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# The politics of antisemitism

Analysis of survey findings

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30 November 2019

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## About the author

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## 1. Introduction

Key findings of Campaign Against Antisemitism’s 2019 Antisemitism Barometer survey are presented in the document, *Antisemitism Barometer 2019*, available via the Campaign Against Antisemitism website. In that document, findings are presented in the form of percentages of respondents in particular groups who expressed particular numbers of antisemitic attitudes. That is because percentages are easy to interpret. However, the current document presents findings in terms of mean numbers of attitudes, and in terms of correlations, because these are more robust. Its purpose is to show that the findings reported in the *Barometer* are likely to reflect real patterns in the population of British adults. For that reason, it also presents measures of statistical significance.

## 2. Fieldwork

Fieldwork was conducted between 24th and 25th September. In total, 2040 responses were obtained. This included 1639 as part of the nationally representative main sample, 197 as part of a boost sample of individuals identifying as ‘very right-wing’, and 204 as part of a boost sample of individuals identifying as ‘very left-wing’.

## 3. Samples

Table 1 provides descriptive characteristics of the main sample and the two boost samples. All three were stratified random samples. The nationally representative sample was collected as part of YouGov’s regular Political Omnibus poll. The samples were stratified according to YouGov’s estimates of the demographic characteristics of the British adult population in the case of the nationally representative sample and the populations of British adults identifying as ‘very right-wing’ or ‘very left-wing’ in the case of the two boost samples. Because the boost samples were smaller, the only demographic characteristic used for this purpose with regard to those samples was gender. In the case of the nationally representative sample, a full range of demographic characteristics were used, including past voting behaviour. Members of each sample were demographically weighted according to the same variables and population estimates used in stratification. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the three samples. Apart from n (i.e. the number of respondents) and age, all numbers are percentages.

Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the three samples

	Nationally representative		'Very right-wing'		'Very left-wing'	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
n	1639	1639	197	197	204	204
Age: mean	50.06	48.51	60.06	60.02	51.81	51.88
Age: SD	16.85	17.29	13.93	13.94	14.85	14.83
Gender: female	57	52	32	34	52	51
Gender: male	43	48	68	66	48	49
Ethnicity: any white	93	91	99	99	96	96
Ethnicity: any other	7	9	1	1	4	4
Religion: Christian	41	39	55	55	17	17
Religion: other	6	7	3	3	10	10
Religion: none	53	54	41	41	73	73
Social grade: ABC1	60	57	76	76	79	79
Social grade: C2DE	40	43	24	24	21	21
Highest qual: degree	29	28	31	32	61	61
Highest qual: non-degree	71	72	69	68	39	39
Brexit vote: remain	43	38	10	10	83	83
Brexit vote: leave	41	41	86	86	14	14

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number and may not sum to 100

## 4. Measurement of antisemitism

The tendency for antisemitism to be expressed not only in prejudiced statements about Jews but also in prejudiced statements about the Jewish state was termed ‘the new antisemitism’ by Pierre-André Taguieff (2004). The key insight of scholarship on contemporary antisemitism in a range of disciplines is that discourse on Israel and those associated with Israel is just as liable to involve antisemitism as discourse on Jews identified as Jews (for major recent studies, see in particular Hirsh, 2007; Jaspal, 2014; Fine and Spencer, 2017; Hirsh, 2017; Rich, 2018; Johnson, 2019). This position was given official recognition in the widely-accepted International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism (IHRA, 2016), as well as a recent United Nations report on religious intolerance (Shaheed, 2019).

Tables 2 and 3 present the questionnaire items used in order to measure levels of what is referred to in this document and the *Barometer* as JpAs for Judeophobic Antisemitism (that is, the form of bigotry sometimes referred to as ‘classic antisemitism’) and AzAs for Antizionist Antisemitism (that is, Taguieff’s ‘new antisemitism’). The JpAs items were developed by Campaign Against Antisemitism and used in past editions of the *Barometer*. The AzAs items were developed by Daniel Allington and David Hirsh, and pilot-tested on volunteers at King’s College London and on a sample collected through the Mechanical Turk platform; the pilot study is reported in a forthcoming blind peer-reviewed article (Allington and Hirsh, 2019 [in press]).

JpAs-6, JpAs-7, and AzAs-5 are greyed-out because they were not used in constructing the measures of antisemitism used here and in the *Barometer*. AzAs-5 was not used solely because it was recognised that its inclusion might cause unnecessary argument (given that, taken in isolation, it presents only indirect evidence of antisemitism). Two JpAs items were removed because a balanced scale with equal numbers of JpAs items and AzAs items was desired. JpAs-6 and JpAs-7 were selected because they had the lowest correlation with other JpAs items. However, all items were well-correlated overall, as we see from table 4, which presents reliability measures for the longer and shorter JpAs and AzAs inventories.

Guttman’s lambda 6 is provided as a measure of internal reliability as well as the more standard Cronbach’s alpha because it is considered more robust, not being biased towards longer scales. Truncating the AzAs inventory may have had more of an impact on reliability measures than truncating the JpAs inventory because AzAs-5 was in fact one of the most strongly-correlated AzAs items. Especially given the short length of the inventories, the reliability scores are very encouraging, and compare favourably with analogous measures used in other studies. For comparison, Staetsky (2017: 33) reports a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.79 for an eight-item scale used in assessing anti-Jewish attitudes and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82 for a nine-item scale used in assessing anti-Israeli attitudes.

Total numbers of JpAs and AzAs statements agreed with (or disagreed with in the case of reverse-coded items) were calculated and treated as indices of Judeophobic (classic) and antizionist (new) antisemitism. Pearson correlations between five-item and full (six- or seven-item) versions of the two indices across all three samples are presented in table 5.

This table shows that:

- All correlation coefficients were very highly statistically significant in every sample, indicating that an individual’s score on one index predicts his or her score on the other
- In the nationally representative sample, coefficients of correlation were very similar to those which the previous British study found between the indices of anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiment (0.44 for the 7-item JpAs scale and the 6-item AzAs scale



and a slightly lower 0.42 for the 5-item versions of each, as compared to the 0.48 reported by Staetsky, 2017: 35)

- Coefficients of correlation were higher in the ‘very right-wing’ boost sample, and lower in the ‘very left-wing’ boost sample (a similar phenomenon appears to be reported by Staetsky, 2017: 49, although not expressed in terms of correlation coefficients)

Social desirability bias provides a plausible explanation of the lower correlation coefficients in the ‘very left-wing’ sample and the higher correlation coefficients in the ‘very right-wing’ sample. This bias is a well-established tendency for survey respondents to avoid giving answers that they believe could be regarded in a negative light. On the left, all forms of racism are regarded as evil, including by individuals espousing antizionist antisemitic views (see e.g. Shaheed, 2019: 5). If antisemitic respondents on the extreme left recognised that certain answers to the Judeophobic antisemitic items would be considered racist, but did not recognise that this might also be true of the antizionist items, then they may have responded to the antizionist items with greater candour. On the other hand, antisemitic respondents on the extreme right would seem unlikely to care whether their answers would be considered racist or not, and might therefore have answered both sets of items with equal candour.

Regardless of this, the correlations indicate that, across the political spectrum, a British person’s attitudes to the Jewish and its supporters are a good guide to his or her likely attitudes to British Jews, and that a British person’s attitudes to British Jews are a good guide to his or her likely attitudes to the Jewish state and its supporters. This was an expected finding, given not only Staetsky’s (2017) findings, but also those of Frindte et al. (2005), Kaplan and Small (2006), Cohen et al. (2009), Weinstein and Jackson (2010), and Jaspal (2015).

The five-item JpAs and AzAs indices were combined by the simple method of addition, producing an overall index of antisemitism that ranged from 0 to 10 and was balanced between old and new forms of antisemitism.

*Table 2: JpAs (Judeophobic antisemitism) items (items excluded from the JpAs index in grey)*

<b>Item</b>	<b>Statement</b>
JpAs-1	British Jewish people chase money more than other British people
JpAs-2	Having a connection to Israel makes Jewish people less loyal to Britain than other British people
JpAs-3	Jewish people consider themselves to be better than other British people
JpAs-4	Compared to other groups, Jewish people have too much power in the media
JpAs-5	Jewish people talk about the Holocaust just to further their political agenda
JpAs-6 *	Jewish people can be trusted just as much as other British people in business
JpAs-7 *	I am just as open to having Jewish friends as I am to having friends from other sections of British society

\* Reverse-coded

Table 3: AzAs (antizionist antisemitism) items (items excluded from the AzAs index in grey)

Item	Statement
AzAs-1	Israel and its supporters are a bad influence on our democracy
AzAs-2	Israel can get away with anything because its supporters control the media
AzAs-3	Israel treats the Palestinians like the Nazis treated the Jews
AzAs-4 *	I am comfortable spending time with people who openly support Israel
AzAs-5 *	Israel makes a positive contribution to the world
AzAs-6 *	Israel is right to defend itself against those who want to destroy it

\* Reverse-coded

Table 4: Internal reliability of scales across samples

	$\alpha$	$\lambda_6$
<b>Main sample</b>		
JpAs (7-item)	0.88	0.87
JpAs (5-item)	0.87	0.85
AzAs (6-item)	0.87	0.87
AzAs (5-item)	0.83	0.82
<b>Boost sample: 'very right-wing'</b>		
JpAs (7-item)	0.90	0.90
JpAs (5-item)	0.88	0.87
AzAs (6-item)	0.91	0.91
AzAs (5-item)	0.89	0.88
<b>Boost sample: 'very left-wing'</b>		
JpAs (7-item)	0.85	0.84
JpAs (5-item)	0.84	0.82
AzAs (6-item)	0.82	0.82
AzAs (5-item)	0.78	0.77

Table 5: Pearson correlations between JpAs and AzAs indices

	5-item JpAs			7-item JpAs		
	r	DF	p	r	DF	p
<b>5-item AzAs</b>						
Main	0.42	1637	< 0.001	0.44	1637	< 0.001
'Very right-wing'	0.52	195	< 0.001	0.56	195	< 0.001
'Very left-wing'	0.35	202	< 0.001	0.33	202	< 0.001
<b>6-item AzAs</b>						
Main	0.42	1637	< 0.001	0.44	1637	< 0.001
'Very right-wing'	0.52	195	< 0.001	0.56	195	< 0.001
'Very left-wing'	0.31	202	< 0.001	0.30	202	< 0.001

Table 6 presents mean scores and standard deviations for all three indices across all three samples. Figure 1 visualises distributions of scores. It will be noted that both of the boost samples were characterised by higher total levels of antisemitism than the nationally representative sample, but that levels were highest in the boost sample for the 'very left-wing'. Table 7 shows that this difference was not statistically significant in the case of the boost sample for the 'very right-wing' but was very highly statistically significant in the case of the boost sample for the 'very left-wing'.

This may come as a surprise, given that the neo-Nazi far right is known to be very highly antisemitic. However, it seems likely that members of neo-Nazi organisations will represent only a tiny proportion of those British adults who identify as 'very right-wing', just as card-carrying Communists will represent only a tiny proportion of those British adults who identify as 'very left-wing'.

Table 6: Mean and standard deviation for antisemitism indices across samples

		JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
	n	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Nationally representative sample	1639	0.71	1.29	0.94	1.35	1.65	2.23
Boost sample: 'Very right-wing'	197	1.17	1.63	0.77	1.31	1.94	2.57
Boost sample: 'Very left-wing'	204	0.45	1.00	2.02	1.62	2.47	2.17

Table 7: Comparison of boost samples with nationally-representative sample (unweighted mean difference and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test)

	Diff.	U	p
Very right-wing	+0.35	155371.5	0.362
Very left-wing	+0.88	121285.0	< 0.001




Figure 1: Distributions of scores on antisemitism indices across samples

## 5. Levels of antisemitism by past voting history

This study was not designed to compare levels of antisemitism by past voting history. However, this topic is anticipated to be of interest to readers, so figures are presented here summarising findings by 2017 general election vote (table 8) and 2016 referendum vote (table 9).

It is noted that Labour and Conservative voters exhibited similar levels of antisemitism, being typical of the population as a whole, while Liberal Democrat voters exhibited notably lower levels of antisemitism. Numbers of respondents who voted for other parties were very small so the corresponding mean scores should be interpreted with great caution. Leave voters had very slightly higher overall scores than Remain voters, but the differences are tiny and should not be taken to indicate a pattern in the population as a whole.

Table 8: Antisemitic views by 2017 general election vote (nationally representative sample)

	JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)		
	n	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Conservative	567	0.79	1.31	0.80	1.24	1.59	2.16
Labour	514	0.59	1.13	1.12	1.45	1.70	2.15
Liberal Democrat	100	0.33	0.80	0.76	1.20	1.09	1.70
Scottish National Party (SNP)	44	0.59	1.39	1.78	1.63	2.37	2.54
Plaid Cymru	8	0.53	0.89	1.02	1.23	1.56	1.71
UK Independence Party (UKIP)	29	0.66	1.25	0.80	1.04	1.45	1.65
Green	24	1.07	1.91	1.01	1.27	2.08	2.69
Other	15	0.96	1.51	0.97	1.69	1.93	2.98
Don't know	45	0.89	1.32	0.68	0.98	1.58	2.06
Did not vote	276	0.86	1.52	0.92	1.38	1.78	2.54

Table 9: Antisemitic views by 2016 referendum vote (nationally representative sample)

	JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)		
	n	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Remain	709	0.52	1.11	1.00	1.36	1.52	2.03
Leave	677	0.86	1.35	0.86	1.27	1.72	2.19
Did not vote	222	0.77	1.48	1.02	1.50	1.78	2.67

## 6. Levels of antisemitism by self-identified position on the left-right axis

Table 10 and figure 2 show antisemitism scores for respondents divided by their self-identified position on a scale from ‘Very left-wing’ to ‘Very right-wing’. Figure 2 additionally shows margins of error. Here, the nationally representative sample was combined as the boost samples of ‘very right-wing’ and ‘very left-wing’ respondents could be straightforwardly grouped with those members of the nationally representative sample who identified in the same way. (This was important for accuracy, as the self-identified ‘very right-wing’ and ‘very left-wing’ are very small minorities, together amounting to less than 5% of the British population.)

It can be seen that levels of Judeophobic Antisemitism are higher among the ‘very right-wing’, fall towards the centre of the scale, and then drop, remaining roughly constant across the whole of the left, while levels of Antizionist Antisemitism are much higher among the ‘very left-wing’, fall towards the centre of the scale, and then drop, remaining roughly constant across the whole of the right. As we have already seen, however, the two indices were correlated, meaning that both on the right and on the left, the same people tended to hold both kinds of antisemitic attitudes. This means that levels of overall antisemitism are roughly constant across the whole of the political spectrum, but lower among those who don’t know where they fall on it, and higher among those who identify with its left-most point. This is not suggestive of a linear relationship but of a contrast between (a) those who identify as ‘very left-wing’ and those who identify with other points on the left-right axis, and (b) those who identify themselves with a point on that axis and those who do not. For this reason, a coefficient of correlation is not presented here. However, we have already seen that the difference in overall antisemitism between the ‘very left-wing’ boost sample and the nationally representative sample was very highly statistically significant, while the difference between the ‘very right-wing’ boost sample and the nationally representative sample was not statistically significant.

*Table 10: Levels of antisemitism by self-identified political position (all samples combined)*

	n	JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Very left-wing	253	0.47	1.04	1.97	1.60	2.44	2.19
Fairly left-wing	233	0.47	1.08	1.27	1.53	1.73	2.13
Slightly left-of-centre	241	0.45	0.90	1.09	1.40	1.54	1.85
Centre	279	0.82	1.31	1.10	1.36	1.92	2.33
Slightly right-of-centre	226	0.93	1.38	0.79	1.28	1.72	2.26
Fairly right-wing	149	0.99	1.49	0.81	1.26	1.80	2.30
Very right-wing	218	1.20	1.65	0.76	1.30	1.96	2.58
Don’t know	436	0.67	1.36	0.69	1.21	1.36	2.28




Figure 2: levels of antisemitism by self-identified political position (samples combined)

## 7. Levels of antisemitism among strong supporters of political leaders

Tables 11-14 compare levels of antisemitism among those who and those who do not strongly like each of four political leaders in turn, in each of the three samples. Absolute numbers supporting some political leaders are very low in certain boost samples (Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, and Jo Swinson in the ‘very left-wing’ sample; Jo Swinson and Jeremy Corbyn in the ‘very right-wing’ sample), in which case the mean figures should be ignored, but are provided for transparency.

Table 15 shows the mean unweighted difference in the antisemitism index for strongly liking each of the four political leaders, and then tests for statistical significance using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. Effects for Boris Johnson and Jo Swinson are statistically insignificant. The increase in antisemitism among those who strongly like Nigel Farage (as compared with those who do not) is small but statistically significant in the nationally representative sample ( $p < 0.05$ ), but loses statistical significance when this is combined with the boost samples. The increase in antisemitism among those who strongly like Jeremy Corbyn (as compared with those who do not) in the nationally representative sample is approximately twice as great, and is highly statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ). When that sample is combined with the two boost samples, that effect becomes still larger, and is very highly statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ).

Table 11: Levels of antisemitism by strong liking for Nigel Farage (across samples)

		JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
	n	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Nationally representative sample</b>							
Strongly like Farage: NO	1447	0.64	1.23	0.95	1.36	1.59	2.19
Strongly like Farage: YES	192	1.18	1.60	0.88	1.24	2.07	2.44
<b>Boost sample: 'Very right-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Farage: NO	83	1.14	1.57	0.94	1.34	2.08	2.49
Strongly like Farage: YES	114	1.18	1.69	0.65	1.28	1.84	2.64
<b>Boost sample: 'Very left-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Farage: NO	200	0.41	0.92	2.00	1.63	2.42	2.12
Strongly like Farage: YES	4	2.32	2.63	2.77	0.96	5.09	3.56

Table 12: Levels of antisemitism by strong liking for Boris Johnson (across samples)

		JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
	n	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Nationally representative sample</b>							
Strongly like Johnson: NO	1402	0.64	1.22	0.96	1.36	1.60	2.18
Strongly like Johnson: YES	237	1.08	1.60	0.84	1.26	1.92	2.46
<b>Boost sample: 'Very right-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Johnson: NO	82	1.50	1.77	1.03	1.39	2.53	2.70
Strongly like Johnson: YES	115	0.92	1.49	0.59	1.22	1.51	2.40
<b>Boost sample: 'Very left-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Johnson: NO	198	0.41	0.92	2.03	1.63	2.44	2.14
Strongly like Johnson: YES	6	1.69	2.26	1.67	1.22	3.36	3.35



Table 13: Levels of antisemitism by strong liking for Jo Swinson (across samples)

	n	JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Nationally representative sample</b>							
Strongly like Swinson: NO	1570	0.72	1.31	0.94	1.35	1.66	2.24
Strongly like Swinson: YES	69	0.41	0.86	0.94	1.36	1.35	1.69
<b>Boost sample: 'Very right-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Swinson: NO	195	1.15	1.64	0.76	1.31	1.91	2.57
Strongly like Swinson: YES	2	2.48	0.71	2.00	0.00	4.48	0.71
<b>Boost sample: 'Very left-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Swinson: NO	194	0.43	0.95	2.06	1.63	2.49	2.16
Strongly like Swinson: YES	10	0.81	1.77	1.31	1.06	2.12	2.58

Table 14: Levels of antisemitism by strong liking for Jeremy Corbyn (across samples)

	n	JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Nationally representative sample</b>							
Strongly like Corbyn: NO	1559	0.71	1.30	0.90	1.31	1.61	2.21
Strongly like Corbyn: YES	80	0.61	1.08	1.71	1.79	2.32	2.39
<b>Boost sample: 'Very right-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Corbyn: NO	192	1.15	1.63	0.75	1.31	1.91	2.59
Strongly like Corbyn: YES	5	1.58	1.82	1.59	1.15	3.18	1.47
<b>Boost sample: 'Very left-wing'</b>							
Strongly like Corbyn: NO	123	0.46	1.13	1.79	1.61	2.24	2.24
Strongly like Corbyn: YES	81	0.44	0.76	2.37	1.57	2.81	2.03

Table 15: Effect of 'strongly liking' each leader (representative sample and combined samples; unweighted mean difference and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test)

	Diff.	U	p
<b>Farage</b>			
Nationally representative sample	+0.36	126790.0	0.038
Combined with boost samples	+0.25	259473.0	0.341
<b>Johnson</b>			
Nationally representative sample	+0.13	162382.5	0.557
Combined with boost samples	-0.05	312656.0	0.231
<b>Swinson</b>			
Nationally representative sample	-0.21	54800.0	0.862
Combined with boost samples	-0.16	79706.0	0.941
<b>Corbyn</b>			
Nationally representative sample	+0.71	50758.0	0.003
Combined with boost samples	+0.92	112023.0	< 0.001

## 8. Antisemitism and the media

Because of concerns that antisemitic attitudes may be being disseminated via social media (e.g. in forms of online disinformation such as conspiracy theories and so-called 'fake news'), respondents were asked for their attitudes to (a) major newspapers and television channels (sometimes referred to as the 'mainstream media' or MSM) and (b) social media as an alternative to major newspapers and television channels.

Table 16 presents levels of antisemitism across all three samples by agreement with the statement, 'As long as you stick to major newspapers and TV channels, you can trust most news most of the time', while table 17 presents the same by agreement with the statement, 'By using social media (Facebook, YouTube, etc), we can get the news that major newspapers and TV channels want to keep secret'. Levels of antisemitism were lower for those who trust major newspapers and television channels as a source of news than for those who do not, but this difference is only statistically significant if we include the two boost samples ( $p < 0.05$ ). Levels of antisemitism were higher for those who regard social media as a way to receive news that major newspapers and television channels try to suppress, and this was very highly statistically significant both in the nationally representative sample and in the nationally representative sample combined with the two boost samples ( $p < 0.001$ ).

Table 16: Levels of antisemitism by trust in major newspapers and television channels (also known as the ‘mainstream media’ or MSM) as a source of news

	n	JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Nationally representative sample</b>							
Trust major newspapers & TV: NO	831	0.82	1.34	1.09	1.42	1.90	2.31
Trust major newspapers & TV: YES	583	0.73	1.34	0.98	1.34	1.72	2.25
<b>Boost sample: ‘Very right-wing’</b>							
Trust major newspapers & TV: NO	126	1.26	1.73	0.83	1.34	2.09	2.72
Trust major newspapers & TV: YES	62	1.12	1.51	0.76	1.32	1.87	2.36
<b>Boost sample: ‘Very left-wing’</b>							
Trust major newspapers & TV: NO	142	0.46	0.98	2.23	1.67	2.69	2.24
Trust major newspapers & TV: YES	55	0.46	1.10	1.58	1.41	2.05	1.99

Table 17: Levels of antisemitism by preference for social media over major newspapers and television channels (also known as the ‘mainstream media’ or MSM) as a source of news

	n	JpAs (max 5)		AzAs (max 5)		Total (max 10)	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Nationally representative sample</b>							
Trust social media over MSM: NO	658	0.63	1.17	0.95	1.32	1.58	2.04
Trust social media over MSM: YES	598	1.02	1.53	1.22	1.48	2.25	2.53
<b>Boost sample: ‘Very right-wing’</b>							
Trust social media over MSM: NO	72	0.86	1.48	0.73	1.29	1.59	2.30
Trust social media over MSM: YES	96	1.46	1.73	0.80	1.29	2.26	2.69
<b>Boost sample: ‘Very left-wing’</b>							
Trust social media over MSM: NO	86	0.21	0.49	1.75	1.51	1.97	1.73
Trust social media over MSM: YES	91	0.63	1.27	2.35	1.60	2.98	2.41

Table 18: Effects of attitude to major newspapers and television channels (also known as the 'mainstream media' or MSM) and social media as a source of news (unweighted mean difference and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test)

	Diff.	U	p
<b>Trust major newspapers &amp; TV</b>			
Nationally representative sample	-0.16	254534.5	0.090
Combined with boost samples	-0.26	410741.5	0.012
<b>Trust social media over MSM</b>			
Nationally representative sample	+0.52	172321.0	< 0.001
Combined with boost samples	+0.60	276387.0	< 0.001

## 9. Conclusions

This analysis has established the validity of the instruments it uses for the measurement of antisemitism, which include the battery of survey items developed by Campaign Against Antisemitism for its annual survey of Judeophobic or classically antisemitic attitudes as well as an innovative battery of survey items covering new or antizionist antisemitic attitudes and previously only pilot-tested on non-probability samples. Moreover, it finds scores generated by these two instruments to be correlated, repeating the well-established finding of a clear statistical association between attitudes to Jews and attitudes to the world's only Jewish state, and validating the combination of the two instruments into a single scale balanced between both forms of antisemitism.

That combined scale has now been used to make several new and substantive findings. Higher levels of antisemitism are found to be associated with strongly liking Jeremy Corbyn and with subjective identification as 'very left-wing'. They additionally appear to be associated with strongly liking Nigel Farage, although the effect is much weaker and is at a lower level of statistical significance (which means that there is less confidence that an effect in the same direction would be found in the wider population). Higher levels of antisemitism are also found to be associated with a preference for non-traditional news sources, with those who view social media as a means through which to gain information suppressed by major newspapers and television channels exhibiting higher levels of antisemitism than those who do not. Trust in traditional news sources may be associated with lower levels of antisemitism, although it seems possible that this effect is confined to certain sub-populations, as it only becomes statistically significant when boost samples are introduced in order to increase representation of British adults identifying as 'very left-wing' and 'very right-wing'.

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