Creating a Commonwealth security culture? State-building and the international politics of security assistance in Tanzania

Thomas J. Maguire* and Hannah Franklin

While numerous studies have examined Tanzania's political, economic and social development either side of independence, the development of its security sector and its interaction with external actors within this context is not well understood. This partly reflects case-specific methodological challenges, tackled here through multiple overseas sources, but also the relative absence of research on intelligence and security communities in the Global South more generally. Approaching this lacunae head on, this article draws on security assistance literature related to 'patron-client relations' and 'principal-agent' theory to trace the nature and impact of limited British security assistance pre-independence, before demonstrating how and why significant change characterised Tanzania's increasingly politicised and unstable security sector and its key international liaison partners post-independence. These changes would quickly end British hopes of integrating Tanzania into a 'Commonwealth security culture' of friendly post-colonial states, with Tanzania charting its own non-aligned path through a competition of Cold War patrons.

In December 1961, at the independence of Tanganyika (as mainland Tanzania was then known), the United Kingdom (UK) remained the new state's hegemonic external security assistance patron. The formal state security structures, practices and customs were all of imposed British origin from its pre- and especially post-World War Two trusteeship of the territory. Today, however, this is no longer the case. While the UK maintains a counter-terrorism and counter-organised crime partnership with the Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service (TISS) and Police Force, the United States (US), Israel and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have all developed varying intelligence and security relationships with different parts of Tanzania's security sector (in the PRC's case, the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) in particular).¹ In this context, this article explores British post-colonial legacies in Tanzania (as it became in 1964 following merger with Zanzibar) and the extent to which the UK remained the hegemonic security assistance patron in the face of political transition. When did this cease to be the case and why, and

*Corresponding author: thomas.j.maguire@kcl.ac.uk (Department of War Studies, King's College London). I would like to thank the reviewers for their useful comments, colleagues Prof. Michael Goodman and Keith Beaven for their feedback and advice, and Dr Daniela Richterova and Dr Natalia Telepneva for organising this special issue. All errors remain my own.
what were the motives of traditional and new external actors and Tanzanian state stakeholders alike for this international cooperation and competition?

In seeking to answer these questions, current scholarship contains a major obstacle: the paucity of studies of non-Western, non-Anglophone intelligence and security institutions and their international relations (militaries are better covered). This is slowly starting to change, heeding calls to diversify the scope of the field and introduce a more comparative politics approach. This emerging comparative scholarship poses a fundamental conceptual question pertinent to this article’s Tanzanian case study: what variables influence and explain the characteristics and development of national intelligence and security systems? The broader sovereign actor’s political system and culture – and changes to it – within which security sectors are located and reciprocally tied is frequently highlighted as a key independent variable, including sovereignty types, regime type and governance traditions. This stands alongside the strategy of that actor and structures such as technological resources in comparative security studies.

While rigorously determining the relative explanatory weight of such independent variables can be problematic, three broad dependent variables representing security sector characteristics act as a useful analytical framework for seeking to do so: structures and organisations; capabilities, skills and equipment; and culture, i.e. interests, practices, norms and cohesion, including for example inter-service cooperation, ‘producer-consumer’ relations, and accountability. Given the fractured nature of the primary source base in this field, identifying evidence for these dependent variables is also tricky. Nevertheless, they provide useful guidelines for making inferential assessments of to what extent security assistance from external actors as an independent variable can and has impacted the characteristics of security sectors of states like Tanzania?

Historical scholarship on the role and impact of security institutions the UK built in its former colonial territories through the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), colonial police, and the British Army has proliferated in the past 15 years. However, Tanzania has gained short shrift. Moreover, the majority of this literature focuses on pre-independence structures and practices, generally ending as the reins of authority were handed over despite the fact that successive British Cabinets intended to preserve national power by transforming formal empire into informal influence. Twentieth century imperial historian Ashley Jackson is critical of this artificial division in scholarship between
‘declining empire’ and ‘post-empire’. Few studies have analysed the post-independence legacies of the security institutions leaders across the Global South took over, the extent to which British hegemonic security assistance continued, and the factors influencing changes or continuities.8

Commonwealth historian Philip Murphy's pioneering research in this area has sought to tackle this problem. Murphy argues that British capacity-building of individual territories’ security sectors – largely through the training and advisory efforts of MI5 and its Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) – formed ‘part of a more general project to create a “Commonwealth intelligence culture” that would survive decolonization.’9 This was designed, Murphy maintains, to:

• build self-sustaining security sectors that could ensure internal stability;
• ensure these sectors remained part of a Commonwealth international intelligence-sharing network to the UK’s benefit;
• inculcate an apolitical ‘British blueprint’ for each security sector that served the state and society, not the narrow interests of the party/regime in power;
• and ultimately preserve competent and pro-British unofficial channels of diplomatic influence for strategic policy objectives.10

In several cases – from Malaya and Singapore, to Jordan and Bahrein, to Kenya – preliminary evidence suggests the UK succeeded on some of Murphy's points. Yet in others, it did not: the post-1969 Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for example, welcomed in Soviet, East German and Cuban advisors to completely overhaul the former British Aden-centric colonial state security sector.11

But what of Tanzania? Its absence from the above literature partly reflects methodological challenges in directly accessing the archives of and individuals who worked in Tanzania’s security sector, with the valuable exception of former TISS officer Peter Bwimbo’s recently-published Kiswahili memoir.12 This article partly overcomes this obstacle by using archival, memoir and interview sources in multiple languages from the several external patrons of Tanzania’s security sector: the UK, US, Israel, Stasi Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA: foreign intelligence) files from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Státní bezpečnost (StB: state security) files from the former Czechoslovakia. Triangulating these many different perspectives also helps, to an extent, to mitigate the problem Daniel Branch emphasises of studies drawing on non-
indigenous sources to speak for indigenous voices. Examining the development of Tanzania’s security sector and its external interactions either side of independence tests Murphy’s thesis, bridges the divide between pre- and post-independence studies, and contributes to emerging comparative intelligence and security studies scholarship on states in the Global South.

This article first outlines wider scholarship on security assistance and international intelligence liaison. It then explores how and why Britain introduced a crash train and equip programme to ‘indigenise’ Tanganyika and Zanzibar’s colonial police and security service, the Special Branch, and improve capabilities as independence loomed. The article then assesses changes and continuities in both territories’ post-independence development and their key international liaison partners either side of two near simultaneous watershed moments in January 1964: the Zanzibar Revolution; and the East African Rifles Mutinies. As a result of an interplay between weak security institutions bequeathed by Britain, domestic court politics, the foreign policy interests of Tanganyika and Zanzibar’s post-independence political elites, and international competition for political influence, significant change characterised Tanzania’s increasingly politicised and unstable security sector. Britain lost its hegemonic security assistance role firstly to Israel from 1963, then to a consortium of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Soviet Union, China and Canada from 1964, quickly ending any hopes of creating a Commonwealth security culture in Tanzania.

Security assistance and intelligence liaison

While states’ militaries have typically been willing to openly participate in defence engagement with partners, providing security assistance to other parts of state security sectors – especially to those not regarded as intimate allies – has not been a natural activity for secretive intelligence and security services. Scholars broadly agree that states sponsor security assistance for two key reasons. Firstly, to improve their own security. This may occur either by improving the capabilities of clients at the expense of a mutual adversary (such as supporting proxy actions targeting rival embassies for penetration) or by gaining special privileges in return, such as intelligence exchange agreements, basing rights for forwardly deployed units, and local intelligence collection capabilities. The second common motive is to provide unofficial channels for shaping the policies of clients to the patron’s benefit. This may be done by gaining access to key political and security elites,
denying an adversary or competitor such inroads, or encouraging specific policy acts. This may be especially useful in states where the security sector has significant political influence or, more sensitively, as a channel for identifying intelligence recruitment opportunities within client services (so-called ‘spin-offs’).\textsuperscript{16}

Client states, of course, have their own motives, which can vary over time in response to inputs such as political change. Firstly, clients may desire to enhance their own security deficiencies – whether of the nation and its citizenry or the regime, party or leader in power – in response to perceived internal or external threats. The nature of what a patron has to offer, therefore, can be important, from scale, to technical suitability, to strings attached, to its fit with current structures and practices (or, indeed, ability to change them). Additionally, domestic power politics can be a driver. One part of a state’s security sector, or a particular minister, may seek an external benefactor due to court politics or competition with a sister service. Ideological, cultural, institutional or personal affinities between political and/or security elites in patron and client states can also grease the wheels through establishing trust and leverage or influence the political acceptability of a particular patron. Finally, international power hierarchies can be important. A client may draw security assistance from a patron due to their hegemonic dependency, such as if a client’s sovereignty status is colonial or otherwise occupied, or from more than one patron to actively avoid such dependency and being drawn into the patron’s security interests. This was a common concern for newly-independent states during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{17}

Client and patron interests and intended outcomes may or may not align. Key recent strides in security assistance scholarship explores this extent of alignment, levels of patron control over client use of assistance, and how these factors can influence the impact of assistance. This has been led by Stephen Biddle and colleagues’ work on ‘principal-agent’ symmetries and asymmetries and Walter Ladwig’s research on ‘patron-client relations’, useful analytical concepts for this article’s case study.\textsuperscript{18} Several, though not all, of these aims and interests drove security assistance between Tanzania and its external patrons either side of its independence, with differing degrees of alignment.
The pre-independence rush to reform

Until the mid-1950s, Britain’s UN-supported trusteeship of Tanganyika and protectorate of Zanzibar had represented an absentee landlord as far as security assistance was concerned. In the immediate post-war years, Whitehall had quickly recognized the need to reform security sectors across the Empire to maintain colonial rule against the perceived growing threats of a Soviet-backed international Communist offensive and anti-colonial nationalism.\textsuperscript{19} Enshrined in the 1948 ‘Attlee Doctrine’ that barred SIS from operating on colonial or Commonwealth territory without local sovereign permission, MI5 had been tasked by Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s Labour government with implementing these reforms in concert with the Colonial Office and local governors.\textsuperscript{20}

In practice, however, in territories lacking major security crises like Tanganyika and Zanzibar (unlike neighbouring Kenya’s Mau Mau Emergency), few reforms had taken place. The decentralised nature of imperial governance that pushed security decision-making to typically reactive colonial governors – in Tanganyika, Sir Edward Twining – the pull of financially limited post-war British security assistance resources to more acute territories, Colonial Office resistance to a significant MI5 advisory role, and the decades-long assumptions in Tanganyika for territorial development and power transition all fed into this. So too did the fact that, relatively speaking, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were not as strategically or economically important for British international interests and Cold War concerns in the 1940s and 1950s as other African colonies and protectorates like Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and the Central African Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Malawi, never mind Cyprus, Aden and the Persian Gulf territories, or Malaya and Singapore.\textsuperscript{21} Consequently, the Tanganyika Special Branch created in the late 1940s remained a sub-department of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), comprising three officers and often illiterate ‘African subordinate staff’ to cover the whole territory.\textsuperscript{22} In Zanzibar, only an Intelligence Branch within the CID had been created, not a formal Special Branch. Due to ‘financial considerations’, as in Tanganyika, it had been given little money for staff, equipment, or payment of sources.\textsuperscript{23} Paltry policing resources as a whole had been concentrated in the commercial and white settler areas of Dar-es-Salaam, leaving much of the rest of the territory unpoliced by a force that Andrew Burton has described as ‘understaffed and incapable’.\textsuperscript{24}

General Sir Gerald Templer’s pivotal 1955 report on colonial security condemned this lack of concern by governors and, implicitly, the Colonial Office, released in the context
of insurgencies in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya that had each caught an underdeveloped security apparatus off guard.\textsuperscript{25} With forthcoming plans for Malayan, Sudanese and Ghanaian independence, power transitions and the state apparatus that went with it no longer seemed so distant. Fears were also growing in Whitehall of an expanding Sino-Soviet ‘peaceful co-existence’ subversive programme across the Global South targeting anti-colonial nationalist movements. These factors and Templer’s stature in Whitehall following his successful two years managing security reform in Malaya meant his critiques and recommendations hit home. Distributing the report to governors, including Twining in Tanganyika, British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd ‘re-emphasized’ there was a ‘need for a sustained effort in building up and improving local intelligence machinery…[before] an emergency is imminent or actual.’\textsuperscript{26} The reforms that followed, coordinated by a new Colonial Office Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) that finally worked closely with MI5, were intended to achieve long-term impacts after independence, inculcating the ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’ that Murphy posits.\textsuperscript{27} MI5 seconded three Security Intelligence Advisers (SIAs) to the ISD to oversee this new security assistance, who travelled from territory to territory spreading the gospel of reform in concert with a growing number of MI5 officers either deployed as SLOs or temporarily embedded into local Special Branches.\textsuperscript{28}

The SIA for East Africa, George Gribble, formerly Director of the Kenyan Special Branch and Deputy Inspector General of the Kenyan Police, visited both Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1956 and focused on organization, recruitment, training, and the need for their own SLO advisor. Drawing on his experiences overseeing the intelligence and law enforcement measures against the Mau Mau uprising from 1952-55, Gribble’s reforms had two aims. The first, ‘anticipation of threats to good order and government which may be foreseen’, was articulated in the context of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)’s growing non-violent demands for independence. These were led by the increasingly influential Julius Nyerere, an Edinburgh-educated teacher who had rallied 40,000 to his cause at his first public meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in 1955.\textsuperscript{29} Twining’s government pressured MI5 to open a personal surveillance file on him shortly before Gribble’s arrival, based on what SLO East Africa Cyril ‘Bill’ Major held to be spurious Special Branch reporting on supposed Communist connections.\textsuperscript{30} This pressure highlights the divergent principal-agent aims and interests that could complicate security assistance. MI5, the external patron, had primarily Cold War interests in insulating territories like Tanganyika
from international Communist subversion post-independence. Client administrations like that of Twining, however, were often more concerned with using such assistance to monitor and manage challenges to colonial rule and British plans for transition in what intelligence studies scholar Rory Cormac has described as ‘an age of competing threats.’

Gribble’s second aim was to ‘secure, as a legacy for the future, a sound intelligence system as part of the accepted machinery of Government’. Special Branch was finally split off from the CID and headed by a full-time Assistant Commissioner, a recommendation MI5 had made in 1947. By 1958 it had opened provincial offices in the headquarters of four out of the eight provinces that previously had no Special Branch presence at all and recruited to enable an expansion to district level if needed. Given most provinces were around 100,000km$^2$, comprising populations frequently around a million or more people, such expansion could only achieve so much. In October 1958, MI5 also appointed Tanganyika’s first SLO, Ian Carrel, an experienced officer formerly posted in Malaya, Kenya, and Hong Kong and whose advice was informed by experience of countering two colonial insurgencies. This split the former Nairobi-based SLO East Africa into individual stations for Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda, recognising the need for closer advisory work.

Parachuted in alongside Carrel that year was Geoffrey Wilson, replacing the retiring Robert Foulger as the new Commissioner of Police. His remit was to guide reforms by drawing on his preceding five years of expanding, indigenising and training the Sarawak Constabulary’s Police and Special Branch in Southeast Asia.

Concomitant training with this expansion was urgent. Unlike higher priority colonies, Gribble found only seven Tanganyikan police officers – expatriate, black African or Asian – had received Special Branch training. Zanzibar was even worse: by 1956 it had a sole Special Branch officer. A 1957 East African Governors meeting emphasised that ‘Africanization’ of Special Branch had to be started ‘well in advance of any political decisions which may lead to the speedy withdrawal of European officers’, but found this ‘was often hampered by the human difficulty of finding enough people within the Police Force who were suited to this type of work.’ To quickly fill the capacity gap, State House prioritised expatriate recruitment from other colonial Special Branches shedding their officers in the build up to independence, such as Malaya, over an indigenisation drive. This included two of the last senior expatriate officers to leave Tanganyika, W.P. ‘Jock’ Mathieson and Tim Hardy. Unlike Malaya, moreover, while East Africa’s colonial territories had their own police colleges (Tanganyika’s was only founded in 1956, in
Moshi), there was no territorial or regional Special Branch Training School to service an indigenisation drive. Training, therefore, had to be done on MI5's London overseas courses, which East Asian officers had dominated since their inception in 1950. By 1958, in contrast, out of the 24 officers on an MI5 ‘Advanced Course’, only two were from Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong each while the rest were from Africa, including Tanganyika.

Peter Bwimbo, stationed from 1953-59 in the Special Branch office of Lake Province headquarters, Mwanza, attended the Hendon Metropolitan Training School in 1960, though was subjected to generalist not specialist police work. Nevertheless, only two or three years out from independence, security assistance for Tanganyika's Special Branch remained focused on expatriate staff.

Long-term reform, therefore, did not occur overnight. Sixty-four percent of all police ranks (uniformed and Special Branch) by 1959 still had less than five years’ experience. Tim Hardy encountered this situation in 1957-58 during his first year in Tanganyika as Head of Special Branch (Southern Province) in Mbeya, covering an area of 125,000km². Compared to the Special Branch he served in in Malaya beforehand and in Sarawak and Hong Kong afterwards, his one expatriate deputy, two expatriate secretaries, a District branch office in Iringa ran by one expatriate officer and a secretary, and ‘a half-dozen, barely literate, male so-called “detectives”’ was positively skeletal. Twining's replacement as governor in 1958, Sir Richard Turnbull, previously Chief Secretary in Kenya, was very concerned that ‘the Police force is so small that it scarcely makes itself felt outside the towns.’ In 1959, British Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod similarly warned that Tanganyika's police was ‘inadequate’ to cope with any serious trouble.

The limited indigenisation reform was not simply a resource issue. It reflected wider policy. By January 1959, the Colonial Office’s constitutional policy still forecast internal self-government a decade later in 1969. These long-term planning assumptions underpinning British security assistance were completely undercut later that year. By late 1959, more extreme left-wing nationalist elements in TANU, other parties and trade unions, such as Oscar Kambona or Nsilo Swai – both under Special Branch surveillance, both with personal MI5 files, both influential ministers after independence – were critiquing Julius Nyerere’s pragmatic, moderate non-racial policies so much that State House and Whitehall feared they might push aside a leader now viewed as competent and pro-Western and resort to political violence if independence demands were not soon met. That October, therefore, three months before Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's
watershed ‘Winds of Change’ speech in Cape Town, Iain Macleod agreed to significantly accelerate the power transition. In September 1960, Nyerere became Chief Minister of Tanganyika after TANU won all seats bar one in the election that month and, in December 1961, Prime Minister of the independent Commonwealth state of Tanganyika.

Consequently, as Michael Macoun recounted, by the time he departed the Tanganyika Police as Deputy Commissioner to become Inspector-General of Police in Uganda in 1959, ‘it was obvious that the process of “localization” was belatedly slow.’ The Tanganyika Police introduced accelerated promotion for indigenous black Africans to district command posts, but this happened more sluggishly in the Special Branch. When Tim Hardy took over the Dar-es-Salaam city Special Branch office in 1960, on the eve of independence, he had a team of four officers (himself, one Tanganyikan-born Sikh, one Ugandan, and one white expatriate officer), twelve rank and file indigenous Tanganyikans, and two expatriate secretaries to monitor the city. He rightly wondered, therefore, ‘if any other capital city in the world was watched over by fewer security intelligence spooks?’

These demographic problems mirrored similar weaknesses in the negligible number of Tanganyikan officers in the 6th and 26th Battalions of the King’s African Rifles that, at independence, would form the nucleus of the Tanganyika Rifles. By this watershed, only four Tanganyikan officers – one of whom was of Asian origin – had commissioned through Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the standard for officer training across British colonies: the first in 1958, two more in 1959, and another, Mrisho ‘Sam’ Sarakikya, in 1961 who at age 30 would in 1964 become Commander-in-Chief of the new post-Rifles Mutiny TPDF. Territories like Malaya, Singapore and Kenya had had a decade or more to recruit, train and blood indigenous junior and senior officers in acute security environments before political transition occurred. In Tanganyika and Zanzibar by independence, by contrast, their future military, police and intelligence services remained dominated by white British expatriates, South Asians and, in Zanzibar additionally, ethnic Arabs. The lack of trained and experienced indigenous Special Branch staff embedded in a professional and institutionalised security sector would have significant implications for continuities, for their pro-British affiliation, and for their integration into a Commonwealth security culture.
Post-independence politics

As colonial territories in Africa achieved independence, the continent increasingly became a Cold War battleground for diplomatic and economic influence. Alongside offering substantial development aid and investment programmes to fledgling economies, the security apparatuses of newly-independent states represented a focal point for this battleground. Early experiences of decolonization in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya and Ghana had raised hopes in Whitehall that a transition model of ‘declaring’ (i.e. formally avowing the existence of) the Special Branch and SLO to the indigenous Chief Minister before independence and persuading them to retain the SLO and Britain as the principal security assistance patron would embed these states into the developing Commonwealth security network.53 This MI5-managed process was among the most sensitive issues surrounding independence, as nationalist parties became responsible for the colonial security organizations that had previously targeted them. ‘We shall never be able to make any African country pro-West’, explained Alex Kellar, MI5’s Director E Branch (Overseas) from 1958-1962, ‘but, by this kind of support, we can at least assist them to sit on the fence and not to fall over on the wrong side.’54 When Julius Nyerere had become Chief Minister in September 1960, Kellar had flown out to Dar-es-Salaam to personally assist Governor Turnbull in declaring the Special Branch and the SLO, Ian Carrel’s 1960 successor Keith Thomas, who Nyerere had agreed to retain.55 As Tanganyika achieved independence and joined the Commonwealth, Harold Macmillan’s government therefore hoped that continued Anglo-Tanganyikan security relations would retain a channel for British influence in Dar-es-Salaam.

At the same time, however, Nyerere placed great weight on his commitment to non-alignment and anti-colonialism, aiming to avoid Cold War politics and neo-colonial British hegemony. In November 1962, following a comprehensive election victory, he amended the country’s constitution to that of a Republic, formally separating from the Queen and making himself head of state as president.56 Nyerere helped found Eduardo Mondlane’s Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), permitted the establishment of training camps for it and other liberation movements, including the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army targeting still-British Southern Rhodesia, and agreed to headquarter the African Liberation Committee, which Oscar Kambona would chair, in Dar-es-Salaam at the inaugural meeting of the Organisation of African Union in Addis Ababa in 1963.57 By that year, clashes over British policy towards the Southern African states’ white minority rule
that these movements were seeking to overturn was souring Anglo-Tanganyikan diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{58}

Nyerere and Kambona, TANU’s Secretary-General, were also starting to look elsewhere for development aid. By the end of 1962, alongside six Commonwealth High Commissions, the US Embassy, and six Western European embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, the PRC, Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia had opened missions. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia would join these in 1963 and Cuba in 1964.\textsuperscript{59} Concurrently, shortly after independence, the US Embassy was asked to remove their declared CIA officer.\textsuperscript{60} With the growing aid and propaganda efforts of these Communist embassies in mind and referencing President Kwame Nkrumah’s increasingly anti-Western foreign policy in Ghana, David Roberts, head of the Africa desk of the Foreign Office Information and Research Department (IRD), the UK’s anti-Communist and counter-subversion propaganda organ, labelled Dar-es-Salaam ‘a centre on the East Coast of subversion comparable with Accra on the West Coast’.\textsuperscript{61} In the context of Cold War competition for influence, therefore, Tanganyika was gaining more strategic interest for Britain and allied and rival powers than at any time since World War Two. These developments placed more diplomatic significance on retaining an SLO liaison conduit and Britain’s security assistance hegemony not only to shape the post-independence security sector but also as a channel for clandestine diplomacy as was proving useful in Ghana and India where overt relations with the UK were under similar Cold War- and post-colonial-infused strain.\textsuperscript{62} As Tanganyika’s security sector became bound up with Nyerere and Kambona’s wider independent political changes, however, British interests would be disappointed.

\textbf{Israel steps in}

Nyerere, Kambona and Job Lusinde – initially Minister for Local Government before becoming Interior Minister – actively sought to reduce British and expatriate influence in the security sector during 1962 through rapidly ‘Africanizing’ the Police and Special Branch.\textsuperscript{63} The small cadre of black Tanganyikan junior officers that had been speedily sent through British training courses from 1958-61 were promoted. Africanisation was central to Nyerere’s project for creating a legitimate state and was done on a scale and at a pace to satisfy the new elite’s political imperatives, with security considerations a lower priority. In the context of internal self-government, in August 1961 Tim Hardy had promoted thirty-
two-year-old Peter Bwimbo to lead Nyerere's recently-formed ten-person security unit. Bwimbo would maintain this position through the turmoil of 1964 until his promotion to Deputy Director of TISS in 1973. He had received no specialised training in protective security, and expatriate officers like Hardy provided or left few guidelines for newly-promoted Tanganyikan officers when they took over.64 M.M. Elangwa Shaidi, until 1961 the only black African Superintendent in the Police Force, succeeded Geoffrey Wilson in 1962 as the first black African Commissioner (later Inspector-General after merger with Zanzibar) of Police, serving in that position until 1970. In December 1962, E. E. Akena replaced R.T.L. Egan as the first black African Director of CID, serving in post until 1967. And in June 1962 Emilio Mzena, the only black African Assistant Superintendent stationed at Special Branch headquarters in Dar es Salaam, succeeded Director of Special Branch Ian Patton, remaining in post until 1973.65 By June 1963, of the large number of expatriate officers still present at independence, only twenty-eight remained out of 133 gazetted police posts, most at Superintendent rank. The British High Commission considered this rush had lead to a 'serious dilution of experienced police leadership'.66

While Nyerere had appointed a British expatriate Government Security Officer in May 1962 to counsel on protective security measures, including communications encryption, this radical overhaul left many junior police and Special Branch posts that needed to be filled and trained.67 Breaking from their British patron, Tanganyika's ministers overlooked Keith Thomas' SLO station and instead turned first to the US and then Israel to service these needs. In early 1963, Kambona, now Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, began negotiations with the US for both protective security training and counter-intelligence training of Special Branch officers.68 US Ambassador William Leonhart had enthusiastically supported these requests, sensing an opportunity for American influence in a sensitive part of government that could generate wider goodwill. As the CIA-supported Office of Public Safety of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) explained regarding security assistance across East Africa, ‘One of the purposes of the program is to pre-empt Bloc efforts’ and gain a foothold.69 A relatively minor US$66,000 was allotted in FY1963 and 1964 for fifteen Tanganyikan participants each year at the recently launched USAID-ran International Police Academy in Washington, DC, including Peter Bwimbo who attended a protective security course on VIP protection during the summer of 1963. However, he found the content to be overly-focused on more developed Western experiences less suited to Tanganyika's requirements.70 Additionally, slowed by
bureaucratic inertia in Washington, by September 1963 any CIA or FBI counter-intelligence assistance was not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{71}

Kambona and Lusinde instead turned to Israel, with whom they had established close personal connections during 1962. In the Spring of 1963, Israel dispatched six police and Mossad officers to Tanganyika to train a ‘small private intelligence unit’ operated by Kambona in parallel with the Special Branch.\textsuperscript{72} Prior to independence, Kambona like many African nationalists had become habituated to relying upon personal party intelligence mechanisms given their lack of access to formal state structures. As Secretary-General of TANU, he had mainly sourced recruits from the TANU Youth League, which by 1960-61 had become a community vigilante mechanism targeting his political opponents.\textsuperscript{73} Kambona, thus, continued to rely on this channel for building his political power base in the context of his pre-independence concerns that Nyerere’s anti-colonial politics were not radical enough and the growing rivalry that would emerge between them from 1965. This had similarities with the concomitant rivalry between Kenyan African National Union (KANU) President Jomo Kenyatta and Vice-President Odinga Oginga in Kenya. Recently released MI5 files reveal that either side of independence, Oginga developed a personal security unit formed predominantly from members of his Luo ethnic group within the KANU Youth Wing and trained out-of-country with Czechoslovak, East German and Chinese assistance. Simultaneously, Jomo Kenyatta developed his own KANU unit founded on fellow ethnic Kikuyu members with Israeli assistance, both forming parallel structures to the established Kenyan Special Branch.\textsuperscript{74} Both cases reflected the influence of domestic court politics shaping new security structures that external patrons like Israel were more than happy to support.

During 1963, Israeli trainers also provided willing aid for two other security reform initiatives: at Kambona’s initiative, six-month short-service commission training in Israel for Tanganyika Rifles officer cadets, competing with established British structures and longer Sandhurst training that had been retained in parallel post-independence; and in-country support for Nyerere and Lusinde’s new People’s Militia, or National Service, headed by Assistant Superintendent of Police David Nkulila.\textsuperscript{75} Breaking from the colonial past, this was aimed at creating a new layer of internal security and agricultural ‘nation-building’ through auxiliary community self-defence units in rural and border areas where the formal police and military presence remained thin. Intimately tied to the TANU Youth League, Israel was an attractive patron because it could offer assistance directly suited to
Tanganyika’s needs based on its own experience and structures: Israel’s paramilitary and rural development Nahal and Gadna programmes centred on the Kibbutz. Their community collectivist approaches appear to have appealed to Nyerere and his cabinet’s embryonic brand of pan-African socialism, ujamaa (‘familyhood’), later formalised in the president’s 1967 Arusha Declaration. Through these three streams, Israel therefore offered Tanganyika a combination of off-the-shelf training overseas and in-country assistance more responsive and tailored to local requirements.

Israel had several divergent aims of its own for intervening in a country thousands of miles away with whom it had few previous linkages. These formed part of its largely improvised ‘periphery strategy’, devised in 1957-58 by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, and entrusted to successive Mossad chiefs from Reuven Shiloah onwards. This aimed to breach the ring of hostile Arab states surrounding Israel to forge ties further afield, creating deterrence, counterbalancing Arab state hostility, acquiring intelligence assets, and presenting these ties as an asset to the US. Mossad also sought to leverage their position diplomatically for winning votes against these Arab states in UN forums. In return, Mossad provided intelligence, training services, arms and sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment. Conducting interviews with numerous former Mossad colleagues for a recent book, Yossi Alpher has shown that East Africa formed part of a ‘Southern Triangle’ in this periphery strategy, focused on gaining influence in non-Arab/non-Muslim majority states neighbouring hostile Sudan through which Mossad could target it and enhance Israeli security. Israel would view Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda as more significant prizes and Alpher does not include any empirical evidence on Israeli efforts in Tanzania. However, when Kambona and Lusinde sought out Israeli assistance in 1962 and 1963, Tanganyika represented Israel’s first opening in a newly-independent state in the Southern Triangle (having gained access to Ethiopia in the 1950s). The Israeli government, thus, jumped and improvised in response to Tanganyika’s requests.

Mossad would also be associated with a much more significant break in colonial-era security structures. On 6 September 1963, Kambona formally dissolved (‘kuvunjwa’) Special Branch and reconstituted it as a ‘Security Service’ or ‘Special Service’ divorced from the police and responsible directly to him (not Interior Minister Lusinde) rather than Commissioner of Police Shaidi as previously. He also created a separate ‘Intelligence Service’ headed by Chief of Protocol and Security in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Wynn Jones Mbwambo, who like Bwimbo had attended the US International Police Academy that
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summer. In theory an external-facing collection service, in practice it was based around Kambona’s Israeli-trained private unit with mainly VIP protective security responsibilities. Nyerere may have been persuaded to act by the Special Branch and SLO Keith Thomas’ ongoing participation in a regional Commonwealth liaison network including white minority-led Southern Rhodesia that became politically unpalatable. This symbolised a major break from the Commonwealth security culture the UK had been promoting.

A small number of senior officers from the colonial era Special Branch were retained, including Emilio Mzena as Director and Bwimbo as head of presidential security. Most, however, were either dismissed or moved to the uniformed police, including B.N. Omari who had only recently returned from a British security training course in 1962. Comparatively, the police would retain more officers who had served and trained in the colonial era, including Omari, Hamza Azizi (succeeding Shaidi as Commissioner in 1964 when the latter became Inspector General), Samuel Pundugu, Philemon Mgaya and Solomon Liani. All would go on to succeed Shaidi as Commissioner or Inspector General from 1970 through to 1984. Indicative perhaps of the more pro-British outlook this police officer corps retained, in 1984, Liani would delicately seek out British security assistance for a reborn Special Branch as a counterweight to what he viewed as the negative influence of TISS, highlighting once more domestic court power politics as a driver of security assistance.

Kambona and Lusinde retained two Mossad officers to train this new service, the latter having visited Israel with Mzena in the summer of 1963 for this purpose. Recruits continued to come from the TANU Youth League. As the TANU National Convention had approved Nyerere’s transformation of Tanganyika into a one-party state in January 1963, political opposition formed the primary target of this endemically politicised service. This had begun to be the case even before Special Branch’s dissolution. During 1962, Special Branch had supported Nyerere and Kambona’s clampdown on political ‘subversives’ – in particular senior figures in Zuberi Mtemvu’s African National Congress – under a new Preventive Detention Act modelled on Kwame Nkrumah’s similar security legislation in Ghana. Nyerere’s November 1962 dominant election victory in part stemmed from this. By March 1963, the US Embassy reported that Special Branch counter-espionage monitoring of the new Soviet Bloc and Chinese embassies was redirected (counter to British and American interests) to concentrate ‘almost exclusively on investigation of trade
union activities and surveillance of former officials from now defunct opposition parties. These changes reflected the weak apparatus bequeathed by Britain at independence, Nyerere, Kambona and Lusinde’s non-aligned foreign policy views and insecurities, and the highly personalised character of politics and power in a number of African states at this time. On the eve of momentous events in the country’s future, therefore, the state’s security sector was being rebuilt from the ground up by a new external patron to service a very narrow set of political elites.

The Zanzibar Revolution and the East African mutinies

On 12 January, Zanzibar’s Arab-dominated minority government under Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah, which had replaced British rule in December 1963, was overthrown in a violent revolution. Thousands of Arab and Asian residents were murdered and exiled en masse. Spontaneous anti-Arab black African street violence led by Ugandan self-proclaimed ‘Field Marshal’ John Okello and radical left-wing elements of Sheikh Abeid Karume and Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu’s Afro-Shirazi and Umma opposition parties were motivated by a complex mixture of ethno-racial tensions, economic inequalities, and grievances at the circumstances of democratic politics. The presence in the revolutionary government of a number of Marxists with known ties to the PRC, Soviet bloc and Cuba, especially Babu, and the quick opening of Communist embassies meant that Zanzibar and Tanganyika acquired further strategic interest for Cold War-orientated international powers. It also led several initial British and American assessments to interpret the coup as an international Communist-backed plot and Zanzibar as ‘an African Cuba under Communist control’. While based on poor intelligence reporting from both liaison sources in the decimated Zanzibar Special Branch and any negligible independent assets, these fears were exacerbated shortly afterwards by a near concurrent breakdown in order within Tanganyika’s security apparatus.

The Tanganyika Rifles mutiny in January 1964 stemmed in part from the problems of demographic representation in this part of the security sector Britain had handed over at independence. The mutiny, at Colito Barracks on 19 January and Tabora on 20 January, was ostensibly a labour strike by a group of junior and non-commissioned officers to protest the continued presence of British officers in the army. Africanization of the Police Force and Special Branch had heightened expectations for similar progress in the military. But
Nyerere and the British commander of the Tanganyika Rifles, Brigadier General Patrick Sholto Douglas, had resisted this for fear of a breakdown of professional discipline, setting a conservative ten-year schedule. Similar grievances, as well as the inspiration of the Tanganyikan mutineers, set off more limited mutinies in the Kenyan and Uganda Rifles days later. The Colito and Tabora mutineers deposed their British officers, who were forced onto planes to Nairobi, and promoted junior officers they considered were being kept down. The mutiny was eventually quelled by a company of British Royal Marines at Nyerere's begrudging request on 25 January.92

Oscar Kambona's insertion of discordant Israeli training into the Tanganyika Rifles assistance programme may also have been a driver of discontent. The inferior standard of the fifteen quickly Israeli-trained officers compared to Sandhurst-trained officers and their politicised fast-tracked promotion by Kambona ironically stoked further tensions. Indeed, on the eve of the mutiny, the Rifles' commissioning board with Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa's support had rejected all fifteen on the grounds of their poor standards, but had been overruled by Kambona. Perhaps unsurprisingly, British intelligence officers and diplomats were keen to stress the impact of Kambona's actions and their Israeli competitors as a key driver of the mutiny rather than the structural weaknesses of Britain's defence sector transition either side of independence.93 Nevertheless, this highlights the challenge of integrating security assistance from different external patrons harmoniously and efficiently, a challenge that would only deepen post-mutiny.

An 'intelligence failure'?

Systemic flaws in Tanganyika's security sector fed into and were highlighted by the mutiny. Wynn Jones Mbwambo acknowledged to the US Embassy that the Government had 'had no intelligence network in [the] Tanganyika Rifles', for Special Branch's successor had mistakenly assumed that 'TR headquarters had [an inward-looking] military intelligence operation'. The Rifles, for their part, had assumed that the new Security Service had retained Special Branch’s old sources that had previously forestalled a mutiny in 1962.94 In a raid on a house in the immediate wake of the mutiny, the new Security Service had stumbled across evidence of disenfranchised opposition politician and trade unionist plotting to remove Nyerere’s government through violence. In his moment of need to discover how widespread involvement in this plot had been, Mzena had turned not to his
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Israeli advisers but rather back to MI5 through new SLO Ronnie Jacobsen to urgently source surveillance equipment. MI5 shipped the equipment immediately by air, eager to regain a security assistance foothold, but it was never collected by Mzena's overburdened service. Instead, making 'no use whatsoever' of previous Special Branch records and relying instead on 'rumour and gossip' to feed uncritical ministerial customers, as Jacobsen decried, the aggressive investigations that followed took a less targeted approach, purging over 500 trade unionists, police, and civil servants. Not only did this mass sweep reflect the new service's lack of capabilities to meet its security requirements. But more broadly, Crawford Young has argued that in a state's exercise of rule, reliance on application of coercion rather than authority devalues its legitimacy and typifies weakness. Moreover, where state strength can discourage opponent action, weakness can embolden such action as highlighted by the opportunistic opposition coup plot. This and Nyerere's repressive security reaction to the mutiny highlighted a very weak state.

Consequently, at the Commonwealth Relations Office's request, Jacobsen undertook a full assessment of Tanganyika's security sector. His conclusions were damning. Tanganyika possessed no effective security organization, he judged, due to 'over-hasty' Africanisation and Kambona's Israeli-aided 'total destruction' of Special Branch. The Security Service had had no formal collection requirements set, instead engaging, Jacobsen deplored, in 'pathetic forms of spying' on expatriates, diplomats, and civil servants. While much of this was pinned on Tanganyikan ministers like Kambona, as with the mutiny itself, Israel attracted significant criticism too. Indeed, the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), its centralised all-source strategic intelligence assessment body for senior policymakers, produced an assessment in July 1964 on 'Israeli activities in Africa' provoked by events in Tanganyika. It critiqued the 'extensive' 'free hand' Israel had gained in Tanganyika that meant 'British influence in the security field was supplanted'. This had produced a 'dangerously low level' in capabilities, leaving 'little doubt that the principal reason for the failure of the Government to learn about the plans for the army mutiny...was a lack of good intelligence which would probably have been provided by the Special Branch had it been in existence.' Overall, the JIC therefore concluded, 'Israeli assistance in military training, security and intelligence has...particularly in Tanganyika, been detrimental to the maintenance of internal security.' In this way, the British were and would continue to be in Kenya and Uganda far less accommodating than the French towards such Israeli influence in their transitioning West African colonies.
Protective security standards for personnel, documentation and communications, Jacobsen reported, had also slipped and Tanganyika had suffered a serious breach of communications security through the sale of a diplomatic one-time pad.\textsuperscript{100} The unsophisticated encryption systems of newly-independent African countries, intelligence historian Christopher Andrew and KGB archivist defector Vasili Mitrokhin explain, meant they were in effect ‘conducting open diplomacy so far as the KGB and other of the world’s major SIGINT agencies were concerned.’\textsuperscript{101} While the particular communications encryption system Tanganyika adopted after independence – British or otherwise – is not yet clear, at some point Dar-es-Salaam turned to Boris Hagelin’s Switzerland-based Crypto AG to purchase machines. Declassified US National Security Agency documents in 2014 and a leaked internal CIA history in 2020 of Operation THESAURUS reveal that the company – completely covertly owned by the CIA and West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) from 1970 – purposefully sold more weakly (and later compromised) encrypted machines to the likes of Tanzania and over one hundred other states than to close US NATO allies like the UK.\textsuperscript{102} With the weaknesses of 1963-64 in mind, Jacobsen concluded that ‘since Tanganyika is in no position to protect her own secrets it seems there is no reason to believe that she will be any more successful with classified information emanating from the UK.’\textsuperscript{103} The tenets of security and trust that underpin liaison relationships had been completely eroded.

Labelling the Security Service as Kambona’s ‘private intelligence organisation’, Jacobsen also emphasised that the pre-mutiny trend of the TANU Youth League-dominated security sector servicing ministers’ power bases had deepened. This would continue through 1964, as Nyerere sought to ensure future loyalty by incorporating the heads of the security apparatus, like Mzena and Shaidi, into the National Executive Committee of TANU, further fusing party and state. By the end of the year, police officers had been forced to take up TANU membership \textit{en masse}.\textsuperscript{104} These drastic changes in part reflected the new post-independence political system in which the security sector existed, which stressed maintaining recently won power and regime security. But it also represented the British failure to build up strong professional indigenous institutions inculcated with a culture of political neutrality, leaving them at the mercy of autocratic ‘elite capture’.\textsuperscript{105}

Jacobsen’s scathing assessment was tinged with post-colonial superiority and \textit{schadenfreude}. Jacobsen, a former civil servant in colonial Nigeria, at no point reflected on the deeper systemic issues owing to underinvestment, recruitment, training and rushed
reforms prior to independence. His report represented the swansong for the six-year old SLO station in Dar-es-Salaam. MI5 had decided to close it in March 1964, with Jacobsen cross-posted to the new SLO station in Lusaka, Zambia, alongside Daphne Park’s new SIS station.  

106 At the end of April, Geoffrey ‘Bill’ Dawson established SIS’ first formal presence in the new United Republic of Tanzania, disavowed with no liaison relationship with the host nation government. By the 1970s, this remained the case, and unlike a number of other African Commonwealth states such as Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Ghana, no TISS officers were attending MI5 or SIS training courses either.  

107 Dar-es-Salaam became only the second SLO station to close in a former colonial territory after Rangoon in 1955, and the first in Africa. MI5 Director-General Roger Hollis later framed it as having been the least effective station in the Commonwealth.  

108 Its early closure represented a conclusive failure to instil a Commonwealth security culture.

Zanzibar’s new partners

On 26 April 1964, Julius Nyerere forged the United Republic of Tanzania between Tanganyika and Sheikh Abeid Karume’s revolutionary Zanzibar, seeking to pre-empt Cold War hegemonic competition over the island by integrating it into a neutral Commonwealth state. This also had the benefit of neutralizing former Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League member Prime Minister Kassim Hanga and especially Minister for Defence and External Affairs Babu’s radical Umma party.  

109 While the merger solved several political problems, it raised the challenge of integrating two security sectors in a state of flux and gaining security assistance from different external patrons. China, the Soviet Union and GDR had descended upon Zanzibar at the new Revolutionary Council’s request, despatching security training teams to protect the new regime. At a meeting in December later that year between head of the Stasi Erik Mielke, HVA chief Markus Wolf, KGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastny, head of the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) Aleksandr Sakharovsky and head of Africa Department Feliks Vinogradov among others, the group made clear what was at stake: ‘Zanzibar must be supported as a base for progress and a fist within Tanzania. It has to be strengthened against all efforts of restoration by colonial and neo-colonial powers.’  

110 In the context of the Sino-Soviet Split, China and the Soviet Union were also competing to train and equip Zanzibar’s new paramilitary field force and army. Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) advisers embedded into the field force under new
Commissioner of Police Eddington Kissasi while the Soviets supplied arms and heavy equipment to the army.  

More importantly, however, in the Spring of 1964 the GDR secured the prize of rebuilding the Special Branch’s replacement, the Zanzibari Security Service, foreshadowing the sizeable wave of African students coming through the GDR's security training schools from the 1970s. Working with Seif Bakari Omar, chairman of the intelligence and security council and political commissar of the army on the Revolutionary Council, and the head of this service, Tanganyikan mainlander Ibrahim Makungu, Markus Wolf took personal charge of overseeing what represented his service’s first security assistance client in sub-Saharan Africa. More broadly, and of significant import for the GDR’s ongoing strategic competition with West Germany pre-Ostpolitik as framed by the Hallstein Doctrine, Zanzibar was the first sub-Saharan African state to have diplomatically recognised East Germany.

Wolf secured a three-month in-country assistance mission for technical equipment and advisers, with HVA officers in the GDR’s mission providing longer-term liaison support. Like Mossad’s officers attached to Tanganyika’s Security Service, in theory this meant more responsive and tailored assistance to Zanzibari requirements. Ahead of a KGB delegation visiting Zanzibar, Mielke and Sakharovsky agreed by December 1964 that ‘MfS [Stasi] activities on Zanzibar are rated positively. All expenses for Zanzibar are justified.’ They also concurred about their ultimate interests: ‘to solidify the personal contacts with, and influence on...Karume... Hanga and Babu’; and ‘to have exact knowledge of English and American plans concerning the Union and against Zanzibar.’ Political influence and developing a proxy to target a mutual enemy represented fundamental aims. For Markus Wolf, HVA colleagues also noted that security assistance for Zanzibar took on a personal resonance that would last until his retirement as Chief in 1986.

Makungu’s Security Service had the express goal of protecting the revolutionary regime in a one-party state. Like its sister service on the mainland, it recruited heavily from the ruling Afro-Shirazi Party’s Youth League that also received significant overseas training from East Germany and the Soviet Union (around 200 had been through GDR Global South courses by 1966). Seif Bakari – in his mid-twenties, a tailor with little education before becoming chairman of the intelligence and security council, and Karume’s most trusted adviser – had been and remained Chairman of the Youth League, a position he used like Oscar Kambona to build his personal power base. The similarities between the changes
that took place to the colonial security apparatuses under two very different external patrons – Israel in Tanganyika and East Germany in Zanzibar – suggest the main drivers were less the interests of security assistance patrons and more those of both nations’ new leaders and the political systems they fostered.

Both the Zanzibari Security Service and nascent TISS were also similarly repressive towards opponents of the regime, though Makungu, Bakari and their subordinates quickly developed a far more brutal human rights reputation. Two of Seif Bakari’s former revolutionary colleagues were deeply critical in their memoirs of his extremist ethno-racial views and the associated atrocities he and Makungu had ordered.118 One, Ali Sultan Issa, then Minister for Education, also highlighted HVA complicity in Zanzibar’s widespread surveillance dragnet: ‘we all know how the East Germans controlled their people, so almost the same system applied here’, Ali Sultan recalled. ‘We thought the walls had ears, that they could be bugged...We had to think before we spoke.’119 British freelance photographer Mohamed Amin was one of many political prisoners interrogated and tortured in the infamous Kilimamigu prison, arrested for filming Soviet security training camps on the island. Notably, he was visited by HVA interrogators who accused him of spying for the UK and US and, recalled Amin, ‘threatened to kill him unless he confessed.’120

The Security Service would not have achieved the surveillance net it did across the island without an influx of HVA equipment. Post-1964 upheavals, this marks an interesting comparison with the relatively more limited technical capabilities of the security service on the Tanzanian mainland which was not initially so well endowed by external patrons. Bakari and Makungu’s prescribed torture and executions, however, likely more reflected their local agency and personal desires. Markus Wolf attested to their brutality in his memoir, seeking to separate their actions from the HVA’s and maintaining that if any HVA officers used ‘forbidden’ coercion, ‘it happened against orders’.121 Wolf also claimed that while the HVA attempted to instil principles of efficacy rather than revenge or intimidation into client interrogators across the Global South, ‘[O]ur influence repeatedly proved to be minimal and we stood powerless as our advice was misused. Like our Western opponents, we sadly discovered that police and security forces in Africa were regarded by those who held power as mere tools to be wielded at will in multifarious tribal, ethnic, and personal rivalries, and not as methods of eliciting information.’122

While Wolf’s defence can be interpreted through a lens of potential scapegoating through ‘othering’ African political cultures, it also highlights the linked challenges of
patron control, principal-agent asymmetries and complicity in partner service actions that have been and remain common to security assistance patrons and clients alike.\textsuperscript{123} Indeed, despite the East German-backed expansion of a panopticon, resort to such brutality may nevertheless still have reflected a capability gap to meet the new regime’s security requirements. The Stasi’s surveillance state back home, by comparison, did not need such brutality because of their technical capabilities and tradecraft. This pattern, similar to a number of Middle Eastern and North African security services’ historical resort to interrogation as their primary intelligence collection method for lack of technical capabilities and to feed confession-based justice systems, once more links to the wider manifestations of state weakness Crawford Young has underscored.\textsuperscript{124}

**Nyerere’s new partners**

On the Tanzanian mainland, Israel continued to be a leading assistance patron to part of the security sector, coordinated by seconded Senior Superintendent of Police E. Bliman. Bliman’s mission concentrated on three main areas: building the police communications network (a relatively sensitive field); developing the Police’s paramilitary Field Force through paratrooper training; and continuing to build the National Service People’s Militia units.\textsuperscript{125} It is not clear from the very limited evidence available, however, if Mossad retained a security assistance role with Mzena’s nascent TISS. Certainly by 1966, recalled the SIS head of station in Dar-es-Salaam from 1966-69, Mossad had no liaison role in this field.\textsuperscript{126} Indeed, all Israeli assistance would end in the wake of the Six Day War in 1967 as Nyerere took a political decision to side with his non-aligned Arab partners.\textsuperscript{127} The July 1964 JIC assessment of Israeli security assistance noted indications of Nyerere’s displeasure about the poor performance of the new Israeli-backed service. Indeed, in the wake of the mutiny, the US had received a request for CIA training but for unclear reasons – perhaps because of the presence of competing Communist state actors – this was not followed up.\textsuperscript{128} USAID did send an Office of Public Safety survey team in the summer of 1964, which focused on the Police Field Force despite competing Israeli trainers and unsuccessfully encouraged Lusinde to revive the Special Branch. But by 1965 – in the wake of two major Tanzanian-American diplomatic incidents involving a forgery plot and expulsion of US diplomats – Tanzania had not pursued the team’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{129}
As Israeli influence in Tanzania’s intelligence service and military was waning, that of the PRC, Soviet Union, GDR and Czechoslovakia (and later Cuba) was rising through mainly generalised overseas programmes. In 1965, the CIA reported ten TISS officers to be training in Moscow.\textsuperscript{130} A US Government study from the late 1980s indicates that a small number of TISS officers alongside officers from twelve other African states received intelligence training from Chinese officers supporting Kwame Nkrumah’s increasingly insecure regime in Ghana from 1965-66.\textsuperscript{131} Additionally, the former Czechoslovakian StB’s archive reveals that between 1964 and 1966, twenty-four Tanzanians (probably TISS officers) attended three six-month long StB training courses in Czechoslovakia focused on state security. Two Zanzibaris also attended two StB courses. The StB had been running a growing number of training courses for state and non-state actors from across the Global South since 1959, particularly focusing on Africa, totalling 243 students from 12 states by 1966. According to the head of the StB First Directorate, Col. Houska, these programmes had three key aims: penetrate the security sectors of African states to build a network of collaborators; work through them as proxies to encourage active measures against US interests; and strengthen the position of Czechoslovakia and socialist states in Africa.\textsuperscript{132} Czechoslovakia had two more specific interests in Tanzania: to ‘paralyze’ the growing competitor influence from mid-1964 of West Germany (short-lived) and – in the context of the Sino-Soviet split – the PRC; and, like Israel regarding Sudan, to exploit the logistical opportunity and political cover to supply arms to the proliferating socialist-leaning African liberation movements in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{133}

Similar patron-client networks emerged in rebuilding Tanzania’s military. Following the Mutiny, the Tanganyika Rifles were disbanded and replaced by the new TPDF. This was founded on the TANU Youth League as an explicitly politicized defence force to ensure regime loyalty. As with the police and TISS, TANU membership became a prerequisite and political doctrine became a primary component of army training.\textsuperscript{134} Nyerere ended Kambona’s previous arrangement of Israeli military training, turning down Israeli offers he informed the West German Ambassador, ‘because they were already too prominent in URTZ [Tanzania] and he did not want [to] become an Israeli colony.’\textsuperscript{135} The UK’s previous dominant military training and advisory role was also significantly scaled back, though former Rifles commander Brigadier General Douglas was initially retained as an adviser and Tanzania continued to request a small number of Sandhurst places. Its overall value,
however, was tainted by the mutiny of a British trained, equipped and structured force and Nyerere had baulked at British strings attached to support for the new TPDF.\textsuperscript{136}

Instead, Nyerere’s new TPDF policy actively reflected his wider non-alignment, extending ‘the hand of friendship’ to a disharmony of multiple patrons rather than be dominated by a single external power.\textsuperscript{137} To support the development of a new officer corps, Nyerere initially approached the Algerians, Ethiopians, Nigerians and British on equal footing. The Nigerians only had the capacity to deploy a contingent of troops to temporarily support internal security and external defence whilst the TPDF was built up by others.\textsuperscript{138} Nyerere’s approaches to the Swedes, Swiss, Australians, Yugoslavs, West Germans and, initially, Canadians also fell through for a variety of reasons. Consequently, in August 1964, following Rashidi Kawawa’s visit to Beijing, Nyerere agreed to China’s offer to provide $31 million and eleven personnel to train the TPDF while the Soviets, not to be outdone by their strategic competitor, offered $42 million and sixty personnel. These were massive levels of assistance on aid, not purchase, terms and with few strings attached. Accepting this, Nyerere hoped, would also draw Chinese and Soviet military assistance away from Zanzibar that was undermining the new Union’s cohesion.\textsuperscript{139} Nyerere additionally considered the nature of Chinese and Soviet aid most appropriate for Tanzanian civil-military relations. ‘Tanzania was [a] one-party state’, Nyerere reminded US Ambassador Leonhart in response to his objections. ‘UK and US military concepts taught patriotism to country but not allegiance to political party. He [Nyerere] did not want [the] army divorced from politics but simply part of national party and political life. It was to be a TANU Army.’\textsuperscript{140}

Under British and American pressure to maintain a significant Western Commonwealth role against this growing Communist state presence, Canada did subsequently step in to one of the first major security assistance missions in its history, training the TPDF in competition with the Chinese PLA until the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{141} Nevertheless, with Tanzania breaking diplomatic relations with the UK in late 1965 for a failure to act against Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), this left the security assistance field heavily slanted towards international Communist powers for the foreseeable future. Britain was forced to run a rump ‘Interests Section’ within the Canadian High Commission until 1968, including its undeclared SIS station. The CIA estimated that while Tanzania would not become a Communist satellite, in the Cold War’s competition this represented a ‘grievous set-back to the West’.\textsuperscript{142} As Anglo-Tanzanian intelligence liaison
had ceased, Britain did not have the option of using the security sector as a clandestine diplomatic link post-UDI. By 1966, Tanzania was hardly a part of the Commonwealth, let alone any Commonwealth security culture or network.

Britain's hopes for using a Commonwealth security culture as a vehicle for continued British influence were rapidly undermined in Tanzania post-independence. MI5’s closure of the SLO post symbolized the end of Tanzania's incorporation into a Commonwealth security culture. Both the mainland and Zanzibar ceased to be plugged into an international liaison network centred on an SLO and London, through which intelligence could be exchanged, British security assistance provided and gained, and clandestine diplomatic relations fostered. The deficiencies of pre-independence security reforms, rapid post-independence Africanisation, politicised new security organs responsive to court politics, policies of non-alignment and anti-colonialism by political elites like Nyerere, Kambona, Karume and Babu that produced misaligned interests with British security liaison, and the competition of other external actors leveraging their security assistance were crucial causes. The UK was eclipsed in the police, security intelligence and defence fields by a combination of Israel, Canada, China, the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, each with their own agendas focused largely on political influence over direct security concerns. The British- and Commonwealth-orientated security sector 'blueprint' handed over at independence was quickly washed away during and after the political transition by new approaches more tailored to local Tanzanian conditions on the mainland and in Zanzibar and the domestic and foreign political interests of their new ruling elites. These new approaches were characterised by regime security in a bifurcated one-party state and the security assistance of a range of international Communist patrons until the end of the Cold War, helping in part to explain the plethora of external patrons that Tanzania still retains today.
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16 Interview with former SIS officer (Security Sector Reform consultant 1990s), Surrey, 21 April 2017; phone interview with former SIS officer (Controller Africa 1993-96), 16 Oct 2017; Eikenberry, *Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers*, 17-20.


‘A Note on the Organisation for Dealing with Security and Intelligence Matters’, attached to Rex Surridge (Acting Governor, Tanganyika) to Arthur Creech Jones (Colonial Secretary), 18 Oct 1948, TNA, CO537/2786.


Vincent Glenday to Arthur Creech Jones, 6 Dec 1948, TNA, CO537/2799.


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41 Burton, ‘Brothers by day’, 79-83.


46 Ian Carrel to MI5 Head Office, 9 Dec 1958; Director General (Roger Hollis) to E2, 25 June 1959, TNA, KV2/3888; MI5 A2A briefing sheet, 7 July 1959, TNA KV2/3889. Kambona (P.F.754,735) and Swai (P.F.760,126)’s personal files have either not been released or have been destroyed.


48 CO note of a discussion on policy between Macleod and Turnbull, 16 Nov 1959, TNA, CO822/1451.

49 Macoun, *Wrong Place, Right Time*, 36.

50 Ibid.

51 Hardy, Reluctant Imperialist, 242.


53 Roger Hollis (Director General M15) to Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Office), 18 Nov 1965, TNA, CO1035/171; Murphy, ‘Creating a Commonwealth intelligence culture’, 141-43; Andrew, Defence of the realm, 444-45.

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55 Alex Kellar to W.S. Bates (Central Africa Office), 5 Sep 1962, TNA, DO183/480; Andrew, Defence of the realm, 469.

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