What Bill Slim Did Next: The Re-Opening of the Imperial Defence College

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This year marks the 70th anniversary of the reopening of the Imperial Defence College (IDC), today the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS). The recognition of this, and the 90th anniversary of the college’s establishment that will follow next year, comes at a period when the discussion that was central to the first post-war course in April 1946 has never been more acute. After the end of the Second World War there were great doubts about what the future held for Britain. The wartime Lend-Lease deal (signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt on 11 March 1941), had allow the US to transfer arms and military equipment to Britain without payment. This was cancelled in September 1945 and more than $4 billion of loans and credit was needed from the US and Canada to fill the wartime gap in Britain’s parlous finances. Even with this the country’s national debt would soon stand at about 250 per cent of GDP and, despite its only recent military triumph, its global position appeared much weakened.¹ As one of the leading historians of the period has argued, nonetheless there was a bullish outlook and across ‘the whole spectrum of party opinion, British leaders had no doubt that Britain must uphold its status as the third great power’.² At the same time as building on the links that had now been forged with the US, it was believed that this could best be achieved through reinforcing the traditional relationship with what was now termed as the British Commonwealth. Even though this was already showing signs of itself going through a period of significant change, with Europe viewed ‘as a zone of economic and political weakness’, it was this which was viewed as being essential in helping demonstrate that Britain was both the hub of a significant international network and still remained a significant global actor.

The debate about this strategy that began in the immediate post-war period at Seaford House, the home of the modern-day college, has continued ever since and without any sign of conclusion. It has followed closely the ever-expanding body of research and thought that has developed over the intervening years to supplement the literature that dates back to the earliest days of the establishment of the British Commonwealth. Presenting evidence to an ad hoc House of Lords committee appointed in May 2013 to examine this subject, the distinguished former diplomat Lord Hannay of Chiswick offered the neat summary that ‘Britain’s international influence has fluctuated quite widely in the past hundred years as have the relative contributions to it of Britain’s hard and soft power’.³ This has become a key theme to understanding the national position, the clear distinctions that have grown between an ability to exercise these two forms of power and how this allows states to influence global events. It was probably a reasonable conclusion made last year by

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the writers of the Strategic Defence and Security Review when it was claimed with some confidence that Britain had become ‘the world’s leading soft power’.4

Recent events, however, have brought this assertion into question. Added to the swirling pattern of unpredictable and expansive global insecurity – ranging across the traditional and more non-traditional challenges – which has emerged over recent years has been the momentous outcome of the UK’s referendum held in June 2016 to determine the future of its membership of the EU and the publication of the long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Report) which has provided a series of important conclusions about the nation’s role in the 2003 Iraq War. These have brought into question the validity of the SDSR’s claims and there are clear parallels to the uncertainty that existed seventy years ago. Once again the college’s students find themselves trying to anticipate what this will all mean for Britain and its future.

The re-establishment of the IDC in 1945 was by no means guaranteed despite the proposal having a number of key supporters such were the financial constraints facing the country. The college had been originally created to support the professional development of senior military officers and civil servants and it was argued that it had helped bring these two sides of the civil-military war effort together.5 General Sir Alan Brooke, Britain’s senior military officer and himself a graduate of the college, was amongst those who praised the ‘inestimable service’ it had played pre-war in helping develop ‘inter-service thought and co-operation’; he, in fact, led the drive to re-open it which followed Japan’s eventual surrender.6 He was backed by the prime minister, Clement Attlee, who was also Minister for Defence, retaining the twin role which had been established by his predecessor Winston Churchill, when he gave his formal approval on 20 September 1945 that the IDC should be re-opened preparations began at once and in the weeks that followed the extent of his enthusiasm was made abundantly clear.7

[NB new paragraph] The process had begun with a report prepared for the chiefs of staff which set out how the college had been organised pre-war along with a series of recommendations that might be considered for changes.8 On the final uncompleted course which had begun in 1939 there had been thirty-six students, six each from the three services plus one territorial officer, six civil servants, three attendees from India and two each from Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. Other than removing the territorial officer, which allowed one more regular officer to be added, the only other recommendation was that there needed to be a general increase in the seniority of the students, and the total course strength ‘should ultimately be doubled’. There was also a note that the commandant and his directing staff be appointed as soon as possible so that
studies could commence once again in January 1946 although March was tacitly accepted as being the earliest realistic date for opening due to the amount of preparations that needed to be done.

Attlee endorsed another of Brooke’s key recommendations, that the next commandant needed to be a more senior figure with ‘requisite experience and prestige’ and the committee favoured a ‘successful Army commander’. The officer selected for the position was General William Slim, acclaimed today for his leadership of the Fourteenth Army during the victorious campaign it fought in Burma, although at the time the role he had played was not widely known amongst the British public. Having been commissioned in The Royal Warwickshire Regiment, he first saw active service in the First World War at Gallipoli and by the conflict’s end had served in France and Mesopotamia, been wounded twice and won the Military Cross. In 1919 Slim transferred to the Indian Army and much of the inter-war period saw him involved in military education, initially as a student at the Staff College, Quetta, then later as a member of the Directing Staff at the Staff College, Camberley and, finally, once more as a student, at the IDC. By March 1942 he had been appointed as the commander of First Burma Corps, and his own memoirs – which remain a standard text for those studying at Staff Colleges around the world - offer the best account of what followed through to the conclusion of an extraordinary campaign in which his leadership was decisive.

There were, however, some tensions surrounding his final months in Burma when an ill-considered attempt had been made to remove him from command. Despite having enjoyed his previous time as a student at the IDC, Slim apparently determined that he would refuse the summons to return to London to now become its commandant. Only the insistence of his friend Louis Mountbatten persuaded him to change his mind and Attlee was able to announce the appointment during the first week of December.

On Christmas Day 1945, the ship carrying Slim back from India docked at Liverpool. The prime minister had made prominent reference in his announcement to the prestige and ‘great powers or organisation and exposition’ that the new IDC Commandant brought to the role. By the time he arrived in London a few days later, many of the key arrangements had already been confirmed. He was responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Ministry of Defence but the college continued to be administered by the Admiralty (it had originally been formed as a naval establishment) which provided the clerical and other staff, while the cost of running it was shared in agreed proportions between the various military Services, the Dominions and India. Initially it had been hoped that the first course would, once again, last for a year but it had by this stage been reluctantly accepted that it would have to be shorter beginning in April and ending in
December. The proposed syllabus was largely completed, a mix of lectures, discussions and conferences on the higher executive direction of war, both strategic and administrative in nature and character, working towards an essentially un-changed charter of ‘The training of a body of officers and civilian officials in the broadest aspects of Imperial strategy’.

The first course was also limited in terms of numbers, just thirty students as opposed to the anticipated figure of seventy who would attend the next one. There were six officers from both the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, seven from the Army, three from the Indian Army, two Canadians, one each from its army and air force, and the same from Australia, along with a single New Zealander. Thirty-nine places were initially made available and the glaring absence was civil servants who it was concluded ‘were too busy organising the peace’, even though in their initial discussions the chiefs of staff had placed considerable importance on their being some non-military representation, and Slim regretted the loss of these six students. There were also no South Africans, as the country’s leader, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, confirmed early on that he was not able to send any military attendees ‘due to depletion of permanent force suitable officers’. Until the very last minute efforts were made to persuade him to release Major-General Evered Poole, one of his senior Army officers still then serving in the Mediterranean, and even a direct intervention from Brooke proved unsuccessful although Smuts promised him that this was only a temporary absence.

One major difference in the first course that followed the war’s end, and which reflected the major strategic shift that had taken place and the changed nature of the international system, was that three American students, one from each service, were now invited to attend. Shortly before his retirement, the chief of the air staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal had made this proposal as part of wider plans for post-war exchanges with British and Commonwealth officers at training schools and establishments. As a result Field Marshal ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, the senior British military official in Washington, was contacted by the Chiefs of Staff committee for his views and his quick response was to ask for confirmation of the number of places that were being offered along with a copy of the original charter. Wilson was not a graduate of the college, and despite having initially written that there was no suggestion of pandering ‘to American susceptibilities’, he also took the opportunity to suggest that the committee might consider changing its name to the ‘Higher Defence College’ or the ‘Commonwealth Defence College’. It was confirmed in reply that some thought had been given to this but it had been decided that it should remain the Imperial Defence College. As a sign of just how important this particular aspect of the reopening was considered, it was,
however, made clear that this could be reconsidered. As it was, Wilson was able to inform his colleagues in London that agreement had been reached and the Americans would join the course.

With only a few months to the anticipated start date of 2 April 1946, the key job for the new Commandant became identifying and confirming suitable premises for the college. This had to be near the Service Ministries and have access to the extensive libraries held in other government departments. The initial chiefs of staff report had hoped it might be possible to continue to use the previous site, 9 Buckingham Gate opposite Buckingham Palace, but the proposal that the course would double in size as quickly as possible meant the former site was impractical in the longer term. It was anticipated that a much larger space would be needed, fifteen thousand square feet of space to accommodate one hundred people, as well as seminar and lecture rooms and possibly even a cinema. Montagu House, then housing the Ministry of Food, was identified as requiring little in the way of alterations and being suitably dignified and quiet, something which was not thought to have been the case with Buckingham Gate. An approach to the ministry for its potential use was, however, rejected and the only possible alternative, a return to the former buildings, albeit with the potential addition of the next door property at 8 Buckingham Gate, was now viewed very firmly as being unacceptable.

Slim therefore set out personally to examine other possible options including an American heiress’ mansion in Regent’s Park, which was inspected but rejected as being too remote, and the German Embassy in Carlton Terrace which was initially thought to have some potential but was then also removed from consideration. More appealing was Seaforde House, a large property located in Belgrave Square which had been leased at the beginning of the century from the Duke of Westminster’s estate by Tommy Scott-Ellis, 8th Baron Howard de Walden. At the war’s start it had been used by Red Cross workers to prepare medical supplies for hospitals before being formally requisitioned on 13 June 1940 to become home to the Assistance Board which acted as agents for the Ministry of Pensions and dealt with temporary injury allowances granted mainly for people evacuated under Government schemes. As the Blitz got underway, in October the square was bombed and, although the damage to the property was not great, its temporary occupants were evacuated and the building derequisitioned. It remained empty for nearly eighteen months but was again pressed into service in March 1943 as reserve office accommodation for the Air Ministry. With the war’s end, France was looking for a new site for its embassy and negotiations had already begun about using Seaforde House. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, intervened to halt these and by January 1946 it had been agreed the buildings would instead become the IDC’s new home. There was little funding available to equip the new college and Slim agreed that he would initially
ask only for the minimum amount of structural alterations. A canteen was, however, deemed vital and this would be needed before the end of March along with chairs, tables, plates, crockery and cutlery. Additional furniture for lecture rooms and the ante-rooms was also required and the Commandant did insist that this should be of a suitable kind, such as was found in Commanders-in-Chief’s houses.

By this stage, early February 1946, Slim had already found that, despite the promises he had received, progress was not being achieved at the pace required and he was still largely operating from Buckingham Gate with only two rooms on the ground floor of Seaford House having been made available. This led him to set 1 March as a deadline for being given full occupancy of the new building after which date the commandant warned that it would not be possible for the course to start on time. The Air Ministry now promised that five more rooms would be available by the following week and they would clear out ‘lock, stock and barrel’ over the weekend of 10/11 March. Perhaps mindful of Slim’s threat that the course might not be able to begin, this agreement was kept allowing the new occupants finally to move in and begin some frantic preparations to receive the students who were to arrive just three weeks later. Joining Slim were his four ‘Senior Directing Staff’: Rear-Admiral Guy Russell, who had been with him on the 1937 course, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd, who had served in Bomber Command and was due to have led the Heavy Bomber Force operating against Japan, Major-General John Whiteley, who had served under General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean and on the Joint Planning Staff, and Thomas Chegwidden, a 50 year-old under-secretary in the Board of Trade who had served throughout the war in supply related roles and was appointed as a civilian instructor. Supporting the senior staff were another group of five military officers who were termed as the ‘Junior Directing Staff’.

The commandant gave the opening address on the morning of Tuesday 2 April and began by telling the audience that he hoped their time at Seaford House would be both ‘profitable’ and ‘pleasant’. In explaining the college’s purpose, he referred to it as being intended to produce officers capable of holding ‘the highest commands or staff appointments in both peace and war’. He pointed to four qualities which he thought were required for those attending, namely ability, experience, knowledge and leadership, and these would be a focus throughout the course. The students were also told that they would learn much more from each other than from the staff or the lecturers and the network they now established would serve them well later.

The purpose of dividing the course into specific periods of study, with emphasis being given to global affairs and developments in politics, economics and warfare, was to give them ‘something
concrete’ to develop their thoughts and prevent them from ‘becoming too academic’. The college was thinking about hypothetical situations five or ten years ahead and it was not assumed that these would result in accurate forecasts for, as he put it, ‘do not think we propound solutions to future situations here, we don’t’. The IDC’s remit was instead to provide opportunities to practice how they would tackle high level defence problems. Much of what was discussed was secret and Slim asked that it not be discussed outside the college or with anybody who was not on the course. He also welcomed the Americans, noting they were the first non-Empire students to attend, but asked that no publicity be given to their presence as this had been a stipulation set by the American authorities. It was also confirmed that there would be no civilians on the course as none could be spared. With this presentation completed the students departed to be issued with a form of identification, a general information leaflet, the programme for the first week and a brief version for the entire course, standing orders, secrecy instructions, the officers’ mess rules, a list of attendees and a copy of the recently confirmed charter of the United Nations. They were also informed that smoking was not allowed in the building before or during lectures but was permitted during the discussion periods that followed.

This initial short course was arranged into two sessions, the first running from April to the beginning of August and the second from September to early December. It began with a review of global political challenges and likely developments, and discussions about the vital interests of the British Commonwealth and Empire and the nature of future war. In May it moved on to consider Commonwealth Economics with the summer spent reviewing in turn Middle East security, the Commonwealth Defence Organisation, the United Nations Organisation and the specific interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and China. There were a total of seventy-two lectures during the first session with an impressive range of distinguished diplomats, politicians and military officers giving presentations to the course. Directly following on from Slim’s opening address to the college, and just a week before his appointment was due to come to an end, John G Winant, the US Ambassador in London, spoke on the ‘United States interests in relation to World Affairs’. On 6 June, two years to the day since the Allied invasion of Europe had begun, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery came to talk on the theme of ‘Command in Western Europe’. The week after, Louis Mountbatten and Lord Tedder followed with accounts of their wartime experiences in South-East Asia and the Middle East. There was also a lecture on 18 June from the recently created Field Marshal Alan Brooke, 1st Baron Alanbrooke, on ‘Command and Organisation in War’ in which he was noted as having said that relations between soldiers and politicians were difficult, ‘more training was required’ and politicians should be sent to the IDC before the week ended with a keynote presentation from the prime minister. The seniority of the speakers was entirely in
keeping with Slim’s ambition to highlight the college’s significance as a focal point for developing ideas and understanding.

As had been the case with the pre-war courses, the key method of learning involved a series of what were termed ‘Schemes and Appreciations’ and these were tackled by syndicate groups, six in total the composition of which were regularly changed. The rationale for this approach was that it encouraged ‘tolerance of the other’s point of view, and gives the students an insight into the working of each other’s minds, which may be invaluable later on when many of them may come together again to deal with the problems of real-life’. The first of these syndicate exercises required those involved to act as joint planning committees and prepare papers for submission to the chiefs of staff setting out the vital political, economic, social, military and scientific interests of the British Commonwealth. This led to a more expansive review as, with the title ‘Get Underneath the Other Chap’s Hat’, they were next required to examine the interests and objectives of China, France, the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-war world. There was some latitude in terms of how these studies developed; another one of those delivered during the first term was titled ‘Commonwealth Economics’ but it developed into a detailed study of whether or not Britain could afford to keep its Armed Forces in their present form. Three main points emerged: the UN was seen as being important as, the more it could be relied upon, ‘the less we need to rely on our own strength’; the best future plan was for a combination of training cadres, a small regular force and conscription; and finally, as it would never be possible to maintain adequate forces adequate for complete security, it was concluded that there was a need to switch to ‘small forces of a different kind (e.g. Atomic)’.

After another month of further high profile presentations, in August the course paused for a short period of summer leave during which the students also travelled to Germany. There had already been visits to a number of military establishments along with the Port of London, and railway and industrial centres, but Slim was also keen that there should be the opportunity to undertake overseas visits. The proposal was rejected, apparently on the basis of the difficulties involved in finding transport at a time when this was in short supply, and the financial implications. The commandant persisted and eventually it was agreed that a specially provided aircraft would transport the men, split into three groups, for ‘invaluable’ seven-day visits which began in Berlin before moving to the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) Headquarters in Bad Oeynhausen, from where they also travelled to Hanover and Hamburg.
When the course resumed for its second term, it began with a review of how sanctions were to be applied by the United Nations before beginning a study of what was termed ‘the Indian problem’. This left October for general work on what ‘a major war’ would entail, before a final phase which looked at “the Commonwealth Security Plan”. There were a further fifty-one lectures during this session and more very senior speakers. Perhaps the most impressive package began on 9 October with Earl Halifax, who had overseen the committee which confirmed the College’s establishment back in 1923, and, most recently had been the British Ambassador in Washington. He gave a presentation titled ‘Anglo-US Relations’ and the next day was followed by Dwight D Eisenhower (soon to be chief of staff to the US Army) who gave another keynote address to the students on the same theme. By the time Slim stood on the stage at Seaford House on Friday 13 December to deliver his closing address, the first post-war course had listened to 123 lectures and tackled thirteen complex study problems. One of those who heard this, now unfortunately untraceable, final address concluded that his time at the college had provided him with ‘a crucial introduction to the mysteries of higher command’, sentiments that seem to have been shared widely amongst those who were in the audience.

One of Slim’s many biographers has described the first course as ‘an extended post-mortem of the war, a study of the lessons learned and an examination of how those lessons could be applied to future conflicts’. It was, of course, more than just that as the re-establishment of the IDC presented an important opportunity to affirm Britain’s position and seniority within the radically changed international system. The commandant was central to this process and the time he spent at Seaford House proved a crucial period in establishing how the college developed a broader understanding of the post-war international system. In July 1946 he received confirmation that it had been decided to maintain the pre-war policy and his appointment would only be for two years and he stepped down the following year passing the role to Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor. Since Slim’s departure, the college he helped revitalise has become viewed globally as a benchmark against which the delivery of senior level professional military education is compared. It has continued to expand and currently around fifty nations each year send Members to attend the annual course at what is now the RCDS, the senior college of the UK’s Defence Academy. Military officers and senior civil servants are joined by representatives from industry and Parliamentarians, the latter attending as part of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Trust programme. It has at the same time sought to make a significant contribution to how the role of strategy and the strategic level of activity is understood within the British military and across Whitehall. The college’s key ethos - the need for “joined-up” thinking to address the ever more daunting challenges to stability, security and prosperity that face the modern world – is unchanged and the vital legacy that was set in motion by
the first post-war Commandant remains intact. In this period of renewed uncertainty its utility and value would appear to be just as important as when Bill Slim sat down to tackle his next big job.

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1 It was not until December 2006 that the final re-payment was made to the United States and Canada which, in 1946, had also provided financial support. Philip Thornton, ‘Britain pays off final instalment of US loan - after 61 years’, *The Independent* (London), 29 December 2006; Finlo Rohrer, ‘What’s a little debt between friends?’, *BBC News Magazine*, 10 May 2006.

2 John Darwin, ‘Britain, the Commonwealth and the End of Empire’, *BBC (History)*, 3 March 2011, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/endofempire_overview_01.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/endofempire_overview_01.shtml) [accessed, 4 June 2016].


6 ‘Re-Opening of the Imperial Defence College’, (extract from minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee), No.245, 9 October 1945, 11 October 1945, ADM1/20122, TNA.

7 Minute by Attlee, 20 September 1945, CAB120/8, TNA; ibid., ‘Re-Opening of Imperial Defence College’, COS(45) 245, 9 October 1945, CAB79/40.

8 ‘Re-Opening of Imperial Defence College’, COS(45) 210, 12 September 1945, CAB80/50, TNA. This was produced by the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Weapons), Rear Admiral Robert Oliver, with the concurrence of the Director of Military Training and the Director of Operational Training.

9 Ibid; ‘Re-Opening of the Imperial Defence College’, (extract from minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee), No.245, 11 October 1945, ADM1/20122, TNA.


14 ‘The Imperial Defence College’, May 1946, Captain Godfrey French Papers, GDFR 2/8, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge (hereafter ‘CAC’).

15 ‘Re-Opening of Imperial Defence College’, COS(45) 210, 12 September 1945, CAB80/50, TNA.

16 Handwritten note by Captain French, n.d., GDFR2/8, CAC; Sir Edward Bridges to Sir John Stephenson, 1 November 1945, DO35/1651, TNA.


18 Slim to Viscount Addison (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs), 18 February 1946, DO35/1651, TNA; ibid., Telegram from High Commissioner (South Africa) to Dominions Office, 6 April 1946.

19 ‘Re-Opening of the Imperial Defence College’, (extract from minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee), No.245, 9 October 1945, 11 October 1945, ADM1/20122, TNA.


21 Cabinet Offices to J.S.M. Washington, 17 October 1945, CAB120/8, TNA.

22 ‘Re-Opening of the Imperial Defence College’, (extract from minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee), No.245, 9 October 1945, 11 October 1945, ADM1/20122, TNA.

23 Attlee to Ismay, 25 November 1945, ADM1/17900, TNA; ibid., A.V. Alexander to Viscount Stansgate, 7 December 1945.

24 ‘Extract from COS(45) 286th Meeting held on Wednesday 19 December 1945 at 11am’, AIR20/3188, TNA.

28 Ibid.
29 Slim to Major-General Sir Leslie Hollis, 9 February 1946, RCDS.
30 Ibid., ‘Notes for Meeting 14th of February, 1946’, n.d.
31 Ibid., J.H. Barnes to Slim, 14 February 1946
32 Chief of Air Staff (Portal) to Prime Minister, 24 October 1945, CAB120/8, TNA; ibid., ‘Extract from COS(45) 237th Meeting held at 11am on Friday 28th September 1945’, AIR20/3188. There is some suggestion that Whiteley had been proposed as the Commandant but this was rejected. The first choice as RAF Instructor had been Air-Vice Marshal W. Elliot but it was decided it would be difficult to release him from his role in the Ministry of Supply and Aircraft Production.
33 Minute by Head of C.E. 1, 27 February 1946, ADM1/20122, TNA; ibid., Sir Henry Wilson Smith (Treasury) to Sir Henry Markham, 28 February 1946.
34 ‘Imperial Defence College (1946 Course) – Programmes and Lectures’, n.d., GDFR 2/8, CAC; W.J. Slim, ‘Opening Address’, April 1946, RCDS
35 ‘Imperial Defence College (1946 Course)’, n.d., Air Vice-Marshy Sydney Button Papers, BUFT 1/32, CAC. With the exception of the charter, much the same is distributed today in the form of the so-called ‘Green Book’ which is issued on the first day of the course.
36 ‘The Imperial Defence College’, May 1946, GDFR 2/8, CAC.
37 Ibid., ‘Imperial Defence College (1946 Course) – Programmes and Lectures’, n.d.
38 ‘Field Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke - Command and Organisation in War’, handwritten notes, 18 June 1946, BUFT 1/37, CAC.
40 ‘Imperial Defence College (1946 Course) – Problem 1’, n.d., GDFR 2/8, CAC.
41 Ibid., ‘Get Underneath the Other Chap’s Hat’, n.d., Syndicate IV.
43 Letter from the Commandant, Imperial Defence College to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 May 1946, CAB80/54, TNA.
45 ‘Imperial Defence College (1946 Course) – Programmes and Lectures’, n.d., GDFR 2/8, CAC.
48 Ismay to Attlee, 14 July 1946, CAB120/8, TNA; ‘Imperial Defence College – Sir John Slessor to be Commandant’, *The Times* (London), 3 September 1947.