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THE INFLUENCE OF UN AND NATO THEATER-LEVEL COMMANDERS ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER OVER BOSNIA DURING DENY FLIGHT: 1993-1995

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the role that theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO played in influencing the use of airpower over Bosnia between the spring of 1993 and the end of 1995. It also uncovers factors explaining why the top UN and NATO commanders in the region acted as they did. The central thesis of this study is that the commanders’ needs to balance the various responsibilities inherent in command powerfully affected their actions when they tried to influence the use of airpower. Stress on these commanders was greatest when they felt forced to make tradeoffs that put their forces at risk without a corresponding payoff in terms of mission accomplishment. In attempting to strike the proper balance between force protection, mission accomplishment, and obedience to civilian political control, commanders drew on their own expertise and that of their staffs. Not surprisingly then, the traditional division between soldiers and airmen over the utility of airpower manifest itself in a split dividing UN army generals from senior NATO airmen, and also helps to explain each groups actions. Because this case is presented in a chronological fashion, it offers the first coherent account of operation Deny Flight—the NATO air operations over Bosnia from April of 1993 until December of 1995. From start to finish, the theater-level commanders acted as more than mere executors of policy. They helped to define their own missions, strove to control the use of airpower, and generally struggled to maintain operational autonomy, so they could fulfill their responsibilities for mission accomplishment and force protection.

Disclaimer: The opinions and conclusions in this paper are those of the author and are not intended to represent the official position of the Department of Defense, the US Air Force, or any other government agency.
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A glance through the footnotes and bibliography would reveal the enormous debt I owe to the many military officers I interviewed for this study—too many to recognize individually here. Often their candor was startling, and their enthusiasm for my research was an encouraging sign to me of the worth of my chosen topic.

My deepest affection and gratitude go to my wife Barbara for her friendship and support throughout this unique and challenging endeavor.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

_This thin edge between what is appropriate for the military to decide and what the civilians decide is a constantly shifting kaleidoscope in history, depending on the circumstances and political factors. It is the core of the decision on when you use air power._

—Richard Holbrooke, Balkans Air Campaign Study Interview

This study focuses on the influence of theater-level commanders on the use of airpower in Bosnia during Deny Flight—the NATO air operation over Bosnia between April of 1993 and December of 1995. In particular, the aim here is to examine how theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO affected the use of airpower and, to the extent possible, explain why they acted as they did. It is the first in-depth, academic study of Deny Flight as a whole.

Military influence on the use of force has often been assumed, but not researched, according to Richard Betts, in his study of post-1945 interventions: _Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises._\(^1\) Betts broke new ground, and found that senior US military officers have generally been less influential than widely believed in decisions over whether to use force. But, when it came to the question of how to intervene, Betts concluded that military leaders jealously protected what they saw as their prerogative for control over operational matters.\(^2\) A decade after Betts's pioneering work, further research by David Petraeus into military influence on the use of force showed that the military have been far more influential in decisions over how force gets used than whether it gets used.\(^3\) Moreover, Petraeus found that theater commanders had the greatest impact when they `submitted plans that satisfied the objectives of the decision-makers in

\(^1\) Betts, 1.
\(^2\) Ibid., 11-12.
\(^3\) Petraeus, 'Military Influence,' 495; and Petraeus, 'American Military,' 249-253.
Washington. Petraeus's work considered intervention decision-making prior to 1987, just when congressionally legislated defense reorganization gave theater commanders a stronger role in controlling decisions over the use of force. A hypothesis tested in this study is that theater-level commanders were influential in affecting decisions over the use of airpower in Bosnia, rather than being mere executors of policy.

By theater-level commanders, I mean military commanders responsible for a given theater of operations and their principal subordinate commanders. A theater commander's job is to help plan military options to obtain policy objectives, and when directed, to translate military action into political objectives. If theater-level commanders sometimes played a leading role in shaping policy, rather than just planning for and executing policies on the use of force, it would be interesting to know why they did so. Some observers have cited the apparent risk-averse nature of the American military, largely ascribed to experiences of the Vietnam War, as the root cause for military transgressions into policy decisions. Indeed, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was a prime example of the Vietnam generation of officers, and his opposition to US intervention in Bosnia has been scrutinized by commentators interested in civil-military relations. However, Petraeus noted the US military's increased reluctance to intervene abroad after Vietnam was an intensification of existing attitudes, rather than a new found cautionousness. This suggested the basis for

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4 Petraeus, 'American Military,' 255.
5 Some observers believed the legislation went too far in empowering the theater commanders. See, Previdi, Civilian Control versus Military Rule, 123; and Bourne, 'Unintended Consequences of Goldwater-Nichols: The Effect on Civilian Control of the Military,' 249-256.
6 On the UN side I will focus on the overall force commanders, headquartered in Zagreb, and their subordinate commanders for operations in Bosnia. For NATO, I will focus on the officers filling the positions of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and the Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH). I also include General Chambers, the first director of NATO's Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) as a theater-level commander, because he was the US Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) until his departure in November 1994.
7 Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, III-4 and III-5. The UK's Defense Doctrine, published after Deny Flight, envisioned the planning function taking place at a higher level, though still with input from the operational commanders. JWP 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, 1.8-1.9.
10 Petraeus, 'American Military,' 258.
risk-aversion lay in more enduring elements of the military profession. Another hypothesis tested here, then, is that the role UN and NATO theater-level commanders chose to play, when acting as more than just executors of policy in Bosnia, was rooted in military professionalism, and can be explained, in part, in terms of commanders' special expertise and responsibility as managers of violence.

The central question of this study is: How did theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO influence the use of airpower in Bosnia? In order to analyze this military influence, I considered several subsidiary questions: First, what patterns were there to the military positions on using airpower in Bosnia? Were American commanders more apt to push for forceful measures than officers from other nations? Were army generals consistently more, or less, willing than air force generals to support the use of airpower? Second, what were the primary factors that shaped the various military attitudes toward using airpower? Specifically, how well do expertise and responsibility—two elements of military professionalism—explain the decisions and actions of the theater-level commanders? Third, how were the demands for impartiality and proportionality reconciled with traditional military principles of the objective, offense, mass, and surprise? Fourth, what methods did military leaders use to exert their influence? To what extent were military attempts to influence the use of force confined to traditional or prescribed military roles, and when, if ever, did military leaders seek unconventional means of influencing policy? Did the commanders work strictly through the chains of command? Did subordinate commanders follow policy decisions and orders from above so as to implement policy, or did they try to affect the shape of policy? Finally, what happened? In what ways did military advisors and commanders succeed or fail in influencing the use of airpower? How was airpower used?

Existing Literature

Of the books, articles, and other studies on the war in Bosnia, few focus on Deny Flight, and none takes military influence on the use of airpower as its central theme. However, other works touch upon the topic studied here, and I have divided them into three categories according to the primary focus taken by their authors: political and diplomatic, UN military, and airpower. Lord David Owen recorded important elements
of the debates about using airpower in Bosnia in *Balkan Odyssey*, the detailed accounting of his role as the European Union’s principal negotiator to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY).\(^{11}\) Despite his numerous references to airpower, though, Lord Owen was primarily concerned with providing an accurate and detailed account of the attempts by ICFY to produce a negotiated settlement in former Yugoslavia. Therefore, in his book, he understandably gave pride of place to the role of political leaders, rather than the operational commanders. However, Owen provided sporadic glimpses of the theater commanders serving the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Of particular interest here, he noted the political-military friction in early 1994 over the control of airpower, between General Cot, the overall force commander, and senior civilian officials with the UN, including the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.\(^{12}\) Lord Owen also delivered a snapshot of the tension between General Rose and US officials over the need for suppressing the Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missile threat in November of 1994.\(^{13}\) Owen captured the issue well in the brief coverage he gave to it, but his anonymous references to NATO missed the important role played by the Alliance’s the two theater-level commanders in the region: General Mike Ryan and Admiral Leighton Smith. Overall, *Balkan Odyssey* is a valuable reference book which details the international diplomacy in the region, thus establishing part of the broader context for viewing the theater-level commanders’ struggles to control airpower.

Dick Leurdijk’s *The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force* focused more on international efforts to use force in Bosnia, than *Balkan Odyssey* did.\(^{14}\) Leurdijk’s book also presented the UN perspective of the conflict, thus complementing the European viewpoint offered by Lord Owen.\(^{15}\) Leurdijk reconstructed the events and important decisions related to the UN’s ‘safe area’ policy in Bosnia and NATO’s use of airpower. Though full of insights into the give-and-take amongst the various nations in NATO, Leurdijk diplomatically side-stepped or downplayed major points of friction that lay at the heart of the debates over NATO’s use

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\(^{12}\) Ibid., 264-265.

\(^{13}\) David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 329.


\(^{15}\) The London Conference of August 1992 established the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (IFCY), which was co-chaired by a UN and an EC/EU negotiator. The UN chairmen was Cyrus Vance until 1 May 1993, then Thorvald Stoltenberg. The EC/EU chairmen was Lord Owen until 12 June 1995, then Carl Bildt. For an overview of NATO’s role and perspective, see, Gregory L. Schulte, ‘Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO,’ *Survival* 39, no. 1(Spring 1997): 19-42.
of airpower in Bosnia. This masked some of the tension that existed within NATO, and glossed over significant strains in the civil-military relations within the UN. Still, Leurdijk’s work served as a ready reference for documentation on the NATO decisions to use airpower in Bosnia.

Richard Holbrooke’s memoir, To End a War, told one side of the story about the disputes he had with Admiral Leighton Smith, the theater commander of forces in NATO’s southern region. Holbrooke wanted more control over NATO bombing during his coercive diplomacy with the Serbs in September of 1995, but Smith resisted interference in operational matters from outside the chain of command. Holbrooke recognized the admiral’s responsibility for the lives of NATO airmen, but he interpreted Smith’s claim that NATO was running out of targets during the Deliberate Force bombing campaign to mean: ‘Smith did not wish to let the bombing be “used” by the negotiators, and would decide when to stop based on his own judgment.’ The thrust of Holbrooke’s account was that for his important negotiations he needed some control over the coercive ‘sticks’ being used, and Admiral Smith was overly cautious in resisting Holbrooke’s inputs into bombing decisions.

The central thesis of Triumph of the Lack of Will, by James Gow, was that the international community could have intervened before the summer of 1995 to stop the war in the former Yugoslavia. Echoing a note sounded by Lord Owen, Gow argued that had there been sufficient international political will to use force to impose the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in the spring of 1993—or to impose successive settlement plans thereafter—then much of the violence over the next two and a half years probably could have been avoided. Gow went further than Leurdijk in detailing the problems of ‘dual-key’ command and control over NATO airpower, and the friction generated between UN military commanders and their civilian superiors over the latter’s reluctance to use force. He also gave a fuller account of the divisions within NATO over airstrikes, though, for the most part, he focused on differences between the nations, rather than the tensions between civilian and military leaders, or the divisions within the various military organizations involved. Of significance to this study, Gow analyzed the change of heart by General Rose, the UN commander in Bosnia during 1994, after the failed attempt to

16 For instance, Leurdijk provides little discussion on the ‘dual-key’ command and control arrangements whereby NATO and the UN jointly controlled the authority to authorize airstrikes.
17 Holbrooke, To End a War, 146.
19 Ibid., 137-139, and 149-154.
use airpower effectively at Gorazde in April of that year. Of General Rose, Gow noted: 'Like any good commander, his loyalty was with his troops: if the UN could not be relied on to back him and the force in critical moments, then for the sake of the soldiers' morale and credibility it was simply better not to move to a use of force.' Gow has also described how Rose's successor, General Rupert Smith, precipitated a hostage crisis for the UN that ultimately helped to make a NATO air campaign in Bosnia a viable option. Chapter 7 of this study will build on the foundation set by Gow.

In contrast to Gow, Jane Sharp took a highly critical view of General Rose in her report: Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion. For Sharp, Rose consistently acted as a surrogate for the British government, and together their concern for British peacekeepers in Bosnia, and alleged sympathy toward the Serbs, led them to do everything within their power to block NATO airstrikes. Though Gow and Sharp believed General Rose played an important role in reducing the likelihood of the UN using airpower, Sharp saw greater continuity in Rose's reluctance to take enforcement action against the Bosnian Serbs. Sharp's praise for General Smith reinforced Gow's argument about Smith's role in paving the way for NATO airstrikes in Bosnia. Overall, however, Sharp downplayed the dangers UN forces faced whenever NATO used airpower, and she did not address the legitimate concerns of the UN commanders responsible for those forces.

Two works on political-military interaction during Deny Flight shed a little light on the influence of theater-level commanders in affecting policy and the use of airpower in Bosnia. Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, of the British Army, served as Lord Owen's first military advisor in Geneva. Although Messervy-Whiting left his posting in Geneva in August of 1993, just after NATO authorized air-to-ground operations in Bosnia, he recorded General Cot's role in establishing a NATO liaison element to compensate for the lack of airpower expertise within the UN. In a broader look at civil-military relations, Michael Williams argued: 'France and the UK, rather than the UN Secretariat, tended to define UNPROFOR's operational mission.' Williams, who served as Director of Information and Senior Spokesman for UNPROFOR, also claimed:

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20 Ibid., 136, 146.
21 Ibid., 151.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 267-269.
24 Jane Sharp, Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion: British Policy in Former Yugoslavia, 32-34, and 42-46.
25 Ibid., 50-54.
27 Michael Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, 46.
British and French officers effectively restricted UNPROFOR’s mission to humanitarian assistance. Williams was in a good position to draw his conclusions, but he gave few details to support them.

The second category of literature on intervention in Bosnia describes the UN's peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, thus providing a ground view of events, rather than an airman’s perspective. Firsthand accounts by commanders during the early stages of the UN’s presence in Bosnia give excellent insights into the ad hoc workings of UNPROFOR, and the scope for initiative and influence afforded to commanders by the UN headquarters’ lax oversight and its inability to manage events so far from New York. UNPROFOR’s first commander, General Satish Nambiar of India, particularly praised the French for bringing to Bosnia five times the number of armored personnel carriers authorized by the UN. Canada’s General Lewis MacKenzie, the first UN commander in Bosnia, recounted his role in July of 1992 in securing extra firepower for Canadian peacekeepers, by working around the UN bureaucracy and dealing with his own government:

The UN never did authorize us to bring the missiles for the TOW [anti-tank weapon]. We were authorized to bring the vehicle [it was mounted on]... In the end, we cheated and brought the missiles anyway. Can you imagine telling soldiers to bring the weapon but not the ammunition? We were also told we could bring mortars, but not high-explosive ammunition—only illuminating rounds to help us see at night. We ignored that order also (emphasis added).

Interestingly, these early UN commanders had next to nothing to say on the topic of airpower, even though a public debate about using airpower in Bosnia was underway during their tours of duty in late 1992 and early 1993. When they did comment on possible air operations, their views were mixed. In July of 1992, MacKenzie urged Nambiar to refuse offers for close air support, writing: ‘the use of air power on our behalf would clearly associate us with the side not being attacked, and thereafter we would very quickly be branded an intervention force, as opposed to an impartial peacekeeping force.’ General Morillon, of France, commanded UN troops in Bosnia after they had been given a more muscular mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In his memoir, Morillon’s only remark about airpower was more positive than MacKenzie’s: ‘It

Ibid.
20 Nambiar, 89.
31 MacKenzie, Peacekeeper, 310.
32 Ibid., 428.
is not sufficient to be passively protected against the threats, it is necessary to be able to make them stop by responding to them...against artillery, the use of aviation is essential.33 However, Morillon, like the other early commanders, left the former Yugoslavia before NATO airpower was ready for air-to-ground missions in Bosnia.

General Francis Briquemont, of Belgium, succeeded General Morillon, and Briquemont had much more to say about NATO airpower in his memoir, Do Something, General!34 The title of his book characterized the specificity of the political guidance given to Briquemont and his superior, General Cot of France, during most of their time in Bosnia.35 They were the first UN generals to exercise some influence on the use of airpower in Bosnia, as will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of this study. However, no bombs fell while either of them served with the UN. Briquemont’s replacement, General Rose, also wrote about his experiences at the head of the UN’s Bosnia-Hercegovina Command.36 Though generally restrained, during and just after his tour in Bosnia, in his remarks about the limitations of airpower,37 in his memoir Rose vented some of the frustration from his run-ins with the theater-level commanders in NATO who wanted to use airpower more aggressively.38 Rose’s book also gave his version of the large role he played in shaping NATO air action through the end of 1994—a topic addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this study.

In Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, Jan Honig and Norbert Both revealed the divergence of views between the two principal UN commanders during 1995: French General Bernard Janvier, and his subordinate British commander in Bosnia, General Rupert Smith.39 During the spring of 1995, the UN commanders disagreed over whether to take more forceful action in Bosnia, including airstrikes. Of special interest were the authors’ revelations about the role of Rupert Smith in helping statesmen in the UN and NATO to confront the impossibility of simultaneously attempting to do peacekeeping and enforcement.40 Though Honig and Both provided excellent evidence and analysis on the role of UN commanders in influencing the use of airpower in Bosnia, that was not the principal focus of their book. They did not discuss the role of NATO commanders, and in

33 Morillon, Croire et Oser, 213.
34 Briquemont, DoSomething, General: Chronique de Bosnie-Herzégovine.
36 Rose, Fighting For Peace.
38 Rose, Fighting, 177.
39 Honig and Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime.

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the final footnote of the book, the authors erroneously concluded that: ‘Air attacks, which
the Clinton administration so favoured and executed, proved relatively ineffective in
September 1995. The NATO air forces quickly ran out of targets and, in 750 attack
missions, bombed the same fifty-six targets over and over again.’\textsuperscript{41} Such a misconception
by these otherwise well-informed scholars was indicative of the paucity of information on
NATO air operations available at the time they wrote. Another book on Srebrenica, by
investigative journalist David Rohde, provided supplementary evidence and worthwhile
analysis of the roles played by the top UNPROFOR officials in decisions over the use of
airpower during the summer of 1995.\textsuperscript{42}

Peacekeeping, 1992-1995,’ examined the efforts by the two international organizations to
work together in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{43} In 1994, Hagman was a staff officer with UNPROFOR, thus
he was an authoritative source on UNPROFOR’s views on the use of airpower, and he
marshaled some of the staff analysis he himself produced as evidence for his research.
Because his focus was on peacekeeping, rather than enforcement, he devoted very little
attention to NATO’s responsibility to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Moreover,
throughout the thesis, the word ‘airstrike’ is often preceded by the word ‘punitive,’ or
followed by the word ‘retribution.’ Air attacks, other than close air support requested by
the UN, were virtually illegitimate in Hagman’s view, because one of his key assumptions
was that NATO air operations were subordinate to UNPROFOR’s mission. As such,
airpower was really meant to be supporting UN peacekeeping. That was one view of
what NATO should have been doing in Bosnia but, as Hagman noted, NATO officers
held different views.

Only a handful of works have focused specifically on airpower in Bosnia;
however, in research theses and reports produced after Deny Flight, several air force
officers took an alternative view from the one taken by Hagman of NATO’s role over
Bosnia. According to Major George Kramlinger, in ‘Sustained Coercive Air Presence
(SCAP),’ from February of 1994 onward, NATO was in a struggle with the UN over
whether to coerce the Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{44} As with the other researchers, Kramlinger
captured the high-points of Deny Flight, but did not dwell on, or analyze, decisions over

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 141-159.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 186.
\textsuperscript{42} Rohde, A Safe Area, Srebrenica.
\textsuperscript{43} Hans-Christian Hagman, ‘UN-NATO Operational Co-operation in Peacekeeping 1992-1995,’ (Ph.D.
diss., King’s College, University of London, 1997).
the use of airpower. Per Erik Solli also saw Deny Flight as an exercise in coercion, rather than as a peacekeeping venture. 45 Similarly, in Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Major Michael O. Beale aimed to provide an account, within the political and historical context of the war in Bosnia, of Deny Flight's evolution from constrained deterrence to more proactive coercion. 46 By going out of his way to consider the Serb viewpoint, Beale revealed many of the complexities of using force in Bosnia. Finally, a pair of research reports on airpower in coalition operations built on the assumption that NATO airpower was over Bosnia for coercion, and that the UN was largely in the way. 47 In addition to their informative texts, these reports contained useful bibliographies.

One of the earliest treatments of airpower in Bosnia appeared as a book chapter in Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason's Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal. 48 The Air Marshal's description of the airpower debates at the policy-making level was informative, and he documented the debate in Britain particularly well. At the time of the book's writing, though, NATO and the UN had used airpower primarily to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and NATO attempts to affect the fighting on the ground were just beginning. Mason's later contributions on the use of airpower over Bosnia have been mostly theoretical—extracting the broader lessons about using airpower in peace support operations. 49 Therefore, while Mason identified and discussed issues such as proportionality, impartiality, and consent—which lay at the heart of the airpower disputes—he did so in an attempt to generalize from the experiences of Bosnia, rather than to document the actions of the theater-level commanders.

Tim Ripley, a journalist and photographer who covered military operations in the former Yugoslavia, purveyed a solid overview of Deny Flight in his book Air War Bosnia. 50 The book supplemented Ripley's many magazine articles, 51 providing a wealth of detailed information about air operations during Deny Flight. 52

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44 Kramlinger, 'Sustained Coercive Air Presence,' 48-76.
45 Solli, 'In Bosnia, Deterrence Failed and Coercion Worked,' 94-115; and Solli, UN and NATO Air Power in the Former Yugoslavia.
46 Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia.
47 Peach, RAF, 'Air Power in Peace Support Operations: Coercion versus Coalition,' 70-76; and Hunt, 'Coalition Warfare Considerations for the Air Component Commander,' 48-65. Also see, Waxman, 'Coalitions and Limits on Coercive Diplomacy,' 38-47.
48 Mason, Air Power, 168-197.
50 Ripley, Air War Bosnia.
51 The articles by Ripley include: 'Oration Deny Flight;' 'Blue Sword over Bosnia;' 'NATO Strikes Back;' 'Operation Deliberate Force;' 'Airpower Vindicated;' 'Reasons for Being;' 'A Deliberate Force on the
Colonel Robert Owen, headed a team of researchers to produce the *Balkans Air Campaign Study* (BACS) sponsored by Air University, a division of the US Air Force. Once published, the BACS report will be the most comprehensive work on the planning and execution of Operation Deliberate Force—the brief NATO bombing campaign in late August and September of 1995. Though the study deals primarily with Deliberate Force, which was technically a part of Deny Flight, it also reveals many previously unpublished aspects of Deny Flight stretching back to 1993. The message of the report is that airpower played a significant role in coercing the Bosnian Serbs to comply with UN and NATO demands, thus ending the three and a half year siege of Sarajevo, and paving the way for the Dayton peace talks. Because the study was directed by, and for, the US Air Force, its strengths are its practical focus and its wealth of information from American sources. These strengths, however, tend to eclipse the role played by UN advisors and commanders in influencing the use of airpower, and the study does not analyze events before the Pale airstrikes in May of 1995. Though publication of the report has been repeatedly delayed, two summary articles appeared in *Airpower Journal,* and a final draft copy of the report was approved for release in July of 1998.

**Method**

In this study, I employed a single case study method befitting a contemporary history. I have used the techniques of identifying, accessing, ordering, and evaluating evidence that one would employ for writing history, but I enriched the data with interviews and first hand observations. I chose to address this single case because the use of airpower over Bosnia fits what Robert Yin called an 'extreme or unique case'—to be used when a situation is 'so rare that any single case is worth documenting and analyzing.' Deny Flight is worth documenting and analyzing for a number of reasons. Others have studied it in order to draw theoretical lessons about the employment of

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51 Ripley has a book forthcoming on Deliberate Force, for which he conducted many interviews with high-level officials in the US, UK, and France. In the book, he presents a lot of new information on the ground campaigns in Bosnia and Croatia during 1995.


55 Ibid., 44.
airpower in peace support activities, but no one has yet studied the role of the theater-level commanders and their influence on the use of airpower. Deny Flight was unique in that divisions at the political level within the UN, within NATO, and between the UN and NATO, made it impossible for political authorities in either the UN or NATO to give clear instructions to their theater commanders about the objective for employing airpower. As argued at the outset of Chapter 4, this left the operational commanders a great deal of leeway in helping their political masters to sort out who would control NATO airpower, and to what end. Moreover, the divided command chain between the UN and NATO left army generals serving with the UN to contend with senior NATO airmen about how to use airpower—a tool which soldiers and airmen have traditionally struggled with each other to control.

To test the hypotheses on the influence of theater-level commanders, I endeavored to find the origins of the plans they used, the objectives served by those plans, and the commanders’ methods of, and success in, promoting their plans. For uses of airpower that were responses to provocations rather than planned operations, I attempted to determine who made the targeting decisions, and how targeting choices were constrained in advance. In order to determine the role that expertise and command responsibility played in affecting the actions and decisions of the commanders, I asked them to explain their concerns and frustrations. I also asked them if there were any actual or potential issues over which they considered resigning. More importantly, in evaluating the commanders’ actions, I looked for patterns reflecting their approaches to using airpower, and checked for changes over time. Through interviews and documentary evidence, I sought to establish the causes of the apparent patterns and any changes. In analyzing evidence, I focused on cases where command responsibilities and military expertise were likely to lead to courses of action different from the ones I would have predicted if other factors were driving the commanders’ decisions, e.g., national political pressures, peacekeeping doctrine, personal advancement, UN or NATO organizational biases.

I gathered evidence for this case study from press accounts, secondary studies of Deny Flight and UNPROFOR, investigative journalists’ accounts, memoirs, and transcripts from press conferences and press releases from the White House, the Pentagon, NATO headquarters in Brussels, and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples. The academic version of Lord Owen’s encyclopedic CD-ROM

57 For instance, see: Mason, ‘Operations in Search of a Title,’ 157-178; and Lambert and Williamson, The Dynamics of Air Power, 105-173.
companion to Balkan Odyssey provided useful data, as did the archival holdings for the BBC/Discovery Channel program, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, held at the Liddell Hart Archives, King's College, University of London. I consulted UN documents, including records of Security Council debates, resolutions, and reports from the Secretary-General. \(^{58}\) I also drew information from US Congressional and UK Parliamentary reports, unclassified portions of (mainly US) military studies, organizational histories, briefings, and reports. In addition, I traveled extensively in Britain, and to Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the US to interview diplomats, NATO and UN staff officers, and participants—peacekeepers and pilots. These sources allowed me to identify the important events, major decision points, and the actors involved in shaping Deny Flight. I also interviewed the theater-level commanders, and other senior officials in the US, UK, France, and Belgium. Accessing French sources and securing and conducting interviews in Paris meant I had to learn French. In all, I conducted over sixty separate interviews, roughly half of them with general officers or admirals. Finally, I made two separate, two-week-long visits to the US Air Force Historical Research Agency to conduct documentary research and to review oral histories held in the Balkans Air Campaign Study Collection. On the second of those trips, I was able to extract over one hundred pages of notes from classified sources, have them reviewed for classification, and declassified as necessary.

In five of the interviews I conducted, including the interviews with Generals Janvier and Chambers, the limitations of interview data were reduced somewhat, because the interviewees kept journals and other documentary evidence from their tours of duty, and they referred to these notes during the interviews. In addition, an interview with the commander of NATO air forces for the southern region, General Ashy, was based on a detailed classified briefing, and the redacted transcript of the interview that I worked from contained sixty-six pages of text accompanied by over forty overhead slides. It included a verbatim mission statement from the North Atlantic Council, concepts of operations for different types of missions, and air orders of battle for the Balkan states. My interviews with principal decision-makers also revealed information unlikely to be captured in documents, such as details of important meetings, briefings, and phone calls. When

\(^{58}\) Throughout this study, I use the UN's system of notation to refer to UN documents. Thus, Security Council Resolution 836 will be referred to in the footnotes as S/RES/836. A valuable compendium of UN Security Council resolutions, debates, and UN Secretary-General reports prior to May of 1994 is contained in Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller, eds., The 'Yugoslav' Crisis in International Law, General Issues
several individuals from different organizations, and with potentially different interests at stake, provided similar accounts of events, that were also consistent with publicly available information, I considered the information reliable. Where accounts differed, I invited interviewees to explain the apparent contradictions, or to elaborate on the differences in perspective. Sometimes this helped to clarify what took place. In other cases I was left with conflicting or incomplete versions of what had occurred. Throughout the text and footnotes of this study, I have indicated where I was unable to reconcile differing accounts of the same events, or where alternative explanations should be considered. Unfortunately, some of the officials I interviewed spoke only on the condition of anonymity. Others asked to see my work before agreeing to let me cite them by name, and I have not yet received permission to name them. Both the anonymous interviewees, and those who might be named later, are cited in the footnotes as Military Official A, or MoD Official B, etc. Regrettably, I did not get to interview General Rupert Smith, the UN commander in Bosnia during 1995. Given General Smith's pivotal role, the absence of an interview may have implications for the absolute reliability of certain judgments I make. However, I did speak with General Smith's NATO counterparts, and at his suggestion I also spoke to some of his subordinates. The consistency of these supporting interviews gives me confidence in my findings.

I made the assumption that all of the theater-level commanders were subjected to political pressures from their respective national capitals. As I conducted my interviews, all of the commanders in the UN and NATO were sure that the other commanders were receiving guidance from home, though most of them denied receiving explicit orders themselves. In NATO, direct political pressure probably did not reach below the regional commander, the four-star admiral in charge of AFSOUTH. However, I assumed the two and three-star air force generals who were subordinate to the AFSOUTH commanders would have been aware of guidance from Washington.

Structure

Chapter 2 discusses background theory concerning military influence on the use of airpower. It first explores the findings of Betts and Petraeus on the subject of military


59 Michael Williams, 46.

60 General Briquemont appears to have been the exception, though he was pressured by the EC at a time when his country, Belgium, filled the rotating post of EC president.
influence on the use of force, and then goes on to propose a theoretical basis for military
demands for autonomy in operational matters, focusing on the special expertise and
responsibility commanders have for managing violence. Chapter 2 also examines the
countervailing political controls that constrain a commander’s autonomy when using
airpower. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the traditional division between
soldiers and airmen over the utility and control of airpower. Chapter 3 briefly describes
the background to Deny Flight, with special attention given to the national policies of the
US, the UK, and France for using airpower in Bosnia. The organizing principle of
Chapters 4 through 9 is chronological, with the break points between chapters determined
by changes of UN commanders in Bosnia, or turning points in the missions of either
UNPROFOR or the Deny Flight air forces. Those chapters present the case study
evidence and analysis. The final chapter states my conclusions, answering the questions
set out above, and addressing the hypotheses of whether and why the theater-level
commanders influenced the use of airpower in Bosnia.
CHAPTER 2
MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER

The military in the post-Vietnam period have exercised considerable influence over how force has been used—particularly in those cases in which the missions have been especially demanding and complex, thereby increasing the dependence of civilian policymakers on military judgment, expertise, and information.

—David H. Petraeus, ‘Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force’

Airpower was the central military component in the US policy for intervention in Bosnia. Airpower has also been at the core of a long-running debate in the US over how much influence the military should exercise vis-à-vis their civilian masters when it comes to using force.¹ To frame the discussion in this study about the influence of theater-level commanders on the use of airpower in Bosnia, this chapter begins by briefly addressing the larger issue of military influence on the US use of force. The second section narrows the focus to look at political controls on the use of airpower, namely, targeting controls, bombing pauses, and rules of engagement. In addition to the political-military dimension of controls on the use of airpower, soldiers and airmen have traditionally held contending beliefs about how best to employ this type of military force.² The third section, therefore, highlights the major causes and consequences of the disparate military views on airpower. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical construct for analyzing the various dimensions of the struggle by theater-level commanders to influence the use of airpower in Bosnia between the summers of 1993 and 1995.

¹ For recent contributions to the debate, see, Holbrooke, To End, 60-152; and Luttwak, ‘From Vietnam To Desert Fox,’ 99-112.
² Betts, 203; Stephen McNamara, Air Power’s Gordian Knot; and Winton, ‘An Ambivalent Partnership,’ 399-442.
2.1 INFLUENCE AND AUTONOMY: THE US MILITARY AND THE USE OF FORCE

This section explores American military influence after 1945 on when, how, and with what constraints on military autonomy, force has been used. Since the Second World War, American military leaders have usually played only a minor role in decisions over whether the US should employ military force. Once decisions to use force have been made, military influence over how force gets used has been relatively more significant. Furthermore, when force has been called for, military officers have lobbied hard to preserve their autonomy in operational matters. As shown below, two elements of military professionalism, expertise and responsibility, create the foundation for military demands for autonomy. Contrary to the military's desire for autonomy, American political leaders have felt the need to constrain, or even control, the use of force in military operations since 1945. Balancing the imperatives of policy against the demands for military autonomy has often led to tension in civil-military relations.

In this study, the word 'influence' will be used in a rather ordinary sense. Influence is the 'power to sway or affect based on prestige, wealth, ability, or position.' This avoids unnecessary restrictions found in more technical definitions. For instance, Roger Scruton excludes coercion from the definition of influence. However, if a military commander attempted to coerce other military or political authorities in order to shape the use of airpower, that would certainly be of interest here. Dennis Wrong makes a distinction between intended and unintended influence. The focus here is on intended influence, though adopting Wrong's definition would be impractical since 'intended influence' is what Wrong calls 'power'—the definition of which takes up two chapters of his book. Richard Betts defines influence as 'causing decision makers to do something they probably would not have done otherwise.' Though generally compatible with the definition used in this study, Betts's definition could be interpreted to mean that military influence had to be causal. This would exclude military influence that served merely as a catalyst, enabler, or shaper of action that decision-makers would have taken anyway. Finally, the ordinary definition adopted for this study is somewhat broader than Samuel Finer's concept of 'influence,' which, in his typology, is the lowest level of military

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3 The American Heritage Dictionary.
4 Scruton, Dictionary of Political Thought, 262.
5 Wrong, Power, 1-32.
6 Betts, 5.
intervention into politics for countries with developed political cultures. For Finer, ‘influence’ meant, ‘the effort to convince the civil authorities by appealing to their reason or their emotions. This level is the constitutional and legitimate one, entirely consistent with the supremacy of the civil power.’ However, Finer’s definition would exclude influence within military organizations themselves, and would presuppose the legitimacy of military influence. For the purposes of this study, the simple definition of influence will work best.

Deciding to Use Force: Military Reluctance and Influence

In the period since World War II, the American military has been neither as belligerent nor as influential in intervention decision-making as popular stereotypes suggest. In fact, the military has become quite the opposite of the hawkish image once popularized in movies and books. Writing in 1960, Morris Janowitz described and decried this stereotype in his classic sociological portrait of the American military elite The Professional Soldier. But in the recriminations over Vietnam, the limitations of the ‘military mind’ and the military stereotype found renewed outlet in the United States. Writing in 1973, Bernard Brodie argued that, ‘[a] Chief of Staff is one who shares with his colleagues a great belief in the efficacy of force in dealing with recalcitrant peoples or regimes abroad.’ Though the stereotype was certainly exaggerated and far from universal, the pugnacious attitudes of certain military leaders of the early 1960s, especially the Air Force generals at the top of Strategic Air Command, tended to lend credence to the popular images.

Contrary to the view of American military leaders as bellicose elites who have pushed their reluctant civilian masters unwillingly into foreign interventions, military leaders have not been particularly warlike or influential when it comes to decisions over whether or not to use force. That professional military officers would normally caution against using military force, was a point argued by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and

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7 Finer, Man on Horseback, 86.
8 Ibid.
9 Betts, 1-2.
10 Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 3-5.
12 Brodie, War & Politics, 486.
13 Betts, 116-117, 120, 127-128.
14 Ibid., 5-6.
the State,¹⁵ and subsequent research has tended to confirm Huntington’s claim.¹⁶ In the first systematic study of the military’s role in intervention decision-making, Richard Betts examined decisions during the period from 1945 until 1972. He discovered American military leaders tended to be less bellicose than the most aggressive civilian advisors to the Presidents.¹⁷ Moreover, military leaders tended to be least effective when they advocated the use of force, and most effective when they united in opposition to armed intervention.¹⁸ A decade after Betts debunked the myth of military warmongering, David Petraeus found that the Vietnam War had had a chastening effect on the American military.¹⁹ By the late 1980s, US military leaders were even less likely to advocate the use of force than either their predecessors or the senior civilian advisors of the day, thus Petraeus concluded that: ‘In short, the military since 1973 had conformed more closely to the Huntington view (originally presented in 1957) than they had during the period of Betts’s analysis.’²⁰

How to Use Force: Options, Influence, and Overwhelming Force

As Richard Haass has argued, decisions about whether to use force should be inextricably linked to considerations about what force is available, and how that force is to be used.²¹ In his study, Betts countered the ‘bureaucratic revisionists’ who suggested that military capabilities drove foreign policy.²² However, he also noted that the traditional theoretical model—whereby clearly articulated foreign policy served as a basis for military strategy—was too neat for the real world.²³ Describing the military role in foreign policy making, Betts observed that:

[M]ilitary officials’ task was not simply to study a policy, deduce the appropriate strategy and forces to implement it, and recommend the results to political leaders...Instead they were often in the position where their advice on what could be achieved was to determine what would be achieved.²⁴

As American involvement in Vietnam began to escalate, senior officers saw untested theories of limited war substituted for their professional advice on the use of force.²⁵ This

¹⁵ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 68-69.
¹⁷ Betts, 5-6.
¹⁸ Ibid., 11-12, and 96.
²¹ Haass, Intervention, 68.
²² Betts, 103.
²³ Ibid., 96.
²⁴ Ibid., 97.
was especially true of the bombing of North Vietnam, where a strategy of graduated pressure was employed to convince Hanoi’s leaders to abandon their support for the insurgent Vietcong guerrillas fighting in South Vietnam. A vignette from the outset of the bombing operations illustrated the disparate civilian and military views:

In early 1965, Chief of Naval Operations David McDonald had returned from a White House meeting where, over the objections of the Joint Chiefs who favored heavy and decisive bombing, the civilian policy makers were planning the program of limited and graduated bombing. He reportedly told his aide that graduated response was militarily senseless and that when the war was over, the civilians responsible would no longer be in office and the only group left answerable for the war would be the military.

Air Force plans called for hitting the entire list of ninety-four strategic targets in North Vietnam within a month. Regardless of one’s views on wisdom of either bombing strategy, the point to be noted here is that even when the questions of whether and how to use force were considered together, the answers did not always reflect the preferred military options. This left military commanders to implement a strategy which they believed could not succeed.

In the period after Vietnam studied by Petraeus, he found that military influence over how force was used surpassed the influence that uniformed leaders exercised on decisions over whether force was to be used. Petraeus concluded:

The military have exercised the most influence, however, once the decision to use force has been made—when the focus has become how to use force, and when decision makers have turned to consideration of the options available to accomplish the objectives established by the president. Options are the military’s area of expertise, and expertise, particularly when concentrated in one institution, yields influence.

Thus, with responsibility for formulating plans, the military gain influence. In describing the military’s unique expertise in this area Petraeus averred:

The development of military options is a complex undertaking that requires knowledge, experience, and creativity. Detailed and timely information about one’s own forces is essential, as is current intelligence on the target of the military action. An understanding of the systems established for planning, coordination, and command and control of military operations is necessary as well. Military operations are complicated affairs, and only senior military officers fully master their conduct.

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26 McMaster, 40-47.
27 Betts, 11.
28 Tilford, Setup, 104; Clodfelter, 76-77; McMaster, 143.
29 McMaster, 106.
31 Petraeus, ‘Military Influence,’ 495.
These observations are axiomatic rather than lessons of any particular conflict, but they again underscore the importance of expertise in giving the military influence over how force gets used.

From the Vietnam War, Army and Air Force officers drew somewhat different lessons about the use of force. Petraeus found that the American military emerged from Vietnam with an acute and lasting awareness of 1) the 'finite limits of public support for protracted military operations,' 2) 'doubts about the efficacy of military force in solving certain international problems,' and 3) 'greater disillusionment with, and heightened wariness of, civilian officials.' The Army and Marine Corps bore the deepest scars, according to Petraeus, while the Navy was the least affected service. However, Petraeus did not elaborate on the US Air Force. Mark Clodfelter has argued that Air Force leaders concluded from Vietnam that 'since Linebacker II demonstrated bombing effectiveness, political leaders must realize that bombing can win limited wars if unhampered by political controls.' This suggested that senior Air Force officers might be just as wary of civilian officials as their army counterparts, but they were less pessimistic about the utility of airpower. A study of the Vietnam generation of professional military officers done by Edward Marks found that career officers from all of the services firmly supported civilian supremacy, insisted on clear-cut political decisions and clear objectives for using force, and wanted to know that risks taken with American lives would 'be for a worthwhile purpose.' Marks's study also found that the Vietnam generation of officers believed that once the military was given clear objectives, it should then be free from political interference in achieving those aims, that is, the officers believed they should be given operational autonomy. So, while soldiers and airmen drew different conclusions about the effectiveness of airpower in Vietnam, both groups agreed the military should control decisions about how to use force in future operations.

The lessons of Vietnam were reinforced by American experiences in Lebanon, Desert Storm, and Somalia. These combined experiences produced a military culture averse to engaging in small wars, and committed to ensuring rapid success whenever and wherever military force was to be employed. As Frank Hoffman has pointed out, the articulation of this military 'doctrine' owed much to General Colin Powell, who formally

32 Petraeus, 'American Military,' 104.
33 Ibid. 104 and 276.
35 Marks, 51.
36 Ibid.
propounded the ideas in the 1992 National Military Strategy. This preferred approach to employing force was called 'Decisive Force' by its authors. Less charitably, Congressman Les Aspin labeled it the 'all-or-nothing' school of thought. Aspin, who was then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, claimed the most important tenet of the 'all-or-nothing' school stipulated that, 'military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion.' He criticized the 'all-or-nothing' school, which he associated with Colin Powell, and stated his own views were more closely aligned with what he called the 'limited objectives' school. For Aspin, compellence and airpower lay at 'the heart of the limited objectives argument,' and Desert Storm had demonstrated airpower's potential to deliver limited political objectives through precise applications of force. Aspin's comments about how to use force, especially airpower, were made with an eye toward US intervention in Bosnia. For now, one should note that as US policymakers considered whether to get involved in Bosnia, they were dealing with a generation of military officers who expected the freedom to decide how to use force once the decision to use it was made.

Theoretical Bases of Demands for Operational Autonomy: Expertise and Responsibility

*Expertise.* While acknowledging the prerogative of political authorities in questions of when and how to intervene, military officers have resented infringements into the area of operational control of military forces. Tensions in political-military relations have arisen when political authorities have dispensed with military advice and entered the professional military domain of managing violence. Clausewitz testified to the abiding condition of problems arising when non-expert political authorities attempt to control military force:

> When people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence...Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse. In the same way

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37 Hoffman, *Decisive Force*, 5-12, 100-102, 103-105.
38 Ibid., 100.
40 Ibid., 185.
41 Ibid., 185-187.
42 Ibid., 188-189.
43 Betts, 9.
as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.44

Thus, military expertise has long been recognized as a basis for effective control over operational matters. Samuel Huntington went so far as to say that military disobedience of political orders would be justified in cases where a 'military officer...is ordered by a statesman to take a measure which is militarily absurd when judged by professional standards and which is strictly within the military realm without any political implications.'45 The final qualification, 'without any political implications,' was as crucial to Huntington's argument as it was unlikely to pertain in the limited military operations following World War II. Moreover, at the time Huntington wrote, the advent of nuclear weapons was already rendering traditional military expertise largely irrelevant.46 Still, for Huntington, the superior expertise of soldiers and statesmen in their respective military and political domains served as the basis for a civil-military division of labor, and it fortified military demands for autonomy.47

Writing in 1960, Morris Janowitz argued for more integrated civil-military relations, and he was far less deferential toward military expertise than Huntington.48 For Janowitz, the military had to forego its absolutist tendencies and accept the blurring of civilian-military responsibilities.49 For the world to survive in the nuclear age, the management of violence could no longer be governed by military logic; rather, the military needed to develop a new expertise in ways of limiting the use of force.50 Janowitz warned that until the military became imbued with a 'constabulary force' outlook, it threatened to transgress the boundaries of civilian control.51 He foresaw this as a likely problem in limited wars and wars against insurgency.52 So, while Janowitz accepted the connection between expertise and professionalism, he was not sanguine about giving the military autonomy to use its expertise until the military profession could be rid of the outdated and dangerous influences of the 'absolutist' heroic leaders, and

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44 Clausewitz, On War, 608.
45 Huntington, 77.
46 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 400-409.
47 Huntington, 11-14, and 71.
48 Janowitz, 418-423.
49 Ibid., 426-430.
50 Ibid., 266-277, and 418-420.
51 Ibid., 343, and 420-421.
52 Ibid., 305-311, and 343.
transformed into a profession led by 'pragmatic' military managers. Moreover, he perceived the greatest need for change in the US Air Force, dominated as it was by generals from the Strategic Air Command.\(^{53}\)

Betts showed how expertise could be used by the military to help preserve autonomy in operational affairs.\(^{54}\) Sometimes, limitations in military capabilities impose constraints on what can be achieved in a given situation. This is known as 'tactical determinism,' where the means more or less determine the ends. In the past, military leaders have falsely asserted tactical determinism, or built plans around real limitations in military capabilities, so as to prevent political authorities from interfering in operational matters. A classic example, cited by Betts, occurred at the outset of World War I, where: 'General Moltke falsely claimed the rigidity of plans as an excuse to refuse a last-minute change in strategy to concentration on the Russian front.'\(^{55}\) However, tactical determinism is not merely a ploy used by experts to maximize their control over the use of force. It is often a real and important factor in decisions over when and how to use force. As an example, Betts showed that Graham Allison was wrong to accuse military leaders of falsely asserting the limits of airpower during the Cuban missile crisis in order to strengthen the chances of a more robust bombing operation or a full scale invasion.\(^{56}\) The limitations of airpower were all too real. This example highlights an important point: in the absence of mutual respect and trust, political leaders might dismiss relevant and accurate military advice, or come to believe that their own judgments on the use of force can substitute for military expertise. Petraeus found that critics of military advice have suspected false claims of tactical determinism, while military planners have supposed that the critics were willing to ignore real-world limitations if they clashed with the critics' preferred solutions.\(^{57}\) The point to note here is that special military expertise is needed to judge the limits of what military means can accomplish, and that the same expertise can give the military leverage in gaining autonomy.

**Responsibility.** Another element of professionalism, responsibility, serves as a basis for the military insistence on autonomy in operational matters. The unique requirement for the military to manage violence on behalf of the state implies certain responsibilities.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 304-307, 315-318, and 430.

\(^{54}\) Betts, 12-13. Also see, Petraeus, 'Military Influence,' 495; and 'The American Military,' 249-250.

\(^{55}\) Betts, 155.

\(^{56}\) Betts, 155-156; and Allison, 124-126 and 205-206.

\(^{57}\) Petraeus, 'American Military,' 231 and 246.
Huntington discussed three forms of military responsibility: representative, advisory, and executive. This study focuses mainly on executive responsibility, because theater-level commanders are primarily responsible for executing policy. Huntington argued that, in its executive capacity, the military profession’s first duty was obedience, even when a professional officer disagreed with a policy he was tasked to fulfill. Two military ethicists, Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin, examined the limits of the obligation for military obedience. They analyzed the possible moral, legal, political, and private bases for disobedience, and they concluded there was almost no scope for either passively refusing orders or for positively acting in defiance of orders, unless the orders were clearly illegal or grossly immoral. However, for Kemp and Hudlin, as with Huntington, the rigid distinction between obedience and disobedience mirrored an equally inflexible division of labor between policy-making and policy implementation that seldom, if ever, exists. Moreover, the responsibilities faced by a commander are more complex than the one-way model—from the military to the political authority—posed by Huntington.

Commanders are also responsible for, and to, the people who serve under them. As James Toner argued, to command is to exercise moral and military competence in fulfillment of extraordinary responsibilities. Furthermore, he claimed that the foremost sign of military incompetence is being careless or wasteful with the lives of the people under one’s command. A competent commander, then, would be one who sought to fulfill military and policy objectives with the least risks and losses to his forces. A more explicit statement of this connection between responsibility and command was put forth by Martin Edmonds. Edmonds pointed out that military organizational structures linked rank with authority; rank, in turn, was linked to responsibility—not just to the state, but also ‘responsibility to the individuals within the military for whom operations mean risking their lives.’

58 Huntington, 14-16, and 72.
59 Kemp and Hudlin, ‘Civil Supremacy over the Military,’ 7-26.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 8; and Huntington, 72. On the lack of clear boundaries between policy-making and implementation, see: Betts, 14; Allison, 162-163; and Michael Clarke, ‘Foreign Policy Implementation,’ 114.
63 Toner, True Faith and Allegiance, 43-44.
64 Ibid. The point of departure for Toner’s discussion on military competence is, Norman Dixon’s list of fourteen aspects of military incompetence. See, Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, 152-153.
65 Ibid., and Sorely, ‘Competence as Ethical Imperative,’ 39-40 and 47-48.
66 Edmonds, Armed Services, 30-31.
affecting armed services as organizations is the prospect of their members being killed in the course of fulfilling their duty; it is this that dominates their organizational practices. Military organizations link operational responsibility and accountability in a clear chain of command. And, Edmonds noted, a commander’s responsibility ‘must include the responsibility for both the operational effectiveness of the unit under his or her command, and the lives of the people in it, in difficult and dangerous situations’ (emphasis added).

Military demands for autonomy in operations are a logical outgrowth of these responsibilities and the clear accountability commanders face. Theater-level commanders are primarily responsible and accountable for both mission accomplishment and the lives of the people under their command. The responsibilities of command are lightened for a commander who is free to pursue a course of action that fulfills his mission and poses the least amount of risk to his forces. However, when circumstances demand a tradeoff, a commander has to have a clear objective, and some sense of its worth, before being able to strike an appropriate balance between mission accomplishment and force protection. Moreover, a commander must also have the means to accomplish his mission, and control over those means, to sensibly manage the risks his forces will face in fulfilling the mission. Without autonomy, a commander cannot work the often delicate balancing act needed to best achieve his given objective with the least risk of getting his people killed.

Like expertise, responsibility is not only a basis for military demands for autonomy, it can also work as a tool for obtaining autonomy. Despite suspicions that military leaders might exaggerate the risks involved in a given military operation—not just of failure, but of losing lives—it is politically risky to order operations which the military advises against. Political leaders can order operations despite military objections; however, as Luttwak noted:

If they choose to go ahead, they must accept both the inherent political risk of the envisaged action and the added political risk of having overruled military advice—not something that is likely to remain secret for very long in the aftermath of failure...Understandably in the circumstances, prime ministers and presidents rarely overrule military chiefs to order action. That too is a diminution of civilian control.

To the extent civilian political leaders take control over operational matters, they become accountable for the consequences. This leads back to the issue of expertise. For as Luttwak observed, ‘“micro-management”...implies responsibilities that prudent leaders

67 Ibid., 31.
68 Ibid., 33.
69 Luttwak, ‘From Vietnam To Desert Fox,’ 102.
must strive to avoid,' because the ability and authority to control does not confer the
expertise to manage successfully.

To summarize, in the military tradition of Western democracies, promotion in
rank is ostensibly based on one's ability to handle increased responsibility. The highest
ranking officers selected for operational command are expected to use their professional
expertise to fulfill their responsibilities for achieving mission success with the least risk
and cost to their forces. Demands for operational autonomy are a natural consequence of
holding a person accountable for human lives and for the accomplishment of a mission for
which that person possesses a special expertise. Therefore, military commanders demand
autonomy in operational matters, because they are expert in the employment of force, and
because they expect to be held accountable for both mission success and the lives of the
people under their command. They can also use their expertise and the responsibility
inherent in command to obtain operational autonomy. To the extent theater commanders
are given, or can otherwise get, autonomy, they can influence how force gets used.

2.2 POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON AIRPOWER: TARGETING AND ROE

We turn now from the broader issues of whether and how force is used to the
means of constraining military autonomy in the use of a particular form of military force:
airpower. For the purposes of this study, 'airpower' is defined as that component of
military power derived from aerospace vehicles capable of sustained and controlled flight.
More specifically, this study is concerned with the use, or threatened use, of conventional
force, rather than on the variety of military services or support functions which airpower
can perform. Constraints on the use of force can take many forms, and they have been a
common feature in limited wars and military operations other than war since World War
II. For NATO member states, all uses of military force since 1945 have been limited in
the sense of the term offered by Robert Osgood, that is, limited in the means employed
and the objectives pursued. According to Christopher Gacek, the difficulty in
reconciling military means with limited political ends stems from the nature of military
force itself. Drawing heavily from Clausewitz, Gacek describes the 'logic of force' as

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70 Nuclear operations will not be addressed because they are irrelevant to the case of Bosnia.
71 For a discussion of airpower in the broader sense of the term, and its use in peace support operations,
see: Mason, 'Air Power in the Peace Support Environment,' 112-125; and idem, 'Operations in Search of a
Title: Air Power in Operations Other than War,' 157-177.
72 Osgood, Limited War Revisited, 3.
that 'powerful tendency of war to reach for higher levels of violence.' Political constraints on the use of force serve the 'logic of policy,' which seeks 'to subordinate all means including force to its own purposes.' The primacy of policy operates regardless of the impact on the means that serve it, that is, regardless of the effect it might have on the military. In contrast to Gacek’s view, Bernard Brodie and other observers have ascribed the escalatory nature of conflict to the professional military’s unmitigated urge to 'win-at-any-cost.' Unsurprisingly, those observers valued tight political controls over military autonomy. The degree to which American political authorities have sought to control military force and inhibit operational autonomy has varied greatly from the hands-on techniques employed during the Vietnam War, to the relatively hands-off approach adopted during the Gulf War. However, in all conflicts, the political controls on airpower have generally come in three forms: direct control over targeting, bombing pauses, and rules of engagement (ROE).

Political controls on airpower can be meant to serve either a positive objective or a negative objective. Political authorities can limit military autonomy and exercise control over airpower so that force becomes part of policy in helping to achieve a desired positive political objective. The types of positive objectives for which force might be used include: signaling, coercion, retribution, or destruction through bombing (e.g., the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility in 1981). In contrast to these positive objectives, negative objectives, as Mark Clodfelter has called them, are likely to come into play in all wars, but especially in limited wars and operations other than war, where traditional military objectives may compete with, rather than complement, important policy aims.

In highly constrained uses of force, what gets bombed—if bombing occurs at all—is often determined less by the positive aim for using force, than by what is left over after

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74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Janowitz, 264; Brodie, 191-192; and Hoopes, 62.
77 Janowitz, 343 and 435; Brodie, 496; Hoopes, 62.
79 Sanctuaries are distinct from ROE, but often the two are treated together. For the purposes of this study, the distinction is not of great enough importance to warrant a separate discussion of sanctuaries. For more on the topic of sanctuaries, see: Brodie, War & Politics, 67-68; Drake, Rules for Defeat, 4-5 and 25-26; Admiral Sharp, 204; Atkinson, Crusade, 288-290; Hallion, Storm, 199; Gordon and Trainor, 326-329; and Wayne Thompson, 'Al Firdos,' 52.
80 For a more thorough discussion of the types of positive objectives that might be served by using force, see: Haass, Intervention, esp. ch. 3; and idem; 'Military Intervention: A Taxonomy,' 1-18.
81 Clodfelter, 141.
satisfying all of the negative objectives. The negative objectives that might be served by political controls on bombing include: preventing the spread of a conflict outside its current boundaries, preventing escalation of a conflict within its given boundaries, avoiding collateral damage, and avoiding friendly losses. Significantly, this last negative objective—casualty avoidance—overlaps with a commander’s responsibility to protect his forces. Thus, external pressure to limit friendly casualties can serve to reinforce a commander’s own internal pressures to minimize the losses to his forces. If any of these negative objectives are set too firmly—thus becoming absolute prohibitions—they can interfere with achievement of the positive objective for which force is being used. As discussed under ROE below, that may be an acceptable price to pay, and it will be up to political authorities to decide whether the negative objectives that constrain force outweigh the positive objectives for using force.

Targeting as Air Strategy: What to Attack, What Not to Attack

Civilian political authorities have exercised control over targeting in order to keep the military means of airpower in line with their policy objectives. Controls over targeting extend beyond decisions on what targets to bomb, to include the rapidity with which targets are struck, their geographical locations, the sequence in which they are to be hit, the weight of effort assigned to each target, and the weapon systems and types of ordnance employed against the targets. Shortly after the First World War, Guilio Douhet averred that strategy in air warfare was no more than the sum of these targeting factors: ‘The selection of objectives, the grouping of zones, and determining the order in which they are to be destroyed is the most difficult and delicate task in aerial warfare, constituting what may be defined as aerial strategy.’83 In 1995, Colonel Phillip Meilinger, then Dean of the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, demonstrated that Douhet’s idea still had currency when he wrote: ‘In essence, Air Power is targeting;’ and ‘selecting objectives to strike or influence is the essence of air strategy.’84 Direct controls on targeting, then, constitute one of the greatest infringement on the autonomy of airmen.

84 Meilinger, Ten Propositions, 20-21.
The nadir in US military autonomy over targeting in air operations came during the Vietnam War. According to the prevailing theories of limited war, a nuanced approach to using force was needed to send the right message to Hanoi, and military considerations about what was to be struck were decidedly secondary. As Richard Betts put it:

Orchestration of the use of force was a political tool, a signaling device. Whether the United States bombed a surface-to-air missile site or oil depot near Hanoi would communicate a message to the enemy and was hence a political decision that had to be made by political authority; it was not a purely military decision to be made by a subordinate commander. 85

President Johnson’s personal control over target selection was summed up in his boast that: ‘I won’t let those Air Force generals bomb the smallest outhouse north of the 17th parallel without checking with me.’ 86 Significantly, up until mid-1967, Johnson operated without the benefit of any direct military advice. 87 After Congressional intervention, General Earl Wheeler, the chairman of the JCS, was permitted to attend weekly White House targeting sessions. 88 Later, during the Nixon administration, bombing of the North was significantly curtailed. 89 However, up until 1972, targets in North Vietnam were still being selected by civilians in Washington. 90

As the above citation from Betts notes, when political authorities are using military force for signaling, they are likely to demand more direct control over targeting in order to ensure that the intended signal gets sent. Moreover, when signaling is a positive aim, negative objectives will usually play a strong role in determining what does or does not get bombed. Such was the case in the airstrikes against Libya in April of 1986, which, according to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff at the time, Admiral Bill Crowe, was meant to ‘send an unequivocal signal that Washington was serious and that terrorist actions would not go unpunished.’ 91 Crowe later wrote that: ‘In the final analysis, our tactical decisions were based on political considerations... We did not want casualties...[and] the other major political goal was to minimize Libyan civilian

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85 Betts, 14.
87 McMaster, 208-209.
88 Betts, 8.
89 Tilford, Setup, 153.
90 House, Committee on Armed Services, Unauthorized Bombing of Military Targets in North Vietnam: Hearing before the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee, 12 June 1972, 46. Hereafter referred to as ‘House, Bombing Hearing.’
91 Crowe with Chanoff, 132. Also see, Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 197.
casualties. The final target selection included ‘about half’ of what Crowe had recommended, but it also included suspected terrorist targets which were not on the admiral’s list, but were added in order to send a signal about terrorism. Because of concerns over potential collateral damage, the decision-makers in Washington ‘sacrificed a number of the best targets’. When signaling, rather than achieving military results, is the positive aim, political authorities will take a more direct role in targeting decisions, and those decisions can easily be driven more by negative objectives than by the positive purpose for the bombing.

**Bombing Pauses: When to Bomb or Not Bomb**

The ultimate targeting control is the ability to stop or start bombing. When bombing forms part of a coercive diplomacy, military commanders will likely find themselves competing with diplomats for control over decisions about how to regulate bombing. Whether bombing should be halted to permit negotiations, or continued to enhance leverage during negotiations—is clearly a matter for political authorities to decide. However, they should expect their commanders to resist bombing cessations whenever a pause might erase the gains for which the military has already paid a significant price, or whenever the pause is expected to increase the costs of operations once bombing is resumed. In Vietnam, American political leaders ordered bombing pauses in futile attempts to win similar restraint from Hanoi. President Johnson did not consult with the military before suddenly ordering the first bombing halt of the Rolling Thunder campaign in May of 1965. Had he done so, he would have met resistance from his top commanders, for as commander-in-chief of the Pacific theater, Admiral Sharp, later wrote: ‘we had enough experience in negotiating with the Communists to know that military pressures must be sustained throughout the negotiating period’. The Johnson administration ordered subsequent cessations in the bombing of North Vietnam despite warnings from commanders in the field that the North ‘exploited them to resupply, prepare for attacks, redeploy forces and commit violations.’

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92 Crowe with Chanoff, 134.
93 Ibid., 135.
94 Ibid., 134.
95 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 684; Seabury and Codevilla, 246.
96 Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 23-29; and Admiral Sharp; 81-83, 145.
97 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 684; and Seabury and Codevilla, 246-253.
98 McMaster, 283-285; and Admiral Sharp, 81-82.
99 Admiral Sharp, 83. Also see, Kissinger, Diplomacy, 488 and 684; Seabury and Codevilla, 246-253.
100 Admiral, 145.
seemed pointless to allow the enemy the luxury of such respites, which, in the end, would only translate to higher casualties on our side." The bombing of North Vietnam had been drastically reduced before the Nixon administration came to Washington. However, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's chief negotiator noted: 'Hanoi bargained only when it was under severe pressure—in particular, whenever America resumed bombing.'

Political authorities may wish to turn bombing off or on to suit their strategies for coercive diplomacy. But, as Alexander George has noted: 'If pushed too far, the civilian authority's effort to transform military force into a highly refined, discriminating instrument of diplomacy and coercive bargaining will eventually break down.' Such breakdowns, George noted, leave negotiators with one of two unpalatable choices: make major negotiating concessions or escalate.

Controls that regulate bombing in conjunction with coercive diplomacy are meant to serve positive objectives; however, they seriously infringe upon a commander's autonomy, and commanders will likely oppose them, especially if the pauses increase costs to friendly forces.

Rules of Engagement: Circumstances for Force

Rules of engagement (ROE) have also served as a powerful constraint on military autonomy in air operations. The US Department of Defense defined rules of engagement as: 'Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.'

Academic instruction given by the US Air Force to its newly recruited lawyers explained that ROE, 'are the primary means by which [political authorities]...provide guidance to deployed forces in peacetime for handling crises and, in wartime, to help control the level of violence.' ROE have usually been derived from legal, political, and operational considerations. The following discussion does not examine the legal dimension of ROE, but instead addresses first the political

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101 Ibid.
102 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 684.
104 Ibid., 227.
107 For excellent primers on ROE, see: Roach, 'Rules of Engagement;' and Hayes, Naval Rules of Engagement, 1-34.
considerations, then some operational concerns. In general, ROE serve negative objectives.

The tension between positive objectives for using force and negative objectives served by ROE was reflected in analysis by Scott Sagan:

Rules of engagement...are designed to balance two competing goals: the need to use force effectively to achieve the objective of an offensive or defensive mission and the desire not to use military force in unnecessary circumstances or in an excessively aggressive manner.

Rules of engagement can constrain the use of force so much that it becomes militarily ineffective. Sagan referred to this as a 'weakness error.' Alternatively, lax ROE can lead to too much force being used for a given situation, resulting in what he called an 'escalatory error.' The trick, as Sagan noted, was to set the ROE between these two errors. Recognizing that this demands an act of judgment on which political and military authorities might differ, Sagan observed: 'ROE decisions, involving tradeoffs between military effectiveness and broader political objectives, are legitimately the province of senior political authorities.' Sagan's analysis and conclusions were sound, yet he failed to give adequate attention to the responsibility commanders have for protecting their forces.

Highly restrictive rules of engagement, useful for preventing unwanted escalation, can also increase the risks to the forces involved in an operation. In Vietnam, the aerial rules of engagement significantly increased the risks to American aircrew and prevented them from taking appropriate measures for self-defense. The rules of engagement prohibited attacks against surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and other air defense targets except in reaction to an immediate threat. Because the North had networked its radar, SAM batteries could get firing cues without turning on their own radar, thus allowing them to shoot with little or no warning to US aircraft. By forcing the aircrews to wait for clear indications of a threat, the ROE greatly reduced the chances that the crews could take effective defensive actions.

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110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 87.
113 House, Committee on Armed Services, Unauthorized Bombing of Military Targets in North Vietnam, report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee, 15 December 1972, 2-4, 8 and 9. Hereafter referred to as 'House, Unauthorized, report.'
114 Ibid.
In the spring of 1972, General John Ryan, the Air Force chief of staff, relieved General John Lavelle of command of the US air forces in Vietnam, when subordinates in Lavelle’s command were found to be falsifying reports to cover up the fact that Lavelle had ordered pre-planned strikes against the North’s air defenses.\footnote{House, Bombing Hearing, 4, 35, 45, 48-49, and 52} It frustrated Lavelle, as it had other commanders before him, to operate under complex rules that seemed to needlessly jeopardize the lives of his men.\footnote{House, Bombing Hearing, 50-51; Broughton, Going Downtown: The War Against Hanoi and Washington, x and 173-174; Sharp, xiii, 4, and 102-103; Drake, 14-15.} In his testimony before the House subcommittee investigating the unauthorized bombings, Lavelle jokingly told the congressmen: ‘We have a saying we used in Vietnam, that we finally found out why there were two crew members in the F-4. One is to fly the airplane and one is to carry the briefcase full of the rules of engagement.’\footnote{House, Bombing Hearing, 7.} However, it was no joking matter for the aircrews involved, as one study later explained:

> To many aircrews, it seemed impossible to find a way to do what was ordered and not get killed by the enemy or hanged by the United States government in the process. The ROEs made many aircrews feel as if they were fighting two enemies: the North Vietnamese and American leaders in the White House.\footnote{Drake, 15.}

Lavelle’s solution was to interpret the rules of engagement in a way that allowed strikes against elements of the North’s air defenses even in the absence of any a clear indication that the air defenses were about to engage US aircraft.\footnote{House, Bombing Hearing, 45, 49, and 50; Drake, 14-15.} Although officers on the joint staff at the Pentagon apparently sympathized with what Lavelle was trying to do, authorities in Washington did not change the rules until after—and perhaps as a result of—Lavelle’s dismissal.\footnote{Ibid., 45.} Despite giving guidance that led to the ROE violations, Lavelle was praised by several congressmen during the hearings into the unauthorized bombings, for trying to protect American airmen.\footnote{For words of praise from four congressmen, see: House, Bombing Hearing, 45, 48, 49, and 50.} In Congressman William Dickinson’s words to General Lavelle: ‘I think if I had been in your position…I would have done exactly what you did. I think you would be less than a man if you were not trying to do all you could, and if stretching the rules [of engagement] is part of it, then good for you.’\footnote{DeRemer, ‘ROE: Leadership Between a Rock and a Hard Place.’} The Lavelle case demonstrated the dilemma commanders faced in Vietnam, where overly restrictive ROE were costing US airmen their lives.\footnote{For an essay on leadership, integrity, and ROE, which focuses on the Lavelle case, see, DeRemer, ‘ROE: Leadership Between a Rock and a Hard Place.’}
The principle of civilian control of the military dictates that commanders abide by political restrictions, even if that means failing to achieve the desired positive objective for using airpower. Commanders are still obliged to apply their expertise in an effort to fulfill their responsibilities for mission success and force protection, within the bounds of the constraints set by their political masters. When political restrictions jeopardize the safety of a commander's forces, he must decide how far to go in risking the lives of the people under his command, since losing friendly forces will be an undesired side effect of a restriction, rather than an intended consequence. The problem for the commander is that it may take expertise, which those above him setting the restrictions lack, to recognize that the constraints are increasing the risks to friendly forces. If a commander balks at political constraints, he might be perceived as falsely exaggerating the dangers they cause, just as military advisors are sometimes suspected of making false claims of tactical determinism. A commander's difficulties are compounded if his mission is not in pursuit of a clearly defined objective, because he will be unable to judge even for himself whether or not the risks to friendly forces are justified by the expected outcome. Little of the foregoing discussion is unique to airpower, but the problems can be especially acute for airpower because of its potential to cause collateral damage, the inordinate stigma that goes with losing an aircraft and its crew, and the political sensitivities over dropping bombs.124 Moreover, the complexities of electronic warfare and aerial tactics required for self-defense are not as easily grasped as are requirements for self-defense by ground forces.

2.3 SOLDIERS & AIRMEN: EFFICACY AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER

One of the main justifications for firm civilian political control over the use of force, according to Bernard Brodie, is the parochial mindset of senior military officers married to their unbalanced commitment to victory.125 The down side of the expertise officers gain from combat experience and professional study is that it tends to create a situation where, 'the services are normally not strategy-minded but rather means minded.'126 Moreover, Brodie asserts:

Military officers have usually spent their entire careers perfecting their skills with respect to some means of war, whether those means be battleships, or

124 Luttwak, 'From Vietnam to Desert Fox,' 108; Gates, 'Air Power and Aspects of Civil-Military Relations,' 30; and Clarke, 'Threats and Challenges in the UK's Security Environment,' 16-17.
125 Brodie, War & Politics, 475 and 492.
126 Ibid., 465.
carriers, or bombers, and they become deeply attached emotionally to those means.\textsuperscript{127}

In examining the American uses of force from World War II through the end of the Vietnam War, Richard Betts found support for Brodie's assertion, especially on the issue of airpower.

Since World War II the debates have pitted the air force, a majority of the Navy, and right-of-center civilians against the army, a minority of the navy, and left-of-center civilians. The former coalition has argued that bombing is more decisive and economical than a strategy based on ground forces and has not been decisive only in those instances where civilian authorities refused to let it be so by curtailing the scope and intensity of the air campaigns. The latter group has argued that bombing can only support the achievement of a military decision, which must be done primarily on the ground by occupying territory and controlling population and that air campaigns are not cost effective. Both theories have become articles of faith.\textsuperscript{128}

Soldiers, though doubtful about what independent air operations can achieve, have generally recognized the value of air support. As Hal Winton has pointed out, soldiers on the battlefield usually depend on air support in a way that is not balanced by a reciprocal need amongst airmen for army support: "The asymmetry of this dependence lies at the root of many of the tensions that exist between the Army and the Air Force regarding air-ground operations."\textsuperscript{129} Principal manifestations of these tensions have been the doctrinal and operational contests over who should control airpower and to what ends.

Despite the relative surfeit of airpower American forces have enjoyed in the conflicts since 1945, the struggle within the US military to control airpower has at times been intense. Army and marine corps officers have long felt, with justification, that their needs for close air support would fare poorly if left entirely to the Air Force.\textsuperscript{130}

Conversely, Air Force officers have traditionally believed, also with justification, that soldiers tend not to appreciate airpower's potential to influence events beyond the battlefield.\textsuperscript{131} As a consequence of these competing views, centralized control of airpower by an airman has long been a leading tenet of Air Force doctrine:

Aerospace forces should be centrally controlled by an airman to achieve advantageous synergies, establish effective priorities, capitalize on unique strategic and operational flexibilities, ensure unity of purpose, and minimize the potential for conflicting objectives.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[127] Ibid., 471-2.
\item[128] Betts, 203.
\item[129] Winton, 'An Ambivalent Partnership,' 401-2.
\item[130] Winnefeld and Johnson, \textit{Joint Air Operations}, 10-11; and Leurs, 'Joint Doctrine,' 111.
\item[131] Betts, 203.
\end{footnotes}
Steve McNamara has detailed the resulting soldier-airman struggle to control airpower.\textsuperscript{133} When the US military reorganized in the mid-1980s, airmen succeeded in having the position of an ‘air boss’ written into joint doctrine. In 1986 the concept of a joint forces air component commander (JFACC) was officially sanctioned in doctrine on counter-air operations.\textsuperscript{134} The idea gradually gained wider currency in the joint arena, and was applied to all airpower missions. Of course establishing and defining the position of an air boss in US doctrine did not eliminate the services’ different approaches to warfare or their desires to control airpower.\textsuperscript{135} The concept was first tested in the Gulf War, where it was criticized by ground commanders who felt that the targets they nominated were too often ignored by the Air Force officers running the air war.\textsuperscript{136} In addition, the Marine Corps had difficulty accepting infringement on control of its airpower.\textsuperscript{137} The issue was finally settled after the Gulf War, and after more than a little friction. The second ‘C’ in JFACC stood for commander, which implied the authority to control air assets, and not coordinator—as the marines had argued—which implied a much weaker position.\textsuperscript{138}

The relative control that an airman or a soldier exercises over airpower will depend largely on who is supporting whom. In US military doctrine, the ‘supported’ commander and forces are the focus of an operation; they have the predominant role to play and they command priority when it comes to resources. Supporting forces, on the other hand, give aid, assistance, resources, firepower, etc., to the supported elements.\textsuperscript{139} This concept applies across military theaters, as well as within a given theater of operations. As applied in its intra-theater sense, the supported-supporting concept determines which forces (e.g., air, land, or maritime) play the predominant role, and which ones assist.\textsuperscript{140} Colonel John Warden has argued that airpower ought to be the key instrument or force (i.e., the supported force) in operations where ‘ground or sea forces are incapable of doing the job because of insufficient numbers or inability to reach the enemy military centers of gravity.’\textsuperscript{141} His prescription for theater commanders was to identify a key (or supported) element for each phase of a campaign and ensure that

\textsuperscript{133} Stephen McNamara, \textit{Air Power’s Gordian Knot}.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{135} See for instance, Gordon and Trainor, 310-312.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 310-312, 330-331, and 410-411.
\textsuperscript{137} Winerfeld and Johnson, 163-164; and Stephen McNamara, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{138} Leurs, 12; and Joint Pub 3-0, \textit{Doctrine for Joint Operations}, II-11 and 12, and II-20.
\textsuperscript{139} Joint Pub 3-0, \textit{Doctrine for Joint Operations}, GL-12.
\textsuperscript{140} Joint Pub 1, \textit{Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces}, 58.
\textsuperscript{141} Warden, \textit{The Air Campaign}, 126.
competing service viewpoints did not interfere with their campaign plans.\textsuperscript{142} As obvious and logical as this sounds, Warden noted that in joint military operations theater commanders often 'failed to identify a key force, and...each [component] either thought it was dominant or didn't realize what its role was in producing a coherent performance.'\textsuperscript{143}

The concept of supported and supporting forces is relevant to military operations other than war but, as this study will demonstrate, that concept was not easily or well applied in Bosnia. The problems were due, in part, to the different views held by soldiers and airmen on the uses and control of airpower. This problem was compounded by the lack of an overall theater commander, with the added complexity of having soldiers from European nations commanding UN forces on the ground, whilst airmen from the US commanded NATO air operations overhead. This created problems due to competing national agendas typical of coalition operations, without the compensating benefits of unity of command and establishment of a common coalition objective. When NATO was contemplating intervention in the spring of 1993, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, chairman of NATO's Military Committee, warned: 'For God's sake, decide what you're trying to achieve before you go out.'\textsuperscript{144} However, after Deny Flight ended, General Joe Ashy, the first commander of NATO air operations over Bosnia observed: 'The bottom line was we did not have unity of command and unity of purpose.'\textsuperscript{145}

\textbf{Summary}

There are at least four dimensions to military influence on the use of airpower that might come into play once military forces are committed in a situation where airpower is likely to be used. First there is the logic of force, or the urge for military victory, which is in tension with the logic of policy, that is, the necessity to make sure the ends dictate the means and not vice versa. Second, while acting under political constraints, a commander must try to balance his responsibilities for both mission success and for force protection. Third, one must consider the competing views that soldiers and airmen are likely to hold on the proper uses of airpower. Fourth, in multinational operations there are likely to be different definitions of success stemming from different views of the conflict and different organizational doctrines. These various dimensions of military influence should be borne in mind as we turn now to the question of the theater-level commanders' role in influencing the use of airpower in Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 124-127.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 127.
\textsuperscript{144} Michael Evans, 'RAF Prepares for Nato Bombing.'
\textsuperscript{145} Ashy, interview by author, 3 July 1998, Fairfax, Virginia, tape recording, author's personal collection.
CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND TO THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA: 1992 - APRIL 1993

The one cliche as popular as 'air power can do anything' is 'bombing doesn't work.'

—Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises

The long-lived debates over the utility of airpower could have gone on without the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but the war in Bosnia emerged as a useful foil for anyone wishing to caution against drawing too many lessons from the experiences of the Gulf War.¹ For some observers high-technology airpower, showcased in the 1991 Gulf War, offered a politically attractive option for intervention.² Precision guided munitions and the survivability of modern aircraft seemed to provide a means for threatening force, or using it, while simultaneously minimizing risks and costs. However, the majority view amongst senior military officers in three of the most influential NATO nations—the US, Britain, and France—was one of deep skepticism about the prospects for using airpower to quell the violence in Bosnia.³ Notwithstanding these military misgivings, NATO airpower was gradually added to the Balkan equation. Air campaign planning modeled on the Gulf War began shortly after United Nations' peacekeepers started arriving in Bosnia under a mandate which authorized 'all measures necessary' for getting humanitarian aid to victims of the war. In order to establish the background necessary for analyzing the role of theater-level commanders in influencing the use of airpower in Bosnia, this chapter briefly describes US, UK, and French national policies.

¹ Freedman, 'The Future of Air Power,' 44; Mason, 'The Gulf War: Unique Or a Precedent?' and 'Peacekeeping: Constraints, Possibilities and Implications,' chapters in Air Power, 137-197.
² See, for instance, Luttwak, 'Toward Post-Heroic Warfare;' Aspin, 'The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces;' and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 15-16.
³ In addition to the evidence given below, see the testimony by General Shalikashvili, then Supreme Allied Commander Europe: Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations 1994, 1, 20, 21, 22 April; 19 May; 17, 23 June 1993, 222-253.
for using airpower in Bosnia, and it reveals the actions of the American commanders in NATO who set up operation Deny Flight.

Airpower and Policy-making in the US, France, and the UK

By late June of 1992, having ‘exhausted virtually all possible political and diplomatic measures’ for a solution to the situation in Bosnia, US Secretary of State James Baker went to National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and the two men agreed to propose ‘the use of force for the sole purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance.’ To support this limited objective, a team of state department advisors produced a two-page outline plan calling for, inter alia, ‘multilateral air strikes (e.g., against artillery in hills) as necessary to create conditions for delivery of humanitarian relief.’ Even though the plan specified that ‘there would be “no US combat troops on the ground”,’ Baker was chary enough about opposition from Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, that he took his proposal and ‘went directly to George Bush to try to work around the interagency process and pre-cook the result.’ Baker’s efforts paid off; on Friday, 26 June 1992, after a vigorous debate amongst the administration’s top policymakers, Baker noted that President Bush ‘squarely backed the game plan I had outlined.’

By 10 July, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had gone public with a proposal for US airpower to support the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. Presumably, this would have accelerated the planning already being conducted by the US Air Force.

In France, airstrikes apparently were not given serious consideration by the military. President Mitterand opposed the idea of airstrikes, and Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister until April of 1993, was reportedly sympathetic toward the Serb cause. With French foreign and security policy traditionally dominated by the ‘Quai,’ or foreign ministry, any military initiative for airstrikes would likely have been blocked. The French Air Force chief of staff, General Vincent Lanata, believed that airpower could have imposed an end to the fighting, not by threatening the Bosnian Serbs, but by giving an ultimatum to the Serb leaders in Belgrade to restrain their forces in Bosnia, or face

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5 Ibid., 648-649.
6 Ibid., 649.
7 Ibid., 649-650.
8 Mason, Air Power, 169.
9 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 27; and Pia Wood, ‘France,’ 142.
10 Guillot, 38.
11 Johnsen and Young, ‘France’s Evolving Policy Toward NATO,’ 18.
bombing in Serbia. However, the French military in general viewed intervention in Bosnia as a job for the army. As long as the French peacekeepers in the Balkans remained vulnerable to reprisals, there was no serious thought of conducting airstrikes. Admiral Lanxade, the Chief of Defense Staff, ruled out the use of force in November, only to do an about-face in December, by speaking in favor of either using force in Bosnia or getting out. However, this apparent change of heart did not signal a change in French opposition to airstrikes in Bosnia.

The British military and government appear to have gone slightly further than the French in considering the possibility of air action. The UK’s military leaders, like observers elsewhere, were concerned that Bosnia was the most unpropitious environment for attempting limited precision airstrikes. Among the challenges to be overcome in Bosnia were its rough terrain and frequent poor weather, the lack of clear front lines, and the potential for simple counter measures against airpower, such as hiding artillery, mortars, and tanks, or placing them near schools, hospitals, or religious buildings. In contrast to the limited objective of using airstrikes in support of humanitarian aid delivery, as proposed by the Bush administration, the British military produced plans with the more ambitious aim of compelling Belgrade to stop fomenting the war. Senior British officers were convinced that for airpower to be used effectively, it would have to be used in a big way, not in small doses. The strategic bombing campaign envisioned by the UK focused on targets in Serbia proper, and executing it was within the capabilities of the Royal Air Force, provided certain intelligence, command and control, and electronic warfare assets were made available through NATO. Though the strategic air attacks were deemed politically unacceptable, the option was at least considered.

14 Cot, interview; Lanata, interview; Régnauld.
15 Pia Wood, 143.
16 Lepick, 81-82.
17 MoD Officials B and D.
18 MoD Officials B and E. Also see Congressional testimony by the USAF Chief of Staff, General McPeak, warning of these problems: Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994, Part 1, 20-22, 28 and 29 April 1993, 213-214.
19 MoD Official G.
20 Ibid., and MoD Official D.
21 MoD Official G.
Early USAFE Planning

Senior American Air Force officers began planning in December of 1992 for an air campaign in the Balkans, and they initially modeled their plan on Gulf War air operations. Though the first plan was shelved and never implemented, it helped to initiate a continuous cycle of US planning that would coexist alongside NATO efforts to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

During the first week of December 1992, senior officers within US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) command, based at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, began developing an air campaign plan for Bosnia. The detailed work fell to Colonel Bob Lushbaugh, chief of operations on the USAFE staff, who began his Air Force career by flying 200 night missions as a forward air controller over Vietnam. Lushbaugh had arrived at Ramstein six months before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and during Desert Storm, he served as chief of staff for Joint Task Force Proven Force (Proven Force included the quasi-independent bombing missions against Iraq conducted under USAFE leadership from Incirlik air base in Turkey). Early in December 1992, the vice commander of USAFE tasked Lushbaugh to, ‘draft a CONOPS [Concept of Operations] for an air campaign in Bosnia like we did in Desert Storm.’ A few days later when the USAFE commander approved Lushbaugh’s concept for an air campaign, Lushbaugh was assigned to work under the direction of Major General James ‘Bear’ Chambers, commander of the US 17th Air Force.

Besides commanding an American numbered air force, Chambers also ‘wore a NATO hat,’ that is, his position made him simultaneously responsible to both US and Allied authorities. However, at this stage, planning for an air campaign in Bosnia was conducted strictly within US channels. With a strong build, and a gruff, aggressive manner ‘Bear’ Chambers had a reputation within the Air Force for possessing great tactical expertise. He had begun his Air Force career as a flying instructor when Eisenhower was President, and he later served two combat tours as a fighter pilot flying missions over North Vietnam. As a two-star general, he flew fighters again in combat during Desert Storm, and he would continue to log combat flying hours over Bosnia until

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Chambers.
he retired in late 1994. During his career, Chambers amassed an astounding number of flying hours for a fighter pilot—topping 5,500 even before NATO air operations began over Bosnia. Thus, the American officers who conducted the initial planning for air operations in Bosnia had learned their profession in the skies over Vietnam, and had recently been involved in the Desert Storm air campaign.

Around mid-December 1992, shortly after planning began at USAFE, Lieutenant General Joseph Ashy took command of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH), making him the senior Air Force officer in NATO’s southern region. Like most of the Air Force’s senior leadership, Ashy too was a fighter pilot who had flown in Vietnam. As a general officer, Ashy had commanded the prestigious 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, and later the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. He was well known within the Air Force fighter community for his direct, no-nonsense, and sometimes abrupt, style. Though Ashy was responsible for NATO air operations in the southern region, and he outranked Chambers, it would have been inappropriate for Ashy to run the US-only planning because he was not directly in the US chain of command.

**NATO Involvement in Bosnia**

General Ashy became involved in planning air operations for the Balkans on his first day on the job, and he quickly became aware of the planning being done by USAFE. NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 17 December agreed to support a UN call to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia, which the UN had declared in October. General Ashy recalled being at the NATO officers’ club at Naples, just after his change of command, and still greeting guests in the reception line when: “I got a tap on the shoulder and [they] said, ‘We really need you over at Admiral Boorda’s office ASAP [as soon as possible]’.” Admiral Boorda was the American commander of NATO’s southern region, or AFSOUTH—Allied Forces Southern Europe. In Admiral Boorda’s office, General Ashy and the other assembled officers were informed that they, ‘needed to do some serious planning for an air operation in the Balkans...specifically over Bosnia, in response to a possible UN resolution and...NAC [North Atlantic Council] guidance, to

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27 Chambers.
28 General Ashy was Deputy Commander-in-Chief of USAFE for the Southern Region. That was a titular position without much real authority. General Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Rob Owen, 29 April 1996, unclassified version redacted by the Air Force Historical Research Agency for the Director of History at Air Force Space Command, October 1997, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.
30 Ashy, interview by Owen.
police a no-fly zone." Chambers and Lushbaugh flew to Naples the next morning, and they briefed their concept of operations for an air campaign to General Ashy and a small group of American planners from Boorda’s command. The objective of the nascent plan was ‘to cause the Bosnian Serbs to cease and desist, and to get them to the bargaining table.’ The plan consisted of three phases and, like its Gulf War progenitor, the first phase was designed to achieve control of the airspace over the area of operations—this served as a starting point for AFSOUTH planning of the no-fly zone. However, NATO enforcement of the zone would not begin until April of 1993. In the meantime, Chambers and Lushbaugh continued to work on an air campaign plan as part of a larger US joint-service effort, and they kept General Ashy informed about it. By the end of January 1993, Chambers’s team completed their plan, and General Chambers briefed it in Washington; then ‘it got put it on the shelf,’ never to be implemented. However, General Chambers’s plan was the first air plan built within the theater, and General Chambers perceived a similarity between this first plan and plans later built by General Ashy for NATO airstrikes.

Enforcing the No-Fly Zone

On 13 March, aircraft flying from Serbia bombed the Bosnian villages of Gladovici and Osatica. The flights from Serbia were observed by UN military monitors, and the attacks were condemned by the Security Council. On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council passed resolution 816 citing Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ for enforcement of the six-month-old no-fly zone over Bosnia. The ban covered ‘flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ other than those authorized by the UN. Responses to violations were to be ‘proportionate’ and ‘subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR.’

31 Ibid.
32 Lushbaugh.
33 Chambers.
34 Ibid.
35 Lushbaugh; and General Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, interview by author, 3 July 1998, Fairfax, Virginia, author’s notes, author’s personal collection.
36 Chambers; Lushbaugh; and Ashy, interview by author.
37 Chambers.
38 Bethlehem and Weller, xlv; and Honig and Both, 89.
39 Honig and Both, 89; and Bethlehem and Weller, xlv and 32.
40 S/RES/816, par. 4.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
Originally, General Chambers was named the Joint Air Component Commander (JFACC) for US air operations in the Balkans, but the advent of the NATO no-fly zone caused Ashy’s responsibilities to overlap with Chambers’s. Sometime around February of 1993, with preparations well underway for enforcement of the ban on military flights over Bosnia, France demanded that the operation be directed by a non-British European. Plans to run air operations from Aviano air base in Italy—a base long used by the Americans—were scuttled, because it was felt that using Aviano would tend to cut America’s allies out of the operation. In the end, NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF) Headquarters at Vicenza was selected as the site from which to direct the no-fly zone enforcement, and its commander Lieutenant General Antonio Rossetti of Italy was to head the operation. Because Rossetti worked for General Ashy, the NATO chain of command in the southern region ran from Admiral Boorda, to General Ashy, to General Rossetti, to General Chambers, who quickly began directing the day-to-day operations from Vicenza’s Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). This arrangement increased General Ashy’s role in controlling the air operations over Bosnia; however, the command relations were a bit muddled, because General Chambers retained both his title as a US JFACC and command of the non-NATO, US air operations in the region, such as the Provide Promise humanitarian air-drops.

The way NATO commanders in the southern region dealt with helicopters violating the no-fly zone illustrated the influence of these theater-level commanders on the use of airpower. In order to maintain tight control over operation Deny Flight, NATO authorities decided that orders to shoot down aircraft caught violating the no-fly zone could not be made by anyone below the CAOC director, General Chambers. The no-fly zone resolution banned unauthorized flights by helicopters, as well as by fixed-wing aircraft. Initially NATO had some success at curtailing helicopter flights. By intercepting the helicopters and making warning passes, NATO pilots got many of the helicopters to land during the first weeks of Deny Flight. But, as General Chambers later recalled, it only worked for about the first 100 intercepts, after which the

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43 Snyder and Harrington, 159.
44 Lushbaugh.
45 Chambers.
46 Lushbaugh and Ashy, interview by Owen. Note: General Rossetti took over command of 5 ATAF on 7 April 1993, replacing Lieutenant General Giuseppe Degli Innocenti.
47 Ashy, interview by Owen; Chambers; and Lushbaugh.
48 lifts, interview by Owen; Chambers; and Lushbaugh.
49 'BACS,' 10.1.
unauthorized helicopters began to heed NATO’s warnings less and less, eventually flouting the no-fly zone openly.\textsuperscript{52} Though no one below Chambers knew it at the time, he and his superiors, Ashy and Boorda, were not going to authorize the downing of helicopters over Bosnia.\textsuperscript{53} However the mounting number of violations by helicopters soon drew criticism from above.\textsuperscript{54} In defending the decision, Chambers later explained that if NATO did shoot down a helicopter: 1) it would turn out to be the wrong helicopter, 2) it would be the right helicopter, but it would fall on the wrong spot, perhaps killing innocent people on the ground, and 3) even if one of the first two reasons did not pertain, the downing of a helicopter would not have an appreciable effect on the military operations of the faction using the helicopter—and all sides were conducting unauthorized helicopter flights.\textsuperscript{55} In Chambers’s view, despite some high-level discontent with the helicopter violations, no one wanted to take the responsibility for overriding the commanders in the field by ordering that helicopters be shot down.\textsuperscript{56}

‘Safe Areas’ and ‘Lift and Strike’

On Wednesday, 20 January 1993, Bill Clinton was inaugurated as the 42nd President of the United States, and his National Security Council soon took up the issue of military intervention in Bosnia. General Colin Powell, in describing his advice to the Council about using airpower in Bosnia, claimed:

\begin{quote}
I laid out the same military options that I had presented to President Bush. Our choices ranged from limited air strikes around Sarajevo to heavy bombing of the Serbs throughout the theater. I emphasized that none of these actions was guaranteed to change Serb behavior. Only troops on the ground could do that. Heavy bombing might persuade them to give in, but would not compel them to quit. And, faced with limited air strikes, the Serbs would have little difficulty hiding tanks and artillery in the woods and fog of Bosnia or keeping them close to civilian populations. Furthermore, no matter what we did, it would be easy for the Serbs to respond by seizing UN humanitarian personnel as hostages.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{51} Chambers.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.; and Lieutenant Colonel Lowell R. Boyd Jr., USAF, AFSOUTH Staff Officer, Naples, Italy, April 1993 - December 1995, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Rob Owen, 6 December 1995, Naples, Italy, transcript of taped interview, BACS Collection. Colonel Boyd recalled the issue of intercepting helicopters coming to a head and being resolved in the first two weeks of Deny Flight operations.
\textsuperscript{53} Chambers; Ashy, interview by author; and Lowell Boyd.
\textsuperscript{54} Chambers.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. The wisdom of AFSOUTH’s policy on helicopters was validated a year later when USAF F-15s accidentally downed two US army Blackhawk helicopters in the no-fly zone over northern Iraq, killing 26 people.
\textsuperscript{57} Powell, \textit{My American Journey}, 576.
It was during one of these early meetings that General Powell’s protestations prompted Madeleine Albright, then ambassador the UN, to ask her now famous question: ‘What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’ The JCS Chairman replied by explaining the need for a clear political objective, much as he had argued months earlier in print. The National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, who had served on the National Security Council staff as a young man during the Vietnam War, sided with General Powell, saying: ‘You know Madeleine...the kinds of questions Colin is asking about goals are exactly the ones the military never asked during Vietnam.’ By 10 February, the new administration had completed a policy review, and it soon became clear that American military intervention was not in the offing.

However, by the beginning of May 1993, the situation in Bosnia had worsened, and the Clinton administration settled on the ‘lift and strike’ policy that it pursued over the next two and a half years. ‘Lift and strike’ referred to lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, and conducting airstrikes against Serb military targets. The US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, advocated unilateral US action, ‘under existing United Nations authority.’ But President Clinton decided he was not ready to act without allied participation. Under intense media and public pressure to ‘do something’ in Bosnia, both London and Paris expressed a willingness to consider using airpower in Bosnia. However, France and Britain remained firmly opposed to any lifting of the arms embargo, because they feared such action would lead to increased fighting in Bosnia, which, in turn, would jeopardize the safety of French and British forces in UNPROFOR. Neither Britain nor the United States was willing to send troops to intervene in the ground fighting, and France would not take tougher measures on the ground in Bosnia without the other two. Unless something were done to affect the balance of power on the ground, there seemed little point in conducting airstrikes.

When US Secretary of State Warren Christopher toured European capitals in early May,

58 Ibid.
60 Powell, My American Journey, 577.
61 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 306; and Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 123.
62 Gordon, ‘12 In State Dept.’
63 Ifill, ‘Clinton Considers Bosnia Air Strikes.’
64 Ifill; and Morgan, ‘Hurd Warns of Dangers.’
65 Gow, ‘British Perspectives,’ 95; and Lepik, 83.
he failed to win support for the administration’s ‘lift and strike’ policy. Throughout the month of May, NATO nations continued to mull over the idea of using military force, especially airpower, either to implement the moribund Vance-Owen peace plan, or to help protect the ‘safe areas.’

On 6 May 1993, just after the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan, the UN Security Council passed resolution 824 declaring Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa and Gorazde ‘safe areas.’ Altogether there were six ‘safe areas,’ because Srebrenica had been made a ‘safe area’ in April, but they were not ‘safe havens’—a label which, under international law, would have implied far greater responsibilities for the UN in seeing that they were indeed safe. Significantly, resolution 824 invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Council called for:

The immediate cessation of armed attacks or any hostile act against these safe areas, and the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from the towns to a distance where from they cease to constitute a menace to their security and that of their inhabitants (emphasis added).

Hopes for the Vance-Owen plan dwindled, and in early June the Security Council tried to make the ‘safe areas’ safe, by giving UNPROFOR a tougher mandate, and by supporting the force with NATO airpower.

Conclusions

The Gulf War had a big impact on the debates over whether or not to use airpower in Bosnia. By the time the Gulf War ended in March of 1991, high-technology airpower had acquired an image as a near antiseptic instrument capable of destroying without killing, and winning without risking. Most military professionals in the US, UK, and France recognized the limitations as well as the capabilities of airpower, and they knew that expectations were running ahead of capabilities. Informed commentators tended to highlight airpower’s limitations and the challenges of using it in Bosnia, but public debates on the issue were often ill-informed. Furthermore, the well known difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of airpower only served to confound efforts, even by informed observers, to separate the enduring and general lessons of the Gulf War from

69 S/RES/824, 6 May 1993.
70 Silber and Little, 274; Honig and Both, 104; Leurdijk, 33-34.
71 S/RES/824, par. 4.
73 Mason, Air Power, 168.
observations applicable to fighting an inept dictator in a desert environment. A less obvious, though not surprising, consequence of the Gulf War was that it created a cadre of airmen—especially in America—who were confident in airpower's abilities and schooled in its application.

By May of 1993, the American and British policies for using airpower in Bosnia had been set and would change little until 1995. Consistent with the findings of Betts and Petraeus, the US military had relatively little influence in shaping that policy. Despite Powell's protestations, the Clinton administration adopted a policy of 'lift and strike.' The weak commitment to this policy owed less to military reluctance to get involved in Bosnia than to internal divisions within the administration, objections from America's European allies, and the President's tendency to focus on domestic programs, such as nationalized health care. The British and French governments preferred to dampen the effects of the war through the presence of lightly armed, impartial UN peacekeepers, who were obviously vulnerable to retaliation should the Serbs respond thus to being attacked from the air. Over the next two years, the ebb and flow of the war in Bosnia, and the consequent media attention on human rights violations, generated undulating pressure behind US ambitions for launching air attacks against the Serbs. British and French resistance to airstrikes rose and fell as necessary to head off such US action, but the policies in Washington, London and Paris hardly changed. With policies set, the influence of senior military officers in America, the UK, and France diminished, and the influence of theater-level commanders serving in NATO and the UN gradually increased.

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74 On this last point, see, Gow, Triumph, 213.
75 The French policy seemed to migrate slightly toward that of the US in February 1994, when the French proposed a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, a measure long sought by the Bosnian Muslims, and one that would be enforced through airstrikes. In August and September, when limited airstrikes took place, they were in the vicinity of Sarajevo, for which the French were primarily responsible. However, it was French opposition in the UN and NATO which first limited, then blocked, more robust airstrikes in November 1994. British opposition to airstrikes was much more uniform and resolute, at least until 1995.
CHAPTER 4

NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIRSTRIKES: MAY - DECEMBER 1993

_The politicians had a great deal of difficulty understanding the problems faced by the military in operations._

—General Francis Briquemont, *Do Something, General!*

During the second half of 1993, UNPROFOR’s commanders could not strike an acceptable balance between mission accomplishment and force protection. In part, their difficulties lay in the muddle of conflicting political guidelines governing UNPROFOR’s mission, and the failure, or inability, of UN political authorities to provide their commanders with clear, prioritized aims. In part, UNPROFOR’s problem lay in its lack of ground forces needed to fully accomplish the enforcement elements of its mission. This shortage of means was exacerbated by three factors. First, UN and EC political authorities repeatedly pressed the commanders to take risks for which the commanders felt they alone would be held accountable should things go wrong. Second, UN political authorities refused, or were unable, to give their commanders control over the airpower, which was suppose to make up for the shortfall in UN ground forces. Third, American Air Force generals in NATO’s southern region were pressing UNPROFOR’s top commanders to support airstrikes that would have endangered UN forces and wrecked UNPROFOR’s prospects for fulfilling the humanitarian elements of the UN mission. Deprived of a clear objective, and lacking the means and authority to accomplish the tasks thrust upon them, the UNPROFOR commanders had nothing against which to balance the weight of responsibility for protecting their forces.

In contrast to their UN counterparts, solving the conundrum over using airpower in Bosnia was less of a challenge for NATO’s commanders. Because General Ashy had been working on air campaign plans since December of 1992, he and Admiral Boorda were able to quickly meet the needs of NATO political authorities during the crisis in
August at Mount Igman near Sarajevo. The political-military tension that might have resulted from the struggle to control such a campaign remained in the background, because no bombs were dropped. The AFSOUTH commanders also smoothly discharged their responsibilities for supporting UNPROFOR with close air support but, again, with no bombs dropped, and with self-restraint from the Serb air defenses, the AFSOUTH commanders were not subjected to the same challenges that actual operations would have imposed.


On 4 June 1993, after the Bosnian Serbs had repeatedly rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan, the UN Security Council resolved, in resolution 836, to protect the populations in the ‘safe areas’ by expanding UNPROFOR’s mandate, and by allowing UN member states to use airpower to support UNPROFOR. However, resolution 836 was not a political compromise between governments for and against using airpower in Bosnia; it was in fact a failure to compromise which shifted the focus of the airpower debate from the political arena to the military. It embodied contradictions and vague language that reflected the divisions between Security Council members—not least those who had sponsored it: France, Russia, the US, the UK, and Spain. One of the Security Council’s leading proponents of ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia, Ambassador Arria of Venezuela, felt compelled to abstain from voting for 836, which he described as a charade cloaking inaction. He reproached the Council, for failing to address fundamental questions, such as: ‘What would be the United Nations’ responsibility if the aggressors were to accept the establishment of safe areas but later refused to withdraw from their surroundings? Would the United Nations then be obliged to use force in order to make them withdraw? Would the Security Council be prepared to authorize military action in order to meet this objective?’ In the weeks following the passage of resolution 836, comments by the UN representatives from the US and the UK would make clear that nothing had changed in their nations’ stances toward the use of airpower in Bosnia. Indeed, immediately after the vote on 836, Madeleine Albright told the Council that: ‘The United States voted for

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1 S/PV.3228, 4 June 1993.
2 Ibid. Also see, Richard Caplan, Post-Mortem on UNPROFOR, 8-9.
3 Ibid., 287.
4 S/PV.3241, 18 June 1993.
this resolution with no illusions. It is an intermediate step—no more, no less. And in an allusion to the Clinton administration's 'lift and strike' policy, she added that the Security Council had agreed to 'keep open options for new and tougher measures...My Government's view of what those tougher measures should be has not changed.'

Resolution 836 represented a wobbly step toward peace enforcement. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it was designed 'to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in resolution 824.' Up until that time UNPROFOR had only been mandated to use force to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. In paragraph 5 of resolution 836, the Security Council charged UNPROFOR with four tasks which, depending on interpretation, might have required UNPROFOR to use force other than in self-defense: 1) 'deter attacks against safe areas', 2) 'promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,' 3) 'occupy some key points on the ground,' and 4) participate 'in the delivery of humanitarian relief' (emphasis added). The first three of these four tasks were new. In order for UNPROFOR to discharge these new responsibilities, the resolution authorized UNPROFOR to use force, and it allowed UN member states to use airpower in support of UNPROFOR. But these authorizations were half-hearted and unclear.

In long, convoluted sentences, resolution 836 spun a web of connections and conditions which would confound those military officers whose duty it would be to implement it. While the Security Council clearly decided to vest UNPROFOR with added responsibility for protecting the 'safe areas,' it simultaneously—though less clearly—made it difficult for the force to fulfill that responsibility. In paragraph 9, the resolution authorized UNPROFOR 'to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas...or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of the Force or of protected humanitarian convoys.' This authorization circumscribed the range of possible interpretations open to UNPROFOR and, for

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5 S/PV.3228.
6 Ibid.
9 S/RES/836, par. 5; and S/25939. Note UNSCR 836 also tasked UNPROFOR 'to monitor the cease-fire.' However, it would have been difficult to justify the use of force other than in self defense to fulfill this task.
10 S/25939.
11 S/RES/836, par. 9.
12 S/RES/836, par. 9.
example, precluded its commanders from proactively using force against the Bosnian Serbs as a means to fulfill the task to 'promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units' from around the 'safe areas.' More importantly, at the insistence of the British, French, and Spanish, the debilitating clause 'acting in self-defence' appeared just before the authorization to use force, and rendered the new authorization meaningless, because UNPROFOR had always had the right to use force in self-defense. Permission to use force in self-defense was not something the Security Council needed to grant to UNPROFOR, nor could the Council properly proscribe it. Indeed, the clause 'acting in self-defence' could have been seen as a step backward from the authority UNPROFOR already possessed, because, from its inception, the force in Bosnia had been allowed to use 'all necessary measures' to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Thus, while paragraph 9 ostensibly added to UNPROFOR's authority to use force in Bosnia, it also contained a clause undermining that same authority.

Paragraph 10 of resolution 836 added airpower to the mix, but in a way that was open to conflicting interpretations. It stated that: 'Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations may take...all necessary measures, through the use of air power...to support the force in the performance of its mandate.' Airpower had not been specifically included or excluded in the paragraph authorizing UNPROFOR to use force (paragraph 9), and UNPROFOR had no airpower of its own. This seemed to imply a division of labor whereby UNPROFOR was only authorized to use force 'acting in self defense,' but NATO—or indeed any individual UN member state, acting alone or in cooperation with others—could potentially use airpower to pursue options barred to UNPROFOR. The freedom to use airpower was, however, constrained in two ways. First, any use of airpower had to be 'subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and the Force.' And second, the use of airpower was meant to support UNPROFOR 'in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 above.' By requiring close coordination with the UN, and linking the use of airpower to both UNPROFOR's expanded mandate, and its convoluted authority for using force (when

13 Honig and Both, 114.
14 S/RES/836, par. 9.
15 L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 323-324.
16 Ibid.
17 S/RES/776.
18 For other interpretations and discussions, see, Leurdijk, 35-36; Caplan, 7-9; Honig and Both, 5-6; and Gow, Triumph, 135-136 and 270-271 n. 9.
19 S/RES/836, par. 10.
20 Ibid.
‘acting in self-defence’) the authors of 836 left open the possibility for two very different interpretations of how airpower could be used in Bosnia. One way to interpret this constraint was to give precedence to the objective of the resolution—protecting the people in the ‘safe areas’—and to argue that airpower could be used proactively for airstrikes in order to execute the tasks spelled out in paragraph 5, which UNPROFOR was proscribed by paragraph 9 from accomplishing (e.g., bombing the Bosnian Serb forces in order ‘to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units’ from around the safe areas). In addition, this first interpretation would permit airpower to be used in support of UNPROFOR forces when they lacked adequate means for self-defense. Alternatively, another interpretation—which appealed to those objecting to the widespread use of airpower—was to say that paragraph 9 of resolution 836 clarified UNPROFOR’s status as a peacekeeping force by limiting it to the use of force only when ‘acting in self-defence.’

Since airpower was intended to support UNPROFOR, it could only be used legitimately for air support. Rather than resolving conflicting agendas through compromise, resolution 836 merely served as a vehicle for transferring the struggle to a new stage—a stage where theater commanders in UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH would play important roles.

UNSCR 844: Implementing an Ambiguous Policy

The ambiguity over airpower continued as the Security Council took steps to implement its ‘safe areas’ policy. On 14 June, Boutros-Ghali submitted a report advising the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 836, in which he noted: ‘NATO confirmed its willingness to offer “protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR”.’ Most of the references to airpower in the report dealt with close air support for UNPROFOR, not airstrikes. However, several remarks alluded to the possibility for broader air action. These included: ‘emphasis must be placed on a credible air-strike capability’ to help UNPROFOR ‘resist a concentrated assault on any of the safe areas.’ Despite an assessment by UNPROFOR’s commander, General Wahlgren, that some 34,000 troops would be needed to implement the ‘safe areas’ policy, Boutros-Ghali justified recommending a ‘light option’ of only 7,600 reinforcements, because: ‘While

21 Ibid.
22 This ‘objectives vs. objections’ manner of expression comes from James Gow’s, ‘British Perspective,’ 88 and 97. It is roughly equivalent to Clodfelter’s positive objectives and negative objectives introduced in Chapter 2. Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower, 141-142.
23 S/25939.
this option cannot, in itself, completely guarantee the defence of the safe areas, it relies on the threat of air action against any belligerent. On 18 June 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 844, approving Boutros-Ghali’s report, authorizing 7,600 reinforcements for UNPROFOR, and reaffirming ‘its decision in paragraph 10 of resolution 836 (1993) on the use of air power in and around the safe areas to support the Force in the performance of its mandate. In brief speeches to the Security Council made immediately after passing resolution 844, the representatives from the US, France, Russia and the UK emphasized their own national spins on implementing the ‘safe areas’ policy. Nothing had changed. Much was being left to the interpretations of those who would have to implement these resolutions.

According to Michael Williams, a former Director of Information and Senior Spokesman for UNPROFOR who has written about the UN’s troubled political-military relations, Generals Wahlgren and Morillon ‘had little idea how to proceed’ with the implementation of the ‘safe areas’ resolutions. Honig and Both have shown that on 5 June, the day before the Security Council authorized enforcement of the ‘safe areas,’ General Wahlgren prophetically warned UN political authorities in New York: ‘If one allowed no controls of the military or paramilitary units of the Bosnian government, one would create a scenario which would encourage the use of the safe areas as havens where forces could refit, rearm, train and prepare for further military operations.’ Moreover, after 836 was issued, General Wahlgren worried that the ‘safe areas’ concept jeopardized the impartiality of his forces in Bosnia, who were supposed to enforce its one-sided restrictions. General Morillon’s memoir refers to the ‘safe areas’ only obliquely. However, he seems to have favored using airpower when necessary to ensure the success of UNPROFOR’s mission. Though Wahlgren wrote to the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, proclaiming the importance of airpower in compensating for the inadequate number of ground reinforcements, the force commander’s successor believed Wahlgren was fundamentally opposed to the more

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
28 Michael Williams, Civil-Military Relations, 25.
29 Honig and Both, 115-116.
30 Messervy-Whiting, 40 n. 27.
31 Morillon, Croire, 202.
32 Ibid., 213.
forceful bent of his new mandate and, in consequence, wanted nothing to do with NATO airpower. In any event, Generals Wahlgren and Morillon left their UN posts just a few weeks after resolution 844 was passed and before NATO made aircraft available for air support. Thus, it fell to their successors to sort out what to do about airpower, and to try to extract a coherent mission from the tangled verbiage of resolutions 836 and 844.

New Leadership for UNPROFOR

Weaknesses in the UNPROFOR chain of command, discussed in the preceding chapter, were complicated, not rectified, by changes made in May of 1993. At the beginning of May, former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg took over from Cyrus Vance as the UN co-chairman to the peace conference in Geneva. Unlike Vance, however, Stoltenberg was designated the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for former Yugoslavia, thus making Stoltenberg the civilian head of UNPROFOR. To assist him in the discharge of his military responsibilities, Stoltenberg recruited his fellow countryman General Vigliek Eide, who had recently retired from NATO’s most senior military post—Chairman of the Military Committee in Brussels. By August, General Eide was based in Zagreb, heading a team of three officers who were to act as the liaison between Stoltenberg and the commander of UNPROFOR. Also in early May, around the time of Warren Christopher’s trip to sell the Clinton administration’s ‘lift and strike’ policy, Boutros-Ghali received support from Paris in insisting that the UN, rather than NATO, should oversee the implementation of any peace plan in the Balkans. However, the French government also agreed, in early May, to a chain of command for implementing a Yugoslav peace plan, which put NATO’s Admiral Boorda at the top, a French general as second in command, and the general commanding NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in charge of operations in Bosnia. Though the Vance-Owen peace plan, for which this chain of command was originally intended, was never implemented, the French government secured the top UNPROFOR billet in Zagreb for General Jean Cot, the man designated as Boorda’s number two for implementing the

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34 Cot, interview.
35 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 157-159.
36 Ibid., 189 and 264; and Gow, Triumph, 101.
37 Messervy-Whiting, 15.
38 Ibid., 28.
39 Littlejohns, ‘Bosnia on the Brink.’
40 Messervy-Whiting, 14-15, and 41; and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 161-162.
peace plan. Whether the UN or NATO led the effort in the former Yugoslavia, General Cot was poised to play a central role. Had the UN and NATO worked together to implement a peace plan, this might not have been a bad arrangement. But adding a layer of civilian authority that was geographically separated from the UN military commanders (Stoltenberg was based in Geneva) only complicated matters for the UNPROFOR generals as they later tried to interpret their mission.

Two months after Stoltenberg was installed, the UN replaced the top two commanders in UNPROFOR with senior infantry generals whose backgrounds and experiences suggested they would be likely to hold the traditional army view of airpower. On 1 July 1993, General Cot, the only four-star general to command UNPROFOR, replaced General Wahlgren—the latter having lasted just four months in his UN post. Cot, at fifty-nine years of age, had spent nearly forty years of his life in uniform, and was one of the most senior generals in the French army. In April of 1990, General Cot had been promoted to four-star general and made commander of the French 1st Army. He had been in his post for over a year by the summer of 1991, when he was tasked to lead secret WEU planning for possible military intervention in Yugoslavia. After being designated as the ground commander, under Admiral Boorda, for implementing the Vance-Owen plan, Cot traveled to Naples at least twice to discuss implementation planning, before taking up command of UNPROFOR; during these visits he was briefed on the US-authored air campaign plan, and he was not impressed.

Though France contributed the largest number of troops to UNPROFOR, it could not expect to retain the two leading command billets, so General Morillon had to give up his post in Sarajevo. In late June, General Morillon learned that an old friend, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont of Belgium, would replace him. General Briquemont was a fifty-eight years-old infantry officer who had recently received his third star, and was about to take command of the 1st Belgian Corps headquartered in

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41 General Morillon says he learned about the shake up in June, but, Philippe Guillot has implied that Morillon may have actually found out about it in May when he went back to France for a weekend for family reasons, but reportedly also secretly met the new Minister of Defence, M. Léotard. Morillon Croire, 202; and Guillot, 38.
42 Cot’s longtime friend, and subordinate commander in UNPROFOR, General Francis Briquemont claimed Cot was the oldest general in the French army. Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, interview by author, 11 August 1998, Brussels, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection.
43 Cot, ‘L’Europe et l’Otan,’ 94; and Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 113. Cot’s chief of staff at the time was Major General Philippe Morillon. Morillon, Croire, 11.
44 Cot, interview; and Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 113 and 124.
45 Morillon, Croire, 202.
46 Ibid.
Cologne, Germany, when another of his French colleagues, General Cot, phoned and invited him to come to work in the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{47} Briquemont was at the zenith of his career in the Belgian army and had already commanded at the brigade and division level in units earmarked for NATO.\textsuperscript{48} Before going to Bosnia, he had not been privy to details of the US-built air campaign plan. On Monday, 12 July 1993, General Cot presided over the change of command in Sarajevo between Generals Morillon and Briquemont, then the French generals departed for Zagreb, leaving Briquemont in Sarajevo with his new and ill-defined responsibilities.\textsuperscript{49} The two francophone army generals at the top of UNPROFOR had not participated in the Gulf War, and their familiarity with airpower was limited mainly to close air support. Nor were they experienced at peacekeeping or peace support operations. Yet both now held command in organizations virtually devoid of airpower expertise,\textsuperscript{50} and they would soon find themselves caught up in negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, whilst outsiders attempted to bring pressure to bear on the Serbs by threatening airstrikes. It was the perfect setup for the traditional soldier-airman split over how to use airpower, reinforcing the political tensions between France and Britain on one hand, and the US on the other.

4.2 NATO AIR-TO-GROUND MISSIONS: JUNE - AUGUST 1993

The need for air support to compensate for UNPROFOR’s inadequate ground forces led the UN’s new commanders to avail themselves of NATO’s airpower expertise and resources; however, from the outset, Cot and Briquemont were highly skeptical of the utility of NATO airstrikes. NATO agreed to provide unspecified air support to UNPROFOR on 10 June, and Admiral Boorda tasked planners at the CAOC to develop a concept of operations for adding close air support to Operation Deny Flight.\textsuperscript{51} Under the direction of Colonel Lushbaugh, the CAOC staff quickly produced this concept of operations, and General Chambers and Admiral Boorda took it to Zagreb for UN coordination.\textsuperscript{52} However, while NATO forged ahead with plans to implement close air support procedures under Change-1 to its Deny Flight plan, OPLAN 40101,\textsuperscript{53} UNPROFOR did nothing to capitalize on its access to NATO airpower prior to General

\textsuperscript{47} Briquemont, \textit{Do Something}, 17-20.
\textsuperscript{48} Briquemont, interview.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.; and Briquemont, \textit{Do Something}, 34.
\textsuperscript{50} Messervy-Whiting, 16.
\textsuperscript{51} Lushbaugh.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Lowell Boyd.
Cot's arrival in July. When he showed up in Zagreb, General Cot's official link to NATO air operations was through a NATO lieutenant colonel who had been dispatched to Zagreb to help coordinate activities for the no-fly zone. Cot quickly made arrangements to have a general officer from the Royal Air Force, who could speak French, and who had experience in air-to-ground operations, assigned to his headquarters to head up a NATO liaison team.

Adding air support to the mission in Bosnia also led NATO political authorities to give some clear guidance to the military on how to interpret the security council resolutions. Though NATO had agreed in general terms to provide air support in June, it was not until mid-July that the NAC specifically offered the UN Secretary-General aircraft for the new mission. NATO ambassadors decided to limit the use of air support to the protection of UNPROFOR; it was not to be used for the wider mission of protecting the 'safe areas.' Furthermore, although the two resolutions authorizing airpower (836 and 844) stated that it could be used 'in and around the safe areas,' NATO ambassadors decided close air support would be made available to UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia. These two NATO interpretations of the Security Council resolutions reflected the French, but more so the British, desires to both avoid escalation and to protect their troops in Bosnia. Unlike the French, who were deployed mainly in and around the 'safe areas' of Bihac and Sarajevo, British soldiers were spread out across central Bosnia, where there were no 'safe areas.' Furthermore, a Bosnian Serb commander had already threatened the British that if NATO jets attacked the Serbs, then the Serbs would target British troops. Through their interpretations, NATO's political authorities were reducing the chances of Serb reprisals. These NATO interpretations were driven as much by objections, or negative objectives—avoiding escalation and friendly casualties—as by the positive aim of assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid; though, in this case the positive and negative objectives complemented each other well.

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54 Messervy-Whiting, 16; and Cot, interview.
55 Messervy-Whiting, 16.
56 Ibid.
57 David Owen and Laura Silber, 'Hurd Hints at Croatia Sanctions;' and George Graham, 'Aspin Orders Military Support to the Adriatic,'
58 Gow, Triumph, 136.
60 Stewart, Broken Lives, 86.
61 Ibid., 303.
62 Serb leaders expected UNPROFOR to shoot back in self-defense, and apparently accepted this. See, Briquemont, Do Something, 94.
63 Gow, 'British Perspective,' 95-97.
NATO’s ‘Operational Options for Air Strikes’

In August of 1993, BSA pressure on Sarajevo led NATO to threaten the Bosnian Serbs with airstrikes. Because American commanders in NATO had been planning for airstrikes already, they were able to move NATO policy toward the sort of forceful use of airpower preferred by the US government. However, NATO political authorities established procedures for controlling the amount of force used, and the rules for initiating airstrikes. The potential for friction between the American theater-level commanders, who favored robust air action, and NATO political authorities, who wished to restrain airpower, did not materialize in 1993 because airstrikes were blocked by UN commanders, particularly General Briquemont. However, tensions quickly peaked at the military level, where the vulnerability of UNPROFOR ground forces helped to push the UN commanders even further toward those political authorities who were opposed to airstrikes.

Increasing Bosnian Serb pressure on Sarajevo during June and July of 1993 led the US government to push its allies for airstrikes against the Serbs. The assault on Sarajevo began with increased shelling at the end of May, and by late July, BSA units were systematically taking government territory around the Bosnian capital. By early August, the Serbs took Mount Bjelasnica south of Sarajevo and were threatening to capture nearby Mount Igman, creating a crisis for the international community. If left unchecked, Serb forces encircling Sarajevo looked set to take control of all land routes into and out of the city. As General Briquemont attempted to negotiate a ceasefire with the Bosnian Serbs, the US government pressed its allies to accept a broad interpretation of resolution 836 by endorsing airstrikes to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo. The American government even suggested it was ready to act alone, according to Dick Leurdijk. Some of America’s allies remained opposed to airstrikes due to concerns for their soldiers in Bosnia; however, following ten hours of debate on 2 August, the alliance issued a warning:

The Alliance has now decided to make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues, including wide-scale interference with humanitarian assistance, stronger
measures including air strikes against those responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  

NATO air forces could mount these airstrikes quickly, because of earlier US planning, and because airstrikes did not require the complex system for air-ground coordination like the one needed for close air support.

Commanders in AFSOUTH quickly responded to calls from Brussels for a plan of action. The mission statement, from the NATO Council to its military authorities, directed them: ‘to assist with the relief of the siege of Sarajevo and, if directed, help relieve sieges of other safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina,’ and in addition: ‘When authorized conduct expanded air strikes elsewhere in B-H.’ Working from the planning materials that had been accumulated and refined since General Chambers first built his air campaign plan at the start of the year, General Ashy and a few members of his staff in Naples quickly put together a list of targets for a robust set of airstrikes aimed at crippling the BSA. Admiral Boorda liked the plan, and a colonel from General Ashy’s staff was dispatched to Belgium to brief the airstrike plan to General Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). General Shalikashvili accepted the plan, so that within just a few days of the order from Brussels to get ready for airstrikes, AFSOUTH had a plan it could execute.

To ensure flexibility and control over airstrikes, NATO ambassadors ordered their military authorities to consult with UNPROFOR and then to report back with some options. In response to this tasking, staff officers in Brussels and at SHAPE produced a memorandum titled ‘Operational Options for Air Strikes.’ A slim document of about ten pages, ‘Operational Options’ spelled out, in broad terms, how airstrikes were to be authorized. Among other things, the memorandum directed NATO military authorities to prioritize and group together proposed targets, by target type and by location, in order to facilitate political oversight and decisions. On 9 August, NATO ambassadors

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71 Ashy, interview by Owen.
72 Ibid.; and Chambers.
73 Ashy, interview by Owen; and Ashy, interview by author.
75 Kehoe.
76 MCM-KAD-084-93, ‘Operational Options for Air Strikes,’ Memorandum for the Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NAC Decision Statement, 8 August 1993.
77 MCM-KAD-084-93.
approved the ‘Operational Options’ memo, but the alliance softened the tone of its threat to use airstrikes,\textsuperscript{78} noting:

\begin{quote}
Air strikes foreseen by the Council decisions of August 2 are limited to the support of humanitarian relief, and must not be interpreted as a decision to intervene militarily in the conflict. ...[Furthermore], NATO’s actions take place under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions, including the UN Security Council resolutions 770, 776, and 836, and in support of UNPROFOR as it carries out its overall mandate.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

The NAC also agreed ‘with the position of the UN Secretary-General that the first use of air power in the theatre shall be authorized by him,’ and the Council reserved for itself the political authority within NATO to launch airstrikes, rather than delegating that authority to the NATO Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{80} In this way, France and the UK could counter any unwanted pressure from the US to initiate airstrikes, either indirectly (as permanent members of the UN Security Council), by pressuring Boutros Boutros-Ghali, or directly, by blocking the NAC authorization.\textsuperscript{81}

Despite NATO’s tight political controls over airstrikes, and the limited nature of its stated aims for conducting them, the airstrike options approved by the NATO Council allowed for militarily significant attacks in graduated steps. ‘Operational Options for Air Strikes’ envisaged an escalating application of force in three phases: an initial demonstrative response to a provocation; a slightly more robust follow-on phase; and an expanded phase of airstrikes.\textsuperscript{82} These graduated steps allowed political authorities to work their way up through the phases as necessary to increase the coercive pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. NATO and UN authorities—both political and military—continued to reference these options for airstrikes until the end of Deny Flight. However, analyses of NATO airstrikes in Bosnia have been plagued by attempts to draw more clarity about the distinctions between the three phases—or options as they came to be called—than the words of the NATO document could provide.\textsuperscript{83} While the title of the document referred to options, the guidance on targeting contained in it spoke of phases.\textsuperscript{84} The options stemmed from being able to choose how far to go when executing the phases. Thus, the

\textsuperscript{78} Leurdijk, 38-39.
\textsuperscript{79} NATO, Press Release (93)52, 9 August 1993.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Since NAC decisions required unanimity, each individual member state had veto power.
\textsuperscript{82} MCM-KAD-084-93.
\textsuperscript{83} Various descriptions of the options can be found in ‘BACS,’ 4.7, 8.41-8.42, 10.11, and 12.8. Of these, the one on page 4.7 is, perhaps, the best, though it inexplicably lists CAS as an example of a target to be hit under Option 3. For examples of flawed descriptions, see: Solli, \textit{UN and NATO Air Power}, 52-53; and Hagman, 229.
options, or phases, originally referred to coherent groups of targets rather than a means of differentiating between individual targets for one-off attacks.\textsuperscript{85}

Considering the confusion that has grown up around Option 1, 2, and 3 targets, and the relevance of these labels to discussions later in this study, it is worth pausing to examine them here. For each of the three phases in the ‘Operational Options’ memo, the document’s authors offered examples, ‘for illustrative purposes only,’ of the types of targets military authorities should consider grouping together when proposing strikes.\textsuperscript{86} The initial response option, or Phase I, could include any militarily significant target threatening a ‘safe area,’ and a ‘smoking-gun’ (a weapon which had recently fired on UNPROFOR or a ‘safe area’) was seen as an ideal target for Phase I.\textsuperscript{87} There was, however, never a requirement to hit only ‘smoking-guns’ in Phase I. Targets outside of Bosnia would not be hit except in Phase III of a response. But, distinguishing between Phases II and III targets inside Bosnia sometimes required an act of judgment, because similar examples and words were used to describe appropriate targets for these phases.\textsuperscript{88} In general, the closer a target was to a threatened ‘safe area,’ and the more direct its contribution to the threat to that ‘safe area,’ then the more likely it was to be hit in Phase II of a response to a provocation. Conversely, targets located farther from a threatened ‘safe area,’ and bearing a less direct connection to the threat against it, would not be hit unless bombing were expanded to Phase III. Accordingly, a weapons depot near Sarajevo might be hit in Phase II of an operation if Sarajevo were threatened. But the same target, if it were struck at all, would be attacked in Phase III of a response to a threat against Bihac.\textsuperscript{89} By the time NATO executed its first airstrike—a year after NATO approved ‘Operational Options’—the idea of conducting strikes against groups of targets in escalating phases of a coercive bombing campaign had given way to the practice of one-off attacks against individual targets which were labeled as Options 1, 2, or 3.\textsuperscript{90} It was not until operation Deliberate Force in the summer of 1995 that the original concept of linking groups of targets to options, or phases, was reapplied. However, by then the ‘safe areas’ were lumped together in two wider ‘zones of action,’ thus further blurring the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{84} MCM-KAD-084-93.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{86} MCM-KAD-084-93.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{89} ‘BACS,’ 8.42.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Hagman gets this evolution backward, mistakenly concluding that, ‘Air Strikes were rarely aimed at a specific violating weapon system (or a “hot barrel”) but rather evolved to include any military target decided by NATO/UN.’ Hagman, 131.
\end{itemize}
distinguish between some Option 2 and 3 targets. On 13 August 1993, NATO published Change-2 to the plan governing Deny Flight, CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, incorporating new procedures and ROE for airstrikes.

4.3 AIRPOWER AND COERCION AT MOUNT IGMAN: AUGUST 1993

In his reaction to NATO pressures for airstrikes, General Briquemont demonstrated his traditional army views on airpower. With America pushing NATO toward airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs, General Cot suggested to General Briquemont that he should go to Vicenza to learn about allied plans for employing airpower; however, General Briquemont already held strong convictions about the use and limitations of airpower in Bosnia. As General Briquemont saw the situation: ‘These ambiguous resolutions (836 and 844), which everyone could interpret as he liked,’ were the cause of UNPROFOR’s difficulties, and in his judgment:

The UN, lacking the means for these resolutions, turned to NATO and air support to compensate for the shortages of means on the ground. After Vietnam and Afghanistan, and considering the terrain in Bosnia, how could anyone still persist in this mistaken thinking about operational strategy?

To General Briquemont, the appeal to airpower was a political gambit based on the minimal risks to NATO airpower, and unrealistic beliefs held by NATO politicians about high-tech aerial warfare. Moreover, he claimed: ‘What troubled me the most was that this mission was the responsibility of NATO (M. Boorda) and of M. Cot and that, at least initially, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia seemed to be considered a secondary player.’ En route to Vicenza, General Briquemont resolved to himself, and told his staff, that: ‘Nothing happens in Bosnia without my consent, and if it does, I will be returning to Brussels immediately.’ Thus, before he had arrived at Vicenza, General Briquemont already held serious doubts about the ability of NATO airpower to compensate for the inadequacies of his ground forces, and he was disturbed that other senior officers might be infringing on his command prerogatives.

91 This will be discussed further in Chapter 9.
92 ‘BACS,’ 12.8.
93 Briquemont, Do Something, 114 and 122; and Cot, interview.
94 Briquemont, Do Something, 122.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 123.
97 Ibid., 123-124.
98 Ibid., 110-111 and 120. Extracts from letters General Briquemont sent to his wife during the week before he went to Vicenza clearly show that he was already seriously concerned about airstrikes before his trip to Italy.
At Vicenza, Briquemont showed the sort of authority and control he expected to exercise as the commander in Bosnia. On 11 August, General Briquemont met with Generals Ashy and Chambers at Vicenza, where a NATO staff officer briefed the UN commander on, ‘the concept of an air campaign...with different phases, and lists of targets for each phase: their type, their location, their proximity to UNPROFOR troops, and their potential for collateral damage.’ After twenty minutes, General Briquemont interrupted the briefing to point out that this was not what he wanted. While the NATO airmen seemed to be focused exclusively on bombing Bosnian Serb targets, General Briquemont’s concerns also included the fighting in central-Bosnia between the Bosnian Croats and the mostly Muslim Bosnian government forces. The UN commander went on to tell the NATO officers that he wanted close air support only, and not ‘a wide ranging air campaign.’ According to General Briquemont, Generals Ashy and Chambers understood his situation, but they claimed that they had their orders from NATO. Briquemont responded by reminding them he was the supported commander in Bosnia, and that ‘NATO should be supporting me, rather than trying to impose its vision of operations on me.’ Briquemont went on to discuss and approve potential air support targets including Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb targets. Before General Briquemont left Vicenza on 12 August, General Ashy told him that one day they would execute the US-authored air campaign, to which Briquemont replied: ‘As long as I am the commander in Bosnia, I don’t think so.’

The next day, Briquemont used the press to explain his views and to dampen enthusiasm for airstrikes; the fallout from his comments illustrated the weakness in the UN chain of command. On 13 August, when General Briquemont and his chief of staff, Brigadier Vere Hayes voiced their criticisms of the American push for airstrikes,

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99 Ibid., 121 and 124.
100 Ibid., 124-125.
101 Ibid., 125.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. General Ashy saw this meeting with Briquemont as a Joint Targeting Board (JTB), and Ashy believed General Briquemont validated AFSOUTH’s master target list. However, Briquemont’s memoir makes no mention of this. In my interview with General Briquemont, he seemed to have been unaware of a Joint Targeting Board, or a list of approved airstrike targets. It seems General Briquemont approved a list of targets he thought was meant for air support, while General Ashy believed he had obtained approval for a list of airstrike targets. Other sources put the date of the first JTB in September, at a meeting between Admiral Boorda and General Cot, as discussed in the next section of this chapter.
106 Ibid., 126.
107 Ibid., 128; and Facts 1993, 606.
Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the UN, demanded that they be disciplined. In Briquemont’s view, what really bothered Mrs. Albright was that ‘everyone knew’ that Briquemont had said: ‘If an aircraft of NATO is firing above Bosnia, without my permission, I am going back to Brussels immediately.’ In making this assertion, Briquemont was appealing to a fundamental principle of war—unity of command, and as the commander in Bosnia, he expected control over all forces within his areas of responsibility. Belgian political and military authorities backed their general, and said furthermore that since he was working for the UN, any punishment would have to be pursued through the UN. Through all of this, General Briquemont felt he had the support of Mr. Stoltenberg. However, an unnamed aide of Kofi Annan, acting without his boss’s permission, and apparently on his own imagined authority, sent a letter, bypassing General Cot, directly to General Briquemont admonishing him. The failure of senior UN political authorities to clearly support or censure their commander in Bosnia highlighted a lack of coherence and efficiency within the UN hierarchy that would continue to plague UNPROFOR operations.

Soldiers and Airmen: Conflicting Views on the Threat of Airstrikes

Generals Briquemont and Cot were skeptical of the US-sponsored air campaign plan, and as they themselves testified, their disagreements with Generals Chambers and Ashy over the utility of airpower owed much to the traditional soldier-airman split. Looking back on the meeting in Vicenza, General Briquemont recalled:

I had seen the confrontation of two different strategic concepts. On the one hand, there were the American airmen who were convinced that the air force could win the war alone—on the other, there were the ground-pounders, to which I belonged, convinced that only the close coordination of actions between forces on the ground and in the air would permit the attainment of the final objective, and convinced that in this kind of internal civil war, the air forces could only be a supporting force.

General Cot held similar views, noting:

I have endured, in Naples and Vicenza, briefings in the style of a High-Mass, where only the Americans knew the business. One could characterize it as directly transposed from the Gulf War, the successive phases of total war…

108 Briquemont, Do Something, 129; Briquemont, interview; and Silber and Tett, ‘Fighting Threatens Talks.’
109 Briquemont, interview.
110 Ibid.; and Briquemont, Do Something, 125.
111 Silber, Tett, and Graham, ‘Sarajevo Accord Puts UN In Charge;’ and Briquemont, interview.
112 Briquemont, interview.
113 Briquemont, Do Something, 131.
114 Ibid., 126.
admit having been concerned, as were other UN military chiefs, about this excitement amongst airmen dreaming of 'breaking the Serbs,' and [who] were uninformed about the situation in Yugoslavia, which they had only seen from their supersonic flights over the country.\textsuperscript{115}

There were other reasons for Generals Cot and Briquemont to oppose airstrikes but, clearly, their outlook as soldiers was an important factor.

Despite General Briquemont's refusal to countenance NATO airstrikes, the threat of such strikes seemed to play an important role in coercing the Serbs into halting their encirclement of Sarajevo and relinquishing the territory they had captured. The Bosnian Serbs had continued their advance around Sarajevo in violation of their own promises in late July to halt the offensive.\textsuperscript{116} As Dick Leurdijk later explained:

On 18 August 1993, Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that the UN now had the 'initial operation sic capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina'. On that same day, NATO carried out its first air support exercise. On the ground, the Bosnian Serbs stopped their attack on Mount Igman. The area came under UNPROFOR control. It was the first time that the UN - through NATO - really threatened to use force and the Bosnian Serbs gave in. This outcome would have important consequences for later decisions on air strikes in the context of NAC's decisions on Sarajevo, Gorazde and the other safe areas.\textsuperscript{117}

Though this reasoning is essentially correct, the timing is in error. Bosnian Serb troops began to withdraw from Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica a week before the date cited by Leurdijk, and they were reportedly gone completely two days before it.\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, if it was NATO airpower that coerced the Serbs, then it was probably the threat of airstrikes, rather than air support, that had motivated them to give in. General Briquemont, who ran the military negotiations for the Bosnian Serb Army's withdrawal, recorded that the real Bosnian Serb willingness to pull back came in the wake of the two NATO decisions to allow airstrikes.\textsuperscript{119} The first Bosnian Serb overture came from Karadzic in Geneva just after the NATO Council's decision to authorize airstrikes on 2 August.\textsuperscript{120} Following that, General Mladic negotiated and signed the military agreement to withdraw his troops from Mount Igman on 10 August, the day after NATO announced its approval of 'Operational

\begin{footnotes}
\item[115] Cot, 'Dayton,' 124.
\item[116] Briquemont, Do Something, 103; and Facts 1993, 570.
\item[117] Leurdijk, 39.
\item[118] 'World News in Brief,' Financial Times, 12 August 1993; Silber, 'Bosnia Factions Agree;' and Briquemont, Do Something, 108.
\item[119] As the following paragraph will show, Briquemont did not credit the threat of NATO airstrikes for the Serb withdrawal. However, his detailed recounting of events between 4-15 August 1993 provided the evidence for the point I wish to make here.
\item[120] Briquemont, Do Something, 103.
\end{footnotes}
Options for Air Strikes. Finally, the threat of NATO airstrikes was kept alive as the terms of the Mount Igman agreement were implemented. Though the sequence of events does not prove that the threat of airpower worked, it would have been reasonable for NATO ministers to conclude that there was a connection between their threats and Serb compliance, as Leurdijk asserted.

Contrary to the NATO view described by Leurdijk, General Briquemont believed the threat of airstrikes was counterproductive to his endeavors to negotiate a solution to the Mount Igman crisis, and that airstrikes exacerbated the risks to his troops. General Briquemont knew that the Serbs had other reasons to quit Mount Igman; in particular, General Mladic was short on manpower and wanted to use UNPROFOR to help consolidate his gains. With ambiguous Security Council resolutions to work from, and ‘Do something, General!’ as his guidance from Mr. Stoltenberg, General Briquemont began trying to calm the situation in Bosnia by negotiating an end to the fighting around Sarajevo. He hoped that the Sarajevo agreement would, in turn, enhance negotiations in Geneva, and reduce the suffering amongst the people in Bosnia. However, the threat of NATO airstrikes, ostensibly in support of UNPROFOR, jeopardized the UN’s impartiality in Bosnia, especially since the threats were being directed only at the Serbs. The NATO threat, he felt, hindered his negotiations and, if carried out, would endanger his forces. Briquemont did not see how NATO airstrikes could help him, and he did not credit them for securing the Serb withdrawal from Mount Igman. Just as Betts found, proponents and opponents of airpower found justification for their opposing beliefs in the same evidence.

4.4 COMMAND WITHOUT CONTROL: SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1993

The crisis over Mount Igman brought General Briquemont face to face with his responsibilities as a commander and forced him to choose between mission accomplishment or force protection. The crisis occurred within six weeks of his taking command. And in that time, General Briquemont had come to see a ‘strange dysfunction

121 Briquemont, Do Something, 103 and 113-118.
122 Silber and Tett, ‘Karadzic Warns of War,’ and idem, ‘Serbs Agree to Pull Back.’
124 Ibid., 104.
125 Ibid., 103 and 122; and Briquemont, interview.
126 Briquemont, Do Something, 112 and 119.
127 Ibid., 119; and Briquemont, interview.
128 Briquemont, Do Something, 110, 120, and 138.
in the strategy of the international community,’ whereby nations advocating airstrikes—especially the US—were unwilling to take risks associated with putting troops on the ground; and those nations taking such risks were unwilling to endorse airstrikes.\textsuperscript{130} The UN commander in Bosnia was acutely aware of the risks he himself was taking by putting soldiers on Mount Igman, and he felt the weight of his responsibilities:

\begin{quote}
I had never experienced quite as profoundly what it meant to be responsible for the lives of so many men. The vast majority of them were the age of my children, because at fifty-eight I was undoubtedly the oldest military man in the field. I have always acted with the thought that a drop of blood of one of my men was a drop of my own blood and I am convinced that every officer worthy of the name thinks this way.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

He knew that in war it was necessary to take casualties, but this was not war.\textsuperscript{132} Though Briquemont’s civilian political advisor, Viktor Andreev, assured him that the Security Council resolutions were so unclear that the general could always justify his decisions and his actions,\textsuperscript{133} General Briquemont himself worried that what he was doing at Mount Igman was both dangerous and beyond the mission mandated to UNPROFOR by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{134} As he later wrote: ‘I knew that I was engaging in an operation which did not conform at all with the mandate of UNPROFOR, but, on the other hand, I had decided to do everything in order to help restart the negotiations in Geneva.’\textsuperscript{135} Five years after sending UN troops onto Mounts Bjelasnica and Igman General Briquemont recalled that:

\begin{quote}
It was a military mission. If I had thirty casualties or dead soldiers on Mount Igman, I’m sure that I [would have been] before the [court-martial] in my country, because it was [outside] of the mandate of the United Nations—but Stoltenberg asked [me to do it].\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

In fact, though, moving the French onto Mount Igman was entirely consistent with the mandate established in resolution 836, which tasked UNPROFOR to ‘promote the

\begin{footnotes}
\item Betts, 203.
\item Ibid., 110 and 127-128. Note: this is nearly a direct translation of what Briquemont himself has written (p. 127).
\item Ibid., 112.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid., 112.
\item Ibid., 111-112.
\item Ibid., 112.
\item Briquemont, interview. Note: My interview with General Briquemont was in English. The bracketed comments in the quotation correct the general’s grammar, and I have omitted the erroneous grammar, without changing the meaning. Further citations from the interview with General Briquemont follow the same rule, but will not be accompanied by a note such as this one. The original words spoken by General Briquemont were as follows: ‘I’m sure that I was [would have been] before the martial-court [court-martial] in my country, because it was out [outside] of the mandate of the United Nations—but Stoltenberg asked that to me [me to do it].’
\end{footnotes}
withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina,' and to 'occupy some key points on the ground.' The real problem for General Briquemont was doing it without taking casualties. Recounting a discussion with his civilian political advisor at the outset of Briquemont's tenure in Bosnia, the General recalled that:

I said: "Okay, I have understood. The resolutions of the Security Council cannot help me in my mission." And the rules of engagement were foreseen for peacekeeping operations. We had no peace. It was the war between the three parties, and I was there with a few 'blue helmets,' and it was impossible to respect the rules of engagement. I have said: "Bon. We shall never speak about the rules of engagement. We shall do our best to avoid casualties—point [period, full-stop]" (emphasis added).

Thus, General Briquemont uneasily confronted the contradictory tasks and restrictions bequeathed to him by the Security Council. Avoiding casualties among UNPROFOR's peacekeepers, easing the suffering of the Bosnian people, and facilitating negotiations in Geneva became his priority tasks. Protecting the 'safe areas,' the principal objective stated in Security Council resolution 836 defining UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia, was impossible with the means available to Briquemont. He simply could not attempt to accomplish this mission within the bounds of acceptable risks to his forces.

In late August and September, Admiral Boorda assuaged the UN commanders' concerns about airstrikes and obtained UNPROFOR approval for a joint UN-NATO target list. It had bothered General Briquemont that he had been left out of the decision-making and planning for airstrikes until senior NATO officers had tried to pressure him into approving an air campaign. And General Ashy had been very direct in attempting to get the UN commander in Bosnia to accept an air campaign. On 21 August, Admiral Boorda attended a dinner hosted by General Cot in Zagreb, during which he conveyed to Generals Cot and Briquemont a sense that he understood their situation and, more importantly, he shared their concerns about the risks involved with airstrikes. However, General Briquemont seems to have been left out of further discussions on airstrikes. In September, General Cot met again with Admiral Boorda for the first UN-NATO joint

137 S/RES/836, par. 5.
138 Briquemont, interview.
139 Briquemont, Do Something, 133.
140 Ibid., 123-124.
141 Ashy, interview by author.
142 Briquemont, Do Something, 177.
143 Cot, interview; Briquemont, interview; and Briquemont, Do Something, 198.
targeting board, in order to review and approve a list of airstrike targets. The list included targets for all three warring factions in Bosnia—though the Serb military possessed by far the most targets suitable for airstrikes. The list did not, however, attempt to designate targets in terms of options or phases; it was just one list of potential targets. Presumably, if the need arose, they would have been grouped into phases to meet the needs of a given contingency, then proposed to UN and NATO political authorities for approval. General Cot remained opposed to airstrikes, but he recognized NATO’s need to plan, and he saw no harm in maintaining his input into the airstrike planning process. Furthermore, General Cot had an incentive to maintain a good working relationship with Admiral Boorda, since he was to be Boorda’s deputy under UN-NATO arrangements to implement the latest peace proposal for Bosnia—the Union of Three Republics plan, which seemed close to being signed during the third week in September 1993.

UNPROFOR Commanders Strive to Control NATO Close Air Support

By the end of September, NATO and UN military commanders had a workable system for close air support, but the UN apparatus for authorizing close air support rendered the system ineffective. Generals Cot and Briquemont had agreed that general Briquemont should be the one to initiate any request for air support. By the end of the month, staff officers at Vicenza, using rules of engagement approved by NATO political authorities, had written a set of procedures for conducting close air support. Just as with the air-to-air missions for enforcing the no-fly zone, the procedures for air-to-ground missions stipulated that ordnance could be expended over Bosnia only with clearance from one of five senior NATO commanders, with General Chambers, the CAOC Director,
being the lowest level of approval authority. As General Ashy described the arrangements: 'We had a briefing that was promulgated by me and approved by Admiral Boorda that had to go to every aircrew before [they] flew...you had to be personally certified by your unit commander to me...we didn’t want anybody out there winging it.' It was a tightly controlled operation.

On the UN side, air support was also tightly controlled, but at such a high level that it was useless to UNPROFOR’s commanders. Only Boutros Boutros-Ghali could approve an air attack. According to General Briquemont, early exercises designed to test the UN’s command and control system demonstrated that: ‘Between Cot and myself, no problem. It was very rapid, very quick reaction.’ However, the UN commander in Bosnia found that the approval process stalled once it got above General Cot:

In the most favorable circumstances, before having the release [approval for an attack], I needed four to six hours. And we had aircraft in the sky permanently. And I said to General Cot: “But, it’s impossible. We have the aircraft above our heads, and I must wait six hours to have the release to...engage one tank, or two tanks.” Concerned about the security of his troops, General Briquemont urged General Cot to obtain the authority to approve close air support missions; the UN commander in Bosnia later recalled arguing that: ‘I can’t have casualties. I have not enough troops on the ground. I have so many aircraft in the sky, and I cannot use the aircraft to defend my own troops!’ But, General Cot needed no prompting; the two senior UN commanders were of the same mind about air support. As General Cot later wrote:

The Secretary-General personally reserved for himself the decision for each possible attack. Yet the delay in the process, between Zagreb and New York and back, of around four hours, was totally incompatible with the urgency of such missions. Furthermore, it appeared unacceptable to me that someone could

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152 ‘BACS,’ 10.1. The five command positions (commanders) were SACEUR (Shalikashvili/Joulwan), CINCSOUTH (Boorda/Leighton Smith), COMAIRSOUTH (Ashy/Ryan), 5ATAF Commander (Rossetti/Fornesiero), and, finally, the CAOC Director (Chambers/Homburg).


154 Ashy, interview by Owen.

155 Briquemont, interview.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 Ibid.; and Briquemont, Do Something, 127; and Cot interview.
decide in New York what ought to have been left solely to my authority: the
security of my units (emphasis added). \(^{159}\)

General Cot’s petition went unanswered, \(^{160}\) and Boutros-Ghali did not delegate the
authority to approve air support to UNPROFOR’s military commanders until 1995. \(^{161}\)

Frustrated at this lack of control, General Briquemont suggested that the UN commanders
would be justified in by-passing their political authorities in order to save the lives of their
troops:

“It’s very strange for generals to say that, but when you are responsible for the
lives of your soldiers on the ground, you don’t react as in peacetime. Eh? I said
to General Cot, ‘But, if I am engaged by the Serbs, or the Croats, or the Muslims,
I shall not ask the release of the political side.’\(^{162}\)

However, the UN commanders realized that Admiral Boorda would block any request for
air support unless he knew that the UN commanders had political approval for an
attack. \(^{163}\) Unlike airstrikes, the UN generals wanted close air support. But, without the
means to approve requests for air support in a timely manner, UNPROFOR could make
little use of NATO airpower.

General Briquemont was also concerned about the vulnerability of Belgian troops,
who were not under his command, but were stationed in Croatia, where close air support
had not yet been authorized. \(^{164}\) Briquemont pressed General Cot to solicit authority from
New York for close air support in Croatia; though again, Cot needed no urging. \(^{165}\) On 19
September, Boutros-Ghali wrote to the President of the Security Council informing him
of General Cot’s desire to have close air support in Croatia. \(^{166}\) And, in early October the
Security Council renewed the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia for six months—this time
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. \(^{167}\) However, the Council postponed authorizing air
support there, and the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia did not
come until the end of March of 1994, two weeks after General Cot relinquished command
of UNPROFOR. \(^{168}\)

\(^{159}\) Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 122.
\(^{160}\) Ibid.
\(^{161}\) Leurdijk, 77.
\(^{162}\) Briquemont, interview.
\(^{163}\) Ibid.
\(^{164}\) Ibid.
\(^{165}\) Ibid.; and Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 122.
\(^{166}\) S/26468, 30 September 1993.
\(^{167}\) UN, Blue Helmets, 518; and S/RES/871, 4 October 1993.
\(^{168}\) UN, Blue Helmets, 518-519; S/PV.3286, 4 October 1993; and S/RES/908, 31 March 1994. Even
though close air support for Croatia was authorized by the UN on 31 March 1994, NATO authorities did
not agree to allow such missions until December of 1994. The new NATO authority was to be spelled out
in Change 3 to OPLAN 40101, but delays caused by negotiations with the Croatian government prevented
Without effective air support, which the UNPROFOR commanders were unable to acquire, the logic of the ‘light option’ broke down, and so too did the whole ‘safe areas’ policy. But the logic of the ‘light option’ was suspect to begin with. At first blush, it seemed logical to assert that the weaker UNPROFOR was on the ground, then the more it would have to rely on NATO airpower. The presence of UN forces would deter attacks on the ‘safe areas,’ and if the deterrence broke down, then UNPROFOR soldiers could call on NATO airpower for close air support. This assumed the Bosnian Serbs—the most likely target of air attacks by the very nature of the UN’s ‘safe areas’ policy—would tolerate CAS if the BSA attacked first, but might respond to other air attacks by taking hostages or by retaliating against UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{169} As discussed earlier in this chapter, NATO ambassadors had interpreted resolutions 836 and 844 to take this into account. However, BSA tolerance for UN self-defense was likely to evaporate if UNPROFOR’s need for self-defense was provoked by UN soldiers aggressively trying to fulfill their mandate, and then counting on NATO air support to back them up. Thus, the weaker UNPROFOR was, the less likely it was to deter BSA attacks on the ‘safe areas,’ and the less aggressive it could afford to be in helping to deliver humanitarian aid in Bosnia.

The ‘Operational Options’ approved by the NAC in August were also of questionable utility. As long as NATO political authorities remained self-deterred by fears of Bosnian Serb retaliation, they would have difficulty choosing one of the first two options: the demonstrative phase or the follow-on phase.\textsuperscript{170} Those options would have served merely as a signal to the Bosnian Serbs to begin taking hostages.\textsuperscript{171} While it was far from certain that a robust air campaign would succeed in compelling the Serbs to quit attacking a ‘safe area,’ the dangers of trying to get to Phase III in a graduated fashion seemed to rule out the possibility of ever making an attempt. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, the weaker UNPROFOR was on the ground, the less it could afford to have NATO airpower attempting to enforce Serb compliance with the ‘safe areas’ policy. By keeping UNPROFOR in place and weak, and refusing to give its commanders timely

\textsuperscript{169} Sabin, ‘Peace Support Operations: A Strategic Perspective,’ 105-111.
\textsuperscript{170} The first airstrikes conducted by NATO, derisively called ‘pin-pricks,’ managed to avoid the logic problem described here because the UN commander in Bosnia ensured that the Bosnian Serbs were warned in advance, and that targets were insignificant. The first significant airstrike in Bosnia by NATO took place in May of 1995 at Pale, with predictable results.
\textsuperscript{171} I am not arguing that it had to happen this way, i.e., that hostages had to be taken. Nothing was predetermined. My point is that if NATO political authorities were convinced that bombing would lead to intolerable risks or costs, as seemed to be the case, then their logic for demanding graduated options broke down.
access to NATO air support, the responsible political authorities practically guaranteed that airpower would not be used effectively, and that UNPROFOR could not succeed in helping to enforce the ‘safe areas’ policy. Airstrikes, and more robust enforcement on the ground, could only come at the price of increased risks to UNPROFOR’s soldiers. Thus, under the circumstances, the ‘light option’ became a prescription for paralysis.

Absent Political Guidance

Without clear political objectives or guidance, UNPROFOR commanders were left to interpret the ambiguous Security Council resolutions, and to decide for themselves what their mission was. In doing so, and in light of their meager resources, they were driven by their responsibilities as commanders to give priority to force protection. At the same time they were pressing for more control over NATO airpower, the senior UNPROFOR commanders vainly solicited clearer political direction from their political authorities. General Briquemont recalled:

I have never had terms of reference for my mission. I’ve asked [for] that. [Brigadier Vere] Hayes asked [for] that. I have said to Mr. Stoltenberg: “Yes, but you asked me to go to Mount Igman, and it was probably the most dangerous mission that we have ever fulfilled with ‘blue helmets’.” The Security Council has never approved this mission—Mount Igman. 12

General Cot recalled meeting with similar frustration.

I was never able to get Stoltenberg to give me written orders. Stoltenberg, as well as Boutros-Ghali, always told me: “There are the UN resolutions which were made by the Security Council; you know how to read the Security Council resolutions as well as I do, therefore we have nothing more to tell you.” And that was very distressing. Very, very distressing. 13

General Briquemont later said: ‘I think it’s very important for the generals to understand what [are] the political objectives. The problem was that we had no politicians to explain that to us.’ 14 While General Briquemont believed that he had excellent civilian political advisors, and a well intentioned political representative, he noted that they possessed no real political authority: ‘It was impossible for them to take a decision. They were permanently reporting to New York for anything.’ 15 To rectify this situation, the UNPROFOR generals repeatedly asked New York to send them a full-time political

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12 Briquemont, interview.
13 Cot, interview.
14 Briquemont, interview.
15 Ibid; and Briquemont, Do Something, 137-138 and 142-143.
representative. But, by the time Boutros-Ghali designated one, both Generals Briquemont and Cot were on the verge of leaving.

With poor ties to the UN’s civilian hierarchy, the senior UNPROFOR commanders fell out of step with the shifting UN diplomacy in Geneva and the career peacekeepers in New York. From mid-June until late September, negotiators in Geneva sought agreement from the warring factions on the Union of Three Republics peace plan, also known as the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. Authored by the Serbs and Croats, the plan embodied the de facto partition of Bosnia into three ethnically oriented republics.

Though General Briquemont supported the plan, he did so while holding the somewhat incoherent conviction that “the political objective was to save Bosnia; and to save Bosnia means that the three communities in Bosnia—the Serb community, the Croatian community, and the Muslims—can live together.” Unlike Briquemont, General Cot was critical of the Geneva-based diplomacy, believing it was premature to negotiate while there was still fighting. He later blamed the negotiations—including the tactics allegedly used by Owen and Stoltenberg in the second half of 1993—for inciting some of the fighting in Bosnia and for prolonging the war. Furthermore, the UNPROFOR generals were not inclined to take directions from the UN peacekeeping department in New York. In contrast to some previous commanders in UNPROFOR, notably Generals Lewis MacKenzie and Lars Wahlgren, Cot and Briquemont did not have backgrounds as peacekeepers. Generals Cot and Briquemont were not part of a UN peacekeeping culture; they, and most of their staff officers, were NATO officers in blue helmets. Absent clear political direction, or a firm commitment to UN peacekeeping doctrine to guide them, Generals Cot and Briquemont were left to set their own course.

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176 Briquemont, interview.
178 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204 and 232-237; and Gow, Triumph, 254-256.
179 The partition, which violated the principles laid down by the first London Conference establishing the Geneva based negotiations, motivated Lord Owen to resist efforts by the warring factions to call it the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204.
180 Briquemont, interview.
181 Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 127 and 129.
182 Ibid.
183 General Cot opined that: ‘The civilian component of the UN is controlled by mandarins, whose careers depend primarily on the suppleness of their spines.’ ‘Dayton,’ 127. In my interview with General Cot, he noted that Kofi Annan was an exception, that Annan knew when to stand up and say no.
184 Briquemont, Do Something, 127.
Responsibility, Risks, and Accountability

Even as they tried to interpret their mission, the top UN commanders in the former Yugoslavia discovered they did not have the authority needed to fulfill their responsibilities as commanders. As partial fulfillment of the European Union pledge to support the UN’s ‘light option,’ the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish governments sent a joint Nordic battalion to Bosnia. When General Briquemont protested that he did not need the Leopard tanks that the Danish were preparing to send, the Danish military informed him that the tanks would be coming anyway.\(^{185}\) After the well armed Nordic battalion arrived at Tuzla, General Briquemont ordered it to leave that quiet part of Bosnia, and to go to Srebrenica where it was needed—twice he gave the order.\(^{186}\) On both occasions, as General Briquemont recounted: ‘The colonel said: “General I cannot execute. The governments refuse to deploy any units in Srebrenica. It’s too dangerous.” A ‘safe area’ too dangerous!’\(^{187}\) Rather than receiving support from the UN headquarters, officials there complained to General Briquemont about the friction he had created amongst the ambassadors in New York.\(^{188}\)

General Cot was not in a good position to help General Briquemont, for as Cot remembered:

> Stoltenberg in Geneva was very much afraid that I would take a decision which would be contrary to the diplomatic negotiations that he was conducting in Geneva. Therefore Stoltenberg often told me that: “I don’t want you to move a single section of soldiers without my authorizations.” And me, I always responded: “I will move whoever I would like to, without your authorization.” Therefore we have had difficult relations.\(^{189}\)

In order to surmount such difficulties, General Cot would typically ask the French Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral Lanxade, with whom he often spoke, to grant UNPROFOR the resources he needed, or to have the French government put pressure on Boutros Boutros-Ghali to get him to approve the course of action Cot wanted.\(^{190}\) However, the French were primarily responsible for the ‘safe areas’ of Bihac and Sarajevo, and the French government had already declined to provide additional soldiers to implement the ‘safe areas’ policy elsewhere in Bosnia.\(^{191}\) So, Generals Cot and Briquemont could only wait

\(^{185}\) Ibid., 138; and Briquemont, interview.
\(^{186}\) Briquemont, interview; and Briquemont, *Do Something*, 282-283.
\(^{187}\) Briquemont, interview.
\(^{188}\) Ibid.; and Briquemont, *Do Something*, 283.
\(^{189}\) Cot, interview.
\(^{190}\) Ibid.
\(^{191}\) Honig and Both, 118.
until another troop contributing nation volunteered forces for Srebrenica. Despite being commanders, they were deprived of the requisite authority for controlling the forces under their respective commands. Without that control, they were unable to execute their mission, which was suppose to include providing protection to the ‘safe areas.’

By November of 1993, General Briquemont had had enough of commanding in a situation where he had insufficient means and inadequate authority to meet the responsibilities of his mission. Generals Cot and Briquemont, who had not been invited to visit New York or Brussels to discuss their situation with political leaders, were delighted to be asked to attend a meeting of European Union foreign ministers in Luxembourg on 22 November 1993. Belgium held the presidency of the EU during the second half of 1993, so its foreign minister, Willy Claes ran the meeting. However, Briquemont’s hopes turned to frustration a week later when it became clear that the European ministers, who were determined to have UNPROFOR guarantee the security of several humanitarian aid routes in Bosnia, were not going to provide the additional 4,000 troops that General Briquemont estimated would be needed to do the job. After a second EU meeting, which took place in Geneva on 29 November, General Briquemont decided he had had enough: ‘At the end of the day, no European country has said one word about my reinforcements. And that day I said to my minister of foreign affairs: “No. No, I don’t play ball. I go back to Belgium.”’ The UN commander in Bosnia maintained that generals have a stronger obligation in time of war to obey their political authorities than in military operations where no vital interests are threatened.

Furthermore, according to Briquemont:

> The generals must dare to say ‘no’ to the politicians. I went out of Bosnia, because in November of ’93 I have said: “No. It’s impossible to play that. I don’t accept to risk the lives of so many soldiers with such a mandate, with such a mission, without the means [which] are necessary to fulfill the mission. It’s impossible” (emphasis added).

Both Generals Cot and Briquemont were irked by UNPROFOR’s flawed command chain that seemed to invite unaccountable officials to try to usurp the generals’ command authority. For Cot, Stoltenberg’s absence from Zagreb, and the primacy of his

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192 As the Dutch reluctantly agreed to do in November of 1993. Ibid.
193 Briquemont, Do Something, 127.
194 Ibid., 277-278; and Briquemont, interview. Also see, Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 249-250.
195 Briquemont, Do Something, 92 and 278.
196 Ibid., 286-287; and Briquemont, interview.
197 Briquemont, interview.
198 Ibid.
negotiating duties in Geneva, was a particular problem.\textsuperscript{200} The UNPROFOR commander rejected the notion that Stoltenberg’s chosen representative, General Eide, had any legitimate role in the UN chain of command.\textsuperscript{201} As Cot later explained:

\begin{quote}
I never accepted that Eide could give me orders, therefore we had very big difficulties with Stoltenberg in Zagreb. I had asked to be the deputy, and he sent me a boss. If you like, Stoltenberg made or designated Eide his assistant, his deputy, and I did not want to be under the orders of that general.\textsuperscript{202}
\end{quote}

General Briquemont resented politicians pushing for him to act, since he believed that he himself, and not those urging the action, would be held accountable if things went wrong:

\begin{quote}
It was not a problem to take decisions. It was not a problem. Because nobody was criticizing my decisions. So long as you have no casualties, you can take all the decisions for the politicians; it’s good. You take the decisions in place of the politicians. When you have casualties, it’s another problem. Because then they ask you: “Why have you done that?” or “Why have you not done that?”\textsuperscript{203}
\end{quote}

In contrast to the clear military chain of accountability, the diffuse nature of the political pressures to ‘do something’ in Bosnia left Briquemont feeling exposed:

\begin{quote}
There was no political leadership...General Cot was alone in Zagreb, there was nobody in Sarajevo...I can say we were alone there, and we tried to do our best to solve the problems. And it is the reason why we must answer all of the questions of the Tribunal of the Hague. Because the Tribunal of the Hague cannot speak with the politicians who were responsible in Bosnia. There were so many politicians who were responsible for something in Bosnia that it is impossible to say that: “You were responsible for that, or that, or that.”\textsuperscript{204}
\end{quote}

Though he would remain at the head of Bosnia-Herzegovina Command until late January of 1994, General Briquemont decided at the end of November to leave rather than be pushed into accepting ever greater risks and responsibilities by political officials who, for the most part, were unaccountable themselves.\textsuperscript{205}

By the beginning of 1994, with the UN ‘safe areas’ policy failing, General Cot precipitated his own departure by pushing even harder for the UN to grant him control over NATO airpower. The average number of artillery and mortar rounds falling on the ‘safe area’ of Sarajevo had climbed to over 1,000 per day, sniping was rampant in the capital, and UNPROFOR had received fewer than 3,000 of the 7,600 reinforcements

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\textsuperscript{199} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{200} Cot, interview; and Briquemont, interview. \\
\textsuperscript{201} Cot, interview. \\
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{203} Briquemont, interview. \\
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid. General Briquemont noted that the French foreign minister, Alain Juppé, whose country had the greatest number of peacekeepers on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, was one exception to this generalization.
\end{flushright}
authorized six months earlier. The Bosnian Serbs also refused to allow Tuzla airport to be opened. At Zepa and Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serbs controlled access to the ‘safe areas,’ and blocked the rotation of UNPROFOR units. Though UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had named Mr. Yasushi Akashi to be his full-time Special Representative in Zagreb, this was cool comfort for General Cot, if all decisions to use air support still had to be referred to New York. As General Briquemont recalled: ‘General Cot has said: “We are not discussing with the representatives of Mr. Boutros-Ghali. They are functionaires [functionaries].”…They were…part of the administration, but they had no responsibilities.’ At the beginning of 1994, General Cot began to complain publicly about the problems with the UN operation, including the Secretary-General’s refusal to give Cot control over NATO airpower. By Cot’s account this caused Boutros Boutros-Ghali to seek his removal:

After having tried in vain, for six months, to obtain the delegation of decision [for approving air support] through normal channels, I chose to speak publicly of my requirement, which immediately led the Secretary-General to ask the French government for my dismissal.

Though the French government agreed to remove General Cot, its foreign minister and defense minister registered their dissatisfaction with the UN’s management of UNPROFOR which, as Philippe Guillot phrased it, ‘consumed generals at an immodest rate’ rather than fixing problems within the UN hierarchy. Indeed, only one of the six generals who served in UNPROFOR’s top two posts had, by that time, managed to complete his full tour of duty. To the diplomats in Geneva, General Cot’s bid for control was part of an attempt to by-pass even the Secretary-General and to open direct communications with the Security-Council. To UNPROFOR’s commanders it seemed that they were on their own, with all of the responsibility, deprived of the means and

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206 A/48/847, 7 January 1994; and Rose, Fighting, 1.
207 A/48/847.
209 Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 122.
210 Ibid.
211 Guillot, 39.
212 Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 122.
213 Guillot, 39.
214 General Nambiar, the first UNPROFOR commander served a full one-year tour. General Morillon’s case is ambiguous since he was ostensibly replaced to make room for General Cot; however, it seems that he was on the verge of being dismissed in April 1993, but was instead kept on until July when Cot took the top position in UNPROFOR. For various reasons, Generals Cot, Wahlgren, Briquemont, and MacKenzie left prematurely. On the same subject, see: Gow, Triumph, 139.
215 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 264-265.
authority for accomplishing their mission, and at times they did not even know how to get
in touch with the political authorities who could make decisions.  

Conclusion

The responsibilities of command, and the expertise born of service affiliation,
shaped the actions of the theater-level commanders who were attempting to find a way to
use NATO airpower in Bosnia during the second half of 1993. General Cot, and to a
greater degree General Briquemont, struggled under the weight of their responsibilities in
circumstances which forced them to make tradeoffs between accomplishing their mission
and protecting their forces. Though their NATO counterparts, Admiral Boorda, and
Generals Ashy and Chambers, often had to work fast and work hard to fulfill their duties
as commanders, their responsibilities were much lighter because they did not have to
make a similar tradeoff between mission and men. In addition to their different
responsibilities, the UN and NATO commanders came from markedly different
backgrounds and had different service expertise. Generals Ashy and Chambers had solid
expertise for planning the conventional air operations called for by NATO, and they were
confident that airpower could be used to coerce the Bosnian Serbs. Conversely, Generals
Briquemont and Cot held the traditional army view that airpower was best used for
supporting ground forces, and they were skeptical of plans to coerce the Serbs through
bombing.

To a remarkable degree, the factors affecting the commanders on either side of the
airpower debate were mutually reinforcing. On one side, senior US airmen serving in a
traditional military alliance, NATO, pushed for a US-backed air campaign, which entailed
little risk to the forces under their command. On the other, European army generals
working for the UN strove to fulfill a largely humanitarian mission favored by the
European governments with vulnerable ground forces in UNPROFOR. Of these multiple,
mutually reinforcing factors, the clash of cultures between the UN and NATO played the
least significant role in shaping the decisions and actions of the theater-level commanders.
They all considered themselves NATO officers, none had any peacekeeping experience,
and the UNPROFOR commanders were driven toward a peacekeeping-like mission by
the limitations of their means, rather than starting with traditional peacekeeping doctrine
to guide their thoughts and actions.

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216 Briquemont, interview.
National ties were stronger than organizational associations, and they played an important role in influencing how the theater commanders viewed plans for using airpower. However, it is difficult to disentangle the national political pressures from the responsibilities of the commanders, since they were all bound up together. The French government's approach to Bosnia was part and parcel of General Cot's. Paris helped him to obtain resources and UN permission for his actions, and both Cot and the French government were concerned for the lives of the French soldiers in UNPROFOR. Similarly, on the US side, the Clinton administration's desire to minimize the risks to US forces led it to adopt a 'lift and strike' policy; therefore, political pressure, mission accomplishment, and force protection all pointed in the same direction. General Briquemont was the exception. Briquemont was from Belgium, and he was under political pressures from the EC—led by the Belgian foreign minister Willy Claes—to take actions that would have entailed serious risks to the people under his command. These EC pressures were not matched by resources, and the people urging the action were largely unaccountable for the consequences should things go wrong. Unable to strike a satisfactory balance between accomplishing the tasks being thrust upon him, and an acceptable level of risk to his forces, Briquemont quit—just as he had threatened to do in August when looming NATO airstrikes promised a similar inability to manage his command responsibilities.
CHAPTER 5

AIRPOWER THREATS, USES, AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: JANUARY - JUNE 1994

*Hitting one tank is peacekeeping. Hitting infrastructure, command and control, logistics, that is war.*

—Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose

*And then the business of low passes and flying around scaring people with noise—Rose was trying to use the threat of airpower, and the Bosnian Serbs knew, after a very short period of time, that Rose wasn’t going to carry through on that threat.*

—Admiral Leighton W. Smith

During the first half of 1994, new UN military commanders in the former Yugoslavia aided their civilian superiors in redefining UNPROFOR’s mission. In the process, UNPROFOR began to discard the elements of its mandate relating to the enforcement of the ‘safe areas’ policy. This would bring UNPROFOR’s mission, as the UN commanders interpreted it, in line with UNPROFOR’s capabilities. It was tactical determinism—where the limitations of the means available determine the ends one pursues—working at the implementation level.¹ The new approach reduced the need for the UN commanders to make some of the more difficult tradeoffs between mission accomplishment and force protection that their predecessors had faced. It also enjoyed political support from the UK, and it was much more in line with traditional peacekeeping activities favored by UN headquarters in New York. But, it came at the price of abandoning the ‘safe areas’ policy. UNPROFOR’s approach not only prevented UN

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¹ Betts’s discussion focused on tactical determinism working at the policy-making level, while policy was still being formed. As this chapter demonstrates, the process can also work backward, reshaping policy after it has been made. And, in this case, military commanders in the field played an important role. Betts, 154-156.
forces from taking enforcement action, it also meant that NATO airpower had to be restrained as well.

The second section of this chapter shows that commanders in NATO’s southern region were moving in the opposite direction from their UN counterparts, but for the same reason: tactical determinism. The problems associated with finding heavy weapons, hitting them, and getting coercive leverage by attacking them, reinforced the allied commanders’ preference for targeting larger and more militarily significant targets in Bosnia. A previously unnoticed aspect of the Sarajevo ultimatum in February, discussed here, shows how NATO commanders sought to preserve their autonomy, in case they were given the opportunity to bomb. The third section highlights the importance of timely decisions for the effective employment of NATO airpower over Bosnia. It also demonstrates that when commanders are accountable for the consequences of military action, they are much more likely to demand operational autonomy. After disappointing attempts to use airpower around Gorazde in April of 1994, the biggest obstacle to the effective employment of airpower came from the civilian and military leaders in UNPROFOR. The fourth section argues that Gorazde was a turning point, after which opposing camps in the contest to control NATO airpower hardened their positions. Commanders in the UN and NATO found that their responsibilities for balancing mission accomplishment and force protection pulled them in opposite directions, and added to the mutually reinforcing factors on both sides of the struggle over the use of airpower in Bosnia.

5.1 COMMANDERS AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

General Rose, Peacekeeping, and Airpower

British influence over the UN mission and the use of airpower in Bosnia increased markedly when Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose replaced UNPROFOR’s Belgian commander in Bosnia, General Francis Briquemont. In choosing General Rose, the British purposely picked a strong willed individual. While Rose has maintained that he was not under explicit instructions from London, that does not mean he was not pursuing British interests. Stephen Hart’s observation about Monty’s ‘casualty conservation’ approach to warfare during the Second World War seems apt:

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2 MoD official F.
3 Rose, Fighting, 13, 16, and 53.
Montgomery’s pursuit of British interests prompts consideration of whether he received any formal instructions from the British government concerning his conduct of the campaign. There is no evidence for any such instructions, but then they were probably unnecessary. It is inconceivable that a commander as senior as Montgomery...would not have been aware of the British government’s agenda.4

General Rose was well aware of Britain’s agenda; shortly before going to Bosnia, Rose met with Britain’s prime minister, and later recalled:

I left the meeting with a firm impression that John Major believed in the humanitarian role being played by the UN in Bosnia, and that Britain had a special contribution to make. He was not about to pull out the troops...[and] in 1994, he never altered the peacekeeping basis upon which British troops were deployed.5

Throughout General Rose’s time in Bosnia, his actions were in consonance with the UK’s interests and the British interpretation of UNPROFOR’s role there.6

From the outset of his tour in Bosnia, General Rose focused on the humanitarian and peacekeeping-like aspects of his mission, to the exclusion of enforcing the UN’s ‘safe areas’ policy. Although UNPROFOR began as a peacekeeping force in Croatia, it never had a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, where there was no peace to keep.7 The resolutions defining UNPROFOR’s mandate in Bosnia—770, 776, and 836—were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, dealing with enforcement measures.8 However, in attempting to rescue what he saw as ‘a collapsing mission’ in Bosnia, General Rose determined that he would concentrate ‘on the three main elements of the mission, which were, in order of priority: the delivery of humanitarian aid, the creation of conditions for a political settlement of the war and the prevention of the conflict from spreading beyond Bosnia.9 While these mission elements might have required enforcement action, they left out the nettlesome ‘safe areas’ aspect of UNPROFOR’s mandate. Staff officers at the UK’s Army Staff College in Camberley built a campaign plan around General Rose’s three mission elements, and Rose went to New York to

4 Stephen Hart, ‘Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation,’ 144.  
5 Rose, Fighting, 13.  
6 Silber and Little, 310-317. For a spirited (if not spleenful) discussion of General Rose’s role in pursuing British interests, see: Jane Sharp, Honest Broker, 32-34, and 43-46. Also see, Mark Almond, ‘Faraway Country,’ 125-141.  
7 The principal Security Council resolutions defining UNPROFOR’s mandate, 770, 776, and 836 were all based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, though resolution 776’s connection to Chapter VII was through resolution 770 rather than an explicit reference in 776 itself. Richard Caplan incorrectly claimed that ‘Res. 776 imposed constraints on the use of force; unlike 770, it was a Chapter VI resolution.’ Caplan, 11. Also see, Gow, Triumph, 270-271 n. 9.  
8 Ciechanski, ‘Enforcement Measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,’ 86-93.  
9 Rose, Fighting, 12.
discuss his ideas about UNPROFOR's mission with some of the Security Council ambassadors and department of peacekeeping officials. During this trip, he found support for his plans from Kofi Annan, the head of the peacekeeping department. Thus, the mutually reinforcing political, military, organizational, and personal factors uniting the camp opposed to using robust airpower in Bosnia to enforce the 'safe areas' policy grew stronger with the appointment of General Rose to head UNPROFOR.

General Rose's interpretation of his mission in Bosnia was also a product of his expertise as a British Army officer. He was well versed in the doctrinal discussions on peacekeeping then percolating within the UK's Army, which would emerge during Rose's one-year tour in Bosnia in the form of official British Army doctrine: 'Wider Peacekeeping.' The doctrine of 'Wider Peacekeeping' undoubtedly evolved as the British Army drew lessons from events in Bosnia during Rose's tenure there, but many of its fundamental concepts—such as the imperative for consent, and the strict boundary between peacekeeping and peace enforcement—were prefigured in the Parliamentary report from July of 1993, which had suggested that new peacekeeping doctrine was needed. The British Army's experiences in Northern Ireland, where Rose had served as a brigade commander in the 1980s, was the wellspring from which much of the British wisdom on peacekeeping flowed. Like his predecessor in Bosnia, Rose too was an infantry officer and had missed the Gulf War. With a proud record from the Falklands War, and as a former commander of British Special Forces, General Rose's military expertise and his outlook on the situation in Bosnia were, unsurprisingly, those of a soldier.

General Rose's views on airpower were fundamentally different from those of the NATO airmen with whom he would soon have to cooperate. He did not favor airstrikes, though he believed some use could be made of close air support. Before leaving for Bosnia General Rose told John Major that: 'although NATO air power certainly had an important role to play in Bosnia, it could not be applied much above a tactical level without collapsing the entire mission.' The day after expressing that view, Rose flew to

10 Ibid., 14 and 24; and MoD official G.
11 Rose, Fighting, 11.
12 Ruggie, 'The UN and the Collective Use of Force,' 9-10.
13 House of Commons, Defence Committee, Fourth Report, United Kingdom Peacekeeping and Intervention Forces, 13 July 1993, xxvii, and xxxviii-xxxix.
14 Ibid., xxviii; and Wider Peacekeeping, xii.
15 Rose, Fighting, 13.
New York, where the US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, asked him what he thought of airstrikes, to which he replied:

[T]here was no case for mounting a strategic air campaign in Bosnia similar to the one in the Gulf War. The circumstances were entirely different. However, I had no problem with the use of close air support in self-defense or to support the mandate. 16

Significantly, in this recollection of the discussion, published nearly five years after the event, Rose described two extremes for using airpower, with no middle ground between those extremes. Lost by this elision was any discussion of a robust air campaign against the Bosnian Serb Army. By seeming to equate bombing, other than for close air support, with a strategic air campaign akin to the one in the Gulf War, Rose was ruling out what was arguably the most effective airpower option. Even some of the staunchest critics of strategic bombing during the Gulf War praised airpower for its effect at the operational level of war, that is, for destroying the fighting potential of Iraq’s Army. 17 Furthermore, the airstrike options favored by General Ashy, and approved at SHAPE, focused mainly on the Bosnian Serb Army, not Belgrade. 18 Whether Rose’s apparent airpower astigmatism was real or affected was unknown, as reflected in the observation of a frustrated NATO airman who, during Rose’s time in Bosnia, claimed that: ‘General Rose either cannot, or will not, understand airpower.’ 19 What is clear, though, is that General Rose did not have the same view of airpower, and its potential usefulness in Bosnia, as the senior American airmen in NATO.

Command Relations, Airstrikes, and Close Air Support

In the fortnight leading up to General Rose’s arrival in Sarajevo, the UN streamlined its chain of command and strengthened its civilian control over UNPROFOR. Mr. Yasushi Akashi arrived in Zagreb as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative and the first full-time civilian head of UNPROFOR. 20 Shortly after Akashi’s arrival, Boutros Gahli approached the French government about replacing General Cot, who had had difficulties with his previous civilian superior, Thorvald

16 Ibid., 15.
18 As discussed in Chapter 4.
19 Military official W.
20 David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 264. Akashi’s predecessor as SGSR continued his duties as the UN co-chairman of ICFY in Geneva.
On 2 February 1994, the UN Secretary-General informed the Security Council that General Cot would be replaced by Lieutenant General Bertrand de Lapresle. Though it would be mid-March before de Lapresle took command of UNPROFOR, General Cot's authority over UNPROFOR had been curbed.

While the UN worked on replacing UNPROFOR's leadership, NATO again threatened airstrikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo, but obvious divisions between alliance members weakened the impact of the threat. On January 10th and 11th, NATO heads of state gathered in Brussels for a summit that the US had hoped would spotlight the launch of its Partnership for Peace proposal. However, with some instigation from Paris, NATO's role in Bosnia—and the absence of American ground forces there—became a major topic of discussion. The summit ended with a communiqué reiterating the alliance's readiness, 'to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Hercegovina.' Asked if NATO's commitment to use airstrikes should be taken seriously after similar threats failed to produce any bombing the previous August, President Clinton said that he believed some members of the alliance were 'more prepared to deal with this than they were in August.' Indeed, France was more willing to support airstrikes, but the British were not.

By mid-February, Boutros Boutros-Ghali had delegated to Mr. Akashi the power to authorize close air support, but not airstrikes. After the NATO summit, Mr. Akashi was instructed to work with NATO to plan for the use of airpower to overcome interference with UN operations in Srebrenica, Zepa, and at the Tuzla airport. Though plans for using airpower aimed ostensibly at all parties, it was obvious that the BSA was most in danger of becoming the target of NATO air action. In late January, four days after General Rose took command in Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali informed the UN Security Council by letter that, for 'operations relating to Srebrenica and Tuzla, I have delegated to my Special Representative, Mr. Akashi, the authority to approve a request for close air

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21 Ibid.; and Guillot, 39.
23 Ridding, 'France Presses U.S. for Stronger Stand on Bosnia;' and Jehl, 'In NATO Talks, Bosnia Sets Off A Sharp Debate.'
25 Apple, 'NATO Again Plans Possible Air Raids on Serbs in Bosnia.'
26 Leurdijk, 40; Pia Wood, 148; and Apple, 'NATO Again Plans,' A1.
28 Ibid.
support from the Force Commander. Though UNPROFOR was ill-prepared to protect these two ‘safe areas,’ the Secretary-General warned that:

The parties should, however, be aware that UNPROFOR’s mandate for the safe areas has been adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, UNPROFOR is not obliged to seek the consent of the parties for operations which fall within the mandate conferred upon it under Security Council resolution 836 (1993) and 844 (1993).

In the same letter, the UN Secretary-General made clear the distinction between close air support and airstrikes, and noted that ‘NATO forces are not authorized to launch air strikes, which would require a further decision of the North Atlantic Council.’ Finally, on 16 February, Boutros-Ghali wrote to the Security Council, stating: ‘I am delegating the necessary authority to my Special Representative...authority to approve a request from the Force Commander of UNPROFOR for close air support for the defence of United Nations personnel anywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Thus, within five weeks of his arrival in Zagreb as the new civilian head of UNPROFOR, Mr. Akashi was apparently vested with full authority to approve requests for close air support anywhere in Bosnia.

On 1 February 1994, General Ashy became a commander in the US chain of command, strengthening his position, but further tangling the awkward lines of responsibility below Admiral Boorda. Back in September of 1993, the US Air Forces in Europe had created a new directorate for General Chambers, making him the US air component commander for the region. By then, Chambers had received his third star, raising to three the number of lieutenant generals in Italy ostensibly responsible for air operations over Bosnia. General Rossetti, the Italian commander of 5th Allied Tactical Air Forces generally did not play much of a role in operational matters, but instead worked with his country’s military and political superiors, keeping them informed, and taking care of the many host-nation support issues. General Ashy was senior to General Chambers, and higher up in the NATO chain of command, so Ashy and his staff worked on policy issues, such as coordinating plans and ROE with SHAPE and NATO

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
34 The reorganization gave General Ashy command of the US 16th Air Force, making him ‘dual hatted,’ since he retained his NATO position of Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH). Snyder and Harrington, 168.
35 Ibid., 164-165.
36 The other two were General Ashy, and the Italian Commander of S ATAF, General Rossetti.
37 Chambers.
Headquarters. 38 Meanwhile, General Chambers and the staff at the CAOC planned and ran the day-to-day flying activities. 39 Though Ashy’s new title as a US commander did not change the working arrangements for air operations over Bosnia, it did give him easier access to US resources and strengthened his position. By the beginning of February, the two camps contending for control of airpower had fortified their positions at the operational level.

5.2 THE SARAJEVO ULTIMATUM: FEBRUARY 1994

An explosion in a Sarajevo market triggered a NATO threat to launch airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs, and it marked the beginning of increased military influence over the possible use of airstrikes. On 5 February 1994, a shell exploded in an unusually crowded Sarajevo market killing approximately sixty people and wounding over 140 others. 40 Though the origins of the blast could not be confirmed, the presumption of Bosnian Serb guilt was strong. 41 Referring to resolution 836, Boutros-Ghali informed the UN Security Council of the need to prepare for the use of airpower in Bosnia to forestall further attacks on Sarajevo. 42 He also asked NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, to secure "a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO’s Southern Command [Admiral Boorda] to launch air strikes at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in and around Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city." 43 This amounted to a very limited and specific request to get NAC approval for airstrikes, if requested by the UN, and then only against ‘smoking-gun’ type targets designated by UNPROFOR. 44

Despite British reluctance, NATO issued an ultimatum backed by the threat of airstrikes to compel the Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. On 8 February, the British Cabinet met in emergency session, and Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd reportedly urged his government to put alliance solidarity ahead of other British concerns, by going along

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38 Ashy, interview by Owen; and Lowell Boyd.
39 Chambers; and Lushbaugh.
40 Silber and Little, 309; and UN, Blue Helmets, 528.
41 Silber and Little, 309-31; UN Blue Helmets, 528; and General Sir Michael Rose, transcript of filmed interview, ‘The Death of Yugoslavia’ Collection, Box 18, File 4 (R-Z), 1, Liddell Hart Archives, King’s College, University of London.
42 UN, Blue Helmets, 529.
44 Schulte, ‘Former Yugoslavia,’ 22-23.
with the US and French-sponsored move in NATO toward tougher action. Meanwhile, General Rose worked hard to finalize an agreement that would obviate any need for NATO airstrikes. Rose shuttled, mediated, and even coerced the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs into a verbal agreement for defusing the situation around Sarajevo. The media and the threat of airstrikes were Rose's most potent weapons in forcing the two sides to accept his four-point plan for relieving the siege of Sarajevo. But, as the Council met in Brussels, General Rose had nothing but verbal assurances to show for his efforts. The British were alone within NATO as they sought to dampen enthusiasm for enforcement action. With France and the US in the fore, alliance ministers issued an ultimatum on 9 February 1994 establishing a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo.

The Sarajevo Ultimatum and Military Influence

The NATO ultimatum went beyond Boutros-Ghali's request in two significant ways: it broadened the list of potential targets, and it included restrictions on Bosnian government forces. The ultimatum called for the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from "an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding an area within two kilometres of the centre of Pale." Rather than removing their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone, the Serbs had the option of placing them "under UNPROFOR control." Bosnian government forces were called upon to relinquish their heavy weapons, and put them under UNPROFOR control. The real teeth to the ultimatum were contained in paragraph (10), which read as follows: The Council decides that, ten days from 2400 GMT 10th February 1994, heavy weapons of any of the parties found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, will, along with their direct and essential military support facilities, be subject to NATO air strikes which will be conducted in close

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45 BBC and the Discovery Channel, 'Episode 5: No Escape.'
46 General Sir Michael Rose, interview with author, 10 December 1997, London, transcript of tape recording, author's personal collection; Rose, transcript of filmed interview, 3; and Silber and Little, 310-315.
47 Rose, transcript of filmed interview, 1-6; Silber and Little, 313-315; and Rose, Fighting, 47-51.
48 Rose, Fighting, 47-48; and Silber and Little, 313.
49 Silber and Little, 315.
50 Ibid., 313.
51 Ibid., 313-314; and Pia Wood, 148.
53 Ibid., par. 6.
54 Ibid., par. 7.
Significantly, paragraph (6) of the ultimatum expanded the potential list of targets by defining heavy weapons beyond the ‘artillery or mortar positions... responsible for attacks,’ which Boutros-Ghali had mentioned in his request. More importantly, paragraph (10) included the rather broad category of potential targets called ‘direct and essential military support facilities.’

The terms of the NATO ultimatum reflected the influences of both General Rose, and the commanders in NATO. Confirming his influence, General Rose wrote:

Determined not to allow the UN peace process in Bosnia to be hijacked by NATO, I phoned an old friend who was involved in the discussions in Brussels, Lt-Gen. Rupert Smith, and told him it was crucial that the UN and NATO demands regarding the ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons be completely aligned. It was particularly important that the text of the NATO ultimatum being drafted that afternoon accurately reflected the wording of the negotiated agreement that had just been obtained in Sarajevo, and that the threat of NATO air strikes would be directed against any party that reneged on the Agreement. Fortunately, Rupert was able to introduce the necessary clauses into the document.

The same sort of peacekeeping impartiality, in a situation where enforcement was called for, had gotten former UNPROFOR commanders, Generals Lars Wahlgren and Philippe Morillon, in trouble with the UN Security Council ten months earlier at Srebrenica. Moreover, it was, arguably, contrary to the intent of resolution 836, which had mandated the use of airpower to support UNPROFOR to ‘promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ However, as a commander General Rose was responsible for both his mission and force protection. By inserting the reference to Bosnian government weapons in the ultimatum, General Rose strove to uphold the peacekeeping principle of impartiality, necessary for preserving BSA consent for UNPROFOR. Thus, by hewing to peacekeeping, he was limiting his need to make the difficult tradeoff between mission and men, which enforcing the ‘safe areas’ policy entailed.

57 Rose, Fighting, 51-52.
58 A report by a Security Council team that traveled to Bosnia and visited Srebrenica criticized the two UNPROFOR commanders for agreeing to disarm the government forces in Srebrenica and for pressuring the enclave’s leaders into accepting terms dictated by General Mladic for surrendering the enclave. S/25700, 30 April 1993. Also see, Honig and Both, 106.
59 S/RES/836. Technically Rose’s agreement did not violate the letter of the resolution, because the Bosnian government was not being asked to withdraw its heavy weapons or any associated units, it merely had to turn them over to UNPROFOR. Arguably, it ran counter to the intent not to disarm the Bosnian government forces.
NATO military influence—mainly by General George Joulwan and General Ashy—affected the potential targets to be struck around Sarajevo, and reflected a desire to enforce the ‘safe areas’ while limiting the risks to NATO aircrews. Greg Schulte, the civilian head of NATO’s Bosnia Task Force at NATO headquarters, later explained: ‘From a military perspective, finding and attacking a specific “smoking-gun” was extremely difficult and risky for the aircraft involved. Therefore NATO agreed to establish a 20 km “exclusion zone” around Sarajevo.’\(^{60}\) Using NAC guidance from the previous summer’s ‘Operational Options’ memorandum, General Ashy developed several response options for attacking targets within the exclusion zone.\(^{61}\) At least one of Ashy’s options included ‘direct and essential military support facilities,’ which was a category of targets listed in ‘Operational Options.’\(^{62}\) General Ashy had also identified the wide range of ‘heavy weapons’ spelled out in paragraph (6) of the ultimatum; however, it was General George Joulwan, the new SACEUR, who intervened at the end of the Council meeting for formulating the ultimatum to suggest that the term ‘heavy weapons’ be specified.\(^{63}\) As a result, the NAC added tanks, rocket launchers, missiles, and anti-aircraft weapons under the heavy weapons rubric, in addition to the artillery and mortars specified by Boutros-Ghali in his request for airstrikes.\(^{64}\) These inputs from NATO officers were significant because the terms of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo guided NATO policy on airstrikes until the end of Deny Flight, and they served as a template for the exclusion zone created at Gorazde in April. Thus, NATO and UN theater-level commanders influenced the ultimatum in ways that made it safer for their forces and more favorable for the missions they preferred.

**Airpower, Control and Autonomy**

The actions of General Rose, as well as those of senior NATO officers, during the ultimatum period, demonstrated how military commanders seek to preserve autonomy...
and avoid outside ‘interference’ in accomplishing their mission. General Rose knew that he had a hand on the UN ‘key’ in the ‘dual-key’ arrangement for authorizing NATO airstrikes,\(^65\) and he resisted pressures to go along with NATO—including pressure from the UK’s Chief of Defence Staff, Marshal of the RAF Sir Peter Harding.\(^66\) In taking this stand, Rose was fortified in knowing he enjoyed the support of General John Wilsey, who visited Rose in Sarajevo on the first day of the ultimatum period.\(^67\) Wilsey was the UK-based Joint Commander of British Forces in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and Rose noted:

> We spoke almost daily throughout my time in Bosnia as I felt it was important that there was someone in Britain who would defend, at the strategic and political level, what I was trying to do at the tactical level. I had seen for myself how British lives had been unnecessarily lost in the Falklands because of political interference and John had suffered the same experience commanding in Northern Ireland. In John Wilsey I was fortunate to have someone who instinctively understood and supported the peace process… It was also perhaps convenient for us both that as I was serving in a UN post, he could not directly give me orders.\(^68\)

Thus, Rose used his UK connections to push his own aims, while shielding himself behind his status as a UN general to ward off unwanted national pressures. However, General Rose feared he might be overridden by higher authorities, thus losing control over military operations in his area of responsibility, if the Bosnian Serbs did not comply with the ultimatum.\(^69\) The Serbs were slow to show any sign of compliance, and once they began to move their heavy weapons, it remained unclear whether they would meet the NATO deadline.\(^70\) Meanwhile, approximately 200 combat and support aircraft from four NATO nations—the US, Britain, France, and the Netherlands—stood ready to enforce the ultimatum.\(^71\) As the deadline approached, General Rose’s soldiers went to extraordinary lengths to verify Bosnian Serb compliance, even assisting the BSA in

\(^{65}\) The term ‘dual-key’ may have entered the lexicon at a NATO meeting on 10 February, the day after the NAC ultimatum. Representing the military at the meeting, Vice Admiral Norman Ray, the Deputy Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, described UNPROFOR’s control over NATO airpower using the ‘dual-key’ analogy, thus easing the concerns of ambassadors who feared that the ultimatum had gone too far. The term would have been familiar to those in the room who understood nuclear safeguards, whereby two keys, far enough apart that one person could not activate them both, needed to be turned simultaneously in order to launch a nuclear missile. Vice Admiral Norman W. Ray, USN, interview by author, 19 November 1997, Brussels, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection.

\(^{66}\) Rose, Fighting, 55-56.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., 52.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 52-53.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 55-56; and Silber and Little, 314-317.

\(^{70}\) Gow, Triumph, 147-148; and Silber and Little, 316-317.

\(^{71}\) Leurdijk, 42-43; Covault, ‘NATO Flights Accelerate,’ 34.
moving some of its equipment. The reports from his soldiers were essential in the decision not to bomb. Rose later remarked that in the end, 'both sides concealed a substantial number of weapons within the TEZ [Total Exclusion Zone], but as long as they did not use them, this hardly mattered.' What mattered to General Rose was that airstrikes were avoided, peacekeeping was not abandoned, 'and that the UN controlled what was happening in Bosnia both from the air as well as on the ground.'

Commanders in NATO also wanted to control NATO airpower but, despite their efforts to maintain operational autonomy, their actions were subjected to detailed political supervision. Admiral Boorda and General Ashy had been to Brussels with sample target folders to brief NATO ambassadors on plans for airstrikes. The commanders used the target folders to illustrate the types of targets they intended to strike and the care that had been taken to minimize chances for collateral damage. By showing just a few sample targets, and avoiding a detailed presentation on all of them, the commanders sought to earn the trust of NATO political authorities, while inhibiting micromanagement from Brussels. However, on the eve of the deadline, the defense ministers and chiefs of defense staff from the four nations providing aircraft for the strikes, plus the minister of defense and chief of defense staff from Italy, gathered at Aviano air base with the principal NATO commanders, General Joulwan, Admiral Boorda, and General Ashy. Under this high-level supervision, Admiral Boorda and General Ashy assessed the level of Bosnian Serb compliance being reported, mostly, by General Rose. As General Ashy recalled:

When we got down to midnight that night, with Secretary Perry, Shali, Joulwan, and all the MODs and CHODs in that room, we were still verifying that the last of these was either in a holding point or was being observed under UN control or had been removed, or we would have been triggered to bomb this stuff. It was the damndest thing I've ever been through.

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72 Rose, filmed interview, 7; and BBC and Discovery Channel, 'Episode 5.'
73 Rose, Fighting, 56 and 61-62; and Senate, Briefing on Bosnia, 23 February 1994, 15-16.
74 Rose, Fighting, 57.
75 Ibid., 55.
76 Cot, interview; Ashy, interview by Owen.
77 Ashy, interview by Owen; Kehoe; Ray; and Ashy, interview by author. I have not been able to determine the date of Ashy and Boorda’s visit to Brussels. In General Ashy’s interview with Colonel Owen, Ashy seemed to indicate it took place around the time of the Sarajevo ultimatum; however, it might have been as early as some time in 1993. The timing would not affect the point I wish to make here about control of information and operational autonomy.
78 Ashy, interview by author.
79 Ibid.
80 Senate, Briefing on Bosnia, 10 and 15; Ashy, interview by Owen; Ashy, interview by author.
81 Senate, Briefing on Bosnia, 15-16; and Rose, Fighting, 56 and 61-62; Ashy, interview by Owen; and Ashy interview by author.
82 Ashy, interview by Owen.
Like General Rose, the NATO commanders had hoped to avoid political ‘help’ in operational matters, and their control over information was a tool for maintaining their autonomy. However, unlike General Rose, they did not succeed.

As discussed in Chapter 2, a commander will want control over forces, and autonomy in using those forces, if he is to be held accountable for the consequences of operations that take place under his command. General Rose had plenty of autonomy and control on the ground, but no real control over NATO airpower. Conversely, the American commanders controlling NATO airpower were so closely supervised that they might not have had autonomy if bombing operations had gone forward. The responsibility borne by the NATO commanders was lifted by higher military and political authorities who arrogated authority over the decision not to bomb. Because there was no bombing, the commanders did not need to cope with infringements on their operational autonomy. Still, the actions of these UN and NATO commanders illustrated how commanders, convinced of their own expertise and charged with responsibility for their mission and their forces, might seek to control military operations and preserve their own autonomy—whether acting against, or in concert with, political pressures. 83

General Cot’s role in the run-up to the ultimatum deadline also suggested that open political support for a course of action reduces the weight of responsibility borne by a commander. During the ultimatum period, Cot was in close contact with General Rose and Admiral Boorda, and he was dependent on them for his information; moreover they, not he, were controlling the forces involved. 84 As a result, Cot lacked both control and autonomy. Yet, the UN force commander later denied being very apprehensive about the prospect of bombing, and claimed that, while he was glad there was no bombing, he had been quite prepared to go along with it if the BSA had failed to comply. 85 In an interview, Cot professed: ‘You seem to think I was afraid of airstrikes. No. I didn’t want, and the UN didn’t want, the Americans to make an American war in the former Yugoslavia. And if the Americans made an American war in Yugoslavia, then they needed to send

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83 For now I wish merely to show that commanders do seek to preserve control and autonomy over operations, and how they might do so. Later in this chapter, and in subsequent chapters, I will show that at times it is, in large part, because commanders have responsibility and expertise that they insist on control and autonomy. Obviously, these demands could be motivated by other factors, such as national political pressures or military doctrine. In the case of the Sarajevo ultimatum, the factors motivating the commanders were mutually reinforcing, so it is difficult to argue persuasively that any of them was most important.
84 Cot, interview.
85 Ibid.
battalions to Sarajevo, Bihac, and Mostar, eh? However, unlike General Rose’s situation, General Cot’s government was comparatively supportive of airstrikes, and Cot seems to have been more ambivalent about them, later recalling:

Mitterrand telephoned me, and said to me: “Do we strike? Do we fire? Or do we not fire?” I said to him: “Boorda and I agree that the ultimatum is properly respected, therefore we are not going to strike.” If the ultimatum had not been respected, we would have struck. That’s obvious, eh?6

President Mitterrand’s willingness to condone airstrikes—not just in the phone call, but openly at the NATO summit in January—reduced the weight of Cot’s responsibility. The majority of UN soldiers on the ground in Bosnia came from France, Cot was a French general, and it was Mitterrand’s prerogative to accept accountability for the consequences to French soldiers as a result of NATO bombing.

5.3 NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST CAS APPROVAL: FEBRUARY - MARCH 1994

Two events between the Sarajevo ultimatum and the crisis at Gorazde two months later illustrated the value of timely command decisions in the control of airpower over Bosnia. The first, the downing of four Serb aircraft caught violating the no-fly zone, showed how quickly a well designed command and control system could function while still maintaining tight control over operations. In the case of the no-fly zone enforcement, there was not much risk to the NATO forces involved, thus no real need for NATO commanders to make weighty decisions in choosing between mission accomplishment and force protection. Moreover, they enjoyed control and autonomy in their actions. In the second event, a failed CAS mission at Bihac, the slow UN approval process caused the mission to fail. General Cot, who professed equanimity over the possibility of bombing as a result of the Sarajevo ultimatum, was outraged when Mr. Akashi was slow to approve the CAS mission and French soldiers were under Bosnian Serb fire. Cot threatened to hold Akashi accountable for the consequences of the delays, clearly demonstrating the connection Cot saw between operational control and responsibility.

NATO Downs Serb Aircraft in the No-Fly Zone

A well designed command and control system, and speedy decisions, were needed to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. On 28 February 1994, UN forces in Croatia saw

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6 Ibid.
Serb Galeb aircraft taking off from Udbina airfield. Soon afterwards, two American fighters over Bosnia picked up radar contacts on aircraft entering Bosnian airspace at low-level from Croatia, and notified a NATO early warning aircraft (AWACS). With permission from the AWACS, the flight lead of the two F-16s descended to low altitude to visually identify the radar contacts, and found six Galebs—small single seat jets used by the Serbs in the ground attack role. The F-16 flight lead managed to maneuver into a position behind the Galebs, apparently without his presence being detected. Whilst the F-16 pilot was waiting for guidance from the NATO AWACS, he saw the Galebs commit a hostile act—attacking a ground target in the central Bosnian town of Novi Travnik—and the pilot reported this to the AWACS. When an officer in the CAOC informed General Chambers of the violation, Chambers immediately ordered the planes shot down. In rapid succession the F-16 pilot downed three of the Serb jets. A second flight of two American F-16s engaged and shot down a fourth Galeb. Two of the Galebs were not thought to have been shot down, but it was suspected that one of the planes might have crashed, perhaps due to fuel starvation, and perhaps in Croatia. At least one Galeb reportedly landed at an air base near Banja Luka in Serb controlled northern Bosnia, further underscoring the military cooperation amongst the Serb communities in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. It took approximately fifteen minutes from the time NATO aircrew first detected the Galebs until the fourth one was shot down.

The downing of the four Galebs highlighted the importance of timely decisions for enforcing the no-fly zone, and the ease of decision-making when mission accomplishment can be achieved with little risk to one's forces. Though resolution 816—authorizing enforcement of the no-fly zone—stipulated that NATO air operations were 'subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and the Force,' there was no 'dual-key'

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87 Solli, UN and NATO Airpower, 27. Within two weeks of the shooting down of the Galebs, the author acquired a copy of the cockpit video from the F-16 which shot down three of the Serb planes. The tape was used along with a 'Talking Paper' to brief officers at the author's home unit.
88 Chambers; and Bucknam, 'Talking Paper on Shootdown of Galebs Over Bosnia,' 29 April 1994.
89 Bucknam, 'Shootdown of Galebs.'
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.; and Facts 1994, 134-135. The Galebs may have divided their formation and made two separate attacks: one on Novi Travnik and another a few miles to the west at Bugojno. See, Mason, Air Power, 180; and Beale, 1.
92 Bucknam, 'Shootdown of Galebs;' and Chambers, interview.
94 Bucknam, 'Shootdown of Galebs;' and Ashy, interview by author.
95 Bucknam, 'Shootdown of Galebs;' and Chambers; Ashy, interview by author.
96 Bucknam, 'Shootdown of Galebs.' Mason reported two landed at Banja Luka, Air Power, 180. General Rose claimed the Serbs held a funeral for the pilots in Belgrade the week after the downing. Rose, Fighting, 71.
control over decisions to take enforcement action against aircraft caught violating the
zone.\textsuperscript{98} A few minutes delay in authorizing the F-16s to engage, and the Galebs could
have been safely on the ground somewhere in Bosnia, or outside of Bosnian airspace.

Close Air Support

General Cot’s actions during a failed NATO CAS mission illustrated how
commanders deprived of control over operations by political decision-makers, might
insist that individuals exercising control also take accountability for the consequences of
the operations. The CAS request system in Bosnia worked on dual paths once a request
reached the UN’s Air Operations Control Center, and the NATO path required no real
decision-making—it operated on the assumption that UN approval would come in a
timely manner.\textsuperscript{99} The airplanes would be ushered to the area where CAS was needed,
while the request worked its way through the UN chain of command.\textsuperscript{100} The NATO key
was, in effect, in the ‘on’ position. According to a February of 1994 report by seasoned
defense journalist Craig Covault, ‘the CAS system set up under U.N./NATO agreement is
designed to react so quickly that [Admiral] Boorda may not know the action is underway
until it has commenced.’\textsuperscript{101} Though perhaps true in theory, this was a bit of an
overstatement.\textsuperscript{102} In practice, General Chambers had time to inform his superiors of the
situation, and they would discuss the pending operation.\textsuperscript{103} Typically, Chambers would
then direct operations while General Ashy and Admiral Boorda monitored events closely
by radio, by phone, and by a computerized aircraft situation display in Naples.\textsuperscript{104}
Chambers’s superiors never overruled him, and NATO never refused a legitimate CAS
request from the UN, though, as shown later, NATO commanders eventually became
wary of the UN practice of using the threat of airpower as a bluff.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{97} Facts 1994, 135.
\textsuperscript{98} Chambers. Citation from S/RES/816, 31 March 1993.
\textsuperscript{99} Colonel Daniel R. Zoerb, USAF, Director, Deny Flight Air Operations Center, HQ AFSOUTH,
interview by author, 29 April 1997, Spangdahlem, Germany, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal
collection; and Covault, ‘NATO Flights Accelerate,’ 35.
\textsuperscript{100} Brigadier General Charles F. Wald, USAF, interview by author, 7 May 1997, Aviano, Italy, tape
recording, author’s personal collection; Zoerb, 29/April/1997; and Covault, ‘NATO Flights,’ 35.
\textsuperscript{101} Covault, ‘NATO Flights,’ 35.
\textsuperscript{102} Ashy, interview by author.
\textsuperscript{103} Ashy, interview by author; and David Miller, ‘NATO Command and Information Systems,’ 57-64.
\textsuperscript{104} Chambers; and Admiral Leighton W. Smith, USN, interview by author, 10 February 1998, Arlington,
Virginia, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection. In the next chapter I will address the
aborted close air support mission at Bihac in November of 1994.
While NATO could and did respond quickly to CAS requests, the UN approval process remained flawed. On 12 March 1994, French troops near Bihac came under fire from Bosnian Serb guns.\(^{106}\) Within minutes, two A-10s were overhead the besieged French forces, awaiting clearance from the UN.\(^{107}\) The A-10s were later replaced by an AC-130 gunship, which orbited near Bihac with an offending Serb weapon under the crosshairs of the plane’s fire-control system, watching the Serb gun fire from time to time.\(^{108}\) This situation, with NATO aircraft standing by for orders to attack, went on for several hours, while the UN hierarchy tried to reach a decision on whether to approve the CAS mission.\(^{109}\) After French soldiers were injured, General Cot demanded that Akashi make a decision.\(^{110}\) Despite having been delegated authority to issue such approval in mid-February, Akashi checked with Boutros-Ghali in New York, before finally giving the go ahead for close air support.\(^{111}\) Moreover, Akashi cause further delays in an attempt to reach Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by phone.\(^{112}\) Finally, ‘Cot lost his temper,’ according to General Rose, who was present in the UN headquarters as Cot and Akashi spoke on a speaker phone:

[Cot] told Akashi that the time for negotiation was over and he wanted either a yes or a no from him, warning him that if he said no, then he would bear all responsibility for the decision. Akashi ignored this and...Cot repeated that he wanted either a yes or a no, adding that if Akashi said no, then the press would hear about it the next day.\(^{113}\)

At about midnight, when the mission was finally approved by the UN, execution was delayed because of problems with the weather and with communications between the ground-based forward air controllers and the gunship.\(^{114}\) During the long delay, the AC-130 had left the target area, and upon returning, its crew needed to reacquire sight of the target.\(^{115}\) When these problems were finally overcome, the forward air controllers withheld permission to expend ordnance, because they had lost sight of the Serb weapon.

\(^{106}\) The number and types of weapons firing on the French are uncertain. It seems that a mobile anti-aircraft gun and possibly a tank were involved. Rose, Fighting, 85; Mason, Air Power, 180; Lowell Boyd; Solli, UN and NATO, 49-50; and Hagman, 123

\(^{107}\) Chambers; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.

\(^{108}\) Chambers.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.; Ashy, interview by author; and Major General James Chambers, ‘Outstanding Air Support of UNPROFOR,’ photocopy of electronic message, 13 March 1994, Vicenza, Italy, to [participating NATO units], BACS collection.

\(^{110}\) Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 123; General Bertrand de Lapresle, interview by author, 13 January 1998, Paris, transcript of tape recording, author’s personal collection; and Rose, Triumph, 85.

\(^{111}\) Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 123; Rose, Fighting, 85; Ashy, interview by author; and Chambers.

\(^{112}\) Cot, ‘Dayton,’ 123; and Rose, Fighting, 85.

\(^{113}\) Rose, Fighting, 85.

\(^{114}\) Lowell Boyd.
and could not verify that the crew aboard the AC-130 had reacquired the correct target. As with the no-fly zone, timely decision-making was needed for CAS to succeed. Unable to control the decision-making process, General Cot refused to be held accountable for the consequences of the delays.

The Bihac CAS episode made a strong impression on General Cot's replacement, Lieutenant General Bertrand de Lapresle, who had arrived in Zagreb two days before the incident and was due to take command at mid-month. General de Lapresle was an armored cavalry officer who had commanded an armored division in Germany, and he considered himself a NATO officer who happened to be assigned to the UN, rather than a peacekeeper. De Lapresle, who was present during the heated exchange between Cot and Akashi on 12 March, drew an important lesson from the incident—never to surprise Mr. Akashi with the need for an instantaneous decision. In order for Mr. Akashi to respond favorably to any request to use force, General de Lapresle believed two things were necessary. First, Akashi had to be kept appraised of all military activities on the ground, and he had to be helped to anticipate decisions about the use of force. Second, Akashi had to be confident that the UNPROFOR commanders were recommending the right course of action for the situation at hand. This second condition required General de Lapresle to begin a process of earning Akashi's trust and educating him about airpower and the procedures for controlling it—explaining to him how to stop air attacks if necessary, and informing him of the likely consequences of using airpower.

Significantly, General de Lapresle was skeptical of the 'safe areas' concept and even more doubtful about the logic behind the 'light option':

I had the normal experience of a NATO officer, having served in the armored forces, and used close air support. And I knew how important it was in order to obtain some military effect on the ground—tactical effect, not strategic—to have this combination of infantry, tanks, helicopters, and aircraft. I knew very well that you cannot have light infantry—which we had in the UN—and air support, without anything in this huge gap between light infantry and F-18s or F-16s. And I was horrified when, I was not yet in charge, this concept of 'safe areas' was imposed to the UN, because in my mind it was completely clear that we would not, or the UN would not, be able to implement the mission as far as 'safe areas' were concerned, if this gap was not filled. General Wahlgren... asked for

115 Solli claimed that NATO aircraft left at the request of the UN. Solli, UN and NATO, 49. NATO sources indicated that the AC-130 left to refuel in-flight. Lowell Boyd; Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
116 Lowell Boyd; Ashy, interview by author.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
35,000 more men... The ‘light option’ was 7,500 men, and the gap between 7,500 and 35,000 being filled with the fact that aircraft would be overhead... I was not very hopeful that airpower would really make the difference.\textsuperscript{123}

Like the other UN army generals who had come to the former Yugoslavia, General de Lapresle started his tour with firm ideas about the utility of airpower in Bosnia. Unlike his predecessor, though, de Lapresle would work closely with the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, and have a greater impact on clarifying UNPROFOR’s mission in Bosnia—lending military legitimacy to the UN Secretariat’s preferred interpretation of UNPROFOR’s mission, instead of combating the Secretariat, as Cot had done.

5.4 TURNING POINT: GORAZDE, APRIL 1994

The attempt by UN and NATO commanders to use airpower at Gorazde in April of 1994 highlighted the bankruptcy of the ‘light option,’ and served as a turning point for the commanders and the organizations they represented. As the first anniversary of the resolution creating the ‘safe areas’ approached, UNPROFOR leaders made their inputs to a UN report evaluating the ‘safe areas’ policy. In light of their experiences at Gorazde and their inability to secure the full complement of reinforcements proposed for the ‘light option,’ the UNPROFOR commanders began distancing themselves from the enforcement elements of their mandate. Meanwhile, the NAC took sides against the Bosnian Serbs and delegated more responsibility to the AFSOUTH commander. The experience at Gorazde taught the senior airmen in AFSOUTH that in order to fulfill their responsibilities as commanders, they needed to get tighter control on the use of NATO airpower. It also reinforced their preference for robust airstrikes instead of CAS. In addition to the other mutually reinforcing factors at work, the responsibilities of command were driving commanders in AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR in different directions.

When the Bosnian Serb Army under General Mladic attacked Gorazde in early April of 1994, UNPROFOR’s commanders had no forces in the ‘safe area’ and had to rely on NATO airpower to block the assault. On 6 April, General Rose sent a team of seven or eight special forces soldiers in the guise of UN military observers (UNMOs) into the enclave; this small force doubled the meager UN presence in the ‘safe area,’ which had previously consisted of just a few liaison officers.\textsuperscript{124} These special forces soldiers were deployed to provide Rose with reliable information, and to act as forward air controllers.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124}
for NATO airpower. It was General Rose's plan to send the forward air controllers into Gorazde with high-tech communications gear, and it indicated he was willing to try to use airpower to enforce the UN mandate to protect the 'safe areas.' General de Lapresle had authorized the operation, and in light of his lessons from the Bihac incident, his subsequent efforts to educate and gain the trust of Mr. Akashi, and the relative speed with which CAS was approved at Gorazde, it seems reasonable to conclude that Mr. Akashi also understood the nature and purpose of the soldiers deployed to the enclave.

On 8 April 1994, Admiral Smith took command of AFSOUTH from Admiral Boorda. Smith was a Navy attack pilot who had flown 280 missions over North Vietnam during three combat cruises. The day of Admiral Smith's change of command, General Mladic 'agreed in principle' to withdraw his forces to the line of demarcation between the Serbs and Muslims that existed in late March. However, the next day the Serbs showed their true intentions by resuming the assault on Gorazde, which precipitated NATO's first real air attack.

General Rose warned Mladic to stop or else face NATO air attacks, and he asked General de Lapresle and Mr. Akashi to approve a close air support mission. When Rose was informed of an intelligence intercept revealing that Mladic had given orders to his commanders to raze Gorazde, Rose noted:

The time for diplomacy or negotiations was over and a great weight was lifted from my shoulders as I found myself back in the familiar business of war-fighting. It did not cross my mind for a moment that the UN should refrain from using force. The lives of my soldiers and the civilians in Gorazde were being directly threatened.

However, the only tools General Rose possessed for going to war were NATO aircraft and a handful of forward air controllers. Given the nature of the attacking Bosnian Serb forces, the poor weather he would confront, and his own lack of expertise in handling airpower, General Rose was not in a strong position from which to fight. UN political approval for close air support came shortly before 5:00 p.m., and with the attack on

124 Rose, Fighting, 100; Ripley, 'Blue Sword,' 22; and Silber and Little, 327-328. Silber and Little asserted the soldiers were all from the British Special Air Service (SAS).
125 De Lapresle, interview, 13/January/1998; Ashy, interview by author; and Hagman, 125. Rose hints at the forward air controller status of these soldiers without directly saying that is what they were. Rose, Fighting, 101.
127 Facts 1994, 96 and 207.
128 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD-ROM reference 177.
130 Rose, Fighting, 106-107.
131 Ibid.
Gorazde intensifying, General Rose coordinated with Admiral Smith to have NATO attack a tank.\textsuperscript{132} Because of poor weather, the first two flights of fighters failed to find the tank.\textsuperscript{133} When a two-ship of F-16s arrived over Gorazde at 6:00 p.m., poor weather conditions forced the pilots to go below a cloud deck, with cloud bottoms at about 6,000 feet above sea level, in an attempt to find the tank.\textsuperscript{134} In so doing, they increased their risk of being shot down, for although they were at the upper limits of small arms fire, they were well within range of anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missile systems. Unable to visually acquire the tank, the F-16 pilots moved to an alternate target selected by General Rose: a group of vehicles and tents reportedly serving as an artillery ‘command post’ on the high ground overlooking Gorazde.\textsuperscript{135} At about 6:25 p.m. on Sunday, 10 April 1994, the F-16s dropped their 500 pound Mk-82 bombs on the ‘command post,’ marking NATO’s first ever air-to-ground mission.\textsuperscript{136} According to General Rose, some senior BSA officers were killed in the attack, including friends of Mladic, and the BSA commander threatened Rose that ‘no UNPROFOR would leave their territory alive.’\textsuperscript{137}

The BSA assault ended shortly after the bombing, but the Serbs resumed their attack the next day, 11 April.\textsuperscript{138} CAS was quickly approved, but before authorizing actual attacks, General Rose had the planes conduct dramatic ‘air presence’ passes in the target area.\textsuperscript{139} Describing the activities for the press in Washington, Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jack Sheehan, said:

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\begin{quote}
The F-18s did not attack the targets immediately. They went through a series of what I would call controlled flight profiles at the request of General Rose. They did a couple of high speed, supersonic runs against the target set, just to make sure the Serbs knew that they were there, that this was a serious activity.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

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The threats had no effect, so shortly before noon General Rose again called for close air support.\textsuperscript{141} A British forward air controller directed a pair of F/A-18s to hit some armored vehicles, but once again poor weather created problems.\textsuperscript{142} The bomb attacks against the vehicles did not go well; out of four bombs, one failed to release from its aircraft, and two

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 147. General Rose reported that the approval process took over an hour because Akashi, who was in Paris, had to check with New York before approving the mission.

\textsuperscript{133} Admiral Smith, press conference, 11/April/1994; and Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 22.

\textsuperscript{134} Admiral Smith, press conference, 11/April/1994; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.

\textsuperscript{135} DoD, ‘Special News Briefing,’ 11/April/1994; and Rose, Triumph, 107.


\textsuperscript{137} Rose, interview by author; Silber and Little, 328; and Rose, Triumph, 107-108.

\textsuperscript{138} DoD, ‘Special News Briefing,’ 11/April/1994; and Rose, Triumph, 108.

\textsuperscript{139} DoD, ‘Special News Briefing,’ 11/April/1994; and Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 23.

\textsuperscript{140} DoD, ‘Special News Briefing,’ 11/April/1994.

\textsuperscript{141} Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 23.

others impacted without detonating. This lead F/A-18 pilot then proceeded to make low altitude strafing attacks on the vehicles. This was even more dangerous to the attacking aircraft than the previous day’s CAS mission, because the F/A-18 pilot was not only vulnerable to anti-aircraft guns and surface to air missile systems, he was also within range of small arms fire, and he was repeatedly making passes near BSA forces he had just bombed. Though unnoticed by most observers then, and since, NATO’s first two air-to-ground missions set off alarm bells within AIRSOUTH. The attacks demonstrated that NATO aircrews could become so engrossed in successfully accomplishing their missions that they would violate the most basic tactical principles and endanger themselves in an attempt to destroy relatively insignificant targets. Such risks might be justified if friendly forces needed immediate relief, or if the air missions were the only way to halt a ground attack. However, AFSOUTH commanders believed there were safer ways, and more appropriate targets, if the goal was to signal Mladic that the UN and NATO meant business.

The BSA assault on Gorazde tapered off after General Rose threatened another air attack, but Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic claimed his forces would shoot down NATO aircraft, and the Bosnian Serbs broke off all contacts with UNPROFOR. During the lull in fighting from 12 to 14 April, General Mladic’s forces took approximately two hundred UN peacekeepers as hostages, or detained them as virtual hostages. This was the first instance of what would become the standard Bosnian Serb response to NATO air attacks; as with subsequent bombings four things happened: 1) the Bosnian Serbs interfered with humanitarian aid deliveries, 2) they broke off negotiations with the UN, 3) they took hostages, and 4) they became more aggressive about firing on NATO aircraft.

On the 15th, Mladic renewed his assault. That night, in Gorazde, two British special forces soldiers were injured when the Bosnian government forces defending the city withdrew precipitately, leaving the British soldiers exposed to fire from onrushing

143 Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 23; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
145 Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
146 Ibid.
148 Silber and Little, 328; and Facts 1994, 269.
149 As will be discussed in the next Chapter, these consequences did not follow the first NATO airstrikes in August and September of 1994 because the Serbs had been warned in advance of the strikes, and UN commanders elected to strike symbolic, and militarily insignificant, targets.
BSA forces. General Rose in Sarajevo phoned Mr. Akashi who was in Pale meeting with Radovan Karadzic. Rose desperately wanted immediate approval for close air support to halt the attack, but Akashi demurred. One of the soldiers died from the wounds suffered that night, but Akashi’s delay most probably was not a factor in the soldier’s death. However, as Gow has argued, what seemed to matter most to General Rose was that in the heat of combat, with soldiers he had put in harm’s way wounded and still taking fire, the general had called upon Mr. Akashi to deliver NATO airpower, and Mr. Akashi had balked.

With UN peacekeepers as hostages, Mladic’s forces began hitting back at NATO airpower. On 15 April, a reconnaissance version of the French Etendard fighter-bomber flying over Gorazde was hit by a heat-seeking surface-to-air missile, but managed to land safely back aboard the carrier Clemenceau. It was the first NATO combat aircraft to be hit during Deny Flight. The next day, with the Serb assault still in progress, the UN leadership once again authorized close air support. A British Sea Harrier was called in to find a tank, but the Sea Harrier was not optimized for such a mission, and the weather was again poor. After several passes at low altitude in the target area, the Sea Harrier was shot down by a shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile. The pilot ejected, sustaining only minor injuries, and was able to join his special forces compatriots in Gorazde. When later asked by Admiral Smith’s aide why he had made multiple passes in the target area when he knew he was being shot at, the Sea Harrier pilot explained that he did it because his countrymen were in trouble. However, Gorazde was a city of approximately 60,000 people, and there were only a half dozen soldiers, whose movement within the enclave was not restricted. If the soldiers really were in harm’s way, it would have been because they had gone there intentionally, possibly looking for targets for NATO airpower. Later on 16 April, American A-10s were tasked to provide air support for the British special forces in Gorazde, but poor weather prevented them from accomplishing their mission.

150 Rose, interview.
151 Silber and Little, 329.
153 Facts 1994, 269; and Rose, Fighting, 112.
154 Gow, Triumph, 150-151.
155 AFSOUTH, ‘Operation Deny Flight Fact Sheet,’ 5 October 1995; Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 23; and Ripley, Air War Bosnia, 70 and 79.
156 Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 23; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
157 Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 23.
158 Commander Kevin M. Donegan, USN, interview by author, 29 April 1998, London, printout of electronic mail, author’s personal collection.
159 Ripley, Air War Bosnia, 70; and ‘Blue Sword,’ 23.
That evening, Russian mediator Vitaly Churkin arranged for Mr. Akashi to suspend further air action in exchange for Bosnian Serb pledges to release the UN hostages and to meet for negotiations the next day. While Karadzic met with Akashi on 17 April, the UN hostages were supposed to be freed, but only a few of them were, and over a hundred were still being detained by the BSA at day’s end. Meanwhile the attack on Gorazde continued, and as NATO readied for airstrikes, General Rose ordered his special forces troops out of the enclave.

North Atlantic Council Decisions and the Gorazde Ultimatum

On 18 April, the same day General Rose’s forward air controllers left Gorazde, Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to Manfred Wörner asking for ‘a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO’s Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery, mortar positions or tanks in or around [any]...of the safe areas.’ President Clinton strongly endorsed the UN request, and on 20 April the NAC met to consider it. However, the Council members adjourned without taking a decision, reportedly because they wanted military commanders to assess the targeting options and the probable effectiveness of airstrikes. Two days later, after the Bosnian Serbs repeatedly made and broke pledges for ceasefires around Gorazde, the Council met again in emergency session. Subsequently, NATO issued two statements on decisions taken by the NAC that day. The first dealt with the immediate relief of the situation at Gorazde, and the second established conditions under which NATO airstrikes might take place for all of the ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia. Significantly, the list of potential targets once again included ‘direct and essential support facilities,’ and it also reflected the broader definition of heavy weapons stemming from General Joulwan’s input during the establishment of the exclusion zone for Sarajevo.

Of immediate consequence, the decisions established a pair of ultimatums for the Bosnian Serbs with respect to Gorazde: one ultimatum demanded that the Bosnian Serbs, and only the Bosnian Serbs, demilitarize the area within three kilometers of the center of the town, and that they grant the UN unimpeded access to the enclave by 0001 GMT on

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160 Silber and Little, 330; and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD-ROM reference 177.
161 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD-ROM reference 177.
162 Ripley, ‘Blue Sword,’ 23; and Silber and Little, 331.
164 Facts 1994, 269-270.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., 270 and 293.
24 April 1994,\textsuperscript{167} the other ultimatum established a twenty-kilometer, heavy-weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde, with a deadline of 0001 GMT on 27 April 1994.\textsuperscript{168} Of greater long term significance, the NAC removed itself, almost completely, from the decision-making process needed to authorize airstrikes around the ‘safe areas.’ Council decisions would no longer be necessary for airstrikes within twenty kilometers of the ‘safe areas’ so long as the strikes were against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and ‘their direct and essential military support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munitions sites.’\textsuperscript{169} It was left for ‘NATO Military Authorities to initiate air attacks...in coordination with UNPROFOR,’ and in accordance with the NAC ‘decisions of 2nd and 9th August 1993.’\textsuperscript{170} NATO’s military authorities would only require further decisions from the NAC if they wanted to conduct airstrikes beyond the parameters spelled out in these two NAC decisions, e.g., beyond the vicinity of the ‘safe areas,’ or against targets of any faction other than the Bosnian Serbs. Furthermore, the NAC decided that:

\begin{quote}
[O]nce air attacks have been carried out against a specific target set pursuant to these decisions, the NATO Military Authorities may continue to carry out, in coordination with UNPROFOR, the attacks against that target set until NATO Military Authorities judge the mission to be accomplished (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{171}
\end{quote}

These NAC decisions were a mixed blessing for NATO commanders. While granting the commanders some autonomy and room for initiative, they also left it to the military to work out arrangements for air attacks with reluctant UNPROFOR leaders.

On the night of 22 April, Mr. Akashi received a briefing on the proposed NATO airstrikes, and he and his advisors were convinced that hitting the dozen or so targets proposed by NATO would only upset the Bosnian Serbs without compelling a positive change in their behavior.\textsuperscript{172} The Bosnian Serbs missed the first deadline but Mr. Akashi, who was with General de Lapresle in Belgrade for negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, blocked NATO air action.\textsuperscript{173} The BSA grudgingly, and only partially, withdrew in accordance with the NATO ultimatums, burning and destroying sections of Gorazde as

\textsuperscript{167} NATO, Press Release (94)31, 22 April 1994.
\textsuperscript{168} NATO, Press Release (94)32, 22 April 1994.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Thomas Quiggin, Military Information Analyst, UNPROFOR Headquarters, Zagreb, interview by author, 20 December 1998, printout of electronic-mail, author’s personal collection; Ashy, interview by author, Chambers; and Military Official Y.
they pulled back. Hundreds of Bosnian Serb combatants remained within three kilometers of the center of Gorazde by posing as police officers, and UN forces continued to find Serb heavy weapons within the twenty-kilometer exclusion zone. However, the BSA ground advance and heavy-weapons fire on Gorazde had stopped. On 26 April, UN officials announced that Bosnian Serb progress toward compliance was sufficient to drop the threat of airstrikes. Though the enclave did not fall, and NATO publicly joined the UN in declaring success, the events around Gorazde marked a turning point in UN-NATO relations and seriously challenged the utility of NATO airpower in Bosnia.

UN and NATO Missions in Bosnia: A Matter of Interpretation and Political Guidance

As a result of the experience at Gorazde, and the continued vulnerability of UN forces, Generals Rose and de Lapresle virtually gave up trying to use airpower as a means to help protect the ‘safe areas.’ By General Rose’s account: ‘Peacekeepers had to believe that any risks they took or sacrifices they made would be justified by results. No one is prepared to sacrifice himself or his comrades for a failed mission.’ Losing a highly skilled soldier due to apparent Bosnian Army malfeasance undoubtedly colored General Rose’s view of the government whose people he was trying to protect at Gorazde. Furthermore, if Mr. Akashi could not be counted on to authorize air support, and if NATO pilots could not find their targets when air support was authorized, then General Rose could not ensure that the risks and sacrifices of his forces ‘would be justified by the results.’ Gorazde apparently changed General Rose from being rather punchy about using NATO airpower to help protect the ‘safe areas,’ to virtually unwilling to call on it. Contrary to that impression, General Rose claimed that he remained willing to use airpower; he was just unwilling to go beyond the ‘smoking-gun’ type targets that he equated with Option 1 airstrikes. As Rose later said: ‘I was a great exponent of airpower, but I was not going to go to level two.’ As the next chapter will show,
General Rose was indeed unwilling to go to Option 2 targets, but he also seemed to have lost his enthusiasm for airpower altogether.

General de Lapresle saw Gorazde as a turning point for himself, and for General Rose. The UNPROFOR commander recalled: 'We had this first experience in Gorazde, which unfortunately confirmed completely what Michael Rose and myself had in mind as to what Harriers and other aircraft could bring us in a very woody, and mountainous, and difficult terrain.'

By all accounts, including their own, the UN commanders suffered no lack of confidence in what unrestrained airpower was capable of doing in a combat scenario. However, UNPROFOR's vulnerability made a more robust use of airpower off limits. Referring to the risks to the lives of UN soldiers, General de Lapresle said:

What sort of explanation would we have to give to their children, or their wives, and so on? Was it really worth the lives of those soldiers who came to keep peace, and not to fight a war against the Serbs? This was a daily concern, of course.

These concerns were undoubtedly heightened when the BSA took the first UNPROFOR hostages, as a result of the air attacks on 10 and 11 April. It seemed that trying to employ airpower, even in a relatively passive or defensive mode of CAS for UN soldiers, exceeded the Bosnian Serbs' tolerance and consent for UNPROFOR’s presence. Rather than compensating for the UN’s shortage of ground forces as the ‘light option’ envisioned, NATO airpower jeopardized UNPROFOR’s security and its humanitarian mission, with no compensating return in terms of protecting the ‘safe areas.’ Although the UN commanders had been aware of this potential problem, the vivid affirmation of their beliefs at Gorazde came just as General de Lapresle and Mr. Akashi were making their inputs to a UN report on the status of the ‘safe areas.’ Thus, not only was Gorazde a personal turning point for General Rose, it was also a turning point in the UNPROFOR mission.

In a report to the Security Council on 9 May, the UN Secretary-General pointed out the difficulties of using force to secure the ‘safe areas,’ the risks of retaliation against UNPROFOR, and the vulnerability of peacekeepers to hostage taking. Furthermore, he

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114 Ibid.; Rose, interview by author; Ashy, interview by author; Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
115 De Lapresle, interview, 13/January/1998; and Rose, interview by author.
117 David Owen, CD-ROM reference 177, 'UN-NATO disagreement over the use of air power.' According to General de Lapresle, Akashi signed the report from Zagreb on which the Secretary-General's report was based. However, Mr. Akashi came to Zagreb unschooled in the workings of airpower, and de Lapresle had mentored him. Moreover, they had spent a lot of time together during the Gorazde crisis. De Lapresle, interview, 8/September/1998.
noted that member states had failed to provide the 7,600 troops called for under the ‘light option.’\textsuperscript{188} Given these difficulties, and the ambiguities from the accretion of resolutions and reports concerning UNPROFOR, Boutros-Ghali conveyed UNPROFOR’s interpretation of its mission with regard to the ‘safe areas.’ The mission, as UNPROFOR interpreted it, was to deter attacks on the ‘safe areas’ merely through its own presence.\textsuperscript{189} If deterrence failed, UNPROFOR ‘could be required to resort to close air support to protect its own members or to request air strikes to compel an end to the attack on the safe areas.’\textsuperscript{190} Finally, Boutros-Ghali sought Security Council confirmation or clarification on UNPROFOR’s interpretation of its mission,\textsuperscript{191} and closed his report with a recommendation that ‘the Security Council approve the statement of UNPROFOR’s mission in relation to the safe areas as set out in the present report.’\textsuperscript{192}

Essentially, by this report, General de Lapresle and General Rose received political support for their preferred interpretation of UNPROFOR’s mission—one that reflected the limitations of their forces. This interpretation saw the ‘safe areas’ as a mechanism to further an overall humanitarian mission aimed at alleviating suffering and promoting conditions for peace.\textsuperscript{193} The UNPROFOR interpretation would prevent the ‘safe areas’ from becoming an end in themselves, that would drain away scarce UN resources, or worse still, serve as a mechanism for justifying enforcement action that might drag UNPROFOR into the fighting.\textsuperscript{194} This interpretation of UNPROFOR’s mission with regard to the ‘safe areas’ was entirely consistent with the views long held within the UN Secretariat.\textsuperscript{195} Unlike Generals Briquemont and Cot who quarreled with the UN staff in New York, and the Secretary-General’s Special Representatives, Generals Rose and de Lapresle added their endorsement and military legitimacy to Mr. Akashi’s report. The shift away from enforcement was not just a change in policy, it was also a reflection of the reality of UNPROFOR’s inability to take enforcement action. As General de Lapresle noted, ‘you can change every word of any Security Council resolution; if you do not have soldiers who have been sent there to fight, you cannot change their behavior on the field. So, what I meant when discussing with Akashi…[was]

\begin{footnotes}
\item[189] S/1994/555, pars. 13 and 16.
\item[190] Ibid., par. 17.
\item[191] Ibid., par. 29.
\item[192] Ibid., par. 32.
\item[193] Ibid., pars. 13 and 24.
\item[194] Ibid., pars. 16, 17, and 24.
\item[195] See, for instance, S/25939, 14 June 1993.
\end{footnotes}
that if we were expected to behave differently, we would need some means.\textsuperscript{196} Though UNPROFOR commanders increasingly took the position that their mission was peacekeeping and not peace enforcement, the Security Council never passed a resolution superseding 836, nor did it offer any clarification of UNPROFOR’s mission in relation to the ‘safe areas.’\textsuperscript{197} However, because the Security Council did not dispute UNPROFOR’s interpretation, which obviously enjoyed the support of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Generals de Lapresle and Rose had good grounds for adhering to their view of UNPROFOR’s mission.

Trust, Expertise, and Forces at Risk

In May, just as UNPROFOR was seeking Security Council approval for its interpretation of its mission with regard to the ‘safe areas,’ General George Joulwan and NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General Sergio Balanzino visited UNPROFOR leadership in Zagreb and Sarajevo. General Joulwan expressed his concern that the UN had not been forceful enough in its use of airpower at Gorazde, and that it was unacceptable for the Serbs to maintain heavy weapons inside the exclusion zones.\textsuperscript{198} General Rose assured SACEUR that any weapons inside the exclusion zones were broken down.\textsuperscript{199} From Zagreb, the NATO visitors went with General Rose to Sarajevo. En route to the UN commander’s headquarters, the group came under fire which General Joulwan was convinced came from a mortar. General Rose suggested it was merely rocket-propelled grenade fire, hence not from a banned ‘heavy weapon.’\textsuperscript{200} Inside General Rose’s headquarters General Joulwan asked the UN chief of intelligence if red pins dotting a map of the Sarajevo area and inside the exclusion zone represented broken-down heavy weapons. According to Joulwan, the intelligence officer assured SACEUR that they represented active heavy weapons, leading General Rose to explain that he had been away from his headquarters for a while.\textsuperscript{201} From that point on, General Joulwan said he felt he could not trust General Rose. According to the NATO commander:

\begin{quote}
It is important that when you commit forces, you must make sure that you have trust and confidence of those you’re working with...[Furthermore,] it’s not just right to be politically correct; you better be militarily correct when you have
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{196} De Lapresle, interview, 8/September/1998.
\textsuperscript{198} Joulwan, interview; Rose, Fighting, 127-128.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., and Rose, Fighting, 125-127. In General Rose’s account the weapons were five old artillery pieces barely 100 meters inside the exclusion zone, and that their range probably precluded them from threatening Sarajevo.
\textsuperscript{200} Joulwan, interview; and Rose, Fighting, 128.
\textsuperscript{201} Joulwan, interview.
forces involved. And so I insisted upon brutal truth, brutal honesty when you’re putting aircrews, and ground crews, and tank crews, and ships at risk. And I didn’t get brutal honesty; I got a shaky answer from Rose.\textsuperscript{202}

The lack of trust was mutual, for General Rose felt that, ‘Joulwan and his team tried to bounce the UN in May into using more force. And [the UN] just [said]: “You’re not doing it”.\textsuperscript{203} General Rose already had forces at risk, and he did not appreciate a NATO general pushing for risky actions when NATO was unwilling to deploy forces on the ground in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{204} Compounding the difficulties was General Joulwan’s tendency at this stage to treat the UNPROFOR commanders as his subordinates since they came from NATO nations.\textsuperscript{205} Joulwan’s motto as SACEUR was ‘one team, one fight;’ however the UN wanted neither to be on the team, nor to join in the fight.\textsuperscript{206}

Though Admiral Smith and General Ashy in Naples understood the difficulties the UN faced when it came to using force against the Serbs, the two senior airmen found that they could no longer blithely countenance the practice of using NATO airpower for ‘air presence’ missions.\textsuperscript{207} Restrictions against targeting anything other than ‘smoking-guns’ or the actual forces threatening the UN was bad enough. Such constraints, however, could be justified in order to protect the lives of UN peacekeepers on the ground. What concerned NATO operational commanders was the UN practice of calling on airpower to intimidate one of the warring factions (almost always the Bosnian Serbs) without, apparently, having the intention, or the political approval from within the UN, to actually employ force.\textsuperscript{208} Initially the mere presence of aircraft had been used by the UN as a show of force to strengthen its hand at road blocks, or to dampen heavy weapons fire.\textsuperscript{209} But, ‘the UN became addicted to air presence,’ according to one NATO officer.\textsuperscript{210} General Chambers noted that over time UNPROFOR found it necessary for the planes to fly lower and to make more noise in order to intimidate the warring factions; and General Rose even requested some high-speed passes below an altitude of 500 feet, which would have made the aircraft vulnerable to ground fire.\textsuperscript{211} As a matter of routine, NATO continued the practice of sending aircraft to the vicinity of UN peacekeepers whenever a

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{203} Rose, interview by author.
\item\textsuperscript{204} Rose, Fighting, 126. Since there were soldiers from NATO nations in UNPROFOR, I take General Rose’s use of ‘NATO’ to mean more specifically the US.
\item\textsuperscript{205} Military Official X and Z.
\item\textsuperscript{206} Rose, Fighting, 125-126.
\item\textsuperscript{207} Admiral Smith, interview; and Donegan.
\item\textsuperscript{208} Admiral Smith, interview; Chambers; Zoerb, 29/April/1997; and Wald.
\item\textsuperscript{209} Admiral Smith, interview; Chambers.
\item\textsuperscript{210} Lowell Boyd.
\end{itemize}
situation began to develop that might require close air support. However, in the wake of the Sea Harrier loss, and the UN’s refusal to employ airpower in a more robust manner, senior NATO airmen became extremely reluctant to give General Rose the same level of control over NATO aircraft that he had exercised at Gorazde.

General Rose held fundamentally different views of NATO airpower and its role over Bosnia than did the senior airmen in AFSOUTH. From General Rose’s perspective, the NATO commanders were presenting him with an all or nothing choice: either he had to be willing to go after something other than the ‘smoking-guns,’ or he would get no air support at all. In his memoir, General Rose says that Admiral Smith ‘would only accept strategic-level targets, such as major HQs, communications sites or logistic installations such as ammunition bunkers. I told him that neither NATO nor the UN had authority to escalate the use of air power in this manner.’ In truth, these were precisely the sorts of targets spelled out under Option 2 of NATO’s ‘Operational Options for Air Strikes,’ and by labeling them ‘strategic-level targets,’ Rose indicated the gulf between his view of airpower and that shared by NATO commanders. More significantly, General Rose believed that NATO should be prepared to lose some aircraft, noting that the downing of the Sea Harrier ‘was unfortunate...but the incident should be considered a routine hazard of peacekeeping.’ The American airmen in NATO disagreed with this on two counts: first they did not see their mission as peacekeeping, and second they viewed the risks as unjustifiable and unnecessary. The principal reason for attempting to employ airpower in Bosnia was to make use of a tool for enforcement action which carried minimal risks. That Admiral Smith felt the risks were unjustified and unnecessary is clear from General Rose’s account. They were unjustifiable because the UN would halt the use of airpower as soon as the Bosnian Serbs stopped shooting; thus, the results

212 Chambers; Admiral Smith, interview; and Wald.
213 Admiral Smith, interview; Zorbe, 29/April/1997; and Wald.
214 Admiral Smith, interview; Donegan.
215 Rose, interview by author.
216 Rose, Fighting, 114.
217 See discussion in Chapter 4 on ‘Operational Options.’ Targets NATO might have considered ‘strategic-level’ would have been part of Phase III, or Option 3 as it came to be called.
218 Rose, Fighting, 114.
219 Admiral Smith, interview. Also note the mission statement given to General Ashy in August of 1993 cited in Chapter 4, the terms of the Sarajevo ultimatum, and the terms of the Gorazde ultimatum which followed the loss of the Sea Harrier. Each of these directed NATO commanders to prepare for enforcement action in situations where Bosnian Serb consent was non-existent.
220 Admiral Smith, interview.
were ephemeral, and the Bosnian Serbs could, and did, resume their attacks when the weather worsened, or after they had taken UN hostages. Under these circumstances, the risks were being taken for no discernible payoff. The rationale for going beyond ‘smoking-gun’ type targets during the Sarajevo ultimatum was to get more payoff for less risk.\(^{221}\) In the days and months after the downing of the Sea Harrier, senior airmen in AFSOUTH, and their political masters in Brussels, would repeatedly demonstrate just how little risk to NATO aircraft they were willing to accept.\(^{222}\) Furthermore, the risks were unnecessary in the eyes of the NATO commanders because they believed there was a better way to use airpower, and that was to strike more significant targets that might actually compel the Bosnian Serbs to respect the UN ‘safe areas,’ and the NATO exclusion zones.\(^{223}\)

**Conclusion**

The growing split between UN and NATO commanders can be viewed in terms of force protection and tactical determinism; that is, it was impossible to prosecute ‘smoking-gun’ type targets within the bounds of acceptable risk to NATO pilots and the capabilities of NATO airpower. Unfortunately the most realistic and safest way of employing NATO airpower clashed with the security needs of UNPROFOR. These disparate limitations and vulnerabilities of NATO and UNPROFOR were driving the commanders in the two organizations further and further apart. Yet NAC decisions increasingly left it to the operational commanders to try to find some workable middle ground whenever political pressures to do something mounted. AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR attempts to meet halfway, however, manifested themselves in the compromised safety of NATO pilots or UN peacekeepers. After Gorazde, the theater-level commanders gradually began to accept the tactical determinism that pulled them toward the separate elements in what was supposed to be a cooperative effort. Rather than seeking political direction, Generals Rose and de Lapresle sought to help define their own mission. General Rose began the process with his campaign plan even before he arrived in Bosnia. After Gorazde, the UN generals made their input, and added military legitimacy, to the UN Secretary-General’s report of 9 May, which moved UNPROFOR away from responsibility for enforcing the ‘safe areas’ policy. These were the first steps

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\(^{221}\) Schulte, ‘Former Yugoslavia,’ 22-23.

\(^{222}\) The topic of limiting risks to NATO aircrew is discussed extensively in the next chapter.

\(^{223}\) Ashy, interview by author; Admiral Smith, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
in creating a division of labor, whereby UNPROFOR conducted peacekeeping and NATO took responsibility for enforcement action.

The difficulties and dangers of providing air presence and close air support to UNPROFOR reinforced the AFSOUTH commanders’ preference for more militarily meaningful air attacks. Moreover, it convinced the NATO commanders of the wisdom of having airmen controlling airpower. Likewise, the difficulties and dangers of having close air support at Gorazde reinforced the UNPROFOR commanders’ desire to control airpower. The theater-level commanders in both the UN and NATO were trying to strike a proper balance between the risks to their forces and accomplishment of their missions. For UNPROFOR, that meant reinterpreting the mission, so as to avoid responsibility for the ‘safe areas’ and the exclusion zones. For AFSOUTH, striking the right balance meant not putting forces at risk unless there was a commensurate payoff. That, in turn, led the commanders in AFSOUTH to favor airstrikes over CAS, and to curtail the reflex of giving UNPROFOR air presence. As noted before, the commanders’ responsibilities were reinforced by national political pressures, differing areas of expertise, and organizational biases. A further assessment of the role of responsibility in motivating the commanders will be made in the next chapter, when their actions can be seen as part of a broader pattern of behavior.
CHAPTER 6
COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTION:
AUGUST - DECEMBER 1994

The whole business of dual-key, again caused a certain amount of discussion. But when you've got two chains of command, slightly different mandates, you're going to have to have a dual-key. There's no other way of running an operation.

—General Sir Michael Rose, December 1997

In the second half of 1994, NATO airmen believed the UN’s piecemeal and highly restrained use of airpower held little prospect for affecting the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs. Furthermore, NATO commanders began to believe that the influence of UNPROFOR’s commanders over the conduct of air attacks unnecessarily jeopardized the safety of NATO airmen. Conversely, commanders in UNPROFOR became convinced—especially after the events at Gorazde in April of 1994—that NATO airpower could easily create more problems than it was likely to solve. Though willing to accept air support in extremis, they harbored serious misgivings over NATO plans for airstrikes. Under the ‘dual-key’ control arrangements, the UN could veto NATO’s more muscular air options, and an unhealthy tension between soldiers and airmen, and the organizations they represented, grew during the summer and fall of 1994.

In this chapter I will show how military commanders in NATO and the UN clashed over their competing concerns for force protection and mission accomplishment. The first section of this chapter addresses UN-NATO friction over the UNPROFOR practice of warning the Bosnian Serbs of pending air attacks. It also examines UN-NATO disputes over ‘proportionality’ in responding to Bosnian Serb provocations around Sarajevo. The UN dimension of this struggle has been addressed elsewhere, but the NATO perspective has been largely unrecognized or misinterpreted.1 The second section shows how the commanders of UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH accepted short term
degradation of their missions during the airstrike against the Serb-controlled Udbina
airfield, and how they cooperated in order to support each other’s needs for force
protection. The third section details some previously neglected issues concerning
NATO’s response in late 1994 to the growing Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat. Though
NATO commanders won formal political approval to change the ROE governing
suppression of air defenses, the commander of UNPROFOR used the ‘dual-key’
mechanism to prevent NATO airmen from acting on their new authority. This inhibited
the ability of NATO airmen to act in self-defense, causing a serious split between
UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH. Thus, despite some compromises on both sides, by the end
of 1994, the divergent responsibilities of UN and NATO commanders contributed to a
breakdown in cooperation between them, rendering Deny Flight virtually ineffective.

6.1 NATO AIRSTRIKES AND THE CLASH OVER WARNINGS,
PROPORTIONALITY, AND CONTROL: AUGUST - OCTOBER 1994

By the summer of 1994, commanders in UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH were
working at cross purposes in Bosnia, even as they tried to cooperate to implement the
same Security Council resolutions. The divided UN-NATO command arrangements
reflected, and were reinforced by, conflicting national political pressures, different means
available, different types of military expertise, and different responsibilities. With US
support for the Bosnian government cause, the commanders in AFSOUTH came under
increasing political pressure to enforce Bosnian Serb compliance with the NATO-decreed
exclusion zone around Sarajevo. The one-sided nature of this sort of intervention
threatened to unhinge Serb consent for the UN forces, whose mandate the exclusion zone
was meant to serve. Meanwhile, the UNPROFOR commanders endeavored to preserve
the humanitarian and peacekeeping focus of their mission, which meant remaining
impartial, and maintaining the consent of the warring factions. The division of labor—
with the UN focusing on peacekeeping and NATO focusing on enforcement—led to
radically different approaches to using airpower.

From the summer of 1994, planners in Naples worked on target matrices to guide
NATO commanders should they wish to propose airstrikes in response to provocations
from any of the warring factions. These matrices were to be used in conjunction with

1 For the UN perspective, see Hagman, 140-142; and Rose, Fighting, 160-180.
2 Zoerb, 30/April/1997; and General Michael E. Ryan, USAF, Commander Allied Air Forces Southern
Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) and Commander US 16th Air Force, September 1994 - April 1996, interview
by author, 6 June 1997, Ramstein, Germany, transcript of taped interview, author’s personal collection.
five thick target books maintained at the headquarters of the principal commanders in the region: AFSOUTH, AIRSOUTH, 5 ATAF/CAOC, UNPROFOR, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Command. Each book contained identical information, such as photographs and target descriptions, on targets approved by the UN-NATO joint targeting board. Additionally, the books included copies of UN Security Council resolutions and NAC decisions relevant to air operations in the former Yugoslavia. Targets were divided into categories according to the type of target and were also divided into five sets—one for each ‘safe area,’ but with only one set for Zepa and Srebrenica combined. Next to each typical provocation and suggested response, the NATO planners identified the authorizing Security Council resolutions, and NATO decisions, as well as the appropriate ROE from the Deny Flight plan, 40101. The target books incorporated targets for the three warring factions in Bosnian: the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian government forces. However, many factors—including the UN ‘safe areas’ concept, the supporting NATO ultimatums, and the fact that the Bosnian Serbs possessed the preponderance of heavy weapons and other likely targets—made it easier for NATO planners to identify Bosnian Serb targets, and more likely that those targets would be nominated for airstrikes. Officers working in the air component of Admiral Smith’s headquarters went to great lengths to keep these books updated, so UN and NATO commanders could react quickly and appropriately to a provocation.

During the summer of 1994, General Rose proposed a new scheme for using airpower, though the proposal convinced some airmen that the UN’s commander in Bosnia did not understand the vulnerabilities of airpower, or share their views on its proper employment. Labeled Operation Antelope, the proposal called for NATO to respond to the unauthorized removal of heavy weapons from UN control points by

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3 ‘Operation Deliberate Force Factual Review.’ The first target books shared by the UN and NATO were built during the second half of 1993 after the Mount Igman crisis (see Chapter 4). These were constantly updated to reflect changes, such as the creation of the exclusion zones at Sarajevo and Gorazde. Ashy, interview by Owen; and Lowell Boyd.

4 Zoerb, 30/April/1997; and Ashy, interview by Owen.

5 Ryan, interview.

6 ‘Operation Deliberate Force, Factual Review,’ 2-2; and Zoerb, 30/April/1997. The targets were divided into six categories: heavy weapons in the Exclusion Zone (EZ); heavy weapons outside the EZ; weapons collection points; direct and essential support facilities; command and control facilities; and air defenses.

7 Zoerb, 30/April/1997; and Ryan, interview.

8 Zoerb, 29/April/1997; and Ashy, interview by Owen.

9 Zoerb, 30/April/1997.

10 Ibid.; Lowell Boyd; Ashy, interview by Owen; and Ryan, interview.

11 Military Official W; and Wald.
striking the exact piece of equipment which had been illegally taken.\textsuperscript{12} From an airman’s viewpoint, this concept of operations was grossly inefficient and seemed quite risky for UN and NATO forces involved. The CAOC chief of plans who headed the project for NATO, Colonel Chuck Wald, recalled:

\begin{quote}
[General Rose] wanted to hit the exact weapon or tank they took out of a cantonment area. And he’d asked us if we could get a C-130 gunship to work with their Lynx helicopters, with their special ops guys on them, with FLIR [Forward Looking Infrared] to go out and find, if we could, a tank that they [the Serbs] had stolen, follow it through towns if we had to, and then hit that particular tank...We planned an operation to do that. I planned it. And we practiced it...It was ludicrous.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

The large number of supporting aircraft required by such a mission—refueling tankers, defense suppression planes, standby close air support aircraft, and search and rescue assets—would create a signature tipping off the Serbs that some air action was about to occur.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, the helicopters and the relatively un-maneuverable AC-130 gunship would have been vulnerable to BSA air defenses.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, it would have been simple for the Serbs to counter an operation like Antelope by seizing weapons from several sites at the same time, or merely waiting for poor weather to steal heavy weapons from the UN.\textsuperscript{16} No attempt was ever made to actually execute Operation Antelope, but General Rose apparently had it in mind when the Bosnian Serbs confiscated heavy weapons from UNPROFOR in early August; Rose later wrote: ‘my plan was to hit the vehicles and weapons with air strikes as they left the weapons collection point.’\textsuperscript{17} However, the plan did not work in this case, as one observer noted: ‘Once a UN helicopter, which was tracking the stolen weapons, was struck by ground fire, it was forced to give up the chase. NATO then launched 16 fighters.’\textsuperscript{18}

**NATO’s First Airstrike, 5 August 1994**

NATO’s first airstrike demonstrated the large, and growing, gap between the UN and NATO over using airpower. On the morning of 5 August, Bosnian Serb forces injured a Ukrainian peacekeeper in a raid on the Ilidza weapons control point west of Sarajevo, and took five heavy weapons.\textsuperscript{19} Yasushi Akashi was away on vacation, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Wald. General Rose hints at this option in his memoir, *Fighting*, 144 and 160.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Wald.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid.; Rose, interview; and Rose, *Fighting*, 175.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Wald.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Rose, *Fighting*, 160.
\item \textsuperscript{18} ‘Maryland’s 175th FG Pilots,’ 18.
\item \textsuperscript{19} S/1994/1389.
\end{itemize}
according to General Rose, General de Lapresle agreed with Admiral Smith ‘to authorize NATO to attack Gulf War-style targets, including Serb ammunition bunkers and communications sites.’

However, General Rose intervened, asserted his rights as the responsible commander, and designated a new target for the attack, which turned out to be a derelict tank destroyer. NATO launched over a dozen French, British, and Dutch aircraft, but, after long delays and problems with weather, two US A-10s, under the control of a French forward air controller, made the attack. NATO’s first ‘airstrike,’ involved no bombs. The A-10s made several strafing passes on the vehicle, which was miles from Ilidza, and which AFSOUTH airmen only later realized had already been out of commission. Throughout the attack, the UN commanders held tight control over events. While General Rose coordinated with General Chambers on which target to hit, General de Lapresle held one phone to Chambers’s NATO superiors in one hand, and in the other he held a phone through which he issued demands to Momcilo Krajjisnik, President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The Serbs agreed to return the weapons after the attack on the broken down vehicle, and General Rose later rejected notions that this was a ‘pin-prick’ strike, stating: ‘this air strike by NATO proved a textbook example of the precise use of force in a peacekeeping mission.’

Admiral Smith had a different view:

I was frustrated as hell when Michael Rose would give us one target, and drop the bomb, and that was it. And I tried my damnedest to get him to understand that you’ve got to do more than go after some derelict tank in the middle of a field.

The underlying problem was that the two commanders were pursuing different missions: the UN general was practicing peacekeeping, and the NATO admiral was attempting to enforce UN mandates and NATO ultimatums.

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21 Rose, Fighting, 160-161; Rose, interview by author; Facts 1994, 561; and S/1994/1389.
22 Facts 1994, 561; and ‘Maryland’s 175th FG Pilots,’ 19. According to General Ashy, the A-10 pilots were not expecting to work with a forward air controller, because they were on an airstrike mission. However, the FAC came up on the radio frequency used by the A-10 pilots, and aborted an attack in progress. After that the A-10s completed the mission under the FAC’s control. Ashy, interview by author.
23 Facts 1994, 561; ‘Maryland’s 175th FG Pilots,’ 18-19; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
24 Rose, Fighting, 160-161.
26 Rose, Triumph, 161.
27 Admiral Smith, interview.
28 Ibid.; Rose, Fighting, throughout. In his memoir, General Rose characterized NATO’s goals, as pursued by Admiral Smith, as war-fighting rather than peace enforcement. Though the brand of peacekeeping General Rose was practicing allowed a greater use of force than traditional peacekeeping, it was based on peacekeeping principles. It also envisioned a definite divide between peacekeeping and peace enforcement that was not to be crossed. General Rose called this dividing line the Mogadishu line.
Warnings

Compounding Admiral Smith's frustration over having the attack directed against a disused vehicle was his discovery that General Rose had given the Serbs a warning before the airstrike.\(^\text{29}\) While most observers appreciated the risks faced by peacekeepers in Bosnia, a continual point of frustration for senior NATO airmen was that few if any commentators seemed to recognize the dangers confronting NATO aircrews.\(^\text{30}\) General Rose believed warning the Bosnian Serbs was necessary for limiting collateral damage, and that it was consistent with the peacekeeping principles of maintaining consent and the minimum use of force.\(^\text{31}\) Moreover, the warnings minimized the chances of Bosnian Serb retaliation against Rose's peacekeepers. For Admiral Smith, warnings created an unjustifiable risk to the lives of NATO aircrews, and he became furious with General Rose over the issue.\(^\text{32}\) Despite the admiral's remonstrations, though, General Rose would ignore Smith's concerns and continue to warn the Serbs.\(^\text{33}\)

The warnings helped General Rose to lower the risks to his forces. UNPROFOR did not just warn the Serbs in general that they were about to be attacked, but told them specifically what would be attacked just prior to each strike.\(^\text{34}\) The practice of giving the Serbs warning served the needs of the UN mission in Bosnia and was intended to head off Bosnian Serb retaliation against UNPROFOR peacekeepers. By warning the Bosnian Serbs of NATO air attacks, UN commanders reduced the chances of killing any BSA soldiers, thus helping to maintain the consent of the Serbs for the UN's presence and its mission in Bosnia. This, in turn, reduced Serb motivations to take revenge against UNPROFOR forces. Therefore, tactical warnings prior to airstrikes helped to maximize both mission success and force protection for UNPROFOR. General Rose considered warnings a principle of peacekeeping,\(^\text{35}\) and he continued to issue warnings despite Admiral Smith's strenuous protests.\(^\text{36}\) Recounting a discussion with Admiral Smith, General Rose recalled:

\(^{29}\) Military Official W; Admiral Smith, interview.
\(^{30}\) Admiral Smith, interview; and Ryan, interview.
\(^{31}\) Rose, interview by author; and Rose 'A Year in Bosnia,' RUSI Journal, 24.
\(^{32}\) NATO Official W; and Admiral Smith, interview.
\(^{33}\) Rose, interview by author; and Admiral Smith, interview.
\(^{34}\) Rose, Fighting, 177; Rose, interview by author; Admiral Smith, interview; Wald; and Military official W.
\(^{35}\) Rose, interview by author; and Rose, 'Bosnia Herzegovina 1994 - NATO Support,' 9. Elsewhere General Rose referred to warning as one of the 'rules for the use of force in peacekeeping' rather than a principle of peacekeeping, per se. See, Rose, 'A Year In Bosnia,' RUSI Journal, 24.
\(^{36}\) Rose, interview by author; Admiral Smith, interview; and Military Official W.
He [Admiral Smith] said: “If you issue a warning, you’re hazarding my pilots.” And I would say: “Sure there is a risk to your pilots, because they’re coming down quite low to deliver their ordnance, and these guys could be ready for them. But the fact is they’re only coming into the theater of operations for minutes at a time.” I said: “We live, you know, within the range of these weapons all the time, so what’s the problem? What’s the big deal? When you’re a peacekeeper you ought to take risks.”

Moreover, General Rose claimed his intent was to give the Serbs only twenty or thirty minutes warning—enough time for them to evacuate their own forces and to help minimize collateral damage, but not enough time to organize their air defenses against the attack.8

Warning the Serbs, however salutary for UNPROFOR, mitigated the effects of airstrikes and put NATO aircrews at increased risk of being shot down. The UN warnings gave the Bosnian Serbs an opportunity to move or protect whatever NATO was going to attack, and to prepare any available air defenses already in the area of the intended target. Combined with other factors detracting from airpower’s effectiveness—such as poor weather, mountainous and wooded terrain, the inherent difficulties of spotting individual weapons, and UN reticence to authorize more robust air attacks—the warnings helped to soften whatever signal airstrikes were meant to send. As the Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat increased during the summer of 1994, warnings of NATO attacks heightened the likelihood the BSA would shoot down another NATO aircraft. So while warnings improved mission accomplishment and force protection for UN peacekeeping, it had the opposite effect on NATO’s enforcement action.

NATO’s Second Airstrike, 22 September 1994

NATO’s second airstrike again highlighted the UN and NATO disagreements over targeting and warning, but it also demonstrated that nations with troops on the ground in Bosnia were involved in the airstrikes. In addition to supporting the UN, maintenance of alliance cohesion was an implied objective for NATO commanders, and participation by as many nations as possible in any airstrike was one of NATO’s stated goals.9 However by September 1994, only American aircraft had prosecuted NATO air attacks, thus distorting the image of Deny Flight by masking its multinational character.10

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37 Rose, interview by author.
38 Ibid.
39 MCM-KAD-084-93.
Commanders in AFSOUTH were anxious to include non-US allies in the next use of NATO airpower, and they got their chance when General Rose’s deputy, Major General André Soubirou, called for an airstrike on 22 September 1994. In the CAOC at Vicenza, General Chambers sat with the French and British senior national representatives and orchestrated the NATO response; over the next several hours, the CAOC team would endeavor to make this particular airstrike more overtly multinational than previous allied air attacks.

As with NATO’s first airstrike, General Rose once again intervened to warn the Serbs, and to redirect the attack against a target of lesser military significance than the one agreed to by his UNPROFOR superior, General de Lapresle. On 22 September, French peacekeepers around Sarajevo came under direct fire from Bosnian Serb forces at several different locations, and at least two Frenchmen were injured. General Rose had just returned to the UK temporarily, and his French deputy, General Soubirou, was in charge in Bosnia. Generals Soubirou and de Lapresle were preparing to strike an ammunition depot at Pale in response to this latest provocation, when General Rose was alerted of the pending operation by his staff in Sarajevo. Working with General Wilsey in the UK, General Rose was able to halt the planned attack, then redirect it toward a target of Rose’s choosing—a T-55 tank in the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Moreover, General Rose again ensured the Serbs were warned about the planned attack, later stating: ‘Adm. Leighton Smith had ordered that no warning be given to the Serbs prior to the attack, in order to avoid giving them time to alert their air defence system, putting NATO pilots at greater risk. I told my Chief of Staff in Sarajevo, Brinkman, to ignore that order.’

Though a pair of US A-10s were the first aircraft on scene and the pilots could see the target, NATO commanders withheld the A-10s in favor of non-US aircraft. Two French Mirage 2000s were brought in, but the pilots had difficulty finding the target and eventually departed the target area for in-flight refueling. After about an hour’s delay,

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41 Wald; Chambers; and Ashy, interview by author.
42 Wald; and Chambers.
43 Facts 1994, 710-711; and Rose, Fighting, 176.
44 Rose, Fighting, 176.
45 General Rose has written that his commander, General de Lapresle, took a special interest in the event because he had a son commanding one of the units involved. Rose, Fighting, 176. Hagman claims that General Soubirou had a son-in-law in one of the participating French units. Hagman, 140.
46 De Lapresle, interview, 8/September/1998; and Rose, Fighting, 176-177.
47 Rose, Fighting, 177.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
the situation grew tense at the CAOC. The airmen in the CAOC, who were aware the Serbs had been warned, worried NATO would lose credibility if they were unable to follow through with the attack, and that the Serbs might shoot down an attacking aircraft. RAF Jaguars were available for the attack, but General Chambers consulted with the British and French senior national representatives, and opted for the French Mirages. However, as soon as the Mirage pilots reported the target in sight, they also announced they were low on fuel and needed to depart. Late in the day, and with NATO credibility on the line, General Chambers ordered the A-10s to attack the tank. At about 6:20 p.m., an A-10 strafed the tank, and the resulting dust kicked up highlighted the vehicle's location for the orbiting Jaguars. The British pilots were then called in to drop 1,000 pound bombs on the tank, and one of the bombs reportedly scored a hit. The British bombs demonstrated the multinational nature of Deny Flight, boosting the apparent legitimacy of the operation, and deflating concerns that only the US—with no troops on the ground—was doing all of the bombing in Bosnia.

Proportionality

NATO's second airstrike also revealed the problems UN and NATO commanders had in agreeing to what represented a 'proportionate' response to Serb provocations. In General Rose's view: 'By using force in a proportionate way, and by not attacking the targets proposed by Adm. Leighton Smith, the route to a peaceful resolution of the war in Bosnia still lay open.' However, NATO commanders did not subscribe to General Rose's judgment on proportionality, and the frustration this issue caused among NATO airmen was evident in a comment later made by General Mike Ryan, who replaced General Ashy in September of 1994:

Proportionality is an awful word and I never want to hear it again....All of us in our own minds understand proportionality, but none of us would agree on what it

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51 NATO, Press Release (94)90; Wald; and Chambers.
52 Wald.
53 Ibid.; and Chambers.
54 Wald.
55 Ibid.
56 NATO, Press Release (94)90.
57 Ibid.; Wald; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997. There was some question as to whether the bombs actually hit the tank. See, for instance, Rose, Fighting, 177.
58 In some accounts of the attack, only the Jaguar contribution was mentioned; see for instance: Ripley, Air War Bosnia, 70; and 'Jags Are Back,' 34; and Rose, Fighting, 177.
59 Rose, Fighting, 180.
is when we come to a certain situation. If we do use it, then we ought to spell out very, very clearly what we mean by proportionality.\textsuperscript{60}

However, even if commanders in AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR had agreed upon a definition of proportionality, they were still bound to disagree over how to apply the concept, given the differences in the vulnerability of their forces and in their interpretations of their missions.

In part, problems with the word `proportionate' may have arisen from its connection to an important concept from laws of armed conflict; one which the airmen would have been especially familiar. According to Green, the principle of proportionality is one of the most basic concepts in the laws of armed conflict that, `prohibits military action in which the negative effects (such as collateral civilian casualties) clearly outweigh the military gain.'\textsuperscript{61} In applying this principle, much is left to `the discretion of the commander of the forces involved,' for he must judge whether the military advantage from the attack warrants the likely unintended effects or `incidental injuries' it might cause.\textsuperscript{62} In making this determination, the commander must consider the military gain `to the whole operation and not merely the particular attack contemplated.'\textsuperscript{63} Although the principle of proportionality guided targeting decisions in Bosnia, it was not the primary cause for disagreement between the UN and NATO commanders.

The term proportionate, as used to describe Deny Flight air attacks, had to do with responding to provocations by the warring factions with an amount of force commensurate with both the provocation and the desired objective, without escalating the level of violence.\textsuperscript{64} However, UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH were pursuing different objectives; and, more importantly, UNPROFOR's judgment of a proportionate response was dictated by its vulnerability—especially to Bosnian Serb reprisals.\textsuperscript{65} The scope for disagreement over the definition of `proportionate' can be illustrated by considering the following questions, first from the viewpoint of a UN commander, then from the perspective of a NATO commander: 1) Was the objective of the airstrike to get the BSA to return a stolen weapon, or was it to change Bosnian Serb behavior toward greater


\textsuperscript{61} Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 120, citing DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 611.

\textsuperscript{62} Green, 120.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 121.

\textsuperscript{64} Zoerb, 29/April/1997; and Hagman, 131-132, citing NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Draft, October 20, 1993, Annex D Rules of Engagement).
respect for the 'safe areas'? 2) Was the airstrike to be proportionate to today’s provocation, or should the provocation be taken as the cumulative weight of transgressions leading up to today’s decision to respond with airstrikes? 3) Which was more important, attaining the objective for the airstrike, or avoiding escalation?

The UN and NATO commanders had different objectives and priorities. AFSOUTH’s objective was to enforce the exclusion zone, and coerce the Bosnian Serbs into respecting the ‘safe areas.’ 66 Whenever an incident occurred that NATO officers believed merited a response, they would propose to the UN targets (selected from the target books using the target matrices) which were geographically near the provocation and could logically be linked to it. 67 The NATO officers preferred fixed targets, which could be safely attacked in nearly any weather and by any type of aircraft, not just planes capable of dropping precision guided munitions. 68 Thus, Serb military depots around Sarajevo, including the ammunition storage site near Pale, were attractive targets for NATO planners whenever there was a BSA provocation around Sarajevo. 69 Moreover, NATO airmen were relatively immune from retaliation, thus their commanders had less to fear from escalation, making it easier for NATO commanders to prioritize their objective of coercion above the desire to avoid escalation. Since May of 1994, UNPROFOR had been trying to shrug off responsibilities for the NATO-declared exclusion zones. 70 Enforcing the exclusion zones reduced UNPROFOR’s ability to fulfill its other responsibilities, which were closer to peacekeeping. 71 When pressed to cooperate with NATO, the UN preferred ‘smoking-gun’ type targets because they could be directly linked to self-defense, or protection of the ‘safe areas,’ and attacks against ‘smoking-guns’ were less likely to jeopardize the UN’s impartial status. 72

In determining UN views on proportionality, UNPROFOR’s vulnerability was more important than UN objectives for ordering airstrikes; thus, the Bosnian Serbs exercised a powerful vote in deciding what was, or was not, a proportionate response. 73

As General de Lapresle explained:

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65 De Lapresle, interview, 8/September/1998; Rose, Fighting, 160-161 and 180; Admiral Smith, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
66 Admiral Smith, interview; and Hagman, 198.
67 Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Hagman, 126 and 131-132, 182-183; Rose, 15; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
73 Zoerb, 29/April/1997; Ashy, interview by author.
My main concern, of course, and so was Michael Rose's, was to avoid, first of all, that countries who had sent their boys and girls in a peace mission would find themselves with body bags coming back to their capital after a sort of military and war action which was not the point [of the mission]; and the second... concern, was not to obtain a military victory, but to come to a ceasefire, [and] to have this ceasefire standing as long as possible in Croatia and in Bosnia. And so when we tried to combine this first objective of no UN lives lost, and hostages, and so on, and so on, and then trying to keep the arms as silent as possible, of course we were not very much enticed into having a strong and efficient use of NATO airpower. 74

General Rose echoed the sentiment: 'My primary responsibility was to the countries that had contributed peacekeeping troops to the mission and I could not allow them to become combatants, hostages or casualties in a war.'75 Through the dual-key mechanism, the UN commanders exercised control in decisions over what constituted a proportionate response. In making their decisions, the commanders in UNPROFOR were guided by their complementary concerns for force protection, and for accomplishing their mission.

**Attempts to Control Airstrikes**

At the end of September, NATO defense ministers intervened to give their commanders in AFSOUTH more control over airstrikes, but UNPROFOR's leaders resisted the move. The 'Operational Options' memo, approved by the NAC in August of 1993, stated that if commanders in AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR could not agree about airstrikes, then they were to refer the matter to higher military and political authorities. 76 But UNPROFOR had no higher military authorities. Therefore, disagreements in the divided UN-NATO military command system could only be reconciled by higher political authorities. When NATO defense ministers met for an informal conference in Seville at the end of September, US officials, led by Secretary of Defense William Perry, urged ending the UNPROFOR practice of issuing tactical warnings in advance of NATO air attacks.77 In addition, Perry advocated a process whereby once UNPROFOR requested an airstrike, NATO commanders would decide which target to hit, using a list of three or four pre-selected candidate targets that had been mutually agreed upon by UNPROFOR and NATO commanders.78 Because this was an informal meeting, no decisions were

74 De Lapresle, interview, 8/September/1998.
75 Rose, Fighting, 235-236.
76 MCM-KAD-084-93.
77 'Record of Discussions: Meeting SRSG, FC and Staff to Review Fixed Targets, and the Implications of NATO Defence Ministers' Meeting—Seville—30 September 1994,' c. 8 October 1994, File B4-2, BACS Collection; and Admiral Smith, interview.
78 Schulte, 'Former Yugoslavia,' 27-28; and Admiral Smith, interview.
taken, but Perry’s proposal was referred to Brussels and New York for formal
consideration. After leaving Seville, the American Defense Secretary went to visit
UNPROFOR’s leaders—Akashi, de Lapresle, and Rose—in Split, Croatia to discuss
airstrikes in Bosnia.79

Before Perry’s arrival at Split, and again after the meeting, UNPROFOR’s leaders
worked out the arguments against the Seville proposals and against more forceful
airstrikes. The UN Force Commander made clear his concern that a more robust use of
airpower would create unacceptable risks to UN personnel on the ground.80 Furthermore,
he questioned whether or not the defense ministers really intended to make the use of
NATO airpower a higher priority than the security of UN ground forces.81 Implicit in the
record of the discussions was the question of whether a few activist NATO states ought to
be recommending policies that might jeopardize the safety of peacekeepers from over
thirty troop contributing countries.82 The Force Commander believed a more forceful
approach in Bosnia would require a redeployment of UN peacekeepers that would, in
turn, change the nature of the tasks UNPROFOR could accomplish.83 The message from
the discussions was clear—unless UNPROFOR was given a new mandate by the Security
Council, it would not support the proposals for stiffer enforcement action.

In talks with Secretary Perry at Split in early October, the UNPROFOR leaders
described the vulnerabilities of their forces, their inability to enforce the exclusion zones,
and the importance of their humanitarian and peacekeeping mission.84 As a consequence
of UNPROFOR’s situation, the UN leaders explained, they could not afford to have
NATO doing the enforcing either.85 General Rose averred: ‘Any force used had to be
within the UN rules of engagement.’86 Since the UN rules stipulated force could only be
used in self-defense, General Rose’s claim virtually ruled out any use of airstrikes to
enforce the exclusion zones.87 The UNPROFOR leaders did not want NATO airstrikes,
and did not want to loosen their control over them.

79 ‘Record of Discussions: Meeting SRSG, FC and Staff;’ Schulte, ‘Former Yugoslavia,’ 27-28; and Rose,
Fighting, 182.
80 ‘Record of Discussions: Meeting SRSG, FC and Staff,’ 3.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Rose, Fighting, 182-183.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 183.
87 Despite such constraints, General Rose himself threatened the Bosnian government with airstrikes
against its forces in mid-August and again in September of 1994. Rose, Fighting, 163 and 184; and Facts
1994, 562 and 711. In his memoir, Rose erroneously claimed that, on the occasion of his threat in
With support from high officials in the UN’s department of peacekeeping, General de Lapresle managed to retain control over airstrikes. Following the meeting in Split, NATO and UN officials conducted talks in New York about implementing new procedures that would end warnings of pending strikes and give NATO a stronger voice in selecting the targets. Formal adoption of these suggestions first raised at Seville was announced in a late-October joint UN-NATO press statement which read, in part:

> While general warning may be given to an offending party, tactical warning of impending air strikes, in principle, will not. Under normal circumstances, several targets, where possible three or four, will be authorized for each air strike, which will be carried out by NATO in close coordination with UNPROFOR.

> “Dual-key” arrangements remain in effect, ensuring that decisions on targeting and execution will be taken jointly by UN and NATO military commanders. The principle of proportionality in response to a violation will continue to be respected, as will the need to avoid unacceptable casualties.

Though the agreement proscribed warnings, ‘in principle,’ it did little else to affect UN control over airstrikes. As General de Lapresle later described his view:

> Of course, they [NATO] wanted to be master of the choice of the target, and I could not accept that, because I knew, and they did not know, who was in the proximity and the vicinity of these targets—UNMOs, CIVPOLs, civil affairs guys, and so on.

It did not take long for NATO commanders to discover that nothing had changed; as Admiral Smith recounted:

> De Lapresle goes back to Zagreb; I call him up and I said: “Well, I guess what I’m looking at is ain’t nothing changed. You’re still going to give me one target, and I get to bomb it, and that’s about it?” He said: “That’s exactly correct.” He said: “My conscience is clear. I have gone back to New York; I have read the documents; I have gotten no new political guidance. My conscience is clear.”

Thus, the political intervention had failed to win NATO commanders greater control over airstrikes; the UN was still firmly in charge.

> After just two ‘airstrikes’ in the summer of 1994, UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH commanders deadlocked over whether and how to proceed with future strikes. The paralysis was a consequence of the commanders’ competing efforts to maintain their chances for both mission success (as they had interpreted their different missions) and

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September, Bosnian government forces were violating a September 1993 NATO ultimatum making them subject to NATO airstrikes. There was no such NATO ultimatum.

89 NATO, Press Release (94)103, 28 October 1994.
91 Admiral Smith, interview.
force protection. The UNPROFOR mission, once its commanders had abandoned attempts to enforce the ‘safe areas’ policy, was one of peacekeeping and support for humanitarian aid agencies. Coupled with its modest military capabilities, and its widely dispersed mode of deployment on the ground in Bosnia, UNPROFOR’s mission dictated that its commanders adhere to peacekeeping principles by acting only with the consent of the warring factions, with minimum use of force, and with impartiality. In light of their responsibilities the military commanders in UNPROFOR felt compelled to issue warnings to the targeted factions in Bosnia—invariably the Bosnian Serbs—prior to authorizing NATO air attacks. Conversely, the warnings endangered the lives of NATO airmen and weakened enforcement measures. So, commanders in AFSOUTH wanted some flexibility in targeting decisions, and an end to the warnings. Though the issue was formally reconciled in NATO’s favor, according to procedures proposed at Seville and thrashed out in New York, the UNPROFOR commanders in Zagreb and Sarajevo retained final control over air operations via the ‘dual-key’ arrangements. There were no more airstrikes related to enforcing either the ‘safe areas’ policy or the exclusion zones, until May of 1995 after new UN commanders replaced Generals Rose and de Lapresle.

6.2 UDBINA: MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT VERSUS FORCE PROTECTION

Subtle Bosnian Serb challenges to the no-fly zone in the summer of 1994 grew more blatant in the fall, prompting a NATO response and a serious split between UN soldiers and NATO airmen. NATO airmen were convinced of substantial support from Serbia for the summer buildup, and continued functioning, of the Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system.92 In mid-July, the US suspended humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo, after two C-141 transports sustained hits from small arms fire on consecutive days.93 A month later a US C-130 and a German C-160 cargo aircraft conducted the last air-drops of Operation Provide Promise, by parachuting supplies to the isolated Muslim enclave of Bihac.94 Though the needs of that enclave and others remained acute, the increasing Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat made further air-drops in Bosnia too dangerous.95 In a mid-September letter to General Mladic, General Rose warned him to stop menacing NATO aircraft, stating:

92 Zoerb, 29/April/1997, Military Official U; and Senate, Briefing on F-16 Shootdown, 13 July 1995, 33.
93 Snyder and Harrington, 175.
94 Ibid., 176.
I am deeply concerned about actions directed against NATO aircraft flying in Bosnia Hercegovina airspace. Specifically, I refer to the MANPAD [shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles] missile firing on 8 September and to repeated radar activity over Prijedor/Bihac areas which include activation of target tracking radar modes. These activities are perceived to be acts of aggression, and I feel compelled to warn you of NATO's prerogative for response.

NATO aircraft, having the inherent right of self-defence, can immediately and decisively exercise that right if challenged by your threat missile systems. This response is totally a NATO decision and does not require UN coordination.

This implied NATO aircraft could shoot in response to 'hostile intent' from the Bosnian Serbs, and that the UN had no control over such actions. Both implications were false.

In addition to the growing surface-to-air threat, by November the Serbs began flouting the no-fly zone: flying fixed wing jets on bombing missions inside Bosnia to support a BSA counteroffensive around Bihac. NATO commanders were losing the initiative in the airspace over Bosnia, and they were clearly failing in their responsibilities to enforce the no-fly zone. However, they could do little to respond to these Bosnian Serb challenges without additional authority from New York and Brussels, and consent from UNPROFOR's leaders for enforcement measures.

The Serbs used the sanctuary of Croatian airspace and their air defense network, to good advantage, making it nearly impossible for NATO aircraft to engage Serb planes violating the no-fly zone. After an initially successful Bosnian Muslim ground offensive launched from within the 'safe area' of Bihac in October, Croatian Serbs joined the BSA and the forces of rebel Muslim leader Fikret Abdulic in a counteroffensive that quickly reversed the government forces' gains. Serb pilots flew supporting missions from Udbina airfield in Serb-controlled eastern Croatia. So long as they remained in Croatian airspace, Serb aircraft could not be engaged by NATO pilots, whose authority to enforce the no-fly zone was limited to Bosnia. By monitoring NATO combat air patrols via the Serbian air defense network, the Udbina based aircraft could time their flights into Bosnia whenever NATO aircraft were refueling or otherwise not in a position to respond. Udbina was only a few minutes flying time away from Bihac. Thus, it was fairly easy for the Serb pilots to make attacks into Bosnia and land before NATO aircraft could engage them. NATO commanders in the region could have mounted more no-fly zone patrols in

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96 Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Sarajevo, TLS (photocopy), to General Ratko Mladic, Han Pijesak, 18 September 1994, BACS Collection.
97 As is discussed in the next section.
98 Warnes, 'The Battle for Bihac,' 40-41; Facts 1994, 874-875; and Ryan, interview.
100 Wald; Ryan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; and Senate, Hearing on Shootdown, 32-3 and 52.
order to narrow the window of opportunity for the Serb violations, but that would have required more aircraft, aircrews, and other resources. More importantly, patrols near Bihac would put NATO aircraft in the midst of the Serbs' most lethal SAM coverage, which was concentrated in northwest Bosnia and eastern Croatia. In addition to the added costs and risks, any subsequent violation would have been all the more damaging to NATO's credibility. Until NATO commanders obtained authority to attack aircraft on the ground in Croatia, there was little they could do to stop the violations.

Udbina: November 1994

NATO commanders in the southern region, including the recently arrived commander of AIRSOUTH, Lieutenant General Mike Ryan, wanted to stop the no-fly zone violations, and they examined options for disabling Serb air activity from Udbina. Ryan, who had taken over from General Ashy in September, was also a fighter pilot from the Vietnam era who had flown 100 missions over North Vietnam. His father, General John D. Ryan, commanded all Air Force units in the Pacific during the time that his son Mike flew in Vietnam, and the senior Ryan had gone on to become chief of staff of the US Air Force. As discussed in Chapter 2, General John Ryan was the man whose duty it had been to discipline General John Lavelle for his actions related to the unauthorized bombings against North Vietnamese air defense targets in late 1971 and early 1972. General Mike Ryan arrived in Naples, having come from the Pentagon where he was an assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, the new AIRSOUTH commander would have been familiar not only with the political mood in Washington, where he had just served, but also particularly sensitive to political controls, such as ROE, that might interfere with a commander's responsibility to protect his forces.

On Friday, 18 November 1994, Serb jets from Udbina attacked the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps headquarters near Bihac using cluster bombs and napalm. Then on Saturday, a Serb aircraft making an attack on an ammunition factory crashed into an apartment building in Cazin, ten miles north of Bihac. Papers found amongst the dead

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101 Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
102 Admiral Smith, interview; Ryan, interview; Chambers; Zoerb, 30/April/1997; and Brigadier General David A. Sawyer, USAF, Deputy Director, Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Vicenza, Italy, interview by Major Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayne Thompson, 11 October 1995, Vicenza, Italy, BACS Collection.
103 See Chapter 2, section 2.2, ROE discussion.
104 UN, Blue Helmets, 535.
105 Warnes, 41; and Ryan, interview.
pilot's possessions established his Serb identity.\textsuperscript{106} With support from the Croatian government, the UN Security Council agreed that day to authorize a NATO air attack against Udbina.\textsuperscript{107} The NAC met on Sunday to issue a decision giving Admiral Smith permission to act on the new Security Council authority, provided he did so in close coordination with UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{108} Despite political pressures to strike Udbina, the UNPROFOR commander refused to turn his key that morning until he was given the details of the planned attack.\textsuperscript{109} In addition to concerns over NATO targeting, there was a question within the UNPROFOR chain of command as to whether General de Lapresle needed Mr. Akashi, who was in Frankfurt en route back to Zagreb, to authorize the attack.\textsuperscript{110} The scheduled time of attack was slipped back several times while the UN commanders wrestled with these issues and took decisions about whether or not to evacuate potential hostages from around Udbina.\textsuperscript{111} Shortly after noon, Mr. Akashi authorized the attack, but with NATO aircraft taxiing for takeoff at bases throughout Italy, the mission was scrubbed at the last minute.\textsuperscript{112} High cloud cover over Udbina was the reported reason for canceling the mission that day.\textsuperscript{113} However, the strike against Udbina may have been slipped a day because of the delays induced by the UN, or because of the need for NATO to change targets or aircraft ordnance loads.\textsuperscript{114}

**Targeting Udbina**

Concerned about retaliation against UN forces and civilian aid workers in the region, General de Lapresle wanted to minimize the chances of causing Serb casualties and he insisted that only the runway at Udbina could be struck.\textsuperscript{115} As Admiral Smith later recounted:

> We had looked at Udbina, and I had wanted to take out everything. I wanted to make a parking lot out of that place. I wanted to take out all of the buildings. I

\textsuperscript{106} Warnes, 41; and Ryan, interview.
\textsuperscript{107} S/RES/958.
\textsuperscript{109} Military Official U.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.; and Admiral Smith, interview.
\textsuperscript{111} Military Official U.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} ‘Jags Are Back,’ 34; and Facts, 1994, 874.
\textsuperscript{114} De Lapresle, interview, 13/January/1998; and Rose, Fighting, 201. Both UN generals indicated targeting decisions made on 20 November caused the one-day slip. Any changes in targets at that point would have necessitated re-planning, and possibly reconfiguring the ordnance loads on the jets. The following discussion, however, is not based on the supposition that the delay was for any reason other than the one given—high cloud coverage over the target.
\textsuperscript{115} De Lapresle, interview, 13/January/1998; and Admiral Smith, interview.
didn't want anything left standing. De Lapresle said: “No.” He would only approve hitting the runway, because he didn’t want to kill anybody.\textsuperscript{116}

For General de Lapresle, destroying the buildings, maintenance facilities, and aircraft at Udbina, as Admiral Smith desired, would have been counterproductive to both UNPROFOR’s mission and the security of the UN’s peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{117}

Admiral Smith agreed to forego attacks against the aircraft, buildings, and maintenance facilities, but he would not compromise on the need to aggressively suppress Serb air defenses at Udbina.\textsuperscript{118} As General Ryan later explained, the NATO commanders took the position that: ‘We’re not going to tie the hands of the force—to have them shoot at us first before we go after them…. So the issue was force protection versus the political fallout of having collateral damage.’\textsuperscript{119} Admiral Smith explained to General de Lapresle the need to attack certain radar guided weapon systems, stating: ‘We don’t hit that, [then] we don’t fly.’\textsuperscript{120} General Rose was opposed to the attack on Udbina because of concerns it would lead to Serb reprisals in nearby Bosnia; in the end, though, the decision on how to advise the UN’s political leaders rested with General de Lapresle.\textsuperscript{121} As the UNPROFOR commander later recalled:

\begin{quote}
This, I must say, was a very difficult decision—to give the green light for an airstrike when you know you will have some CIVPOL, or some UNMOs, or some civil affairs people who will be held [as] hostages. And the first thing you have to do is give the go-ahead order, and then, second, immediately [make] contact with the Serbs…in order to get [back] those guys who are hostages.\textsuperscript{122}
\end{quote}

Despite his concerns, once General de Lapresle was convinced preemptive SEAD attacks were essential for protecting NATO airmen, he supported the demands of the AFSOUTH commanders.\textsuperscript{123} Ultimately, NATO was allowed to execute a tactically sound attack, which included preemptively launching high-speed, anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) at Serb air defense systems.\textsuperscript{124}

On Monday, 21 November, 39 strike aircraft attacked the runway and taxiways at Udbina, and Dutch, American, British, and French aircraft took part in the raid.\textsuperscript{125} The Serbs responded predictably with fresh provocations in Bosnia and by taking hostages in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116] Admiral Smith, interview.
\item[119] Ryan, interview.
\item[120] Admiral Smith, interview.
\item[121] De Lapresle, interview, 13/January/1998; and Rose, \textit{Fighting}, 200-203.
\item[123] Admiral Smith, transcript of press conference, 22 November 1994; and Admiral Smith, interview.
\item[124] Ryan, interview.
\end{footnotes}
Croatia. Though publicly touted as a success, behind the scenes some high-level political authorities in Washington and Brussels were upset that NATO commanders—especially Admiral Smith—had not ordered bombing against more lucrative targets at Udbina. According to one high-ranking NATO official, the decision not to hit aircraft was a political one, and Admiral Smith had gone beyond the bounds of his military authority by making the decision to agree with General de Lapresle without first consulting Brussels. Responding to a reporter’s question at a press conference the day after the attack, Admiral Smith defended the UN rationale for limiting the attack, and explained his own role as the supporting commander:

General de Lapresle and I have had many conversations on this subject. He, and the other members of the United Nations Protection Force command structure with whom I talk, believe that their principle concern is the safety of their forces and their mission, being peacekeeping. So, response is going to be, in their view, proportional to the offence and measured, rather than what some of us might consider more militarily effective. General de Lapresle spoke with me several times before this strike and he specifically asked that we limit our strike to the runways, and I later added the taxiways, and the purpose was to ensure to the best that we could, that we would minimize the number of people on the ground that were injured as a result of this strike, and minimize collateral damage (emphasis added).

Clearly, negative objectives drove the targeting at Udbina. Despite efforts to limit collateral damage and Serb casualties, Serb forces in Croatia threatened retaliation and took UN peacekeepers hostage—including two Czech soldiers stationed as observers near Udbina. The day after the Udbina raid, Serb air defenses inside Bosnia fired the first radar-guided missiles at NATO jets patrolling the no-fly zone—a subject taken up in the next section.

Interpreting the Results

Though not unrelated to the BSA ground offensive against Bihac, the attack on Udbina was designed primarily to stop violations of the UN declared no-fly zone over Bosnia, rather than to affect the BSA. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to criticize the raid for failing to deter the Serb attack on Bihac, as some observers have done. The

126 NATO Official C; Joulwan, interview; and Admiral Smith, interview.
127 NATO Official C.
130 Admiral Smith, interview; Ryan, interview; Zoerb, 30/April/1997; and Rose, Fighting, 201-202.
131 For instance, see Hagman, 147. In his analysis, Hagman correctly notes the strike had ‘no effect on the Serb encirclement of Bihac,’ but, incorrectly concludes that was the raid’s purpose, saying he found ‘no indication that enforcement of the “no-fly zone” was the primary aim.’ My research indicates that because of no-fly zone violations by aircraft flying form Udbina, planners in AFSOUTH began looking at options
bompiring of Udbina came at political insistence, with urging from AF SOUTH officers, and against the desires of UNPROFOR. NATO commanders insisted on the attack and wanted to destroy much more at Udbina than they did, but they compromised mission accomplishment in deference to the UNPROFOR commanders' concerns for the safety of their soldiers. Some officials may have hoped the raid would deter the Serb assault on Bihac; but if they did, then UNPROFOR's efforts to limit attacks to the runway probably undermined that objective. UNPROFOR's open reluctance to risk casualties, even amongst Serb military personnel at Udbina, could only enfeeble any deterrent signal the attack might have conveyed. A NATO official later described the dilemma in using force for deterrent effect in Bosnia: Deterrence often depends on a credible threat to use a great deal of force, while peacekeeping operations are based on a minimum use of force. And, as Sabin has noted, in peace support operations, 'there is a...risk that a perceived paralysis of command could lead to a failure of deterrence and could encourage locals to challenge the intervening forces with impunity.' That pretty well describes what happened at Bihac, and in the no-fly zone over Bosnia, after the Udbina raid.

The Udbina attack forced both General de Lapresle and Admiral Smith to make tradeoffs between accomplishing their missions and protecting their forces. As one might expect in an intervention where vital national interests were not engaged, mission accomplishment came in second behind force protection. Broadly speaking, the UN and NATO commanders were supposed to be cooperating to achieve the same overall goal. However, practically speaking, the disparate capabilities and vulnerabilities of their forces, and the discordant political voices telling the commanders what to do, had driven them to a division of labor—with the UN doing peacekeeping, and NATO doing the enforcing. Just as Admiral Smith compromised his mission by targeting only the runways and taxiways, the UNPROFOR commander accepted the inevitable disruptions to his peacekeeping mission in Croatia. However, both commanders stood firm when it came to the issues most likely to affect the safety of their forces; General de Lapresle refused to countenance attacks most likely to give the Serbs cause for retaliation, while Admiral Smith demanded permission for preemptive attacks against air defenses. That

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for attacking Udbina around mid-1994, before the Bosnian government offensive from Bihac and the ensuing Bosnian Serb counter-offensive. Zoerb, 30/April/1997; and Chambers.

132 De Lapresle, interview, 8/September/1998; Rose, *Fighting*, 169 and 200-202; Ryan, interview; and Wald.

133 Charles Skinner, Political-Economic Advisor to USNATO, interview by author, 28 April 1997, Brussels, notes and tape recording, author's personal collection.

134 Sabin, 'Counter Air in Peace Support,' 165.
both commanders resisted compromising on issues most likely to put their forces in danger, while accepting a short-term degradation in their respective missions, also indicated they not only took seriously their own responsibilities for protecting their people, but they also respected and honored, as best they could, each other's needs in this regard. Admiral Smith's decision to forgo more lucrative targets at Udbina angered some of his superiors, leading General de Lapresle to note that: 'Leighton Smith was rather alone in his clear understanding on what was [on] my mind and what was going on in the field.' General de Lapresle reciprocated. After Admiral Smith convinced the UNPROFOR commander of the need for preemptive SEAD, Admiral Smith recalled: 'UN New York tried to disapprove the integrated air defense target, and de Lapresle said: "No. Admiral Smith is exactly correct. He cannot go in there without taking those out first".' In peace support operations, where vital interests are not at stake, a commander might expect to eventually recover from setbacks to the mission, but he cannot recoup a lost life. Thus, when tradeoffs must be made between force protection and mission accomplishment in these types of intervention, protecting people will likely trump mission accomplishment.

6.3 'RETROSPECTIVE SEAD' AND THE GROWING UN-NATO RIFT: NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1994

The airstrikes at Udbina began an eventful week for AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR that highlighted the growing concerns for force protection in NATO. For over eighteen months, NATO aircraft had flown combat air patrols, reconnaissance flights, and practice air support missions within range of Serb radar-missile defenses without being fired upon. However, on Tuesday, the day after the Udbina airfield attack, a Serb surface-to-air missile site at Otoka in northwestern Bosnia fired two radar-guided SA-2 missiles at a pair of British Sea Harriers patrolling the no-fly zone. Though the jets escaped unharmed, the Serb firing of radar-guided missiles signaled a serious new challenge to NATO. Since the Serbs possessed more modern, more capable, and mobile radar-
guided missiles, such as the SA-6, NATO airmen had to assume that these too might be used against them. In response to this challenge, General Ryan ordered the deputy director of the CAOC, Brigadier General Dave Sawyer to locate the exact position of the offending SAM site and to set in motion plans to attack it. Meanwhile General Ryan worked on getting the UN and NATO keys turned for an airstrike against the site. Up until this point, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) was not an authorized mission for Deny Flight operations, except as a defensive element in support of actual CAS or airstrike missions. By the autumn of 1994, the growing surface-to-air threat over Bosnia had generated efforts at NATO headquarters to change this, even before the missile firings from Otoka. Because it was already under active consideration in Brussels, AFSOUTH was able to get NAC approval the next day, 23 November, to conduct what became known as ‘retrospective SEAD.’

While the Deny Flight rules of engagement had always permitted NATO airmen to use force in self defense, nearly all NATO aircraft flying over Bosnia were unsuited to respond to missile firings. Thus, when threatened, a NATO aircrew would take evasive action and leave the area covered by the missile system. Once away from the threat, NATO forces were prohibited by the ROE from going back and attacking it. Such operating procedures ceded the initiative to the Serb missile crews, who were tied in to a larger air defense network and could pick on NATO aircraft that were least likely to be able to shoot back. Within NATO, the British and French were reluctant to approve air defense suppression in response to the Serb practice of menacing of NATO aircraft with target tracking radar. So long as the Serbs were not firing missiles, NATO ministers from some of the troop contributing nations remained unwilling to authorize a new mission that could lead to an escalating use of force in Bosnia. Once the Serbs began seeking missiles. Moreover, radar-guided missiles such as the SA-2 and SA-3 carried a much larger warhead, and they could engage aircraft at any altitude (recall that an early version of the SA-2 shot down Gary Powers in a high-flying U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960).

Sawyer.

Ibid.


Ryan, interview; and Chambers.

Ryan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; and Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 32-33 and 52.

A variety of radar types are used in most radar-guided SAM systems. The different radar perform different functions, such as early warning, surveillance, target acquisition, and target tracking. Once a target tracking radar is locked onto an aircraft and the aircraft is in range of the missile site, the missile crew can shoot at the aircraft.
firing radar-guided missiles, NATO commanders in the region wanted to take out the entire Serb integrated air defense system.\textsuperscript{151} Barring that, they pushed to be able to go back ‘retrospectively’ with an appropriately equipped force and eliminate an offending missile site.\textsuperscript{152} For the senior commanders in NATO’s southern region, it was a matter of self-defense. On 23 November, the NAC authorized ‘retrospective SEAD,’ but stipulated that any response ought to be proportional, without collateral damage, and subject to the ‘dual-key’ arrangements with the UN.\textsuperscript{153}

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**Figure 6.1** - Outline of events around the time of the Udbina airstrike.

As NATO aircraft approached Otoka on Wednesday morning, several Serb SAM sites in northwestern Bosnia threatened the strike package and fired missiles, thus fueling the escalating spiral of threats and uses of force from both sides. The NATO jets responded by firing high-speed, anti-radiation missiles at the Serb SAM batteries, including one which happened to be inside Croatia, ten miles north of Otoka.\textsuperscript{154} Unable to complete the planned destruction of the Otoka site, because of the challenge from the other SAM sites, NATO commanders launched another strike package that afternoon to hit Otoka.\textsuperscript{155} In retaliation, the Bosnian Serbs threatened war against UNPROFOR, and

\textsuperscript{151} Admiral Smith, interview; Zoerb, 29/April/1997.

\textsuperscript{152} Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.

\textsuperscript{153} NAMILCOM, ‘Implementation of Council Decision,’ Message to SHAPE, 230800 Nov 94.

\textsuperscript{154} Warnes, 42.

took hundreds of peacekeepers hostage; three were reportedly made to lie on the runway at Banja Luka.\textsuperscript{156} On Thursday, the Bosnian Serbs, operating from a previously undetected site near Danji Vakuf in central Bosnia, fired a radar-guided SAM at two British F-3 Tornado aircraft on a routine no-fly zone patrol.\textsuperscript{157} Meanwhile the ground offensive against Bihac continued with the Bosnian Serb forces pushing up from south of the enclave, overrunning the point at which they had promised UNPROFOR they would stop.\textsuperscript{158} In Brussels, the NAC met and declared, \textit{inter alia}, its willingness to activate the heavy weapons exclusion zone which it had provisionally declared seven months earlier when it created the exclusion zone at Gorazde.\textsuperscript{159} However, rather than unilaterally declaring a new heavy weapons free zone at Bihac via an ultimatum, as it had with Gorazde, the Council made the activation of the new zone contingent on UNPROFOR agreement.\textsuperscript{160} UNPROFOR found the task of policing the existing exclusion zones burdensome, and declined the opportunity to create yet another.\textsuperscript{161}

UNPROFOR’s top military commanders opposed NATO airstrikes, and while they wanted air support to protect UN peacekeepers around Bihac, they refused to authorize NATO air operations needed to reduce the surface-to-air threat in northwestern Bosnia.\textsuperscript{162} In a meeting on 25 November, the commander of UNPROFOR made it clear he viewed airstrikes as being fundamentally incompatible with his peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{163} The NATO officer sent to the meeting reported to General Ryan and Admiral Smith that so long as General de Lapresle commanded UNPROFOR, there was little hope the UN would turn its key for airstrikes.\textsuperscript{164} That night, however, when peacekeepers in the Bihac area came under fire, General Rose personally called the CAOC for air support.\textsuperscript{165} The increased SAM threat around Bihac precluded NATO commanders from sending a pair of fighters, which were already in the no-fly zone, in response to the request; a larger package of aircraft capable of protecting itself against Serb air defenses

\begin{footnotes}
\item[156] Warnes, 42; and Facts 1994, 889.
\item[157] Sawyer.
\item[158] Military Official U.
\item[159] NATO Press Release (94)114, 24 November 1994.
\item[160] Ibid.
\item[162] Facts 1994, 889.
\item[164] Joersz, message to CINCSOUTH. General de Lapresle later confirmed this was an accurate reading of his position. De Lapresle, interview, 8/September/1998.
\item[165] Rose, interview; and Sawyer. In his memoir, General Rose placed this event on 24 rather than 25 November. He also implied the claim he made about his forces being under fire may have been a ruse to
\end{footnotes}
needed to be assembled. Because the peacekeepers in Bihac lacked forward air controllers, NATO and UN officers had had to work out a scheme whereby an ersatz forward air controller would clear NATO aircraft to attack Bosnian Serb forces within an improvised grid. A couple of hours later when the requisite force was assembled, the situation had quieted and General Rose did not have a specific target for NATO to strike. However, he still wanted NATO aircraft to fly into northwestern Bosnia. NATO airmen demurred; they would put their forces at risk to fulfill a specific mission, but not, in this particular case, for air presence.

Some UN officials were wary of 'retrospective SEAD,' because they suspected that NATO airmen were more interested in retribution than self defense. Others accepted NATO's need for force protection, but still believed the new air operations against the Serbs created a cycle of escalation that was detrimental to UNPROFOR's mission and the safety of its peacekeepers. The Serbs again fired a SAM at a pair of F-16s at the end of the week; however, on Saturday, 26 November, General Ryan was thwarted in his efforts to send a heavily escorted reconnaissance package into northwestern Bosnia to pinpoint a SAM site that had fired at NATO aircraft. As the force marshaled over the Adriatic, high-level French intervention through NATO headquarters forced General Ryan to recall the reconnaissance package. With some 250 UNPROFOR hostages, Britain and France, as well as the UN leadership in the former Yugoslavia, were uneasy about the escalating use of force in Bosnia. Moreover, some

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166 Sawyer.
167 Zoerb, 27/May/1998. This type of CAS is known as 'procedural control' and it is inherently riskier than 'close control' CAS, in terms of collateral damage and danger of friendly fire, because the forward air controller cannot see the targets, the aircraft, or the friendly forces that might be near the target area.
168 Sawyer. Jane Sharp, citing a newspaper article by E. Vulliamy, claimed that: 'CIA intercepts of SAS communications later revealed, however, that as NATO planes took off from Aviano in Southern Italy, Rose (who had recently learned that Belgrade had supplied the Bosnian Serbs with new SAM anti-aircraft missiles) was ordering his SAS spotters in the field not to identify any targets.' Jane Sharp, Honest Broker, 43. Whether or not the report is true, it gives an indication of the intensity of the split between AFSOUTH and UNPROFOR in late November of 1994.
169 Admiral Smith, interview; and Sawyer.
170 Admiral Smith, interview; and Sawyer.
173 Sawyer; and Ryan, interview.
174 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 327; and NATO Official C.
175 Military Official U; Ryan, interview. General Ryan and others were less specific about the origins of the order to recall the package.
ambassadors believed the AFSOUTH commanders were baiting the Serb air defenses, and intense discussions over ROE and hostile intent raged in Brussels. The recriminations over the week of activities around Bihac were so intense that Lord Owen later described this point in time as "the nadir in UN-NATO and US-EU relations."

**NATO and UN Split Over Airpower: December 1994**

By early December, while NATO formalized new rules for protecting its aircraft in the no-fly zone, UNPROFOR pressed NATO to minimize its flights over Bosnia. Unable to take actions necessary for protecting NATO airmen, General Ryan and Admiral Smith briefly shifted the no-fly zone patrols to the relative safety of the airspace over the Adriatic. The move made the patrols safer, but virtually ineffective. When NATO aircraft returned to the skies over Bosnia, on 5 December, they were well escorted by SEAD aircraft. In an effort to win the release of UNPROFOR hostages and ease Bosnian Serb concerns about NATO airpower, the UNPROFOR commander broached the subject of reducing NATO air operations over Bosnia with his NATO counterpart, CINCSOUTH. Admiral Smith responded to the request by acknowledging his continued support for the UN, but emphasized repeatedly that, even if he were inclined to reduce NATO air activity, it would require a political decision which he was not empowered to take on his own. On 8 December, the day of Admiral Smith's reply, the NAC agreed to change the rules of engagement for SEAD by authorizing it as a stand-alone mission (i.e., no longer limited to the support of CAS or airstrike missions); this further codified the Council's decision on 'retrospective SEAD' from 23 November.

Two days later, UNPROFOR secured the release of the remaining hostages taken during

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180 Sawyer; Homburg, interview by author; and Ripley, 'Silence of the SAMS,' 25. Ripley claimed the move out of Bosnian airspace was requested by UNPROFOR in order to facilitate peace talks. It seems likely that visits by high level diplomats to Sarajevo on 4 December may have prevented the resumption of flights over Bosnia before that date. However, in my research for this study (including the sources cited here) I found that the reason for the pull back to the air space over the Adriatic was because NATO could not defend itself adequately.
181 General Bertrand de Lapesle, Zagreb, TLS (photocopy), to Admiral Leighton Smith, Naples, 7 December 1994, File B1a, BACS Collection.
182 Admiral Leighton Smith, Naples, TLS (photocopy), to General Bertrand de Lapesle, Zagreb, 8 December 1994, File B1a, BACS Collection.
183 'Operation Deliberate Force Factual Review,' 2-1.
the week following the Udbina airstrike. That same day, 10 December, in a letter to the Bosnian Serb President, Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Akashi explained that NATO operated only in support of the UN mission, and that the alliance had four ‘primary missions in the airspace over Bosnia:’ no-fly zone enforcement, CAS for UNPROFOR, enforcement of the heavy weapons exclusion zones around the ‘safe areas,’ and deterrence of armed attacks against the safe areas. Mr. Akashi tried to assuage Serb fears of NATO airpower by stating:

Except for self-defense, NATO aircraft will not conduct air-to-ground operations without advance authorization from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. NATO will not use force except in pursuit of these missions, or in self-defense when aircraft are directly threatened by anti-aircraft fire, surface-to-air missiles, locking on of anti-aircraft weapon tracking radars, or attack by aircraft. No automatic firing of missiles will occur. If the armed forces in conflict respect the terms of Security Council resolutions and the North Atlantic Council decisions of 9 February 1994 and 22 April 1994, do not attack UNPROFOR, and do not threaten NATO aircraft, they will have nothing to fear from NATO.

Mr. Akashi’s letter sent mixed signals, for it implied NATO aircrew might act if merely threatened but not fired upon, while at the same time stating that, ‘no automatic firing of missiles will occur.’ In fact, NATO ROE did not allow aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone, or performing other routine missions, such as reconnaissance or CAS training, to use force in response to ‘hostile intent,’ such as lock-ons by Serb target tracking radar. That was why the heavy escorts were needed, so that NATO airmen could shoot back right away in response to a hostile act. The NAC decision of 8 December 1994 merely recognized the need for stand-alone SEAD missions in response to hostile acts against UN or NATO aircraft. Even with this new authorization, NATO commanders needed dual-key approval to conduct strikes against offending surface-to-air weapon sites. The Serbs would have to fire first, then NATO commanders in AFSOUTH would have to coordinate with UNPROFOR over a ‘proportional’ response.

UNPROFOR-AFSOUTH agreement on proportionality was most unlikely for SEAD because, unlike airstrikes, SEAD had nothing to do with the UN commanders’ responsibilities, and everything to do with the responsibilities of NATO commanders. From General Ryan’s perspective, the debates on proportionality reached the point of absurdity over SEAD: ‘Proportionality by some said that if they shoot at you with a SAM

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185 Note that the first and third missions are not consent based peacekeeping activities. Yasushi Akashi, Zagreb, TLS (photocopy), to Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Pale, 10 December 1994, BACS Collection.
186 Ibid.
missile and they miss, then you can shoot a missile back, but you have to miss them!"\textsuperscript{188}

In contrast to those urging a minimum use of force, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recently published new 'Standing Rules of Engagement' (SROE), which included guidelines on proportionality for the use of force in self-defense:

\textit{Proportionality.} The force used must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of US forces (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{189}

Although General Ryan was part of an alliance operation, that did not free him from following the new ROE guidance. Page one of the SROE contained a notice that forces under multinational control would remain so, 'only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and with rules for individual self-defense contained in this document.'\textsuperscript{190} However, even after NATO ROE changed to reflect a more robust approach to dealing with the Bosnian Serb SAM threat, NATO commanders could not make the UN accept the US view of proportionality. Unlike enforcement of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, UNPROFOR had no responsibility to enforce the no-fly zone, or to do anything else in the airspace over Bosnia. Moreover, its forces were not threatened by SAM firings. Conversely, freedom from the SAM threat was the \textit{sine qua non} for NATO operations.

Suppressing Bosnian Serb air defenses was an issue of self-defense for the commanders in AFSOUTH, and they could not tolerate 'dual-key' controls over their aircrews' right to self-defense. The 'dual-key' concept was embedded in the Security Council resolutions and supporting NATO decisions that authorized the use of airpower in Bosnia. It reflected the ground commanders' need to have control over air actions affecting the security of ground forces. Although the term 'dual-key' was new for air operations, the same fundamental concept was at work in close air support, i.e., the ground commander ultimately controlled the process for designating targets and approving attacks. However, two aspects of this 'dual-key' principle were new in Bosnia. First, it applied to airstrikes, which in combat scenarios would normally fall under the

\textsuperscript{187} Gamble, The NAC decision of 8 December 1994 allowed stand-alone SEAD missions in response to hostile acts against UN or NATO aircraft.

\textsuperscript{188} Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.


\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., A-1.
purview of the air component commander. Second, and more importantly, the rationale
for the ‘dual-key’ stemmed from the ground commanders’ responsibilities for force
protection and mission success. In a combat scenario, these responsibilities would
normally be complementary, and airpower would support both the security of the ground
forces and the accomplishment of a common mission. In Bosnia, however, when
AFSOUTH commanders used airpower for enforcement, they endangered both
UNPROFOR’s forces, and its primary mission. UNPROFOR commanders needed the
‘dual-key’ mechanism to fulfill their command responsibilities. However, when the
Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat increased, the ‘dual-key’ control over SEAD strikes
interfered with the airmen’s right to self-defense.

Nearly every NATO aircraft operating over Bosnia was incapable of an immediate
riposte in self-defense to SAM firings. Even multi-role aircraft, suitable for air-to-air and
air-to-ground missions, were incapable of effectively responding to having a missile fired
at them. Unlike certain UN soldiers who had armored vehicles, which were sufficiently
well protected to drive through Serb road blocks, the NATO airmen had to depend
primarily on avoiding fire, rather than withstanding it, for their survival. An aircraft
which had just dodged a missile would not be well positioned to return fire against the
offending site. Therefore, NATO air forces needed specialized SEAD aircraft to cope
with the Bosnian Serb SAM threat. These specialized aircraft were scarce resources, and
were generally not suitable for other missions, such as close air support, or enforcing the
no-fly zone. Moreover, the Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system allowed them to
launch missiles with very little, if any, warning to the aircrews being fired upon. This
tactic greatly reduced the time SEAD aircraft would have for responding to a threat, and
this would, in turn, degrade the protection afforded by SEAD escort.

Commanders in AFSOUTH were responsible for missions to enforce Security
Council resolutions and NATO decisions, and, in practice, these were directed almost
exclusively against the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, the Bosnian Serbs were most unlikely

191 Under US doctrine, the ground commander and the air commander work for a common superior, the
Joint Task Force commander. In Bosnia, there was no equivalent overall commander, no unity of
command, and no unity of purpose guided by a common objective. See Admiral Leighton Smith’s
192 The ‘Block-50’ variant of the F-16C was somewhat of an exception to this generalization; however,
these aircraft were just being fielded, and were not readily available in Europe. ‘SEAD Role for F-16
Comes Closer.’
193 Again, certain fighters adapted for SEAD missions are rare exceptions, and even these generally have to
be fitted with weapons for a particular mission, rather than being able to go out equally well prepared to
perform SEAD and another mission. Given their scarcity, and the high demand for them, commanders
could not expect to employ them in such an inefficient way for very long.
to consent to having NATO aircraft overhead the parts of Bosnia where enforcement might be needed. This situation left NATO with five possible courses of action: 1) conduct a SEAD campaign to destroy the Bosnian Serb air defenses, 2) make forceful responses through ‘retrospective SEAD’ to induce self-restraint from the Bosnian Serbs, 3) provide SEAD escorts for missions over Bosnia, 4) avoid the Bosnian Serb air defenses, 5) ignore the threat and continue to operate over Bosnia. This last option would have been a gross dereliction of duty by NATO commanders. Moreover, the US SROE, clearly and repeatedly stated: ‘A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend that commander’s unit and other US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.’ The first option—conducting a SEAD campaign—was too extreme for UN authorities. The second option—conducting ‘retrospective SEAD’—was permitted on one occasion, then blocked by UN commanders, mainly because of the vulnerability of UN forces. The UN commanders did not like the third option—heavy SEAD escort over Bosnia—because it meant that NATO aircraft could only fly over Bosnia during brief periods when the specialized SEAD aircraft were available, thus greatly reducing the UN’s ability to call on close air support. Moreover, these escorted missions were indistinguishable, in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, from the large packages of aircraft used for airstrikes. The more threatened the Serbs felt, the more they used their air defense system. The more they used their air defense system, the more NATO felt the need to actually attack the air defense. So, heavily escorted packages tended to feed the cycle of escalating force. The final option—avoiding Bosnian Serb air defenses—equated to abandoning NATO’s responsibilities over Bosnia, in order to secure force protection. There were no good options that would permit both the UN commanders and the NATO commanders to accomplish their disparate missions within the bounds of acceptable risks to their forces.

Responsibilities for different missions, and for the protection of different forces, led to a temporary end in UN and NATO cooperation for using airpower over Bosnia. Senior UNPROFOR officials were unhappy with NATO’s apparent attempts to hijack the

195 Admiral Smith, interview; Rose, Fighting, 200.
mission in Bosnia and change its course from peacekeeping to war-fighting. 196 The assessment of General Rose and his staff summed this up well:

We all firmly believed that NATO should not act outside the principles of peacekeeping. If NATO was only able to respond to such incidents [as the SA-2 attack] in a way that risked collapsing the entire UN mission, then it would be better not to respond at all. 197

General de Lapresle was of the same view:

I could no longer call for...air support action because of this SEAD....As these air defense systems appeared, it was more and more difficult for me to have this [air support]. And I could either have nothing...no aircraft over Bosnia, or thirty aircraft together, completely changing the spirit of my mission and the psychological perception of the Bosnian Serbs of what I was up to. 198

By December, the UN generals no longer wanted air support on the terms NATO was offering.

The situation was equally vexing for NATO commanders who also saw their forces and their enforcement mission jeopardized by UNPROFOR’s limitations on the use of airpower. As General Ryan reflected afterward:

I was the commander of the air campaign in Bosnia and had lived with almost-Vietnam rules the first year that I was there, and it was the most frustrating thing that I have ever dealt with...I may have been frustrated as an aircrewmam by some of the stupidity in Vietnam, but I was doubly frustrated [in Bosnia] because...I guess I took it on myself to be frustrated for all our aircrews, when [the Bosnian Serbs] could shoot at us with SAMs and we had to go back and ask the UN’s permission to come back and take out the same site. 199

Despite the NAC authorization for stand-alone air defense suppression missions, in early December NATO commanders could not get their UNPROFOR counterparts to agree to airstrikes or ‘retrospective SEAD.’

Conclusion

The ‘dual-key’ worked as intended for airstrikes; however it was seriously dysfunctional for other no-fly zone operations. By giving UNPROFOR commanders veto control over airstrikes, the ‘dual-key’ permitted Generals Rose and de Lapresle the power to manage the risks to their forces. The UN army generals used the ‘dual-key’ to influence targeting decisions so as to prevail with their concept of proportionality, thus helping them to maintain Bosnian Serb consent for UNPROFOR’s presence. Because

196 Military Official U; Rose, interview; and de Lapresle, interview, 13/January/1998.
197 Rose, Fighting, 203.
airstrikes were supposed to be in support of UNPROFOR’s mandate to deter attacks on
the ‘safe areas,’ Admiral Smith and General Ryan had little choice but to tolerate this
aspect of the ‘dual-key’ arrangement. Moreover, Admiral Smith sympathized with
General de Lapresle’s need to protect UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, so he did not push very
hard for airstrikes.

In contrast to AFSOUTH’s unhappy tolerance for UN controls over enforcement
measures relating to the ‘safe areas,’ Admiral Smith and General Ryan refused to accept
the ‘dual-key’ factors that might endanger NATO airmen. Though the NATO
commanders succeeded in winning support to end the UNPROFOR practice of issuing
warnings before airstrikes, their victory had little effect because Generals Rose and de
Lapresle never asked for, or approved, another airstrike related to the ‘safe areas.’ When
the ‘dual-key’ prevented effective self-defense of airmen flying over Bosnia, the NATO
commanders’ tolerance for the ‘dual-key’ ended. Unlike the responsibility to deter
attacks on the ‘safe areas,’ which was supposed to be shared by the UN and NATO,
responsibility for the no-fly zone belonged exclusively to the commanders in AFSOUTH.
Furthermore, only NATO airmen were endangered by the lack of effective SEAD. From
the perspective of the army generals serving with the UN, SEAD strikes created the same
adverse consequences as airstrikes for ‘safe area’ enforcement; they therefore blocked
NATO’s retrospective SEAD attacks. This deprived General Ryan and Admiral Smith of
the ability to balance their responsibilities for force protection and mission
accomplishment in an area where they alone were accountable. The ‘dual-key’ was not
intended to interfere with NATO airmen’s right of self-defense or with the enforcement of
the no-fly zone. But that is what it did. The conflict engendered by the ‘dual-key’ has
generally been misplaced. It was not inherently a bad thing as many NATO airmen came
to believe. It was a necessary tool designed to help the supported commanders in the UN
control the risks to their forces on the ground. The ‘dual-key’ was merely symptomatic of
the real problem, which was political disunity over the best approach to intervention in
Bosnia, which in turn gave birth to two command chains, with different missions, and
forces with different vulnerabilities.

199 General Michael E. Ryan, USAF, cited in Tirpak, ‘The Chief Holds Course,’ 39 (bracket comments in
original).
CHAPTER 7

PAVING THE WAY TO ENFORCEMENT: JANUARY - JUNE 1995

*Our field commanders carry out political decisions; they do not make them. Soldiers can prosecute war when ordered to do so; they cannot declare war.*

—Kofi Annan, November 1994

Through their planning, initiative, and insistence on operational autonomy, in the first half of 1995, theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO paved the way for enforcement action later in the year. The first section of this chapter describes the origins of two key NATO plans for airpower: Dead Eye and Deliberate Force. Created at General Ryan’s initiative, these plans later defined the shape of NATO air actions against the Bosnian Serbs. Another step in the process of clearing the way for NATO air action in Bosnia took place when General Rose’s successor, General Rupert Smith precipitated a hostage crisis for the UN. Though other researchers have analyzed General Smith’s role in that regard, in the second section I present evidence showing that making airpower more useable in Bosnia was probably an element in Smith’s calculations rather than coincidental.¹ I also argue, in the third section, that the shooting down of a US F-16 in the no-fly zone had a major impact on furthering AFSOUTH plans to use airpower in Bosnia. The F-16 downing was important because it highlighted for Western political leaders the dangers to NATO airmen posed by the Bosnian Serb air defense system, thus helping AFSOUTH commanders acquire material resources and broader political support for their Dead Eye and Deliberate Force plans. The final section of the chapter shows how Admiral Smith helped to raise European political awareness—particularly within NATO—of problems with the no-fly zone. Fortified by his expertise and sense of responsibility to his forces, the AFSOUTH commander refused pressures that would have

¹ For evidence of General Smith’s role in precipitating the hostage crisis in order to reinforce UNPROFOR and move the UN mission in Bosnia toward enforcement action, see: Gow, *Triumph*, 267-270; and Honig and Both, 141-159.
increased the risks to NATO pilots. This precipitated a NATO review of operation Deny Flight, and lowered the political resistance to the type of forceful SEAD operations favored by the senior airmen in AFSOUTH.

7.1 AIR CAMPAIGN PLANS, AND UNPROFOR CHANGES: WINTER 1994-95

Origins of 'Dead Eye' and 'Deliberate Force' Plans

Planning for an air campaign that was eventually executed in the summer of 1995 owed something to plans developed at the CAOC to neutralize the Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat. In the autumn of 1994, planners at the CAOC in Vicenza began looking at ways to deal with the new Serb surface-to-air threat. They solicited and received approval from the new CAOC Director, Major General Hal Hornburg, to build a plan aimed at destroying the Serb air defense system. By mid-December they had put together a plan called 'Dead Eye' that would win back control of the airspace over Bosnia by systematically attacking the entire Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system. When this plan was presented to General Ryan, he expanded the initiative and ordered that an air campaign plan be built—one aimed at attriting the BSA's military capability.

The wider air campaign plan was developed under the direction of Colonel 'Doc' Zoerb, an American on General Ryan's staff in Naples, and it eventually was given the title 'Deliberate Force.' Zoerb had worked on various air plans and targeting schemes at Naples since his arrival in January of 1994. Between December 1994 and June 1995 his team drew from existing target lists to craft an air campaign plan to take away the BSA's military advantage over its adversaries. The idea behind the planning was to level the playing field by attriting certain BSA military capabilities, so that the Bosnian Serbs would see it as in their best interest to cease military operations and genuinely seek a negotiated settlement in Bosnia. As General Ryan later explained:

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2 Brigadier General Victor E. Renuart, USAF, interview by author, 28 May 1998, Spangdahlem, Germany, transcript of taped interview, author's personal collection; and Wald.
3 Renuart; and Major General Hal M. Hornburg, USAF, interview by Major Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayne Thompson, 16 October 1995, Vicenza, Italy, transcript of tape recording, BACS Collection.
4 Renuart; and 'B-H SEAD Campaign,' NATO CAOC briefing of B-H Enemy Air Defenses, c. mid-December 1994, File B3d-3, BACS Collection.
6 Ryan, interview; Zoerb, 30/April/1997; Hornburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson; Lowell Boyd; and Renuart. The targeting scheme for Colonel Zoerb's air campaign plan was married to a planning document called Deliberate Force some time around May or early June of 1995.
7 Zoerb, 29 April, 1997.
8 Ibid.; and Ryan, interview.
9 Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
That was the premise of the bombing operation. That was the heart of the bombing operation—you’d heard about lift and strike... Lift wasn’t going to occur. So if you’re going to level the playing field, you do it the other way around by attriting.¹⁰

Ryan and his planners had studied the BSA and had seen how it depended upon maneuvering its better armed, but less numerous, forces to dominate the Bosnian government forces.¹¹ During the fighting around Bihac in the autumn of 1994, NATO planners observed that General Mladic had taken two and a half weeks to maneuver his forces and equipment through the Posavina corridor into western Bosnia.¹² Once in place, the BSA forces drew from local caches of ammunition, and rapidly reversed the gains made by the Bosnian government forces.¹³ By taking away the command, control and communications facilities on which Mladic depended for directing his forces, and by hitting certain arms caches and targets that would limit the BSA’s mobility, Ryan believed he could go a long way toward leveling the playing field.¹⁴

General Ryan had not been given political direction to initiate plans for a wider air campaign, nor did he seek political approval for the planning; he simply believed it prudent to have such a plan because the course of events in Bosnia indicated that it might be needed.¹⁵ Though mildly concerned that some NATO nations might object to military planning that had not been directed by the NAC, General Ryan saw it as part of his responsibility as a commander to order the planning.¹⁶ Later he observed:

If we didn’t do the planning, I think we would have been as remiss as the UN was in not upholding the mandates they were suppose to... I never did get called on that. We planned it, and I briefed it to Joulwan and briefed it to—we started briefing it [in] March [or] April.¹⁷

Thus, the need to properly defend NATO air forces over Bosnia served as a catalyst for wider air campaign planning, and activities for both issues fell under General Ryan’s responsibilities.

Through the winter and into the early spring of 1995, planners at Naples and Vicenza returned the focus of airstrike planning to its original, robust form. By the time General Ryan had arrived in theater, the accretion of political restrictions and lessons

¹⁰ Ryan, interview.
¹¹ Ibid.; Zoerb, 29/April/1997; and Military Official Y.
¹² Ryan, interview.
¹³ Ibid.; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Renuart.
¹⁵ Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Ryan, interview; and Hornburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson.
¹⁶ Ryan, interview.
about what airstrike options the UN would accept had driven airstrike plans to become little more than a series of disjointed target lists associated with the ‘safe areas,’ or with specific attacks like the one at Udbina. General Ryan reversed that trend and became involved in the planning. He spent many hours pondering what it was that constituted the Bosnian Serb’s center of gravity, and how to use airpower to affect that center of gravity in a way that would compel the Serbs to quit fighting. Ryan also brought in various outside experts and agencies in an attempt to identify which of over one hundred and fifty possible targets to strike in order to produce the desired effect on the BSA. Meanwhile, planners at the CAOC attempted their own analysis of the Bosnian Serb air defense system. After their initial effort, they received a visit by US Air Force experts from Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, who specialized in command, control, and communications warfare. The planning General Ryan ordered in late 1994 was not entirely different from earlier efforts; in fact, it reversed the evolution which had led to airstrikes for one-off attacks against individual symbolic targets. General Ryan’s initiative returned the planning focus to a more comprehensive view of air operations, like those envisioned in 1993.

NATO air campaign planning could also support plans to withdraw or reinforce the UN from Bosnia. By December of 1994, NATO planners in Belgium had been tasked to develop a plan to extricate UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia, and the withdrawal from Bosnia was expected to be messy. When senior NATO officers saw the magnitude of the effort that would be needed to withdraw UNPROFOR, they raised the question of whether such a large force might be better used to reinforce the UN in the former Yugoslavia, rather than to consummate its failure. By consequence, allied chiefs of defense staff meeting that winter in the Hague decided that plans for reinforcing UNPROFOR should be drawn up. Thus, by early 1995 NATO military staffs were actively planning for several options ranging from the complete withdrawal of

17 Ibid.
18 Military Official Y; and Renuart.
19 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
20 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Wald; Renuart; ‘BACS,’ 2.8, 4.8 and 4.10.
21 Renuart; Hornburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson; ‘BACS,’ 4.8.
22 Renuart; Wald; and ‘BACS,’ 4.8.
23 Ashy, interview by Owen.
24 Lowell Boyd.
26 Joulwan, interview; and MoD Official D.
27 Joulwan, interview; Lanata, interview; and MoD Official D; and Senate, Current Operations Abroad—Bosnia, 12 January 1995, 13.
UNPROFOR to its reinforcement. The broad ranging air campaign aimed at the Bosnian Serbs could have been used to support several options, including the one for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. However, should UNPROFOR try to withdraw, it was not at all clear that the Bosnian Serbs would pose the greatest risk to the departing peacekeepers. AFSOUTH planners continued to maintain active lists of potential Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat military targets—though, there were scarcely enough of these to warrant an air campaign plan. The uncharacteristic speed with which Western governments implemented military options in response to crises during the spring and summer of 1995 underscored the value of these early planning efforts.

New UN Commanders and Redefining UNPROFOR

Early in 1995, the two top UNPROFOR commanders completed their one-year tours of duty in the former Yugoslavia. General Rose’s replacement had a background that suggested he might have a better understanding of airpower and a more flexible approach to ground operations in Bosnia than the rigid peacekeeping formula followed by Rose. Near the end of January, Lieutenant General Sir Rupert Smith arrived in Sarajevo to take over Bosnia-Hercegovina Command from General Rose. General Smith was known to be an innovative problem solver who had forged good relations with the US military during the Gulf War. As commander of the 1st (UK) Armored Division, General Smith had witnessed first-hand how coalition airpower had prepared the battlefield before the ground war, and he had seen the difficulties of employing CAS. In the two years prior to taking command of the UN forces in Bosnia, Smith served as the assistant chief of the Defence Staff (Operations and Plans) in London, so he was intimately familiar with the British contributions to both the UN and NATO for operations in the former Yugoslavia. 

28 Joulwan, interview.
29 Lowell Boyd.
30 Honig and Both, 158-159 n. 4.
31 Zoerb, 29/April/1997; and Renuart.
32 I am referring to the reinforcement of UNPROFOR with the Rapid Reaction Force after the Pale airstrike, and the expansion and implementation of plans for a SEAD campaign and a wider air campaign after the O'Grady shootdown and the Srebrenica crisis respectively. These responses are discussed below.
33 Before leaving Bosnia, Rose’s promotion to four-star general had already been announced. Some observers viewed the promotion as a reward from the British government for a job well done. See, Brand, ‘Rose Considered,’ 12; and Jane Sharp, Honest Broker, 46.
34 Nine British soldiers were killed by ‘friendly-fire’ from US A-10s. See, Atkinson, Crusade, 464; and House of Commons, Defence Committee, Fifth Report, Implementation of Lessons Learned from Operation Granby, session 1993-94, 25 May 1994, xxiii. Prior to the war, General Smith had also been briefed about the air campaign by General Buster Glosson, USAF, who directed air operations and ran the ‘Black Hole’ planning group. MoD Official G.
Yugoslavia. Thus, his recent joint-service responsibilities, and his background, probably gave Smith a less parochial view of the conflict than his predecessor.

At the beginning of March, Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier, of France, took over from his compatriot General de Lapresle. Janvier, like Rupert Smith, had also worked well with American military officers during Desert Storm, where Janvier commanded the ‘Daguet Division,’ or 6th Light Armored Division. When asked after he had left Bosnia about the basis for his knowledge of airpower, though, Janvier cited first and foremost, his experiences as a young officer in Algeria where, in the early 1960s, he had learned about close air support. He held views similar to General de Lapresle’s regarding the UN’s role in Bosnia and the use of NATO airpower. So, Janvier’s arrival did not change the cordial but occasionally tense nature of the relationship between UNPROFOR and AFSOUTH.

Soon after General Janvier took over in Zagreb, the UN Security Council reorganized UNPROFOR. However, the move had no real impact on the responsibilities of UNPROFOR’s principal commanders. General Smith’s command in Sarajevo took the name UNPROFOR, which had previously applied to the overall theater UN force, headquartered in Zagreb. The theater force, commanded by Janvier, was renamed the United Nations Peace Force (UNPF), and it remained under Mr. Akashi’s political direction. Smith’s continued to be subordinate to Janvier’s.

Calling the overall theater command a ‘Peace Force’ aptly reflected the growing efforts by the UN Secretariat to divest the force of any enforcement responsibility in the former Yugoslavia. In December of 1994, Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a report on the ‘safe areas,’ lamenting the failings of the ‘light option’ and the difficulties experienced by the UN when trying to use airpower to compensate for UNPROFOR’s inadequate ground forces. He made it clear that UNPROFOR’s ability ‘to enforce respect for the safe areas by unwilling parties is extremely limited, unless additional troops and the necessary weapons and equipment are made available’ (emphasis added). Though worried

35 Robert Fox, ‘Gulf Commander Named to Take Over from Rose.’
36 As noted earlier, General Rose’s primary avenue of influence was through the British army; specifically through General Wilsey at Wilton.
38 Janvier, interview.
40 Ibid., 23.
41 Gow, Triumph, 270-271 n. 9.
43 Ibid., par. 42.
enforcement action would jeopardize the humanitarian portion of the UN's mission in Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali at least paid lip service to the idea of taking enforcement action if UNPROFOR were given the necessary forces. A month later, when the UN Secretary-General published his 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,' he sounded a more pessimistic note about the UN's ability to conduct enforcement and the difficulties of 'subcontracting' enforcement to regional organizations such as NATO. Moreover, Boutros-Ghali expressed concern over 'using force, other than in self-defence, in a peacekeeping context.' This was one step away from acknowledging the incompatibility of simultaneously conducting peacekeeping while taking enforcement action.

In late May, at Boutros-Ghali’s insistence, General Janvier traveled to New York to brief the Security Council on, inter alia, UNPF’s inability to enforce the ‘safe areas’ policy, and to explain the requirement for a new, more realistic mandate if UN forces were to stay in Bosnia. The US Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, and others who viewed it as a call to abandon the UN’s principal mission in Bosnia, harshly criticized Janvier’s presentation. Nonetheless, on 30 May Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the Security Council recommending a new mandate for UNPF that would limit the force strictly to peacekeeping duties. Gone was the talk of early 1994, when Boutros-Ghali wanted to remind the warring factions in Bosnia that ‘UNPROFOR’s mandate for the safe areas has been adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, UNPROFOR is not obliged to seek the consent of the parties for operations which fall within the mandate conferred upon it under Security Council resolution 836 (1993) and 844 (1993).’ UN demands for more resources, in order to carry out its enforcement duties in Bosnia, had gradually yielded to an acceptance of the incompatibility of simultaneously attempting peacekeeping and enforcement. Considering the limitations of UNPROFOR’s means, the UN had little option but to chose peacekeeping.

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44 Ibid., pars. 57 and 58.
45 ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,’ 3 January 1995, pars. 77-79.
46 Ibid., par. 79.
47 Janvier, interview; and Honig and Both, 152-153.
48 Honig and Both, 153.
49 S/1995/444, pars. 72 and 78-82.
51 ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,’ pars. 35 and 36; and S/1995/444, par. 62. The foregoing discussion should not be taken as a criticism of the UN Secretariat. As others have noted, the Security Council members, especially the permanent members, failed to resolve their political differences and bequeathed an impossible task to the UN Secretariat and to UNPROFOR, i.e., implementing resolution 836 to the satisfaction of the Security Council members who could not agree on it themselves. See for instance, Leurdijk, 35-37; Caplan, 7-9; Honig and Both, 5-6 and 152-153; and Gow, Triumph, 136-137.
While UNPROFOR adopted a peacekeeping posture, NATO picked up the enforcement mission in Bosnia. This division of labor made life increasingly difficult for the theater commanders, especially Admiral Smith. The AFSOUTH commander recalled being at a high-level exercise at SHAPE in April of 1995, during which the NATO Secretary-General and an Under Secretary General from the UN gave speeches acknowledging the incompatibility of the UN and NATO missions:

And both of them said: "The problem that we have here is that NATO is in peace enforcement and the UN has been peacekeeping, and those are incompatible goals." And when they finished up, I thought: God that's magnificent. They've finally realized the problem. I've been saying that for months. 52

The admiral expected this recognition to lead to a resolution of the problem. However, the division of labor persisted and the two organizations continued to pursue their dichotomous agendas through their theater commanders. Admiral Smith concluded that the political authorities in NATO and the UN were ducking their duties, and pinning the blame for failure in Bosnia on the military commanders:

They were shirking their responsibility....So why did they have to have a Contact Group? Why? Because two political bodies [the UN and NATO] that were involved in this thing couldn't talk to each other. They were getting absolutely nowhere, and they were just beating [up] their military leaders, because that happened to be a lucrative target. 53

The problem was especially acute for Admiral Smith, because in addition to enforcing the no-fly zone, and the heavy weapons exclusion zones, he was also supposed to support the UN commanders. Conversely, the UN commanders were not obliged to help NATO with enforcement, especially since the UN Secretariat backed the move to peacekeeping, and the Security Council failed to insist on enforcement.

7.2 THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Throughout early 1995 in Bosnia, peace talks foundered, the cessation of hostilities agreement was repeatedly violated, and the rhetoric and actions of the warring factions prefigured a renewed bout of intensified fighting. 54 Fighting between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian government forces continued around Bihac through January and February. 55 During the third week in March, Bosnian government forces launched a

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52 Admiral Smith, interview.
53 Ibid.
54 'Three Separate Operations,' 25-27.
55 Ibid., and Facts 1995, 36.
major offensive.\(^56\) The Serbs shelled Tuzla, Gorazde,\(^57\) and Sarajevo in reply, and the UN threatened airstrikes to stop attacks on civilians; while at the same time, Mr. Akashi condemned the Bosnian government for instigating the trouble.\(^58\) In April—the third anniversary of the war in Bosnia—the downhill spiral continued as Bosnian Croat forces joined government forces against the Bosnian Serbs in central Bosnia, fighting continued around Bihac, and on two consecutive days near mid-month, sniper fire in Sarajevo claimed the lives of French peacekeepers.\(^59\) When the four-month ceasefire expired at the beginning of May, the most significant fighting was not in Bosnia, but in eastern Croatia, where Croatian government forces retook Western Slavonia—one of the four UN Protected Areas.\(^60\) Serbs in Croatia launched rockets into Zagreb in retaliation for the Croatian government offensive.\(^61\) The slide toward war continued in Bosnia as well, and by the start of the second week in May, Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo prompted General Rupert Smith to seek authorization for airstrikes to silence the guns.\(^62\) Smith’s UN superiors rejected the request, but the starter’s gun had been fired in the race by the warring factions to win their shares of Bosnia.

Rupert Smith and Airpower

As Bosnia stumbled toward open warfare, General Rupert Smith had a vision of how events might unfold, and the role airpower might play. In June of 1994, Smith had warned a US Senate committee that an all out Bosnian Serb attack would be ‘most unlikely to be halted by airpower alone.’\(^63\) Furthermore, he cautioned: ‘The mission of the air forces to provide protection and support for UNPROFOR is different from that required for stopping the Serb attacks. It is unlikely that there would be sufficient resources to conduct both of those missions simultaneously successfully.’\(^64\) After describing the messy UN withdrawal that airstrikes might provoke, General Smith rather presciently testified that the peacekeepers guarding the heavy weapons control sites would be vulnerable to being taken hostage, and that the weapons would fall to whichever

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\(^{56}\) UN, Blue Helmets, 556; Facts 1995, 221; and Honig and Both, 143.

\(^{57}\) This was the first shelling of Gorazde since NATO established an exclusion zone around the ‘safe area’ on 23 April 1994. Gorazde was shelled again on 11 April 1995. For more on the deteriorating conditions at Gorazde, see: Royal Welch Fusiliers, White Dragon, 44-45 and 110.

\(^{58}\) Facts 1995, 221.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 288.

\(^{60}\) UN, Blue Helmets, 549-550; Facts 1995, 362-363.


\(^{62}\) Ibid., 362; and Honig and Both, 150-151.


\(^{64}\) Ibid., 20.
faction reached them first. Later on the same day that Smith testified, General Mike Ryan spoke to the same committee with similar prophetic accuracy, pointing out that the first steps of a Serb attack would be directed against ‘the outlying regions that they could take very quickly.’ A month after the Senate hearings, General Smith reportedly: ‘spelled out the options of extending Nato air action to bombing a number of Bosnian Serb targets simultaneously’ in a briefing to the foreign ministers of the Contact Group nations meeting in Geneva.

During the winter of 1994-95, General Smith was exposed to elements of General Ryan’s emerging air campaign plan, even though Smith might not have been fully aware of all of the details of it. In early 1995, NATO was busy planning to support a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and the airpower portion of those plans was linked to Colonel Zoerb’s air campaign plan. As one AFSOUTH officer responsible for withdrawal planning later explained: ‘As we were writing the withdrawal plans, we were writing in the flexibility for an air campaign. Colonel Zoerb and the people in the Deny Flight Air Ops Cell were all heavily involved in writing a campaign plan but not calling it that,’ because of NATO political sensitivities. General Joulwan recalled:

There was a great hue and cry that the UN might have to withdraw. So my instructions were to plan a withdrawal option. So we had both a peace implementation option and a withdrawal option for Bosnia. Then in January [of 1995], all the CHODS [NATO Chiefs of Defense Staff] went to the Hague and talked about a reinforcement plan for the UN. So there was a series of plans by AFSOUTH that had hybrid pieces to it. But the consistent part of that was a series of air targets. We went through all of the detailed planning. Included were the targeting of air defense sites, of key installations, of all the associated sites (emphasis added).

In February of 1995, General Smith traveled to the NATO war-gaming center at Ramstein, Germany (home of USAFE Headquarters), for a computer assisted exercise of a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. From an air planner’s perspective, preventing the BSA from interfering with UNPROFOR’s withdrawal, required the same initial actions as for Colonel Zoerb’s campaign plan. Neutralizing the Bosnian Serb air defenses would be the first step. Next would come the key BSA command and control sites that had not already been destroyed when the IADS were attacked. After that the

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65 Ibid., 20-22.
66 Ibid., 81.
67 Fox, ‘Gulf Commander,’ 17.
68 Lowell Boyd; and Joulwan, interview. Also see, Hagman, 264 n. 130.
69 Lowell Boyd.
70 Joulwan, interview. Also see, Senate, Current Operations Abroad--Bosnia, 12 January 1995, 11-13.
71 ‘UN Stages Bosnia Pullout Drill;’ Leurdijk, 66; and Facts 1995, 131.
courses of action might vary, but as General Joulwan noted, the core list of targets for a number of options was pretty much the same. In short, for at least eleven months prior to his request for airstrikes in May of 1995, General Smith had been contemplating future scenarios for UNPROFOR, and airpower seemed to be a recurring theme in those scenarios. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that General Smith’s efforts to reinforce UNPROFOR, and to use force proactively in Bosnia, were made with the intention of including NATO airpower.

Pale Airstrikes and UNPROFOR Hostages: 25 - 26 May 1995

General Rupert Smith helped to keep UNPROFOR from getting further entangled in the war in Bosnia, and in the process, he made the use of airpower a safer, hence more viable, option for the UN. But in order to do so, he first took what at the time appeared to be an inordinate risk with the lives of his troops. Research by Honig and Both has shown that by early March of 1995 General Smith was pretty sure of Bosnian Serb intentions to go on a final offensive that year. Furthermore, given the mutually exclusive options of making UNPROFOR a purely peacekeeping force, or turning it into a force capable of taking enforcement action, Smith preferred enforcement. James Gow suggests the same thing, and argues further that it was British support for General Smith, and the reinforcement of UNPROFOR, that primarily shaped Western response to the situation in Bosnia in 1995. Smith asked for airstrikes on Monday, 8 May, to curb Bosnian Serb shelling near Sarajevo, but was turned down by Boutros-Ghali, who was acting on advice from Akashi and Janvier. As Honig and Both have revealed, in a move uncharacteristic for the British government, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote a letter to Boutros-Ghali complaining about the decision to deny the airstrikes.

At a meeting in Paris a few days after the refused airstrike, Generals Smith and Janvier told Boutros-Ghali that UN forces in Bosnia needed to be able to use force more decisively, or else they needed to stick exclusively to peacekeeping. For either option,

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72 Shortly before taking up his post in Bosnia, General Smith was again in Washington, apparently meeting with members of the US JCS. Senate, Current Operations Abroad—Bosnia, 12 January 1995, 21.
73 For a fuller discussion of General Smith and the events leading up to the Pale airstrikes in May 1995, see: Honig and Both, 141-159; and Gow, Triumph, 265-270.
74 Gow, Triumph, 267-268.
75 Honig and Both, 141-142.
76 Honig and Both, 141-157.
77 Gow, Triumph, 267-268.
78 Honig and Both, 150; and Facts 1995, 362.
79 Honig and Both, 151.
80 Ibid., 151-152.
the UN generals wanted to redeploy their most vulnerable soldiers out of the eastern ‘safe areas,’ and away from the weapons control points, to more secure positions in central Bosnia. 81 The UN soldiers were potential hostages, and thus a block to the more forceful option. 82 Yet, if the UN eschewed force, and UNPROFOR were tasked strictly with peacekeeping, then there was no point in keeping UN soldiers in the ‘safe areas,’ which seemed set to become the center of fighting between the factions. 83 After hearing the commanders’ arguments, the UN Secretary-General insisted that Janvier brief the Security Council on these military proposals. 84

On 24 May, while Janvier was at the UN headquarters in New York for his briefing, fighting intensified around Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serbs removed some heavy weapons from a UN collection point. 85 General Smith issued a démarche to the Bosnian government and to the Bosnian Serbs warning them ‘that their forces would be attacked from the air if all heavy weapons did not cease firing by 1200 the next day.’ 86 In addition, Smith demanded the Bosnian Serbs return the heavy weapons they had recently confiscated from UN weapons control sites. 87 By this point, little had been done to reduce the risks to UNPROFOR from Bosnian Serb retaliation. 88

On the afternoon of 25 May, after the Serbs failed to return the stolen heavy weapons by the UN deadline, NATO aircraft attacked an ammunition storage facility near the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale. The next day, the Bosnian Serbs failed to meet another deadline for returning the heavy weapons, and a second round of strikes destroyed the remainder of the ammunition bunkers at the same storage site near Pale. While still more demonstrative than militarily significant, the strike was considerably more robust than the two previous airstrikes requested by the UN. 89 General Smith clearly had a different view of proportionality than his predecessor. 90 General Ryan later recalled:

If we had an incident occur, we’d pull out the book, go to the matrix, and say: “What can we do under the current guidelines.” And the guidelines kept getting piled on….It was wacko, but those were the political rules that we were given. I don’t know whether those books are still around, but it…was from that that we

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 152; and Janvier, interview.
85 Janvier, interview; and S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, par. 9.
86 ‘Fighting Escalates,’ 31.
87 Ibid.
88 S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, par. 11; and Janvier, interview.
89 Ryan, interview; and Renuart. Also see, Honig and Both, 153-154.
90 Renuart; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
did things like the Pale raid....And we stretched it a little bit actually on that one.\textsuperscript{91}

General Janvier was in New York when the first démarché was issued, and he did not return to Zagreb until after the second airstrike.\textsuperscript{92} According to Janvier, Mr. Akashi consulted with Boutros-Ghali before the strikes.\textsuperscript{93} However, Janvier criticized the UN's lack of forethought and its failure to give advance warning to its own forces, as well as to the many aid workers in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{94} Had Janvier been in Zagreb, he probably would have blocked the strikes, or at least picked a less forceful bombing option. Moreover, given his criticism of the resulting hostage crisis, he would have been unlikely to approve the attacks without doing more to prevent UN peacekeepers from being taken hostage.

Gow, and Honig and Both, have suggested that Rupert Smith was intentionally trying to force the responsible officials in the international community to confront the choice between peacekeeping and enforcement in Bosnia, because the UN could no longer go on pretending to do both.\textsuperscript{95} General Ryan and his chief planner in Naples also believed that General Smith's decision to strike the Pale ammo dump was a risk he took aimed more at influencing the UN than the warring factions.\textsuperscript{96} The Serbs responded to the first strike by shelling all of the 'safe areas,' except Zepa, with especially appalling results in Tuzla, where 70 civilians were killed and over a hundred others were wounded.\textsuperscript{97} After the second strike, the Serbs rounded up UN peacekeepers throughout Bosnia, taking over 300 hostages, and using many as human shields against further attacks.\textsuperscript{98}

The Pale airstrikes lanced the Bosnia boil, and although there was an awful mess to be cleaned up, the procedure helped to cure the underlying problems inhibiting the use of airpower in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{99} The first problem the UN had to deal with was getting its hostages back, but the hostage crisis itself proved useful to UNPROFOR and to those who wished to intervene more forcefully against the Bosnian Serbs. Whereas Smith's predecessor had reportedly discouraged the use of the term 'hostage' to describe UN peacekeepers taken by the Bosnian Serbs after the airstrikes at Gorazde and again after the

\textsuperscript{91} Ryan, interview.
\textsuperscript{92} Janvier, interview.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Gow, \textit{Triumph}, 267-268; and Honig and Both, 149.
\textsuperscript{96} Ryan, interview; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
\textsuperscript{97} 'Fighting Escalates,' 31; and Honig and Both, 154.
\textsuperscript{98} 'Fighting Escalates,' 31.
\textsuperscript{99} Gow, \textit{Triumph}, 268.
SEAD strikes in November of 1994, General Smith did nothing to downplay the fact that the Serbs held hundreds of his men hostage against further NATO airstrikes. The UN hostages were seen around the world for what they were, including those hostages who were chained to potential targets as human shields. These images could only strengthen the case for people who viewed the Bosnian Serbs as the ‘bad guys.’ The hostage crisis exposed, in dramatic fashion, the dilemma UNPROFOR faced when trying to take enforcement action. It demonstrated the futility of simultaneously conducting peacekeeping and enforcement action in Bosnia, and it forced the international community to confront the choice between the two.

As Gow has argued, after the Pale airstrikes General Smith was able to strengthen his forces and begin to reduce the ready supply of UN hostages. In the aftermath of the Pale airstrikes, the British and French governments were unusually quick to reinforce UNPROFOR with a 12,000 strong multinational Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia. The Dutch also contributed 180 soldiers to the force. Honig and Both have inferred from the speed of the offer to send the RRF that the decision to reinforce UNPROFOR had been made before the Pale airstrikes. Gow has suggested it was Rupert Smith’s idea to reinforce UNPROFOR, and that British political authorities were supporting him, rather than Smith being the mere executor of policy. Later Admiral Smith judged that if Rupert Smith had not received the RRF, he probably would not have agreed to the Deliberate Force airstrikes a few months later. The Pale airstrikes and subsequent hostage taking also contributed to the collapse of the UN’s heavy weapons control regime, greatly reducing the number of UN soldiers deployed in vulnerable positions around Sarajevo. Over the next three months, General Smith continued to redeploy his forces to more defensible sites. By dramatically demonstrating UNPROFOR’s untenable position, Rupert Smith was able to reinforce and redeploy UNPROFOR, thus removing the main obstacle to NATO airstrikes.

100 Military Official U, and UN Official A.
101 Indeed, as Gow, Honig and Both, and General Ryan have suggested, demonstrating the vulnerability of UNPROFOR was General Smith’s intention.
102 Gow, Triumph, 267-268; and Gow, ‘Coercive Cadences,’ 293.
103 Honig and Both, 155.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Gow, Triumph, 269-270. Also see, Jane Sharp, Honest Broker, 51-52.
107 Admiral Smith, interview.
108 UN, Blue Helmets, 557.
109 Gow, ‘Coercive Cadences,’ 293; Gow, Triumph, 268; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
110 General Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Gow, Triumph, 267-268; Gow, ‘Coercive Cadences,’ 293; and Honig and Both, 153-154.
During the hostage crisis General Janvier repeatedly restrained General Smith from using force in Bosnia and, with Akashi, Janvier wanted to keep UNPROFOR from becoming a tool for enforcement action. On the evening of 26 May, Janvier returned from New York, where he had been to brief the Security Council. The next afternoon, at Rupert Smith's urging, French forces in Sarajevo recaptured an observation post at Vrbanja bridge from BSA soldiers who had taken it earlier in the day. Fighting at the bridge cost the French two dead and fourteen wounded; the Bosnian Serbs suffered four dead and an unknown number of lesser casualties. The Vrbanja bridge episode also netted the UN four Bosnian Serb 'POWs,' putting the world body in an awkward position. As Honig and Both have shown, two days after the Vrbanja bridge incident, Janvier issued a policy directive to General Smith stating: 'the execution of the mandate is secondary to the security of UN personnel. The intention being to avoid loss of life defending positions for their own sake and unnecessary vulnerability to hostage-taking.' On 2 June, General Janvier blocked a request from General Smith to open a road into Sarajevo, noting: 'We must definitely avoid any action which may degenerate into confrontation, further escalation of tension and [thus] the potential use of air power.' A week later, Janvier, Akashi, and Rupert Smith met in the Croatian coastal town of Split to discuss the RRF that was being assembled to support UNPROFOR in Bosnia. During their meeting, Smith argued that he did not want the RRF unless he could use it for fighting. According to Smith, 'the Serbs want to conclude this year and will take every risk to accomplish this,' and Serb designs 'will lead to a further squeezing of Sarajevo or an attack on the eastern enclaves, creating a crisis that short of air strikes we will have difficulty responding to.' Janvier and Akashi disagreed, doubting Smith's analysis of Serb intentions and explaining the need to return to traditional peacekeeping. When the meeting ended, Akashi informed the press that the arrival of the RRF would not alter UNPROFOR's peacekeeping mission. Later that day, Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter to

\begin{footnotes}
\item Janvier, interview.
\item UN, Blue Helmets, 557; 'Fighting Escalates,' 31; and Janvier, interview. David Rohde claimed it was Smith who urged the French commander in Sarajevo to take the action. Rohde, 27.
\item Janvier, interview; and UN, Blue Helmets, 557.
\item Janvier, interview.
\item General Janvier, UNPROFOR directive 2/95, 29 May 1995, cited in Honig and Both, 156.
\item Honig and Both, 156.
\item For an abridged account of the meeting based on an internal UN document, see, Rohde, 419-422.
\item Ibid., 420-421.
\item Ibid., 420.
\item Ibid., 420-422.
\item Ibid. On the proposed mission of the RRF, see, Leurdijk, 71.
\end{footnotes}
the Security Council confirming that the RRF ‘would operate under the existing UN rules of engagement.’\textsuperscript{122} Clearly, Rupert Smith did not enjoy support from Zagreb or New York in his effort to clear the way for stronger action in Bosnia.

7.3 F-16 DOWNING AND HOSTAGE DEALS

Hostage-taking was, as Gow has argued, the Bosnian Serbs’ primary tool for countering Western coercion.\textsuperscript{123} With General Smith working successfully to remove this option, the Serbs needed to find a new way to exploit international political divisions, and to stymie American intervention. In retrospect, the downing of an American aircraft over Bosnia, may have been an attempt by the Bosnian Serbs to net a US pilot to help forestall more forceful intervention by the international community.

Following the Pale airstrikes, the Bosnian Serbs declared all agreements with the UN void and, as with earlier NATO air attacks, the Bosnian Serbs also threatened to shoot down NATO aircraft.\textsuperscript{124} A few days later, on 2 June 1995, a Bosnian Serb SA-6 surface-to-air missile system shot down US Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady, who was flying an F-16 over Bosnia on a no-fly zone patrol.\textsuperscript{125} The Serbs were thought to have intentionally targeted a US aircraft.\textsuperscript{126} In what was later recognized as a ‘trap,’ the Serbs had moved a mobile SA-6 from the known SAM sites to a position 40 km south of Banja Luka airfield, and were flying military jets from Udbina near the border with Bosnia.\textsuperscript{127} As Admiral Smith recalled:

\begin{quote}
When Scott O’Grady got shot down, we were...trying to shoot down [a Serb]
airplane as he came slipping across the border [from Croatia to Bosnia]. We
were hoping he’d come across the border, but they were flying these feints. You
know in retrospect it looks like what they did is just set us up, and I should have
been smarter—I mean I should have seen that. ... They were setting up a trap.
But as you go down that path, it doesn’t look that way.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

NATO commanders had gradually relaxed the requirements, put in place at the end of 1994, for all flights over Bosnia to be escorted by SEAD aircraft. The escorted packages of aircraft gradually gave way to unescorted flights relying on looser protection from

\begin{footnotes}
\item[123] Gow, ‘Coercive Cadences,’ 290; and Triumph, 267-269.
\item[124] Lindemann, Clark and Silber, ‘West and Russia in Bosnia Pact;’ Scott O’Grady with Jeff Coplon, Return With Honor, 13; and Ripley, ‘NATO Strikes Back,’ 25.
\item[125] O’Grady and Coplon, 10-20.
\item[126] Senate, Briefing on the F-16 Shootdown in Bosnia, 13 July 1995, 52. Hereafter, ‘Senate, Briefing on Shootdown.’
\item[127] Admiral Smith, interview; Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 2 and 34; Sawyer; and Barbara Starr, ‘“Deny Flight” Shootdown May Put USAF on the Offensive,’ 24.
\item[128] Admiral Smith, interview.
\end{footnotes}
specialized SEAD aircraft operating independently over Bosnia, instead of being
dedicated to protect specific missions. Eventually, commanders in AFSOUTH allowed
flights into Bosnia without any SEAD protection, so long as the aircraft remained outside
of the range of known SAM sites. O'Grady's flight, call-sign Basher 51, purposely
avoided Serb SAM coverage.

The flight lead demonstrated a small measure of complacency by continuing to
orbit over northwestern Bosnia after he was momentarily illuminated by an SA-6 tracking
radar. However, given the rules of engagement for Deny Flight and the prohibition
against preemptively eliminating such threats, it was not uncommon for NATO airmen to
continue their missions after being locked onto by SAM radar. This was precisely the
environment General Ryan and Admiral Smith had hoped to avoid when they moved to
eliminate the SAM threat in late 1994, but British and French reluctance, and the 'dual-
key' control over NATO airpower, precluded such proactive steps. When O'Grady was
locked onto by the SA-6's radar, he blindly took evasive maneuvers, but within a few
seconds, the second of two missiles split his aircraft in two. The BSA forces operating
the SA-6 battery were able to take the shots, with little warning to O'Grady, by drawing
on radar information from the wider integrated air defense network, rather than using their
own radar. With hundreds of UN hostages, some being used as human shields, the
Bosnian Serbs could be fairly certain that the downing of a US aircraft would not lead to
any immediate retaliatory action.

O'Grady's downing complicated the release of the UN hostages taken after the
Pale raids, and indicated that the Bosnian Serbs may have been trying to capture an
American pilot. On 2 June, the Bosnian Serbs began releasing some of the 377 hostages
taken following the raids on Pale, but they began taking additional peacekeepers
hostage. One hundred and twenty-one hostages were freed that day, but sixty-one
others were taken. Though Milosevic was credited with helping to win the release of
UNPROFOR troops, Gow has suggested that General Smith was confident that the
Bosnian Serbs would release the hostages unharmed. Whatever Smith's calculations,
the downing of an American combat aircraft led to renewed pressure from the US for airstrikes against the Serb SAM sites. Furthermore, a rescue attempt threatened to lead to an escalating use of force in Bosnia, especially if one of the rescue aircraft were shot down. General Joulwan recalled French anxieties over the F-16 downing:

The French were very concerned that we would mount a rescue of O'Grady. In fact, I was having a dinner the night O'Grady was shot down. Willy Claes was coming to the dinner... And we already had a very extensive search ongoing. And Willy came to dinner that night and said: “You know the French are concerned that any rescue attempt may interfere with their hostage negotiations.”

And I said: “Willy, this is a NATO pilot. We’re going to find him. And I’m going to use everything at my disposal to find him.”

This exchange illustrated a central feature of hostage taking in Bosnia: matters were quickly taken out of military hands and worked at the political level. Though the French could not stop American generals in NATO from taking action, they could certainly give instructions to the French generals working for the UN in the former Yugoslavia.

Even before O'Grady’s fate was known, General Mladic sought assurances against airstrikes in exchange for the UN hostages. Within two days of the downing, the UN reported that Mladic wanted to meet with General Janvier; Mladic was refusing to discuss the hostages until he was given guarantees his forces would not come under further air attacks. When O'Grady was rescued on 8 June, the Bosnian Serbs still held over 140 UN soldiers hostage. Within a week of the rescue, leaders in Pale claimed Serbia’s President Milosevic had secured international guarantees against further NATO airstrikes. Allegations of a secret deal with the French to block NATO airstrikes arose soon after the last hostages were freed on 18 June, and General Janvier’s delay in authorizing close air support for Dutch peacekeepers when Srebrenica fell in July seemed...
to lend credence to the charge.\textsuperscript{147} At the end of May, Janvier's predecessor, General de Lapresle, was dispatched by the French government to negotiate the release of the hostages, and he later confirmed that Mladic pressed him for guarantees against NATO airstrikes.\textsuperscript{148} But, the former UN commander said he told Mladic that the Bosnian Serbs would have to discuss that with Janvier and Akashi.\textsuperscript{149} General de Lapresle recalled that, while he was trying to win back the French soldiers, 'Janvier was simultaneously, of course, involved in the process of trying to obtain the release of these hostages, and so, I expect, were a lot of other guys—Churkin...and many others.'\textsuperscript{150} But the problem for the Bosnian Serbs, according to de Lapresle, was that they did not know who could reliably deliver on the promise they were seeking.\textsuperscript{151} General Janvier has denied being involved in any negotiations over the hostages, which seems surprising.\textsuperscript{152} However, as other researchers have argued, even if Janvier was involved in negotiating the release of the hostages, the principal deal-making over the French hostages was going on at a higher level, between Presidents Chirac and Milosevic.\textsuperscript{153} Given the Bosnian Serb claims about international guarantees to President Milosevic, the most likely explanation is one suggested by David Rohde: 'Milosevic, desperate to curry favor with the West and free the hostages, may have lied and told the Bosnian Serbs he received a verbal assurance when he did not.'\textsuperscript{154} Whether General Janvier played a role in helping to strike a deal for the release of the French hostages remains unknown. However, if Janvier gave Mladic any assurances against airstrikes, he was probably acting under political instructions.

Apparently, the Bosnian Serbs also wanted to strike a deal with the US over O'Grady. Immediately following the downing of O'Grady's F-16, the Serbs claimed to have captured him, only to state a few days later that they had not.\textsuperscript{155} Then, on 7 June, one of Mladic's confidants working through a humanitarian organization managed to contact Colonel Chuck Wald, the American wing commander at Aviano air base in

\textsuperscript{146} Silber, Martin, and Clark, 'Diplomatic Effort Stepped Up;' James, 'U.S. and Allies,' 5; and RUSI, ISR 1996, 63.

\textsuperscript{147} For a well reasoned analysis of Janvier's role that concludes his delays were probably not the result of an explicit deal, see, Rohde, 359-373.

\textsuperscript{148} De Lapresle, interview, 13 January 1998.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{152} Janvier, interview.

\textsuperscript{153} Jane Sharp, citing a report based on a 19 June cable from Akashi to Annan, says the guarantee was made over the course of three phone calls between the two presidents on 3, 9, and 11 June 1995. Citing different sources, David Rohde offers corroborating evidence of the Chirac-Milosevic phone calls about the hostages. Jane Sharp, Honest Broker, 53; and Rohde, 359-364.

\textsuperscript{154} Rohde, 364.
Italy. The man claimed the Bosnian Serbs were willing to release the pilot, unharmed, in exchange for a secret line of communication to the US. A pilot from O'Grady's squadron was sent with Air Force special agents and Italian intelligence officers to meet Mladic's representative in the coastal town of Trieste, bordering Slovenia. After negotiating through the night and into the morning, one of the agents received word by cellular phone that O'Grady had been rescued. The Americans abruptly walked out on the Serb, leaving Italian authorities to do as they liked with him. Possible explanations for the Bosnian Serb ruse are, 1) they wanted the Americans to give up the search for O'Grady so that Mladic's men could find him, or 2) they suspected he was dead or lost and would not be found soon, thus giving them a chance to extract guarantees against further airstrikes by exploiting US uncertainty over the fate of O'Grady.

The downing of O'Grady's jet indicated that the Bosnian Serbs may have been trying to capture an American pilot in order to neutralize the primary force behind NATO airstrikes—the US. Netting a US airmen held several advantages over taking UN soldiers hostage. It was in the Bosnian Serbs' interest to keep the UN in Bosnia, and taking its peacekeepers hostage could only dampen the enthusiasm of troop contributing nations, and the UN Secretariat, for continuing UNPROFOR's mission. By 1995, the BSA was war weary and outnumbered. Its adversaries were growing stronger with outside help. Belgrade was less able—and arguably less willing—to offer assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. The best hope for the Serbs was to use the UN to try to hang onto their territorial gains, much as they had done in Croatia prior to losing Western Slavonia. If war were to come, UNPROFOR could be pushed aside where necessary, and it could be used to block NATO airstrikes—either through UN self-deterrence and the 'dual-key,' or through more hostage taking. If the UN pulled out, the 'dual-key' and the potential hostages would be gone. By the spring of 1995, it looked as though UNPROFOR might be withdrawn from Bosnia, thus removing the 'dual-key' and the potential hostages. Moreover, the Clinton administration was under pressure from Congress to act

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157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., 9-10. The pilot, Major Paul Strickland, was sent to help determine whether or not the Bosnian Serbs in fact had O'Grady.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid., 12.
161 Senate, Situation in Bosnia, 1 December 1994, 18.
162 General Charles G. Boyd, 'Making Peace with the Guilty,' 30-31; and Military Official Y.
163 General Boyd, 30-31; and Military Official Y.
164 General Boyd, 30-31.
The Bosnian Serbs may have reasoned they needed a US pilot as a hostage to continue to neutralize the threat of airstrikes.

There is not enough evidence to reach a definite conclusion about whether the shootdown of O’Grady was a premeditated attempt to capture an American airman, or just an act of retribution for the Pale airstrikes. The bid to open a secret line of communication through the US Air Force wing at Aviano, however, suggests the Bosnian Serbs were trying to make a deal with the US. Because the downing of an American jet held the potential to evoke more of the airstrikes the Serbs were trying to avoid, retribution would seem to have been an insufficient motive for setting what appears to have been a baited trap. The Serbs were probably trying to capture an American pilot, or drive a wedge between the US and its allies by provoking the US while shielding themselves behind UN hostages.

7.4 KICKING THE PROBLEM BACK UPSTAIRS

The F-16 downing forced political authorities in the US and NATO to recognize the threat posed by the Bosnian Serb air defense system, and in the process, it paved the way for the execution of air operations planned in AFSOUTH. Disagreement between the US, Britain, and France over the best strategy for Bosnia had been one of the principal weaknesses of international efforts to intervene in the former Yugoslavia. These unresolved political disputes had been passed down to military proxies in AFSOUTH and UNPF, but the military efforts to work out a solution had failed. The shooting down of O’Grady helped to kick the problem back upstairs where it could get resolved. Because the shootdown failed to net a hostage, there was no US inhibition to counter the increased frustration American political authorities felt over the loss of the F-16. General Ryan was ready with the Dead Eye plan and a plan for a wider air campaign—Deliberate Force. At the same time, Admiral Smith forced political authorities in NATO to confront the need to eliminate the Bosnian Serb air defense threat by refusing to send aircraft over Bosnia without heavy SEAD escorts. These restrictions made it impossible for NATO to enforce the no-fly zone or the heavy weapons exclusion zones, leading NATO to reassess its Deny Flight operations.

166 A Pentagon official briefing the Senate Armed Services Committee said the Department of Defense study of the shootdown concluded it was an act of retaliation for the Pale airstrikes. Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 52.
167 Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 44 and 52.
Impact in the US of the Shooting Down of O'Grady

O'Grady's downing added to the factors impelling the Clinton administration to take leading role in the Balkans, while simultaneously highlighting the risks American airmen faced because of the 'dual-key.' At a time when the 1996 presidential race was starting to heat up, the shooting down and subsequent rescue of O'Grady aroused American public interest in Bosnia more than any event before it.\textsuperscript{168} Under domestic political pressure, the administration backed away from hints, made by the President at the end of May, that the US might send ground troops to help UN forces in Bosnia regroup and reestablish their credibility.\textsuperscript{169} Though American public opinion militated against sending US ground forces to Bosnia, the administration had promised to provide 25,000 soldiers to assist in a NATO withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Leading administration officials believed breaking that promise might break the alliance.\textsuperscript{170} Thus, from a US policy perspective, UNPROFOR had to be made to work, at least until a solution could be found for Bosnia. In the meantime, airpower was the only acceptable US contribution to the equation. On 6 June, President Clinton's top national security advisors gathered at the first in a series of meetings that culminated in a new administration policy for the Balkans.\textsuperscript{171}

The shooting down of O'Grady also demonstrated to US and other NATO political authorities the sophisticated nature of the Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system, and the risks to their airmen over Bosnia, thus adding political support to military demands to neutralize the air defenses.\textsuperscript{172} There had always been a risk to NATO aircrews over Bosnia, and it had increased significantly in late 1994 when the Serbs became more active at employing their radar-guided SAMs. However, the senior commanders in

\textsuperscript{168} Public opinion polls showed that American public interest in Bosnia was never very high. Typically the number of survey respondents who followed the war in Bosnia 'very closely' hovered around the ten to fifteen percent level. American interest peaked at the time of Captain Scott O'Grady's shootdown and rescue, with twenty four percent of Americans—about double the average—claiming to follow events in Bosnia 'very closely.' The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 'Support for Independent Candidate in '96 Up Again,' transcript of media survey, 24 August 1995. Despite the low numbers of Americans claiming to follow the war closely, a Harris poll, conducted in June of 1995, found that over eighty-five percent of Americans had 'seen, heard or read' something 'about the recent fighting in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia.' Louis Harris and Associates, 'Public Opinion Survey, Study No. 951103,' June 1995.


\textsuperscript{171} Lippman and Devroy, 'Clinton's Policy Evolution;' A16; and Bob Woodward, The Choice, 254-255. Note: Woodward's version confirms the timing of the increased policy attention, but credits the UN hostage crisis as the catalyst for it.

\textsuperscript{172} Lord (Field Marshal) Richard Vincent, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, interview by author, 22 September 1998, London, author's notes, author's personal collection; Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 36-37, 42-43, and 51-54; and Michael Evans, 'Serb Radar Link-up.'
AFSOUTH had to contend with the distinct lack of appreciation for these risks. The downing of a state of the art fighter with its American pilot changed the perception in the US that airpower was a risk free option; as General Ryan noted:

We were using force in Bosnia on the air side, and putting people at risk on the air side, which for some strange reason isn't considered putting Americans at risk. It's only Americans at risk when you put them on the ground. The stark reality of that was [revealed] when O'Grady got shot down, and suddenly we have this hue and cry back in the United States.173

As the facts surrounding the downing emerged, it did not take long for politicians in the US to recognize the risks. Senator Warner, the second ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, was the first to question the Pentagon officials who had been sent to brief the committee on the downing of the F-16. He got straight to the point: 'We are still subjecting our airmen to some measure of risk...thrust upon us by virtue of the U.N. decision as they balance the risk to the airmen against the risk to the ground forces.'174 The Senator wanted to know, 'why do not the American commanders say: Well by God, we are not going to put our American airmen at risk?"175 When the briefers explained that there were no risk-free military operations and that technically the NATO airmen were not combatants in Bosnia, Warner retorted: 'You are not a combatant, but you are taking combatant consequences....I just do not know how our Commander in Chief, the President, and others in authority can continue to submit these men in the aircraft to risks because of a policy decision by the United Nations.'176

The down of O'Grady's jet was a reveille for Washington, and America's new found attention to Bosnia opened the floodgates for US resources to the CAOC.177 It strengthened the case of those arguing for preemptive attacks against Bosnian Serb air defenses in the event of any air campaign against the BSA, and it helped ensure General Ryan would get the equipment he needed to prosecute air attacks against both the air defenses and the BSA.178 As General Ryan recalled:

O'Grady going down caused an uproar, and a substantial increase in the help we were getting. It was very difficult to get funding for the CAOC...and after O'Grady went down, we got all kinds of help.179

173 Ryan, interview.
174 Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 42.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid., 43.
177 Ryan, interview; and Hornburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson.
178 Riggins, 'CAOC History,' 9; Ryan, interview; Hornburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson; Sawyer; and Renuart.
179 Ryan, interview.

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The CAOC Director, Major General Hal Hornburg was later asked if the UN hostage crisis was a contributing factor to the sudden US interest in Bosnia; his tongue-in-cheek response was: ‘What hostage crisis? It was Scott O’Grady.’

According to Hornburg:

We had requirements identified long before Scott O’Grady got shot down, but everybody thinks that we only started wondering about where we were going to go in the CAOC on the 2nd of June. That is not true. That is when Washington started caring.

Generals Ryan and Hornburg invited a Pentagon team to evaluate the CAOC and to recommend any changes or additional equipment needed to modernize it. The CAOC expanded significantly before the end of August, with an influx of American personnel and computer hardware and software for managing an air campaign.

In addition, General Ryan began to gain a reputation at the Pentagon for issuing short term requests for limited, high-demand aircraft, such as KC-10 tankers and electronic combat aircraft, and then holding onto them long past the time covered by his requests. In another step in the process of preparing for air action in Bosnia, USAFE established a new command at Aviano air base in Italy, on 1 July: the 7490th Wing (Provisional). According to USAFE historians: ‘The purpose of the action was to bring all aircraft supporting Deny Flight at the base under a single chain of command.’

Colonel Chuck Wald, commander of the 31st Fighter Wing permanently based at Aviano, commanded the new organization. The move enhanced America’s ability to employ its airpower in the region, whether it intended to act unilaterally, or in concert with its NATO allies.

Because General Ryan had ordered air campaign planning months earlier, he had something to offer US political authorities when the need to settle matters in Bosnia came to the fore in June of 1995. The week of the Pale airstrikes, a team of US Air Force officers from the ‘Checkmate’ division at the Pentagon visited Italy to analyze Colonel Zoerb’s plans for air operations in Bosnia—hereafter referred to as the Deliberate Force

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180 Hornburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson.
181 Ibid.
183 Ibid.; ‘BACS,’ 2.8, 4.6, and 12.14; and Riggins, ‘CAOC History,’ 9-11 and 41.
185 Snyder and Harrington, 182.
186 ‘USAF Fact Sheet: 4190th Provisional Wing.’ On 1 January 1996, the 7490th Provisional Wing became the 4190th Provisional Wing.
187 ‘BACS,’ 4.8 and 4.23 n. 13; and Zoerb, 27/May/1998.
Although General Ryan believed Deliberate Force would be needed, he and Admiral Smith were not ready to share the details of the plan with other NATO members. As General Ryan later recalled:

I briefed it to [General] Shalikashvili on the US side, and I briefed it to the National Security Advisor. So, on the US side they were fairly familiar with what we were doing, what we were planning. We did not take it around to [the other NATO] capitals.

Deliberate Force aimed at an objective not all NATO capitals were willing to endorse: 

'[To] adversely alter BSA advantage to conduct military operations against the BiH [i.e., the Bosnian government army].' The Deliberate Force plan also targeted the entire Bosnian Serb air defense system as well as their command and control facilities, so it overlapped with the Dead Eye plan. Through June, General Ryan and his staff continued to refine both plans and the lists of associated targets that went with them.

The CAOC Director, Major General Hal Homburg, invited Colonel Dave Deptula to come to Vicenza to teach the CAOC staff what Deptula had learned through experience as one of the principal ‘Black Hole’ planners for the air campaign in Desert Storm.

Though the date on which General Ryan briefed the plan for Deliberate Force to US political authorities is unclear, evidence suggests the briefing took place sometime in June or early July. Broader allied participation in the planning, and integration of the air plans with the RRF’s ground scheme of action, did not begin until late July when NATO was more united in its approach to Bosnia.

If General Ryan had delayed planning until the NAC specifically directed it, he would not have had a viable air campaign plan to

188 Deliberate Force was originally the name of a planning document which was used in conjunction with a targeting scheme built by Colonel Zoerb. The targeting scheme had previously been called simply 'Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.' For the remainder of this study, Colonel Zoerb’s targeting scheme will be referred to as the Deliberate Force plan, but it was not an official NATO plan akin to OPLAN 40101 'Deny Flight.' To the author’s knowledge, there was never an official US plan called Deliberate Force either. According to the Balkans Air Campaign Study, Colonel Zoerb’s planning ‘existed in the form of briefing slides and memos only, and was the immediate precursor to DELIBERATE FORCE.’ ‘BACS,’ 4.8 and 4.11.

189 Ryan, interview; and Admiral Smith, interview.

190 Ryan, interview.


192 Zoerb, 30/April/1997.

193 ‘BACS,’ 8.39.

194 Homburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson; and ‘BACS,’ 4.6.

195 The concept of operations for what later became Deliberate Force had been briefed to General Joulwan during the winter of 1994-1995. However, the plan itself was still being refined when O’Grady was shot down. Since Deliberate Force seems to have been the basis of General Shalikashvili’s proposal when he met in London with the British and French chiefs of defense staff on 16 July, I have concluded that General Ryan most likely briefed the plan to the US National Security Advisor in June, or early July at the latest.

offer US political authorities when they suddenly felt compelled to come up with a new policy on Bosnia.

Impact in NATO of the F-16 Downing

While General Ryan worked on the plans, Admiral Smith forced political authorities in NATO to confront the implications of the SAM threat; however, doing so strained his relations with some of his superiors. After the downing of O’Grady’s F-16, NATO’s Deny Flight mission took a clear back seat to the safety of the forces in the region. All practice air support to UNPROFOR stopped, and combat air patrols to enforce the no-fly zone were shifted south from Bosnian airspace to the skies above the Adriatic. The UN abandoned the weapons control regime, and without UN cooperation, NATO ceased to be able to enforce the exclusion zones around the ‘safe areas.’ Only essential missions were flown over Bosnia, and these required heavy SEAD escorts. Despite RAF protests, Admiral Smith refused to let British F-3 Tornado aircraft over Bosnia, because he deemed their electronic countermeasures equipment inadequate. The Dutch Ministry of Defense recalled six of its eighteen F-16s supporting Deny Flight to Holland. Meanwhile, in a historic move Germany’s parliament voted to deploy sixteen jets to the southern region, including eight Tornado aircraft specially equipped for dealing with surface-to-air threats. Thus, with help from Admiral Smith, the downing of O’Grady’s jet focused the attention of NATO’s European political authorities on the air defense threat in Bosnia.

Notwithstanding pressures from Brussels for more aggressive policing of the no-fly zone, Admiral Smith refused to put NATO aircrews at risk, forcing NATO to reevaluate the Deny Flight mission. With Deny Flight operations greatly curtailed, the Serbs began flying military jets from Banja Luka airfield in northern Bosnia—perhaps baiting NATO for another SAM trap. Admiral Smith recalled General Joulwan

197 Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 37-38.
198 Ibid.; Hagman, 156-157; Beale, 33-34; and Watkins, ‘Does Deny Flight Still Work?’
199 UN, Blue Helmets, 557.
200 Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 48-49; Hagman, 156-157; Watkins, 3; and Ripley, ‘Silence of the SAMs,’ 38.
204 Admiral Smith, interview; and Butcher, ‘NATO Request for Bosnia Air Strike.’
pressing for more intensive air patrols over Bosnia to enforce the no-fly zone, but Smith refused:

They had SAM sites up there, and we knew we couldn’t take them out, and I just said: “I’m not going to put our pilots in danger.” I mean, I did that in Vietnam. I trolled around trying to get SAM sites to shoot at us so that we could knock them down—that’s dumb. And these were not unsophisticated missiles. So I just told George: “We’ve got to change the way we’re doing business.” They had complete radar coverage.... They knew exactly what we were doing... I told my boss: “You told me not to do anything stupid, [well]... I’m not going to troll for missiles up there. I’m not going to do it. Period. They can fly airplanes out of Banja Luka all they want to.”

The AFSOUTH commander saw three options open to NATO: 1) let the Serbs fly, 2) destroy the Serb SAM threat and put patrols back over Bosnia, or 3) conduct an airstrike against Banja Luka. Despite NATO policy requiring its commanders to coordinate closely with their UN counterparts, Admiral Smith remembered being reprimanded for writing to General Janvier suggesting airstrikes at Banja Luka: ‘What a firestorm that was... I had to go up to Brussels and spend a little time with the Secretary-General while he told me that I was out of my box. So you’re damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.’

The NATO Secretary-General, Willy Claes, probably wanted to avoid a rerun of the impotent raid on Udbina, which occurred in the first month of Claes’s tenure at NATO. With backing from Mr. Akashi, General Janvier had predictably refused the request anyway, so NATO was down to two options: let the Serbs fly, or destroy the SAM threat. But Janvier and Akashi were still trying to revive the UN’s moribund peacekeeping mission, and to reestablish ties with the Bosnian Serbs; they were not about to let NATO go after the Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system. With the UN unwilling to make use of airpower, and NATO’s own regional commander refusing to put aircrews at increased risk to enforce the no-fly zone, NATO was forced to conduct a complete reassessment of Deny Flight operations.

Admiral Smith believed his expertise and his responsibility as a commander obligated him to stand firm when it came to decisions over how to conduct air operations in Bosnia. Furthermore, he was willing to accept the backlash that came from standing

205 Admiral Smith, interview.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Janvier, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; and Butcher, ‘NATO Request,’ 11.
209 Rhode, 419-421 n. 8; and Honig and Both, 155-157; Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 42-43; Admiral Smith, interview; and Janvier, interview.
211 Admiral Smith, interview.
up to the people above him in both the US and NATO chains of command. The AFSOUTH commander later averred:

I knew more about air strikes and air operations than anybody above me, and I figured if they didn’t like what I was doing, then they could just remove me, and that was just fine with me. It’s real easy to say that when you have absolutely no promotion potential, but I was prepared to be fired on a lot of issues. One of them was trolling in SAM sites. 212

Admiral Smith recognized General Janvier was the supported commander.213 And without the permission of his UN counterpart, Admiral Smith could not eliminate the SAM threat. As Smith saw it:

Western militaries are obligated to follow the political guidance of their masters. They had very clear guidance. I had sort of fuzzy guidance. I was getting pushed to do more, do more, do more. And yet, I couldn’t do it without the permission of the ground commander, so I was sort of caught between a rock and a hard place.

Admiral Smith could have easily ordered a resumption of air operations over Bosnia that entailed greater risks to NATO aircrews, but instead, he stood his ground. As a result, the problems created by the SAM threat and the ‘dual-key’ controls over the proper defense for aircrews was kicked back upstairs to the political level.

The viability of enforcing the no-fly zone was in question, and NATO political authorities in Brussels tasked their military staff to come up with options for the future continuance of the flight ban over Bosnia. The Military Committee responded by presenting six options ranging from doing nothing, that is, abandoning the no-fly zone, to attacks that would neutralize the Bosnian Serb air defenses.214 Furthermore, the military authorities in Brussels supported Admiral Smith in his decision to control the risks to alliance aircrews by shifting the no-fly zone patrols to the airspace over the Adriatic.215

Back in the US, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, said of the NATO commanders: ‘If they at any point make a determination that they think the risk to American or other NATO flyers is unacceptable, we will fully back them in either standing down the operation or modifying it to a level that they find is acceptable.’216 Though some NATO officials were displeased about the disruption of the no-fly zone, apparently no one was willing to accept the responsibility

212 Ibid.
214 MCM-KAA-050-95.
215 Ibid.
216 Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, cited in Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 44.
for overruling Admiral Smith. Until the end of August when Operation Deliberate Force began, NATO air operations over Bosnia remained severely curtailed because of the SAM threat.\textsuperscript{217} However, the downing of O'Grady's jet and Admiral Smith's restrictions moved NATO political authorities to accept more liberal ROE for SEAD, including preemptive attacks against early warning radar in the event future airstrikes were needed to defend the 'safe areas.'\textsuperscript{218}

Conclusion

During the first half of 1995, theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO laid the ground work for more effectively using airpower in Bosnia. However, the strongest advocates for enforcement were not at the top of the theater chains of command for either the UN or NATO, but one level down, at the level of their principal subordinate commanders—Generals Rupert Smith and Mike Ryan. This represented no real shift in General Ryan's attitude, but it was a marked change for the UN command in Bosnia. Absent clear policy direction, the commanders at the top of each chain, General Janvier and Admiral Smith, refused to take greater risks in order to accomplish the enforcement elements of their respective missions. General Janvier consistently acted so as to minimize short-term risks to UN forces, and to move the mission in Bosnia toward peacekeeping. He did this through policies restricting General Rupert Smith's initiative on the ground, and by refusing to turn the UN key for airstrikes, whether they were urged by NATO or by General Smith.

Likewise, Admiral Smith refused to accept greater risks without clearer political direction. However, unlike Janvier, Admiral Smith's mission was primarily one of enforcement, and his efforts to minimize the short term risks to his forces pushed NATO toward forceful action. Admiral Smith's refusal to expose NATO aircrews to the SAM threat in Bosnia was an important factor in forcing political authorities in NATO to face squarely the dilemma posed by the 'dual-key' controls over SEAD strikes. If the Bosnian Serbs were attempting to capture an American pilot, then the AFSOUTH commander's contribution may have been more important than previously recognized. However,

\textsuperscript{217} Senate, \textit{Briefing on Shootdown}, 37; Watkins, 'Does Deny Flight Still Work?'; Mate Granic, Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, TLS (photocopy), to Yasushi Akashi, Zagreb, 6 August 1995, BACS Collection (The letter complains about Serb jets taking off from Banja Luka to bomb a factory in Croatia); and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, TLS (photocopy), to Willy Claes, Brussels, 15 August 1995, BACS Collection (The letter turns down NATO requests to take preemptive action against portions of the Serb integrated air defense network in Croatia).

\textsuperscript{218} Senate, \textit{Briefing on Shootdown}, 58-59.
Admiral Smith did not seem to have that specific possibility in mind. He was, instead, trying to balance force protection and mission accomplishment, and he refused to put NATO airmen at an increased risk just to keep up appearances in the no-fly zone. This eventually helped to kick the ‘dual-key’ problem back upstairs where it could get resolved. By his own account, Admiral Smith felt his expertise and responsibility demanded that he take a strong stand and accept the consequences of displeasing his superiors.

One level below the theater commanders the principal subordinate commanders, Generals Rupert Smith and Mike Ryan, were stronger advocates of enforcement. To push enforcement, Ryan and Rupert Smith were willing to take greater risks—especially General Smith—and in so doing they helped to shape events as they unfolded. General Ryan was consistent in pressing for enforcement action in the no-fly zone over Bosnia. His initiative to use American officers assigned to NATO for air campaign planning, rather than officers from the US 16th Air Force, might have raised the ire of some NATO nations. Though he might have been told to stop, there was little serious risk associated with the planning. Conversely, sending no-fly zone patrols over northern Bosnia without SEAD escort right after the bombing of Pale was risky. This may have been intended to draw ineffective fire from older, long range SA-2s and SA-3s, operating from well known, fixed sites. NATO fighters could more easily defeat those older SAM systems. General Ryan would then have had grounds to press the UN for SEAD strikes. There is, however, no evidence for or against that hypothesis. If O'Grady had been captured or killed, or if another airplane had been shot down, it is quite possible that Admiral Smith would have asked for a new air component commander. Though the shooting down of Captain O'Grady had a significant impact on the future use of airpower in Bosnia, it is difficult to credit that to General Ryan, since there is no evidence he intentionally exposed O'Grady to the threat. Indeed, it was Ryan's effort to make Deny Flight safe for his pilots and to make it succeed, rather than letting the mission fail, that inadvertently led to the downing. General Ryan's main influence during this period, then, was to direct the air campaign planning that became an important element in the US government's policy for Bosnia.

General Rupert Smith did the most to clear the way for the effective use of force in Bosnia, including airpower. The UNPROFOR commander took a big risk in order to end the facade that the UN and NATO were okay just muddling through in Bosnia. The UN hostage crisis after the Pale airstrikes proved what others had argued about the non-
viable nature of UNPROFOR’s bifurcated mandate for enforcement and peacekeeping. Though he raised the short-term risks to his forces by precipitating the hostage crisis, he undoubtedly lowered the longer-term risks of perpetuating UNPROFOR’s untenable peacekeeping mission in a land where there was no peace. The UNPROFOR commander was also taking risks with his own career, for if the Bosnian Serbs had killed some hostages, Smith very well might have been replaced. Janvier and Akashi would have been vindicated in arguing against the use of force, and would have been in a stronger position to push for the UN’s preferred option of peacekeeping without enforcement. General Smith did not succeed entirely in removing the Bosnian Serbs’ primary counter-coercive weapon: hostages. However, he prepared the ground so that he could succeed later. The Bosnian Serbs would get to play the hostage card one more time, at Srebrenica in early July. After that, the importance of General Ryan’s air campaign planning would come into play. With the exception of General Janvier, the theater-level commanders in NATO and the UN were leading actors in the move toward effective employment of airpower in Bosnia.
CHAPTER 8
SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONS TO USE AIRPOWER: JULY - AUGUST 1995

The problem is not only that the boundaries between policy, strategy, and tactics are rarely clear but that civilian leaders may insist on the right to control operations because of their political implications.

—Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises

The fall of Srebrenica in July of 1995 had a major impact on the policies of Western governments toward Bosnia. In addition to the Pale hostage crisis and the downing of O'Grady's F-16, the loss of the 'safe area,' and the reports of atrocities afterward, led the UN and NATO to endorse US proposals to use airpower in Bosnia. Srebrenica also reinforced Western concerns of UN impotence, and the problems inherent in the 'dual-key' controls over NATO airpower. However, as the first section of this chapter argues, the notion that airpower could have defended Srebrenica was unrealistic, and the blame heaped upon General Janvier for delaying the use of airpower was more indicative of the hazards of command than of any mistake on his part. After the fall of Srebrenica, the US faced a dilemma in pushing to use airpower more forcefully in Bosnia: acting unilaterally would have been easier but potentially devastating to NATO, the UN, and many bilateral foreign relationships; however, acting within the existing UN-NATO framework promised to emasculate or even paralyze attempts to use airpower. The second part of this chapter shows how theater military commanders remained caught up in the political struggles over using airpower in Bosnia. American commanders in NATO and the UNPROFOR commander, General Smith, willingly pushed at the boundaries constraining airpower, while General Janvier had to be put under political pressure before he veered from the traditional UN reluctance to endorse airstrikes.
8.1 SREBRENICA: 6-11 JULY 1995

The difficulties encountered by the UN and NATO in trying to use airpower effectively at Srebrenica typified many problems with Deny Flight. First, there was a mismatch between the capabilities of airpower and the expectations for airpower on the part of some of the people involved in the decisions over whether and how to use it. Second, concern for the safety of UN soldiers led national political authorities to get directly involved in decisions about using airpower. Third, there was confusion over CAS and airstrikes; and fourth, negotiations on other important issues helped to paralyze the UN chain of command. Fifth, the Serbs were able to monitor NATO air operations and apparently timed their ground activities so as to avoid air attacks. Finally, the recriminations after the fall of Srebrenica highlighted the accountability inherent in command, even when a commander lacks the means and authority to fulfill his responsibilities.¹

When the Bosnian Serb assault against Srebrenica began in the dark, early hours of 6 July, it followed a familiar pattern of Serb ethnic cleansing.² The apparent random and sporadic nature of the initial assault made it difficult for the battalion of 450 Dutch peacekeepers, and the remaining Muslim defenders, to predict the scale of the operation and its ultimate purpose.³ Though it would be several days before the Dutch commander in Srebrenica, Lieutenant Colonel Ton Karremans, concluded that the Serbs were determined to take the entire ‘safe area,’ he phoned the UNPROFOR chief of staff in Sarajevo, Dutch Brigadier General Cees Nicolais, to discuss the option of calling in NATO airpower.⁴ With the attackers’ objectives still unclear, and the existing UN policy against any action that might lead to an escalation of violence, the two Dutch officers elected to forego a request for air support.⁵

At first the UN was self-deterred from calling on airpower, both by its policy of avoiding the use of airpower in order to prevent retaliation, and by its concerns about disrupting talks over Serb recognition of Bosnia that were going on between Carl Bildt

¹ As the footnotes show, the next six paragraphs are mainly a distillation of research done by others, especially Honig and Both, but with a focus on NATO airpower. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge my debt to them here at the outset.
² Honig and Both, 4.
³ Ibid., 4-7; and Rhode, 23.
⁴ Honig and Both, 4-17.
⁵ Ibid., 8.
and Serbian President Milosevic. By Saturday evening, 8 July, the Bosnian Serbs had taken their first Dutch soldiers as prisoners, and by the next afternoon, they held 20 peacekeepers hostage. On 9 July, American demands within NATO for airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs were overridden by the Dutch, because, as Honig and Both have revealed, the Dutch considered airstrikes 'dangerous' and 'counterproductive'.

July 1995 - The Fall of Srebrenica

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SUNDAY</th>
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- **BSA Assault Begins at 0315 Hrs**
- **Dutch Officers Decide Against Air Request**
- **Peacekeepers First CAS Ordered into Request to UN Authorizes Blocking Positions 2200 Hrs**
- **UN Authorizes Conditions Set for Next Day's Approval CAS at 1210 Hrs**
- **BSA Warned at 1930 Hrs**
- **Calls Halt**

**Figure 8.1: Srebrenica.** The shaded area shows the days Srebrenica was under attack.

Repeated Serb assaults on Srebrenica led the Dutch peacekeepers to finally ask for air support on the morning of 10 July, but the request was turned down within the UN chain of command. Despite the UN’s reluctance to call on NATO, a swarm of combat aircraft gathered over the Adriatic. When another Serb attack developed that evening, the peacekeepers in Srebrenica issued a second request for air support, and the UN battalion submitted a list of approximately forty targets around Srebrenica. This time the request made it quickly to General Janvier, but by the time he consulted his staff, Mr. Akashi, the Bosnian Serbs, the Dutch government, and NATO, it was after 9:00 p.m., the fighting had died down, and air support no longer seemed like a useful option. Janvier asked that a strong NATO air force be available for the next morning, but he stipulated it

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7 Honig and Both, 10; and Rohde, 41 and 79.
8 Ibid., 16.
9 Rohde, 99.
10 Honig and Both, 18.
11 Ibid., 19-20; and Rohde, 118-124.
would be used only for CAS, and only if the BSA used heavy weapons in their attack.\textsuperscript{13} Somehow the message was misconstrued or misinterpreted, so that the commander of the besieged peacekeepers expected massive airstrikes against the BSA forces surrounding the enclave on the morning of 11 July.\textsuperscript{14}

The next morning, NATO put up a package of approximately sixty aircraft, including a dozen attack jets for the forward air controllers in the enclave.\textsuperscript{15} Below the orbiting air armada, General Ryan and Admiral Smith monitored the situation from a specially equipped command and control ship, the U.S.S. Lassalle.\textsuperscript{16} At 10:00 a.m., with clear skies over Srebrenica, the Dutch requested air support, but the anticipated Serb attack had yet to materialize.\textsuperscript{17} Although the request was forwarded to General Janvier and Mr. Akashi shortly before 11:00 a.m., the situation did not meet the criteria specified by Janvier the night before.\textsuperscript{18} By 11:00 a.m. the package had been holding in its orbit over the Adriatic for approximately four hours, and had reached the limit of its endurance.\textsuperscript{19} Soon after the package of NATO aircraft began returning to Italy, the final Serb ground assault on Srebrenica began.\textsuperscript{20} The Bosnian Serbs had evidently been tipped off through their air defense network that the NATO planes were departing, and would not be available to provide air support.\textsuperscript{21} About an hour after the final assault began, and while NATO aircraft were being serviced in preparation for an afternoon package, General Janvier signed a 'Blue Sword' order authorizing close air support.\textsuperscript{22}

The Serbs moved quickly to take the city, and as the enclave's Muslim defenders made for the hills in an effort to escape the hopeless situation, the Dutch peacekeepers found themselves surrounded, outgunned, and swamped by refugees.\textsuperscript{23} Several peacekeepers had been taken hostage by the BSA in the first days of the assault, but from the outset, everyone in Srebrenica was a virtual hostage. At around 2:30 p.m., two Dutch F-16s, guided by a Dutch forward air controller executed attacks against two tanks just

\begin{itemize}
\item Honig and Both, 20; Rohde, 133.
\item Honig and Both, 21-22; and Rohde, 132-133.
\item Honig and Both, 22; and Admiral Leighton Smith, 'NATO Close Air Support - Srebrenica - 11 July 95,' transcript of news conference, Naples, Italy, 12 July 1995.
\item Ryan, interview; and Admiral Smith, news conference, 12 July 1995.
\item Honig and Both, 23.
\item Ibid., 20; Rohde, 133.
\item Honig and Both, 22; and Rohde, 144.
\item Ibid. The ability of the Bosnian Serbs to monitor NATO flying activities closely, and the networking of the Serbian air defense system and that of the Bosnian Serbs was well known at the time. See, Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 36, 45, and 51-52; and Ripley, 'Silence of the SAMS,' 36-37.
\item Honig and Both, 24. A 'Blue Sword' order was used for CAS—not airstrikes.
\item Ibid., 23-24.
\end{itemize}
south of the town. The next flight into the area was a pair of USAF F-16s but the pilots failed to find their target—an artillery piece in a heavily wooded area. Following the attacks on the tanks, the Serbs threatened to kill the peacekeepers they were holding hostage, and to shell the civilians and soldiers in the enclave, unless the air attacks ceased. With another batch of fighters scheduled into the Srebrenica area, the news raced up the Dutch national chain of command; Defense Minister Voorhoeve phoned directly from the Hague to a Dutch officer at NATO’s air operations center in Vicenza and ordered an immediate end to the air operations. Left out of the decision-making loop, the NATO commanders aboard the Lassalle were caught by surprise. General Ryan insisted on going ahead with the attacks, but the forward air controller on the ground ordered the NATO aircraft away.

Within days, Srebrenica was ‘ethnically cleansed’ of its Muslim population, and 23,000 more women and children became refugees of the war. Herded, with methodical Serb assistance, to the town of Potocari just north of Srebrenica, the women and children then moved westward, out of Bosnian Serb held territory, to Kladanj. Thousands of men went missing during the ‘cleansing’ and were presumably killed. When the Bosnian Serbs finished with Srebrenica, they moved on to the ‘safe area’ of Zepa, twelve miles to the southeast.

Expectations and Blame

Srebrenica demonstrated the unrealistic expectations of airpower that some people held—participants and observers. On the night before Srebrenica fell, the Dutch battalion commander thought massive airstrikes would force Mladic to back off, or make the BSA suffer grave consequences with ‘bombing everywhere.’ David Rohde later claimed: ‘If NATO Close Air Support had been used earlier,...the 7,079 missing might still be alive

24 Ibid., 25; and Admiral Smith, news conference, 12 July 1995.
25 Honig and Both, 25; and Rohde, 162.
26 Honig and Both, 25; and Rohde, 162.
27 Honig and Both, 25-26; Voorhoeve, ‘Protecting the Peacekeepers,’ Washington Post, 20 November 1995, A20. Note: In the Washington Post article, Voorhoeve’s says: ‘I called U.N. headquarters in Zagreb at 4 p.m. and asked to call off a new round of air support...’ Other sources indicate that Honig and Both’s version is accurate, so that even if Voorhoeve phoned Zagreb at 4:00 p.m., he apparently phoned the CAOC first.
28 Ryan, interview.
29 Ibid.
30 Honig and Both, xix, and 45-66.
31 Rohde, 343-349. Rohde uses the Red Cross figure of 7,079.
32 Honig and Both, 21.
Neither airstrikes, nor close air support would have made that much of a difference at Srebrenica. Airpower alone could not defend the ‘safe areas,’ as senior NATO and UN commanders had been warning since the spring of 1993. First, the number of Bosnian Serb soldiers attacking Srebrenica was at most a few thousand, and their heavy weapons—hidden around the enclave—made difficult targets for airstrikes. Even when they were massed for an attack, the Bosnian Serb forces were hard to find and hit from the air, as the problems with CAS on 11 July demonstrated. Second, the BSA had an SA-6 surface-to-air missile battery in eastern Bosnia, so NATO aircrews could safely go to Srebrenica only with SEAD escort. That translated into limited periods of air support by large packages of aircraft. Since the Bosnian Serbs were able to monitor NATO air operations, they could adjust the timing of their ground operations as necessary, and take cover whenever NATO aircraft approached. Third, the Dutch peacekeepers and citizens of Srebrenica were virtual hostages from the outset. By the afternoon of 9 July, hours before the first request for airpower reached UN leaders in Zagreb, the Bosnian Serbs held twenty Dutch soldiers, whom they later threatened to kill when NATO started dropping bombs. In summary, there was not much for NATO to bomb, the conditions for bombing were poor, and the Serbs could, and did, turn off the bombing by threatening to make things worse. Though airpower could have been used sooner, and perhaps more effectively, at Srebrenica, it would have been most unlikely to stop the Bosnian Serbs from taking the enclave. Problems with airpower and the fall of Srebrenica lay not with the slowness of decisions, or any failure in the execution of air support, but in the unrealistic expectation that airpower could defend the enclave.

The attention and blame General Janvier has received since the fall of Srebrenica highlights the accountability that accompanies command. Honig and Both note that Janvier was in a no-win situation, recognized it, and tried to raise the alarm. So, Janvier was not guilty of failing to see the danger at Srebrenica. Rather than credit Janvier with foresight, David Rohde concluded:

Whether Janvier was cynical or misguided, he is more responsible than any other individual for the fall of Srebrenica. The restrictions on the use of airpower that
he actively endorsed and his decision not to approve Close Air Support on Monday, July 10, had disastrous results. 38

As Honig and Both have pointed out: 'General Janvier, in particular, has unjustly been much maligned. He is often blamed for losing Srebrenica because he did not authorize massive air strikes.' 39 Though they disagreed about whether or not to fault Janvier, neither Rohde nor Honig and Both made mention of any civilian policy-maker who has been singled out in the manner in which Janvier has. General Smith was away on leave during the fall of Srebrenica, so he has largely escaped any blame. 40 General Janvier inherited the problems associated with Srebrenica. Like his predecessors, he lacked control over the forces under his command; he could neither remove the Dutch peacekeepers, nor reinforce them. Nor could he order airstrikes without higher UN approval, and, in this case, without Dutch national approval. An alternative evaluation of Janvier's role, opposed to the one offered by Rohde, is that Janvier believed he could not stop the fall of Srebrenica, and he saw no point in further endangering the Dutch peacekeepers or the people of Srebrenica by authorizing air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs. General Briquemont had previously quit as the UN commander in Bosnia, rather than persisting in a situation where he lacked the means and authority to fulfill the responsibilities for accomplishing his mission and protecting his forces. 41 And as Briquemont had noted, the clear accountability that goes with command explains to a large extent why generals and not policy-makers have been called to the Hague to answer questions about war crimes. The focus on Janvier after Srebrenica has illustrated one of Briquemont's principal concerns during his tenure in Bosnia: commanders are likely to be held accountable even when they are not given the tools to fulfill their responsibilities.

8.2 THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND THE DECISIONS TO USE AIRPOWER

Stung by the debacle at Srebrenica and their own inability to take effective action in the face of Serb audacity, Western governments decided to meet at a conference in London on 21 July to consider future options for Bosnia. From Srebrenica, Mladic's forces moved on to take the 'safe area' of Zepa, which was smaller and less well defended than Srebrenica. 42 This would make Gorazde, with its battalion of British soldiers, the

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38 Rohde, 368.
39 Honig and Both, 182.
40 Rohde, 366.
41 See Chapter 4, section 4.4.
42 Facts 1995, 513.
last of the ‘safe areas’ in eastern Bosnia, and the next likely target for ‘ethnic cleansing’
by the Bosnian Serbs. In advance of the London Conference, the uniformed chiefs of
defense from the US, the UK, and France met in the British capital to discuss military
options for halting Mladic’s forces. At the meeting, General Shalikashvili reiterated US
calls for airstrikes, and briefed a three phased air campaign plan. France’s Admiral
Jacques Lanxade put forward several options for reinforcing Gorazde with some or all of
the UN’s new RRF. The British did not have a separate plan of their own, and
tentatively backed the American option for airstrikes, with the stipulation that strikes take
place only after British troops were mostly out of harm’s way—British soldiers in
Gorazde were scheduled to leave at the end of August.

The London Conference was partially successful as a consensus building exercise,
and it demonstrated the continuing attempts by the US, Britain, and France to wield
influence through their military commanders. When the conferees met in London, at least
one of them—Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, the Chairman of NATO’s Military
Committee—could perceive no overall purpose for the gathering; however, he noted that
there were numerous bilateral meetings going on behind the scenes. At the end of the
London Conference, Britain and the US agreed, in general, to use airpower to prevent the
fall of Gorazde. France was skeptical of the plan, and the Russian delegate refused to
sanction the option for a stronger use of NATO airpower. Even the British-US
agreement was an uneasy compromise. The British insisted on retaining the ‘dual-key’
arrangement that gave the UN veto power over any airstrikes proposed by the American-
dominated NATO chain of command. General Shalikashvili and US Secretary of
Defense Perry reportedly urged eliminating the ‘dual-key’ controls on airpower
altogether. Through their compromise in London, the British and Americans tentatively
agreed to remove UN civilians from the airstrike decision-making process, by delegating
the UN key to General Rupert Smith. This, however, bypassed the senior French officer,

43 Ibid.
44 Bruce Clark, Gray, and Barber, ‘Doubts Grow;’ and MoD Officials F and J.
45 MoD Official J.
46 Bruce Clark, Gray, and Barber, ‘Doubts Grow;’ Facts 1995, 513; and MoD Officials F and J.
47 MoD Officials F and J.
48 Lord (Field Marshal) Richard Vincent, Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, interview by author,
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
Attacks.’
52 Gray, ‘Clinton Fights;’ and Robinson and Gray, ‘Taking of Hostages.’

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General Janvier. On the NATO side, General Ryan would hold the key for airstrikes. As General Ryan later recalled: 'At first they wanted to push it down to Rupert and me, because they wanted to cut Janvier out of it. But then that didn't make any sense.' It did not make sense, because France, the nation with the most soldiers on the ground in Bosnia, would not have had a role in decisions to use airpower.

**Decision to Use Airpower to Protect Gorazde**

Decisions in Brussels and New York in late July modified the agreement reached between the US and Britain over the 'dual-key,' and further demonstrated the influence of theater commanders in shaping the use of airpower in Bosnia. On 25 July, the NAC met for almost twelve hours before finally authorizing more robust airstrikes in response to any Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde. Significantly, General Joulwan urged NATO political authorities to consider wider zones of action, rather than limiting air operations to the vicinity of Gorazde, and NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes included the suggestion in a letter to his UN counterpart outlining NATO plans for airstrikes. The next day, Boutros-Ghali wrote back to Claes agreeing that the new NATO initiative for airstrikes could be authorized within the bounds of existing UN Security Council resolutions, and that he had 'instructed United Nations military commanders in the Former Yugoslavia to commence preparations for defining...the “zones of action” referred to in your letter.' Boutros-Ghali also acknowledged that 'the question of Option 3 remains to be decided, both within the North Atlantic Council and in the United Nations Security Council.' Significantly, the UN Secretary-General agreed to delegate the UN's key for NATO airpower to the military commanders beneath Mr. Akashi. However, instead of delegating it to General Smith, authority to request NATO air strikes was passed to General Janvier. Janvier would then have to coordinate airstrikes with

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53 Ryan, interview; and Robinson and Gray, 'Taking of Hostages.'
54 Ryan, interview.
55 AFSOUTH, 'Deliberate Force,' Fact Sheet, 2. The 'BACS' report covers the evolution of NATO and US target planning. However, different aspects of the planning are captured with varying degrees of fidelity in three chapters of the report. The following discussion draws from the BACS draft report and other sources. See, 'BACS,' 2.8-2.9, 4.8-4.10, and 8.38-8.39.
56 Leurdijk, 76; and NATO, 'Press statement on Gorazde by Secretary General Willy Claes, following North Atlantic Council meeting on 25 July 1995.'
57 Joulwan, interview; Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
58 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General, TLS (photocopy), to Willy Claes, NATO Secretary-General, Brussels, 26 July 1995, BACS Collection.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
Admiral Leighton Smith, rather than with General Ryan.\textsuperscript{62} For CAS, Janvier was authorized to further delegate the UN key to General Smith.\textsuperscript{63} Finally, Boutros-Ghali told the NATO Secretary General he had issued instructions to Mr. Akashi 'to take all measures necessary to protect the United Nations personnel in the theatre and to reduce their vulnerability to retaliation and hostage-taking.'\textsuperscript{64} By stymieing the attempt to push control over airstrikes down to Generals Smith and Ryan, the UN Secretary-General and the NAC signaled the lingering reluctance at the political level to fully endorse NATO airstrikes. However, there was a definite shift away from NATO being a supporter of UNPROFOR, toward the Alliance becoming more of an independent actor in Bosnia.

Events on the ground in Bosnia during late July led NATO ambassadors to expand their threats to use airpower to stop Serb military advances. On the first day of the London Conference, the remaining Dutch peacekeepers taken hostage at Srebrenica were freed, thus removing one of the factors inhibiting NATO air attacks.\textsuperscript{65} Four days later, on 25 July, General Smith negotiated with General Mladic for the evacuation of Zepa's 17,000 Muslims, leaving just four 'safe areas' remaining of the original six.\textsuperscript{66} Rather than attacking Gorazde as anticipated, the Bosnian Serbs joined the Croatian Serbs, and rebel Muslim forces, to launch a three pronged assault on Bihac.\textsuperscript{67} The Bosnian government forces around Bihac were no match for the three factions arrayed against them, and as the prospects of losing another 'safe area' loomed, NATO considered extending the threat of airstrikes to protect all four of the remaining 'safe areas.'\textsuperscript{68} Of all the Bosnian enclaves, Bihac was the most difficult to support with airpower; the lines between the warring factions were less clearly drawn there than at the other 'safe areas,' and the peacekeepers in Bihac had no forward air controllers.\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, Bihac lay near the Bosnian Serb air defense stronghold in northwestern Bosnia.\textsuperscript{70} On 27 July, NATO concerns for Bihac eased somewhat, as thousands of Croatian troops joined the fighting against the Serbs.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{62} Facts 1995, 530.
\textsuperscript{63} Boutros-Ghali, TLS, to Willy Claes, 26 July 1995.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Facts 1995, 529.
\textsuperscript{66} Adams and Silber, 'UN in Talks With Serbs;' and Facts 1995, 529. On the day Smith and Mladic met, the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal announced charges against Mladic and Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic for 'genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.'
\textsuperscript{67} Facts 1995, 530 and 549; and Silber and Robinson, 'Fear of Wider Conflict.'
\textsuperscript{68} Facts 1995, 549.
\textsuperscript{69} NATO, 'Press Statement on Gorazde;' and Zoerb, 30/April/1997.
\textsuperscript{70} Senate, Briefing on Shootdown, 33.
\textsuperscript{71} Facts 1995, 549 and 565.
The Croatian assault quickly cut Serb lines south of Bihac and relieved the pressure on the beleaguered government forces in the enclave.\textsuperscript{72}

**Decision to Use Airpower in Defense of Other ‘Safe Areas’**

Not to be outflanked, NATO announced a decision on 1 August to extend the threat of airstrikes against any faction threatening any of the remaining ‘safe areas.’\textsuperscript{73} The NAC decision authorized NATO military authorities to conduct graduated air operations up to Option 2—a reference to the ‘Operational Options for Air Strikes,’ developed two years earlier.\textsuperscript{74} In a statement to the press, Secretary-General Claes claimed that: ‘These decisions are intended to protect the safe areas and not to help any party fight against the other.’\textsuperscript{75} Allied officers at the CAOC, not just Americans, built target lists, so that by early August there were individual ‘plans’ for Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, and Gorazde.\textsuperscript{76} However, senior airmen in AFSOUTH believed it was impossible to defend the ‘safe areas’ with airpower alone.\textsuperscript{77} At the suggestion of using airpower to defend the ‘safe areas,’ General Ryan later exclaimed:

> Not defend the ‘safe areas’! I FOUGHT that language—that language was going around, and I said: “There’s no way we can defend those ‘safe areas.’ You cannot defend the ‘safe areas’ with air... you can’t defend the ‘safe areas’ without a competent ground force.”\textsuperscript{78}

In General Ryan’s view the best way to relieve the threat to the ‘safe areas’ was to compel the Bosnian Serbs to stop attacking them by using airpower to attrit Bosnian Serb military capabilities.\textsuperscript{79} While this approach may have been the best way to use airpower to stop attacks on the ‘safe areas,’ it could not help but upset the balance of military power among the warring factions.\textsuperscript{80} Throughout August, planners at the CAOC and in Naples

\textsuperscript{72} Silber and Robinson, ‘Fear of Wider Conflict,’ 20; and Silber, Dempsey and Robinson, ‘“Underdog” Croatia Learns How to Bite.’

\textsuperscript{73} NATO, ‘Press Statement on Other Safe Areas by the Secretary General Following North Atlantic Council Meeting on 1 August 1995.’

\textsuperscript{74} MCM-KAD-057-95, ‘NATO Air Operations to Stabilize Bosnia-Hercegovina Beyond Gorazde,’ Memorandum to the Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31 July 1995, cited in ‘BACS,’ 4.10 and n. 19. ‘Operational Options’ is discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.2.

\textsuperscript{75} Leurdiijk, 76; and NATO, ‘Press Statement... 1 August 1995.’

\textsuperscript{76} ‘BACS,’ 4.9-4.10; and Colonel Steven Teske, USAF, interview by author, 6 May 1997, Aviano Air Base, Italy, tape recording, author’s personal collection. As the BACS pointed out, these ‘plans’ for the individual ‘safe area’ were little more than target lists, and overhead briefing slides. As of May 1997, the individual ‘safe area’ plans were still being held in a historical file in a safe in the Guidance Apportionment and Targeting Cell at the CAOC in Vicenza.

\textsuperscript{77} Admiral Smith, interview; Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.

\textsuperscript{78} Ryan, interview. This was consistent with General Ryan’s testimony to Congress in April of 1993; see, Sciolino, ‘U.S. Military Split,’ A1 and A6.

\textsuperscript{79} Ryan, interview.

continued to refine plans for the ‘safe areas,’ the Dead Eye plan, and plans for a wider air campaign.\footnote{81}

NATO ministers helped to open the door for General Ryan’s air campaign plan by agreeing to ‘authorize operations “to support the defense of the Safe Areas within a wider zone of action” (ZOA) than had previously been considered.’\footnote{82} By authorizing wider ZOAs, NATO ministers freed their military commanders from restrictions limiting airstrikes to only those targets in the vicinity of a particular ‘safe area.’ This, in turn, helped to push NATO thinking on airpower toward General Ryan’s plan for a wider air campaign. After General Joulwan proposed the ZOAs, planners in AFSOUTH were tasked to help define them. One NATO officer suggested dividing all of Bosnia into two zones, using a line taken from a map used for planning Dead Eye operations.\footnote{83} The line had originally been drawn on the map as a ‘do not cross line’ for separating aircraft that would be simultaneously attacking the northwest and southeast segments of the Bosnian Serb air defense system.\footnote{84} It had been nothing more than a tactical expedient for avoiding mid-air collisions. When the UNPROFOR commander, General Rupert Smith, saw the proposed zones, he suggested modifying them, by making the area around Tuzla part of both zones, thus the Posavina corridor—a key route for Serb access to western Bosnia—was in both zones (see Figure 8.2 at the end of this chapter).\footnote{85} No matter where a triggering event might occur, NATO would be able to strike targets in the area where the zones overlapped.\footnote{86} It also meant that a provocation in Tuzla could trigger airstrikes in the zone of the commanders’ choosing. General Joulwan, who was intent on being able to limit the maneuverability of Mladic’s forces, approved the zones.\footnote{87} However, General Janvier initially balked at the larger zones, telling Admiral Smith he had been

\footnote{81}‘BACS,’ 4.9-4.10.
\footnote{82}AFSOUTH, ‘Deliberate Force,’ Fact Sheet, 3. The NAC decision for the wider zones of action reflected acceptance of a memorandum from the Military Committee to the Secretary-General supporting ‘the wider application [of] airpower in a wider context.’ MCM-KAD-057-95, ‘NATO Air Operations to Stabilize Bosnia-Hercegovina Beyond Gorazde,’ cited in ‘BACS,’ 4.10 and n. 19.
\footnote{84}Ibid., and Zoerb, 30/April/1997.
\footnote{85}General Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Zoerb, 30/April/1997. Generals Smith and Ryan were meeting in Kiseljak on 29 July 1995 to begin the process of coordinating NATO air operations with ground operations by the RRF. They had their key planners with them, including Colonel Zoerb, USAF, and Colonel David Nicholls, Royal Marines. General Smith may have made his input for the wider zones at this meeting. Nicholls, ‘Bosnia: UN and NATO,’ 34-35; and Colonel Zoerb, ‘Notes From Kiseljak Meeting,’ 29 July 1995, File B4-3, BACS Collection.
\footnote{86}General Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
\footnote{87}Joulwan, interview; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
contemplating zones twenty-five to thirty kilometers around the 'safe areas'—slightly larger than the heavy weapons exclusion zones at Sarajevo and Gorazde.\(^8\)

Though the military commanders in AFSOUTH wanted political guidance and needed political approval for their actions, they also controlled access to their plans so as to maintain operational security and their own autonomy. Commenting on briefings of Deliberate Force given in the summer of 1995, Admiral Smith recalled: 'We wanted very much to not let the Military Committee and the NAC get into the details of those targets.'\(^9\) General Ryan was given a broad mission statement by the NAC, which had the 'aim of deterring attacks on safe areas and responding, if necessary, through the timely and effective use of airpower...until attacks on or threats to the safe areas have ceased.'\(^10\) This broad guidance suited General Joulwan, who believed NAC involvement in operational decisions would be politically divisive, hurting both alliance cohesion and military effectiveness.\(^11\) Though Admiral Smith did not want any 'help' in operational matters, he would have preferred to have political authorities in the UN and NATO come to an agreement on a common approach for the operation, rather than leaving it to him and General Janvier to sort out matters.\(^12\) General Ryan appreciated, and would soon make good use of, the latitude given to him by the NAC mission statement. At an Air Power conference on the anniversary of Operation Deliberate Force, Ryan observed:

> The biggest lesson I think we learned is that if we have a chance on the military side to be influential in writing the mission statement, we'd better have our best people standing there doing it, because that's what you're going to get graded on.\(^13\)

The NATO commanders were not without political oversight, though. On 3 August, in Italy, General Ryan and Admiral Smith briefed NATO Secretary-General Claes and General Joulwan, on the Dead Eye plan, the Deliberate Force plan, and the target sets for the individual 'safe area' defense plans.\(^14\) For his part, Secretary-General Claes attempted to reassure the commanders about the depth of political backing for a robust air campaign.\(^15\) While the commanders wanted operational autonomy, it appears they also wanted, or needed, political blessing from Brussels.

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\(^8\) Admiral Smith, interview; and Nicholls, 'Bosnia,' 34-35.
\(^9\) Admiral Smith, interview.
\(^11\) Joulwan, interview.
\(^12\) Admiral Smith, interview.
\(^13\) Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
\(^14\) AFSOUTH, 'Deliberate Force,' Fact Sheet, 3; 'BACS,' 2.8; Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 30/April/1997.
\(^15\) Zoerb, 30/April/1997.
Changing Landscape and US Political Leadership

Croatian ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Serbs from UN Protected Areas marked the further decline of UN influence in the former Yugoslavia and set the stage for American leadership within NATO. On 4 August, the Croatian Army launched an offensive to retake the Serb controlled Krajina region of Croatia. It did not help UN-NATO relations, when, on the first day of the Croatian offensive, US aircraft providing air presence to Canadian peacekeepers in Croatia fired two anti-radiation missiles in self-defense against a Krajina Serb SAM site near Knin.96 To make matters worse, a Croatian Air Force MiG aircraft attacked a UN observation post killing a Danish peacekeeper, yet NATO was not empowered to conduct counter-air operations against Croatia.97 In four days, the fighting was mostly over, and Croatian forces sent 150,000 Serb refugees fleeing into Serbia and Bosnia.98 The operation highlighted the UN’s impotence. Even worse, from a UN standpoint, the Croatian move appeared to have US support, or at least acquiescence.99

Neither the BSA nor the Yugoslav Army rendered assistance to their Krajina kinsmen, fueling speculation that Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic had made an agreement to let Zagreb take control of the Serb occupied lands within Croatia.100 In Bosnia, Karadzic was publicly critical of Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leader reportedly attempted to dismiss his army commander, General Mladic; Mladic had supposedly been meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade just prior to the Croatian assault.101 On the first day of the Croatian offensive, Karadzic ordered Mladic to step down, but the general refused and two days later eighteen Bosnian Serb generals signaled their support for Mladic.102 As one news reporter put it: ‘Mr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, has lost control of his armed forces, whose commanders now clearly take their orders from Belgrade.’103 For NATO planners, knowing whether this family squabble amongst the Serbs was genuine, or merely affected, was important; if General Mladic really was more responsive to Milosevic than Karadzic, then a NATO strategy based on coercing the Bosnian Serbs would have to focus on Belgrade, not just Pale. After the late

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96 Janvier, interview; UN, Blue Helmets, 552; and Silber and Robinson, ‘Croats Unleash Attack on Krajina.’
98 UN, Blue Helmets, 552.
100 Ibid.; ‘Turn of the Tide?’ 47; and Moore, ‘An End Game in Croatia and Bosnia?’ 10.
101 Facts 1995, 566.
102 Ibid.; and ‘Croatia’s Blitzkrieg,’ 41.
103 Mortimer, ‘Slicing Up the Bosnian Cake.’

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July NATO decision for a graduated air campaign, a trio of NATO generals—one British, one American, and one French—was dispatched to Belgrade to give General Mladic a final warning, but Mladic was unimpressed by the threat of NATO bombing. 104

In August of 1995, the Clinton administration committed itself to taking the lead in the West’s approach to Bosnia. With the political risks attending this new assertiveness, the US wanted as much control as possible over the various components in its strategy for the Balkans. By 1 August, US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had worked out a new US strategy for Bosnia. 105 A week later, after several meetings with President Clinton and his top national security advisors, Mr. Lake traveled to the capitals of the other Contact Group 106 countries—France, Germany, Russia, and Britain—to present the administration’s latest plan for a comprehensive settlement in the former Yugoslavia. 107 In contrast to earlier administration efforts to win allied acceptance for its policies, one reporter noted, ‘this time Lake was given permission to present the US plan as something Clinton was determined to pursue with or without the allies’ support.’ 108 In another account, President Clinton acknowledged that by taking the lead on Bosnia: ‘I’m risking my presidency.’ 109 On 11 August, as Congress left Washington for its summer recess, President Clinton vetoed a bill lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims—making it easier, temporarily, for the Europeans to follow America’s lead in the Balkans. 110 Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke visited leaders in former Yugoslavia to push the administration’s new plan. 111 Though the details of the plan remained secret, Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey revealed to the press that: ‘The Bosnian government will play a role in compelling the Serbs to accept the plan, and

104 The officers were, General James Jamerson, USAF, Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten, RAF, and a French army major general serving in the operations directorate of the French Joint Staff. After the meeting, Air Chief Marshal Wratten reported to the British Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo, that the message had been delivered and that Mladic showed no signs of taking it seriously. Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten, telephone interview by author, 18 May 1997, London, author’s notes, author’s personal collection. Also see, Jane Sharp, Honest Broker, 57; and ‘BACS,’ 12.13 n. 48.

105 Lippman and Devroy, ‘Clinton’s Policy Evolution.’

106 The Contact Group was an outgrowth of the international peace conference in Geneva. Established in April of 1994, the Contact Group came up with a ‘take it or leave it’ plan, which the Bosnian Serbs rejected in July of 1994. The Group was hamstrung by pretty much the same disparate alignment of allegiances that prevented effective action from the UN Security Council. By 1995, the Contact Group had become just another forum for disagreement between Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and the US.


108 Carney, ‘Finally, The Leader of NATO Leads,’ 54. President Clinton’s determination to go it alone if necessary is also discussed in Bob Woodward, The Choice, 267-268.


111 Holbrooke, To End, 3-4 and 74-75; Facts 1995, 590; and ‘US Peace Plan for Bosnia Attacked,’ The Financial Times, 16 August 1995, 2.
our military is an integral part of this process. Such candidness about a secret plan was indicative of the limits of US influence over Bosnian Croat and government Federation forces. On 17 August, in a note about Croatian military forces passed from Robert Frasure, the head US negotiator for the Balkans, to Richard Holbrooke, Frasure wrote: ‘Dick: We “hired” these guys to be our junkyard dogs because we were desperate. We need to try to “control” them. But this is no time to get squeamish about things.’ When Frasure was killed in a road accident on Mount Igman two days later, Holbrooke took over as the lead US negotiator and quickly moved to sideline the Contact Group, while still preserving it so that it could later ‘endorse and legitimize any agreement’ he might achieve. With the high political stakes the US administration was facing, it needed as much control as possible over the disparate components of its Balkan strategy.

The extent of US control over NATO airpower remains unclear. Senior US officials were aware of General Ryan’s Deliberate Force plan, and robust airstrikes had long been a part of the administration’s policy toward Bosnia. However, Richard Holbrooke, a long-time supporter of bombing the Bosnian Serbs, has claimed that there was no connection between the US diplomatic initiative and NATO bombing:

Almost everyone came to believe that the bombing had been part of a master plan. But in fact in none of our discussions prior to our [late-August diplomatic] mission had we considered bombing as part of a negotiating strategy.

A different account, supposedly based on interviews with Anthony Lake, apparently contradicted Holbrooke’s assertion:

The Europeans loved the diplomatic effort with Clinton putting the reputation of the United States on the line, but they hated the idea of bombing. But Lake insisted that the two were bound together and that the president had already decided on U.S. policy.

Holbrooke was doubtful of European support for an air campaign, and, in all likelihood, he had no choice but to depend on America’s theater commanders, working within the alliance, to do as much as they could to support the administration’s strategy.

112 Harriet Martin, Clark and Ridding, ‘Bosnia Hails Force Element in US Plan.’
113 Holbrooke, To End, 73.
114 Ibid., 84.
115 Ibid., 102; Bob Woodward, The Choice, and Ryan, interview.
116 Holbrooke, To End, 104.
118 Holbrooke, To End, 103-104.
AFSOUTH and UNPF, Subject to Close Coordination

Though NATO—with the US in the fore—was moving toward more forceful action in Bosnia, General Janvier was slow to accept plans for NATO bombing. After the 25 July and 1 August NAC decisions, NATO’s military commanders were left to work out the details for implementing the decisions with their counterparts in UNPF and UNPROFOR, and it took nearly two weeks before a basic procedural agreement was reached. During that time, General Janvier made his case against using NATO airpower, but was overruled by political authorities within the UN. On 10 August, General Janvier and Admiral Smith signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which formalized, and added some of the necessary details to, the military arrangements for implementing the NATO decisions. For instance, Willy Claes had announced: ‘There is a strong feeling among Allies that such [bombing] operations, once they are launched, will not lightly be discontinued.’ In working out the new ‘dual-key’ arrangements, this meant once bombing commenced, it would not stop until the commanders agreed that the conditions precipitating the bombing had been alleviated. A ‘dual-key’ decision by General Janvier and Admiral Smith would be needed to stop bombing, as well as to start it; according to the MOU, Janvier would not stop it on his own. The commanders also adopted the triggers for airstrikes set by NATO: 1) by ‘any concentration of forces and/or heavy weapons, and the conduct of other military preparations which, in the common judgment of the NATO and UN military commanders, presents a direct threat to the safe areas’; or 2) by ‘direct attacks (e.g. ground, shelling, or aircraft) on the Safe Areas.’ To the NATO military commanders, it seemed that these conditions for triggering bombing operations already existed at the time the decision was made establishing the triggers. All it would take was some event to precipitate a recommendation from the commanders to commence airstrikes.

General Janvier also agreed to NATO control over airstrikes for suppressing Bosnian Serb air defenses, but he remained suspicious of SEAD operations. Admiral Smith and General Ryan insisted that once a ‘dual-key’ decision was made to initiate air attacks, then the NATO commanders would be free to execute all or part of the Dead Eye

119 Admiral Smith, interview; and Ryan, interview.
120 NATO Official D; Military Official Q; Admiral Smith, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
121 Snyder and Harrington, 184; AFSOUTH, ‘Deliberate Force,’ Fact Sheet, 3; and Leurdijk, 78.
123 Zoerb, 30/April/1997; and Military Official Q.
124 ‘BACS,’ 10.15; and AFSOUTH, Deliberate Force Fact Sheet,’ 2-3.
125 Ryan, interview; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
plan without requesting further approval from General Janvier. As Admiral Smith recalled: 'When we put together the MOU, we included that in writing—that the turning of the key would authorize me to strike, at will, those targets which I thought were necessary to neutralize the integrated air defense sites.'\(^\text{126}\) It was a matter of force protection, and Janvier understood it and agreed to it in principle.\(^\text{127}\) However, he was wary that Ryan and Admiral Smith might use Dead Eye to conduct airstrikes unrelated to the Bosnian Serb air defenses, in circumvention of the target approval procedures governing Deliberate Force; therefore, Janvier insisted he be kept informed of all Dead Eye operations.\(^\text{128}\)

On 14 August, General Ryan presented a detailed briefing on his concept of operations for Deliberate Force to General Janvier and Admiral Smith.\(^\text{129}\) The meeting also served as a Joint Targeting Board, whereby the commanders vetted potential targets to ensure they were valid military targets that could be linked to desired military and political objectives. In this case the objective was to make the BSA stop attacking or threatening a 'safe area.'\(^\text{130}\) As General Ryan's chief planner, Colonel Zoerb later noted, this objective was easy to state, but it did not do much to define the shape the air operations would eventually take.\(^\text{131}\) The military objective of Deliberate Force was to destroy the things that gave the BSA superiority over their adversaries.\(^\text{132}\) This meant attacking BSA command and control facilities, and certain supply and infrastructure targets that Mladic needed in order to maneuver his more capable, but less numerous, forces.\(^\text{133}\) Of approximately 150 potential targets General Ryan put before the board, just under ninety were approved as viable Option 1 and 2 candidates for NATO airstrikes.\(^\text{134}\) While General Janvier agreed these were valid airstrike targets, he was very careful to ensure he was not giving his advance approval for hitting the entire list of targets, should he decide to turn the UN key in the days ahead.\(^\text{135}\) By this point, General Janvier had come to accept the two wider zones of action, each covering over half of Bosnia. The target sets for the 'safe area' defense plans covering Sarajevo and Gorazde contained many of the same targets, so with the wider ZOAs approved, planners at the CAOC

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\(^{126}\) Admiral Smith, interview.

\(^{127}\) Janvier, interview; and Military Official Q.

\(^{128}\) Janvier, interview; and Military Official Q.

\(^{129}\) 'BACS,' 2.9, and 4.11.

\(^{130}\) Zoerb, 30/April/1997.

\(^{131}\) Ibid.

\(^{132}\) General Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.

\(^{133}\) Ibid.

\(^{134}\) 'BACS,' 4.11.
combined the two into one overall plan called Operation Vulcan. Those targets approved by Janvier on 14 August, which also belonged to the Vulcan target set, served as the initial menu of targets for Operation Deliberate Force two weeks later.

Additional procedural arrangements between UNPROFOR and AIRSOUTH were ironed out on Thursday, 17 August, when General Ryan, General Smith, and Major General David Pennefather, who headed the operations staff of the RRF, met to discuss a draft Air-Land Coordination Document. With no doctrine to guide them, the UN and NATO commanders invented the air-land document to coordinate and de-conflict, *inter alia*, targets and use of the airspace over Bosnia. If air operations commenced, Generals Ryan and Smith would nominate targets to Admiral Smith and General Janvier, who would decide whether or not to approve the attacks. In agreeing on procedures for nominating targets, General Ryan proposed that General Smith pick all CAS targets, and the two commanders would share responsibility for nominating interdiction targets near the RRF. General Ryan would be responsible for picking airstrike targets farther afield, and for deciding which air defense targets to strike. This division of responsibilities reflected the needs of the commanders to ensure force protection and mission accomplishment. For General Smith to be able to use airpower to protect his forces, he needed control over CAS. Likewise, Ryan needed to have a free hand in selecting air defense targets. Since part of General Smith’s mission was to forestall a BSA attack on Sarajevo, he needed to be able to nominate the close-in interdiction targets. For Ryan, interdiction targets were important to limiting BSA mobility and attritting its military capability.

135 Military Official Q.
136 ‘BACS,’ 4.9; Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
137 ‘BACS,’ 12.14; and Zoerb, ‘AU’s Deliberate Force Report.’
138 AFSOUTH, ‘Deliberate Force,’ Fact Sheet, 3; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and ‘BACS,’ 4.10.
139 Nicholls, ‘Bosnia,’ 35; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Ryan, interview.
140 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 30/April/1997.
141 ‘BACS,’ 4.10; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Ryan, interview. See also, Nicholls, ‘Bosnia,’ 35.
142 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Ryan, interview.
143 Rapid Reaction Force Operations Staff, ‘HQ 1 (UK) ARMD DIV RRFOS Brief,’ 17 November 1995, slide no. 18; and Nicholls, ‘Bosnia,’ 35.
Conclusion

In the judgment of the UN and NATO theater commanders, it was not possible to
defend the ‘safe areas’ with airpower alone. The fall of Srebrenica might have served to
make that point, if airpower had been used earlier and with greater commitment.
However, as political factors aligned behind US leadership for a more robust use of
airpower, heralding its limitations would not have served the interests of America, the US
commanders in NATO, or, arguably, the Alliance. As Western impatience with the UN’s
approach in Bosnia opened the door for forceful air operations, NATO theater-level
commanders, and General Rupert Smith, actively pushed back the boundaries
constraining the use of airpower. This set the stage so that when airpower was called for,
it could be used in a way the commanders believed was most effective. Moreover, senior
airmen insisted upon pre-approval for a SEAD campaign in the event of NATO air
operations. By building a plan around real tactical limitations, and setting it as a
precondition for airstrikes, the NATO commanders ensured General Janvier would not
falter in decisions to authorize SEAD during Deliberate Force. Amongst the theater-level
commanders, General Janvier harbored the greatest misgivings about the utility of a
NATO bombing campaign, and he resisted the shift from UN to NATO primacy.
Ultimately, however, Janvier took his political orders and went along with the NATO
plans, even though he remained uneasy about a policy that publicly implied the
continuation of the UN’s primacy and its impartial role in Bosnia, but in reality was
headed in a more belligerent direction. However, Janvier’s mission was waning, and his
forces were growing increasingly less vulnerable, even as the importance of NATO’s
mission and the likelihood that NATO airmen would be put in harm’s way were growing.
Zones of Action and Target Distribution

Figure 8.2: Zones of Action and Target Distribution for Operation Deliberate Force. The southeastern zone included all targets to the south and east of the line defined by the points A-B-C. The northwestern zone included targets north and west of the line defined by the points A-B-D. Everything within the wedge near Tuzla, defined by the line C-B-D, was part of both zones.

* General Ryan, briefing to Air Power Conference, slide no. 8.
"The General who values his good name," wrote Marmont, "must see to it that he has a completely free hand. Either he must not be interfered with, or he must be removed from his command." But he must have a sufficiently clear-cut plan of his own on which to base his firmness. Nothing tends more surely to provoke interference from above than a lack of assurance below.

—Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword

Well, everybody had an opinion, but nobody [else] had a plan. So, we were the only ones that had a plan; so we got to execute.

—General Mike Ryan, Interview, 6 June 1997

Operation Deliberate Force highlighted the political-military dimension of the struggle by theater-level commanders to influence the use of airpower in Bosnia. The ascendancy of Richard Holbrooke in negotiations for a settlement of the wider Yugoslav conflict led him to seek some control over NATO airpower. In his attempt to influence the campaign, Holbrooke clashed with Admiral Smith, the commander responsible for NATO forces and the success of Deliberate Force. As the first section of this chapter shows, Admiral Smith invoked these command responsibilities to maintain his control over operations: first with General Janvier in order to win UN approval for proposed targets, later with Holbrooke during a pause in the bombing. The need to balance risks to one’s forces and mission accomplishment is a serious responsibility borne by commanders, and because of their military expertise, commanders may be the best judges of risks. As the second section of this chapter demonstrates, a commander may set limits on the risks he will take in order to accomplish a given mission.

However, responsibility also gives commanders leverage for shaping operations, and that influence is fortified when it is combined with expertise and control over
information. Because air strategy revolves around targeting decisions, a commander who controls information about targets has a good chance of preserving operational autonomy while influencing air campaign strategy. During Operation Deliberate Force, General Ryan and Admiral Smith maintained a close hold on information about the campaign, so as to keep control of it, and ensure its success. However this tight military governing of air operations led to friction between NATO’s theater-level commanders—especially Admiral Smith—and some US and European political authorities.

9.1 OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE: DEFENSE OF SARAJEVO

As August drew to a close, Serb shelling of Gorazde and Sarajevo prompted Bosnian government calls for NATO action. The UN announced on 18 August that no new peacekeepers would replace the British forces who were set to leave Gorazde at month’s end—a move which the Bosnian government feared might signal the international community’s abandonment of Gorazde’s 60,000 Muslims.1 Four days later, a Bosnian Serb shell fell on Sarajevo killing six people and wounding nearly 40 others.2 The government in Sarajevo demanded the Serbs be punished, but the UN refused to act because the Serb shelling was provoked by Bosnian army attacks on the Serb suburb of Vogosca.3 A similar transaction near Gorazde also failed to elicit airstrikes.4 While the Bosnian government seemed intent on creating a cause for Western intervention, Bosnian Serb leaders reportedly gathered in Belgrade and consented to make Serbia’s President Milosevic their lead negotiator on the six member team that would represent the breakaway Serbs at upcoming US-led peace talks.5 Richard Holbrooke, speaking on a US television news show on 27 August, warned the Serbs of Western intervention should the upcoming round of peace talks fail.6 However, intervention was triggered before the talks even began.

The Trigger

Shortly after 10:00 on Monday morning, 28 August 1995, Serb shells began falling again on Sarajevo. Over the next ten minutes, five rounds hit the capital, with the

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., and 629.
5 Fedarko, ‘Louder Than Words,’ 57; and Ridding, Martin, and Silber, ‘Bosnian Threat to Quit Talks Unless Nato Punishes Serbs.’
6 Silber and Clark, ‘US Warns Serbs.’
fourth round landing in the crowded Markale market, killing at least 37 people and wounding more than 80. The Bosnian government threatened to boycott the upcoming peace talks unless NATO and the UN carried out airstrikes against the Serbs. When Admiral Smith learned of the blast, he phoned Zagreb to inform the UN of his intent to turn the NATO key, if, indeed, the Serbs were the guilty party. General Janvier was attending his son’s wedding in France when the blast occurred, thus General Rupert Smith held the UN ‘key’ for NATO airstrikes. As UN investigators sought to discover the origins of the blast, the last of the British forces in Gorazde withdrew eastward into Serbia. They reached Serbia around 8:30 p.m., on 28 August, arriving safely in Belgrade early the next morning—a little less than 24 hours before the first bombs of Deliberate Force slammed into targets in southeastern Bosnia. UN investigators proved to General Smith’s satisfaction that the Serbs had shelled the market, and on the night 28 August, he and Admiral Smith decided to order airstrikes against the Serbs. However, General Smith asked for a one-day delay before commencing the air campaign so that he could secure his forces. In the final hours leading up to Operation Deliberate Force, French soldiers withdrew from two observation posts near Sarajevo, leaving no UN peacekeepers for the Bosnian Serbs to take hostage.

When the market blast occurred, General Ryan was already at the CAOC for an exercise—turned execution—of the Vulcan plan. By the next morning he was joined by a small team of planners, led by Colonel Zoerb. Admiral Smith sent a message through NATO’s military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, recalling aircraft tasked to support Deny Flight. Likewise, he ordered the US aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt to steam.

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8 Nelan, 76; and Harriet Martin, ‘UN Threatens Raids.’
9 Major General Michael C. Short, USAF, interview by author, 2 May 1997, Ramstein, Germany, tape recording, author’s personal collection; Zoerb, 25 May 1997; Teske, interview by author; and Atkinson, ‘Anatomy of NATO’s Decision.’
10 Military Official Q.
11 Royal Welch Fusiliers, 69-70.
12 Atkinson, ‘Anatomy of NATO’s Decision;’ ‘BACS,’ 5.3; and Military Official Q.
13 ‘BACS,’ 5.1.
14 Janvier, interview; and Beale, 36. A report citing a US admiral said that by the end of August, the UN had reduced the number of peacekeepers in Bosnia from a peak of ‘22,000 to fewer than 3,600.’ Komarow, ‘U.N. Pullback Gives NATO Jets Breathing Room.’ There were some Russian soldiers in a Bosnian Serb held area near Sarajevo but, because of the traditional close relationship between the Serbs and Russians, they were not expected to be in any danger of being taken hostage. Facts 1995, 630.
17 Ibid., 5.1-5.3; Colonel Steve Teske, USAF, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Campbell, et. al., 14 February 1996, Ramstein, Germany, transcript of tape recording, BACS Collection; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
into the Adriatic, within easy striking distance of targets in Bosnia.\(^{18}\) On 29 August, the CAOC leaders received the official order to go ahead with the air campaign, but they elected to proceed with a scaled-down schedule of sorties that day, in order to mask preparations for the next day’s attacks.\(^{19}\)

The Targets

Aware of the impending airstrikes, General Janvier hastily returned to his compound in Zagreb, arriving Tuesday morning, 29 August. At 9:30 a.m., his staff updated him on the situation, and at the end of that meeting Janvier announced that, as of that moment, he once again held the UN key.\(^{20}\) Though he did not overrule General Smith’s decision to turn the key, that evening Janvier demurred when it came time to approve the first batch of airstrike targets.\(^{21}\) Inexplicably, General Janvier had not been shown the proposed list of thirteen targets until late in the afternoon.\(^{22}\) With the first wave of attacks just a few hours away, Admiral Smith phoned for word of Janvier’s approval. Janvier asked for more time to consider the targets, but the AFSOUTH commander pressed him for a decision; in doing so, Admiral Smith later claimed he told Janvier: ‘My pilots are showing up in the ready rooms, and they don’t know which targets to go hit, so I’ve got to have your answer now. Because you’re endangering the lives of my pilots and I won’t put up with that.’\(^{23}\) Under pressure from Admiral Smith, General Janvier agreed to hit five of the thirteen targets nominated by General Ryan.\(^{24}\) It was the only time Admiral Smith said he could recall losing his temper in his dealings with General Janvier.\(^{25}\) Smith later said he told Janvier: ‘This is crazy. I will start the bombing operations, but I must tell you that I’m going to write a letter up my chain of command telling them that you’ve abrogated your side of the agreement, and that this is a failed campaign at the very outset.’\(^{26}\) After quick consultations with his advisors in Zagreb, Janvier consented to authorize ten of the thirteen targets, but he refused to approve three

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\(^{19}\) ‘BACS,’ 5.3; and Teske, interview by Campbell.

\(^{20}\) Military Official Q.

\(^{21}\) Admiral Smith, interview; Short; and Atkinson, ‘Anatomy of NATO’s Decision.’

\(^{22}\) Janvier, interview; Admiral Smith, interview.

\(^{23}\) Admiral Smith, interview. Admiral Smith admitted he was exaggerating the urgency slightly, because the first round of strikes were going after air defense targets and did not require Janvier’s approval. However, the second batch of strikes, which Janvier did need to approve, was scheduled within two hours of the first.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.
targets that had the word ‘barracks’ in their title. Admiral Smith gave General Ryan the go ahead to hit the ten targets, and told him to change the names of the three ‘barracks’ to more accurately reflect the nature of the objects NATO wanted to bomb at those sites.

Admiral Smith’s frustration with General Janvier reflected the shift for AFSOUTH from being the supporting to the supported element of the UN-NATO team. For Deliberate Force bombing operations, Smith’s forces were at risk, not Janvier’s. Furthermore, Admiral Smith, not the UN commander, was responsible for mission accomplishment. In pressuring Janvier, Admiral Smith invoked these two principal command responsibilities—force protection and mission accomplishment. As the commander accountable for the forces at risk and the outcome of the operation, Admiral Smith expected, even demanded, support from Janvier—much as previous UN commanders had demanded support from Admiral Smith.

General Janvier’s reluctance to authorize strikes against targets labeled as ‘barracks’ was emblematic of a lack of understanding about airpower and targets that persisted well after Deliberate Force. The concept denoted by the term ‘target’ had changed with the advent of precision guided munitions (PGMs), but the military vernacular had failed to keep up with this technological change. Poor bombing accuracies in the Second World War drove allied air forces to conduct area bombing—even when theory and doctrine called for precision bombing. By Desert Storm, some NATO air forces had the capability to strike precisely at individual targets, such as buildings, communication towers, and aircraft shelters. A large number of such ‘targets’ might be concentrated at one site, an airfield for example; yet target libraries continued to refer to these sites, or target complexes, as single targets. Planners at an operational headquarters were apt to use the term ‘target’ to denote the entire site, while a pilot flying a mission might use the word ‘target’ to describe the individual object he was supposed to hit at the site. With PGMs, it became increasingly important to distinguish between the two types of ‘targets,’ but there was no official terminology for doing so. For those

27 Ibid.; Janvier, interview; Military Official Q; and ‘BACS,’ 10.17 and 10.20.
28 Admiral Smith, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
29 During and after Deliberate Force some observers interpreted the repeated bombing of certain targets as wasted attacks against holes in the ground. See: AFSOUTH, transcript of press briefing, 9 September 1995; idem, 12 September 1995; and Honig and Both, 186 n. 11.
30 W. Hays Park, ‘Precision’ Bombing and “Area” Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?'
31 Target Descriptions: Pale Ammo Depot South, and Hadzici Ammo Storage Depot, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.
32 The DoD Dictionary of Military Terms contains four US definitions for the word target and five NATO definitions. The first definition offered for both US and NATO usage is: ‘a geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces.’ The dictionary does not include a listing
whose business it was to plan and execute air attacks, the term ‘aim point’ or ‘DMPI’ (desired mean point of impact—pronounced ‘dimp-ee’) was used to differentiate the individual target from the larger target complex. As an air campaign, Deliberate Force was unique in that the majority of bombs dropped were PGMs. After the Pale airstrikes, and the many briefings General Janvier had received on NATO air plans, Admiral Smith incorrectly assumed the UN commander understood the distinction between the larger target complexes and the individual targets or DMPIs that were going to be bombed.

In Bosnia, targets such as the Hadzici and Pale ammunition storage sites contained up to twenty bunkers or buildings, each one a separate ‘target’ with a specific aim point. NATO planners analyzed each of these individual targets with its respective aim point in terms of the utility for hitting it, and its potential for collateral damage. Moreover, in Bosnia, several large target complexes were concentrated in certain areas. In the vicinity of Hadzici, there were at least three target sites: a military vehicle repair facility, a military equipment storage site, and an ammunition storage site. The number of individual targets or DMPIs at these three target sites ranged from ten to over sixty. It was two days after Deliberate Force began that Admiral Smith finally realized General Janvier had not distinguished between the larger target sites and the individual DMPIs. Furthermore, many of the targets or target complexes in Bosnia still bore their old Cold War labels, which by 1995 no longer reflected the true nature of the sites. So, a target labeled a ‘barracks’ might no longer have served primarily for housing troops. Furthermore, target sites actually containing barracks often held other buildings or objects which NATO wished to bomb. For example, the ‘Sarajevo Army Barracks’ contained BSA air defense assets and military storage facilities. As directed by Admiral Smith, AFSOUTH planners changed the names of the three barracks, later resubmitted them for

for either ‘aim point’ or ‘desired mean point of impact’ or DMPI, which air planners, targeteers, and aircrew use to denote specific ‘targets’ within a larger target complex. Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms (London: Greenhill Books, 1991), 388.

33 ‘BACS,’ 8.1; and Ryan, briefing slide, Air Power Conference, slide nos. 43 and 44. Of the total 1,026 bombs dropped, 738 were PGMs.
34 Admiral Smith, briefing to the Air War College.
35 Target Descriptions: Pale Ammo Depot South, and Hadzici Ammo Storage Depot, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.
36 ‘BACS,’ 10.11; and Ashy, interview by Owen. MCM-KAD-084-93, ‘Operational Options for Airstrikes,’ from August of 1993 contained an explicit statement directing NATO commanders to try to minimize collateral damage.
38 Ibid.
39 Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College.
40 Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
General Janvier's approval, and NATO aircrews bombed them without hitting any buildings housing Mladic's soldiers.\footnote{Target Description: Sarajevo Army Barracks and Ordnance Depot, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.}

General Janvier's reluctance to approve airstrike targets was not due solely to inadequate time for considering the target list, or concerns about what NATO was going to bomb. Even after he was delegated the UN key, Janvier continued to discuss all bombing decisions with Mr. Akashi, and Akashi remained philosophically opposed to NATO bombing operations.\footnote{Admiral Smith, briefing Air War College; and Zoerb, 30/April/1997.} In addition, General Janvier remained uncomfortable participating in the charade of UN impartiality whilst NATO conducted a campaign aimed solely at the Bosnian Serbs.\footnote{Admiral Smith, interview; and Military Official Q.} Richard Holbrooke has claimed that direct pressure from Kofi Annan, then UN Under Secretary-General for peacekeeping, was necessary in order for Janvier and Akashi to give in to NATO demands for bombing on 29 August.\footnote{Holbrooke, To End, 99 and 103. According to Holbrooke: 'Annan's gutsy performance in those twenty-four hours was to play a central role in Washington's strong support for him a year later as the successor to Boutros Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General of the United Nations. Indeed, in a sense Annan won the job on that day.'} Describing the target approval process with Janvier after the first stormy experience, Admiral Smith later said: 'It was pretty pro forma after that.'\footnote{Admiral Smith, interview.} Overall, Janvier's reluctance to initiate Deliberate Force stemmed, to some degree, from his lack of expertise and confidence in airpower; but more importantly, Janvier's hesitation derived from his need for political direction—despite the public pronouncements about his authority in decisions for airstrikes.

### Executing Deliberate Force

Once Admiral Smith and General Janvier approved the proposed targets, General Ryan was responsible for executing Deliberate Force. Speaking at a press conference on the second day of Deliberate Force, Admiral Smith said: 'Once General Janvier and I decided it was time to execute air operations, we turned the air operations over to General Ryan and he is responsible for execution.'\footnote{Admiral Smith, 'NATO Air Strike,' transcript of press conference, 31 August 1995.} General Ryan's means of control over the air operation were many. Within physical, meteorological, and logistical constraints, Ryan could decide which of the approved targets to hit, the sequence for attacking them, and how rapidly to strike them.\footnote{Robert Owen, 'Balkans: Part 2,' 9.} He determined how far to go in attacking the Bosnian Serb
air defense system before going after other BSA targets. The theater air commander was also free to choose which aim points to strike within a given target complex, what time of day to attack them, and which aircraft and ordnance to employ against the aim points. Finally, General Ryan determined what restrictions, or special instructions, to issue to the aircrews who were attacking the targets. The latitude given to Ryan by Admiral Smith, and the broad mission statement from the NAC, allowed General Ryan to use airpower in a manner he thought most effective.

From the outset of Deliberate Force, General Ryan’s decisions reflected the way in which a commander must use his expertise to balance force protection against mission accomplishment. Given time, General Ryan would have preferred to destroy the entire Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system (IADS) before hitting any of the other BSA targets. However, he felt compelled, initially, to confine attacks against air defenses to southeastern Bosnia and to forego the heart of the IADS in the northwest. Eliminating the entire IADS would have delayed the attacks Ryan believed were needed to diminish the Bosnian Serb military capability. Despite tough talk from some Western political leaders after the London Conference, experience suggested permission to continue the bombing might not last long. Therefore, General Ryan opted to begin strikes against BSA targets after just one wave of attacks aimed at degrading the Serb air defenses in the southeast zone of action. The added risk to NATO aircrews, caused by the delay in fully prosecuting Dead Eye, was small so long as aircraft stayed clear of northwestern Bosnia. By putting off attacks against the northwestern component of the air defense system, Ryan applied his expertise to fulfill his principal responsibilities as a commander—achieving his assigned mission with the least unnecessary risks and costs to his forces.

Though the air operations between 30 August and 14 September of 1995 have become known as Operation Deliberate Force, they were not simply an execution of the Deliberate Force plan crafted by Colonel ‘Doc’ Zoerb earlier that year. Operation Deliberate Force, as it unfolded, embodied elements of three distinct sets of plans built

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49 Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
50 Robert Owen, ‘Balkans: Part 2,’ 9; Hornburg, interview by Reagan and Thompson; Zoerb; 30/April/1997; and Short.
51 Robert Owen, ‘Balkans: Part 2,’ 9; and ‘BACS,’ 10.17 and 5.10.
52 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
53 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
54 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
55 ‘BACS,’ 5.3-5.4.
56 The French Mirage 2000 shot down on the first day of Deliberate Force was hit by a shoulder fired, infrared guided SAM near Sarajevo. Attacking the Bosnian Serb IADS could do little to neutralize such threats, and the best defense against them was to stay above their reach.
during the nine months before the Sarajevo market blast. First, in late 1994, planners at the CAOC developed a plan called Dead Eye, which was designed solely for defeating Bosnian Serb air defenses. The second relevant plan took shape in early 1995, when General Ryan instructed his planners to develop a campaign plan for degrading the BSA’s fighting potential. The plan built by Colonel Zoerb, which I have referred to as the Deliberate Force plan, contained targets throughout Bosnia, and it was not linked to the defense of any particular ‘safe area.’ Third, after Srebrenica and Zepa fell, Western leaders vowed to prevent the loss of the remaining four ‘safe areas,’ and planners at the CAOC created target lists for the defense of each of the remaining enclaves. In August, the plans for defending Gorazde and Sarajevo were combined into one new plan called ‘Vulcan,’ which Ryan went to the CAOC to exercise on the morning of 28 August.58 When General Ryan executed Deliberate Force, the operation contained elements of all three sets of plans. The airstrike targets were initially chosen from the Vulcan plan.59 The air defense targets came from a portion of the Dead Eye plan.60 The heart of the operation—the logic behind the prosecution of the campaign—derived from the Deliberate Force plan.61

Ryan’s execution of Operation Deliberate Force supported an observation made a century earlier by Moltke the elder:

> Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end. Certainly the commander in chief (Feldherr) will keep his great objective (Zweck) continuously in mind, undisturbed by the vicissitudes of events. But the path on which he hopes to reach it can never be firmly established in advance.62

Moltke’s comment fits the case of Deliberate Force, because in prosecuting the campaign, General Ryan was guided by his view of the objective more than the details of existing plans.63 Ryan was bent on undermining the BSA’s military advantage.64 In his view, that was the surest way to end the threat to the ‘safe areas’ and to get Mladic to comply with UN resolutions and NATO ultimatums.65 Mladic would determine whether the bombing

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57 See Chapter 7.
59 ‘BACS,’ 4.14 and 5.3.
60 Zoerb, 29/April/1997; and ‘BACS,’ 4.14 and 5.4.
61 Ryan, interview; and Zoerb, 30 April 1998.
62 Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War, 45.
63 To differentiate between the types of targets that were bombed, I will refer to targets hit in order to degrade the BSA’s war-fighting potential as ‘Deliberate Force targets’, using that term interchangeably with ‘airstrike targets.’ The other category of targets hit during Operation Deliberate Force will be referred to as ‘Dead Eye targets,’ a term I will alternate with ‘air defense targets’ or ‘IADS targets.’
64 Ryan, interview.
65 Ibid.; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
would lead to a quick ceasefire, or whether the airstrikes would continue until the BSA’s fighting potential was drawn down to a level on a par with the Bosnian government forces. The speed with which General Ryan prosecuted Deliberate Force targets demonstrated his desire to level the playing field as much as possible before Mladic gave in, or international political will gave out.66

Collateral Damage and Other Priorities

By doing his utmost to limit collateral damage, General Ryan again faced the potential need to make a tradeoff between force protection and mission accomplishment; though, as with the decision to delay prosecuting the northwest part of Dead Eye, the added risks were minimal. Collateral damage concerns factor into targeting decisions whenever Western nations consider employing airpower.67 In operations other than war, such as Deliberate Force, it is probably safe to say that avoiding collateral damage will usually rank just behind protection of friendly forces as a commander’s top priorities. Although Deliberate Force seemed like combat, General Ryan was acutely aware NATO was not at war.68 In total war, an air component commander’s priorities are likely to be: 1) mission accomplishment, 2) force protection, and 3) collateral damage, in that order. In operations other than war, the priorities are more likely to be: 1) force protection, 2) collateral damage, and 3) mission accomplishment.69 As Major Reed, a contributor to the Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) averred, this was definitely the case in Deliberate Force.70 And, as the surface-to-air threat declined in Bosnia, General Ryan’s concern for collateral damage motivated him to issue instructions that appeared to place collateral damage on a near equal footing with force protection.71 Several BACS contributors described a policy during the last two days of Deliberate Force restricting tactics during bombing attacks so as to further reduce chances for collateral damage, thus illustrating

66 General Ryan and a handful of other CAOC leaders and US planners hardly slept from the outset of Deliberate Force until the pause two days later. Robert Owen, ‘Balkans: Part 2,’ 10; ‘BACS,’ 9.2; Teske, interview by author; and Ryan, interview.
67 See, for example, DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix O, ‘The Role of the Law of War,’ esp. 611-617; and RUSI, The Democratic Management of Defence, 48-52.
68 Ryan, interview; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
69 The reason why the priorities ought to align this way follows the same logic as in the discussion of ROE, weakness errors, and escalation errors covered in Chapter 2, section 2.2.
70 ‘BACS,’ 10.2 and 10.20-10.23. Admiral Smith made this point repeatedly in his press conferences during Deliberate Force, and in his briefing to the Air War College.
71 ‘BACS,’ 5.10 and 10.17-10.18.
how a commander must apply his expertise to make tradeoffs between force protection and mission accomplishment.\textsuperscript{72}

Colonel Robert Owen, head of the US Air Force’s ‘Balkans Air Campaign Study’ has shown that commanders in AFSOUTH were more sensitive to collateral damage than the American diplomats involved in Deliberate Force.\textsuperscript{73} However, General Ryan and Admiral Smith believed European and UN political sensibilities mattered as much as American tolerance for unintended damage.\textsuperscript{74} At a briefing to the USAF’s Air War College, a few weeks after the campaign, Admiral Smith highlighted this point, when he explained that if General Ryan had been less diligent in planning the airstrikes, or NATO aircrews had been less careful when executing them, then:

I believe that we would have lost the political and the public support to continue these operations. They would have ceased. And I do not think we would have people in Dayton today talking about peace. That’s a firm conviction of mine, and believe me, I’m probably as good as anybody in terms of experience and knowledge to make that judgment, because I was there watching it day by day.\textsuperscript{75}

One high ranking NATO official later put it in more personal terms, describing General Ryan’s painstaking efforts to avoid collateral damage as, ‘very wise, because, if something had gone wrong, he would have been on the next plane out.’\textsuperscript{76} Moreover, General Ryan personally accepted responsibility for collateral damage, later telling an audience in London:

If you’re the commander of an air operation [collateral damage is] your business, nobody else’s business...Don’t let it get down to the individual air crew or unit. If they screw it up. It’s normally your screw-up, not theirs.\textsuperscript{77}

The lack of tolerance for collateral damage amongst NATO’s political authorities was consistent with the concept of proportionality from the laws of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{78} According to official NATO statements, there was no military objective other than to defend the remaining ‘safe areas.’\textsuperscript{79} UN political authorities reportedly directed the RRF to halt offensive operations after the second day of Deliberate Force, demonstrating the

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
\textsuperscript{75} Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College.
\textsuperscript{76} NATO Official C.
\textsuperscript{77} Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
\textsuperscript{78} As discussed in Chapter 6. For a discussion of collateral damage, proportionality, and future implications regarding PGMs, see, ‘BACS,’ 10.22.
\textsuperscript{79} NATO, Press Release (95)73, 30 August 1995; and Admiral Smith, transcript of news conference, 31 August 1995.
absence of official support within the UN for any positive military objective. With no enemy, ostensibly, and no overt political backing for leveling the playing field, it would have been difficult for NATO commanders to make the case that any appreciable collateral damage was proportional to the overall objective of the operation. By minimizing collateral damage, General Ryan and Admiral Smith were working within the confines of the laws of armed conflict, and the narrow objective for the bombing established by the UN.

The AFSOUTH commanders' concerns for collateral damage were apparently driven mainly by their desire to maintain political cohesion within the alliance and with the UN. From the outset of Deliberate Force, NATO officers in Naples conducted a precision-attack marketing pitch. As with press conferences during the Gulf War, AFSOUTH displayed cockpit videos of precision munitions slamming into military targets. In addition to these public presentations, Admiral Smith presented General Janvier a photograph to impress upon the UN commander NATO's sensitivity toward collateral damage and the alliance's ability to limit it. Contained in the photo was a large building with a red cross ringed by other buildings. The picture, taken by French reconnaissance aircraft, clearly showed the outermost buildings flattened, inner buildings left standing as a buffer, and the large building bearing the red cross untouched.

Minimizing the number of BSA soldiers killed by Deliberate Force air operations, was also important for keeping the UN on-board with NATO, and it was something General Ryan elected to make a priority based on the peace support nature of his mission. General Ryan's chief planner, Colonel Zoerb, identified certain elite BSA troops as desirable targets, believing the best way to stop Mladic was to attack his most effective fighting forces. Two years after the campaign, when asked about the myriad political constraints bounding the air operation, General Ryan added:

80 Admiral Smith, interview; Robert Owen, 'Balkans: Part 2,' 14. A key planner and Chief G2/G3 on the RRF Operations Staff (RRFOS), Colonel D. V. Nicholls, made no mention in his article for RUSI Journal of UN orders to halt offensive operations. However, RUSI's annual International Security Review for 1996 reported the RRF fired 1,000 shells before the pause on 1 September, and an RRFOS briefing showed 1,381 total rounds fired when the campaign ended on 14 September. Nicholls, 'Bosnia,' 35-36; RUSI, ISR 1996, 69; RRFOS, 'HQ 1 (UK) ARMD DIV RRFOS Brief, 17 Nov 95,' slide no. 25.
81 For a discussion of collateral damage, proportionality, and future implications regarding PGMs, see, 'BACS,' 10.4-10.5, 10.17-10.18, 10.22.
82 Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College.
83 Admiral Smith, 'NATO Air Strikes,' press conference, 31 August 1995; Atkinson, 'NATO Tailors Bombing Information;' and William Matthews, 'Accuracy is Phenomenal.'
84 Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College.
85 When the author interviewed General Janvier in 1998 and asked about the photo, the general had his military aid fetch the framed photograph from his office.
86 Zoerb, 29/April/1997.
There was one that was unsaid...no one ever told me to do this, but, limit carnage—limit loss of life. So, we didn't hit buildings that had apparent administrative functions....So we limited by time of day, by function, by location, loss of life on the Bosnian Serb Army side.\(^{87}\)

As his chief of staff noted, 'anytime there was doubt, we didn't bomb...When we went after targets where there might be people around, we went at two o'clock in the morning, in a clear attempt on Mike's part to minimize loss of life.'\(^{88}\) General Ryan's efforts not only helped to keep the UN from breaking ranks, they also apparently facilitated the peace negotiations later at Dayton. At the Dayton peace talks, one member of the Bosnian Serb negotiating team alleged large numbers of casualties and collateral damage, in an apparent attempt to strengthen the Serb bargaining position, but President Milosevic dismissed the ruse claiming, 'that there were only 25 fatalities in the whole air campaign.'\(^{89}\)

General Ryan had good political and practical reasons for limiting BSA casualties. Political consent for the campaign, especially from the UN, dictated that NATO bombing go only so far in attacking the Serbs.\(^{90}\) Avoiding BSA casualties, as much as possible, kept NATO from crossing a fuzzy line between coercive diplomacy and war. The UN could not have openly endorsed a campaign against the BSA without a new Security Council resolution, and Russia would certainly have vetoed that. Without the UN's legitimizing acquiescence for the campaign, NATO would probably have called for an end to Deliberate Force, leaving the US to decide whether to stop or continue with an ad hoc coalition. Moreover, had General Ryan purposely targeted BSA troops, in their barracks or in the field, he would have initiated a dynamic that would have been difficult to control. As one senior NATO staff officer put it: 'Lord knows that once you kill somebody over there, it becomes a family...vendetta, or religious thing, or whatever; and it's hard to stop the cycle.'\(^{91}\) The AF SOUTH commanders knew that if Deliberate Force succeeded, and a peace agreement followed, then NATO forces would be put on the ground in Bosnia to implement the agreement—and they would be responsible for commanding that force. In all likelihood, the commanders did not want to poison the

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\(^{87}\) Ryan, interview.

\(^{88}\) Short.

\(^{89}\) Ambassador Christopher Hill, US State Department, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Owen, 27 February 1996, transcript of tape recording, 16, File H-1, BACS Collection. Also see, Beale, 37. Note: The figure of 25 killed is not to be taken as an official or reliable estimate of the number of casualties from Deliberate Force.

\(^{90}\) Janvier, interview.

post-Deliberate Force environment by giving the Bosnian Serbs cause for revenge. Thus, political and practical reasons militated against targeting BSA soldiers.

Pause

Negotiations for a comprehensive settlement in the former Yugoslavia were ostensibly separate from the airstrikes, which were conducted for the much narrower purpose of alleviating the Bosnian Serb threat to the ‘safe areas.’ Although General Ryan and Richard Holbrooke maintained an arms-length relationship, and denied any connection between the negotiations and Deliberate Force, the two processes became linked on the second day of the campaign. At Milosevic’s instigation, through Paris and the UN, and Holbrooke’s support, through Washington, General Janvier was invited to meet with General Mladic to discuss a halt to the bombing. Janvier asked for a twenty-four hour hold on airstrikes, and Admiral Smith consented. Late on the evening of 31 August, the CAOC staff was notified to withhold all attacks after 4:00 a.m. the following morning—about 50 hours after the campaign had started.

On 1 September, Generals Janvier and Mladic met in the border town of Zvornik, and Janvier sought to gain Mladic’s signature on a document pledging compliance with UN and NATO demands. The initial twenty-four hour pause was overcome by events, as the meeting between the two commanders stretched toward the fourteen hour mark. At the end of the meeting, Mladic brought Janvier a letter promising a Bosnian Serb ceasefire and a withdrawal from the Sarajevo exclusion zone, so long as NATO and Bosnian government forces fulfilled certain Serb conditions. Janvier refused to sign Mladic’s letter, but left for Zagreb confident the BSA commander would soon agree to Western demands. Admiral Smith and a small entourage from Naples flew to Zagreb to meet Janvier at his compound on the airport at Camp Pleso. Janvier convinced Admiral Smith he had made significant progress toward getting Mladic to agree to halt BSA attacks on the ‘safe areas,’ and to withdraw the heavy weapons from

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92 The connections between the two appear to have been indirect, with Holbrooke working through the State Department or NATO Headquarters, only once calling Admiral Smith directly.
93 Janvier, interview; Holbrooke, To End, 107-114; and Atkinson, ‘Anatomy of NATO’s Decision.’
95 Janvier, interview; Facts 1995, 645.
96 Military Interview Q.
97 Ibid.
98 Short; Atkinson, ‘Put to the Test;’ and Military Official Q.
99 Admiral Smith, interview; Short; and Military Official Q.
around Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{109} Without seeking political approval, Smith agreed to Janvier’s proposal to extend the pause out to ninety-six hours, in order to give Mladic time to comply.\textsuperscript{101} General Ryan’s chief of staff, who was at the meeting between Janvier and Smith, notified the AIRSOUTH commander that it looked as though Deliberate Force might be over, but General Ryan ‘just postured the forces, getting ready to go again.’\textsuperscript{102}

The reactions of Holbrooke and Willy Claes to news of the longer pause demonstrated the political-military tension coercive diplomacy can engender over who gets to control the use of force. Upon learning of the elongated pause, the two political officials began pressing Admiral Smith and General Janvier to resume the bombing. Richard Holbrooke spoke to Admiral Smith by phone, pushing him to restart the campaign.\textsuperscript{103} Smith rebuffed pressures from outside the chain of command,\textsuperscript{104} and, in Holbrooke’s opinion, the admiral ‘was edging into an area of political judgments that should have been reserved for civilian leaders.’\textsuperscript{105} Though, as Holbrooke noted: ‘Smith saw it differently: he told me that he was “solely responsible” for the safety and well-being of his forces, and he would make his decision, under authority delegated to him by the NATO Council, based on his own judgment.’\textsuperscript{106} However, Admiral Smith could not easily dismiss General Joulwan’s complaints.\textsuperscript{107} Although Admiral Smith had been given the NATO key for bombing, General Joulwan believed once operations commenced, he and the Secretary-General were responsible for ensuring its proper execution.\textsuperscript{108} Meanwhile, the NATO Secretary-General phoned Zagreb and asked Mr. Akashi to put Janvier on the phone. Even though Janvier was not in the NATO chain of command, Claes raged at the UN General for agreeing to the longer pause.\textsuperscript{109} Given that NATO’s credibility was at stake, and given the importance of Holbrooke’s diplomacy, Holbrooke and Claes apparently could not tolerate leaving the bombing decisions entirely to the discretion of the theater commanders.

The matter was finally settled by an ultimatum from the NAC. On the evening of 2 September, NATO ambassadors met to take up the issue of resuming Deliberate Force.

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\textsuperscript{109} Admiral Smith, interview; Short; and Military Official Q.
\textsuperscript{101} Admiral Smith, interview; and Military Official Q.
\textsuperscript{102} Short; and Atkinson, ‘Put to the Test.’
\textsuperscript{103} Joulwan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; and Holbrooke, \textit{To End}, 118.
\textsuperscript{104} Admiral Smith, interview; Holbrooke, \textit{To End}, 118.
\textsuperscript{105} Holbrooke, \textit{To End}, 118.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Admiral Smith, interview; Joulwan, interview; and Holbrooke, \textit{To End}, 118-119.
\textsuperscript{108} Joulwan, interview. In my interview with General Joulwan, he said he cited the terms of reference set up by the first SACEUR, General Eisenhower, to support his case for taking the role as chief executor for Operation Deliberate Force.
\end{small}
Secretary-General Claes ‘ruling on his own authority’ told the NAC ambassadors they were assembled to reaffirm an earlier commitment to back the military commanders in their decisions; they were not gathered to decide themselves whether or not to resume the bombing. The meeting lasted into Sunday morning, 3 September, and ended with an ultimatum threatening to resume airstrikes if the Bosnian Serbs did not 1) remove all heavy weapons from the twenty kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo, 2) cease all attacks on the remaining four ‘safe areas,’ and 3) lift the siege of Sarajevo by allowing unhindered access by road, and air, to the Bosnian capital. According to the ultimatum, the military commanders were free to recommence bombing operations ‘at any moment.’

The extended pause brought Admiral Smith and Richard Holbrooke, the two officials responsible for the different aspects of Western policy toward Bosnia, into conflict over who would control NATO airpower. According to Holbrooke, Admiral Smith used the risk to his forces and the authority granted to him by NATO as a shield to block Holbrooke’s attempt to influence bombing decisions. Holbrooke was leading negotiations on behalf of the West and was responsible for the outcome of what seemed to be the last, best chance to get a peace deal, not only in Bosnia, but in all of the former Yugoslavia. Though he had a hand in stopping the bombing, he was blocked by Admiral Smith and General Janvier from restarting it. Moreover, according to Holbrooke, Admiral Smith forbade General Ryan from having any contact with Holbrooke’s team. Holbrooke could not invoke civilian control over the military himself, in order to restart the bombing, so he pressed his views through those in Washington and Brussels who could exert pressure on Admiral Smith through the US and NATO chains of command. From a negotiator’s perspective, it would have been helpful to have the legitimacy of alliance support and military responsiveness, without the complications associated with getting sixteen nations to agree on a common position, and without having to act through military commanders whose allegiances were to their forces and to diverse international political authorities. As Holbrooke later wrote: ‘A great deal

109 Janvier, interview; and Atkinson, ‘Put to the Test.’
110 Holbrooke, To End, 120; NATO Official D; and NATO Official C.
113 Holbrooke, To End, 119.
114 Ibid., 145 and 362.
115 Holbrooke, To End, 118-120.
of any good negotiation is improvisation within the framework of a general goal." Improvisation would not be possible without some control over the ‘sticks’ one uses in coercive diplomacy. From the standpoint of a military commander, it would have been desirable to get clear objectives and political cover for operations, without interference, or remote steering, from outside the chain of command. In addition to potential conflicts between the military objectives of an operation, and the shifting aims inherent in improvised negotiations, people outside the chain of command are unlikely to be held accountable for problems resulting from their interference in operational matters. Thus, with coercive diplomacy, political-military tension over who gets to control the use of force is probably inevitable.

The NATO ultimatum authorized General Janvier and Admiral Smith to resume bombing at their discretion, but the two commanders elected to give Mladic time to comply with the ultimatum. On the night of 4 September, poor weather over Bosnia hindered NATO’s attempts to verify signs of BSA compliance. The weather cleared the next morning, and the UN and NATO commanders were soon convinced that the vast majority of Serb heavy weapons remained inside the Sarajevo exclusion zone; by mid-morning they decided to go ahead with more airstrikes. At 1:05 p.m., on 5 September, NATO airpower once again began paring away at the BSA’s war-fighting potential.

9.2 DELIBERATE FORCE: LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD AND COERCING THE SERBS

As discussed in Chapter 2, air strategy is mainly a matter of targeting decisions intended to lead to the accomplishment of some objective. By keeping a tight hold on information about targets and battle damage assessment (BDA), General Ryan and Admiral Smith controlled bombing strategy. In doing so, the two airmen sought to minimize the risks to their forces, while maximizing their chances of achieving the objectives of Deliberate Force. In the process though, Admiral Smith further alienated himself from Richard Holbrooke, and upset some NATO political authorities who believed the bombing operations were going too far.

116 Ibid., 111.
119 Admiral Smith, ‘NATO Recommences;’ and Military Interview Q.
120 Admiral Smith, ‘NATO Recommences;’ and Thornhill et al., ‘Hardline Serbs,’ 2.
Figure 9.1: Operation Deliberate Force. The shaded area shows days on which NATO conducted bombing operations. Although 1 September is not shaded, NATO did drop bombs that day before the pause went into effect at 4:00 a.m. Central European Time.

New Objectives

During the bombing pause, NATO clarified the official objective of Deliberate Force, giving General Ryan a better chance to level the playing field, and allowing Richard Holbrooke more scope to use the campaign as part of his coercive diplomacy. As Admiral Smith later put it: ‘the goal posts got moved.’ The day prior to the pause, the AFSOUTH commander told the press: ‘Our operation has one objective. It was stated clearly by Secretary General ClAES at NATO and that objective is to reduce the threat to the Sarajevo safe area and to deter further attacks there or on any other safe area.’

However, at his first press conference after the pause, Smith stated:

Now there are three conditions and you know that they are:
- no attacks on safe areas
- begin immediately a withdrawal of all heavy weapons from the 20 km exclusion zone and complete that withdrawal without any halts or delays
- complete freedom of movement for the UN forces and recognized humanitarian aid distribution assets, as well as free access to Sarajevo airport.

CINCSOUTH stressed, ‘those objectives remain, they are not negotiable.’ This suggested these three conditions for ending Deliberate Force had existed from the

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121 Admiral Smith, ‘NATO Air Strike,’ 31 August 1995.
122 Admiral Smith, ‘NATO Recommences.’
123 Admiral Smith, ‘NATO Recommences.’

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beginning of the campaign, but no such terms had been publicly articulated prior to the NAC ultimatum issued on 3 September. More revealingly, Admiral Smith concluded the press conference saying:

Let me just tell you that we have a pretty good idea of what we want to accomplish in these operations. And whether it's visible to us or not, at this point I think we're making progress towards achieving the level that we desired. So I'm satisfied that we know enough about existing targets to affect the military capability if we continue this process.

These remarks suggested the objective of Deliberate Force was to achieve a certain level of destruction against the Bosnian Serb military, that is, to level the playing field between the BSA and Federation forces. Admiral Smith later conceded: 'We never said what our objective was publicly,' and that the objective was, in fact, to draw down the BSA’s military capability in order to put them on a more even level with their adversaries.

As a result of Admiral Smith's press conference on 6 September, General Joulwan issued a 'Media Policy for Operation Deliberate Force.' The new policy directed subordinate commanders to, 'above all, keep NATO political authorities properly informed.' Aimed at preventing news from reaching NATO ambassadors via their television sets, the new policy required all NATO officers to get clearance from Brussels before making any statements. Admiral Smith subsequently left it to one of his senior staff officers, Group Captain Trevor Murray, to conduct press conferences for the remainder of Deliberate Force. General Joulwan later explained that, 'a very important part for the strategic commander is to acquire the political consensus to give the operational commander flexibility, and to insure you hold sixteen nations together.' In General Joulwan's view, when the NATO nations got together in the Council and forged a position, then that one position set the objectives for the military, even though the common position was unlikely to completely satisfy each individual nation—including the US. Satisfied that NATO had established conditions for success in Bosnia, General

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124 Admiral Smith, interview.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Joulwan, interview; and Atkinson, 'NATO Tailors.'
128 General George Joulwan, cited in Atkinson, 'NATO Tailors.'
129 Joulwan, interview; and Atkinson, 'NATO Tailors.'
130 Admiral Smith next appeared at a press conference on 15 September, a day after suspending Deliberate Force bombing operations. Group Captain Murray ran the meetings with the media on 9, 11, and 12 September. Group Captain Murray's press conferences were all held at 5:00 p.m. Central European Time (CET), in keeping with General Joulwan's guidance. See transcripts of AFSOUTH press conferences 6, 9, 11, 12, and 15 September 1995; and Atkinson, 'NATO Tailors.'
131 Joulwan, interview.
132 Ibid.
Joulwan did not want his subordinates upsetting the fragile political consensus arranged in Brussels. 133

Battle Damage Assessment and Target Selection

Commanders in AFSOUTH were tight-lipped about the results of the bombing as Deliberate Force progressed, and that helped them to preserve their autonomy. 134 At the outset of Deliberate Force, General Ryan saw to it that a message went out directing all agencies involved in the operation to refrain from issuing estimates of BDA. 135 As General Ryan later explained, previous air operations, stretching back to Vietnam, taught him that tight controls were necessary:

So that we didn’t have nations, or particular intelligence agencies, briefing BDA that was not corroborated, and coming up with conclusions from that. None of the nations knew what targets were approved....If you don’t know what the target set is, you can’t measure how you’re doing, because you don’t know what your objective is. And therefore, none of the other agencies were empowered in any way to say...whether we were accomplishing what we thought we needed to accomplish. 136

General Ryan tracked the BDA very closely and provided all of the information to Admiral Smith, who then decided what to release. 137 Even General Janvier complained that he had difficulty getting BDA, and never did get all of the damage assessments. 138 By controlling the BDA closely, the AFSOUTH commanders prevented people on the fringes of policy-making, and people in the press, from grading their performance. 139 It also kept NATO political authorities from ‘helping’ the commanders with operational decisions. Finally, the tight controls on BDA kept the Serbs in the dark about NATO operations and intentions. Speaking about BDA, General Ryan said:

We didn’t let Washington control it, or any of the other nations’ capitals control it, because you didn’t want to have people second-guessing what you were doing. The people you wanted second-guessing what you were doing were the Serbs, not the capitals. 136

Thus, maintaining operational autonomy was one of the principal purposes for the tight controls over BDA.

Ibid.

14 For a discussion of the other reasons for controlling BDA during Deliberate Force, see the chapter by Major Mark McLaughlin, titled, ‘Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility,’ in BACS.


16 Ryan, interview.

17 Ibid.; and Admiral Smith, interview.

18 Janvier, interview.


20 Ryan, interview.
In addition to restricting the release of BDA information, General Ryan exercised personal control in selecting every airstrike target during Deliberate Force, further enhancing his autonomy. Mike Ryan and Rupert Smith nominated targets for approval by Admiral Smith and General Janvier. Once those targets, or target complexes, were approved, General Ryan decided what to hit. In explaining his extraordinary degree of control over targeting, General Ryan told a US Air Force team studying the campaign that he was motivated mainly by his concern for collateral damage; saying:

> You can not delegate selection... There will be no time in the future when [the air commander] will have the option to say, I delegate that responsibility. The commander must be accountable for all actions taken by his forces.

A year after the Deliberate Force campaign, General Ryan expanded on that point at an airpower conference in London, noting: "Your targeting is always going to be joint, it’s always going to be political, and I guarantee it’s going to be on CNN, so you’d better get it right." As the commander who was clearly responsible and accountable for the campaign, Ryan demanded control. Close control of target selection and, more importantly, the secrecy surrounding the target lists, meshed well with controls on BDA to help General Ryan to ensure he maintained autonomy in executing the campaign. Through the chain of command, General Ryan kept the NATO Secretary-General informed of the campaign and its progress. As noted above, Ryan did not want people outside the chain of command second-guessing his decisions, and keeping a tight control over targeting supported his freedom to operate without interference.

By controlling access to information about targets and BDA, General Ryan made it extremely difficult for outsiders to critique his performance. It also, undoubtedly, helped maintain alliance cohesion and UN cooperation, at least for the duration of the campaign. Keeping quiet about the objective of leveling the playing field prevented nations in the UN or NATO that might have opposed weakening the BSA from breaking ranks. Governments sympathetic to the Bosnian Serb side, that had lost patience with the leaders in Pale, could go along with the bombing while genuinely claiming (naively perhaps) not to support measures that favored the Federation forces. Thus, the secrecy with which commanders in AFSOUTH guarded their objective, the targets they were hitting, and the progress of the campaign, served to enhance the commanders’ operational

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143 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
144 Joulwan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; and Ryan, interview.
autonomy, alliance solidarity, and UN acquiescence whilst the bombs were falling. As the Balkans Air Campaign Study noted, the secrecy was also necessary for operational security: enhancing both force protection and mission accomplishment. Finally, it gave the commanders and their political masters flexibility in deciding how far to go in prosecuting the campaign, making it difficult for outsiders to challenge claims that the operation succeeded in achieving the planned objectives. From the perspective of the commanders responsible for the outcome of the campaign, there was no immediate downside to controlling information about targeting, BDA, and the campaign objective.

SEAD, Option 2%, and Coercion

When NATO commanders finally got around to attacking the heart of the Bosnian Serb air defense system in northwestern Bosnia, the attacks served several different objectives, thus demonstrating the potential leverage which force protection gives commanders for influencing the use of airpower. Shortly after bombing resumed on 5 September, Admiral Smith and General Ryan sought to eliminate the heart of the BSA air defense network in northwestern Bosnia. Admiral Smith later stated he had received intelligence reports that the BSA had moved SAM batteries south from Banja Luka to positions from which they could threaten NATO aircraft traveling to and from their targets. The individual missile batteries were difficult to track; however, the threat they posed to NATO aircraft could be greatly reduced by destroying about a dozen command, control, and communications facilities located in northwestern Bosnia. In that way, the missile batteries would be forced to work in an autonomous mode, without the benefit of information provided by the larger integrated air defense system. Operating autonomously, the missile batteries would need to use their own radar, giving allied aircrews more warning, while simultaneously making the SAM operators more susceptible to attack from NATO SEAD aircraft. By deciding to execute the remainder of the Dead Eye plan, Admiral Smith and General Ryan made Deliberate Force operations safer for NATO aircrews.

The response from Brussels over a cruise missile attack, during the execution of Dead Eye-northwest, demonstrated the accountability thrust upon the commanders, even for problems they had not caused. In order to reduce the risks to allied airmen, Admiral

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145 'BACS,' 6.4.
146 Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College.
147 7490 Composite Wing (P), memorandum for CAOC, 7 September 1995, File C2a(2), BACS Collection.
148 Admiral Smith, briefing to Air War College.
Smith requested permission from Washington to use cruise missiles against the air defenses, and President Clinton reportedly authorized the attacks on 7 September. However, the missile attacks, scheduled for the night of 8-9 September were delayed for approximately thirty-six hours by General Joulwan, so he could give NATO political authorities advance notice. The AFSOUTH commanders elected to go ahead with the first strikes into northwestern Bosnia early on 9 September, using stand-off munitions from NATO aircraft. Hurriedly put together and marred by technical glitches, the raid achieved disappointing results. When the cruise missile strikes finally did go ahead on 10 September, they caused an uproar in Brussels, particularly from the French who complained NATO military authorities had overstepped their bounds by using cruise missiles. For the military planners in AFSOUTH, the cruise missile was just another weapon, and it had the advantage of accuracy without risk to the lives of NATO airmen. The missile attack was coordinated through NATO headquarters, but notification to NAC ambassadors went out late on Sunday afternoon, 10 September, and the attack was made that evening. Although the delays in notification originated in Brussels, and even though AFSOUTH had approval from NATO Headquarters and Washington before the strike, Admiral Smith was made to bear the brunt of the political criticism for the cruise missile attack. This indicated there would be no political shielding from Brussels if military operations went awry.

The political consternation over the cruise missile strikes probably had more to do with political sensitivities over how far NATO should go with its graduated air campaign, than with the use of the missiles, per se. The French lost a Mirage 2000 on the first day of Deliberate Force, and its two-man crew was still missing, so it would have been illogical for the French to have been upset about sending American missiles instead of French airmen against the Serb air defenses. By 10 September, when the missile attack was made, AFSOUTH commanders were running low on worthwhile Option 1 and 2 targets in southeastern Bosnia, and wanted to ratchet up the pressure on the Serbs in order to get

149 Admiral Smith, interview; and Bradley Graham, 'U.S. Fires Cruise Missiles.'
150 Joulwan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; and NATO Official D.
153 Admiral Smith, interview; and Zoerb, 29 April 1998.
154 Joulwan, interview; and NATO Official D.
155 Joulwan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; Gamble; and NATO Official D.
156 Admiral Smith, interview.
157 NATO Official D.
them to comply with the NATO ultimatum from the previous week.¹⁵⁸ Hitting Dead Eye targets in northwestern Bosnia not only gave the commanders their long awaited opportunity to eliminate the threat to NATO aircrews, it also gave them more targets to bomb. However, General Janvier recognized the larger military significance of the Bosnian Serb command and control facilities and other targets on the Dead Eye list.¹⁵⁹ The Bosnian Serbs were facing a ground offensive from Federation forces in western Bosnia, and Janvier viewed some Dead Eye northwest strikes as equivalent to Option 2½ airstrikes.¹⁶⁰ Admiral Smith recalled discussing the issue with Janvier when General Ryan proposed hitting a large target complex called the ‘Banja Luka SAM Repair Facility.’ Smith later said he told Janvier:

“I could defend it as an option 2 target because that’s where the facilities are, and we know that damned well they’ve got some SAMs in there. Or, I can say it’s a 2 ½ to 3, and take it off [the list for now] and let’s try to get it later.” I was frankly afraid, at this point, that if we overstepped at all, the NAC would say: Stop. Or the UN would say: Stop. The UN had already told the RRF to cease and desist. They said: “You’re not an offensive force. Stop.”¹⁶¹

Thus, the French reaction to the cruise missile strike was probably a signal of growing discomfort over the shape Deliberate Force was taking, rather than a sign of displeasure about the choice of weapons being used in the campaign.¹⁶²

Having nearly run out of Option 1 and 2 targets, Admiral Smith refused to risk the lives of NATO airmen by sending them to revisit targets that had been destroyed on earlier attacks. However, the lack of targets created a problem for Richard Holbrooke, because NATO bombing was a useful tool for his negotiations with Milosevic.¹⁶³ As General Ryan recalled:

Holbrooke did some coordination, in telephone calls with [Admiral] Snuffy [Smith], and with Joulwan, and through the State Department. But, his biggest thing was: “Keep it up.” That was his advice...Keep hitting them. Because it’s giving me great leverage, particularly over in Serbia.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁸ Short; General Ryan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview.
¹⁵⁹ Janvier, interview; and Military Official Q.
¹⁶⁰ Janvier, interview.
¹⁶¹ Admiral Smith, interview.
¹⁶² The nature of Deliberate Force and the coincidental Federation ground offensive have made it difficult to determine whether the connection between the two campaigns was pre-planned or opportunistic. Research for this study has not uncovered any evidence to contradict official claims that it was not pre-planned, but that is hardly surprising or definitive.
¹⁶³ Holbrooke, To End, 145-151.
¹⁶⁴ Ryan, interview.
But the AFSOUTH commanders needed something to bomb in order to continue the campaign. Admiral Smith later professed he was willing to get fired over certain issues, and, 'one of them was going back after targets that didn’t make any difference, and bombing holes in the ground.' By 12 September, there were few targets and DMPIs left to bomb, and poor weather continued to interfere with Deliberate Force operations. Though they could scrape together enough targets for about another two day’s worth of bombing, the commanders in AFSOUTH believed they were reaching the point of diminishing returns with Option 1 and 2 targets. Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General appeared to be trying to find a way to end the bombing, and on 12 September, Russia introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council, calling for an end to Deliberate Force. However, as Admiral Smith later recalled:

When we started getting down to the bottom of that funnel, and we were running out of targets, I was encouraged by at least one individual up the chain of command to go back and hit targets a second time. And I said: “No. I’ve been down that road too. And I ain’t going to send these pilots in there hitting holes in the ground because we don’t have the political stomach to ratchet up the price. And we’re not going to do that.”

According to Richard Holbrooke, some people in Washington did not believe the NATO commanders were running out of targets:

[US Secretary of State] Christopher told me he doubted that the military had really exhausted all its authorized Option Two targets. But there was no way to question the military within its own area of responsibility—the military controlled the information and independent verification was virtually impossible.

Holbrooke was forced to make an unplanned return to Belgrade on 13 September to try to get a ceasefire before NATO commanders ran out of targets.

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165 The officer running the BDA cell for General Ryan was RAF Wing Commander Andy Bachelor. He told BACS researchers that during the campaign there was no intentional bombing of targets that had already been destroyed. Due to the shortage of targets with a higher payoff, some partially destroyed targets were re-attacked late in the campaign. Wing Commander Andy Bachelor, RAF, interview by Major Orndorff, 14 February 1996, Ramstein, Germany, tape recording, BACS Collection. Ratios for bombs dropped compared to targets or DMPIs attacked supported Bachelor’s assertion: 2.8 PGMs, and 6.6 general purpose bombs, per DMPI. PGMs are usually dropped in pairs, and general purpose bombs (i.e., non-PGMs) are usually dropped in multiples of two, with six per pass being common. General Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference. Also see, Hallion, ‘Precision Guided Munitions,’ 13.

166 Admiral Smith, interview.

167 Ibid.; Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference; and Ryan, interview.

168 Silber and Clark, ‘UN in Split with NATO.’


170 Admiral Smith, interview.

171 Holbrooke, To End, 146.

172 Ibid.
As Deliberate Force air operations were coming to a close, the commanders in AFSOUTH turned up the psychological pressure on the Serbs, including President Milosevic. At a news conference in Naples on 12 September, a member of the AFSOUTH staff handed out fact sheets on the F-117 stealth aircraft to journalists as they entered the room. When the NATO spokesman, RAF Group Captain Trevor Murray, began taking questions, reporters asked about the F-117, which had not featured in Murray’s briefing. Apparently taken by surprise, Group Captain Murray denied plans to bring the F-117s into theater, much to the bemusement of the journalists who were left wondering why they had been given the fact sheets. The F-117s had originally been a serious consideration for attacks against the Bosnian Serb air defenses, and support equipment and personnel for the stealthy planes was already in Italy. By 12 September, the F-117s were no longer needed for Bosnia, and the apparent press conference snafu was a calculated attempt to make Serbia’s president wonder what might be coming next. Around the same time, officials at AFSOUTH began admitting to the press that NATO was running out of Option 1 and 2 targets, and it was time to consider Option 3. Admiral Smith and General Ryan believed these psychological pressures might intimidate not only General Mladic, but also Milosevic, who would have been concerned already over the influx of refugees poised to enter Serbia because of the Federation ground offensive in Bosnia. Poor weather over Bosnia led NATO to cancel nearly half of its sorties on 13 September, as Richard Holbrooke held a hastily arranged meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade. Holbrooke later wrote that this was his ‘moment of maximum leverage,’ and NATO bombing his ‘best bargaining chip.’ After several hours of talks, Milosevic produced President Karadzic and General Mladic, and that night the Serbs agreed to the terms of the 3 September NATO ultimatum. The bombing was suspended for seventy-two hours to give the Serbs a chance to comply with the agreement they had

173 Military Official X.
175 Military Official X.
176 General Ryan requested six F-117s on 8 September. They were approved by the US Secretary of Defense on 9 September. Personnel and equipment needed to support F-117 operations were deployed to Italy, but on 11 September the Italian government turned down the American request to bring the planes into Italy. ‘BACS,’ 8.3; and Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
177 Ryan, interview; and Admiral Smith, interview.
179 Admiral Smith, interview; and Ryan, interview.
180 AFSOUTH, ‘Deliberate Force’ Fact Sheet, 7; and Holbrooke, To End, 146-148.
181 Holbrooke, To End, 151.
182 Ibid., 148-152.
signed. After a another seventy-two hours to allow the BSA to complete its withdrawal of heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, Deliberate Force officially ended.

Aftermath: More of the Same

Though Deliberate Force helped to end the war in Bosnia, it did nothing to resolve two of the principal tensions underlying the contest to control airpower during Deny Flight: the political-military tension over who controls the use of force; and the soldier-airman controversy over the efficacy of airpower. As NATO planners made preparations for the peace implementation force (IFOR), they sought to 'NAC-proof' the aerial rules of engagement to make sure NATO airmen would not again be hobbled in using force for self-defense. Meanwhile, in order to make sure Admiral Smith was responsive to political direction from Brussels, someone at NATO headquarters proposed sending to Naples a Special Representative of the NATO Secretary-General. This political overseer would operate much the same as Mr. Akashi had for the UN Secretary-General. Admiral Smith balked at the suggestion, later claiming:

I got a call one time from Mons saying that the NAC was going to send a Secretary-General's Special Rep to whom I would be responsible...And I said: “Well when you send him, send another CINC, because I'm going to be gone.” They didn’t send him.

When Smith later came under fire for not using the authority granted to him in the Dayton accords to apprehend suspected war criminals, he claimed:

I told [NATO political authorities] time and again: “You want me to go after the [war] criminals, fine. You give me the orders, get…out of the way, but understand there's a price. There are going to be a lot of people killed. Probably going to set this peace process back a long way. But you give me the order, we'll go get them. We may not be successful, but we'll give it a...good try.” They didn't like that.

Admiral Smith apparently believed that whatever authority was given to him under the Dayton agreement, he still needed specific political orders from Brussels before using alliance forces in dangerous circumstances. And once given those orders, he wanted the alliance's political authorities to stay out of the operational details. At his change of

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183 Private discussion with US Air Force officer responsible for IFOR planning.
184 Admiral Smith, interview; and Zoerb, 27/May/1998.
185 Joulwan, interview; Admiral Smith, interview; and Zoerb, 27/May/1998.
186 Admiral Smith, interview.
187 Admiral Smith, interview.
command and premature retirement, in July of 1996, Admiral Smith cautioned his successor:

> The further away people are from the problems, the more apt they are to have a solution for them. And...those who shout loudest for this or that action, are the ones who bear absolutely no responsibility for the consequences of those actions.

Political authorities are unlikely to be comfortable making the sort of explicit commitments Admiral Smith desired. As Richard Betts argued, diplomats and politicians value flexibility just as military officers value commitment to policy objectives. Moreover, using force creates a dynamic all of its own, and there is little incentive for a politician to commit to supporting a course of action that might lead to unintended and undesired consequences. It is far safer, politically, to keep one's choices open, and to keep an arms-length relationship with policy implementation when it has the potential to backfire. This calculus can lead to political pressure for action without guarantees of political support for a commander should things go wrong. The riskier the venture, then the greater the disincentive a political official would have for making himself accountable for the consequences. However, when operations pose high risks, military commanders will want to make their political masters aware of potential dangers, and will want assurances that the proposed course of action is really what is desired. Guarantees from special representatives, secretary-generals, and assistant secretaries of executive departments are unlikely to suffice. Their authority is derivative, and they may have agendas not fully supported by the elected political leaders at the top of the chain of command. Furthermore, because of the clear accountability that goes with a military chain of command, commanders cannot depend on these second and third tier officials for top cover. Though the need to use airpower diminished greatly with the end of Deliberate Force, the political-military tension over controlling the use of force in Bosnia continued.

Assessments of Deliberate Force have confirmed Richard Betts’s conclusion that beliefs for and against airpower tend to become articles of faith, and that people on both sides of the airpower debate often draw opposite conclusions from the same evidence.

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188 Admiral Smith received his fourth star in conjunction with his assignment as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe. When he retired two years later, he still had not reached the 35-year mandatory retirement point.

189 Remarks of Admiral Smith in, AFSOUTH, 'AFSOUTH Change of Command,' transcripts from change of command ceremony, 31 July 1996. Admiral Smith was later given an honorary knighthood by Britain, which some observers viewed as a gesture of appreciation for Smith's resistance to using force more often in Bosnia.

190 Betts, 36 and 76.

191 Betts, 203.
General Cot saw the Deliberate Force airstrikes as long-range air support, and he judged that the RRF was a more important factor in the campaign's success, at least around Sarajevo, especially because unlike airpower, 'it did not depend on the weather of the moment.' General Briquemont believed what really mattered in 1995 was the change in the balance of power on the ground against the Serbs. Finally, General Rose did not give the air campaign much credit for bringing the war to an end, noting:

The NATO air campaign in Bosnia in August and September 1995 formed part of a series of strategic actions taking place at that time. These included the use of artillery and mortar by the UN Rapid Reaction Force to neutralise the Bosnian Serb heavy weapons around Sarajevo, the Croat-Muslim Federation ground offensive in the west of Bosnia, and most important of all, the emergence of a political settlement acceptable to all sides. The NATO air campaign was no more than a useful signal to the Serbs that the peacekeeping option had been suspended and that the West was now prepared to use a greater level of enforcement than before.

Such judgments were consistent with the thinking of these generals during their tenures in command with the UN—reflecting the traditional soldiers' view of airpower as a supporting arm for the land forces.

The views of NATO officers also changed little, and airmen placed greater weight than non-airmen on airpower's contribution to ending the war. General Ashy viewed the campaign as a success, seeing it as an execution of the planning he had done as far back as 1993. General Ryan averred: 'There were lots of other things going on; there was a ground operation going on in the west, there was diplomatic effort... There was a lot going on, but Air Power is a decisive force.' The Balkans Air Campaign Study team reached the same conclusion. Presumably being a decisive force means that it was a necessary, but perhaps not a sufficient, element amongst the factors leading the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the 3 September NATO ultimatum. General Ryan's chief planner, Colonel Zoerb, considered the NATO airpower contribution far more important than that

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192 Cot, 'Dayton,' 123.
193 Briquemont, Do Something, 133.
194 Rose, Fighting, 238. General Rose erroneously claimed that 'nearly 100 cruise missiles' were fired during Deliberate Force. The actual number of cruise missiles fired was thirteen—all on 10 September.
195 Ashy, interview by Owen. The targets struck during Operation Deliberate Force had their roots in the planning begun under General Ashy. Like Deliberate Force, General Ashy's plans would have degraded the BSA's military capability. However, the research done for this study suggests the logic behind Deliberate Force was based on studies of the BSA undertaken during General Ryan's tenure. The center of gravity analysis, determination of an end state, and the heavy reliance on PGMs were the product of planning conducted under General Ryan. Moreover, Dead Eye was also produced during General Ryan's time in Naples.
196 Ryan, transcript of Air Power Conference.
Admiral Smith who had been less enthusiastic about using airpower than his air component commanders believed there was, 'a confluence of events, that occurred in the June, July, August, September time frame, that all came together very, very nicely, that made airpower look a lot better, perhaps, than airpower was.' The point here is not to decide which judgment on the air campaign best captures its significance in the confluence of events during the summer of 1995, but to note that the participants' views on airpower changed little as a result of the campaign, and that airmen placed a higher value on the airpower contribution than did soldiers.

Conclusions

During Deliberate Force, the soldier-airman dimension of the struggle for control over NATO airpower was less significant than the political-military dimension. Once General Janvier approved the first list of targets at the start of the campaign, tension between Janvier and Admiral Smith diminished greatly. This reflected the alignment of expertise and command responsibility: airmen controlled airpower in pursuit of a mission for which they were responsible. As the responsible air commander, General Ryan was given the freedom to use his expertise to manage the campaign and the risks to his forces. Thanks largely to Rupert Smith, the UN ground forces were able to defend themselves, and had little need to call for air support. Because General Smith was delegated UN control for CAS, and Ryan had agreed that Smith would nominate CAS targets, General Smith possessed virtually complete control over the CAS mission. Therefore, as the responsible ground commander, Smith controlled the resources commensurate with his responsibilities. These arrangements worked well, not because of any formal doctrine (there was none), but because it reflected the advantages, from a military perspective, of marrying expertise, responsibility, and autonomy.

The political-military aspect of the contest to control NATO airpower was less harmonious. Because the bombing gave Holbrooke leverage in his negotiations, he wanted some control over airpower—more than Admiral Smith was willing to concede.

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199 Admiral Smith, interview.
200 Ten CAS missions were executed the first day of Deliberate Force, all against pre-planned, heavy weapons sites. As the CAOC plans director Colonel Steve Teske describe these missions, they were really battlefield air interdiction with forward air controllers, rather than what would normally be considered close air support. Despite the large number of CAS sorties flown just in case they might be needed, few expended ordnance because the BSA did not attack UN forces. One exception to this occurred around Tuzla on 10 September.
201 On the absence of doctrine, see, Owen, 'Balkans: Part 1,' 11-12; and 'BACS,' Chapter 3.
Holbrooke’s negotiations were part of a larger policy that Deliberate Force supported. Therefore, it was only natural for Holbrooke to want to control NATO airpower, especially in light of his limited ability to influence other elements supporting his coercive diplomacy, such as the Federation ground offensive. However, Admiral Smith’s superior expertise in military matters, and his responsibility for the lives of allied forces, not just US forces, led him to resist pressures coming from outside the chain of command. Expertise, control of information, and responsibility for NATO forces, also worked for the theater-level commanders as powerful tools for keeping control over Operation Deliberate Force. But this strong military influence in such a highly politicized operation did not sit well with some of the political authorities concerned.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS: EXPERTISE, RESPONSIBILITY, AND MILITARY INFLUENCE OVER THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA

*When the external threat is low, policy decisions appear less consequential and so policy costs are lower—what does it matter if civilian interference has disastrous side-effects when there is no Soviet menace to capitalize on the error?*

—Peter D. Feaver, 'Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory of Explanation of the Souring of Civil-Military Relations'

Theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO served as more than mere executors of policy, and in so doing, they significantly influenced the use of airpower in Bosnia between the summers of 1993 and 1995. Of the various reasons why the commanders chose to play the roles they did, their expertise and their responsibilities as commanders were important factors. However, expertise, and responsibility for mission accomplishment and force protection, often reinforced other forces motivating the theater-level commanders, such as national political pressures and UN and NATO organizational preferences. If one examines the actions of the commanders across the entire period of Deny Flight, certain patterns emerge, indicating the role of expertise and command responsibility. During Deny Flight, the theater-level commanders demonstrated an appreciation for their responsibility for, and to, the people under their command, not just responsibility upward to the state, or to multinational political authorities. Unlike tactical determinism which rests on limitations in the capabilities of military means (i.e., what feasibly can be done), responsibility sets limits based on what ought to be done and who will be held accountable (i.e., is it worth it). Without clear, authoritative guidance about objectives, theater-level commanders in NATO and the UN turned to their own internal compasses for direction in decisions about how much risk to take in order to use airpower in Bosnia. The commanders also demonstrated that responsibility for people’s lives
served as more than just a basis for decisions; it also worked as a tool for gaining autonomy and influence in operational matters.

How the UN Commanders Influenced the Use of Airpower

The UN’s theater-level commanders significantly influenced the use of airpower in Bosnia. They all wanted close air support, and, with the exception of General Rupert Smith, they all opposed airstrikes. Generals Briquemont and Cot were the first, and last, UN commanders to attempt to reconcile the ambiguities inherent in the ‘safe areas’ policy. Both left their tours of duty early because of clashes with civilian political authorities over acquiring and controlling the means for fulfilling the command responsibilities of mission accomplishment and force protection. Unlike Briquemont and Cot, who sought clearer political direction for their mission, General Rose offered his own interpretation via his campaign plan. By winning approval in the UK and the UN for a campaign plan focused on the humanitarian and peacekeeping elements of UNPROFOR’s mandate, General Rose reduced UNPROFOR’s needs for NATO airpower. Later, General Rose not only shaped the terms of the Sarajevo ultimatum to mirror the impartiality needed for peacekeeping, he also used UN forces to help the Bosnian Serbs meet the ultimatum deadline. In addition, he controlled information about the degree of Bosnian Serb compliance with the ultimatum, and later lapses in Serb compliance with the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, in order to head off NATO airstrikes. At Gorazde, General Rose held tight control over NATO airpower, and he attempted to conduct limited airstrikes in the guise of close air support for his special forces. However, after Gorazde, he used the ‘dual-key’ to delay airstrikes, so he could issue warnings to the Bosnian Serbs and control targeting decisions for airstrikes. General Rose was a central figure in influencing NATO’s first ever uses of airpower for bombing operations, and the course he chose minimized the need to make tradeoffs between the lives of his soldiers and UNPROFOR’s mission, as Rose interpreted it.

General Rose’s superior, General de Lapresle, initially played a less direct role in influencing the use of NATO airpower. De Lapresle helped to solidify the UN’s stance against the use of airpower to enforce the ‘safe areas’ policy. He did this by educating Mr. Akashi in the ways of using airpower, and by adding military legitimacy to the UN Secretariat’s position that UNPROFOR’s job was to deter through its presence, and that it could not be expected to act more forcefully without the necessary ground forces for doing so. Later in 1994, General de Lapresle took a more direct role in shaping the
employing airpower, by using the ‘dual-key’ to limit NATO airstrikes at Udbina and to block SEAD operations after the first air defense suppression missions on 23 November 1994. De Lapresle’s successor, General Janvier, was equally opposed to robust air action, and tried to restrain his more activist subordinate, General Rupert Smith. Though influential in advising against airstrikes in early May of 1995, and in delaying close air support at Srebrenica, Janvier was ultimately outmaneuvered by other theater-level commanders, and overruled by political authorities. Rather than dumping the enforcement elements of UNPROFOR’s mandate, as Janvier and the UN Secretariat preferred, General Smith cleared the way for forceful action, including NATO airstrikes. He did so by precipitating a hostage crisis. He also helped commanders in NATO broaden the allowable zone for airstrikes by proposing that the area around Tuzla be contained in both zones of action for Deliberate Force.

Generals Briquemont, Cot, de Lapresle, and Janvier used fairly conventional means to try to influence the use of airpower in Bosnia. Except for Briquemont’s public criticism of airstrikes in August of 1993, and Cot’s complaints to the press about not having approval authority for close air support missions, these commanders generally worked within the UN chain of command or their own national chains of command. The other UN commanders, Michael Rose and Rupert Smith, took unusual measures to influence the use of airpower: Rose by issuing warnings to the Serbs, and Smith by causing the hostage crisis. Even when working within the UN chain of command, certain commanders took active roles in shaping policy. General Rose demonstrated the enduring truth in Betts’s finding: ‘Advocates of an existing plan have an advantage over opponents who do not have one of their own.’ By introducing his own campaign plan, Rose moved the UN mission away from enforcement. Security Council ambassadors, such as Madeline Albright, who favored a more forceful approach in Bosnia had no military advocate in the UN to counter General Rose’s plan. Likewise, General de Lapresle’s endorsement of the interpretation of UNPROFOR’s mission put forward by Mr. Akashi effectively altered UN policy, and divisions within the Security Council prevented it from overruling UNPROFOR’s interpretation. Even after the UN agreed to go along with NATO demands for multiple targets, General de Lapresle remained master of the decision-making process for airstrikes.

1 Betts, 153.
Why the UN Commanders Influenced Airpower as They Did

Answering the question of why the commanders chose to influence the use of airpower in the ways they did is more complex than seeing how they exercised their influence. As shown throughout this study, the factors impelling the theater-level commanders to try to win control over airpower were often mutually reinforcing, rather than in tension with one another. The UN Secretariat's organizational bias for peacekeeping meshed well with the British government's reluctance to see NATO conduct airstrikes. British army doctrine for peacekeeping added to the list of reasons that might explain why, for instance, General Rose resisted applying all but minimal doses of airpower in Bosnia. French political pressures were also consistent with British and UN desires to avoid the sort of robust air attacks which American commanders in NATO believed were needed to coerce the Serbs. Although army commanders were skeptical about using airpower, and air force generals advocated its use, the unusual alignment of commanders (i.e., soldiers commanding UN forces and airmen commanding in NATO) make it difficult to test the theoretical proposition that army and air force officers took their respective positions because of their service affiliations. The challenge, then, is to determine when, how, and to what degree, expertise and command responsibility motivated the commanders. The UN commanders provided plenty of testimonial evidence that their actions were guided by their concerns for the safety of their forces and the need to sustain the UN mission in Bosnia. While that is a strong indicator, in and of itself it cannot be counted as sufficient evidence. To better gauge their motivations, it is necessary to look at their actions, especially when expertise and responsibility pushed the commanders in directions which cannot be explained well by other factors.

General Briquemont warrants special attention, because national political pressures were not a strong factor for him. Furthermore, political instigation from the EC directed Briquemont toward more aggressive measures, which he resisted. Briquemont took command shortly after the creation of the 'safe areas,' when UN leaders still expected to get the 7,600 reinforcements promised under the 'light option.' Moreover, he was not of the UN peacekeeping culture, and he was not imbued with doctrinal ideas about peacekeeping. His failure to see the coercive value in the threat of NATO airstrikes

2 In Jervis's discussion of cognitive dissonance, he explains that decision-makers become committed to their decisions, and they will seek justifications for their actions or decisions after the fact, which might not reveal their true reasoning at the time of the decision. Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 382-387.
was consistent with a soldier's view of airpower. Interestingly, Briquemont sought more infantry from the Danish ministry of defense, instead of the tanks the Danes were planning to send to Bosnia. This suggests that aside from differences between soldiers and airmen, soldiers from different army branches prefer different weapon systems according to the soldiers' backgrounds. General Briquemont threatened to quit over airstrikes, but not because they were inconsistent with UNSCR 836; he accepted that the ambiguities in the resolution allowed for such action. He threatened to quit because he considered himself the commander in Bosnia, and he demanded control over operations in his area of responsibility—especially when they might put his forces at risk. When General Briquemont ultimately did quit, it was because he was pushed to take greater risks and responsibilities by unaccountable officials, and without being given the resources to fulfill the additional tasks being thrust upon him. Thus, for General Briquemont, expertise as a soldier and the responsibility inherent in command weighed heavily in his decisions and actions.

General Cot left Bosnia because he clashed with the civilian hierarchy in the UN over control of close air support. The frustrations that precipitated his departure came at a time when fighting in Bosnia was escalating, and UN forces were increasingly endangered. He was already on the way out when the Sarajevo ultimatum nearly led to NATO airstrikes, and his responsibilities were lightened by the open accountability of elected political leaders (especially President Mitterrand) for the pending strikes. However, three weeks later, when French soldiers came under fire at Bihac, he demanded air support, and threatened to make Mr. Akashi bear the blame for the consequences of inaction. Thus, Cot's behavior also indicated the importance of responsibility and accountability for human lives as a factor motivating his behavior.

General Rose's repeated attempts to employ special forces in Bosnia, first at Gorazde, later as part of Operation Antelope, and again at Bihac, indicated the influence of his past and his expertise as a former commander of special forces. Rose had cause to be embittered toward the Bosnian government, after its forces apparently created the situation leading to the death of the special forces soldier Rose had sent to Gorazde. Given the risk he took with his special forces in sending them to Gorazde to help protect the 'safe area,' and the urgency with which he pleaded to Mr. Akashi for CAS, it seems reasonable to argue that Rose was motivated by his sense of responsibility to his forces to block later uses of airpower, to select meaningless targets, and to issue warnings to the Serbs. These actions lowered the risks to his forces and increased his chances of
succeeding in the UN's humanitarian mission, but not its mission to protect the 'safe areas.' However, General Rose's case is complicated, because presumably the British government would have put extra pressure on Rose to be less aggressive after a British soldier was killed in Gorazde, and a British Sea Harrier was shot down the next day. Furthermore, the British government sent hundreds of peacekeepers to Gorazde in the spring of 1994, giving leaders in London strong reasons for wanting to avoid confrontation with the Serbs. Thus, national political pressures, doctrinal beliefs, expertise, and responsibility all pointed in the same direction, and all played a role in shaping Rose's influence on the use of airpower.

General de Lapresle did not share General Rose's expertise in peacekeeping, and seems to have been driven away from trying to protect the 'safe areas' by the inadequacy of the means at his disposal for executing tasks relating to the 'safe areas.' Furthermore, de Lapresle, an armored officer, felt the need for forces that could fill the gap between light infantry and NATO fighter aircraft—unlike General Briquemont, who wanted more ground forces, but not tanks. Again, the evidence suggests theater-level commanders were most comfortable employing, or advocating the need for, the forces with which they were most familiar. That rule seemed to apply not just between services (e.g., soldiers and airmen), but for officers from different backgrounds or branches within the same type of service.

Except for Rupert Smith, the European army officers who served as theater-level commanders with the UN exhibited the sort of risk-averse behavior ascribed to the Vietnam generation of professional military officers in the US. General Briquemont during the Mount Igman crisis, and General Rose during the assault on Gorazde, took risks with their forces. However, later in their tours, when risks outweighed the value of taking tougher action, the generals resisted political pressures to do more. The same could be said of General de Lapresle; he authorized General Rose's plan to send special forces to Gorazde, but after that he became reluctant about using airpower to uphold the UN 'safe areas' policy. Generals Rose, de Lapresle, and later General Janvier, helped steer the UN mission away from enforcement of the UN's 'safe areas' policy, which held the greatest potential to endanger the lives of UN forces. What set General Smith apart from the other UN theater-level commanders was not a predilection for taking unnecessary risks with his troops, but a view of a worthwhile objective for taking short-term risks in order to lower the costs to his forces over the long term. Only when UN commanders had a clear, attainable, positive objective for using force, were they willing
to take risks with their forces. Thus, responsibility for peoples lives inherent in command was a factor motivating the senior UN commanders to resist political pressures to ‘do something’ until that something was defined and weighed against the risks of attempting to do it. While the Vietnam War undoubtedly sensitized a generation of American officers to the imperative of avoiding risks in the absence of worthwhile and achievable objectives, their ‘risk aversion’ was not a uniquely American phenomenon. Nor is it confined to one generation. It is a natural product of the special expertise and responsibility of professional military officers, and theater-level commanders are likely to possess an uncommonly high degree of both expertise and responsibility.

**How NATO Commanders Influenced the Use of Airpower**

The American commanders in NATO also influenced the use of airpower beyond being mere executors of policy. General Joulwan helped define heavy weapons to include elements of the BSA that were only indirectly related to the siege of Sarajevo, and his inputs were incorporated in the terms of the Gorazde ultimatum as well. He called for the zones of action which helped move NATO political thinking beyond the offending weapons surrounding each individual ‘safe area,’ thus opening the door for General Ryan’s air campaign. Finally, General Joulwan pushed his subordinate commanders, especially Admiral Smith, to resume bombing during the pause in Deliberate Force, and to avoid saying anything to the press about the broader implications of the campaign that might disturb alliance cohesion.

General Ashy’s early planning, and his apparent success in winning General Briquemont’s approval for the NATO target list, helped move NATO toward the sort of robust air action favored by the US government. In addition, Ashy’s efforts with Admiral Boorda to limit the details of target information presented to NATO ambassadors, while at the same time convincing them that the AFSOUTH commanders had done everything necessary to limit collateral damage, was intended to prevent micro-management from Brussels. General Chambers’s main contribution was to set up an efficient system for enforcing the no-fly zone and providing close air support to the UN. There was nothing unusual about how he did this, but his expertise was evident in the successful working of each system. In addition, his efforts to make Deny Flight bombing operations overtly multinational boosted the apparent legitimacy of the operation.

General Ryan demonstrated the value of having a plan ready in advance of political orders for such planning. He and Admiral Smith greatly increased the impact of
Deliberate Force by making Dead Eye an automatic component of NATO air operations. Admiral Smith's earlier refusal to patrol the no-fly zone more aggressively, without first suppressing Bosnian Serb air defenses was, a helpful precursor for Dead Eye operations, heightening political awareness within NATO of the threat to allied airmen. Together General Ryan and Admiral Smith controlled information about targets, BDA, and the military objective of Deliberate Force, so as to maintain operational autonomy during the campaign. Efforts by NATO theater-level commanders to influence the use of airpower were fairly conventional and confined to the NATO chain of command, and they all moved NATO toward a forceful air campaign.  

**Why the NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower as They Did**

The factors motivating the NATO commanders tended to be mutually reinforcing. Thus, explaining why they chose to influence airpower as they did raises the same difficulties encountered in trying to explain the actions of the UN commanders. For the most part, the capabilities and limitations of airpower, the commanders' expertise, the imperative for protecting their forces, and US political pressure all worked together to push the commanders toward robust air operations. However, Admiral Smith demonstrated a willingness to upset some US and NATO superiors, in order to meet his responsibility for the people under his command. Admiral Smith's behavior underscored the dilemma a commander might face in trying to fulfill his responsibilities up and down the chain of command. At the risk of stating the obvious, negative objectives cannot substitute for positive objectives when a commander weighs the responsibility for his forces against the objectives for using force. Yet, for much of 1994, the absence of an overriding positive objective for using force meant that negative objectives defined how and when airpower was used in Bosnia. This was true at Gorazde in April, the airstrikes around Sarajevo in August and September, and the attack against Udbina in November. In each case, there was a positive objective for air operations, but it was not sufficiently important to overcome the negative objectives, or objections, for using airpower. By the end of 1994, Admiral Smith had seen enough to know that NATO was not politically united behind a positive objective for its air operations; after that he twice restricted no-fly zone activities over Bosnia to avoid unnecessary risks to NATO airmen: first at the

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2 This conclusion would be challenged if later evidence revealed the commanders were intentionally baiting the Bosnian Serb SAM operators, and knowingly exposing NATO aircrew to added risks in order to create a cause for eliminating the SAMs.
end of November 1994, and again after the downing of O’Grady. As Deliberate Force wound down, Smith again resisted air operations that might have needlessly put NATO airmen in harm’s way, when he refused to stretch out the bombing campaign to hit previously destroyed targets. Smith’s actions suggest that when a commander must decide how much risk to take with his forces, a policy or strategy of using force is unlikely to suffice, a commander will want a positive objective (not overshadowed by negative aims) to sensibly make decisions. Overall, expertise and command responsibility were strong motivators shaping the actions of NATO theater-level commanders in their attempts to influence the use of airpower over Bosnia—even if the importance of responsibility was most clearly discernible on the rare occasions when it ran counter to other factors motivating the commanders.

Objectives, Authority, and Responsibility

The absence of a palpable threat to national interests robbed those who chose to intervene in Bosnia’s war of a rationale for accepting costs and risks. As leading nations—principally the US, the UK, and France—tried to work out their differences, they did so in a cost-intolerant environment. The theater-level commanders who served in the UN and NATO were enlisted in the battle to hold down costs (a negative objective), aside from whatever positive objectives they were supposed to be pursuing. In addition to pressures from home, political and military leaders from nations contributing troops to UNPROFOR constantly reminded the UN commanders in Zagreb that the contributing countries were unwilling to see their soldiers put at risk. These external political pressures to guard the lives of the forces entrusted to the UN commanders reinforced the internal pressures, or responsibilities, borne by the commanders to balance mission accomplishment against force protection. The need to contemplate tradeoffs between mission and men’s lives emerged for NATO commanders when the surface-to-air threat increased dramatically during the second half of 1994.

The sum of external and internal pressures for minimizing costs to friendly forces repeatedly worked to convince UN and NATO theater-level commanders to avoid the dangerous middle ground between peacekeeping and enforcement actions. The measure of a ‘good’ commander is probably best demonstrated by how well that commander balances responsibility for accomplishing a mission with the responsibility to avoid unnecessary costs to the lives of the people under his command. In Bosnia, the theater-level commanders sought to affect the shape of their missions, their forces, and their rules
of engagement, so as to avoid tradeoffs between their missions and their men’s lives. When tradeoffs had to be made, the commanders often shouldered the responsibility. They had to decide how much risk to accept. They were usually the ones held accountable, or they expected to be held to account. When the objectives for a military operation were unclear, or patently beyond the capabilities of the available forces, then it became impossible for commanders to strike a balance between mission and men. Under such circumstances, theater-level commanders leaned toward force protection. They tolerated, however unhappily, restrictions that kept them from accomplishing their missions, provided those restrictions did not also unnecessarily jeopardize the lives of their people. After briefly flirting with efforts to combine consent based peacekeeping and enforcement actions in early 1994, the theater-level commanders eschewed the middle ground and accepted the incompatibility of the two approaches.

As with tactical determinism, the responsibility for the lives of people under one’s command can serve as a tool for shaping policy. Commanders in Bosnia used force protection as a powerful device for persuading their counterparts in the military-to-military dialogue over using airpower, as was evident at Udbina. Both sets of commanders—those in UNPROFOR and in AFSOUTH—could, and to some extent did, take advantage of their expertise and the threat to their forces to further their respective missions. The argument was one sided, with UNPROFOR holding the floor, until the summer of 1994 when the Serb SAM threat began to mount. After that, NATO commanders were able to take a firmer stand in dictating how airpower would be used. An example of the leverage commanders gain by the need to protect their forces occurred during Deliberate Force. The AFSOUTH commanders expanded and prolonged bombing in Bosnia by prosecuting attacks against Dead Eye targets in the northwestern part of the country. General Janvier (and almost certainly the French government) saw this as a circumvention of controls on the NATO bombing campaign. Ironically, policy-makers in Washington suspected the AFSOUTH commanders were not doing enough to keep the bombing campaign going. Despite suspicions and grumbling on both sides—against and for continuation of the bombing—the AFSOUTH commanders were not overruled. Thus, the commanders’ prerogative to ensure force protection undoubtedly strengthened their demands for control over operational matters and allowed them to shape the use of airpower over Bosnia.

Political controls on military commanders can at best transfer, but not eliminate, the responsibility that goes with command. Some observers have advocated that NATO
adopt the UN practice of assigning a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to work alongside theater commanders. This might be desirable for political leaders who wish to exercise tighter control over their theater commanders. The Special Representative could detect and curb unwanted independence on the part of commanders, while also providing a single point of contact for political inputs to commanders. However, the experience from Deny Flight indicates that in order for a Special Representative to be effective, he would need real decision-making authority and, more importantly, he would have to have accountability within the chain of command. Without authority, the Special Representative would likely hinder timely decision-making. Without accountability, the Special Representative would probably find commanders unwilling to recognize his authority to make decisions affecting the safety of friendly forces.

Perhaps the most important lesson of Deny Flight is the need for political and military leaders to explicitly recognize and agree upon the political objectives for using force and their shared responsibility for determining the acceptable costs for doing so. 'Do something, General!', is no substitute for a clear objective. However, it may well be indicative of the guidance military commanders are likely to get, as fewer and fewer elected officials in Western states have any personal experience serving in the military. The challenge for theater commanders will be to marry the means available to the desired political objectives, and do so within the bounds of acceptable costs. In Western democracies, where the military is subordinate to civilian control, presidents and prime ministers sit atop the military chains of command. Therefore, political leaders at the highest level cannot entirely escape the responsibilities and accountability that go with commanding military operations. They are forced to share the concerns of the theater commanders, who must strike a proper balance between force protection and mission accomplishment. Political leaders can best help to strike the right balance by establishing a positive objective for which force is to be used, and a sense for the acceptable level of costs, including friendly losses, collateral damage, time, and material costs. However, these are variables that cannot be spelled out in precise terms, and they are likely to change over time. Therefore, theater commanders may not be able to wait to be assigned an objective; they may have to become partners in establishing objectives and willingly embrace the responsibility for the consequences of their plans. The theater-level

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4 This was a consideration as NATO readied to deploy IFOR in later 1995. Also see, Michael Williams, 17 and 30.
commander who can gauge the political currents and come up with a plan to connect the
means available to the desired ends, while staying within the bounds of acceptable costs,
will be well positioned to win political support for his plans. Thus, theater-level
commanders will need to anticipate, plan, and expect to be held accountable, if they wish
to maintain operational autonomy and avoid orders to just 'do something.' If a political
leader wants action from his commanders, he should recognize the limits to which
military commanders can resolve unsettled political issues, and understand that
commanders will want clear positive objectives and explicit authority to act, so that they
can best balance the responsibilities for mission success and the lives of friendly forces.
Striking the right balance will continue to be in the interest of both political authorities
and their theater commanders, and it will continue to motivate commanders as they seek
to influence the use of airpower in future interventions.
Notes on the Bibliography

1. UN Documents: In the footnotes, I used the UN system of referencing UN documents. They are listed here chronologically, under 'The United Nations.'

2. BACS Collection: The Balkans Air Campaign Study was commissioned by Air University and headed by Colonel Robert C. Owen, USAF. In addition to producing its own study, the team of researchers was chartered to collect documentary information on the background, planning, and execution of Operation Deliberate Force. The archival material from that study is held at the US Air Force’s Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. In this bibliography, the shortened form ‘BACS Collection’ is used to refer to that archival material, in lieu of ‘Balkans Air Campaign Study Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.’

3. ‘BACS’: In the footnotes, the format ‘BACS, 10.5’ was used to refer to page 10-5 of the final draft version of the Balkans Air Campaign Study (the decimal point was used to avoid confusion with dashes, which have been used throughout this study in the footnotes to indicate a continuous span of pages). In case the sequence of chapters changes when the BACS is finally published, the following key will help locate material referenced in this study.

   Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS), Final Draft June 1998

   Chapter 1: The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses, by Dr. Karl Meuller
   Chapter 2: The Planning Background, by Lieutenant Colonel Bradley S. Davis
   Chapter 3: US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning, by Colonel Maris McCrabb, USAF
   Chapter 4: The DELIBERATE FORCE Air Campaign Planning, by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Campbell, USAF
   Chapter 5: Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August - 14 September 1995, by Major Mark J. Conversino, USAF, Ph. D.
   Chapter 6: Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility, by Major Mark C. McLaughlin, USAF
   Chapter 7: Assessing the Effectiveness of DELIBERATE FORCE: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection, by Major Mark C. McLaughlin, USAF
   Chapter 8: Weapons and Tactics: The Military Science and the Operational Art of DELIBERATE FORCE, by Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Sargent, AFRES
   Chapter 9: Leaders and Followers—The Human Factor, by Major John C. Orndorff, USAF
   Chapter 10: Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engagement in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, by Major Ronald M. Reed, USAF, J. D.
   Chapter 11: Roads Not Taken—Theoretical Approaches to Operation DELIBERATE FORCE by Major Robert D. Pollock, USAF
   Chapter 12: Summary, by Colonel Robert C. Owen, USAF, Ph. D.

4. Military Rank: For published works, or contemporaneous document, I used the rank held by an individual at the time the cited item was produced. For interviews, I used the rank at the time of the interview; however, I listed the position(s) held during the period.
of interest. Thus, for instance, my entry for Lieutenant General Régnault includes the posts he held as a Brigadier General and a Major General.

5. **Multiple works by same author:** For news articles, books, etc., the order is alphabetical. For Congressional reports, it is chronological. For transcripts of news conferences or press releases, the order is chronological.

6. **Facts 1993:** In the footnotes, *Facts 1993*, is used in lieu of *Facts On File Yearbook 1993*.

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