A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TEACHER DEVELOPMENT:
ENGLAND’S TEACHING AND LEADERSHIP INNOVATION FUND

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Abstract

This article identifies new arrangements between the state and non-state actors in the public sector, one that extends current understandings of education privatisation, the transformation of public services ‘by substitution’ (Ball, 2010) and, specifically theories of the ‘shadow state’ (Wolch, 1990). Drawing on data from the Political Economy of Teacher Education (PETE) project, the paper’s context is the current situation of post-qualification teacher development in England and its point of departure the Teaching and Leadership Innovation Fund (TLIF) initiative, in the wider context of Conservative political interests in promoting ‘social mobility’ through enhancing ‘teacher quality’. Through a political economy analysis of public records, course information, Freedom of Information (FOI) requests and interviews, the paper offers an emerging typology of enterprises to describe the organisations that won TLIF funding to provide Continuing Professional Development (CPD) for teachers in designated ‘Opportunity Areas’. Further, the paper extends available theorisations of the shadow state by identifying three kinds of shadow state structure – autonomous, intermediate and co-created – in relation to CPD provision under TLIF. This provisional identification is offered for critical examination beyond the immediate context of English CPD policy. The paper argues that these different relations of power and interdependence represent a new political economy of teacher development in England.
### Key Words

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A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TEACHER DEVELOPMENT:
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In this paper, we identify new arrangements between the state and non-state actors in the public sector, extending current understandings of education privatisation (Verger, Fontdevila & Zancajo, 2016), the transformation of public services ‘by substitution’ (Ball, 2010) and, particularly, theories of the ‘shadow state’ (Wolch, 1990). Drawing on Political Economy of Teacher Education (PETE) project [hyperlink: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/pete-the-political-economy-of-teacher-education], we examine post-qualification teacher CPD in England through a political economy analysis of a significant policy intervention in the context of Conservative political interests in promoting ‘social mobility’.

Our approach to the analysis of political economy focuses on the interaction of political ideas and economic processes within the cultural context of the public education system, the distribution of power and privilege within that system, and what this means in terms of opportunities for teacher development. It differs from the networks approach of Ball (e.g. Ball & Junemann, 2012) by asking ‘whether changing patterns of participation are matched by changing distributions of resources and capabilities’ (Goodwin, 2009, p. 685). It also differs from Gunter’s interrogation of the broader politics of education (e.g. Gunter, 2018) by engaging with the complexity of the education economy as an economy (Robertson & Dale, 2015).
Our point of departure is an analysis of the Teaching and Leadership Innovation Fund (TLIF) initiative, created by the UK Conservative government for England in 2016 (https://tlif.education.gov.uk/). TLIF was intended to improve ‘teaching quality’ through targeted CPD in designated ‘Opportunity Areas’ characterised by low ‘social mobility’. By focusing on TLIF and England specifically, we offer a distinctive case internationally not only of the vernacularisation of a ‘travelling’ education policy idea (Ozga & Jones, 2006) concerning the relationship between ‘teaching quality’ and ‘social mobility’ (Barber & Mourshed, 2007), but of the political, economic and ideational dimensions of policy enactment (Verger et al, 2016). Through an analysis of CPD under TLIF, we make an argument about new relations of power between the state and non-state actors and the differential allocation of resources and privilege that flow from those relations. Specifically, we extend Wolch’s conceptualisation of the ‘shadow state’ – non-state, private or charitable organisational infrastructure undertaking activities formerly the responsibility of the public sector ‘yet remaining within the purview of state control’ (Wolch, 1990, p. 4) - by provisionally identifying three different types of shadow state structure – autonomous, intermediate and co-created. In doing so, we respond to Trudeau’s (2008) call to build ‘theory that can appreciate the variegated interactions that take place between state and non-state actors’ (p. 670).

In the next section, we put CPD for teachers in historical context, consider more recent aspects of education privatisation and Conservative political interests in the relationship between ‘teaching quality’ and ‘social mobility’.
Changing contexts for teachers’ CPD

Post-qualification training for teachers was, in many countries, a late twentieth century invention, expanded by a post-war welfare state (Day & Sachs, 2004). Formalised training opportunities were initially tools of a professionalisation agenda (Morrish, 1970), subsequently re-appropriated as interventions designed ‘to maintain a high standard of teaching and to retain a high-quality teacher workforce’ (OECD, 2009, p. 49). The provision of CPD has, in part, been historically influenced by the type of state, with significant variations between the US, UK and Nordic models, for example (Miettinen, 2013). In England, the formal expectation that experienced teachers might continually develop their practice through CPD was first referenced in the Plowden Report (1967), a major post-war, welfare state policy artefact (Kogan, 1987). By the end of the century, CPD was increasingly directed towards narrower, economistic measures of teaching quality, founded on an elision of educational attainment and ‘social mobility’ (OECD, 2015).

The neoliberal landscape of CPD in England: Outsourcing and the shadow state

From the 1990s onwards, there was a shift from locally determined CPD policy in England, enacted through local education authorities (LEAs – similar to US school districts or European municipalities) towards more centralised national interventions, culminating in the National Strategies (1998 - 2010) (Fullan, 2000). Designed and funded by the New Labour government, and centrally delivered through outsourcing to the non-profit Centre for British Teachers (CfBT) and subsequently Capita, a private company, the National Strategies represented a form of education privatisation familiar in other parts of the world (Verger et al, 2016).
Outsourcing service responsibilities previously held by the state to non-state providers has been described as one dimension of the creation of a ‘shadow state’ (Wolch, 1990), defined by Wolch as:

- a para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organisations,
- administered outside of traditional democratic politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control (Wolch, 1990, p. 4)

Outsourcing and ‘contracting out’ public service functions has featured in UK public policy for decades, partly driven by neoliberal commitments to marketisation as a lever for efficiency but also by more Conservative concerns about whether the state should intervene in all aspects of society. As Wolch notes, ‘the emergence of the shadow state is fundamentally linked to recent transformations in the welfare state’ (p. 15), with these transformations often informed by arguments from the political Right that a shadow state comprised of special interest and voluntary organisations was ‘necessary to forestall state monopoly over service provision’ (p. 5).

Use of the shadow state as an analytic concept has since extended to address the role of the private and non-profit sectors in public service delivery (e.g. Ball, 2010; Jessop, 2015; Milward, 1994; White, 2016). Wolch anticipated some of these developments, distinguishing between ‘partnership’ and ‘contract’ models, with the latter primarily concerned with efficiency of delivery through outsourcing. In England, the National Strategies were unique examples of large-scale, centralised CPD initiatives (Fullan 2000:18), benefitting from high levels of funding, delivered through a contracted, shadow state ‘mediating structure’ (Wolch,
By 2010, when New Labour left office, the National Strategies had received £3.8 billion (Ellis, 2011) and over 2000 advisors had been employed by CfBT or Capita to mediate the National Strategies (DfE 2011:3) in local areas.

After 2010, however, and the election of, first, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition and then a majority Conservative government, the context for CPD in England changed again in the economic context of austerity policies following the Global Financial Crisis and a further reconfiguration of the state’s role. Specifically, a more politically and educationally conservative, ‘traditionalist’ stance was taken on school subjects (Yandell 2010), children, young people and ‘the importance of teaching’ (DfE, 2010). Simultaneously, the school system underwent significant reform.

**Privatisation as reform in the context of austerity**

As Verger et al (2016) argued, the form of privatisation followed in England results from a radical restructuring of the state’s role in providing public education, rationalised through an ‘equity frame’; i.e. that public education has ‘failed’ to address ‘social mobility’, requiring market mechanisms and private-sector involvement to address this ‘crisis’ (p. 182). Ball (2012) described this process, with reference to school reform, as a consequence of an historically ‘reluctant state’. We need to understand these systemic changes to view CPD in a context where the cultural meanings of ‘schools’ and ‘teachers’ have been disrupted.

The academisation of the state school system in England can be seen as a shift in cultural political economy rather than merely a legal-administrative process (Rayner et al, 2018; see
also Jessop, 2002). Governance structures for academy schools such as Multi-academy trusts (MATs) can also be seen as structures of an education shadow state. Academisation has therefore been consequential for the provision of CPD. Historical opportunities for teachers to develop their practice through engagement with LEA advisory services have largely been displaced by provision within Multi-academy Trusts (MATs) or single academies, especially for secondary schools. In turn, the provision of CPD in MATs and single academies has been relative to the budgetary constraints and economies of scale achieved across schools and chains, as well as their ideological commitments and educational philosophies. Simultaneously, the decline of LEAs, and the funding channeled to schools through them, has meant that CPD opportunities within maintained schools has, with some exceptions, fragmented (NAO, 2017; Pedder & Darleen Opfer, V., 2011).

**Abolition and ‘selective dismantling’: the ‘bonfire of the quangos’**

Ostensibly implemented to save £2.6 billion, the ‘bonfire of the quangos’ (Walters, 2010) by the Coalition government post-2010 abolished a number of public bodies or ‘quangos’ (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations). Education quangos abolished included the Training and Development Agency for Schools in England (the TDA; established in 1994 to oversee all forms of teacher development); the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA); and the General Teaching Council for England (GTC). Given that these organisations had been public bodies with funding powers, independent board members and an independent chair that reported directly to Parliament, their abolition represented a critical moment in the emergence of new arrangements. In March 2013, the National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL) was formed, merging the TDA’s functions with those of another quango.
In March 2018, the NCTL was abolished and its functions taken in-house to the Department for Education (DfE).

The National Audit Office (2010) and the Institute for Government (IfG) (2010) pointed out that while the government did not have a reliable means of tracking savings made, the ‘bonfire’ per se would not enhance public confidence in public services. Indeed, the IfG noted that quangos or ‘arm’s-length bodies’ had the potential to ‘protect the constitution; regulate big business… and give expert independent advice’ (IfG, 2010, p. 10). Nonetheless, abolition, like privatisation, was an important policy tool under the Coalition. As Wolch (1990) noted, restructuring the welfare state has involved the ‘selective dismantling’ (p. 42) of key institutions that have provided democratic oversight for the state’s delivery of public services. ‘Selective dismantling’ reduces opportunities for public deliberation and accountability while strengthening the decision-making powers of policymakers and reducing their direct responsibilities.

A Conservative focus on education and social mobility: The Opportunity Areas

Arguments about education’s potential to ‘tackle disadvantage’ have been central in Conservative education policy rhetoric since 2010. The 2010 White Paper ‘The Importance of Teaching’ regarded teachers as ‘important’ because they could ‘liberate’ children from disadvantage:

Throughout history, most individuals have been the victims of forces beyond their control. … But education provides a route to liberation from these imposed constraints. Education allows individuals to
choose a fulfilling job, to shape the society around them, to enrich their inner life. It allows us all to become authors of our own life stories. (DfE, 2010a, p. 6)

A ‘crisis’ or ‘equity frame’ (Verger et al, 2016) has enabled the issue of ‘social mobility’ to become primarily associated with school reform in England since 2010 but also with teacher development. Announcing the ‘Opportunity Areas’ programme in October 2017, then Education Secretary Justine Greening described teachers as ‘the experts driving social mobility’ (Greening, 2017). As Greening later acknowledged, Conservatives tend to regard society as a market whose key dynamic is the relationship between ‘opportunity’ and ‘talent’ (Greening, 2019). Arguing that ‘the market [society] is broken’ when it should be ‘free’ suggests a political response to societal inequities founded on belief in a meritocracy (ibid.). While this view takes no account of structural constraints and is ahistorical (Dorling, 2012), it has become appealing to one strand of British Conservatism.

The primary purpose of the policy has been to target resources at increasing ‘social mobility’ (DfE 2017b) in 12 Opportunity Areas experiencing high levels of child poverty identified based on a ‘Social Mobility Index’ (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-mobility-and-opportunity-areas).

Greening stated, again emphasising social mobility, that the TLIF’s aim was to enable ‘new, high-quality CPD provision to be delivered where it can make the most difference and where it’s needed most’ (Greening, 2017). The first TLIF competition and its winners are our focus in this paper.
Studying TLIF: data and methods

Across the PETE study, we have sought to prioritise ‘understanding social change and historical transformation’ (Mosco, 2009, p. 26) in relation to ‘the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time’ (Collinson, 2003, p. 3). In the case of TLIF, we have sought to understand the embeddedness of these interactions between CPD providers and the DfE, their histories and motives, and the political-institutional processes that reproduce and potentially transform what is possible in terms of development opportunities for experienced teachers. To achieve this, we have adopted the multiple method approach of critical policy sociology (Taylor, 1997). This approach requires understanding policies like the TLIF as ‘ideological and political artefacts which have been constructed within a particular historical and political context’ (Gale 1999, p. 399).

The primary data for our analysis of TLIF consists of public records from the websites and archives of regulators in England, such as Companies House and the Charity Commission. We also refer to the websites, course materials and public communications of the eight organisations funded in the first round of TLIF; DfE policy texts; responses to our FOI requests to the DfE; interviews with some of the organisations awarded funding and two unsuccessful bidders. Our study was approved by the King’s College London Research Ethics Committee.

In response to our request for unsuccessful bidders to participate (made via social media channels and personal networks), two organisations agreed to be interviewed. Given there
were 60 unsuccessful applicants to the first round of TLIF (FOI: CRM 0841010), these organisations are clearly neither representative or disinterested. Rather, these interviews were interested accounts of the competitive tendering processes but that nonetheless provided information both the tendering process and how it was perceived. Notes were taken during interviews and later verified by interviewees. The discourse of interviews was not a focus of analysis; the information provided contextualised and extended the publicly available data.

The Teaching and Leadership Innovation Fund

In this section, we summarise the outcomes of our research into the eight organisations that won funding in the first round of TLIF, report on their history, legal-financial status and espoused motives before placing them in the context of the TLIF and current CPD policy. Table 1 displays the winning organisations, amounts awarded, and whether they agreed to participate in the research. A Subject Access Request later confirmed that the DfE had advised them not to do so.12

TABLE 1 HERE

The winning organisations

Institute for Teaching (IfT)

The IfT was announced in 2016-17. Operating as an ‘incubated’ venture within the educational charity ARK (Absolute Return for Kids) for less than two years, it nevertheless won by far the largest TLIF grant. Well connected to DfE policymaking via ARK and its
chain of academy schools, the IfT benefited from a DfE press notice and endorsement at its launch from the Education Secretary, who urged ‘the profession to embrace the high-quality training it will provide’ (DfE, 2017), even though the IfT had no track record.

The IfT’s vision was first presented in a 2016 pamphlet for the Demos think-tank entitled ‘Beyond the Plateau’ (Hood, 2016). It was styled as a ‘graduate school’ after the American model of ‘independent graduate schools of education’ such as Relay (Zeichner, 2016; see also Ellis, Steadman & Trippstad, 2019), despite not having their degree-awarding powers.

The IfT won £6.4m in the first round of TLIF, or 36% of the total allocated, which supported its ‘Transforming Teaching’ course. Course information on the IfT’s website (https://ift.education/courses/transforming-teaching/) stated that schools that met the eligibility criteria would be subject to a fee of £30,000 per year for a ‘two to three year’ course, covered by a TLIF-funded bursary. Course content was unclear, other than that coaching and ‘bespoke support’ are offered to leaders and teachers with a focus on ‘furthering the effectiveness and consistency of your teaching and learning’ (ibid.).

The IfT’s funding was never set out in detail as it published no separate accounts. By 31st August 2018, the IfT brand had merged with another organisation with very close links to ARK, Ambition School Leadership, to become Ambition Institute.
Teach First

A member of the global Teach for All umbrella organisation and modelled on Teach for America (Ellis, Maguire, Trippstad, Liu, Yang & Zeichner, 2015), Teach First, a charity, has received extensive financial and political backing from successive governments. It was awarded £3.9 million (the second highest award).

Its annual report and accounts for 2016-17 (https://bit.ly/2KYZP7b) show Teach First employing 543 staff with income of £61 million and expenditure of £57.9 million. Its primary income sources are government grants and fees charged to schools. Founded in 2002, it has expanded to the point where it sometimes claims to be the largest graduate employer in the UK (The Independent, 2015).

Teach First’s TLIF grant supports the ‘Leading Together Programme’, a two-year programme intended to support a school’s senior leadership team (https://www.teachfirst.org.uk/stories/introducing-leading-together). The programme matches schools with an ‘achievement partner’; provides school leaders with access to 12 ‘learning modules’; ‘bespoke school support’; and ‘school-to-school collaboration’.

A frequent criticism of Teach First concerns the levels of direct state funding it receives at a time when other programmes are funded by tuition fees (Fearn, 2014); it is also recognised as disproportionately expensive compared to other forms of teacher training (NAO, 2016).
Institute of Physics (IoP)

IoP is a learned society and membership organisation awarded a Royal Charter in 1970 but traces its history to 1873. IoP aims to support ‘all of those who share our passion for physics’ (IoP, 2015, np). Operating across schools and universities, it offers research and knowledge exchange; policy advice; and networks of physicists. It is a charity with 525 employees, 1900 volunteers and annual income of £65.8 million (https://bit.ly/2JeinOf).

The IoP has focused on addressing the shortage of specialist Physics teachers and improving the subject confidence of non-specialists; supporting the continued development of specialist Physics teachers; and addressing the gender imbalance in the discipline within a wider context of promoting inclusive Physics classrooms. It works with approximately 1000 schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland and does not charge state-funded schools (IoP, 2015).

The IoP received £2.7 million from TLIF for the ‘Future Physics Leaders’ project. The project aims to support a specialist Physics teacher in ‘hubs’ of Opportunity Area schools (https://www.iop.org/news/17/september/page_70059.html) through six half-day workshops; subject knowledge enhancement workshops for non-specialists; and career development support for NQTs.

Ruth Miskin Training

Ruth Miskin, a former headteacher, has built a successful business through her ‘Read Write Inc’ training and resources that support synthetic phonics instruction. Miskin has won
ministerial endorsements and a significant following among schools. For example, Miskin, as a consultant, was partly responsible for devising the pilot phonics screening framework for Year 1 children under the Coalition in 2011 (Clark 2014).

Ruth Miskin Training is run by Ruth Miskin Literacy Ltd, a private company owned by Miskin, its Chief Executive (https://bit.ly/2WRxmr1). The company appears to generate significant funds through fees paid by schools. The company’s abbreviated 2017 accounts (https://bit.ly/2RnFjya) state that it had £1.87m in ‘cash at bank and in hand’, with ‘shareholders’ funds’ of £3.9m, with Miskin the only shareholder. The company employed 74 people on average in 2016-17. As at March 31st, 2017, Ruth Miskin was owed £1.05 million by her company.

The company was awarded £1.6 million in TLIF 1 for a two-year programme which includes ‘two days of whole-school Read Write Inc. Phonics training; two days of literacy leadership training for the headteacher and reading leader; 16 in-school development days; [and] supply cover for the Reading Leader on 19 days’ (https://www.ruthmiskin.com/en/tlif/). The website adds that this programme is ‘all funded by TLIF – normal cost £14,700’. Up to 108 schools were scheduled to participate.

There appear to be benefits for the company beyond this funding. On its website, it states that TLIF-funded schools ‘will be required to purchase Read Write Inc phonics resources. The publishers (Oxford University Press) are offering a 30 per cent discount’ (ibid.).
STEM Learning

STEM Learning was set up in 2004 as a joint-venture between four universities, with the aim of supporting STEM education. Shares in the private company are owned by York, Leeds, Sheffield and Sheffield Hallam universities equally (https://bit.ly/2IPDGFM). Among its projects are management of the National Science Learning Network, under contract with the DfE, and the STEM Ambassadors programme, under contract with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. In accounts for the year to 31st July, 2018, its turnover was £16.5 million with 111 employees (https://bit.ly/2Kphgya).

Awarded £1.4 million from the first round of TLIF, STEM Learning offers ‘Aspire to STEM’. This programme is intended to support 40 partnerships involving around 200 schools and aims to ‘improve leadership to support STEM teaching’ including developing ‘excellent teaching of STEM subjects’; ‘increasing science capital within disadvantaged communities’; and building ‘teachers’ confidence in advising pupils about STEM careers’ (https://www.stem.org.uk/news-and-views/news/aspire-stem-stem-learning). Participating schools receive up to ten days CPD for teachers and leaders; in-school mentoring; action-planning and review; and collaboration, support and placement activities.

Teacher Development Trust (TDT)

Established in 2012, the TDT enjoys close connections to DfE policymaking through its Chief Executive, David Weston, a former secondary school teacher. It was founded by a former director of the government’s National Centre of Excellence in the Teaching of Mathematics, Dr Mark McCourt. Ten trustees, comprising a range of prominent
educationalists, were appointed, plus an advisory board of equally well-networked figures within the English policy sphere.

In 2017, the TDT was awarded a £1.3 million contract under TLIF to develop CPD ‘Excellence Hubs’ in six Opportunity Areas. TDT was paid £269,048 in 2017-18; this appears to be by far the largest element of its income that year (47%) (https://bit.ly/2ZDBuYV). Previously, its main sources of income had been membership fees and consultancy work, though income from the latter declined significantly between 2016 – 2017 and 2017 - 2018, from £135,955 to £49,032, a gap plugged by TLIF funding. As a proportion of the charity’s income, the TDT Chief Executive’s salary appeared relatively high at 14.6% in 2017 – 2018.

Weston chaired the ‘Expert Group’ that led to the government’s ‘Standard for Teachers’ Professional Development’ (DfE, 2016). The TDT claims that it is ‘uniquely placed in the education system’ to offer ‘cutting-edge intelligence’ including with respect to its ‘policy work’ (https://tdtrust.org/advisor/support-for-providers).

Tom Bennett Training (TBT)

A former secondary school teacher, Tom Bennett rose to prominence through his ‘Behaviour guru’ blog (http://behaviourguru.blogspot.com/), associated books, and social media participation. TBT is a brand name of Anvil Education Ltd, established in 2013, a for-profit company (https://bit.ly/2XivLuz) with a seemingly limited presence in the CPD market before the TLIF award. Bennett is its only director and shareholder.
The abbreviated accounts for TBT/Anvil suggest it started out as a very small business: for the year to 31st May 2014 referring to sums in the hundreds of pounds (https://bit.ly/2ZvUdp4). TBT/Anvil’s 2017-18 accounts (https://bit.ly/2Ro1lRK) show assets increasing from £18,543 in 2017 to £94,236. Anvil was awarded £952,000 from TLIF 1 in May 2017. Its average number of employees moved beyond zero for the first time during 2017-18, with two people employed on average that financial year.

At the time of writing, TBT’s website advertises a behaviour-management course for teachers, ‘Running a room’, and ‘Running a School’ for school management. Course content is unclear on the website; it states that the courses are TLIF-funded and available for free to schools fulfilling DfE criteria. Other schools are reminded that the training is still available ‘at a commercial rate.’ (https://www.tombennetttraining.co.uk/eligibility/).

As a consultant, Bennett has had a very close relationship with the government. His biography on the website of researchED, the campaigning organisation he founded in 2013 (https://researched.org.uk/sessions/tom-bennett/), states that he was appointed the government’s school behaviour ‘czar’ in 2015. He produced a report on behaviour for the government (DfE, 2017) and chaired a DfE working group on ‘pupil behaviour’ in initial teacher education (DfE, 2016).
EdisonLearning UK

EdisonLearning UK was founded in 2002 by senior school leaders looking to develop the support for schools they would like to have received. Later acquired by the owner of the large American school services company, EdisonLearningInc, it was created as a standalone UK company. In 2018, EdisonLearning UK made a post-tax profit of £86,592; its average number of employees was 19 (https://bit.ly/2xikbAq).

Edison Learning claim to take a ‘holistic’ approach to teacher development and school improvement enacted in long-term partnerships with schools. Since 2002, EdisonLearning has worked with over 500 schools and a further 160 from 2013 through the NAHT/Aspires programme developed with the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT), supported as a pilot by the government. EdisonLearning’s model of improvement work is the trade-marked ‘Five Strand Design’ encompassing Pedagogy and Curriculum, Assessment for Learning, Learning Environment, Student and Family Support, and Leadership (http://edisonlearning.net/about-us/).

EdisonLearning UK won a contract worth £950,000 in the first round of TLIF to work with a further 96 schools on the NAHT/Aspire model. By the contract’s end, it aims to have worked with over 1200 teachers.

The TLIF organisations as enterprises

The DfE did not release the value of awards won from the first round of TLIF in 2017 when it announced the winning organisations. Indeed, when asked about the amount it had won, the
IfT responded, ‘at the request of the DfE we are unable to disclose the exact sum’ (Mansell, 2017). We established the amounts through FOI requests and they were ultimately published on the DfE’s Contracts Finder website. This reluctance to disclose information, together with the government’s intervention into our research, suggests a degree of anxiety about the TLIF and Opportunity Areas projects.

*Types of enterprise*

The first round winners of TLIF may be categorised, after Ball (2010, p. 1), as types of ‘entrepreneurial organisation’. Ball saw the creation of such organisations as an effect of ‘the enterprise narrative’ in which enterprise and entrepreneurialism are asserted as ‘new solution[s] to entrenched social problems and as an alternative to public sector provision’ (ibid.). Table 2 displays the winning organisations attributed to an emergent typology of enterprises.

*TABLE 2 HERE*

The *scholarly enterprises* have the longest histories of providing CPD for teachers; a track record of successfully delivering projects in partnership with government; and a mission that goes beyond the aims of TLIF and government policy. These enterprises existed prior to TLIF and, on the basis of past performance, are likely to survive beyond them, trading on their scholarly status.
By contrast, the *entrepreneurs* and *enterprising charities* have shorter histories and some are more closely tied to specific policy directions. Among the *entrepreneurs*, Ruth Miskin has consulted on the teaching of phonics under several governments (Gunter & Mills, 2017). Miskin has developed a successful business with more employees, additional income streams tied to its core activities and a reach beyond the UK.

More typical, historically, of entrepreneurs in the CPD market, EdisonLearning UK’s founders capitalised on their professional expertise as a small or medium-sized enterprise without apparent closeness to policy makers. EdisonLearning existed prior to current CPD policy and looks likely to survive beyond it. What makes EdisonLearning UK unusual is that it is owned by one of the largest American school services companies. On the other hand, TBT, however, seems to have barely existed as a CPD provider prior to its TLIF award. Bennett’s position as the government’s ‘behaviour czar’, among other activities, has cemented his strong association with behaviour management in schools, a school policy priority of both governments after 2010. The *entrepreneurs* run for-profit enterprises.

Among the *enterprising charities*, Teach First has the longest history. It has built relationships with governments since 2002. Despite benefitting from philanthropic donations, the majority of its income comes from government grants and the fees it charges schools. From its accounts, it appears it could not exist as an independent charity without its current level of government funding. The TDT again appeared to be reliant on government funding at a time (2017 – 2018) when its income from other sources was declining. The IfT’s success in securing the largest tranche of TLIF funding is notable, given that it had no track record as an independent entity. Announced in 2016, it was officially launched in 2017 at roughly the
same time as its TLIF award. The *enterprising charities* were not-for-profit enterprises that seemed to exist to meet a policy need, rather than growing in response to market demand or philanthropic donations. To that extent, they are not ‘venture philanthropies’ (Saltman, 2010).

The TLIF arises from a distinctively different political-economic base to previous national CPD initiatives. No LEAs or universities, key partners in CPD delivery historically, were awarded funding (15 universities and 2 local authorities were among 60 unsuccessful bids [FOI: CRM 0841010]) and neither were large private organisations such as CfBT or Capita, with track records of large-scale service delivery. Equally, the amount of funding distributed under TLIF represents a fraction of that allocated to the National Strategies. Instead, a diverse set of enterprises was selected, representing a more fragmented approach to the delivery of a national initiative in the context of austerity policies and indicating a more experimental and fragile ethos to the TLIF initiative.

**A new political economy of teacher development**

We discuss three arguments in this section, concerned with, first, the relationship between the ‘model of the market’ and political values; second, our provisional identification of three types of shadow state structure based on the emergent typology of enterprises introduced earlier; and, third, the significance of the relations of power and interdependence between the state and these shadow state structures.
Neoliberal logic and conservative political values

The winners of TLIF funding were selected through a competitive tendering process typical within public sector procurement. A detailed evaluation process appears to have been conducted by the DfE, with feedback provided on failed bids. Some in the profession, as well as journalists, queried the selection of some organisations regarded as government ‘loyalists.’ One blogger wrote about ‘jobs for the boys’ (Brown-Martin, 2017; see also McInerney, 2017). Invoking the concept of ‘cronyism’, questions were raised over how organisations known for their closeness to government policy, such as Ruth Miskin Training, TBT, Teach First, the TDT and the IfT, had won funding (again) over their competitors.

While the standard operating procedure of neoliberalism is to create market conditions and install competitive mechanisms in the public sector, it would be naïve to believe that competition on the basis of price/value for money, track record and substantive expertise alone are determining. Wendy Brown (2015) cautions that the ‘market model’ is paradigmatic of neoliberal rationality ‘even when money is not at issue’ (p. 31), defining the ‘paradox of neoliberalism’ (p. 48) as:

- structuring markets it claims to liberate from structure, intensely governing
- subjects it claims to free from government, strengthening and retaining
- states it claims to abjure. In the economic realm, neoliberalism aims simultaneously at deregulation and control (p. 49)

From Brown’s perspective, a ‘reluctant state’ (Ball, 2012) exists alongside a state with controlling and more traditionally conservative instincts, using the logic of competition to ‘regulate society by the market’ (p. 37). With reference to British Conservatism, since the
2010 election of the Coalition administration, new manifestations of historical fault-lines can be identified. One such fault-line relates to the Thatcherite contradiction of ‘free market/strong state’ (Gamble, 1988; see also Hall [2011] with specific reference to the 2010 Coalition government) – the capitalist commitment to competition and unregulated market forces - and a more paternalistic commitment to control, traditional moral values and cultural nostalgia.³

Alongside the ‘hollowed out’, ‘reluctant state’ (Ball, 2012), therefore, a more ‘authoritarian state’ (Poulantzas, 1978) seeks to preserve values perceived to be at risk through the unfettered operation of the market; it is authoritarian not in the sense of the exercise of force against opposition but in trying to protect valued policies and practices from dissent, in part through decreased opportunities for public deliberation through the selective dismantling of institutions. In this context, enterprises able to work with radical policies but also political values are likely to be of great use. It is unsurprising, therefore, that tendering process selections have ideological dimensions as well as purely economic and administrative criteria. Indeed, allegations of cronyism miss the point that ‘there is never such a thing as “pure” market relations or economic relations disembedded from particular relations of power’ (Kahn & Formosa, 2002, p. 61). As Kahn and Formosa (2002) note, the economic and political dimensions of governance (in this case, governance of teachers’ CPD) are co-evolutionary.

**Autonomous, intermediate and co-created shadow state enterprises**

Although categorising the organisations that won TLIF funding as types of enterprise can be useful in distinguishing between types of entrepreneurial organisation on the basis of legal-
financial status, it has less explanatory power when analysing the new kinds of relationships of power and privilege between the state and non-state actors that we have described. Therefore, we have provisionally identified three types of shadow state structure to better represent the relationships of power and relational interdependence we have described between the state and non-state actors. We present this more ‘variegated’ and relational (Trudeau, 2008) analysis of the shadow state as an alternative to the concept of cronyism.

The ground for our provisional identification of three types of shadow state structure is the degree of economic, political and policy-related autonomy that each organisation has in the CPD provision market. Table 3 classifies the organisations that won TLIF funding into three types of shadow state structure: autonomous shadow state structures; intermediate shadow state structures; and co-created shadow state structures.

**TABLE 3 HERE**

As the name suggests, autonomous shadow state structures have the highest degree of autonomy. The IoP and STEM Learning trade on the basis of their scholarly heritage and historical contributions to disciplinary knowledge. EdisonLearning UK is more typical of small and medium-sized enterprises that have long traded on their professional expertise. For these organisations, TLIF has been an additional stream of activity and income; for the state, they met a policy need. The success of these autonomous shadow state structures does not depend only on TLIF; they are economically and politically independent and not at significant risk of short-term policy changes.
We identify Ruth Miskin Training and Teach First as *intermediate shadow state enterprises*. By ‘intermediate’, we suggest that while they are not entirely autonomous (economically, politically nor independent of policy), they operate outside of - and are financially viable beyond – this particular initiative. Their relative autonomy arises from different factors. Miskin has created a successful company in terms of profitability and market reach based on her expertise and closeness to policy-makers. However, her business depends on systematic synthetic phonics being government policy (Gunter & Mills, 2017). If policy changed, her company may be unable to sustain its current level of activity. Teach First is primarily a provider of initial teacher education and has grown over time but nonetheless depends in large part on government grants and a more generous funding settlement from the state than other forms of training. To that extent, Ruth Miskin Training appears to have a greater degree of economic and political autonomy than Teach First as a shadow state structure.

In our analysis, the IfT, the TDT and TBT appear to have the least economic, political and policy-related autonomy as shadow state structures. Established either during the Coalition government era (TDT; Anvil Education/TBT) or during the period immediately after the TLIF initiative was announced (IfT), these entities were exceptionally close to policy-makers at personal and organisational levels during this period. Of the three organisations, the TDT had the most visible track record prior to TLIF. At the time of its award, however, its income from other sources was declining. Officially launched one year *after* the TLIF initiative was announced, the IfT still won the largest award. TBT appears to have been a very small business prior to its award in 2017. For each, there appears to be a question of viability in the medium to longer term, whether in relation to organisational growth and therefore increasing
staff costs in the context of declining non-government income (the IfT, now Ambition Institute); the balance between state funding and fee income from service users (TDT); or merely returning to previously low levels of entrepreneurial activity in an open market (TBT). The risks for all three entities are economic, policy-related and political: they are relying on continuity of policy and, to varying degrees, continuity of political values.

We refer to these organisations as *co-created shadow state structures*. Each emerged during the same political moment; they cannot trade on scholarly heritage or contributions to disciplinary or scientific knowledge; they did not exist prior to 2010. We use ‘co-created’ to suggest that they met a need within an area of responsibility the state wished to outsource; that the state created opportunities these organisations could utilise to start up in the market; and that while the state used competitive tendering and the market model, the selection process was, to varying degrees, a process of co-creation of enterprises which, clearly in addition to fulfilling the tendering criteria, could also work with a given set of radical policies and political values. *Co-created shadow state structures* arise out of the meeting of political need and policy entrepreneurship in a context where the state seeks reliable partners, not only (perhaps not even) in terms of a record of efficiency but, critically, in terms of being able to work with given political values.

*Relations of power and interdependence*

The transformation of CPD under TLIF represents a similar process of transformation to academisation – a cultural change as an aspect of political economy rather than just a bureaucratic/administrative one. As Ball (2010) notes, ‘central to this transformation is a process of substitution – a process which replaces traditional public sector actors with others’
Unlike the process under New Labour, centralised CPD policy is mediated through diverse enterprises selected on different lines and representing different types of shadow state structure, leading to more fragmented and fragile situations. Whereas the rationale for the National Strategies was articulated on the basis of a body of research evidence (e.g. Beard, 1999), no such overarching rationale for the TLIF initiative was provided. Similarly, while delivery of the National Strategies was contracted to service organisations with existing infrastructure and track records, these were not essential to win TLIF funding. While continuity exists in the use of ‘entrepreneurs to address intractable and ‘wicked’ social problems’ (Ball, 2012, p. 95), austere economic conditions and politically conservative values are producing new arrangements for national CPD provision under TLIF. We see the emergence of co-created shadow state structures as qualitatively different features of these new relations between the state and non-state actors and argue that TLIF represents a new political economy of teacher development in England.

Another feature of this new political economy is the structural reconfiguration of governance and the state. Not only are policy formation and delivery less subject to open deliberation following the ‘bonfire of the quangos’ and the academisation of the school system, but as additional responsibilities were assumed by the DfE at a time of reduced civil servant numbers and budgetary cuts, resources to complete these tasks are more tightly stretched. The fragility of the state’s capacity to govern may have impacts on political decision-making and the nature of these impacts is inevitably going to be more difficult to discern given that the processes are less open to scrutiny. Taken together, new governance arrangements and reduced funding may help to explain the apparent anxiety around the TLIF policy. In this context, the selection of ‘loyal’ or trusted entrepreneurs and enterprising charities may reflect the interdependence of the state and the co-created shadow state structures in a
political economy characterised by the selective dismantling of public bodies that historically mediated policy and funding, and the exclusion of previous partners in service delivery, such as LEAs and universities.

**Conclusion**

We have argued that, since 2010, a new political economy for teacher development in England has emerged, representing a qualitative shift in the mechanisms and ethos of education privatisation, driven by the historical fault-line between ‘free market/strong state’ (Hall, 2011) in British conservatism during times of economic austerity. We have argued that interdependent relations of power and privilege have been established with a diverse set of enterprises being substituted for public sector actors in the delivery of nationally determined CPD policy for teachers, unlike the service delivery organisations and companies selected for previous outsourced CPD interventions. In particular, we have developed an emergent typology of enterprises (*scholarly enterprises, entrepreneurs* and *enterprising charities*) involved in the process of substitution and have provisionally identified three types of shadow state structure - *autonomous, intermediate* and *co-created* – for further critical examination.

Finally, it is worth emphasising that TLIF was focused on the high-poverty Opportunity Areas on the assumption that CPD for teachers in these areas would improve young people’s ‘social mobility’. To that extent, TLIF connects to influential, globally travelling ideas about the relationship between ‘teaching quality’ and ‘social mobility’ (Barber & Moursheed, 2007). The TLIF is an example of a narrowly focused kind of CPD, based on more explicitly economistic assumptions about improving teaching in order to ‘liberate’ young people’s
‘social mobility’. It was advanced not as a general opportunity for teacher development, but as the primary policy solution for addressing entrenched and highly spatialised economic problems. In addition to the STEM focus, phonics instruction, behaviour management and leadership represent familiar policy responses to intractable social and economic rather than specifically educational problems. It is the combination of these familiar policy responses within reconfigured regimes of governance and funding delivered by a set of enterprises that in some cases operate as *co-created shadow state structures* that leads us to identify the current arrangements as representing a new political economy for teacher development in England.
Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Helen Gunter, Tom Are Trippstad, Justin Fisher and Meg Maguire for their critical feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.
References


Department for Education (2017a) Creating a Culture: How school leaders can optimize behavior. (Author: Tom Bennett). London: DfE.


Notes

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1 A response to a Subject Access Request (CRM:0841011) by the first author of this paper confirmed that officials in the Department for Education wrote to the winners of TLIF 1 funding in October 2018 to ask them not to participate in our research as this might ‘negatively impact on what TLIF is trying to achieve before we are able to provide any evaluation of impact/success’.

2 https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/50d0c65f-c713-44f1-a38f-fc9fb1331cc2?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U

Amounts awarded are detailed on the Contracts Finder at these locations:

Teach First: £3.9m https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/f4cd3cbf-0bd3-4f6b-a49d-91dc0578c134?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U

The Institute for Teaching (Ark Schools): £6.4m https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/13bc5ef6-b179-46d2-9930-c7e065be701f?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U

Anvil Education: £952k https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/8be995b5-3e74-4f80-97a0-3ac7595c228b?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U

EdisonLearning: £950k https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/10265c94-c866-4a49-a7a3-f54c70340951?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U

Institute of Physics: £2.7m https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/fda48213-a232-416f-ae2e-8e93c0d2136f?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U

STEM Learning: £1.4m https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/a85029de-0316-4dbd-8ff6-c7605008e1b9?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U

Teacher Development Trust: £1.3m https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/c2009dd3-c7d1-4817-b884-827c288634a8?p=@FQxUIRRPT0=NjJNT08=U
Ruth Miskin Training: £1.6m [https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/f74a8e91-dec7-4ff8-8f45-cc5e8d4669ac?p=@@FQxULRRPT0=NjJNT08=U]

3 Gamble (1988), referring to a key characteristic of ‘New Right’ governments such as Margaret Thatcher’s, noted that a ‘strong state’ was required ‘to break the resistance of special interests, including the new class of public sector professionals who are likely to oppose’ such governments’ radical policies (p. 33).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Funding awarded</th>
<th>Response to request to participate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Teaching</td>
<td>£6.4 million</td>
<td>Declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach First</td>
<td>£3.9 million</td>
<td>Nothing received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Physics</td>
<td>£2.7 million</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Miskin Training</td>
<td>£1.6 million</td>
<td>Declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM Learning</td>
<td>£1.4 million</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Teacher Development Trust</td>
<td>£1.3 million</td>
<td>Declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Bennett Training</td>
<td>£952,000</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EdisonLearning UK</td>
<td>£950,000</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Successful bidders to the Teaching and Leadership Innovation Fund, Round 1*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of enterprise</th>
<th>TLIF organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Ruth Miskin Training; Tom Bennett Training (TBT); EdisonLearning UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarly enterprises</td>
<td>Institute of Physics (IoP); STEM Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprising charities</td>
<td>Institute for Teaching (IfT); Teach First; Teacher Development Trust (TDT)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: The winning TLIF organisations categorised as types of enterprise*
Table 3: The TLIF winning organisations categorised as three types of shadow state structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous shadow state structures</th>
<th>Intermediate shadow state structures</th>
<th>Co-created shadow state structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Physics (IoP) (scholarly enterprise)</td>
<td>Ruth Miskin Training (entrepreneur)</td>
<td>Institute for Teaching (IfT) (enterprising charity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM Learning (scholarly enterprise)</td>
<td>Teach First (enterprising charity)</td>
<td>Teacher Development Trust (TDT) (enterprising charity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EdisonLearning UK (entrepreneur)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tom Bennett Training (TBT) (entrepreneur)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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