The period stretching from the restoration of Louis XVIII in 1814 until the fall of Napoleon III in 1870 remains the terra incognita of the history of French global ambitions. Even the volume of L’Aventure coloniale de la France covering the years 1789–1870 stresses that the French ‘cautiously withdrew into themselves’ after the collapse of the first Napoleonic Empire. Such a view, this article argues, relies on an extraordinary neglect for the resilience of French formal and, above all, informal power between the fall of the Bourbon monarchy’s Atlantic empire and the rise of the Third Republic’s African and Indochinese empire: France in the intervening years remained a military, economic, scientific, and cultural superpower, who deployed her influence on a global scale, and not always unsuccessfully. It is therefore possible to recast the years 1814 to 1870 as a French ‘imperial meridian’, in the sense of an historiographical chasm between two classical periods of imperial expansion.

The British imperial meridian identified by Christopher Bayly referred to a phase of authoritarian rule combined with the forceful imposition of modern economic institutions on Britain’s imperial possessions between 1780 and 1830, a policy facilitated by the contemporary crises of the Ottoman, Persian and Mughal empires. His analysis entailed a radical revision of earlier interpretations of the transition from Britain’s first ‘predatory’ empire in the Americas to a second ‘developmental’ empire in Asia and Africa. The French imperial meridian does not have the same ideological coherence as Bayly’s. As befits an age of ‘flux and hiatus’ in global history, French imperial policies
were often hesitant.iii But a reappraisal of French global ambitions during this period offers new insights on French imperialism from the eighteenth to the twentieth century and its relation to European overseas expansionism in the nineteenth century. This section argues that overlooking French projects of global expansion between 1814 and 1870 has established a false sense of discontinuity between the first and second French colonial empires, and points to the gradual adoption of a policy of collaboration with Britain, to preserve and enhance France’s stake in the exploitation of the extra-European world, as a key neglected feature of the period. The second and third sections will test these hypotheses: they will examine, respectively, the revival and survival of the French ‘old colonial system’ from 1814 to 1848, and the search for new means of spreading French influence, including the global defence of Catholicism and free trade, between 1848 and 1870.

Most recent syntheses on the history of French imperialism are based on the assumption that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic years marked an abrupt and fundamental break.iv The First French colonial empire collapsed, the narrative goes, and post-Revolutionary France gradually reconstituted a new empire, a linear process which culminated with the Third Republic.v Apart from such syntheses, classical works tend to focus on two distinct moments, ‘successful’ or dramatic, of French imperial history: the prosperity of the French West Indies in the late eighteenth century and the Haitian revolution on the one hand, and the republican mission civilisatrice and decolonization on the other.vi Anglophone historians have been making increasingly important contributions to the field, while the recent revival of interest among francophone historians in the republican empire is largely fuelled by domestic political controversies about
immigration — a connection which came to the fore when the French National Assembly adopted an amendment prescribing that history textbooks acknowledge ‘the positive role of French presence overseas, especially in North Africa’ in February 2005.\textsuperscript{vii} Even valuable works on the intermediate period suffer from a pronounced regional (Algeria, the Pacific Ocean) or temporal (the second abolition of slavery) focus.\textsuperscript{viii} The last comprehensive analysis of French colonial policy between 1814 and 1870 dates back to Christian Schefer’s stringently pro-colonial works in the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{ix}

Why such a prolonged neglect for the history of French imperial ambitions in this period? A practical factor is the limited accessibility of official archives, in contrast with the well-catalogued colonial archives from the early modern era and, to a lesser extent, from the years 1870 to 1962.\textsuperscript{5} Sources are nonetheless abundant and such practical difficulties not insurmountable. At least four other factors, political and intellectual, probably played a more important role. First comes political mythology, with republican historians keen on portraying the Revolution as a watershed that found its natural conclusion with the establishment of the Third Republic. François Furet and Pierre Rosanvallon, among others, have demolished this teleological conception of nineteenth-century French political history, which viewed the successive monarchical — légitimiste, orléaniste and bonapartist — restorations of the years 1814–70 as anomalies or mere stages towards the advent of a republican democracy. A similar republican teleology informed the history of French colonization. Moderate republican historians such as Gabriel Hanotaux or Georges Hardy often decried the errors of colonial policy made by the nineteenth-century monarchies or at most acknowledged their minor territorial contribution to the edification of the republic’s empire. Only more conservative scholars
such as Schefer or Henri Blet sympathetically analysed the period’s colonial ideas and enterprises.¹¹

A second cause of oblivion is the deep imprint of the Napoleonic continental model of empire, at the expense of overseas expansion, in French culture. Still today in French, ‘l’empire’ refers to the First Napoleonic Empire. To discuss ‘empire’ in the British sense, one ought to speak of ‘les colonies’ or ‘l’empire colonial’. Decolonization and European integration since the 1950s have reinforced the dominance of this continental conception of imperialism and the decline of colonial history in French universities. A third, loosely related factor is the focus on nation-state and class formation, common to a great deal of nineteenth-century European history, but compounded in the French case by the historiographical obsession with the causes and consequences of the Revolution, one of the last bastions of resistance to the rise of global and transnational history.¹² This focus has further relegated colonial issues to the periphery of French history between 1770 and 1870.¹³

The fourth, probably decisive factor is the small territorial extent of French colonial possessions between 1800 and 1880. Yet it only operates because historians of French imperialism have failed to take into consideration the concept of ‘informal empire’ and — to adapt the British expression — what was not ‘blue on the map’. In other words, there were no French equivalents to John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, whose controversial ideas breathed new life into British imperial history after 1950. Gallagher and Robinson’s thesis on the ‘imperialism of free trade’ stated that even after mercantilist methods of exploitation were abandoned in the mid-nineteenth century, Britain continued to seek imperial expansion, by informal means if possible and by formal annexation only
when necessary. Such an outlook opened new avenues of research into the global spread of British influence. The study of all periods of French imperial history has suffered from this neglect of the informal dimension of empire, but none has suffered more than the years 1814 to 1870, when French territorial expansion was at its lowest ebb.

Despite the reduction of her naval and military capability at Trafalgar and Waterloo, France remained a major economic power, ranking second only to Britain for the size of foreign trade and foreign investments. She was still well endowed with intellectual and cultural influence. Her academic institutions and engineering schools, inherited from the Ancien Régime (Collège de France, Muséum d’histoire naturelle, École des Mines and École des Ponts) or created by the Revolution (École Polytechnique, École normale supérieure, Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers), enjoyed immense global prestige. The French language, especially in continental Europe and throughout the Mediterranean world, preserved its status as the main medium of intellectual, scientific, and even commercial and financial communications. Egypt, for example, could be viewed as a cultural and economic French colony for much of the nineteenth century, even after the establishment of a British protectorate in 1882.

Taking into consideration informal imperial expansion should not lead to abandoning the history of formal colonies, which often served as crucial relays for the spread of economic or ideological influence. But such an investigation requires a shift of emphasis from traditional political history and diplomatic tussles over territorial acquisitions to intellectual and legal history and the evolution of French ideas about global expansion, colonial institutions and other means of exploiting overseas territories. Retracing the connections between France’s first and second colonial empires should also
rely on a more careful examination of the thousands of individuals who promoted or carried out projects of overseas expansion, a group which encompassed merchants, civil servants and even customs agents as well as prominent intellectuals. As several examples in the next two sections will illustrate, these agents of French expansionism frequently circulated between old and new French colonial possessions, as did administrative and economic practices.

Such a reappraisal of France’s role as an imperial power in the years 1814 to 1870 has important implications for the study of other empires and, in particular, of British imperialism in the nineteenth century. The British empire towered high above all the others after 1815. But it is possible to use the case of France, the second most dynamic imperial power after Britain, to call into question at least two widely held assumptions about the singularity of the British empire and its relations with other European powers overseas. Firstly, the most popular paradigms devised to conceptualize the chronology and the methods of British expansion, such as ‘free trade imperialism’ or ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, are implicitly understood to apply exclusively to Britain. With some minor adjustments, such paradigms may help to explain the pace and ways of other European imperialisms: for example, the third section of this article suggests that there also was a French ‘imperialism of free trade’ between 1850 and 1870, which incorporated some features of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. Secondly, an intriguing aspect of post-1815 European expansionism is the absence of major armed conflicts over colonial issues between European powers, which stands in sharp contrast with the recurrent mercantilist wars of the early modern era. Richard Drayton has emphasized the often underestimated level of transnational cooperation between members of European civil societies as they
conquered and exploited extra-European possessions in the early modern period, for instance between European settlers in the Caribbean islands. After 1815, such cooperation between Europeans intensified and reached the level of interstate politics.

Relations between the French and British empires in the nineteenth century are a case in point. Tensions undeniably persisted between the two powers. Existing works dwell at length on the numerous overseas crises that supposedly brought the two countries to the brink of war, from the diplomatic struggle over Muhammad Ali’s Egypt in 1840 to the Fashoda standoff in Sudan in 1898. Yet the most remarkable feature of this enduring rivalry is that unlike colonial competition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it never erupted into war. Britain and France fought several overseas wars in the nineteenth century, but always in alliance and as the joint representatives of ‘western’ civilization against ‘barbarian’ Orientals or to restore order in the unstable new republics of Latin America: the 1827 war to liberate Greece, with Russian support, from Turkish rule; the 1845–7 intervention to prevent the annexation of Uruguay by Argentina; the Crimean War of 1853–6 to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russian ambitions; the Arrow or Second Opium War of 1856–60, which resulted in the definitive opening of China to western trade and missionaries; and the 1862 expedition, also with a Spanish contingent, to force Mexico to fulfil its obligations to European creditors. It is apt that this tradition of joint imperial military ventures ended, together with modern colonial empires, at Suez in 1956.

Imperial competition between Britain and France can therefore be re-interpreted as a form of cooperative emulation, which enabled both countries to accentuate their technological military lead and political dominance over extra-European nations. The
naval arms race of the years 1840–70, for example, accelerated the adoption of steam and iron-armouring by both navies.\textsuperscript{xviii} It led not to a Franco-British conflict, but to a tacit and unequal condominium over world seas in the 1860s. Such a condominium remained unequal because it crucially relied on the new acceptance by the French elite that if France wanted to participate in western expansion, it would now have to be in a subordinate position. Trust-building between the two countries’ elites was a gradual and uneven process, which derived from a succession of opportunities overseas rather than a deliberate grand plan. Yet as early as 1814 Henri de Saint-Simon, the utopian thinker, proposed the creation of a Franco-British parliament in which Britons would be guaranteed the majority of representatives, in return for letting France share Britain’s privileged position ‘in its relations with the rest of the world’. In 1823, Dominique de Pradt, a widely read analyst of international affairs, called on his countrymen to admit that France was no longer able to compete single-handedly for global dominance. Instead, he argued, France should forge an alliance with Britain to promote ‘liberal principles’ on a global scale and prevent the expansion of Russian military despotism: ‘The only liberty left [to France] lies in the choice of a necessary protector.’\textsuperscript{xix}

Frustration with France’s diminished status caused occasional lapses into the old model of confrontation, as in 1840 or 1898. But on each occasion, realism prevailed and France backed down: in return, she obtained a limited right of action and expansion overseas. By 1881, Lord Salisbury, then foreign secretary, referred to France in his private correspondence as Britain’s ‘faithful ally’.\textsuperscript{xx} Although strained by the partition of Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, cooperation was restored by the 1904 \textit{Entente Cordiale} agreement, usually cited as an act of European diplomacy designed to contain German
ambitions, but whose official and far from perfunctory purpose was the solving of territorial and commercial disputes overseas. This view contrasts with the emphasis placed by many historians on the intensity of Anglophobia in nineteenth-century France. Yet, as has been shown for the eighteenth century, the rise of mutually xenophobic public discourses between Britain and France did not necessarily reflect the actual feelings of policy-makers or populations. Furthermore, Anglophilia, or *Anglomanie* in contemporary French political parlance, was widespread among the elite. François Guizot and Napoleon III, who together conducted French foreign policy almost uninterruptedly from 1840 until 1870, were fervent admirers of Britain and staunch supporters of a Franco-British alliance.\(^{xxi}\)

Such imperial cooperation can also be construed as collaboration. The model of an empire by collaboration, relying on indigenous rulers in formal and informal colonies, may be extended to the European continent, where some countries such as France, Portugal or the Netherlands were granted the dignity of junior partners in imperial expansion. Thus the system of the British empire comprised not only territorial possessions and informal dependencies, but also *auxiliaries* such as the French empire.

II

British global hegemony after the Napoleonic wars transformed French imperial ambitions more profoundly than the domestic ideological turmoil of the Revolutionary era. Shunning earlier projects of more liberal forms of colonization, the Restoration sought to resurrect predatory methods of imperial exploitation and adjust them to the limiting conditions of a British-dominated world. The July Monarchy proved in the main
content with ensuring the survival of the resuscitated old colonial system, although it initiated a policy of collaboration with Britain with regard to issues such as the repression of the slave trade.

Reaction in the French colonies arguably began under the Consulate, which re-established slavery in 1802. But the loss of all French territories overseas to Britain after the resumption of maritime warfare in 1803 and Haitian independence in 1804 thwarted Napoleon’s projects. It was only during the lasting peace that followed the Congress of Vienna that France was able to undertake a sustained effort to restore the pre-Revolutionary state of affairs in her colonies. In contrast to historians who often describe the colonial dimension of the Vienna settlement as having sanctioned the liquidation of the Bourbon empire, contemporaries viewed it, by comparison with the colonial clauses of the 1763 Paris peace treaty, as generous. Britain returned to France all her tropical colonies except Mauritius but including its Senegalese comptoirs of Gorée and Saint-Louis, in addition to Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Bourbon and her Indian comptoirs. The 1814 peace treaty also recognized French sovereignty over Saint-Domingue and Britain secretly pledged not to hinder France’s future attempts to restore effective control over the island.

This secret article testified to the regime’s determination to restore the old order, a proclivity perhaps even more pronounced in the colonies than in metropolitan France. The Restoration’s first minister of the navy and colonies was Pierre Victor Malouet, a former senior administrator of Saint-Domingue, intendant of French Guyana, and staunch defender of the slave trade and racial discrimination at the Constituent Assembly in 1789–91. In his four months as minister until his death on 7 September 1814, Malouet
pursued a policy of arch-reaction. His instructions to the newly appointed gouverneurs and intendants (these old regime positions were resuscitated, even as the Restoration maintained the Napoleonic préfets in metropolitan France) of the recovered colonies comprised the reinstatement of discriminations against free coloured individuals and of the ‘mitigated’ version of the Exclusif adopted in 1784, which still banned most commercial relations between the colonies and foreign countries. Malouet also commissioned three agents — one white, one mixed-race, and one black — to sound out Haitian leaders about the restoration of French sovereignty over the former ‘pearl of the Antilles’. Malouet’s death did not alter the course of the Restoration’s policy. On 10 October 1814, the new gouverneur and intendant of the Indian Ocean colony Île Bourbon were instructed ‘to uphold severely the prohibitive regime’ of commercial relations.xxv

The disastrous outcome of the Hundred Days resulted in several setbacks. Firstly, the heavy indemnity imposed upon France at the 1815 peace treaty forced the Bourbons to rescind plans for a new military expedition to Saint-Domingue, a decision compounded by the arrest and expulsion of the three agents sent to the island.xxvi Secondly, Napoleon’s decision to abolish the slave trade on 29 March 1815, in the hope of bolstering support amongst liberals at home and reducing British hostility to his return to power, called into question the provision of the 1814 peace treaty that authorized France to resume slave trading operations for five years. Under British pressure, the Bourbon government confirmed the act of abolition. Yet it pursued a policy of active tolerance, requesting metropolitan port authorities and colonial governors to turn a blind eye to slave trading.xxvii
Under the premiership of Joseph de Villèle from 1821 to 1828, colonial reaction intensified. Villèle spent most of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period in Bourbon, where he married into the local créole aristocracy and became a leading opponent of the abolition of slavery. His ascendancy marked the high tide of reaction in metropolitan politics, but Villèle also took extraordinary measures in the colonies, including a partial handover of the local administration to planters and steep increases in the import duties on foreign sugar, which effectively reserved the domestic market for French colonial sugar. Reaction is never a mere return to the previous state of affairs: in the colonies under Villèle, it offered planters more than they had ever received under the Ancien Régime.

Colonial reaction met with some notable successes. Trade with the remaining French colonies soared. Existing works offer abundant statistics about the prosperous colonial trade of the late eighteenth century and the more modest yet significant contribution of colonial markets to French external trade after 1880. Figure 1 examines the evolution of the proportion of French imports that were drawn from the French colonies, from the end of the First Napoleonic Empire until the mid-1890s. It is based on three different series of administrative unpublished and published figures, but the divergences observed when the series overlap (in 1821–9 and 1847–56) do not call orders of magnitude into question. The share of colonial imports in all French imports rose from almost nothing in 1815 to 20% in 1820, while the tariffs introduced by Villèle in 1822 and 1826 reversed the downward trend of the early 1820s, with an average of nearly 15% over the decade. Given the exiguity of the contemporary French colonial demesne, such figures are startling. They sustain the comparison with the 30% share of colonial imports
in total French imports before 1789, while the 15% threshold would not be reached again until the official adoption of a policy of imperial autarchy during the Depression of the 1930s. xxix

Figure 1: Share of colonial imports in total French imports, 1810–1896 (in %)


Figures about the French slave trade under the Restoration are equally remarkable. Available estimates put the number of African slaves transported by French ships to the West Indies at 137,000 in the years 1821–1830. This figure almost matches the average French transatlantic slave trade of the years 1761–1780 (143,000 per decade) and made
France the second slave-trading European nation of the 1820s, although still far behind Portugal. Not all the slaves were disembarked on the French islands, as many were probably destined to Cuba. Yet the plantation system experienced a genuine revival of prosperity in Martinique, Guadeloupe and Bourbon: by 1826, the three islands exported together the same amount of sugar — 69 million tons — as Saint-Domingue before the Revolution.

Historians have paid little attention to this revival. In addition to the general causes of lack of interest in French imperial issues between 1814 and 1870, this may be due to the absence of a mass movement against slavery comparable to the one that agitated British public opinion at the time. Yet it is a conceptual fallacy to presume that opinions about slavery would express themselves similarly in different cultural contexts. British abolitionism was closely tied to the evangelical revival of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In France, which was both Catholic and more secularized, hostility to slavery found other, more diffuse channels of expression. Contemporary debates about naval policy, colonial tariffs or the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitutional Charter of 1814 teemed with references to the legitimacy or abhorrent character of the institution.

Thus the sensation caused by the Raft of the Medusa at the 1819 official painting Salon did not only result from Théodore Géricault’s artistic audacity. When she ran aground a sandbank off the West African Coast in 1816, the Medusa was transporting French troops and administrators to reinstate French rule in Senegal. Between 1816 and 1819, several surviving participants in the expedition became embroiled in slave-trading scandals. These included Julien Schmaltz, a former Lorient merchant and administrator in
the Dutch East Indies, who was appointed governor of Senegal and introduced new systems of semi-coerced labour in the Senegalese hinterland. Géricault went on to prepare what would have been a major anti-slavery painting, the African Slave Trade, if he had completed it before his death in 1824. Another major scandal was the arbitrary imprisonment and deportation of a dozen free men of colour in Martinique, suspected of involvement in the 1822 slave rebellion on the island and publication of an incendiary pamphlet, which denounced the flouting of the rights of free coloured individuals in the colonies. In this as in several other instances, orators of the liberal opposition such as Benjamin Constant pilloried the complicity of the government in the continuation of the slave trade and racial discrimination.

Colonial reaction nonetheless met with a major failure with regard to the re-establishment of French sovereignty over Saint-Domingue. The Bourbon monarchy only recognized the new Haitian Republic in 1825, in return for commercial privileges and an indemnity of 150 million francs. Memories of the 1802 expedition to re-conquer the island, which cost Bonaparte 50,000 of his best soldiers, played a part in the decision. But the long-delayed renunciation of one of the most prodigious sources of wealth under the Ancien Régime was also grounded in the realization that the international market in colonial goods had undergone a drastic change with the rise of Cuban competition and the emergence of new producers in Asia. As shown by the need to introduce protective tariffs on colonial sugar, the French plantation economy was no longer competitive. The resuscitated Exclusif now functioned to the benefit of the colonies, and if re-conquered, Saint-Domingue would have become a fiscal burden. The recognition of Haitian independence nonetheless aroused loud and enduring protests from the royalist right.
Nor did it bring hopes of obtaining a sufficiently large colony to satisfy French needs in tropical products to an end.

The conquest of Algeria, in its initial stage, may thus be construed as an attempt to provide France with a substitute for the riches of Saint-Domingue rather than a new colonial departure. The Restoration fleetingly entertained projects of a new large plantation colony in Guyana, Senegal or Madagascar.\textsuperscript{xxxviii} Yet none met with substantial results and the Bourbon government turned its attention to North Africa, where the weakening of Turkish rule seemed to offer new possibilities. As early as 1825 and following the failure of an attempt to resuscitate the Compagnie d’Afrique, a Colbertian monopoly for trade with Algiers abolished by the Revolution, a report from the ‘direction du Commerce extérieur’ at the ministry of the interior envisaged the establishment of a ‘régime colonial’ in the Regency of Algiers: ‘new cessions of territory’ and ‘new commercial privileges’ would enable France to exploit ‘the largely uncultivated land, covered with a population that could easily be encouraged to work’; such a colony would provide France with ‘a large number of productions from the two worlds’.\textsuperscript{xxxix}

Even traditional scholars who eulogized colonization have tended to admit that the public humiliation of the French consul by the Dey of Algiers in 1827 was a pretext rather than a proximate cause for the seizure of Algiers on 5 July 1830.\textsuperscript{xl} Yet most have merely underlined, as a deeper motive, the search for military prestige abroad of a government embattled at home, and contended that the Restoration had no specific plans for the conquered territory. As a result of the overthrow of the Bourbons just four weeks after the fall of Algiers, an event partly triggered by liberal anxieties about the regime’s imperial ambitions in Africa, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the
Restoration had the ambition of transforming Algeria into a new Saint-Domingue. However, the beginnings of French rule in Algeria under the July Monarchy reveal that there were deeper connections than has been traditionally assumed between the respective figureheads of the first and the second French colonial empire. The troubling resemblances between the fates of the two colonies may not have been entirely coincidental: both were intensely colonized and became major recipients of French investments, both underwent extremely violent revolutions, which helped to bring down the Bourbon monarchy in 1792 and the Fourth Republic in 1958, and both were subjected to extraordinary efforts of suppression in French official and private memory after 1825 and 1962.

Thus the first governor of French North Africa appointed by the July Monarchy was General Bertrand Clauzel, a Napoleonic soldier who had been governor of Le Cap, Saint-Domingue’s largest city, during the 1802 expedition and had married into the local créole aristocracy. Back in Europe, Clauzel served as a high-ranking administrator in Naples, Holland, Spain, Portugal and Dalmatia and, as a result of proscriptions after Waterloo, established himself as a farmer near La Mobile (modern Alabama) between 1815 and 1820. His career therefore lay at the confluence of early modern, Napoleonic and modern French imperialism. In several pamphlets published in the 1830s, Clauzel used statistics on land productivity in the French West Indies and Louisiana to suggest that the Mitidja plain (south of Algiers) alone could provide Western Europe with most of the cotton, sugar and other colonial products that she required. Nor was Clauzel the only official in Algeria who had acquired colonial administrative experience in the Americas. Amédée Usquin, from Burgundy, served as a justice of the peace in Guadeloupe and
Martinique before becoming a ‘royal judge’ at Oran (western Algeria), where he supervised the installation of a new courthouse in 1833–4. Forced to resign after a quarrel with the sous-intendant civil of Oran in September 1834, he was later appointed ‘first judge’ at Chandernagor in India.\footnote{\textit{xliv}}

The policy of ‘occupation restreinte’ pursued by France in its new African colony until 1840, whereby direct rule was confined to coastal cities and the surrounding plains, was reminiscent of the early stage of colonization in Saint-Domingue, where large parts of the interior of the island were left to maroon slaves. Mercantilist conceptions of economic exploitation continued to inspire the early years of French rule. The customs legislation introduced by Clauzel in 1835 reproduced almost word for word the milder version of the \textit{Exclusif} he issued at Le Cap in 1802.\footnote{\textit{xlv}} The shift from slavery to free labour was also incomplete. Not only were the ownership of slaves by Muslim Algerians and the slave trade tolerated until around 1850, but large-scale land expropriations and fiscal privileges for European settlers aimed to turn indigenous Algerians into a cheap agricultural workforce.\footnote{\textit{xlvi}}

After Clauzel’s final resignation in 1837, the poor results of experiments in tropical cultures and the worldwide glut in colonial goods gradually forced the French to encourage the cultivation of cereals and the vine. But the fear of competition for metropolitan producers delayed the lifting of restrictions on Algerian exports to France until the passage of a law in January 1851 and a decree in February 1860.\footnote{\textit{xlvii}} Another factor that thwarted French hopes of turning Algeria into a new Saint-Domingue was the constitution of a powerful Islamic state in Western and Central Algeria, under the leadership of Abd al-Qadir, who declared jihad on the French in 1839. Eight years and an
army of 100,000 soldiers proved necessary to vanquish Abd al-Qadir, and war forced the French to extend direct rule over the entire territory of the former Regency. xlvi

Continuity also prevailed in the French islands, ensuring the survival of slavery until 1848. The July Monarchy embarked upon a forceful policy of repression against the slave trade, with the draconian law of 4 March 1831 and the controversial granting of the right to search French merchant ships to the Royal Navy in 1845. Three laws in April 1833 also reduced the commercial privileges granted to producers of colonial sugar, reinforced the powers of colonial governors and the oversight of legislation by metropolitan authorities, and abolished civil and political discriminations against coloured citizens. Yet the new legislation confirmed the Exclusif, while a franchise twice as high as in metropolitan France enabled white planters to remain in control of local politics. Jean Filleau de Saint-Hilaire, director of the colonies at the ministry of the navy since 1825, retained his position until 1842. Hopes of a rapid slave emancipation quickly abated, as the economic results of emancipation in the British colonies seemed to disprove the abolitionists’ theories about the superiority of free labour. By the mid-1840s, a number of French politicians began to reappraise the civilizing virtues of slavery and delegates from the French West Indies mounted a project for an international alliance for the global defence of slavery between France, Spain, the United States, and Brazil against the British-led global campaign for abolition. New legislation in 1845 relaxed a few commercial restrictions and improved the legal status of slaves. xlix But supporters of such reforms often hoped to give a new lease of life to the Exclusif and slavery rather than embark on a profound transformation of French imperial policy.
The revolution of February 1848 dealt a death blow to the reformed old colonial system, while the decay of the plantation economy and the abolition of slavery compelled French intellectuals and politicians to devise new conceptions of imperial expansion. The short-lived colonial policies of the Second Republic yielded no significant result. But Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte gradually embraced and forcefully implemented a policy of global expansion that privileged informal means of influence, or what might be described as a French imperialism of free trade. These changes also transformed French perceptions of British power, from a constraining factor to a potential partner for the establishment of European dominance overseas.

The second abolition of slavery partly resulted from demographic and economic constraints. The flight of slaves to the emancipated British islands accentuated fears of a long-term decline in the slave population of the French islands. More importantly, the rapid growth of a metropolitan beet sugar industry after 1830 provoked a steep fall in sugar prices on the metropolitan market and brought colonial plantations to the brink of ruin in the 1840s. Yet the proximate cause for abolition was the advent of the Second Republic. Underlining the danger of a slave revolt comparable to the one that devastated Saint-Domingue after the proclamation of the First Republic in 1792, a handful of radical abolitionists led by Victor Schoelcher obtained the adoption of a decree of immediate emancipation on 24 April 1848, although the emancipation of domestic slaves in Algeria and Senegal was carried out more gradually. The Second Republic pursued a colonial policy of ‘assimilation’, extending parliamentary representation in Paris and male universal suffrage, with the notable exception of indigenous Algerians, to all French
overseas territories. It also encouraged metropolitan emigration to the colonies, with the twin objectives of reducing metropolitan unemployment and promoting a new kind of colonial development based on white labour, but a large-scale experiment in such state-sponsored colonization met with disastrous failure in Algeria.\footnote{li}

Only under the Second Napoleonic Empire and partly as a result of the direct influence of several Saint-Simonians on Napoleon III did France adopt new, ‘liberal’ methods of imperial expansion. Recent scholarship in political theory has drawn a parallel between the leading role of Alexis de Tocqueville in the conversion of French liberals to imperial expansion and the impact of new justifications for imperial rule championed by James and John Stuart Mill in Britain.\footnote{lii} Yet from the historian’s standpoint, there is a dual danger of exaggerating Tocqueville’s influence on French thinking about empire and the liberal character of his views on colonization. Tocqueville’s writings on Algeria were not published until the twentieth century or were parliamentary reports, which attracted little contemporary attention and exercised no discernible influence on French colonial policy, in Algeria or elsewhere. Minutes from parliamentary committees on Algerian affairs, which record his personal interventions in legislative discussions, also cast doubt on his alleged liberalism: his main concern was the promotion of white immigration rather than improving the condition of indigenous Algerians and he opposed free trade even limited to Franco-Algerian intercourse.\footnote{liii}

Mid-nineteenth-century French imperial liberalism probably owed more to the critique of mercantilist exploitation by economists such as Jean-Baptiste Say, who kept alive the physiocratic legacy during the Restoration.\footnote{liv} But it was above all indebted to the keen interest of Saint-Simonians in the global expansion of western trade and industry
after 1830 and, more particularly among them, of Michel Chevalier, a leading figure of
the movement. As early as 1832 in the *Système de la Méditerranée*, Chevalier called on
France and the west to turn their attention to Africa and Asia, which new technologies
such as railroads and steamships and telegraphs would make easier to exploit. Following
a two-year visit to the United States, Canada, Mexico and Cuba, his *Lettres sur
l’Amérique du Nord* (1836) lamented the loss of France’s North American continental
culture in 1763, highlighted the superiority of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ methods of colonization
over ‘Latin’ (French, Spanish and Portuguese) approaches, and urged France to embrace
economic reforms in order to resume overseas expansion as well as to increase domestic
prosperity. It was France’s duty, he wrote, ‘to awake [the Latin peoples] from the
lethargy they have sunk into in both hemispheres, to raise them to the level of other
nations, and to enable them to make a mark on the world’. Despite this emphasis on
rivalry between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin ‘races’, Chevalier’s conception of Western
expansion was extremely cooperative: characteristically, his first letter on North America
consisted in a proposal for a London-Paris railroad, which would form the material basis
of a ‘close alliance’ for the exploitation of global resources. Not unlike British
Utilitarians, French Saint-Simonians eschewed traditional European state rivalries in
favour of a British or Franco-British-led endeavour by all ‘western’ countries to improve
the condition of ‘backward’ races.

The *Lettres* were serialized in the widely circulated *Journal des débats* and went
through four editions and numerous reprints. Chevalier also had influential disciples,
including Jules Duval, a correspondent of the *Débats* on Algerian affairs, and later editor-
in-chief of *L’Économiste français* (1861–9), a semi-monthly publication that stalwartly
supported trade liberalization and overseas expansion. The first issue proclaimed that ‘general colonization [was] the linchpin of political economy’: it would make possible ‘the exploitation of the entire globe, [which was] the permanent aspiration and supreme goal of mankind [and] an infinite source of works, products, exchanges, emulation and wealth’. Duval’s conception of ‘colonization’ encompassed ‘rayonnement pacifique’ as well as territorial dominion.\textsuperscript{lvii}

The ideas of Chevalier and his allies reached their maximum influence under the Second Napoleonic Empire. Historians have sometimes derided this regime’s claim to imperium, contrasting it with the more substantial territorial conquests of Napoleon I in continental Europe — a tradition inaugurated by Victor Hugo, who ridiculed the first emperor’s nephew as a ‘white Soulouque’, drawing an interesting parallel with Faustin Soulouque, president of the Haitian republic who crowned himself emperor in 1849.\textsuperscript{lviii} But if the globe rather than Europe is selected as the scale of imperial expansion and if areas of informal influence are taken into consideration, the Second Napoleonic Empire appears as the most determined attempt to restore French global power since the War of American Independence.\textsuperscript{lix} As professor of political economy at the Collège de France since 1840, a dominant figure in the section of the Conseil d’État in charge of economic legislation after 1852 and life-member of the imperial Senate after 1860, Chevalier proved a major proponent and artisan of these new global designs.

Free trade imperialism ultimately relied on hard power, especially sea power, and the Second Empire soon launched an unprecedented programme of naval construction. French engineers took the lead in the steam and iron-armouring technological revolutions and the French Navy’s budget trebled between 1850 and 1865, when it reached nearly
two thirds of British naval expenditure.\textsuperscript{lx} The rapid narrowing of the naval gap elicited anxiety in London and the British press, but later developments showed that Napoleon III wished to turn France into a serious partner for the exploitation of global resources rather than avenge Trafalgar. The main guarantee of cooperation he offered Britain was the 1860 commercial or ‘free trade’ treaty between the two countries. Although it continues to be referred to as the Cobden treaty, research has proved that its main instigator was Chevalier.\textsuperscript{lxii} The latter also steered the abolition of the colonial \textit{Exclusif} through the Senate in 1861.\textsuperscript{lxiii} Chevalier’s support for free trade owed little to Ricardian political economy or Cobdenite utopianism. In his lectures at the Collège de France, he advocated government intervention to encourage the construction of infrastructure and the expansion of credit. But after the embrace of free trade by Britain in 1846–9, he became convinced that commercial openness would foster economic growth and facilitate the expansion of French influence throughout the world: the decay of Chinese power, he contended, illustrated ‘the lot reserved to the nations that isolate themselves’.\textsuperscript{lxiii}

Partly as a result of the Second Empire’s commercial policies, French foreign trade soared. Between 1850 and 1870, exports trebled in value (see figure 2) and the exports/GDP ratio doubled, from 6 to 12\%. The share of French exports in world exports rose from less than 10\% in 1850 to nearly 15\% in the mid-1860s. Instead of cotton textiles, coal and hardware, France exported silks, wines and luxury ‘articles de Paris’. But as with its British contemporary, French economic imperialism had a financial as well as a commercial dimension. The net value of French foreign investments augmented from 0.75 billion francs in 1850 to 13.3 billion in 1870. French capital and French engineers played a leading role in the construction of infrastructure in Eastern Europe and
throughout the Mediterranean. The cutting of the Suez Canal, between 1858 and 1869, is the most famous such French-led, cooperative and financial imperial venture. French global financial power relied on the new joint-stock banks modelled on the Crédit Mobilier, founded in 1852, and France’s continuing adhesion to a bimetallic standard. Bimetallism made Paris an essential intermediary between Britain and the handful of countries that had adopted a gold standard on the one hand, and the vast majority of the world, especially Asia and including British India, which remained on a silver standard, on the other.\textsuperscript{lxiv}

Figure 2: French exports, 1815–1896 (in million of francs)

In accordance with the paradigm of free trade imperialism, the Second Empire only reluctantly resorted to territorial expansion. Furthermore, the territories acquired in Western Africa (Senegalese hinterland) and East Asia (Cochinchina) were not destined to become mercantilist plantations, but areas where France would exercise a benevolent and non-exclusive patronage. The Comte de Chaussegoup-Laubat, minister of the navy, explained to the governor of Cochinchina in 1862: ‘It is a sort of suzerainty, of sovereignty that we want, with free commercial intercourse, accessible to all ... We do not wish to found a colony in the sense given to this word by our fathers, with European settlers, institutions, regulations, and privileges; no, it is a veritable empire that we must create’. The Second Empire favoured commercial treaties as a means to propagate French influence, not only with Britain and eleven other European countries in 1860–6, but also with Siam in 1856, Japan and China in 1858, and Madagascar in 1862. The Reception of the Siamese Ambassadors (1861) by Jean-Léon Gérôme, an official painter who specialized in Orientalist subjects, depicted the ratification of the treaty with Siam with a pomposity that highlighted the restoration of French global imperial grandeur by commercial means.

Near the centre of Gérôme’s painting figures a Jesuit priest, the Abbé Lanardie, who played a key role in the negotiation of the treaty with Siam in 1858. This presence illustrates an important feature of French free trade imperialism after 1850: its close association with the global promotion of Catholicism. Chevalier viewed Catholicism as the essentially Latin branch of Christianity and as the main source of legitimacy for the expansion of French influence throughout the world. Reconciliation between the modern French state and the Catholic Church was one of the central planks of the
bonpartist regime. Partly as a result, French Catholic missionary zeal underwent unprecedented growth between 1850 and 1870: the Oeuvre de la propagation de la foi, founded in 1822, reached a million subscribers, while numerous new organizations were created, such as the Missions africaines and the Pères blancs. Hélène de Chappotin, the daughter of Saint-Domingue planters, proved a major figure of French missionary renaissance: after joining a mission affiliated with the Jesuits in India in 1864, she founded the Franciscaines missionnaires de Marie, an elite order with branches in Ceylon, China, Chile, Canada, Congo and Tunisia. By the late nineteenth century, two thirds of the 75,000 European Catholic priests, brothers and nuns working in missions overseas were French. The defence of missionaries, Catholic believers or Catholic nations served as official justifications for French military involvement in the Crimean War in 1853, in China in 1856, Cochinchina in 1858, Lebanon in 1860, and Mexico in 1862.

The paradigm of free trade imperialism may also be used to explain two major imperial ventures under Napoleon III: the attempt to transform Algeria into an ‘Arab kingdom’ after 1861 and the expedition to install Maximilian of Habsburg as Emperor of Mexico between 1862 and 1867. Historians of Algeria often describe the policy of the Arab kingdom as a missed opportunity to pursue a policy of cooperative colonization between European settlers and indigenous Algerians. Napoleon III put a halt to land-grabbing by European settlers, trying to confine the latter to industrial and commercial activities, and improved the legal status of indigenous Jews and Muslims. An influential advisor of the emperor on Algerian affairs and stalwart supporter of the Arab Kingdom was Ismayl (born Thomas) Urbain, who offers another extraordinary instance
of the transversal circulation of imperial ideas between the first and second colonial empires, from French Guyana to Algeria via Cairo. However, existing works tend to romanticize Urbain’s ‘Arabophile’ policies, which sought to achieve, by more subtle means, the same goals as his ‘assimilationist’ opponents: the breaking down of collective tribal property and the imposition of new capitalist structures of production on Algerian society.

The exact motives of the Mexican expedition are controversial among historians, who have alternately placed an emphasis on several non-mutually exclusive explanations: France’s desire to check American expansionism in Central America, the hopes of French financiers to take control of Mexican silver mines, and the ambition of Napoleon III to establish peace and stability on a global as well as a European scale. Yet one of the most compelling contemporary justifications was the case made by Chevalier from 1850 onwards for the establishment of a progressive Mexican monarchy: while ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘Protestant’ republicanism had plunged Spanish America into chaos since the 1820s, a monarchical regime committed to free trade and under French protection would better suit Mexico’s ‘Latin’ and ‘Catholic’ temperament and enable the country to exploit its potentially enormous mineral and commercial wealth. The Mexican example would reverberate across ‘Latin America’ — an expression probably forged by Chevalier — and enhance French influence in the old as well as in the new world. Chevalier therefore warmly approved of the crowning of Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico in 1864 and the sending of 30,000 French troops to bolster his fledging regime: ‘Among the diverse interests and duties of French politics, none is greater and more immediate than
upholding and fostering the power of the Latin group, the vanguard of Catholic nations’. lxxvii

The most polished theoretical exposition of this French imperialism of free trade was Paul Leroy-Beaulieu’s De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes. The book’s first edition came out in 1874 and is often mistaken as a blueprint for the Third Republic’s policy of colonial expansion. Yet the text was written in the last years of the Second Empire as an essay that won, in March 1870, the first prize of a concours on political economy organized by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 1866. Leroy-Beaulieu’s book eulogized European expansion and British liberal methods of economic exploitation. It drew extensively on the writings of British ‘free trade imperialists’ such as Herman Merivale, Robert Torrens and Edward Wakefield, but also on those of Duval and Chevalier, whose daughter, Cordelia, Leroy-Beaulieu married in May 1870. lxxviii Leroy-Beaulieu placed an emphasis on informal means of colonization, defining the latter concept as ‘the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to [a nation’s] language, moeurs, ideas, and laws’. Only in the significantly altered second edition of De la Colonisation, published in 1882, did Leroy-Beaulieu begin to advocate territorial expansion. lxxix

Three successive setbacks destabilized French free trade imperialism after 1865. The great Algerian famine of 1866–8, which caused the death of approximately 20% of the indigenous population, was attributed by European settlers and their republican metropolitan allies to the Emperor’s Arabophile policies and discredited the concept of an Arab kingdom. lxxx The virulence of anti-French guerilla activity and the threat of American intervention after the end of the Civil War also forced Napoleon III to
withdraw French troops from Mexico, a decision which led to the overthrow and execution of Maximilian, a major humiliation for the bonapartist regime in 1867. But the decisive blow was dealt by the catastrophic outcome of the Franco-Prussian war in the summer of 1870, which triggered revolutionary insurrections in Algiers as well as Paris and the establishment of a republican regime in metropolitan France between 1870 and 1877. lxxxi

The decade of recueillement that followed the fall of Napoleon III witnessed a decline in French initiatives overseas, and even the abandonment of several comptoirs and protectorates in sub-Saharan Africa. But once firmly entrenched, the Third Republic resumed colonial expansion on a scale unprecedented since the days of Louis XIV. The colonies consolidated under the Second Empire such as Algeria and Senegal or the new colony of Cochin-China served as bridgeheads for massive territorial acquisitions in Africa and Indochina after 1880. Despite the new regime’s difficult relations with the Catholic Church, republican leaders had no qualms using the existing network of missionaries to propound French influence or justify annexations overseas: ‘anticlericalism’, Léon Gambetta declared, ‘[was] not an item for export’. Yet as it developed, the imperialism of the Third Republic diverged in several fundamental ways from the empire imagined by Napoleon III and his Saint-Simonian advisors. France gradually reverted to domestic and imperial protectionism after 1872, and abandoned the bimetallic standard in 1873. The fear of Germany held in check the traditional Anglophobia of republicans, but the British empire now served as an anti-model as well as a source of emulation. The new emphasis on territorial conquest and the ‘assimilationist’ rhetoric of the mission civilisatrice were frequently contrasted with the supposed British reliance on indirect rule and exploitative
conception of colonization. Even support for Catholic missions dwindled as antclericalism entered a more radical phase in the wake of the Dreyfus affair in the 1890s and with the separation of church and state in 1905.\textsuperscript{lxxxii} Elements of continuity persisted, but general histories underestimate the extent to which the advent of the Third Republic profoundly reshaped the nature of French imperialism, with consequences lasting until the collapse, partly resulting from the imperial setbacks of Dien Bien Phu, Suez, and the Algerian revolution, of the Fourth Republic in 1958.

IV

Territories, actors and memories from the eighteenth-century Bourbon empire played a key role in the reformulation of French imperial ambitions after 1814, although the route to the re-emergence of France as a major colonial power proved a sinuous process rather than a gradual transition. The high level of interaction between French metropolitan and extra-European events also suggests that despite the exiguity of French colonial possessions between 1814 and 1870, imperial ambitions and disappointments contributed in no small measure to the domestic political instability that characterized post-Revolutionary France until the 1870s: the seizure of Algiers in 1830, the economic decay of the French West Indies in the 1840s, imperial chaos after 1848, and the disastrous outcome of the Arab Kingdom policy and Mexican expedition in the 1860s played a significant role in the respective demises of the Bourbon Restoration, July Monarchy, Second Republic and Second Napoleonic Empire. Further research on the French imperial meridian may therefore cast new light on the making of modern France as well as French imperial reconstruction.
An in-depth analysis of how Britain came to tolerate a restrained form of French overseas expansionism and of how France grudgingly came to accept a relatively subordinate status may also lead to a significant revision of the history of European imperialism in the nineteenth century. It was not only superior military and economic power, or the crises undergone by Asian and African states, but also the increasing capacity of European states to collaborate between themselves that explain the acceleration of European formal and informal expansion after 1815. This trend was sustained by the growing popularity of political and economic liberalism and, especially in British Utilitarian and French Saint-Simonian circles, of the concept of ‘the west’. In contrast to early modern mercantilist conflicts and the resumption of imperial clashes from the 1890s onwards, such collaboration stands as one of the most salient features of ‘liberal imperialism’ in the nineteenth century.
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iv A view recently challenged by Pernille Røge in ‘Political Economy and the Reinvention of France’s Colonial System, 1756–1802’ (Univ. of Cambridge PhD, forthcoming).

v The first and second volumes of Denise Bouche and Pierre Pluchon, Histoire de la colonisation française, 2 vols. (Paris, 1991) respectively end and begin in 1815; the ternary organization of the Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Jean Meyer, Jacques Thobie et al., Histoire de la France coloniale, 2nd edn, 3 vols. (Paris, 1996); — La Conquête until 1870, L’Apogée between 1870 and 1931, and Le Déclin since 1931 — reveals that its main focus remains the Third Republic’s empire; and four out of the five volumes of L’Aventure coloniale de la France deal with post-Revolutionary developments, making little attempt to connect them with the single volume on L’Empire des rois. With the exception of Frederick Quinn, The French Overseas Empire (Westport, Conn., 2000), other general histories also tend to combine an emphasis on the revolutionary discontinuity with a teleological bias towards the advent of the Third Republic’s empire: Arthur Conte, L’Épopée coloniale de la France (Paris, 1992); Jacques Binoche-Guedra, La France d’outre-mer, 1815–1862 (Paris, 1992); and Robert Aldrich, Greater France: a History of French Overseas Expansion (Basingstoke, 1996).

vii The clause was abrogated by a decree on 15 February 2006; on contemporary French politics and colonial history, see Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel and Sandrine Lemaire (eds.), *La Fracture coloniale: la société française au prisme de l’héritage colonial* (Paris, 2005), and Stéphane Dufoix and Patrick Weil (eds.), *L’Esclavage, la colonisation et après: France, États-Unis, Grande-Bretagne* (Paris, 2005).


x Charged with the classification of nineteenth-century administrative colonial papers in 1911, Schefer himself involuntarily (one hopes) contributed to making his scholarship immortal by adopting an ‘unsophisticated’ system of classification and by leaving the task uncompleted, which resulted in the ‘breaking up’ of original series and the loss of numerous papers; see Jean Favier (ed.), *Les Archives Nationales: état général des fonds*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1978–88), iii, 374–5. Many of the papers pertaining to the administration of Algeria between 1830 and 1870, held at the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre in Vincennes, are also poorly catalogued, although this difficulty is compensated by the better cataloguing of ministerial papers on Algeria (series F80) and the archives of the Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie, both now at the Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence.


xiii With the exception, on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, of the works of Yves Benot and Marcel Dorigny. But it is characteristic that Benot never held an academic position, while Dorigny stressed, in a private conversation, held on 7 November 2009 and from which he authorised me to quote, that he did not rank among the academic ‘mandarins’ of the Revolution in France.


Bureau d’administration, reports of 20 and 25 June 1814 on Saint-Domingue; instructions to the gouverneurs and intendants of Martinique and Guadeloupe, 16 Aug. 1814; and instructions to the gouverneur and intendant of Bourbon, 10 Oct. 1814: Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (hereafter CAOM), 11/COL/61, fos. 3–4, 6–11, 13–14.


Figures based on http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces. These do not include the French slave trade in the Indian Ocean, while the Bourbon sugar plantations expanded rapidly after 1815; see Fuma Sudel, Une Colonie, île à sucre: l’économie de la Réunion au XIXe siècle (Saint-André de la Réunion, 1989), 30–5.


De la situation des gens de couleur libres aux Antilles françaises (Paris, 1823).


Schefer, France moderne, 197–223.


On Clauzel’s influence on the shaping of Algerian customs legislation, see minister of war to minister of commerce, 4 Sep. 1835: AN, F12 6179, and minister of war to Clauzel, 17 Nov. 1835: CAOM, F80 949; on the partial re-implementation of the *Exclusif* at Saint-Domingue in 1802, see Ardouin, *Études*, v, 127–8.


Victor Hugo, Napoléon le petit, 37th edn (Paris, 1900), 22; 1st edn in 1852.


Documents officiels relatifs à la loi sur le régime douanier des colonies (Paris, 1861), 106–9.


Born in French Guyana in 1812, the son of a white French merchant and of a free mulatto woman, Ismayl (or Ismaïl) Urbain was educated in Marseilles, where he became an adept of the Saint-Simonian religion. He later preached the Saint-Simonian gospel in Constantinople and Cairo, where he learnt Arabic and converted to Islam. Thanks to the patronage of Chevalier, he became an interpreter for the French army in Algeria in 1837. He then served at the direction of Algerian affairs at the ministry of war from 1845, as Councillor of the Government in Algiers from 1860, and as personal interpreter of Napoleon III during the latter’s one-month visit to Algeria in 1865. See Michel Levallois, Ismaïl Urbain, Une Autre conquête de l’Algérie (Paris, 2000) and Anne Levallois (ed.), Les Écrits autobiographiques d’Ismayl Urbain (1812–1884) (Paris, 2005).


Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (Paris, 1874), 608; see 2nd edn (Paris, 1882), 253–4 and 541, for examples of additions that stress the benefits of territorial acquisitions.

