complexity of this debate and the invalidity of any simplistic causal association of poverty with criminality¹¹.

This theoretical debate of discourses that directly link poverty and crime, led to the challenge of the idea that without significantly reducing poverty and inequality, public security interventions could not succeed in reducing violence (Soares 2000, Ratton 2012). This contestation seeks to avoid determinism and defeatist approaches,
since addressing poverty and inequality could take a lifetime while there are other shorter-term measures that can be taken to curb violence, such as increasing the control of firearms.

Rather than directly linking poverty to violence, researchers have emphasised the multifaceted and complex causes of various forms of violence and the connections, for example, since the 1980s between the proliferation of firearms and the increasing rates of violence in Brazil (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002, Beato and Marinho 2007, Dreyfus, Lessing, and Purcena 2005, Rangel and Bourgois 2005).

‘Firearm-related mortality in Brazil has increased significantly for all age groups since 1991, but death rates due to firearms have risen the most among children and adolescents aged 10 to 19. In 1991, 55.7% of homicides involving 15–19-year-olds were firearm-related, while in 2000 the proportion amounted to 77%. In the state capitals with the highest adolescent firearm-related mortality rates (between 102 and 222 per 100,000), rates are 5 to 11 times those of the overall rate for all age groups’ (Pinheiro 2006, 302).

In the state of Pernambuco, in 2002, the proportion of deaths of young people caused by homicide was over 50%, a rate of 111.3/100,000 (Cerqueira, Lobao, and Carvalho 2007). For some academics, the expansion of the global economy, revolutions and improvements in technology, transportation and communication, and free-market reforms such as deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation, have all heightened opportunities for legal and illegal international economic activities and consequently enhanced the flow of illegal goods and services (Penglase 2008, 121), including firearms and drugs. The growth of the international trade in firearms has increased the likelihood of people resorting to armed violence to settle private disputes (Kruijt and Koonings 1999).

It was in this context of high levels of armed violence that debates about the aetiology of this phenomenon and about what needs to be done to curb it emerged. Such debates concerned with how best to control crime – whether through long-term structural changes (such as poverty reduction) or short-term measures (such as controlling firearms) – set the milieu in which a new security programme was developed in the state of Pernambuco. The next section examines the genesis of, and theoretical influences behind, this security programme.
2.4 The adaptation of criminological theories from the Global North

‘Public policies result from a mix of leadership intention, bureaucratic groping, organisational slippage, practical trial-and-error and electoral profiteering’ (Wacquant 2012, 252)

This section explores the context in which the emergence of the programme of police reform and public security Pact for Life (PPV) took place. The section also examines PPV’s inherent theoretical influences, highlighting some of the ‘electoral profiteering’, as Wacquant puts it, associated with it.

Pernambuco’s case is worth examining for a number of reasons, not least because, putting aside all the issues of quantification, this state accounts for a large proportion of Brazil’s and the world’s homicides. In 2005, approximately 10% of the world’s homicides – 47,578 deaths – happened in Brazil (DATASUS 2015). In 2007, approximately 10% of Brazil’s homicides happened in Pernambuco: a total of 4,592 deaths (ibid). PPV was created with the aim of reducing these extraordinarily high levels of homicide in the state of Pernambuco. It was launched in 2007, when violent mortality was at its highest in this state.

Government data show a gradual decrease in homicide rates in this state between 2008 and 2013. The average homicide rate in the state of Pernambuco between the years 2000 and 2005 was 54.13/100,000 (DATASUS 2015) then it dropped to 46.67/100,000 between the years 2006 and 2011 (ibid). To provide a context for comparison, Pernambuco’s average homicide rate was over five times higher than the world average homicide rate in the year 2000, which was 8.8/100,000 (Bailey and Dammert 2006). For high-income countries the average homicide rate was 2.9; for low and middle-income countries it was 10.1 (ibid). Although focusing on homicide figures does not provide a complete understanding of crime and violence, these figures illustrate the gravity of these issues in Brazil and suggest an important decline in lethal crime in tandem with the implementation of PPV.

PPV has become a high-profile intervention for the reduction of homicides. It received international awards from the Inter-American Development Bank in 2014 and from the United Nations in 2013 (see Ribeiro 2014, GEPE 2013) as well as extensive media coverage in Brazil. Its creators and supporters have travelled to other states in Brazil and other countries in Latin America to share their expertise. It has
been promoted as a model by Brazil’s federal public security secretariat (SENASP) and some Brazilian states have developed programmes inspired by it, for instance Pará, Bahia and Alagoas (Macedo 2012). The intervention was one of the main marketing points in the political campaign of the state governor of Pernambuco Eduardo Campos (2007-2014), who was also a candidate in the 2014 presidential elections. As argued by Wolff (2014), highly publicised reductions in violent crime associated with PPV facilitated Campos’ re-election for a second term in office and launched his political career at the national level.\(^{13}\)

Despite the historical, political, social and discursive significance of PPV, very few studies have examined its impact. Ratton (see Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014) – an academic who was involved with the development of PPV, while employed as advisor to Eduardo Campos, and who therefore is not a fully independent evaluator – has published a small-scale study (N= 25) focusing on the views of actors involved in the policy’s development at the government and civil society level. He portrays a very positive image of the policy that he was involved in designing, claiming PPV is a ‘success’\(^{14}\) (ibid, 26). This thesis presents an independent analysis of PPV drawing on the experiences of marginalised people in Recife, especially (albeit not exclusively) the young. The thesis analyses the effects (intended and unintended) of this new security programme, enabling a deeper discussion of the hegemonic discourse of success.

Nóbrega (2012) and Wolff (2014) have dedicated very small sections in their studies to PPV and have not gone into much depth in their analysis of the program. Macedo (2012) has conducted the most extensive critical study of PPV so far, focusing on the governance of the policy. She attended PPV-related official meetings and interviewed policy-makers and actors involved with the project. However, none of these studies examined the underlying theories that inform PPV’s ideologies or the discourses of state actors and civil society actors in recipient communities in any depth. Neither did they examine the wider impacts of changes in policing with the implementation of PPV. This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature.

*The genesis and theoretical rationale of PPV*

The governor of the state of Pernambuco, Eduardo Campos (2007-2014) contracted a sociologist from the federal university of Pernambuco (UFPE), Professor José Luiz Ratton, to work as his public security advisor. Between March and April 2007, an
initial set of consultations and events was organised as part of a forum of public security (*Fórum Estadual de Segurança Pública*) where the topic of public security was debated and the plan that informed PPV was drawn up. For Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez (2014, 2) PPV was the first institutional reform of the Pernambucan police. They describe in more detail the process of developing the policy. The initial security plan proposed over one hundred projects (PESP-PE 2007) organised into six lines of action: ‘qualified repression; institutional enhancement; information and knowledge management; training and capacity-building; crime and social violence prevention; and democratic management’ (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, 2). However, only some of those were implemented. The interviews and observations in the communities studied revealed that the social crime prevention measures initially proposed and the mediation of conflicts in communities (PESP-PE 2007, 124) do not seem to have been implemented. These are significant issues that future research could examine. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine why such projects had not yet been implemented. The implemented changes focused, for the most part, on the governance of police work (interview with Ratton, July 2013, see also Macedo 2012).

In two separate interviews in July 2013, sociologists involved with the design of PPV explained that the rationale for the programme emerged from successful homicide reduction programmes implemented elsewhere, such as Bogotá, Minas Gerais and New York. A book edited by Veloso and Ferreira (2008a) based on a seminar in Rio de Janeiro in 2007 about what violence reduction programmes work around the world, puts forward the idea that cities such as Bogotá, Medellín, Minas Gerais, New York and São Paulo have experienced reductions in homicide because of the implementation of new security policies based on managerial police reforms (p. 18, p. 20). The authors clearly state their admiration and support for police performance management programmes such as COMPSTAT from New York (p. 26-28).

Proponents of managerialism in Brazil, unlike those in the US and UK, are among critical social scientists from the ‘left’ who also propose ideas around social justice. They perceive managerial reforms not only as a tool to reduce violence, but also to make police accountable to the most disadvantaged sectors of society (Soares 2008, 12-15). Whether the latter is possible through those means – managerial police reforms – is yet unclear in practice. This thesis will consider whether these proposals
are well founded. In particular, Chapter 5 discusses the New York miracle and research that challenges crime reduction claims grounded in COMPSTAT, managerial reforms, Broken Windows theory and Zero Tolerance policing. This is not to say that managerial reforms have no value, but rather that they have limits and risks.

The Minas Gerais programme known as Stay Alive, for example, was explicitly influenced by US violence-reduction programmes, such as Operation Ceasefire and hotspot policing (Beato Filho 2013, 1 and 5). Nonetheless, it combined managerial police reforms with important social crime prevention measures (e.g. youth sports programmes and conflict mediation). PPV’s design also has clear similarities with US homicide reduction programmes, including similarities with the (in)famous American police performance management programme known as COMPSTAT (Macedo 2012). For instance, both the New York programme and PPV territorialised police work by enforcing responsibility for policing particular geographical areas. In the PPV case, these areas are known as AIS (Áreas Integradas de Segurança) and the state of Pernambuco now has 26 of them. Other similarities are the emphasis placed on police performance targets, monitoring levels of homicide and demanding reductions. This does not mean a clear and simple re-production of US models but rather the emulation of some aspects of these security programmes.

Ratton’s academic work before the initial design of PPV was influenced by situational crime prevention (SCP) theories (Ratton et al. 2011). The situational approach that he adopts, which emerged initially in the work of Felson (2002) and Clarke and Felson (2004) in the Global North, focuses on perceived environmental causes of crime such as increased opportunities for crime (as defined by the State) and has been widely criticised by theoretical criminology on a number of grounds (see Raymen 2015 for an extensive review). As Raymen puts it, the majority of these critiques pull to pieces the idea of the wholly rational criminal actor, questioning the foundations of classical criminology on which these notions are centered (p. 1). SCP approaches offer ‘false promises of their ability to control much crime and deviance’ (ibid).

According to Ratton et al. (2011) traditional studies about violence and homicide have focused on the individual characteristics of perpetrators and victims, leaving aside important interactional and situational factors. He rightly argues that individualistic analyses are unable to account for temporal and spatial changes in the context of high rates of lethal violence and that such analyses fail to explain why
certain homicide situations are more common than others. While these are valid criticisms of individualistic causal accounts, Ratton’s emphasis on situational factors does also neglect important aspects of the theorisation of violence and homicide.

The study conducted by Ratton et al. (2011) was based on an analysis of 78 homicide *inquéritos* (police investigation registers) between 2002 and 2007, and argued that, among other things, in over 88% of cases victims and perpetrators were known to each other. There is a clear bias in the study in that it deployed only data produced by the police (homicide investigation registers). The study argued that homicides in Recife happen more often in routine daily interactions in socially disorganised and deprived environments; it most frequently involves young males (93% of victims were male and 98% of perpetrators were male) who are black or mixed, know each other and have easy access to firearms; and more often occurs at night, at weekends, in public spaces. The key motivation is the resolution of conflicts through violence, invariably using a firearm and resulting in the death of at least one of the individuals involved.

A significant limitation of the study is that it does not consider the impact of institutional factors on the ‘diagnosis’ of homicide. Firstly, while many homicide cases may occur between people who know each other, it is important to acknowledge that these data look at cases where a suspect was identified and sometimes convicted. As such, it neglects data and cases where the police were unable or unwilling to adequately identify the accused. Easy-to-accuse and ‘usual suspects’ are more likely to be included in the data.

Secondly, such interactional studies fail to acknowledge the structural, institutional and systemic disparities that contribute to their conclusions. They make claims of a diagnosis of where and who the victims and perpetrators of homicide are, concluding that these are mostly poor young males. They claim to reveal how and when these homicides occur. However, most cases of homicides are not resolved, so the actual groups of perpetrators are difficult to label. The evidence emerging from police records is also unlikely to suggest that the police perpetrated most homicides. Moreover, inequalities in the field of security can fuel a cycle of ‘rough justice’, vigilantism and vengeance for those who cannot access formal means of justice. While educated middle- and upper-class individuals in Brazil often benefit from private security and better access to the formal justice system, the poor and less educated are left to provide security and conflict resolution with ‘their own hands’.
These dynamics reveal, among other issues, a lack of adequate public security provision. That is not to say that it is the middle-class that is responsible for crimes such as homicide, but rather that, situational studies can portray a blame-the-victim view, failing to acknowledge the significance of unequal security provision.

When justice is administered, the overwhelming use of the prison as a form of punishment tends to exacerbate inequalities and social exclusion through the application of the law against the poorest, most marginalised and stigmatised groups in society (Cavadino, Dignan, and Mair 2013, Wacquant 2009). Non-violent means of conflict resolution and restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989, 2002, 2004) are therefore important parts of any intervention that aims to reduce violence without generating more prison overcrowding and more social inequality.

The initial plan of public security in Pernambuco proposed some conflict resolution programmes (PESP-PE 2007, 124) but it is unclear whether such projects were implemented, at least according to interviews with members of the public security system, as will be seen in Chapter 5. Instead of proving conflict resolution, the situational crime prevention approach is centred on state interventions such as increased surveillance through CCTV cameras and increased policing and control of those marginalised populations perceived as criminal. As such, it ignores important definitional limitations of crime: the adopted definitions do not focus on the crimes perpetrated by the State and the powerful (such as police abuse of force or deaths caused at work). The criminal is perceived as a rational actor who has calculated the risks against the gains of committing criminal actions, thus the emotive (bravado, anger, impulsivity and immaturity) and uncalculated aspects of crime explored in other studies (Drybread 2014, Hayward 2007, Katz 1988, Lyng 1990) are neglected.

The interventions that are justified under the situational crime prevention framework have had perverse social control effects elsewhere (Raymen 2015). These include the reproduction of inequalities in the criminal justice system, as seen in the overrepresentation of poor people in prisons, the deterioration or continuation of poor police-community relations, the displacement of certain crimes to areas that are unsupervised, to the further disadvantage of the most marginalised groups.

Some studies address the limitations of situational and managerial criminology by engaging with the cultural and emotive aspects that lead a conflict to result in death. These include attempts to maintain a sense of masculine honour (Bourgois 2003, Drybread 2014, Polk 1994, Zaluar 2010) and fear of victimisation when faced
with a situation where all those involved are armed, leading one of the individuals to ‘pull the trigger’ first (Wilkinson and Fagan 2001). In such circumstances violence and fear become key elements of daily life, a currency of survival (Fagan and Wilkinson 1998, Zubillaga 2009, Rodgers 2009) and one means by which people negotiate their place and identity. Managerial criminology, and its emphasis on target monitoring, surveillance and arrests, is not able to capture or address these cultural and emotive aspects of a society with high levels of violence.

Monitoring police statistics and focusing on performance evaluations based solely on statistics fail to acknowledge the profoundly socially constructed nature of what is defined as a crime and who is defined as a criminal, a critique which is well elaborated by Young (2011). Statistical counts (even when they emerge from victimisation surveys) often fail to capture harmful practices (Raymen 2015, 14) and hidden crimes such corporate crimes, domestic violence and police misconduct. Social constructions of criminals tend to reinforce conventional stereotypes and the criminalisation of those perceived as undeserving ‘others’ (Garland 2001, 175).16

These criticisms of the theoretical rationale underpinning PPV do not mean that there were no positive aspects of this public security programme. The emphasis on monitoring certain police targets offers potential benefits to society as a whole. For example, PPV monitors firearms apprehensions by police, which encourages the control of firearms. As firearms are widely acknowledged as a key element in the increase of lethal violence (Cavalcanti 2016, Dreyfus, Lessing, and Purcena 2005, Rangel and Bourgois 2005, Squires 2000), this aspect of PPV can be seen as having beneficial effects to society. The same could not be said about PPV’s emphasis on monitoring the amount of drugs apprehended by police. The latter tends to reinforce issues associated with the war on drugs, such as old problems of criminalisation of the marginalised, while having no proven effect on the reduction of violence (Simon 2007).

A key limitation of the few criminological and public security studies, including those conducted in Pernambuco such as Ratton et al.’s (2011), is the lack of consideration of the ways in which institutional inadequacy in the public security system and the type of policing provided, can affect the dynamics of multiple forms of violence in Recife’s low-income communities. These studies have not engaged with the ways in which safety and security interventions affect these communities
from the perception of the marginalised themselves. This thesis addresses these issues.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter’s contribution has been three-fold. First, it provided a glimpse into the structural context of low-income communities in Brazil. This literature focused on demographic data about housing and income and on debates about the conceptualisation of the marginalisation affecting low-income communities and favelas (Perlman 2010; Wacquant 1996). Second, the chapter began to explore the theoretical critique of the link made in everyday discourses about crime and poverty or marginality and violence. It showed that while the very term ‘marginal’ in Brazil, which often connotes poor, has come to signify ‘criminal’, very few people in poor communities become criminals – they are often criminalised and, rather than marginal, poor communities are central to Brazilian society, economy and culture. These communities are, however, marginalised in that they are often neglected by the State, having the worst access to housing and public services including security. They are over-targeted and under-protected by the criminal justice system. The ‘crime/violence and poverty/marginality’ link remains embedded in policy-making and in the practices of the security apparatus, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6.

Finally, the chapter began to examine the limitations of the theories that have been influential in the development of new security interventions. Far from vilifying these theories and approaches to crime control (e.g. Situational Crime Prevention and managerial criminology) or the work of well-meaning academics that deploy their rationale, my intention here was to point out the limitations and dangers posed by the adaptation of Global North theories. Of course, it is not argued here that policy transfer or emulation, or SCP and managerial criminology, are the cause of crime or police violence. Instead, it is argued that there are key limitations in this literature, which mar the provision of security, such as the failure to take into account emotive aspects of crime, the cultural context of societies with high levels of violence and the Brazilian institutional context. It is argued that these Global North criminological theories have been contested outside Brazil, on multiple grounds, not least because they exacerbate inequalities through the division of societies along class and ethnic lines, especially because of the process of ‘othering’ suspects and individuals.
perceived as undeserving. Moreover, these theories are also inadequate in the Brazilian context due to its deeply ingrained inequalities, widespread issues of discrimination and criminalisation, and the lack of appropriate public security provision. Such issues are illustrated by an already problematic overrepresentation of poor indigenous and afro-descendant people in the criminal justice system. There is a risk that these existing problems will be amplified.
CHAPTER 3 – The criminological study of public security in Brazil

This chapter moves beyond theories of marginality and poverty to include some of the institutional aspects of the research problem. It synthesises some of the analytical literature about crime and violence that has emerged in Brazil in the last thirty years. During that period, the steady flow of academic work concerning violence, criminality, public security and criminal justice has made this one of the most important fields of research in the Brazilian social sciences. There has been a growing concentration and consolidation of academic works about these themes from the 1990s, half of which have been produced by research groups in the country’s southeast, especially Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000).

The chapter argues that the ways in which new security interventions and policing affect marginalised communities and the young in northeast Brazil have been overlooked in the criminological and Brazilian public security literature, in spite of the fact that the demographic and spatial concentration of multiple forms of violence have impacted primarily upon the marginalised, the urban poor and the young. How have institutions and communities responded to this context? The focus of this thesis is on the ways in which new government security agendas impact people in low-income communities, how these communities, and their young people respond to this agenda and what effects these programmes of state building and social control have on the poorest subjects of these interventions.

This chapter is structured in the following way. First, it presents the lack of balance in the production of studies about urban violence and crime. This literature has understudied the effects of the State’s crime control interventions in the northeast Brazil. Second, it examines some of the problems and challenges of the State’s attempt to monopolise violence. Some of those challenges relate to issues of gender and age inequities. Third, this debate leads on to the question of whether or not, or how, the State is present in certain Brazilian communities. Fourth, the chapter reflects on the notions of democracy and security, examining from a social democratic viewpoint why these concepts should not be perceived as incompatible. Finally, this theoretical reflection provides a backdrop to examining the emergence of public security as a field of study in Brazil and exposes important gaps in this literature.
3.1 Brazil’s internal knowledge production inequalities

Most studies about the increase in urban criminality, tend to identify a shift in the patterns of crime from the end of the 1970s, notably suggesting that a greater degree of criminal organisation emerged in cities like Rio, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte, as well as rising use of violence in criminal actions, leading to higher homicide rates. This shift was consolidated in the 1980s with the expansion of the drug trade, particularly cocaine, and with the increasing use of sophisticated weapons of greater lethal power (Velho 2000, Paixão 1983, Zaluar 1994, Caldeira 2000, Adorno 1992, Machado da Silva 1993, Misse 1997, Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000). None of these studies have focused on how the State has responded to increasing concern with urban criminality in the northeast of Brazil, or on the impact this response has had on people in low-income communities. However, these issues are the focus of this thesis.

Misse’s (1999, 84) perspective focuses on the continuous growth of ascribed social causes of violence and on those represented as ‘social danger’. The social accumulation of violence is a social process characterised by the social representation of violence, which is measured by the number of deaths, fights, conflicts, thefts, robberies and kidnappings, and by the insecurity felt by the population. The statistical methods employed in measuring violence are significant in this project, as is the way in which suspects are represented. A sea of numbers and the measurements of those numbers fail to engage with developments at ground level. For instance, many crimes are not reported, and numerical data cannot show in any detail how and whether these crimes have been dealt with or how the State, through the police, has interacted with suspects and residents of low-income communities. Ethnographic methods can counter this issue by providing insight into perceptions and voices from below.

Although most of the studies examined so far help to contextualise and analyse the issue of violence in Brazil, most of them refer to empirical cases based in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo where crime has become very organised. They risk missing out contextual differences in relation to other parts of Brazil. Moreover, some of the key issues that emerge from this literature are the institutional problems entangled in the context of violence. This raises questions, which this thesis addresses drawing on ethnographic methods, about the work of state institutions such as the
police and the context in the northeast of Brazil; it raises questions about how public security policies have changed and what has been their impact.

3.2 State building and the monopoly of violence

A key issue in the production and maintenance of high levels of violence is the failure, inability and even unwillingness of the Brazilian state to legitimately monopolise the use of force:

‘Institutionally, for a civilized or pacified society to exist it is necessary that the State has the monopoly of the use of violence, that is, citizens should not be able to use guns as a means of solving private conflicts’ (Zaluar 2013, 5).

State attempts to monopolise the use of force are key in state building, as shown in the work of Charles Tilly (1992). Before the emergence of modern European states, multiple social actors took part in violent interactions. State control of and monopoly over violence was essential for the formation and establishment of these nation states. This essentially is a crucial theme in this thesis, as it reveals that the development of new public security policies, such as Pacto pela Vida, is part of an attempt at state building, while also a part of efforts to promote electoral interests.

Alba Zaluar – who is one of the Brazilian pioneers in the study of urban crime and its relations with state institutions (such as the police) – argues that Brazil is characterised by an ambivalent domain of social processes and practices that are not controlled by the formal institutions of the rule of law (Zaluar 2004a, b). She argues that a mixture of factors has enabled the rise of new forms of violence, especially directly related to the spread, distribution and consumption of illicit drugs. These include the accelerated urbanisation and persistent poverty that has left many poor young men in a state of vulnerability, while organised crime has offered them opportunities for what she calls 'perverse integration' (Zaluar 2004a). Zaluar’s analysis examines three main dimensions of violence: the institutional (which relates to persistent civil rights violations), the importance and limits of macro social explanations (poverty and social exclusion) and micro social factors that involve young men in drug trafficking (issues such as bravado and interpersonal power struggles over women, weapons and dope). All of which shape a society where the
rule of law is deficient. These issues, she suggests, are connected to, for instance, the practice of *acerto de contas* (settling the bill or reckoning), which entails some form of bribery to ensure impunity – such as payments made to the police to secure the release of an arrested criminal. The *acerto* can also refer to the settlement of debts between traffickers, where the debtor may pay with his life if he does not have sufficient money. 

Although some of the processes and practices in Zaluar’s analysis may resemble those in other Brazilian cities, including the spread of firearms, drugs and violence, this does not mean that these processes are homogenously occurring throughout Brazil. It is important to note that her research was conducted in the context in Rio de Janeiro, where crime has become very organised. However, the level of criminal organisation varies throughout Brazil. This has implications for the development of security policies and for the ways in which policing is conducted. Freitas (2005), for instance, found that national policies to address youth violence were not applicable to the particular context of Recife. In his case study, violence was often associated with interpersonal and family disputes, and crime (including small-scale drug trade) in Recife at that time was more disorganised and less business-like in comparison to cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. These regional differences in social practices are central challenges to state building and the monopoly of violence in Brazil. Other challenges relate to local cultural and gender dynamics and the social construction of gender roles, more specifically to the dominant roles and meanings ascribed to masculinity.

*Gender*

Through a gender lens, Zaluar’s (1985, 1995, 2013) ethnographic studies in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas contextualise the social milieu in which the risk of violence becomes widespread and in which the culture of violent masculine honour and bravado becomes the norm. She explains this culture as the seductive warrior ethos, which is enmeshed with masculine discourses, ideals and practices, easy money and consumerism. Although Zaluar’s studies were conducted in Rio de Janeiro, she engaged with low-income communities that are largely developed and inhabited by north-eastern migrants. As a consequence, she offers some insight into patriarchal cultural norms and the dominance of certain forms of violent masculine identity in the northeast region of Brazil.
An exceptional ethnographic study by Drybread (2014) conducted in a juvenile detention centre in northeast Brazil focused on the performance of gender roles by young people. Drybread’s study illustrates that violence is not necessarily the outcome of the rational calculation of risks as a situational crime prevention or managerial criminology would portray (as discussed in chapter 2). Rather, Drybread’s study explores cultural and emotive elements, such as vengeance, honour and virility (p. 753) that were motives of violence. She argues for an understanding of gender that moves beyond the investigation of relations between males and females. Manhood among her participants was constructed in relation to age rather than femininity. In this context, the act of murder and the ability to enact violence were exercised to affirm the autonomy and manliness associated with masculine adulthood. The importance of understanding gender relations and cultural norms in different regions in Brazil is illustrated by the fact that:

‘In more industrialised and wealthy areas of the country, there are arguably styles of manly self-presentation and behaviour that are still uncommon in northeast, where historical circumstances and socioeconomic pressures have given rise to regionally particular ideals of manhood and masculine honour that admit no place to men who are considered weak or cowardly’ (Drybread 2014, 756)

These hierarchical gender roles and violent forms of masculinity are key challenges in the reduction of violent relations in the city and cannot be easily addressed by policing or PPV’s methods of police performance monitoring. One of the important points made by Drybread is the need for a space for teaching inmates (although this could be extended to the wider population) that ‘there are several ways for an individual to enact and preserve his manhood – and violent crime need not be one of them’ (p. 760). This suggestion would be more easily applied if, in practice, Brazilian society and its institutions – e.g. prisons, juvenile centres, the police, schools – could provide safer, inclusive spaces that encourage more hospitable social relations so that sustaining the social performance of strength and bravado is not needed to provide a sense of security. In theory, but not necessarily in practice, Brazil has advanced important legislation attempting to ensure the safety of young people, as discussed below.
Youth

In 1990 Brazil replaced the discriminatory, repressive and segregationist legislation known as ‘Minors’ Code’ with the Children’s and Adolescent’s Act (Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente or ECA). The Minor’s Code in operation from 1927 to 1990 had discriminated between the definitions of ‘child’ and ‘minor’ (Rizzini 1997). Children were constructed as deserving innocent individuals in need of adult protection while minors were constructed as undeserving young wrongdoers from poor and morally deficient families (Drybread 2014, 757). This code made it legally possible to institutionalise children indeterminately whether or not they had broken the law (Drybread 2009). ECA redefined childhood by including all children and adolescents as rights-bearing citizens and forbidding the institutionalisation of young people, unless they commit a heinous offence of violence such as rape, murder or kidnapping with a maximum sentence of three years (Drybread 2014, 758). Young people under the age of 12 were considered children incapable of committing crimes and those between 12 and 18 years old were considered adolescents, who could not be held criminally responsible.

ECA became a reference for Latin America because of its emphasis on human rights and the respect for the development of children and adolescents (UNICEF 2015). This legal change developed a new discourse that constructs young people as bearing rights instead of as objects of intervention (Moore 2015, 273). However, it is still unclear how much the law has changed discriminatory practices (ibid). As it will be shown in Chapter 7, police practices are embedded in misconstructions that portray young, poor, afro-descendant males as criminals and young, poor, afro-descendant females as morally dangerous. These discriminatory practices resonate with wider inequalities in Brazilian society, revealing its racist and classist discrimination that conflate crime with poverty.

Despite the legal gains Brazil made with the establishment of ECA over 25 years ago, Brazil’s interim government, at the time of writing, has announced its support for the reduction of the age of criminal responsibility and support for the increase of sentences for young offenders from 3 to 10 years. Those issues have been increasingly debated and proposed by the ultra-conservative political right (Amaral 2016). Young people, while being one of the most victimised groups in Brazil (as argued in Chapter 1), continue to be under-protected and continuously constructed as criminals in need of tougher penal sanctions. Misconceptions about crime, and the
intersections of, race, class, age and gender inequalities operate to limit the development of fair and legitimate state institutions that could attempt to monopolise and curb violence, thus hindering the best interests of Brazilian people.

3.3 Absence of the State?

In 1993, O’Donnell (1993) published a paper that argued that human rights violations were linked to the absence of the State in certain geographical areas. He classified territories into blue, green and brown areas, according to the degree to which the State was present and the effectiveness of its institutions. Brown areas had the worst conditions, where the State, or more specifically the rule of law, was absent and institutions were ineffective. He argued that countries like Brazil and Peru are dominated by brown areas (O’Donnell 1993). His thesis embodies a common fallacy that Brazilian cities are divided between accessible and no-go areas. In the former the State is supposedly present; in the latter, allegedly the territory of criminals, it is absent.

A book by Zuenir Ventura (1994), *Cidade Partida* (‘The Divided City’) focuses on this dualistic ideology. Ventura’s journalistic account focused on the case of Rio de Janeiro, where he saw the rich ‘zona sul’ (south zone) as separate and segregated from the poor favelas in the ‘zona norte’ (north zone) and peripheries of the city. Brazilian cities are indeed segregated territories with acute social divisions. However, the emphasis on ‘division’ and on ‘dual’ cities ignores the connections that do exist between different areas of the city. It becomes tempting to perceive favelas as not only poor but also dysfunctional areas, which have failed to integrate with the rest of the city; areas in which traffickers impede the progress and development of civil society because they do not tolerate forms of social or political organisation that might challenge their power. This common misconception fails to acknowledge the ways in which the State is present in different territories and the ways in which poor areas are connected to the political system and to the rest of the city.

While it is widely accepted that the ‘rule of law’ (as opposed to the ‘State’) is underprovided in many parts of countries like Brazil, the view that the State (all together) is entirely absent has been contested. In fact, some scholars have argued that the State is a key player in violent social relations in O’Donnell’s so-called brown areas. Some scholars have argued that criminal violence is actually a facet of politics
(Feltran 2011) and that it has played a role in a system of clientelism, which has existed at least since the period of military rule (Arias 2006). The relevance of the work of Arias is examined in more detail in this section.

Machado da Silva (1995) was one of the first critics to argue against the thesis that crime and violence in poor areas were associated with the absence of the State. He suggested that social scientists needed not only to focus on the institutional dimensions of the object of study but also look at societal dimensions of the phenomena. Elizabeth Leeds (1996) had also observed that rather than being absent, the State is entangled in violent relations through 'patron-client' relations with favela residents. Local politicians standing for election to the city government would attempt to establish a relationship with the leadership of the residents’ association (Associação dos Moradores, or AM) in Rio’s favelas. They would promise increased resources to the community in exchange for the AM organising votes. Additionally, they established informal agreements with drug traffickers to allow certain candidates to conduct their election campaigns in the favelas under the control of the gangs (Leeds 1996, 75). Furthermore, the Brazilian police, one of the State’s most visible institutions, is often involved in drug deals and have an established ‘role in escorting shipments of drugs and guns to favelas as well as in killing other corrupt police and blaming favela drug dealers for those murders’ (ibid, 65).

The political scientist Desmond Arias (2006) expanded this critique, by deploying ‘social network’ theories to argue that violence in poor urban areas was in fact not caused by the absence of the State, but rather by an intricate network involving a variety of social actors: civil society (e.g. NGOs, residents’ associations), the police, corrupt politicians and favela residents. His study of three of Rio’s low-income communities revealed that violence worked as a 'lubricant' that enabled the existence of a network of clientelist relations involving these social actors. Violence was a resource, a way of maintaining a certain kind of social order, a currency that maintained the status quo. Politicians would access vote-buying opportunities through residents’ associations, which were often controlled by traffickers and their approved representatives. Traffickers too could bargain with residents for their complicity with trafficking by offering them financial support or even enabling community festivities and providing security, especially against rape and theft in the community.

The police were avoided where possible, to avoid attracting attention to drugs and arms trading in the community. The police only became involved in cases of
corruption, by extorting money from traffickers or in providing reactive policing after events had spiralled out of control (e.g. disputes between drug gangs). While this network functions to line the pockets of corrupt police and to increase the number of votes for corrupt politicians, it has damaging consequences for the favela: fear, segregation, lack of trust in official institutions and the State, impunity, escalation of mortality and bereavement. From Arias’ perspective, the State is therefore deeply entangled in this network, both through its corrupt institutions such as the police and through politicians who interacted with the favela, its residents and associations to seek and buy votes. Arias demonstrated that rather than being a place left behind, favelas are deeply connected to the city, the State and the political system.

The data emerging from this thesis corroborate his findings, insofar as the State was present in the communities studied and residents were connected in multiple ways to the rest of the city, especially through work. What this thesis contributes to this literature is the emphasis on the ways in which the State was present in these communities in the northeast regions and on the effects this has on the communities from the perspective of young people.

In Rio’s favelas, Leeds (1996) concluded that drug traffickers had become a ‘parallel power’ to the State. Traffickers gained some form of acceptance (not necessarily legitimacy) among local residents for providing services that the State had failed to deliver, including cash loans, medication and access to work (often of an illegal nature). Goldstein’s (2003) study echoed some of these findings. Often, however, this parallel power and support from traffickers compromised residents in a number of ways, such as requiring them to be complicit with the drug trade, or to hide suspects and illegal merchandise in their homes (Penglase 2008, 2009). The different forms that violence and coercion have assumed in different communities are essential to any analysis of public security. It is important to note the diverse relational aspects of the interactions between various social actors. Viewing the favela as a separate or a parallel system diverts attention away from an analysis of its actual complex relationships with the State and local political elites.

As argued by Andreas and Martinez (2012) the illicit trade, violence and corruption are all interconnected issues that impact on public security and on the boundaries of state power, however, questions about the dynamics of public security, about how the State’s actions and policies affect areas seen as violent, remain understudied. The lack of adequate data as well as insufficient comparative and
theoretical analysis makes this area of scholarship uneven and limited (Andreas and Martinez 2012).

3.4 Some reflections on democracy and security

Nearly three decades ago, Petit (1987) sketched a social democratic theory of the State, defining social democracy as a ‘philosophy for policymaking’ (p. 543), a political movement. Social democracy questions and challenges the destructive excesses of capitalist societies, and their systemic inequalities. Instead, it proposes the ideal of the public or common good, organised around the principles of equality, solidarity and social justice (Loader and Sparks 2015, 16), including promoting the well-being and safety of the most vulnerable in society. In line with this, this thesis draws on and supports Robert Reiner’s (2010, 2011) proposal for a social democratic criminology that acknowledges that there is no peace without justice. Alongside other critical criminologists (Bowling et al. 2016, Currie 1991/2013, Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1996, 1994, Loader and Sparks 2015, Reiner 2010), I take the values and the philosophy of social democracy as critically important in crime control, public security and policing theory. This is not to say that the notions of democracy, security or even democratic policing are not contested. It is not the place here to detail all that is disputed in this debate, some of which is discussed elsewhere (Harkin 2015, Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1994, 37-48), but a few points are in order to clarify the viewpoint and argument of this thesis.

First, as Petit points out, democratic theories share one important element, that is, that the ‘social ideal of equal respect for all persons ought to be central to the organisation of society’ (1987, 538). There are caveats to this ideal. A key difference for example between the liberal democratic and the social democratic points of view is the focus on the individual or the State. For social democrats, it is inconceivable to imagine ‘all individuals as equal partners in the organisation of social and political life’ (ibid, 542). The social democrat perspective is grounded in the historical condition within which the State is a reality. It does not ask what equally valued individuals should require of institutions and of the State if they are to enjoy equal respect (ibid). Instead, the social democrat considers ‘what the state should do in the world as it is now in order to promote this ideal’ (ibid).
The second point to be acknowledged is that public services are affected by the incorporation or rejection of democratic ideals. As Jones, Newburn, and Smith (1994, 1) put it, ‘the protection of liberty, social and economic opportunities, and the ability of individuals to shape and develop their lives are crucially affected by a range of public services. The police are arguably the central public service in a modern state’. Policing is ambiguous and has the potential to affect different social groups in unequal ways, especially the most marginalised, often exacerbating inequalities by bringing the most disadvantaged into contact with the criminal justice system as suspects and perpetrators rather than as victims (Bowling et al. 2016, Loader 1996). Selective targeting and discretionary practices of stop-and-search can disproportionately affect arrests, convictions and incarceration (Bowling et al. 2016, 140). The police and penal institutions mediate identity and status since their acts and omissions have the power to distinctively constitute people as part of the polity or define their place within hierarchical social structures (Loader and Sparks 2015, 38). For these reasons, improving policing as a public service requires the adoption of fundamental democratic values (Bowling et al. 2016, 151). Since the police are supposed to protect essential freedoms, and monopolise the legitimate use of force, it is important to consider ‘democratic policing’, in some proposed definition, as ‘preferable to other arrangements’ (Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1994, 3) such as militarised policing (Huggins 1998). Democratic policing is the proposal that policing as a public service should follow democratic principles. In summary, as Jones, Newburn and Smith (1994, 44) outline, these criteria relate to:

1) Equity, that is, fair distribution of service and law enforcement.

2) Effective and efficient delivery of service.

3) Responsiveness, that is, the choice of policing methods and allocation of resources. Policing needs to be responsive to some expression of the public’s wishes. However, it must be emphasised that this principle must be balanced against the ideals of justice and equity so that the will of the majority is not favoured if it is discriminatory. As the authors argue, ‘it would be undemocratic for the police to adopt a highly discriminatory
policy of law enforcement, even if a local majority favoured such a policy’ (ibid, 47).

4) Distribution of power, that is, the power to decide which policing policies are adopted needs to be distributed.

5) Information needs to be published on funding, expenditure, activities and outputs.

6) Redress, which means that it should be possible for a representative body to dismiss unlawful, incompetent or corrupt officers or those who abuse their power.

7) Participation, that is, as far as possible, citizens should take part in discussions of policing policy with police managers. This last criterion, as the authors outline, is less of a priority than equity because of the difficulties in getting people together to discuss policy-making. The right not to participate is central to contemporary democracy as ‘it is not the case that every literate or sane person expects or wishes to actively participate in public policy-making’ (ibid, 45).

The final point to clarify is that in spite of the inevitable task of social control with the threat or potential use of coercive force, the police’s role is secondary in maintaining order and security (Bowling et al. 2016, Reiner 2011). That is to say that the police are not single-handedly able to control crime and promote order, neither is policing all about law enforcement. ‘The police are, in fact, an all-purpose emergency service charged with responding to a wide range of different urgent social problems’ (Bowling et al. 2016, 129). As Bowling et al note, much of the police function is, and should be related to peacekeeping and deploying dialogue, for instance mediating conflict, looking for missing people, persuading suicidal people not to jump off a ledge, dealing with accidents, escorting drunks and asking young people not to disturb the elderly (ibid, 131).

While radical Marxists perceive the police as repressive agents of the State, protecting the class interests of elites (Cohen 1979/1997, Storch 1976), this approach
can also be perceived as deterministic and structurally fatalistic in that it does not recognise important and positive peacekeeping aspects of public security institutions. Indeed, the police can act as repressive agents of the State, protectors of classed interests to the disadvantage of the weakest. But the police can also be understood as a public service, which is needed by all social classes (Lea and Young 1993). Class and social justice are absolutely important in this debate, hence my proposal of a social democratic approach, foregrounding a ‘general’ order rather than the privilege of ‘particular’ classes or forms of order that privilege certain interests over public interests. The police as a public service can be understood as a necessary ‘all-purpose emergency service’ (Bowling et al. 2016, 129), which can be achieved with ‘good communication skills and the personal and institutional authority vested in the police uniform’ (ibid, 131) as well as the power to use force, with limits and when absolutely necessary.

3.5 Issues of public security

The term public security emphasises the protection of people, property and democratic political institutions from internal or external threats (Bailey and Dammert 2006). As such, it differs from the term national security, often used in the Cold War period, which focused on the protection of a state and its territorial integrity from other state actors and political opponents. In the Brazil, the study of public security emerged from research about the prison system (Lima and Ratton 2011). However, this field of study has moved on to acknowledge the interconnections between the State, institutions of criminal justice, public security policies, and civil society. In line with this, this thesis puts forward an analysis of the dynamics of security in the city of Recife, in the northeast of Brazil.

Understanding the dynamics of the interactions of citizens and security institutions in a society that is exposed to rapid change is paramount for the promotion of justice and public security. For instance, the type of policing implemented by governments has direct impacts on the prison population – since the police have a high degree of control over who goes to prison, and who is targeted or not by their work, thus delineating boundaries between perceived criminals and non-criminals, reinforcing marginalising relations: ‘us’ and ‘them’. So beyond the issue of increasing incarceration and its perverse impacts, another key institution of the public
security system, central to this thesis is the police. The police are the most visible, albeit not the only, State presence in Brazilian poor communities. There seems to be a consensus, in most studies in this field, that policing is a key problem in any understanding of the barriers to the establishment of the legitimate monopoly of force by the State in Brazil.

The two main police forces that interact with poor communities are the *policia civil* (PC, civil police) and the *policia militar* (PM, military police). The former is responsible for investigations while the latter patrols the streets and apprehends suspects before passing them over to the civil police. Both forces are part of the public security apparatus, respond to the state governor, and are heavily armed. The PC tends to be overtly bureaucratic, distanced from the communities they are meant to serve and too focused on paperwork, while the PM is mostly precariously and insufficiently trained. Its military training is also inappropriate for establishing good relations with civil society and dealing with the communities they interact with.

The military police has a strict hierarchy (Soares 2000) and its military training is a central feature of police culture in Brazil. Police culture in Brazil resembles the logics of Brazilian culture, as synthesised by Roberto da Matta: when personal relations are established, they supersede formal and institutional norms and associations, allowing for every kind of benefit, potentially opening the way to various forms of discrimination and the giving and receiving of illicit favours (Soares 2000, 62). The rigid military hierarchy and structure of the PM limits interaction with the public and distances them from the communities they patrol. The PC on the other hand spends most of its time in police stations (*delegacias*) dealing with paperwork (Pereira 2008) and supposedly conducting investigations. This structure contributes to the ineffectiveness of both forces and causes difficulties when it comes to cooperation between them.

Most of the police violence in low-income communities is committed by the military police (Perlman 2010, 168). The slowness of the Brazilian courts and the inadequacy of mechanisms of police accountability prompt the military police to act coercively in the streets instead of arresting suspects (Pereira 2008). They are key contributors to the cycle of violence by their use of extrajudicial violence, violent raids/aggressive incursions and lethal force.

According to Perlman (2010) a key contributor to rising violence in favelas has been the rise of armed militias formed by self-appointed, off-duty or retired police
officers who take law-and-order problems into their own hands. Militias have also been known to extort money from favela residents, demanding regular payments for the delivery of goods, taxing taxi and motorbike-taxi businesses, and even charging people for entering or leaving the favela (Perlman 2010, 168). As argued by Scheper-Hughes (2004) and Pinheiro (2006), this contributes to the disproportional mortality of poor, non-white males, since they are the main victims of death squads and police violence:

‘Victims of police violence and summary executions tend to be young Afro-Brazilian males between the ages of 15–19 years, who are often involved in criminal gangs’ (Pinheiro 2006, 298)

The police force is deeply resistant to change (Soares 2000). Some studies, based on data about death occurring in conflict with the police, particularly autos de resistência (‘resistance to arrest’, cases of lethal police violence which are not registered as homicide) have shown that the degree of police violence is still very high and hard to measure (Bueno and Lima 2012). For instance in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Bueno and Lima estimate that 22,525 people were killed in confrontation with the police between 1993 and 2011. There is still no standard register for data about cases of police violence in the country, and since the restoration of democracy in Brazil, basic civil rights such as safety remain insufficiently consolidated (Possas 2012), both in practice and in the public perception. For instance, despite the difficulty in accessing this type of data, there is ample evidence that human rights violations, including by the State continue to happen routinely in Brazil (Possas 2012).

A study of ten Brazilian state capitals (Cardia 2012) found that 47% of participants thought it appropriate for a police officer to be violent towards an incarcerated person who tried to escape; 62% thought that the criminal justice system overprotects the rights of the accused; and 29% thought it acceptable for courts to accept evidence extracted via torture. The ‘paradox of democracy’ is that violations continue to occur routinely in large numbers, despite emerging in different forms when compared with the period of military rule (Possas 2012). The persistence of extra-legal violence is fuelled by the population’s fears and sense of insecurity. As argued by Garland (1996, 2001), over the last thirty years high crime rates have led to this sense of insecurity and fear that engenders punitive attitudes towards the ‘other’ –
the offender – and provides support for regressive policies and practices which are incompatible with a human-rights agenda, such as mandatory and arbitrary sentencing, and the excessive use of imprisonment.

Ethnographic studies of policing and judicial practice in Rio de Janeiro have argued that the deviance and distortions of these institutions are not merely occasional or isolated cases of staff and institutional failure, but rather that they reveal mass adherence (even if not explicitly) to a deviant system of conflict management typical of segregated and hierarchical societies (Kant de Lima 1989). Brazil’s justice system is replete with loopholes that aggravate impunity, perpetuate inequalities and generate widespread dissatisfaction. Those who have access to good lawyers can manipulate endless and innumerable delays in prosecution (Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000). Extrajudicial punishment is routinely applied both by the agents of the public security apparatus and by the population, which, according to existing studies, largely condones the humiliation, torture and even the killing of those considered criminals, before or after their official sentence (Singer 2000, Feltran 2011).

In this context, Tavares dos Santos (2009) suggests that contemporary policing in Latin America has tended to face a crisis of effectiveness and legitimacy. According to him, despite the creation of new police institutions, and the formation of some community policing initiatives and programmes of police education organised by public universities, reforms have been partial. The impact, extent and suitability of public security initiatives in Brazil remains under-studied and it is unclear whether they are appropriate to address the ‘security gap’, truly reform the police, and provide lasting results. Public security studies also need to consider how marginalised young people in the northeast of Brazil respond to these issues. As the main victims of lethal violence, and the least protected group in society, how do young people respond to the context of fear, anxiety and increasingly repressive crime control? This thesis addresses these gaps in the literature, examining some of the effects of the recent policing and security initiatives in Recife.

3.6 The dynamics of public security as object of study

Brazilian academics have made efforts to research and understand the area of study that has come to be loosely labelled ‘public security’ (Lima and Ratton 2011). Until the late 1990s, the topic of public security in Brazil was generally studied from a
juridical or a military perspective, leading to fragmented, mainstream and normative accounts (Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000, Macaulay 2007). As a research topic, public security policies have not yet become as consolidated as other themes such as delinquency, violence, policing and the criminal justice system.

Public security policies (also known as ‘public safety policies’) are actions, strategies and programmes managed and sometimes developed by the State to address crime and violence. Sapori (2007) explains that there are many theoretical gaps in this field of study in Brazil. He argues that there is a need to deepen the knowledge about the dynamics of criminal justice since the field of public policies of crime control and public security policies remain under researched. There is thus a need to produce knowledge about governmental actions aimed at providing the collective good of public safety in Brazil. Growing insecurity and fear of crime affects trust in the State and its agents, therefore even the State’s legitimacy depends by and large on its capacity to maintain order and some degree of safety for the citizens subject to its authority (Sapori 2007). Consequently, as a topic, public security has become paramount in academic, practical, policy and political terms.

While there is a discourse in Brazil that the problem of violence cannot be resolved without profound reforms in the penal system or a change to the socio-economic structure, scholars such as Soares (2000) and Sapori (2007) argue that changing policies and the governance of public security institutions can reduce crime. The focus is thus on tangible measures of crime reduction as opposed to addressing the deeper inequalities or the multitude of (often contested) causes of crime in Brazil. The latter could take far longer to produce results and would require shifts in various long-term social policies, such as those in the field of education and development. This is not to say that these researchers fail to understand or promote a more equal society, but rather that they perceive the need to take specific measures to promote public safety, beyond and in addition to long-term policies to address structural inequalities. For Adorno and Salla, public security policies need to adapt to rapid societal change and turbulence:

‘Crime has increased and become more violent; organised criminality has spread through society reaching economic activities far beyond traditional crimes against property, increasing the homicide rates, above all among adolescents and young adults, and disorganising forms of social life and
standards of inter- and intra-class sociability. Nevertheless, public safety policies continue to be formulated and implanted according to conventional, aged models, which are incapable of accompanying the quality of the social and institutional changes underway within society’ (Adorno and Salla 2007, 10).

Adorno and Salla suggest that while crime has become more widespread and innovative, making use of new technologies (e.g. telecommunications, transport, modern firearms), the application of law and order continues to consist largely of old, militarised police models of chasing known criminals. Understanding the dynamics of public security in Brazil demands engagement with the continuities and changes in this field of study.

Despite investments in public security by federal and state governments in the equipping of police forces, the overall model of policing and training of human resources remains unsatisfactory. Until the late 1990s there were no national official statistics on criminality, a problem that has only recently begun to be addressed. The data available from the National Secretariat of Public Safety (SENASP), part of the Ministry of Justice, for the years 1999-2001 reveal that the rates of violent crime – homicide, theft followed by death, extortion by kidnapping, rape – are generally higher in Brazil than in other countries with similar socio-economic characteristics (Adorno and Salla 2007, 12-13).

Rates of violence and inequality remain high and impede the consolidation of civil rights. At the national level the Brazilian state has been shy in its initiatives to address these issues. A new agency was established at the federal level, Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública (SENASP), which translates as National Secretariat for Public Security, part of the Ministry of Justice. SENASP has introduced national public security policies with modest incentives for state governments to collect data and endorse reforms, but a number of barriers have hindered its progress (Pereira 2008).

As explained by Pereira (2008), SENASP has lacked continuous leadership, which has impacted adversely on its activities. Pereira argues that the key barriers to the improvement of public security include the fragmentation of the public sectors, the politicisation of the police and the privatisation of security, all of which constrain the effectiveness of public security organisations in preventing violence. The issue of
fragmentation is ingrained in the Brazilian federalist system, electoral regulations and the party system, which prevents presidents from having a majority in Congress. This means that in order to rule, elected presidents must negotiate a multiparty coalition in Congress, and negotiate (sometimes through bribery) with congress, state governors and mayors their support for legislative initiatives. A further issue is that since public security provision remains mostly a responsibility of each state, the funds invested by SENASP have often been used for different purposes.

Fragmentation is also seen in the Brazilian policing system, as discussed above. The division of labour between two main police forces, one civil and one military, and their disjointed training, limit the possibilities for implementing the community policing models proposed by SENASP. Moreover, the division between the two police forces often results in competition, rivalry, poor communication and inadequate information sharing (Pereira 2008).

The second issue – politicisation – affects both policing and the policy-making apparatus. Part of the problem is that most high-ranking positions in the police and even in SENASP are staffed with political appointees, so political patronage and loyalty continue to be a problem (Pereira 2008). This also leads to a discontinuation in policies and practices when new governments are elected. Members of the police are also able to deploy their contacts and police associations to run for office and despite it being illegal, the police often use strikes as political weapons. Thus the politicisation of the security system obstructs its effectiveness in curbing violence.

Finally, in relation to the privatisation of security, Pereira argues that it challenges the notion that security is a public good. Commercial and private interests rather than the collective good are prioritised. Private security is a thriving industry in Brazil (Cubas 2002). It is widely tolerated, although illegal, for police officers to supplement their income by taking second jobs in the private security sector. Public resources are therefore employed to protect private interests. Some contractors have even been known to perpetrate massacres so as later to be able to sell their security service to the affected communities demonstrating how the industry can be parasitic in nature (Pereira 2008). It is a business that thrives on the failures of the public security system and profits from the context of an intense fear of crime, while itself generating yet more inequalities (e.g. in access to safety), mistrust, and segregation in society.
Researchers have observed that increasing spending on public security has not necessarily led to reductions in the level of violent mortality (Caldeira 2000, Turollo and Guimarães 2013). As Pereira (2008) neatly puts it:

‘If resources are being poured into a system in which collusion between State agents and organised crime is common, in which corruption and illegal violence by State agents is widespread, in which basic sharing of information and cooperation between different agencies is often impossible, in which partisan political loyalties are more important than technical skill and diligence in police promotions and the implementation of State policy, and in which private security interests cream off public intelligence and personnel for profit – then much of these resources will be wasted’

Furthermore, much of the official data about violence and public security issues, do not always reflect the real situation of crime and violence in the country (Kahn 1998, Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000) – official data are frequently poorly recorded, inaccurate or corrupted and research is also often fragmented. The Brazilian public security system has thus been described as a ‘bureaucratic labyrinth’ replete with ‘corporative immobility’ (Soares 2000, 88) – an ineffective system with intense resistance to change. Furthermore, while the country has one of the world’s largest prison populations, only 8% of homicides have actually resulted in successful convictions (Soares and Balestreri 2012, unpaged). Part of the problem, is that Brazil lacks an effective federal system of public security and as Soares and Balestreri argue, another concern is that military models continue to be reproduced in the (poorly paid and trained) police force:

‘The police are not valued. Overall, wages are insufficient. Working conditions are inadequate. As a consequence the police adopt illegal second informal jobs in private security. The authorities do not interfere to prevent the collapse of the government’s budget. They prefer to live with the illegality in the underlying system. The outcome is that irrational working shifts cannot be adjusted, the dual loyalty precludes the execution of routines; internal discipline is contaminated by binding with unlawful activities; and impunity
encourages the formation of interest groups whose extreme expression are the militias.’ (Soares and Balestreri 2012, unpaged)

Specialists have raised questions about the mechanisms that link enforcement and violence; about the policing strategies that are least or most likely to prevent or aggravate the violence related to the illicit trade; and argued that more research is needed about how law enforcement shapes the nature and level of organised violence (Andreas and Martinez 2012, 385). These questions are crucial since certain policing methods and public security policies can increase perverse effects, and even unintentionally fuel further violence.

For instance, as some actors are removed from the drug trade, new ones emerge to claim their market share while violent competition continues. Moreover, if social actors are simply removed from this context, for example by imprisonment, new questions may nevertheless emerge about the incarceration system, its sustainability, and what happens after those actors’ eventual release from prison. Thus, considering how the State and society respond to and interact with the context of violence raises fundamental questions for this field of inquiry. Moreover, there is a need for research that takes these questions to geographical areas that have not so far been widely studied (Andreas and Martinez 2012, Garmany 2011).

In Recife, since the government of Eduardo Campos (2007-2014), these policies have been grouped together under the project Pacto pela Vida (‘Pact for Life’). Over one hundred projects were proposed as part of Pacto pela Vida, including: police reforms; the creation of specialised police stations for certain groups (e.g. the elderly, women, LGBT, children and young people); disarmament projects; social and educational projects. Their alleged aim is to reduce mortality in the state of Pernambuco, but there are currently no studies examining the extent to which these projects have been implemented, nor their effects.

Among Brazilian states, Pernambuco remains near the top of the ranking in terms of homicides committed with guns, occupying 6th position behind Alagoas, Espírito Santo, Pará, Bahia and Paraíba (Waiselfisz 2013). However, there has been an improvement, considering that the rate of homicides committed with firearms in Pernambuco dropped from 50.3/100,000 in 2001 to 30.3/100,000 in 2010 (ibid, 19). In Recife, the state capital, the rate of homicides committed with a firearm remains high but it did also decline from 2000 to 2010 (Ibid, 25):
Recife’s rate of homicides committed with a firearm per 100,000 of population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>88.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-45.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Homicide rate with firearms

Source: Mapa da Violência (Waiselfisz 2013, 25)

Recife has seen declining numbers of homicides with a firearm – unlike other cities in the Northeast such as Salvador and Fortaleza:

Number of homicides with a firearm in Brazilian state capital cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Δ%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortaleza</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>235,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>157,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>-41,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Number of homicides in three cities

Source: Mapa da Violência (Waiselfisz 2013, 23)

Although the data above refer only to homicides committed with firearms – and do not include homicides committed with other means such as white weapons – this illustrates the saliency and level of the issue of armed violence in Brazil. It is important to note that homicide rates in one city are one narrow measure of the changes that have occurred in the context of hyper-violence. Violence occurs in many forms and lethal violence is only one of those. These figures do not necessarily mean that people feel safer or that they are safer in reality. Sometimes crime is simply displaced to other areas (Machado da Silva 2010). Sometimes security measures can improve the quality of life of the population, but they can also have no noticeable effect, or even have perverse impacts on people’s daily lives. It is therefore necessary to study these effects in more depth. This was the main objective of this thesis.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the birth of a field of study – public security – in the Brazilian literature. It has discussed the focus of these studies, geographically, in
terms of objects of study and theoretically and the gaps in this emerging body of literature. It argued that studies about violence and security have neglected the issues affecting, and the voices of, the marginalised and the young in the northeast of Brazil. There are a few exceptions, for example the ethnographies conducted by Zaluar, Drybread and Morris, examining important regional, emotive and gendered aspects of violent relations that prominently affect young people in the northeast of Brazil. The chapter has also discussed key international debates about the role and presence or absence of the State and the rule of law in areas perceived as marginalised and highly unsafe. It has outlined some of the intricate problems of public security provision and the challenges faced by any group, State or civic, that aims to curb high levels of violence and insecurity.

The chapter drew on critical criminological theories proposing that security and democratic ideals, in particular social-democratic ideals, should not be conceived of as exclusive and incompatible. It acknowledged some of the problems and ambiguities in this debate, such as the issue that security measures can lead to the excessive criminalisation of some populations. This chapter provided the background and gaps in knowledge production that inform this thesis, which considers the forms, ideals and effects of public security policies in contemporary Recife. Academics have not examined how the policy and programme *Pacto pela Vida* has been perceived or what impacts it has had on the communities where lethal violence and sporadic policing are most common. This thesis examines this public security project and its effects. In particular, the research focuses (albeit not exclusively) on issues that affect marginalised young people and their relationship with the police.
CHAPTER 4 – Methodology

‘Sometimes I question how anyone could do research that is not ethnographic in a low-income community in Brazil. Anything strict, or to a schedule, seems to fall to pieces. But you can observe and gather valuable data from naturally emerging conversations or by just hanging around. In fact, you need lots of hanging around to get people’s trust and to get them to open up. It was only towards the end of my first fieldwork trip (four months in the field) that I noticed people truly opening up and trusting me enough to talk to me. Being pregnant has helped. People have been more empathetic towards me since my bump became noticeable. Suddenly we had something more obviously in common: family. I had arranged to meet a participant at 4.30pm today for a walk around his community, Tourinho. I rang him at 4.45pm as he had not arrived. He said he was on his way. By 5pm he arrived. The walk was really interesting and useful. I will write about it in my data chapters. We had to go back to the NGO by 6pm for a focus group, and I made sure we were on time but none of the participants arrived until 7pm. When will I learn that nothing starts on time here? I had to re-arrange other commitments as we didn’t finish till 8.30pm. I brought some cake, biscuits, crackers and soft drinks. I donated some money towards the collection that was going around for the birthday cake for one of the NGO’s members of staff. But the group was reluctant to accept it. They are more motivated by other forms of support rather than money. For example, if you become a friend or if you are friendly – charismatic – and you run workshops (such as sports, arts, educational or training courses), then you are “in”. Solidarity brings you in; money doesn’t necessarily have the same effect. The focus group was like a casual conversation in a circle; people gradually started sharing their experiences, asking questions and showing black humour, laughing about stories of police violence. They laughed at each other’s impressions of beatings and brutal encounters with the police. On the way back home I saw another incident. The police were there but there were no cordons; a mulato male body was on the ground, he appeared to be dead.’ (Field note, 28th October 2013).
Most studies in the field of public security and violence in Brazil point to a lack of adequate official data and problematic statistical information, all of which make it difficult to develop appropriate policies to address these issues. Often researchers resort to the strategy of employing a variety of sources, such as police records, the media, official government documents (e.g. from the Ministério Público), medical registers, judicial documents and a variety of qualitative methods (Possas 2012, 17). This thesis is a qualitative study employing ethnographic methods. The data collection entailed field observations, focus groups, semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews (Ball 1981). The participants were mostly young people (aged 16-29) who lived in two low-income communities – Tourinho and Vitoria (pseudonyms to protect participants’ anonymity) – in Recife, northeast Brazil. However, other participants included: older residents in the two communities studied, active members of community and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); professionals working with young people; and state actors involved with public security provision (e.g. members of the police force, secretaries of security, policy-makers).

These methods were used to gain an in-depth, qualitative understanding of the ways in which public security interventions affect the everyday lives and experiences of people in low-income communities, particularly young people. The study examined the heterogeneity of experiences, resistance and meanings that emerge from these communities. Furthermore, it analysed the ways in which new public security policies implemented in Pernambuco since 2007 (starting with the government of Eduardo Campos and continuing through the current government of Paulo Camara) have affected the groups participating in the research. What are the effects of these interventions? How do the groups considered most marginalised in Brazilian society perceive them? How do agents of the public security system relate to the new policies and the context in which they are working? A rich and contextualised understanding of these questions facilitates an assessment of the current state of violence and security in Recife. As well as allowing for hidden or marginalised views and agendas to emerge, fostering a plural debate, this facilitates an analysis of the barriers, challenges, successes and possibilities for change and improvement in the field of public security. As such, this thesis addresses the following question: “How do public security policies aimed at reducing violence affect young people in Recife’s low-income communities?”
Questions about public security policies and the effects of violence have become paramount in contemporary Brazil, because Brazilians continue to experience numerous and persistent social inequalities, including inadequate access to safety and justice. Therefore, there is a need for detailed research on the existing workings and the systematic relations that constitute the field of public security, where the democratic system and the law guarantee rights which are not fully accomplished in practice (Pereira 2000). The data collection and analysis were guided by four sub-questions looking at different aspects of public security and violence:

1. How have recent state strategies to address violence developed?
2. How do public security policies affect local interactions and economies (e.g. community interactions, local enterprises, gendered relations)?
3. How do communities suffering long-term social exclusion respond to these strategies? (e.g. Are these interventions welcomed? How do residents perceive them? Do residents perceive them as beneficial or counterproductive? Why?)
4. How do these communities respond to everyday forms of violence? (e.g. Are people ‘silenced’ by local criminals and violent policing practices or do they react? If so, how? How are community interactions and residents’ daily lives affected?)
5. Why do (or don’t) young people feel that recent public security policies are beneficial (or harmful – e.g. in terms of stigma, marginalisation and criminalisation) to their communities?

The following sections of this chapter examine and discuss the rationale of the research design and the methods of data collection employed. The chapter also discusses the use of ethnographic methods in the context of the study of public security and draws on feminist research to debate the dilemmas surrounding the representation of the voices of marginalised groups in society. Finally, the chapter vindicates the deployment of two case studies and the thematic method of analysis of the rich data gathered.

4.1 Research design

This section discusses the methods of data collection used in the study (interviews, focus groups and participant observations) and how they were employed. A
discussion of ethnographic methods, case studies and methods of analysis follows. For the purpose of comparing data and analysing whether or not the findings may be extended as to generalise about the city as a whole, two case studies have been selected and three fieldtrips were conducted to Recife, in the northeast of Brazil. Correspondence with local contacts began prior to the first fieldtrip (June-October 2013), with a view to choosing potential case studies and identifying gatekeepers. Face to face meetings were held with gatekeepers shortly after arrival in Recife in order to confirm the research plans and agree upon terms for carrying it out. The second and third fieldtrips (December 2014; January-February 2016) were scheduled with the aim of maintaining contact with the communities and following up local developments. Contact was maintained virtually, especially through social networking sites (e.g. Facebook), with organisations, young people and community residents that participated in the research. This process enabled me to become acquainted with the communities, gain trust and conduct interviews with ‘expert’ local respondents and employ informal ethnographic methods and observations in each of the communities.

Initially, contacts were approached through involvement with local organisations and local institutions. After establishing contacts I was able to arrange and conduct semi-structured interviews, and unstructured interviews and conversations with residents identified through snowballing techniques. Contacts and participants in the police and public security system were accessed through Professor J.L. Ratton of the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), who had direct experience working with the government’s security programme Pacto pela Vida. Further participants were identified through recommendations, using the snowballing method. An outline of which methods were used with which groups is summarised in Figure 3.

| Community residents, activists and young people (aged 16 and over). | Interviews (unstructured and semi-structured), observations and focus groups. |
| Police, agents of the public security system and experts (e.g. local academics). | Semi-structured interviews. |

Figure 3: Research groups
Before returning to the UK the initial findings of the research were presented at an event in each community, where participants could provide feedback and discuss the initial analyses and preliminary findings. These meetings provided rich discussions and data.

4.2 Interviews

In this study, interviews with residents, young people and community activists focused on discussing topics such as the neighbourhood, issues around safety, the relations between the community and the State, opinions about the police and the government, including its security policies (such as Pacto pela Vida), and socio-economic data (e.g. regarding employment and education). In these cases, I initially deployed unstructured ethnographic interviews, which bear a resemblance to informal conversations with a purpose (Ball 1981). These conversations occurred in a number of contexts, even while just ‘hanging out’ with participants, walking around the community, in their local ‘hang out’ (a non-governmental organisation that resembles a youth club), in their homes once I had got to know them, while waiting for a bus, or in local bars and restaurants. This type of interview avoided intimidating participants in situations of urban marginality and lack of familiarity with formal research, thereby allowing them to express themselves in naturally occurring conversations. They also enabled me to build rapport with participants and learn about new topics, which were not predicted in the initial research design. As a result, unstructured interviews also enabled the development of semi-structured interview scripts. Unstructured interviews were onerous at times, as they required extensive field notes working from memory, when it had not been possible to use audio recording, after encounters with participants. This way of working can consequently be very time consuming (Bernard 2002).

Once familiarity was established with participants and the research field, semi-structured interviews were conducted. Semi-structured interviews are open-ended but are guided by a schedule and a list of topics. Interviews with the police and agents of the public security system were semi-structured. This type of interview is useful in formal settings and when it is unlikely that the researcher will have a second chance to interview participants, so it is important to ensure that certain topics are covered (Bernard 2002). Interviews with this group focused on their experiences at work, their
opinions about the training they receive, about the adequacy of the security policies in place, and the challenges that they face. This approach allowed the contextualisation and understanding of their lived experiences and of the impact of public security policies and violence in their lives and in the communities. Denscombe (2007) suggests that ‘when the researcher needs to gain insights into things like people’s opinions, feelings, emotions and experiences, then interviews will almost certainly provide a suitable method’ (174). Those interviews included open and closed questions to enable issues of relevance to be established and to allow for the emergence of themes which were important to participants (Bryman 2001).

4.3 Focus groups

Focus groups can be a useful complementary method to discuss the workings of a research question and to gain insights from participants in a group debate. They can provide additional details to other methods and information about the ‘why’ questions in relation to people’s options (Bernard 2002). According to Bernard, focus groups produce ethnographically rich data. They can provide insights into diverse perspectives about a research problem in addition to enabling the researcher to observe group dynamics and allowing for unanticipated issues and topics to emerge (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006). Research studies involving young people have benefited from this method (Lyon, Dennison, and Wilson 2000). Similarly, in this research, two focus groups were conducted during the first field trip in both case study communities and resulted in rich discussions.

Twelve residents and young people attended the first focus group in the community of Vitoria. Twenty-five people, mostly residents and young people, attended the second focus group in the community of Tourinho. Five of these people are also community activists and youth workers. It was difficult to organise the focus group events at a time that suited all potential participants and the process required patience and a culturally informal approach to adapt to the schedules of late comers and early goers. In this part of Brazil in particular, it was also important to allow at least one hour for participants to arrive and gather, since they tended not to expect that events start at the scheduled time. Despite these minor difficulties, the discussions allowed for rich data and insights to emerge. The focus groups discussed the following topics:
- Community life (e.g. shared spaces and interests etc.) and leisure activities
- Urban services, infrastructure and the community’s main needs
- The development of violence, the drug traffic and existing interventions to address violence (and potentially also the drug trade)
- Policing, (in) security and the program *Pacto pela vida.*

These interviews and focus group sessions enabled me to become familiar with the communities and to continue building the necessary rapport with participants to access data that could help answer the research questions. They provided data regarding: 1) The context of the community; 2) How residents participate (or don’t participate) in State and community strategies to address violence; 3) How they are affected by security strategies (or the lack of adequate strategies/interventions) and by policing methods; 4) How public security policies affect young people in poor communities.

In the focus groups, young people and community residents surprisingly discussed these topics openly and even gave numerous examples of their personal experiences of police brutality, feelings of insecurity and disconnection from state institutions. Many people felt that they could not rely on the State and that state policies and strategies had not ‘reached them’ or had any impact in their community, other than reinforcing common stereotypes about them, such as the idea that young black or *mulato* (mixed ethnicity) males in poor communities are criminals. When people were questioned about the main needs of the community they often mentioned a lack of public spaces and leisure opportunities. However, the topics that dominated our discussions were fear of crime, the drug trade, violence and insecurity – these seemed the most prominent issues from residents’ perspectives. People were very secretive about the drug trade, many chose not to go into detail about this topic and some people during interviews quietly whispered their views and experiences of the drug trade. These are only preliminary findings, Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 outline and discuss the empirical data in more detail.

4.4 Participant observation

A participant observer engages in activities appropriate to the social situation to
observe the surroundings, people and events that occur (Spradley 1980). The technique allows the researcher to obtain ‘experiential knowledge’ (Bernard 2002, 322) and even observe whether people’s actions are in tune with their interview responses. For instance, in some interviews people said that they had no contact whatsoever with the police, the State or state agents; however, while conducting observations it was possible to notice that these people were often in contact with state agents and the police. Sometimes, this happened in institutional settings, including state-funded schools and health centres. On other occasions informal conversations unfolded where young people complained about encounters with the police, when they had received a baculejo (a local term used to describe an unpleasant or forceful stop-and-search, when the police often use brutality and violence, for example by applying pressure to the suspect’s interlaced fingers while his/her hands are above their head and punching the suspect’s ribs or kicking their legs to spread them and/or hitting the suspects on the genitals).

As a means of complementing data gathered from secondary sources (e.g. reports and other literature) and from interviews and focus groups, participant observation can allow for the triangulation of research findings. Although the method has been traditionally used by anthropologists (Scott 1985), other scholars have found it useful to collect detailed and in-depth data and to attain a profounder understanding of the field and research topic (Iqtidar 2011). Some Brazilian scholars have conducted well-respected and productive research projects using only this method (Zaluar, 2010).

In the first case study, observations were conducted in events organised by an NGO in the case study community and while ‘hanging around’ with young people and residents in the neighbourhood. In one community for example, young people made no effort to hide their stashes of drugs for sale when I walked around with locally known research collaborators. The reasons why literally every participant had mentioned the drug trade as one of the main problems in the community became clear. The drug trade certainly was very noticeable and so was the fact that, for the most part, very young males were engaged in the trade at street level.

It was also easy to observe that the police were hardly ever present in the communities. There were also opportunities to conduct observations during interviews and at a local school where I occasionally volunteered as a supply English teacher. Inappropriate living conditions in these communities were also easily
noticeable; so was the inadequate provision of public services. Insufficient rubbish collection and vast open sewage pipes were common problems. So was the lack of leisure spaces for the community and the state of the local school – lacking space, ventilation and human resources. The drop out rate would probably be way higher if there had not been programs such as *Bolsa Família* (a government conditional cash transfer based on criteria such as school attendance). These conditions made it easy to see why education did not seem an appealing route for young people wanting to achieve social mobility. There were many opportunities to have informal conversations with the school’s staff, the chef and the students. Many had stories that they wanted to tell about bereavement in their families caused by young people’s involvement in the drug trade or police violence. The data from all these encounters were rich in detail and allowed for an understanding of the social context of the communities and of research participants.

4.5 *Ethnographic methods and a feminist approach*

‘The importance of ethnographic fieldwork is unquestionable when one tries to understand social actors and explain the sudden and continuous growth of violent expressions in the city’ (Zaluar 2013, 3)

Ethnographic methods provide rich data, detailed descriptions of participants’ narratives and of the researcher’s observations; they also provide the ground for the analysis and interpretation of these data. Their significance lays in their provision of opportunities for the researcher to engage with participants in an empathetic way, to ‘look through their eyes’ so to speak (Hoggart, Lees, and Davies 2002). An ethnographer is never simply a researcher; rather, her or his personal life becomes implicated in the fieldwork (Whyte 1955). The exposure to research encounters and systematic reflection about these, guided by field notes, permits the ethnographer to confront new questions and develop those that seem relevant; consequently unexpected findings can emerge from the study. The researcher deploying these methods becomes a translator of lived experiences and narratives, with the task of producing a text (Feltran 2011). Learning and translating this information entails the process of using ethnography as a method.
Ethnographic methods are challenging because the time taken to collect data is extensive, involving prolonged periods in the field. In many ethnographies the narratives are written in a literary almost storytelling approach, an approach that can in some cases define the audience for the work (Creswell 1998, 61). For instance, while this form of writing can appeal to a broader public, it may not necessarily be applicable for researchers interested in quantitative (‘hard’) data or policy makers interested in summarised bullet points about a social issue. A further challenge is that in studies that use qualitative or ethnographic research methods the researcher needs to remain adaptable since she/he is involved in a learning process, which can lead to shifts in the research questions, as they develop in the course of the research (Blaikie 2000).

While deploying ethnographic methods, the researcher needs to remain sensitive to fieldwork issues such as gaining access to groups through gatekeepers and individuals who can provide or block entrance to the research field. The field researcher located key informants, individuals who provide useful insights into the group and could guide the researcher to information and further contacts. The researcher should also become concerned about reciprocity between the investigator and the subjects being studied in exchange for their information, and the impact of the researcher on the field (reactivity) and on the people being studied. Therefore, to allow for ethical standards, the field researcher should make his or her presence known to avoid deception about the purpose of the research. For Creswell (1998) this process results in a final product that is a holistic portrait of the social group and context, which incorporates both the views of the actors in the group (emic) and the researcher's interpretations of views about human social life (etic).

The key research topics of this thesis – violence and public security – are not easily researched. Both topics are intertwined in complex relations including, for example, the State, its apparatus and civil society. Often people are unwilling to talk openly about these issues due to fear of retaliation by the police and local criminals. The topics are also embedded in intricate networks involving various powerful actors such as politicians, the military and businesses, not only poor people living in slums. Many of these actors are difficult to reach, especially the ones involved in illegal networks, given the secrecy and illegality of their activities. However, researching these groups directly, especially their connections to violent relations, crime and public security inadequacies can prove challenging due to issues of deception and the
unleashing of partial narratives (see Young’s 2011 discussion of the limitations of ethnographic research). The most powerful actors are well protected, they rarely appear on the news and for the most part they lie beneath the surface of common knowledge. As a result, researchers are left with few options when researching the topics violence and public security, such as investigating media accounts and public perceptions.

This thesis engages with the views of those most marginalised populations, whose opinions and experiences have been largely neglected in the international literature, as well as investigating the dominant narratives of state actors. The initial idea was to meet some young people (aged 16 and over, for ethical reasons) and residents of low-income communities to discuss with them their everyday experiences and views about the research topics: public security and violence. For this purpose, a feminist approach was adopted insofar as the study engaged with the voices of people who are often ignored and silenced in society and in the mainstream literature. Feminist researchers have emphasised the importance of examining the experiences of the oppressed and marginalised (Alcoff 1991, Hemmings 2011, Ryan-Flood and Gill 2010, Stanley and Wise 1993). It was for these purposes that I spent 6 months conducting fieldwork in Brazil. This immersion, coupled with the fact that I had previously lived in the northeast of Brazil for 17 years, have family ties in the area and significant understanding of local cultural norms, allowed me to develop research contacts and access data that may otherwise not be available in the literature or if less proximity or other methods were used. In that sense, although the study is not a traditional ethnography, it deployed ethnographic methods and techniques.

In this research, the perceptions and experiences of state actors (e.g. public security agents and the police), community leaders and those engaged with young people targeted by security policies were all included. While considering the difficulties in encountering ‘truthful’ accounts and interpretations, particularly when engaging with politicians, the study aimed to triangulate the findings by using a variety of sources and methods, engaging with as many people as possible in the community and by deploying critical theory to deconstruct emerging and often conflicting narratives.

Ethnographic methods provide the foundations for both data gathering and data analysis. Nevertheless, where appropriate, a thematic analysis was employed for analysing the qualitative data gathered (Butler-Kisber 2010). This method allows for
an analysis of the data prior to the development of theories, unlike positivist methods in which the researcher may already have rigid definitions and conceptualisations prior to collecting or analysing their data. However, there is debate as to whether a researcher really can go into the field completely free of preconceptions about their subject of study (Silverman 2010). Despite this possible limitation, a thematic approach enables researchers to make links across individual experiences, events, and actions (Butler-Kisber 2010).

4.6 The politics of representation

Researching less powerful groups raises questions of representation (Alcoff 1991). As argued by Bourgois (1996, 11) ‘any detailed examination of social marginalisation encounters serious problems with the politics of representation’. Social scientists often worry that their research, the stories and the events they write about could be misinterpreted as negative stereotypes of disadvantaged groups. In fact, much of the literature on poverty in the United States has been critiqued for its middle-class moralising bias that devalue the narratives of the poor, constructing them as morally inferior, see for instance Young’s (2011) critique of the famous study *Tally’s Corner* (Liebow 1967).

Nevertheless, this need not mean that social scientists should avoid writing about marginalised groups, or sanitise the social problems and suffering that exist (see Bourgois 2003, Goldstein 2003, Scheper-Hughes 1993). Furthermore, it would be impossible to study and analyse a history of events without its subjects (Spivak 1988). To ignore existing social problems and marginalise research done with vulnerable groups out of fear of giving the poor a bad ‘name’ or representation, would make us ‘complicit with oppression’ (Bourgois 1996, 12).

Spivak (1988) has challenged the retreat approach adopted by some researchers (e.g. Foucault, Deleuze), including feminist academics (Trebilcot 1988). The ‘retreat approach’ rejects the practice of ‘speaking for others’. Indeed, in some circumstances, speaking for others should be avoided, as it can disempower and even misrepresent or harm those who are spoken for (Alcoff 1991). Nevertheless, avoiding the practice all together assumes that it is possible to be disentangled from discursive practices in a neutral place in which words do not have material effects.
For Spivak (1988), as well as for Alcoff (1991), retreating is not a solution to the dilemmas of speaking for, with or to less privileged groups. If less privileged groups speak for themselves, their speech will not necessarily reflect their interests or even be ‘listened to’, corroborating in political ineffectiveness. Excluding and ignoring the oppressed person’s voice can simply ‘continue the imperialist project’ (Spivak 1988, 298). It leaves the possibility of dialogue unexplored. For those reasons, this study has advocated the feminist practice of speaking with and to rather than for the oppressed.

While focusing on studying the experiences of the poor in relation to violence and public security, it is also important to note, that in most low-income communities and favelas very few residents engage in crime. The majority of residents are representatives of the working class of Brazil, providing numerous services to predominantly middle- and upper-class areas of the city. The favelas and periferias are not ghettos, therefore; they do not have the typical characteristics of traditional American ghettos as described by scholars such as Wacquant (2012, 2008). Ethnographic accounts best capture these differences, by focusing on the local level, rather than applying Eurocentric or dominant Anglo-Saxon theories without specific knowledge of the everyday experiences and context of the subjects of study. This allows for the development of important observations of micro dynamics in relation to the structural macro context to generate more encompassing theories applicable to the Brazilian setting. Furthermore, this approach fosters plural debates that include knowledge produced by researchers in the Global South.

Ethnographic methods need not be used in their most traditional form, as developed by anthropologists. Many researchers from a variety of disciplines, including political science, geography and sociology, have deployed these methods to obtain rich, contextualised and in-depth data (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995, Garmany 2011a, Gupta 2006, Iqtidar 2011). Researchers that apply ethnographic methods are no longer simply trying to study kinship and ‘other’ societies. Ethnography is a phenomenological method, which can be employed for re-thinking dominant European and Anglo-Saxon categories, in order to understand a society in its context. It can be used to grasp what may appear ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘useful’, and ‘unusual’; and how people perceive public institutions or social phenomena.

As argued by Emerson et al. (1995, xvi) ‘ethnography can contribute to a deeper understanding of the personal, work, an organizational processes likely to be
encountered’. Rather than setting out with a hypothesis, when deploying ethnographic methods the writer aims to construct a narrative from field notes that will interest the outside audience, introducing the setting, examining patterns of behaviour, typical situations in that setting and evidence to reach an academic contributory idea. The vivid details in this type of writing enable writers to establish a degree of legitimacy, allowing the reader to understand the context in which something is made possible, and understanding social occurrences at ground level. However, it is essential to consider the potential limitations of the method. Spivak (1988), for instance, notes the importance of considering the unequal power relations between researcher and the ‘researched’, particularly when knowledge is produced about the Global South’s marginalised groups from the perspective of European and North American scholars.

As someone who was born, grew up and has family ties in Recife, I am particularly attuned to northeastern cultural norms, accents and material realities. This is an advantage in conducting the research. At the same time, having spent over a decade outside Brazil, and having become a social researcher, I developed an enhanced ability to notice and challenge taken for granted power relations and inequalities extant within the Brazilian context. Nevertheless, it is important to stay attentive to differences that can pose a challenge, including the researcher’s gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic status.

For Zaluar (2013) for instance, gender and class origin became a key challenge when conducting research in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in the 1980s and 1990s. In over twenty years of research, she became acutely aware of the need to engage with research assistants from these communities. She was often accepted as an interlocutor but explained that she was ‘fooled most of the time’ (Zaluar 2013, 7). Participants persistently misled her because they did not feel obliged to tell the truth to a female outsider. When she realised this, she decided to introduce male research assistants. She found that once she recruited a male research assistant from the community, accounts that were significantly different began to emerge. In one of her field studies she learned that one of her research participants was planning to rape her (Zaluar 2004a, b) but having employed research assistants from the community increased her safety by enabling her to access this information before it was too late and to be accompanied in her fieldtrips by a local resident who knew the area and its residents. Ethnographic studies have thus benefited from the employment of research assistants. For these reasons – the search for rich accurate accounts and the reduction
of research risks – I chose to adopt Zaluar’s methods of research collaboration and I recruited two research collaborators. Additionally, I believed that there could be benefits to participating for the collaborators and for the wider community that we could reach, such as the opportunity to have a dialogue about local issues and the potential for sharing any concerns with a wider international audience. My personal experience of being a research collaborator in the UK, during my undergraduate studies, also contributed to this belief that participatory research offers potential for mutual benefits. While being a research collaborator I learned practical research skills, gained research experience and became more interested in finding ways in which the social sciences and communities outside academia can work towards similar goals of promoting social justice. My hope was that the collaborators in Recife would gain similar positive research experience. Collaborators also received an honorarium for their time.

I recruited one local female and one local male collaborator from one of the communities – Tourinho – where the research was first carried out. This approach enabled safe access to a much larger number of participants within a short period of time. Because of their local ties of kinship and friendship, and because they were active members of the community through their volunteering work with a non-governmental organisation providing sports and arts workshops to young people, residents felt more inclined to participate in the study and attend interviews and to help the collaborators with their work. 

In the second case study community, Vitoria, I was able to conduct the data collection at a local school, which reduced some of the risks associated with the research. It also meant that I could access a significant number of participants for the study. I was unable to find collaborators that were mature, old enough (e.g. 18 years old and over) and had the time and the necessary knowledge of the community to participate safely. My own time constraints and the lack of youth organisations or NGOs in Vitoria also hindered the recruitment of collaborators in this second case study community. For all these reasons above, I was unable to recruit collaborators in Vitoria. Nonetheless, I was still able to gain in-depth data through the interviews and observations that I carried out on my own.

The collaborators in Tourinho were well connected and well liked in the community because of their voluntary work, as well as for their efforts to organise events and celebrations (e.g. children’s day festivities, São João parties, Christmas celebration) and to collect gift donations for young people in the community. By
being associated with the collaborators I was accepted and trusted more easily had I simply been a stranger.

In some aspects collaborators were gatekeepers, who had lived in the community for most of their lives and were familiar with the surroundings and with residents. Their participation added value to the research, not only because I was safer in the community and able to visit areas that I would otherwise not have dared to visit, but also because in some cases people felt more comfortable talking to them. For instance, the interviews conducted by the male collaborator, especially with other young men in the community, elicited data that may not otherwise have become available to a female outsider. When walking in the community with the collaborators, young men felt no need to disguise their activities (e.g. while they were splitting the stashes of drugs) and some residents felt safe to approach the researchers to say hello and to find out more about who the lead researcher was. I believe that my own vulnerabilities, as an evidently pregnant woman, contributed to this curiosity and to being perceived as not threatening and in need of solidarity. This vulnerability, combined with the engagement of the collaborators, facilitated the research.

Some researchers have had similar positive experiences of doing research in Brazilian low-income communities. Perlman (2010, xix), for instance, wrote ‘I have never felt as safe or as welcomed in any community before or since. My presence was met with warm acceptance. People took care of me as they did of each other […] People loved being interviewed’. At the time of her original study, some aspects of being a low status young female student caused her not to be taken seriously. But at the same time, not being taken seriously enabled Perlman to access government documents and aerial photographs that she needed in the research. The process of doing research, therefore, requires the researcher to adapt to particular contexts.

4.7 Case study research and neighbourhood cases

The two cases studies of this research were selected and defined on the basis of their socio-economic and geographical features. The first case is the community of Tourinho and the second case is the neighbourhood of Vitoria, both in Recife. For ethical reasons, the names of all participants and the names of their communities have been changed to pseudonyms. Firstly, this section examines the importance and the
limitations of case study research. Secondly, it describes the two cases selected and explores their relevance to this project.

‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2009, 18)

Yin (2009) argues that case studies are the preferred method when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being asked; when the researcher has limited control over events, and when there is an emphasis on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life setting. For Yin, the complexity of the phenomenon being studied and the depth of its real-life context indicate that there will be many more variables at play than the data may imply. To address this challenge, he suggests that many sources of evidence must be employed and the researcher must attempt to triangulate findings.

Therefore, despite common misunderstandings that a case study is a ‘soft method’, it requires rigorous methodological routes. There is a common misconception that case studies are unsuitable for scientific generalisation. However, similarly to experimental research, case studies can also be ‘generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations and universes’ (Yin 2009, 15). Their goal is therefore analytic generalisation rather than statistical generalisation or enumeration.

Quantitative methods deployed in experimental research and surveys are often considered more rigorous or ‘scientific’ and are frequently prioritised by funders; however, they often fail to engage with the phenomenon’s context and focus on a few variables instead (Yin 2009). Other methods, for instance, histories may be rich in context yet they focus mostly on non-contemporary events and are more suited for dealing with archival or secondary data when living respondents may no longer be available to participate in the study. Different methodologies can thus complement the limitations and strengths of one another. It is with this in mind that this study deployed multiple methods. One of the advantages of conducting case studies is the method’s ability to work with diverse forms of evidence, for instance documents, interviews and observations (Yin 2009). Furthermore, case study research can engage with single or multiple cases.
Case studies can be deployed for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory studies, the focus of this thesis is explanatory. The thesis examines how current public security policies aimed at reducing violence interact with the needs of young people in communities facing marginalisation in Recife and how they affect these communities. The development of the research in two case studies allowed the researcher to compare the findings from each community. It also enabled the researcher to examine whether the findings in one place are unique or whether they are also present in other parts of the city. For instance, are residents’ experiences of policing similar? Do security policies have diverse or similar impacts in each community? A comparative approach can inform these questions. The neighbourhoods for this study were selected, for the most part, on the basis of practical conditions, such as the availability of access through gatekeepers, but also because they were understudied and met particular socio-economic and geographical criteria predominant in much of Brazil’s population, such as:

- The neighbourhoods are ‘informal settlements’, or in the Brazilian term ‘abnormal agglomerates’, that is, they are perceived as favelas, and they are low-income communities in the peripheries of the city, where most residents do not have land title.

- The areas are perceived as undesirable places to live because they face stigmas associated with crime and violence.

Research about violence in Latin America shows that poor communities are disproportionately affected by urban and state violence and inappropriate public security provision. This makes it important to consider and conduct research in these communities. An important reason for selecting Tourinho and Vitoria is that both communities remain understudied. Students from Recife’s largest university (UFPE) tend to conduct research where the university has established ties (e.g. in a community known as ‘Coque’) or in another medium sized community (called ‘Brasilia Teimosa’) located near the middle/upper-class neighbourhood of ‘Boa Viagem’ where many students live and where transport links facilitate access. The fact that Tourinho and Vitoria were under-studied made them more appealing sites for the research. This also meant that I had to spend a significant amount of time
developing networks, contacts, and trust in the communities. I also had to spend hours travelling in multiple forms of overcrowded public transport from one end of the city to another, often at dawn and late in the evening, or being stuck in traffic jams. The hardest part of doing this work was dealing with feelings of anger, sadness and frustration at my inability to change the problems and injustices that I could see and that participants discussed. The second hardest part was being pregnant while experiencing first-hand some of the difficulties in accessing public services (e.g. healthcare, public transport) that Brazilian people routinely experience.

The first case study was conducted in Tourinho, a small community in Recife’s south zone peripheries. Some participants came from surrounding areas, because they were all engaged with the NGO that provided access to most participants and because of their physical proximity. The community surrounds one of the largest prisons in Latin America, making it an interesting site to examine the dynamics of public security, the interactions between crime, state institutions and poor communities. During interviews residents explained that the drug trade was often run from inside the prison. In the 1970s, the community was much smaller, at the time it was mostly formed by prisoner’s wives who wanted to live near their imprisoned partners. Some social housing, conjuntos habitacionais (COHAB) in Portuguese, were also built in the area. The community faces the stigma attached to poor neighbourhoods, it is perceived as a dangerous ‘no-go’ area, beleaguered by the drug trade and it also faces inadequate provision of public services and policing. Approximately one hundred interviews and two focus groups have been carried out in this community. Numerous pages of field notes have also been written during this case study. I maintained contact with my informants from the start of the first fieldtrip.

The second case study community, Vitoria, is a low-income neighbourhood in the north part of Recife near one of the city’s upper-class areas. Access to Vitoria was established through contacts at a local school. The community faces similar problems to Tourinho, insofar as it is a stigmatised area, where the drug trade and inappropriate public service provision and policing are key issues in resident’s views. However, there are some differences between the two sites. First, different battalions of the military police (PM) patrol each community. Second, there are important geographical disparities in the communities. Vitoria is located in a predominantly hilly area, which residents call ‘altos’ (a type of hill). This means that Vitoria has
more areas that can only be accessed on foot or by motorbikes, making it harder to police and, unlike Tourinho it does not have a prison nearby. Vitoria is also listed among the fifteen most violent neighbourhoods of Recife, because in 2013, those 15 (out of the total 94) neighbourhoods were the territories where 51% of homicides in the city occurred, according to government reports (Oliveira 2015b). Vitoria is mostly affected by the tráfico formiga (‘ant trade’) – in other words small amounts of drugs are dealt by many different young men, which seems to have significant implications in terms of higher competition, often leading to more violent disputes at street level when compared, for example, with Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, where a relatively small number of large, organised criminal groups dominate the market. Due to the presence of the prison, where organised criminals operate, drug trafficking in Tourinho, seems to face less problems of small-scale drug trafficking competition in comparison to Vitoria.

4.8 Final methodological remarks

This chapter discussed the research methods employed in this thesis. It argued that ethnographic research in the field of public security can enable the researcher to elicit in-depth data about people’s everyday lives, narratives and the effects of social and security policies in ways that could not otherwise be achieved with, for instance, quantitative research. Numerous pages of observations, unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews (N = 185) and focus groups (N = 4) were conducted during 6 months of fieldwork with the assistance of 2 research collaborators. Some of the recurring themes in interviews were particularly prominent among younger age groups (16-29) and among the participants who considered themselves as indigenous, black, moreno or pardo (mixed ethnicity). For these reasons, the age and ethnicity of participants is presented, according to what participants themselves considered their ethnic origin to be. In some cases residents did not associate with an ethnicity and did not want their age revealed.

As seen in this chapter, the communities selected were diverse yet share some commonalities. Both communities have a high density of households and inhabitants, and are known as hot spots for drug-related crime and violence. They share some of the problems found in favelas, including poor access to housing and public services, such as: rubbish collection, education, sanitation, health care and public security
provision. A more detailed discussion of the latter will be provided in the next chapter. The chapters that follow go beyond methodology, the sea of numbers, homicide statistics and contextual information in order to examine the living intricacy of people, places and dynamics that get lost in dominant narratives, in macro theories and overarching generalisations.
CHAPTER 5 – Police reform

This thesis examines the impacts and effects of new public security policies on people living in poor communities in the northeast of Brazil. Through an analysis of qualitative data from observations and interviews with state actors (government officials and high-ranking members of the police) this chapter examines the impact of a public security policy and program of police reform entitled Pacto pela Vida (Pact for Life, or PPV) from the perspective of this group of participants. The chapter outlines the security policy that this thesis focuses on and deconstructs the discourses of State officials and the police about the effects of this public security intervention. The chapter argues that the application of Global North solutions and criminological theories to the Global South is particularly problematic given Recife’s context, and is based on the fallacies of theories of deterrence and policing.

At this point, it is important to reiterate this thesis’ conceptualisation of the State. The State here refers to a political system or association that can reveal the workings of power and governance (Gupta 2006). The State is not a fixed unitary entity, making it difficult to define, yet it is distinct from other institutional forms. Migdal (2001) provides a more precise definition:

‘The State is a sprawling organization within society that coexists with many other formal and informal social organizations, from families to tribes to large industrial enterprises. What distinguishes the State, at least in the modern era, is that State officials seek predominance over those myriad other organizations’ (63)

As Midgal conceptualises it, acquiring this predominance is the State’s major challenge. But beyond definitions of the State, what is most important for this thesis, as Gupta and Sharma (2006) put it, is to focus on the practices of the State, the ways in which the State manifests in everyday life, which can enable an appreciation of its role in the ‘perpetuation of exploitation and inequality’ (19). With this in mind, an analysis of the existing top-down discourses of state actors about security enables a comparison, in subsequent chapters, with the narratives emerging from the bottom up, from marginalised people living in poor communities, especially young people.
whose voices are often under-represented in the literature on public security. By engaging with both sides of this debate, the thesis allows for the voices of the marginalised to emerge while also investigating the discourses of the powerful.

Conflicting discourses and tensions in the field of security – and between the police and young people in poor communities – exist around the world and so are not unique to Brazil. However, the forms they take in the northeast of Brazil are often overlooked. The existing literature tends to extrapolate the findings emerging from the Rio-São Paulo axis to the remainder of the country, yet this fails to account for regional differences. In the Brazilian context, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are the exceptions rather than the norm (see Garmany 2011b for a wider discussion).

Furthermore, as Macaulay (2007) asserts, the overall literature and research in this field is rather thin with regard to Latin America. This chapter therefore expands the existing literature by also exploring some of the challenges in this field, and some of the Brazilian regional differences relevant to the formulation and implementation of security interventions, with a specific focus on the context of Recife. In its own right, the case of Recife warrants further investigation. As shown in Chapter 2, Recife has one of the country’s highest concentrations of violence when measured by homicide rates (57.1/100,000 inhabitants in 2011, Waiselfisz 2014, 63). The city is one of the Northeast’s largest economic hubs and ranks among the ten largest Brazilian capitals, with a metropolitan population estimated at about 3,750,000 inhabitants (IBGE 2010). Focusing on Recife expands understandings of violence, public security and youth safety in the Global South, beyond the contexts of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

Some of the chapter’s guiding questions are: what practical changes have occurred in the field of public security since the implementation of PPV? How do experts (policy-makers and practitioners) explain the decline in homicides in Pernambuco? What, in their opinion, are the current challenges in the field of public security? These questions are important and are worth analysing not only because they examine recent developments in an understudied geographical area but also because they refer to the relation between state and society, which exposes the effectiveness of civic rights – such as the right to safety, protection from arbitrary arrest and police brutality, access to a fair trial – as they have been enforced in northeast Brazil.
First, the chapter outlines provides an overview of this current programme of public security and police reform in Pernambuco. Second, it begins to examine the narratives of state agents involved with this programme, focusing on their alleged achievements and the challenges that they face. This leads to a discussion of the perverse effects that can be seen in instances where crime control policies from the Global North have been emulated in the Global South. It concludes with an analysis of the theoretical implications of these developments.

5.1 Overview of public security reforms

Most Latin American police forces are notoriously corrupt, inefficient and militarised (Chevigny 1995, Frühling 2009, Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, Macaulay 2007, Mesquita Neto 2011). As Macaulay (2007, 634) puts it, Latin American police forces are ‘plagued by a number of ills, including: corruption; militarised hierarchies, organisational culture and training; prejudice- rather than intelligence-led policing practices; lack of independent external oversight; and high levels of human rights abuses under democratic conditions’. These characteristics are not conducive to the re-democratisation of the region and provoke calls for reform.

In the last two decades a number of police reform initiatives have been developed, and implemented in Latin American countries (Husain 2009, Frühling 2009), often in response to these growing perceptions that the police and criminal justice systems are not adequately responsive to citizens, do not provide security and justice and are not accountable to the law or to the communities they serve (Mesquita Neto 2006, 153). Furthermore, increasingly high crime rates have led to demands for improved public security policies and policing (Tulchin and Ruthenburg 2006, Husain 2009). It is in this context that PPV emerged.

State actors who were interviewed explained that PPV had emerged in response to the extreme levels of violence and high homicide rates in Pernambuco, and the growing perception that the public security apparatus and the police urgently needed to address the situation. Although over one hundred project ideas were proposed in the initial PPV plan, as seen in Chapter 2, and structured around six lines of action (PESP-PE 2007, Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014), only two lines of action were implemented. In an interview with one of the sociologists involved with the design of PPV in July 2013, I was told that although PPV was perceived as a
success for the reduction of homicides, the implemented parts of the programme had been focused on the governance of the police.

It is unclear how the process of policy implementation took place and why only certain lines of action were implemented. Although these questions are not the focus of this thesis, attempts were made at having a discussion about this with State actors and sociologists initially involved with the programme. Neither could provide an answer or justification and some claimed that there were some social crime prevention programmes, such as the project ‘Atitude’, which provides arts training for ex-offenders trying to overcome addiction. Such programmes were very small in size and unable to cope with the demand. Thus, the question remains for further research, why have social crime prevention programmes received less funding or not been implemented? This has become a key critique of the State’s failure to implement all of the initially proposed projects. The sociologist Ana Portella, who was also involved in the design of PPV, argued that the recent setbacks, such as increases in homicide rates, are a result of the lack of implementation of all projects initially proposed (Maciel 2015). As Portella argued:

‘Intelligence-led policing and new managerial reforms were successfully implemented. The civil and military police work was implemented but the integration between the police, government and society has been unsatisfactory. There is no sizeable programme of prevention, for example, and neither has the human rights agenda been implemented, remaining restricted to some of the police training’ (ibid, unpaged).

Some of the important and not implemented projects relate to: (1) educative measures at schools; (2) the failure to create a council of public security responsible for the democratic management of PPV; and (3) improvements to the quality of life in low-income communities, such as improvements to the health service and measures to tackle racial violence (ibid).

The implemented projects displayed similarities to the violence and crime-reduction strategies developed and deployed in cities such as New York, Bogotá and Belo Horizonte, insofar as they focused on the application and management of information, crime statistics and police targets. This led Macedo to argue that the policy was a case of ‘institutional isomorphism’ (2012, 28), because it mimicked and
appropriated governance and social control measures developed elsewhere. Overall the policy focuses on the expansion of the use of institutions of social control such as the police and the prison, thus emphasising the panoptic model of governance long ago noted by Foucault (1979).

Although many of the projects originally proposed were not implemented, investment in public security grew rapidly. Using data from the federal government system of integrated financial administration (SIAFI), Macedo (2012, 84) estimated that investment in public security in Pernambuco grew by 717.4% from 2006 to 2010. However, it is not possible to access detailed information about the distribution of this investment, a critique made by the academic Zaverucha (Macedo 2012). Interview data and initial evaluations of PPV (Macedo 2012; Wolff 2014) show that the intervention focused far more on repressive policing instead of on the social and economic projects originally proposed.

One of the most visible changes with the implementation of PPV is the establishment of a computerised system of monitoring and management of police work, comparable to the American model COMPSTAT, which seeks to make chiefs of police accountable for dealing with crimes committed in the areas for which they are responsible. Police work in Pernambuco was territorialised and divided into 26 catchment areas, or Áreas de Segurança Integrada (AIS), geographical ‘areas of integrated security’. The PPV management committee meets weekly and monthly to compare, monitor and discuss data gathered in each of these 26 areas of security. Once these meetings are over, the information is not made available to the public (Macedo 2012, 101). A number of police operations are monitored in these meetings, for example:

1. *Malhas da Lei*: monitors the enforcement of arrest warrants in operations by civil and militarised police.

2. *Repressão ao Crack*: monitors the amount of crack cocaine seized and the number of flagrant arrests.

3. *Autoria CVLI*: monitors the degree of resolution of police investigations into intentional lethal crime.
4. *CVLI Focos qualis*: monitors the number of police investigations submitted to the justice system in cases of serious crimes where the offenders have been identified.

5. *Mandados*: monitors the number of prison warrants resulting from the integrated work of chiefs of police and the public ministry.

6. *Repressão ao Crack 1*: monitors the number of drug selling points identified by police operations.

The implementation of PPV has also come with increasing use of Situational Crime Prevention methods (Clarke 1997, Clarke and Fels 2004), that is, not only more policing to reduce criminal opportunities, but also closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in some locations, electronic monitoring tags for offenders, geo-mapping of hot-spots and the placement of ambulances in hot-spots to attempt to save the lives of victims of violence. These developments are problematic on a number of levels that are discussed below.

First, three main contested ideologies provide the basis for this model, all of which emerge from the mainstream criminological theories of the Global North discussed in Chapter 1. These include: (1) deterrence theory (Nagin 2012) through increased policing and incarceration; (2) situational crime prevention theory (Clarke 1997, Clarke and Felson 2004) mentioned above; and (3) rational choice theory (Clarke and Felson 2004). The rationale for these theoretical frameworks is that crime is inevitably going to happen – unless the opportunities in the environment are reduced – because it perceives rational individuals as calculating the risks and opportunities of offending. By assuming the inevitability of crime, and adopting an approach that focuses on the management of crime, instead of focusing on addressing the causes of crime, the model neglects the significance of structural, racial, gendered and economic inequalities in motivations to commit interpersonal violent crime. It also marginalises the irrational and emotive aspects of crime, such as bravado, rivalry and jealousy.

The second problem relates to the impacts of this managerial model of control. The model emphasises State definitions of crime, tending to focus on controlling certain crimes, such as drug related street offenders rather than for instance the violence caused by corporations in environmental disasters or the persecution of drug barons higher up in the hierarchy of the drug trade or even the violence committed by
state actors (e.g. the police). The outcome of this is the aggravation of social inequalities by targeting the easier to catch (read poorer) suspects. Remarkably, the impact of the focus on police work is to the detriment of any social measures of security intervention initially proposed by PPV (PESP-PE 2007, 116-140). For example, social work, training programmes and employment schemes for young people who are likely to become involved with the drug trade and violence.

The policing and targeting of drug-related offenders (by arresting them and seizing their drugs) assumes that targeting drugs equals reducing violence and draws more young people into the youth and criminal justice system. Preventative social measures should take effect before young people become involved in the drug trade, and before they enter the costly, brutalising and inhumane Brazilian criminal justice system (Rosenblatt 2012). Therefore, the policy’s emphasis on monitoring, for example, the amount of narcotics apprehended replicates parts of the contested system of security governance of the war on drugs (Simon 2007). More inequalities were revealed in Chapter 7, in the narratives of poor community residents who felt criminalised and under-protected in their experiences of policing, and in the experiences of people who were victims of non-lethal yet serious violent crimes.

The third problem is that some of PPV’s operations were circumstantial and discontinued, raising concerns about the temporality and unsustainability of safety interventions. Fourth, PPV’s structure of governance, for the most part, reveals that only data produced by the State or the police are used as indicators for monitoring outputs or ‘success’ and police performance, as illustrated above in the list of some of the police operations and programs that were put in practice. The absence of adequate means of external control is an important critique raised by members of civil society, as discussed in Chapter 8. This selective use of outputs for monitoring jettisons the importance of relational aspects of policing such as police accountability, citizens’ perspectives about police performance and data from victimisation surveys as opposed to police data. The consequences and challenges of this approach are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

5.2 The views of state actors: alleged achievements and challenges

This section examines extracts from in-depth interviews conducted with ‘experts’, including high-ranking state officials involved with the development and
implementation of PPV. These include executives and high-ranking members of the police – both the plain clothed investigative civil police (*Policia Civil* or PC) and the uniformed patrolling militarised police (*Polícia Militar* or PM). High-ranking officials were keen to praise the government’s security policy. This is not surprising, given that patronage, hierarchy and political connectedness play important roles in police and government officials’ promotions and career prospects in Brazil (cf. Denyer Willis 2015, 131-132; Pereira 2008, 199). Nonetheless, interviewees’ narratives enable an analysis of a hegemonic discourse about security interventions and at least illustrate some of the national and regional challenges in the field of public security.

According to most high-ranking interviewees the governor had been brave and ambitious to take on-board the challenge of discussing and addressing the public security problem in Pernambuco, as this was seen as an unsavoury, politically dangerous and difficult topic. Interestingly, it is precisely the image of doing something about law and order that has been attractive to different electorates around the world (Chevigny 2003, Frühling 2009, Malone 2012). In fact, as argued by Uildriks (2009) ‘all too often police reforms and initiatives to improve the quality of policing are the result of opportunistic and political considerations’ (16). However, according to all high-ranking interviewees, PPV is not a temporary or politically opportunistic project but the first tangible systematic and *successful* public security strategy aiming to reduce lethal violence in Pernambuco.

During the ten-year period 2002-2012, lethal violence was on the rise in most states in the northeast region of Brazil – except in Pernambuco, where homicide rates declined between 2008 and 2012 (Nóbrega 2012, 21, Waiselfisz 2014, 26, Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, 11). The policy-makers and practitioners who were interviewed offered a series of explanations for this, all of which related to PPV. This is illustrated in the following interview extract with a senior member of the management of the public security secretariat:

‘Having the political will is a start [in order to achieve reductions in homicide]. Also, another point is the model of management by results. Third, there is investment; we increased [the public security budget] from 20 million [Reais] per year to around 80 million [Reais] per year. It varies from year to year […] there are plenty of areas of investment that are not included in these
80 million, but they are also important, such as training and recruitment. But this 80 million is mostly structural investment, such as creating áreas integradas de segurança (integrated areas of security), investing in police stations, appropriate cars for the police, appropriate uniforms, guns, bullet-proof vests, handcuffs. [...] we have recruited 10,000 new professionals over the last 10 years. [...] There are cases when you invest in a certain municipality, in all those things, but without achieving a reduction in violence and criminality, so something is missing there. I think it is the model of management by results that we have applied with Pacto [PPV] that is important’ (23rd September 2013)

While experts claimed that the ideas implemented by PPV were innovative, they share many similarities with models of police reform in countries such as the US. For example, PPV emulated performance management systems, such as COMPSTAT, and shared an emphasis on increasing incarceration, just as seen in America’s widely debated and contested Zero Tolerance Policing (Bratton 2005, Dixon 2005, Burke 1998, Dennis 1997, Jones and Newburn 2007, Newburn and Jones 2007, Silverman and Della-Giustina 2001, Young 1998).

In fact, measuring police performance is not new in Brazil either. For example, the Minas Gerais police went through a number of reforms in partnership with research and academic organisations during the 1990s and 2000s (Ward 2006, 177-179). The idea of territorialising police work by creating new geographical distinctions, such as the AIS (Área integrada de segurança) mentioned in the extract above, is not new either. Moreover, áreas integradas de segurança were also created in 1999 in Rio de Janeiro in an attempt to better organise and improve public security provision (Husain 2009, 77).

It is noticeable that in the opinion of all the government experts interviewed, the results allegedly achieved by PPV were an outcome of investment in more policing, including investing in resources; in the tools of policing, such as guns and safety equipment; and in investment in the management of police work, such as making the police responsible for certain areas and monitoring their targets through the State Planning and Management Secretariat (SEPLAG). This raises administrative approach raises a number of issues and it assumes that crime can only be prevented through the criminal justice system. Social measures, which can prevent crime, are
undermined (e.g. the creation of youth clubs, leisure activities, apprenticeships, quality employment, better education, educational campaigns, substance misuse treatment). Social measures, such as those mentioned, have potential to avoid the long-term impacts of the excessive use of the criminal justice system for criminalised individuals, for society and for the resources of the State.

Despite PPV’s managerialism and focus on more policing, its implementers deployed a specific narrative about crime, one that assumed that the responsibility for crime lies beyond the work of the police; a narrative that emphasised shared responsibility among government agencies and society. Once again, this is not a new idea (see Garland 1996), not even in the Brazilian context. The federal government had since the year 2000 launched the National Public Security Plan (Plano Nacional de Segurança Publica) with comparable principles where responsibility for security is concerned (Mesquita Neto 2011, 391). Macaulay (2007, 645-646) supplements Garland’s (1996) thesis, positing that under high levels of crime, States delegate responsibility to other agencies and social actors, especially where radical criminal justice reforms are unlikely to bring about electoral benefits. An interview with a Delegada in the homicide department illustrates the embedment of this narrative of delegating responsibility for crime:

‘Many people think safety is a question to be addressed by the police but there’s a lot more to it than that. There are issues around education, sanitation, and so on. Pacto came to unite all these elements with the objective of reducing criminality in the state of Pernambuco, especially focusing on lethal and intentional violent crime. You will hear a lot about this CVLI (Crimes Violentos Letais Intencionais or Intentional Lethal Violent Crimes). The firefighters also became involved, there is more planning, and government bodies now have shared targets. So for example, lighting in one area may help reduce criminality so CELPE (an electricity company) may be involved, or closing a bar in another area might help. In summary, we are all [in it] together, with the same objective, which is to reduce lethal crime, which has been happening over the last few years. […] The state of Pernambuco has been divided into 26 areas, some need more attention than others. For example, [points to a map] this area here, Santo Amaro, was very violent, but now we have about three homicides per month there.’ (Delegada, civil police, DHPP, 7th October 2013)
High crime rates have led officials to cast doubts on the ability of the traditional institutions to control crime. Thus, the responsibilisation narrative has emerged in tandem with the acceptance of the limits of the State in crime fighting. This requires multi-agency working, an issue that is further illustrated in an interview with a military police chief (*major*) in Pernambuco:

‘We used to think of security as a problem for the police but now it is everyone's responsibility. All the different State secretarias (agencies) are responsible for security. For example, the secretariat of education is responsible too, they need to make sure the schools does not provide opportunities for drug use, they need to make sure the school has appropriate lighting, make sure they engage the students’ (School patrol, military police, 16th October 2013)

The process of expanding the narrative of ‘security’ and widening responsibility for crime-fighting has long been observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, for example in the UK and US (cf. Garland 1996, 2001). This narrative and agenda has been simultaneous with the steady escalation of the size and scope of State agencies of criminal justice and increases in the numbers of cases processed (ibid) in these countries, as well as with continuing international US police assistance, such as the provision of police training (DP 2015a, Leeds 2014).

An example of the increase in the scope of the criminal justice system is seen in increasing homicide investigations and increasing numbers of people incarcerated. For instance, although homicide investigations may refer to cases committed in previous years, the number of cases investigated in 2007 was equivalent to only 5.4% of the 4,592 homicides committed that year24 in Pernambuco (Nóbrega 2012, 126). Between September 2008 and July 2009 there was an increase of 430% in the number of *inquéritos* (police investigations) submitted to the criminal justice system in Pernambuco (ibid, 156). Despite the tardiness of the Brazilian courts in processing these cases, 21% of them led to imprisonment (ibid). This is a sharp increase in cases brought to justice in comparison to years prior to 2007.

While a growing body of literature has critiqued the consequences of the growth of the penal State (Garland 2001, Wacquant 2009, Cunneen et al. 2013), for
the experts interviewed, this new way of working is responsible for the alleged successes of PPV. According to many interviewees, a shift in the way the police would achieve promotions, was also an important managerial reform implemented through PPV. Brazilian public office and promotions are notoriously known to be achieved through personal contacts and via a hierarchical structure (cf. Soares 2000), but promotions in PPV would (allegedly) be achieved by results, as argued by the chief of Pernambuco’s civil police:

‘We began to concentrate on gestão para resultados (management by results), and we began to have management indicators. In the past, to reach a higher rank in the police one would need around 18 years of experience. But in the new model what mattered were results, so this gave young officers an opportunity and they embraced the changes. […] This is a change in culture. Before 2007 you had no targets, you worked if you felt like it. […] In 2009, the bonus system was created, so officers had an incentive to hit targets, for seizing firearms and/or crack cocaine, for example. The culture of private businesses is now implemented inside a public institution – the police.’ (24th September 2013)

The idea that there has been a change in police culture, in particular a change towards the ‘culture of private businesses’, as the chief of Pernambuco’s civil police claims above, is a crucial tenet of the contested managerial criminology that began to be implemented in the Global North at least some thirty years ago (Brownlee 1998, Feeley and Simon 1992, Garland 2001). Under the managerial approach, humanitarian ideals have been misplaced in the move towards business-like and efficiency-oriented policies in which quantitative outputs (e.g. the number of people processed through the criminal justice system) have priority over the ideals of rehabilitation and social crime prevention (e.g. investment in educational programmes and employment and training opportunities for offenders or groups at risk of offending). This approach presents dangers and inherent contradictions to the idea of ‘efficiency’, because, it makes the criminal justice system larger and overburdened, therefore more expensive and harder to manage (Brownlee 1998). Humanitarian values are also harder to enforce as the following section on incarceration suggests, and as seen in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 – in the data emerging from lower-ranking police
offers and civil society – which explore some additional criticisms of the managerial approach.

According to some high-ranking experts, another outcome of PPV was that the investigative police (civil police) began to investigate crimes prior to making arrests. This was an important shift, one that was seen as a new approach in the Brazilian context, which was named *repressão qualificada*, but the idea is simply ‘intelligence-led’ policing. It entails gathering information before making arrests rather than making arrests and subsequently attempting to extract confessions from suspects (often through the use of methods of torture). This is expressed in an interview with the chief of the Pernambuco’s civil police:

‘Before, the police would go into a favela and kick all the doors down, regardless of whether people were innocent or guilty. People in favelas are poor, that doesn’t mean that they’re all criminals. Now with this new concept, police intelligence began to have value. In the beginning of Eduardo’s government we had 6 people working in intelligence, now we have 200 people. Now the police have a new reality.’ (24th September 2013)

This alleged change implies that the police in Pernambuco are now more democratic in the sense that they no longer simply ‘kick all the doors down’ in poor communities to investigate crime. But rather, the police now investigate crimes prior to making arrests with its increased number of intelligence specialists. This is an important point but it significantly contradicts arguments by lower-ranking members of the police and the accounts of community residents that emphasise continuous arbitrary policing and abuse of force. So while politically-connected and high-ranking state actors made claims about the innovations, modernisation and democratisation of the police, Chapter 6 draws on data from lower-ranking officials who contested these claims and presented further critiques of the public security apparatus. Moreover, the experiences and narratives of community residents and activists in Chapter 7 challenge any claim that the police have become more democratic, insofar as policing continues to be unequally applied, targeting suspects on the basis of their social status rather than any actual information that has been gathered.
5.3 The limits of current modes of control and of the discourse of success

Although the dominant discourse emerging from government officials and high-ranking members of the public security apparatus is that PPV had reduced homicides in Pernambuco, and is therefore the sole cause for claims of success, more needs to be said about the effects of this program of state building and about the potential for confounding causal variables. In a workshop, Tulio Kahn, a respected Brazilian academic, connected to the state government of São Paulo, argued that the reduction in homicides in Pernambuco, as well as in Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, was linked to a number of factors, including demographic changes. According to Kahn (2011):

‘The economy's upturn after the 2003 crisis, the progressive reduction of social inequality, the issue of the Disarmament Statute in 2003, improved police efficiency in some states, combined with the decrease in the proportion of young population, among other factors, seem to be stabilising and even reducing violent crime in some states. The drop in homicides can be observed particularly in the big cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Pernambuco states, to mention only the most important. All these states had in common a large population but a low rate of population growth between 2000 and 2010. The police of these states have undergone extensive management reforms in recent years and have specific policies for the control of the homicides.’

Although Kahn, in this analysis, has ignored the role of organised crime in some places, such as São Paulo, in monopolising and exerting control over who dies and how many murders occur (see Denyer Willis 2015 for a broader discussion of this), he did raise important points such as economic growth and demographic changes – including a decrease in the proportion of the population made up of young males, the grouping most prone to be involved in violent crimes either as perpetrators or victims. In fact, although PPV claimed accountability for reductions in homicides, recent data show increasing rates of homicide since Brazil’s recent economic downturn (Oliveira 2015a, DP 2015b). This raises questions about PPV’s claims and the efficacy of its methods.
Moreover, beyond confounding and contributing factors to the reduction in homicides, it is also important to note the effects, sometimes perverse, of methods of state building and crime control such as PPV, which raise doubts and questions on the dominant success discourse of PPV. The displacement of crime to other areas is one such issue. When asked about this potential effect, high-ranking interviewees acknowledged the possibility of displacement, including an increase in homicides in one of Recife’s neighbouring cities (Olinda), but they reasoned that there is simply a need to avoid letting ‘the areas that are doing well stagnate’ (interview with senior member of the public security secretariat). They did not posit any apparent concern for preventing the causes of crime and, in their narrative, the displacement of crime could be addressed by improving and strengthening the repressive arm of the State – policing. This approach fails to answer how reforms – based on an unsustainable approach of increasing the demands on the criminal justice system and the overload on prisons – such as PPV can be maintained to avoid compromising state resources and ultimately state capacity.

Another form of displacement relates to the type of crime committed. While cases of lethal violent crime decreased, some experts argued that property crime increased, alongside increasing economic development and increasing wealth in the city, as illustrated below:

‘In 2006, the state of Pernambuco had over 4,000 cases of murder. Now, you can walk around Boa Viagem Avenue [an upper-class avenue on Recife’s seafront] and you’re certainly not going to be murdered. But don’t take your handbag with you because you’re likely to be mugged [laughter]. […] People from poor communities, like Ibura, come here [the upper-class neighbourhood] to steal’ (Delegado, civil police, 26th September 2013)

Although the overall homicide rate declined in Recife – in 2002 it was 90.5/100,000 and by 2012 it had dropped to 52/100,000, indicating a decline of 42.5% over this ten-year period (Waiselfisz 2014, 39), there remain many challenges in the field of security. The rate of 52/100,000, far from a ‘success’, is well above the national and international average, and it is also above the rate of murders considered to be an ‘epidemic’ (10/100,000).
Another challenge relates to regional differences. According to interviewees, the problem of lethal violence in Pernambuco is different in comparison to larger Brazilian cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. While deaths in Pernambuco were also often related to the drug trade in some way, the trade in Pernambuco is less organised and smaller than in the southeast (Wolff 2014). By being less organised, there is more competition and less monopoly over the underground economy, which generates more violence as interpersonal and business conflicts multiply at street level. This potentially explains Recife’s higher rate of homicide in comparison with other Brazilian capitals (see the homicide data in Chapter 2 and Waiselfisz 2015; 2014; 2013 for interstate comparative data). The case of Recife contributes to an understanding of regional social and policy challenges but it also creates potential for a gloomy view of human interaction, bordering on a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ (Hobbes 1651/2009).

Another challenge is that these interpersonal conflicts now affect more women and younger children than in previous years, through their involvement in the drug trade, an issue posed by a delegada from the homicide division of the civil police (DHPP):

‘In the past, many women died because of domestic violence, today their deaths are often connected to the drug trade […] Often women in the communities look for the protection that they can get from drug lords. There is a high status associated with being the woman of a criminal. But this woman will spend 24 hours marked to be killed by a rival gang so many of them die in this way. And in other ways too; when there is a dispute or disagreement, people nearby die too. All the structure of the drug trade that you have in different places like Rio, you can find here too but in a smaller scale – there is the person who will deliver the drugs, the one who will split them, the taxi driver who will be involved, the soldados (people in charge of ‘security’ and confrontations), the aviâozinhos (literally, little airplane, but meaning a child who delivers drugs and messages from the sales point – called boca – to the customer). Here aviâozinhos are younger: 6 or 7 year olds’ (7th October 2013)

The perceived increase in the involvement of young people in criminal activities, including the drug trade, has intensified debates about reducing the age of criminal
responsibility in Brazil (Douglas 2015, Haubert and Cancian 2015). In July 2015, parliamentarians in the Camara de Deputados (Brazilian House of Representatives) voted against reducing the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 years old for heinous crimes, which included drug trafficking. However, after an amendment to the proposal that removed drug trafficking, torture, aggravated robbery and terrorism from the original proposal, the proposal by the Brazilian centre and right wing parties has moved on to a second round of voting prior to be sent to the senate. Age and gender, for that matter, have come to the fore in the penal age. The population of incarcerated women has been on the rise. The vast majority of these women are incarcerated due to direct, and indirect involvement, or simply proximity to the drug trade. For instance, they are the mothers, wives, girlfriends and female relatives of men involved in the drug trade, who are often the ones present at home when the police arrive to search for drugs (Denyer Willis 2015). The delegada quoted above emphasised such important regional differences in the country, which generate obstacles to policing. Pernambuco’s context posed the challenge of ‘micro-trafficking’ instead of ‘macro-trafficking’, as argued by a major of the military police:

‘Micro-trafficking is the tráfico formiga (translates as ant trade). An ant carries one little grain of rice at a time. Just like that, the young people in the community make a sale and then go get a couple more rocks of crack cocaine from their hiding spot at a time. If they get caught, they say it is for personal use. Throughout the night he may use a couple of rocks and sell 7 or 8, running back and forth’ (1st August 2013)

Because of these regional differences, and lower criminal organisation in Pernambuco, the police face fewer barriers in entering communities affected by the drug trade25, in comparison to cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. These communities in Pernambuco also tend to be smaller and accessible by vehicle, facilitating the police’s presence. In comparison to Rio, Pernambuco’s communities are affected by the drug trade but are not under drug trafficker control. However, the young age of perpetrators and the fact that they trade in small quantities at a time mean that policing and prosecuting them becomes more difficult. And, as stated above, this increases the numbers of street level disputes, due to the multiplication of individual competitors in the trade of small amounts of narcotics.
Some experts denied the presence of gangs or organised criminal groups in Pernambuco, arguing that the problem of organised extermination groups and gangs had been addressed by PPV, while others claimed that only small criminal groups remained:

‘There are small groups. Police action has tackled the large groups. Six years ago they were far more organised but the way they have found to exist is by going small. Most have been imprisoned but occasionally one [or another] has been released. In the past, they weren’t just [involved] in [drug] trafficking but also in the business of execution/killing). This still exists but in a much smaller scale in comparison to 5-6 years ago.’ (Executive Secretary of Management of Public Security, 23rd September 2013)

‘There were some [organised crime] groups, like Thundercats, Hylanders, but they didn't focus just on the drug trade, they did killings too and other criminal activities. They have mostly been dismantled since Pacto started.’ (Civil police, delegado G.M., Boa Viagem, 26th September 2013)

Thundercats and Hylanders are two of Pernambuco’s armed organised criminal groups. They have been associated with multiple offences, such as fraud, drug trafficking, extortion, armed robbery and summary executions (G1-PE 2013), often linked to the acerto de contas, that is, an informal type of ‘justice’ or violent punishment to settle debts or punish those who have debts in the underground economy. The acerto can also refer to bribe arranged with the police in exchange for freedom (for more details on the dynamics of the acerto see Mingardi 2000).

According to the delegado above, these groups have been dismantled by PPV. Chapter 7 and 8 contradict this claim with data from the case study communities, where residents’ experiences contradict the narratives of state officials.

Given the regional differences explained above, different policing approaches have been deployed. In contrast to the UPPs (Pacifying Police Units) in Rio, the state apparatus in Pernambuco did not need to reclaim spaces from the control of drug lords. One similarity between the UPPs and PPV is the expansion of policing in poor communities, as illustrated by the comments of a civil police delegada:
'The problems here are different. The drug trade in Rio is far more organised than anywhere else in the country. They are also better armed, with guerrilla firearms. The only similarity [in our approach to public security policy] is that here we have the *patrulha do bairro* (neighbourhood patrol), which *brings the police inside the [poor] communities* like the UPPs do in Rio, except that here they come in police cars.’ (Centro, Recife, 24th September 2013)

While in Rio de Janeiro there has been an emphasis on attempting to enforce community policing and the UPP police patrol on foot, the type of policing provided in Pernambuco is still more distant. Officers tend to remain in police cars rather than trying to make connections and establish relationships of trust with the communities that they police. Data emerging from interviews with state actors and with community residents reveal that PPV has placed insufficient (if any) emphasis on community policing. The community-policing model, *Policia Amiga* (friendly police) in Pernambuco, was attempted in only twelve communities in all of the state, and ended up associated with increased police abuse and corruption (Wolff 2014, 176). In the most notoriously violent or feared communities, patrolling on foot increased officers’ concerns about possible ambushes (ibid). Yet the alternative – motorised patrols – reinforces the distance between civil society and the State, since officers are unable to interact and establish relationships with community residents. The insufficient number of officers available to work serves only to exacerbate this issue.

Another important regional difference is that while police forces in Rio and São Paulo continue to be responsible for a number of executions and homicides resulting from police action, many expert interviewees praised PPV for achieving one of the lowest rates of police killings in the country. During 2007-2012 the Pernambucan police killed an average of 31 people per year (Bueno, Cerqueira, and Lima 2013, 124), an average of 0.35 killings per 100,000 inhabitants. However, these figures are actually higher than in the years prior to PPV. In 2004 the Pernambucan police killed 17 civilians, in 2005 they killed 24, and in 2006 the figure was 13 (ibid). Official data on police killings in Pernambuco was not available prior to 2004.

It is important to note that Bueno *et al*.’s (2013) data only included cases of police killings of civilians while in confrontation (*mortes em confronto*) and during working hours (thus not including off-duty police killings or other police homicides and injury followed by death – because of the unavailability of these data in many
Brazilian states). Bueno et al (2013, 122-123) raised questions about the reliability of this type of data in Brazil, arguing that more effort and investment is needed to produce data that are trustworthy. Nevertheless, in comparison to states such as São Paulo (SP) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Pernambucan police action seems less lethal, at least while on duty and according to official statistics. According to Bueno et al (2013) during the same time period (2007-2012), the SP police killed an average of 479 civilians per year (an average rate of 1.16 per 100,000 inhabitants), while the RJ police killed an average of 885 per year (5.55 per 100,000 inhabitants)26.

One of the effects of Pernambuco’s comparatively less lethal policing is that the Pernambucan police have avoided becoming an enemy to low-income communities (Wolff 2014, 100). Wolff’s argument is that the somewhat less lethal application of police force in Recife has allowed them to avoid alienating people in low-income communities to the same extent as in Rio de Janeiro. He argues that ‘because of this, favela residents have not sought alliance with drug traffickers, who for their part remained relatively isolated from local political life’ (66). It is important to note that even in Rio de Janeiro where drug traffickers are able to enforce authority and influence local politics in many communities, most residents have not sought alliance with traffickers because of police violence. Instead, in many cases, residents fear Rio’s heavily armed and organised drug traffickers, and have been coerced into this alliance by trafficker’s violence or threats (Penglase 2005, 2008).

Some public security officials who were interviewed claimed that PPV achieved the ‘success’27 of having fewer police killings in comparison to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo by, on one hand, including police killings in official homicide data. Whereas in most of Brazil police killings were problematically called autos de resistência, which could be interpreted as ‘acts in self-defence’, they were not included in intentional homicide rates. And, on the other hand, there was a system of payment by results, that is, bonuses are given to police forces if their area presents low and declining numbers of homicides according to established targets. So, according to high-ranking interviewees, every PM officer and chief of battalion (Major) will receive a bonus for each six-month period in which the area they are responsible for hits targets relating to, for instance, the reduction in the number of homicides by 12% (a figure based on international violence-reduction strategies) and the number of firearms seized. Civil police received their bonuses according to the
number of *inquéritos* (police investigations) of homicide cases that they had resolved and sent to the *Ministério Publico* (Public Prosecutor).

Low-ranking interviewees from the military police claimed that they never received their bonus, even if they had achieved their targets. They also claimed that despite declining rates of homicide it was very difficult to hit the 12% reduction mark. Furthermore, many scholars are suspicious of the accuracy of Brazilian data on police killings, since the ‘civil police control the state’s forensic “morgues” (*Instituto de Medicina Legal*, or IML), making it possible for civil police officers to hide information that could transform a police shooting into a homicide’ (Huggins 2010, 77).

Zaverucha (2004, 107) criticises the conflict of interests that can emerge from the work of investigative police with that of what should be the ‘scientific police’ responsible for forensics. For instance, he received complaints that *laudos periciais* (forensic reports) had been altered to hide evidence of torture suffered within police stations. Data about violence thus become compromised at least partly due to the civil police control over forensic information. According to Zaverucha (2004, 113), the IML remains under the subordination of the SDS (Secretariat of Social Defence), which is a police authority, despite the separation of the IML from the direction of the civil police. The full autonomy – functional, administrative and financial – of the IML has not been established.

Huggins (2010) hypothesises that the police may be responsible for up to 70% of all civilian murders in Brazil as the violence committed by off-duty officers (often working for the private security sector or as vigilantes) is often underestimated. Nevertheless, despite Huggins’ extensive and influential research about Brazilian policing, she presents no evidence for this 70% figure. It is difficult to measure clandestine acts of violence by police that have not been brought to justice. According to the report by the special rapporteur of the United Nations, Phillip Alston (2008, 25) ‘the public prosecution service in Pernambuco estimated that approximately 70% of the homicides in Pernambuco are committed by death squads’, and these are predominantly formed by ex-police, prison agents, active and off-duty police.

Some recent examples of military police involvement in *grupos de exterminio* (death squads) as well as in drug and firearm trafficking in Pernambuco include the case of *Operação Guararapes* II in Recife’s metropolitan region (G1-PE 2012) and the case of three military police officers in another death squad, one of whom killed at
least thirty people, in the hinterland of the state of Pernambuco (G1-PE 2015). The cases of police abuse of force are not limited to those connected to death squads, but they also relate to on-duty officers who have not been caught. When police transgressions and brutality are revealed, they do much to maintain the constant erosion of public trust in the State and its institutions. The case of a group of military policemen who forced seventeen teenagers to jump off a bridge (Ponte Joaquim Cardoso) into the polluted Capibaribe River in Recife during the 2006 carnival highlights the point. The teenagers were allegedly mistaken for a group that committed arrastões (mass robberies which typically take place in crowded public places and involve weapons). Nearly a decade after the incidents, none of the police officers have been incarcerated, although they are now facing trial for the death of six of the victims and the attempted murder of the other surviving eleven youths who were forced to jump into the river (DP 2015c).

In order to be successful, police reform needs to include a number of measures beyond changes in police promotion – for example changes in training, and internal and external systems to control poor conduct and procedures (Frühling, 2009). That is not to say that reforming the way the police are rewarded is not a significant step forward. Traditionally, promotions in Latin America have been profoundly influenced by informal and personal connections (Soares 2000, Ungar 2009, Uildriks 2009, 11). This had the adverse effect of fostering opportunistic professional motivations and obstructing attempts to improve the quality of policing. As Uildriks (2009) puts it, this notorious traditional informal method of promotion mars Latin American criminal justice systems by an opportunistic mentality that is linked to the ‘absence of a connection between individual police performance and rewards’ (p. 12). But, as this section reveals, more needs to be done to reform Latin American police.

This section has begun to examine aspects of public security and policing that have not been dealt with by new security interventions. It explored the limits of current models of control and challenges to its claims of success. State actors claimed to have reduced the number of homicides in Pernambuco through the implementation of PPV yet they ignored other potential causal factors to this phenomenon. For instance, the changes suggested by Kahn (2011), including the country’s period of economic growth, the reduction of socio inequality, the disarmament statute, and the decrease in the proportion of the young population. PPV’s model – of targeting crime
hot spots through policing – risks displacing crime to other areas, an issue that interviewees were unable to address.

The increased focus on deploying the criminal justice system mars state capacity and does not deal with longstanding problems in the police, such as involvement in police violence and death squads. Methods such as community policing, that emphasise the development of relationships with recipient communities, have not been successfully implemented in Pernambuco despite the regional differences highlighted. Those included the lower level of criminal organisation in comparison to Brazil’s large southeaster cities, which facilitates the presence of the police in affected communities. One other potential challenge for Pernambuco is that the number and proportion of cases of homicide are higher than in the southeast, at least in part due to increased competition in the drug trade at street level. By emphasising a criminal justice approach in this context, PPV will face difficulties of sustainability and saturation. Moreover, the homicide data that PPV bases its claims on can be manipulated since the civil police are in charge of the morgues (IML). Irrespective of this risk, this section revealed that recent government statistics show increasing numbers of homicide during 2015. Further critiques will be presented in following sections and chapters.

5.4 Hyper-incarceration

The Brazilian prison system has been described as chaotic, repressive and even a ‘warehouse wasteland’ (Denyer Willis 2015, 56). One of the main challenges to PPV, acknowledged by expert-interviewees, was prison overcrowding. Nevertheless, police interviewees saw rising rates of incarceration as a desirable effect of their work, given that PPV had focused on policing and imprisoning offenders, growing incarceration meant that they were doing ‘a better job’ at tackling crime. At the time that the interviews were conducted in 2013, officials and senior managers at the secretariat for public security in Pernambuco claimed to have no strategy or perceived solution to the issue of overcrowding. Some discussions were taking place with regards to the construction of new prisons, yet no concrete strategy or plan to deal with this issue had been developed. The initial plan of public security, out of which PPV emerged, had mentioned the problem of growing incarceration rates. However, none of its projects proposed a solution to this, even though the plan proposed that the criminal
The justice system became more effective at ‘reducing impunity’ (PESP-PE 2007, 63). Even the proposed projects that related to the prisons only vaguely refer to improving efficiency and prison management without explaining how these outcomes would be achieved (ibid, p. 95-96).

Personal email correspondence dated 24th August 2016, with the Integrated Centre of Communication of the Secretariat of Social Defence in Pernambuco reveals that a number of new prisons are emerging in the state to deal with increasing numbers of prisoners. Those are: the maximum security *Presídio de Tacaimbói*, opened on 8th April 2016 with 676 spaces; the *Presídio de Santa Cruz do Capibaribe*, opened on 10th July 2015 with capacity for 186 inmates; and the *Complexo de Araçoiaba*, which is under construction, with capacity for 2,754 inmates distributed over 7 units. There is also a new institution for young offenders (*Centro de Atendimento Socioeducativo*) under construction in the city of Arcoverde.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the initial proposals for community conflict resolution programmes (ibid, 124) do not seem to have been implemented or at least prioritised. Email correspondences with workers involved in the administration of the public security system indicate that the means of conflict resolution may never have been implemented. The views of these workers indicate that there is much resistance and disappointment with the effects of PPV on the prisons, as illustrated by the narrative of a senior lawyer who has worked for nearly two decades in Pernambuco’s penitentiaries:

‘I am unaware of any planning on the part of the judiciary in the development of PPV. I am also unaware of any conflict resolution interventions or mediation. What we have today are *audiências de custódia* (court hearings prior to custodial sentences), which were a recommendation of the CNJ (National Justice Council). This establishes that the person arrested for a flagrant offence is presented to a judge before a decision is made about whether they will be sent to prison or respond to their trial in liberty. I highlight that this initiative only takes place in the city of Recife due to the shortage of material resources (judges, staff etc.). The decision to provide gratification for officers who hit targets is absurd. Prison overcrowding is unbearable, the state (Pernambuco) has now reached 31,000 incarcerated people, but our capacity is for 11,000. This has led to many recent prison
rebellions. Another issue is the insufficient number of penitentiary agents. We should have at least 6,200 agents but instead we have 2,000. In response to the deficit of 4,000 agents, some prisoners are given the role of an agent, given a key and the command of a pavilion. That way, any plans to improve the penal system are delayed’ (correspondence 20th August 2016).

There is much to unpack in this extract, not least the absence of conflict resolution, overcrowded understaffed prisons, prisoner rebellions and the issue of prison governance, which is further illustrated in Chapter 7, through the narrative of an ex-prisoner who was given the ‘key-holder’ role, taking charge of the governance of a prison pavilion. A significant element of the extract above is the critique of the impact of PPV’s methods on prisons and inmates. According to the Centre of Communication of the Secretariat of Social Defence in Pernambuco (email correspondence 24/08/2016), the court hearings prior to imprisonment implemented since 2015 are leading to increasing liberation of prisoners.

There is much heterogeneity in the data that emerged from the public security system itself. For police interviewees and those involved in the management of the public security system, hyper-incarceration was seen as a sign that the police and the criminal justice system had become more efficient by processing more cases. Nonetheless, the prison population in Pernambuco was increasing before the start of PPV in 2007, which indicates that although PPV may have contributed to the continuing growth of the prison population, it cannot be the sole cause of this phenomenon. For instance, in 1999 there were 7,533 inmates in Pernambuco, and by 2006 this figure had doubled to 15,778 (PESP-PE 2007; Nóbrega 2012, 64).

The prison population in Pernambuco, as well as in the rest of Brazil, has continuously increased since the 1990s (Carvalho 2013; see also table 6 below). Data from the penitentiary census, DEPEN (MJ 2015) show that in 1994 Brazilian prisons housed 129,169 inmates, approximately 88 prisoners for every 100,000 of the country’s inhabitants. But by 2011 the prison population had increased to 514,582, approximately 270 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants (Carvalho 2013, 2). In comparison to the national average, which is already high by international standards, the state of Pernambuco has an even higher rate of inmates per overall population: 294/100,000 in 2011 and 327/100,000 in 2012 (see table 6, figure 4; see also figure 5 to compare the incarceration rates of all Brazilian states). It is clear that the rate of
incarceration has accelerated during the PPV years (since 2007). In 2006, there were 185.57 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants and by 2012 this rate had risen to 327.07/100,000. This phenomenon is not unique to Pernambuco or even Brazil. Increasing rates of incarceration have been observed throughout the globe in the last 10-20 years. The Anglo-Saxon literature best captures this development in countries such as the US, the UK since the Thatcher era, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada since 2000 (Feeley and Simon 1992, Cunneen et al. 2013, Garland 2001, Wacquant 2009).

Table 6: Pernambuco’s prison population (2005-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TOTAL INCARCERATED POPULATION</th>
<th>PRISONERS AWAITING TRIAL</th>
<th>PRISON SPACES</th>
<th>PRISON POPULATION/100,000 INHABITANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>17,423</td>
<td>9,437</td>
<td>8,198</td>
<td>220.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>15,778</td>
<td>5,954</td>
<td>8,256</td>
<td>185.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18,836</td>
<td>10,508</td>
<td>8,298</td>
<td>221.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19,808</td>
<td>11,243</td>
<td>9,562</td>
<td>226.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21,041</td>
<td>12,349</td>
<td>9,675</td>
<td>238.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>23,925</td>
<td>13,737</td>
<td>10,135</td>
<td>271.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>25,850</td>
<td>15,177</td>
<td>10,567</td>
<td>293.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>28,769</td>
<td>18,003</td>
<td>11,478</td>
<td>327.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 4: Prison population in Pernambuco (2005-2012)

This growth in imprisonment is not proportional to growing criminal activity. In some places crime was dropping while incarceration rates were increasing at disproportionate levels, while in other cases both reported crime and incarceration rates were expanding (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010, Nagin 1998). One of the factors that many researchers have associated with the increasing use of imprisonment is the growing social (rather than criminal) insecurity arising from the implementation of free markets and neoliberal policies. For example, the casualisation of wage labour and the commotion of ethnic hierarchies (Wacquant 2012). The rationale behind the neoliberal conceptual framework is that free markets have increased social inequality, while decreasing welfare provision, and that these developments have revived a number of insecurities, not least fear of crime, which contributes to demands for authoritarian crime control of ‘others’, the ‘have nots’, the poor, those perceived as dangerous and subjected to ethnic and racial discrimination (Cunneen et al. 2013, Feeley and Simon 1992, Garland 2001, Wacquant 2008). These authors argue that current social insecurities are therefore coupled with widespread ideologies of
individualism and with the increasing commodification of public goods to contribute to a perceived need to police and warehouse the ‘other’, the stigmatised populations seen as criminal and undeserving.

Under this framework, the rehabilitative approach to justice was abandoned and replaced with a focus on the individualisation of responsibility and accountability, and an emphasis on rational choice – all of which dilute the necessity for social and structural responses to crime (e.g. improving education and welfare support, addressing unemployment). According to these authors, the neoliberal philosophy has revived neoclassical concepts such as deterrence and retribution, which have come to be central aspects of current criminal justice.

However, this analysis does not necessarily apply to Brazil, a country that has not followed the traditional neoliberal political economy and instead has expanded overall spending on welfare and education in the 2000s (Barros et al. 2010, Comin, Barbosa, and Carvalhaes 2012, Neri 2009), as argued in the introduction (Chapter 1). Furthermore, few would dispute that Brazilian society has been unequal, punitive and racially discriminative towards the poor for centuries before neoliberalism came about. Instead, the expansion of mass incarceration in Brazil may be best explained as an outcome of modifications in sentencing law and practice, the enactment of ‘tougher’ penalties and increasing punitive practices in sentencing. These changes have been driven by popular politics and by mass media influence in triggering punitive reactions to extensively reported events such as high-profile cases (Hall 2014, Cunneen et al. 2013, Carvalho 2013), for instance the case of Isabela Nardoni and the case of Eloá. As argued by Hall (2014), this penal culture is ‘the extent to which social, historical and political ideology coincide in the minds of popular media, government policy and activism’ (58-59). Penal ideology or penal culture, as defined below, has played a key role in increasing sentences in the Brazilian case.

Azevedo and Cifali (2015) argue that to understand the paradox of a leftist country such as Brazil, which had been committed to redistributive policies and the reduction of social inequality but which has shown increasingly conservative tendencies when it comes to public security policies, namely the expansion of the prison system, it is important to observe the role of politics at each federative state level. For instance, while the Worker’s Party governed the country (Lula’s and Dilma’s governments), states such as São Paulo were governed by the PSDB party, which has discursively and in practice enforced a certain style of punitive law-and-
order politics, promoting heavy incarceration, in particular for drug-related offences. These are important localised developments with an impact at the national level, since the state of São Paulo’s prison population (207,447 inmates in 2013) is disproportionate in accounting for 36% of the country’s inmates although the state is home to only 22% of the national population (Ibid). Furthermore, Azevedo and Cifali also suggest that in recent years many punitive laws have been proposed and rapidly created in contexts of high public demand. Although the number of cases against white-collar criminals has also increased, the demographics of the majority of the Brazilian prison population remain concentrated in low-income and poorly educated individuals who have committed theft or drug-related offences (Azevedo and Cifali 2015, 119; Carvalho 2013). The criminalisation of activities associated with the poor, or with particular ethnic groups, leads to the overrepresentation of these populations in prison.

If the police and the criminal justice system start to process more cases, clearly more people will be imprisoned. If the police target specific crimes in particular areas, either due to discrimination (by the police, society or policy-makers) or due to actual increased occurrences of these crimes in certain areas, more of these targeted populations will end up receiving some form of punishment. In this way, the emphasis on tackling drug related offences impacts the growth of the prison population. This is one of Carvalho’s (2013) main arguments.

Both Macaulay (2012) and Carvalho (2013) explain that Brazilian legislators in the 1990s contributed to the expansion of the prison population with the creation of new crimes (extension of criminalisation), and the limitation of rights in the execution of sentences, which reduced the number of inmates who could leave the prison system. A noteworthy example of this development was the creation of act 8.072/90, which ‘increased punishment, withdrew progressive sentencing, increased the term for parole and obstructed the commutation and pardon for crimes known as heinous crimes’ (Carvalho 2013, 1), including drug trafficking. In 2007, drug trafficking accounted for 15% of the Brazilian male prison population and by 2011 it represented 24.43% of male inmates and 49.65% of female inmates (ibid, 3). Nonetheless, interviewees raised an important point about the impact of the crisis of the Brazilian penal system (while also placing the onus of the problem of increasing mass incarceration and prison overcrowding simply on the slowness of the Brazilian
criminal justice and court system). According to a delegado of civil police, in the neighbourhood of Boa Viagem, Recife:

‘One of the challenges is that the justice system is very slow. If you go to a prison, you will find that 70% of prisoners are temporary prisoners [prisoners awaiting trial]. They are still awaiting trial. Most should not even be there. This also causes overcrowding in the prisons.’ (26th September 2013)

Police interviewees argued that many of the people currently incarcerated are not meant to be in prison; they are prisoners awaiting trial for much longer than they are supposed to be in custody. In some cases prisoners await trial for years. The justice system is incapable of dealing with the amount of cases to be processed. According to some interviewees, it is possible to find prisoners in this situation for 5 years, and even 10 years. A number of studies conducted in different parts of Brazil corroborate concerns with this excessive amount of time for cases to be processed in the Brazilian criminal justice system (Adorno and Pasinato 2007, Ratton, Torres, and Bastos 2011, Ribeiro, Machado, and Silva 2012, Pinheiro 1999).

The Brazilian penal code stipulates that the legal duration for processing cases of homicide (homicidio culposo) should be approximately 260 days (if the accused is in custody) and up to 310 days (if the accused is not already in prison) between the crime being reported and the first appearance in court (Macedo 2012, 33). However, as shown in Ribeiro’s (2012) review of studies in this field, the average processing time for cases of homicide varies from 707 days to 2,230 days (over 6 years).

This situation raises a number of concerns about the disrespect for prisoners and suspects’ human rights, and raises questions about the perverse impacts and the sustainability of methods of public security that overtly rely on policing and incarceration, exacerbating Brazil’s multiple existing injustices and inequalities. The emergence, growth and effects of organised crime inside prisons has already been identified and studied in the southeast of Brazil (Adorno and Pasinato 2007, Gay 2015, Feltran 2011, Dias 2011, Denyer Willis 2015, Misse 2011b, Nóbrega 2012). Pernambuco’s existing situation indicates that the state is likely to follow similar patterns, developing societal relations determined and influenced by criminal factions such as the Comando Vermelho from Rio de Janeiro and the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) from São Paulo. Indeed some researchers already predict that the type of
prison gang dynamics found in Rio de Janeiro may emerge soon in Pernambuco (Wolff 2014, 96). While these questions are not central to this thesis, they relate to the potential for the erosion of state capacity emerging from the State’s own security initiatives (e.g. PPV) and from the continuing repressiveness and precariousness of the Brazilian criminal justice system. Additional research would be necessary to examine these pressing questions and shifting new dynamics.

The activities and power of gangs and organised criminal groups like the PCC are made possible through the prison system, insofar as the prison provides a space from which to organise, to foster anger against injustice, and a justification for joining a criminal organisation that can provide a network of support, governance, rules and survival in the prison (Darke 2013, Denyer Willis 2015, Dias 2011, Feltran 2011). A recent geography PhD study by Arruda (2014) conducted in Pernambuco’s prisons revealed that groups such as the PCC already have influence over smaller gangs of inmates. Arruda (2014, 186) argued that the prison houses the main leaders of organised crime and functions as the headquarters for drug trafficking. The management of the prison and its inmates is shared between representatives of the State (poder público) and the bosses of criminal organisations.

Many interviewees saw incarceration as the only available method to deal with drug-related violent crime. They claimed that the problem of violent crime was often associated with drug addicts but that there were insufficient rehabilitation programs. Furthermore, in their view, many convicts were not interested in being rehabilitated and the extant rehabilitation programs had not seemed successful in restoring offenders. This loss of hope in rehabilitation was a contributing factor to the increasing use of incarceration, as seen in the narrative of a senior member of Pernambuco’s secretariat of public security:

‘This is one of the problems that we face. The prison population has increased a lot. […] Many crimes are no longer happening because people who are more likely to offend are now in the programme. They offend, the police arrest. We don’t have the means to remove people from incarceration and stop them from offending, or rehabilitate them. There are [drug rehabilitation] programmes but their efficacy is questionable, sometimes people don’t even want to join the programmes […] We don’t have a solution yet, a way to get people off crack.’ (23rd September 2013)
The apparent solution to crime had rather Americanised connotations. Despite the claims that PPV was exclusively tailored to Pernambuco’s context, some experts admitted to having travelled to the US and observed the models of policing that (supposedly) worked – including zero tolerance policing – as shown in an interview with the chief of the Pernambucan civil police:

‘Over the years since Pacto [pela vida] started, the prison population has more than doubled from around 15,000 to 30,000 inmates now. On average, we used to imprison 50 people per month. Now the figure is around 500. Among the successful (my emphasis) criminological policies in the world, I had the opportunity to visit New York in 1998 and get to know their Zero Tolerance (my emphasis) policing, where they had very high incarceration rate. Here it has not been different. We created Operation Malhas da Lei, which consists of the capture of inmates. Today we have this operation in each area, there are 26 malhas, I knew it would go well, in six months we went from 50 to 400 captures per month. The secretariat decided this was the secret [to success]. The secret to success is incarceration. This is our aim (my emphasis). I don’t know any other policy in the world that could revert a situation of violence without incarceration.’ (24th September 2013)

So, in the narrative of the chief of the Pernambucan civil police at the time of the research, incarceration is the ‘aim’ of PPV and is perceived as ‘the secret to success’. The question of how success is defined, of course, is important here. The punitive rhetoric on crime, which argues that prison works and that this form of punishment deters crime, is in conflict with the objectives of effectiveness of managerialism and threatens to erode these ideals, since it widens the size of the criminal justice system, increasing the burdens on it and makes it harder to manage.

As Macaulay (2007) puts it, politicians (and the police, it could be added) in Latin America are ‘deluded in supposing that incarceration is an adequate containment and incapacitation strategy’ (638). The very fact that prison gangs have coordinated mass organised criminal acts outside prisons, using their mobile phones and networks, illustrates Macaulay’s point. This was made evident and fresh in the public mind when the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) gang brought chaos to
São Paulo by coordinating riots and hostage-taking in 2006 and during the attacks in 2012, which resulted in the deaths of 24 military police, 8 civil police, 7 penitentiary agents, 3 municipal guards and 493 civilians (Cubas 2013, 24). These incidents were not unique. The Comando Vermelho (CV) in Rio de Janeiro has also caused major disruption to the city by organising mass criminal acts from within the prison (Penglase 2005). While Criminal groups in Pernambuco do not seem as organised and powerful, there is ethnographic evidence that suggests that organised prison groups in Pernambuco are also in control of operations outside the prison. This will be illustrated in Chapter 7, in the narratives of interviewees from one of the case study communities, Tourinho.

This section has exposed growing support for incarceration among state actors. This support was grounded in the loss of hope for rehabilitation of criminals, in the idea that the aim of the public security apparatus is to reduce impunity by increasing the amount of offenders that are caught and punished. The data from the ministry of justice show disproportionately high rates of imprisonment, and raise questions about the perverse impacts of the increasing use of this approach. Some of these issues relate to the inability of the Brazilian criminal justice system to manage the increasing numbers of prisoners, many of whom have overstayed their time awaiting trial, and to the abuse of human rights through the warehousing of inmates in overcrowded conditions. Beyond these problems, the section argues that prison has been an unproven method of incapacitation in the Brazilian context. The method has instead contributed to increasing criminal organisation. The following section expands on the inherent problems of the ideologies that justify increasing penalisation.

5.5 Zero tolerance

Many Latin American public officials and political leaders, under pressure to show that something is being done about crime and violence, are tempted to try to adopt quick fixes from the US experience, which is ‘seen to represent something like best practices’ (Bailey and Dammert 2006, 2). According to Bailey and Dammert (2006), these ideas are not well understood and may produce unwanted outcomes. They also fail to acknowledge cultural and regional differences. Zero tolerance policing,
sometimes referred to as ‘broken windows’, is one such example, taken from New York and imported to countries such as Brazil and Mexico.

Homicide rates in New York dropped from 25.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 8.4 per 100,000 in 1999 and continued dropping thereafter (Young 2011, 120). When Mayor Giuliani and his police commissioner Bratton introduced zero tolerance policing, an aggressive and targeted policing method, supported by a system of computer mapping of high crime areas, known as COMPSTAT, crime was already declining (Young 2011, 122). But they claimed that their intervention had led to falling crime and both Giuliani and Bratton received international recognition based on these claims. At the core of their narrative is the idea that the criminal justice system and the police can deter crime. The myth of the New York miracle, as Young (2011) contends, was constructed by the narratives of state actors and social agencies aiming to capitalise on a phenomenon that was disconnected from their interventions.

Believers in Deterrence Theory argue that the criminal justice system has a role in dissuading people from committing crime (Nagin 2012, Onwudiwe, Odo, and Onyeozili 2005) and this in turn justifies calls for tougher criminal justice interventions, such as the extensive use of imprisonment and policing (Beato 1999, Onwudiwe, Odo, and Onyeozili 2005). But international studies have critiqued and refuted deterrence theory. According to Beato (1999), there is no evidence that increased policing reduces crime. In the US, while both the prison population and the length of sentences tripled between 1975 and 1989, this did not give rise to a proportional or substantial decrease in violent crime (Reiss and Roth 1993).

As Dixon (2005) argued, when New York’s crime rates were falling, crime rates were in fact declining all over the US. There is evidence that both high incarceration rates and New York’s zero tolerance policing cannot account for declining crime rates in the US in the 1990s and 2000s since a number of other social factors were at play. Levitt (2004), for instance, presents evidence that the decline in crack cocaine and the legalisation of abortion were important factors in the great American crime drop. Furthermore, as Young (2011) argues this was not an exclusively American phenomenon, crime rates where declining in most of the developed world.

Zimring (2007) argues that no single variable, on its own, could account for this phenomenon. He compares the US with Canada, which also saw declining crime rates (albeit without changes in imprisonment) and argued that the great crime drop
was part of an expected cyclical downturn influenced by a number of social factors, including a decline in the most crime-prone age group: 15-29 year-olds. In his analysis Zimring also included changes in the model of policing as one of the factors responsible for the crime drop, including the introduction of COMPSTAT and changes in police management in New York. But he does not include increased incarceration as part of the equation. Zimring fails to take into account any cultural changes in American society and the impact of the decline in crack markets. The ethnographer Ric Curtis (1998) introduced the ‘little brother syndrome’ thesis to explain the cultural shifts that impacted the American crime rate. In a nutshell, Curtis argued that children, who had seen the devastating effects of gang violence, were less inclined to take part in this violence when they grew up. His argument is that this generational factor impacted crime rates.

With regard to increasing incarceration, some countries such as the Netherlands and Germany have reduced their prison population and have also seen declining crime rates (Young 2011, Economist 2013). In Brazil, while the prison population has been increasing, overall crime rates, especially homicide rates, have not declined (Dias 2012, Salla 2012, Waiselfisz 2014). These examples contradict the mainstream criminological theories of zero tolerance policing and deterrence. Moreover, even if hyper-incarceration did reduce crime, questions must be asked about what kind of society is being developed if only repression is deployed to address social ills. Incarceration is a very costly method of crime control and does not lead to criminal rehabilitation (Brownlee 1998). If anything, it is likely to have a criminogenic effect and encourage recidivism (Simon 1997/2013, Young 2011), since once an individual has been through the criminal justice system and is labelled a criminal, chances of future employment and housing are significantly reduced (Maruna 2001), and opportunities arise within prison to become involved in gangs or criminal organisations (Arruda 2015, Dias 2011, Misse 2011). As Simon (1997/2013) puts it ‘incarceration measurably increases the chance that someone will commit another crime and likewise makes it harder for the subject to be absorbed into an alternative economy of power (like work, but also including family and community building activities)’ (p. 541).

An over-reliance on punishment as deterrent also reinforces social divisions, insofar as it promotes the ideology of ‘them and us’, a criminology of the ‘other’ (Brownlee 1998, Garland 2001), in which offenders and suspects, especially those
from socially and economically marginalised backgrounds, are constructed as outcasts, excluded undesirables, whom the rest of us must fear and against whom we require protection. This ideology and discourse of deterrence generates a vicious circle by intensifying the demand for punishment and social control (Brownlee 1998, 326).

The new model of policing that was developed in Pernambuco, according to all high-ranking interviewees, entailed a modernisation and break away from the old model of policing that had emphasised the characteristics commended by the older (military) police service, such as a strict hierarchy and authority to repress suspects regardless of whether evidence had been gathered (a system that resembled the incarceration of war prisoners). The new police, according to government experts, focuses on intelligence-led policing, is better resourced (for example, they have greater access to firearms – regardless of whether that is in reality desirable), and have access to information technology.

5.6 Prioritising managerial reforms over the training and structure of the police

PPV is infused with problematic methods and effects. While it improved the capacity of the public security system to apprehend more suspects, not a single interviewee said that police training or other crime prevention methods had been emphasised. When specifically asked about training, high-ranking officials made vague claims that there was continuous training provision. Contradictorily, when interviewing lower ranking officers (e.g. soldados in the military police), officers complained about the scarcity of training. Likewise, residents in low-income communities believed police brutality and widespread discrimination occurred because the police were not appropriately trained. In the words of one young man from the Tourinho case study, police officers ‘come bulinado (bullied/harassed) from the academy. In the training of ROCAM [a specialised military police battalion] they get beaten, pepper in their eyes, they get shot with plastic bullets, they have to spend 2-3 days without eating… this creates a monster for the streets’.

The inadequate training hypothesis seems plausible, but it could also be suggested that beyond inadequate training there are extreme and ingrained social divisions in Brazil that are used as bases on which to attempt to justify disdain, brutality and discrimination. Moreover, factors such as inefficient oversight of police
work, inefficient methods of accountability, and the lack of trust in the formal justice system’s ability to deal with those perceived as criminal all compound the willingness to deploy ‘rough justice’ on the streets and act as a ‘monster’ (as described by many of the community residents who participated in this research). These issues are examined and made prominent in the narratives of members of civil society examined in Chapter 7.

Police training and challenging the militarised structure were not mentioned in interviews as key elements of PPV. The overall emphasis was on PPV as a managerial reform for the public security system. PPV’s initial plan proposed ‘integrated working’, that is, the idea that the institutions of criminal justice and the different police forces, including civil and military police, work cooperatively to complete the cycle of policing. Indeed, this was mentioned in interviews when senior officials argued that PPV has brought these agencies to work together, for instance by having weekly meetings for monitoring targets. These meetings are attended by representatives of all military police battalions and civil police stations as well as members of other agencies and projects such as: the prison; the drug rehabilitation programme Atitude; government statisticians analysing police and crime data; and the managers and members of the public security secretariat (SEPLAG). The key message and belief from the proposers and supporters of PPV was that managerial reforms could reduce homicide.

Indeed, some of Brazil’s key proponents of managerial reforms have made these arguments known in an edited book by Veloso and Ferreira (2008b). These authors propose that ‘increasing police efficacy’ (p. 49), ‘speeding the process of detention’ (p. 55) and ‘repressive and punitive interventions’ are ‘the leading determinants of the reduction of violence’ (page 56-57) in what they considered successful crime reduction initiatives in Brazil and abroad, including the cases of the cities of Boston, New York, Bogotá, Belo Horizonte and São Paulo. Much of this argument is based on the delusion that William Bratton, managerial police reforms and COMPSTAT achieved the ‘New York miracle’ of reduced homicides.

Veloso and Ferreira have also misunderstood the strategies of the Boston Gun Project (known as Operation Ceasefire) by suggesting that a central aspect of Ceasefire was the elevation of rates of imprisonment (p. 51). The Ceasefire evaluation report, which they quote, clearly states that at the heart of the Ceasefire approach was the ‘pulling levers’ framework (Braga et al. 2000, 5). Key to this framework was not
increasing rates of incarceration, but rather disseminating a crime prevention message. In other words, one of the central strategies was to ‘advertise’ a speedy response by law enforcement agencies specifically for cases of violence (not drug offences).

Another important aspect of Ceasefire was the ‘personalised nature’ of the application of its framework (p. 20), which included meetings and forums with gang members and a working group formed of street workers, probation officers, churches and community groups (p. 5). Unlike Veloso and Ferreira, who support the Broken Windows Theory proposing targeting low-level crime (see p. 48), the Ceasefire approach focused on serious violent crime and on targeting illicit firearm-traffickers. As the Ceasefire evaluation reports, key to the success of the approach were the efforts of the working group and the circulation of the crime prevention message. These Global North cases of alleged successful violence reduction have been misunderstood and uncritically embraced by Brazilian proponents of managerialism in crime control.

5.7 Theoretical implications and conclusions

This chapter has argued that ideologies informed by mainstream criminological theories emerging in the Global North have penetrated the discourse and practice of police reform in Brazil with perverse consequences for the Brazilian context. It challenged the underlying notions of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and deterrence through more policing and incarceration that dominate the methods of security provision in the PPV framework. These theories are part of a particular field of inquiry: mainstream criminological knowledge. Mainstream, managerial or standard criminology refers to conservative, dominant and traditional schools of thought within the discipline, such as classical, neoclassical and positivist criminology. Focusing on Brazil, this thesis challenges the practicality of these theories and their ideologies.

SCP and deterrence theory have many limitations, not least that they rely on punishment (through incarceration or the risk of punishment through increased policing and increased barriers to offending) as a deterrent. Punishment is far from guaranteed since an offender may not be caught, or they may come to an informal settlement or agreement – an acerto – with corrupt police officers to avoid
imprisonment. Neither do these theories take into account individual differences, such as ‘attention to future consequences’ (Nagin 2012, 68), which is to say that not all individuals, especially young offenders, think of future consequences when they are about to offend, so the risk of future punishment, for example, would not necessarily have a deterrent effect on their actions. It is not argued here that there should be no punishment, but that it has not been proven that incarceration is an effective method of crime control. Deterrence is a difficult theory to test, given that only those who have not been deterred come into contact with criminal justice institutions. There is also no evidence that deterrence methods actually reduce reoffending (ibid).

In fact, scholars associated with the critical school of criminology have proposed that removing large numbers of people from certain communities through incarceration – a process which has a notoriously disproportionate impact on the poorest and most ethnically diverse areas – tends to reduce their resources and social capital, therefore making these areas more, not less, prone to crime (Simon 2007). Alongside other scholars, this chapter has also challenged the idea or claim that growing incarceration reduces crime (Dixon 2005, Levitt 2004, Young 2011, Zimring 2007). Growing incarceration and the application of SCP against discriminated populations contribute to the extreme inequalities extant in Brazilian society and in the Brazilian criminal justice system, whereby poor blacks end up over-represented, targeted and criminalised.

This thesis expands the work of critical criminologists (Taylor, Walton, and Young 2013), who stand in opposition to mainstream criminology, to an under-studied Brazilian metropolis, Recife. It considers the perverse effects of managerial theories developed in the Global North, which travel to the Global South. Accordingly, this chapter discussed some of the regional differences that warrant the study of Recife, including the city’s high crime rates, similarities and dissimilarities in methods of policing (e.g. Recife deploys less lethal force, and a motorised approach), differences in the drug trade and organised crime (which are smaller in scale and organisation yet more deadly) in comparison to the more studied southeast of Brazil. The chapter drew on the discourses of the powerful to examine how this context and the effects of the informant ideologies of security programs, as manifested in projects such as PPV, are perceived from the top-down. It drew attention to the increasingly high rate of incarceration in overcrowded prisons, and the growth of the deployment of repressive measures of crime control (e.g. policing) to the detriment of social
measures, providing a critique of the ideologies that make these interventions intelligible in the hegemonic discourses of state actors.

Promoting democratically accountable policing does not seem to be the aim of the security project. This would require a change in the focus of governance, from the managerialism that emphasises the numerical count of arrests made and drugs apprehended to a more discursive model of policing, which would require extensive police training and independent oversight of the police. These points have not received enough attention during PPV, as the following chapters show.
CHAPTER 6 – Institutional self-critique

This chapter draws on the challenges to the dominant discourse of ‘success’ presented earlier by high-ranking state actors, and examines critical and counter-hegemonic narratives on the part of other state actors, namely low-ranking police officers. The chapter scrutinises inherent and enduring problems in the security apparatus, which are noticeable in the narratives of state actors, including classism, racism and brutalising training. It argues that these problems, and the unequal social relations in which they are embedded, hinder the application of democratic principles in security interventions and erode the legitimacy of the State and its interventions. In doing so, the chapter complements an incipient criminological body of literature on policing in the Global South (Bayley 2001, Bayley 2006, Carrington, Hogg, and Sozzo 2016, Chevigny 1995, Denyer Willis 2015, Huggins 1998, Tavares dos Santos 2009).

This thesis is concerned with the effects of new public security initiatives on young marginalised people living in Recife’s low-income communities. In Chapter 5, high-ranking government officials and high-ranking police made the case that the new security agenda in Pernambuco had been innovative and successful in reducing crime, particularly homicide, and that this had benefited all citizens. However, Chapter 5 also began to reveal some of the perverse effects of the new security agenda and provided a critique of the theoretical frameworks and ideologies that this agenda is based on. While the reform of state institutions, in particular the security apparatus, is desirable in order to foster the protection of the population, these institutions exist within a particular set of unequal social and power relations that repeatedly hinder or undermine reforms.

This chapter examines the practical problems of implementing security interventions without promoting respectful, non-sporadic policing and without working to develop trust in police-community relations. It discusses hidden and obscured self-critiques of hegemonic discourses from the perspective of state actors who are not politically well-connected, namely lower-ranking police officers. These issues are important because when particular methods of security are enforced, such as those that have embedded some of the ideals of zero-tolerance policing, they can have spatial and social class implications (Davis 2013). Attempts to cleanse the streets of groups and communities who are perceived as disorderly, socially undesirable (e.g.
the poor and marginalised) can be attractive to businesses and profit-seeking real estate developers (influential sectors in Pernambuco), though, ultimately the chapter supports the thesis that this approach segregates social space and the polity along class and ethnic lines.

This chapter starts by exploring key emerging themes and critiques of the new security agenda by drawing on interviews with members of the police. First, it looks at narratives that reveal the connection made by security providers between crime, poverty and substance misuse – a narrative that is part of a broader and enduring criminalisation of the poor. Second, it examines some challenges emerging from inadequate community-police relations, including lack of trust in the police and the resulting impediments to investigations, as seen in community’s ‘law of silence’. Third, the chapter exposes corruption, class and ethnic discrimination in the narratives of members of the security apparatus. Finally, the chapter explores some of the dilemmas arising from increased policing in the Brazilian context and from the challenges faced by low-ranking officers, who complain about the inadequacy of their training and about the brutalising processes that they have encountered in the force. It is argued that new security interventions in Pernambuco and police reform have not in fact done what would be necessary to promote policing that is respectful of citizens’ rights, intelligence-led, and based on consensus.

6.1 Blaming the poor: crack, social class and violence

The narratives examined in this section reveal the development of a counter-narrative to the punitive rhetoric about crime and criminals. In these narratives, criminals are not portrayed as outsiders who need to be incarcerated and eliminated from the public sphere. They are constructed as socially excluded and impoverished people with drug addictions, who ultimately epitomise public health problems in the country. This construction is paradoxical, as it ‘others’ criminals along class lines since the police present classist understandings of the causes of crime. In this narrative, crime and poverty are inherently conflated. While the police claim to be just doing their job, which is, in their view, to arrest criminals, they do not believe this is the long-term solution to violence and crime in the city. Police interviewees argued that although in their view PPV’s emphasis on policing could reduce homicide rates, it was necessary to do more to prevent the causes of crime. However, this would not be achieved
simply through policing. Interviewees called for a less symptomatic approach, one that includes crime prevention through sports and education, as suggested by a senior member of the Pernambucan civil police:

‘Look, young people don’t like the police. The police are there to restrict them and enforce the law. The country doesn’t seem to have realised that young people need areas of leisure; that they need to be at school, that they need family and social support. If the young are not supported by society, by the church, by the family, they will choose the easy route [crime]. Unfortunately, without those things, they will probably end up [involved] with the police. We see the success of Pacto [Pela Vida] in reducing mortality, there are 1,000 less deaths each year. If Pacto [Pela Vida] wasn’t here, there would have been 6,000 more deaths in this process [2007-2013]. I think we need a policy towards the young people before they become involved with the police. In terms of investigation, we are one of the best in the country but we need to see young people as a fundamental piece of the puzzle – they need education, football, but what do they have today? Even a football match becomes a war’ (24th September 2013).

Members of the police force are acutely aware of the deleterious effects of adversarial encounters on police-community relations. As he puts it, ‘young people don’t like the police. The police are there to restrict them and enforce the law’. The possibility of improving these encounters and relationships through accountability, or striking up respectful dialogues, and generating or sustaining opportunities for positive relationships and communication is side-lined by a Hobbesian account of a ‘war of all against all’, of conflict: ‘Even a football match becomes a war’. Where law enforcement is seen as the inevitable way to uphold the social contract, despite its alleged secondary role in crime control – as the interviewee puts it crime would be best or primarily prevented by social interventions (education, leisure, the family and so forth). The public and the young are constructed as dangers and threats in the enduring ‘war’ metaphor (Corva 2008, Sousa Silva 2016, Steinert 2003). This denies the relevance of the possibility of democratic communication in the policing of marginalised social groups. As Steinert (2003) argues, the war metaphor fits into dominant ‘cultural values’, insofar as there is an admiration for ‘masculinity that will
exact proper retribution for the harm done’ (274). It follows that the ‘warrior’ role or ethos (Zaluar 2013) is perceived as necessary in this masculine narrative that constructs certain members of the public as criminal enemies.

For the chief of the investigative police interviewed above, young people turn to criminal lifestyles because they live in socially deprived conditions – without social support, including support from the ‘family’ and ‘church’, without ‘leisure’, and even peaceful ‘football’ matches. Young people are constructed as perpetrators, but never as victims of crime or as citizens in need of protection or public security services. The police interviewee feels the need to justify the managerialist ideology – PPV’s methods and coercive authority – by claiming that it decreases homicide rates. However, he does not deny the importance of addressing deeper structural issues, which are seen as an obstacle to enhancing the type and quality of possible police-youth encounters.

In an interview with a young female chief officer in the civil police (delegada), she argued that the problem of homicide in Pernambuco is mostly associated with poverty and drug addiction. State actors interviewed repeatedly made similar claims. However, data from the Department of Homicide and Protection to the Person in Pernambuco (DHPP-PE) show that almost 32% of cases of reported homicide are drug-related (Nóbrega 2012, 129), leaving the majority of cases brought to the police classified as un-related to drugs. Moreover, given that the police in Brazil resolve so few cases of homicide each year (Costa 2015), it is difficult to make an accurate association between cause and effect.

While comparing PPV to other interventions (e.g. UPPs in Rio de Janeiro), the same delegada maintained that while PPV focused on tackling impunity and resolving cases of homicide, it did not succeed in providing any other type of intervention – such as adequate drug rehabilitation or social assistance in the poor communities targeted by the program. Furthermore, she also emphasises the regional differences between Recife and Rio, where the drug trade is better armed and more organised in comparison with Pernambuco.

‘The problem here is mainly related to the situation in poor communities. If you ask me today how many people I have arrested in middle class areas, I will tell you almost none. The crimes that we focus on today, like homicide, robbery followed by murder, mostly originate in poor communities in the
periphery. The protagonists are from the periphery. Sometimes, they live in a house with no lighting, no food. If it weren’t for these conditions, people wouldn’t have the reduced moral values to point a gun at someone else to steal handbags. These people are excluded from society. This generates a revolt against our society. They will try to include themselves in their own way. We have a beautiful seafront, posh neighbourhoods. Then you go into the periphery they haven’t even got pavements or paved roads. […] The kids I see looking for food in the saucepans in their houses, and crying because there is no food – unfortunately they’ll be my ‘clients’ [arrested criminals] in the future. Pacto [pela vida] is achieving results but not in relation to the causes of crime – in some cases it is not even poverty, it is miséria (extreme poverty)! […] Often these crimes are related to the use of crack cocaine. We need preventative policies at the federal, state and local government level to deal with this. We also don’t have enough rehabilitation centres in Pernambuco. They are all over-crowded. Ninety per cent of the homicides are linked to drug trafficking, either as dealers or as users, sometimes it is caused by a dispute, drug debt. Once we reduce the population of drug addicts we will also reduce homicides, because we will reduce the problem of drug debt and the demand for crack. I don’t know if you have ever met a crack addict… they have lost their lives and the ability to make decisions. If you ask them any questions, all they will tell you is ‘I want another rock [of crack cocaine]’. Crack is a disease. This is a public health problem. If we treat it as a problem for the police, we will simply overflow prisons. This is not what we intend. But Pacto [pela vida] is doing what it can within the limits of the police.’ (Delegada, civil police, Centro, Recife, 24th September 2013)

Here we see the association of the problem of violent mortality as one caused by drug addiction. Addicts accrue debts and pay with their lives. If only there were fewer addicts, there would be less drug debt and less demand for crack cocaine. In this way, broader, structural and institutional issues connected to drug trafficking – which is organised from outside poor communities, facilitated through financial institutions and political actors (Nóbrega 2012, 60), and enriches people higher up the scale – become marginal, and the only culprit to be targeted is the drug addict living in poverty.
In a context where firearms are readily available, where there is a population in either poorly paid work or unemployed, and where young people have access only to poor quality education and inappropriate policing, the problem of crime is individualised to an extent and the scapegoats are a few drug addicts. A wide international literature discusses the problem of individualising crime and placing blame on certain social groups, particularly young black men (Caldeira 2000, Fernandes 2013, 2014, Hall 1978, Misse 1995, 2011a, Sousa Silva 2016, Wacquant 2008, Young 1999, 2011). So the point here is not to dismiss the destructive impact that the spread of crack cocaine can have in a community, or to explore the process of individualisation of crime, since this has already been written about. Instead, the objective is to examine the problematic contradictions within the narratives that focus on structural problems and yet simultaneously individualise these problems by placing the onus for crime on individual addicts. These explanations rely on opposing sets of values. Ultimately, the emphasis on locating the causes of crime at the level of individual failure (addiction) makes intelligible the punitive discourse that is deployed to justify repressive policing and incarceration and relegates compassion, restorative justice and rehabilitation to the periphery.

The delegada rightly points out the significance of the crack-cocaine epidemic in current levels of homicide in Brazil, as well as some of the continuing structural problems in Brazilian society – such as poverty, social inequality and inadequate infrastructure in poor communities – ‘they haven’t got pavements or even paved roads’. She defends the role of PPV as it is ‘doing what it can, within its limits’. But there is no consideration of the type of policing that is on offer to those communities, or of the fact that somewhere further up the ladder decisions were made to invest in repressive policing (‘arresting criminals’) as the main method of crime control instead of investing, for instance, in drug rehabilitation or in other social crime-prevention methods (e.g. demilitarised community policing, youth clubs, apprenticeships and employment opportunities).

Nóbrega’s (2012, 93-94) study argues that when it comes to crimes such as homicide there is an inverse relationship between poverty and crime. While poverty declined and investment in welfare increased in northeast Brazil, the number of homicides continued to grow in the 2000s. His thesis is contradicted by the case of Pernambuco, where the rates of homicide were in decline from 2007-2012 in tandem with reductions in poverty and increasing investments in welfare, as shown in earlier
chapters. Nonetheless, Nóbrega does consider one important factor in linking an increasing number of homicides with a growing population of young people (aged 15-29) in northeast Brazil. His data suggest that increasing homicide rates in the region are also connected to various other factors including the crack trade, firearm availability, alcohol consumption, the inefficacy of the institutions of public security (ibid, 37), and the migration of organised crime from the southeast of Brazil to the northeast, with many of the drug shipments seized by the police in Pernambuco found to have come from São Paulo (ibid, 58).

The northeast region of Brazil has had a thriving marijuana business, and indeed has ideal climatic conditions for growing marijuana plants. In 2009, however, the federal police destroyed 1.6 million crops (549 tons) of marijuana in the region, and this dismantling of the business is said to have inadvertently stimulated the trade in crack (ibid, 61), a drug that is more easily transported and harder to detect. The growth of the crack business has been accompanied by a growing number of murders linked directly to the activities of death squads, although the impact of death squads on homicide rates is difficult to analyse (especially in quantitative terms) since data are often based only on killings that have been reported and investigated, leaving out those death squads that have not been dismantled or prosecuted (Nóbrega 2012, 126-138).

According to Wolff (2014) the spread of crack cocaine in Recife brought instability to low-income communities with increases in violence associated with crack addiction. Wolff explains that in Rio de Janeiro traffickers have been able to become organised and coercively establish their authority, informal law and social control over communities because they have access to more wealth, in comparison with Recife. Rio has a higher demand for cocaine from upper- and middle-class clients, and because of the geography of low-income communities in the city (which are often located in hilly areas with narrow alleyways) police and motorised access is more difficult and drug hiding-places more numerous. The case in Recife is dissimilar to Rio in many ways. Most of Recife’s low-income communities are smaller, located on flat land and accessible by car, which facilitates motorised police action.

Furthermore, while marijuana was the predominant drug in the Northeast’s drug market, the profits it provided were significantly smaller than those associated with the crack/cocaine trade. As Wolff (2014) argues, all these factors have made drug traffickers less powerful and less influential in Recife than in Rio de Janeiro,
including in their degree of control over the local trade, thus enabling more competition and small-scale (albeit lethal) disputes. The cocaine trade was never really established in Recife to the same extent as in Rio partly due to lower demand and because Recife’s gangs are less wealthy and less organised (Koster 2009, Wolff 2014). As argued by Garmany (2011b), the greater concentration of wealth in Brazil’s south and southeast regions ensured that these regions had higher demand and a more thriving market for illicit drugs in comparison with the northeast region. Additionally, by being better connected in terms of transport, communication and technology, the drug market developed earlier in the southeast of the country.

According to Wolff (2014) by 1998 crack cocaine had started to spread in Recife, with the consequence that the city began to experience much higher rates of homicides than Rio de Janeiro. A cheaper and highly addictive drug, crack became widespread in poor communities. These particular findings from Wolff’s research – which connect increasing homicide rates with a single factor: the spread of the crack market – are based on interviews with members of the police and therefore provide only a partial account of the dynamics of a high-homicide society. His research had to rely on first-hand data because there is very little written about drug gangs in low-income communities in Recife. Nevertheless, this raises the risk of his research findings becoming skewed.

While crack can be destructive and lead to lethal disputes, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish a single cause or leading cause of violence in Recife. Neither is this the aim of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to note that while there are regional differences in terms of wealth and geography, between Rio and Recife, a number of other factors need to be taken into account in any analysis of violence and the dynamics of public security interventions – not least the impact of the type of policing provided (or not provided), the fluctuation in public policy provision, the spread and impact of small arms, and cultural aspects such as machismo and bravado which influence a cycle of personal revenge. The impacts of rixas (rivalry and interpersonal conflict) need to be taken into account (Rodgers 2009).

As revealed in the ethnographic study of institutionalised young people who committed infractions by Drybread (2014) in the northeast of Brazil, socio-legal constructions of young people, and emotive and local cultural norms and values, play important roles in violent interactions. Drybread’s study revealed that for her
participants – institutionalised male young offenders – masculinity was constructed not in relation to femininity but in relation to age. These young men committed murder to prove themselves as sujeito-homen (man-subjects) instead of children. News reports can also provide illustrative examples of the cultural and emotive rationale that often affects violent relations such as in the case of Isabel de Souza, a three-year-old who was shot in the head during her baptism by a jealous relative who had a rixa with the child’s father. Isabel died in hospital (JC 2015). Likewise, death squad killings of petty criminals must also be taken into account (Alston 2008, Huggins 2010, Ratton 2012).

Regional differences in violence are important because the type of public security policy that needs to be provided must address those differences (Freitas 2013). Data from the Department of Homicide and Protection to the Person in Pernambuco (DHPP-PE) show that almost 32% of cases of homicide are related to drug trafficking, 28.2% are associated with vengeance, 20.5% are linked to interpersonal relations, 7.9% are considered crimes of passion, 7.16% are connected to death squads and 4.14% with fights (Nóbrega 2012, 127-129). These data refer to registered homicides. There is scope for inadequate categorisation or overlap, for example, if a person killed by a death squad hired by drug traffickers (e.g. due to a drug-related debt) or if the same criminal group operates as a death squad and drug trafficking organisation, how should the crime be categorised? Quantitative classifications can be somewhat blurred. How, for instance, is a fight not classified as an interpersonal relation? One important point is that whether or not crack cocaine is the leading cause of lethal death in Recife, security interventions (such as PPV) do not seem equipped to deal with the root causes of crack addiction, neither are they able to deal with crime problems symptomatically, as shown in this thesis. The expansion of repressive policing and incarceration as methods of crime control – part of the war on drugs in which it becomes the norm to blame the poor, the marginalised and drug-addicted for violent relations – obstructs understandings of the causes of crime and hinders the implementation of democratic values in public security interventions.

6.2 Silencing the poor?

So far this chapter had shown that certain narratives about drugs and criminals have been deployed to account for structural violence and crime problems. An
interchangeable issue is dialogue between the police and the recipients of policing, because accountable problem-solving policing requires the public’s cooperation, and information emanating from citizens (Jackson et al. 2013, Lea and Young 1993, Shiner 2016). So one of the main challenges for the current type of policing in the view of police interviewees, in the context in which only the poor are being targeted, is the ‘lei do silêncio’ (law of silence, that is, an unwritten rule in poor communities that residents will not talk to or inform the police, in other words, ‘no grassing’). But if the police are mostly in their cars or inside police stations, instead of establishing connections in the community, it is not surprising that people will not inform or trust the police. Police corruption and inefficiency, are also factors leading to mistrust, so is residents’ fear of revenge:

‘One of the main challenges we face is the predominance of fear. I will give you a very clear example. There is a community, in area 5, ‘Alto Jose Bonifácio’, where an 11-year-old boy was playing on the steps leading up the hill. A guy on a motorbike is going up the steps [riding the motorbike actually on the steps] and shoots the boy. His mum and neighbours see it all, and the mum runs to him. The man in the motorbike threatens her: ‘You’ll let him bleed to death there, you won’t save him. And tell your other son to stop messing around in the area’. This mother would not talk. She would not say anything about who did this. In a place like this, you’d never get any witnesses. If it wasn’t for the investigations, phone taps and intelligence-led policing, we’d immobilised. The way we investigate has improved.’ (Delegada, Civil Police, Imbiribeira DHPP, 7th October 2013)

How do the police obtain information if people refuse to talk to them? According to police interviewees, occasionally an informer will come forward, but the delegada claimed that there is a need for covert police operations, such as telephone tapping, as people in poor communities are too scared to inform the police. This is a significant issue for the Pernambucan police and for many other police forces in Latin America. Moreover, as well as fear, as Denyer Willis (2015, 71) points out, lack of trust in the Brazilian justice system discourages witnesses from stepping forward, making it difficult to resolve cases, particularly homicide, leaving investigations either obstructed or reliant on indisputable evidence such as security camera footage, where
this is available. Other resources include anonymous tips and fingerprints, although these are hardly reliable or available, especially hard scientific evidence (such as fingerprints and DNA samples), given that the police generally hear about cases long after the crime has occurred, are slow to respond to calls, and usually do not even bother to isolate the crime scene with cordons (cf. Garmany 2013, Denyer Willis 2015).

In authoritarian regimes the police enforce security and conduct investigations by instilling fear, through brute and unrestricted force, often using torture, but these methods are unwarranted in democratic regimes, although they continue to be used (Huggins 2010, Zaverucha 2004). As would be expected, none of the police interviewees acknowledged the continuing use of any methods of torture. However, recent media reports – for instance concerning the kidnapping and torture of a law student by civil police; instruments of torture found in a Pernambucan prison; and cases of torture in juvenile detention centres (Cavalcanti 2011, JC 2013, Machado 2011) – and first-hand accounts from interviews conducted in low-income communities suggest otherwise, as will be illustrated in Chapter 7. In a democratic society the police can only attempt to provide security and carry out investigations through means that are respectful of citizens’ human rights, in cooperation with the public and with their consent (Jackson et al. 2013, Shiner 2016, Uildriks 2009, 16). So the lack of dialogue between the police and the public, and the factors and relations that silence the poor – fear of retaliation, sporadic police presence, motorised distant policing, mistrust – are some of the problems that obstruct cooperative police-citizen relations and the implementation of democratic public safety interventions.

6.3 Ethnic, gender and class discrimination

This section reveals that programmes of security and police reform such as PPV have, instead of addressing long-standing problems of segregation and discriminatory policing, aggravated these issues, further restricting access to public space and social relations along class, gender and ethnic lines. In the first part of this chapter interviewees blamed the poor for violence by talking about criminals as impoverished drug addicts and people who refuse to cooperate and communicate with the police due to fear. In this section, a moralising narrative about the poor is observed in interviewees’ opinions about crime. In all cases, poverty and crime are discursively
linked, in the latter in a more discriminatory narrative that directly criminalises poor, *mulato* and black people. The evidence emerging from interviews with members of the police and with residents in low-income communities indicates that both social class and ‘race’ were mobilising factors in police-community interactions. This is not a surprising finding – it is well backed up by the Brazilian and the international literature (Barros 2008, Bowling and Phillips 2007, Goodman and Ruggiero 2008, Hall 1978, Wacquant 2008, Zaluar 2004a) – but nevertheless it is a rather enduring and bleak one. What is distinctive in the evidence here presented is the extent of discrimination, disdain and ethnic and social class divisions in the ways in which community-police relations took form in Pernambuco, despite efforts to reform the police.

The police are the most visible state institution, the ‘State on the streets’ (Hinton 2006). Yet, the very nature of police work can enforce social distinctions and social divisions by enforcing the law against certain citizens in order to protect others. This generates an unequal distribution of public safety. While some citizens receive police protection, others are the targets of police repression. This imbalanced provision of security and the way it affects diverse social groups is what González (2014, 24) calls ‘micro-citizenships’, which is to say constrained or fragmented citizenships. The concept refers not only to the imbalance in the receipt of security provision, but also to its consequences, such as the likelihood that some citizens will refrain from public space and community participation due to fear of crime and inadequate protection, and also the likelihood that some groups will resort to extra-legal measures or ‘take the law in their own hands’.

At the very least, the unequal distribution of policing and disproportionate policing tactics – such as police racial profiling, verbal and physical confrontation with residents of poor communities – generate resentment and hostility towards the methods of the police. The next chapter shows in more detail that this was a key concern for residents, who demanded to be treated with respect and dignity, but instead felt vulnerable to discriminatory and disproportionate policing practices.

Although in theory the police have the job of protecting any citizen in need and enforcing the law against perpetrators, in reality by targeting specific groups – for instance due to societal or institutional misconceptions and prejudice against particular groups or because a particular type of crime, prominent among certain social groups (e.g. drug-related offences instead of tax evasion or police violence) is
targeted – the State and its repressive arm, the police, generate the fragmentation of

citizenships (González 2014, Neocleous 2000). However, this fragmentation is not

simply caused by enforcing the law to protect some groups of citizens against other
citizen groups, but also by societal prejudice and decisions about enforcing certain

laws and prioritising certain crimes (that is, when the State decides to enforce the law
or when it enacts surveillance).

Class discrimination is embedded into everyday interactions, in everyday talk,
in the way spaces in the city are organised. It is widespread in Brazilian society in a
way that is taken for granted by Brazilians. However, for an outsider, the way it
occurs seems less subtle. In an interview with a high-ranking officer from the military
police (major) we talked about the type of violence and drug trafficking that occurs in
the communities that he polices. He complains that the trendy new musical style in
the community only attracts poor people to the area, and is nostalgic about the days
when the clubs in the community played samba and attracted an upper-class clientele.
He directly associates violence with poverty. Even the personal taste of the poor (e.g.

*brega* music) is allegedly a cause for violence:

‘We have this disorderly occupation [housing] in the *morros* [hillside communities], abandoned by the State. […] There is a lack of structure, lack of investment, lack of culture. They have a life that is different to the rest of the city. It is a different reality. If you walk past, [you will see that] these are party people. Sunday to Sunday there is always beer on the bar tables, the music is created in the community, those *bregas* [type of music]. It is mostly young people who are out and about. The other thing is that now it is natural here for women to be the mother *and the father* in the household. They get pregnant and they themselves raise the kids. So what happens is, in these parties, there are a lot of drugs, some people are addicted, others use them regularly. In the past, the clubs in these communities played samba, now it is just *brega*. I have already talked to them to put the samba back on but they choose *brega*. It is a culture shock really. In the past, we had Martinho da Villa, Zeca Pagodinho [famous samba artists], the people that would come to these parties were upper class, you could tell, because they were coming from Boa Viagem [upper-class neighbourhood], and you could tell by their nice cars. With these people, there is no type of violence, no fights, no theft. But
some people are seduced into the hill by young women that have active sexual
lives, and then there are the traffickers, this is when violence occurs.’ (Major,
military police, 1st August 2013)

The major’s view places the blame for violence on poor young women and families perceived as dysfunctional. As he puts it, first, these women get pregnant (almost mysteriously, as the role of men in reproducing is neglected here), then they raise the children themselves – implicitly, these are the children who then become offenders. Then, these women, in his narrative, seduce people into the community, where once again, mysteriously violence occurs when presumably ‘seduced’ people encounter drug traffickers. Young women are thus constructed as a ‘moral danger’ and young men as ‘criminals’ (Loader 1996, 48). The interstices of the asymmetrical power relations with regard to gender, class and age are mixed and meshed in a narrative that simply criminalises people in the peripheries of the city. But the nature of the major’s rhetoric does little to explain crime and much to place culpability on the victims of multiple forms of structural violence.

Even the musical taste of these populations, or any expression of their culture, is blamed and associated with violence. As social scientists have argued (Bourdieu 1984, Skeggs 1997, 2004) judging the tastes of the working class and the poor is a method of enforcing social distances and segregation by the dominant social classes. For Bourdieu, the mechanism through which the dominant classes naturalise their representations and ideas is defined as ‘symbolic violence’ and is developed by institutions and agents of authority. However, the association of crime with poverty, and the repression and criminalisation of activities associated with the poor, is not new in Brazil, as illustrated by the work of Holloway (1989) on the criminalisation of capoeira and the work of Chazkel (2011) on the jogo do bicho (a form of informal gambling known as ‘the animal game’). The behaviour and activities of lower classes in Brazil have historically been perceived by elites as distasteful and threatening, often leading to brutal reactions, surveillance and control by police (Holloway 1993). Just as Denyer Willis (2015) notes, ‘poor black and brown men have been – and are – the subjects of the social processes that criminalise bodies and spaces, alternatively called structural, everyday, institutionalized, or symbolic violence’ (9).

Some officials admitted the problems of class and ethnic discrimination in the police at an institutional level, as well the problem of police corruption, and argued
that more police are now dismissed due to this. While other officers denied discrimination or dismissed its extent, every official interviewed associated crime with poverty, and often with one’s ethnicity, as shown in the extract below, where a homicide detective, a delegada at the Department of Homicide and Protection of Persons civil police station, argues that poor black people are the main ‘recruits’ for criminal lifestyles.

‘Nobody likes the police. If I said that there is no corruption in the police and no discrimination in relation to race and class, I would be lying. But now we have a lot more officers being dismissed. There is prejudice everywhere. But here today the ‘marginal’ [criminal] doesn’t have a stereotype anymore, a stereotype of colour. […] But If I said that this is not a problem anymore I would be lying; it is the poor and black people that are still victims of this recruitment [into crime], unfortunately they are still the main actors in the practice of crime. If the police were just walking about the streets wearing uniforms, preventative police, people would like that. But if you go to make arrests, invade a community at night, knock down some doors to make an arrest, nobody likes that. There is no harmony in this relationship – of course not! But there is no guerrilla [referring to the inexistence of independent armed groups taking part in fighting against the police]. There are exchanges of bullets between criminals and police but more in cases of retaliation, not simply because the police went into the community, this is rare’ (Delegada, civil police, DHPP, 7th October 2013)

Once again, crimes of the powerful, white-collar crimes and crimes committed by the police themselves are not considered. According to the delegada, ‘poor and black people’ are ‘still the main actors in the practice of crime’. This association of crime with poverty is well documented in Brazil, as discussed in Chapter 2. There is a body of literature focusing on critiquing this social representation (see also Nóbrega 2012, Beato and Reis 2000). The delegada notes the type of policing that is delivered to those perceived as criminal, that is repressive policing. As she puts it, making ‘arrests, invading a community at night, and knocking down doors’, all of which causes friction and disdain for the police.
In a study of racial profiling in the Pernambucan police, Barros (2008) conducted a survey with 923 participants (454 in training and 469 already working for the military police), 24 interviews and looked at 1,538 Boletins de Ocorrência (registered police crime records), he found that most officers (65%), most trainee officers (76.9%) and students in the school for non-commissioned officers (74%) believed that black or mixed race people are targeted during stop-and-searches. In line with the delegada’s views above, this approach (targeting on ethnic and class grounds) generates widespread distrust and dislike for the police. The distrust, disdain and dislike often emerge because of the police’s involvement with corruption and discriminatory practices. But rather than being unique to the police, such problems are endemic at most levels of the Brazilian state (Hinton 2006, 11) and, it could be argued, at most levels of Brazilian society. Police reforms and the implementation of PPV have not dealt with these issues. Although according to interviewees a number of dismissals due to corruption have occurred, the training of police and current internal oversight systems have not focused on addressing the lack of police accountability, institutional racism, classism and corruption in the force.

6.4 Rolling out policing

The expansion of policing has the potential to drain state capacity and resources. An issue that was emphasised in many experts’ narratives was the need to recruit more and new staff since PPV had achieved results by focusing on cases of homicide; additionally, by dealing with cases of murder within 24 hours of their occurrence. For experts, the regular monitoring of police targets and the bonus system for achievement were also central to PPV’s achievements, but the achievement of targets depended on the police being well staffed:

‘We don’t have enough officers. I have 740 officers in my battalion. Just one of the neighbourhoods we police has 11,000 inhabitants. We should have at least one officer for every 100 inhabitants to be able to act. In total my battalion polices an area of nearly 200,000 people. Also bear in mind that officers also take holidays, get ill and pregnant, so effectively, we have even fewer.’ (Major, military police, 1st August 2013)
Complaints about the insufficient number of police officers were also common in interviews with the civil police. Yet, policing has increased, and armed militarised police are even present inside public schools. This topic has raised much debate in Pernambuco, as well as internationally (Kupchik 2016). Research studies in the US have found that bringing police inside schools tends to increase the chances that young people will be arrested for minor behaviours and leads to poorer care for young people (ibid, unpaged). In other words, more policing means more criminalisation. Moreover, police officers end up being asked to provide wider services, such as dealing with family crises and the effects of childhood trauma, without being adequately trained for this (ibid). One interviewed major chose a medical metaphor to explain his view of the need for armed policing in schools:

‘Look, the gun is the tool of work for the police, just as the scalpel is a tool for the surgeon. But today the biggest ‘gun’ that we have is the spoken word and dialogue.’ (Major, school patrol, military police, 16th October 2013)

According to the major, the school patrol had been established prior to PPV and was seen as an essential aspect of policing. Schools, in particular state funded schools, had become besieged with firearms and with the spread of the drug trade – students were both dealing and using drugs at school – often this led to violent, and sometimes lethal, conflict at schools, generating a perceived need for policing. Yet, for the major, the school patrol did not just provide repressive law enforcement, it also became involved with educational work, including preventative talks to discourage young people from using and dealing drugs and encouraging them to participate in artistic and sport activities instead. These non-adversarial dialogues were seen as necessary to create opportunities to befriend young people and build positive relationships between the police and the young.

‘[The school patrol] started a few years before Pacto [pela vida], around the year 2000, during the government of Jarbas. We provide motivational talks at schools, sometimes music, many of our officers are musicians or sports people. We try to dissuade young people, as parents ourselves, from becoming involved in a life in drugs’ (Major, school patrol, military police, 16th October 2013)
Despite the ‘armed police at school’ polemic, young people in the schools that I visited during the fieldwork, enjoyed the art and sport activities provided by the school patrol. In one particular school, young people had developed strong relationships with two well-liked officers who visited the school unarmed to provide talks and anti-drug motivational courses, but this was a small initiative with only two officers involved.

6.5 Soldiers

This section explores the strongest self-critique of the public security system, which emerged from interviews with soldados (‘soldiers’, the lowest and initial rank in the militarised police force; those who patrol the streets). Their critique was centred on the inadequacies of the methods and ethos of policing in use, on the fallacies of brutalising training and working conditions, which they viewed as a form of socialisation of police to be violent. Among the interviewees, while the high-ranking officials involved with PPV for the most part praised the government and PPV itself, officials further down the hierarchy tended to be more critical of the programme. Interviews conducted with low-ranking military police officers were arranged through a contact established a few years ago in one of the case-study communities. This set of interview data was very different from the data gathered from interviews arranged through a snowballing method with higher-ranking officers. The interviews were more critical of the government’s approach to crime control. At times, the officers asked to stop voice-recording them, especially when they wanted to talk about issues that could lead to their detention for disciplinary action, since the militarised police continue to abide by a military code of conduct. This was most evident when they discussed data mishandling, violence and corruption in the police:

Roxana – ‘How has Pacto pela Vida changed the work you do?'

Officer Júlia – ‘We have targets, like reducing homicides, but the ethos is still the same. Our boss wants us to be out on the streets dando tapas (slapping people), they don’t understand that a lot of the work we could do is preventative, we could instead be talking to young people and doing some
educational work about drugs and guns. Our boss is not interested in that. How can we reduce homicide with oppressive work? We are hardly trained to use a gun… I think I got a chance to try using one once in my training.’

Interviewees claimed to have had hardly any firearms training and yet were given a gun to carry. Júlia’s partner also said ‘I think I got to shoot a gun once during training, some people didn’t even get one chance as there wasn’t enough ammunition’ (military police soldado Júlio, July 2013). While researchers have debated the variation in the training and use of armaments across nations, for instance, in the US officers are taught to shoot at the centre of mass and in Sweden police are taught to shoot at a suspect’s legs (Maguire 2010, 200), the idea that a military police officer in Brazil can receive a gun to work with after having had hardly any training handling firearms raises concerns about the potential for more widespread and serious misuse of armaments and force. Furthermore, there is a danger that State use of violence can fulfil the ‘brutalisation hypothesis’, which is the idea that state violence can encourage or be used to justify more violence by the general population (Maguire 2010, Shepherd 2005).

Roxana – ‘Really? So what was the rest of the training like?’

Officer Júlia – ‘We have had hardly any training. I think we had about 4 months when we started a few years back. Most of the people who started with me have dropped out. One attempted suicide. We didn’t get our pay for a while; some people couldn’t afford the bus or food during training. It was quite a brutalising experience. You are treated with very little respect, you are shouted at, and your skills are not really put into use. I have a degree but have never used these skills at work.’

While officers like Julia criticised police training – both its quality and availability – higher-ranking officials had claimed that the police were no longer trained to be brutal and violent, and that they were now in the service of communities rather than the State. There is a stark contrast between the claims made by the less powerful low-ranking and the more powerful and politically connected high-ranking officers.
‘In the past we focused on serving [interests of] the State. So if we caught someone on the streets we would give them a beating. I am saying this because it is the reality. The police would kill. ‘Ah [if we come across] bandits we kill them’, and that [approach] was seen as OK. People themselves would celebrate if a bandit was killed. But there has been an evolution in society. Things have changed with Pacto. Before, alcoholism was very common in the force, even in high-ranks. But, in 2004, we had this national training, which included a human-rights module. In 2007, Pacto started and it aims at preserving life, not killing. Today you have a different type of police. The police battalion that hits targets [of reducing homicide] will get a prize, a bonus at the end of the semester, say R$3,000 (approximately £700 at the time of the interview) for an official, R$1,500 for a soldado (initial rank in the military police). Pacto has been saving lives. […] If you ask me, how many people have been killed by the police in my battalion since the start of Pacto, I can tell you, less than 10 people. That is a large difference in comparison to the 1990s.’ (Major, military police, 1st August 2013)

As seen in the two extracts above, while many high-ranking officials had argued that the police had become more humane under PPV and that the ethos of the police was no longer to kill, eliminate or beat criminals, lower-ranking officers casted doubt on the impact of brutalising police training. The initial plan of public security in Pernambuco had proposed a number of reforms. This included police training, such as training in harm reduction for 2% of officers in the military police (PM) and civil police (PC) (PESP-PE 2007, 114) and the training of 16% of officers within 4 years, in courses about: human rights, firearms, public law, violence against women, ethnic and racial relations, prevention and mediation of conflict (ibid, 112-113). The data emerging from interviews with officers suggests that either training proposals were not implemented, or they failed to reach a significant or sufficient part of the police force. Given that officers are equipped with firearms and continuously deal with issues that affect human rights, these training courses and refresher courses should reach all relevant members of the police.

A recent study conducted by a member of the military police in Brazil corroborates the deleterious impact of these contradictions, revealing increasingly emerging critiques within the police and the denial of their importance by older
generations within the police (França and Gomes 2015). As França and Gomes argue, the warrior ethos within the PM training continues to take precedence over the development of skills in negotiation and respect for human rights. The experiences of suffering and physical punishment in police training instigate the military pedagogy and mentality that lauds values associated with masculinity and the use of force, thus contributing to the enactment of police violence on the streets (ibid).

When residents in low-income communities did have contact with the police, it was the military ethos of the patrolling police that prevailed – the police were violent and abusive towards residents – practices that resonate with the hazing in police training (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 148) that is still predominant as argued by the PM soldados interviewed. Huggins’s et al show that hazing in police training was significant to the creation of acceptability of violence (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002). According to Huggins, physically and psychologically punishing exercises, detention for failure to obey to arbitrary authoritarian commands, abusive name-calling and status degradation were all part of the dehumanising militarised police training in Brazil during the military dictatorship years (1964-1985). According to my research participants in low-ranks of the PM, beyond the re-democratisation of Brazil, these same aspects of police training remain present in the militarised police.

Officers argued that the training they were subjected to was brutalising and did not prepare them to deal with civil society. They argued that among the initial recruits who started with them, most had decided to leave the police before their training had ended, seeing that this type of work ‘was not for them’. One trainee had committed suicide, most suffered from anxiety and stress related to the training, work and to bullying from superiors. Six trainees died during interviewee’s training course in car accidents and run over in front of their battalion. According to interviewees, this happened because they were under pressure to return to training on time but were not given enough time to return to the battalion after being out on the streets.

Interviewees also reported that there were months of delay between starting their training and getting their first salary; many had to survive in a situation of severe poverty, with no money for transport, accommodation or food. One trainee had come from the interior of the state and having no payment, no family or friendship networks to support him in the city, he would walk miles after training until the nearest hospital where he would check himself in, this was both his accommodation and a place to
receive some form of nutrition – he received *soro* (intravenous hospital serum), as he could not afford to buy any food. What these examples show is that the institution of a culture of brutalisation in the police as an institution is not generated on the streets, but rather it is present and ingrained from within, noticed in the very beginning of officers’ recruitment and training. The provision of basic police rights is significant to any police force or state that wants to reform because ‘ultimately human rights values can only be expected to be internalised by police if, they are treated likewise’ (Uildricks 2009, 14).

Another problem with their training, according to participants, was that it was inconsistent and not available for all officers. For example, some officers had not received any training for 4 years, since they started working for the police. However, some of their colleagues had been selected and sent to further training courses. This privilege, they explained, was not universal as there were not enough officers to patrol each area, so further training would take them away from urgent patrolling duties. They explained that there had been some changes in the curriculum of the last set of recruited police officers, including the addition of a module on community policing. The officers interviewed had not received this training. They did not believe that their training could prepare them for policing civilian communities.

This is an important difference in comparison to Huggins’s *et al* (2002) research. While in *Violence Workers* many officers had accepted the status quo, and became executioners, torturers or atrocity facilitators, my low-ranking participants critiqued the police force’s training and practices and viewed those as archaic and in need of reform. This does not deny the role of hazing in police training in shaping the outcomes of the type of policing that is enacted on the streets. Many residents, as seen in the next chapter, complained about police violence and brutality. Certainly militarised dehumanising and brutal training plays an important part in shaping the identities and practices of many officers in the force. However, while Huggins *et al* aimed to interview police that were involved in atrocities, it must be noted that our samples are clearly different. My police sample was established on the basis of access, experience of having worked during the PPV years and willingness to be interviewed. Nonetheless, what both my data and Huggins’ *et al* data show is that the training of Brazilian police remains inadequate and brutalising.

The critique made by low-ranking officers went beyond the inadequacies of training and extant police culture. They also questioned the accuracy and reliability of
police and homicide statistics and raised questions about the unequal distribution of policing across neighbourhoods. Those issues are illustrated in the extract below:

‘During carnival I worked in the office computing the homicide stats. Our boss wants to hit the targets so that he gets a bonus. We were told not to compute some of the deaths. There was not much we could do, otherwise we would be at risk of disciplinary action. We can even be imprisoned. I don’t really believe that Pacto [pela Vida] has made much difference. I live in a low-income community myself, we have hardly any policing. I see a police car pass by but I don’t see them do anything. The police don’t know how to abordar (approach/stop and search) a citizen. The police are sent to particular areas where they are on ‘show’ or when it is near an election. […] Pacto pela Vida made some changes. They divided the city in different areas [áreas integradas de segurança, or AIS], some motivational plans were created to motivate officers. And more officers were contracted. We definitely have a lot more police officers than we did before Pacto.’ (Officer Júlia – PM)

Officer Júlia, just like other residents in the community, expressed a lack of satisfaction with the type of policing that is available in low-income communities. Many of Brazil’s low-ranking officers, like Júlia and her colleague, live in the very low-income communities that are the subjects of police criminalisation, where much of the population is targeted as ‘suspect’. The officers’ complaints were very similar to those of the residents. They see a police car occasionally going past but they do not see any intelligence-led policing taking place or any actual policing on the streets. Just as the majority of interviews with officers and officials emphasised, Pacto pela Vida focused on repressive policing action and very little on preventative work.

During an interview with two low-ranking police officers who both live in low-income communities, they asserted that despite the fact they are police officers living in the community, there is not enough policing actually taking place in their communities. They argued that the police are in fact rarely present, and even when they are present there is much corruption in the high-ranks of the police, so that if they arrest a drug trafficker, he will have important political allies or friends in the police and the case will be dropped. This is much like the argument made by Arias (2006; 2010), that the continuation of trafficker power and violence in poor
communities can be associated with extended networks between criminals, politicians, state actors and community actors.

The officers interviewed argued that they knew better than to interfere in their own community, where they felt vulnerable and where their families are exposed to arbitrariness and risk experiencing cruelty and vengeance from local criminals. Both officers claimed that most of the increase in police presence seen during the implementation of PPV focuses on protecting high-income neighbourhoods, especially during election periods. Throughout the last election period, the mayor extended the number of police cars and officers and asked them to go on ‘display’ to upper-class neighbourhoods. In the officers’ words: *Foi um puro circo* (literally, ‘It was a pure circus [show]’).

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter’s findings warrant at least two important contributions to the debate on public security and the criminological literature. First, they expose some of the ingrained and continuing forms of social and power inequalities extant in the security apparatus, as well as its institutional failure to address deep-seated and longstanding issues of corruption and discrimination, which primarily affect people living in low-income communities. Second, they enable an examination of a counter-narrative about security policies emerging from state actors themselves. This counter-narrative illustrates concerns about the inadequacy of increased and repressive policing in resolving crime in Brazil, as well as concerns about the structure of the police and the type of police training that is available. As suggested in the introduction of this chapter, these findings complement a growing body of literature about policing in the Global South.

The enduring issues of classism, sexism and racism in the police, explored in this chapter, impede the possibility of consensual intelligence-led policing. These affected the possibility of improving the quality of police-community interactions, and contributed to a lack of trust in the police, which ultimately reinforces the ‘law of silence’ (the informal rule of not informing on somebody, not ‘snitching’) in poor communities. The chapter showed that problems in the training and brutalisation of officers before they start working also reduce the prospects for positive community-police relations. In other words, it was argued that continuing and unaddressed issues
of classism, racism and training in the public security apparatus mar the application of safety policies and interventions, insofar as these policies cannot promote the safety of the most marginalised and vulnerable if these populations are continuously perceived and treated as criminal and undeserving of respectful treatment.
CHAPTER 7 – Public perceptions of crime, safety and policing: The case study communities

What intended and unintended effects (if any) have new public security interventions such as Pact for Life (PPV) had on the communities most affected by high rates of homicide? The preceding chapters outlined and discussed the emergence and impacts of this new public security intervention from the perspective of state actors. This chapter complements these data by affording a focus on the experiences of public safety of members of civil society and young people living at the margins. This chapter asks: How do the subjects of this new security programme perceive it? What impacts has PPV had on their experiences of security and on the type of security that is on offer in their communities? This chapter critically examines the impact of managerialist criminological ideologies on the quality of policing, police accountability and on the relationship between marginalised community residents, young people and the police in Brazil.

Studies focusing on the Anglo-Saxon experience have argued that young people’s frequent use of public space has made them more available as a population to be policed, and that safety interventions and methods of policing have increasingly criminalised, excessively policed (often on the basis of their socio-economic status) and yet also under-protected those young people (Loader 1996, McAra and McVie 2005, Squires and Goldsmith 2010). But to date, few academic studies have focused on young people’s experience of policing in the context of the new public security initiatives and state building exercises, especially in the northeast of Brazil. The experiences of young people in northeast Brazil share some similarities and distinctions in comparison with the southeast of the country and elsewhere in the world. However, there is currently no published work that provides insight into how young people in low-income communities respond to new policing interventions such as PPV. This chapter asks what shifts, continuities, and silences can be observed in the field of public safety from the perspective of youth in Recife’s periferias.

The chapter provides a glimpse of the world and perceptions of Brazilian non-elites that are poorly understood and rarely examined. The data were gathered in two low-income communities in Recife’s metropolitan region. First, this chapter explores the demographics and socio-economic context of these two case study communities.
Second, it focuses on an examination of the data emerging from the first case-study community: Tourinho. The findings reveal that young people perceive the police as brutal and distant. Third, the chapter examines data from the second case study community, Vitoria. It shows some similarities in the perceived problems of the public security system in comparison with Tourinho.

After months of fieldwork in periferias in the northeast of Brazil, negative experiences of policing and of life at the edge of the city in communities where drug trafficking and extermination groups torment the life of residents became noticeable and recurring themes. These data are complemented with residents’ experiences of criminalisation, seen in their narratives about the imposition of disrespectful policing on poor residents perceived as deserving (trabalhadores or workers) and the treatment of these residents as bandidos (criminals). The chapter argues that the continuing conflation of poverty and criminality, and the racialisation of punitive crime control, continues despite recent police reforms and the implementation of new security programmes. As such, it provides a counter-narrative from below and a critique of the hegemonic technocratic discourse of ‘success’ in public security intervention that were deployed by state actors in Chapter 5. Managerial reforms have exacerbated some of the ills of the Brazilian criminal justice system. For example, police in Brazil adopt illegal practices to reach quantitative targets, the model of policing has remained practically unchanged and protection rackets and organised criminals continue to operate from within prisons.

7.1 Demographics

Recife, the capital city of the state of Pernambuco, is located in the northeast of Brazil, a region that was a hub for the sugar cane industry in the 16th century (Schepers-Hughes 1993). Although sugar cane remains the most important crop in the region, its economic importance has declined. There are large industrial plants in the city’s suburbs, but most of the economy relies on the service sector, it being estimated that 60% of the population works in the private service sector (Koster 2009). In contrast to other large Brazilian metropolises, where poor communities are generally concentrated in peripheral areas, Recife has a large number of slums scattered across the city, but its periferias do also tend to have higher concentrations of poverty.
The first case study community, Tourinho, as defined by participants in the area, comprises two adjacent neighbourhoods located in the peripheries of the metropolitan region of Recife, with a total of 41,097 inhabitants. The boundaries of the community are hard to define, even for residents themselves. A smaller part of the community (under 3,000 residents) is part of the city of Recife while the largest part belongs to the metropolitan region of Recife, more specifically it is located within a neighbouring municipality: Jaboatão dos Guararapes. Demographic data about the neighbourhood’s population in Recife are easily accessible; however, detailed data about neighbourhoods in Jaboatão are not available. For this reason, most of the data here presented are limited to the smaller better-off section of the community.

In the 19th century, the territory belonged to an engenho (sugar mill) and early in the 20th century the population began to settle in the area. Today the community is constituted of a combination of small gated terraced houses, some two- and three-storey buildings, some irregular settlements and some small local businesses. Most residents have metal bars around their houses’ windows and doors, gates and sometimes guard dogs. The average monthly household income is R$1,296 (the equivalent of £298 in 2013) and the average household consists of 3 people. This
income is probably an overestimate since data on the poorer side of the community, belonging to the municipality of Jaboatão dos Guararapes, are not available.

The only data available about the part of the community located within the Jaboatão dos Guararapes municipality show that there are over 3,000 households considered by the State as ‘abnormal agglomerates’ in the community, or in other words, ‘abnormal housing’, slums or irregular settlements (IBGE 2010). Over 10,000 people live in these impoverished households, on average 3.4 people per household.

The population is 54.5% female and 45.5% male. According to the local city council (Recife 2013), the population is ethnically 54% pardo (mixed background), 35.5% white, 9% black, 0.95% amarela (yellow) and 0.54% indigenous; 37% of the community is aged under 25 (see Table 7). The second case study community, Vitoria, is situated in the north part of Recife, adjacent to a middle-class neighbourhood and it is constituted of several smaller low-income communities. According to the local city council (Recife 2013), its population is 33% white, 55% parda (mixed background), 10.23% black, 1% amarela (yellow) and 0.22% indigenous. Nearly 40% of the population is aged under 25 (see Table 8).

Table 7: Demographics of Tourinho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population by age</th>
<th>% Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 4 years</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 14 years</td>
<td>15.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 17 years</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 24 years</td>
<td>11.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 59 years</td>
<td>50.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 years plus</td>
<td>11.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8: Demographics of Vitoria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population by age</th>
<th>% inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 4 years</td>
<td>6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 14 years</td>
<td>15.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 17 years</td>
<td>5.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 24 years</td>
<td>12.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 59 years</td>
<td>49.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 years plus</td>
<td>10.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from the local city council (Recife 2013) show that Vitoria occupies an area of 160 hectares and has a total of 31,025 inhabitants (193.38 inhabitants per hectare), 46.74% are male and 53.26% female. There are 9,113 households in the area and an average of 3.4 people per household. The average monthly household income is R$ 1,166 (the equivalent of £268 at the time of writing).

The local government published a series of reports about the human development index (HDI) of Recife’s neighbourhoods, with the support of a United Nations project (PNUD, Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento) in the 2000s. The data refer to the years 1991 and 2000. Although this is over a decade ago, it does give some indication of socioeconomic conditions in both studied communities. The HDI was created to provide a point of comparison in terms of development between countries and it includes data about income, life expectancy and education. The HDI in the upper-class neighbourhood of Boa Viagem in Recife was 0.964 in the year 2000, this was equivalent to Norway’s HDI. Meanwhile the HDI in Tourinho was 0.751 and in Vitoria, it was 0.731 in 2000, respectively equivalent to the HDI of Kazakhstan and Ecuador (Bitoun 2005). These figures, although quite dated, and somewhat imprecise, exemplify the extent of social inequalities within the city.

While since the 2000s there have been some economic improvements in Brazil, as shown in Chapters 1 and 2, such as mild reductions in income inequality and increasing social investments in welfare and education, Brazil continues to be a highly unequal country in which the population’s ability to consume, often through credit, has increased. So one can easily find well-dressed people in low-income communities using mobile phones and cars. But access to education (especially higher education), adequate public transportation, healthcare, housing and public safety, among other public goods, continues to be precarious and unequally distributed throughout Brazilian cities.

7.2 Tourinho: distant and brutal policing

‘The ROCAM\textsuperscript{35} (militarised police patrol on motorbikes) gave him a baculejo (a forceful or violent stop and search). They looked at his carteira de identidade (ID card), took 40 reais (equivalent to approximately £13 at the time) from his wallet and called him a shameless cripple. He wasn’t disabled
or anything, he might have smoked [marijuana] and he had a broken leg’
(Luther, community resident and activist, September 2013)

Young people’s experiences of stop and search were traumatic. Their friends’
experiences were also traumatic and resonated known problems of coercive and
militarised policing (Huggins 1998). Although the program PPV had increased
sporadic policing to some extent, by increasing motorised police patrols and police
 crackdown operations, it had not so far improved the quality of policing, neither the
quality of the interactions and dialogue between the police and community residents
or the level of police accountability. Policing did not resemble what is known
internationally as community policing. The baculejo illustrates the continuity of the
inadequate, violent and adversarial policing. This term was first referred to in the
methodology chapter. It is used locally to describe a violent or coercive ‘stop and
search’ where the police may, for instance, apply pressure to the suspect’s interlaced
fingers while his/her hands are on his/her head, punch the suspect or kick his/her legs
to spread them open.

This approach provoked much disdain for the police in the community. In a
focus group in Tourinho, young people argued that although cases of homicide might
have decreased, other forms of violence continue in the community. They argued that
this violence was different from what they saw on TV in Rio de Janeiro, where they
often heard reports of police entering communities shooting. They argued that in
Pernambuco, instead, the police entered the community dando lapada (giving out
beatings). Some young people referred to the police as the capitão do mato, a
historical character from the time of slavery, who was responsible for capturing
fugitive slaves and punishing those who caused disorder or who disobeyed their
masters. The analogy said much about the type of policing available for poor black
and mulato communities.

The analogy of the capitão do mato dando lapada has parallels to the general
state approach to these communities, insofar as the access to general public services
beyond policing, is also inadequate and socially unjust. The living conditions of those
communities in the periferias, favelas and informal settlements in 21st century Brazil
are illustrated in the following field note observation from an afternoon in July 2013:
'At nearly 2pm I got off a bus, which barely squeezed through the narrow paved roads and alleys leading to the community. As I walked into the unpaved roads of the community I noticed cheerful people sitting outdoors on plastic chairs chatting. There were occasional bits of pavement to walk on, some open sewage running down the street and uncollected bits of rubbish scattered around, stenches of odour in the air. The weather was still and the heat reflected off the brick and concrete walls around. Some of the decaying small brick houses that formed the community and the apartment blocks had been built in the 1970s near the prison. But despite the appearance of deterioration, rents were surprisingly high, the funding I had naively set aside for accommodation would hardly cover the monthly cost (R$350, approximately £116 at the time) of renting a single room in a home in Tourinho’

Outward appearances said little about the people who live in Tourinho. Many of the people encountered during the fieldwork were active members of social movements, active in local politics, innovative people capable of reinventing themselves and being creative and organised. In a meeting with Lourdes in the small building where she ran an NGO in Tourinho that provides leisure and cultural activities, sports and arts training to young people in the peripheries of the city, she explained that there is a high demand for housing in the area as many of the prisoners’ family members want to live near the prison, as well as traffickers who kept business ties with inmates, pushing the price of rents upwards. Lourdes was quick to deflect attention away from negative connotations about the community and was keen to present positive and innovative images of its people. She explained her work in the community:

‘The group [NGO] started in the porch of my house. Some of the guys used to tag walls with spray paint during the night… we didn’t have the financial means but we decided to get together and put what little we had together to form a group that would do something for the community… using drawing, tagging, graffiti. We have been together 10 years […] and have won prizes due to our community work taking kids off the street.’
Lourdes became one of the co-researchers in this project and enabled access to a larger sample of residents and young participants; she also became a key informant. In a focus group towards the end of the fieldtrip, Lourdes was less reluctant to talk about security or topics that risked associating marginalised people in the peripheries with crime. She explained that distant policing was one contributing factor to inadequate security provision since the police were unable to develop relationships in the community that would facilitate their work. In her words ‘If Pacto pela Vida is something that should get to us, they should have contact with the community and know what happens here. But they don’t know the reality of the community. É eles lá e nós aqui (they are over there and we are here)’  

A young female elaborated that the problem was not solely that the police had little contact with residents, but also that the contact they had, tended to be brutal and lacked dialogue:

‘They [the police] don’t arrive chatting; it is all done on the base of violence. I watched them stop a group of four guys the other day and ask for their ID cards. The boys didn’t have their IDs. The police ordered them to put their hands on their heads. One guy was a bit slow so the officer gave him a bufetada [a slap] that sent him into a wall and then to the ground. It is better to trust a thief than the police. One side is insecurity, the other is fear’ (Estrela, 17 years old, white, Tourinho, 29th October 2013)

Having to face threatening behaviour by the police was the norm for the young people in this study. Numerous accounts of police misconduct emerged in our conversations, from minor to severe verbal and physical abuse. Just as Brinks (2008) argued, the communities that were least patrolled were the recipients of the most acute forms of police brutality. Marquinhos, a young mulato male, was picked up and taken to the police station with three friends, and described this negative encounter:

‘The officer sat next to his partner, with his gun pointed at us. We asked him, ‘Could you not point your pistol at us? None of us is a bandit’ he replied ‘You want me to point it at my partner, do you?’’, so I said [sarcastically] ‘But in our direction it’s ok, is it?’ He got up, went towards a guy who he’d arrested, and stepped on his hands like this [demonstrates]. Then he started asking the boy where the boca (drug-selling point) was. After 30 minutes of massagem
(literally ‘massage’, but meaning beating/torture), the boy was pianinho-
pianinho (docile/withdrawn).’

Such methods of policing and governing the young and the marginalised are reminiscent of Foucault’s (1979) work on criminal justice institutions insofar as they attempt to discipline the body of the excluded. The exception is that, in Tourinho, governing the marginalised continues to entail physical brutality against the bodies of young poor and black males, and continued to be visible in public spaces well beyond medieval times. Therefore, the European Foucauldian framework does not enable an understanding of the continuing issues of visible physical violence against the marginalised in ex-colonies, such as Brazil. These issues can only be understood in the historical and socio-economic context of Brazil (discussed in Chapter 2) taking into consideration the narratives that make continuing forms of violence and problematic methods of police reform intelligible (as discussed in Chapter 5).

Existing policing practices caused fear and anger in the community. But fear emerged from other sources too, beyond local criminals and the police, the local prison and its guards were another part of the State that caused distress and carried negative connotations for residents. As I walked around Tourinho with Lourdes, around one of the largest prisons in Latin America, I was told that there were regular shootouts by the prison wall. ‘Guards shoot at people trying to throw parcels over the wall’, she said, ‘only last week I was on my phone walking down this street when I heard the shots and run [to avoid a stray bullet]. The community lives with these dangers on a daily basis’.

Proximity to the prison meant that many participants were in tune with the dynamics of prison-community relations and aware of the ways in which the prison meshes with the periferias. The intensification of policing that came with PPV, the increasing targeting of drug offenders and incarceration of members of extermination groups had caused important changes in the landscape where organised criminal groups operate. Although a recent study by Wolff (2014) claims that criminal behaviour in Recife’s low-income communities remains ‘unconstrained by the organisational and socialization dynamics of prison gangs’ (p. 97), according to residents of low-income communities surrounding the prison, criminals in Recife’s prisons do indeed have an impact in the community even from within the prison’s walls.
According to residents, Recife’s prison inmates have control over drug shipments. They also coerce residents to hiding inmates in their homes when there is a prison escape and coerce young people in the community to throw parcels containing weapons and drugs over the prison wall. A study conducted by a Brazilian scholar, Arruda (2014), contradicts Wolff’s point too. Arruda’s study, which was conducted with ex- and current inmates inside Pernambucan prisons, showed that well-connected prisoners have control over and involvement with criminal organisations operating inside and outside the prison. This is supported by data emerging through conversations with residents in Tourinho.

For local residents, PPV’s methods had done little to reduce fear and insecurity. The increasing use of inadequate and chaotic prisons and local young offenders’ institutions aggravated residents’ anxieties. These institutions were the sources of multiple examples of corruption, firearm and drug trafficking affecting the community and other state institutions, such as the school. Lourdes had arranged an interview with a local teacher Samuel (25 years old, white, Tourinho) who discussed these anxieties in the following extracts of our conversation:

Roxana – ‘What are the main problems faced by young people in your neighbourhood?’

Samuel – ‘I think the lack of space, lack of activities, drugs, violence and fear. This is the society of fear. Some of my students are armed in the classroom selling drugs. I leave my home and I don’t know whether I will come back again. About ten years ago my neighbours could sit outdoors till late playing dominos. Now by 8pm everyone is indoors. I was in a music gig [in the community] the other day but it had to be interrupted because two people were murdered. I see children working as aviãozinhos [delivering drugs or messages for drug dealers]. I live near the FUNASE (a young people’s detention centre) and just this week 100 young offenders escaped. All that? How? Did anybody see it happen? How do they get hold of guns? Through the police themselves. It costs R$40 reais (about £13 at the time) for a little gun, R$300 (about £100 pounds at the time) for a [model] 38.’

Roxana – ‘Really? So how difficult is it to get hold of a firearm?’
Samuel– ‘It’s very easy to buy guns. The police themselves sell guns to bandits. Unfortunately, we have to live as if we were in prison. In my house I use 8 locks, but it has to be like that, there are armed men constantly walking by. There’s no security for us. But [pauses sarcastically, and sighs] they have built the arena (the football stadium for the 2014 World Cup).’

Residents saw that the State had funds to make certain investments, such as spending on the preparations for large sporting events, but public money was hardly ever invested in the communities most at need. These communities bore the brunt of the availability of firearms, police corruption and violence and drug trafficking, all of which became familiar themes in interviews with community residents. Residents provided ample evidence of the systematic violation of their civil rights – not least the right to safety. In this context, for many young men, access to firearms and involvement in the drug trade offered an artificial form of safety, a level of income that occasionally available, often temporary, minimum wage jobs could not afford them (see also Goldstein 2003). Top-down public security policies had not affected people on the ground level, since policing had hardly changed in their view.

Roxana – ‘How about the police? Are they around when this is happening?’

Samuel – ‘Most of the time the police car is carrying a novinha (attractive young 16-17 year-old female). Most of us have no contact with the police. They are just there in their cars… We never talk. People with money wet [bribe] the hands of the police and get their attention. The police work for the government but really they act like a private service. Those who can’t wet their hands don’t receive any attention. The police don’t know how to approach us, they have poor training and go straight to the tapa (slap/violence).’

These are familiar complaints throughout Brazil: police violence; the lack of dialogue in police-community interactions; and ineffective, distant policing – ‘the police are just there in their cars… we never talk’. When residents did encounter the police they
were stereotyped, considered to be criminals on the basis of their appearance and where they live, and were subjected to repression:

‘There are many menores (young people under 18) being killed in brutal ways here. The impact of crime is large. The community has not mobilised about this. The police are violent and don’t work properly and they judge by appearance’ (Najha, male, 18 years old, mixed ethnic background)

‘The government have invested a lot in repression, little in education and little social assistance, they have reduced the number of homicides, [but] increased the prison population’ (Baque forte, male, 33 years old, black)

Another key informant and co-researcher, Luther, commended this critique. Luther, an activist and arts teacher from the community, teaches graffiti to schoolchildren, on a temporary ‘verbal’ contract with the local municipality. He doesn’t have carteira assinada (signed employment contract and official employment documentation). He says that the municipality doesn’t want any commitment with employees like him. And he will get a little extra cash being on a verbal contract since his taxes are not being paid. He is also involved with the same NGO where Lourdes works. The following is an extract of a conversation we had while he showed me around the neighbourhood, explaining that repressive policing and the prison could not resolve drug related offences in the community:

Luther – ‘We live right where the drug trafficking occurs. It is up to you if you want to go up or not. That is where they stay waiting for people coming to buy.’

Roxana – ‘Are the customers coming from outside the community or from within the community?’

Luther – ‘Most are from the community. For the young people it’s like a job. Sometimes they get into trouble with the police but a couple of weeks later someone else will take on that job. So it’s this circle of things, the drugs are always around. […] That big derelict house was a FEBEM (young offender’s
institution). Then it was mostly used as a base for drug sales and it has also been used for prostitution. A girl was killed selling drugs here, during the night. Don’t worry, we are OK [safe] here in the daytime. We think a group of guys came to take her stash and killed her. But art has power to change things, we did some work here to reclaim the building, we got a donation and used the money to buy tins of spray paint to do our [graffiti] work here. These two girls over there, they are selling drugs, they hide it in the bushes until they get a customer with cash. Some people have been caught here by undercover police. People who sell need guns to defend themselves, if someone comes to take their stash. […] That quadra (cement football pitch) over there is also another ‘point’ for drugs. That area over there is a favela invasion. Over that hill is where the drugs are being sold now. We can go up if you want, it is safe to go up with me now. They know me around here’

[We go up a steep alleyway]

Luther – ‘Dá-le Edson [greets a friend walking pass]. This is the reality here, those small kids are selling drugs, some as young as 9 or 11 years old’

Roxana – ‘Are there many people out at night here?’

Luther – ‘Most people selling drugs are out at night, that is when the money is there to be made, the rest of the residents are usually indoors, unless they study or work at night. So some of those guys sitting on that wall over there are lookouts, if the police come over they’ll use their mobile phones to let the patrão know that sujou (they inform the boss). Some of these young men have orders to retaliate and shoot at police, they have position of respect with the boss so they are given a gun to carry around their waist. Others will run into the mata [woods] where in the dark it’ll be very hard to see them. You don’t need to go far to see children involved in the drug trade.

[…] Many politicians come around promising bricks and cement. Asking for a vote. But don’t actually do anything for the community. The houses here are mostly rented; they are expensive 300-350 reais a month (£100-116 at the
People who work here try to save to build a house and rent it. […] Some of these guys are working in the trade to send money to other guys who got caught and are in prison. There is this aspect of power in the drug trade. The trade is so ‘banal’, people from the community walk pass and don’t even look. On this street here, the guys throw bags of drugs over the walls of the prison wall, sometimes it has been arranged even with the security man in the prison or arranged by mobile phone with the guys inside’

Luther’s account reveals many similarities to the experiences of cities like Rio de Janeiro, insofar as very young children become involved in the drug trade, sometimes as lookouts and eventually as armed guards for the trade. His narrative retells well-known problems of clientelism and state neglect for living conditions in the neighbourhood. When residents were asked what could be done to resolve the issue of insecurity and drug related violence, most participants pointed to the government and the State as responsible for these tasks. They explained that they had already done their share of the work by paying taxes, so they expected better policing and more state investment in spaces for leisure in the community, activities and better training opportunities for the young, as well as more investment in the creation of good quality well paid jobs and less corruption in the police and the State more generally. Community residents explained that these were some of the reasons why they had joined the 2013 street protests.

During the fieldwork, one hundred and sixteen respondents in the two case study communities were asked to rate the work of the police in their communities. While only seven respondents (6%) perceived police work as satisfactory, 32 participants (32%) said that policing was average or regular in their community (33% chose not to respond and 28% said that the quality of policing was poor or terrible). Despite the ills of the police, residents demanded more policing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police work rating</th>
<th>N. of participants</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor/terrible</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer not to say</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 9: Police work rating
Luther angrily summarised the community’s security demands and the racial and social inequalities experienced in the community (and possibly in most of the country), especially relating to policing and criminal justice:

‘There is some policing here because the prison is inside the community. It is bad with the police and worse without them. What the community needs is more professionals, educators, psychologists, social workers and so on. But because of the police’s culture, they suspect anyone that walks by with a plastic bag in their hand; they stop and search because in poor communities the police see everyone as a bandit. I’ve seen this with my own eyes. It is normal here. If you live near the *boca de fumo* (drug sales point) they are immediately rude to you. For them, any citizen out on the streets at 11pm is involved [in the drug trade]. If a rich kid gets caught, they are labelled chemically dependent [on illicit drugs] and taken to rehab, if a poor guy is caught, he’s thrown in the prison. What is the use of the Brazilian prison? It just jails the mind 24 hours a day. You never hear of a young person who left a Brazilian prison and started university. The carceral system doesn’t regenerate anyone’.

Luther’s views about the prison were not unique in the communities studied. Other residents supported the critical view that the prison has few functions other than to exclude certain groups in society since, as Luther put it, the prison does not stop crime or rehabilitate offenders: it ‘doesn’t regenerate anyone’. Luther and three other community activists had spent time in youth penal institutions (e.g. FUNASE) providing arts workshops to young offenders, and reported the horrors of the conditions in which young people were incarcerated in these institutions. These included common cases of torture, risk of losing one’s life with frequent killings and rebellions, overcrowding and insufficient socio-educative programmes. Although this thesis is not about the youth justice system, these are important problems that warrant further research because the cumulative effects of changes in public security policies
have profound implications for multiple criminal justice institutions, for human rights and societies more broadly. These issues deserve more attention and discussion.

7.3 Vitoria: workers vs. criminals

Access to the Vitoria was facilitated through a contact in a local school. Most of the participants at the school were students aged between 16 and 18. However, some were mature students who also lived in the community or had returned to education to attend evening classes. Some of the staff that lived in the community were also interviewed, like Zefinha, the school chef, a resident since the 1970s. Zefinha explained that when she first moved to Vitoria, there were few houses; there were many trees and green spaces. But as more and more houses were self-built by residents and their growing families, there is now barely any unoccupied space in the area and hardly any leisure spaces for young people. Almost every space is needed for housing and every space is used. She explained that there was plenty of work around in the past, but in the last decade, the community saw the establishment of the drug trade, in particular the crack cocaine business and drug dealers became the main employer in the community. According to residents, like Zefinha, in the drug trade young people can earn better wages, but this business has brought a rise in drug related disputes and homicides. Many students, she explained, are drug users and drug dealers. However, this was not immediately noticeable. The following field note highlights the most evident issues in Vitoria: the inadequate provision of state services, poverty and brutal policing:

'It was eleven thirty in the morning. Approximately 30 children were lying on the concrete floor, in a space of about 12m²; then they were move around, working out. There is plenty of loud talking and screaming on the background. An adult monitors what they do. This is their physical exercise class. The school’s amenities are very small and there are no green spaces or recreational areas, other than this concrete floor where the young people are exercising. The security guard opens the door and lets me in. The admin staff are running

1 To read more about the youth justice system in Pernambuco consult Amorim, Melo, and César (2016), Nolasco (2010) and Schuler (2015).
around trying to attend to all the requests and answer all the questions posed by young people who are coming into the small air-conditioned office area. The atmosphere is tense and the staff seem stressed. The students, who are coming in, want to know whether they will have any classes or any teaching. Some of the teachers have not turned up for work. One of them called to say she had childcare issues that day. Another teacher had been sporadically coming to work due to health problems. There was no one to substitute them. The admin staff are trying to operate a miracle with the timetable. They explain this is a daily occurrence because, the state government hires most teachers on temporary contracts, and according to the admin staff, temporary workers often have little regard for the school or the children. I sit down to wait for my interviewee, Gustavo. I am nearly five months pregnant and my bump is already visible, giving rise to a lot of interest and questions from the young people. They ask about the gender of the baby, if my son will have an English name, and where he will be born. I try to steer the conversation to learn more about the young people. Gustavo is late. More young people come into the office, they ask for new rucksacks. The school’s deputy director tells me that the children sell the rucksacks that they are given at school for R$10 (roughly £3 at the time). The young people claim that the last rucksack they were given was damaged, or ended up stolen or lost. A small child walks in the office with no uniform. He looks about ten years old. He is delivering food for the staff from a local business. He receives some change for his work. Since Gustavo has not arrived and I cannot get hold of him on the phone, I agree to provide cover for the absent teachers and deliver an English class. The students are thrilled, they ask if I can stay and teach them every day. Gustavo arrives after my class. He is tall, moreno (mixed ethnicity) and quiet. He is sixteen years old and has recently committed some offences in the community. The staff at the school were keen to warn me about this. His latest known infraction was the theft of a motorbike in front of the school. He gives me short answers to most of my initial questions but when we start talking about police-community relations he decides to tell me about one of his encounters with the police in the neighbourhood. “I was out at midnight with four friends, we were coming back from a football match in the stadium, we watched Sport against Náutico. The police stopped us and asked what we were
doing out at that time. We said we’re coming back from the football. Then they started beating us to the ground, kicking and punching us. A neighbour woke up and called two of his brothers who work for the civil police to stop them. We went to the police station the next day but nothing was done about it.” Despite reporting the crime, and despite nothing being done about it by the police, Gustavo says he would like more policing in the neighbourhood to feel safer. He explains that not all the police are violent and corrupt.’ (Field note, 2nd October 2013)

The differential treatment that the police provide to different sectors of society, which often depends on one’s social class, but also ethnicity, age and gender, generates hostility in community-police relations. This was the case in both case-study communities. Paradoxically, despite being exposed to inappropriate safety provision and differential policing, people in low-income communities demand more policing. This section explores this problem drawing on data from the second case study community: Vitoria. The section also discusses the effects of the construction of residents as workers or *bandidos* (common criminals, rather than bandits). Note that in Brazil there is no connotation in everyday use of the term *bandido* to Hobsbawm’s (2000) social bandits or Robin Hood.

The local *escola estadual* (state-funded school) where most of the research was conducted in Vitoria, like the remainder of the neighbourhood, occupies a particular space in the city, an area seen as undesirable and peripheral (*periferia*), a working-class neighbourhood, spatially segregated from the predominantly white middle and upper class parts of Recife and yet interconnected to the city through the workers, voters and people that live in Vitoria. The neighbourhood is densely populated with small self-built brick houses, with some narrow pavement on some streets, most of which have open sewers, no green spaces such as parks or gardens, and hardly any public spaces where residents could gather, except for the *quadrinha* (a cement football field) where young men gather to smoke licit and illicit substances and where some drug dealers conduct their business.

The interviews were conducted at the school, sometimes at the small dusty library (which was often closed) when we could find a space to sit that did not have mice excrement. Sometimes the school’s deputy headmaster offered her small office when she was occupied with other activities around the school, otherwise, interviews
could also be conducted in empty classrooms, during the frequent gaps in the curriculum caused by absent teachers. The background epitomised the conditions of living in the neighbourhood and the precariousness of the education system in the area. Young people frequently wanted to be interviewed to occupy their time during the daily *aulas vagas* (a free hour with no lesson due to the routine absence of school teachers). Many interviews brought out very similar themes to those raised in Tourinho, such as concerns about inappropriate distant policing, police corruption, drug trafficking and routine homicides. Participants repeatedly complained that there was no dialogue between residents and the police and that officers were only ever in the neighbourhood after a crime or traffic accident happened.

One of the disparities between the communities was that in Vitoria, young people seemed even more under-protected, isolated and entrapped at home due to fear of violence. Just as Caldeira (2000) demonstrated in *City of Walls*, in relation to upper and middle-class people, people in the low-income communities studied also put up metal bars on the doors and windows of their homes to feel safer, they had high levels of suspicion and their habits were changing to avoid interactions in public. In his ethnographic study in a different Recife community, in the early 2000s, Koster (2009, 283-284) referred to an informal curfew placed on residents by drug traffickers, particularly at night. Residents would be told to stay indoors, for instance when traffickers were executing other gang members at night. Bystanders would also be killed to avoid incriminating evidence. Vitoria and Tourinho's residents also made

![Figure 7: Main street in Vitoria*, July 2013.](image-url)
references to similar situations, and adapted to these occurrences of violence by staying indoors in the evenings, sometimes as early as 8pm.

In this context, inappropriate security provision can deteriorate public life in many ways, including by leading fearful citizens to withdraw from public spaces (Pearlman 2010, Saunders-Hastings 2013, Frühling 2009, González 2014), or from participating in political and community life (e.g. participation in public debates, or through associations, protests and community organisations). The police, as the most visible institution of the State in charge of citizens’ protection, also fulfil many political functions. All policing is in this sense political but not necessarily egalitarian or conducive to democratic participation. The police can be used as a political tool to protect some citizens from other citizens. They can also enable politicians to achieve political ends, either by gathering votes through their associations or through the services that they provide to certain citizens, or even simply by being visible in some areas and appearing to be protecting some citizens. As such the corporation is a politicised institution with potential to either improve or deteriorate public life and the conditions in which democratic ideals can be fostered.

For residents, fear of crime, and lack of protection from it, had profound consequences. Their other major fear was that of being mistaken for a criminal or bandido by police while spending time in public spaces and interacting with potential criminals. In a deeply unequal society such as Brazil, to be constructed as a bandido or criminal has profound consequences for the chances of life or death of poor black and mulato people. Whether imagined or real, the bandido category can also impact their chances of employment, of being free to use public spaces, or simply of having freedom from time in prison. At first, this fear of being thought to be a criminal might seem unwarranted, but a closer look into local relations provides the rationale for the worker versus bandido division.

One afternoon, in a conversation with a friendly and elderly resident who owns the local bakery, Dona Lalá, she was interested in what I was doing in the community. I explained that I was studying and writing about the impacts and consequences of the State’s actions and in how the Brazilian criminal justice system affects the lives of ordinary people from Recife. She advised me to speak to Seu Antonio; she said ‘a great injustice had happened to him’, which would show me how the Brazilian State treats the poor. She arranged a meeting for me to meet Seu Antonio at her house one afternoon when he would be around to fix her sink. While
Dona Lalá went off to the housework at the back of the house, I talked to Seu Antonio on the porch behind the metal fence where we could catch a breeze and some shade from that scorching afternoon.

Seu Antonio was a short, frail-looking man, slim and dark-skinned, his face and hands had many wrinkles. I imagined he was in his early 60s but in fact he was only 48. His appearance resulted from years of hard labour and suffering. Despite the relative power asymmetry between researcher and informant (Spivak 1988), Seu Antonio was very receptive and keen to tell me his story, which emphasised his identity as a worker rather than a bandido. Seu Antonio explained that he was arrested in Alto do Pinhal – an even less affluent part of the neighbourhood – where he had met Dona Lalá and her family before they moved. During his youth, he had been a close friend of one of Dona Lalá’s ten children. Prior to our meeting he was unfairly sentenced and incarcerated for 3 years and had been to 5 different prisons. The following excerpt re-tells Seu Antonio’s story:

Roxana: ‘Can you tell me more about how the arrest happened?’

Seu Antonio: ‘At that time, I was in the habit of drinking [alcohol] with a friend in Alto do Pinhal. He invited me for a beer at his house. I was sitting in the living room and he went to the kitchen to get something. I didn’t know, but he was rolling marijuana. I never smoked that stuff. I didn’t know he smoked. He was selling it too.’ [He pauses, waiting for a reaction or for more questions]

Roxana: ‘So what happened after your friend was in the kitchen?’

Seu Antonio: ‘Some police entered the house, with guns and arrested everyone. Me too. I couldn’t understand what was going on. They took me, didn’t want to know that I had nothing to do with the drugs. In court, the safado (shameless, dishonest person) [his friend] incriminated me. He said I was involved too. I had no money to pay the lawyer, who wanted R$2,000 (£700 at the time) to free me but I couldn’t pay. In prison, people with money don’t stay more than 2-3 days. The son of a shop owner I met inside left in 2 days because his father paid.’
This type of heavy-handed raid or occasional policing is common in Brazil’s most marginalised communities and slums (Arias 2006). Seu Antonio finds it necessary to assert his innocence by explaining he ‘had nothing to do with the drugs’ and ‘never smoked’, emphasising that he stayed in prison only because ‘he could not pay’ the lawyer, while ‘the son of a shop owner’ paid and became free. For Seu Antonio this was not an option. Having migrated from the countryside’s dry lands with his mother and siblings to Recife at age 7, his family had never had enough cash; he left school at age 10 to work and support the household. Seu Antonio’s case is one of many stories in which the poor (and often black or mulato) are criminalised and receive differential treatment from all the institutions of the criminal justice system because of their socio-economic circumstances.

But the lines that divide those perceived as deserving from those seen as undeserving are not simply drawn between the criminal justice system and citizens, they are also drawn among people of similar background. Social inequality in Brazil systemically affects all social relations and institutions. For instance, when asked what prison was like, Seu Antonio said he was respected by inmates and was never beaten because his recorded offence was not seen as serious enough. He said that for the most part, prisoners only persecuted people who committed sexual offences, or those who had hit their mothers. For these inmates, seen as undeserving, the only perceived solution was death by beating. Here lies another telling episode of the blurred boundaries of injustice. Seu Antonio had seen some of these offenders get murdered in jail. To obtain protection, many inmates join gangs in prison, an issue already documented by ethnographers (Penglase 2008). But because Seu Antonio ‘minded his own business’, and was not seen as undeserving, he was offered a role of respect, that of the chaveiro (translates as keyholder).

The chaveiro is responsible for maintaining order inside the prison. Other prisoners elect him and the informal rule is that the group will do as he says. The chaveiro makes the decisions and can also offer protection to prisoners under threat by inmates. Scholars have begun to discuss this form of self-governance in Brazilian prisons (Darke 2013, Arruda 2014), a consequence of increasing incarceration, precarious physical conditions and overcrowding. In this context, the chaveiro becomes necessary, to provide order and informal justice. Chaveiros in Pernambucan prisons are also responsible for managing prison wings as if they were a market.
This includes the management of all sales that occur informally among prisoners and between prisoners and outsiders, including food and clothing sales, as well as drug sales.

Zaverucha (2004, 42-43) argues that prison authorities are complacent with this practice, since they are aware of it and either authorise, fail to eliminate it and even incentivise the election of a chaveiro. The chaveiro has a similar role to the preso de ordem (ordering inmate). Until the early 2000s, prisoners used to be kept captive in overcrowded cells in police stations in Pernambuco. The preso de ordem would accomplish the tasks that police officers did not want to get involved with in these cells, partly because police wanted to avoid the foul odour from these overcrowded cells but also because they wanted to avoid contamination with common diseases and ailments caused by unhygienic conditions in cells (Zaverucha 2004). The preso de ordem would, for example, provide water in buckets for prisoners to drink, resolve conflicts between prisoners, collect laundry and so on, in exchange for an early release.

Seu Antonio's story is telling of the practice of informal governance in prisons through the role of chaveiros. He explained that those who stole from inmates would receive a severe beating with a piece of wire, wood or the shaft of a wooden broom. He argued that thieves should not be mixed with matadores (murderers), because thieves would get together to kill matadores. This seemed contradictory, the line drawn between being a thief and a murderer being rather blurred if thieves also kill. Seu Antonio explained that matadores were hired on the outside to kill thieves in cold blood, but in prison thieves made up the vast majority of inmates, so together they could get revenge. While in prison, Seu Antonio had no idea when he was going to be released. But one day, after three years of incarceration, a prison warder asked him if he wanted some work in the prison. It was some labouring work in exchange for a couple of days on the outside. Allowing prisoners a ‘day-off’ on the outside has been sanctioned by law in Brazil (McCann 2008, 64). The possibility of going out made him accept the work.

It was then, in 2011 that he went to Dona Lalá’s house, looking to talk to her son Seu Zé to tell his story and ask for work. The type of work he did was often temporary, informal and low-paid, what is known colloquially in Brazil as bico; the nearest equivalent Anglo-Saxon academic term is sub-employment. He explained that his bicos were in the local construction industry. He has known Dona Lalá since he
was 15 years old; he worked with two of her sons and has been a family friend since. So a few days after he told Seu Zé about the injustice that happened, a lawyer went to the prison and he was released. Seu Antonio was keen to show me some paperwork that he carried around with him, with numbers that I could use to look up his files and see official reports about his innocence. Only by making alliances with a family that had a somewhat higher-class status and available cash, Seu Antonio was able to access the formal justice system.

This excerpt illustrates why people in low-income communities fear associating with criminals or being mistaken as a *bandido*. It also shows how, for the majority of Brazilian citizens, the post-democratic Brazilian state continues to govern in undemocratic and unjust ways. Seu Antonio had a number of his human rights violated, including the right to life, liberty and security (Article 3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] and article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]), the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5 UDHR and article 7 ICCPR), the right to equality before the law and equal protection by the law (Article 7 UDHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR), and the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Article 9 UDHR and Article 9 ICCPR).

It is commonly heard in Brazil that there is no justice for the poor, and indeed, this is well founded in the everyday experiences of the poor. It emerges from a society where social inequality is intertwined with institutions that need reform, such as the prison and the police, and can only be understood in the context of existing power relations. Brazilians have constitutional rights to justice but in practice access to justice is deeply unequal (Holston and Caldeira 1998, Zaluar 2010). Seu Antonio’s case is one example of the multiple forms of abuse, violence and violations that have become routine and occur in a large scale in Latin American countries. These violations are not necessarily a deliberate part of state policy, which was the case during previous Latin American military dictatorships, as explained by Engstrom and Hurrell (2010):

‘Consolidating democracies have not sought to strengthen the regional human rights regime as much as this theoretical approach might lead us to suppose. Instead they have laid much greater emphasis on the construction of a regional system of protecting and promoting democracy – one which is far more directly
under the control of states, which is politically and legally less constraining, and which is less susceptible to progressive development both from within the ‘system’ and by civil society groups.’ (15)

While the few opportunities for civil society’s engagement in Brazil’s democracy limit the progress of the human rights regime, so do other aspects of Brazilian federalism. That is, international institutions, such as IAHRS (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) have reduced abilities to make Brazilian federal authorities accountable for human rights violations, given that Brazil’s infamous military police are controlled at sub-national level (Engstrom 2012), dispersing and diluting accountability.

Moreover, Seu Antonio’s case exemplifies one of the perverse outcomes of increased policing without the democratisation of police values. Poor black males are arrested, simply for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, without having necessarily committed an offence. A number of violations of his rights, as argued above, followed his arbitrary arrest. He became simply another number to be measured by police performance statistics, mistakenly assumed to be a ‘success’ arrest of a member of an armed and drug-related criminal group. This type of police arbitrariness generates resentment towards the State and its institutions in poor communities. It also reinforces the authority of organised criminals that claim to provide security in these communities. It posits parallels with the first case study, Tourinho, as shown in Luther’s experience:

‘They [the extermination group that provides private security] asked me to paint the words Aqui só entra quem for convidado (Only those who’ve been invited enter here), and paint a picture of a police car turned upside down next to the words, on a wall at the entrance to the community.’ (29th October 2013)

Fear of crime not only led to the isolation of residents and their retreat from public space, as argued earlier, but it also led to resentment towards the State. While many criminologists have argued that fear of crime is often unrelated to the actual experience of crime, this was not the case in the communities studied. Most participants had either been victims of armed robbery, threats and violence, or they had friends and family who had been victimised in these ways. Crime, fear and
inadequate policing eroded public life. Adequate or at least basic security provision is a key necessity for societies to participate in community life and develop beneficial networks and organisations.

Apart from one local grassroots NGO, residents were unaware of the existence of other organisations through which continuous dialogue or non-adversarial contact with the police or the public security apparatus was possible, where demands could be made, and where the system could be responsive to residents – such as CONSEGs (Conselhos de Segurança Pública), a public security council that had existed in the state of Pernambuco prior to PPV. Residents explained that sometimes, during election years, participatory organisations and NGOs would appear to act as beneficiaries in the community, then they would introduce a political candidate that they supported for vote bargaining. Once elections were over these institutions would vanish, especially if the candidate had not been elected, and old patterns of inequalities once again prevailed.

7.4 Gender inequalities

The intersections of gender, age and class inequalities in Brazilian society make visible key limitations of policing and public security interventions such as PPV. Gender studies have pointed to the importance of acknowledging and understanding the effects of the performance of gender roles (Butler 1988, Drybread 2014), the ways in which patriarchal relations or the dominance of masculine values over feminine values perpetuate genders inequalities, and the manifestations and effects of certain forms of masculinities centred on the ethos of violence and bravado (Bourgois 2003, Connell 2005, Zaluar 2010). Feminist studies have also argued for the importance of understanding the silences (Ryan-Flood and Gill 2010) that expose patriarchal relations and gender inequalities. What is not said can say much about how gender inequalities manifest. For instance, while policing and PPV have allegedly aimed to reduce homicides – a type of violence that victimises men far more than women – the programme and its interventions have been silent about the ways in which non-lethal violence against women might be addressed. Sexual and non-lethal violence – the types of violence most often committed against women and girls – have been neglected.
Brazil is a patriarchal society with growing cases of femicide and widespread violence against women. Here I adopt Chesney-Lind’s definition of patriarchy as a ‘gender system in which men dominate women and what is considered masculine is more highly valued than what is considered feminine’ (Chesney-Lind 2006, 9). Symbols, values, representations and the performance of femininity, and even the lives of feminine bodies, are less valued. Patriarchal and sexist ideologies demarcate gendered power relations and portray women’s bodies as the property or object of desire and dominance by men. Patriarchal dominance can take many forms; of particular concern to criminology are violence against women, rape, inadequate access to justice, the neglect of women’s needs in policies of crime control and the ways in which crime control affects gendered bodies differently.

Few would deny the existence of multiple forms of gender violence and the repression of women in multiple spheres of social life in Brazil, such as the family, work, religion, in communities, politics and in the criminal justice system (Gregori 2010, Hautzinger 2007). However, the role and place of women in patriarchal societies is often under-theorised or left unaddressed. As Wilding (2010) suggests, in Latin America, women are consistently missing from mainstream debates about violence, whether as victims or perpetrators of violence. In this study, three out of every ten participants, male and female, expressed concerns about rape or violence against women. This is probably an under-estimate considering the stigma and shame associated with these topics and the reluctance to associate oneself with the role of victim of sexual or gender-related crime. Nonetheless, these concerns were based on common knowledge about unreported sexual and violent crimes against women, especially in Vitoria. These themes are demonstrated in an interview with Alice (16-year-old, mixed-ethnicity):

Roxana – ‘What can you tell me about your community?’

Alice – ‘I don’t spend much time out on the streets so I don’t know much about the neighbourhood. I know that we have problems with sanitation on the stairs [the community is on a hill and there are very long stairs, instead of roads, along the hill]. There are also mudslides in the community during the rainy season so people can lose their homes. There is plenty of drug trafficking and drug use,
especially crack cocaine […] now and then you hear of a young person who was killed.’

Roxana – ‘Really? Can you tell me more?’

Alice – ‘Well, like a friend of my cousin’s, he was killed because of drug debt. That is quite common. There are also cases of men killing their women. Recently a guy shot, killed and cut up the body of his woman, because of jealousy. She was very pretty and polite, she was 21 years old.’

Roxana – ‘What about the police, do you see them around?’

Alice – ‘Yes I see a police car around, I noticed they started going around about one year ago.’

Roxana – ‘Are people happy about this?’

Alice – ‘Yes, but we need more policing.’

The first analysis of quantitative data from the Brazilian national health system database (Sinan, Sistema de Informações de Agravo de Notificação do Ministério da Saúde) by Cerqueira and Coelho (2014, 6), estimates that there are 527,000 cases of attempted or actual rape in Brazil every year and, of those cases, only 10% are reported to the police. The study reveals that 89 per cent of victims of rape in Sinan’s data are female and 70 per cent are children and adolescents (ibid, 26). Many young women, like Alice, were concerned about being raped and avoided public spaces because of this rational fear based on known cases of rape and violence against women in the community. Neither the police nor drug traffickers were available to offer support, justice or protection (as it is the case in some communities in the southeast, where drug traffickers take on this role, see Arias 2006). It is interesting to note that while PPV focuses on curbing the level of homicide, a crime that has greatest impact on young men in poor communities, the policy fails to address serious crimes against women.
This is not to say that women are not affected when men in the community, their sons, partners and male friends are killed or when they are the recipients of police solutions to crime (imprisoned). Clearly, there are multiple forms of impact these occurrences have on communities and women, such as loss of income, bereavement and family breakdown. By being silent and neglecting or marginalising the importance of the variety of crimes in the city, PPV provides a very partial form of public safety provision. The policy is, in this sense, made by men and for men. Its implementation, as shown in Chapter 5, emphasised punitive and repressive practices advocated by mainstream criminological theories that draw on narrow understandings of crime and criminal justice.

As argued by Young (2011, 189) ‘the lens of orthodox criminology not only distorts, it leaves out’. In this instance, by being androcentric, focusing on repressing crimes that mostly affect men, such as homicide, criminal justice interventions based on orthodox criminological theories have left out gender issues. The data that are measured, monitored and emphasised in police targets – such as the amount of drugs apprehended and the number of cases of homicide – have nothing to say about rape or victims of serious non-lethal violence. The public security apparatus has disregarded the provision of women’s safety in at least two ways. Those are: (1) by failing to include women in any significant or genuinely proportionate and representative form in the running of the system; and (2) by failing to consider and monitor violent crimes that affect women in the performance outputs that are measured.

The government of Pernambuco created a secretariat for women, but it is still unclear what impacts this has had at street level or for people’s daily lives. This new and small secretariat for women promotes a number of programmes focusing on gendered violence, including campaigns against violence against women and the training of public sector professionals who deal with victims of domestic violence (Portella and Nascimento 2014, 53). It also runs 4 shelters for victims and their children (ibid). None of these projects produce performance indicators and neither are their outputs monitored by PPV, a critique already made by sociologists involved with the initial design (albeit not the implementation) of the PPV (ibid). Moreover, data from an interview with members of the Secretariat for Women reveal that these are small-scale projects that are unable to deal with the scale of gendered violence in the area.
Certainly some improvements or moves in the right direction have started at national level, prior to PPV, such as the creation of women-only police station (delegacias da mulher). However, with the creation of PPV, Pernambuco has seen increasing rates of incarceration of women rather than increasing security for women. In an interview with a senior member of staff of Recife’s Secretariat for Women (28th January 2016), I was told that with increased policing and growing incarceration of men involved in the drug trade, more women in low-income communities have been pushed into the drug trade, sometimes due to lack of alternative economic means or coerced by their imprisoned partners, leading to sky-rocketing rates of incarceration of women too.

Alice’s narrative above has parallels with the case of two sisters from her community, Vera and Simone. Vera had been in an abusive relationship for nearly twenty-five years with Fernando, and her extended family had had enough of seeing her hiding her bruises. Vera was withdrawn, ashamed and depressed. She relied on her abuser as a source of income. According to Simone, Fernando was an ‘alcoholic and schizophrenic’ and in one of his crises he had threatened to kill the entire family. His daughters were so scared of him that one fled to Rio de Janeiro in search of a better life and the other started sleeping with a knife concealed under her pillow. Simone explained how her family had decided that it was time to do something about Fernando. He was a threat for the entire family and they knew that the formal justice system could not deal with him efficiently enough to ensure the safety of Vera and her daughters. At the time of the fieldwork, the family, which included Vera and Simone’s siblings, was debating whether to hire a matador (a killer), to exterminate Fernando. In their view this was the only solution to Vera’s and the family’s suffering at the hands of Fernando. I have kept in touch with this family and know that Fernando is still alive and Vera continues to live with him. The family’s decision was swayed by one of the evangelical siblings who argued against killing. Both of their daughters have now moved to Rio de Janeiro but many members of the family still think that they need to take justice in their own hands. This gap in public safety service provision to women and surviving victims of violence, beyond fostering inequalities, has potential to erode the capacity of PPV by generating more work related to homicides inflicted by militias, matadores, illegal security groups and death squads that are keen to fill the security gap, or to ‘employ violence (e.g., vigilantism)
as a means of creating their own extra-legal forms of security’ (Arias and Goldstein 2010, 4).

The inadequate and unequal provision of access to justice in programmes such as PPV compound and contribute to the status quo by neglecting and being silent about gender violence. PPV focuses on trying to reduce homicides and not on trying to reduce (non-lethal) violence more broadly speaking. Although at the national level Brazil has implemented some innovative gender-focused initiatives, local public security policies such as PPV have generally failed to focus on women’s needs and to address the social and power inequalities that engender gender violence. On the national scale, Brazil started to criminalise domestic and family violence in 2006 with the creation of the Maria da Penha law. The country’s women-only police stations were first established in 1985, and access to them has been expanded with the opening of 475 units (Hautzinger 2007, UN Women 2011). Evaluations from the United Nations suggest that women-only police stations have increased access to services such as counselling, legal and social support (UN Women 2011, 1). However, women-only police stations are not open overnight or at weekends when cases of rape and violence are more likely to occur (Mendonça 2015) and large numbers of complaints brought to women’s police stations never enter the legal system (Gregori 2010). Neither are the police or mediators available in low-income communities, or in good terms to enable dialogue with residents or prevent these crimes from happening. In the case of local policies, the public need to trust the police to report these crimes, and the police needs to be responsive and present so that community-police relations can be developed and trust can be built. Furthermore, public security policies need to be expanded to include social and economic assistance to victims of gender violence. The criminalising approach cannot address the economic and gender inequalities (Hautzinger 2002, Hautzinger 2007) that force abused women to stay in these relationships.

7.5 Age

The neglect of gender issues is one weakness of PPV; another issue is the lack of attention to the age of victims and perpetrators of crime. Enforcing policing and incarceration does not appear an adequate policy to resolve the roots of youth crime and youth victimisation. Despite not having reached the level of organisation present
in Rio de Janeiro, the drug trade has become so widespread in Recife that it was mentioned in every interview. Many young people interviewed had friends or family who had become involved with the trade, often at a very young age:

George (18 years old, male) – ‘I was born here and have lived here all my live with my six brothers, I am the youngest, I lost my father when I was 6. I live with my mother. [...] The main problem here is drugs. Lots of my old school friends are in this life in drugs.’

Roxana – ‘Are they using drugs or selling them?’

George – ‘Both. They are selling and smoking crack and marijuana.’

Roxana – ‘When did they get involved with this “life in drugs”?’

George – ‘When they were 11 or 12 years old. Many are dead already.’

Roxana – ‘Really?’

George – ‘Yes, because of drug debt. They end up in fights. Young people killing young people. Sometimes it’s rivalry, or because one took the selling spot of the other. Or they have a misunderstanding over how they split the product between them [...] sometimes I hear them arguing about it.’

Roxana – ‘So, do they have a boss?’

George – ‘Yes, they do.’

Roxana – ‘And is the boss also a young person? Do people in the community know who their boss is?’

George – ‘He’s an adult. Yes, people know him, but no one talks about this. The police came and did a clean-up last month. Sometimes the police take
their guns and drugs. There were others [other bosses] who were arrested but this guy came to take their place.’

George seemed aware of police action in the community; however, repressive action did not suffice to resolve the cycle of violence in the drug trade. Neither did it stop ever-younger children from engaging in the drug trade. The perception that the police are unable to succeed in the war on crime and drugs because people aged under 18 cannot be prosecuted and penalised in the same way as adults is one of the rationales for demands to reduce the age of criminal responsibility in Brazil. So far the move towards reducing the age of criminal responsibility has been one of the main successes of conservative (and sometimes evangelical Christian/protestant) groups such as the so-called Bancada Bala, Boi e Biblia (also known as the bancada BBB, or ‘Bullets, Beef and Bible’ caucus) and the Bancada da Bala (the bullet lobby) formed largely by politicians that are linked to the armaments industry and ex- or current members of the police that have turned to politics to propose increasingly punitive agendas (Douglas 2015). However, repressing this kind of crime (drug related) through policing does not stop it from happening, as the data here and international studies reveal (Shiner 2016). There were new candidates and recruits willing to re-establish business as usual once arrests had been made. Moreover, there is incontestable evidence that incarcerating younger people neither reduces crime nor rehabilitates young offenders, but that it does lead to negative life-outcomes (Gomes 2015, MacDonald 2006, 2010, Squires and Stephen 2005).

George’s experience suggests that the police presence on its own (given that some police live in the community) might deter some crimes, but cannot address the various forms of violence and drug related crime in the community:

George – ‘There isn’t much theft here. There are many policemen living in my alto [hill], maybe that’s why. The problem is mostly drugs and [violent] fights between couples. It’s not safe here. After 8pm you can’t really sit outdoors. Like, there was a guy sitting near my neighbours’ that got hit by a stray bullet.’

Roxana – ‘So has the government done anything to change this situation?’
George – ‘I think so, there are more police cars. I think there are fewer homicides. But I don’t think there’s enough policing here. And their work needs to improve. There’s no dialogue between the police and the residents. I don’t think people fear them, but they don’t trust the police. […] They take bribes and even drugs, without arresting, it is not that common here but it happens.’

Nearly all participants mentioned police corruption in the neighbourhood, including accepting payments instead of arresting suspects. The drug trade, in particular the growing trade in crack cocaine, has increased illicit cash exchanges and provides more opportunities for corrupt police to extort drug dealers and traffickers (Wolff, 2014, 126). As George suggests, despite police corruption, increased policing was a key demand in the communities. But so was improvement to the model of policing, such as improving the approach and increasing ‘dialogue between the police and residents’.

7.6 Public reflections on policing: discrimination, mistrust and criminalisation

In Tourinho and in Vitoria the drug trade provided an alternative source of income and lifestyle to some young men with few qualifications and few well-paid employment prospects, just as in Bourgois’ (2003) study of crack dealers in East Harlem. But residents and young people themselves were aware that what they called a vida no mundo das drogas (life in the world of drugs) would lead to either early death or trouble with the law. Most residents were concerned with the easy access to firearms and the lack of meaningful activities for young people, which in their view led many the young towards the drug trade and a vicious circle of unregulated violence. But unlike the drug trade in southeast Brazil (e.g. Rio de Janeiro), residents claimed that traffickers did not interfere with the day-to-day activities of public service providers such as the opening and closing of schools and local businesses. In contradiction, most claimed that the drug trade and firearms were sometimes present within schools, thus interfering with some aspects of services in the local community. Although most participants had noticed an increase in policing, they argued that this was not enough to ensure safety and address drug related violence in the neighbourhood. As explained by one young female student:
'My best friend had to move to the interior of the state because her cousin, and neighbour, killed two chefes de boca (bosses of a drug selling point). The entire family was under threat so she had to leave’ (Karine, 16 years old, female)

As in Tourinho, in Vitoria most participants wanted more policing, despite complaining about multiple police ills and brutality. It was possible to code the interview data from 116 participants into four categories about their perception of the police presence in their neighbourhoods. Only nine participants (8%) responded that they thought the police were sufficiently present in their community. Sixty-five respondents (56%) said that the amount of policing in their neighbourhood was inadequate. Thirty participants (26%) did not want to comment on this topic and seven (6%) said that the police was sometimes sufficiently present in the area. What was even more disturbing is that seventy-two participants (62%) responded that they feared and mistrusted the police, while only fifteen (13%) responded that they did not fear or mistrust the police and twenty-nine respondents (25%) refused to comment.

People felt distant to the police, there being no dialogue or positive interaction with them. Residents would occasionally call the police and report a crime anonymously over the phone. However, most people were unlikely to provide information to the police during investigations, partly this was because the police were hardly present in the community, while the people that they may be 'snitching' or informing on, were there most of the time. The lei do silêncio (literally 'law of silence', discussed in Chapter 5) remains strong.

People feared revenge but in some cases they simply did not trust the police, given that when residents and young people did talk face-to-face to the police, their encounters were rather unpleasant. Police officers interviewed claimed to be attempting to do their work and follow orders, but in some cases, this work entailed arbitrary stop and searches to meet targets, for example some officers were told to simply stop and search thirty people riding motorbikes. The arbitrariness of those stop-and-searches deteriorated community-police relations and in some cases led to conflict between officers and residents. Most young males interviewed explained that if they were outdoors after 9pm they were immediately seen as criminals. Some of these young men claimed that the police would ‘plant’ drugs in their pockets to arrest
them. Some had also seen friends being arrested in this way. Young males also reported that the police extort cash from residents under threat of arrest. Many had been victims of police violence, as illustrated by Gustavo’s experience above. The dominant discourse about violence reduction and managerial police reform – which focuses on targets such as drugs and firearms apprehensions, numbers of arrests, and number of people processed through the criminal justice system – obscures the multitude of ways in which arriving at these targets or acclaimed results affect and generate costs to the marginalised. The data presented here provide a challenge to the narratives of ‘success’ of state interventions.

Experiences of police brutality were common, in much the same way that Garmany (2014, 1242) suggests, on the basis of his research in a favela community in a different northeaster Brazilian state, that ‘hostility and disrespect toward the poor have become institutionalised procedure’. Bernardo, 16, from an indigenous background, had been a victim of arbitrary brutal tactics during a stop and search carried out by a special militarised police force called GATI (Grupo de Apoio Tatico Itinerante – Policia Militar de Pernambuco, GATI-PMPE). Bernardo explained that during recurrent stop-and-search operations, police officers had punched and kicked him (and other young people in the community), and ordered him to interlace his fingers while physically compressing them, causing intense pain.

Specialist militarised shock troops, such as GATI, or ROTA in São Paulo, or BOPE in Rio de Janeiro, formed by heavily armed military police were created to combat threats of a 'terrorist' nature, armed banked robberies and serious armed conflict. ROTA for example, was created during the last military dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1985), specialising in armed conflict and political repression. Yet, when armed conflict was no longer a motive for this type of policing, these troops turned to the combat of ordinary crime without abdicating the methods developed during periods of military arbitrariness (Pinheiro 1982, 60). The current research shows that GATI, just like ROTA, continues to arbitrarily deploy militarised repression methods on ordinary civilians perceived as suspects.

Physical punishment and extra-legal methods of social control were commonly imposed on the bodies – particularly the young, indigenous or afro-Brazilian bodies – of people who live and utilise public space in particular territories, in the criminalised slums and territorially peripheral communities, the spaces perceived as dangerous, criminal, undeserving, and undesirable to inhabit. Both
violence and the repression emerging through the public security apparatus are unevenly distributed in the city. Residents of the *periferias* are the population most exposed to violence emerging from the drug trade and from the most repressive methods of policing, as demonstrated in several studies (Cano 1997, Feltran 2008, 2011, Fernandes 2013, Garmany 2011a, Zaluar 2004a). In both case study communities, non-lethal police violence, such as the *baculejo* (forceful stop and search, often involving a physical beating) had been common. But there were also cases of police killings. One young man had seen his brother being shot by the police in 2013, he explained:

‘My brother was coming back from a gig at night when one of his mates stole his silver chain, so he decided to call the police. When the police came, instead of treating him as a victim, they accused him of theft and of carrying a firearm. He didn’t have a firearm. They shot him but he survived […] My other brother was involved in drug trafficking and he was shot and killed by the police in 2012. My mother was devastated. The officer who shot him was disciplined and lost his uniform [lost his job]’ (João, 17, Vitoria, *mulato*)

Despite being the most victimised group in the community, young indigenous and black people were also the most criminalised group by the police. Young black males were the focus of police surveillance, just like in other parts of Brazil (cf. Adorno 1995) and beyond borders (Cavadino, Dignan, and Mair 2013, 291, Wacquant 2008). Inevitably, the more a group is targeted by penal and repressive institutions, the more likely it is that they will become over represented in crime statistics (as offenders) and in penal institutions, such as the prison. Institutional racism generates a vicious circle of criminalisation – the more black people are over-represented in the penal system as offenders, the more they are the subjects of surveillance and the targets of police work.

**7.7 Conclusion**

Drawing on data from two case-study communities in the peripheries of Recife, this chapter has presented a critique of the public security apparatus, based on the voices of people in marginalised communities. The chapter presented demographic
information that contextualised these communities in the epicentre of multiple social inequalities. Focusing on data emerging from observations in the communities and interviews with residents, mostly (albeit not all) young (aged 16-29), the chapter examines the current state of policing in the peripheries of Recife, the gaps in public security provision, and the consequences thereof. For the most part the chapter reveals continuity in neglectful, criminalising and violent methods of policing. When asked what changes they had noticed in terms of government action to improve security, most participants said they hadn’t noticed anything, some had seen the appearance of a police patrol car but had not actually seen the police in action on the streets, their relationship felt distant from the police. When they did interact with the police, those encounters were adversarial and reflected enduring problems of disrespect for the human rights of poor, indigenous and afro-descendent citizens.

One of the gaps in public security provision is the neglect of women in policy making and in the application of policies. PPV focused on targeting homicides, a crime that affects more men than women. It did not address the multiple forms of violence, including non-lethal violence, that exist in the city. So female victims of abuse and rape were left neglected and unprotected, leading some residents to seek or contemplate seeking alternative forms of security provision from matadores (hired killers) and extermination groups. Furthermore, since female victims of serious non-lethal violence were uncounted and unrepresented in the dominant framework that focuses on monitoring quantitative targets, there was no observable adaptation of the public security apparatus to deal with their victimisation.

While claims of reduced numbers of homicides were good for political campaigns, the current model of policing did little to resolve insecurity in marginalised communities, which saw ever-younger children join the drug trade and ordinary residents criminalised by racist, sexist and classist policing and public security interventions. As such, the chapter provided a critique of the dominant technocratic discourse of ‘successful’ state interventions (e.g. PPV) presented in the media, in the narratives of state actors (especially high-ranking government actors), and even in the discourse of some academics (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014).
CHAPTER 8 – Democratising public security interventions

This thesis focuses on examining the effects of public security interventions on people in low-income communities, especially the young. The previous chapters explored, from an institutional perspective, a particular intervention (PPV), its challenges and alleged successes (Chapter 5); from the perspective of the police and low-ranking officers, issues of discrimination and a self-critique of public security interventions (Chapter 6); the perspective and experience of policing of young people and residents of low-income communities (Chapter 7). So far, this investigation has brought to light conflicting constructions of public safety programs, and revealed significant challenges in the implementation of safety measures.

This chapter examines some further challenges to the democratisation of Brazilian policing, drawing on reflections, observations and interviews emerging from the two case study communities and from politically active members of civil society, including activists and members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) concerned with the issues of public safety and justice. The chapter argues that the application of new public security interventions has been considered a success based on the measurement of certain quantitative outputs – such as the reduction of homicide rates, the increasing numbers of people processed through the criminal justice system, increasing apprehension of drugs and firearms – while neglecting the limits of this type of measurement and disregarding the importance of qualitative aspects of public safety interventions. Drawing on the Brazilian case, and expanding on longstanding quantitative/qualitative debates in the social sciences (Silverman 2010, Westmarland 2001, Young 2011), this chapter examines some of the epistemological problems in the prioritisation of quantitative measures over qualitative ones. Overlooked qualitative aspects include: citizens’ perspectives, police accountability and external independent policing oversight, the hidden\textsuperscript{45} and under-studied impacts of public safety interventions, such as the continuation of organised criminals and death squads operating from within overcrowded prisons.

Recent studies focusing on Brazil have begun to theorise issues around the monopoly of violence in Brazil (Denyer Willis 2015, Arias and Goldstein 2010). The data presented in this chapter and in the literature review (Chapters 2 and 3) suggest the need for social theory that does not emanate from a hegemonic Euro-American
(Global North) unidirectional point of view, and for theory that does not exclude large sections of humanity (in the Global South). Part of this debate is based on the need for a post-colonial perspective, an approach that does not simply align itself in relation to theories from the Global North. For instance, state theories about the monopoly of violence, often originating from the European context (Tilly 1992), are frequently deployed in debates relating to the Brazilian case. Although there is credit in considering who, whether and how violent relations take place, the monopoly of violence may not be the best framework to understand the State or violence in Brazil, since arguably neither the State nor organised criminal groups (at least outside São Paulo) have ever had a monopoly of violence.

In the following order, the chapter debates: (i) the limits of the ways in which progress or success in public security interventions are measured, (ii) the effects of undemocratic, distant and brutal policing, such as the coexistence of the police with violent organised crime and death squads, (iii) the inadequacy of means of civil participation in the establishment and monitoring of public security interventions, and (iv) the debate about the extent of the state presence in low-income communities or State-civil society engagement. Finally, the chapter reflects on the debate around measures that may promote democratic – which is to say transparent, accountable and respectful – policing. These include the demilitarisation of the police and the public security apparatus, structural changes to this system, and the creation of permanent means of dialogue between civil society and the police.

8.1 The manipulation of quantitative data

Chapter 7 started to develop a critique of the uses and misuses of quantitative data in the measuring and overseeing of public safety interventions, insofar as the data that are measured neglects significant and serious violence that does not necessarily lead to death, for instance, rape and violence against women, even when these crimes are reported. In an interview with a senior member of the statistics team (Gerência de Análise Criminal e Estatística or GACE) of the secretariat for public defence of Pernambuco, I was told that although the State does have data on these crimes, the data are not used to monitor performance, unlike the data on homicides and drug apprehensions. Moreover, although the state of Pernambuco has recorded these crimes when they have been reported, the data are classified, apparently so as to avoid
causing panic and increasing fear associated with certain areas. This section examines other limits and problems pertaining to quantitative measures, especially in terms of accuracy. Following sections examine the need for qualitative measures.

Both community activists and residents in both case study communities were suspicious of the accuracy of government statistics. They argued that in most low-income communities, residents had not noticed a drop in violent crime. In fact, levels of lethal violence fluctuate and it may be difficult for residents in poor communities to notice declining crime rates at street-level. In this aspect, statistical figures are more easily observed. However, even where statistics can be observed, there are multiple confounding issues at stake and numerous classifications that can impact statistical data. As elaborated by Denyer Willis (2015, 38), a potentially violent death can be classified in various different ways: ‘found bones (ossadas), found bodies (corpo achado), suicide (suicídios), suspicious death (morte supeita), death to be clarified (morte a esclarecer), robbery followed by death (roubo seguido de morte, or latrocínio), manslaughter (homicídio culposo), resisting arrest followed by death (resistência seguida de morte), multiple homicide (chacina), and intentional homicide (homicídio doloso)’. Eight of these categories are possible in Pernambuco, with the exception of the notoriously contested ‘resisting arrest followed by death’, which was used throughout Brazil to justify police killings, but has been abolished as a category for labelling violent deaths in Pernambuco with the creation of PPV.

In my third and final trip to Recife during my research, I obtained permission to attend another PPV meeting on 27th January 2016, where I could observe first hand the complexity of counting the dead. A delegado approached the head of statistics sitting next to me to informally request the change of classification for a case. Bones had been found in his jurisdiction and classified as a homicide, affecting his targets. The delegado argued that often these deaths occurred in neighbouring states but these dead bodies were buried in his jurisdiction; and that the death may have been manslaughter (homicídio culposo) instead of homicide (homicídio doloso), in which case, the delegado reminded the statistician that the death would not affect his stats. Denyer Willis (2015) argues that there is no question that statistics released by the public security apparatus are ‘adjusted, manipulated, subcategorized, or poorly represented to convey rosier images of public security’ (51).
Another recent example in Pernambuco raises concerns about the manipulation of statistical data. The Associação dos Delegados de Pernambuco (ADEPPE or association of chiefs of civil police of Pernambuco), dissatisfied with working conditions and low pay, started a campaign in August 2015 to pressure government officials to negotiate these issues. As part of the campaign the ADEPPE has published crime rates that are significantly higher than those released by Pernambuco’s secretariat of social defence (SDS). For instance, according to the SDS, there were 3,785 cases of car theft in Pernambuco from 1st January to 31st July 2015, while according to ADEPPE there were 7,955 (Oliveira 2015c). According to the SDS there were 380 robberies on public transport from 1st January to 31st July 2015, but according to ADEPPE there were 971 (ibid).

The potential for manipulation of data is a key concern in the Brazilian context, since the police control the morgues (IML) and there are no effective independent institutions of oversight, as the latter section of this chapter reveals. Moreover, much of the work that the police do is not easily quantifiable in the same way that arrests, gun apprehensions and numbers of deaths are. What residents are clearly able to judge are the quality of policing and their relationship with the police. Accordingly, in residents’ views, the police’s relative absence (sporadic presence), brutality, indifference, corruption and prejudice have not changed with PPV – these characteristics of policing were not easily addressed by PPV’s system of monitoring quantifiable performance targets.
8.2 Death squads

The type of policing available made many residents feel unsafe and sometimes led them to rely on the work of illegal private security groups and death squads. But many residents were simply victims of extortion from these groups, who charged them fees for security. In these circumstances community residents felt that the police were, in effect, protecting the rich and criminalising the poor. In the words of Luther, a key informant in Tourinho introduced in Chapter 7, who has lived all his life in the community:

‘We don’t feel safe. We ask ourselves: who’s worse, the bandits or the police? Because the police are meant to protect us but they sometimes kill. We live in a violent society that values having, not being. The police force was created to protect the rich, not the poor’ (Black, teacher, artist, activist, October 2013).

Several other residents made similar comments. As illustrated in Chapter 7, residents of low-income communities felt under-protected by the police, but they were also acutely aware of routine killings by drug traffickers, death squads and individuals connected to the drug trade. These killings were often linked to drug debt. Revenge, whether fuelled by inter-personal conflicts or by disputes relating to the drug trade, was used in place of a dysfunctional and slow criminal justice system, or where formal avenues of justice could not be utilised (e.g. to settle disputes in the underground economy). Since citizens are unable to access justice through state institutions they are increasingly likely to seek extra-legal forms of security (Arias and Goldstein 2010, Davis 2010). Revenge, private violence and extra-legal security were made possible through what Arias and Goldstein (2010) have conceptualised as ‘violent pluralism’, through a variety of violent actors, citizens, police, ex-police and death squads.

The context of high insecurity made private security options appealing to residents, so that the efforts to improve personal safety go beyond the middle and upper class gated community. Low-income community residents also tried to increase their safety using gates, locks and avoiding being outdoors in the evenings, due to fear of crime and violence. Many participants felt trapped and imprisoned in their own homes. Many paid small fees, such as R$3 per week, for illicit private security in the
community, which was sometimes delivered by ex-police officers, deploying violence as a means of conflict resolution.

The infrequent presence of the on-duty police also compelled residents to piece together alternative security solutions. As argued by Denyer Willis (2015, 7), after the fall of centralised authoritarian regimes, ‘new and decentralized security entities have become powerful producers and regulators of violence, particularly in parts of cities with weak state-society relations’. These decentralised ‘security entities’ are present outside São Paulo where Denyer Willis (2015) conducted his study. For instance, Luther, as well as other residents, commented that some of the organised *matadores* (hired killers) that manage and systematise illicit security companies in the community, and extort residents for the service provided, have been imprisoned. However, according to residents, these illegal groups continue to manage their business and earn an income from within the prison, they continue to operate in the community from within the prison:

‘Most people here pay R$3 per week for security. On Saturdays a man comes to collect the money from each household. If you are not in, he will come again on Sunday. The leader of the gang, Marcos Cabeça Afundada (‘Sunken-Head Marcos’) is in prison but his guys still work for him. Many *matadors*, who used to look after a street each, are in prison but the money continues going to them. From inside prison they can order a killing [of a local thief]. I can’t tell you exactly what happens if a resident refuses to pay [the fees]. Sometimes their house will get burgled. But the *matador* assures you that if anything is taken from you, he will reimburse you for what was taken. It’s bad with him, and worse without him.’ (Luther, 29th October 2013)

Participants in Tourinho explained that these illicit security and extermination groups formed by ex-policemen operated by extorting money from residents in return for their services while also working as an insurance company, promising to reimburse residents for potential losses. As long as the fees of R$3 per week (R$13 per month) were paid (the equivalent of around £2.50 per month or 4 hours of labour paid at the minimum wage in Brazil). However, residents were coerced into paying these fees since they were aware that they would be victimised if they did not, potentially by the same group that provides this form of security. The extermination groups were
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti

responsible for informal justice in the community, by killing any petty criminals, people who owed money, or even drug dealers and users. However, according to numerous residents of Tourinho, since the leader Marcos had been imprisoned, the number of drug dealers in the community had increased:

‘Some people miss the time when Marcos was out because the community did not have problems with drugs. The drugs problem started here in the last 7 or 10 years. But you know he was not arrested because of the community. No one here would have spoken about him (reported him to the police). But his friends are also ex-police officers and they are all being investigated for being part of an extermination group. When he was investigated they found 60 fighting cocks in his house and an imported pistol, apparently worth R$20,000 (£6,670 at the time), which could shoot even under water. He got done for that. Now everything here is acabado (run down), there is crack cocaine everywhere. The public market is full of zombie addicts – kids, women and men. When Marcos was out, the problem in the community was just homicides between rival security groups. People died because of the competition between extermination groups. One group would start terrorising the community to damage the reputation of the other group, because they wanted to take over the security business, it caused all sorts of fights.’

The parasitic nature of the security business escalated levels of violence in the community. Dellasoppa (2010) argued that militias and informal security groups, usually backed by policeman living in poor communities, have presented themselves as the security solution for these areas while simultaneously ‘breaking down’ the State’s monopoly on legitimate force. But discussing the issue as a ‘breakdown’ of the monopoly of violence suggests that such a monopoly has in fact existed at some point in the history of Brazil – which does not seem to be supported by the literature discussed in this thesis. What is observable is that these groups have multiplied the sources of violence in communities in the peripheries of the city.

Moreover, even where the State has attempted to monopolise violence through state building programs and interventions such as PPV, these attempts have proven inadequate. That is because, even though the police carried out a number of operations to arrest members of death squads in Pernambuco (Alston 2010) and the
main leaders of these groups had been imprisoned, they were still able to maintain their power and coercion in the community, operating from within the chaos of the Brazilian prisons, through their networks and mobile phones.

The information about death squads, emerging from community residents interviewed, is plausible, given that Brazilian prisons are known to be overcrowded, informally organised (as discussed in Chapter 7) and the headquarters for many criminal organisations, where all sorts of contraband and mobile phones circulate (Arruda 2014, Dias 2011). In this context, Luther explained that nobody in the community would want to be seen talking to the police:

‘If you are seen talking to the police and then they seize some stuff [e.g. firearms] from one of the [extermination] groups, later your house could be burgled because they think you grassed them up [informed on them]. It is not worth the risk. Some people might do it but only anonymously’.

Criminal groups in the community needed and wanted to avoid any contact with the police or with police informants, as this could increase the costs of their operations. For this reason, they were concerned with the identity of their clientele. A young man had recently received a beating in the community because he was not known in the community and tried to buy drugs there. The dealers thought he was a police informant and attempted to kill him but he got away. According to residents, he ran out of the community, todo rasgado (totally torn-up) from his beating. This type of violent display of resistance to the police comes about not only from the need to avoid police for the conduct of illicit activities, but also from the resentment and hostility is provoked by inadequate, sporadic, arbitrary and discriminatory policing tactics. Residents wanted to be treated with dignity and respect but in the absence of this, a minority had decided to retaliate, generating great impact in the circle of hostility in police-community relations. Transparent, non-sporadic, demilitarised (in practice, dress-code and equipment) and accountable policing could go some way to increasing trust and proximity between citizens and the police, and to reducing the demand for death squads.
8.3 Civil society and police oversight

This section discusses data gathered through interviews with community activists and members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), here labelled as ‘civil society experts’. They are considered experts because as a group they have insight into both the perceptions of state officials and the perceptions of people in recipient communities, given that their work bridges these two worlds. This group presented some of the core critiques of PPV, which related to its focus on repression as opposed to social prevention of crime; as well as to the amount of money invested in these aspects of crime control; and the concerns about the impacts of escalating incarceration and overcrowding in prisons. In the previous chapter, many participants argued that the only government action that they had noticed was more repression towards poor and black people. This experience resonated with the claims made by civil society activists:

‘Based on our organisation’s experience, government statistics do not represent what low-income communities say about police brutality and crime. The government of Pernambuco claims that homicide and violent crime have decreased but poor communities continue to complain about these issues and have not felt any difference.’ (NGO activist.)

According to activists, PPV was simply reinforcing the traditional conservative approach to public security policies, which emphasised repressive policing. They were dissatisfied with the level of oversight over the police, with the lack of police accountability and demanded independent monitoring of PPV as a program through councils, a request which was not met, it seems due to lack of political will.

Between May 2007 and September 2010, a group of Pernambucan journalists financed by the Associação do Ministério Público de Pernambuco (Association of the Public Prosecutor Ministry of Pernambuco, AMPPE) organised a blog – PE Body Count – that consulted public security institutions about the numbers of cases of homicide on a daily basis. While the blog existed, information about nearly 14,000 homicides – including time, name of victim, location, and other details – were made publicly available. A digital counter of homicides was placed in the centre of Recife and on the web for one year. The blog and the counter worked to pressure the
government for reforms and as a method of independent monitoring of the conditions of public insecurity. According to interviews conducted by Macedo (2012) with members of the team who ran the blog, cases of violence were often underreported in official statistics and sometimes registered as deaths from falls, electric shocks or traffic accidents, instead of as homicides. But when the blog’s funding was no longer available and with the employment of some leaders of social movements in government jobs, independent methods of monitoring the public security apparatus were no longer available (ibid).

Latin America is known to have insufficient mechanisms for police or state agencies to consult and engage with citizens about what they want from police, except for rare public consultations (Ward 2006, 199). As argued by Ward (2006), when police reforms are attempted without the participation of civil society (NGOs, community groups, individual citizens, research organisations), they can generate suspicion about the extent of commitment and transformation, especially in places where citizens have high levels of distrust for the police. Madalena, a sociologist who had been involved with the public security department, summarises the main critiques made by civil society activists and debates them with members of the public:

Madalena (23rd July 2013) – ‘Pacto pela Vida is very expensive. But in 2006 we were in a state of civil war [metaphorically speaking], more than 4,000 people were killed in Pernambuco and Recife. Pacto emerged out of a forum that was organised for experts to discuss this problem. There were people who worked with healthcare, organisations like Gajop (NGO) were invited but they refused to participate in this way, they thought the event should be open to more people and organisations. There was a meeting at university and various project proposals emerged. The university proposed six ações (projects) with popular participation. But the way this was left, Pacto [pela Vida] was not a public security policy, just a plan. The aim was to reduce homicide rates by 12% each year. It was not something to be accomplished solely by the police, but also by social workers, psychologists, and so on. Why 12%? The statisticians of the SDS (Secretaria de Defesa Social, or secretariat of social defence), said that this target was based on studies from Colombia and from the USA. This idea was also based on arguments by Brazilian scholars like Sapori and Luiz Eduardo Soares that the problem of security could be
addressed if the lack of articulation between justice institutions such as the police, prison, public prosecutor, courts was resolved. *Pacto [pela Vida]* led to improved targets but the public prosecutor (*Ministério Público*) says that 90% of *inquéritos* (police investigations) received are poor and lack information.

Another issue is that it is common for the police to be involved in death squads, such as *os justicieros*. So one of the objectives was to tackle death squads. [...] There has been some reduction in homicides but an increase in violent property crime. Crime is migrating. Some targeted areas, like Santo Amaro, have improved but criminality has increased in other areas. Unfortunately the only method of crime prevention implemented has been repressive: increasing policing, there has not been any increase in social interventions’.

Female resident – ‘We need vocational courses and apprenticeships to occupy the young people here. They used to queue for any opportunity of training. We asked for two training schools and instead we received an *academia da cidade* (a program for physical activity/exercise)’

 [...] 

Madalena – ‘*Pacto* is only 10% about prevention and 90% about repressive policing. The *patrulha do bairro* (neighbourhood patrol) is nothing like community policing. The police shouldn’t just be inside their cars. They need to be inside the neighbourhood making connections, getting to know people and what happens in the area, being responsible for the neighbourhood. There is insufficient training for the police. The police have maintained the military code of conduct. They should be trained to avoid using their guns and only selectively use force where necessary. There has been some reduction in homicide statistics since it has been prioritised and even the fire service is involved in trying to save victims of violence before they pass away. So if someone has been run over and at the same time there is a call about someone who has been a victim of attempted homicide, the second will be prioritised because the person who was run over may die but this won’t affect the homicide rates. We need an independent *conselho* (council) to monitor this public security policy and to press for improvements but there is resistance
and a lack support and interest from the government to have this established.’
(Madalena – Sociologist – July 2013)

Community activists made a number of criticisms in relation to PPV: the policy is expensive, focused on repressive crime control, and lacks organised official external supervision. One of the main critiques was that to some extent the policy had reduced homicides by improving the provision of emergency health care and rescuing people who had already been victims of violence. Consequently, while this would have an impact in violent crime statistical trends, it does not necessarily mean that violence decreased. As Madalena exemplifies above, the fire service is now more active in rescuing and prioritising victims of homicide and people who have been shot, but this does not stop them from being shot or victimised in the first place. Another PPV strategy that contributes to this fallacy is stationing ambulances in and around areas considered hot spots for violence during high-crime periods (e.g. weekends). As Wolff (2014, 176) puts it, this practice has ‘substantially increased the survival rate of gunshot victims without necessarily affecting the overall number of violent incidents’ or, for that matter, without affecting the fear of crime and scepticism by residents in the poorest and most affected communities.

Civil society activists argued that PPV’s focus on increased policing side-lines the need for a broader and systemic approach to public security, one that includes more methods of social crime prevention. Residents, as seen above and in the following section were sceptics of PPV’s claimed results and methods. Instead, they demanded more programs devoted to crime prevention (such as vocational training/education, recreation, family welfare, employment, routine patrol on foot). Furthermore, to be effective a broader policy approach requires a combination of crime preventative measures with: (a) adequate crime repression and investigation; (b) appropriate prosecution; (c) well-staffed and humane prison system; (d) ex-offender rehabilitation (employment training and job opportunities, counselling, drug treatment). As argued by Bailey and Dammert (2006, 19), simply relying on increased police presence and more crime repression can produce more convictions (including of non-guilty persons), stretch the criminal justice system (which then becomes more vulnerable to inefficiency and injustice), and overcrowd the prison system (where advanced criminal skills can be developed).
The emphasis on repressive policing alongside the breakdown of communication between government and civil society were key complaints in interviews with activists. According to Pereira (2005, 200), while democracy in Brazil has been beset by continuing violence and repression by state security forces, there has been a failure to form genuinely democratic and sustainable institutions that connect the public to political representatives. In the sphere of public security and policing, this disconnection poses important questions about the instability of state building efforts.

The political unwillingness to systematically and recurrently engage with the public in the long term, and the failure to support an external oversight council for PPV, were important shortcomings of the programme – and were only admitted by civil society activists such as Madalena, who was no longer employed at the time the fieldwork was conducted. In contradiction to her critical view, the higher the ranking of the public officials working in public safety, the more they praised PPV and the governor, and the more they ignored the need for continuing communication and engagement with civil society. If the purpose of the police is solely coercive, without negotiation or consultation, they are effectively an authoritarian and undemocratic institution. A lack in oversight limits the ways in which the police can be subjected to democratic standards of accountability.

The Pernambucan constitution (Art. 101) created the Conselho de Defesa Social (Council of social defence) to coordinate public security interventions (Alepe 2015), but the government has not put this into practice (Zaverucha 2000). When government officials and high-ranking practitioners were asked during the fieldwork about PPV’s disengagement with civil society and about an independent monitoring council, they claimed that PPV had emerged from civil society and explained that there was originally a forum for debate and public consultation prior to the establishment of PPV.

However, this engagement with civil society occurred on a one off basis and thus was not lasting. As Engstrom and Hurrell (2010) put it, ‘the democracy regime [in Latin America] operates with relatively little civil society participation […] As such, the notion of solidarism that underpins the democracy regime is still fundamentally State-centred’ (3). Furthermore, institutions such as the National Public Security Council (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Pública, CONASP) have a
limited consultative role instead of a deliberative role and its members are appointed by government officials rather than elected (Leeds 2013), limiting their impartiality.

The government officials interviewed argued that there were already other institutions in place to monitor the police, such as the corregedorias de polícia (the police internal affairs and complaints office). However, it is common knowledge that those institutions are not independent from the police, neither are they run by civil society, so they are unable to provide effective and independent police oversight. Police themselves staff the corregedorias. State officials argued that PPV had weekly meetings to monitor the police. However, this was an internal, and therefore not independent, method of control and oversight.

Chevigny argues for a combination of internal and external oversight of the police, suggesting that ‘real accountability will have to combine internal and external controls’ (1995, 267). He explains that when monitoring comes exclusively from outside, it leads to resistance and a lack of cooperation on the part of the police, therefore making it very difficult for outsiders to investigate. As a result, recommendations made by outsiders are easily ignored. If monitoring comes exclusively from internal structures, meanwhile, it becomes ineffective and existing habits are liable simply to become normalised.

In Pernambuco, mechanisms of external oversight directed exclusively at monitoring Pacto pela Vida have not been developed. PPV suffers from low levels of information transparency, and engagement with civil society only occurred, sporadically and infrequently at the beginning of the governor’s mandate (Ribeiro 2014, 5 and 20). There were no systematic mechanisms – such as an external council, an external committee, or even regular community meetings with state actors – to ensure that the state was responsive to citizens’ demands and to complaints about PPV, policing and safety. The council of public safety or CONSEGs (Conselhos de Segurança Pública) that had existed in some locales in the previous government of Jarbas Vasconcellos were not present in the territories of the case studies. In sum, in Recife (and in many other parts of Brazil), there exist few formal opportunities for public deliberation about policing and public safety interventions.

There are some institutions that can enforce external control over police activities, but they do not have this oversight as their main task. As Cubas (2013) notes, some examples are Comissões de Assembleias Legislativas (Committees of Legislative Councils), Comissões das Ordens de Advogados (committees of barristers
associations), *Ministérios Públicos Estaduais* (state public ministries), committees by religious groups, National and regional human rights councils, international organisations, civil society organisations and the press. Few mechanisms of external oversight have focused on the control of police abuse of force and police violations of citizens’ human rights. Some exceptions are the police ombudsmen (*ouvidoria*), an institution directed by a representative from civil society and with the autonomy to denounce cases brought to its attention, and therefore with some power to monitor police abuses.

The state public ministry and some international organisations can also monitor the police. However, few people in low-income communities are aware of these institutional resources and their roles. Most residents (albeit not all) interviewed were very distrustful of the state and its institutions and are unlikely to report crimes, especially crimes committed by the police. Even the police themselves are unlikely to report their colleagues in cases of abuse of force and inappropriate treatment of citizens, leaving those problems to be dealt with by internal oversight institutions, as illustrated in a study about the Brazilian police ombudsmen (Cubas 2013). Furthermore, the extent to which complaints against the police lead to any outcome, or punishment, beyond the initial *denúncia* (complaint communication) is unclear. Brazilians commonly say that such complaints *acabam em pizza*, (‘end in pizza’), meaning that nothing is done about them.

PPV’s internal oversight meetings are not open to the public, but during the fieldwork I did attend one such meeting, on 4th July 2013, through an invitation by a gatekeeper. Unlike in the findings of Suska (2014, 7), it was not possible to see ‘high ranking officers explaining themselves to a number of civilians’. Instead, they explained themselves in front of colleagues and government officials. At the meeting, which consisted for the most part of a male-dominated round table of government officials, chiefs of civil police and heads of militarised police battalions, the police were indeed judged on their targets, which were displayed through a flashy PowerPoint presentation compiled by government statisticians. The targets were for the most part measured in relation to the number of corpses resulting from violent crime and lacked the inclusion of broader methods to measure police work, such as victimisation surveys or public opinion polls about police work. This absence of victimisation surveys constitutes a major impediment to criminological and social
research in Latin America, as well as to the formulation of coherent and meaningful policy agendas (Macaulay 2007).

Furthermore, there was no independent organisation or member of civil society present at PPV’s weekly meetings to discuss or monitor the policy. New equipment, flashy PowerPoint presentations, meetings at the SEPLAG with men in suits and police, PPV adverts on television and headlines in local newspapers, all portrayed a very different picture of the public security apparatus in comparison to the reality experienced at the ground level in poor communities.

In summary, while state officials in Chapter 5 claimed that PPV was a policy focused on targets and results, that it worked to reduce violence because of the increase in policing and in investment in the police’s resources – such as police cars, guns, bullet-proof vests and recruitment of more police officers – these were precisely the factors that residents of low-income communities criticised. Residents noticed the new police cars; but they did not see any change in police work, nor did they ever see any police officers apart from when they had been called to deal with a specific situation. They claimed not to have any contact with the police, other than the occasional stop and search if they were out at night, or if they were black, and these adversarial encounters regularly featured examples of brutal police conduct.

8.4 Lack of, excess or inappropriate state involvement? Building state presence through public security interventions

When asked about the presence of the State in their neighbourhood, many residents in the two communities studied said that they had not noticed any presence at all, other than during elections when politicians visited the community making promises and asking for votes in exchange for goods, for instance electronic devices such as tablets. Residents commonly mentioned the existence of this type of clientelism in their communities. Just as Leeds (1996) argued in relation to Rio de Janeiro, electoral democracy has returned but the deeper re-democratisation of Brazil has been a slow and fragile process with neoclientelistic overtones, without guarantees of adherence to rule-of-law principles, and without guarantees of practical democracy for the poor.

However, some residents did show awareness that the State was present in their communities in a multitude of ways – for instance through institutions such as schools and, in Tourinho, in the form of a prison, a hospital, a cemetery and a police
station. As argued by young people, the State was present throughout their everyday life, albeit not necessarily in the ways that they desired: ‘of course the state is present here. The schools, the police station, the hospital, all this is the State’ (Marcos, 18 year old, mulato, Tourinho). Residents perceived all of these institutions as necessary but undesirable, given their adverse connotations – the loss of liberty, illness, and bereavement, abuse of force and disrespect by the police. Thus the issue of ‘state absence’ is better rephrased as the ‘type of state presence’ that residents in these communities experienced.

*Pacto pela Vida* is effectively an exercise in increasing state presence and state-building in these communities, in the sense that the presence of the police – ‘the State on the streets’, as Hinton (2006) puts it – has increased in comparison to previous years, even though it remains insufficient and inadequate. PPV, just like the UPPS (*Unidade de Policía Pacificadora*, or Pacification police units) in Rio de Janeiro, is an exercise of state-building insofar as the State is rhetorically, figuratively and physically increasing presence in the field of public security, regardless of the motivations or intentions of this development (such as to cater ‘security’ for large sporting events, to look to be doing something about crime, and to support a political campaign).

This type of state-building has not yet dissipated old habits of clientelism, old forms of state engagement and methods of political bargaining in poor communities. It illustrates that the State is not absent, but rather inadequately engaged with these spaces and their residents. However, in contradiction to the findings of Arias (2006) in Rio de Janeiro, Recife’s clientelist politicians did not appear to make connections with drug traffickers in poor communities to bargain for votes. This may be understandable as traffickers are less organised and less powerful in Recife in comparison with Rio de Janeiro. Thus politicians did not use traffickers’ influence over community organisations to pursue their political ends, such as campaigning and vote buying. In Recife, politicians could directly interact with these communities and their organisations, without the mediation of organised criminal groups.

The problem often cited in poor communities was the selective type of state presence that is available to them. Most often, residents explained that during election year they would interact a lot more with state officials and politicians, especially those asking for votes and arranging vote buying. But they felt that the quality of the provision of basic services, such as health care was inappropriate, they often
experienced water shortages, poor schooling (e.g. *aulas vagas*, cancelled lessons, due to teacher absences), precarious lighting, open sewers running down through the community; as well as a violent state presence experienced through brutal encounters with the police. Many residents, despite wanting more and better quality policing, thought that the best way to resolve the problem of safety was to invest in better quality education for the young, opportunities and spaces for leisure and culture; and well paid job opportunities. These social measures, in their view, had been sidelined by security measures focusing on more policing and more surveillance (e.g. the installation of closed-circuit television cameras).

According to policy-makers and government officials who were interviewed, some of the changes and advances brought by PPV were: (1) the institutional reform of the police; (2) the managerial reform of criminal justice institutions – including the civil and militarised police forces, the *Ministério Público* (Public ministry) and the judiciary – all of which were encouraged to improve their shared communication and efficiency through a system of monitored targets. Police work was allegedly integrated since the civil and militarised police needed to work together, and were monitored through a model of central government management via the *Secretaria de Defesa Social* (Secretariat of social defence); (3) police work was territorialised and the state of Pernambuco was split into 26 areas (AIS, or areas of ‘integrated security’) to facilitate the management of police work in each territory on the long run; (4) finally, a system of financial gratification was created for members of the police in each area that hit its targets related to the overall aim of reducing lethal violent crime (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, 14). PPV implemented measures to increase the professionalisation of police work, which entailed the bureaucratic restructuring of the police as an institution with new criterions for promotion and merit.

All of these changes differ widely from the perceived modifications from the point of view of residents in low-income communities, as shown in chapters 7 and 8. Many residents in poor communities had not noticed the effects of PPV. While most participants from low-income communities claimed to have heard of PPV, most had no idea what the government or the police were doing differently. However, young people were able to convey their disaffection with the police and their feeling of disconnection and distance from public institutions and public policies, as illustrated by these two excerpts from conversations in each of the case-study communities:
‘The secretariat of public defence only represses and controls the population. *Pacto pela Vida* is a mechanism of control, full of racism, homophobia and awful stop and searches. Repression is the tactics of the police and it is directed at the poor and black people from the periphery’ (Maria, 26 years old, black, Tourinho)

…

Roxana – ‘What impact has *Pacto pela Vida* had in your neighbourhood?’

Oliveira (18 years old, Vitoria, mixed background) – ‘Almost none, before we had no policing, now there are two officers.’

In fact, residents’ perception that little had changed in practical terms at street level may be supported by recent increases in homicide rates. Media reports have revealed that since March 2014 the number of homicides in Pernambuco has been increasing again (Oliveira 2015a) and government data confirm this trend (see table 10 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>Recife</th>
<th>RMR</th>
<th>PE rate</th>
<th>RECIFE rate</th>
<th>RMR rate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4592</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>2617</td>
<td>53.97</td>
<td>68.02</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4523</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>2445</td>
<td>52.59</td>
<td>63.08</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4018</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>2111</td>
<td>46.19</td>
<td>52.04</td>
<td>55.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3495</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>39.78</td>
<td>42.58</td>
<td>46.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3507</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>1783</td>
<td>39.47</td>
<td>44.71</td>
<td>47.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3320</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>36.96</td>
<td>38.27</td>
<td>43.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3101</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>34.14</td>
<td>28.76</td>
<td>36.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3436</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>37.41</td>
<td>32.45</td>
<td>39.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INFOPOL (SDS 2015)

This raises questions about the sustainability of PPV’s crime control methods. An interview with Delegado Ramon (PC) published on the *Diário de Pernambuco* (20th June 2014) indicates that police in the state are dissatisfied with their working conditions, overworked (some police work up to 64 hours per week), under pressure to meet targets and yet they get paid the second worst salary among all Brazilian state police forces. Del. Ramon claims that these were some of the concerns that led the
police to strike and this consequently impacted the recent negative results of PPV (Oliveira 2014).

The concern with sustainability had been raised by civil society and activists interviewed and also in a recent evaluation of PPV (Ratton et al. 2014, 2). As argued by Uildriks (2009, 2) ‘what perhaps most characterizes initiatives in Latin America to modernize and democratize policing and criminal justice systems is the difficulty of achieving lasting police and criminal justice reforms, security and an integration of democratic principles and the rule of law on an institutional level.’ It is therefore difficult to identify developments in the field of public security that will be lasting and successful in the long-term, and in which success can be measured from multiple perspectives, and by quantitative and qualitative aspects. These differences in methods of measuring and the dissonance between what communities and activists viewed as important measures of an efficient public safety system and what the State itself claimed as a successful and efficient system, ultimately suggest the need to debate democratic demilitarised public safety intervention in the remainder of this chapter.

8.5 Democratic public security?

Community activists and those who had become involved with social movements felt disheartened about PPV. They explained that there was no room to debate the intervention and no real public participation in the day-to-day running of the programme. PPV had come from above and was being implemented from above, regardless of what people thought at ground level:

‘I took part in the initial process of the program but there was no space to debate youth and human rights, there was only repression and spread sheets with numbers and statistics. There was no room for social movements. The result is simply more police cars, with their attention turned to commercial locations and evangelical churches’ (Baue Forte, 33 years old, black, community activist, Tourinho)

Some young people, particularly those most politicised and involved in the student mobilisations and protests of 2013, argued that Pacto pela Vida was a tool of
oppression by the State, used against the poor and non-white population. The vast majority of participants said that their monthly income was insufficient for their basic needs and indicated that they felt targeted by the police because of their ethnicity and/or social class.

‘In practice Pacto is a program of repression towards the poor. The police are poorly trained, they instil fear in residents of peripheral neighbourhoods’ (Malungo, 22 years old, non-white, Tourinho)

It was common knowledge that police practice and the way they approach suspects continues to be different according to social class. The problem of officers ‘knocking down the doors of shacks’ in favelas, invading them without a warrant, was especially noticeable during the night, when fewer witnesses are present. The practice of operating at night was instituted at least as far back as during the military regime (1964-1985), according to Huggins (1998, 136), as it enables the police to hide their activities while also inculcating fear in the targeted population. Disrespect, discrimination and police violence towards low-income residents remain common. Goldstein’s (2003, 177) research in the 1990s in Rio de Janeiro shows that ‘the forms and levels of daily violence and suffering in the city are experienced differently according to class, race, gender, and location’. Just as Anthony Pereira (2000) argued, in this context, democracy is rendered inoperative. Where the practices of formal institutions, like the police, are enacted through such an extremely unequal social order, and the rule of law is differentially experienced according to social status, access to citizenship rights and democracy are at best limited and inadequate. The differential treatment and disparities in the way security and repression are distributed are perennial examples of social inequalities in Brazil.

Holston and Caldeira (1998, 263) argued that one of the paradoxes in Brazilian democracy is that while political institutions have been democratised, citizenship is compromised as citizens suffer continuous violations of their civil rights, and violence and impunity are standard. On the one hand, the State is responsible for violent and corrupt policing, while on the other hand, police violence is tolerated due to popular ‘support for illegal and/or authoritarian measures of control’ (Holston and Caldeira 1998, 265). It could be argued that this paradoxical aspect of a ‘disjunctive democracy’ (Holston and Caldeira 1998, 264) – tolerance of
violent policing – is not applicable in this study, according to data emerging from the residents of Tourinho and Vitoria. Residents wanted less repressive and discriminatory policing; paradoxically, they wanted more police patrolling the streets on foot (not staying in their cars). One young male summarised it well:

‘We need the demilitarisation of the police. The way it is now, they don’t make us feel safer, they don’t protect the community, their impact is negative. They don’t respect residents – and if you’re poor, you’re treated like a bandit’

(Jose Claudio, 17 years old, black, Tourinho)

Contradicting Holston and Caldeira’s (1998) argument, the residents of Tourinho and Vitoria did not favour military and violent police practices. As argued by Goldstein (2003, 199), questions about democracy and citizenship must be connected to the experiences of the poor. The lived experiences of the poor are under-described, under-analysed and simplified as homogenous responses to politics and policies that go against their interests. However, insofar as the debate on militarised policing goes, in the two Pernambucan case studies, residents’ responses to issues of policing and security did not seem to conflict with their interests. Community residents repetitively talked about their wish for the demilitarisation of the police. Many viewed the police force as a repressive agency of the State, particularly towards the poor. They wanted and needed policing, but they demanded a model of policing that respected them and viewed them as citizens instead of enemies and suspects. Bailey and Dammert (2006) echo these points and elaborate an explanation of why military involvement in domestic policing is a problem.

The Brazilian military police, although now under civilian control, is divided into military ranks, is institutionally beset by a rigid military hierarchy and ideology (see Cubas 2013), as well as military culture and training, and continues to be subjected to a military penal code. Moreover, the Brazilian military continue to be influential in the country’s public security provision apparatus, with many generals occupying positions of leadership in the secretariats of public security of various states and the army being increasingly present in public life and called in to control public order (Fernandes 2013, Harig 2014, Mesquita Neto 2011, 258, Soares 2000, Zaverucha 2000). One recent example of this occurred during the police strikes in May 2014 in Pernambuco, when the army was called in to control rioting and looting.
in the larger cities of the metropolitan region. The photos below (figure 10 and 11) circulated on social media at the time, their source is unknown but informants in Recife have confirmed their accuracy.

Figure 9: The army patrolling an upper-class neighbourhood, Boa Viagem, Recife, May 2014.

Figure 10: The army pointing rifles at ordinary citizens while patrolling a low-income community in Recife, May 2014.

The reliance of the Brazilian federal and state governments on the armed forces to contain short-term crises in the public security apparatus, for instance police strikes, postpones and hinders reform proposals and the demilitarisation of the public security system (see also Mesquita Neto 2011). In this context of militarised public safety, fighting those perceived as internal enemies and threats take precedence over consensual policing, equality before the law and the protection of citizens’ safety and human rights. The military ethos and mission is distinct from that of the police. As argued by Chevigny (1995, 255):
‘Military forces are organised primarily to use violence against a well-defined enemy, and although they can patrol, they are ill-suited to turn to the police jobs of service, peaceable order keeping, or even arresting suspects for crime. A soldier is trained to solve many problems by shooting someone, and the police if they think of themselves as an army, are likely to do the same.’

Soldiers obey orders from above instead of responding to citizens’ demands and their use of force is less restrained. Yet, although the army’s presence in public security is of concern and worth mentioning, there are similar issues with the type of policing that exists in Brazil. The patrolling police *policía militar* (PM) is no longer under the control of the army but it does maintain militarised training, culture and hierarchy, as well as the semiology of its ranks, such as the *soldado* (or soldier, which is the lowest rank of the military police). The PM soldiers tend to obey orders from above, rather than respond to citizens’ demands, in the same ways as an army soldier would.

Police forces have historically and frequently been an obstacle to democracy, via strikes and politicisation (Pereira 2008), and through being deployed to support undemocratic governments, for instance, in Brazil (Huggins 1998) and in India (Bayley 1983). In this context, the contested concept of ‘democratic policing’ stands in stark contrast to the policing observed in the course of this research. Democratic policing tends to be defined in the literature by a range of criteria or a set of principles (Bayley 2001, Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1996, Loader and Walker 2007, Manning 2010, Pino and Wiatrowski 2006). This thesis has adopted Bayley’s definition, which refers to democratic policing as a model of crime control in which the police are governed by the rule of law instead of being driven by arbitrary political regimes. The definition implies that the police are accountable to the law as opposed to government (Bayley 2006).

A democratic police would focus on protecting human rights so that democratic politics could be conducted in a fair manner, this means that the citizenry need to be free from the threat of arbitrary arrest and detention, and to be able to enjoy freedom of association and movement. Democratic policing requires protecting the public from cruel and excessive use of force; it requires respect for due process and equality of treatment. An essential feature of the concept is therefore police accountability (Loader 1996). Democratic policing demands negotiating expertise to
manage disputes and assist the public, officers need to know their community and apply moderation in their use of authority (Bailey and Dammert 2006, 15-18).

Moreover, in this framework, democracy has relevance to policing because the values associated with democratic citizenship – equality, justice, representation and participation – should come to the fore, and preclude managerial concerns with efficiency and effectiveness (Loader 1996). This is particularly important for those marginalised populations that have little or no influence over the few existing formal and informal channels to affect police work. As Loader (1996) put it, policing requires democratic legitimation at least for three reasons. First, because as an exercise of power, policing can have a significantly detrimental influence over citizens’ quality of life and liberties; second, policing signifies an allocation of a public good, the provision of public safety, having effects of the ordering of social relations and playing a key role in the mediation of conflict. Finally, democratic legitimacy is important because ‘a legitimate institution holds out greater hope of achieving its purposes’ (Loader 1996, 38).

Nonetheless, the concept of ‘democratic policing’ does have its limitations, since the nature of police work can enforce social inequalities by using coercion against certain citizens in order to protect other citizens. This quintessential aspect of policing can function as an obstacle to even the most developed and reformed, allegedly democratic police forces (Harkin 2015). Moreover, policing cannot be disconnected from wider societal asymmetries of power and inequality. This is not to say that police misconduct and abuse, such as the targeting and discriminatory treatment of poor black youth, cannot be changed until broader inequalities in Brazilian society and the cultural inheritance of slavery are addressed. But rather that, the inherent classism, sexism and racism in policing and public security interventions, as seen in the findings of this thesis, are made intelligible in this wider context.

Democratic policing is rather different from the type of policing experienced in low-income communities in Recife. As shown in previous chapters, residents argued that the police discriminated on the grounds of ethnicity and skin colour; that black people were stopped and searched more often and they were also often the victims of verbal abuse, such as being called *bandido* and ‘marginal’ by the police and the victims of physical abuse and excessive use of force by both the military and civil police. Police brutality, disrespect and violence are common in their daily lives. Under such conditions ‘democratic politics loses its legitimacy and efficacy’ (Holston
and Caldeira 1998, 263). Residents felt criminalised, not only by individual officers but also by the policies and state programmes, including Pacto pela Vida. In their view, PPV was not a ‘success’; it targeted them as suspects rather than as citizens in need of access to public security. The managerial reforms implemented by PPV, focusing on increasing effectiveness and efficiency, did not attempt to make policing more democratic or legitimate.

Appearance, clothing and indicators of social class were said to influence police practice rather than actual intelligence-led information. For example, poor residents expressed concern over the duality in what they claimed was the police view: residents were either seen as ‘workers’ in uniforms or ‘criminals’ if they happened to be wearing clothes that, in the minds of the police, they probably could not have been able to afford to buy legally.

‘They know that I am not involved [in the drug trade] but they stop and search me nearly every day and treat me badly. [...] People say, if you are black you are a drug trafficker, if you are white you are drug user. The families who live near this situation always suffer, often the police come into our homes and turn them upside down [...] Yes, there is police corruption here, I have seen young people loose their money in a simple stop and search’ (Fiori, male, 21 years old, Tourinho, Black)

Most residents complained that the police were untrustworthy, corrupt, and inefficient and that officers discriminated against them on the grounds of ethnicity and social class. As argued by Holloway (1993, 7) ‘Despite major changes since slavery was declared illegal in 1888, Brazil still lives with the legacy of the social relations, institutions, and attitudes built up over the previous 350 years when it was a society of slaves and masters’. The country maintains ‘strong roots in the culture of slavery, oppression and social exploitation’ (Fernandes 2013, 211).

Many residents stated that they feared the police, because of the memory of past police violence and abuse – whether experienced personally, seen in the media, or heard of in the community. Nevertheless, rather paradoxically, most participants argued that they would like more policing. In their view, it is the model of policing that needs to be addressed. Another divergence with Rio de Janeiro, for example in contrast to Goldstein’s (2003) findings, is that in Tourinho and Vitoria residents’
greater sympathy was towards the police and not towards local criminals. Recent ethnographic work by Palloma de Menezes (2014) in Rio de Janeiro shows that residents in low-income communities are often unwilling to show sympathy for, or talk about, either the police or drug traffickers. Adopting either narrative is risky for residents that live among both the police and organised armed groups.

In the beginning of my fieldwork, I also found it difficult to have conversations about these topics with residents, who often deflected my questions. However, once I had spent more time in the field, taking part in community activities (e.g. volunteering) and celebrations (e.g. children’s day) and becoming a virtual friend to many residents on social media (e.g. Facebook), it became clear to residents that I was not an informant to either the police or local criminals but rather a pregnant researcher who was going back to the UK. Only then did our conversations begin to flow. We developed some level of trust in our relationships and residents began to talk about these topics. The fact that residents were not completely unsympathetic to the police should not be surprising. I do not wish to convey an image of homogeneity. There was conflict, controversy and diversity in views about the police and about local criminals. Nonetheless, residents did demand more policing, they also demanded better policing, and not the type of policing they received. This should not be surprising. Despite being critical of policing practices, communities around the world tend to demand more policing (Herbert 2006), especially more foot patrols, which are perceived as non-threatening (Waddington 2006, 3) and associated with more visibility, accessibility and responsiveness (Wakefield 2006, 7).

For the most part, interviewees who were at the top of the government and police hierarchies saw few defects in PPV. Nevertheless, some of these interviewees did mention the problem of corruption in the police force and generally in public institutions in Brazil, and some even suspected that the ‘success’ figures presented by PPV were often exaggerated. During interviews with low-ranking militarised police officers and even with a delegado (chief of civil police), these suspicions were expressed, as shown in Chapter 6. Often this happened after the interview was ‘officially’ finished, once the voice recorder was turned off, the interviewee would narrate accounts of corruption. One delegado alleged that the success of Pernambuco’s public security program PPV was a political project. He had worked for the police handling data for PPV and claimed that when the policy failed to reach its 12% target in homicide reduction in a year, it still made newspaper headlines
celebrating the ‘success’ of reducing it by just under 6%. The year after, the reduction was similar but the headlines celebrated a 12% decrease – he said ‘how they got to that [false] figure I don’t know’.

One of the main challenges for PPV, in the experts’ views, related to the difficulty of putting a sufficient number of police officers on the streets. Many of those recruited through concursos (public contests) they argued, were not truly interested in police work and would leave as soon as a better opportunity came up. But residents as demonstrated above also demanded more officers and more policing. Another challenge, cited by state actors, was increasing the number of prison spaces. The majority of participants, from civil society and from the State, observed a need to increase the scope of social crime prevention interventions, including programs for the rehabilitation of drug addicts.

One of the most pressing challenges to be addressed by PPV, for low-ranking officers and low-income community residents, is the type of police training that is implemented. Cases of class and ethnic discrimination by state actors, namely the police, were common and associated with poor training. Sometimes this discrimination materialised in relation to where the alleged ‘suspect’ lived, the poorer the community the more suspiciously residents were treated. Dress code also raised suspicion by the police. For example, young black men wearing branded surfer shorts were seen as criminals. Supposedly they could not afford this type of clothing unless they were drug traffickers. Furthermore, in the eyes of the police, if poor residents were workers, the police expected them to be employed in manual working class jobs, which, in their view, require uniforms.

In summary, the development of a public security intervention has been an advance in the sense that ‘security’ and policing had so far been commodities only affordable or delivered to the upper and middle-classes. These sectors of the population already resorted to paying for private security (e.g security guards, gated communities, private leisure centres etc.). While residents in poor communities were and still are exposed to extortion groups claiming to provide security, as illustrated in Chapter 7. It is nonetheless an advancement that some effort, regardless of its motif, has been made to develop a public security intervention, this thesis has revealed numerous pitfalls in the theoretical rationale, design and implementation of this program.
Clearly, declining homicide rates benefit the population as a whole, poor or otherwise. However, it is unclear whether it was solely the implementation of PPV that led to this temporary decline in murder rates. And the adequacy – both in terms of kind, quality, quantity and distribution – of public security provision remains questionable. PPV is founded on what Young (2011, 191) would call a ‘cosmetic criminology’, insofar as it treats crime as a mere blemish, addressing it through superficial administrative measures while ignoring processes of stigmatisation, prejudice, and power inequalities inherent in the policy, in the security apparatus and in the criminal justice system. One key reform that localised and managerial interventions such as PPV were not able to achieve is the democratisation of the police, which – as suggested above – is a key demand on the part of residents of low-income communities. Essential to this is the demilitarisation of the police and public security apparatus as the section below suggests.

8.6 Demilitarisation: can it be achieved?

Approximately three decades after the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship, the demilitarisation of the police has not yet materialised. In a recent interview, the academic and former public security secretary for the state of Rio de Janeiro and later for the federal government under Lula, Luiz Eduardo Soares argued that the leftist federal governments of Lula and Dilma have refused to engage with the topic of security because dealing with crime and policing is seen as a right-wing agenda (Aranda 2015). He argued that the political left believes that violence is only a consequence of structural issues such as education and poverty, and therefore public security policies are neglected and considered the responsibility for each state as opposed to the federal government. In this context, a federal issue such as demilitarising the police remains stalled. However, the violent police response to the 2013 protests against rising bus fares and the famous case of the disappearance of the builder Amarildo after being captured by the military police in Rio de Janeiro also in 2013 revived the debate about demilitarisation (Bonis 2013, Kawaguti 2013, Araújo 2014, Welle 2014). One year later, the Truth Commission that investigated crimes committed by the last military dictatorship (1964-1985) stated its support for the
demilitarisation of the police, among other recommendations (FolhadeS.Paulo 2014). The UN’s Human Rights council had already recommended demilitarisation in May 2012 to reduce the amount of extra-judicial killings by the police in Brazil (Bonis 2013) and a study by the Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (N = 21,101) found majority support for demilitarisation among members of the Brazilian military police (Welle 2014).

But the revived demilitarisation debate is complex and contested for a number of reasons (see Mesquita Neto 2011, 241-268 for a discussion of previous attempts to demilitarise public security in Brazil). By law, the Brazilian 1988 constitution established the existence of a military police, required to be an auxiliary force to the army if the country is for instance at war. This has implications to the structure of the police and their training, which is essentially military and centred around the combat of enemies, rather than focused on service to civilians. So first, demilitarisation would require at a minimum, an amendment to the constitution, which is a lengthy process, requiring political will and majority approval on a series of voting sessions at the legislative. Second, the distinctive possible ways to demilitarise and re-establish the police are contested (Kawaguti 2013). There are questions around, for instance, whether the military police would be integrated to the civil police, or whether a whole new force would be created; which branch of the State would be in charge policing, the municipalities or each federative state; and questions around the salary, pensions and job benefits of existing members of the police after the military police are inoperative. Third, although as illustrated above many Brazilian scholars support the demilitarisation and agree that it could lead to positive outcomes, they argue that demilitarisation on its own is unlikely to end police violence altogether. This argument is reinforced by common knowledge that the civil police are also notoriously violent, and corrupt, although being most infamous for torturing suspects rather than for killing them at the rate that the military police do (see for instance Sapori’s critique of demilitarisation on FolhadeS.Paulo 2014). It could be argued that although demilitarisation would not enable the end of police violence completely, it is at least possible to suggest that it has potential to reduce it, and to promote better policing through the unification of the police. This does not mean that Brazil needs one single police force, or a centralised police. Rather, the country could benefit from having police forces responsible for completing the full cycle of policing and that are trained through coordinated groups of institutions founded on democratic principles.
rather than militarised and separate institutions (as it is the case currently for the military and civil police).

At least four proposals have been presented by politicians to demilitarise the police, all of which recommend the unification of the main police forces – the civil and the military police – so that one force will be responsible for the full cycle of policing (Kawaguti 2013, Welle 2014). This measure would eliminate the current division of functions, between the investigative police (PC) and the patrolling police (PM) and reduce the existent competition, conflict and lack of collaboration between the different police. In an interview with the Brasil Post, the specialist in public security Ignacio Cano, makes an important point, that although demilitarising the police would be beneficial, demilitarising the entire public security apparatus and its policies is essential to reduce police violence (Araújo 2014). This could entail for instance less involvement of military personnel in policy making and implementation; the end of the army’s involvement in public security matters; the end of the military training, hierarchy and military justice system that can either acquit violent officers or punish minor misdemeanours with incarceration.

Overall, the findings of this thesis strongly suggest that there is public support for demilitarisation in the communities studied and that demilitarisation would be a step towards more democratic policing and public safety. Yet, as argued by the previous coordinator of the Secretariat of Security, Justice and Human Rights of the estate of Rio de Janeiro Jacqueline Muniz (2006), democratising police practices and improving police-citizen interactions does not need to wait until the constitution is amended. Willing public leaders, estate governors, secretaries of public security and chiefs of police could, in the meantime, take measures to democratise policing – such as stressing the importance of transparency in policing to limit opportunities for police deviance, explaining how police procedures must take place and enforcing systems of rewards and punishments for, respectively, democratic and deviant policing practices. Once demilitarisation is achieved, more profound and lasting transformations can be achieved, including changes to the structure of the police, their type of training, and ultimately to police culture.
8.7 Conclusion

This chapter argued that existing methods of safety intervention in Pernambuco have been deemed a success based on a narrow set of quantitative measurement indicators, to the neglect of qualitative indicators. The chapter examined some of the problems of quantitative measurement, such as the potentially confounding manipulation of data. It also reinforced the argument made in previous chapters that there is a clear dissonance between the experiences and demands of civil society and the claims made by the State.

Community residents generally took the view that although there had been noticeable increases in the amount of policing, the model of policing remained the same – militarised, violent, disrespectful of citizens’ human rights, sporadic and distant (motorised instead of foot patrols, thereby reducing the chances of some form of dialogue emerging between the police and the community). Paradoxically, and in spite of these ills, residents demanded more policing, just as they also demanded better policing. Residents were fully aware of the needs for organised security provision. Inadequate policing had led to the formation of alternative security groups, informal extermination groups and death squads formed (although not exclusively) by off-duty or ex-police officers who extorted money from residents in return for protection, even when members of these groups had already been incarcerated. There was awareness that simply incarcerating members of organised criminal groups was insufficient to control them. This is because organised criminals could continue to run their business from inside the overcrowded and chaotic prisons, through their networks with corrupt prison staff, police, visitors and even via mobile phones. Moreover, new groups of organised criminals emerged when previous ones had been dismantled. Criminals also diversified into various activities beyond extortion and informal security provision and the community had seen sprawling crack-cocaine drug and firearm trafficking and armed robberies. Although there is no single panacea for these problems, the chapter debated some measures that may have potential to curb and moderate these problems, including the democratisation and demilitarisation of public safety interventions.
CHAPTER 9 – Conclusions

‘Transitions to democracy very rarely wipe out – in one dramatic reform – the accretion of years and sometimes decades of authoritarian practices and mentalities in militaries and judiciaries’ (Pereira 2005, 200)

While the above quote from Pereira refers to militaries and judiciaries, this thesis contends that its core point, regarding the legacy of undemocratic rule, also applies to other state institutions, not least the police and the public security apparatus. Brazil is a young democracy, but democratic transition and the reinstatement of elections do not necessarily imply the democratisation of state institutions or the reduction of violence, as this study and others have shown (Arias 2010). Nonetheless, the continuity of an authoritarian legacy does not mean that there has been no change.

What are the impacts of reforms and new public security policies on those most in need of protection? How do residents of Brazil’s low-income communities perceive the security agencies and the new approaches to security? How do they relate to the police in contemporary Brazil? What differences are there between the security needs of the understudied northeast of Brazil and the southeast? What difference does this make for the types of policies and practices necessary to exert a monopoly of violence, or at least to control violence? This thesis has contributed to the debate around these questions.

The central argument of this thesis is that managerial police reforms and new security programmes, namely PPV in Pernambuco, have not been the panacea to criminological problems. These reforms have not addressed long-standing issues of discriminatory policing. They have also failed to tackle brutalising, militarised police training and practices. The overall model and style of policing, in spite of the implementation of new security interventions, remained somewhat unchanged (‘old wine in new bottles’). New security interventions had no effect in making the police adopt democratic principles such as equality before the law and accountability, especially when the police interacted with marginalised people in low-income communities. Neither were these new programmes able to inhibit diverse forms of violence and the continuing operation of organised criminals in these communities. Instead, the increasing use of policing and incarceration as methods of crime control
exacerbated existing inequalities, with the most vulnerable populations worst affected. This argument contributes new insights to the criminological and public security literature in Brazil, which had, first, both largely marginalised the stories and lived experiences of the poorest communities in the northeast of Brazil and second, failed to challenge the narrative of ‘success’ about new methods of crime control deployed in this region of the world.

While this thesis has challenged managerial police reforms in Brazil, considering some of their effects, this does not mean that the author entirely disagrees with some of these reforms or with some of the proposals made by authors that support managerial reforms, such as L. E. Soares (2008) and Ratton et al (2014). For example, the proposals to control firearms and monitor police apprehensions of firearms have the potential to reduce violence. The same effect could not be expected through monitoring drug apprehensions. What this thesis has argued is that it is important to consider the wider cumulative effects of managerialism, which have profound implications for police-community relations, criminal justice institutions (e.g. the prison) and the exacerbation of social inequalities.

This thesis has addressed some important debates around the methods and principles of policing that were not affected by managerial reforms focusing on monitoring certain targets. To conclude, the remainder of this thesis discusses the need to address inequalities in knowledge production, the provision of security as a public good and summarises the main findings examined in preceding chapters. It also highlights the key contributions made, makes policy recommendations and presents a critical reflection of the study, suggesting areas for future research.

9.1 Inequalities in knowledge production

While the criminological literature has largely been produced in the Global North and in Anglo-Saxon countries, the Brazilian literature on public security has for the most part focused on the southeast of the country. Both, therefore, have tended to neglect the northeast of Brazil, and cannot fully account for all regions of a continent-sized country such as Brazil. Significant regional differences render dominant theories and public policies inadequate to some contexts. For instance, the ways of explaining and addressing regional problems need to account for diversity – for example the fact that criminals are exceptionally well organised in the southeast of Brazil yet the rate of
violence as measured by homicide rates is much higher in the northeast, an issue illustrated in earlier chapters. Public security or safety provision, crime and violence rank as some of the most important and contested topics for most Brazilian people. And yet, as illustrated in chapters 2 and 3, much of this literature in Brazil focuses on the experiences of the southeast region, where drug traffickers in poor communities have been so powerfully organised that they have been described as ‘parallel states’ (Leeds 1996). In these cases traffickers have assumed control over entire communities, enforcing the law with their own hands, controlling who is allowed in and out of communities, and making it difficult for the police to interact with local people. In some cases traffickers also assume the role of welfare provider, dispensing loans, jobs and medication, yet at the same time they coerce residents into turning a blind eye to trafficking or hiding drugs and firearms in their own homes. This literature has, for the most part, neglected regional differences. The case studies in Recife provide evidence that criminal groups there have not been organised or powerful enough to be considered ‘parallel states’ within poor communities. And yet both the southeast and the northeast regions face similar problems when it comes to the need to be able to walk the streets safely, or to co-produce policing through consensual practices rather than having it imposed on citizens without respect for their human rights and needs. Policing, in all of Brazil, needs to be distributed throughout cities with the same democratic principles (transparency, accountability, equality before the law), regardless of the social inequalities and differences deep-seated in citizen’s circumstances.

The State is not as absent as one might initially think in these communities, whether in the southeast or the northeast of Brazil. In Pernambuco, for instance, the development of the public safety programme Pacto pela Vida (PPV) since 2007 is one example of state building and illustrates the interactions of the State with people in poor communities. While some studies have argued that the implementation of the PPV programme has been a success (Ratton et al. 2014), these existing enquiries have not elicited the voices of marginalised groups subjected to these interventions. No study had yet been conducted in Recife’s low-income communities to examine the perspectives of their people, and understand how these new security interventions impact residents, in particular young people, in these communities. The cases of Tourinho and Vitoria have much to reveal about the impact of the new security agenda. This investigation is particularly important given that PPV has gained enough
positive publicity to receive international awards and to potentially influence national policy, as stated in interviews with government agents⁵⁴; and, corroborating Macedo’s (2012) findings, Brazil’s national secretariat for public security (SENASP) has proposed to implement PPV at the national level. It is therefore essential to understand what implications this could have for Brazil and the Global South.

This thesis has engaged with the views of residents of low-income communities and with the discourses of state agents and members of civil society, in order to challenge the dominant technocratic and managerialist discourse regarding PPV. Here, the adopted definition of technocracy refers to an organisational structure or system of governance where decisions are made on the basis of a particular type of mainstream technological knowledge. In PPV’s case this technological knowledge is based on statistical information, especially homicide rates, the number of firearms and drugs seized and the number of people processed through the criminal justice system. This form of knowledge is founded on the deployment of a success narrative focusing on crime management, the identification, analysis and management of crime data. The managerial and dominant discourse refers to PPV as a successful policy (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014) but when we ask how this success is measured, and by whom, an alternative analysis arises.

9.2 Public security in debate

The states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Pernambuco have, since the 2000s, seen overall declining homicide rates (with some upward fluctuations). The literature theorising this phenomenon is becoming polarised. On one side are the scholars who argue that a number of factors related to government interventions are responsible for this decline. Among these, we have former advisor and head analyst of the São Paulo State Secretariat for Public Security, Tulio Kahn, who argued that improved policing was a key factor in declining homicides (Goertzel and Kahn 2009, Kahn 2011); Beatriz Magaloni (2015), supporting the UPPs in Rio; and, former advisor in the field of Public Security to the deceased ex-governor of Pernambuco Eduardo Campos, Ratton (2012) in Pernambuco.

On the other side, are a minority of researchers conducting qualitative and ethnographic research, who argue that evidence from the ground up can enrich this debate, provide alternative explanations and raise important questions about public
safety and public security provision. Among these, are Feltran (2008; 2011), Dias (2013), Wolff (2014) and Denyer Willis (2015). Feltran, Dias and Denyer Willis all argue that policing and hyper-incarceration in the state of São Paulo have not caused the decline in homicides, but rather that they have enabled or facilitated the monopoly of violence by one criminal group, the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital). In their view, the State’s public security provision has had perverse impacts and has not contributed to reducing crime in the ways it claims.

Depending on where the questions to evaluate public security provision, and interventions such as PPV, are asked and on who is asked those questions, an entirely different discourse emerges. Evidence from poor communities in Chapter 7 provides a critique of the dominant discourse of successful intervention and successful policing. The statistical reduction of homicides in Pernambuco, whether accurate or not, did not speak to people in these communities.

For these communities, the mainstream criminological literature (as labelled by Taylor, Walton, and Young 2013), the theories on crime prevention, policing and reform (Bratton 2005, Clarke 1997, Clarke and Felson 2004) emerging from the Global North and deployed in the development of security policies in the Global South do not address the developments at the micro level in the peripheries of Recife. Theories such as ‘Broken Windows’ (Bratton 2005, Wilson and Kelling 2013) and situational crime prevention55 (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1988, Clarke 1997, De Souza and Miller 2012) have been used to promote managerial criminology around the globe, from COMPSTAT in New York to PPV in Recife, regardless of their applicability or of their perverse outcomes. Moreover, Brazil’s proponents of managerialism have, in some cases, misread and misunderstood homicide reduction programmes from the Global North, such as Operation Ceasefire, as illustrated in Chapter 5. These authors had incorrectly interpreted the central element of Ceasefire as the increase in rates of incarceration (Veloso and Ferreira 2008b), and some seem to have truly believed that COMPSTAT and crime management technologies could make the Brazilian police more accountable and reduce crime (Soares 2008, 12-15), showing little awareness of the established critiques of managerialism, COMPSTAT and the New York miracle, discussed in Chapter 5. The fact that academics from the Brazilian left – who are proponents of police demilitarisation and supporters of the human rights agendas, such as Luiz Eduardo Soares – support contested managerial
crime control measures that risk exacerbating social inequalities suggests another paradox that warrants further research.

The dominant managerial success discourse is disconnected from the voices of people in low-income communities. The overall feedback from people in the case-study communities revealed dissatisfaction with the State and with the type of security and policing that is provided. While technocrats may argue that the only type of data that can truly convey results are statistics about actual crime rates, this dismisses the importance of the relational aspects of the police with citizens. Statistical reductions in homicide may look good on paper but they do not mean that the police are less violent and brutal in these communities. Residents had numerous complaints about cases of disrespect and abuse of their human rights on the part of the police. Furthermore, the analysis of homicide data does not take into account the cases of non-lethal violence, when the victim survives, such as rape and gender violence or police abuse of force; neither does it account for potential manipulation in the classification of deaths or in the manoeuvring of evidence collected at the morgues (IML), which are controlled by the police.

9.3 Summary of findings

This study started by outlining the development of a body of literature on youth crime and marginality around the globe. It attempted to both draw attention to and address the need for research that engages with the perceptions of young people and research that deploys ethnographic methods in the field of public security in the northeast of Brazil. As discussed in the introduction, the thesis contributes to the emerging body of literature that is developing southern theories, and a southern criminological approach, through an engagement with knowledge produced by academics in Brazil and an engagement with the perceptions of under-represented groups in civil society, namely young people and residents from low-income neighbourhoods. As such, this thesis ultimately develops a critique of mainstream criminological theories developed in the Global North and emulated or inadequately applied in the Global South.

Chapter 2 provided some of the demographic and socio-economic backdrop to the research, including themes such as poverty, inequality and housing. It discussed the critique of popular notions that link marginality and poverty as causal factors to crime in Brazil. This utilitarian belief – that narrowly defines crime exclusively as the
Chapter 2 also examined the genesis and theoretical rationale of Pernambuco’s new public security intervention: PPV.

Chapter 3 started by focusing on the existing gaps in the literature, arguing that more research that takes into account Brazil’s regional differences and unequal knowledge production is necessary. It discussed issues relating to gender, young people, emerging debates in the international literature about Brazilian criminal justice institutions and the inadequate presence of the State in poor communities. It examined the development of the public security field of inquiry in the Brazilian literature and its most salient theories and debates about violence. It showed that the literature in this field has predominantly emerged in the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo academic hub, despite the exceptionalities of these cities (Macaulay 2007, Garmany 2011b). The vast majority of studies largely neglected the northeast of Brazil, despite clear evidence that violence and security are prominent themes in all of Brazil and that hard data, such as figures on homicide rates are particularly high in the north and northeast of Brazil. Furthermore, most of the literature in this field does not focus on the views and experiences of young people in poor communities. Chapter 3 also clarifies the use of key terms in the thesis, such as democratic policing, and reflects on policing theory and on some of the ambiguities of policing, democracy and security.

Chapter 4 discussed the research methods employed in this thesis. It argued that ethnographic research in the field of public security can enable the researcher to elicit in-depth data about people’s everyday lives, narratives and the impacts of social and security policies in ways that could not otherwise be achieved with, for instance, the quantitative methods favoured by technocrats. An emphasis on narratives can counter the limitations of methods that simply emphasise demographic variables out of context (Young 2011). There is a dearth of this type of research in the field of public security, and in particular in the northeast of Brazil, with few exceptions, a fact deriving partly from concerns about researchers’ safety and from the lack of prestige that this field of inquiry has among academics and government officials in Brazil. For the former, security is seen as a conservative topic, and for the latter it is an unsavoury subject. Its importance is therefore neglected. Chapter 4 also discussed
some of the challenges of deploying ethnographic and qualitative methods, including debates around the representation of the marginalised in academic work.

Chapter 5 outlined the main themes emerging from interviews with public officials, high-ranking members of the civil and military police in Pernambuco, and civil society representatives. These data are presented first, not because there is any superiority over the data emerging from poor communities, but because this approach helps to contrast the stark differences between the dominant discourse of success about government interventions and the narratives of people who are subjected to these interventions and state practices. The chapter provided: an overview of the high-profile program of public security *Pacto pela Vida* (PPV) in Pernambuco; participants' arguments that the police managerial reform had reduced homicides and of how it had done so, while also linking the methods arguably used with internationally contested policing strategies, such as (narrowly defined) Zero Tolerance policing and COMPSTAT; a debate about challenges to the current model of public security in Pernambuco, as seen from the perspective of these expert interviewees, these include prison overcrowding and the unsustainability of the program. Finally, the chapter provided a critique of the transplantation of Americanised crime control methods and criminology, developed in an atypical context – that of advanced industrial countries in the Global North – to societies such as Brazil.

Continuing with the emerging critique of the new security agenda, Chapter 6 outlined some of the contradictions emerging in high-ranking officials’ and police narratives, such as examples of class, gender and ethnic discrimination and acknowledgements of police corruption. It suggested that managerial police reforms have not targeted or addressed the endurance of these problems, which hinder the development of policing that is respectful of citizens’ human rights. The chapter also shows some of participants’ views about the increasing use of policing as an alleged solution to structural and social problems in poor communities. The narratives that emerged from interviews with low-ranking members of the police, who live in low-income communities, were rather critical and sceptical of PPV’s methods – including the continuation of brutal street policing orders from superiors, and even the extent to which the hard data presented by the government was reliable.

Chapter 7 focused on the perceptions of residents and young people in the two case study communities. It starts with more specific demographic information to contextualise the two communities, defined by their socio-economic context and
The chapter examines the most remarkable emerging themes from these places, which are not usually visited, but rather are more frequently avoided because they frighten and vex the middle and upper class public. For residents in both communities, the type of policing that they received was distant, sporadic and counterproductive. Residents feared local organised criminal groups in charge of informal security, extermination groups but also feared speaking with the police, who were hardly present at all in their neighbourhoods, except during the occasional motorised patrol. Moreover, when residents did have contact with the police, they were also subjected to brutal policing methods and were treated as criminals instead of being protected. This generated hostility and resentment but did not reduce demands for more and better policing.

The chapter also illustrated some of the main gaps in security provision in the PPV program, such as its lack of focus on gender issues and its silences on the issues of non-lethal violence against women. Drugs, violence and a lack of decent job opportunities were mentioned as key problems in the community in almost every interview. Residents also complained about other problems such as rubbish collection and general infrastructure (public transport networks, local health care, water shortage), yet concerns about safety always ranked first for residents. Some of the reasons for their concerns were personal experiences of victimisation, including being victims of theft and armed robbery or seeing friends and family victimised. In fact, most residents were concerned about armed robbery on the streets, a crime, which does not necessarily affect PPV’s homicide statistics, since many victims survive. Many participants in the two communities had experienced numerous cases of bereavement among family and peer groups, because of crime and violence in their neighbourhoods. This increased their fear, their feelings of being under-protected and their withdrawal from public spaces. It also contributed to the power and influence of extortion groups selling security in the neighbourhoods.

Chapter 8 focused on debating some of the key broader theoretical debates connected to the research. It discussed some of the epistemological problems of focusing exclusively on quantitative outputs to measure success in crime control, not least because all data, even quantitative data, can be manipulated. Moreover, the chapter shows that despite increasing managerialism in crime control, increased policing and incarceration, organised criminals still exert influence outside prisons, from within them by operating over, under and through the walls. The chapter
reviewed PPV as a state-building exercise and the type of state presence that it provides, contrasting the discourse of success with the counter-narratives of people in the case study communities. It engaged with the views of civil society representatives from non-governmental organisations and social movements, who were both more critical of PPV’s methods, especially its dominant focus on repressive policing, and more in-tune with the views of people in low-income communities. Chapter 8 also examined the proposal of democratic policing, acknowledging some of the difficulties of achieving demilitarisation in Brazil.

9.4 Key contributions: youth and safety in Recife

From the findings of this dissertation, lessons can be learned and applied beyond Brazil, since other countries face similar issues – including countries attempting to make their institutions more democratic, or transitioning from authoritarian rule (e.g. Iraq, other Latin American countries), or suffering high crime and inequality rates, growing vigilantism and similar security issues (see Arias and Goldstein 2010, 6-10 for a discussion of this). Mainstream proposed solutions, or those that become implemented such as managerial reforms, can be understood as part of broader shifts in social control with comparable developments found in many other countries (Brownlee 1998, Loader 1996, Maguire 2000, 316). The effects of these developments and the risks they pose vary according to the socio-economic context and history of each locale. They impact on populations differently through: the exacerbation of social inequalities; the deterioration of police-community relations; the development of problematic prison complexes; the further organisation of criminal groups; and the additional erosion of public spaces, safety and human rights, all of which become permissible in the agenda of particular forms of crime control.

This thesis has made, at the very least, a twofold contribution to the academic literature on youth, crime and security. First, few qualitative studies deploying ethnographic methods have looked at how young people respond to violence and security issues in Brazil. With the exception of some of the research conducted in São Paulo (MNMMR, IBASE, and USP-NEV 1991) and Rio de Janeiro (Goldstein 2003, Zaluar 2004a), few studies have focused on the effects of institutions and methods of crime control through the lens and experiences of young people or marginalised people in the northeast of Brazil, with some exceptions (see for example Drybread
Studies focusing on the profiling of victims of homicide in Recife (Arnold, Falbo, and Figueiroa 2002) do not provide in-depth qualitative data about young people’s lives and perceptions, neither do they allow for any agency from the part of the researched. For the most part, the literature in this field, in Recife, has emerged from public health quantitative studies concerned with identifying and connecting causal variables to dead bodies (Falbo, Buzzetti, and Cattaneo 2001). Although some analytical academic work has briefly mentioned the Recifense case (Huggins and Mesquita 2000, Mesquita 1993), this work has not allowed for the voices of the marginalised to emerge. This leads to an insufficient consideration of agency and of the humanistic and spontaneous aspects of social phenomena and social action. The first overarching contribution of this thesis was to address this gap in the literature. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that there is a growing body of research about the effects, dynamics and intersections between prisons and communities outside prison in Brazil (Moore 2015, Silvestre 2008a, b, 2016) and relating to youth justice institutions in the northeast of Brazil (Amorim, Melo, and César 2016, Drybread 2014, Nolasco 2010, Schuler 2015).

The second main contribution was to address the gap in relation to the emergence of new security agendas. In particular this focused on the impacts of the policing programme *Pacto Pela Vida* (2007-date) in Pernambuco. As shown in Chapter 5, few studies have focused on PPV, and the ones that have tended to emulate or even generate the State’s dominant technocratic discourse of success (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014), or to look at PPV’s system of governance (Macedo 2012), without engaging with the recipient populations, which is to say the people most affected by security programmes. By engaging with the everyday lives of the marginalised, this thesis enabled a comparison between the discourses of the governing and the governed. It allowed for responses to emerge from below and exposed the realities of the field of security and policing in some of Brazil’s most neglected populations.

Public security policies and policing in Pernambuco, and it could be said in most of Brazil, penalise people on the basis of their appearance, social background and perceived deservedness. Citizens who do not appear to be *trabalhadores* (workers) – by not using a uniform, or by being unemployed, or by not having the reputation of a worker – and those poor indigenous and afro-descendant citizens who use public space are criminalised or considered *bandidos* (criminal), even when they
have not committed a crime. Those who have a criminal record are forever considered undeserving *bandidos* and expendables. They are exposed to unlimited violations that are not constructed as crimes. They are treated, disciplined and handled as disposable bodies, the bodies that can be tortured, punished, incarcerated and disrespected during forceful militarised police stop-and-searches. Improved police training and increased opportunities to generate dialogue between these populations and the police are essential to amend thin and impoverished youth-police relations and community-police relations. Although residents complained that the police were distant and often disrespectful, they perceived a need for policing and public rather than private forms of security. Regular community public security forums that are inclusive of all residents, rather than available to small vocal minorities, open to dialogue and feedback between the police and the community; and an external and independent civil society council to monitor public security policies could go some way in addressing the problems and consequences of distant policing and arbitrary security policies.

Although research on policing in Latin American has been growing since the 1990s, few studies have examined the impacts of public security interventions and police reform in Latin American cities from the perspective of recipient communities. Studies also face difficulties in measuring the success of reforms and identifying factors that are useful for comparison before and after reform (Ward 2006). This thesis provided an inquiry into the impacts of a particular public security intervention – PPV – in Recife, from the perspective of state actors (police and government officials), civil society (activists, NGOs) and residents of low-income communities. It revealed that there are a number of conflicting narratives between groups of research participants, and that their perceptions about the outcomes of PPV are rather conflicting. On one hand, there has been a step forward in the state of Pernambuco with the development, at state level, of the idea that ‘security’ cannot be simply a commodity for the rich (e.g. private security) and that it needs to be universally provided (public security) in order for all citizens, regardless of their social class, to be safer. On the other, public security policies have evolved but remain discriminatory and perceived as repressive. Access to public services, including security (but also beyond, e.g. education) is still inadequate, hindering wider progress to reduce crime and make citizens’ safe. The level of violence against youth, class and
ethnic discrimination and inequalities remain high in Brazilian society and within state institutions such as the police.

The data presented above reveal that by focusing on homicide reduction and increasing levels of incarceration, PPV has side-lined other important crimes in poor communities, including rape, non-lethal violence, violence against women, extortion and crimes committed by state actors, such as police abuses of force and abuses of human rights in prisons and young offender institutions. Women have been overlooked by the policy and so have the needs of young people. PPV defined and over-enforced the idea of security as the reduction of homicides; this has taken precedence over the overall protection of human rights. Respect and fairness towards people in low-income communities should, but has not, go hand-in-hand with legitimate policing or democratic police reform. Most residents in the low-income communities studied did not notice the effects of public security interventions at ground level. In sum, the protection of the rule of law has not been the emphasis of programs such as PPV. Changing the focus and methods of security programs is fundamental to promoting more democratic, just and accountable policing. This needs to start from the training of the police and has to include educative campaigns to increase public support for the rule of law.

Data from the case study communities revealed that simply incarcerating members of organised criminal groups did not, according to residents, dismantle extermination groups in charge of the sale of security in these communities. From inside the prison, members of these groups continued to manage and profit from a parasitic business, which, in the context of only sporadic policing, extorts money from residents in forcibly selling an alternative form of security. Despite attempts at state-building such as PPV, the monopoly of violence in these communities continues to be fragmented and the marginalised continue to be treated as expendable nonentities victimised both by violent police and by illegal security groups which are themselves often made up of ex-police officers.

Key local demands were social and preventative interventions such as investment in (1) vocational training for the young, (2) better-quality education, (3) access to leisure spaces and cultural activities, (4) improved work opportunities, (5) the demilitarisation and enhanced training for the police to develop dialogue and respect for human rights in their interactions with the public. Residents viewed these as essential to reducing violence. Instead, Pacto pela Vida focuses on more policing
(albeit unsatisfactorily), on imprisoning offenders and on measuring and monitoring targets.

Ultimately, this approach is leading to the escalation of the prison population in an unsustainable manner. At the time of the research, there was no sustainable strategy for addressing the overcrowding in prisons, the prison-breaks, the rehabilitating offenders, or for dealing with the burden on the criminal justice system and courts. Nevertheless, there has been an overall statistical reduction in the number of homicides in the state of Pernambuco and in Recife (with recent fluctuations upwards\textsuperscript{58}). It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to assess whether this is a direct impact of \textit{Pacto pela Vida} or whether there may be other influencing factors. Kahn (2011), for instance, also included in his analysis of declining homicides in the main cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Pernambuco, the decrease in the proportion of young people in the population, the influence of an improved economy since 2003 and the degree of success of measures of gun control. It is possible that PPV has been at least one of the causal factors.

But, most importantly, this thesis has provided a challenge to the hegemonic discourse about violence reduction and managerial police reform that masks the counter-productivity and the cost of these interventions to the marginalised. The empirical and lived experience in the \textit{periferias} is largely disconnected and divergent from the dominant discourse of success depicted by government officials, high-ranking politically connected police and even mainstream academics connected to the government through policy making.

The data emerging from the voices of people in marginalised communities provide a counter-narrative to the hegemonic top-down discourse about security and PPV’s successes. Participants from the two low-income communities studied were deeply dissatisfied with the level of (or lack of) protection on offer from state agents such as the police. Not only were they acutely aware of instances of police misconduct, such as planting drugs to make arrests and demanding money in order to free individuals in their custody, many participants had been the subjects of brutal police practices, particularly during stop-and-searches. These included physical and verbal abuse. While residents demanded more policing, among other demands – such as better vocational training opportunities, more job opportunities and leisure spaces in the community – they did not believe that the current militarised model of policing could resolve crime issues in the community, neither could it foster positive
community-policing relations. Policing did not, in its current model, offer residents protection – and not least among the reasons for this was the fact that residents in poor communities were themselves seen as ‘the problem’.

9.5 Policy recommendations

I hope to conclude by seconding some of Elliot Currie’s (1991/2013) social crime prevention strategies and complementing them with some further practical strategies for the Brazilian context. Currie proposed a number of macro and micro social crime prevention strategies. In summary, this thesis endorses the following of those:

1. A supportive and active labour market policy ‘which seeks to provide all citizens with both the competence and skills to participate in the necessary work of the larger society and concrete opportunities to put those skills to work. This necessarily involves a substantial role for the public sector – a deliberate and unapologetic use of public resources not merely to train the labour force for hoped-for jobs in the private sector, but also to create dignified public and non-profit jobs in areas of pressing social need’ (Currie 1991/2013, 393). This model is intended to emulate full-employment policies of Scandinavian countries and to encourage community-oriented jobs in critically needed areas such as the social and physical infrastructure of these communities.

2. A strategy to generate intensive reductions in social and economic inequalities by ‘upgrading earnings and public benefits and services for low-income people both in and out of the paid labour force’ (Currie 1991/2013, 394). While programmes such as Bolsa Familia have begun to reduce Brazil’s inequalities, inequality remains high and these reductions have only been slight. So more needs to be done. A living wage coupled with full-employment would go some way to reducing those inequalities so keenly felt and expressed by most of Brazil’s population. These changes would also reduce the appeal of the drug trade as a form of income. As Currie (1991/2013) adds ‘this strategy should explicitly include an effort to reduce the gaps in the earnings of men and women’ (395), since women’s ability to economically support themselves is limited by low-wages and parsimonious benefits, they become more susceptible
to staying in violent relationships with abusive partners. Increasing women’s resources would also benefit many poor young people in households supported by women.

3. ‘Comprehensive child and family support programmes’ (Currie 1991/2013, 396) to address child abuse and neglected childhoods before young people become involved in drug abuse or in criminal groups or gangs that offer alternative forms of income, peer support and a sense of belonging.

4. Inclusive youth intervention strategies, including expanding opportunities for ‘serious and intensive training programmes […]’, which provide usable formal skills’ (ibid, 398) and widening access to spaces in high quality higher-education institutions and increasing access to funding for the living costs of students from disadvantaged backgrounds.

5. Expanding and remodelling methods of treatment to substance abuse instead of simply incarcerating drug addicts who offend. Addiction treatment needs to be user-friendly, easily available, and provide alternative opportunities to achieve gratification, status and esteem. These include stable employment opportunities and help to maintain relationships and family ties away from drug cultures.

A number of public security and criminal justice policy recommendations are necessary to complement Currie’s ideas and adapt them to the Brazilian context. These include enduring measures to control firearm availability, including increasing regulation and control over manufacture, transfers and sales, as well as educational measures to lessen the tendency to resort to violent and armed conflict resolution. The implementation of formal means of conflict resolution, mediation and restorative justice could go some way to reducing the excessive use of prisons, which are already overcrowded and chaotic. Other necessary changes include: non-militarised improved police training with an emphasis on democratic values (including respect for equality before the law, safety from arbitrary arrest and persecution, and access to safety); measurement and performance monitoring of police accountability and legitimacy through citizen surveys; encouragement of discursive policing (Loader 1996) through
independent councils to monitor police work, those must also be publicised so that residents in poor communities are aware of these avenues; and regular police-community forums open and accessible to all residents (this needs to include adequate timing, such as hours that do not collide with school hours to include the young, diverse opportunities/timings for non-adversarial police-community interactions to occur and a friendly inclusive atmosphere for all); improved police response to the victimisation of marginalised communities, in particular to the young and women.

The creation of a fully independent oversight institution\(^5^9\) – which is well funded, able to investigate police misconduct, and staffed by members of civil society (rather than by current or previous members of the police, due to potential conflicts of interest) who have gone through a formal and transparent selection process (not appointees) so as to maintain effective independence – could go some way to promoting police accountability and reducing police abuse of force.

The Brazilian criminal justice system also requires reforms to reduce the problems that compound the issue of prison overcrowding. These include an amendment to the law, to remove drug trafficking from the list of heinous crimes and reduce the number of petty drug-related offenders who end up incarcerated. The latter could be subjected to other penalties, including community work. There should be rehabilitative measures in prison, including adequate training and post-release employment opportunities. Prison infrastructure also needs extensive improvement to adequately address the human needs in line with human rights and reduce the anger and hostility that encourages the formation of organised criminal groups.

None of these recommendations are easily achievable; they require organisation and political will, so public support for them would go some way in motivating politicians and the State to endorse them. It is hoped that this thesis and the dissemination of its findings will go some way in encouraging support for these recommendations and their practical application.

9.6 Critical reflections on this study and further research

While the research for this thesis has been able to contribute to a growing body of literature on youth, policing, public security and violence, and to make policy recommendations, a number of questions remain unanswered. Also, like any other study, this one faced certain limitations. Doing fieldwork overseas means that there is
a limit on the amount of time that is spent abroad, since a PhD student in the UK tends to be funded on the assumption that their thesis will be completed within three years. I was able to travel three times to Brazil during the course of my research and spend a total of six months in the field. However, when using ethnographic methods, more time in the field could have occasioned even more findings – or perhaps it would have yielded too much data to be analysed within the scope of a British PhD. Another limitation of this study is that although data were obtained from a variety of participants, insofar as the views of community residents are concerned the study only focused on two communities. Given that this is a qualitative study, this is justified by the focus on obtaining in-depth and rich data rather than on the extrapolation of quantitative findings from wider datasets. However, future studies could focus on the experiences of policing and the effects of public security interventions in other communities and cities, which may have different needs and diverse geographies, to conduct comparative analyses.

To answer the overarching research question of how public security interventions impact on young people living in low-income communities, it would have been helpful to consider, for instance, changes in data about victimisation in their respective neighbourhoods rather than the diluted data on homicides in the city overall. That is because there are certainly disparities in the distribution of crime and policing across the city. Although these criminological data by GPS location do exist, they are currently based on reported crime (rather than a more expansive victimisation survey) and classified by the government of Pernambuco, so are therefore not available to researchers. After a formal request and a discussion with staff at official government bodies (e.g. GACE) in charge of statistics, I was told that the reason the data are classified is to avoid panic and to reduce fear associated with crime in certain areas.

Further research is needed to address unanswered questions relating to how public security interventions may tackle the displacement of crime to other areas; and to how the police could be made accountable for their actions, particularly in low-income communities and in their contact with poor young black males, given that existing institutions of external control have proven to be inefficient and insufficient to promote accountability or address police deviance.

One of the achievements of PPV, though again at an unsatisfactory level, is the start of an effort towards monitoring the work of the police. As shown in
interviews, currently this focuses on targets such as seizing firearms and presenting lower homicide figures in certain areas. Research into other methods of measurement and evaluation would enable a wider and more holistic analysis and examination of police work. These could include, for instance, further research into public perceptions and victimisation surveys.

Although this thesis has proposed a number of policy recommendations, as seen above – including the demilitarisation of the public security apparatus and the creation of a unified police force managed at each federative state level and supported by local municipalities – more research is needed to outline the processes needed in order to achieve police transparency and accountability. This is particularly the case because some of these recommendations had already been proposed in Brazil’s project for a Unified System of Public Security (*Sistema Único de Segurança Pública*), but not put into practice (Mesquita Neto 2011, 394-398). Future research should consider the extent to which proposed reforms and projects were implemented, which policy recommendations became implemented in the field of public security and the reasons why some projects were not implemented. For example, it is unclear whether the initial proposals for projects in conflict mediation (PESP-PE 2007, 124) were ever implemented. Conflict mediation, as seen in the Boston Ceasefire project (Braga et al. 2000), is a central part of reducing violence. Other studies could also consider the existence and roles of alternative forms of conflict resolution in marginalised communities beyond the criminal justice system.

More critical criminological research is needed in this field. For example, independent qualitative and quantitative victimisation studies could provide a more complete analysis to assess the needs and demands of Brazil’s population. These studies could address key gaps in the data produced by the police, given that crime is under-reported and poorly recorded, and government statistics often corrupted. Furthermore, they could expand what is known about violence beyond the data about homicides available through the public health system (SUS), for example to include data on violent crimes that do not necessarily lead to death or contact with the health system, such as rape, gender violence, armed robberies and police abuses. Furthermore, longitudinal studies could monitor the shifts in and development of security policies, the impact of these policies on poor communities and their effects on a variety of institutions, including the judiciary and youth institutions, so as to assess continuing changes in this field and promote best practices. More research is
also needed into the effects of increasing incarceration and into approaches to reduce re-offending and promoting effective rehabilitation of offenders. It is hoped that the questions and indications of gaps in the literature presented here will stimulate debate and foster other rigorous inquiries that can propose and facilitate processes of democratisation, advance egalitarianism, and address imbalances in knowledge production globally.

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NOTES

1 See Diário de Pernambuco (DP 2016).

2 See Carvalho (2013).


4 I have refrained from using italics for the term favela because it has become internationally used and widely known.

5 I adopt the dichotomy Global North/Global South as a metaphor to the contested and debatable categories that depend on the context of use. While the metaphor relates to some extent to geographical areas, the countries included in each category are not necessarily located in the south or north hemisphere. For instance, with the exception of Japan, Asian countries tend to be included in the ‘Global South’ category. GDP and per capita income are not necessarily the defining and dividing specification of categories either here, since the Asian tigers (Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea) are economically rich. The metaphor focuses more on development and on a post-colonial critique of the European and North American (the Global North) dominance in knowledge production in the social sciences. Thus ‘Global South’ relates to what is subaltern, marginalised, invisible or other. As Carrington et al (2016, 6) put it, deploying the north/south metaphor needs not to ignore or neglect that ‘there are enclaves of the south within the north and unresolved North/South tensions within many societies.’

6 Examples of studies and theories considered part of the mainstream branch of criminology, also known as orthodox, establishment and managerial Criminology, are most notably observed in the works of Herrnstein and Murray (1994), Hirschi and Gottfredson (1988), James Q. Wilson (1983), John Dilulio (1996), Clarke and Felson (2004), and David Farrington (1986) among others known as the ‘technocratic mainstream’ (Currie 1998). These studies do not only deploy technocratic discourses but they also tend to be uncritical by maintaining rigid definitions of what is science and what is not, without questioning how those demarcations came to being or questioning who makes those demarcations. Some theoretical examples are works that build on rational choice theory, routine activity theory, situational crime prevention (Clarke and Felson 2004), Broken windows theory and zero tolerance policing (Bratton 2005, Wilson and Kelling 2013), all of which inform the new
public security policy developed in Pernambuco since 2007. Deconstructionist critical theory has presented challenges to the rigid and narrow definitions proposed by rational choice theory and to the limitations of deterrence theory. Nonetheless, these theoretical frameworks have regained life in the work of neoclassical criminologists such as Clarke and Felson, and Farrington. The positivist school of criminology shares the rigid definitions and demarcations of classical criminology. This conservative field of criminology is deterministic and essentialist by failing to allow for agency, minimalising social structural issues and denying meaning to the relational aspects of human interaction. Furthermore, it fails to engage with the theorisation of methods social control or with a critique of the apparatus or institutions of control.

This is of course not an exclusively criminological phenomenon. The social sciences in general have initially tended to use the Global South as a data mine for theories that portrayed the global periphery, the marginalised as primitive, tribal and pre-modern and thereafter, this hegemonic pattern has focused on the exportation of Global North theories to the Global South (Carrington et al 2016, Connell 2007).

Here state building refers to the development of the State, or of a legitimate organisation that can govern or command authority over a territory.

Rather than being marginal, the urban poor perform key and integral roles in society and in the economy within an unequal context embedded in asymmetrical power relations. They take on the least secure, hardest and least paid jobs. They deliver a number of services for the city, they are consumers and also contribute culturally. They aspire to improve their lives and the lives of their children through education. They build their own homes and communities and are socially organised under the most arduous conditions. They are also acutely conscious of how politics affects their lives within and outside their communities. They cooperate with clientelistic politicians and bargain with candidates to mitigate the hardships of poverty. The favelas afford a low-cost solution to insufficient affordable housing and sometimes, they provide proximity to jobs.

The resolution of cases of homicide in Brazil is very low, thus it becomes difficult to establish even the most basic causal factors or the culprits. Some studies have correlated the rising death toll with the availability of firearms (Rangel and Bourgois 2005, Nobrega 2012),
although that alone cannot explain why some countries with even more firearms (e.g. the USA) have lower homicide rates than Brazil.

11 The work of criminologist David Garland (2000; 2001) can be helpful in this debate. Garland explained that wealth and inequality are the key factors in societies with high crime rates, rather than poverty per se. Various phenomena, he argued, have all contributed to a complex vicious circle of expanding crime rates and extensive punitive punishment: increasing opportunities for crime, caused by booming consumption and the availability of desirable goods such as cars and mobile phones, coupled with the abandonment of the rehabilitative model of punishment; increasing fear of crime; the growing politicisation and populism associated with crime, whereby counterproductive punitive policies are endorsed in an attempt to appear ‘tough on crime’ and gain votes; and the amplification of the privatisation and commercialisation of crime control.

12 Violent crime trends tend to rely on homicide rates as a guideline for measuring violence in Latin America because governments lack standard vocabulary and data-collection methods about different types of crime. Cadavers are easily countable in comparison to other types of violent crime, such as non-lethal violence and torture, which are often hidden and unreported in Brazil.

13 Campos was a candidate in the presidential elections of 2014 but he died in an airplane accident during the campaign.

14 Ratton maintains the claim that PPV was a ‘success’, but recently publicly criticised the programme, arguing that its successful aspects had been derailed and pointing to the many failures of the programme: its lack of attention to the prisons and youth offender institutions, the absence of conflict resolution programmes (24th September 2016, Jornal do Comércio, available online: http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/politica/permambuco/noticia/2016/09/24/pacto-pela-vida-morreu-diz-mentor-do-programa-254101.php)

15 Such as, security guards, alarms, locks, private transport and built-environment design.

16 Garland has argued that the marginalisation of offenders is often ignored and they are ‘depicted instead as culpable, undeserving and somewhat dangerous individuals who must be
carefully controlled for the protection of the public and the prevention of further offending’ (Garland 2001, 175).

17 Note that these figures refer only to homicides committed with firearms, and consequently do not represent the rate of all homicides (e.g. those committed with knives or other means).

18 In line with the university’s ethical guidelines, I decided to interact with participants that were aged 16 years and above, that is the age at which participants are considered to have capacity to give consent to participate in the research. Further studies that obtain approval by ethics committees could expand this enquiry and consider the views of children below the age of 16.

19 Central to this thesis is the State’s role in the provision of security and its aim to monopolise legitimate force. While organised criminals and private security companies play significant roles in this field, the former is illegitimate and the latter is subjected (at least in theory) in some way or another to the State’s predominance. The state institutions entitled to deploy legitimate coercion – the police and the armed forces – have a prevalent role and authority over other organisations involved in the distribution and containment of force.

20 It is significantly noticeable that state repression, in the form of police brutality in Brazil, does not tend to make news or raise vocal and organised opposition, unless it is directed at those perceived as deserving respectable citizens, namely white middle- and upper-class victims. This makes the study of poor young people’s experiences of security even more urgent, an issue that will be examined in more detail in chapter seven.

21 Note that many projects were proposed, but not necessarily implemented. The 138 projects originally proposed in Campos’ Plano Pernambucano de Segurança Publica (Pernambucan Public Security Plan) were divided into six lines of action:

   (1) Qualified crime repression: focusing on improving the work of criminal justice institutions, especially the level of responsiveness to victims and on improving police investigations;

   (2) Institutional improvement: focusing on integrating the work of criminal justice institutions;

   (3) Management and information management: focusing on planning, managing and evaluating projects and the actions of PPV;
(4) Training public security staff;

(5) Social prevention intervention: including 42 projects such as ‘protection of victims of violence’, ‘disarmament’, ‘treatment of drug users’.

(6) Democratic management: 4 projects to promote mechanisms of public participation in safety policies and the dissemination of information about PPV, including the creation of the Conselho Estadual de Segurança Publica (Council to oversee PPV) – this was one of the projects that was proposed but not implemented.

22 See Macedo (2012) for a detailed description of other police operations, such as: (1) Contra ameaça: monitors the number of intimations registered in police stations. (2) Autoria CVP: monitors investigations about violent property crime. (3) Quadrantes de segurança: monitors the reduction of violent crimes, illegal carrying of weapons and drug trafficking offences in each area. (4) Transporte seguro: monitors the reduction of crimes against property conducted in means of public transportation. (5) Autoria IP: Monitors the number of completed and conclusive police investigations relating to heinous crimes (other than homicide). (6) Carrossel de Fogo: monitors the number of firearms apprehended and flagrant arrests relating to intentional lethal crimes in hot spots. (7) Risco Zero: monitors the number of firearms apprehended and flagrant arrests relating to intentional lethal crimes in and near bars and nightclubs. (8) Sossego: monitors the issuing of police legal terms (Termos Circunstanciados) emitted to combat environmental crimes, traffic crimes and sound pollution. (9) Resgate de vidas: monitors the work of fire-fighters in partnership with the public health system (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS), considering the speed of the treatment of victims of violent crime with high risk of death in the metropolitan area of Recife, by monitoring the number of rescued survivors.

23 There are some fluctuations in homicide rates (e.g. in the state of Bahia) and there was a mild decline in homicide rates from the year 2011 to 2012 in the states of Paraiba and Alagoas, however, over the entire ten-year period (2002-2012) those states present an upward trend in homicide rates.

24 This was not far from a typical year in terms of numbers of homicides, considering that the average number of homicides from 1998-2007 in Pernambuco was 4,342.

25 Author interview with Delegada, civil police, Imbiribeira DHPP, 7th October 2013. See also Wolff (2014).
Another way of measuring police killings is to compare it as a percentage of the total number of homicides (Bueno et al 2013, 119). For example, in Pernambuco, in 2012, police killings are 1.54% of the total number of homicides, while in Rio they are 13.53% and in São Paulo 7.71%. The average percentages over the six-year period between 2007-2012 would be 1.73% for Pernambuco, 32.13% for Rio and 6.37% for São Paulo. These calculations were made using Bueno’s (2013) data.

Police killings in the state of Pernambuco are still high in comparison to the US and the UK. Police in the entire US killed 607 civilians in 2011 and the UK police kill on average 2 civilians per year (Wolff 2014, 89).

See Carvalho (2013) for a more comprehensive review of these issues and international comparisons of the Brazilian prison population. In South America, Brazil ranks fourth in number of prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, after French Guiana (316), Suriname (356) and Chile (313). In comparison to European countries, Brazil’s rate is also considered high: Spain (160), France (102), England (153) and Germany (88). In absolute numbers, Brazil has the fourth largest prison population, after the US (2,266,832,157), China (1.65 million) and Russia (864,197) (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2012).

In March 2008, the five-year-old Isabela Nardoni was found after being thrown from a sixth floor apartment, while under the care of her father Alexandre Nardoni and his partner Ana Carolina Jatobá. Isabela Nardoni died of her injuries while she was taken to hospital by the Brazilian corpo de bombeiros (firefighters). Nardoni and Jatobá were sentenced to 31 years and 26 years, respectively, for Isabela’s death. In the same year, Eloá, a 15-year-old student, was kidnapped and kept hostage for 100 hours by her ex-boyfriend Lindmberg Alves. Alves shot Eloá, who later died in hospital. He was originally sentenced to 98 years and 10 months imprisonment, however the Brazilian penal code permits a maximum sentence of 30 years. Both these cases gained extensive national and international coverage (FolhadeS.Paulo 2008, Estadão 2015).

Marquinhos, 18 years old mulato male, Tourinho, 29th October 2013.

Chapter 8 discusses some of the difficulties associated with militarised police hierarchy and demilitarising the police.
Deterrence theory, part of the classical school of criminology, can be traced back to the works of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century who posited (quite intuitively) that proportionate punishment deters crime (Nagin 2012). Classical criminology deploys 18th century concepts (such as deterrence, free will and rational choice) to make criminal punishment intelligible. Both neo-classical Deterrence theory and Situational Crime Prevention theory assume criminals to be rational actors who calculate their offences and act in self-interested ways (O'Malley 1992/2013). Crime is seen simply as opportunistic and therefore methods of crime control must reduce these opportunities through changes in the physical environment. Under these frameworks, the role of emotions, impulses and cultural aspects (such as bravado) and the irrationality associated with committing certain offences, are all neglected.

During the fieldwork in 2013 I attended a protest event in a community in Recife that was under pressure from Real Estate Developers to sell its properties and relocate, because its location was ideal for wealthy commuters who worked in the city’s large business and health sector, as well as being close to the downtown city centre and to upper-class neighbourhoods on the seaside. It is difficult and perhaps impossible to establish whether the securitisation of the community through PPV had been a step towards these pressures or whether they would have existed even without securitisation. However, it is undeniable that Recife’s Real Estate and property developers have visibly increased, with sprawling sky scrappers around the city. The data from this research suggest a parallel phenomenon of securitising the city through policing the poor, who often complained of being unfairly criminalised and under-protected by security agents.

In 2000, a UN representative, Nigel Rodley, visited Recife to collect data for a world report about torture, his visit was communicated in advance by the superiors of the civil police to delegados (chiefs of police), and yet two delegados failed to take precautionary measures (Zaverucha 2004, 34). In the police stations of Ibura and Cavaleiro, Rodley found tools used to torture suspects. The police simply claimed that they had been there ‘for a long time or belonged to those imprisoned’, which does not explain why they had not been thrown away.

ROCAM-PMPE stands for ‘Rondas Ostensivas com Apoio de Motocicletas’

Lourdes, 29 years old, mulata, Tourinho, 20th October 2013.
Neither does this thesis focus on theorising this topic, which is beyond the scope of this research. Other scholars have begun to investigate questions related to this issue (e.g. Denyer-Willis, Graham ‘Police Violence and the Internet in Brazil: New Visibilities of Historical Patterns’ Lecture at UCL, London, 2nd March 2016).

Author interviews with Lourdes and Luther, Tourinho, 4th August 2013.

In the words of Samuel (resident of Tourinho, white, local teacher) ‘Ah ‘o tráfico’ (drug trafficking) is everywhere. Today a rock [of crack cocaine] is R$5 (under £2). It is easy money, easier than sweating to build a home. But there is no territorial dispute like you see in other places, because each community has its ‘dono’ (owner/drug lord) and the bandidos (ordinary criminals rather than bandits) are more united than the community as a whole. There is little rivalry in the trade here; most of the rivalry is over women. They send messages out through ‘aviões’ when there is a large cargo being transported saying ‘don’t walk on this street’. This is not when 5 or 6 little rocks are being sold.’

Extracts from an interview with Samuel (25 years old, resident of Tourinho, white) illustrate the point that policing remains ‘distant’ despite the implementation of PPV. Roxana – ‘Have you noticed any changes at all in the kind of work the police does?’ Samuel – ‘Not really. Like I say they just drive past occasionally in their car but don’t really do much.’ Roxana – ‘Have you heard of Pacto pela vida?’ Samuel – ‘Yes but that doesn’t mean much for us. I have seen their advert on TV and the stickers on the police car, but that is all really.’ Roxana – ‘So how present would you say the State is here?’ Samuel – ‘My only connection with the State is that I have a temporary contract to work for a State school as a teacher. But they don’t even offer a decent working environment. We haven’t got appropriate access to health, or education or sanitation. The government created some programs but it does not maintain them.’

A police investigation document (Oficio 052/2001-DIR, of 23rd January 2001) about the death of Helio Jose Muniz on 14th January 2001 in the Prison Anibal Bruno revealed that the directors of the prison were fully aware and supported Helio's role as chaveiro. His case and death of highly publicised in the media as he was known for admittedly killing over sixty people in Camaragibe, a municipality in the outskirts of Recife's metropolitan region, including thirteen members of the police and an ex-mayor. Helio was became a central character in a documentary entitled ‘O Rap do Pequeno Principe contra as Almas Sebosas’, translates as ‘The Little Prince's Rap Against the Wicked Souls’ (Caldas and Luna 2000).
I asked how he knew whether someone was a thief or a matador. He said, they could tell by the prison number, but sometimes they could tell by a piece of paper on their cell which states what crimes the inmate has been convicted for.

According to Alice, neither the police or drug traffickers were able or willing to control violence against women. Traffickers were not as organised or in control of the community and social order in the community as in Rio de Janeiro (see Arias, 2006).

Bourgois’ (2003) study of crack dealers in Harlem, USA, showed that drug gangs accommodated uneducated poor young men who would otherwise likely be employed in poorly paid service sector work considered feminised. Involvement in the drug trade and access to firearms provided these men with an unconventional setting to enact a certain form of masculine identity and bravado.

The issue of death squads is perhaps hidden to the middle and upper-classes but not to the communities that bare the brunt of their actions and that are extorted by these groups.

The suicide category is an interesting one. The 2014 Mapa da Violência, for example, shows that the numbers and rate of suicides have been growing in most of Brazil. The country shows an upward variation of 15.3% between 2002-2012 in number of suicides and a 20.3% increase in the rate of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants in the same period. Pernambuco also shows increasing suicides, with a 18.7% increase in rates of suicide (per 100,000 inhabitants) between 2002 and 2012 (Mapa da Violência 2014).

While researchers working in Rio (e.g. Leeds 1996, Arias 2006) have argued that drug groups have compromised the autonomy of political community associations, and that they can coerce residents to vote in a certain way and control access to the community allowing only some politicians to campaign in the area (e.g. those that had made deals with traffickers), the situation in Recife is different. Drug groups were far less organised and smaller and did not have such strong control over community access.

The following example will illustrate the point. A locally well-liked NGO and social movement in Tourinho organised festivities for children’s day in October. They collected donations in the form of cash, food and toys for the children in the community and
surrounding communities. The festivity turned into a lively street party with over 300 people attending. There were performances by local dance groups, food, a bouncy castle and live music. One local charismatic vereadora (city councilor) made a large donation, provided the bouncy castle and attended the party. As a result, residents and a large community engaged with the NGO made comments that they had decided to vote for that particular politician because she was perceived as so ‘nice’ having provided this one off contribution. The material circumstances of the communities, the divisive and unequal spatiality of the city, required residents to be venturesome and innovative in their approaches to mitigate hardship.

49 None of the participants earning the minimum wage thought that what they earned was enough for a decent living.

50 For a discussion of the limitations of ‘democratic policing’ see Harkin (2015).

51 Many scholars have made their views public, through the media, on the topic of demilitarisation, for instance, Ignacio Cano, Luis Eduardo Soares, Fabio Gomes França, among others.

52 According to a study by NEV-USP (the 5th National Report on Human Rights in Brazil), between 1993 and 2011 at least 22.5 thousand people were killed in conflict with the police in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, on average 1,185 people per year or three each day (Possas 2012, 16). Given that Brazil does not legally support the death penalty or exterminations, these figures are exceedingly high.

53 The first three proposals – by politician Chico Lopes (from Brazil’s communist party, PC do B), senator Blairo Maggi (from the PR party) and Celso Russomano (PRB party) – divert in some aspects, see Kawaguti (2013). There is a further demilitarisation proposal to amend the constitution (PEC 51/2013) by senador Lindbergh Farias (from the worker’s party, PT-RJ), which essentially proposes the unification of the police forces and the autonomy for each federative state to establish their force’s structure (see Welle 2014).

54 Interview with a senior member of staff of GACE-PE on 27th January 2016 and discussion with Regina Miki, Brazil’s national secretary of public security on 26th February 2016. Miki confirmed that the national level homicide reduction program (Pacto Nacional de Redução de Homicídios) based on PPV is ready to be rolled out with some alterations. According to her
the changes would address gaps in PPV, however, she did not specify in much detail exactly how this would be done. She explained that the national plan would include some elements of the UPPs program in Rio de Janeiro, insofar as the establishment of permanent and continuous policing would come alongside permanent access to social assistance. She also indicated that the national plan addresses the issue of prison overcrowding, since PPV had not thought of any strategies for this problem.

55 Situational Crime Prevention refers to three main criminological theoretical frameworks: environmental criminology, rational choice and routine activity theory. Some practical examples of this frameworks are: making changes to spaces to make them safer (e.g. lighting, changes in the built environment, using security cameras); police work; using neighbourhood groups to address crime problems; interagency working and sharing responsibility for crime prevention.

56 This is not to say that quantitative methods are not needed in the social sciences. But rather that attempts to measure behaviours and effects, or qualitative data, can be imprecise, messy and even dangerous by neglecting qualitative aspects of research problems. Some data are necessarily quantitative. For instance, figures such as data on mortality, age, imprisonment and homicide rates and economic indicators are all important. But that does not mean that quantitative data cannot be manipulated for particular ends and interpretations.

57 Despite the increasing punitive-ness – insofar as zero tolerance implies more emphasis on incarcerating suspects of drug-related crime (but also of violent inter-personal crime), and disregarding any potential mitigating circumstances of the accused (e.g. material inequalities, social injustice) – the very idea of zero tolerance is contestable since there seems to be a lot of tolerance among government officials, in their narratives and actions, and even denial of other forms of crime and violence, such as state crime and police violence.

58 Homicide rates have been increasing since 2014 again, coinciding with the period since Brazil entered a new economic downturn.

59 The British Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) could offer an interesting model for independent oversight, although, the scale of the work of such an institution would be far greater in Brazil than in Britain.