The new patron state in South Korea: cultural policy, democracy and the market economy

Hye-Kyung Lee
Culture, Media & Creative Industries
King’s College London
Strand
London WC2R 2LS

Bio:
Hye-Kyung Lee is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Culture, Media and Creative Industries, King’s College London. She has written on cultural policy and industries, cultural marketing and transnational fan culture. She co-edited Cultural Policies in East Asia (2014 Palgrave Macmillan) and co-wrote a commissioned paper ‘The challenges and opportunities for the diversity of cultural expressions in the digital era in East Asia’ (2015, UNESCO Bangkok Office). Her monograph Cultural Policy in South Korea: Making a New Patron State will be published in 2018. She is co-editing the Routledge Handbook of the Cultural and Creative Industries in Asia (2018) and Asian Cultural Flows: Cultural Policies, Creative Industries, and Media Consumers (2018).

Abstract:
This article explores conceptual frameworks for understanding Korea’s contemporary cultural policy by looking into the historical transformation of the culture-state-market relations in the country. It argues that Korea has become ‘a new kind of patron state’, which emulates the existing patron states in the West firmly within the statist framework and ambitiously renders government-led growth of cultural industries (and the Korean Wave) as a new responsibility of the state. The formation of Korea’s new patron state has been driven by a ‘parallel movement’ consisting of democracy and the market economy, which has defined the political and socio-economic trajectory of Korean society itself since the 1990s. Democracy has been articulated in cultural policy as cultural freedom, cultural enjoyment and the arm’s length principle; meanwhile, the market economy of culture has been facilitated by a ‘dynamic push’ of the state. After discussing the parallel movement, the article points out the tension, ambiguity and contradiction entailed in cultural policy of the new patron state.

Word count: 8850 words (excluding references)
Introduction
In recent years, South Korea’s energetic cultural policy, often in connection to the global success of its pop culture (the ‘Korean Wave’ phenomenon), has sparked much attention of international media and research communities. The publication of this special issue is a clear indicator of the increasing scholarly inquiry into the policy and the significance of such inquiry in engendering new perspectives of culture-state relationship and internationalising this academic field. The existing literature provides useful accounts of the policy, especially its historical evolution and concerns with cultural identity, the persistence of the strong government, and the development of sub-policies such as arts funding, nation branding and multicultural policy (Hong 2014; H.-K Lee 2012, 2018; Yim 2002; Yuk 2016). In addition, there are commentaries on urban cultural policy, cultural diplomacy and cultural labour in the country. Another set of literature focuses on the Korean government and its agencies’ active support for cultural industries and the Korean Wave (Chung 2012; Jin 2014, 2016; C. Kim 2017; Y. Kim 2013; Kwon and Kim 2014; Otma 2011; also see Lee 2018: Chapters 5 and 6).

While their themes vary, the above writings shed light on the specificity of Korean cultural policy, which is difficult to fully comprehend within the existing, West-centric analytical frameworks. For example, the Korean state’s democratic but remarkably hands-on approach to the arts and cultural industries is hard to make sense of from the views that see culture, state and market as competing discourses that are mutually exclusive (McGuigan 2004), cultural policy as an overlapping zone where negotiations take place between equally powerful fields of culture and politics/economy (Vestheim 2012), institutional autonomy as a dominant framework of cultural policy (Blomgren 2012) and cultural policy narrowly defined as public policy on the arts and heritage (Mulcahy 2006: 320-321). Similarly, the Korean state’s ever-increasing cultural investment poses a challenge to the prevailing idea that cultural policy today is increasingly neoliberal in the sense that the state gives way to the market and public subsidy is replaced by private funding such as business sponsorship (McGuigan 2004, 2015).

Hence, this article intends to explore conceptual frameworks for understanding Korea’s contemporary cultural policy by looking into the historical transformation of culture-state-market relations in the country. The transformation has been driven by a ‘parallel movement’ consisting of democratisation and the expansion of a market economy, which have determined the political and socio-economic trajectory of Korean society itself since the 1990s. The article argues that Korea has become ‘a new kind of patron state’, which emulates the existing patron states in the West firmly within the statist framework and ambitiously renders the development of cultural economy as a new mission of the patron state. The following section will draw our attention to the importance of
conceptual articulation of ‘the state’ in discussing Korean cultural policy and raise issue with the analytical relevance of the notion developmental state, which is often referred to by the existing literature. Then, the next sections will explain how Korea has become a new patron state and elaborate the parallel movement behind its emergence and expansion. In particular, the focus is on the interpretations of democracy in cultural policy and the crucial roles played by the state in conditioning the market economy of culture. The conclusion will reflect on the limitations of the parallel development of cultural policy, especially the lack of coherent rationale and the inherent tension in the construct of a new patron state.

Thinking about ‘the state’ in Korean cultural policy
The existing literature on cultural policy does not look enthusiastic about discussing the state in depth, and this is particularly so when it comes to writings derived from Anglophone societies such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Seemingly, it not only indicates the commentators’ cherishment of cultural autonomy and self-organisation as a coordination mode of cultural policy, but also reflects the laissez-faire tradition in these societies. It is not uncommon that the state is mentioned with some suspicion and reluctance in terms of danger, failure, decline, subjugation to market and globalising forces, and instrumentalism (Bell and Oakley 2015; Gray 2007; Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015; Kammen 2000; McGuigan 2004). Such narratives of the state are also conscious of the broader discourses of welfare state crisis, privatisation, new public management, decentralisation, neoliberalisation, globalisation and the hollowing out of the state (Held and McGrew 2004; Mann 1997; McGuigan 2015; Rhodes 1994; Stewart and Walsh 1992). Meanwhile, the accounts of cultural policy in countries such as Germany and France highlight the state protecting culture (as the totality of human creations and articulations and/or the bearer of national identity and expressions) and acting as a buffer against market and globalising forces while being put under the increasing threat of the latter (Loosely 2003; Wesner 2010).

In contrast, commentators on Korean cultural policy point out the centrality of the state in supporting culture, growing its market economy and pursuing outward cultural globalisation. It is interesting to observe that the endeavours to conceptualise the state are more visible in writings on cultural industries and the Korean Wave rather than those about arts policy, which has been the traditional terrain of cultural policy studies. This implies that the main concern here is the role of the state vis-à-vis market forces. Looking into the government’s consistent investment in cultural businesses, cultural exports and nation branding, Jin (2006, 2014) concludes that the country’s neoliberal reform has not reversed the state-driven cultural policy and this clearly shows the power of nation state not diminishing even in the global age. Chung’s (2012) research on cultural industries
policy since the 1990s discusses its rise against the country’s political and economic shifts and its effectiveness in boosting cultural businesses. Thus, Kwon and Kim’s (2014) article in this journal suggests that investigating government policies is critical to understanding the Korean Waves. Meanwhile, I have problematised the dichotomist viewpoint that treats culture, the state and the market as mutually exclusive by finding cultural export to have become a state-mediated national project and the government to have played decisive roles in instituting an arm’s length arts council (H.-K. Lee 2012, 2013).

Notably, many writers make sense of the state in Korean cultural (industries) policy from the perspective of ‘developmental state’ (or ‘developmentalism’), which was explored in studies of industrial policies and economic governance in East Asian societies such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Amsden 1989; Öniş 1991; Woo-Cummings 1999; White 1988). The key point of this perspective is that the spectacular economic performance in these late capitalist economies was attributed to the state’s dynamic intervention in the market in the form of strategic planning, resource mobilisation and allocation, investment in prioritised industries, investment coordination, the protection of domestic industries and effective linkages to private sectors. Commentators regard the presence of the strong state in cultural investment in contemporary Korea as a continuation of the developmental state as Jin (2014:90) states, ‘[i]n the realm of culture, the developmental state is not dead’. This view is supported by Kwon and Kim’s (2014: 426) finding that ‘the Korean government continued to demonstrate its capability as a developmental state by competently orchestrating the industrial growth [in cultural industries]’. In the same vein, Otmazgin (2011) highlights the legacies of the developmental state in his analysis of Korean and Japanese cultural industries policies that apply an industrial policy approach to culture. Taking a further step, Chung (2012) attempts to update the notion of the developmental state by conceptualising contemporary Korea as a ‘neo-developmental state’ wherein the key elements of developmentalism such as emphasis on economic growth and export have converged with concerns about social welfare and neoliberal agendas such as competition. Similarly, Kim (2016) in the context of Seoul Metropolitan Government’s cultural policy, comments on intersections between the developmental state and neoliberalism in contemporary Korea.

However, the analytical relevance of the notion of ‘developmental state’ is debatable. First, active industrial policies and industrialisation in East Asian countries can be discussed and understood from the broad perspective of ‘the state’, its function and capacity, not necessarily the developmental state as a specific type of state. Indeed, Karl Polanyi’s (2001[1944]) seminal finding on the embeddedness of the market economy in England, which had been deemed as one of the most liberal societies, demonstrate that the emergence of the capitalist market economy itself was a
product of state actions. From this perspective, making and implementing an intense industrial policy in Korea, or other East Asian countries, was never a deviation from the roles the state could potentially play in facilitating the market economy and speeding up the time-rate of its development. Second, the above writers’ interpretation of ‘development’ is rather slippery: they use this term to refer to ‘state-led’ investment and support provision, not necessarily implying a transformation in the nation’s productive structure via growth-enhancing rather than market-enhancing economic governance especially in low income countries (Khan and Christiansen 2011). Deliberating over historical and political specificity of the actual operation of Korea’s developmental state from the 1960s till the 1980s, too, encourages us to question the analytical relevance of this notion to contemporary Korea that has ‘already developed’, is now undergoing the process of post-industrialisation, and has successfully advanced democratic political institutions that were seriously lacking during the period of industrialisation (Öniş 1991). Another criticism is that the notion weighs domestic industrial policy too heavily whilst the significance of geopolitical and historical factors is less acknowledged. For instance, the competition with the communist North and concerns with national security assisted the authoritarian regime in the South in soliciting national consensus on the state-led economic modernisation; and the South benefitted from the substantial geostrategic advantage in its economic relationship with Japan and the United States, two of its closest allies during the Cold War period (Cumings 1984; J.-y. Lee 2012; Öniş 1991: 117).

In addition, we should pay attention to the ‘cultural formation’ of Korea’s developmental state (J.-y Lee 2012) created by the Park Chung Hee’s military authoritarian regime (1961 to 1979) and underpinned by his extremely ‘active’ cultural policy. The core of the policy was the tight nexus between culture, state and economy. Whereas culture gave imagined boundaries to Korea as a nation state (Anderson 2006; Yim 2002), the state set a discursive and moral framework where the meaning and purpose of culture were determined (H.-K. Lee 2018: Chapter 3). Culture – primarily as ‘national culture’ that highlighted heritage, tradition and patriotism – was employed to build national identity and cultivate a sense of loyalty to the state. As a source of collective memory and righteous historical perspective and also as an antidote to Western values and ideas such as democracy, freedom and individualism, it would assist the nation’s (or the Park regime’s) political and economic survival. Koreans were mobilised through cultural programmes and campaigns advocating state agendas such as national unity, modernisation, anti-communism, industrialisation and reform of their way of life. In this way, they were disciplined to become an obedient citizenry and productive workforce who would willingly take part in the process of the nation’s industrialisation. Of course, this necessitated severe restriction on cultural freedom and statist co-option between the authoritarian government and the cultural sector.
Thus, it would not be easy to neatly dissociate Korean developmental state from its contentious cultural underpinnings. Moreover, defining Korean cultural policy today as ‘developmental’ does not adequately recognise the policy’s significant historical transformation (democratisation). The other side of the coin is that the notion is potentially applicable to ‘undemocratic’ cultural policy (e.g., in China) where the state leads the growth of the market economy of culture via very hands-on promotion of domestic cultural industries and their exports. In this case, the term developmental overlooks the problematic side of the policy, such as tight censorship, by highlighting the state’s dedicated leadership and commitment to the cultural sector.

‘The new patron state’ and a parallel movement of cultural policy
As also suggested elsewhere, contemporary Korea can be understood as a new patron state (Lee 2018). ‘Patron state’ is a familiar idea for cultural policy researchers. Born in the context of Western Europe and North America in the post-war period (notably Cummings and Katz 1987), it has been broadly understood in terms of the state acting as a benevolent patron for culture and having an institutionalised cultural subsidy system whilst culture itself being kept distance from politics. At the core of this idea, there is co-existence of cultural freedom and state cultural intervention in the form of subsidy, which aims at cultural preservation, artistic excellence and public accessibility, although the existing patron states differ from one another in terms of specific roles assigned to the state, (de)centralisation of policy making and relationships between key actors in the policy network. In this sense, the remit of the patron state is distinguished from cultural patronage before the twentieth century, or state cultural promotion in less democratic societies today. The successful democratisation of Korea has helped it to become on par with the existing patron states in the West: the Korean state is a resourceful patron for the cultural sector; a coherent and robust cultural funding system has developed; and artists and cultural organisations enjoy freedom. The transformation involves the borrowing of ideas and institutions from the existing patron states; yet, this has occurred firmly within the statist framework where cultural policy is coordinated by the mode of ‘hierarchy’ as opposed to the modes of ‘market’ and ‘self-organisation’ (Jessop 1999, 2016). Furthermore, Korea has invented a new obligation of the patron state: giving comprehensive and systematic support to cultural industries and cultural export, and taking this as a national economic project.

The emergence and consolidation of a new kind of patron state in Korea have been driven by democracy and the market economy, the two forces of the ‘parallel movement’ that has shaped the path of the Korean society itself since the 1990s. Unlike the existing patron states in the West, Korea in the 1990s witnessed democratisation and neoliberalisation taking place concurrently. Both were legitimised as an alternative to the military authoritarian governance that lasted from Park Chung-
Hee’s coup in 1961 until the restoration of the presidential election in 1987. Democratisation in Korea, part of what Samuel Huntington (1993) calls ‘third wave democratisation’ in the late twentieth century, resulted in the fundamental transformation in terms of the sources of authority of the government, its purpose and the procedures for constituting it, especially presidential elections. This came with the increased civil liberty and freedom of expression, the arrival of civilian rule, and the rise of civil society, which eventually led to the consolidation of democracy, the process by which ‘democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down’ (Diamond 1994: 15). Importantly, this process was joined by the civilian Kim Young-Sam government’s (1993-1998) neoliberal reform of the nation’s economic governance. The reform enjoyed democratic credential as it was taken as a progressive endeavour of de-statatisation of business, finance and overall economic life of Korean society. Similarly, the liberal government (1998-2003) of Kim Dae-Jung who had been a well-respected leading figure in the nation’s democratic struggle in the past decades, ‘based on the legitimacy of the pro-democracy movement effectively mitigated people’s potential resistance to intensified neo-liberal reforms [under IMF’s heavy pressure] after the 1997 crisis’ (Lim and Jang 2006: 448). For President Kim Dae-Jung, democracy and the pursuit of market economy were a twin force that would rescue Korea out of the economic crisis and determine the nation’s path for the future. Cultural policy development aptly reflected this macro-level context.

The arrival of democracy meant a substantial shrinking of the nation state as the central reference of cultural discourse in Korea: the prescriptive idea of ‘national culture’ was delegitimised and statist cultural campaigns were discontinued. More specifically, democracy in Korean cultural policy was understood mainly as ‘cultural freedom’, ‘cultural enjoyment’ and ‘arm’s length principle’. Meanwhile, we should consider the unevenness of neoliberal reform in Korea, which contrasts the sweeping effect of such a reform taking place in the United Kingdom, a heartland of neoliberal ideology. In Korea, the reform focused on economic governance, especially reforming the ownership structure and governance of conglomerates (‘chaebols’), internationalising finance and maximising the flexibility of labour market whilst cultural industries, along with information, technology and R&D industries, emerged as an infant industry deserving government investment. The popular discourse of knowledge economy, information society and post-industrial society served as a powerful buffer that kept these nascent industries away from neoliberal policies and justified state intervention. Against the backdrops of the urgent mission of ‘rebuilding of the nation state (gukgajaegeon)’ after the 1997 economic crisis, the post-industrial transition of Korea and the nation’s ambition to win intensifying global competition, the nexus between culture and the state began being reconfigured with an increasing emphasis on the former’s economic potential.
Across arts and cultural industries, Korean cultural policy has been dominated by the hierarchical mode of coordination that relies on top-down planning, resource mobilisation, investment, infrastructural provision, training and skills development and export support (Lee 2018: Chapter 1). The political and economic shifts since the 1990s have not altered the existing structure of cultural policy driven by the powerful central government and its executive agencies. The ministry’s budget, including several endowment funds under its purview, has increased consistently: 126.8 billion won (0.4% of the government budget) in 1991 to 1,170.7 billion won (1.23%) in 2000 (MCT 2005: 49). The growth continued: 2,874.6 billion won (0.95% of government budget) in 2009 to 4,104.8 billion won (1.19%) in 2013 (MCST 2014: 74-75). Similarly, the ministry has expanded in terms of its size too: 316 staff members in 1990 to 646 in 2015. This has coincided with the diversification of its focus from heritage and the arts to tourism, cultural industries, the Korean Wave and creative start-up businesses, each area of which has seen a proliferation of government initiatives and investment schemes. Although local authorities were given a degree of autonomy in the 1990s and have played an increasingly important role as cultural patrons, the overall landscape of cultural policy is still determined by the central government in terms of its discursive leadership in setting agendas and its capacity in developing key institutions for cultural policy, such as cultural funding agencies and investment programmes. The prevailing hierarchical mode of coordination can be compared with the modes of ‘market’ (contractual relations, competition and pursuit of private interests) and ‘self-organisation’ (collaboration and network among mutually dependent actors) (Jessop 1999, 2016). Both the democratic transition of cultural policy and the facilitation of market economy of culture have relied upon the mode of hierarchy that prefers state-led approaches as the following sections will demonstrate.

**Articulations of democracy in cultural policy**

The foremost fruit of democratisation of Korean cultural policy is the increased freedom of culture or freedom of expression. This can be seen as a negative liberty citizens are entitled vis-à-vis external compulsion of the state and other citizens, an essential condition of electoral democracy (Habermas 1994), which was ardently called for by the vigorous democratic movement in the country. Achieving and normalising cultural freedom in this sense was a corollary of the dynamic interplays between the democratic movement, cultural activism, cultural consumerism as well as constructive responses of the government. First of all, the progressive arts movement and cultural activism, which prevailed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, seriously contested the existing coupling between culture and the state by resisting government control on arts, popular culture and journalism. Their pressure led the ex-general Roh Tae-Woo, the leader of the ruling conservative party who became an elected
president later, in June 1987 to assert that the government could not and should not control culture (Seo 1988). The state’s non-intervention in culture became a new normal in a decade although its influence on public broadcasting continued. It was the Roh government (1988-1993) that played decisive roles in democratically transforming Korean cultural policy in the period of transition from military to civilian rule. It liberalised publisher registration and loosened the censorship on theatre and film scripts (1988). It also lifted bans on public access to publications from communist countries including North Korea and artworks produced by those who defected to the North (1988). The constructive response of the government to the pro-unification agenda of the surging democratic movement resulted in the dilution of the statist and prescriptive understanding of ‘national culture’ and contributed to the eventual demise of this idea in cultural policy discourse in Korea.

As of the mid-1990s, the pursuit of cultural freedom became a consumption project, wherein fans of popular culture called for more liberty and demanded the abolishment of cultural censorship (Lee 2018: Chapter 4; Sim 2006). Facing the rising discontent of artists and cultural consumers alike, the civilian Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1998) finally put an end to cultural censorship (on performance, film screening and recorded music) in 1996. This created an environment where cultural producers could freely create works that dealt with socially and politically sensitive themes and thus diversify the repertoire of cultural expressions in Korean society. The year 1999 was another key moment: the liberal Kim Dae-Jung government (1998-2003) radically revised the existing cultural laws and ambitiously enacted new ones (e.g., it revised Performance Act, replaced Motion Picture Act with Act on Motion Picture Promotion, and Recorded Music Act with Act on Recorded Music, Video and Games) with a firm intention to deregulate cultural production and distribution. Furthermore, the laws clearly indicated a shift from regulation to promotion that requires the state to plays bigger roles to encourage cultural production as opposed to leaving it to market forces. Through the above processes, cultural freedom, which was initially emerged as a political issue, became a pre-requisite of consumer society and a baseline of cultural promotion policy. In addition, the existence of varied stakeholders across public and private sectors explains why it has been strongly consolidated. In this regard, the recent scandal around the misconduct of the conservative president Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017) is quite telling. Her abuse of power included drafting a blacklist of ‘leftist’ artists and pressurising the cultural ministry and its agencies/affiliated organisations to exclude them from public funding (BBC News 2017). Yet, Park’s impeachment in March 2017, following a series of large-scale public demonstrations, unfailingly manifests Korean society’s robust support for cultural freedom and that Park’s attempt to restore the authoritarian state in cultural funding was an utter failure.
The second articulation of democracy in the context of Korean cultural policy is ‘cultural enjoyment (munhwahyangsu)’ that is translated to public access to and enjoyment of culture. This can be understood as a type of positive freedom: the state creates structures and programmes so that the public can easily enjoy cultural and arts activities regardless of their socio-economic circumstances and geographical locations. It was as early as the 1980s when policy makers began talking about cultural enjoyment and regularly conducting surveys on public cultural consumption.iii Still, they were preoccupied by promoting prescriptive ‘national culture’ and building large-scale cultural venues such as the Seoul Arts Center (1987), the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art (1986) and the National Gugak Center (1986) (ACK 2008a: 42). Then, the Roh Tae-Woo government’s conversion of the Ministry of Culture and Public Information to the ‘Ministry of Culture’ in 1990 signalled the historic dissociation of cultural policy from public propaganda, a core component of the policy thus far. Under the strong leadership of the ‘culturalist’ minister, Lee Eo-Ryeong (1990-1991), the new ministry reoriented the policy towards cultural creation and public accessibility.

Yet, the process was typically Korean – top-down and led by the cultural ministry, lacking deliberation on culture itself – its definition, legitimacy and value – among cultural producers, citizens and cultural bureaucrats. Without meaningful discussion, a quick consensus formed that culture (mainly professional arts), as intrinsically positive and beneficial to the public, should be brought closer to and be part of their everyday life. As such, cultural enjoyment was about culture seeking the people, rather than seeking of people’s culture. Having been already familiar with the Western discourse of ‘democratisation of culture’ (dissemination of professionally made culture) and ‘cultural democracy’ (empowering people to choose their own cultural pursuit and legitimising their choice) (Evrard 1997; Mulcahy 2006), Korean policy makers comfortably equated cultural enjoyment to ‘democratisation of culture’.

Table 1. A summary of cultural enjoyment programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Main areas of cultural enjoyment policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(funded by Korean Culture &amp; Arts Foundation and, later, Arts Council Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>National female writing competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social and cultural education (including support for cultural club activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for youth’s cultural enjoyment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Touring of arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Cultural enjoyment right of the disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural month and cultural day events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As seen in Table 1, cultural enjoyment programmes have focused on offering performance tickets at subsidised prices, tours of theatres, dance and music performances and art exhibitions, bringing arts to marginalised communities and remote places, supporting activities organised by cultural clubs and so on (ACK 2008b; MCST 2014). As lottery money began feeding into arts funding in the mid-2000s, the agenda of cultural enjoyment gained more prominence. As of 2017, Arts Council Korea’s expenditure allocated to this is biggest among its spending on the four major categories of activities: cultural enjoyment (1,070 billion won); arts creation (453.8 billion won); regional arts (319.5 billion won); and encouragement of private donation and arts management
(315.9 billion won) (ACE 2017: 5-7). Although policy makers refer to the terms ‘cultural democracy’ and ‘prosumption’ to stress participatory components of cultural enjoyment programmes, this does not necessarily contest the latter’s dissemination-centric approach (ACK 2008b: 69). In this sense, cultural enjoyment is a matter of cultural policy – not cultural politics – that can be neatly managed by the government. One of the most recent development is the enactment of the Cultural Basic Law (2014) designed to promote Korean citizens’ ‘cultural right’, that is, their right to cultural enjoyment without discrimination based on sex, religion, race, generation, region, social class, economic status and physical conditions through feely creating culture and participating in cultural activities. Whilst the law is a clear signal showing Korean cultural policy’s aspiration for progressive envisioning of positive cultural freedom, we are yet to observe how the idea of cultural right and the law’s principles such as diversity, autonomy and creativity will be translated into concrete policy measures and whether this will bring some elements of cultural politics and society-wide deliberation on culture to cultural policy, which has rarely happened so far.

Another key rendering of democracy in Korean cultural policy is arm’s length principle, under which autonomous councils act as a buffer between the government and the cultural sector. As a tenet of institutional autonomy of culture, this principle allows cultural funding to be made by cultural experts and practitioners by insulating them from intervention of the government as the paymaster (Blomgren 2012). It is worth noticing that the democratic credential of arm’s length principle is sometimes questioned in the existing patron states including the United Kingdom, the birth place of arts council, due to its deficiency of representation and participation of citizens (and arts communities) (Gray 2012). Nevertheless, Korean policy makers expected it to trigger a kind of ‘deliberative’ democracy (Gray 2012; Habermas 1994) through active communication, discussion and consensus formation among artists themselves, within structure of an arts council, for example, the council, sub-councils and the system of peer review. Especially, the arm’s length principle was thought to embody the three governing principles of the liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government’s (2003-2008) – participation (participation of practitioners in policy making), sharing of power (between the government and the newly created arts council) and autonomy (insulating arts funding decision from politics). Modelled after arts councils in the United Kingdom and following the establishment of the Korean Film Council in 1999, Arts Council Korea was created in 2005.

Nonetheless, there hardly was a replacement of ‘the state’ by ‘self-organisation’. The creation of the council was driven and guided by the cultural ministry that regarded ‘self-organisation’ as a more democratic mode of coordination of arts funding policy. As an enthusiastic advocate of the arms-length principle, the liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government strongly justified the arts council model and initiated relevant discussion. In particular, its balancing act between conservative and
progressive sections of the arts community and facilitation of a cross-sectoral agreement on the need for an arm’s length arts council, should be noted (H.-K. Lee 2012). The initial expectation was that the council, which was to be driven by consensus, trust, mutual understanding and collaboration between artists themselves, would institute self-organisation as a new mode of cultural policy making, which is neither market nor hierarchy (ACK 2008b; Jessop 1999; Powell 1990). However, the relationship between the arts council and the government thus far has been more complicated as the council works firmly ‘within’ the length of a short arm from the government and has been dependant on the latter’s support. The strong state has manifested itself in the form of the government’s habitually hands-on approach, increased monitoring of the council by various governmental bodies (which is a consequence of the rising audit culture) and key funding decisions made at the state level (e.g., the abolishment of the council’s existing endowment fund and bringing in lottery money) (H.-K. Lee 2012). In particular, the Act on the Management of Public Institutions (2007) seriously undermined the arm’s length principle by designating Arts Council Korea as a ‘semi-public’ organisation. Clearly, British-style arm’s length public bodies hardly find their space in Korean cultural policy.

The Park Geun-Hye scandal, especially the arts council’s implementation of the blacklist drafted by the presidential office, aptly shows how short the arm’s length actually can be. As noted, Park’s infringement of cultural freedom was a so extraordinary incident that would not easily recur in Korea where democracy has been firmly consolidated. Whilst criticising Park’s (failed) authoritarian approach is an easy thing to do, a more difficult task is to comprehend why Arts Council Korea run by professional artists, cultural experts and cultural administrators did not dare to resist it. What appears obvious here is the dominance of the hierarchy over self-organisation in the relationship between the government and the council and its internalisation by the council members and staff. Then, the question would be how the council can secure a decent length of arms within the given parameters and more progressively articulate its roles in promoting cultural freedom in both negative and positive senses as well as facilitating meaningful deliberation on arts policy.

The market economy of culture

Alongside democracy, the other constituent of the parallel movement of Korean cultural policy has been the market economy of culture. Before delving into this, it is useful to consider two interpretations of the market. The first one is an abstract construct of a self-regulating market: ‘the market’ in this sense is regarded as a system, rationality or coordination mode that organises economic activities. Highlighting individual liberty, private property rights, profit-seeking motivation, competition and free trade, this idea of market forms a core tenet of neoliberal ideology
(Harvey 2007). The other interpretation is ‘the markets’ in plural, which are historically, locally and sectorally specific and are shaped (regulated) by social relations and state policies. In this sense, neoliberalisation can be seen as making ‘regulated markets into a self-regulating market’ and embedding social relations in the economic system (Polanyi 2001[1949]: 60). The growth of a market economy of culture in Korea since the 1990s is a complicated phenomenon situated in the country’s neoliberal reform, where cultural industries have sought advantages in the unevenness of the reform and the rise of new economy discourses. Of significance, the rapid expansion of these industries is not something that happens naturally but has occurred under strong ‘push’ from the state.

The Korean state’s endeavour to develop cultural industries, as an economic sector, via a comprehensive range of policy measures can be understood from the perspective of the ‘entrepreneurial state’, the state that sets a vision for industrial development, has willingness and ability to take on risk, and facilitates innovations in the private sector (Mazzucato 2013). This perspective applies the Schumpeterian understanding of entrepreneurship to industrial and innovation policy of nation states (Schumpeter 1989[1949]). Korean policy makers believe that the role of the state should go beyond the traditional approach of the existing patron state to cultural industries – that is, addressing market failure and protecting local cultural production from global forces – to stimulate the growth of the industries by offering bold investments, inventing new methods of cultural financing, providing infrastructure and encouraging innovations in the private sector. The Korean state’s adoption of an entrepreneurial role is vindicated by the prevailing economic reasoning of culture and policy makers’ fascination with the possibility of the nation’s outward cultural globalisation (the Korean Wave). The following will discuss some of the key measures taken in this area, which eventually removes ‘cultural’ concerns from cultural industries policy.

First, if the Roh Tae-Woo government (1988-1993) transformed Korea from an authoritarian state to an emerging patron state, the Kim Dae-Jung government (1998-2003) set crucial legal and financial grounds for the rise of an entrepreneurial state in the nation’s cultural industries policy. Importantly, the cultural laws introduced and revised under Kim’s leadership – such as the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries (1999), the Act on Motion Picture Promotion (1999), the Performance Act (revised in 1999), the Act on Recorded Music, Video and Games (1999) and the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries (1999) – required the state (‘the state and local authorities’) to become an ‘entrepreneurial state’ in order to develop cultural industries, content industries or a specific cultural industry. This set a template for the following laws concerning cultural industries. What the state ‘ought to’ do, according to these laws, is very wide-ranging: including planning, promotion of production, supporting export, developing human resources, facilitating skills and technology development, providing infrastructure and so on
in the relevant cultural industries. As part of the policy package, the laws also stipulate that the state and local authorities ought to provide financial support for cultural industries. The Korean government’s impressive administrative and financial capacity allows these laws to be very quickly translated into actual policy measures in the areas mentioned above, generating a dense structure of state promotion of cultural industries.

Second, there has been a continuous increase in the cultural ministry’s spending on cultural industries. It was only 5.4 billion won (1.8% of the cultural ministry’s budget) in 1994 but it grew to 100 billion won (11.7% of the ministry’s budget) in 1999 when the Kim Dae-Jung government was initiating a very hands-on policy in this area, including setting up a special fund for cultural industries investment. Unlike many of Western patron states such as the United Kingdom and France, the growth of the spending in Korea defied party politics. It continued regardless of changes of government between liberal and conservative to reach 500 billion won (19.6% of the ministry’s budget) in 2015 (MCST 2016). Another notable phenomenon is that the ministry has effectively leveraged private funding by inventing a new method of cultural financing: its investment in the cultural and film accounts of Motae Fund (fund of funds) under the purview of the Ministry of SMEs and Startups, feeds into public-private investment funds that are managed by professional fund managers and are dedicated to cultural, film and creative businesses of a small and medium size. According to the cultural ministry’s latest report, this way of cultural financing successf ully raised private money so the total amount of public-private cultural investment was 2.3 times the government’s initial fund (MCST 2017). Between 2006 and 2016, 1,868.1 billion won was raised (74 public-private investment funds) and was invested in 1,663 SME cultural businesses, mainly film, commercial performance and games (MCST 2017). In the case of film, the importance of this type of financing is very visible: the fund raised via the cultural and film accounts of the Motae Fund accounted for approximately 39.3% of the total production cost between 2010 and 2013 (Hyun 2014: 4). The government has tried to invest in areas that are less attractive to private investors by committing some of public-private funds to certain areas such as micro companies and pre-/early production. Despite these efforts, the trend has still been that these funds prefer more lucrative areas such as popular film and games.

Third, the roles of the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA, 2001-) and the Korean Film Council (1999-) have been essential in delivering policy as these are executive agencies that make policy ‘really happen’. Although the film council was established as an autonomous arm’s length agency, it has functioned as an executive agency in the Korean state’s film investment. KOCCA’s remit is much wider, covering all areas of cultural industries from pop music, broadcasting, animation to character design. If the film council is positioned between cultural and industrial
policies, KOCCA has more confidently applied an industrial policy approach to cultural industries promotion: investment in development, production, distribution and marketing; export support; provision of market and legal information; hosting showcases; sending Korean producers to media, film and book markets abroad; and so forth. Via offering a wide range of export support from its inception, KOCCA and its overseas offices (United States, Europe, Japan, China, Indonesia and UAE) have actively rendered cultural globalisation as a much-needed and crucial opportunity for Korea’s cultural export, stimulating domestic cultural producers’ global ambition and helping their access to overseas markets.

Fourth, state policy set a much important context for the market economy of culture in Korea by turning culture into a ‘fictitious commodity’, which has ‘the form of a commodity (can be bought and sold) but is not actually produced in order to be sold’ (Jessop 2007: 118; Polanyi 2001[1949]: Chapter 6). It was the 2000s that the cultural ministry and its agencies initiated a bold discursive exercise deconstructing culture to sellable and flexible ‘content’. The term ‘content’ was adopted by KOCCA in 2001 (J.-y. Lee 2012: 130) and was soon incorporated into the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries, when the law was revised in 2003 and defined content as ‘data or information of symbol, text, voice, sound and screen image’. This term quickly gained currency and eventually replaced ‘culture’ in the discussion of cultural industries policy. ‘Content’ as a popular discourse highlighted the affinity and convergence between culture, software, information and digital technology (J.-y. Lee 2012: 130). It also understood culture – now as content – as digitally modifiable, mixable and able to be easily put into for-profit production of cultural goods and services. In the similar vein, the idea of ‘digital cultural archetype’, as a specific type of content, was invented and made popular in the 2000s. This term referred to a basic form or prototype that is a component of the cultural heritage and tradition of Korea, and its digitalisation was a main strand of KOCCA’s activities from 2002-2010: this agency aimed to identify cultural archetypes in Korean history and digitalise them to generate a huge pool of content (photos, pictures, texts, sound, moving images and other forms of data), which was to be used in the making of TV shows, films, games, comics and so on. In recent years, policy makers have ardently advocated the idea of ‘story’, a key input in the production of narrative-based cultural commodities. The ministry’s Plan for Story Industry Promotion (2015-2020) put all narrative-based cultural businesses in the new category of ‘story industry’ and aims to grow this industry to a size of 5 trillion won (approx. USD 4.59 billion) by 2020 (MCST 2015). While a law on story industry promotion is still to be enacted, the ministry and KOCCA try to create an encouraging environment by organising annual story competitions, provide physical space and mentoring for story creators, offer financial investment options, and provide story creators with various supports in business planning, marketing and overseas pitching.
These efforts to commodify culture have been pushed further by the *state-led creation of markets* for trading cultural ideas and creative expressions. The cultural ministry and its agencies’ invention of markets for scenario, digital cultural archetype and story not only manifest the Korean government’s firm belief in active cultural industries policy. But it can also be taken as a rather extreme example reminding us that the market does not emerge naturally. The state-funded creation of those markets intended to fully commodify scenario, cultural archetype and story so they could be freely traded between creators and buyers. It was under the liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government (2003-2008) that the Korean Film Council launched the ‘Scenario Market’ (2005-) to radically transform the existing ways of production and distribution of film scenarios by creating a state-sponsored and centralised online e-commerce site for scenario trade. KOCCA, too, ambitiously created an online marketplace (culturecontent.com) in 2005 for trading digital cultural archetypes. The latest arrival of a market of this kind is ‘Storyum’, a centralised online market for story trade, launched by the cultural ministry and KOCCA in 2016. These ‘markets’ are heavily supported by a comprehensive package of activities provided by the film council/KOCCA, including state-funded mentoring/development (for creators), an online review system, matching between story sellers and buyers, copyright protection (using DRM technologies) and a standard template of contract designed by the film council/KOCCA. Copyright protection is a crucial pre-condition for the commodification of cultural ideas and expressions and, hence, it forms a key function of the above online marketplaces.

Yet, it is debatable if these state-created markets have been successful. Culturecontent.com failed to produce a notable amount of trade and, thus, has become a website that offers digitalised historical content to the public free of charge and to producers of educational materials for a minimal charge whilst ‘Storyum’ is too young to be evaluated. In the case of Scenario Market, the verdict is mixed. From its creation in 2005 to February 2018, approximately over 6,500 scripts have been registered for sale; however, only 180 scenarios were traded during this period, and not all of them were made into a film. This is quite a small number given the number of domestic films produced, for example 373 films in 2016 (KOFIC 2017: 14). In this sense, the actual role of this marketplace looks closer to being a hub where (potential) scriptwriters showcase their work and get feedback and mentoring. In a similar vein, a disappointing commercial performance is also seen in the operation of the public-private investment funds supported by the government’s Motae Fund. Despite some attention grabbing success of films funded in this way, many of the public-private investment funds hardly make profit. As of October 2017, the average earning rate of those funds was 0.97: the earning rate of 217 out of 477 projects invested was under 1.0 (this means that the spending was bigger than the earnings) and 27 projects did not generate any earnings at all (Yonhap News 2017).
One reason for their underperformance might be that the funds are banned from investing in projects of big media corporations and required to focus on SMEs, bearing higher risk.

These cases are interesting examples showing the complicated – and even paradoxical – nature of Korea’s cultural industries policy. While having developed against the backdrop of the neoliberal economic reform, the policy demonstrates the government’s unreserved conviction that a dynamic push of the state is an essential condition for the growth of the cultural market economy. Yet, the broader and longer-term effect of the policy seems contentious. It makes things possible, which would not happen without state support, and can help cultural producers and businesses – especially those who are less resourced – more easily access finance, skills and market information. Yet the irony is that the stronger state intervention is, the more commodified Korea’s understanding of culture becomes.

Conclusion

Korean cultural policy since the 1990s has been a state project not a government project. It defies the Western style of party politics typically manifested by the left-wing government increasing cultural investment and the right-wing reducing it by funding cuts and privatisation. There were attempts to bring cultural policy under crude party politics (illustrated by the Park Geun-Hye’s scandal) (Lee 2018: Chapter 4) but the overall commitment of the Korean state to culture is persistent and ever-increasing. Similarly, there have been no notable shifts in policy discourse, policy structure or cultural budget in spite of changes of government between liberal (so-called leftist) and conservative (so-called right-wing) over the years. This article has proposed the idea of patron state to capture the democratic transformation of the policy and to highlight the coexistence of cultural freedom and state intervention. Korea as a new patron state pursues democracy and market economy robustly within the statist framework, which does not necessarily seek an overarching, unitary rationale of cultural policy. This process has been competently managed by the government but not without tension and contradiction. The lack of deliberation on culture itself means that the interpretations of democracy have rarely gone beyond the given framework of cultural policy, and the policy’s hierarchical mode is in inherent tension with its pursuit of arm’s length principle. Meanwhile, the assimilation of cultural industries policy to industrial policy puts economic boundaries on the nation’s cultural imaginations and engenders the possibility of the policy’s own exhaustion as a ‘cultural’ policy.

References


BBC News (23.1.2017) South Korea ministry apologises over artists' blacklist.


Hyun, G.-A (2014) Peondeuseseo yeonghwatujareul banneun beop (How to get an investment from Motae Fund). Busan: KOFIC.


Otmazgin, N. (2011) A tail that wags the dog? Cultural industry and cultural policy in Japan and South Korea


Yonhap News (18.10.2017) ‘Cheongsandoen motaepeondeu munhwa, yeonghwagyjeong… wongeumhoesu motae’ (Competed cultural and film accounts cannot break even).

i The ministry’s 2015 Cultural Policy White Book (p. 48) notes that the newly born ‘cultural ministry’ had a total of 316 staff members. Its ‘Munhwacheyukgwangwangbu jeongwonhyeonhwang (The current number of staff)’ shows a total of 646 people are employed by the ministry as of September 2016. In addition, the document indicates that 2,094 people are employed by organisations affiliated with the ministry, such as the National Museum of Korea and the National Gugak Centre.

ii In terms of cultural spending (spending on arts and culture; excluding tourism and sports), local authorities spent more (3,272.8 billion won) than the central government did (1,986.8 billion won) as of 2015 (data generated at KOSIS website).

iii The cultural ministry and Korea Culture and Tourism Institute began regularly conducting surveys on Korean’s cultural enjoyment to understand the cultural life of Koreans (every 3 years since 1988 and every 2 years since 2006).

iv Yet, its actual policy focuses on the creation of stories for film and drama, in the form of original prose, 10% of which is dedicated to dialogues that express and highlight main characters.