In the study of genocide and other forms of mass atrocity there is a widespread sense that ideology matters. “Few scholars,” observes Benjamin Valentino, “have failed to comment on the central role that ideology has played in some of the twentieth century’s bloodiest mass killings.”¹ In a recent theoretical survey, Scott Straus identifies ideology as one of the two most important factors (alongside armed conflict) emphasised in contemporary explanations of mass political violence,² and a wide range of atrocity-theorists have certainly given ideology, or related phenomena like ‘worldviews’ or ‘myths’, a central role in their work.³ Such perspectives have been echoed in the policy-world, with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations also making frequent reference to the role of ideological phenomena.⁴

But despite these sentiments, all is not well with efforts to theorise the role ideology plays in mass atrocities. Core concepts have typically been defined vaguely, if at all, and it is not clear that leading theorists actually share a common understanding of what ideology means, let alone how it relates to other closely implicated phenomena. Scholars have sometimes assumed that a focus on ideology must involve an emphasis of case-specific ideologies,⁵ and as a result, comparative accounts of the common ideological foundations of mass violence remain limited. Even those that do exist have been uneven in their theoretical coverage. There is abundant cross-case research on dehumanisation and hate speech,⁶ for example, but other violence-promoting ideological factors have been postulated in a rather scattergun fashion. ‘Nationalist myths’, ‘narratives’, ‘hate propaganda’, ‘identities’, ‘purity’, ‘racism’, ‘revolutionary visions’, ‘scapegoating’, ‘militarism’, ‘moral exclusion’, ‘utopias’ – all of these elements and more have been suggested as potential pieces of the ideological jigsaw surrounding atrocities. But theorists have produced few holistic accounts of how these different pieces fit together. So whilst the present literature contains many points of deep insight, we still lack a shared conceptual and theoretical framework for thinking about ideology’s role in mass atrocities. This undercuts the value of what we do know, undermining theorists’ efforts to pool research gains and resolve analytical disagreements. But it also obscures what we do not know. Without some attempt to build holistic pictures of ideology’s role in atrocities, we are less likely to spot areas where investigation has been relatively shallow. It has rarely been noticed, for instance, that whilst theorists have commented extensively on the ways ideologies depict victims so as to justify violence (portraying them as
inhuman, dangerous, or guilty, for example), they have given far less consideration to ideological representations of perpetrators.7

Such problems have been exacerbated by an underlying failing. Despite their frequent affirmations of ideology’s importance, genocide and atrocity scholars have generally failed to engage with the specialist academic literature on ideology, ideas, and related phenomena.8 Leading ideological theorists of recent decades – such as Michael Freeden, Teun van Dijk, Quentin Skinner, John Jost, Raymond Boudon or John Thompson – make almost no appearance in texts on atrocities.9 This is understandable up to a point. ‘Ideology-studies’ is a fragmented field, and theorists of atrocities cannot be masters of everything. But the general failure to ground their discussions of ideology in the topic’s established literature is problematic, and leaves atrocity-theorists bereft of relevant methodological, theoretical, and empirical research.

This article aims to address these problems and encourage theorists of atrocity to think about ideology more effectively. I do this by discussing four key questions:

1. What do we mean by ideology?
2. Who, in cases of atrocity, might be relevantly affected by ideology?
3. How do these people come to be influenced by atrocity-justifying ideologies?
4. How might ideology encourage these people to commit, or permit, mass violence?

At present, atrocity-theorists’ answers to these four questions tend to take the form of unspoken and sometimes dubious assumptions. A more explicit and systematic consideration is needed. My aims here are theoretical and preliminary: I am primarily interested in offering a better framework for analysing ideology’s role in atrocities, not a complete and empirically substantiated theory (though I do offer some substantive claims which gesture at what such a theory might look like). Throughout, I shall use the term ‘atrocitys’ broadly, to denote all non-accidental acts of large scale violence against civilians, including but not limited to genocide.10

I acknowledge that the critical picture I have painted is a little too sweeping. Three theorists – Eric Weitz, Ben Kiernan, and Alex Bellamy – have produced important studies of the role of ideology across cases, and comparative observations can also be found in the work of Jacques Semelin, Michael Mann, James Waller, Donald Dutton, and
several others. More broadly, a sophisticated literature influenced by anthropology and cultural analysis has produced compelling studies of phenomena which I would term ideological. I am indebted to all this work – and much of my discussion attempts to reorganise and integrate the insights of existing theorists rather than revise them or offer completely novel claims. Nevertheless, these exceptions remain too few and too partial: they still lack engagement with theorists of ideology, and their identification of ideological factors remains narrow and theoretically underdeveloped. Research on atrocities has therefore still, in my view, failed to get to grips with ideology.

Question 1: What do we mean by ‘ideology’?

Ideology is famous for its “semantic promiscuity” – described by one prominent theorist as “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science”. Nevertheless, in recent decades theorists of ideology have made real progress in thinking about how the concept can most usefully be used. Two impressive and influential definitional investigations by Malcolm Hamilton and John Gerring have systematically examined the many criteria that have been explicitly or implicitly attached to ideology, and exposed the vast majority of them as analytically unhelpful. Their conclusions are supplemented by the conceptual and methodological work of others, including Aletta Norval, Kathleen Knight, Michael Freeden and Teun van Dijk. Whilst disagreement certainly remains on how ideology ought to be defined, these theorists have converged on certain conclusions, and produced an established literature which can guide definitional efforts.

Unfortunately, atrocity-theorists have not looked to this literature for guidance in their use of the concept of ideology. Usually theorists either do not define how they are using ideology at all, or specify an idiosyncratic definition, seemingly of their own invention, with little attempt to explain or justify it. Even then, it often becomes clear that authors’ actual understandings of ideology are bedraggled with various implicit connotations not specified in their criteria. Some studies, such as those by Barbara Harff, James Waller, or the Genocide Prevention Task Force, also attach ideology to other descriptors (‘exclusionary’ ideology or ‘extraordinary’ ideology) without complete clarity on what these delimit. The use of ideology in research on atrocities thus retains that
“theoretical clumsiness” which Clifford Geertz identified in the social sciences more
generally back in 1964.21

Unsurprisingly, this creates problems, which include but go beyond the classic
difficulty of theorists talking at cross purposes. There has been a common tendency, for
example, to construct typologies where ‘ideological’ killers, motives or atrocities are hived
off from notionally non-ideological types which, from the perspective of contemporary
ideology-studies, actually look deeply bound up with ideology. There may well, for
example, be some distinction between what Michael Mann calls “ideological”, “bigoted”,
“disciplined”, “comradely”, and “bureaucratic” killers. But the use of ‘ideological’ only to
describe the first category implies that it has little role to play in the others, which most
theorists of ideology would dispute.22 The same could be said of Harff’s contradistinction
of “ideological” and “retributive” genocides, or Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s
separation of genocides which “implement…an ideology” from those which “eliminate a
real or potential threat…spread terror among real or potential enemies… [or] acquire
economic wealth”.23 Retribution, elimination/terrorisation of threats and enemies, and
the pursuit of economic wealth can all be deeply ideological activities. The United States’
massacres of Native Americans, Belgium’s murderous exploitation of the Congo, and
Germany’s annihilation of the Herero were, for example, variously motivated by
economic interests and the perceived need to repress or punish dangerous ‘rebels’. But
they were also, as Alex Bellamy points out, inextricably bound up with European
colonialist ideology.24 Such typologies encourage a problematically compartmentalised
view of ideology’s potential relevance, and rest on narrow, unspoken, and contestable
assumptions about what the concept denotes.

To rectify such conceptual problems, atrocities-theorists need to engage more
seriously with the specialist contemporary literature on ideology, regarding two points in
particular. First, atrocity-theorists should heed the increasing agreement amongst
ideological analysts that a broad definition of ideology is the most analytically productive
one. In this paper I use the following definition: an ideology is a distinctive system of normative,
semantic and/or reputedly factual ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which
underpins their understandings of their political world and shapes their political behaviour.25 These are
scalar rather than binary criteria. Things may be more or less ideological the more
distinctive and systematised they are, and less ideological (without being entirely un-ideological) when more mundane and disorganised.

Some have worried that a broad definition like this is in danger of encompassing so much that it cannot be of practical use.26 I do not think so. It is a mistake to think that the utility of concepts is proportionate to their narrowness. Plenty of ubiquitous social science concepts (consider ‘psychology’ or ‘culture’) are far broader than even the most encompassing definitions of ideology. But they continue to be useful because their purpose is not to attach thick tranches of evaluative conclusions onto their referents, but to denote broad categories of forces, factors and phenomena. This is the best way, I suggest, to talk about ideology. It minimises the prejudicial evaluation of belief-systems by the categories we use to refer to them. It also encourages different sorts of belief-system to be analysed in tandem, rather than drawing firm but rather arbitrary lines between certain familiar (and therefore supposedly ‘unideological’) political desires – such as acquiring national wealth or eliminating certain threats – from notionally radical or extremist ones like redistributing property or swearing loyalty to a national leader. And as academics are never going to all agree on a single highly specific conception of ideology, a broad definition is also the most feasible way to avoid conceptual confusion.27 Nor does it really involve any costs – we can always specify narrower subtypes of ideology. For most contemporary ideological analysts, therefore, ideologies need not be wrong, oppressive, dogmatic, fanatical, opposed to self-interest, in service of self-interest, fantastical or irrational. These are all connotations that lurk in the background of many uses of ideology, but are all best left for empirical determination, not definitional pre-judgement.

However, a fleshed-out understanding of ideology is not derived solely from definitional criteria. A second crucial feature of contemporary ideological analysts’ use of the concept is their depiction of ideologies as rich and multifaceted phenomena.28 They are not presented as just a handful of core principles or beliefs, but as elaborate and burgeoning cultural edifices – historically sculpted networks of values, meanings, narratives, assumptions, concepts, expectations, exemplars, past experiences, images, stereotypes, and beliefs about matters of fact. Only by taking this complexity of atrocity-justifying ideologies seriously can we hope to understand how perpetrators of mass violence come to believe in them. One cannot, for example, fathom the relevance of
Nazism to the Holocaust simply by talking of ferocious anti-Semitic hatred. One has to get to grips with the idealised representation of military life and ethnic community embedded in the legacy of the World War I *kampfgemeinschaft*, the long legacy of Christian anti-Semitism in Central Europe, the centrality of racial ‘science’ authorised by the German medical and academic professions, the distinctively Nazi virtue-systems of obedience and merciless toughness, their quasi-deterministic conceptions of historical time, and much more besides. So too with all other ideologies. Specialist analysts of individual atrocities often have done this – building rich and comprehensive pictures of the ideological backgrounds to violence. But these have rarely extended to the level of overarching theory.

In particular, there has been a common tendency for genocide scholars to associate ‘ideology’ primarily with what we might think of as its ‘attitudinal’ and ‘normative’ components, and to ignore or background it’s more ‘descriptive’ and ‘semantic’ components (though such components are obviously always entangled). Ideologies are more than bundles of extremist values, hate-filled passions, and radical revolutionary ambitions. They are just as importantly comprised of basic but idiosyncratic descriptive beliefs about the world, and of subtle semantic framings which inject meaning into parts of that world. Atrocity-justifying ideologies label victims as dangerous threats or guilty criminals, assert that society is at a crisis-filled turning point, euphemistically reframe killing as ‘self-defence’ or ‘serving the revolution’, and enrich all of these claims with textured historical narratives and mythical ‘knowledge’. It is often these sorts of ideological elements which make violence look desirable, or at least permissible, to many ordinary perpetrators. I therefore worry about the emphasis many analysts and policy documents place on “hate ideology”, “hate speech”, “hate propaganda”, “hate broadcasts” or, more broadly, “normative mobilization”. Such phrases are apt in some circumstances, but it is vital to recognise that the key ideological processes which lead to violence are often built on frames and factual assertions as much as on passionate emotions or radical values. Overlooking this point can render preventive efforts to fight atrocities lopsided, and risks renewing a tendency to conceive of perpetrators as universally consumed by a burning, out-of-control hatred – a portrayal now widely accepted as inaccurate.
Question 2: Who, in cases of atrocity, might be relevantly affected by ideology?

There has been a propensity, in existing scholarship on atrocities, to limit the presumed relevance of ideology to only certain specific sorts of actor. Some imply, for example, that ideologies can only influence those who are actually members of ideological organisations, or who receive explicit propaganda and indoctrination sessions, or who display manifest brutality towards their victims. Other theorists suggest that ideology generally only matters for (some members of) the public, duped into killing by the legitimating manipulations of self-interested leaders. Or the reverse, Valentino has influentially suggested that mass publics are largely apathetic masses induced to participate through conformity pressures, self-interest, and coercion – it is the leaders and elites who are genuinely motivated by ideologies in initiating mass violence.

Such portrayals are not wholly in error, but their restriction of ideology to certain groups often rests on the sort of conceptual confusion described above. As with the typologies discussed under question 1, the underlying problem is an unusually narrow visualisation of what ‘ideology’ might denote. If killers are not found to match expectations of the “raving ideologue” acting on the basis of “insane ideological commitment”, it is quickly inferred that they were relatively uninfluenced by ideology in general. Such reasoning appears, for example, to underpin ideology’s relative de-emphasis by, inter alia, Waller, Valentino, Scott Straus, John Mueller, Charles Tilly and Stathis Kalyvas. These theorists rightly reject depictions of atrocity perpetrators as all “caught up in the throes of bloodlust” or “swept up in supremacist euphoria”, and stress, by contrast, the relative “ordinariness” of killers. But an explanation which emphasises ideology need not deny such ordinariness. Ideological beliefs do not need to be held pathologically, with one hundred per cent conviction, with explicit and self-conscious emphasis, or on the basis of many years of prior commitment. And as a result, someone does not have to be a card-carrying member of an explicitly ideological movement for ideology to influence their behaviour. A perpetrator might be conflicted, lack visible hatred, and participate in atrocity in part for non-ideological motives. Yet they may still have internalised ideological beliefs about the nature of their actions, and the moral status of their victims, which are vital in making them able to kill. I suspect that this possibility has been understated in part because of the frequent association of ‘ideological
explanations’ with the particular approach of Daniel Goldhagen, and his claim that an eliminationist anti-Semitic ideology held with high conviction was the crucial and sufficient cause of the Holocaust. But whatever the merits or shortcomings of Goldhagen’s work, he does not represent the limits of an explanatory focus on ideology.

Ideology cannot, therefore, be presumed to be relevant at only one part of the machinery of atrocity-perpetration. In terms of their causal relationship to violence, a loose distinction can be drawn between three main categories of perpetrators: policy-initiators (who make the key decisions which lead to the commission of atrocities); direct killers (who do not issue the original orders to kill, but carry out the acts of physical destruction); and bystanders (who do not actively participate in killing, but possess potential unused power to frustrate it, making their passivity a key enabling condition). These categories are not completely clear cut: sometimes policy-initiators may serve as direct killers as well, and in relatively spontaneous acts of atrocity there may be no discreetly identifiable policy-initiators. We might also want to talk about two further categories: indirect killers (staffing the bureaucracies linking policy-initiators and direct killers) and victims (given the ways they have occasionally been complicit in their own destruction, most famously in the case of the Jewish Sonderkommando in the Holocaust).

A successful account of the ideological dynamics of atrocities should explore the potential role of ideology for all these participant categories, and should avoid the temptation to treat them as homogenous blocks, with members all sharing the same motives and mind-sets. As many theorists emphasise, perpetrators of violence participate for a variety of reasons and in a range of dispositional states. As such, they may be influenced by ideological beliefs held with varying levels of commitment, conviction and consciousness. In general, for the reasons Valentino identifies, we might expect atrocity-justifying ideologies to be endorsed with greater conviction amongst policy-initiators than direct or indirect killers. We might also expect ideology to play a more active motivational role for the former, and a more passive enabling role for the latter. And at least in the cases of the Nazi and Stalinist leaderships, data on the internal discourse of the regime can be found which supports such a presumption. But these are still broad-brushed generalisations. Actual assessments of ideology’s role should be attuned to complex distributions of ideological belief across members of participant
categories, rather than reaching binary conclusions to the effect that some groups of killers ‘are ideological’ whilst others ‘aren’t’.

**Question 3: How do these people come to be influenced by atrocity-justifying ideologies?**

In discussing how atrocity-justifying ideologies come to influence large numbers of people, a plea to avoid crude ‘brainwashing’ accounts, in which beliefs are channelled in a top-down manner from policy-initiators to passive direct-killers, is likely to meet with quick approval. But there is not an abundance of more sophisticated models available in the atrocity-studies literature – in general, the question of ideological dissemination in contexts of atrocity remains under-examined.\(^47\) Two subsidiary questions can be delineated here. First, how is ideology *communicated* – how does it ‘get around’? Second, how is ideology rendered *persuasive* – why do people buy-in to the discourses and arguments which serve to justify mass violence?

The first question has no definitive answer. Ideology can be communicated by almost any means, and dominant conduits are largely determined by contextually available resources and technologies. But four principal forms can be distinguished: first, everyday social interactions; second, long-term institutionalised practices of explicit education such as state schooling or institutional training programmes; third, medium-run propaganda programs such as sustained media campaigns, or organised public protests aimed ‘upwards’ at leaders; and fourth, short-run calls to violence such as incitement speeches, SMS instructions, orders funnelled through institutional hierarchies, and escalatory radio and television broadcasts. Effective ideological dissemination will usually rely on multiple channels, and involve a combination of ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘horizontal’ communication. This is important, as it demonstrates the error in assuming that a lack of explicit indoctrination in blatant political organisations indicates the weakness of ideological motives or beliefs.\(^48\) Such explicit indoctrination is simply not the only way that ideology ‘gets around’.

But why do audiences buy-in to atrocity-justifying ideologies? Again, existing work in the study of ideology and ideas provides a wealth of explanations to be plundered in analysing this question. I will outline only what I take to be one un-radical but
nevertheless central insight associated with work in social epistemology, namely that the vast bulk of peoples’ beliefs are formed, not through a process of personal empirical inference, but under conditions of “epistemic dependence”.49 As the sociologist Michael Baumann puts it:

“Almost all of our knowledge is acquired, not by our own autonomous exploration, but by relying on information from others… the quality of our beliefs is [dependent] on the quality of collective knowledge acquisition.”50

People absorb prominent ideological discourse not because they are unusually gullible but because, like all of us, they are dependent on key ‘epistemic authorities’ (political leaders, intellectuals, church and community elders, news media, or simply other individuals) for the vast majority of their political knowledge.51 Atrocity-justifying ideologies are most influential when they operate through such epistemic dependence: when they can be founded on top of factual claims and narratives circulated by significant epistemic authorities who are deemed trustworthy by members of a social group.52

This raises the question of why ordinary people, who are not mindless, psychotic, or already committed ideologues, deem disseminators of atrocity-justifying ideologies to be credible epistemic authorities. But this is not a difficult question to answer. Disseminators may have strong reservoirs of status and credibility in the eyes of those they influence, at least compared to (potentially limited) alternatives.53 Or the ideological beliefs they peddle may look plausible in light of the broader ideological environment of an audience’s specific historical context.54 Or perhaps the beliefs are simply amenable to the audience’s basic self-interest or psychological needs.55 Indeed, one of the most important strands of research in recent ideology-studies has been the analysis of such “motivated social cognition”: the endorsement of ideological beliefs because they satisfy psychological compulsions towards positive self-esteem, cognitive dissonance minimisation, or terror management, or otherwise provide a satisfying (rather than epistemologically optimal) account of reality.56 Finally, epistemic authorities may be able to make their claims plausible simply by saturation. Sufficiently suffuse an ideological environment, so that a belief becomes something ‘everybody says’, and it is liable to
receive wide endorsement even if never properly substantiated. These processes, though not the whole story, are all crucial explanations for the successful dissemination of beliefs conducive to violence (and conversely, ideological dissemination will tend to fail when these conditions are not satisfied).

**Question 4: How might ideology encourage these people to commit, or permit, mass violence?**

In a sustained analysis of the ideological dynamics of mass atrocities, this is likely to be the question which occupies theorists the most. Yet despite individual points of deep theorisation (on dehumanisation and moral exclusion, for example) it has generally been answered either incompletely or indirectly. Comparative studies have tended to identify broad recurring ideological ‘themes’ that surround atrocities: Weitz focuses on “utopias of race and nation”, Kierman on “racism”, “territorial expansionism”, “cults of cultivation” and “purity”; whilst Bellamy lists three “basic pathways” for the justification of atrocities – “denial”, the “principle of military necessity”, and a broad “ideology of selective extermination”. These are insightful conclusions – but they remain causally unspecific, sometimes intentionally so. They trace important patterns in the ideological background to violence, but they leave the more causally proximate ideological foreground under-theorised. How, in a given ideological environment, do perpetrators actually come to believe that mass violence is permissible or even desirable? How do the background themes actually feed into the concrete decisions to initiate and participate in atrocities? We lack detailed answers to these questions.

To develop them, I believe we should distinguish at least three proximate causal pathways. Ideology may a) generate or shape active motives that create the desire to commit violence; b) create legitimating perceptions or beliefs which make violence seem permissible prior to/during commission; and/or c) provide rationalising resources for retrospectively dealing with the commission or permission of violence after the fact. There is no reason to assume, as some appear to, that a weak role along one pathway necessitates an equally weak role along the others. It may be the case, for example, that many direct-killers do not possess strong ideological motivations, yet do participate in part due to ideological legitimations. It is also important to avoid the easy assumption
that the third pathway – post-hoc rationalisation – is causally irrelevant. Atrocities, we must not forget, are hardly ever single isolated acts of killing, but campaigns of violence involving *reiterative* participation on the part of direct-killers. As such, successful rationalisation of violence may well be a key requirement for large scale atrocities to occur. Though often forthcoming, successful rationalisation is not guaranteed and may be facilitated or obstructed by ideological factors.

We can unpack the potential role of ideology further. Ideology may serve to motivate, legitimate, and rationalise for a committed core of policy-initiators and/or direct-killers themselves, but it may also serve as a means for the committed core to mobilise (or demobilise) others, providing *them* with ideological motivations, legitimations or rationalisations. Such efforts will generally aim to convert the less enthusiastic into active participants, but ensuring that they remain passive bystanders may be enough. Motivations, legitimations and rationalisations may also enable and encourage violence at varying levels of cognitive complexity. As has been made particularly clear by the research of sociologist Randall Collins and military psychologist David Grossman, killing is *hard*.65 But there are several reasons for this, and an important distinction can be drawn between deep-seated psychological resistance to killing on the one hand, and ‘higher-order’ normative concerns with appropriate behaviour and positive moral self-identity on the other.66 Ideological motivations, legitimations and rationalisations may be important in overcoming both of these sources of restraint.

Having drawn the distinction between motivation, legitimation and rationalisation, however, I should stress that most ideological components can serve all three pathways. Which pathway is more or less important will vary at the individual level, so our generalisations about ideology’s role may need to remain presumptively neutral between the three pathways. I therefore collectively refer to processes of motivation, legitimation and rationalisation as ideological *justification*. One foremost task in understanding ideology’s role in atrocities, then, is an identification of the recurring mechanisms by which ideologies justify (motivate/legitimate/rationalise) mass violence against civilians across different cases.

Drawing on a review of the existing secondary literature on atrocities, combined with my own analysis of available primary documents from a range of cases, I suggest
that we can identify six such recurring justificatory mechanisms. I term these (with varying degrees of originality):

(i) dehumanisation
(ii) guilt-attribution
(iii) threat-construction
(iv) deagentification
(v) virtuetalk
(vi) future-bias

I believe this six-fold list of justificatory mechanisms more comprehensively describes the ways ideologies actually feed into perpetrators’ willingness to kill than existing models. Importantly, it encompasses ideological representations of both victims and perpetrators. The first three justificatory mechanisms are primarily about victims – portraying them as subhuman, guilty or threatening. A central function of all three is the “moral exclusion” of victims from the “universe of obligations” perceived by perpetrators – but this is not the only way in which these three mechanisms serve to justify violence, nor are the means of moral exclusion described by each mechanism the same. The latter three justificatory mechanisms principally describe ideological representations of perpetrators (whether policy-initiators, direct killers, indirect killers, or bystanders). Nevertheless, this division between characterisations of victims and perpetrators is not total. For example, the ideological processes which depict victims as threatening and guilty also serve to frame perpetrators as acting in self-defence and as being, themselves, the ‘real victims’. Portrayals of victims and perpetrators are thus entangled.

In the remainder of this section, I provide a brief account of these six recurring justificatory mechanisms. I stress that this is an illustrative model only, an example of what a more comprehensive account of the causally proximate ways in which ideologies contribute to the perpetration of atrocities might look like. Developing and substantiating the six-fold model in a sustained fashion is a task beyond the confines of this article.

Dehumanisation
As analysed in an extensive literature, atrocity-justifying ideologies typically contain conceptions of victims which represent them as inhuman, subhuman or in other ways inferior to perpetrators, as documented in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Japanese occupation of China and numerous other atrocities.68 “No war may be conducted humanely against nonhumans,” declared General von Trotha, the senior German commander during the Herero genocide.69 “We thought of them as things,” one Japanese general reported, regarding Chinese victims of the Rape of Nanking, “not people like us.”70 Such beliefs are frequently endorsed by leading epistemic authorities: including scientists, members of the medical professions, and public intellectuals. As one Nazi doctor put it: “Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind.”71 Such dehumanisation encourages mass violence in a number of ways: legitimating killing by morally excluding victims from the universe of obligations perceived by perpetrators;72 actively motivating violence through feelings of revulsion and the need to ‘purify’ alien infections;73 and providing a euphemistic lexicon for sanitised communication about mass killing (as “cleansing”, “delousing”, “pest-control” and so forth) which eases legitimisation and rationalisation.74

Guilt-Attribution
But dehumanisation is not the sole way to portray victims in a manner conducive to violence. Accusing victims of great past or present crimes has been just as prevalent a justificatory mechanism – generating the desire for vengeance and framing victims as legitimate targets of repression. As clear proof of victims’ guilt is typically unavailable, conditions of epistemic dependence are crucial. Rumours, unsubstantiated assertions by authorities, and incessant repetitions of anecdotal cases have been utilised to create a confident social perception of victims as guilty in cases of violence ranging from Cambodia, to Armenia, to racist violence in the United States.75 And in almost all large scale atrocities, the guilt-attribute process involves the ascription of guilt to a collective.76 That such a perception is an established part of atrocity-justifying ideologies has been noted by several theorists, notably Waller, Mann, Semelin and Staub,77 and it is also frequently affirmed by subsequent perpetrator testimony. “I was then of the conviction
that the Jews were not innocent but guilty,” declared one former Nazi police battalion member involved in mass shootings of Jews, “I believed the propaganda that all Jews were criminals… and that they were the cause of Germany’s decline... The thought that one should disobey or evade the order to participate in the extermination of the Jews did not therefore enter my mind at all.” Similarly, Hutu killers of the Rwandan genocide described how “we thought all Tutsis at fault for our constant troubles… That’s how we reasoned and that’s how we killed at the time.”

**Threat-Construction**

A striking feature of atrocities is the mismatch, in the eyes of an outside observer, between the objective harmlessness of victims and the perception of them as dangerous threats by their killers. It is the perceived threat that matters, and killers’ ideological worldviews are centrally characterised by their descriptive and semantic representation of victims as threatening. There is, as Martin Shaw writes, a “construction of civilian groups as enemies, not only in a social or political but also in a military sense, to be destroyed.” I say descriptive and semantic, because of the crucial role played by the recurring lexicons deployed by perpetrating organisations which presumptively assign victims threatening status. Suharto’s anticommunist policies in Indonesia, for example, consistently targeted “gangs of security disruptors”, the Nazis fought “Judeo-Bolsheviks” or “International World Jewry”, and Stalinists targeted “socially harmful elements”. Defining the enemy is thus a crucial process of constructing them, but such lexicons also look appropriate because of direct factual claims expounded by powerful epistemic authorities – often the state security apparatus. A Rwandan army memorandum thus asserted a threat from “Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power… who wish to reconquer power by all means necessary including arms.” The infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences similarly affirmed that: “Except for the period of the [Croatian Ustaše state established by Nazi Germany] Serbs were never so endangered as they are today”. Such threat-construction has three central effects: establishing a clear motivation for killing victims, framing them as legitimate targets, and reframing perpetrators as legitimately acting in self-defence. It is also conducive to violence through several indirect psychological processes, increasing in-
group cohesion and identification, increasing propensities to obey authorities, increasing inclinations for severe punishment, and so forth.90

Deagentification

By ‘deagentification’, I refer to the ideological portrayal of killers as lacking meaningful agency or responsibility in causing atrocities to occur. Such deagentification is not usually total: perpetrators rarely claim that their individual actions lacked any agency. But the overall atrocity – the fact that people are dying – is typically presented by atrocity-justifying ideologies as an ‘inevitable’ or ‘necessary’ result of certain irresistible forces or unavoidable conditions. Providence, the laws of class or racial struggle, technological progress, the nature of war, or simply the actions of others are held up as the real cause of atrocities, rather than the deliberate decisions made by policy-initiators, direct and indirect killers, and bystanders. To borrow a phrase from Eric Gordy, atrocity-justifying ideologies engage in the “destruction of alternatives”91: forcefully asserting that no other option but violence exists (a move particularly visible in justifications of atrocity in terms of “military necessity”).92 And for some atrocity-justifying ideologies, such claims are supported by elaborate quasi-deterministic conceptions of history. Nazis asserted that they merely wished, in Martin Bormann’s words: “to adapt our people to the laws of nature... the ineluctable struggle for existence. This struggle exists, whether we like it or not, whether we reject or accept it... Just as the individual... must assert and maintain his existence, so must the nation as a whole.”93 Similarly Communist and colonialist ideologies consistently depicted the destruction of whole groups as an unavoidable consequence of historical development.94 Whatever the method, such ideological elements occlude the role of human agency in causing the atrocity in question, shielding perpetrators from the perception of moral responsibility for the death and suffering caused. They are recurring features of the ideological discourse surrounding atrocities, yet, aside from scattered comments across the atrocity-studies literature, and rather more sustained reflections by Hannah Arendt and certain social psychologists, their role remains under-examined.95

Virtuetalk
By virtuetalk, I refer to the rhetorical presentation of killing as demonstrating the laudable character of the perpetrator – a pervasive element of atrocity-justifying ideologies (despite sitting in slight superficial tension with deagentifying claims). Virtuetalk attempts to connect the substantive activity of killing with sedimented, respectable social values: duty, vigilance, hardness, courage, etc., and to denigrate moral qualms or resistance as indicating weakness, treasonous tendencies, or other socially disrespected qualities. Bolsheviks in Russia were told:

“You must assume your duties with a feeling of the strictest Party responsibility, without whimpering, without any rotten liberalism. Throw your bourgeois humanitarianism out of the window and act like Bolsheviks worthy of Comrade Stalin. Beat down the kulak agent wherever he raises his head.”

The Khmer Rouge likewise recommended “seething hatred and blood rancor against national and class enemies,” whilst a Nazi police battalion manual stated that “he behaves correctly who, by setting aside all possible impulses of personal feeling, proceeds ruthlessly and mercilessly.” Such discourse, whilst sometimes noted, has received little empirical or theoretical examination from theorists of genocide. Yet perceptions of virtuous and vicious behaviour are crucial components of any ideological worldview, and may be psychologically vital: strengthening conformity pressures by tugging on the machoistic insecurities of typical perpetrators, and legitimating participation in atrocity by attaching it to a positive and socially lauded sense of self-identity. It also, like dehumanisation, serves to provide a euphemistic lexicon for sanitised communication about mass killing.

Future-Bias

Theorists have often remarked on the ‘utopian’ quality of atrocity-justifying ideologies. The most horrific campaigns of violence – such as the Holocaust, Stalinist Terror, Maoist Cultural Revolution or Cambodian politicide – are often conducted as part of radical visions of societal transformation. But the causally significant dynamic here is not, I believe, limited to such grandiose schemes. I talk of ‘future-bias’ to refer to a future-
orientated moral fallacy which recurs across atrocities: the perception of known moral harms in the present – the deaths of victims – as outweighed by massive future goods which have not been discounted for their uncertainty. Atrocity-justifying ideologies frequently invoke a consequentialist calculus, in other words, but the calculus is loaded: no means in the present is sufficiently terrible as to be unjustifiable given the confident assertion of huge benefits multiplied into the infinite future. This creates an extraordinarily permissive moral logic. And because the expected future benefits have often been ideologically hegemonised in their historical context by powerful epistemic authorities, it often does not even occur to perpetrators to question the likelihood of the benefits that their actions are framed as being in pursuit of actually accruing. Nazi soldiers were thus confident that after the war “the great peace will come for which all peoples are hoping. Fighting for that, no sacrifice is too great.”103 “We were convinced that we were creating a Communist society,” one Soviet citizen later testified, “that it would be achieved by the Five Year Plans, and we were ready for any sacrifice.”104 More broadly, extreme or abusive military policies have frequently been justified in the name of speculative future benefits which are then fallaciously weighed up with known present harms on an equal footing.105 This form of consequentialist reasoning, and the broader orientation towards a speculative future that surrounds it, is a key recurring feature of the ideological justification of violent atrocities.

These six justificatory mechanisms may be present in varying degrees in different cases – certainly they are not all required for atrocities to become viewed as justified. But all six have in fact been pervasive, I believe, in the twentieth century’s major cases. They are visible in the public and private discourse which surrounds atrocities at the time, and in the subsequent testimony of perpetrators (despite often running against their self-interest).106 This provides some basis for taking them seriously, as data telling us something about how perpetrators actually thought.

But I stress that these six justificatory mechanisms do not describe all the ideological dynamics of atrocities. Other scholars may identify further justificatory mechanisms that recur across cases, as well as case-specific justificatory mechanisms which do not recur. And there are many other ideological phenomena which less directly cause violence, but remain relevant, such as the background themes mentioned at the
beginning of this section. In particular, there are at least some other recurring ideological forces which we might think of as ‘intensifier mechanisms’, such as polarised group identities, highly antagonistic attitudes towards existing normative systems, and ideologically-based epistemic over-confidence. Such forces do not justify violence on their own – even polarised group identities need to be converted into a reason for violence through threat-construction, guilt-attribution, etc. But they broaden and strengthen the justificatory mechanisms, expanding the scale of the violence they can encourage. A full theory of the ideological dynamics of mass atrocities would need to account for these, just as it would also need to consider those ideological factors which restrain violence. Justifications (as motivations/legitimations/rationalisations) are, I have argued, the most causally proximate manner in which ideology encourages violence, but they are not the only ideological phenomena that matter.

Conclusion

Theorists have increasingly accepted that genocides and other mass atrocities occur, in part, because “perpetrators believe that mass killing is the right thing to do.” For outsiders, convinced that mass killing is amongst the very worst things one can do, such a belief is inexplicable unless we get to grips with ideology: with the distinctive worldviews and justifications that perpetrators operate under. This is not to imply that ideology provides a sufficient explanation of atrocities – it does not. Ideological factors sit alongside psychological, personal, institutional, situational, economic and political ones. But they are central in their own right, and are also entangled with these other factors, since few forces can shape human behaviour unmediated by the worldviews and schemas of meaning which ideologies provide.

In this paper, I have sought to offer a more systematic and comprehensive framework for thinking about the role of ideology across cases, and in the process tried to offer some illustrative outlines of what a more theoretically developed account of that role would look like. Bellamy rightly notes that whilst “the precise contours of justification shift from case to case” of atrocity, there are nevertheless useful generalisations we can make regarding the features of ideologies which serve to justify violence across cases. Theorists have been doing this for some time, generating much
important knowledge in the process. My argument is not that that this existing work is hopelessly flawed, but that it has been held back by a lack of theoretical development on a range of vital questions. How do the many different ideological elements identified by theorists fit together? How are they disseminated in specific contexts of atrocity? Why do perpetrators buy-in to them? How are they differently internalised (or not) amongst different sorts of perpetrator? How might they actually encourage violence? How do they draw upon or constitute broader ideologies? How do they interact with other ideological forces which may intensify or restrain them? These questions have certainly not been ignored by atrocity-theorists, but they have not been considered in a systematic or comprehensive fashion.

This article cannot claim to have changed all of that, since much more remains to be said on all the points I have raised. But I hope to have offered a better footing for building the sorts of theories which would systematically investigate these issues, and which would incorporate the latest research from both atrocity-studies and ideology-studies. This paper has therefore aimed to start a ‘rethinking’ process which might allow us to advance out understanding of ideology’s role in atrocities. It certainly has not finished it.

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9 For an exception see: Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 162-3; Alex Bellamy, Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31.

10 See: Bellamy 2012 (see note 9 above), 14. I believe my discussion has relevance for both ‘terroristic’ and ‘non-terroristic’ atrocities, as they have typically been conceived, but my focus is on the latter.

11 Donald Dutton, The Psychology of Genocide, Massacres and Extreme Violence (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007); Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above); Kiernan 2003 (see note 3 above); Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above); Bellamy 2012 (see note 9 above); Waller 2007 (see note 5 above); Semelin 2005 (see note 6 above); Mann 2005 (see note 6 above).


16 Gerring 1997 (see note 13 above).

17 Kathleen Knight, “Transformations in the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century,” American Political Science Review 100 (2006); Norval 2000 (see note 8 above); Freedeen 1996 (see note 8 above); Michael Freedeen, Ideology – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); van Dijk 1998 (see note 8 above).

19 Semelin 2005 (see note 6 above), 22; Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 185; Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 30; Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 50; Bellamy 2012 (see note 9 above), 11 fn. 25.

20 Harff 2003 (see note 3 above); Genocide Prevention Task Force 2008 (see note 4 above), 25; Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 40-53 & 185.


22 Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 27-9.

23 Harff 2003 (see note 3 above), 61; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990 (see note 6 above), 29. See also: Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 204; Peter du Preez, *Genocide: The Psychology of Mass Murder* (London: Bowerdean and Boyars, 1994), 66-78; Hull 2003 (see note 12 above), 161.

24 Bellamy (see note 9 above), 81-95.


27 See: Geertz 1964 (see note 21 above).


31 E.g. du Preez 1994 (see note 23 above), 122-4; Valentino 2004 (see note 1 above), 31; Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 40-53.


35 Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 40-53 & 104; Valentino 2004 (see note 1 above), 31 & 48-9; Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 26-30 & 214.
37 Valentino 2004 (see note 1 above); Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 90-1; Straus 2012 (see note 2 above), 549; Harff 2003 (see note 3 above), 62-3; Genocide Prevention Task Force 2008 (see note 4 above), 42 & 82.
38 Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 102.
39 Ibid. 185.
43 See: Paul Roth, “Hearts of darkness: perpetrator history and why there is no why,” *History of the Human Sciences* 17 (2004); Newman 2002 (see note 32 above); Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 40-53.
44 Chirot & McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 20-44; Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 26-9; Staub 1989 (see note 19 above), 38-43; Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 115-22.
47 Though see Bellamy 2012 (see note 10 above).
48 Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 124.
52 Baumann 2007 (see note 50 above), 150-1; Gagnon 2004 (see note 36 above), 189.
57 Benesch 2012 (see note 6 above), 5; Edelman 1977 (see note 55 above), 1-21; Boudon 1999 (see note 51 above), 156-8.

59 Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above).

60 Kiernan 2003 (see note 3 above).

61 Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 160-1.

62 Ibid. 161.


64 Valentino 2004 (see note 1 above), 67 & 100; Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 49, 53 & 121-2; Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above) 54 & 56; Shaw 2007 (see note 40 above), 116.


66 This builds on Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 52-7.

67 See note 58 above.


69 Hull 2003 (see note 12 above), 154.

70 Zimbardo 2009 (see note 68 above), 307.


72 Fein 2002 (see note 58 above), 84.


74 Semelin 2005 (see note 6 above), 252-3; Waller 2007 (see note 5 above), 208 & 211-12; Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 22 & 33-4.

75 Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 92-8, 128, 133, 169-70; Semelin 2005 (see note 6 above), 172, 186, 250 & 354-5; Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 70-80; Staub 1989 (see note 19 above), 48-9; Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 74-84.

76 Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 177; Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 29, 63 & 140; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990 (see note 6 above), 357; Hinton 2002 (see note 12 above), 11.

77 See note 75 above; Waller 2007 (see note 6 above), 212-19.

78 Goldhagen 1997 (see note 71 above), 179.

79 Zimbardo 2009 (see note 68 above), 15.

80 Chalk and Jonassohn 1990 (see note 6 above), 10 & 25; du Preez 1994 (see note 23 above), 48-9; Chirot & McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 5, 14-16 & 31-6; Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 33, 37, 106-112.

81 Shaw 2007 (see note 40 above), 111.

82 Harff 2004 (see note 3 above), 61; Chandler 2000 (see note 68 above), 6 & 93-4.

83 Hinton 1998 (see note 3 above), 47.

84 Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above), 105, 107-8, 125 & 139.

85 Chalk and Jonassohn 1990 (see note 6 above), 337.

86 Hagenloh 2000 (see note 30 above).

87 Valentino 2004 (see note 1 above), 182.

88 Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above), 195-6.

89 Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 31-6 & 61-5; Jackson 1989 (see note 30 above), 56-7; Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 136, 162-3 & 400; Semelin 2005 (see note 6 above), 145; Goldhagen 1997 (see note 71 above), 262; Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 169.

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 61-107; Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 65; Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 100.


92 Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 168 & 173; Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above), 61.


94 Bellamy 2012 (see note 9 above), 84; Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above); Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above), 107; Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 81-2, 88, 101. See also: Lewis Cass, “Removal of the Indians,” *North American Review* 30 (1830): 69-71.


97 Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above), 153.


99 Although see: Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 177.

100 Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 52; Mann 2005 (see note 6 above), 200 & 254; Semelin 2005 (see note 6 above), 286. See also: Rudolf Hoess, *Commandant of Auschwitz* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1959).

101 Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 22, 33-4 & 99.

102 Valentino 2004 (see note 1 above), 92-3; Weitz 2003 (see note 3 above); Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 60-1, 134 & 142-4; Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 108.


104 Figes 2008 (see note 96 above), 91.

105 Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 169; Zimbardo 2009 (see note 68 above), 420 & 431-3; Dutton 2007 (see note 11 above), 20 & 71.

106 See: Hoess 1959 (see note 100 above).

107 Harff 2003 (see note 3 above), 66-8; Valentino 2004 (see note 1 above), 16-22.

108 See note 7 above.

109 Chirot and McCauley 2006 (see note 3 above), 5.

110 Berger and Luckmann 1967 (see note 54 above); Newman 2002 (see note 32 above), 60.

111 Bellamy 2012 (see note 3 above), 180. See also: Bellamy 2012 (see note 9 above), 97.