OUTSIDE NATO AND THE EU
SUB-REGIONAL DEFENCE CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

Nemeth, Bence

Awarding institution:
King's College London

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OUTSIDE NATO AND THE EU:
SUB-REGIONAL DEFENCE CO-OPERATION
IN EUROPE

KING’S COLLEGE LONDON

DEFENCE STUDIES DEPARTMENT

BY

BENCE NÉMETH
ABSTRACT

I am studying why European nations have created new sub-regional Multinational Defence Co-operations (MDCs) in the last couple of years, instead of using the existing NATO and EU institutional frameworks for military collaboration. By applying the multiple-case study research method elaborated by Robert K. Yin, I investigated three cases: the Central European Defence Co-operation, the British-French ‘Lancaster House Treaties’ and the Nordic Defence Co-operation. In this framework I tested three rival explanations using the method of pattern matching, which means that I generated predicted patterns regarding the studied phenomena and compared them to empirically based patterns. The three rival explanations I compared regarding the creation of new sub-regional MDCs were 1) the lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states. This research framework provided the opportunity to close certain explanations out, and helped to develop the empirically based patterns concerning every case that could convincingly explain the three studied cases individually. These empirically based patterns helped to develop a generic framework that describes the circumstances, which encouraged the launch of the studied sub-regional MDCs. The thesis concludes that two main structural and two main situational factors played the most significant roles in the creation of the MDCs. The structural factors are ‘previous defence collaborations between the participating states’ and ‘similar perception about certain defence related EU/NATO processes and initiatives’. The situational factors are ‘strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry among them’ and ‘supportive political milieu towards sub-regional multinational defence co-operation’.
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Austrian Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAT-PDT</td>
<td>Advisor Team Pre-Deployment Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADI</td>
<td>Atlantic Defence Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALTBAT</td>
<td>Baltic Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTDEFCOL</td>
<td>Baltic Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTNET</td>
<td>Baltic Air Surveillance Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTRON</td>
<td>Baltic Naval Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA</td>
<td>Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDC</td>
<td>Central European Defence Co-operation</td>
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<td>CECSP</td>
<td>Central European Cyber Security Platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEENCOOP</td>
<td>Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support</td>
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<td>CEUDIP</td>
<td>Central European Disaster Prevention Forum</td>
</tr>
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<td>ChoD</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJEF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPA</td>
<td>Cooperation Area</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
<td>Comprehensive Political Guidance</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DATF</td>
<td>Deployable Air Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defence Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>Defence Policy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capability Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security Defence Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU Training Mission Mali</td>
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<td>FFT</td>
<td>Food for Thought</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HG2010</td>
<td>Headline Goal 2010</td>
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<td>HHG</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
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<td>HLWG</td>
<td>High Level Working Group</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Forces</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JDEAL</td>
<td>Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis</td>
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<td>JSF</td>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>LoI</td>
<td>Letter of Intent</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;A</td>
<td>Mergers and Acquisitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>Medium Altitude Long Endurance (drone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Multinational Defence Co-operation</td>
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<td>MLCC</td>
<td>Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>MLF</td>
<td>Multinational Land Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBG</td>
<td>Nordic Battlegroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDAC</td>
<td>Nordic Armaments Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDCAPS</td>
<td>Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDEFCO</td>
<td>Nordic Defence Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDEF MCC</td>
<td>Nordic Military Co-ordination Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDEF PSC</td>
<td>Nordic Defence Policy Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORDSUP</td>
<td>Nordic Supportive Defence Structures</td>
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<td>NPG</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning Group</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSRA</td>
<td>National Security Risk Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCCAR</td>
<td>Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;S</td>
<td>Pooling &amp; Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Prague Capabilities Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Partnership Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;T</td>
<td>Research and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Airlift Capability</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Slovak Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNL</td>
<td>Senior Level Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>Visegrad Four / Visegrad Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIT</td>
<td>Weapons Intelligence Team</td>
</tr>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the dynamically evolving processes regarding European security and defence have generated a great deal of research on the field of international security.\(^1\) This is understandable, if we take into consideration that after the fall of the Soviet Union Europeans found themselves in a fundamentally transformed strategic environment, where maybe for the first time in history, they did not have to fear traditional military threat in the near future. This has been epitomised by NATO’s generation of a succession of strategic concepts.\(^2\) Furthermore, Europeans also had to learn to live in a unipolar world, where the sole superpower – the United States – was and is their ally, while other security concerns that had not received much attention earlier gained more significance.\(^3\) The consequences of these processes have triggered overarching changes in the European military affairs as well.\(^4\) According to Anthony King, this ‘changing nature of warfare’ in Europe has been examined by scholars who have studied ‘national, EU and NATO security and defence policy and [...] have explored the institutional transformation of the armed forces themselves at national, EU and NATO levels.\(^5\) This focus on the national and

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\(^5\) King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, p. 5.
international institutional level is also true in regard to the much narrower research topic of this thesis - Multinational Defence Co-operation (MDC) in Europe.

MDC has been defined by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence as ‘any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capabilities. This can include exchanges and liaison, training and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations.’\(^6\) Such initiatives in the framework of NATO and EU have been studied widely for the last twenty five years. However, ‘traditional’ bilateral and sub-regional defence collaboration that was established outside the NATO and EU frameworks has received much less academic attention, despite the fact that many – like the Benelux, Baltic, Visegrad Four, Nordic, Anglo-French, Central European etc. – have emerged for the last two decades. The thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by analysing three cases: the Central European Defence Co-operation, the British-French ‘Lancaster House Treaties’ and the Nordic Defence Co-operation. These sub-regional MDCs provide a good opportunity to study current processes concerning military co-operation in Europe, as all of them have been established at the end of the 2000s and at the beginning of the 2010s, and their participating states have effectively begun to tighten their defence co-operation on an unprecedented and comprehensive scale, which was not typical for earlier non NATO/EU MDCs.

Interestingly, these states co-operate with each other irrespective of whether they are members of the same defence related organisation(s) (NATO, EU). In other words, currently many European countries only partly use the NATO and EU frameworks to intensify their multinational defence co-operation and they engage with partners on a different basis. This is surprising, because these two organisations have been in the focal point of military co-operation in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Although NATO and EU provide many robust mechanisms for defence co-operation and flexible solutions for non-member states to participate in their projects as well, the question emerges why the participating states of Nordic Defence Co-operation, British-French security treaties and the Central European Defence Co-operation prefer sub-regional solutions over the frameworks of NATO and/or EU in certain cases. Along these lines the thesis attempts to answer the following research questions:

• Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU?
• What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU?
CHAPTER 2.
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will first provide a background to developments in European defence co-operation and then considers how MDCs have been examined within the academic literature to-date. It suggests that the literature can be sub-divided into four themes. First, one part of the literature highlights the creation of multinational mainly land formations. Secondly, scholars have studied collaborative equipment procurement concentrating on increasing European co-operation and the changing nature of transatlantic armament relations. Thirdly, the literature has also focused on the different aspects of co-operation on multinational capability development like the concept of pooling and sharing, which among others has been manifested in the concept of Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO) and the Ghent Process in the EU, and in the Smart Defence initiative in the framework of NATO. Fourthly, the chapter considers the literature on sub-regional MDCs and concludes that it has not been part of the major scientific debates and their thorough, comprehensive and comparative study has not been made either.

BACKGROUND

Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, circumstances supported military co-operation in Europe. Thanks to the end of the Cold War, governments could redefine their priorities and have been spending proportionately less on defence than before and more to fulfil social needs and sustain economic growth. In the meantime, European countries needed to adapt their armed forces to the emerging post-cold war security environment. Previously, on the European continent everyone prepared for a large-scale conventional war with mass conscript armies trained to stop and repel territorial aggression. However, these times have passed and the conflicts of the 1990s – especially the NATO intervention in Kosovo – highlighted that European armed forces were not prepared for expeditionary warfare. Accordingly, while there was a

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need for restructuring the European armed forces to meet the requirements of the new era, governments did not provide extra funds for it but rather decreased the defence expenditures considerably. This resulted in massive force reductions, and most of the European NATO countries cut their military personnel by 25-50 per cent over the 1990s.\textsuperscript{10} It was not only necessary because of the defence budget cuts, but it was also needed to channel resources for modernization and transition from conscripts to professional armed forces. The latter was crucial, because professional troops are more prepared and equipped for expeditionary operations, and they are understandably much more expensive as well. These processes and circumstances provided a solid basis for multinational defence co-operation.

During most of the 1990s, the emphasis was mostly on the creation of multinational land forces. The Alliance laid down the guidelines of its new force posture and the characteristics of its future forces in the 1991 Strategic Concept.\textsuperscript{11} In this manner it also determined the main directions of defence co-operation in Europe for the next decade. According to the document, even though the size and readiness of Allies’ forces was to be reduced and the concept of forward defence to be abandoned, the Alliance would possess ‘a limited but militarily significant proportion’ of immediate and rapid reaction elements to be able to respond quickly and flexibly to the ‘multi-directional’ risks of the new era. Besides these reaction troops, NATO’s conventional forces would be made up of the main defence forces and the augmentation forces, in addition the document supported strongly the creation of multinational forces.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, many bi- and multinational corps were created to ensure the ability of the Alliance to conduct Article 5 operations after the Cold War. Parallel with this, NATO also adopted crisis management to its security agenda, and developed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to have a tool for such operations outside NATO’s territory. According to the concept, CJTF was a ‘deployable multinational, multiservice task force generated for and tailored […] to military operations not involving the defence of the Alliance territory’.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, CJTF


\textsuperscript{11} The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Brussels, NATO, 1991.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

was intended to be flexible and modular; it could have been augmented and composed from staff and force elements according to the requirements of the particular mission. This provided the possibility to create ‘coalitions of the willing’ which could have been led either by NATO or Western European Union (WEU), and also Partnership for Peace (PfP) members could have participated in CJTFs.

The experience of post-Cold War military conflicts in the 1990s revealed that as a consequence of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the assessment of military power based on quantitative measurements became inadequate, and the focus on capabilities is more important than on forces. Namely, the force approach has been changed by the capability approach, which concentrates not exclusively on the number of troops and assets, but mostly on the military effects which can be achieved by a means of action. The Gulf War and the interventions on the Balkans underlined that Europe lacked crucial capabilities necessary to deploy and sustain forces in operations abroad using precision weapons and the most advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies. Thus, in the end of the 1990s both NATO and EU initiated their own defence capability development programmes to overcome these shortfalls, mostly building on the capability approach instead of the force approach.

NATO’s heads of state and government accepted the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington Summit in 1999 to improve the ability of member states to take part effectively in crisis management operations outside of the Atlantic Alliance’s area. DCI identified 59 shortfall areas and categorized them into five groups as deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; survivability; consultation, command and control and effective engagement. In the same year, the European Union established the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and member states agreed in the Helsinki Summit in 1999 to establish a 50-60 000 strong military force by 2003 capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks and capable to sustain itself for at least one year. This was called the Helsinki Headline

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16 NATO, "Defence Capabilities Initiative", News Release, April 25, 1999
18 Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
Goal (HHG). After the assessment of the commitments made by member states to meet this goal, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) found shortfalls almost in the same capability areas as NATO’s DCI did. The EU launched the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)\(^\text{19}\) to obtain the missing capabilities from its member states by voluntary contributions on national and also multinational basis. However, both initiatives faced the same problem: European states did not spend enough sources on defence capability development.\(^\text{20}\)

Based on the lessons learnt from the earlier initiatives, NATO launched the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) at the 2002 Summit in Prague.\(^\text{21}\) With the creation of the NRF, NATO intended to establish ‘a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to react quickly whenever needed.’\(^\text{22}\) Two main considerations were behind the NRF concept. First, NATO needed a tool to be able to provide rapid and substantial military response to emerging crisis, thus, the initial concept was that the NRF would contain 20-25,000 troops to be deployed after five days’ notice and engaged in combat operations after deployment. Second, NRF was deemed a crucial facilitator of capability transformation especially for European Allies by common training, introducing new doctrines and new technologies.\(^\text{23}\) PCC covered identical shortfall areas as DCI, but PCC was more focused and also provided the possibility to assess and measure easier the progress of member states on the agreed capability development goals. Furthermore, PCC was intended to foster multinational defence co-operation by facilitating pooling of resources and role specialization among Allies.\(^\text{24}\) Even though PCC became more successful than DCI, it could not realize every capability target, and the Alliance decided to concentrate on specific ‘high priority capability development areas’ of the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). The CPG was accepted at the Riga Summit in 2006, and gave further relevance and almost absolute priority to expeditionary capabilities in

\(^{19}\) Presidency Conclusion, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14-15 December 2001


\(^{21}\) Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002

\(^{22}\) Ibid.


\(^{24}\) Carl Ek, NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment, CRS Report for Congress, January 24, 2007, 3.
NATO. The Lisbon Capabilities Package – accepted at the 2010 Summit in Lisbon – determined the direction of the Alliance’s capability development focusing on the need of NATO’s Afghan mission and other long existing critical shortfall areas.

In the same time, the European Union developed the EU Battlegroup concept and established the European Defence Agency (EDA). Although the European Council declared the Helsinki Headline Goal fulfilled in 2004, it was only a virtual achievement. Officials it was not admitted, but the military ambition of the EU was lowered significantly by the EU Battlegroup concept that was launched in the framework of a new process called Headline Goal 2010 (HG2010). EU Battlegroups were defined as battalion-sized forces (1500 troops) able to be deployed in 15 days and be sustained for 30 days or 120 days by rotation in crisis management operations.

According to the concept, two Battlegroups were to be available at any particular point in the time with individual battlegroups following a six month rotation. Battlegroups – as NRF in the Atlantic Alliance – were deemed the driving force of multinational military co-operation especially on training and interoperability, because most of the member states could not establish one Battlegroup alone, thus many of them had to collaborate on it. EDA was intended to be the catalyst of European defence co-operation on crisis management capabilities by developing capabilities, promoting co-operation on research and technology (R&T) and armaments and also fostering competitive European Defence Equipment Market. EDA, together with the EU Military Committee (EUMC), played a key role in elaborating the Capability Development Plan (CDP) in 2008, which defined ‘future capability needs from the short to longer term’.

More recently the Lisbon Treaty provided the opportunity for the creation of Permanent Structured Co-operation in defence for ‘those [European Union] Member

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26 Lisbon Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, Press Release (2010) 155 Issued on 20 Nov. 2010


28 Ibid.

29 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSPof 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency

States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions.' The launching of PESCO would require a qualified majority in the European Union; thereafter the participating states of the co-operation could set criteria regarding the participation in the mechanism, where the EDA would play a significant role. Throughout the years the concept about PESCO’s exclusiveness has eroded and disagreements have emerged concerning its implementation as well, thus PESCO has not been established yet.

Because of the disagreements among European states regarding PESCO’s realization, the EU began to focus on more practical approaches of ‘pooling’ of capabilities to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. Thus, EU defence ministers put the concept of Pooling & Sharing (P&S) to the top of the agenda of EU defence policy at their meeting in Ghent in September 2010. To facilitate the conceptual framework of P&S Germany and Sweden suggested that EU member states should categorize their military capabilities based on the level of sovereignty they want to keep regarding their individual capabilities. For this process the following three categories were offered: 1) capabilities ‘maintained on a strictly national level’; 2) capabilities to be pooled that do not ‘create too strong dependencies’ in the case of co-operation; 3) ‘capabilities and support structures where mutual dependency and reliance upon European partners is acceptable in an international role- and task-sharing framework’. During 2011, EU member states finished this categorization and indicated which capabilities they would be willing to co-operate on. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched a very similar initiative to the Ghent Process in NATO, called ‘Smart Defence’. According to Rasmussen, ‘Smart defense is about building security for less money by working together and being more flexible’. The concept has three main elements: prioritization means ‘aligning national capability priorities’

31 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42.6.
32 Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol (No 10)
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
more with NATO’s capability goals, *specialization* aims at coordinating defence budget cuts in an organized manner in order to achieve ‘specialization by design’ and avoid the usual way of ‘specialization by default’ and finally *co-operation* is basically pooling and sharing of capabilities.  

We can see that the most robust MDCs have emerged in the framework of NATO and EU until the early 2010s. It is understandable, because they are the organisations, which can provide the forum for Europe wide defence collaboration. Accordingly, this relevance of NATO and EU concerning MDCs has also been reflected in the literature. The following sections show this phenomenon and demonstrate that the literature of MDCs has focused on the topics of multinational forces, collaborative equipment procurement, multinational capability development and has dealt much less with the sub-regional MDCs.

**MULTINATIONAL FORCES**

Moskos, Allen and Segal highlight that one of the main characteristics of post-Cold War armed forces is their ‘internationalization’ brought about the creation of many multinational forces since the beginning of the 1990s.  

This is generally a new phenomenon compared to earlier periods although there are a few examples such as the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious brigade and the Franco-German brigade. During the Cold War the NATO countries coordinated their forces with individual nation corps committed to a NATO Army Group headquarters. With the end of the Cold War multinational formations began to proliferate, and nowadays even a battalion-sized unit may contain elements from different countries. According to Anthony King, this process was primarily commenced by the decreasing financial resources allocated to defence in Europe that made the concentration and transnationalization of Europe’s armed forces necessary. However, the financial pressure on defence budgets could not have triggered this process alone. Fréderic Mérand argues that the internationalization of armed forces could take place in Europe thanks to spreading the ‘model of the culturally interoperable professional soldier’, which took root

through the socialization of thousands of officers in the multinational organizations of NATO during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{41}

The literature regarding multinational forces has focused mostly on four main topics. The NATO multinational corps and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept was the centre of scholarly interest in the 1990s,\textsuperscript{42} and the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (NRF) marked the research on multinational forces in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{43} It was typical that when a new type of multinational force was invented, initially descriptive and policy related articles were published about the topic (see later). The more theoretical and conceptual pieces regarding the particular type of force appeared several years later and when other new concepts emerged the research concerning the older concepts went out of fashion. Thus, big theoretical debates were rarely applied to multinational forces.

The development of multinational corps began in the beginning of the 1990s, and two multinational corps were in the focus of research of that time; the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Euro-Corps.\textsuperscript{44} While the British-led ARRC was deemed as an ‘Atlanticist’ project, the Franco-German Euro-Corps was seen as a controversial ‘Europeanist’ enterprise emerging outside the framework of the Alliance to undermine NATO and US presence in Europe. Not

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Frédéric Mérand, \textit{European defence policy: beyond the nation state} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 68.
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surprisingly some British analysts called it a ‘Frankenstein’s Corps’. However, the debate was eased after European leaders agreed that the Western European Union (WEU) would represent the European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) of the Alliance, thus the Euro-Corps became available to NATO as well. According to George Stein, both the Euro-Corps and the ARRC were rather political projects, thus he questioned their potential military usefulness. Stein argued that the intended capabilities of these two multinational corps did not ‘have any reasonable relationship to any possible military use’, and without appropriate power projection capabilities their role was not clear in the emerging European security architecture. He also pointed out that the establishment of multinational forces often served symbolism rather than military purposes.

In accordance with Stein, many scholars perceived the political aspects of the creation of multinational formations in general and also in terms of NATO. For instance, Robert H. Palin clearly stated that ‘multinational forces are instruments of differing foreign policies not only in a military sense, but in the political interplay between nations. They are used to establish national status and credibility, and influence allies’ perceptions of each other.’ Martin A. Smith highlighted that in the beginning of the 1990s NATO member states were primarily interested in saving money by restructuring their forces. Thus, NATO planners feared that unilateral cuts and withdrawal of NATO commitments that could result in the collapse of NATO’s force structure. However, emphasising the necessity of multinational forces and the need of greater military integration helped to save NATO’s structures from the disintegration by making it politically acceptable for member states.

At the same time, the creation of multinational corps caused many problems regarding the operational effectiveness of these land formations. John Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young pointed out that although NATO supported the creation of multinational forces, the commanders of multinational formations did not have the same authorities over their subordinate troops as national commanders had, especially

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47 Ibid. 216.
49 Smith, NATO in the first decade after the Cold War, 66-68.
in peacetime. Whitford and Young suggested the harmonization of regulations and delegation of more command authority to commanders. In the end of the decade, Young also noted that almost 10 years after multinational land formations began to appear and Allies had declared six multinational corps and four multinational divisions to NATO, it became clear that multinational land force structures were ‘not well suited to meet Allied Strategy’.

The other major issue regarding multinational forces in Europe in the 1990s was the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The debate over the CJTF concept was perceived by many scholars in the context of NATO, WEU and ESDI. Among others, Nora Bensahel proved that the CJTF concept ended NATO’s existential crisis of the 1990s by changing the terms of the debate about European security. The CJTF concept was a compromise which placated Europeanists – especially France – who originally preferred a strong WEU instead of NATO. She highlighted that the debate between Europeanists and Atlanticists about ‘whether NATO should exist’ and ‘should NATO have a role in post-Cold War Europe at all’ changed by the CJTF concept to ‘how the new role should be constructed’. Alexander Moens claimed that in the second half of the 1990s a Gordian knot existed in the European security architecture, but the CJTF could not cut that. The Gordian knot was that France wanted a strong European defence identity within a ‘robustly European’ Alliance. However, the US involvement in this NATO would have been much smaller resulting in much less NATO capability for out of area operations. Up until this point the United States remained heavily involved in European defence issues, France was not interested in following NATO’s dynamic. Thus, Paris wanted to develop a second command chain in NATO for CJTFs, where the US would have had less influence. Furthermore, because the Alliance agreed to assist WEU-led

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Whitford and Young, “Multinational command authorities: The need for change in NATO,” 35-57.
Young, Multinational Land Formations and NATO: reforming practices and structures, 34.
Whitford and Young, Withford and Young, “Multinational command authorities: The need for change in NATO,” 44-45.
Bensahel, “Separable but not separate forces”, 64.
operations with NATO’s assets, France did not see why ESDI should be ‘locked’ into NATO’s command structure.\textsuperscript{57}

Understandably, military experts emphasized the military aspects of the CJTF initiative. According to US Army Lieutenant Colonel Charles Barry, the CJTF concept was not only unique and ‘unprecedented in military doctrine’, but it provided a tool for the Alliance to be capable to conduct ‘out of area’ operations, which ensured NATO’s relevancy for the future.\textsuperscript{58} At the same time, he also pointed out the main difficulties concluding that ‘there are formidable problems to solve before the concept’s minimum requirements are met’.\textsuperscript{59} He highlighted the lack of political consensus concerning the operational concept for CJTF Command and Control (C2) among Allies and the differences between the United States and France on the level of political control in CJTF operations and the support role of NATO commanders during the missions lead by the WEU. As far as operational issues were concerned, he argued that the biggest problems layed in the areas of logistical support and communication, which stemmed from the ‘out of area’ nature of CJTF. However, in the final analysis, he stated that the CJTF initiative was worth making work because it could have been the answer to the major dilemmas – the utility of NATO, pulling closer the former communist countries to NATO, strengthening the ESDI – that emerged for the Alliance after the Cold War.\textsuperscript{60} In contrast to Barry, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cooke harshly criticized the CJTF concept, arguing that it ‘has too many moving parts for it to be a workable option for a political entity such as NATO.’\textsuperscript{61} Cooke described the difficulties regarding the process of augmentation, the potential incompatibility of equipments used in a multinational mission, the national political agendas of member states which could hinder the augmentation of forces and finally the problem of residual capabilities in NATO HQs during a CJTF operation. He suggested that the ‘lead nation’ concept could be the ‘best and simplest solution’ for out of area missions, because it does not have to face the problems mentioned above, and thus it ‘could provide the rapid crisis response capability NATO lacks’.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{58} Barry, ”NATO’s combined joint task forces in theory and practice,” 82.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. 93.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. 89-93.
\textsuperscript{61} Cooke, ”NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor “, 135.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.134.
During the 2000s most scholarly attention in regard to multinational forces was paid to the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the EU Battlegroups.\textsuperscript{63} Besides NRF the Alliance also created more NATO Rapid Deployment Corps similarly to ARRC, but this development has been barely studied.\textsuperscript{64} The NRF concept was proposed by Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler in \textit{Survival} in 2002.\textsuperscript{65} They argued that the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) accepted at the Washington Summit in 1999 to improve the capabilities of member states in order to take part effectively in out-of-area operations could not bring the expected results. According to them, DCI was too comprehensive and lacked ‘clear goals and concrete requirements.’\textsuperscript{66} In addition, capabilities as such were too abstract to appeal for politicians. However, a ‘small, elite, mobile expeditionary force’,\textsuperscript{67} which the authors called NATO Spearhead Response Force in their article, could solve these problems. According to them, it would provide the tool for Europeans to participate in demanding missions outside NATO’s territory relatively cheaply and quickly, as Europeans possessed most of the assets necessary for the development of this force, and could foster the transformation of the armed forces as well.\textsuperscript{68}

While some scholars have analysed NRF’s implementation, operational potential and its impact on the transformation of NATO forces,\textsuperscript{69} others have studied the issue from a conceptual viewpoint. Sten Rynning investigate the evolution of NRF in order to shed light upon whether Europeans wanted to continue to ‘emulate’ the US type of warfare characterized by concepts of jointness and expeditionary war as they did in the 1990s, and whether they want to begin to create a ‘European way of war’. Rynning’s conclusion is that Europeans in general are willing to copy the US model

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. 125-126.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. 118.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. 127.
\end{footnotesize}
of war, because they have actively supported the development of NRF based on American principles, but he also identifies some controversial issues (e.g. operational flexibility, question of planning authority) where Europeans are ambivalent.\textsuperscript{70} Jens Ringmose holds the view that despite NRF has played a crucial role in the transformation of NATO forces, the lack of troop commitments and the debate about NRF’s operational role made it a ‘qualified failure’. He points out that every member state perceives the Alliance’s goals differently, and this ‘strategic confusion’ has been mirrored in the development of NRF as well, which hindered its advancement. Furthermore, he insists that only political face-saving rescued the NRF, because many did not see its military potential after the troop commitments of Allies had not reached the appropriate level. Despite these results, Ringmose argues that the ‘criteria for success have been, somewhat creatively, redefined’ regarding NRF, thus, probably it will not be seen as a failure.\textsuperscript{71}

Similarly to the NRF, a significant part of the literature concerning the EU Battlegroups analyses strategic, operational and practical questions from policy related aspects.\textsuperscript{72} In contrast with this track, academic research often uses case studies comparing the approaches of two EU member states on EU Battlegroups, while such research also touches upon the question ‘Why EU Battlegroups have not been used yet?’ Wade Jacoby and Christopher Jones study the transformational impact of EU Battlegroups on the armed forces of two smaller member states; the Czech Republic and Sweden.\textsuperscript{73} They reveal that neutral Sweden has shown a much greater willingness to adapt the EU Battlegroup concept than the Czech Republic, whose defence policy – as a NATO member – should be closer to expeditionary warfare, and thus to the concept of EU Battlegroup. Jacoby and Jones argue that the main reason of this phenomenon is that the Battlegroup concept fits much better to the already ongoing national defence reforms in Sweden than in the Czech Republic. Namely, Sweden redefined its strategic concepts after the Cold War and shifted its military doctrine

\textsuperscript{70} Rynning, ”A new military ethos? Nato’s response force,”, 5-21.
from territorial defence to rapid deployment in order to be able to participate in international operations to improve her international role. At the same time, thanks to the security guarantees what NATO membership provides, the Czech Republic could continuously decrease its defence budget and has mostly been focusing on developing niche capabilities and providing ‘policy loyalty’ to NATO, instead of executing a much more expensive comprehensive military reform. Furthermore, in regard to the question of deployment of Battlegroups the authors suggest that the real problem is not on the supply but on the demand side, because European leaders have not really needed such capability yet, and could use more suitable alternatives to different operations.

Laura Chappell compares the cases of Germany and Poland regarding the development of EU Battlegroups using the concept of strategic culture. She points out that while the two countries share a regional outlook rather than a global one, their strategic cultures are different in many aspects. With regard to Germany, rejection of nationalism and the ‘culture of restraint on the use of military’ are the main characteristics of their strategic culture that lead to the German ‘reflexive multilateralism’ which respects and uses multilateral frameworks in international relations. Contrarily, Poland’s strategic culture contains an instinct Atlanticist view, the self-perception of a reliable ally, the want for a voice in European affairs and scepticism towards those multilateral organisations whose members build on different values, like the United Nations Security Council. Chappell argues that despite these differences the national strategic cultures of the studied countries have been converging regarding the Battlegroup concept, but the most important element whether a Battlegroup in a certain case was used, is still based on the national interests of particular participating states of the Battlegroup. Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli draws similar conclusion studying the case when the United Nations asked for EU military support in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008, but the EU did not send Battlegroups despite a German-led and a British Battlegroup being on stand by that year. She claims that both Germany and the United Kingdom provided ‘a number of very good reasons and justification for non-deployment’ – economic constraints, shortfalls in capabilities, problems with troop availability and

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strategic planning etc, while ‘their lack of political willingness to deploy was the main cause for inaction.’

COLLABORATIVE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT

According to Mark Lorell and Julia Lowell, three types of international weapons procurement collaboration exist: 1) **reciprocal trade** happens when countries agree to procure each others’ products, 2) **co-operative production** (coproduction) occurs when a) one country develops a product and produces it jointly with its partner or b) one country produces a product developed by its partner country under license agreement, while 3) **codevelopment** is the case when countries jointly develop and produce a weapon system. This type of co-operation is different from the previously introduced ‘multinational forces’, because while collaborative equipment procurement projects had already proliferated in Europe during the Cold War, the creation of multinational forces have emerged only after the fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, not surprisingly, collaborative equipment procurement has a very rich literature both in the policy and academic domains. Since the early 1990s most works regarding collaborative equipment procurement have been dominated by the different aspects of the emerging European armament co-operation and the transatlantic defence industrial relations.

In the early 1990s most scholars and policy makers attempted to find the right ways in regard to collaborative equipment procurement in the new strategic environment. Andrew Moravcsik, among others, studied the characteristics of the internationalization of European defence industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moravcsik’s article is still relevant not only because it was written just after the fall of the Berlin Wall and thus provides an insight to those topics that concerned scholars that time, but it touches upon almost every relevant issue (free-market and juste retour, transatlantic relations, European procurement agency etc.) concerning collaborative equipment procurement which characterized the literature for the next

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two decades. He notes that as the modern weapon systems became more and more sophisticated, the European defence industry found itself in crisis, and two main concepts were circulating designed to be able to boost European defence industry. The first one deemed that ‘the application of free-market principles would introduce competition […] thereby promising, […] increased efficiency and rationalization through greater economic of scale.’ However, Moravcsik points out that the defence market has never been functioning purely along free-market principles, and the usage of this principle could be highly problematic, especially because not only economic but also military and political reasons are taken into consideration. The second one, the *juste retour* principle, guarantees that every participating nation of the given armament co-operation develops and produces their share of the programme equal to their share of weapons being procured as part of the project. This method requires substantial amount of coordination and negotiation to proportionately distribute the different work phases among nations participating in a project. Namely, ‘*juste retour* works like a cartel, in which the participants divide the market share between them.’ However, *juste retour* has been criticized for preventing competition and causing delays and cost overruns, currently the mostly cited examples for this are the cases of the A400M military transport aircraft and the Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighter jets, but Moravcsik argues that these views are not supported by adequate statistical data.

Moravcsik also suggests that nations should find a balance between these two principles and outlines a model for it. According to his concept, *juste retour* based co-development should be used only for the most expensive weapon systems (aircrafts, helicopters, large missiles etc.), and the free-market principle should be applied regarding lower cost products (small arms, small transport planes, minor aerospace items etc.). Between these two sides (like in the cases of tanks, electronics, radar and avionics systems etc.) multinational consortia should compete with each other, where every consortia would include companies from the participating countries of the programme, thus in these cases the *juste retour* and free-market principles would be mixed. Moravcsik also touches the issue of transatlantic trade, which – in his view – is not developing appropriately due to protectionist U.S. policies. Despite this phenomenon, he warns against developing a protectionist European defence industrial

79 Ibid. 71.
80 Ibid. 74.
policy, because it could be expensive and could also cause retaliation from the United States. Furthermore, Moravcsik does not recommend the establishment of a European armaments procurement agency either, because historical experience shows that similar organizations could only provide an environment for voluntary collaboration which does not necessarily has an added value.\textsuperscript{81}

One of the recurring topics of the post-Cold War literature concerning collaborative defence procurement has been transatlantic armament relations. The debate of the mid 1990s was triggered by Ethan B. Kaptstein’s 1994 article in Foreign Affairs, where he argued that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States had found itself in a monopolistic position on the armaments market which the U.S. was to exploit and thus ‘Washington’s rational for engaging in international arms collaboration has disappeared’.\textsuperscript{82} He claims that US monopoly is good for the world economy, because her allies can abandon their inefficient weapons production capabilities and invest resources into their more competitive industries. Kapstein points out that the United States produces the most advanced military technologies, thus other arms producing countries with smaller domestic markets and decreasing defence budgets, coupled with the ever increasing cost of weapon systems will not have a real chance to catch up with the US. He highlights that these states will not be able to achieve the appropriately long production runs of modern weaponry to decrease their unit costs by export sales either, because the shrinking export market had begun to be dominated by US products.

Jens van Scherpenberg suggests that US monopoly in the defence industry and her technological lead in dual-use industries can have a positive spill-over effect for the United States on other industrial sectors as well, which will also result in loss of European global competitiveness regarding defence, dual-use and high-tech civilian products. This situation will also have an impact on transatlantic relations, because European Allies will have to decide whether they want to challenge the American defence industrial monopoly or subordinate themselves to US firms as subcontractors and specialize themselves in niche areas. Scherpenberg favours the former one, which would require deep co-operation among European arms producers. In addition, he proposes that governments should create a market oriented environment where

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. 76-81.

civillian and defence industries could successfully work together. These efforts could lead to real transatlantic defence industrial co-operation of equal partners, where Euro-American consortia would compete for contracts in the Transatlantic area. However, if Europe accepted the junior partner role of the US, it would lose its competitiveness not only in the defence sector, but also in the domain of technologically advanced civilian products. In 1997 Robert P. Grant analyzes the elements of transatlantic armament relationships and concludes that the fears of either the collapse of the European defence-industrial base or a transatlantic defence trade war caused by protectionist European policies are exaggerated and the most likely scenario would be keeping the status quo with some smaller transatlantic co-operative R&D projects emerging. He points out that although the dynamics of current processes show that transatlantic defence co-operation will slightly increase, the US still favours competition over co-operation with European allies. In order to create a ‘mutually beneficial transatlantic armament relationship’ Europe has to concentrate its defence industry and the US should abandon its restricted technology transfer policies towards her European allies.

It is important to note that in the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, significant changes occurred in the European defence industry. First, new intergovernmental agreements and organizations were set up to improve armament co-operation in Europe. The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy – the four biggest European defence industrial nations – established the Organisation Conjointe de Co-opération en matière d'ARMement (OCCAR) in 1996 to improve collaborative weapons procurement among them. Two years later, the same countries together with Sweden and Spain signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to facilitate the integration of the European defence market. Finally, the European Union established the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2005 in order to develop defence capabilities, promote armaments co-operation, enhance collaboration on R&D and integrate the European defence market.

85 Belgium joined in 2003, Spain joined in 2005.
Second, the European defence industry went through a high level of consolidation at the same time. A series of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that took place among European defence companies resulted in the establishment of three European ‘defence titans’, which could play in the same league as their American counterparts. \(^{87}\) Thus, BAE Systems, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and Thales became the most important industrial actors in the European defence business. While BAE Systems was a solely British entity which emerged by the British Aerospace’s purchase of Marconi Electronic System, EADS turned into the first real pan-European defence firm with the fusion of the French Aérospatiale-Matra, Germany’s Daimler Chrysler Aerospace (DASA) and the Spanish Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA), and Thales was created with the French Thomson CSF’s acquisition of the British Racal Electronics.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s these processes sparked American fears and a lively debate about an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’, which would close its doors and would lock out the United States from the European defence market. However, Europeans have pointed out that a ‘Fortress America’ had already existed, and steps have been needed to ease the situation both in the United States and Europe. \(^{88}\) Burkard Schmitt highlights that the evolution of two impenetrable Fortresses on both sides of the Atlantic may cause conflicts, which can have a spill-over effect and thus poison other aspects of transatlantic relations as well. At the same time he argues that the chances of creating such a situation are small because the ‘European objective is not a fight between “fortresses” but a balanced partnership.’ He also notes: ‘But it takes two to tango.’ \(^{89}\) Debra R. Mohanty reasons that although Europe’s possible choice to create its fortress is understandable, it should strive to facilitate the establishment of an Atlantic Defence Industry (ADI) instead. \(^{90}\) Jeffrey Becker moves along this line and uses ADI as the unit of analysis in his realist research framework arguing that the countries of the Atlantic community have gone through a deep

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integration and transnationalization which justifies putting ADI in the centre of research.\(^91\)

Ethan B. Kapstein points out that Washington made significant changes in its technology-transfer procedures in order to facilitate transatlantic equipment cooperation in the end of the 1990s, and contrary to some other papers Kapstein perceives the ‘radical restructuring’ of European defence industry as a positive phenomenon. According to him, this has provided the opportunity to European companies to become full partners of American firms like BAE Systems in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme and Thales in the development of air defence systems.\(^92\) The JSF, in this respect, is highly important, because it is the most expensive defence procurement programme in history; furthermore it has been the first time when the United States has allowed its partners to participate in the co-development and co-production of a new and highly advanced military equipment based on US technology.\(^93\) Although only the United Kingdom has been deeply involved in every phase of the project (a Level 1 partner), Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy are also collaborative partners in Europe. Kapstein highlights that the reason behind the intention of fostering international collaboration within the JSF programme was the American fear of a ‘Fortress Europe’ that would not allow in American weapons to the European market anymore which is the biggest export market of US defence equipments. Thus, JSF works as a Trojan horse, which ensures American access to the European defence market and also provides leverage for Washington via co-operation.\(^94\)

In the first half of the 2000s, independently from the ‘fortress debate’ many scholars have studied the implications of the restructuring and integration of the European defence industry.\(^95\) For instance, Terrence Guay and Robert Callum draw

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\(^94\) Ibid. 137-159.

attention to ‘the critical and underappreciated economic and political role of the EU’ in the transformation of the European defence industry. The two scholars identify two external and two internal factors concerning the EU, which played determining role and basically led to the defence industrial mergers and acquisitions mentioned earlier. According to them, the first external factor affecting the EU was the consolidation of US defence companies in the first half of the 1990s which resulted much fewer, larger and more competitive American defence firms. The second factor was the cumulative effect of mutually reinforcing processes in the field of technology and defence economics, like the American superiority in military technology; the skyrocketing costs of new weapon systems and equipments and their longer production runs; or shrinking defence export markets. The first internal factor affecting transformation within the EU was its general economic restructuring which also regulated some aspects of the defence market, and the intention of EU bodies to put the defence industry under the rules of European single market. The second internal factor was the evolution of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), because this process encouraged European defence industrial consolidation. Guay and Callum also make predictions for the future and claim that the EU, the US, national governments and technological questions will determine the future of Europe’s defence industry.

Seth G. Jones examines the post-Cold War European armament co-operation from a realist point of view. According to him, security co-operation among European Union member states has significantly increased after the Cold War, which was basically a response to the new characteristics of the international and regional (European) system. With regard to the international system, Jones points out that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the bipolar system became unipolar. Thus, in order to aggregate their power in order to decrease their ‘reliance on the United States and’ increase ‘their ability to project power abroad’ European states began to collaborate on an unprecedented scale regarding security. The second reason of strengthening

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97 Ibid. 757-776.

98 Ibid.

European security co-operation relates to regional dynamics. Namely European states wanted ‘to ensure peace on the continent and to prevent the rise of Germany as a regional hegemon.’ In his book Jones investigates four types of European security co-operation and European armament collaboration is only one of them. In the chapter dealing with it, he studies almost 500 Transatlantic and European arms production collaborations (M&As, co-productions, co-developments) in the period between 1961 and 2000, and compares the characteristics of Cold War and post-Cold War armament co-operation. He tests his arguments and concludes that ‘the “Europeanization” of governments and defence executives toward greater collaboration was a result of structural changes, not a constitutive process or solely of economics factors.’

Although market policies of nations relate only indirectly to collaborative equipment procurement, it is important to note that during the first decade of the 21st century much of the policy oriented research put forward the argument for the liberalization of the EU defence market, arguing that it would result in significant savings Europe-wide. A recurring element of the debate has been the problem of Article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty (earlier Article 296 of the European Community Treaty) which stated that ‘any member state may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material’. For EU member states this article provided an excuse for deeper collaboration and also gave a tool to continue their protectionist defence industrial policies causing sizeable inefficiencies in defence equipment procurements. Thus, not surprisingly Article 296 became a kind of symbol for many scholars that presented the biggest obstacle to defence market liberalization.

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100 Jones, The rise of European security cooperation 179.
For the past several years, scholarly work on collaborative equipment procurement has flourished and although it has been eclectic, it has also produced high quality research. For instance Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll have surveyed European capabilities and co-operation including armament collaborations. They point out that only the 20% of the biggest European weapon acquisition projects were collaborative equipment procurement, and an ‘unhealthy proportion’ of multinational programmes began in the Cold War, including the Eurofighter Typhoon and A400M. In addition, European governments have spent much less on the development of new high-tech projects and have tended to buy equipments off-the-shelf. Some scholars set against different paradigms and logics concerning certain aspects of European equipment procurements. While Alrik Thiem studies European intergovernmental armaments co-operation by comparing six different paradigms using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, Jozef Bátorá investigates three pairs of conflicting institutional logics regarding EDA and its relationship to ‘the political order of EU on defence’. Others draw attention to the consequences of the emergence of European level collaboration in the defence industry. André Barrinha, among others researches the political discourse on this issue, arguing that the EU took over some of the national justifications of the necessity of developing defence industry while both the European and national levels remain important and in some aspects these parallel rationales have become rivals. Catherine Hoeffler comes to a similar conclusion and suggests that while the liberalization and internationalization of the defence industry created a European supranational defence economic patriotism and improved the EU’s role in the defence

105 Ibid 68-69.
106 Constitutional-culture model, homogeneity-trust model, power-differential model, security-dependence model, policy-responsiveness model, competition model
108 Intergovernmental and supranational institutional logic, Europeanist and Euro-Atlanticist logic, logic of liberalisation and Europeanization of EU’s defence market
business significantly, this process also strengthened ‘national stakes’, and the EU is still under pressure by ‘transatlantic strategies’ of European defence companies.\textsuperscript{111}

Jocelyn Mawdsley studies the options that small states have in the environment where the EU has an increasing influence on armaments co-operation and bigger EU states have changed the dynamics of defence collaboration. She highlights that the EU plays an ever-increasing role in European armaments co-operation by institutionalization and regulations. For instance, the Commission and the EDA attempt to liberalize the defence market and limit the application of Article 296 in order to restrict protectionist defence procurements. This clearly weakens the position of less competitive defence firms of small states. In addition, Mawdsley points out that during the Cold War European small states demanded equality in intergovernmental armaments collaborations, claiming the application of the concept of juste retour or compensation, and they also used their domestic defence markets as bargaining chip, playing off foreign defence companies against each other. However, the possibility of using these tactics in the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century was fading away. For instance, as a result of the creation of European defence titans and the establishment of armament organizations led by the biggest arms producers, the argument of equality among European nations and their defence companies in the field of defence is not sustainable anymore. For instance, the creation of OCCAR and the adoption of a LoI mean that if smaller states want to join the biggest European arms producers, they will have to accept their rules, and they will probably still not be able to contribute to projects because their companies are not necessarily advanced enough to win contracts or subcontracts. Furthermore, smaller states will be pressed politically to acquire the products of European titans in the future, thus they will also lose the leverage to playing off foreign companies.\textsuperscript{112}

Applying the research framework of historic institutionalism Marc R. DeVore strives to answer the question ‘what impact will past organizational outcomes have on shaping future development of European’ armaments organizations?’ In his research he investigates 16 different European and transatlantic armaments organizations which have been created since the end of the Second World War. DeVore shows that


in the first half of the Cold War functional, transatlantic organizations developed fastest and deepest in this domain thanks to the American political, technical and financial support of transatlantic armament co-operation. However, from the mid-1960s politically driven European organizations began to flourish because of the drying up of American subsidization and because certain conflicts emerged between the US and European nations. The majority of pre-existing transatlantic organizations survived and were not replaced by other European ones. After the Cold War, the evolution of the EU provided inspiration for armaments collaboration as well and supranational bodies attempted to control this field. But the existing transatlantic organizations have become even stronger and, although new pan-European institutions have been established, they have often taken over the responsibilities of earlier organizations. DeVore points out that early organizational choices influenced later processes, because the opportunity costs of replacement of efficient armament organizations are too high to substitute with new ones, in addition even the components of less successful organizations are usually preserved in their successors. Although it is clear that the current ‘polycentric’ dynamics of armament co-operation is inefficient, DeVore concludes that ‘due to their path-dependent development, it would be prohibitively costly to replace today’s organizations with a single new entity’ and thus ‘the EU’s role will likely remain limited to its current responsibilities and domains outside the mandates of existing organizations.’

MULTINATIONAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

With regard to the literature of multinational capability development, we can identify two major trends. One school of scholars has developed the conceptual background of multinational capability development and based on their concepts they examined certain issues, others have focused exclusively on policy analysis and advice without any conceptual work. In the first part of this subsection I attempt to show the literature concerning how the concept of multinational capability development has changed, thereafter I introduce the major policy issues and trends of the literature in the second part.

113 DeVore, “Organizing international armaments cooperation,”, 432-458.
The Evolution of the Concept of Pooling & Sharing

As the capability approach became dominant, the concepts on defence co-operation also became more sophisticated. The conceptual bases have been laid down by Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden in their paper ‘The arithmetic of defence policy’ published in *International Affairs* in 2001. The authors point out that not only decreasing defence budgets, but also their shrinking purchasing power resulted in the sharp decline of military capabilities in Europe. The reason for this is that defence inflation is significantly higher than ‘normal’ inflation, because although maintenance costs in the field of defence rise at the same ratio as inflation, personnel costs and equipment costs rise much higher than inflation. Consequently, the higher rate of defence inflation would normally cause a decline in the purchasing power of defence budgets even if they remained unchanged in real terms and did not decline, as it has happened in Europe for the last decades. These lead to continuous decreases in force levels and military capabilities to compensate the diminishing defence budgets and the effects of defence inflation. Alexander and Garden predicted that this ‘arithmetic’ suggests that by 2020 the front line forces of the UK might be the half of the 2001 level. The authors identify only two options to counter this trend: increasing the defence budget significantly or establishing ‘real co-operation’ at European level. They conclude that the first option was very unlikely, thus they argued that despite many difficulties of the second one, it still remained a much more viable possibility. However, they also highlight that ‘real co-operation’ will not solve the problem of the arithmetic of defence policy either, but ‘it could put off the crisis for a generation or more’.

Alexander and Garden identify two types of co-operation, pooling and integration, but they do not elaborate the conceptual framework of these. They argue for EU-wide supranational pooling of forces and they proposed operational integration for sensitive capabilities. They point out that although duplication and multiplication basically exist in every field of European defence (e.g. headquarters, bases, logistics support, planning, training, procurement etc.), some areas of co-operation can provide results faster. According to them, aircraft capabilities are the

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115 Ibid. 515-517.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid. 520.
most obvious choices for initial pooling, because in this field the procedures are harmonized, in addition the unit costs and the costs of infrastructure are very high, which may necessitate more co-operation. Thus, pooling of air transport capabilities or creating a European air-to-air refuelling fleet would be ideal candidates for collaboration. With regard to navies, the pooling of transport ships, supply support and integration of naval training could produce significant savings. However, according to them the Land domain offers less potential, because Land capabilities are usually very sensitive, and co-operation of land forces can save much less resources than the previous two fields. Still, logistical support, medical service, communication, IT systems can be the first areas where successful co-operation could begin regarding land forces. Alexander and Garden acknowledge that this type of supranational co-operation could not be established regarding combat capabilities, thus they propose their operational integration, which later could lead to common procurement, training and maintenance. For developing new common European capabilities further, they suggest the creation of a European planning and budgetary system supported by a common European defence budget. According to Garden, the allocation of around 5 percent of the defence budgets of every EU member state to this European defence budget would be a good start. Alexander and Garden perceive the sensitivity of pooling and rationalization processes, which could cause the closure of headquarters and bases and could raise problems regarding national sovereignty. However, they argue that ‘the arithmetic of defence policy is implacable and will not tolerate delay for very much longer.’

Volker Heise maps the potential for military co-operation to fulfil EU capability development programmes, but provides a vague conceptual framework. First, he differentiates pooling of capabilities, specialization, task-sharing and collective capabilities as new approaches and provides some examples concerning every type of co-operation. However, he also uses the term ‘multinational approaches’ as a distinct category, and claims that European nations prefer to choose this type of collaboration based on multinational agreements, where countries can preserve their

118 Ibid. p520-528.
120 Alexander and Garden, “The arithmetic of defence policy,” 529.
interests, like in the case of co-operation on satellite assets between Germany and France. He does not elaborate how it is distinct from ‘pooling of capabilities’. Heise also introduces the concept of ‘pooling of sovereignty’ for areas, which ‘are not at the core of nations’ autonomy’. According to him, this field of co-operation can produce significant savings, where he uses the possible creation of permanent European Operational Headquarters as an example. He also points out that a “European army” would be the perfect way to end nations’ duplication of capabilities and structures and consequently ensure the most economic use of resources. It would provide the highest level of military integration.¹²² He acknowledges that for the creation of a European army, much higher level of political integration under a much stronger European Parliament would be needed; while an integrated European society would be a prerequisite for that as well.

Jean-Pierre Maulny and Fabio Liberti provide the first coherent concept and set of definitions regarding ‘pooling’ in a study made for the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence.¹²³ Their concept has become the starting point for categorization of different defence co-operation initiatives. Maulny and Liberty identify four pooling categories:

1. sharing of capabilities, whereby member states create common capabilities through the provision of national capabilities and there is no structure to organize their use;
2. pooling of capabilities, which involves an integrated structure to organize the use of national capabilities;
3. pooling through acquisition, where national capabilities do not exist and are substituted in favour of multilateral capabilities, and the multilateral organization owns the assets;
4. role sharing, whereby certain capabilities are relinquished on the assumption that another country will make it available when necessary.

The authors also investigate the standpoint of major member states on defence co-operation and study some of the current examples of defence collaboration. They observe that among the member states of the European Union too much duplication exists in the field of defence and this ‘represents a huge and irrational cost for

¹²² Ibid. 47.
¹²³ Maulny and Liberti, Pooling of EU member states assets in the implementation of ESDP.
European taxpayers.124 They do not believe that a full military integration is possible in Europe, but according to them ‘pooling’ provides the possibility for significant savings.

After the financial crisis of 2008 Bastian Giegerich125 pointed out in one of his articles – similarly to Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden ten years earlier – that military equipment costs have been rising much higher than inflation. The problem existed already before the financial crisis, but he highlights that the current ‘budget crunch’ created by the negative effects of the crisis made the situation much grimmer. He identifies two types of solutions for the sharply diminishing defence budgets: lowering the level of ambitions of European armed forces, or using the crisis as an opportunity to deepen defence co-operation. He prefers the second one, and provides a balanced analysis highlighting not only the benefits but also the difficulties of multinational defence co-operation. Giegerich shows that multinational co-operation needs much more coordination than national capability development, while it may lower operational effectiveness, often reduces national autonomy and also can create losses of national industrial positions. He uses almost the same categories126 as Maulny and Liberti regarding the concept of pooling and sharing (P&S), but he perceives multinational procurement as a distinct element, which is not part of P&S in itself. He differentiates two types of multinational procurement; joint acquisition and co-development. Joint acquisition or pooling of acquisition takes place when several nations procure and maintain a capability together which they do not possess individually on a national basis. (It is the same category as pooling through acquisition by Maulny and Liberti.) Co-development, which is a new element in the literature of P&S but not of the MDCs, is when two or more nations develop and produce an asset that they individually could not afford. Giegerich shows that the biggest problem regarding this type of collaboration is that European nations do not harmonize their defence asset requirements, causing inefficiencies, cost overruns and longer development phases. It also means that countries will have national specifications making common maintenance and training difficult or impossible at all.

Tamás Csiki and Bence Németh attempt to consolidate the earlier concepts and categories regarding P&S in their paper prepared for the first defence ministerial

124 Ibid. 3.
126 Giegerich’s categories are sharing of capabilities, pooling of capabilities, role and task sharing.
meeting of the Central European Defence Co-operation. They do not perceive the concept of P&S as a new approach, but a framework which provide the opportunity to categorize every multinational military co-operation initiative. Thus, compared to earlier pieces of the literature they provide many examples for every category, and use P&S as a synonym to MDC. They take the categories of Maulny and Liberti as a basis with the distinction that they employ the two sub-categories for pooling through acquisition – joint acquisition and co-development – introduced by Giegerich. However, while Giegerich does not perceive them as part of P&S, Csiki and Németh use them as an integrated element of P&S.

**Pooling and Sharing in Practice – PESCO, Smart Defence and the Ghent Process**

The literature concerning the practical applications of pooling has almost exclusively been raised in the framework of the EU and NATO. Whilst in the case of the EU, Permanent Structured Co-operation of the Lisbon Treaty and the ‘Ghent Process’ have dominated scholarly works, in the case of NATO the literature has focused mostly on the ‘Smart Defence’ concept.

Among others Patrick Wouters, Colonel of the Belgian Air Force, offers a detailed analysis of possible ‘key performance indicators’ on PESCO in the light of the concepts emerged in different formal and informal negotiations. He distinguishes three main ‘strategic objectives’ during the development of PESCO’s criteria: building military capabilities, ensuring operational commitment and governing defence investment. By analysing different aspects of European defence (e.g. force generation, military statements of requirements, burden-sharing, funding) Wouters provides many thoughtful but not elaborated ideas. Nick Witney raises the questions of membership, criteria and types of co-operation in the framework of

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PESCO. He points out that member states that are willing to provide more resources on defence are not necessarily the same that are contributing the most to operations. Thus, it is very hard to find a clear ‘pioneer group’ or the ‘hard core’ among European states regarding defence, and it is the reason why PESCO should be a ‘more inclusive system’. He argues for the creation of ‘specialist sub-groups’ instead of an overarching PESCO, because this way PESCO could optimize the different contributions of member states. He proposes that those member states who contribute most to most ‘specialist sub-groups’ would become the core group, and they could have bigger voice in determining the strategic direction of the whole PESCO. At the same time Witney suggests a minimum entrance criteria for participation even to the ‘specialist sub-groups’ (e.g. 1% of GDP spent on defence and 1% of military personnel deployed on operations), and highlights the possible important role of EDA in the process.130

Sven Biscop studies whether PESCO has the potential to solve the major difficulties of European defence, which he perceives as the inefficiency of defence spending on European level and intra-European duplications of defence capabilities. According to him, the most important problem of defence planning in Europe is its ‘exclusively national focus’, and he argues that it can be solved by ‘pooling’ which can decrease duplications and provide more deployable capabilities.131 According to these, Biscop lays down principles, which should govern the development of PESCO’s criteria. Among others he argues for criteria which are quantifiable and verifiable, while at the same time aimed at precise qualitative objectives. These should apply to specific capabilities rather than to the whole armed forces, in addition they should be result-oriented commitments.132 In other pieces133 Biscop and Jo Coelmont elaborate a detailed and concrete proposal for the criteria of PESCO, where they suggest ‘no strict entrance criteria, but well-defined commitments to be achieved by pMS134 by an agreed deadline.’135 Namely, it would be an output-driven instead of input-driven system. These are the following:136

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130 Witney, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy, 14-28.
132 Ibid. 7-8.
134 pMS: participating Member States
1. the improvement of deployability and sustainability of participating states according to an agreed percentage;

2. harmonization of defence expenditures while the participating states that are spending less on defence than the EU average would not decrease their defence budgets;

3. participating states will contribute in ratio of their GDP to the EDA-initiated projects aimed at addressing the shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal process;

4. participating states will deploy in all CSDP operations requiring military assets with significant contributions.

Furthermore, Biscop and Coelmont also suggest the creation of a permanent capability generation conference and the establishment of clusters of multinational defence collaborations also in PESCO’s framework.

Since the Lisbon Treaty took effect from the end of 2009 many expert and high level negotiations on PESCO have been held during 2010, but member states could not reach consensus regarding PESCO, thus it has not been implemented yet. In the light of these events, Laura Chappell and Petar Petrov study PESCO using the concept of strategic culture, looking for the answers whether PESCO could stimulate the European capability development efforts, and what role EDA could play in this process. The authors identify four conflicting visions concerning European strategic culture: Atlanticism vs. Europeanism, regional vs. global, pro-active vs. restrictive in use of force, defence sovereignty vs. pooled defence resources. They analyse the possible impact of PESCO and EDA in easing of these different approaches. To support their argument, they use the evolution of EU Battlegroups as a case study, showing the possible barriers which PESCO’s implementation can face. Chappell and Petrov conclude that ‘European strategic culture is not advanced enough to provide a top down approach to military capability development’, thus instead of PESCO ‘a bottom up approach would most likely remain in the foreseeable future’ on the field of EU’s capability development.

136 Ibid. 2-3.
138 Ibid. 62-63.
The idea of creating clusters or groups of countries to maintain and develop military capabilities together in the framework of either NATO or the EU is not a new one. However, scholars have begun to focus on this issue only after the financial crisis the EU launched its P&S initiative in the form of the Ghent process. Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont perceive the Ghent initiative as an indirect way to establish PESCO, and claim that the ‘Ghent Framework is the first step towards what would be the first dimension of an integrated capability development process’. Nick Witney also sees EU’s P&S as an episode to achieve something bigger in the framework of the EU, and suggests launching a European Defence Review and the creation of a ‘European Defence Review Commission to propose a redefined and rearticulated [EU] common strategy and an initial set of the decisions needed to make a reality of it.’ In contrast to these views which put P&S in a pan-European context, Tomas Valasek argues for the creation ‘of multiple, discreet, regional “islands of cooperation”, whose members will partly integrate their militaries’. According to him, significant regional differences exist among European states regarding their defence needs, which must be taken into consideration for establishing successful pooling and sharing initiatives. For this reason, establishing an overarching PESCO or identical islands of co-operation is not realistic. Among others Valasek highlights that MDCs works much better between states that share similar strategic culture, have armed forces with similar size and quality and have compatible defence industries. Christian Mölling and Sophie-Charlotte Brune point out as well that defence co-operation comprising all EU members ‘will certainly remain the exception rather than the rule’. They survey almost 70 MDCs and conclude that 60% of the studied projects have only five or less members, in addition defence collaborations mostly work either as ‘user groups’ around common and pooled equipments or are ‘clusters

139 Michèle A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith, European defense integration: bridging the gap between strategy and capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 80-97.
144 Ibid. 21-27.
145 Mölling and Brune, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence, 43.
of regional co-operation’. Furthermore, they highlight that the majority of the analyzed forms of co-operation are not integrated in the EU framework.\footnote{Ibid. 43-45.}

Smart Defence was high on the agenda during the Chicago NATO Summit in 2012, but many scholars have perceived that the process slowed down and there is a need to ‘revitalise’ it. Claudia Major, Christian Mölling and Tomas Valasek point out in a short policy paper that Europeans still fear the dependencies which MDCs can cause, thus NATO should provide incentives to its member states to ease their concerns. The authors suggest more than half a dozen initiatives to invigorate Smart Defence like the creation of a NATO-wide ‘reinvestment pool’, ‘regional capability targets’, assistance in the specialization of Allies etc.\footnote{Claudia Major, Christian Mölling, and Tomas Valasek, \textit{Smart but too cautious: How NATO can improve its fight against austerity} (London: Center for European Reform, 2012), 1-6.} Bastian Giegerich reviews the most important questions and problems decision makers have to face regarding the implementation of Smart Defence. Inter alia he highlights the possible difficulties that ‘specialization by design’ could cause; he touches upon the problem of sovereignty regarding MDCs; also discusses Smart Defence’s defence-industrial aspects and the concerns on the access to multinational capabilities during operations. Furthermore, Giegerich shortly introduces three possible models, which NATO should take into consideration for ‘specialization by design’: NATO’s Centres of Excellences, islands of co-operation and ‘model based on mentoring’.\footnote{Giegerich, “NATO’s Smart Defence: Who’s Buying?”, 69-77.}

**SUB-REGIONAL DEFENCE CO-OPERATION**

After the end of the Cold War some countries struggled with finding effective answers to the challenges of the new international environment and decreasing defence budgets, therefore began to co-operate with their sub-regional partners more intensively. Among them the Benelux, the Baltic and the Nordic states deepened their military collaboration significantly over the 1990s. Although these initiatives have achieved a high level of collaboration and integration between the armed forces of the participating countries, they remained the exceptions rather than the rule among European MDCs, and accordingly these issues have not received much scholarly attention.

Belgium and the Netherlands integrated their navies to a large degree when they signed the Admiral Benelux agreement in 1995 upon, which they established a
binational joint command and binational and integrated military education. The two countries occasionally coordinate their procurements and have also agreed on role specialization in the maritime domain. In 1996 they established the Deployable Air Task Force (DATF) to pool some of their air assets and personnel in order to make their exercises and participation in operations more effective. DATF was engaged successfully during NATO’s Kosovo air campaign in 1999.

The Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – established the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) in 1994 to participate in peacekeeping operations, and parts of it were deployed three times to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main aim of the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) – operational since 1998 – has been minimizing mine hazards, thus enhancing security on the Baltic Sea. Every state provides 1-2 mine hunters to the squadron, but these vessels remain under national authority and the staff positions rotate between the three states. The Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) is a unified air space surveillance system based on partly common procurement and maintenance. Finally, the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) has been financed by all of the three countries since 1999. The Nordic countries could also build on their previous co-operation regarding peacekeeping operations of the Cold War when they established the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) in 1997. NORDCAPS provided joint training for peacekeeping operations and coordinated Nordic contributions to the security sector reform of third world countries. In 1994, Nordic Armaments Co-operation (NORDAC) was also founded to foster co-operation on certain capability development issues among Nordic states.

During the first decade of the twenty-first century the aforementioned (Benelux, Baltic, Nordic) collaborations have slowed down and have been extended rarely to new areas, because processes within NATO and EU began to dominate defence collaboration in Europe, leaving less space for co-operation on sub-regional basis. Thus it is not surprising that with regard to the Benelux MDCs only several policy analyses have been published and although Baltic defence co-operation has received more scholarly attention, its literature has also remained thin. While some

scholars have studied the experience, the current state of affairs and the prospects of Baltic Defence co-operation, the question of defensibility of the Baltic States in case of a Russian attack were much debated in the late 1990s and early 2000s before the Baltic States’ NATO accession. The Nordic co-operation has been studied the most among these three collaborations, but this research has focused mostly either on the Nordic co-operation in peacekeeping operations or on the impact of the European Security and Defence Policy on the Nordic states.

Sub-regional MDCs have been boosted after the financial crisis of 2008. The three most important examples of recently emerged real multinational defence co-operation are the Nordic Defence Co-operation, the UK-French defence treaties and the Central European initiatives for pooling and sharing capabilities. In 2009 the five Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – established Nordic Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO) which covers almost the whole spectrum of their defence sectors in order to achieve cost-effectiveness and enhanced operational capability. In 2010 France and the United Kingdom signed a pact on co-operation in strategically crucial fields like nuclear weapons testing; the operation of two aircraft carriers; sharing of training, resources and maintenance; the establishment of a division-size joint expeditionary force; and common research and development. In 2011 the Defence Policy Directors of six Central European countries – Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia – agreed to begin to map up the possible areas of co-operation where their countries could pool and share military capabilities, and also agreed to coordinate their standpoints on different

defence policy and planning issues. Understandably the British-French co-operation generated the most research among these MDCs as it has the biggest scale and may also influence the whole dynamic of European defence policy. These publications have been mainly initial policy oriented analyses, policy recommendations or opinions, similarly to the papers published related to NORDEFCO and the Central European Defence Co-operation.

CONCLUSION

The main post-Cold War literature regarding MDCs has not contained the issue of sub-regional MDCs, because it has focused rather on defence collaborations in the EU and NATO. In this context scholars have mostly studied the different aspects of multinational land formations, collaborative equipment procurements and co-operation on multinational capability development. While with regard to multinational land formations and multinational capability development NATO and EU frameworks and initiatives were the focal points of the literature, in the case of equipment procurement other institutions and agreements (OCCAR, LoI) and also European and transatlantic defence industrial collaborations have been significant research topics as well. However, the empirical literature connected to sub-regional MDCs is very thin compared to the scholarship of EU- and NATO-related MDCs. Furthermore, it is disjointed and typically includes policy analyses and even the very few academic papers are descriptive and a-conceptual. In addition, the sub-regional MDCs have been studied only separately or – especially in the cases of the sub-regional MDCs created recently – have just begun to attract scholarly attention. This clearly establishes an empirical and analytical gap as there has been no attempt at scrutinising the sub-regional MDCs in a systematic and comparative manner.

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155 E.g. M. Funch and J. Schou-Knuden (ed.), One for all, all for one: New Nordic defence policy? (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2009); Håkon Lunde Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, Oslo Files 01, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2011)

156 E.g. Csiki and Németh, On the Multinational Development of Military Capabilities.

CHAPTER 3.
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

In my thesis I am studying why European nations have created new sub-regional MDCs and have re-energized old ones in the last couple of years, instead of using the existing NATO and EU institutional frameworks for military collaboration. To conduct my research I apply the multiple-case study research method elaborated by Robert K. Yin, who distances this approach from the classical survey based concept of case studies and adapts the logic of the experimental method. Based on this approach, I investigate three cases – the British-French ‘Lancaster House Treaties’, the Nordic Defence Co-operation, and the Central European Defence Co-operation – by testing three rival explanations using the method of pattern matching, which means that I generate predicted patterns regarding the studied phenomenon and compare them to empirically based patterns. The three rival explanations which I will compare regarding the creation of new sub-regional MDCs are 1) the lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main aim of the research is to study why some countries turned from NATO and EU to their sub-regional partners in some aspects of military co-operation. The financial crisis clearly triggered the impression that the negative effects of the further decreasing defence budgets could be tackled only by tighter defence cooperation among European states. New initiatives have emerged both in NATO and EU in this regard as it was introduced in the literature review, but interestingly, new defence co-operations have been created and old ones have been revitalized on the sub-regional level.158

Importantly this co-operation has tended to be exclusively military in form, which is a significant phenomenon, because – not counting some exceptions like the

Benelux and Baltic military collaboration – most of the sub-regional co-operative structures which were established after the Cold War in the 1990s focused primarily on practical, non- or soft security issues. Nevertheless, they contributed to European security by playing a crucial bridge-building role in ceasing the East-West divide created by the Cold War. In addition, many of them served as important space for the former communist countries during their preparation to NATO and EU accession. Thus, unsurprisingly sub-regional collaborations were never perceived as alternatives to pan-European organizations, but they were intended to complement them. Researchers in the 1990s pointed out that although sub-regional structures were more flexible and adaptable to the problems of the particular sub-region than big multilateral organizations, they had their own limits as well. For instance they were not big enough to tackle ‘major global issues’ or transmit normative principles. Furthermore, they were deemed inappropriate for co-operation in the field of ‘strategic military security’. Alyson JK Bailes highlighted at the time that sub-regional structures did not initiate regular Defence Ministerial or defence staff level meetings, and were not interested in ‘co-operation on defence modernization’ either. Moreover, they did not elaborate ‘hard’ arms control measures’ like the OSCE, and did not get involved in nuclear issues or discussing security guarantees.

However, the currently evolving sub-regional MDCs are significantly different from the typical sub-regional structures of the 1990s, as they are sub-regional collaborations focusing on military co-operation and are also organizing defence ministerial and/or senior military level meetings. While in the 1990s many Western and former communist countries established sub-regional co-operations to facilitate the evolution of their relationship with each other after the Cold War, nowadays this intention does not exist, because all participating states of the concerned sub-regional

159 e.g. Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Council of Baltic States, Visegrad Group, Central European Free Trade Agreement, Central European Initiative, Black Sea Economics Cooperation, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
collaborations are members of NATO and/or EU. Namely, their relations are so extensive in every field – including defence issues – that it is not evident why they have established new structures instead of using the existing ones inside the NATO and EU. Furthermore, it is often not politicians but the European defence policy elites and the armed forces – national defence policy communities – that are the major driving forces behind this sub-regional military co-operation, which is also a change compared with the 1990s. However, until now there has been no attempt to problematize the dynamics behind these collaborations, and no one has investigated why sub-regional MDCs had been used on many issues instead of using the institutionalized solutions of the NATO and EU. Along these lines the thesis attempts to answer the following research questions:

- Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU?
- What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU?

**KEY CONCEPTS**

**Sub-regional MDCs**

To study not pan-European MDCs we have to clarify what we understand under the term and what is the most useful definition for them. I propose that the most appropriate term is ‘sub-regional multinational defence cooperation’, because it describes their nature best, namely that these are defence related frameworks for cooperation between European countries, which are either neighbours or belong to one sub-region.

However, the current primarily policy oriented literature defines not pan-European MDCs in Europe loosely, and different authors identify them under alternative names. For instance, Mölling and Brune call them ‘clusters of cooperation’, and although Tomas Valasek also uses the term of Mölling and Brune he calls them ‘islands of cooperation’ and ‘regional clusters’ too. In the same time

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an EUISS report applies the term of ‘regionalisation of military capabilities’.\textsuperscript{166} At the same time, Pieter-Jan Parrein points out that ‘Europe is regarded as a region with regional cooperation organizations such as the EU or the Council of Europe, therefore regional cooperation within Europe is in fact sub-regional’,\textsuperscript{167} thus he calls them ‘sub-regional defence cooperation’. The different terms and definitions probably stem from the situation that while many new and older reenergized MDCs in Europe are based on membership of relatively well-defined and institutionalized regions/sub-regions (e.g. Baltic, Benelux, Nordic), other mostly bilateral collaborations are not necessarily significant in dimensions outside defence cooperation. Furthermore, in the case of bilateral defence collaborations it is not clear why some are deemed regional/sub-regional (British-French,\textsuperscript{168} British-Dutch\textsuperscript{169}) while others are perceived as exclusively bilateral co-operations (Dutch-German, German-French).

During my research I am going to use the term ‘sub-regional multinational defence cooperation’ (sub-regional MDC), because I believe that the summation of the concepts of sub-region and MDC provides the best term describing the not pan-European defence collaborations I am interested in. In order to introduce this term I clarify separately the concept of sub-region and MDC, and sum them up into one definition.

According to John Agnew to ask what region is, is a
‘worthy question, without doubt – or at least it used to be. Increasingly often, answering this question proves if not an impossible task, then at least one that is bound to produce multiple answers, once again, both politically and conceptually. Labelling regions has ceased to be – assuming that it ever was – a descriptive exercise in which observers held their mirrors – geographical, cultural and so on – to the(ir) world: what a region is always reflects ‘the biases, intellectual and political, of their originators.’\textsuperscript{170}

We face similar problems when defining the concept of sub-region. Andrew Cottey points out that ‘the term is not exact, since it is clear that the definition of any sub-region (like that of a region) reflects not only geography, but also history and politics – often making the issue contentious.’ In his research, Cottey perceives

\textsuperscript{166} Missiroli, Rogers, and Gilli, \textit{Enabling the future}, 47.
\textsuperscript{167} Parrein, \textit{Sub-regional European Military Cooperation Initiatives}, 1.
\textsuperscript{169} Missiroli, Rogers, and Gilli, \textit{Enabling the future}, 45.
Europe as a region and according to his definition “‘sub-regional’ refers to a geographically and/or historically reasonably coherent area within the OSCE space as a whole.”\(^1\) I accept this definition, but at the same time I would like to point out that the sub-regional co-operations I am interested in are situated in the territory of EU and NATO Europe, and do not include collaborations from other parts of the OSCE area.

The concept of Multinational Defence Cooperation seems to be more concrete than the term of sub-region. MDC is basically collaboration between states on different military related issues. I use the already mentioned definition of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence which says that an MDC can be ‘any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capabilities. This can include exchanges and liaison, training and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations.’\(^2\)

According to these approaches, we can conclude that sub-regional MDC is any arrangement where two or more nations belonging to a European geographically and/or historically reasonably coherent area work together to enhance their military capabilities.

Accordingly, I perceive Europe as a region, and under the term of Europe I understand the combined territory of the EU and the European NATO member states. In this respect regional MDCs are NATO and EU level collaborations in my thesis, because these two institutions cover the vast majority of the aforementioned territory.\(^3\) Thus, sub-regional MDCs are defence co-operations below NATO and EU level.

Based on this definition and the literature the following eight defence collaborations in Europe are currently deemed relevant sub-regional MDCs:

- **Baltic Defence Cooperation:** In order to prepare for NATO accession and create military capabilities they lacked the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – established four major defence co-operative structures (Baltic

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\(^3\) The memberships of NATO and EU significantly overlap. From the 28 EU member states only Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are not part of the NATO, and from the 27 European NATO members Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Albania and Macedonia are not EU members.
Battalion, Baltic Naval Squadron, Baltic Air Surveillance Network, Baltic Defence College) during the 1990s which are still operational.

- **Benelux Defence Cooperation:** Belgium and the Netherlands integrated their navies in many aspects via the Admiral Benelux agreement (1995) and also established the Deployable Air Task Force (1996) to exercise and participate in air operations jointly. In 2012, the Ministers of Defence of the Benelux states signed a declaration on defence cooperation 174 to reinvigorate their defence collaboration.

- **Central European Defence Co-operation:** In 2011, the Defence Policy Directors of six Central European countries – Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia – agreed to begin to map up the possible areas of co-operation where their countries could pool and share military capabilities, and also agreed to coordinate their standpoints on defence policy and planning issues.

- **British-Dutch Amphibious Force:** The co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands regarding amphibious forces started in 1973. Currently the marines of the two nations use the same training and tactics, and are conducting operations in a fully integrated manner.

- **British-French Defence Cooperation:** In 2010, France and the United Kingdom signed two treaties on co-operation in strategically crucial fields like nuclear weapons testing; the operation of two aircraft carriers; the sharing of training, resources and maintenance; the establishment of a division-size joint expeditionary force; and common research and development.

- **Nordic Defence Cooperation:** In 2009, the five Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – established the Nordic Defence Co-operation which covers almost the whole spectrum of their defence sectors in order to achieve cost-effectiveness and enhanced operational capability.

- **South Eastern Europe Defence Cooperation:** The South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministers Process began in 1996 that resulted in the creation of the South Eastern Europe Brigade by Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey in 1999. Both the process and the brigade

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174 BENELUX-declaration on cooperation in the field of defence on 18 April 2012
have been working and providing fruitful fora for co-operation and confidence building in the region.

- **Visegrad Group:** The Visegrad Group consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The co-operation was founded in 1991 with the aim to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of the four Central European countries in general. Although, regular meetings between the Chiefs of Defence and Ministers of Defence of the participating countries were held, the collaboration of the Visegrad Group was not strong on the field of defence until 2011, when they decided to establish an EU Battlegroup be operational and stand by in 2016.

**Threat Perception**

The magnitude of the threat perception literature is well illustrated by Janice Gross Stein who distinguishes two major approaches and seven sub-approaches how threat perception has been studied in the field of International Relations.\(^{175}\) Stein points out that the two major approaches are the rationalist and the psychological ones, and with regard to the rationalist approach five concepts exist that describe threat perception as:

1) ‘changing balances of power and the attendant difficulty the sender faces in making commitments credible to the perceiver’

2) ‘security and status dilemmas which make intentions difficult to read and threats difficult to assess’

3) ‘institutional interests’

4) ‘political culture’ and

5) ‘the violation of norms’.

At the same time psychological approaches – pioneered by Robert Jervis\(^ {176}\) – have focused either on psychological mechanisms which are influenced among others by beliefs and values resulting in ‘misperception’ and ‘miscalculation’, or highlights the problem of ‘two-level’ games, when ‘leaders may be speaking to multiple

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constituencies simultaneously and therefore have an incentive to distort either their intentions or their capabilities or both.¹⁷⁷ During my research I will not be interested in how the threat perception of countries evolves and what kind of factors influence it in different situations as the vast majority of the literature does. I am rather interested in identifying whether such a common threat perception existed among the participating nations of sub-regional MDCs at all. Still I can use some of the indications certain concepts regarding threat perception provide. For instance F. Gregory Cause III points out that the approach of the realist school in International Relations with regard to balancing – when states align against an external threat – ‘presumes that identifying threats is the starting point of decision-making on alliances’.¹⁷⁸

In addition, Stephen Walt provided important contribution concerning the theory of alliance building when he developed the balance of threat concept. For Walt alliance means ‘a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states’,¹⁷⁹ which basically includes the concept of sub-regional MDCs described earlier as well, thus in general Walt’s concept is applicable to them. One of the main arguments of Walt is that not power per se – as it was perceived by most of the realist thinkers that time – but rather threats are the basis of balancing behaviour in international politics. Although Walt accepts that distribution of power is highly important in this regard, he argues that a threat’s constituent elements are geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions too and they have to be taken account for understanding the dynamics of alliances.¹⁸⁰ Walt offers a solid but simple concept of threat perception which says that the independent variable is the ‘imbalances of threat’ and the dependent variable is ‘Alliances against the most threatening state’. According to him, ‘an imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or coalition is significantly more dangerous than the second most threatening state or coalition. The degree to which a state threatens others is the product of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability and the aggressiveness of its intentions.’¹⁸¹

However, I am not interested in what kind of elements a threat has or how threat evolves in certain states; I will be only interested in whether the studied countries

¹⁷⁷ Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations”.
¹⁸⁰ Ibid. 5.
possessed the same threat perception and whether it fostered the establishing of sub-regional MDCs. At the same time, I would like to point out that Walt’s concept of threat is overly state centric, and does not allow taking into consideration transnational and subnational threats, which can also serve as the basis for common threat perception. Thus, with regard to my research ‘perception of the same threat’ – whatever the threat is – is used as independent variable instead of Walt’s variable of ‘imbalance of threat’. Similarly, ‘alliances against the most threatening state’ is too narrow and state centric for dependent variable in my research, thus I change it to ‘alliances against the biggest threat’.

**METHODOLOGY**

**Case Study Research Method**

In order to answer the research questions of the thesis properly the case study research method seems to be the most appropriate approach. The question can be raised on what basis the researcher should choose between the different research methods. According to Robert K. Yin, three factors are relevant in this respect: the form of the research question (whether it needs exploratory or explanatory answer), whether the researcher has control over behavioural events and lastly whether the research focuses on contemporary events. For instance, if the research is explanatory – which is indicated by the research question using the how? and/or the why? interrogative – needs control over behavioural events and focuses on contemporary issues, the researcher should use the experimental method. In the case when the research is exploratory (uses who?, what?, where? like questions), there is no need for control over behavioural events and focuses on past events, archival analysis will be the most suitable method. However, if the research is explanatory, examines contemporary events, and the scholar do not have the opportunity to manipulate the relevant behaviours the preferred approach is the case study method. My thesis fits to this situation. Namely, it studies current events regarding European sub-regional MDCs, I cannot manipulate the relevant behaviours of the actors and although my research questions contain both exploratory and explanatory elements, the explanatory part is much more significant. Thus, I use the case study method for my research.

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In political science the traditional view is that the method of single-case and multiple-case study researches differ. This phenomenon is signified in the names of these types of methods as well, because only the single-case study research is called ‘case study’, and the multiple-case study is mostly called ‘comparative research’.\textsuperscript{183} In addition, political scientists apply different methods on the basis of the number of the studied cases regarding multiple-case studies, thus they differentiate small-N comparison (2-12 cases) and large-N studies.\textsuperscript{184} Contrarily, Yin argues that ‘case study research includes both single- and multiple case studies’,\textsuperscript{185} and developed a set of rigorous procedures which provides a comprehensive but still flexible framework for case study research thus mitigating the deficiencies suggested by critics of the case study method. Accordingly, I follow the case study research method and design proposed by Yin.

Yin elaborated a twofold, technical definition for case studies. While the first part of the definition introduces the scope, the second part focuses on the technical characteristics of case study research. ‘In essence, the twofold definition shows how case study research comprises an all-encompassing method covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approach to data analysis.’\textsuperscript{186} According to Yin’s definition:\textsuperscript{187}

1. ‘A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth in within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.’
2. ‘The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.’

Based on the approach introduced in this definition Yin proposes not only the components of a case study’s research design, but also establishes a set of procedures.

\textsuperscript{184} Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, Political research: methods and practical skills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 202-229.
\textsuperscript{185} Yin, \textit{Case study research}, 19.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid. 18.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
to improve its quality and discusses the types of case studies as well. According to Yin, the research design of a case study has to contain at least five components:\(^{188}\)

1. a study’s question,
2. its propositions,
3. its unit(s) of analysis,
4. the logic linking the data to the propositions,
5. the criteria for interpreting the findings.

It means that the research design should include not only the type of information and data which the researcher needs to collect – it can be inferred from the study’s question, the propositions and the units of analysis – but it has to tackle the situation after data collection by providing the logic which links data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the findings.\(^{189}\)

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\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{TESTS} & \text{Case Study Tactic} & \text{Phase of research in which tactic occurs} \\
\hline
\text{Construct validity} & \bullet \text{use multiple sources of evidence} & \text{data collection} \\
 & \bullet \text{establish chain of evidence} & \text{data collection} \\
 & \bullet \text{have key informants review draft case study report} & \text{composition} \\
\hline
\text{Internal validity} & \bullet \text{do pattern matching} & \text{data analysis} \\
 & \bullet \text{do explanation building} & \text{data analysis} \\
 & \bullet \text{address rival explanations} & \text{data analysis} \\
 & \bullet \text{use logic models} & \text{data analysis} \\
\hline
\text{External validity} & \bullet \text{use theory in single-case studies} & \text{research design} \\
 & \bullet \text{use replications logic in multiple-case studies} & \text{research design} \\
\hline
\text{Reliability} & \bullet \text{use case study protocol} & \text{data collection} \\
 & \bullet \text{develop case study database} & \text{data collection} \\
\hline
\end{array}
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\textit{Figure 1 – Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests}\(^{190}\)

At the same time, Yin provides detailed procedures to the four tests – construct validity, internal validity, external validity, reliability – common to every social science method (See Figure 1) in order to improve the quality of the case study

\(^{188}\) Ibid 27.
\(^{189}\) Ibid. 35.
\(^{190}\) Ibid. 41.
research.\textsuperscript{191} For instance, with regard to construct validity – ‘identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied’ – he suggests to ‘use multiple sources of evidence, establish chain of evidence’ and ‘have key informants review draft case study report’. In the case of reliability – ‘demonstrating that the operations of study can be repeated with the same result’ – he proposes to ‘use case study protocol’ and ‘develop case study data base’.\textsuperscript{192} Of course, Yin does not list only these procedures, but elaborates them in detail.

As I already mentioned Yin does not consider the distinction between single- and multiple-case studies as the ‘classic’ approach in political science does, and developed a case study research design that is applicable to both. According to Yin, for this we have to think about case studies analogous to experiments. Thus, the rationales which underpin the execution of a single experiment can justify conducting a single case-study, and multiple-case studies must be ‘seen’ as multiple experiments, where not the sampling logic of the ‘classic’ case study approach should be used but the replication logic of multiple experiments. Yin highlights that based on the logic of experiments at least five major rationales exist for developing single case design, which are emerging either when the case represents the critical case in testing a theory, or when it is an extreme case, or is a typical case, or is a revelatory case or is a longitudinal case. Although, multiple-case designs are deemed providing more ‘compelling’ results, not every research can be done in this manner, and usually researches concerning the extreme case, the critical case and the revelatory case is conducted in a single-case study.

However, we have to bear in mind that in general multiple-case studies are more ‘robust’ than single-case studies, thus if we have the opportunity to conduct a multiple-case study instead of a single-case study, it has to be the preferred type. Yin argues that the multiple experiments’ replication logic and not the survey based sampling logic is relevant regarding multiple-case studies. Thus, he proposes two replication logics and suggests that ‘each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)’. According to Yin, ‘an important step in all of these replication procedures is the development of a rich, theoretical framework’, because it provides the relevant factors – which will be found

\textsuperscript{191} See a summary in Yin, \textit{Case study research}, 40-45.  
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid. 40-41.
(literal replications) or will be not found (theoretical replication) – in the selected replication procedure.\textsuperscript{193}

Besides, the elaborating on the aspect of whether the research was a single-case study or a multiple-case study Yin also distinguishes between case studies on the basis of whether they had more than one unit of analysis or sub-units of analysis. If so, he calls them ‘embedded’ case studies, if not, and the case study investigates the case from a ‘global’ perspective, it is a holistic case study (see Figure 2). Both types have their own advantages, but the researcher has to pay considerable attention to their weaknesses as well. For instance, with regard to the holistic case design usual pitfalls are that scholars can conduct the study ’at an unduly abstract level, lacking sufficiently clear measures or data’, or the case study may take a new orientation ’and the evidence begins to address a different research question’.\textsuperscript{194} A typical problem of the embedded case design can occur easily, if the case study focuses too much on the sub-unit level and ’fails to return to the larger unit of analysis’.\textsuperscript{195}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Basic Types of Design for Case Studies\textsuperscript{196}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid. 54.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid 51.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid. 46.
We can see that for conducting case studies Yin developed a comprehensive approach and a set of procedures which he elaborated in detail. Accordingly, Yin’s approach provides a more rigorous and standardized research design than earlier approaches of case studies, thus it enhances the chances for a successful research. Using the suggested design and procedures by Yin I attempt to answer the research questions of the thesis.

**Research Design**

As it was mentioned earlier the two main research questions of the thesis are ‘Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU?’ and ‘What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU?’ We can assume that the European countries which establish and/or renew sub-regional MDCs are not fully satisfied with those opportunities that NATO and EU frameworks offer, therefore deem the two organizations inadequate and inefficient for defence co-operation on certain issues. At the same time these countries deem co-operation in sub-regional MDCs more beneficial. The question is why they think that a new or a renewed sub-regional co-operation, which is less institutionalised, would be more advantageous or more effective, than co-operative frameworks in organizations – EU/NATO – which have well institutionalized solutions for collaborations and negotiations?

Different explanations exist. One of the understandings of this phenomenon in the policy sphere is best described by Pieter-Jan Parrein.\footnote{Parrein, Sub-regional European Military Cooperation Initiatives, 1-3.} He argues that new sub-regional MDCs have been established and old ones have been reenergized, because of two main reasons. First, the evolution of pan-European structures regarding defence cooperation did not progress appropriately, as they have not mitigated significantly the European fragmentation on the field of defence. This phenomenon was also demonstrated by the Literature Review chapter. Secondly, European states also needed quick solutions for maintaining national capabilities after the austerity measures generated by the financial crisis.\footnote{Ibid.} This explanation seems logical, as the new sub-regional MDCs were established after the beginning of the financial crisis.
Another possible answer can be inferred from the emerging different threat perceptions of NATO/EU member states, which generates concerns for many policy makers and scholars in NATO. Among others this problem has been noted by British Defence Secretary Philip Hammond\textsuperscript{199} and experts from many NATO member states, who deemed this issue highly significant regarding future alliance operations on a recent NATO workshop as well.\textsuperscript{200} Marko Papic – analyst at Stratfor – even argues that the main reason of the evolution of ‘a set of regionalized groupings’ regarding security is the different threat perceptions countries possess on the continent. Thus, he explicitly states that ‘in Europe, there is no such clarity of what constitutes a threat’ and because of ‘the regionalization of European security organizations’ basically ‘NATO has ceased to effectively respond to the national security interests of European states.’\textsuperscript{201}

To find out which concept explains the phenomenon of the development of sub-regional MDCs for the recent years best, I will use the above mentioned three concepts as rival explanations and test them through different cases. The analytic technique I use is pattern matching, which ‘compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions)’.\textsuperscript{202} Furthermore, using rival explanations as patterns provides an opportunity of pattern matching for independent variables. According to Yin,\textsuperscript{203}

This analysis requires the development of rival theoretical propositions, articulated in operational terms. The desired characteristic of these rival explanations is that each involves a pattern of independent variables that is mutually exclusive: If one explanation is to be valid, the others cannot be. This means that the presence of certain independent variables (predicted by one explanation) precludes the presence of other independent variables (predicted by a rival explanation). The independent variables may involve several or many different types of characteristics or events, each assessed with different measures and instruments. The concern of the case study analysis, however, is with the overall pattern of

\textsuperscript{202} Yin, Case study research, 136.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid. 140.
results and the degree to which the observed pattern matches the predicted one.

This type of pattern matching of independent variables also can be done either with a single case or with multiple cases. With a single case, the successful matching of the pattern to one of the rival explanations would be evidence for concluding that this explanation was the correct one (and that the other explanations were incorrect). Again, even with a single case, threats to validity – basically constituting another group of rival explanations – should be identified and ruled out. Moreover, if this identical result were additionally obtained over multiple cases, literal replication of the single cases would have been accomplished, and the cross-case results might be stated even more assertively.

I apply this analytic method in a multiple case design, because – as it was mentioned earlier – a multiple case study is more ‘robust’ and can provide more compelling results. This means that I will use one of the replication logics suggested by Yin. This multiple-case design will be an embedded one and not a holistic one (see Figure 2), where the cases are certain sub-regional MDCs and the ‘embedded unit of analysis’ are different for the three possible explanations:

1. Dissatisfaction with European-level defence integration
2. Defence budget cuts after the financial crisis
3. Threat perceptions of the states in the studied sub-regional MDCs

The potential cases for the research are the sub-regional MDCs, which were presented in the Key concepts section. However, if we want to focus on recent trends and the reason why new sub-regional MDCs have been established or an older one reenergized, we have to find the most relevant ones for the research. The Nordic Defence Cooperation, the British-French Defence Cooperation and the Central European Defence Co-operation are obviously important sub-regional MDCs in this regard, because they have been established in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, thus they can be good cases to study current dynamics behind defence co-operation. At the same time, despite the fact the British-Dutch Amphibious Force represents a matured cooperation with a very high level of integration between the British and Dutch marines, but it had been established in 1973, and thus it clearly cannot be a good case for investigating current trends. The situation is similar with the Baltic Defence Cooperation and the South Eastern Europe Defence Cooperation, as both were created in the 1990s, and although the participating nations of these two MDCs have
discussed their revitalization recently, significant efforts have not been made to do that. Although the Benelux Defence Cooperation was also established in the 1990s, it has been renewed in 2012, but the problem with it is that its implementation is in a premature stage. I believe that the Visegrad Group could not be among the most appropriate cases for my study either, because despite the fact that the V4 countries decided to create a new EU Battlegroup in 2011, this initiative answers to an older request made by the EU in 2004 concerning the Battlegroup concept, and not necessarily reflects to recent phenomena.

Accordingly, the Nordic Defence Cooperation, the British-French Defence Cooperation and the Central European Defence Co-operation seem to be the most significant cases for my research. These cases are also appropriate for using the literal replication logic, because it requires the selection of similar cases, where the predicted results are similar as well. These sub-regional MDCs are similar, because they have been established for the last several years, they are multidimensional co-operations, are or intended to be permanently structured and in contrast to the development of sub-regional cooperation of the 1990s they are focusing exclusively on defence collaboration. Thus we can assume that the dynamics behind their creation are similar.

For doing my research I will use three main sources: (1) official documents like National Security Strategies, National Military Strategies, official statements etc., (2) I will study the changing ‘material’ commitments – e.g. military exercises, cooperative capability development projects, cooperation on military technology – of these states regarding NATO, EU and sub-regional MDCs, (3) and finally I will conduct interviews with officials of the studied countries to get a more sophisticated picture about the investigated processes.

**Rival Explanations**

In order to undertake my research, I have to operationalize the patterns of the three earlier mentioned rival explanations to compare their predicted patterns with the empirically based ones. Thus, I develop generic predicted patterns for all three possible explanations mentioned earlier and will test them regarding my three cases (Nordic Defence Cooperation, the British-French Defence Cooperation and the Central European Defence Co-operation). In all cases, the dependent variable is the ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’, and the independent variables will be established on
the basis of the propositions of the three rival explanations. As I use the literal replication logic, I am looking for similar predicted results regarding every case, which means that I suppose that one of the rival explanations will answer my research questions convincingly, and the other two will not be appropriate to explain the phenomenon of establishing sub-regional MDCs instead of using NATO and EU cooperative structures. During the operationalization process I develop assumptions, which serve as prerequisites for verifying the studied variables of the patterns of the rival explanations.

**Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation**

One of the views is that European states have turned to sub-regional MDCs instead of NATO and EU on many issues because of the lack of progress regarding defence collaboration in the two organizations, which elements were described in detail in the Literature Review (e.g. problems of NRF, EU Battlegroups, NATO DCI and other capability packages, PESCO).

However, the independent variable of this rival explanation (‘lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence cooperation’) cannot be linked directly to the dependent variable (‘creation of sub-regional MDC’). Namely, the independent variable of ‘lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence cooperation’ would not trigger the search for alternative solutions per se for member states until they are not dissatisfied with the results of cooperative efforts in these two organizations. Accordingly, the intervening variable between the earlier mentioned independent variable – ‘lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence cooperation’ – and the dependent variable – ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ – is the ‘European nations are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ (see Figure 3).

Based on this pattern’s variables several assumptions can be inferred, which can serve as prerequisites for verifying this rival explanation. Each assumption is prerequisite for the variables of the rival explanation. This means that Prerequisite 1 is
prerequisite for the independent variable, Prerequisite 2 is the prerequisite of the intervening variable and Prerequisite 3 is prerequisite for the dependent variable. The prerequisites are the following:

1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be identified.
2. The dissatisfaction of countries of the studied sub-regional MDC concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected.
3. The creation of the sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of the participating countries with the NATO/EU.

If these prerequisites can be identified in the studied cases, we can say that Rival Explanation 1 can explain appropriately the phenomenon why European states have established new sub-regional MDCs instead of using EU and NATO co-operative structures.

*Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis*

According to Rival Explanation 2 the independent variable is the significant defence budget cuts executed as a consequence of the financial crisis, and this contributed to the emergence of sub-regional MDCs. There is a similar problem as at the Rival Explanation 1 in the sense that the independent variable of ‘defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’, cannot lead directly to the creation of sub-regional MDCs, it needs an intervening variable. Nations have to clearly believe that they need to act quickly to retain national military capabilities and as such national military options in times of budgetary reductions for the European armed forces to think about establishing new multinational defence co-operations. Thus, the intervening variable of the ‘need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’ is needed to explain properly the relationship of the independent variable of ‘defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’ and the dependent variable (see Figure 4).

![Figure 4 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 2](image-url)
The prerequisites for the variables of the pattern of this rival explanation are the followings:

1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC.
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC.
3. The creation of the studied sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the participating countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

*Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions*

As it was mentioned earlier, another explanation for the creation of new sub-regional MDCs is that countries in different sub-regions in Europe have increasingly sub-region specific threat perceptions, and they answer to these threats by establishing new sub-regional military co-operations instead of using NATO/EU structures for military co-operation. In the ‘Key concepts’ section I introduced briefly the approach I apply to study the supposedly convergent threat perceptions of European states. I mentioned that – based on Walt’s concept which I partly changed for my research – I use ‘perception of the same threat’ as independent variable and ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ as its dependent variable. However, in the predicted pattern, which assumes that convergent threat perceptions is the main cause of the creation of sub-regional MDCs, ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ will serve as an independent variable which links the independent variable of ‘perception of the same threat’ and the dependent variable of ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ (See Figure 5).

![Figure 5 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 3](image)

In this pattern if a group of countries perceive the same threat as the biggest threat, they will ally against it by creating sub-regional MDCs. It means that if I could verify that the participating states of the studied sub-regional MDCs share the same threat
perception which is differing from the threat perceptions of the other studied sub-regional MDCs, we can assume that they may be the basis of the creation of the researched sub-regional MDC. In the same time, if I could verify this phenomenon, I also need to investigate whether these shared threats initiated discussions and negotiations among the participating nations of the studied sub-regional MDCs. In addition, a crucial issue may be whether the shared threat perceptions were related to the established sub-regional MDCs or they just accidently matched. Furthermore, if two or more sub-regional MDCs share the same threat perception, we can assume that the main cause behind these military collaborations is not this rival explanation, because the participating nations of the MDCs sharing the same threat perception should co-operate within one single MDC and not separately in different MDCs.

Similarly to the previous explanation many assumptions can be inferred concerning this rival explanation as well, and they can serve as prerequisites for verifying the variables of this pattern:

1. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat.

2. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of the sub-regional MDC.

3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and creation of sub-regional MDC have to be detected.
CHAPTER 4.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN
DEFENCE CO-OPERATION (CEDC)

In 2011, the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) body was established by six Central European countries to facilitate collaboration focusing on military capability development. The participating countries of this co-operative body have been Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. The question this chapter attempts to answer is why these countries created this particular defence collaboration, while opting not to use numerous other opportunities to cooperate in EU and/or NATO frameworks.

Some would argue that CEDC was created because not all of the participating countries shared the membership of either the EU or NATO, thus these organizations did not provide appropriate forum for them to co-operate on defence. In 2011, when CEDC was founded the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia were members of both NATO and EU, Austria was an EU member and had no intention of joining NATO to maintain its neutral status, and Croatia was a NATO member only. However, both NATO and EU are flexible and open to friendly non-member states regarding their participation in their defence co-operation initiatives. For instance, Norway – like Croatia in 2011 – is a NATO member only, but Oslo is active in EU defence collaboration as well. Among others Norway signed a co-operative arrangement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2006, thus Norway is allowed to participate in EDA projects and programmes, but it does not have voting rights. Furthermore, Norway contributes forces to the Nordic Battlegroup, which is part of the EU Battlegroup initiative. Thus, the situation that Croatia was not member of the EU at the time of the initiation of CEDC does not explain properly why the six Central European countries mentioned above opted for creating a new forum to facilitate defence cooperation rather than using existing EU frameworks to

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204 Bence Németh, How to Bridge the “three Islands”: The Future of European Military Co-operation, Strategic Snapshots vol. 4, (Group on Grand Strategy, 2012).
206 See more information about the EU Battlegroup concept in the Literature Review chapter.
encourage capability development. In addition, if we take into consideration that Croatia finished its accession negotiations with the EU in 2011,\textsuperscript{207} and joined to the EU in 2013, we can ask the question why these countries just did not begin to use some form of EU framework to co-operate, when they knew that Croatia would join to the EU soon.

The CEDC countries could have worked together under the umbrella of NATO too, despite the fact that Austria is not a member of the Alliance. The reason is that similarly to other neutral European countries Austria has very close relationship with NATO. Austria is a member of the Partnership for Peace programme and contributes to NATO operations, attends in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and maintains a diplomatic mission to NATO in Brussels as well.\textsuperscript{208} Furthermore, NATO allows friendly non-aligned states to participate in its certain capability development projects. For instance, Finland and Sweden are members of the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) project, where they co-operate together with 10 NATO members ‘to acquire, manage, support and operate three Boeing C-17 strategic transport aircrafts’ under the auspices of NATO Support and Procurement Agency.\textsuperscript{209}

Accordingly, the CEDC countries could have co-operated either in the EU or NATO, if they had wanted, because both organizations provided opportunities for that. However, they rather decided to create a new defence co-operative framework outside the EU and NATO, which went against the trends of the 2000s when NATO and EU defence co-operations trumped regional ones.\textsuperscript{210} This chapter attempts to answer the question why this happened. The chapter first introduces CEDC and its implications. Thereafter it shortly introduces previous Central European defence collaborations to provide context for the research. The vast majority of the chapter is focusing on figuring out why these six Central European countries created CEDC instead of using EU or NATO by applying the research method introduced in the Research Framework chapter. Accordingly, I compare the three operationalized, predicted rival patterns with the empirically based pattern by checking whether the

\textsuperscript{210} See Literature Review chapter.
assumptions developed to each rival explanation in the research framework chapter came true before and during the creation of CEDC. This way, I intend to identify the most applicable answer to the research question.

CREATION OF CEDC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The origins of CEDC\textsuperscript{211} go back to an Austrian-Hungarian bilateral defence policy directors’ meeting in November 2009, when the two directors discussed the opportunities of organizing regional seminars on defence co-operation.\textsuperscript{212} The first such seminar was held in Vienna in May 2010, where experts of Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia exchanged their views concerning co-operating on different defence issues.\textsuperscript{213} The next seminar was organized in Budapest in October 2010, where the experts of the same countries showed up and focused solely on the concept of Pooling and Sharing of capabilities.\textsuperscript{214} At the end of this seminar Péter Siklósi, the Hungarian defence policy director (DPD) proposed that the DPDs of the countries participated in these two seminars should meet on the margin of the informal EU DPD meeting in January 2011 to discuss the possibilities of practical defence co-operation.\textsuperscript{215} On this meeting the DPDs of the above-mentioned six Central European countries agreed to investigate the areas of possible defence collaborations among their countries, and decided to concentrate on practical co-operative initiatives, which might deliver added value for defence capabilities.\textsuperscript{216} They wanted to make this co-operation as flexible as possible, where the participating countries ‘could choose à la carte among defence co-operation initiatives without formal obligations.’\textsuperscript{217} It meant that CEDC was intended to become a forum for

\textsuperscript{211} The name of the co-operation changed several times. Originally, it was called Central European Roundtable on Defence Co-operation, later it was named Central European Defence Initiative. The Defence Policy Directors (DPDs) of the co-operation finally decided on the EU DPD meeting in Vilnius on July 3-4, 2013, that the name of the co-operation would become Central European Defence Co-operation (CEDC).


\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid. 19.

\textsuperscript{216} Csiki and Németh, \textit{On the Multinational Development of Military Capabilities}, 1.

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
raising ‘potential areas of practical co-operation and each and every country was free to join and contribute to it.’

The first step for this was a creation of an extended survey, a matrix, which was filled by all of the six participating Central European MoDs to figure out the possible areas of co-operation, and find overlapping interests. These areas were discussed on DPD level, and where the MoDs identified promising topics for co-operation one country took the responsibility of the lead nation to draft a food for thought paper concerning the issue and organize expert level seminars for those CEDC countries that were interested in. If the expert level negotiations became fruitful, the practical co-operation could begin usually in a bi- or trilateral format. Some of the projects have been the followings:

- The joint training of Czech, Croatian and Hungarian Air Mentor Teams for NATO’s ISAF mission in the framework of the Advisor Team Pre-Deployment Training (AAT-PDT) started as a consequence of CEDC negotiations. Originally it was a Czech-Croatian bilateral initiative, and thanks to the negotiations in CEDC Hungary joined to this project making it more viable. The AAT-PDT course programme is funded by the Multinational Helicopter Initiative and takes place both in Ostrava, Czech Republic and Zadar, Croatia, as the Czech Republic provides the training on simulators while the real life training is organized in Croatia.

- Early on Austria and Croatia produced a ‘food for thought’ (FFT) paper on co-operation of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Their intention was to facilitate SOF related co-operation among CEDC countries utilizing their already existed bilateral training programmes as a platform for further collaboration. Austria and Croatia probably hoped that other countries

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218 Ibid. 2.
221 Established by the UK and France.
would join to their SOF training programmes, but their initiative had a lesser impact and remained as a forum for sharing experiences in conferences and seminars.\textsuperscript{226}

- Hungary developed an FFT paper ‘on Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) co-operation and in this framework “Train the Trainers” and “Weapons Intelligence Team” (WIT) activities have been successful in sharing lessons learned.’\textsuperscript{227}

- On the basis of the multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence battalion located in the Czech Republic, CBRN collaboration was re-energized among certain CEDC countries thanks to CEDC negotiations.\textsuperscript{228}

- In 2010 the Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre (MLCC) in the Czech Republic was created. Three of the five founding members (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) of MLCC became later CEDC countries,\textsuperscript{229} and the negotiations about logistical co-operation in CEDC format made possible that Austria and Croatia later joined to the MLCC. The project became one of the Smart Defence projects of NATO.\textsuperscript{230}

- Although CEDC nations have discussed co-operation on disaster relief operations for years,\textsuperscript{231} a Letter of Intent on the ‘Central European Military-Civil-Defence Assets Initiative (Use of military assets in disaster relief and options for enhancing cross-border cooperation)’ was prepared and signed by Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia only in 2016.\textsuperscript{232} The aim of this co-operation is supporting ‘cross-border regional disaster relief, by the use of military assets’ in the event of natural or manmade disasters.\textsuperscript{233}


\textsuperscript{227} Csiki and Németh, “Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Co-operation,” 18.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{230} Csiki and Németh, “Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Co-operation,” 18.

\textsuperscript{231} “Letter of V4 and CEDC Defense Ministers to EU’s HR/VP Catherine Ashton,” Csaba Hende to Cathrine Ashton, April 9, 2014, Budapest, Hungary.


\textsuperscript{233} Letter of Intent between the Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, the Ministry of Defence of Hungary, the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia regarding the Use of Military
As the participating states of CEDC wanted to stay as flexible and practical as possible the DPDs did not intend to create costly bureaucracies to support the emerging projects, thus decided to maintain the lead nation and round table formats. While lead nations are facilitating the practical collaborations, the DPD level negotiations are organized in round table format mostly on the margins of EU, NATO and Visegrad Four meetings. Later the presidency system was also introduced, which meant that every year one of the CEDC countries took the leadership of the cooperation and organize the ministerial level meeting. The first CEDC defence ministerial meeting was organized by Austria in Frauenkirchen in 2012, and since then the defence ministers of the participating countries meet annually.

Although, the original aim of the creation of CEDC was to improve the cooperation on capability development, the coordination of defence policy standpoints became a very important part of the initiative as well. The DPDs of CEDC countries often meet on the margin of EU and NATO DPD meetings to discuss and co-ordinate their standpoints before the plenary sessions. Another example for policy co-ordination is that due to the CEDC meetings Hungary and Austria intensified their co-operation in the EUFOR’s Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a consequence of Hungary taking over the air policing tasks of Slovenia’s airspace in 2014, the question of the establishment of a Central European regional air policing system was also raised in CEDC.

The latest example of defence policy co-ordination happened concerning the European migration crisis. Many CEDC countries have been directly affected by the waves of migrants arriving to Europe, and their defence ministers discussed this issue and signed a Joint Declaration in April 2016. They agreed that the CEDC ‘countries will support all initiatives aimed at reducing the migration pressure on Europe,’ and

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*Assets in Disaster Relief and Options for Enhancing Cross Border Cooperation in the Framework of Central European Defence Cooperation, 2016, International Agreement.* The text can be find here: https://www.google.hu/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjW0Y6246POAhXqHJoKHzqGChmQFghNMA&url=http%3A%2F%2FANDAT%2FVLADNAGRADIVA.NSF%2F18a6b9887c33a0bde12570c50034eb54%2F9540e03676e7c615c125718100272785%2F%2FFILE%2FlntPismoVojSred.doc&usg=AFQjCNCG0lJzHRqRDge_dyEUvWmFWxerY4A&bvm=bv.128617741,d.bGs

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234 Csiki and Németh, “Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Co-operation,” 2.
235 Ibid. 1.
236 See: Csiki and Molnár, *Seminar on Central European Solutions.*
237 Csiki and Németh, “Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Co-operation,” 2.
238 Ibid.
240 Kurowska and Németh, *The Central European Playground,* 4-5.
'are committed to enhancing coordination in taking action to solve the crisis.'

Since then Austrian policemen and troops arrived to the borders of Hungary to assist to handle the situation. The Czech and Slovakian police and militaries have sent their personnel to Hungary earlier as well, and renewed their contributions after the CEDC meeting.

CEDC is a flexible and practical organization not only in terms of capability development issues and policy co-ordination, but also in terms of co-operating with countries outside the CEDC framework. For instance, Poland has an observer status in CEDC. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia collaborate with Poland on defence issues in another sub-regional framework called the Visegrad Four (V4) co-operation. Thanks to Poland’s observer status in CEDC, Warsaw is aware of the defence collaborative efforts of its V4 partners in CEDC, which helps to avoid creating duplications in the two sub-regional co-operative groups. Another example for this flexibility and practicality is that CEDC states invited the Balkan countries (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) affected by the migration crisis to the CEDC defence ministerial meeting in April 2016. It was a logical step, as migrants can reach CEDC countries only through these Balkan countries, thus co-operating with them is essential.

We can see that CEDC provides an open forum for incubating ideas and starting capability development projects in bi- and trilateral formats, thus it has an important clearinghouse role for defence co-operative initiatives in the region. Accordingly, CEDC is a useful framework for facilitating smaller multinational capability development projects among Central European countries. In addition,

CEDC allows its participating states to co-ordinate their defence policy standpoints on certain areas in NATO and EU and support each other on region specific issues (disasters, migration crisis). However, CEDC has its own weaknesses as well. Among others is that the visibility of this co-operation is low. Probably, the reason behind it is that it is a new form of defence co-operation, and it does not have a flagship project and the co-operation remains at the levels of MoDs. Another problem is that although the co-operation is flexible and practical, sometimes it means that it does not have a well-defined direction, thus it remains ad hoc in many aspects.

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION OF CEDC COUNTRIES BEFORE THE CREATION OF CEDC

The CEDC countries have never co-operated in this constellation on defence earlier. The closest thing to CEDC was the Austro-Hungarian Empire one hundred years ago, when the territories of the current CEDC countries were part of the Habsburg led Austro-Hungarian Empire and their population was recruited to the Austrian-Hungarian armed forces. However, at that time the CEDC states did not exist in their current format, thus this comparison is not really adequate either. After World War I the Paris Peace Conference divided Austria-Hungary into pieces, accordingly several new countries emerged on the map of Europe: Czechoslovakia was established from the northern part of the empire, the territories of current Slovenia and Croatia were attached to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the south (the Yugoslav Kingdom also included current Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), while Austria and Kingdom of Hungary – the two ruling pillars of the empire – became also separate and independent states, though their territories became significantly smaller. Some other parts of Austria-Hungary were also given to Romania and Italy.

Taking into consideration that several countries were winners and others were losers of the peace treaties of World War I, it is not surprising that not all of the countries of the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire co-operated with each other on defence over the next decades. In the interwar period Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia established a military coalition called ‘little entente’ against Hungary and Austria to prevent the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy in any form and intended to prevent any Hungarian attempt at irredentism vis-à-vis newly established borders.
Although Austria and Hungary did not join their forces for revenge, Hungary sided with the Axis Powers for gaining back some of its former territories. Immediately before and during World War II Austria became part of the Third Reich via the Anschluss, the Western part of Czechoslovakia (the current Czech Republic) was occupied by Nazi Germany, and although Slovakia earned its independence its Southern territories were taken by Hungary.

After World War II the borders established by the peace treaties of World War I were restored, but as a consequence of the new geopolitical situation of the Cold War defence co-operation between the countries of the region was not possible. Czechoslovakia and Hungary became the part of the Soviet sphere of influence, thus they had no choice but to join to the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Although, Yugoslavia was a Communist country like the Soviet Union, the relationship between Moscow and Belgrade broke after World War II, and Yugoslavia declared itself a non-aligned country. Thus, Yugoslavia also developed its own distinct doctrines and weapon systems and prepared to defend itself from NATO, as well as the Warsaw Pact. Austria became a neutral country in 1955, which made sure that it did not have to join either to NATO or to the Warsaw Pact. However, the Soviet military operational plans intended to attack NATO through Austria as well. Accordingly, there was no opportunity for countries of the region to co-operate on defence issues during the Cold War, because they mostly prepared for war against each other. Despite the fact that Hungary and Czechoslovakia belonged to the same military bloc and thus used the same weapons and doctrines, their defence co-operation was limited too. The reason behind this phenomenon was that the Warsaw Pact countries were ‘strategically subordinated to the Soviet High Command’, thus there was not much space for regional or bilateral initiatives.

After the end of the Cold War the situation changed fundamentally in Central Europe. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed. Slovenia and Croatia

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249 In the region Hungary also occupied or got territories via treaties from Romania and Yugoslavia during WWII.
fought for their independence in the Yugoslav Wars and became sovereign states in 1991. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist in 1993, when the Czech Republic and Slovakia divorced peacefully. All the CEDC countries have become member of the EU, and with the exception of Austria, all of them have joined to NATO for the last two decades. Thus a new political environment allowed these countries to begin to cooperate on defence issues with each other in different formats.

One of the most well-known Central European collaboration is the so-called Visegrad Four (V4) co-operation, which was established by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1991. After the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia both the Czech Republic and Slovakia remained member of this co-operative initiative. Although defence issues were raised early on in the framework of the Visegrad Co-operation, originally the V4 did not focus on military aspects of co-operation. The main aim of the four Central European post-communist countries was to help each other to build democracy, establish the rule of law and ensure state sovereignty in the region. In addition, they represented themselves as a bloc during accession negotiations with NATO and the EU, thus representing their interest much more effectively than they would have been able to do that individually. The V4 co-operation was very successful in the 1990s, but when the participating countries joined both the EU and NATO the need for collaboration slowed in many aspects in the 2000s. Still the four countries have been meeting regularly at heads of state, prime ministerial, and expert levels to discuss and co-operate on many policy areas (foreign policy, culture, environment, economy, defence etc.).

Defence co-operation has not been a very visible and relevant part of V4 co-operation until recently. Promising initiatives have always emerged, but they never developed. A typical example for this is the agreement, which was signed by the V4 defence ministers in 2002 to modernize Mi-24 attack helicopters together in a common V4 project, but because of the competing economic interests of the participating states the project was cancelled. Although defence collaboration on V4 level had not been fruitful in the 1990s and 2000s the defence ministers, the Chiefs of

252 Austria in 1995; Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004; Croatia in 2013
253 Hungary and Czech Republic in 1999; Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004; Croatia in 2009
Defence (ChoDs) and different groups of subject matter experts met regularly. The turning point was in 2011, when the V4 countries agreed to provide a V4 EU Battlegroup in the first six months of 2016. The Visegrad Battlegroup consists of approximately 2500 troops from the four countries (950 troops from Poland, 750 troops from the Czech Republic, 510 troops from Hungary and 450 troops from Slovakia), and the preparations, the trainings and exercises organized concerning the development of the battlegroup re-energized not only the V4 defence co-operation but the whole V4 project as well. The Visegrad countries already decided to make sure that the V4 Battlegroup will be on stand-by in the second half of 2019 too.

Another example for Central European sub-regional defence co-operation was the Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP). CENCOOP was initiated by Austria in 1996 in order to foster common participation of Central European countries in peace support operations. The project started in 1998 with Austria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, while Switzerland and Croatia joined to the initiative in 1999 and in 2001 respectively. The Austrian assumption behind the initiation of CENCOOP was that in the post-Cold War era more and more peacekeeping troops were needed, which seemed to be logical if we take into consideration that after the Yugoslav wars many international peace support operations were launched in the Balkans in the 1990s. Austria’s peacekeepers earned a solid reputation thanks to its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, thus for Vienna it was self-evident that it should help and lead the Central European nations in this regard. However, to the second half of the 1990s most of the post-communist Central European countries focused more on joining to the NATO and participating in NATO initiatives like the Partnership for Peace programme, than on sub-regional initiatives. Accordingly, the interests of the neutral (Austria and Switzerland) and the NATO membership aspirant (Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia) participants of CENCOOP began to diverge. This became more serious after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when many Central European post-Communist countries sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan to

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257 Csiki and Németh, “Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Co-operation,” 16.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
support the US war against terror. Austria and Switzerland were less eager to participate in these missions and did not have the experience and expertise to provide support and leadership to other countries concerning counterinsurgency operations and on the area of more intensive war fighting. Accordingly, CENCOOP basically died out for the second half of the 2000s.262

Another regional defence co-operation in Central Europe is the Multinational Engineer Battalion Tisa established by Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine in 1999 for disaster relief operations.263 The four participating countries often experience severe floods of the river Tisa, and they created this multinational battalion to help each other during floods. The battalion has a multinational command element and approximately 700 troops.264 Every participating country provides one company for that, but the troops are not located in one garrison, but rather are on stand-by status in their respective countries. Although multinational staff exercises are held regularly,265 the battalion has not deployed yet, despite the common floods of the Tisa river.

The Multinational Land Forces (MLF) is an Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian trilateral brigade-level unit. Italy provides a regiment and most of the combat support and combat service support elements, while Hungary and Slovenia contributes to the unit with one battalion each. Although these units are based on the territory of their countries, they regularly train together. The elements of MLF were deployed to multinational operations several times in Kosovo and Afghanistan, in addition on the basis of MLF the three participating countries provided a 1500 troops strong battlegroup to the EU Battlegroup rotation in 2007 and 2012.266

Besides of the above mentioned multilateral sub-regional defence collaborations a plethora of smaller bilateral co-operation endeavours exist between the CEDC countries mostly on the area of education, training and sharing experiences concerning operations. One of the most notable bilateral defence co-operation in the region is between the Czech and Slovakian armed forces. It is not surprising, if we take into consideration that the military personnel of the two countries served in the Czechoslovakian military until the early 1990s, thus both the cultural and institutional ties between the two armed forces could remain strong. In addition, the language

262 Ibid.
264 Ibid. 997.
265 Ibid. 993-1006.
266 Németh, “Magyarország Szerepe a Regionális Biztonsági-védelmi Együttműködésekbén,”, 103-104.
barrier between the two militaries as relatively small, as the Slovak and Czech languages are similar to each other. Although, in the 1990s the two armed forces looked mostly inward to organize themselves as individual armed forces, in the late 1990s and early 2000s Czech-Slovak bilateral defence co-operation started to work very well. For instance, the two countries deployed together a battalion to Kosovo in 2002 and a CBRN battalion in Iraq, they also organized large-scale bilateral military exercises, and provided an EU Battlegroup that was on stand-by in 2009. Another relevant bilateral co-operation exists between Hungary and Slovenia most notably, Hungarian fighter jets have been providing the air-policing tasks over Slovenia since 2014 for an indefinite period. Slovenia is a small country with a population of 2 million, and does not have fighter jets, thus under NATO agreements always a neighbouring NATO country are taking the air-policing tasks over Slovenia.

We could see that before CEDC the participating states had not co-operated on defence in this format. Although, the territories of the CEDC countries were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire one hundred years ago, we cannot trace back the origins of CEDC to this previous historical period, because the political situation of that time was so radically different. Sub-regional or even bilateral defence co-operation between CEDC countries or between their predecessors was very rare until the end of the Cold War, as the geopolitical situations of the interwar period, World War II and Cold War did not permit it. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia created new opportunities and CEDC countries have begun to co-operate with each other in different regional frameworks (V4, CENCOOP, Tisa Batallion, MLF) and also bilaterally since the 1990s. At the same time, the six CEDC countries have never collaborated on defence in the current framework, despite the fact that the defence collaborations between the six

268 Ibid., 254.
270 Ibid.
273 Before Hungary took over the air-policing tasks over Slovenia, Italy had been responsible for it for 10 years.
participating states have been dense not only in the sub-regional and bilateral levels, but also in the EU and NATO too.

**CREATING CEDC INSTEAD OF CO-OPERATING IN NATO AND EU**

The next parts of this chapter attempts to answer the question why these six Central European countries created CEDC, a new framework for defence co-operation, which did not have any historical precedent, and why they did not use rather EU or NATO for their defence co-operative efforts. This is a very important question especially regarding the former post-Communist countries, as their main aim after the fall of the Berlin wall was to join these two organizations. Joining the EU and NATO was not only a technical or legal issue, but it had a symbolic relevance for them. In the early 1990’s the former Communist countries believed that they had the chance to leave the ‘East’ and the Soviet influence and could move back to ‘Europe’ or the ‘West’, where they believed that they historically belonged.\(^{274}\) They wanted to reconnect with Europe to reclaim ‘a heritage that, in political terms, entailed the creation of liberal democracy, and, in economic terms, the establishment of a market economy’.\(^{275}\) Thus, not surprisingly the priorities of Central and Eastern European countries became the accession to NATO and EU,\(^{276}\) the two organizations that represented ‘Europe’ for them and hoped that these organizations would help them to become prosperous, safe, democratic and ‘European’ countries.

The aspiration of post-Communist CEDC countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) regarding joining the EU and NATO was successful, as currently all of them are member states of both organizations. Thus, it is intriguing why they created a new sub-regional Multinational Defence Co-operation (MDC) instead of working in the organizations (NATO and EU), of which they wanted to be part, and they worked hard for years to fulfil their accession criteria. In the end, this meant so much for them concerning their national security, economic development and even in terms of identity.

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Why the CEDC countries opted for co-operating in an MDC?

As I delineated in the Research Framework chapter I attempt to answer my research questions by using multiple case design, and in regard to every case I test three rival explanations introduced earlier. Thus, I try to identify the prerequisites of the operationalized generic predicted patterns of the three rival explanations regarding CEDC. If I can identify the prerequisites of one of the rival explanations regarding this case, we can say that a rival can explain why the CEDC countries established the CEDC instead of co-operating in NATO or EU. The three rival explanations are 1) the lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states.

Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation

According to ‘Rival Explanation 1’, (see Figure 6) defence co-operation in NATO and EU did not progress well (independent variable), and CEDC countries became dissatisfied with this situation in NATO and EU (intervening variable), this led to the creation of an alternative body, which is CEDC (dependent variable). For this rival explanation I established three generic assumptions, which serve as prerequisites for verifying ‘Rival Explanation 1’. The prerequisites are the following:

1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be identified.
2. The dissatisfaction of CEDC countries concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected.
3. The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of CEDC countries with NATO/EU.

If all of these prerequisites can be confirmed, we can assess that ‘Rival Explanation 1’ has explanatory power concerning the case of CEDC. Based on this framework I attempt to identify these prerequisites one by one.
Prerequisite 1:
The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be identified.

This is the only prerequisite among the prerequisites of the three rival explanations, which is not directly associated with the participating states of the studied MDCs. In addition, the lack of progress concerning relevant EU and NATO defence cooperation – especially in the area of military capability development – was introduced and demonstrated in the Literature Review chapter. Thus, in this section I am not going to repeat the events and processes in this regard, but based on the Literature Review chapter I will take Prerequisite 1 of Rival Explanation 1 as a given regarding every case.

Accordingly, Prerequisite 1 based on the Literature Review is confirmed.

Prerequisite 2:
The dissatisfaction of CEDC countries concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected.

As I mentioned earlier the post-communist CEDC countries wanted to be members of the EU and NATO not only because of legal issues or economic gains but because of symbolic reasons too. When they successfully joined these organizations, they were inexperienced and first attempted to find their places and figure out the dynamics in these organizations. Accordingly, they were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress of defence co-operations in EU and NATO, rather they were criticized by others, because they often lagged behind concerning military modernization and did not keep their defence budgets at an appropriate level.

The CEDC countries, which joined NATO after the Cold War, have been criticized regularly both openly and behind close doors by NATO officials and representatives of older NATO member states. For example, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO in 1999 (along with Poland) and faced harsh criticism from NATO officials in the early 2000s. Ferenc Juhasz the Hungarian defence minister that time received several critical remarks because of the severe defence budget cuts in Hungary and the lack of progress regarding the transformation of the Hungarian
Defence Force. In 2002, he acknowledged ‘after meeting with NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson that Hungary has failed to meet its NATO commitments over the past four years to such an extent that the alliance has unofficially told him that Hungary would already have been expelled if an expulsion were possible.’ General Joseph Ralston, the Alliance’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe that time told Juhasz that ‘Hungary had not met any of the commitments it had freely undertaken earlier’. At the same time, Western NATO members were concerned about the corruption and lack of transparency concerning defence contracts in the Czech Republic. In this regard one of the major issues was the Czech aircraft tender. Namely, the Czech armed forces intended to buy more than twenty new aircrafts, which according to the NATO Secretary General was ‘unnecessary from the NATO point of view’, and these costs could have been spent on the procurement of more demanding capabilities. Similarly to Hungary the Czech Republic was also criticized for implementing defence reforms too slowly and narrowly.

Western NATO states were disappointed with the contribution of new NATO members to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in early 2000s too. One of the senior defence diplomats of a Western NATO member argued that many NATO countries believed that Hungary ‘could have done more in Afghanistan’. Similarly to Hungary, the Czech Republic was also reluctant to provide military assistance to the ISAF mission in the first years of the operations in Afghanistan. In 2007, Liam Fox the British shadow defence secretary that time criticized several NATO countries including Hungary, because according to him these NATO members did not provide enough support for their allies in Afghanistan. Referring to the new Eastern European member states he argued that ‘they have come into NATO, pocketed the security guarantee and have cut defence spending,’ and he stressed that NATO should ‘be able

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282 Ibid.
283 Bartkowski, “Impact of NATO on Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,” 3.
284 Ibid.
to suspend NATO members who do not spend the levels of funding that we agreed.\textsuperscript{285}

In 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen criticized both the Czech Republic and Slovakia for reducing their defence budgets, thus moving farther from reaching the goal of spending 2\% of their GDP on defence, on which all NATO members agreed on. In this regard, Rasmussen sent a letter to the Czech prime minister ‘warning that his government might not be able to fulfil its commitments to the alliance should these cuts continue in the coming years.’\textsuperscript{286} In addition, according to the Czech media, a draft NATO report was leaked which concluded that the ‘Czech Republic would not be useful for NATO if a real war broke out unless it adds money to the armed forces’\textsuperscript{287} Rasmussen met the prime minister, the president, the ministers for defence, foreign affairs and interior of Slovakia in May 2011, when he expressed his dissatisfaction regarding Slovakia ‘for providing too few financial resources for its military.’\textsuperscript{288}

We can see that the above-mentioned three CEDC NATO members (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) were not dissatisfied with NATO rather NATO officials and NATO members were dissatisfied with them. Thus, it is not surprising that there is no evidence that they would have expressed any dissatisfaction concerning NATO on defence co-operation. There is no record about open NATO criticism towards Slovenia or Croatia, and there is no sign of Croatian or Slovenian dissatisfaction from their governments towards the Alliance either. Croatia joined to NATO in 2009, thus between the date of Croatian admission to NATO and the creation of CEDC only two years passed, which time may be too short to determine whether there were serious clashes between Croatia and NATO. Slovenia’s case is also a special one. Before Slovenia’s 2004 admission to NATO Slovenia’s critics had ‘legitimate issues to raise especially concerning its limited force projection capabilities’.\textsuperscript{289} However, the possibilities the relatively small sized Slovenia was


\textsuperscript{289} Ryan C. Hendrickson, “Expanding NATO: The Case for,” Parameters 32, no. 4, 74.
clear for NATO members, thus their expectations about Slovenia’s future contributions had to be remained realistic.290

If we look at the defence budgets of the CEDC NATO members, we can see that they have been consistent underperformers in providing sufficient financial resources to their defence capabilities, as none of them have ever reached the above-mentioned 2% of GDP threshold on defence spending.291 Not surprisingly the question whether these new NATO members are free riders in the Alliance has been raised from time to time.292 Wade Jacoby argued that new NATO members attempted to compensate their slow military transformation and low defence budgets by ‘policy loyalty’ in the 2000s.293 He pointed out that, when older NATO members realized that they can expect only limited military contributions from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) NATO members, they rather asked for policy loyalty, diplomatic support, niche capabilities and troop contributions to NATO missions instead of significant defence capabilities.294 Thus, NATO’s recognition of the factors blocking real defence reform led it to refashion its key demands to stress the policy loyalty of CEE states’.295 Accordingly, CEDC NATO members were not dissatisfied with NATO, as they benefited from the situation. Namely they could avoid costly structural defence reforms by providing ‘policy loyalty’, and still could benefit from NATO’s security guarantees.

We can see that the main debates that affected CEDC NATO members concerning security and defence were linked to NATO and not to the EU. It is not surprising, if we take into consideration that NATO is a much more mature organization regarding defence, as its primary functions has always been being a

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290 Ibid.
295 Ibid.
military alliance, while the EU based defence co-operation is younger and not as deep as NATO's (see Literature Review chapter). In addition, the United States, militarily the most powerful country on Earth and the leading member of NATO, pushes the Alliance towards much more elaborated and challenging military demands. Accordingly, CEDC NATO members have prioritized defence co-operation in NATO over EU mostly using the argument that the two organizations were complementing each other, as NATO possesses better tools on the military domain while the EU has more suitable tools concerning the civilian tasks of crisis management operations. This means that CEDC NATO members were even less concerned about the lack of progress in EU defence initiatives, because they focused on NATO. Austria’s situation has been different, because it has been an EU member since 1995, but has never joined to NATO. As I pointed out earlier, Austria built a very close relationship with NATO, Vienna has even been contributing to NATO operations on the Balkans, and at some point in the 1990s it seemed that the political will might exist in Austria to join the Alliance.296 In addition, the public would have supported Austrian NATO accession as well, but especially the controversies of NATO’s Kosovo intervention in 1999 and Operation Iraqi Freedom (which was not a NATO operation) in 2002 made Austrians more cautious about NATO membership and strengthened the status of permanent neutrality – taken by Austria in 1955 – as an important element of Austrian identity.297 However, the EU’s initiative for creating a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) questioned the sustainability of Austria’s permanent neutrality status. Furthermore, Vienna was aware of the changing international security dynamics, and intended to be a constructive and solid member of the EU concerning security and defence issues as well.298 Accordingly, it changed the slogan of neutrality to solidarity,299 and decided to reduce the concept of neutrality.

299 Ibid. 15.
to its core, which meant that they would not join a military alliance and would not permit the stationing of foreign military troops on Austrian territory.\footnote{Martin Krüger, “Austria,” in \textit{Neutrality and Non-alignment in Europe Today}, ed. Hanna Ojanen, FIIA Report (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003). 10.}

However, despite the fact that Austria supported ESDP, there is no sign that the Austrian government would have been dissatisfied with the lack of more serious EU defence co-operations. This might be partly explained first by the ambivalent Austrian standpoint with abandoning or reducing its neutrality further. Namely, deeper EU defence co-operation could have created situations when new debates might have emerged on Austria’s stance on neutrality. Secondly, already in the Cold War the Austrian political elite never believed that the Austrian Armed Forces (AAF) would fight,\footnote{Schmiedl, “Austrian Security Policy,” 108-109.} and accordingly the AAF’s war fighting capabilities were limited. Austrian troops have rather focused on participating in international peace operations since the 1960s,\footnote{Ibid. 115-118.} thus for Vienna the EU’s less developed defence co-operation and lesser focus on actual warfighting fit to its identity and its operational military experience. Based on the above-mentioned ambivalent Austrian standpoint on its neutrality and its limited war fighting capabilities, probably Austrians were less interested in a quickly progressing EU defence collaboration. Thus, these two factors might be likely the reasons, why Vienna was not dissatisfied concerning the lack of progress in ESDP.

We can conclude that none of the CEDC countries were dissatisfied with the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts at the EU and NATO. They were not critical towards these organizations, rather some of them were criticized. We could see that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have received open criticism several times from NATO members and NATO officials because of their lack of progress on military reforms, small contributions to NATO’s ISAF mission and their defence budget cuts. Because of different reasons Croatia and Slovenia have not been criticized by the Alliance and allies, and they were not critical to NATO either. However, all these countries have struggled to catch up with their NATO commitments, especially on military reform and defence budgets, thus they were not in the position for being dissatisfied or critical concerning NATO’s defence co-operations. Although the aforementioned five countries have been both EU and NATO members, for them NATO have been the more important organization.
concerning defence collaborations. Not surprisingly they were less focused on EU in this regard, and accordingly have cared less whether ESDP progressed appropriately or not. Thus, ESDP’s slow progress was not a concern for them. Austria has been an EU member only, and Vienna was not dissatisfied with ESDP either, as a less deep co-operation and less focus on war fighting capabilities fit to Austria’s identity and the capabilities of its armed forces.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed.

Prerequisite 3:

*The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of CEDC countries with NATO/EU.*

This section looks at whether the creation of the CEDC is linked to CEDC countries’ dissatisfaction with NATO/EU. Taking into consideration the findings regarding Prerequisite 2, we can conclude that dissatisfaction with EU/NATO was not a factor in creating CEDC. The situation seems to be quite the opposite, because many CEDC countries perceived CEDC as a platform, which might help to fulfil their EU and NATO obligations.

Among others Austria regarded CEDC as the Central European realization of EU’s Ghent process about Pooling and Sharing of defence capabilities, and a framework where Vienna could work together with its NATO member neighbouring states after CENCOOP died out. Croatian also saw CEDC in the context of the aforementioned EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative, but Zagreb deemed CEDC as a possible tool for contributing to NATO’s Smart Defence initiative and an opportunity to co-operate with Visegrad countries as well. One of the original ideas the Hungarians intended to realize via CEDC was the creation of a Central European regional air-policing system. The Hungarian MoD had realized that many countries in the region struggled with the procurement (Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia) and maintaining (Hungary) of modern fighter jet fleets, and thus believed that co-

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304 Austria, *Weissbuch* 12, 34.
operation on this area would be economical and logical.\textsuperscript{308} The Hungarian MoD did not intend to create an independent Central European capability, but it wanted to incorporate it into the NATO Integrated Air Defense System. The scheme could have been similar to the agreement between Slovenia and Hungary, which provides the legal basis for Hungarian aircrafts to execute air-policing tasks over Slovenian territory.\textsuperscript{309} However, the idea of regional air policing seemed to be a too big step for CEDC countries, thus it was side-lined at a very early stage of the creation of CEDC.

Although the Czechs, Slovaks and Slovenes did not oppose CEDC, they were not as enthusiastic about it as the other three CEDC states (Austria, Croatia, Hungary). The Slovenes were neutral all the time, and was not against any ideas but did not advocate any initiative concerning CEDC either.\textsuperscript{310} The Czechs thought that too many multinational defence initiatives (EU pooling and sharing, NATO Smart Defence, regional groupings in NATO Defence Planning Process, V4 Battlegroup, CEDC) were launched in the early 2010s, and saw the situation as a ‘mess’.\textsuperscript{311} As the Czechs main focus was on NATO and their sub-regional preference was in V4, they attempted to use CEDC to somehow facilitate NATO projects among Central European states and channelled some of their projects in this regard to CEDC.\textsuperscript{312} According to the MoD officials of some CEDC countries,\textsuperscript{313} Slovakia was very sceptical about CEDC in the beginning. Similar to the Czech Republic, Slovakia also prioritized NATO and V4 over other options regarding multinational defence cooperation. Thus, it is not surprising that Slovakia wanted to use CEDC for supporting NATO and EU projects and brought Poland to the CEDC as an observer. Probably, Bratislava did not want its biggest neighbour and the most powerful member of the V4 to miss out from any major regional defence initiative. More importantly, Slovakia perceived the CEDC mainly through a NATO and EU lens, as other CEDC members had done. One Slovakian MoD officials framed the general feeling about the relationship between CEDC and EU/NATO the best:

‘CEDC was established to support initiatives of EU and NATO as well. EU and NATO offer many projects and initiatives where

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{308} Hungarian MoD Official, interview by author, December 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{309} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{310} Austrian MoD Official. Interview by author. August 2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{311} Senior Czech MoD Official, interview by author, June 2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{312} E.g. The Czechs propagated their Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre, which resulted in the participation of more CEDC countries in this Centre. The Centre became a Smart Defence project.
  \item \textsuperscript{313} Austrian MoD Official. Interview by author. August 2014. And Hungarian MoD Official, interview by author, December 2012.
\end{itemize}
CEDC countries doesn’t have enough resources (financial, personal, technical etc.). Together we have a potential to support EU and NATO projects and operations effectively. I wouldn’t see CEDC cooperation as a competitor to the EU and NATO initiatives. During the first CEDC meetings there was matrix of projects identified, in which are participating countries willing to cooperate. All of them are in line with EU and NATO Pooling&Sharing and NATO Smart Defence [initiatives]. We are searching for partners to join already existing projects.314

To sum up we can see that dissatisfaction with the EU/NATO did not play a role in creation CEDC. As Prerequisite 2 was not confirmed, this should have been enough per se to confirm that this variable is not relevant in this case. This section not only supported the findings of Prerequisite 2, but highlighted that a major factor in establishing CEDC was that the participating countries wanted to use CEDC for fulfilling NATO Smart Defence and EU Pooling and Sharing projects.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed.

Conclusion
We can conclude that Rival Explanation 1 has no explanatory power about why Central European countries created CEDC instead of using the NATO and EU frameworks (see Figure 7). Only Prerequisite 1 was verified and Prerequisite 2 was not, which mean that the independent variable of ‘Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ was not proved to be the source of the intervening variable of ‘CEDC countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’. Accordingly, this cannot be the reason why CEDC was established. Furthermore, we could see that CEDC was established for fulfilling NATO Smart Defence and EU Pooling and Sharing projects in a Central European framework.

![Figure 7 – Rival Explanation 1: Actual CEDC Pattern](image)

314 Slovak MoD Official, e-mail interview by author, September 2014.
Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis

This rival explanation assumes that as a consequence of the financial crisis CEDC countries decreased their defence budgets (independent variable), accordingly they needed alternative multinational solutions to maintain their national military capabilities (intervening variable). The prerequisites for this rival explanation are the following:

1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the CEDC countries.
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the CEDC countries.
3. The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to CEDC countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

Prerequisite 1:

Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the CEDC countries.

The financial and economic crisis of 2008 had a severe impact on the CEDC countries, and they implemented austerity measures to balance their budgets similarly to most of the European countries. In this section, I investigate whether defence budget cuts have happened in the consequence of the financial crisis in the CEDC countries.

According to a 2010 decision of the Austrian government the Austrian MoD could spend 530 million Euros less between 2011-2014, than it was planned earlier.315

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Austria’s defence budget in 2010 was approximately 2.2 billion Euros, thus the Austrian defence budget cut for the 2011-2014 period was around 6%. This measure was a direct impact of the financial crisis. Croatia began to reduce its defence budget because of the financial crisis earlier and cut its defence spending by 11.39% already in 2009. However, as a consequence of continuous reductions, Croatia spent 18% less on defence in 2014 than in 2009, and thus the defence budget could not reach 2% of GDP to 2010 as it was originally planned, and instead fell from 1.62% of GDP to 1.41% of the GDP in five years (2009-2014). According to the data provided by the Czech Ministry of Defence, Prague cut its defence budget every year between 2009 and 2014, and spent 25% less on defence in 2014 (39.1 billion Czech koruna) than in 2009 (51.8 billion Czech koruna). However, if we compare these data on 2010 constant US dollars, the reduction is more than 30%.

Similarly to Croatia, Hungary’s defence budget was 18% less in 2014 (1.2 billion USD) than in 2009 (1.47 billion USD) on 2010 prices. Nevertheless, if we take into consideration that the Hungarian government made a pledge in 2009 that it would increase its defence budget by 0.2% of its GDP – from 1.1% of the GDP to 1.3% of the GDP – in the next four years, we can see that the difference between the original planned and the actual defence spending was more than 30%. In the case of Slovakia, the trend was similar to the other CEDC countries, and Slovakia’s defence expenditure also decreased in most of the years between 2009 and 2014, which resulted in a 25% smaller defence budget in 2014 than in 2009. Proportionately Slovenia’s defence budget suffered the biggest hit among CEDC

316 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
countries in this period, as its defence spending was reduced by 38% between 2014 and 2009.\textsuperscript{325}

We could see that all of the aforementioned countries decreased their defence budgets as a consequence of the financial crisis. Namely, on average they reduced their defence spending by 25% in the period between 2009 and 2014. The smallest decrease happened in Austria by a defence budget cut of 6% and the biggest one was in Slovenia, where defence spending was reduced by 38%.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has been confirmed.

\textit{Prerequisite 2:}
The\textit{ defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the CEDC countries.}

The previous section showed that all CEDC countries reduced their defence spending after the financial crisis. Now I study how the CEDC MoDs handled this situation and what kind of answers they gave to the emerging problems stemmed from the defence budget cuts. In this regard this section also attempts to find out whether CEDC countries have searched for alternative multinational solutions in MDCs (multinational defence co-operation) to maintain their national military capabilities. For this, first I investigate the major measures made by the CEDC MoDs to manage the defence budget cuts. Second, I also look at the white papers, national military strategies and national security strategies that CEDC countries developed right after the financial crisis, because these documents might help to understand the institutionalized views of the CEDC MoDs concerning MDCs and multinational capability development opportunities.

As a consequence of the Austrian defence budget cuts, the Austrian MoD decided to decrease its personnel, decommission military equipment, reduce trainings and sell some of its properties. In this regard, one of the major measures was that AAF’s personnel were cut by 1000 (from 27,300).\textsuperscript{326} Approximately half of them were pensioned off, others were transferred to the Finance and Interior Ministries and the unfilled positions were eliminated. The MoD also decommissioned 500 tanks,

closed several caserns and reduced training hours significantly.\textsuperscript{327} Accordingly, the first Austrian response to the defence budget cuts was traditional, and Vienna intended to solve its problems on the national level. If we look at the latest Austrian White Paper published in 2012,\textsuperscript{328} we can see that Austria did not consider alternative multinational solutions for maintaining its national capabilities. Austria considered the major multinational co-operation on defence in the framework of EU’s initiatives,\textsuperscript{329} which cannot be considered a new alternative multinational solution. Furthermore, interestingly although a sub-chapter of the document described CEDC as an important MDC it was not considered as a forum for co-operation on capability development.\textsuperscript{330} Accordingly, there is no sign that Austria would have searched for alternative multinational solutions to mitigate the effects of its defence budget cuts.

The Croatian armed force was in the middle of the execution of its 2006-2015 long-term development plan,\textsuperscript{331} when the financial crisis hit the country and its defence budget. The defence budget cuts had a serious impact on most of the parts of the Croatian armed force. The most well-known problems emerged with the aging Croatian MiG-21 fighter jet fleet, as two fighter jets crashed in 2010 on the same exercise\textsuperscript{332} and an additional one crashed in 2014.\textsuperscript{333} Although, in regards to the first two cases of 2010 the Croatian prime minister dismissed that the defence budget cuts had any relationship with the crashes,\textsuperscript{334} in 2014 referring to the new case the defence minister admitted that ‘defence cuts were in some degree responsible for the crash’.\textsuperscript{335} Despite its hardships Zagreb did not try to explore possibilities concerning multinational defence co-operations on capability development in the late 2000s and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{327}Ibid.
\bibitem{328}Austria, Bundesminister für Landesverteidigung und Sport, \textit{Weissbuch 12} (Vienna: BMLVS/Heeresdruckzentrum, 2013).
\bibitem{329}Ibid. 34-35.
\bibitem{330}Ibid. 33-34.
\end{thebibliography}
early 2010s. Earlier Croatia considered the possibility of bilateral fighter jet procurement with Slovenia, and was ready to co-operate with other nations on this issue too.\textsuperscript{336} A four-way fighter jet procurement amongst Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey project was also floated, but this idea did not materialize either, and in 2007 Croatia decided to procure fighter jets alone.\textsuperscript{337} However, Croatia does not have the resources for that so far. Thus, we can see that although Croatia searched for alternative multinational solutions to maintain certain national military capabilities (fighter jets), this did not relate to the defence budget cuts of the financial crisis, because Zagreb already abandoned the idea of multinational fighter jet procurement before the financial crisis.

The Croatian Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2013 shows as well that Croatia did not take MDCs into consideration for alleviating the negative effects of the economic crisis on its defence budget. The document states that the Croatian MoD’s answer for the defence budget cuts resulted by the economic crisis was the ‘decrease and rationalization of expenditures, […] improved management, proper determination of priorities, more effective use of resources’ etc. It means that Croatia intended to solve its problems nationally and not in a multinational way. Although the document has a short chapter about ‘international defence co-operation’,\textsuperscript{338} it highlights that the emphasis for Croatia concerning MDCs lay on ‘defence diplomacy and participation in arms control activities as well as confidence and security building measures’,\textsuperscript{339} and only a lesser degree on capability development. Accordingly, we can conclude, that Croatia did not want to use multinational solutions to mitigate the defence budget cuts resulted from the financial crisis. Although it attempted to procure fighter jets in a multinational way in the 2000s, it abandoned this idea before the financial crisis broke out. Furthermore, the 2013 Croatian SDR shows that the Croatian MoD intended to handle the defence budget cuts with rationalization, and did not perceive multinational defence co-operation as an important tool for capability development let alone a possible answer for the defence budget cuts.

First and foremost the Czech Republic dealt with the problems stemmed from its decreasing defence budget by the traditional national way. Namely, the Czech

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{338} Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, \textit{Strategic Defence Review} (Zagreb, 2013), 51-52.
\item\textsuperscript{339} Ibid. 51.
\end{itemize}
armed force intended to absorb the negative effects generated by reduced resources itself, at the same time the Czech MoD was open to multinational solutions on capability development, but did not focus on it. The Czech armed force significantly cut its personnel, as the number of its employee was reduced from 24 000 to 18 000 in 2010.\footnote{Mölling and Brune, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence - Annex, 42.} In this regard, altogether 4500 positions were dismissed at the MoD and among the troops, while the General Staff and the Joint Support Command were restructured into three agencies resulting in a 1600 personnel reduction.\footnote{Jakub Kufcák, “The V4 Countries and the Impacts of the Austerity Cuts on Their Defence Spending and Armed Forces,” Obrana a Strategie 14, no. 2, 43, doi:10.3849/1802-7199.14.2014.02.035-048.} Besides this, among others the Czech armed force reduced its level of ambition, withdrew most of its forces from NATO’s Kosovo mission (KFOR), sold military properties and postponed the procurement of several major weapon-systems and equipment.\footnote{Ibid.} The Czech MoD was open to multinational solutions, but was not looking actively for alternative multinational solutions on capability development, and according to the Czech White Paper of 2011 the Czechs concentrated on the existing co-operative frameworks of NATO and EU.\footnote{Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, The White Paper on Defence (Prague, 2011), 94-96.} Accordingly, Prague saw NATO and the EU as especially useful in establishing strategic capabilities on areas, where individual countries were not able to develop them alone.\footnote{Ibid. 65.} The document also mentions that the Czech Republic ‘naturally co-operates’ with neighbouring countries and it is willing to collaborate with other states as well, but these projects ‘have to be based on the principles of mutual advantage and balanced sharing of costs and returns’.\footnote{Ibid.} The White Paper underlined the importance of the Czech Republic’s military co-operation with Slovakia because of historical and cultural reasons.\footnote{Ibid.} Based on these, we can conclude that the Czech Republic dealt with the effects of the defence budget cuts individually, and did not consider multinational solutions seriously in this regard. It does not mean that the Czech MoD was not open to multinational defence co-operative efforts, but they did not perceive MDCs as a solution for the shrinking defence budgets. Rather they saw multinational defence co-operation as an opportunity to develop and share costly strategic capabilities in

NATO/EU frameworks, and as natural activity with neighbouring countries especially with Slovakia.

Unlike the Czech Republic, Hungary maintained its level of ambition and its troops in international operations, but it stopped most of its major procurement programmes and postponed them until after 2016. Besides the freeze on procurement, the Hungarian MoD renegotiated its lease contract with SAAB concerning Hungary’s Gripen fleet extending the contract another 10 years in order to free financial resources for the period of 2012-2016. In 2011, the MoD cut the administrative and command positions of the Hungarian Defence Force and MoD by 1000, and decided to sell some of its properties as well. At the same time Hungary seriously considered that projects in MDCs might be alternatives for national capability development on certain areas. As the Hungarian National Military Strategy of 2011 states

‘in capability development we must increasingly rely upon NATO, EU, regional and bilateral programmes. [...] Keeping cost efficiency in mind, the opportunities lying in the development and sharing of defence capabilities in international cooperation must be exploited. In this regard, it is advisable to rely upon regional defence and military cooperation, among others the cooperation of the Visegrad Four and other Central European partners.’

Similarly to the Czech Republic Hungary perceived NATO and EU as frameworks, which were appropriate for developing costly capabilities ‘that the country could not procure or maintain on its own and that are also absent in the international domain’. However, the difference between the Hungarian and the Czech stance on MDCs was that while Hungary openly advocated the usage of sub-regional (which the official documents called ‘regional’) MDCs, the clear priority for the Czech Republic remained the co-operation in NATO and the EU. The Hungarian openness to MDCs was evident in the implicit remarks of the previous and the

347 Kufcák, “The V4 Countries and...,” 45.
351 Ibid.
352 Csiki and Molnár, Seminar on Central European Solutions, 9-11.
explicit statement of the current defence policy directors of Hungary about the possibility that MDCs could mitigate the effects of the financial crisis on defence capabilities. Not surprisingly Hungary took a significant part in the creation of CEDC, furthermore in the first half of the 2010s it was very active in deepening defence collaborations in V4 format as well. Based on the aforementioned processes and phenomena, we can conclude that Hungary took seriously that MDCs could help maintain its certain national military capabilities and thus MDCs could mitigate the negative effects caused by the financial crisis on national defence capabilities.

After the financial crisis the Slovak Armed Forces (SAF) was reorganized significantly in 2009, in addition the newly elected government initiated a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 2010, which was outlined in a new White Paper. The Slovak MoD, similar to its Hungarian counterpart, prioritized its contributions to international operations and its troop readiness over capability development, thus postponed its major procurement programmes and reduced some of the staff personnel as well. The replacement of the MiG-29 fighter jets was perceived as one of the most pressing and costly issues, but the SAF will not have funds for that in the foreseeable future. According to Slovakia’s 2011 White Paper, Bratislava is ready for co-operating on many defence capability areas in multinational format, but its emphasis is on collaborations in NATO and EU. Although, the White Paper does not emphasize explicitly the prevalence of NATO in this regard, the list of potential areas of multinational capability development suggests that NATO is the most important multinational framework for Slovakia on capability development. While in terms of sub-regional defence co-operation only one remark can be found in the document, and it is about the Visegrad Group, it states that bilateral military co-

354 Hungarian MoD Official, interview by author, December 2012.
355 Kufcák, “The V4 Countries and...,” 47.
358 Kufcák, “The V4 Countries and...,” 47.
360 Ibid. 94-95
operation has to be pragmatic, economically feasible and long-term.\textsuperscript{361} We could see that Slovakia’s measures, which intended to handle the decreasing financial resources after the economic crisis, were also national ones. Although, the Slovak MoD supports MDCs, according to its new White Paper it prioritizes defence co-operation in NATO above any other forms. Accordingly, in the case of Slovakia the financial crisis did not foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities.

Slovenia’s case is similar to the cases of Hungary and Slovakia in the sense that Ljubljana decided to postpone or cancel its procurement programmes, but did not cut its personnel as much as the Czech Republic. Right after the financial crisis the resources for modernization were decreased by 50\%, and the Slovene MoD did not have the funds to recruit more soldiers as it was planned earlier.\textsuperscript{362} Slovenia published a new National Security Strategy in 2010, and although it touches the effects of the economic crisis several times,\textsuperscript{363} it does not contemplate about how the Slovene MoD should handle the defence budget cuts resulted by the financial crisis. Interestingly, the document does not mention multinational defence co-operation at all, and does not states how they should be used to meet policy objectives. In addition, even the General Long-Term Development Plan of the Slovenian Armed Forces published in 2011 barely touches MDCs. It only says that ‘the legal basis allowing the implementation […] of multinational modernization and equipping projects of the Slovenian Armed Forces should also be provided’.\textsuperscript{364} This shows, that Slovenia probably does not possess the legal framework for multinational capability development projects. Based on the national measures to the defence budget cuts, and the total lack of interest in MDCs in Slovenia’s strategic documents, we can assume that Slovenia did not take into consideration that it should look to alternative multinational solutions to manage its shrinking national capabilities.

In this section, we could see that the individual CEDC countries intended to solve the problems caused by the defence budget cuts after the financial crisis mostly in a national way. Although they had different priorities, basically CEDC armed

\textsuperscript{361} Ibid. 94.
\textsuperscript{362} Mölling and Brune, \textit{The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence - Annex}, 69.
\textsuperscript{363} Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, \textit{Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia} (Ljubjana: Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Defence, 2010), 12; 24; 32;
\textsuperscript{364} Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, \textit{Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025} (Lubjana: Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Defence, 2011). 56.
forces rationalized themselves and cut defence expenses by reducing personnel, postponing or cancelling procurement programmes, decreasing training hours, withdrawing their troops from international operations etc. However, they rarely looked at MDCs as a tool for alleviating the impacts of the economic crisis on defence budgets, if they looked at them at all. Thus, except Hungary they did not searched for alternative multinational solutions on defence co-operation.

This is logical, if we take into consideration that defence budget cuts for CEDC countries were imminent, and CEDC MoDs had to manage their worsening budgetary situation immediately. Developing multinational projects takes time, which CEDC countries did not have. Accordingly, it is not surprising that they reacted nationally on handling the defence budget cuts, and if they had to choose they preferred already existing multinational frameworks. Austria focused on EU, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia prioritized NATO over any other options concerning capability development. It means that these three countries were open to multinational capability development programmes, but they did not search for alternative ones, and as we could see, none of them considered MDCs as a cure for the decreasing defence budgets. Slovenia did not concentrate on multinational capability development at all, while Croatia focused on integrating to NATO and preparing for joining the EU. Although Croatia intended to procure fighter jets in a multinational programme earlier, Zagreb abandoned this idea to the second half of the 2000s. Hungary was the only one CEDC country that really believed that MDCs could be the solution of the problem caused by the economic crisis. Accordingly, we can conclude that the defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis did not foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the CEDC countries except Hungary.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed.

Prerequisite 3:
The creation of the CEDC needs to be linked to CEDC countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

In regards to Prerequisite 2 we could see that CEDC countries, except Hungary, were not searching for alternative multinational solutions to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis on defence budgets. Accordingly, in terms of the relationship between
the creation of CEDC and the financial crisis, we can say that most of CEDC MoDs did not see how CEDC could alleviate the problems of the defence budget cuts, which is supported by the views of CEDC MoD officials as well.

Referring to the effects of the financial crisis Peter Slovak, the Head of Defence Policy Division at the Slovak MoD, pointed out that ‘capability planning with pooling and sharing […] is one of the ways how to get more capabilities for less money, but it will be quite difficult to reach this goal due to an uncertain resource (financial) perspective’. Accordingly, some perceived the financial crisis as an obstacle and not an opportunity for multinational defence co-operation. Austrians perceived that CEDC was more a political project than a financial one. Johann Pucher, the Austrian defence policy director highlighted that ‘enhancing co-operation in capability development would enable cost saving as well as preservation of existing capabilities that otherwise could not be maintained; co-operation should not be focused on economic goals only but has to take into account the political dimension of pooling and sharing incentives.’ Accordingly, Austrian officials believed that CEDC might bring cost-savings in the long term, but this would take time and huge amount of work, and the political side of the co-operation was more important in the beginning.

Czech officials perceived the financial crisis as a factor in creating CEDC and believed that the impact of the financial crisis on defence budgets was part of the ‘official’ narrative for establishing CEDC. However, the ‘unofficial’ reason for the Czechs was not related to economic issues, but rather the biggest added value of CEDC was that it brought Austria and Croatia into a Central European framework, where the Czech MoD could work with them together with other countries from the region. Thus, the possible economic benefits of the co-operation for the Czech Republic played a much less part than other considerations. The Croatian MoD supported any initiatives, which provided opportunities for working together with NATO and EU members. Croatia joined NATO in 2009 and was before its accession to the EU (2013) at the time of establishing CEDC. Accordingly, the Croatian MoD was less concerned with the economic issues concerning defence co-operation, and

365 Csiki and Molnár, Seminar on Central European Solutions, 14.
366 Ibid. 6.
368 Junior Czech MoD Official, e-mail interview by author, June 2014.
369 Senior Czech MoD Official, interview by author, June 2014.
focused more on how they could integrate into different multinational defence cooperative frameworks. CEDC just fit to this effort. Hungary perceived CEDC as a possible tool for alleviating defence budgetary constraints, but other considerations were taking into account as well. Hungary held the EU Presidency in the first half of 2011, and the Hungarian MoD wanted to gain political capital and support from its Central European partners for its presidency tasks as well. Probably, this also played a role why at the end of 2010 the Hungarian defence policy director initiated formal talks with his CEDC counterparts for the time of the Hungarian EU Presidency in 2011. We can conclude that most of the CEDC countries did not search for alternative multinational solutions to alleviate the negative effects of the financial crisis on defence budgets, thus it cannot be linked to the CEDC either. Namely, the individual MoDs had different motivations concerning CEDC, but gaining economic benefit in the short term was not among them.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed.

Conclusion

We can conclude that Rival Explanation 2 has no explanatory power about why Central European countries created CEDC instead of using the NATO and EU frameworks, because none of the arms of the predicted pattern of this rival explanation was proved (see Figure 9).

![Figure 9 – Rival Explanation 2: Actual CEDC Pattern](image)

Only Prerequisite 1 was verified, but Prerequisite 2 and 3 were not. Thus, the independent variable of ‘CEDC defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’ is valid. However, no signs were found which would verify Prerequisite 2, that means that the defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis did not foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in CEDC countries. Accordingly, the existence of the proposed intervening variable of ‘Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’ was not found regarding CEDC countries with the exception of Hungary. As the intervening variable is not verified and no signs were found for its existence,
there cannot be a link between the dependent variable of ‘Creation of CEDC’ and the 
non-existence intervening variable (see Figure 9).

**Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions**

Rival Explanation 3 supposes that the main reason why CEDC was created is because 
the CEDC countries have perceived the same threat or threats as the biggest threat for 
their security. Accordingly, their threat perception has converged and began to differ 
from their NATO and EU allies, and thus they decided to co-operate against this 
threat and finally institutionalized this co-operation in a sub-regional framework 
outside the NATO and EU frameworks.

![Figure 10 – Rival Explanation 3: Predicted CEDC Pattern](image)

As I introduced in the Research Framework chapter in ‘Rival Explanation 3’ 
the ‘perception of the same threat’ as independent variable is linked through the 
intervening variable of ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ to the dependent variable 
of ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’. It means, if the CEDC countries share the same 
threat as the biggest threat (independent variable), they will begin to discuss this with 
each other and decide to ally against this threat (intervening variable), and at the end 
of the process they formalize this alliance by creating the CEDC (dependent variable).

For this rival explanation I established three generic prerequisites for verifying 
its pattern, which I modified by incorporating CEDC countries to the appropriate 
places in the prerequisites. In this section I investigate them one-by-one. These are the 
followings:

1. The CEDC countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats 
as the largest threat.
2. The CEDC countries have to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding 
the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of 
CEDC.
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) CEDC countries discussed and 
co-operated on and the initiation and creation of CEDC have to be detected.
**Prerequisite 1:**

*The CEDC countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat.*

In order to identify whether CEDC countries shared the perception of the same threat(s) as the largest threat, I compare the threats the CEDC countries’ relevant national security documents describe. I am focusing on these documents and do not take into consideration public perceptions about security issues and threats. Public perceptions are volatile, can change quickly, thus they are not reliable sources for comparative analysis concerning threat perceptions of countries. In addition, national security documents are the foundations of foreign and security polices of governments, thus they are more relevant concerning multinational defence co-operations.

During this section I compare the national security documents of the individual CEDC countries, and use those documents which publications were the closest to the establishment of CEDC in 2010-2011. An additional criterion for choosing the appropriate national security documents is that the concerned documents had to be published between 2009 and 2013 to reflect to the international security environment of the time when CEDC was launched. Although an old strategic document could be valid, after a while it does not necessarily reflect the views of governments anymore, and a new strategic document, which was published just after the creation of CEDC might provide a better picture how the governments perceived threats that time. Accordingly, if a relevant strategic document in a country was valid, but e.g. was published 10 years earlier than the creation of CEDC and another relevant strategic document was published e.g. two years after the launch of CEDC, I use the latter one.

The reason behind this is that between 2008 and 2012 major shifts happened in the international security environment that could not be reflected in earlier national security documents. Namely, around the establishing of CEDC the effects of the financial crisis could already be felt everywhere in 2008-2009, the Arab spring was happening in 2010-2012 and the Syrian civil war was started (2011). However, the studied national security documents can not be newer than 2013, because from the beginning of 2014 another series of major geopolitical events happened, which probably made several aspects of the documents published between 2009 and 2013 obsolete. Among others, Russia occupied Crimea and the war on Donbas began in
2014, the migration crisis in Europe became very severe in 2015 and the vote on Brexit in 2016 questioned many assumptions concerning the future of Europe. Accordingly, the national security documents of CEDC countries published between 2009 and 2013 provide the most relevant information about how CEDC countries were thinking about threats at the time of the creation of CEDC.

The ideal national security documents for my research are the national security strategies and the White Books of CEDC countries, as these documents are on the top of the hierarchy of national security documents in Central European states. In addition, they usually delineate the threats in detail the concerned Central European country faces or perceives to face. If neither a national security strategy nor a white book was published in the defined timeframe in a CEDC country, than any other relevant national security document that came out in that defined period and provides some information about threats is used.

In regards to Austria I use the Austrian White Book of 2010, as its’ development and its’ publication was going on at the same years (2010-2011), when CEDC was established. Although, another White Book was published in 2012 too and a new Security Strategy was published in 2013, as the previous one was more than 10 years old, the publication of these two documents were not as close to the creation of CEDC as the publication of the 2010 White Book. For Croatia I employ the Croatian Strategic Defence Review of 2013. Unfortunately, Croatia has not updated its 2002 National Security Strategy yet, despite the fact that Zagreb developed a draft document for its replacement in 2010 and has been criticized recently for not adopting a new holistic national security strategy. During the defined timeframe Croatia did not publish any other national security document than the Strategic Defence Review, thus it is the only possible choice for my research. The

370 Austria, Bundesminister Für Landesverteidigung Und Sport, Weissbuch 10 (Vienna: BMLVS/Heeresdruckzentrum, 2011).
371 Austria, Bundesminister Für Landesverteidigung Und Sport, Weissbuch 12 (Vienna: BMLVS/Heeresdruckzentrum, 2013).
Czech Republic published both a White Paper and a Security Strategy in 2011. Similarly to the Czech Republic, Hungary also developed two national security documents in the period I am interested in. In 2012 Hungary’s National Military Strategy and Hungary’s National Security Strategy were published too, and I apply the threats provided by Hungary’s National Security Strategy. Slovakia came out with a new White Book on defence of 2013. Unfortunately, the last Slovakian Security was published in 2005, thus I use the White Book regarding Slovakia’s threats. Slovenia published its National Security Strategy in 2010, which will provide the basis for my study.

The national security strategies of Central European countries were compared and analysed in regional projects or together with other European countries in comprehensive studies. However, these researches were either not studying the national security documents of the period of 2010-2013, or were not Central European focused enough, or they did not incorporate all the CEDC countries. Threat perceptions of Central European countries using their security strategies were studied too, but they did not analyse all of the CEDC countries either. Thus, the literature does not provide an appropriate guidance for comparing the threat perceptions of CEDC countries.

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388 France and Witney, Europe’s Strategic Cacophony.; Csiki, “Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia”.
389 Csiki, “Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia”.
The national security documents I chose to study contain the threats of the CEDC countries. The number of threats, how they are structured and whether they are perceived either threats or risks or challenges can differ significantly in different documents. (See Figure 11) On average, the CEDC countries perceived 11-12 threats according to their studied strategic documents. The fewest threats were mentioned by the Austrian White Book and the Czech Security Strategy (9 threats), and the most threats were perceived by the Slovenian security strategy (15 threats). While Croatia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia call threats the phenomena that have negative impacts on their national security, Hungary calls them threats and challenges, Slovenia names them threats and risks. Austria the only CEDC country, which does not use the expression of ‘threat’, rather it uses the labels of challenges and risks. Despite the different labels, there is no significant difference regarding issues the strategic documents of CEDC countries raise about their security concerns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Threats</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Czech R.</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>List</td>
<td>Security Env./List</td>
<td>List</td>
<td>List</td>
<td>Security Env.</td>
<td>List by categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Challenges, risks</td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Threats, challenges</td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Threats, risks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11 – Characteristics of Threats in the Strategic Documents of CEDC Countries

Although these strategic documents introduces the threats the concerned countries deem relevant, they do not prioritize them. Accordingly, it is not clear which threats are perceived as the largest threat by CEDC countries. The studied strategic documents of Austria, 391 Czech Republic 392 and Hungary 393 list and shortly describe the perceived threats. In these three cases, we may assume that the list might be a priority list as well, and the threats described earlier on the list are more important for these countries than the latter ones. However, this cannot be the case concerning the strategic documents of the other three CEDC countries. Slovenia’s security strategy also lists and shortly describes the threats, but it does not provide a

priority list rather it categorizes them based on the sources (global, transnational, national) of the threats. Therefore, we do not know which threats are the most important for Slovenia. In the Croatian SDR we find a description about the security environment of Croatia, which contains threats, but they are neither elaborated nor prioritized. The Slovakian White Paper also gives a security environment analysis and not a threat list. Although, the Slovakian document is much more structured than the Croatian one, based on the information of the Slovakian White Paper provides we cannot be sure about the most important threats regarding Slovakia either.

As I cannot identify which threats are the largest threats for all of the CEDC countries, I am just looking for threats that can be identified in the studied strategic documents. If we compare these threats we find six common themes, which means that all documents mention them as individual threat categories. These are the following:

- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Terrorism
- Regional conflicts
- Organized crime
- Cyber security
- Natural and man-made disasters

Although we cannot compare how relevant these threats are in different CEDC documents, the number of common themes shows that CEDC countries perceive national security threats similarly. In other words this means that Austria and the Czech Republic share 66% of their perceived threats with other CEDC countries. Croatia shares 60%, Hungary shares 50%, Slovakia shares 43% and Slovenia shares 40% of their perceived threats with the other CEDC states. Accordingly, we can conclude that CEDC countries have similar threat perception, as many of their perceived threats are shared with the other CEDC countries. However, we cannot

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identify whether they share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat, as their concerned strategic documents do not prioritize their perceived threats.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has been partially confirmed.

**Prerequisite 2:**

*The CEDC countries had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of CEDC.*

I could only partially identify prerequisite 1, which means that based on the relevant national security documents, I could conclude that CEDC countries share six national security threats. However, I could not identify, whether these threats are the largest threats for the individual CEDC countries, because CEDC countries do not prioritize them in their strategic documents. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that they did not share the same threat as the largest threat, which could help to create CEDC. To figure this out, I study all the six shared national security threats to figure out whether any of them initiated discussions that generated some level of co-operation among CEDC countries before establishing CEDC. If I can detect the discussions and the beginning of co-operation on any of the aforementioned six threats concerning CEDC, I can conclude that prerequisite 2 is confirmed. However, if CEDC countries either did not initiate discussions among themselves on any of the confirmed shared threats, or they did not begin to co-operate on this national security threat or they began to co-operate but in another format or institution with other countries on these threats, prerequisite 2 cannot be confirmed. The latter issue is relevant too, as this would mean that CEDC was not created against that shared threat, as the concerned countries deemed other co-operative frameworks and/or countries more appropriate to collaborate against a particular national security threat.

In regard to the threat of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), we can say that all CEDC countries deemed this issue as an important security problem. However, there is no sign that they intended to co-operate on this topic exclusively with each other, as no discussion and no co-operation was initiated regarding this question before the creation of CEDC among CEDC states. Probably, its reason was that the CEDC countries had already been collaborating on this issue in different and probably more effective frameworks than CEDC. The three V4 member
CEDC countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia – have very similar position on nuclear issues. As researchers pointed out:

‘Since the 1960s Central European states have been quick to join the relevant arms control agreements and export control regimes. Active participation in this field was encouraged by the Soviet Union and is in line with the priorities of the European Union and NATO, which guarantees that the non-nuclear stance of these states is likely to remain firm in the future. Despite a few cases in which Central European states hold slightly different positions, they mostly think alike and the key determinant of their rather conservative and cautious behaviour seems to be their NATO membership.’  

In regards to chemical and biological weapons, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are members of the same conventions (Chemical Weapons Convention, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Australia Group and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention), which show that they had already cooperated on this issue on different international formats. Although, a multinational CBRN battalion was established in the Czech Republic in 2004, it was a NATO project and not Central European one. The Czech Republic intended to use CEDC to involve more Central European countries into this NATO project, as from the 12 participating nations only the Czech Republic and Hungary were CEDC countries. However, besides the Czech Republic, none of the CEDC countries were interested in CBRN cooperation in CEDC, and even the Czech Republic intended to buttress a NATO project with the help of CEDC. Accordingly, we could see that the three V4 member CEDC countries did not intend to create CEDC on non-proliferation of

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400 Belgium, Italy, Canada, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States; David Oliver, “Czech CBRN Defence,” CBRNe Portal, August 26, 2014, http://www.cbrneportal.com/czech-cbrn-defence/.
WMD, as they had already co-operated in different formats on it and prioritized NATO level co-operation over other options in this regard.

Similarly to the above-mentioned three countries, Croatia’s aim was to mitigate the problems of the proliferation of WMD via larger organizations than CEDC. Croatia’s National Strategy for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2013 highlights that Zagreb deemed the UN, NATO and the EU the most relevant actors on this field, and in regards to sub-regional collaboration in general the document mentions South-Eastern Europe only and does not mention Central Europe at all. Slovenia was also committed to NATO concerning non-proliferation of WMDs, while Austria deemed the UN and the EU the main forums for collaboration on this area. Thus, we can conclude that CEDC countries did not initiate a discussion about the proliferation of WMD and instead used other internationals frameworks for co-operation on this issue.

According to the studied strategic documents another possible threat, which could initiate discussion and cooperation before the creation of CEDC might be terrorism. It is important to note that according to the EUROPOL only a handful terrorist attacks happened in the CEDC countries between 2006 and 2013. Thus these states are not affected significantly by terrorism. However, based on this data we cannot exclude that Central European countries perceived terrorism as a threat, which could initiate discussion and co-operation amongst them. At the same time, such kind of discussion did not happen among CEDC countries. Hypothetically, the idea of a V4 co-operation on terrorism emerged among analysts in Central Europe.

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402 Rózsa and Anna Péczeli, Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe.
404 Ibid. 6.
408 Vera Rihackova, Counterterrorism Policies in Central Europe (Prague: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2006). 9-34.
before the creation of CEDC, and one year after the establishment of CEDC in 2012 an official V4 document stated that ‘the Polish Presidency believes that it is imperative to consistently reinforce and improve coordination between the counter terrorism systems of the V4 states while responding to the tasks set forth in relevant counter terrorism strategies’⁴⁰⁹. However, this intention has not been translated into the policy field since then, and it was not an issue before and during the establishment of CEDC either.

In regard to V4 counter-terrorism co-operation Péter Marton highlights that Central European countries are members and participating states of a plethora of international (EU ⁴¹⁰ and non-EU) co-operative frameworks, where they can collaborate on different areas concerning terrorism⁴¹¹. He also points out that ‘the perception of the threat of terrorism is a rather feeble basis for launching enhanced cooperation in this field. In the meantime, the actually emerging challenges typically require ad hoc, specific exchanges of information in a demand-driven as opposed to a pre-institutionalised format.’⁴¹² Thus it is not practical ‘to “V4-ize” cooperation over the related challenges’.⁴¹³ These mean that Central European countries not only co-operated on many international frameworks concerning terrorism, but analysts even deemed unnecessary and problematic the creation of new sub-regional institutions for that. This sub-regional institution was even understood as a co-operative initiative in V4 format and not in CEDC. Thus, no discussions and collaboration happened on CEDC level about terrorism before the establishment of CEDC.

The situation was different concerning the threat of organized crime in the sense that countries in a very similar format as CEDC have already created a co-operative framework on this issue in 2000. Actually co-operation on police and internal issues had already been going on earlier as well, but the institutionalization of this collaboration was established that time. The ministers of interior affairs of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia founded the so-


⁴¹² Ibid. 23.

⁴¹³ Ibid.
called Salzburg Forum in 2000, which has been focusing on internal security and police co-operation in the Central European region.\textsuperscript{414} The goals of the co-operation for the period of 2010-2020 are ‘Cooperation and Lobbying within the EU’, ‘Regional Cooperation’ (changing experience and lessons on operational expert level meetings and working groups) and ‘Cooperation with Third Countries’.\textsuperscript{415} Bulgaria and Romania joined to this initiative in 2006, and Croatia joined in 2012.\textsuperscript{416} The case of Croatia is relevant here, because Zagreb joined to the Salzburg Forum as a full member\textsuperscript{417} after the creation of CEDC. Accordingly, Croatia’s joining in the co-operation and the goals of the Salzburg Forum for 2010-2020 mean that the Salzburg Forum was deemed the most appropriate framework for Central European co-operation on organized crime or any other internal and police issues.

In 2013, Austria and the Czech Republic initiated the Central European Cyber Security Platform (CECSP), which provides a forum for five Central European states (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)\textsuperscript{418} ‘to assist each other in the future in the field of cyber security by sharing information, best practices and methods, in order to deal with cyber threats.’\textsuperscript{419} This means that although CEDC countries perceived cyber defence as a relevant national security problem, CEDC was not deemed a framework for co-operation on cyber issues despite the fact that CEDC was created two years earlier than CESCP. I have to point out that all CESCP countries took into consideration the elements of the cyber security frameworks of EU and NATO,\textsuperscript{420} which shows that these two organizations had a significant impact on Central European cyber policies. In regards to Croatia and Slovenia, we can observe that they did not join to or create any sub-regional collaboration on cyber security, and according to their national strategies on cyber security their focus concerning

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{416} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{417} Croatia gained observer status in 2006.


\textsuperscript{420} Berzsenyi, “Kiberbiztonsági Analógiák és Eltérések.” 131.
\end{footnotesize}
international co-operation are collaborations via international organizations especially via the EU and NATO.\footnote{Republic of Slovenia, Cyber Security Strategy - Establishing a System to Ensure a High Level of Cyber Security (Ljubljana, 2016); Republic of Croatia, The National Cyber Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (Zagreb, 2015).}

Natural and man-made disasters are important topics in all CEDC countries. The most common natural disaster in Central Europe is floods from major rivers. One of the biggest rivers in Europe the Danube is running through the Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia, and if a major flood happens on the river, it affects all five CEDC countries. Despite this situation no structured co-operation was established among CEDC countries on this issues, and it is particularly true on defence co-operation. The Czech Republic initiated the only related co-operation in 1998, when Prague together with Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia established the so-called Central European Disaster Prevention Forum (CEUDIP). CEUDIP’s original goal was to improve early warning systems in Central Europe, ‘and through the cooperation of the meteorological and hydrological services of the participating countries, a regional radar network was established that enabled improved region-wide weather forecasting.’\footnote{Melinda Moore et al., Models of Relief: Learning from Exemplary Practices in International Disaster Management (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 149.} Later CEUDIP also intended to deepen the co-operation on training, education and exchanging information,\footnote{Ivan Obrusník, Presentation on “Czech National Committee for DR - Czech National Committee for DR and Cooperation among DRplatforms in Central Europe (CEUDIP).” 2005. https://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr thematic-sessions/presentations/session1-2/ceudip-Mr- obru%C4%85n%E5%92%84.pdf.} but for the last several years the intensity of the co-operation has decreased significantly. The only Central European MDC on disaster relief operation is the earlier mentioned Multinational Engineer Battalion Tisa established by Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine in 1999 for disaster relief operations.\footnote{András Somlai-Kiss, “A TISZA Többnemzeti Műszaki Zászlóalj Bemutatása Különös Tekintettel Az árvízvédelmi Szerepére,” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny 21, Special Issue, (2011): 993-1006.} However, such kind of co-operation was not discussed among CEDC countries before the creation of CEDC. At the same time, Austria intended to use CEDC for co-operation on natural and man-made disasters from a very early stage,\footnote{Austrian MoD Official. Interview by author. August 2014.} but Vienna was the only one, who was eager to co-operate on this issue with military capabilities in the beginning. Despite the lack of enthusiasm from the parts of other CEDC countries, now discussions have been going on disaster relief issues in CEDC for years. However, as this topic was
almost exclusively a concern for Austria at the creation of CEDC, natural and man-
made disasters could not be the shared threat, why CEDC was created in the first
place.

The last shared threat of CEDC countries, which I identified in the previous
section is regional conflicts. CEDC countries have participated in many peace support
operations in conflict zones for the last two decades, and many projects, which were
incorporated into CEDC were related to military operations (MLCC, AAT-PT, SOF
training, CBRN co-operation, Austrian-Hungarian co-operation on EUFOR Althea).
Accordingly, CEDC countries discussed and co-operated a lot on multinational
military operations before the creation of CEDC. However, I have to point out that
co-operation on multinational military operations and co-operation on the ‘threat of
regional conflicts’ are not the same thing. CEDC collaboration on regional conflicts
would mean that the participating countries decide how to handle or mitigate the
effects of regional countries with a CEDC framework. However, as we could see in
previous sections, the different CEDC co-operative projects were not established
directly against the ‘threat of regional conflicts’, as they were rather intended to
support NATO and EU operations. Accordingly, they were only indirectly related to
regional conflicts via EU and NATO efforts, and the primary focus of CEDC
countries in this regard was to fulfil they obligations towards EU and NATO.

To sum up we can see that no significant discussions were initiated which
could generate co-operation before the creation of CEDC regarding the shared threats
of the studied countries. Even in the cases, when co-operations on a shared threat
were created in Central Europe, they were not initiated among CEDC countries, but
they were launched in different Central European formats.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed.

Prerequisite 3:

The links between the shared biggest threat(s) CEDC countries discussed and co-
operated on and the initiation and creation of CEDC have to be detected.

As Prerequisite 2 was not verified, Prerequisite 3 cannot be confirmed either. Namely,
as there were no discussions and co-operation on the shared biggest threat of CEDC
countries, they cannot be linked to the creation of CEDC. These findings are
underpinned by the results of the interviews conducted with MoD officials in CEDC
countries as well. Although some of them said, that shared threats had a role
concerning the creation of CEDC on some extent,\textsuperscript{426} others were clear that according to their opinion shared threat perceptions did not play a role in establishing this MDC.\textsuperscript{427} However, even the officials who said that shared threat perceptions might have a role in launching CEDC, none of them deemed it as a major factor in this regard.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed.

\textit{Conclusion}

We can conclude that Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power about why Central European countries established CEDC instead of using NATO and EU frameworks for defence co-operation.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{rival_explanation_3.png}
\caption{Rival Explanation 3: Actual CEDC Pattern}
\end{figure}

Prerequisite 1 was verified only partially, but Prerequisite 2 and Prerequisite 3 were not verified. It was not possible to validate entirely the independent variable of ‘Perception of the same threat’, but it was not possible to dismiss it either. The reason was that the CEDC countries shared many threats, but because they did not prioritize their shared threats in their national security documents, I could not verify whether they deem the same threat(s) as the largest threat(s). Accordingly, I studied all shared threats regarding the investigation of Prerequisite 2. Prerequisite 2 could not be verified, as no significant discussions were initiated on the identified shared threats among CEDC countries, which could generate co-operation before the creation of CEDC. Although, Central European countries including many CEDC countries created different sub-regional frameworks for co-operation on different threats or they used NATO or EU for that, they did not intend to co-operate exclusively with CEDC countries on these issues. Accordingly, Prerequisite 3 could not be verified either, which means that there is no link between shared national threats of CEDC countries and the creation of CEDC.


\textsuperscript{427} Slovak MoD Official. E-mail interview by author. September 2014.; Hungarian MoD Official. Interview by author. December 2011.
CONCLUSIONS
The research questions of my thesis ask why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU? What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU? To answer these questions for the case of CEDC I tested the three rival explanations, which I operationalized in the Research Framework chapter. One of the rival explanations says that the studied MDCs including CEDC were created, because the participating states of the MDCs were dissatisfied with the progress of defence co-operation in NATO and the EU. The second one assumes that the financial crisis had a negative impact on the defence budgets of these states that forced them to find alternative multinational solutions to maintain their national military capabilities. The third rival explanation supposes that the participating countries of the MDCs created new co-operative frameworks, because they shared the same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s) and they allied against this threat and institutionalized this alliance by establishing CEDC. For figuring out, whether any of the studied rival explanations could explain the creation of the studied MDCs I operationalized them. I developed independent, intervening and dependent variables for them and set prerequisites for each of the variables, which had to be verified for proving them right.

The first rival explanation’s independent variable was the ‘Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ which, according to the rival explanation, leads through the intervening variable of ‘CEDC countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ to the dependent variable of ‘Creation of CEDC’. Although, the prerequisite of the independent variable was verified during my research, the prerequisite of the intervening variable was not, thus the independent variable could not be the cause of the dependent variable. This means that there was a lack of progress in NATO and EU regarding defence co-operation, but CEDC countries were not dissatisfied with this situation, and they did not establish CEDC for this reason. Accordingly, taking into consideration the findings concerning this rival explanation, we can conclude that dissatisfaction with EU/NATO was not a factor in creating CEDC. The situation seems to be quite the opposite, because many CEDC countries perceived CEDC as a platform, which might help to fulfil their EU and NATO obligations. CEDC countries believed that they could contribute with their
co-operation in CEDC to NATO’s Smart Defence and EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives. Therefore, we can say that CEDC countries intended to give answers to the new requirements of EU’s and NATO’s initiatives by collaborating in CEDC.

The second rival explanation’s independent variable is ‘CEDC defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’, the intervening variable is ‘Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’, while the dependent variable is ‘Creation of CEDC’. This rival explanation assumes that because of the defence budget cuts, CEDC countries realized that they needed alternative multinational solutions, and the multinational solution for their decreasing defence budget was the creation of CEDC. In regard to this rival explanation I verified that although significant defence budget cuts happened in all CEDC countries, this phenomenon did not facilitate the establishing of CEDC. CEDC armed forces rather intended to solve their budgetary problems in national ways by rationalizing themselves and cutting defence expenses and not in multinational format. Thus, the CEDC countries, except Hungary, did not search for multinational solutions for alleviating their budget constraints. My research highlighted that CEDC countries had very different motives for joining CEDC, and their levels of enthusiasm towards CEDC also varied, but most of them did not perceive scarce resources as the main reason for creation CEDC.

The third rival explanation presumes that the CEDC countries perceived the same national security threats as the largest threat by all of the studied countries (independent variable), and they began to ally against this threat by discussing on and co-operating to counter this threat (intervening variable), and finally they institutionalized this alliance by establishing CEDC (dependent variable). Based on their national security documents we could see that the CEDC countries shared six national threats, but they did not begin to discuss and co-operate on these threats. Many CEDC countries either began to co-operate on certain threats in other sub-regional formats, or they have already co-operated in existing frameworks or they did not begin multinational co-operation on certain threats at all. In addition, the interviews conducted with officials of CEDC countries also support the findings that shared threat perceptions did not have a major role in establishing CEDC. Accordingly, the creation of CEDC cannot be linked to the dependent variable of this rival explanation.
We could see that my research concluded that none of the rival explanations have explanatory power over the creation of CEDC. The actual empirically based pattern (see Figure 13) rather suggests that two new independent variables played the most important roles in establishing CEDC. The first one is that the EU and NATO generated a milieu via the Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing initiatives that supported the creation of sub-regional MDCs. This milieu facilitated the CEDC countries to co-operate on NATO and EU multinational projects (intervening variable). The other independent variable highlights that all CEDC countries had their individual motivations to co-operate in a CEDC format. These motivations varied country by country, but all CEDC countries had a particular interest to participate in this collaborative framework.

![Figure 13 – Empirically Based CEDC pattern](image)

What kind of implications the case of the CEDC countries has on the research questions? Namely why have CEDC countries established CEDC, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU? What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU? My research pointed out that CEDC countries did not perceive CEDC as an alternative to NATO and EU, rather it was deemed an opportunity to support NATO’s and EU’s new initiatives. Accordingly, we can conclude that NATO’s and EU’s initiatives created a milieu, which supported the creation of MDCs on capability development, and this environment highly facilitated the creation of CEDC. Thus, the policies of NATO and EU may play a highly important role and can encourage significantly the creation of sub-regional MDCs. This case also showed that although the identification of common themes in establishing MDCs can help to understand certain processes, we have to take into consideration the individual interests and
motivations of participating countries as well to understand fully the dynamics behind the creation of defence co-operations.
CHAPTER 5.
The Lancaster House Treaties

Two treaties on the deepening of security and defence co-operation between France and the United Kingdom, known as the Lancaster House Treaties, were signed by French President Nicholas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron at 10 Downing Street on 2nd November 2010. While one of the two treaties focused on co-operation regarding defence capability development, research and development on military technologies, defence industry, defence market and also on military operations, the other one facilitated nuclear collaboration between Paris and London. The two treaties, as we will see in this chapter, were deemed historical by both politicians and analysts thanks to their comprehensiveness and their implications to nuclear issues.

However, the question arises why Britain and France created the Lancaster House Treaties for bilateral co-operation, when they, together with other Allies, also had the opportunity to co-operate within existing NATO and/or EU frameworks. With regards to capability development and R&D they could have opted for collaboration either in EDA or in the several dedicated NATO agencies instead. Alternatively, they could have chosen the pre-existing Pooling & Sharing initiative of the EU launched in September 2010. Besides, they could have strengthened the co-operation in defence markets via the EU. The nuclear co-operation is the only issue, which did not have an appropriate EU or NATO structure in place for the type of co-operation France and Britain sought for. Although NATO has the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), France is not member of it. In addition, NPG does not discuss the creation of joint facilities and the kind of practical collaborations the two countries agreed on. Moreover, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which has the authority to foster nuclear co-operation in Europe, only dealing with the peaceful application of nuclear

428 Besides the Lancaster House Treaties, which I am elaborating upon in this chapter, a very similarly named Lancaster House Agreement also exists. The latter was the end product of conferences which resulted in the recognition of the independence of Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe) in 1979.


energy. Accordingly, Britain and France had several opportunities to co-operate on the issues the Lancaster House Treaties implied, except the nuclear ones, in EU and/or NATO institutional frameworks. The question is why they did not do so given that this was the mainstream approach during the 2000s as we have seen it in the literature review?

This chapter attempts to answer this question by comparing the three rival explanations elaborated in the research framework chapter with the empirically based one. First, the chapter introduces the Lancaster House Treaties in more details, the second part delineates the historical background of British-French defence cooperation putting the current events into context. In the last part, based on the first two sections, I compare the three operationalized, predicted rival patterns with the empirically based pattern by checking whether the assumptions developed to each rival explanation in the research framework chapter came true before the signing of the two Treaties. Thus, I attempt to identify the most applicable answer to the research question.

THE TREATIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

The two treaties signed by Sarkozy and Cameron in 2010 established the basis and a new general framework for defence co-operation between Britain and France. A separate joint Letter of Intent (LoI) was also signed by defence ministers of the two countries in which they agreed on a number of collaborative projects. The first part of this section focuses on the contents of the two treaties and the LoI, and the second part introduces how politicians and analysts interpreted the Lancaster House Treaties, and what kind of justifications they used regarding them. In addition, it also summarises the progress on defence co-operation that the two have made since.

The Treaties and the joint LoI

One of the two treaties determines the objectives and different aspects of the mechanism regarding Anglo-French defence co-operation.\textsuperscript{431} In the first article of the document, the two countries agree on five main objectives: 1) coordination on capability development, maintenance, procurement, facilities and equipment; 2) reinforcing the defence industry, co-operation in research and development; 3)
collaboration on common deployments; 4) co-operation on national (nuclear) deterrents; 5) supporting each other regarding actions in the UN, NATO and within CSDP. The later parts of the treaty omit discussing the last two issues almost entirely, and instead focus on the details of the first three objectives. Accordingly, it lays down several principles with regard to the common deployment of troops, about how the two states can access each other’s facilities or equipment, and it also sets some baselines for market access, costs and benefits of the joint projects as well as for the co-operation on defence industrial issues. The Treaty touches upon the issue of exchanging information on various aspects like consulting on future operations or sharing classified information. In addition, the agreement states that the ‘Parties undertake to consult before taking any decision on significant capability programmes or procurement’. Thus, we can see that the document sets the requirement of a very high level collaboration in pooling and sharing of military capabilities between France and Britain.

The Treaty also determines how the co-operation will be managed. The guidance for defence collaboration comes from the French President and the British Prime Minister. They can rely on the binational Senior Level Group (SLG), whose national delegations’ heads are directly appointed by the French President and the British Prime Minister. The SLG’s main task is to co-ordinate the preparations for the defence and security element of the British-French annual summit. The SLG adopts decisions in consensus and in this capacity determines the long-term aims and priorities of the co-operation, oversees the progress of respective projects, identifies new areas for co-operation and resolves the emerging disputes. The agreement strengthened the High Level Working Group for collaboration on armaments and industrial issues (established in 2006), but the HLWG has not directly been inserted in the mechanism mentioned above. Accordingly, co-operation is supervised and guided by the highest political level in both countries and their decision-making is supported by non-permanent working groups.

The second treaty focuses on co-operation on technologies related to the stewardship of nuclear stockpiles. In this regard, France and Britain agreed on exchanging classified information concerning the safety and security of nuclear

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432 Ibid. 4.
433 Ibid. 7.
434 France No. 02 (2010)
They also agreed to build and operate jointly a radiographic/hydrodynamic facility in France and a facility for radiography and diagnostics technology programmes in the United Kingdom. The facility in Britain was set to be operational by 2014, the first phase of the facility in France was due to be finished in 2014 with its second phase completed in 2016. While construction and operational costs of the facility in Britain are paid for by the UK, France is responsible for the same regarding the first phase of the facility on its soil. A joint team from both countries is responsible for the construction and operation of the facilities. Their activities are supervised by a steering committee, which is co-chaired by the Directeur des Applications Militaires and the Chief Scientific Adviser of the UK Ministry of Defence, who are serving as the Principals of the projects, and they are also responsible for coordinating the activities of other agencies at their home countries regarding this co-operation. They are to meet at least once a year, and will report to the SLG established in the other treaty. The two countries guarantee access for each other to the facilities for 50 years or until the date they mutually agree. While in the facility in France the experts from both countries will be able to conduct experiments in separated and jointly used areas, in the facility in Britain there will be only shared areas although there is no obligation to do joint projects only in any of the facilities.

A joint Letter of Intent and a Package of Joint Measures was also signed about a number of concrete projects in the framework of the first treaty described above. These were the following:

- Development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force: The 10,000 strong unit will be a bi-national, non-standing force and will imply elements of all three services: ‘a land component comprised of formations at national brigade level, maritime and air components with their associated headquarters, and logistics and support functions’.

- Co-operation on aircraft carriers: France and Britain decided to establish an integrated carrier strike group from the assets of both countries by the early 2020s. The aim is to achieve that at least one aircraft carrier of the two countries always be available for joint operations.

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• Common support to A400 transport aircrafts: The two countries agreed on developing a common support plan for the A400s to decrease related costs, moreover a bilateral Joint User Group has been established in order to enhance co-operation on training regarding A400s.

• Collaboration on development of submarine technologies and systems: The parties would develop jointly certain technologies and systems for the next generation nuclear submarines. The work would begin in 2011 with the goal to rationalize the two countries’ industrial base and save costs by ‘sharing of development activities, procurement methods and technical expertise’.436

• Maritime mine countermeasures: France and Britain agreed to harmonize their plans concerning the development of ‘elements of mine countermeasures equipment and systems’.437 A common project team was set to be established in 2011 to discuss the details of a prototype mine countermeasures system.

• Co-operation on future military satellite communication: The two states decided to develop a joint concept study in 2011 about the possibilities of collaborating on military communication capabilities for their satellites entering into service between 2018 and 2022.

• Air-to-air refuelling and military air transport: The parties study the possibilities of how the UK’s Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft programme’s potential spare capacities could be used by France for air-to-air refuelling and military air transport tasks.

• Collaboration on Unmanned Air Systems: Britain and France agreed to work together on the development of the next generation of Medium Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Air Surveillance Systems. A jointly funded, competitive assessment phase was to be launched in 2011 to deliver a new UAV between 2015 and 2020. Several options have been drafted for long term co-operation in this field as well.

• Defence industrial co-operation: The two countries agreed on a 10-year strategic plan for the British and French Complex Weapons sector. They

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436 Ibid.
437 Ibid.
intended to create a single European prime contractor and achieve up to 30% efficiency savings. Many joint weapon projects (e.g. on anti-surface missile, cruise missiles, short range air defence technologies) were set to start in 2011.

- Research and technology: The two biggest military powers in Europe decided to continue their R&T co-operation with a 100 million Euro annual budget providing 50 million Euros by each of them. The co-operation would focus mostly on the areas mentioned earlier (satellite communications, UAVs, naval systems, weapon projects) but would also include new areas like sensors, electronic warfare, materials etc.
- Cyber security and counter-terrorism: Britain and France agreed upon strengthening their co-operation regarding cyber security and created a framework to coordinate their collaboration in this field.
- The parties agreed on a series of issues concerning counter-terrorism co-operation from the early detection of terrorist activities through sharing information on changes in the national threat level to the prevention of CBRN terrorism, security of commercial aviation and many more.

The two treaties and the joint LoI show that Britain and France aspired to achieve a deep but practical co-operation avoiding the creation of unnecessary bureaucratic institutions. They rather focused on concrete projects which can be beneficial for both of them in the mid- to long-term.

The official justification for the agreements emphasized the commonality of the two countries and thus it was claimed that Britain and France were ‘natural partners in security and defence’.438 According to the official argument, this natural partnership was based on four main common characteristics of the two countries. First, the United Kingdom and France were members of the same formal and informal groups, as they were permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, they were NATO and EU members and were also members of the group of nations, which possess nuclear weapons. Second, they spent the most on defence in Europe and they were the European countries that were willing to use military force in international politics. This is underpinned by the fact that they had the 3rd and 4th

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438 Ibid.
biggest defence budgets in the world,\textsuperscript{439} which altogether provided 50\% of all European defence expenditure.\textsuperscript{440} In addition, UK and France invested two thirds of the budgets for defence research and technology in Europe. Moreover, they were contributing the most to international military operations and were ‘able and ready to fulfil the most demanding military missions’\textsuperscript{441} as well. Third, they faced the same ‘new challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, terrorism, cyber attack, maritime and space security’.\textsuperscript{442} Lastly, they stated that the UK and France could not imagine a serious security threat that would not impact on them both. At the same time, both politicians and several analysts emphasized that the treaties and the LoI were of historical importance. The French President Nicholas Sarkozy said that the ‘unprecedented’ agreement showed ‘a level of trust and confidence between the two countries never equalled in history’\textsuperscript{443} and commentaries in the press also called the deal ‘unprecedented’ and ‘historic’.\textsuperscript{444}

\textbf{The Implications of the Treaties}

In the short term the most tangible impact of the treaties was on the co-operation of the two countries regarding military operations especially in Libya but also to some extent in Mali and the Central African Republic. The Libyan situation seemed to be escalating into a full scale civil war during early 2011, thus a Western-led military intervention began on 19 March 2011 to enforce an arms embargo with a naval blockade and implement a no-fly zone over Libya, preventing Muammar Gaddafi’s forces from attacking its own citizens from the air. Although, the operation became a NATO one after a few days, it was initially led by France and the UK with the support of the United States. As a result, many commentators and analysts perceived


\textsuperscript{440} Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ”UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration.”

\textsuperscript{441} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{442} Ibid.


the conflict as a ‘French and British War’. Britain and France were not only the biggest proponents of the intervention and coordinated effectively their diplomatic efforts in the UN, but they also provided the most troops and assets for the operations. Perceptions about the results of the Libyan intervention are mixed, but it clearly had a very positive effect on British-French defence relations. The Libyan conflict proved for many people in the British and French foreign and security establishment that the two countries could work and fight together. This sentiment was shown in the 2012 UK-France declaration on security and defence which stated that ‘our cooperation in Libya has been a defining moment – and one on which we will continue to build in the future’.

The situation was different in Mali and in the Central African Republic, where France intervened alone and British contributions to these operations remained limited. In January 2013 after the government of Mali asked for military assistance to take back the Northern part of the country from separatists, France quickly deployed 4000 troops and fighter jets to assist the Malian government. Before the beginning of the French intervention, Francois Hollande called David Cameron and asked him to support the French operations in Mali. The British prime minister contributed to the French efforts by two C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft and a Sentinel R1 surveillance plane, in addition he promised to send 40 military trainers to assist the Mali Army in

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the framework of the EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM).\textsuperscript{450} Later the number of British troops supporting the French increased to 330 with the majority focusing on training those West African soldiers who would take over tasks from the French in Mali.\textsuperscript{451} In December 2013, France sent additional 600 troops to the Central African Republic in order to reinforce the 1000 French troops already stationing there in response to the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation. There a serious religious conflict between Christians and Muslims resulted in the fleeing of hundreds of thousands of people. The United Kingdom assisted France by providing a C-17 transport aircraft.\textsuperscript{452} Although, the French probably expected bigger contributions from the British, still Britain was the fastest and most generous contributor to the French operations in Africa. Moreover, it provided capabilities that the French lacked.

Besides operations, another very visible manifestation of the Treaties has been the surge in Franco-British military exercises, mostly related to development of the 10 000 strong Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). The first major French-British military exercise after signing the Lancaster House Treaties was ‘Flandres 2011’ which took place in Mailly-le-Camp, France in June 2011. Altogether 1050 French and 450 British military and civilian personnel took part in this event in order to identify the areas where significant work was needed to enhance the ability of the two armed forces to fight together.\textsuperscript{453} During 2012 some British and French units trained together at the company level using facilities in both France and the United Kingdom\textsuperscript{454}. The biggest British-French exercise of 2012 was conducted off Corsica in October, when 2600 British and 2400 French army, navy and air force personnel had been deployed on 11 surface ships and a submarine to practice joint naval and


amphibious manoeuvres. In 2013 the frequency of common British-French trainings and the usage of each other’s facilities increased significantly. Among others one company of the Commando Royal Marines took part in the exercise of French Marines, ten French military cadets had an internship in the British Army’s rapid reaction force (16 Air Assault Brigade), French units participated in a British live firing artillery exercise, 200 French troops, 43 vehicles, four helicopters, two landing craft and a catamaran practiced amphibious tasks on Hampshire Beach in the United Kingdom and thereafter they used British training facilities. In addition, 300 French paratroopers parachuted together with 1300 British soldiers in Scotland, and French Mirage 2000 and RAF Typhoons fighter jets exercised together in the UK.

Even though the nuclear co-operation between the two countries is not so visible and is not covered by the press, they are ongoing according to the plans and will generate savings for both London and Paris. The progress in this regard is remarkable, especially if we take into consideration that nuclear co-operation is one of the most sensitive projects in the Lancaster House Treaties.

However, although the collaboration between France and the United Kingdom is quite successful regarding operations, training, creation of the CJEF and nuclear issues, there has not been significant progress in terms of joint capability development. According to Edgar Buckley, who was senior vice president of Thales and also took part in the work of the UK-French High Level Working Group, ‘joint procurement has not yet become a reality, with a strong tendency on both sides to

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judge each co-operative opportunity separately on its merits rather than within the overall context of the treaty.”  

Although certain major joint projects had been discussed between London and Paris, implementation has not begun, and even the targeted 100 million Euro annual budget for common R&T projects has not been spent. Buckley points out that only co-operation in the area of Complex Weapons met with success, but this co-operation, especially on missiles, had been quite effective much before the Treaties were signed.

For instance, the biggest project laid down in the Letter of Intent in 2010, the co-operation on aircraft carriers suffered significant problems, because the UK decided to switch back to the short take off and vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), instead of the conventional variants which would have been compatible with the French Charles De Gaulle aircraft carrier’s launching and landing systems. Thus, the British and French aircraft carriers will not going to be able to operate each other’s aeroplanes. That said it will not prevent them from coordinating the operating cycles of the aircraft carriers and providing escorts to each other. Although it seemed that there would be great potential in the co-operation on UAVs. On the French-UK Summit of 2014 Prime Minister Cameron and French President Hollande agreed on launching 120 million GBP worth feasibility studies for future combat air systems involving six companies. The main aim of this work is to provide concepts and technologies for Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, and it will only be decided after the two years long feasibility phase whether the two countries would wish to co-operate on the demonstration and manufacturing phases. However, with regard to the medium altitude long endurance (MALE) drones France finally decided to buy the American Reaper off-the-shelf. Besides these, there are several other projects where practical co-operation is going on (e.g. the anti-ship missile Sea

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463 Ibid.
464 Ibid.
465 Ibid.
Venom, an anti-mine underwater system, Future combat air systems), but there has not been a breakthrough in major capability development projects yet.

**BRITISH-FRENCH RELATIONS AND DEFENCE CO-OPERATION BEFORE THE LANCASTER HOUSE TREATIES**

British-French relations have always been complicated, and during the last centuries France and the United Kingdom competed more than co-operated with each other, thus the mutual suspicion of these two countries is not surprising. Nevertheless, the two countries share very similar values and cultural attitude; in addition, they were allies during the two World Wars and during the 1956 Suez crisis. However, as Philippe Chassaigne and Michael Dockrill very diplomatically stated, ‘in spite of all these encouraging elements, the history of the last 100 years [1898-1998] of Franco-British relations is marked by difficulties, such they appeared on more than one occasion to be hardly possible to overcome’. Still they also point out that ‘with the benefit of hindsight, we can see now that most of these crises, however acute they seemed to be at the time, were in fact nothing more than gut reaction’. Among others, the rivalry for colonies during the early 1900s, the great crisis in Franco-British central bank relations between the two world wars and the ‘Problem of de Gaulle’ during the Cold War did not help to foster a better understanding and creating an appropriate environment for defence co-operation either. Even before World War II, when Britain and France should have prepared together for defeating Nazi Germany, their military doctrines were basically focused on how to buck pass the costs of defence to each other.

The Franco-British defence relations during the Cold War were described by Jean Chabaud as ‘succession of misunderstandings and missed opportunities’. He points out that ‘there were many occasions on which the French and British positions

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469 Ibid.
471 Ibid. 4.
could have been identical. However, prejudices and misunderstandings prevented this. Accordingly, the foreign and defence policies of the two countries diverged significantly during the Cold War despite the two countries signing a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance in Dunkirk in 1947, both of them were founding members of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948 and NATO in 1949. The roots of the divergence can be traced back to before and during World War Two, stemming from different world views, experiences and different relations with the United States. For instance, while after the Second World War Britain remained a great power and forged a very strong relationship on every level with the United States, France felt humiliated and wanted to restore its greatness which it believed had been lost during the war. The situation became more complicated as the French believed that after the World War II they would be degraded to a servile status towards the United States. In addition, Washington distrusted Charles de Gaulle – the leader of the Free French during the war and President of France later – from the beginning, what in turn also had a negative impact on de Gaulle’s views about Americans. These dynamics had an impact on the relations of Britain and France, and among others de Gaulle had the impression ‘that the British […] would never stand up to the Americans’.

After the Second World War both Britain and France were in similar positions in the sense that they had to handle their relative declining power and both knew that they needed the United States for that. The United Kingdom decided to become a kind of ‘loyal courtier’ of the United States in order to be able to persuade Americans to make the British policy their own. Although France was convinced too that the United States had to be involved in European affairs via some transatlantic structure, Paris wanted to create a European organization where France was in a dominant position, from where it could be able to speak with Washington on an equal basis and make an end of its inferior status. However, the evolution of NATO did not favour France, which led to repeated French disillusionments in the Alliance – NATO did not

476 Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the President of the French republic, Cm 8217, 1946-47. Ratified and came into force 8 September 1947.
478 Ibid. 247.
provide help in France’s colonial wars, NATO rearmed Germany, Anglo-Saxons dominated the organization\(^{479}\) and the United States who did not provide ‘sufficient’ military aid to Paris and humiliated France again during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

These processes led to France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966, and put France and Britain to different paths on many aspects of defence policy. France decided to become an independent great power to restore its greatness, thus followed a distinctive foreign policy from that of the United States and overtook the lead in the integration process of the EC/EU. Parallel with these Paris developed, its indigenous doctrines and weapon systems in every area independently from NATO and the United States. At the same time the United Kingdom put NATO into the focal point of its defence policy, co-operated more intensively with the United States on foreign and defence policy, and when London could not allocate the appropriate resources for the development of certain military technologies, it procured them from Washington. In addition, in the framework of NATO Britain followed and adjusted to US military doctrines as well.

Despite the aforementioned processes, Franco-British defence relations never ceased during the Cold War. The closest military co-operation between them was Operation Musketeer in 1956, when Franco-British troops invaded Egypt to take over the Suez Canal\(^{480}\). From the 1960s the two countries co-operated on several armament programmes like the Martel missile, the Jaguar aircraft, the Lynx, Puma and Gazelle helicopters.\(^{481}\) However, later both countries embarked on multilateral armament programmes instead of bilateral ones and, besides the previously mentioned collaborations of the 1960s, they did not initiate other British-French major armaments programmes during the Cold War. In 1962 the two countries discussed the possibility of an ‘entente nucléaire’, a framework where they could combine their nuclear forces and could co-operate on developing technologies necessary for new nuclear weapon systems. However, at the same time the United States offered Polaris missiles for both countries, and while Britain accepted the American offer, France

\(^{479}\) Ibid. 254-262.


declined it. In the subsequent years the idea of nuclear cooperation emerged between London and Paris on several occasions, but it did not take root.\textsuperscript{482}

British-French relations became more institutionalized after 1976, when the annual Franco-British summit was established. That year London and Paris also signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Placing of Services and Facilities of the Government of the French Republic at the Disposal of British Forces in times of crisis’.\textsuperscript{483} In the long term these Franco-British summits significantly helped to improve defence co-operation between the two states, which culminated in the agreement of 1982, when Paris and London decided that their defence ministers would meet twice a year. Two years later at the 1984 Franco-British summit the parties also agreed on that none of them would begin any new armaments programme without discussing it with the other.\textsuperscript{484} However, they could not agree on the development of a new fighter aircraft with the result that the French developed the Rafale whilst the British participated in the development of the multinational Eurofighter.

The end of the Cold War transformed the strategic environment significantly and opened up new windows of opportunity for many new defence collaborations in Europe as we have seen an overview in the Literature Review. Co-operation this time was driven mostly by decreasing European defence budgets, newly emerging military technologies, new tasks – expeditionary warfare – for the European armed forces and the joint allied operations of the 1990s (the Gulf War in 1991, peace support operations on the Balkans in the 1990s and the Kosovo War in 1999). These processes affected the British-French relations as well and created the momentum for an improvement of defence co-operation between London and Paris, which was never seen during the Cold War. Thus, a series of British-French bilateral agreements and initiatives regarding defence were established during the 1990s and the 2000s:\textsuperscript{485}

- In 1992 the Anglo-French Joint Nuclear Commission was established, which became the main forum for discussion on nuclear issues between the two countries.

\textsuperscript{483} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{484} Jean Chabaud, “The prospects for Franco-British co-operation.” 155-166.
• In 1995 the Franco-British European Air Group was created. (The membership of this initiative was extended later and currently it is called ‘European Air Group’, where seven European nations are co-operating on air defence training and reciprocal air support.)

• In 1996 the Franco-British Joint Commission on Peacekeeping was established for harmonizing the doctrines and procedures of the two armed forces regarding peace support operations. In the same year a Letter of Intent was signed on maritime co-operation. In the LoI France and the United Kingdom established 20 working groups to study among others amphibious operations, operational doctrine and personnel exchanges and also aircraft carrier development.

• In 1997 a Letter of Intent between the British and French armies was signed.

• In 1998 a Franco-British Joint Declaration was adopted at St. Malo which declared that the European Union ‘must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force’\(^{486}\). This declaration created the basis for the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU.

• In 2000 a Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operative Defence Research and Technology was updated by the two countries which covered several co-operative initiatives between the UK and France (e.g. jet engines and airborne radar, armoured fighting vehicles, ship propulsion systems). In the same year France and Britain together with Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden signed a Letter of Intent on the Framework Agreement on Defence Industrial Restructuring.

• At the Franco-British Summit of 2003 the two countries reached an agreement on further defence co-operation both bilaterally and in an EU framework. On this occasion, they agreed upon improving their co-operation on aircraft carriers, proposed the creation of the European Defence Agency and suggested that the EU should take over the NATO operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• In 2006 the United Kingdom and France agreed to co-operate on future aircraft carrier design and established a High Level Bilateral Working

\(^{486}\) Franco-British Summit Joint declaration on European Defense Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998
Group for studying the possibilities for improving the collaboration on current and future armament programmes between the two states

- At the 2008 summit London and Paris decided to co-operate on the A400 transport aircrafts, initiated a joint helicopter trust fund, proposed the creation of European carrier group interoperability and a joint industrial strategy for complex weapons.
- In 2009 the UK and France proposed initiatives on UAVs and next generation military communication satellites.

In addition, France and the UK have also co-operated with other countries on several armament programmes. Good examples for this are the British-French-Italian PAAMs surface-to-air missile system for destroyers and the Meteor air-to-air missiles for the Eurofighter Typhoons and A400s.487

However, not every collaborative effort was beneficial for both countries and in some cases there were misperceptions about the intentions of the other. For instance, the UK withdrew from the British-French-Italian Horizon destroyer programme in 1999 and Britain developed the Type 45 destroyer instead.488 The UK also withdrew from the British-French-German Trigat Mr third-generation anti-tank missile programme in 2003 and instead procured American and Israeli weapon systems off the shelf.489 Furthermore, the UK and France occasionally saw the raison d’être of their common initiatives differently, which later caused misunderstandings between them and could slow their collaborations. The most obvious example is the St. Malo agreement, because while the initiative was seen by the British mostly as a capability development issue where CSDP could develop into the ‘European wing of NATO’, the French perceived the agreement as a political issue that would lead to a ‘European alternative to NATO’.490

To sum up, Franco-British defence collaborations during the Cold War were the exceptions rather than the rule, while at the same time the institutional framework for a fruitful co-operation had been laid down already during the 1970s and 1980s

488 Ibid.
thanks to the establishment of the Franco-British summits and the regular defence ministerial meetings. However, only the geopolitical changes that stemmed from the fall of the Soviet Union and the new tasks undertaken by the armed forces in the 1990s that created the proper environment for a much closer Franco-British co-operation.

**CREATING LANCASTER HOUSE TREATIES INSTEAD OF CO-OPERATING WITHIN NATO AND EU**

Having introduced the Lancaster House treaties, this part attempts to answer the question why France and the United Kingdom chose to co-operate bilaterally in the framework of the Lancaster House treaties instead of within the framework of NATO and/or EU. Revealing the dynamics why certain countries opt for MDCs instead of co-operation in NATO and EU is relevant per se, but the relevance of the Lancaster House treaties excel from other currently created or reenergized MDCs in Europe. Its reason is that the United Kingdom and France have often functioned as the engines of NATO and the EU’s defence policy for the last decades, and invested huge amount of resources and energies into them. Accordingly, it is even more important to figure out why these two countries, that have such prominent roles in NATO and EU, decided to co-operate in an MDC in 2009 instead in one of the two institutions they nurtured.

**The role of the United Kingdom and France in NATO and EU/CSDP**

Since the beginning of the Cold War the United Kingdom has been the ‘staunchest supporter of the Atlantic Alliance as the dominant organisation for the provision of military security’\(^{491}\) in Europe, and has been the second most influential member of NATO after the United States\(^{492}\). In addition, after the 1975 defence review NATO and European defence became irrevocably the focal point of British defence policy, as the UK had to abandon the vast majority of its overseas commitments and bases because of financial constraints\(^{493}\). Even after the Cold War the central objective of British defence policy was to make sure that NATO would remain the continent’s


\(^{492}\) Ibid.

principal defence organization. Thus, the UK not only undertook the responsibility of the framework nation of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in 1991, but played a highly important role in the transformation of NATO to adapt to the new strategic environment of the 1990s and 2000s and among others London was a major actor in the NATO-led Kosovo war.494

Britain has also been highly active in creating the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (currently it is called as Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP). Until the late 1990s London was against a strengthened WEU or EU that considered military security issues, as Britain did not see the rational of duplicating NATO’s military capabilities in another institution and was not sure that a uniquely European formation in the military domain without the United States would work at all. In addition, with the possible emergence of an alternative defence forum London did not want to lose its influence enjoyed through NATO.495 However, Britain became more and more frustrated about the lack of progress in European capability development within NATO, and at the same time London received messages from the US that without serious capability development in Europe NATO’s existence could be questioned.496 Therefore, the Blair government attempted to facilitate military capability development via the EU as well, thus the idea of the Franco-British St. Malo agreement of 1998, which became the founding document of CSDP was Tony Blair’s initiative and did not come from the French part.497 Similarly, in the coming years Britain not only actively contributed to various initiatives aimed at strengthening EU defence – like adopting the Helsinki Headline Goal, the Capability Action Plan, the European Security Strategy, and framing Permanent Structured Cooperation –, but initiated and introduced the concept of the EU Battlegroups and together with France pushed the establishment of the European Defence Agency.498

Despite the fact that France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command structure in 1966, Paris has contributed significantly to NATO’s efforts since the end of the Cold War and even before the fall of the Berlin wall maintained a

494 Rees, Preserving the Security of Europe. 60-61.
495 Ibid. 62.
497 Presentation of Gérard Paul Errera on ’Saint Malo at 15’ Lecture/Public Talk, Royal College of Defence Studies, Seaforf House, 37 Belgrave Square, London SW1X 8NS, 3 december 2013 (18:30-19:45)
498 O’donell, ”Britain’s Coalition Government and EU Defence Cooperation,” 420-421.
much closer relationship with the Atlantic Alliance as it was widely believed. France not only kept its seat at the North Atlantic Council in the major political decision-making body of NATO, but French contact groups co-operated with NATO’s regional commands from the end of the 1960s, France planned to place its forces under NATO operational control during a major European war, participated in joint manoeuvres with NATO forces and discussed military questions like nuclear deterrence with NATO.499 Right after the Cold War the question of France’s reintegration to NATO was raised and with the leadership of Jacque Chirac the reintegration attempt was almost successful in 1996-1997. However, the French wanted a bigger share from the command post allocations (among others the position of the commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe) than NATO members and especially the United States was willing to provide for Paris, thus France’s reintegration to NATO was not achieved that time. Still, a process of ‘creeping integration’ to NATO has been intensified on behalf of France and the practical co-operations between NATO and France have increased significantly.500 To the end of the 2000s France became the biggest contributing nation to NRF, its contribution to NATO’s budget was the third in tie with the UK,501 additionally France was among the top five troop contributors to NATO operations.502 Eventually, France fully re-integrated to NATO in 2009 under Nicolas Sarkozy.503

With regard to the European Union’s defence policy France has always been its biggest proponent. As Trine Flockhart puts ‘all French governments since the early 1950s have held that French dominated European integration process would boost not only European but also French influence internationally.’504 Naturally, it was true for defence policy as well. After the end of the Cold War, France intended to create a ‘European pillar’ in the NATO structure during the 1990s under the European

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503 However some exceptions still apply to France: France’s nuclear forces remained under national control, France maintains control over its troops in military operations and French troops remain under national control in peacetime. Ghez and Larrabee, “France and NATO,” 81.
Security and Defence Identity. However, after the unsuccessful French attempt for reintegration into NATO, France began to focus on creating a defence arm for the EU. After the St. Malo agreement France was the main engine and played a crucial role for establishing ESDP and it would be too much to list how much France have done for creating institutions, capabilities, strategy for and starting operations in the aegis of ESDP/CSDP.\(^{505}\)

As this part demonstrated, France and Britain were highly interested in NATO’s and CSDP’s success and invested significant amount of resources in them. We can conclude that these two countries have played a central role in formulating those processes that positioned NATO and EU at the heart of European defence cooperation through setting the agendas, designing and launching new initiatives and providing the necessary expertise and resources for them. Thus, it is highly important to know, why they have recently decided to co-operate in an MDC rather than in either NATO or EU as they have done it earlier.

**Why the United Kingdom and France opted for co-operating in an MDC?**

Based on my Research Framework chapter I am applying multiple case design to figure out why the countries in the studied cases created new MDCs instead of using NATO and EU defence co-operative frameworks. For this I test three rival explanations concerning every case. Thus, I try to identify the prerequisites of the operationalized generic predicted patterns of the three rival explanations regarding the Lancaster House Treaties. Accordingly, if I can identify all the prerequisites of one of the developed rival explanations regarding the Lancaster House Treaties, we can conclude that this rival explanation can sufficiently explain why the UK and France established the Lancaster House Treaties and not collaborated in NATO or EU. The three rival explanations are 1) the lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states.

Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation

Figure 14 – Rival Explanation 1: Predicted Lancaster House Treaties Pattern

According to ‘Rival Explanation 1’, the adoption of Lancaster House Treaties’ main reason (see Figure 14) is that defence co-operation in EU and NATO had not evolved appropriately (independent variable), thus France and the United Kingdom became dissatisfied with the co-operations in NATO and EU (intervening variable). This rival explanation argues that these independent and intervening variables lead to the adoption of Lancaster House treaties. I developed three prerequisites for verifying ‘Rival Explanation 1’. The prerequisites are the following:

1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be identified.
2. The British and French dissatisfaction concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected.
3. The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to both France’s and Britain’s dissatisfaction with NATO/EU.

If these prerequisites are identifiable, we can conclude that “Rival Explanation 1” has explanatory power concerning the case of Lancaster House Treaties.

Prerequisite 1:
The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation within the EU and NATO needs to be identified.

This is the only prerequisite among the prerequisites of the three rival explanations, which is not directly associated with the participating states of the studied MDCs. In addition, the lack of progress concerning the relevant EU and NATO defence cooperation – especially in the area of military capability development – was introduced and demonstrated in the Literature Review chapter. Thus, in this section I am not going to repeat the events and processes in this regard, but based on the Literature Review chapter I will take Prerequisite 1 of Rival Explanation 1 as a given regarding every case.
Accordingly, Prerequisite 1 based on the Literature Review is confirmed.

Prerequisite 2:

*The British and French dissatisfaction concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected.*

The United Kingdom and France have had different institutional preferences regarding defence co-operation. While Britain’s priority has been defence collaboration mostly via NATO, France attempted to facilitate an autonomous European defence via EU’s ESDP/CSDP. However, both countries became dissatisfied and frustrated by the lack of progress in NATO and EU mostly because of the lack of contribution by many of the other European countries. Although this dissatisfaction was present in both countries, the United Kingdom was more discontent with the evolution of defence cooperation in the two multilateral organizations than France, or at least London was more willing to express its opinion openly in this regard.

The United Kingdom has been dissatisfied with its European allies and their contribution to defence for long time. As mentioned earlier, in the late 1990s one of the main reasons why Britain supported the launch of ESDP was that European nations were not willing to invest more into military capabilities via NATO and the United States sent very clear messages that Washington would lose its interest in the Atlantic Alliance, if Europeans did not want to provide more contribution in terms of military capabilities. Accordingly, Tony Blair initiated the St. Malo Agreement to facilitate Europeans to co-operate more on defence.  

During the 2000s the UK was at the centre of many of the NATO and EU defence co-operative initiatives and tried to convince and pressure its partners into taking defence issues more seriously. At that time, the UK focused on defence co-operation in terms of a contribution to NATO operations, especially in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the UK measured the collaborative efforts of its allies by their operational contributions and their level of defence budgets.

Several British Secretaries of Defence expressed their frustration openly about the lack of contribution of European nations to operations and their low-level defence

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506 Howorth, *Security and defence policy.*

budgets. Among others Defence Secretary Des Browne (Labour) stated in 2007 that ‘unless Europeans spend more on defence, and more of their defence budgets on capability, both NATO and the EU will be hamstrung. For Europe to have more capability its members must spend more – quite a lot more.’ In January 2009 Defence Secretary John Hutton (Labour) also expressed his dissatisfaction about the unwillingness of Europeans to provide an appropriate level of contribution to NATO’s operations in Afghanistan. He stated that

‘The campaign in Afghanistan is evidence of the limited appetite amongst some European member states for supporting the most active operation NATO has ever been tasked with. […] It isn't good enough to always look to the U.S. for political, financial and military cover. […] Freeloading on the back of U.S. military security is not an option if we wish to be equal partners in this trans-Atlantic alliance.’

The British view was that while only a few countries – including the UK – took the brunt of the dangerous tasks and the fighting in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the troops from most European NATO members were deployed to stable parts of the country and their caveats impeded to send them to combat missions. The United Kingdom was also highly dissatisfied not only because Europeans sent proportionately much fewer soldiers to Afghanistan than Britain, but because they were not willing to deploy vital equipment like helicopters either.

Liam Fox both as Conservative shadow and then Coalition Defence Secretary criticized European NATO members for their insufficient level of contribution to the Afghan mission and their low defence budgets. In 2007 as shadow defence secretary he accused Germany, Italy and Spain of ‘not fully playing their role’ in ISAF, and also suggested that the NATO membership of Poland and Hungary should be suspended as ‘they have come into NATO, pocketed the security guarantee and have cut defence spending.’ He stressed that NATO should ‘be able to suspend NATO

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members who do not spend the levels of funding that we agreed.” Fox as Defence Secretary was not so radical, but he consequently criticized NATO members whose defence budgets did not meet the 2% of GDP, which was agreed as a threshold by NATO members. He also pointed out that many NATO Allies were unwilling to deploy their soldiers and equipment on operations or if they did so with significant restrictions about how and where they could be used. Liam Fox’s opinion represented the British view well, when he mentioned only France, Turkey, Norway, Denmark and Estonia as worthy European partners concerning defence. Although, this message had been delivered after the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties, it was telling that Fox’s successors, Phillip Hammond, reiterated the Fox argument in 2012. ‘Too many countries are failing to meet their financial responsibilities to NATO, and so failing to maintain appropriate and proportionate capabilities. Too many are opting out of operations or contributing but a fraction of what they should be capable of.’ Such open and sustained criticism from successive British defence secretaries reflected the dissatisfaction of the British defence establishment disappointed with the defence collaborative efforts of many of their European allies in the second half of the 2000s and early 2010s.

This view has also been underpinned by other officials and official documents. For instance, Quentin Davies, the UK Minister for Defence Procurement expressed his frustration regarding the slow progress in both NATO and EU, as ‘collaboration within the NATO planning process has failed to produce joint kit requirements’ and ‘the European Defence Agency has not met early expectations’. In addition, the 2010 British Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) clearly prioritized bilateral defence cooperation over multilateral collaborations. Although the document says that the UK will look for partners and possibilities to ‘share capabilities, technologies and programmes, ensuring that collective resources can go further’, it

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511 Christopher, “Tories attack Nato members’ defence budgets,”
also emphasizes the UK’s preference toward bilateral collaborations in this regard. It stated that the UK ‘will focus particularly on building new models of practical bilateral cooperation’ and ‘will generally favour bilateral equipment collaboration or off-the-shelf purchase, because such arrangements are potentially more straightforward and more fruitful than complex multilateral agreements, which have delivered mixed results for us in the past.’\footnote{Ibid. 59-60.} This basically means that the UK decided that it would not take part actively in Europe wide (i.e. NATO and EU) pooling and sharing projects, because earlier multilateral projects did not provide satisfactory results.

French commitment to NATO had not been and could not be as strong as the UK’s, especially since Paris’ reintegration into NATO was only accomplished in 2009 and omitted French nuclear forces. France’s priority had been developing an autonomous European defence with French leadership possibly via ESDP/CSDP, thus it is understandable that France was more interested in the success of ESDP/CSDP and accordingly had more stake in it. With regard to France, officials did not criticize openly NATO and EU members as the British defence secretaries did, but during the second half of the 2000s French disillusionment on ESDP became clear. This can be identified as French attitude and policies have significantly changed towards ESDP/CSDP in this period. Among others Bastien Irondelle and Frédéric Mérand referring to several French experts\footnote{David Dominique, “France/OTAN: la dernière marche,” \textit{Politique étrangère} 2/2008, 429-441. doi:10.3917/pe.082.0429.; Louis Gautier, \textit{La Défense De La France Après La Guerre Froide - Politique Militaire Et Forces Armées Depuis 1989} (Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 2009).; Jean-Dominique Merchet, Défense Européenne, La Grande Illusion (Paris: Larousse, 2009).} point out that at the end of the 2000s ‘a certain degree of disenchantment’ with ESDP’s operational accomplishments and a disappointment concerning ESDP’s ‘institutional stagnation’ were perceivable on behalf of the French.\footnote{Bastien Irondelle and Frédéric Mérand, “France's return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?,” \textit{European Security} 19, no. 1. (2010): 33. doi:10.1080/09662839.2010.499362.} In addition, even the 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security mentioned ‘hopes and disappointments’\footnote{French Republic, The Office of French President, \textit{The French White Paper on Defence and National Security} (Paris, 2008), 20.} regarding ESDP, highlighting the French dissatisfaction with the evolution of ESDP. Accordingly, it is not surprising that President Sarkozy and his team seemed ‘convinced that ESDP has reached a plateau in the pre-2007 configuration’.\footnote{Irondelle and Mérand, „France's return to NATO,”33.} Thus, President Sarkozy
attempted to reinvigorate ESDP during the French EU Presidency in 2008 and had great ambitions for that: he intended to establish the core of a European military HQ and also wanted to revise the European Security Strategy. Furthermore, Sarkozy also intended to define the criteria of PESCO and thus improving European capabilities, which France supported consequently from the very beginning. However, none of these initiatives had been realized during the French Presidency due to various reasons.\textsuperscript{522}

This experience might have been revealing for President Sarkozy as he did not attempt to achieve any major goal regarding ESDP/CSDP in the future. The French disillusionment in ESDP/CSDP was also well indicated by later developments: in early 2010, when the Spanish EU Presidency put PESCO on the agenda again, France was not the champion of the issue anymore, but ‘took a much nuanced position’ on it and even ‘seemed no longer support the idea’.\textsuperscript{523}

Based on these it is not surprising that French politicians became more and more frustrated. Antoine Rayroux who conducted a comprehensive discourse analysis of French parliamentary debates about ESDP pointed out that while in the period of 2000-2007 the dominant discourse of members of parliament regarding ESDP was ‘enthusiastic and ambitious’ in 2008-2009 the debates showed disappointment.\textsuperscript{524} As he points out,

‘in 2008-2009, the discourse progressively turns more critical, as the first CSDP interventions overseas lack ambitions, industrial defence cooperation mostly happens at a bilateral level, and French MPs lament the fact that CSDP deals exclusively with overseas operations, not the defence of Europe. Several debates even suggest that the existence of a European defence should be called into question, with France’s return to NATO command structures and absence of new operations, cooperation, and European identity: “Europe of defence has broken down, and its achievements are particularly poor. ... And regarding European states’ reactions, let’s face it: defence is a priority for none of them” (Assemblée nationale 2009).\textsuperscript{525}


\textsuperscript{523} Biscop and Coelmont, “CSDP and the ‘Ghent Framework’,”, 153.


\textsuperscript{525} Ibid. 235-236.
Many analysts agree that one of the many reasons why Sarkozy finished the reintegration of France to NATO was the lack of progress in ESDP. French officials highlighted that French reintegration to NATO can be understood as St Malo II, because the logic behind it was very similar to Tony Blair’s move in the second half of the 1990s, when he supported the launch of ESDP because he wanted to facilitate European defence efforts this way. Now the situation was the other way around and France intended to do the same through reintegration into NATO, especially because the French defence establishment became convinced that via NATO Europeans might be more willing to develop their military capabilities.

In addition, with this step France could remove the obstacles caused by its lack of involvement in NATO’s integrated military structure. Although the United Kingdom was keen to launch ESDP in the late 1990s and early 2000s and then to develop its institutions and capabilities, the British view changed significantly to the mid-2000s and especially once the defence establishment became frustrated with the lack of contribution by many European nations via ESDP. Consequently, the United Kingdom ‘played an active blocking role’ regarding the development of many EU capabilities and institutions, because British officials saw them as possible duplication of NATO assets. Therefore, the French had a very strong incentive to minimize the conflicts with the United Kingdom, the biggest European military power, and accordingly Sarkozy chose to reintegrate almost fully to NATO. France’s reintegration into the Atlantic Alliance did not mean that Paris was fully satisfied with the functioning of the organization. Among others the French saw serious problems with the conduct of ISAF, and by 2010 had the fear that ‘the Lisbon summit threatens to be a complete waste of time, unable to challenge the bureaucratic drift plaguing the institution and the instigation of a document of little use’.

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527 Brickerton, “Oh bugger, they’re in the tent,” 120.
528 O’donnell, “Britain’s coalition government,” 428.
530 O’donnell, “Britain’s coalition government,” 423.
Despite these reservations, NATO became the primary organization for France regarding defence in the 2013 French White Paper,\textsuperscript{533} which is a significant shift compared to the 2008 White Paper, where the EU was still prioritized over NATO. Although the 2013 White Paper was published three years after the signing of Lancaster House Treaties, it reveals important tendencies about French defence policy between 2008 and 2013 when the two White Papers were published. In the 2013 White Paper, another important change regarding defence co-operation is that bilateral collaborations are mentioned several times in this document,\textsuperscript{534} while this aspect was almost totally ignored in the 2008 White Paper.\textsuperscript{535} However, in contrast to the British 2010 SDSR the 2013 French White Paper officially does not prioritize bilateral defence co-operation over multilateral ones regarding capability development. In addition, the document refers to both NATO’s Smart Defence and EU’s pooling and sharing initiatives several times, and declares that France intends to engage in them and highlights the role of European defence industry in this regard.\textsuperscript{536}

In sum, we can see that France became dissatisfied with the faltering progress of ESDP/CSDP and Paris has given a bigger role for NATO in its defence policy after the French reintegration to NATO. Accordingly, France has found itself in the strange situation when it began to invest in and focus on an organization (NATO) which it historically distrusted, and became frustrated and disappointed with another organization (EU’s CSDP) which it had created and nurtured, and often saw as a potential competitor of the former one.

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<td>France</td>
<td>Traditionally not interested,</td>
<td>Growing dissatisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>but growing interests after</td>
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<td></td>
<td>reintegration</td>
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\textit{Figure 15 – Dissatisfaction of the United Kingdom and France regarding NATO and ESDP/CSDP}

\textsuperscript{534} Ibid. 20., 52., 57., 64., 99., 103.
We can conclude that by 2010 both the United Kingdom and France grew generally dissatisfied with the progress regarding Europe wide defence co-operative efforts especially in the institutions which had been the most relevant for them (see Figure 15). For the UK, NATO has been the bedrock of defence policy, yet several British defence secretaries still criticized NATO members openly because of their inadequate defence efforts in the Afghanistan operations and their low level of defence budgets. In addition, the 2010 SDSR declared that bilateral cooperation on military equipment is the prioritized means for London. At the same time, Britain entirely lost its interest in ESDP because of its slow development and of the fear of duplicating capabilities and institutions in NATO. For France, ESDP was the priority during most of the 2000s and NATO had a smaller relevance for Paris, because among others France was not full member of the Alliance. Nevertheless, as ESDP stagnated and Paris could not reinvigorate this policy area even during the 2008 French EU Presidency, the French establishment became disenchanted regarding ESDP. One of the many reasons why Paris was willing to reintegrate to NATO was to facilitate the defence efforts of European nations and remove the obstacles of its partial NATO membership posed towards Atlanticist NATO members. However, because of the traditional French distrust felt towards the Atlantic Alliance, NATO could not take over entirely the place previously occupied by CSDP in French defence policy.

Based on the above detected dissatisfaction on behalf of the United Kingdom and France concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO, Prerequisite 2 has been confirmed.

Prerequisite 3:
The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to both to France’s and Britain’s dissatisfaction with NATO/EU.

As we have seen in the previous sections both Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 have been confirmed. This means that defence co-operation within the EU and NATO did not progress as expected (Prerequisite 1) and both Britain and France were dissatisfied with this situation (Prerequisite 2). This part investigates whether it was identifiable that the source of the creation of Lancaster House Treaties was the two countries’ aforementioned dissatisfaction concerning NATO and EU. As this part will show, both British and French officials and analysts considered the dissatisfaction of
the two countries regarding NATO and EU an important factor regarding the development of the Lancaster House Treaties.

As we have seen in the case of Britain the SDSR 2010 provides important information in this regard. This official strategic document of the British MoD was developed parallel with the Lancaster House Treaties and states that the UK is looking for ‘practical bilateral cooperation’ with countries possessing similar military posture as Britain or collaborating with the UK on operations. In addition, the SDSR also states that the UK favours bilateral or off-the-shelf solutions on equipment procurement, because ‘complex multilateral agreements (...) have delivered mixed results for us in the past’.537 Basically this means that, in general, the UK supports practical bilateral cooperation, and because of the British dissatisfaction with multilateral solutions, the United Kingdom opts for bilateral agreements over multilateral ones in the field of equipment cooperation. These requirements fit exactly to the Lancaster House Treaties.

Nevertheless, the connection between the Lancaster House Treaties and the British dissatisfaction with NATO and EU is not explicitly articulated in the document, and the dissatisfaction with multilateral frameworks is only expressed directly in terms of equipment cooperation. However, as one senior UK MoD official remarked ‘the curse of consensus’ in the EU and NATO frameworks had been perceived as a serious problem in the UK regarding defence cooperation.538 Thus, on behalf of the British the lack of progress in these two organizations were seen as an important factor when the Lancaster House Treaties were drafted, because British officials thought that with France, who had ‘broadly similar capabilities and strategy’ as the UK had, it would be ‘easier to do’ collaborative projects and making progress bilaterally than multilaterally within NATO or EU.539 Not only officials, but also British analysts expressed the view that ‘neither NATO nor the EU can offer the solution to the strategic dilemma both London and Paris face’540 and argued for stronger British-French bilateral defence cooperation because of this reason.

In the case of France, officials were not only dissatisfied with the developments in EU structures regarding defence collaboration, but for instance Vincent Thomassier, the defence procurement attaché at the French Embassy in

London, also expressed his frustration concerning the lack of progress in other pan-European structures like in MBDA as well. Referring to MBDA he said on the Franco-British Council Seminar in October 2009 that, ‘what we are doing is not enough. Three years ago we defined a common industrial strategy but I sense a frustration from the minister (...). We are not doing enough. Perhaps we are still too rich and the crisis isn’t pinching enough.’\footnote{Franco-British Council Seminar, report, 2-3.} This type of frustration regarding multinational defence cooperation was repeated by other French officials as well, and they also recognized that the capability development projects initiated by the 1998 St Malo agreement basically failed. As a senior French MoD official stated in an interview about the Lancaster House Treaties in December 2010 ‘France fought hard for EU defence structures for ten years. We are now in a new era of developing capabilities. If we cannot do that collectively as Europe then we need to look at other ways.’\footnote{Ben Jones, Franco-British Military Cooperation, 19.} In early 2011 a similar view was expressed by Benoit Gomis, former French MoD employee and research analyst at Chatham House that time, who highlighted that the ‘EU and other multilateral frameworks are clearly secondary to the 2010 UK-French agreements’.\footnote{Benoît Gomis, Franco-British Defence and Security Treaties: Entente While It Lasts? (London: Chatham House, 2011), 8.}

In hindsight, several analysts perceived that the frustration and dissatisfaction regarding the development in NATO and especially in EU had a major role in the creation of the bilateral Franco-British agreements in the form of the Lancaster House Treaties.\footnote{Biscop, “The UK and European defence,” 1297–1313; French Scholar Specializing on the Lancaster House Treaties. Interview by author. June 2014.; O’donell, “Britain’s coalition government,” 422-427.} As, for instance, Sven Biscop pointed out

‘the Lancaster House meeting looked more like St-Malo in reverse, aimed at bilateral rather than European cooperation. France in its public diplomacy tried to frame the agreements in a European narrative. But for the UK, Lancaster House represented a choice for bilateral cooperation with the only other European country perceived to matter, to the detriment of multilateral cooperation with partners seen more as dead weight and within EU (or indeed NATO) institutions seen as the opposite of cost-effective.’\footnote{Biscop, “The UK and European defence,” 1306.}

Based on the above mentioned documents, statements of officials and views of analysts Prerequisite 3 has been detected. Both the United Kingdom and France were dissatisfied with the progress in NATO and EU concerning defence co-operation and
this played an important role in deepening bilateral defence co-operation between each other. Accordingly, the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties is linked to both to France’s and Britain’s dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in NATO and EU.

Conclusion

Rival Explanation 1 – Actual Lancaster House Treaties Pattern

In regards to this rival explanation Prerequisite 1, Prerequisite 2 and Prerequisite 3 were verified. This means that the independent variable of ‘Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ proved to be the source of the intervening variable of ‘UK and France are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’. By the verification of Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 we can say that due to the slow progress in EU and NATO regarding defence issues Britain and France became frustrated and dissatisfied with defence co-operation in these two organizations. By the verification of Prerequisite 3, it was shown that the intervening variable of ‘UK and France are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ and it has a strong link to the dependent variable of ‘Creation of the Lancaster House Treaties’. Accordingly, the British and French dissatisfaction with defence co-operation in NATO and EU was one of the main reasons why the Lancaster House agreements were signed.

Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis

Rival Explanation 2 states that the financial crisis generated defence budget cuts in the France and the UK (independent variable). This phenomenon generated the need for alternative multinational solutions in these two countries in order to maintain their national military capabilities (intervening variable), and this process lead to the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties (dependent variable). The prerequisites for this rival explanation are the following:
1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the UK and France.

2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the UK and France.

3. The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to UK’s and France’s search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

**Prerequisite 1:**

Defence budget cuts had to happen as the consequence of the financial crisis in the UK and France.

The 2008 financial and economic crisis hit the United Kingdom and France significantly, and both London and Paris intervened massively to avoid the collapse of their banking and financial sectors. As a consequence of the huge stimulus packages that the two governments provided, the budget deficits of these two countries reached historical heights, and accordingly they were compelled to introduce austerity measures. In this section I investigate whether these austerity measures affected the defence budgets of France and the United Kingdom, and if so, how big their impact was.

After the financial crisis the UK government introduced the biggest spending across-the-board cuts for decades. The 2010 Spending Review resulted in average departmental cuts of 19% in order to save £81 billion over four years. According to the document, the Ministry of Defence had to make £4.3 billion of savings during 2011-2015, which meant that the defence budget was set to be reduced by 8% in real terms for that period. Based on these conditions the announced defence budgets for the next fiscal years were £33.8 billion in 2011-2012, £34.4 billion in 2012-2013, £34.1 billion in 2013-2014 and £33.5 billion in 2014-2015. Although the Ministry of Defence suffered proportionately lower budget cuts that time than some other departments, it was not ‘ringfenced’ like health, education and overseas aid. Thus, according to the Office for National Statistics, the defence budgets of 2011-2012 and

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2012-2013 altogether fell by 7% which ‘was the largest decline in spending out of all ten functions of government.’ Namely, that defence spending ‘fell faster than any other area of government’ during these two years.548

The Autumn Statement 2012 introduced another 1% reduction in the next year and 2% in the year after for every ministry in the UK. The Ministry of Defence was not excluded from these austerity measures either,549 and had to absorb an additional £735 million of cuts for the next two years (£245 million in 2013-2014 and £490 million in 2014-2015).550 At the same time, according to George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the British MoD got the ‘flexibility on their multi-year budget to ensure that this will not lead to reductions in military manpower or the core defence equipment programme over the Parliament’.551 However, when George Osborne announced the approved UK budget in March 2013, he announced an additional 1% departmental budget cut above the reductions already made in the Autumn Statement 2012. Consequently, the British defence budget was cut by an additional £249 million in 2013-2014 and by further £247 million in 2014-2015 (altogether £496 million).552 These repeated cuts were bigger in real terms than the reductions that any other department had to make in the UK.553

Between 2010 and 2013 French governments announced their intention of making altogether €132 billion savings for the coming years in five rounds. However, Paris used the tool of increasing taxes more extensively than London, whose approach focused mostly on cutting government expenses.554 Thus, it is less surprising that the French armed forces had to make less than 3% savings during the 2009-2014 period.

553 Ibid.
from its planned €185.9 billion multi-year defence budget. With regard to the next five-year defence budget, at the end of 2013 the French government announced that France would spend €190 billion (pensions included) on defence between 2014 and 2019, freezing the defence budget at €31.4 billion per year (pensions excluded) until 2016, thereafter possibly allowing for a moderate increase. Although nominally the French defence budget was not decreasing, analysts pointed out that this was a real term cut, because it did not allow for inflation. In spring 2014 the French government announced that it intended to cut the already frozen defence budget by a further €2.4 billion from the planned €31.4 billion to €29 billion. However, the French chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the army, air force, and navy chiefs of staff threatened to resign, if this reduction had taken place. Thanks to this move of the top military leaders of France the defence budget was not any further.

Although budget cuts in France do not seem as severe as in the United Kingdom, because the defence expenses had been reduced by around 3% between 2009 and 2014, and were frozen. However, if we take into consideration the intention of the 2008 French White Paper, which wanted to increase the defence budget by 1% above the inflation per year from 2012, and spend €377 billion (pensions excluded) on defence between 2009 and 2020, there is a significant reduction regarding the planned French defence budget. Namely, the French MoD spent around €31-€33 billion (pensions excluded) every year in the period of 2009-2014. Thus, in the ten years planning period when France intended to spend €377 billion (pensions excluded) on defence, Paris actually spent less than €350 billion, which is more than a 9% reduction.

In conclusion, both the United Kingdom and France introduced reductions in their defence budgets after the financial crisis. While the British armed forces suffered

an 8% real term reduction beginning from 2010 and later they had to make additional cuts, right after the crisis the French defence budget was decreased by 3%, while in the period of 2009-2020 it will suffer more than 9% reduction.

Based on the above detected British and French defence budget cuts, Prerequisite 3 has been confirmed.

*Prerequisite 2:*

The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the UK and France.

The previous section highlighted that both the United Kingdom and France have cut their defence budgets as a result of the financial crisis. In this section I investigate what respective measures the two countries have undertaken regarding their armed forces thanks to the reductions of the defence budgets and whether they had searched for alternative multinational solutions in MDCs to maintain their national military capabilities. In general, we can say that neither France nor the United Kingdom have searched for alternative solutions to maintain their national military capabilities; rather they were committed to handle their hardships in the traditional national way. Among others they did not search partners actively for pooling and sharing of military capabilities to mitigate the effects of the defence budget cuts, but they intended to absorb these negative effects alone.

As Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman pointed out, the United Kingdom was the first Western country, which made a complete defence and security review taking into account the negative effects of the financial crisis. Thus the 2010 SDSR can indicate well how Britain intended to handle the ‘age of austerity’ concerning defence around the time the UK and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties. The preparation for the SDSR began already during the summer of 2009, when Secretary of State for Defence Bob Ainsworth (Labour) announced that the Ministry of Defence would develop a Green Paper for the SDSR until early 2010. Based on the results of this document the newly elected Conservative – Liberal Democrat government

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eventually adopted the SDSR and published it on 19 October 2010. As the discussion on the Lancaster House Treaties between France and the UK began at the end of 2009 and they were signed on 2 November 2010, the treaties and the SDSR had been developed and drafted parallel and had an impact on each other.

The SDSR on the one hand revealed the future vision of what kind of capabilities and structures the British armed forces would need by 2020, on the other hand it focused its provisions mostly on the period of 2010-2015 and identified the necessary strategic decisions for that timeframe. Thus, it left certain questions to be answered after 2014 when the Afghanistan mission was set to end. According to Andrew Dorman ‘this allowed the government to justify significant cuts to the armed forces with plans to reconstitute some capabilities by 2020.’ These cuts meant reductions in personnel, decommissioning of equipment, slowing the procurement of new equipment and even cancelling projects. Among others the SDSR envisaged a nearly 10% reduction of service personnel (17 000 from 175 000) until 2015, reducing the deployable number of brigades from six to five, the number of Challenger 2 main battle tanks by 40% and the artillery by 35%; decommissioned the Harrier fleet, reducing the size of the Tornado fleet, delaying orders for the Joint Strike Fighters, cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 maritime aircraft programme, retiring the C130 Hercules transport aircraft fleet in 2022, one decade earlier than planned; decommissioned HMS Ark Royal and thus temporarily eliminated the British carrier strike capability, reducing the size of the surface fleet and so on. In accordance with these measures the SDSR decided to close bases, rationalize the command structure and the resource management systems. Although the SDSR increased the reserve forces to compensate some of the reductions and also introduced future procurement projects, the planned cuts show that the British armed forces faced very serious short-term reductions regarding their capabilities. Thus, ‘inevitably, the UK’s level of

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564 Ibid.
567 United Kingdom. HM Government. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, 15-34.
ambition has been scaled back by the SDSR, which became absolutely clear from the military tasks and defence planning assumptions set.

The United Kingdom did not search for alternative solutions to help maintain its national military capabilities. First, the document did not mention any cooperation in the framework of NATO and EU or regional framework, which could fit to the definition of Multinational Defence Co-operation. This means that the British government – as the SDSR stated – was not interested in ‘complex multilateral agreements, which have delivered mixed results’ earlier regarding capability development. Instead, the British government intended to strengthen collaboration between nations on military operations and political issues in NATO and EU. Thus, the SDSR emphasized the importance of ‘ensuring that NATO has the political will and ability to respond to current and future threats’, ‘successfully complete the mission of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan’, ‘recognise the importance of NATO’s wider security role’, ‘continue to reform NATO’, ‘foster better EU-NATO cooperation’, ‘support continued EU enlargement’ and ‘support EU missions’ etc.

Second, although the SDSR stressed the importance of ‘building new models of practical bilateral cooperation with those countries whose defence and security posture is closest to our own or with whom we cooperate in multinational operations’, the document did not mention directly which countries the authors were thinking of in this regard. Of course, the SDSR names the two most important partners of Britain concerning defence, and not surprisingly these were the United States and France. However, the cooperation with these two partners could hardly be called a new multinational solution, because of the existing collaboration with the US and the practical British-French defence cooperation that had flourished since the end of the Cold War. Yet, since the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties was so close to the


570 Definition of MDCs: ‘Any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capabilities. This can include exchanges and liaison, training and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations. Ministry of Defence, Multinational Defence Co-operation, Policy Paper, Paper No. 2, (London: Directorate of Corporate Communications, 2001), 2.

571 United Kingdom. HM Government. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, 60.


573 Ibid. 59.
publication of the SDSR, the authors of the document probably had the British-French co-operation in their mind in this regard. However, if we investigate the document, we can see that it lists six initiatives to strengthen British-French defence collaboration, four of which (cooperation on training and doctrine, complex weapons, UAVs, logistics of A400) had already been underway in different formats before the negotiations on the Lancaster House Treaties began. Thus, only collaboration on cyber defence and the creation of a Joint Readiness Force were really new initiatives. In addition, even the other major projects stemming from the Lancaster House Treaties and its LoI and Package of Joint Measures like nuclear co-operation and collaboration on aircraft carriers had been discussed for years. Thus, the Lancaster House Treaties can be perceived more as the result of a long process than an immediate answer to the financial crisis. As a UK MoD official pointed out, the vast majority of the Franco-British bilateral projects had already existed before Lancaster House, and the treaties ‘only canonized’ them and put them into one overarching framework.574

Accordingly, we can conclude that London did not search actively for alternative multinational solutions to maintain its national military capabilities, but it focused more on how Britain could deal with the loss of capabilities as a consequence of austerity. Britain did not take into consideration the multinational organizations at all and rather focused – at least declaratorily – on bilateral cooperation, but no serious steps have been taken regarding capability development collaboration, except for strengthening the British-French cooperation. In addition, many of the initiatives of developing deeper British-French cooperation were not even new, but they had been incorporated into existing ones within the SDSR, the Lancaster House Treaties and its LoI and Package of Joint Measures.

In contrast, the situation in France was quite different than that in Britain, as the French defence budget did not decrease as much as the British one. During the 2008-2014 period the French armed forces had to realize only a 3% reduction in their planned budget, thus in France no bigger cuts in terms of personnel had been carried out575 nor in terms of capabilities than it had been planned in the 2008 White Paper. The 2013 White Paper was the first strategic document, which had been drafted after

the financial crisis in France, but the cuts and reductions foreseen there were not as serious as in the British SDSR either. Although the 2013 French White Paper decided that the personnel of the 288,000 strong Armed Forces (222,000 active military and 66,000 other personnel)\textsuperscript{576} would be decreased by 34,000 between 2014 and 2019,\textsuperscript{577} the French Armed Forces reduced its personnel by 40,000 in the period of 2008-2012 as well.\textsuperscript{578} Therefore, the elimination of jobs in the armed forces cannot be exclusively attributed to the negative effects of the financial crisis, because this process began much earlier, and in addition the financial crisis did not hit the French defence budget as severely as it was expected.

Although that is true that the French Armed Forces did not receive the same amount of resources in the period of 2014-2019 as it was proposed in the 2008 White Paper, this did not resulted in ‘radical strategic rebalancing’.\textsuperscript{579} Of course, freezing the defence budget in France had a price. Consequently, the French MoD decided to slow down the purchase of the Rafale jets, buying only 26 instead of 66 between 2014 and 2019.\textsuperscript{580} It also decided to delay plans for further attack submarines and frigates.\textsuperscript{581} However, Paris did not eliminate entire capabilities or cancelled projects as London did regarding the aircraft carriers or the Nimrod MRA4 maritime aircraft programme. As François Heisbourg highlighted, the ‘French have pointedly decided they are not going to make such crunchy choices’.\textsuperscript{582}

We can therefore conclude that France did not search for multinational alternative solutions to maintain military capabilities, which would have lost in consequence of the financial crisis, because Paris did not lose them as it decided to maintain its existing military capabilities nationally. The losses were instead managed by cuts to personnel and the rationalization and delay in the development of certain capabilities. That is another question that analysts pointed out the risks of the 2014-

\textsuperscript{578} Ibid. 107.
\textsuperscript{581} Carnegie, "France cuts armed forces,".
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid.
In addition, although the French Armed Forces will certainly retain their current capabilities to conduct military operations abroad throughout most of the 2010s, in the longer term it may face problems. Moreover, the French defence industry will have to face the consequences of the delays in the French Armed Forces’ equipment procurement programmes.\textsuperscript{584}

We can conclude that neither the United Kingdom nor France did search for a range of alternative multinational solutions in MDCs to mitigate the negative effects of the financial crisis to maintain their national military capabilities. The United Kingdom basically accepted that some of its military capabilities have been lost temporarily or permanently as a consequence of cuts resulting from the financial crisis. In the SDSR London declared that it is open only to bilateral cooperation and not to EU and NATO lead collaborations concerning capability development and named the United States and France as its main defence partners. However, in both cases the SDSR paved the road for continuing the already existing collaborative projects and did not plan to mitigate the new capability gaps through new multinational solutions. France also decided to handle its challenges in a national framework, but in contrast to Britain, Paris did not eliminate capabilities. Instead, thanks to the smaller reductions in its defence budgets decided to ‘muddle through’. Although France has always been the supporter of multinational solutions, and also participated in them actively in Europe, it resolved to maintain its military capabilities in a national framework. Thus, France did not search for alternative solutions either.

Based on the above detected processes, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed.

**Prerequisite 3:**
The creation of the Lancaster House Treaties needs to be linked to the UK’s and France’s search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

According to the previous sections Prerequisite 1 has been confirmed, while Prerequisite 2 has not been. Thus we can say that as a consequence of the financial crisis Britain and France decreased their defence budgets (Prerequisite 1), however there were no signs that these two countries looked actively for alternative

\textsuperscript{583} Ibid.

multinational solutions of pooling and sharing of capabilities with other countries to maintain their national military capabilities in the consequence of the defence budget cuts (Prerequisite 2). The only exception was the Lancaster House Treaties and its LoI and Package of Joint Measures, but the majority of the initiatives based on these agreements were not new at all and discussions about them had been going on often for years before the signing of the Treaties. Thus, they cannot be perceived as an answer to the defence budget cuts in the consequence of the financial crisis either, but rather the agreement was the result of the culmination of defence collaboration between France and the UK.

If we analyse the discourse of British and French officials on the forums of the Franco-British Council, we can see that the effects of the financial crisis did not play a major role during their discussions before the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties either. That is true that they recognized that defence budget cuts could be expected, and ‘the heavy constraints on defence budgets […] will be a push towards speeding up Franco-British cooperation’. Some of the participants even perceived this situation as a positive thing, which might provide a needed window of opportunity to push for a deeper defence co-operation between the two countries. However, others pointed out the possible dangers the financial crisis could pose to the decades long British-French defence collaboration. Christophe Burg, the director of industrial affairs at the DGA, noted that ‘in times of crisis like the one we are facing today it would be really dangerous if nationalism should reappear’ and in this regard he highlighted that Paris already channelled large sums into the defence sector to ‘propping up the domestic economy’. Others argued that focusing on the mitigation of the effects of the financial crisis via defence co-operation would be problematic, because this would generate short term projects. Sir Menzies Campbell ‘expressed the fear that concentrating on the short term is the wrong aim: nothing will come of identifying military capabilities based on the available finances’. James de Waal emphasized that ‘the financial crisis must not emerge as the leitmotiv of a revival of the Franco-British dimension; it is not a synonym for more intense cooperation’.

Accordingly, both British and French officials were aware of both the opportunities

587 Ibid.
588 Chick, Franco-British Defence Co-operation Roundtable, 6.
589 Ibid.
and dangers the financial crisis could provide for defence co-operation, but they did not perceive it as a game changer concerning British-French defence collaboration especially not in the short term.

This is underpinned by the results of the interviews I conducted with British and French officials and scholars.\(^{590}\) Many of the interviewees mentioned that the financial crisis might have an impact on supporting the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties, but none of them deemed it as the most important factor. Certain officials did not even perceive the effects of the financial crisis as an important issue concerning the establishment of the treaties.\(^{591}\) However, all of them were aware of the phenomenon, that the agreement had a financial aspect, but it has not been necessarily linked to the financial crisis, but to a longer trend that pressured defence budgets in Europe.

At the same time the question emerges, if not the effects of the financial crisis then what triggered the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010. We could see that defence co-operation between France and the United Kingdom has been evolved for decades, and the Lancaster House treaties canonized them into one overarching framework. However, why this canonization happened in 2010, and what could play a major factor in it, if it was not the financial crisis. In this regard all of the officials and scholars I interviewed during my research concerning the Lancaster House Treaties emphasized the importance of the personalities of and the chemistry between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron in the creation of Lancaster House Treaties. Sarkozy was an Atlanticist French president unlike his predecessors of the previous seventy years. Sarkozy’s pro-American and pro-UK personality helped not only making France’s reintegration to NATO happen, but also created trust between Paris and London as well.\(^{592}\) According, to British officials, without France’s reintegration to NATO, the Lancaster House Treaties could not come true, and this step helped a lot to ‘get over a silly rivalry’ between France and the United Kingdom on defence.\(^{593}\)

However, the successful Conservative election and the appointment of David Cameron as a prime minister of the UK in May 2010 were needed for starting a more


\(^{591}\) Senior UK MoD Official. Interview by author. March 2014.


\(^{593}\) Senior UK MoD Official. Interview by author. March 2014.
ambitious British-French defence deal too. Although the discussions between France and the UK about deepening defence co-operation began at the end of 2009, it was not clear what form it would take.\textsuperscript{594} David Cameron was the person who after became prime minister pushed for a more ambitious deal, and even sent a handwritten letter to President Sarkozy about his proposition to create a treaty on defence collaboration between France and Britain.\textsuperscript{595} Although, Cameron was the most keen on this issue first, Sarkozy took over the idea immediately and provided full support.\textsuperscript{596} Both Sarkozy and Cameron were right wing politicians, and it was very important that they actually liked each other and there was chemistry between them.\textsuperscript{597} At the same time, they supported this deal not only because they liked each other and ideological reasons, but they had their own agenda as well. For Sarkozy the treaty was important to show Germany and the EU that France could be lead Europe, and could pull the UK to European projects too. For Cameron, the deal was relevant, because he could show to British Eurosceptics that Britain could cooperate with Europeans outside EU frameworks.\textsuperscript{598}

Accordingly, we can conclude that as Prerequisite 2 was not detected, Prerequisite 3 could not be detected either. This part supported the findings of Prerequisite 2, as it showed that although British and French officials were aware of the possible positive and negative effects of the Franco-British defence co-operation, it was not deemed the most important factor in this regard. Rather the personalities, individual motivations and relationship of President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron played a very significant role in the establishment of the Lancaster House Treaties.

\textit{Conclusion}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure18.png}
\caption{Rival Explanation 2: Actual Lancaster House Treaties Pattern}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{594} Mid-career UK MoD Official. Interview by author. March 2014.
\textsuperscript{595} Senior UK MoD Official. Interview by author. March 2014.
\textsuperscript{596} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{598} Ibid.
The predicted pattern of Rival Explanation 2 was not proved in the case of the Lancaster House Treaties. Namely, Prerequisite 1 was verified, but Prerequisite 2 was not. This means that the intervening variable of ‘Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’ was not found in this case (see Figure 18), thus the independent variable (UK and French defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis) could not be linked to the dependent variable (Creation of the Lancaster House Treaties). Accordingly, we can conclude that the decreasing defence budgets in the UK and France as a consequence of the financial crisis did not foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities. However, it was shown that the personalities, individual motivations and the relationship of President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron played a crucial role in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties.

**Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions**

According to Rival Explanation 3 the United Kingdom and France have perceived the same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s), thus they started to co-operate against this threat and finally institutionalized this co-operation into the Lancaster House Treaties.

![Figure 19 – Rival Explanation 3: Predicted Lancaster House Treaties Pattern](image)

Based on the Research Framework chapter, the independent variable of ‘Rival Explanation 3’ is the ‘perception of the same threat’ that is linked to the dependent variable of ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ via the intervening variable of ‘alliances against the biggest threat’. Thus, this rival explanation assumes that the United Kingdom and France perceive the same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s) (independent variable), they start to discuss this with each other and begin to co-operate against it (intervening variable), and finally formalize this alliance by creating the Lancaster House Treaties (dependent variable). The prerequisites for these rival explanations are the followings:

1. The UK and France had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat.
2. The UK and France had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties.

3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the UK and France discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and creation of Lancaster House Treaties have to be detected.

**Prerequisite 1:**

*The UK and France had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat.*

In order to identify whether the United Kingdom and France share the perception of the same threat(s) as the largest threat, I compare their strategic documents, which were valid at the time when the Lancaster House Treaties were developed. In the case of the United Kingdom the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) describe the best what kind of threats the British government perceived that time. With regard to France the 2008 French White Paper provides the most adequate information about the official French threat perception in 2010, the year when the Lancaster House Treaties were signed.

The British NSS does not use the term threat but applies the term of risk, which is a less concrete and immediate security issue than a threat. As the NSS identifies only risks and not threats, I investigate them in this section. In the framework of National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) subject-matter experts, analysts and intelligence specialists identified and prioritised the internal and international risks the United Kingdom would face over 5 and 20 years horizons. The NSRA investigated many aspects and areas of different potential risks, and prioritized them taking into consideration their relative likelihood and relative impact and also the UK’s vulnerability to these. The NSRA was submitted to the National Security Council, which finalized the prioritization and ‘identified 15 generic priority risk types, and allocated them into three tiers’. To ‘Tier One’ belonged those risks that were deemed to have the ‘highest priority for UK national security looking ahead,

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taking account of both likelihood and impact.\textsuperscript{602} Risks of ‘Tier Three’ were the least important in terms of likelihood and impact to UK national security among the studied risks, and risks of ‘Tier Two’ were those, which were between the risks of ‘Tier One’ and ‘Tier Three’ in terms of likelihood and impact.

As I am interested only in the largest threat(s) – in this case ‘risks’ – the United Kingdom perceived, I study only the risks of ‘Tier One’, because they were deemed the most pressing security issues by the British government and its security community. They are the following:

- ‘International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists; and/or a significant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland.
- Hostile attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cyber crime.
- A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response, such as severe coastal flooding affecting three or more regions of the UK, or an influenza pandemic.
- An international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK, and its allies as well as other states and non-state actors.’\textsuperscript{603}

The 2008 French White Paper does not elaborate the methodology of the risk assessment for the document, but we know that a commission set up by the French President was responsible to deliver the French White Paper. The membership of the commission was diverse and included members of parliament, experts from the armed forces and government agencies, scholars from academia and representatives of the defence industry.\textsuperscript{604} Thus, based on the work of this commission the 2008 French White Paper among others introduces the perceived vulnerabilities of France. This means, that the 2008 French White Paper does not use the term ‘threat’ either, thus I study the ‘vulnerabilities’ the document identified. The document does not use such a sophisticated categorization as the British NSS, it only states what the vulnerabilities

\textsuperscript{602} Ibid. 27.
\textsuperscript{603} Ibid.
of France are and elaborates them in a few sentences. According to the 2008 French White Paper the most relevant seven vulnerabilities of France are:

- ‘Terrorism of mass destruction’
- ‘Ballistic and cruise missile threats’
- ‘Major attacks against information systems’ (cyber attacks)
- ‘New and robust espionage activities’
- ‘Major criminal networks, including narco-trafficking’
- ‘Health risks (like pandemics), natural catastrophes, industrial disasters and technological risks’
- ‘High proportion of French citizens leaving the country’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks of the United Kingdom</th>
<th>Vulnerabilities of France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. International terrorism incl. using of WMD</td>
<td>1. Terrorism of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cyber attacks</td>
<td>2. Ballistic and cruise missile threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Large scale natural disasters and pandemic</td>
<td>3. Major attacks against information systems (cyber attacks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. International military crisis drawing in the UK</td>
<td>4. New and robust espionage activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Major criminal networks, including narco-trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Health risks (like pandemics) natural catastrophes, industrial disasters and technological risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. High proportion of French citizens leaving the country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 20 – British and French Risks and Vulnerabilities*

If we compare the risks and vulnerabilities (see Figure 20) the United Kingdom and France officially identified in their strategic documents as the most pressing security issues for them, we can assess that their risks and vulnerabilities are overlapping. For both France and Britain the top security issue is terrorism. Although there is a difference concerning them, because while the United Kingdom perceives terrorism broadly, France concentrates only on the potential terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, in the case of the United Kingdom CBRN terrorist attacks are a major concern as well, thus we can conclude that in regard to the top priority security issue France and the United Kingdom share almost the same threat as the biggest threat. Cyber attacks are the second most important risk

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605 Ibid. 14-15.
for Britain and the third biggest vulnerability for France in their studied strategic
documents. In addition, natural and manmade disasters and pandemics can be
perceived also as major concerns the two states shared, because these issues were the
third important area in the British NSS and the sixth one in the 2008 French White
Paper. Accordingly, we can conclude that international terrorism including the
potential usage of WMD, cyber attacks, natural and manmade disasters and
pandemics were the threats identified as the biggest threats the two countries shared in
the time of the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties.

Based on the above detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has been confirmed.

Prerequisite 2:
The UK and France had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared
threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of the Lancaster
House Treaties.

In this section I attempt to detect whether the United Kingdom and France had
initiated discussions about the three shared threats (1. terrorism including the potential
usage of WMD; 2. cyber attacks; 3. natural and manmade disasters and pandemics)
the previous section confirmed, and whether they had concluded that they should co-
operate on acting together against these threats. In this section, the main sources of
my research are the official declarations, communiqués and press statements made by
French presidents and the British prime ministers after the Franco-British summits in
the 2000s. These documents provide appropriate information whether the shared
threats have been discussed on the highest level, and could be the basis of further
discussions and actions on the lower levels between experts of the two studied
countries.

Although the official communiqués of the consecutive Franco-British summits
have mentioned the problem of terrorism and proliferation of WMDs since the early
2000s, the first reference to co-operation on these areas between the UK and France
appeared in 2006 when the communiqué stated that the UK and France ‘will explore
options for broad cooperation between naval, intelligence and civilian organizations
in order to ensure improved coordination of our efforts against terrorism, proliferation

uk.org/Franco-British-summit-Joint,4685.; Franco-British summit - Communiqué, Lancaster House,
and illegal migration’. However, besides this one sentence the communiqués did not deal with these issues at all.

A big shift can be perceived by 2008, as the part of the joint declaration of the Franco-British summit referring to defence and security issues began to focus much more on bilateral defence and security issues than cooperation within multilateral frameworks as it used to be typical in earlier declarations. On this occasion much bigger emphasis was put on several security and defence related topics than previously and among others the declaration clearly stated that the UK and France would co-operate on countering the proliferation of CBRN weapons, terrorism and cyber attacks. Furthermore, in terms of terrorism, which was perceived as the biggest threat by both countries in their respective strategic documents, the British prime minister and the French president agreed on several practical collaborations. They decided that they would co-operate ‘from threat analysis to technical and operational cooperation’ and in order to combat nuclear terrorism the two countries would ‘work together (...) by screening traffic including that passing through the Channel Tunnel.’ In addition, they also agreed to develop ‘concerted responses to the development of violent extremism (...), including radicalisation and recruitment and terrorist propaganda’ and ‘organise a seminar to share experience and best practice’. One year later the French President and the British Prime Minister decided to deepen their co-operation on counter-terrorism among others by ‘high level operational coordination’ and by establishing ‘high level, strategic working groups’. Their declaration on defence and security after the 2009 summit also touched the question of cyber attacks. Accordingly, since 2008 the UK and France have discussed the questions of terrorism and cyber attacks on the highest level and decided to co-operate on both issues, but co-operation on counter-terrorism was much more elaborated.

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609 Ibid.
610 Ibid.
612 Ibid.
Besides the declarations of the summits and the actions that stemmed from them, British and French officials discussed threats before the Lancaster agreements as well. For instance, British officials were closely involved in the preparation of the 2008 French White Paper,\(^\text{613}\) and also French officials participated in the work of the British SDSR published in 2010.\(^\text{614}\) In this process, the question of risks and vulnerabilities have been touched upon and discussed between the parties. The converging views on threats is also well represented by the declaration on defence and security of the 2009 Franco-British Summit which stated that ‘it is difficult to envisage a situation in which the vital interest of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interest of the other also being threatened.’\(^\text{615}\) Furthermore, if we look at the discussions of experts and officials who participated in the two events of the Franco-British Defence Co-operation Roundtable in 2010, we can see that they agreed that their countries practically shared the same threat perception.\(^\text{616}\)

We can conclude that the threat perceptions of France and the UK began to converge noticeably after 2008, and the two countries discussed two out of the three shared perceived risks and vulnerabilities identified on the highest level and began to co-operate on them. They discussed and co-operated most intensively on counter-terrorism including the potential use of WMD and also discussed and began to collaborate on cyber security. However, they did not touch upon the questions of natural and manmade disasters and pandemics at all.

Based on the above detected processes, Prerequisite 2 has been confirmed.

**Prerequisite 3:**

The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the UK and France discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and creation of Lancaster House Treaties have to be detected.

This section investigates whether the two threats – terrorism including the potential use of WMD and cyber attacks –, which are the biggest threats shared by the UK and France, and the two countries began discussions and practical co-operation on them,

\(^{615}\) 30th France-UK summit.
were the main reasons for the adoption of the Lancaster House Treaties. In order to find out whether a link exists between them, I study and take into consideration the official statements, declarations of the signatories – President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron – of the Lancaster House Treaties, the text of Lancaster House Treaties themselves, as well as the related LoI and Package of Joint Measures and the views and discourse of officials.

At the Franco-British Summit on 2 November 2010 the British Prime Minister and the French President referred several times to terrorism, cyber attacks and new threats after they signed the Lancaster House treaties. The question of terrorism was highly topical that time, because two days earlier the Greek police in Athens caught a courier who intended to post a parcel bomb to French President Nicolas Sarkozy.617 Thus, it is not surprising that David Cameron said on the joint press conference of the summit that

‘the events of the last 72 hours have reminded us that our societies and our security have never been more connected and when the threats from terrorism, from cyber space and from nuclear proliferation cross our borders so must our response. (...) The terrorists think that our open societies and our interconnectedness is a source of weakness. They are wrong. Nicolas and I are absolutely determined to show that they are a source of our strength, our solidarity and our power in defeating terrorism.’618

Furthermore, both President Sarkozy and David Cameron deemed cyber security as an important issue and a ‘major challenge’ for their countries.619 In accordance with these statements the Joint declaration on defence and security cooperation of the 2010 Franco-British Summit declared that ‘together we face new challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, terrorism, cyber attacks, maritime and space security.’620 However, if we examine the whole declaration and the full text of statements delivered by President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron we find that terrorism and cyber security did not play a major role in them. This means that the key messages were not about co-

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619 Ibid.
operation of terrorism and cyber threats regarding security and defence, but about nuclear co-operation and traditional defence collaborations on operations, as well as capabilities including Pooling & Sharing and defence industrial co-operation.

This is reflected in the Lancaster House Treaties and in the Package of Joint Measures. Although the Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty of the Lancaster House Treaties declares that terrorism, proliferation of WMDs and cyber-attacks are strategic challenges for both Britain and France, the Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty does not address them at all. As I introduced earlier the five main objectives of this treaty are:

1) coordination on capability development, maintenance, procurement, facilities and equipment ‘to perform the full spectrum of missions, including the most demanding missions’;
2) reinforcing the defence industry, co-operation in research and development;
3) collaboration on common deployments;
4) co-operation on national (nuclear) deterrents;
5) support each other regarding actions in the UN, NATO and in the CSDP.

Based on these main objectives we can see that this treaty does not address the shared threats of terrorism and cyber security. Furthermore, besides the introduction of the treaty, where the common strategic challenges are listed, not a single reference was made on them, as the treaty focuses on these five main objectives. If we look at the second treaty of the Lancaster House Agreements, which is the Nuclear Treaty, we can see that this treaty mentioned the issue of ‘countering nuclear or radiological terrorism’ as a task where the UK and France will change ‘relevant classified information’. However, it is the only one reference to terrorism and there is no reference to cyber security at all in this document. The situation is very similar in the Package of Joint Measures as well, because among the eleven proposals what the document introduces, counter-terrorism and cyber security comprises one proposal, as they were put into one package. It means that from the eleven proposals only one addresses the shared threats, and this is less than one tenth of the package. Accordingly, we can say that issues related to the two biggest shared threats of France

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621 France No. 01 (2010) 4.
622 France No. 02 (2010) 3-4.
623 Taylor, Franco-British Defence Co-operation, 11-12.
and UK had a very minor role in the Lancaster House Treaties and its Package of Joint Measures.

Based on this we can conclude that the shared threat perceptions of the UK and France could not initiate the Lancaster House Treaties, as their relevance in the treaties and the Package of Joint Measures were almost irrelevant. If terrorism and cyber security had been the main reasons of adopting the treaties, they should have dominated these documents and the overall framework of the documents should have been built around these two topics. However, it was not the case. The minor role of the shared threats in the Lancaster House agreements is underpinned by the fact that interviewed officials\(^{624}\) never mentioned the common threat perception as a major catalyst or main reason regarding Lancaster House agreements, and even on the meetings\(^{625}\) of the Franco-British Defence Co-operation Roundtable predating the Treaties these issues had barely been touched upon and had not become integrated part of the discourse. To sum up, there is no link between the question of terrorism and cyber attacks and the initiation and adoption of the Lancaster House Treaties.

Based on the above detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed.

**Conclusion**

We can conclude that Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power about why France and Britain established the Lancaster House Treaties instead of using NATO and EU frameworks for defence co-operation

![Figure 21 – Pattern Rival Explanation 3: Actual Lancaster House Treaties Pattern](image)

We could see that Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 were verified, but Prerequisite 3 was not. Accordingly, the independent variable of ‘Perception of the same threat’ is valid and the proposed intervening variable of ‘Alliances against the biggest threat’ could be verified as well. By the verification of Prerequisite 1, we can conclude that the threat perception of the UK and France was almost the same, as

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their relevant strategic documents at the time of signing of the Lancaster House agreements identified very similar risks and vulnerabilities. Both countries perceived terrorism as the top priority security issue, and cyber security was in the top three for the UK and France as well. Accordingly, they perceived the same threats as the largest threats. During the investigation of Prerequisite 2, I showed that from 2008 the two states discussed these issues on the highest level – head of state and head of the government – and initiated practical collaborations on them.

However, Prerequisite 3 could not be verified, which means that there is no link between the fact that Britain and France perceived terrorism and cyber attacks as major threats, they discussed and co-operated on them and the initiation and adoption of the Lancaster House Treaties (see Figure 21). The examination of the Treaties and the Package of Joint Measures, the interviews taken with officials and the discourse between British and French experts highlight that the shared threat perception of France and the UK did not play a major role in the creation of Lancaster House Treaties.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I intended to find out why the UK and France established the Lancaster House Treaties, when several pan-European structures existed for defence co-operation in the framework of NATO and EU, where they could have co-operated? In addition, my research also intended to figure out the circumstances that encouraged these two countries to prefer a new co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborating within NATO and EU. For this, I studied three rival explanations developed and operationalized in the research framework chapter, where I set independent, intervening and dependent variables for every rival explanation and developed prerequisites for every variable. In the current chapter I studied, whether these prerequisites could be verified concerning the Lancaster House Treaties. If all of the prerequisites of a rival explanation could be verified, we could conclude that the variables of the rival explanation are valid, thus it has explanatory power over the research question in the Lancaster House Treaties case.

The first rival explanations presumed that France and the UK were dissatisfied with the progress of defence co-operation in NATO and the EU, thus they created the Lancaster House Treaties in the hope that this co-operative framework will work better than pan-European MDCs. The independent variable of this Rival Explanation
was the ‘Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’, which was proved to be the source of the intervening variable of ‘UK and France are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ which could be linked to the dependent variable of ‘Creation of the Lancaster House Treaties’, as Prerequisite 1, Prerequisite 2 and Prerequisite 3 were verified. Accordingly, the UK and France were dissatisfied with the progress concerning co-operation on capability development in the EU and NATO, and because of their frustration on this issue decided to establish a bilateral co-operation on defence, which became the Lancaster House Treaties. Accordingly, Rival Explanation 1 has explanatory power over the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties.

Rival Explanation 2 states that the negative effects of the financial crisis lead to defence budget cuts in the UK and France, and the decreasing financial resources created a situation, when London and Paris had to search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain their national military capabilities, and they found this solution in the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties. According to Rival Explanation 2 the independent variable is ’UK and France defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’ that is linked via the intervening variable of the ’Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’ to the dependent variable of the ’Creation of Lancaster House Treaties’. Although Prerequisite 1 of Rival explanation 2 in the case of the Lancaster House Treaties was verified, but Prerequisite 2 and Prerequisite 3 were not. This means, that the defence budgets in the UK and France were cut as a consequence of the financial crisis, but this phenomenon did not foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the two studied countries. Thus, the negative effects of the financial crisis on defence budgets could not be the main reason of the the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties either. At the same time, my research highlighted that the personalities, individual motivations and the relationship of the signatories of the treaties – President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron – played a crucial role in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties.

Rival Explanation 3 supposes that the UK and France established the Lancaster House Treaties, because they shared the same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s) (independent variable) and they began discussions on and co-operation against this threat (intervening variable) and finally institutionalized this alliance by signing the Lancaster House Treaties (dependent variable). We could see that
Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 could be verified, but Prerequisite 3 could not. This means that although France and the UK shared the same threats as the biggest threats and they also initiated discussions and co-operation concerning them (terrorism and cyber attacks), the shared threats were not the reason why Lancaster House Treaties were created. Thus, Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power over the case of the Lancaster House Treaties.

Only ‘Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation’ - has explanatory power over the Lancaster House Treaties among the studied rival explanations. However, this chapter showed that it was not the only reason behind establishing this MDC, and based on the findings of my research it is possible to build the empirically based pattern that lead to the creation of Lancaster House Treaties (see Figure 22). Besides Rival Explanation 1, a crucial element concerning Lancaster House Treaties was that it could be built on a decades long British-French defence co-operation. In the first half of this chapter we could see that the majority of mechanisms and foras of British-French collaboration on defence were created in the 1980s, and many practical co-operative projects were going on between the two countries in the 1990s and 2000s. As I mentioned earlier a UK MoD official pointed out, the vast majority of the Franco-British bilateral projects had already existed before Lancaster House, and the treaties ‘only canonized’ them and put them into one overarching framework. Accordingly, the Lancaster House Treaties could not have been done without the at least 30 years long defence co-operation between Paris and London. The already existing mechanisms and forums for negotiations, the networks of experts from both countries and the many practical co-operative frameworks were all needed to create this overarching framework over British-French defence co-operation. Without them there would not have been anything, which could have been put into this overarching framework.

Both the dissatisfaction of the UK and France concerning the lack of progress on defence in EU and NATO frameworks, and the decades long British-French defence co-operation were long trends that were necessary and indispensible to create the Lancaster House Treaties. However, the variable that triggered this co-operation was the personalities, the motivations and the relationship of the signatories of the treaties. Nicolas Sarkozy’s Atlanticist views – including his support to France’s

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reintegration to NATO – were necessary to build more trust between Paris and London. At the same time, David Cameron’s pragmatism and will to achieve something in Europe outside the EU was also significant. In addition, the fact that both of them were right wing politicians and liked each other helped as well. As one French scholar pointed out, this deal between David Cameron and Francois Hollande probably would not have come true, because they had so different personalities and views on Europe.627

![Diagram of Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation leading to the Lancaster House Treaties]

**Figure 22 – Empirically Based Lancaster House Treaties Pattern**

What are the findings concerning the research questions in the case of the Lancaster House Treaties? Why did the UK and France established the Lancaster House Treaties, when similar pan-European structures existed in the framework of NATO and EU? What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU? This chapter highlighted that three major factors played significant roles in the establishment of the Lancaster House Treaties. First, the common theme of dissatisfaction with pan-European defence co-operation created a common ground for UK and France for a more intensive collaboration. Second, without previous decades long defence co-operation this more intensive collaboration could not have come true. Third, personalities and people matter. Accordingly, we can conclude, that the Lancaster House Treaties did not come from nowhere. It was a result of two long term trends, which were necessary for creating the ‘groundwork’ for this MDC. However, what triggered the Lancaster House Treaties were a constellation of compatible political personalities, who grabbed these trends and pushed for a more intensive co-operation on defence.

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Defence ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for establishing the Nordic Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO) on 4th November 2009 in order to ‘strengthen the participating nations’ national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions.’\(^6\) The five Nordic countries decided to enhance their defence related co-operation on every possible field including but not limited to capability development, defence policy, multinational operations, defence technology and defence industry.\(^7\)

The question emerges why the Nordic countries created a new co-operative framework on defence instead of using already existing ones in NATO and the EU. It is true that the Nordic countries did not all share NATO and EU membership, as Iceland and Norway were only members of NATO whilst Finland and Sweden were only members of the EU. Although Denmark was member of both organizations, Copenhagen decided to opt-out of being part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, thus Denmark has not participated in EU led military operations or taken part in EU military capability development collaboration.\(^8\)

At the same time the Nordic states used both EU and NATO extensively to co-operate militarily with each other and other countries. Although not members, Finland and Sweden are important partners for the Alliance, and their co-operation with NATO is based on long-standing policies and matured frameworks. Among others they became members of the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997, and both of them have Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme with NATO. This lays out a programme of co-operation

\(^6\) Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, 4 November 2009, 3.

\(^7\) Ibid.

between them and NATO over a two year period and includes collaboration on security and peacekeeping, crisis management and civil emergency planning. \footnote{631}{“Relations with Sweden,” NATO, November 28, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52535.htm. “Relations with Finland,” NATO, November 28, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm} Finland and Sweden have also contributed to NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, \footnote{632}{Ibid.} in addition they maintain diplomatic missions to NATO in Brussels as well. Furthermore, Finland and Sweden are founding members of the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) under the auspices of NATO Support and Procurement Agency, thus they procured and operate three C-17 transport aircraft alongside ten NATO nations. \footnote{633}{“Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC),” NATO, September 7, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm.} Norway is in a different situation as a solely NATO member but it participates in EU defence co-operation, including contributing to the EU Battlegroup project via the Nordic Battlegroup. \footnote{634}{“Norway Signs Co-operative Arrangement with EDA,” Norway Mission to the EU, March 13, 2006, http://www.eu-norway.org/ARKIV/newsarchives/Norway_signs_co-operative_arrangement_with_EDA/#.V4uGzFcVjXI.} Oslo also signed an arrangement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) to get allowed to participate in EDA projects. \footnote{635}{“Norway Signs Co-operative Arrangement with EDA,” Norway Mission to the EU, March 13, 2006, http://www.eu-norway.org/ARKIV/newsarchives/Norway_signs_co-operative_arrangement_with_EDA/#.V4uGzFcVjXI.}

Accordingly, when Nordic countries intend to participate in EU or NATO projects and operations they generally can, even though they may not be members of a particular organization. Thus, the Nordic states could have intensified their defence co-operation either in the EU or NATO, if they had wanted, because both organizations provided opportunities for that and some of the Nordic countries exploited these opportunities in the past. However, just like the participating countries of the Lancaster House Treaties and CEDC they decided to establish a multinational defence co-operation outside the EU and NATO.

This chapter attempts to figure out why the Nordic countries created NORDEFCO instead of intensifying their defence co-operative efforts in the EU or NATO. The first part of this chapter introduces what kind of co-operation the NORDEFCO is and what are the implications of its launch has had. The next section delineates the previous defence collaborative frameworks among Nordic states to provide important background information and context for the later parts of the chapter. The biggest part attempts to answer the research questions of the thesis.
concerning the Nordic states applying the research framework I introduced in the research framework chapter. Accordingly, I compare the three operationalized, predicted rival patterns with the empirically based pattern by checking whether the assumptions developed to each rival explanation came true before and during the creation of NORDEFCO.

**CREATION OF NORDEFCO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS**

The Nordic defence ministers signed the MoU of NORDEFCO in November 2009, but several studies and many negotiations were conducted in the previous years that led to the creation of this MDC. In 2007 Norway and Sweden published reports independently and together about how cost-effectiveness could be achieved via defence co-operation among Nordic armed forces to help each other keeping the full range of defence capabilities. In June 2008, another report was written together by Norway, Sweden and Finland that identified 140 possible areas for defence collaboration, and suggested 40 of them as an initial first step by the beginning of 2010. In November the same year, Iceland and Denmark joined to this initiative, which culminated in the establishing of the so-called Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP), which ‘was something prelude to NORDEFCO’.

These activities remained at defence ministry level, but other processes also supported the creation of NORDEFCO. In June 2008, the foreign ministers of the five Nordic countries charged Thorvald Stoltenberg (former minister of foreign affairs of Norway) ‘to produce an independent report on how Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy could be developed during the coming 10–15 years.’ The Stoltenberg report was presented to the Nordic foreign ministers on an extraordinary

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638 Håkon Lunde Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War (Oslo: Institutt for forvarsstudier, 2011), 18.


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meeting in February 2009 and generated discussions about several wide-ranging issues.641

Thanks to these processes the Nordic Defence Co-operation was established at the end of 2009 by signing an MoU.642 With this step the participating countries put many of Nordic defence collaborations under the framework of one structure. The MoU of NORDEFCO emphasized that this MDC is ‘a comprehensive, enhanced and long-term approach to defence related issues’.643 Accordingly, it listed several, general co-operation areas including ‘defence related strategic and policy issues of common interests’, enhancing operational effectiveness, improving interoperability, collaboration on multinational operations, gaining technological benefits, improve the competitiveness of the defence industry of the Nordic countries. In addition, the document kept open the possibility of collaboration in other areas and stressed that the participants will ‘identify new possible initiatives for cooperation in the areas of policy, capabilities and operations’.644

NORDEFCO is not an organization but a ‘lean structure for a comprehensive cooperation’.645 Decision-making is based on consensus on every level, it has an annually rotating chairmanship, and both the defence ministers and Chiefs of Defence meet twice a year, while state secretaries meet once every year. The MoU established the Nordic Defence Policy Steering Committee (NORDEF PSC) and the Nordic Military Co-ordination Committee (NORDEF MCC). The PSC makes strategic decisions in any NORDEFCO related issues. It also makes sure that the co-operative efforts remain coherent, and tasks and provides guidance to the MCC.646 Meanwhile MCC manages the military level co-operation among the Nordic countries and establishes appropriate organizational structures for that if it is necessary. Furthermore, it provides military advice to PSC, and if MCC identifies any policy related issues, it forwards them to PSC.647 The PSC’s members are from deputy state secretary or director general level, while MCC consists officials from the strategic

642 MoU of NORDEFCO
643 Ibid. 3.
644 Ibid.
646 MoU of NORDEFCO. 4.
647 Ibid. 5.
military level. Originally the PSC focused on issues regarding policies, operations and capabilities, since 2014 it has also been dealing with co-operative armaments initiatives as well. Thus, currently the National Armaments Directors and Capability Directors of Nordic states take part on PSC meetings too.

Below the level of MCC the practical work is pursued around five Cooperation Areas (COPAs): Capabilities (COPA CAPA); Human Resources & Education (COPA HR&E); Training & Exercises (COPA TR&EX); Operations (COPA OPS); Armaments (COPA ARMA). The basis of agreements in the MCC and PSC are the recommendations coming from the COPAs. The COPAs meet on senior military representative level (usually O-6), and they decide on launching new initiatives and review on-going ones. The COPAs decide whether a new working

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648 Saxi, *Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War*, 19.
650 Ibid.
651 Iceland does not send representatives to most of the COPAs’ meetings representatives as it does not have military.
group should be established for a certain activity, and existing working groups report back about their progress to the senior representatives of the COPAs. In 2014, the five COPAs managed more than 40 on-going projects, and some of them have already had tangible results:

- Platform for Security Policy Dialogue: As a result of Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine and the growing Russian military presence in the Baltic Sea region the relevance of discussions on security policy issues among the Nordic states enhanced. It also created a need for exchanging information on emergency planning and preparedness.

- Operations: The four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway), which are participating in international peace operations, co-ordinate their activities concerning several operations (Syria, Afghanistan, Mali).

- Capacity building: The Nordic countries are creating a joint capability for defence sector capacity-building. It means that they establish advisory teams that will be able to be deployed in a 6 months’ notice. Although not with this joint teams, the Nordic countries have already supported the East African Standby Force by advice and financial means in the framework of NORDEFCO.

- Training and Exercises: During the Iceland Air Meet 2014 (IAM 2014) Iceland provided host nation support, while three Nordic countries – Norway, Sweden and Finland – together with the Netherlands conducted military exercises with fighter jets, helicopters, NATO AWACS and air-to-air refuelling aircrafts.

- Air Surveillance: Norway, Finland and Sweden are co-operating with NATO on an Air Situational Data Exchange system, which allows Sweden and Finland to exchange air situational data between them and NATO countries.

- Common contracting: In order to create significant savings, Norway and Sweden signed framework agreements with Rhenmetall M.A.N. Military Vehicles for the common procurement and logistical support of military trucks in 2014. Finland later decided to join to the framework agreements. Denmark

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653 Heimvik and Iversen, Nordic Defence Cooperation Annual Report 2014. 16-39
654 Ibid. 10-13.
and Norway also signed a common life-cycle support contract with a company concerning their C-130J aircraft.

- **Base Camp Co-operation in UN Mission in Mali**: Sweden and Norway collaborate on base camp materials and Sweden is leasing equipment from Norway to fulfil its peacekeeping tasks in Mali.
- **Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED)**: As a part of an EDA projects Sweden, Norway and Denmark are co-operating on training and procurement to support C-IED activities.
- **Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis (JDEAL)**: The Nordic countries decided to procure jointly two JDEAL laboratories for using them in operations. JDEAL’s full operational capacity was expected to be reached in 2015.
- **Engineering**: The on-going Nordic engineering collaboration was formalized on road construction, bridging capability and education.
- **Surplus sale of Multiple Launch Rocket System**: Occurred between Denmark and Finland in 2014. COPA ARMA identified the possibility of the sale, and the National Armament Directors made it happen.

As we could see, projects in NORDEFCO do not need the participation of all Nordic countries as they can choose to opt out of any activities, but they also have the opportunity to join to an on-going project later. Of course, the above listed projects not the only ones pursued in the framework of NORDEFCO. Among others, co-operation on exercises, trainings, educational activities have been extremely successful throughout the years, but armament programmes and common procurements have usually generated disappointments.  

On the one hand, we can see that Nordic defence collaboration is expanding and deepening and the political support exists for further progress. On the other hand, it seems that NORDEFCO has structural and political limits which will be difficult to overcome. For instance, in December 2013 the Nordic countries agreed on a vision about what the NORDEFCO should look like in 2020, which says:

‘By 2020 we envision an enhanced political and military dialogue on security and defence issues and actively seek for new possibilities for cooperation. We create efficient and cost-effective solutions based on a

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shared understanding of our mutual potential and challenges. We are committed to enhanced cooperation and coordination in capability development and armaments cooperation. We coordinate activities in international operations and capacity building, human resources, education, training and exercises. We seek to increase pooling of capabilities and to deepen cooperation in the area of life-cycle support of our defence inventories.  

Although this vision is in line with current ambitions and the significant progress has been achieved at a practical level, several analysts and practitioners argue that in the current circumstances NORDEFCO cannot grow appropriately. Some point out that the current aggressive/assertive Russian behaviour and Moscow’s growing military presence in the Baltic region have changed the situation significantly since launching NORDEFCO in 2009. Thus, as Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, NORDEFCO will not necessarily be able to meet its full potential.  

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION OF NORDIC COUNTRIES BEFORE THE CREATION OF NORDEFCO  

Defence co-operation among Nordic countries started on certain areas already during the Cold War, but the roots of defence collaboration dates back to the interwar period. The possibility of establishing a Nordic Defence Union among the Nordic countries was already discussed in the 1930s several times, but the idea was turned down, and the only defence co-operative efforts among Nordic countries were established bilaterally between Finland and Sweden and between Sweden and Norway on a limited scale before World War II. In that period all the Nordic countries deemed themselves neutral, and did not join neither to the Axis Powers nor to the Allies. However, this did not allow the majority of them from involvement in the Second World War. While Denmark and Norway were occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940,
Britain invaded Iceland in the same year. Finland successfully fought for its independence against the Soviet Union during the war and in the final years it also expelled German troops from its territory. Sweden was the only Nordic country during World War II that was not involved directly in major military confrontations. However, it is worth to note that Sweden provided a volunteer corps with more than 8000 troops to support Finland against the Soviet Union during the Winter War in 1939-1940.

The idea of establishing the Nordic Defence Union was raised again after the war and was seriously considered by the governments of Sweden and Norway in 1948. Finland and Denmark joined in the negotiations soon afterwards and these four Nordic countries established the Scandinavian defence committee in October 1948 to investigate different aspects of the creation of the Nordic Defence Union. However, the idea of a Nordic defence bloc was not realized, as Denmark, Iceland and Norway became founding members of NATO in 1949, while Sweden chose to keep its neutral status and established itself as an armed neutral country. Finland signed a special agreement with the Soviet Union in which Helsinki agreed to maintain a neutral status in return for Soviet troops leaving its territory. As a result, Finland was not allowed to develop closer relationships with the West and remained more or less on the Soviet orbit during the Cold War.

As a consequence of the Nordic states division between East and West orbits defence co-operation during the Cold War could only be limited. Nevertheless, Denmark, Iceland and Norway collaborated extensively in the framework of NATO, and they were able to co-operate militarily with Finland and Sweden in UN peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, Nordic defence co-operation on this area did not create tensions between Nordic countries and ‘their’ respective super powers. The Nordic co-operation on peacekeeping operations was extremely successful during the Cold War. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden worked together closely and

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663 Blidberg, Just good friends, 41-63.
665 Iceland does not have armed forces, thus Rejkyavik did not take part actively in this co-operation.
often deployed peacekeepers to the same conflict zones at the same time. The four Nordic countries altogether provided the 25% of peacekeeping forces to UN operations during the Cold War (approximately 125,000 troops), which generated a huge reputation for them.\textsuperscript{666} They also developed a distinct Nordic model for peacekeeping, which, according to Peter Viggo Jakobsen, consisted the following elements:\textsuperscript{667}

- creating institutional frameworks for defence ministerial negotiations and working groups for practical co-operation;
- co-operation on military education by establishing joint UN peacekeeping courses;
- developing national stand-by forces of volunteers which could be deployed in short notice;
- willingness for deploying troops for UN operations.

The framework for the above-mentioned co-operation was called NORDSAMFN (Nordic cooperation group for military UN matters), where decision making among Nordic states was based on consensus, and troop contributions to UN operations were made on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{668} The Nordic stand-by force, which was the most important element of NORDSAMFN, was established by Norway, Sweden and Denmark in 1964, and later Finland also joined to this collaboration. In the second half of the Cold War the Nordic stand-by force consisted a 6000 strong troop pool (Denmark 950 troops, Finland 2000 troops, Norway 1330 troops, Sweden 2000 troops), but it was never used as a joint Nordic force, despite the fact that this possibility was considered several times.\textsuperscript{669} However, as a result of the continuous Nordic contribution to UN missions and because of difficulties in recruitment, the Nordic stand-by force became instead a system that ensured the rotation of Nordic troops in UN operations than a real stand-by force, which could have been deployed in a short notice.\textsuperscript{670} The training, deployment of and providing equipment for the national elements of the stand-by unit were responsibilities of the individual Nordic

\textsuperscript{667} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{668} Ibid. 213.
\textsuperscript{669} Ibid. 29.
\textsuperscript{670} Ibid. 31-32.
countries. The soldiers of the stand-by-force were volunteers, approximately 90% of them were civilians who completed their basic military training as conscripts and only 10% were professional soldiers. Every volunteer had the obligation to finish a 3-4 weeks long national peacekeeper training, while non-commissioner officers and officers took part in joint Nordic UN training programmes as well.  

After the end of the Cold War the geopolitical situation changed significantly in Europe, which created an environment that supported co-operation among Nordic states on military affairs. The Soviet Union collapsed, thus Finland could distance itself from Moscow, and also Sweden’s position on armed neutrality could be eased. Accordingly, both countries changed their neutral status and became non-aligned. Although, they still do not join to military alliances like NATO. However, the evolution of their approach in this regard allowed them to join to the EU in 1995 and participate in EU’s security and defence policy. In addition, they are also participating in NATO partnership structures as it was mentioned earlier, accordingly EU membership and NATO partnership status provided Stockholm and Helsinki new platforms to participate in defence collaboration outside the framework of the UN. This would have been impossible during the Cold War, when the East-West divide was stark, and the Kremlin probably would not have tolerated Finland’s and Sweden’s abandonment of neutrality to non-alignment. Furthermore, the security situation was much safer in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s, and although the defence budgets and troop levels of the Nordic countries were significantly decreased, these developments (Euro-Atlantic integration, peaceful security environment in Europe) created an environment where defence co-operation become much less sensitive among Nordic states than earlier.

Accordingly, in 1994 Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden established the Nordic Armament Co-operation (NORDAC) ‘with the goal of coordinating armaments development, maintenance and procurement’. NORDAC provided some

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671 Ibid. 32.
tangible benefits and generated savings by information sharing on technology and test results, which were discussed in the so-called Co-operation Groups (COG). COGs were dedicated to broad co-operation areas like logistics, military clothing, NATO codification, Nordic Public Private Partnership, investigation (of new areas of co-operations) etc., and helped to facilitate some smaller procurements between the Nordic countries. At the same time, the few major joint Nordic armament collaborations failed. The Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme (SNHP) did not result in an all-Nordic procurement as it was intended, because Denmark decided to buy the AgustaWestland EH101 helicopter, while the other Nordic countries opted for the NH90 helicopter. Similarly, the Viking submarine project started with only three Nordic nations (Finland did not participate), but Norway decided to quit the programme in 2003, and Denmark did the same one year later. As analysts pointed out, one of NORDAC’s significant problems was that it had a great imbalance favouring Sweden concerning armament deals in the Nordic region, as Stockholm had the strongest defence industry among the participating countries.

The Nordic peacekeeping model, which was the success story of Nordic military co-operation in the Cold War, faded after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Jakobsen highlights that two changes contributed to this situation. First, many states, which earlier were not interested in participating in peacekeeping missions, began to send troops in big numbers to peacekeeping operations. This meant that the Nordic countries lost their status as major troop contributors. Secondly, the peace operations after the Cold War needed a different approach concerning the use of force. While peacekeepers had previously used force mostly for self-defence, the international operations of the 1990s and 2000s needed combat-capable forces for offensive operations as well. Realizing this situation, Nordic countries created several new Nordic frameworks for reforming their participation in international missions. These were NORDCAPS, the Nordic Battlegroup and SHIRBRIG.

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678 Ibid.
679 Hagelin, ‘Hardware politics, “hard politics” or “where, politics?”’ 170.
680 Ibid. 171.
682 Ibid.
They established NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support) in 1997, and at the same time they abolished NORDSAMFN the co-operative structure that was created in the Cold War.\(^{683}\) The size of NORDCAPS’ force pool (12 000) was twice the size of NORDSAMFN’s (6 000), but the force pool was never used for joint deployments, and as the EU Battlegroup concept was introduced in 2004 analysts deemed NORDCAPS ‘obsolete’, and NORDCAPS’ force pool was ceased in 2006.\(^{684}\) Under NORDCAPS the Nordic countries rather created a joint support package for improving UN capacities, and started security sector reform projects in the Balkans, in Africa and in Ukraine.\(^{685}\) In addition NORDCAPS’ framework was used to create the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG), which was established under the aegis of the EU’s battlegroup initiative, and was on stand-by for the first time in 2008. Sweden took the responsibilities of NBG’s framework nation and provided 2000 troops to the unit, while Finland and Norway contributed to it on company level. Because of Denmark’s opt out from ESDP/CSDP it could not take part in this project, but Ireland and the Baltic countries did.\(^{686}\) The third co-operative frameworks on operations was the Danish-lead SHIRBRIG (Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations). Although it was not purely a Nordic initiative as Canada and the Netherlands also contributed to this unit, it had a heavy participation from the four Nordic countries. The multinational brigade was established in 2000, and made forces available at short notice for UN operations for a maximum of six months. Elements of SHIRBRIG were deployed among others to UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN headquarters in Liberia, UN Mission in Sudan and also supported African multinational organizations to create their stand-by forces. However, not like the NBG SHIRBRIG could not be deployed for conducting offensive enforcement operations,\(^{687}\) and finally SHIRBRIG was deactivated in 2008.\(^{688}\)

As it was mentioned in the previous section, NORDSUP was established with a ‘focus on force production and supportive functions’\(^{689}\) in 2008 after a trilateral study of Finland, Norway and Sweden identified 140 possible military co-operation

\(^{683}\) Jakobsen, ”Still Punching Above Their Weight?”, 459.

\(^{684}\) Ibid. 460.

\(^{685}\) Ibid.

\(^{686}\) Ibid. 461.

\(^{687}\) Ibid. 462-463.

\(^{688}\) Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, 16.

\(^{689}\) Forsberg, ”The rise of Nordic defence cooperation”, 1169.
areas among the three Nordic countries, and they began collaborating on 40 of them. Iceland and Denmark joined shortly to this initiative. NORDEFCO was created in 2009 and took over the responsibilities and institutional structures of NORDSUP, NORDCAPS and NORDAC merging all of them into one overarching framework.690 Rieker and Terlikowski pointed out that the establishment of NORDEFCO in 2009 ‘was in reality nothing more than a merger of earlier cooperation initiatives (NORDAC, NORDCAPS and NORDSUP) in different areas within a common framework. This means that it has not led to the establishment of any new institutions.’691

This section showed that the concept of defence co-operation among the Nordic states goes back to the interwar period and Nordic defence collaborations have evolved for the last half-century. Before and after World War II Nordic states considered the establishment of a Nordic Defence Union, but this idea was not realized. However, structured and well-established defence collaboration has been going on among Nordic countries since the 1960s. They began to co-operate extensively on UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, and they were highly successful for developing and applying a distinct Nordic peacekeeping model in the aegis of NORSAMFN during the Cold War. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the new geopolitical situation created opportunities for Nordic defence collaboration, but also created difficulties for it. The international situation was much more suitable for establishing new co-operative frameworks and the Nordic countries exploited this opportunity by creating NORDAC, NORDCAPS, NORDSUP, NBG, SHIRBRIG and NORDEFCO. At the same time these new Nordic defence co-operative frameworks have been a symptom of the crisis of the Nordic model, and highlights that the Nordic countries could not find a new long lasting, stable model for military co-operation in the post-Cold War period.

**CREATING NORDEFCO INSTEAD OF CO-OPERATING IN NATO AND EU**

The forthcoming sections of the chapter attempts to answer the question why the Nordic states created NORDEFCO instead of using pan-European structures – EU and NATO – for defence co-operation. The situation of Nordic states is different

690 Ibid. 1171-1172.
compared to the participating countries of the previously studied sub-regional MDCs. First, every participating states – except Austria – of the Lancaster House Treaties and CEDC were members of both NATO and EU, when these sub-regional MDCs were created. Second, for most of the participating states of Lancaster House Treaties and CEDC NATO and/or EU had a bigger relevance than for ‘normal’ members. Britain and France had great stakes at least in one of the two organizations for decades, because they founded and nurtured these institutions (France – EU; UK – NATO) to support their foreign and security policy goals. In the case of the post-communist Central European states, NATO and EU were important not only in political and practical terms, but they also had a symbolic role in the eyes of Central Europeans. Namely, for Central Europeans EU and NATO memberships represented the West, thus when they joined these two organizations they felt that they finally left the ‘East’ and belonged to the ‘West’ again.

The dynamics concerning NORDEFCO is quite different. First, the participating countries of NORDEFCO belong only either to NATO or to EU, and none of them have memberships in both organizations. The only exception is Denmark, but because its opt-out from ESDP/CSDP we can regard Copenhagen as a NATO member only concerning defence issues. Accordingly, NORDEFCO states are more like Austria in CEDC in terms of institutional membership, as they are member of only one of the relevant institutions concerning my research. In addition, they are not major countries in NATO and EU as France and UK, and for them NATO and EU are not relevant as symbols, as it used to be for Central European post-communist countries, because the Western orientation of Nordic countries was never questioned. Accordingly, we can say that Nordic countries were less integrated into transatlantic structures than participating states of the Lancaster House Treaties and CEDC, and – as we will see in the coming sections – they had quite different motivations to take part in NATO and EU defence collaborations. At the same time, they participated in NATO and EU operations during the 1990s and 2000s, and as the first section of this chapter showed they participated in several EU and NATO capability development projects even though they were not members of the particular organization. The question emerges; why they decided to deepen their already existing Nordic based defence collaborations by establishing NORDEFCO instead of focusing their efforts
on EU and NATO co-operation, as this was the norm in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s.\footnote{As Iceland does not have a military, its defence co-operative options are limited. Accordingly, my research focuses on Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden concerning NORDEFCO.}

**Why the Nordic countries opted for co-operating in an MDC?**

In the Research Framework chapter I explained that I attempt to answer my research questions by using multiple case design, and with regard to every case I test three rival explanations. Thus, I try to identify the prerequisites of the operationalized generic predicted patterns of the three rival explanations regarding NORDEFCO. If I can identify the prerequisites of one of the rival explanations regarding this case, we can say that a rival has explanatory power why the Nordic countries established NORDEFCO instead of co-operating in NATO or EU. The three rival explanations are 1) the lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation 2) the impacts of the financial crisis, 3) different emerging shared threat perceptions of European states.

**Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation**

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 24 – Rival Explanation 1: Predicted NORDEFCO Pattern*

According to ‘Rival Explanation 1’, (see Figure 24) defence co-operation in NATO and EU did not progress appropriately (independent variable), and Nordic countries became dissatisfied with this situation in NATO and EU (intervening variable). Finally, this dissatisfaction caused the creation of NORDEFCO (dependent variable). For this rival explanation, I created three assumptions that are prerequisites for verifying ‘Rival Explanation 1’.

The prerequisites are the following:

1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be identified.
2. The dissatisfaction of Nordic countries concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected.
3. The creation of the NORDEFCO needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of Nordic countries with NATO/EU.

If all of these prerequisites can be confirmed, we can assess that ‘Rival Explanation 1’ has explanatory power over the creation of NORDEFCO.

**Prerequisite 1:**
The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO needs to be identified.

This is the only prerequisite among the prerequisites of the three rival explanations, which is not directly associated with the participating states of the studied MDCs. In addition, the lack of progress concerning relevant EU and NATO defence cooperation, especially in the area of military capability development, was introduced and demonstrated in the Literature Review chapter. Thus, in this section I am not going to repeat the events and processes in this regard, but based on the Literature Review chapter I will take Prerequisite 1 of Rival Explanation 1 as a given regarding every case.

Accordingly, Prerequisite 1 based on the Literature Review is confirmed.

**Prerequisite 2:**
The dissatisfaction of Nordic countries concerning the lack of progress of defence cooperative efforts in EU and NATO needs to be detected.

The four Nordic countries that have armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) were not critical towards NATO and EU before the creation of NORDEFCO. They tended to be reliable and constructive members of the organization they had membership in and they had not showed any sign – at least publicly – that they would be dissatisfied with the lack of progress on defence cooperative efforts in the EU or in the NATO.

Denmark was viewed as an unreliable NATO ally during most of the Cold War and Copenhagen was highly sceptical towards NATO and US policies in the 1980s. At the same time, Norway was viewed as one of the most trusted NATO members in that period, but it became ambivalent towards NATO during the 1990s. However, at the time of the creation of NORDEFCO, Denmark was considered as a top-tier member of NATO, and Norway was also perceived as a country that fulfilled
its NATO commitments. Their high regard and prestige in the Alliance is shown by
the fact that they have given the last two Secretary Generals of NATO. Former prime
minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen was the first Nordic politician to
become Secretary General of NATO, and held this position between 2009 and 2014.
Currently, Jens Stoltenberg, former prime minister of Norway, is the incumbent of the
post. Yet, despite the recent achievements of both countries being acknowledged by
their allies, Denmark and Norway have struggled with military transformation and
fulfilling demands of the NATO and especially of the US. Thus, they focused more
on their own problems concerning defence than on the weaknesses of other NATO
members in the 2000s.

During the Cold War Denmark was perceived as a ‘reluctant ally’ in
NATO, and even the term ‘Denmarkization’, which referred to allies who accepted
‘NATO protection without willingness to pay for it’, highlights that Copenhagen’s
relationship with NATO was more than problematic. As early as the 1950s the NATO
allies talked about a ‘Danish problem’ and throughout the 1970s Copenhagen was
repeatedly criticized because of his lack of defence efforts. The situation
culminated in the 1980’s when Denmark’s foreign policy was ‘characterized by
scepticism toward the alliance in general and the United States in particular’. In the
framework of the so-called ‘footnote policy’ Denmark attached ‘dissenting footnotes’
to NATO communiqués concerning the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) initiative
and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s. Not surprisingly, American
officials including their Secretary of Defense and the President heavily criticized
Copenhagen. Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO even told that
‘Danish policy ran the risk of excluding the country from the alliance’.

At the same time, Norway was deemed as a reliable ally. Although, in the
beginning of the Cold War Oslo and Copenhagen were on the same page on several

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697 Ibid.
699 Ibid.
issues and implemented restrictive policies towards NATO. Thus, they did not allow
the establishment of foreign military bases or the storage of nuclear weapons on their
soil during peacetime, and restricted allied military activities in some of their areas. However, Oslo made much more defence efforts along the lines of NATO goals
during the Cold War, and was much less critical towards US policies (INF, SDI) during the 1980s than Denmark. By the 1970s and 1980s, Norway was deemed as one
of the most reliably NATO members by the US, and proportionately Oslo received
the largest American military support among allies in that period. Accordingly, it is
not surprising that certain analyst described the relationship between Oslo and
Washington as ‘an alliance within the alliance’.703

However, the roles of Denmark and Norway in NATO changed after the end
of the Cold War, and while Denmark earned the label of the ‘impeccable ally’ Norway was deemed an ‘ambivalent ally’. It was argued that Denmark’s change of
attitude towards NATO happened, because Copenhagen intended to ‘compensate for
the sins of the 1980s’, but more importantly, because it felt that it had to ‘compensate
for the consequences of the defence opt-out’ concerning the EU. As Copenhagen
shut itself out of ESDP/CSDP Denmark concentrated on NATO, as it remained its
only option. Denmark adapted faster to the new international environment than
Norway and already by 1992 established the 4500-strong Danish International
Brigade (DIB) for international operations, and was willing to deploy war-fighting
and sizeable forces to NATO operations on the Balkans throughout the 1990s.
Copenhagen also left its earlier position on the necessity of UN resolutions
concerning international operations and took part in NATO’s Kosovo operations and
in the coalition of willing intervention in Iraq as well. In NATO’s ISAF mission,
Denmark deployed almost 700 troops mostly in high-risk areas, which contribution

700 Ibid. 765.
701 Ibid. 767.
702 Rieker, Europeanization of national security identity. 154.
703 Ibid.
was highly praised by allies.\textsuperscript{708} At the same time, Denmark transformed its armed forces successfully. The process began with the creation of DIB, but it got pace slowly and was executed ‘half-heartedly’ in the 1990s, and as a consequence of the peace dividend the defence budget and troop levels were cut in Denmark as well.\textsuperscript{709} However, this half-hearted transformation was much faster than the similar processes in the vast majority of allies. Although NATO recognized and valued Danish soldiers and their contribution to international operations already during the 1990s and early 2000s, the 2004 Defence Agreement by focusing exclusively on deployability, sustainability, professionalization and by the abolition of the remaining territorial defence forces pushed Denmark irrevocably to the top-tier of NATO members. The process that started with the 2004 Agreement was called as ‘role model within NATO’ by the US Ambassador to NATO and was praised by the Secretary General of NATO as well.\textsuperscript{710}

However, Danish policy makers and the armed forces faced difficulties around the time of the creation of NORDEFCO. It did not finish the transformation process according to the original plans because Danish participation in demanding international operations cost much more than anticipated. As a result, the costs of operations were subsidized from the financial resources previously allocated for capability development. Another serious problem was that many soldiers resigned because of the frequent overseas deployments. In addition, the debate about burden sharing in the Alliance began to shift to the level of defence budgets, and as Denmark’s defence budget in terms of GDP was not close to the agreed NATO level\textsuperscript{711} Copenhagen had concerns about the sustainability of its top-tier NATO member status.\textsuperscript{712} Accordingly, the highly sceptical Danish views of the 1980s about NATO radically changed to the second half of the 2000s, and the lack of progress on defence co-operative efforts in NATO was not a major concern for Danish decision makers, as they rather focused on how Denmark could keep its position in NATO.

In terms of the progress of the defence co-operation in the EU, Denmark was not dissatisfied either, as Denmark was not part of the ESDP/CSDP. Although the Danish parliament supported the Treaty of the European Union, the majority of

\textsuperscript{708} Ringsmose and Rynning, "The Impeccable Ally?", 61-63.
\textsuperscript{709} Ibid. 59.
\textsuperscript{710} Ibid 59-60.
\textsuperscript{711} It was 1.4% instead of 2% of GDP. Source: NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, “Defence Expenditures,” 6.
\textsuperscript{712} Ringsmose and Rynning, "The Impeccable Ally?", 72-80.
Danish voters voted against it on a referendum in 1992. Thus, the Danish political leadership made a special arrangement in the European Council and opted-out of co-operation on EU level in four areas including defence. This was acceptable for Danish voters on another referendum in 1993, but it meant that Denmark did not have a word in ESDP/CSDP.713 Although, the opt-out on defence matters had not significant impact on Denmark’s prestige, coalition power and reputation in the EU in general,714 the fact that Danish officials are not taken seriously concerning defence issues in the EU created deep frustration in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. As a Danish MoD official put it: ‘We are obliged to be attentive towards every change and development in the ESDP. We have to participate in meetings and in committees but we are not taken seriously. Our market value vis-a-vis the other EU countries is very limited… As a bureaucracy, we are paralysed.’715 Accordingly, a kind of dissatisfaction of Danish officials regarding ESDP existed, but it was not because of ESDP’s lack of progress per se, but because Denmark could not participate in it.

As we have seen, Norway was viewed one of the most co-operative and reliable NATO members in the Cold War, but it quickly lost this status in the 1990s, as Oslo adapted to the new international situation much slower than Denmark and was ambivalent to the direction NATO took. Countries with high defence budgets, large well-trained militaries and relevant strategic position were deemed ‘good allies’ in NATO during the Cold War, which Norway met perfectly. However, after the Cold War the meaning of ‘good ally’ changed, and in this regard the focus shifted to the number of capable troops deployable to international operations and the willingness to use them in combat missions.716 At the same time, Norway was reluctant to send combat troops to NATO operations especially in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Oslo deployed only non-combat troops (field hospital, helicopter wing, logistics battalion) to the international operations on the Balkans, which changed only in 1997 when

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714 Ibid. 356-357.
716 Petersson and Saxi, ”Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009,” 775.
Norway provided a mechanized battalion to the SFOR mission in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{717} Although, Norway sent F-16 fighter aircraft and a mechanized battalion to the Kosovo war in 1999 like Denmark, the Norwegian aircraft were not able to deliver an air-to-ground capability and the Norwegian battalion needed twice as much time to be deployed than the Danish one.\textsuperscript{718} The major deficiencies in Norway’s military capabilities were clear to all. Partly this was because Oslo was not only reluctant and sceptical about out of area operations but it was also not an enthusiastic supporter of NATO enlargement either,\textsuperscript{719} preferring to concentrate on NATO-Russia relations.\textsuperscript{720}

Two reasons are generally identified by analysts for this reluctance.\textsuperscript{721} The first one stems from Norway’s geopolitical position, and while the Alliance focused on out of area operations and NATO enlargement in the 1990s, Norway’s main security problem remained territorial. Although Norway did not believe that Moscow would attack in the short term, the proximity of Russia remained a concern for Norway, because of the instability of the Russian state in the 1990s and the competitive interests of Norway and Russia in the High North.\textsuperscript{722} The other issue is cultural. Norwegians perceive themselves as a peaceful nation, who never started a war,\textsuperscript{723} and according, to this line of reasoning Norwegian soldiers should be used to bring peace via UN peacekeeping missions to other countries. This partly explains the reluctance of deploying combat troops to international operations in the 1990s. The late transformation of Norwegian armed forces can be partly linked to the strong tradition of territorial defence and conscription, which not only supported the idea that the ‘people’ have to defend the territory where they live, but also served as an important socialization and educational institution.\textsuperscript{724}

\textsuperscript{719} Rottem, "The Ambivalent Ally: Norway in the New NATO,” 630.
\textsuperscript{721} Rottam
\textsuperscript{723} Rottem, "The Ambivalent Ally: Norway in the New NATO,” 620.
However, in the 2000s Norway’s attitude changed and became a less ambivalent ally in NATO. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence started to reform defence in 2001 creating the capability to deploy more troops in demanding international operations. Although Oslo’s focus on Russia did not change radically, the visible Russian military decline helped the Norwegian armed forces to focus less on territorial defence, and the government could argue that Norway has to take its share in NATO operations in an exchange for a future help form the Alliance.\textsuperscript{725} Referring to the necessity of adapting to deployments in international operations, Norwegian Chief of Defence, Sverre Diesen put it that ‘we are facing some fundamental developments, which leave us few choices but to adapt or to become militarily and security politically irrelevant.’\textsuperscript{726}

Accordingly, Norway not only transformed its military, but became more ambitious in international operations as well. In the first period of NATO’s Afghan mission, Norway deployed special operation forces and F-16 fighter aircrafts capable for conducting air-to-ground tasks as well.\textsuperscript{727} Although, it sent only non-combat units to the coalition of willing operations in Iraq, the Norwegian contribution to the ISAF mission increased gradually and Oslo was praised by US representatives for ‘punching above its weight’ in Afghanistan in 2008.\textsuperscript{728} At the same time, US and NATO officials expressed their disappointments, as Norway ‘answered negatively to the alliance request to contribute combat forces for the south’.\textsuperscript{729} Accordingly, we can see that Norway made huge steps to become again a trusted ally in the 2000s, and was not dissatisfied with the lack of progress on defence co-operation in NATO anymore. Although, Norway’s scepticism and ambivalence towards NATO policies were clearly detectable in the 1990s, this attitude changed and softened significantly to the mid-2000s, and Norway aligned with NATO’s major policies and initiatives.

With regard to the EU, Norway was not dissatisfied either. Although Norway is not an EU member, Oslo is much more integrated into ESDP/CSDP than EU member Denmark, as Norway participated in the EU Battlegroup initiative with

\textsuperscript{726} Haaland, "Participation in Peace Support Operations for Small Countries: The Case of Norway,” 505.
\textsuperscript{727} Saxi, "Defending Small States," 417.
\textsuperscript{729} Ibid.
providing troops for the Nordic Battlegroup, Oslo also takes part in EDA projects and provides troops to EU operations. Although some segments of Norway’s political leadership were ambivalent towards ESDP/CSDP in the early 2000s, since then every government has supported Norway’s participation in it. Thanks to these activities Norway achieved some level of access and even influence in ESDP/CSDP, but not as much as it expected. At the same time, Norwegian diplomats have a similar problem as the Danish ones, namely they feel that they are often side-lined in the decision-making processes of ESDP/CSDP. Thus, for Norway the progress (or the lack of progress) of defence co-operation in EU is not a problem per se, rather the Norwegian MoD is concerned that it does not have enough influence in it.

Sweden and Finland were in a very different situation than Norway and Denmark, as they were neutral EU members and did not join the NATO. As we will see, these two countries did not have problem with the lack of progress on EU or NATO level defence co-operation before the creation of NORDEFCO. Its reason was partly that EU’s defence co-operation progressed on a way these two countries preferred, and despite the fact that they were not members of NATO, they could join to the NATO initiatives they preferred and could ignore NATO initiatives and international operations they did not like.

During the Cold War, European neutral countries like Sweden and Finland ‘had to demonstrate the ability to defend themselves autonomously against violation of their neutrality and to maintain their territorial integrity. Moreover, their neutral status required that they achieved this by conducting a nonaggressive policy.’ Thus, these countries relied heavily on doctrines of dissuasion and territorial defence and militarily engaged only in peacekeeping operations.

However, after the Cold War these states adopted a more co-operative strategy towards NATO and the EU and developed their military capabilities to be able to participate in a range of expeditionary operations. In addition, Sweden and Finland

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733 Ibid. 312.
734 Ibid. 320-321.
also invested huge energy in making sure that EU’s security and defence policy would take a direction, which was acceptable for them. In 1996, two years after Finland and Sweden joined the EU, the two Nordic countries jointly proposed the so-called Petersberg tasks, which defined CFSP’s and ESDP’s future, and made sure that ESDP would not focus on collective defence for a while but on ‘humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, thus their non-alignment policy could be maintained’. They also supported the British-French initiative in St Malo, although Sweden had concerns that ESDP progressed too fast by setting capability goals – the so-called headline goals – for EU members in the end of the 1990s. However, during the Helsinki Summit in 2000 both Stockholm and Helsinki made sure that the headline goals would not be too demanding and the new institutions and processes would be developed according to their interests. Furthermore, they insisted and successfully ‘uploaded’ to ESDP that EU should not only focus on the military side of crisis management, but it must include the civilian aspects of it as well. Accordingly, we can see that both Sweden and Finland played a major and leading role by shaping CFSP’s and ESDP’ goals, requirements and institutional framework in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Finland and Sweden have also been participating actively in many EU led crisis management operations and also made significant changes to prepare their armed forces for expeditionary tasks. However, the two countries had very different approaches in this regard. Despite the fact that according to the Finnish laws 2000 Finnish soldiers may serve abroad in international operations, Finland still prioritizes territorial defence over expeditionary operations, it also prefers civilian crisis management tasks in international missions and is willing to use force only for self-defence purposes. Finland still has a large conscripts based military, which has

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736 Ibid.
737 Ibid. 72-74.
approximately 350,000 soldiers (mostly reservists), and Helsinki’s focus concerning capability development remains on territorial defence like air defence capabilities, modernization of regional troops etc. This approach is understandable, if we take into consideration that Finland shares a 1340 km long border with Russia, and has the memory that it had to defend itself from Russia during World War II several times. However, as ESDP/CSDP’s demands and requirements concerning military transformation were not demanding, Finland did not have problem with the lack of progress of defence co-operation in the EU as it could successfully represent its interests. Namely, with some minor changes Finland could continue its Cold War practices and participate in peace support operations, but now it had the opportunity to conduct this activity not only as a member of the UN but as a member of the EU as well. At the same time, it could focus on territorial defence and was not under pressure to transform its armed forces like many NATO members.

In contrast with Finland, Sweden became one of the major proponents of transformation and expeditionary operations in the EU and ‘fully embraced’ the opportunities ESDP provided in this regard. In 1999, Sweden began to transform its traditional territorial defence focused military to an armed forces focused on expeditionary operations. The reason why Sweden ‘had to do’ this was summarized perfectly by Hakan Syrén the Chief of Defence of the Swedish Defence Force:

‘To a greater degree than before, our peace and freedom is built upon active participation in European security cooperation… Our operative long-term plan is to contribute to building peace and security in an increasingly complicated world where national borders do not play the same role they used to.’

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741 Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, 55.
746 Frederick Lee-Ohlsson, Sweden and the development of the European security and defence policy: a bi-directional process of Europeanisation (Bruges: College of Europe, 2008).
747 Jacoby and Jones, "The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic,” 325.
Accordingly, Sweden deemed its participation in international operations necessary partly because it believed that promotion of peace and human security was its duty, and partly because Swedish contribution to international operations served Swedish interests and national security. During the 2000s, Sweden radically reorganized and transformed its armed forces by developing a small professional military with expeditionary, rapid deployable capabilities and abandoning territorial defence entirely. Even conscription was abolished in 2010, and the number of Swedish soldiers was reduced to 34,000. To create a successfully transformed armed forces, Sweden used the EU Battlegroup initiative as an engine for change. As Stockholm became the lead nation of the Nordic Battlegroup and provided the vast majority of troops and capabilities for that, this allowed the Swedish political and military elite to execute many necessary changes in the military until 2008, when the Nordic Battlegroup became operational. Thus, Sweden was not dissatisfied with the lack of progress of European defence co-operation at the time when NORDEFCO was launched (2007-2009), because the processes in the EU concerning defence were in tune with Swedish intentions.

Finland and Sweden did not have a problem with the progress of defence co-operation in NATO either. On the one hand, the two Nordic countries were not part of NATO, thus for them this issue was less relevant than for members of the Alliance. On the other hand, Sweden and Finland had the opportunity to co-operate with NATO extensively. As Andrew Cottey pointed out, the force structure, the defence budget and even the level of contribution to NATO international operations of Sweden and Finland ‘have been broadly comparable with alliance member states of similar population size’. Both countries deployed approximately 500 troops to the IFOR mission in Bosnia and 800 troops to KFOR in Kosovo during the 1990s. Sweden even provided one of the three non-NATO member-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. Stockholm deployed 500 troops to the ISAF mission, while Finland contributed by 150 Finnish soldiers to the Swedish PRT. The collaboration

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750 Jacoby and Jones, ”The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic,” 324-327.


752 Ibid.
between the two Nordic countries and NATO was not confined to operations. Thanks to the different structures established for facilitating partnerships between NATO and non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland participated in the development of all the collaborative frameworks related to NATO partnerships, and also participated in NATO exercises and trainings.

With regard to co-operation on capability development with NATO, Sweden and Finland took part both in individual NATO projects and systematic defence co-operation as well. For the former, the best example is the earlier mentioned Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). In this project, the two Nordic countries together with ten NATO member states procured and have been maintaining three C-17 transport aircrafts under the auspices of a NATO agency. The systemic capability development co-operation between NATO and its Nordic partners is going on in the framework of Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). PARP was designed for NATO partners, and this process ‘serves as a planning tool to guide and measure progress in defence and military transformation and modernisation efforts’. This means that the Alliance and PARP members agree on so-called Partnership Goals (PGs) to make sure that capability development of partners are in line with NATO’s plans. Thus, the armed forces of partners can become interoperable with the militaries of NATO to be able to participate effectively in NATO’s international operations. The PGs are agreed mutually between NATO and each PARP member, and PARP members’ progress on the Partnership Goals is reviewed regularly. In the 2001-2006 period both Sweden and Finland accepted more than 60 PGs. Sweden took fully advantage of this process and deemed it ‘as one of the most effective and useful tools for improving interoperability and overall modernization.’ Thus, similarly to the EU Battlegroup initiative Sweden used PARP as a tool to foster its own military transformation. Although, Finland was very co-operative in PARP as well, Finland was less eager to accept profound changes

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753 Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP, MTEP, ETee).
754 Juha Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO - How similar are Finland and Sweden within NATO cooperation? FIIA Report 48 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016), 32-43.
757 Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO. 62-63.
758 Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO. 33.
concerning its armed forces in this process, thus PARP for Finland was more ‘a window into NATO that provides the Finnish defence establishment with an in-depth understanding of NATO requirements, force structures, standards, and planning disciplines.’ Accordingly, progress (or the lack of it) on defence co-operation in NATO was not a concern for Finland and Sweden, because although they were not members of the Alliance, they could participate in many NATO partnership co-operative frameworks on the depth and level they deemed appropriate.

We can conclude that none of the studied Nordic countries were dissatisfied with the lack of progress of defence co-operation at NATO and EU in the period when NORDEFCO was established (2006-2009). We could see that although Denmark was highly critical towards NATO in the 1980s, and Norway was ambivalent to the developments of the Alliance in the 1990s, the attitude of both countries had changed to the 2000s, and they became reliable supporters of most NATO policies, transformed their armed forces for expeditionary tasks and were relevant contributors to NATO’s operations. At the same time, huge efforts were needed from them to get their ‘good ally’ status, thus they did not focus on the lack of defence co-operation in NATO, rather they were occupied by the difficulties to maintain their position in the Alliance. They were even less concerned with EU level defence co-operation, as Norway was not an EU member and Denmark opted-out of ESDP. Their major problem was not the lack of progress in the EU, but the fact that they could not have influence in ESDP/CSDP related decisions. Sweden and Finland were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress regarding defence co-operation in EU and NATO either. In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s they made sure that ESDP would take a direction that was convenient and acceptable for them. Although, Stockholm and Finland took a very different approach concerning transformation of their armed forces, ESDP/CSDP provided a very flexible framework to satisfy both of them. This was the case concerning NATO too. Sweden and Finland have not been NATO members, but they have contributed to NATO operations and co-operated extensively with the Alliance on the level they wanted.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed.

759 Michel, Finland, Sweden and NATO. 6.
Prerequisite 3:
The creation of the NORDEFCO needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of Nordic countries with NATO/EU.

This section studies whether the establishment of the NORDEFCO can be linked to dissatisfaction of Nordic countries concerning NATO and EU. As the findings in Prerequisite 2 showed the Nordic countries were not dissatisfied with NATO and EU concerning capability development co-operation before and during the creation of NORDEFCO. However, the question emerges, if Nordic countries were not dissatisfied with NATO and EU, why did they create NORDEFCO instead of collaborating in one of the pan-European organizations. Accordingly, it is important to investigate how EU/NATO related institutional considerations played a role in establishing NORDEFCO.

The differences in EU and NATO memberships of the Nordic countries was not a relevant problem, as Nordic countries could co-operate with the organizations they were not part of too. At the same time, for instance Norway perceived Nordic co-operation as an opportunity for Nordic countries to get access and ‘penetrate’ even more to the projects of the organization that they were not members of, but other Nordic states had membership in it.\(^{760}\) For Norway this was the EU, as Sweden and Finland were active members of ESDP/CSDP. In addition, Norway hoped that it could co-operate with Nordic countries on the security issues of the North Sea, as prospects of collaboration with NATO members did not seem fruitful in this regard.\(^{761}\)

In the case of Sweden and Finland institutional consideration for participating in NORDEFCO was quite different. As we could see in the description of Prerequisite 2, these too countries were not dissatisfied with the developments on defence co-operation in the EU in general. However, officials from both countries deemed this organization ‘too slow, large, heterogeneous and cumbersome’ especially for very practical oriented collaboration on capability development that intended to save costs.\(^{762}\) They believed that smaller groupings of countries was better suited for this task. An interview from 2010 with General Hakan Syren, who was Chairman of the European Union Military Committee at the time and was the Chief of Defence of the

\(^{760}\) Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, 25.
\(^{761}\) Ibid. 28.
\(^{762}\) Ibid.
Swedish Defence Force during the creation of NORDEFCO, represents well the Swedish way of thinking in this regard:

‘We are trying to bring clusters of countries that can cooperate around the table, and we are trying to find different areas where it’s possible to cooperate. This can be training and exercise, education, maintenance, procurement, or surveillance and, if we can identify these areas pragmatically and put the member states around the table, then the bottom-up approach will meet the top-down approach, and then we have an instrument that really can activate, stimulate and give inspiration for deeper cooperation. This is also forced by the lack of money…’

Finland supported NORDEFCO for similar reasons, and Finnish officials also perceived the EU ‘too heterogeneous, slow moving, and based in any case on NATO standards’, thus they would have preferred capability development related defence co-operation in NATO over EU. However, as Finland was not NATO member, it would have been too difficult to fulfil the potential of this co-operation, thus they rather opted for the Nordic option.

Denmark was not especially interested in NORDEFCO on capability development, because Copenhagen was ahead of other Nordic countries concerning military transformation and its main partners were top-tier NATO members like the UK and the US in this regard. Furthermore, Denmark already cut its capabilities and specialized its armed forces to provide effective expeditionary forces to NATO and coalition of willing operations, thus Nordic co-operation would not have provided tangible benefits for Denmark.

We can conclude that the dissatisfaction with EU/NATO did not play a major role in establishing NORDEFCO. Although in general Finland and Sweden – the two Nordic countries that are EU members and participating in ESDP/CSDP – were not dissatisfied how defence co-operation progressed in the EU before the creation of NORDEFCO, their experience about EU decision-making suggested that the EU would not be the appropriate choice for multinational co-operation on capability development. Thus, they supported the idea of creating a smaller Nordic group for collaboration for this purpose. At the same time, the Nordic NATO members did not believe that their respective organization – the Alliance – would not be appropriate for

764 Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, 29.
765 Ibid. 30.
multinational capability development. Denmark was not enthusiastic about NORDEFCO and it did not shift from NATO co-operation towards NORDEFCO. Although, Norway partly shared Sweden’s and Finland’s view about the difficulties of co-operation in big multilateral organizations, Oslo’s main institutional related reason for establishing NORDEFCO was not the dissatisfaction with EU/NATO, rather it intended to get more access to ESDP/CSDP via NORDEFCO.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed.

Conclusion
To sum up Rival Explanation 1 has no explanatory power about why Nordic states established NORDEFCO instead of using the NATO and EU frameworks for capability development (see Figure 25). Prerequisite 1 was confirmed, but Prerequisite 2 was not. Accordingly, the independent variable of ‘Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ could not be the source of the intervening variable of ‘Nordic countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’. Thus, this variable cannot the reason why NORDEFCO was created (dependent variable) either.

However, we saw that for some degree EU/NATO related institutional considerations played a role in establishing NORDEFCO. Among others Sweden and Finland did not feel that the EU could be an effective platform for co-operation on capability development, because they deemed the EU to large and slow for this task. They believed that collaboration in a smaller, like-minded group would be much more effective. This type of reservations concerning EU played a role in the launch of NORDEFCO from the part of these two countries. In the case of Denmark, the EU/NATO related institutional perspectives did not play a significant role in creation NORDEFCO, while Norway hoped that it can get better access to ESDP/CSDP via a Nordic military co-operation.

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766 Ibid. 29
Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis

Rival Explanation 2 argues that the main reason and independent variable why NORDEFCO was established is the financial crisis and its negative effects on the Nordic defence budgets. According to the intervening variable of Rival Explanation 2, Nordic countries realized that they needed alternative multinational solutions to maintain their national military capabilities to mitigate the negative effects of the financial crisis. The dependent variable is that as a consequence of this chain of events, Nordic countries established NORDEFCO (see Figure 26). Based on these, the prerequisites for this rival explanation are the following:

1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the Nordic countries.
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the Nordic countries.
3. The creation of NORDEFCO needs to be linked to Nordic countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

Figure 26 – Rival Explanation 2: Predicted NORDEFCO Pattern

Prerequisite 1:
Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the Nordic countries.

The Nordic countries have small, open and export oriented economies, which were affected by the global economic crisis of 2008. However, the four Nordic countries possessing armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) successfully managed the situation and the impact of the economic crisis for the four Nordic economies ‘was not as serious as expected and their recovery was obvious’. In 2011, an EU

report on the impact of the financial crisis on European defence highlighted that ‘with the exception of Sweden, Poland, France, Finland and Denmark, all states are implementing more or less drastic consolidations measures strongly affecting defence spending’.\textsuperscript{768} We can see that three of the five EU countries that did not cut their defence budgets after the financial crisis were participating states of NORDEFCO whilst Norway was not included in the report but its situation was similar to the other three Nordic countries.

Denmark was the only Nordic country that slightly decreased its defence budget after the financial crisis. Copenhagen initially considered only a 500 million USD saving over a five-year period from an approximately 4 billion USD annual defence budget,\textsuperscript{769} which is a mere 2.5% decrease. The Danish MoD intended to achieve this savings by cutting operating costs and decommissioning older equipment.\textsuperscript{770} However, Danish defence spending more or less stagnated until 2012, since 2013 it has been decreasing sharply,\textsuperscript{771} which generated a series of problems regarding manning and maintaining different platforms.\textsuperscript{772} At the same time, these defence budget problems cannot be attributed directly to the direct effects of the economic crisis, as the defence budget cuts happened five years after the crisis broke out.

Finland increased its defence budget by 13% to 2.78 billion EUR in 2009,\textsuperscript{773} and in the next year the Finnish MoD announced that its defence spending would increase further by 2% every year in the period of 2011-2015.\textsuperscript{774} Accordingly, the financial crisis did not have any serious impact on Finnish defence budgets and military capabilities. Although the 2% increase was not executed in 2014 and 2015 as it was originally planned, the Finnish defence budget never went below 2.66 billion EUR.\textsuperscript{775} Similarly to Finland, Sweden and Norway also increased their defence

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{768} Mölling and Brune, \textit{The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence}, 33.
    \item \textsuperscript{770} Mölling and Brune, \textit{The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence – Annex}, 45.
    \item \textsuperscript{771} NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, “Defence Expenditures,” 5.
    \item \textsuperscript{774} Europolitics, “Recent defence spending plans announced by EU member states.” November 10, 2010, 7.
    \item \textsuperscript{775} Ministry of Defence of Finland. “Share of defence budget of GDP.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
budgets after the financial crisis. In 2013, the Norwegian defence budget was 7.4 billion USD, which was a 20% increase compared to the 2009 defence budget (6.2 billion USD). Sweden also increased its defence budget every year after the financial crisis, and provided 16% more funding for defence in 2014 (44.98 billion Swedish krone) than in 2009 (38.51 billion Swedish krone). At the same time Stockholm intended to rationalize and reorganize certain elements of its armed forces to save costs.

We could see that the states did not decrease their defence budgets significantly as a consequence of the financial crisis. Only Denmark executed smaller cuts in defence spending whilst the other three countries increased their defence budgets more than 15% after 2008.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has not been confirmed.

Prerequisite 2:
The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the Nordic countries.

The findings in Prerequisite 1 highlighted that the Nordic countries did not cut their defence budget as a consequence of the financial crisis. Accordingly, this could not foster the search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capability in the Nordic countries.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has not been confirmed.

Prerequisite 3:
The creation of NORDEFCO needs to be linked to Nordic countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

As Prerequisite 1 was not confirmed, thus Prerequisite 2 could not be confirmed either. Accordingly, in the case of the Nordic countries the creation of NORDEFCO

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cannot be linked to the negative effects of the financial crisis on defence budgets. This means, that NORDEFCO was not established to mitigate the impacts of the financial crisis via multinational defence co-operation.

Although, NORDEFCO was not created because of the financial crisis, its establishing had a very important economic rationale. As Toumas Forsberg highlighted ‘cost-effectiveness, the financial aspect, is the most commonly cited argument for increased Nordic cooperation in security and defence policy’.780 During the 2000s several Swedish and Norwegian official reports and academic studies were published, which pointed out that the current state of defence affairs did not allow smaller countries to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities.781 Many reasons were mentioned including the decreasing defence budgets after the Cold War, the increased demand for participation in costly international operations, increasing labour costs and the problem of defence inflation, which refers to the phenomenon that every generation of defence equipment costs significantly more than the previous generation, resulting in static defence budgets losing their purchasing power.782

The former Norwegian Chiefs of Defence Sverre Diesen and the former Swedish Chief of Defence Hakan Syrén are deemed to be the ‘architects’ of NORDEFCO,783 and they had very good interpersonal chemistry.784 Both of them used the concept of a special version of a ‘critical mass’ to describe the above-mentioned problem. Under critical mass Sverre Diesen understood the ‘smallest practical number of any given weapon system’, and He argued that ‘we […] need to remind ourselves that there is a lower limit as to the number of systems or units of each capability – tanks, frigates, fighters – which can be sustained before it becomes either unpractical, prohibitively expensive or both. An air force of 10 modern jet fighters is absurd, both because of sky-rocketing unit costs and the fact that operating 10 planes will not generate a sufficiently large pool of people with pilot experience required to fill all the positions in the command structure, the support organisation and other functions necessary to operate and support a fighter force.’785

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780 Forsberg, “The rise of Nordic defence cooperation”, 1174
781 See the literature review about this topic in: Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, 9-13.
782 Ibid.
783 Swedish Scholar. Email Correspondence by Author. October 2014.
784 Ibid.
785 Sverre Diesen, ”Multinational Defence Integration: Potential in the Nordic Region” (speech, Round Table Conference of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament, Helsinki, April 13, 2012).
However, the armed forces of smaller European nations – including the Nordic countries – became so small that many capabilities were below the threshold of ‘critical mass’. The vision of Diesen and Syrén was that this problem should be solved with the help of multinational defence co-operation. As Diesen put it:

‘This means that each participating nation [of the defence co-operation] will retain its full spectrum of weapon systems and capabilities, achieving instead the necessary economy of scale by integrating their force production or force generation processes. In other words, all the support functions underpinning and enabling the operational capabilities such as military schools, maintenance workshops, specialist training centers, storage facilities, bombing ranges and other infrastructure etc etc, will be joint, each country looking after its designated slice of these support functions for all the participating nations.’

Accordingly, it is not so surprising that the Norwegian and Swedish armed forces published reports independently and together as well in 2007, where they emphasized the necessity of co-operation with other Nordic countries to achieve cost-effectiveness in order to be able to keep full range of defence capabilities. As we could see, the debate about this issue had been going on in Norway and Sweden for years, and the Chiefs of Defence of the two countries supported the idea of closer multinational defence co-operation in the Nordics. Probably, the fact that both countries were in the middle of the transformation of their armed forces in the 2000s fostered a better understanding of each other too, as they faced very similar problems during this process.

Finland joined in the analytical work of mapping possible co-operative areas among the Nordic countries, which resulted in the Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish joint report that identified 140 areas for collaboration. Based on the results of this analysis, the three countries established NORDSUP to create joint logistical and

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786 Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, 11.
787 Diesen speech
790 Saxi, Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War, 18.
791 Ibid. 17
support capabilities, co-ordinate training activities and harmonise their equipment.\textsuperscript{792} NORDSUP’s progress report reiterated the argument of Diesen and Syrén:

‘Given the loss of purchasing power, small and medium sized countries will not be able in the close future to sustain complete and balanced armed forces. To put it somewhat simplified we face two options: either to share capabilities with strategic partners on a bilateral or multilateral basis or to face a future with fewer capabilities.’\textsuperscript{793}

As we know, NORDSUP was incorporated into NORDEFCO together with NORDCAPS and NORDAC, but the question of ‘critical mass’ and cost-effectiveness dominated the discourse concerning Nordic co-operation on defence. Accordingly, we can conclude that the financial crisis did not play a role in the creation of the NORDEFCO, rather the main motive behind NORDEFCO was the recognition that small states were not able to maintain full spectrum of military capabilities because of different structural financial constraints. Thus, the Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence started a process to solve this problem with multinational defence cooperation in the Nordic region.\textsuperscript{794}

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has not been confirmed.

\textit{Conclusion}

We can conclude that Rival Explanation 2 has no explanatory power about why Nordic countries established NORDEFCO, and did not use NATO and EU for defence co-operation.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 27- Rival Explanation 2: Actual NORDEFCO Pattern}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{792} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{793} Ibid.
Prerequisite 1 was not confirmed that meant that neither Prerequisite 2 and nor Prerequisite 3 could not be valid either (see Figure 27). Accordingly, the negative effects of the financial crisis on Nordic defence budgets did not have any relationship with the creation of NORDEFCO, because defence spending of Nordic countries were not decreased after the financial crisis. However, the analysis pointed out that the creation of NORDEFCO had a very important economic background especially from the part of Sweden and Norway and partly from Finland as well. The military leadership of these countries believed that the structural financial constraints of their defence sectors could be handled by multinational defence co-operation, thus they created NORDSUP to save costs by extending and deepening defence collaboration on many areas. Later NORDSUP was integrated into NORDEFCO.

**Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions**

Rival Explanation 3 suggests that NORDEFCO was created because Nordic countries have perceived the same threats as the biggest threats (independent variable). Accordingly, they began to discuss how they should co-operate to face with these threats together (intervening variable), and finally they institutionalized this co-operation in the form of NORDEFCO (dependent variable).

![Figure 28 – Rival Explanation 3: Predicted NORDEFCO Pattern](image)

For this rival explanation I developed three prerequisites, which are the followings:

1. The Nordic countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat.
2. The Nordic countries had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of NORDEFCO.
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) Nordic countries discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and creation of NORDEFCO have to be detected.
Prerequisite 1:

The Nordic countries had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat.

To identify whether Nordic countries shared the perception of the same threat(s) as the largest threat, I compare the threats of the relevant national security documents of the four Nordic countries that have armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) describe. Just like in the CEDC and Lancaster House cases, I am also focusing on national security documents regarding Nordic countries and do not take into consideration public perceptions about threats, because public perceptions are volatile and national security documents are the foundations of foreign and security policies of governments.

Interestingly the Nordic countries do not have explicit national security strategies. For instance, Sweden published only a national strategy on ‘Swedish participation in international peace-support and security-building operations’ in 2008, but did not have any other national security or defence related strategic document during the time when NORDEFCO was launched. Denmark did not have strategic level document on how national security should be organized either, and officials at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that Denmark ‘does not need one’. Similar to Sweden and Denmark, Finland and Norway did not have national security and national military strategies either. However, it does not mean that they did not provide political guidance for national security and defence institutions. Nordic countries provided guidance in the forms of different official documents. Although the structure and focus of these documents are quite different than the national security and national military strategies of the participating countries of CEDC and the Lancaster House Treaties, they provide an appropriate basis for analysis. Thus, during this section I compare the contents of official documents from 2008-2009 of the four Nordic countries concerning security threats and challenges, as the publication of these documents were close enough to the creation of NORDEFCO to represent the official threat perception of the studied states that time.


796 Nicolai Schat-Eppers, Strategy or no strategy: explaining the absence of a Danish national security strategy, Master's thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2013, 43.
With regard to Finland, I study the government report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy from 2009,\(^{797}\) in the case of Norway I analyse the recommendations of the Armed Services Committee of the Norwegian Parliament on a defence and security from 2008,\(^{798}\) and from Sweden I investigate a functional Government Bill on defence from 2009.\(^{799}\) Among the Nordic states, Denmark’s case is unique regarding the document I analyse, because it is not a governmental decree or a report of the Parliament. I use an official report compiled by the Danish Defence Commission in 2008,\(^{800}\) which document provided the guidance for the so-called Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 published in 2010.\(^{801}\) The Defence Commission’s members are politicians, scholars, military officers, and governmental officials, who have appropriate knowledge and experience on defence issues. The Commission is not a permanent body, but it is created only when the Danish government perceives that strategic changes needed concerning Denmark’s defence policy. The 2008 Defence Commission has been the tenth one since 1866, when the first Defence Commission was established.\(^{802}\)

The documents I analysed mention the threats and challenges the studied Nordic countries face, but in most cases they do this in an unstructured way, thus it is not clear, which threat was the most relevant for the individual Nordic countries. The only exception is the Finnish document that not only mentions the threats but also systematically describes them and provides appropriate context to make clear, why they were important threats and challenges for Finland.\(^{803}\) On average nine threats and challenges were mentioned by the individual documents, and five of them were common theme in all of them. These were the following:

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Environmental issues (natural disasters and/or climate change)

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\(^{802}\) http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/DefencecommissionsinDenmark.aspx

We can conclude that the four Nordic countries shared the view about these five issues and considered them as security threats or challenges. If we would like to know the proportion of the shared threats from all of their perceived threats, we can say that Norway and Finland shared 63%, Denmark shared 71% and Norway shared 42% of their perceived threats with the other studied Nordic countries. Thus, we can conclude that Nordic countries had similar threat perceptions in 2008-2009, because many of their perceived threats were shared with the other Nordic states. At the same time, we cannot figure out whether they shared the same threat or threats as the largest threat, because their official documents did not prioritize them appropriately.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 1 has been partially confirmed.

Prerequisite 2:
The Nordic countries had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of NORDEFCO.

To analyse whether these shared threats played a role in creating NORDEFCO, I study whether the Nordic countries initiated discussions and co-operation on them before the creation of the NORDEFCO. For this purpose I used the results of the Stoltenberg Report and compared them with the shared threats identified in Prerequisite 1. If the Stoltenberg report covered the topics of the shared threats, we can conclude that high-level governmental discussions were initiated about them, as the Nordic ministers of foreign affairs discussed the Stoltenberg report in 2009. If the ministers discussed the above-mentioned shared threats, as a next step I also have to analyse whether co-operation was initiated on the discussed shared threats. I chose the Stoltenberg report as a reference point for my analysis, because of two reasons. First, it was the only official report, which covered comprehensively security and foreign affairs issues form a Nordic perspective, and was discussed on high level by ministers before the creation of NORDEFCO. Second, many Nordic analysts perceive the
Stoltenberg report as an important step in creation of NORDEFCO,\textsuperscript{804} which probably means that the Stoltenberg Report had significant impact on NORDEFCO.

As I mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, Thorvald Stoltenberg was asked by the foreign ministers of the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway) in June 2008 ‘to produce an independent report on how Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy could be developed during the coming 10–15 years.’\textsuperscript{805} The development of the report was based mainly on interviews and conversations with different officials and experts from the five Nordic countries. For this Stoltenberg got a small secretariat from Norway, and two contact persons from each Nordic capital to help facilitate and organize the meetings and the research. Accordingly, no committee was established, and, except the contact persons, no other officials took part in the development of the report. Thus, the report ‘was less likely to be a list of lowest common denominators, but also it was not “owned” by the governments that commissioned it. They could take or leave its contents piecemeal, which is precisely what they did.’\textsuperscript{806} The Stoltenberg report was published half a year later, and Stoltenberg presented the results of it to the Nordic foreign ministers on an extraordinary meeting in February 2009.\textsuperscript{807} The report contained 13 concrete proposals that were partly defence related and also covered issues concerning foreign policy and non-military aspects of security. These were the followings:\textsuperscript{808}

Proposal 1. Nordic Stabilisation Task Force
Proposal 2. Nordic cooperation on surveillance of Icelandic airspace
Proposal 3. Nordic maritime monitoring system
Proposal 4. Maritime response force
Proposal 5. Satellite system for surveillance and communications
Proposal 6. Nordic cooperation on Arctic issues
Proposal 7. Nordic resource network to protect against cyber attacks
Proposal 8. Disaster response unit
Proposal 9. War crimes investigation unit

\textsuperscript{806} Archer, ”The Stoltenberg Report and Nordic Security,” 49.
\textsuperscript{807} Ibid.
Proposal 10. Cooperation between foreign services
Proposal 11. Military cooperation on transport, medical services, education, materiel and exercise ranges
Proposal 12. Amphibious unit
Proposal 13. Nordic declaration of solidarity

If we compare the proposals with the five shared threats of the Nordic countries (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental issues, arctic region, cyber attacks), we can conclude that three shared threats are addressed by the Stoltenberg report. Environmental issues were dealt in the framework of the ‘Nordic maritime monitoring system’ (Proposal 3), as one of its aims was to create capabilities to monitor pollution in the Nordic region, and in the framework of ‘Disaster response unit’ (Proposal 8). This unit would co-ordinate Nordic efforts in the case of large-scale natural or manmade disasters. The Arctic region – another shared challenge – is directly addressed in Proposal 6, where the co-operation should include maritime safety, search and rescue services and also issues related to environment and climate change. The topic of Arctic region was touched partly in Proposals 4, 5, 6 and 12 too. Stoltenberg also proposed co-operation on cyber issues by establishing a Nordic resource network to handle cyber threats and ‘to facilitate exchange of experience and coordinate national efforts to prevent and protect against’ cyber attacks. Accordingly, we could see that discussions were initiated on three Nordic shared threats by the Stoltenberg report: environmental issues, Arctic region and cyber attacks. The question is, whether co-operation happened after the discussions on these issues.

Clive Archer made an assessment about the Nordic responses concerning the Stoltenberg report’s proposals, and he found that only six of the thirteen proposals received immediate attention by the Nordic foreign ministers. However, in 2009 some kind of co-operation started or continued on every proposal except the last two ones (the amphibious unit and the Nordic declaration of solidarity). Furthermore, the Nordic foreign ministers also accepted a version of the Nordic solidarity clause – the

809 Ibid. 12-14.
810 Ibid. 23-24.
811 Ibid. 19-20.
812 Ibid. 21.
Stoltenberg report’s most far-reaching proposal – in April 2011. Although it was watered down significantly compared to the original proposition, because Stoltenberg’s idea was to establish a kind of mutual defence agreement, and the actual version of the Nordic solidarity clause applies only to natural and man-made disasters, cyber and terrorist attacks. At the same time, this also means that we can conclude that co-operation also started against terrorism among the Nordic states even though this was not explicitly mentioned in the Stoltenberg report.

We can conclude that discussions and co-operation started concerning four shared threats of the Nordic countries before the creation of NORDEFCO. Three of them (environmental issues, Arctic region, cyber attacks) were addressed by the Stoltenberg report and its follow-up co-operative initiatives, and Nordic collaboration in the case of a terrorist attack was included into the Nordic solidarity clause. The Nordic countries did not deal with the question of co-operation on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which was their fifth shared threat.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 2 has been confirmed.

Prerequisite 3:
The links between the shared biggest threat(s) Nordic countries discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and creation of NORDEFCO have to be detected.

In the previous section, we could see that the Nordic countries launched discussions and started co-operation on their shared threats except on the proliferation of WMD. This section investigates, whether these collaborations could be linked to the creation of NORDEFCO.

In general, we can say that there is no link between the co-operation on the shared threats and the creation of NORDEFCO, as the Nordic collaborations concerning the shared threats were not conducted in NORDEFCO. After the Nordic foreign ministers had discussed the Stoltenberg report, the question of the maritime response force (Proposal 4) and Arctic co-operation (Proposal 6) were dealt with by the Arctic Council and for collaboration on cyber attacks (Proposal 7) the Nordic national computer emergency response teams were assigned. In addition, the co-

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operation on disaster response (Proposal 8) was not continued in NORDEFCO either but on a ministerial meeting on Civil protection and Crisis preparedness. 815

Among the proposals of the Stoltenberg report the creation of ‘Nordic Stabilisation Task Force’ (Proposal 1), the ‘Military cooperation on transport, medical services, education, materiel and exercise ranges’ (Proposal 11) and ‘Amphibious unit’ (Proposal 12) dealt with military issues, and these were the areas where NORDEFCO could have a role. 816 However, the Nordic states had lesser ambitions in these areas, and did not intend to invest into a Nordic Stabilization Task Force or into an Amphibious Unit. Furthermore, only the Amphibious Unit would have had some limited link to the Arctic Region anyway. The only proposal, where Stoltenberg directly referred to co-operative frameworks (NORDAC, NORDCAPS), that became integrated parts of NORDEFCO later was Proposal 11 about military co-operation. However, the issues of Proposal 11 did not have a direct link with the shared Nordic threats identified in Prerequisite 1 (environmental issues, Arctic region, cyber attacks, terrorism) as we could see in Prerequisite 2.

Accordingly, the co-operative efforts, which could be linked to the shared threats, were not related to the creation of NORDEFCO, as they were conducted in other Nordic collaborative frameworks. At the same time, there were some military related issues that the Stoltenberg report incorporated, they either could not be linked to the shared threats or co-operation did not start on them.

However, I would like to note that the process led to the Stoltenberg report created a very positive milieu towards Nordic co-operations in general, and this milieu probably helped the creation of NORDEFCO as well. The Nordic foreign ministers’ discussion when they asked Stoltenberg to develop the report about possible future areas for Nordic foreign and security policy co-operation was in the same month, when the Finnish-Swedish-Norwegian NORDSUP report was published. The foreign ministers meeting and the process of the development of the Stoltenberg report probably generated the positive milieu, which made sure that Denmark and Iceland joined to NORDSUP in November 2008 and helped to create NORDEFCO as well. This environment, where political support existed to Nordic co-operation in general probably made it much easier to go one step further from NORDSUP to NORDEFCO, which integrated every Nordic defence related collaborations into one

816 Ibid.
frameworks. Without this milieu the new Nordic military co-operation could have remained on trilateral level between Finland, Norway and Sweden in NORDSUP.

Based on the above-detected findings, Prerequisite 3 has *not* been confirmed.

**Conclusion**

Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power over the creation of the NORDEFCO, despite the fact that the Nordic countries’ threat perception was very similar (independent variable) and they began discussions and co-operation on the shared threats (intervening variable) in the framework of the Stoltenberg report and its follow-up collaborations. Thus, both Prerequisite 1 and Prerequisite 2 could be confirmed. However, the creation of the NORDEFCO (dependent variable) could not be linked to these discussions and co-operations on shared threats, because co-operation on them started in different frameworks and not in NORDEFCO. Accordingly, Prerequisite 3 could not be confirmed and thus we can conclude that NORDEFCO was not established because of the same threat perceptions of the Nordic countries.

![Figure 29 – Rival Explanation 3: Actual NORDEFCO Pattern](image)

At the same time, the positive milieu towards Nordic co-operations that existed in 2008-2009, probably helped to create NORDEFCO. Without activities on other areas concerning foreign and security policy the new Nordic military co-operation could have stuck in a Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish NORDSUP.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In this chapter I attempted to figure out why the Nordic countries created the NORDEFCO, when they had the opportunity to co-operate in NATO and/or EU frameworks as they did earlier? Furthermore, I was also curious of the circumstances that encouraged the participating states to choose a new collaboration rather than co-operating in NATO and EU. In this chapter I studied the three rival explanations developed and operationalized in the research framework chapter to get answers to my research questions. During the operationalization of the rival explanations I
created variables and prerequisites for them, and in this chapter I studied, whether these prerequisites could be confirmed regarding the NORDEFCO case. If all of the prerequisites of a rival explanation could be confirmed, we could conclude that the variables of the rival explanation were valid, thus it has explanatory power over the research questions concerning NORDEFCO.

Rival Explanation 1 suggests that the independent variable was the ‘Lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation’ which resulted in the intervening variable of ‘Nordic countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ that led to the dependent variable of ‘Creation of NORDEFCO’. Rival Explanation 1 did not have explanatory power over why Nordic countries chose to co-operate in NORDEFCO instead of collaborating in NATO and EU. Although Prerequisite 1 was confirmed, Prerequisite 2 was not, which meant that Nordic countries were not dissatisfied with the progress concerning EU/NATO related defence co-operation before the creation of NORDEFCO. Accordingly, Prerequisite 3 could not be confirmed either, namely the establishing of NORDEFCO does not have relationship with the dissatisfaction of Nordic countries on NATO/EU defence collaborations, because Nordic countries were not dissatisfied with it. At the same time, my analysis revealed that certain EU/NATO related institutional considerations played a role in creating NORDEFCO. The main element here was that the two EU members, Sweden and Finland, did not believe that the EU could be an effective platform for co-operation on capability development, as they perceived the EU to slow for effective co-operation on multinational capability development. They believed that collaboration in a smaller group, where the participants know better each other would be much more appropriate. The NATO members, Norway and Denmark, did not have such type of reservations with NATO, but Norway was interested in improving its relations on defence co-operation with EU member Nordic states (Sweden and Finland) via NORDEFCO to get more access to ESDP/CSDP projects and initiatives.

Rival Explanation 2 assumes that as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 defence budget cuts happened in the Nordic countries (independent variable), thus the Nordic states searched for alternative multinational solutions to maintain their national military capabilities (intervening variable). This search led them to create NORDEFCO (dependent variable). My research showed, that already the Prerequisite of the independent variable could not be confirmed, because no serious defence budget cuts happened in the Nordic countries after the financial crisis. Only Denmark
decreased its defence spending slightly, but the three other Nordic armed forces received more financial resources that time. As a consequence, the prerequisites of the intervening and dependent variables could not be true either. Thus, the defence budget cuts could not be the reason why NORDEFCO was created, as no serious budget cuts happened in the Nordic countries in the studied period. However, my research highlighted that the creation of NORDEFCO had a very important economic rationale, which was shared and propagated mostly by Sweden and Norway, and later Finland supported this concept as well. The Chiefs of Defence of Sweden and Norway were convinced that they could solve the problem of ‘critical mass’ with multinational defence co-operation. This shared vision of the two military leaders contributed greatly to the creation of NORDEFCO.

Rival Explanation 3 argues that Nordic countries perceived the same threat(s) as the biggest threat(s) to their national security (independent variable) and began discussions and co-operation on these shared threats (intervening variable) that led to the creation the NORDEFCO by institutionalizing the co-operations on the shared threats (dependent variable). We could see that Rival Explanation 3 does not have explanatory power over the creation of the NORDEFCO either. Nordic countries shared the perception of same threats with each other, and they also began to co-operate on them, thus the prerequisites of the independent and intervening variables could be confirmed. However, these collaborations were not institutionalized in NORDEFCO but in other frameworks. Accordingly, the prerequisite of the dependent variable could not be confirmed, which means that shared threat perceptions did not play a role in establishing NORDEFCO. At the same time, the fact that many collaborations were discussed and started among the Nordic countries shows, that the political milieu was very supportive for deeper Nordic military co-operation. In other political circumstance NORDEFCO could not necessarily have been emerged in its current form.

So what kind of implications the case of the NORDEFCO countries has on the research questions? Namely why have Nordic countries established NORDEFCO, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU? What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU? My research concluded that none of the rival explanations have explanatory power over the creation of NORDEFCO. The empirically based pattern
(see Figure 30) highlights that three new independent variables were the most important once concerning the creation of NORDEFCO. The first one is the shared vision and leadership role of the Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence. Although, the problem of ‘critical mass’ posed hardships to many smaller European countries most of them did not start collaboration on this issue with another countries. The leadership role and shared vision of Diesen and Syrén was needed to kick off co-operation on this issue first bilaterally than regionally.

The second variable is the institutional considerations of Sweden and Finland, and lesser extend of Norway. The two EU members did not deem EU as an appropriate forum for multinational defence co-operation on capability development, because EU was deemed too slow for that, and as they were not NATO members a Nordic co-operation seemed to be a beneficial option for them. At the same time, Norway was interested to get more access to ESDP/CSDP projects, and hoped that via a deeper Nordic defence collaborative framework it could get this access.

The third independent variable is the political milieu, which supported the creation of a fully Nordic defence co-operation. Without this milieu the military co-operation among Nordic states could have stopped by creating NORDSUP with the participation of Finland, Norway and Sweden only. We could see that basically these three countries were really interested in defence co-operation with their Nordic partners on capability development, because of their institutional considerations and shared vision. Denmark has always been sceptical towards this initiative and Iceland
did not have too much to add for this co-operation. However, Denmark and Iceland were also pulled into a reenergized Nordic defence collaborative framework, and the positive milieu probably facilitated the integration process and helped to incorporate NORDCAPS and NORDAC together with NORDSUP into NORDEFCO’s overarching framework. Without the political milieu supportive to Nordic co-operation in general, the integration might have stopped between Finland, Norway and Sweden in NORDSUP.

My research highlighted as well that the engine of the creation of NORDEFCO was the Swedish-Norwegian core. Both countries had EU/NATO related institutional considerations for creating NORDEFCO, but most importantly their military leadership shared a vision about solving the ‘critical mass’ problem via multinational defence co-operation. When they started practical collaboration and had an appropriate basis to extend this co-operation they also involved Finland, who also had its own interests in participating in a Nordic co-operation. The core later pulled the less interested countries (Denmark, Iceland) into this defence co-operative framework as well thanks to the supportive political milieu for Nordic. This demonstrates that a strong core can launch a much wider multinational defence co-operation in appropriate circumstances.
CHAPTER 7.
CONCLUSION

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH GOALS AND METHODOLOGY

In this thesis I have considered why European states have established new sub-regional MDCs recently, instead of co-operating in NATO and EU institutional frameworks for military collaboration, when this was the norm in the 2000s. Not surprisingly, military co-operation in NATO and EU has received most of the scholarly attention over the last quarter century, and collaborations in the form of more traditional bilateral and sub-regional MDCs remains an understudied area. As a result, this thesis has attempted to fill this empirical gap in the literature by investigating three of the newly emerged sub-regional MDCs, focusing on the reasons why they were created and what circumstances helped their launch. Based on this the thesis formulated the following research questions:

- Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU?
- What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU?

The literature review demonstrated that most of the existing literature was focused on EU and NATO related defence co-operation. In contrast, there was comparatively little attention dedicated to developments at the sub-regional level and an empirical deficit clearly existed at the sub-regional MDCs. Moreover, at the conceptual level there had been no attempt at studying sub-regional MDCs in a systemic and comparative manner. Therefore, I developed a research design for studying sub-regional MDCs based on Robert K. Yin’s case study research method.\textsuperscript{817} I used an embedded multiple-case design and applied pattern matching as the main analytical technique. Three case studies were selected - CEDC, the Lancaster House Treaties and the NORDEFCO - for my research as they were established in the late 2000s and early 2010s, thus they could provide a glimpse about dynamics of the

\textsuperscript{817} Yin, Case Study Research – Design and Methods.
creation of sub-regional MDCs over a consistent period. The ‘embedded unit of analysis’ were three different possible explanations for the reason of the creation of the studied cases. The explanations supposed that the reasons for the creation of the MDCs were the following:

1. Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation
2. Effects of the financial crisis
3. Convergent threat perceptions in Europe

In order to investigate the cases and their embedded unit of analysis I applied pattern matching, which ‘compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions)’.818 As a result, I developed rival explanations concerning the three possible explanations by creating operationalized predicted patterns for each of them in the form of different independent, intervening and dependent variables. During the operationalization process, I developed a series of assumptions that served as prerequisites for verifying the studied variables of the patterns of the rival explanations. I also used the so-called literal replication logic, which means that I was searching for similar predicted results regarding every case. Accordingly, I assumed that one of the rival explanations would be able to answer my research questions appropriately, while the others would not be convincing. At the end of every case, I compared the predicted patterns with the actual empirically based pattern.

FINDINGS

In this chapter, I first compare the results of my research regarding every rival explanation across the three cases to figure out whether one of the rival explanations could answer my research questions on every case. Second, I introduce the empirically based patterns of the three cases, and finally I generalize the results of my research to make conclusions about the reasons and circumstances why the three studied sub-regional MDCs were created. This generic framework provides added value to our knowledge about how and why sub-regional multinational defence cooperation emerges.

818 Ibid. 136.
Comparison of the individual rival explanations across the studied cases

In this section I analyse how convincingly the rival explanations could explain my research questions across the cases of CEDC, Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO. For this, I compare the individual generic rival explanations and their ‘actual’ version concerning every case. Thus, I briefly introduce what the generic rival explanations look like, and thereafter I compare them with their actual CEDC, Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO versions respectively. If a rival explanation can explain every case convincingly, we can conclude that it has explanatory power over my research questions.

**Rival Explanation 1 – Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation**

This rival explanation suggests that European states were dissatisfied with the lack of progress on NATO/EU level defence co-operative efforts, thus they created sub-regional MDCs for progressing better in a different format. In this case the independent variable is ‘lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence cooperation’ which links via the intervening variable of ‘European nations are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ to the dependent variable of ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ (see Figure 31).

![Figure 31 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 1](image)

Based on this pattern’s variables I developed several assumptions as prerequisites for verifying this rival explanation. Basically, each variable has its own prerequisite, thus Prerequisite 1 is prerequisite for the independent variable, Prerequisite 2 is for the intervening variable and Prerequisite 3 is for the dependent variable. The prerequisites are the following:

1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO had to be identified.
2. The dissatisfaction of countries of the studied sub-regional MDC concerning the lack of progress of defence co-operative efforts in EU and NATO had to be detected.
3. The creation of the sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the dissatisfaction of the participating countries with the NATO/EU.

If we compare the actual patterns of the three cases (see Figure 32) with the generic pattern of Rival Explanation 1, we can see that Rival Explanation 1 has explanatory power over the case of the Lancaster House Treaties only. Every prerequisite of the Lancaster House Treaties could be verified, which means that the pattern of Rival Explanation 1 met the empirical based pattern concerning this case. It was shown, that both the United Kingdom and France were dissatisfied with the progress of defence co-operative efforts in NATO and the EU, as they felt that most of the European countries do not take defence seriously enough, thus a closer co-operation between Europe’s premier military powers would be beneficial. This phenomenon played an important role in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties between the two countries.

As far as the CEDC and NORDEFCO are concerned Rival Explanation 1 does not have explanatory power, because Prerequisite 2 could not be verified concerning these two cases. As the intervening variable was not valid, it could not link the independent variable to the dependent variable either. This means that although lack of progress on pan-European and Transatlantic defence co-operation (independent variable) could be verified based on the Literature Review chapter, the dissatisfaction of the Nordic and CEDC countries with NATO and EU defence co-operation (intervening variable) could not. We could see that the NATO member CEDC countries were not critical towards NATO, rather bigger allies were critical towards
them on defence issues. They were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress on EU defence collaborations either, because they focused almost exclusively on NATO issues, and were less concerned with ESDP/CSDP. Austria has been an EU member only, and Vienna was not dissatisfied with ESDP, as a less deep co-operation and less focus on war fighting capabilities fit to Austria’s identity and the capabilities of its armed forces.

Although the NATO member Nordic countries used to be sceptical (Denmark in the 1980s) and ambivalent (Norway in the 1990s) towards NATO earlier, in the period when NORDEFCO was created they became relevant proponents and supporters of NATO policies, co-operative initiatives and operations. Sweden and Finland were not dissatisfied with NATO either, because despite the fact that they were not NATO members, they could join plenty of NATO initiatives and operations, and they could choose the level and depth of this co-operation. The Nordic EU members were not dissatisfied with the EU as it was flexible enough to support both Sweden’s ambitious military transformation goals and even make Finland satisfied with its territorial defence focus. Denmark could not participate in ESDP/CSDP, because of its opt-out, thus interestingly the non-EU member Norway was more integrated into ESDP/CSDP projects, initiatives and operations. Lack of progress in ESDP/CSDP was not a problem for them, but Danish and Norwegian officials and bureaucrats were concerned by the fact that they could not influence decisions in ESDP/CSDP.

Based on the comparison of the predicted generic version of Rival Explanation 1 and the three actual case patterns we can conclude that Rival

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819 E.g.: Maciej Bartkowski, “Impact of NATO on Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic: The Case of Unfulfilled Commitments and Broken Promises,”. Adams, “Tories Attack Nato Members’ Defence Budgets,”; Richter, “NATO Chief Slams Czechs over Reduced Military Spending.”.
820 See CEDC chapter.
824 Cotley, “The European Neutrals and NATO: Ambiguous Partnership,”, 446-472.; Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO.
825 Jacoby and Jones, ”The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic”. 324-327.
Explanation 1 cannot explain per se why the three sub-regional MDCs were established, because it had explanatory power over the case of Lancaster House Treaties only.

**Rival Explanation 2 – Effects of the financial crisis**

Rival Explanation 2 assumes that as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 the defence budgets cuts of the studied European states were decreased, which forced them to turn to multinational solutions in order to get help to maintain their national military capabilities. At the end of this process, the studied countries created sub-regional MDCs to mitigate the effects of the defence budget cuts. Accordingly, the independent variable of Rival Explanation 2 is ‘defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’, the intervening variable is ‘need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’ and the dependent variable is ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ (see Figure 33).

**Figure 33 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 2**

The prerequisites for the variables of the pattern of this rival explanation are the following:

1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC.
2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the participating countries of the studied sub-regional MDC.
3. The creation of the studied sub-regional MDC needs to be linked to the participating countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis.

**Figure 34 – Actual Case Patterns of Rival Explanation 2**
If we compare the actual case patterns (see Figure 34) and the generic pattern of Rival Explanation 2, we can conclude that none of the actual case patterns met the generic one. In the cases of CEDC and the Lancaster House Treaties, we can see that the participating countries cut their defence budgets as a consequence of the financial crisis, thus the prerequisite of the independent variable was verified. However, they did not search for alternative multinational solutions (except for Hungary)\(^{827}\) to mitigate the effects of their decreased defence budgets on national military capabilities, rather they chose to absorb the losses individually. In the case of the Lancaster House Treaties, the United Kingdom accepted that some of its military capabilities would be lost temporarily or permanently,\(^{828}\) while France rather opted for ‘muddling through’ and slowed down its military modernization.\(^{829}\) The CEDC countries chose different strategies to deal with the defence budget cuts as well, but basically all of them attempted to solve its financial problems on its own.\(^{830}\)

Accordingly, the prerequisite of the intervening variable was not verified concerning these two cases, thus the intervening variable (‘need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’) could not link the independent variable to the dependent variable (‘creation of sub-regional MDC’).

The NORDEFCO case was different, because already the dependent variable was not verified, namely the Nordic countries did not cut their defence budgets. Only Denmark decreased it slightly, but the other three Nordic countries that have armed forces (Finland, Norway, Sweden) increased their defence budgets significantly in the years following the financial crisis.\(^{831}\) As even the independent variable was not verified, it could not be the source of the intervening and dependent variables either.

Based on the fact that Rival Explanation 2 could not provide the answer to my research questions concerning the studied cases, we can conclude that it does not have explanatory power over them.

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\(^{828}\) United Kingdom. HM Government. *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty*.

\(^{829}\) Carnegy, "France cuts armed forces as budget squeeze hits military".

\(^{830}\) See CEDC chapter.

**Rival Explanation 3 – Convergent threat perceptions**

Rival Explanation 3 supposes that the countries perceived the same threat(s) in their sub-region, and accordingly they began to form an alliance by starting conversations and co-operation against this threat(s). As a final step, they institutionalized this alliance in the form of the studied sub-regional MDCs. Based on the above-mentioned logic the independent variable of Rival Explanation 3 is ‘perception of the same threat’ by the countries of the studied sub-regions, the intervening variable is starting establishing ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ by these countries and the dependent variable is ‘creation of sub-regional MDC’ (see Figure 35).

![Figure 35 – Generic Pattern of Rival Explanation 3](image)

The prerequisites for verifying the variables of this pattern are the following:

1. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat.
2. The participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC had to initiate discussions and co-operation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to co-operate on them before the creation of the sub-regional MDC.
3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) the participating states of the studied sub-regional MDC discussed and co-operated on and the initiation and creation of sub-regional MDC have to be detected.

![Figure 36 – Actual Case Patterns of Rival Explanation 3](image)

The analysis of the actual case patterns (see Figure 36) suggests that none of them met the generic pattern of Rival Explanation 3. The dependent variable in all
three cases was verified, accordingly the countries of the individual sub-regional MDCs shared the same threats as the most important national security issues. In case of CEDC, the intervening variable could not be verified. Although CEDC countries shared the same threats, they did not start discussions or co-operation on them in CEDC format, because they had already been collaborating on these issues in different Central European, European and other multilateral formats. In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO the participating countries started conversations and co-operation in Nordic and British-French bilateral frameworks on the shared threats, thus the intervening variable was verified in these cases. However, there was no link between the intervening and dependent variables. The analysis of the Lancaster House Treaties and the Package of Joint Measures, the interviews with officials and the discourse between French and British experts highlighted that shared threats were not a factor in establishing of this MDC. The Nordic countries discussed many security related issues on high level and they began collaborations on them, but co-operation on issues that could be connected to the shared threats were not initiated in the framework of NORDEFCO but in other Nordic formats and institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEDC</th>
<th>Lancaster House Treaties</th>
<th>NORDEFCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Proliferation of WMD</td>
<td>- Terrorism</td>
<td>- Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Terrorism</td>
<td>- Cyber security</td>
<td>- Proliferation of WMD</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Regional conflicts</td>
<td>- Natural and man-made disasters</td>
<td>- Environmental issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Organized crime</td>
<td></td>
<td>(natural disasters and/or climate change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cyber security</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Arctic region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| - Natural and man-made disasters |                       | - Cyber attacks

Figure 37 – Shared Threats of the Sub-regional MDCs’ Participating Nations

The comparison of the shared threats of the participating nations of the three sub-regional MDCs (see Figure 37) shows that these countries not only shared threats with their sub-regional partners, but they shared them with countries in other sub-regions as well. Accordingly, regarding most of the threats it would not have been
logical to start a sub-regional co-operation, because these were not sub-region specific problems. The only exception here is the Arctic region, where Nordic countries have special interest as a consequence of their geopolitical location. Accordingly, this comparison supports the findings that the studied sub-regional MDCs could not be created against sub-regional threats.

We can conclude that none of the three rival explanations answered the research questions of my thesis.

**Why the sub-regional MDCs were created? – The empirically based patterns**

Although the studied rival explanations did not answer why European countries established the three studied sub-regional MDCs, when similar pan-European structures existed in the framework of NATO and the EU, my research has helped to rule out many possible answers to this question, and has also assisted in the development of the empirically based patterns concerning every case. The empirically based patterns answer my first research question:

- Why have European countries established and revitalized sub-regional MDCs in recent years, when similar pan-European structures exist in the framework of NATO and EU?

![empirically based CEDC pattern](image)

**Figure 38 – Empirically Based CEDC Pattern**

The empirically based CEDC pattern (see Figure 38) highlights that one of the main reasons why CEDC was created is that NATO’s and EU’s initiatives (Smart Defence, Pooling and Sharing) created a milieu, which supported the creation of MDCs in general. This milieu had an impact on Central European countries, and accordingly they intended to create CEDC to support NATO’s and EU’s new

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832 As it was mentioned in the NORDEFCO chapter, Nordic countries intensified their co-operation on Arctic issues, but mostly in the Arctic Council and not in NORDEFCO.
initiatives. This means that CEDC countries did not want to establish an alternative to NATO and EU frameworks for defence co-operation, rather they wanted to support them with CEDC. The other identified main reason of the launching of CEDC was that every CEDC countries had individual motivations to co-operate in a CEDC format. The biggest stakes were hold by Hungary\textsuperscript{833} and Austria\textsuperscript{834}, the two countries that initiated CEDC, but every participating state had some interest in it, if nothing else they just did not want to be left out.

Based on these, I identified two independent variables concerning the creation of CEDC. One of them is ‘EU and NATO generated milieu that supported creation of sub-regional MDCs’. This independent variable is linked to the dependent variable of ‘creation of CEDC’ via the intervening variable of ‘CEDC countries wanted to co-operate on NATO and EU multinational projects’. The other independent variable is the ‘individual motivations of CEDC countries’ with an emphasis of Austrian and Hungarian motivations.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure39.png}
\caption{Empirically Based Pattern of Lancaster House Treaties}
\end{figure}

As we could see, the rival explanation of ‘Lack of progress in pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation’ had explanatory power over the Lancaster House Treaties case, thus this contributed significantly to the creation of this MDC. Another important factor was that defence co-operation between Britain and France had already been going on for decades.\textsuperscript{835} As the Lancaster House Treaties

\textsuperscript{833} Kurowska and Németh, The Central European Playground, 4; Csiki and Molnár, Seminar on Central European Solutions, 5.; Hungarian MoD Official, interview by author, December 2012.;
\textsuperscript{834} Slovak MoD Official, e-mail interview by author, September 2014.; Austrian MoD Official. Interview by author. August 2014.
\textsuperscript{835} See the pre-Lancaster House Treaties co-operation at: Taylor, Franco-British Defence Co-operation – A New Entente Cordiale? 4-7.
basically put the already existing co-operative initiatives into one framework,\textsuperscript{836} this process was crucial. A third reason was that the personalities and motivations of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron matched and was chemistry between them worked well.\textsuperscript{837} Although, the first two factors were long-standing trends, the constellation of compatible political personalities, who grabbed these trends and pushed for a more intensive co-operation was needed to trigger the Lancaster House Treaties.

Thus, the empirically based pattern of the establishing of the Lancaster House Treaties (see Figure 39) has three independent variables. The first is the ‘Lack of progress on pan-European/Transatlantic defence cooperation’, which according to Rival Explanation 1, is linked to the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties (dependent variable) via the intervening variable of the ‘UK and France are dissatisfied with EU and NATO’. The second and third independent variables were the ‘decades long defence co-operation between France and UK’ and ‘personalities, motivations and relationship of leaders’, which were directly connected to the dependent variable of the ‘creation of the Lancaster House treaties’.

![Empirically Based Pattern of NORDEFCO](image)

\textit{Figure 40 – Empirically Based Pattern of NORDEFCO}

The actual empirically based pattern of NORDEFCO (see Figure 40) shows that the creation of this MDC happened thanks to three main reasons. First, the Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence shared a vision that they could solve their ‘critical mass’ problem via multinational defence co-operation,\textsuperscript{838} and took a

\textsuperscript{836} Mid-career UK MoD Official. Interview by author. March 2014.
\textsuperscript{838} Saxi, \textit{Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War}, 73.
leadership role in this regard. Second, several countries had institutional considerations that supported the creation of NORDEFCO. Sweden and Finland did not perceive EU as the most appropriate forum for defence co-operation of capability development, and as they were not members of NATO they believed that a sub-regional organization would suit their interests better.\footnote{Ibid. 28-29} Although Norway was not EU member and did not have serious concerns with co-operation in NATO, Oslo saw NORDEFCO as an opportunity to get more access to ESDP/CSDP via more robust defence co-operation with EU member Finland and Sweden.\footnote{Ibid. 28.} The third main factor was the political milieu that supported the Nordic co-operation in general. Without this milieu, the military co-operation among Nordic states could have stalled by creating NORDSUP with the participation of Finland, Norway and Sweden only. Accordingly, the empirically based pattern of the creation of NORDEFCO had three independent variables: ‘shared vision and leadership of the Swedish and Norwegian ChoDs’, ‘institutional considerations of Sweden, Finland and lesser extent Norway’ and the ‘supportive political milieu to Nordic collaborations’.

**Circumstances that encourage establishing sub-regional MDCs – a generic framework**

The previous section answered the first research question concerning the studied cases. This section attempts to generalize the results of my research and answer the second research question of my thesis that asks the following question: What have been the circumstances, which have encouraged various European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation on military capabilities rather than collaborate within NATO and EU?

I made generalizations based on the empirically based patterns introduced in the previous section and the empirical material used for studying the three rival explanations. According to the results of my research, I concluded that the three cases provide two main structural and two main situational factors that played the most significant roles in the creation of these sub-regional MDCs. The factors are:

*Structural Factors:*

- Previous defence collaborations between the participating states
Similar perception about certain defence related EU/NATO processes and initiatives

**Situational factors:**
- Strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry among them
- Supportive political milieu towards sub-regional multinational defence cooperation

**Structural Factors**
In regard to sub-regional MDCs, under the term of structural factors I outline solid long-standing relationships, trends, perceptions that had been developed for a relatively long period and do not change overnight. Usually they are bounded by and linked to certain structures e.g. organizations, institutions, frameworks. I identified two structural factors concerning the circumstances that encourage the creation of sub-regional MDCs:
- Previous defence collaborations between the participating states
- Similar perception about certain defence related EU/NATO processes and initiatives

Based on the research of the three cases, we can conclude that these structural factors did not trigger the establishment of sub-regional MDCs, but they enabled their creation. This means, that the existence of these structural factors would not have been enough per se to launch sub-regional MDCs, but without their presence the studied MDCs would not have been established either.

*Previous long-standing defence collaborations between the participating states*
If we look at the three studied sub-regional MDCs, we can see that they barely included new initiatives or new institutions. Basically all of them created new frameworks that merged with already existing defence collaborations, some of which had been evolving for decades.

In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties, a UK MoD official pointed out, that the vast majority of the Franco-British bilateral projects had already existed before Lancaster House, and the treaties ‘only canonized’ them and put them into one
overarching framework.\textsuperscript{841} These defence collaborations between France and Britain have been evolved for almost 30 years. For instance, the agreement that made sure that British and French defence ministers would meet twice a year was signed in 1982, the two MoDs agreed on that they would not start new armaments programmes without discussing it with each other in 1984.\textsuperscript{842} The Anglo-French Joint Nuclear Commission was established in 1992, the Letter of Intent between the French and British armies was signed in 1997, and the Memorandum for Understanding concerning co-operation on defence related research and development was signed in 2000.\textsuperscript{843} These were only the frameworks that opened the opportunity for the two countries to collaborate on a range of activities including aircraft carriers, UAVs, A400 transport aircrafts, missile systems, helicopters, trainings and exercises etc.

The situation with NORDEFCO was the same. As analysts have pointed out, NORDEFCO ‘was in reality nothing more than a merger of earlier cooperation initiatives […] in different areas within a common framework.’\textsuperscript{844} The origins of the Nordic defence collaboration go back to the 1960s, when NORDSAMFN was established to improve Nordic co-operation on UN peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{845} NORDSAMFN was abolished in 1997, and a larger and more developed structure was created in the form of NORDCAPS in the same year.\textsuperscript{846} NORDAC was established Nordic collaboration in the field of armament development and procurement in 1994,\textsuperscript{847} and NORDSUP was launched to focus on ‘force production and supportive functions’\textsuperscript{848} in 2008. Basically, these three structures were merged into the framework of NORDEFCO in 2009.

Although CEDC did not have as long a history as the British-French bilateral defence co-operation and the Nordic military collaborations, defence co-operation among Central European states has evolved rapidly since the end of the Cold War. They collaborated in bilateral, sub-regional (e.g. Visegrad Group, CENCOOP) and regional (OSCE, EU, NATO) frameworks, and accordingly they developed dense bilateral and multilateral co-operative relations with each other. If we look at the

\textsuperscript{841} Mid-career UK MoD Official. Interview by author. March 2014.
\textsuperscript{842} Chabaud, “The prospects for Franco-British co-operation.” 155-166.
\textsuperscript{843} Taylor, \textit{Franco-British Defence Co-operation – A New Entente Cordiale?}. 4-7.
\textsuperscript{844} Rieker and Terlikowski, \textit{The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security}, 3.
\textsuperscript{845} Jakobsen, \textit{Nordic approaches to peace operations}, 10, 29, 213.
\textsuperscript{846} Jakobsen, “Still Punching Above Their Weight?”, 459.
\textsuperscript{847} Hagelin, ‘Hardware politics, “hard politics” or “where, politics?”’, 170.
\textsuperscript{848} Forsberg, ”The rise of Nordic defence cooperation”, 1169.
projects of CEDC,\textsuperscript{849} we can see that almost all of them were based on on-going projects, like the Austrian-Croatian bilateral SOF co-operation, the Czech-Croatian bilateral training for Air Mentor Teams, the Czech-led Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre etc. Thus, similarly to the Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO, CEDC was an initiative that put already existing collaborations into one overarching framework.

Accordingly, previous long-standing defence collaborations between the participating states of the studied sub-regional MDCs were crucial, as they enabled the creation of CEDC, Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO. Without the already existing multinational projects and institutions the studied MDCs could not have been created in their current format.

\textit{Similar perception about certain defence related EU/NATO processes and initiatives}  

The similar perceptions of the participating countries of the MDCs about certain processes and initiatives of EU and NATO affected the creation of the studied sub-regional MDCs significantly, but the type of its impact was different concerning every case. In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties, the British and French dissatisfaction regarding the progress on EU and NATO level defence capability co-operation facilitated the creation of the British-French MDC. Both countries perceived processes on capability development negatively in these two institutions, and they believed that as the only two major military powers in Europe could progress faster bilaterally than it was possible for them within EU and NATO.\textsuperscript{850} CEDC was established to support NATO and EU initiatives, because the smaller Central European countries perceived that they did not have enough resources to provide appropriate capabilities to than new Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing initiatives.\textsuperscript{851} Thus, Central European countries investigated how could they work together to support NATO and EU in their efforts, and searched partners for already existing projects in the framework for CEDC. In the case of NORDEFCO, the EU members Sweden and Finland did not deem EU as an appropriate forum for multinational defence co-operation on capability development, because it was deemed

\textsuperscript{849} Csiki and Németh, “Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Co-operation,” 18.  
\textsuperscript{850} See the analysis about this topic in the Lancaster House Treaties Chapter.  
\textsuperscript{851} See the analysis about this topic in the CEDC Chapter.
too slow and complicated for that. \textsuperscript{852} These phenomena supported the establishing of NORDEFCO.

The studied European countries were deeply integrated into EU and/or NATO, and their perceptions concerning these organizations took a long time to evolve. Thus, these perceptions are probably deeply ingrained into the way of thinking of decision makers of the studied countries. Accordingly, the similar perceptions about NATO and EU processes and initiatives had a relevant impact on the creation of the studied MDCs.

\textit{Situational Factors}

Under the term of situational factors I understand personal relationships, and the political and economic environment that might change relatively fast. Accordingly, these elements create a situation that is not a long-lasting one; still provide a window of opportunity to launch initiatives. I identified two situational factors concerning the circumstances that encouraged the creation of sub-regional MDCs.

- Strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry among them
- Supportive political milieu towards sub-regional multinational defence cooperation

Based on the research of the three cases, we can assess that the situational factors help to explain why the studied sub-regional MDCs were established at a particular time. The presence of these factors triggered the launch of the studied MDCs, without them the MDCs could not have begun.

\textit{Strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry among them}

In all three cases a core group of enthusiastic high-level officials initiated the sub-regional MDCs. They were the key figures concerning the launch of the studied MDCs that means that for some reasons they invested time and resources to create these collaborative frameworks.

\textsuperscript{852} Saxi, \textit{Nordic defence cooperation after the Cold War}, 28-29.
With regard to NORDEFCO, the former Norwegian Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen and the former Swedish Chief of Defence Hakan Syrén were the key figures and the ‘architects’ of the co-operation. They shared the same vision that their ‘critical mass’ problem could be overcome by deeper multinational, Nordic defence co-operation.\textsuperscript{853} They took the leadership role to launch several analyses and organize different multinational (bilateral, trilateral with Finland, Nordic) discussions about this issue. They pressed forward for the institutionalization of the co-operation they imagined. In the case of the Lancaster House Treaties, David Cameron was the person who pushed for an ambitious defence agreement with France, and even sent a handwritten letter to President Sarkozy about his propositions.\textsuperscript{854} Sarkozy became enthusiastic about the idea and provided his full support.\textsuperscript{855} In the launch of CEDC the Austrian defence policy director Jan Pucher and his Hungarian counterpart Péter Siklósi were the key figures. They organized seminars\textsuperscript{856} to lay down the foundations of CEDC and thereafter they also took the CEDC presidency roles for continuing and deepening this co-operation.

In all three cases the key figures (Diesen and Syrén, Cameron and Sarkozy, Pucher and Siklósi) had a very good interpersonal chemistry among them as well. This seems to be logical, because people less likely start new co-operation with people they do not like. Accordingly, we cannot ignore the role of personalities in the creation of sub-regional MDCs.

\textit{Supportive political milieu towards sub-regional multinational defence co-operation}

Supportive political milieu was crucial concerning the launch of the studied MDCs in every case. Without the milieu that supported Nordic collaborations in general, NORDEFCO might have not been created. Most probably, new Nordic military co-operation would have stopped by creating NORDSUP with the participation of Finland, Norway and Sweden, as these three states were interested the most in deeper Nordic defence co-operation. However, the positive milieu of the time helped to tet Denmark and Iceland involved into a reenergized Nordic defence collaborative framework. In the CEDC case the NATO and EU created a positive milieu by launching the Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing initiatives. My research

\textsuperscript{853} Ibid. 73.
\textsuperscript{854} Senior UK MoD Official. Interview by author. March 2014.
\textsuperscript{855} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{856} Csiki and Molnár, \textit{Seminar on Central European Solutions}, 4.

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showed that these initiatives emphasized and encouraged the necessity of multinational defence collaborations that facilitated the establishing of CEDC. As far as the Lancaster House Treaties are concerned, the political milieu was different and was strongly attached to the British Prime Minister and the French President. For Cameron, the domestic political milieu was the most important one, because he wanted to demonstrate to British Eurosceptics that Britain could cooperate with Europeans outside the EU.\textsuperscript{857} For Sarkozy, the European-level political milieu was more relevant, and wanted to show that France could lead Europe and even could pull the UK to European projects.\textsuperscript{858}

To sum up, supportive political milieu towards launching new sub-regional MDCs was important, because without that the enthusiastic officials should have worked in vacuum. Probably, they were still convinced that launching the MDC was necessary, but outside the enthusiastic group other officials or countries would not have been necessarily participated in a new defence co-operative framework.

\textbf{Concluding remarks}

The original patterns of rival explanations I developed for conducting the research about why certain European countries established new sub-regional MDCs instead of co-operating within NATO and the EU and figuring out the circumstances that encourage European states to prefer sub-regional co-operation over NATO and EU could not explain the research questions. However, this research framework provided the opportunity to close the rival explanations out as possible explanations, and helped to develop the empirically based patterns concerning every case that could convincingly explain individually the three studied cases. These empirically based patterns helped to develop a generic framework that describes the circumstances, which encouraged the creation of the studied sub-regional MDCs.


\textsuperscript{858} Ibid.
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