Martin Heidegger: Freedom, Ethics, Ontology

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There are three obstacles to any discussion of the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and ethics. First, Heidegger’s views and preoccupations alter considerably over the course of his work. There is no consensus over the exact degree of change or continuity, but it is clear that a number of these shifts, for example over the status of human agency, have considerable ethical implications. Second, Heidegger rarely engages directly with the familiar ethical or moral debates of the philosophical canon. For example, both Sein und Zeit (SZ) and the works that would have completed its missing third Division, works such as his monograph on Kant (Ga3), and the 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Ga24), place enormous emphasis on the flaws present in earlier metaphysics or philosophies of language or of the self. But there is no discussion of what one might think of as staple ethical questions: for example, the choice between rationalist or empiricist meta-ethics, or between consequentialist or deontological theories. The fundamental reason for this is Heidegger’s belief that his own concerns are explanatorily prior to such debates (Ga26:236–7). By extension, he regards the key works of ethical and moral philosophy as either of secondary importance, or as not really about ethics or morals at all: for example, Ga24, when discussing Kant, states bluntly that “‘Metaphysics of Morals’ means the ontology of human existence” (Ga24:195). Essentially his view is that, before one can address ethics, construed as the question of how we ought to live, one needs to get clear on ontology, on the question of what we are. However, as I will show, the relationship between Heideggerian ontology and ethics is more complex than that simple gloss suggests. Third, the very phrase “Heidegger’s ethics” raises a twofold problem in a way that does not similarly occur with any other figure in this volume. The reason for this is his links, personal and institutional, to both National Socialism and to anti-Semitism. The recent publication of the Schwarze Hefte exemplifies this issue: these notebooks interweave rambling metaphysical ruminations with a clearly anti-Semitic rhetoric no less repulsive for the fact that it avoids the biological racism of the Nazis (see, for example, Ga95:299-300, 381-2; Ga96:243). In this short chapter, I will take what will doubtless be a controversial approach to this third issue. It seems to me unsurprising, although no less disgusting for that, that Heidegger himself was anti-Semitic, or that he shared many of the anti-modernist prejudices often found with such
anti-Semitism among his demographic group. The interesting question is rather: what are the connections between his philosophy and such views? To what degree do aspects of his work support them or perhaps, most extremely, even follow from them? Yet to answer this question, one needs to begin by understanding what exactly his philosophical commitments were, specifically his ‘ethical’ commitments. The purpose of this chapter is address that question.

As the citations for the Schwarze Hefte indicate, Heidegger left behind an enormous quantity of work. The Gesamtausgabe currently runs to one hundred and two volumes: all of these are complex texts, and many are extremely lengthy. For that reason, what I provide here is, at best, a snapshot of some of the key issues, arguments, and assumptions underlying this dimension of Heidegger’s thought.

**Authenticity and Existentialism**

SZ, often regarded as Heidegger’s masterpiece, is a complex fusion of Kantian, existentialist, theological and Aristotelian themes. In the current context, the place to start is with the second half of the text, where Heidegger presents two distinct pictures of “Dasein”, a term we can take, at least provisionally, as referring to human beings as he conceives them.¹

On the one hand, Dasein is typically “inauthentic” [*uneigentlich*] and dominated by “*das Man*”: I translate this as “the one”, to be read as in phrases such as “one does not do that”. The basic idea is that Dasein is particularly vulnerable to simply taking over as “quasi-natural ‘givens’” the assumptions, practices, and ideals of the society in which it is socialised (SZ:115).² Heidegger sees this tendency as an inevitable side effect of the necessary process of sustaining a common “world”, a world which provides the context for any action (SZ:129,299). However, to succumb to it, to live inauthentically, is to fail in several senses: (i) Epistemically: ‘the one’ is unconsciously oriented towards evaluating and performing acts in terms of their social salience. This can include appearing socially appropriate, solidifying one’s self-identity, or taking a predictably rebellious stance on existing mores (SZ:174-5). As Heidegger sees it, these all contrast with discourse and action motivated by and oriented around a genuine engagement with the truth of a particular topic (SZ:168-9). (ii) Normatively: by tacitly deferring to an existing social framework, Dasein fails to take

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¹ There are passages in which Heidegger introduces a third “undifferentiated” mode (for example, SZ:53,232): unfortunately, space prohibits treatment of this here (see Golob 2014:214-224 for discussion).
² Crowell 2007:326.
responsibility for itself. Heidegger here replays a classic Enlightenment theme: there is a strong temptation to exist in a tranquilized unquestioning state, in which the individual need never take personal responsibility for the principles that underlie her life (SZ:126-7,175,322).

(iii) Ontologically: insofar as Dasein fails to recognise the historical contingency of any particular set of social norms and practices it fails to recognise its own nature as “thrown” (SZ:144).

On the other hand, Heidegger presents what is clearly his preferred alternative: authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. Authentic agents, like all Dasein, operate against the backdrop of a common social world (SZ:299). However, they are distinctive in that they live in a manner which recognises the fundamental facts about their own being, in particular their finitude: for example, they recognise both the contingency of social norms and the absence of any transcendental alternative (SZ:391). As Carman neatly puts, all value is understood as “worldly through and through, embedded in the contingencies of historical tradition and social life”. To frame the point in Kantian terms, the authentic agent is aware that there are no categorical imperatives to be found either in the precepts and practices of particular societies, or in some set of a priori facts about the self. According to Heidegger this realisation is both prompted and dramatized by moods such as anxiety in which Dasein experiences the world as a whole as lacking any normative significance: to continue the Kantian analogy, it is exposed simply as a chain of hypothetical imperatives which can thus be simultaneously suspended (SZ:187-8,343). One sees here Heidegger’s use of paradigmatically existentialist themes, such as the ‘limit experiences’ of alienation, anxiety and death, to advance what are essentially claims about normativity.

From an ethical perspective, these remarks raise several questions, which I will take in turn.

First, is authenticity an ethical ideal? One striking point is that Heidegger presents authenticity as the single universal “demand” [Zumutung] on Dasein (Ga29/30:246–8). The sketch above thus needs an immediate modification: the sole obligation binding merely on Dasein qua Dasein is to recognise the absence of any other such obligations. This is an ethical demand in at least a broad sense: it identifies a privileged way of life such that we would be obliged to give up certain other projects or practices if they were found to conflict

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4 As I see it, “death” in SZ refers similarly not to a biological event, but to a distinctive fact about the normative space within which Dasein operates: see Golob 2014:223-4. For an overview of the debate see Thomson 2013.
with it (for example, because they were likely to bring Dasein under the influence of ‘the one’). I thus agree with Braver when he talks of “an ethical dimension” to authenticity’s “existential imperative”. However, the second order nature of authenticity - it is effectively an awareness of the limits and topology of the space of reasons - means that it is hard to see how it itself could enjoin or forbid any very specific first order course of action (one could, for example, presumably be an authentic torturer). Heidegger clearly further believes that agents who are authentic will thereby possess a distinctive capacity for phronetic choice, for immediately discerning, in a quasi-perceptual manner, what needs to be done given the complex contours of each specific situation (SZ:264,384; Ga19:163–4;Ga24:407–8). But it is not obvious why this should be. An awareness of supposedly meta-normative facts about the contingency of social practices is neither necessary nor sufficient for making good decisions in any plausible sense of good. It is not necessary because there may be situations where an agent’s unwillingness to reflect on and question certain beliefs is precisely what allows them to endure intense physical or social pressure, and yet nevertheless take the right course. It is not sufficient as Heidegger’s own political choices make clear. Dreyfus suggest an interesting reading when he notes, drawing on SZ: 391, that authentic agents, since they do not unreservedly identify with any practice, are more able to let unsuccessful projects go.6

Undoubtedly, a willingness to cut one’s losses is a useful thing. But we still lack any explanation as to why authentic agents would be not just more ready to do this but, crucially, ready to do it at the right time. In sum, it seems plausible that Heidegger himself regarded authenticity as an ethical ideal in at least a broad sense.7 It is also true that he took this ideal to have implications for an agent’s ability to act appropriately at the first order; but his argument for that is unconvincing.

The second issue is why Heidegger takes authenticity to be such a desirable goal: crudely, what reason do I have to be authentic? One answer would be to cite the supposed benefits of authenticity with respect to first order decisions. But, as noted, that seems the weakest part of Heidegger’s position. Heidegger himself tends to present the issue in perfectionist terms. Authentic Dasein fully realises its own essence: it “becomes ‘essentially’ Dasein in that authentic existence” (SZ:323). Elsewhere, he talks in terms of the full realisation or liberation of Dasein. The one unavoidable demand on us is:

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5 Braver 2014:24.
7 For a defence of this in relation to the existing secondary literature, see Golob 2014:241-5.
To liberate the humanity in man, i.e. the essence of man, to let the Dasein in him become essential. (Ga29/30:246–8, cf.254-5; original emphasis)

As with anxiety, Heidegger again appeals to specific experiential states in support of this view. For example, the “call of conscience” is analysed not as a warning against any specific misdeeds, but rather as a disturbing awareness of Dasein’s true nature, a call from itself to itself, making visible the fact that Dasein is not “at home” in the world, that none of the projects which it pursues have any necessary connection to it (SZ:187-8,273-276). One distinctive feature of Heidegger’s work, though, is that perfectionism is not the endpoint of his argument. He often suggests that such perfectionism is important precisely because it makes possible a further activity: namely philosophy. The suggestion is that only insofar as the philosopher herself is authentic will she understand Dasein well enough to “coin the appropriate existential concepts” (SZ:316, 178; Ga26:22). The result is a vision of philosophy as fundamentally bound up with a personal revelation and commitment:

What philosophy deals with only manifests itself at all within and from out of a transformation of human Dasein. (Ga29/30:423)

This move may appear puzzling: why support the perfectionist demand for a full realisation of one’s own essence by arguing that it is necessary for philosophy, an activity participated in by only a handful of the population? The answer is that Heidegger views all human action as tacit philosophising: in SZ’s terms, all human action assumes an understanding of the being of entities, and philosophy simply makes such understanding explicit (SZ:324, 363; Ga25:24-26). Thus “to be a human means already to philosophise” (Ga27:3). The norm of authenticity is thus ultimately grounded in the practice of philosophy as fundamental ontology; as we will see, this tendency to reform ethical questions as ontological ones also plays a central role in Heidegger’s later writings.

**Freedom and the History of Being**

I want now to turn to a second theme, one that forms a transition point between Heidegger’s earlier and later writings: freedom. From the vantage point of SZ, Heidegger’s stance on freedom may seem a largely pessimistic one. As Han-Pile observes:
Dasein is often pictured in *Being and Time* as anything but free: it ‘ensnares itself’ (BT: 267), is ‘lost’ (BT: 264), ‘alienated’ (BT: 178) and needs to be ‘liberated’ (BT: 264, 303).\(^8\)

I introduced the possibility of liberation, understood in terms of authenticity, in §1. During the years following SZ, Heidegger frequently combines a Kantian discourse focussed on autonomy and self-responsibility with this perfectionist framework. The 1930 lecture course *The Essence of Human Freedom* (Ga31), for example, concludes that:

Practical freedom as autonomy is self-responsibility, which is the essence of the personality of the human being, the authentic essence, the humanity of man.

(Ga31:296)

During the decades after SZ, however, freedom comes to play two further, central roles in Heidegger’s thought: its importance is such that he is ultimately willing to identify it as prior even to being and time (Ga31:134).

First, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Heidegger increasingly appeals to an interplay between freedom and a capacity to act on the basis of reasons. On the one hand, it is Dasein’s freedom which initially explains its ability to take on obligations or recognise laws: freedom is thus a necessary condition on any ethics, or indeed any rationally guided activity. For example, when discussing the normativity of logic, Heidegger raises the following question:

How must that entity who is subject to such laws, Dasein itself, be constituted so as to be able to be thus governed by laws? How ‘is’ Dasein according to its essence so that such an obligation can arise? (Ga26:24)

His immediate answer is that:

Obligation and being governed by law in themselves presuppose freedom as the basis for their own possibility. Only what exists as free could be at all bound by an obligatory lawfulness. Freedom alone can be the source of obligation. (Ga26:25)

On the other hand, it is because Dasein is able to recognise and act on the basis of reasons that its behavior cannot be analysed in purely causal terms, and so is immune to the traditional arguments of hard determinism. As Heidegger sees it, Dasein necessarily experiences the world as structured in terms of norms or grounds, where “grounding something means making possible the why-question in general” (Ga9:168/64). Furthermore,

\(^8\) Han-Pile 2013:291.
any causal story about human behavior is explanatorily derivative since it is possible only in virtue of the interpretative capacities of Dasein, for example its ability to construct scientific theories (Ga31:303).

One can raise several concerns about these aspects of Heidegger’s work. It is not so much that he articulates some independently graspable notion of freedom which is then used to illuminate our capacity to recognise norms; rather, his actual practice tends simply to be to use “freedom” as another name for Dasein’s understanding of being, albeit one that stress its normative dimension (Ga34:60; Ga9:190/86; Ga54:213). Furthermore, the attempt to demonstrate the derivative status of causal explanation trades off an obvious ambiguity: the fact that our theories about causation depend upon our rational capacities clearly does not rule out the possibility that those capacities are themselves susceptible to an entirely causal explanation. One underlying problem here is that Heidegger regards any real engagement with a naturalistic determinism as illegitimate: indeed, he holds that even to define human freedom in opposition to natural causality is a mistake, “for when something is defined by distinguishing it from something else, the latter plays a determinative role in the definition” (Ga31:210).

Second, during the later 1930s and the 1940s, Heidegger starts to place particular emphasis on the limitations on human agency. This marks a key moment in the series of developments in his work known as the “turn” [Kehre], and it has exercised an enormous influence on structuralist and post-structuralist trends in French philosophy, an influence amplified by a concurrent backlash against Sartrean radical freedom. Heidegger analyses history as a series of shifting metaphysical frameworks, of different ways of conceiving being: for example, as that which is immediately and unchangingly present, that which is created by God, or that which appears as a resource for our technological manipulation of nature. Each epoch can be thought of, to borrow a Foucauldian phrase, as a historical a priori; and Heidegger at times suggests that our agency is sufficiently determined by these frameworks that we have little option but to play them out.

No human calculation or activity, in and of itself, can bring about a turn in the present world’s condition: one reason for this is the fact that the whole of man’s activity has been stamped by this world condition, and has come under its power. How then should he ever become master of it? (Ga4:195)
This comes close to a metaphysical determinism: as I will now discuss, this question of the scope of agency, of how we can or should respond to being, is central to his later discussions of technology and of thought.  

**Technology, Thinking and Thanking**

The recurrent discussions of technology in Heidegger’s post-war work are of obvious interest for anyone seeking to construct a Heideggerian ethics. Heidegger argues that modern technology is problematic in a way in which its medieval counterpart, say, was not: the hydroelectric plant over the Rhine differs in essence, rather than merely in scale and sophistication, from earlier attempts to tame and utilise the river, such as wooden bridges (Ga7:16). Underlying this claim is the belief that ‘modern technology’ is distinguished by a fundamental change in attitude, one that supposedly began with Descartes: entities are viewed as either resources for, or obstacles to, man’s manipulation of the natural world. In this sense, modern technology exemplifies a standpoint in which we “reduce everything down to man” (Ga11:43). Post-Galilean science both supports and results from this shift insofar as it supposedly identifies that which is with that which is measurable, quantifiable and controllable; Heidegger thus sees such science not primarily as a empirically warranted theory, but rather as a projection of a specific interpretative framework and set of standards which then, unsurprisingly, finds its own evidential confirmation (Ga41:92–4).

Heidegger’s writings on technology have a certain easy resonance with contemporary environmentalism which shares his disgust at a view of “the earth as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit” (Ga7:15). He also anticipates the concern that a technologized obsession with productivity will ultimately subordinate the very beings, human agents, whose wishes it supposedly serves.

The current talk about human resources...gives evidence of this. The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is ordered by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazine. (Ga7:18-9)

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*I say “comes close” due to the presence of the qualifier “in and of itself” in his remark.*
Heidegger sees these developments as linked to two deeper metaphysical trends. In one sense they constitute the “acme of the subjectivism of man” (Ga5:111). This is both because of the identification of value with human needs, and because of the links between technology and what Heidegger calls “representation” [Vorstellen] or the “world picture” [Weltbild]: essentially, a view of being as that which can be grasped, pictured, and manipulated by man (Ga5:89). The details of his position here are deeply unclear, but he often suggests that this subjectivism articulates biases in philosophy first entrenched by Plato’s appeal to ideas (Ga40:197/144; Ga40: 207/151).  

However, Heidegger nevertheless denies, for the reasons introduced in the previous section, that these changes are ultimately explicable in terms of human agency. When we make sense of the world in this way, locating it within what he calls an “enframing” [Ge-stell], it is because we are ourselves subject to the changing dynamics in the history of being, where that is understood not primarily as a story about how humanity has interpreted being, but rather as one about how being has revealed itself to us (Ga7:19). As he puts it bluntly “modern technology…is no merely human doing” (Ga7:20).

How should we assess this position from an ethical perspective? There are, I think, two related points to be made.

First, there is the issue of agency. Heidegger goes beyond a conventional historicism on which the scope for contemporary action is limited by the assumptions and practices we have taken over from earlier periods, and by the perhaps unforeseen and unintended implications of earlier actions. This is because, as he sees it, the explanatorily primary driver of historical change is not human agency at all – be it past or present – but rather shifts in the way in which being discloses itself to us. Yet there is no clear analysis of what this means, and there is an obvious danger of hypostatising being into a quasi-mystical agent, what Sheehan rightly satirised under the label “big being”. Furthermore, the minimisation of agency here may seem to entail a stark break between Heidegger and a recognisably ethical project. This is Geuss’s view, for example:

Heidegger’s own analysis does result in what he calls a demand [Forderung], a demand for a new experience of being, but this is not a moral or ethical demand … it does not result from common sense or traditional forms of philosophical thinking, it is not anything that could conceivably be in the power of any individual (or group of

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10 For discussion of this aspect of that deeply complex relationship see Golob 2014:123-135.
I think matters are more complex, though. Heidegger does indeed identify various practices as required, and it seems that there are certain actions, such as his own writing, which he conceives at least as a good means of fostering these. The privileged class of actions are effectively ways of responding to being: thinking it, giving thanks for it, and watching over it (Ga9:303/105;Ga7:32). The result, prima facie, is an ethics of a type, albeit one with a highly unusual conception of the good life. As Heidegger puts it himself, “humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanity of the human being high enough” (Ga9:330/161). This is because the true basis for our dignity is an ability to respond appropriately to being, to serve as the “shepherd of being”.

The human being is the shepherd of being. Human beings lose nothing in this “less”; rather, they gain in that they attain the truth of being. They gain the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by being itself into the preservation of being’s truth. (Ga9:342/172)

This brings me to the second point: Heidegger’s concern over technology is fundamentally different from that of modern environmentalists. For him the problem is not primarily that technological and economic practices are damaging the natural world, where “damage” is cashed in terms of pollution, loss of habitat, loss of wilderness, or species extinction. Rather, the problem is that building a hydroelectric plant on the Rhine crudely forces being in to a particular conceptual framework, the Ge-stell: as Braver comments, “pollution isn’t the problem with technology; our distorted relation to being is what we should be concerned about”. In the ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger puts the point in terms of dwelling: responding to being is the way in which we dwell in the world, and this question of dwelling is prior to either ethics or ontology (Ga9:357/188). However, it is clear that the bias is very much towards the ontological: no content is ever given to the idea of an appropriate response to being other than one which follows the contours of being itself, and thus ‘gets it right’ ontologically. In this sense, as I suggested with respect to his early work in §1, Heidegger’s philosophy ultimately remain deeply theoretical in its outlook. Since he assumes that “to exist means to philosophise” (Ga27:214), it is perhaps unsurprising that he ultimately analyses the question of how we should live in terms of a correct or incorrect

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12 Geuss 2005:59.
13 Heidegger takes his point to be supported by the fact that the German names for many of these acts are linked etymologically: for example denken (to think) and danken (to thank).
14 Braver 2014:147.
understanding of being. Indeed, one can see the ramifications of this assumption throughout his work. Consider, for example, the absurd insistence that the “Greeks are the utterly apolitical people (Ga54:142): the problem here is that he simply reduces the polis to the openness within which being appears and thus recasts it, and the debates about value that occur within it, in purely ontological terms (Ga54:133).

I have argued that Heidegger’s work, both ‘early’ and ‘late’, supports a displacement of the ethical by the ontological. I want to end with one of the consequences of this displacement. Whilst Heidegger’s anti-humanism supposedly grants us a higher “dignity” as shepherds of being, he offers no real account of what this dignity would amount to: for example, what political or market actions might it enjoin or forbid? At the level of the theory itself there is, at best, a disturbing vacuum here. In Heidegger’s own case, this vacuum was all too easily filled with the metaphysical anti-Semitism of the Schwarze Hefte.

The question of the role of world Jewry is not a racial question, but the metaphysical question about the kind of humanity that, without any restraints, can take over the uprooting of all beings from being as its world-historical ‘task’. (Ga96:243) The relation between a philosophical doctrine or school, and the way in which its ideas and rhetoric functions in a given political context will always be a complex one: consider, for example, the history of Kant-Studien during the Nazi period. Yet the ease with which Heidegger’s occlusion of ethics as an independent discipline meshes with the idiocy just cited is simultaneously jolting and utterly predictable.

**Abbreviations**

References are to the Gesamtausgabe edition (Klostermann: Frankfurt), with the exception of SZ where I use the standard text (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1957). These German paginations are displayed marginally in almost all translations. In the case of Ga9 and Ga40, I also follow the standard practice of listing the pagination of the original edition after that of the Gesamtausgabe text. With respect to translations, I have endeavoured to stay close to the Macquarrie and Robinson version on the grounds that it is by far the best known. Where other translations exist, I have typically consulted these but often modified them: the relevant translations are listed below.

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15 Doubtless, Heidegger would regard this demand for some kind of policy outcomes as just another symptom of the technological viewpoint.

16 For a detailed treatment, see Leaman and Simon 1994.
SZ  

Ga3  
  *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1998); *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997)

Ga5  
  *Holzwege* (1997)

Ga7  
  *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (200)

Ga9  

Ga11  
  *Identität und Differenz* (2006)

Ga19  

Ga24  

Ga25  
  *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik...*(1995)

Ga26  

Ga27  
  *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1996)

Ga29/30  

Ga31  

Ga34  

Ga40  

Ga41  
  *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (1984)

Ga54  
References