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The Professional Middle Class in Afghanistan: From Pivot of Development to Political Marginality

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The Professional Middle Class in Afghanistan: From Pivot of Development to Political Marginality

Introduction

From the 1950s, the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union shifted increasingly to what is broadly termed the Third World. As part of this contest, both sides pursued what today might be termed a development agenda: large-scale economic aid in the forms of loans, technology, and expertise to help countries escape poverty. Although the purpose of this aid was to showcase the superiority of each side's respective system, the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies shared a great deal in terms of how they conceptualized economic growth, the sort of projects they implemented, and even their understanding of the role of the state.¹

Theorists in both camps also saw the creation of a professional, urban middle class as crucial for economic and cultural progress. Primary and higher education were seen as crucial to the broader development agenda by indigenous elites, development scholars, and policymakers. As Dianne Davis explains, modernization theory, in vogue in the 1960s, assigned a crucial developmental ("morally superior and generative") role to the middle classes. That changed dramatically in subsequent decades. As Davis puts it: "When modernization theory held sway in the field of development, middle classes danced on center stage; when modernization theory fell out of favor, replaced initially by dependency or world-system theory and then a variety of state-centered paradigms, middle classes swiftly exited the theoretical limelight."² This change of paradigm suggests that tracking the course of the Afghan middle class allows a comparison of the different developmental approaches deployed by international donors and by the Afghan ruling elites.

In keeping with the themes of this dossier, particularly its focus on the implementation and appropriation of developmental ideologies, metrics, and hierarchies, this essay explores the various efforts to create an Afghan middle class through three periods: first under the Musahiban dynasty (until 1973) and republic (1973–78); second during the communist period and Soviet intervention (1978–92); and third since the United States–led invasion in 2001. Drawing on archival research (for the Cold War period) and oral histories (especially for the post-2001 period), we seek to place the development programs of each era into broader context, while pointing to the similarities and differences between First and Second World approaches. We also compare the Cold War period, when state-led modernization was in vogue, and the current

era, when the role of the state is minimized and NGOs are a dominant part of the development landscape.

Afghanistan presents an interesting case study in how international donors and Afghanistani elites implemented similar yet competing visions of development. From the 1950s, Afghanistan's rulers pursued a modernization drive for which they sought and received U.S. and Soviet (and, to a lesser extent, East and West German, Indian, and Japanese) support. By 1963, demands from intellectuals for democracy, and power struggles within the royal family, led King Zahir Shah to support a liberal constitution, leading to a ten-year period sometimes called "New Democracy." In 1973, the king's cousin Mohammed Daud, who had served as prime minister in the 1950s, ousted the monarch with support from military officers and intellectuals who were dissatisfied with the slow pace of social and economic change and with the growth of corruption under the king, thus inaugurating the republican period. Throughout the monarchical and republican years Afghanistan managed to remain neutral in the Cold War, although Soviet influence was increasingly dominant in the military, which the United States, wary of antagonizing Pakistan, did not want to aid. This changed in 1978, when communists with support in the military came to power, precipitating a series of events that led to the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Throughout the ensuing occupation, Moscow continued to supply economic aid; with the withdrawal in 1989, however, this aid declined, and by 1991 there were hardly any Soviet advisers left in the country. A civil war followed, which led to a new group, the Taliban, taking control of most of the country by the late 1990s. Since 2001, finally, Afghanistan has once again seen an influx of aid and expertise, primarily from the United States and European countries in the context of the United States-led NATO intervention.

The two interventions—Soviet and American—thus provide interesting case studies of "transformative" occupations. In both cases, large-scale changes in society were believed by occupiers and their clients alike to be necessary for the success of the occupation. At the same time, social transformation became not just a precondition for stabilization but the very purpose of occupation. Arguably, the Soviet occupation sought to deepen and extend the reach of a modernizing state that been the goal of the Afghan regimes of the 1960s and 1970s that preceded the communists. Following the 2001 intervention, meanwhile, the international community sought to help institute a political regime in accordance with Western perceptions and views, while attempting, with no great success, to draw on local traditions.³ And although the political system that emerged in Afghanistan after 2001 resembled in some ways that of the 1960s, characterized as both were by competitive elections that were not free of government and powerbroker manipulation, that is where the similarities ended. In the economic field, by the 2000s the talk was no longer of modernization but of rapid economic growth driven by donor-funded infrastructural development and by the private sector. The 2001–14 period was stable as far as the political elite was concerned, in large part due to the presence of Western troops, which kept the ruling coalition together somehow.

In a study of the professional middle class, educational institutions necessarily

occupy a special place. This essay indeed dedicates much space to them. The development of educational institutions with the help of outside powers did not begin in the Cold War period. Indeed, colonial powers also established schools and even universities with the aim of creating a competent indigenous elite loyal to the metropole.⁴ The organization, administration, and curricula of these schools and colleges were thus geared toward these ends. Although formal colonial empires were on their way out by the 1950s, the legacies of these educational arrangements carried over and were in some cases replicated in the post-Cold War world. Educational institutions in newly independent states tried to create citizens loyal to new national governments; and the influx of aid and advice was accompanied by an expectation that these new cadres would be, at the very least, favorably disposed to the donor nations.⁵ This remained true after 2001, despite the end of the Cold War. At the same time, as we will see, both First World and Second World educational aid sought to help create modern subjects with many common attributes in spite of the donors' competing ideologies.

We focus on a period in Afghanistan's history (1960–2013) that saw an exponential expansion of the state motivated in part by First and Second World development ideologies that were dominant in those decades. In the 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan's monarchical and republican rulers tried to create an urban middle class to advance their modernization agenda. Expanding educational opportunities within Afghanistan and abroad helped this strategy, although it presented the government with a new set of problems: how to employ an ever-growing pool of graduates while limiting their politicization. After the Soviet intervention, the urban middle class continued to grow, but the issue of unemployed graduates that had already appeared in the 1970s only intensified. Although the state remained weak, the expansion of an educated middle class was one of the very real effects of this policy. Some scholars have recently critiqued the tendency to follow the “modernization paradigm” common in the historiography on Afghanistan in the twentieth century, and the resulting Weberian histories, which focus on the state while leaving aside other possible accounts.⁶ While we believe this criticism is just, we focus on the urban middle class not as a privileged and reified incarnation of political modernity but precisely because its creation was a stated goal of Afghanistan's various governments and the foreign powers that funded, promoted, and helped draw up development programs.

Education and the Making of an Urban Middle Class in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s

Barnett Rubin and others have identified Amir Habibullah's reign (ruled 1901–19) as the period when an Afghan intelligentsia first appeared, united by ideas of progress inspired in part by reforms in the Ottoman Empire and by modernist trends in British India.⁷ This intelligentsia, despite helping to shape the reform agenda of Amir Amanullah (r. 1919–29) and leaving a lasting legacy, was nevertheless small. Amanullah fell from power in 1929, but the new dynasty in Kabul in the 1930s also shared the vision of the same Afghan modernist intelligentsia and inherited their links with modernists in India and beyond.⁸ Prior to World War II, Afghanistan flirted with

accepting large-scale German aid and advice, but British pressure prevailed against this idea. The larger-scale development projects of the 1950s and 1960s, however, created the need for a large number of people educated in the natural sciences, capable of administering the growing state and economics institutions and ready to staff the expanding primary school system. Credit available under the Truman administration's Point IV program, combined with the dollar surplus accumulated in the interwar due to high external demand for Karakul wool, meant that Afghanistan for the first time had the opportunity to import technology and expertise on a massive scale. Facing a consolidating Pakistani state with which it shared a contested border and in the context of the global emergence of new nation-states with ambitious development goals, Afghanistan's rulers (the dynasty and political elite that supported it) decided to pursue a modernization program that included infrastructure, electrification, and the transformation of agriculture. They also tried to establish a planning system to help direct these developments, bringing in Indian, Dutch, and Soviet advisers to help organize the planning department. The priorities of Afghanistan's government were consistent with those of other postcolonial states, where elites saw large-scale economic development as crucial to the survival of the state. Indeed, state building and development were assumed to go together—a state was needed to pursue development, but development would also help strengthen the state.

But by the early 1950s, Afghanistan's development programs had already hit certain obstacles.⁹ Among the most important, in the eyes of Western analysts, was a lack of qualified personnel. In a 1953 article, the economist Peter Franck, then completing his Ph.D. at Berkeley and working as a consultant for U.S. government agencies and foundations, found “underdeveloped government,” by which he meant both weakness of political structures and lack of qualified personnel, to be at the core of Afghanistan's problems. He concluded his discussion of Afghanistan's development difficulties:

Unless the level of understanding among the presently illiterate is raised and the best use made of those already highly trained, much of our worry about instability and economic stagnation in Afghanistan will be with us for a long time. But this is one link in the strangling chain of incompetence and underdevelopment that can be strengthened—without incurring political and economic fireworks.¹⁰

Soviet advisors to the Afghan government—and Afghanistan's leaders themselves—reached the same conclusion in the same period. Georgii Ezhov, a Soviet translator and economic adviser who worked in Afghanistan from the 1950s, recalled that one of the greatest problems in organizing planning was finding qualified people who could carry out the work.¹¹

The 1950s thus saw a rapid expansion of higher education in a bid to remedy the issue. A school of medicine, which would become part of Kabul University, had been established in 1932. Foreign teachers arrived from India, France, and Germany to teach in the secondary schools in Kabul.¹² In the 1950s, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States began supporting the development of the university.¹³ Columbia University, meanwhile, oversaw a teacher-training program, intended to “create an educational system dedicated to creating a new generation with skills, attitudes and values required in a more dynamic and modernizing

environment.”¹⁴ As a result of such efforts in the 1950s, a 1971 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) report would call Kabul University the “primary indigenous institution for training the top leadership needed for social and economic modernization.”¹⁵

The expansion of Soviet- and U.S.-funded road works, oil and gas exploration, agricultural modernization, and factories from the 1950s required technical personnel at all levels. In the short term, as with teaching, the solution was to import specialists en masse, often housing them either in settlements meant to resemble U.S. suburbs or housing projects modeled on those in the postwar USSR (the famed Kabul *mikrorayon*). Some of these specialists were supposed to train Afghans on the job; for the more elite professions, however, the Soviets agreed to construct a technical college in Kabul and several small ones for the oil and transport industries.¹⁶ In addition, thousands of students were sent to study in the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries. Education was also supposed to provide social mobility. By the early 1970s, Soviet economic advisers and their interlocutors had developed a system to recruit promising workers for further study in the USSR. Soviet-trained Afghan teachers at the Kabul Polytechnic would help identify students who might be interested in studying in the Soviet Union, organized preparatory studies, and examined potential recruits.¹⁷ In all, the USSR helped train over 70,000 skilled laborers, technicians, and engineers, according to Soviet government figures.¹⁸

The focus on educational achievement and qualifications meant that higher education, including training abroad, increasingly became a precondition for membership in the state elite. Before 1953, according to Barnett Rubin, only 12.6 percent of the elite (which he defines as those in senior government positions and state appointed judges) had formal postsecondary education. During Daoud’s premiership from 1953 to 1963, 70 percent of the elite had some higher education, and this reached 89 percent in the New Democracy period from 1963 to 1973.¹⁹ The 1950s also saw the recruitment of Eastern Pashtuns with foreign (Western) education into the state elite, while the New Democracy period, by contrast, saw less emphasis on Pashtun recruitment and more on Persian-speaking Kabuli elites. Rubin sees this as evidence of the increasing importance of relations rather than origins for appointments, as well as the decreasing emphasis on Pashtun nationalism during the New Democracy period.²⁰

Meanwhile, the expansion of primary schooling created a large pool of potential students for the university and various technical colleges. The variable quality of this primary education, as well as the importance of family connections and origins, however, limited access to higher education and thus to the new elite. Training at one of the elite high schools was still the best way to get a chance at education at Kabul University or in a Western institution. Children of the Kabul elite (both Persian speakers and Mohammadzai Pashtuns, the tribe to which the royal family belonged) dominated the student body of these high schools. Rubin points out that while Mohammadzai Pashtuns were more likely to go to the West if they were to pursue foreign military training, other Pashtuns went to the Soviet Union. Western education was still considered more prestigious (and more selective, since the United States accepted relatively few military officers for training).²¹

Table 1. Education and health statistics, 1932–78

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Schools</i>	<i>Number of Pupils</i>	<i>Number of Teachers</i>	<i>University Students</i>	<i>Number of Doctors</i>
1311 / 1932	22	1,350	105		
1315 / 1936	92	9,275	309		
1320 / 1941	331	64,000	2,190		38
1325 / 1946	359	93,544	2,677		88
1330 / 1951	378	98,743	3,128	461	137
1335 / 1955	804	126,092	4,007	758	149
1340 / 1961	1,436	235,301	5,983	1,987	250
1345 / 1965	2,298	443,459	9,824	3,451	527
1351/ 1971	3,972	760,469	21,920	7,732	827
1974				10,956	
1978				21,118	

Derived from Maxwell J. Fry, *The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to Economic Development* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 14, and Barnett R. Rubin, "The Old Regime in Afghanistan: Recruitment and Making of a State Elite," *Central Asian Survey* 10, no. 3 (1991): 73–100.

Not surprisingly, the schools, colleges, and universities sponsored by the USSR and Washington also served as demonstrations of the two political systems and their visions of modernity. Soviet teachers and administrators were expected to conduct "political work" among students. Soviet-sponsored institutions included libraries with Soviet books and magazines, such as the Persian-language *Akbar*, devoted to life in Soviet Central Asia, as well as *Sputnik*, an illustrated digest of Soviet news published for foreign audiences. A teacher noted happily that students tended to sneak these magazines out of the library but did not return them.²² Teachers were expected to "ably discuss" social and political questions "from the position of Marxist-Leninist interpretations of Soviet domestic and foreign policy."²³

Of course, Soviet and U.S. visions of modernity were similar in many ways, and this is also visible in their approach to education and the creation of a professional class. Western sociologists noted the need for professionals who were future-oriented and rational as a "precondition for development" and the importance of a modernizing elite that would be charged with "the articulation of development goals and supervision of development strategies."²⁴ Soviet teachers, likewise, saw the creation of new subjects out of "traditional" boys and girls as part of their job. A teacher in Mazar-i-Sharif, for example, noted that most of her students were children of mullahs or traders, and their views tended to be conservative, but:

Over the last two years the views of students have changed. The students began to notice that Afghans do not know how to work, that much time is spent on prayer and rest. They became interested in such questions as where life on earth and man came from. They started questioning certain positions in the Koran. In dreaming about the future of their country, they said that they wished that Afghanistan would have many schools, that all the boys would study, that the factories would belong to the people, they dreamed about the development of science and technology in their country, and about flying to space. Some students thought that

having land, sheep, money, it is not necessary to work, let those work who do not have anything. But all the other students changed their mind.²⁵

The report may not be a good indication of what was actually happening among students, but it says a great deal about the kind of subject Soviet educational aid was supposed to create—"future-oriented," having faith in science and technology, thinking in terms of national progress, and with desires for himself and his country that are geared, through the underpinning binary of modernization theory, toward "modern" conceptions (formal, Westernized education, space travel) rather than "traditional" ones (land, sheep).

By the 1970s, state education had expanded markedly in Afghanistan, thanks in no small part to foreign aid. Kabul University had produced Afghan specialists in all fields. Yet the consequences were different from those expected by the theorists and planners of the 1950s. First, the quality of both teachers and graduates was often low, especially in key fields like engineering, to the point where some Western observers urged withholding accreditation.²⁶ Second, job opportunities for graduates were limited, and the government was forced to hire them into the bureaucracy.²⁷ Third, and perhaps most consequential, the expansion of education brought students into contact with new ideas and debates. For many, the discussion of political and social problems became more important than their actual studies. Sultan Ali Kishntmand, who would later go on to serve as prime minister in the communist government of the 1980s, followed the path from lycée to Kabul University, becoming more politicized at each step through his conversations with teachers and fellow students.²⁸ At the university, he writes in his memoir, "days and nights were spent in discussions about the future of Afghanistan."²⁹ He and his friends read Jack London, Maxim Gorky, the Iranian avant-garde writer Sadegh Hedayat, as well as various publications from the Iranian Tudeh party.³⁰ It was also at university that he met Babrak Karmal, a student activist who would emerge as one of the leading figures of the communist movement, and who was installed at the head of the party and state with the help of Soviet troops in December 1979.

Indeed, both Kabul University and the technical college became highly politicized places. Already in 1965 student-led protests organized by Babrak Karmal helped force the resignation of the sitting prime minister, Mohammad Yusuf. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the leftists were losing their hegemony over the student body, and Islamist groups began mounting a serious challenge. Islamist opposition to the Musahiban modernization program coalesced around charismatic teachers like the theologian Barnahuddin Rabbani and student leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Universities and colleges thus became the primary social base of the Islamists, just as they were for the radical left.³¹

We should note that studying with U.S. or Western European teachers did not necessarily make students predisposed to Western-promoted capitalist development or liberal political systems. Hafizullah Amin, for instance, a leading hard left figure who played a crucial role in the 1978 uprising and then led a series of bloody purges against rivals and allies, ultimately prompting the Soviet invasion, had studied education at Columbia University and indeed was probably first drawn to Marxism in the United States.³² Many students of the technical college opposed the leftists, and even among

those who studied in the Soviet Union there were many who would join the Islamist opposition.

The Soviet Occupation

The coup that brought the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power in 1978 and then triggered the Soviet intervention at the end of 1979 transformed both the middle class and the educational systems that helped create it. On the one hand, expanding the educational system and bringing more women into the professional workforce were both avowed goals of the PDPA. In addition, the expansion of the state apparatus with Soviet support meant that the urban middle classes grew significantly. But at the same time, the political upheavals and repressions of those years divided the educated elite that had emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, sending many into exile.

Higher education was reoriented after the coup toward the USSR and other socialist countries, which affected the curriculum, training, composition of staff, and social life at the institutions. The Soviet Union and its allies now provided most of the "foreign" specialists teaching at Kabul University and were the main destination for students seeking to study or do graduate work abroad. Many of the older teachers—including some of the most qualified ones—left after the revolution and the Soviet intervention: 230 teachers in all, according to a Soviet report. The university was forced to hire less qualified teachers without graduate training, leading to a decline in the quality of teaching. By 1984, almost half of the teachers had only the most basic (licentia or bachelors) degree, while only 15 percent had a doctorate. And though after 1980 teachers were hired who had often completed some graduate training in Soviet and other East Bloc countries, still, as late as 1985 only 29 percent of those with a masters or Ph.D. had earned their degrees in the USSR, while the rest had studied in Germany, France, India, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries.³³

Not surprisingly, the PDPA and its Soviet advisers did their best to limit political life in the university, driving any activity that did not support the ruling party underground. The kinds of alternative political life that had troubled Soviet teachers in earlier years were no longer easily found. Instead, the main youth organizations were now the Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth and the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women, both subordinate to the PDPA and thus operating under the guidance of Soviet Komsomol advisers.³⁴ We should emphasize here that throughout the occupation Soviet commanders and advisers believed that they could defeat the United States-sponsored insurgency only by making the communist regime more attractive to the population—in part by accelerating the kinds of modernizing economic development pursued under the aegis of monarchical and then republican regimes since the 1950s. The expansion of education, while pursued for its own ends, thus also became a part of the "counterinsurgency" in the 1980s, as it offered the possibility of distancing young people from elements hostile to the regime. Despite these efforts the actual level of enthusiasm for the PDPA and for the USSR appeared quite low to Soviet advisors, who complained that "under a surface calm" was a great deal of indifference, national pride "bordering on nationalism," and "distrust towards the politics of the PDPA."³⁵

Table 2. Breakdown of students by social origin, 1984–85

<i>Social group</i>	<i>1984</i>		<i>1985</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
Workers	1,154	19	820	14
Peasants	969	16	706	12
Intelligentsia	3,366	56	3,946	66
Merchants	147	3	59	0,5
Bourgeoisie	33	1	30	0,5
Craftsmen	269	5	323	5

Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), fond 9606, op. 11, delo 353, and GARF, f 9606, op. 11, d. 354.

As part of this transformative expansion of education under Soviet occupation in the 1980s, Kabul University actively recruited from sectors of the population that had previously had little hope of attaining higher education. Thus, as of October 1984 the university had 5,615 day students and 723 students taking evening courses or studying in the “workers faculty.” While 56 percent of students were still from the “intelligentsia,” 19 percent were now children of “laborers,” and 16 percent were the children of peasants. This meant that “laboring classes” represented 35 percent of all students, 9 percent higher than the previous year. Even considering the likelihood that many students hid their actual social origins so as to avoid ostracism, these figures are impressive and point to the priorities of the regime and the university administration.³⁶ However, during the following year these figures returned to their 1984 levels, pointing to the limits of the more radical aspects of the university’s admissions and recruitment policies.³⁷

The period of Soviet occupation also saw a transformative influx of women into educational institutions and the middle class. By 1985 women made up a majority of the student body: 3,325 out of 5,956 students. Their share of the student body was particularly large in the faculty of natural sciences, where they accounted for 791 out of a total contingent of 989 students. Women were also the majority in the faculties of philology, economy, social sciences, and pharmacology.³⁸

The ongoing conflict also changed the ethnic makeup of the faculty and student body. From 1983 to 1984, the share of Pashtuns in the former had declined from around 52 percent to 40 percent, while the share of Tajiks had grown to 52 percent. The numbers were even more stark for the student body: as of October 1984, 60 percent of students were Tajiks, while only 33 percent were Pashtun. Soviet officials attributed this change to the concentration of fighting in the “Pashtun zone” along the Pakistani border where middle schools had largely ceased to function and where Pashtuns had stopped enrolling in high schools.³⁹ In fact, there were probably other factors as well, including the distrust of parents toward the ruling group in Kabul, and the dominance of Tajiks in the first postintervention communist government under Babrak Karmal, installed with the help of Soviet forces. While pledging party unity, Karmal had in fact pushed out many of the “Khalqis” in positions of authority. Since the Khalq segment of the PDPA had more support among Pashtuns, and Karmal’s Parcham faction of the PDPA found support mainly among Tajiks, his

Table 3. Breakdown of student body by ethnic group as of October 20, 1984

<i>Ethnic Group</i>	<i>1984</i>		<i>1985*</i>	
	<i>Number of Students</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number of Students</i>	<i>%</i>
Pashtun	1,974	33	1,507	25
Tajik	3,551	60	3,886	65
Hazara	203	3	240	4
Baluch	16	0.5		
Nuristani	16			
Uzbek	106	2	143	3
Turkmen	42		64	1
Indian	17	1.5		
Other	14			

* For 1985, the number of Baluch, Nuristani, and “others” is given as 108, or 2 percent of the student population. Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), fond 9606, op. 11, d. 353, and GARF, f 9606, op. 11, d. 354.

policies led to the further alienation of Pashtuns. It is not surprising that Karmal’s policies also affected other issues, including university enrollments.⁴⁰

As the figures for teachers at Kabul University suggest, a large part of the middle class was either opposed to the PDPA from the beginning or became disillusioned with it at some point after the revolution. Some of this opposition may have been ideological, but interviews and the few published memoirs for this period also suggest that the regime’s paranoid persecution of potential opponents before the Soviet intervention had alienated many intellectuals originally supportive of the regime or at least predisposed to share its broader goals.⁴¹ The Soviet intervention and occupation of the country further alienated many intellectuals. Among those who joined the resistance to the Soviet Union were graduates not only of Kabul University but also some who had studied in the USSR. Even many progressive women, whom the revolution claimed to represent, turned against the communist government.⁴² Thousands of others fled abroad, settling in Iran, Europe, and North America.

In this connection, a noteworthy development that presaged future dynamics was the arrival of NGOs in Afghanistan. The first NGO involved with Afghanistan was established in 1979 and at the start operated precisely in the refugee camps that were popping up in Pakistan, close to the Afghan border. More and more NGOs got involved with Afghanistan in the ensuing decade of Soviet occupation and insurgency. By 1989 there were forty operating across the border.⁴³ At this point they employed only a small portion of the middle class, but their number was about to take off, in ways described below.

Despite these modes of middle-class resistance to and flight from the Soviet occupation, the Soviet-supported regime’s support was also urban and indeed concentrated in Kabul. In 1986, the only year for which detailed statistics are available, 69 percent of the party membership was from the capital. The Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan, the local equivalent of the Komsomol, drew 77 percent of its membership from Kabul.⁴⁴ Many teachers entered the state bureaucracy, replacing supporters of the old regime there, and a growing number of women were drawn in

turn to replace them in the schools. However, the upheavals of the revolution and emigration made it difficult to expand the size of the medical profession: for the first half of the 1980s there were only 1,110–1,200 physicians in the country, two hundred fewer than in 1979. Physicians were also heavily concentrated in Kabul (80 percent).⁴⁵

The general Soviet policy throughout the intervention was to accelerate the state-building and development processes they had supported, alongside their American competitors, since the 1950s. The demands of fighting against the United States-backed insurgency, and the radical vision of social transformation espoused by the ruling PDPA, magnified the need for a strong state in the eyes of the regime and its Soviet backers, even as that state was falling apart. As the evidence above suggests, the PDPA fought to create a new educated middle class to replace the one it had alienated or repressed. At the same time, the real and perceived weaknesses of the state led Moscow to fill the gap with thousands of advisers, who attempted to replicate Soviet institutions.⁴⁶ After the departure of the advisers starting in 1986, and of Soviet troops starting in 1988, the regime of Mohammed Najibullah (Najib) turned increasingly to militias to stay in power, ultimately further undermining the state it hoped to preserve.⁴⁷

The Middle Class, 1992–2001: Surviving in a Time of State Collapse

Under the Rabbani Government

Najibullah's regime started faltering in the second half of 1991, as the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed imminent and the newly empowered and hostile Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, blocked support. Najibullah was ousted in April 1992. The government that followed was formed by an uneasy coalition of all nine main groups that had been fighting against Najibullah, with some splinters of the pro-Soviet regime also demanding inclusion. Unable to agree on power sharing, the new leaders first lost control over their own military commanders in the provinces and then battled each other in Kabul. Political authority collapsed and the ability of the central state to function was jeopardized.

The professional middle class was particularly badly affected by the slow collapse of the state. Most of the active members of the opposition who were still alive in 1992 had not managed to complete their studies before going underground, but they were nonetheless appointed to positions of responsibility within the state machinery. The bulk of government officials, meanwhile, stayed in place, except for those in senior positions who were almost entirely replaced. The new bosses were often inexperienced and not fully educated or had been professionally inactive for long years and needed the advice of the professional classes. Few of those purged by the PDPA in the late 1970s and early 1980s recovered their former positions, mostly because they were not associated with opposition armed groups or, if they were, were associated with the weakest ones (typically the royalist parties).⁴⁸

Infighting among the factions of the old armed opposition meant that by 1993 the country was already sliding rapidly into a civil war. The professional middle class was quickest in leaving Afghanistan for neighboring countries, or for Europe when possible. They had better chances than anybody else to sell their professional skills abroad.⁴⁹ Although exact statistics are not available, certainly tens of thousands of

Table 4. Number of graduates employed by government and students enrolled in university courses, 1978–2013

	1978	2000	2002	2013
Number of graduates and post-graduates employed by the government			8,921	36,892
Students enrolled in university courses	10,603	3,976	22,717	124,741

Source: Central Statistics Office, Kabul.

educated professionals quit Afghanistan in the 1990s, adding to the smaller (but still very significant) wave that, as we saw above, had left the country after the 1978 coup. The migration of a large part of the middle class had a number of long-term consequences, which would become visible after 2001. Apart from the decline in a number of middle-class professions, these consequences included the education of a growing number of Afghans abroad, some of whom returned at least temporarily to Afghanistan after 2001, and an accelerated generational change within the middle class inside Afghanistan.

The Rabbani government (1992–96) struggled to pay adequate salaries, and the country suffered from hyperinflation caused by the unrestrained printing of banknotes by the government, which was unable to fund its expenditure otherwise. During this period the real salaries of government bureaucrats collapsed to new lows. The portion of the professional middle class employed by NGOs was less directly affected by the collapse of the state and even prospered in some cases, as the NGO presence in the country continued to grow during this period. Moreover, the income of the NGO-employed professional middle class was sheltered from inflation, because NGOs paid their employees in foreign currency. The economic decline of these years, however, did affect those independent (nonstate) professionals who operated outside the NGO sector, as they saw the disposable income of their potential clients decline.⁵⁰

Kabul University, meanwhile, was turned into a battlefield in the 1990s and the production of graduates completely stopped, although it continued in some of the Afghan provinces. The number and quality of new graduates fell well below the replacement level, particularly because of massive emigration.

Under the Taliban's Emirate (1996–2001)

The conquest of Kabul by the Taliban in October 1996 dealt another blow to the professional middle class. Initially the Taliban absorbed the government bureaucracy almost as they found it, not least because those who had most to fear from them fled before their advance.⁵¹ Even less likely to be professionally educated than the mujahidin of the 1980s and 1990s before them, the Taliban appointed their own members, usually mullahs, to senior positions and tasked the next layer of government bureaucrats to advise them on technical issues. Because the cultural and political distance between the professional bureaucrats and the Taliban was so much greater than what had separated the Islamist factions of the mujahidin and the bureaucracy, the Taliban government was characterized by significant friction between the top layer

of government and the professionals working for it. However, the Taliban were able to coerce the resistant and filled any vacant positions with Taliban, eliminating meritocracy: "Recruitment and employment in the Taliban's governmental offices was also strange. The majority of the officials were titled as Mullah or Maulana, an honorary religious title. Even in places where specialists were needed to carry out technical projects, the majority of employees were barely literate Taliban or those known as Mullah or Maulana."⁵²

Another wave of middle-class professionals started leaving the country, unwilling to put up with the strictures imposed by the Taliban, particularly those regarding women. Some of the middle class who could not afford to leave the country, such as many female teachers, went underground.⁵³ This life underground might have strengthened the sense of a professional, middle-class identity opposed to the Taliban and in general critical of the armed militias confronting each other throughout Afghanistan. Universities continued to produce graduates in this period, although in small numbers and without appropriate facilities.⁵⁴ In their access to government jobs, however, these graduates were discriminated against: "In a sensitive ministry such as Foreign Affairs, if necessary, college graduates would be appointed after successful completion of exams, whereas the Taliban were either directly appointed or occasionally took a simple test. For example, [minister] Akhund would ask a Talib which books he had read in school. Simply naming those books sufficed."⁵⁵

The Taliban mostly viewed the educated middle class with suspicion, as they did anyone not religiously educated who claimed some influence or authority. "Technocrats" could only be allowed to play a role under Taliban supervision, although some Taliban leaders, such as Mawlawi Rabbani, gave more leeway to professional civil servants. The Taliban indeed tried to train their own professional cadres, although with little success as the quality of training was low and the recruits had weak educational backgrounds.⁵⁶ They also tried to Islamize the professions: for example, doctors were expected to study religious subjects as well, even at the expense of scientific subjects.⁵⁷ This uneasy relationship of the middle classes with the Taliban worsened over the years as the regime gradually consolidated control. In 2000, the Taliban purged former leftists from the bureaucracy and the armed forces, while also sidelining Pashtun nationalists. The Taliban also understood that they could not afford to pay for a 400,000-person strong bureaucracy, nor did they need one, and so started cutting jobs.⁵⁸ The fact that even those who retained salaries were paid irregularly and salaries for senior employees were curtailed contributed to the further demoralization of the state-employed middle class. New rating tables that recognized the value of non-Taliban senior professional employees were introduced only in 2000, a year before the fall of the Taliban government.⁵⁹

As pointed out in the previous section, the history of NGOs in Afghanistan started in the late 1970s. Their numbers started rising quickly during the 1990s with the de facto collapse of the Afghan state in 1992–93 and continued under the Taliban, as NGOs started filling the gap created in the provision of services, as well as delivering humanitarian assistance. By 2001, there were an estimated 300 NGOs active in Afghanistan, and they were about to start playing an even more important social and political role under the U.S. occupation.

The Afghan Middle Class, 2001–2014: A Genetic Transformation

The Middle Class Falls Off the Radar

The displacement of the Taliban from power in November 2001 seemed suddenly to relaunch the prospects of the professional middle class in Afghanistan, but with major differences compared to their prospects under the developmental frameworks of the republican 1970s and the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. As Afghanistan's international alignments dramatically changed, so also did the new Afghan government's economic policy. Any idea of a direct role of the state in the economy was abandoned and replaced with the idea that the private sector would propel economic growth. In this neoliberal vision the state had to limit itself to handling infrastructural development and providing services, including education. This strategy included creating an environment that could attract international investment and opening the country to world trade.⁶⁰ Afghanistan had never been good at implementing planned forms of "disciplined development," as described by Davis, but any notion of managed or state-driven development was dropped altogether in 2001.⁶¹ Beyond this general understanding, however, there was little coherence in terms of developing a concrete strategy for reconstructing Afghanistan under NATO occupation. Various donors followed their own priorities, which sometimes contradicted those of other, uncoordinated donors.⁶² Nobody talked explicitly any more of the professional middle class. Of the seven main factors of long-term economic growth identified in the National Development Framework of 2002, only one, "strengthening the government's capacity for policy-making and implementation," implied the absorption of new professional skills into the state bureaucracy.⁶³

Undisciplined Development: The Rise of the NGOs and of the Private Sector

A major change in the composition of the middle class after 2001 was the growing role of NGOs as a source of employment. As shown above, the NGO phenomenon was not new to the post-2001 period. However, only after 2001 did NGOs really expand to employ a significant portion of the Afghan middle class. In early 2003 the number of NGOs in Afghanistan had already risen to over 1,000.⁶⁴ By 2005 there were 2,400 of them and some estimates went as high as 3,000.⁶⁵ It is very difficult to estimate how many professional, middle-class Afghans might have been NGO employees after 2001: one 2010 estimate was 72,000.⁶⁶ Only a portion of these NGO employees were university-educated professionals. However, the health sector was largely taken over by NGOs, other than main hospitals and three of 34 provinces. Many doctors, therefore, worked for NGOs by around 2010.⁶⁷ Since NGOs actively helped implement projects as well, some engineers found their way there. NGOs were also active in more political fields, such as women's rights and human rights. Their growth after 2001, transforming service provision and opportunities available to middle-class Afghans, was, again, mostly driven by donor countries routing funding through them rather than the state.

An important parallel development was the emergence for the first time in Afghan history of a powerful private sector, as the state withdrew from the economy and aid organizations and Western militaries supplied large funds. The new Afghan business

class (that is, the owners of large private companies) needed middle-class professionals to staff offices and implement projects.⁶⁸ Finally, a growing number of professionals also started trying their luck on the free market, selling their services directly to the public, particularly in the health sector.⁶⁹

After 2001, therefore, the Afghan professional middle class rapidly divided into four main sectors (aside from those who had fled the country and did not return after 2001): private sector (for-profit) employees; self-employed professionals (mostly doctors and pharmacists); employees of NGOs and international organizations; state-sector employees. This was in stark contrast to the 1970s, when the state enjoyed a near monopoly of employment opportunities for the professional middle class. In the 1980s, as we saw, NGOs started emerging as an alternative, as did the armed opposition to the Soviet occupation, which also employed substantial numbers of middle-class professionals in its own bureaucracy based in Pakistan. Only after 2001, however, did this state monopoly truly collapse.

The Social Polarization of the Middle Class

The emergence of new alternatives to state employment does not imply that state employment of university-educated Afghans declined in absolute terms: it continued to rise rapidly. Universities were soon churning out rising numbers of graduates, although of much lower quality than in the 1970s and even 1980s. A senior government official reflected in 2013 that: “Our universities are a disaster—they don’t even meet the standards of 1960s.”⁷⁰ Many Afghans also enrolled in private universities of varying quality; most were not much better than state universities.⁷¹ Finally, the wealthiest sent their sons and sometimes daughters to study abroad in unprecedented numbers.⁷² The state-employed middle class was thus not in absolute decline; however, it was in relative decline, faced with a collapse of its perceived status in society and with the rise in nonstate employment in NGOs and elsewhere. A real decline of state employees’ salaries meant that few graduates working for the government could afford a middle class standard of living with their salary alone.⁷³ The growing number of graduates also far outstripped the number of employees the state could afford to recruit. For those who graduated in Afghanistan, the employment rate was estimated at just 10 percent, leaving many disappointed.⁷⁴

The overall size of the pool of university-educated Afghans remains difficult to estimate. Surveys have varyingly put it at somewhere between 0.4 percent and 2 percent of the adult population by 2007–2009. Of these surveys, the 0.4 percent implicitly estimated by the survey of the Ministry of Labor seems most realistic.⁷⁵ The middle class as a whole was estimated as 10–15 percent of the population, including an army of small shopkeepers.⁷⁶ A salary of \$200 was considered enough to be rated lower middle class for these purposes, though this was insufficient to rent a family house in the poorest neighborhoods of Kabul. Public sector wages reached up to a mere \$250/month, except for those trained in the West and offered higher salaries by foreign donors.⁷⁷

Despite the declining quality of the universities, their graduates wanted “middle-class” standards of living, self-employment opportunities, and consumerism modeled on Indian, Turkish, and European lifestyles advertised in movies and television serials,

hugely popular after 2001. The emergence of a stronger and dynamic business sector arguably contributed to the splintering of the professional middle class into diverging sectors. State employees could only afford to compete for “middle-class” standards of living by indulging in bribery and corruption.⁷⁸ The exceptions were a few Western-trained professionals, employed by the government at much higher salaries (paid by donors).⁷⁹

Self-employed professionals rarely found in the rising business class new clients who could afford their services, as the wealthy typically relied on the services of foreign professionals or traveled abroad. Arguably the emergence of a new middle class of self-employed professionals was instead the consequence of the lower quality of government-provided services, compared to the 1970s–80s, and of the declining government salaries for educated professionals.

This independent middle class has therefore been weakly connected to the business class, except for shared interest in economic growth, which enabled employees in the private sector to buy services from the professional middle class (mainly in the health sector). In post-2001 Afghanistan large businesses consisted of mobile telephone companies, a few banks, and some construction companies, with very little international participation except for a few joint ventures. Most of the members of this new self-employed middle class were thus struggling economically and were not seen as a threat to the status of the state-employed middle class.⁸⁰

The state-employed middle class instead appears to have viewed the new business class and the NGO sector with contempt and as the main causes of its own relative social decline. The regular harassment to which the newly wealthy were subjected by the state bureaucracy can be interpreted as the state-employed middle class exploiting the scope offered by state positions, in part also to extract rents.⁸¹ Over time, arrangements were worked out in which the business class accommodated state officials, with both colluding to share rent in a regulated way at the expense of state coffers, as in the case of custom posts.⁸² This meant that the Afghan state was less able than ever to play any role in the development of the country, as development became even less disciplined than the National Development Framework discussed above had planned for.

Finally, the portion of the middle class employed by the private sector was relatively privileged in terms of salaries paid, because of the shortage of adequately competent professionals.⁸³ The flow of foreign money and the import of new ideologies, stressing the preeminence of the private sector in the economy, contributed therefore decisively to the emergence of a new middle class, no longer dependent on state jobs for its economic survival. It is instructive to look at how this development influenced middle-class politics.

Middle Class Politics

After 2001, the old political parties of the 1980s tried to remobilize their old followers employed in the state bureaucracy, which we will describe here as the “old middle class,” with some success. The membership of the successor parties to the PDPA was therefore often made up of government officials. Similarly, in the cities the Islamist parties that dominated the 1992–96 scene recruited people whom they had

appointed into government jobs during their dominance in the 1990s onward. But while the influence of the old leftists within the government bureaucracy had been paramount in the 1970s, after 2001 the picture was much more fragmented, as a result of the political vicissitudes of the 1990s. The leftists retained control over the trade unions, which were weaker than in the 1970s. Most important, the state-employed middle class was no longer as generally influential as before, because of the emergence of a strong business sector and of nonstate-employed portions of the middle class. Any state-centered strategy of reform, aimed at empowering the old middle class, was no longer credible because of the changes to Afghanistan and its international alignment. The privately employed middle class failed to get visibly involved in the political debates of 2002–11, perhaps because of its relatively privileged status. Similarly, there is little indication that the self-employed middle class had a major political impact.

After some signs of rising mobilization within the old middle class in 2005–9, the defeat of the PDPA's successor parties in the 2010 elections finished off 1970-style middle-class politics. The politics of the 2010s were without precedent in their domination by money, sanctioning the entry into politics of a new business class, whose riches often originated in the shadow economy. Demoralization ensued and party membership fell.⁸⁴ Even women activists of this generation were losing hope by 2010: "The political parties are weak and are mostly not real. To attract people you have to work hard, have public activities and offer them a future. There are exceptions, some parties have youth wings. There is a strong female opposition to Shia family law, but there is no real movement."⁸⁵

A combination of developments led almost by default to the new NGO sector's hegemony: the decline in status and isolation of the old middle class, as well as the lack of politicization among the independent professional middle class and among the privately employed middle class. Often benefiting from foreign (Western) patronage, the NGOs themselves now became political actors, lobbying the government for reform and expansion of NGO activity. A polarization emerged between some senior state officials and the old middle class on one side and the NGO sector on the other. The former argued in favor of the reestablishment of the pre-1978 model of the Afghan state, with the direct state provision of services. The latter argued for keeping delivery of essential services in its own hands indefinitely, not just as an emergency measure.⁸⁶ Many NGOs also promoted gender rights and human rights, which state officials found suspicious.⁸⁷

Alongside NGOs, middle-class politics expressed itself through a myriad of what international donors call Civil Society Organizations (CSO), which could not legally register as NGOs and were estimated to number over 4,000 in 2009. One of the most politically involved of the CSOs was the Herat Professional Shura, which in 2002–2004 challenged the warlord and Herat governor Ismail Khan.⁸⁸

The NGO/CSO model attracted many educated Afghans because it implicitly accepted that the middle class did not seek power for itself. This was realistic and attractive to much of the new post-2001 middle class, which, sheltered by international intervention, shunned political involvement and focused on money. In this system Western governments and donor agencies advocated civil and social rights, without the middle class itself having to mobilize for them. Western governments and NGOs

also often funded local NGOs, which could therefore function independently of their underlying social structure and acquire a “vanguard” character.⁸⁹ The 2002–11 period was thus the heyday of the NGO middle class, which emerged as one of the key transformative impacts of post-2001 foreign occupation.

New changes began in 2012. Middle-class segments previously politically dormant mobilized politically, worried about the future of the country and about deflation of the economic bubble created by foreign intervention.⁹⁰ Thus 2012 saw the launch of political movements explicitly rooted in the upper middle class and the business class.⁹¹ But though they included several well-known individuals, their ability to reach a large section of the population remained questionable.

If the upper end of the middle class was worried by 2012–13, the lower end had started losing hope in the post-2001 system some years earlier. New graduates from the country’s universities became particularly and increasingly frustrated by their exclusion from the new wealth in Afghanistan. By 2009 the first signs of radicalization appeared among the growing body of university students. Various anti-establishment groups started attracting students, as they had done in the 1960s and 1970s, but this time the hard left was noticeably absent. It was Islamic groups that dominated the student scene from 2009 onward. Hizb-i Islami (Islamic party), a protagonist of campus politics in the 1970s, remained influential in campuses like Nangarhar University’s, which it dominated together with Salafist groups (Islamic fundamentalists).⁹²

By 2014, however, the landscape had changed significantly.⁹³ In addition to rejecting electoral politics, most of the Islamic groups considered the Afghan state illegitimate and advocated its overthrow. Not unlike outcomes in some Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, privileging a massive quantitative expansion of university education at the expense of quality produced masses of aspiring lower-middle-class members, unemployed, increasingly frustrated, and inclined toward radicalization.⁹⁴ By 2013 there were already some signs that this Islamist radicalization was affecting government structures, as former students started to enter government employment.⁹⁵

Conclusion

Narratives of the middle class as the protagonist of social and economic development in Afghanistan reflected the dominant social and development theories of the 1960s, as well as a social and political reality due substantially to political elites’ belief in those theories in Afghanistan and beyond, and social theorists’ provision of theories matching such elites’ expectations. Similarly, the post-1990 paradigm shift resulted not just from academic debates but also from changing political realities, dialectically entwined with those debates. Until 1991, intensified by the Soviet occupation, near consensus existed inside Afghanistan about the need for state-led development, managed by a state-employed professional middle class. But as early as 1978 this narrative started fraying as political turmoil deeply affected the professional middle class. The USSR-sponsored left maintained its predominant role within the professional middle class only through coercion, forcing many dissident members of that class into exile. By controlling higher education, the leftist regime managed after a few years to produce a new, more amenable professional middle class. At the same time, however, many refugees abroad had an unprecedented opportunity to study in foreign

universities. Although less apparent in the 1980s, the seeds of the internal fragmentation of the middle class in social and political terms were thus planted. These would germinate when those foreign-trained professionals returned to Afghanistan in the wake of the NATO forces. This 1980s fragmentation of the middle class and the dilution of its fidelity to state-led development increased as Afghan leftists remained dependent on Soviet patronage, little imagining the impending Soviet implosion. The sudden disappearance of that patronage in 1991 led to the collapse of the Afghan state. The Soviet occupation of the 1980s, therefore, was undoubtedly “transformative,” although mostly in ways unplanned and unexpected by the Soviets and their clients. The new, “red” professional middle class created through Soviet patronage remained an important component of the Afghan professional class well after 2001, and even its natural enemies, like the Taliban and the jihadist parties of the 1980s, enlisted its services.

Even if the Afghan state was reestablished in 2001–2002 in a form superficially resembling its 1970s incarnation, in reality the old idea of state-led development was dead. The professional middle class had suffered multiple emigrations in 1978, 1979, 1980, 1992, and 1996, making a return to the state-led development of the 1970s a daunting prospect even had the political will existed. NATO and especially U.S. ideology disdained state-led development in Afghanistan and the state was thus confined to a supporting and regulatory role. In this new environment the professional middle class refragmented in separate and sometimes rival “middle classes,” losing its pivotal role of the 1960s and 1970s. The state-employed middle class remained nostalgic about an era when it played a crucial role and often responded to its sociopolitical decline by taking revenge on the new middle and wealthy classes by demanding increasingly oppressive bribes. Gradually, portions of the old state-employed middle class were incorporated in the new order through co-optation by the new privileged groups.

The new (at least in size) privately employed and independent professional middle classes had substantially diverging interests compared to their state-employed colleagues. They shared no interest in reestablishing a strong state and even less in an authoritarian state with control over the economy. They also had little interest in becoming politically active: while in the 1960s and 1970s the state-employed middle class had a vested interest in pushing for accelerated state-led development, which meant more jobs and power for them, the new middle classes mostly stayed away from politics. In part this was due to things already going their way: breakneck growth of the private sector, a degree of political liberalization, greater media freedom than ever, and loosening social customs. But political engagement also did not appear likely to bring them any benefit, contrary to the 1960s and 1970s, when the monarchy was widely criticized for its weak leadership and management of state-led development, as well as for its reluctance to fully involve the professional classes in running the state. Arguably in the 2000s the weakness of the Afghan state and its limited role in economic management deprived the middle classes of a major vector for political mobilization. The exception to this rule of middle-class political disengagement under NATO occupation was a particular section of the privately employed middle class, the NGO sector. NGO activism in Afghanistan might have had several causes, not least the fact that many NGOs were set up with an agenda to advance specific social and

political rights, usually as defined in the Western hemisphere. President Karzai's liberalism, therefore, was not liberal enough for most NGOs because he was willing to compromise with conservative clerics. As of 2016, the questions were whether the NGO sector would remain important after the impending Western withdrawal, and what would be the fate of NGO-sponsored social and political rights.

The post-2001 occupation of Afghanistan by the Americans and their allies is turning out to be transformative of Afghanistan mostly in unexpected, even unwanted ways, just as the Soviet occupation before it. Western occupiers never seriously considered the Soviet experience, let alone tried to learn from it—they saw themselves as liberators, and the Soviets as invaders. Even if this distinction was true at least in part, many of the dynamics unleashed by the two occupations were similar. While it is too early to say how many of the changes wrought in occupied Afghanistan after 2001 will survive the withdrawal, the social structure of Afghanistan has been substantially altered. As a result, it is likely that some at least of the transformations could be permanent.

NOTES

1. See Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 90–97; David Engerman, “The Second World’s Third World,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 183–211.

2. Dianne E. Davis, *Discipline and Development: Middle Classes and Prosperity in East Asia and Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 26.

3. On similarities between leftist insurgents and nonleftist counterinsurgency strategists, as well as the shift to thinking about ethnicity and cultural factors during the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, see Michael Fitzsimmons, “Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity, and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31 no. 3 (June 2008): 337–65.

4. See Keith Watson, “Colonialism and Educational Development,” in *Education in the Third World*, ed. Keith Watson (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 1–47.

5. On education and Cold War development paradigms, see Westad, *Global Cold War*, 93; Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Andrew J. Kirkendall, *Paulo Freire and the Cold War Politics of Literacy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). A recent work on international development in Afghanistan during the Cold War is Timothy Nunan, *Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

6. James M. Caron, “Afghanistan Historiography and Pashtun Islam: Modernization Theory’s Afterimage,” *History Compass* 5, no. 2 (March 2007): 314–29.

7. Barnett R. Rubin, “Lineages of the State in Afghanistan,” *Asian Survey* 28, no. 11 (November 1988), 1188.

8. Nile Green, “The Trans-Border Traffic of Afghan Modernism: Afghanistan and the Indian ‘Urdusphere,’” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 53 no. 3 (2011): 475–508; Nile Green, “The Road to Kabul: Automobiles and Afghan Internationalism, 1900–1940,” in *Beyond Swat: History, Society and Economy along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier*, ed. Magnus Marsden and Benjamin Hopkins (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 77–92. On Amanullah, see Nawaz Shahrani, “King Aman-Allah of Afghanistan’s Failed Nation-Building Project and Its Aftermath,” *Iranian Studies* 38, no. 4 (December 2005): 661–75.

9. See Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), and Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State," *Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 512–37.
10. Peter G. Franck, "Economic Planners in Afghanistan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 1, no. 5 (February 1953): 323–40.
11. Interview with Georgii Ezhov, Moscow, February 2013.
12. Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), 309.
13. For the FRG, getting involved in development aid was part of the way the country tried to break with its Nazi past. See Quinn Slobodian, *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2012).
14. USAID Project Appraisal Report, Afghanistan, Elementary and Secondary Education, 1970.
15. Dr. Edwin L. Martin, USAID End of Tour Report, June 26, 1971.
16. "Record of Conversation with the Minister of Mining Affairs and Industry Yusuf," March 5, 1963, State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter GARF), fond 9606, opis 2, delo 200, 1–3.
17. "Note from the office of the adviser regarding the recruitment of Afghan citizens for study in the USSR for 1971," GARF, f. 9606, op. 1, d. 4755.
18. Memorandum from the Soviet embassy in Kabul: "Economic and technical cooperation between the USSR and DRA," Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), f. 5, p. 77, d. 802, p. 38–39.
19. Barnett R. Rubin, "The Old Regime in Afghanistan: Recruitment and Making of a State Elite," *Central Asian Survey* 10, no. 3 (1991): 89.
20. Ibid., 84–85.
21. Ibid., 89.
22. End of tour report from A. N. Mikheeva, Instruction at Oil Technical College in Mazar-i-Sharif from 1971 to 1973. GARF, f. 9606, op.1, d. 5909.
23. Report from E. P. Andrulionis, teacher at Kabul Polytechnic, GARF f. 9606, op. 1, d. 6462.
24. Henry Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development," *Journal of Development Studies* 7, no. 2 (January 1971): 144–45.
25. Mikheeva report.
26. "Technical Manpower Development for Afghanistan at Kabul University," report prepared for US AID, October 1977, accessed May 5, 2010, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACN308.pdf.
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28. Sultan Ali Kishmand, *Yād'dāsh't'hā-yi siyāsī va rūyidād'hā-yi tārikhī: Khāṭirāt-i shakhsī bā burhab'hā'ī az tārikh-i mu'aṣir-i Afghānistān* (Najīb-i Kabīr, 2002), 85–86.
29. Ibid., 89.
30. Ibid., 83.
31. See, for example, Said Hodi Nasrushohi, *Nahzathoe-Islami-Afghanistan* (Tehran: Office of Political and International Studies, 1360 [1981–82]).

32. Nabi Misdaq, *Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 110.
33. "Technical Specialists at Kabul University," 1986, GARF, f. 9606 op. 11, d. 354, part 2, 7.
34. "Social Organizations in Kabul University," 1986 GARF, f. 9606, op. 11, d. 354, 26–27.
35. "The Political Situation in Kabul University," 1986, GARF, f. 9606, op. 11, d. 354, 28–29.
36. "Report on Kabul University," 1984, fond 9606, op. 11, d. 353.
37. GARF, f. 9606, op. 11, d. 354, part 2.
38. "The Student Body," GARF, F. 9606, op. 11, d. 354, p. 20. The report also pointed out that compulsory army service for men limited their numbers.
39. "The Student Body," GARF, f. 9606, op. 11, d. 354, p. 21.
40. Karmal's persecution of Khalqis was something the Soviets opposed but had difficulty stopping. See Artemy M. Kalinovsky, *A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).
41. Authors' interviews with Abdul Razzak, Sooraya Baha, and Ahmed Muslem Hayat. See also Hasan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). See also the journal of the Writer's Union for a Free Afghanistan, published in Peshawar, where many Afghan intellectuals took positions against the PDPA regime.
42. See Hafizullah Emadi, "State, Modernization, and the Women's Movement in Afghanistan," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 23, nos. 3–4 (Fall–Winter 1991): 224–43.
43. Asger Christensen, *Aiding Afghanistan* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 1995), 127.
44. Antonio Giustozzi, *Afghanistan: War, Politics, and Society, 1978–1992* (London: Hurst, 2000), 11.
45. *Ibid.*, 11–12.
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