The Dynamics and Institutionalisation of the Japan – US Naval Relationship (1976-2001)

Guran, Mary Elizabeth

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The Dynamics and Institutionalisation of the Japan – US Naval Relationship (1976-2001)

M. Elizabeth Guran

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of War Studies
King’s College
University of London

January 2008
Abstract

At the start of the twenty-first century, cooperation amongst international navies has once again emerged as an important element of international affairs, given new global security challenges, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. As such, the Japan-US naval relationship has been a relatively under-studied topic. The thesis pursues two interrelated objectives. First, it identifies and discusses the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship over a 25-year period, between 1976 and 2001. Second, it examines the relationship between naval cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship.

A variety of factors contributed to the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship during this time period. The research indicates that the internal dynamics within the naval relationship, combined with external influences such as threat perceptions, national leadership influence and domestic politics drove and/or constrained the relationship at various times. The proposition advanced by this thesis is that when the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and US Navy operate together against a mutually acknowledged security threat or challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is created in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates improved cooperation.

Institutionalisation is characterised in the thesis by the nature and extent of internal coordination, operational interaction, external linkages and by the depth of the relationship. The analytical framework uses these four components as indicators of progress in the development and institutionalisation of the naval relationship. A mapping technique is employed in the thesis as a tool of analysis to help order issues and provide a structure for comparing empirical data at three points over the course of twenty-five years.
Acknowledgements

Over the course of this long journey, I have many people to acknowledge and thank who helped sustain and provide guidance during my work on this thesis. I regret that I cannot identify everyone by name. My first thanks goes to my supervisor, Dr. Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Elliott School’s Security Policy Studies Program at George Washington University. She graciously kept me as her student long after she left King’s College and her wise words helped steer the structure and substance of this project. I also want to thank King’s College and the Department of War Studies, whose patience I appreciated as I worked diligently to complete this thesis, while continuing to work for the US Government—a feat more difficult than I ever could have imagined.

I owe much to my family for their encouragement, understanding and tolerance over the course of my studies, including many shortened or missed holidays. I regret sadly that my father, who was here at the start of this project, is not here now to see its conclusion. I believe he would be proud. My friends, as well as colleagues at the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), deserve my heartfelt thanks. I tried their patience on numerous occasions, I’m sure, but they stood by me during the tough times and provided much inspiration and moral support. The Unity of Washington, DC choir was my rock while writing this thesis and buoyed my spirit during our weekly practices. To the Capital Hiking Club, I will return as a hike leader—I promise.

I also want to thank the Council on Foreign Relations and Hitachi for providing me the opportunity, in 2002, to work at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, as part of the International Affairs Fellowship. The experience provided many valuable interactions with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, and it gave me a better
appreciation and understanding of the national security decisionmaking environment in Japan.

Finally, I want to thank the many naval officers from both Japan and the United States—active and retired—who graciously provided me with endless hours of interviews. Their professionalism and dedication to their service and to their mission is admirable. With them, I share a love of the sea.
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<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD/ISA</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-submarine warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANTFLT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSDFLT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSEVENTHFLT</td>
<td>Commander, US Seventh Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FS-X</td>
<td>Fighter support experimental</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<td>JASDF</td>
<td>Japan Air Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>JMSDF</td>
<td>Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTWD</td>
<td>Navy Theater-Wide Defense System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACFLT</td>
<td>US Pacific Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Rim of the Pacific exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASS</td>
<td>Towed array sonar system</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD/R&amp;E</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>US Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>USNFJ</td>
<td>US Naval Forces Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WPNS</td>
<td>Western Pacific Naval Symposium</td>
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Introduction

At the start of the twenty-first century, cooperation amongst international navies has once again emerged as an important element of international affairs, given new global security challenges and the growing relationship between maritime security and the globalised economy. Approximately one century earlier, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American navalist, writer and educator, promoted the idea of a transnational consortium to protect a large and growing system of international trade, acknowledging that even the strongest great powers were incapable of unilaterally defending a worldwide system of maritime commerce. While global conditions are different one hundred years from whence Mahan wrote, nevertheless, maritime cooperation has encountered renewed interest given new global challenges, such as tensions over ocean resources, international terrorism, territorial disputes and sovereignty issues, sealane security and the potential maritime transport of weapons of mass destruction. Once again, there is an acknowledgement that no one nation can defend the maritime landscape given the myriad challenges that exist.

In an address at the US Naval War College in September 2005, Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations for the US Navy, expressed sentiments similar to Mahan's while discussing the need for global naval cooperation and the concept of a ‘1,000 ship navy’:
Today’s reality is that the security arrangements and paradigms of the past are no longer enough for the future. And today’s challenges are too diverse to tackle alone; they require more capability and more resources than any single nation can deliver. ¹

The need and desire for maritime cooperation and coordination is becoming increasingly evident in East Asia, a region in which the confluence of interests, growing trade and investment, and economic prosperity are helping to unite nations in the region as they look for ways to protect their seaborne trade. In many cases, these navies, often with different cultural backgrounds and national politics, have had little prior experience working or operating together. Operational doctrine, institutional structures, and compatible systems and equipment amongst the navies generally do not exist. While the region lacks an integrating security mechanism, there are growing indications that regional nations, including China, see the benefits of cooperation to protect their economic interests. Cooperation is also emerging amongst military forces that have come together since the events of 11 September 2001 to support anti-terrorism activities, despite their cultural, political and threat perception differences. In alliance and non-alliance relationships, differences in culture, language, domestic politics and government structures can create challenges for operational cooperation. The ebb and flow of cooperation and institutionalisation in the Japan - US naval relationship during the Cold War and

¹ Admiral Mullen’s statement was part of his Keynote Address to the 2005 International Seapower Symposium. See US Naval War College, Seventeenth Annual Seapower Symposium, Report of the Proceedings, edited by John B. Hattendorf, 19-21 Sept. 2005, p. 5. The concept of a ‘1,000-ship Navy’ emerged at this Symposium. The concept calls for a global approach to international security in which policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of threats is a high priority for all nations interested in economic prosperity and security. The term ‘1,000-ship Navy’ eventually evolved into the ‘Global Maritime Partnership’, which became a key part of the US Navy’s new maritime strategy (‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’), launched in 2007.
post-Cold War periods can provide useful lessons for emerging bilateral and multilateral naval relationships in East Asia and elsewhere in the world.

The Japan - US naval relationship has been a relatively under-studied topic in the academic community. While defence think tanks and technical journals have pursued aspects of the naval relationship, scholars have typically focused on the Japanese Navy, the US Navy or the Japan - US security relationship. This thesis helps to close the information gap concerning the Japan - US naval relationship by highlighting key developments in the relationship and by providing an analytical assessment of the critical factors that drove and constrained the relationship and its institutionalisation. The United States influenced the strategy, force structure, training and equipping, and many other aspects of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Of all the military services, the two navies have consistently had the closest relationship. The naval relationship was re-established relatively quickly after World War II, and it grew in the decades that followed. The Japan - US naval relationship is unique because of constitutional and other policy restrictions that limit JMSDF activities to an exclusive self-defence oriented posture. As a result, the nature and scope of Japan - US naval operational interactions are also limited in many respects.

The proposition advanced by this thesis is that when the US and Japanese navies operate together against a mutually acknowledged security threat or challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is created

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2 Article Nine of the Japanese constitution states that land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The establishment of a Japanese defense force was based on the notion that Japan would only have a basic defence capability that would demonstrate just enough deterrent capability so as not to make the area around Japan into a power vacuum. The United States played a leading role in drafting Japan’s constitution. See, for example, Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, ‘Japan’s Evolving Defense Establishment’. In *Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications*, edited by Yuki Tatsumi and Andrew L. Oros (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007), pp. 18 and 76-77.
in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates improved cooperation. Scholars have not studied the concept of institutionalisation as it applies to military relationships. As such, the thesis thus fills a gap in the literature. In this thesis, institutionalisation is defined as the development of systems, structures, procedures and practices that enhance cooperation between navies and ultimately contributes to a more integrative naval relationship. The progress toward institutionalisation highlights the key dynamics in the Japan-US naval relationship.

The thesis is designed primarily as an empirical study that provides insights concerning the development of the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation over a 25-year time period—from 1976 through 2001—a period of major change for the naval relationship. The thesis pursues two interrelated sets of questions: 1) What are the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship between 1976 (the start of formal Japan-US discussions on defence cooperation) and 2001? 2) What is the relationship between naval cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship?

Institutionalisation serves as the focal point for the thesis. Military relationships benefit from institutionalisation because it contributes to improved bureaucratic coordination, interoperability of systems, equipment and doctrine and coordination of procedures and operations. Ultimately, this leads to more effective military operations. Institutionalisation is characterised in the thesis by internal coordination, operational interaction and cooperation, external linkages and by the depth of the naval relationship. The analytical framework uses these four components as indicators of progress in the development of the naval relationship and to help identify the nature and extent
of internal and external influences. A mapping technique is employed in the thesis as a tool of analysis to help order issues and provide a structure for comparing empirical data from three different times during the 25 years. Through this unique approach and broader analytical framework, the thesis fills a void in the literature by expanding the understanding of institutionalisation to include military relations—specifically naval—within a non-NATO alliance relationship.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes the literature review, research design and methodology discussion. The concept of institutionalisation, international naval cooperation from a historical perspective, Japan-US naval relations, Japan-US security relations, and culture and societal issues are discussed in the context of existing literature. The analytical framework is also identified. Chapters 2 through 4 are the empirical chapters. Chapter 2 concerns the institutional foundations for the naval relationship, from 1976-1981; Chapter 3 discusses the maturing of the naval relationship, from 1987-1991; and Chapter 4 discusses the strengthening of institutional links, from 1996-2001. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings in the thesis and provides the thesis conclusions.
CHAPTER 1: Literature Review, Research Design and Methodology

Multinational military cooperation has been a frequent focus of real-world operations, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Historical evidence shows that military cooperation amongst nations yields many benefits on a political as well as on a military level. This was the case for the West during the Cold War and has become ever more relevant in the post-Cold War era. Despite the acknowledged importance of multinational military cooperation, a surprising dearth of academic material exists—beyond technical defence journals and material generated by US military commands and private research organisations—concerning the nature and evolution of military cooperation and relationships in a non-NATO context. In the naval arena, for example, while defence journals regularly highlight issues associated with multinational naval operations and exercises throughout the world, few authors have attempted to move beyond the 'bonds of seamanship' and explore the nature and development of international naval cooperation. The common maritime interests, tasks and shared risks that tend to naturally link navies together are only part of a broader equation that also includes national interests and differences associated with relations between sovereign nations. As such, the Japan-US naval relationship, as part of the Japan-US security alliance relationship, is an interesting case study, with the potential to shed light on how military cooperation evolves.

Institutionalisation is a key dynamic in the relations between military forces of different nations. It provides depth, definition and a degree of structure to a military relationship. Nevertheless, except for the case of NATO,
scholars have not focussed on the institutionalisation of military-to-military relations, and as such, the institutionalisation of naval relationships remains unexplored by the academic community.

This thesis answers two key questions concerning the Japan-US naval relationship: 1) What are the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship between 1976 and 2001? and 2) What is the relationship between naval cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship? The proposition advanced by this thesis is that when the US and Japanese navies operate together against a mutually acknowledged security threat or challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is created in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates improved cooperation. This causal relationship is contrary to what scholars have identified with international organisations, in which institutionalisation drives cooperation.

The thesis draws on a variety of scholarly literature and related theories concerning institutions, alliance relations and naval cooperation. Although none of the theories associated with this literature specifically addresses the institutionalisation of naval relationships and answers the questions posed in this thesis, they do provide some useful insights concerning the dimensions of cooperation and institutionalisation from an international organisational perspective.

The relevant literature on Japan-US naval cooperation and institutionalisation can be divided into five areas: 1) Institutionalisation, 2) International naval cooperation from a historical perspective, 3) the Japan-US naval relationship, 4) the Japan-US security relationship, and 5) Culture and
related societal issues. The literature discussed is taken from English language sources. While each body of literature provides valuable information and insights for the development of the thesis, none, in part or in total, comprehensively addresses the question of what drove and constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship. Furthermore, while scholars have written extensively about the link between cooperation and institutionalisation in terms of international organisations and security alliances, they have not examined this linkage in terms of military-to-military relationships within alliances. It is this gap in the literature that this thesis addresses.

Institutionalisation

One of the notable changes in the Japan-US naval relationship over the last 30 years is the increased institutionalisation of the relationship, which began to formalise in 1976 and 1977, about the same time as the Japan-US security relationship began its own process of institutionalisation. Greater institutionalisation resulted in more formalised relations and regular meetings, more frequent exercises and training, a greater sharing of information and technology, and 'legitimacy' in the eyes of the Japanese and US governments, which encouraged more open relations. While institutionalisation is discussed extensively in an international context and in the public policy arena, scholars have not generally addressed the institutionalisation of military relationships. For example, it is not clear whether the institutionalisation of military relationships follows a similar path as that of security alliances, and whether

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3 The details of these interactions are discussed in Chapter 2.
they are influenced in similar ways. Nevertheless, information gleaned from other policy arenas can be useful in establishing a framework for analysis of military relationships in non-NATO alliance settings.

‘Institutions,’ according to John Ikenberry, ‘specify what it is states are expected to do and make it difficult and costly for states to do otherwise.’ Ikenberry is referring here to ‘institutional binding’, in which states respond to potential threats and strategic rivalries by linking together in mutually constraining institutions. ¹ Ikenberry identifies a series of mechanisms/processes that help bind states together, such as institutional agreements, transgovernmental connections, routines and coalitions, as well as reinforcing political activities and institutions. ⁵ Security alliances are the most important and potentially far-reaching form of binding, according to Ikenberry, but they can vary in the nature and extent of this binding. The NATO alliance, for example, with its intergovernmental planning mechanisms, multinational force, and integrated military command is a more ‘binding’ institution than other security pacts. The range of obligations is more extensive, and the institutional mechanisms that ensure ongoing commitments are greater within the NATO alliance. ⁶

While institutions are the rules of the game, so to speak, institutionalisation is the process by which those norms, or shared standards of behaviour, are created and developed. Understanding institutionalisation

⁵ Ibid., pp. 65-69.
requires consideration of how norms change over time and adapt to each other and to their larger environment, according to Michael E. Smith. Scholars have written extensively about institutionalisation in the international context. Their definitions are broad and diverse. Samuel Huntington, for example, defines institutionalisation as the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability. He notes that the level of institutionalisation in political systems can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organisations and procedures. John Ruggie defines institutionalisation as a mutual intelligibility of behaviour together with the communicative mechanisms and organisational routines that make this possible. In the international arena, practitioners have used the term in a variety of ways; however, generally the institutionalisation of military relations is not part of these discussions.

Nevertheless, these non-military applications can provide insights that are helpful when assessing military relationships. Michael E. Smith, for example, who writes about institutionalisation in the context of member cooperation within the European Union (EU), provides a valuable contribution in this regard. According to Smith, institutionalisation means several things. Firstly, institutionalisation can indicate that certain behaviours amongst a set of

---


9 In the international arena, practitioners have used the term in a variety of ways, such as: to advocate a more formalised system of cooperation between states in Latin America (see Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘Toward a Multilateral Security Scheme—Conflict Resolution in Latin America: Best Practices in the Southern Cone’, NDU Pacific symposium 2001, pp. 13-15); to discuss restraints on the Chinese Communist Party (see Cheng Li ‘Is the CCP Becoming More Institutionalized?’ The Carnegie Endowment, Conference on the Future of Political Reform in China, 29 January 2004); and to discuss the development of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia (see Tsuneo Akaha, ‘Non-Traditional Security Issues in Northeast Asia and Prospects for International Cooperation,’ prepared for conference at the United Nations: Thinking Outside the Security Box: Non-traditional Security in Asia: Governance, Globalization, and the Environment, March 15, 2002.)
actors persist over time. These actors thus adapt together—although to
different degrees—in the face of internal and external challenges. Secondly,
institutionalisation also means increasing complexity. As such, collective
behaviours and choices are more detailed and closely linked. According to
Smith, the complexity can be measured in terms of an increase in the number of
norms, the clarity of those norms, the change from norms into laws, and the
extent to which norms tend toward 'behaviour obligations.' Thirdly,
institutionalisation allows actors to apply increasingly broad, general criteria to
particular norms to make certain decisions. Decision-making thus becomes
more automatic than discretionary as the institution develops.¹⁰

Smith examines the relationship between cooperation and
institutionalisation in his study. His hypothesis is that institutionalisation helps
promote greater international cooperation. As such, he treats
institutionalisation as the independent variable and cooperation as the
dependent variable.¹¹ Smith notes that as institutionalised cooperation
increases and the outputs and outcomes accumulate over time, a dynamic
process develops in which the outcomes change from effects into causes as
actors use them to justify additional institutional changes. This results in a
dynamic process that influences future cooperation while also helping to
institutionalise it, according to Smith. As such, he moves beyond the work of
other scholars in promoting an understanding of the effects of
institutionalisation.¹² As part of his study, Smith identifies the five stages of EU
foreign policy institutional development and specifies criteria to measure each

¹⁰ Smith, pp. 26-27.
¹¹ Ibid., pp. 38.
¹² Ibid., pp. 25-30, 32-36 and 57-58.
dimension in the process. Smith does not indicate whether the dynamic process he describes and his framework for measuring institutional development could apply to other types of organisations, beyond the European Union. Researchers would benefit from a more comprehensive discussion of Smith’s theory, hypothesis and implementation.

Kirsten Rafferty is one of few scholars who have written about the institutionalisation of security alliance relationships and assessed their development using qualitative and quantitative measurements. Her analysis covers certain multilateral and bilateral alliances but not the military relationships within those alliances. Her comparative analysis of bilateral and multilateral alliances and their institutionalisation provides a unique contribution to scholarly literature. Rafferty defines institutionalisation as a three-stage process that occurs gradually as practices develop into patterns, expectations materialise, and in some cases, formal organisations emerge. According to Rafferty, states opt to institutionalise their alliances in order to facilitate consultation and cooperation in an uncertain environment and to

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13 According to Michael Smith, the five stages of EU foreign policy institutional development include: 1) Establishing the policy domain as an intergovernmental forum, 2) Sharing information, 3) Establishing norms, 4) Creating organisation structures, and 5) Establishing governance (e.g., setting goals, devising specific policies to reach them, implementing the policies, providing the necessary resources to carry out the policies, and establishing some form of policy assessment or oversight). See Smith, pp. 38-49.

signal (to one another and to outsiders) the allies’ commitment to the agreement by increasing the costs of exit.\textsuperscript{15}

As with Smith, Rafferty has also developed a way to measure institutionalisation. She identifies three dimensions of institutionalisation—policy coordination, institutional breadth and institutional depth—which she then analyzes using a set of quantifiable components. While Smith’s concept is more dynamic, Rafferty uses a predominantly linear approach and does not appear to account for or incorporate feedback loops into her analysis. Furthermore, she does not account for or address how one category may affect another, as Smith does in his methodology. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that as the nature and extent of policy coordination increases in an alliance relationship, institutional depth is likely to increase as well—and vice versa.

Rafferty states that all alliances are institutionalised to some minimal degree, with norms, rules and expectations of cooperation, but they are not institutionalised at the outset. Some alliances undergo a deeper, broader form of institutionalisation that may or may not be accompanied by a formal organisational structure. Alliances deepen when the allies come to identify with the alliance and include its welfare in their calculations of their own self-interest, Rafferty argues. They broaden when military cooperation becomes linked with cooperation in other areas that are only indirectly linked to the military rationale of the alliance but that are seen as providing a valuable contribution to achieving the alliance’s over-arching objective—consistent with neo-functionalist arguments.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts…’, pp. 3-5. Ernest B. Haas was one of the proponents of neo-functionalism international relations theory. As applied to the issue of European integration, it aimed at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spillover effects to further the process of integration. See Ernst B. Haas, \textit{Beyond the Nation-State}.
The institutionalisation that occurs in bilateral security alliances is different than that in multilateral alliances, according to Rafferty. In bilateral alliances, institutionalisation is more likely to be characterised by patterned practices and expectations of behaviour than by formal organisations or bureaucratisation. This is the case, she says, because creating a formal organisation or committee to oversee and implement cooperation may be more costly for bilateral alliances than using existing intergovernmental channels and also because deep institutionalisation is likely to limit political flexibility in bilateral alliances, thereby undermining the very nature of the partnership. Therefore, according to Rafferty, institutionalisation is generally stronger in multilateral alliances than in bilateral alliances.

In the case of the Japan-US alliance, Rafferty argues that it underwent only a modest degree of institutionalisation and that it could be characterised as informal and limited to expectations about how each ally would act in a crisis. According to Rafferty, the alliance was largely symbolic in that it has served as a signal of the allies’ intentions and not a mechanism to facilitate real military cooperation for the defence of either party. Rafferty does not examine the military relationships within security alliances and there is no indication as to whether she believes their progress toward institutionalisation is similar to that of security alliances. This may be a reason why her reference to military cooperation challenges the empirical record concerning Japan-US naval activities during the Cold War. As identified in Chapter 2, naval scholars and practitioners identify substantial military cooperation between the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in the 1980s against the Soviet

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*Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). Also, Michael E. Smith refers to ‘functional spillover’ in his discussion of European Union institutionalisation. According to Smith, it is the result of actors who push for institutionalisation in one domain to achieve goals in another domain. See Smith, pp. 32-33.

naval forces in the Northwest Pacific. This was not ‘symbolic’ cooperation, according to these scholars and practitioners, even though Rafferty’s analysis identifies it as such. Rafferty does not indicate whether military relationships reflect the nature of the bilateral or multilateral alliance of which they are a part.18

While Michael Smith is explicit concerning the causal relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation, Rafferty is ambiguous. Her analysis seems to indicate that states can and do cooperate without institutionalisation. It is only when the benefits of institutionalisation outweigh the costs that states move further in the direction of institutionalisation. As just indicated, Rafferty views deep institutionalisation as less likely in bilateral alliances than in multilateral alliances. But this does not mean that cooperation does not occur. The states will cooperate but without all the formal machinery.

The issue of ‘threat’ and its effect on states and on alliances is discussed frequently in international relations literature and is generally dominated by realist theory. Less attention has been paid to understanding how fluctuations in threat levels affect alliance and military cooperation, and in particular, the role that institutionalisation may play in this process. For example, does institutionalisation facilitate an alliance’s capacity to survive significant transformations in the strategic context? What role, if any, does institutionalisation play in a military relationship?

John Ikenberry, in writing about Cold War NATO relations and alliance institutionalisation, provides observations concerning the role played by external factors in the early stages of institutionalisation. While acknowledging the role played by a heightened Soviet threat in the years following World War

II, Ikenberry does not appear to consider threat necessary for institutionalisation to continue. He notes that despite the demise of the Soviet threat, NATO has not shown signs of decay but has actually undergone political renewal and expansion of cooperative relations. Similarly, in the case of the Japan-US alliance, Ikenberry argues that ten years after the Cold War, the alliance appears to be as stable as ever and in fact has undergone a renewal in recent years in which the US and Japan reaffirmed their security partnership and developed more sophisticated forms of military cooperation, contingency planning, and burdensharing.\textsuperscript{19}

Smith refers to a variety of exogenous and endogenous factors that initially influenced institutionalisation in the European Union, but he is less definitive about the need for an external threat for cooperation and institutionalisation to continue. Michael Smith states that there is no consistent relationship between threats and common action in the case of the European Union. For example, Smith states that some crises, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf crisis, did not prompt a major collective response and yet in other areas, such as Central America and South Africa, EU states acted on the basis of common principles and understandings, not fears about external threats. Smith’s perspectives address the start of institutionalisation but not necessarily its continuation.\textsuperscript{20}

Kirsten Rafferty could not come to a conclusion with respect to the Japan-US security alliance and its need for an external threat ‘...because the shallow nature of the institutionalisation provides only limited insight into the functioning of the Japan-US alliance’.\textsuperscript{21} It is interesting that Rafferty does not

\textsuperscript{19} Ikenberry does not acknowledge the turmoil in the Japan-US relationship after the demise of the Soviet Union and as such does not identify the resurgence of a threat as a causal factor for the changes that occurred in the years thereafter. See Ikenberry pp. 212, 247-250, 256.
\textsuperscript{20} Smith, pp. 240-46.
reach a stronger conclusion concerning the Japan-US security relationship. The evidence she presents in her argument on bilateral and multilateral alliances would certainly lead one to expect her to argue that bilateral alliances, given their weaker institutionalisation, are less able to withstand changes in the strategic environment than are multilateral alliances.

In his Ph.D. thesis on alliances and the determinants of their cooperation, Geunwook Lee argues that it is the extent of institutionalisation in alliances that determines their ability to survive changes in threat levels. In particular, he states that a well-coordinated military membership, including coordinated war plans, exchanged military intelligence and an integrated command structure, is a key component of this institutional structure. With a well-coordinated military membership, an alliance as an international institution can survive the threat that originally built the alliance and maintain itself in the future with new or dormant purposes, according to Lee.  

Lee does not, however, examine the military relationships in the context of institutionalisation. Further, Lee’s analysis does not distinguish between bilateral and multilateral alliances in terms of institutionalisation. As such, he does not identify whether one or the other creates a stronger foundation for institutional processes to advance.

Summary:

Institutionalisation is a familiar concept in international relations and is discussed extensively in literature concerning international organisations. In these contexts, institutionalisation provides some valuable perspectives and insights for security-related organisations. Some scholars and defence

practitioners have examined the institutionalisation of security alliances—chiefly NATO. Scholars have not examined the institutionalisation of military-to-military relationships within alliance relationships, except briefly in regard to NATO. As such, there is no empirical evidence about the extent to which the institutionalisation process for military relationships parallels that for security alliances and whether the external influences are the same.

While international security literature generally acknowledges that security threats are important for the start of alliances, there is less consensus about the need for an external threat for cooperation and institutionalisation to continue. Rafferty’s analysis of bilateral and multilateral alliances sets her apart from other scholars and academics who do not take the bilateral or multilateral nature of security alliances into consideration in their own analyses of how changing threat levels affect security alliances. However, Rafferty does not go so far as to attribute the nature of institutionalisation in the Japan-US security alliance as determining its capacity to survive changes in the strategic environment. Certain other scholars do make the connection between institutionalisation and the strategic resilience of alliances, and one in particular states that a well-coordinated military membership aids in institutionalisation. Academic literature does not appear to address how security threats—or the absence of them—affect institutionalisation in military-to-military relationships.

Michael Smith and Kristin Rafferty, in particular, contribute to the analytical framework and approach for this thesis. Michael Smith’s work on the institutionalisation of the European Union and the dynamic relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation is important in establishing the hypothesis, despite the fact that Smith views the causal relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation differently than does this thesis. Smith
highlights institutionalisation as the independent variable that drives cooperation in the European Union. This thesis views the reverse in the case of the Japan-US naval relationship. This thesis builds on Rafferty’s three dimensions of institutionalisation—policy coordination, institutional breadth and institutional depth—and expands the application from security relationships to military relationships.

International Naval Cooperation—A Historical Perspective

Navies are unique amongst the military services because of their ability to operate independently and away from public view and to move fluidly through international waters and make port calls in foreign lands. Navalists in the academic and professional arenas often point to a ‘spiritual bond’ that exists between sailors throughout the world due to the risks that they all share in operating at sea.23 Despite daily interactions between navies at sea, the formalisation of international naval cooperation is a relatively new phenomenon.24 Of the classic navalists, only Alfred Thayer Mahan dealt with international naval cooperation in his writings and gave the subject more than a passing acknowledgement. Mahan distinguished between naval cooperation and naval alliances. This is an indication that he gave some consideration to institutionalisation. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with a strong naval

24 Geoffrey Till points to a tradition of rules of the road, behaviour, custom and courtesy that has been established over the years between navies. This falls short, however, of more formalised cooperation. See Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 361-68 and 110-111.
component, emerged in the late nineteenth century—during Mahan’s lifetime. The alliance and the naval relationship had some institutional links and as such they provide the basis for useful reflection on the formation and collapse of naval relationships within alliances.

Mahan's ideas concerning naval cooperation centred on the concept of a transnational naval consortium. He believed the security of a large and expanding system of international trade in the twentieth century would depend upon such a consortium. He was convinced that even the strongest nations were incapable of unilaterally defending a worldwide system of maritime commerce for financial and other reasons and as such believed that naval cooperation was in the national interest of the United States and of other major nations in the world.25

The American Mahan had a particular interest in naval cooperation with the Royal Navy of Great Britain, a navy (and a country) for which he had unsurpassed admiration. His desire for an Anglo-American naval consortium, based on shared mutual interests, was part of a larger vision for an 'Imperial Federation,' composed of 'English-speaking dominions and colonies mature and British enough to warrant inclusion'.26 Initially, Mahan identified Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa as part of this federation, which Mahan saw stitched together economically by preferential tariffs, or no tariffs at all, and in particular by a great navy.

26 Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters, pp. 268-270.
Mahan distinguished between naval cooperation and naval alliances in his writings and provides a glimpse of what could possibly be considered ‘institutionalisation.’ Naval cooperation would help link together the English speaking world. Furthermore, he believed that no single power in the industrial era was capable of exercising naval supremacy on its own and hence cooperation was vital for international stability and for the maintenance of international commerce. On the other hand, Mahan was against any formal union or alliance of any kind—even with Great Britain—stating that ‘the American people simply would not accept it.’ From his writings, equality between naval partners appears to be one of Mahan's unstated criteria for a successful alliance relationship, and in Mahan's mind, no navy could measure up to the Royal Navy. He believed that the US Navy was still far too weak to participate in a naval ‘alliance’ with Britain on a basis of equality. It appears that Mahan may have viewed alliances as more institutionalised relationships than the relationships he envisioned in naval consortiums. However, the literature is not completely clear about how he distinguished these two relationships.

Mahan viewed culture and race as important factors in naval cooperation. As such, he believed in the importance to the civilised world of Anglo-American racial and cultural leadership. Many of his writings on racial and cultural issues are considered controversial and even racist in orientation. For example, Mahan viewed the Asia region as culturally static and its people as inferior to the ‘Teutonic’ race. His perspectives on Japan are particularly interesting because he did not associate Japan with other Asian countries. He viewed Japan as superior to other Asians and included it in the group of important sea powers,

27 Sumida, p. 84.
29 Ibid., pp. 268-270.
along with Great Britain, Germany and the United States, who, if necessity arose, would cooperate together to resist aggression from Russia and China.\footnote{Seager, \textit{Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan}, pp. 206-211 and 499.}

Mahan's sea-power doctrine reached Japan during its formative years, in the late nineteenth century, when it was beginning to emerge as a world power. The government placed translations of Mahan's more important books in all schools, and the naval and military colleges adopted \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783} as a textbook. Mahan's influential book, published in 1890 when he was President of the US Naval War College, examined the factors leading to supremacy of the seas, with a particular focus on Great Britain's naval achievements. Mahan's philosophy of seapower strengthened the economic and political forces already stimulating naval developments in Japan. This acceleration in navalism fostered and supported the new imperialism and new naval construction.\footnote{William E. Livezey, \textit{Mahan on Sea Power} (University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), pp. 60-63 and 76-77.} In 1911, however, the political situation in Asia was deteriorating and Mahan (as well as the United States more generally) no longer viewed Japan as a cooperative partner.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 218-223.}

As Mahan was writing, teaching and building his naval and academic career, Great Britain was finalising a treaty with Japan for an Anglo-Japanese alliance. This was the first example of substantive naval cooperation in the twentieth century. It was Japan's first alliance with a European power and helped boost its international standing and status as a naval power.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} \textit{The first treaty of 1902 was revised during the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, then revised again in 1911 and renewed for one year in 1920. See Ian H. Nish, \textit{The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907}, (London: Athlone Press, 1966), pp. 374-377, and Timothy D. Saxon, 'Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation, 1914-1918', \textit{Naval War College Review}, Winter 2000, Vol. LIII, No. 1, pp. 79-83.}} It is not clear how Mahan viewed this alliance, given his sentiments against naval alliances, and particularly between navies of unequal capabilities.
A number of scholars have written about the Anglo-Japanese alliance relationship. It is significant for this thesis because it was one of very few alliances during the early twentieth century, and it incorporated a strong naval component. Ian Nish has focussed both on the broader alliance relationship and on the naval relationship in his analysis. The relationship is relevant to this thesis because several of the issues Nish highlights in his work parallel those developed herein, such as the role of a common security threat in binding allies together, as well as the role that political and strategic interests play in building and maintaining alliances (security and naval), and eventually, in pulling them apart.

The alliance relationship benefited both nations and both navies. For Great Britain, the alliance was a means by which the burden of maintaining the Pax Britannica could be shared with another power. As such, it enabled Britain to add to her own power the naval power of Japan and thereby to help defend Britain's commercial stake in China. For Japan, the cooperation of the largest naval power in the world would help save it from isolation and was a source of prestige for Japan in the international community. For both countries, the alliance helped boost an anti-Russian front in Asia. Nish points out that both naval institutions—the British Admiralty and the Japanese Ministry of Marine—were particularly supportive of this relationship but for different reasons. The Ministry of Marine in Japan wanted to ensure that the strength of British battleships and cruisers in East Asian waters was kept superior to that of Russia. The British Admiralty believed that the alliance would enable Britain to

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34 Ian Nish, pp. 269, and 373-74. According to Nish, there was a tendency for Britain to encourage Japan's naval building programmes in order to limit British commitments in the region and allow British naval building to focus on Europe. In 1902, for example, the Admiralty wanted to concentrate Britain's fleet in European waters and could only do this by entrusting its defence in the east to Japan. Later, in 1905, when Britain wanted to defend the Indian frontier without making large-scale increases in its standing army, Japanese assistance was sought to meet the deficiency.
reduce the size of its fleet on the ‘China Station’. In addition, British naval vehicles would be able to use Japanese protected bases for coaling and repairs.\textsuperscript{35}

A naval conference was held in 1902 to work out the details of the naval arrangement. Clearly, the navies had substantial interests in this relationship and decided early on to publish a joint signal book and to freely exchange intelligence information through the British and Japanese naval attachés.\textsuperscript{36} The exchange of intelligence, the publication of a joint signal book, the shared threat perceptions, active operational cooperation and support by senior leadership in both countries suggests that institutional ties of some nature did exist between the two navies.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance reached its prime in the early years of the relationship. Later, many of the common interests that had bound the allies together were gradually lost. Primary amongst these interests was defending against the identified enemy, Russia. When this focus was lost, something of the heart of the treaty was also lost.\textsuperscript{37} Timothy Saxon notes that in the later years of the alliance, with the German threat to Britain’s Far East possessions eliminated and the nascent Soviet Union no longer threatening India, Great Britain did not require Japan’s naval cooperation.\textsuperscript{38} In addition to the loss of a common threat, the United States began to pressure Great Britain about its relationship with Japan because the United States was growing concerned about the growth of the Japanese navy and did not like Japan's continental expansion in Korea and Manchuria. As part of its broader strategic interests, Britain was attentive to the American views.\textsuperscript{39} Neither Nish nor Saxon discussed the extent to which, if at

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 251-253.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 251-252. [The archival source cited by Nish for this information is: FO \textit{Japan} 574, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 3 January 1903, containing bridge to Admiralty, 26 November 1902; Bridge papers 15, Kerr to Bridge, 2 January 1903.]
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 373 and 377.
\textsuperscript{38} Saxon, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 83-87.
all, the naval relationship and its institutionalisation bolstered the broader alliance relationship, particularly in the alliance’s more challenging years. In the end, higher-level political interests carried the day and the alliance broke apart at the national and naval levels.

Summary:

The writings of and concerning Alfred Mahan, the nineteenth century American navalist, and those on the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the start of the twentieth century, provide some interesting perspectives for this thesis concerning the factors that contribute to and detract from naval cooperation and institutionalisation. Alfred Mahan is one of few classic navalists who have written about naval cooperation. His ideas centred on the concept of a transnational naval consortium to help support a large and expanding system of international trade in the nineteenth century. Mahan distinguished between naval cooperation and naval alliances. Although an ‘alliance’ could be considered more institutionalised than mere naval cooperation, Mahan did not readily advocate forming alliances. Equality between navies, including common cultures, was an important consideration. The Anglo-Japanese naval alliance was the first substantive example of naval cooperation in the twentieth century, and it appeared to be institutionalised to some degree. The alliance provided political, economic and security benefits to both nations, but Japan and Britain were by no means equal partners. Common interests brought them together, including a shared threat perception. The relationship came apart when these common interests no longer existed. Although it is not clear whether, in the...
end, the two navies wanted to sever their ties, their futures were linked to the national prerogatives.

**Cold War and Post-Cold War**

The literature concerning naval cooperation in the post-World War II years focussed principally on NATO. But even in this context, naval cooperation was not a major alliance concern. Planning in the post-World War II years had as one of its basic assumptions the continuing importance of land power because the major threat to Western security was the large conventional land army of the Soviet Union. Maritime operations, therefore, were not as high a priority as other operations on the ground. It was not until the Soviet Union developed forces capable of challenging the West for control of the seas that attention was drawn to the inadequacies of the allied maritime posture.40

As the navies began to operate together in the early days of NATO, the US Navy, the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom and the Royal Canadian Navy began to coordinate their naval planning. Initial meetings focussed on closer standardisation in the field of planning, operations and logistics to secure the sea lines of communication between North America and Europe in the event of war.41 Allied maritime forces emphasised securing the seas for reinforcement and resupply, which meant developing large numbers of anti-submarine warfare ships, planes and attack submarines and countermine forces to keep the harbours open. Operating together, the alliance recognised the need for greater coordination of their maritime activities and operations and established a


maritime institutional structure consisting of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief Channel. With intensified maritime activities and greater attention given to NATO's maritime posture in the 1970s, the alliance established additional structures to improve the effectiveness and coordination of maritime operations, such as the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, which provided training and practice in allied naval cooperation. In the Mediterranean, a reorganisation of the command structure resulted in the creation of a new subordinate command for maritime-air cooperation. The standing naval force, in particular, marked the beginning of a more significant institutionalisation of naval forces within NATO.

Formality does not always equate with effective cooperation, however, especially for navies. Joel Sokolsky points out that in fact formality may be viewed as detrimental to the inherent flexibility usually associated with sea power. Some formality is often necessary, but too much becomes a hindrance to operations. In the case of NATO's standing naval force, Sokolsky notes that formalisation helped familiarise navies with a central set of naval procedures, but it operated under a rigid set of political guidelines that did not always please the participating navies. It was the price that had to be paid for getting allied governments to agree to it.\textsuperscript{42}

While in the Cold War naval scholars and analysts focussed on naval operations within security alliances, in the post-Cold War era, coalition operations have received primary attention. Coalitions tend to be ad hoc, issue oriented and short term, and may include nations with widely divergent capabilities and interests. The fundamental element that distinguishes

\textsuperscript{42} Sokolsky, \textit{Seapower in the Nuclear Age}, pp. 187-190.
coalitions from alliances is that they usually are not created until the crisis that spawns them is evident.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite the fraternal bonds that may exist between navies of various cultures and nationalities, challenges still exist in organising navies for effective multinational operations, particularly if they are not part of an established alliance. These include, for example, identifying a leader, agreeing to the mission (including the political aims of the exercise), working out the operational and tactical procedures, and developing a strategy. These challenges are minimised in highly institutionalised alliance relationships, such as NATO, which has profited from many years of combined action against a common perceived threat.\textsuperscript{45}

Admiral William Owens (USN-ret), former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, states that unlike alliances, the members of coalitions can include nations normally less than friendly. As such, they may have little experience working together and must overcome considerable distrust amongst their members and do not necessarily start from a common understanding of rules of engagement or operational familiarity. Furthermore, the military capabilities of coalition members can also differ greatly, and these differences can complicate and hinder effective coordination when military force is used.\textsuperscript{46}

Interoperability is one of the key characteristics of an institutionalised relationship and as noted earlier is important to the effectiveness of a naval


\textsuperscript{45} Till, pp. 361-368.

\textsuperscript{46} Owens, pp. 41-42. A 1991 conference on multinational naval cooperation in the post-Cold War era points out that coalitions, compared with alliances, are difficult to organise and operate without common experience, training, communications and equipment. See Jeffrey I. Sands, \textit{Multinational Naval Cooperation in a Changing World: A Report on the Greenwich Conference}, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, October 1992, pp. 5-6. This conference was sponsored jointly by the Royal Navy, the Center for Naval Analyses (in the USA), the Royal Naval College, the Greenwich Forum and was supported by the US Naval War College.
operation, regardless of whether the navies are part of an alliance or a coalition. As part of a series of reports it did on multinational operations in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, the Center for Naval Analyses, a semi-government organisation that serves as the analytical arm of the US Navy, has identified five elements that constitute interoperability. The five elements include:

1) The ability and willingness (politically and militarily) of nations to organise themselves into a common force,
2) The ability of force elements to understand and account for each other's operational methods in working together as a team,
3) The ability of a force to exchange information well enough to establish and maintain a common picture of the operational situation,
4) The ability of force elements to support and sustain each other, operationally and logistically, and
5) The ability of the force's equipment to interact appropriately, ideally as the result of standardisation programmes.

The Center's work was part of a tasking in 1995, from the US Naval Doctrine Command, to produce a doctrine-like publication on multinational maritime operations that could be released to all the world's navies for use in coalition operations. The several documents that resulted from this tasking provide a US Navy perspective on multinational maritime operations and

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identify some for the challenging issues that naval forces encounter when operating in a multinational maritime environment.

Shared doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures are fundamental in developing interoperability. Multinational doctrine details how navies intend to operate in a collaborative environment. Formal alliances generally develop doctrine, as well as common operating procedures to guide their operations. NATO, for example, has developed Allied Joint Publication 1 as a capstone doctrinal publication and also has a series of Allied Tactical Publications that provide a framework for it operations. For decades, NATO has operated from these publications laying out tactics, techniques and procedures. The primary purpose of these Allied Tactical Publications is to facilitate the dissemination of orders and information pertinent to allied maritime operations. For example, they provide a common source of signals and tactical principles, such as how to deploy an ASW screen, how to conduct rear area support, and how to manoeuvre in formation.49

One of the most important factors in interoperability is having compatible platforms, systems and equipment for more effective operations. This includes the systems and technology to help prosecute the threat and also critical communications and other types of links that improve the interaction between naval forces when operating together. Command, control and communications become more complicated when other navies are involved. According to one naval specialist, communications and combat systems data do not flow easily between different militaries because these systems typically have developed over years in distinct military cultures and operations.50

49 Discussion of naval interoperability and its elements is found in Michael Johnson, Peter Swartz, Patrick Roth, Doctrine for Partnership, pp. 77-78. See also Ken Gause, ‘US Navy Interoperability with Asian Allies,’ SP Yearbook 2002, pp. 31-34, for reference to the challenges of operating with Asian navies.

50 Ibid.
Political will and commitment of the national governments is important because navies generally do not act independently but are affected by myriad other factors. Significant amongst these is the respective governments that have to agree to cooperate and build a mutually reinforcing defence relationship.

Some naval analysts view the demonstration of political will by governments as the first most important demonstration of commitment to naval interoperability.\(^{51}\)

The US Navy has played an important role in the growth, development and operations of other navies, as well as in the institutionalisation of relationships with these navies. The knowledge that it conveys and shares is one way in which the US Navy influences the doctrine, structure, technology and operations of other navies—as did other navies in earlier eras. The structural power that the US Navy possesses and exercises as a ‘naval hegemon’ increases its own power as well as the power of the United States over the conduct of world affairs. According to Susan Strange, power over structures means that relations within those structures are affected, even though the influence may occur inadvertently. Joseph Nye uses the term ‘co-optive power’ to describe a similar concept—the attraction of one’s ideas or the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express.\(^{52}\)

Steven Lukes, in his work on the three dimensions of power, states that at a very basic level, the concept that underlies the one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three-dimensional views of power is that ‘A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.’\(^{53}\) Although

\(^{51}\) *Ibid.*


Lukes’ work does not cover military organisations, nevertheless, his ideas are interesting to contemplate in the context of the Japan-US naval relationship or in fact any military relationship in which a hegemonic power is part. Such an analysis would be difficult, however, given the very evaluative nature of the notion of ‘interests’, an observation noted as well by Lukes in his study. 54

Summary:

Despite the bonds that exist between navies of various cultures and nationalities, challenges still exist in organising navies for effective multinational operations, particularly if they are not part of an established alliance. In the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, NATO still stands as the example of a highly institutionalised alliance; its navies operate with established doctrine, procedures, technology and experience. Shared threat perceptions have helped strengthen the alliance relationship. However, lessons from NATO also show that excessive formality does not always equate with effective naval cooperation. Indeed, in the early days of NATO’s development, navies appear to have been most effective with just the minimum amount of structure. In this case, ‘structure’ needs to be distinguished from ‘institutionalisation’.

Although alliances appear to help foster institutionalisation in military-to-military relationships, the contemporary literature indicates that in the post-Cold War era, greater reliance will be placed on building temporary coalitions to meet specific situations as they arise. In these coalitions, institutionalisation will be more difficult to achieve since they may be comprised of navies with little experience working together and with different equipment and operational

54 Ibid.
procedures. The US Navy has played an important role in the growth, development and operations of other navies and in the institutionalisation of relationships with these navies—both within and outside of alliances. The structural power it possesses and the consequent knowledge that it conveys and shares are the ways in which the US Navy influences the doctrine, structure, technology and operations of other navies, as was the case with other dominant navies during earlier periods of history.

The Japan - US Naval Relationship

Academic literature on the Japan-US naval relationship is relatively sparse. Scholars have typically focussed on issues concerning the broader Japan-US security relationship, and naval issues sometimes are discussed within this context. The few scholars who have written about the Japan-US naval relationship have focussed principally on either the Japanese Navy or the US Navy. Few have focussed on the operational interaction and cooperation between the two navies. As such, primary source documents provided the predominant authoritative sources for this section.

Of all the US military branches represented in Japan, the US Navy has maintained the closest relationship with its counterpart, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. The relationship was re-established soon after World War II ended—first, on a personal basis and then more officially as a result of US Navy liaison with the Demobilization Liquidation Bureau. With US and other occupation forces deploying to Korea starting in 1950, Japan established the National Police Reserve and a maritime counterpart—the Maritime Safety Force to provide basic levels of security, in the absence of occupation troops. The
Maritime Safety Force was transferred to the National Safety Agency in 1952, after the ratification of the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement between the United States and Japan. In 1954, the National Safety Agency became the Defense Agency, with separate land, sea and air forces created for purely defensive purposes. 55 Initially, the US Navy provided Japan with some of its older ships and equipment, since most of the Imperial Navy platforms had been destroyed, given to allied navies or put under the control of Naval Shipping control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine. In 1952, US Navy instructors began training Japanese officer-instructors who would then provide training to new Japanese naval recruits. This training, on ships lent from the United States, occurred quietly, so as not to attract attention from the Japanese of US publics. 56

Officers from the US Navy and from the former Imperial Japanese Navy generally had a more favourable relationship relative to the other services following World War II. This was due largely to personal friendships that had existed prior to the War, the moderation of certain former Imperial Navy senior officers, US Navy respect for Japanese naval capabilities and the traditional international camaraderie of naval personnel. 57 Some of the admirals with whom the US Navy re-established relations included those with reputations as moderates and who advocated a no-war-with-America policy. This included, for example, Mitsumasa Yonai, who was Navy Minister from 1937-1939 and had unsuccessfully opposed the more aggressive and powerful voices of the General

56 Ibid., p. 84.
57 Ibid., pp. 69-97. See also US Naval Institute, Reminiscences of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Vol. I, Oral History Department, Annapolis, Maryland, 1979, pp. 86-120. Burke’s oral history describes his interactions with former Imperial Japanese Navy officers after World War II and his efforts to establish a naval organisation in Japan. The oral history is a valuable source of information about the early foundation of the Japan-US naval relationship.
Staff arguing for war. Another Imperial Navy officer, Kichisaburo Nomura, was Ambassador to the United States at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941. According to Auer, he had sentiments similar to Yonai's, and had been close to many US Navy admirals from the time of his active duty.58

One of the key American figures in the post-World War II Japan-US naval relationship is Admiral Arleigh Burke who was instrumental in encouraging the establishment of a post-World War II naval organisation in Japan. His decision to utilise the expertise of experienced officers from the former Imperial Japanese Navy in mine sweeping missions during the Korean War is a key factor in the relations that developed between the two navies in later years and in the re-establishment of a naval organisation. Japan provided badly-needed minesweeping capability to the US Navy from October-December 1950. This was a sensitive mission for Japan given its post-World War II non-military status. The Japanese government was not in a position to ‘order’ the participation of Japanese crews nor could the United States ‘command’ such participation. Crews were persuaded to participate by Japanese officials in charge of the mission. Most were ex-Imperial Navy personnel.59

In his oral history, Burke acknowledges his concern that without a navy, Japan did not have a way to protect itself—to stop smuggling at sea, detect aliens approaching Japan by sea, and protect its fishermen—and would be completely dependent on the United States for support.60 After the Korean War,

58 Ibid.
59 According to Auer, forty-six Japanese minesweepers, one large ‘guinea pig’ vessel used for activating pressure mines, and 1,200 former naval personnel were employed in operations at Korean ports. They swept 327 kilometers of channels and anchorages extending 607 miles. See Auer, pp. 65-67. Also see US Naval Institute, Reminiscences of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, pp. 30-50.
60 In his oral history, Burke recounts a conversation with Nomura in which he asks, ‘How can a nation become viable without the power to protect itself at all?’ He then acknowledges that the United States cannot assume the role of protector forever: ‘That’s all right for a year or so or for a few years, but it can’t be. We cannot do it. We don’t have the power to do that. No nation can take on the support of another nation. It can’t be done.’ US Naval Institute, Reminiscences of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, pp. 112-114.
Burke recognised that there were additional security concerns in the region against which Japan had no defence. As a matter of self-interest, he also recognised that what was not provided by Japan would have to come from the United States. It was in the United States’ best interest, therefore, to assist Japan in re-establishing a defensive naval capability. Eventually, Admiral Burke recommended to Kichisaburo Nomura that he take ten of the very best officers from the former Imperial Japanese Navy and start a new naval organisation. Burke notes in his oral history that a small circle of former Imperial Navy senior personnel—part of the Demobilization Bureau—had already begun thinking about a future navy but had kept their planning very quiet. These former naval personnel were not about to overthrow the government, according to Burke, but had recognised many of the realities that Burke himself saw as problematic for an island nation without a naval organisation.61

In addition to Admiral Burke, one of the more recent key specialists in Japan-US naval relations is James Auer—a practitioner and scholar. As a naval officer in 1973, he published his Ph.D. dissertation on the post-war development of Japanese maritime forces and the early Japan-US naval relationship. In his dissertation, he disclosed several facts that had not previously been made public about the role of former Imperial Navy officers in clearing mines with the US Navy during the Korean War. Auer also identified rudimentary joint training between US Navy and JMSDF units and technical assistance that the US Navy provided to the Japanese maritime forces in the early years following World War II.62 As with Japan’s assistance in the Korean War, information concerning training provided by the US Navy was not publicly acknowledged at the time.

61 Ibid., pp. 115-120 and Auer, p. 73.
62 Auer, pp. 94-97.
Auer also served as the Director for Japan Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1979 - 1988. While at the Department of Defense in the 1980s, James Auer played an important role in the development and implementation of a division of responsibilities between the US Navy and the JMSDF for protecting the sea lines of communication in the northwest Pacific. The establishment of a division of roles and responsibilities was a key turning point for the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation because it meant that the JMSDF was becoming an involved alliance partner, sharing risks and working with the US Navy against the growing Soviet naval threat in the Northwest Pacific.63

Another scholar, Peter J. Woolley, picked up where Auer left off in 1971, although not from an exclusively historical perspective. Woolley examines Japan’s naval development and policies, including the cultural, legal and political challenges that surrounded decisions concerning the growth, development and deployment of the JMSDF during the period 1971-2000. Although his focus is clearly on the JMSDF and not on its relationship with the US Navy, he does address the relationship in various contexts. A notable part of his work concerns Japan’s cultural predilection for *kata*, or form, and its relevance to JMSDF development and operations.64

Published in 2006, Euan Graham’s comprehensive study of Japan’s sealane security highlights JMSDF activity, particularly in sealane defence, and the political forces that helped drive it. Graham relates Japan’s sealane security to the broader, historical context of its defence policy, alliance relations and

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63 James Auer’s contributions in this regard are documented in an oral history interview. See James Auer Oral History Interview, conducted by Koji Murata, Japan Project, National Security Archives, George Washington University, March 1996.
national strategy. The JMSDF-USN relationship is not a primary focus of
Graham's work, even though various aspects of the relationship are discussed in
several parts of his study.\(^6^5\)

Relatively little information exists in the literature concerning factors
that may have influenced the Japan-US naval relationship, such as the nature of
the threat and domestic politics in Japan and the United States. The subject of
external influence is discussed extensively in the context of the Japan-US
security relationship, but there is no indication as to whether these same factors
apply to the naval relationship. This thesis examines some of these unanswered
questions through an examination of pertinent archival documents, many of
which were formerly classified, such as cable traffic and memoranda between
the US Embassy in Tokyo and the US Departments of Defense and State in
Washington. In addition, the Command Histories from the US Pacific Command
and the US Pacific Fleet provide additional information that is not available
from other sources. These primary source documents provide unique insights
into various facets of this relationship, such as threat perceptions, domestic
politics, and the sharing of sensitive military information and technology
between the US Navy and the JMSDF.

**Summary:**

The Japan-US naval relationship has not received the academic attention
it deserves. Scholars have typically focussed either on the Japanese Navy or the
US Navy, but few have examined the relationship between the two navies,
including operational interaction and cooperation. Of all the US military

branches represented in Japan, the US Navy has maintained the closest relationship with its counterpart, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, with members of the US Navy even helping to re-establish a naval organisation in Japan not long after World War II. Significant in this relationship in the early days has been the role of particular people, such as Admiral Arleigh Burke, and certain Japanese admirals who recognised the importance of the relationship, based on their personal and operational experience, and helped move it forward. While the 'bonds of seamanship' may have helped re-establish the relationship after World War II and helped maintain it, the existing literature indicates that both navies were acting out of self-interest and saw mutual advantage to a cooperative relationship. In this regard, the establishment of a division of roles and responsibilities was a key turning point for the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation.

The literature does not provide extensive treatment of the various internal and external factors affecting the Japan-US naval relationship. Certain scholars, such as James Auer, provide some perspectives on the early relationship, and Peter J. Woolley provides an indication of the role that culture may play in the relationship, and Euan Graham identifies Japan and US involvement in sealane defence. Archival documents and interviews with US Navy and JMSDF officers provide the best sources of information on the JMSDF-USN relationship and the factors affecting its development.

**Japan-US Security Relationship and Its Institutionalisation**

The Japan-US security relationship provides a key foundation to understanding the naval relationship. Naval cooperation, as with military
relations in general, is integrally linked to the broader strategic and political environment. Ultimately, navies are instruments of state policy, and as such, are subject to many of the same influences as the nation itself. There are several examples in the twentieth century in which naval cooperation was foiled by challenges in the broader political relationship between nations. The naval relationship between Great Britain and Japan during the early part of the twentieth century is one such example, as was discussed earlier in this chapter. Naval cooperation during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 is another example of cooperation that was terminated as a result of political forces.\(^{66}\)

Many scholars have written about various aspects of the Japan-US security relationship, and bookshelves are filled with sources on this topic—particularly for the post-Cold War period.\(^{67}\) The literature is both analytical and policy prescriptive and provides a better understanding of the environment in which the naval relationship operated.\(^{68}\) The thesis views the literature on the Japan-US security relationship through the lens of institutionalisation, and as such, this provides a way to focus the voluminous material on this topic.

Although the term 'institutionalisation' is not often used to describe aspects of the relationship, the progress toward institutionalisation is evident

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\(^{66}\) Willard Frank notes in his article on this subject that just as humanitarianism had joined the naval officers together, the imperatives of power politics drove them apart. See Willard C. Frank, Jr., 'Multinational Naval Cooperation in the Spanish Civil War, 1936', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. SLVII, no. 2, (Spring 1994), pp. 72 and 88.


through various ‘markers’ highlighting important events in the alliance relationship. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States marked the beginning of a relatively loose bilateral alliance relationship. As such, Article V of the bilateral Security Treaty commits the United States to assisting Japan should it be threatened or attacked, and Article VI grants the US military use of bases and facilities in Japan as a means of providing for the peace and stability of the Far East region. However, under the Treaty both Japan and the United States assume an obligation to maintain and develop capabilities to resist armed attack in common and to assist each other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration.  

The alliance began a very gradual move toward institutionalisation. Scholars and defence practitioners note that the United States and Japan were initially satisfied with very limited formal institutionalisation. The alliance created a limited consultative structure under Article IV of the treaty. While there was never a formal secretariat, there were two consultative committees, the Security Consultative Committee and the Security Subcommittee that provided what analyst considered to be a ‘superficial dialogue’ that generally avoided difficult or bilaterally contentious subjects.  

Both the initial formation of the Japan-US security alliance and its gradual institutionalisation was a practical decision that supported specific interests in both countries. For the United States, the alliance was an important part of its global containment of communism. The alliance became part of a

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broader network of bilateral and multilateral relationships that included NATO; the Australia, New Zealand, US alliance; the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization; the Central Treaty Organization; and bilateral alliances with the Philippines, South Korea, and others. Most of the US alliance relationships, including the alliance with Japan, provided the United States with military bases in important strategic areas of the world. The United States hoped that the alliance would stabilise Japan against communist subversion and would allow Japan to focus on economic and political development. Similarly, the United States was able to oversee Japan’s ‘rearmament,’ which helped reassure regional neighbours that Japan would peacefully reintegrate into the global political and economic systems.  

Nevertheless, this is a unique alliance relationship. The Japanese constitution, written with major assistance from the United States and ratified in 1947, states in Article 9 that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. It further states that land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained and that the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised. In 1952, when the US Congress ratified the peace treaty that formally ended the US occupation of Japan, it also ratified the Japan-US Security Treaty, which allowed the US military to continue using important bases in Japan for the defence of the Far East and to intervene in Japan to put down internal disturbances should the Japanese government request assistance. As previously discussed, the creation of a 75,000 ‘National

Police Reserve’ was the result of US pressure that led to a rearmament of sorts in Japan at this time, as the United States found itself increasingly stretched with security commitments throughout the world, including the Korean War.

Japan’s alliance with the United States was based on its realistic assessment of the geopolitical landscape and its domestic aspirations—social, political and economic. As the decades proceeded, the growing Soviet military threat and Japan’s vulnerability became more evident and was acknowledged in official Japanese government publications, such as the Defense Agency's annual white papers. The fear of possible abandonment by the United States was a serious concern to Japanese policymakers when, after the Vietnam War, the United States began to withdraw forces from Asia and reposition them in other parts of the world. In 1976, when an undetected Soviet MIG-25 landed in Northern Japan flown by a pilot seeking asylum, Japan recognised its vulnerability to other potentially hostile aircraft.73 As a consequence, developing ways—institutionally—to ensure continued US military presence in the region became very important to Japan.

As the Soviet threat increased in the latter 1970s and early 1980s, the United States recognised the advantages of closer association and cooperation with Japan because it also meant greater access to bases and other support in Japan. The United States needed these facilities to help prosecute the Soviet threat in the Northwest Pacific. Eventually, in the 1980s, the United States came to realise that Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’s anti-submarine warfare expertise was a valuable asset and unprecedented cooperation between the two

Navies continued for the decade. Literature on the security relationship indicates that there was no strong coordination between the US and Japanese military forces during the early years of the alliance relationship. The alliance was frequently characterised as ‘designed to administer bases but not to fight.’ Naval cooperation, however, appeared to be an exception. Daily cooperation between US and Japanese forces was known to be ‘…severely circumscribed, and reasonably effective only at sea (out of sight, out of mind).’ Prime Minister Suzuki’s pledge in 1981 for Japan to assume sealane defence out to 1,000 miles further encouraged Japan-US naval cooperation. Scholars and defence practitioners have not done a more detailed comparison of operational mechanics associated with the naval relationship and the other military services.

Primary source documents from the US Naval Archives provide unique insights into various facets of this relationship, such as the sharing of sensitive military information and technology between the US Navy and the JMSDF, and the extent to which the naval relationship affected the broader security relationship and vice versa. The documents provide some evidence of the split in the US Government’s approach to Japan and the role that key civilian figures, such as US Senator Mike Mansfield, played in the naval and broader security relationship. Senator Mike Mansfield served as US Ambassador to Japan from 1977-1989. His role as a strong advocate of the Japan-US relationship, in the midst of heated battles over trade and defence burden-sharing, is well documented.

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76 Giarra and Nagashima, p. 98.
These documents highlight Mansfield’s interactions with the US Navy concerning the Navy’s decision not to release certain sensitive military information and technology to the JMSDF. In the late 1970s, the Navy’s submarine community, as well as senior Navy leadership in Washington, was particularly concerned about protecting US Navy technology that enabled the Navy to detect increasingly quiet Soviet submarines. Primary source documents provide this information and highlight other US government differences with the US Navy. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 2. The material highlights three important findings: firstly, the differences, and ultimately inequities, in the Japan-US naval relationship compared with other US naval relationships, such as within NATO, regarding the sharing of sensitive information and technology; secondly, the internal conflict within the US Navy concerning the nature and extent of information that should be shared with Japan (and the JMSDF in particular); and thirdly, the contradictions between official statements made by senior US officials in Washington concerning their desire for improved cooperation with the Japanese defence forces and the importance of the alliance relationship—and what was really happening behind the scenes in the naval relationship.

The years immediately following the end of the Cold War were tumultuous ones for the alliance relationship as the United States and Japan worked to redefine their alliance in the absence of the Soviet threat and in the midst of other domestic and external challenges. The first alliance challenge—the diplomatic repercussions from the 1991 Gulf War—struck a strong blow to the Japan-US security relationship in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Japan’s $13 billion contribution to the war effort was dismissed outside Japan as
‘checkbook diplomacy’ without human contribution.\textsuperscript{77} Japan learned a hard lesson through this experience and ensured that it provided a physical presence on the ground in later international crises and peacekeeping operations during the decade of the 1990s. Soon after the 1991 Gulf war, the Japanese government submitted the UN Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill to the Diet for approval. The government stressed the importance of making international contributions and eventually sent its Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia in 1992 and to Mozambique in 1993.

This watershed event and its implications sparked a surge of writing on the part of scholars and other alliance specialists.\textsuperscript{78} However, few have written about this seminal event in terms of the naval relationship, even though Japan’s naval assets were the primary Japanese defence units deployed after the war. While the Japan-US security relationship encountered a significant setback when the Japanese government turned down the US request for defence support during the Gulf War, there is no indication in the literature as to whether the naval relationship was similarly affected.

In addition to the Gulf War, a series of other factors in the early and mid-1990s served to shake up and eventually reinvigorate the security relationship and its institutionalisation. In Japan, the response to the Gulf War, combined with domestic political changes and the collapse of the ‘bubble economy’, called into question Japan’s role and power in a new era as well as the military


\textsuperscript{78} For insights into the tension and struggles between the United States and Japan during the Gulf War, see Michael Armacost, \textit{Friends or Rivals: The Insider’s Account of Japan-US Relations}. Numerous other scholars writing about the Japan-US security relationship have also addressed the Gulf War and its effect on the relationship. See for example Michael M. Mochizuki, ed., \textit{Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring Japan-US Security Relations}, and Ryuichi Teshima, \textit{1991 nen Nihon no Haiboku} (Japan’s Defeat in 1991). Teshima is a journalist with NHK network in Japan.
operability of the Japan-US alliance. With the demise of the Soviet Union toward
the end of 1991, Japan's defence policy-making organisations were faced with
the most fragile conditions in the early 1990s, according to one Japanese
scholar. Without a formidable national security threat, Japan lost one of its key
rationales for the existence of the Self-Defense Forces and the presence of US
forces in Japan. 79 Further, North Korea’s nuclear developments in 1993-1994
brought into question Japan’s capability to take meaningful joint action with US
forces, if a war broke out on the Korean Peninsula. In spite of its shared
concerns about North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program, Japan
found itself politically hesitant and militarily incapable of supporting US
attempts to apply military pressure on North Korea. 80

At about the same time, certain Japan specialists in Washington, DC,
were concerned that a more ‘independent Japan’ was emerging because they
saw evidence that Japan had placed priority on a multilateral security
framework over the Japan-US alliance. As part of their evidence, these officials
pointed to a 1993 draft report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues. The
officials pointed to the fact that in the table of contents of this report, Japan’s
multilateral interests were identified and discussed first, followed by a
discussion of the Japan-US security alliance. 81 A critical event for the Japan-US
security relationship, which signalled the need to strengthen the alliance
structure, concerned a tragic incident in 1995 in which US Marines raped a

Policy Today, pp. 145-147.
80 See, for example, Hughes and Fukushima, ‘Japan-US Security Relations’, in Beyond
Bilateralism: Japan-US Relations in the New Asia-Pacific; edited by Ellis S. Krauss and T.J.
81 The report was published in August 1994 as The Modality of the Security and Defense
Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century. Michael Mochizuki points out that there
may have been confusion in the translation of the Japanese phrase for ‘multilateral security
strategy.’ If translated as ‘multidimensional’, the concept has less of a connotation that Japan
should gradually move away from a policy focussed on bilateral Japan-US security. See
Mochizuki, pp. 8-10 and 37 and Tsuchiyama, pp. 46-147.
schoolgirl in Okinawa. As a result, the United States faced strong anti-US and anti-base sentiments, particularly in Okinawa.  

These events, combined with a series of new threats at the end of the Cold War, served eventually to help reinvigorate the alliance and its institutionalisation. Significant amongst the regional threats during this decade included the North Korea nuclear developments in 1993-1994, Chinese missile tests across the Taiwan Straits in 1996—an effort to intimidate Taipei before elections and signal the People's Liberation Army's readiness to use force if necessary to prevent Taiwanese independence; and the North Korean Taepodong missile launch over Japanese airspace in 1998. Michael Green states that the 1996 Chinese missile tests had the effect of elevating the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto declaration to a 'strategic' initiative and provided additional inducement for the United States and Japan to complete the new Defense Cooperation Guidelines. While the Guidelines were completed in 1997, they had not been approved by the respective legislatures. US officials expected a long-term delay in Japan due to the entrenched interests and the power of the regional districts that would be responsible for implementing cooperation agreements between the United States and Japan, but the 1998 missile launch served to speed these decisions in Japan.  

Japan and the United States had been engaged in missile defence dialogues since the early 1980s, but the efforts were politically driven—largely aimed to ameliorate tensions in bilateral political and economic relations. In the early 1990s, the politically-driven approach shifted to a threat-driven approach as the Iraqi use of short-range Scud ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, coupled with the North Korean test of the Nodong missile in the Sea of Japan in 

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82 Tsuchiyama, pp. 146-147.  
83 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 90-91.
1993, presented evidence of the threat to the Japan-US alliance from theatre ballistic missiles. The Japan-US Theater Missile Defense Working Group met throughout the 1990s, but it was not until 1998 that Japan agreed to participate in cooperative technological research with the United States. Missile defence would require new and unprecedented levels of political and operational cooperation and coordination between the United States and Japan and between their respective defence forces and as such would contribute to the institutionalisation of the security relationship. The key relationship for coordination would be between the two navies, given the shipboard deployment of the missile systems.\footnote{Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra and Michael J. Green, ‘The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense,’ in The Japan-US Alliance: past, Present, and Future, edited by Michael J. Green and Patrick Cronin, pp. 170-173; Michael J. Green, ‘State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy,’ AccessAsia Review 2, 1 (1998), 31-32, and the proceedings from ‘The Future of Japan-US Security Relations: Beyond an Era of Tension on the Korean Peninsula,’ CSIS Pacific Forum annual Conference, San Francisco, California, March 1999.}

Not all Japan scholars and defence specialists agree about the extent to which new security threats and challenges bolstered alliance relations and promoted security cooperation and increased alliance institutionalisation. For example, institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, argue that the end of the Cold War did not eliminate cohesion and stability amongst the industrial democracies, as discussed earlier. This postwar order was reinforced but not caused by the Cold War, according to Ikenberry. Ikenberry does not discuss alliance security initiatives in the context of relations with Japan nor does he address the security challenges created by the Chinese and North Korean missile launches and nuclear developments in the post-Cold War environment.\footnote{G. John Ikenberry, After Victory, pp. 233-239, 246-251, and 255-256.} Proving causal linkages is always a difficult task. Nevertheless, the predominant literature seems to indicate that the compilation of the security challenges
involving China and North Korea had an important role in moving the alliance to a higher level of cooperation.


One of the initial formal markers of institutionalisation was the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. The Guidelines were significant because they constituted the first time that the alliance addressed the issue of Japan-US defence cooperation—publicly—other than in the bilateral Security Treaty, as noted above. The Guidelines called for joint studies on operational issues in three areas: prevention of aggression against Japan, responses to military attacks on Japan, and Japan-US cooperation in case of a conflict in the Far East. One of the key studies, with implications for the two navies, concerned sealane defence and the operational requirements of this mission. The issue raised by this more controversial study was how ‘joint’ US and Japanese military operations would be.

Most scholars and defence practitioners concede that the Guidelines did not immediately result in new operational advances and activities, but it is generally acknowledged that the Guidelines set in motion a process of joint studies and exercises based on the notion of ‘functional integration of operations’ versus what had previously been a geographical division of labour that restricted Japan’s Self-Defense Force operations to Japanese territory and

US military operations beyond. That said, however, the alliance waited approximately two decades before the issue of operations outside of Japan could be discussed openly and honestly, due to domestic political constraints in Japan.  

A variety of opinions exist concerning the relevance of the 1978 Defense Guidelines for the naval relationship. One perspective maintains that the US and Japanese navies had been cooperating since the 1950s and as such did not really need the 1978 Defense Guidelines for effective cooperation. Others, however, have regarded the Guidelines as an opportunity to provide some written guidelines and legitimacy to a relationship that had very little formality, agreements, or commitments. The Guidelines, combined with the political commitment made by Prime Minister Suzuki for Japan to assume responsibility for sealane defence out to 1,000 miles from Japan, were key elements in the institutionalisation of the relationship.

Just as the 1978 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines were an initial marker for alliance institutionalisation, the revised Guidelines, finalised in 1997, marked a step forward in enhancing the security relationship and its institutionalisation. The new Guidelines also provided a subtle shift from geographically specific commitments to 'situational definitions' for dealing with regional contingencies in areas surrounding Japan. Japan’s role and

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88 Ibid.
89 James Auer Oral History Interview, conducted by Koji Murata, Japan Project, National Security Archives, George Washington University, March 1996.
commitment, as defined by the Guidelines, were still confined to non-combat, rear area functions. (Chapter 4 provides additional details concerning the 1997 Guidelines.) The literature is not explicit about the significance of the 1997 Guidelines to the naval relationship or to any of the service relationships, for that matter. An assessment of the extent to which the Guidelines facilitated naval operations is generally only found in interviews with Japanese and US naval and/or defence officials and analysis of defence documents, which this thesis provides.

Summary:

Many scholars have written about various aspects of the Japan-US security relationship. As such, the literature provides useful background to understand the environment in which the naval relationship and its institutionalisation developed. Although the term ‘institutionalisation’ is not often used to describe aspects of the relationship, the progress toward institutionalisation is evident through various ‘markers’ highlighting important events in the alliance relationship.

As with the naval relationship, a variety of external factors played important roles in influencing the security alliance, including external threat and other alliance crises, domestic politics, and particular people. There is a general consensus in the literature that security threats generated by the Soviet Union helped drive the relationship during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War a variety of accumulating regional threats helped Japan, in particular, see the advantages of increased defence cooperation with the United States. As such, these security challenges were also instrumental in the gradual
institutionalisation of the alliance. The key markers for alliance institutionalisation during this period were the 1978 and 1997 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines and Prime Minister Suzuki’s sealane defence commitment. The Guidelines helped to facilitate cooperation once the two countries had recognised it was in their national interest to do so. The Guidelines did not on their own lead to defence cooperation. For the navies, both sets of Guidelines provided ‘legitimacy’ to the cooperation that had already been ongoing in the naval relationships.

Culture and Societal Issues

Culture and society have played an important role in international affairs and strategic studies literature, particularly since the end of the Cold War. It is a topic that cannot be avoided when discussing security relations between a Western and a non-Western nation and as such is relevant to this thesis. As discussed earlier in this chapter, even naval practitioners acknowledge the importance of culture and societal issues in terms of their effect on the ability of navies to operate effectively together and to institutionalise their respective naval relationships. Stephen Peter Rosen has cautioned, however, that efforts to understand the relevance of cultural differences for strategy have sometimes resulted in people jumping to the conclusion that differences in military behaviour and outlook are related to cultural differences—whereas after careful assessment, they turn out to be either non-existent or just as plausibly explained.

by non-cultural factors.\textsuperscript{93}

In the social sciences, there are many types of culture—political, national, organisational, strategic—as well as other types used in the anthropology and sociology disciplines. While many have argued over the meanings and subtleties of these various terms, they share three common elements: 1) Culture is \textit{shared}—that is, it is a collective phenomenon; 2) culture is \textit{transmitted}—it constitutes a social heritage, linking one generation to another; 3) Culture is \textit{learned}—it is not a straightforward result of people’s genetic constitutions. Once programmed, however, it is not easily altered.\textsuperscript{94}

‘Political’ culture was advanced by various members of the political science community, such as Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye, in the mid-1960s.\textsuperscript{95} Lucian Pye discusses political culture in an Asian context and notes that Asian societies share orientations toward authority that significantly differ from those held in the West, taking a more passive view toward power. He notes that in most parts of Asia, possession of power is viewed more as a way of avoiding having to make a decision—and in fact ‘security lies in having no choices to make’.\textsuperscript{96}

‘Strategic’ culture grew out of a need to explain differences in the military behaviour of people from European and non-European cultures. It is applied to political-military decision-makers to capture the beliefs and assumptions that

\textsuperscript{93} Rosen is referring here to early efforts to understand the relevance of cultural differences for strategy. He notes that they began with the observation of ‘obvious’ differences in culture and ‘obvious’ differences in military behaviour, and arrived at the conclusion that the first was the source of the second. See Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,’ \textit{International Security}, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 9-11.

\textsuperscript{94} Harry Eckstein, ‘Culture as a Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences’, \textit{Journal of Theoretical Politics} 8(4), 1996, pp. 490-491. The author notes that these three points come from writings by Talcott Parsons.


frame their decisions about national and international security issues. Strategic culture holds that different countries and regions approach the key issues of war, peace, and strategy from perspectives that are both distinctive, and deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs.\(^97\)

Stephen Rosen focuses primarily on the way in which social structures affect military power by studying the dominant social structures of a country and the extent to which the military organisations are similar to or different from their society.\(^98\) In the process, he identifies two principles that are important for this thesis. Firstly, organisations such as the military have some ability to isolate their members from society and to develop internal structures that govern their members and that may differ from those found in the society as a whole. Secondly, military organisations will be less likely to reflect the structures of society as a whole the smaller and more isolated the military organisations are relative to society. He contends that the military, as is the case with the church, is a closed, highly organised institution, and as such might not resemble its host society as much as other organisations in a particular country. Concerning navies in particular, Rosen contends that the general norms and social structures are less likely to affect them (and air forces), which are both strongly influenced by the nature of their tasks.\(^99\) In addition to Rosen’s work, the notion of a ‘strategic personality’, is also relevant to this discussion. According to the concept, a state’s historical experience shapes how it sees itself, how it views the outside world and how it makes its strategic decisions.

\(^97\) Rosen, ‘Military Effectiveness,’ pp. 11-12, Desmond Ball, ‘Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region,’ Security Studies 3, no. 1, Autumn 1993, pp. 44-45. The discussion of strategic culture began in the late 1970s with Jack Snyder and his work on strategic culture and Soviet limited war doctrine. Other scholars, such as Alastair Johnson, Colin Gray, Ken Booth, Elizabeth Kier, and others have also written extensively on strategic culture.

\(^98\) Rosen, ‘Military Effectiveness,’ p. 6.

\(^99\) Ibid., p. 29.
The concept has been most frequently used in the context of threats caused by weapons of mass destruction proliferation. In light of Rosen’s work, Japan’s ‘strategic personality’ is likely different than that of the JMSDF.\(^\text{100}\)

Alastair Johnson warns of the dangers of misusing strategic culture as an analytic tool because ‘done badly’ it could reinforce stereotypes about the strategic predispositions of other states. In particular, he warns that care should be taken regarding the Asia-Pacific region, ‘an area where US images of the "other" have been rife with stereotyped generalisations about particular strategic “styles”’. It is also an area, he contends, where there have been few rigorous behavioural analyses about propositions concerning strategic culture.\(^\text{101}\)

Colin Gray’s work on strategic culture focuses primarily on the US-Soviet relationship. Of particular relevance to this study of Japan-US naval relations is his contention that national differences in strategic culture rarely move the US government to take explicit account of how these differences could potentially affect policy goals and methods.\(^\text{102}\)

In his 1999 book on *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, Thomas Berger states that Japan’s deeply ingrained culture of antimilitarism has imposed powerful constraints on the kinds of policies its leaders have chosen to pursue.\(^\text{103}\)

According to Berger, the power of cultural forces was particularly evident at critical junctures in post-war history when a variety of equally plausible options

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\(^{100}\) Caroline Ziemke shows how the analysis of a state’s strategic personality can provide insights into why a state might want nuclear weapons and how its policies may develop once it gets them. See Caroline Ziemke, ‘The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation Perspective’, in *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests, and World Order*, edited by Victor A. Utgoff (Boston: The MIT Press, 2000), pp. 87-93.

Caroline F. Ziemke


\(^{103}\) See Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1999). The focus of this book is on the broader defence relationships that Germany and Japan have developed, particularly in the post-World War II era. While the Japan-US naval relationship is not extensively discussed, several issues concerning the broader defence relationship are also relevant to the naval relationship.
seemed available to policy makers. At such times, according to Berger, Japan invariably opted for policies that were most consistent with established antimilitary patterns of behaviour. Without these conditions, Japan-US defence cooperation in training and military planning, which began in 1978, could have been initiated at a much earlier date, according to Berger. While Thomas Berger discusses the effect of Japan’s culture of antimilitarism on the Japan-US security relationship, he unfortunately does not discuss the implications for the individual service relationships, including the naval relationship, and whether or not they follow a similar pattern as the security relationship.

Peter Katzenstein has also written about culture and national security in several of his books. In 1996, for example, he published a large volume on this subject, the result of a project that gathered participants from Cornell University, the University of Minnesota and Stanford University. Katzenstein, Elizabeth Kier, Alastair Johnston and other scholars who contribute to the volume provide a sociological perspective on the politics of national security and argue that security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors. The term ‘culture’ is invoked as a broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. In critiquing this study, Nicholas Onuf argues that it is built on weak definitions of norms, identity and culture and that it does not satisfy the needs of other scholars who are interested in executing case studies. The volume

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104 As noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, naval cooperation occurred before 1978. However, progress in the institutionalisation of this cooperation did not begin to occur until the late 1970s, the time period noted by Berger, when the Japanese civilian leadership recognised that it was in Japan’s best interest to increase its cooperation on defence-related issues with the United States. Further, as noted in Chapter 2, the 1978 Defense Guidelines also provided a degree of legitimacy to ongoing naval cooperation. See Berger, pp. 193-197.


nevertheless provides new perspectives that may be useful to scholars and practitioners examining Japan’s national security environment.

In one of the articles in the Katzenstein volume, Thomas Berger argues that while there will continue to be incremental shifts in Japan’s defence and national security policy, a dramatic shift from the core principles of its political-military culture is likely only if there is a major shock to the system that persuades Japan’s leaders that their approach to defence and national security has been wrong. Japan’s national security policy changes in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist activities, and the nearly overnight decision to deploy JMSDF forces to the Indian Ocean in the fall of 2001 represented a significant shift in Japan’s foreign and security policies. However, the policy shift came not as a result of a direct attack or danger to Japan—as Berger predicted—but rather from a realistic appraisal of Japanese national interests and its relationship with the United States, in light of lessons learned after the 1991 Gulf War when Japanese forces did not deploy to the Middle East. The effect of 11 September 2001 on the Japan-US naval relationship and the security relationship will be discussed further in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

Discussion of ‘organisational’ culture is particularly helpful in explaining differences in military behaviour between nations, and this relates closely to the topic of this thesis. Elizabeth Kier defines organisational culture as ‘the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings and the forms or practices whereby the meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated to the members of an organisation’. She maintains that a military’s organisational culture is not equivalent to the national character. Further, while

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the military’s culture may reflect some aspects of the civilian society’s culture, the military’s powerful assimilation processes can displace the influence of the civilian society. Second, Kier argues that while all military organisations can be classified according to a basic set of components, not all military organisations share the same mixture of values and attitudes. As such, this affects how they respond to constraints set by civilian policymakers, and explains choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines.\(^{109}\)

Kier does not address navies and their organisational culture in her study, but her broader assessments of military organisations are useful when examining international naval relationships. As discussed earlier in this chapter, a popular perception of navies is that living and operating at sea creates a strong fraternal bond that unites all naval personnel who share similar professional concerns.\(^{110}\) Kier’s work is a useful reminder that while military organisations, including navies, may share a certain amount of common values and attitudes with their fellow services in other countries, their organisational culture is likely influenced by a range of domestic and other factors.

The unique elements of the JMSDF are identified in work by Peter J. Woolley, who highlights the *kata* factor as an element of influence that has been overlooked when scholars and analysts attempt to explain the low profile of Japan’s military contributions to Western security. According to Woolley, *kata*, or ‘form’, means a clear preference to act only after careful planning and rehearsal. It is emphasised in every endeavour, in stark contrast to the US

\(^{109}\) Kier, pp. 70-83. The case study for Kier’s work is the French army during the 1920s and 1930s. She also refers to British army activities in the course of her discussion. Navies are not discussed and as such one does not know how she would view their organisational culture.

\(^{110}\) The now deceased US Admiral Richard Colbert, known for his efforts in encouraging collaboration and cooperation amongst navies of the ‘free world’, believed that the common aspects of problems associated with living and operating at sea creates a strong fraternal bond that unites all naval personnel who share similar professional concerns. See Sokolsky, *The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform*. 59
predilection for improvisation and innovation. Woolley identifies how the kata factor has affected JMSDF operations, and particularly its preparation for deployment to the Persian Gulf in April 1991 for minesweeping operations, at the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, in which the JMSDF took a series of incremental steps to prepare for an eventual deployment. Woolley’s contribution is unique because he addresses the operational implications of kata for the JMSDF. Woolley, however, did not take his analysis a step further to examine the effect of kata on the broader Japan-US naval relationship. The clash between the inherent flexibility of navies and the cultural predilection in Japan toward ‘form’ cannot be ignored. Scholarship would benefit from a further examination of this relationship, in light of the increased operational contact between the two navies.

**Summary:**

The academic work discussed in this section provides different perspectives that can help explain the relationship that developed between the US Navy and the JMSDF in the latter part of the twentieth century. Much has been written about Japan’s unique transition from a military-oriented nation during and prior to World War II to a more pacifist nation after the war. Few have examined the transition of the JMSDF and its post-World War II relations with the US Navy. The studies have shed some light on this issue, but no one has conducted a thorough examination of this relationship from a cultural perspective. Nevertheless, in their discussions of political, strategic, national

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and organisational culture, various scholars help establish a valuable foundation for examining the unique Japan-US naval relationship.

In his discussion of strategic culture, Stephen Peter Rosen maintains that military organisations are closed and highly organised institutions that might not resemble their host society as much as other organisations in the same country. He further notes that navies, unlike armies, are less likely to be influenced by norms and social structures. Alastair Johnson cautions not to overuse strategic culture as an analytic tool, particularly concerning military forces in the Asia-Pacific region, to avoid reinforcing stereotypes about 'strategic styles'. Thomas Berger, in his specific focus on Germany and Japan, maintains that Japan's deeply ingrained culture of antimilitarism has imposed powerful constraints on the kinds of policies its leaders have chosen to pursue, including the start of a more cooperative defence relationship with the United States. Elizabeth Kier points out that while all military organisations can be classified according to a basic set of components, not all military organisations share the same mixture of values and attitudes and in fact are influenced by a range of domestic and other factors.

Kier and other scholars provide useful perspectives concerning culture and security relationships, and each one provides useful potential insights for a further examination of the Japan-US naval relationship. However, the cultural implications of this unique naval relationship remain relatively untouched.

Chapter Conclusion

As identified in this chapter, the Japan-US naval relationship is understudied. Scholars have typically focussed on the Japanese Navy, the US
Navy or the Japan-US security relationship. Naval cooperation has been discussed primarily in operational terms, chiefly in professional journals and other similar publications. Similarly, institutionalisation is a relatively common concept in international relations and some scholars have used it in the context of security alliances, but very little has been written about the institutionalisation of military relationships—particularly military relationships outside of NATO. Scholars and defence practitioners have provided a useful foundation for the examination of naval cooperation and institutionalisation, but many questions remain unanswered, as indicated in this chapter.

Despite the relative sparsity of academic literature on the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation, existing literature on related topics is nevertheless useful and provides a valuable foundation for an examination of the relationship in this thesis and contributes to the establishment of a framework for analysis. In this regard, sets of criteria for measuring institutional development have been created using various case studies, albeit non-military in orientation. Other scholars and naval practitioners have examined the concept of naval cooperation and as such have developed criteria for effective naval cooperation. Although the concepts of cooperation and institutionalisation share much in common, the literature indicates that ‘institutionalisation’ requires a deeper connection than ‘cooperation’. As such, institutionalisation recognises the necessity for common norms. This is not a requirement in a cooperative relationship, although common language and culture are recognised as contributing to more effective cooperation.

Common interests, including a shared threat perception, have been the basis for initiating security cooperation and eventually institutionalisation in alliance relationships. This is the case for security alliance relationships and
likely also naval relationships. There is no clear consensus from the literature as to whether external factors, such as threats, are needed for the continued institutionalisation of security alliance relationships and naval relationships. However, based on work by one scholar, the answer might lie in the bilateral or multilateral nature of security alliances. As such, the nature of the bilateral Japan-US security alliance may likely have contributed to weaker institutionalisation in the alliance relationship. As a result, a security threat may have been needed for further progress in institutionalisation.

This literature review also highlights reoccurring and cross-cutting themes that are useful in an examination of the Japan-US naval relationship and identifies where there is a lack of clarity and consensus: 1) Despite the international ‘bonds of seamanship’, navies are instruments of state policy and as such are subject to many of the same influences as the nation itself. Evidence exists, however, that navies act out of self-interest and engage in cooperative relationships when there are mutual advantages to doing so. 2) The 1978 and 1997 Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines, the commitment made by Prime Minister Suzuki for Japan to assume sealane defense out to 1000 miles, as well as other government-to-government agreements helped facilitate cooperation and progress toward greater institutionalisation. In the case of the naval relationship, in particular, these agreements appear to have provided ‘legitimacy’ to the relationship and to ongoing naval cooperation. 3) Culture and societal issues are important factors that can affect military cooperation and institutionalisation. They can help facilitate cooperation and institutionalisation in cases where similar culture and language exists and can slow progress when major differences are present. However, neither the professional nor the
academic literature addresses whether the significance of culture and societal issues recedes as cooperation and interaction between navies increases.

Research Design and Analytical Framework

This thesis is concerned with the Japan-US naval relationship from 1976 through 2001 and the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained its development and institutionalisation. Just as there are advantages to institutionalised alliance relationships, similarly, military relationships also benefit from institutionalisation because it contributes to improved bureaucratic coordination, interoperability of systems, equipment and doctrine and coordination of procedures and operations. Inevitably, this leads to more effective military operations.

The central argument in this thesis is that operational cooperation between the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in response to a mutually acknowledged threat promotes institutionalisation in the relationship. While numerous factors have contributed to the development and institutionalisation of the naval relationship, operational cooperation is the significant factor that binds the navies together and prompts them to establish and/or strengthen institutional links. Operating under challenging conditions, navies recognise that they need to create a system and institute a set of rules to coordinate and harmonise their activities and operations. As such, a dynamic is created in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates additional cooperation. If navies only cooperate periodically in joint exercises for broadly stated yet unspecific security reasons, the institutionalisation process likely will occur much more slowly compared with
cooperation against a mutual security threat. This argument turns on its head the international organisation theories of certain other scholars who view institutionalisation as a requirement for effective cooperation in their particular studies.\textsuperscript{112}

Two interrelated sets of questions are pursued in the thesis:

1. What are the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship during the period 1976 - 2001?
2. What is the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship?

**Analytical Framework:**

The thesis is designed primarily as an empirical study that provides insights on the development of the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation from 1976 through 2001. Institutionalisation, as used in this thesis, is defined as the development of systems, structures, procedures and practices that enhance cooperation between navies and ultimately contributes to a more integrative naval relationship. The progress toward institutionalisation highlights the key dynamics in the Japan-US naval relationship over a 25-year period.

\textsuperscript{112} In his work on the European Union, Michael Smith, for example, states that institutionalisation helps promote greater international cooperation within the European Union. Smith treats institutionalisation as the independent variable and cooperation as the dependent variable. Other academics identify institutionalisation as promoting cooperation but do not go as far as Smith in formalising this relationship in a model of international cooperation and characterising it as part of a dynamic process between cooperation and institutionalisation. See Michael E. Smith, pp. 25-32.
The thesis uses an analytical framework to obtain a clearer understanding of how the Japan-US naval relationship developed and changed and the key factors that drove and constrained the institutionalisation process. The framework is built around the four elements that characterise institutionalisation in a naval relationship, as defined by this thesis: internal coordination, operational interaction, institutional depth and external linkages. Using a mapping technique, the thesis tracks the institutional changes in the naval relationship and the various factors that influenced these changes, at three points during this 25-year period: 1976-1981, 1986-1991 and 1996-2001.

‘Mapping’ is a useful tool used principally in policy analysis to compare empirical data over periods of time through a structured approach. It is also used as a way to analyse policy making processes. In this thesis, the approach provides a systematic way to examine changes in the nature of the Japan-US naval relationship over three points in time, using the four elements that characterise institutionalisation. As such, the approach is a key tool to help identify the dynamics that have driven and/or constrained the development and institutionalisation of the relationship. This examination, and the quantitative and qualitative data that emerges from it, lays the foundation for a better understanding of the role of cooperation and institutionalisation, and the interplay between them, in this particular naval relationship.

The thesis draws on a variety of scholarly literature and related theories concerning institutions, alliance relations and naval cooperation. None of the theories associated with this literature specifically addresses the institutionalisation of naval relationships or military relationships more broadly. They do provide some useful insights concerning the dimensions of institutionalisation from an international organisational perspective. Through use of this framework, the thesis fills a void in the literature by expanding the understanding of institutionalisation, to include military relations, and the various factors that drive and constrain military institutionalisation within a non-NATO alliance relationship.

In designing the analytical framework, the thesis draws primarily on work by Michael Smith and Kristin Rafferty, as well as other scholars associated with the study of institutions and alliance relations. They created their own frameworks for discussing institutionalisation, and some of their ideas are reflected in this thesis. However, no scholar or defence practitioner has done a comprehensive analysis of institutionalisation in military relations. Michael Smith focuses specifically on the institutionalisation of foreign policy making within the European Union. He examines the stages of institutional development, which he identifies as intergovernmental forums, information-sharing, norms, organisations and governance.\(^\text{114}\) Of particular utility to this thesis, Smith examines the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation and argues that institutionalisation helps promote greater international cooperation. He maintains that as institutionalised cooperation increases, and the outputs and outcomes accumulate over time, a dynamic process develops in which the outcomes change from effects into causes as

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\(^{114}\) Michael E. Smith, pp. 25-58.
actors use them to justify additional institutional changes. Although this thesis argues that for the Japan-US naval relationship, cooperation drives institutionalisation—and thus turns Smith’s hypothesis on its head—nevertheless, his framework for analysis and his discussion of the dynamic relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation have contributed to the framework of this thesis.

Kristin Rafferty’s work on the institutionalisation of security alliance relationships provides the most relevant work for the analytical framework. Her case studies include both multilateral and bilateral alliances relationships, and include the Japan-US security alliance. Although she does not specifically address military relationships within security alliances, her framework for analysis provides useful insights for this thesis. Rafferty identifies the three dimensions of institutionalisation as it applies to security alliance relationships—policy coordination, institutional breadth and institutional depth. This thesis expands on her dimensions of institutionalisation and uses some of these elements in the analytical framework.115

Other scholars, such as John Ikenberry, have identified a series of mechanisms and processes that help bind states together: institutional agreements; transgovernmental connections, routines, and coalitions; and reinforcing political activities and institutions. Ikenberry’s framework is useful for determining the presence of institutionalisation in international organisations, including security alliance relationships—and potentially military-to-military relationships.116

In constructing the analytical framework, the thesis also considered the work by scholars who have studied the relationship between external threats, alliance cooperation and institutionalisation. While their work acknowledges the role that threat plays in initiating alliance cooperation, there is no consensus on the effect that variations in threat have on alliance cooperation and institutionalisation. Similarly, scholars differ as to the role, if any, of institutionalisation in bolstering alliances during periods of transformation and varying threat levels. As an institutionalist, John Ikenberry does not consider threat necessary for institutionalisation to continue. He maintains that in the case of the Japan-US alliance, ten years after the end of the Cold War the alliance was stable and was adding to its overall institutionalisation.\textsuperscript{117} Kristin Rafferty acknowledges the struggles that the Japan-US security relationship encountered when the Cold War ended, but she does not go so far as to say that this weaker institutionalisation in the Japan-US security relationship was the reason why the alliance struggled in the years immediately following the Cold War.\textsuperscript{118} The evidence she presents, however, does seem to point to the benefits of institutionalisation during times of strategic transition, but that there was likely less of this institutionalisation in the Japan-US security relationship in the years immediately following the Cold War.

Indeed, this is the conclusion of Geunwook Lee in his work on alliances and the determinants of their cooperation. While Lee does not distinguish between bilateral and multilateral alliances, he states that alliances without an elaborate institutional structure can crumble easily. Part of this structure, according to Lee, is a well-coordinated military membership, consisting of coordinated war plans, exchanged military intelligence and an integrated

\textsuperscript{117} Ikenberry, pp. 212, 247-250, and 256.
command structure.\textsuperscript{\ref{119}} Lee comes the closest of anyone in examining the role of institutionalisation in military-to-military relationships. The variables he identifies are consistent with that presented in this thesis.

While the literature provides valuable perspectives and various ways of assessing the institutionalisation process, it is neither sufficient nor completely appropriate for an examination of military relationships. Geoffrey Till's work is helpful in this regard as he identifies the political and operational components comprising effective naval cooperation.\textsuperscript{\ref{120}} Similarly, work by the US Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analysis in the United States have identified other ways to examine operational cooperation between navies, focussing in particular on elements of interoperability.\textsuperscript{\ref{121}} Together, these organisations and scholars provide useful insights and tools for analysis, from which this thesis draws. Finally, naval practitioners, such as Admiral William Owens (USN-ret), have identified the importance of cooperation between navies as an important step to building institutional relationships, even if the navies are not part of a formal alliance.\textsuperscript{\ref{122}} These perspectives from practitioners help build the central argument in this thesis that operational cooperation against a mutually recognised security threat contributes to institutionalisation in naval relationships.

In this thesis, progress toward institutionalisation constitutes the key dynamic in the Japan-US naval relationship during the years 1976 to 2001. The analytical framework used in this thesis, combined with the archival research and interviews, brings together a unique approach that highlights the range of factors that influence the naval relationship during this period and helps

\textsuperscript{119} Lee, \textit{Bringing Institutionalized Cooperation Into Military Affairs}, p. 244.
\textsuperscript{120} Till, pp. 110-111 and 361-368.
\textsuperscript{121} See previous citations from the Center for Naval Analysis, including work by Johnson, Kohout, Swartz, Roth, Hirschfeld and Hayes.
\textsuperscript{122} Owens, pp. 40-42.
facilitate analysis of the progress in naval cooperation and ultimately institutionalisation.

The analytical framework is built around the four elements that characterise institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship: 1) internal coordination, 2) operational interaction, 3) institutional depth and 4) external linkages. These elements are derived from work by various academics and defence professionals, as discussed throughout this chapter, and by interviews conducted with US and Japanese naval personnel and defence specialists during the course of this work. Some of the elements, such as ‘operational interaction’, are more quantitative in nature. Other elements, such as the ‘depth of the relationship’, are defined in qualitative terms. Kristin Rafferty, in particular, provides relevant input with her three dimensions of institutionalisation, as it applies to security alliance relationships: policy coordination, institutional breadth and institutional depth. This thesis builds on the dimensions identified by Rafferty and adapts them to a naval environment. The following four categories provide the principal structure for the mapping process. Each category description also refers to the quantitative and qualitative indicators that are used to assess progress in each category.

**Internal Coordination:** Internal coordination connotes a structure for cooperation and decisionmaking. This coordination provides the most visible evidence of ‘institutionalisation’ because actual coordination structures can be identified. In the context of this thesis, internal coordination is characterised by the development of communication mechanisms, procedures and organisational

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123 These elements would likely be applicable to other naval relationships as well. The relative ranking and emphasis of the various elements may differ, but overall they represent the important elements of a developing naval relationship. This broader subject, however, is not the focus of this thesis.
routines—such as regular high-level and other meetings, and the sharing of information and intelligence.

**Operational Interaction:** Operational interaction helps bind navies together, and it is a theme that consistently emerges in naval literature and in the interviews conducted for this thesis. By sharing defence burdens and risks through operational deployments that support the national interests of the respective countries, a closer naval bond is created. It is particularly important in the context of institutionalisation because it promotes institutional progress in the other categories—particularly internal coordination and institutional depth. In the context of the thesis, operational interaction is characterised by the nature and extent of joint training and exercises, operational deployments and the capability of the forces operating together.

**Institutional Depth:** Identifying the depth of an institution can be difficult because the results tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. Some of the depth in a military relationship is generated by the nature of the broader alliance relationship, including the shared concepts of security, democratic norms and procedures. It is further characterised in naval relationships by shared naval goals and threat perceptions, culture and language, and by the degree of trust that has been generated amongst the military members.

**External Linkages:** Connections with other navies and naval organisations, in conjunction with the US Navy, help build stronger Japan-US naval relations and organisational coherence by reinforcing the importance of structures,
procedures and linkages with other navies. It is also an effective way of influence rendering, particularly by the leading naval power. These linkages are characterised by joint participation in defence conferences, forums and symposia; participation in regional security organisations; and attendance at respective educational institutions—such as war colleges.

The thesis tracks progress in institutionalisation over the 25-year period using these four categories and the qualitative and quantitative elements that comprise each one. The dynamics are captured through a systematic ‘mapping’ process that tracks the institutional changes in the naval relationship and the various external and internal navy factors that influenced these changes and the development of the relationship over the three different time periods. The thesis examines the external and internal sources of influence, priorities them based on the role they play in each time period and identifies how they affected the progress toward institutionalisation.

Determining internal and external influence can be difficult given the multiple factors that may have affected a particular time period. Further, an unavoidable element of subjectivity is often associated with making such determinations. Nevertheless, taking these qualifications into consideration, the trends that emerge from this analysis will be useful when comparing one time period to another and establishing the various forces that influenced the Japan-US naval relationship over time, including whether the influences come primarily from outside or inside the relationship.
Methodology

The unique methodology for this thesis contributes to the originality of the thesis. First, the thesis utilises a ‘mapping’ technique to track the changes in the relationship over a 25-year period, as discussed above. The technique assesses the relationship at the beginning, middle and end of this time period using the four categories that characterise institutionalisation—operational interaction, internal coordination, external linkages and institutional depth—and a set of quantitative and qualitative elements that help to further identify the extent of institutionalisation in the relationship. Essentially, a picture is taken of the relationship at three time periods, each covering 5 years. The mapping begins in 1976—the start of formal discussions to develop joint guidelines for defence cooperation in the Japan-US security relationship and ends in 2001 with the JMSDF’s operational deployment to the Indian Ocean in response to UN anti-terrorism initiatives following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The time periods covered include 1976-81, 1986-91 and 1996 to 2001.

The thesis relies principally on official documents and interviews as primary sources of information. Given the sensitive nature of the Japan-US naval relationship and the security relationship, many documents concerning Japan-US naval relations and surrounding issues are classified, particularly those concerning policy decisions, sensitive communication concerning naval capabilities, and other important operational information. Some of this material has been declassified and offers an exceptional perspective concerning what drove and constrained the naval relationship during this time period.
The thesis relied extensively on official documents obtained from US and Japanese officials and from the US Naval Archives, located at the Navy Yard in Washington, DC. The Archives maintains copies of many pertinent documents—classified and unclassified. They provide valuable insights concerning the nature of Japan-US security relations during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In accordance with US regulations, most classified documents 25 years or older can be declassified. The documents reviewed as part of this thesis included personal memos from senior US political and naval officials, documents concerning political-military affairs and associated memoranda. In addition, command histories from the US Pacific Command and US Naval Forces Japan were also reviewed. These documents were particularly useful for Chapter 2, which covers the period 1976-1981. Through these documents the chapter provides enlightening historical insights concerning the early stages of institutionalisation in the naval relationship.

When key documents were not available due to their classified status, the thesis relied on interviews with officials who had taken part in policy and/or operational decisions. This was particularly the case for Chapters 3 and 4, which covered the later periods in the relationship. To the extent possible, interviews were corroborated by other interviews and by publicly available documents, such as the annual Defense White Papers (Defense of Japan) produced by the Japan Defense Agency and the Annual Reports to Congress from the US Secretary of Defense. These documents were very useful because they provided information concerning exercises and training, various defence statistical data, and summaries of defence policy decisions. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 also contain data compiled by Japanese naval officials that identify and quantify certain types of education and training that occurred in Japan and the United
States involving USN and JMSDF personnel. The data also identifies JMSDF staff liaison positions at US Navy commands and when they were established.

During the course of the research, nearly 100 interviews were conducted with mid-and senior-level US and Japanese civilian and military officials and non-government representatives. Except in certain cases, the thesis does not identify the names of individuals interviewed in the body of the thesis. Instead, to maintain anonymity, a coding system is used that is referenced back to each interview. The list of interviews is available for review.

The interviews in this thesis covered five categories: interviews with JMSDF officers, US Navy officers, civilian officials at the Japan Defense Agency and at the US Department of Defense, civilian officials at the US Department of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives from think tanks and private research organisations. Interviews with the JMSDF included the Chief of the Maritime Staff (in 2002) and many of his senior officers. They provided excellent perspectives concerning the nature of USN-JMSDF relations and the challenges facing the relationship. The detail of the discussions and the candour of these officials helped facilitate a better understanding of the naval relationship and the key factors driving and constraining its growth. Interviews were also conducted with many mid-and senior-level JMSDF officers attending the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo as well as with other Japanese officers attending conferences and study group meetings in Tokyo and in Washington, DC. These interviews provided essential details concerning USN-JMSDF operations at the unit level. The officers represented air, surface and subsurface specialties.

Interviews with US Navy officers included admirals and senior staff (active and retired) who held key positions within the US Pacific Forces, US
Navy headquarters or Department of Defense headquarters in Washington, DC during one or more of the periods examined in this thesis. These interviews also included USN officers who conducted active unit-to-unit training with the JMSDF, such as anti-submarine warfare. As with the JMSDF, the interviews covered the major warfare areas—air, surface and subsurface and the information provided was key to understanding developments at the unit level.

Interviews were also conducted with senior and mid-level civilian officials (active and retired) from the US Department of Defense in Washington and the Japan Defense Agency in Tokyo. These officials provided insights concerning policy decisions and the various influences affecting defence policy-making in the context of the Japan-US security alliance. Included in this category are interviews with members of the research staff from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. In addition to defence civilians, interviews with senior and mid-level officials at the US Department of State in Washington, DC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo provided valuable insights concerning how external influences in the area of foreign policy and international affairs affected the naval relationship. Representatives of the US legislative branch, such as the US Congressional Research Service and the US Government Accountability Office, were also interviewed and some of their documents were used in the course of the research.

Representatives of US and Japanese private research organisations and think tanks were also useful sources of information. Many of these officials had previously held positions within the US and Japanese governments and played important roles in formulating policy concerning the Japan-US security relationship.
In addition to personal interviews, research sources for the thesis also included the oral histories of prominent US and Japanese officials, such as Admiral Arleigh Burke, produced by the US Naval Institute, and those of US and Japanese officials who were interviewed as part of the National Security Archives’ Japan Project at the George Washington University in Washington, DC. These oral histories provided valuable perspectives concerning the environment in which decisionmaking was taking place, as well as the rationales for decisions taken.

I effectively mitigated any impact from my lack of fluency in the Japanese language by conducting extensive interviews with Japanese officials from the JMSDF, the Defense Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and Japanese think tanks. Some of the interviews were conducted in English and others required interpreters. In addition, a majority of JMSDF tactical manuals are the same as those used by the US Navy, and as such are in English. Numerous important Japanese primary source documents, such as the annual defence white papers, have also been translated into English. As a visiting research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo in 2002, I established many professional relationships with a wide range of Japanese research analysts at the Institute. We regularly exchanged information and these analysts helped corroborate and validate information obtained through other sources.

Many aspects of the Japan-US naval relationship are unique compared with other military relationships. The thesis does not attempt to use the experiences in this relationship to explain other international military relationships nor does it attempt to compare the Japan-US naval relationship with the experiences of the ground and air forces. The thesis conclusions are specific to the Japan-US naval relationship. However, during the course of the
research for this thesis, discussions were held with US Army and Air Force officers with an expertise in the Japan-US security relationship and with their counterparts in the Air and Ground Self-Defense Forces in Japan. While not part of the formal interviews for this thesis, these discussions were useful in that they confirmed the unique aspects of the naval relationship and its development compared with the other services. Further research, however, would provide a better understanding of how the air, ground and maritime forces have developed over the last 30 years and the various influences that drove and constrained their respective development.

Originality

The thesis derives its originality from various sources. Firstly, the selected methodology—a mapping technique—combined with the broader analytical framework provides a unique analytical approach not replicated by other scholars. Secondly, while numerous historians have examined various aspects of the Japan-US security relationship, few have examined the relationships and interactions between the US and Japanese military forces—and none has used this particular approach and methodology. Thirdly, in previous studies concerning the institutionalisation of international organisations, institutionalisation has served as the dependent variable and cooperation as the independent variable. In this study of Japan-US naval relations, institutionalisation is the independent variable in relation to naval cooperation, which is the dependent variable. This turns on its head previous analyses and provides a new perspective on the role of institutionalisation in international relationships. Moreover, by further qualifying the type of
cooperation necessary for institutionalisation, the thesis provides an additional unique element not explored by other scholars.

Finally, access to archival documents, recently declassified, revealed new perspectives concerning the nature of the Japan-US naval relationship (as well as the security relationship) during the heart of the Cold War. Few, if any, scholars have focussed on this material, in part because until recently the documents were classified. The documents reveal differences within the US Navy and the US government more generally over what information and technology should be given to Japan versus other allies. Previously, much of this information was protected by security classifications.

Summary of the Key Questions and Argument:

1. What are the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship during the period 1976 - 2001?
2. What is the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship?

The key proposition in this thesis is that operational cooperation between the US Navy and the JMSDF in response to a mutually acknowledged threat promotes institutionalisation in the relationship. While a number of different factors affect the USN-JMSDF relationship, the nature and strength of the relationship rests on the ability of the two navies to operate together against a common threat or major security challenge. The hypothesis turns on its head certain international organisation theories that view institutionalisation as
requirement for cooperation in international organisations. As these two navies work together and share risks, familiarity increases, trust grows and the effect of culture and language differences is reduced. As these navies cooperate, they recognise the need to establish structures to facilitate more effective cooperation. As such, a dynamic is created in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates additional cooperation. While the thesis focuses on the Japan-US naval relationship, the central proposition of the thesis could likely apply to all naval relationships, but further research would have to be conducted to better understand the causal factors.
The years 1976-1981 are important and significant for both the Japan-US naval relationship and the broader security relationship between Japan and the United States. For the first time in the history of the Japan-US security relationship, defence cooperation was now attractive to both Japan and the United States, as it served national interests in both countries. In Japan, perceptions of the international situation, and Japan’s security in particular, had begun to shift. With the long-term presence of the United States in the region becoming less certain, the threat from the Soviet Union increasing, and with Japan’s own economy in turmoil, Japan began to reconsider its security relationship with the United States and desired greater cooperation. Similarly, in the United States, the end of the Vietnam War, economic pressures, and a growing Soviet threat drove the United States to re-examine its alliance relationships throughout the world, with a greater emphasis on sharing the international defence burden.

As such, leaders in both countries undertook initiatives to facilitate defence cooperation. After extensive joint discussions on this subject, in 1978 the governments formalised their decisions in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and agreed to conduct follow-on discussions. Although they had been training and cooperating with each other for over two decades, the defence cooperation initiatives helped legitimise joint naval activities and cooperation, which had never been publicly acknowledged in Japan, and allowed the US Navy and the JMSDF greater freedom to conduct their activities. With this cooperation eventually came greater institutionalisation in the naval
relationship as both navies recognised that more routinised training and additional arrangements and structures were needed to facilitate more effective cooperation.

For the naval relationship, the period 1976-1981 included a number of important 'firsts' that were evidence of gradual institutionalisation, such as regular navy-to-navy meetings, scenario-based joint training, system acquisition decisions for improved interoperability and changes in arrangements for access to classified information and technology. While both navies may have wanted to raise their level of cooperation in the past, the political support from both governments ultimately enabled the changes to occur, demonstrating that navies cannot exist independently of their national governments. The defence cooperation initiatives and Japan's 1981 commitment to extend Japan's sealane defences to 1,000 miles provided the foundation and political commitment for naval institutional improvements. The precedents established during this five-year time period provided the foundation for an increasingly robust naval relationship in later years.

The first part of this chapter focuses on the naval relationship itself and on the various factors that drove it and helped define its development during these formative years. The latter part of the chapter focuses on other factors—political, economic and diplomatic—that in some way influenced the naval relationship. These factors were particularly significant in driving the Japan-US security relationship, as well as the naval relationship, during this period. First, however, a brief review of the naval relationship prior to 1976 is helpful in providing useful background for this discussion.
THE NATURE AND BASIS OF THE JAPAN-US NAVAL RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO 1976

In the 1970s and earlier, operational contact between the two navies, including joint training and exercises was periodic, not continual. The JMSDF’s lack of operational training and experience meant that it was limited in what it could do with the US Navy. Despite the influx of former Imperial Navy personnel at the founding of the JMSDF, the lack of operational training and experience was a problem that affected the service for at least two decades. According to James Auer, Admiral Sadayoshi Nakayama was surprised to learn, upon taking command of the JMSDF, how little sea experience many of his commanding officers had, and thus instituted new procedures whereby officers were selected for command by experience rather than by rank. Many of the former navy officers were very young prior to 1945 and few of the middle-level officers had previous command experience. In the early 1960s, a series of ship collisions and air accidents occurred as the JMSDF increased its operational tempo with newly-built ships, as well as ships and aircraft received from the United States.124

The lack of operational training and experience also affected the number and sophistication of joint training events with the US Navy. Table 1 provides a summary of the JMSDF-USN joint training that took place in the vicinity of Japan during the early part of the 1970s. The training emphasised anti-submarine warfare (ASW), an important mission for protecting the sealanes surrounding Japan. For the first 20 years of the naval relationship, the United States viewed technical assistance and training as a way to help Japan defend

itself. This slowly began to change in the latter part of the 1970s when the United States (and the US Navy) saw its own national interests best served by exercising with Japan’s maritime and air forces and incorporating Japan’s defence forces into its broader regional strategy.125

Table 1: Japan-US Joint Training in the Vicinity of Japan (1973-1976)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Exercise Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973 (11-14 April)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>From west of Kyushu to south of Kii peninsula</td>
<td>Exercise involved ASW detection, attack, communication and liaison</td>
<td>6 vessels 51 plane-days: 4 vessels several planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (10-12 July)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>South of Kii peninsula</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>5 vessels 12 plane-days: 4 vessels 4 plane-days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (24-28 November)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>East of Izu Islands</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>6 vessels 32 plane-days: 5 vessels 5 plane-days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 (25-29 May)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>East of Mikura Island</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>7 vessels 32 plane-days: 7 vessels 6 plane-days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 (20-24 February)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>East of Izu Islands</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>5 vessels 47 plane-days: 7 vessels 6 plane-days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 (21-24 July)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>South of Kii Peninsula</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>5 vessels 26 plane-days: 3 vessels 5 plane-days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: no data is available prior to 1973.

In addition to joint training activities with the US Navy, the JMSDF initiated ‘Ocean Cruise Training Activities’ in 1957 to provide an opportunity for newly commissioned junior officers who had recently graduated from the Maritime Officers Candidate School to participate in professional exchanges

with other navies. The fact that only three years after the formation of the JMSDF and a little over a decade after World War II, Japanese naval ships could sail into US and other foreign ports was significant and testified to the support that existed in the United States for the JMSDF. The JMSDF’s first ocean cruise took place in 1957—to Midway Island and Hawaii. Deployments continued annually to Hawaii and then to the mainland USA, Canada and Mexico. By 1965, these deployments expanded to other international locations.\footnote{John Downing, ‘A Japanese Navy in All But Name’, \textit{Jane’s Navy International Fleet Review}, April 1999, vol. 104/issue 003, p. 2.}

One of the most important decisions made by the US Navy during the 1970s was the stationing of the \textit{USS Midway} aircraft carrier in Yokosuka, Japan, in 1973. The naval presence was very visible and provided evidence of the US defence commitment to Japan, as well as strengthened the security relationship.\footnote{James Auer provides a very good discussion of the decision-making process, including domestic politics and influence behind the scenes in Japan, which resulted in the eventual homeporting of the \textit{USS Midway}. See James Auer Oral History Interview, conducted by Koji Murata, March 1996, National Security Archives Japan Project, George Washington University, pp. 1-4.} The presence of the carrier, however, did not automatically mean that there was robust naval cooperation. Indeed, the most active cooperation during the mid-1970s occurred between ASW patrol aircraft—which were land-based, not carrier based.


The year 1976 marked the start of an era of cooperation between the defence forces of Japan and the United States. For the naval relationship, it was a period characterized by new opportunities and challenges concerning the nature and extent of their cooperation. Although the two navies had conducted
joint training during the previous 20 years, the latter part of the 1970s marked the start of a more formalised relationship—with regular meetings, more formalised operational procedures and routines. This period established the foundation for enhanced naval cooperation, which flourished in later years—along with a more robust institutional framework.

A mapping process provides an effective way to examine the evolution of the relationship during this period, in a structured manner. The thesis examines four particular elements of the Japan-US naval relationship in order to obtain an understanding of the nature of the relationship, progress in naval cooperation, and ultimately institutionalisation during this particular time period. These elements include: internal coordination, operational interactions, external linkages and the depth of the naval relationship.

**Internal Coordination**

The USN and JMSDF made progress toward a more coordinated and formalised relationship during this time period. The Japan-US security relationship now recognised the navies as an important part of alliance strategy and as such, the navies for the first time were able to formalise navy-to-navy contact and coordination, as well as increase the substance of their encounters. In some cases, such as formal naval meetings, this was the first time the navies had sat down together and discussed important strategic and procedural issues that affected both navies. Furthermore, as the navies worked to coordinate their relationship and associated more closely with each other, disagreements naturally arose between them. Of particular significance during this period
were the disagreements concerning JMSDF access to classified information, systems and equipment.

While high level contact between the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the US Department of Defense increased during this time, important lower level contact did not occur consistently.\textsuperscript{128} For example, during the latter part of the 1970s, the JDA did not have direct and regular contact with US officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs—the key Department of Defense office for Japan policy issues.\textsuperscript{129} In addition to minimal contact with Washington officials, JDA Directors and Deputy Directors dealt with fairly low-level officials at the US Pacific Command, US Forces Japan, and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff—not their rank equivalents, according to a former JDA deputy director.\textsuperscript{130} The lack of a closer working relationship was one of the factors that likely contributed to challenges in the relationship at this time, such as concerning the sharing of sensitive information and technology.

In the naval context, the JMSDF maintained a close relationship with US Naval Forces Japan (USNFJ). However, USNFJ was not an operational command, and hence had little influence over naval operations in the region. The role of the Commander, US Naval Forces Japan—a two-star Admiral—was limited generally to ‘housekeeping’ issues with the US Navy and liaison responsibilities with Japan and the JMSDF.\textsuperscript{131} The US Seventh Fleet,

\textsuperscript{128} As will be discussed later, the JDA was not an actual ministry but an agency that reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As such, the JDA had limited autonomy, particularly in matters affecting broader defence policy. This had certain practical implications for the JDA during a period when it needed to engage more closely with the United States on defence policy issues. See Takashi Maruyama Oral History Interview, conducted by Akihiko Tanaka, 12 April 1996, National Security Archives Japan Program, George Washington University, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{129} Interview 5A (21 March 2000) and 5E (8 April 2005), with a former official from this Department of Defense office.
\textsuperscript{130} See Keiji Ohmori Oral History Interview, conducted by Koji Murata, 20 December 1996, National Security Archives Japan Project, George Washington University, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{131} USNFJ provides shore installation management, including base and logistics support for surface, subsurface, aviation and amphibious elements of the US Seventh Fleet that operate from Japan, and provides liaison with the JMSDF. See mission description in \url{http://www.cnff.navy.mil/mission.html}, accessed 7 September 2005.
commanded by a four-star admiral, was the key US Navy operational fleet in the
Northwest Pacific. The JMSDF often had the impression during this time
period that its communication with the Commander and/or staff of US Naval
Forces Japan was a direct link to Navy headquarters in Washington. However,
this was not the case, and these false assumptions often resulted in JMSDF
disappointment.

*Regular High-level Meetings*

Even though the US Navy and the JMSDF had been interacting with each
other since 1955, they had not conducted formal navy to navy policy meetings,
similar to what was done on an annual basis between navies within the NATO
alliance, as well as with Australia and New Zealand. The first formalised
meeting, known as ‘Navy-to-Navy Talks’ between the US Navy and the JMSDF
were held in December 1977. (The United States held talks with the South
Korean Navy immediately after those with Japan.)

The 1977 naval talks were significant because they showed that the two
navies were institutionalizing their relationship and that the JMSDF was part of
the international naval 'club', with the USN. Further, they were an
acknowledgement that the navies were working toward strategic alignment—a
key element in close naval relationships—with common goals and strategies. In
a letter to the meeting participants, the US Chief of Naval Operations

132 Established in 1943, the US Seventh Fleet is the largest of the Navy's forward-deployed fleets,
with forces that operate throughout Asia and further west to the Arabian Sea. The Commander,
US Seventh Fleet, is embarked on the *USS Blue Ridge*—the Seventh Fleet flagship since 1979—
and forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan. Seventh Fleet forces spend more than half of each
year taking part in operations, exercises and port visits to nations within their area of operation.
133 See, for example, interview 5E (8 April 2005), with USN officer who had spent several
deployments in Japan.
summarised his expectations for the naval talks and emphasized the importance of a shared strategic perspective. He stated that while there was a history of cordial relations between the two navies over the previous two decades, it was time that the navies shared a common strategy and ensured that their policies and missions were complementary. This was only logical, he said, since both Japan and the United States shared common interests in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific.\(^{134}\)

The 1977 talks covered a wide variety of topics of both short and long-term policy interest to the navies, including security assistance programmes, mutual exercises, interoperability of weapon systems, bilateral security plans, and standardisation of procedures and equipment.\(^{135}\) However, given the nature of the discussions, it was clear that this was the first time the two navies had talked about and shared information concerning some fairly basic naval concepts and conditions. For example, during the talks the US Navy gave a presentation on US Navy policy, including mission, functions, and roles. After the presentation, JMSDF representatives stated that they were generally familiar with the concepts from ‘open source professional literature’—indicating that this was the first time they had obtained this information officially—from the US Navy.\(^{136}\) Similarly, the JMSDF gave a presentation on its defence programme, task group composition and new naval construction, and US Navy

\(^{134}\) Memorandum from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations to participants in the first staff talks between the US Navy and the JMSDF. This memorandum was contained in: Memorandum for the Record, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, ‘United States Navy/Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff Policy Talks’, 2 February 1978, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

\(^{135}\) Memorandum from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations to OPNAV distribution list, ‘Navy to Navy Policy Talks with Korea and Japan’, Memo 605/189, 30 June 1977, declassified from Confidential, p. 1, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

representatives asked basic questions concerning command relationships between JMSDF district and mobile forces. It also appears to be the first time that the JMSDF presented—graphically—its command, control and communications network, including current and planned capabilities, as well as communication problems between the JMSDF and the US Navy. This issue became a highly sensitive issue in years to come, as is discussed later in this chapter.

The naval talks also appeared to be the first time that there had been a candid discussion of the regional threat and the naval balance in the Pacific, complete with maps and other graphics detailing these developments. The JMSDF representatives highlighted their fears about Soviet capability to conduct surface strike hit and run attacks against Japanese coastal batteries, especially in the Sea of Japan, and their concerns about their own capabilities against nuclear submarines. It also appeared to be the first time the two navies discussed their respective roles and missions and how they would work together to meet the emerging Soviet naval threat in Northeast Asia and the western Pacific.

During the naval talks, the participants agreed that the JMSDF role was to maintain sea control in the western Pacific through ASW operations, using surface and air platforms, and by blockading Tsugaru, Soya (La Perouse) and Tsushima Straits. The US Navy role was to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, maintain mobile strike capability, and protect the Sea Lines of

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137 Ibid.
139 Less than a year later, the Chief of Naval Operations briefed the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (Kanemaru) on the US Navy strategy for defence of Japan—the first time this had been done for a JDA director. See Memorandum for the Record, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Call by Minister Kanemaru on Admiral Holloway’, Memo 61/S49-78, 26 June 1978, declassified from Secret, pp. 1-2. Box 426A, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
Communication (SLOC) outside the JMSDF area of responsibility. Of particular note, in response to JMSDF concerns that it may have difficulty in getting air cover from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, the US Navy urged the JMSDF to take the initiative to get this assistance because air support from US aircraft carriers might not be immediately available. This was another reminder to the JMSDF that while cooperation with the US Navy was improving, in the end Japan could be on its own for critical portions of a regional conflict and as such, had to improve its own capabilities.

In assessing the frank exchange of information during the naval talks, Vice Admiral William Crowe, the senior US Navy representative at the meeting, stated that the Japanese view of its contributions to the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty would likely form the basis for future planning and policy discussions between the two navies. Furthermore, Admiral Crowe praised the willingness of Admiral Oga, the senior Japanese representative present, to discuss sensitive matters concerning US Navy/JMSDF/South Korea naval cooperation, ‘…while considering the obvious political and emotional problems….’ In summary, he declared the naval talks ‘a complete success’, portending closer cooperation between the two navies in the future.

The US and Japan had different goals and expectations, as well as different stakes in the talks. As was evident by the rank of the naval officials heading each delegation, the stakes were higher for the JMSDF. The Chief of the Maritime Staff headed the delegation. The JMSDF had wanted to participate in this kind of a dialogue with the US Navy because it put the JMSDF on a level with other major navies, which had already been participating in formalised

141 Ibid., p.1.
naval talks. It was also an opportunity for the JMSDF to lay out its desires and concerns, in front of a captive audience, about the growing regional threat, cooperation with the United States on certain naval missions, and future acquisition items. The JMSDF also wanted the opportunity to present items for which it was hoping to get US Navy support, such as for a 'small' carrier.\(^\text{142}\)

For the US Navy, a Vice Admiral—the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations)—was the senior representative. As was typical at the time, there appeared to be a split between naval representatives located in the Pacific and those in Washington. According to officials from the US Pacific Command, the US Navy supported the naval talks because it believed they would assist in maintaining allied confidence in US defence commitments in the Western Pacific and would complement other Japan-US defence links at the US Pacific Command, the Joint Staff (of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), and ongoing efforts in the Japan-US Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation. US Navy officials in the Pacific hoped that the talks would expand cooperative defence measures in functional areas of intelligence, operations, communications and logistics.\(^\text{143}\) As will be discussed later in this chapter, the desires of US Navy officials in the Pacific were not always the same as the US Navy as an institution, particularly in some of these functional areas.

Washington naval officials had a slightly different set of priorities that were evident the first chance it had to comment on the JMSDF presentation on ASW cooperation. A US Navy representative immediately asked, ‘How does the JMSDF plan to work closer with the Republic of Korea Navy?’ In addition, ‘what is the JMSDF view on the implementation of USN-ROKN-JMSDF exercises?’


\(^{143}\) Cable from USCINCPAC to Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Navy to Navy Talks with Korea and Japan’, 170120Z, June 1977, declassified from Confidential, p. 1, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
These were both extremely sensitive questions for Japan—a country for whom participation in collective defence operations was technically not allowed and for whom defence relations with South Korea were particularly sensitive. But the United States saw Japan’s cooperation on these issues as an important factor for the Japan-US naval relationship, given the instability on the Korean Peninsula and the naval role in the event of the crisis. Admiral Oga explained that exercises with Korea were difficult because of the ‘peculiar political relations’, something that the US Navy representatives in the Pacific were certainly well aware of. Nevertheless, the candour of the first set of Japan-US naval talks set an important precedent for later dialogue.

**Information Sharing**

The sharing of sensitive information and technology was a particularly thorny issue of naval relations in the late 1970s and created a challenge for internal coordination in the relationship. Advocates for Japan in the US government, such as Ambassador Mike Mansfield, wanted to eliminate many of the restrictions that were preventing Japan from obtaining key systems, equipment and technology, and which put Japan on a less than equal basis with other US allies. These advocates, including many officials within the US Pacific Fleet and Pacific Command, also believed that greater access to information and technology would improve the JMSDF’s interoperability with US forces and enable Japan to more effectively cope with the emerging threat from the Soviet Union. Officials at the US Navy headquarters in Washington viewed the

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situation differently and as such, this highlighted internal differences within the US Navy and raised questions about the Navy’s relationship with the JMSDF, compared with other naval relationships. A review of the JMSDF-USN relationship at this time also highlights less quantifiable issues such as trust and cultural identity, which will be discussed later.

In 1976, the US Navy’s policy for disclosure of classified information was contained in Naval Instruction S5510.155—‘National Disclosure Policy’. This document identified eight categories of military information. For each category, the policy established disclosure classification levels for particular countries and international organisations. For example, in 1976 Japan was cleared for access to six categories of information at the Secret level and two categories at the Confidential level, as identified in Table 2. The policy did not automatically authorize disclosure of information to a particular country, but it established the highest level of access that the Chief of Naval Operations could authorise subject to satisfaction of the disclosure criteria.

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Table 2: National Disclosure Policy Towards Japan (January 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Military Information</th>
<th>Disclosure Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category One</td>
<td>Organization, Training, and Employment of Military Forces</td>
<td>Secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Two</td>
<td>Military Materiel and Munitions</td>
<td>Secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Three</td>
<td>Applied Research and Development, Information and Materiel</td>
<td>Confidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Four</td>
<td>Production Information</td>
<td>Confidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Five</td>
<td>Combined Military Operations, Planning, and Readiness</td>
<td>Secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Six</td>
<td>US Order of Battle</td>
<td>Secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Seven</td>
<td>North American Defense</td>
<td>Secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Eight</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Secret</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even if a country was not cleared for access at a certain level, the country (or the US supporting organisation) could apply for an exception to the policy. According to archival documents, the US Navy at the time preferred the exception approach to information and technology disclosure rather than making wholesale changes to the formal disclosure policy. In the case of Japan, between 1963 and 1977, the US government requested six exceptions for the release of classified information. The US Navy requested four of the six exceptions for the JMSDF. In 1963, for example, the US Navy requested an exception for the release of Secret-level information concerning acoustic detection systems for ocean areas and barriers that contained information on both operational systems and systems still in research and development. In 1972, the Navy requested the release of Top Secret level information on...

minefield planning, which the JMSDF needed to implement the coordinated joint emergency plan for the defence of Japan.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the mid-1970s, the established US policy towards Japan was to treat it as co-equal to NATO allies. Japan was included in summit meetings of industrialised democracies and consulted closely within bilateral and multilateral forums. Japanese financial and political support was solicited in most major international undertakings. Even on US Congressional notifications for arms transfers, as part of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Japan was placed in special status shared only by NATO nations, Australia and New Zealand (part of the ANZUS alliance). However, for access to certain sensitive and classified information, the United States did place Japan on a different level than NATO and ANZUS allies. In particular, as noted in Table 2 above, the United States restricted Japan's access to information concerning applied research and development, as well as production information to the Confidential level, while NATO allies, Australia and New Zealand, had access at the Secret level. NATO and ANZUS allies also received greater access to information concerning Combined Military Operations, Planning, and Readiness—at the Top Secret level—while the United States restricted Japan to the Secret level.\footnote{Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, ‘National Disclosure Policy Toward Japan’, #010815Z, November 1977, declassified from Secret, p. 2, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.}

In the latter part of the 1970s, the JMSDF increasingly encountered problems accessing information and technology for exercises with the US Navy, principally systems for ASW operations and secure communications between US Navy and JMSDF platforms. In addition, the JMSDF had difficulties in arranging technical briefings at the Secret level concerning systems and
equipment for potential purchase. In many cases, the US Pacific Fleet supported the requests, but US Navy headquarters denied the JMSDF access to requested information. Examples of some of these incidents are described below.

In January 1976, the US Pacific Fleet requested permission to provide the JMSDF information on US towed array sonar systems (TASS) used on surface ships for anti-submarine operations for a JMSDF-USN anti-submarine warfare exercise. With the rapid growth in capability of the Soviet submarine fleet, TASS technology provided an extremely valuable asset for the US Navy in addition to under water surveillance systems—all of which were highly classified systems. While US disclosure policy permitted disclosure of general information concerning TASS on a need-to-know basis, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in Washington did not believe this included information revealing capabilities, technology, performance and/or utilisation of the equipment. Hence, the CNO’s office denied the US Pacific Fleet’s access request. After a request for reconsideration of the original disclosure request, and after identifying inconsistencies in the treatment of Japan compared with certain other allies participating in the exercise (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK), the CNO’s office granted the Pacific Fleet’s request on a one time basis only.150

One year later, the Maritime Staff Office of the JMSDF requested assistance in arranging detailed technical presentations concerning certain surface ship air defence weapon systems—at the highest level of classification releasable to Japan. According to the US Embassy’s Office of Defense

150 Cables from Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), #220241Z, January 1976; CNO to CINCPACFLT, #132205Z, February 1976; CINCPACFLT to CNO, #262001Z, February 1976; and CNO to CINCPACFLT, #272257Z, February 1976 (all declassified from Secret), Box 352, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
Cooperation, the JMSDF was considering requesting these systems in future defence budgets. Therefore, the Defense Cooperation Office considered the briefings useful in contributing to standardisation of equipment and complementarity of USN and JMSDF forces, in addition to, of course, potential purchase of US equipment. For the purpose of this briefing, however, the Navy did not grant an exception to the disclosure policy and the information was conveyed at a Confidential classification level.  

Also in 1976 and 1977, many problems arose concerning JMSDF access to secure communications technology for use in exercises with the US Navy. Operational lessons learned from exercises held between the two forces at the time indicated the need to have secure communications capability when the USN and JMSDF operate together. A particularly illuminating memorandum from the JMSDF identifies Japan’s desire for this technology and its rationale for improved interoperability when operating with US forces. The memorandum is quoted below in its entirety.

From: Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet (CINCSDFLT), JMSDF  
To: Commander US Naval Forces, Japan  
Subj: Secure Communications  

1. Lessons learned through combined exercises and operations with the United States Navy proved that both USN and JMSDF should have common secure communications.  
2. Necessity of secure communications has been discussed at the combined ASW Committee meetings since 1975 and the Committee reported the results of discussions to COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFORJAPAN and other US Forces concerned.  
3. During the SOAP [Soviet Out-of-Area Patrol] Operations ’77, JDS Akigumo and Asagumu were deployed on scene and covered teletype and covered

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151 Cable from CMDAO Tokyo to CNO Washington, ‘Japan Request for Technical Briefings’, #120744Z, April 1977, p. 1, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.  
152 The JMSDF memorandum is contained in Naval Message from COMNAVFORJAPAN to CINCPACFLT, ‘Proposal for Communication Security Assistance to JMSDF’, #300050Z, 30 November 1977, declassified from Secret, p. 2, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
voice equipments were installed on these ships. It showed us the great benefits of covered communications for coordination between on-scene commanders.

4. Working level negotiation has already started and discussions have been held between staffs of COMNAVFORJAPAN and CINCSDFLT.

5. CINCSDFLT hereby requests COMNAVFORJAPAN to provide Self-Defense Fleet with means for secure communications in order to conduct more effective US/JMSDF combined exercises and operations.

In the exercise described above, the JMSDF provided one to two ships on-scene for the majority of the operation. However, initially, no instructions, intelligence or any classified information could be passed directly between the US Navy on-scene commander and the JMSDF ships due to the lack of secure, US compatible communications equipment aboard Japanese ships. In this particular case, the US Navy eventually delivered the appropriate equipment to the ships to ensure secure communications. However, other similar exercises occurred during the mid-1970s when this was not the case.

In 1977, after continued problems in obtaining access to secure communications equipment from the United States for use in exercises with the US Navy, the JMSDF requested, through the Commander, US Naval Forces Japan, that Japan develop its own secure communications equipment for US Navy/JMSDF exercises. The equipment would be used to provide secure covered radio teletype communications between USN and JMSDF ships. However, before Japan began work on developing these systems, it wanted assurance from the US Navy that the equipment, once developed, would be used during JMSDF-USN exercises. It was likely that the JMSDF and the headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan were using this option as another way to push the US Navy (in particular, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) to improve Japan’s access to secure communications systems that the US Navy had been denying Japan up to that point. Naval officials from the headquarters,
US Naval Forces Japan, maintained that the proposed secure communications equipment would have been a tremendous improvement over the equipment that was currently being used in exercises—off-line encryption/decryption equipment. However, they also admitted that it was questionable whether the equipment, if developed, would satisfy the needs of both navies during real world operations.\textsuperscript{153}

The terse reply from the CNO’s office stated that it was not feasible for US Navy ships to carry additional equipment solely to support combined exercise activity. Should such an operational requirement exist, the message stated, the release, on loan, of limited numbers of US secure communications equipment to provide for secure interoperability between the USN and JMSDF may be appropriate. Before this could happen, the CNO’s office wanted to ensure that an operational requirement for Japan-US communications security was documented and justified. Furthermore, the office required that the US Pacific Fleet submit a detailed proposal containing information on equipment, funding, installation and maintenance that would be provided in support of such a requirement.\textsuperscript{154}

In the autumn of 1977, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, submitted a proposal to the National Disclosure Policy Committee to upgrade national disclosure levels for Japan in three categories: production, technology and military planning. The stated reason for doing so was to facilitate information exchange at Security Consultative

\textsuperscript{153} Naval Message from COMNAVFORJAPAN to CINCPACFLT, ‘Development of COMSEC Equipment by Japanese for Mutual Training’, #072311Z, March 1977, pp. 1-2, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

\textsuperscript{154} Naval Message from CNO to CINCPACFLT, ‘Development of COMSEC Equipment by Japanese for Mutual Training’, #022000Z, May 1977, declassified from Secret, p. 1, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
Committee meetings and to make US disclosure policy consistent with US
defence policy toward Japan. The initiative was likely the result of ‘behind the
scenes’ activities by Japan advocates within the International Security Affairs
office and is an example of the importance that particular people played in
establishing and maintaining Japan-US naval relations.

The proposal was raised before the National Disclosure Committee on
the 26th and 28th October 1977, but the proposal was defeated each time. The US
Navy voted against the proposal on the grounds that the existing policy—which
allowed exceptions to the disclosure policy—was adequate for Navy
programmes and that no case had been established to support the upgrading.
The vote on the 28th October 1977 was a split 4-4 vote, with the NDPC Chairman
casting the deciding vote. Those in favour of the disclosure policy change for
Japan included the Department of State, Joint Staff, US Army, and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Those against upgrading
Japan’s disclosure included the Navy, Air Force, Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, and OSD/Comptroller. 155

In the midst of this discussion, the US Embassy in Tokyo, and in
particular Ambassador Mike Mansfield, became increasingly frustrated with the
access problems the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were having with the US
Department of Defense and, in particular, the US Navy. After learning of the
Disclosure Committee’s decision, Ambassador Mansfield sent a caustically
worded cable back to the Department of State noting his frustration in response
to the policy decision. He stated that,

155 Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of the Navy,
declassified from Secret, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives
Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
It makes no sense to me to attempt to engage the Japanese in a closer security relationship, as signified by our work in the new Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation and our plans to renew consultation in the SSC, if we continue to indicate in our day-to-day relations that some close allies are more equal than others. Surely we are better off having the Japanese intimately tied to us through dependence on technology than encouraging them to move out on their own. And I am convinced that they will reluctantly take the latter course rather than engage in repeated, often frustrating, and sometimes humiliating efforts to obtain access to information that we should find in our mutual security interest to share in the first place.  

Ambassador Mansfield was particularly incensed with the Navy's response to the proposal raised at the National Disclosure Committee meeting. During visits to the American Embassy in Tokyo by the Secretary of the Navy (Mr. Claytor) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (VADM Crowe) in the Fall of 1977, Ambassador Mansfield was very critical of the US Navy for denying the JMSDF access to classified material. In meetings with the Secretary of the Navy and with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Ambassador Mansfield stated that the Navy should know Japan's importance as an ally, and as such he was displeased that the Navy had not supported the proposal to upgrade disclosure levels in the stated instance.  

After intense promotion on the part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, a March 1978 vote by the National Disclosure Committee members resulted in concurrence by all members, including the Navy, for raising the eligibility levels for Japan to ‘Secret’ in Categories 3 (applied research and development) and 4 (production

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156 Cable from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘National Disclosure Policy Toward Japan’, #10816Z, November 1977, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

information) of the National Disclosure criteria.\textsuperscript{158} The arguments made by members from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD/R&E) were particularly convincing and apparently were key reasons why the Navy in the end changed its vote. In a draft white paper, the ISA office noted that raising the disclosure level would encourage Japanese views on security policy to coincide with US views and would be regarded by them as one indication that the US government regarded Japan as a full partner, a most important consideration. From ISA’s perspective, any diminution of trust between the United States and Japan, particularly given the growth of Soviet military power, would support elements in Japan who urged a more independent security posture. A loosening of Japan’s ties to the United States would alter the world power balance and would be a serious US disadvantage, ISA believed.\textsuperscript{159}

Why did the Navy end up being the ‘odd man out’ through most of the disclosure debate? First it is important to point out that the ‘Navy’ in this context refers to the representatives in Washington—principally in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The US Navy representatives out in the field, in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the US Pacific Command and the US Pacific Fleet, tended to side with the US Embassy in Tokyo, the US State Department

\textsuperscript{158} The CIA concurrence actually came on 10 March because the representative at the March meeting had not yet received the agency opinion. The Department of Energy abstained because it had no direct agency interest. See Department of Defense Memorandum, ‘Minutes of Special NDPC Meeting’, 13 March 1977, declassified from Secret, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.\textsuperscript{160} Having to deal with Japan on a daily basis, the Navy representatives in the Asia-Pacific region viewed its relations as more than purely military and rather a combination of political, military and diplomatic influences. As such, the US Navy representatives in the field tended to be more sympathetic to Japan and its interests. For example, in the midst of the debate on disclosure policy, the Defence Attaché (a US Navy Captain) at the American Embassy in Tokyo sent a telegram to Washington stating that Japanese officials were aware of significant differences between briefings and technologies provided them and NATO allies. He further noted that when technology is released, it is done with such reluctance and delay that it raises questions about the current and future Japan-US relationship. The Attaché also pointed out that the United States reversed the decision to make the P-3C patrol aircraft available to the JMSDF only after Japan expressed interest in the Nimrod—a similar aircraft produced by the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{161} The P-3C Orion is a land-based maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. It eventually became the primary anti-submarine platform for the JMSDF.

The Chief of Naval Operation’s office in Washington viewed the situation through a more singular analytical lens. Officials believed that the existing policy was adequate for Navy programmes and that no case had been established to support the upgrading. The CNO’s office pointed out that the Navy had requested only five exceptions to national disclosure policy in the previous five years under the existing disclosure criteria and that this was evidence of the adequacy of the current policy. A memorandum from the Office

\textsuperscript{160} DOD’s Office of Research and Engineering had initially voted against changing the policy but changed its mind after hearing the views of the Department of State and DOD’s Office of International Security Affairs.

\textsuperscript{161} Naval message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘National Disclosure Policy Toward Japan’, November 1977.
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs points out that this logic is flawed because the Japanese, given their ‘psychology’, will not ask for an exception to the disclosure policy when they know their request will be rejected. In a discussion paper prepared for the March 1978 National Disclosure Policy Committee meeting, officials from the CNO’s office stressed that release of information under Category 4 (production information) posed the greatest risk of technology loss. For this reason, only countries with acceptable industrial security systems have had access to Secret information in Category 4 (e.g., the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Federal Republic of Germany). According to archival documents, in the early 1970s, US Department of Defense officials found deficiencies while reviewing Japan’s facilities and procedures for storing classified material. These shortfalls were later corrected, according to the Defense Attaché at the American Embassy, Tokyo. Scepticism existed, nevertheless, amongst certain US Department of Defense Officials concerning the release of sensitive information to Japan.

During the latter part of the 1970s, the US Navy was very concerned about the advancing threat from Soviet submarines and as such was particularly protective of US technology developed to detect these submarines. The US Navy submarine and intelligence communities, in particular, closely guarded these acoustic detection systems as they participated in the increasingly competitive cat and mouse game with the Soviets in the Western Pacific. Any leak of information from Japan to the Soviet Union would have been devastating for the US Navy, according to a retired senior US Navy officer and submariner, who had extensive contact with the JMSDF as well as with US Navy

headquarters during this period. As such, he was very aware of USN concern about guarding US submarine detection systems.\textsuperscript{164}

Even once the Disclosure Policy had changed, however, the JMSDF and the US Navy still had disagreements over what technology Japan could obtain. For example, prior to signing a memorandum of understanding for a long-term purchase from the United States of P-3C aircraft, Japan wanted to ensure that the aircraft would be equipped with advanced systems that would enable the aircraft to operate effectively against the growing Soviet submarine threat, in conjunction with US forces. The Maritime Staff Office of the JMSDF submitted to the US Navy a detailed questionnaire concerning releasability issues. Many of these issues concerned promises or agreements made by the Navy in the past concerning the licensed production of certain supporting equipment on-board the P-3C aircraft, as well as release of certain technology and information. In March 1978, after reviewing the draft P-3C memorandum of understanding, the Maritime Staff Office of the JMSDF informed the US Embassy in Tokyo that many of the questions concerning the releasability of information and technology still had not been resolved.\textsuperscript{165} The two navies did eventually sign the P-3C memorandum of understanding in April 1978, with the US pledge that remaining releasability issues would be settled in the future.

Given this progression of events, it is not surprising that even after the United States and Japan signed the P-3C memorandum of understanding, technology access problems still existed. As the JMSDF was planning its P-3C programme, the KG-40 cryptographic system became a key focus of its

\textsuperscript{164} Interview 21A (9 May 2005 and follow-up on 5 June 2007).

\textsuperscript{165} Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Japan Questionnaire Concerning P-3C MOU Annex A’, #270355Z, March 1978, declassified from Confidential, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. The message details the many issues of concern raised by the Japanese prior to signing the P-3C MOU.
attention. The KG-40 is used to provide cryptographic security protection for Navy Link 11 and any data communications meeting Tactical Data Information Link data standards.¹⁶⁶ Link 11 and the KG-40 were critical to ensuring effective and secure communication and data transfer between USN and JMSDF platforms. Japan was aware that NATO allies were receiving more information and technology than Japan, including the KG-40 system, and JDA officials pressured the US government to release more of this information to Japan. The American Embassy in Tokyo, again concerned about the double standard existing between NATO and Japan on access to cryptographic systems, sent a message to Washington laying out these concerns. The message emphasized that Japanese officials, aware that the KG-40 is a standard NATO system, were concerned at what they perceived was a lack of US confidence in them, despite repeated high-level assurances of Japan’s importance as a US ally. The JMSDF eventually received this system but not for nearly two years. In the interim, the JMSDF made do with borrowed systems and equipment from the US Navy.¹⁶⁷

Summary

Several themes emerged concerning the institutional coordination of the relationship during this period. Firstly, a mutually recognised security threat, combined with a new priority on defence cooperation within the Japan-US security relationship, provided the necessary incentives for increased


institutionalisation in the relationship, reversing what had existed previously, when there was little formal coordination and sharing of basic information. Secondly, the interactions between the USN and JMSDF during this time indicate a lack of trust between the navies, which likely emanated from the lack of operational familiarity between the navies. This was manifested most clearly in the discussions concerning whether or not to raise Japan’s level of access to classified military information. As the two navies had not previously participated together in military operations against a mutually recognised security threat, sharing risks and defence burdens, there was no basis for the development of this trust. Differences in culture and language also contributed to the challenges experienced by the navies at the start of this period. Thirdly, the disagreements within the US Navy concerning the disclosure of classified military information and technology to Japan demonstrated that navies are not necessarily unified entities. The objection of Navy headquarters likely emanated from the influence of the US submarine community, which was closely guarding acoustic technology for detecting the increasingly quiet Soviet submarines. Further, while the JMSDF had many supporters within the US Pacific Fleet and the US Pacific Command, a large part of the US Navy at this time still tended to look to Europe rather than Asia for its close alliances.

Operational Interactions

The period 1976-1981 constituted 'foundation years' for the operational aspects of the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation. The more prominent changes in training, exercises and interoperability occurred some years later and implemented the plans laid out during this earlier time period.
Nevertheless, the JMSDF and US Navy made determined steps in improving the nature and extent of its operational interaction during this period. While unit training and small exercises had occurred in earlier years, the political commitments that resulted in the 1978 Japan-US Guidelines for Defense Cooperation enabled the two navies to operate more openly together and to pursue more sophisticated and threat-relevant training scenarios. The Guidelines were the impetus for JMSDF participation in the multilateral Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which occurred for the first time in 1980. Participation in this multilateral exercise raised the self-confidence of the JMSDF and as such, improved the partnership relationship between the two navies. But operational aspects of the relationship suffered from the lack of sharing of sensitive information and technology, demonstrating that political will and mutual trust were not yet present in this naval relationship.

The US Navy and the JMSDF participated in a number of training activities with US naval forces from the mid-1950s onward. However, the training generally had a singular focus, such as minesweeping or ASW, and was directed toward improving the JMSDF technical skills in a defined area. The frequency and technical sophistication of this training grew during the 1976-1981 period, with a growing pattern of formal and informal interaction among USN and JMSDF operational units. In addition to the joint training indicated in Table 3, unit training was also ongoing, particularly between ASW units.

Table 3: Japan-US Joint Training (1976-1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Exercise Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976 (4-7 Sept.)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Sea area south of Kyushu</td>
<td>ASW detection, attack; communication and</td>
<td>Japan: 6 vessels, 47 aircraft flights; US: 4 vessels, 4 aircraft flights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>(22-26 Mar.)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Sea around Izu Islands</td>
<td>Same as above, 7 vessels, 23 aircraft flights, 4 vessels, 4 aircraft flights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>(27-30 Apr.)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Eastern area of Izu Islands</td>
<td>Same as above, 6 vessels, 24 aircraft, 5 vessels, 6 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>(1-8 July)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Sea of Japan &amp; eastern area of the Main Island</td>
<td>Same as above, 1 vessel, 4 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>(28 Oct. –1 Nov.)</td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Eastern area of Izu Islands</td>
<td>Same as above, 8 vessels, 52 aircraft, 10 vessels, 4 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>(17-20 Apr.)</td>
<td>ASW training</td>
<td>East of Izu Islands</td>
<td>Same as above, 8 vessels, 16 aircraft, 5 vessels, 9 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>(15 July)</td>
<td>Small-scale exercise</td>
<td>South of the Main Island &amp; west of Kyushu</td>
<td>Same as above, 1 vessel, 2 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>(10-17 Feb.)</td>
<td>ASW training</td>
<td>East of Nansei Islands</td>
<td>Same as above, 5 vessels, 7 aircraft, 18 vessels, 24 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>(15-30 June)</td>
<td>Small-scale exercise</td>
<td>Japan Sea, sea west of Kyushu and south of Honshu</td>
<td>Tactical movement training, 1 vessel, 1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>(12-15 Nov.)</td>
<td>ASW exercise</td>
<td>West of southwestern Islands</td>
<td>ASW search, attack and practice with communications, 6 vessels, 41 aircraft, 5 vessels, 8 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>(2-6 Feb.)</td>
<td>ASW exercise</td>
<td>Sea east of Okinawa</td>
<td>Same as above, 8 vessels, 15 aircraft, 3 vessels, 35 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>(12-14 May)</td>
<td>ASW exercise</td>
<td>Sea south of Okinawa</td>
<td>Same as above, 8 vessels, 10 aircraft, 2 vessels, 4 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>(29 July-17 Aug.)</td>
<td>Small-scale exercise</td>
<td>Seas surrounding Japan</td>
<td>Same as above, 1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>(12-22 May)</td>
<td>ASW training</td>
<td>Sea off Akita</td>
<td>Same as above, 10 vessels, 32 aircraft, 12 vessels, 24 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>(22 June-10 July)</td>
<td>Small-scale training</td>
<td>Seas around Japan</td>
<td>Tactical Movement Training, 1 vessel, 1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>(17-22 Aug.)</td>
<td>ASW training</td>
<td>Southwest of Kyushu</td>
<td>ASW patrol, attack and practice with communications, 7 vessels, 4 aircraft, 5 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>(25-30 Sept.)</td>
<td>ASW training</td>
<td>East of Nansei Islands</td>
<td>Same as above, 9 vessels, 11 aircraft, 6 vessels, 6 aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to joint training that occurred in the vicinity of Japan, the JMSDF also conducted ASW training off the coast of Hawaii, as shown in Table 4. According to a US Navy officer who commanded the submarine training
facility, this was excellent operational training for the JMSDF and was often combined with land-based training at the submarine facility at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.168

**Table 4: JMSDF-USN Exercises in Hawaii (1976-1981)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Description of activity</th>
<th>Japan’s Contribution*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977 (May-June)</td>
<td>Escort ship training</td>
<td>2 escort ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 (May-June)</td>
<td>ASW patrol plane training</td>
<td>8 P-2Js</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 (Sept.-Dec.)</td>
<td>Submarine training</td>
<td>1 submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 (July-Aug.)</td>
<td>Destroyer training</td>
<td>2 destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 (July-Aug.)</td>
<td>ASW patrol plane training</td>
<td>8 P-2Js</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 (July-Sept.)</td>
<td>Submarine training</td>
<td>1 submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 (Aug.-Nov.)</td>
<td>Submarine training</td>
<td>1 submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 (Jan.-Apr.)</td>
<td>Destroyer training</td>
<td>2 destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 (Feb.-Mar.)</td>
<td>ASW patrol aircraft training</td>
<td>8 P-2J</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*US participating units not documented.

The training highpoint for Japan-US naval relations occurred in 1980, when the JMSDF first participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.169 RIMPAC is a comprehensive, multinational naval engagement planned by the Third Fleet of the US Navy and conducted nearly annually since 1971 with the participation of warships and other platforms from foreign

168 Interview 21B (May 2007)
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The JMSDF had wanted to participate in RIMPAC years earlier, but a combination of factors, including the Lockheed scandal (discussed later in this chapter) prevented JMSDF participation until 1980.

Japan participated in RIMPAC 1980, conducted for about three weeks from February 26 through March 18, 1980, in the central Pacific near Hawaii. Forty-three ships, 200 aircraft, and 20,000 personnel from the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan participated in this exercise. The JMSDF sent a helicopter-carrying destroyer, a missile-mounted destroyer, and 8 ASW patrol aircraft (P-2J) to participate.\(^{170}\) While this was a multilateral exercise, Japan was able to operate ‘officially’ only with the US Navy, given Japan’s collective defence restrictions. Through its participation in RIMPAC 1980, the JMSDF became more fully aware of the extent of expertise and capabilities of the US Navy (and other navies as well) and as such was introduced to the latest combat technology. Just as significantly, JMSDF pride in its own capabilities was also boosted by this experience. According to Japan’s 1980 Defense White Paper, ‘the JMSDF became convinced that it was not at all inferior to the US Navy or any other forces in terms of navigation, technique, morale, and discipline’.\(^{171}\)

Not all current and former JMSDF officers agree on the benefit of participating in this large exercise. While the JMSDF wanted very badly to participate in RIMPAC 1980 (and earlier RIMPAC exercises), one retired officer maintained that there was not much difference between this exercise and other bilateral training interactions the JMSDF had had with the US Navy since the 1950s.\(^{172}\) But participation in large-scale manoeuvres with the United States—


\(^{172}\) See, for example, Admiral Naotoshi Sakonjo (JMSDF-ret.), interviewed by Koji Murata, 4 April 1996, National Security Archives Japan Program, George Washington University, p. 16.
something that had not been done previously—did have significant merit for the JMSDF, even though the operational contact with other countries was minimal, because it was a sign that the JMSDF was recognised as a ‘player’ in the Pacific region. Furthermore, even though no operational interaction occurred with other navies, there were many opportunities for informal contact between naval personnel of different countries at the social events and gatherings throughout the exercise. This was considered nearly just as important for increasing understanding and relations among navies, according to JMSDF officers.\textsuperscript{173}

Operational interaction between navies is enhanced by the extent of their interoperability because it is an indication of organisational coherence. Interoperability between navies is comprised of many different elements—some tangible and others less tangible. At a broad level, the US Department of Defense defines interoperability as ‘the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks’. The definition further notes that it is the condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.\textsuperscript{174} However, interoperability is more than equipment, technology and standardisation. It also involves cultural, political, and other less tangible dimensions. These less tangible dimensions are often more important than having compatible systems and equipment because they go to the heart of relations between navies. At the highest level, nations must be willing and able to organize themselves into a common force and accommodate each other’s operational methods. At the operational and tactical levels, navies must be able to exchange information well enough to maintain a common

\textsuperscript{173} Interviews 19E (2 March 2002) and 22F (4 August 2005), with JMSDF officers.
picture of events and be able to support and sustain each other. In summary, the key elements of naval interoperability include compatible doctrine and operating procedures, compatible systems and equipment, and compatible political and cultural approaches.¹⁷⁵

Unlike NATO, US Navy interoperability in the Asian theatre is not based on a long-standing alliance with a tradition of common operating patterns and standardisation of systems. In the 1970s, Japan and the United States were only just beginning to establish the foundations for compatible forces. However, decisions made during the years 1976-1981 helped enhance interoperability between the two navies and strengthen their organisational foundation. Firstly, US and Japanese defence forces officially acknowledged in defence cooperation guidelines that they needed to be able to work together effectively in order to resist regional threats. Secondly, they began talking in navy-to-navy meetings about their respective capabilities. Also, the navies made key decisions on procurement of compatible systems and equipment and access to information and technology that enhanced the navies' ability to operate together. Thirdly, the two navies enhanced their exercise programme and began to operate together more frequently and realistically. As such, through more frequent contact, the navies moved toward common approaches and procedures, systems and equipment.

Until 1976, interoperability existed at the very basic level, unless the US Navy lent more sophisticated equipment to the JMSDF for particular exercises. During the 1976-1981 period, as Japan was making a transition to a force that was more capable of dealing with the developing regional threat, defence

acquisition plans included qualitative improvements in JMSDF platforms, systems and equipment. New acquisition plans included, for example, new anti-aircraft missile destroyers containing remodelled Tartar anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as anti-ship striking capability, helicopters designed to deploy on specially-designed destroyers for additional ASW capability, and land-based P-3C ASW aircraft. However, the operational benefits of these acquisitions and their contribution to JMSDF-USN interoperability did not appear until some years later, and will be discussed in Chapter 3.

In terms of tactical communication systems, the US Navy and JMSDF had only a very basic capability to communicate and pass mission-essential data in a high threat environment. In 1977, for example, the 'secure' communication capability in use between USN and JMSDF ships involved manually encrypted/decrypted messages passed over uncovered voice circuits. The system was neither rapid nor accurate enough and resulted in degraded tactical effectiveness and late reporting to higher authorities. Sometimes, as discussed earlier, the US Navy would temporarily install equipment on JMSDF ships for a particular exercise. However, this practice was not consistent and typically involved bureaucratic delays.

Communicating tactical data and sharing interactive pictures of the operating environment became increasingly important to the United States and its allies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the Soviet threat increased. In the late 1970s, as discussed earlier, the JMSDF did not have access to advanced

tactical data links, such as Link 11, although the US Navy, as well as NATO allies, had been using the system to link their ships and aircraft for a number of years. The availability of this system became a sensitive JMSDF-USN issue, particularly in the context of the new P-3C aircraft that Japan planned to buy for its naval forces, as discussed in an earlier section. Even with the 1978 change in US National Disclosure Policy, conflict between the two navies over access to technology still occurred.

The Japan-US naval relationship did not develop its own doctrinal publications but rather used those from NATO as the foundation for its operations. Over the years, the US Navy and JMSDF made changes to the publications to accommodate the unique conditions under which the naval relationship operates. The common publications are in English, although the JMSDF has made some translated materials available.

Political will and commitment are the final major components of interoperability between navies. In the case of the Japan-US relationship, the two countries' willingness to begin cooperating on defence-related matters, as demonstrated by the 1978 Defense Cooperation Guidelines, as well as Prime Minister Suzuki's statement in 1981 that Japan would take responsibility for sealane defence were important contributions to future naval interoperability. The two navies also demonstrated their commitment to a more integrated and interoperable relationship, as demonstrated by the navy-to-navy formal talks held during this period. However, each navy had its own interests. The US Navy had to balance its concerns about the risk of unauthorized disclosure of information and technology concerning US submarine operations and capabilities against having the JMSDF as an active player in ASW operations in the Northwest Pacific.
The JMSDF recognised the importance of interoperability and the need to create compatible doctrine, tactics and procedures with the US Navy at this critical point in their relationship. The JMSDF recognised that it was in its own best interest to do so. According to research conducted by Alessio Patalano, Admiral Yada, Chief of the Maritime Staff in 1980, wanted to increase the level of cooperation with the US Navy, in accordance with the recommendations of the 1978 Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines. Yada introduced the concept of ‘Renkei’, translated as ‘teamwork’ / ‘coordination’ as part of his efforts to strengthen JMSDF-USN cooperation. In particular, Admiral Yada wanted to strengthen the ASW capabilities of the JMSDF and to improve interoperability and communications between the two navies. Patalano’s research also indicated that the JMSDF viewed closer ties with the US Navy as an opportunity to learn as much as possible at the tactical level and to be able to maximise the use of modern equipment as well as develop original tactics. 

**Institutional Depth**

As discussed in Chapter 1, the depth of a naval relationship is determined by a number of tangible and intangible factors, such as shared fundamental values, perceptions of the international environment and shared concepts of security, along with an equitable sharing of burden and risk. Similar language and culture help to further promote and strengthen a naval relationship. Due to

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178 This discussion concerning ‘Renkei’ and Admiral Yada’s efforts to promote interoperability with the US Navy came from original work by Alessio Patalano, as part of his forthcoming doctoral thesis in the Department of War Studies, King’s College, University of London, entitled, *Unveiling the Imperial Legacy: Strategy, Naval Policy and Propaganda in the Post-Cold War Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force*. This information was the result of Patalano’s examination of JMSDF Chief of the Maritime Staff ‘official instructions’. Mr. Patalano provided an English translation of the original Japanese text.
a variety of factors during this period, the US and Japanese navies did not experience the deeper ties that existed between the US Navy and certain other navies in Europe. Firstly, as noted earlier in this chapter, the US Navy still looked across the Atlantic for its strongest relationships. Secondly, the lack of extensive operational interaction during this period prevented the development of deeper personal and professional relationships. Thirdly, culture and language differences between the two navies were exacerbated because there were fewer opportunities for interaction and familiarisation. A fraternal bond exists between navies; however, navies are still products of their national governments and cultures, with all the prejudices and preconceived notions that go along with those associations. Interviews with US and Japanese naval officers—active and retired—provided valuable perspectives concerning the depth of the naval relationship at this time and the factors that influenced it.

While sharing much in common as navies, the institutional depth of the Japan-US relationship in the mid-1970s was challenged by memories of World War II, language and cultural differences, and the lack of familiarity between the two navies because they had not worked together in an actual operation. The ‘institution’ of the US Navy still looked toward Europe, rather than the Pacific, for its close allies. As the Soviet naval presence expanded into the western Pacific during the late 1970s and early 1980s, USN attention began to shift as well. The changing nature of the threat and its perception by both navies were the key drivers in moving the navies closer together. However, the incident involving the sinking of the Nissho Maru, discussed later in this chapter, demonstrated how quickly a growing relationship can regress when crises emerge.
The nature of Japan-US naval relations for the first 30 years after World War II, particularly on an interpersonal level, is well documented by Admiral Arleigh Burke and by James Auer.\textsuperscript{179} JMSDF senior officers continued to have good working relations with senior US Navy officers stationed in Japan after that time. However, despite these prominent early relationships between the two navies, one should not underestimate the effect that World War II had on members of the US Navy, and hence the naval relationship, well into the 1970s and 1980s. A prominent example of the mark that World War II left on certain US Navy officers involved a 1978 incident concerning the Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. and the memory of his father, Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Sr., who died on the bridge of his flagship, the \textit{USS Arizona}, during the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

In May 1978, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, DC—Ambassador Fumihiko Togo—had wanted to visit the headquarters of the US Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia, and meet with Admiral Kidd. The Japanese Ambassador was considered to be ‘pro-military’ and particularly ‘pro-Navy’, and had already visited US Pacific Fleet headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Third Fleet headquarters in San Diego, California, and the US Naval Academy.\textsuperscript{180} The only missing link was the Atlantic Fleet. The request for a visit went out twice and was turned down each time, with diplomatic excuses made about the Admiral’s unavailability. This visit request quickly escalated into a sensitive issue at the highest level. Finally, the reason for Admiral Kidd’s resistance emerged in a

\textsuperscript{179} Admiral Arleigh Burke’s Oral History Interview, (volume I), May 1979, from the US Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, and James E. Auer, \textit{The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces}.

\textsuperscript{180} Naval Message from CINCLANTFLT to Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Visit of Japanese Ambassador’, #171455Z, May 1978, and Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Proposed Visit of Ambassador Togo (Japan) to CINCLANTFLT’, (unsigned and undated), and attached hand-written memorandum from OP-61B to OP-612, 19 May 1978. Both documents are from Box 426A, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. The memorandum stated the following: ‘CINCLANTFLT Protocol Office has advised that Admiral Kidd does not plan to have the Japanese call on him, period’. An attached handwritten note explained that despite the various reasons that had been given in the past for Admiral Kidd’s inability to meet with Ambassador Togo, the ‘real reason’ was that Admiral Kidd’s father had been killed at Pearl Harbor and was entombed on the *Arizona*. As such, Admiral Kidd had no desire to meet with the Japanese Ambassador.

Admiral Kidd’s attitude was by no means unusual for US naval personnel during this period. Even Admiral Arleigh Burke, one of the best friends of Japan’s maritime community, had less than positive sentiments about the Japanese in the years immediately following World War II. One of the questions posed to him during his oral history interview was whether his attitude was typical of naval personnel at the time. Admiral Burke provides a useful discussion of the effect of wars—and World War II in particular—on naval relationships:

> Oh, yes, I think it was because when you go to war you see a lot of things, you're fighting them all the time, and they're your enemy, so this attitude was generally held by all our navy people at that time and, as a matter of fact, even now, that opinion is held by quite a few old-timers who have not been in Japan since the war. They still do not like Japanese.

Gradually, in the late 1970s, a network of relationships between the two navies began to increase as a growing number of Japanese officers graduated
from the Naval War College and other training programmes in the United States. Beyond these contacts, JMSDF-USN relationships generally were between JMSDF officers and US Navy officers who were or had been stationed in or operated out of Japan. JMSDF relations with senior US Navy officials in Washington during the 1970s were not as collegial due to a lack of regular contact and, according to several key US naval officers, a lack of interest by senior US Navy officers in Washington to establish a closer working relationship. 185 This was particularly the case for officers who had not had experience operating in the Pacific region in the post-World War II years. US Navy officers also point to the fact that during this time Europe was still the priority mission for the US Navy and for the other US military services, since concern about the Soviet threat was focussed principally in the European region during the early years of the Cold War. Further, many US military officers had spent formidable periods of their careers in Europe and as such, they were most comfortable operating with navies within the NATO alliance. 186

Several other factors prevented the Japan-US naval relationship from achieving the closeness that existed with other naval relationships, such as within NATO. According to several senior US Navy officers (active and retired) who had served in Japan and Washington from the 1970s through the 1990s, one of the problems in working with the JMSDF was that the US Navy never completely knew if it could depend on the JMSDF in case of a crisis in the region because any request for assistance involved arduous negotiations between Japan and the United States before a decision was made, due

185 Interviews 5E (8 April 2005), 5F (10 January 2006) and 15A (22 August 2000).
186 Interviews 3C (14 December 1999), 2B (29 July 1999), 13A (21 June 2000) and 20A (24 May 2000), with USN officers who had experience operating with the JMSDF as well as with the navies of other US allies.
principally to constitutional and other restrictions in Japan. One experienced US Navy officer stated that, 'if you can’t plan it (a navy) in, it’s irrelevant'.

US naval officers interviewed also noted that culture and language differences affected the naval relationship at this particular time. While most senior level Japanese officers (captain and above) spoke English, the quality was not consistent. The JMSDF required all officers and senior enlisted to pass an English language test, but this simply guaranteed that the officer had basic language skills. Few US Navy officers spoke Japanese. The US Navy did not encourage or reward this capability. Therefore, when senior US Navy officials met with their JMSDF counterparts, interpreters often had to be used. This did not encourage spontaneity or depth in a relationship, according to US officers. In addition, without more extensive operational contact between the navies, there was no incentive to work through the cultural and language differences.

A combination of cultural and other issues emerged in the forefront of an unfortunate accident involving the collision of the US nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarine, the USS George Washington, with a Japanese cargo vessel, the Nissho Maru. The collision occurred on the morning of 9 April 1981, when the submarine surfaced in stormy seas and hit the cargo vessel. The Japanese captain and another crew member drowned. The other 13 crew members floated in two life rafts at sea for hours before being rescued by a Japanese destroyer. According to reports of the accident, the submarine

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187 Interview 5E (8 April 2005).
188 Numerous officers interviewed for this study emphasised the cultural implications of operating with the JMSDF versus with English-speaking navies (i.e., navies for whom English was the primary language), including the US, UK, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand navies. Although the relationship between the USN and JMSDF became closer in later years (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4), similar language and culture still bound the English-speaking navies closely together, according to interviews with US naval personnel (active and retired).
189 See, for example, interviews 5E (8 April 2005), 7A (20 July 2000), 2B (29 July 1999), 3C (14 December 1999) and 13 A (21 June 2000).
submerged, left the scene and did not immediately report the accident. In an interview with the retired naval officer who was the US Defense Attaché (US Embassy Tokyo) at the time of the collision, the official noted that cultural differences affected how Japan and the United States reacted to the accident and exacerbated an already difficult situation. Japan was particularly angry because the US Navy did not immediately admit its mistake. The damage that the incident caused to the Japan-US security relationship and the naval relationship was serious and it unleashed a storm of protest and anger in Japan. The most serious consequences for the security and naval relationships came because the incident gave critics of the Japan-US security relationship a new platform for their anti-American protests, and boosted Japan's anti-nuclear movement. In the end, the US Navy took full responsibility for the accident in the final, very critical investigative report, issued nearly 5 months after the accident. One aspect of the incident that would not be forgotten was Ambassador Mansfield's apology to the Japanese government. When Ambassador Mansfield delivered the Navy report to Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda, he bowed deeply from the waist to nearly a 45-degree angle—a powerful symbol of contrition in Japan. The action was covered in the Japanese press and helped in mitigating the effects of the accident and the public anger that had been generated there from. Despite the wording of the

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190 Don Oberdorfer describes this incident in his biography of Mike Mansfield, the US Ambassador to Japan at the time of the accident. See Don Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield: The Extraordinary Life of a Great American Statesman and Diplomat (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003), pp. 489-492.

191 Interview 21A (9 May 2005 and follow-up on 15 June 2007).

192 According to Oberdorfer, Minoru Tamba, chief of the security bureau at the Foreign Ministry, wept when he was informed, believing the event would be too destructive to the relationship. See Oberdorfer, p. 490.

193 Don Oberdorfer quotes portions of the Navy report including, 'inadequate command supervision' and 'less than professional watch-standing procedures', as well as a combination of coincidences that had caused the accident. Oberdorfer also notes that the report sharply criticised the submarine crew's 'disregard of one of the mariner's historic, and primary, responsibilities—to render assistance to vessels in distress. See Oberdorfer, pp. 490-491. See also interview 21A (9 May 2005 and 15 June 2007).
Navy report and US apologies, the incident set back the security and naval relationships nearly a year, according to the retired naval officer who served as the Defence Attaché at the time. The US Navy had to work hard behind the scenes to reinforce and renew the naval relationship, including restoring a degree of trust that was just beginning to build prior to the accident.  

External Linkages

Linkages to outside organizations expand the nature and extent of mutual contacts between navies. These opportunities were critical in helping familiarize Japanese naval personnel with respective operating procedures and decision making and encouraged the growth of friendships and personal contacts between the navies. During this period, the JMSDF was seeking out opportunities for contact with the US Navy and for a better understanding of its operations. This was facilitated through personnel exchanges, staff liaisons and increased training and educational opportunities in the United States. Typically, the JMSDF was seeking out opportunities for increased contact with the US Navy and for a better understanding of its operations. For the US Navy, it was a way to share its knowledge and influence the development of the JMSDF. As such, however, the Japan-US naval relationship during this period was somewhat one-sided in terms of the flow of information and influence rendering. USN officials encouraged this growth in influence rendering, recognising that it supported US interests.

As the Japan-US naval relationship matured, the navies began participating together in an increasing number of naval conferences, forums and  

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194 Interview 21A (9 May 2005 and follow-up on 15 June 2007).
symposia. Such participation helped to strengthen the relationship and its institutionalisation by providing ideas for new approaches and procedures, as well as a way to engage other navies about their operational experiences. As was the case with training and exercises, the two navies were in the early stages of expanding their relationship to include connections with outside naval-related organisations and conferences. The US Naval War College provided the focus for many of these new opportunities, including the bi-annual International Seapower Symposium.

Educational exchanges and training and technical assistance provided an important avenue for broader institutional linkages. The two navies approached these opportunities differently, given their different expectations about the naval relationship. Soon after the formation of the JMSDF in 1954, Japan's naval officers were very interested in re-establishing a professional relationship with the US Navy, which included officer exchanges, liaisons, and increased training and educational opportunities in the United States. These opportunities were critical in establishing closer relationships between the two navies and increased institutionalisation because they helped familiarise naval officers with respective operating procedures and decision making, as well as encouraged the growth of friendships and personal contacts between the navies. In addition, English language skills—critical for working with the US Navy—also improved as an increased number of Japanese officers (and later enlisted personnel) came to the United States for study and technical training.

JMSDF participation in educational activities grew steadily through the years, as indicated in Table 5. In 1956, Admiral Richard Colbert invited the JMSDF to send a senior officer to the Naval Command College, an institution at
the Naval War College established for foreign naval officers. The JMSDF continued to send one to two officers a year to the Naval Command College during this period. As Japan began to acquire more technologically sophisticated systems from the United States, particularly in the area of air defence, the JMSDF sent a large number of its officers and enlisted personnel to technical training classes in the United States. This training began in the late 1970s but grew more rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, after the purchase of the Aegis air defence system and its predecessor, the TARTAR system. In addition to US defence institutions, the JMSDF also sent many of its officers to programmes (degree and non-degree) at US universities. Some but not all of these numbers are captured in Table 5.

Table 5: JMSDF Education and Training in the United States, through 2004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Numbers of JMSDF Officers/Enlisted</th>
<th>Date Attendance Began</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College (Naval Command College)¹</td>
<td>49 officers in total (always 1)</td>
<td>Since 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College (Naval Staff College)</td>
<td>31 officers in total (always 1)</td>
<td>Since 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Post-Graduate School</td>
<td>29 officers</td>
<td>Data not available *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense University</td>
<td>4 officers</td>
<td>Since 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Colleges</td>
<td>18 officers</td>
<td>Data not available *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEGIS-related courses</td>
<td>283 officers and enlisted</td>
<td>Data not available *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/technical courses</td>
<td>306 officers and enlisted</td>
<td>Data not available *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence courses</td>
<td>44 officers and enlisted</td>
<td>Data not available *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other misc. training/courses</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Data not available *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JMSDF (Maritime Staff Office), Education Office, 19 August 2004

* JMSDF officials were not able to provide a year by year break-out of the number of JMSDF personnel attending US educational institutions nor was it able to identify when attendance began, in most cases.

The US Navy and others in the US defence establishment recognised the importance and value of having Japanese officers study in the United States. This is demonstrated in a November 1977 cable from the Defense Attaché at the US Embassy in Tokyo—a Navy captain—to the Commander, US Pacific Forces. The cable identifies three areas of concern that warranted further US attention in order to foster better defence relations between the United States and the Japan Defense Agency. One of the three items included expanding ‘military schooling’ for more members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and funding the expansion with International Military Education and Training funds. The Defense Attaché believed that there was an obvious correlation between the high degree of interface between US and Japanese students attending such training, and the strong rapport, understanding and influence resulting from that interaction and exposure to US military personnel, equipment and doctrine.

The US Navy did not have the same sense of desire or urgency to send US Navy officers to defence or other educational institutes in Japan. In 1977, the US Navy sent an officer to the JMSDF’s Maritime Staff College, and this continued on a fairly regular basis thereafter, as indicated in Table 6. In 1982 US officers began attending the National Defense College/National Institute for Defense Studies, in Tokyo—the equivalent of the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. As a matter of priority, the US Navy—which found itself increasingly stretched as it deployed forces throughout the world in response to the expanding Soviet naval threat—wanted its officers to focus on operational matters. Therefore, the Navy did not actively encourage language training or other educational training that would have provided a considerable number of

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US Navy personnel a better understanding of Japan and likely a closer relationship with JMSDF officers.\textsuperscript{197}

**Table 6:** USN Education and Training in Japan, through 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Numbers of USN Officers</th>
<th>Date Attendance Began</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Staff College</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Since January 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute for Defense Studies</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Since August 1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JMSDF (Maritime Staff Office), Education Division, 19 August 2004

* JMSDF officials were not able to provide a year by year break-out of the number of USN personnel attending JMSDF educational institutions

Another way in which the JMSDF attempted to enhance its relationship with the US Navy was through liaison officers placed on the staff of certain Navy commands. As indicated in Table 7, the JMSDF provided two officers to the headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan, beginning in 1956, to serve as links between the two navies. An additional liaison was added to the US Pacific Fleet in 1974. No additional JMSDF liaison officers assumed positions on US Navy staffs during the 1976-81 period. As the liaisons were mid-level naval officers—generally a Commander or Captain—they served as administrative liaisons—not as decision makers. According to JMSDF and USN officers interviewed, the JMSDF liaisons benefited the JMSDF more than the USN because the liaisons received access to certain types of information and US perspectives that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain.\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{197} See, for example, interviews 3C (14 December 1999) and 2A (22 March 1999).

\textsuperscript{198} See, for example, interviews 18A (8 July 2004) and 19E (3 February 2002).
Table 7: JMSDF Liaison Officers on US Military Staffs, through 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position/Institution</th>
<th>Numbers of JMSDF Officers</th>
<th>Date Attendance/Representation Began</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters, US Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1 officer</td>
<td>Since 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters, US Naval Forces Japan</td>
<td>2 officers</td>
<td>Since 1956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JMSDF (Maritime Staff Office), Education Office, 19 August 2004.

As was the case with education and training, the US Navy did not reciprocate and place USN officers on JMSDF staffs. The only liaison officer the US Navy provided to Japan during this time was a junior Navy lieutenant who taught naval history classes at the Maritime Academy in Eta Jima, Japan. This position was established in October 1972. According to US Navy officers interviewed, other operational requirements prevented the US Navy from placing one of its officers on the JMSDF staff. They noted that since the two navies were located so close to each other, communication was not a problem. That said, however, several USN and JMSDF officers of the period interviewed have indicated that one or more US liaisons at the JMSDF headquarters would have provided tangible benefits, particularly in the early days of the naval relationship when institutional links were being established.199

Summary

The foregoing analysis indicates that while interacting in various capacities for many years prior to 1976, the two navies were just in the early stages of formalising their relationship. They had a considerable way to go to come close to the relationship that the US Navy had established with certain

allies in NATO and in the ANZUS alliance. The relationship displayed just the basic elements of institutionalisation during this period. The key accomplishment for the naval relationship was establishing a foundation for cooperation, which was critical for building the later relationship. In addition, the developments during this period also represented an acknowledgement on the part of both navies that naval cooperation was in their best interest, and as such, both navies made adjustments to their policies and procedures.

Some of the greatest achievements during this period occurred in internal coordination—a key institutional building block. This was best exemplified in the first formalised naval talks, held in 1977, that helped foster improved navy-to-navy understanding and began to lay the groundwork for closer operational cooperation. Operational cooperation, in the form of exercises and training, also grew during this period but was challenged by a lack of interoperability due in part to the US Navy's objection to sharing certain information and technology with the JMSDF. The US Navy's unwillingness to share sensitive information and technology, even though the United States had provided some of the same information to certain other allies, demonstrated a lack of trust between the two navies. The US Navy adjusted some of their policies towards the end of this period, which represented the start of more substantive cooperation between the two navies. Similarly, the JMSDF recognised the importance of teamwork between the navies and, through its policies and practices, took various actions that strengthened certain operational capabilities and interoperability. Of particular significance in 1980, the JMSDF participated in its first RIMPAC multinational exercise.

One of the most interesting revelations during this period was that the US Navy was far from a unitary block when it came to fostering cooperative
relations with the JMSDF and providing the JMSDF access to classified military information and technology. The institution of the US Navy was split between those who had had experience operating in the Pacific and working with the JMSDF and those whose experience had been with the US Atlantic Fleet and principally with NATO allies. The two navies were just beginning to operate together—on a regular basis—to meet mutually acknowledged security threats. Institutionalisation was beginning to grow out of this cooperation as both navies acknowledged that certain structures, processes and procedures were needed to enhance operational interaction.

OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE JAPAN-US NAVAL RELATIONSHIP

The changing nature of the Japan-US security relationship was an important influence on the naval relationship, particularly in the early stages of institutionalisation. This was exemplified by the political commitment by Japan and the United States to support defence cooperation, as articulated in the 1978 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. They provided the foundation for increased cooperation of a more complex nature and served to ‘legitimise’ the cooperative relationship that had been developing between the two navies. The decision by Japan and the United States to improve the nature and extent of their security cooperation rose from a large degree of self-interest motivated by political, economic and security factors in each country. Changes within Japan were particularly important in facilitating new levels of cooperation. With the support of Japan’s political leadership, US officials could more easily engage their counterparts and constructively work toward building a more cooperative security relationship. At the same time, the JMSDF had greater freedom to
engage the US Navy, with overt support from their senior political leadership. This had not been the case in the past.

A combination of factors in both countries helped create conditions for cooperation. The growing threat from the Soviet Union became an increasing concern to both navies and defence establishments and eventually the political establishments. In the United States, the aftermath of Vietnam, rising debt, inflation and balance of payment problems meant that the United States in the 1970s was principally concerned with getting allies to help share the defence burden through increased defence spending and a more equitable sharing of military roles and missions. Japan was a focus of congressional attention because of ongoing trade battles and competition over a variety of other economy-related issues. Key US civilian officials were responsible for asserting the importance of the Japan-US security relationship and helped launch cooperative initiatives with Japan that ultimately benefited the navies, fending off US congressional pressure.

In Japan, the key factors that led to a more cooperative security relationship with the United States and increased exercises and other interaction between the navies included a growing Soviet threat in the Northeast Asia region and recognition of the vulnerability of Japan, changing attitudes of the Japanese public toward defence and security issues and a growing consensus on defence issues within the Japanese political establishment. In addition, continued vitriolic trade and economic relations with the United States created competing pressures on the government and on efforts to cooperate on defence-related issues with the US government. As with the United States, key officials in Japan were responsible for helping to facilitate change in the security relationship.
Threat Perceptions

Until approximately 1976, US concerns about the Soviet Union were principally focussed on activities in the Atlantic and in Europe. However, a series of events and new activities in the strategic environment changed these perspectives. Of particular concern was growing Soviet naval strength in the Pacific. In 1977, Admiral Maurice Weisner, Commander-in-Chief, US Forces Pacific (CINCPAC), warned that the Soviet Union had improved and increased its naval capabilities to such an extent that they could pose a threat to US maritime interests in the Pacific Ocean. One year later, in 1978, CINCPAC noted a fundamental change in the balance of naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. He noted that the Soviet Pacific Fleet was now the largest of all Soviet fleets and that it was likely that new Soviet vertical/short take-off-and-land/anti-submarine warfare carrier and Backfire Bomber would join the Pacific Fleet beginning in 1980, significantly improving Soviet war-fighting capabilities in the Pacific. In a statement to the Far Eastern Economic Review (May 5, 1978), Admiral Weisner stated that if war broke out, US forces in the Pacific would have an 'even chance' of defeating Soviet forces but that 'the balance of power is tipping towards the Soviets'.

Along with the acknowledgement of the increasing Soviet threat in the Pacific came unsettling revelations by senior military personnel about US

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200 For example, in 1975, the Ford Administration reduced the number of forward-deployed aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific from three to two. See US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *US Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations*, Committee Print, prepared by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 1979, p. 190.

201 US CINCPAC, *1976 Command History*, declassified from Top Secret, p. 498, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.


vulnerabilities—particularly with regard to the US ability to defend vital sealanes in the Pacific. The revelation emerged initially with the announcement in February 1976 by Admiral James Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, that the United States had lost its once undisputed control of the Sea of Japan. 204 Then, in 1977, Admiral Stansfield Turner stated that because of the shortages of sea control forces and mobile logistics support forces, the United States would have difficulty protecting lines of communication into the western Pacific. 205 Referring to the ‘swing strategy’, Admiral Holloway testified that if US Pacific Fleet assets were shifted to Europe in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, remaining US forces could protect only military lines of communication to US allies in the Western Pacific. Holloway omitted any reference to the US ability to keep sea lines of communication open for economic supply of Japan from the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and the United States. 206

During the period 1976-1981, Japan’s concerns about the growing threat from the Soviet Union were publicly acknowledged and discussed in increasing detail each year in its annual defence white papers. 207 These security concerns were one of the central reasons Japan re-evaluated its defence requirements and its force structure, beginning with the 1976 Defense Outline, and for the increased focus on improving naval capabilities in the late 1970s. Japan’s new assessments were a striking change from the past, when publicly articulated and published statements in Japan concerning defence and the international situation indicated a relaxation of tensions between the East and the West. The

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206 US Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, pp. 185-186.
207 While some may question when Japan began to be concerned about the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the potential effect on the region, scholars appear to agree that the public acknowledgement of this threat occurred in the mid-to-later 1970s. See James Auer Oral History Interview and the Defense of Japan white papers for years 1976-1981.
formidable incident for Japan came in September 1976, when a Soviet MIG-25 aircraft intruded its territorial airspace. The 6 September intrusion and forced landing at Hakodate Airport in Hokkaido by the Soviet Union’s most advanced fighter aircraft was one of a number of wake-up calls that occurred in the next few years that prodded Japan into making needed changes to its defence forces, including its naval forces. The incidents demonstrated not only the increasingly daring Soviet forces but also the vulnerabilities of Japan’s defence forces to defend its borders from regional threats.

The JDA’s annual White Papers became increasingly specific during the years 1976-1981 concerning the nature of this potential threat. The 1976 report contained less than 5 pages about Soviet military capabilities. This coverage grew incrementally larger during each of the years that followed. According to the JDA, Soviet aircraft approached Japan about 200 times that year, and scrambles by Japanese Air Self-Defense Force aircraft were flown on more than 300 occasions. From an operational standpoint, questions arose as to how the Self-Defense Forces could have allowed a MIG-25 to penetrate Japan’s territorial airspace, despite round the clock coverage by 28 radar stations across the nation and Air Self-Defense Force aircraft on ground alert. The JDA and the Self-Defense Forces discovered that the Soviet aircraft was able to land undetected due to the lack of early warning capability against low-altitude intrusions and insufficient airborne ‘look-down’ radar capability of interceptor

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aircraft in Japan. This discovery—and other recognised vulnerabilities—affect...procurement decisions for Japan’s Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces for years to come. For the JMSDF, platforms with enhanced surveillance capabilities received priority.

The notable increases in Soviet armed strength included particularly its increased naval power and advancing ‘blue water’ capability, which Japan feared had begun to affect the regional military balances in both Europe and the Far East. The 1978 defence white paper stated that Soviet naval power was becoming ‘an unignorable factor in the security of the island regions off the coast of continental Asia’.

Changing Public Opinion and Politics in Japan

Over the course of the post-war period, Japan’s security planning process revolved around the contentious domestic issue of defining the purpose of the Self-Defense Forces, as well as containment of the military’s institutional influence in national policy formulation. The relatively late incorporation of Japan’s military into US regional strategy was due not only to decisions in the United States but also in Japan, where a slow and complex process existed for defining an acceptable place for the post-war military in national policy. It was not until the national policymaking process had gained greater domestic support that the Japanese government was able to move in the direction of creating a policy dialogue with the US government to establish procedures and goals for

211 This incident, and the continued assertiveness of Soviet forces in the years that followed, helped justify procurement decisions during this time period and resulted in such purchases as the E-2C Hawkeye, an airborne, all-weather early warning aircraft that warns the naval task force of approaching air threats. See Defense of Japan, 1977, pp. 126 and 137.
cooperation between the two militaries.\textsuperscript{213} This, then, enabled the navies to conduct their cooperative activities more openly.

In the mid-1970s, Japanese public opinion began to change concerning security issues in general, and more specifically concerning Japan’s defence forces and the Japan-US security relationship. Security issues began to be discussed more openly and less passionately, and both the security treaty (between the US and Japan) and the Self-Defense Forces received greater public acceptance.\textsuperscript{214} Table 8 indicates changes in public opinion between 1965 and 1977 on questions concerning the role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and demonstrates that a greater recognition of the SDF role in national security preservation existed in 1977 than in earlier years. Of particular significance, on 5 August 1976, the Japanese High Court ruled that it was legal for the country to maintain military forces—reversing a district court ruling made 35 months earlier.\textsuperscript{215}

\textbf{Table 8: } How Should SDF Efforts Be Concentrated? (Public Opinion Poll)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disaster-relief operations</th>
<th>Preservation of national security</th>
<th>Maintenance of public peace</th>
<th>Community activities</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Japan Defense Agency, \textit{Defense of Japan 1978}, p. 177. (The Prime Minister’s Office conducted this survey until 1975, when an external research organisation conducted the survey.)

\textsuperscript{214} Cable from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘US Goals and Objectives: Overview Statement’, cable #220635Z, February 1978, declassified from Secret, p. 4, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
Japanese defence officials expressed optimism about the emerging changes in Japanese public opinion. Michita Sakata, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, stated in the 1976 Defense White Paper that ‘...a tendency to confront defence issues within current realities has begun to emerge among the people. They seem to have accepted that defence power is not a tool to wage war, but rather to deter it, in other words, a tool for people’. \(^{216}\)

The significance of the public opinion shift in Japan at this time and the effect it had on the JMSDF should not be minimized. Between 1952 (when Japan and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty) and the mid-1970s, a vocal minority had successfully stymied the public discussion of defence issues and targeted the US government and the Mutual Defense Agreement as objects of hostile reproach. Throughout the Japanese government and the public in general there existed a moderate opposition to what was viewed as the 'promotion' of defence and security issues, and this affected the implementation of defence programmes. Anti-defence public opinion significantly affected defence programmes during the Fourth Defense Plan (1972-76), according to Japanese officials, including the type and amount of equipment procured, changes in the defence budget, and the extent of cooperation with US military forces. This attitude even affected the publication of Japan’s second Defense White Paper in 1976 (the first was published in 1970), according to former JDA Director General Michita Sakata. He stated that the drafting took longer than expected due in part to ‘...the predominance with the Defense Agency of a long-standing passive atmosphere, shunning public controversy, over positive attitudes of presenting defence issues frankly to the people and cultivating understanding of Japan’s defence requirements’. \(^{217}\)

\(^{216}\) Japan Defense Agency,\emph{ Defense of Japan 1976}, p. 44.
\(^{217}\) \emph{Ibid.}, pp. 1-2.
As preparations were being made for JMSDF participation in the 1980 RIMPAC multilateral exercise, Japanese defence officials cautioned US officials to keep discussion of the preparation out of the public eye. These defence officials realised that while Japanese public opinion was changing, JMSDF participation in a multilateral exercise at a location way beyond Japanese territorial waters—even though Japan would be operating solely with US forces—was still a sensitive subject to the Japanese population.\textsuperscript{218} According to two former senior Defense Agency officials, although Japan was technically capable of participating in RIMPAC prior to 1980, they were not able to do so because advance political groundwork had not been laid in time. According to these officials, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation was a key element in the ‘political persuasion’ that was necessary before the JMSDF could participate in RIMPAC, demonstrating once again the important role of Japanese domestic politics in the JMSDF’s ability to interact operationally with the US Navy.\textsuperscript{219}

The increased public interest in Japan's national defence and the attitudinal shift can be attributed to a number of factors. According to JDA Director General Sakata, various factors contributed to this shift, such as the end of the Vietnam War, the debate over ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, tension on the Korean Peninsula, Sino-Soviet conflict on the 'hegemony' issue, the Japan-US summit conference, and the activities of Soviet naval and air forces around Japan.\textsuperscript{220} The American Embassy viewed the situation similarly and discussed it frequently in cable traffic back to

\textsuperscript{218} Naval Message from CINCPACFLT to USDAO (Canberra, Australia), ‘JMSDF Participation in RIMPAC’, #150210Z, December 1978, declassified from Secret, p. 2, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

\textsuperscript{219} Ohmori Oral History interview, p. 8 and Maruyama Oral History interview, pp. 18-19.

Washington. The Embassy saw that old inhibitions—political, psychological and constitutional—were less apt to paralyze the government of Japan and to affect its security relationship with the United States. These changes, in addition to the JDA’s establishment of a semi-official think tank for defence issues, were unimaginable in prior years, according to the Department.221

One indication of the changes in outlook on security-related issues is to compare Japan’s first Defense White Paper, published in 1970, and the second one, published in 1976. Table 9 provides an assessment of the key elements in each one. The assessment, conducted by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, identifies a move away from autonomous defence and towards a view that was more closely aligned with the United States at that time and with the Mutual Security Treaty. As indicated in Table 8, an attitude shift is now visible.

Table 9: Comparison of Japan’s 1970 and 1976 Defense White Papers
Conducted by the US Department of State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970 White Paper</td>
<td>Emphasised ‘autonomous defense’, referring approvingly to European neutrals</td>
<td>Small nuclear arms were considered legally and theoretically permissible, though contrary to government policy</td>
<td>The Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty was considered necessary as long as Japan was not a nuclear power and no major changes in the international situation took place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 White Paper</td>
<td>Places unequivocal emphasis on principle of collective security</td>
<td>Japan affirms reliance on US nuclear deterrence and emphasises its three non-nuclear principles</td>
<td>Places greater emphasis on the Treaty and conveys a sense of less qualified and more permanent support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to the changing attitudes toward security and defence among the Japanese public, the mid-to-late 1970s also saw greater consensus concerning defence issues within the political establishment in Japan. This includes the political parties and the government bureaucracy—principally the JDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. These changes contributed significantly to improved security cooperation and enhanced defence links between the two countries because previously existing barriers to intra-government cooperation were reduced or eliminated. The result of these changes was a more pragmatic approach to foreign and security policy planning—better suited to the domestic and international conditions of the late 1970s.  

Three political changes were critical to the renewed support for the Mutual Defense Treaty and security cooperation with the United States. The
first change was the alignment of the factions within the ruling LDP to support this objective. The unification of the LDP and its movement to a new middle ground began with the collapse of Defense Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s autonomous defence plan (the Fourth Defense Buildup Program from 1972-1976). For senior members of the Japanese government in the mid-1970s, the Nakasone experience (and the failure to achieve his goal) proved that the constituency for defence spending had to be expanded to include moderates in government and industry—including the Ministry of Finance. Depth of support, such as from industry, had to be sacrificed for breadth of support from the public, according to new Japanese leadership. Secondly, in addition to the growth of consensus among LDP factions, the Democratic Socialist Party provided centrist political party support for Japan-US relations and the Komeito (Clean Government) Party provided their tacit support. Finally, the Japan Socialist Party dropped its opposition to the Mutual Security Treaty and Japan’s security relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{223} Obtaining political party consensus (or in the case of the Japan Socialist Party—the lack of opposition) was essential in order to pass necessary legislation and defence programmes that would serve as the foundation for the new security relationship with the United States.

In conclusion, the political environment in Japan in the 1970s had a critical effect on the conduct of JMSDF-USN exercises and other related interaction. The shifts in Japanese public opinion concerning security and defence issues and the JMSDF, combined with other political changes, helped

\textsuperscript{223} For a more detailed account of the political changes and how they affected support for defence in Japan, see Naval Message, ‘Japanese Defense—the Future’, pp. 2-4 See also, Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, ‘Moderate Parties Pledge Support of Japan-US Relations’, #160006Z, December 1977, declassified from Confidential, pp 1-2, Box 426, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
increase the number of naval exercises and enabled the two navies to operate more openly together. The discussions between Japan and the United States on defence cooperation, which culminated in the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, finally provided an element of legitimacy for naval cooperation between the two countries.

**Defence Burdensharing**

In the mid-to-late 1970s, a combination of political and economic tensions in the Japan-US relationship served, ironically, to influence changes in the security relationship, including a greater focus on defence cooperation, which ultimately benefited the naval relationship. During this time period, the United States began to pressure Japan for increased defence burdensharing, given the struggling US economy, the growing trade imbalance between the United States and Japan, and the growing threat from the Soviet Union that was requiring increased US military attention and resources.

In the United States, the US Congress had assumed the role of the chief antagonist on burdensharing issues, maintaining that Japan’s defence forces should significantly expand their role and mission in the region given its economic status and the potential security challenges it faced in the region. In 1976, Japan had the third largest economy in the world and a gross national product of about $500 billion. A report to the Congress by the US General Accounting Office in January 1977 is one example of the discussions and debate at the time within the US government concerning whether or not Japan was bearing an appropriate share of the defence burden. The summary page at the
The burdensharing requests included not only increased financial support for US forces stationed in Japan but also suggestions that Japan should upgrade its own defence capacity, with particular emphasis on qualitative improvements in ASW and air defence. While Japan’s Self-Defence Forces had gradually improved their capabilities, they still were not capable of defending Japan against a large sustained attack. Furthermore, while Japan’s defence spending approached $5 billion in fiscal year 1976, Japan’s financial support for the US military presence in Asia was limited to paying land rental for areas occupied by US forces in Japan. The burdensharing debate was not just a phenomenon affecting Japan. The United States was at the same time pressuring its allies in Europe to both increase defence spending and improve their defence capabilities, as indicated by additional US General Accounting Office reports to the Congress at this time.\footnote{US General Accounting Office, \textit{Opportunity for More Equitable Sharing of the US/Japan Defense Burden}, January 1977, ID-77-8, pp. 1-3. See also, Naval Message from American Embassy, Tokyo, to US Secretary of State, \textquoteleft Japan Self-Defense Capabilities\textquoteright, \#100153Z, 10 May 1977, p. 2, Box 425, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.}

In Japan, burdensharing was part of a larger set of issues concerning trade and balance of payments disputes. As tensions grew, diplomatic officials...
in both Japan and the United States were concerned about rising nationalist, ‘go it alone’ sentiment in Japan. These debates coincided with the US decision in 1976 to withdraw a large portion of its forces from South Korea.\footnote{In his successful Presidential campaign in 1976, Jimmy Carter promised to withdraw, eventually, US ground forces from Korea. The plan evolved into a withdrawal of nearly 32,000 troops over a 4 to 5 year period. See USCINCPAC, \textit{1977 Command History}, declassified from Top Secret, p. 41, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.} This decision created significant concern in Japan about the future presence of the United States in the region and ultimately the future security of Japan. According to archival documents, Japan faced a conundrum over the force withdrawal issue. If it made a major diplomatic issue out of the withdrawal proposal, the United States would then ask Japan why it was not increasing its defence capabilities in order to better meet the perceived threat.\footnote{US Navy position paper, ‘Japan: Politico-Military Summary’, written by Captain J.E. Baker, OP-612, 16 June 1978, declassified from Secret, p. 1, box 426A, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. This position paper highlights the various issues that made Japan and other Asian countries sceptical of US intentions in the region. See also personal note from Defense Attaché, American Embassy Tokyo, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, 17 March 1977, concerning Japanese statements concerning potential US force withdrawal from the Republic of Korea. Both documents were obtained from the Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC, boxes 426A and 425, respectively.}

The increasingly contentious atmosphere between the two countries on issues of burdensharing and trade-related issues was creating serious diplomatic problems. In November 1977, US Ambassador Mike Mansfield sent a detailed cable to the US Secretary of State detailing his concerns over the state of the Japan-US relationship. As with his other communiqués back to Washington, Ambassador Mansfield alleged that US officials did not trust Japan—be it with regard to trade relations or on Japan’s ability to safeguard sensitive defence information and technology. Regarding defence burdensharing, Mansfield stated that while Japanese performance in some areas left much to be desired, it was important to recognise the limitations on the ability of the Government of Japan to influence the events. He noted that within these limits, Japan was
attempting to strengthen the capability of its forces by commitments to purchase such aircraft as the F-15, P-3C and the E-2C—all of which were qualitative improvements over existing platforms. In Japan, moderate proponents of continued US military presence exerted their influence in supporting qualitative improvements for Japan's Self-Defense Forces, further financial support of US forces in Japan and greater security cooperation with the United States, including with the US Navy. As discussed in Chapter 3, Japan’s efforts eventually paid off, particularly for the JMSDF, and resulted in US congressional favour for the transfer of certain technologies, such as Aegis capability for JMSDF destroyers.

**Defence Cooperation Initiatives**

The naval relationship in the 1970s was not isolated from other elements in the Japan-US security relationship. As the broader security relationship was undergoing an institutionalisation process, two elements were particularly significant for the naval relationship: the work of the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation and the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. They provided a certain ‘legitimacy’ for defence cooperation between the two navies, laid out a path for future cooperation and served to engage senior leadership in both countries on defence cooperation. Without these efforts and the sanction of the US and Japanese governments, the cooperation and institutionalisation between the two navies would have remained at a fairly low level.

The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, established in 1976, and the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, which emerged from the Subcommittee, established the first formalised mechanism between Japan and the United States to discuss when and how the two defence forces should cooperate for defence purposes.²²⁹ Although the US Navy and the JMSDF had had ongoing cooperative activities at a low level for many years, the activities were not publicised, particularly in Japan. As such, the Defense Cooperation Subcommittee and the Defense Guidelines provided a certain legitimacy for defence cooperation between the US and Japanese navies. They also served as vehicles to engage the United States on issues of growing concern to Japan.²³⁰ Of particular significance was the role played by senior Japanese officials in initiating and promoting discussion of defence cooperation. For the naval relationship, the engagement by Japanese political officials and their influence in promoting changes in Japanese public opinion toward greater acceptance of the defence forces provided an additional boost to the JMSDF and its desire to pursue active cooperation with the US Navy.

Japanese and US officials assumed important roles in initiating improved defence cooperation between both countries. Japanese officials, in particular, encouraged the establishment of improved defence cooperation and discussions between the United States and Japan. The Subcommittee on Defense

²²⁹ The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation was part of the Security Consultative Committee, an alliance mechanism discussed in Chapter 1.
²³⁰ The SDC focussed on potential contingencies in Japan and the Far East and on Japan-US joint exercises and other activities during non-conflict periods. The defence establishments in the United States and Japan believed that under the aegis of the SDC panels, Japan-US military requirements could surface more openly. This is likely true because previously there was no other way to establish these parameters without the existence of a formal structure. While the navies had been working together for over 20 years, this was the first opportunity they had had to sit down with their counterparts, as well as their respective civilian leaderships, and discuss operational planning. See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Staff Paper, ‘Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation: Terms of Reference’, 21 June 1976, declassified from Confidential, Box 352, Political-Military Division: Japan, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
Cooperation emerged after a series of meetings between senior US and Japanese officials: US President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Miki Takeo in August 1975, and subsequent talks that month between US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Michita Sakata.\(^{231}\)

In discussions with Schlesinger, Sakata suggested that in order to move forward with the Japan-US Security treaty, Japan and the United States needed to come to terms with the specifics of the arrangement between the two countries concerning control of the sea areas. The role that JDA Director General Sakata played in initiating discussions on defence cooperation was remarkable for two reasons. Firstly, it was highly unusual that a Japanese official, who was not the Prime Minister, had the authority—or wherewithal—to make such a suggestion to a senior official in the US government. Secondly, the Defense Agency was not an independent agency, and typically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency’s parent organization, served as the key point of contact in high-level dialogues with the US government. While initially suggested by Japan, US officials realised that participation in such a process was in the best interest of the United States, given other emerging issues such as the drawdown of its forces from the region after the Vietnam War.\(^{232}\)

In August 1977, the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation made the first of a series of important decisions affecting the Japan-US defence relationship. The Committee agreed that while the Self-Defense Forces would be in charge of responding to limited and small-scale aggression, in the case of larger scale

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\(^{232}\) Apparently Sakata wanted to discuss the matter of emergency cooperation with US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger after Sakata was questioned in the National Diet on the protection of maritime traffic. He recognised that there was no established organ to discuss defence cooperation—in an emergency or any situation. See Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1976*, pp. 5-6, and Takashi Maruyama Oral History, p. 10.
aggression, the Self-Defense Forces would be in charge of defensive operations and US forces would head the offensive. In essence, Japan was the shield and the United States the spear. This decision was critical in the preparation of guidelines for defence cooperation. For the navies, it was critical in how they would share responsibilities in defending the sealanes that surrounded Japan and was a precursor to later discussions on roles and missions.\(^{233}\)

In 1978, after two years of discussion and deliberations between US and Japanese representatives in the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, Japan and the United States approved the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Defense Guidelines were considered a milestone in Japan-US defence relations. They formed the basis of defence planning and other activities—albeit limited—between US forces and Japan’s Self-Defence Forces until the late 1990s. The Guidelines set precedents for civilian control, interagency cooperation and operational legitimacy for the JSDF, as well as helped to bind the US and Japanese strategies together.\(^{234}\) The Guidelines spelled out a general division of labour between the two defence forces and called for joint studies on operational issues in three areas: prevention of aggression against Japan, responses to military attacks on Japan, and Japan-US cooperation in case of a conflict in the Far East. The Guidelines also called for joint exercises and training, cooperation in intelligence activities, and the study of

\(^{233}\) A number of events occurred nearly concurrently during the mid-1970s and helped influence the division of defence responsibilities between the United States and Japan and the institutionalising of Japan-US defence cooperation between the defence forces. For Japan, the 1976 National Defense Programme Outline, discussed later in this chapter, was particularly important. Japanese scholar Yoshihide Soeya provides a useful discussion of how National Defense Program Outline and other factors affected Japan-US defence cooperation. See Yoshihide Soeya ‘Japan’s Dual Identify and the Japan-US Alliance’, pp. 15-16.

how facilitative assistance should be extended to US forces. In defence planning, studies focussed on responding to a military attack on Japan. Cooperation in the case of an emergency in the Far East proved too controversial due to constitutional and political constraints on Japan’s security policy and was pursued in the later 1990s, when Japan and the United States revised the Guidelines. Despite its shortcomings, the 1978 Defense Cooperation Guidelines laid the groundwork for the ‘roles and missions’ strategic approach that the Japan-US alliance pursued in the 1980s. This approach was critical for the two navies, particularly after 1981, when Japan publicly committed itself to protect the sealanes out to a radius of 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo.

Mixed views emerged in Japan and the United States concerning whether and how the JMSDF and US Navy benefited from the Guidelines. Some officials, such as James Auer, former Japan Director in the Office of the Secretary, US Department of Defense, maintained that the Defense Cooperation Guidelines made little difference to the JMSDF and US Navy because a habit of cooperation already existed between them. Auer believed that the Guidelines ‘worked fine’ but were limited in scope and 20 years too late, especially for the naval forces. He stated that the two navies had been conducting joint exercises and intelligence sharing since the 1950s, although Japan’s ability was very low initially.

Others, such as Keiji Ohmori, a former senior Japanese defence official, maintained that the Guidelines helped raise the technical sophistication of joint training between the two navies and with Japan’s Air Self Defense Force (JASDF), he said. The JMSDF and the JASDF traditionally had the closest

236 James Auer Oral History Interview, p. 9.
relationship with the US forces. For example, Ohmori pointed out that the
Defense Guidelines helped influence the emergence of scenario training. Prior
to the Guidelines, joint training for both the JMSDF and the JASDF generally
involved learning particular technical skills from the US forces. In addition to
changes in the nature of joint training, the number of exercises also increased,
which Ohmori attributed to the Guidelines.  

**Importance of People**

In taking stock of the political changes that occurred between 1976 and
1981 in Japan, Michita Sakata, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency
from 1975-1977, stands out as having had a particularly significant influence on
the Japan-US security relationship and on the JMSDF-USN relationship. Sakata
was one of the key Japanese officials who stepped forward and pushed for
closer cooperative security relations with the United States following the end of
the Vietnam War, when the possibility of US withdrawal from Japan threatened
to reignite internal LDP warfare over ideologically sensitive defence issues. Sakata
was responsible for creating the long-term National Defense Program
Outline (NDPO), which emphasized the primacy of the Japan-US alliance
relationship. The NDPO, adopted by Japan’s National Defense Council on 29
October 1976, set out the principles for Japan’s defence alongside the necessary
force structure to achieve these principles. The new plan included a standard
defence force concept that restricted the potentially endless quantitative build-
up of Japan’s defence forces and expenditures for which there was limited

237 Ohmori Oral history interview, p. 8.
domestic support. The NDPO created an internal political truce within the LDP and also a more stable foundation for the emergence of a new security policy in Japan. 239

In addition to the NDPO, Sakata played a key role in initiating policy discussions with US Defense Secretary Schlesinger and other US officials on defence cooperation, an unprecedented move by a senior Japanese bureaucrat. These discussions resulted in the creation of the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, and two years later, the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. In general, he set a new direction for the defence establishment—away from an industry constituency to one that had a broader base—in order to achieve increased public support for defence policies, defence forces, and the Japan-US Mutual Defense Treaty. 240

As a long-time Diet member, Sakata understood the importance of public support for national defence and as such helped establish programmes and initiatives to provoke public discussion and consideration of defence issues. In order to reach the public, Sakata re-commissioned the publication of an annual Defense White Paper. He also recommended that the National Defense Council assume a more active role on issues considered to be within the framework of overall national security. 241 His most significant action to improve public relations within Japan for defence issues was the creation of a ‘Forum on Defense’, consisting of 11 representatives of industry, academia and the media who met six times over a period of three months and issued a public report with its findings in September 1975. According to defence specialists, the group had

239 See, for example, Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, pp. 67-69.


241 Former Director General Nakasone had initiated the first White Paper six years earlier, in 1970. No additional White Papers were issued after that time. See Defense of Japan 1976, pp. 4-5 and 53.
the most open and healthy debate on defence issues that Japan had experienced in the post-war period. This ultimately had an important influence on the Japan-US defence and naval relationships, as defence issues were now more publicly recognised and accepted.242

Once Sakata laid the groundwork for increased defence cooperation, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, in 1981, provided the political commitment for more significant and long-term security cooperation with the United States. Prime Minister Suzuki, in a summit meeting with US President Reagan, announced that Japan would provide sealane defence in the northwest Pacific out to 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo. As such, the Prime Minister was also endorsing extended JMSDF cooperation with US forces, which would be operating in the region. This was also another example of civilian leadership laying the foundation for the JMSDF to assume a much more robust role in Japanese and regional security matters. Prime Minister Suzuki declared that some new 'division of roles' between Japan and the United States in the northwest Pacific was desirable and that Japan would 'seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defence capabilities in Japanese territories and surrounding seas and air space'.243

Why would Prime Minister Suzuki have made such a commitment, and what influenced his announcement? To some, this announcement came out of the blue and was a surprise. To others, especially within the Japanese government, the announcement was a surprise only in so far as it had not been previously planned and coordinated in Japan prior to the Prime Minister’s departure for Washington. For example, according to a former senior Japan

242 See Defense of Japan 1976, pp. 4-6 for Sakata’s own explanation of why public forums and discussions were important in order to achieve a successful defence programme. See also Green, Arming Japan, pp. 75-76.

Defense Agency official, Noboru Hoshuyama, the 1,000 mile sea lane defence concept was ‘well known and almost common sense’ inside the Defense Agency as well as inside the Japanese government. According to Hoshuyama, the 1,000 mile sealane defence, as well as the territorial waters around Japan, was the area the government had targeted for defence. He contemplated that perhaps someone informed Prime Minister Suzuki that this was a commonly accepted view within the Japanese government and that as such there should be no problem in mentioning it in his Washington speech.244

According to the Japanese senior official who served as Director General of the North American Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry was very surprised at Suzuki’s announcement. Director General Shinichiro Asao regretted that MOFA officials had not explained more about sealane defence when they briefed the Prime Minister. Asao stated that MOFA officials did not know in advance whether the sealane defence issue would be raised at the press conference that followed the Suzuki-Reagan communiqué.245

Euan Graham, in his book on Japan’s sealane security, bases his discussion of the Suzuki announcement principally on interviews with Hisahiko Okazaki, who at the time was Japan Defense Agency Councillor for Foreign Relations and had accompanied Prime Minister Suzuki to the United States. According to Okazaki, the brief for Suzuki’s May 1981 visit to Washington was prepared with the objective of presenting Japan in the most positive light possible, by re-packaging existing policy statements that were a matter of Diet record. For example, Prime Minister Suzuki appeared before the House of

Councillors Special Committee on Security on 10 November 1980 and stated that the SDF had the legal right ‘to defend Japanese shipping on the high seas if it is exposed to attack and other dangers’. According to Graham, this was the first time that a post-war prime minister had asserted the constitutionality of protecting Japan’s sealanes beyond the extent of its territorial waters.  

Graham writes that Suzuki was unaware of the controversy generated by the Joint Communiqué or by his subsequent press conference until he read the Japanese press coverage of the summit during a refuelling stop on his return flight to Tokyo. It was only at this point that Suzuki realised his comments on sealane defence had been taken by Washington as an official policy commitment on the part of his administration.

The situation surrounding Prime Minister Suzuki’s announcement was likely an example of the influence rendering that occurred between the defence establishments in Japan and the United States. In 1980 and 1981, a number of influential US officials visited Japan and met with government officials, including Okazaki, to discuss the concept of a Japan-US division of labour based on sharing roles and missions. The defence policymaking environment in Japan was particularly sensitive at this time to US pressure on burdensharing, and was anxious to placate Washington through concessions on security issues. It is likely, therefore, that defence officials in Japan, such as Okazaki—who had strong links to the US defence establishment—did what they could to influence the Prime Minister’s announcement. Japan’s assuming responsibility for sealane defence out to 1,000 miles was consistent with expectations from Washington for a division of labour.

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247 Ibid., pp. 132-138.
Soon after Prime Minister Suzuki's visit, the Japanese and American press as well as government representatives began disputing the context and meaning of Suzuki's statements. In Japan, opposition parties were opposed to such an extension of defence lines and expanded cooperation with the United States. In the United States, many saw the 'commitment' as hollow, given the capability of the JMSDF at the time and that it was meant to placate the US government in the midst of sensitive discussions over defence burdensharing. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, however, stressed that in previous discussions with Japan he had only asked that in the near-term Japan start to acquire the capability to defend the sealanes out to 1,000 miles.

Suzuki's announcement was eventually taken to mean that Japan had committed to a goal—to be attained in about a decade. This was consistent with expectations by the US defence establishment that Japan assume greater defence burdensharing responsibility. However, the Japanese government made it clear that its sealane responsibilities applied only in the event that Japan was under attack. This interpretation soon changed to accommodate sealane defence without an attack on Japanese territory—a more realistic assumption during the Cold War.249

Summary

External factors played a key role during the 1976-1981 time period in influencing the development and expansion of the naval relationship. The developing threat environment, national leadership influence and compatible

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national goals and objectives—as reflected in defence cooperation initiatives in the broader security relationship—contributed to the movement toward increased cooperation between the navies. While external factors were not as critical to the naval relationship in later periods, once the navies had established a closer operational relationship, they now were instrumental in helping establish the foundation for cooperation and eventually naval institutionalisation during the years covered in this chapter.

The political commitment by Japan and the United States to support defence cooperation, and the resulting Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1978, provided the foundation for increased cooperation of a more complex nature and served to ‘legitimise’ the cooperation that had already started to develop between the two navies. The navies realized they could do only so much without the support and commitment of their respective governments. As such, Prime Minister Suzuki’s commitment in 1981 to develop the capability for sealane defence out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan opened the door to new opportunities for the JMSDF and new contributions to the naval relationship.

Domestic politics in both Japan and the United States contributed to the transformation of the Japan-US security relationship and was a positive influence on naval cooperation during this period. In Japan, the alignment of factions within the ruling LDP to support the Mutual Defense Treaty and security cooperation with the United States, the support and tacit support of the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito Party, respectively, and the lack of opposition of the Japan Socialist Party helped improve the nature of Japan-US security relations by removing previous resistance that prevented initiatives for cooperation. Similarly, the shift in public opinion in Japan toward greater public acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces, as well as for the security treaty
between the United States and Japan, was also an important step in the development of the naval relationship. Combined with the US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the shift in public opinion in Japan enabled the two navies to operate more openly together and to increase the nature and sophistication of their exercises.

In the United States, domestic politics contributed to the advancement of the security relationship and defence cooperation. While US congressional pressure for increased defence burdensharing on the part of Japan contributed to periods of tense foreign relations between the two countries, this pressure also served to provide an incentive for greater defence cooperation between the two countries.

Chapter Conclusion

This early period in the institutionalisation of the naval relationship provided a variety of new opportunities for the JMSDF and US Navy as they moved toward more cooperative relations with each other. Although the two navies had been exercising together for the previous two decades, the institutionalisation in the relationship was relatively limited. During this earlier time period, there was no need to create institutional structures because the naval relationship entailed no operational engagement, *per se*, but rather training and limited exercises.

During the 1976-1981 time period, institutionalisation growth was closely linked to the Japan-US security relationship and to other external influences, such as the increased threat and domestic politics. It is doubtful that without the progress in the security relationship, including the emergence of the
Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, that the navies could have on their own advanced institutionalisation in the operational relationship. With the domestic political restrictions that Japan faced, agreement had to be reached at the national level before naval cooperation—which had been ongoing—could be made public and enhanced. Advancements in the security relationship provided a degree of legitimacy to the naval relationship and its associated activities.

Significantly, however, external influences were not enough on their own for institutionalisation to grow in the naval relationship. As the nature and extent of JMSDF-USN interaction and cooperation increased, the navies recognised that a more effectively coordinated relationship was necessary, including new communication mechanisms, improved interoperability of systems and equipment and improved structures for decisionmaking. This is not a unique phenomenon for navies. Indeed, the British and Japanese navies responded similarly as their operational relationship developed within the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the early part of the twentieth century.

The new cooperative relationship—now publicly recognised—served the interests of both navies and they derived benefits from it. As such, the navies had their own reasons for promoting the relationship. In the case of the JMSDF, the cooperative relationship with the USN provided a way for it to have deployment opportunities that it likely would not have experienced given domestic constraints in Japan. The Rim of the Pacific naval exercise, for example, gave the JMSDF the opportunity to operate in an environment with other navies—something unheard of just two years earlier—and a way to increase its own prestige. For the US Navy, the developing operational relationship that was receiving greater recognition in both countries meant that it could turn its attention to the growing naval threat in the broader Pacific
region and rely more heavily on the JMSDF to secure the area around Japan. This sentiment grew in the mid-1980s as the JMSDF’s technical capability increased.

Nevertheless, despite evidence of institutional growth during this period, the two navies had far to go when compared with other alliance naval relationships due to a range of constraints in the external environment and within the naval relationship itself. Chapters 3 and 4 show how some of these challenges were mitigated in the latter part of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.
CHAPTER 3: Maturing of the Naval Relationship: 1986-1991

For the two navies, the five years between 1986 and 1991 were marked by a diverse set of challenges and circumstances. The growing threat from the Soviet Union over the previous decade and a convergence of US and Japanese strategic interests resulted in more physical integration and interoperability than ever before. In the previous period (1976-1981), the two navies made strides towards establishing a foundation for cooperation. During this period, the JMSDF and the USN operated extensively together and created a division of labour of sorts for its military cooperation under the Japan-US Mutual Security treaty. The growth of this relationship, and the increased trust that developed, proved key to improvements in the sharing of sensitive information and technology. This culminated in 1988 in the transfer to Japan of the Aegis advanced radar system—the top of the line air defence system—despite on-going battles in the security relationship over technology transfers.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new threats, the end of the 1980s was a time of change for the security relationship. The two defence bureaucracies worked more closely together than in the previous decade and established close personal and professional contacts. However, as the Japanese economic bubble continued to grow, conflicts between the two nations increased over trade-related matters and defence burdensharing. In 1991, Japan’s unwillingness to send defence forces to the Persian Gulf, a decision driven by political forces in Japan, was a turning point for the alliance and naval cooperation. Operational interaction in the form of exercises, as well as other cooperation between the two navies, began to slow as Japanese and US
interests diverted and this affected continued institutional progress in the relationship.


During this key period in the evolution of the Japan-US naval relationship, the capability of the two navies operating together increased significantly, relative to the previous period. The period was marked by themes that reflected an increasingly close naval relationship. All the elements of institutionalisation—internal coordination, operational interaction, external linkages and institutional depth—grew during this period. The greatest growth occurred in the area of operational interaction. This growth was particularly significant because of its effect on the other elements of institutionalisation. As a result of the increased contact between the US Navy and the JMSDF, their standards of behaviour in an operational environment became more similar and culture and language differences were more easily overcome than in the past. New structures, procedures and routines—such as regular high-level naval meetings—emerged in order to facilitate the operational cooperation.

The specific roles and missions of each navy were also now more explicitly defined. This helped facilitate exercises and joint operations against regional threats. While Japan took responsibility for defending the air space and sealanes up to 1,000 miles from its shoreline, the United States provided the nuclear umbrella, offensive projection forces in the Northwest Pacific, and sealane protection forces in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans. Interoperability between the two navies improved during this period as a result of the JMSDF’s acquisition of technologically sophisticated platforms for anti-
submarine and anti-air warfare missions—most of which were the same platforms as those operated by the US Navy. In addition, a closer alignment of doctrine and operational philosophies improved operations and interoperability.

**Internal Coordination**

The two navies emerged in 1986 with much more sophisticated processes for working together, including regular high-level navy-to-navy meetings and more defined organisational procedures and routines. In large part, this was due to an agreement to share roles and missions in the region and the new requirement for closer cooperation. This was also the case for sharing information and intelligence. The US Navy needed the JMSDF assistance in defeating a formidable regional naval threat and as such loosened many of the former restrictions on sharing information, systems and technology with the JMSDF. However, at the end of the Cold War, with both navies heading in somewhat different directions, signs emerged that the internal coordination was breaking down.

The discussions between the United States and Japan concerning their respective roles and missions occurred primarily in the early 1980s, but the effect was felt in the latter part of the decade. Internal naval coordination was critical to ensuring that the JMSDF and USN worked effectively together in performing their respective missions. One of the ways this was accomplished was through Navy-to-Navy Talks, which had begun in the previous period. Now these talks were being held on an annual basis. While the minutes

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250 As discussed in Chapter 2, Prime Minister Suzuki, in 1981, called for a new division of roles for the United States and Japan in the Northwest Pacific, with Japan taking responsibility for defending the air space and sealanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from its shoreline, the United States provided the nuclear umbrella, offensive projection forces in the Northwest Pacific, and sealane protection forces in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans.
and discussion points from these meetings remain classified, naval officials participating in them stated that the nature of the discussions had changed considerably since 1977, when the first formal set of meetings occurred.

By the mid-1980s, the talks were considerably more open and relaxed, and information and intelligence were shared more freely by the US Navy. This was due, in part, to the increased time the navies were now spending operating together against the Soviet threat and recognition on the part of both navies that operational cooperation was in their best interests. According to one retired US Navy officer, ‘the Soviet submarine force bound the two navies in a “lovers embrace” ’ and as such, cooperation was considerably improved from the previous period.\[251\] US Navy officers who participated in the Navy-to-Navy Talks during this period noted that they were no longer conducted in a teacher-student format, with the US Navy providing the majority of the information, as had been the case in the past. Now, the JMSDF had information to share with the US Navy concerning trends in the movement of Soviet naval forces, which they were also tracking.\[252\] In general, 10 years after the first Navy-to-Navy Talks, the discussions were now conducted on a more equal basis and the navies responded to each other more honestly and openly. In addition to the Navy-to-Navy Talks, the US Pacific Fleet and the JMSDF were now holding annual staff talks, the first of which was held in 1988. Moreover, JMSDF-USN Intelligence Exchanges were being held bi-annually.\[253\]

The mid-to-late 1980s was a period of improved information and intelligence sharing between the JMSDF and the US Navy, and the United States began to loosen many of its previous restrictions on technology transfers. A

\[251\] Interview 5E (8 April 2005), with retired US Navy officer with extensive experience in Japan.

\[252\] Interview 16B (8 March 2005), with former US Navy official.

more equitable sharing of sensitive military information, intelligence and technology was a significant accomplishment for the naval relationship. According to US Navy officers (active and retired) interviewed, the JMSDF dedication to sealane defence and the need to communicate with US forces and transfer mission-related data was the impetus for many of these changes.254 Gradually, the US Navy and the US Department of Defense expanded the range of technology shared with Japan, including equipment and technology for improved anti-submarine warfare, tactical communication, secure data transfer, and finally, in 1988, Aegis technology for improved air defence, which will be discussed later in this chapter. In October 1987, for example, the US Secretary of Defense and the Director General of the Japan Defence Agency agreed to promote ASW technology and equipment exchanges, as well as to conduct closer exchanges of information related to ‘maritime observations’.255

Another important reason for the relatively close relationship between the navies during this period was their mutual dedication to the ‘maritime strategy’.256 Yet, this ‘strategy’ was not a US strategy but a US Navy strategy. The JMSDF responded energetically to it, according to US Navy officials and Japan specialists, and the strategy was the driving force for JMSDF operations in the 1980s.257 US Navy influence was exerted through the maritime strategy, given JMSDF dedication to it. The JMSDF was ‘empowered’ by its role in the implementation of this strategy in the Northwest Pacific—empowered to

254 Interviews 16B and 21A, with retired US Navy officers who held key positions in managing the naval relationship during this time.


256 Conceived by the US Navy in the 1980s, the ‘Maritime Strategy’ focused heavily on offensive operations against the Soviet Union. The strategy was used to broaden the US Navy’s role in Cold War military strategy and justify new procurement, including a ‘600-ship’ Navy. For further information on this concept and its development, see John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper #19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004).

improve its operations with the US Navy but also to go beyond the complementary roles and missions established in the 1980s.

In addition to encouraging Japan to take certain actions during this period, the United States was also influential in stopping Japan from taking certain actions. For example, in the early 1990s, the United States found out about the JMSDF interest in building an aircraft carrier—and squashed it. This was one of a number of incidents that occurred in the early 1990s that indicated that divergent goals and objectives were beginning to take the navies in different directions, at the end of the Cold War period. While the capabilities Japan wanted to develop were useful for sealane surveillance and defence missions, they also signalled possibly larger ambitions as well. Senior US government officials opposed a power projection capability for Japan, viewing it as redundant rather than complementary to US capabilities in the region. According to Michael Armacost, US Ambassador to Japan at the time, there was very little support in senior US circles for Japan’s plans, particularly in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, in which Japan did not participate. Interviews with retired US Navy officers who were familiar with the developments indicated that senior JMSDF officials were angry that they did not receive support for their proposals when they met with senior US Navy officials in Washington. A more significant revelation, according to these officers, is that the US admiral who received the Japanese officials had not been briefed on the controversial nature of their visit beforehand and quickly dismissed the issue with little discussion—an indication, according to these officers, that the formerly close relationship

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258 Interview 5A (21 March 2000), 5D (8 April 2005) and 3B (14 December 1999), with retired US Navy officers with extensive Japan experience.
was breaking down. This was also an indication that naval roles, missions and
goals were not being as closely coordinated as they had been in the past.260

Operational Interaction

The JMSDF and USN moved from conducting relatively simple exercises
and training in the late 1970s to more realistic exercises and operations during
this period, in response to regional threats and the new roles and missions they
were now performing. This cooperation, in which the navies shared operational
risks and the regional defence burden, was a critical element in binding the
navies together. While these joint interactions were technically ‘exercises’ and
‘training’, in reality they were critical operations that provided anti-submarine
and related support in the region. The end of the decade brought new threats in
the Middle East. The US Navy helped prepare the JMSDF to make its first out-
of-area deployment since the Korean War and provided assistance during this
1991 minesweeping deployment, at the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm.
However, this cooperation was short-lived. The JMSDF returned from the
deployment but did not return to the region until a decade later.

Japan-US naval exercises at this time were divided into two general
classes—‘fleet exercises’ and more unit specific training. Fleet exercises
included the participation of a variety of platforms in exercises such as
‘ANNUALEX’ and RIMPAC. These exercises generally occurred on a regular
basis—such as once a year, lasted a number of days and included formal
exercise preparation and debriefing periods. Unit-specific exercises focused on
a specific specialty, such as anti-submarine warfare. It may have included just

260 Interview 5A (21 March 2000), 15A (22 August 2000) and 3D (4 December 1999), with retired
US Navy officers with extensive Japan experience.
one type of platform (such as the P-3C) or several types (submarines and anti-submarine helicopters).

The JMSDF-USN formal exercise programme increased in both scope and sophistication during the 1986-1991 period, providing a further indication of a more integrative concept of operations between the two navies, as well as of growing institutionalisation. Key indicators for exercise complexity include the number of units participating in the exercise, the diversity of the units and the scale of the exercise. In the 1970s, JMSDF-USN interactions tended to focus on just one warfare specialty and were limited generally to just anti-submarine warfare and minesweeping exercises. This changed in the mid-to-late 1980s, as the US Navy and the JMSDF participated in a greater number of combined operations emphasizing ASW, air defence and surface strike operations, as a result of new threats and security challenges.

By 1987, most ASW exercises were part of a larger contingent of forces that also engaged in air defence and surface strike training. This was in large part because of on-going threats in the Persian Gulf and the acknowledgement by navies worldwide that this was the threat against which they needed to exercise. The 1987 missile strike in the Persian Gulf against the USS Stark, a guided missile frigate, and the subsequent threats in this region, dramatically increased the global focus on missile defence. Nevertheless, ASW was still the backbone of JMSDF-USN operations. Only minesweeping exercises remained a singular focus. Japan’s minesweeping capability was a unique asset for the nation and since the end of World War II Japan had taken great pride in these

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261 Interview 3B (14 December 1999), with US Navy officer who participated in JMSDF-USN exercise development and implementation.

262 See, for example, George C. Wilson, ‘Preemptive US Strike on Iran Missiles Debated: July 1 Deployment of Weapons Possible’, Washington Post, 5 June 1987, p. A-1. This article, and a series of other similar news articles, note concern by the US government and other governments about Iran’s possible deployment of Silkworm anti-ship missiles against international oil tankers transiting the Gulf and potential international responses.
forces. The US Navy acknowledged the importance of this mission capability, since the US capability was minimal. Without minesweeping vessels deployed in the region, the US Navy’s contribution to the exercises was limited to aircraft that helped lay the mines.\textsuperscript{263}

Another change during this time period was the participation in 1987 of the \textit{USS Midway} carrier battlegroup in the JMSDF’s annual combined exercise. The Midway’s participation was a result of an ‘invitation’ from the JMSDF. According to James Auer, who was stationed in Japan at the time, the two navies had been talking for some time about the possibility of having the \textit{Midway} and its battlegroup exercise with the JMSDF. The discussions were deliberately conducted behind the scenes because although the Japanese public was less resistant to Japan-US security cooperation, sensitivity still existed in Japan, especially when a US aircraft carrier was involved. This was a clear example of the shift in JMSDF-USN combined exercises from a decade earlier, when the focus was on relatively simple engagements and generally just one warfare specialty. JMSDF records indicate that a US aircraft carrier participated in a JMSDF combined exercise again in 1989 and in November 1991. Preparation for the Gulf War in 1990 and anti-shipping concerns in the Persian Gulf in 1988, and the dedication of forces to that region, likely prevented aircraft carrier participation during these years, according to a USN officer.\textsuperscript{264}

In addition, for the first time in a JMSDF annual exercise, the headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan manned a 24-hour exercise cell within

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{263} Japan had been perfecting its minesweeping capability since 1945, when its minesweepers began to search Japanese waters for mines sown during World War II. They were later used in 1950 to clear mines in Korean harbours. In 1990, Japan had more than 40 highly capable minesweeping vessels. By comparison, in 1987 the US Navy had only three minesweeping vessels in the active Navy and 18 in the reserve force, all of which had been built in the 1950s. See Norman Polmar, \textit{The Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet} (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1987), pp. 233-234.
\textsuperscript{264} Interview 3G (March 2000).
\end{flushleft}
the operations command centre to provide a liaison between the US Navy and the JMSDF operating forces at sea and ashore commanders.\(^{265}\) Table 10 provides a list of major JMSDF-USN combined exercises held between 1986 and 1991. The list is evidence of the increased diversity and sophistication of the exercises, compared with the exercises and training presented in Chapter 2. The reduced activity in 1990 and most of 1991 is due to the Gulf War and the preparation for the Gulf War—the focus of US Seventh Fleet forces during this time period.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participating Forces-- JMSDF</th>
<th>Participating Forces-- USN</th>
<th>Training Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
<td>14-18 April 1986</td>
<td>110 personnel</td>
<td>110 personnel</td>
<td>'Mutual coordination between Japanese and US units'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>8-12 June 1986</td>
<td>12 vessels, 40 aircraft</td>
<td>4 vessels, 9 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defense, Surface Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>19-29 July 1986</td>
<td>26 vessels, 26 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale Training</td>
<td>31 July – 7 Aug. 1986</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Tactical movement training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Exercise</td>
<td>25-29 Sept. 1986</td>
<td>16 vessels, 60 aircraft</td>
<td>14 vessels, 99 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW and Air Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>15-27 Feb. 1987</td>
<td>22 vessels, 19 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise (locations in Japan)</td>
<td>11-15 May 1987</td>
<td>120 personnel</td>
<td>120 personnel</td>
<td>Training in adjustment of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise (US Naval War College)</td>
<td>June 1987</td>
<td>15 personnel</td>
<td>50 personnel</td>
<td>Training in adjustment of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>19-29 July 1987</td>
<td>26 vessels and 23 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>12-21 Aug. 1987</td>
<td>14 vessels and 17 aircraft</td>
<td>4 vessels and 13 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defence, and Surface Strike training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-class Training</td>
<td>1-10 Sept. 1987</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Tactical movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan-US Combined Training in JMSDF Exercise</th>
<th>24-28 Sept. 1987</th>
<th>15 vessels and 65 aircraft</th>
<th>10 vessels (including the aircraft carrier Midway) and 95 aircraft</th>
<th>ASW and Air Defence training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>4-11 Feb. 1988</td>
<td>About 10 vessels and some aircraft</td>
<td>About 5 vessels and some aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defence, and Surface Strike training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>15-27 Feb. 1988</td>
<td>31 vessels and 28 aircraft</td>
<td>1 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>13-22 May 1988</td>
<td>14 vessels and 14 aircraft</td>
<td>7 vessels and 13 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defence, and Surface Strike training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise (locations in Japan)</td>
<td>31 May – 4 June 1988</td>
<td>120 personnel</td>
<td>120 personnel</td>
<td>Training in adjustment of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>19-29 July 1988</td>
<td>27 vessels and 25 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale Training</td>
<td>5-13 Aug. 1988</td>
<td>1 vessels</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Tactical movement training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-US Combined Training in JMSDF Exercise</td>
<td>5-12 Oct. 1988</td>
<td>9 vessels and 33 aircraft</td>
<td>9 vessels (including the aircraft carrier Midway) and 123 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW and Air Defence training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise (US Naval War College)</td>
<td>23-30 Jan. 1989</td>
<td>15 personnel</td>
<td>50 personnel</td>
<td>Training in adjustment of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>1-7 Feb. 1989</td>
<td>8 vessels and 10 aircraft</td>
<td>5 vessels and 5 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defence and Surface Strike training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise (locations in Japan)</td>
<td>5-9 June 1989</td>
<td>120 personnel</td>
<td>120 personnel</td>
<td>Training on coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>19-24 June 1989</td>
<td>9 vessels and 7 aircraft</td>
<td>4 vessels and 8 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defence, and Surface Strike training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>19-29 June 1989</td>
<td>28 vessels and 22 aircraft</td>
<td>3 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale Training</td>
<td>7-15 Aug. 1989</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Tactical movement training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-US Combined Training in MSDF Exercise</td>
<td>29 Sept. - 14 Oct. 1989</td>
<td>27 vessels and 130 aircraft</td>
<td>54 vessels (including the aircraft carrier Midway and the battleship Missouri) and 272 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defence, and Surface Strike training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>15-27 Feb. 1990</td>
<td>28 vessels and 28 aircraft</td>
<td>1 vessel and 5 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>19-26 Feb. 1990</td>
<td>6 vessels and 4 aircraft</td>
<td>3 vessels and 17 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW, Air Defence, and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the unit level, the most active ASW units in both navies were the P-3C patrol aircraft. The JMSDF had acquired 40 P-3C aircraft by 1987, and by 1990 this number had increased to 60—far surpassing the number of US Navy P-3C aircraft deployed to Japan during this time period. During the height of the Soviet submarine threat, in the mid-1980s, JMSDF and USN P-3C squadrons worked very closely together in prosecuting the Soviet submarine threat. Based on the numerous interviews conducted for this study, the JMSDF-USN P-3C community appears to be the model success story of JMSDF-USN cooperation during the Cold War period. P-3C ASW squadrons were nearly interchangeable, according to US and Japanese naval officers. According to one Japanese naval officer, a typical engagement might have included a USN P-3C dropping a
number of sonobuoys into the ocean and then a JMSDF P-3C arriving on the scene later to monitor the submarine contacts. The JMSDF aircraft would be replaced later with another USN P-3C, which would continue the monitoring. Finally, a JMSDF P-3C would arrive and retrieve the sonobuoys.

As compared with other JMSDF and USN platforms, the P-3C units conducted frequent training, often without the formal announcements and preparation that occurred with other units. One advantage over other naval units is that many of the P-3C bases were either co-located or located relatively close to each other, which facilitated joint unit training, joint briefings, and other joint interaction. As discussed in Chapter 2, the joint training occurred even before the two navies were using the same aircraft. In the mid-1980s, the JMSDF transitioned to the P-3C patrol aircraft from the P-2J. The P-3Cs used digital technology that facilitated data transfers between the aircraft, increased the speed of processing submarine contacts and improved secure communication between the aircraft. Interoperability between the navies thus improved considerably as a result of using similar aircraft to prosecute ASW targets.

Another contribution to improved alliance interoperability in the area of ASW came in 1988, when the JMSDF began deploying SH-60J ASW helicopters aboard its destroyers. These helicopters provided additional ASW capabilities as well as anti-surface protection. In addition, during the same year, the

267 A sonobuoy is a small sound receiver-transmitter normally dropped from an aircraft to detect submarine noises and transmit them back to the aircraft. (See John V. Noel, Jr. and Edward L. Beach, Naval Terms Dictionary (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1978) p. 277.

268 These comments were reiterated in with JMSDF and USN officers who had operated the P-3C aircraft. See, for example, interviews 2A&B, 4A, 5A, and 9A and many others in both navies. Even non-P-3C naval personnel noted that the level of cooperation between the JMSDF and USN P-3C community was nearly unprecedented.

269 Interviews 5A and 9A. Both naval officers (one active and one retired) were P-C3 pilots.

270 As the successor of the JMSDF HSS-2B anti-submarine helicopter, the SH-60J is a licensed modification of the US Navy's SH-60 airframe.
JMSDF began taking steps to equip its destroyers with a ‘passive’ sonar system known as TASS, capable of searching for submarines over a wide range of area. Since the US Navy also had TASS, this enabled more effective operations when ships from the two navies were operating together against Soviet submarines.

Despite the interaction and extensive training that went on between P-3C units during this period, USN officers interviewed cautioned that this did not necessarily mean that all JMSDF-USN units were operationally engaged in the same way. Indeed, according to these officers who had had several deployments in Japan, JMSDF and USN ships homeported in Yokosuka rarely if ever engaged each other at sea during this period, outside of one of the formal exercises. The USN officers maintained that these were missed opportunities to practice and improve certain tactical skills, such as communications. They attributed the lack of interaction to the Japanese preference for advanced planning versus extemporary engagement. Further, there was no internal JMSDF-USN influence to change this situation.271

In addition to exercises and training conducted at sea, the 1980s also saw greater use of command post exercises. These exercises are conducted on land, usually at a defence headquarters location or at one of the war colleges. Command Post exercises typically include computer simulations and other ways to simulate naval operations without actually having to conduct an operation at sea. It also gives the respective naval staff greater opportunity to exchange information and hold discussions that might not be possible at sea. For the first time, in June 1987, the two navies participated in a command post exercise at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. This was known as the

271 Interviews 3B (14 December 1999), 20A (24 May 2000), and 7A (20 July 2000), with USN officers whose ships were homeported in Japan during the 1986-1991 period. According to one officer, even JMSDF and USN ‘sister ships’ based at Yokosuka did not interact at sea, outside of the formal scheduled training. He noted that when his ship was heading out to the operating area, the JMSDF ship often would be returning.
Northwest Pacific War Game for the Defense of Japan. Participants included US Naval Forces Japan, US Seventh Fleet, the US Pacific Fleet and the JMSDF.\(^{272}\) Also during this time period, the JMSDF also began participating in specialized combined training at elite training facilities in the United States. JMSDF participation in ‘Blue Flag’ began in 1990. The first exercise included the JMSDF, the US Navy, US Fifth Air Force, US Air Force Tactical Air Command, and the US Army IX Corps.\(^{273}\) While the Blue Flag exercise used a ‘defence of Japan’ scenario, the advanced tactical communication mechanisms practiced during the exercise helped the two navies prepare for joint operations in the Persian Gulf region, at the end of the war.\(^{274}\)

Throughout the 1980s, the JMSDF participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise with an increased number of naval assets and more robust exercise scenarios. The ‘collective defence’ restrictions still existed, prohibiting JMSDF operational contact with any navy but the US Navy. But once ‘over the horizon’, JMSDF ships had more operational freedom. Officially, however, it still cooperated just with the US Navy.\(^{275}\) While RIMPAC was just one of a number of exercises for the US Navy and other navies, it was a major training event for the JMSDF because of the unique opportunities it provided. In the latter part of the 1980s, as the JMSDF became a more confident participant, it had more operational contact with other ships, including tactical communication exchanges and informal cooperation on search and rescue.

\(^{272}\) Commander, US Naval Forces, Japan, *Command History for 1987*, (no page numbers).

\(^{273}\) Blue Flag is a US Air Force-run exercise conducted from Hurlburt Field, Florida, and is one of the largest computer-assisted modeling and simulation exercises in the world. It trains combat leaders in command, control and intelligence procedures. The operation center for these exercises is set up just as it would be in an actual operation and provides excellent combined training, generally with multiple service and international military forces participating. See Air Force News, ‘SECAF Cites Importance of Blue Flag’, [http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996/n19960624_960600.html](http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996/n19960624_960600.html), accessed 22 August 2006.


\(^{275}\) According to one US Navy officer, ‘over the horizon’ generally meant beyond the 1,000 mile marker, which had become almost a ‘psychological barrier’ for the JMSDF. Interview 20A (24 May 2000), with a senior US Navy officer with numerous deployments in Japan.
Table 11 provides a summary of how the numbers and types of JMSDF platforms used in RIMPAC exercises gradually increased each year between 1980 and 1990.

Table 11: JMSDF Participation in RIMPAC (1980-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIMPAC Year</th>
<th>Number of Destroyers</th>
<th>ASW Aircraft</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 1980</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>P-2J</td>
<td>Training in surface strike, ASW patrol and attack, air-defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 1982</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>P-2J</td>
<td>same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 1984</td>
<td>5 + 1 flag officer</td>
<td>P-3C/P-2J</td>
<td>same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 1986</td>
<td>8 + 1 submarine</td>
<td>P-3C</td>
<td>same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 1988</td>
<td>8 + 1 submarine</td>
<td>P-3C</td>
<td>same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 1990</td>
<td>No exercise held</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One senior retired USN admiral recounted his experience with the JMSDF in RIMPAC in the mid-1980s as evidence that the JMSDF was now defying stereotypes concerning its cautious approach to operational issues. The US admiral, who was a destroyer squadron commander, noted that the Japanese admiral—the ASW commander for the exercise—asked many questions and was very assertive in his approach, even more so than the USN officers. He wanted the operation to be realistic and for all the players to position themselves as if they were in a wartime situation. As such, he questioned the US Navy for temporarily taking its aircraft carrier out of the operational scenario so that it could go and recover aircraft. The Japanese admiral noted that this would not have been done in a real war.  

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276 Interview 15A (22 August 2000) and (24 May 2000), with one retired and one active senior US Navy officers.

277 Interview 15A (22 August 2000), with senior USN officer, with several deployments to Japan.
The 1980s marked a period of capability improvements in JMSDF-USN operations. In large part this was because of increased interoperability between the two navies. As discussed in Chapter 2, research done by Alessio Patalano indicates that JMSDF leadership recognised the importance of improving cooperation with the US Navy, as an alliance partner and as one of the two leading naval powers at the time, and in 1980, Admiral Yada, the Chief of the Maritime Staff of the JMSDF, introduced the concept of ‘Renkei’ (translated as ‘teamwork’ / ‘coordination’). His focus at the time was on strengthening ASW capabilities, as well as improving interoperability and communications with the US Navy. In 1985, the Renkei concept was more fully developed and articulated by the then Chief of the Maritime Staff—Admiral Osada. He focused on further strengthening the partnership with the US Navy, particularly in the areas of equipment, tactics, language and personnel exchanges.278 As with the actions taken in 1980, this new focus was a continued desire to operate effectively with the USN and recognition on the part of the JMSDF that improved cooperation, interoperability—and ultimately institutionalisation in navy-to-navy relations, was in the best interest of the JMSDF.

The JMSDF had replaced older platforms with state-of-the-art new ones, and many of the new platforms were the same or nearly the same as US Navy platforms—albeit defensive in orientation. For example, certain offensive weapon systems, such as Tomahawk, were not installed on JMSDF ships. While in pure numbers, the changes were not particularly significant over those made

278 This information was the result of an examination of JMSDF Chief of the Maritime Staff ‘official instructions’ by Alessio Patalano. His forthcoming Ph.D. thesis (in 2008) is entitled, *Unveiling the Imperial Legacy: Strategy, Naval Policy and Propaganda in the Post-Cold War Japan Maritime Self Defence Force*, King’s College, University of London. Mr. Patalano provided an English translation of the original Japanese text. In addition to improving cooperation and interoperability with the USN, Patalano’s research revealed that in 1985, Admiral Osada also advocated improving the nature and extent of cooperation with the ground and air forces in Japan—the JGSDF and the JASDF.
in the previous decade. However, in qualitative terms, the JMSDF had become one of the world's most technologically advanced navies. In addition, the JMSDF had exceeded the US Seventh Fleet in numbers of capable platforms, such as destroyers and P-3C ASW aircraft. These capability improvements meant that combined naval operations had become smoother and more effective because the USN did not have to reduce its own capabilities when operating with JMSDF platforms. This was a source of pride to the JMSDF, according to both JMSDF and USN officers interviewed. Operational procedures could be more easily synchronized, resulting in greater organisational coherence and increased institutionalisation.

The most significant defence acquisition during this period, in terms of its contribution to joint operational effectiveness was the foreign military sale from the US Navy to the JMSDF of the very highly capable Aegis fleet air defence system. Given the improvements in aircraft and missile range in the 1980s, and the use of long-range stand-off missiles to attack surface ships, Aegis provided the JMSDF with needed capabilities for sealane defence in the Northwest Pacific. With the changing threat environment, Japan realized that its forces had become increasingly vulnerable to missile threats, particularly in the context of air defense at sea. Funding for the Aegis system was included in the

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279 Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., ‘Proposed Sale of Aegis Weapons Systems to Japan’, Statement before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 June 1988, p. 2. Sigur states that in 1988, the JMSDF had over 50 destroyers, more than twice as many as the US Seventh Fleet at the time. Further, while the Seventh Fleet had 25 P-C3 patrol aircraft, the JMSDF had nearly 100 such aircraft.

280 See, for example, interviews 15A (22 August 2000), 20A (24 May 2000) and 3C (14 December 1999) with senior- and mid-level USN officers and 19E (2 March 2002) and 60A (11 September 2002), with senior JMSDF officers.

281 In congressional testimony, Rear Admiral Edward Baker, Jr. made the point that without Aegis, Japan’s naval surface ships prosecuting Soviet submarines would be vulnerable to attack by multiple numbers of Soviet aircraft, as the JMSDF carried out their mission to protect the sealanes 1,000 miles from Japan. See Rear Admiral Edward B. Baker, Jr., ‘Statement to the Seapower Subcommittee’, House Armed Services Committee, US House of Representatives, 4 February 1988, pp. 5-6.
Defense Agency’s 1988 budget, and the JMSDF commissioned the first of four new Kongo class destroyers, with the Aegis system installed, in March 1993. Japan was the first US ally to acquire Aegis capability. South Korea, Norway, Spain and Australia also acquired the system, but did so many years later.

The Aegis system—known as the ‘crown jewel’ of the US Navy—was exponentially better than the previous air defence system, known as Tartar, which the JMSDF had acquired from the United States in the 1960s. The Tartar system was not able to keep up with advances in aircraft and missile technology. The Aegis acquisition was particularly remarkable given the battles over release of defence technology to the JMSDF in the 1970s and early 1980s and indicated a major change in the level of trust between the two navies. Not all portions of the US Aegis system were installed on the Japanese ships. For example, the Navy did not export the Tomahawk system and several other systems were also deleted from the Japanese ship, which was oriented toward more defensive missions. Table 12 provides a comparison of Tartar and Aegis capabilities.

**Table 12: Capability Differences between the Tartar and Aegis Missile Defence Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Tartar System</strong></th>
<th><strong>Aegis System</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of range covered by radar</td>
<td>100 km or more</td>
<td>Several hundred km or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtailment of reaction time</td>
<td>(no information available)</td>
<td>About 1/2 or below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases in the capability to destroy targets simultaneously</td>
<td>Several targets</td>
<td>10 targets or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of maximum range</td>
<td>18 km or more</td>
<td>100 km or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of electronic warfare capability</td>
<td>Capable of countering medium-degree jamming</td>
<td>Capable of countering high-degree jamming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


282 Interview 3J (4 April 2005) and 16A (8 March 2005), retired US Navy officers with extensive experience in the Pacific, including Japan.
**Persian Gulf Operations**

The previous discussion concerned the development of JMSDF-USN capabilities to facilitate naval operations against Soviet forces in the area surrounding Japan. However, Japan-US naval cooperation and interaction was also effective in helping the JMSDF in 1991 to make its first out-of-area deployment since the Korean War. The lead up to this operation occurred in the mid-1980s, as oil tankers operating under many flags had become casualties of the prolonged war between Iraq and Iran. The eventual response of the United States to these attacks was to police the international waters of the Persian Gulf. Kuwaiti oil tankers were reflagged as US vessels and escorted through the Straits of Hormuz by the US Navy. In addition to the United States, several navies from Western Europe and the Soviet Union also assisted in the effort.\(^{283}\)

JMSDF preparation for the 1991 deployment actually began in 1987, when the US government asked Japan to contribute to the international naval effort to escort reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers. The Japanese Cabinet decided against deploying Japan’s naval forces to the Gulf in 1987 and instead decided to contribute funding and technical assistance, as will be discussed later in this chapter. However, in the interim, JMSDF officials began calculating what would be required if it deployed minesweepers such a long distance, and with assistance from the US Navy, developed a deployment plan. This was all conducted quietly and behind the scenes.\(^{284}\)

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JMSDF initiative and JMSDF-USN cooperation was demonstrated again in 1988. According to accounts by Peter Woolley, two retired JMSDF admirals went aboard US escort vessels to observe the operation in the Gulf and report back as to whether Japanese participation might be feasible in the future. This initiative was worked closely with the US Navy and would not have been possible without US Navy encouragement. The admirals produced an unofficial study for the Strategy and Research Center in Tokyo, and the report was circulated in the Japanese Diet, Foreign Ministry, and the JMSDF’s Maritime Staff Office. The report stated that the JMSDF was capable of undertaking an escort mission in the Persian Gulf and explained how it could be successfully accomplished.285

In August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait marking the beginning of another Gulf crisis, once again the Japanese government was confronted with the decision of whether to allow its defence forces to participate in the resulting military operation in the Gulf. Once again the Japanese government decided not to contribute defence forces, after months of debate within the Japanese government. It was not until April 1991, when Operation Desert Storm had concluded, that the Japanese government agreed to a minesweeping deployment. With many of the plans already made and having worked closely with the US Navy, the JMSDF was able to deploy fairly quickly to the Persian Gulf. Japan deployed six JMSDF ships—a destroyer escort, four minesweepers, and a fleet support ship—to the Gulf. The deployment was noteworthy because

it demonstrated the extensive behind the scenes preparation and planning by the JMSDF and its politically savvy strategy.\textsuperscript{286}

The latter part of this chapter provides a broader analysis of the Government of Japan’s response to the US request for assistance in the Persian Gulf, from a foreign policy perspective. Few academics or defence practitioners have analysed the operation from a naval perspective. As discussed in Chapter 1, Peter Woolley focuses primarily on the JMSDF response. He maintains that JMSDF behaviour leading up to the deployment is clear evidence that it took action after careful planning and rehearsal, as the previous four decades indicated, and that \textit{kata} was a prevailing influence.\textsuperscript{287} Based on the evidence during this period, however, this appears to be more the case for the Japanese government rather than for the JMSDF. The JMSDF’s persistence was in sharp contrast to the cautionary approach of the Japanese government. A certain element of \textit{kata} was present in JMSDF behaviour, such as when the Japanese government refused to allow naval deployments to the Gulf and the JSMDF retreated behind the scenes to develop alternate plans. However, the JMSDF reaction appears to be more closely emulating US Navy behaviour. This could be expected, given the relatively close operational relations that had developed between certain elements of both navies. Certain JMSDF and USN officers interviewed for this thesis agree that the close operational relationship between the two navies during the 1980s had resulted in the JMSDF adopting many of the operational characteristics of its larger and more capable partner, using the US

\textsuperscript{286} In April 1991, a senior Japan Defense Agency official announced that the Japanese government had formally asked the JMSDF to ‘consider formation of a minesweeper squadron, equipment needs, and compile specific information on floating mines in the Gulf.’ See Woolley, \textit{Japan’s Navy}, p. 103, and reflection by US Navy officers, such as interview 5F (12 January 2007) and 12A (14 December 2006).

\textsuperscript{287} As discussed in Chapter 1, Woolley notes that \textit{kata}, or ‘form’, is emphasized in every endeavour, in stark contrast to the American predilection for improvisation and innovation. See Peter J. Woolley, \textit{Japan’s Navy}, pp. 65-87 and Peter J. Woolley and Commander Mark S. Woolley, ‘The \textit{Kata} of Japan’s Naval Forces’, pp. 59-69.
Navy in part as a conduit to favourable decisionmaking by the government of Japan.  

By late 1990, it became increasingly difficult to schedule JMSDF-USN exercises because of the chance that US naval forces would not be available. With increasing US Navy activity in the Middle East, some of the training events that had occurred in the past were postponed. During the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War, US naval exercises and training in the region focused primarily on preparation training for the deployment to the Middle East. According to a former US Pacific Fleet official, combined training between the US Navy and JMSDF forces was reduced during the preparation for the Gulf War and during the conflict itself. Some ASW and minesweeping training were still conducted but many of the major combined training exercises were cancelled.  

The US Seventh Fleet played a key role in the naval portion of the 1991 Gulf War. The US Seventh Fleet Commander, Admiral Stanley Arthur, assumed responsibility on 1 December 1990 as US Naval Forces Central Command. He deployed to the Middle East and led US naval operations during Operation Desert Storm, which began in January 1991. The Seventh Fleet flagship, the USS Blue Ridge, along with the USS Midway, the US aircraft carrier permanently forward deployed in Japan, and Midway’s battlegroup, participated in the

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288 Interviews with US and Japanese naval officers confirm a trend that was developing, starting in the latter part of the 1980s, after several years of close cooperation with the US Navy against the Soviet Navy in the Northwest Pacific. See, for example, interviews with 19A (7 June 2004), 19E (2 March 2002), 3H (2 March 2000) and 15A (22 August 2000).

289 US Naval Forces Japan, Command Histories, 1990 and 1991 (no page numbers). Also, see interview 16A (4 March 2005). In addition to reassigning forces to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the United States began to downsize its armed forces in the 1990s, because of budget concerns, and consequently reduced some of its naval presence in the western Pacific. See interviews 16A (4 March 2005) and B (8 March 2005) and 17B (19 November 2002) and D (8 March 2005). Also see Woolley, Japan’s Navy, pp. 143-144.
These forces and the US Seventh Fleet Commander, returned to the western Pacific in the Spring of 1991. However, interaction with JMSDF forces remained limited because the US forces were working to re-establish their readiness status after their Middle East deployment and participation in the Gulf War. Table 13 identifies the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet assets that deployed to the Middle East during the 1990/1991 period.

**Table 13:** US Seventh Fleet Ships and Aircraft that Deployed to Operation Desert Shield and/or to Operation Desert Storm (1990-1991)

(Departed Japan in August, September, and October 1990)
*USS Midway (aircraft carrier)
*USS Blue Ridge (flag ship for the US Seventh Fleet)
*USS Bunker Hill
*USS Mobile Bay
*USS Fife
*USS Oldendorf
*USS Dubuque
*USS San Bernardino

*Ships based in Japan (as part of Overseas Family Residency Programme)

**Institutional Depth**

During the mid-to-late 1980s, with the increased activity between the two navies and their respective civilian counterparts in the US Department of Defense and the Japan Defense Agency came a closer relationship on many

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levels. The naval relationship benefited from these closer relationships. The United States was satisfied with the progress Japan had made in improving its defence capabilities and in taking responsibility for sealane defence 1,000 nautical miles from its shoreline. This influenced the nature and tone of the relationship between the navies and the defence organisations. The closeness of the relationship is exemplified by the relationship between the top national officials and those in the respective defence organisations, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Within the naval relationship, changes occurred at the professional and at the personal level. This is not to downplay the cultural differences and how this affected the approach to naval operations, or the challenges in the relationship in the early 1990s, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter with regard to the JMSDF desire for a helicopter carrier. But for most of the period under review in this chapter—1986-1991—the two navies maintained a generally close relationship.

The relations between the two navies improved during the latter part of the 1980s in large part due to the nature and extent of the navies' operational interactions against a mutually acknowledged security threat. Generally, the improvements were most visible between senior naval officials and certain operational units. One retired US Admiral who was stationed in Japan during the 1960s and 1970s identified significant differences in the relationship decades later. He stated that while he had a relatively close relationship with the JMSDF for official purposes during the earlier years, this was not the case for personal relationships. He maintained that senior US Navy officers stationed in Japan in the 1980s and later had closer personal and professional relationships with the JMSDF likely due to the increased day-to-day contact between the navies and a
greater acceptance on the part of the Japanese public for the Japan-US defence relationship.\textsuperscript{291}

The JMSDF used the improved naval relationship to its advantage. The relationship became a conduit for encouraging favourable decisionmaking by the Japanese government concerning JMSDF systems and equipment and on the nature of JMSDF operations. One official at a private research organisation in the United States who had been a senior defence official at the US Embassy in Tokyo during this period noted that the influence ‘messengers’ to the Japanese government generally were US Navy and US Department of Defense officials, and representatives of the Japanese and US defence industry, rather than the JMSDF itself. In fact, this official noted that generally, the JMSDF did not have a close working relationship with other elements of the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{292}

As was clear in interviews with both JMSDF and USN personnel, certain USN units had more contact with the JMSDF than others, and this affected the nature of their relationship. At the unit level, the extensive operations between P-3C ASW units, for example, improved the nature of their professional relationships as they became more at ease in operating with each other. These joint operations also encouraged social interaction after the work was finished and the establishment of long-lasting bonds.

This was not the case with all JMSDF and USN units, given the more limited contact they had with each other, as indicated earlier in this chapter. These relationships remained relatively formal, and engagements occurred just during the course of scheduled exercises. This was likely due to cultural and language differences between the two navies, according to USN officers.

\textsuperscript{291} Interview 15A (22 Aug. 2000).
\textsuperscript{292} Interview 14A (5 December 2000) and 14B (12 April 2005). Discussions with USN officers in the Mutual Defense Assistance Office at the US Embassy in Tokyo also provided useful perspectives in this regard because of their role in facilitating the purchase of US defence systems.
interviewed who were deployed in Japan during this period. While increased operational contact overall had broken down some of the cultural barriers, the same informality that existed between the English-speaking navies of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, still did not exist with the JMSDF-USN relationship. With the English-speaking navies, it was more likely that the commanding officers of respective ships would initiate contact with neighbouring ships for the purpose of tactical engagement—as well as social engagement.  

In the 1980s, the increased number of JMSDF officers who were able to speak English helped build closer personal relationships between the navies and consequently, increased institutional depth. A significantly increased number of JMSDF officers attended university training as well as specialized naval training in the United States during this period, where English language skills were a pre-requisite. Even certain enlisted and non-commissioned officers attended technical training courses in the United States, taught in English, during this period. Nevertheless, several US Navy officers interviewed noted that language still was a problem in an operational environment—up through the 1990s—and specifically noted that during RIMPAC exercises, coordination cells were staffed with some JMSDF personnel with just basic English skills. Although the general trend for the JMSDF was toward increased English language proficiency, in the late 1980s still only a relatively limited number of US Navy personnel had a working knowledge of Japanese. US Navy officers interviewed

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293 Interviews 2A (22 March 1999), 2B (29 July 1999), 3A (18 October 1999), 3B (14 December 1999), 13A (21 June 2000) and 20A (24 May 2000), with USN officers who had operated with both Japanese and one or more of the English-speaking navies indicated in the text.

294 Interviews 7A (20 July 2000), 10A (20 December 2006), 20A (24 May 2000), with USN officers who had operated with the JMSDF during this period in various contexts.
indicated that language and Japan-related expertise was not rewarded in the US Navy. The priority was on operational expertise and time at sea.\textsuperscript{295}

As such, the onus was still on the JMSDF personnel to learn English and adapt to the methods of the US Navy if they wanted a closer relationship with USN personnel and if joint JMSDF-USN operations were to be effective. ‘Learning’ from the USN was a priority for the JMSDF. Indeed, one USN officer stated that during a visit to a JMSDF destroyer, the words ‘learn from the USN’ was written in calligraphy on the wardroom wall. He was told that the then Chief of the Maritime Staff had ordered that these words be placed on a wall in all JMSDF ship wardrooms.\textsuperscript{296} Despite the years of cooperation between the two navies, the US Navy officer who made these comments was unsure whether the Chief of Staff’s action was an indication that the naval relationship was one of ‘convenience’ during a period when the JMSDF needed US assistance or whether there was a deeper partnership developing between the two navies, of which this was an example.\textsuperscript{297}

\textbf{External Linkages}

With increased operational contact between the JMSDF and USN and the maturing of the naval relationship, the two navies expanded their contacts with other navies and institutions. The JMSDF and USN now participated together in numerous international meetings and conferences each year. New to the region in 1988 was the multilateral Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Established in 1988 to promote mutual understanding and naval cooperation in

\textsuperscript{295} This opinion was expressed frequently in interviews with USN officers. Examples include interviews 3C (14 December 1999), 2A (22 March 1999) and 2B (29 July 1999).
\textsuperscript{296} Interview 3C (14 December 1999).
\textsuperscript{297} Ibid.
the Western Pacific region, WPNS is the only high level Western Pacific naval forum at which regional navies meet and discuss common challenges. WPNS grew out of the biennial US Chief of Naval Operations-hosted International Seapower Symposium at the US Naval War College. Australia hosted the first symposium in Canberra in 1988. The second symposium was held in 1990 in Thailand. Initially, topics for discussion at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium included relatively uncontroversial topics such as safe navigation and pollution control. Nevertheless, this gave the JMSDF its first real taste of discussing mutual challenges with its neighbours in the region and with its US alliance partner. These meetings served to strengthen the organisational coherence of the Japan-US naval relationship and its institutionalisation by reinforcing the importance of structures, procedures and institutional linkages with other navies.

JMSDF attendance at the US Naval War College and at other defence-related institutions in the United States continued during this period. Table 5 in Chapter 2 identifies total JMSDF attendance at defence-related and civilian institutions during the three periods under review. Neither JMSDF nor USN officials were not able to specifically break out the extent to which attendance increased during this particular period. They did state that attendance at technical training courses in the United States for new defence systems and equipment, such as Aegis, likely increased during this period because of the introduction of so many new platforms, systems and equipment for the JMSDF. A majority of these systems and equipment came from the United States.

Training occurred at various USN operational commands for the surface, subsurface and air forces. Similarly, records do not indicate whether the comparatively small USN attendance at defense colleges in Japan increased during this time. Likely the numbers were fairly consistent through time, according to US and Japanese naval officials. Table 6 in Chapter 2 provides total participation of USN personnel through 2004.

In addition to technical training and conferences that occurred at the US Naval War College and at other USN commands, the JMSDF officers who attended the year-long course of study at the US Naval War College and the USN officers attending the Maritime Staff College in Tokyo established important personal contacts that began to have a larger effect on the relationship during this period. In interviews, several JMSDF admirals, including the Chief of the Maritime Staff, and other senior naval officers noted with fond memory their experiences at the Naval War College and the contacts they had established with counterparts in the US Navy. Significantly, officers interviewed also noted how these contacts had been useful in facilitating operational engagement and dealing with crises in the relationship—such as ship accidents involving the loss of life. This was a conscious effort on the part of the Naval War College to foster international bonds and to establish a common naval ‘framework’ within which they could all relate. The establishment of these institutional linkages is a powerful mechanism for creating organisational coherence between navies and for influence rendering by the leading naval power, in this case the US Navy. This is consistent with the original intent of Admiral Colbert, the founder of the

299 Interviews 19A (7 June 2004), 3J (4 March 2005) and 3K (4 September 2004).
300 Interviews with several JMSDF admirals in Tokyo, Japan, including Admiral Toru Ishikawa, Chief of Staff, JMSDF (11 September 2002).
Naval Command Course at the US Naval War College—established in 1956 for senior non-USN officers.\textsuperscript{301}

Summary

The naval relationship grew in all aspects of institutionalisation during this period—internal coordination, operational interaction, institutional depth and external linkages. Increased operational cooperation, however, was the key driving element for institutionalisation during this period. The common goal of opposing the Soviet naval threat in the region, through the US Navy’s ‘maritime strategy’, helped unite the two navies. Cooperation—and ultimately institutionalisation—was recognised as being in the best interest of both navies. Together, they shared operational risks and the defence burden, which brought the navies closer together. As the navies cooperated more closely, they developed new organisational procedures and mechanisms to facilitate more effective cooperation and increased their sharing of information and intelligence—thus strengthening other elements of institutionalisation. Increased operational cooperation created greater familiarisation between the navies, which led to the establishment of closer operational bonds. This, in turn, helped minimize some of the cultural and language differences between the two navies. While the tendency toward greater cooperation occurred generally throughout both navies, the closest cooperation and greatest improvement occurred amongst ASW units who were operationally engaged on a daily basis, particularly the P-3C units.

The JMSDF began adapting some of its practices—and to some extent its behaviour—to that of the US Navy. Admiral Osada’s efforts to strengthen the partnership with the US Navy by improving interoperability in the areas of equipment, tactics and language, is an example of JMSDF adaptation. In particular, the JMSDF became more assertive in pursuing its own objectives and used the US Navy as a conduit of sorts to assist in this effort. As discussed in Chapter 1, adaptation to the hegemonic naval power is a common phenomenon throughout history. In particular, the acquisition of equipment and technology—generally from the United States—helped turn the naval relationship into one of equals, or nearly so.

However, just as the Soviet naval threat contributed to the establishment of a stronger naval relationship, the demise of the threat and additional changes in the strategic environment were leading factors that resulted in reduced operational interaction and cooperation. The full effect of these changes on the institutionalisation of the relationship was manifested some years later and will be addressed in the next chapter. However, signs of the loosening of the relationship began to appear in the closing days of the Cold War, as respective naval goals began to divert—particularly on issues of future roles and missions and associated systems and equipment.


During the mid-to-late 1980s, the collision of US global-military interests and Japan's national-economic interests became more evident and affected all aspects of the Japan-US relationship, including the naval relationship. Security
and economic factors, driven by the demise of the Soviet threat, the rise of other security concerns in other parts of the world, Japan's exceptional economic performance and domestic political pressures in both countries, helped fuel this conflict. In addition, *gaiatsu*—outside pressure—in this case from the United States, became a regular part of the landscape as the United States pressured Japan for improved trade concessions and greater contributions to defence burdensharing. Ultimately, navies are instruments of state policy and as such are subject to many of the same influences as the nation itself.

As in the earlier period, particular people had important roles to play in the Japan-US security and naval relationships. A dichotomy of sorts existed between senior level officials and those managing the relationship on a daily basis. In the United States, the transition from Ambassador Mike Mansfield to Michael Armacost in 1989 was a sign of less sympathetic and supportive relations between Washington and Tokyo, particularly on economic matters. In Japan, the transition from Prime Minister Nakasone to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu had similar results. At the same time, however, the Japan-US security relationship had matured to the point that certain middle- and senior-level officials in the defence bureaucracies were helping to facilitate and influence the security and naval relationships behind the scenes, in spite of the external influences. Many of these officials were or had been US Navy officers and as such had established particularly effective relations with the JMSDF, working with them to facilitate naval cooperation during this period.

As external security challenges shifted from the Soviet threat to a variety of challenges in the Middle East, the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf became a litmus test of Japan’s commitment to alliance burden sharing. Japan’s decision not to contribute military personnel to this operation or to any of the naval
operations in the Gulf prior to 1991—for domestic political reasons—affected
the Japan-US security relationship, including operational interaction within the
naval relationship, probably more than any other factor during this period. For
the navies, the challenges lay in the fact that they were no longer operating as
closely together, with coordinated roles and missions.

**US and Japan Respond to Changing Threats and New Challenges**

A number of external challenges existed for both the United States and
Japan during the 1986-1991 period, including continued challenges from the
Soviet Union and emerging new threats in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.
The threats, and the military missions to combat these threats, were distinctly
different from those in the earlier part of the decade.

By the latter part of the 1980s, the ‘second Cold War’ had started to wind
down. However, despite the ‘Vladivostok speech delivered by Soviet President
Gorbachev in 1986 and the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
treaty in 1987, the Soviet Union still maintained considerable forces in the
region. In 1988, for example, about one-third of Soviet forces were stationed in
the Far East, including Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles. Furthermore, Soviet aircraft continued to violate
Japanese airspace, including off Rebun Island, Hokkaido, and over the Okinawa
Main Island in 1987.\(^3\)

A key element in defending against the Soviet naval threat in the 1980s
and in tightening the link with the US Navy was Japan’s commitment to develop
sealane defence capabilities out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan’s shoreline,

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as discussed in Chapter 2. The Reagan administration embraced the sealane
defence mission for Japan as part of an overall strategy to encourage US allies
to take more responsibility for defending themselves and thereby contribute to
the defence of the region. It was also part of a new burdensharing strategy on
the part of the Reagan administration that emphasized shared ‘roles and
missions’ rather than percentage of GNP.303 Japan took responsibility for
defending the air space and sealanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from its
shoreline, and the United States provided the nuclear umbrella, offensive
projection forces in the Northwest Pacific, and sealane protection forces in the
Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans.304

While Japan and the United States cooperated against the Soviet threat
during the 1980s, the threats emanating from the Middle East in the latter part of
the 1980s posed a different kind of challenge. By the mid-1980s, conflict
between Iran and Iraq was ongoing and attacks on ships in the Persian Gulf
threatened international shipping, in particular oil tankers. In 1986, Iran had
attacked 25 Kuwaiti oil tankers but had avoided American ships. However, in
May 1987, an Iraqi missile attack disabled a US Navy guided missile frigate, the
USS Stark, in the Persian Gulf, killing 37 naval personnel and injuring many
others.305 As a result, the United States increased its pressure on US allies to

303 James Auer does an effective job at explaining this change in his Oral History Interview,
March 1996, p. 7. See also FY 1985 Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to
the Congress, February 1, 1984, p. 40, and Robert F. Reed, The Japan-US Alliance: Sharing the
Burden of Defense, National Defense University, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83-7,
304 Reed, p. 50.
305 Iraq claimed that the attack was an accident saying that the pilot of the F-1 Mirage jet believed
he was firing on an Iranian vessel. At the time, the United States was most worried about the
missile threat from Iran and its Silkworm missiles imported from China. The Silkworm missile
was credited with a range of 50 miles and a warhead with the explosive power of 1,100 pounds
of TNT—three times the power of the Exocet missile that disabled the USS Stark. See
and ‘Preemptive US Strike on Iran Missiles Debated’, George C. Wilson, 5 June 1987. See also
Defense of Japan 1988, pp. 53-54, and Don Oberdorfer and Molly Moore, ‘New Accord to Let
help protect international shipping in the region. Japan, which was more
dependent on Middle East oil than any other major western nation, became a
particular target of attention by the US Congress.\textsuperscript{305} In addition to its oil
consumption, the vulnerability of Japan's oil tankers provided Japan with
another stake in the growing conflict in the Persian Gulf. By June 1988, 19 ships
affiliated with Japan, including four ships owned by Japanese companies, had
been attacked and damaged in the Gulf region, yet no JMSDF ships participated
in the escorting of tankers through the Gulf\textsuperscript{307}.

The Japanese government was split on how to respond to US pleas for
assistance in the Gulf region. While the JMSDF was very eager to participate in
an out of area security operation, and the JDA supported this effort, other parts
of the Japanese government had varying opinions. After a high level conference
between the Japanese government and the ruling party, Japan issued a policy
statement in October 1987 concerning Japan's contribution to protecting safe
navigation in the Persian Gulf. The Japanese government decided that it could
contribute only through strictly non-military means. In the official statement—
'Japan's Policy of Contributing to the Securing of Free and Safe Navigation in
the Persian Gulf'—Japan identified three other ways in which it could contribute
to safer navigation in the Gulf: 1) establishing and funding facilities to assist
shipping by use of high-precision radio waves, 2) expanding the scope of its
economic and technological cooperation with countries in the Gulf area once
hostilities had ceased and 3) shouldering a fiscal burden, commensurate with its
international responsibility, to carry out UN Security Council Resolution 598.\textsuperscript{308}

\textsuperscript{305} For example, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and
the International Energy Agency, in 1986, approximately 56 percent of Japan's oil transited the
Strait of Hormuz, compared with 14 percent for Germany, 18 percent by the United States, and
\textsuperscript{307} Defense of Japan 1988, pp. 53-54.
\textsuperscript{308} See Defense of Japan 1988, pp. 54-55 and pp. 257-258.
In August 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the United States again suggested that Japan send minesweepers and tankers to the Gulf. The Japanese government eventually refused on the grounds that minesweepers might get drawn into hostilities. The process of arriving at a response was steeped in intense inter-agency rivalry and it contributed to the government’s inability to produce an effective decision.309 According to Michael Armacost, US Ambassador at the time, Japan’s post-war history had left its government ill equipped to respond decisively to international security crises. It had no tradition of expending political capital or assuming major political risks on behalf of general principles.310

Japan eventually deployed JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the conflict was over, but it was an operation conducted essentially on its own. Political decisions made in Japan prevented a more intense level of operational cooperation between the JMSDF and USN in the Gulf during the years leading up to the 1991 conflict. The JMSDF’s minesweeping efforts in the region after the war received little worldwide attention or outward appreciation, despite the fact that it was the first time Japan had deployed forces outside of its territorial waters in support of an operation since World War II. Instead, the world focused on Japan’s $13 billion contribution to the international operation as an example of its ‘checkbook diplomacy’.311


310 Armacost, pp. 99-100.

**Closer Working Relationships on Security Issues**

During the latter part of the 1980s, the Japan-US security relationship had matured to the point that certain middle level officials in the defence bureaucracies were helping to facilitate and influence the security and naval relationships behind the scenes. In addition, these officials helped to facilitate a more private approach to defence burdensharing during this period. Since many of the key players had naval backgrounds and had established extensive transnational naval connections, the naval relationship benefited as well. These officials built on the foundation established by senior leadership in both countries. Their activities would not have been possible without that broader political support.

In the US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense (East Asia and Pacific Affairs), the Japan Senior Country Director was a particularly influential position, and this office became a key focal point for Japan-US security issues. In the 1970s, Japanese defence bureaucrats did not have regular contact with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This changed in the 1980s, partly due to the US officials who held the Country Director position. They actively reached out to both the JDA and the Self-Defense Forces. In the United States, one of the most effective links between the two defence establishments and the two navies was Dr. James Auer. Auer served as Japan Country Director from April 1979 until September 1988. Prior to that, he was a US Navy officer with numerous deployments in the Pacific, including Japan. Auer spoke Japanese, was the first USN graduate of the JMSDF Maritime
Staff College and had established himself in the naval and political establishments in Japan.\textsuperscript{312}

In addition to middle-level officials within the Department of Defense’s Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, senior Defense and State Department officials, such as Richard Armitage, helped influence Japan-US security relations in the critical period of the 1980s through the key positions they held. These officials played important roles in encouraging Japan to maintain its commitment to develop SLOC defence capability. Between 1981 and 1989, Armitage served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific and then as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.\textsuperscript{313} The Japan Senior Country Director reported through these offices. In the early part of the decade, Armitage was very involved in helping Japan craft its force structure to respond to the new sealane defence mission. He was one of the key US officials at the conference in Hawaii in June 1981, when the US government provided an estimate of the force structure that Japan would require in order to effectively defend its air space and sealanes out to one thousand miles.\textsuperscript{314}

In Japan, US officials began to foster close working relations with JDA senior- and mid-level bureaucrats responsible for implementing the new defence build-up and the sealane defence mission. They met fairly frequently at conferences and, with the increased institutionalisation of the security

\textsuperscript{312} As identified in Chapter 1, Auer is the author of the key work on the development of the JMSDF, published in 1973: \textit{The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71}, originally his Ph.D. dissertation. Upon Auer’s departure in 1988, another US Navy officer—Torkel Patterson—became Senior Country Director and served in this position until 1992. As with Auer, Patterson also had had numerous tours in Japan, he spoke Japanese and had graduated from Japan’s Maritime Staff College. He also maintained strong links with key JDA and JMSDF officials.

\textsuperscript{313} As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Richard Armitage returned to government during George W. Bush’s first term and served as Under Secretary of State—still with a strong interest in Japan.

\textsuperscript{314} Reed, p. 50. See also White House biography of Richard Armitage, \texttt{http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/armitager-bio.htm}, accessed 4 December 2006.
relationship, had established regular links between bureaucracies. The relationship between the JDA director and the US Secretary of Defense was an important one at this time, particularly given the sensitive FS-X discussions, according to Yukoh Kurihara, who worked with Secretary Caspar Weinberger.  

In addition to Japanese officials in the defence bureaucracy, Japanese civilians and local government officials played key roles in supporting the naval relationship during this time. To be effective in their relationship with the JMSDF and with the Japanese government more generally, US Navy officials had to establish a relationship with key civilians such as majors and local businessmen, and work these relationships from behind the scenes. This was a key difference in managing the Japan-US naval relationship versus other US naval relationships in the world, according to US Navy officers interviewed. They noted that the politicians and businessmen ‘knew how to get things done’ and as such, US Navy officials made it a point to establish effective relations with them.  

With the forward presence of a large number of US Seventh Fleet assets in Japan and in the area around Japan, personal relationships with the local communities become very important, according to a former US Seventh Fleet Commander. Japanese mayors, in particular, wield significant power, he stated, because the Japan central government generally will not override a mayor.  

The mayors from Sasebo, Sapporo and Yokosuka—locations of large US Navy presence—were particularly notable for their influence. Key civilian  

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315 Kurihara notes the importance of being able to speak English and of establishing a relationship based on honesty rather than ‘flattery’. See Yukoh Kurihara Oral History Interview, conducted by Koji Murata, 21 December 1996, National Security Archives, George Washington University, pp. 5-7.  
316 See, for example, interviews 8A (28 August 2000), 17E (12 June 2002), 21A (9 May 2005) and 25A (4 January 2007).  
businessmen, with strong connections to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), often were some of the first ‘officials’ an incoming Seventh Fleet Commander would meet upon arrival in Japan. These businessmen would be particularly helpful during alliance crises because of their ability to provide advice on what to do and who to talk with.\textsuperscript{318} Therefore, cultivating not only a professional relationship but a strong personal relationship, which involved attending extensive social activities, was very important, according to a former US Defense Attaché, who served at the US Embassy in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{319}

Beyond the influence of bureaucrats and civilians in Japan, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stands out as a figure who influenced the 1986-1991 period—and ultimately the naval relationship—but whose role in government came a few years earlier. For the navies and for the defence relationship more broadly, he provided the support and financial resources for their growth and development later in the decade. The results of his work came to fruition in the latter part of the decade, with a formidable ASW force structure. Nakasone served as head of the Japan Defense Agency from 1970-1972 and as Japanese Prime Minister from November 1982-November 1987.

During his early days as Prime Minister, Nakasone announced that his primary focus in the area of foreign policy would be to improve the Japan-US security relationship and specifically to carry out the Japanese part of the Reagan-Suzuki communiqué concerning SLOC defence, to include substantial increases in defence spending. In 1983, 1984 and 1985, the Japanese government froze most budget categories except defence as Nakasone increased Japan’s defence spending in response to the rising Soviet threat. Japanese defence spending increased in terms of both the ratio to GNP and absolute size in the

\textsuperscript{318} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{319} Interview 21A (9 May 2005).
mid-to-late 1980s, and in 1987, for the first time, the ratio of defence budget to GNP exceeded one percent.\textsuperscript{320}

For the naval relationship and its institutionalisation, this increase in Japanese defence funding translated into improved operational interoperability, as Japan was now able to purchase some of the same platforms, systems and equipment used by the US Navy, and increased operational exercises. It also indicated that the United States and Japan were increasingly in agreement on the nature of the Soviet threat and what was needed to defeat it. The navies and their respective operational activities benefited from this new coherence in strategic perspectives because it meant that dedicated resources and attention would be consistently provided.\textsuperscript{321}

**Economic and Other Pressures**

A continuing tension between cooperation and rivalry characterised the Japan-US relationship in the latter part of the 1980s. While the United States and Japan were cooperating on defeating the Soviet threat, they were at the same time engaged in some virulent trade battles. Michael Armacost notes that congressional virulence over trade issues was evident at his confirmation hearings for his appointment as US Ambassador to Japan. In particular, the fact that the White House and US State Department were not longer willing to play down economic interests in favour of strategic concerns was a significant


\textsuperscript{321} In a 1983 House Armed Services Committee hearing, Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific Forces, stated that Japan and the United States ‘basically agree on the Soviet threat’. The primary difference was the ‘urgency to meet that threat’. As such, he noted that the United States was waiting to see what the new prime minister (Nakasone) would do to increase military spending. See ‘US Pacific Chief Says Japan Shows “Steady” Military Gains’, United Press International, 1983.
change from the past, according to Armacost. In addition, defence acquisition issues were now challenging the otherwise cooperative relationship between the two defence establishments. Domestic politics in both countries were fueling these battles. For the broader Japan-US relationship, the crisis over the FS-X (Fighter Support Experimental) epitomized the frustrations felt by both countries. While it had its own share of acquisition battles during this period, the naval relationship overcame some of the challenges that had affected the broader relationship—likely due to the closer and more well developed institutional links that existed between the two navies. Nevertheless, the relationship could not avoid being affected by some of these tensions.

By the mid-1980s, Japan had developed into an economic superpower that increasingly challenged and often aggravated the United States. Japan's huge international surpluses, the growing strength of the yen against the dollar, and its high savings rate made it the world's leading creditor nation, and the United States became the world's leading debtor. In a biography of former US Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, Don Oberdorfer points out that during Mansfield's first year in Tokyo in 1977, the US deficit in merchandise trade was approximately $8 – $10 billion, which was then seen as a catastrophic figure. In 1988, Mansfield's last year in Tokyo, the US deficit was $52 billion. These large US trade deficits, combined with high unemployment and weak growth in wages led to strong internal pressures in the United States to punish and/or contain Japan. The security relationship did not escape these new pressures, despite efforts in the past to protect it from external turmoil.

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322 Armacost, pp. 32-33.
324 According to Michael Armacost, ‘...the readiness of the White House and State Department to play down economic interests in favor of strategic concerns had diminished’. See Armacost, pp. 32-34.
The year 1988 was a critical time for the Japan-US relationship. Not only were economic pressures building, evidenced by the 1988 Trade Bill that established firm deadlines for measuring progress on trade-related matters; there was also a key change of the guard in Tokyo. Michael Armacost, a relative hard-liner on economic issues, replaced the long-serving Mike Mansfield as Ambassador. He was determined to change the perceptions that the Tokyo Embassy had ‘tilted too far in favour of its host’ and to re-establish the mission’s reputation for credible and objective economic reporting, as well as to establish a closer relationship with the business community.  

Armaments cooperation and technology sharing were part of the evolution of the Japan-US security relationship during this period. However, they were also part of the trade battles experienced by the broader relationship. As discussed in Chapter 2, the US Navy was hesitant to provide Japan’s Self-Defense Forces with sensitive information and technology in the late 1970s, fearing that it would fall into Soviet hands. This gradually began to change in the 1980s as the two navies began more extensive cooperation. US officials justified the release of front-line defence systems for licensed production as a means of strengthening security relations with Japan, particularly in the light of the threat from the Soviet Union. It also provided better interoperability with US forces. However, by the mid-to-late 1980s, the United States began to recognize that there were economic implications to US technology transfer policies that were not appropriate anymore given Japan’s status as an economic competitor with the United States. These policies and practices provided a way for Japan to make inroads into the traditional strongholds of US industry,

Ibid., pp. 32-34.
especially in the high-tech areas, and became a lightning rod for US trade officials concerned by the economic implications of military sales and licensed production programmes.\textsuperscript{326}

US dissatisfaction with defence industrial cooperation programmes was matched by pressure in Japan for indigenous development as well as production of defence systems.\textsuperscript{327} This situation came to a head in the mid-1980s when the Japan Defense Agency wanted to replace its F-1 support fighter with an indigenous aircraft based on both domestic and foreign systems—FS-X. While willing to support the FS-X programme, DOD insisted that cooperation take place under a government agreement with provisions for protection of information and technology flowback. After several years of contentious discussions and cabinet-level confrontations concerning ‘US-based’ versus ‘indigenous’ options for FS-X, the principals agree to pursue codevelopment based on the US F-16 fighter aircraft.\textsuperscript{328}

According to Gregg Rubinstein, agreement on a joint FS-X programme triggered an even greater controversy. FS-X had become a symbol for inflated


\textsuperscript{327} Richard Samuels uses the term ‘technonationalism’ to refer to the belief in Japan that ‘…technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong’. See Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army; (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. x.

Japanese expectations of aerospace leadership, just as it was a target for frustration over trade problems and fears for the US industrial base in Washington. In the end, although the United States and Japan agreed to develop FS-X based on the US F-16 fighter, the two sides had basically different ideas of what codevelopment meant. For the United States, it was an extension of co-production. For Japan, it meant a maximum of indigenous development with US support but minimal US oversight. The approaches were never reconciled and continued to complicate the FS-X development programme and broader Japan-US relations on this and related acquisition matters.  

Although the FS-X was not a naval system, the aircraft development experience had an effect on the JMSDF-USN relationship. Naval officers interviewed for this study stated that as a result of the FS-X experience, the Navy—as with the rest of the US government—had no desire to enter into further contentious negotiations over systems’ development and more often than not acceded to Japanese interests, creating future compatibility and interoperability problems. Senior US Navy personnel expressed their concern about future compatibility and interoperability of Japanese systems with the US Navy systems.  

Domestic politics in both countries contributed significantly to these developments. In the United States, the US Congress was probably the most vocal critic of the FS-X experience, viewing such programmes as adversely affecting US employment and the long-term economic competitiveness in the US aerospace industry. Despite the challenges with the FS-X programme, however, in 1988 the US Government agreed to transfer the advanced Aegis radar system

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Rubenstein, pp. 270-283.

In particular, senior US Navy officers expressed their concern over Japan’s development of a follow-on platform to the P-3C Orion, which the JMSDF and USN had used for many years to conduct joint anti-submarine operations off the coast of Japan and in the Western Pacific Ocean. See interviews 5E (8 April 2007), 5F (10 January 2007) and 26A (15 June 2002).
to Japan as a military sale, as discussed earlier in the chapter.\footnote{331} Although foreign military sales posed fewer risks of potential technology loss than co-development or licensed production, it was still a controversial military transfer because no other ally had this advanced radar system. Congressional concerns related to the SPY-1D radar technology and the associated complex real-time computer programmes. Many members believed that the latest US technology should not be released to Japan because of concern that it might ‘reverse engineer’ the system. Despite these concerns, Congress eventually approved the sale, with US Navy assurance that additional constraints on the transfer of technology had been made.\footnote{332}

At a time when the United States was urging Japan to play a larger defence role in Northeast Asia, the Aegis system provided an extremely valuable resource for missile defence and for close cooperation with US naval forces in the area. Furthermore, given the substantial trade deficit that existed with Japan at the time, congressional officials believed that such a big-ticket sale would provide some offsets. While it is difficult to make a definitive judgement on the role that naval institutionalisation played in this decision, behind the scenes naval influence—at a time of peak cooperation against the Soviet naval threat—helped make this foreign military sale more palatable.\footnote{333}

\footnote{331}The Aegis combat system is an integrated missile guidance system that is capable of simultaneous operations against a multi-mission threat, involving anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. See ‘Lockheed Martin-US Navy Aegis Weapon System Guides Standard Missiles to Target Intercept’, press release, Lockheed Martin, 11 December 2003.

\footnote{332}Under the Arms Export Control Act, Congress has 30 days to block a sale after being notified of the intended sale by the Executive Branch.

\footnote{333}According to one retired naval official, the Aegis sale was testament to the ‘greatness of the Japan-US alliance’ but he also noted that there were likely a number of USN and congressional ‘visionaries’ who foresaw the potential role of the JMSDF in future missile defence efforts and the consequent value of Aegis. See interview 16A (4 March 2005). Also see interviews with retired US Navy officers 3J (4 March 2005), 3K (4 September 2004) and 5A (21 March 2000).
Summary

The end of the 1980s and early 1990s was a unique period for the Japan-US alliance relationship because of the significant events and changing circumstances in the international political, economic and security arenas. Despite the growing strength of the naval relationship, it could not avoid being affected by some of these factors, such as the change in the threat environment. This was also a period of dichotomies. On the one hand, the security and naval relationships were strengthened by the close coordination of defence-related activities during the Cold War period. For example, a new group of security relationship 'managers' at the US Department of Defense and at the Japan Defense Agency helped facilitate better relations between the United States and Japan at the working level. On the other hand, however, bitter trade battles and pressures for a more equitable sharing of the defence burden emerged from domestic sources in both Japan and the United States. Economic and security issues were no longer isolated from each other in alliance discussions, as was the case in the past.

Despite the domestic political battles waging in Japan and the United States over economic issues and the spill-over effect for the security relationship in the mid-1980s, naval exercises and other operational interaction were relatively unscathed. With the continued formidable threat from the Soviet Union's Pacific fleet, both countries recognised that it was in their best interest for cooperative naval operations to continue. Once the primary threat to Japan abated, JMSDF and USN naval cooperation and exercises suffered. The effect of reduced operational interaction was exacerbated by Japan's decision not to deploy forces to the Gulf. Driven by domestic politics in Japan, the lack of a
Japanese presence in the Gulf stifled the further development of the cooperative naval relationship.

The acrimony associated with the FS-X experience, also driven by domestic political factors, never subsumed the naval relationship, but its legacy did affect acquisition discussions in the future, including naval. In this light, the foreign military sale of the Aegis system to the JMSDF surprised many onlookers. However, this decision was also a testimony to the cooperative role that the navies played in the battle against Soviet naval forces in the region during the 1980s and how the successful naval relationship was able to influence elements of the security relationship, particularly with respect to defence burdensharing.

The Japan-US naval relationship was increasingly strengthened during the Cold War, but the change in the geostrategic landscape combined with decisions made by the Japanese government that prevented the JMSDF from joining the US Navy in support of new missions in the Middle East ultimately curtailed the level of cooperation between the two navies and the continued development and strengthening of institutional dimensions in the relationship.

**Chapter Conclusion**

A variety of elements influenced the naval relationship during this diverse period in the Japan-US alliance relationship, including factors internal to the naval relationship as well as external factors. However, while external factors principally drove the relationship in the earlier period, now the naval relationship itself provided the primary momentum for growth. Naval institutionalisation was enhanced considerably during the 1980s due principally
to intensified operational cooperation between the two navies in response to a mutually recognised external security threat. Cooperation was recognised as being in the best interest of each navy and efforts were made by both the US Navy and the JMSDF to improve interoperability. An alignment of alliance goals and objectives was an important part of an increasingly synchronistic relationship. As the key players in the battle against Soviet military activities in Northeast Asia, the navies benefited from supportive government policies and generous material support. Enhanced operational cooperation helped drive other aspects of institutionalisation during this time period, particularly internal coordination and institutional depth, which in turn enhanced further operational cooperation and institutionalisation.

The robustness of naval operational cooperation helped overcome a variety of external challenges, such as cultural and language differences and the pressures of domestic politics, although these challenges never completely disappeared. The close operations between the two navies during the 1980s and the development of personal relationships at all levels bolstered the naval relationship and protected it somewhat from the divisiveness of the Japan-US relationship at the national level. As such, during a period of acrimonious discussions over the FS-X aircraft development as other trade disputes between the two countries, the US Congress agreed to release the advanced Aegis radar system to Japan, as a foreign military sale, to improve JMSDF sealane defence and the effectiveness of JMSDF-USN operational cooperation in the Northwest Pacific.

The increased technical capability of the JMSDF contributed to the improved cooperative relationship between the two navies. However, although technology can help equalise military relationships, it can also drive these
relationships in other directions. Once an alliance partner achieves a certain level of technological parity, then some fundamental questions may arise concerning the previously perceived value of the alliance. If, for example, a naval force has the capability to patrol the sea lines of communication by itself, it may begin to question the role of an alliance partner, particularly if there is no formidable threat with which to contend. This was not an issue of serious concern during this time period; however, with the demise of the Soviet threat and with the goals and objectives of the two navies diverting, signs were emerging during the latter part of this period that the JMSDF was considering a broader array of options. With the changing external circumstances, pressures of domestic politics in each country and reduced operational contact, the naval relationship was now subject to new challenges that served to weaken the relationship and its institutionalisation.

After nearly a decade of unrest and discord in the Japan-US security relationship and a similar but lesser level of discordance in the naval relationship, the years 1996-2001 marked a period of greater agreement and institutionalisation of Japan-US security relations and naval relations. By 1996, new security threats in Northeast Asia, such as missile tests launched from North Korea and tensions in the Taiwan Straits between China and Taiwan, pointed to renewed purpose and the need for new structures to help manage the security relationship. In 1997, a revised set of defence cooperation guidelines initiated a new era of cooperation between Japanese and US defence forces and eventually resulted in better joint planning and regional conflict preparedness. Nevertheless, signs of strain were still visible in discussions over host nation support, as well as basing and facilities issues affecting US military personnel stationed in Japan. Relations were not what they had been when both nations had been cooperating against the Soviet threat, as was the case in the previous decade. As a result, issues that would typically have been viewed as alliance ‘irritations’ had risen to the surface and had become ‘problems’.

For the naval relationship, the 1997 Defense Guidelines helped legitimise certain naval activities that were ongoing or were being discussed, but they did not in and of themselves push the naval relationship to new operational levels and institutionalisation. The emergence of new threats and the consequent need to develop joint operational approaches helped facilitate additional institutionalisation in the relationship. Despite the emergence of new regional threats, the two navies did not always share similar perceptions of these threats. Further, the particular interests of each navy often took precedence over the
naval relationship. It was the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the Japanese government’s response with emergency legislation, that facilitated the subsequent JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean and ushered in a new phase in the JMSDF-USN relationship and its institutionalisation. As with previous eras, working together and sharing risks in an operational setting in support of mutually recognised interests were key elements in the development of a closer naval relationship. For the purpose of this thesis, however, sufficient time did not elapse to study the effect that this series of deployments to the Indian Ocean had on the naval relationship.

Civilian leadership in both countries played an essential role in promoting the naval relationship and supporting it during this period as the navies developed new missions and adapted to the post-Cold War operating environment. This highlights once again the role of personalities in the naval relationship as well as the security relationship and the influence rendering from one relationship to another. While in the late 1970s, Japanese officials took the lead in initiating better security cooperation with the United States—fearing US abandonment in the face of growing security threats. In the 1990s, US officials were the ones concerned about the state of the relationship and used their influence to launch new alliance initiatives that contributed to greater institutionalisation. The naval relationship benefited even more than the other military relationships because it became the principal tool for implementing new security cooperation initiatives, as was the case during the Cold War.
In 1996, the navies emerged from a period in which they had had less operational contact with each other than in the previous decade. Most important, the navies were not engaged, operationally, in a common mission, nor did they have a common mission around which to focus and structure their exercise program. The naval relationship no longer had the US Navy’s ‘maritime strategy’ as the central unifying force of the operational relationship, as it did in the Cold War. As a result, both navies moved in more independent directions than they did in the 1980s. The continued institutionalisation of the security relationship with the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines (and other associated agreements), helped legitimise ongoing naval cooperation and provided ways to make the cooperation more effective. The JMSDF’s 2001 deployment to the Indian Ocean began the process to help re-bond the operational relationship and demonstrated that the JMSDF could be responsive to US calls for assistance.

**Internal Coordination**

The Japan-US naval relationship took on a different posture during the post-Cold War decade, and this shaped the nature and extent of internal coordination. Relations between the two navies had become more distant during the early part of the decade, as each navy had its own set of priorities, driven principally by their respective governments. This shaped the nature and extent of internal coordination in the relationship. The US Navy was actively engaged in interdiction operations in the Middle East, as part of post-Desert
Storm operations. The JMSDF was moving in another direction and becoming more involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations throughout the world as part of the Japanese government’s focus on ‘comprehensive security’. Its operations in this regard were generally without the participation of the US Navy. In the 1980s, the coordination of respective roles and missions between the two navies was one way in which they maintained a close relationship. However, in the early- to mid-1990s, with the divergence of their respective roles and missions, the navies required less coordination of their activities. Conditions gradually changed later in the decade as the two navies became increasingly concerned about emerging new threats in the region.

A variety of official ‘navy-to-navy talks’ occurred during this period. This was evidence of the expansion that had occurred in the number of naval organisations and levels of representation compared with the first navy-to-navy talks held in 1977. Further, it was an indication of continued growth in institutional linkages, despite the challenging alliance relationship in the earlier part of the decade. In addition to senior level navy-to-navy talks, official meetings also occurred at other levels on a regular basis, such as between the Commander of the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet and the Commander of the JMSDF’s Second Fleet, between the US Seventh Fleet and the JMSDF Escort Flotilla, as well as between US Naval Forces Japan and the JMSDF’s Maritime Staff Office.

Despite the unavailability of transcripts, insights concerning the nature and tone of various official talks emerged, nevertheless, through discussions with naval officers who either participated or observed these talks. One overall theme reflected by these officers was that the candour and confidence of

334 These issues will be discussed further in the second half of this chapter.
JMSDF officers had increased significantly over the life of these meetings—twenty years in the case of the top-level naval talks. An example of this new candour was the admission in these talks of the JMSDF desire to conduct confidence building activities in the region, with its neighbours, without necessarily the participation of the US Navy.\textsuperscript{335}

As relations between the navies became more diverse, there was increased presence of JMSDF officers throughout various US Navy commands. While most of the presence was not permanent representation, nevertheless it was an indication of interest, on the part of the JMSDF, to maximise its relationship with the US Navy. As with previous decades, personnel representation and exchanges heavily favoured Japan. Outside of the educational environment (e.g., the JMSDF Staff College and the National Institute for Defense Studies), it does not appear that US Navy personnel participated in any other personnel exchange or representation in Japan. According to USN officers, the promotion pressure in the US Navy and the associated requirement to maximise time spent at sea meant that USN personnel generally were not available for such positions in Japan.\textsuperscript{336}

The permanent JMSDF liaison positions, as identified in previous chapters (Table 7 in Chapter 2), remained unchanged: A JMSDF officer served on the staffs of US Naval Forces Japan and the US Pacific Fleet.\textsuperscript{337} In addition, JMSDF officers served for shorter periods of time on other staffs and within other Navy commands for the purpose of improving JMSDF operations. Temporary positions for JMSDF officers existed at various times for various

\textsuperscript{335} Interviews 3I (April 2000), 15A (August 2000), and 16A (March 2005) with US Navy officers who had participated in or observed these senior-level navy-to-navy meetings.

\textsuperscript{336} Interviews 17C (September 2004), 3B (December 1999).

\textsuperscript{337} Although beyond the scope of this thesis, in 2002 a liaison position for Japan was designated on the staff of the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida, given the JMSDF deployments to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
purposes at the US Naval Doctrine Command (Norfolk, Virginia) the US Naval War College (Newport, Rhode Island) and the Afloat Training Group Western Pacific (Yokosuka, Japan), as well as other commands. For example, in the 1990s, a JMSDF officer was assigned to the Naval War College for the purpose of understanding its war gaming centre and associated operations so that something similar could be established in Japan for the JMSDF. A JMSDF assignment at the Afloat Training Group Western Pacific was for the purpose of translating US Navy training publications into Japanese. The translation of US Navy doctrinal and training publications was important because, according to one USN officer who had attended the Maritime Staff College, US Navy publications are used as the main guidance for JMSDF planning.  

Of particular interest to this study is that the JMSDF did not have a liaison officer on the US Seventh Fleet Staff, the US Navy’s operational command for this region, and whose flagship headquarters was in Yokosuka, Japan. US Navy personnel interviewed for this study, who had previously been part of the Seventh Fleet staff, indicated that this lack of JMSDF representation on the US Navy’s operational staff was evidence that when it came to operational issues in the East Asia region, Japan was still only a limited player. They noted that given the US Seventh Fleet’s wide geographical responsibilities, Australia—which had a liaison officer on the Seventh Fleet Staff—was more likely to assist the US Navy than was Japan because of the latter’s operational limitations. They further noted that the Seventh Fleet likely did not want Japan to have access to classified information and discussions, since the JMSDF had a limited operational focus.  

338 Interview 3B and 3C (December 1999).
339 Interviews 7A (July 2000) and 15A (August 2000).
This perspective was contested, however, by a former US Seventh Fleet Commander. In an interview for this study, he stated that with the close proximity of the US Navy and the JMSDF in Japan, there was no need to have a JMSDF liaison officer on the Seventh Fleet staff. If he, as Seventh Fleet Commander, wanted to convey information to the JMSDF, he would simply pick up the phone and contact the appropriate person, given the close proximity of the navies. Communication was not a problem, he said.340

In 1998, Japan and the United States signed the first of several agreements concerning their joint participation in cooperative technological research on the Navy Theater-Wide Defense (NTWD) system, a marine-deployed missile defence system. Although a formal decision on participation in the NTWD program had been expected by the summer of 1997, it was postponed indefinitely due to the lack of consensus in Japan and because of pressure from Beijing. However, when North Korea test-fired its new Taepodong missile directly over Japanese territory on 31 August 1998, Japan made its decision to participate in the program soon thereafter.341 With the selection of a naval system, the US Navy and the JMSDF became key players in a process that would eventually involve the sharing of sensitive defence information and technology between the two countries. One DOD official noted that the two navies exerted much effort behind the scenes to influence the decision in favour of a naval launching platform. He stated that the strong naval relationship had much to do with keeping the discussions going forward, despite some political difficulties. It was the navies’ initiative to take on the missile defence mission, he said.342

342 Interview 11A (January 2007).
While the focus of the late 1990s was on missile defence research cooperation, the navies, as well as their respective defence establishments, knew that in the very near future the alliance would need to turn its attention to operational cooperation—a much more difficult endeavour given the lack of joint command and control arrangements in the defence relationship. Interviews with naval officers in both navies and key civilians who had been involved in the development of missile defence systems acknowledged that for a successful defence system, all parties would have to share key information and intelligence. An integrated operational system involving US and Japanese defence personnel would have to exist, and most importantly senior policymakers in both the United States and Japan would have to demonstrate the political will to facilitate this arrangement.  

From 1998 onwards, coordination and interaction occurred extensively between the navies, and between the US Department of Defense and the Japan Defense Agency in preparation for what was anticipated to be a difficult coordination task as the navies eventually moved to operational testing. As of 2001, there was no such system to manage naval operations or broader defence operations. According to US and Japanese defence officials, the Japanese government’s reaction to the 11 September 2001 terrorist events demonstrated that the precedent existed for such political will and for meaningful naval cooperation. At the time, however, no one was quite sure whether this level of

343 Similarly, Cronin, Giarra and Green point out that fielding theatre missile defence in Japan will necessitate significant changes to the mechanics of bilateral cooperation and Japanese self-defence. They note that given the very short warning times, ‘it will be absolutely necessary to achieve effective, seamless, and unimpeded command and control of disparate sensors and weapons, commanded by both nations, and controlled by a variety of interconnected military organizations that are doctrinally interconnected’. See Cronin, Giarra, Green, ‘Theater Missile Defense and the Japan-US Alliance’, pp. 181-182.
cooperation and support could be replicated in the case of missile defence—without an impending threat.\textsuperscript{344}

In addition to the agreement concerning cooperation on missile defence research, Japan made important changes to its procedures for protecting sensitive defence information during this period. These changes were necessary given the alliance agreement to proceed on missile defence, as well as outstanding deficiencies in the Japanese system compared with other US allies. Over the life of the security alliance, one of the key constraints to sharing sensitive defence information between the United States and Japan had been the lack of sufficient laws and regulations in Japan for handling sensitive defence information. The NATO alliance, for example, and each of its member countries, had a process for handling sensitive defence information and for punishing those that mishandle or release this information to those not authorized to receive it. Japan, however, had only minimal rules and procedures, and minimal punishment for the unauthorized release of sensitive defence-related information.

According to US and Japanese defence officials, the rules and regulations governing the protection of sensitive defence-related information were deliberately weak and limited in coverage because of concerns about secrecy in Japanese government in the aftermath of World War II. Furthermore, only Japan's Self Defence Forces were subject to these regulations.\textsuperscript{345} This is a key difference between the US-Japan security alliance and NATO. In 2000, a bipartisan working group of well known US scholars, senior security specialists, and former US government officials wrote a report that advocated changes in the Japan-US security alliance, including the establishment of an improved

\textsuperscript{344} Interviews 5F (January 2006), 11A (January 2007), 15A (August 2000) and 69 (February 2002).

\textsuperscript{345} Interviews 11A (January 2007), 15A (August 2000) and 69 (February 2002).
system in Japan to protect sensitive defence information. The report identified the deleterious effect that the lack of a sufficient infrastructure for the protection of classified information had had on establishing a strong security relationship between Japan and the United States.

Prior to the mid-1970s, Japan had no set procedures for handling sensitive defence information, including punishments for mishandling this information. In 1978, as part of the move to institutionalise the Japan-US defence relationship, Japan developed a minimum level of regulations to help protect classified information provided to Self-Defense Force personnel. The regulations stated that the punishment for unauthorized disclosure would be one year or less imprisonment, or a fine of under 30,000 Japanese yen.346

US defence officials were not satisfied with this arrangement for several reasons. Firstly, the regulations covered only Self-Defense Force personnel, not the civilian defence establishment or defence industry personnel. Secondly, the punishment for breaking the regulations was minimal and the leaking of classified information was not considered a criminal offence. Without a rigorous system for protecting classified information and prosecuting offenders, US officials did not want to share sensitive defence information with Japan out of concern that it would be leaked. In addition to the hesitancy to share information, US officials also tended not to discuss sensitive defence-related information with Japanese civilian officials, limiting these discussions to uniformed personnel, because civilian defence officials were not covered under these regulations.347

According to US and Japanese defence officials, Japan's Self-Defense Forces sometimes had sensitive information provided by US forces that they did

347 Interviews 5F (January 2006), 11A (January 2007), 15A (August 2000) and 69 (February 2002).
not share with their civilian leadership. This had implications for the broader defence relationship because the civilian leadership sometimes did not have the information it needed to make effective decisions and it created a divided defence establishment. Combined, the implications put Japan in a category apart from the United States' other alliance relationships.\textsuperscript{348}

Many US and Japanese officials believed that the lack of a free exchange of information between the United States and Japan, and the lack of trust that this generated, contributed to an alliance relationship that was considerably weaker than other alliance relationships, such as NATO and the US-Australia security arrangement.\textsuperscript{349} In the mid-to-late 1990s, as attention focused on strengthening the Japan-US alliance, the upgrading of Japan’s system for protecting classified information was one of the issues addressed in numerous meetings and discussions.

This process changed in late 2001 as a result of an incident involving the unauthorized release of defence information by a JMSDF officer in September 2000. The officer was arrested after he delivered two confidential documents to a military attaché from the Russian Embassy in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{350} Since the incident involved a JMSDF officer, the JMSDF was under particular scrutiny at this time. As a result of the incident, the Japan Defense Agency established the Committee for Measures to Protect Classified Information and improved procedures for handling classified information with a view to preventing future leakage. In October 2001, amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law passed the Diet and

\textsuperscript{348} Interviews 5F (January 2006), 10A (December 2006) and 69 (February 2002). In addition, see Institute for National Strategic Studies, \textit{The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership}, National Defense University, 11 October 2000.

\textsuperscript{349} Interviews 10A (December 2006), 11A (January 2007), 69 (February 2002) and 7A (July 2000). See also, \textit{The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership}.

\textsuperscript{350} For a more detailed discussion of this incident, see Japan Defense Agency, \textit{Defense of Japan 2002}, pp. 299-301.
resulted in the imposition of tougher criminal punishment for the leakage of certain classified defence information.

Table 14 provides a comparison of the new defence secrets system in Japan and the provisions that existed prior to that time. According to US defence officials, the new system is better than what existed before, but it contains many weaknesses, such as relatively light punishments (up to 5 years' imprisonment) for anyone who discloses classified information. Since these changes only occurred in late 2001, it will take additional years before one can assess the effect they have had on the Japan-US naval relationship as well as the security relationship.

Table 14: Japan's Provisions to Protect Sensitive Defence Information: 1978 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positions subject to the provisions</td>
<td>SDF personnel who obtain information through the course of their duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment provisions</td>
<td>Imprisonment of one year or less or a fine under 30,000 yen (note: attempted and negligent leaks will note be penalized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of punishment for accomplices</td>
<td>Planning, instigating or aiding and abetting (imprisonment of one year or less or a fine under 30,000 yen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offences committed outside of Japan</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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351 Interviews 11A (January 2007) and 3C (December 1999).
Operational Interactions

Some types of JMSDF-USN training and exercises increased during the 1996-2001 time period, as new security challenges emerged globally and in the region. In general, however, training and exercises were a mixed review. The navies’ participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multilateral exercise expanded as well. The influence of the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines was evident in the nature of some of the exercises, which focused on the potential for naval activity in the ‘areas surrounding Japan’—a primary focus of the new Guidelines. Significantly, Japan’s defence forces had become more multilateral during this period. They participated in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations as well as confidence building exercises with neighbouring countries and many of these missions and activities were conducted without USN participation. The Self-Defense Forces, including the JMSDF, was gaining a degree of independence from the United States, and this affected the nature of the naval relationship during this period.

Anti-submarine warfare had been the focus of JMSDF-USN training and exercises during previous periods. This remained, even though the Soviet submarine threat had diminished, in large part because the JMSDF wanted to continue this training focus. In addition, other interaction during this period involved anti-surface warfare training and tactical coordination, which corresponded with the emerging regional threats. Table 15 provides a summary of some of the training and exercises that occurred between the JMSDF and US Navy between 1996 and 2001. Given the similarity of the exercise data over these five years, a sample of two years (1997 and 2001) is identified below. As is

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352 Interview 5A (March 2000) and 15A (August 2000).
evident in the table, the size and complexity of training and exercises during this period resembled the training that took place during the 1976-1981 period. For example, most training objectives have just one element, e.g., ASW or minesweeping training. This change, compared with the middle period (1986-1991), can likely be attributed to the different priorities of the navies and the relative inattention to the naval relationship.

Table 15: JMSDF-US Navy Combined Training (1997 and 2001)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participating Forces from Japan</th>
<th>Participating Forces from US</th>
<th>Training Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>Feb. 15-20, 1997</td>
<td>4 vessels</td>
<td>4 vessels 1 aircraft</td>
<td>Anti-submarine and anti-surface training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>Feb. 15-27, 1997</td>
<td>18 vessels 22 aircraft</td>
<td>2 vessels 4 aircraft</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>Feb. 18-25, 1997</td>
<td>5 vessels 10 aircraft</td>
<td>5 vessels 10 aircraft</td>
<td>Anti-submarine and anti-surface ship training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
<td>Mar. 10-20, 1997</td>
<td>35 personnel from the Maritime Staff Office</td>
<td>About 50 personnel from US Naval Forces Japan</td>
<td>Training on coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>June 5-9, 1997</td>
<td>7 vessels 8 aircraft</td>
<td>4 vessels 6 aircraft</td>
<td>Anti-submarine and anti-surface training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>July 7-10, 1997</td>
<td>7 vessels 8 aircraft</td>
<td>4 vessels 6 aircraft</td>
<td>Anti-submarine and anti-surface ship training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>July 17-29, 1997</td>
<td>25 vessels 19 aircraft</td>
<td>5 aircraft 8 underwater explosive ordinance disposal members</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>Sept. 14-16, 1997</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
<td>4 vessels 2 aircraft</td>
<td>ASW and anti-surface ship training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale Special Exercise</td>
<td>Oct. 3-6, 1997</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Training on tactical movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
<td>Nov. 19-30, 1997</td>
<td>31 vessels 3 aircraft</td>
<td>4 underwater explosive ordinance disposal members</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Small-scale Training</td>
<td>3-5 Feb. 2001</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Training on tactical movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>5-17 Feb. 2001</td>
<td>19 vessels 15 aircraft</td>
<td>2 vessels 1 aircraft, and underwater explosive ordnance disposal</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Personnel Details</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
<td>12-22 Mar. 2001</td>
<td>40 personnel</td>
<td>Training in coordinated operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Medical Training</td>
<td>14 Mar. 2001</td>
<td>290 personnel from SDF Yokosuka Hospital</td>
<td>Training in joint operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>22-26 June 2001</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>ASW training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>17-29 July 2001</td>
<td>19 vessels, 1 vessel</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Training</td>
<td>23 July – 1 Aug. 2001</td>
<td>3 vessels, 4 vessels</td>
<td>ASW training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping Training</td>
<td>19-30 Nov. 2001</td>
<td>28 vessels, 5 personnel (underwater explosive ordinance disposal personnel)</td>
<td>Minesweeping training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Given the similarity of the training between 1996 and 2001, only two years were highlighted in this table (1997 and 2001).

Some of the exercises during this period focused on elements of the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines, and specifically on potential contingencies in the ‘area surrounding Japan’. For example, the exercise Keen Edge 2000—a biannual command post exercise—was the first time that Japan and the United States had conducted training that was based on a contingency outside of Japan. Keen Edge tests how well US and Japanese forces work together in a military operation, the effectiveness of joint operations amongst Japan’s three services, and some political elements involving Japanese leadership decisionmaking. With the passage of implementing legislation for the Guidelines by Japan’s Diet in May 1999, Keen Edge 2000 provided the first opportunity to exercise new areas of cooperation. Training involved 5,000 Japanese personnel and 1,350 Americans. It included Japanese rear-area support for US forces and practice of noncombatant evacuation operations of Japanese personnel.

As discussed in previous chapters, command post exercises are computer simulated. In this exercise participants use the computerized joint theater level simulation system which simulates movement of forces and equipment in the field.
citizens abroad. Operation Keen Edge took place at US Forces Japan headquarters at Yokota Air Base and Japanese Self-Defense Force headquarters, both near Tokyo.

In addition to the Keen Edge command post exercise in 2000, the RIMPAC multilateral exercise was still ongoing and Japan's participation had expanded considerably since its first participation in 1980. 1998 marked the tenth year that Japan had participated in RIMPAC—a large-scale multinational power projection and sea control naval exercise conducted by the US Third Fleet, in the vicinity of Hawaii. While this is a multinational exercise, Japan still participated bilaterally with the US Navy. Of the three RIMPAC exercises held during this period (RIMPAC 1996, 1998 and 2000), RIMPAC 2000 represented the JMSDF's largest contribution and a mission expansion. The JMSDF dispatched 8 ships, including an Aegis-type destroyer, a submarine and 8 P-3C aircraft. The exercise also included use of new communication technologies and new exercise scenarios involving the provision of humanitarian assistance. Despite the improvements over the years, one DOD official who participated in RIMPAC 1998 noted that in this exercise, Japan was not integrated into the broader RIMPAC command organisation. Rather, JMSDF staff officers were located outside of the operational centre. The official also noted that language difficulties complicated some of the liaison responsibilities of these staff representatives.\(^{354}\)

In interviews with numerous US and Japanese naval officers, all emphasized the importance of RIMPAC exercises for the Japan-US naval relationship but particularly for the JMSDF. Operating in a sophisticated and technically challenging environment with other navies increased the confidence

\(^{354}\) Interview 10A (December 2006).
and technical capabilities of the JMSDF. Even though the JMSDF ‘officially’
operated just with the US Navy, through the years the JMSDF increased its
opportunities during the exercise to work outside of the bilateral arrangement.
One JMSDF officer stated that the RIMPAC experience was an important factor
in helping the JMSDF transition to a multinational operating environment during
its deployment to the Indian Ocean in November 2001.355

Despite the progress made over the three time periods, interviews with
US and Japanese naval officers revealed that besides the pre-planned and
organised training and exercises, not much other operational interaction occurs
between US and JMSDF forces. Spontaneous interaction for training purposes
rarely if ever occurs, they said, unlike the case with other naval allies. US
officers whose ships had been homeported in Japan noted that communication
is very rare between USN and JMSDF ships off the coast of Japan, even between
JMSDF and US ships that are berthed close to each other in Yokosuka, Japan.356
Both the USN and JMSDF were to blame, they said, for not looking for and
making better use of opportunities—often relatively small—to improve
cooperation in the relationship. The US Navy generally had other operational
priorities and these ‘alliance development’ opportunities with Japan did not
figure high on that list. The JMSDF generally approached interactions with the

355 Assessment of the RIMPAC exercise was a standard question posed to all USN and JMSDF
officers interviewed for this thesis project. See, for example, interviews 10A (December 2006)
and 19E (March 2002).
356 Interview 3I (April 2000). A similarly serious indictment of the operational relationship came
from the 1997 National Defense University’s Strategic Assessment which stated that US forces
and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces ‘seldom operated along-side each other, much less together’. See
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 Strategic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force
applied to all relationships—ground, air and sea, the ground forces faced the greatest challenges
given the conditions and environment in which they operated.
US Navy in a more formalised manner and was not as comfortable at initiating interaction of a more informal nature.\(^{357}\)

Another characteristic of this period is the increased independence of the JMSDF and the US Navy and the increased tendency of each one to conduct operations without the presence of its respective alliance partner. This perspective emerged in many of the interviews conducted during this period, in public and private discussions between the JMSDF and US Navy and in press articles.\(^{358}\) As discussed earlier, in the early and mid-1990s, the US Navy participated in interdiction operations in the Persian Gulf and surrounding area, and also in the Adriatic Sea in response to problems in the Balkan region during this same time period. The JMSDF did not participate in these operations. The JMSDF, too, increased its international activities and participated in a variety of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations in the 1990s given the passage of a law to facilitate peacekeeping operations. Until the passage of this legislation—an effort by the Japanese government to improve its reputation in the international community after its non-participation in the 1991 Gulf War—these types of operations outside of Japan would not have been conducted.

Japan and the United States did not participate together on these operations due to a lack of coordination and priority on the part of both governments. One former Defense Department official and a specialist on Japan-US security alliance issues, emphasised in a 1999 article that as a matter of both ‘principle and practice’, Japan and the United States needed to be more consistent with these operations. He stated that ‘how we work together in small but consequential ways will set the course for much more important missions in

\(^{357}\) Interviews 2A (March 1999), 7A (July 2000), 10A (December 2006), 18A (July 2004) and 20A (May 2000).

\(^{358}\) Interviews 3I (April 2000), 5C (March 2000), 23A (August 2000).
the future." This was a point that was made continuously in discussions with US Navy officials, who noted that both the JMSDF and US Navy had some share in the blame for these conditions, as discussed above.

Table 16 provides a list of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations conducted by the Self-Defense Forces during the 1990s. Most of these operations had JMSDF participation.

**Table 16:** Japan Self-Defense Force Participation in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance Operations (as of May 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(periodic deployments)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1993- Jan. 1995</td>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1996 onwards</td>
<td>UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.–Dec. 1998</td>
<td>International disaster relief activities in Honduras (Hurricane)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. – Nov. 1999</td>
<td>International disaster relief activities in Turkey (Earthquake)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1999 to Feb. 2000</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance to East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2001</td>
<td>International disaster relief activities in India (Earthquake)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations that the JMSDF and other Self-Defense Forces were conducting on their own, the JMSDF undertook—for the first time—naval confidence-building exercises with its neighbours. As with peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the unique element once again was that confidence building activities did not involve US Navy units. Certain ‘Japan-watchers’ in the United States were concerned that Japan was moving away from the alliance. Table 17 provides a list of the

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confidence building exercises, as well as ship visits, between Japan and Russia and between Japan and South Korea during the 1990s.

**Table 17**: JMSDF Confidence Building Activities and Ship Visits with the Russian and ROK Navies (as of May 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1999</td>
<td>Joint search and rescue</td>
<td>JMSDF and ROK Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1997 and Sept. 1999</td>
<td>Russian ships visit Japan</td>
<td>JMSDF and Russian Navy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States generated new cooperation between the JMSDF and US Navy. As stated throughout the thesis, the most valuable interactions between navies contributing to institutionalisation occurs when they are operating together in response to mutually recognised security challenges, in which they share risks and the defence burden. The US Navy helped prepare the JMSDF for its deployment to the Indian Ocean to service, support and refuel US ships operating in the area. Beyond the mission itself, the JMSDF knew its ships would be operating in a high threat environment and as such needed the ability to defend themselves and communicate in a secure environment with the USN and other navies operating in the region. The pre-deployment and en route training provided by the US Navy covered some of these operational requirements, and the rest was incorporated in theatre, according to USN officers who provided some of the
training. The training was not new to the JMSDF, but it often involved different equipment and different operational scenarios and rules of engagement.\textsuperscript{360}

The JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean in 2001 initiated certain new operational guidelines, doctrinal changes, new tactics, techniques and procedures and established new precedents for close operational relations between the two navies. While the significance of these changes may not have been evident in 2001, and for the purpose of discussion in this thesis, the JMSDF deployments continued for a number of years afterwards and the effect on the naval relationship likely became more permanent. Future researchers will need to more fully examine this new JMSDF-USN cooperation and the full extent to which it resulted in institutional changes in operating procedures, doctrine, and in the nature and extent of information, intelligence, systems and equipment provided to the JMSDF from the US Navy.

While preparation for the Indian Ocean deployment occupied a large part of the USN and JMSDF time in 2001, training at JMSDF and USN defence colleges and training institutions continued in 2001 and in the years that preceded the deployment. Table 5 in Chapter 2 provides a summary of JMSDF training in the United States, and Table 6 in Chapter 2 summarises USN training in Japan for the years covered in this thesis. There is no indication that the rate of attendance was significantly different than the previous period, based on interviews with the JMSDF officers who compiled this data. They noted that participation in training likely increased most significantly during the 1987-1991 period when technical training associated with new weapon systems and equipment was most predominant. Following those years, participation in overseas training remained generally constant.\textsuperscript{361}

\textsuperscript{360} Interviews 18A (July 2004) and 17B (November 2002) with USN officers who assisted in the deployment preparation.

\textsuperscript{361} Interview 19D (June 2004).
Institutional Depth

As a consequence of the different paths taken by the US Navy and the JMSDF after the 1991 Gulf War, the naval relationship encountered several challenges that ultimately affected the depth of the relationship itself and ultimately its continued institutionalisation. In the earlier part of the decade, the two navies interacted less and shared fewer common missions. In addition, the two navies did not necessarily share similar goals and threat perceptions, and they spent more time operating independently rather than together on missions of mutual agreement. This ultimately affected the depth of the naval relationship. Gradually, with new security challenges in the latter part of the decade and in 2001, and with increased opportunities for operational cooperation, the navies began to reorient their relationship. The 2001 JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean was important in this regard.

Nevertheless, the naval relationship could not avoid being affected by some of these external factors. As will be discussed in the second half of this chapter, the US-Japan security alliance was experiencing a variety of challenges during this period and was characterised as ‘drifting apart’. This was the case even in the latter part of the decade. Despite new defence cooperation initiatives and new emerging threats in the Northeast Asia region, there appeared still to be a degree of disharmony in the naval relationship and in the security relationship. A sign of such disharmony was the emergence of alliance ‘housekeeping’ and facilities management issues that were becoming priority agenda items at alliance meetings. Some of these issues directly affected US naval forces located in Japan and served to detract from operational priorities.

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They included, for example, pollution generated by an incinerator facility near the Atsugi US Navy facility, discussions concerning a replacement for the Futenma Air Station from which US Marine Corps air forces operated, and negotiations on host nation support to subsidise the stationing costs for US forces in Japan. In a healthy alliance relationship, these types of issues should not assume centre stage.\(^{363}\)

The sentiment of an ‘alliance adrift’ was highlighted by Yoichi Funabashi, a prominent Japanese journalist, in a January 2000 article for the *Asahi Shimbun* as an apt description of what had transpired in the alliance since the end of the Cold War. In the article he quotes a US official who was participating in host nation support discussions as saying that, ‘on the surface, it appears that the Japan-US alliance is going well but I was made to realize how strained it really is underneath’.\(^{364}\) At the naval level, thoughtful senior officers in both the US and Japanese navies were expressing similar concerns and provided further evidence of a naval relationship that was not necessarily moving together in the same direction. Threat perceptions, goals and missions were no longer in synch. One of the results of spending less time training together was that the JMSDF and the US Navy began to develop more independent approaches to their operations. For the JMSDF, an indication of this independence was its desire to build its own aircraft carrier, for example, as discussed in Chapter 3. The JMSDF looked for US Navy support for this initiative but did not get it. This issue never fully went away—even later in the decade.

US Navy officers—active and retired—who had served in Japan identified what appeared to be a ‘brake’ when it came to increased bilateral cooperation.

\(^{363}\) Email perspectives from mid-and senior level military and civilian personnel working in the Asia-Pacific region (See document 17A, February 2000).

These officers stated that the brake appeared to be a combination of institutional and psychological misgivings across the Government of Japan and the Self-Defense Forces about deepening cooperation with US forces. The theme in several interviews with JMSDF officials tended to be that the US Navy and the US government more broadly, did not trust Japan. This was particularly the case in regard to JMSDF confidence building activities in the region. US Navy officials expressed concern that the JMSDF wanted to pursue activities in the region without USN participation. JMSDF representatives, on the other hand, equated this US reaction to a lack of trust in the JMSDF in its interactions with other navies.

**External Linkages**

While a number of defence conferences and symposia were held during the 1996-2001 time period, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) stands out as particularly notable because the JMSDF hosted the Fifth WPNS, held in Tokyo in 1996. As discussed in an earlier chapter, the WPNS is a unique forum for multi-national naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. It was initiated originally as a regional version of the International Seapower Symposium, which the US Navy hosts during alternate years at the Naval War College, in Newport Rhode Island. Since the first symposium in 1988, the WPNS gradually shifted from Cold War-era issues to broader topics such as maritime security, rescue at sea, maritime pollution prevention, and contributed to increasing the transparency amongst navies, with the continued goal of promoting mutual understanding and naval cooperation.

Malaysia hosted the pivotal 1994 Symposium that refocused the participants’ efforts on Confidence Building Measures in the new post-Cold War era. In the 1996 Symposium, which was hosted by Japan, the JMSDF admiral in charge paid tribute to the role the US Navy played not only in this particular naval gathering but also in strongly supporting Japan to be received back into Asia in the post-World War II era. And just as notable, he also stated that Japan had been conveying the views of Asian nations to Americans.\textsuperscript{367} The confidence exhibited in the remarks is indicative of the transformation the JMSDF had undergone over the previous two decades. The WPNS provided an opportunity for the JMSDF to excel not only in front of its alliance partner but also its neighbours and peers in the region. This new experience contributed to its increased self confidence and likely to the JMSDF’s desire to pursue cooperative activities with its neighbours in the region.

**Summary**

The period began in 1996 with recognition by both navies that the lack of a central focus for the relationship, after the demise of the Soviet threat, had weakened the operational links that had been established in the 1980s during extensive JMSDF-USN cooperation in sea lane defence against Soviet submarines. The security alliance was being characterised as ‘adrift’ and to some extent so was the naval relationship. The incident in 2000 involving the leaking of classified information by a JMSDF officer demonstrated the need for a significant revision of procedures in Japan for handling sensitive defence information. The lack of sufficient procedures continued to raise questions

\textsuperscript{367} This was part of a speech given at a prominent think tank in Washington, DC in March 2000. The organization maintains a non-attribution policy for its programs. See interview 5C (March 2000).
about the institutional strength of the Japan-US naval relationship at this time, compared with other naval relationships.

New security challenges served to alert the navies of increased danger in the region but they did not necessarily serve as a rallying point for increased Japan-US naval cooperation. The 1998 North Korean missile launch did galvanize research cooperation on missile defence. All acknowledged, however, that missile defence cooperation would be complicated in the future by the lack of joint command and control arrangements. The JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean in 2001 to provide logistical and other support to the US Navy as part of Operation Enduring Freedom helped to re-energize the naval relationship and encouraged further institutionalisation as both navies recognised that the establishment of certain organisational structures and procedures helped to further facilitate navy-to-navy cooperation when faced with operational challenges.

The 1997 Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines provided some direction in terms of new roles and missions for the forces, and the Guidelines influenced the nature of some training and exercises during this period. They also helped ease some of the bureaucratic irritations that the navies faced in operating with each other and provided legitimacy to certain ongoing naval activities and preparation for ballistic missile defence, which is discussed further in the second half of this chapter. Preparation for the JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean introduced new requirements and new incentives for cooperation.
OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE JAPAN-US NAVAL RELATIONSHIP (1996-2001)

The years immediately following the end of the Cold War were tumultuous ones for the security relationship and the naval relationship as a result of different national priorities, new international security challenges and a growing division between the United States and Japan on how best to handle these challenges. In addition, domestic economic challenges in each country, combined with continued bilateral trade battles, exacerbated other security-related factors. Signs of strain were visible in discussions over host nation support, as well as basing and facilities issues that affected US military personnel stationed in Japan.

Eventually, the interests and objectives of Japan and the United States began to converge once again, in large part because of certain regional security challenges that created incentives for renewed security cooperation and domestic political forces in each country. As in the past, this convergence benefited the naval relationship. The navies became the principal tool for implementing new security initiatives, such as missile defence, as was the case in the Cold War. Changes were reflected in the navies’ joint exercises and in other interactions. The events of 11 September 2001 served to reorient the security relationship and once again defence cooperation was recognised as being in the best interest of both nations.
Divergence of Interests and Policy Priorities

For Japan, the 1991 Gulf War had been a wrenching wake-up call to engage in and indeed contribute more fully to the international community. While it had deployed minesweeping vessels to the Gulf after the war's conclusion and provided $13 billion in support of the war effort, Japan had repeatedly turned down US requests before and during the war for rear-area support in the form of minesweeping, refugee and humanitarian assistance and non-combatant materiel support.\textsuperscript{368} Despite the financial contribution, Japan recognised it had to do more and respond more quickly to a future international crisis. In 1991, Japan enacted legislation that enabled it to participate in international peacekeeping operations in a non-combatant role. Between 1991 and 1996, Japan deployed forces to several humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, often away from the US forces to which they had become closely attached in the previous decade. Some analysts in the United States saw this as evidence that Japan was adopting a more independent foreign and defence policy. Others saw this as a missed opportunity for US forces to work alongside Japan as it began to deploy outside its territory.\textsuperscript{369}

In 1994, a blue-ribbon advisory group of Japanese intellectuals, appointed by Prime Minister Hosokawa, examined the future of Japanese defence policy in light of the dramatic changes in the international political and economic environment over the previous decades since the 1976 National Defense Program Outline—the policy framework for defence planning in Japan—had


\textsuperscript{369} Interviews 11A (January 2007), 5E (April 2005), 3K (September 2004) and 3B (December 1999).
been issued.\textsuperscript{370} The eventual report that was issued in 1994, known as the Higuchi Report, did not recommend major departures from current policies, but it did attempt to frame these policies in a new way. For example, it suggested moving from a ‘cold war defence strategy’ to a ‘multilateral security strategy’.\textsuperscript{371} Although Japan’s own defence capabilities and cooperation with the United States would remain important pillars of Japanese security policy, the report recommended that these elements now be viewed more from the vantage point of cooperative security.

The report caused a stir in Washington because it identified ‘multilateral’ interests as one of a number of priorities for Japan. Of particular concern to certain analysts in the United States was the fact that in the report’s table of contents, the section of the report concerning multilateral issues came before the section concerning the Japan-US alliance.\textsuperscript{372} For some in Washington, this was further evidence that the alliance was beginning to drift apart and that Japan was hedging against a worsening of Japan-US relations.\textsuperscript{373} One of the key authors of the report—Akio Watanabe—stated that from his perspective the issue involved the necessity of redefining the Japan-US security relationship within the new international conditions of the post-Cold War, and did not involve choosing one framework or another.\textsuperscript{374}

\textsuperscript{370} Mike M. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” pp. 8-10.  
\textsuperscript{371} Mike Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” pp. 8-10 and 37.  
\textsuperscript{372} According to Mike Mochizuki, the original Japanese phrase for multilateral security strategy is *takakuteki anzen hosho senryaku*. Although the Japanese government’s translations of *takakuteki* into English is *multilateral*, the word can also be translated as *multidimensional*. If it is translated as *multidimensional*, the concept has less of a connotation that Japan should gradually move away from a policy focused on bilateral Japan-US security to one focused on multilateral or multinational institutions. The idea would be to embed the bilateral security relationship in a more multidimensional or multifaceted framework. (See Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” p. 37. Note that Mike Mochizuki acknowledges Akihiro Magara of the Asian Forum Japan for pointing out this distinction in language.)  
After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States reoriented its security policies to focus on new global security challenges—particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Europe. The United States had withdrawn a large number of forces from the Pacific region for the Gulf War, and some had not returned to the region. In the case of the Navy, ships returning to the region remained there for shorter periods of time—often on the way to the Middle East. The US military was now focused on new global challenges in regions outside of Northeast Asia. The US Navy was maintaining a continued force presence in the Middle East, with an intensive interdiction mission ongoing in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm. By the mid-1990s, the US Navy was also maintaining a significant force presence in Southeastern Europe, as problems in the Balkans began to ignite.

For both Japan and the United States, economic challenges were present in the early 1990s. This affected naval relations because funding shortfalls influenced opportunities for interaction, and in particular costly exercises. In Japan, all government programs were facing severe scrutiny as the Japanese economy began to decline. By 1991, Japan's economic ‘bubble’, which had grown over the past decade, eventually burst. Therefore, not only was Japan facing the challenges associated with a new and unfamiliar security landscape after the demise of the Soviet threat and Japan’s foreign policy ‘failings’ during the Gulf War, its self-confidence was significantly diminished as its reputation as an economic superpower began to fade. In addition, the Japanese people, including certain politicians, began questioning the cost of maintaining the alliance relationship, and in particular the continued presence of US forces in Japan after the tragic incident in 1995 involving the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl.

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375 Interview 18 A (July 2004).
376 See Mike M. Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), pp. 25-46.
by US servicemen stationed in Okinawa. While the economic conditions in the United States were not as severe as in Japan, by 1992 the United States found itself in a recession in the aftermath of the Gulf War and had to prioritize government spending. Consequently, the focus of the US defense community, was on regions of likely or actual conflict—principally the Middle East and the Balkans region.

**Mutual Security Challenges**

In the middle of this tumultuous period, key officials in both the United States and Japan realized that changes needed to be made in both countries to preserve the security relationship and to ensure that it was capable of coping with post-Cold War security challenges. In 1995, in the aftermath of the Okinawa rape incident, Japan revised its 1976 National Defense Program Outline to better reflect the new expectations for its Self-Defense Forces and reaffirm the importance of the Japan-US security arrangements. These sentiments grew stronger as the nature and frequency of regional threats increased. In and outside of Japan, pressure was mounting for the Self-Defense Forces to participate in activities that would help build a more stable international security environment.

In April 1996, US President Bill Clinton and Japan Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto signed the US-Japan Declaration on Security, which marked the

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culmination of a series of consultations on the state of the Japan-US alliance and its role in the post-Cold War era. Of particular applicability to the naval relationship, Japan and the United States also agreed to review the 1978 Defence Cooperation Guidelines in light of situations that might emerge in the areas surrounding Japan, promote logistical cooperation, strengthen technology and equipment exchange, cooperate in ongoing ballistic missile defence studies and in UN peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian relief activities and arms control and disarmament.  

While the Japan-US security relationship was experiencing a number of challenges and each country was refocusing its efforts, security threats were growing in the Northeast Asia region. This proved to be a key element that refocused the security relationship and the naval relationship, although not initially. Indeed, these new threats did not spark increased naval interaction until later in the decade, due in particular to the domestic politics in Japan. As discussed earlier in the chapter, these new security challenges were of particular concern to the two navies, who began discussions of mission preparation before these challenges became a concern to the political leadership—as was the case in the mid-1970s when both navies together grew concerned over Soviet submarine developments in the western Pacific, before Japanese civilian leadership.

In May 1993, North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test with a Nodong-1 SCUD-type missile in the direction of the Sea of Japan. Evidence of

In the Joint Declaration, the two leaders confirmed that the Japan-US security relationship remains the cornerstone for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region in light of destabilizing factors and uncertainty in the region and that the United States would maintain about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including the level deployed in Japan. Japan would continue to provide US forces with facilities, operating areas and host nation support, in accordance with the US-Japan mutual security treaty. See USIA Washington File, _US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century_, signed 17 April 1996, text located in, [http://www.fas.org/news/japan/11318448-11333165.htm](http://www.fas.org/news/japan/11318448-11333165.htm), accessed 3 November 2005.
North Korea’s developing nuclear program emerged later that year. This however, did not promote increased interaction on the part of the two navies as one would have thought. According to Michael Green, with Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata’s coalition government having lost its majority in the Diet, political conditions in Japan at the time constrained the activities of the JMSDF. Green points out that despite the nuclear and missile developments in North Korea, the JMSDF informed the US Navy that Japan probably could not provide ships for surveillance and minesweeping unless Japan was directly attacked or the United Nations provided an appropriate mandate. In addition to the North Korean missile tests, China launched a series of missile tests across the Taiwan Straits beginning in 1995 and held military exercises in March 1996 in an effort to intimidate Taiwan before elections and indicate the People’s Liberation Army’s readiness to use force if necessary to prevent Taiwanese independence.

Japan did not significantly change in its approach to security matters until August 1998, when North Korea test launched a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile directly over Japanese territory. It was the Taepodong-1 launch, in particular, that created heightened concern in Japan, as the population realised its vulnerability to missile strikes. The launch resulted in improved defence cooperation with the United States and eventually contributed to the passage of laws in Japan, despite previous political opposition, to implement the 1997 US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. Prior to the Taepodong-1 launch, domestic support for theatre missile defence was limited to certain government ministries, but this expanded in December 1998 when Japan agreed to fund joint

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380 Michael J. Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, pp. 120-121. Green also notes that Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency held a series of crisis planning meetings with their counterparts in the United States, but it became apparent to US officials that the Japanese representatives would not have the legal authority to support US war plans without new legislation that the Socialists would attempt to block.

missile defence research with the United States. By August 1999, the United States and Japan had signed a five-year agreement for joint research on advanced sea-based, upper-tier technologies that could eventually be integrated with US programs.\textsuperscript{382}

This agreement, and Japanese domestic support, brought about changes in Japan-US naval interactions, including an increased number of exercises and new exercise scenarios, some of which were related to the new cooperation over theatre missile defence. For the naval relationship, the close involvement of the US Navy and the JMSDF in promoting a sea-based missile defence program, using existing Aegis ships, helped to further empower the relationship. Greater interoperability using high tech systems and a common operational focus contributed to an enhanced exercise program and further institutionalisation.

In general, Japanese and US defence officials interviewed for this thesis shared similar perspectives concerning regional security challenges. However, in some cases differences emerged. For example, Japanese officials were more reticent than US officials in identifying the potential threat from China as one of the reasons why missile defence was needed. Yet in other discussions, senior JMSDF officials expressed greater concerns than US Navy officials about potential future challenges from China as a result of its overall development—economic, political, and security—and its long-term effect on Japan’s security and potential vulnerabilities. According to one senior Japanese official, these differences in threat perceptions were due to Japan’s close proximity to China. These differences in threat perceptions could pose challenges to the Japan-US

naval relationship in the future, he said. These views are consistent with those identified by others in Japan. For example, Euan Graham cites Yoichi Hirama, a retired JMSDF admiral, as saying that what is feared most in Japan is that China’s ‘strategic genius’ rather than its brute military strength will effectively identify and exploit Japan’s political and economic vulnerabilities.

Graham also points out that although Japanese attitudes towards China since the end of the Cold War have been marked by ambivalence, the rise of a new political generation and the demise of ideology as a significant factor in China-Japan relations have combined more recently to open up political debate on China and to weaken political taboos in Japan against criticizing the country. Further, he notes that the retrenchment of LDP politicians regarded as broadly sympathetic to China has helped to shift the balance of political opinion towards more nationalist platforms within the controlling party.

New Institutional Frameworks

One of the most important contributions to institutionalisation during the 1997-2001 time period was the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Guidelines were created as a tool to deal with new alliance challenges in a changing security landscape. It was a step to further institutionalise the Japan-US security relationship, particularly in light of the emergence of new regional security challenges. The 1997 Guidelines defines the

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383 Interviews with Japanese officials: 22c, 22f, 69a, 70a, 72a, 74a, 78a and with US officials: 3A-C, 5A-B, 11A, 15A, 17A-B, 24B. Reinhard Drifte makes reference to some of these differences in his work on Japan’s security relations with China. He notes that the United States does not face China as a geographical neighbour and hence does not always grasp that China can disrupt Japan’s peace in many more ways than sending nuclear missiles. See Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China Since 1989: From balancing to bandwagoning? (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 158-159.


385 Ibid., p. 219-220.
role of the Japan-US alliance in the post-Cold War era as consisting of three parts: 1) cooperation under normal circumstances, 2) action in response to an armed attack against Japan, and 3) cooperation in situation in areas surrounding Japan that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.\textsuperscript{386} While the essence of the old Guidelines concerned the response to a military attack on Japan, the core of the new Guidelines related to ‘a situation in areas surrounding Japan’—a more likely scenario in the post-Cold War environment.

Until 1997, the United States and Japan relied on the 1978 Defence Cooperation Guidelines, which provided a basic structure for military cooperation, the beginning of an institutionalised security relationship and a layer of legitimacy to the defence relationship. The 1978 Guidelines had many shortfalls, however, particularly in the area of operational planning. US and Japanese officials acknowledged the shortfalls in the 1978 Guidelines and knew that these shortfalls would prevent the alliance from responding effectively to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The 1997 Guidelines were not perfect and numerous problems still existed in implementation, but they went much further in creating an effective framework for cooperation than did the 1978 Defense Cooperation Guidelines.

On operational issues, the navies did their best to build their relationship using the institutional foundation of the 1978 Guidelines, but numerous challenges existed. During the Cold War, the navies worked together to pursue the Soviet submarine threat and both navies hoped that if the Soviets ever attacked Japan, all operational restrictions from the Japanese government would be lifted, according to senior US and JMSDF officers. However, they all admitted that this was an extremely inappropriate way to plan for naval

operations.\textsuperscript{387} As with the 1978 Guidelines, the new Guidelines did not obligate either the US or Japanese governments to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. This had particularly significant implications in Japan, where the cooperation of local governments was essential for the movement and support of troops and troop movement through and around the country. Japanese government efforts to correct this were made at a later time, aided to a large extent by the changing nature of the external environment and in particular, the 1998 Taepodong missile launch.

The 1997 Guidelines also included a number of other provisions, such as a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies. The Guidelines provided for conducting bilateral defence planning and mutual cooperation planning and also covered areas of cooperation that were not part of the 1978 Guidelines, including United Nations peacekeeping activities, international humanitarian relief and emergency relief operations.\textsuperscript{388}

For the naval relationship, the Guidelines even laid out how ship inspections would be conducted to ensure the implementation of economic sanctions under United Nations resolutions, and it specified the conduct of search and rescue operations and that they would take place in non-combat areas.\textsuperscript{389} More significantly, however, the 1997 Defence Guidelines provided additional institutional ‘legitimacy’ for the activities of the two navies, including more overt planning. This is not an insignificant element. Japanese government support for the naval relationship, as well as the defence relationship, had always been essential, since so much in the security relationship depended on

\textsuperscript{387} Interviews 14A (December 2000) and 15A (August 2000).
\textsuperscript{388} See Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation.
\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., pp., 11-12.
the Japanese government. In addition, increased emphasis on specific roles and missions for the forces was also noteworthy, since the JMSDF would be assuming rear-echelon support during national security emergencies in the ‘areas surrounding Japan’. Significantly, this was the first time since the early 1980s that a discussion of roles and missions for the naval forces were revisited. Still, however, for day-to-day operational issues, the new Guidelines were no panacea. As discussed below, it would take a new security crisis, further legislative changes in Japan, and a subsequent out-of-area joint deployment for the Japan-US naval relationship to make significant operational gains.

Problems Still Remained

Despite these initiatives, all still was not well with the inner workings of the alliance, and this affected the naval relationship. The state of the relationship was reflected in some of the more basic ‘housekeeping’ issues that emerged. For example, discussions had stalled over host nation support to subsidise the outlay of funds to support US forces stationed in Japan, as well as the 15-year time limit on the US military use of a replacement for the Futenma Air Station on the island of Okinawa. Similar problems existed regarding dioxin pollution generated from an industrial waste incinerating facility that stood next to the Atsugi US naval facility. Relations between the two countries had become strained, despite the decorum on the surface, according to those on the inside of the relationship and outside commentators, such as Yoichi Funabashi.

They noted that the strain was visible in the distrust displayed in some of the working level discussions. An example of this growing distrust involved the US Navy facility at Atsugi. According to Funabashi, some US officials seemed to suspect that the Japanese government deliberately ignored the situation to make it uncomfortable for the US military to stay. This, and other elements of distrust from the local population, was weakening the foundations of Japan-US security, according to Funabashi. He warned of a new ‘soft nationalism’ developing in Japan if US policymakers did not pay closer attention to the complex national sentiments emerging in Japan.391

It is difficult to determine the specific effect these disagreements had on Japan-US naval relations, including operational interaction, during this period. US Navy training, such as night aircraft carrier landings, was curtailed on many occasions because of disturbances to the local population, which had domestic political implications and ultimately affected US military activities. According to US Navy officials interviewed, these basing-related problems grated on US Navy commanders because they needed to make alternative arrangements for training—often outside of Japan. The JMSDF was not responsible for these decisions from the Japanese government, and in fact faced many of the same restrictions with their own operations. Nevertheless, US officials noted that military-to-military relationships could not help but be affected by the acrimonious alliance relations during this period on working level issues.392

391 Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Time to Take Japan-US Talks to the Next Level’, Asahi Shimbun, 31 January 2000. Similar sentiments were expressed in a February 2000 email exchange between senior-level bureaucrats within the US military structure in Japan and in the Pacific, indicating that without the threat from the Soviet Union to keep the US-Japan relationship in check, environment problems, crimes by US military personnel, obtrusive training operations, land-use hassles, and other base-related issues had created a more dynamic atmosphere filled with numerous political problems. (Email exchange on 1 February 2000, document 17a).
392 Ibid.
Japan's ‘Special Measures’ Legislation and New Security Cooperation

The 11 September 2001 terrorist events in the United States cast a new light on the security relationship and the naval relationship. The events themselves and the high-level cooperation between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, put a new priority on the alliance relationship. All elements of the relationship benefited from this reorientation, but the navies likely benefited the most because they became the principal tools to demonstrate new security cooperation.

Japan’s absence in the 1991 Gulf War took a heavy toll on Japan’s international reputation, and therefore after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Japan took swift action to demonstrate support for the United States. Junichiro Koizumi, as Prime Minister of Japan, had a keen understanding that during this crisis, Japan needed to respond with its Self-Defense Forces. As was the case during the Cold War, naval assets became a key tool for US-Japan cooperation. In a press conference on 19 September 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi announced ‘Japan’s Measures in Response to the Series of Terrorist Attacks in the United States’. This extensive statement provided the Japanese government’s basic policy and measures for the immediate future that helped facilitate the JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean where it provided support and services to the US and other armed forces participating in anti-terrorism activities. The Special Measures Law was passed by the Diet on 29 October 2001, but by then, plans were already in motion for JMSDF assistance in the Indian Ocean.

As discussed in previous chapters, one of the realities of dealing with Japan and its defence forces over the previous decades was the extensive planning and discussions that occurred before actions were taken. This continued to be the case in the late 1990s, according to US naval officers who had served in Japan during this period.\textsuperscript{395} The action by the Japanese government was particularly significant because of the speed at which decisions were made within the Diet, the government bureaucracy and within the JMSDF itself. Of the seven Measures identified in the statement, four were of direct applicability to the defence forces, and one was JMSDF-specific.\textsuperscript{396} The JMSDF-relevant measure concerned ‘the dispatch of JMSDF vessels to carry out information-gathering operations for anticipated activities, under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, in seawaters from Japan to the Indian Ocean’. The Japanese government developed a plan to implement the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, based on input from the JMSDF information-gathering mission, and Prime Minister Koizumi approved it on 20 November. The implementation plan identified the types of support activities that the JMSDF could perform in the seas between Japan and the Indian Ocean. This included supply of fuel, water, and other requirements for ship support; transportation of fuel for ships; and repair, maintenance, medical activities and general sea port services. In addition, the JMSDF was to assist with search and rescue when called upon in the areas deployed and provide assistance to people in need.\textsuperscript{397}

\textsuperscript{395} See, for example, interview 18A (Sept. 2004) and 20A (May 2000).

\textsuperscript{396} These measures included, for example, carrying out medical, transportation, supply and other activities in support of the US and other armed forces responding to the terrorist attacks that were deemed to be a threat to international peace and security in UN Security Council Resolution 1368, providing assistance to displaced people from Afghanistan and providing additional security at US facilities in Japan. See Japan Defense Agency, \textit{Defense of Japan 2002}, pp. 109-115

\textsuperscript{397} Ibid.
Many behind-the-scenes discussions went on between the navies and their respective bureaucracies to influence the wording of this legislation. According to a senior DOD official, as a result of very ‘forward-leaning’ US officials at the National Security Council, Department of Defense and Department of State, along with the Defense/Naval Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and key JMSDF admirals in Japan, the naval relationship was invoked. Key officials were in place to influence decisionmaking and to help avoid a repeat of the 1991 decision by the Japanese government not to deploy the JMSDF to the Gulf War.\textsuperscript{398}

On 9 November 2001, 11 days after the passage of the Special Measures Law, the Defence Agency dispatched two destroyers and a supply vessel to the Indian Ocean for the purpose of gathering information for a future mission. On 25 November 2001, satisfied with the results of the information-gathering mission, the JMSDF sent an additional destroyer, a supply vessel and a minesweeper tender to join the vessels already dispatched. This was the start of a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean for the JMSDF. The JMSDF provided support services to the US Navy in November and December 2001. In January 2002, it expanded its support to include naval forces from the United Kingdom. Support to additional countries was added in later months—beyond the scope of this thesis.\textsuperscript{399}

The United States and Japan were again cooperating on matters of shared mutual interests and using their military forces to do so. At another level, however, each participant had its own reasons for cooperating on this mission, beyond the alliance relationship. The Japanese government, for example, while

\textsuperscript{398} Interview 11A (January 2007).
sympathetic to the effects of terrorism, particularly after 11 September, wanted to be viewed as a ‘player’ in the international arena and a dependable ally to the United States, so not to be caste aside and further shut out of alliance benefits, a similar theme reflected nearly 25 years earlier. For the JMSDF, the mission got them out of Japanese waters where they were competing for missions with the Japan Maritime Safety Agency (coast guard). In addition, the mission allowed the JMSDF to demonstrate that it had the capability and skills to conduct missions, along side other navies, in areas beyond Japanese waters.\textsuperscript{495} For the US Navy, particularly the forces in the Pacific, the JMSDF deployment provided fuel and other assistance, hence reducing the burden of the US Navy. Other officers recognised that the deployment helped the JMSDF become a more effective alliance partner. Further, the deployment satisfied the US Congress and demonstrated that Japan was doing its part to assist the United States in combating international terrorism.

**Summary**

As with the previous two time periods, a combination of domestic politics, security challenges and political leadership in both countries influenced the security relationship and the naval relationship during the 1996-2001 period. The naval relationship was not a force on its own but was integrally connected to the broader geo-political environment. During this period, the divergence of US and Japanese domestic and foreign policy priorities and interests played a part in defining both the security and naval relationships. It was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks combined with recognition on the part of the

\textsuperscript{495} Interviews 19F (April 2004) and 22F (August 2005).
Japanese government that it needed to take substantive action and demonstrate its commitment to the security relationship, given its experience during and after the 1991 Gulf war that pushed both the security and the naval relationships into greater defence cooperation. Ultimately, Japan was looking after its own interests, and the navies were direct beneficiaries of the mission. The navies were influenced by institutionalisation from the security relationship and at the same time they created additional institutionalisation once they increased their interaction and cooperation.

Prior to the 11 September incidents, the alliance had been suffering from a certain element of indifference—particularly in the mid-1990s. With each of the navies focusing on their own priorities, the alliance relationship did not receive the same degree of attention it had received in the 1980s. Even with a new series of security challenges, threat perceptions were not always consistent between Japan and the United States. Eventually, a number of events, such as the 1998 Taepodong missile test launch, demonstrated that Japan was vulnerable. As was the case in the past, Japan had to weigh the cost and benefits of pursuing a more independent stance or binding itself closer to the United States, as it eventually did in the case of missile defence. As such, a series of new defence cooperation agreements in the late 1990s further institutionalised the security relationship and enhanced legitimacy for new joint naval activities.

**Chapter Conclusion**

The 1996-2001 period was one of dichotomies. Coming immediately after a lethargic period in both the naval relationship and the security relationship,
the period included new threats and security challenges that served to motivate civilian leadership in both countries to initiate greater cooperation on defence matters and to take steps to further institutionalise the alliance relationship. In many ways, the two navies had made greater progress in building cooperation and institutionalisation than had the broader security relationship. For example, while a ‘strategic dialogue’ was just being established for the Japan-US security relationship in the late 1990s, the US Navy and the JMSDF had established a navy-to-navy dialogue and other forums for exchange and discussion with senior naval officials relatively soon after the approval of the 1978 Defense Cooperation Guidelines, as noted in Chapter 2. Also, early on, the two navies appeared to have a better appreciation of the implications of the emerging threat than did the security relationship, but this was not necessarily reflected in the nature and extent of naval exercises at the time.

On the other hand, many US Navy officers—active and retired—identified what they believed were less than optimal relations between the navies and an inherent ‘brake’ on a closer alliance relationship and increased institutionalisation. Certainly in practical terms, the lack of a satisfactory Defence Secrets Act and other similar structural weaknesses affected the nature and extent of sensitive data and information passed to Japan from the United States. But the sentiments expressed concerning the naval relationship were of a deeper nature. The institutional and psychological misgivings about operational cooperation with US forces were likely due to a combination of complex forces in Japan emanating from political, cultural and historical factors.

Japanese national security policy changes, and the nearly overnight decision to deploy JMSDF forces to the Indian Ocean in the fall of 2001, were
significant to the naval relationship. The policy shift came not as a result of a
direct attack or danger to Japan but appears to have been more a reflection of
shrewd calculations on the part of the Japanese Prime Minister, who above all
was concerned about Japan’s national interests. In addition, a very active
Japan-US ‘naval relationship’ with a strong support structure in both Japan and
the United States helped make this shift possible.

Evidence presented in this chapter, based on interviews in 2002, indicates
that some threat perception differences existed between the two navies,
particularly concerning China. Over time, some of these perspectives may
change and naval views may become more consistent. How the two navies—
and the two countries—reconcile their differences will be instrumental in the
development and implementation of an effective missile defence programme,
and for the continued institutionalisation of the naval relationship.
CHAPTER 5: Conclusions

In the Asia-Pacific region, the Japanese and US navies have worked together in an alliance relationship for fifty-some years, and in the post-Cold War period have expanded the nature and extent of their cooperation. Although the naval relationship is unique in certain regards compared with other US military relationships, nevertheless, lessons from its development will be useful as international military forces initiate new cooperative relationships in support of security and stability throughout various regions in the world. As such, this thesis has shed new light on an understudied topic.

The thesis pursued two interrelated objectives. First, it identified and discussed the dynamics that have driven and in some cases constrained the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship during the period 1976 through 2001. Second, it examined the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation in this particular naval relationship. The proposition advanced by this thesis is that when the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operate together against a mutually acknowledged security threat or challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, a dynamic is created in which cooperation encourages institutionalisation, which in turn facilitates improved cooperation. The research confirms this proposition and also indicates that sustaining this bilateral naval relationship was difficult once there were no longer mutually acknowledged security challenges around which to organise joint naval operations. Although one cannot say that the Japan-US naval relationship is an institutionalised relationship, it does exhibit many of the attributes of institutionalisation.
Institutionalisation served as the focal point for the thesis. Just as there are advantages to institutionalised alliance relationships, similarly, military relationships also benefit from institutionalisation because it can contribute to improved bureaucratic coordination, interoperability of systems, equipment and doctrine and coordination of procedures and operations. Inevitably, this leads to more effective military operations. In this thesis, the progress toward institutionalisation highlighted the key dynamics in the Japan-US naval relationship over a 25-year period (1976-2001). These dynamics were captured through a systematic ‘mapping’ process that tracked the institutional changes in the relationship and the various factors that influenced its institutional development over three different periods during this 25-year time span. The mapping technique and the analytical framework employed in the thesis helped facilitate analysis of the naval relationship, the institutionalisation process and the various internal and external factors that influenced the relationship.

The navies were integrally connected to the broader political and security environment, including the Japan-US security relationship. Naval cooperation, which helped drive institutionalisation in the naval relationship, depended in large part on political decisions—particularly from the Japanese government. Although all navies are subject to decisions from their national governments, this naval relationship was particularly sensitive given the unique domestic political environment in Japan.

Institutionalisation is characterised in the thesis by internal coordination, operational interaction, external linkages and by the institutional depth of the relationship. As the activity level increased within one or more of the four elements, institutionalisation was enhanced. However, not all the elements had an equal effect on institutionalisation, as demonstrated in the thesis.
Operational interaction, for example, influenced other elements of institutionalisation, such as internal coordination and the depth of the relationship, and hence had an overall greater effect on institutionalisation than any of the other elements.

The thesis shed new light on the Japan-US naval relationship—a relatively under-studied topic in the academic community. In general, the growth and development of the Japan-US naval relationship is unique compared with other naval relationships because of Japan’s restrictive defence policies and the extent to which these policies have affected operational interaction between the navies. While all militaries are subject to the restrictions imposed by their respective national governments, Japan’s constitutional restrictions on the use of force and associated policy decisions by the Japanese government reduced the flexibility of naval interactions and the extent of operational cooperation, particularly outside of Japanese waters. This curtailed the development of the relationship, cooperation between the navies and ultimately its institutionalisation.

**Institutionalisation and Cooperation**

Academics and others have written extensively about the connection between cooperation and institutionalisation in the context of international organisations and security alliances, but they have not addressed the unique dynamics of military-to-military relationships—particularly those outside of NATO. This thesis addressed the gap in the literature by providing a new perspective on the relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation—in a naval context. The thesis showed that in the Japan-US naval relationship,
operational cooperation in which both navies were operating together against a mutually acknowledged security threat or challenge, sharing risks and the defence burden, was the key driving factor that influenced institutionalisation. This finding differs from what certain scholars have identified concerning international organisations, such as the European Union, in which institutionalisation, the independent variable, drove cooperation.\textsuperscript{401} The thesis attributes these differences, in part, to the nature of naval relationships, compared with other international organisations, and the uniqueness of this particular naval relationship. Further research will need to be conducted to determine whether these patterns exist for other military relationships.

The behaviour exhibited by the US Navy and the JMSDF over the 25 years examined in this study is consistent with what has been noted by naval scholars and practitioners concerning naval relations. Elements of institutionalisation emerged once a level of trust was established between the two navies, and this occurred when the navies operated together and shared risks to support mutual interests.\textsuperscript{402} These conditions likely account for the causality differences when comparing institutionalisation in this naval relationship to the development of institutionalisation in international organisations. Since the thesis did not explore other military relationships, it cannot assume that the experience of the Japan-US naval relationship is necessarily transferable.

Although the US Navy and the JMSDF became more institutionalised in the 1980s, it wasn’t enough to hold the navies together once they were not


\textsuperscript{402} For example, see Admiral William A. Owens, US Navy (ret), *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 40-42. Although Owens is comparing naval operations within alliances versus coalitions, he makes the point that there is often distrust amongst navies in coalitions when they do not start from a common understanding of rules of engagement or operational familiarity, if military capabilities differ greatly, and generally if they are not used to operating with each other.
operating consistently together. Sustaining this naval relationship was difficult once there was no longer mutually acknowledged security challenges around which to organise naval operations and the roles and missions of the navies. While renewed security challenges and policy support from the respective governments helped reinvigorate the relationship later in the decade, it does bring into question the sustainability of this particular relationship. In the case of NATO, for example, when the threat from the Soviet Union dissipated, the alliance adopted new functions and partnerships and ultimately redefined itself based on a new security environment. The navies followed suit. This was not the case with the Japan-US security relationship, which faltered after the demise of the Soviet threat as Japan and the United States pursued different national interests, and it was not the case with the naval relationship.

This observation is consistent with research on bilateral and multilateral security relationships. Kristin Rafferty, for example, maintains that bilateral alliances in general are not as institutionalised as multilateral alliances, and as such, not as resilient. However, in her work on the Japan-US security relationship, she does not go so far as to say that the challenges the alliance encountered after the Cold War were due to the bilateral nature of this bilateral alliance relationship.\footnote{Kristin L. Rafferty, ‘Institutionalizing Bilateral Security Pacts: An Exploration of the Japan-US Alliance’, paper prepared for the 45\textsuperscript{th} Convention of the International Studies Association, March 2003, pp. 8-9.} Neither Rafferty nor other scholars discuss military relationships. Based on the empirical evidence in this thesis, it is fair to say that the Japan-US naval relationship made definite strides in institutionalisation in the 1980s, but this progress did not seem to have been enough to bind the navies together and sustain them, particularly when the national interests of both nations translated into different operational priorities for the navies. For this
naval relationship, operational cooperation was key in binding the navies together. The lack of a strong institutional base in the naval relationship likely was due to erratic operational cooperation between the navies, and this likely contributed to their inability to sustain their relationship once mutually acknowledged security challenges no longer existed around which to organise joint naval operations. As noted throughout the thesis, the development of this institutional base was influenced by a variety of internal and external factors.

**External and Internal Influences on the Naval Relationship**

A variety of factors were responsible for influencing the Japan-US naval relationship during the period 1976 through 2001. The analytical framework used in this thesis, combined with the archival research and interviews, brought together a unique approach that highlights the range of factors influencing the growth and institutionalisation of the naval relationship from 1976, the start of formalised defence cooperation discussions in the security relationship, through 2001, when the JMSDF began its deployments to the Indian Ocean. The research indicates that the internal dynamics within the naval relationship, combined with external influences such as threat perceptions, national leadership influence and domestic politics drove and/or constrained the relationship at various times. The navies were integrally connected to the broader political and security environment, including the Japan-US security relationship, and as such external influences were critical to the development of the naval relationship.

Determining internal and external influence can be difficult given the multiple factors that may have affected a particular time period. This is the
case, for example, with the years 1986-1991, which covered critical periods of the Cold War and the post-Cold War and therefore were subject to many different influences. Further, an unavoidable element of subjectivity is often associated with making such determinations. Nevertheless, taking these qualifications into consideration, the trends that emerged from this analysis are useful when considering the various forces that influenced the Japan-US naval relationship.

One of the key trends when assessing the nature and extent of influence during these three periods is whether the influence comes primarily from outside the relationship or inside. In this regard, each period was slightly different. As the naval relationship matured, it was no longer as dependent on the security relationship and on other external factors for its own growth. However, the naval relationship could not remove itself completely from external support and influence. National leadership support, in particular, continued to be important throughout the time periods because of its impact on naval budgets and policies. Further, Japan’s constitutional limitations and defence policies—although less restrictive in later periods—continued to be one of the significant external constraints for the naval relationship. The key external and internal factors that helped to influence the naval relationship and its institutionalisation are discussed below, for each of the three time periods.

1976-1981

The influence rendered in 1976-1981 comes primarily from outside the relationship. This is logical, because 1976 marked the start of formal discussions between Japan and the United States on defence cooperation. Prior
to that time, the naval relationship was not promoted and had little visibility, particularly in Japan, despite the fact that the two navies had been in operational contact with each other for over 20 years. Senior leadership in Japan and the United States played key roles in pushing forward the security relationship and with it, the naval relationship. As discussed in Chapter 2, Japanese officials, in particular, were responsible initially for encouraging defence cooperation with the United States because they saw it in Japan’s best interests to do so, in light of the growing Soviet threat and Japan’s vulnerability.

The dominant external influence during this period for the security relationship and for the naval relationship was the growing threat from the Soviet Union. It was important because it also drove several other external influences such as leadership support, domestic politics, public opinion, and compatible national goals and objectives. For example, the immediacy of the threat, demonstrated by frequent intrusions from Soviet MIG aircraft into Japanese air space, provided a strong incentive for Japanese officials to make the necessary domestic political changes and appeal to the Japanese public for support. By locking in US support in the form of a more cooperative defence relationship, Japan—recognizing its vulnerability—was fending off the possibility of ‘abandonment’. Japan made many changes to its own policies that endorsed a closer security relationship with the United States, such as the 1976 Defense Program Outline, and soon after Japan and the United States opened discussions on defence cooperation. Similarly, in the United States, with its defence commitments growing after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US officials recognised that financial and operational assistance from allies was needed in order to meet its worldwide commitments.
In general, factors generated from within the naval relationship itself did not significantly drive the relationship and contribute to institutionalisation during this period. The naval relationship was just emerging as a more publicly acknowledged defence relationship. As with the broader security relationship, the naval relationship was influenced by the Soviet threat. The navies were very aware of the growing Soviet naval activity in the region and took advantage of the changes taking place in the broader security relationship to initiate cooperative activities. This included the 1977 Navy-to-Navy Talks and the 1980 Rim of the Pacific multilateral exercise, in which the JMSDF participated for the first time. While the growing Soviet threat helped boost elements of the relationship during this period, it constrained certain other elements. The unwillingness of the US Navy to share sensitive acoustic data concerning Soviet submarines with the JMSDF demonstrated that a lack of trust still existed between the navies at this time. Personal relationships between the navies were not yet strong enough to override these difficulties. Further, force capability differences still existed and constrained operational interactions between the two navies, as did culture and language differences. As such, while external factors served to promote navy-to-navy relations, several elements within the naval relationship served to constrain the relationship during this period.

1986-1991

This second period saw a reversal of sorts in the factors influencing the naval relationship. Now, the two navies played the key role in driving their relationship forward. This was in large part due to the close operational relationship that had developed between the two navies, particularly in anti-
submarine warfare, against Soviet naval forces in the Western Pacific. As a result of this more intensive interaction, the navies' joint operational capabilities had increased considerably, roles and missions had been defined, personal relationships grew stronger, information sharing increased and the navies began to more closely align their operational strategies and doctrine. The unprecedented steps by the JMSDF in the mid-1980s to align elements of its doctrine with that of the US Navy helped to further bind the two navies and increased institutionalisation. These factors served to strengthen and reinforce the naval relationship and contributed to growth in institutionalisation. In addition to its own development, the success of the naval relationship and its accomplishments against Soviet naval activity in the Northwest Pacific helped temper congressional rancour over trade and burdensharing issues in the broader Japan-US relationship.

When the Soviet threat began to diminish toward the end of the decade, a wider range of security challenges emerged on the international horizon for which there was reduced consensus between the two countries on how to handle them. Although the naval relationship was still strong, certain external factors began to constrain the relationship beginning in 1990. The Japanese government’s decision not to deploy the JMSDF to the Middle East during the 1991 Gulf War or during the build-up to the war prevented the JMSDF from continuing the trend of cooperating with the US Navy on security challenges that affected the national interests of both countries.

Leadership support for the naval relationship, which had been strong during earlier years and served to promote the naval relationship, now constrained it. Mutual resentment at the national levels affected the naval relationship. The United States resented Japan’s lack of participation in the Gulf
War, and Japan resented that its large financial contribution to the war effort was essentially unacknowledged. Although the naval relationship itself was still strong, the JMSDF’s inability to continue high-visibility cooperation with the US Navy was the start of new challenges in the naval relationship and a decline in further institutionalisation.

1996-2001

During the 1996-2001 period, both external and internal naval factors influenced the naval relationship, but the primary drivers were the external influences, such as security challenges, national leadership influence, domestic politics and the Japan-US security relationship. This was a period of renewal, of sorts, for the security relationship and the naval relationship, both of which experienced difficult relations in the early to mid-1990s, at the start of the post-Cold War era. In the later part of the decade, new security challenges served as the impetus for renewed joint discussions on defence cooperation between the two countries and for the creation of new policies and agreements, such as the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines. As with the 1976-1981 period, key senior officials played leadership roles in steering the security relationship, and through it, the naval relationship.

The Taepodong-1 missile launch by North Korea over Japan in 1998 and various activities by China provided incentives for Japan to strengthen defence cooperation with the United States. Not all the external and internal influences during this period were positive, however. Despite the new regional threats and the new Defense Cooperation Guidelines, the security alliance exhibited signs of stress and was a constraining force on the naval relationship. However, the
decisions by the Japanese government to assist the United States in anti-terrorism operations after the events of 11 September 2001, helped facilitate new maritime cooperation which, for the first time, involved long-term deployments of JMSDF forces. The Indian Ocean logistics support operations helped to re-ignite the JMSDF-USN operational relationship and set in motion a new set of joint operations.

**Summary of external and internal influences**

From this discussion, it is clear that the development and institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship was a complex process and was influenced by many different factors. In the naval relationship, institutionalisation ebbed and flowed, depending on internal and external factors of influence. External factors played particularly important roles in influencing the development and institutionalisation of the naval relationship and as such demonstrated that navies are not independent entities but are integrally linked to the national interests of a country and to the policy decisions made by the respective governments. The US Navy and the JMSDF influenced events behind the scenes to its own favour, particularly in the 1980s, but once relations at the national level declined and national interests diverted, operational interactions were affected and the naval relationship began to weaken.
External Influences

In this thesis external influences came principally from four sources: external threats and security challenges, national leadership influence, the Japan-US security relationship, and domestic politics in the respective countries. Although other sources provided some influence, the elements identified above were the key drivers.

1. External Threats and Security Challenges: Mutually acknowledged external threats and security challenges were instrumental in facilitating a greater consensus between the policymakers in Japan and the United States on issues concerning the Japan-US security relationship and the naval relationship. In international relations, the effect of security challenges on alliance cohesion is a well understood phenomenon, as discussed in Chapter 1, but the effect that threats and security challenges have on the institutionalisation of naval relationships has not been as effectively examined. As this naval relationship demonstrates, cooperation and institutionalisation grows when the navies share similar threat perceptions. Further, threats and security challenges drove several other external factors that contributed to institutionalisation, such as leadership support, domestic politics, public opinion and national policy goals and objectives.

2. National Leadership Influence: The thesis demonstrated that national leadership can provide either a supportive influence on the naval relationship, as was the case in Japan after the events of 11 September 2001, or a constraining influence, as was the case during the 1991 Gulf War when the Japanese government decided not to deploy JMSDF forces and only later agreed to do so once the conflict was over. Naval literature acknowledges the important role of
external factors in a naval relationship, such as the personality of leaders and their attitudes to naval matters. Senior leadership support was particularly important in this naval relationship because of the operational restrictions associated with Article 9 of the Constitution and its interpretation. The thesis shows a progressive loosening of the associated restrictions, due in large part to the direction of senior leadership in Japan. Key examples of this include Prime Minister Suzuki’s 1981 announcement that Japan would defend its sealanes out to 1,000 nautical miles, which drove a closer operational relationship with the United States, and Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2001 commitment, through emergency legislation, to assist the US Navy in the Indian Ocean with refuelling and other logistical assistance after the events of 11 September 2001. Middle-level US and Japanese bureaucrats in the 1980s and 1990s also were critical elements in the promotion of both the security relationship and the naval relationship.

3. Japan-US Security Relationship: In addition to security threats and leadership support, the Japan-US security relationship was a key influence for the naval relationship. First, the institutionalisation efforts undertaken by the security relationship, such as with the Japan-US Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, helped to legitimise efforts often already underway by the navies or operational desires that had not yet been undertaken. As such, the naval relationship encountered institutionalisation at two levels: through the security relationship and through its own internal processes. Also, the JMSDF sometimes used the security relationship as a way to justify requests for

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increased joint activities with the US Navy and for increased resources. The United States used its influence through the security relationship to pressure Japan to increase its defence capabilities and its alliance contribution. The naval relationship often was the beneficiary of this pressure, as was the case with sealane support during the 1980s. Less overt pressure for increased operational contributions and intelligence sharing occurred behind the scenes, through navy-to-navy contacts and through other close contacts in the security relationship.

4. Domestic Politics: Domestic politics, particularly in Japan, greatly influenced the Japan-US naval relationship as well as the broader alliance relationship. As noted throughout the thesis, the Japan-US naval relationship was unique compared with other naval relationships due to the operational restrictions the JMSDF faced in its interactions with the US Navy. Political forces in Japan were instrumental in providing new opportunities for the JMSDF and in removing some of the roadblocks that limited its activities with the US Navy. At other times, political decisions restrained the JMSDF which, in many cases, curtailed the further institutionalisation of the Japan-US naval relationship.

The shifts in Japanese public opinion during the 1970s concerning security and defence issues, combined with other political changes such as the alignment of factions within the ruling LDP to support security cooperation with the United States, enabled the two navies to interact more openly together and began to change the nature and frequency of their exercises. Of particular significance was the role played by senior Japanese officials in initiating and promoting defence cooperation with the United States, which was only possible
once there had been a shift in Japanese public opinion to more positively acknowledge Japan’s defence forces and the Japan-US security relationship.

JMSDF participation in 1980 in the Rim of the Pacific multinational naval exercise, known as RIMPAC, is another example of the important role of Japanese domestic politics in the JMSDF’s ability to exercise with the US Navy. As discussed in Chapter 2, although the JMSDF was technically capable of participating in RIMPAC prior to 1980, the JMSDF was not able to do so because advance political groundwork had not been laid in time. The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation was a key element in the ‘political persuasion’ that was necessary before the JMSDF was able to participate in this exercise.405

In the mid- to later 1980s, despite the domestic political battles waging in Japan and the United States over economic issues and the spill-over effect for the security relationship, naval exercises and other formal interactions remained relatively unscathed. With the continued formidable threat from the Soviet Union’s Pacific fleet, both countries recognised that it was in their best interest for cooperative naval operations to continue. In the mid-1980s, the Japanese government froze most budget categories except defence. Under Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan’s defence spending actually increased. These additional defence resources helped facilitate an increased number of exercises with the US Navy, using platforms and equipment that were technologically more sophisticated than they had been in the past and as such, more interoperable with US Navy assets.

In 1991, the Japanese government’s decision not to send the JMSDF to the Persian Gulf was a turning point for the alliance and for naval cooperation. Political decisions made in Japan prevented a more intense level of operational

405 Ohmori Oral History interview, p. 8 and Maruyama Oral History interview, pp. 18-19.
cooperation between the JMSDF and US Navy during the years leading up to the 1991 conflict and afterwards. As Japanese and US interests began to divert, and with the US Navy’s operational priority focused on the Middle East, the navies spent less time exercising together.

The mid-1990s was a particularly difficult period for Japan politically, and this affected support for naval cooperation. With Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata’s coalition government having lost its majority in the Diet in 1994, political conditions constrained the activities of the JMSDF, despite growing concerns over North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs. North Korea’s 1998 test launch of a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile directly over Japanese territory was the event that finally activated the Japanese political establishment. The Japanese government’s concerns about its vulnerability to a missile strike contributed to improved defence cooperation with the United States and eventually to the passage of laws in Japan to implement the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. Political support in Japan also helped facilitate closer cooperation between the US Navy and the JMSDF in promoting a sea-based missile defence program, including exercises that reflected this cooperation.

Internal Navy Influences

While external influences played important roles in driving the Japan-US naval relationship, influences from within the naval relationship became particularly important once the navies had received the necessary external support and after they had begun operating together. Once this occurred, the relationship appeared to support itself, and indeed, in certain cases, influence
the broader security relationship, such as during the 1980s when defence burdensharing issues challenged the relationship. Influences from within the relationship included force capability; internal navy politics; culture, language and other societal factors; and operational interaction.

1. Force Capability: The JMSDF’s high quality systems and equipment, which began to emerge in the 1980s, helped facilitate improved navy-to-navy operational cooperation and helped bolster the naval relationship in the context of the overall alliance relationship. As pointed out frequently by naval practitioners and academics, technology can unite and/or challenge naval relationships. In the case of the JMSDF-USN relationship, technology did both. In the early days of the relationship, the lack of compatible systems and equipment created operational challenges and rifts in the navy-to-navy relationship when certain technologies were not shared. These challenges began to diminish once there was greater sharing of systems and technology and greater equality in the technical expertise of both navies.

2. Navy Politics (between and/or within the navies): The disagreements within the US Navy in the late 1970s and early 1980s concerning whether or not to share certain classified information and technology with the JMSDF was a key constraint in the development of a more cooperative naval relationship in the early days and demonstrated that a lack of trust still existed between the two navies. Similarly, the JMSDF’s desire for an aircraft carrier and its unsuccessful strategy to obtain the support of the US Navy was evidence that this was unlike any other naval relationship in terms of the JMSDF dependency on the US Navy. The JMSDF’s desire for more independent operations raised concerns in the US Navy—concerns that did not exist with other US naval
relationships—and demonstrated the complexity associated with the JMSDF-USN relationship.

At times, the JMSDF would use their US Navy and other US contacts to help achieve their own operational goals, which might be considered politically unacceptable if pursued only through Japanese channels. Requests from US officials would be couched as ‘good for the security relationship’. This included, for example, requests for operational deployments outside of Japan’s territorial waters, access to US systems and technology—such as Aegis, and certain tactical engagements that likely would not have been possible if they had not been requested by the US government.

3. Culture and language: The differences in culture, language and other society-related issues had a constraining effect on the naval relationship in the early years. This was mitigated somewhat in the years that followed, after the Soviet naval threat required increased cooperation between the US and Japanese navies. The empirical evidence shows that culture and language differences were increasingly less important as a defining element of the relationship during the latter time periods: 1986-1991 and 1996-2001. This was due principally to the increased operational contact between the navies. Interviews with JMSDF and USN personnel indicated that the more the USN and JMSDF operated together, cultural differences became less relevant. In addition to operational contact, the JMSDF members were spending increased amounts of time in the United States in technical training and education programs during the 1980s and 1990s, given the JMSDF purchases of US systems and equipment (e.g., the P-3C and the Aegis radar system) and an expansion of attendance at US universities. This provided additional opportunities for interaction between members of the two navies and other Americans. JMSDF English language
training and capability increased as well during these decades in response to
increased operational contact and training programs.

Despite the efforts of the JMSDF to adapt in various ways to USN
practices, the US Navy officials who have been the most effective in their
relationships with Japan and its navy, according to a former US Seventh Fleet
commander, are those who have understood the uniqueness of the relationship.
American naval officers went through certain protocols to establish personal
trust, recognising that even small gestures were very important. This is not the
case in relations with other western navies, he said. 406

Alfred Thayer Mahan promoted Japan's westernisation and distinguished
it from other Asian nations. 407 However, despite the improvements in cultural
understanding by the JMSDF and USN, and language improvements by the
JMSDF during the 1980s and 1990s, the Japan-US naval relationship never
developed the closeness that exists between the United States and English-
speaking allies, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand.

In terms of the overall effect on the naval relationship, however,
interviews with US Navy officers indicated that ultimately, external political
constraints and domestic politics played a bigger role in constraining the naval
relationship than culture, language and other societal differences.

4. Operational Interaction: Of all the elements, operational interaction
was most responsible for helping to drive the naval relationship forward, bind
the navies more closely together and help institutionalisation to occur. As the
navies shared operational risks in support of mutual security interests, they

407 Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis: Naval Institute
developed new organisational procedures and mechanisms to facilitate more effective cooperation.

Japan-US cooperation in the 1980s against Soviet naval forces in the Pacific is the best example of how effective operational cooperation pushed the relationship forward and drove other aspects of the naval relationship. As cooperation increased there was a need for more effective internal coordination, to include navy-to-navy meetings and improved information and intelligence sharing. The JMSDF deployments to the Indian Ocean in response to the 11 September terrorist events drove the relationship further ahead, as both navies recognised that they had to upgrade and improve equipment, interoperability of systems and equipment, communications and operating procedures in order to be operationally effective in the new environment.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Mapping as a Methodological Tool

The thesis employed a mapping technique, as part of the methodology, to track the changes in the Japan-US relationship over a 25-year period and identify trends or other occurrences of a recurring nature that may exist throughout the time period. The technique facilitated an assessment of the relationship at the beginning, middle and end of this time period, using a structured approach, which helped identify the external and internal influences and the extent of institutionalisation in the relationship. The four elements constituting institutionalisation, along with quantifiable and non-quantifiable indicators, served as the ‘map’ from one time period to another and provided a useful way to compare progress between periods. The trends that emerged from this analysis are useful when considering the various forces that influenced the
Japan-US naval relationship. It was particularly useful in helping to order these factors and to establish a foundation for analysis.

Despite the strengths of this methodology and approach, there were some weaknesses. Firstly, by focussing just on three particular periods during this 25-year span, the thesis did not capture activities and accomplishments that may have occurred at other times during these years. For example, the JMSDF-USN relationship progressed considerably between the first period (1976-1981) and the second period (1987-1991), and there were many factors responsible for this progression. While the thesis summarized these inter-period changes and the factors responsible for them, it did not conduct a more extensive analysis. Secondly, certain time periods saw more diverse naval activity than others periods and hence this made it somewhat difficult to discern the overall ebb and flow of institutionalisation. The 1986-1991 period in particular was a diverse period, as it covered critical years of the Cold War and the start of the post-Cold War. Determining the progress towards institutionalisation required taking into consideration multiple and varied influences in a relatively short period of time. Thirdly, in some cases, it was difficult to obtain complete data for each of the elements of institutionalisation, and as such, small holes in the map may exist. This was mitigated, however, by the strength of the overall trends that emerged from the mapping process.

The Future of the Japan-US Naval Relationship and Related Future Research

The US Navy and the JMSDF shared a unique naval relationship during the Cold War and post-Cold War years due in large part to the legal and political constraints that affected the nature of JMSDF operational interactions with the
US Navy. The thesis demonstrated how a variety of influences, within and outside of Japan, contributed to institutional and political changes that eventually helped facilitate new missions for the JMSDF and new opportunities for cooperation with the US Navy, including the JMSDF deployments to the Indian Ocean beginning in 2001.

While the thesis did not go beyond 2001 in its analysis of the relationship, future researchers will have new opportunities to explore the evolution of this naval relationship and its institutionalisation, given the political and other institutional changes in Japan and in the Japan-US security relationship since 2001. Will these changes encourage greater independence on the part of the JMSDF, or growth and development within the structure of the security relationship?

Further, how will threat perception differences affect the future naval relationship and its institutionalisation, particularly as China assumes a greater role in the region? Evidence presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis indicates that some threat perception differences existed between the two navies concerning China. One indication of Japan’s concern about security challenges from other countries is the amount of space devoted to these challenges in its Defense Agency annual reports. The 2002 report, for example, devoted nine pages to China and nine pages to North Korea. The 2003 report increased its China coverage to a total of twelve pages and North Korea remained at nine pages. China will likely be the most important challenge facing Japan’s security in the future, and as such, to the Japan-US alliance relationship as well. With the advancement of the missile defence initiative, the need to manage any

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differences concerning regional threats and security challenges will become ever more important.

In Japan, the approval of the 2004 National Defense Program Guideline, which provides a greater emphasis on the Self-Defense Forces’ participation in international security efforts and the reconsideration of certain constitutional and other restrictive provisions and principles in Japanese security policy, are examples of several important changes that occurred since 2001. In addition to these changes in Japan, new developments in the Japan-US security relationship include new potential missions for Japan-US defence cooperation, such as missile defence. The Defense Policy Review Initiative, launched by the United States and Japan in 2002, and the subsequent Security Consultative Committee document, *Japan-US Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*, provide the basis for new levels of cooperation in the Japan-US security relationship for the future. Eventually, researchers will want to conduct further work concerning how changes in the security relationship have affected, if at all, the naval relationship, and determine whether trends identified in this thesis are still valid. Will increased institutionalisation in the security relationship strengthen the naval relationship? Likewise, will increased institutionalisation in the naval relationship decrease the extent to which it is influenced by the security relationship?

Despite the uniqueness of this naval relationship, the movement towards increased cooperation and institutionalisation between the US and Japanese navies during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods can provide many useful lessons for emerging bilateral and multilateral military relationships in East Asia.

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and elsewhere in the world, particularly in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist events. While the East Asia region lacks an integrating security mechanism, there are indications that regional nations, including China, see the benefits of security cooperation to protect their economic interests. For example, the protection of sea lines of communication is a high priority for all nations. However, in many cases, these countries have different cultural backgrounds, national politics and have had little prior experience working or operating together. Operational doctrine, institutional structures and compatible systems and equipment amongst the navies generally do not exist. In addition, the forces are often subject to operational restrictions imposed by their respective national governments, as was the case with Japan’s navy, which can inhibit operational interaction. The US and Japanese navies encountered many of the same challenges over the course of their relationship and as such can provide a useful guide to other navies—even those that are not part of an alliance relationship.

One observation, consistent with current research and with this thesis, is that institutionalisation may occur less frequently in new arrangements organised after 11 September 2001 in response to anti-terrorist operations. These operations are most effective when the coalitions are stable and when there are strong institutional links to help facilitate the sharing of sensitive information and intelligence. However, stable military relationships in which trust is a key component are not easy come by, as identified in this thesis, given differences in culture, language, politics and threat perceptions amongst

410 See Eric A. McVaden, ‘US-PRC Maritime Cooperation: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 7, Issue 12 (13 June 2007). The author, a retired US Navy rear admiral and former US Defense Attaché to China, maintains that China recognises that it cannot on its own protect its economic and trade interests throughout the world and as such has become increasingly receptive to cooperative naval efforts in sealane security.
coalition partners, as well as the sometimes short-term nature of these coalitions.  

Finally, although the thesis focussed exclusively on the US and Japanese navies, the causal relationship between cooperation and institutionalisation in other military relationships is worth exploring. This would broaden the understanding of what drives and constrains ground and air forces when operating in combined operations with other international forces and in alliance relationships. For navalists, research on other military services would also help confirm whether navies are unique in terms of what motivates them to institutionalise their relationships with other navies. If indeed navies are unique in requiring operational cooperation before institutionalisation, this is a significant finding that fills an otherwise unexplored aspect of institutionalisation in a military context.

Final Summary

Operational cooperation between the US Navy and the JMSDF in response to a mutually acknowledged threat promoted institutionalisation in the relationship. While a number of different factors influenced the JMSDF-USN relationship, the nature and strength of the relationship rested on the ability of the two navies to operate together against a common threat. The hypothesis turns on its head international organisation theories that view institutionalisation as a requirement for cooperation. When the two navies worked together and shared risks, familiarity increased, trust grew and the

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effect of culture and language differences was reduced. As the navies cooperated in an operational setting, they recognised the need to establish structures to facilitate more effective cooperation. As such, a dynamic was created in which cooperation encouraged institutionalisation, which in turn facilitated additional cooperation. While this thesis focused on the Japan-US naval relationship, likely the central proposition of the thesis and many of the findings could apply to other naval relationships.
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2. Suzanne Basalla, Office of the Secretary of Defense
3. Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander, US Pacific Command
4. Captain Frank Buerger, Defense and Naval Attaché, US Embassy, Tokyo
5. Rear Admiral Robert Chaplin, Commander, US Naval Forces Japan
6. Dr. Richard Cronin, Congressional Research Service
7. Admiral Walter Doran (USN-ret), Raytheon and formerly, Commander, US Seventh Fleet
8. Captain Bruce Dyer (USN-ret), formerly Pacific Fleet officer
9. Dr. John Garofano, US Naval War College
10. Captain James Garrett, Commander, Activities Far East, US Coast Guard
11. Kenneth Gause, Center for Naval Analyses
12. Paul Giarra, SAIC and formerly, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Japan Affairs, and retired US Navy officer
13. Dr. Michael J. Green, Council on Foreign Relations
14. Rear Admiral Harry Harris, Joint Chiefs of Staff and formerly, P-3C Wing Commander in Japan
15. Rear Admiral Michael Haskins, Commander, US Naval Forces Europe and formerly, P-3C Wing Commander in Japan
16. John Hill, Office of the Secretary of Defense
17. Dr. Hank Kenny, Center for Naval Analyses and formerly, Special Assistant to Ambassador Mike Mansfield at the US Embassy, Tokyo
18. Captain Peter Leenhouts, Office of the Secretary of Defense
19. Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (USN-ret), Center for Naval Analyses and formerly, Director, East Asia Policy Office—Office of the Secretary of Defense
20. Dr. Mike Mochizuki, George Washington University
22. John F. O’Connell, formerly Defense and Naval Attaché at the US Embassy, Tokyo
23. Torkel Patterson, Raytheon, and formerly, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Japan Affairs, and retired US Navy officer
24. Dr. Jonathan Pollack, US Naval War College
25. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Shigley, US Pacific Command
26. Commander Mark Staples, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Japan Desk, and later US Embassy, Tokyo
27. Commander Richard Suttie, US Embassy, London, and formerly P-3C pilot in Japan
29. Commander David Titley, formerly Fleet Oceanographer, US Pacific Fleet
30. Dean Vaughn, US Pacific Fleet and retired US Navy officer
31. Lieutenant Colonel Rick Weir, Joint Chiefs of Staff
32. Commander John Yi, EP-3C pilot and student at National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo

* The titles and positions associated with each official were those held at time of the interview. In some cases, previous positions are noted if relevant to the thesis topic. Most interviews were conducted between Dec. 1998 and 2005.
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2. Admiral Toru Ishikawa, Chief of Staff, JMSDF
3. RADM Sumihiko Kawanura (JMSDF-ret)
4. RADM Yoji Koda, Director, Operations and Plans Department, Maritime Staff Office, JMSDF
5. Captain, Kenji Nakanishi, Maritime Staff College, JMSDF
6. Vice Admiral Fumio Ota, Director, Defense Intelligence Headquarters
7. Captain Umio Otsuka, Maritime Staff Office, JMSDF
8. Commander Ryo Saki, Maritime Staff Office, JMSDF
9. Captain Toshiya Sato, Naval and Assistant Defense Attaché, Embassy of Japan (Washington, DC)
10. Captain Takamichi Takahashi, Visiting Fellow, Stimson Center, Washington, DC
11. Captain Gojiro Watanabe, Visiting Fellow, Stimson Center, Washington, DC

Other Japanese Officials *

1. Kimihiro Ishikane, Minister, Head of Chancery, Embassy of Japan
2. Ken Jimbo, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo
3. Taro Kono, Parliamentary Secretary for Public Management, Japan Diet, Lower House
4. Takaaki Mizuno, *Asahi Shimbun*
5. Chiharu Mori, *Yomiuri Shimbun*
6. Akihisa Nagashima, National Security Advisor, Democratic Party of Japan
7. Masatoshi Shimbo, Japan Defense Agency
8. Atsuo Suzuki, Japan Defense Agency
9. Kuniichi Tanida, *Asahi Shimbun*
10. Hideshi Tokuchi, Office of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary
11. Yoshihito Uchiyama, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
12. Dr. Akio Watanabe, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo
13. Kyoji Yanagisawa, President, National Institute for Defense Studies

* Interviews were also conducted with the principal scholars at the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan, during research fellowship in 2002.