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14. ‘They are in the right because I love them’: Literature and Palestine Solidarity in the 1980s

Anna Bernard

In his introduction to After the Last Sky (1986), his collaboration with Edward Said, the photographer Jean Mohr recalls an encounter with a fellow photographer in New York in 1984. When Mohr told his acquaintance that he was working on a book about the Palestinians, the man replied, ‘Sure, why not! But don’t you think the subject’s a bit dated?’ Mohr derides this comment as ‘foolishness’, and uses it as an opportunity to reflect on his growing sense of moral responsibility towards the Palestinians since he first went to the refugee camps in Lebanon and the West Bank in 1949, in relation to his own background as the child of Germans who applied for Swiss citizenship in the 1930s. Mohr sees the deteriorating conditions of life in the camps as an indictment of everyone who stands by while the situation continues: ‘The Israelis are not solely to blame, we are all guilty’.

As I write, nearly as much time has passed since this exchange took place as had then passed since Mohr first visited the camps. While the subject of Palestinian statelessness remains disgracefully current, the man’s provocation now itself seems dated, signalling the transformation of the metropolitan left’s relationship to Palestinians in the intervening decades. In 1984, Mohr’s colleague could blithely say, ‘these days, who’s interested in people who eat off the ground with their hands? And then there’s all that terrorism’. He thus exhibits the liberal disregard for Palestinians that Said, in 1979, wrote ‘dehumanized us, reduced us to the barely tolerated status of a nuisance’. Today, although the vilification of Palestinians certainly persists, since the 1980s the global ““NGOization” of political activism has fuelled the representation of
Palestinians as victims in need of international aid, diplomacy, and increasingly, solidaristic civil disobedience, which since 2005 has been channelled through the international boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement. Mohr’s emphasis on the plight of Palestinian refugees and his implicit comparison of Palestinians to German Jews is an early example of this return to the language of human rights by Palestinian leaders and activists as well as their international supporters. The increasing influence of the humanitarian revival would supplant the third-worldist anti-colonial liberationism that had characterised the Palestine Liberation Organization’s ‘global offensive’ in the 1960s and 1970s.

The rhetorical shift from Palestinian resistance to Palestinian suffering was prompted in part by the massacre of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila camps in Beirut in September 1982, perpetrated by Lebanese Phalangists (Kataeb) with the support of the Israeli army shortly after the PLO’s withdrawal from the city. At this point, as Said wrote a decade later, it seemed to many international observers that ‘Israel had lost virtually all the political high ground it had once occupied; now it was Palestine and its people that had gained the moral upper hand’. Widely circulated images of the atrocity spurred the formation of metropolitan solidarity organisations that sought to represent the Palestinian struggle in humanitarian terms, including the Palestine Solidarity Campaign in Britain and the November 29th Coalition (later the Palestine Solidarity Committee) in the United States. The emergence of such organisations was partly a response to ‘the political destruction of the Palestinian resistance movement’ in Beirut, itself a symptom of the increasing power of the reactionary oil-producing regimes in the region since 1967. However, this change in tactics was also part of the broader turn to human rights that Samuel Moyn argues took place in the metropolitan countries from the 1970s onwards, when ‘Westerners left the dream of revolution behind […] envisioning an international law of human
rights as the steward of utopian norms, and as the mechanism of their fulfillment’. Palestinian revolutionary nationalism ‘straddled this divide – rather than produced it’: it rose to prominence as the metropolitan left’s support for armed liberation struggles waned. The turn to humanitarian argumentation in the 1980s was thus not only a strategic response to the PLO’s defeat, but also an adoption of what had become the Palestinians’ only ‘legitimate’ option in the eyes of many potential supporters.

Palestine’s importance in the history of humanitarianism’s displacement of liberationism, coupled with its status as ‘the most visible focus of global solidarity’ since the end of South African apartheid, would seem to make it an ideal subject for postcolonial literary studies. Yet postcolonial scholarship has only recently begun to address it. Its omission resulted partly from the field’s Anglophone emphasis, which traditionally excluded the Middle East and North Africa, but also from its general political cautiousness, which has tended to privilege empire’s aftermath over on-going anti-colonial struggles. However, in the last decade Palestine’s status in the field has changed, as the considerable momentum of the international solidarity movement has made it more practically and politically feasible for postcolonial and world literature scholars (including myself) to work on Palestine, to the point that Palestine now has more of a presence in the field than any other country in the MENA region. Early debates over whether Palestine should be included under the rubric of the postcolonial have given way to a broad recognition of the region as the quintessential site of contemporary colonialism. There is also now far more Palestinian literature available in translation for students and scholars who do not read Arabic, as increased general interest in Palestine has generated a market for new translations of Arabic texts and Palestinian diaspora writing in English and other European languages. Arguably, recent acts of repression and censorship of Palestine-related teaching, research, and student activism in
the US, UK, Canada, and Australia\textsuperscript{21} seek to contain not only specific solidarity movement victories, but also this shift in the visibility and perceived importance of Palestine across the Anglophone academy.

However, the mere fact of Palestine’s greater incorporation into postcolonial literary studies does not tell us how it is being represented. Is the national movement seen as a response to a human rights crisis, the political expression of an ethnonational ‘narrative’, or the potential site of a wider social liberation? Are Palestinians represented as a suffering mass, or as agents of individual or collective resistance? What response are they presumed to elicit from non-Palestinians? I have argued previously that attention to the literature of Palestine and Israel could enrich postcolonial studies’ reductive account of what it means to narrate the nation.\textsuperscript{22} Here, I would like to make a related but distinct claim, that the literary history of Palestine solidarity, which includes Palestine’s contemporary representation in postcolonial studies, reveals a tension between two modes of solidarity that the field has tended to conflate: the first based on common ideological commitments, the second on a defence of rights regardless of the victim’s politics.\textsuperscript{23} North-south solidarity is the implicit – and sometimes explicit – \textit{raison d’être} of postcolonial criticism in the metropolitan academy, insofar as it seeks to challenge past and present forms of imperial exploitation from within the metropolitan centre. Yet scholars in the field have rarely directly addressed either the important differences between ideological and humanitarian solidarity, or the politically and stylistically diverse ways in which texts solicit and theorise each kind of solidarity.\textsuperscript{24}

This essay takes up these questions by returning to examples of Palestine solidarity literature written in the 1980s, when the future of the national movement appeared uncertain, and the humanitarian turn had not yet been consolidated. I focus on narratives in English and French
by Raja Shehadeh (1951–present) and Jean Genet (1910–1986), two writers with distinct biographies and affiliations who have profoundly shaped the metropolitan reception of the Palestinian cause. Shehadeh is a Palestinian who has spent most of his life in the West Bank, working for part of that time as a lawyer arguing human rights cases in the Israeli military courts. Genet was French, but unlike Shehadeh he lived with a camp of fedayeen in Jordan in the early 1970s, and he supported other armed liberationist movements, including the independence struggle in Algeria and the Black Panther Party in the United States. By reading Shehadeh’s neglected early diary *The Third Way: A Journal of Life in the West Bank* (1982) alongside Genet’s landmark works ‘Quatre heures à Chatila’ (‘Four Hours in Shatila’, 1983) and *Un captif amoureux* (‘A prisoner in love’, translated as *Prisoner of Love*, 1986), I bring two kinds of appeal for solidarity with the Palestinians into conversation. Shehadeh acts as a witness and advocate for his fellow West Bankers, making the case that their (and his) everyday existence under occupation represents a ‘third way’ of struggle that is neither violent nor compliant, and thus deserves external support. Genet, meanwhile, declares his solidarity with the revolutionary period of Palestinian resistance that ended fifteen years earlier, with the PLO’s defeat in Jordan. His work elegises that phase of the struggle, grounding his support in his admiration and love for the fedayeen, without resolving the question of how his readers should respond to the revolution’s aftermath.

Shehadeh’s work can reasonably be seen as an expression of the humanitarian turn, and Genet’s as a refusal of it. Yet Shehadeh and Genet’s appeals are not as antithetical as they might seem, for they share the effort to articulate a deliberate, self-critical, and open-ended account of a solidarity based on common political commitments. Both writers are sober about the structural and tactical limitations of their approaches and their own constraints as actors, but these concerns
do not lessen their principled endorsement of Palestinians’ right to resist. Strikingly, both also draw on the notion of solidarity as a form of love, encouraging their readers to apprehend ‘the embodied and emotional constitution of solidarity’ as a relation forged through struggle, rather than an act of charity. Shehadeh and Genet’s self-conscious explorations of how to define and engage in solidarity are thus not simply historical documents of imagined relationships between Palestinian activists and their supporters in the 1980s, but also contribute to our understanding and practice of international solidarity with Palestine in the present, within the academy and beyond it.

‘A lawyer is a useless Sāmid’: Solidarity and Self-Criticism

Since Said’s death in 2003, Raja Shehadeh has arguably become the best-known spokesperson for the Palestinians in Anglophone literature. Shehadeh’s prominence is due in part to his prolific output, his decision to write in English, and his reputation as a political moderate, but it also indicates the accessibility of his work, which makes intimate, confessional use of the diary and personal essay forms. The Third Way was his first book in this mode, published a few years after he co-founded the first Palestinian human rights organisation, Law in the Service of Man (later renamed Al-Haq, meaning ‘truth’), in 1979. The Third Way did not achieve the same degree of recognition when it was published as his later books, particularly Strangers in the House (2002) and Palestinian Walks (2007), and it is not often cited now (for instance, as of this writing it does not appear on the list of works on Shehadeh’s English-language Wikipedia page). However, it was noticed by a few high-profile contemporaries, including Said, in After the Last Sky; the Israeli novelist David Grossman; and the US scholars Barbara Harlow and Noam Chomsky. Chomsky correctly predicted that The Third Way would remain unknown in the United States,
and called this neglect ‘a shame – indeed, a scandal’. The book was also reviewed in major area studies journals, including *MERIP, Middle East Journal, and Journal of Palestine Studies.*

Most of Shehadeh’s interlocutors focused on the book’s framing notion of *sumūd*, the ‘third way’ of the title, which Shehadeh describes as a response to the Israeli occupation that refuses the choice between ‘mute submission’ and ‘blind hate’. For Shehadeh, *sumūd* denotes the experience of ‘watching your home turned into a prison’ and deciding to ‘stay in that prison, because it is your home’. The book collects Shehadeh’s journal entries from 1980, the year that his ‘groundbreaking’ legal work *The West Bank and the Rule of Law* was published, alongside stories of violence, imprisonment, and dispossession related to him by neighbours, clients, and acquaintances. It began life as an anonymous column by ‘Samed’ (the personal noun for someone who practises *sumūd*, transliterated in *The Third Way* as *sāmid*) in the London magazine *The Middle East,* and was published in book form by the London press Quartet Books, which had come under the directorship of the British-Palestinian publisher Naim Attallah several years previously. In the same year, it was also published in Hebrew by Adam Press in Jerusalem, followed by French and German translations in 1983, an American edition in 1984, and an Arabic translation in 1985.

*The Third Way* is historically distinctive for having introduced the idea of *sumūd*, which Shehadeh translates as the state of being ‘steadfast’ or ‘persevering’, to an Anglophone readership. He did not, however, invent the term, as Said erroneously suggests in *After the Last Sky*. According to Alexandra Rijke and Toine van Teeffelen, the notion of *sumūd* had begun to gain currency among Palestinians in the 1960s, with the rise of the PLO and the consolidation of the national movement. While the term was originally used to describe a range of forms of ‘steadfastness’, including the survival of residents of the refugee camps and the continuation of
the armed struggle, in the 1970s it became primarily associated first with Palestinians who had remained ‘inside’ the Israeli state (al-dākhil) after 1948, and then with Palestinians living in the occupied territories, which had come to be seen as the most promising site for popular resistance.\textsuperscript{40} When \textit{The Third Way} appeared, the idea of \textit{sumūd} as Shehadeh defines it was beginning to spread: for instance, in a 1982 interview with Gilles Deleuze in \textit{Libération}, the Palestinian-French writer and intellectual Elias Sanbar expressed a similar desire to portray Palestinians as combatants in every area of their lives, not as refugees or ‘militiamen in the strict sense’.\textsuperscript{41}

Although Shehadeh has recently claimed that the book’s main aim was to identify \textit{sumūd} as the most important Palestinian strategy at that time,\textsuperscript{42} \textit{The Third Way} represents it more broadly than this statement implies, as a general attitude of refusal to Israeli domination rather than a prescribed set of tactics. Rijke and van Teeffelen contend that because Shehadeh’s account of \textit{sumūd} appeared in English, it was less a contribution to intra-national debates about the meaning of \textit{sumūd} than ‘a conceptual window to communicate Palestinian humanity to non-Palestinians’, including Shehadeh’s Hebrew-language readers, such as Grossman. Shehadeh’s definition of \textit{sumūd} seemed to resonate with liberal metropolitan readers’ preference for non-violent methods of civil disobedience associated with Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.\textsuperscript{43} Nabeel Audeh, writing in the \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies}, criticised it for this reason, complaining that ‘[f]or Shehadeh the humanist, the agent of social change is not “Class-conscious man” but simply “Universal Man” with his reason and his innate good-will intact’.\textsuperscript{44} Yet although \textit{The Third Way}, like Shehadeh’s later work, mostly eschews materialist analysis and party affiliation, it is not a pacifist or accommodationist text. Rather than avoiding a confrontational politics, it presents \textit{sumūd} as a contestatory practice, of which the recourse to
international humanitarian law is a necessary but partial component. The book thus promotes a solidarity with Palestinians that conceives of them as political actors and strategists rather than as victims, at a time when, as Lori Allen has written, ‘[h]uman rights and international humanitarian law were sources of creativity and even courage for some people living under occupation’.  

It must be emphasised that Shehadeh’s notion of sumūd does not provide a model for international solidarity activism, since it refers to Palestinian practice while living under occupation. However, sumūd and solidarity share a metaphorical connotation, as Emily Riddle has argued: ‘in both abstract nouns, a sense of fixity becomes moral as well as physical, that which is grounded in the land and in the cause’. This notion of political commitment as physically and morally located – that is, based on consistent principles that are brought to bear on a particular struggle – can also be found in Shehadeh’s effort to persuade a non-Palestinian audience that sumūd constitutes a politics of defiance. He contends that sumūd is not simply an instinctive, ‘human’ response to the occupation, but a conscious and sustained activity that is ‘developing from an all-encompassing form of life into a form of resistance that unites the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation’. To support this claim, Shehadeh often examines his own effort to forge a political practice from his location as an educationally and economically privileged Palestinian who has chosen to remain in the West Bank. His account is suffused with doubt and self-recrimination, dwelling as much on his fear that his legal work is futile as on his fear of the occupation authorities. While another contemporary reviewer described this approach as ‘an over-intellectualizing with which only a few Palestinians would feel comfortable’, Shehadeh’s self-criticism can alternatively be read as a dramatisation of his on-going position-taking, which requires him to test each decision he makes against his belief in the Palestinians’
right to self-determination and socio-economic equality. His approach invites the non-Palestinian reader to examine her own relationship to the Palestinian national movement in a similarly rigorous fashion, while also validating the sense of anxiety or ambivalence that this reader might feel in the process of formulating a position of solidarity.

Like Sanbar, Shehadeh depicts *sumūd* as a form of combat, which he refuses to elevate over the armed resistance that was then going on in Lebanon, insisting that ‘[the *fedayeen*] and I are fighting for the same thing’.\(^{49}\) He is not arguing that *sumūd* is morally ‘good’ while armed struggle is morally ‘bad’; and conversely, he does not concede that *sumūd* is less effective or strategically important than armed struggle.\(^ {50}\) Both methods are driven by a necessary and empowering anger, which he contrasts with self-defeating despair: ‘Anger fuels memory, keeps it alive […] We samidīn [the plural form of *samed/sāmid*] cannot fight the Israelis’ brute physical force but we must keep the anger burning – steel our wills to fight the lies’.\(^ {51}\) This is not the language of someone who is trying to make the Palestinian cause palatable to liberal western European, North American, or Israeli readers. He further rejects the opposition between *sumūd* and armed resistance by suggesting, apocalyptically, that *sumūd* is an interim strategy, to be maintained under the ‘long-drawn-out occupation, with no end in sight but war’; ‘I sometimes long for the day I most dread – the day we samidīn will have to spill blood for this loved and hated land’.\(^ {52}\) Shehadeh thus deprives the reader of ‘obvious grounds for optimism’, as Robert Spencer has written of *Palestinian Walks*\(^ {53}: \) *sumūd* is not an alternative to violent struggle, and it is unlikely to achieve Palestinian liberation by itself.

The nightmares that punctuate Shehadeh’s narrative also discourage the romanticisation or premature celebration of *sumūd*, especially when it comes to Shehadeh’s practice of it in the Israeli courts. Shehadeh dreams (presciently) of the spread of settlements across the West Bank,
but he also has more gruesome and surreal visions of Israeli soldiers in concentration camp uniforms who stamp his arm with a number and of spinning death masks with an Israeli and a Palestinian face on each side.\textsuperscript{54} The waking counterpart to this visceral apprehension of his vulnerability as a Palestinian are the passages in which Shehadeh expresses doubt about the value of his work as a lawyer, armed only with his clients’ testimony:

\begin{quote}
I am beginning to be wearied by the constant attrition of not being believed […] I know very well the psychological mechanism that makes people believe the concise, documented account as opposed to the confused, incoherent, verbal one. I know all this so well that I sometimes believe it is ludicrous, irrational, to expect anyone to believe the story of the weak.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

At first glance, this pronouncement seems to echo Didier Fassin’s observation of the paradox of contemporary human rights campaigns, which designate the ‘testimony’ of professional advocates as more credible than that of victims:

\begin{quote}
The survivors, because they need the facts to be established and because they are aware of the risk of not being believed, distance themselves from affects. The humanitarian agents, because they seek primarily to move their audience and because they know that they have a capital of credibility, exploit these affects.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

Yet the important difference between the two statements is that in Fassin’s account, the possibility of ‘believable’ emotive argumentation arises within a relation of humanitarian solidarity and in an international setting: the lawyer or advocate speaks for the ‘survivors’ but is not one of them, and the audience for the victims’ claims is presumed to be a neutral party who might be swayed by an appeal for empathy. By contrast, many of the lawyers who practised in the Israeli military courts were Palestinian, and as Shehadeh has said more recently, he and his
Palestinian colleagues at Al-Haq knew that “a lot of emotion was not going to work” in that venue. Instead, Shehadeh and his colleagues saw their work in the courts as an ‘expression of Palestinian collective empowerment through law’, and thus as another arena of combat.

However, in *The Third Way* Shehadeh appears more sceptical about this claim. When he suffers no repercussions for having published *The West Bank and the Rule of Law*, and his Canadian-Israeli friend ‘Enoch’ (whom Shehadeh has recently named as Henry Abramovitch) tells him that it is because the Israeli public does not care about the legality of the occupation, he despairs of the inherent weakness of his chosen form of *sumūd*: ‘the law, reason, words – everything I deal with – mean nothing […] I have refused fully to acknowledge this for fear of having to confront my own impotence’. Subsequently, when Shehadeh and his father are defeated in their legal challenge to the deportation of the mayors of Hebron and Halhūl in December 1980, he reflects that ‘everybody[‘s…] hopes will be smothered. And it is all for the good. We will be freed of hope, and of dependence […] A lawyer is a useless Sāmid’. The narrative’s trajectory toward despondence undercuts Shehadeh’s previous insistence on the necessity of anger: his early defiance comes to look like an empty threat.

Shehadeh’s disheartenment mirrors the decline of adversarial politics in the Palestinian national movement and across the Arab region at that time, as the revolutionary optimism of the 1960s and early 1970s gave way to a ‘condition of all-round crisis and collapse’. Yet his move from confrontation to lament can also be read as a mobilisation of affect, which seeks, as Fassin puts it, ‘primarily to move’ Shehadeh’s non-Palestinian readers. Crucially, instead of soliciting empathy for his suffering as a victim of the occupation, Shehadeh asks the reader to recognise the immense effort (and perhaps the impossibility) of resisting the occupation through legal channels. The affect he ‘exploits’ is his political and personal demoralisation as a humanitarian
agent who is also a stateless person. This is a different use of testimony from that described by Fassin: it presents Shehadeh’s participation in the struggle as the basis for his readers’ connection with him, ‘provoking their imagination’ by making his sense of frustration and failure ‘part of their own’ experience.\textsuperscript{64} The reader’s solidarity becomes the necessary adjunct to Shehadeh’s \textit{sumūd}; his diary seeks to succeed where his legal work has failed by turning a wider non-Palestinian public against a regime that disregards and punishes even legal and non-violent forms of protest.\textsuperscript{65} This attempt to reach a larger audience recalls Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s account of the rise of international advocacy networks, which holds that when individuals and organisations ‘have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas […] they may] directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside’.\textsuperscript{66} Shehadeh’s turn to literature broadens his appeal beyond the local and international legal arena to readers who might be willing to support an informal and largely unarmed popular struggle for national liberation, an imagined formation that prefigures the impending mass civil uprising of the first \textit{intifada}.

The idea that the Palestinian practice of \textit{sumūd} requires engagement and support from non-Palestinians, and that it is part of a wider struggle for human emancipation, emerges more vividly in Shehadeh’s use of love as a figure for solidarity. Shehadeh first invokes love when he introduces the idea that \textit{sumūd} represents a ‘third way’ of resistance, in an account of a conversation with his friend Enoch/Henry about the legacy of the Holocaust. From Enoch/Henry, Shehadeh learns that ‘really honouring the memory of people who have suffered creates courage and a capacity for love’.\textsuperscript{67} This invocation of the Holocaust counters its subsequent appearance in the nightmare of the monstrous soldier-survivors. Here, it signals a basis for connection between histories of oppression by representing both Palestinians and European Jews as ‘people
who have suffered’. However, Shehadeh makes it clear that suffering is not morally or politically valuable in itself⁶⁸; instead, he extols the ‘courage’ and ‘capacity for love’ that are produced by the struggle to end suffering. Such a struggle is defined by its refusal of ‘the psychology of a victim’ and by its consciousness that oppositional praxis is always a work in progress: it is ‘something that is created as I go along, forged step by step while I live here as Sāmid’.⁶⁹

In the epilogue, Shehadeh observes that sumūd does require hope after all, but this hope cannot be tied to the outcome of a particular act of resistance or a specific political vision: ‘not hope for this or that to happen, nor hope for the far-off future. It is the kind of general hope you draw from the people around you whom you love’.⁷⁰ By naming his community as the engine of his sumūd, Shehadeh grounds his activism in his ‘passionate’ connections⁷¹ to others, including Israelis who are in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, as he affirms: ‘It is the faces, on the West Bank and in Israel, that I love, admire, am proud to know, that have pushed aside my nightmare visions’. Shehadeh links his appreciation for his comrades’ ‘humanity’ to an anecdote about a young Israeli soldier whom he saw playing football with young Palestinians in Ramallah, and insists that it ‘is not mere sentimentality to linger for a moment over’ this scene. This fleeting vision of reconciliation does not provide narrative closure: Shehadeh concludes merely that ‘[o]ur struggle is not senseless: it is not yet proven that good never wins the day’.⁷² From this sequence of observations, we might conclude that for Shehadeh, the possibility of the triumph of ‘good’ designates a broad commitment to the establishment of relations of equality and community between all the region’s inhabitants. He invites the reader to build her own connections of solidarity with a movement whose next steps are uncertain, but whose principles remain constant: that Palestinians have a right to live under a government of their choosing and to resist the denial of their rights.
‘Because I had known them’: Solidarity as Passionate Commitment

Apart from its authors’ different political attitudes, the most obvious contrast between Genet’s writing on Palestine and Shehadeh’s is that Genet, as a non-Palestinian, spends more time exploring his reasons for supporting the cause. While this attribute might seem to give his work functional value as a model of solidarity theory and practice for other non-Palestinians, his articulation of how he understands and experiences his solidarity with the movement is so idiosyncratic that it is not clear whether he sees it as generalisable. Said, in his review of *Prisoner of Love*, suggests that it is not: he says that like Adorno, Genet is ‘to be neither emulated nor routinized, no matter how much the reader might appreciate (or appropriate) some of what they say’. Yet Genet is a crucial figure for thinking about the contest between different idioms of solidarity in the 1980s. Rather than seeing the humanitarian turn as inevitable or strategically advantageous, Genet openly resists it by grounding his solidarity with the Palestinians in the period of armed struggle, which he continues to memorialise after its defeat. His use of the idea of love as a way of thinking about solidarity is not derived from a universal love for one’s fellow human beings, as some of Genet’s readers have suggested. Instead, it is based in a specific attraction to the Palestinian revolution that Genet metaphorises as desire, but that might also be understood as a literalisation of the notion of solidarity as passionate connection and commitment, in contrast to Shehadeh’s sincere but comparatively cursory associations of solidarity with love for fellow participants in the struggle.

Genet’s work on Palestine was produced and circulated originally in French; his expression of solidarity with the Palestinians should therefore be understood in relation to the specific legacies of Algerian independence (the first liberation struggle that Genet declared
himself in solidarity with), French Maoism, and the student uprisings of May 1968. However, he had also been well-known in English as a playwright since the late 1950s, and his work on Palestine appeared in major English-language venues. His first essay on this subject, ‘The Palestinians’ (1973), came out in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* before it was published in French, and ‘Four Hours in Shatila’ (1983) appeared in the same journal shortly after its initial publication in *Revue d’études palestiniennes*. His final work *Un captif amoureux*, published posthumously by Gallimard in 1986, was published in English translation in the same year by the New York Review of Books and reissued in 1989 by Picador. It was reviewed in the *New York Review of Books*, the *London Review of Books*, and *Grand Street* (by Said), and it received another round of press reviews when the New York Review of Books re-released it in 2003, this time with an introduction by the Egyptian Anglophone novelist Ahdaf Soueif.

Early readers like Clifford Geertz and Edmund White refused to see the book as an endorsement of the Palestinian struggle, insisting instead on Genet’s position as an outsider in the movement and his non-partisanship. While Genet’s lament for what became of the Palestinian revolution after his time with the fedayeen might seem to support this claim, these critics overlook the text’s main source of narrative energy, which comes from Genet’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, even as he traces the movement’s ‘brutalization’ by a self-serving PLO leadership. I would argue instead, with Bashir Abu-Manneh and Said, that the ‘artistic greatness’ of Genet’s writing on Palestine ‘results from its author’s political allegiance’ and ‘unquestioned solidarity’ with the ‘very same oppressed identified and so passionately analyzed by Fanon’. Revolution, Genet insisted, meant being ‘on the side of the weakest’; acting in solidarity meant going ‘immediately to the people who asked me to intervene’ (he is referring to the Black Panthers and the Palestinians) and ‘help[ing] to the extent that I can’.
As I have already suggested, solidarity is a central theme of all of Genet’s writing on Palestine, but he first makes this preoccupation overt in ‘Four Hours in Shatila’. Genet was famously the first European observer to enter the Shatila camp after the killings, and the essay moves between his account of what he saw and his memory of living with the fedayeen a decade earlier. Genet describes the experience of stepping over mutilated bodies that have blackened in the sun in unadorned but precise detail (Geertz derisively calls this emphasis ‘inflammatory’84). He describes their wounds, their stench, their swelling; he speculates about how they died, focusing more on what the Lebanese soldiers might have done than on how the victims might have felt. Here, Genet is ostensibly fulfilling a role that we know from contemporary human rights advocacy: he is a ‘reliable’ observer (an outsider, a European) giving a factual account of what he sees and what he believes happened. But the essay’s vocabulary and form refuse this structural position. Genet foregrounds his relationship to the victims, which is not so much an empathic relation as it is a physical and spatial one: he steps and almost trips over their bodies; he feels that he is ‘at the center of a compass whose quadrants contained hundreds of dead’.85 This description does not come from a recognisable vocabulary of humanitarian empathy with suffering; this is horror on a mass scale, and what matters is not how Genet feels about it, but his proximity to it. It implicates him not only as a witness, but as a participant in a struggle that has been virtually annihilated, the evidence of its destruction all around him.

The structure of the essay more openly identifies Genet as a partisan by juxtaposing his present observations of the aftermath of the massacre with his memories of the PLO camps. The horror of the massacre is punctuated by the joy and beauty (Genet’s own terms86) of the Palestinian revolution. It is in this context, as he describes the bombed buildings of Beirut, that
Genet first names his solidarity with the Palestinians as a relationship of love, an idea that he would go on to develop in *Prisoner of Love*:

You can select a particular community other than that of your birth, whereas you are born into a people; this selection is based on an irrational affinity [*une adhésion non raisonée*], which is not to say that justice has no role, but that this justice and the entire defense of this community take place because of an emotional – perhaps intuitive, sensual – attraction; I am French, but I defend the Palestinians wholeheartedly and automatically [*entièremen, sans jugement*]. They are in the right because I love them. But would I love them if injustice had not turned them into a wandering people [*un peuple vagabond*]?  

This definition of solidarity recalls Said’s famous distinction between filiation and affiliation in *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (published the same year as this essay), in which filiation is a given relation and affiliation is a chosen one. However, Genet’s understanding of affiliation as attraction and love departs from Said’s notion of deliberate alliance. For Genet, ‘*adhésion*’ – which can also be translated as ‘joining’ or ‘membership’, emphasising the idea of belonging to an organised movement – supersedes the process of evaluation and judgement that might normally be associated with ideological commitment (‘*sans jugement*’). Genet embraces this feeling of passionate and spontaneous connection to the Palestinians as proof of the integrity of their cause, even as he admits that his position might be tautological: ‘they are in the right because I love them’ (emphasis added).

Although Genet’s reference in this passage to Palestinian ‘wandering’ (or vagabondism) invokes a history of suffering, his feelings are not limited to or even particularly aimed at women and children, the archetypal victims of humanitarian solidarity and the focus of many metropolitan condemnations of the massacre. Instead, Genet emphasises his love for the dead.
Palestinian fighters: ‘Many died in Shatila, and my friendship, my affection for their rotting corpses was also immense, because I had known them. Blackened, swollen, decayed by the sun and by death, they were still fedayeen’. He mourns these men not simply as human beings, but for the loss of their exceptional radiance, which he attributes to their quest for liberation:

The statement that there is a beauty particular to revolutionaries raises many problems [...] Perhaps this may be explained in the following way: breaking with the ancient ways [les ordres archaïques], a new freedom pushes through the dead skin, and fathers and grandfathers will have a hard time extinguishing the gleam in the eyes, the throbbing in the temples, the joy of blood flowing through the veins.

The eroticism of this passage appears elsewhere in his descriptions of the fedayeen, but in Prisoner of Love, Genet insists that ‘I never desired any particular person, I was all desire for the group as a whole’. He reasserts his passion for the collective in the book’s conclusion: ‘From late 1970 to late 1972, more than anything else I loved the fedayeen’. Both statements distinguish sexual or romantic love for an individual from solidaristic love. These forms of relation might share the same vocabulary and even the same sensations, but because solidaristic love is forged through participation in the revolutionary struggle of a group, the struggle’s supporters enter into relation with all its members. Elsewhere in the book, Genet suggests that passionate connection to a movement’s protagonists is necessary to solidarity because solidarity is itself a form of human connection: ‘how can you make a comrade of an ideology?’

Genet also uses love as a figure for solidarity in the broader sense of post-revolutionary social solidarity: love metonymically and metaphorically names the ‘new kinds of relations’ that he claims the Palestinian revolution has established. He observes in 1973 that ‘[r]evolutionary activity is not restricted to the use of an emotive vocabulary, nor even to the use
of the rifle; it also lies in the challenge to live a happy life to the full’, a life that would include the space and time for people to make love. In *Prisoner of Love*, Genet claims that the songs the *fedayeen* sang among the Jordanian hilltops were a ‘call to love’, issued from ‘the configuration of nature in the darkness’. The primal character of this call demonstrates the bonds among the *fedayeen*, but it also conveys the freedom and creativity that the revolution has initiated. The singing, like the revolution itself, is ‘a great improvisation performed among the mountains, in the midst of danger’. When Genet asks one of the men what the songs are about, he confirms the connection Genet has intuited: ‘Love, of course! And occasionally the revolution’. 

Genet’s linking of revolutionary violence and revolutionary desire with life force (‘a new freedom pushes through the dead skin’) also appears in his controversial 1977 essay praising the Red Army Faction, and it recalls the use of this kind of imagery in New Left thought of the 1960s and 1970s. Genet’s language echoes not only Frantz Fanon’s classic essay ‘Concerning Violence’ (1963), but also Herbert Marcuse’s *Essay on Liberation* (1969), which has been far less influential in postcolonial studies. Marcuse writes of the European and North American youth movements of the 1960s: ‘There is a strong element of spontaneity, even anarchism, in this rebellion, expression of the new sensibility, sensitivity against domination: the feeling, the awareness, that the joy of freedom and the need to be free must precede liberation’. Marcuse sees this spontaneous demand for freedom in the metropolitan centres as a response to the anti-colonial independence movements. However, he goes further than Fanon or Genet in asserting the importance of metropolitan solidarity to the process of decolonisation: ‘the preconditions for the liberation and development of the Third World must emerge in the advanced capitalist countries. Only the internal weakening of the super-power can finally stop the financing and
equipping of suppression in the backward countries’.

Marcuse thus describes a reciprocal north-south solidarity, or what Abu-Manneh, in his discussion of Genet, calls a ‘mutually beneficial revolutionary encounter’. The citizens of the formerly colonised countries demonstrate the possibility of establishing the ‘new kinds of relations’ that Genet saw among the fedayeen, while the citizens of the colonising countries oppose the counter-revolutionary activities of their own governments, seeking to generate world-systemic conditions in which those new relations might be realised.

Yet while Genet shares Marcuse’s attraction to spontaneity, in Prisoner of Love he appears less persuaded of the revolutionary potential of north-south encounters (although he does compare the atmosphere of the camps to the mood of ‘freedom’ in Paris in May 1968).

He is suspicious of a pair of French activists that he met in Jordan, whom he says ‘were like two children of May 1968 – liberated but full of antiquated platitudes’. He worries about ‘watching revolutions from plush and gilt stage boxes’, although he wonders if there is any way around it: ‘What other place are we to watch from if the revolutions are first and foremost wars of liberation? From whom are they trying to free themselves?’

Unlike other metropolitan supporters of the Palestinians, Genet suggests, he is aware that his love for the fedayeen may not have been reciprocated: ‘It’s only now that I feel I’d like to have been a tree myself, so as to see how they really felt about me’. Genet’s insistence here on the limits of his access to the fedayeen and their revolution is characteristic of the self-criticism and uncertainty that come to dominate Prisoner of Love as the narrative continues. Such statements undermine the more celebratory portrayal of solidaristic love that appears in Genet’s earlier works and elsewhere in the book. Instead, he ponders whether his acts of solidarity with the Palestinians made any difference, and whether his writing about them will be read: ‘What if this book were only a
mirror-memoir for me alone [...]?’. This shift towards a negative representation of metropolitan solidarity as self-congratulatory or solipsistic recalls the melancholic shift that takes place in Shehadeh’s text, but Genet goes further than Shehadeh by doubting the worth of his own book, even though Palestinians had asked him to write it.

Prisoner of Love also takes a dark view of what Genet’s love has become after the Palestinians’ defeat, a turn of events that he sees as the consequence of not simply the PLO’s military losses in Jordan and Lebanon, but the betrayals of the Arab regimes and the PLO leadership. After 1973, he says:

I was still charmed, but I wasn’t convinced; I was attracted but not blinded [Encore charmé, pas convaincu, séduit pas aveuglé]. I behaved like a prisoner of love [un captif amoureux]. [...] So much love to start was bound to grow less. [...] it all went to show that every revolution would deteriorate, would capitulate before the invasion of stultifying comfort.

Genet expresses a certain (and to my mind, frustrating) fatalism here, in his suggestion that capitulation is the fate of all revolutions. Yet this charge is directed at specific individuals for specific acts of betrayal. He speaks scathingly of PLO leaders who have personally profited from the revolution, blames Arafat for its defeat, and asserts that if the PLO accept territory for a Palestinian state, they will betray their own fighters. He notes wryly: ‘I found the manners of almost all the ordinary Palestinians, men and women, delightful. But their leaders were a pain in the neck [emmerdants, lit. ‘annoying as shit’]’. The leadership have left Genet without a movement with which to be in solidarity; they have left him with a love that has no object.

Genet ends on a bleaker note than Shehadeh in part because he refuses to seek a compromise between liberationist and humanitarian ideas of solidarity. In fact, in the 1973 essay,
he explicitly distinguishes between them: ‘the pro-Palestinian movement itself is very weak and always runs the risk of being accused of anti-Semitism. Thus the attitudes taken are more humanitarian than really political’. Yet he shares with Shehadeh a commitment to showing his work. Genet endlessly examines his reasons for being in solidarity, returning on multiple occasions to the idea of the revolution as a spectacle from which he derives an unearned pleasure. At the same time, he continues to emphasise the need for solidarity, even and especially in the absence of a revolutionary movement. Immediately after he describes himself as a ‘prisoner of love’, he cites Arafat’s prediction that the rest of the world will lose interest in the Palestinians, “and for the West and all the rest of the world the Palestinian problem will be solved simply because no one sees its picture any more”. His self-criticism and his criticism of what the struggle has become do not disable his solidarity; the trajectory of his enquiry is toward the possibility of its realisation.

**Palestine Solidarity, Then and Now**

Genet and Shehadeh’s work contributed to the international Palestine solidarity movement by making a case for the legitimacy and integrity of the Palestinian cause at a time when its future looked bleak, and its metropolitan reputation was in dispute. Yet the French fellow traveller and the Palestinian human rights lawyer resisted the growing emphasis on suffering and testimony, and the privileging of ethics as an alternative to politics, that have characterised the humanitarian turn. Instead, they urged the reader to recognise and respond to Palestinians’ organisational actions, beliefs, and goals, and above all to comprehend their united opposition to Israeli domination. In place of a ‘politics of compassion’, they promoted a ‘politics of justice’. This emphasis thwarts past and present attempts to recuperate Shehadeh and Genet’s work as non-
partisan. The idea of solidarity as love that they articulate seeks – paradoxically – to avoid romanticising either Palestinian suffering or Palestinian heroism. As Genet remarks, ‘To be a fedayee for a moment when you haven’t had to endure a fedayee’s woes is like wearing a forged medal [c’est faire sur soi, de cette malédiction, un faux-semblant],’ something which might also be said of the desire to imaginatively substitute oneself for the occupied subject or refugee, as appeals for empathy with the oppressed in humanitarian activism and postcolonial literary scholarship have sometimes encouraged. Instead, these writers invoke the notion of love as a way of imagining a non-hierarchical and anti-identitarian relation between participants in a struggle and their supporters.

My hope in returning to these works is that by recovering the historical trajectory through which liberationist solidarity came to be seen as naïve, and humanitarian solidarity the only pragmatic option, we can undo that automatic response. These writers’ insistence on both the difficulty and the possibility of shared struggle continues to offer more radical ‘resources of hope’ to activists and intellectuals who seek to build connections across distance. At a time when cynicism about the effectiveness of human rights-based activism is mounting, and new ideas of revolution and liberation, through civil disobedience but also through armed resistance, are on the rise, it is imperative that postcolonial scholars engage the archive of decolonisation, liberation, and political solidarity. This task has a particular salience in the context of the contemporary Palestinian struggle. We are a long way from where we were in the 1980s, when metropolitan support for the Palestinian cause was confined to members of the Arab diaspora and a small group of non-Arab activists. This change in public opinion presents a real opportunity for those of us whose governments continue to enable the occupation of the West Bank, the siege of Gaza, and a refugee crisis in its fifth generation to follow Shehadeh and Genet’s example and
speak out against it. ‘We are all guilty’, as Jean Mohr put it, of allowing the catastrophe to continue.

Notes

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2 Said and Mohr, After the Last Sky, p. 8.
3 I use the term ‘metropolitan left’ to designate citizens of the core countries of the capitalist world-system who identify with the political left. This shorthand term (which includes a wide range of positions) allows me to focus on the modes of appeal for solidarity with struggles in the global peripheries that are directed at this demographic.
4 Said and Mohr, After the Last Sky, p. 7.
7 The founding of the United Nations Works and Relief Agency (UNWRA) in 1949 identified Palestinians as a population in need of humanitarian aid (United Nations Relief and Works Agency, ‘Who We Are’, <https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are> (last accessed 19 January 2018), n.p.). This representation of Palestinians as humanitarian victims was challenged by the rise of the PLO in the 1960s.


16 For a discussion of Palestine’s relationship to postcolonial studies, see Anna Bernard, *Rhetorics of Belonging: Nation, Narration, and Israel/Palestine* (Liverpool: Liverpool


Examples include York University’s (Canada) denial of club status to Students Against Israeli Apartheid in 2013; the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s revoking of Steven Salaita’s contract in 2014; the investigation of Jake Lynch at the University of Sydney in 2015; the University of California at Berkeley’s temporary suspension of the module ‘Palestine: A Settler-Colonial Analysis’ in 2016; and the cancellations of Israeli Apartheid Week events at the universities of Exeter and Central Lancashire in 2017.


This is not to say that north-south affiliations have not been explored: see, for instance, Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). However, postcolonial scholarship has rarely engaged with the literature of organised solidarity movements, apart from some key exceptions, such as Barbara Harlow, *Resistance Literature* (London: Routledge, 1987) and Priyamvada Gopal, ‘Redressing Anti-Imperial Amnesia’, *Race & Class*, 57:3, (2016), pp. 18-30.


Ibid., p. 4.


43 Rijke and van Teeffelen, ‘To Exist is to Resist’, p. 89.

44 Audeh, ‘Steadfastness’, pp. 78-79.

45 Allen, *The Rise and Fall of Human Rights*, p. 34.


50 As Jonathan Kuttab, a co-founder of Al-Haq, has pointed out, armed struggle is sanctioned under international law: ‘We always stated that human rights are only part of what Palestinians are entitled to, and that our political rights go beyond respect by the occupiers of our human rights and of the Geneva Convention’ (Allen, *The Rise and Fall of Human Rights*, p. 42).

51 Shehadeh, *The Third Way*, p. 68.

52 See Ibid., p. 32, 125.

53 Robert Spencer, ‘Ecocriticism in the Colonial Present: The Politics of Dwelling in Raja


55 Ibid., p. 69.


58 Ibid., p. 58.

59 Shehadeh, *Where the Line is Drawn*, loc. 83.


61 Ibid., pp. 128-129. The mayors Fahd Qawasmeh and Muhammad Milhim were deported in May 1980, in retaliation for a PLO attack in Hebron that killed six Israeli settlers. Their deportation followed an unsuccessful attempt to deport the Nablus mayor Bassam Shakaa, whose Israeli lawyer, Felicia Langer, succeeded in getting his expulsion order overturned in the Israeli Supreme Court. However, in June 1980 Shakaa lost both legs in a car bomb attack claimed by the Jewish Underground organisation, and in 1982 the occupation administration replaced all remaining ‘nationalist’ Palestinian mayors in the West Bank with Israeli army officers. See Shehadeh, *The Third Way*, pp. 47-48, 56, 101, 109-111, 128; Bassam Shak’a, Muhammad Milhem, and Fahd Qawasmeh, ‘The Mood of the West Bank: Interviews with Three West Bank Mayors’, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 9:1, (1979), pp. 112-120; and Moshe Ma’oz, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank: The Changing Role of the Arab Mayors Under Jordan and Israel* (London: Routledge, 2015), Chapters 7-9.


As he puts it in a recent interview: ‘I saw writing as a way of serving the cause of justice and human rights. Human rights reports reach a limited sector of the population and so have limited impact, but if you write something that touches more people and is mass-distributed, the impact is that much stronger’. Vincent Bernard, ‘Interview with Raja Shehadeh’, International Review of the Red Cross, 94.885, (2012), pp. 13-28; p. 15.

Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Border, p. 13.


Ibid., p. 143.

Featherstone, Solidarity, p. 37.


85 Genet, ‘Four Hours in Shatila’, p. 6.

86 Ibid., p. 4, 11, 20.

87 Ibid., p. 13; Genet, ‘Quatre heures à Chatila’, p. 11.

See for example Seth Anziska, ‘A Preventable Massacre’, *New York Times*, 16 September 2012,  
(last accessed 19 January 2018), n.p.


91 Ibid., p. 11; Genet, ‘*Quatre heures à Chatila*’, p. 10. See also Genet, ‘The Palestinians’, p. 19.


93 Ibid., p. 300. This statement is in reference to the Black Panthers, but the comparison to the  
Palestinians is implied. See also Genet, *The Declared Enemy*, p. 149.


95 Ibid., p. 307.


97 Ibid., p. 22.


99 Ibid., p. 46.


101 Marcuse, like the rest of the members of the Frankfurt School apart from Theodor Adorno,  
has not often been engaged by postcolonial critics. Benita Parry is a notable exception: see  
p. 38, 49, 52.


103 Ibid., p. 84.


106 Ibid., p. 133.

107 Ibid., p. 304.

108 Ibid., p. 347.

109 Ibid., p. 381.

110 Ibid., p. 282.

111 Ibid., p. 217; Genet, *Un captif amoureux*, p. 258.

112 See Genet, *Prisoner of Love*, pp. 139-140, 208, 306.

113 Ibid., p. 280; Genet, *Un captif amoureux*, p. 328.


116 Ibid., p. 217.


