King's Research Portal

DOI:

[10.1080/07075332.2017.1283639](https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1283639)

Document Version

Peer reviewed version

[Link to publication record in King's Research Portal](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Kennedy, G. (2017). Filling the Void: Anglo-American Strategic Relations, Philippine Independence, and the Containment of Japan, 1932-1937. *INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW*, 39(5), 836-859.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1283639>

Citing this paper

Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Filling the Void?: Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Philippine Independence, 1932-1937

Throughout the interwar period Great Britain and the United States faced the challenge of an expansionist Japan seeking to destabilize the established balance-of-power system that governed the international order in the Far East.¹ The growth of the perception, and eventual reality, of the Japanese threat to both Western nations and their national security interests in the region, provoked a number of responses. International arms agreements, naval fortification agreements, declarations of spheres of influences in China, appeasement, coercion, persuasion, appeals to moderation, sanctions, embargoes, proxy war and economic warfare were all utilized at one time or another by Great Britain and America in the quest to arrest Japan's drive to dominate Far Eastern international affairs in the period from 1931-1942.²

This study of Anglo-American strategic appreciations of the impact of potential Philippine independence on that Far Eastern international security system provides insights into a number of current international history debates concerning inter-war Anglo-American strategic relations. As well, the analysis provided offers insights into the various strategic concepts embedded in each Western nation and their use of diplomacy in relation to their deterrence, appeasement, coercion or compellence postures.³ Other lessons from this case study are relevant to the nature and character of the Anglo-American inter-war strategic relationship. The evidence presented adds credibility to the arguments which take the position that Anglo-American strategic relations generated by Far Eastern strategic considerations were the cornerstone of the pre-1941 alliance relationship. Furthermore, it reinforces the point that the wartime strategic alliance was not just the personal creation of a Churchill-Roosevelt political interaction, but the logical outcome of years of informal, coordinated,

conscious, parallel strategic collaboration aimed at maintaining the balance of power in the Far East.⁴

Other aspects of the study are important for achieving a greater clarity concerning the operationalisation (the process) of both British and American foreign policy formulation.

Who within the various layers of the Foreign Office and State Department machinery, as well as other government departments in London and Washington, were engaged in the information gathering, intelligence creation, narrative construction and decision making required for the building of such a strategic relationship?⁵ Often a disparaging appreciation is made of such a holistic and deep-diving approach to understanding the actual decision-making environment and mechanisms of foreign policy management, with such actions and influences referred to as merely being 'What one clerk said to another'.⁶ That casual dismissal of more detailed and rigorous foreign policy and diplomatic analysis in favour of simplistic great man or grand strategy synthesis has all too often presented the eventual visible outcome or action as the actual strategy or policy.⁷ This is methodologically incorrect for the historical analysis of such foreign policy and diplomatic interactions, as well as misleading as to the reality and place of actors and agents with that decision making system and process. The following study represents a school of international history that argues the irrefutable centrality of understanding the meaning and importance of the how, where, why and who of "clerks" speaking to one another if historians are to understand the reality of the issues, the connections made over the deliberations of such incidents, and the true influences and values of the relationship that were complicit in the motivations of the decisions taken.⁸

On the American side of the equation, the analysis provided here also challenges the existing literature which presents an adversarial and anti-British attitude being the norm for American policy makers charged with the conduct of Far Eastern foreign policy formulation, such as Stanley K. Hornbeck, Joseph Grew and Nelson T. Johnson. The archival evidence

provided reveals that even as early as 1934-35, such was simply not the case. Close strategic cooperation and understanding with Great Britain, regarding the situation in the Far East, served the national interests of the United States, a fact recognized and desired by all three men.⁹ Theirs was not a simple isolationist ideology which espoused that all American interests could be achieved by 'going it alone'.

Finally, as an incident in Anglo-American strategic relations, analysis of this particular event reinforces a growing international history literature, which is focused on the utility of using a case study/incident approach to not only illustrate larger strategic themes, but for emphasizing that multi-layered reality that was British and American inter-war foreign policy formulation. In focusing on particular incidences or international evolutions, and combining systemic analysis with an appreciation for personality and contingency, a more comprehensive and accurate appreciation for the complexity within such foreign policy formulation is achieved.¹⁰

American possession of the Philippine Islands was both a strategic boon and liability in the 1920s and 30s. While the use of basing facilities in the Philippines for the United States Navy (USN) allowed America to aspire to Mahanian ideals regarding the attributes of naval power, imperial possessions and accompanying power projection capabilities in the Far East, the reality of the strategic value of the former Spanish imperial outpost was a completely different matter.¹¹ In the aftermath of the First World War, the Washington Naval Treaty system limited the strategic utility of the Islands for power projection and forward basing purposes.¹² Unable to modernize or enlarge the fortifications already in place, combined with decreased USN ship strength, the strategic worth of the Philippines was in the eye of the beholder. Internationally-minded American policy makers viewed even the restricted worth of the Islands as a useful power projection and deterrence asset. US politicians and military leaders not as enamoured of American imperial activities so far from the continental United

States saw them as a potentially dangerous strategic liability that could be easily held hostage or overwhelmed before the garrison could be reinforced or relieved.¹³ More importantly, the Islands were situated in the midst of the most dynamic and fractious part of the inter-war international system, compelling the United States to have to participate in the ongoing balance of power process generated by the national security competition existing between Japan, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.¹⁴ The ultimate prize for the United States and the other Powers was to either expand, protect or consolidation their various strategic interests in China.¹⁵ However, the requirement to provide security for the Philippines added another dimension to the **American** position within that balance of power dynamic.

By the mid-1930s, with the rise of continued Japanese competition in the Far East seeking to limit or diminish America's presence in the region, domestic American opinion questioned the utility of further protection and possession of the Islands.¹⁶ However, the consideration of granting independence for the Philippines became a strategic risk in its own right due to the significant disruption such action would create in the balance of power relationship which provided stability in the Far East.¹⁷ One of the disruptions to that Far Eastern balance, created through the contemplation of Philippine independence, was the question: if the United States would not provide security and stability for the Islands, then who would? Providing an answer to that question was one of the many strategic crossroads for Great Britain and the United States in the **region**. Common strategic values such as democracy, **the rule of law** and capitalism, shared strategic interests in the containment of Japan, **the creation of** stability in China and the provision of a balanced international system in the region, were all **part of the dialogue surrounding** the strengthening of the Anglo-American strategic relationship **surrounding the** Philippine question. However, it was not international relations or questions of strategic positioning that began the Anglo-American

interaction over importance of the Philippines but rather domestic American trade questions.¹⁸

In January 1933, despite a veto by President Herbert Hoover to the contrary, Congress passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. The legislation provided for the independence of the Philippine Islands, although not immediately. Aware of the enormous impact the granting of immediate independence would have on the Island's economy, governance and financial stability, a transitional period of ten years was established in order to make the move to being a separate and self-governing nation less disruptive.¹⁹ The main driving force behind the Hoover government granting independence was that administration's failure to secure a tariff on Philippine products or any limitation on imports of Philippine sugar. That failure created a large movement in favour of Philippine independence amongst mainland US states affected by the market competition. In particular, Philippine cane sugar and coconut oil **were** in direct competition with American beet sugar and dairy products. Aligned with the agrarian states were the Pacific coast states that resented the seemingly unlimited number of cheap Filipino labourers immigrating to the mainland.²⁰ Therefore, from such domestic commercial tensions did a potential shift in the Far Eastern strategic balance of power arise.

That winter the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Ronald C. Lindsay, informed London that the Philippine President, Manuel L. Quezon, was being largely ignored by American politicians and the press as he paid another trip to Washington in order to attempt to get the American Government to change the conditions of the independence legislation. Mired in domestic trade and commerce issues, reported Lindsay, Quezon's appearance had generated some signs of higher strategic thinking and analysis in Washington about what independence would mean.²¹ Influential newspaper publisher William R. Hearst warned of the potential for Japanese commercial and economic penetration of the Philippines, which would provide the rationale for any future military action Japan thought necessary to

protect its interests. Throwing away the strategic utility of the Philippines as a base of operations for protecting American interests in the Far East, as well as the indigenous commercial value of the Islands to the American economy overall, was a selfish, short-sighted and disloyal act that played straight into the hands of the Japanese.²² Isolationist Senator William Borah represented the opposite view to Hearst. He told the Associated Press that he would like to see the United States dispose of all her overseas possessions with the exception being the immediately adjacent Islands required for coastal defence. Tired of the Philippine requests for independence and seeing them as being unwilling to take responsibility for what that meant, Borah hoped that America would relieve itself of the strategic liability as soon as possible.²³ Lindsay's observations initiated the Foreign Office's (FO) contemplation of what the Far East would be like without an American-protected Philippines. Sir Robert Craigie, Head of the FO's American Department and the man at the forefront of British naval disarmament negotiations gave some of the first thoughts on that potential new reality.²⁴ Craigie, concerned about the viability of the Washington Naval Treaty system past the scheduled 1935 London Naval Conference, pointed out that if that system collapsed and all Powers were free to build fortified naval bases in the Far East, the US would have to reconsider the degree of political freedom granted to the Islands.²⁵

The question of the utility of America possessing naval bases was an important theme in early 1934. Delays in the final agreement regarding the independence act allowed the press and politicians, as well as diplomatic and military observers, time to reflect on what not being able to maintain a forward naval presence in the Far East would mean to American influence and prestige. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in an address to Congress on the nature of the amended agreement with the Islands made vague and indecisive comments on the basing matter, declaring that the Act would allow the United States the right to retain military and naval bases in the Islands if it so wished, even after actual independence had been granted.

He recommended, however, that the military bases be given over to the independent Philippine Government upon the implementation of actual independence, while the naval bases not suffer the same fate. The President recommended that the law be changed so that the satisfactory resolution of the control of naval bases question could be resolved `... on terms satisfactory to our own Government and that of the Philippine Islands.`²⁶

The basing amendments, along with a few commercial details, were incorporated into the Tydings-McDuffie Bill, which President Roosevelt signed on March 24th, 1934. The Bill ensured American access to the Philippine bases for the next ten years while the independence transition went on.²⁷ British FO officials hoped that the United States would continue to project naval power forward into the Far East, using the Philippines in that power projection system to act as a deterrent to Japan's desire for expansion. As importantly, retention of an American naval presence was a demonstration of American resolve to stay engaged in the regional balance of power system. An American presence ensured that Britain could not be easily singled out by Japan for greater concessions in the region, particularly regarding China.²⁸ Such public and political displays in the continental United States were only part of the picture with regard to the shaping of Anglo-American strategic relations on the matter.

In the spring of 1933 the American Ambassador to China, Nelson T. Johnson, drew the State Department's attention to the importance of the Philippine independence issue to American security in the Far East. He pointed out the fact that Japan's attitude was one of disregard for international treaties and that an unprotected Philippines would in all likelihood be considered a target of opportunity for Japanese expansionism.²⁹ Furthermore, the American departure from the Philippines, and ensuing instability, was not just an American conundrum but a problem for the British, French and Dutch colonial positions in the Far East as well. That point had been made clear to Ambassador Johnson during one of his frequent

and extensive conversations with senior British naval officers stationed in the Far East. Over the course of three days of chatting, golfing and dining, Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, the recently appointed Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the British China Squadron, along with his Chief of Staff, Commodore Thomson, drove home the Admiralty view on America abandoning her Far Eastern outpost emphatically to Johnson. The Royal Navy officers told Johnson that Britain wished to see a strong American naval presence in the Far Eastern waters. Abandoning the Philippine naval position would instead send a strong message to Japan that American naval power was not a viable deterrent in the region.³⁰

While the information had not been solicited by the American Ambassador, and offered as the Royal Navy Officer's own personal views, Johnson felt that the discussions were indicative of the reporting being sent to London on the matter, and also represented the tenor of a strong strand of British naval and foreign policy. He invited the Stated Department to pay particular attention to a theme Admiral Dreyer had hinted at, in a purposeful but non-committal fashion; that Great Britain considered the possession of the Philippines and control of the vital naval base at Manila Bay by a friendly power to be so critical for its own Far East strategic situation that in the event of America abandoning the Islands completely Great Britain would have to fill that vacuum and take over the protection of the Philippines in order to prevent Manila Bay from coming under Japanese control.³¹ As for being able to entangle the Japanese into any effective security arrangement for the Islands once the United States had withdrawn, Johnson was most sceptical. He held little faith in the Japanese abiding by any agreement regarding a neutralized Philippines in the aftermath of that nation ignoring its previous commitments to such international agreements as the Washington Treaty and Kellogg Pact. Furthermore, Great Britain could not be condemned for thinking similarly about Japan in such circumstances. If Britain did feel abandoned by America, Johnson argued, its choices would be between either appeasing Japan and making the best of that

relationship, or leading a French/Dutch coalition, minus a reliable US, to challenge Japan's expansion. Such an alliance was problematic to create, to say nothing of presenting itself as an effective military conglomeration that could deter Japan. By the spring of 1934, a number of converging strategic concerns about America's future as a maritime power in the Far East supported Johnson's assessment.³³

Both Great Britain and the United States were concerned about the ability of the upcoming London Naval Conference in 1935 to provide the restrictions on Japanese naval power that it had in the past. As well, both nations believed that the chances of Japan leaving the treaty system, due to its inferior allowable tonnage in comparison to the two western Powers, were high.³⁴ Unfettered by any naval building restriction, Japan would be free to create an even larger navy to assist its destabilizing, expansionist policies in the region. Such a condition created grave concerns for American and British strategic foreign policy makers in and of itself. Linking the possibility of a transitioning and unprotected Philippine independence element into the equation gave even greater cause for serious considerations of possible future sources of tension in the Far Eastern balance of power.³⁵

In May 1934, reports from intelligence sources in the Philippines made their way to the British embassy in Japan that President Quezon was experiencing some doubts as to the security of the Islands as an independent entity. The respected Far Eastern expert and commercial counsellor at the embassy, George Sansom, informed the FO that Quezon was concerned about an independent Philippines being able to resist Japanese commercial and economic advances.³⁶ Conversations with retired British Lieutenant-Colonel Hodsoll, a resident of Manila and close friend of the Philippine President, just prior to Quezon's mission to Washington in late 1933, saw Quezon reveal intimate insights into his lack of faith in the Islands ability to go it alone. As a result, Hodsoll, under oath to not repeat the conversation within the Islands, was told that Quezon was willing to 'go hat in hand to Downing Street' to

ask for the Philippines to be admitted into the British Commonwealth in order to acquire a more secure position.³⁷ This revelation did not generate an immediate or high-level response from the British foreign policy making machinery within the FO, but the possibility of Britain being placed in an awkward position **with the United States** by the Philippine situation was now a question that needed to be interrogated.

The impact of the Philippine question on American security in region was also being similarly interrogated in Washington. In January 1934, Stanley K. Hornbeck, the head of the State Department's Far Eastern Department, told Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr that it was his belief that the realisation of a 'desirable solution' to the Philippine issue was not politically achievable. Hornbeck hoped that the whole problem would be shelved and an official decision deferred until conditions in the Far East made such a destabilizing event less likely to create major ripples in the existing balance of power. A proponent of naval building and increasing America's ability to use credible naval power to deter Japan, Hornbeck wished to see a stronger USN in place in the Pacific before the Philippine question was resolved.³⁸ Then, from a position of strength sound strategic decisions could be made: 'However, if my advice were sought by the Administration in connection with this question, my suggestion would be that effort be made to get the question into executive hands and out of legislative hands.'³⁹

By autumn of that year Hornbeck's desires were being fulfilled. On September 26th, 1934, Secretary of State Cordell Hull convened a meeting between senior State Department and United States Navy officers to discuss the impact of the Philippine question on American strategic relations in the Far East and the upcoming naval **conference** talks in London.

Assistant Undersecretary of State William Phillips, Hornbeck, Chief of the Western European Division of the State Department, James C. Dunn, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William H. Standley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, H.L. Roosevelt, and Vice Admiral J.

Greenslade, Commander Battleships United States Fleet met with Hull and quickly got to the topic of the effect of a US withdrawal from the Philippines on American naval strength.⁴⁰ Admiral Standley stated his view that the withdrawal had greater diplomatic ramifications than strategically. He acknowledged that the American declaration was causing other Powers in the region to reconsider their own policies regarding strategic alignments. Overall, however, he argued the independence issue was not the dominant feature of American naval force in the Far East. That strength would be commensurate with the desire the nation had to support vital policies such as the Open Door Policy, Nine Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and others which rested upon substantial American naval power being present in the Far East. If, however, the policy was to withdraw from those obligations and the region, it was best to begin that process now in the Philippine situation.⁴¹ The consensus of the meeting was **that** a policy of scuttle from the region was not acceptable for American strategic interests. Therefore, support for those international obligations and the associated naval strength, including critical basing rights, were seen as being absolutely necessary. Consensus was also achieved with regard to the perspective that to withdraw from either support to those policies or to withdraw American naval power from the Far East would only encourage Japan to further aggression in the region.⁴² As for their collective view of Japan's place in the Far Eastern balance of power system, 'It was further the consensus that Japan's policy was definitely to continue its aims at dominating Eastern Asia. In these plans she is being held up at present by the United States and similarly by Great Britain. It was not felt, however, that she would give up her long term ambitions and would seek every occasion to press them further.'⁴³ If the Philippines were left exposed and unprotected in the more volatile environment that the post-London Naval Conference Far East **potentially could** be, Japan would in all likelihood engulf the Islands into the Japanese Empire.

British preparations for the London Conference also included considering America's strategic intention in the Far East in general and its remaining in the Philippines specifically.⁴⁴ In September 1934, the Marquess of Lothian, Philip Kerr, a firm believer of and tireless supporter for closer Anglo-American strategic relations (and future British Ambassador to the United States), visited America.⁴⁵ Well networked into that nation's foreign policy making elite, Kerr was granted an interview with President Roosevelt in order to get an 'unofficial' insight into the American President's policies with regard to the London Conference, security in the Far East, European security and international monetary policy.⁴⁶ The President, annoyed with the British over textile trade agreements that allowed Japan access to the Indian market, thus disadvantaging America's textile trade with the Philippines due to Japan being able to dump cheap goods into that market because of the profits found in India,⁴⁷ told Lothian that the idea of a formal anti-Japanese alliance was not achievable, for both domestic and international reasons. The American people would not stand for such an entanglement of American interests with a European, imperial state, and Japan's reaction to such an overt statement could be more dangerous than the various outcomes that were yet to be explored through coercive, deterrence and engagement policies. Cooperation between the two English-speaking nations would '...have to rest on the fundamental identity of their interests and ideals.'⁴⁸ Roosevelt spent a large part of the conversation exposing Lothian to his view of the strategic situation in the Far East. America, FDR explained, was under no illusion as to the imperial and expansionist nature of Japan, and that the immediate aim of its foreign and defence policies was to either acquire parity at the London conference, thereby assuring local naval superiority, or, to acquire a greater sphere of influence from which to build a series of naval and air bases to establish a more capable deterrent through defence in depth. The best way to deal with such a situation, opined the President, was for Great Britain and the United States to ensure they took a firm line with Japan along the same strategic

issues, thus creating the image of solidarity and unity within the Japanese strategic thinking process.⁴⁹ As for the place of the Philippines within all of this, when asked directly by Lothian whether the United States would abandon the Islands and associated naval bases, Roosevelt's position was, 'He said not for ten years but at the end of ten years it was possible and even probable.'⁵⁰

Shortly after Philip Kerr's interview with President Roosevelt, the British naval attaché in Washington, Captain A. R. Dewar, informed the head of the RN's Intelligence Division, Admiral G.C. Dickens, of senior American naval and marine officer attitudes toward the Philippine question. Directed by Dickens to investigate specifically this particular issue, Dewar had a wide-ranging network to utilize. His investigations revealed that the USN was indeed wrestling with confirming the exact impact the independence issue raised. Many senior individuals, such as a Chief of Bureau and General Wells, Commander of the Marine garrison in Hawaii and a man with intimate knowledge of the Philippines, had openly declared their desire for the United States to leave the Islands as soon as possible. Such opinion arose from a combination of scepticism regarding America's level of strategic interest in the region, and a belief that holding the Islands in the face of full Japanese aggression was not a viable option. Both were reluctant to see the United States put into a position of being involved in any international troubles arising in the Far East.⁵¹ Further, Dewar was of the opinion that, 'I am rather inclined to think that this opinion may be held oftener than it is expressed.'⁵² The implications of such statements were clearly an important issue for the British to have to recognize. Reports of American senior officers having grave doubts as to America's future in the Far East only added to the scepticism of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir A. Ernle M. Chatfield regarding the reliability of the United States as a possible ally in the region. Nonetheless, despite his reservations, Chatfield was forced to have

to agree to the FO line that America's potential for support was a prize worth more than Japanese promises to recognize British interests in the Far East.⁵³

In February 1935, Admiral Dickens asked the FO for their assessment of general conditions in the Far East concerning Great Britain's strategic interests, with an emphasis on the likelihood of Japan being able to seize the resource-rich Dutch Netherlands East Indies. A comprehensive reply was prepared, with an important part of that appreciation focused on the Philippine situation.⁵⁴ The FO pointed **firstly** to the American Government's tendency to focus on domestic matter rather than international questions, which was a position tinged with a large portion of the population espousing pacifist sentiments with regard to the foreign affairs. More and more the United States was seen to be disengaging from the most contentious region, the Far East, in order to avoid any potential conflict with Japan. Yet, an equally large part of the nation regarded a war with Japan as inevitable and desired a strong navy and naval presence in the Pacific. The FO regarded the root of the Philippine independence action being the result of that American international aloofness and ordinary commercial selfishness.⁵⁵ As for the strategic importance of the Philippines to the British strategic position:

The independence of the Philippines is a factor which in its turn may have incalculable consequences for the future balance of power in the South Seas.... We should not forget, in this connexion, that if America eventually gives up her last strongholds in the Philippines, the naval bases, (as she may when the matter comes up for discussion in something approaching twenty years) an independent Philippines Government will be far weaker and more defenceless in the face of Japan even than that of the Netherlands East Indies. It would appear to follow that if Japanese designs on the Philippines develop, His Majesty's Governments may one day be confronted with just as grave a problem in these regions as that we have set ourselves to examine in connexion with the Netherlands East Indies.⁵⁶

The FO's strategic assessment was deemed worthy of consideration by not only the RN's senior leadership, but also the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) and Cabinet, all of whom subsequently **analysed** it. With requests for

higher consideration of the question being supported by the FO's Permanent Undersecretary Sir Robert Vansittart and the Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, as well as the Secretary of the CID Sir Maurice Hankey, the issue of the importance of the Philippines to British security in the Far East was **clearly** becoming more pronounced within the British strategic policy making elite.

In the State Department, consideration of the Philippine issue was also building strategic momentum. At the start of 1935, Stanley K. Hornbeck advised Secretary of State Hull about the general strategic picture in the Far East. The Island's status was a source of possible tension for US-Japanese **relations**, but one among many.⁵⁷ The idea of independence was not to be taken as a reality just yet, said Hornbeck. **He warned that** there were many things that could derail the Islands moving from under America's protection, and to make plans for the future based around no American presence or strategic interest in the Philippines was not a sound approach. Associated with the issue's effect on Far Eastern strategic relations Hornbeck appealed for continuity in American foreign policy in the Pacific due to that region being the most important for the nation's security policies.⁵⁸ Quoting Theodore Roosevelt's maximum to speak softly and carry a big stick, the Head of the Far East Division called on the administration to prepare the navy and its supporting structures, such as bases, for a possible conflict with Japan: 'To be, in relations with Japan, secure, and to have, in relation to our legitimate interests in the Far East, influence, we must possess both the fact and the appearance of political and economic and military strength, especially the strength of a powerful and adequately equipped Navy.'⁵⁹ Japan would continue to challenge America's desire to uphold the laws and structures that produced the existing balance of power in the region, he believed. Furthermore, it was not in **the interests of the** United States to itself inject destabilizing, new issues into the international order of the region, such as the question of who would oversee and protect the Philippine Islands.⁶⁰ Finally, Hornbeck called

upon America to work closely with Great Britain in providing stability and governance in the region, believing that their common values and desire for upholding international law and order made them natural allies against Japanese de-stabilizing efforts:

We should cultivate in relation to problems of the Far East conditions of close harmony and the maximum of practical cooperation between ourselves and Great Britain. Toward doing this, we should go out of our way to inform the British Government of our views, to consult them with regard to theirs, to give them notice of our intentions, et cetera, et cetera, in regard to matters where there is involved a community, a parity or a similarity of interest. We should, in dealing with them coordinate our moves and methods with regard to Far Eastern matters with our moves and methods in regard to other matters.⁶¹

Hornbeck's appreciation and suggested way forward was in unison with recommendations put forward by the United States Ambassador in Japan, Joseph P. Grew, who also called for closer Anglo-American cooperation in thwarting Japanese aggression and expansion.⁶² These evaluations and recommendations regarding the Far East, Philippines and Great Britain, were all put to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt for their consideration.⁶³ The eventual appointment of General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the United States Army in September 1935, signalled a level of investment and interest by the United States in the continued wellbeing of the Islands and their staying within the American security orbit.⁶⁴ The Hornbeck/Grew case for sustained American interest in the fate of the Philippines appeared to hold a good deal of influence within the Roosevelt administration.

The British evaluation of the situation in 1935 confirmed a sustained American interest in retaining bases and influence in the Far East through a military presence in the Islands.⁶⁵ Reports from Washington and the Philippines confirmed that the United States was going to lease air and naval bases in the Islands. MacArthur was to train the local forces to defend the islands, all of which was interpreted as indicating that the United States would continue to be responsible for the security of the Islands.⁶⁶ That strategic condition was a great relief to the British. Such a commitment was not only important for the Philippines but

was also taken as a general sign of America's commitment to remaining a serious contributor to the regional balance of power.⁶⁷ Colonel Hodsoll, now a key source for the FO, WO and Admiralty regarding insights into the situation in the Philippines, made three main points on the matter to the British policy making elite.⁶⁸ Firstly, there was a slowing down, in both the USA and Philippines of the idea of complete independence. Secondly, the Americans were fully expected to retain naval bases in the Islands. Finally, as a consequence of clearer and closer Anglo-American strategic understanding, there was a general expectation in the Philippines that the US and Great Britain would cooperate to check any future Japanese penetration.⁶⁹ This newly re-invigorated appreciation of America's potential support for Great Britain's interests in the Far East guided the British response to a request by Quezon in the autumn of 1935 for the appointment of a British economic advisor to his government.⁷⁰

While certain elements of the FO thought the prestige of such an appointment would be a good thing for the protection of British trade interests with the Islands, greater strategic considerations such as those voiced by Robert Craigie, called for caution. Comparing the situation to be the equivalent of America offering to provide an economic advisor to the Egyptian government, Craigie counselled restraint and the avoidance of irritating a now friendly US administration over such a minor matter. Before any action was taken, the FO asked Ambassador Lindsay to investigate the American attitude towards the issue.⁷¹ On the heels of an earlier indication by President Quezon that he desired closer strategic relations with Great Britain, the FO was wary of any actions that appeared to create closer strategic links with the Philippines.⁷² Such an act would either encourage the United States to withdraw more quickly from the region or irritate the Japanese as they would be branded the aggressive, destabilizing reason for Britain assuming the protection of the island. Under such conditions, Great Britain could expect Japan to thereafter be more belligerent towards British Far Eastern interests overall. As well, taking up the appointment could re-kindle anti-British

sentiments within the American administration of British imperial **and** commercial competition making inroads in the region at America's expense. While Lindsay was consulting with the State Department about its views of closer Great Britain/Philippine relations, efforts to ascertain the degree of sincerity President Quezon possessed for closer relations with Britain were also underway.

As 1935 drew to an end reports from Manila continued to highlight the growing possibility of President Quezon approaching Great Britain for entry into the Commonwealth. A.L. Kennedy of *The Times* and A.P. Blunt, Consul-General in Manila, conducted a range of extensive discussions with the **F**ilipino leader on December 12. They focused their discussions on the idea which Roy Howard, an influential American newspaper publisher, had put forward in his papers proclaiming that the Philippines, if abandoned by America, would petition for incorporation into the British Empire.⁷³ Quezon emphasized the uncertainty within the United States Government as to which option was preferred: remain militarily and economically in the Islands, or, to remove all liability of American responsibility for the security of the Islands. When pressed by Kennedy and Blunt about the circumstances under which he envisioned the Islands entering the British Empire, Quezon replied that it all depended on whether the United States wished to remain in the Far East to protect their own vital interests in the face of increasing imperialistic behaviour on the part of Japan. If the United States did not feel it had a strategic need to remain in the region then there was nothing more to talk about. If America did feel that the Far East was strategically important to their future then the Islands were a valuable defence attribute that could not be ignored. Blunt informed the FO that with regard to British interests in the US/Philippines question: 'The remarks ...struck both Mr. Kennedy and myself as particularly instructive. They explain how, and on what grounds, an appeal to His Majesty's Government might arise.'⁷⁴ Answering the question regarding how far President Quezon would take his

exploration regarding possible entry into the British imperial system was an important part of the Anglo-American strategic relationship throughout 1936.

With the Washington Treaty System apparently unravelling after the failure of the 1935 London Naval Conference to retain Japanese support, some American Far Eastern experts were concerned about Great Britain's future international relations and actions in Asia. On July 2, 1936, the day he was due to return to America for a period of leave, the American Counselor of Embassy in London, Ray Atherton, invited the former British Ambassador to China, Sir Alexander Cadogan, to lunch.⁷⁵ The purpose of the luncheon was for Atherton to solicit Cadogan's perspective on Great Britain's Far Eastern strategy before he took on his new official duties in the FO and became restricted in what he would be able to say on and off the record. Cadogan was non-committal as to how Britain would safeguard its national interests in the Far East within the changed environment created by the results of the failed London Naval Conference. While not proposing that he supported the idea of a renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Cadogan was also clear in explaining the need Great Britain had for continued amicable relations with Japan. Cadogan told Atherton that, '...he felt that outside nations must maintain and uphold their rights insofar as possible, conscious, however, that his country certainly felt, and he was inclined to believe that that sentiment was the same in the United States, that neither nation would fight in the Far East.'⁷⁶ Without any guarantee of assured American support for a more confrontational or punitive approach to deterring Japanese expansion, Cadogan was unwilling to rule out any viable strategic option that could deliver Great Britain's security needs. Of particular note, reported Atherton,

I said to him both countries should realize that in the same way that nature abhorred a vacuum the Japanese would abhor an Anglo-American front against them and they would avoid any action, I thought, that would tend to unite us. I was particularly struck by the fact that Cadogan in no way attempted to inspire me with an idea that he or his Government favoured a day-to-day Anglo-American front, which would merely possibly make the Japanese harder to work with.⁷⁷

Atherton was not alone with his concerns over Great Britain's true intentions in the Far East

Fuelled by the ill-timed and ill-conceived Far Eastern tour of senior British Treasury official, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, American Ambassadors Grew and Johnson tended towards emphasizing the need for America to be cautious of Great Britain appeasing Japan to such an extent that it endangered the ability of the two Western nations to be able to cooperate in any meaningful way in the deterrence of Japan.⁷⁸ Hornbeck differed from the two Ambassadors in that, while he acknowledged Great Britain's need to appease certain aspects of Japan's desire for greater influence in the Far East, he also believed that the strategic similarity and ties to the United States would see the two nations able to collaborate constructively and consistently in creating a deterrent effect. In particular, confronted by the Japanese withdrawal from the London Naval Conference, Great Britain and the United States were investing in greater levels of naval power and associated basing infrastructure to support their positions in the region. Part of that basing was to be provided by the Philippines. MacArthur and Quezon were working vigorously, Hornbeck pointed out, to strengthen the defences of the Islands in order to secure those facilities for American naval forces to use.⁷⁹ These operational conditions were a central part of creating a stronger American naval capability in the region, as well as sending a strategic signal to Great Britain that US investment in the Islands, and Far East in general, was a strategic reality. For Hornbeck, such actions meant that: 'Thus, it may reasonably be said there has been created and there is being hardened a military 'iron ring' around Japan.'⁸⁰ But that ring would only be effective as a limiting influence on Japan if it remained intact.

Still, the experience of the two nations working together during the London Naval Conference and over international trade issues had created a situation that held great promise for the iron ring indeed holding. American Ambassador to Great Britain, Robert W. Bingham, had always held the creation of closer and more effective Anglo-American

strategic relations as one of his key objectives. In light of such discussions as those taking place around the Philippine issue the Ambassador believed that his strategic desire was indeed becoming a reality. This strengthened relationship was an important development Bingham believed, due to the dangers facing both nations in the years immediately ahead, where the need for the intimate strategic understanding would be crucial. Bingham informed the British that this was also the view of newly re-elected President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, as well as large swathes of more influential American business and financial leaders: 'Both countries knew that any idea of an actual military alliance was out of the question – at all events in advance of an emergency – but, short of this, there was ample scope for the closest consultation and co-operation.'⁸¹ Did President Quezon's quest for entrance into the British Empire endanger that growing Anglo-American strategic relationship and the strength of the iron ring or not was the strategic question to be answered? As 1936 neared an end the issue moved from the realm of the hypothetical to a reality.

On December 11, Colonel Hodsoll, acting on behalf of President Quezon, attended a meeting in London at the Foreign Office with one of the senior members of the American Department, J.M. Troutbeck. The topic discussed was the likelihood of FO officials receiving President Quezon to discuss the future status of the Islands when the President attended the upcoming Coronation ceremony in May 1937.⁸² Senior officials cautioned against taking on any further Far Eastern commitments. To do so would generate both an aggressive Japanese response, aimed at all British interests in the region, as well as aggravate Anglo-American strategic relations.⁸³ Robert Craigie, fresh from his role as chief negotiator at the London Naval Conference, and soon to be Ambassador to Japan, posited that it would perhaps be a good idea to sound out the Americans, without giving President Quezon away, as to what they thought of the idea of the Philippines being part of the Empire. Simultaneously, he cautioned against taking on additional strategic liabilities in the region.⁸⁴ The twin Permanent

Under-Secretaries, Sir Alexander Cadogan and Sir Robert Vansittart, agreed generally with Craigie's approach. Cadogan was sceptical regarding the competence of American foreign policy in the Pacific, advising that, 'It is they [America] who have created this difficulty for him [Quezon]: the Tydings-McDuffie Act seems to recognise that the US will continue to have some responsibility for the fate of the islands: has he asked them whether they have as yet any idea as to how they propose to discharge their responsibility?'⁸⁵ Vansittart was in favour of engaging with Quezon and ensuring that British neglect of the situation did not push the President towards closer ties with Japan. He recommended that the **CID** be advised of the level of importance the issue had now achieved, and while that was being done the Americans could be approached and their view obtained.⁸⁶ However, the new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, while he agreed with Cadogan that Quezon should attempt to get a firm answer from the Americans as to their intentions, was not as passive as the rest of the FO members. He did not view the question as an issue that Great Britain had to deal with alone. Indeed, he believed that the long-term security of the Islands was a matter that Great Britain and the United States could collaborate on jointly, enhancing their strategic relationship to contain Japan.⁸⁷ Faced with some hard choices ahead, Craigie proposed that the FO inform Quezon that they would indeed be happy to meet with him during the Coronation, but the **Philippine President would be** well advised to acquire an American statement as to their intentions towards the Islands before he arrived. Furthermore, because '... the most important thing in all this is to avoid any misunderstanding over this with the United States.', Craigie would meet with Ray Atherton for an intimate discussion to try and gain greater clarity of the American position on the matter.⁸⁸ As 1936 came to a close Eden approved Craigie's approach and authorized him to meet with Atherton.⁸⁹

On February 19, 1937, Craigie met with Atherton to discuss the Quezon **matter**. Craigie asked him to find out the State Department's position on US intentions towards

protecting the Islands. Atherton was informed that the FO would meet with Quezon and let the President put forward his points, but would be unwilling to commit Great Britain in anyway. As well, Craigie, '... would not, however, deny that this question of the probable United States attitude towards the defence of the Philippines was a matter of very close concern to His Majesty's Government and that it would help us very much to have some indication of the probable intentions of the United States Government in this matter. We had not, of course, the slightest intention to interfere in any way, but it was obvious that, if the United States should wash her hands completely of any responsibility for the Philippines, this would raise a problem of first-class importance for ourselves.'⁹⁰ The FO had shown themselves willing and able to cooperate and share sensitive materials with the United States regarding Far Eastern security, a condition desired by many within the policy making elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Atherton expressed his gratitude for the request, being grateful the question was asked, as he had felt personally for some time that it was imperative that the US Government took the matter more seriously.⁹¹ He assured Craigie that he would contact Secretary Hull immediately to get clarification on this important matter and cooperate on a mutually agreeable resolution to the problem.

True to his word Atherton informed Hull and the State Department of the FO's approach to him and their desire for clarity of the American attitude towards retaining naval bases and security obligations in the Philippines.⁹² He relayed to Hull Quezon's desire to know if Britain would provide security for the Islands, given that American officials had been unwilling to confirm whether or not there would be a continued presence and interest, not only in the Islands, but in the Far East in general. Furthermore, Quezon was willing to consider turning to the Japanese for future economic and military security if the United States or Great Britain were willing to provide reassurance to the Philippines. Such matters were important to the British Government's planning for the protection of their Far Eastern

interests, Atherton explained, and therefore they desired Hull's views on the matter.⁹³ Vital to that future of Far Eastern stability was the growing British desire for joint and collaborative actions with the United States to create order in the region, and for that reason Atherton reported, 'The Foreign Office concluded by saying that they were most anxious there should be no misunderstanding between the two Governments on this general problem since their interests were 'identical'.'⁹⁴

By May 1937, the Roosevelt Administration was taking greater control of the situation. Citing the ability of the newly re-elected Roosevelt Government to now focus on the question, Hull could reassure the British on many elements connected to the issue. He wanted the British to understand that Quezon could not be considered the head of an independent state but instead an official under the American Government, and that he (Hull) too shared a desire that the Anglo-American axis be firmly of the same mind on the matter. Hull instructed Atherton to inform the FO that Quezon was in the US to discuss the Philippine independence matter with the Government. It was Hull's belief that the discussions would result in a mutually beneficial program regarding the provision of security for the Islands. Hull intimated that the State Department would in all likelihood discuss that arrangement with the British in the near future to ensure that HM Government were aware of all necessary developments.⁹⁵

Hull's views were also reflective, he advised the British, of the President's desire for a sustained presence in the Far East and closer Anglo-American strategic relations,⁹⁶ as well as other key members of the American Far Eastern policy making elite. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral William C. Leahy, and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, were also of the opinion that American Far Eastern security required a sustained presence in the Philippines, as well as closer strategic relations with Great Britain in deterring Japan.⁹⁷ With such collusion and collaboration in

place the State Department had no problem in assuring President Quezon that an American presence in the Islands and Far East was a reality for the future, closely linked to Great Britain's power in the region. As well, Quezon was deterred from visiting Britain for the Coronation and did not get the opportunity to become a formal and visible source of irritation and embarrassment to the British Government. Anglo-American diplomatic joint efforts had defused the situation while at the same time had added to the growing closeness and confidence each nation had of the other's reliability in facing Japanese attempts to destabilize the boundaries set by the regional balance of power.⁹⁸ British officials were equally impressed with the benefits of a collaborative approach to the specific question of the Philippines, as well as the more general move forward in creating closer and more synchronized strategic relations.⁹⁹

In April, Anthony Eden circulated a FO memorandum on the future of the Islands to the CID.¹⁰⁰ He informed them that President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and other senior members of the State Department had indeed held conversations with President Quezon in early March. Part of those conversations had been to warn the Philippine leader away from the idea of sounding out the British Government about possible entry into the Empire, while at the same time entertaining his concerns about future Island security.¹⁰¹ The FO reported that the Roosevelt Administration had agreed to better long-term economic and trade relations with the Philippines, allaying some of Quezon's fears over the independent Philippines being economical vulnerable to both external exploitation as well as a decline in the domestic standard of living. As for British strategic interests in the matter, an ungarded Philippines would undoubtedly attract the interest of Japan. Seeking to spread its influence in the region, Japanese control of not only Philippine trade, but basing and forward deployment into the region adjacent to Singapore and Australia, would almost certainly mean the end of Great Britain's control of those two imperial possessions.¹⁰² In light of the circumstances

confronting them, the FO asked the CID to consider the strengths and weakness, risks and advantages, of the four possible solutions recommended: 1. The incorporation of the Philippines into the British Empire or alternatively an alliance with the Empire. 2. The Philippines be granted membership to, and thereby obtain the international protection of, the League of Nations. 3. The provision of a joint Anglo-American guarantee of the Philippines from foreign aggression. 4. The adoption of a multilateral treaty for the permanent neutralisation of the Philippine Islands.¹⁰³ Although still somewhat reluctant to join with the United States, given certain reservations about that nation's reliability in maintaining a cooperative relationship, the FO recommended that of the four options a joint Anglo-American guarantee was the preferred way forward. From such a position of unity and strength, perhaps Japan could be coerced into joining the two Western powers in providing the multilateral treaty of neutralisation.¹⁰⁴ However, the optimally desired outcome of any future British diplomatic efforts on the matter was for the United States to continue to provide security for the Islands and maintain the status quo in the region: 'This, no doubt, is the best solution from the British point of view, and it is only in the event of the *status quo* being altered that alternative solutions arise at all.'¹⁰⁵ Therefore, given that the State Department was thought to be about to approach the British Government for their position on the matter shortly; that President Quezon, while quiet for the moment, had not guaranteed he might not return to the question of Imperial protection at some point in the future through regular diplomatic lines of communication; and that New Zealand had raised the matter for discussion on the agenda of the Imperial Conference set to take place later that year, a sound strategic policy on the matter was required.¹⁰⁶

In the spring of 1937, further conversations with the United States Government and work by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (COS) continued to clarify the British position. Utilizing Norman Davis' presence in London to act as his emissary, President Roosevelt

informed Anthony Eden and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain that neutralisation of the Pacific was a project he was keen to try and implement. The President informed the British that he was willing to join in a neutralisation treaty for the Philippines as part of a larger neutralisation programme for the Pacific which would include Great Britain, Holland, France and Japan.¹⁰⁷ Work by the COS acknowledged the need to not disappoint the American President through a complete rejection of the idea, but also pointed out that, 'Strategically it would be of the first importance that the United States of America should be associated in any such agreement. In war we should primarily rely upon the exercise of economic pressure in order to defeat Japan, and the United States of America would almost certainly be prepared to assist in applying this form of pressure, even if they were unwilling to support their signature to the extent of providing effective military co-operation.'¹⁰⁸ The COS also agreed that Japan would not sit quietly by and allow Great Britain to assume control over the Philippines.

The inclusion of the Islands into the Empire would undoubtedly create not just a Japanese backlash against the British presence in the Islands, but also trigger a general China and Far Eastern-wide response. That response could take the form of not only more difficult trade and economic relations between the two nations, but more direct military action by Japan.¹⁰⁹ It was unlikely, however, that Great Britain could afford to challenge Japan in this way alone:

If the terms of the settlement allowed us to maintain forces in the Philippines in peace, we could, if we were prepared to accept the expenditure entailed, ensure that in war we should benefit The expenditure would, however, have to be very high, since we always regard Japan as a potential aggressor, and we could, therefore, only be certain of securing the integrity of the Philippines by taking adequate defensive measures in peace. Manila, in particular, would have to be protected on a scale comparable to that of Singapore. If, on the other hand, the terms of the settlement prevented us from maintaining forces in the Philippines in peace, we could not rely on having the benefit in war of the advantages of being able to operate from the Philippines, while we should at the same time have the added responsibility of co-operating with the Philippines in the defence of their country if they were attacked. Any settlement which made us solely responsible for the defence of the Philippines

would, therefore, constitute a very heavy addition to our commitments; and it would also increase the risk of Japanese intervention against us when we were already involved in war in Europe... From our point of view, it is essential to prevent the control of the Philippines passing into Japanese hands, as such a development would seriously weaken our whole strategic position in the Far East.¹¹⁰

The COS viewed the Philippines as occupying a central position in the 'no man's land' between the British and Japanese spheres of influence in the Far East. Whichever nation filled the strategic vacuum left by a disengaged United States would greatly improve its strategic position to the detriment of the other. To that end, the COS agreed that the best possible solution was to co-operate with the United States in both building a solid strategic relationship that could deter Japanese aggression, and, ensure that the Philippines remained firmly under the sole protection of the United States.¹¹¹ The Japanese invasion of China in July 1937 consolidated this growing belief in the need for Anglo-American Far Eastern strategic cooperation by providing undeniable evidence of Japan's desire to upset the existing regional balance of power and re-align the state of existing spheres of influence.¹¹² With the whole concept of peace in the region now in question, the strategic context for the interaction of British and American strategic relations changed completely. The Philippines question became a stepping stone on the road to parallel but not joint Anglo-American strategic relations as more vital strategic problems and challenges arose.¹¹³

* * * * *

By the spring of 1939, with the chance of a general European war becoming more likely, Anglo-American strategic relations in the Far East were strong and becoming more unified in their quest to thwart an agreed common threat: aggressive Japanese expansionism.¹¹⁴ Issues and interactions, such as the Philippine security question and resulting interrogation of future intentions by American and British strategic foreign policy makers had played a vital part in strengthening that relationship. The Philippine question was, however, only one of many instances where Anglo-American strategic collaboration was

required in order for that informal alliance to mature: Keelung, the *Panay* and *Lady Bird* incidents, Tientsin, the Burma Road, loans to China, economic sanctions, financial and naval **planning for the** blockade of Japan, were just some of the others. The result of this continued process of working through incident after incident, crisis after crisis, threat after threat, created by Japanese action, was for Anglo-American strategic understanding and trust to grow deeper and stronger through each experience.¹¹⁵ Both nations recognised the need to maintain the ability of their respective maritime power to play an irreplaceable role in the existing balance of power system, deterring, containing or coercing Japan. The potential loss of the Philippines into the Japanese sphere of influence represented a destabilization in that balance which consequently represented potentially devastating results. By March 1939, British fears of the Philippines becoming Japanified, or that the United States would abandon the Pacific and leave Great Britain to carry the burden of facing Japanese expansion alone, had been allayed. American fears of Great Britain striking a separate deal to appease Japan had also been addressed.¹¹⁶ The proof of the veracity of that informal strategic relationship was evident in the summer of 1939, when of the new British Ambassador to the United States, Philip Kerr, relayed to the FO and Whitehall his belief that President Roosevelt was willing to work with Great Britain in the Far East to continue forging a ring of iron around Japan, even in the face of a war in Europe.¹¹⁷ As such, the nature of the eventual Anglo-American wartime alliance had already begun to take shape, with its roots not in Europe but in the Far East. The requirement to maintain boundaries and balances in the Far Eastern security environment had created new strategic bonds between Great Britain and the United States.¹¹⁸ Those bonds, predicated upon personal relationships, shared values and experiences, and shared strategic appreciations **being held within the foreign policy making machinery of each nation** such as those demonstrated in the Philippine issue, would evolve

and grow ever closer under the realities of the European war and escalating tensions in the Far East from 1939-1942.¹¹⁹

ENDNOTES

¹ M.L. Roi and B.J.C. McKercher, "'Ideal' and 'Punchbag': Conflicting Views of the balance of Power and Their Influence on Interwar British Foreign Policy", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.12, No.2, June 2001, pp.47-78; Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., with the assistance of Dale K. A. Finlayson, *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941* (New York, 1973), Ann Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937* (New York, 1975); Keith Neilson, "'Unbroken Threat': Japan, Maritime Power and British Imperial Defence, 1920-32", in Greg Kennedy ed., *British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: Influences and Actions*, (London, 2005), pp.62-72; Stephen L. Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937*, (Vancouver, 1975); Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude to the Pacific War*, (Pittsburgh, 1992). **The term Far East is used throughout the paper as it is the descriptor used at the time and the geographic implications inferred by the actors involved and using it are the only ones that make historical sense.**

² Emily O. Goldman, *Sunken Treaties*, (Pennsylvania, 1994); Christopher Hall, *Britain, America, and Arms Control*, (New York, 1987); Malcolm H. Murfett, "Look Back in Anger: The Western Powers and the Washington Conference of 1921-1922", in B.J.C. McKercher ed., *Arms Limitation and Disarmament*, (New York, 1992), 83-104; Stephen W. Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, vol.1, (London, 1968), p.70-75; Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca, 1987); Ian Nish. ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, (New York, 1982); Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*, (Annapolis, 1991); J. Kenneth McDonald, "The Washington Conference and the Naval Balance of Power, 1921-22", in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan eds., *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power*, (London, 1989):189-213; Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, (London, 1972); Erik Goldstein and John Maurer eds., "Special Issue on the Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 4, (1993); Roger Dingman, *Power in the Pacific: the Origins of Naval Arms Limitation*, (Chicago, 1976); William R. Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922*, (Austin, 1971); Sadao Asada, "Between

the Old Diplomacy and the New, 1918-1922: The Washington System and the Origins of Japanese-American Rapprochement”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol.30, No.2, April 2006, pp.211-230.

³ On the concept of deterrence see, Lawrence Freedman, “Deterrence: A Reply”, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.28, No.5, October 2005, pp.789-801, with associated Round Table articles on deterrence by Patrick M. Morgan and Richard Ned Lebow; Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (London: Polity), 2004. For aspects of historical debate and relevance of appeasement to foreign policy making in the interwar period see special edition of *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, “Appeasement: Rethinking the Policy and the Policy-Makers”, Vol.19, No.3, 2008. For British foreign policy formulation and usage in the interwar see special edition of *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, “Power and Stability in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965”, Vol.14, no.2, 2003. Regarding the role of intelligence and American appreciations of Japan for foreign and military policy making purposes see Douglas Ford, “Realistic Caution and Ambivalent Optimism: United States Intelligence Assessments and War Preparations Against Japan, 1918-1941”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.21, No.2, pp.175-201, 2010. This article’s place in the American historiography is in line with Michael J.Hogan, “SHAFR Presidential Address: The ‘Next Big Thing’: the Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol.28, No.1, pp.1-21, 2004, pp.16-19 specifically; Emily Hill Griggs, “A Realist Before ‘Realism’: Quincy Wright and the Study of International Politics between the two World Wars”, *the Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, (March 2001), pp.71-103.

⁴ Antony Best, *Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936-41*, (London, Routledge), 1995; Nicholas E.Sarantakes, *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan*, (Lawrence Kansas, University Press of Kansas), 2009; Ian Cowman, *Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations in the Pacific, 1937-1941* (London, Bloomsbury Academic), 1997; Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-45*, (Oxford, OUP), 1978; idem, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933*, (London, Hamish Hamilton), 1972; Greg Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939: Imperial Crossroads*, (London, Frank Cass), 2002; Michael Hogan, *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation*

of *Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928*, (Columbia, MO, University of Missouri Press), 1978.

⁵ Ian Nish, "Britain and Japan: Long-Range Images, 1900-52", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.15, No.1, pp.149-161, 2004; Tae Jin Park, "Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931-1941: the American State Department and Propaganda on the Sino-Japanese Conflict", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.22, No.3, pp.388-407, 2011; Antony Best, "'Our Respective Empires should Stand Together': The Royal Dimension in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.16, No.2, pp.259-279.

⁶ The most infamous of such archivally challenged master synthesizers, who favoured sweeping style over detailed substance was A.J.P. Taylor, who used this phrase to diminish Victor Rothwell's *Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947*, in his January 1982 review published in the *London Review of Books*. It has been promulgated by lesser acolytes ever since. The original phrase is more often linked to G.M. Young's *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age*, (Oxford, OUP), 1936.

⁷ A comprehensive rebuttal to critics of the extensive use of empirical evidence in such cases can be found in the special edition of *Contemporary British History*, "The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century", Vol.18, No.3, 2007; and Keith Neilson, *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939*, (Cambridge, CUP), 2006, introduction.

⁸ D.C. Watt, 'The Nature of the Foreign-Policy-Making Élite in Britain', in D.C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press) 1965, 1-15; Christopher Baxter and Andrew Stewart, eds, *Diplomats at War. British and Commonwealth Diplomacy in Wartime* (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff), 2008; J. Connell, *The 'Office': A Study of British Foreign Policy and its Makers, 1919-1951*, (London, Wingate), 1958; Zara Steiner, "On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More", *International Affairs*, Vol.73, No.2, 1997, pp.531-546; Greg Kennedy, "The Ties That Bind: Imperial Networks and Security: Lord Crawford and Balcarres and the Governor Generals to Australia and Canada, 1930-1939", *Canadian Journal of History*, Vol.47, No.3, Winter 2012, pp.567-595; Eric Goldstein, "The British Official Mind and the United States, 1919-42" in T.G. Otte and Constantine A. Pagedas eds., *Personalities, War and Diplomacy:*

Essays in International History, (London, Routledge), 1997, pp.66-80; Kristin Hoganson, “Hop off the Bandwagon! It’s a Mass Movement, Not a Parade”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol.95, No.4, March 2009, pp.1087-1091⁹ and linked articles in this round table on the state of the research and writing of American diplomatic history.

⁹ Wayne S. Cole, *Determinism and American Foreign Relations During the Franklin D. Roosevelt Era*, (Lanham, Md, University Press of America), 1995; J.D. Doenecke and J.E. Wilz, *From Isolationism to War, 1931-1941*. (Arlington Heights, VA, Virginia University Press), 1991; Justus D. Doenecke, *Diplomacy of Frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933 as Revealed in the Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck*, (Stanford, Hoover Institute Press), 1981; W.L. Langer and S.E. Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940*, (New York, Harper and Brothers Publishing), 1952; Edward S. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy: The US Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor*, (Annapolis, MD, US Naval Institute Press), 2007; Bradford A. Lee, *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press), 1973; R.G. O’Connor, *Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930*, (Westport CT, Greenwood Press), 1969; Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II*, (Cambridge, CUP), 1974; Arthur Waldron ed., *How the Peace Was Lost*, (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institute Press) 1992; Peter Bell, “‘Leaving Us in the Lurch’: The British Government, the First DRC Enquiry and the United States, 1933-34” in Malcolm Murfett ed., *Shaping British Foreign and Defence Policy in the Twentieth Century: A Tough Ask in Turbulent Times*, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan), 2014, pp.64-86.

¹⁰ For use and role of incidents in international history see Greg C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson eds, *Incidents and International Relations: People, Power, and Personalities*, (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press) 2002; K. Neilson, “‘Incidents’ and Foreign Policy: A Case Study”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.9, No.1, 1998, pp.53-88; idem, “Perception and Posture in Anglo-American Relations: The Legacy of the Simon-Stimson Affair, 1932-1941”, *The International History Review*, Vol.29, No.2, 2010, pp.313-337; Michael E. Chapman, “Fidgeting Over Foreign Policy: Henry L. Stimson and the Shenyang Incident, 1931”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol.37, No.4, 2013, pp. 727-748; Karl

Schweizer and Jeremy Black, "The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.17, No.3, 2006, pp.617-631.

¹¹ W. Nugent, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion* (New York, 2008); E. P. Crapol, "Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations", *Diplomatic History*, Vol.16, 1992, pp.573-97; Annick Cizel, "Nation-building in the Philippines: Rooseveltian Statecraft for Imperial Modernization in an Emergent Transatlantic World Order", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.19, 2008, pp.690-711; Serge Ricard, "Theodore Roosevelt: Imperialist or Global Strategist in the New Expansionist Age?", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.19, 2008, pp.639-657; Dean Kotlowski, "Independence or not? Paul V. McNutt, Manuel L. Quezon, and the Re-examination of Philippine Independence, 1937-9", *International History Review*, Vol.32, No.3, September 2010, pp.501-531.

¹² Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca, 1987); Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, (New York, 1982); Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*, (Annapolis, 1991).

¹³ Frank Hindman Golay, *Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946*, (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin), 1998; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, (New York, Octagon Books), 1971 edition, Ch.6; *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol.1, (London, Hodder and Stoughton), 1948, Ch.20; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, (New York, OUP), 1979, p.9 and p.92; Russell D. Buhite, *Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy Toward China, 1925-1941*, (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1969), pp.92-93; Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan*, (New York, Simon and Schuster), 1944; B. J. C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-45* (Cambridge, CUP), 1999, pp.143-148; Glenn Anthony May, "The Unfathomable Other: Historical Studies of US-Philippine Relations", in Warren I. Cohen, *Pacific Passage: the Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century*, (New York, Columbia University Press), 1996, pp.279-313.

¹⁴ Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations*, Chs. 2 and 3; W. R. Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-5* (New York, OUP), 1978; H. L. Stimson, *The Far Eastern Crisis* (New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers), 1936; Warren F. Kimball ed., *Churchill and Roosevelt; the Complete Correspondence, Vol.1, Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942*, (Princeton, PUP), 1984; William H. McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*, (Oxford, OUP), 1953; Keith Neilson, *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order*; idem, “The Defence Requirements Subcommittee, British Strategic Foreign Policy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement”, *English Historical Review*, Vol.143, No.477, 203, pp.652-684.

¹⁵C. R. Kitts, *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784–1990* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America), 1991, pp.1–40; Shizhang Hu, *Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy, 1919-1937*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press), 1995; William C. Kirby, “Sino-American Relations in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1949”, in Cohen, *Pacific Passage, pp.163-190*; Dane Kennedy, “Essay and Reflection: On the American Empire from a British Imperial Perspective”, *The International History Review*, Vol.29, No.1, 2007, pp.83-108; Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press), 1965; Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941, (Basingstoke, Hampshire; Palgrave Macmillan), 2002; Arthur N. Young, *China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945*, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press), 1963. ;.

¹⁶ P. A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines*, (Quezon City), 2006; H. W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*, (New York, OUP), 1992.

¹⁷ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* [FRUS], 1933, Vol.III, ‘Report by the Special Assistant of the Embassy in France’, Feb.7, 1933, pp.155-157; *Ibid*, despatch from Marriner (Chargé in France) to Secretary of State, March 17, 1933, p.241;

¹⁸ Kiichi Fujiwara and Yoshiko Nagano ed., *The Philippines and Japan in America's Shadow*, (NUS Press, Singapore), 2011; Robert David Johnson, *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations*, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.), 1995.

¹⁹ Foster Rhea Dulles, 'The Philippines and the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act', *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol.IX, No.22, January 1934, pp.246-256.

²⁰ Ibid; F[oreign] O[ffice] 371/17576/857/17//45, The National Archive, Kew, London, Confidential despatch from Lindsay to Simon, Jan.18, 1934

²¹ FO 371/17576/17/17/45, despatch from Lindsay to Sir John Simon [Foreign Secretary], Dec.21, 1933.

²² Ibid

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East*, pp.121-211.

²⁵ FO 371/17576/17/17/45, Craigie minute, Jan.8, 1934.

²⁶ FO 371/17576/2319/17/45, Press Release from Whitehouse, March 2, 1934.

²⁷ FO 371/17576/2756/17/45, confidential despatch from Lindsay to Simon, March 29, 1934.

²⁸ FO 371/27576/2319/17/45, Allen minute, March 27, 1934.

²⁹ FRUS, 1933, Vol.III, despatch from Johnson to Secretary of State, June 12, 1933, pp.360-362.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid, p.362.

³³ Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Container 53, Record of Conversations in 1933, record of conversation between Johnson and Roy Howard, editor of *The World Telegram*, May 31, 1933. Explaining the US and British strategic relationship to questions by Howard regarding why Britain had not 'supported' America's methods of dealing with Japanese expansionism Johnson told Howard, 'he must remember that England's policy in Asia was based first, last, and at all time, upon England's interests in India, while France's policy was based upon her interest in Indo-China; and that, having no intention of retiring from their holdings in Asia, England and France would be realists in their dealings with an expansive and aggressive Japan; therefore, we

could not hope for hearty British and French support in a policy merely founded on abstractions; we could only expect complete and hearty cooperation from Great Britain and France if and when we were prepared to play the international game in the way they had played it.`

³⁴ Neilson, "Perception and Posture in Anglo-American Relations", p.318-19; Chris Bell, *The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars*, (London, Macmillan), 2000; Greg Kennedy, `1935 A Snapshot of British Imperial Defence in the Far East`, in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy eds., *Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman*, (London, Frank Cass), 1997, pp.190-216; Andrew Field, *Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939: Planning for War Against Japan*, (Basingstoke, Routledge), 2004.

³⁵ FO 371/17576/3702/17/45, Robert Craigie (Craigie was Britain's chief naval negotiator during the London Naval Conference and became Ambassador to Japan in 1937) minute, May 3, 1934; FO 371/18168/2414/57/23, despatch from Ambassador F. Lindley to FO, March 29, 1934; J. Pierrepont Moffat Diary, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 26, Vol.35, January 1 to July 1, 1934; CAB[inet] 53/5, TNA, Kew, London, Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee, Meetings 131-170, July 3, 1934 to March 31, 1936, Meeting No.136, Nov.26, 1934.

³⁶ FO 371/17576/4667/17/45, confidential letter from Sansom to Orde, May 11, 1934.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford University,(hereafter Hornbeck Papers) Chronological Day File, 1931-1946, Box 453, Folder Oct. 1932-May 1933, confidential memo by Hornbeck, March 14, 1933.

³⁹ Hornbeck Papers, , Box 454, Folder Jan.-Mar. 1934, note from Hornbeck to Carr, Jan.4, 1934.

⁴⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, Private Secretary Files, Japan, 1933-34, record of conversation, Sept.26, 1934.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ CAB[inet] 53/5, Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) Meetings No.131-170, TNA, KEW, London, July 3, 1934 to March 31, 1936, No. 136, Naval Staff Memo, Nov.26, 1934, First Sea Lord Chatfield states his belief that the United States desired to disassociate themselves from the Islands.

⁴⁵ For full exploration of Lord Lothian's role in Anglo-American strategic relations see Priscilla Roberts ed., *Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1900-1940*, (Republic of Letters Publishing BV, Dordrecht, Netherlands), 2010.

⁴⁶ FO 371/18183/6784/591/23, Summary of interview between Lothian and Roosevelt from Ambassador Lindsay to FO, Oct.12, 1934.

⁴⁷ Henry L. Stimson Diary, Yale Library, New Haven, Connecticut, entry for October 31, 1934.

⁴⁸ FO 371/18183/6784/591/23, Summary of interview between Lothian and Roosevelt from Ambassador Lindsay to FO, Oct.12, 1934.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ FO 371/17601/9320/1938/45, Secret letter from Dewar to Dickens, Nov.9, 1934.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Chatfield Papers (CHT), National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London, /3/1, secret letter from Chatfield to Warren Fisher (Treasury), February 5, 1934; CHT/4/4, secret and personal letter from Chatfield to Dreyer, February 2, 1934; FO 371/18764/9202/722/45, Admiralty report to FO, October 21, 1935; Neilson, "The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee"; Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations*, Chs.4 and 5. Despite a desire to make appeasement a more favoured approach to relations with Japan the Admiralty and Treasury had to follow the FO lead on the "America-first" approach for protecting British interests in the Far East, as both the above studies point out. As for Colonial Office interest in the Philippine matter, they were happy to take the FO lead on the matter, as was the Australian Government, see CAB 2/6, Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence, November 1933-October 1937, Meeting 271, October 14, 1934; FO 371/18749/7039/282/45, a range of documents on shipping, defence and security from Australian and London perspectives, August 7,

1935, and, FO 371/18749//7575/282/45, same range of documents, August 26, 1935; for British ability to marginalize Australian input into Anglo-American Far Eastern affairs see, Greg Kennedy, “American and British Merchant Shipping: Competition and Preparation, 1933-39” in Greg Kennedy ed., *The Merchant Marine in International Affairs, 1850-1950*, (London, Frank Cass Publishers), 2000. For more insight into the Colonial Office and its lack of influence Far Eastern affairs see Ronald McCrum, *The Men Who Lost Singapore*, (Singapore, NUS), 2016 (forthcoming).

⁵⁴ FO 371/19354/1234/231/23, Secret, FO Memo, February 16, 1934.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ FRUS, 1935. Vol.III, Memo by Hornbeck, Jan.3, 1935, pp.829-838.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p.829.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p.831.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p.830

⁶¹ Ibid, p.836; FRUS, 1935. Vol.III, Memo by Hornbeck, March 27, 1935, pp.855-857.

⁶² FRUS, 1935. Vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Dec.27, 1934, pp.821-829

⁶³ FRUS, 1935. Vol.III, letter from Hull to Grew, Jan.21, 1935, p.842.

⁶⁴ FO 371/18764/8479/722/45, despatch from Osborne, Washington Embassy to Foreign Secretary Sam Hoare, Sept.26, 1935.

⁶⁵ FO 371/18761/2147/722/45, FO memo on Far Eastern Situation and Philippines by Gore Booth, Feb.27, 1935

⁶⁶ FO 371/19359/2366/483/23, Secret Conversation between Dreyer and Major-General F. Parker (Commander US Army in Philippines), January 26, 1935.

⁶⁷ FO 371/18761/3505/722/45, despatch from Washington to FO, April 4, 1935; FO

371/18761/3728/722/45, minutes by Orde, Craigie and Vansittart, April 12, 1935; FO

371/18761/4645/722/45, War Office report, May 22, 1935; FO 371/18761/6029/722/45, telegram from Wellesley to Lindsay, July 5, 1935.

⁶⁸ FO 371/18764/9202/722/45, report from Admiralty, Oct.31, 1935.

⁶⁹ FO 371/18761/4852/722/45, record of conversation, May 24, 1935.

⁷⁰ FO 371/18764/99088/722/45, despatch from Blunt to FO, October 11, 1935.

⁷¹ FO 371/18764/9088/722/45, telegram from Blunt to FO, Oct.11, 1935.

⁷² FO 371/18761/2870/722/45, despatch from Harrington to FO, February 12, 1935.

⁷³ FO 371/19822/744/34/45, confidential despatch from Blunt to Hoare, December 18, 1935.

⁷⁴ Ibid. For assessments of Philippines defensive worth and capacity for the future see, FO 371/19822/746/34/45, confidential despatch from Blunt to FO, December 19, 1935. This item shows close, intimate working relationship of Blunt with General MacArthur himself, a condition that was also true for his relations with American intelligence agencies in the Islands, see FO 371/19823/855/34/45, Very Confidential letter, Blunt to A. Holman, American Dept., December 23, 1935; FO 371/19823/1564/34/45, Very Confidential letter, Blunt to Holman, Jan.16, 1936; FO 371/19824/7238/34/45, Secret despatch from Blunt to American Dept., July 30, 1936; FO 371/20285/7048/273/23, letter from Blunt to N.B. Ronald, Far Eastern Dept., Oct.9, 1936; FO 371/20988/205/205/10, Most Secret Letter from Floud, British Consulate-General, Canton (formerly of Manila) to FO, December 3, 1936. For continuation of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship in the Philippines see, Roland H. Worth Jr., *Secret Allies in the Pacific: Covert Intelligence and Code-Breaking Prior to the Attack on Pearl Harbor*, (London, McFarland and Company Inc.), 2002.

⁷⁵ *FRUS, The Far East*, Vol.IV, 1936, Memorandum by Atherton, July 13, 1936, pp.241-43. Cadogan at the time was about to take up the post of Joint Deputy Under Secretary at the Foreign Office.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p.242.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p.243.

⁷⁸ Ibid., despatch from Grew to Hull, August 6, 1936, pp.261-264; despatch from Johnson to Hull, Sept.11, 1936, pp.288-291.

⁷⁹ Ibid., memorandum by Hornbeck, August 8, 1936, pp.264-266.

⁸⁰ Ibid. p.266.

⁸¹ FO 371/19829/9447/180/45, confidential despatch Eden to Lindsay, (record of interview between Bingham and Craigie on November 19), December 1, 1936

⁸² FO 371/19824/10298/34/45, Troutbeck minute of conversation, December 11, 1936.

⁸³ Ibid., Troutbeck minute, December 15; Orde minute, December 16, Craigie minute, December 18, 1936.

⁸⁴ Ibid., Craigie minute, December 18, 1936.

⁸⁵ Ibid., Cadogan minute, December 18, 1936.

⁸⁶ Ibid., Vansittart minute, December 18, 1936.

⁸⁷ Ibid., Eden minute, December 23, 1936.

⁸⁸ Ibid., Craigie minute, January 6, 1937.

⁸⁹ Ibid., Eden minute, January 6, 1937.

⁹⁰ FO 371/20650/1479/20/45, record of conversation between Craigie and Atherton, February 19, 1937.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² FRUS, Vol. I, General, 1937, telegram from Atherton to Hull, February 19, 1937, pp.978-979.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ FRUS, Vol.I, telegram from Hull to Atherton, March 11, 1937, p.979. **Quezon's primary focus in Washington was to discuss the selection of the new US High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt. See various files in FO 371/20651.**

⁹⁶ Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations*, Chs. 6 and 7. See also Roosevelt Papers, FDR – Private Secretary Files, Japan, 1937-1938, undated memo, 1937, by Brig. General Charles Burnett, Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs, `Japanese Penetration of the Philippine Islands`.

⁹⁷ Hornbeck Papers, Box 456: Chronological Day File, Folder: March-May 1937, note from Hornbeck to Hull, April 12, 1937; tentative draft by Hornbeck and Hamilton, April 14, 1937; confidential note from Hornbeck to Hull, May 4, 1937.

⁹⁸ For detailed discussions of the handling of President Quezon while he was in Washington see various files in FO 371/20651. Colonel Hodsoll continued to have a role in this affair, keeping the British informed of Quezon's and American positions while he was in Washington with Quezon, see, FO 371/20650/1699/20/45, report from Hodsoll to Mallett (Washington Embassy), February 23rd, 1937.

⁹⁹ CAB 2/6, Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes of Meetings, MAY 1936 TO OCT.1937, 294th Meeting, June 17, 1937, Papers 1321 and 1331.

¹⁰⁰ CAB 4/26, Papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Secret Paper 1321-B, 'The Future Status and Security of the Philippine Islands', April 14, 1937.

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid. CAB 4/26, CID Papers, Secret Paper 1331B, Annex II, Confidential despatch from Eden to Lindsay, April 16, 1937.

¹⁰⁴ CAB 4/26, CID Papers, Secret Paper 1331B, Annex II, Confidential despatch from Eden to Lindsay, April 16, 1937.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. CAB 53/30, Papers of Chiefs' of Staff (COS) Sub-Committee, TNA, Kew, London, Papers 541-570: Secret Paper 553 (JP), 'Review of Imperial Defence, Report by the Joint Planning Sub-committee', January 26, 1937; Secret Paper 560, 'Imperial Conference, 1937. Review of Imperial Defence', February 22, 1937; Secret Paper 561, 'Review of Imperial Defence Prepared for the Imperial Conference, 1937. Not by the Secretary covering extracts from draft minutes of CID/288th Meeting', February 11, 1937.

¹⁰⁷ CAB 4/26, CID Papers, Secret Paper 1331B, Annex II, Confidential despatch from Eden to Lindsay, April 16, 1937.

¹⁰⁸ CAB 53/31, Chiefs' of Staff Papers, TNA, Kew, London, Secret Paper 580, 'The Future Status and Security of the Philippine Islands, Strategical issues Involved', May 14, 1937.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² FO 371/22180/71/71/23, FO telegram to Craigie, January 3, 1938; FRUS, Vol.III, Far East, 1938, record of conversation between Hull and Lindsay, January 20, 1938.

¹¹³ Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Varieties of Assurance" *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.35, No.3, June 2012, pp.375-399.

¹¹⁴ CAB 4/26, Secret Paper 1331B, Annex III, despatch from Eden to Lindsay, May 4, 1937; FO 371/22800/A3880/27/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, notes by Lindsay on Anglo-American relations in preparation for royal visit, May 23, 1939.

¹¹⁵ Greg Kennedy, "The Keelung Incident and Britain's Far Eastern Strategic Foreign Policy, 1936-37", in Kennedy and Neilson eds., *Incidents and International Relations*, pp.135-158; Antony Best, "The Road to Anglo-Japanese Confrontation, 1931-41", in Ian Nish and Ypichi Kibata eds., *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000*, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan), 2000, pp.26-50; Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance*, pp.133-35; Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, pp.32-55.

¹¹⁶ FO 371/22801/2330/63/45, Hodson to Thompson, February 27, 1939, and associated minutes, March 27, 1939; FRUS, 'The Far East', Vol.III, 1939, memo by John Carter Vincent of Department of Far Eastern Affairs to Hornbeck, January 20, 1939, pp.483-485; FO 371/23569/11851/1236/23, Command Paper 81(39), November 13, 1939; Kennedy, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations*, pp/262-268.

¹¹⁷ FO 371/22815/5899/98/45, record of conversation between Lothian and FDR, August 30, 1939.

¹¹⁸ On the issue of boundaries and balances in international history see, Joseph A. Maiolo, "Systems and Boundaries in International History", *The International History Review*, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2016.1217554, August 25, 2016.

¹¹⁹ Greg Kennedy, 'Symbol of Empire: Singapore and Anglo-American Strategic Relations in the Far East, 1924-1941', Brian P. Farrell and Sandy Hunter (eds.), *A Great Betrayal? The Fall of Singapore Revisited*, (Singapore, Marshall Cavendish International), 2010, pp.32-52; idem, "What Worth the

Americans: Britain's Strategic Policy Making Elite's View of the US as a Far Eastern Maritime Power, 1930-1941" in Kennedy ed., *Britain's Naval Strategy East of Suez*, pp.90-117.