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technologies, the greening of the financial system, and three urban case studies. Each chapter is packed with detailed information skilfully embedded in the governmental-ity frame.

Space does not permit an exhaustive explication of Zhang's analysis. Suffice to say it is truly original and illuminating. She shows how China's government has successfully combined discourse and leadership with an evolving range of policy instruments to bring about the widely recognized achievements in constraining the rise of carbon emissions. Though market instruments are being applied more frequently, it is the command-and control measures that have been key to progress. The central government has successfully recruited many types of actors to engage in this effort – local governments, state-owned energy producing and energy consuming enterprises, appliance manufacturers, and financiers as well as households. However, the role of civil society remains limited. The role of the financial system is described in some detail, which is of great value as few systematic accounts exist in English.

The result is an all-embracing account of a decade of government action to mitigate climate change. Though the overall tone is positive, the author does not shy away from identifying weaknesses and challenges, notably the continuing tensions between the central government and many local governments, as well as numerous setbacks and unintended consequences. Whilst Zhang is optimistic that the low-carbon transition has been secured, she warns that lower rates of economic growth could stall progress. Likewise, new approaches will be needed to achieve the stated goals. The final implication is that China's experience shows that command-and-control instruments backed by strong leadership can effectively drive the low-carbon transition.

These two books address the same topic, but with quite different objectives, approaches and styles. Lee et al. have produced a relatively slim and highly readable volume that can be appreciated by policy analysts in think tanks and corporations, as well as by academics and graduate students seeking a current overview of the low-carbon transition in China. In contrast, Zhang's book is a scholarly monograph to be studied and appreciated by academics and advanced graduate students interested not just in China but in the wider governance of the low-carbon transition. The two volumes complement each other greatly. Read both and you will be well informed.

PHILIP ANDREWS-SPEED  
[cpandrewsspeed@hotmail.com](mailto:cpandrewsspeed@hotmail.com)

*AI Development and the "Fuzzy Logic" of Chinese Cyber Security and Data Laws*

MAX PARASOL

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022

xiv + 408 pp. £95.00

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China's emphasis on technology as a source of national power is a marked aspect of its emergence as a peer-competitor to the United States and of that competition itself. Semiconductors, big data, mobile Internet, space, financial and bio technologies figure large in this history, as do autonomous weapons systems and smart surveillance. It has been something of a puzzle as to how China's strategic planning, with its emphasis on indigenization and centralized control, managed to achieve such technological innovation. "Closed" systems are conventionally considered the enemy of the "openness" required for true innovation, with its transnational scientific exchange and data flows and the entrepreneurial opportunities of the global market. This

seems a particularly acute tension given the marked shifts in China towards data localization and enhanced information controls during the course of President Xi Jinping's leadership.

Max Parasol's first book, *AI Development and the "Fuzzy Logic" of Chinese Cyber Security and Data Laws*, addresses this intellectual and practical conundrum in productive fashion. His empirical focus is on the artificial intelligence (AI) innovation ecosystem in China. AI needs data – do Chinese data laws encourage or discourage AI innovation, therefore? The sector is demonstrably thriving, yet should not be, if arguments about "closed" versus "open" socioeconomic systems pertain. Parasol's central argument is that previous work has tended to downplay the real history of Chinese innovation and what he calls the "fuzzy logic" of Chinese technology law and regulation. Through novel documentary research and interviews with Chinese officials and others, Parasol shows how this fuzzy logic expresses a strategic ambiguity that couples the promotion of conflicting AI and data policies with their pragmatic reconciliation through selective implementation, where ideas and practices can be tested before wider roll-out and marketization.

The book is organized in two sections, the first setting out the "Historical and doctrinal background" to relevant policy, legal and regulatory frameworks, the second explaining their "Impact on artificial intelligence" through the central motif of fuzzy logic. These are sub-divided into five and four chapters, respectively. The background section begins with necessary context for understanding innovation in China, not as a failure of Western (read: Schumpeterian) models, but as a combination of post-Mao bottom-up innovation and top-down policymaking, an entrepreneurial ecosystem "with Chinese characteristics." Within this complex structure, the Party looks to AI to solve social problems (some unpalatable to external eyes); AI companies look to government for direction, data and capital. Chapter two shows how Chinese tech companies have historically negotiated the tension between government regulation and "commercial realities" since 2000, particularly the contortions of variable-interest entities (VIEs) that seek to attract foreign investment whilst not falling foul of government restrictions on those same sources of capital. Fuzzy logic pertains when lower-level regulation is sacrificed for higher-level policy ambitions. Chapter three expands upon this situation under Xi since 2014, in which a pro-innovation "Internet Plus" strategy has conflicted with increased information restriction under the "Network Sovereignty" (*wangluo zhuquan*) programme. Chapters four and five demonstrate how recent data security policies and the 2017 Cyber Security Law are seen not as antithetical to tech innovation but as "two wings of one body." For example, internal data control and collection is, in part, modulated so as to provide the raw data that AI firms, in particular, crave in providing solutions to public policy problems.

The chapters in the second section detail exhaustively how AI innovation is affected and enabled by the "fuzzy logic" of data and cybersecurity law and policy, particularly "data localization" in its Chinese form. This asserts that data generated in China by domestic or foreign entities, or by Chinese firms operating anywhere, are sovereign assets and must be protected and exploited in pursuit of Chinese interests (chapter six). Data localization is not easy and reinforces tensions between the domestic demands of legitimate "data protection" and national-level strategic goals, including uncertainty around the role of foreign firms' involvement in Chinese AI markets and transnational data exchange for research and development ("protectionism"). Deliberate ambiguity exists around what data are deemed protected or "important" under security legislation, meanings that shift according to political ideology and commercial priorities (chapter seven). Chapters eight and nine

show how the fuzzy logic of AI policy, law and regulation benefits the Chinese AI sector by permitting data collection for machine learning and big data analytics and the running of “public-private petri dishes,” effectively large-scale AI experiments that feed back into public policy for AI and other social concerns. The author concludes by reaffirming the strategic utility of intentional fuzzy logic to AI innovation, whilst noting that it is not a one-off solution to the dynamic problem of how to balance political security with technological innovation.

Overall, this book is a timely, insightful and well-researched contribution to the literature on China and technology. Its attention to “fuzzy logic” will appeal to scholars of Chinese government and policy, and its empirical focus is of great interest to the wider international studies community, including those concerned with great power competition, cybersecurity and international political economy. Parasol’s fascinating book is likely to find its way onto postgraduate reading lists and presents ideas and hypotheses that can be tested and expanded in future scholarship.

TIM STEVENS

[tim.stevens@kcl.ac.uk](mailto:tim.stevens@kcl.ac.uk)

*The Communist Judicial System in China, 1927–1976: Building on Fear*

QIANG FANG

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This book addresses a major lacuna in Western research on 20th-century China. It provides a history of the judicial system devised by the Communist Party, from the first policy experiments in the late 1920s until the death of Mao Zedong. This is a formidable challenge, especially when going beyond an analysis of structures to include the actual workings of the system. Qiang Fang draws upon a wealth of archival documents, mainly from the Shanghai Municipal Archives but also from the huge collection of county-level archives held at Shanghai Jiaotong University. This is difficult material to work with, since the files are often highly disparate and context-specific.

The argument is structured in seven chronological chapters. All take a larger claim as point of departure in order to replace long-held assumptions with a more nuanced perspective. The red thread that holds all chapters together is stated in the subtitle: building on fear. This could be read in two ways: either as the effect induced by the Communist judicial system (and to a certain extent by repressive legal organs everywhere), or as the fundamental mode of how the CCP perceived its political environment. It is the latter aspect that the book foregrounds, for example by claiming that even Mao’s death “failed to liberate the Party from the persistent fear of losing power” (p. 18). This ever-changing threat assessment is thus to account for the “judicial pendulum,” swinging from pure instrumentalism to “liberal” perceptions of universal legal principles. In the chapters and at the very end of the conclusion, however, there is also evidence for the first reading.

Chapters one and two are devoted to the pre-1949 period and mainly rely on published sources. Against the backdrop of the bloody onslaught by Kuomintang forces, the notion of fear for CCP survival clearly resonates. That the external threat was also instrumentalized within brutal inner-party feuds could have been reflected more