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PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE AND EMPIRICAL REASON:

DISCUSSION

BILL BREWER

I greatly appreciate the penetrating critical engagement of all my commentators. Here I reproduce their comments followed by my individual replies in alphabetical order. Some of the most important points that I make, which involve a significant revision to the views presented in my paper, are relevant to a number of comments. I make these points at the earliest opportunity and refer back in subsequent discussions. This explains the disproportionate length of my earlier replies.

David de Bruijn

For Brewer, perceptual reasons can be “objectual” in being the objectual truth-makers for perceptual judgments they support:

Given what ‘F’ means, o itself makes application of F correct: o is what makes ‘o is F’ true and in this sense constitutes a reason to apply the concept [to o in judgment] (p. 5).

Perceptual knowledge must be a special case of knowledge in this regard: a case in which the knowledgeable character of judgment is grounded in the way the

very truth-makers for the relevant judgment become subjectively available as reasons.

My question concerns the role of conceptual capacities in Brewer's account. Specifically, Brewer holds that an objectual reason for judging "o is F" is recognized through the conceptual registration of o's "visually relevant similarities (VR-similarities) with paradigm exemplars of F."

in registering [o's] visually relevant similarities with the paradigm exemplars that enter into her own understanding of [F], [the subject] recognizes the status of the object [...] as a reason to judge that o is F. (p. 8)

I worry whether Brewer's conception of the role of conceptual capacities in terms of registering VR-similarities can characterize perceptual knowledge as "special" in the above sense.

Consider that objectual reasons are, if you will, "quasi-factive": as truth-makers for the fact "o is F", objectual reasons guarantee the truth of "o is F." In this sense, to recognize o as an objectual reason for F is to recognize what makes it true that o is F.

But conceptually registering VR-similarities is not quasi-factive: registering VR-similarities can make it "evidently correct" or "clearly rational" to judge "o is F", but does not guarantee that "o is F" is true. In this sense, registering VR-

similarities is not to recognize what makes it true that o is F, because VR-similarities do not make it true that o is F.

Now, clearly o can both be a reason for judging “o is F” (an objectual reason) and some rationalizing factor for judging “o is F” (by making it “evidently correct” to judge “o is F” on the basis of o’s VR-similarities). But these are two different types of rational status that seeing o could be thought to confer on the perceiving subject. If they are not identical, it seems to me not clear that Brewer has described perception as the “special case” of knowing I outlined above: a case in which the knowledgeable character of judging “o is F” is grounded in recognition of reasons that are the very truth-makers for “o is F.”

Reply

David is absolutely right that my account is supposed to be one on which seeing that p is a way of knowing that p on which, as he puts it, “the knowledgeable character of judgment is grounded in the way the very truth-makers for the relevant judgment become subjectively available as reasons” (p. 000). He rightly contrasts this with any account on which the status of seeing that p as a case of knowing that p is instead to be explained by the subjective availability of factors that, although they may make it reasonable to judge that p in some sense, do not yet suffice for the truth of p. Implicit in this contrast is a criticism that I also endorse of the latter approach that McDowell puts powerfully as follows: it is one on which “knowing that ... [p] can be constituted by being in a position in

which, for all one knows, ... [it may not be the case that p]. And that seems straightforwardly incoherent" (1982, p. 457).

David's objection to my view is that it actually falls on the wrong side of this contrast for my purposes. For the VR-similarities with paradigm exemplars of F that are subjectively accessible in my acquaintance with an o that is indeed F are precisely features of o that are common to other objects that merely look F although they are not in fact F.

I agree with this objection and wish to propose a significant revision to my view in order to respond to it. This revision also improves the explanation available of the way in which perception serves as a source of our understanding of what certain basic perceptible properties of mind-independent objects are; but this is a topic for another occasion.¹ I begin by setting out the revised view and then explain its impact on David's objection.

Where previously I attempted to make do with an account of seeing o simply in terms of conscious visual acquaintance with o, I now expand the basic metaphysics of visual perception to include also acquaintance with certain of the basic perceptible features of o, such as its shape and its colour. Thus:

(O1) S sees o iff S is v-acquainted with o from a given point of view and in certain circumstances, together designated 'P'.

¹ See Campbell and Cassam (2014) and my (forthcoming) for more on this topic.

- (O2) o thinly looks F iff S is acquainted with o's Fness or o merely has VRSs with paradigm exemplars of F from P.
- (O3) o thickly looks F iff o thinly looks F and S registers o's Fness (conceptually, as F) or merely registers o's VRSs with paradigm Fs.

The previous account of illusion and hallucination remain intact. The key development here is a disjunctive account of thin looks, as acquaintance with Fness in the 'good' case, or the mere de facto existence of VRSs with paradigm Fs in the 'bad', illusory case.

I then propose the following five necessary conditions on seeing that o is F.

- (F1) o is F: a reason to apply F.
- (F2) S is acquainted with o from some P
- (F3) S is acquainted with o's Fness from P.
- (F4) S registers o's Fness.
- (F5) S judges that o is F.

(F1)-(F4) guarantee that the knowledgeable character of the judgment made at (F5) is grounded in the way the very truth-maker for that judgment becomes subjectively available as a reason. That truth-maker, o, is an objectual reason (F1), made subjectively accessible in (F1) and (F2), as the reason that it is given (F4). Hence the account now falls on the right side of David's helpful contrast.

Although this revision implies modifications to my discussion of both error and the nature of perceptual reasons in general that I cannot set out explicitly here,² I hope that at least the shape of these is discernible. The overall position remains one that endorses Objectual Reasons Priority whilst rejecting Factual Reasons Priority.

Chris Hill

Bill Brewer holds that we are aware of objective physical properties of objects at the level of experience. It's not clear what the range of these properties is supposed to be, but they clearly include properties like objective sizes, objective shapes, and objective distances. According to Brewer, and also John McDowell, conscious experience puts us directly in touch with such properties.

This view is called into question by two considerations. First, it is challenged by the fact that the phenomenology of experience is in constant flux. As an SUV drives away from me, its apparent size diminishes; and as a coin spins on its axis, its apparent shape changes. The objective properties of objects are comparatively stable. Second, Brewer's view is challenged by experimental evidence indicating that phenomenology leads us to misjudge a number of objective magnitudes. To illustrate, work by Frank Durgin indicates that the slants of hills appear larger than they actually are, and work by Jack Loomis shows that exocentric lengths that are objectively the same size appear to decrease with distance.

² See my reply to Wayne Wu below for a brief indication on the latter.

In view of these facts, we cannot explain how things appear to us by supposing that experience provides direct access to objective properties. Rather, experiential awareness must be concerned with relational, viewpoint-dependent properties of some kind. Unlike objective properties, but like appearances, viewpoint-dependent properties depend on such factors as distance, lighting, and angle of view.

This is not to deny that we are perceptually aware of objective properties. Rather, the point is that such awareness is non-phenomenological, post-experiential, and inferential. Moreover, it requires a long process of learning. Consider, for example, the phenomenological cues concerning distance that experience makes available. These cues include aerial perspective, height within the visual field, and texture gradients. Reflection shows that these are all cues that have to be interpreted. The fact that something looks bluish, or has a certain height in the visual field, has no intrinsic relation to distance. Because of this, we can only become aware of the significance of the cues by learning – specifically, learning to make inferences from experiences to higher level states that are downstream from experience.

If all of this is right, we should have reservations about Brewer's contention that experience justifies perceptual judgments because it puts us directly in touch with the objective properties with which the judgments are concerned. There is reason to prefer the view that the relationship between experience and

awareness of objective properties is inferential, and that epistemic justification derives from the reliability of the relevant inferences.

Reply

Chris rightly characterizes my view as one on which we are acquainted with mind-independent physical objects and certain of their properties, such as their shapes and colours. He is also of course right that our experience of the very same such objects and properties may change over time when the objects themselves do not – as when a coin spins on its axis or a shadow moves over a uniformly coloured surface – and that our experience may similarly systematically mislead about the objective properties of things – as when experience of the Müller-Lyer figure misleads us about the relative lengths of its two main lines. He draws the conclusion that experience must therefore be of something other than the actual shapes and colours of things, from which we derive those objective features by some kind of inference.

I deny that any such move is necessary or desirable. Indeed, the account of looks presented above is designed precisely to avoid it. For we may be acquainted with certain objective properties – the circularity of a coin, say, from (changing) points of view from which the coin in question has visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of incompatible shape properties. At an angle of 45° to straight ahead, for example, it has VRSs with an eccentric ellipse. In misleading cases, such VRSs may be made especially salient by cues or context. In this way, the actual shape of the coin, say, looks other than it is. But none of this is in any

tension with, and indeed depends upon, the fact that the perceiver is acquainted with the coin and its circular shape; and indeed it also looks circular even when viewed at 45° to straight ahead. This captures the sense in which it looks constant in shape even as it spins. Thin looks as elucidated in (O2) above are very thick on the ground.

Chris is absolutely right again that what I call above the 'registration' of o's Fness, as such, is a conceptual skill that may in certain contexts require practice over time. This point motivates a circularity objection that I consider at length in the paper. For it highlights a respect in which perceptual knowledge that o is F may depend upon prior knowledge that a, b, and c, say, are F. I reply (a) that what I propose is an explanatory rather than an anti-sceptically suasive account of seeing that o is F; (b) that such prior knowledge need not concern o itself; and (c) that in the most basic cases involved in concept acquisition it will be testimonial rather than perceptual knowledge of other Fs.

There are inferential/theoretical cases with the structure that Chris proposes. Suppose, for example, that I am watching a collection of toy cars racing round a track, and that each car has a dial on its roof pointing at a number. I may on this basis correctly infer their various speeds. If the dials are accurate, or, even better, if I know that they are, then I may arrive at knowledge of their speeds on this basis. But perceptual knowledge of the shapes and colours of the things that we see around us is absolutely not like this; and it is a virtue rather than a vice of my account that it respects this significant contrast.

Adam Pautz

I think that perceptual reasons come in degrees. For instance, if you take part in a discrimination task, you have more reason to believe that certain shades are distinct (shades that *clearly* look distinct) than you have for believing that others are distinct (shades that *just barely* look distinct). Likewise, if you are engaged in a loudness-scaling task, you have more reason to believe that one tone is *louder than* another (a simple ordinal judgment) than you have to believe that the one is *roughly twice louder* the other (a more difficult ratio judgment). But it is unclear how Brewer's account of the epistemic role of experience might accommodate this point. For it only appeals to non-gradable notions such as *S is acquainted with o*, *S sees that p*, *S resisters that q*.

Reply

I agree with Adam that we can make sense in certain cases of the idea of relative degrees to which perception may provide us with reasons to make various judgements. There is a natural way to accommodate this idea on the view that I propose here as follows.

Objectual reasons as I understand them are objects and their properties, such as their shapes and colours, that are the relata of visual acquaintance. These may be better or worse reasons for various judgements about those objects. For example, a central instance of redness constitutes a better objectual reason to judge that that object is red than does a more peripheral instance. Thus,

acquaintance with the colour of the former object provides the subject with a better reason to judge that that object is red than does acquaintance with the colour of the latter. Similarly in the case that Adam cites of shade discrimination, where two objects with quite distinct colours together constitute a better objectual reason to judge a difference of shade than do pairs of objects with very similar colours.

I suggest that we might also extend Adam's idea to include relative degrees to which subjects fall short of having reasons to make certain judgements about what they see. For example, seeing a series of increasingly eccentric plane ellipses head on in normal circumstances, a subject falls increasingly short of having a reason to judge that the figures are circular. Again, my position accommodates this extension straightforwardly. For the shapes of the figures in question, which contribute by acquaintance to the objectual reasons provided by the subject's perception of them, are increasingly distant from circular.

This response is based on two closely related assumptions: first, that the notions of centrality and peripherality make sense in connection with the properties of objects concerned; second, that some metric governs these notions in such a way as to substantiate the idea that there are relative degrees to which they constitute objectual reasons for certain judgements, and indeed that this metric may continue beyond the extension of the predicates in question to measure increasing distance from being an instance.

I am not committed to these assumptions with respect to all properties of mind-independent physical objects. But I conjecture that they do apply with respect to the most basic perceptible properties of such things, like their shapes and their colours; and this is all that is required for my purposes here.

Raja Rosenhagen

Objects look various ways to us, Bill Brewer claims, thinly and thickly. Why, I wonder, can't how things *thinly* look to one vary with one's concepts, beliefs, and expectations?³

Pit, suppose, has never seen or heard of Fs. As Pit lacks the concept $\underline{F}$, to him, o cannot look *to be* F. He cannot register its *being*, nor see it *as*, F. Suppose o is F. If so, o is visually relevantly similar to paradigm examples of F. And if a thing's being so related entails its thinly looking F to one, o thinly looks F to Pit.⁴

Yet, one could argue, o can thinly look F only to those who possess $\underline{F}$. Indeed, such concept possession may allow – or even, in experts, *force* – o 's visual features to cohere, in one's consciousness, in ways specific to instances of $\underline{F}$ so

³ In what follows, I mostly just refer to concepts, yet take reference to beliefs and expectations as understood.

⁴ Brewer seems to accept this, as he accepts that ducks look *ducklike* even to children who lack the concept of a duck (Brewer (2011), p. 121 [Chapter 5.3]).

construed, i.e. ways depending on expectations concerning how Fs react if placed in various circumstances, expectations absent in those lacking $\underline{F}$.⁵

Experts or phobics, Brewer might propose, *register* different thin looks o has anyway: Different thin looks are salient to different subjects.⁶ Experts and phobics, he could hold, routinely register, or mask out, certain thin looks that laymen and non-phobics may or cannot register, or will not mask out. Yet the question is: Why think o thinly looks all conceivably visually relevant ways to any subject whatsoever (including, perhaps, ones that may become relevant only in the distant future)?

Allowing that how objects thinly look can vary with one's concepts may help accommodate expert vision, racial perceptual bias, wishful or fearful seeing, etc. Moreover, the variation of how things look to one is conceivable, its occurrence, perhaps, empirically demonstrable.⁷ Suppose it were demonstrated. Would this be the end of Brewer's view? What reasons, if any, can entitle philosophers to rule out such variation as impossible? Perhaps Brewer does not. If so, can he accommodate it?

⁵ The idea that features of what one sees may cohere in different ways, depending on what concepts and beliefs one has at one's disposal, goes back to the discussion of the so-called theory-ladenness of observation in Hanson (1958), who in turn may have taken it from Wittgenstein.

⁶ See Brewer's contribution to this volume, section 1.

⁷ Susanna Siegel, in her contribution to this volume, arguably builds her entire account based on the idea that such cases are conceivable, an idea shared by many contributors to the debate concerning the so-called cognitive penetration of perception, even though whether such variation is actual is contentious.

Reply

Raja is right that *o* thinly looks *F* to *Pit* on my view, provided that his point of view and circumstances are appropriate. Thin looks are intended to capture the way that normally functioning vision provides the subject with a conscious experiential perspective upon what is actually there in the world around her, regardless of what she goes on to make of it. They capture the way in which those of us with the relevant concepts may characterize the nature of that perspective regardless of the perceiver's own conceptual sophistication. Faced with a plane hexagon, for example, we may rightly use that concept to say what shape she sees even if she is unable to put it in those terms herself. Indeed, it is precisely because this characterization of her perspective is correct that her experience may contribute to her subsequent acquisition of the concept of a hexagon. The concept is apt to characterize how things (thinly) are for her visually even before she has it. Resisting the idea that thin looks have application in this way is therefore inconsistent with the empiricist thesis that I endorse that perceptual experience plays an ineliminable explanatory role in the acquisition of certain basic concepts for mind-independent objects.⁸ It acquaints us with certain shapes and colours themselves, for example, that play a fundamental role in our possession of concepts for those shapes and colours. In being so acquainted, objects look just those ways independently of any conceptual registration of their doing so. The revised account of thin looks offered above is intended to capture precisely this phenomenon.

⁸ See Campbell and Cassam (2014) for important debate about this thesis, and my (forthcoming) for more on my own position.

Raja also outlines very well the need for a further notion of the way things look that is highly sensitive to the conceptual capacities of the perceiver, along with her cognitive focus, interests, purposes, expertise, bias, wishes, fears, and so on. My view is ideally placed to capture all that is required here too, precisely as Raja predicts, in terms of thick looks: those amongst the ways things thinly look that are registered by the perceiver, given all of these relevant factors. The key point to stress here is that thick looks are genuinely phenomenological. They indicate a specific cognitive modification of the perceiver's consciousness, a further feature of her experiential perspective upon the world. As such I see no reason why they cannot accommodate all the phenomena that Raja mentions and provide all the explanation that he rightly requires.

Miloš Vuletić

In cases of perceptual illusion, according to Bill Brewer, a subject is acquainted with an object *o* that is, say, *G*, but looks *F*. Brewer claims that the object *o* is a reason to apply the concept *G*, but the subject is not presented with a reason to judge that *o* is *G*, since *o* does not look *G*.⁹ The subject is not presented with a reason to judge that *o* is *F* either, and “*o* is no reason to apply *F* at all.”

⁹ The object *o* is an *objectual* reason to apply the concept *G*, according to Brewer; this is so because *o* is a truth-maker for ‘*o* is *G*’. The subject will *have* reason to judge that *o* is *G*, on Brewer's account, when the object looks both thinly and thickly *G* to her. Brewer also recognizes the notion of a *factual* reason. The subject of an illusion is not presented with a factual reason to judge that *o* is *F*, either.

Brewer thus claims that it is not rational for the subject of an illusion to judge that *o* is *F*, even though *o* looks *F*. This is problematic. Here is why: if it is not rational for the subject to judge that *o* is *F*, there is no attitude that *it is rational* for the subject to adopt with respect to this judgment.

It is not rational to disbelieve that *o* is *F*: there are no grounds for the subject to judge that *o* is anything other than *F*.¹⁰

It is also not rational to withhold judgment that *o* is *F*. For the subject to withhold, her evidence should be, on balance, neither in favor of judging that *o* is *F* nor in favor of judging that *o* is not *F* (Comesaña, 2013). But this is not the case: the subject's grounds for judging that *o* is *F* are on balance stronger—the object *looks F* to her.¹¹ This is why Brewer finds the subject's error in judging that *o* is *F* understandable: it is plausible to recognize that the subject's mistaken judgment is somehow grounded in her experience. The subject does not apply the concept *F* by accident—there is an element of the phenomenology that prompts the application of *F*.

Brewer's position commits him to the claim that the subject of an illusion cannot be rational in taking any attitude towards judgment that *o* is *F*: she should not withhold, assent to, or disbelieve that *o* is *F*. This is an undesirable consequence: intuitively, many cases of illusion do not involve such peculiar breakdowns of

¹⁰ The fact that *o* is *G* is not a ground for the subject to judge that *o* is *G* (or that *o* is not *F*) on Brewer's own view because the object does not look *G*, hence the subject does not recognize *o* as *G* (or as non-*F*).

¹¹ In fact, *o* looks *F* both thinly and thickly in Brewer's sense.

rationality. The observation that the subject has some grounds in *o*'s looks for judging that *o* is *F* shows a better way of accounting for illusions: besides objectual and factual reasons, we should recognize *subjective* perceptual reasons for judgment, i.e., reasons provided by phenomenology of experiences, both veridical and non-veridical.¹²

Reply

Miloš raises a number of interesting issues about cases in which an object, *o*, that is *G* and not *F* nevertheless looks *F*. On my view this is a matter of *o* having VRs with paradigm exemplars of *F* from the point of view and in the circumstances in question. Especially given the revisions to my position noted above, the best response I can give to his comments is to consider the various possible cases falling under this description in turn. An important point to make at the start about all such cases, though, is that, although the perceiver is not acquainted with an objectual reason to apply *F*, things are visually for him in certain respects just as they would be if he were so acquainted. Although he does not, it is for him as if he had reason to apply *F*. This is part of why any such judgement that he does make is understandable, although not rational: it is for him as if it were rational.

An *o* that is *G* may look *F* in cases in which the perceiver is actually acquainted with *o*'s Gness. For example, if I see a coin at 45° to straight ahead, although it

¹² On the notion of subjective reason similar to what I have in mind here see Schroeder (2008).

looks elliptical, it may also look round, since I may be acquainted with its actual shape.¹³ Indeed, it may be that very circular shape that looks to me other than it is. If I further register its circularity, as I may well do in any normal situation, then I may knowledgeably judge it to be circular, whilst also recognizing its current elliptical look too. If I do not, then I am still acquainted with an objectual reason to apply G, though I fail to register it as such.

In either this case or any in which I am not acquainted with o's actual Gness, I may instead register the VRSs that o has with paradigm Fs. This is, I think, the case that Miloš has in mind, in which o thinly and thickly looks F. Here there is a factual reason made available by perception that plausibly confers genuine rationality on the mistaken application of F, over and above the 'as if' rationality noted at the start of my reply, namely, that o looks F. This may be known by application of the ascent routine sketched in my paper. Then, either because the transition from the fact that o looks F to the actual Fness of o is de facto generally quite reliable, or because the subject knows/believes that it is, he may be rational in deriving that conclusion, that o is F, understandably mistaken as it may be. Taken together with the earlier 'as if' rationality, I claim that this captures what should be said in favour of that mistaken judgement in such cases.

The crucially important point for me, though, is that this is absolutely not the structure of the rationality of perceptual knowledge in normal cases, with the only difference being that the conclusion reached is true in such knowledgeable cases. In seeing that o is F we do not derive a conclusion about the world in this

¹³ See also my reply to Chris Hill above.

way from a premises about the way things look; and it is a fundamental virtue of the alternative account that I offer in my may paper to explain how seeing that o is F is indeed a way of knowing that o is F that it avoids any such implication.¹⁴

Wayne Wu

I wish to supplement Brewer's rich account of perceptual knowledge by highlighting concepts that should figure in further elaboration. The missing concepts are critical for understanding agency: attention, learning, skill or expertise, and automaticity. All of these can be understood technically, and they should have more of a central role in discussions of perceptual knowledge. Brewer focuses on seeing an object O and *registering* that it is an F which "involves the active deployment of the concept of an F" (4). He takes "registration" as a *primitive* and it is here that I think more can be said.

There can be clear differences between individuals who grasp a concept F but differ in how they apply it in perceptual judgments. A learner might have to make a special effort in attending to relevant similarities that individuate F's. Concept application is an intentionally substantial activity. It is not clear to me what sort of attention Brewer has in mind when he invokes it, and the absence of emphasis on properties is striking, especially given how much feature attention informs our actions. Consider in contrast an expert who, given the task, has their attention automatically captured by individuating features so that the concept is automatically applied. There is nothing else for the expert to do than simply

¹⁴ See my reply to Wayne Wu below for a little more on this important point.

come to recognize the O as an F in this way. In both cases, the resulting judgments can count as knowledge.

Once we draw on these additional concepts, the expert knower seems to me to be different than the cases Brewer describes. I don't think he would disagree, but then, *registration* is not conceptually primitive. There is more to say. We might put the knower's position this way: she simply sees that O is F. There is no inference, no effortful attention, no casting about for more evidence. O's Fness is patently clear. That is the psychological reality of actual knowers, and we are all perceptual experts for a wide swathe of Fs. In attending to O and relevant features (and thereby being acquainted with them), one automatically applies the concept.

Brewer's description seems to divide perception and cognition too starkly: perception is imbued with cognition in the expert knower. His description of the transition from perception to knowledge seems more to incline towards the perspective of the learner and not that of the expert where the transitions between perception and cognition are clearer. For the expert, inference as an active process, conscious or not, drops out. The normal case, then, is knowing by perceiving attentively in this way.

Reply

As he predicts, there is little in Wayne's comments that I really disagree with. His main focus is on the nature of our conceptual registration of the basic properties

that we are acquainted with in perception, such as the shapes and colours of the various objects around us that we see. In particular, he wishes to highlight the role in such registration of attention, learning, skill, and automaticity. I absolutely agree that these are important components of registration. Registration involves attention, which may range from the effortful and time-consuming in learners to the relatively automatic and immediate in experts; and it constitutes the exercise of a conceptual skill, which may in this way be possessed to a greater or lesser degree of excellence.

This is perfectly consistent with the respect in which I regard registration as a theoretical primitive. For this consists simply in the denial that any theoretical reduction may be given of conceptual registration in these or any other terms. Nevertheless, Wayne is quite right to insist that that empirical and theoretical work in these areas will help to elaborate further what is involved in registration and how we acquire and accomplish this skilled conceptual activity.

Wayne is also right to point out that my lack of consideration of acquaintance with, and registration of, perceptible properties is a deficiency in the view set out in my paper. I seek to address this, albeit sketchily, in my reply to David above.

Finally, Wayne is again right to stress that there is no inference involved in normal cases of seeing that o is F. But it would be wrong to interpret my position along any such inferentialist lines. Indeed, this is precisely the point of my denial of Factual Reasons Priority. Still, I claim to have given a substantive explanatory justification of the status of seeing that o is F as a way of knowing that o is F by

appeal to Objectual Reasons Priority and my associated adoption of the structure of Van Cleve's (1979) response to the Cartesian Circle objection.

Correcting for the inclusion of acquaintance with basic perceptible properties, I claim that

(B1) For all o and all F , seeing that o is $F \rightarrow$ knowing that o is F

does not depend for its truth upon

(B2) The perceiver knows that (for all o and all F , seeing that o is $F \rightarrow$ being acquainted with o 's F ness and registering this as F)

but only upon the de facto truth of what is known in (B2), namely

(B3) For all o and all F , seeing that o is $F \rightarrow$ being acquainted with o 's F ness and registering this as F

Thus, we do not infer o 's F ness from facts about our acquaintance and registration that are supposed to be given in perception and known in advance of o 's F ness itself. Nevertheless, in being acquainted with o 's F ness and registering it as such, perception provides us with objectual reasons, recognized as such, for our basic knowledgeable empirical judgements.

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