British generalship on the Western Front in the First World War, 1914-1918

Robbins, Simon Nicholas

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British Generalship on the Western Front

in the First World War, 1914 - 1918

Simon Nicholas Robbins

Submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

King's College, University of London

2001
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to the period of seminal change, 1914-18. The first two chapters examine the impact of the pre-war emphasis on world-wide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence on the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparedness for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and materiel. British Generals, busy managing the army's expansion and inexperienced in continental war, were slow to reform. Tardiness in learning from mistakes and improving performance resulted not from the social background of senior officers, although resistance to change was a factor, but from the small size and inexperience of the military elite which had to learn how to run a continental war. The subsequent three chapters analyse this poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', and careerism within the high command; the development of a younger, more professional leadership; and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916. The next three chapters explore the rapid learning curve undergone by the high command in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1916-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate which bedevilled Allied offensives in 1915-17 and an operational style of attack employing limited-objective set-pieces to overcome the German defence in depth. A final chapter concludes that, although there were problems of adjustment in the war's early years, the developments of 1916-18 provided the tactical and operational efficiency to defeat the German Army.
Contents

Contents 3
Source note 4
Glossary of abbreviations 5
Introduction 9
Chapter 1: The Army's Ethos and Culture 27
Chapter 2: The Decline and Fall of an Army 67
Chapter 3: The Brain of an Army 109
Chapter 4: Developing a Professional Leadership 160
Chapter 5: The Army's Over-ambitious Decision-making 192
Chapter 6: Training for Victory 231
Chapter 7: Tactical Innovation 270
Chapter 8: A Strategy for Victory 310
Conclusion 351
Appendix 1: Biographies of The War Managers 374
Appendix 2: Breakdown of Sample by Occupation 508
Appendix 3: Service of British Officers 509
Appendix 4: Leading Forty Schools 510
Appendix 5: Numbers of Officers at Public Schools 511
Appendix 6: Universities Attended by Officers 512
Appendix 7: Father's Occupation 513
Appendix 8: Graduates from Staff College 514
Appendix 9: Staff Experience within the B.E.F., 1914 515
Appendix 10: Analysis of Senior Officers 516
Appendix 11: Analysis of Staff Officers 518
Appendix 12: Analysis of Staff at G.H.Q. 520
Appendix 13: Average Ages of Army Commanders 522
Appendix 14: Average Ages of Corps Commanders 524
Appendix 15: Average Ages of Divisional Commanders 527
Appendix 16: Schooling of Senior Commanders 530
Appendix 17: Schooling of Senior Staff Officers 532
Appendix 18: Changes in Senior Commands during the War 534
Appendix 19: Promotion of Senior Commanders in 1914 535
Bibliography 537
Word count 580
Sources

Records from numerous archive sources are referred to in the text, and they are given the acronyms below:

**CCC:**  Churchill College, Cambridge

**IWM:**  Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, London

**LHCMA:**  Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, Strand, London

**NAM:**  National Army Museum, Chelsea, London

**NLS:**  National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh

**PRO:**  Public Record Office of England and Wales, Kew, London

**CAB:**  Cabinet

**WO:**  War Office

**RAF:**  Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, London

**RAI:**  Royal Artillery Institute, Woolwich, London

**SRO:**  Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh:
GLOSSARY

The following abbreviations are employed:

A.A.G. Assistant Adjutant-General
A.A. & Q.M.G. Assistant-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General
A.D.C. Aide-de-Camp
A.D.G.A.M.S. Assistant Director-General, Army Medical Services
A.D.M.S. Assistant Director of Medical Services
A.D.O.S. Assistant Director of Ordnance Services
A.F.A. Bde Army Field Artillery Brigade
A.G. Adjutant-General
A.I.F. Australian Imperial Force
A.M.O. Army Medical Officer
A.M.S. Assistant Military Secretary, or Army Medical Service
A.N.Z.A.C. Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
A.O.C. Air Officer Commanding
A.O.C.-in-C. Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
A.P.M. Assistant Provost Marshal
A.Q.M.G. Assistant Quartermaster-General
A.S.C. Army Service Corps
B.E.F. British Expeditionary Force
B.G.G.S. Brigadier-General General Staff
B.G.I Brigadier-General, Intelligence
B.G.O. Brigadier-General, Operations
B.G.R.A. Brigadier-General, Commanding Royal Artillery
B.G.R.E. Brigadier-General, Commanding Royal Engineers
B.G.R.A. Brigadier-General, Commanding Royal Horse Artillery
B.G.O. Brigadier-General, Training
Bt. Baronet
C.A.S. Chief of the Air Staff
C.B. Companion of the Bath
C.F.S. Central Flying School
C.G.S. Chief of the General Staff
C.G.S.O. Chief General Staff Officer
C.I.D. Committee of Imperial Defence
C.I.G.S. Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C.-in-C. Commander-in-Chief
C.M.G. Companion of St. Michael and St. George
C.R.A. Commander Royal Artillery
C.R.E. Commander Royal Engineers
C.R.H.A. Commander Royal Horse Artillery
C.S.O. Chief Staff Officer
D.A.G.  Deputy Adjutant-General
D.A. & Q.M.G.  Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-General
D.A.A. & Q.M.G.  Deputy Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster-General
D.A.A.G.  Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General
D.C.G.S.  Deputy Chief of the General Staff
D.C.L.I.  Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry
D.A.D.G.  Deputy Assistant Director-General
D.D.G.  Deputy Director-General
D.D.G.M.S.  Deputy Director-General Medical Services
D.D.M.S.  Deputy Director of Medical Services
D.D.O.S.  Deputy Director of Ordnance Services
D.G.M.S.  Director-General of Medical Services
D.L.  Deputy-Lieutenant
D.L.I.  Durham Light Infantry
D.M.I.  Director of Intelligence
D.M.O.  Director of Military Operations
D.M.O. & I  Director of Military Operations and Intelligence
D.M.S.  Director of Medical Services
D.M.T.  Director of Military Training
D.Q.M.G.  Deputy Quartermaster-General
D.O.S.  Director of Ordnance Services
D.S.D.  Director of Staff Duties
D.S.O.  Distinguished Service Order
D.Q.M.G.  Knight Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George
G.A.N.  Groupe des Armees du Nord
G.A.R.  Groupe des Armees de Reserve
G.B.  Great Britain
G.C.B.  Knight Grand Cross of the Bath
G.C.M.G.  Knight Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George
G.H.Q.  General Headquarters
G.O.C.  General Officer Commanding
G.O.C.-in-C.  General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
G.Q.G.  Grand Quartier General des Armees Francais
G.S.O.1  General Staff Officer (1st Grade)
G.S.O.2  General Staff Officer (2nd Grade)
G.S.O.3  General Staff Officer (3rd Grade)
H.A.G.  Heavy Artillery Group
H.A.R.  Heavy Artillery Reserve
H.L.I.  Highland Light Infantry
H.M.S.  Her/His Majesty’s Ship
Hon.  Honourable
H.Q.  Headquarters
I.  Intelligence

6
I.a. Intelligence Section A
I.b. Intelligence Section B
i/c in charge
I.C.S. Indian Civil Service
I.G. Inspector-General
I.M.S. Indian Medical Service
I.R.A. Irish Republican Army

J.P. Justice of the Peace

K.C.B. Knight Commander of the Bath
K.C.I.E. Knight Commander of the Indian Empire
K.C.M.G. Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George
K.C.S.I. Knight Commander of the Star of India
K.I.A. Killed In Action
K.O.S.B. King's Own Scottish Borderers
K.O.Y.L.I. King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
K.R.R.C. King's Royal Rifle Corps
K.S.L.I. King’s Shropshire Light Infantry

L. of C. Line of Communications

M.C. Military Cross
M.C.C. Marlebone Cricket Club
M.E.F. Mediterranean Expeditionary Force
M.F.H. Master of Fox Hounds
M.G.C. Machine-Gun Corps
M.G.G.S. Major-General General Staff
M.G.O. Master-General of Ordnance
M.G.R.A. Major-General Royal Artillery
M.F. Member of Parliament
M.T. Mechanical Transport

N.S.W. New South Wales
N.Z. & A. New Zealand and Australian

O. Operations
O.a. Operations Section A
O.b. Operations Section B
O.B.E. Officer, Order of the British Empire
O.C. Officer Commanding
O.T.C. Officer Training Corps

P.C. Privy Councillor
P.M.O. Principal Medical Officer
p.s.c. Past Staff College

Q.M.G. Quarter-Master-General
Queens Queen’s (Royal West Surrey Regiment)

R.A. Royal Artillery
R.A.F. Royal Air Force
R.A.M.C. Royal Army Medical Service
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.E.</td>
<td>Royal Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.F.A.</td>
<td>Royal Field Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.F.C.</td>
<td>Royal Flying Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G.A.</td>
<td>Royal Garrison Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G.S.</td>
<td>Royal Geographical Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.H.A.</td>
<td>Royal Horse Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.M.C.</td>
<td>Royal Military College</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.M.A.</td>
<td>Royal Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.M.L.I.</td>
<td>Royal Marine Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.N.A.S.</td>
<td>Royal Naval Air Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.N.D.</td>
<td>Royal Naval Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.M.O.</td>
<td>Senior Medical Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.O.</td>
<td>Staff Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.R.</td>
<td>Special Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.W.</td>
<td>South Western</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.A.</td>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
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<td>T.F.</td>
<td>Territorial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>V.C.</td>
<td>Victoria Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>V.C.A.S.</td>
<td>Vice-Chief of the Air Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.C.I.G.S.</td>
<td>Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Y.L.I.</td>
<td>Yorkshire Light Infantry</td>
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INTRODUCTION

We are too near the events of the Great War to see them as our descendants will see them, without prejudice and with fuller knowledge of the facts as a whole.¹

Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Birch, 1920.

History has given the British high command during the First World War a bad reputation and the public has a deep-seated belief that many of the British offensives made between 1914 and 1918 led to needlessly heavy casualties for negligible military gain. Since the guns stopped firing over eight decades ago, the Great War has resulted in a large volume of literature of varied quality and objectivity. The conventional image of that war is one of a senseless bloodbath - a stark war of attrition conducted by unimaginative and incompetent generals and lacking any tactical innovation. There is an almost indelible image of futility produced by the heavy losses sustained on the Somme and at Passchendaele in 1916 and 1917.

This popular perception of the First World War was an image based largely on the vivid impressions of popular writers like Edmund Blunden, Erich Maria Remarque, Robert Graves, and Siegfried Sassoon.² These and other works all

¹ Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Birch, Artillery Development in the Great War, The Army Quarterly, October 1920.
² Edmund Blunden, Undertones of War (1928), Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (1929), Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That (1929), and Siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of a Fox Hunting Man (1928) and Memoirs of an Infantry Officer (1930).
emphasised the appalling conditions faced by the front-line soldier and criticised commanders for their bloody-mindedness and distance from those conditions. Such an approach found a public highly receptive to anti-war messages and strongly disinclined to view war in any sort of positive light. These eminently readable works combined with the moving war poetry of Binyon, Graves, McRae, Owen, Sassoon, and others established a mind set that viewed the Great War with great revulsion and laid the foundations for a "mud-and-blood" view of the war which put the blame for the slaughter of British soldiers on the Western Front directly at the feet of the B.E.F.'s commanders. British generals were caricatured as being incompetent, mistake-prone and callous Victorians who did nothing to rectify their colossal errors. The true story of the First World War and its tactics is not quite so mindless or simplistic as these critics would have us believe.

Two major British Schools of thought had developed in an attempt to address the controversies surrounding British generalship on the Western Front. The critical school, which has included both Lloyd George and Liddell Hart, has tended to stress internal factors, usually the incompetence of Haig, G.H.Q., and senior military commanders. The second major school of thought, which has included both Brigadier-General Edmonds and John Terraine, has stressed external factors, including the pre-war British inexperience and lack of preparation, the problem of adapting to new technology,
the fighting power of the German Army, restraints imposed by coalition warfare, and political interference.

Sir Basil Liddell Hart and C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, who provided the first realistic depictions of the war, were both extremely able and influential historians who had served as infantry officers on the Western Front. Although Liddell Hart claimed objectivity, and Cruttwell more nearly achieved it, each could not avoid subjectivity in treating the fundamental experience of his life. Liddell Hart was increasingly critical of the whole Western Front campaign while Cruttwell was more understanding of the problems faced by the generals. Liddell Hart came to exert a dominant influence on First World War historiography through his own prodigious output in the 1920s and 1930s. Although his work was not scholarly by modern standards, Liddell Hart listed an impressive range of published sources and enjoyed significant 'inside' contacts with Edmonds and many senior officers. Liddell Hart was mainly concerned to inculcate broad strategic views in a polemical style and was always a staunch supporter of the 'indirect approach' as a far more attractive alternative to Western Front attrition.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Liddell Hart turned from his excessive adulation as a junior officer during the war to extreme criticism, convinced that the grand strategy of the war had proved an exercise in futility. For Liddell Hart, the purpose of military history was didactic, instructing

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for the future. He therefore devoted far more attention to the failures of 1915-17, notably the Somme and Passchendaele, than to the successes of 1917-18. The fighting on the Western Front of the Last Hundred Days in 1918, culminating with the German request for an armistice, the period on which his claim to greatness must rest, was almost completely ignored. By the standards to which military historians now aspire, *The Real War* is a very partial and selective look at the Western Front.

Liddell Hart completely failed to understand that the skills demanded in the leadership of mass armies in an industrialized age were more managerial than the heroic generalship of the 'Great Captains'. Although the quality of much of what was written on operations was excellent and remains of analytical value to this day, he could not begin to unravel the processes by which the German Army was defeated and one of the fundamental dilemmas of the First World War, the need to integrate new technology and to shape doctrine in the light of technological capabilities, was solved by 1918. Both Fuller and Liddell Hart drew the false deduction that because the massive bombardments preceding the Battles of the Somme and Third Ypres had not achieved their aims, artillery would have little influence on future conflict.

The observations of a group of influential military theorists who wrote during the 1920s and 1930s were particularly critical. Yet for all the significance of
their writings, the views of the First World War advanced by Sir Basil Liddell Hart and others, such as Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, who savagely satirized his fellow officers as 'Colonel Blimps', are far from objective. Most of them served in the war and personally suffered through the years of mud, blood, barbed wire, and gas. Many, too, were deeply involved in the partisan and often bitter internal debates among the post-war armies over the proper roles of mechanisation, air-power, and fire-power on the emerging modern battlefield. Like their ideological opponents, their interpretations of the lessons of the Great War were sometimes coloured by their view of what the future should look like.

Cruttwell was an infinitely greater historian than Liddell Hart and his *magnum opus* is more objective and balanced. He comments on the industrialization of the war while reflecting the contempt of the infantry for the staff. Above all, Haig receives remarkably fair, even generous, treatment. Although critical of his weakness, Cruttwell concludes that 'Haig grew with disappointment and disaster, until he stood out in the last months of the war as a very great general' and notes the impact made at G.H.Q. in 1918 by Lawrence, Haig's C.G.S., which is often ignored.6

Sir James Edmonds was the chief editor and principal compiler of the multi volume Official History, written not as a popular layman's history but as textbooks, which could be employed in military academies to teach lessons to future generals. Hampered by the need to skate carefully around mistakes made by senior officers and worries that criticisms of the high command's conduct would damage the army's prestige and Britain's international reputation, Edmonds confined his text to a bald narrative of events, omitting criticisms or placing awkward evidence in footnotes or appendices. The result was that the books were written in a dry style, which did not give much encouragement to read them, obscured some important lessons, glossed over the professional defects of senior officers, and failed to educate the lay public in the realities of the war. Nevertheless, careful reading sheds much light on British operations, the lack of preparation for a continental war, and the massive expansion of the army, which occurred during 1914-16. Edmonds' industry also left a huge mountain of material, notably the official records and the oral and written reminiscences of survivors, which remains a very valuable source for historians to this day.

The memoirs of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill, outstanding polemics in defence of

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8 See C.A.B.44 and 45, P.R.O.
9 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (six volumes, 1933-1936).
their own reputations, which sold in large numbers and shaped the popular historical memory of the Great War, had a long-term impact on popular perceptions of the Somme and Passchendaele as bloody and futile campaigns and did most damage to the reputations of the generals. Lloyd George in particular was highly selective in his choice of evidence and emotive, defending his reputation and political judgement during the war, whilst attacking and denigrating the reputation and military judgement of the generals, notably Haig and Robertson.

The popular image of the war was perpetuated after the Second World War by the work of historians who were still being inspired by the 1930's revulsion against war. It was given fresh impetus and new directions by the mood of the sixties, which was anti-establishment, socially sensitive and was expressed by people who had fought in neither war. Despite the saturation coverage of the First World War in the 1960s, little was produced of lasting scholarly value because there was so little attempt in the polemical books of Leon Wolff and Alan Clark ¹¹ to place the war in historical perspective. Both authors emphasised the failures of 1915, 1916, and 1917 and ignored the successes of 1918.

In 1960 Falls produced a balanced and unjustly neglected masterpiece.¹² In direct contrast to Liddell Hart in the 1920s and 1930s and to the prevailing trend of the

1960s, Falls was anxious to demonstrate that ‘the military art’ had not ‘stood still in the greatest war to date’ and that ‘skill and intelligence’ were applied find solutions to the stalemate of the early years of the war.\textsuperscript{13} Anticipating the more strident revisionism of John Terraine, Falls argued that technology and mechanization, which led to improved tactics and strategy, had unlocked the German defences and that from August 1918 the British Armies had triumphed. Ten years later E.K.G. Sixsmith, using some archival sources, which were becoming available, came to the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{14} Such conclusions opened the way for later, more academic research but did little to change the prevailing, popular image.

From the 1960s John Terraine defended the generals against their critics, maintaining that the generals were not ‘donkeys’ and that, despite his mistakes during the attritional battles of 1916-17, Haig had won the war by exploiting new technology. Haig had been the first allied leader to perceive that the Germans were cracking in 1918 and had then led his armies to a series of great victories the second half of 1918.\textsuperscript{15} Although critical of Haig’s strategy in 1917, Correlli Barnett supported Terraine’s

\textsuperscript{13} Cyril Falls, \textit{The First World War}, p.xvi-xvii.
\textsuperscript{14} Major-General E.K.G. Sixsmith, \textit{British generalship in the Twentieth Century} (1970).
interpretation of the conduct of operations on the Western Front.\textsuperscript{16}

In recent years there has been a renewed interest in both academic and more populist circles in the First World War reflecting the considerable impact that the war has had on British History in the Twentieth Century. An increased awareness of the Great War has led many to develop an interest in learning about the Western Front. This growing awareness of events between 1914 and 1918 amongst the general public has been reflected in the publication recently of a wide variety of books on the war, notably fiction,\textsuperscript{17} and popular books,\textsuperscript{18} which try to make sense of and lay the blame for the huge slaughter and sacrifices of many ordinary men and women which took place during 'the war to end all wars'. In terms of the historiography of the First World War, the 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of a post-Second World War generation of professional military historians from Britain and the Commonwealth who began the transformation of our understanding of the conduct of the war on the Western Front. Scholars, such as Brian Bond, Martin van Creveld, Tony Ashworth, Richard Holmes, and

\textsuperscript{17} Such as Pat Barker \textit{Regeneration} (1991), \textit{The Eye In The Door} (1993), \textit{The Ghost Road} (1995); and Sebastian Faulk, \textit{Birdsong} (1993).
Timothy Lupfer, began to make the first assault on the popular image of the war.\textsuperscript{19}

With the advantage of being at a distance from both world wars and having virtually unlimited access to a wide range of source material, our understanding of British command had been transformed during the 1980s. The publication of Shelford Bidwell and Dominic Graham's pioneering work \textit{Firepower} in 1982,\textsuperscript{20} one of the few studies to take a balanced view between the internal and external arguments, moved the discussion from the decisions of a small group of leaders, such as Haig, to a study of the British Army, a huge organisation by 1918, as a bureaucracy which reacted to and implemented change. They examined the technology involved in the Allied victory, maintaining that the British achievement had been ignored. It increased attention to the importance of artillery and led to new studies of the First World War.

Exploiting the full range of sources now available to throw new light on the Western Front, scholars, such as David Woodward, Ian Beckett, Keith Simpson, David French, Peter Simkins, John Bourne, and Bruce Gudmundsson produced first-class scholarly analyses of the British Army as a social institution, its attempts to absorb new technology


\textsuperscript{20} Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, \textit{Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945} (1982).
and doctrine, the practical difficulties of military operations, and a more subtle interpretation of the personalities and issues. The publications of contemporary historians display a refreshing detachment from the emotional hang-ups and petty vendettas, which have characterised so much of the historiography of the First World War. At the same time this new wave of scholarship has revealed serious gaps as well as the need for a reassessment of well-worn subjects.

Study of the performance of the British High Command on the Western Front was invigorated by the Canadian military historian, Tim Travers, in a series of articles and two major books, which addressed the British Army's weaknesses during the Great War in managerial terms. In *The Killing Ground* Travers argued that he had attempted to take a balanced judgement, but with greater emphasis on internal factors and with his analysis commencing well before the war and based upon a wide range of sources, including official and private papers. He concluded that the 'ethos' of the pre-war officer corps was hierarchical and riven with favouritism, whereby the officer corps influenced by


hierarchy and personality proved inflexible in meeting the challenges of the war.

Travers believed that there was not a revolution in military thinking before the war and that pre-war ideas and a particular pre-war image of warfare persisted throughout the war. There was an enduring legacy of the Napoleonic experience and the cult of the offensive spirit so that senior commanders, especially Haig, pursued tactics which were often inappropriate and beyond the capabilities of the weapons systems employed. Travers also identified the penchant of senior commanders to regard battle as an ordered and regular activity, notably Haig, who saw his role as that of 'master planner' issuing generalized instructions.

Travers' account does not explain the reasons for the successes of 1918. Given the severity of his strictures, the pre-war Regular Army ought not to have been able to adapt at all, even slowly and inadequately, to the challenge of defeating the German Army on the Western Front. In particular, it is difficult to square his account of the pre-war army, based largely on personal papers and 'court gossip', with the army as a practical instrument of empire. The army's role as a colonial police force has often been regarded as a source of institutional weakness. It produced an army, which fought in 'penny packets', lacked operational doctrine, was weak in staff work and under-gunned in heavy artillery.
But the wars of empire also produced an officer corps with vast combat and active service experience. The intensity and range of professional opportunity offered by the pre-war British Army was enormous. It is difficult to reconcile the fit, adaptable, energetic, resourceful men who served as battalion, battery, brigade and divisional commanders in 1918 with the dogma-ridden and unprofessional commanders depicted by Professor Travers. He also gives far too little attention in his work to the second half of 1918, when the B.E.F. finally succeeded in integrating infantry, artillery, armour and aircraft, something it could hardly have achieved had it been as ‘traditional’ and hostile to ‘technological solutions’ as he claims. What Travers never explains is what an “unstructured” battle might be like, and in what important aspects it would differ from a catastrophe. Neither does he explain what the generals and staffs are for, if it is not to try to bring some degree of order out of chaos.

In the 1990s, reflecting the renewed interest in the war, a number of books by Bill Rawling, Robin Prior, Trevor Wilson, Martin Samuels, Paddy Griffith, Paul Harris, David T. Zabecki, Paul Harris, David French, Andy Simpson, Shane Schreiber, Ian Malcolm Brown, and Niall Ferguson have successfully challenged the dominant view of trench warfare and have sought to paint a clearer picture of the evolution of strategy, tactics and training by both British and German
armies. These authors argue that the last two years of the war saw many innovative efforts to break the stalemate of trench warfare and restore manoeuvre to the battlefield.

Those efforts did not bear fruit completely in 1917 and 1918, but the ideas behind them were taken up and improved forming the basis for tactics in the Second World War. A growing number of historians acknowledge impressive developments in fighting efficiency and that the British Army climbed a steep 'learning curve'. Refuting the assumptions of authors such as Martin Samuels and Martin van Creveld and arguing that in doctrine, training and tactics the British had achieved parity with the Germans by 1918, Paddy Griffith has produced one of the few British contributions to the understanding of operational matters and the technical problem of how the British Army achieved the breakthrough. Neither Tim Travers, explaining British failures in managerial terms, nor Dominick Graham, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, focusing on the technical problems of achieving and converting a break-in into a breakthrough, have provided altogether convincing explanations for the


transformation of British fortunes in 1917-18. It is operational rather than social studies which will alone correct the myths still current.

For the most part the commanders of the British Army have remained faceless, devoid of personality or character. The British military leadership is characterised as being led by unthinking automatons, part of a "monolithic" war machine. This faceless and colourless portrayal of British commanders gives little recognition to individual military prowess, and, in the end, extends oversimplified caricatures of generals as Colonel Blimps. The results are a grossly stereotyped image of British commanders. A more balanced assessment of these men both as personalities and leaders is long overdue. Undoubtedly the war saw the emergence of a tougher and younger group of leaders during the war.

Haig had good reason to be proud of his triumph in November 1918 but British victories and defeats were fundamentally the accomplishments of a specific group of men. In many ways, Haig’s subordinates are the forgotten men of the Twentieth Century. Haig’s subordinates are far less well known than, say, Montgomery’s lieutenants, because of Haig’s dominating personality. While the battlefield commanders of the Second World War such as Montgomery and Slim became familiar names to the British people, Birdwood, Byng, Horne, Plumer and Rawlinson remain relatively unknown. Increasingly, as the war progressed Haig’s subordinates, resisting interference, played a major, and largely
positive, role in winning the war on the Western Front but they have received little recognition or serious study.

The debate continues as to whether the British successes of summer 1918 were due to improved strategy, tactics, weapons, technology, leadership, staff efficiency or merely mass. Every institution has a culture. The much discussed, yet never properly and comprehensively researched regimental system can still be placed at the heart of British military culture and its diversity of sub-cultures. Much cultural behaviour can be positive, functional and cohesive but the British Army cannot be absolved from the negative aspects of its cultural behaviour. It is the intention of this study to examine the mind set of the high command and its efforts to analyse early mistakes and to improve tactical and operational efficiency on the Western Front.

In particular, this study looks at the development of British operational thought during the war, a subject that has been comparatively neglected. The concept of the operational level of war is employed here in the sense of the 'area between strategy and tactics which denoted the fighting of battles in a given theatre of operations in pursuit of the political objective of the war,' and as the 'grey zone once called Grand Tactics, the tactics of large formations', such as army groups, armies and corps. One

26 J.G.G. MacKenzie and Brian Holden Reid (editors), The British Army and the Operational Level of War, p.i.
area of much debate during the war was over the employment of breakthrough or siege operations against the German defences.

This work is based on a wider range of sources than those available to earlier polemical writers such as Fuller and Liddell Hart. Since the late 1960s a vast array of sources have become available, not only official documents, such as operational records and War Diaries of formations, in the Public Record Office but a vast array of private papers, such as contemporary letters and diaries and post-war memoirs written by participants in the war. Most official records relating to the Great War were not open to historians until the mid-1960s and collections of private papers also began to be deposited in repositories from the late 1960s onwards. These enable the historian to produce a detailed and balanced picture of the British Army and its operations on the Western Front.

Contemporary scholarship has begun to correct flaws in the prevailing, populist perception of the war and to provide a more balanced view, which does not shy away from apportioning blame where blame is due or giving praise when merited. This author aims to provide a synthesis of older ideas with a more balanced approach to the problem, unencumbered by the emotional baggage of having lived through, or grown up in the immediate shadow of, the Great War. The transformation of the B.E.F. from a small, colonial army of some 220,000 soldiers in 1914 to a large,
continental army of over two million men in 1918 capable of defeating the best army in the world, so often ignored by critics, was a unique British military achievement, which requires some explanation.

Above all, it is hoped to provide a more balanced understanding of the war, replacing the cherished stereotype of a futile and blundering B.E.F. with the perception that the British Army was tactically innovative during the second half of the Great War and able to learn from past mistakes as was clearly shown by its performance in 1917 and in 1918. How impressive developments in tactics, staff work, training, operational planning and all-arms co-operation were introduced, codified, and implemented and at what levels the British Army progressed along the ‘learning curve’ are some of the important questions which have to be considered and answered. By examining how strategic and technical innovation, effective co-ordination and planning were handled, it is possible to evaluate the performance of the British Armies in France.
CHAPTER ONE

The Army's Ethos and Culture

To understand the British Army in 1914, one must comprehend something of the character and mentality of the officer corps, which was shaped by the ethos and culture of the Army's hierarchy. In this opening chapter the British military leadership on the Western Front is examined as a group and "social institution". Every institution has a culture, the integrated pattern of behaviour that transmits knowledge and learning to succeeding generations, which can be observed in its distinctive behaviour. The Regular Army, largely cut off from British civilian society by the demands of foreign service and the distaste often displayed for army life by the middle and working classes alike, had its own unique style and identity. Who were the Army's leaders and what were their backgrounds, ethos and culture?

In an attempt to evaluate the breadth of background, education and experience of the men who formed the High Command of the British Army biographical data has been collected on a sample of 700 senior commanders and staff officers, who served on the Western Front at divisional level and above between 1914 and 1918. The overwhelming majority (89%) were British Army officers, mostly serving officers (82%) but also including a small number of retired

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1 See Appendix 1.
officers (7%), with the rest (11%) being made up of a motley mixture of officers from the Indian Army, the Territorials, the Dominions, civilian life and even the Royal Navy! ²

These war managers were born between 1854 and 1894, with 311 (44.5%) being born in the 1870s;³ drawn from an Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, upper class or professional background.⁴ The British Army's elite shared an Establishment and Victorian upbringing, which provided a common social background and elaborate family ties. The leadership of the B.E.F. were members of a privileged class enjoying social prestige based on family origin and service to the state, which supplied a strong group and cohesive morale. They were a cohesive group recruited from either an aristocratic and landed-gentry background (34.5%) or respectable middle-class service families (35%) and a significant minority (8.5%),⁵ such as Field-Marshal Lord Byng and Lord Cavan, Brigadier-General Hon. A.M. Henley, and Major-General Hon. W. Lambton, were members of the nobility. Others had aristocratic wives or family connections. A number of generals were close to the Royal Family, notably Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney (III Corps), who was 'a personal friend' of the King,⁶ and Field-Marshal Earl Haig, whose marriage to the Queen's lady-in-

² See Appendix 2.
³ See Appendix 8.
⁴ See Appendix 7.
⁵ See Appendix 7.
⁶ Field Marshal Lord Kitchener to Field Marshal Sir John French, 11 July [1915], French Papers 75/46/11, IWM.
waiting took place in the private chapel of Buckingham Palace.  

The landed influence on the officer corps was still strong, with the gentry representing over a quarter (26%) of the sample. The typical officer had the conventional upbringing of an upper-class Victorian gentleman. General Sir Walter Kirke, a staff officer throughout the war, had a typical background being the second son of Colonel St.G.M. Kirke. The Kirkes had been the squires of Mirfield Hall, East Markham, Nottinghamshire, for several centuries. He went to Haileybury, leaving at sixteen to attend a crammer to pass into Woolwich where he won the riding prize. He took up polo and racing when in the Army. Unfortunately, despite such an illustrious background, the wealth associated with the lineage had, as for many other gentry families, almost entirely evaporated by the time Walter Kirke was born.

All the available biographical and autobiographical evidence underlines the continuing influence of old established families with a tradition of military service. This elite was traditionally drawn from gentry with a military tradition and such families continued to serve King and Country as officers in the armed services. Major-General Sir Hereward Wake was one of the Wakes of

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7 The Countess Haig, The Man I Knew, pp.36-37.
10 See Appendix 7.
Northamptonshire, who when they were not defending the Empire, resided at the family seat, Courteenhall. General Sir Walter Congreve came from an old Staffordshire family with a tradition of service in the army and a notable ancestor in the inventor of the rocket. The County families of Tyrone and Fermanagh in Ulster produced six Field-Marshal...

It was a narrow, almost feudal world whose ethos and values remained those of the landed gentlemen, who moved in 'county' circles. Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds noted that 'in 1914 the army was still very feudal in its status, and great personages, even great ladies, exercised the higher patronage'. Personality and connections, rather than professional expertise, continued to exert a big influence in the Army. Many officers believed, as a result, that 'influential backing is more important than the possession of brains and professional ability'. For example, Haig was accused of flaunting his royal connections, and his rapid rise attributed partly by contemporaries to his links with the Royal family.

14 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers I/2B 5a, LHCMA.
15 Edmonds, Remarks on the Staff College, undated, Edmonds Papers I/2B 6, LHCMA.
Rawlinson, Robertson, and Smith-Dorrien, kept up a long correspondence from France with the King through his Private Secretaries. At lower levels, aristocratic officers such as Major-Generals Lord Loch and Hon. W. Lambton also had contacts with the King and were reporting on operations. The Army's values still espoused the traditional and leisurely lifestyle of the gentry and an officer was still expected to be a 'Gentleman', in an era when it was de rigueur for a 'Gentleman' to always carry a walking stick, which had replaced the sword as the symbol of belonging to the gentry.\textsuperscript{18} Service served to confirm one's social status. Allenby, who looked like 'a typical young English fox-hunting squire',\textsuperscript{19} joined the Army because 'other openings were limited, for commercial business was not in those days considered a suitable occupation for a gentleman'.\textsuperscript{20} In Scottish society of the mid-nineteenth century, Douglas Haig's mother was regarded as having married beneath her class by marrying into trade (his father owned the Whisky Distillers) and as a result he went to school in England and into an English cavalry regiment, the 7th Hussars, rather than into the Scots Greys,\textsuperscript{21} and was referred to disparagingly as 'the opulent whiskey distiller'.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{18} Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoirs, p.38, Archibald Papers, IWM. \textsuperscript{19} Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XIV, Edmonds Papers III/2 13-14, LHCMA. \textsuperscript{20} General Sir Archibald Wavell, \textit{Allenby: A Study in Greatness}, p.35. \textsuperscript{21} See Duff Cooper, Haig, p.166; Lord Geddes, \textit{Unworthy Apologia, National Review}, February 1953, p.109, Liddell Hart Papers 15 2 23, LHCMA; and Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart to Victor Bonham-Carter, 2 March 1964, Liddell Hart Papers 1/90 36, LHCMA. \textsuperscript{22} Annotation by Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, 2 September 1918, on a letter from Major E.J. Thompson, Haig's A.D.C. at G.H.Q., to Pinney, 1 September 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, from the landed gentry in Scotland,\textsuperscript{23} was 'an awful snob' at Staff College, who allegedly socialised only with officers of the Rifle Brigade and Guardsmen.\textsuperscript{24} If a person had the proper background as a gentleman, it could be assumed that he would have the proper abilities as an officer. Major-General Sir Robert Rice, 'a fine type of a loyal and determined English gentleman, ready to do his duty whatever required and regardless of his rank',\textsuperscript{25} was the ideal officer. In 1914 Major-General Sir Frederic Glubb reminded his son 'that you are also a gentleman, a simple honest English gentleman - you cannot be anything better whatever you are'.\textsuperscript{26}

Officers were 'expected to have more sense of chivalry and honour'\textsuperscript{27} and conduct themselves in accordance with a code of behaviour based upon 'standards of morality, manners, and honesty, qualities we have been taught to regard as sacrosanct, and a peculiar heritage of our race'.\textsuperscript{28} The Army's code was largely implicit and unwritten. A gentleman knew when he had broken the code. If caught transgressing the manners and morals which were stressed by the culture of the Army resignation was expected. For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Repington

\textsuperscript{23} General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter I, p.2, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{25} Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 8 November 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/6 PRO.
\textsuperscript{27} Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 15 May 1918, Maurice Papers 4 4 2/1, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{28} General Sir Kenneth Wigram to Major-General G.P. Dawnay, 8 December 1946, Dawnay Papers 69/21 3, IWM.
was forced to resign from the Army not for being either named as co-respondent in a divorce case in 1901 or incompetence but because he had 'broken a solemn written promise to a brother officer' and 'not behaved like a gentleman'.

To be a gentleman was to fulfil the expectations of one's peers and often had little to do with professional competence. For example, when discussing the possibility of his removal from command of Second Army Haig decided that 'Plumer is himself such an honest straightforward gentleman that I feel one ought to retain him if possible'.

Criticisms of senior officers reflected the prevailing ethos. Those such as Brigadier-General John Charteris, who 'behaved in anything but a gentlemanly manner', were disapproved of and compared ill-favourably with those, such as Field-Marshal Viscount Byng, who was 'a perfect old courtier & gentleman in every way', or General Sir Charles Fergusson, 'a perfect sahib'.

Senior officers who had served in the ranks were rare but there were a few, notably General Sir Gerald Boyd, Major-General Lord Dugan, and General Sir William Peyton. Boyd was forced to obtain his commission through the ranks because he had failed to get into Sandhurst while in

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29 Introduction by A.J.A. Morris to The Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington CMG, Military Correspondent of The Times, 1903-1918, pp.6-10.
30 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 18 February 1916, Robertson Papers 1/22 24, LHCMA.
31 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 8 March 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
32 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 15 August 1915, Howell Papers IV/C/3/208, LHCMA.
33 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 23 August 1914, Milward Papers 6510-143-1, NAM.
34 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.35, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
Peyton's case he joined the ranks and was commissioned in the regiment of which his father was a colonel.\(^{35}\) The most famous ex-ranker, who made it to the very top of the Army despite his working class origins, was of course 'Wully' (later Field Marshal Sir William) Robertson and there was some disgust during the war at his lack of a gentleman's social graces.\(^{36}\) Haig commented that it was 'much easier ... to work with a gentleman'.\(^{37}\)

The officer corps, educationally and socially exclusive, was dominated by the values of the gentry, whose family and social life was based very largely on horses and hunting. As Major-General J.F.C. Fuller noted, 'it was a delightful life, mostly duck-shooting and hunting in winter, and tennis and cricket in the summer'.\(^{38}\) Sport was a central activity of officers, who had ample leisure time to indulge their passion for field sports and team games so characteristic of the public schools from which they came and were great enthusiasts for hunting, shooting, riding, and other outdoor sports. Most officers enjoyed playing sport of some kind, either individually or for regimental teams. 19 (2.7%) of the sample particularly distinguished themselves at first-class sport. One staff officer noted that 'every senior officer with the forehead of an ape who

\(^{35}\) Obituary of General Sir William Peyton, in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs, p.134a, Lee Papers, IWM.
\(^{36}\) Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 10 April 1915, Howell Papers IV/C/3 135, LHCMA; Major-General Sir John Davidson to Major-General Sir Louis Spears, 19 March 1933, Spears Papers 2 3 8, LHCMA.
\(^{37}\) Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 13 February 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/8, PRO.
can afford a horse thinks he is first a huntsman & then a soldier'. 39 Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh was highly unusual in being no good at games, an indifferent horseman, and looking 'the embodiment of the Staff College "owl"'. 40

General Sir Alexander Godley was typical in his all-round sporting interests: captaining the school Cricket XI; marrying a member of a famous Irish hunting family; being keen on all forms of sport; a noted rider, polo player and judge of horses; and Master, successively, of two garrison packs of hounds. 41 The obsession of Regular officers with sport also manifested itself in Divisional Race meetings and Horse Shows during the war. In 1917 the 33rd Divisional Race Meeting, consisting of 'seven events including two mule Races', was a miniature Epsom 'within 8 miles of 7th Div. fighting hard at Bullecourt' 42 while the sports meeting of the 15th Division 'was very like an Agricultural Show, with jumping and musical riding and races on foot and mounted'. 43 The Cavalry Horse Show, besides being attended by 'a great gathering', produced 'an excellent lunch' with salmon and grouse. 44

The Army's officer corps had been undergoing a social transformation since the mid-nineteenth century in which the

39 C.M. Page to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 25 August 1934, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
40 Obituary of Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh by Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, no date, Edmonds Papers V2/File 2, LHCMA.
42 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 7 May 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
43 Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, p.129, Lee Papers, IWM.
44 General Sir Sidney Muspratt, Diary, 1 September 1917, Muspratt Papers 86/22/1, IWM.
"landed class", in slow decline, was gradually being replaced by the middle class, which by 1930 held an absolute majority both in the officer corps as a whole and in its senior ranks. By 1912 the aristocracy and landed gentry constituted only 41% of the entire officer corps and 64% of the officers holding the rank of Major-General and above.45 Men like Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, General Sir David Henderson, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, General Sir Charles Monro, and General Sir Cecil Romer, belonging respectively to distinguished families of ministers, academics, distillers, shipbuilders, merchant bankers, physicians, and judges,46 came from a professional or commercial rather than a gentry background. Nearly a quarter (24%) of the sample were from the professional classes.47 The broadening of the officer corps social background was gradual although to some extent accelerated by the Boer War and Great War.

A significant proportion of officers were either sons of serving officers or had relatives in the services. This self-recruitment from among the sons of professional officers was extremely widespread among the British military elite. No less than 228 (32.8%), nearly a third, of the sample were the sons of Army Officers.48 Jacob was one of

46 See, for example, General Sir George Barrow, The Life of General Sir Charles Monro, pp.18-19.
47 See Appendix 7.
48 See Appendix 7.
twenty-eight male members of his family who served in the East India Company's Army or the Indian Army, 1817-1926, while Colonel B.C. Battye came from 'one of the well known family who served India for generations'. Many other senior officers also had brothers and relatives serving, notably Birdwood who was one of five sons to serve with the army in India. This resulted in a narrowing of the base of the British officer corps and the danger of officers becoming a self-perpetuating clique but had the advantage of an increase in the officer corps' professional identity.

In addition 79 (10%) were sons of generals, implying an even tighter circle of recruitment. For example, General Sir Hubert Gough, coming from an Anglo-Irish family, which had abandoned the Church for the profession of arms in the eighteenth century and included a Field-Marshal, had a father and an uncle who were generals and had won the V.C. Thus, kinship provided a complex network of relationships within the Army's elite. The daughter of General Sir Francis Treherne married the son of Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob (respectively the S.M.O. and G.O.C., Meerut Division), the two families having known each other well in India pre-war, with the son of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson as the best man. Marriage to the daughter of a high-ranking

50 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.1, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
52 Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Goughie: The Life of General Sir Hubert Gough, pp.3 and 383.
53 General Sir Charles Richardson, From Churchill's Secret Circle: The Biography of Lieutenant General Sir Ian Jacob, p.16.
officer was often a useful step in building a career cementing professional ties with marriage. For instance, General Sir Eric de Burgh married the daughter of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe,\textsuperscript{54} while Brigadier-General Sir John Gough, V.C., wed the daughter of General Sir Charles Keyes, becoming the brother-in-law of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes and Brigadier-General Sir Terence Keyes.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, Cavan and Byng and General Sir Noel Birch and Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode were brothers-in-law. Such relationships maintained the social exclusiveness of the Army's leadership.

Wealth was not necessarily synonymous with social status and, although some officers, such as Haig, were personally well off, many lacked financial largesse. Far from emulating the relaxed amateurism of the officers of the nineteenth-century gentry, these officers - often from a lower income group than their predecessors - were forced by their relative poverty to work hard and to take their careers as military professionals seriously. Burnett-Stuart, who won a scholarship to Repton, was aware that 'the state of the family finances made this rather important' \textsuperscript{56} while Kirke had to leave Haileybury at the age of sixteen because of his failure to gain a scholarship.\textsuperscript{57} Once in the Army, Kirke had to rely on his ability to buy and train

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[54]{General Sir Eric de Burgh, Memoir, p.21, de Burgh Papers 7306-67, NAM.}
\footnotetext[56]{General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter I, p.3, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.}
\footnotetext[57]{General Sir Walter Kirke, Memoirs, p.1, Kirke Papers, IWM.}
\end{footnotes}
horses for racing and polo, selling them at a profit, to finance his life style.\textsuperscript{58} Brigadier-General Sir Ormonde Winter resorted to the shroff, or local native money-lender, to finance his sport in India.\textsuperscript{59} Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, as a bachelor with few expenses, helped his parents to pay the school fees of his younger brother.\textsuperscript{60}

Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart was forced to seek active service abroad in Somaliland when his father crashed financially,\textsuperscript{61} and like Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 'a poor man',\textsuperscript{62} with no allowance, had to live off his salary. Maurice and Brigadier-General E.G. Wace, both sons of Major-Generals, had to live off their own earnings and like Brigadier-General P. Howell, 'a poor man and keen',\textsuperscript{63} were driven by economic necessity to take their profession seriously. Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell 'had practically no private resources and during his whole career was always undertaking extra work to support his family' with the result that as C.G.S., G.H.Q. he 'was an exhausted man'.\textsuperscript{64} Whatever the sociological reasons behind the phenomenon, military professionalism developed gradually, slowly eclipsing the patrician-gentleman model.

\textsuperscript{59} Brigadier-General Sir Ormonde Winter, Winter's Tales, pp.28-30.
\textsuperscript{60} Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Notes on his letters and a letter to his Mother, 10 April 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM1 57, IWM.
\textsuperscript{61} Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, pp.45-46.
\textsuperscript{62} General Sir Charles Grant to Lord Rosebery, 20 May [1918], Grant Papers C41 24, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{63} Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Home, Diary, 15 March 1915, Home Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{64} Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [Brigadier-General Sir] J.E. Edmonds, 7 June 1934, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1934 41, LHCMA.
Social change and the growing professionalisation of the officer corps, who increasingly saw the Army as a career rather than a pleasant hobby, had implications for the Army’s performance during the war. It was easier for those with independent means to show the moral courage to risk professional ruin. In the First World War Guardsmen and Cavalrymen with private means, such as Lord Cavan who was quite happy to retire to hunt with the Hertfordshire Hounds, were much more willing to criticise superiors and to resist orders whereas impecunious officers, such as Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, who could not afford to lose their jobs, were not.65 General Sir Herbert Lawrence had 'one very strong asset', namely 'the independence of a civilian and the training of a soldier' having 'a very big job in civil life to go back to'.66 As a successful banker outside the Army in peacetime, Lawrence could afford to be more independent than his predecessor, Kiggell, declaring that 'for myself, I care nothing and am quite ready to make room for a better man & take other employment'.67 Charteris noted that it was 'difficult for any regular professional soldier not to be influenced to some extent by considerations of his own future prospects'.68 For example, when Major-General Sir Frederic Glubb, an officer with a

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67 General Sir Herbert Lawrence to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 9 April 1918, Maurice Papers 4 S 12, LHCMA.
68 Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G.H.Q., p.286.
wife, two children, and no private means, was placed on half-pay before the war it 'was no slight matter' and Wace, who was 'very poor with a considerable family', was removed as G.S.O.1, 32nd Division during the war 'the loss of the comparatively high pay' was 'a bitter blow'.

Similarly, professionally Major-General Sir Archibald Paris (Royal Naval Division), did not want to go back to being a Colonel and routine duties.

A strong desire by some officers to take advantage of a small window of opportunity in wartime to enhance their careers meant that careerism became a major problem during the war. Colonel C.J.L. Allanson remarked 'on the depressing extent to which soldiers, especially the ambitious Staff College type, cold-bloodedly regarded war as a professional opportunity' noting that when the war ended General Sir William Bartholomew commented that 'it's ended a year too soon for me', thinking only of his lost chance of further promotion while Burnett-Stuart, who was a Brigadier-General on the staff of VII Corps and G.H.Q., was always talking about people being 'in his way' for promotion. Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, as a rising staff officer during the war, was alleged to be eager to rise and determined to do so by

70 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Philip Game to his wife, 6 December 1917, Game Papers PWG 16, IWM.
71 Major-General Sir Archibald Paris to Mrs Christine Pilkington, 30 March and 6 May 1916, Paris Papers, IWM.
73 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with General H. Karslake, 20 November 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 11 1936 107, LHCMA.
agreeing with G.H.Q. Such behaviour ate into the ethos of officers.

Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson claimed that subordinates tended to cover up mistakes or inconvenient data and falsified reports in order to give a good impression and tell superiors what they wanted to hear, rather than the truth, in an attempt to appease the high command. It is alleged that Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson ordered the destruction of operation orders issued by G.H.Q. during the retreat from Mons in order to hide the panic, which had occurred during that campaign, while Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-Williams (37th Division) predated orders he had given and made untrue statements of events. Similarly the Staff of the Fourth Army destroyed the War Diary of Fourth Army General Staff for 1 July 1916, and substituted a Narrative of Events in order to cover up the failure to exploit the success at Montauban by XIII Corps.

One staff officer remarked that 'a feeling was created amongst those in the front line that to tell unpalatable truths' was 'unpopular with those above, and led to one being considered not to have the right amount of "The

75 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.  
76 Major-General Sir L. Pope-Hennessy to Liddell Hart, 28 May 1937, Liddell Hart Papers 1/579 3-4, LHCMA.  
77 Liddell Hart, Talk with M. Cuthbertson, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1933/25, LHCMA.  
78 Liddell Hart, Talk with Edmonds, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1931/3, LHCMA; Liddell Hart, 'Some Odd Notes for History', Liddell Hart Papers 11/1933/5, LHCMA.
fighting spirit' which 'undoubtedly led people to hesitate to tell the whole truth'.

Shoddy practices, such as falsification of reports and 'the whitewashing habit', prevented the high command from recognizing 'the most valuable lessons' from the Somme in 1916 'which might have saved us from many of the futilities of Passchendaele in 1917. Post-battle narratives by commanders, which 'did not always paint a true picture', failing 'to bring out some of the big lessons' were one reason for the failure 'to learn from our mistakes'.

On the Ancre in November 1916 one commander refused 'several times' to send on the reports by his Brigade-Major about the very poor conditions on the grounds that he would lose his job while another Brigade Major 'had to alter considerably a draft narrative, not because it was in any way inaccurate' but because his commander 'wanted certain incidents to appear in a more favourable light than they perhaps should have done'.

Fear of dismissal when 'it was common talk that no divisional commander dared say his infantry were unfit to attack for fear of being sent home', led to even more nefarious practices. One battalion commander admitted frankly after the war that he 'only renewed the attack' on Guedecourt in September 1916 'to save my reputation' and because he 'was more frightened of my superiors than even of

79 Major-General G.M. Lindsay to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 28 June 1937, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
80 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
81 Major L.W. Kentish to Edmonds, 19 November 1936, CAB 45 135, PRO.
82 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
When unable to persuade 14th Division of the impracticality of an attack on Delville Wood in August 1916, Brigadier-General P.C.B. Skinner (41st Brigade), hatched a plan with the commander of the 8/K.R.R.C. to launch a feint attack and then reported the position occupied. When in April 1918 a battalion commander ‘flatly refused to carry out’ a ‘futile’ attack his brigade merely reported that the counter-attack had failed.

Nevertheless, many officers remained in less glamorous posts because the they saw it as 'the right course for the general show' and regarded such 'days of grave crisis' as 'not time to think of one's own career' although they fully realised that such action might be 'suicidal' and 'bad professionally' because it meant being left behind in promotion by friends and colleagues. The G.S.O.1, 30th Division was proud that his report on the operations of July 1916 was ‘strictly accurate and not patched up as an “apologia pro sua vita”’.

The careerism of a minority of officers was counter-balanced by the social and cultural homogeneity of the officer corps which shared a close sense of community. Everyone knew each other either personally or by repute.

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84 Brigadier-General H.H.S. Morant to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 April [?1930], C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
85 Laton Fraven to Edmonds, 13 April 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
86 Lieutenant-Colonel M.C. Clayton to Edmonds, 3 March 1934, C.A.B.45 122, PRO.
87 Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Lister, Addenda to My Diary of 1st French Army Operations from 2nd April - 12 August 1918, p.2, Lister Papers, LHCMA.
88 General Sir Walter Kirke, Diary, 21 December 1915 and 10 January 1916, Kirke Papers, IWM.
89 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 18 March 1930, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
Above all, 'the old Army was a small family affair' in which an individual officer, Brigadier-General Philip Howell, could write to his wife that 'I seem to know everybody & everyone me', attend a conference with 'all the generals & staffs of the whole bally show' meeting 'hundreds of old friends', and be taken to have tea with Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief, who explained 'the whole situation on the map'.

From attending a particular school; Sandhurst or Woolwich; belonging to a particular regiment, or having participated in certain campaigns together; or Staff College, each officer had a small circle of acquaintances with whom he remained on intimate terms throughout his entire career. Friendships were particularly strong at regimental level. Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Lieutenant-General E.F. Norton, and Major-General E.O. Lewin, artillery staff officers during the war became friends while serving together in 30th Battery, R.F.A. Colonel A. Crookenden (G.S.O.1, 11th Division) named his son after a friend in the same Regiment who was killed in 1915. These ties continued to be a strong influence on senior officers, such as Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, who whenever visiting G.H.Q. stayed or dined with Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Dunnington-Jefferson, who had

91 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 30 June 1916, 20 and 28 September 1914, Howell Papers IV C/3 308 & 66-67, LHCMA.
92 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2 1/55, LHCMA.
93 Mrs Mary Napier to Major A. Crookenden, 24 October 1915, Crookenden Papers, IWM.
also joined the Royal Fusiliers. This group cohesion was extended from regiments to divisions during the war. For example, the 51st Division was 'almost a family concern'.

The Staff Colleges, the passport to high rank, provided a very important method of meeting fellow high-flyers and making life-long friendships. Edmonds stated that the friends made at Camberley 'remained my closest friends for the rest of my life, eclipsing those of my school, Woolwich cadet and young officer at Chatham periods'. The Staff College also widened an officer's contacts. Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery noted that 'two of the happiest years of my service were spent at the Staff College, where I made many friends in other branches of the Army'. The closeness of the links between officers and their families can be seen in the friendship of Lieutenant-General Sir Basil Burnett-Hitchcock and Edmonds who served together for three years on the peace staff of the 4th Division, whose wives shared the same house when the war came, and whose children were at Oxford together and 'were almost one family'.

An example of the friendships and networks made by officers can be seen by the careers of two officers.

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94 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 31 May 1917, 20 January 1918, and 18 December 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
95 Brigadier-General Sir Standish Craufurd to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 August 1944, CAB 45 118, PRO.
96 Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Karslake to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 22 October 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 1/414, LHCMA.
97 Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XIV, Edmonds Papers III/2/26, LHCMA.
99 Edmonds to Liddell Hart, 25 November 1938, Liddell Hart Papers, 1/733 16, LHCMA.
General Sir Sidney Clive, a staff officer at G.H.Q. during the war, was 'curious how many people one knows' while lunching at XI Corps in September 1915 with five friends; who he had met during service with his regiment (Grenadier Guards), at Staff College, the manoeuvres of 1913, during the war, and at G.H.Q. Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor was at "The Shop" with Major-General C.E.D. Budworth; a subaltern in India with Winston Churchill and General Sir Hubert Gough; in "G" Battery with General Sir Percy Radcliffe, and with Field-Marshal Earl Haig on the Staff of Sir John French during the Boer War. As the war progressed the small numbers of the old Regular Army tended to be swamped by the more numerous territorials and New Army officers. For example, going on the leave boat to the U.K., Edmonds discovered that 'as time passed I found that I knew fewer and fewer of the officers on board; from knowing everyone in 1914, I was glad in 1918 if I saw the face of a single old hand'.

With the close-knit Regular Army sustaining many deaths especially during 1914 and 1915, no senior officer was unaffected by the loss of colleagues. In early 1915 Sir John French haunted by the high casualties imagined that 'my room is becoming thick with the spirits of my friends'.

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100 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 11 September 1915, Clive Papers II/2 47, LHCMA.
101 Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1915, pp.19, 23, 31 and 32, and -1916, p.2, Tudor Papers, RAI.
102 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVII, Edmonds Papers III/11 14, LHCMA.
103 Frank Davies and Graham Maddocks, Bloody Red Tabs: General Officer Casualties of the Great War, 1914-1918, pp.xii, note that 232 generals were killed or wounded during the war.
104 Sir John French to Mrs Bennett, 25 February 1915, French Papers 75 46 1, IWM.
'Wully' Robertson 'felt deeply' the death of Colonel Freddy Kerr, a close friend killed by a shell while G.S.O.1, 1st Division on 31 October 1914. Increasingly officers, such as Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen felt 'awful losing all one's friends one after another' and saw each casualty list 'with a feeling of horror for the loss of another friend' while Howell felt 'anger at losing my friends & anxiety to preserve the few who are left'. Many officers also suffered the loss of close relatives: John Capper and Hubert Gough had brothers killed in 1915; Major-General Sir Robert Montgomery, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, General Sir Walter Braithwaite, and Capper lost their only sons; while Herbert Lawrence lost both sons.

One outsider noted that the three pillars of General Lord Jeffreys' beliefs and loyalty were Eton, the Brigade of Guards and the Conservative Party. These pillars contributed to the homogeneity of the British Army. The majority of the sample were in school during the last years of Queen Victoria's age. The officer corps was not only dominated by public school educated men but also came from a very narrow band of schools. For example, the bulk of the officers trained at Woolwich for the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers came from Wellington, Cheltenham, Clifton, Marlborough and Malvern while the Guards, Cavalry and

105 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 31 October 1914, Clive Papers II/1/50, LHCMA.
106 Colonel R. Meinertzhagen to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Dunnington-Jefferson, 28 May 1915, Dunnington-Jefferson Papers, IWM.
107 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 28 September 1915, Howell Papers IV/C 3 229, LHCMA.
109 See Appendices 4, 5, 16 and 17.
Infantry officers at Sandhurst were supplied from Eton, Harrow and Winchester.\textsuperscript{110} In 1913 nearly half the cadets at Woolwich in 1913 came from five schools.\textsuperscript{111}

This trend was also reflected in the Army's elite. Of the sample, over a seventh (96) had attended Eton while over a third (223) had been educated at one of five public schools \textsuperscript{112} and over half (334) had attended one of ten public schools.\textsuperscript{113} Five public schools founded to provide soldiers and civil servants for the Empire alone provided nearly a quarter (154) of the officers in the sample.\textsuperscript{114} Sir Frank Fox even compared service at G.H.Q. to 'such a life as studious boys might live at a Public School, if there can be imagined a Public School in which sport was reduced to the minimum essential to keep one fit for hard "swotting"'.\textsuperscript{115}

At School important links could be forged which would be useful in the Army both for senior commanders, such as Hubert Gough, who had been a contemporary at Eton of Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Major-Generals Sir Neill Malcolm, and Sir Percy Hambro,\textsuperscript{116} and junior officers, such as General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, who was a contemporary at Rugby of Generals Sir Desmond Anderson, Sir Harold Franklyn, George Giffard, Arthur Percival and Sir

\textsuperscript{110} Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan, \textit{Peace and War, A Soldier's Life}, p.17.

\textsuperscript{111} Wellington, Cheltenham, Clifton, Marlborough, and Winchester; Alan Shepperd, \textit{Sandhurst}, p.115.

\textsuperscript{112} Eton, Wellington, Harrow. Marlborough, and Charterhouse.

\textsuperscript{113} Eton, Wellington, Harrow. Marlborough, Charterhouse, Winchester, Clifton, Cheltenham, Rugby and Haileybury.

\textsuperscript{114} Cheltenham, Clifton, Haileybury, Marlborough, and Wellington; see Appendix 4.

\textsuperscript{115} "G.S.O." [Sir Frank Fox], \textit{G.H.Q.}, p.3 of the Foreword.

\textsuperscript{116} Obituary, \textit{The Times}, 20 March 1963, Liddell Hart Papers 1/323/42, LHCMA.
Henry Pownall.\textsuperscript{117} For others acquaintance began even earlier. Colonel T.T. Grove was at Preparatory School with General Sir Charles Deedes, General Lord Jeffreys and Major-General O.H.L. Nicholson.\textsuperscript{118} The 'Old School Tie' could also provide a point of contact between the Regular and Non-regular Officers. One temporary artillery officer following a visit from the Second Army commander (Plumer) was admonished for not being 'obsequious enough' and talking 'to the old man as if he had been a friend' by his Colonel who was unaware that they were both Old Etonians.\textsuperscript{119}

Some officers, such as Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-Williams, proclaiming Winchester the 'best school in the world', were aggressively proud of their school.\textsuperscript{120} General Sir Sidney Clive, like his father an Old Harrovian, having heard in France that his wife had sent his son to Eton, returned to take him to Harrow.\textsuperscript{121} Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, who had gone to a private school in France rather than public school, was made to feel at Woolwich 'that I was quite out of the herd, I had missed something that they all had'.\textsuperscript{122} Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton 'was fully conscious that the Brighton College of his day was neither an Eton, a Harrow nor a Winchester; it was not even a Clifton, a Charterhouse nor a Tonbridge' and 'it was many a long year before he could bring himself to admit without a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[118] Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.4, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
\item[119] Major R.P. Schweder MC to his wife, 19 December 1916, p.110, Schweder Papers, IWM.
\item[120] Guy Chapman, \textit{A Passionate Prodigality}, p.163.
\item[121] Obituary of Brigadier Archer Clive, \textit{The Times}, 17 April 1995, p.17.
\item[122] Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2/1/4, LHCMA.
\end{footnotes}
certain embarrassment the precise locality of his Alma Mata'.  
While some 73 (10%) of the sample had been to University with Oxford and Cambridge by far the most popular Universities, often, as in Haig's case, officers did not bother to take a degree, although Congreve (Pembroke, Oxford) was sent down for shooting the Junior Proctor in the head with an air gun. Many officers resembled Haig who 'read few books and never a single novel' and had 'few, if any, interests outside soldiering' other than polo and his family.

The modern regimental system was at the heart of British military culture and its diversity of sub-cultures. Alanbrooke believed that his regimental service were 'some of the happiest and certainly the most carefree days of my life'. Military dynasties were common as families became associated with regiments. For example, Major-General Sir Guy Dawnay served with the Coldstream Guards as did his father, his brother, and, eventually, his two sons while his brother-in-law, General Sir Sidney Clive, joined the Grenadier Guards as did his father, his brother, and his son. Officers were bound to their regiments by strong family ties, which owed little to grandiose ideas of nation

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123 Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton, Charlton, p.29.
124 See Appendix 6.
125 Commander Sir Geoffrey Congreve Bart., The Congreve Family, p.129.
127 General Sir Noel Birch to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 15 December, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/V1J24, LHCMA.
128 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2/1 9, LHCMA.
129 Major-General G.P. Dawnay, Personal Correspondence, 1919-50, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
or empire, but much to tradition, homogeneity and regimental pride. General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, a rifleman, stated in his memoirs that his proudest day came when he became Colonel Commandant of his Regiment’s 1st Battalion.\(^{131}\) Staff Officers at G.H.Q., such as Generals Sir Sidney Clive \(^{132}\) and Sir Walter Kirke, \(^{133}\) tried to get back to their regiments without success.

In an Army which was permanently fragmented and thinly spread over a large Empire a soldier’s loyalty was to the concrete reality of the "Regiment", not to the more abstract concept of the "Army", the regimental system, while promoting unit esprit de corps and cohesion, encouraged inter-arm rivalry and friction. When one Brigadier-General reported after the Battle of Cambrai that some drunken, artillery officers had looted his headquarters, ‘it raised an awful storm’ and he and his Divisional Commander were put under pressure by the Corps and Army to withdraw the report, which he refused to do.\(^{134}\)

With the advent of modern weapons the cavalry in particular felt itself to be under threat. The transfer of de Lisle from the infantry to a cavalry regiment, in an attempt by Lord Roberts to reform the cavalry after the Boer War, generated much opposition within the cavalry.\(^{135}\)

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131 General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter I, p.6, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
132 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 1 June 1915, Clive Papers II/1/140, LHCMA.
133 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 2 February, 17 and 25 August, and 16 November 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
134 Brigadier-General Sir Standish Crauford to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 and 25 August 1944, C.A.B.45/118, PRO.
135 General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, Reminiscences of Sport and War, pp.121-124.
to the war Haig and French had been allies in their defence of the Cavalry arm. During the war, Beddington was accused by a senior officer, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Kavanagh, of being "a traitor" to his arm, the cavalry, for advocating the abolition of the Cavalry Corps in 1916. Allenby (Cavalry Corps) and his B.G.G.S. (Howell) were reported to Haig by Major-General H.J.M. Macandrew (B.G.G.S., Indian Cavalry Corps) as being 'despondent' regarding the possibilities of cavalry action in future.

Such attitudes hindered any objective assessment of progress and fostered an extreme parochialism, which, according to Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, hampered the promotion of good officers, by replacing intelligence and professional knowledge with regimental favouritism. It was the perception of many officers that belonging to an elite regiment could enhance an officer's prospects within the Army. It was claimed that Major-General Sir John Davidson had 'the additional advantage' of being in the K.R.R.C. while General Sir Francis Davies, as a Guardsman with 'a lot of influence', was thought capable of avoiding removal as a Divisional Commander after Neuve Chapelle. The subsequent promotion of Davies to be

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137 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoirs, pp.95-96, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
138 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 11 April 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
140 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 6 February 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
141 Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Keary to his brother, Captain F.W. Keary, R.N., 23 April 1915, Keary Papers, IWM.
Military Secretary at the War Office reinforced this perception. The rapid promotion of Bethell, the youngest divisional commander on the Western Front, was attributed to his belonging to Haig's old regiment, 7th Hussars, although, in fact, Haig appears to have shown greater loyalty to his second regiment, the 17th Lancers, which formed the Guard of Honour at G.H.Q. throughout his tenure as Commander-in-Chief.

The Army was a small professional force designed primarily for a particular task: the defence of the Empire. Few of the officers in the sample were without imperial experience as only 123 (18%) of 700 were not veterans and most had much more battle experience than their Continental counterparts. Of the sample 485 (69%) had fought in South Africa (1899-1902), 73 (10%) on the North-West Frontier (1897-98), and 64 (9%) on the Nile (1897-99). Most of the senior officers in the sample had obtained positions of influence as a result of their pre-war, colonial service. For example, of the four Inspectors-General of the King's African Rifles before the war, three, Major-Generals J.E. Gough, G.H. Thesiger, and A.R. Hoskins, served on the Western Front. Other officers, such as General Sir William Heneker, General Sir Thomas Morland, and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard, had also served with distinction in West Africa.

142 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 11 October 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
143 See Appendix 9.
It is debatable whether colonial experience was of much use on the Western Front and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien bluntly complained that 'one could never become an up-to-date soldier in the prehistoric warfare to be met with against the Dervishes'.\(^\text{145}\) At the turn of the century the British in Africa were still employing the square, notably against Fulani horsemen during the Kano-Sokoto Expedition in Northern Nigeria in March 1903,\(^\text{146}\) and against the Dervishes of the Mad Mullah in Somaliland in April 1903.\(^\text{147}\) A large number of British Generals whose experience was bush orientated had only a rudimentary knowledge of modern war. Typical were Major-General Sir Henry Lukin, who had fought in the Zulu War (1879), being severely wounded at Ulundi, in Basutoland (1881), in Bechuanaland (1896-97), and in the Boer War (1899-1902),\(^\text{148}\) and General Sir William Heneker, who had served in Benin and Nigeria (1899-1903), published a book on 'Bush Warfare' (1906),\(^\text{149}\) and was said to be 'more at home in a rough house than in civilised discussion or speculation'.\(^\text{150}\) Although not "educated" soldiers, men like Lukin, who was 'an experienced soldier' having 'commanded the Cape Mounted Rifles' during 'the last year of the South


\(^{150}\) Major-General H Essame to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 27 January 1962, Liddell Hart Papers 1/269/107, LHCMA.
African War',¹⁵¹ possessed 'an abundance of sound common sense' and tactical flexibility.¹⁵²

Physical robustness, and initiative was required by officers on campaign against savage foes, especially those who found themselves in command of small forces in remote areas. Many officers became self-sufficient because of their experiences, notably Major-General S.S. Butler who 'had travelled from Baghdad through Arabia to Damascus disguised in native Arab costume' ¹⁵³ and Meinertzhagen who, as a junior officer in Kenya, was one of 'three white men in the heart of Africa, with 20 nigger soldiers and 50 nigger police, 68 miles from doctors and reinforcements, administering and policing a district inhabited by half a million well-armed savages'.¹⁵⁴ Brigadier-General W.D. Wright won the V.C. at Rawia in March 1903 defeating the determined charges of the Emir of Kano's 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot with a small troop of Mounted Infantry, consisting of one officer and forty-four men. Major-General C.H. Foulkes thought nothing of journeying 175 miles with an escort of six Hausa soldiers, riding almost non-stop for three days and two nights, in order to capture the fleeing Emir of Kano despite a display of military might by at least 10,000 warriors.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 29 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9 PRO.
¹⁵² Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1918, p.3, Tudor Papers, RAI.
¹⁵³ Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 9 June 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 32 PRO.
In defending the Empire the combined world-wide experience of the older officers and N.C.O.s was formidable. While at Staff College 'there was hardly a corner of the British Empire but you could hear about it from someone who had been there, and hardly a small war of the past fifteen years but someone had taken part in it'.

General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall remembered that in his artillery brigade before the war in 1914 all the senior officers and even some of the subalterns had war experience and that, as a result, the field training was practical and taken very seriously. Field-Marshal Lord Milne first came to the attention of Kitchener when serving at Omdurman, while Lieutenant-General G.H. Fowke first came to prominence during the Siege of Ladysmith. The Regular Army was especially successful in producing at battalion and brigade level the drive, inspiring leadership and bravery of men such as Brigadier-General J.V. Campbell, who won the V.C. on the Somme in 1916 by rallying his men with his hunting horn, Field-Marshal Lord Gort, who won the M.C., three D.S.O.s and the V.C. commanding battalions of the Grenadier Guards, Brigadier-General Frank Maxwell, V.C., who led his troops from the front, and Brigadier-General (later Major-Generals Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars, p.6. Obituary of Field-Marshal Lord Milne, n.d., Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hutton Papers, LHCMA. Obituary of Lieutenant-General Sir George Fowke in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs, p.216a, Lee Papers, IWM. Obituary of Brigadier J.V. Campbell, V.C., 23 May 1944, in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs, p.100a, Lee Papers, IWM. [Brigadier] Sir John Smyth, V.C., Milestones: A Memoir, p.128. Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft, Three Years with the 9th (Scottish) Division, pp.86 and 91-92, and Sir William Darling, So It Looks To Me, pp.170-171.
General) A.L. Ransome, who 'was quite willing and able to take a rifle and do a bit of the stabbing himself'.

In many ways the Army's own "culture" reinforced the Colonel Blimp stereotype, which still prevails. Senior officers were often difficult and arbitrary in their behaviour towards subordinate officers, notably General Sir Richard Haking, who was 'a vindictive bully'; Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, who spoke to subordinate generals 'as if he was teaching a class of N.C.O.s'; Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-Williams, whose entrance caused 'a minor stampede' amongst his staff; and General Sir Peter Strickland, a feared autocrat whose arrival caused his staff to exit in panic via the nearest window. Senior officers, such as General Sir Bertram Sergison-Brooke and the Major-General Hon. W. Lambton, were distinctly "livery" in the morning and could not be approached until after luncheon while others were notorious for their temper, notably Allenby, nicknamed 'the Bull'; General Sir Horace

163 R. Cude, Memoirs, p.156, Cude Papers, IWM.
164 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 8 and 20 December 1915 and 18 April 1916, Game Papers PWG 9 & 11, IWM.
165 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 24 December 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
168 Oliver Lytton, Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, p.52; Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiat, Happy Odyssey, p.79.
169 General Sir George Barrow to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 3 June 1938, Allenby Papers 6/VI/16; General Sir Charles Grant to Wavell, 21 November 1936, Allenby Papers 6/VII/26; General Spencer E. Hollond to Wavell, 4 December [c.1936-38], Allenby Papers 6/VII/31, LHCMA.
Smith-Dorrien;\textsuperscript{170} Bruce-Williams, 'a blustering bounder';\textsuperscript{171} Major-General Sir Oliver Nugent;\textsuperscript{172} and Major-General H.L. Reed.\textsuperscript{173}

One non-regular officer noted how 'the English professional officers of 1914' formed an 'isolated and self-contained body' which amazed him 'by their narrow professionalism and the extent to which they had preserved the outlook of the least intelligent and most snobbish type of late Victorian public-school boy'.\textsuperscript{174} Senior commanders of the Great War 'retained an almost schoolboyish way of talking', using exaggerated terms about each other such as 'cads and bounders, roters or stinkers' which did not represent a considered judgement but rather reflected 'the persistent adolescence characteristic of many regimental messes'.\textsuperscript{175} For example, one officer called a fellow Brigade Commander 'a bounder and a cad, a bombastic fat buckstick'.\textsuperscript{176}

Numerous stories illustrate the remoteness and Blimp-like qualities of the Generals at different levels of the hierarchy and the 'professional exclusiveness' of the old regular Army 'made it impossible for them to establish any

\textsuperscript{170} Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.10, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159/1, LHCMA; The Earl of Carnavon, No Regrets, pp.100-101; General Sir Archibald Murray to Jasper, 28 December 1933, Murray Papers 77 48 4, IWM.

\textsuperscript{171} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 18 May 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS; Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality, p.173; Major-General P.G. Whitefoord, Diary, 15 and 16 May 1918, Whitefoord Papers 77/2 1, IWM.

\textsuperscript{172} Captain Cyril Falls to Liddell Hart, 22 August 1964, Liddell Hart Papers 1/276/60, LHCMA.

\textsuperscript{173} Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Holland to Field-Marshal Lord Horne, 12 October 1918, Horne Papers 73 60 2, IWM; General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 14 January 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.


\textsuperscript{175} Lord Geddes, Unworthy Apologia, National Review, February 1953, pp.109-110, Liddell Hart Papers 15 2 23, LHCMA.

\textsuperscript{176} General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 24 April 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
contact with the civilians who formed the overwhelming majority of the officers in the line'. Regular soldiers were often unable to unbend and found it difficult to establish relations of mutual trust with their own citizen soldiers, increasing the gulf between them and the New Armies. General Sir William Thwaites (46th Division), a Gunner with his eyeglass, ruddy complexion and fierce white moustache, could appear even to a regular staff officer as 'the very model of a modern Major-General' portrayed in The Pirates of Penzance. Major-General Sir John Capper with 'a fanatical temperament' and 'holding the most archaic views on soldiering, government, and the conduct of life' epitomised the stereotype of Colonel Blimp being an 'extremely dogmatic' soldier who 'in arguing seemed rather to bark than talk', 'repressed rather than invited opinions, and would not tolerate argument'.

The Army disliked and distrusted showmanship of the type which generals such as Montgomery would indulge in during the Second World War. It was seen by officers as "bad form" to court the press by having one's photograph in the newspapers. Soldiers had an 'extreme reticence and horror of all forms of publicity', boastfulness, and appearing conspicuous. In marked contrast to the Second World War most of the senior officers, such as Haig, Allenby

179 Extracts from H.Q. Tanks, 1917-1918 by Captain the Hon. Sir Evan Charteris, Liddell Hart Papers 15/2 6, LHCMA.
180 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 11 February 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
181 Notes by General Sir Ivor Maxse, [January 1918], Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
and Plumer, were loath to address the troops. Haig, in particular, was notorious for his inability to make a coherent speech. Many generals, such as Major-General H.I.W. Hamilton (3rd Division) or Major-General W. Douglas Smith (20th Division), appeared taciturn, dour, and austere to their own staff officers let alone the troops they commanded.

Regular officers were slow to appreciate that the New Army made greater demands on their powers of leadership than the Old Army and tensions between the professionals and amateurs (like R.N. and R.N.V.R. in the Royal Navy) continued well into the war. Senior officers proved unsympathetic in their professionalism to the New Armies and attempted to inculcate Regular discipline, ill-suited to 'the type of war we were then fighting'. Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker (21st Division), 'very unpopular' and 'positively inhuman' to his troops, admitted that he had been impatient and had misjudged the differences in dealing with Regular and New Army troops. Many officers agreed with the sentiment that France was 'no place for amateur soldiers, of whom we have more than enough

184 Colonel R. Macleod, Memoirs, pp.235-246 and 380-381, Macleod Papers 1/1, LHCMA.
185 Lieutent-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.178-179, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
already' and 'it became a joke that very simple language had to be used in instructing the officers and men of the New Army'. One Divisional Commander complained about the 'sarcastic' and 'disparaging remarks' made in 1917 by Maxse (XVIII Corps) about the London Territorials of 58th Division, 'constantly comparing them with "teachers at a girls' school"'. Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson believed that Kitchener's 'ridiculous and preposterous' New Armies were 'the laughing-stock of every soldier in Europe', and were 'a roughish lot with hardly a gentleman amongst the officers'. Regular soldiers were particularly unfavourable towards the lax discipline of Colonial troops. For example, General Sir Archibald Murray noted that, although 'from a physical point of view a magnificent body of men', the Australians had 'no idea of ordinary decency or self control'. Even Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, an innovative soldier, believed that the Canadians in 1914 were 'not an army but a mob, much worse than Kitchener's army'.

Commanders at all levels were obsessed with saluting and regulations relating to uniforms and equipment. For example, Haig spoke to the Army and Corps Commander (Gough and Jacob) about 'the lack of smartness, and the slackness

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187 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 20 October 1914, Kirke Papers, IWM.
188 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers III/10 8, LHCMA.
189 Major-General H.D. Fanshawe to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 58th Division A/35/6312, 29 September 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
191 Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 21 November 1915, Game Papers PWG 9, IWM.
192 General Sir Archibald Archibald Murray to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 18 March 1916, Robertson Papers 1/32/13/1, LHCMA.
193 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his Father, 15 August 1914, Fuller Papers IV 3/141B, LHCMA.
of one of its Batt[alion]ns in the matter of saluting when I was motoring through the village' where the 49th Division was billeted,\textsuperscript{194} while Haig's staff complained to the commanders of the 16th and 33rd Divisions because troops failed to salute the Commander-in-Chief.\textsuperscript{195} Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson took Cavan, his fellow Grenadier, to task for being improperly dressed, wearing the gold spurs of a guardsman when he was no longer a regimental officer.\textsuperscript{196}

The Army firmly believed that 'discipline increases the self-respect of the individual and is shown by a smart and soldierly bearing, scrupulous cleanliness, good saluting, punctilious care of arms and the habit of unhesitating obedience to command'.\textsuperscript{197} Obsessive behaviour gained intelligent Commanders reputations as martinets. Allenby (Third Army) was notorious for haranguing a dead body for not wearing a helmet;\textsuperscript{198} Gough (Fifth Army) went round the trenches spotting dirty rifles;\textsuperscript{199} and Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps) inspected the latrines whenever he visited a unit.\textsuperscript{200} Haking (XI Corps) when inspecting a unit which had just come out of the trenches complained about the 'dirt on their

\textsuperscript{194} Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 4 September 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/13 PRO.
\textsuperscript{195} Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Major-General W.B. Hickie, 5 March 1916, Kiggell Papers V/12, LHCMA; Major E.G. Thompson to Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, 1 September 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{196} Oliver Lyttleton, Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, p.46.
\textsuperscript{197} S.S.143, The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1919T, February 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
\textsuperscript{198} Major-General Cecil A. Heydeman to Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, 22 March 1939, Allenby Papers 6/V/32, LHCMA; Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Wavell, 23 June 1938, Allenby Papers 6/VI/33, LHCMA; Major-General Sir Lothian Nicholson, Diary, 5 March 1917, Nicholson Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{199} Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Broad, 12 February 1947, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1947/2, LHCMA.
clothes from hard work' and inspected the 26th Brigade for 2½ hours in August 1916, while General Sir Cameron Shute (V Corps) ordered troops to wear 'two head chains & burnished metal' for a parade. In September 1917 the 37th Division insisted that 'a very high standard of smartness and cleanliness must be insisted upon throughout the training period'.

In the eyes of one senior officer 'to concentrate on such trifles while neglecting serious matters showed a lack of a sense of proportion'. This elaborate protocol, and ceremony, which governed military life far more than that of civilians, formed a barrier between the Army leadership and the New Army troops. A non-regular, regimental officer noted that 'the Old Army could not grasp that the New Army cared nothing for soldiering as a trade; thought of it only as a job to be done, and the more expeditiously the better'.

Nevertheless, the social isolation of the Army officer can be overdrawn. The more thoughtful officers were able to temper their professionalism with a more sympathetic approach. Haig, more flexible than many senior officers, preferred to stress the fighting spirit and keen

201 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 11 May 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM; see also General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 9 May 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
202 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 3 August 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
203 Pinney, Diary, 31 October 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
204 Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Dill, Notes on Training to be carried out in the Reserve Area, 37 Division No.G.3116, p.2, 11 September 1917, Dill Papers I/3/2, LHCMA.
205 Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles quoted by Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Diary, 2 February 1939, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1939 6, LHCMA.
206 Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality, pp.141-142.
determination of the Australians rather than their poor disciplinary record. Generals such as Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood and Field-Marshal Lord Plumer with experience of Dominion troops were able to accept colonial ideas of discipline. There are, moreover, many examples of the high regard held for senior officers at all levels of the high command. General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was an example of an officer who could speak with great eloquence to the troops and was greatly admired by regimental officers. Plumer was someone who 'the men all love & admire', taking the trouble to get to know even his battalion commanders individually and gaining the confidence of the troops.

Jacob (II Corps) 'made a great impression on the [8th] Division by finding time to see all the officers of each Brigade at Brigade H.Q. and to talk to each of them individually' in June 1917. One N.C.O. awaiting 'with no little trepidation' an interview with General Sir David Campbell (21st Division) for a commission was put at his ease 'with a kindly word' and emerged proud of his service with his battalion on the Somme.

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208 Colonel R. Macleod, Memoir, pp.245 and 256, Macleod Papers, LHCMA.
209 Lieutenant-Colonel T.S. Wollocombe, M.C., Diary of the Great War, pp.38 and 69, Wollocombe Papers, IWM; Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Floyer-Acland, Memoirs, p.29, Floyer-Acland Papers, IWM.
210 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Morland to his daughter, 20 June 1917, Morland Papers, IWM.
211 Rowland Feilding, War Letters to a Wife, France and Flanders, 1915-19, p.163.
212 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, p.113, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
213 I.L. Read, Of Those We Loved, p.268.
George Harper (51st Division), 'the most charming of men',\textsuperscript{214} won 'the genuine affection of all ranks' by being 'in constant touch with his troops, both in and out of the line' and was 'known personally to many of them'.\textsuperscript{215} Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Walker (1st Australian Division), 'a waspish little bloke with a very quick turn of wit', maintained close contact with his troops and 'spent a lot of time chatting to them' wishing 'to know exactly what the men were thinking'.\textsuperscript{216} Brigadier-General R. McDouall (141st Brigade) calling his troops 'a lot of lazy Buggers for not digging fast enough', removed his tunic and began digging beside them.\textsuperscript{217}

Most of the top officers of the B.E.F. were part of a homogeneous and tightly-knit group with its own sense of identity, ethics and standards. The interpretation that the social background of the officer corps was responsible for the failings of the Army in the First World War, while providing a possible answer for the shortcomings of some officers, remains dubious and conveys the impression of monolithic stupidity among the officer corps which is not convincing. Indeed, the fact that the army leadership of the First World War and the successful commanders of the Second World War came from the same social background makes untenable the interpretation that the social background of

\textsuperscript{214} N.G. Barron to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 January 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.

\textsuperscript{215} Major F.W. Bewsher, \textit{The History of the 51st (Highland) Division}, p.273.

\textsuperscript{216} Major H.V. Howe to Captain E.W. Bush, 1 February 1972, Bush Papers 75/65 2, IWM.

\textsuperscript{217} Corporal H.W. Smith, Diary, 15 September 1916, Smith Papers, IWM.
an officer corps dominated by the "landed classes" explains
the army's failures to meet the challenges of trench warfare
or the suggestion that senior officers were incapable of
adjusting to changing conditions.
The British Army, like the other Armies involved from 1914, was unready for an unexpected trench war quite distinct from a "traditional" war of movement. Unlike other European armies, the British Army was employed in world-wide garrison and policing duties for the Empire and, while excellent for colonial warfare, its small, professional organisation was ill-prepared for continental warfare, with its clashes between mass citizen armies. Birch noted that ‘our army was to a great extent an amateur facing a professional army, and that those in command, in fact in all ranks from general to lance-corporal, had to train their men and fight at the same time’.¹

In a repeat of the Crimean and Boer Wars the British Army, small by Continental standards, lacked the organisation for rapid expansion. The Army leadership, trained in small isolated wars and with little experience of continental warfare, as a result of its pre-war role as an imperial police force, was severely handicapped when pitted against the well-trained and highly organised German Army. Kiggell remarked after the war that ‘putting “new armies” up against highly trained ones, of such good stuff as Germans, is somewhat like putting up a village XI against the

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¹ General Sir Noel Birch to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 June 1938, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
Australians'. It was not until 1917-18 that all ranks, including the generals, could compete on equal terms.

Unlike the other major armies in 1914, which could concentrate their efforts on trying to absorb the lessons of modern warfare, the British coped with a rapid expansion of their professional army from a very small base. They faced the daunting task of raising and training a large and powerful army while deeply engaged in a major war, a task that other armies with their larger, conscript armies largely avoided. In August 1914 Haig proposed that the B.E.F. should not 'go over for 2 or 3 months' during which time 'the immense resources of the Empire' could be developed.\(^3\)

For political reasons, this good advice was ignored and, as a result, the first years of the war were a harsh and costly experience for the British Army. In 1915 and 1916 generals and staffs had to improvise formations from corps upwards. Looking back on the poor performance of the British commanders in 1914 General Sir Thomas Snow noted that 'we were one as bad, or I should say as ignorant, as the other' since 'we had none of us had the practice in handling such large bodies of troops, and the restrictions placed on the manoeuvre of troops in England had taught me many false lessons'.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 16 June 1938, C.A.B.45 135, PRO.

\(^3\) Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 5 August 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.

The largest force put into the field during the lifetime of any serving officers had been the relatively small number, a peak of 45,000, raised for the Boer War.\(^5\) The B.E.F. was not organised as the 'sole strategic reserve for use as required in the Empire' until 1906; previously the Home Army 'had no real war organisation and was just a number of draft-finding units'.\(^6\) In 1914, the British Regular Army at home consisted of only one cavalry and six infantry divisions and lacked even provisional planning for raising troops on anything approaching the Continental scale. Despite this the B.E.F. expanded from 4 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division in August 1914 to 11 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions in January 1915; the cavalry remained static but the infantry divisions continued to expand in number to 22 in July 1915; 38 in January 1916; 55 in July 1916; 57 in January 1917; to a peak of 62 in July 1917.\(^7\)

This ten-fold expansion in a time of war cannot be dismissed as an insignificant accomplishment. Nevertheless this was only achieved at great cost as the Army was plunged into a spiral of decline from which it only recovered in 1917-18. As Macdonogh noted, 'the old British Army was destroyed at 1st Ypres'\(^8\) and in these first months of the

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\(^5\) C. Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p.347.


\(^7\) Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Luckock, *Growth of British Troops in France, 1914-1918*, Staff College, Camberley, April 1920, Field-Marshal Sir John Dill Papers 3 2, LHCMA; see Appendix 16.

\(^8\) Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 July 1938, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
war the Regular Army lost a large percentage of its trained peacetime strength. The heavy casualties of 1914 and 1915 left the British with the Herculean task of revitalising the Army at all levels, reconstructing the Army at formation and unit level and creating the weaponry necessary to win the war.

In marked contrast to the Canadian and A.N.Z.A.C. Corps, which with permanently allocated divisions and supporting arms possessed the inestimable advantage of homogeneity, enabling them to develop a cohesion in their training, the division remained the basic fighting formation in the British Army and the composition of corps was constantly altered as the operational situation demanded.9 Moreover, it was 'not the policy of G.H.Q. to keep divisions in [the same] Corps' in 1916 and Corps Commanders such as General Sir Walter Congreve who wished to retain divisions were not allowed to do so.10 In 1916 XIII Corps thought that the Army 'has grown too big to think in Divisions' and that it was 'desirable that the Corps should be more generally recognised as the real "unit of attack"' and 'should exercise very close supervision and command over the plans and methods of divisional Commanders in order to ensure continuity and to avoid the repetition of methods which have been found to be erroneous'.11 As early as October 1916 Kiggell had suggested the 'regrouping of Divns.

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10 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 9 October 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
11 XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.9, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
in Corps and keeping [the] same Divns. in Corps' \(^{12}\) but the idea was not developed.

As a result, in contrast to the Canadian and Australian experience, British formations were constantly broken up. Henry Wilson (IV Corps) listed 12 divisions which had been under him in 1916 on a relatively quiet front \(^{13}\) while Maxse (XVII Corps) "hosted" 'no less than 30 British Divisions in 1917'. \(^{14}\) General Byng (Third Army) complained to G.H.Q. in August 1917 that 'the Divisions in a Corps are constantly changing'. \(^{15}\) Rawlinson (Fourth Army) noted the difficulties of supervising training schools efficiently 'owing to Corps constantly changing their Divisions and areas'. \(^{16}\) As late as October 1918 Major-General G.P. Dawnay (M.G.G.S., Staff Duties, G.H.Q.) was 'constantly being told by divisions moving from corps to corps and army to army that they are being taught differently - different doctrine and different methods - as they move from one command to another' \(^{17}\) and Fergusson (XVII Corps) complained of the detrimental effect of 'this constant shuffling of divisions from one Corps to another'. \(^{18}\) Experience showed that 'to work up poor divisions is impossible while they keep on shifting from Corps to Corps' whereas 'if Divisions were left in a Corps

\(^{12}\) General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 24 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.

\(^{13}\) Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, Memoranda at beginning of January 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.

\(^{14}\) Notes and Hints on Training, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 659, 10 February 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53/8A, IWM.

\(^{15}\) Field-Marshal Viscount Byng to Advanced G.H.Q., 20 August 1917, W.O.95 365, PRO.

\(^{16}\) General Sir Henry Rawlinson to G.H.Q. (Training), Fourth Army G.T.107, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.

\(^{17}\) Major-General G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir A.A. Montgomery, G.H.Q., 31 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.

\(^{18}\) General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Home, 10 October 1918, Home Papers 73/60 2, IWM.
for a good long time one could work up Corps esprit de corps'.

The system of rotating divisions through corps during 1915-17 gave Corps Commanders, who could further their own ambitions by proclaiming that the situation was more favourable than the more experienced divisional commanders judged it to be, little incentive to husband the divisions, which came and went with great rapidity. For example, Haking's disastrous attack (XI Corps) at Fromelles, which was 'a botch job' and 'as good an illustration as there was of the reckless extravagance in expenditure of life which ruled the minds of some of the subordinate commanders, like Gen. Haking, at this stage of the war', showed that 'the weakness of G.H.Q. lay in not seeing that a Corps commander, left to himself, would also be tempted to win glory for his Corps by spectacular success, and would be prodigal in using the Divisions that passed through his hands for this purpose'. Similarly the attack at Beaumont Hamel by the Fifth Army on 13 November 1916, was allowed against the protests of various Corps and Divisional commanders and staff who pointed out the appalling conditions and the exhaustion and disorganisation of his troops, because Gough was 'so keen and confident' that the

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19 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 11 April 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
20 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 30 July 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
21 Captain Philip Landon to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 April 1937, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
22 General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 23 October 1936, CAB 45/135, PRO; Major-General G.M. Lindsay to Edmonds, 28 June 1937, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
Commander-in-Chief decided to permit the attack.\footnote{23} The lack of cohesion and co-ordination at corps level exacerbated the weaknesses of an inexperienced army in controlling the battle at the operational level.

As General Noel Birch remarked, 'we had to learn our lesson in the pitiless school of war'.\footnote{24} Brigadier-General John Charteris noted 'we were learning our job by hard experience, and progress was on the whole rapid though costly', believing that battles such as Loos 'though unsuccessful, tactically or strategically' were justified by 'the lessons learnt and subsequently applied'.\footnote{25} As one battalion commander remarked on the Battle of Loos, 'everyone has to learn, staffs and troops alike, when faced with conditions so new as those of 1915'.\footnote{26} Marshal Foch thought that Haig's 'tremendous losses' on the Somme in 1916 were 'partly owing to having an untrained Army & Generals'.\footnote{27}

The British Army had to undergo a steep "learning curve" which 'during 1917 and 1918 led step by step to eliminating the omissions of 1916'.\footnote{28} With inexperienced commanders, staff, and troops the plans of the British during the period 1915-17 were with hindsight very ambitious and very difficult to achieve. Inexperienced in the

\footnote{23} Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 4 June 1938, CAB 45/135, PRO; see also Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 November 1916, W.O.256/13, PRO; General Sir Hubert Gough, The Fifth Army, p.156.
\footnote{24} General Sir Noel Birch to Edmonds, 8 July, 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
\footnote{25} Brigadier-General John Charteris to Edmonds, 24 February 1927, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
\footnote{26} Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. Martin to Edmonds, 8 September 1926, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
\footnote{27} Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 12 November 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
\footnote{28} Major-General R.M. Luckock to Edmonds, 8 August 1930, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
operational art the British from 1915 launched a series of small-scale battles and costly, attritional attacks on unsuitable terrain 'with heavy losses and no decisive success'. Poor or unrealistic planning and ineffective control of operations meant that too often the troops went into battle without adequate preparation, fire-support, logistic support and effective co-ordination that might have allowed the difficult task of expanding the initial break-in into a breakthrough to be achieved.

The best plans were doomed to failure unless the commanders at lower levels were thoroughly conversant with the ground, the men were fully briefed and were properly launched into battle. As early as December 1914 General Sir Archibald Murray, C.G.S. at G.H.Q., warned that 'it is important' that 'orders be issued in sufficient time to enable subordinate commanders to become thoroughly acquainted with the situation and to make all necessary arrangements' and that 'should this not be possible it will usually be better to postpone the attack'. With the expansion of the Army and the largely "amateur" status of the New Armies, this lesson had to be relearnt. One Brigadier-General noted that 'bad Staff work and want of co-ordination between Corps & Divisions' resulted 'in the many isolated efforts' failing because 'no attack could be successful if orders reach attacking troops too late for

30 General Sir Archibald Murray to First and Second Armies, 28 December 1914, Loch Papers 71 12 1, IWM.
careful explanations to be given to subordinate commanders and plans to be carefully thought out'.

Another lesson was the importance of preparation. One junior staff officer commented that the staff 'cannot say that their orders were always framed on sound tactics based on F.S.R. Part I' and they 'could not expect the gallant and brave men to do what was impossible and to give them no sporting chance of a fight' wasting good officers and men in offensives which were ill-prepared and showed 'a total disregard of the opinion of Officers, N.C.O.'s and men who had to do it'. After the war, Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery noted that the more tired the soldier was 'the more it is necessary to ensure that he is given a good "kick off", and is launched on his task with a reasonable and sporting chance of success'.

British operations in the Second Battle of Ypres were typical of the problems the "amateur" British Army had to face while adapting to operations on a continental scale. The Staff work of the Second Army in the Ypres Salient, exemplary in 1917, 'was very bad' in 1915 and divisions, notably the 50th, were thrown in without adequate orders or briefings. Haig received reports from subordinates that 'the state of the British troops around Ypres is not satisfactory' with reinforcements being 'ordered into the

31 Brigadier-General R. FitzMaurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 7 November 1936, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
32 M.C. Ferrers-Guy to Edmonds, 29 June 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
33 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
34 Major-General A.I. MacDougall, Diary, 4-13 May 1915, MacDougall Papers DS/MISC 92, IWM; see also Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 27 May 1915, Howell Papers IV/C 3/167, LHCMA.
fight without any preliminary reconnaissance or method' and counter-attacks being 'ordered over open ground, in daylight, which could not possibly succeed and only unnecessary losses resulted'.

General Sir Aylmer Haldane (3rd Division) complained that he was forced to undertake three attacks in 1915, which failed because they had 'at best been gambles, and none of them had the odds in their favour which Napoleon insisted on as indispensable', and was highly critical of the "holding" attacks' ordered by G.H.Q., 'silly shows' which asked 'men to sacrifice their lives uselessly' in attempting to pin down German reserves and frittered away men 'in absolute opposition to the principle of economy of force'.

The poor management of operations continued at the Battle of Loos in September 1915 when no proper staff arrangements were made to clear the roads for the advance of XI Corps to exploit the initial success of the assaulting divisions. Although Haig maintained that there was 'no avoidable delay' to the movement of the divisions of XI Corps 'through the administrative areas' of I and IV Corps, there is little doubt that poor staff work did indeed make the advance of the 21st and 24th Divisions on 25 September 1915 much more difficult than it should have been. The 21st and 24th Divisions were 'brought to the fight in an

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35 Field-Marshall Earl Haig, Diary, 2 June and 4 July 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
36 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 14 June 1915, 12 March 1915, and 25 April 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
38 Haig to G.H.Q., First Army No.194 15(a), 21 October 1915, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
exhausted condition, due to bad Staff work' both behind the
line where this fatigue was 'due in large measure to the
lack of any efficient traffic control' and in the front
lines by 'the utterly constant changes in orders'.

The 64th Brigade (21st Division) was held up for over
one and a half hours at Bruay Railway crossing by a train
accident and uncontrolled traffic. The Guards Division
had to wait at Marles les Mines for six hours because of the
crowded condition of the road due to shocking staff work.

Forestier-Walker (21st Division), witnessing successive
delays notably at the level crossing at Marles Les Mines,
feared that even Regular Divisions 'would have had to do
extraordinarily well' to cope with 'not only the enemy in
front, but with the bad staff work of Higher Commands, the
frequent counter-orders and the disgraceful lack of
organised control in the district behind the Front line'.

According to Jeffreys, who witnessed 'the appalling
confusion and congestion of the traffic' between La Bussiere
and Noeux les Mines, 'the afterwards excellent system of
traffic control of the army was evolved as a result of the
lessons of that day'.

Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice (B.G.O., G.H.Q.)
later admitted that 'for the night march of the 2 divisions
which was through a congested area and crossed several lines

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39 Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 24 January 1927,
C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
40 Major J. Buckley to Edmonds, 1 January 1927, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
42 Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker to Edmonds, 24 January 1927, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
43 General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 21 August 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
of railway in which there was much traffic, G.H.Q. should have made arrangements for assisting the march of newly formed divisions' and that 'this was a bad oversight on my part' \(^{44}\) and as 'there was so much friction and discussion about the employment of the general reserve I ought either to have insisted on the First Army making arrangements for clearing the roads or seen to it myself'. \(^{45}\) General Sir Robert Whigham (Sub Chief at G.H.Q.) noted that there were also 'faults in the exercise of command and Staff work' by the inexperienced XI Corps H.Q. Before the battle First Army had been warned to help the new Army Divisions by the C.G.S. (Robertson) because 'in nearly every case the march discipline of the New Divisions when proceeding to the front to join Armies has been noticed to be very indifferent' so there was no excuse for First Army to neglect traffic control. \(^{46}\)

There were also complaints concerning the way in which the 28th Division was made to march to the Loos battlefield instead of being allowed to travel by bus and rail. \(^{47}\) In a later attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 13 October 1915, Major-General Hon. E.J. Montague-Stuart-Wortley (46th Division) noted that the troops were hurried into the trenches to relieve the Guards Division and launched into the assault when 'the division had barely time to become

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\(^{44}\) Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1926, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.

\(^{45}\) Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to Edmonds, 12 January 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.

\(^{46}\) General Sir Robert Whigham to Edmonds, 9 July 1926, CAB 45/121, PRO; see also G.H.Q. Instruction O.A.M.799 to First Army, 8 September 1915, W.O.95 158, PRO.

\(^{47}\) Brigadier-General Philip Howell Diary, 11 October 1915, Howell Papers IV/D/12, LHCMA.
acquainted with the actual position' and that 'the division suffered very heavy losses by an attack which was ordered to be made, contrary to appreciation of the situation' by the local commanders.48

One Brigadier-General noted that 'there can be little doubt that during the early days of trench fighting, and even later, we were too prone to make isolated attacks'.49 In his post-operations report Major-General Sir John Capper, concluded that the 24th Division 'was split up and in fact did not exist as a division during the fighting', losing control of its artillery, and that its attack 'seems to have been unsupported by any special artillery fire, and to have been isolated'.50 During 1916-17 the problem of poor staff-work, the result of the inexperience of commanders and staff officers, continued to dog the British, extending the time-lag between the planning and execution, making them slow to react to events, and hindering the translation of their planning into reality.

In March 1916 the recapture of the Bluff in the Ypres Salient emphasised that the 'preparation must be most careful and minute' with the troops selected to carry out the attack 'prepared and practised beforehand'.51 The experiences on the Somme in 1916 and at Ypres in 1917 reinforced this lesson and commanders of divisions began to

48 Major-General Hon. E. J. Montague-Stuart-Wortley to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 June 1926, C.A.B.45/121, PRO.
49 Brigadier-General G.C. Kemp to Edmonds, 26 June 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
50 Major-General J.E. Capper to V Corps, 25 October 1915, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
51 Major-General Sir John Davidson to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 4 March 1916, Maurice Papers 3 5 25, LHCMA.
stress the necessity of giving subordinate units time to prepare their assaults noting that 'without it the bravest troops fail and their heroism is wasted' whereas 'with sufficient time to prepare an assault on a definite and limited objective' a well trained division could 'capture almost any "impregnable" stronghold'. Much anxiety and resentment stemmed from the mismanagement of troops, which reinforced the perception of uncaring generals. Once established this reputation was very difficult to shake off.

Many failures in attack on the Somme were caused by a combination of 'bad staff work - want of co-ordination - Infantry launched hurriedly into action - with insufficient knowledge of what was expected of them' and ignorance of the situation by the Higher Commands. The failed attack by the 24th Brigade on Contalmaison on 7 July showed all the failings which so blighted the British performance in both 1916 and 1917, namely: 'insufficient preliminary reconnaissance'; 'lack of co-ordination between neighbouring units'; 'no proper liaison between units'; too many isolated bombing attacks along trenches instead of a 'well mounted, well gunned, simultaneous attack in strength and numbers across the open'; a 'lack of properly regulated and well timed Artillery support'; 'false reports of the situation';

52 Major-General F.I. Maxse to II Corps, 18th Division in the Battle of Ancre, 1916, 18 Division No. G.274, 14 January 1917, paragraph 6, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8, IWM.
53 Brigadier-General R. FitzMaurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 7 November 1936, C.A.B.45/133, PRO.
poor tactics; and 'Brigade Headquarters too far back, out of touch with the immediate situation'.

The tendency amongst higher commanders 'to allow too short a time between the issue of their orders for an operation and the time at which that operation is to take place' continued resulting 'in futile loss of life'. Complaints of inadequate time to prepare and execute attacks during the Somme Campaign in 1916 to the B.G.G.S. of II Corps alone were numerous. One Brigadier-General complained 'how most of the attacks made in those days were very hurried & without proper artillery preparation' and that attacks 'owing to the lack of time in getting orders given' were 'delivered piecemeal & for this reason failed'. One regimental officer noted that the attack on Delville Wood on the 20th July 'was one of many instances of a hurriedly arranged, piecemeal attack going wrong' with orders being 'only received verbally at 1030 p.m. on the 19th' forcing the battalion to deploy 'in the dark' and 'on totally unfamiliar ground without having a chance to see their objectives or lines of advance'.

Brigadier-General H.C. Potter (9th Brigade) complained of many instances on the Somme 'of delay in transmission of orders failing to give subordinate commanders a fair chance

54 Brigadier-General G.W.St.G. Grogan, V.C., to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 April 1930, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
55 Major-General W.T. Furse to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 9th Division, 26 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
56 Brigadier-General P. Howell, Diary, 17 July, 8 August, 31 August, and 2 October 1916, Howell Papers IV/D 13, LHCMA.
57 Brigadier-General F.G.M. Rowley to Edmonds, 22 October 1934, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
58 Captain V.C. Runcer to Edmonds, 11 December 1933, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.

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of carrying out their orders', giving as an example the late arrival of orders on the afternoon of 22 July 1916 for an attack on Longueval early the following morning which resulted in a failure because the attacking troops 'were rushed into the attack at short notice with very little time to examine the ground'. In another instance neither the 2/D.L.I. nor the 11/Essex had any time to carry out a reconnaissance and 'could only just get their troops into a suitable position to attack by Zero hour' and although Brigadier-General R.J. Bridgford (18th Brigade) 'protested most strongly against this ill advised scheme owing to the lack of time' he was ordered to continue. At one extreme, the 41st Division sent out an impossible order for an attack in September 1916, which allowed no time for the assault to be prepared. Pinney's 33rd Division was asked to attack Transloy at '48 hours notice' with the result that 'a soaked tired Div.' was expected 'to do what wants 4 days preparation and fresh troops'.

Claims that it was 'the slowness of the New Armies which was the cause of the impasse in various parts of the battle field in the days following the main assaults' were refuted and the blame for failed attacks put squarely on 'the failure to give time to local commanders to organise their attacks' and the tendency to employ tired troops in

59 Brigadier-General H.C. Potter to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1934, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
60 Humphrey H. Prideaux to Edmonds, 5 December 1933, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
61 H.P. Pickering to Edmonds, 17 June 1935, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
62 Major-General A.J. MacDougall, Diary, 16 September 1916, MacDougall Papers DS/MISC/92, IWM.
63 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 3 November 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM.
attacks so that 'very heavy losses have been suffered and
lives have been sacrificed to no purpose'. The relatively
untrained battalion and company commanders of the New Armies
required "nursing" into battle and considerable time to
reconnoitre the ground before attacking. Unlike the well-
trained 'Old Army', they could 'not be hustled on and told
to attack at an impossible hour'. One Brigadier-General
in July 1916 noted that 'the present staffs, from want of
experience' did not know 'how long it takes for an infantry
unit to carry out an order and get into position' and
'the Corps apparently had no notion how long orders take to
percolate through from the higher command to the Company
Commanders'. One battalion commander on the Somme noted
that 'orders were often received by the battns. after the
time they were supposed to have been carried out' and that
'it never seemed to be realised by the higher authorities
that after orders were received by the battn. Comdr., that
Company Comdrs. had to be collected, who again had to see
their platoon Comdrs. often widely scattered & difficult to
get at'.

Bridges (19th Division) warned that 'the new army wants
lots of time & warning to do anything' and attributed the

64 Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish to 3rd Division, 76th Brigade No. B175, 3 August 1916, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
65 Major General F.I. Maxse to Major General A.A. Montgomery, 31 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53 7,
IWM.
66 Brigadier-General T.H. Shoubridge to Major-General F.I. Maxse, 30 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53/7,
IWM.
67 Brigadier-General F.G.M. Rowley to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 22 October 1934,
C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
68 Lieutenant-Colonel C. Connell to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 26 November 1929,
C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
failure of his division at Bazentin-le-Petit to the lack of 'more time to prepare'.

One major lesson from the Battle of the Somme was that 'the officers of the New Army take more time to digest orders and to pass them on' especially during the 'necessary preparations prior to an attack' and the better commanders, realising that there was no substitute for careful preparation and that 'when ample time was not given, attacks failed', allowed time for reconnaissance by the divisional commander and his staff, liaison with other artillery and divisional commanders, to issue orders to sub-commanders, and to brief the battalions involved.

To 'issue their orders in sufficient time to enable Battalion and Company Commanders to reconnoitre the ground to be attacked, make their preparations in detail and issue their orders' six hours was 'a minimum time for orders to pass from Corps to the Company Commanders and if less than that time is allowed adequate preparation cannot be made'. But this minimum of 6 hours recommended by G.H.Q. for orders to pass from Corps to Company H.Q. was considered by some divisions and corps to be 'greatly underestimated' given the

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69 Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 15 August 1916, French Papers 75/46/11, IWM.
70 Major-General G.T.M. Bridges, Some Further Notes on the Recent Operations, by the Divisional Commander, 19th Division, 9 September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
71 Major-General J.S.M. Shea to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 30th Division, 2 August 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
72 IXth Corps, Notes on Information collected from various Sources including troops who have been engaged in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
conditions on the Somme.\textsuperscript{73}

One division even suggested that 'operations orders should be issued 12 hours previously to all concerned',\textsuperscript{74} while XIII Corps required that 'on average a period of at least 24 hours from the time Divisional Operation Orders are issued before the Platoon Commander in the front line is in a position to carry out his part in the attack'.\textsuperscript{75} The Brigade Major of the 36th Brigade (12th Division) commented that 'it might take as much as six hours to go up from Brigade Headquarters, round two forward battalions and return' and that 'when the higher staffs issued these orders, often very lengthy and complicated, they did not ensure there was time for them to be digested below, and for orders to reach the troops who were actually to attack' giving the troops no chance of success.\textsuperscript{76}

Inexperienced staff and troops ensured that the British Army was unable to react quickly to events and that any attempt to "force the issue" by speeding things up resulted in disaster. During the later stages of the Battle of Loos General Sir Edward Bulfin (28th Division) was informed 'late on the night before the attack, which started at dawn' that

\textsuperscript{73} Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Deedes, Notes on Experience gained during the Recent Operations, 2nd Division No. G.S. 1001/1/51, 16 August 1916, and Major-General W.G. Walker, 2nd Division No. G.S. 1001/1/52, 16 August 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA; see also Brigadier-General A.R. Cameron, Questions relating to an initial attack after lengthy preparation, X Corps, 16 August 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.

\textsuperscript{74} Major J.McD. Haskard, Notes on the Recent Operations, 19th Division No. G. 48 27, 19 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA; See also Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Johnson, Notes on the Recent Operations - 2nd Phase: 20th - 30th July 1916, 19th Division, September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.

\textsuperscript{75} XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.10, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.

\textsuperscript{76} Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
'the guns which had registered and been given their targets were to come out, and I had to put a new lot of artillery who knew nothing of the targets and had not registered' with the result that 'the whole show was hopeless'.

One staff officer noted on the Somme in November 1916 that 'it cannot be too well realised that you cannot change plans at the last moment, it takes hours for orders to reach front line, as wires [are] invariably cut by shell fire'.

Colonel W.H.F. Weber (G.S.O.1 30th Division) complained that in the planning to capture Falfemant and Guillemont 'between 20 and 30 July the plan was changed or postponed no less than ten times' which involved 'one wild rush of visiting Corps & Divisions' while 'a request for a Barrage Map invariably accompanied each fresh change of plan'.

In a lecture on the lessons of the Battle of Loos, Montgomery (B.G.G.S. IV Corps) noted that once the planning process had been completed 'the less interference with subordinates the better' since 'mistrust and nagging at subordinates on matters of detail does an infinity of harm'. Unfortunately, this lesson was not learnt. One artillery commander complained that during the Battle of the Somme 'one was being harassed by Staffs from the rear a good deal', which 'added to the nightmare'.

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77 General Sir Edward Bulfin to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 11 December 1927, CAB 45/120, PRO.
78 H. Spender Clay, Diary, 17 November 1916, quoted by H. Spender Clay to Edmonds, 28 September 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
79 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 19 October 1933, Extracts from Diary, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
80 [Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery], Lecture given at Head-Quarters, 3rd Army, on 14th December, 1915 on action of IV Corps at Loos, , 25 September 1915, W.O.95 711 PRO.
81 Colonel J.H. Bateson to Edmonds, 26 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
tendency within the high command of 'issuing orders without an accurate knowledge of the local situation and against the strong representations of commanders on the spot who had that knowledge'.

Some sections of the high command were resistant to demands for more preparation. When in September 1916 Morland asked for a postponement, which was reluctantly given, to allow time for the XV Corps to take Guillemont there was talk of his B.G.G.S. (later General Hon Sir Francis Gathorne Hardy) 'being replaced by someone else as a consequence of this protest'. Similarly, General Gough reported that the B.G.G.S. of Canadian Corps (later General Sir Percy Radcliffe) 'made unnecessary difficulties with bad results on the whole corps and also on neighbouring division'. In such an atmosphere lessons were not learnt.

A number of generals at all levels of the hierarchy were quite prepared to browbeat and bully doubtful generals into carrying out their wishes and making sure that subordinates at lower levels of the command structure obeyed and implemented the approved policy. Examples of such commanders were Haking (XI Corps), who constantly bullied and interfered with the planning of his subordinates, such as Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game, the G.S.O.1 of the 46th Division in late 1915 and reported Lieutenant-General

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82 N.N. Menzies to Edmonds, 19 April 1934, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
83 General Hon Sir Francis Gathorne Hardy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 28 August 1934, C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
84 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 October 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
85 Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 10, 11 and 24 November 1915 and 8, 10, and 20 December 1915, Game Papers, PWG 9, IWM.
R.G. Broadwood, 57th Division, for 'lack of fighting spirit',\textsuperscript{86} when they tried to prevent the loss of lives in unprofitable attacks by their troops; Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps), who unjustifiably removed Major-General P.S. Wilkinson (50th Division)\textsuperscript{87} and Major-General P.R. Wood (33rd Division),\textsuperscript{88} who was 'a victim to this bullying';\textsuperscript{89} and Lieutenant-General Sir Cameron Shute (V Corps), 'a great thruster' with 'a rather ruthless nature',\textsuperscript{90} who in late 1918 continually harried his divisional commanders such as Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney (33rd Division)\textsuperscript{91} and General Sir David Campbell (21st Division), who complained that 'the fortnight's bosh [sic] hunting to which he had looked forward all his Service had been absolutely miserable owing to Shute's fussing'.\textsuperscript{92}

But during the Battles of the Somme and Third Ypres Gough (Fifth Army) in particular was notorious for harassing subordinates into over-ambitious action, often breaking the chain of command by speaking direct to Divisional commanders, and demanding that they implement unworkable orders. 'Very impetuous and difficult to get on with'\textsuperscript{93} as well as being 'excitable & thoughtless & impatient', Gough

\textsuperscript{86} Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Colonel C.J.C. Allanson, 19 August 1937, Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1937/69, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{87} Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 23 February 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM; General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 24 February 1918, IWM.
\textsuperscript{88} Pinney, Diary, 27 November 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{89} Pinney, Diary, 28 November 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{90} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 10 April 1918, and Autobiography, Volume II, pp.436-437, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{91} Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 21 and 29-30 September, 2, 10-12, 22-26, and 29-31 October, 6 and 9 November 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{92} Pinney, Diary, 15 September 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{93} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
was 'like a cat on hot bricks' lacking respect for senior officers who did not come up to his standards and developing a tendency 'to fight with everyone above him as well as with the Boches'. The death of his brother, Brigadier-General J.E. Gough, V.C. in early 1915, exacerbated Gough's almost irrational and unrealistic demands for speedy progress from his subordinates. One subordinate thought that Gough's 'temperament did not suit him for command' and when serving under him in France 'found him full of nerves & hunting his subordinates'.

General Sir Edward Bulfin (28th Division) recalled serving under Gough at I Corps at the Battle of Loos as 'a sort of horrid nightmare' and did not 'want to serve under him again'. On the Somme Major-General W.H. Rycroft (32nd Division) was said by his G.S.O.1 (Wace) to be terrified of Gough and on receiving orders to return in October 1916 remarked 'wryly that it would be his undoing unless we went to Rawly's Army!' Lacking 'the kick in him to stand up to Gough, when all initiative was taken out of his hands', Rycroft was duly removed when his division failed in an attack on 18 November 1916. Other senior officers, such as Jacob (II Corps), Malcolm (his M.G.G.S.) and Percival (49th Division) were also alleged to be 'terrified' of

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94 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 14 October 1914, Howell Papers IV/C/3/75, LHCMA.
95 Howell to his wife, 19 March 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 129, LHCMA; see also Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, p.54, LHCMA.
96 Major-General Sir Richard Bannatine-Allason to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 November 1931, Edmonds Papers II/2 257, LHCMA.
97 General Sir E.S. Bulfin to Edmonds, 11 December 1927, CAB 45/120, PRO.
98 Brigadier-General E.G. Wace to Edmonds, 30 November 1936, CAB 45/138, PRO.
him. By early 1917 Gough had gained the reputation of a commander who 'terrorises those under him to the extent that they are afraid to express their opinions for fear of being degomme'.

Unlike good officers, such as Allenby and Plumer, Gough does not seem to have learned from the experiences of 1915-16. By early 1917 commanders such as Birdwood, who was 'very sick at going to the V Army', Haldane and Lambton were 'not at all keen' to go to Gough's Army. By March 1917 junior officers felt that 'heavy losses & complete failure' were 'very typical [of] Gen. Gough, who apparently does not care a button about the lives of his men'. By mid-1917 there was 'little confidence' in Gough, notorious for his 'encounters' with subordinates and 'looked on as a bit of a freak'. By late 1917 there was 'intense feeling against Goughy', who had made 'many enemies', with 'the formation of a sect of officers called the G.M.G. which interpreted means "Gough must go"'. By late 1917 'no division wanted to go' to the Fifth Army.

99 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 29 August 1916, Howell Papers IV/C/3/339, LHCMA.
100 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 31 March 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
101 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 26 January 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
102 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
103 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 10 September 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
104 Brigadier A.E. Hodgkin, Diary (Volume III), 14 March 1917, Hodgkin Papers P.399, IWM.
105 Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer: The Diaries of Walter Guinness (First Lord Moyne), 1914-1918, 23 July [1917], p.162.
106 Major-General J.W. Sandilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1923, C.A.B.45/192, PRO.
107 Brigadier-General C. Yatman to Edmonds, 23 May 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
108 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 14 October and 1 November 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1 9, CCC.

In October 1917 Kiggell recommended to Haig that the Canadian Corps 'should be sent to General Plumer and not to Gough because the Canadians do not work kindly with the latter' who 'drove them too much in the Somme fighting last year' and again in November 1917 'of the strong wish of divisions not to be sent to Gough's Army'.\footnote{Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 October and 8 November 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 24, PRO.} General Sir William Peyton (the Military Secretary) 'had told Haig three times that he was not only injuring himself but injuring also the cause by keeping Gough in command' but Haig was 'perfectly infatuated with him'.\footnote{Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoir, Chapter XXVIII, Edmonds Papers III/12 17, LHCMA.}

The Brigade Major of the 36th Brigade had 'the most bitter memories' of the Somme in 1916, commenting that it 'merely resulted in a useless loss of life and lowering of morale in the formations which took part in it' since 'the conditions, weather and in particular mud' made 'any real success out of the question'.\footnote{Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.} One sapper noted that 'the end of the SOMME battle, as seen by the regimental officer, appeared to be a pointless and depressing affair - a stale remnant of what had once been quite exciting'.\footnote{Major-General C.G. Woolner to Edmonds, 2 April 1934, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.} One
Company Officer, later a battalion and Brigade commander, complained of the 'failure of the Higher Command to cancel hopeless attacks which eventually made the troops feel that they were not being given a sporting chance'.

The Somme was the nadir of the British Army and things began to improve thereafter but nevertheless problems continued into 1917, partly because new, inexperienced commanders came out to the front repeating old mistakes and partly because 'the High Authorities never seem to learn lessons which are obvious to those who have to carry out their plans'. At Brigade level it was 'felt, perhaps quite wrongly, that the Staffs of the higher formations were not taking sufficient trouble to find out the true situation' and, although 'admittedly it was difficult for them in the limited time available, as even a Brigade Headquarters probably necessitated a long walk in the mud', they seemed 'time and again to ignore our reports and not to care that they were so ignorant, and to issue orders and instructions quite inapplicable to the real situation'.

Too often the orders of the Higher Command were 'only a summary of the decisions taken at numerous conferences' which prescribed 'the choice of methods selected by (even) Battalion Commanders'. For staff officers 'it was literally not possible both to effect the necessary personal touch

115 Brigadier-General S.V.P. Weston to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 17 March 1937, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
116 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 26 July 1916, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
117 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
with Formations to the flanks and to observe first-hand what one's troops were doing in front' since 'it was one constant stream of long motor rides over bad roads to conferences at which each new plan had to be examined and acted upon as it came along'. During the planning for the operations on the Ancre in November 1916 by the 32nd Division, Wace (the G.S.O.1) 'was furious at the time that the whole of these arrangements, even including the selection of Advanced Bde H.Q., were definitely laid down to us by Corps H.Q. as the Army Commander's decision' or 'in other words Rycroft did not in effect command the 32nd Division' but 'was told what orders he was to issue, and he hadn't the spirit to say he would command his own Division'.

Colonel E.M. Birch noted that during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line the Fifth Army advanced 'without real cooperation of formations or time given to them (as was the case in the early days on the Somme, when my experience as G.S.O. 1 [25th] Divn. was similar) to function properly'. One reason for the failure to complete a very ambitious programme at Arras 'was the lack of co-operation between units, and a lack of co-ordination from the higher command' which resulted in there being 'no guiding hand from above to co-ordinate attacks' and in 'one futile attack after another, with appalling waste of human

118 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 October 1933, Extracts from Diary, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
119 Brigadier-General E.G. Wace to Edmonds, 30 October 1936, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
120 Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
life'.\textsuperscript{121} Birch also remembered, as G.S.O.1 Fifth Army
during the Battle of Arras in April 1917, 'how disgruntled I
was at the sketchy & hurried way plans were made, giving
recipients of orders no time to digest & act upon them',
which 'was a repetition of the early days of the Somme
fighting, resulting as then in much loss & little to show
for it'.\textsuperscript{122}

The attack by the 27th and South African Brigades of
the 9th Division at Arras on 12th April 'was completely
wiped out' because 'no doubt the Attack looked alright on
the map, but viewed from the actual ground it was hopeless'
with 'something like 1500 yds of absolutely open ground to
be advanced over in the face of an enemy well entrenched &
well supplied with Machine Guns & Artillery'.\textsuperscript{123} For 34th
Division's assault at Arras on 29 April 'the orders for the
attack were not issued from the Corps until early on the
27th April' and as a result 'the detailed orders did not
reach battalions in time to enable adequate instruction to
be given to the junior officers' most of whom 'were
inexperienced'.\textsuperscript{124} One junior staff officer also noted that
'attacks were constantly being put in with insufficient time
to organise them' when 'the wire about the Hindenburg Line
was so strong that nothing short of a carefully prepared
attack had any hope'.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{121} Brigadier-General R.A.C. Wellesley to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1937,
C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
\textsuperscript{122} Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
\textsuperscript{123} Colonel Sir George W. Abercromby, April 12th 1917, undated, C.A.B.45/l 16, PRO.
\textsuperscript{124} Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Vignolles to Falls, 10 February 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
\textsuperscript{125} Major Hon D.G. Fortescue to Falls, 6 February 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
Another example of formations not being given enough time to prepare for an attack occurred during operations of the 7th Division at Bullecourt when the 22nd Brigade 'was put into a night attack at very short notice' on 3 May and the 20th Brigade only received their orders late in the afternoon of 6 May when the troops 'had some miles to march, all arrangements for guiding onto the forming up tapes had to be made & the tapes themselves laid out' and 'the notice was too short to allow of any reconnaissance of the ground' for an assault on 7 May. One staff officer at Third Army during the Battle of Cambrai noted that 'all these attacks without proper preparation were pretty dreadful' especially as 'we did exactly the same at Loos'. But the lesson was gradually learnt. As a result of experiences at Ypres in 1917, the Second Army stressed that prior preparation, reconnaissance and close liaison by staffs were 'vital to the success of any operation'. G.H.Q. emphasised in early 1918 that each stage of the offensive had to be thought out, planned and rehearsed in every detail beforehand while commanders such as Harper (IV Corps) reiterated in late 1918 that 'success in battle' was 'largely dependent on the care and forethought exercised by Commanders in laying their

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126 Lieutenant-General A.N. Floyer-Acland to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
127 Major-General E.C. Gepp to Edmonds, 14 July 1944, C.A.B.45/118, PRO.
128 Notes on Recent Operations, Second Army No. G.S.52 2, [November 1917], Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
initial plans' and that most battles were 'won or lost before zero hour'.

Other recurring faults emerged during the war. At some considerable additional cost in life and materiel, the British armies always fought for ground as much as to defeat the enemy. General Sir John Burnett-Stuart commented that 'ground came to have an exaggerated value, and that much fighting took place either merely to advance the line a fraction of an inch on the map without any tactical advantage, or to retain a bit of ground which was so commanded and exposed as to be worse than valueless, when often a much better position existed close behind it'.

'Clinging for months to bad and valueless positions became a fetish which it was worth no commander his place to disregard' and those who surrendered ground voluntarily were likely to face severe disapproval. For example, when a withdrawal to a shorter line at Ypres rather than hold onto 'an impossible position' was ordered in May 1915 by the G.S.O.1 on his own initiative, both General Allenby (V Corps) and General Plumer (Second Army) 'showed their disapproval by recommending, without any enquiry of the circumstances' the removal of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson (4th Division), causing much anxiety.

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130 Lieutenant-General Sir George Harper, Guiding Principles Affecting the Attack, IV Corps, 23 October 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
131 General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter VIII, pp.85-86, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
'Heavy losses and ill success',\textsuperscript{133} especially in 1915 and 1916, were invariably 'the general result of this policy of "hanging on at all costs" in unfavourable ground', resulting in an 'unduly large' casualty bill with the British 'losing heavily in life, fighting strengths, fighting efficiency, ammunition, equipment and, above all, moral' with the troops 'losing faith in the judgement and skill of those above them' and 'without sufficient corresponding gain'.\textsuperscript{134} Typical examples of this policy was the failure of Sir John French to abandon the Ypres Salient, a policy advocated by Smith-Dorrien in 1915, which would have saved 100,000 casualties.\textsuperscript{135} The British in early 1918 hung 'onto every yard of ground, whether it be to their advantage or not' \textsuperscript{136} and the failure to abandon the Flesquieres and Passchendaele Salients before the German Spring Offensive prevented subordinate commanders from being able 'to economize men and make the Germans attack us in conditions as favourable to ourselves as possible, that is to say on ground of our own choosing'.\textsuperscript{137} The British in the end were forced by circumstances to abandon both salients. Edmonds believed that 'G.H.Q. or Third Army hung on too long to the Flesquieres Salient so when the garrison did at last clear out it was forced N.W. away from the Fifth Army and a

\textsuperscript{133} Montgomery-Massingberd, \textit{The Autobiography of a Gunner}, pp.16-18, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159 1, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{134} Brigadier-General P. Howell, Note on our position round Ypres, 28 May 1915, Howell Papers II/C/7, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{135} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 4 December 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{136} Haldane, War Diary, 17 April 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{137} Haldane, War Diary, 17 April 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
gap between the Armies was created'.\textsuperscript{138} Haig was considered to be much more flexible than many of his generals in refusing to hold onto useless ground or retaking lost ground if it was not worth the casualties.\textsuperscript{139}

Another tendency was to commit troops in piecemeal assaults on narrow fronts. The more experienced British commanders were critical of the tendency to carry out a "nibbling" attack on a narrow front 'after a large attack in order to "straighten the line"' when the front could 'easily be straightened when the next big attack is carried out'.\textsuperscript{140} The result was that the attacker lost 'far more men in the drawn-out original attack' than if he 'broke it off, and prepared for another'.\textsuperscript{141} As early as December 1914, the British were taught the lesson that it was better to wait for a major offensive rather than trying to save casualties by gaining ground with 'small isolated attacks' which 'lost too many lives' to 'the subsequent most costly counter-attacks'.\textsuperscript{142} Generals remained wedded to 'minor and premature attacks' which 'when launched without adequate art[iller]y support or when sufficient time for preparation has not been possible, only result in useless waste of life and energy without inflicting on the enemy greater losses than we suffer ourselves'.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{138} Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to General Sir Hubert Gough, 21 November 1932, C.A.B.45/192, PRO.
\textsuperscript{139} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.430, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{140} Haldane to Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, 16 April 1917, Spears Papers 2 2, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{141} Haldane, War Diary, 19 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{142} General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 20 December 1914, Milward Papers 6510-143-1, NAM.
\textsuperscript{143} General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 9 March 1916, Kitchener Papers WB 36, PRO 30 57.
Early in 1915 Haldane, a witness of the Russo-Japanese War, was highly critical of these "holding" attacks ordered by G.H.Q., 'silly shows' which asked 'men to sacrifice their lives uselessly' in attempting to pin down German reserves, frittering away men 'in absolute opposition to the principle of economy of force'. After the Battle of Loos one staff officer reported that 'events have proved the costliness or futility of attacks made by small formations such as brigades or even divisions, owing to the subsequent punishment by concentrated hostile artillery fire' and, noting that 'the troops hate these small efforts and go for them with small enthusiasm', recommended that any 'offensive should therefore be on a comparatively large scale - say with 6 to 9 divisions on a front of 5,000 to 10,000 yards'.

Yet on the Somme, as before at Neuve Chapelle and Loos, 'the minor, but very costly piecemeal attacks' continued to be 'a feature of operations'. During the period of late July 1916 'piecemeal attacks were being made on small fronts' against 'the LONGUEVAL and DELVILLE WOOD salient'. The isolated attack on Delville Wood by the 3rd Division in July 1916 'was a very great mistake and was 'foresdoomed to failure'. One staff officer noted that, although

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144 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 12 March 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
145 Haldane, War Diary, 25 April 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
146 Major J.M. Elles, Notes on a further offensive, p.2, 10 October 1915, W.O.158 17, PRO.
147 Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish to 3rd Division, 76th Brigade No. B175, 3 August 1916, p.14, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
149 Brigadier-General S.G. Craufurd to Edmonds, 19 November 1933, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
'constant isolated attacks' on Guillemont in August 1916, which ignored G.H.Q. instructions, were 'extremely demoralizing to the Germans', better good results 'might have been obtained by the Artillery leaving the front line to be held by a few outposts and thereby avoiding the terrible casualties these minor operations caused'.

Instead the infantry had no rest and 'it was impossible to consolidate or make the necessary preparation for any larger operation'. Experienced commanders were critical of 'the folly of such tactics' which were 'quite unsound and very costly', noting that the attritional nibbling tactics employed by G.H.Q. and the Fourth Army on the Somme in 1916 were very costly and 'hanging on and scratching forward from Bazentin was expensive work & we got well hammered'.

These numerous small, isolated attacks 'to straighten line prior to a big attack' were 'unnecessary' and 'very costly in valuable lives, munitions, and morale'.

As one regimental officer noted, 'the most noticeable feature in the operations during this period was the almost invariable failure of small attacks' which led to the realisation that 'attacks on a large scale were as a rule much less costly in proportion and the ground gained was easier to hold owing to dispersion of enemy's artillery fire'.

150 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 26 July 1916, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
151 Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 15 August 1916, French Papers 75/46 11, IWM.
152 Laton Fraven to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 13 April 1934, C.A.B.45/133, PRO.
153 Francis P. Heath to Edmonds, 29 March 1934, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
the irritation of these minor attacks, after a series of big operations had come to an end because 'in nine cases out of ten this "nibbling" was carried out by tired officers and men in (consequently) a very half-hearted fashion, and almost invariably meant heavy loss of life, and ended in disappointment & failure'. The G.S.O.1, 17th Division, felt that 'there was something very seriously wrong with our tactics, and methods, of attack' on the Somme in which the British 'squandered men' in the opening phase 'without inflicting commensurate loss on the enemy'.

The Germans too were critical of British tactics on the Somme employing a series of 'almost continual attacks on a smaller scale to attain more limited objectives', which relied heavily on stereotyped attacks preceded by a heavy bombardment with little attempt at surprise, failed to exploit any initial success. Haldane maintained that instead of applying a policy of attrition employing 'piece-meal attacks', once the initial assault had taken place 'it would be much less costly to let things settle down' and instead 'of nibbling a small bit' to wait until 'the next general attack' as the attacker lost 'far more men in the drawn-out original attack' than if he 'broke it off, and prepared for another'. One Corps noted that the Somme

154 Brigadier-General Rudolf Jelf to Edmonds, 27 November 1934, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
155 Major-General R.J. Collins to Edmonds, 7 February 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
157 S.S.478 (Translation of a German Document), Experiences of the IV German Corps in the Battle of the Somme During July 1916, G.H.Q. Ia/20245, 30 September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 49, LHCMA.
158 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 26 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
159 Haldane, War Diary, 19 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
operations 'have proved once again that small isolated attacks are usually doomed to failure' and noted that 'the French on our right attributed much of their success to the fact that the Commander of the VI French Army sternly set his face against any attempt at small isolated operations and hardly ever attacked on a narrower front than that of 2 Corps'.\textsuperscript{160} Haig told Gough that it 'was better to wait than to start a series of small operations which could not have decisive results'.\textsuperscript{161}

The problem, however, remained at Arras in 1917. Fergusson (XVII Corps) threw away 'a lot of lives' on 'useless narrow front enterprises' at Roeux on the Scarpe \textsuperscript{162} as part of a series of 'numerous & isolated attacks on Roeux, the Chemical works and Greenland Hill' which made 'very sorry reading'.\textsuperscript{163} Charles (B.G.G.S., XVII Corps) maintained that 'the policy of tying the enemy down' to prevent him from moving his reserves elsewhere 'could equally well have been achieved by maintaining a strong and active force of artillery on our front' allowing 'the divisions who had taken part in the original victorious attack' to regroup and embark on a second stage of the Battle of Arras which 'would have achieved equally striking successes as they did on 9th April at a very much smaller cost in human life'.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{160} XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, p.13, [August 1916], Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{161} Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 November 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 14, PRO.
\textsuperscript{162} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 21 October 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{163} Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 July 1937, C.A.B.45/118, PRO.
\textsuperscript{164} Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles to Edmonds, 28 July 1937, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
Major-General C.G. Fuller (G.S.O.1, 29th Division) agreed on 'the futility of piecemeal attacks, beloved of the Higher Command, and abhorred by the Divisions and still more so by the Bdes & Bns.' whereas the adherence to general attacks would have ensured success at much lower cost in casualties.  

The lesson was belatedly learnt in September 1917 when worried about 'the wisdom of making small attacks on farms and isolated strong points', Haig decided 'to stop Gough from going on with these little attacks' although Gough was resistant to this pressure. In the victorious advance of 1918 very different tactics were employed. For example, Haldane (VI Corps) was warned by his Army Commander, in October 1918 to attack only on a broad front or with small raids and to avoid attacks on a narrow front.

A common complaint during the war was a propensity to repeat assaults, which had failed, rather than finding alternative avenues of attack. One major reason for 'our painfully slow progress and heavy losses throughout the Somme battle' was 'the failure on the part of higher commanders to apply boldly the principles of "reinforce when successful"'. Unlike the Germans who in Spring 1918 'exploited any small breakthrough that they made and spread out behind such of our troops as had held their positions',

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165 Major-General C.G. Fuller to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 July 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
166 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 September 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 22, PRO.
167 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 21 October 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
168 Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Nosworthy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 July 1935, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
the British 'generally had been accustomed to hammering away at the points which we had been unable to take at first'. Unfortunately, this attritional form of operations was persistently throughout the campaigns of 1915-17.

At Loos in 1915 attacks were continued into November when they should have been abandoned at the end of September; on the Somme in 1916 Haig was 'bent on continuing the battle' until 'forced to stop by the weather' and indeed wanted 'to go on all through the winter'; at Arras repeated attacks were made along the Scarpe in May 1917; and at Ypres in 1917 the offensive was allowed to continue into November, despite the protests in early October 1917 of Gough and Plumer who made it clear that they did not expect to see any further great strategic results from operations, making 'rather doubtful victories' such as the capture of Passchendaele 'extremely costly'.

There was no coherent, co-ordinated tactic other than battering on in the hope that the Germans would collapse and as a result each battle seemed to have developed a momentum of its own with Haig determined to continue with it whatever the circumstances. 'In the opinion of the intelligent man in the trench the prolongation of the battle, and the final autumn attacks, were a mistake, and a waste' because of the

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169 Brigadier-General A.P. Benson to Captain Cyril Falls, undated, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
170 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 14 November 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
171 Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.23, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159 1, LHCMA; General Lord Rawlinson, Diary, 6 October 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 7, CCC.
173 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 19 September and 6 October 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1 7, CCC.
poor ground conditions.\textsuperscript{174} One staff officer later concluded that 'the Somme battle 'proved conclusively' that 'it is useless to attempt to maintain the momentum of the original attack if halts occur anywhere, unless ample time is given to the artillery to prepare for the next phase'.\textsuperscript{175}

The Battle of Arras in April 1917 'was another example of the same disastrous policy, of continuing the effort after all possible hope of success has gone' \textsuperscript{176} and 'the many regrettable failures on the part of the British troops engaged' which were 'in strong contrast' to 'the fine successes achieved by the Canadians' at Vimy Ridge were mainly due to 'the use of tired troops'.\textsuperscript{177} Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles (then B.G.G.S. XVII Corps) noted that continuing the offensive proved futile as 'we had nothing but tired divisions who had lost pretty heavily in the initial attacks of the 9th, 10th & 11th of April, & it was quite evident, on the XVIIth Corps front, at any rate, that we were up against fresh German divisions who had no intention of retreating' and 'to hurl these depleted, & to some extent disorganised, formations against good troops who had had 3 or 4 days in which to place & dig in their machine guns was to ask for failure'.\textsuperscript{178} Similarly, after the initial success at Cambrai on 20 November 1917, the 2nd Guards Brigade was pushed into a hopeless and 'criminal'

\textsuperscript{174} Pearson Choate to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 26 March 1926, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
\textsuperscript{175} Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Karslake to Edmonds, 28 January 1936, C.A.B.45 135, PRO.
\textsuperscript{176} Major-General G.M. Lindsay to Captain Cyril Falls, 16 January 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
\textsuperscript{177} Major-General W.L.O. Twiss to Edmonds, 18 September 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
\textsuperscript{178} Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles to Edmonds, 14 July 1937, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
attack on Les Tone Wood and La Fontaine on 27 November despite the protests of its commander and Feilding (Guards Division), who 'got little backing from the Corps Cdr'.

Commanders also showed an unimaginative obsession for frontal attacks rather than by-passing strongpoints, which invariably resulted in heavy casualties. Haig felt that at Neuve Chapelle 'there is no doubt' that Willcocks and Joey Davies 'were impregnated with the old tactical idea that if during an attack any part of the line is held up, it is dangerous for the others (who are not held up) to press on' and 'hence no steps were taken to reinforce our trps. [which] had met with success, and press forward and round the flanks of the points still holding out'. When the question whether the VIII Corps should in July 1916 'attack BEAUMONT HAMEL by direct assault or envelopment' was discussed by G.H.Q. 'it was decided to attack it direct' because of the 'complication of [the] artillery programme' and the 'danger to our own troops from our own artillery or enemy' rifle fire'. Similarly, the plans of the 64th Brigade to bypass the Cojeul Valley - 'a death trap' - by capturing the neighbouring dominant features was ruined by the insistence of General Sir John Shea (30th Division) 'on "a continuous line of attack"' and as a result the

179 Lieutenant-General Sir Bertram Sergison-Brooke to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 December 1944, C.A.B.45/118, PRO.
180 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Edmonds, 6 August 1925, Edmonds Papers II/4 39a, LHCMA.
181 General Staff, Precis of tasks allotted to Corps of Fourth Army, p.7, undated [1916], W.O.158/19, PRO.
9/K.O.Y.L.I. were faced 'with an impossible task forced on them by Gen. Shea's pigheadedness'\(^{182}\).

One Divisional Commander (Pinney) during the Battle of Arras in May 1917 found that his Corps Commander (Snow) was reluctant to abandon the concept of frontal assaults despite the opposition of the battalion, Brigade and Divisional commanders who favoured a flank attack.\(^{183}\) Haig complained in August 1918 that the 32nd Division had lost 1,700 men in three days fighting 'due to having attacked the enemy in a prepared position without first reconnoitring to find out the best lines of approach, weak spots, in fact how best to attack it' so that 'our men came across uncut wire and were mown down by machine-gun fire'.\(^{184}\) In September 1918 Haldane (VI Corps) was annoyed to find that the 62nd Division had taken a town 'by direct attack, and not by working round the rear as I wished, which would have been more effective and would have gained more ground.'\(^{185}\) Perhaps the explanation was that the Division's commander, Major-General (later General Sir Robert) Whigham, had only just taken command having spent most of the war as a Staff Officer at G.H.Q. and the War Office.

The Army had to travel along a series of learning curves before victory was achieved in 1918. The nadir came on the Somme in 1916 but thereafter lessons were learnt and

\(^{182}\) Brigadier-General H.R. Headlam to Captain Cyril Falls, 9 June [1938], C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
\(^{183}\) Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 22-25 May 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
\(^{184}\) Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 16 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/35, PRO.
\(^{185}\) General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 1 September 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
the Army gradually improved. That process was both painful and rather slow given the relative inexperience and small size of the British Army and its officer corps. The regeneration of an army, the development of a competent officer corps to command that army, and the articulation of an advanced military theory to govern all levels of war occurred in a short period of three years, but at a tremendous cost to the British nation. It is how the Army improved and developed which will now be looked at more systematically.
CHAPTER THREE

The Brain of an Army

One of the biggest problems faced by the Army was to produce enough staff officers capable of running the bureaucracy, producing the efficient command and staff methods at which the German Army excelled, and manning the staffs of the large formations required in continental warfare. By the end of 1915, on top of the divisional commanders and staffs required to man the forty divisional H.Q.s, commanders and staff officers had to be provided for three Army and nineteen Corps H.Q.s, in France alone. Clearly 'the difficulties and desire for change that have arisen during the war' were 'due chiefly to the rapid rise of both Commanders and Staff Officers with absolutely no Staff experience' and while 'brains, ability and personal gallantry' were useful they could 'not compensate for lack of military knowledge, far less for lack of good staff training'.

While it was one thing to theorise about the achievement of good command and staff procedures, it was quite another to develop enough staff officers with the talent for such large-scale operations. Major-General J.F.C. Fuller noted during the war that 'our weak point is

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1 [Lieutenant-General] Sir Richard Butler, Memorandum on 'Headquarters Units with a Division', 12 December 1918, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
our Staffs not the men'. ² It was impossible to 'expect a General Staff only inaugurated 9 years ago, if so long, on a basis of 6 Divisions, and insufficient for that, to provide adequate staff officers for 60 Divisions' ³ and 'to talk of 25 Corps is to talk like a madman or a fool' because it had 'taken our German friends 40 years to make 25 Corps'.⁴ The tendency to concentrate on the mistakes made while the Army was adapting to terra incognita during the period 1915-17 has meant that the process by which the Army developed a war-winning staff in 1917-18 has been neglected.

A relatively small group of graduates of the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta held most of the key positions in the B.E.F. Pre-war neglect led to a shortage of well-trained and educated officers capable of undertaking the task of managing a hugely expanded army. Early in the war it quickly became apparent that the B.E.F. lacked an adequate supply of well-trained staff officers to equip the staffs of the new Divisions. 211 of the sample or just over a third (34%) lacked any staff experience whatsoever prior to August 1914. Similarly only 92 (just under 15%) had held the post of G.S.O.1 or higher whereas 273 (nearly 74%) had held lower staff posts such as G.S.O.2 and G.S.O.3. In peacetime, this assured a healthy competition for places but relegated to regimental soldiering the unlucky majority who

² Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his mother, 27 March 1918, Fuller Papers IV/3 228, LHCMA.
³ Lord Esher to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 26 June 1915, French Papers 75 46 1, IWM.
⁴ Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson to General Lord Rawlinson, 16 September 1914, Maurice Papers 3 4 3, LHMCA.
tended to resent ambitious colleagues who attended Staff College and ensured a severe shortage of qualified staff officers during wartime.

The few "educated" officers who had attended Staff College prior to the war were thinly spread as the "brains of the army" during the war. Only thirty-two candidates were admitted to Camberley each year during the 1890s compared to a "year" consisting of 60 students in 1930 and 90 in 1952 respectively, nearly double and three times the number which passed through pre-1914. This meant that graduates were the elite of the Army and certainly the year of 1913 was a vintage one, including as it did two future Field-Marshal, Ironside and Dill, who were to rise to the rank of Brigadier-General by the end of the war.

Reforms at Camberley after the Boer War 'made the Staff College one of the most efficient places of military education in the world' and one student, who qualified in 1913, concluded that 'as a result of what I had learnt at Camberley I was well equipped to deal with any situation that arose when I was a Staff Officer'. The task of the students 'was to learn the arts of lubrication' as they were 'to be greasers of the army machine, normal functionaries'.

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5 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XIV, Edmonds Papers III/2/3, LHCMA; Regulations Respecting The Staff College, War Office, 1894, Edmonds Papers I/2A/1, LHCMA; Edmonds, Four Generations of Staff College Students, Part I: 1896, The Army Quarterly, Volume LXV, October 1952, p.42.
8 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.29, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
9 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VI, pp.4-6, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
10 Brigadier Edward Beddington, Memoirs, p.52, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
and not 'as disciples of war and of wisdom'.

Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, as Commandant, bluntly informed his students that they 'were at the Staff College to learn staff duties and to qualify for Staff Captain, not to talk irresponsible trash' on 'subjects of policy or strategy'.

A major flaw was the British Army's neglect of the operational aspects of modern war; namely the planning and staff work required for operations on a continental scale. Staff officers had little opportunity to hone their skills during peacetime. Neither army nor corps staff existed in peacetime, a condition imposed by the small colonial army, so that many duties had to be learned "on the job". The peacetime staff of a Division consisted of a General Staff Officer, a D.A.A.G., a C.R.A. and a C.R.E. with other staff only joining on mobilization or for manoeuvres and training during every summer. Since peacetime divisions were only allowed one G.S.O.1 and as a result relied on the allocation of additional personnel before they were able to go to war. For example, 'the four additional staff officers who were, on mobilization, appointed to the 4th Division were strangers to it' and having little experience or training were unable even to write operational orders.

11 Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame, Dusty Measure, p.50.
12 Brigadier-General A.F.U. Green, Evening Tattoo, pp.32-33.
14 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXII, Edmonds Papers III/7/4, LHCMA.
15 Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXIII, Edmonds Papers III/8 5, LHCMA.
Edmonds noted that 'in 1914 there were very few trained staff officers, that is men who had served on the staff of a command, a division, or a brigade with troops; and of these few more than half (including the best George Morris, Adrian Grant-Duff and "Gussie" Geddes, who fell in action in 1914) were either killed or disabled in the early days'.

At first, the British Army was very inexperienced at the staff work required in warfare on a continental scale. One battalion commander noted that 'in the early stages of the war the Germans were better practised than were our staffs in the handling of large units'. During the Somme in 1916 'staff work (Divisional, Brigade, & Battalion) in the earlier stages of the battle was poor' as even 'the most competent officers were working on a scale and in conditions of which they had no experience, and they had to learn their job', but in the later stages 'the Staff, having had an opportunity to learn, were just beginning to take hold of their job'.

One of the most able of the trained staff officers, General Sir Charles Harington (M.G.G.S. Second Army), admitted that he had not been prepared to 'think in "Armies"', having 'never even in theory' contemplated the problems of commanding a force larger than the original B.E.F. Yet within less than two years of the outbreak of

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16 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers 1/2B 5a, LHCMA.
17 Lieutenant-Colonel R.R. Gibson to Edmonds, 10 August 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
18 Pearson Choate to Edmonds, 6 April 1936 and 26 March 1926, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
the war he found himself responsible for the staff work of
an Army which 'two or three times in tenure exceeded thirty
divisions'.

Harington blamed the British Army's many
problems on the failure to develop 'a General Staff
"doctrine"' in parallel to the big formations that had
developed from nothing during the war and to standardise
document at Army, Corps and Divisional level. The methods
employed 'varied considerably' so that 'very divergent views
are held and entirely different methods exist in the various
Armies, Corps & Divisions'.

Camberley and Quetta together could barely accommodate
a minority of officers producing only 447 Staff College
graduates in the 1914 Army List so that, while pre-war
reform established the increasing dominance of Staff College
graduates within the Army, a shortage of Staff graduates
meant that entrance into the top military elite remained
open to non-graduates, who were given posts of
responsibility as a result of "hands-on" experience and the
army's rapid expansion during the war. Certainly as the
B.E.F. grew, the Staff College graduates (376 or 61% of the
sample) tended to dominate the Army's hierarchy.
Nevertheless, there was a significant minority in the sample
of commanders and staff officers (239 or 39%) who had not
gone to Staff College. An analysis of commanders in the
First World War highlights the fact that Staff graduates

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20 D.C.I.G.S. [Major-General C.H. Harington] to C.I.G.S. [Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson], 11 July 1918,
Maxse Papers 69 57/11, IWM.
21 Brian Bond, *The Victorian Army and the Staff College*, 1854 - 1914, p.324.
held a majority the highest posts, but their numbers were too few to establish an exclusive monopoly.

Of the eleven senior officers who held the posts of Commanders-in-Chief and Army Commander eight (73%) had attended Staff College whereas at Corps and Divisional level things were much more even. Progressing down the hierarchy the dominance of the Staff College diminished as the supply of graduates began to run out and only 27 (56%) out of 48 Corps Commanders and 99 (51%) out of 195 divisional commanders had graduated from the Staff Colleges.\textsuperscript{22} Staff College training was not a prerequisite for success. For example, successful brigade, division and corps commanders, such as Cavan, Jacob and Maxse, were not graduates. As the war progressed the proportion of divisional commanders who were staff college graduates steadily dropped. During 1914 84% of divisional commanders had p.s.c. In 1916 the figure fell to 78% and in the final year to 73%.\textsuperscript{23} By the latter stages of the war a number of officers who had not been to Staff College had received sufficient on-the-job training to make them efficient divisional commanders.

It was the older and younger officers who tended not to have been to Staff College. The senior officers, divisional and corps commanders such as Lieutenant-Generals Sir Charles Anderson, R.G. Broadwood, Sir John Keir, Sir Herbert Watts and Sir Charles Woollcombe; General Sir James Willcocks; and

\textsuperscript{22} See Appendix 10.
\textsuperscript{23} See Appendix 15.
Field-Marshal Lord Cavan, had been able to make a career in the less professional era before the Boer War without attending Staff College while the junior ones, such as Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery and Lord Wilson; Lieutenant-Generals Sir Philip Neame, Sir Francis Nosworthy, and E.A. Osborne, who served as G.S.O.1 of Divisions towards the end of the war, had not had a chance to attend before war broke out. Of the 293 (47%) of the sample who were born in the 1870s only 83 (28%) had not been to Staff College whereas of the 218 (35%) born in the 1850s and 1860s and the 103 (16%) born in the 1880s and 1890s 102 (46%) and 56 (54%) respectively had not attended Staff College. 

In its exclusivity the Army was compared to the College of Cardinals and 'the Vatican Board of Cardinals'. Regular officers dominated and only 22 (3%) of the sample were not regular British or Indian Army officers, 15 of whom were Commonwealth officers (2%) and 3 were Royal Navy officers! Major-General G.P. Dawnay, himself a "dug-out", concluded that 'such rot' was talked about non-regular soldiers not getting 'enough high appointments & that the Staff runs the war in its own interests, & doesn't want it to stop'. An investigation by G.H.Q. for the War Office in July 1918 showed that 'well over 50% of the divisional commanders had never been on the staff during this war'.

24 See Appendices 10-12.
26 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 22 September 1926, Liddell Hart Papers 1 302 100, LHCMA.
27 See Appendix 2.
28 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 26 July 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
while 30% had 'never been on the Staff at all'.

visited by the Minister of Education, who 'had recently expressed the opinion that officers of the New Army had not been promoted to high positions which they merit', Haig maintained that 'the truth is that we have more vacant appointments than qualified officers to fill them'.

More important for the functioning of the army's operations was a growing shortage of Staff Officers as the war progressed and Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler reported in 1918 that 'most of the higher staffs are double' the size of those of 1915 necessitating the employment of unqualified, non-regular officers on the staff as the Regular Army could not provide the numbers of trained staff officers required. By 1918 the total number of Staff positions throughout the army had risen to some ten thousand. The General Staff at G.H.Q. in November 1917 concluded that 'the supply of trained Staff Officers is falling short of the demand'. In May 1918, G.H.Q. stressed that 'it must also be realised by all Commanders of formations that the supply of trained Staff Officers is getting very low and that Officers appointed to first grade appointments in future will not have had the same staff

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29 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, 27 July 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21/3, IWM.
30 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 11 February 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
31 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.151, Henderson Papers DS/MISC 2, IWM.
32 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, Answers to Questions Issued with Fifth Army No.G.A.402 10, 29 January 1919, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
34 G.H.Q., G.S. Note on Infantry Organisation, 28 November 1917, W.O.158/20, PRO.
training, or experience on the Staff, as the Officers whom they replace.  

These problems were exacerbated by the high casualties sustained by the small pool of qualified staff officers during the first years of the war. Out of the 447 staff college graduates in the Army List of August 1914 219 (49.2%) were killed or died of wounds during the war including 180 Camberley Staff Graduates. Among the many staff officers lost early in the war were Captain J.B. Jenkinson (Brigade Major, 3rd Brigade) and Captain R.W.M. Stevens (Brigade Major, 9th Brigade) killed in August 1914; Colonel F.W. Kerr, Major G. Paley, and Captain R. Ommanney (G.S.O.1, G.S.O.2, and G.S.O.3 of the 1st Division respectively) and Lieutenant-Colonel A.J-B. Percival (G.S.O.1, 2nd Division) all killed by a shell landing on their Headquarters on 31 October 1914; and Captain G.M. James (Brigade Major, 22nd Brigade), killed in November 1914.

G.H.Q. was forced in late 1914 to start 'making a list of all p.s.c. people not serving on the Staff'. The shortages of staff meant that officers at G.H.Q. spent much of the war trying to leave but were told that owing to the shortage of staff officers their services were too valuable for them to be allowed to depart. When Clive requested a

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35 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, O.B. 1329, 7 May 1918, W.O.95/370, PRO.
36 Camberley Staff College Graduates who lost their lives during the Great War, Edmonds Papers I/2B 4a, LHCMA.
37 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 14 December 1914, Howell Papers IV C/3/95, LHCMA.
transfer from the staff to command of troops in June 1915, Sir John French refused remarking that 'he had let two go, & both had been killed within a week'.  

Kirke's attempts to get out of the Intelligence Section in 1915 and 1916 were foiled because he could not be spared. G.H.Q. refused to sanction the offer of command of a Battalion to General Sir Eric de Burgh because as p.s.c. his "services could not be spared for regimental duty".  

Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell (C.G.S., G.H.Q.) maintained that 'the needs of the Army and the Empire' made it 'impossible to let highly trained staff officers take up commands' as it was 'indispensable that staff work should be efficient and it will become still more so when we get the Germans into the open'. When in 1917 Robertson (C.I.G.S.) wished to promote Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Edward Ellington to command of a Brigade, Kiggell insisted on his appointment as B.G.G.S., VIII Corps because he was 'a trained staff officer and the number of these is running low' and G.H.Q. had 'three B.G.G.S.s to find at present' whereas there were 'a large number of officers who have been through all the recent fighting who are well qualified to command Brigades and deserving of selection for such command'.

38 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 1 June 1915, Clive Papers II/1/140, LHCMA.  
40 General Sir Eric de Burgh, Memoir, p.10, de Burgh Papers 7306-67, NAM.  
41 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges, 22 November 1916, Kiggell Papers V/61, LHMCA.  
42 Kiggell to General Sir Robert Whigham, 4 January 1917, Kiggell Papers V/72, LHMCA.
By late 1916 Kiggell was worried that staff officers 'holding the appointment of B.G./G.S., G.S.O.1, and equivalent appointments in the administrative branch of the staff, whom it has been necessary to keep on the staff for the good of the Service' should be given brevet promotion to compensate for the likelihood that 'the majority, if not all, of them would have been selected to command a Brigade' but for the fact that they 'possessed the necessary qualifications for staff employment'. Moreover, it 'was much quicker and easier to reach the rank of B[rigadie]r-General by getting command of a Brigade, than by waiting to become the chief staff officer of an Army Corps, which is the lowest staff appointment carrying the [same] rank'.

It was also easier for a Brigade Commander than a B.G.G.S. to obtain command of a Division as the Staff Officer had to command a Brigade first in order to become familiar with modern conditions.

Most staff officers during the war stayed in staff appointments throughout the war and few of the senior ones had any actual experience of front-line service during the war. There was certainly no policy of interspersing staff posts with tours of front-line duty as was the case in the Second World War. The few exceptions included General Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence who had the advantage of having

43 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the Army Commanders, 11 November 1916, Kiggell Papers V/59 1-2, LHMCA; see also Kiggell to General Sir Robert Whigham, 11 November 1916, Kiggell Papers V 58, LHMCA.
44 Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to his wife, 24 June 1915, Maurice Papers 3/1 4 196, LHCMA.
45 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, 27 July 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21/3, IWM.
commanded the 66th Division in 1917 before becoming C.G.S. in December 1917; Lieutenant-General Sir Louis Bols, who had commanded a Battalion and a Brigade, 1914-15, before being appointed B.G.G.S. XII Corps and then M.G.G.S. Third Army in 1915; Major-General Sir Reginald Hoskins who was 'a first rate' Brigade commander before becoming B.G.G.S. V Corps in 1915; and Colonel E.R. Clayton who commanded a battalion for a year, 1916-17, before becoming G.S.O.1, 2nd Division in 1918. A number of officers, such as Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Philip Neame, and E.A. Osborne, who were relatively junior at the beginning of the war, rose to hold the post of G.S.O.1 in 1918 having given gallant service in the front-line in 1914 as regimental officers and thus gained first-hand experience of the conditions but once they were appointed to the Staff they did not return to front-line service again.

The problem of the shortage of qualified personnel was undoubtedly exacerbated by the number of the staff officers who proved incapable of standing the pace during the early period of the war. Both General Sir Archibald Murray in 1915, who fainted in 1914 when he was told some bad news, and General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, who 'was an exhausted man' by December 1917, were relieved as C.G.S. at G.H.Q.

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46 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 27 September 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
47 Field-Marshal Sir John French to Lord Kitchener, 25 January 1915, and to General Sir Archibald Murray, 25 January 1915, Murray Papers 79 48 3; Sir John French, Diary, 24 and 25 January 1915, French Papers 75 46 2; Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 31 January 1915, Loch Papers 71/12 1, IWM; General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 9 February 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
48 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 30 October and 6 December 1914, Rawlinson Papers 1 1, CCC.
49 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, p.5, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC; see also Rawlinson, Diary, 3 January 1918, Rawlinson Papers 1 9, CCC.
on the grounds of ill-health. At a more junior level, Colonel F.R.F. Boileau (G.S.O.1, 3rd Division), 'an exceptionally fine soldier and tactician', was announced to have died of wounds during the Retreat from Mons when in fact he had gone 'quite off his head with strain & finally shot himself'. Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds (G.S.O.1, 4th Division) broke down and 'threatened to shoot' the 4th Division transport drivers if they did not obey an order from G.H.Q. to throw off all kit and baggage from the wagons to make room for tired men and had to be replaced.

One disillusioned battalion commander believed that 'all the shell-shocked idiots of the British Empire were put to do staff work'. There were a number of reasons for such perceptions. In contrast to the large Staff Officer Corps in the German Army, which allowed all division and most regimental staff positions to be held by highly trained members of this "corps", the rapid expansion of the army meant that there was a severe shortage of trained staff. Many new staff officers were seconded from front-line units, due either to wounds or meritorious service. Prior to the Battle of Loos the 24th Division had 'no staff officer, who had acted in that capacity with troops in the field during the war' and although 'the G.S.O.s I and II were serving regular officers, who entered on the war as regimental

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50 Lieutenant-Colonel T.S. Wollocombe, M.C., Diary of the Great War, p.52, Wollocombe Papers, IWM.
51 Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to his wife, 28 August 1914, Maurice Papers 3/1 4 10 LHCMA; See also Loch, Diary, 28 August 1914, Loch Papers 71/12/1, IWM.
52 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 28 August 1914, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
53 Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Richardson to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 24 May 1930, C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
officers, both had been badly wounded in the first two months in France, and had spent months in hospital or convalescing and neither 'had had any opportunity of appreciating to what extent everything connected with staff work before and during battle had developed in France, since the commencement of the war'.

Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart, the G.S.O.1, 'was not well' and both having 'been wounded in still open warfare on the Aisne and 1st Battle of Ypres' were in hindsight 'not well acquainted with what trench warfare attacks entailed'. Undoubtedly a shortage of competent staff officers lowered standards.

At a lower level, some staff officers achieved rapid promotion in the early years of the war. Brigadier-General John Charteris, who went from the rank of Captain in August 1914 to that of Brigadier-General in December 1915, General Sir Richard Butler, who was promoted from being a Major on Smith-Dorrien's staff at Aldershot pre-war to be Chief of Staff of an Army, and Brigadier-General Philip Howell, who rose from Captain to Brigadier-General in two years, all attained the rank of B.G.G.S. very rapidly. General Sir John Coleridge was able to rise from G.S.O.3 to G.S.O.1 very rapidly while serving with the 11th Division in just over a year owing to 'the death or wounding or illness

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54 Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 November 1927, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
55 Brigadier-General B.R. Mitford to Edmonds, 23 January 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
56 Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart to Major A.F. Becke, 3 August 1925, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
57 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.185, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
58 Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Home, Diary, 15 March 1915, Home Papers 82/18 1, IWM.
59 Brigadier-General C.R. Woodroffe, Diary, 22 February 1915, Woodroffe Papers, IWM.
of his superiors'. As a result in the early years of the war there was a rapid turnover of staff. For example in 1916, Henry Wilson (IV Corps) 'lost my Br. Gen. G.S., my 2nd Grade G.S., my C.R.A., & my C.E. & my Camp Commt' in 1916.

Many officers who had attended Staff College prior to the reforms after the Boer War were not able to perform adequately as Staff Officers during the war. Brigadier-General F.A. Buzzard became G.S.O.1, 9th Division 'although he had been a failure as G.S.O.2 with 2nd Division' and, proving to be 'indifferent', had to be replaced after only two months in the post. Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel L. Hume-Spry (G.S.O.1, 50th Division in 1914-15) was described as 'the most completely brainless man' and was soon sacked. Brigadier-General P.D. FitzGerald (G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division) was 'completely idle and irresponsible' disappearing from his headquarters to go courting whenever the division was out of the line much to the consternation of his staff. One Brigadier-General 'was amazed' by the 'monstrous appointment' of Brigadier-General A.G.A. Hore-Ruthven (B.G.G.S., VII Corps) regarding him 'as a thorough good sporting hard riding man with a minimum of intellect' who, although 'quite cool and collected', had 'not slightest idea as to what was going on

60 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.152, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
61 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 24 March 1916 Wilson Papers, IWM.
62 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 29 August and 2 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5, PRO.
63 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.20, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
64 General Sir Sydney Muspratt, Memoirs, pp.59-60, Muspratt Papers, IWM 86 22/1.
or what he was going to do next'. One regimental officer could not imagine how Major-General H.D. de Pree, who as B.G.G.S., IV Corps was the 'bete-noir' of 'Uncle' Harper (51st Division), 'got such a responsible job'. One possible reason was that he was Haig's cousin!

Inevitably staff work suffered, notably in 1915 and 1916. For example, General Sir Ivor Maxse (18th Division) complained in 1915 that 'the Brigade Majors are inexperienced in staff work' and about one in particular 'who cannot write any sort of operation order and apparently cannot learn any routine work'. An attack on Monchy by 29th Division on 14 April 1917 'was another example of the dangers of inexperienced Staff Officers' in which 'the Bde Major, who drew up the orders for the attack of the 88th Bde was an excellent fellow, but very young' and 'in making out the orders, he omitted to detail troops to occupy the trenches vacated by the attacking troops a matter of routine' and 'as a result, when the Germans counter attacked, there was practically nobody in our front line at Monchy' and disaster nearly ensued.

By 1916 there was a determined effort to train more staff officers and slowly a corps of experienced and able staff officers emerged. In December 1915 G.H.Q. had 'started a small staff College' under Burnett Stuart whose

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65 Major-General J.W. Sandilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1923, C.A.B.45/192, PRO.
66 Major-General D.N. Wimberley, Memoir, p.107, Wimberley Papers, IWM.
67 General Sir Ivor Maxse to Brigadier-General H.C. Lowther, 18 November 1915, Maxse Papers 69 53 6, IWM.
68 Major-General C.G. Fuller to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 July 1938, C.A.B.45 116 PRO.
aim was 'to train junior staff officers'.69 Bonham-Carter, commanded the Senior Staff School at Hesdin from October 1916 to April 1917, set up to help 'promising second grade staff officers to fit themselves to fill first grade appointments in divisions by courses lasting six to seven weeks'.70 The officers trained by Bonham-Carter on the three courses held that winter, included an impressive array of talent who not only held the appointment of G.S.O.1 of a Division or Army, providing a pool of useful staff officers to back up the staff officers educated at the Staff College at divisional level during the war,71 but many of whom would have very successful careers after the war, notably Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Lord Wilson; Lieutenant-Generals E.A. Osborne, Sir Philip Neame, V.C., Sir Francis Nosworthy, Sir Arthur Smith; Major-Generals Sir Kenneth Buchanan, R.J. Collins, Sir Cyril Gepp, F.S.G. Piggott, and Hon. P.G. Scarlett. Attending the Staff Course in 1917, Montgomery described how the students 'all helped each other and acquired knowledge from each other'.72

By December 1916 the training of junior Staff Officers was carried out either by attachment to formations within divisions or at the Senior and Junior Staff Colleges run by G.H.Q.73 The Senior Staff School under Lieutenant-Colonel

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69 Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to his wife, 30 November 1915, Maurice Papers 3/1/4/264, LHCMA; General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 28 November 1915, Clive Papers II/2 97, LHCMA.
70 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, pp.24-28, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
71 Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, pp.24-28, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
72 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his father, 13 April 1917, Montgomery Papers BLM1/58, IWM.
73 G.H.Q., Record of Army Commanders' Conference held at Rollencourt Chateau on Saturday, December 9th, 1916, at 1 a.m., O.A.D.291 20, 12 December 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
Bonham-Carter at Hesdin held a course for 20 officers training for senior staff appointments while the Junior Staff College under Lieutenant-Colonel R.A.M. Currie held two courses lasting six weeks for 50 officers training for junior staff appointments. Having shut down during the operations of 1917, the two G.H.Q. Staff Schools were re-opened on 1 October 1917 in Cambridge to train staff officers during the autumn and winter of 1917. Field-Marshall Lord Alanbrooke believed that the Cambridge Staff Course in March 1918 was 'the most excellent value'.

From 1916 there was a growing meritocracy on the staff with a large number of talented, and often young, non-regular officers who served on the Staff, filling the posts of Brigade Major, G.S.O.2 and G.S.O.3. With such talent it is difficult to sustain the argument that by the end of the war the Army had failed to employ the brains available to it outside the Regular Army. Although it is perhaps also noteworthy that most of these men, like the regulars, were public school educated holding similar interests and in the case of the Military Director of Kinematograph Operations at G.H.Q. a great athlete specialising in horse-racing, pig-

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75 Brigadier-General K. Wigram to Third Army, G.H.Q. O.B./1329, 28 July 1917, W.O.95/365, PRO; and Major-General R.H.K. Butler to Third Army, G.H.Q. O.B./1329 2, 7 September 1917, W.O.95 365, PRO.
76 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke to his mother, 13 January 1918, Alanbrooke Papers 1 1/1 1/1, LHCMA.
sticking, polo, and big-game shooting. Some liked the Army so much that they obtained regular commissions. In March 1918 the Brigade Major of the 88th Brigade (29th Division), Captain J.K. McConnel, was only 23 while the Staff Captain, Gerald Pilleau, was 'a boy of 20'. Anthony Eden was Adjutant of a battalion at 18 and Brigade Major of the 198th Brigade at 20.

A promotional ladder, from G.S.O.3 to G.S.O.1, was developed and climbed by officers such as Montgomery, Neame, and Grigg, who became G.S.O.1 of Divisions in 1917-18 by dint of experience rather than by qualifications. Of the 275 men who held the position of G.S.O.1 of a Division 57 (21%) did not have p.s.c. after their name. Until 1917 the post of G.S.O.1 (Intelligence) at Army level continued to be held by staff graduates. By 1918 there were exceptions like Lieutenant-Colonels S.S. Butler, F.S.G. Piggott (Fifth Army), and R.S. Ryan (First Army), which suggests the monopoly was breaking down but all these officers were still regular officers. C.H. Mitchell (Second Army), a Canadian Militia Officer, was the only non-regular to be G.S.O.1 (I) with an Army. Edward Grigg was the only civilian to become G.S.O.1 of a division during the war. Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee and Colonel H.W. Holland were the only two Territorial officers to attain the rank of

78 Obiuary of Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Faunthorpe, in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs, p.129a, Lee Papers, IWM.
80 Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter VIII, pp.4-5, C.A.B.45 208, PRO.
81 Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer, pp.11 and 16.
82 See Appendix 11.
G.S.O. first grade at G.H.Q.' but as Territorials were given O.B.E.s instead of the C.M.G. given to the Regular G.S.Os.1. The highest-ranking civilian was Sir Eric Geddes, formerly Manager of the N.E. Railways, appointed as Director-General of Transportation with the rank of Major-General in October 1916 to organise 'the working of the railways, the upkeep of the roads'. Geddes was 'a most capable man' and 'a great success' but did not challenge the military at their own competency.

The dominance of the Staff College elite was much more pronounced on the staff as only graduates could be expected to perform to the required standards. All twenty-three (100%) of the C.G.S. at G.H.Q. and the M.G.G.S. at G.H.Q. and with the Armies in the field were graduates. Of the B.G.G.S. at G.H.Q. and with the Corps 95% and 93% respectively were graduates while of the G.S.Os.1 at G.H.Q and with the Divisions at the front 75% and 79% respectively were also graduates. Of the 76 men who held the posts of C.G.S., M.G.G.S., B.G.G.S., and G.S.O.1 at G.H.Q. only 13 (27%) were not graduates and apart from one (a B.G.G.S.) all of these held the post of G.S.O.1. Only 4 (6%) of the 67 men who held the post of B.G.G.S. of a Corps had not been to Staff College while only 57 (21%) who served as G.S.O.1 of

83 Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, pp.219, 224 and 235, Lee Papers, IWM.
84 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 24 August, 12 and 24 September, 7 and 27 October, 9 November 1916, W.O.256/12 and 13, PRO.
85 Haig, Diary, 24 August 1916, W.O.256 12, PRO.
86 Haig, Diary, 7 May 1917, W.O.256 18, PRO.
87 See Appendices 11 and 12.
Divisions lacked the magic letters p.s.c. after their name.\textsuperscript{88}

Staff College graduates formed the spine of the B.E.F. in the war years. For example, Brind (G.S.O.1, 56th Division) 'was very much one of those who ... made the Division what it was' \textsuperscript{89} while MacMamara (G.S.O.1, 32nd Division) was one reason 'why the Division did so brilliantly'.\textsuperscript{90} Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. ap Rhys Pryce (G.S.O.1, 38th Division) 'was a thoroughly capable officer in every way', who 'in reality commanded the Division'.\textsuperscript{91} Although gradually at divisional and army level staff posts were filled by officers who had not attended Staff College, the higher staff posts remained the preserve of the Regular soldiers and there were certainly no civilian high flyers the equivalent of men such as Toby Low (later Lord Allington), Sir Enoch Powell and Sir Edgar Williams who attained the rank of Brigadier General Staff during the Second World War. Early in the war Regular officers who had not been to Staff College saw 'little hope of advancement' on the General Staff, although administrative staff jobs with 'Q' were available.\textsuperscript{92} Major-General Sir John Headlam echoed the resentment of many who were not part of the magic "'inner ring'" formed by those who had passed staff college (p.s.c.) when he wrote that 'to the Staff fanatic

\textsuperscript{88} See Appendices 10-12.
\textsuperscript{89} R Shoollred to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 11 June 1929, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
\textsuperscript{90} Brigadier A.C. Girdwood to Edmonds, 30 June 1930, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
\textsuperscript{91} Major G.P.L. Drake-Brockman to Edmonds, 7 February 1930, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
\textsuperscript{92} Lieutenant-Colonel P.F. FitzGerald, Memoirs, p.21, FitzGerald papers 79 35 1, IWM.
\textsuperscript{93} Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges, Alarms and Excursions, p.55.
nothing counts in comparison with those magic letters' and that 'ten years of the most splendid service in war are as nothing when weighed in the balance against a week at Camberley'.

Much of the operational effectiveness of the Australian and Canadian Corps sprang from the skill of their high-quality British staff officers. All seven B.G.G.S. of the Canadian Corps, the two ANZAC Corps and the Australian Corps between 1915 and 1918 were Regular officers who had been to Staff College. General Sir Brudenell White and Field-Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey, the two Australians who served as B.G.G.S. with the ANZAC or Australian Corps, were both regular soldiers and products of the Staff College. In the Canadian Corps, General Sir Arthur Currie insisted upon retaining British officers in the three senior staff appointments and singled out Brigadier-General N.W. Webber, his B.G.G.S., for particular praise. Lacking a large pool of their own staff officers the Canadians employed the best British staff officers, three of whom (Field-Marshal Lords Alanbrooke, Sir John Dill and Lord Ironside) later rose to become C.I.G.S. and Field-Marshal. The first Canadian G.S.O.1 was not appointed until November 1917, and by the Armistice, one of the four Canadian divisions still had a British G.S.O.1 while two of the six Australian and New

94 Major-General Sir John Headlam to Major-General A.W. Bartholomew, 19 May 1919, Brigadier E.C. Anstey Papers 1159 2, RAI.
95 The seven officers were Field-Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey; Generals Sir Charles Harington, Sir Percy Radcliffe, and Sir Brudenell White; Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn; Brigadier-General N.W. Webber; and Brigadier R.F.J. Hayter.
Zealand divisions still had a British G.S.O.1. The Canadian and Australian Corps could scarcely have become operational without British assistance and the existence of its small caste of pre-war staff-trained officers such as Harington, Radcliffe, or Webber.

Early in the war the principle of the Staff as servant of the troops had to be re-learnt and some staff officers were too brusque or too domineering. Although able and hard-working, Bruce-Williams (M.G.G.S. Second Army) 'developed a rather objectionable manner to those under him in rank' and was removed by Haig because he 'had caused much friction' and 'was not a good enough staff officer'.

There was much criticism of other senior Staff Officers in 1915, notably Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker (Second Army), Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Jeudwine (V Corps), and Major-General Sir Alistair Dallas (IV Corps). Forestier-Walker was 'difficult both with superiors and inferiors and quite out of touch with his Corps' being 'always in the office' while Jeudwine was 'often rude' and hated in his corps. In dealing with peers and juniors, courtesy, consideration and good manners were equally essential.

At a lower level arrogance exacerbated problems.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Cory (G.S.O.1, 51st Division),

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97 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 22 May 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
98 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 27 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10, PRO.
99 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 8 February 1915, Clive Papers II/1 95, LHCMA.
100 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 17 April 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 139, LHCMA.
101 Clive, Diary, 8 February 1915, Clive Papers II/1/95, LHCMA.
102 Howell to his wife, 7 August 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 203, LHCMA.
who seemed to suffer from a swollen head' and 'hardly spoke' to his commander,\textsuperscript{103} was duly replaced. Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney had to calm down one of his Brigadier-Generals who 'was crying with rage at imaginary slights' by G.S.O.1, 33rd Division.\textsuperscript{104} Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Moore (G.S.O.1, 29th Division) in November 1917 was 'an unpleasant person' and 'one of those persons who think that in order to be efficient one must be rude'.\textsuperscript{105} In 1918 Pinney commented on his new G.S.O.1, Lieutenant-Colonel M.O. Clarke, that 'his talents are A.1, his manner is B4 & many resent it'.\textsuperscript{106} It is significant that both Clarke and Moore lasted only a few months before being replaced as G.S.O.1. Colonel Karslake (G.S.O.1, 4th Division) was 'a capable officer, and impresses men with right ideas, but he has not got on as well as he should because of a sarcastic manner'.\textsuperscript{107} It was known that the '"G" and "Q" branches [were] not on speaking terms in one Corps' \textsuperscript{108} and Pinney had to warn his Staff that 'they were to help everyone & NOT get up rows between different branches'.\textsuperscript{109}

The work-load sustained by the few experienced staff officers was considerably increased. One Brigadier-General noted that 'the first principles of war were overwhelmed by a mass of detail which dispensed with individual initiative
& any elasticity’ and giving as an example the orders issued by VIII Corps prior to 1 July 1916 a ‘terrible document’ of 76 pages which ‘had been endeavouring to legislate for everything’ and issued with 365 Supplementary Instructions and it took three days ‘to reduce this enormous mass of instructions to some 8 pages & 5 maps of brigade orders’.

Of the October battles on the Somme the G.S.O.1, 30th Division noted that ‘there was never time during this period to manage anything’. One solution for individual Corps, such as the II Corps in 1916, was to attempt to reduce the pressure of work on staff officers and to ‘draft instructions for reducing staff work in our staffs: fewer reports & returns; more liaison; less reduplication’.

A persistent theme was the long hours required to keep that bureaucracy turning over. Life as a Staff Officer was not easy as critics and regimental officers imagined. General Sir Walter Kirke (G.S.O.1, 4th Division) found the paper work to be intense and was up until 12.30 a.m. while the G.S.O.1, 17th Division complained that during the Somme ‘the pace was terrific, averaging 16 to 18 hours work a day for the G.I of a Division & I personally was tied terribly to my office’. The senior staff of 20th Division during the attack on Guillemont on the Somme in 1916 remained in a 'dark office dug-out, lit by electric light' for 36 hours.

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110 Brigadier-General H.C. Rees to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 November 1929, C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
111 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 20 April 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
112 Brigadier-General P. Howell, Diary, 4 October 1916, Howell Papers IV/D/13, LHCMA.
113 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 3 April 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
114 Major-General R.J. Collins to Edmonds, 7 February 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.

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'talking incessantly through the telephone sending messages and orders'.\footnote{General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 3 September 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.} During the advance in September 1918 Lieutenant-General Laurence Carr (G.S.O.1, 51st Division) 'had only averaged 2 hrs. sleep' during 'the previous five nights'.\footnote{Lieutenant-General Laurence Carr to his wife, 5 September 1918, Carr Papers, LHCMA.}

Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (Brigade Major, 104th Brigade) with a routine of being woken at 5 a.m. and working until 11 p.m. became 'very tired' \footnote{Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his father, 11 March 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM1 39, IWM.} and by 1917 he 'was beginning to feel the strain a bit'.\footnote{Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his father, July 1917, Montgomery Papers BLM1 61, IWM.} Kiggell as C.G.S. sent a circular round the sections of G.H.Q. in early 1917 stressing 'the great importance' that staff officers and clerks employed in all the offices 'should normally finish their work by 10 p.m.' in order to remain fit for offensive operations.\footnote{Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the Branches of G.H.Q., 19 January 1917, Kiggell Papers V/983/2, LHMCA.} In January 1917 Haig urged the desirability of organising work in offices so as to allow Sunday to become as much as possible a rest day' as 'many excellent clerks and officers also are suffering from the continuous daily work.'\footnote{Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 3 January 1917, Haig Papers , W.O.256/15, PRO.} During the German Spring Offensive of March 1918, the B.G.G.S. of the III Corps became so exhausted that his duties had to be taken over for the night by the G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division \footnote{General Sir Eric de Burgh, Memoir, pp.14 and 16, de Burgh Papers 7306-67, NAM.} while early in April 1918 Major G.M. Lee (Brigade Major, 41st...
Brigade) 'broke down under the strain' and was invalided home. Colonel T.T. Grove (G.S.O.1, 6th Division), having lost a lot of weight, was feeling the strain so much towards the end of the war that he asked for post at home but then withdrew his application as he could not bear to leave. 

The scarcity of trained staff officers not only diminished significantly the efficiency of the staff in the B.E.F. but also added to the pressure on commanders. As a result, there was a tendency for army commanders, such as Birdwood, 'to do the work which his subordinate Generals should perform' while General Lord Rawlinson did 'a great deal himself' so that 'the proper staff are at somewhat of a discount'. Edmonds noted that 'several divisional commanders' in 1918 'had to do their own staff work, and then go round the infantry brigadiers to tell them what to do'. Haldane felt that he had 'to think of everything now that my staff is very different from what it was'. Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps) 'devoted much of his time to the small details of administration that he should have left to Staff Officers and junior ones at that'. While serving as G.S.O.2, Indian Corps Beddington discovered that the B.G.G.S. (Macandrew) had decreed that no orders were to be

122 Major-General Sir Cyriaic Skinner to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 20 December 1926, C.A.B.45 193, PRO.
123 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, pp.40-41, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
124 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 September 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
125 Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 3 December 1914, Game Papers PWG 4, IWM.
126 Edmonds to Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers I/2B 5a, LHCMA.
127 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 13 September 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
128 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.26-27, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
sent out without his prior approval and that as a consequence in his absence the other members of the staff were reluctant to send out draft orders warning of a pending move to subordinate units.129

More difficult to solve than the lack of staff officers was the decline in good relations between the Staff and the front-line troops. It would appear that the main cause of friction were the young, junior staff officers holding the posts of A.D.C. and G.S.O.3 who despite their lowly rank wore the Red Tabs of the General Staff. Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery noted that 'there was a tremendous gulf between the staff and the fighting army; the former lived in large chateaux miles behind the front'.130 During the First World War all staff officers were entitled to wear the red tabs and hat-bands of the General Staff but, during the Second World War, only full colonels and above were allowed to do so as a result of the hostility engendered amongst front-line troops by junior staff officers.131

One junior staff officer, a non-regular, noted that when compared with the more experienced French and German Armies the Regular Army during 1915 and 1916 'tended to lead a secluded and relatively luxurious life far behind the firing-line where, immersed in office work, they had no time for personal contact with the front-line troops'.132

129 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, pp.87-88, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
130 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Colonel Sir Henry Abel Smith, 7 August 1969, Haig Papers 347 64, NLS Acc.3155.
131 Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, p.135, Archibald Papers, IWM.
result, considerable friction was generated between the staff and regiments in the front-line during the Great War, which, by making it very difficult for the high command to be able to obtain accurate "feed-back" from the front-line, hindered the successful administration of reform and the introduction of new ideas. One junior artillery officer noted that 'the Staff had not the remotest idea of what conditions were like in the line'.

Usually the staff 'never went further than at the most Brigade H.Q. where in a way they were not welcomed because of the "approach" which was often in an "off hand red tab superior manner"'. During the whole time that the Cavalry Corps were in the Ypres Salient under the Second Army in mid-1915, 'not a single member of the Army Staff had come round to visit them and enquire into their needs'. In May 1916, Haig noticed that 'in many divisions, the Staff does not circulate sufficiently amongst the brigades and battalions when operations are in progress'.

The G.S.O.1, 30th Division on the Somme noted that 'an effort to keep personal touch between Divl. Hdqtrs. and the front line troops would take a staff officer some 8 or 9 hours'. The dangers of visiting the front for staff officers were very real and it is often forgotten that even staying back in the rear could be dangerous; for example,

133 G.P. MacClellan to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 15 October 1936, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
134 Paul Maze to 2nd Earl Haig, undated, Haig Papers 347 12, NLS Acc.3155.
135 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 June 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
136 Haig, Diary, 14 August 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/12, PRO.
137 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 20 April 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
Lieutenant-Colonel F.E.Ll. Daniell (G.S.O.1, 21st Division) was killed by a shell, which landed on his headquarters in February 1916,\textsuperscript{138} and Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Longridge (G.S.O.1, 1st Division) was shot through the head and killed while visiting the front-line in August 1916.\textsuperscript{139}

The lesson that senior officers must pay frequent visits to battle areas to be with the forward troops and commanders in order to make the on-the-spot assessments and decisions which would guarantee the success of operations was gradually absorbed. During the first years of the war 'the best use was not made' of liaison officers 'as they were not sent far enough forward' never going 'further forward than Brigade H.Q.'\textsuperscript{140} The G.S.O.1, 32nd Division complained of 'the lack of liaison from back to front; we went back always to Corps H.Q.' having 'no recollection of Corps G.S. coming up to us to help & see how we were faring, & never further up i.e. to Bdes or to the men in front!'\textsuperscript{141}

At Third Army in 1916 there were three G.S.O.3s who 'each had a Corps to look after and were supposed to know all about it and everything that went on in it, state of the trenches etc.' but little notice was taken of their reports while the units regarded their visitors as spies trying to find fault rather than attempting 'to find out the real and actual conditions in the front line and to help as far as

\textsuperscript{138} Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.182, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
\textsuperscript{139} General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 18 August 1916, Strickland Papers P.362, IWM.
\textsuperscript{140} General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.15-17, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
\textsuperscript{141} Brigadier-General E.G. Wace to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 October 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
Liaison Officers were often seen as 'the Army Commanders' private snoopers' and when a "learner" staff officer from Army H.Q. was found in his area by G.O.C. 96th Brigade he 'was furious, & rightly so, that the Army should send up a sort of spy who never reported to Div. H.Q. or to Bde H.Q. either going up or coming back!' One Regimental Officer noted how the Staff of the 91st Brigade were 'reduced to a state of perspiring nervousness' by a visit for tea by two officers from Corps.

Good staff officers found techniques to ensure that they kept in close contact with the front. Prior to the Battle of Loos the G.S.O.2 of the 21st Division 'had reconnoitred from the air 3 days before as far back as Pont a Vendin'. General Sir Walter Kirke (G.S.O.1, 4th Division) frequently went round the trenches with the C.R.E. and the G.O.C., realising that 'its a good thing for the men to see the Staff pretty often' to prevent them thinking that the staff were 'leading a life of ease and luxury behind'. Colonel W.H.F. Weber (G.S.O.1 30th Division) 'three times went right down to the front line to receive impressions' of operations to capture Trones Wood. One Brigade Major did 'not get out enough round the line' because his Brigade Commander did 'not encourage it much' and it was only when

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142 Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoir, September 1916, p.15, Roupell Papers GR3, IWM.
143 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.15-17, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
144 Brigadier-General E.G. Wace to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 October 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
145 Comments by Brigadier D. Forster, 12 April [1926]. C.A.B.45/120 PRO.
146 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 4 July 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
147 Colonel W.H.F. Weber to Edmonds, 18 March 1930, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
his commander was replaced by a younger man that he was able to 'go out every morning', doing his office work in the afternoon. 149 Montgomery, while serving as a Brigade Major in 1916, had a routine of visiting the trenches in the morning and doing his office work in the afternoon 150 and while serving as G.S.O.2, 33rd Division, in 1917 took it in turns with the G.S.O.1 'to go out and visit the trenches' every other day. 151 By 1918 a number of staff officers were employing aircraft in order to be able to travel about much more quickly. 152 G.H.Q. noted in April 1918 that 'staff officers cannot satisfactorily retain touch with units belonging to their own formations or with other units on their flanks if they allow themselves to be bounded by their offices' and that 'they should make frequent personal reconnaissances in order to find out for themselves the situation both in front and on their flanks'. 153

Another solution was the development of liaison officers, whose duty it was to keep their superiors informed about the conditions at the front, and, as 'undoubtedly when properly used' they 'proved of real value', 154 their employment gradually became universal. On the First Army Staff it was the rule that 'every staff officer had to go out once every day (or night) and visit some unit' and that

149 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 4 and 23 April 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
150 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his mother, 7 May 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM1/43, IWM.
151 Montgomery to his father, July 1917, Montgomery Papers BLM1 61, IWM.
152 See for example, Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke to his mother, 27 July 1918, Alanbrooke Papers 1 1/11/26, LHCMA; General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoir, p.81, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
153 G.H.Q., T 9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.4, Staff Duties, 13 April 1918, W.O.58 70, PRO.
154 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.15-17, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
'every position of the front held by the Army had to be visited at least once every week'.\textsuperscript{155} As a result of experiences on the Somme in 1916 XIII Corps advocated that 'more use might, perhaps, be made of the French system of Liaison Officers' whose responsibility was 'keeping the superior authority informed of the situation and for verifying the position actually held by the infantry' and ensuring that 'the spirit of the orders of the superior authority is carried out by lower formations'.\textsuperscript{156}

The Fourth Army noted that it was 'essential' that Divisional Commanders should have Liaison Officers at Brigade Headquarters 'during important periods of operations' to keep them informed 'of all important events' and 'thus considerably relieving the work of the Brigade Staff'.\textsuperscript{157} By 1917 the post of "Intelligence Officer" at Brigade Headquarters had been evolved to keep them in touch with the front line \textsuperscript{158} and Plumer (Second Army) had officers living in sectors of the front line in order to keep him in touch with the troops.\textsuperscript{159} By mid-1918 the troops of the 13th Brigade (5th Division) were visited regularly in the line by staff officers from XI Corps.\textsuperscript{160} In 1918 the 8th Division had a staff Officer (G.S.O.2), who 'was the principal

\textsuperscript{155} Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 1 May [?1926], Haig Papers, W.O.256 7, PRO.
\textsuperscript{156} XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.9, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{157} Appendix 6, Liaison, to unsigned and undated memorandum, possibly draft for Fourth Army G.S. 400, [December 1916], Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{158} Sir David Kelly, \textit{The Ruling Few}, pp.94-96.
\textsuperscript{160} Major W. Wilberforce to Edmonds, 10 July 1933, C.A.B.45 119, PRO.
liaison officer between the forward units and Divisional H.Q.

Improving the quality of British staff work at all levels was essential. At his first conference with his Army Commanders in January 1916, Haig 'spoke on the importance of good Staff work and the need for adhering to the principles of F.S.R. During 1915-17, the staff work of the B.E.F. gradually improved as the Army absorbed the new, inexperienced staff officers. By 1917 a number of formations had gained a very good reputation for their staff work and at Army level in particular Staff Officers formed close working partnerships with their commanders. For example Rawlinson and A.A. Montgomery formed a close partnership at Fourth Army, which was, apart from the partnership of Plumer and Harington at Second Army, the best known Commander and staff officer partnership at Army level in the British army during the war. In contrast to the Fifth Army the Second Army in 1917 was renowned for 'wonderful organization and devotion to detail' in its 'detailed preparation for the battle, down to battalion and battery level'. Anderson Hastings, 'supreme as a Staff Officer', formed 'a strong combination' with Horne, 'a first-rate soldier', at XV Corps and then First Army

161 Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoir, p.2, Roupell Papers GR5, IWM.
162 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 8 August 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 7, PRO.
164 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.29, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
165 Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer, p.162.
166 Anthony Eden, Another World, p.135.
167 Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.27-28, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
while Byng at the Third Army also formed effective partnerships with Bols and Vaughan.

Nevertheless, relationships were sometimes unhappy and problems could arise when commanders and staff officers were unable to combine happily. In 1917 General Sir Hubert Gough and his M.G.G.S., Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, although old friends, proved to be a disastrous combination and the Fifth Army gained an unenviable reputation for poor organisation.\textsuperscript{168} As things had 'not been running at all smoothly',\textsuperscript{169} there was 'much discontent with Neill Malcolm', who 'accentuated and encouraged Gough's peculiarities, instead of softening them down',\textsuperscript{170} and failed to control his restless Army Commander.\textsuperscript{171} As a result as early as mid-1916, the combination of Gough and Malcolm had 'managed to put everybody's back up'.\textsuperscript{172} In November 1916 Gough and his staff 'had simply no conception of the conditions in the forward area'.\textsuperscript{173} By September 1917 even Haig was 'inclined to think that the Fifth Army staff work is not so satisfactory as last year'\textsuperscript{174} and Malcolm left to command 66th Division.\textsuperscript{175} In 1918 Plumer held 'no high opinion' of Harington's replacement, Major-General Sir Jocelyn Percy, at 6 feet 3 inches 'a personality to be remembered',\textsuperscript{176} who 'was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.3-4, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
\item \textsuperscript{169} General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 11 and 13 October 1917, Rawlinson Papers 19, CCC.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVIII, Edmonds Papers III/12 16, LHCMA.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 17 April 1916, Howell Papers IV C/3 139, LHCMA.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Howell to his wife, 24 July 1916, Howell Papers IV C/3 325, LHCMA.
\item \textsuperscript{173} General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 23 October 1936, CAB 45 135, PRO.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 18 September 1917 Haig Papers , W.O.256 22 PRO.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, p.121-122, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Edmonds, Obituary of Major-General Sir Jocelyn Percy, The Times, 25 August 1952, Edmonds Papers V/2, LHCMA.
\end{itemize}
not given the standing that was his due, and he had as a result on more than one occasion great difficulty in obtaining an essential service’.  

An ‘outstanding’ feature of XV Corps staff, which was a ‘very happy family’, was the ‘intensive training for the issue of operation orders’ by the B.G.G.S. (Hastings Anderson) who realized that ‘it was all important in major operations that orders to units - smallest units - must reach them in plenty of time and that there must not be a second’s delay to passing orders from Corps to Division & division to Brigade etc’.  

As a result ‘the staff work went like clock work’ and the commander ‘could get his orders carried out’. Furthermore, as soon as ‘a Division was ordered to join the Corps, one of the Corps Staff went at once to the Div.’s H.Q. - even before it came into Corps area - to give maps, photographs, areas, traffic routes and in fact every scrap of useful information which could be circulated and digested during the move up’.

The greatly increased mobility of their forces in 1917 and especially 1918 suggests that there had been a great improvement in the level of staff work. By early 1917 Corps Commanders, such as Du Cane, XV Corps, and Maxse, XVIII Corps, emphasised the necessity for a closer understanding between Regimental and Staff officers, stressing that the

177 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.29-30, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
178 Major P.J.R. Currie to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 April 1930, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
179 C.M. Page to Edmonds, 25 August 1934, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
180 Currie to Edmonds, 23 April 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
181 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 10 March 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
Staff were 'the servants of the troops'. The Staff were to 'avoid blaming subordinate Staffs unless their fault is grave' and above all to make sure that 'the troops have the earliest notice of matters affecting them'. It was also made clear that in order to help the troops the Staff 'must be a happy family and that there was to be 'no quarrelling between branches of the Staff'. ¹⁸²

By 1917-18 all British headquarters had gained greatly in the ability to exercise command; and had gained self-confidence too from their recent successes. Lord Cavan in October 1917 agreed with Haig that 'now the divisions understand the manner of making an attack, long delays for special preparations are no longer necessary'.¹⁸³ British staffs by late 1917 were able to assemble and deploy large numbers of men and equipment in a way which had not been possible in 1916. For the Battle of Cambrai seven assaulting divisions, five of whom 'had been concentrated in the back areas for training and were brought up to the front of attack by night moves', were supported by 1009 guns, of which 667 guns had to be moved in from other areas, and three Tank Brigades, which were moved to the front on 36 trains.¹⁸⁴ Staff procedures were appropriately flexible and unbureaucratic.

¹⁸² Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, XVIII Corps Staff Conference, Agenda, 1 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
¹⁸³ Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 1 October 1917 Haig Papers , W.O.256 23 PRO.
¹⁸⁴ Major C.A.L. Brownlow, Notes on the Battle of Cambrai, Novr. 1917, undated, pp.4, 6, 7, and 9, C.A.B.45/118, PRO.
G.H.Q. warned in April 1918 that 'in warfare of movement it is neither possible nor desirable for Commands and Staffs, especially those of Divisions and Brigades, to carry out their functions with the facilities and the deliberation which have come to be looked on as normal in trench warfare'. Furthermore, 'it must be realized that it is necessary for headquarters to be prepared to dispense with heavy paraphernalia, to send away such officers and personal as are not immediately necessary to the conduct of the battle, and to work as far as possible with a message book only'. By the autumn of 1918, the staff work of the B.E.F. had improved immensely and had become a smooth routine, based on much hard staff work, which was one of the factors in the victories of that year. Montgomery (G.S.O.1, 47th Division) had 'to work out plans in detail for the operations' and to supervise 'all the branches of the Staff, and administrative arrangements' to ensure that:

The day generally commences with an organised attack at dawn, after which we continue to work all day; then another organised attack is arranged for the next morning to carry us forward again, and so on. It means little sleep and continuous work, at night guns have to be moved forward, communications arranged, food and ammunition got up etc. etc. It would, however, be a mistake to think that an outdated minority of incompetents represented the Old Army's

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185 G.H.Q., T 9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.4, Staff Duties, 13 April 1918, W.O.58 70, PRO.
186 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his mother, 3 September 1918, Montgomery Papers BLM1 65, IWM.
best officers. Many officers took their profession very seriously. The training at the Staff College had a great deal to do with producing a group of British generals and staff officers capable of successfully leading armies against very proficient German forces. Those officers who attended Staff College in the late 1890s prior to the Boer War, such as Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, Lord Byng, Earl Haig, Sir William Robertson, and Sir Henry Wilson; Generals Sir Hubert Gough, Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, Sir George Macdonogh, and Sir Henry Rawlinson; and Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 187 went on to hold senior posts at G.H.Q. and Army level during the First World War.

Others such as Generals Sir George Barrow, Sir John Du Cane, Sir William Furse, Sir Richard Haking, and Sir Stanley Maude; and Major-Generals Sir Thompson Capper, H.N.C. Heath, O.S.W. Nugent, E.M. Perceval, H.G. Ruggles-Brise, and A.E. Sandbach held posts as divisional and corps commanders at home and abroad. Staff College graduates such as Field-Marshall Sir Archibald Montgomery, Generals Sir Hastings Anderson, Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Sir Lewis Halliday, V.C., and Sir Charles Harrington, General Sir William Thwaites; Lieutenant-Generals Sir Louis Bols, Sir Basil Burnett-Hitchcock, Burnett-Stuart, Sir Sidney Clive and Sir Louis Vaughan; Major-Generals Hugo de Pree, Sir Charles Gwynn, and Hubert Isacke, held most of the Staff posts at Divisional, Corps,

and Army level. Later batches at the Staff College produced the men who held staff appointments at Corps and Divisional level, such as Field-Marshals Sir Thomas Blamey, Sir John Dill and Lord Ironside; Generals Sir John Brind, Sir Harry Knox, Sir Norman Macmullen, and Sir Percy Radcliffe; Brigadier-Generals Sir Archibald Home, R.H. Kearsley, and Sir Samuel Wilson.

The men, who left Staff College after the Boer War, were 'well-educated soldiers' and formed a new breed of professional staff officers, who held most of the Staff posts at Divisional, Corps, and Army level during the war. Their standard of ability was 'high' and their Staff College education gave them 'an enormously increased power of using our wits logically and with knowledge'. These men were the backbone of the B.E.F. in the war years and enabled the war to be fought. Their contribution to the winning of the war has been much neglected and ignored when British generalship during the war is roundly condemned as incompetent.

188 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VI, pp.9-11, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
CHAPTER FOUR

Developing a Professional Leadership

The Army was in transition during the period 1915-17 as both the commanders and their troops embarked on a learning curve, which would only be fulfilled with victory in 1918. During this transitional period there was a fundamental weakness at the top since the commanders at all levels were inexperienced or unfit for command. In the long term, far more important was the search for competent officers, regardless of arm. The Army hierarchy was dominated by officers (280) from the infantry who formed 43% of the sample. Indeed 337 officers (55%) had served with the infantry at some point in their career. The Artillery (112) were the next most dominant arm forming 17% of the sample while officers who originated from the Cavalry (65), Engineers (64) and Guards (33) formed respectively only 10%, 10% and 5% of the sample. The Indian Army (46) and Dominion (32) officers provided respectively 7% and 5% of the sample. When the war began a small group of 25 officers (4%) were retired and served as "dugouts".

Non-regular officers (19) formed only some 3% of the sample of whom 15 were Dominion officers (2%) while the British non-regulars were very poorly represented with only

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1 See Appendix 3.
2 See Appendix 2.
4 officers forming less than 1% of the sample. Nevertheless the image that all senior Dominion officers were non-regulars is misleading as over half (17 or 55%) were serving officers with their own Regular Forces. Some, like Gellibrand and Russell, had served in the British Army while others, like Heneker and Hayter, were still serving in the British Army.

The cavalry held a prestige within the Army's hierarchy which was proportionately much greater than the numbers of cavalry officers in senior posts. Although the cavalry in France played little active part in the war and represented only 10% of the sample, a large number of commanders in the highest echelons were cavalrymen. Both Commanders-in-Chief (Haig and French) and five of the ten Army Commanders (Allenby, Birdwood, Byng, Gough, and Haig) were cavalrymen. Only 4 (40%) of the Army Commanders (Monro, Plumer, Rawlinson, and Smith-Dorrien) were infantrymen. The other Army Commander (Horne) was a gunner (10%).

The dominance of cavalrymen at the top of the B.E.F.'s power structure is striking but at a lower level the picture was very different. At corps and divisional level, the infantry (including Guardsmen) were dominant forming the largest group with 40% (including Guardsmen, 62%) of Corps commanders and 47% (including Guardsmen, 55%) of Divisional

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3 See Appendix 2.
4 See Appendix 10.
commanders appointed. The Cavalry forming the next largest group with 21% of Corps commanders and 14% of Divisional commanders appointed at the expense of the Gunners (15% Corps commanders, 11% Divisional commanders), Guards (12% Corps commanders, 8% Divisional commanders), and Sappers (4% Corps commanders, 4.5% Divisional commanders). The conclusions to be drawn from this evidence are clear: during the war years the British Army believed that service with the cavalry was second in importance only to service with the infantry when it came to training officers for command but the infantry predominated overall. The artillery came third.

There was a drastic shortage of adequate officers for higher command at operational level compared with the French and German Armies during 1915-1916, which meant that 'owing to the smallness of the old regular Army our divisions, army corps and armies were commanded by men of whom only a few had even handled a division'. Of the sample of 700 officers who served on the Western Front during the war only 63 (9%) had commanded a brigade, 28 (4%) a division, and 9 (2%) a corps prior to the war. General Sir Horace Dorrien-Smith, a veteran of the Boer War, was the only British general officer on the western front with personal experience of commanding a division in action before the war.

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5 See Appendix 10.
6 See Appendix 10.
and only 34 (5%) had commanded a formation of Divisional or larger size prior to August 1914.⁸

On returning to the UK to take command of the 18th Division, Maxse noted in November 1914 that none of his Brigade commanders had 'ever handled more than one battalion'.⁹ Of the 23 divisional commanders on the Somme on 1 July 1916, only 3 had commanded even a brigade before the war, while of the 18 corps commanders, only 2 had commanded a division.¹⁰ Their inexperience and that of their subordinates was inevitable and, as a result, mistakes were frequent and costly. In part because of their colonial background, corps and division commanders lacked experience when fighting at an operational level because 'their training had been in frontier wars and South Africa'.¹¹ One such commander was Major-General Sir Henry Lukin (9th Division), a South African, who had done well in bush-wacking expeditions in Africa, but whose knowledge of modern warfare was rudimentary.¹²

Other commanders, like Hamilton-Gordon, Pulteney and Woolcombe, were brought into Divisional and Corps commands from Britain because of their seniority. At a lower level General Sir Tom Bridges' hair had 'gone grey with his quick rise from Sq[quadron] Leader in 4 D[ragoon] G[uards] on the

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⁸ See Appendix 9.
⁹ General Sir Ivor Maxse to Brigadier-General H.C. Lowther, 18 November 1915, Maxse Papers 69/53 6, IWM.
Mons Retreat' to command of the 19th Division in December 1915. Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell rose from substantive Major to Major-General in about a year while General Sir Peter Strickland obtained command of the 1st Division 'just 10 days over 2 years since I got Lieut. Col.!!!' Haig promoted Jacob from Colonel to Lieutenant-General 'in about 18 months'. The rapid expansion of the Army meant that majors were 'getting commands of Brigades as a matter of course'. Such rapid expansion left formations without experienced leaders.

For many the war represented a new impetus for careers providing opportunities for advancement, which had previously seemed unattainable. Field-Marshal Earl of Cavan had actually retired in 1913 and had to be hastily recalled on the outbreak of war. Major-General P.R. Robertson, 'an able divisional commander', would not have attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and command of a Battalion 'but for the opportune outbreak of the war' while Jacob, commanding a battalion prior to the war, had been 'officially informed that there was no further employment for him and that he would be retired' in September 1914.

Until the end of 1916 it cannot be said that there was a proper system of promotion based on professional expertise.

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13 Brigadier-General F.A. Maxwell, Diary, 20 May 1916, Maxwell Papers 7402-25-17, NAM.
15 General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 1 June 1916, Strickland Papers P.362, IWM.
16 Brigadier-General P. Howell to Sir Montague Turner, 7 July 1916, Howell Papers IV/C/2 233, LHCMA.
17 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 25 September 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
18 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.42, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
19 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, pp.92-93, LHCMA.
because there was no sustained reservoir of experience of continental warfare. During the period 1914-16 promotion to the high command and staff positions went mainly by seniority in the absence of any operational experience to influence decisions. Of the thirty Divisional commanders in the B.E.F. in 1914 no less than nineteen (63%) became Corps commanders, and six (20%) were killed or invalided while only five (17%) failed to become corps commanders, all of whom were rather elderly. Furthermore, five (17%) became Army commanders. Of the twenty-five Brigade commanders in August 1914, only four (16%), did not become divisional commanders while twenty-one (84%) did so in the rapid expansion of 1914, 1915 and 1916. In August 1914 the three Brigadiers of the 4th Division, Haldane (10th Brigade), Hunter-Weston (11th Brigade), and F.M. Wilson (12th Brigade) 'were far and away better than the Brigadiers of other Divisions and all became Corps Commanders'. Others were less lucky. General Sir Edward Bulfin (2nd Brigade) proved 'with his fine soldierly qualities' to be 'one of Haig's 'stoutest hearted Brigadiers' and a tower of strength at all times' but was wounded and thus was removed from the promotion race at a vital time and did not get a corps until 1917.

Of the remaining 165 British and Dominion officers who obtained command of a Division on the Western Front between 1914 and 1916, the majority were promoted primarily on seniority, and only a minority had gained operational experience to influence their positions. The promotion system during this period was highly dependent on seniority, with only a small percentage of commanders having operational experience. This was particularly evident in the promotion of Divisional and Corps commanders, where the majority were promoted based on seniority rather than operational experience.

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21 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 20 and 27 September 1914, and 1 November 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
1915 and 1918 only a very few, 20 (or 12%), became Corps commanders.\textsuperscript{22} 145 (88%) failed to progress to Corps level. In other words, those who commanded a division at the beginning of the war were particularly well placed for rapid promotion during the expansion of the army whereas those who attained this post later in the war were unlikely to progress further. Five (56\%) of the nine corps commanders in 1914 were promoted to command of armies, and one (Haig) became Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1915. This first group of corps commanders who went on to command armies must be seen as constituting a particularly privileged but rapidly upwardly-mobile elite within the B.E.F.

Of the 34 corps commanders who served between 1915 and 1918 only five (17\%) rose subsequently to army command.\textsuperscript{23} Even though few of this second generation of corps commanders managed to rise any higher than that level, they nevertheless perpetuated a relatively unchanging chain of command throughout the war. Those Officers, who were in the right place and rank in 1914 and 1915 and had good reputations, were able to move furthest up the ladder at a time when the Army needed commanders to step into the vacuum created by expansion. Once the initial expansion was beginning to slacken off in 1916 and ended in early 1917 promotion became slow and a matter of dead men's shoes once again.

\textsuperscript{22} See Appendix 19.
\textsuperscript{23} See Appendix 19.
The rise by seniority meant that men often moved up in rank in spite of their personal qualities or competence because of the urgent need for "educated" soldiers. Like Wellington in the Peninsula, Haig had doubts about his senior officers' abilities commenting in June 1917 that he had at last got five Army commanders 'who knew their business' whereas in 1916 only one did.\textsuperscript{24} Lacking a pool of experienced officers during the early days of the war, Haig could not show ruthlessness in replacing senior subordinates until there were officers to replace them. The overall average competence and inexperience of the officer corps did not allow him to make wholesale changes. Prior to the war in 1911, Haig was aware that 'there are a great many useless officers' who 'are just able to scrape along in peace time, but are quite unfit for the responsibilities which will come upon them in the event of war'.\textsuperscript{25}

As early as 1914 when Haldane removed three out of the four Battalion Commanders of the 10th Brigade, two of whom were arrested and cashiered for cowardice,\textsuperscript{26} while Major-General E.C. Ingouville-Williams had sent home three of the four battalion commanders of the 16th Brigade, within three months of arrival in France, the fourth going on to command a Division.\textsuperscript{27} Corkran (5th Brigade) reported in October 1915 that 'two of the C.O.s in the brigade were tired and

\textsuperscript{24} General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 14 June 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1 7, CCC.
\textsuperscript{25} Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 31 August 1911, Haig Papers 328e, NLS.
\textsuperscript{26} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 4, 5 and 15 September 1914, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
\textsuperscript{27} Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.33, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
not very good'. 28 Henry Wilson complained in March 1916 that the 68th Brigade had '3 bad C.O.s out of 4'. 29 Others had to be sent home to command Divisions of the New Army because they could not stand the pace, notably General Sir Ivor Maxse (4th (Guards) Brigade), who 'seemed to have lost his fighting spirit which used to be so noticeable at Aldershot in peacetime' and 'had not done well', 30 and Major-General R.H. Davies (6th Brigade), who 'seemed much changed, full of nerves', and 'very jumpy'. 31

Many of the older divisional commanders, such as Major-General Hon. E.J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley (46th Division), who could not provide 'the necessary thinking' and took 'life very easily', failed to provide the leadership and energy required of front-line commanders. 32 At Gommecourt in 1916 Stuart Wortley was 'a worn out man who never visited his front line and was incapable of inspiring any kind of enthusiasm'. 33 Progress in getting new blood into the high command proved difficult because of the relative shortage of experienced or capable men. There were many more positions available for senior commanders and staff officers in France than there were competent officers. Major-General J.F.C. Fuller noted that 'our regular army was an army of dilettantes & our new armies, armies of amateurs'. 34

28 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 October 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 6, PRO.
29 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 2 March 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
30 Haig, Diary, 6, 14, and 17 September 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
31 Haig, Diary, 27 August, 18, 22, and 24 September 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
32 Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 19 and 20 November 1915, Game Papers PWG 9, IWM.
33 Brigadier-General Frank Lyon to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 June 1929, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
34 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his mother, 27 March 1918, Fuller Papers IV/3 228, LHCMA.
work ethic of some senior officers is characterised by the C.R.A. of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, who 'looked upon his profession as a means of providing him with an easy going life connected with horses, hunting and good friends'.

This shortage of officers necessitated the use of 'dugouts', such as Lieutenant-General R.G. Broadwood and Major-Generals C.G.M. Fasken, Sir John Ramsay and C. Ross, as commanders at divisional level in 1915 and 1916. For example, Major-General Charles Ross (an instructor at the Staff College before retiring in 1912 to become a writer of military history) rejoined as a Brigade commander and, despite having 'very little experience of regimental soldiering or command', was promoted to command 6th Division in November 1915. He failed to exercise any command over his division, leaving his brigadiers a free hand to go their own way', but managed to survive until August 1917 before being given a division at home. It was indicative of the rapid expansion of the Army that officers of modest accomplishment, such as Ross and Ramsay, could be appointed to command of Divisions during 1915-16.

Many middle-ranking officers agreed in 1915 that 'all our commanders were too old'. The presence of commanders at Brigade, Divisional and even Corps level who were 'old-

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35 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2/1/70, LHCMA.
36 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.47, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
37 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Spencer Wilkinson, 15 March 1916, Edmonds Papers II/2/133, LHCMA.
fashioned and out of date in most things' 38 created friction and inertia within the Army's machinery which prevented its smooth operation. It was not surprising that 'the new divisions under their old "dug out" generals' conducted attacks which 'just throw men's lives away' because the 'old gentlemen' were 'with no imagination, or no first hand knowledge, & with minds far too "set" ever to learn new things'.39

In 1915 Haig noted that the brigadiers, such as H.R. Davies, Lawford, Strickland, and Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Watts, who were being promoted to command divisions were respectively 'a hard practical soldier', 'a hard fighting plucky soldier', 'a capable hard-featured officer', and 'a plucky hard little man' but also that Lawford and Watts were respectively 'endowed with no great ability' and 'no great brains'.40 In particular Watts (later XX Corps), although 'a fine leader and a delightful chief to serve' 41 and 'a hard fighter, a leader of men', was 'a distinctly stupid man and lacks imagination!' 42 Both Cavan and Watts, as Divisional and Corps Commanders, had to rely heavily on their trained General Staff.43 Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney 'was the most ignorant general' that his staff officer had served under during the war and could not

38 Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery to his Mother, 10 April 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM 1 41, IWM.
39 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 21 June 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 183, LHCMA.
40 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 26 February, 22 April, and 5 May 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/3-4, PRO.
41 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VIII, p.3, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
42 Haig, Diary, 9 May 1916, W.O.256 10, PRO.
43 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.24, and Chapter VIII, p.2, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1 and 9 2, CCC.
be let out of his B.G.G.S.'s sight as he could not be trusted to be left to his own resources.\(^4^4\)

At a lower level many younger, middle-ranking staff officers, who were 'accustomed to taking soldiering very seriously even in peacetime',\(^4^5\) had to "carry" their seniors. Major-General Sir Cecil Bingham (4th Cavalry Brigade) 'was a charming rather elderly gentleman who was content to leave nearly everything' to Beddington, his Brigade Major, who 'was in fact commanding the Brigade'.\(^4^6\) Bingham later commanded a cavalry division and the Cavalry Corps. Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery (Brigade-Major, 104th Brigade) found that his Brigadier 'was an old retired officer' who was 'a very nice person but quite useless and it would be true to say that I really ran the Brigade, and they all knew it'.\(^4^7\) In the 15th Division, where the commander, Major-General Reed, V.C., was hot-tempered and his competency was in question, Lieutenant-Colonel W.N. Diggle, the G.S.O.1, was 'exceptionally loyal' and kept 'things working very smoothly'.\(^4^8\) The Army's rapid expansion had removed too many experienced officers and while bringing many others too rapid advancement.

Undoubtedly some senior officers were unfit both physically and mentally for the strenuous demands of war in August 1914. For example, one officer, who 'gloried in hock

\(^4^4\) General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.1, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
\(^4^5\) Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.152, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
\(^4^6\) Brigadier Edward Beddington, Memoirs, pp.83-84, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
\(^4^7\) Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Notes on his letters, Montgomery Papers BLM1 1, IWM; see also Montgomery to his Mother, 10 April 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM1 41, IWM.
\(^4^8\) General Sir Arthur Holland to General Lord Horne, 12 October 1918, Horne Papers 73 60 2, IWM.
for breakfast & high living generally', had to refuse
command of a Division in 1914, while Lieutenant-General
Sir James Grierson (II Corps), who left Southampton looking
'like a beef extract advertisement', promptly died of a
heart attack in August 1914 before he could see action.
Men of much stern material were needed to perform under
the 'tremendous strain' that senior commanders were enduring
during the war. Sir John French complained in 1915 that
the strain and anxiety were 'most terribly wearing' and
'very trying' admitting that he 'had really begun to feel it
horribly'.

Many were unable to stand the pace. In July 1916
Brigadier-General H.F. Jenkins (75th Brigade) 'found the
strain of command too much for his age & asked to be allowed
to resign his command & to return to England'. On the
Somme in October 1916 Brigadier-General J.F. Edwards (71st
Brigade) 'had to apply to be relieved of his command because
he found it beyond his physical powers to go round his front
line' while Brigadier-General F.C. Carter (24th Brigade)
resigned because 'his health is not too good and he feels
too old for the hard work of a Brigr'.

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49 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 13 July 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
50 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 6 May 1937, Liddell Hart Papers 1/302 246, LHCMA.
51 Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 19 August 1914, Loch Papers 71/12/1, IWM; General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 17 August 1914, Milward Papers 6510-143-1, NAM.
52 Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 7 September 1937, Liddell Hart Papers 1/466 1, LHCMA.
53 Field-Marshal Sir John French to Mrs Bennett, 18 February 1915, French Papers 75/46/1, IWM.
54 Lieutenant-Colonel E.N. Snapp to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 July 1930, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
55 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.44, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
56 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 13 March 1915, Rawlinson Papers 1 1, CCC.
L.F. Philips (189th Brigade) 'had a complete nervous breakdown just before zero hour' at Beaumont Hamel in November 1916. Lieutenant-Colonel George Powell commanding a battalion in the 18th Division on the Somme in July 1916 cracked up and had to be quietly sent home when in line for command of a brigade.58

Gradually as the war progressed the older commanders unfit for the strenuous life of trench warfare at Battalion, Brigade, and Divisional level were ruthlessly replaced by battle-hardened veterans. Brigadier-General F.J. Kempster (91st Brigade), an 'old boy [who] was useless and had received the boot in no uncertain manner', was replaced by Brigadier-General J.R.M. Minshull-Ford, 'a topping chap, a soldier both in appearance and being'.59 During the Battle of Cambrai Brigadier-General H. Nelson (88th Brigade) 'fell senseless to the ground during a German attack in early December 1917 60 and was replaced by the much younger Brigadier-General B.C. Freyberg, V.C. A "dug-out" having retired in 1909, Brigadier-General F.S. Derham (69th Brigade, 23rd Division) was replaced by the comparatively youthful Major-General T.S. Lambert who was over ten years younger and commanded the brigade for two years until May 1918 when he was given command of 32nd Division. Lambert 'was a first class soldier, who left nothing to chance and

57 Brigadier Harold M. Sandilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 20 November 1936, C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
58 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 29 and 31 July 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
59 Major C.C. May, Diary, 24 February and 11 March 1916, May Papers, IWM; see also General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, p.5, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/2, CCC.
60 Brigadier-General H. Biddulph to Edmonds, 22 September 1944, C.A.B.45/118, PRO.
never hurried prematurely’, and ‘was close up to the scene of action, from whence he could watch the attack, and control by timely action its course’.

Commenting on ‘the strain of commanding a battalion in this kind of warfare’, Haig believed that ‘only young and strong men can stand it’. Command of Brigades and Battalions was by the end of the war seen as a job for only fit, young men. One battalion commander in 1915 noted that it was ‘a young man's war' and that 'no man over 50 should be further forward than the Division - a Brigadier should be under 50 - over that they are no use'. Born in 1858 Derham was ‘as too old’ at sixty. General Sir David Campbell, on being appointed to command of the 21st Division, 'on hearing the first time they met that Brigadier-General G.M. Gloster (64th Brigade) was 52 years of age, without further enquiry expressed the opinion that that was too old for a brigade command and had him sent home'. One Brigade commander, who had been out in France as a Brigade commander since July 1915, wounded for the second time in March 1918, and evacuated home, was not recommended to return to resume command of a brigade in the Field 'in view of his age' (56 years old) by the Military

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61 Brigadier-General G.W.St.G. Grogan, V.C., to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 April 1930, C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
62 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 13 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 31, PRO.
63 Brigadier-General E.M. Morris to Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, 21 July [1915], Lee Papers, IWM.
64 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 3 March 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
65 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.185, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
66 Brigadier-General Hon. R. White, late commanding 184th Brigade (61st Division) to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 30 September 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
Secretary at G.H.Q. on the advice of his Divisional, Corps, and Army Commanders. Lieutenant-General Sir John Keir (VI Corps) was sacked because he was ‘over 60’. Major-General Sir Edward Montague-Stuart-Wortley (46th Division) was too old at the age of 58.

To be effective the British Army had to promote rapidly those officers with outstanding managerial skills and technical expertise. In June 1915 Haig felt that ‘even if ample guns and ammunition, etc, be provided, progress will be disappointing unless young capable commanders are brought up to the front’ and urged that ‘some of the present captains should be chosen to command battalions, Majors Brigades, etc’. In July 1915, Haig informed the Prime Minister (Asquith) of the ‘necessity for promoting young officers to high command’ and that ‘to make room, some of the old ones must be removed’ and, looking through the lists of Major-Generals in the Army list for ‘young, capable officers’, recommended ‘in order of seniority’ Morland, Horne, Gough and Haking for command of corps believing that ‘they should eventually be given command of armies’ and that ‘the present circumstances in which the Army was placed justified the selection of the best and youngest men to fill

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67 Major-General Sir Harold Ruggles-Brise to The Secretary, War Office, 23 May 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
68 Major-General Sir Colin MacKenzie to XI Corps, 61st Division No. Q.88, 11 May 1918; Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Haking to A.M.S. First Army, XI Corps No. A/923 13, no date; General Sir Henry Horne, First Army, to the Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 18 May 1918, Maxse Papers 69/53 11, IWM.
69 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 8 August 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 12, PRO.
70 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 1 August 1915, Game Papers PWG/12, IWM.
71 Haig, Diary, 25 June 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
72 Haig, Diary, 8 July 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
the highest commands. Of the four generals mentioned all were commanding corps by the end of 1915 but only Gough and Horne were promoted to command Armies (in 1916).

By 1917 G.H.Q. was reluctant to give appointments to senior officers 'when they have not had recent experience' in France 'as the responsible Commanders are naturally anxious to get men who are absolutely up to date with the various peculiarities of this war'. Haig was able to take his pick of 'a large number of brigadiers highly recommended for advancement, and who have commanded their Brigades in all the hottest fighting during the past eighteen months' and doubted whether it was possible 'for even the most gifted officer to suddenly take command of a Division before a modern battle and do justice either to himself or his troops'. Brigadier-Generals Hon Arthur Asquith, the son of the Prime Minister, and B.C. Freyberg 'courageous and capable leaders' who were 'young men of exceptional ability and great promise' both got Brigades in early 1917. In 1918 Brigadier-General G.H. Gater (62nd Brigade, 21st Division), a New Army officer and 'very highly recommended' by his superiors as 'a magnificent brigadier' who was 'quite exceptional', had 'been strongly recommended for a division'.

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73 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 26 July 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5 PRO.
74 General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Brigadier-General H.S. Sloman, 6 March 1917, Kiggell Papers, LHCMA.
75 Haig to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 20 August 1917, French Papers 75 46/11, French Papers, IWM.
76 General Sir Hubert Gough, 'My Story', News Chronicle, 18 November 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 1/323 26, LHCMA.
77 Brigadier-General S.E. ('Tom') Hollond to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 7 October 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
From 1915 younger and fitter commanders were gaining command of Brigades. For example, Brigadier-General Hon. J.F.H.F.S. Trefusis had commanded the Irish Guards with 'great success' and as a result, although he was only a substantive Captain, Haig promoted him to command 20th Brigade.' Brigadier-General A.B. Beauman was at the age of 29 the third youngest officer to be promoted to the command of a brigade behind two V.C.s, Bernard Freyberg and Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford. Bradford was 25 and Freyberg was 28 when given command of a Brigade. Asquith and Gater, both non-regulars, were in their thirties and old men in comparison! Brigadier-General G.S. Shephard, a model for Carruthers in Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands, was only 31 when he was given command of 1st Brigade, R.F.C., in 1917 while Salmond obtained the rank of Major-General at the age of 36, becoming commander of the R.F.C. in France in 1918 at the age of 37. Major-General H.K. Bethell was the youngest divisional commander on the Western Front at the age of 35.

During the years of war the average age of general officers dropped. The emphasis was shifted to promotion by merit. The mean age of army commanders fell from 62 in August 1914 to 54 in July 1917, rising to 56 in November 1918; that of corps commander fell from 54.5 in August

78 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5, PRO.
79 Brigadier-General A.B. Beauman, Then A Soldier, p.57.
80 Colonel W.D.B. Thompson, Biography of Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford VC MC, p.3, IWM.
81 Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg, VC, p.102-103.
82 Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer: The Diaries of Lord Moyne, 1914-1918, p.16.
83 See Appendix 13.
1914 to 53 in November 1918; that of divisional commanders from 55 in August 1914 to 52 in July 1916, 50 in July 1917, and 49 in November 1918. Not only, as one would expect, did the commanders become younger and more energetic further down the hierarchy but also the fall in the age of commanders became much more dramatic. By 1917-18 a cadre of officers led divisions with a level of competence that allowed them to compete with their German counter-parts. Major-General F.A. Dudgeon when appointed to command the 56th Division in August 1917 had already commanded a Battalion, April - August 1915, and the 42nd Brigade (14th Division) for exactly two years from August 1915, serving at Neuve Chapelle, the Second Battle of Ypres, Hill 60, Bellevaarde Ridge, the Somme, and Arras. This new blood provided a level of competence and professionalism, which made sure that the British Army with a good balance of experience and relative youthfulness, was now, at last, well-run and able to attack with the high level of performance which Continental warfare required.

By 1916 it was becoming apparent that the performance of officers like Major-General H.G. Walker (2nd Division), who was 'a gallant soldier & a gentleman but without much tactical knowledge', was not successful enough and that they needed to be replaced by more effective commanders,
such as General Sir Peter Strickland (1st Division from 1916) who had 'a violent temper' and was 'unpleasantly rude' but was 'an ambitious fighting-man with any amount of energy'. By May 1918 the three brigadiers of the 1st Division, Brigadier-Generals G.C. Kelly, H.H.S. Morant, and W.B. Thornton, 'were young' but 'they had all proved their capacity in the field'. Major-General H.W. Higginson was given command of the 12th Division because 'he did very well as a brigadier in 18th Division'.

From the Battle of the Somme onwards some effective commanders emerged within the B.E.F. who had gained experience and were active in pursuing new ideas while the process of the weak and ineffective being weeded out by the high command continued. Young and experienced Brigadier-Generals were given command of divisions. Thus, 'most of the people who come out from home with the new Divisions are sent away fairly soon', being replaced by younger officers who had already proved themselves while commanding Brigades. For example, Major-General Sir William Fry, 'a cherry good-natured officer, [who] would probably execute orders better than he can make a plan', brought the 30th Division out to France but was quickly replaced in command prior to the Battle of the Somme by a younger man. General Sir John Shea, who was 'a very smart fellow' with 'plenty of brains

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88 Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, pp.127-128, Archibald Papers, IWM.
89 Pearson Choate to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
90 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 15 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 31, PRO.
91 Haig, Diary, 8 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/31, PRO.
92 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 25 September 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
93 Haig, Diary, 8 April 1916 Haig Papers, W.O.256 9 PRO.
and energy' was given the 30th Division but was nevertheless himself sacked in early 1917 and replaced by Major-General W. de L. Williams, who had commanded a brigade since 1915.

A pattern of renewal had been established. For example, Major-General Sir Ivor Philipps (38th Division), who 'had no training as a commander in the field', was removed by General Lord Horne (XV Corps) on the Somme because he was 'ignorant' and lacked the required skills and replaced by Major-General C.G. Blackader, commander of a Battalion between 1912 and 1915, and a Brigade in 1915. Blackader in turn made way for General Sir Thomas Cubitt, a younger man, who had commanded a Battalion and then a Brigade between 1916 and 1918.

Originally a regular soldier who had retired from the Indian Army before the war and was serving with the Pembrokeshire Yeomanry, Philipps had been promoted to command the 38th Division in early 1915 'over the heads of many more senior and meritorious officers' as a friend of Lloyd George and it was 'hardly surprising that he was ignorant, lacked experience and failed to inspire confidence'. Under the command of Blackader and Cubitt the political atmosphere was eliminated and the division 'did

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94 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 25 September 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
95 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 and 25 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
96 Haig, Diary, 17 January 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/7, PRO.
97 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, pp.13-14, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/2, CCC.
extremely well'. In August 1918 General Shute (V Corps) reported that 'Cubitt commanding 38th (Welsh) Division had done very well' and in October 1918 Haig noted that he had 'done particularly well as a divisional commander'.

Similarly, the 50th Division demonstrates the process by which good men were established in command of Divisions. Major-General Sir Walter Lindsay, 'a charming man but physically old and not an efficient commander of a division', was sacked by Allenby (V Corps) in June 1915 and replaced by the exceptional Cavan who before being promoted to command of the Guards Division in August 1915 reinvigorated the Division. His successor, Major-General P.S. Wilkinson, 'a capable energetic commander' and 'a sound, not brilliant' man, completed the good work of turning it into 'a magnificent division' before making way for General Sir Henry Jackson, a younger commander who had already commanded a Battalion and a Brigade, in March 1918.

99 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 December 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 14, PRO.
100 Haig, Diary, 25 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 35, PRO.
101 Haig, Diary, 17 October 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 37, PRO.
102 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, pp.20-22, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
103 Haig, Diary, 23 March 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
104 Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, pp.20-22, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
As 'an immediate result' of the failure of the 32nd Division on the Ancre in mid-November 1916, Major-General Rycroft who 'always gave one a feeling of confidence and fair-play', the G.S.O.1, and two Brigadiers including the 'very good' Brigadier-General Compton, were removed and replaced by more efficient and younger men. Rycroft, a cavalryman, knew nothing 'at all about the P.B.I. or how to treat them'. Rycroft was replaced first by Major-General Sir Reginald Barnes (promoted from 116th Brigade), who fell ill, and then by Major-General C.D. Shute who, although 'not popular' and 'very talkative and rather a gas bag', had been recommended for promotion by Lord Cavan from 59th Brigade and when later commanding the 19th Division 'did splendidly'. Shute worked the 32nd Division 'hard but sensibly' and 'understood infantry and their funny ways as none of the others did' and 'that is why the Division did so brilliantly afterwards'. On Shute's promotion to V Corps the division was commanded briefly by Major-Generals J. Campbell and R.J Bridgford before Major-General T.S. Lambert took over command until the end of the war. All had been brigadiers since 1915.

As 'an experienced fighter' and 'a most likeable personality', who was 'full of sound common sense' and never 'rattled', but, above all, 'did not cling to steriotyped

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105 Lieutenant-Colonel H.J.N. Davies to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 November [1936], C.A.B.45/133, PRO.
106 Brigadier A.C. Girdwood to Edmonds, 30 June 1930, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
107 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 August 1915, 28 April 1916, and June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5, 9, and 19, PRO.
108 Girdwood to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 June 1930, C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
[sic] tactics if he saw something better', Major-General Sir Henry Lukin (9th Division) was a typical divisional commander in 1916-17. By 1917 and 1918 one of the main attributes of a commander, whether at battalion, brigade, divisional, or corps level, was his ability to train his command and to pick subordinates who were also able to train their formations. Divisional commanders, such as Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney (33rd Division) spent much time interviewing or admonishing subordinate commanders and regimental officers, constantly looking for better officers to fill posts in his units, particularly as battalion commanders, where necessary removing battalion commanders when they proved incompetent, recommending those suitable to command Brigades. New, younger commanders ruthlessly weeded out incompetent or unfit subordinates. For example, on taking command of the 8th Division, Heneker immediately sacked his C.R.A., two of his three Brigade Commanders, and the G.S.O.2, who were not up to his standards. He later also got rid of the third brigade commander and the A.A. & Q.M.G.!

Fergusson (XVII Corps) noted that the 'constant shuffling of divisions from one corps to another' meant that 'a mediocre man very often goes on and on, because he is

109 Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1918, pp.3 and 31, Tudor Papers RAI.
110 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 22 April, 8 May, 1 September, 20 October 1916; 12 and 16 July, 1 September, 17 December 1917; 1, 4-5 April, 23 May, 11, 14-15, 21 July, 22 September, 14 October 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
111 Pinney, Diary, 8 August 1917, 3 October and 8 November 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
112 Pinney, Diary, 28 November 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM.
113 General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 27 and 31 December 1916, Heneker Papers, IWM; see also Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, pp.106-107, Beddington Papers, LHMCA.
never long enough in one unit for the Corps Commander to feel justified in firing him out'. For example, when the 2nd Division moved from the I Corps to the IV Corps in early 1916, Gough passed onto Henry Wilson his adverse but informal views on its commander, Major-General H.G. Walker, who was later replaced. By 1917, however, continued assessment of the abilities of commanders had become more formalised replacing arbitrary sackings and allowing for the removal of mediocre commanders. The Fifth Army asked its Corps in September 1917 'to furnish a report on all divisional commanders who have been under your command from 31st July 1917' commenting on their 'fitness to command a division during active operations' and 'capacity for training a division'.

Maxse (XVIII Corps) reported favourably on two commanders but adversely on two others. Major-General Sir Robert Fanshawe (48th Division) was 'a good average divisional commander and trainer' while Maxse had 'formed a high opinion' of General Sir George Harper commanding 51st Division, which was 'now one of the two or three best divisions in France' thanks to 'his intimate up-to-date knowledge of infantry tactics' and 'a masterly manner in active operations'. On the other hand, Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe, (58th Division) lacked the 'decision of

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114 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Horne, 10 October 1918, Horne Papers 73 60/2, IWM.
115 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 24 February 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
character' to command during active operations, having 'little influence over his subordinate commanders' while Major-General G.J. Cuthbert (39th Division) had 'few ideas regarding the tactical employment of a division in battle' and, although 'a good disciplinarian of a narrow type', had 'little or no conception of training methods'. Both Cuthbert and Fanshawe refuted Maxse's adverse reports on them by complaining of Maxse's interference in the training of their divisions but to no avail as both were removed from command of their divisions. According to Jacob (II Corps) Cuthbert had been 'inclined to be very obstinate & mulish' on the Somme in 1916.

The process was a continuous one and by 1918 it was difficult to arbitrarily sack a divisional commander. When General Sir Walter Congreve (VII Corps) 'had reported unfavourably on him, Brigadier-General F.W. Ramsay in temporary command of the 16th Division complained in February 1918 to the visiting Commander-in-Chief, who asked Congreve 'to go once more into the question, as Ramsay had done well as a brigadier'. Ramsay was not confirmed in command of the 16th Division but given the 58th Division in June 1918. In October 1918 Fergusson reported to Horne (First Army) that Major-General H.L. Reed, V.C., was unfit to command 15th Division while praising the 63rd Division

117 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S.82, 27 September 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
118 Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 20 December 1936, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
119 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 15 February 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
120 Haig, Diary, 17 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/35, PRO.
under Major-General C.A. Blacklock as the finest he had ever seen. Reed was able to survive as his previous Corps Commander assessed him to be an 'above average Divisional Commander'. By 1917-18 the older or less professional senior officers had been weeded out and replaced by those trained by experience at the front and with a greater commitment to professionalism. By September 1918, Haig felt that 'we have a surprisingly large number of very capable Generals' on whom 'are our successes to be chiefly attributed'.

There was a steady flow of changes in the personnel holding senior commands at Divisional, Corps and Army level during the period 1915-18 as commanders were either incapacitated, sacked or promoted so that between 20% and 33% of commanders changed each year. In the matter of generalship and professionalism, 1918 clearly demonstrated that the British had passed the nadir of incompetence and were at last coming into their own. Out of fifty-three British Divisions in France in late 1917 and 1918 no less than 36 (68%) had had at least one change in command. In August 1917, for example, Major-Generals G.J. Cuthbert, C. Ross, and H.G. Ruggles-Brise (39th, 6th, and 40th Divisions respectively) were selected to command Divisions at home. In another case Lukin (9th Division) 'compelled because of

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121 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Horne, 10 October 1918, Horne Papers 73 60 2, IWM.
122 Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Holland to Horne, 12 October 1918, Horne Papers 73 60 2, IWM.
123 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 20 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 36, PRO.
124 See Appendix 18.
125 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 24 August 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.

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the grave illness of his wife to accept the offer of a tour of duty in England' was replaced by Tudor. Others such as Major-General W.H. Greenly, 'who was very exhausted, broke down and had to hand over command' of the 2nd Cavalry Division. The British Army's particular weakness was at corps level. Haig complained that 'he had sent home more than a hundred brigadiers, but that he was found to leave certain corps and divisional commanders in their appointments because he could not be sure of securing better ones'.

Haig had to allow men like Fergusson (II Corps), 'a smart-looking pleasant man' who got 'on well with his subordinates' but had no mental courage and caused 'too many difficulties', and Pulteney (III Corps) who, while 'a plucky leader of a Brigade or even a Division', had 'quite reached the limits of his capacity as a commander' and had 'not, however, studied his profession sufficiently to be really a good corps commander', to remain in their posts. Despite some unfavourable reports 'regarding his military efficiency' as commander of 15th Division, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick McCracken managed to be promoted to a corps. McCracken, who 'was quite pleasant and amiable, but weak and lazy, and left everything to his staff' with only

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127 General Sir Eric de Burgh, Memoir, pp.14 and 16, de Burgh Papers 7306-67, NAM.
128 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers 1/2B 5a, LHCMA.
129 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 December 1915 and 20 February 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 8, PRO.
130 Haig, Diary, 11 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/10 PRO.
131 Haig, Diary, 4 August 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 12, PRO.
'imperturbability in the worst situations' as his strong point, 'was not found out and sent home' until March 1918.132 Some older corps commanders were indeed replaced but many were able to linger. Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery noted 'that the real people who were tired were the commanders behind; Corps Commanders were getting pretty old by 1917 and few of them knew what went on up in front', notably Snow (VII Corps) and Hamilton-Gordon (IX Corps).133 Snow had failed at Gommecourt on 1 July 1916, having made little effort to reduce casualties for this subsidiary attack 134 and proved 'quite useless' at the Battle of Arras where 'he merely told his Divisions to get on with it' and provided 'no co-ordinated artillery plan'.135 Hamilton Gordon (IX Corps) always appeared to be 'in his dotage' 136 and in a state of gloom and depression 137 but was not sent home until September 1918 138 'to make room for younger men'. By early 1918 the need for a clearout of Corps commanders was apparent and Henry Wilson as C.I.G.S. was very keen on adopting a scheme for 'turning out some of our senior Generals & starting a flow of promotion' and make it possible to promote younger men to command of corps and

132 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.188, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
133 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
134 F.H. Walers to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 9 September 1929, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
135 Montgomery to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
136 General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 23 May and 3 June 1917, Heneker Papers, IWM.
137 General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 31 July 1931, C.A.B.45 123, PRO.
138 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 8 September 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
139 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to his wife, 5 September 1918, Haig Papers 152, NLS.
Most of the Corps Commanders involved in the German counter-attack at Cambrai 'retired shortly afterwards', notably Generals Sir William Pulteney, Sir Thomas Snow and Sir Charles Woolcombe, who were unable to rise to the occasion showing little enthusiasm for the operations and were removed along with Generals Sir Frederick McCracken and Sir Walter Congreve in a purge of Corps Commanders which took place in early 1918. Congreve (VII Corps) suffered from asthma and 'had not really recovered from having his arm blown off at the SOMME' or his son's death. Woollcombe (IV Corps) was 'a first rate officer' but 'rather old in mind for an active corps in the field'. By late 1918 unsuccessful corps commanders were quickly removed if unsuccessful, for example, when Rawlinson said 'that General Butler's arrangements had not met with his entire satisfaction' Haig 'directed Lawrence to arrange to relieve the III Corps complete, and to send General Morland and staff with three fresh divisions, now in G.H.Q. Reserve to replace it'.

Although there is no doubt that bad staff work and poor leadership contributed to the failures of divisions in the period 1915-17, the clear-out of senior officers was often

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140 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 20 February and 7 March 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
141 Major-General C.G. Fuller to Edmonds, 7 January 1945, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
142 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 8, 10 and 15 November 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
143 Haldane, War Diary, 27 February, 12 March, and 22 May 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
144 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 22 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 31, PRO.
145 Major-General J.W. Sandilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1923, C.A.B.45 192, PRO.
146 Haig, Diary, 13 and 27 February 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
147 Haig, Diary, 22 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 36, PRO.
unfair and drastic. Snow (VII Corps) felt that 'the whole proceeding was most unjust and to be regretted' and, although the sacked officers were replaced by more experienced men who had been through the fighting of 1914-15, this did 'not remove the injustice to those who suffered'.\textsuperscript{148} Perhaps one of the most notorious removals was that of Smith-Dorrien, 'an exceptionally gifted soldier', from command of the Second Army in May 1915 because Sir John French, 'a much less able man', disliked him.\textsuperscript{149} Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker (21st Division) was also removed with 'quite unnecessary peremptoriness and harshness' by his Corps Commander (Fergusson) on the grounds of his unpopularity with the troops. This seriously damaged his career as he 'was relegated to the command of a Home Service division for about a year' and, although 'he managed to retrieve the situation to some extent' when commanding a division in Salonika, he retired immediately after the war in 1920 as a Major-General.\textsuperscript{150}

Perhaps the most interesting example of the necessary clear out of the 'obsolete & incompetent officers who are always such a supreme asset to the enemy'\textsuperscript{151} occurred on the Somme in April 1917 when a battalion commander, Colonel F. Rayner was '"degummed"' by his Brigadier-General E.W.S.K. Maconchy, who was promptly '"degummed"' by Major-General

\textsuperscript{148} Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow, Memoir: 27th Division Nov 1914 to June 1915, p.25, Snow Papers 76/79/1, IWM.
\textsuperscript{149} General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.19, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC, see also General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 7 May 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{150} Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, pp.178-179, Henderson Papers DS/MISC 2, IWM.
\textsuperscript{151} Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his father, 21 January 1916, Fuller Papers IV/3 177, LHCMA.
A.E. Sandbach (59th Division) who was himself "booted", and they 'all travelled on the same cross Channel boat' back to England! They were all considered too old for their jobs (Sandbach was 60, Maconchy was 58 and Rayner 50) and were 'pushed out at the first chance', as 'the 59th Division were out new from Home & somewhat inexperienced'.

In the cases of Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe and Lieutenant-General Sir John Keir, who were removed from command of V and VI Corps respectively, Haldane felt that there were firm military grounds for removing them but that the arbitrary way in which their replacement was achieved caused friction and insecurity within the high command. Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe was 'quite ignorant of how to set about preparing to carry out an operation' but, although agreeing that Fanshawe lacked 'enough experience to command a Corps', when sacked in June 1916, Haldane noted that 'there are other Corps commanders who are in like case' and survived in their posts.

General Sir Aylmer Haldane noted that 'there are several Generals in our Army who, the moment anything goes wrong search for a scapegoat' which inevitably led to 'a general feeling of insecurity'. Snow (27th Division) remembered that in 1915 'there was a great epidemic of stellanbosching' in which the higher commands were

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152 Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, p.125, Lee Papers, IWM.
153 Lieutenant-Colonel L.W. Lewer to Captain Cyril Falls, 10 January 1939, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
154 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June and 7 August 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
155 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 22 and 23 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10 PRO.
156 Haldane, War Diary, 6 April and 25 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
157 Haldane, War Diary, 24 February and 30 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
determined to whitewash themselves for the unsatisfactory state of affairs by making scapegoats of subordinates, and many brigadiers were relieved of their commands'.\textsuperscript{158} For example, when Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Alderson (Canadian Corps), who ‘was at best a mediocre general’,\textsuperscript{159} was replaced by Byng many Canadians, notably Currie (1st Canadian Division), were suspicious that Alderson had been removed as a result of his involvement in the controversy about the Ross rifle.\textsuperscript{160}

Brigadier-General F.M. Carleton (98th Brigade) felt that he had been ‘sacrificed to the ambitions of an unscrupulous general’ \textsuperscript{161} when removed from command on the Somme by Major-General H.J.S. Landon (33rd Division) who justified Carleton's replacement on the grounds that he lacked ‘quick, practical methods of command, and a cheerful outlook which will communicate itself to the troops’.\textsuperscript{162} Carleton’s recent promotion to replace Strickland (promoted to 1st Division) was an example of how a ‘change in command owing to promotion or casualties often had a marked effect on the value of a particular unit, and affected the battle’. Carleton ‘although unmistakably a soldier, was a Cavalry man, and not exactly bursting with knowledge of infantry tactics, or experience of infantry in action’ and as a result of ‘friction between 98th Brigade and 33rd Division Hdqts’ was

\textsuperscript{158} Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow, Memoir: 27th Division Nov 1914 to June 1915, p.25, Snow Papers 76/79/1, IWM.
\textsuperscript{159} Daniel G. Dancocks, \textit{Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography}, p.68.
\textsuperscript{161} Brigadier-General F.M. Carleton to his wife, 28 August 1916, Carleton Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{162} Major-General H.J.S. Landon to XV Corps, 33rd Division R1, 28 August 1916, Carleton Papers, IWM.
sent home 'but fought his case at the House Guards, and won
his case, and later returned to the Front to command another
brigade'.

While some commanders needed to be removed, the "hire
and fire" syndrome, which affected the high command
undoubtedly, had an adverse effect on both the troops and
subordinate commanders. Whether the rapid turn-over of
commanders was ultimately beneficial is debateable. As
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow noted, 'throughout the
war it was difficult to know how one's actions would be
viewed by one's superiors' so that 'one was never sure
whether for some particular action one would be promoted or
stellanbosched'. As late as October 1917, General Sir
Charles Grant on getting command of a Brigade noted that
'indeed one rises and falls with great rapidity out here -
uneasy in this respect is the humble slave who wears a
Brigadier's uniform'.

Early in the war corps and divisional commanders froze
into inaction waiting orders from higher command displaying
little initiative and allowing golden opportunities to slip
by. Gough complained that 'a great deal of time was lost,
and many great opportunities lost also because we were so
slow in preparing to meet a new situation' and that
'throughout the army among the senior officers the spirit of

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163 Pearson Choate to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
164 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow, Memoir: 27th Division Nov 1914 to June 1915, p.25, Snow
Papers 76/79/1, IWM.
165 General Sir Charles Grant to the Earl of Rosebery, 31 October 1917, Grant Papers C41 2, LHCMA.
energy, of resolution, & of initiative, was lamentably
under-developed' and 'the value of time was not
recognised'.\textsuperscript{166} The oft remarked upon ponderousness of so
many British operations may have owed something to the fact
that boldness required commanders to gamble and the prospect
of being sacked inhibited many from doing so.

One Company Commander complained in December 1915 that
initiative was 'asked for, but woe to the man who displays
it'.\textsuperscript{167} Officers worried about the security of their own
jobs were unlikely to be willing to experiment or innovate
for fear of being removed if anything went wrong. Hence the
care shown by some subordinates 'to avoid giving offence to
superiors by hesitation to launch attacks when desired'.\textsuperscript{168}

An example, of how savagely senior officers could object to
'the departure from an order in the presence of the enemy'
was the reaction on the 1 July of Major-General Sir Oliver
Nugent (36th Division), who 'was "Rigid" in so far as the
obedience to his orders was concerned' and 'kicked up such a
fuss about "disobedience"' threatening one of his officers,
who had been forced to adapt his orders during the battle,
with court martial for "rank disobedience of orders"'.\textsuperscript{169}
Nugent was also reluctant to stop the hopeless attack of the
107th Brigade on his own responsibility.\textsuperscript{170} Unsurprisingly,

\textsuperscript{166} General Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 18 March 1944, C.A.B.45 140,
PRO.
\textsuperscript{167} Major C.C. May, Diary, 13 December 1915, May Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{168} Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Colonel C. Allanson, 19 August 1937, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1937 69,
LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{169} Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier to Edmonds, 23 March 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
\textsuperscript{170} Captain Cyril Falls to Liddell Hart, 22 August 1964, Liddell Hart Papers 1 276 60, LHCMA.
a lack of initiative at all levels was a persistent British weakness.

Under intense pressure to conform many officers while showing great physical courage demonstrated little moral courage in the face of bullying by their seniors. Snow (VII Corps) was accused of being 'more frightened of G.H.Q. than he was of the enemy'.

One impatient, staff officer concluded that too many generals were far more 'terrified of their own rules and regulations' than they were 'of the Germans; or of losing the war, or getting uselessly killed many thousand men'.

General Sir Havelock Hudson, whose 8th Division lost 'more than half his whole force' on 1 July 1916, was 'such a nice little man & very quick & sensible' but while he was 'quick enough to see what was going to go wrong' he had 'not quite enough personality to be insubordinate & refuse' pressure from above.

With quick decisions and prompt response essential in modern battle for success time was wasted in deciding the next move at every step and the resulting failure was inevitable.

Junior commanders were often placed in a cleft stick when given orders by seniors to make unsuitable assaults. Having 'no confidence in the plan' to attack the main Hindenburg Line in June 1917, Freyberg (173rd Brigade) went to see Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe (58th Division)

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172 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 18 August 1915, Howell Papers IV C 3/188, LHCMA.
173 Howell to his wife, 3 July [1916], Howell Papers IV C 3 188, LHCMA.
'prepared to refuse to do it' aware that, although it was 'the duty of the commander to refuse to commit his men to a bad plan', if he did refuse, he would be sent home and another officer would be brought in at the last minute ignorant of the ground and the men. Freyberg remained at his post but the attack, as predicted, was 'a complete failure' with heavy losses. By the period 1917-18 the learning process was less fraught and the problem of scapegoating diminished as the incompetent commanders at all levels were removed and replaced.

By 1918 commanders had learnt to stand up for themselves. Colonel C.R.C. de Crespigny (1st Guards Brigade) expressed contempt for any senior officer and showed little respect for generals and the higher command. 'Uncle' Harper (51st Division) was harshly intolerant of G.H.Q. and of the orders that emanated from there. Such officers were quite capable of standing up to bullying senior officers in 1917 and 1918 and to resisting undue pressure from above. A mature and experienced commander knew how to handle the tactical situation himself after ascertaining the facts on the ground and not to permit interference from any quarter.

The personality of its commander was immensely important in the performance of a division. Haig considered

that 'much also depends on the fighting spirit of the G.O.C. Division' since 'the division is our real battle unit' and divisional commanders had to be 'able to inspire the unit with their own personal energy and fighting spirit'.

Haig believed that Divisional commanders should 'be able to inspire the unit with their own personal energy and fighting spirit'. Hull was 'full of energy, dash and ambition' and 'made the [56th] Division what it was' showing 'the extent to which the personality of the Divisional Commander permeates through a division'. Lord Cavan (XIV Corps) 'spoke in high terms of Major-General Douglas Smith commanding 20th Division' which had become 'quite a different force' since his appointment. Haig felt the improvement in the 33rd Division after the replacement its commander of Landon with Pinney proved how the performance of a Division depended on the qualities and spirit of the commander.

In contrast Haig noted that the 40th Division was 'a poor division' under Major-General Sir Harold Ruggles-Brise. Sir Charles Fergusson (XVII Corps) claimed that under the 'mediocre' Reed the 15th Division had slipped 'from 1st to 3rd class' whereas, by contrast, Blacklock, 'a first rate commander', had made the 63rd Division 'one of

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177 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 27 October and 7 November 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 6, PRO.
178 Haig, Diary, 7 November 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/6, PRO.
179 Brigadier-General Frank Lyon to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 June 1929, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
180 R Shoollred to Edmonds, 11 June 1929, C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
181 Haig, Diary, 23 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10 PRO.
182 Haig, Diary, 27 October 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
183 Haig, Diary, 24 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
the finest'.

According to Haig, Matheson, 'whose company was judged the best at company training before the war at Aldershot', had 'made the 4th Division into one of the best in the army' while Sir Edward Fanshawe considered that the 3rd Division 'under Deverell was one of the best trained that ever came into the V Corps'.

Worn out and performing poorly on the 1 July 1916, the 8th Division, which had been commanded 'damned badly' by his predecessor, 'improved beyond all recognition' under Major-General (later General Sir William) Heneker, who 'greatly improved' the division, which had been 'allowed to become sleepy' and its esprit-de-corps 'at rather a low ebb owing to a series of unsuccessful attacks', and 'soon put our tails up'.

To be effective the British Army had to promote rapidly those officers with outstanding managerial skills and technical expertise. Throughout the war but especially in 1917-18 the British Army was able to produce some highly competent corps commanders, who vied for accolades, notably the Earl of Cavan (Guards Division and XIV Corps), 'an exceptionally highly gifted commander' and rated the best Corps Commander in France; Jacob (II Corps), a 'first-
rate' 193 and 'most efficient general'; 194 de Lisle (XV Corps) 'one of the best Corps Comdrs.'; 195 Morland (X and XIII Corps) 'one of our best'; 196 and Watts (XIX Corps) 'a born leader of infinite courage and coolness in action', 197 who 'had the name of knowing better than anyone exactly how much you could ask our infantry to do'. 198 One staff officer felt that 'except for Lord Cavan, Horne and Congreve were about the two best Corps Commanders in France' and that Jacob inspired 'great confidence in his capacity'. 199

At Divisional level the Army also produced energetic and efficient officers such as Major-General C.A. Blacklock (63rd Division) who was 'thorough, and quite a first-rate commander'; 200 Bethell (66th Division) 'a wonderful fighting soldier'; 201 Major-General Hon. W. Lambton (4th Division) 'a wonder', 202 who was 'full of brains and energy'; 203 and Major-General Sir Samuel Nicholson (34th Division) whose behaviour during the Battle of Lys in April 1918 was 'magnificent'. 204 Haldane concluded that Deverell (3rd Division), Hickie (16th Division), and Shute (32nd Division) 'were the 3 best divisional commanders who served under me

193 Field-Marshal Earl Haig Haig, Diary, 9 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/5, PRO and Brigadier-General P. Howell to Sir Montague Turner, 7 July 1916, Howell Papers IV/C/2/233, LHCMA.
194 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.31, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
195 Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1918, p.36, RAI.
196 Howell to his wife, 20 June 1916, Howell Papers IV/C/3 303, LHCMA.
197 Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VIII, pp.1-2, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
198 Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe to Edmonds, 29 June 1935, C.A.B.45/123, PRO.
199 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, p.92, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
200 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Horne, 10 October 1918, Horne Papers 73/60/2, IWM.
202 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 4 July 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
203 Kirke to his wife, 10 July 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
204 Major-General Sir Walter Constable-Maxwell-Scott to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 February 1933, C.A.B.45 124, PRO.
in the war' 205 while General Sir George Harper made the 51st Division into 'one of the two or three best divisions in France'.206

Moreover, a cadre of competent leaders was slowly built up during the war and by 1917-18 the leadership required to win victory was developed. By 1918 generals such as Major-General T.O. Marden (6th Division) 'a man of restless energy, and a first-class Regimental officer, with an exceptional knowledge of detail' who left no one 'in any doubt who commanded the division',207 and Major-General Edward Feetham (39th Division), killed in action in March 1918 and described by a fellow officer from the Berkshire Regiment as 'a very fine Regimental officer of the best type' who 'had seen much service in the Sudan and S. Africa',208 were far more typical of the very best type of British general than the old-fashioned stereotypes of lazy aristocrats and unthinking martinets.

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205 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 10 April 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
206 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S.82, 27 September 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
207 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.48, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
208 Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick McCracken to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 13 June 1935, C.A.B.45/124, PRO.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Army's Over-ambitious Decision-making

For much of the war the excessive optimism, not just a British phenomenon, was a psychological barrier to a realistic vision of the war making it difficult for the British to assess accurately the German Army and to adjust to an unfamiliar continental warfare. The British high command's great strength, its tremendous self-belief in refusing "to conclude that by the rules of the game we were beaten";¹ was a two-edged sword. The hierarchy's ethos expressed in the motto "We'll do it. What is it?",² demanding 'the necessary enthusiasm, and the relentless offensive spirit, which pursues its object with dogged determination till it is achieved',³ was a powerful asset in keeping the Army going, when the other armies of 1914 all succumbed to mutinies.

Most officers agreed with the sentiment that 'no matter what happens, this war has got to be won for once & for all even if it takes years to do it'.⁴ But this faith in victory too often degenerated in the early years of the war into a fatal lack of realism within the hierarchy, termed

¹ Field Marshal the Earl of Cavan to Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 4 April 1928, Liddell Hart Papers 1 155 1, LHCMA.
² Lieutenant General Sir Tom Bridges, Alarms and Excursions: Reminiscences of a Soldier, p.73.
³ Brigadier-General J.P. Du Cane, B.G.G.S. III Corps, to 4th Division, III Corps G.340, 13 January 1915, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 38, LHCMA.
⁴ Brigadier-General C.R. Woodroffe, Diary, 20 October 1914, Woodroffe Papers, IWM.
variously as 'the cult of optimism', 5 'the "Cavalry Spirit"', 6 and the 'offensive spirit'; 7 an unthinking assumption that the Germans 'must steadily & obviously go down hill: unless the Allies become very stupid or rash' which was echoed by many officers. 8

More damaging still was the way in which a realistic review of planning was impeded by over-optimism. Prior to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien thought that the war would be over in March 1915. 9 Although understandable in the first year of the war, such over-optimism was demonstrably unrealistic by 1917. Full of exhilaration, the British Army rushed headlong into over-ambitious offensives during the period of 1915-17. The 'undue optimism of the higher command was one of the direct causes of failure'. 10

The planning process was 'too ambitious' with the result that 'in nearly every major operation in France the irrepressible optimism of the Higher Formations carried on the offensive beyond the point when from a balance sheet point of view, it had ceased to show a profit' because 'they never knew when to take their profit and stop'. 11 Only an 'unimaginative cult of the "offensive spirit"', which 'led

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5 Comments on Loos Draft by Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart, 19 January 1926, CAB45/121, PRO.
6 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 3 March 1915, 24 February 1916, and 13 June 1916, Haldane Papers Acc.20248 and 20249, NLS; General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 26 August 1914, Milward Papers 6510-143-1, NAM.
8 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his uncle, Sir Montague Turner, 7 July 1916, H.Q. II Corps, Howell Papers IV/C 2 233, and Howell to his wife on 4 July 1916, Howell Papers IV C/3 311, LHCM.
9 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Diary, 15 March 1915, Haldane Papers, Mss 20248, NLS.
10 Note by Colonel E.R. Clayton, undated, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
11 J.L. Weston to Captain C. Falls, 21 July 1937, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
to a disregard of the technique of stationary warfare',
could explain 'this delusion about the "War of Attrition"
and the bull-headed persistence in counting territorial
gains of a thousand yards as worth any sacrifice of
lives'.

In particular, the overconfidence of the high command
manifested itself in an underestimation of the supreme
importance of secrecy and surprise for modern operations.
Attempts to mislead the Germans in 1915-17 failed miserably
given the all too obvious offensive preparations and poor
security. The attack at Loos on 25 September 1915 was
common knowledge not only in London but also to the enemy, while during the St Eloi attack in March 1916 one Divisional
commander found that his operation was 'a general subject of
talk'. In April 1916 the D.A.A. & Q.M.G, 3rd Division was
sacked for writing home that the British attack would be
from Arras to the Somme. Surprise prior to 1 July 1916
'was non existent' and the 'lack of secrecy or any effort to
mislead' was one of 'the causes of this disaster'. The
British attack at Ypres in 1917 was an open secret and one
corps commander complained that a young staff officer at

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13 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 27 September 1915, Game Papers PWG 8, IWM, and
Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, p.118, Archibald Papers, IWM.
14 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 19 March 1916, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
15 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
16 Brigadier-General H.C. Rees to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 November 1929,
C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
17 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 27 July 1917,
Kiggell Papers IV/7, LHCMA.
G.H.Q. had actually informed his A.D.C. about 'the big push up north to break the line'.

Translations of German battle reports showed that the massive build up for the 1 July 1916, which gave numerous 'indications of an impending attack' to the enemy, was spotted by German aeroplanes as early as February 1916. At Beaumont Hamel the 'want of surprise' was 'the main cause of our failure' as 'the Hun must have known for weeks that an attack was pending' because 'our Artillery had been endeavouring to cut his wire'. On the Somme lengthy preparations made concealment very difficult as there were 'masses of transport and men moving about in daylight, many in full view of the enemy' and the mass of guns made concealment 'out of the question'. Similar lengthy bombardments prior to the Battles of Loos, Arras, Messines, and Ypres made sure that the element of surprise was 'completely lost'. In January 1918, Lawrence bluntly concluded that 'hitherto, with the exception of the CAMBRAI operations, every intended offensive has become known to the enemy before it developed owing to changes in the organization, command, grouping and distribution of the

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18 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Kavanagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 11 May 1917, Kiggell Papers IV 105, LHCMA.
19 S.S.544, Experiences of the Recent Fighting At Verdun, Berlin, 25 December 1916, G.H.Q., 28 February 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
20 S.S.553, Experience of the German 1st Army in the Somme Battle, 24 June - 26 November 1916, General von Below, 30 January 1917, G.H.Q., 3 May 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
22 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hutton, War Diary: Battle of the Somme, p.6, Hutton Papers, LHCMA.
23 Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, p.118, Archibald Papers, IWM.
forces to be employed'.

Rawlinson was in no doubt that the 'very large number of casualties' in 1915 had been the result of 'faulty tactics and a misconception of the strength and resisting power of the enemy bred of a persistent optimism at G.H.Q.' rather than any shortage of shells. For example, before the Battle of Loos in September 1915, 'everyone was too optimistic', notably Haking (XI Corps) who assured his troops that once the German line had been broken there would be no resistance, giving Regimental officers the 'altogether misleading' impression that there would be 'very little opposition' and that the enemy was badly defeated, which was 'a most regrettable travesty of the real facts'.

Similarly before the Battle of the Somme the high command was so 'misled by a faulty optimism' that 'the whole plan of attack did not allow for any failure'.

Prior to 1 July 1916 VIII Corps (Hunter-Weston) 'were

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24 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, The Influence of Increased Strength on German Intentions during 1918, Ia/43614, 1 January 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
26 Copy of letter from Colonel G. Crossman, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
27 Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland Feilding to his wife, 16 September 1915, War Letters to a Wife, p.37.
28 Colonel C.G. Stewart to Major A.F. Becke, 3 August 1925, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
29 Copy of letter from Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.G. Rainsford, 14 March 1926, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
30 Comments by Brigadier-General R.M. Ovens, 3 February 1926, C.A.B.45/121, PRO.
31 Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Simonds to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 February 1930, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
32 Lieutenant-Colonel John L. Hartley to Edmonds, 5 November 1929, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
saturated with optimism over-emphasising the effect of the preliminary bombardment’. Hunter-Weston ‘was extremely optimistic telling everybody that the wire had been blown away’ although they ‘could see it standing strong & well’ and that all they ‘had to do was to walk into Serre’, announcing that the enemy’s front line trenches would ‘be blown to pieces’.

The subsidiary assault on Gommecourt by VII Corps ‘inspired with unusual optimism’ and was marred ‘by the unwarranted optimism of the higher commands for an attack that never had any possible chance of being a success’. General Gough ‘became more and more optimistic as the day of the battle grew near’. Haig believed that ‘all the Corps Commanders’ were ‘full of confidence’.

Even after the 1 July 1916 commanders such as Gough (Fifth Army) who was ‘ultral optimistic’ promoting ‘far reaching’ plans, and Haking (XI Corps), who ‘was most optimistic’ and had no doubts that the Germans on the Somme being ‘very tired, confused & rather demoralized’ were ‘in a bad way’ remained unrealistic in their aims. This ‘undue optimism was one of the direct causes of failure’ for XI Corps at Fromelles. Similarly, one battalion attack on

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33 Ian Grant to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 October 1929, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
34 Charles Howard to Edmonds, 6 November 1929, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
35 Major J. Collis Browne to Edmonds, 12 November 1929, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
36 Colonel L.A.C. Southam to Edmonds, 3 July 1929, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
37 Major E.J. Snalding to Edmonds, 20 July [1929], C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
38 O.G. Wynne to Edmonds, 11 July 1930, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
39 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 29, 29 and 30 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/10, PRO.
40 Brigadier-General P. Howell, Pocket Diary, 6 July 1916, Howell Papers IV/D 13, LHCMA.
41 Howell, Pocket Diary, 14 September 1916, Howell Papers IV/D 13, LHCMA.
42 General C.A. Milward, 22 June 1916, War Diary, Vol.III, Milward Papers, 6510-143-5, NAM.
43 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 29 August 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
44 Note by Colonel E.R. Clayton to [Edmonds], undated, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
the Somme in August 1916 failed with heavy losses 'largely
due to over optimistic reports about German moral' which
 lulled the troops, who had 'expected a sitter', into a false
sense of confidence.\textsuperscript{45}

Despite the bitter experiences of 1916 over-optimism
continued buoyed up by success in early 1917. Before the
Third Battle of Ypres, Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob (II
Corps) addressing the officers of 25th Division 'talked the
most arrant nonsense' concerning the plans of the Fifth Army
'to drive the Germans right out of Belgium'.\textsuperscript{46} In late 1917
Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell (3rd Division) was still
'very optimistic' thinking that 'the Germans are beaten and
that the war may finish this year'.\textsuperscript{47} Failure at Cambrai in
November 1917 was caused by 'too great optimism in the
higher command',\textsuperscript{48} which meant that 'the fighting power and
morale of the German Army were higher than expected'.\textsuperscript{49}

The official spirit was one of optimism. G.H.Q.
stressed 'the great importance of a real spirit of
determination being instilled constantly into regimental
officers and men by all corps, Divisional, and Brigade
Commanders'.\textsuperscript{50} In training officers and N.C.O.s, senior
officers especially valued 'a cheerful countenance' and
emphasised the importance of being optimistic and

\textsuperscript{45} Brigadier-General P. Howell, Diary, 28 August 1916, Howell Papers IV/D/13, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{46} Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, \textit{Staff Officer: The Diaries of Lord Moyne, 1914-1918}, 23 July 1917,
p.162.
\textsuperscript{47} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Diary, 8 October 1917, Haldane Papers, Mss 20249, NLS.
\textsuperscript{48} Haldane to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 December 1944, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
\textsuperscript{49} Major-General Sir John Davidson to Edmonds, 31 January 1945, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
\textsuperscript{50} Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, 8 May 1917, Kiggell Papers
II/11/2, LHCMA.
enthusiastic at all times in order to foster the moral and 
*Esprit de Corps* of the Army.\(^{51}\) Visiting G.H.Q. in late 1916 one officer found that 'it is a relief to hear people speak optimistically again after the way everyone at home is convinced that the war will last 5 years and that then we shall be beaten'.\(^{52}\) One division on the Somme in 1916 emphasised 'the importance of officers maintaining a cheerful attitude in dealing with their subordinates, even under distressing circumstances' \(^{53}\) while one divisional commander spoke to subordinates 'about keeping cheerful instead of moaning about bad conditions which were made worse thereby'.\(^{54}\) At a local, regimental level raids were encouraged by the high command as a means 'of inculcating the offensive spirit into young troops and of giving them the moral superiority over the enemy that is so essential whether in offensive or defensive warfare'.\(^{55}\) Corps commanders such as Birdwood tried 'to inculcate a real spirit of offensive' among his men.\(^{56}\)

Pessimism was frowned upon since it was believed that 'a staff officer who allows a difficult task to depress him is useless'.\(^{57}\) Commanders like Pinney tended also to look

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\(^{52}\) Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 4 December 1916, Game Papers PWG 14, IWM.

\(^{53}\) Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Johnson, Notes on the Recent Operations - 2nd Phase: 20th - 30th July 1916, 19th Division, September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.

\(^{54}\) Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 8 November 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM.

\(^{55}\) Policy on the Army Front for 1918, Fourth Army No. 161 (G), Section III, 30 January 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 61, LHCMA.

\(^{56}\) Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood to Colonel D. Rintoul, 23 July 1916, Birdwood Papers WRB 1, IWM.

\(^{57}\) General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VI, pp.6-7, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
down on anyone they thought was 'a pessimist'. Few were immune to this ethos and even realistic commanders, like Haldane, tended to be critical of officers such as Hamilton-Gordon, XI Corps ('the most melancholy-looking individual I know'), or Lieutenant-Colonel E.R. Clayton, G.S.O.1, 2nd Division ('a doeful-looking customer'), who did not project the image of being 'a great thruster' such as Shute or 'full of energy and ideas' like de Lisle. In mid-1915 Philip Howell, 'an exceptionally brilliant officer' who 'had been largely responsible for the success achieved by the II Corps' on the Somme in 1916, was called 'the most mischievous pessimist in France' by Major-General Sir Frederic Glubb (Chief Engineer, Second Army) and warned by Major-General Sir Robert Montgomery (C.R.A., Third Army) that 'by being so awfully pessimistic' he was doing himself 'a lot of harm at G.H.Q.' and that to save his career he 'must cheer up'.

Those officers who did not follow "the party line" found their career jeopardised, reinforcing the tendency in other officers to tell their superiors what they wanted to hear. Haldane was warned by Major-General H.B. Williams (M.G.G.S., Second Army) 'not to show my disapproval of what is proposed and not to do otherwise than advocate what is

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58 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 21 September 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
59 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 21 June 1916, 24 August 1918, 10 April 1918, 2 June 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
60 Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Nosworthy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 July 1935, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
61 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 18 and 19 July 1915, Howell Papers IV C 2/195-196, LHCMA.
Allenby (V Corps) moved Lieutenant-Colonel Cuthbert Evans (G.S.O.1, 3rd Division) back to regimental duties in 1915 because he was pessimistic and made difficulties. In 1916 Brigadier-General John Charteris (B.G.I., G.H.Q.) informed Haig that Sir Henry Wilson (IV Corps) was pessimistic and should be removed when he questioned the prevailing optimism, stressing that subordinates 'in constant touch with the Germans' knew 'very well what fine soldiers they were'. Divisional commanders such as General Sir Peter Strickland who had 'not written very cheerful letters' worried that they would be in 'trouble' if the censor read them. Nearly sent home in March 1918 when the censor read a despondent letter to his wife, Brigadier-General C.H. Rankin was saved by the intervention of Kavanagh (Cavalry Corps).

Conversely, commanders were pressurised into attacking despite unsuitable conditions and 'it was common talk that no Div[ision] C.O. dared say his infantry were unfit to attack for [fear of] being sent home'. When Furse and Tudor (G.O.C. and C.R.A. of 9th Division) suggested in July 1916 that 'it was sheer waste of life to advance further, until a general advance of the whole army was made' this

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62 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 22 August 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
63 Brigadier-General Cuthbert Evans to Haldane, 13 August 1915; Haldane, War Diary, 16 and 31 June 1915; 1-3, 8 and 12 August 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
64 Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Belgrave to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 20 February 1929; Major-General H.D. de Pree to Edmonds, 20 January 1929; and General Sir Charles Deedes to Edmonds, 21 January 1929, CAB45 139, PRO.
65 General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 5-11 March 1916, Strickland Papers, IWM.
66 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to General Sir George Greaves, 12 March 1918, Haig Papers Acc.3155, No.147, NLS.
67 F. Wilson to Edmonds, 26 October 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
In the spring of 1917 Lieutenant-General R.G. Broadwood (57th Division) was reported for 'lack of fighting spirit' by his Corps commander (Haking) because he tried to prevent the loss of lives in unprofitable attacks by his troops.⁶⁹

In a climate where 'a lack of realism and an excessive optimism' prevailed Brigadiers, 'naturally anxious about their own professional careers, were reluctant to challenge' senior decisions ⁷⁰ and for many officers, knowing that 'optimism pays in the way of promotion' to declare that 'we can break through the German line whenever we want to; that the Boches are absolutely in extremis' and that 'very soon we'll be in Berlin; that every thing we do is perfect'.⁷¹ There was a tendency for the higher command to be 'sceptical of reports received from Battalions, Brigades and Divisions', ⁷² which contradicted their optimism and for Divisions to discount the value of much of the information coming from Battalions and Brigades because of the junior ranks of their Intelligence Officers.⁷³

Macdonogh complained that the Operations Section at G.H.Q. 'cooked or suppressed' intelligence to suit their own 'preconceived notions' and 'systematically concealed'

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⁶⁸ Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 December 1933, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
⁶⁹ Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Colonel C. Allanson, 19 August 1937, Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1937 69, LHCMA.
⁷¹ Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 19 July 1915, Howell Papers IV C/2 196, LHCMA.
⁷² E. Wough Flanagan to Edmonds, 19 December 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
⁷³ L. Green to Edmonds, 1 August 1936, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
information from him in 1914. Cavan (XIV Corps) concluded that the opinions of Corps Commanders on the Somme in 1916 'should have carried more weight' and that the advances of October and November should never have been attempted given the poor ground conditions. Those who prophesied bad news, such as a German attack on Vimy Ridge in May 1916 or a German counter-attack at Cambrai in November 1917, were told by their seniors that they had got 'the "wind up"'.

The hierarchy's over-confidence created a situation in which too many senior officers were out of touch both physically and mentally with their subordinates. From 1916 G.H.Q. were considered 'wholly inaccessible' and 'useless as guides, philosophers or friends' because of its 'complete isolation & therefore ignorance of what is going on'. Although his staff stressed that 'he talked to numerous Regimental Officers, and saw and discussed affairs regularly with Battalion commanders and Brigade and Division commanders', Haig was seen by his critics as being 'quite out of touch with the whole Army & even with his own Staff', living 'an isolated life completely out of touch with his Corps generals and with the feeling of the Army';

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74 Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 22 November 1922, C.A.B.45/141, PRO.
75 Field-Marshal Earl Cavan to Edmonds, 9 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
76 G.C.S. Hodgson to Edmonds, 14 January 1928; General Sir Thomas Snow to General Sir Hugh Jeudwine, 5 February 1923, Jeudwine Papers 72 82/2, IWM; see also General Sir Ronald Charles to Edmonds, 14 January 1929, C.A.B.45 139, PRO.
77 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 9 and 13 November 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
78 Major-General Sir John Davidson to Edmonds, 3 July 1938, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
79 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 2 September 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
seeing and entertaining nobody. When attending periodical conferences with Army Commanders, Haig and his personal staff 'always brought their lunch with them and seldom if ever lunched at Army Headquarters' limiting the chances for informal discussion. During the Battle of Ypres in 1917 Haig isolated himself on his private train with Kiggell and one staff officer and a few A.D.C.s

None of Haig's senior staff, including Major-General Sir John Davidson (B.G.O) and Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell (C.G.S.), ever went to the front. Of Kiggell one Brigadier-General remembered that 'we used to say on the Somme that he never ventured S. of Amiens: no doubt a gross libel'. Kiggell 'had not the slightest idea of the local conditions' and when he did finally visit the front at Passchendaele after the battle he was shocked by the conditions and burst into tears. Davidson's Operations Staff tended to remain in their offices instead of visiting Corps and Divisional H.Q. where they could have learnt much.

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80 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 1 November 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM; see also General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 13 September 1916, Clive Papers II/3/58, LHCMA; Major-General T.H. Shoulbridge to General Sir Ivor Maxse, 30 July 1916, Maxse Papers 69/57 7, IWM.
81 R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 13 August 1937, Allenby Papers 6/V1116, LHCMA.
82 Lord Gorell, One Man ... Many Parts, p.205.
83 Brigadier-General C.D.A. Baker-Carr, From Chauffeur to Brigadier, pp.245-247; General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.5-6, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
84 Major-General B.R. Mitford to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 1 February 1934, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
85 Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe to General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 31 December 1930, Haldane Papers, NLS.
86 Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Edmonds, 7 October 1927, Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1927/17, LHCMA; Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, The Real War, p.367.
87 Haldane, War Diary, 22 March 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Burnett-Stuart felt that 'several of the senior officers had been there so long that they developed an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the forward troops, and were shy of visiting them'.\(^8\) Tandy (G.S.O.1, Operations) admitted that his knowledge of the front-line 'never consisted of more than that gleaned from official reports and telegrams from Armies, plus secondhand word pictures from Liaison Officers at the time'.\(^8\) When General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter arrived as Director of Training, he 'was horrified by the lack of knowledge at G.H.Q. of the conditions under which the fighting in the Ypres Salient was being carried out'.\(^9\)

Henry Wilson, not an impartial observer, believed that Haig and his staff 'are completely out of touch with the Army' owing 'chiefly to the fact Robertson & Haig abolished my system of Liaison',\(^9\) which kept G.H.Q. informed of conditions at the front, when armies were introduced in early 1915.\(^9\) During the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 a gap between the Meerut and 8th Divisions was unreported owing 'to faulty liaison work' between the Corps and the First Army because experienced officers such as Hugh Dawnay, Lord Loch, Frank Lyon, 'Mary' Price-Davies, and Jimmy Shea who had kept G.H.Q. in touch with the front in

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\(^8\) General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoir, p.80, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.

\(^9\) Brigadier-General E.N. Tandy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 4 December 1944, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.

\(^9\) General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.5-6, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.

\(^9\) Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 24 December 1917 Wilson Papers, IWM.

\(^9\) Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to his wife, 19 January 1915, Maurice Papers 3/1 4/70, LHCMA.
1914 had been 'replaced by quite inferior men, not p.s.c.', who were 'told nothing & know nothing & therefore are no use'.

In 1916 'the importance of getting touch between G.H.Q. and Corps by means of first class liaison officers' was ignored by Haig. The Operations Staff under Davidson 'did not make proper use of the means at their disposal for keeping in close touch with the formations and units in front'. Whereas close liaison could have allowed G.H.Q. 'to get first hand information' of the situation at the front and to 'have heard the opinion of the troops', liaison officers tended to visit formations rather than the front itself and, as junior officers, could not override senior staff officers. Colonel E.M. Birch (G.S.O.1, Fifth Army) remarked 'woe betide him who so much as hinted' to G.H.Q. liaison officers in 1917 that mistakes were continuing in 'a repetition of the early days of the Somme fighting'. At the time of Passchendaele and during the Battle of Cambrai, G.H.Q. 'had not been sufficiently well informed of conditions at the front'.

93 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 6 and 14 March 1915 Wilson Papers, IWM.
94 Wilson, Diary, 1 September 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
95 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.5-6, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
96 Colonel A.C. Jeffcoat to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 August 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
97 Report by Major Gort to B.G.O. re 17 Division, 3 November 1916, W.O.158 235, PRO; Brigadier-General P. Howell, Diary, 19, 23 and 25 September 1916, Howell Papers IV/D 12, LHCMA.
99 Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
100 Major-General E.G. Miles to 2nd Earl Haig, 28 November 1957, Haig Papers 347/1, NLS.
Effective liaison between G.H.Q. and 'the sharp-end' was re-introduced by Dill at the end of 1917 when staff officers with first-hand experience of the front and conditions at the front were appointed to the Operations Branch of G.H.Q.\textsuperscript{101} "to maintain a closer liaison between G.H.Q. and the troops in the line".\textsuperscript{102} At last G.H.Q. was able to link planning with first-hand information of the actual situation.\textsuperscript{103} The liaison officers in 1918 'were carefully chosen and exceptionally able young officers' who visited 'the most forward troops' and returned 'to G.H.Q. quickly with valuable information which would not have reached the C-in-C through ordinary channels for some time',\textsuperscript{104} bringing G.H.Q. 'in much closer touch with forward formations' during 1918.\textsuperscript{105}

Haldane commented in March 1918 that VI Corps were 'visited much more frequently by S.O's from G.H.Q. than formerly'.\textsuperscript{106} One liaison officer travelled by aeroplane to IX Corps on the Aisne and reported back to Haig.\textsuperscript{107} Liaison officers "short circuited" the long chain of command from brigade to G.H.Q. by visiting the front 'to get the

\textsuperscript{101} Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [Major-General] J.F.C. Fuller, 1 October 1929, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1929/16, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{102} Major-General E.G. Miles to 2nd Earl Haig, 28 November 1957, Haig Papers 347/1, NLS Acc.3.155.
\textsuperscript{104} General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.17-18, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
\textsuperscript{105} Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter IX, p.13, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
\textsuperscript{106} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 11 March 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
\textsuperscript{107} Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 28 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
“atmosphere” of the fighting troops’ and ‘to “feel the pulse” of the whole great machine’ taking ‘the latest information’ and ‘a general view of the whole trend of the battle back to the C.-in-C. the same evening’.\textsuperscript{108}

A common complaint after the war was that senior commanders did not visit the front. In 1916 Fifth Army staff ‘had simply no conception of the conditions in the forward area’ and were ‘blissfully unconscious, living as they did, in a substantial chateau several miles behind the line’.\textsuperscript{109} One regimental officer remarked that ‘the Army or anyhow the Corps Commander at whatever risk ought occasionally to have come right up into the front line and seen the conditions for himself’ and ‘many of us felt that those responsible for the issuing of operation orders were out of touch with the real conditions under which the troops were to attack’.\textsuperscript{110}

Another noted that ‘I don’t think the higher command quite realized the conditions under which the front line troops were existing’.\textsuperscript{111} As a result the ‘higher leadership was sadly lacking in ability to cope with the changing conditions of the campaign’ and that ‘the instructions issued by higher authority hardly met the arduous conditions under which the troops were ordered to endure or to attack’.\textsuperscript{112} Haldane (VI Corps) concluded that ‘half the

\textsuperscript{108} Lieutenant-General A.N. Floyer-Acland, The Journal of Arthur Nugent Floyer, p.95, Floyer-Acland Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{109} General Lord Jefferies to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 October 1936, C.A.B.45 135, PRO.
\textsuperscript{110} E. Wough Flanagan to Edmonds, 19 December 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
\textsuperscript{111} Major K.B. Godsell to Edmonds, 13 October 1936, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
\textsuperscript{112} Brigadier-General W. Robertson to Edmonds, 15 July [?1930], C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
trouble during the war arose from senior commanders knowing nothing of the conditions at the front'.

The custom of not leaving headquarters during operations was common at divisional and even Brigade level. One officer who commanded a Company, Battalion and Brigade, complained that 'many C.O.'s buried themselves in a Deep Dug-out & proceeded to write endless orders without keeping personal touch with their Batt.' although there were brigade commanders, such as Bernard Freyberg, who 'was a brilliant exception', and Frank Maxwell, who was often 'personally in no-man's-land seeing the alignment of troops for attack'. One reason why senior officers did not visit the front from 1915 was a wish to preserve the lives of the limited numbers of trained commanders that were available.

In October 1915 after three divisional commanders, Major-Generals T. Capper, G.H. Thesiger and F.D.V. Wing, had been killed during the Battle of Loos, Robertson (C.G.S., G.H.Q.) warned of 'the necessity of guarding against a tendency by senior officers such as Corps and Divisional Commanders to take up positions too far forward when fighting is in progress'. This order was interpreted by many commanders to mean that 'owing to the scarcity of regular trained officers of the higher ranks, senior officers should be chary of exposing themselves unduly in

113 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Note on War Diary, 15 December 1914, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
114 E. Wough Flanagan to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 December 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
115 Brigadier-General S.V.P. Weston to Edmonds, 29 March 1937, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
116 Sir William Darling, So It Looks To Me, p.170.
117 Lieutenant-General W.R. Robertson, G.H.Q Confidential Letter O.B./888 to the First, Second, and Third Armies, Cavalry and Indian Cavalry Corps, 3 October 1915, W.O.95/2, PRO.
the forward dangerous zone'. To minimise casualties Nugent (36th Division) 'had laid down that no C.O. should go further than his battle H.Q.' on 1 July 1916.

Haldane noted in 1915 that 'few divisional generals go to their front trenches'. One divisional commander in the Ypres Salient in May 1915 'had never been outside his dugout for three weeks'. Montague-Stuart-Wortley (46th Division) was notorious for rarely visiting his front line, and 'there was always a feeling' against him 'for not going into the trenches'. In July 1916 Purse (9th Division) had his H.Q. at Bruay some 7 miles from the front and seemed quite out of touch with the battle at Longueval. While on the Somme the commander of the 123rd Brigade had no idea of the conditions at the front or the positions of their men. Even in 1917 the 'difficulty was to get commanders of divisions to go forward and take control of the operations' since 'they had been accustomed to sit behind trenches and command by the aid of the telegraph' and once the wires got broken 'they lost communication with their brigades who were advancing and fighting'.

Commanders at Brigade and Divisional level were expected to be accessible to the high command and it was

118 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 5 October 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS; Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1917, p.38, Tudor Papers, RAI.
119 Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 March 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
120 Haldane, War Diary, 15 August 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
121 Major-General A.I. MacDougall, Diary, 4-13 May 1915, MacDougall Papers DS/MISC 92, IWM.
122 Charles A.S. Page to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 1 June 1929, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
123 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 1 August 1915, Game Papers PWG 12, IWM.
124 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 July 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 11, PRO.
125 MacDougall, Diary, 16 September 1916, MacDougall Papers DS/MISC 92, IWM.
126 Haig, Diary, 11 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
'anathema' for Brigadiers to move away from the telephone' ensuring that 'they become nothing better than ciphers perfectly unable to command their Brigades' as it was 'unpopular with higher authority' for Brigade commanders to visit the front because they were supposed 'to send them pretty messages of victory all the time'. By going forward commanders often cut themselves off from their communications for a long time, as happened to one Brigade commander at Loos when he was lost with his Brigade-Major for four hours. One of 'the difficulties of commanders from divs. upwards' was 'getting to know the actual situation in time to take action' and 'of even the front line formations (divs. & bdes) finding out the situation'. Haldane (3rd Division) visiting Delville Wood in July 1916 after 'a very risky' journey found a 'state of confusion, which he could not rectify' and had to return having achieved nothing. Effective commanders, such as Haldane, concluded that, despite the difficulties, they had to visit the front 'before ordering an attack, as the map does not show the difficulties of the ground and that makes all the difference'. Haig noted that 'no one who has not visited

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127 Brigadier-General F.A. Maxwell to his wife, 16 April and 20 September 1917, Maxwell Papers 7402-31-24 31, NAM.
130 Brigadier-General S.G. Craufurd to Edmonds, 19 November 1933, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
131 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 15 August 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
the front trenches can really know the state of the
ehaustion to which the men are now reduced'.  

Wishful interpretations of German intentions and
capabilities percolated down from the highest levels of the
hierarchy, reinforcing the tendency for British offensives
to be over-ambitious. Both Commanders-in-Chief set the
trend with their unrealistic optimism. 'Obstinate and
unreasonable', Sir John French 'believed what he wished to
believe' and 'never could believe that the Germans were
not at the last gasp', being always reluctant to pass on
information which did not fit in with his plans during the
campaign of 1914. During the First Battle of Ypres,
convinced that 'everything was going splendidly' and that
'the Germans were exhausted', Sir John 'got very angry,
banged the table with his fist' when Macdonogh informed him
that some fresh German corps were arriving, shouting "How
do you expect me to carry out my campaign if you keep
bringing up these blasted divisions". Sir John remained
'ridiculously optimistic about German state of collapse' and
in mid-1915 was 'convinced that the Boches are coming near
the end of their reserves'. Robertson (C.G.S., G.H.Q.)
struggled to get him 'in a better frame of mind & not so

132 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 4 November 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 14, PRO.
133 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
134 General Sir Percy Radcliffe to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 November 1923,
C.A.B.45/141, PRO.
135 General Sir George Macdonogh to Edmonds, 14 November 1922, C.A.B.45 141, PRO.
136 Macdonogh to Edmonds, 11 October 1922, and Notes and Suggestions by General [Sir George]
Macdonogh, undated, C.A.B.45/141, PRO.
137 General Sir Percy Radcliffe to Edmonds, 21 January 1924, C.A.B.45 141, PRO.
138 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 28 June 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
ridiculously optimistic about German state of collapse' yet informed a conference that he and Sir John French 'looked out above all things for optimists'.

French's replacement as Commander-in-Chief brought no new realism because Haig was equally optimistic in his forecasts, convinced that German powers of resistance were diminishing and that a decisive victory was imminent. In the campaigns of 1916-17, being 'a strong man' and 'very determined', Haig did 'not always realise the limitations of his men' and his optimism 'obscured his judgement and led to heavy casualties in attempts to advance and decisively defeat the German Army, with insufficient means'. For example, in June 1916 he informed the King that there were signs that 'the Germans might bargain for peace before the following winter', believing that he could 'smash up the whole Bosh Army' on the Somme. Despite the disaster of 1 July Haig concluded that 'Germany is beaten' and remained confident that the enemy was increasingly demoralised and 'not fighting so well'. After the war Haig continued to claim that Germany was in a critical position in the summer of 1916 owing to the simultaneous Allied attacks on all fronts.

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139 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 19 July 1915, Howell Papers IV C 2/196, LHCMA.
140 General Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 12 July 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
141 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 7 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10, PRO.
142 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 31 August 1916 and 5 June 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
143 Haig, Diary, 28 July 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/11, PRO.
144 Haig, Diary, 27 September and 2 October 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
145 Haig, Operations on the Western Front, 1916-1918, 30 December 1920, p.24, Haig Papers, W.O.256/38, PRO.
The belief that 'the prospects of success' in 1917 were 'distinctly good' was confirmed in Haig's eyes by successes at Arras and Messines which 'undoubtedly produced a considerable moral effect on the German forces' which appeared 'much rattled' and showing 'unmistakable signs of deterioration'. Indeed, Haig informed his Army and Corps commanders in mid-1917 that 'the power of endurance of the German people is being strained to such a degree as to make it possible that the breaking point may be reached this year' and that 'one more great victory' would culminate in 'the collapse of Germany before next winter'. Haig stressed that 'the present moment is very favourable for ending the war'.

Haig believed that 'Germany was within six months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower' and that 'further defeats in the field may have unexpectedly great results'. In response to the 'grave misgivings' of Lloyd George (the Prime Minister) Haig stressed that his optimistic view of 'the very changed condition of the German Army since the commencement of the Somme battle last July' was 'justified by the present condition of our opponents' troops' and based on the German shortage of manpower,

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146 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 19 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 17, PRO.
147 Haig to Lord Milner, 11 June 1917, C.A.B.21 22, PRO.
149 Haig to Army and Corps Commanders, O.A. 799, 5 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
150 Haig to Field-Marshals Sir William Robertson, 22 August 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
151 Haig, Diary, 19 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
152 Haig, G.H.Q. Letter O.A.D.478, Present Situation and Future Plans, 12 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
economic problems, and 'a marked and unmistakeable fall in morale of the German troops', which 'almost every week gives us fresh indications of the decisive effect of the Somme Battle on the German Army' and its 'very changed condition'. By September 1917 he believed that 'the enemy is tottering and that a good vigorous blow might lead to decisive results'. Such prophesies of doom were to come true only in 1918 and proved premature in both 1916 and 1917.

Haig tried to persuade Robertson (C.I.G.S.) that 'the German was now nearly at his last resources' and that 'the German Army was in reduced circumstances'. Indeed, he complained that Robertson 'was most gloomy & pessimistic & talked d- nonsense', believing that the 'pessimistic estimates' issued by Macdonogh (a catholic) at the War Office were 'tainted (i.e. catholic) sources' and did much harm and cause many in Authority to take a pessimistic outlook, when a contrary view, based on equally good information, would go far to help the Nation on to Victory'. In October 1917 Haig protested to Robertson at the War Office's failure to point out evidence of poor German morale to the War Cabinet.

153 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 22 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
154 Haig, Diary, 23 and 28 September 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 22, PRO.
155 Haig, Diary, 9 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
156 Haig, Diary, 10 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
157 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 11 June 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
158 Haig, Diary, 15 October 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 23, PRO.
159 Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 13 August 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
160 Haig to Robertson, O.A.D.652, 16 October 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 23, PRO.
The War Office more adept at evaluating German intentions than G.H.Q. and both Robertson (C.I.G.S.) and Macdonogh (D.M.I) refuted the over-optimism of Haig and Charteris. Disagreeing with G.H.Q.'s calculations of the 'extent of depletion of enemy reserves' and observing that 'the diminution of German morale has been greatly overdone at General Headquarters', Robertson did not expect 'a great and definite victory involving the collapse of the German Army' in 1917. Dismissing Charteris' claims that Germany was on the point of collapse, Macdonogh concluded that 'the morale of the German troops has not been affected by their reverses or by the adoption of a purely defensive role to such an extent as to make a decisive success for the Entente probable in the near future', emphasising that he could 'see no hope of exhausting the German reserves of personnel' and that 'the morale of the German people is as yet far from being broken'.

Robertson implored Haig not to argue that 'you can finish the war this year, or that the German is already beaten'. Macdonogh in particular noted that to publicise 'a low state of morale in the German Army' would lead the public to 'expect immediate great results, in which they

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161 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Telegram R.142, 13 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
162 Robertson to Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, 10 December 1917, Robertson Papers I/34 41, LHCMA.
163 Robertson to Haig, 28 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 17, PRO.
164 General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General J. Charteris, 8 August 1916, Macdonogh Papers, W.O.158 897, PRO.
165 Note by the Director of Military Intelligence, Cabinet Committee on War Policy Memo. No. W.P.49, The Man-Power and Internal Conditions of The Central Powers, 1 October 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 23, PRO.
166 Robertson to Haig, 13 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
will probably be disappointed' allowing the politicians 'to
criticise our operations, run down the tactical handling of
the troops' in 'a sudden revulsion of public feeling' away
from 'undue optimism'. Macdonogh noted that 'the better the
German morale, the finer the exploit of the British Army in
defeating it'.

As early as February 1917 the Earl of Derby (Secretary
of State for War) urged that Charteris should be sacked blaming him for rash and optimistic promises of a
breakthrough made in the British and French Press. Haig
ignored this good advice, presenting an over-rosy view of
the war which raised unfulfilled expectations and encouraged
Lloyd George (the Prime Minister) to sneer at Haig’s
‘optimistic views’. Eventually, as Robertson and
Macdonogh predicted, Haig’s over-optimism rebounded as Lloyd
George and the War Cabinet demanded an explanation for the
successful German counter-attack which was launched at
Cambrai on 30 November 1917 despite G.H.Q.’s reports that
‘German morale was low and many German divisions of inferior
fighting quality’ and Haig’s assurances that 'the Germans
are well on the down-grade in morale and numbers'.

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168 Earl of Derby to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, 20 February 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 15, PRO.  
169 Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, pp.118-119, Lee Papers, IWM; General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 8 March 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS; General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars, p.27.  
170 Haig, Diary, 21 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.  
171 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Haig, Telegram No.47259, 5 December 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 25, PRO.  
172 Robertson to Haig, 6 December 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/25, PRO.
It was clear that G.H.Q. had miscalculated the effect of the collapse of the Eastern Front would have on the Western Front. In June 1917 Charteris argued that there was 'no reason to anticipate that Russia will make a separate peace' and concluded that 'Germany may well be forced to conclude peace on our terms before the end of the year'.

Charteris 'failed to appreciate the profound affect which the disappearance of the Eastern Front was bound to have on our position in the West, and he continued to encourage Haig by the prospects of an early victory, which had previously appeared to be within the bounds of possibility'. G.H.Q. underestimated the importance of keeping Italy and Russia in the war, ignoring the warnings of the War Office.

As late as October 1917 Haig was refusing to admit that Russia would collapse and contended that any German divisions transferred from the Eastern Front were likely to be of poor quality and unfit to take the offensive. In short 'the highly optimistic estimates formed at G.H.Q. in '16 and '17 of the waning strength of the Germans were proved to be all wrong' for, although intelligence showed that 'the Germans were undoubtedly very near the end of their tether up to the moment when the Russian Revolution

173 Brigadier-General John Charteris, IA/35273, 'Note on the Strategical Situation with Special Reference to the Present Condition of German resources and Probable German Operations, 11 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/19, PRO.
175 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 30 November, 3 December 1916, 19 April 1917, and 26, 30, 31 May 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
176 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, 20 April and 15 and 27 September 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 17 and 22, PRO.
177 Haig to Robertson, 8 October 1917, and Haig, Diary, 18 October1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 23, PRO.
upset all calculations', the biggest mistake made by G.H.Q. 'was in not recognising the enormous effect caused by the Russian Revolution'.

Haig's forecasts 'had entirely miscalculated' the strength of German resistance.

Blinded by optimism Haig failed to grasp the fact that, although suffering much distress, the Germans were far from collapsing during 1916 and 1917 but rather were strategically on the defensive in the west while pursuing victory on the Eastern Front. In these calculations Haig 'placed the greatest reliance' on his B.G.I. but Charteris 'regarded it as one of his duties to maintain Haig's morale by gilding the intelligence lily, a self imposed duty which eventually led to his downfall'. Charteris was happy to distort facts, notably removing all the more able-bodied Germans from a prisoner-of-war camp in order to impress his chief with the deterioration of the German troops.

Increasingly under the B.G.I.'s influence Kiggell's opinions began to 'reek of Charteris'. Reputed to be 'such a confirmed optimist that he was unable to weigh evidence objectively' and jumped to conclusions ahead of the information available, Charteris was judged to be out of

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179 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 16 October and 3 September 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
181 Macdonogh to Brigadier-General E.L. Spears, 1 February 1933, Spears Papers 2 3 70, LHCMA.
183 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 1 and 4 October 1917, Clive Papers II/61, LHCMA.
touch with events\textsuperscript{185} and to have an 'harmful' influence on Haig.\textsuperscript{186} A turning point came when in December 1917 Kiggell reported that Charteris 'was much disliked in Corps and Armies' and Haig finally agreed to sack Charteris although insisting that 'no one had done or could do the Intelligence work better'\textsuperscript{187} and that Lloyd George had plotted to remove Charteris because of his influence with the Press.\textsuperscript{188}

As the war progressed the hierarchy's over-optimistic perceptions were increasingly challenged as front-line commanders became more realistic in their assessment of German durability. Birdwood (II ANZAC Corps) gave a typical opinion in early 1917 that 'things are certainly going well out here at present, but I still do not delude myself with any belief that the Germans are yet beaten, and that the war is over, for I am sure we have still very much before us both in time and fighting'.\textsuperscript{189} Plumer thought German morale 'very much better than Haig & Kigg[ell] think' and that 'our men have no illusions on this point'.\textsuperscript{190} In late 1917, the Second and Fifth Armies in Flanders expressed the predominant view when they informed Haig that a general demoralization of the enemy producing great strategic results could not be expected.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{185} Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 3 September 1916, Wilson, IWM.
\textsuperscript{186} Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.14, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC; see also Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of An Unconventional Soldier, p.141.
\textsuperscript{187} Field-Marshall Earl Haig, Diary, 9 December 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 25, PRO.
\textsuperscript{188} Haig to his wife, 23 November 1917, Haig Papers No.148, NLS.
\textsuperscript{189} Lord Birdwood to Colonel D. Rintoul, 13 April 1917, Birdwood Papers WRB/1, IWM.
\textsuperscript{190} Wilson, Diary, 12 June 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{191} Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, Fifth Army S.G.657 502, 1 October 1917; General Sir Herbert Plumer, Second Army G.924, 30 September 1917, W.O.158 250, P.R.O.; and General Sir Charles Harington to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 9 November 1934, Maurice Papers 3 2/7, LHCMA.
Suspicion of 'exaggerated optimism in high quarters' and the belief that 'the German defence is going to crack tomorrow, that his troops are demoralised' grew as bitter experience taught that 'we have not got the Germans beat yet and so it is useless talking of breaking their line and hunting them with Cavalry!!' Senior officers came to 'always mistrust this kind of tonic from behind' believing that it was 'better to tell the men that they have a tough job' and that prophesies of easy success were 'invariably wrong and do harm' because 'over optimism rebounds'.

By 1917 pronouncements of impending victory had lost credibility with many commanders, who preferred to believe that 'pigs may fly!' According to Gough, Army and Corps Staffs became more and more disillusioned with the tendency to indulge in wishful thinking and began to discount much that emanated from G.H.Q. Germans offensives at Cambrai in November 1917 and in the Spring of 1918 had a further sobering effect on the British high command.

A greater realism went hand-in-hand with increased efforts to make contact with the troops. It should be remembered that good commanders and staff officers at all levels kept in close touch with the troops in the front line. Smith-Dorrien (Second Army) regularly made personal

192 Brigadier-General P. Howell, Pocket Diary, 17 July 1916, Howell Papers IV/D 13, LHCMA.
193 General Lord Rawlinson to Lieutenant-Colonel O.A.G. Fitzgerald, 24 April 1915, Kitchener Papers, PRO 30 57 51/WB 19B.
194 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Diary, 10 July 1916, Haldane Papers, Mss 20249, NLS.
195 Haldane, Diary, 11 July 1916, Haldane Papers, Mss 20249, NLS.
196 Howell, Pocket Diary, 16 July 1916, Howell Papers IV/D/13, LHCMA.
197 Haldane, War Diary, 5 June 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
198 General Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 12 July 1926, C.A.B.45/121, PRO.
reconnaissances of the ground in 1915,\textsuperscript{199} while Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker (21st Division) at the Battle of Loos came up to the front-line 'to investigate personally' and walked 'along calmly with shells bursting literally all round him'.\textsuperscript{200} In the last years of the war such visits to the front became the norm.

At Army level Rawlinson (Fourth Army) visited the front 'one very early morning' in November 1916 and with Feilding (Guards Division) and Cavan (XIV Corps) 'walked about 40 or 50 yards in front of our own wire',\textsuperscript{201} while Gough (Fifth Army) liked 'to see things for himself'.\textsuperscript{202} Horne (First Army) visited Divisional H.Q.s every day and cheered his subordinates up creating an atmosphere of confidence.\textsuperscript{203} Allenby (Third Army) 'was constantly out in his car inspecting parts of the Army Area, visiting trenches, Divisional Headquarters, Hospitals, Ammunition dumps, etc'.\textsuperscript{204} Byng (Third Army) was always in close contact with the front\textsuperscript{205} and Plumer (Second Army) travelled about his front.\textsuperscript{206}

At Corps level, Jacob (II Corps) 'kept himself fully informed of all that was passing and in close touch with his

\textsuperscript{199} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.421, Haldane Papers Acc.20254, NLS.
\textsuperscript{200} Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.167, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
\textsuperscript{201} Field-Marshal Earl Cavan to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 9 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
\textsuperscript{202} Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1917, p.38, Tudor Papers RAI.
\textsuperscript{203} General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 31 July 1931, C.A.B.45 123, PRO.
\textsuperscript{204} R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, 13 August 1937, Allenby Papers 6/VII/6, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{205} Haldane, War Diary, 7 June 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS; Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.327, Haldane Papers, NLS; Captain Rt. Hon. Sir Basil Brooke, Bart., to Edmonds, 15 May 1945, A.B.45 118, PRO.
\textsuperscript{206} Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Diary Notes, 31 March 1927, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1927/1b, LHCMA; General Sir Charles Harington, Plumer of Messines, pp.316-317.
subordinate commanders, so he always knew the situation of everyone and the condition of his troops' 207 while Birdwood made 'almost daily visits round the trenches'.208 At Divisional level, Major-General Sir Amyatt Hull (56th Division) 'fully enjoyed' creeping round the new front line at Gommecourt 209 and Major-General W. Douglas Smith (20th Division) was quite happy to crawl round trenches to see things for himself.210 At Arras de Lisle (29th Division) went upto the front 'most days' regardless of the shelling,211 while General Sir Herbert Lawrence (66th Division) went round the trenches 'quite often'.212

At Brigade level, Major-General Lord Dugan (73rd Brigade) and Major-General Sir John Capper (24th Division) narrowly avoided capture by a German patrol while out visiting front-line posts unarmed.213 Brigadier-General P.R. Wood (43rd Brigade) was right in the front line sheltering in a shallow trench from heavy, enfilade machine gun fire 214 while Brigadier-General W.H.L. Allgood (45th Brigade), 'used to go round his line every morning during operations either just before or just after dawn'.215 Commanders were also more willing to consult front-line subordinates. Tudor (9th Division) noted that 'later in the war a Divisional

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207 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.31, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
208 Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood to Colonel D. Rintoul, 23 July 1916, Birdwood Papers WRB 1, IWM.
209 Colonel A.S. Bates to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 June 1929, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
210 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 30 July and 8 August 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
211 A.T. Miller to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 January 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
213 Major-General Sir Winston Dugan to Edmonds, 13 July 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
214 Brigadier-General P.R. Wood to Captain Cyril Falls, [June 1937], C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
215 T.G. Taylor to Edmonds, 13 January 1930, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
Commander's opinion was given due weight as it was realized that they 'were in a better position than higher commanders to appreciate the situation on their own fronts'.

In 1918 General Sir Walter Braithwaite (62nd Division) 'commanded his division from his horse, in the best open warfare style' in 'the closest personal touch with the situation', which enabled him to "grip" his command. At Army level Allenby was prepared to listen to the advice of others while Rawlinson in November 1916 was persuaded by Feilding (Guards Division) and Cavan (XIV Corps) to abandon an attack. Plumer took care to consult every corps and divisional commander's opinion in order to adjust his plans to local needs and opinions prior to the great success at Messines in 1917. Byng was 'always ready to hear what one has to say about the difficulties which have to be surmounted' and did not 'force his own views' on subordinates or 'insist on an attack being carried out in accordance with his ideas'.

The re-discovery of surprise, the chief feature of each offensive, became a major ingredient for success in 1918 as 'the experiences of the past two years' showed that 'the element of surprise forms a very leading factor in the

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216 Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 December 1933, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
217 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 5 April 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21/3, IWM.
218 R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Wavell, 5 April 1937, Allenby Papers 6/1/6, LHCMA; General Sir George Barrow to Wavell, [3 June 1938], Allenby Papers 6/III/3, LHCMA.
219 Field-Marshal Earl Cavan to Edmonds, 9 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
220 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Diary Notes, 31 March 1927, Liddell Hart Papers 11 1927/1b, LHCMA; General Sir Charles Harington, Plumer of Messines, pp.316-317.
221 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 9 September 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
preparation and execution of an attack'. At Cambrai in November 1917 great care was 'exercised to guard against our intention becoming known prematurely, even to our troops' and 'measures against leakage of information' included keeping G.H.Q. staff in the dark about the plan until late September 1917 and informing Army Commanders (except Byng) only on the eve of the attack.

As a result the British 'did in fact pull off a real surprise, not only on the Hun, but on the gossip-mongers round London dinner tables where to our shame and horror, we had learnt that all our previous Offensives had been discussed weeks before they had taken place'. There was no preliminary bombardment or registration by the artillery and the infantry divisions, reinforcing artillery and tanks 'were moved as late as possible from distant billets by rail' and their arrival camouflaged and strictly regulated to prevent detection by the Germans. Predicted artillery fire and the tank's ability to crush the formidable wire defences of the German Hindenburg Line made long wire-cutting programmes by the artillery, which negated surprise previously, no longer necessary.

222 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, The Influence of Increased Strength on German Intentions during 1918, Ia/43614, 1 January 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
223 Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter VII, pp.2-3, C.A.B.45 208, PRO.
224 General Sir Hugh Elles to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Notes on Official History - Battle of Cambrai, 23 March 1944, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
225 Brigadier-General E.N. Tandy to Edmonds, Personal Note on Cambrai Plan, 4 December 1944, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
226 S.S.218, Operations by the Australian Corps against Hamel, Bois de Hamel and Bois de Vaire, 4 July 1918, Note by the General Staff, G.H.Q., July 1918, Major-General G.P. Dawnay Papers, IWM.
The Battle of Cambrai became the model for the British attacks at Hamel and Amiens in 1918 when strategic deception became a major weapon in the British arsenal. The success of the Australian Corps at Hamel 'was largely due to the secrecy with which they were prepared' with 'every precaution' being taken 'not only to deceive the enemy and to do nothing to arouse his suspicion, but also to prevent our own troops from knowing that an attack was intended'.

Great care was also taken to preserve the secrecy during subsequent operations by Fourth Army at Amiens on 8 August 1918; by Third Army on 21 August 1918, and by Second Army on the Clercken-Passchendaele Ridge in September 1918.

Redeployment of the Canadian Corps was made 'with every conceivable precaution for secrecy' and deception measures such as installing dummy tanks, continuing normal radio traffic, and the movement of some Canadian units to the Second Army front in the Kemmel area, which 'quite misled the Canadian troops', who 'spoke of the “coming offensive to retake Kemmel”'! ‘No outward preliminary preparations at all that could be spotted’ were allowed and as a result the Germans ‘were completely taken by surprise and

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227 G.H.Q., T 9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.19, Attack carried out by the Australian Corps near Hamel on the 4th of July, 1918, 5 August 1918, W.O.58 70, PRO.
228 Lieutenant-Colonel C.J. Aston, M.C., to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 October 1937, C.A.B.45/184, PRO.
229 Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Newman, Second Army Artillery Instructions No.1, 20 September 1918, W.O.158 211, PRO.
230 Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Lister, Notes on Operations of First French Army, 29 July and 2 August 1918, Lister Papers, LHCMA.
231 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 7 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 34, PRO.
demoralised', enabling the troops to achieve 'their objectives quickly with very little loss'.

From 8 August 1918 the British 'realized that the corner had been turned' and 'seized the initiative once more'. Senior commanders such as Byng, Harper, Godley, and Rawlinson were 'confident that we shall get the Germans back to the Hindenburg Line'. By September 1918 the German was 'no longer the same man that he used to be' and, although he was 'still capable of putting up quite a good fight', was 'on the hop' and 'thoroughly disorganised'. G.H.Q. concluded that with German resources badly overstretched there was a unique opportunity to gain a decisive victory.

By October 1918 there was 'little doubt that our breaking the whole of the Hindenburg systems of defence has had a great effect on the enemy' and he was 'ready to make peace on our terms', being 'thoroughly demoralised' and at 'the end of his man power'. By November 1918 'the Bosch infantry was not fighting well and handing itself in pretty freely' even though 'the artillery was pretty active'.

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232 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
233 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 8 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/34, PRO.
234 Lieutenant-General Lord Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter IX, 'The Turning of the Tide', p.12, C.A.B.45/208, PRO.
235 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 25 August, 1918, Henry Wilson Papers, IWM.
236 Lieutenant-Colonel O.S. Nelthorpe, Appreciation by the General Staff, 10 September, 1918, W.O.158 20, PRO.
237 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his mother, 3 September 1918, Montgomery Papers BLM1 65, IWM.
238 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his mother, 3 September 1918, Montgomery Papers BLM1 65, IWM.
239 Lieutenant-Colonel O.S. Nelthorpe, Appreciation by the General Staff, 10 September, 1918, W.O.158 20, PRO.
239 Haig to his wife, 7 October 1918, Haig Papers 152, NLS.
240 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
241 Alanbrooke to his mother, 1 November 1918, Alanbrooke Papers I/1 11/35, LHCMA.

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Unlike in 1916-17 there was a consensus that 'we have given the Germans a severe blow' obtaining 'the greatest victory which a British Army has ever gained'. The optimism of the hierarchy was shared by front-line troops who with high morale just wanted to get after the Germans, who 'fled like rabbits'. But 'the training of four years' taught the British 'not to count our successes beforehand' even with 'the whole German line to the south tottering'.

While Foch talked of still fighting in 1919 Haig believed that the Allies 'ought to hit the Boche now as hard as we could' in order to 'get peace this autumn', calculating that the enemy's resistance could be 'completely broken' without 'another campaign next year'. In September 1918 Haig travelled to London 'to impress on the Home Authorities the importance of hitting as hard as we could up to the mud time' but, while Wilson (C.I.G.S.) agreed that 'there was ample evidence of the deterioration of the Boch', Haig, handicapped by his previous over-optimism in 1916-17, had difficulty in persuading the Government.

In particular Milner (Secretary of State for War), who thought that Haig was 'ridiculously optimistic' and was 'afraid he may embark on another Passchendaele', warning that 'if he knocked his present Army about there was no

242 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to his wife, 27 August 1918, Haig Papers, Acc. 3155, No.152, NLS.
243 Major-General A.N. Floyer-Acland, Journal, pp.103-104, Floyer-Acland Papers, IWM.
244 Lieutenant G.H. Thomas to his parents, 5 September 1918, Thomas Papers, IWM.
245 Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter X, p.1, C.A.B.45/208, PRO.
246 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 11 August, 1918, Henry Wilson Papers, IWM.
247 Haig, Appreciation of the Present Situation, O.A.D.90, 1 August 1916, W.O.158 21, PRO.
other to replace it'. Fortunately Haig's optimistic views were now tinged with a new realism and more in tune with his subordinates. Indeed, Haig and his Army Commanders all agreed in October 1918 that 'the enemy is fighting a very good rear-guard action' and that 'the enemy has not yet been sufficiently beaten as to cause him to accept an ignominious peace'.

In the end the greatest strength of the British Army was its supreme self-confidence, which allowed it to keep going where all the other nations who entered the war in 1914 had suffered mutinies or collapsed. One of the British Army's most important achievements has gone largely unnoticed: namely, that the B.E.F.'s morale remained remarkably high till the end of the war. Optimism was necessary to carry through such a war. Before the British could defeat the German Army in 1918 they had to learn to temper their confidence with realism. A vital precursor to victory was that the Army should have an objective and realistic analysis of the tactical possibilities and not, as one Brigadier-General complained, display 'rather a Micawber attitude of expecting something good to turn up'. But the price of that lesson in 1916 and 1917, notably on the Somme and in Flanders, was a high one and Haig, in particular, must bear a heavy responsibility for the over-ambition,

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248 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 9 and 23 September 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
249 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 31 October 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 37, PRO.
250 Brigadier-General R. FitzMaurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 7 November 1936, C.A.B.45/133, PRO.
which prevented a satisfactory strategy being employed prior to mid-1917.
Training for Victory

Training the New Armies so that they were capable of defeating the Germans presented a major challenge for the British Army. The formation, equipment, and training of the 30 divisions of the New Armies and the increase in strength of the B.E.F. from six to 60 divisions in less than two years was a major achievement. Certainly, at first the British Army had neither the experience, training, nor ability to match the Germans in the tactical realm and 'in an army the greater part of which had had no experience of any war except this war of trenches, a certain lack of tactical sense was perhaps not to be wondered at'. Against the skill of the Germans the British pitted inexperienced and undertrained troops. In September 1916 Foch noted simply that 'our Divisions were green soldiers & his were veterans' because the British Army had had to expand from '6 to 60 Divisions'.

The daunting task of raising and training a large and powerful army while deeply engaged in a major war was considerably worsened by the rapid expansion of 1915-16. This process produced a 'lack of uniformity of training throughout the British armies in France' resulting in 'the

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1 General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter VIII, p.86, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
2 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 12 and 13 September 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
unevenness of the worth of battalions' as late as April 1918.³ The best solution would have been to expand the original eight Regular Divisions of the B.E.F. 'by amalgamating less regular forces with it' to create 'quite a considerable Army'.

But in reality it proved impossible to harness the 'undeveloped power' of the Empire when 'the bulk of our highly trained regular officers are at once carted off to France' ⁴ and killed 'in the first two months' of the war.⁵ The advice of Haig that the B.E.F. should not 'go over for 2 or 3 months' during which time 'the immense resources of the Empire' could be developed ⁶ was ignored. In November 1914 Haig reiterated that, since 'it will be many months before the new forces forming in England can take the field', British policy 'ought therefore to be to husband the strength of our present field army as much as possible'.⁷

The failure to amalgamate the New Army Brigades and Battalions with Regular Divisions once in France to give them experience and raise their efficiency was a more culpable mistake.⁸ The main value of the Regular British Army in 1914 was 'as a picked force of professional soldiers' ⁹ but, unfortunately, this expertise was not employed to provide 'a sufficiently strong nucleus of first

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³ Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier, Impressions and Recollections, p.217 and 221.
⁴ Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lord Haldane, 4 August 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
⁵ Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 29 January 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
⁶ Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 5 August 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
⁷ Haig, Diary, 18 November 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 2, PRO.
⁸ Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 10 November, 1914, Howell Papers IV/C/2 66, LHCMA.
⁹ General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 27 November 1914, Clive Papers II/1/65, LHCMA.
rate trainers & leaders' to raise rapidly 'the standard of efficiency as a whole'.

'All regular officers without exception' thought that 'the formation of new units is being overdone' and wanted existing Regular units to absorb the newly raised troops in the form of drafts, mixing the 'very good army' of Regulars in France and the 'second rate army' of civilians to form one 'good army'.

To do this the alternatives were either 'to draft your reinforcements onto existing units' or to place plenty of regular officers and N.C.O.s into the new units. Either method ensured an interchange of personnel in which New Army officers would learn from attachment to Regular units while allowing regulars, 'who have been through the mill' and were 'now rather stale', to take a well-earned rest while training the Yeomanry and New Armies. Aware of the poor quality of the battalion and company commanders of the newly-raised formations, Maxse urged in early 1915 the employment of junior captains and subalterns, who had gained priceless war experience with the B.E.F., to command battalions of the New Armies, which contained excellent raw material especially the junior officers who 'necessarily lack experience in leadership', and raise their skill levels.

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10 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 1 August 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
11 Haldane, War Diary, 1 August 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
12 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 11 November, 1914, Howell Papers IV C/2 67, LHCMA.
13 Howell to his wife, 3 November, [1914], Howell Papers IV/C/3 82, LHCMA.
14 General Sir Ivor Maxse, Notes on the New Armies by a Divisional Commander, 3 February 1915, Maxse Papers, IWM 69/53/5.
Aware of 'the danger of sending out the new army in corps or armies, whose staffs and officers have not got experience',\textsuperscript{15} and of 'the necessity of using the troops by battns',\textsuperscript{16} Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief, supported by Haig (First Army) fought in January 1915 to replace Lord Kitchener's proposal to send out the New Armies as armies and corps with that of sending them 'out by Battalions or even Brigades, for incorporation in our existing Divisions and Corps'.\textsuperscript{17} French won the agreement of the War Cabinet that 'the New Army will not come out in larger bodies than Divisions' \textsuperscript{18} and that 'two seasoned brigades and one new brigade will form a division'.\textsuperscript{19} Maxse also suggested that the twelve divisions of the First and Second New Armies should exchange two battalions in each brigade for two, experienced battalions as soon as they landed in France in order to create homogeneous Divisions.\textsuperscript{20}

Unfortunately, this good advice was not acted upon. Kitchener refused to split up the New Armies and amalgamate them with the formations already in France maintaining that 'such a use of the New Army would ruin it'.\textsuperscript{21} Instead 'whole brigades and even divisions' of the New Armies were

\textsuperscript{15} General Sir Sidney Clive Diary, 5 January 1915, Clive Papers II/1 83, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{16} Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 9 January 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{17} Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 4 January 1915, and Expansion of the British Army in the Field, 11 January 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 3, PRO.
\textsuperscript{18} Haig, Diary, 20 January 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 3, PRO.
\textsuperscript{19} Haig, Diary, 26 January 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/3, PRO.
\textsuperscript{20} General Sir Ivor Maxse, Notes on the New Armies by a Divisional Commander, November 1914, Maxse Papers, IWM 69/53/5.
\textsuperscript{21} Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, undated, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
'coming out to take the field'. This method of expanding the Army contrasted sharply with the way in which the Dominions formed new divisions. Following the Gallipoli campaign the Australians doubled the number of battalions by splitting the original existing units and using reinforcements to bring both halves up to full strength giving 'a veteran character and a feeling of brotherhood to the whole force'.

The failure to mix the raw Kitchener Army troops with more experienced troops cost the Army many lives. The heavy casualties sustained by 'newly arrived units' in late 1914 demonstrated that there could be no 'real, rapid training unless the trainers are regular officers & men who have been through the mill' and that '10%, 20% even 30% of the casualties' which had occurred in divisions newly arrived in the theatre 'during their first engagements, might have been avoided'. The 'fatal policy of trying to form new units (big units, like divisions) instead of drafting onto old ones' resulted in 'a terribly big bill' in the form of heavy casualties and lost trenches even in formations like the 28th Division formed from 'real good regular battalions from India'.

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22 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 11 November, 1914, Howell Papers IV/C/2 67, LHCMA.
23 General Sir John Monash to his wife, 22 April 1916, quoted in P.A. Pedersen, Monash As Military Commander, p.133.
24 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 July 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
25 Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 10 November, 1914, Howell Papers IV C 2 64, LHCMA.
26 Howell to his wife, 20 February 1915, Howell Papers IV/C/3/113, LHCMA; see also Major-General Lord Loch to George V, 19 April 1915, Loch Papers 71/12 1, IWM.
The older and more established divisions, for example, had a distinct advantage notably the 7th Division which was 'quite one, if not the best of the Divisions in our Army' whose arrangements for 1 July 1916 were 'particularly good' because they 'had a great deal of experience', having 'taken part in every attack from NEUVE CHAPELLE, FESTUBERT, LOOS'. The failure to put reinforcements such as the 28th Division into the line gently as 'new boys' resulted in heavy casualties. A huge 'waste of human material' within New Army formations such as the 34th Division, which had 'never done any good' and was seen as 'a "used-up division"' despite the 'd-ed good men' in its ranks, resulted from a shortage of leadership to provide the required training.

Throughout the war the comparative low level of training achieved by the troops and their junior leadership was a serious problem. General Sir Reginald Stephens (5th Division) lamented that 'most of our troubles have come from our lack of training'. The lack of training was reflected in the poor performance of the British Army. General Sir Ivor Maxse blamed 'the local success of the enemy' at Cambrai in late November 1917 on the 'lack of battle-training' in the infantry and the Machine Gun Corps.

27 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to [Major-General W.P. Braithwaite], 28 August 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48/21, LHCMA.
28 General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 23 and 24 February 1915, Kitchener Papers WB/13 and 15, PRO 30/57.
29 Brigadier Hon. William Fraser, 1 November 1917, quoted in General Sir David Fraser (editor), In Good Company: The First World War Letters and Diaries of The Hon. William Fraser, Gordon Highlanders, p.173.
30 General Sir Reginald Stephens, Points from the late Operation [October 1917], p.8, Stephens Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
31 General Sir Ivor Maxse, Note by a member of the Court of Enquiry, p.1, paras.1-2, 28 January 1918, W.O.158 53, PRO.
While in September 1918 Harper (IV Corps) felt that 'it was evident during the earlier stages of the recent operations that British troops had not reached a sufficiently high standard of training to manoeuvre successfully in the field throughout the varying stages of the battle'.

The British 'fought the war after 1914, (or say 1915) with almost untrained men, and whenever we had to move, in 1917, and especially in 1918, the troops did not know how to do it, nor did the artillery know how to support them' and as a result there was 'unnecessary slaughter, and the non-attainment of objectives'. One staff officer concluded that from the Battle of Arras in early 1917 until the end of the war G.H.Q. did not understood 'with what poor & untrained material we were fighting'. Haldane (3rd Division) stated in early 1916 that 'the authorities quite forget that one's officers are young and those in command of companies have only about one year's service and cannot therefore show the knowledge and initiative of those we had earlier in the war'. Owing to rapid promotion, 'most of the brigadiers and C.O's now are not competent to teach'.

The British Army had expanded too rapidly for the quality of its training and leadership to be unaffected and shortages of both within the New Armies were major obstacles to effective training on a large-scale. The Regular Army

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32 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
33 Major-General C.G. Fuller to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 July 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
34 Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
35 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 6 April 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
36 Haldane, War Diary, 22 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
was 'dwindling at a most alarming rate' while the New Armies were 'increasing at an equally alarming rate'. The Battles of 1914 at Mons, Le Cateau, the Marne, the Aisne, and Ypres 'practically wiped out the men of the original Expeditionary Force' so that during the period 1915-17 the B.E.F. was 'an army of amateurs - not professionals' - lacking the skills 'good enough to attack, break through, and carry on a pursuit'.

Rapid expansion diluted the officer and N.C.O. cadres to such an extent that the bulk of junior officers and the majority of other ranks who went into action had no pre-war service. General Sir Henry Rawlinson calculated in 1915 that owing to casualties the 'officers were at least 50% less efficient than they were last Autumn and our troop leading is correspondingly less good' and this was having 'a marked effect on our fighting efficiency'. A shortage of well-trained junior leaders was to be a major problem throughout the war. Commanders complained about the quality of the leadership at regimental level. Haldane (3rd Division) noted in early 1916 that 'the troops have been badly trained at home, there being few people with knowledge to do the work' and G.H.Q. noted that 'officers and troops generally do not now possess that military knowledge

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37 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 11 November 1914, Howell Papers IV C/2 67, LHCMA.
38 Colonel R. Macleod, Memoir, p.107, Macleod Papers, LHCMA.
39 General Sir Charles Grant to the Earl of Rosebery, 24 January 1916, Grant Papers, LHCMA.
40 General Lord Rawlinson to the Adjutant-General of the Forces, 24 June 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 23, PRO 30/57.
41 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 25 February 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
arising from a long and high state of training which enables them to act promptly on sound lines in unexpected situations'.

In mid-1916 de Lisle (29th Division) complained that he was 'short of some good battalion commanders for training' the troops. In late 1916 the poor quality of the regimental officers in the 57th Division rendered them unfit to command a platoon or to read a map, while Rawlinson (Fourth Army) commented that on arrival in France the troops 'were very green and their officers want a good deal of training'. Deverell (3rd Division) noted that 'a trained soldier can not be made in a few weeks and trained leaders require long training and practice' and that 'inexperienced officers and men must have experienced leaders immediately with them.'

Heavy casualties exacerbated this problem in 1916-17. By late September 1914 the 4th Division had 'only one commanding officer left, all the other 11 having been either killed or wounded'. Similarly by mid-1915 the 7th Division had lost the best of its officers and men and 'the ranks now contain many new hands who are inexperienced at the job'. At the Battle of Loos 5/Lincolns lost 22

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43 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 10 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/10, PRO.
44 Colonel C.J.L. Allanson, Diary, 3 December 1916, quoted in Allanson of the 6th, edited H. Davies, p.123.
45 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 9 March 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
46 Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 November 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
47 General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 24 September 1914, Kitchener Papers WB 2, PRO 30 57.
48 Rawlinson to Colonel B. FitzGerald, 21 June 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 23, PRO 30 57.
officers and 460 men and 'with the exception of the M.G. officer, every officer in the battalion was killed or wounded' resulting 'in almost a complete lack of leadership for the battalion as a whole'.

Corkran (5th Brigade) reported in October 1915 that 'the esprit de corps of the old units were lacking in battalions' and that owing to hard fighting 'some of the battalions seemed to lack the fighting energy and morale which characterised the original units of the expeditionary force'.

On 1 July 1916 the 11th Brigade (4th Division) lost its six Commanding Officers and Brigadier-General as casualties (4 killed) and one battalion, 1/Somerset Light Infantry, lost 26 officers and 438 other ranks, including the Commanding Officer and the Adjutant (both killed) and 'no single officer of those who formed up in the assembly trenches prior to the attack' was 'available for duty at the end of the day'.

The 23rd Division in August 1916 had 'great difficulties in getting Officers & N.C.O.s of any standing at all', having 'lost about 5,000 all ranks' as casualties on the Somme. At the end of 1917 after the Battles of the Somme, Arras, Ypres, and Cambrai 'the wastage in officers & N.C.O.s, as well as men was appalling' and it was wonderful 'how battalions managed to carry on, subject

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49 Colonel T.E. Sandall to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 27 June 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
50 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 October 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 6, PRO.
51 V.H.B. Majendie to Edmonds, 25 October 1929, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
52 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 13 August 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
as they were to a continuous loss of trained & experienced personnel'.

By the autumn of 1915 'the majority of professional soldiers' in the line 'were either promoted N.C.O.s or very recent products of Sandhurst'. The dearth of experienced officers was a major disadvantage to the newly formed New Armies. The "K3" Divisions, such as the 21st and 24th Divisions, were manned with untrained officers, especially subalterns, and lacked trained instructors as the best retired and "temporary" officers had already been allocated to the "K1" and "K2" divisions and Cadet Battalions were not formed until early 1916 so that newly commissioned officers received no training before joining their battalions. In the 24th Division there 'was a paucity' of the ex-regular officers while 'the younger ones were mostly the cast-offs of the Old Army owing to mental or physical disabilities'.

The 21st Division 'had one inherent weakness in the paucity of Regular Officers' so that when it 'landed in France, no Battalion had more than one Regular Officer besides the C.O. (who was in all cases a 'Dug out')' and 'the actual number of regular and ex-regular officers in the 13 Battalions was 14, exclusive of the Battalion Commanders', practically all of whom were old Indian Army Dugouts.

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53 Major-General C.G. Fuller to Captain Cyril Falls, 12 December 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
54 Major J. Buckley to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 1 January 1927, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
55 C.T. Atkinson to Edmonds, 3 December 1927, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
56 Lieutenant-Colonel R.R. Gibson to Edmonds, 10 August 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
57 Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker to Edmonds, 24 January 1927, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
58 Forestier-Walker to Edmonds, 10 December 1927, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
The problem of untrained regimental officers and N.C.O.s is too often forgotten when discussing the performance of the generals. The efficiency of British units rested almost entirely on the small handful of regular officers, who after 1915 were forced to do the work of their junior officers and N.C.O.s, having to train them as well as the men.\textsuperscript{59} Owing to the shortage of experienced trainers during training in the U.K., Forestier-Walker (21st Division) and his staff "ran" not only the Divisional schemes but 'also conducted nearly all' the Infantry Brigade tactical exercises.\textsuperscript{60} Much training was unsatisfactory because many of the young officers and N.C.O.s had not learned how to teach their troops and regimental officers lacking 'a thorough grounding in military knowledge'.\textsuperscript{61}

Williams (37th Divisions) reported that 'officers were often very tired when relieved' because 'with the present inexperienced troops the company officers are always on duty and so get little sleep when fighting is going on'.\textsuperscript{62} Should these become casualties the efficiency of a unit tended to drop rapidly. For example, one officer on assuming command of the 9/K.O.Y.L.I., found that, as a result of the heavy casualties sustained on the Somme including two C.O.s and all the Battalion staff, 'no one

\textsuperscript{59} Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoirs, pp. 23 and 65, Roupell Papers PP/MCR/56 GR1, IWM.
\textsuperscript{60} Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 December 1927, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
\textsuperscript{61} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 21 February and 22 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{62} Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 11 May 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 18, PRO.
left knows anything and all has to be organised'. A major
shortcoming affecting the quality of the British Army's
training was a severe shortage of good N.C.O.s. The loss of
experienced N.C.O.s in battle affected the performance of
units; one platoon commander complained in August 1916 that
when his platoon sergeant - 'one of the best N.C.O.'s in the
Company' - got wounded the platoon 'wasn't anything like it
was without him'.

Haig commented in October 1915 that 'with the
Territorial & new troops one misses the junior officers with
some tactical knowledge & training' who could 'act on the
spot at the right moment'. One major reason for 'our
painfully slow progress and heavy losses throughout the
Somme battle' was 'the lack of initiative on the part of our
Junior Regimental Officers and N.C.O.s, due, of course, to
lack of training'. Stephens (5th Division) noted that
'the men were inclined to be trench-bound' and lacking in
initiative so that having taken a trench they were 'quite
satisfied to sit in it and hold it very much as if it were
part of the old permanent line' rather then consolidating it
against counter-attack and preparing for the next attack.
The junior leaders were not equal to their tasks
demonstrating a tendency to panic, to surrender if cut off,

63 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 13 September, 5-7 October, and 5 November 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
64 Second-Lieutenant A.M. Jameson to his mother, [August 1916], Jameson Papers, IWM.
65 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, to his wife, 14 October 1915, Haig Papers 141, NLS.
66 Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Nosworthy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 July 1935, C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
67 General Sir Reginald Stephens, 'lessons from the recent offensive Operations, [?September 1916], Stephens Papers 69 70/1, IWM.
and to suffer heavy casualties by employing large bodies of men in close order.\footnote{G.H.Q., S.S.478 (Translation of a German Document), Experiences of the IV German Corps in the Battle of the Somme During July 1916, G.H.Q. Ia/20245, 30 September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 49, LHCMA.}

In early 1917, G.H.Q. noted that the advance to the Hindenburg Line was "'sticky'" because the majority of officers and N.C.O.s 'have had little or no experience in anything but trench warfare' and recommended that 'no opportunity should be lost, either by tactical schemes or otherwise, of teaching open warfare tactics and especially the use of ground to all officers and N.C.O.s'.\footnote{G.H.Q., S.S.156, Notes on Recent Operations Compiled by G.S. Fourth Army, G.H.Q. O.B. 1782/A, April 1917, p.5, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 51, LHCMA.} Allenby (Third Army) believed that 'the companies having been so long in trenches were now like "blind puppies" and unable to see the features of the ground and take advantage of the cover afforded for turning out the enemy’s machine guns'.\footnote{Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 14 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.}

'Three years of trench warfare had left its mark'\footnote{Colonel C.E. Vickery to Captain Cyril Falls, 11 February 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.} and it was 'a matter of comment at the time' that 'the stickiness of many operations' was 'not due to the mud but what was called trenchitis of the brain'.\footnote{Brigadier-General C. Yatman to Falls, 2 November 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.} Throughout 1917 'the German forces seemed to have more initiative than had the British' at junior leadership level with corporals and sergeants holding onto pillboxes or trenches 'determinately' whereas if 'our troops lost their officers too often they retired not because they had been beaten' but simply to

\footnote{Colonel C.E. Vickery to Captain Cyril Falls, 11 February 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.}
'receive orders from someone more senior'. In early 1918 Army Commanders were still worried about the training of their troops; Plumer (Second Army) complained that his troops 'are untrained, with indifferent officers & although as brave as possible they simply don’t know their business', while Byng (Third Army) was anxious 'not so much from want of numbers as from want of training of men & of officers'.

One Brigadier-General thought that 'the perfectly incredible ignorance of our jolly New Army' was 'absolutely inevitable' given that the expertise of the Regular Army had 'become instinct only by years of business, experience, & learning' whereas the New Army's training was 'surface deep at best'. Whereas the Germans had personnel trained under national service and 'could therefore devote much more time and attention to thinking out new methods etc', the British 'had to do all that was possible against time with untrained civilians'. British junior leaders, both young officers and N.C.O.'s, 'were just as gallant as the Germans, but were at great disadvantage' because of a 'lack of military sense and instinct'. 'Most of the Germans had gone through their 2-years' period of compulsory training & were real soldiers, with a well developed military instinct' whereas 'many of our young officers came straight from an office stool or

73 Earl Stanhope to Captain Cyril Falls, 21 September 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
74 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 17 April 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
75 Wilson, Diary, 2 May 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
76 Brigadier-General F.A. Maxwell to his wife, 20 September 1917, Maxwell Papers 7402-31-31, NAM.
77 Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart to Falls, 16 January 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
some commercial employment' and 'could not be expected to be in the same class as leaders'. The 'extraordinary lack of skill' shown by the British troops on the Somme reflected the fact that the percentage of the French troops who 'had had no prewar training' was 'at the very most 10% and probably considerably less' whereas that of the New Army troops 'with any prewar training [was] at a maximum of 3% or 4% of the personnel'.

Equally disastrous was the shortage of trained men, especially after the heavy losses suffered by battalions in the attritional fighting of 1916-17. General Lord Jeffreys (57th Brigade) complained in October 1916 that the drafts of reinforcements had not had much training and indeed one Lance Corporal, arriving on the Somme with some reinforcements, 'did not know how to load his rifle'. By 1917, when 'large new drafts' of reinforcements formed 50% of Brigades, commanders had to rely on 'short intensive training' to turn the new men 'into soldiers, as apart from brave men dressed in khaki'. Reinforcements from home 'were but partially trained' because 'the period of training at home for infantry had been reduced, except for the Guards, to about three months'.

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78 Major-General W.L.O. Twiss to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 18 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
79 Brigadier W.E. Clark to Edmonds, 21 November 1934, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
80 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 13 October 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
81 Colonel H.D. Buchanan-Dunlop to Captain Cyril Falls, 11 December 1938, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
82 74th Infantry Brigade, Operations 10th, 11th August 1917, [August 1917], Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
83 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter IX, p.6, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
As the war progressed the quality of the conscripts, who were either unreceptive, draft dodgers or very young troops, deteriorated in contrast to the volunteers of the New Armies in 1915 and 1916.\textsuperscript{84} In December 1917 Haldane (VI Corps) received reports from two Commanders, Deverell (3rd Division) and Nicholson (34th Division), that the troops were fed up with the war.\textsuperscript{85} The Army ‘was beginning to feel the strain of the heavy casualties and unpleasant conditions under which fighting was taking place on the Ypres front’ and its morale ‘was becoming gradually depressed’.\textsuperscript{86} After the battles of March 1918 the British Army, badly depleted by heavy casualties, was receiving very young reinforcements, mainly of boys of 19\textsuperscript{87} while many officers and N.C.O.s were young and inexperienced.\textsuperscript{88}

During the war the ‘tight regimental system of reinforcements’ broke down ‘in the face of heavy and uneven Infantry casualties’.\textsuperscript{89} A common complaint by Battalion, Brigade and Divisional commanders was the disastrous effect on the morale and fighting qualities of the infantry of the ‘hurried system of reinforcing units in the field’, which resulted in battalions being sent reinforcements of ‘men belonging to every kind of Corps other than their own’.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{84} Lieutenant-Colonel E. Hewlett to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 18 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69/53/11, IWM.
\textsuperscript{85} General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 26 December 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
\textsuperscript{86} General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter IX, p.6, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
\textsuperscript{87} Lieutenant-Colonel C.W.H. Birt to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 11 August 1931, C.A.B.45/122, PRO.
\textsuperscript{88} Major General J.K. Dick-Cunyngham to Edmonds, 8 July 1931, C.A.B.45 122, PRO.
\textsuperscript{89} Major-General D.N. Wimberley, Memoir, p.223, Wimberley Papers, IWM.
\textsuperscript{90} Brigadier-General R.J. Kentsh to 3rd Division, 76th Brigade No. B175, 3 August 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Regimental officers remonstrated at the 'pernicious habit of drafting officers and men of different regiments to fill up casualties often quite unnecessarily i.e. 50 Dublin Irishmen put into kilts in the Seaforths in the same brigade whilst in same draft 50 English recruits were sent to the Dublins'.

Misgivings were also experienced by commanders that too much time was devoted to the construction of defences, fatigues and recreation to the detriment of training. As late as October 1918 a common complaint by Divisional and Corps Commanders was the lack of time and opportunity to train their men. Training in France was made more difficult by additional factors, notably the 'great pressure' to avoid 'the destruction of crops' which was 'maintained by the French Authorities', whose reluctance to provide 'adequate areas' for training was 'extremely detrimental' to the training of the Army. Finding the time and space 'to carry out training in back areas undisturbed' was equally difficult especially when Divisions in reserve 'almost without exception' were called upon 'to provide large working parties'. The infantry were expected to supply men for fatigues and 'a host of other duties, which

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91 Brigadier W.F. Jefferies to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 March 1930, Jefferies Papers, LHCMA.
92 Major-General C.N. Nicholson to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 10 October 1918; Major-General John Ponsonby to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 11 October 1918; Lieutenant-General A.E.A. Holland to Maxse, 7 October 1918; Lieutenant-General R.B. Stephens to Maxse, 14 September 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
93 Brigadier-General C. Bonham-Carter, Training in France, 8 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69 57/11, IWM.
ought to be performed by men drawn from other sources than fighting formations about to go into action'.

One Brigade commander complained that, although 'C.O.s always live in hope of the Division being one day out of the line without any working parties to be found', a long rest of ten days for a battalion to train was a rarity except when 'training for a special operation'. More typically 11th Division when resting 'only got two or three days training' before going back into the line again. At Arras the 51st Division 'had a very serious lack of training' because it had been 'continuously in the line without rest since its arrival in France on 1st May 1915'. In late 1917 the 34th Division was 'tired out and suffers from not having had a sufficiently long time out of the line for training' while in the 20th Division 'one brigadier went so far as to say that he considered his men were not in a fit state to withstand a heavy attack'.

From 1915 onwards the British were providing large-scale training in an ever-increasing number of schools of instruction for all ranks. The development of Army Schools was 'due to the individual effort' of General Sir Charles Monro (Third Army) 'who first originated the idea'.

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94 Brigadier-General M.L. Hornby, 116th Brigade, to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, XVIII Corps, 28 July 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
95 Brigadier S.G. Francis, 111th Brigade, to Major-General H. Bruce Williams, 37th Division, 5 September 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/12, IWM.
96 Major-General H.R. Davies to Maxse, 2 September 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/12, IWM.
97 J.L. Weston to Captain Cyril Falls, 21 July 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
98 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 October 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 22, PRO.
99 Major-General W. Douglas Smith, 20th Division, to XVIII Corps, 3 March 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
100 Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish to General Sir Ivor Maxse, 21/22 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 57/7, IWM.
Worried by the rapid deterioration in the standard of officers in France, Monro decided to set up an Army School, establishing the Third Army School for the instruction of 50 officers and 50 N.C.O.s in a month's course. By late 1915 and early 1916 the Third Army School of Instruction was attended by 100 officers and 100 N.C.O.s for one month's course and in April 1916, Henry Wilson (IV Corps) found it 'a most admirable place' and 'quite the best run school I have seen in this country', obtaining 'a lot of tips for our School'.

This was destined to be the seed from which sprang not only the Third Army School but, later on, a school in each Army and dozens of Corps and Divisional Schools as well. In early 1916 the types of schools and the lengths of courses run by corps and divisions varied tremendously and many had been set up during the winter of 1915-16. Haig noted in May 1916 that de Lisle (29th Division) had 'recently started a divisional school' when 'other divisions have had them going since November last'. The Battle of the Somme re-emphasised the need for schools and by the winter of 1916-17, visiting various Divisional Schools, Haig was impressed by the good work that was being done to train

101 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his mother, 12 October 1915, Fuller Papers IV 3 163, LHCMA.
102 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 December 1915 and 11 March 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 7 and 9, PRO.
103 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 8 April 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
104 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of An Unconventional Soldier, pp.56-57.
105 Wilson, Diary, 8 and 13 January 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
106 See Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, p.91, Beddington Papers, LHCMA and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 9 November 1915, Game Papers PWG9, IWM.
107 Haig, Diary, 10 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10, PRO.
young officers and N.C.O.s as platoon commanders. But as late as September 1917 there were only 17 Schools for 20 Corps.

By 1917 a whole system of schools at Army, Corps, Divisional and even Brigade level had been established. The G.H.Q., Army and Corps Schools had been established in France 'to assist in the individual training of junior officers and N.C.O.s' The G.H.Q. Schools dealt with special arms or services, for example the Machine Gun School, Anti-Aircraft Gunnery School, and the Physical and Bayonet Training School etc., while Army and Corps Schools had been established to train junior officers and N.C.O.s to become efficient instructors. By December 1916 G.H.Q. Schools included the School of Gunnery and the Senior Officers' School for Battery and Battalion Commanders respectively in the U.K.; the Machine Gun School at Camiers; the Junior and Senior Staff Schools at Hesdin; The R.F.C. School of Aerial Gunnery at Camiers and Carmont; the Cadet School at Blendeceques for commissions from the ranks; the Wireless School at Camagne; 5 Base Training Camps at Etaples (2), Calais, Havre and Rouen; the Machine Gun Base Depot at Camiers; and the Physical and Bayonet Training School. The Five Armies each had Schools for the Infantry, Artillery, Trench Mortars, Sniping, and Signalling, while

108 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 and 20 December 1916, 12, 13, and 14 February 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/14, PRO.
109 Haig, Diary, 23 September 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 22, PRO.
110 Brigadier-General C. Bonham-Carter, Training in France, 8 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69 57 11, IWM.
111 G.H.Q., Summary of Schools of Training for the British Expeditionary Force during Winter 1916-1917, no date [?December 1916], Haig Papers, W.O.256 15, PRO.
Schools for Bombing, Musketry, Mounted Troops and Lewis Gunners were at either Corps or Divisional level.\textsuperscript{112} Army Schools included the Infantry School to train company commanders and N.C.O.s as well as commanding officers, the Trench Mortar School, the Artillery School, the Telescopic Sight School to train battalion sniping officers and N.C.O.s, the Signalling School, and the Musketry Camp while the Corps Schools were the Combined Lewis Gun and Stokes Mortar School and the Signalling School. The Divisional Infantry School was to 'teach junior officers and N.C.O.s to become platoon commanders and platoon sergeants'.\textsuperscript{113} Every battalion was required from 1916 in accordance with G.H.Q.'s instructions to retain a permanent Instructional Staff, which did not go into battle.\textsuperscript{114}

All these problems had a dramatic effect on the British tactical performance. Rather ironically given its poor reputation on the Somme and at Passchendaele, following reforms adopted after the Boer War, the B.E.F. in 1914 was 'the most efficient body of troops that ever took the field' \textsuperscript{115} and impressed by its tactical expertise 'the Germans called the British professional Army "a perfect thing apart"'.\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, General Sir Ivor Maxse claimed that

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\textsuperscript{112} G.H.Q., \textit{Summary of Schools of Training for the British Expeditionary Force during Winter 1916-1917}, no date [?December 1916], Haig Papers, W.O.256 15, PRO.
\textsuperscript{113} Fourth Army: Courses of Instruction During the Winter, 1 November 1916 - 1 April 1917, Fourth Army G.S. 318, 8 January 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{114} G.H.Q., \textit{S.S.152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France}, quoted in Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{115} Major-General Beauvoir de Lisle, \textit{Report on Operations by 29th Division, January 27th, 1917}, 30 January 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{116} Colonel R. Macleod, Memoirs, p.99, Macleod Papers 1/1, LHCMA.
before 1914 'our minor tactics were ahead of both French and German'.

Major-General G.P. Dawnay (M.G.G.S., G.H.Q.) agreed that the British 'were far ahead of the Continental Armies in tactics before the war' and that by 1918 the 'German and French tactics more and more closely follow the principles of our pre-war Field Service Regulations'..

Unsurprisingly, British tactical methods at regimental level quickly deteriorated from the high standards of 1914 as the Regular Army ceased to exist and 'too much attention had been given in training the New Armies to "the bomb and the bayonet", and too little to the use of the rifle'.

One regimental officer noted 'the cult of the bomb was strong during 1916-17' in which 'the men seem to have given up the rifle for those wretched bombs and can think of nothing but the latter when any enemy are about' having the 'tendency to throw a bomb when a rifle could be used with equal, if not greater, effect'. On the Somme 'owing to lack of training in the rifle & an over partiality for bombs' the troops 'could not hit the enemy' at 300 yards, when 'the Archers of Crecy would have made better shooting'. It was very hard to get the men to use their rifles as 'both sides at this period seemed to be

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117 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, Draft No.4 on Reform of Schools in France, [August 1918], Maxse Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
118 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, 27 July 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
119 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoir, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers 111110 6, LHCMA.
120 Major L.H. Cockran to Edmonds, 23 January 1934, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
121 Lieutenant-Colonel T.S. Wollocombe, Diary, p.170, Wollocombe Papers, IWM.
123 Brigadier-General W.D. Croft to Edmonds, 28 November 1929, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
124 Lieutenant-Colonel R. Oakley to Edmonds, 11 August 1935, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
suffering from the bombing mania'. In late 1917 the fact that some troops 'had little skill in the use of their rifles and had inevitably lost confidence' was perceived as 'one of the factors that led to a definite lowering of morale, observed not only by anyone moving about the Army, but reported by censors'. G.H.Q. noted in early 1918 that in the past 'the importance of the bomb' had been 'unduly emphasized at the expense of the rifle and bayonet'.

As the war progressed, the better commanders began to demand musketry practice and slowly British tactical skill began to improve. As early as July 1915 the Third Army stressed that 'all infantry battalions when at rest must be practised for at least ¼ hour daily in rapid loading and in rapid fire' and that 'the use of the rifle from behind all classes of cover with the least possible exposure must form part of the daily routine of training'. In 1915 expecting his battalions to train at musketry for 'at least 2 hours per day' Heneker constructed 'a 50 yards range' for battalions to practice 'rapid fire and fire discipline by sections'. One battalion commander issued an order that 'every man was to fire at least 50 rounds a day when in line' and eventually increased it to 100 rounds.

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126 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.8, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1 and 9/2, CCC.
128 Special Points with regard to the Training of Infantry, Third Army G.192, [July 1915], Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 37, LHCMA.
129 General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 3 and 5 August 1915, Heneker Papers, IWM.
130 Brigadier-General W.D. Croft to Edmonds, 28 November 1929, C.A.B./132, PRO.
noted that on the Somme 'some Brigades have realised that the rifle has been neglected during trench warfare and that more musketry training is required' and 'undoubtedly this period was the turning point' marking 'a return of sane use of weapons and movement'. Training in June 1917 37th Division stressed that 'every effort must be made to raise the standard of musketry training throughout the Division'. In the 9/DLI rifle drill took place not only 'in reserve or out of the line but actually in the line'. By early 1918 the 58th Division carried out musketry training in the trenches every day while in the 42nd Division Sections were 'practised in firing five rounds rapid from their positions at least twice during their tour in the line'. One Brigadier-General expected his men to be able to 'fire 15 aimed rounds a minute'. In early 1918 G.H.Q. emphasised that 'the rifle and bayonet are, and always will be, principal weapons of every infantryman' who were to 'use it freely and confidently to overcome opposition and repel counter-attacks'.

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131 IXth Corps Notes on Information collected from Various Sources including Troops who have been engaged in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
133 Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Dill, Training in the Bomy Area, 37 Division No.G.1475, pp.1-2, 7 June 1917, Dill Papers I/3 2, LHCMA.
134 Colonel W.D.B. Thompson, Biography of Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford, V.C., M.C., p.12, Bradford Papers, IWM.
135 Major-General A. Solly-Flood, 42nd East Lancashire Division, "Go One Better", published by Gale & Polden Ltd, Aldershot, 20 February 1918, Brigadier-General Hon A.M. Henley Papers, IWM.
136 Brigadier-General Hon A.M. Henley, Lecture: February 1918, Henley Papers, IWM.

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This musketry training enabled the infantry to become self-reliant employing their own rifles to fight. Musketry practice 'by day and night' allowed one battalion to repel a heavy German counter-attack at Ypres inflicting 'enormous casualties'.139 The 6/Northumberland Fusiliers in April 1918 employed the rapid musketry of the "Old Contemptibles" in 1914 to drive off the enemy infantry, who came within 40 yards, 'with heavy losses'.140 In a counter-attack in mid-September 1918 'whole platoons of the enemy infantry were simply mown down' by 'first rate troops', who were 'well trained in musketry', and the ground was 'covered with German corpses'.141 This superb musketry can be compared favourably with the German reliance on the machine gun and the grenade and neglect of the rifle even late in the war.142

One complaint was that the troops instead of acquiring the tactical knowledge required in open warfare were 'over trained at Saluting, Close Order Drill in the ranks, Bayonet & P.T. and Bomb throwing' 143 because the infantry 'had so concentrated on bombing & sticking sacks with their bayonets'.144 For example, General Sir William Heneker (8th Division) was 'rather too keen on spit and polish and outward appearance at the expense of efficiency with the

139 Colonel H.D. Buchanan-Dunlop to Captain Cyril Falls, 11 December 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
140 Lieutenant A. Thompson, Statement regarding the circumstances of his capture by the enemy, p.3, Thompson Papers, IWM.
141 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 36, PRO.
142 Brigadier-General Hon A.M. Henley, Diary, 4 September 1918, Henley Papers, IWM.
143 General Sir Julian Byng to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, [July 1918], Maxse Papers 69 57/11, IWM.
144 Colonel H.D. Buchanan-Dunlop to Falls, 11 December 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
weapons with which the men were armed'.\textsuperscript{145} Platoon and section commanders also spent too much time teaching the mechanics of the Lewis Gun so that the 'tactical handling of the gun & dispositons of the teams in action are hardly ever practised'.\textsuperscript{146} There was a tendency 'even at Lewis gun schools to concentrate too much on turning Lewis gunners into skilled armourers, far too much time being spent on teaching stripping and mechanism, and far too little on the tactical handling of the gun'\textsuperscript{147} so that 'they were utterly "fed up" with the war'.\textsuperscript{148}

General Sir Reginald Stephens (5th Division) worried that on the Somme 'our infantry has displayed the most magnificent courage but, I think it is admitted, a want of cunning'.\textsuperscript{149} Major-General H.L. Reed (15th Division) complained that the troops 'suffered from want of knowledge on the part of junior leaders how to advance against M.G.s' and 'how to avoid bunching & crowding & so making the very best target for the boche Machine Gunners'.\textsuperscript{150} In September 1918 Harper (IV Corps) noted that 'in the past the main efforts in training had been directed too much towards the training of the body and too little toward the training of the mind' with an over-emphasis on elementary training such as close order drill rather than on tactical work, training

\textsuperscript{142} Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoir, p.1, Roupell Papers PP/MCR/56 GR5, IWM.
\textsuperscript{143} Major-General G.D. Jeffrey to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 9 September 1918, Maxse Papers 69/53 12, IWM.
\textsuperscript{144} Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{145} Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of An Unconventional Soldier, p.278.
\textsuperscript{146} General Sir Reginald Stephens, Bedfords at Falfamont [1916], p.1, Stephens Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
\textsuperscript{147} Major-General H.L. Reed, V.C., to Maxse, 1 September 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
the men 'to act as individuals with an individual intelligence'.

At the end of the Somme Battle Fourth Army concluded that 'one of the principal lessons of the fighting of the last four months' was 'the need for more tactical training for Company and Platoon Commanders' to give them 'the necessary tactical knowledge and initiative to take advantage of initial success'. As a result in April 1917 the Fourth Army issued a collection of tactical schemes setting realistic exercises for Company, Platoon and Section commanders to discuss, undertake and solve both indoors and outdoors, which was quickly taken up by G.H.Q. and re-issued to the whole Army, and stressing the importance of Corps and Divisional Commanders ensuring that tactical exercises and instruction in billets were carried out during the winter 'to spread this essential knowledge of elementary tactics and the use of ground'.

During operations at Ypres in 1917 Second Army emphasised that it was 'more and more evident that greater stress must be laid on training in open warfare to encourage initiative and power of leading in the ranks of Junior N.C.O.s and Privates, which are so necessary when Officers

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151 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
152 Major-General A.A. Montgomery, M.G.G.S. Fourth Army, to III, XIV, I Anzac, and XV Corps, Fourth Army No. 414(G), 10 November 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 4, LHCMA.
153 Major-General A.A. Montgomery, Notes on Tactical Schemes, Fourth Army No. G.S. 623, 15 April 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
154 S.S.159, Notes on Tactical Schemes Compiled by Fourth Army, G.H.Q. O.B. 1793 35, May 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
155 Major-General A.A. Montgomery, M.G.G.S. Fourth Army, to III, XIV, I Anzac, and XV Corps, Fourth Army No. 414(G), 10 November 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 4, LHCMA.
become casualties'. By the end of the war in November 1918 G.H.Q. was clear that 'the success of an offensive campaign' depended not only on 'the will to go forward' but also 'the skill to go forward', in other words the 'offensive spirit' combined an 'eagerness to fight and the knowledge of how to fight'.

In late 1918 Byng felt that 'by means of experience in this open air warfare - platoon and Co[mm]any commanders are improving in tactics to a very great extent' and that 'our men are fighting better than they have ever done, and are killing more Germans'. Hastings Anderson (M.G.G.S., First Army) also noticed the 'marked improvement in minor tactics' and maintained that 'the proof lies in the reduced casualties with which we have been able to achieve successful results in dealing with the enemy's m.g.s and Rear Guards'. Major-General Sir John Ponsonby (5th Division) commented that 'indeed one of the most gratifying features' of the operations after 21 August 1918 had 'been the way in which young officers of all services have been prepared to assume responsibility and act on their own'. There were also numerous examples of Privates and N.C.O.s taking over command when officer had been killed. This improvement in tactical handling of troops and initiative

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157 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
158 General J.H.G. Byng to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 25 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
159 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 November 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 37, PRO.
160 Major-General W.H. Anderson to Maxse, 14 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69/53/12, IWM.
had been achieved despite the few opportunities for training since the Division had returned from Italy in April 1918.\footnote{5th Division Report on Operations, August 21st - September 4th, pp.6-7 and 15, General Sir John Ponsonby Papers 6306-69-1, NAM.}

How was this improvement achieved? G.H.Q. did not begin to respond to the challenge of training a mass army until late 1916. Henry Wilson, convinced of the importance of 'the education & training of Officers',\footnote{Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 1 January 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.} 'strafed' Kiggell, the C.G.S. at G.H.Q., in March 1916 'about giving us proper teachers for our schools' because 'the present casual arrange[men]ts are disgraceful'.\footnote{Wilson, Diary, 15 March 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.} G.H.Q. did not seem to be concerned with large-scale training ignoring the necessity of sponsoring training schools and the setting up of training schools and the evolution of ideas was left to the ad hoc efforts of senior commanders.\footnote{Wilson Diary, 11 and 28 August, 6 September, 21 October 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM; General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 24 October 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.} One Brigadier-General complained in early 1917 that 'most of what has been done in the training line in France is due more to individual efforts of Army, Corps, Divisions and Brigade commands than to any clear direction' from G.H.Q.\footnote{Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish to General Sir Ivor Maxse, 21/22 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 57 7, IWM.} Prior to 1917 there was little direction of training by Brigade and Divisional Commanders to ensure that 'a uniform system throughout' and, if a battalion was good, it was 'in spite of the Higher Commanders (e.g. Brigade and Divisional) in the Division'.\footnote{Kentish to Maxse, 21 22 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 57 7, IWM.} In December 1916, Haldane noted that 'at
last G.H.Q. had woken up' asking for proposals on the subject of organisation for attack whereas before it had always been the case that 'the initiative comes from below and not from above' because those in command had 'no experience of the fighting at first hand'.

During 1916 'in some units not a single platoon was organised' and many battalions were 'not organised in permanent sections and platoons' so that 'the men do not know to which platoon of section they belong' and subalterns were 'too frequently shifted from platoon to platoon and even from Company to Company'. In January 1917, Montgomery (M.G.G.S., Fourth Army) informed Butler (D.C.G.S., G.H.Q.) that, having 'talked to a great many of our Division and Brigade Commanders', he was 'quite certain that the general feeling in the Army is that G.H.Q. must lay down a definite organization for a platoon, company and battalion, and that they must also lay down a standard form of attack for a platoon, company and battalion'. Cavan (XIV Corps) confirmed that 'any authoritative book of instructions for the training of the Platoon is not only necessary and urgent, but would be heartily welcomed by every Commander to whom I have spoken' and urged that 'no time should be lost in drawing up "Instructions for the

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167 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 9 December 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
168 Precis of the Remarks made by the Army Commander at the Conference held on 27 December 1916, Fifth Army G.A. 68 0/29, 28 December 1916, Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
169 General Sir Ivor Maxse to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 31 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53/7, IWM.
Training of a Platoon for offensive action", as soon as possible'.\textsuperscript{170}

Montgomery also noted that there was no universal doctrine in the British Army unlike the French Army, which was 'months ahead of us in practising these principles' and ensuring that 'exactly the same methods' were universally applied, and 'until you give us some guidance from above we shall be unable to catch them up'. Montgomery thought that there were 'plenty of experienced Divisional Commanders' notably Strickland (1st Division), Deverell (3rd Division), Maxse (18th Division), and Shea (30th Division) 'all of whom have commanded brigades, and two of them battalions, during the war' who could advise G.H.Q. on training.\textsuperscript{171}

A major innovation in early 1917 was the introduction of a training section at G.H.Q. as the result of pressure from the Armies. In early 1917 Brigadier-General A. Solly-Flood, who had been appointed by G.H.Q. to organise instructional classes for Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors in October 1916, was brought to G.H.Q. to inaugurate a Training Directorate for all arms and services in France in order to re-model the battle manuals of the British Army and revise tactical doctrine.\textsuperscript{172} With plenty of front-line experience as commander of 35th Brigade and of training as Commandant of the Third Army Officers' School experimenting in late

\textsuperscript{170} Field-Marshal Earl of Lord Cavan to Fourth Army, 30 January 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.

\textsuperscript{171} Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, 27 January 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.

1916 with new infantry formations,\textsuperscript{173} Solly-Flood was ordered to 'inaugurate a Training Directorate for all arms and services in France' and provide 'for the co-ordination of all training whether carried out under G.H.Q., the Armies, the Corps or the Divisions'.\textsuperscript{174}

As B.G.T., Solly-Flood attempted 'to ensure uniformity in teaching' by 'the issue of pamphlets laying down principles or in reporting lessons learnt during fighting' and by setting up 'in each Army a permanent demonstration platoon to show methods of applying principles of tactics in the best way under various conditions'.\textsuperscript{175} The important reforms carried out by the new training Section at G.H.Q. was the restoration of the platoon organisation as a focus for new tactical change, standardising recent innovation for the Army in manuals such as \textit{S.S.143} and \textit{S.S.144} issued in February 1917.

The experiences on the Somme laid the foundation for what would be the decisive tactical reappraisal in the B.E.F. in the winter of 1916-17 and the tactics, which the British were to employ from the summer of 1917 onwards, had been formulated. \textit{S.S.143} made official the new doctrine, which combined the weapons adopted by the infantry since 1914 into a self-contained unit capable of training and fighting on its own.\textsuperscript{176} Hitherto the only manual available

\textsuperscript{174} Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish to General Sir Ivor Maxse, 21 22 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 57/7, IWM.
\textsuperscript{175} General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.7, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
to Platoon commanders had been 'Infantry Training', which had been written pre-war and pre-trench warfare. S.S.143 was a vital milestone in tactics, making a changeover from the Victorian era of riflemen in lines to the twentieth century era of flexible small groups built around a variety of weapons. The new edition of S.S.143 issued in February 1918 was to be 'the manual upon which the victories of 1918 were won by the British and American Armies'.

From 1916 onwards G.H.Q. issued a large number of publications which, being regularly updated, were designed to aid the training of formations and units, notably on artillery in offensive operations (S.S.98); co-operation of aircraft with artillery (S.S.131); the training and employment of Divisions for offensive action employing the various combined arms (S.S.135); recreational training (S.S.137); the training and tactics employed by the infantry (S.S.143); communications (S.S.148); Instructions for training within Schools at G.H.Q., Army, and Corps level (S.S.152); Tactical Schemes to train junior officers and N.C.O.s (S.S.159); the use of smoke (S.S.175); infantry and tank co-operation and training (S.S.204); and tank co-operation with other arms (S.S.214). Another series of pamphlets entitled The Experiences of Recent Fighting, such as S.S.111 (on gas), S.S.119 (on the Somme), S.S.158, 160-

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177 Siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, pp.186-187.
178 G.H.Q., S.S.143, The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, February 1918, Maxse Papers, IWM.
179 Lord Gorell, One Man ... Many Parts, p.204.
161 (on the battles which took place in the spring of 1917), S.S.170-174 (on Messines), and S.S.218 (on Hamel 1918) disseminating the lessons learnt in the battles of 1916-18. By the beginning of 1918 it cannot be said that G.H.Q. failed to provide guidance because 'the principal S.S. publications to which Infantry Commanders should turn to for further information on the various branches of infantry tactics and organisations' included manuals on a multiplicity of technical and training matters.181

Yet it was felt by mid-1918 that 'the progress in obtaining uniformity of training was not rapid enough' and that the appointment of a general of high rank was required 'to compel Army and Corps Schools to adopt similar methods'.182 Uniacke, Deputy Inspector General of Training from July 1918, observed that the Training Branch at G.H.Q. had 'generally neglected the somewhat important matter of instruction' and 'still more the question as to whether instruction once given was ever properly applied'.183 Montgomery (M.G.G.S., Fourth Army) admitted in November 1918 that, although the 'system which has been evolved during the last three years' worked 'very well indeed in two out of the five Armies', in the other three armies the system had not worked so well because 'people have not done their job and

182 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.24, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
183 Major-General H.C.C. Uniacke to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 30 June 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53/10, IWM.
have not taken sufficient interest in the show'.

Dawnay (M.G.G.S., Staff Duties) argued that the German success in the Spring of 1918 'proved, above all things, the necessity for thorough training on the recognised tactical principles' and that, because 'there is no doubt that our own troops suffered from lack of sufficient training', it was 'a matter of the highest urgency to take steps to improve the efficiency of training throughout the Armies in France'. Therefore, since the great administrative burden on the Training sub-section at G.H.Q. made the installation of some further machinery was 'very necessary', Haig established an Inspectorate of Training to supervise training throughout the Armies in France and to ensure that the British Armies in France had 'adequate machinery to assist in bringing the training to a high pitch'.

Maxse, an excellent trainer of troops, was appointed Inspector-General of Training 'to assist the troops and their commanders' to train the Armies in France and 'if possible to help in co-ordinating the training in England and France' and was 'empowered to visit any formation, unit

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184 Major-General Sir A.A. Montgomery to [Major-General G.P. Dawnay], Fourth Army, 2 November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
185 Major-General G.P. Dawnay, M.G.G.S. (Staff Duties) G.H.Q., to the Director of Military Operations, War Office, G.H.Q. O.B./2266, 8 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
186 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to The Secretary, the War Office, G.H.Q. O.B./2255, 16 June 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
187 Major-General G.P. Dawnay, M.G.G.S. (Staff Duties) G.H.Q., to the Director of Staff Duties, War Office, G.H.Q. O.B. 2266, 9 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
or training establishment' at 24 hours. Organised to 'interpret G.H.Q. doctrine as regards training and inculcate uniformity throughout the British Forces', Maxse and his staff were to 'devote their energies to assisting Army and subordinate Commanders to improve the standard of training in all arms of the service'. When an Assistant Inspector of Training (Major-General Lord Dugan) recommended the sacking of the Commandant and Chief Instructor of the X Corps School because they lacked drive and were too old, Maxse was able to appeal to the C.G.S. (Lawrence) to ensure their removal despite the opposition of the Corps commander (Stephens).

The appointment of Maxse as Inspector-General of Training in 'revolutionising the whole of the training arrangements', was intended by Dawnay to produce 'a renaissance in tactics' and a return to the 'old pre-war principles', providing the bureaucratic machinery capable of producing uniform organisation and doctrine, which was such a feature of the German Army. This was seen by Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps) as 'one of the finest moves we made for the improvement of our Army' and by Hastings Anderson

189 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, Inspector General's Conferences, July - August 1918, Maxse Papers, 69/53 12, IWM.
190 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, Record of a Conference of Army Commanders held at HESDIN on Friday, 5th July, 1918, O.A.D.291 34 2, 5 July 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/33, PRO.
191 Major-General Lord Dugan, Visit to Xth Corps School, 28 August 1918; General Sir Ivor Maxse to General Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, 29 August 1918; General Sir Reginald Stephens to Lieutenant-Colonel J.C.H. Hamilton, 25 September 1918, Stephens Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
192 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 14 June 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21/3, IWM.
193 Dawnay to his wife, 17 September 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
194 Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 18 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
(M.G.G.S., First Army) as providing 'the benefit of uniform organisation in the battalion and training'.

It has been that Maxse, as Inspector General of Training, 'radically recast the tactical doctrine on lines that followed but improved on the new German tactics'. It is doubtful, however, that there was enough time to make a radical difference in the short time between Maxse’s appointment in July 1918 and the beginning of the British counter-stroke on 8 August 1918. For progressive commanders little that Maxse taught was radically innovative. For example, having spent all day at a 'demonstration & lecture' by Maxse, Strickland (1st Division) saw 'nothing new in it'. Maxse’s main impact was as a conduit throughout the army for a more systematic dissemination of tactical doctrine, which had been developed in 1916-17. Solly-Flood had 'introduced many drastic changes in Training & in methods of attack & defence' and later claimed that 'Maxse got all the kudos & all the rewards, but it was not he who did the work'.

Solly-Flood had a point. The assumption that the Army lacked any structure for training the New Armies in France and suffered from an anarchy in training doctrine until mid-1918 ignores the fact that a large number of training schools were already established within the B.E.F. and that

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195 Major-General W.H. Anderson to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 14 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53/12, IWM.
196 Sir Basil Liddell Hart to Captain G.C. Wynne, 17 June 1958, Wynne Papers, LHCMA.
197 General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 16 August 1918, Strickland Papers P.362, IWM.
198 Major-General Arthur Solly-Flood to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 26 November 1930, CAB 45 137, PRO.
a Directorate of Training had been in existence since early 1917, producing manuals and pamphlets and making a very significant contribution to victory. The increasingly skilled performance of the British on the battlefields of 1917 and 1918 rested on the training which began in some cases as early as 1915 but in all cases began in real earnest in late 1916 or early 1917, when the British Army began to concentrate much more on training after the jolt of the Somme in 1916. Thereafter, there was much more emphasis on training as the war progressed and generals realised its overwhelming importance.

The phenomenon of a collapse in tactical expertise is often ignored in assessing the achievements of the British Army during the First World War. It is perhaps no small coincidence that it was not until late 1917, three years after the beginning of the war that the British were able to be on equal terms with the Germans and a similar length of time was to pass until the Battle of Alamein in 1942 when the British were to find a winning formula in the Second World War. A new British Army rose swiftly out of the blood and mud of the Somme campaign. The events of 1917 provided the British commanders with further battle experience and, sound tactical theory aside, it was training within the schools system, which ensured the battlefield efficiency and tactical success of the British Army during 1917-18.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Tactical Innovation

The First World War was shaped by dramatic developments in communications, transportation, and weapons technology and by the impact of that new technology upon tactics. The war on the Western Front, often portrayed as a mindless slugging match, was actually surprisingly dynamic at the tactical level. The failure to conduct significant manoeuvre at the tactical level was the root cause of the inability of armies to achieve strategic success during the First World War. Successful operational manoeuvre depended directly on success at the tactical level, specifically conduct of tactical manoeuvre. Much of the war was spent searching for the means to restore mobility to the battlefield and to smash the enemy's ever-more complex defences.

The British faced the problem of how to break down the German defensive system. This tactical problem was defined by one regimental officer, who had served on the Western Front, as 'how to surprise, overrun, and penetrate a well-sited defence system some four miles deep, the front edge of which was only a short distance from one's own, protected by massive wire entanglements and covered by the flanking fire of machine-guns and a wall of fire from artillery and
mortars of all calibres sited in depth'.\textsuperscript{1} Robertson (C.G.S., G.H.Q.), outlining the British difficulties during the war, noted in 1915 that 'these Germans are dug in up to the neck, or concreted' in 'one vast fortress, without any of the disadvantages attaching to it' so that 'attack on a narrow front & we are enfiladed at once' while an 'attack on a wide front is impossible because of insufficient ammunition to bombard and break down the defences'.\textsuperscript{2}

As early as September 1914 the 4th Division noted that 'the Germans handle their machine guns very skilfully'.\textsuperscript{3} German machine guns were 'most admirably handled' and 'most difficult to discover' causing 'more than half' of the British casualties at Neuve Chapelle.\textsuperscript{4} Early in the war the British 'had not been able to find a satisfactory antedote' to machine-guns \textsuperscript{5} but commanders, such as Rawlinson, were confident that if they could 'only find a way of silencing these weapons' their task 'would be easy for their infantry are poor creatures, mostly Landstrum'.\textsuperscript{6} The British had to slowly and painfully learn the best ways of overcoming what one staff officer called 'our arch enemies'.\textsuperscript{7}

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\textsuperscript{1} Major-General R.C. Money quoted by Major-General E.K.G. Sixsmith, \textit{British Generalship in the Twentieth Century}, p.157.
\textsuperscript{2} Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 20 June 1915, Kiggell Papers IV/1, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{3} Brigadier-General J.A.L. Haldane, 10th Brigade, to 4th Division, 26 September 1914, and 4th Division G.100 to III Corps, Suggestions for Short Instructions for Benefit of Formations and Individuals arriving in the Theatre of War based on the Experience gained in the Campaign, 28 September 1914, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 32, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{4} General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 23 March 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 17, PRO 30 57.
\textsuperscript{5} Rawlinson to Kitchener, 23 March 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 17, PRO 30 57.
\textsuperscript{6} Rawlinson to Kitchener, 5 June 1915, Kitchener Papers WB/22, PRO 30 57.
\textsuperscript{7} General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 30 April 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
By the end of 1916, it was recognised that 'what have most impeded our advance during the recent fighting on the SOMME have been machine guns manned by alert and determined men, firing from shell holes and other positions which cannot be identified, behind, and well clear of, the enemy trenches'. The Fourth Army concluded from the fighting of 1915-16 that 'the chief danger the infantry have to face is the machine gun' which to avoid the creeping barrage on the front and support trenches were now 'placed several hundreds of yards behind the enemy's front line' and 'difficult, if not impossible, to locate before the attack commences', being 'hidden, not in substantial emplacements, but in grass, hedges, shell holes etc, where they are difficult to locate, and so destroy'.

Once the infantry got beyond the carefully prepared artillery support, they were unable to exploit the initial success beyond the village of Neuve Chapelle to seize the Aubers Ridge. As Haig's Artillery Adviser at First Army reported after the battle, the failure of the infantry to advance beyond Neuve Chapelle was not the result of a lack of determination but the result of the failure of the artillery to keep up with the infantry after the initial bombardment and to the strength of the German machine gun

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8 Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston to Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, 29 October 1916, Butler Papers 69 10/1, IWM.
9 Notes on the Lessons of the Operations on the Somme as regards Infantry Attack formations and the Employment of Specialists, Fourth Army No. G.S. 360, 1 December 1916, Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
10 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to XIII, XV and IX Corps, Fourth Army No. 264(G), 20 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 16, LHCMA.
defences which were in depth behind their front line system. The attempt to rush through the German defences, well entrenched and secured by machine-guns, failed because the strong-points or hinges, which had to be lifted before the defensive system could be toppled, remained intact.

In the most disastrous attempt to smash through the German defences on 1 July 1916, the infantry advanced 'to the attack in dense lines, almost shoulder to shoulder', casting aside all previous training based on fire and movement. The lessons of the pre-war "fire with movement" training, which emphasized that 'no movement towards the enemy can take place, in modern warfare, unless the advancing troops are covered by fire', were ignored and resulted in heavy casualties.

Major-General R. Wanless O'Gowan thought that 'G.H.Q. did not quite trust the training of the Infantry' and was told by Sir Henry Rawlinson just before 1st July that 'the attack must be made in waves with men at fairly close intervals in order to give them confidence; this was wrong & entailed heavy casualties; the men would have done better in small groups & were quite well enough trained to adopt that formation' as the 31st Division had done 'quite a lot of musketry' and 'the results, although they did not come up to the Old Army, were

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11 M.G.R.A., First Army, Control of Fire during the Operations 10-16 March, 1915, undated, W.O.95/154, PRO.
12 Lieutenant-Colonel G.C.W. Gordon-Hall to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 October 1934, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
13 Major O.M.T. Frost to Edmonds, 5 July 1930, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
not at all bad, especially in rapid firing'. This lesson had to be relearnt during 1916-17.

The improvement in British tactical skill and the ability to penetrate the German defences in 1917 and 1918 was the result of the adoption of a platoon organisation, which gave the infantry its own weapons and emphasised a return to fire and movement recommended by innovative divisional commanders, such as Deverell (3rd Division), Stephens (5th Division), and Maxse (18th Division), during 1916. In September 1916, Stephens advocated a new platoon organisation of two rifle sections, including rifle grenadiers, a bomber section and a Lewis Gun section to replace the platoon of four rifle sections, which had been employed on the Somme. Shea (30th Division) summed up the main lesson of the fighting on the Somme as being that 'the platoon will be the "fighting unit" and will be self-contained' and that 'the object of this organisation and training is to develop the use of all weapons in combination' with each platoon having Lewis Gunners, Bombers, Rifle-grenadiers ('its own "infantry artillery"'), and riflemen so as 'to exploit to the full and in combination all weapons, thus giving greater power of offence while if possible employing fewer men'.

The new self-contained platoon was designed to exploit the increased fire-power given to the infantry by the rifle

14 Major-General R. Wanless O'Gowan to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
15 General Sir Reginald Stephens, 'Lessons from the recent offensive Operations', c. September 1916, p.6, Stephens Papers 69 70 1, IWM.
16 General Sir John Shea to Major-General Lord Loch, 8 December 1916, Loch Papers 71 12 5, IWM.
grenade and the Lewis Gun, which was 'a very valuable addition to the fire power of a unit, especially in the attack',\textsuperscript{17} to deal with enemy strongpoints and enable the infantry to fight its own way forward. In February 1917 G.H.Q. laid down the organisation of the Battalion constructed around a platoon of 1 Lewis Gun Section, 1 Bombing Section and 2 Sections of Riflemen, as the 'unit for fighting and training' containing 'all the weapons with which the Infantry is now armed',\textsuperscript{18} and provided guidance on formations for the infantry in assaults which had 'frequently been employed with success in recent fighting' and which were to 'be adopted throughout all Armies in France'.\textsuperscript{19}

Within each platoon, the rifle-grenadiers were intended to form half of the covering fire team, together with the Lewis gun, while the assault team was made up of the hand-grenade section and the rifle section. By the summer of 1917 the platoon, considered 'the principal unit of the Army', was 'self-contained' and 'an army in miniature' with its own fire support with 'the Lewis guns supplying covering machine gun fire; the rifle grenadiers acting as artillery; and the riflemen making the infantry assault'.\textsuperscript{20} One Divisional Commander noted that 'too much attention cannot, 

\textsuperscript{17} Field-Marshal Sir John French to Field-Marshar Lord Kitchener, 8 August 1915, Kitchener Papers WA/118, PRO 30 57.
\textsuperscript{18} Organization of the Infantry Battalion, G.H.Q. O.B.1919, 7 February 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{19} Lieutenant-General L.E. Kiggell, The Normal Formation for the Attack, outlining the principles to be adopted throughout all Armies in France, G.H.Q. O.B.1919/T, 14 February 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
in my opinion, be devoted to training platoon and section commanders in the co-operation of Lewis Guns, grenades and rifle grenades for dealing with the hostile resistance'. Abandoning the "bomb", infantry tactics from 1917 depended on the rifleman and the Lewis gun working in combination and the German machine guns ceased to intimidate.

S.S.143 recommended that the different weapons of the four sections should be used in conjunction with riflemen and bombers advancing on a flank while the Lewis gunners gave covering fire and rifle bombers opened up 'a hurricane bombardment on the point of resistance'. An attack by the 1st Borders in January 1917 demonstrated such tactics. Establishing a barrage of rifle grenades from the front, Corporal Robins 'on his own initiative (but in accordance with previous training) moved round' the flank of the German strong point and brought 'his Lewis Gun into action enfilading the rear trench' in order to cut off and force the surrender of three German machine guns. The capture of Quarry Post by a company of the 5/Royal Berkshires (35th Brigade, 12th Division) during the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917 'was an example of skilful use of all the infantry weapons of the period, a barrage of Stokes Mortars and rifle grenades smothering the fire of defenders'.
By late 1918 the principles of fire and movement were
was recognised as the 'bedrock of infantry tactics' with the
Lewis Gun section providing the 'fire' and the rifle section
the 'movement', with each platoon divided into two rifle and
two Lewis Gun sections. The Training Leaflet No.4 issued
by I.G.T. in October 1918 gave six drill formations for
company and platoon commanders to train the two rifle and
two Lewis gun sections of platoons in fire and movement.
G.H.Q. also stressed that Lewis gunners as 'the framework of
the infantry advance' were to 'be trained to push well
forward with the leading riflemen' and that 'every effort
must be made to teach them how to use ground and take
advantage of cover'.

The years 1917-18 saw a new flexibility in British
attack formations as 'the infantry radically altered their
tactics', in which 'two lines of skirmishers acted as an
advanced-guard; loose groups followed, ready to manoeuvre
against strong points'. As early as July 1916 30th
Division noted that the 'best formation in which to advance'
was within 'small handy columns'. XIII Corps emphasised
that 'small columns must be ready at once to manoeuvre round
and attack in flank and rear any parties of the enemy or

25 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, I.G.T., to General Sir Herbert Lawrence, C.G.S., G.H.Q., 12 August
1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
26 Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.4, Training Leaflets,
September 1918 - February 1919, Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
27 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.5, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers
92, LHCMA.
28 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.183, Anstey Papers, RAI.
29 Lieutenant-Colonel W.F. Weber, 30 Division G.902, 15 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers
47, LHCMA.
strong points which hold up the waves in front'. In 1917 XVIII Corps advocated 'a more elastic infantry formation for the attack' employing platoons 'working in depth rather than battalions stereotyped in waves' so that behind the initial assault wave "worms" of 'little columns of units in depth' were ready to "stalk" the enemy 'on a narrow front close to the barrage'. The Second Army noted that 'the waves of attacks' employed at Ypres in late 1917 did 'not give sufficient elasticity' to counter the new conditions being experienced and abandoning linear formations advocated that the troops 'should move in small columns in file, the formation which the nature of the ground forces the men to adopt eventually'.

Copying German infiltration tactics used at Arras, Ypres and Cambrai in 1917 the 4th Seaforth Highlanders developed 'the "Dribbling" method of attack in which, 'instead of advancing in waves parallel to the objective', the attacking troops were 'deployed in sectional columns in single file' and "dribbled" forward in small numbers until close enough to their objective to launch the final assault'. The troops then advanced 'irregularly by short rushes' while others provided covering fire 'to pick off enemy machine gunners, and, by keeping up an accurate and deliberate fire' kept the enemy's heads down. Such methods

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30 XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.5, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
31 XVIII Corps No. G.S.70, 21 August 1917, Maxse Papers, IWM.
were designed 'to reduce casualties' by limiting 'the targets presented to hostile machine guns'. By early 1918 the platoon attacked with either one section thrown out as skirmishers and three sections advancing behind in single file or "worms" or each section advancing in single file preceded by its two scouts.

By late 1917 it was expected that 'one or two determined men' should be able to clear 'a fortified shell-hole' with the bayonet and four men could 'take a "Pill box" by fire and movement'. By August 1918 Maxse's I.G.T. staff believed that '3 men can be a fighting unit' capable 'of "stalking" a hostile light machine gun' by fire and movement. Harper (IV Corps) advocated that platoons should first 'locate the machine guns by means of patrols' and then 'stalk them, under cover of Lewis gun and rifle fire, until within close enough range to hit the team or the gun with the bullet or rifle grenade'.

Above all, frontal attacks were to be resisted. Acknowledging that the temptation for officers who saw an attack fail was to 'pour in more men is very great', Stephens encouraged platoon and section leaders in 1916 to

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34 4th Seaforth Highlanders, The Counter-Stroke: A Proposed Method of Assembly and Assault, [1917], Maxse Papers 69 53 10, IWM.
35 See Plate IA and Plate IB from S.S.143, The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B./1919T, February 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
36 Some Notes Made by a Battalion Commander after our Successful Attack on Wurst Farm Ridge on 20th September 1917, no date, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
37 Brigadier-General W. Dugan, Some Points brought out during a visit to 31st Division on 29-8-18, 29 August 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
38 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
think 'of a way to get round the flanks'.

The experiences of Divisions on the Somme showed that rather than reinforcing troops held up by 'carefully entrenched positions with well concealed M.G. emplacements', which was 'usually inadvisable', it was better to aid the progress of their neighbours 'by acting offensively and aggressively against the flank of the enemy who is holding them up'.

XIII Corps noted that 'all ranks' must have the idea of outflanking enemy resistance 'so thoroughly ingrained in them that they will be ready to press on to their own objective irrespective of what occurs on their right or left'.

Stephens stressed in the training of the troops that that 'any enemy resistance that is left must be overcome by their own weapons'. The infantry were not to rely on the artillery or tanks but were to employ fire and movement at the platoon level to reach their objectives, making intelligent use of the fire-power of the bomb, rifle grenade, rifle and Lewis gun to overcome opposition. One Divisional Commander in October 1917 commented that 'the French method of capturing strong points by working round them with Lewis Guns, which had been frequently practised in training, 'proved most successful'. If held up by

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39 Major-General R.B. Stephens, Lessons from the recent offensive Operations [1916], p.5, Stephens Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
40 Major-General W.T. Furse to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 9th Division, 26 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
41 XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.5, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
42 Major-General R.B. Stephens, [Bedfords at Faltermount 1916], p.2, Stephens Papers 69 70 1, IWM.
43 Major-General R.B. Stephens, Points from the late Operation [October 1917], p.8, Stephens Papers 69 70 1, IWM.
opposition, platoons were expected under the new doctrine to 'obtain superiority of fire and envelope one or both flanks' and also to help neighbouring units which were held up by employing fire and movement tactics.  

Experiences at Ypres confirmed that German strong points were 'inclined to surrender when the attacking parties begin to work round towards the rear of the buildings' and that once attacking troops can outflank a fortified position the defence cracks up at once'. Cator (58th Division) emphasised in September 1917 that the 'flank attack should be frequently employed in preference to the straight-forward frontal attack from one line to another' because 'it takes the enemy by surprise, strikes at his weakest point, his flank, and affects the morale of his troops, who do not put up such a strong resistance as when frontally attacked'. It was important that during training flanking manoeuvres 'should be thoroughly drilled into the men so that on meeting with a point of resistance it becomes a second nature to engage it from the front by fire with a portion of the party told off for its capture, while the remainder work round its flanks and behind it'. XVIII Corps concluded that 'surprise is to be the first and chief consideration and all concerned should be reminded that the

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45 Major-General H.R. Davies to Maxse (XVII Corps), Narrative of Operations, 8-30 August 1917, 11 Division No. G.S. 640, 5 September 1917, p.21, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8, IWM.
46 Some Notes Made by a Battalion Commander after our Successful Attack on Wurst Farm Ridge on 20th September, 1917, no date, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
Germans put their hands up directly they are attacked from their rear', stressing that 'surprise is essential to success'.

By late 1918 tactical doctrine emphasised pressing forward boldly without worrying about the flanks, and on bypassing the enemy's defences to maintain the momentum of the advance. As one division noted, failure to adhere to 'the principle of Infiltration' could mean that 'the whole advance of a Brigade' was stopped 'because one or two patrols have met with resistance'. Subordinate units were reminded that 'where one part of the line is held up, troops on the right and left should move on, and those points, where resistance is least or non-existent, should be used as means of filtering through supporting or strengthening forces'.

IV Corps stressed 'the advantages of being able to manoeuvre reserve platoons into positions from which they can surprise the enemy from a flank' and the importance of mutual support, where neighbouring units held up by pockets of the enemy holding out would be assisted by a flank attack to clear such resistance. Platoons were to capture their objectives, not stopping until organised resistance was met, regardless of their flanks and 'if one of the leading platoons is definitely held up, and the other is still

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48 Major H.E. Franklyn to 51st and 58th Divisions, XVIII Corps No. G.S.66 114, 28 August 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
49 Lieutenant-Colonel W.S. Whetherby, 61st Division G.C.40 28, 2 September 1918, Maxse Papers 69/53/12, IWM.
50 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, *Guiding Principles in Tactics and Training for Platoon and Section Commanders*, IV Corps, 23 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53/12, IWM.
making ground, the supporting platoons drive home the attack of the latter' in order to 'make a gap through which the supporting companies can penetrate'.

By the end of the war G.H.Q. emphasised that 'the idea must not be allowed to gain ground, however, that an offensive is impossible under any conditions without a barrage of great density or without the co-operation of tanks' and asserted that 'the infantry must never for a moment be permitted to consider that it merely exists to follow up an artillery barrage or to accompany a "tank battle"' but was adamant that 'the infantry must always be prepared to fight its way forward by means of its own weapons, making use of all cover available to facilitate its advance'. The successful conduct of a battle depended upon the rapidity with which local successes was gained and exploited and attacks were to be 'pushed to the fullest extent possible' allowing an 'initial success' to be 'exploited at once by the bold and rapid intervention of all available troops' taking every advantage of the enemy's disorganisation' by pressing the attack 'relentlessly at points where the enemy's resistance is weak' and employing reserves 'where progress is being made and not in places where the attack has been checked'.

Where an attack has completely failed' the assault 'should generally not be renewed until the defence has been shaken by further

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51 Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.4, Training Leaflets, September 1918 - February 1919, Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
52 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, pp.8-9 and 20-23, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
bombardment, by the infantry fire fight, by the bringing up of additional means of assistance to the infantry (e.g. tanks), or by an enveloping movement.

By October and November 1918 the staff of the I.G.T. were promulgating 'the system of exploiting the "soft spot"' at battalion level in which it was emphasised that 'the enemy's defences will not be equally strong along the whole front' and that it was the task of platoons to 'find, penetrate and exploit' these "soft spots". Leading platoons were to push 'boldly forward regardless of open flanks' with the object of bypassing 'organized resistance' to exploit gaps in the enemy's defences and to outflank strong-points and machine guns. This required initiative, determination, skilful leadership and, above all, co-operation between well-trained sections 'all steeped in the same doctrine and working to one plan'. The 38th Division in the crossing of the River Selle in October 1918 employed these "soft spot" tactics.

When open warfare returned in the final advance of 1918, it became even more important 'not to push frontally against his Machine Guns, but always to try to turn a flank'. Any platoon, which was held up, was not

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53 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.8, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
54 Brigadier-General W. Dugan, Notes on a Visit to II American Corps, 10 November 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
55 Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.13, Training Leaflets, September 1918 - February 1919, Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
57 Major-General R.B. Stephens, Lecture [September 1918], Stephens Papers 69 70/1, IWM.
reinforced but was to provide covering fire. At battalion level it was made clear that a supporting company 'does not reinforce a company which is definitely held up, it supports the company that is making progress' and that platoons were to be detached 'to attack in flank the enemy who are holding up neighbouring units'. The weaknesses and holes in the enemy defences were to be exploited rather than reinforcing previous failures. In November 1918, Braithwaite's IX Crops 'forced the passage of the [Sambre] Canal at two points' while putting down 'a barrage of smoke and gas on the rest of the front' and then by 'striking outwards, the defenders of the Canal were captured from the rear' by an attack which was 'a complete surprise'.

The Army could not just depend on superior infantry tactics to win the war but had to develop the means of either destroying or neutralising the enemy's defences - the obstacles to a successful advance by the infantry. The British spent 1915-17 searching for fire-power to support the infantry's advance and the "weapons system" to unlock the formidable defences on the Somme and at Passchendaele. In early April 1917 one corps commander noted that the key to success was a combined operation by the different arms because 'our present troops, excellent as they are for a

58 Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No 4, Training Leaflets, September 1918 - February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
59 Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No 4, Training Leaflets, September 1918 - February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
60 General W.R. Birdwood to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 30 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
61 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 November 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/37, PRO.
regular attack on trenches, are not to be relied on when anything like open warfare supervenes' and 'they can only go forward safely covered by an artillery barrage and if possible with the assistance of tanks' since 'Machine guns are the weapons that trouble most when open warfare comes' and 'with the present army, tanks, smoke and gas shell are needful to neutralize them'.

By the end of 1917 by developing along several learning curves the British evolved tactics, which employed combined arms to overcome the German defences. For example, the capture of the Westhoek Ridge by the 74th Infantry Brigade on 10 August 1917 took place under an artillery barrage supported by 36 machine guns with the infantry surrounding and capturing any strong points holding up the advance while the inevitable German counter-attacks 'were annihilated by our artillery and machine gun fire'. Employing a skilful combination of overwhelming firepower and new infantry tactics the British sought to undermine the German defence in depth and return some mobility to the battlefield.

The successful advance by the 51st Division of 1,000 yards towards Poelcappelle in September 1917, stressed 'the success of the methods employed to overcome the system of defence in depth by concrete "pill-boxes" and shell-hole posts' including incessant use of the rifle by the infantry, barrages by the artillery both to support the infantry and

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62 General Sir Aylmer Haldane to Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, 16 April 1917, Spears Papers 2 2, LHCMA.
63 Operations 10th, 11th August, 1917, 74th Infantry Brigade, [August 1917], Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
to neutralise the defences and counter-attacks, a barrage by thirty-two machine guns, and the employment of twelve tanks. Aircraft and tanks (new weapons developed during the war) formed with the artillery and infantry (the traditional arms) an all-arms team, which returned mobility to the battlefield.

Gradually different weapons coalesced into one weapons system in which co-operation between arms provided the solution to breaking through the German defences. Harper (51st Division) concluded that 'it is now proved that we can blow the Boches out of any line & then hold it against counter attacks'. In 1917 generals like Plumer showed at Messines 'by use of siege methods' and at Broodseinde 'by attacking on a narrow front with a thousand yards' deep barrage, that a breach could be made, employing the arms in combination.

By early 1918 this team-work was well-established and the British sought 'to establish a mastery over the enemy's aircraft and artillery' and 'to protect the advance of our infantry against rifle and machine gun fire by a moving barrage of artillery and machine gun fire carefully organised in depth'. Tanks were seen as one way 'to make up to a certain extent for the lack of training on the part of our troops, i.e. a poorly trained Division with Tanks

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64 Major-General G.M. Harper to Maxse (XVIII Corps), Report on the Advance towards Poelcappelle by the 51st (Highland) Division, 20 September 1917, undated, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8, IWM.
65 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 28 September 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
66 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers III/10 6, LHCMA.
will achieve what it would take a very highly trained Division to do without tanks'. The operations of the 5th Division with the Third Army on 21 - 23 August 1918 provide an example in which the infantry, artillery and tanks worked in combination to overcome the German defences, notably the German wire and machine guns, relying on the initiative of junior officers to overcome difficulties and exploit opportunities to advance or to aid the advance of others.

Artillery, machine-guns, riflemen, and tanks had become the four elements of an offensive team, which were an essential part of any successful attack. The British high command believed that success could only result from the co-operation of all arms. By November 1918, G.H.Q. outlined the now standard doctrine that the 'infantry must be practised in co-operation with the artillery, trench mortars, tanks, machine guns, and combat patrol aeroplanes, which accompany them in attack'. When all these newly developed weapons began to work as a team as they did from 1917, the Germans were unable to find an answer to the sheer power of the British assault. During the advance after September 1918 'the thickest barbed wire entanglements were crossed, and the enemy seemed either disinclined or else incapable of stopping us when we attacked under a barrage'.

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68 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, Memo., III Corps, 24 May 1918, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
69 5th Division Report on Operations, August 21st - September 4th, pp.1-7, General Sir John Ponsonby Papers 6306-69-1, NAM.
70 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.5, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
71 Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter X, p.14, C.A.B.45 208, PRO.
The British began to develop use of machine guns en masse to provide covering fire for their infantry as one solution to the enemy's own machine guns. Machine-guns were employed from the Somme in 1916 onwards 'for overhead fire to cover advancing infantry, for establishing barrages against counter-attacks and for holding in advance of captured trenches to cover consolidation' and to provide 'a machine gun barrage for a depth of 1,000 yards' freeing the infantry to deal with the enemy infantry. Following the experiences of the Fourth Army in the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line, G.H.Q. noted in April 1917 that 'the value of machine guns in covering the advance of troops with enfilade, oblique, or overhead fire was most marked' especially when employed 'well forward'.

By August 1917 the British were 'well ahead of the enemy' in the use of 'barrages and covering fire, offensive and defensive, by massed machine guns' which had 'been brought to a high pitch of perfection' and could 'afford very great assistance to an attack' and 'render counter-attacks almost, if not quite, impossible'. During the Third Battle of Ypres Machine Gun barrages were employed in both the offensive, covering 'the advance of the infantry to each objective by searching the ground about 400 yards in front of the Artillery barrage', and the defensive, placing

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72 IXth Corps Notes on Information collected from various Sources including troops who have been engaged in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.

73 S.S.136, Notes on Recent Operations Compiled by G.S. Fourth Army, G.H.Q. O.B. 1782 A, April 1917, p.6, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 51, LHCMA.

74 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the five Army Commanders, O.B. 2089, 7 August 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
'a protective barrage about 400 yards' in front of the objective while it was being consolidated." By 1918 the main employment of machine guns 'to provide covering fire for the attacking infantry' and 'to assist in the defence of the position won and to repel counter-attacks', as well as 'to inflicting losses on the enemy and to reducing his morale' with harassing fire by day and night, was well-established."

Crucial to success was the development of artillery. By 1917 the British held 'the view that ground is gained by the artillery, that ground is defended by artillery, that battles are won by artillery and that battles are lost by lack of artillery'. Against a strong enemy with interlocking defences there could be no hope of infiltration tactics without a devastating avalanche of shells to shatter the cement holding the corner stones of the defences together. Fourth Army noted the importance of artillery to the success of operations following its experiences on the Somme, contrasting the successes on 14 and 27 July, notably when the capture of Delville Wood 'was rendered a certainty by the enormous concentration of guns - 1 Gun to three yards - the Infantry assaulting under a barrage fired from over 200 Field Guns on a comparatively narrow front', with the failures to take Guillemont because of 'the difficulties of

75 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 69, 12 August 1917, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8A, IWM.
77 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 69, 12 August 1917, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8A, IWM.
concentrating artillery fire'. By 1918 'an effective 18-pdr. barrage' was considered to consist of one gun per 20 yards against defensive lines with dugouts and one gun to 15 yards against shell-hole positions.

When criticising generals for employing long artillery bombardments to soften up the German defences, which put the enemy on full alert, it is often forgotten that the technology for predicted fire was first employed at Cambrai in November 1917. From 1915 wire obstacles posed a difficult dilemma because 'to "strafe" it with artillery' simply led the Germans to expect an attack while if left uncut it was difficult for the assaulting troops to enter the enemy's trenches. These problems were not solved until 1917 by the development of new technology and artillery tactics as one important ingredient in the formula of success in 1918. By the end of 1915 British hopes lay in 'a greater development of artillery power rendered by an increased supply of guns and ammunition, and a greater experience in the handling of them' in order to produce 'a really crushing and stunning artillery bombardment' which 'once commenced, will continue in ever increasing volume, knowing no cessation or even pause until the time of assault arrives, and which will then advance like a wave in front of

78 Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.5, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 12, LHCMA.
79 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
80 Major C.C. May, Diary, 22 January 1916, May Papers, IWM.
the infantry - overwhelming all in its path'.

Although the Germans had noted an improvement in the way that the British artillery on the Somme had 'registered skilfully and inconspicuously', the British still employed a long preparatory bombardment, which aimed at 'the demoralisation of the enemy and the methodical destruction' of his defences. Haig 'undervalued the immense growth of the German defensive system' which could no longer 'be battered out of shape by a few hours' bombardment', especially as, without the artillery resources of 1917-18, the Fourth Army 'were in fact short of artillery for the task' they 'were asked to achieve' and were 'trying to reach objectives which were out of the reach of our artillery'. Indeed, 'the inadequacy of the attack' and of 'the artillery massed' for it which 'was the major cause of the failure of the assault to penetrate more than a limited distance on the first day'. It should be remembered that in 1916 the French forces on the Somme, enjoyed an enormous advantage in heavy artillery compared with Rawlinson and that Foch, their commander, 'had heaps of heavy guns and went forward line by line on a time programme, and told his generals that

81 The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos, pp.27-28, December 1915, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 45, LHCMA.
82 S.S.486, Extracts from German Documents Dealing with "Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme", General Staff (Intelligence) G.H.Q. Ia/20958, 11 October 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 49, LHCMA.
83 Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.6, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 12, LHCMA.
84 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.112, Anstey Papers, RAI.
86 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.169, Anstey Papers, RAI.
87 Colonel C.E. Callwell to Colonel J.H. Boraston, 24 April 1926, Boraston Papers 71 13 1, IWM.
if anyone went beyond 1,000 yds he would turn him out', losing only 5,000 casualties compared to 70,000 lost by the British in July 1916.88

The Battle of the Somme produced one very important and successful development: the creeping barrage, which was employed on a large scale for the first time.89 The attacking troops hugged the creeping barrage as closely as humanly possible in order to be 'on or under the edge of the artillery barrage and ready to rush the trench the moment the barrage lifts' as it was 'cheaper to lose men by our own artillery fire than to give the enemy time to bring his machine guns up from their dug-outs'.90 The 19th Division concluded that to keep the enemy's machine-guns quiet 'an intense barrage must be put up just prior to the infantry assault' and 'so accurately timed that the infantry regardless of loss from an occasional 'short' round, can advance under it and enter the hostile trench immediately the barrage lifts'.91 This lesson was emphasised by other corps and divisions on the Somme and by the Fourth Army and the creeping barrage and stationary barrages moving forward according to a timetable had been established by the end of 1916 as 'the best basis on which to operate'.92

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88 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 7 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
89 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, p.10, Bonham-Carter Papers 92, CCC.
90 IXth Corps Notes on Information collected from various Sources including troops who have been engaged in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
92 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 19 December 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
To attain the best results very close co-operation was necessary between infantry and artillery, which took time to develop. At first close liaison between the artillery and the infantry was difficult to achieve. One Divisional Commander on the Somme noted that 'with a few brilliant exceptions Heavy Artillery observers were too far back and too optimistic as to their probable performances' and advocated a closer liaison between the artillery and infantry.93 Another noted the importance of the infantry being supported by its own divisional artillery because the tendency in which Divisions were 'of necessity put in very quickly one after the other' and 'very frequently' supported 'by guns of another division'94 prevented close co-operation between the infantry and artillery. The Fourth Army after the Battle of the Somme came to the conclusion that 'it is distinctly advantageous that Divisions should be supported by their own Divisional Artilleries, under the command of their own C.R.A.s'.95

The lesson that good artillery co-operation was vital seems to have been learnt quite well throughout the B.E.F. by the later stages of the Somme but the Infantry were too often 'required to conform their movements strictly in accordance with the barrage programme',96 reinforcing the

93 Major-General G.T.M. Bridges, Some Further Notes on the Recent Operations, by the Divisional Commander, 9 September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
95 Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.2, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48/12, LHCMA.
96 Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], pp.7-8, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48/12, LHCMA.
tendency for tactics to be somewhat stereotyped and 'the Artillery programmes were sometimes inclined to be too "wooden", trust being implicit in the rather new Creeping Barrage'. Edmonds noted that 'an artillery barrage was insufficient, it could not account for every enemy machine gun; even the creeping barrage, dropping ahead of the assault, when it came into practice in 1916, was insufficient, except when employed on an immense scale'. Commanders were already becoming aware on the Somme in 1916 of the dangers of 'trying to do every attack by barrage and relying on stereotyped tactics' which meant that 'the Bosch always knows by our barrage where we are going to attack and when we are'. Nevertheless, one Corps Commander complained in November 1918 that 'Div. Genls. still, in some cases, will not move forward without an artillery barrage, and continue to order bdes, to make certain laid-down bounds and "leap-frog" their troops during an advance', causing delay and taking away responsibility and initiative from brigadiers and their troops.

As the war wore on, British doctrine laid great stress on the need for the troops to operate behind a great weight of artillery fire to neutralise rather than destroy the defences. A movement away from long bombardments and a return to the surprise bombardment, without registration

98 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoir, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers III/10 6, LHCMA.
99 Brigadier General T.H. Shoubridge to Major General F.I. Maxse, 30 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53/7, IWM.
100 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 8 November 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
from a mass of guns assembled secretly, which ushered in the employment of new tactics at Cambrai in November 1917,\textsuperscript{101} took longer to become established practice. The hurricane bombardment of 6-8 hours used so effectively by the Germans in March 1918 might have been employed by the British in 1917 but they were 'still obsessed with the idea that the total destruction of all enemy defences must be achieved before the attack' and were 'therefore still wedded to lengthy preliminary bombardments of several days which sacrificed all the advantages of surprise'.\textsuperscript{102} They only gradually learnt that 'the main advantages to be derived from Artillery fire was in its power of neutralising the hostile rifle, machine gun and artillery fire, as opposed to the destruction of trenches & obstacles'.\textsuperscript{103} Unfortunately, the long preliminary bombardments employed in 1917 'inevitably indicated the general front of an intended attack and allowed the Germans to reinforce his artillery'.\textsuperscript{104}

An attempt by Allenby (Third Army) prior to the Battle of Arras to achieve a surprise, by employing a short, sharp artillery bombardment rather than a week's bombardment which had preceded the Somme attack,\textsuperscript{105} met much resistance, being opposed by G.H.Q. as inadequate to deal with the German

\textsuperscript{101} Brigadier E.C. Anstey, \textit{The History of the Royal Artillery}, p.85, Anstey Papers, RAI.
\textsuperscript{102} Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes For My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 3 1 85, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{103} Alanbrooke, Notes For My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 3 1 85, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{104} Colonel S.W.H. Rawlins, \textit{A History of the Development of the British Artillery in France}, 1914-18, p.124, Rawlins Papers 1162, RAI.
\textsuperscript{105} R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 13 August 1937, Allenby Papers 6/VII/6; General Sir Charles Grant to Wavell, 21 November 1936, Allenby Papers 6/VII/26, LHCMA; see also Field-Marshal Lord Allenby to his wife, 10 and 12 April, [1917], Allenby Papers 1 8 2 and 1 8 4, LHCMA.
defences. Horne (First Army) wished to employ a long bombardment before the attack on Vimy Ridge and was supported by G.H.Q. General Sir Arthur Holland (C.R.A., Third Army), who had instigated this plan, was promoted to command the I Corps and replaced by a more conventional officer (Major-General R. St. C. Lecky) in order to lengthen the bombardment to forty-eight hours.¹⁰⁶

G.H.Q. had some good reasons for opposing the idea of a short, intensive bombardment. Calibration in the field artillery was still rather elementary while flash-spotting and sound-ranging were not very far advanced. Without such aids the accuracy of unobserved fire attained at Cambrai and afterwards was scarcely possible. Moreover, the high rate of fire proposed for the short bombardment would have made observation of fire very difficult from the ground or from the air.¹⁰⁷ Also all the Corps Commanders and their chief staff officers and most of the Divisional commanders were hostile to the scheme,¹⁰⁸ and fellow Army commanders, such as Rawlinson, were also opposed to a forty-eight hours intensive bombardment.¹⁰⁹

Yet in the final analysis Allenby was correct about the difficulties of wire-cutting because the wire on the

¹⁰⁶ Extract from Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke to General Sir Clement Armitage, [1934], Spears Papers 2/3 2 LHCMA.
¹⁰⁸ Captain Cyril Falls to Wavell, 10 December, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/VII/23; General Sir Charles Grant to Wavell, 21 November, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/VII/26, LHCMA.
¹⁰⁹ General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 21 January 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
Wancourt-Feuchy Line could not be cut in ten days, let alone two or four. The Army in 1917 remained divided about the best tactics to employ. While some, like General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle thought with hindsight that it was quite feasible for the troops to "bullock through" with the aid of wire-cutters if the defence was adequately shell-shocked by H.E. shells of large calibre guns and gassed (this was precisely what the Germans did in their great offensives in the Spring of 1918 when they did very little wire-cutting in the battle zone defences) others, such as Haldane considered that there were not enough tanks available and that the wire being 'exceedingly formidable' could not be cleared by a short bombardment alone. General Sir Percy Radcliffe (B.G.G.S., Canadian Corps) felt in hindsight that 'of course, we could never have got our infantry through the old established defences, such as Thiepval or Vimy, after only a few hours' bombardment'.

Nevertheless, from 1916 onwards new tactics were developed which 'fixed the artillery doctrine which was to be followed for the rest of the war and which was to form the basis of post-war training'. Following problems with the quality of the ammunition issued to the artillery on the Somme in 1916, when it was estimated that one shell in three

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111 General Sir Aylmer Haldane to Major-General Sir Edward Spears, 31 October 1934, Spears Papers 2 3 52-56, LHCMA.
112 General Sir Percy Radcliffe to General Sir Noel Birch, 8 July 1918, Colonel S.W.H. Rawlins Papers 1162, RAI.
113 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.229, Anstey Papers, RAI.
did not explode," the introduction of an instantaneous fuse was eagerly awaited to improve the performance of the guns employed on the Somme. Moreover, use of the new 106 fuse ensured that the advance was not hindered by the destruction of the ground, which was so prevalent with the "delay action" fuse used by the artillery upto 1917.

Following the Battle of the Somme Fourth Army staff, pointing out 'the paramount importance of the factor of accuracy' for the artillery when supporting the infantry, stressed the necessity of calibrating guns and correcting for the temperature of charge and air; the barometer, the wind; and the wear of the guns. New equipment and methods of sound-ranging, flash-spotting, survey, calibration, photography were gradually developed and employed in 1917. By late 1917 the British artillery had become very efficient employing new techniques such as calibration. By the end of the war the calibration of each field gun, a procedure available only to the Garrison Artillery before the war, gave the accuracy required. All these improvements were the result of 'the slow evolution of an artillery doctrine, which had been going on for three years'.

114 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 9 March 1918, W.O.256 28, PRO.
115 Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.10, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 12, LHCMA.
116 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 70, 21 August 1917, Maxse Papers, 69 53/8A, IWM; Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft, Three Years With the 9th (Scottish) Division, p.87.
117 Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.9, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48/12, LHCMA.
118 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.158, Anstey Papers, RAI.
119 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, pp.10-11, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
120 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.227, Anstey Papers, RAI.
By mid-1918 the lessons of Cambrai had been learnt and Birch (M.G.R.A., G.H.Q.) was stressing that a preliminary bombardment should not hinder the advance by turning the ground 'into a crater-field'.

By the end of 1918, in order to ensure the advantage of surprise, British doctrine stressed the importance of being able to either 'dispense entirely with a preliminary bombardment, and to rely upon other means, such as tanks, to crush passages through the enemy's wire and to prepare the way for the assaulting infantry' or to rely on a short bombardment 'of extreme violence' to ensure 'not so much the destruction of the enemy's defences as the demoralization of his troops, the neutralization of his artillery, trench mortars and machine guns, wire-cutting and the destruction of his observation stations, command posts and centres of communication'.

As Haig noted the 'excellent photos' taken by aeroplanes meant that attacks could 'all be planned out beforehand' in the minutest detail. Before the Battle of Neuve Chapelle the Intelligence of the First Army employed air reconnaissance to obtain tactical information about the German defences. Air reconnaissance was still in its infancy in early 1915 using hand-held cameras but it revolutionised military intelligence by enabling a close and

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121 M.G.R.A.'s remarks on proof copy of S.S.214, Tanks and Their Employment in Co-operation with Other Arms, [July 1918], W.O.158 832, PRO.
122 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.20, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
123 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 25 February 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 3, PRO.
complete picture of the enemy's defences to be provided with great precision.

Air power developed a new tactical function by providing observation for the British artillery, locating enemy defences and batteries, and reporting through "contact patrols" on the positions of the advancing British troops. Ultimately, such developments and improvements in the handling of the R.F.C. greatly assisted the better performance of the British artillery during 1917 and 1918. As early as September 1914 'much use had been made of observers in aeroplanes to locate the enemy's guns and trenches, as well as to direct the fire of our own artillery'. By 1915 aircraft were already very important in providing "the eyes" for the artillery, locating and reporting the positions of enemy targets. From Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 onwards aerial photography provided photographic maps which gave a comprehensive picture of the whole German defensive system so that for the first time in history the British Army went into action with an intricate map of the enemy's defences. During the Battle of Loos in September 1915 'constant air photographs were taken to try and locate machine-gun emplacements, strong points, etc., with considerable success' for the artillery. During the

125 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 18 September 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
127 Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery, Lecture given on action of IV Corps at Loos, 25th September 1915, 14 December 1915, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 45, LHCMA.
Battle of the Somme the R.F.C. issued 45,000 photographic prints while 19,000 negatives were taken.  

'The value of daily aeroplane photographs' which were 'taken and developed' each day was noted by the XIII Corps who also stressed the importance of close co-operation between the artillery and the R.F.C. observers.'  

Fourth Army concluded that 'the great development in combined and artillery and aeroplane work' on the Somme required that 'increased importance' be given 'to thorough cooperation between these arms'.  

Following the experiences of 1917, two manuals, S.S.131 and S.S.135, published in December 1917 and April 1918 respectively, outlined the important contribution which aircraft provided for the all-arms team, notably locating targets for and directing the artillery's fire, reporting the dispositions of both the British and enemy infantry, and providing intelligence for the high command.  

Ground support, another important facet of airpower, was developed in 1916-17. The Germans noted that on the Somme 'the enemy's airmen were often able to fire successfully on our troops with machine guns, by descending to a height of a few hundred metres' and were keen to learn the 'lesson to be learnt from this surprisingly bold

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128 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 28 November 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/14, PRO.  
129 XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.2, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.  
130 Haig, Diary, 28 November 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/14, PRO.  
131 S.S.131 Co-operation of Aircraft with Artillery (December 1917) and S.S.135 Co-operation between Aircraft and Infantry (April 1918).
procedure on the part of the English airmen'. By August 1917 R.F.C. low-flying aeroplanes were co-operating with the infantry by attacking the enemy's infantry, artillery, trenches, and corps commanders, like General Sir Ivor Maxse, were advocating 'a more extensive use of low-flying aeroplanes' in order not only 'to attack strong points, nests of machine guns, infantry advancing or massing for counter-attack, and the personnel of enemy's batteries' but also 'to deal with the enemy's anti-tank guns and forward batteries' which otherwise would prevent 'the effective use of Tanks in large numbers'. By late 1917 close air support was already commonplace.

During the German Spring Offensive low-flying aircraft played an important part, notably in March and April 1918 when the 'concentration of every available fighter on low-flying action' against the enemy breakthrough "froze up the German advance". The importance of air power and British dominance of the air was shown during the last months of the war when the R.A.F. 'had the upper hand of the Bosch the whole time' and 'had some extraordinary good days on the back roads in the Bosch area shooting down guns and transport'. At the end of the war G.H.Q. noted that 'the

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132 S.S.478 (Translation of a German Document), Experiences of the IV German Corps in the Battle of the Somme During July 1916, G.H.Q. Ia/20245, 30 September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 49, LHCMA.
134 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 70, 21 August 1917, Maxse Papers, 69 53/8A, IWM.
136 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
essential preliminary to all other aerial work is to gain at least a local and temporary superiority in the air' but once that had been achieved 'offensive action against enemy troops and transport by means of machine gun fire and bombs by low flying machines' became 'feasible and must be vigorously undertaken'.

The tank helped to give more mobility on the battlefield because as one Brigadier-General on the Somme commented 'they produced the effect of fire superiority for which we are otherwise entirely dependent on the artillery and produced it at the time and place required as the action progressed'. Another Brigadier noted that the tanks provided the means once again 'to surprise, mystify, and hoodwink your enemy' for they 'could take the place of heavy guns, which would otherwise be wanted to cut the wire, and which would give the show away by their mere presence on the roads weeks before they opened fire'. By early 1918 the tank ('a mechanically propelled armoured battery') was a major component in a successful assault, providing the mobility, security and offensive power with which 'to reduce resistance to the infantry advance' and 'to offer local protection to the infantry attack'.

Close co-operation between tanks, artillery, and infantry was essential to take 'full advantage' of 'the

137 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.29, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
138 Brigadier-General H.C. Rees, 11th Brigade, to 4th Division, 3 November 1916, p.2, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 3, LHCMA.
139 Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft, Three Years With The 9th (Scottish) Division, pp.146-147.
opportunities Tanks may create' and also to protect the tanks from enemy anti-tank guns. G.H.Q. maintained that 'tank units must be trained to co-operate with other arms in the attack' and 'if tanks were to be used to the best advantage, there must be the closest co-operation between them and other arms'. In breaking down 'organized resistance, the tank was allotted two separate roles in co-operation with the infantry: either to replace the barrage or to accompany the infantry to deal with particular strong points. At the end of the war doctrine decreed that 'in addition to assisting the advance of the infantry across the enemy's organized system of defences, the tank in open warfare was 'rapidly to exploit any success which had been obtained by disorganizing the enemy's reserves and breaking up his communications'.

However, tanks were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire and mechanically unreliable in 1916-17 and an intense debate occurred within the British hierarchy over their employment. The correct operational employment of tanks was evolved in 1917 and gradually their strengths were acknowledged. It was the tanks from 1917 and particularly in 1918, which in the close support role delivered the hammer punch allowing a

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141 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.6, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
142 S.S.214, Tanks and Their Employment in Co-operation with Other Arms, p.3, August 1918, W.O.158 832, PRO.
143 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
144 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.7, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
breakthrough. G.H.Q. concluded in December 1916 that 'in the present stage of development, tanks must be regarded as entirely accessory to the ordinary methods of attack, i.e., to the advance of Infantry in close co-operation with the Artillery'.

At Arras in early 1917 'the tanks owing to shortage of numbers and poor tactical employment achieved very little'. During the Third Battle of Ypres 'the Tank was being used outside its limitations' and 'many were frittered away in the Ypres salient'.

In August 1917, Maxse was advocating that the employment of tanks 'to neutralize strong points, nests of machine guns and generally to facilitate the task of the infantry' and as a means 'of economizing man-power and minimising casualties'. New artillery tactics combined with better tank techniques to provide the means to unlock the German defences but this was only made finally clear by the success by the British at Cambrai on 20 November 1917 and the great offensives of the Germans in the spring of 1918. At Cambrai tanks were used in large numbers for the first time, making passages in the wire for the infantry and demoralising the German defenders. They were, however,
vulnerable to German machine gunners and artillery suffering heavy casualties.¹⁵¹

Many British commanders simply had not learned how to employ tanks properly. Although recognising that tanks were useful for mopping up and dealing with machine guns, Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell in August 1917 felt that 'a check must be kept on the enthusiasts'.¹⁵² As late as February 1918, when Major-General Sir John Capper (Director-General of Tanks, War Office) came to breakfast to enlist his 'sympathy in Tanks', Rawlinson 'would have none of him'.¹⁵³ As late as July 1918 some of the Staff at G.H.Q. were alleged to be not yet convinced of the tank's value and to be holding Haig back in developing them.¹⁵⁴ But attitudes did change. In June 1918 a converted Rawlinson was employing demonstrations to encourage 'the Australians to understand and appreciate the Tanks'.¹⁵⁵ Montgomery (M.G.G.S., Fourth Army) was enthusiastic about the employment of Mark V tanks on 4 July 1918 at Le Hamel 'which helped enormously to save casualties'.¹⁵⁶

By August 1918 Britain had 18 tank battalions in France to support 54 Divisions or a ratio of 1 to 3.¹⁵⁷ Haig himself notified Lawrence (C.G.S.) in August 1918 that

¹⁵¹ Notes on the Offensive against Cambrai, unsigned, no date, Maxse Papers 69 53/8A, IWM.
¹⁵² Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to General Sir Hubert Gough, 7 August 1918, Kiggell Papers V/114, LHCMA.
¹⁵³ General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 3 February 1918, Rawlinson Papers 1 9, CCC.
¹⁵⁴ General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 9 July 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
¹⁵⁵ Rawlinson, Diary, 30 June 1918, Rawlinson Papers 1 11, CCC.
¹⁵⁶ Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 8 July 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
Byng's Third Army was to be provided with the latest Mark V tanks in order to 'carry out a surprise attack on as large a scale as possible with the object of breaking the enemy's front & disarranging his plans'. Haig was generous in praising the Tank Corps for its contribution to the final victory, noting in his dispatch of the final months of the war that 'since the opening of our offensive on 8 August, tanks have been employed on every battlefield and the importance of the part played by them in breaking up the resistance of the German infantry can scarcely be exaggerated'. Montgomery noted in October 1918 that 'the tanks have been of very great assistance to us, and there is no doubt they are a great adjunct to an infantry attack, although they will not win the war by themselves, as some people seemed to think at one time'.

The tendency to see the British as 'enthusiastic but tactically incompetent schoolboys', in contrast to German soldiers who are almost always perceived as incomparable tacticians ignores the British tactical expertise prior to the war and development during the war as part of a continuing learning curve. The tactical innovation achieved in 1916-17 has, unfortunately, been obscured by the lack of operational progress and heavy losses in the mud of Ypres in

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158 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, 12 August 1918, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
159 Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915 - April 1919), 21 December 1918, p.302.
160 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
161 B.I. Gudmundson, Stormtroop Tactics, p.175; see also Martin Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma, pp.152 ff.
late 1917 and by the contrasting rapid German advance in the Spring offensive of March 1918. In reality in tactical affairs the Germans had been overtaken by the British tactics of late 1918 and were unable to provide an answer to their new firepower and tactics of infiltration.

By the end of 1917 the British had developed a modern doctrine of offensive warfare for the era of the machine gun and artillery fire. The emphasis was on flexibility and elasticity and much depended on the initiative of junior officers and battalion commanders. To do this took time and much training but the fact that the British Army was able to do so by 1918, forging a powerful weapon which was able to manufacture the victories of the Last Hundred Days, suggests that the British Army and its leadership was much more impressive and effective than a concentration on the poor performances of 1915-17 alone would suggest. The faults exposed by the failures during the period of 1915-17 serve as an important contrast to the successful application of all-arms co-operation in 1918. Prior to 1918 the British were seeking an unlimited breakthrough success, which was simply impossible to achieve at that time.
CHAPTER EIGHT

A Strategy for Victory

The foremost strategic problem for the British high command during the early years of the war was that of conducting a successful strategic offensive and here was the biggest learning curve of all. The British high command lacked the experience at the operational level to control the large battles, which occurred during the Great War, and this was reflected in a poor operational performance during 1915-17. It was at this operational level that much of the damage to reputations would be inflicted and the British proved to be least well-equipped to adjust to the problems of trench warfare. This inexperience of the operational level was a recurrent problem dogging the British Army until 1917, which accounts for the failure to gain tangible results until 1917-18. During this process the British Army was hobbled by a serious doctrinal controversy in which the Army’s doctrine of seeking a quick, decisive victory had to conform to the harsh reality of tactical stalemate in the trenches. As a result, stunning displays of all-arms coordination at Broodseinde and Cambrai were executed in something of a strategic vacuum.

Part of this learning curve required the development of G.H.Q. from what was essentially an Army Headquarters into a large staff of the type, such as S.H.A.E.F. during the
Second World War, capable of managing continental operations on an unprecedented scale. By 1918 the enormous staff of the Quartermaster General alone could be likened to a great modern industrial organisation such as Shell or I.C.I. The growing pains of G.H.Q. were reflected in the mediocre performance of 1915-17 while it is surely no coincidence that when G.H.Q. was at last functioning properly in 1918 victory was finally achieved.

The British lagged behind the Germans badly in developing the bureaucratic apparatus at G.H.Q. to analyse problems, 'some branch whose chief duty it is to think', which was noticeably absent in the British Army in 1915-17, and was not able to catch up with the dynamic leadership of Ludendorff until 1918. As an institution G.H.Q. was hastily and imperfectly improvised during mobilisation and did not function properly as the "brain" of the Army during 1914-15. Matters were made worse by personality clashes within the General Staff.

Following Henry Wilson's outspoken behaviour during the 'Curragh Mutiny' in March 1914, Asquith's Liberal government had vetoed his appointment as C.G.S. at G.H.Q. by Sir John French and Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray was brought in from 2nd Division to be C.G.S., although originally intended to be Quartermaster-General, and Major-General Sir William Robertson was given the post of

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2 Brigadier-General C.D. Baker-Carr, *From Chauffeur To Brigadier*, p.89.
Quartermaster-General. As a result, ‘G.H.Q. was almost entirely staffed from the M.O. Directorate’, with Colonel G.M. Harper as G.S.O.1, and having worked with Wilson (the Sub-Chief) for years they continued to regard him as their chief and looked to him for orders’ while Murray, the C.G.S. ‘a comparative stranger, knowing nothing of the plans drawn up with the French, was in a position of the greatest difficulty’. Murray complained later that ‘the senior members’ of the G.H.Q. staff ‘ignored me as far as possible, continually thwarted me, even altered my instructions’. Matters were not helped by the fact that, although possessing a thorough knowledge of staff duties in general, Murray was ‘by nature petulant’ and ‘difficult to work with’, being cordially disliked by his subordinates as ‘incompetent, cantankerous, timid & quite useless’. Murray and Harper were continually rowing and on 24 August Harper ‘let his personal feelings get the better of him’ and ‘stuck his toes in the ground refusing to do anything for Murray and consequently Lord Loch had to write messages even though it was not his job which caused a most unpleasant “atmosphere” as Harper resented it’. Henry Wilson had to intervene to persuade Sir John and Murray from sacking

5 General Sir Archibald Murray to Glyde, 22 December 1930, Spears Papers 2/3 77-85, LHCMA.
6 Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p.198.
7 Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 24 August 1914, Loch Papers 71/12 1, IWM.
8 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 4 December 1914, Rawlinson Papers 1 1, CCC.
9 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to his wife, 27 February 1915, Howell Papers IV C 3 115, LHCMA.
10 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 14 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
11 Loch, Diary, 24 August 1914, Loch Papers 71/12 1, IWM.
It was 'rather sad' and 'deplorable' that Murray was still making distinctions between members of the General Staff, and 'talking of "my men" and "his men" after working together for a month'.

There were also complaints that French surrounded himself with a personal staff, including Colonel the Hon. W. Lambton (Military Secretary), Colonel Brinsley Fitzgerald (Private Secretary), Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald Watt and Captain F.E. Guest (A.D.C.), who lived in his quarters in St Omer replacing his official staff. Few shared Sir John French's high regard for this personal staff who were seen by outsiders as being 'such awful courtiers', 'very stupid' and 'making mischief like old women'. One regimental officer felt that G.H.Q. was 'full of the most extraordinary scallwags', who were 'no use to anyone & get in many people's way'. Lord Esher warned Sir John French that this '"War Cabinet" requires strengthening' and that the King regarded his advisors as trouble-makers.

Sir John French required a strong personality as C.G.S. to offset his limitations, notably his lack of staff experience. Murray was also insufficiently robust, fainting at one point 'when some bad news came in' at St. Quentin of Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand at Le Cateau on 26

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12 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 7 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
13 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 18 September 1914, Clive Papers II/1 24, LHCMA.
14 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to his wife, 27 August 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 216, LHCMA.
15 Margot Asquith to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 2 July 1915, French Papers, IWM.
16 Howell to his wife, 28 September 1914, Howell Papers IV C/3 70, LHCMA.
18 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 30 October 1914, Rawlinson Papers 1 1, CCC.
August 1914. As a combination Sir John French and Murray were 'between them quite unable to size up a position or to act with constancy for 24 hours' 19 and often 'were out motoring & playing the ass all day'. 20 Murray became 'a cipher at G.H.Q.' 21 with Sir John French ignoring his General Staff 'chiefly because Murray is incapable of managing them and getting any good work out of them'. 22 'Rendered useless, because the C.G.S. does not represent them', 23 G.H.Q. was 'incapable of organising an attack on a large scale'. 24

The performance of G.H.Q. during the retreat from Mons when it panicked and fled from St. Quentin to Noyon without notifying its change of address to the Corps, 25 was inglorious. Major-General Lord Loch, G.H.Q. Liaison Officer with II Corps, felt that G.H.Q. had 'lost their heads' and that an order to throw away ammunition so as to carry men on wagons' had merely 'put the cap on the demoralisation'. 26 General Sir Aylmer Haldane (10th Brigade) witnessed the demoralising effect of 'such a mad order' on the 4th Division. 27 In early September 1914 the General Staff at

19 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 28 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
20 Wilson, Diary, 6 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
21 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 28 November 1914, Rawlinson Papers I I, CCC.
22 Rawlinson, Diary, 6 December 1914, Rawlinson Papers 1 1, CCC.
23 General Sir Sidney Clive Diary, 29 December 1914, Clive Papers I 111/82, LHCMA.
24 Rawlinson, Diary, 6 December 1914, Rawlinson Papers 1 1, CCC.
25 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, August 1914, Edmonds Papers III/9 5-6 and 11, LHCMA; Wilson, Diary, 27 August 1914, Wilson Papers DS/MISC 80/V, IWM; Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Luckock, Lecture IV, Mons and the Retreat, p.15a, Lectures on the Western Front in The Great War to the Staff College, Camberley, February 1920, Dill Papers (Old List) 3 2, LHCMA.
26 Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 28 August 1914, Loch Papers 71 12 1, IWM; see also Luckock, Lecture IV, Mons and the Retreat, pp.15-15a, Lectures on the Western Front in The Great War to the Staff College, Camberley, February 1920, Dill Papers (Old List) 3 2, LHCMA; Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, War: August 1914, Edmonds Papers III/9 11, LHCMA.; General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, pp.416-417.
27 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 28 August 1914, Haldane Papers, NLS.
G.H.Q. were 'in the depths of gloom' preparing to retreat to the Bay of Biscay that the French Liaison Officer with British Army told G.Q.G. that the B.E.F. had lost all cohesion.

When eventually sent home in January 1915 and replaced by Robertson, it was felt that Murray had been 'intrigued out' by Henry Wilson, who 'got French influence to bear with Sir J. F[rench]'. The French Government was indeed heavily involved in his replacement. Robertson admitted after the war that, although tempted by the extra pay, he had not wanted the job because he knew that he was not the first choice and that the Commander-in-Chief had previously asked for Wilson to succeed Murray. Like Murray, Robertson's influence was diminished by Sir John French's tendency to listen to Henry Wilson, who dined at French's personal table, while Robertson was relegated to a junior Mess, although his predecessor had lived with the Commander-in-Chief and had no separate mess of his own.

As C.G.S., Robertson was hampered by an 'unofficial adviser', a rival 'of similar rank' but 'totally different temperament', whose relationship with the Commander-in-

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28 General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 16 March 1927; see also Edmonds, G.H.Q. Pessimism during the Mons Retreat, undated, C.A.B.45 129, PRO.
29 Brigadier-General E.L. Spears, Liaison, 1914, p.240.
30 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 25 January 1915, Rawlinson Papers 1/1, CCC.
31 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS; Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Diary, 22 January 1915, Haig Papers.
32 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 29 December 1914 and 21 January 1915, Clive Papers II/1 82 and 88-89, LHCMA.
33 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p.218.
34 General James Marshall-Cornwall, Haig As Military Commander, p.138.
35 Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p.222.
36 Clive, Diary, 13 October 1915, Clive Papers II/2 68, LHCMA.
Chief was especially close and cordial having been in his confidence in 1914 more than any other member of G.H.Q.'s Staff. Wilson was believed to be an 'agent provocateur' attempting to remove Robertson 'whom he dislikes'. Relations further deteriorated when the removal of Harper 'a close and trusted friend of Henry Wilson' was 'carried out in a very untactful way', fuelling a mutual antagonism between Robertson, who was 'suspicious' and 'hostile', and Wilson, who was 'rather upset by the changes made in his absence' touring the French front.

Substantial changes in personnel were made by Robertson, who although accused of picking staff officers like Perceval 'who will do nothing but just what they are told', selected a team of talented staff officers, such as Macdonogh (B.G.I.), a man of 'many outstanding talents', and Maurice (the B.G.O.), who possessed 'quite exceptional talents' and was seen by a French staff officer as one of the few flexible British staff officers. But problems remained, however, with the performance of G.H.Q. as the central bureaucracy of the B.E.F. during 1915. Despite

38 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
40 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 29 January and 8 February 1915, Rawlinson Papers 1 1, CCC.
41 Rawlinson, Diary, 12 June 1915, Rawlinson Papers 1 3, CCC.
42 Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 8, 18, 26 February, 6 and 21 March, and 2 and 6 May 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
43 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 28 January 1915, Clive Papers II/1 90-91, LHCMA.
44 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to his wife, 8 February 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 108, LHCMA.
47 Clive, Diary, 22 March 1916, Clive Papers II/2/141, LHCMA.
their talent, these officers were inexperienced in the staff work required in continental warfare. Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice admitted after the war that difficulties were caused at the Battle of Loos by the inexperience of G.H.Q.'s Staff in operational matters.48

Maurice and his Operational Staff were very active in writing papers discussing the new tactical realities but attempts by these officers to think change tactics in 1915 floundered on the opposition of Sir John French, who continued to believe in the efficacy of the cavalry on the modern battlefield and 'still adhered obstinately to the idea of hordes of mounted men sweeping over Europe'.50 He allowed his favourite, Haig, to continue to pursue the chimera of the breakthrough. French remarked that 'sometimes a Staff must be made to understand that a General intends to conduct a Campaign in his own way or not at all',51 and Haig noted in March 1915 how Sir John made a point of seeing him alone in order to underline Robertson's lowly status as an administrator, who carried out rather than instigated policy.52

But, above all, Sir John French, 'un beau sabreur of the old-fashioned sort' and 'a brave fighting general'

48 Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1926, CAB 45 120, PRO.
49 See, for example, 'G.S. Notes on Operations 1915', W.O. 158/17. PRO.
50 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 16 January 1915, Howell Papers IV C 3 103, LHCMA.
51 Field-Marshal Sir John French to Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener, 15 December 1914, Kitchener Papers WA/46, PRO 30 57.
52 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 17 March 1915, W.O.256 3, PRO.
53 Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter III, Edmonds Papers III/8 and III/10, LHCMA.
who was 'out of his professional depths',54 failed to realise the necessity of employing G.H.Q. as a well-oiled machine under his C.G.S. ready to give advice. Robertson complained that 'Sir J. chopped & changed everyday & was quite hopeless',55 while Whigham (Sub-Chief) 'was very sick as he had to cancel & then re-write his orders'.56 Indeed G.H.Q. was split up for the Neuve Chapelle battle, the Battle of Aubers,57 and again for the Battle of Loos when Sir John French established his advanced command post at an inaccessible chateau near Lillers, leaving his C.G.S. (Robertson) and staff at St. Omer, 25 miles away.58 Sir John French was not a Staff College graduate and he tended to undervalue the professional training of staff officers.

With his extensive staff experience in many ways Haig acted as 'his own Chief of Staff' and worked at his own house, away from the offices of the G.H.Q. staff 59 while the actual incumbent, Kiggell, seldom contradicted his strong-willed leader and was more of a clerk than an executive instrument,60 having 'little to do except to see things go smoothly'.61 Although 'straight and charming', Kiggell was 'unknown to the Army' and 'neither organises nor assists the work of the Staff'.62

54 Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp.301 and 313.
55 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 29 July 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
56 Wilson, Diary, 27 May 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
57 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 16 March and May 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
58 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 24 September and 9 October 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5-6, PRO.
59 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 4 January 1918, Clive Papers II/4/88, LHCMA.
60 Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [General] Sir Hubert Gough, 9 April 1935, Liddell Hart Papers 11 1935 72, LHCMA.
61 Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G.H.Q., p.74.
62 Clive, Diary, 6 December 1917, Clive Papers II/4 80, LHCMA.
Haig would not tolerate criticisms or suggestions from his staff very easily. When in October 1917, Colonel Rawlins frankly told him that if the Passchendaele offensive continued, no artillery would be available for a 1918 spring offensive, Haig reportedly went white with anger and said, 'Col. Rawlins, leave the room'. When Edmonds agreed with Rawlins, Haig added: 'You go too'. This was the only occasion when Edmonds heard anyone really stand up to Haig and tell him the truth, noting that he could make suggestions to Robertson or Macdonogh, but not to Haig. Kiggell would 'neither represent contrary views to Haig nor decide between contrary views when representing Haig'.

Haig's staff was 'an excellent machine, formed to carry out his ideas and intentions' they initiated 'nothing'. 'Tavish' Davidson (B.G.O., G.H.Q.), although 'a charming fellow' and 'quite able', lacked the necessary drive and personality to influence the head-strong Haig and it was not until Brigadier J.G. Dill became B.G.G.S., Planning in March 1918, that a permanent Plans sub-section was created and a real grip was felt on the helm. A small advance had been the formation of a small planning team, a special subdivision of the Operations Section at G.H.Q. consisting of

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63 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 'Memoirs', Chapter XXVI, p.1, Edmonds Papers, LHCMA.
64 Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Edmonds, 1938, Liddell Hart Papers 11 1938 59, LHCMA.
65 Liddell Hart, Talk with Sir Hubert Gough, 9 April 1935, Liddell Hart Papers 11 1935/72, LHCMA.
66 Lord Esher, Diary, 1 June 1916, 2 16.
67 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 27 February 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
68 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 6 February 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
Lieutenant-Colonel C.N. Macmullen and Major Lord Gort as his assistant, created especially to study the problem of an offensive in Flanders in January 1917. But the advice of this section and that of Davidson (B.G.O) was often ignored, notably in the planning for Third Ypres.

It was not until 'a reorganisation of the General Staff at G.H.Q.' occurred with the replacement of Kiggell (C.G.S.), Butler (D.C.G.S.), Maxwell (Q.M.G.), and Charteris (B.G.I.) by Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Lawrence, Major-General G.P. Dawnay, Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke, and Brigadier-General Edgar Cox respectively,\(^70\) providing new blood and new ideas in January 1918, that strong direction and a well-balanced team emerged at G.H.Q. Lawrence placed great stress on personal contact with formations in the field, spending a great part of his time visiting Army, Corps and Divisional H.Q.s informally.\(^71\)

Lawrence, 'cold and laconic',\(^72\) with 'outstanding ability',\(^73\) 'great strength of character and very clear judgement' \(^74\) was, unlike Kiggell, an impressive and significant figure.\(^75\) Lawrence was adamant that he would 'certainly refuse to act on the same lines as Kiggell, who had become rather like a superior A.D.C. & was absolutely

\(^{70}\) General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 5 June 1918, Clive Papers II/4/133, LHCMA.

\(^{71}\) [Colonel Hon. I.L. Melville], Note on 'Gen. The Hon. Sir H.A. Lawrence', May 1960, Lawrence Papers, NLS.

\(^{72}\) Major-General Sir John Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.

\(^{73}\) General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.13, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.

\(^{74}\) Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G.H.Q., p.286.

\(^{75}\) Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, p.165, Lee Papers, IWM.
unknown in the army',\(^{76}\) accompanying Haig on his visits to the divisions, corps and armies in the field and in his conferences with his French Allies and his Army Commanders,\(^{77}\) and insisting on having the right to attend all conferences between Haig and other Staff Officers at G.H.Q.\(^{78}\)

Having accepted Lawrence against his will, Haig soon began to appreciate him,\(^{79}\) praising his 'cool judgement, equable temperament, and unfailing military insight'.\(^{80}\) Very soon Haig had 'complete confidence' in Lawrence who was allowed greater responsibility, for example in July 1918 sending reserves to aid the French when Haig was absent in London.\(^{81}\) Lawrence's integrity and wisdom certainly infused a new spirit into the General Staff at G.H.Q.\(^{82}\) producing 'an atmosphere of smooth and effortless efficiency'.\(^{83}\) Haig was not only better informed but also better advised. According to Davidson, 'Haig & Lawrence never liked each other either before or after 1918, but for the war in 1918, they were a superb combination with the most supreme confidence in each other'\(^ {84}\) working very closely together in planning and execution of operations\(^ {85}\) notably 'the

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\(^{76}\) General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 5 January 1918, Clive Papers II/4 89, LHCMA.

\(^{77}\) Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 30 January; 7, 13, 15 and 27 February; 4 March; 28 and 29 April; 16, 17, and 31 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/27, 28, 29 and 30, PRO.

\(^{78}\) [Colonel Hon. I.L. Melville], Note on 'Gen. The Hon. Sir H.A. Lawrence', May 1960, Lawrence Papers, NLS.

\(^{79}\) Major-General Sir John Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.

\(^{80}\) Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, p.240.

\(^{81}\) Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.

\(^{82}\) General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Haig as Military Commander, p. 257.

\(^{83}\) Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.

\(^{84}\) Davidson to Fulford, 4 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.

\(^{85}\) Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
August offensive, which smashed the Hun and smashed him so badly that he never recovered, and from then on, it was success after another for us'.

In his final despatch Haig noted that Lawrence had held the position of C.G.S. 'with an unfailing insight, calm resolution and level judgement which neither ill-fortune nor good were able to disturb'.

Lawrence was an 'able man' with a 'pleasant and tactful' manner remaining 'unflustered' at times of crisis and whose judgment 'was always sound' and 'unerring in spotting the weak point of a case' but 'above all he had a really good business head'. Colleagues found that they no longer had to consult Haig on all matters now that they could now get their 'work done with C.G.S. 'whereas beforehand they 'could get nothing done, as K[iggell] would not take responsibility'. Undoubtedly 'with his virile personality Lawrence proved in the last year of the war a more stimulating support for the Commander-in-Chief', running G.H.Q. "like a well-oiled machine" and providing 'complete coordination of planning & execution' for the first time.

At last G.H.Q. had a team capable of fighting a modern war and much of the credit for its creation can be given to Lawrence, who reorganized the General Staff and promoted new
and efficient staff officers to key jobs at G.H.Q., such as Dawnay, an 'exceptionally able' and 'first rate man' \(^93\); Dill, 'a splendid staff officer' \(^94\) with 'a brilliant brain' who was later C.I.G.S.; \(^95\) and Cox, more realistic than Charteris, \(^96\) was 'a very, very first class Chief of Intelligence', \(^97\) and 'probably one of the best military brains of his generation' whose impact 'at G.H.Q. was striking'. \(^98\) Lawrence himself was willing to delegate power to and open to ideas from such officers. \(^99\)

The weakness of G.H.Q. as an institution was reflected in the length of time needed to develop a strategy capable of winning the war. Regarding the annihilating battle as central to its war-fighting doctrine, the Army was ideologically opposed to siege warfare stressing that 'since the object of war can only be attained by the destruction of the enemy's field armies, all fortress warfare must be considered as subsidiary to that end', and advocated where possible 'an attack without recourse to siege operations'. \(^100\) When faced with the strategic alternatives of either 'bite and hold' (siege) or breakthrough (conventional) operations, the Army leadership was predisposed towards the latter whereas the stalemate in the trenches increasingly

\(^{93}\) General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.13, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/2, CCC.
\(^{94}\) Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter IX, p.6, Bonham-Carter Papers, IWM.
\(^{95}\) Major-General S.S. Butler, Memoirs, p.34, Butler Papers, IWM.
\(^{97}\) Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 30 August 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21/3, IWM.
\(^{98}\) Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.313, Anstey Papers 1159/10, RAI.
\(^{99}\) General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 2 and 6 March 1918, Clive Papers II/4 100-102, LHCMA.
necessitated commanders focusing on the former. For much of the war the high command was divided by this issue, which was only finally resolved in late 1917.

In December 1914, one staff officer noted that 'opinion is gaining ground that the way to work is to capture a trench, organize its defence, and wait for a counter-attack, which is sure to come; so as to make the Germans lose heavier in the counter-attack than we lost in the attack'. 101 As a battalion commander, Stephens believed that 'the offensive actions of the past year have proved that it is impossible to break through either the German or the Allied lines, as they now exist, on the Western Front'. 102 The high command, notably Haig, insisted on pursuing the unrealistic aim of overrunning the German defences in one, huge blow in pursuit of 'the apparently impossible break-through', 103 which was to be the modus operandi until late 1917.

In March 1915 Haig attacked at Neuve Chapelle 'with the definite objective of advancing rapidly (and without check) in the hope of starting a general advance' 104 in which the Germans were to be carried 'right off their legs'. 105 The operation at Neuve Chapelle was not planned as 'a very limited objective,' 106 as the Corps Commander (Rawlinson) and his two Divisional commanders wished, 'a minor operation'
whose conception was 'to capture a trench here, or a trench there', but as 'a serious offensive movement with the object of breaking the German line' to capture Aubers Ridge. Haig was convinced that a golden opportunity to push his reserves through to capture the Aubers Ridge had been squandered at Neuve Chapelle because of over-caution, believing that 'if Rawlinson had only carried out his orders and pushed on from the village at once, we would have had quite a big success'.

A consistent advocate of siege tactics and limited objectives to wear down the Germans during the period 1915-17, Rawlinson opposed Haig's breakthrough strategy. As a result of his experiences at Neuve Chapelle, Rawlinson, was 'content with capturing another piece out of the enemy's line of trenches and waiting for the counter attack', believing that 'we can always take a line of trench 1000 yards long and hold it against counter attack' and that 'in doing so we ought to kill 4 Germans for every one of our own men' which 'raises our moral and lowers the enemy's' while inflicting 'heavy losses on the enemy'.

Rawlinson was convinced that 'if we had not tried to do too much our losses would have been one quarter what they were and we should have gained as much ground', believing

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107 First Army, Notes at Conference held at Bethune on 3rd March, 1915, undated, W.O.95 154, PRO.
108 Memorandum by G.O.C. First Army, 28 February, 1915, W.O.158 181, PRO.
109 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 2 April 1915, Kiggell Papers II/1, LHCMA.
110"Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 18, PRO 30 57.
111 Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 18, PRO 30/57.
that 'it was not in the first assault that the casualties occurred but in the subsequent attacks on the various prepared keeps and redoubts which the enemy had constructed in the rear of their front line of defence'.\textsuperscript{113} Haig 'would have been better advised to content himself with the capture of the village instead of going on with the attack' in an attempt to break through and that 'had he been content with the village we should have gained just as much ground and reduced our casualties by three quarters'.\textsuperscript{114} Such limited objectives did not, however, result 'in any decisive victory which could affect the final issue of the war' and 'only very slowly forces the enemy's line back towards their own frontier'.\textsuperscript{115}

Noting that the British assault at Neuve Chapelle 'failed to penetrate the enemy's front', Du Cane (M.G.R.A., G.H.Q.) also advocated a series of limited attacks in which 'the first assault would be prepared and delivered as at NEUVE CHAPELLE' but 'should not be pressed so far as to carry the infantry beyond the range of artillery support' and 'the first step should then be consolidated, counter-attacks repelled and a fresh advance prepared for'. The next step would 'take place as soon as possible' with fresh troops and the process 'repeated till the enemy's resources

\textsuperscript{113} General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 15 March 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 16, PRO 30 57.
\textsuperscript{114} Rawlinson, Diary, 25 March 1915, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
\textsuperscript{115} Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 18, PRO 30 57.
are exhausted' and his resistance so weakened that 'a bid for decisive victory' could be launched.\textsuperscript{116}

The General Staff at G.H.Q. developed the concept of 'two distinct operations', namely 'the preparatory action' to use up the enemy's reserves relying on the fact that 'once the ground won has been consolidated' the inevitable enemy counter-attack was 'likely to be far more costly to him than to us' and that 'a series of attacks in the same neighbourhood, if each is preceded by a careful registration of the objective by the artillery' would result in 'a slow but steady advance on our part from trench to trench, unaccompanied by very heavy casualties' and 'the decisive attack' to break through, 'carried out on the lines adopted at Neuve Chapelle'.\textsuperscript{117} At the Battle of Aubers Ridge in April 1915 the same mistake was made of 'hammering at the enemy's defences' after the initial success losing 5000 men for little gain whereas if the British had been 'content with the capture of the Village and stopped at the end of the first day' their losses 'would have been only 2300' having 'killed twice that number of Germans.'\textsuperscript{118}

Thus, in 1915 the fundamental differences over operational methods, which were to dog British planning until late 1917, were outlined. The indecision over whether it was 'a problem of moving warfare, checked momentarily by field defences, as Haig thought' or a 'basic problem of

\textsuperscript{116}Brigadier-General J.P. du Cane, Memo. on Neuve Chapelle, pp.1-4, 15 March 1915, W.O.158 17, PRO.
\textsuperscript{117}G.H.Q., 'General Staff Notes on the Offensive', [April 1915], W.O. 158/17, PRO.
\textsuperscript{118}General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 21 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 19A, PRO 30 57.
siege warfare, the methodical approach and the blasting of a
breach as Rawlinson believed', had a fatal impact on the
campaigns of 1916 and 1917, leaving a legacy of bitterness
over the British generalship during the war. In mid-1915
Hugo Montgomery (Oa, G.H.Q.) noted that each attack 'had
been gradually brought to a standstill by the arrival of
reserves on the defending side' and had merely pushed 'the
line back for a short distance at the expense of very heavy
casualties'. The enemy trenches resembled 'an elastic band
which can be pushed back with sufficient force but which it
is very difficult to break through'. Faced with stalemate
Montgomery also emphasised the distinction between 'a
"wearing" attack' to 'gradually draw in all the enemy's
reserves' and a decisive attack launched 'with a view to
breaking through'.

The debate about the efficacy of limited and unlimited
objectives for an offensive was continued again during the
planning before the Battle of Loos. Noting that the French
had failed to take Loos village six months before and that
the Germans had fortified the area with great diligence
since, Rawlinson advocated a series of siege operations to
wear down the Germans, being 'strongly of the opinion that
the capture of Hill 70 cannot be undertaken successfully in
one rush, but that it should be divided into at least two,
if not three, distinct but consecutive operations' to take

119 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.112, Anstey Papers, RAI.
120 Major-General H. de F. Montgomery, Siege Operations, pp.1-3, [May - June 1915], W.O.158 17, PRO.
121 Montgomery, Co-operation with the French in the Offensive, pp.1-2, 19 June 1915, W.O.158 17, PRO.
the German front line, Loos village, and then Hill 70 over a period of a week or ten days. Once again Haig refused to accept limited objectives and remained obstinately in favour of a dramatic breakthrough; announcing that 'the enemy is to be beaten on a certain length of front and driven out of it, and must not be allowed time to reform in rear of the captured trenches' by 'a violent and continuous action'. Haig promulgated 'the principle that men must go forward as fast and as far as possible once the attack is launched' and Gough (I Corps) stressed that 'this attack, by its suddenness and the size of the force employed, is aimed at capturing the enemy's second line, viz., HULLUCH-STAELIE-HAISNES, in practically one rush'.

In post-battle assessments IV Corps felt that lacking 'the means wherewith to carry out the big thing, then the 1st Army should have given a limited objective' and outlined the risks and advantages involved between the alternative strategies. In 'the "all out" attack or the attempt to break through the enemy's whole system of defences at one rush', experience had shown that 'what we gain in the first rush is the easiest gain and very often much more than we are finally left in possession of' so that 'victory is almost as disorganising as defeat and no victory

122 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Proposals for the Attack of Loos Village and Hill 70, Fourth Corps No.H.R.S.503, 22 August 1915, W.O. 95 157, PRO.
123 First Army G.S.164(a), General Principles for the Attack, 6 September 1915, W.O.95 158, PRO.
124 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 14 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/5, PRO.
125 General Sir Hubert Gough to First Army, I Corps No.494(G)51, p.2, 17 September 1915, W.O.95 592, PRO.
126 [Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery] to [Brigadier-General F.B. Maurice], H.Q. IV Corps, 13 October 1915, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 40, LHCMA.
is more disorganising than one in which the attack is to go "all out" and units start with the intention of going forward until exhausted'.¹²⁷ By contrast a limited objective was 'by far an easier task' and offered a chance 'to inflict local loss on the Germans' or 'to draw in as many local reserves' but did not offer the same 'big results', which had so narrowly been missed at Loos.¹²⁸ In December 1915 Stephens, now a brigade commander, was 'very thoroughly convinced that the surest way of obtaining decisive results is not by attempting to break through the enemy's front at one blow but by wearing down his power of resistance by a methodical advance from trench line to trench line on a very wide front'.¹²⁹

Yet ironically Sir John French was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by Haig who remained the main proponent of the decisive battle. Gough complained that in 1916-17 that 'Haig's conferences were too big & too formal & Army Commanders only attended to hear Haig's plans, never to discuss them and 'there were not enough discussions, between the H.Q. Staff and the Army Commanders concerned, - when we could sit round a table with the maps before one, & really thrash out the problems'.¹³⁰ Most of the Army Commanders

¹²⁷ [Montgomery], Lecture Given at Head-Quarters, 3rd Army, on 14th December, 1915 on action of IV Corps at Loos, 25th September, 1915, W.O.95 711, PRO.
¹²⁸ Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery, Lecture given on action of IV Corps at Loos, 25th September 1915, 14 December 1915, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 45, LHCMA.
¹²⁹ Brigadier-General R.B. Stephens, Memo. to 8th Division, B.R.75, 25 December 1915, Stephens Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
¹³⁰ General Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 27 May 1945, C.A.B.45 140, PRO.
were reputed to be scared of Haig and since it was not in his nature to seek counsel in 'marked contrast' to Allenby and Kitchener, who were open to advice, Haig was 'as a rule intolerant of any opinion that differed from his own'. It was difficult for a subordinate to express criticism when Haig resented opposing views or gratuitous advice, telling Birdwood (Fifth Army) that "I won't have anyone criticising my orders".

The General Staff at G.H.Q. noted in January 1916 that 'the lesson of the war up to date is that a carefully prepared attack, if supported by an unlimited expenditure of munitions, causes more loss to the defence than to the attack in the first stages of the operation' but that 'owing to the depth and strength of the defences, the attack loses the advantages of the preparation and the artillery support which it started with'. The inescapable conclusion was that 'operations intended merely to cause loss to the enemy, at a less cost to ourselves, should not be pushed to the point where effective artillery support is lost and where disorganisation sets in'. Haldane (3rd Division) also advocated attacks 'with a limited objective' to make 'the enemy quit his front system of trenches and force him to

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131 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to General Sir Aylmer Haldane, 17 March 1931, Haldane Papers, NLS; Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Edmonds, 23 September 1929, Liddell Hart Papers, 11 1929 15, LHCMA; Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 12 July and 22 June 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.

132 General Sir George Barrow to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, [3 June 1938], Allenby Papers 6/III/3, LHCMA.

133 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Tea with General [Sir John] Dill, 24 August 1931, Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1931/1c, LHCMA

134 General Staff, General factors to be weighed in considering the allied plan of campaign during the next few months, pp.2-3, 16 January 1916, W.O.158 19, PRO.
move his heavy guns back' allowing the attackers to take advantage of the enemy's disorganisation to consolidate and prepare for another attack, envisaging a strategy of limited attacks 'on front after front of Corps or Armies, so that the enemy is constantly having to rebuild his line and shift or lose his guns' becoming disheartened and allowing the British to 'escape the heavy losses which invariably result from pushing on after the first day of attack'.

The War Office was opposed to 'a big push' in 1916 as Kitchener preferred 'to continue small offensives with a view solely to killing Germans' on the premise that it was 'impossible' to finish the war in 1916 and that 'it would be unwise' to make 'an attack "au fond" incurring 50 or 60,000 casualties which could not be replaced'. While Robertson concluded that 'we shd. not be helping the French by throwing away thousands of lives in knocking our heads against a brick wall' and tried to persuade G.H.Q. that 'the road to success lies through deliberation' and 'nothing is to be gained but very much is to be lost by trying to push on too rapidly', believing that 'the thing is to advance along a wide front step by step to very limited and moderate objectives, and to forbid going beyond those objectives until all have been reached by the troops engaged'.

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135 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 25 March 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
136 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 29 and 30 March 1916, Rawlinson Papers I 5, CCC.
137 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 26 July 1915, Clive Papers II/2 26, LHCMA.
138 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 5 July 1916, Kiggell Papers IV/3, LHCMA.
Aware that all his Corps Commanders were opposed to an unlimited offensive on the Somme Campaign in 1916 and thinking it 'wiser to adopt the limited one and to look to winning this war in 1917', Rawlinson pointed out that the depth and strength of the German defences in both the front and second defensive systems and in the 'strongly fortified villages' such as Mametz and Beaumont made a breakthrough unlikely to succeed. Convinced that a breakthrough involved 'very serious risks' leaving the troops disorganised, without effective artillery, and vulnerable to the German counter-attack, Rawlinson once again advocated a series of limited advances, aiming 'to kill as many Germans as possible with the least loss to ourselves' by seizing points of tactical importance with good observation which would force the Germans to counter-attack 'under disadvantages likely to conduce to heavy losses' and take full advantage of the materiel superiority of the Entente over the Germans.

Yet Haig still planed 'to go for an unlimited offensive' in 'a gamble which involved considerable risks'. Given the choice between a breakthrough battle to gain decisive results and a battle of attrition to inflict heavy casualties by limited but systematic advances, Haig maintained his stubborn obsession with the elusive decisive

139 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 31 March 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 5, CCC.
140 Rawlinson, Plan for Offensive By Fourth Army, G.X.3 1, 3 April, 1916, W.O.158 233, PRO.
141 Rawlinson, Diary, 23 May 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 5, CCC.
142 Rawlinson, Plan for Offensive Operations by Fourth Army, Fourth Army G.X.3 1, 19 April, 1916, W.O.158 233, PRO.
battle. Dismayed, when studying Rawlinson's proposals for attack, to learn that 'his intention is merely to take the enemy's first and second system of trenches and "kill Germans"', Haig determined that 'we can do better than this by aiming at getting as large a combined force of French and British as possible across the Somme and fighting the enemy in the open'.

Haig wished to 'attack the enemy vigorously on as wide a front as possible' in order to capture the front line system and then envelope the enemy's defences. Haig once again wanted to overcome 'the whole of the enemy's defences in one rush as was attempted at Loos' in the forlorn hope of 'breaking the line and gambling on rushing the third line on the top of a panic'. Haig was still inclined 'to favour the unlimited with the chance of breaking the German Line' rather than an attack for limited objectives. In July 1916 G.H.Q. hoped to 'first effect a breach in the enemy's outer systems of defence' with the infantry and artillery and then 'to exploit it without a moment's delay and to the utmost of our resources' by 'at once pushing mobile troops through the breach to operate to any great distance beyond it'.

143 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
144 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Plan for Offensive By Fourth Army, G.X. 3/1, 3 April 1916, W.O.158/233, PRO.
145 Rawlinson, Diary, 1 April 1916, Rawlinson Papers 15, CCC.
146 Rawlinson, Diary, 4 April 1916, Rawlinson Papers 15, CCC.
147 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Notes of the Conference of Army Commanders on 18 March 1916, O.A.D.291 9, 24 March 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
Haig criticised the methodical advance being planned by the 18th Division because 'much valuable time' was being lost and insisted that instead the 'men should be training to go forward to the maximum of their power' and of Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps) who 'was only going to take the enemy first system to begin with, and proceed slowly stage by stage' believing that 'if he attempts to do it piece by piece, the enemy will bring on reserves (as the French have done at Verdun, though surprised at first) and the position will only be gained after great sacrifice of life'.

In comparison the French Army 'went forward line by line on a time programme', losing only 5,000 casualties compared to the 70,000 lost by the British early in July 1916. Aware that the attack of the XIII and XV Corps at Montauban succeeded because 'their task was less ambitious', Major-General Hon. William Lambton (4th Division) noted that in 'going for a big thing' in 'a very optimistic vein' everything 'had to go like clockwork'. The success of limited objectives was shown again on the Somme by the successful attacks on 14 July and 15 September 1916, and later at Vimy Ridge, Messines, and Hill 70 in 1917.

Clearly the tactical method of rigid adherence to time-tabled attacks was ill-suited to the break through strategy adopted by G.H.Q. but had possibilities if allied to a

148 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10, PRO.
149 Haig, Diary, 7 and 8 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
150 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 7 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
151 Major-General Hon. W. Lambton to [Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson], 18 July 1916, Maurice Papers 3 5/28, LHCMA.
strategy of limited objectives. Haldane concluded that, since 'the enemy can always recover from a frontal attack and hold another line', operations should concentrate on taking positions to 'cause the enemy continual loss' and to obtain good observation for the artillery, complaining that by 'seeking to win their objective quickly', G.H.Q. had failed to assemble sufficient troops to take advantage of the lack of German reserves and were then forced to resort to the dubious tactic of attrition, 'pure "Bludgeon work", which is so frightfully costly'. Haldane advocated the launching of 'a great feint attack' on the Somme 'as the containing attack' to pin down German reserves before launching another surprise attack without a preparatory bombardment 'where the ground was suitable' and supported by massed tanks to destroy the wire in order to break through.  

By early 1917 when the French under Nivelle 'talked about "breaking through"' British generals were sceptical having given up 'that catch word some time ago'  

152 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 10 and 22 October 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.  
153 Field-Marshal Lord Byng to Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode, 30 May 1917, Chetwode Papers P.183, IWM.  
154 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, 20 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
numbers on long fronts, for unlimited objectives' and 'the school of small and sudden offensives with comparatively small forces on limited fronts for limited objectives' and concluding that 'both schools were wrong, and have been proved wrong over and over again', Henry Wilson suggested that 'a middle course of big operations on long fronts for limited objectives' was 'by far the wisest plan', inflicting 'a maximum of damage to the enemy with a minimum loss to ourselves' and keeping him 'in a state of constant tension and anxiety'. But the most important idea - a series of offensives along the whole front to exhaust and confuse the enemy, which was the winning Allied strategy in 1918 - had still to be fully formulated.

As the war progressed, there was considerable dissent and debate grew within the army, as an alternative theory of limited objectives emerged and gradually gained the ascendancy over the breakthrough as the preferred operational method, providing a template for generals, such as Montgomery, to follow in the Second World War. The doctrinal split within British operational planning came to a head during the planning for the Third Battle of Ypres in mid-1917. Lieutenant-Colonel C.N. Macmullen, leading the small planning team created especially to study the problem of a Flanders offensive, advocated the employment of limited objectives carried out step by step within the range of

powerful artillery support to capture the Passchendaele Ridge.\textsuperscript{156} This agreed with proposals for a limited offensive in Flanders by the commanders on the ground, Plumer and Rawlinson,\textsuperscript{157} who concluded that the lesson of the Somme was to refuse to allow the infantry 'to carry out an assault unless the hostile trenches had been absolutely pulverised' and to undertake 'only a very limited objective in depth'.\textsuperscript{158} But Gough and Haig had more ambitious plans to smash through the German defence with one decisive blow.

In response to these ambitions Davidson (B.G.O.) outlined limited operation, which was to prove so successful for the British in 1917-18 in unlocking the German defensive system, advocating 'a deliberate and sustained advance' divided up into 'a succession of operations' to a depth of not less than 1,500 yards and not more than 3,000 yards'. This 'deliberate and sustained advance' was designed not only to take advantage of the success of 'the first day's operations' when the enemy was in 'a state of disorganisation' but also to be 'in a position to deliver a second and well organised attack'. An limited objective for each successive step ensured that 'the infantry was not pushed too far and that the objectives are well within their reach' and that 'a good line of departure for the next operation' was secured since experience showed that 'with

\textsuperscript{156} Lieutenant-Colonel C.N. Macmullen, \textit{Summary of the proposed Northern operations in chronological order}, 20 February 1917, W.O.158 214, PRO.

\textsuperscript{157} Field-Marshal Lord Plumer to G.H.Q., 30 January 1917, W.O.158 38, P.R.O. and General Sir Henry Rawlinson to G.H.Q., 9 February 1917, W.O.158 214, P.R.O.

\textsuperscript{158} Rawlinson, Diary, 7 December 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 7, CCC.
sufficient and efficient artillery preparation we can push our infantry through to the depth of a mile without undue losses or disorganisation'.

Davidson concluded that, if a series of such advances were repeated every two or three days and the momentum maintained, the cumulative pressure of the sustained succession of blows would destroy the German reserves without excessive demands being placed on the attacking infantry. Believing that 'an "all-out" attack' to break through was only viable when the enemy was beaten and in disarray, Davidson questioned the feasibility of a decisive offensive. Instead he promulgated a step by step advance with limited objectives under the artillery's powerful support to inflict maximum losses on the enemy strength and morale while reducing to a minimum the casualties and strain on the British troops.159 Rawlinson also urged Haig 'to make Goughy undertake deliberate offensives' so that the troops did 'not go beyond the range of their guns or they will be driven back by counter attacks'.160

Davidson's plea for limited objectives faced much opposition from the proponents of the breakthrough. Gough contended that limited objectives did not 'reap all the advantages possible resulting from the first attack'.161 Ambitious for 'an advance to THOUROUT and ROULERS' to

159 Major-General Sir John Davidson to the C.G.S., Operations by Second and Fifth Armies for the capture of the Passchendaele-Staden Ridge, 26 June 1917, W.O.158 249, PRO.
160 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 3 July 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
161 Memo. by General Sir Hubert Gough on the G.S. Note of 26 June, addressed by General Davidson to C.G.S., dated 26 June 1917, W.O. 158 249, PRO.

339
inflict a 'decisive defeat upon the enemy', Gough remained adamant that 'any thoroughly prepared attack can break through any defences which the enemy can devise' maintaining that 'the great initial success of the 1st July, 1916, 13th November, 1916, and 9th April, 1917, are sufficient proof that this claim is not too great'. Gough was confident of reaching the third objective (Green Line), an advance of 3,500 yards, and hoped to reach the Red Line beyond the fourth (Black Line) with battle patrols.

Haig over-ruled his own planners with 'the general intention of wearing out the enemy' and 'the strategical idea of securing the Belgian Coast and connecting our front with the Dutch frontier' by first capturing 'the bridgehead formed by the Passchendaele-Staden-Clercken ridge' and then pushing 'on towards Roulers-Thourout, so as to take the German coast defences in the rear'. Whereas Macmullen, Plumer and Rawlinson 'had recognized that the problem before them was a siege operation and wished to proceed step by step, in a repeat of earlier 'rush tactics' Haig sought 'to silence the enemy's artillery and burst a way through in one assault'. Where 'the Operation Section urged a succession of limited attacks; the Fifth Army proposed to go as far as possible in the first rush, hoping to reach a depth of 5,000

162 Major-General N. Malcolm, Fifth Army, Notes for Conference - 24 5 1917, 23 May 1917, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8A, IWM.
163 Malcolm, Note by M.G.G.S. on principles upon which Fifth Army Commander proposes to carry out the forthcoming operations, Fifth Army S.G.671 1, 7 June 1917, W.O.158 249, PRO.
164 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 21 July 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC; Memo. by General Sir H. Gough on the G.S. Note of 26 June, addressed by General Davidson to C.G.S., 26 June, 1917, W.O.158 249, PRO.
165 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 14 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
yards, which would be beyond the range of all except the heaviest artillery, in 8 or 9 hours'.

Once his breakthrough operations, which had been 'ill-considered and the probabilities of success not sufficiently weighed', 'proved an expensive fiasco' Gough was forced to repeat the small attritional attacks of the Somme while G.H.Q. rethought its strategy. More receptive to Davidson's concept of limited objectives, Kiggell now considered that it was 'beyond dispute that we should so limit each advance as to ensure having fit and organised units at the end of it' and that the British should only 'go all out', pushing the advance and the men 'to the utmost limits' when the enemy was beaten and 'so exhausted and disorganised that he cannot hit back effectively'. Kiggell now suggested that the offensive should consist of a series of consecutive blows in which 'our furthest objective must be not only within the power of our artillery, but within the power of our infantry' allowing them to beat off the enemy counter-attacks and to 'exhaust the enemy as much as possible and ourselves as little as possible in the early stages of the fight.'

In reply Rawlinson once again outlined the choice between 'a decisive battle with an unlimited objective' and 'a battle of attrition', which was 'by far the most suitable

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166 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, *The History of the Royal Artillery*, pp.192 and 169, Anstey Papers, RAI.
167 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 4 September 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
168 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to General Sir Hubert Gough, 7 August 1918, Kiggell Papers V 114, LHCMA.
169 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the five Army Commanders, O.B. 2089, 7 August 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
at the present juncture', noting that the British had failed 'to carry out a battle of attrition on absolutely definite lines, with successive objectives well within covering range of artillery and well within the physical capacity of the infantry'. Rawlinson contrasted attempts at breaking the enemy line at Loos in September 1915 and on the Somme in July and September 1916 (where 'although the crust of the enemy's defence was broken' the over-ambitious objectives had resulted in 'very heavy losses', 'disorganization from which it took many days to recover' and 'a disheartening effect on the morale of the troops, who felt that they had been called upon to carry out tasks beyond the limit of their powers') with limited operations at Longueval in July 1916, Vimy in April 1917 and Messines in June 1917 (where 'the objectives given were well within the physical capacity of the troops' and 'they reached their final objectives with their energies comparatively unimpaired, and consequently, in a state to throw back any counter-attacks that were likely to be put against them').

Rawlinson advocated delivering 'a succession of carefully worked out hammer blows on the enemy at short intervals with the object of definitely beating him to his knees so that there is no question that his morale is finally broken'. By relying on his artillery, Rawlinson hoped to reduce the numbers of infantry assaulting, 'thus economising troops and saving valuable time' so that greater
reserves were available for the next phase of the attack.\textsuperscript{170}
This strategy was implemented by Plumer's Second Army in September and October 1917 and the final offensive, which brought victory in 1918. Davidson's tactics prevailed as Plumer (Second Army) began a series of limited battles, which unlike previous battles planned as a single-action breakthrough formed a succession of 'bite and hold' operations to wear down the enemy over many days, leaving the breakout and exploitation until a later, final phase when the enemy was too weak to resist. Aware that German tactics relied on the defence in depth and counter-attacks,\textsuperscript{171} objectives were selected to give 'the greatest advantages to defeat the enemy counter-attack', which were a 'real opportunity for inflicting loss on the enemy', and left the infantry 'in condition to consolidate and hold the points gained'.\textsuperscript{172}

Plumer's tactics employed a methodical advance in steps with strictly limited objectives 'making four steps of approximately 1500 yards each with each division on a frontage of no more than 1000 yards' and 'to support them he wanted his allotment of artillery doubled, asking for 1,339 guns and howitzers for the offensive front alone'. The German defensive system 'failed with terrible losses against

\textsuperscript{170} General Sir Henry Rawlinson to G.H.Q., Fourth Army No.806 (G), 9 August 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{171} Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Mitchell, \textit{The Enemy's Tactical Methods East of Ypres}, Second Army Intelligence, 16 September 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
\textsuperscript{172} Major-General C.H. Harington, \textit{Notes on Training and Preparations for Offensive Operations, Second Army, 31 August 1917}, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
the systematic advances of Plumer'. During the battles of
the Menin Road (20 September), Polygon Wood (26 September),
and Broodseinde (4 October), the scale of success was
comparable with that of Arras or Messines in 1917 or Amiens
in 1918.

The battle of Broodseinde was 'by far the best thing
the Second Army ever did', notable as one of a growing
number of 'black days of the German army', in which their
entire front-line system was overrun with relatively light
casualties to the attacker. The success of Second Army's
limited objectives, in which German policy of the counter-
attack 'suffered heavy losses and was quite fruitless',
forced a switch in German tactics to holding the front-line
in force. At last the British had got to grips with
German defensive tactics.

The year 1917 'witnessed the turn of the tide' not only
because 'those hammer blows were struck which led to the
final victory in 1918' but also because the correct
operational methods had at last been adopted, using siege
tactics, providing a glimpse of the succession of battles,
which were to provide victory during the last Hundred Days
of the war in late 1918. Unfortunately, this success has
been overshadowed by Haig's stubborn refusal to cut his

174 General Sir Charles Harington to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 9 November 1934, Maurice
Papers 3 2 7, LHCMA.
175 Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, Volume II,
pp.xi and 303.
176 Translation of 5th [German] Guards Brigade Order I.Br.1125, General von Radowitz, 29 September
1917, G.H.Q. Ia/40569, 7 October 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
177 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes For My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 3 1 85, LHCMA.
losses in October, once the weather had turned, continuing the battle into the now infamous Passchendaele stage, in which 'many thousand valuable lives' were lost in 'rather doubtful victories'.

British planning had finally abandoned the breakthrough as an operational method and the strategy of attacks on multiple axes was developed. In early 1918 Stephens (5th Division) proposed a strategy of 'many limited offensives carried out as quickly as possible one after the other - as fast as the guns can get there' but each offensive was 'to be sternly shut down after the first success' because 'we never lose many on the first day of a successful show, its afterwards [that] the losses come' and the 'first days can be so prepared nowadays that they are bound to succeed'.

In marked contrast to Loos, the Somme and Passchendaele, the Battle of Amiens was closed down by Haig as soon as it was realised that the German resistance was hardening, switching the main axis of attack to the Third Army area and attacking on the Scarpe on 21 August 1918. Haig refused to carry out Foch's order to continue the Amiens offensive when informed by Lambert (32nd Division) of growing resistance and also postponed the attack on the Roye-Chaulnes front because Currie (Canadian Corps) and

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178 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.421, Haldane Papers, NLS.
179 Haldane, War Diary, 14 November 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
180 General Sir Reginald Stephens to Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, 6 March 1918, Dill Papers I/8, LHCMA.
181 Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.34, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159/1, LHCMA.
182 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, 12 August 1918, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
Rawlinson (Fourth Army) warned that it 'would be a very costly matter'.

Haig had by mid-1918 begun to give effective army commanders, such as Rawlinson, and corps commanders, such as Currie, Haldane and Monash, greater participation in planning. For example, Rawlinson proposed the offensive at Amiens launched on 8 August to Haig and when Rawlinson suggested the discontinuation of the Amiens offensive Haig agreed 'without a murmur'.

Haig met his Army commanders prior to the Battle of Amiens alone with his C.G.S. and 'had a general talk for 1½ hours' to discuss 'the policy and future plans of the Generalissimo (Foch)' and 'they appreciated the opportunity of being able to state their views to me personally instead of before a number of staff officers as on one of the periodical conferences with army commanders and staffs'.

Haig met his five Army commanders and his C.G.S again on 30 August to tell them 'the general plan decided on by Foch' in order that 'they might realize that the enemy would be engaged by the Allied Armies on a very wide front from now on'. Considerable power in the B.E.F. had shifted to the army commanders, in particular to the experienced Byng and Rawlinson. Later, Haig sent Lawrence to see Horne and Currie, 'to tell them that I have no wish to attack the Queant-Drocourt line, if they have any

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183 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 10 and 14 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/34, PRO.
184 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 16 July, 14 August, and 15 August 1918, Rawlinson Papers, CCC.
185 Haig, Diary, 29 July 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/33, PRO.
186 Haig, Diary, 30 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/35, PRO.
doubts about taking it' since he 'was opposed to doing more attacking than was absolutely necessary'.\textsuperscript{187}

British doctrine stated that 'the development of active operations, whether undertaken by ourselves or the enemy, may normally be expected to take the form of a methodical and progressive battle, beginning with limited objectives and leading up by gradual stages to an attack on deep objectives in chosen portions of the front'. Each attack was one of 'successive steps in a continuous offensive' for carefully selected intermediate objectives which would 'best facilitate the reorganization of the infantry for the next stage of the attack' and final objectives providing 'a good defensive line well within the physical capacity of our infantry and the zone of effective artillery support' yet with the 'good observation over the enemy's defences' and suitable positions for the artillery, ready for 'the resumption of the attack at the earliest date possible'. It was emphasised that the offensive should 'be composed of several carefully prepared attacks' and carried out as 'a series of rapid blows, each delivered before the enemy has had time to reorganize after the previous one'.\textsuperscript{188}

The doctrine followed by the British Army in the last, successful campaign of the war was summed up by G.H.Q. as consisting of 'a series of attacks delivered on a wide front, but not necessarily on a continuous front' and

\textsuperscript{187}Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 31 August and 1 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/36, PRO.
\textsuperscript{188}S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1635, January 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
employing 'a series of minor operations' to occupy the
deadline's outpost zone in front of his main battle position
'in order to capture and to occupy suitable ground from
which to initiate attacks on his main defensive system'.

Attacks were also made where a deep thrust would bypass any
centres of resistance and was likely to unmine the German
defences. For example, on the 'capture of the high ground
between Croisilles and Heninel' by XVII Corps (Fergusson) in
August 1918, Haig 'pointed out that a door into the
Hindenburg Line had been opened, so it was no longer
necessary to make attacks along our whole front to take it'
but that 'it ought now to be possible to pass troops through
the gap already made, and take the Hindenburg defences in
the rear'. Similarly, in August 1918 the 9th and 29th
Divisions of XV Corps (de Lisle) took the Outersteene ridge
'which looks back into the back of the enemy's defended
line'. By September 1918 it is clear that the British
understand the necessity of fighting separate operations to
capture the outpost zone and the main battle position when
the Germans were adopting a defence in depth giving the
enemy two alternatives - either to 'continually give ground
and to prepare new lines of resistance in rear - a policy he
could not adopt indefinitely' - or 'to strengthen the force
in occupation of his outpost zone and to accept battle in

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189 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.8, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd
Papers 92, LHCMA.
190 Field-Marshai Earl Haig, Diary, 26 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 35, PRO.
191 Haig, Diary, 18 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 35, PRO.
that area' with his troops 'exposed to the full power of the attacking artillery'.

Attacks were be made as a series of interlinked thrusts on a wide front of 40-50 miles rather than on a narrow front as in 1917 in order to ensure that the Germans could not collect large forces of artillery on the flanks of the British offensive and to force the Germans to disperse their resources. M.G.G.S., Fourth Army described how after the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918, 'first of all the First Army, then the Third and then the Fifth' joined the attack, stretching and confusing the enemy.

In the final four months of the war the British Army captured more German prisoners than the American, Belgian and French armies combined. By the end of October 1918 the British Army had 'engaged and defeated' 100 German divisions since 8 August 1918 while the Americans, Belgians and French combined had beaten only 98. The Fourth Army's campaign compared favourably in terms of captured prisoners and equipment and the smallness of their casualties 'with those of the Second World War in North Africa, Italy or Normandy'.

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192 G.H.Q., T/9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.20, 6 September 1918, W.O.58/70, PRO.
193 General Sir Noel Birch to General Sir Percy Radcliffe, 5 July 1918, Colonel S.W.H. Rawlins Papers 1162, RAI.
194 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
196 Major-General A.A.Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
197 Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.36, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159/1, LHCMA.
The German Army had been defeated in the field as the result of a 'relentless and methodical hammering on a shaken enemy' \(^{198}\) but also the discovery of a sensible and effective operational strategy. At the operational level the British had discovered a very effective technique by mid-1917 to compensate for the deficiencies of training, which had so handicapped them in 1915-17. Rather than a single strategic thrust, a series of powerful successive multi-army strategic operations along several axes of attack were employed to destroy the German Army. This renaissance in British military thought in 1917-1918 has been overshadowed by the horrific casualties of the Somme and Ypres.

CONCLUSION

The long succession of pyrrhic victories, which characterised the Allied campaigns on the Western Front, did irreparable damage to the credibility of an entire military generation who rose to high command in the British Army during the First World War. As a result, since the 1920s, British generals and senior officers have been stereotyped as Colonel Blimps who allowed their troops to be butchered through incompetent tactics and an abject slowness to reform. Undoubtedly this Blimpishness, epitomised in the post-war Low cartoons, was one facet of the Army which underpinned the great resolve and stubborn will to win required in modern wars and shown by the Army's leadership in the long, hard campaign required to defeat Germany.

Unfortunately, this stereotype does little to aid comprehension of the inner workings of the Army, or to understand how the traditions and bureaucracy, inseparable from all military hierarchies, affected the manner in which the war was conducted by the Army's leadership. British generalship was the product of a particular system, and not just the fruit of the peculiar idiosyncrasies and shortcomings of particular individuals at G.H.Q. Nor does it explain why it was that of all the armies, which went to war in 1914, the British was the only one that had not mutinied on a large scale or simply disintegrated by 1918.
Unlike the continental armies of France, Germany, and Russia, the raison d'être of the British Army was to provide a garrison for an Empire, which was shielded from potential foes by a large and dominant Royal Navy. The rigours of defending the Empire had important consequences in shaping the identity of the elite of the British officer corps and in turn the conduct of the war.

The emergence of a solution to the tactical and operational problems of 1914 can be traced through a series of learning curves, which when synthesised gave birth to a new, modern style of warfare. The Somme marked the beginning of a steep learning curve in many areas, which was uneven but capable of carrying the army to victory, a major achievement that has not been properly appreciated. During the early years of the war, an inexperienced but over-confident hierarchy emphasized accomplishments rather than shortcomings. Realistic evaluations of German capabilities were too often replaced with bureaucratic optimism, the result of the unwillingness or inability of many leaders to examine previous mistakes closely even when there was enough critical information to show that over-optimism was unwarranted. The official "party line" of optimism pervaded the hierarchy, which as a result lost touch with reality, tending to accept only that information that they wanted to hear and ignoring the warnings of subordinates. Under the prevailing climate of optimism professionalism was eroded;
optimistic commanders were more likely to be promoted while the careers of subordinates who made realistic but pessimistic objections stagnated.

Attitudes in 1915-17 were epitomised by the way in which over-confident and over-ambitious generals were deluded by technology into an over-reliance on artillery and made little effort to achieve operational or tactical surprise, allowing the Germans to turn prospective breakthroughs into punishing and costly battles of attrition. Haig epitomized the faith that victory would be won and his flawed personality made him the most controversial general of the Great War. Growing realism from 1917 onwards made victory in 1918 possible. The turning points were the failure of the Flanders offensive in July 1917, the German counter-attack at Cambrai in November 1917, and the German Kaiserschlacht of March 1918, which convinced even Haig that the enemy should not be over-rated and encouraged him to introduce more realistic operational methods and re-emphasize the importance of surprise.

One factor in this change in emphasis was the replacement in 1916-18 of tired or mediocre commanders, paving the way for a new generation of professional soldiers. The evidence suggests that there was a learning process in the early years of the war as the Army leadership struggled to come to terms with an unfamiliar situation and in 1915-17 younger, middle-ranking officers often had to
'carry' their superiors. Older and incompetent senior commanders and staff officers were gradually replaced by more energetic men who had learnt many harsh lessons during the war. The leadership qualities of the British generals of the First World War as a group of men have been much disparaged. Painting the B.E.F.'s commanders as uniformly incompetent is both unfair and greatly exaggerates the case against the generals.

Although the British Army in the Great War did provide a number of examples of incompetence, the real weakness of the British leadership was inexperience of continental warfare and the severe dilution of that leadership by the rapid expansion of the army and the heavy casualties of trench warfare. Most senior officers had little practical experience of large-scale operations, having made their reputations policing the Empire in campaigns on the North West Frontier or in Africa, and had little opportunity to learn before being thrust into battle. Their responses to fighting European armies were unsurprisingly conditioned by their colonial experiences. The heavy losses of 1914-15 made disastrous inroads upon the numbers of trained and experienced officers available. The shortage of experienced senior officers at all levels was a major factor in hindering the quick assimilation of complex lessons early in the war.

Many senior officers failed when confronted by the
professionalism of the Germans in 1916-18 and were removed but as the generals gained experience through on-the-job training the turnover rate became relatively low. In the reconstruction of the British Army command, the criterion for promotion became ability on the battlefield and by 1918 a meritocracy based on promotion for able and experienced officers was established within the Army leadership, which listened to each other and adapted decisions accordingly. The offensive of 1918 was entrusted to those officers who had shown their abilities in the short but terrifyingly intense battle-school of 1916-17. A growing professionalism within the army's elite ensured victory for the British Army in 1918.

The offensive on the Western Front would not have succeeded without the solid performance of the British army, corps and divisional commanders, as well as their troops. The British Army was not an unchanging monolith composed of stupid Blimps that overwhelmed the Germans with sheer numbers, but rather a force that improved steadily during the war. By 1917-18 Britain had developed commanders who were thoroughly tempered by war, capable of coping with the complexities of modern operations and achieving effective parity in performance. This achievement plus the quantitative advantage more than compensated for any continuing tactical deficiencies.

The great strength of the British high command was that
it was able to produce at all levels that minimum of high calibre commanders, such as Allenby, Byng, Horne, Plumer, Rawlinson, Currie, Maxse, Monash, de Lisle, Tudor, and Carton de Wiart, capable of attaining victory. The divisional commanders provided most of the operational leadership and were the key leaders. While recognizing the weaknesses in the B.E.F.'s command system, the hackneyed stereotype of chateau generals requires revision. Over-concentration on Haig and his own clique at G.H.Q has overshadowed the very real advances made throughout the rest of the hierarchy, which has been tarred by Haig’s extreme loyalty to friends such as Butler, Charteris, Gough, and Kiggell and his inability to choose close subordinates with any judgement, which while making him more likeable, was a fatal flaw for a "great captain".

With its colonial background, the British Army also had to develop a modern, professional and efficient staff system. This depended upon the stability of staff personnel, which was disrupted by a large turnover in the most senior staff positions during the period 1915-16. The practice of frequently replacing staff personnel prevented a long tour of duty, which provided continuity of thought and leadership on the staff. The commanders frequently did not trust their staff officers, who lacked experience, and often usurped their functions reducing their status, lowering their morale, and altering the relationship between the
commander and his staff. In contrast to the rapid turnover in the early years of the war when the staff were not in their posts long enough to provide needed direction to their formations, the lengthy tenures of the staff in the later years provided continuity of thought and leadership, in which officers became well versed in the functions of the Staff.

British commanders and staffs had to learn how to run large-scale operations the hard way under combat conditions. Staff functions became more responsive and multi-faceted than ever before, demanding a high degree of teamwork, efficiency and knowledge. To achieve a "staff culture" of greater flexibility and effectiveness, the British high command were required to improve its staff training, procedures and techniques. By 1918 the staff involved in the planning process at all levels were very experienced and well practised in working together having, in many cases, worked as a team in 1916-17. Their hard work, professionalism, flexibility and abiding cheerfulness under great pressure throughout the final campaign were second to none.

In the matter of the higher direction of war, the organization of G.H.Q. in 1914 had been essentially a hastily improvised Army Headquarters but developed slowly into a large staff organization, similar to S.H.A.E.F. during the Second World War, capable of managing a
continental war on a scale never seen before. Under Robertson in 1915 and Kiggell in 1916-17 G.H.Q. grew in size and complexity. One important step in early 1917 was the formation of a Training Section to give the Staff a greater role in the development of tactical and operational doctrine. A further step in implementing the transformation of G.H.Q. into a powerful 'military brain' at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief was taken in late 1917 with the re-organisation of the staff under Lawrence, who oversaw a thorough overhaul of G.H.Q.'s organization into an operational and planning monolith of more appropriate proportions and gave the staff at G.H.Q. a greater sense of professionalism and realism. G.H.Q.'s role throughout the war in disseminating new ideas and its willingness to embrace technological solutions should not be underestimated. G.H.Q. was responsible for running the successful operations of 1918.

Poor training was probably the single most serious weakness of the British Army in 1915-17 and a continual handicap for all British units. The New Armies had been hastily formed from volunteers who had no formal training and resulted in a lack of qualified leadership at all levels, both officer and N.C.O., leaving the Army without a strong base of experienced leaders. While there were many outstanding exceptions, large numbers of the "amateur" officer corps lacked professional knowledge, aggressiveness,
leadership ability, and a professional commitment to soldiering. The rapid expansion of the army severely strained the British training system, which was largely based on a regimental system designed to train a small, professional army for colonial warfare rather than a large, conscript army for continental warfare.

This expansion had a pervasive, adverse impact on training, which was often disrupted by operational requirements. The low state of training was not only one of the major causes of the low level of battle effectiveness but also the greatest obstacle in improving that capability. Poor leadership seriously affected all efforts to create an effective fighting force, starting a cycle of poor training and poor fighting proficiency, which was a residual problem that lasted the whole war and a continuing source of concern. Massive efforts were made to improve the quality of the troops by the establishment of a school system of training, which had to be developed from scratch.

The entire process took years of work but was essential. Training schools had to be improvised quickly and during the period 1915-17 were expanded rapidly to train the great influx of recruits into the New Armies. The expansion of the British Armies placed great demands on the new training schools, which expanded to offer training at G.H.Q., Army, Corps, and Divisional level teaching troops, notably Officer's and N.C.O.s, how to operate equipment and
new tactical techniques. Only through intensive training could divisions approach a common standard of battle effectiveness. Even a limited period of training made a tremendous difference in a division’s efficiency.

The schools system was the most successful innovation in 1916-17, successfully developing the numbers of professionally competent officers and N.C.O.s. Although at first providing little tactical knowledge or practice in combined arms warfare, the schools helped to create a standard of training for the whole Army, raising the quality and competence of the junior leadership and turning out specialists in increasing numbers to satisfy the mounting demands for skilled instructors within the Army. This laid a foundation upon which the British Army built during the last two years of the war steadily improving its efficiency and competence. The British Army of 1918 was well-equipped and schooled by four years of hard campaigning.

One great problem was the lack of appreciation by senior officers, notably at G.H.Q., of the value of training schools and a Training Section to produce training manuals and develop tactical doctrine was not set up at G.H.Q. until early 1917. As late as 1916 the training provided in France was due more to individual efforts of Army, Corps, Divisions and Brigade commands than to any clear direction from Higher Command. Confident of victory, G.H.Q. had neglected training and provided no central control of innovation in
tactics, delaying the systematic introduction of new training methods and tactics until 1917. 1917-18 saw signs of greater flexibility at the tactical level and an increasingly successful standardisation of organisation and doctrine, which was such a feature of the German Army. The ad hoc development of doctrine and tactics by senior officers in the absence of any direction from G.H.Q. during 1915-16 was in marked contrast to the efforts made by the high command in 1917-18 to improve training methods and to develop better tactics.

Early in the war the British struggled to create a force with a coherent combined arms doctrine but by mid-1917 the B.E.F. had found an operational style of attack employing the highly effective, limited-objective set-piece, under an umbrella of artillery employed in enormous yet well-controlled quantities to support the infantry advance. Although cumbersome and imperfect, this type of set-piece, attritional battle was appropriate given the state of training and tactical effectiveness of the British armies and reflected the increasing materiel strength and tactical sophistication of the British Army from mid-1916 onwards.

By late-1917 the British had abandoned the idea of the penetration and exploitation. Attempting a strategic breakthrough against the German Army was extremely risky as the British found out to their cost on 1 July 1916 and 31 July 1917. Instead the British embraced the tactics of the
limited objective attack which took a 'bite' out of the
german defences, achieving break-ins that could be exploited
to depths of up to two or three thousand yards and covered
by the artillery. Once the assault had penetrated the outer
crust of the German defences, the momentum of the attack had
to be kept going, taking the enemy out in 'digestible
bites', preferably with a pause between each 'bite' to build
up gun ammunition, move guns forward and re-organise the
troops. These were the "stepping stones" that enabled the
British to break-in into the depth of the German defences.
The trick was to avoid too long a pause between 'bites' or
phases, allowing operational sustainability.

At Cambrai in November 1917 the problem of the tactical
penetration of the front was resolved on the basis of well-
organised co-operation between the combat arms, bringing the
new infantry and artillery tactics together for the first
time in large-scale operations. But the broader
significance was that in applying these tactics and
techniques it provided a blueprint, which the British would
use to produce stunning results on the Western Front in the
second half of 1918. Massive British manpower, armour, air
and artillery superiority was employed in huge set-piece
battles from late 1917 to 1918, which relied on careful
preparation and the massive firepower provided by the
combined arms of infantry, machine-guns, artillery, tanks
and aircraft to crush the German defences.
Modern offensive forces, above all the large-scale employment of tanks and aircraft, opened up the possibility of overcoming the enemy's defensive systems. Employing the technique of the massive set-piece battle the British Army emerged victorious in November 1918. Overall the cautious fire-power approach, which was adopted in 1917-18, was largely justified, since the 1916-18 experiences on the Western Front had demonstrated that simple numerical superiority was not enough to ensure Allied successes over the Germans. That the British Army had got from its 1916 nadir to a point in 1918 where it could take on the highly effective German Army, and consistently win, despite its limitations, was a tremendous achievement, of which British commanders were justly proud.

One factor inhibiting the performance of the British Army in 1915-17 was poor operational planning. By 1914 the British Army had evolved a tactical doctrine aimed at fighting a short war in Europe. This allowed it to develop doctrine within the existing colonial traditions, which shaped tactical responses to war during 1914-16. Training and doctrine on the cheap, a recurring theme in British military history, contributed to the poor quality of the available British generals and the operational failures of this period. Although the British Army possessed in the Field Service Regulations a doctrine, which provided the linkage between the strategic, operational and tactical
levels of warfare, doctrinal development was haphazard and largely the product of hasty improvisation rather than doctrinal debate and the exchange of ideas in peace.

For the British officers trained in colonial warfare, the operational level of conflict barely existed and they had no experience of the operational level. The peacetime structure of the British Army did not encourage officers automatically to think in operational terms. Much of the controversy of the war years was much less concerned with the adoption of new weapons than with the choice between two radically different concepts of strategy, attrition and manoeuvre. In 1915-17 the emphasis was on ambitious attempts to break through the German defences and restore mobility whereas in 1917-18 faith was placed instead in set-piece battles to grind down the enemy.

Haig’s view of the offensive was frequently at odds with those of many other military planners while he pursued the chimera of the decisive breakthrough with great tenacity. Differences in opinion as to ultimate goal - a decisive or limited offensive - continued to haunt British planning until mid-1917. Haig placed strategic conditions on all his battles that hindered his commanders from making proper use of the new techniques that were available to them by 1917 - techniques that he did not fully understand himself. Whereas Haig and Gough advocated a strategy of annihilation to crush the enemy and quickly achieve
strategic ends, Plumer, Robertson, and Rawlinson pressed for restraint and adoption of a strategy of attrition to cope with the appalling destructiveness of modern war.

In advocating the concept of "attrition" during the Great War, generals increasingly assumed that in modern war victory could not be achieved by a single attack or a single, continuous offensive. Only when all the enemy's forces and means were exhausted in the struggle, and when he was unable to continue armed resistance, only then could final victory over the enemy be counted on. This conclusion regarding the inevitability of a protracted war was questioned by Haig who naturally gravitated towards a strategy of annihilation. Advocating a strategy of annihilation and over-estimating the power of modern artillery to devastate enemy defences, Haig rejected the strategy of attrition.

Haig's conception of the offensive, which prevailed in 1915-17, resulting in over-ambitious offensives and attritional battles in which the British suffered needless casualties for little commensurate gain, is the one history remembers and dominates perceptions of the way the war was fought. Prior to Cambrai Haig strung out his divisions and artillery along a broad front so that, in particular, the British offensives on the Somme and at Ypres lacked concentration and as a result failed to achieve decisive results. The war had become one of attrition, but the high
command was dedicated to the idea, and therefore committed to the strategy, of a short war and a decisive victory. The unpopularity of a "strategy of attrition" until late 1917 is explained by the Army’s doctrine, which stressed that only the "strategy of annihilation" could provide victory, and appeared to be confirmed by its most recent experiences of large-scale war - the swift offensive operations leading to the fall of Pretoria during the Boer War.

But by mid-1917 the British had a masterplan for winning the war, which revolved around a shift from a strategy of decisive blows to a strategy of attrition. The turning-point in the great strategic debate of the war between the contending strategic schools of "attrition" and "annihilation" was concluded in mid-1917 by the adoption of the concept of successive, limited operations. The pattern of Haig’s methods of attack in 1917-18 in massing huge quantities of men and material to crush the enemy in a set-piece battle, closely resembled and were the model of military excellence for Montgomery’s style of warfare in 1942-45. The impossibility in modern warfare of destroying an enemy army by a single blow compelled the British to achieve this by a series of successive operations.

The change in emphasis away from big battles in favour of successive, limited operations, begun during the Third Battle of Ypres as an ad hoc response to the switch in command from Gough to Plumer, became enshrined as official
doctrine in mid-1918. Plumer’s offensive represented a radical departure from the past British strategy and tactics. The attacks were characterised by massive co-ordinated assaults against German defensive positions with infantry, tanks and artillery. Plumer’s success at Ypres rested on the lavish use of artillery and infantry to support tanks in a drive against a well-prepared German position, and was crucially important for the development of British tactics for the rest of the war.

The large-scale and high intensity of simultaneous attacks over an extended area outpaced and overloaded the decision-making of their German opponent. By mid-1918, British operational methods had improved. Gone were the days of general advances on a broad front, instead, tanks, infantry, artillery and aircraft were concentrated in key “breakthrough sectors” and breaches made in German defences using massive artillery bombardments. Deception measures prevented the defenders from concentrating their resources, while constant air strikes disrupted enemy supply lines and delayed the movement of reserves.

The abandonment of the breakthrough strategy in 1918 in favour of a series of inter-linked limited offensives, which gave the British more options in their axis of attack bypassing enemy strongpoints, returned considerable autonomy to his commanders in the field. The emphasis on securing limited objectives against counter-attacks meant that
potential (but risky) opportunities to win battles were not
exploited but the logic of attrition suggested that as long
as the Allies avoided defeats, and thus sustained their own
morale, sheer weight of numbers eventually would secure
victory. A point ignored disastrously by Haig while
planning his over-ambitious offensives during 1915-17.

By employing a new operational style based on a series
of simultaneous and successive operations, which
concentrated the available forces against several, narrow
sectors of the front (rather than dissipating it evenly
along a broad front) and limited the freedom of manoeuvre
for the defender’s reserves, the British managed to
manoeuvre their wary opponent out of successive defensive
positions in 1918. Operations on a wide front, executed by
the five armies co-operating with one another on a series of
axes led to the creation of enormous breaches in the enemy
fronts, which resulted in the enemy defence being chopped
into pieces and destroyed piecemeal, becoming so
disorganised that he suffered a series of successive
strategic defeats.

At this operational level the object of the great
British offensives on the Western Front in the second half
of 1918 was nothing less than unHINGING THE ENEMY’S ENTIRE
defensive system. The victories from Amiens onwards,
however ponderous, were genuine nonetheless, and the careful
but unimaginative professionalism set the pattern for the
British generalship until the Armistice, slowly grinding the enemy into submission by the inexorable logic of an attritional war of materiel. By 1918 the British operational art of war had come of age, as an evolution of British military thinking, which had been forged by the harsh realities of 1915-17. The war made the Army more coherent and professional in its approach to development, doctrine and training but, as the pragmatic approach had appeared to work during the war, there was no incentive to analyse the demands of modern command and no wide-ranging system of reform was advocated after 1918.

Although internal factors, such as the personalities and mistakes of Haig and his staff at G.H.Q., the over-optimism of the high command, and the culture of the pre-war Regular Army, were contributory factors to the mistakes made in 1915-17 neither the army’s culture nor individuals can be blamed for the problems faced during the war. Inevitably Haig and G.H.Q. must accept much of the blame for ignoring the importance of training until 1917 and implementing an over-ambitious strategy until late in 1917, by which time much damage to the Army’s reputation had been done. Haig merely personified much that was wrong with the Army as a whole but it is clear that Haig’s approach to operational planning and the atmosphere of fear engendered by G.H.Q. abrogated constructive dialogue within the high command. But far more fundamental problems faced the Army.
Rather than judging them, individually and collectively, as Colonel Blimps, it is important to remember that the generals expanded a small, professional army organised to garrison colonies into a large army of amateurs capable of facing and defeating the German Army, the best continental army in the world. When the British Army's colonial organisation, small officer corps, and large numbers of untrained and volunteer troops, are taken into account, it is clear that although some, notably Haig, Kiggell, Gough, Haking, and Charteris, did not perform well at different levels and periods of the war, the overall performance of the generals was very creditable overcoming many serious handicaps to win the war.

External factors, such as British inexperience of continental warfare, new technology, and tenacious German resistance provide a much more reliable means of understanding the problems faced by the British Army when apportioning blame for the heavy losses of the war. The poor British performance for much of the Great War cannot be blamed solely on the social background of the Army elite and opposition to new ideas by reactionary senior officers, although resistance to change was a factor. The real explanation lies more in the unpreparedness of the small British Army in 1914 for a continental commitment.

This explains the inexperience in handling large formations and the practice of command and staff work, which
an European war entailed and an organisation capable of managing such a war effectively. The role of the British Army as a garrison for the Empire, whose imperial role was dominated by world-wide policing duties, provides a better clue towards the problems the British generals had in adapting to the new conditions on the Western Front than any alleged rigidity and inflexibility amongst senior officers. Far-reaching consequences stemmed from this lack of experience of continental warfare, which was a factor of far greater importance than the social composition of the officer corps in explaining the failures of 1915-17.

Given the difficulties faced by the Army it is not surprising that the path towards victory was not smooth and was at first painfully slow. Hindered throughout the war by the small size and inexperienced of its military elite, the British had to improvise a Nation in Arms for the first time in their history. British generals were so busy learning to manage this tremendous growth of their army that they had little time to ponder tactical reforms. These institutional handicaps make the great victories of 1918 all the more remarkable. In the end a growing professionalism within its elite ensured victory for the British Army in 1918 and like the rest of the Army G.H.Q. had achieved an organisation and expertise which allowed it to plan and implement a war-winning strategy.

Haig’s mistakes, which in retrospect made the
achievement of 1918 seem like a pyrrhic victory, should not obscure the achievements of his commanders and the British Army as a whole. What must not be forgotten is that Haig relied on his army, corps and divisional commanders and staffs to train the army and to implement his strategy and it was ultimately the learning process undertaken by these men during 1916-17, which allowed Haig to finally triumph in 1918. With hindsight this strategy could have been implemented some two years earlier in 1916 although it is doubtful if the results would have been quite so conclusive. German resistance was still very strong in 1916-17.

The Somme marked the beginning of a steep learning curve in many areas and the last two years of the war saw many innovative efforts to break the stalemate of trench warfare and restore manoeuvre to the battlefield. Those efforts did not bear fruit completely in 1917 and 1918, but the ideas behind them were taken up and improved forming the basis for the tactics of the Second World War. Between 1917 and 1918, a revolution took place, which amounted to the birth of modern warfare. All this was achieved while the Army had to undergo a rapid expansion training and absorbing huge numbers of ill-trained soldiers, whose bravery was only matched by their inexperience.

The tempo of the learning curve quickened as the war progressed and can be divided into four specific phases: the opening period of mobile warfare (August - November 1914);
trench stalemate while the army rapidly expanded (December 1914 - June 1916); an interval of debate when the army realised the need for change and rapidly implemented new techniques (July 1916 - August 1917); a revolutionary phase which saw a qualitative shift or 'leap' causing a dramatic transformation in doctrine represented by the battles of Cambrai, Hamel and Armies (September 1917 - November 1918). The Army had progressed along a number of learning curves in leadership, staff work, training, tactics and operations and had radically overhauled its methods to evolve new techniques of warfare which would dominate the rest of the century.
APPENDIX I

Biographies of The War Managers:

Biographies are provided for a group of 700 Officers who formed the military elite of the Imperial Forces holding the principal senior command, administrative, medical and staff posts within the B.E.F., notably at G.H.Q, the Armies, Corps, Divisions, and the Tank and Royal Flying Corps and managing the operations of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-1918. For each individual certain standardized biographical facts such as the date of birth, date of death, posts held, occupation of father, schools attended, branch of service, foreign service, awards and decorations, publications, have been recorded. Among the most important special characteristics on which information was sought were their education, military training, branch of service, battle experience, religion, politics, service record, etc.

The most fruitful sources consisted of the Army List, Who's Who, Kelly's, and similar biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Other printed sources include memoirs, obituaries and articles about prominent figures. The private papers of individual officers are also able to provide kinds of information which do not normally appear in printed sources. The sources, unfortunately, are not always consistent in their accuracy or criteria of information. For some individuals it is possible to gather very adequate information on their education but not on parental occupation. For others it was vice versa. It was difficult to obtain biographical information on some lower ranking and Dominion officers in particular but, nevertheless, despite the inconsistency of some of the sources, it is possible to analyse the top levels of the military elite of the B.E.F. and to identify some trends revealed by the data.
Adair, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Shafto (born 1878)
St. Edwards School, Oxford and Oriel College, Oxford.
Joined Cheshire Regiment, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902;
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, XVIII and XIX Corps, 1917;
G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, X Corps, 1918;
G.S.O.2, American Staff College, 1918; G.S.O.2, L. of C.,
1918-19; retired 1928. Won Golf Championship of Southern
India, 1908.

Alderson, Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Alfred Harvey (1859-
1927)
Joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1878; South Africa, 1881;
Egypt, 1882 and 1884-85; South Africa, 1896 and 1900-1902;
O.C. Mounted Infantry, Aldershot, 1897-99; Inspector-General
of Mounted Infantry, South Africa, 1902-03; G.O.C. 2nd
Brigade, 1903-07; 6th (Poona) Indian Division, 1908-12;
Mounted Division, Central Force, U.K., 1914; Canadian
Division, 1914-15; Canadian Corps, 1915-16; Inspector-
General of Canadian Forces in UK, 1916; Inspector of
Infantry, 1916-18; retired, 1920. Author of With the
Mounted Infantry and Mashonaland Field Force (1896), Pink
and Scarlet: Hunting as a School for Soldiering (1900), and
Lessons from 100 Notes made in Peace and War (1900).

Alexander, Major-General Ernest Wright (1870-1934)
Harrow and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1889; O.C. 22nd
and 27th Brigades, R.F.A., 1914-15; V.C., 1915; B.G.R.A.,
27th Division, 1915-16; B.G.R.A., XV Corps, 1916-17;
retired, 1920.

Alexander, Major-General Henry Lethbridge (1878-1944)
Militia; joined Dorset Regiment, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1902; Staff Captain, Eastern Command, 1911-14; D.A.A. &
Q.M.G., 8th Division, 1914-15; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 8th
Division, 1915-16; A.A. & Q.M.G., Junior Staff School,
France, 1916-17; D.A. & Q.M.G., XIV Corps, France and Italy,
1917-18; D.A. & Q.M.G., G.H.Q., Italy, 1918-19; retired,
1927.

Alexander, Major-General Ronald Okeden (1888-1949)
Born in Ceylon. Bedford. Emigrated to Canada. Canadian
Militia, 1908; Royal Canadian Regiment, 1910; served with
24th Canadian Battalion; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian
Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1918-19; p.s.c.,
1919; Major-General, 1940.

Allanson, Colonel Cecil John Lyons (1877-1943)
Bedford and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897;
transferred to Indian Army (42nd, later 6th Gurkha Rifles),
1902; p.s.c., 1907; A.D.C., 1899-1902, and Private
Secretary, 1908-11, to Governor of Bengal; Military
Secretary to Governor of Madras, 1912-15; O.C. 6th Gurkhas,
Gallipoli, 1915 (wounded three times, despatches, and recommended for the V.C. and given the D.S.O.); G.S.O.1 57th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1917-19; retired, 1920.

**Allardyce, Brigadier John Grahame Buchanan (1878-1949)**
Sedburgh and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1902; Captain, 1905; D.S.O., 1917; Deputy Assistant Inspector-General of Training, G.H.Q., 1918-19.

**Allen, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Seymour (born 1879)**

**Allenby, Edmund Henry Hynman (Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby) "The Bull" (1861-1936)**
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined 6th Dragoons, 1882; transferred to 5th Lancers, 1905; p.s.c, 1897; Bechuanaland Expedition, 1884-85; Zululand, 1888; and South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 5th Lancers, 1902-06; 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1906-10; Inspector of Cavalry, 1910-14; G.O.C. Cavalry Division, 1914; Cavalry Corps, 1914-15, V Corps, 1915; Third Army, 1915-17; C-in-C, E.E.F., 1917-19; created Field-Marshal and Viscount, 1919; High Commissioner Egypt and Sudan, 1919-25. His only son was killed in action in 1917.

**Anderson, Lieutenant-General Charles Alexander (1857-1940)**
Charterhouse. Entered Royal Artillery, 1876; Jowaki Afreedee Expedition, 1877-78; Afghan War, 1878-80; Burma, 1885-86; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Mohmands Expedition, 1908; G.O.C. Troops, South China, 1910-13; 7th (Meerut) Indian Division, 1913-15; Indian Corps, 1915; XV, XVII and XI Corps, 1915-16; I Corps, 1916-1917; Southern Command, India, 1917-19; retired, 1920.

**Anderson, Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Francis (1885-1967)**
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Devon Regiment, 1905; transferred East Yorkshire Regiment, 1910; G.S.O.2, 8th Division, 1917; War Office, 1917-18; 5th Division, 1918; and V Corps, 1918; G.S.O.3, V Corps, 1915-16; Brigade-Major, 36th Brigade, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 8th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, V Corps, 1918; G.S.O.2, I Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 25th Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. 45th Division, 1940; Assistant C.I.G.S., 1940; G.O.C. III Corps, 1940-43; II Corps, 1943-44; retired 1944; Trustee of the Imperial War Museum, 1945.

**Anderson, General Sir (Warren) Hastings (1872-1930)**
Eldest son of General David Anderson. Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Cheshire Regiment; 1899; South Africa, 1899-

Anley, Brigadier-General Barnett Dyer Lempriere Guy (1873-1954)

Anstey, Brigadier Edgar Carnegie (1882-1958)

Armes, Colonel Reginald John (1876-1948)

Armitage, General Sir (Charles) Clement (1881-1973)
Marlborough. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; South Africa, 1901-1902; p.s.c.; D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1914; G.S.O.3, 14th Division, 1915; G.S.O.2, 14th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1916; G.S.O.1, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 31st Division, 1919; D.S.O., 1916 and 1918; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley, 1934-36; G.O.C. 1st Division, 1936-38; Master General of the Ordnance, India, 1938-42; retired 1942.
Ashmore, Major-General Edward Bailey "Splash" (1872-1953)

Aspinall-Oglander, Brigadier-General Cecil Faber (1878-1959)

Asser, General Sir (Joseph) John (1867-1949)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Dorsetshire Regiment, 1887; Soudan, 1897-99; Soudan, 1910; Adjutant-General, Egyptian Army, 1907-14; retired, July 1914; re-employed as Commandant, L. of C., 1914-15; Base Commandant, 1915-16; restored to active list, 1916; G.O.C. L. of C. Area, 1916-19; British Troops in France and Flanders, 1919; retired, 1930. Brother of Brigadier-General V. Asser.

Atkinson, Lieutenant-General Edwin Henry de Vere (1867-1947)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1885; Burma, 1889-90; Zhob Valley Expedition, 1890-91; Instructor, R.M.A., 1896-99; Chief Engineer, I Corps, 1916-17; Chief Engineer, First Army, 1917-19; Engineer-in-Chief, India, 1923-24; Master General Supply, India, 1924-29; Master General of the Ordnance, India, 1929-30; retired, 1930.

Babington, Lieutenant-General Sir James Melville (1854-1936)
Wimbledon School. Joined 16th Lancers, 1873; Bechuanaland, 1884-85; South Africa, 1899-1901; G.O.C. New Zealand Defence Forces, 1902-07; retired, 1907; G.O.C. Lowland Mounted Brigade, 1908-13; 23rd Division, 1914-18; XIV Corps, Italy, 1918-19; C.-in-C., British Forces in Italy, 1919; retired 1919.

Baillie, Colonel Hugh Frederick (1879-1941)

Bainbridge, Major-General Sir (Edmund) Guy Tulloch (1867-1943)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined East Kent Regiment, 1888; Dongola Expedition, 1896 (despatches); Nile Expedition, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); p.s.c., 1910; G.S.O.1, Western Command, 1912-14; B.G.G.S., First Army, U.K., 1914-15; G.O.C. 110th Brigade, 1915-16; 25th Division, 1916-18; Inspector of Infantry, 1918-19; 1st Division, 1919-23; Retired, 1923.

Baker-Carr, Brigadier-General Christopher D'Arcy Bloomfield Sal tren (1878-1949)

Baldock, Major-General Thomas Stanford (1854-1937)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1873; p.s.c., 1888; South Africa, 1901-02 (despatches); G.O.C. 49th Division, 1911-15; severely wounded, July 1915; and retired 1916. Author of Cromwell as a Soldier (1899).

Bannatine-Allason, Major-General Sir Richard (1855-1940)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1875; Afghan War, 1878-80; Soudan, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1903; attached to Japanese Army, Manchuria, 1905; G.O.C. Nowshera Brigade, India, 1910-14; 51st (Highland) Division, B.E.F., 1914-15 (sacked); 61st Division, U.K., 1915-16; 64th (Highland) Division, U.K., 1916-17; retired, 1918. Assumed additional name of Allason, 1885.

Barnardiston, Major-General Nathaniel Walter (1858-1919)
Barne, Brigadier William Bradley Gosset (1880-1951)
Clifton; R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1899; West African Frontier Force, 1905-08; p.s.c., 1910; Staff Captain, Coast Defence, Eastern Command, 1913-14, and Thames and Medway Defences, 1914; D.A.A.G., VII Corps, 1915-16; Brigade-Major, Royal Artillery, 48th Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, Western Command, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1918; G.S.O.2, XIX Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, Italy, 1918-19; C.R.A., Gibraltar, 1930-34; B.G.R.A., Eastern Command, 1934-37; retired 1937. M.F.H., Royal Calpe Hunt, Gibraltar, 1933-34. His brother was Bishop of Lahore.

Barnes, Major-General Sir Reginald Walter Ralph (1871-1946)
Westminster and Militia. Joined 4th Hussars, 1890; with Spanish Army in Cuban Insurrection, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Instructor, Cavalry School, 1906-07; A.M.S., to Governor, Malta, 1909-11; O.C. 10th Hussars, 1911-15; G.O.C. 16th Brigade, 1915-16; 32nd Division, 1916-1917; 57th Division, 1917-19 (wounded twice, 1914-18); retired, 1921. One of the close Army friends of Winston Churchill (in Cuba together).

Barratt, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Sheridan (1891-1966)

Barrow, General Sir George de Symons "Billy" (1864-1959)
Son of Major-General de Symons Barrow. Stubbington House, Hampshire; R.M.C. Joined Connaught Rangers, 1884; transferred to Indian Army (4th Bengal Cavalry), 1886; Waziristan Expedition, 1894-95; China, 1900; p.s.c., 1898; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1911-12; O.C. 35th Scinde Horse, India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, Cavalry Division, 1914; B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; G.O.C. Mhow Cavalry Brigade, 1915; B.G.G.S., X Corps, 1915; G.O.C. 1st Indian Cavalry Division, 1915; M.G.S., First Army, 1915-17; G.O.C. 7th Division, 1917 (sacked); 3rd Mounted and 4th Cavalry Divisions, 1917-19; A.G., India, 1923-24; G.O.C. Eastern Command, 1924-28; retired, 1929. Author of The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, GCB GCMG (1931, q.v.) and The Fire of Life.

Barter, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles St. Leger (1856-1931)
Educated abroad. Joined 105 Foot, 1875; p.s.c., 1896; Ashanti, 1895-96; Tirah Campaign, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1901 (wounded, despatches); Instructor, R.M.C., 1884-89; D.A.A.G., War Office, 1889-94; Military
Secretary to the Governor of Cape Colony, South Africa, 1894-95; O.C. 2/K.O.Y.L.I.; Poona Brigade, India, 1909-13; 47th Division, 1914-16 (sacked).

Bartholomew, General Sir William Henry "Barty" (1877-1962)

Barton, Group Captain Robert John Fergusson (1891-1988)

Battye, Colonel Basil Condon (1882-1932)

Baumgartner see Percy

Bayley, Colonel Arthur George (1878-1949)
Shrewsbury and R.M.C. Joined Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; Brigade-Major, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-16; G.S.O.2, 56th Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, Senior Officers' School, Aldershot, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 14th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Machine Gun Corps Training Centre, 1918-19; retired, 1935. Lecturer, 1936, and Librarian, 1939, at Staff College, Camberley, and Head of Department of Military Studies, University of London, 1940.

Beck, Major-General Edward Archibald (1880-1974)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1900; South Africa, 1898-1902; employed with Egyptian Army, 1909-12; Brigade-Major, 45th and 44th Brigades, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-16; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.2, France, 1916; G.S.O.2, 56th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, XI Corps, France and Italy, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 41st Division, Italy, 1918-19; Director of Personal Services, War Office, 1938-40; G.O.C. 9th Division, 1940; retired, 1940.
Becke, Brigadier-General John Harold Whitworth (1879-1949)
Trinity College, Glenalmond, and Militia. Joined
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment, 1901; South Africa,
1899-1902; transferred to R.F.C., 1912; O.C. 2nd Squadron,
R.F.C., 1915; 1st Wing, R.F.C., 1916; 4th Brigade, R.F.C.,

Beckwith, Major William Malebisse (1877-1952)
Eton and New College, Oxford. Joined Coldstream Guards,
1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); retired as
Captain, January 1914; G.S.O.3, XI Corps, 1915-16; D.S.O.,
1916; G.S.O.2, XI Corps, 1916-18; G.S.O.2, 74th Division,
1918; G.S.O.1, 30th Division, 1918-19. Married the third
daughter of the 7th Duke of Richmond, 1904.

Beddington, Brigadier Sir Edward Henry Lionel "Moses" (1884-
1966)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 16th Lancers, 1902; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3,
2nd Cavalry Division, 1914-15; Brigade-Major, 4th Cavalry
Brigade, 1915; G.S.O.2, Indian Cavalry Corps, 1915; M.C.,
1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, Fifth
Army, 1916; G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1916-1917; D.S.O., 1917;
G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1917-19; C.M.G., 1919; retired, 1920;
re-employed, 1940-45; Brigadier, 1942.

Belgrave, Lieutenant-Colonel John Dalrymple (born 1881)
Malvern and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; South
Africa, 1902; Staff Captain, 8th Brigade, 1914; G.S.O.3,
First Army, 1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1915-16; D.S.O.,
1916; G.S.O.2, XIV Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Egypt,
1917; G.S.O.1, Cyprus, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 12th Division,
1918-19; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1921. Elder brother of Colonel
H.D. Belgrave, D.S.O.

Bernard, Lieutenant-General Sir Denis John Charles Kirwan
"Podge" (1882-1956)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1902; p.s.c.;
G.S.O.3, 10th Division, U.K. and M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 10th
Division, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915-16;
G.S.O.1, 4th Australian Division, E.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-
17; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., France, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Inspector-
General of Training, 1918; Director of Recruiting and
Organization, War Office, 1934-36; G.O.C. 3rd Division,
1936-39; Governor and C.-in-C., Bermuda, 1939-41; retired
1941.

Wellington and R.M.A. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1907;
retired, 1911; emigrated to Canada; served with 8th Canadian
Battalion, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 1st Canadian Division, 1916-17;
D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2th
Canadian Division, 1918-19; C.M.G., 1919.
Bethell, Major-General Sir (Hugh) Keppel "Beetle" (1882-1947)

Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1901; p.s.c.; transferred to 9th Gurkha Rifles, 1905, and 7th Hussars, 1914; Staff Captain, Meerut Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; Brigade-Major, 8th Cavalry Brigade, 1915; O.C. 1/ Northamptonshire Regiment, 1915-16; G.O.C. 74th Brigade, 1916-18; D.S.O., 1917; G.O.C. 66th Division, 1918-19; C.M.G., 1918; C.B., 1919; G.O.C. Presidency and Assam District, 1930-34; retired, 1935. A headstrong character and at 36 the youngest British Divisional Commander on the Western Front. His father also served during the war!

Biddulph, Brigadier-General Harry (1872-1952)

Grandson of Robert Biddulph, M.P.; fourth son of General Sir Robert Biddulph, R.A.; and nephew of 1st Baron Bidduiph (Banker and Liberal M.P., 1865-1900). Charterhouse. Entered Royal Engineers, 1892; Tirah Expedition, 1897-98; Waziristan Expedition, 1902; Staff Captain, War Office, 1907-12; Chief Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1912-14; D.S.O., 1917; A.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., 1918; Chief Engineer, XIX Corps, 1918; Deputy Engineer in Chief and Inspector of Mines, G.H.Q., 1918-19; C.M.G., 1919; Chief Engineer, Southern Command, 1927-28; retired, 1929. Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel Hope Biddulph, D.S.O., and Lieutenant-Colonel M. Biddulph, O.B.E. Two sons also joined the Army.

Bingham, Major-General Hon. Sir Cecil Edward "Cis" (1861-1934)


Birch, Colonel Edward Massy (1875-1964)


Birch, General Sir (James Frederick) Noel "Curly" (1865-1939)

Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1885; Ashanti Expedition, 1895-96; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.1, Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; B.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1915; M.G.R.A., G.H.Q., 1916-19; Director of Remounts, 1920-
21; Director-General of the Territorial Army, 1921-23; Master General of the Ordnance, 1923-27; retired, 1927. Brother-in-law of Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode (q.v.). Author of Modern Riding and Modern Riding and Horse Education. Reputed to be 'two metres tall'. Director of Vickers-Armstrong.

Birdwood, William Riddell (Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood) "Birdy" (1865-1951) Clifton, Militia, and R.M.C. Joined 12th Lancers, 1885; transferred to Indian Army (11th Bengal Lancers), 1887; Hazara Expedition, 1891; Isazai Expedition, 1892; Tirah Campaign, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches); Assistant Military Secretary, South Africa and India, 1902-04; Military Secretary, India, 1905-09; C.S.O., Mohmand Expedition, 1908; G.O.C. Kohat Independent Brigade, 1909-12, Secretary to the Army Department, India, 1912-14; I ANZAC Corps, 1916-18; Fifth Army, 1918-19; G.O.C. Northern Command, India, 1920-24; C.-in-C., India, 1920-24; Field-Marshal, 1925; Baron, 1938. Author of Khaki and Gown (1941) and In My Time (1946). One of five sons to serve in the army in India, notably Brigadier-General H.B. Birdwood and Lieutenant-Colonel G.T. Birdwood, and father of Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. C.B. Birdwood. A pre-war protege of Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener. One brother was the brother-in-law of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson (q.v.). Another was killed in action in 1914. Played rugby for Richmond. 'Best Officer-at-Arms' two years running in India. A competent commander who frequently visited the front line.

Black, Lieutenant-Colonel Claud Hamilton Griffith (born 1881) Cheltenham and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1900; transferred to Indian Army, 1901, and to 12th Lancers, 1914; p.s.c., 1912; Staff Captain/G.S.O.3, H.Q., India, 1909-10; G.S.O.3, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.3, 1st Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1916-18; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, VI Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 40th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1927; re-employed in the War Office, 1939.


Blair, Brigadier-General Arthur (1869-1947)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined K.O.S.B., 1890; p.s.c., 1897;
Nile, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1901 (severely wounded,
despaches, D.S.O.); Staff Captain/G.S.O.3, War Office,
1907-08; Brigade-Major, 10th Brigade, 1908-11; G.S.O.2,
South Africa, 1912; G.S.O.2, Egypt, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1914; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 27th Division, U.K. and
B.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 5th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 23rd
Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., V Corps, 1916; G.O.C. 201st
Brigade, U.K., 1916-17; South Midlands Reserve Brigade,
1917; No.3 Section, Tyne Garrison, 1917-18; Tees Garrison,
1918-19.

Blair, Colonel James Molesworth (1880-1925)
Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford. Served in South
Africa as a volunteer and nominated by the C.-in-C. for a
commission, 1901; Joined Royal Highlanders, 1901; Mohmand
Expedition, 1908; transferred to Gordon Highlanders, 1911;
p.s.c., 1913; Military Attache, Petrograd, 1914-18; G.S.O.1,
V Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, Belgian H.Q., 1918; G.S.O.1,
Military Mission to Far East, 1918-20; Military Attache,
Belgrade and Prague, 1921-25.

Blamey, Field-Marshal Sir Thomas Albert (1884-1951)
Australian. Public School, Wagga Wagga. Australian Staff
Corps, 1906; p.s.c., 1914; G.S.O.3, 1st Australian Division,
M.E.F., 1914-15; 2nd Australian Division, M.E.F., 1915; A.A.
& Q.M.G., 2nd Australian Division, M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1,
1st Australian Division, 1916; O.C. 2nd Australian
Battalion, 1916; 1st Australian Brigade, 1916-17; D.S.O.,
1917; G.S.O.1, 1st Australian Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S.,
Australian Corps, 1918-19; D.M.O., Australia, 1919-20;
G.O.C. 10th Australian Brigade, 1926-31; 3rd Australian
Division, 1931-37; knighted, 1935; 6th Australian Division,
1939-40; Australian Corps, A.I.F., 1940-41; C.-in-C.,
Australian Army, 1941-1945; Deputy C.-in-C. Middle East,
1941; G.O.C.-in-C. Allied Land Forces South Western Pacific

Blewitt, Lieutenant-Colonel Guy (1884-1969)
Eldest son of Major-General W.E. Blewitt. Harrow and R.M.C.
Joined Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1905;
Staff Captain, 5th Brigade, 1915-16; Brigade-Major, 167th
Brigade, 1916; M.C., 1916; G.S.O.2, 18th Division, 1916-17;
G.S.O.2, VII Corps, 1917; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2 (Chief
Instructor), Senior Officers' School, Aldershot, 1917-18;
G.S.O.2, VII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.2, 19th Division, 1918;
G.S.O.2, VIII and XVIII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, VIII Corps,
1918; G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1918-20 (wounded twice);
retired to take up farming, 1922; Meat and Livestock Officer
(Midland Area), Ministry of Food, 1939-45. Deputy
Lieutenant for Essex and Master of the Essex and Suffolk
Hounds (Essex side). Brother-in-law of Major-General C.E.D. Budworth (q.v.).

Bloore, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Richmond (1871-1955)
Marlborough. Joined K.R.C., 1890; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); p.s.c., 1907; Bazar Valley Field Force, 1908; D.A. & Q.M.G. and G.S.O.2, India, 1907-11; Commandant, School of Musketry, India, 1913-15; G.S.O.2, 34th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 71st Division, U.K., 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 30th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Western Command, 1918-19; retired 1919.

Boileau, Colonel Frank Ridley Farrer (1867-1914)
Cheltenham. Entered Royal Engineers, 1887; South Africa, 1899-1902; p.s.c.; D.A.A.G., War Office, 1902-05; Professor, Staff College, Quetta, 1906-10; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1910-14; died of wounds, 26 August 1914, having shot himself.

Bols, Lieutenant-General Sir Louis Jean (1867-1930)

Bonham-Carter, General Sir Charles (1876-1955)

Boscawen, Major Hon. George Edward (1888-1918)

Bourne, General Sir Alan George Barwys (1882-1967)
Cheltenham; Entered Royal Marine Artillery, 1899; p.s.c., 1915; served with Grand Fleet, 1914-17; G.S.O.2, 11th Division, 1917-18; D.S.O., 1918; G.S.O.2, Third Army, 1918;
G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1918-19; A.A.G., Royal Marines, 1933-35; Colonel Commandant, Portsmouth Division, 1935-38; A.G., Royal Marines, 1939-43; retired, 1943.

Bowdler, Lieutenant-Colonel Basil Wilfred Bowdler (1930)

Bowly, Colonel William Arthur Travell "Boy" (1880-1957)

Boyce, Major-General Sir William George Bertram (1863-1937)
Royal School, Armagh. Joined Berkshire Regiment, 1887; transferred to Army Service Corps, 1892; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); Commandant, A.S.C. Training Establishment, 1909-13; Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport, Aldershot, 1913, and Eastern Command, 1913-14; Deputy Director of Transport, B.E.F., 1914; Director of Transport, B.E.F., 1914-19. Director of Rolls Royce Ltd.

Boyd, Major-General Sir Gerald Farrell "Gerry" (1877-1930)
St. Paul's. In the ranks, Devon Regiment, 4 years 200 days; Sergeant, 1899; commissioned, East Yorkshire Regiment, 1900; transferred to Leinster Regiment, 1904, and Royal Irish Rifles, 1915; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.C.M., D.S.O.); Brigade-Major, 11th Brigade, 1912-15; G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., V Corps, 1916-8; G.O.C. 170th Brigade, 1918; 46th Division, 1918-19 (severely wounded and despatches); Commandant, Staff College, Quetta, 1923-27; Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, 1927-30.

Boyd-Rochfort, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold (1881-1960)
Eton. South Africa, 1899-1901; joined 21st Lancers, 1901; Instructor, R.M.C., 1908-12; Captain, 1912; Staff Captain, 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; Brigade-Major, 9th Cavalry Brigade, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 24th Division, 1916-17; M.C.; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, Tank Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, No.3 Tank Group, 1918-19; retired, 1920. Stockbroker who ran his own stud-farm, "Tally Ho". Champion Officer at Arms in the
Army. His eldest brother, Arthur, won the V.C. and his elder brother, Cecil, was a famous horse trainer world-wide.

Bradford, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Austen (born 1879)

Braine, Brigadier Herbert Edmund Reginald Rubens (1876-1942)
Dulwich and Militia. Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1900; South Africa, 1900-02; North-West Frontier, 1908; p.s.c., 1910; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.3, 8th Division, 1914-15; Brigade-Major, 19th Brigade, 1915; G.S.O.2, XIII Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, 29th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1918-19; G.O.C. 133rd Division, 1928-30; 12th Brigade, India, 1930-33; retired, 1933.

Braithwaite, General Sir Walter Pipon (1865-1945)
Bedford, Victoria College, Jersey, and R.M.C. Joined Somerset Light Infantry, 1886; p.s.c., 1899; Burma, 1886-87 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); D.A. & Q.M.G., II Corps and Southern Command, 1902-05; D.A.A.G./G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1906-08; G.S.O.1, Staff College, 1908-09; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1909-11; Commandant, Staff College, Quetta, 1911-14; D.S.D., War Office, 1914-15; C.G.S., M.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 62nd Division, 1915-18; VII Corps, 1918; IX Corps, 1918-19; Western Command, India, 1920-23; Scottish Command, 1923-26; Eastern Command, 1926-27; A.G. to the Forces, 1927-31; retired, 1931. His only son was killed in action, 1916.

Bray, Major-General Sir Claude Arthur (1858-1934)
Winchester and R.M.C. Joined 30 Foot, 1878; transferred Army Pay Department, 1891; Afghan War, 1880; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches, C.M.G.); Chief Paymaster, Army Pay Department, 1906; Chief Accountant, Northern Command, 1906-07, and H.Q., South Africa, 1907-10; Paymaster, Southern Command, 1910-14; Paymaster-in-Chief, G.H.Q., 1916-18; retired, 1918.

Bridges, Colonel Arthur Holroyd (1871-1953)
Blundell's School, Tiverton, and R.M.C. Joined Durham Light Infantry, 1891; transferred to the Indian Army (116th Mahrattas), 1892; South Africa, 1899-1900; East Africa, 1901; p.s.c., 1904; Commandant, School of Musketry, India, 1907-11; Instructor, R.M.C., Duntroon, 1913-15; G.S.O.1, 1st Australian Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 2nd Australian Division, 1916-18; D.S.O., 1917; O.C. 11th Mahrattas, Mesopotamia, 1918-20; 53rd Brigade, 1920-21; retired, 1925.
Bridges, Lieutenant-General (George) Tom Molesworth (1971-1939)
Newton College, Devon. Entered Royal Artillery, 1892; South Africa, 1899-1902 (seriously wounded, despatches); East Africa, 1902-04 (seriously wounded); transferred to 4th Dragoon Guards, 1908, and 4th Hussars, 1914; p.s.c.; Military Attaché, Brussels, Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, 1910-14; rallied troops during the Mons Retreat with a tin whistle and a drum; G.S.O.1, Belgian H.Q., 1914-15; G.O.C. 19th Division, 1915-17 (wounded); Head, British Military Mission to U.S.A., 1918; Chief of Military Mission to the Army of the Orient, 1919-20; retired, 1922; Governor, Southern Australia, 1922-27. Author of Alarms and Excursions (1940). His wife was a friend of the Asquiths. His step-son was killed in action, 1914. When wounded losing his leg he told the hospital staff to feed it to his pet lion which, having been won by a friend in a Red Cross raffle in Paris and become the 19th Division's mascot, was short of meat.

Bridgford, Brigadier-General Robert James (1869-1954)

Briggs, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles James (1865-1941)
Educated privately in France and Germany and at R.M.C. Joined 1st Dragoon Guards, 1886; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Natal Native Rebellion, 1906; Brigade-Major, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1899-1900; O.C. 1st Imperial Light Horse, 1901-02; 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1913-15; 3rd Cavalry Division, 1915; 28th Division, 1915-16; XVI Corps, Salonika, 1916-19; British Forces, Salonika, 1919; retired, 1923.

Brind, General Sir John Edward Spencer "James" (1878-1954)
Broad, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Noel Frank (1882-1976)

Broadwood, Lieutenant-General Robert George (1862-1917)
Charterhouse. Joined 12th Lancers, 1882; Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Egypt, 1898 (despatches); and South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, C.B., 1900); G.O.C. Natal, 1902-04; Orange River Colony District, South Africa, 1904-06; South China, 1906-10; Lieutenant-General, 1912; retired, 1913; G.O.C. 57th Division, 1916-17; died of wounds, 21 June 1917.

Brooke, Alan Francis (Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke)
"Brookie" (1883-1963)

Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal Sir (Henry) Robert Moore
"Brookham" (1878-1953)

Bruce, Colonel George David (born 1872)
Son of Major-General A.A. Bruce. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1893; transferred to Indian Army (61st Pioneers), 1897; North-West Frontier, 1897-97; China, 1900; p.s.c.; Brigade-Major, North Lancashire (later 154th) Brigade, 1910-15; G.S.O.2, 16th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 14th Division
1916-17; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1917-18; D.S.O., 1918; G.S.O.1, H.Q., India, 1918.

Bruce-Williams see Williams, Hugh Bruce

Bryant, Lieutenant-Colonel Alan (1869-1917)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Gloucestershire Regiment; p.s.c., 1902; Instructor, R.M.C., 1903-04; Brigade-Major, 12th and 8th Brigades, 1904-07; G.S.O.2, Coast Defence, Eastern Command, 1908-11; G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, 18th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 18th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 56th Division, 1916; D.S.O., 1917; O.C. Battalions, Welsh Regiment and Northumberland Fusiliers, 1917; killed in action, 17 October 1917.

Buckland, Major-General Sir Reginald Ulick Henry (1864-1933)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1883; Soudan, 1885 and 1888 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Egyptian Army, 1888-89; Survey Duty, Lagos, 1890-91; Adjutant, School of Military Engineering, 1895-99; Instructor, School of Gunnery, 1904-07; Chief Instructor, School of Gunnery, 1907-08; Chief Engineer, Egypt, 1913-14; IV Corps, 1914-16; and Fourth Army, 1916-19. Died in 1933 after being knocked down by a motor car.

Buckle, Brigadier-General Archie Stewart (1868-1916)

Buckle, Major-General Christopher Reginald (1862-1952)

Budworth, Major-General Charles Edward Dutton "Buddy" (1869-1921)
Educated privately and at the R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Chief Instructor, School of Gunnery; B.G.R.A., 1st Division, 1915; IV Corps, 1915-16; X Corps, 1916; M.G.R.A., Fourth Army, 1916-19. Author of various military pamphlets. Brother-in-law of Lieutenant-Colonel Guy Blewitt (q.v.).
Buifin, General Sir Edward Stanislaus (1862-1939)
Stoneyhurst; Trinity College, Dublin; and Militia. Joined Yorkshire Regiment, 1884; Burma 1892-93; South Africa, 1898-1902; G.O.C. Essex Infantry Brigade, 1911-13; 2nd Brigade, 1913-14 (wounded); 28th Division, 1914-15 (sick); 60th Division, U.K., France, Salonika, and E.E.F., 1915-17; XXI Corps, E.E.F., 1917-19; retired, 1925.

Burkhardt, Colonel Valentine Rodolphe (1884-1967)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1903; Captain, 1914; Staff Captain, R.A., 28th Division, 1914; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 42th Division, 1915-17; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, British Military Mission at French Headquarters, 1918; G.S.O.1 with the French First Army, 1918; Military Attache, Peking, 1932-34; G.S.O.1, China Command, 1936-39; retired, 1939; Military Attache, China, 1939; retired, 1941. First Class Interpreter in Chinese and author of Chinese Creeds and Customs (1953-58).

Burnett-Hitchcock, Lieutenant-General Sir Basil Ferguson (1877-1938)
Harrow, Brighton College, and R.M.C. Joined Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1900; p.s.c., 1904; Staff Captain, Eastern Command, 1905-08; G.S.O.2, Bermuda, 1910-12; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 4th Division, 1912-15; G.S.O.2, 47th Division, 1915; A.Q.M.G., V Corps, 1915; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1915-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., IX Corps, 1916; D.A. & Q.M.G., XIV Corps, 1916-17; Director of Mobilization, War Office, 1917-21; G.O.C. 55th Division, 1926-28; 4th Indian Division, 1928-30; retired, 1933. Renowned for his efficient staff work.

Burnett-Stuart, General Sir John Theodosius "Jock" (1875-1958)
Repton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1895; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; Staff Captain/G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-09; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1908-09; G.S.O.2 (D.M.O.), New Zealand, 1910-12; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Camberley, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, 6th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 15th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1 (Commandant, Staff Course), G.H.Q., 1915-16; B.G.G.S., O.b., G.H.Q., 1916-17; B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1917; Deputy Adjutant-General, G.H.Q., 1917-19; G.O.C. Madras District, India, 1920-22; D.M.O. and I., 1922-26; G.O.C. 3rd Division, 1926-30; British Troops in Egypt, 1931-34; Southern Command, 1934-38; retired, 1938. Efficient if somewhat highly-strung.

Burrowes, Brigadier-General Arnold Robinson (1869-1949)
Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1888; Hazara Expedition, 1891; p.s.c., 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; D.A.A.G. & Q.M.G., Bermuda, 1906-07; G.S.O.2, Bermuda, 1907-10; G.S.O.1, 61st Division, U.K., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 66th Division, U.K. and France, 1916-18; Base Commandant, 1919; retired, 1920. He was the designer of the service web
equipment worn throughout the Army. Author of The 1st 
Battalion The Faugh-A-Ballagho in the Great War (1925)

Burstall, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Edward (1870-1945) 
Canadian. Bishop's College School, Lennoxville, and R.M.C. 
Entered Royal Canadian Artillery, 1892; Yukon Force, 1898- 
99; South Africa (1st Canadian Contingent), 1899-1902 
(despatches); p.s.c., 1906; O.C. Royal Canadian Horse 
Artillery, 1907-11; Inspector of Canadian Artillery, 1911- 
14; B.G.R.A., 1st Canadian Division, 1914-15; C.R.A., 
Canadian Corps, 1915-1916; G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division, 
1916-19; Q.M.G., Canada, 1919-20; Inspector-General, Canada, 
1920-23; retired, 1923.

Burtchaell, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Henry (1866-1932) 
United Services College and Trinity College, Dublin. 
Entered Army Medical Service, 1891; North-West Frontier, 
1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Assistant 
Director-General, A.M.S., War Office, 1910-14; S.O. to 
D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1918-19; D.M.S., India, 1919-23; retired, 
1923.

Butler, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Harte Keatinge (1870- 
1935)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Dorset Regiment, 1890; South 
Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches); p.s.c., 
1906; Brigade-Major, Aldershot, 1906-10; G.S.O.3, Aldershot 
Command, 1911-14; O.C. 2/Lancashire Fusiliers, 1914; 3rd 
Brigade, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., First Army, February - June 
1915; M.G.G.S., First Army, June - December 1915; D.C.G.S., 
G.H.Q., 1915-18; G.O.C. III Corps, 1918-19; Western Command, 
1924-28; retired, 1928.

Butler, Major-General Stephen Seymour (1880-1964)
Winchester and Militia. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 
1899; transferred to South Staffordshire Regiment, 1908; 
South Africa, 1899-1901; King's African Rifles, 1905-08; 
explored Northern Arabia disguised as a Bedu, lecturing to 
R.G.S. on return, 1907-08; Egyptian Army, 1909-15; G.S.O.3, 
ANZAC Corps, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, ANZAC Corps, M.E.F., 
1915; G.S.O.2, ANZAC Corps, France, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, Fifth 
Army, 1918; G.S.O.1 (Deputy Chief, Intelligence), G.H.Q., 
1918-19; Inspector-General, West African frontier Force, 
1926-30; Kaid, Sudan Defence Force, 1930-35; G.O.C. 48th 
Division, 1935-39; retired, 1939; re-employed, 1939-43. His 
brother was killed in action, 1916.

Buzzard, Brigadier-General Frank Anstie (1875-1950)
St. Paul's and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; 
p.s.c., 1912; Staff Captain, R.A., 4th Division, 1908-11; 
G.S.O.2, Wessex Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 43rd (Wessex) 
Division, U.K., 1914; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1915; G.S.O.1,
9th Division, 1915; served with R.A., 1916-18 (wounded, Despatches); D.S.O., 1917; and Bar, 1919; retired, 1921.

Byng, Hon. Julian Hedworth George (Field-Marshal Viscount Byng of Vimy) "Bungo" (1862-1935)
7th son of 5th Earl of Strafford. Eton and Militia. Joined 10th Hussars, 1883; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1884; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 10th Hussars, 1902-04; Commandant, Cavalry School, Netheravon, 1904-05; G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1905-07; 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1907-09; East Anglian Division, 1910-12; Egypt, 1912-14; 3rd Cavalry Division, 1914-15; Cavalry Corps, 1915; IX Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16; XVII Corps, France, 1916; Canadian Corps, 1916-17; Third Army, 1917-19; Baron, 1919; Governor-General, Canada, 1921-26; Chief Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, 1928-31; Viscount, 1928; Field-Marshal, 1932. Brother-in-law of Field-Marshal Lord Cavan (q.v.). Another brother-in-law was killed in action in 1914.

Caldecott, Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Lawrence (1874-1927)
Rugby; Oriel College, Oxford; and Militia. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; Tibet, 1903-04; A.D.C. to Lieutenant-Governor, Burma, 1907-10; Captain, 1913; service with R.G.A., 1914-18; D.S.O., 1916; Deputy-Assistant Inspector-General of Training, 1918-19. Played cricket for Hampshire; rode winner of jumping championship of Burma.

Cameron, General Sir Archibald Rice (1870-1944)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Royal Highlanders, 1890; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches); Military Secretary to Governor of Cape Colony, 1905-08; Instructor, R.M.C., 1909-13; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1914; G.S.O.2, 5th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1915; B.G.G.S., X Corps, 1915-18; B.G.G.S. (additional), Fourth Army, 1918; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, 1918-19 (wounded, despatches); D.S.D., War Office, 1925-27; G.O.C. 4th Division, 1927-31; Scottish Command, 1933-37; retired, 1937.

Cameron, Major-General Neville John Gordon (1873-1955)
Son of General Sir William Cameron. Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Cameron Highlanders; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1900-02; A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, Scottish Command, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 103rd Brigade, 1915-16; wounded, 1 July 1916; 151st Brigade, 1916-17; 49th Division, 1917-19; 16th Brigade, Ireland, 1921-23; 12th Brigade, 1923-25; 49th (West Riding) Division, 1926-30; retired, 1931. His only son was killed in action in 1940.

Campbell, General Sir David Graham Muschet (1869-1936)
Clifton. Joined 9th Lancers, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1902; Brigade-Major, India, 1905-09; O.C. 9th Lancers, 1912-14 (wounded); G.O.C. 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-16; 21st

Campbell, Major-General John (1871-1941)
Grandson of Major-General J.D. Mein. Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Cameron Highlanders, 1892; Soudan, 1898 (despatches); South Africa, 1900-01 (despatches); p.s.c., 1903; Staff Captain, War Office, 1904-05; Brigade-Major, Aldershot, 1905-08; Chief Instructor, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1909-13; O.C. 2nd Cameron Highlanders, 1914-15 (wounded); 121st Brigade, 1915-18; 31st Division, 1918-19; 11th Brigade, 1919-21; retired, 1921.

Campbell, Colonel Robert Bruce (1878-1963)

Campbell, Lieutenant-General Sir Walter (1864-1936)
Wellington; Trinity College, Cambridge; and R.M.C. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1887; p.s.c.; Waziristan, 1894-95; Chitral, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); A.Q.M.G., Scottish Command, 1911-14; A.A. & Q.M.G., 6th Division, 1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., III Corps, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., Third Army, 1915; D.Q.M.G., M.E.F., 1915-19; Q.M.G. to the Forces, 1923-27; retired, 1927.

Capper, Major-General Sir John Edward (1861-1955)
Grandson of W.T. Copeland, M.P., owner of the Copeland potteries. Wellington College. Entered Royal Engineers, 1880; Tirah, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Commandant, Balloon School, 1903-10; Superintendent of the Balloon Factory, Farnborough, 1906-09; Commandant, School of Military Engineering, 1911-14; Deputy Inspector of Communications, 1914-15; Chief Engineer, III Corps, 1915; Chief Engineer, Third Army, 1915; G.O.C. 24th Division, 1915-17; M.G. Corps Training Centre, U.K., 1917; Director-General, Tank Corps, U.K., 1917-18; G.O.C. 64th Division, U.K., 1918-19; Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey, 1920-25; retired, 1925. Both his brother, Major-General Thompson Capper (q.v.), and his only son were killed in action during the war. Also brother of Brigadier-General W.B. Capper and
Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Capper. A soldier of progressive ideas, meeting the Wright brothers in 1904 and pioneering balloons and aircraft, he was a leading figure in British military aeronautics prior to the war and was then involved in the development of the tank during the war.

Capper, Major-General Thompson "Tommy" (1863-1915)

Carey, Major-General George Glas Sandeman (1867-1948)

Carr, Lieutenant-General Laurence (1886-1954)

Carter, Major-General Sir Evan Eyare (1866-1933)
King's School, Canterbury; Trinity College, Oxford; and London School of Economics. Joined Leicestershire Regiment, 1889; transferred to Army Service Corps, 1890; p.s.c., 1896; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches, C.M.G.); D.A. & Q.M.G., War Office, 1901; Chief Instructor, A.S.C. Training Establishment, 1905-08; Assistant Director Supplies and Transport, London District, 1912; Colonel i/c A.S.C. Records, Woolwich Dockyard, 1913-14; A.Q.M.G., Lines of Communication, 1914-15; Director of Supplies, G.H.Q., 1915-19; retired, 1921.

Carter-Campbell, Colonel George Tupper Campbell (1869-1921)
Joined Scottish Rifles, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Adjutant, Volunteers, 1904-07; O.C. 2nd Cameronians, 1915; 94th Brigade, 1915-18; 51st Division, 1918-19. An outstanding officer and a very fine type of Regular officer of his day who had the gift of inspiring his subordinates.
Carthew, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Walter Colby (1880-1955)

Cator, Major-General Albemarle Bertie Edward "Alby" (1877-1932)

Cavan, Earl of, Frederick Rudolf Lambart "Fatty" (1865-1946)
Eldest son of 9th Earl of Cavan, who he succeeded in 1900. Eton and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1885; South Africa, 1901 (despatches); O.C. 1st Grenadier Guards, 1908-12; retired, November 1913; re-employed, August 1914; G.O.C. 2nd London Brigade, 1914; 4th Brigade, 1914-15; Guards Division, 1915-16; XIV Corps, France and Italy, 1916-18; British Troops in Italy, 1918-19; Aldershot, 1920-22; C.I.G.S., 1922-26; Field-Marshal, 1932. Brother-in-law of Field-Marshal Lord Byng (q.v.). Regarded as one of the best Corps commanders on the Western Front.

Cavendish, Brigadier-General Frederick William Lawrence Sheppard Hart "Caviare" (1877-1931)

Cayley, Major-General Douglas Edward (1870-1951)
Son of Deputy Surgeon-General H. Cayley. Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Worcestershire Regiment, 1890; South Africa, 1900-02; O.C. 4th Worcesters, 1914-15; 88th Brigade, 1915-17 (gassed); 110th Brigade, 1918; 19th Division, 1918-19 (wounded thrice, despatches); retired, 1919. Brother of Major-General Sir Walter Cayley and father of Commander R.D. Cayley, R.N.

Cecil, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Edward (born 1878)
Grandson of 2nd Marquis of Salisbury, son of Lord Arthur Cecil, and cousin of Viscount Cecil of Chelwood
(Conservative M.P., 1906-23). Winchester and Trinity College, Cambridge. Joined 18th Hussars, 1899; transferred to 21st Lancers, 1899; O.C. 21st Lancers, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 58th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, th Cavalry Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division, 1918-19; retired, 1921.

Charles, Lieutenant-General Sir (James) Ronald Edmonston (1875-1955)
Winchester and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1894; South Africa, 1899-1900; Bazar Valley and Mohmand Field Forces, 1908; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, Lahore Division, 1915; B.G.G.S., Indian Corps, 1915; B.G.G.S., XV and XVII Corps, 1915-18; G.O.C. 25th Division, 1918-19; D.S.D., India, 1921-23; Commandant, R.M.A., 1924-26; D.M.O. and I., War Office, 1926-31; M.G.O., 1931-34; retired, 1934.

Charles, Lieutenant-Colonel William Gwyther (1880-1925)
Felsted School. Joined Essex Regiment, 1900; p.s.c.; employed with West African Frontier Force, 1903-05; G.S.O.1, 40th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1918-19.

Charlton, Air Commodore Lionel Evelyn Oswald "Leo" (1879-1958)

Charrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Sydney Herbert (1878-1954)

Charteris, Brigadier-General John (1877-1946)
Charteris, Colonel Nigel Keppel (1878-1967)

Chetwode, Sir Philip Walhouse (Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode) (1869-1950)

Chichester, Major-General Sir Arlington Augustus (1863-1948)

Church, Colonel George Ross Marryat (1868-1940)

Clarke, Colonel Arthur Lionel Crisp (1874-1935)
Rugby and Militia. Joined Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); p.s.c.; Assistant Instructor, School of Musketry, 1902-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1907-08; G.S.O.2, South Midland Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 48th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 27th Division, B.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 27th Division, Salonika, 1916; G.S.O.1, 69th Division, U.K., 1916-19; retired, 1920.

Clarke, Lieutenant-Colonel Mervyn Officer (1878-1963)
Son of Surgeon-General J.J. Clarke. Harrow. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; p.s.c., 1913;
G.S.O.2, 17th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, Staff Course, Cambridge, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, II Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division, 1918; 20th Divisions, 1918 (sacked); O.C. 3rd Royal Fusiliers, 1918-19. Well known for playing all games, his caustic remarks, and for his outspokenness.

Clarke, Colonel Reginald Graham (1879-1959)
Harrow and Militia. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Assistant Instructor, School of Musketry, 1910-13; Instructor, School of Musketry, 1915; Instructor, Machine Gun Corps Training Centre, 1915-16; Chief Instructor (G.S.O.2), Machine Gun Corps Training Centre, 1916; Chief Instructor, Machine Gun Corps, 1918; D.S.O., 1918; Deputy Instructor, Machine Gun Units, Third Army, 1918-19; retired, 1928.

Clarke, Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Edwards (1871-1962)

Clayton, Colonel Edward Robert (1877-1957)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1897; Tiral Expedition, 1897-98; p.s.c.; G.S.O.2, XI Corps, 1916; O.C. 6th Scottish Rifles, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, VI Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1918-19; retired, 1930.

Clayton, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Thomas (1855-1933)
Entered Army, 1876; Bechuanaland, 1884-85 (despatches); Ashanti, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, C.B.); Director of Supplies, War Office, 1906-10; Major-General i/c Administration, South Africa, 1911-15; Inspector-General of Communications, B.E.F., 1915; retired, 1917.

Clive, General Sir (George) Sidney (1874-1959)
Cobbe, General Sir Alexander Stanhope (1870-1931)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir A.H. Cobbe. Wellington and R.M.C. Joined South Wales Borderers, 1889; transferred to Indian Army, 1892; p.s.c.; Chitral Relief Force, 1895 (despatches); South Angoniiland Expedition, 1898; Expedition against the Kwamba, 1899 (despatches); Ashanti, 1900 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Somaliland, 1902-04 (despatches, V.C.); G.S.O.1, H.Q., India, 1910-14; G.S.O.1, Lahore Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., I Corps, 1915-16; D.S.D. and D.M.T., India, 1916; G.O.C. 7th Indian Division, Mesopotamia, 1916; III Indian Corps, Mesopotamia, 1916; I Indian Corps, Mesopotamia, 1916-19; Secretary of Military Department, India Office, 1920-26; G.O.C. Northern Command, India, 1926-30; Military Secretary, India Office, 1930-31. Brother of Colonel H.H. Cobbe.

Cochrane, Brigadier-General James Kilvington (1873-1948)
Bedford and R.M.C. Joined Leinster Regiment, 1893; West African Frontier Force, 1900-03; p.s.c., 1908; G.S.O.3 (D.M.O.), New Zealand, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, 12th Division, 1914-16; G.S.O.1, 55th Division, 1916-17; Commandant, Small Arms School, 1917; G.S.O.1 (British Mission to U.S.A.), 1917; G.O.C. 61st Brigade, 1918-20; retired, 1920.

Coffin, Major-General Clifford (1870-1959)

Coleridge, General Sir John Francis Stanhope Duke "Daddy" (1878-1951)
Wellington and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1898; transferred Indian Army (8th Gurkha Rifles), 1900; p.s.c.; Tibet, 1903-04; North-West Frontier, 1911-12; G.S.O.3, 11th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 11th Division, M.B.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 55th Division, E.E.F and France, 1916-17; G.O.C. 188th brigade, 1917; 189th Brigade, 1917-18; G.O.C. Northern Command, 1933; Secretary, Military Department, India Office, 1933-36; G.O.C. Northern Command, 1936-40; retired, 1940.

Collins, Major-General Robert John "Jack" (1880-1950)
One of eight sons. Marlborough and Militia. Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902; Egyptian Army, 1904-11; Somaliland, 1910; p.s.c., 1913; G.S.O.3, I Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, Second Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1916; 17th Division, 1916-17; Fifth Army, 1917; Staff School, Cambridge, 1917-18; G.O.C. 73rd Brigade, 1918-19; D.M.T., India, 1923-26; Commandant, Small Arms School, 1929-32; G.O.C., 3rd Indian Division, 1934-38; retired, 1938; re-employed; 1939; G.O.C. 61st Division, 1939;
Commandant, Staff College, 1939-41; retired, 1941. Editor of the Army Quarterly, 1942-50, and author of Lord Wavell (1948). Brother of Rear-Admiral R. Collins and Brigadier L.P. Collins.

Congreve, General Sir Walter Norris "Squib" (1862-1927)  
Harrow; Pembroke College, Oxford; Militia; and R.M.C.  
Joined Rifle Brigade, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1902 (V.C., wounded and despatches); Commandant, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1909-11; G.O.C. 18th Brigade, 1911-15; 6th Division, 1915; XIII Corps, 1915-17 (wounded losing a hand); VII Corps 1918 (sick); G.O.C. Southern Command, 1923-24; Governor, Malta, 1924-27. A country gentleman of the old school from an old gentry family with many service connections. Brother-in-law of General Sir John Shea (q.v.). His son, Major W. la T. Congreve, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., was killed in action on the Somme in 1916.

Constable-Maxwell-Scott, Major-General Sir Walter Joseph (1875-1954)  
Son of Hon. Joseph Constable-Maxwell-Scott (third son of Baron Herries of Terregles); his mother was the great-granddaughter of Sir Walter Scott. Stonyhurst and Militia.  
Joined Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 1897; p.s.c.; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-13; G.S.O.1, 22nd Division, B.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-17; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division, 1917; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1934.

Cookson, Major-General George Arthur (1860-1929)  
Wimbledon School. Joined 13 Foot, 1880; transferred to 90 Foot, 1880, and Indian Army (29th Cavalry), 1884; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.O.C. Lucknow Cavalry Brigade, 1911-14; 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, 1915-16; retired, 1919.

Cory, Lieutenant-General Sir George Norton (1874-1968)  
Canadian. Bishop's College School, Lennoxville, and R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1895; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; Aden, 1903; G.S.O.1, 51st Division, 1915; 27th Division, 1915; B.G.G.S., VI Corps, M.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-17; M.G.G.S., British Salonika Force, 1917-19; D.C.G.S., India, 1922-26; G.O.C., 50th Division, 1927-28; retired, 1931; re-employed, 1940-43.

Cosens, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Philip Lewes (born 1884)  
Couper, Major-General Sir Victor Arthur (1859-1938)
Joined Rifle Brigade, 1879; Burma, 188-89; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Inspector of Gymnasia, 1910-14; G.O.C. 43rd Brigade, 1914; 14th Division, 1914-18; retired, 1919.

Courage, Brigadier-General Anthony (1875-1944)

Cox, Brigadier-General Edgar William (1882-1918)

Cox, General Sir (Herbert) Vaughan (1860-1923)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined 25th Foot, 1880; transferred to Indian Army (69th Punjabis), 1883; Afghan War, 1879-80; Burma, 1885-89; Mohmand, 1897; Tirah, 1907-08; China, 1901-02; O.C. 69th Punjabis, 1902-07; 4th Indian Brigade, 1912-14; 2nd Indian Brigade, 1914; 29th Indian Brigade, Arabia, E.E.F., and Gallipoli, 1914-15 (wounded); G.O.C. 4th Australian Division, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-17; Military Secretary, India Office, 1917-19; retired, 1921. Capable.

Crookenden, Colonel Arthur (1877-1962)

Crookshank, Major-General Sir Sidney D'Aguilar (1870-1941)
Northcotts. Entered Royal Engineers, 1889; Chitral, 1895; C.R.E., 47th Division, 1915-16; Deputy Director of Light railways, 1916-17; Chief Engineer, XV Corps, 1917; Deputy Director-General of Transportation, 1917-18; Director-General of Transportation, 1918-19; Chief Engineer, Southern Command, 1925-27; retired, 1927.

Crossman, Colonel George Lytton (1877-1947)
Radley and R.M.C. Joined West Yorkshire Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches and D.S.O.); Instructor,
R.M.C., 1908-12; G.S.O.2, 30th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, VII Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, R.F.C., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 59th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1918; G.S.O.1, No.1 Tank Group, Tank Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1934.

Crozier, Major-General Baptist Barton (1878-1957)

Cubitt, General Sir Thomas Astley (1871-1939)

Cuffe, Colonel James Aloysius Francis (1876-1957)
Queen's Service Academy, Dublin; University College, Dublin; and R.M.C. Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1896; Nandi Expedition, 1905-06; G.S.O.3, Third Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1916-18; G.S.O.1, H.Q., Allied Armies in France, 1918-19; retired, 1926.

Cumming, Brigadier-General Hanway Robert (1867-1921)

Cunningham, Colonel Sir Thomas Andrew Alexander Montgomery (1877-1945)
Succeeded his father, Colonel Sir William Cunningham, V.C., as 10th Baronet, 1897. Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1897; South Africa, 1900-01 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); D.A. & Q.M.G., 5th Division, 1909-12; Military Attache, Vienna and Cettinje, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, attached French Army, 1914; G.S.O.2, I Corps, 1914-15; Military Attache, Athens, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 68th Division, U.K., 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1,
American Staff School, 1918; retired, 1924. Author of *Dusty Measure* (1939).

**Curling, Brigadier-General Bryan James (1877-1955)**

**Currie, General Sir Arthur William (1875-1933)**

**Currie, Brigadier-General Ryves Alexander Mark (1875-1920)**
Wellington and Militia. Joined Somerset Light Infantry; North-West Frontier, 1897; p.s.c., 1911; G.S.O.2 (commandant Cadet School), 1915; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1 (Commandant, Junior Staff School), 1916-17; G.O.C. 176th Brigade, 1917; B.G.G.S. (Commandant, Senior and Junior Staff Courses and Staff School, Cambridge), 1917-18; G.O.C. 89th Brigade, 1918-19. Died on active service, 30 April 1920.

**Cuthbert, Major-General Gerald James (1861-1931)**
Privately educated. Joined Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 1882; transferred to Scots Guards, 1882; Soudan, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); O.C. 1st Scots Guards, 1904-06; 13th Brigade, 1914; 140th Brigade, 1914-16; 39th Division, 1916-17; 72th Division, U.K., 1917-18; retired, 1919.

**Dalby, Major-General Alistair Grant (1880-1963)**
Eton and R.M.C. Joined K.R.R.C., 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); Somaliland, 1904; Egyptian Army, 1906; O.C. 8/Berkshire, 1915-16; Instructor, Senior Officers School, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, Training, G.H.Q., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1918 (severely wounded twice, despatches, D.S.O.); retired, 1937; re-employed, 1939; G.O.C. 18th Division, 1939-40.

**Dallas, Major-General Alistair Grant (1866-1931)**
Joined 16th Lancers, 1886; transferred to Durham Light Infantry, 1902; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; Commandant, School of Musketry, South Africa, 1907-11; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, IV Corps, 1914; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1915 (sacked); G.O.C. 32nd Brigade, M.E.F., 1915-16; 53rd Division, M.E.F. and E.E.F.,
1916-17; 71st Division, U.K., 1917-18; 1st Cyclist Division, 1918-19; retired, 1922.

Daly, Major-General Arthur Crawford (1871-1936)

Daniell, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Edward Lloyd (1874-1916)
Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Seaforth Highlanders, 1895; p.s.c.; Crete, 1897; Soudan, 1898 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1901; Mohmand Expedition, 1908; G.S.O.2, 5th Indian Division, 1911-13; G.S.O.1, 21st Division, 1915-16; killed when his Division's H.Q. was shelled, 4 April 1916.

Davidson, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Humphrey (1886-1962)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1906; G.S.O.3, 2nd Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.3, IV Corps, 1916; G.S.O.2, IV Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, R.F.C., 1917; G.S.O.1, R.F.C., 1917-18; Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry, 1918-19; retired, 1920; Deputy Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry, 1939-40. Brother of Major-General Sir John Davidson (q.v.).

Davidson, Major-General Sir John Humphrey "Tavish" (1872-1954)

Davidson, Lieutenant-Colonel Norman Randall (1878-1917)
King's Scholar, Eton. Entered Royal Artillery, 1898; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2, Guards Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1916-17; D.S.O., 1916, and Bar, 1917. Died of wounds, 5 October 1917.

Davies, Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Martin (born 1881)
G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 58th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1920.

Davies, General Sir Francis John "Joey" (1864-1948)
Eldest son of Lieutenant-General H.F. Davies. Eton and Militia. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1884; Soudan, 1885; p.s.c., 1891; West Africa, 1892; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1908-09; G.O.C. 1st Brigade, 1909-10; B.G.G.S., Aldershot Command, 1910-13; Director Staff Duties, War Office, 1913-14; G.O.C. 8th Division, 1914-15; VIII and IX Corps, 1915-16; Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, 1916-19; G.O.C. Scottish Command, 1919-23; Lieutenant of the Tower of London, 1923-26; retired, 1926. Brother of Major-General H.R. Davies (q.v.).

Davies, Major-General Henry Rodolph (1865-1950)
Second son of Lieutenant-General H.F. Davies. Eton. Joined Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 1884; Burma, 1887-88; Tirah, 1897-98; China, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, North China, 1906-09; O.C. 2/Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1911-15; 3rd Brigade, 1915-16; 11th Division, 1917-19 (wounded, September 1918); 49th Division, 1919-23; retired, 1923. Brother of General Sir Francis Davies (q.v.).

Davies, Colonel Richard Hutton (1862-1918)
New Zealander. New Zealand Staff Corps; p.s.c.; O.C. New Zealand Mounted Rifles, South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, C.B.); 6th Brigade, 1910-14; 20th Division, 1914-16. Died, 5 May 1918.

Davies, Brigadier-General Walter Percy Lionel (1871-1952)
Educated privately. Militia. Entered Royal Artillery, 1893; p.s.c., 1906; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); G.S.O.2, India, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, Meerut Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, Meerut Division, B.E.F. and Mesopotamia, 1915-16; B.G.R.A., 13th Division, Mesopotamia, 1916-19; retired, 1924.

Dawkins, Major-General Sir Charles Tyrwhitt (1858-1919)

Dawnay, Major-General Guy Pagan (1878-1952)

Dawson, Brigadier-General Robert (1861-1930)

De Brett, Brigadier-General Harry Simonds (1870-1965)

De Burgh, General Sir Eric (1881-1973)
Son of Lieutenant-Colonel T.J. de Burgh. Marlborough and Militia. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1903; transferred to Indian Army (9th Hodson's Horse), 1904; p.s.c., 1914; South Africa, 1902; G.S.O.2, 3rd Cavalry Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1917-18; C.G.S., India, 1939-41; retired, 1941. Married the daughter of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe (q.v.), 1923. A brother was killed in action in 1914.

Deedes, General Sir Charles Parker (1879-1969)
Winchester and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Light infantry, 1899; p.s.c., 1911; South Africa, 1901-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1916-17; Deputy D.S.D., War Office, 1918; Director of Personal Services, War Office, 1930-33; Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, 1934-37; retired, 1937. Played cricket for Hertfordshire. Father of Major-General C.J. Deedes.

De Lisle, General Sir (Henry de) Beauvoir (1864-1955)
Descended from an ancient Channel Island family. Born on Guernsey, educated in Jersey and R.M.C. Joined Durham Light Infantry, 1883; transferred to 5th Dragoon Guards, 1902, and 1st Royal Dragoons, 1903; p.s.c., 1899; Soudan, 1885-86 (D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); O.C. 1st Dragoons, 1906-10; G.S.O.1, Aldershot Command, 1910-11; G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1911-14; 1st Cavalry Division, 1914-15; 29th Division, 1915-18; XIII Corps, 1918; XV Corps,

**De Pree, Major-General Hugo Douglas (1870-1943)**
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1890; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; East Africa, 1901; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1906-09; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1909-10; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., Lahore Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, Lahore Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1916-18; G.O.C. 189th Brigade, 1918; 115th Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1931. Cousin of Field-Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.) and a Trustee of his Estate.

**De Rougemont, Brigadier-General Cecil Henry (1865-1951)**

**Deverell, Field-Marshal Sir Cyril John (1874-1947)**
Bedford. Joined West Yorkshire Regiment; 1895; p.s.c., 1907; Ashanti, 1895-96; O.C. 4/East Yorkshires, 1915; 20th Brigade, 1915-16; 3rd Division, 1916-19; Q.M.G., India, 1927-30; C.G.S., India, 1927-30; G.O.C. Western Command, 1930-33; Eastern Command, 1933-36; C.I.G.S., 1936-37; Field-Marshal, 1936. He earned the reputation of being a ruthlessly aggressive commander during the war rising from Captain to Major-General in only two years.

**Dick Cunyngham, Major-General James Keith (1877-1935)**

**Diggle, Lieutenant-Colonel Wadham Heathcote (born 1885)**
Dill, Field-Marshall Sir John Greer "Jack" (1881-1944)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined Leinster Regiment, 1901; South Africa, 1901-02; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1917-18; B.G.G.S. (Operations), G.H.Q., 1918-19; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley, 1931-34; D.M.O. and I., War Office, 1934-36; G.O.C. Palestine, 1936-37; Aldershot, 1937-39; I Corps, 1939-40; V.C.I.G.S., 1940; C.I.G.S., 1940-41; Field-Marshal, 1941; Head of British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, 1941-44.

Dillon, Eric FitzGerald (Brigadier Viscount Dillon) (1881-1946)

Dobbie, Lieutenant-General Sir William Graham Shedden (1879-1964)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1899; South Africa, 1901-02; p.s.c., 1911; G.S.O.3, Second Army, 1915; G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, VII Corps, 1916; G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1918-19; G.O.C. Malaya, 1935-39; retired, 1939; Governor and C.-in-C., Malta, 1940-42; retired, 1942. Author of A Very Present Help (1945) and Active Service with Christ (1948). A member of the Plymouth Brethren, his nephew was Major-General Orde Wingate of Chindit fame.

Dooner, Lieutenant-Colonel John Graham (1878-1918)

Doran, Major-General Beauchamp John Colclough (1860-1943)
Son of General Sir John Doran. Joined 16 Foot, 1880; transferred, 18 Foot, 1880; Afghan War, 1880; Soudan, 1884-85; Hazara Expedition, 1888; Miranzai, 1891; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); A.Q.M.G., Irish Command, 1908-12; G.O.C. 8th Brigade, 1912-14; 86th Brigade, 1914-15; 25th Division, 1915-16; retired, 1920. Brother of Brigadier-General W.R.B. Doran and brother-in-law of Major-General Sir William MacPherson (q.v.).
Dorling, Colonel Francis Holland (born 1877)  
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1897;  
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; employed with South African  
Constabulary, 1901-04; Instructor, R.M.C., 1906-10; G.S.O.3,  
G.S.O.2, VI Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1917-18;  
G.S.O.1, Tactical School, Camberley, 1918-19; retired, 1931.  
Brother of Vice-Admiral J.W. Dorling.

Douglas, Major-General Sir William (1858-1920)  
Bath. Joined 1 Foot, 1878; Bechuanaland, 1884-85; p.s.c.,  
1897; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. a Battalion of the  
Royal Scots, 1900-04; A.A.G. and G.S.O.1, 8th and 6th  
Divisions, 1906-09; G.O.C. 14th Brigade, 1909-12; East  
Lancashire (later 42nd) Division, U.K., M.E.F. and B.E.F.,  
1913-17; Western Reserve Centre, U.K., 1917-18.

Drake, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald John "Reggie" (1876-1948)  
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined North Staffordshire Regiment,  
1890; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; Staff Captain and  
D.A.A.G., War Office, 1908-12; retired, 1912; G.S.O.2, War  
Office, 1914-17; G.S.O.1, I.B., G.H.Q., 1917-19; retired,  
1919.

Drew, Major-General Sir James Syme (1883-1955)  
Harrow. Joined Cameron Highlanders, 1902; D.S.O., 1916;  
G.S.O.2 (Chief Instructor), Senior Officers School,  
Aldershot, 1918; G.S.O.2, 15th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2,  
XVIII Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.2 (Chief Instructor, Senior  
Officers' School, Aldershot, 1918; G.S.O.2, 63rd Division,  
1918; G.S.O.1, 29th Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. 52th Division,  
1938-41; Director-General, Territorial Army and Home Guard,  
1944-45; retired, 1945.

Dreyer, Major-General John Tuthill (1876-1959)  
Grandson of General J.F.C. Dreyer. Royal School Armagh and  
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897; South Africa, 1901- 
02; Instructor, School of Gunnery, 1907-09; Experimental  
Staff, Shoeburyness, 1910-13; Staff Captain, Military  
Aeronautics Directorate, War Office, 1913-14; Lefroy Gold  
Medal, Royal Artillery Institution, 1914; Deputy Assistant  
Director of Military Aeronautics, War Office, 1914-15;  
D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1915; Member, Ordnance Committee, Ministry  
of Munitions, 1915-18; Assistant Director of Artillery,  
G.H.Q., 1918-19; Director of Artillery, War Office, 1923-24;  
retired, 1930. Brother of Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer.

Du Cane, General Sir John Philip (1865-1950)  
Grandson of Baron Lyndhurst. Wellington and R.M.A. Entered  
Royal Artillery, 1884; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches);  
Professor, Staff College, 1905-07; G.S.O.1, War Office,  
1908-11; C.R.A., 3rd Division, 1911-12; B.G.G.S. to  
Inspector-General of Home Forces, 1912-14; B.G.G.S., III  
Corps, 1914-15; M.G.R.A., G.H.Q., 1915; G.O.C. XV Corps,

Dudgeon, Major-General Frederick Annesley (1866-1943)
Educated abroad. Joined South Lancashire Regiment, 1885; p.s.c.; O.C. 2/South Lancashire, 1914-15; 42nd Brigade, 1915-17; 56th Division, 1917-18 (sick); retired, 1927.

Dugan, Winston Joseph (Major-General Lord Dugan) (1877-1951)
Lurgan College and Wimbledon. In the ranks 3 years 291 days; commissioned into Lincolnshire Regiment, 1900; transferred to Worcestershire Regiment, 1904; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 2/Royal Irish Rifles, 1915-16 (wounded, D.S.O.); 184th Brigade, 1916 (wounded); 73rd Brigade, 1916-18; Assistant Inspector of Training, 1918-19 (C.M.G.); G.O.C. 56th Division, 1931-34; retired, 1934. Governor of South Australia, 1934-39, and Victoria, 1939-49; created Baron, 1949.

Duncans, Major-General Francis John (1870-1960)
Shrewsbury, Switzerland, and Germany. Joined Royal Scots, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. Battalion of Royal Scots, 1914; 165th Brigade, 1916-17; 60th Brigade, 1917-18; 61st Division, 1918-19 (wounded); Military Attache, Bucharest, 1919-24; retired, 1924.

Durand, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Marion (born 1876)

Edmonds, Brigadier-General Sir James Edward "Archimedes" (1861-1956)
Elles, General Sir Hugh Jamieson (1880-1945)


Evans, Brigadier-General Cuthbert (1871-1934)

Fanshawe, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Arthur (1859-1952)

Fanshawe, Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple "Fanny" (1860-1957)
Winchester and Militia. Joined 19th Hussars, 1882; Egypt, 1882-84; Soudan, 1884-85; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. Queen's Bays, 1903-07; 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1907-10; Presidency Brigade, India, 1910-13; Jubbulpore Brigade, India, 1913-14; 1st Indian Cavalry Division, 1914-15; Cavalry Corps, 1915; V Corps, 1915-16 (sacked and replaced by his brother, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe [q.v.]); 58th Division, 1916-17 (sacked); 18th Indian Division, Mesopotamia, 1917-19; retired, 1920. Brother of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe (q.v.) and Major-General Sir Robert Fanshawe (q.v.). Married the daughter of

Fanshawe, Major-General Sir Robert "Fanny" (1863-1946)

Fasken, Major-General Charles Grant Mansell (1855-1928)
Son of General E.T. Fasken. Marlborough. Joined 17 Foot; 1874; transferred to 16 Foot, 1875, and Indian Army, 1878; Afghan War, 1878-80; Aitchakzai Expedition, 1880; Hazara Expedition, 1888 (despatches); North-West Frontier, 1900; Somaliland, 1903-4; G.O.C. Bannu Brigade, India, 1907-11; Major-General, 1907; retired, 1914; G.O.C. 19th Division, 1914-15 (invalided). Brother of Brigadier-General W.H. Fasken.

Faunthorpe, Lieutenant-Colonel John Champion (1872-1929)
Rossall School and Balliol College, Oxford. Entered Indian Civil Service, 1892. Joined Army, 1914; Military Director of Kinematograph Operations on Western Front, 1916; Lieutenant-Colonel and G.S.O.2, Intelligence Branch, G.H.Q., 1917; War Mission to U.S.A., 1918; Attached British Embassy, Washington, 1919-20; demobilised, 1920; retired from I.C.S., 1925. A great athlete, he excelled at all sport, notably horse racing, pigsticking, polo, rifle shooting (representing India at Bisley), and big-game shooting, and in natural history.

Feetham, Major-General Edward (1863-1918)
Marlborough and Militia. Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1883; Camel Corps, Soudan, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); O.C. 10/Mounted Infantry, 1902; O.C. 2/Royal Berkshires, 1911-15; C.B., 1915; 137th Brigade, 1915-16 (sick); 71st Brigade, 1916-17; C.M.G., 1917; 39th Division, 1917-18; killed in action, 29 March 1918.

Feilding, Major-General Sir Geoffrey Percy Thynne (1866-1932)

Fergusson, General Sir Charles (1865-1951)

Festing, Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Christian (born 1879)
Son of Major-General Sir Francis Festing. Winchester. Joined Royal Marine Light Infantry, 1898; China, 1900; Captain, 1909; Assistant Professor, Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 1914; G.S.O.2, 3rd Canadian Division, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, Canadian Corps, 1918-19. Brother of Brigadier-General F.L. Festing and uncle of Field-Marshal Sir Francis Festing (C.I.G.S., 1958-61). One of three brothers who all won the D.S.O. A brother-in-law was killed in action in 1915 and a brother died of war wounds in 1923.

Fisher, Lieutenant-General Sir Bertie Drew (1878-1972)
Marlborough; New College, Oxford; Joined 17th Lancers, 1900; South Africa, 1900-02; p.s.c.; learnt to fly, 1913; G.S.O.3, Military Aeronautics, War Office, 1913-14; Brigade-Major, 6th Cavalry brigade, 1914-15; O.C. Leicestershire Yeomanry, 1915; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division, 1915-18; G.O.C. 8th Brigade, 1918-19; (wounded twice; D.S.O., 1915, and Bar, 1918); Commandant, R.M.C., 1934-38; retired, 1938; G.O.C. Southern Command, 1939-40. Trustee of the estate of Field-Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.).

FitzGerald, Brigadier-General Percy Desmond (1872-1933)

Follett, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Spencer (1882-1941)
Eton and Militia. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1901; South Africa, 1899-1902; Instructor, R.M.C., 1911-14; O.C., Young
Officers' School, 1916; G.S.O.2, 68th Division, U.K., 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 38th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, X Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 14th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 59th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1929.

Ford, Major-General Sir Reginald (1868-1951)

Forestier-Walker, Major-General Sir George Townshend "Hooky" (1866-1939)

Forster, Brigadier David (1878-1959)
St. Paul's and R.M.A. (Pollock Medal). Entered Royal Engineers, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1900; p.s.c., 1913; G.S.O.3, 21st Division, U.K., 1915; G.S.O.2, 21st Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915-16 (wounded); G.S.O.1, 50th Division, 1916 (wounded); 33rd Division, 1916-17 (wounded); War Office, 1918-22; retired, 1934; re-employed, 1940-42. Author of Mind and Method in Modern Minor Tactics (1919). Very religious and an active member of the Oxford Group from 1921.

Foss, Brigadier Charles Calveley (1885-1953)
Son of the Bishop of Osaka, Japan. Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Bedford Regiment, 1904; Captain, 1912; won V.C. at Neuve Chapelle, March 1915; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd Canadian Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 1st Canadian Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps, 1917; G.S.O.2, Staff School, Cambridge, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, XXII Corps, U.K., 1918; G.S.O.1, 57th Division, 1918-20; retired, 1937; re-employed, 1940-42.

Foulkes, Major-General Charles Howard (1875-1969)
Bedford Modern School. Entered Royal Engineers, 1894; Sierre Leone, 1898-99; South Africa, 1899-1900; Nigeria, 1903; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.O.C. Special Brigade,
1917; Director of Gas Services, 1917-19; Chief Engineer, Southern Command, 1924-26; Aldershot Command, 1926-30; retired, 1930. Father of Major-General T.H.F. Foulkes. Author of Gas! The Story of the Special Brigade (1934). Played hockey for Scotland, 1907-09, winning an Olympic medal in 1908.

**Fowke, Lieutenant-General Sir George Henry (1861-1936)**
Wellington. Entered Royal Engineers, 1884; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); with Japanese Army in Manchuria, 1905; Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1906-08; Inspector of R.E., 1913-14; Chief Engineer, 1915; Engineer-in-Chief, 1915-16; Adjutant-General, 1916-19; retired, 1922.

**Fowler, Lieutenant-General Sir John Sharman (1864-1939)**
Cheltenham. Entered Royal Engineers, 1886; p.s.c.; Isaazi Expedition, 1892; Chitral, 1895 (despatches), Tirah Expedition, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1911-13; Commandant, Army Signal School, 1913-14; Director of Army Signals, 1914-19; G.O.C. Forces in China, 1922-25; retired, 1928. Colonel Commandant Royal Signal Corps, 1923-34. Brother-in-law of General Sir Alexander Godley (q.v.).

**Franklyn, General Sir Harold Edmund (1885-1963)**
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir William Franklyn. Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Regiment, 1905; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, 17th Division, 1915; G.S.O.2, 21st Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, Staff Course, Cambridge, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, XVIII Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, 21st Division, 1917-19; G.O.C. 50th Division, 1938-40; VIII Corps, 1940-41; Northern Ireland, 1941-43; C.-in-C., Home Forces, 1943-45; retired, 1945. Brother of Brigadier G.E.W. Franklyn; he married the daughter of Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Belfield in 1913; and his son was killed in action in 1944.

**Franks, Major-General Sir George MacKenzie (1868-1958)**
Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1887; p.s.c.; Waziristan Expedition, 1894-95; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Soudan, 1898-99; Professor, 1909-12, and G.S.O.1, Staff College, Quetta, 1912-14; M.G.R.A., Second Army, 1915-17; G.O.C. 35th Division, 1917-18; Inspector-General of Artillery, U.K., 1918-20; retired, 1928.

**Freeman, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred Rhodes (1888-1953)**
French, John Denton Pinkstone (Field Marshal Earl of Ypres) (1852-1925)
Eastman’s Naval Academy, Portsmouth, and H.M.S. Britannia. Entered Royal Navy, 1866; Militia, 1871; 8th Hussars, 1874; transferred to 19th Hussars, 1874; Soudan, 1884-85; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1897-99; Cavalry Division, South Africa, 1899-1902; Aldershot, 1902-07; Inspector-General of Forces, 1907-11; C.I.G.S., 1911-14; Field-Marshal, 1913; C.-in-C., B.E.F., 1914-15; C.-in-C., Home Forces, 1915-18; Governor-General, Ireland, 1918-21. Created Viscount, 1915, and Earl of Ypres, 1921.

Friend, Major-General Rt. Hon. Sir Lovick Bransby (1856-1944)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1873; Soudan, 1898; Instructor, R.M.C., 1883-84; Secretary, Royal Engineers Experimental Committee, 1885-89; Director of Works and Public Stores, Egyptian Army, 1900-04; Director, Egyptian Public Works, 1905; Assitant-Director of Fortification and Works, War Office, 1906-08; O.C. Scottish Coast Defences, 1908-12; Major-General i/c Administration, Irish Command, 1913-14; G.O.C. Ireland, 1914-16; President, Claims Commission, France, 1916-18; retired, 1920.

Fry, Major-General Sir William (1858-1934)
St. Columba's College, Dublin, and R.M.C. Joined West Yorkshire Regiment, 1878; Afghan War, 1879-80; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, C.B.); Commandant, Mounted Infantry School, Burford, 1905-06; G.O.C. lancashire District, 1907-08; East Lancashire Division T.F., 1908-10; 58th (1st London) Division T.F., 1912-15; 30th Division, 1915-16 (sacked); i/c Administration, Irish Command, 1916-19; retired, 1919; Lieutenant-Governor, Isle of Man, 1919-26. Author of 1914 (1919).

Fuller, Major-General Cuthbert Graham (1874-1960)

Fuller, Major-General John Frederick Charles "Boney" (1878-1966)

**Furse, Lieutenant-General Sir William Thomas "Bill" (1865-1953)**


**Gage, Brigadier-General Moreton Foley (1873-1953)**


**Game, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Woolcott (1876-1961)**


**Gathorne-Hardy, General Hon. Sir (John) Francis "Frank" (1874-1949)**

Geddes, Rt. Hon. Sir Eric Campbell (1875-1937)

Geiger, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald John Percival (born 1876)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1896; Crete, 1897-98; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1916-18; G.S.O.1, with French Army, 1918; retired, 1921.

Gellibrand, Major-General Sir John (1872-1945)

Gepp, Major-General Sir (Ernest) Cyril (1879-1964)
Marlborough. In the ranks of Imperial Yeomanry, 1 year 145 days; commissioned D.C.L.I., 1901; South Africa, 1900; Somaliland, 1909-10 (despatches); King's African Rifles, 1906-11; retired, 1911; D.S.O., 1916, and Bar, 1917; re-gazetted, 1917; G.S.O.2, 7th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, Third Army, 1917; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1918-19; retired, 1941; Director of Prisoners of War Department, War Office, 1941-45.

Gerrard, Major-General John Joseph (1867-1938)
St. Augustine's, Ramsgate, and Trinity College, Dublin. Entered Army, 1891; Major, R.A.M.C., 1898; North-West Frontier, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902; A.D.M.S., 34th Division, 1915-16; D.D.M.S., VIII Corps, 1916-18; D.M.S., Home Forces, U.K., 1918; D.M.S., Fifth Army, 1918-19; retired, 1922.

Giles, Major-General Edward Douglas (1879-1966)
Grandson of General Sir J. Schneider. Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Shropshire Light Infantry, 1899; transferred to Indian Army (35th Horse), 1901; p.s.c., 1912; G.S.O.3, Indian Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, Indian Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 3rd Cavalry Division, 1916; D.S.O.,
Girdwood, Major-General Sir Eric Stanley (1876-1963)

Glasfurd, Colonel Alexander Inglis Robertson (1870-1942)
Eldest son of Major-General C.L.R. Glasfurd. Fettes and R.M.C. Joined North Lancashire Regiment, 1890; transferred to Indian Army (46th Punjabis), 1892; p.s.c., 1907; he made an official visit to the battlefields from the Staff College, Quetta, 1907; North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.2, 3rd Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 48th Division, 1916-17; O.C. 40th Pathans, East Africa and Afghanistan, 1917-20; retired, 1921. Well-known big-game hunter. Author of *Leaves from an Indian Jungle* (1904), *Rifle and Romance in the Indian Jungle* (1905), *Sketches of Manchurian Battlefields* (1908), and *Musings of an old Shikari* (1928).

Glasfurd, Brigadier-General Duncan John (1873-1916)

Glasgow, Major-General Sir (Thomas) William (1876-1955)

Gleichen, Count Albert Edward Wilfred "Glick" (Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen) (1863-1937)
Grandson of Queen Victoria's half-sister and Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Seymour. Only son of Admiral H.S.H. Prince Victor of Hohenlohe-Langenburg (Count Gleichen). His wife was Maid of Honour to Queens Victoria and Alexandra. Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1881; p.s.c., 1891; Soudan, 1884-85; Soudan, 1896; Abyssinia, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1900 (wounded, despatches);
Military Attache, Berlin, 1903-06, and Washington, 1906-07, when he met the Wright brothers and wrote a report on their revolutionary "flyer", a significant document in early aviation history; Assistant D.M.O., M.O.2, War Office, 1907-11; G.O.C. 15th Brigade, 1911-15; 37th Division, 1915-16; Director, Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information, 1917-18; retired, 1919. Author of With the Camel Corps up the Nile (1888), With the Mission to Menelik (1897), The Doings of the 15th Brigade (1917), and A Guardsman's Memories (1932).

Glubb, Major-General Sir Frederic Manley (1857-1938)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1877; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); Chief Engineer, Northern Command, 1909-12; Chief Engineer, Southern Command, 1912-14; C.R.E., III Corps, 1914-15; Chief Engineer, Second Army, 1915-17; Engineer-in-Chief, Italy, 1917-18; Chief Engineer, Second Army, 1918-19; retired, 1919. Father of Lieutenant-General Sir John Glubb ('Glubb Pasha'), the author of Into Battle: A Soldiers Diary of the Great War (1978).

Glyn, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur St. Leger (1870-1922)
Grandson of 1st Baron Wolverton. Eton. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1891; South Africa, 1899-1900; retired as Major, 1907; Liaison Officer, re-employed, 1914-19 (Despatches); Liaison Officer, British Mission G.A.N., 1918-19. He died in 1922 and his widow married Major-General F.W. Ramsay (q.v.).

Godley, General Sir Alexander John "Alick" or "Lord God" (1867-1957)
Cousin of A.D. Godley (scholar) and J.D. Godley, 1st Baron Kilbracken, (civil servant). Royal Naval School, Haileybury, United Services College, and R.M.C. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1886; transferred to Irish Guards, 1900; p.s.c., 1898; Rhodesia, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1901; Commandant, Mounted Infantry, Longmoor, 1903-06; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1906-10; G.O.C. New Zealand Forces, 1910-14; ANZAC Division, M.E.F., 1914-15; 1st ANZAC Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16; 2nd ANZAC Corps, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-17; 22nd Corps, 1918-19; Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, 1920-22; G.O.C. Army of the Rhine, 1922-24; Southern Command, 1924-28; Governor of Gibraltar, 1928-33; retired, 1933. Author of Life of an Irish Soldier (1939). Brother-in-law of Lieutenant-General Sir John Fowler (q.v.). Stern but frequent visitor to the trenches.

Godwin, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Alexander Campbell (1873-1951)
United Services College and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1895, and Indian Army (23rd Cavalry), 1896; North-West Frontier, 1901-02; p.s.c., 1909; G.S.O.2, India, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 1st Indian (later 4th) Cavalry Division, 1915-17; G.O.C. 6th
Mounted Brigade and 10th Cavalry Brigade, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., Desert Mounted Corps, E.F., 1918-19; Major-General Cavalry in India, 1923-27; Commandant, Staff College, Quetta, 1927-28; G.O.C. Peshawar District, 1928-31; retired, 1932.

Gogarty, Colonel Henry Edward (1868-1955)
King's School, Canterbury, and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1888; transferred to Worcestershire Regiment, 1908; p.s.c., 1897; Zhob Valley Expedition, 1890; South Africa, 1899-1901; G.S.O.2, Malta, 1907-11; Chief Instructor, School of Musketry, 1913-15; G.S.O.1, 2nd and 22nd Divisions, 1915 (sick); G.S.O.1, Salisbury Training Centre, UK, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Machine Gun Corps Training Centre, UK, 1916-17; Area Commandant, British Forces in Italy, 1917-18; A.A.G., L. of C., Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1920.

Goldsmith, Colonel Harry Dundas (1878-1955)

Gordon, Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Hamilton "Sunny Jim" (1859-1939)

Gordon, Lieutenant-Colonel Evelyn Boscawen (1872-1963)

Gordon, Major-General Hon. Sir Frederick (1861-1927)
Gordon-Hall, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Charles William (1875-1930)
Privately educated and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1894; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1898 (severely wounded); South Africa, 1899-1900 (severely wounded, despatches); G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1911-14 (D.M.O., 1913-14); G.S.O.2, 1st Canadian Division, 1914-16; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps, 1916; G.S.O.2, 5th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1916-19; retired, 1921.

Gorringe, Lieutenant-General Sir George Frederick (1868-1945)
Wellington. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888; Dongola, 1896 (D.S.O.); Soudan, 1897-99; South Africa, 1900-01; Soudan, 1902-04; Director Movements & Quarterings, War Office, 1906-09; G.O.C. 18th Brigade, 1909-11; Bombay Brigade, India, 1912-15; 12th Indian Division, 1915-16, and III Indian Corps, 1916, in Mesopotamia (severely wounded); 47th Division, 1916-19; 10th Division, Egypt, 1919-21; retired, 1924.

Gorton, Brigadier-General Reginald St. George (1866-1944)
Felsted. Entered Royal Artillery, 1886; p.s.c.; Miranzai Expedition, 1890; Hunza Nagar Expedition, 1891; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902; S.O. (Intelligence), War Office, 1903-07; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1909-12; Assistant Secretary (G.S.O.2), C.I.D., 1912-14; G.S.O.2, Second Army, U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, First Army, B.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 8th Division, 1915; A.A. & Q.M.G., 7th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 59th Division, 1916-18; A.A.G., War Office, 1918; B.G.G.S., Dunsterforce, Mesopotamia, 1918-20; retired, 1922.

Gosset, Colonel Francis William (1876-1931)

Gough, General Sir Hubert de la Poer "Goughie" (1870-1963)
Eldest son of General Sir Charles Gough, V.C., and nephew of General Sir Hugh Gough, V.C. Eton and R.M.C. Joined 16th Lancers, 1889; p.s.c., 1899; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); Professor, Staff College, 1904-06; O.C. 16th Lancers, 1907-11; 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1911-14; 2nd Cavalry Division, 1914-15; 7th Division, 1915; I Corps, 1915-16; Reserve Corps, 1916; Reserve Army, 1916; Fifth Army, 1916-18 (sacked); retired, 1922. He came from a family renowned in war - four members of his family - his father, his uncle, his brother, and a cousin - won the V.C. His brother, Major-General J.E. Gough (q.v.), was killed in
action in 1915. Author of *The Fifth Army* (1931) and *Soldiering On* (1954). An accomplished horseman, in India he twice won the Army Cup. Energetic and open-minded but impulsive and hot-tempered. Friend and protege of Field-Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.).

**Gough, Major-General John Edmond (1871-1915)**
Youngest son of General Sir Charles Gough, V.C., and nephew of General Sir Hugh Gough, V.C. Eton. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1892; British Central Africa, 1896-97; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; Somaliland, 1902-03 (V.C., 1903) and 1908-09; p.s.c., 1905; Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, 1908-09; G.S.O.1, Staff College, 1909-13; B.G.G.S., Aldershot, 1913-14; B.G.G.S., I Corps, 1914; M.G.G.S., First Army, 1914-15; killed in action, 21 February 1915, when he was about to take command of a Division. Both his father and uncle and a cousin had also won the V.C. Brother of General Sir Hubert Gough (q.v.) Protege of Field-Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.).

**Graham, Brigadier Lord (Douglas) Malise (1883-1974)**

**Graham, Major-General Sir Edward Ritchie Coryton (1858-1951)**
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 22 Foot, 1878; transferred to the Cheshire Regiment, 1879; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches, C.B.); O.C. 2/Cheshire, 1900-02; A.A.G., War Office, 1905-08; G.O.C. 8th Brigade, 1908-12; South Midland Division, 1914; D.A.G., B.E.F., 1914-19; retired, 1920.

**Graham, Brigadier Malise (1884-1929)**
Second son of Sir Reginald Graham, 8th Baronet. Eton and Militia. Joined 16th Lancers, 1903; G.S.O.3, I corps, 1915-16; Brigade major, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 4th Cavalry Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, 4th Cavalry Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1918-20. Famous equestrian who died from an accident while jumping his horse at the Dublin Horse Show, 1929.

**Grant, Colonel Arthur Kenneth (born 1881)**
Haileybury and Militia. Joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1900; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); G.S.O.2, X Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, Staff School, Cambridge, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 50th Division, 1918; retired, 1937; re-employed, 1939-45; A.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., France, 1939.

**Grant, General Sir Charles John Cecil "Charlie" (1877-1950)**
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Grant. Harrow. Joined Coldstream Guards, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902

Grant, Colonel Henry Frederick Lyall see Lyall Grant

Grant, Major-General Sir Philip Gordon (1869-1943) 
Educated privately and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Aden, 1903; Somaliland, 1904; Egyptian Army, 1909-14; Chief Engineer, XV Corps, M.E.F. and France, 1916-17; Chief Engineer, Fifth Army, 1917-19; Commandant, School of Military Engineering, 1923-27; Inspector of Royal Engineers, 1926-27; retired, 1931. Father of Rear-Admiral John Grant, who was the first member of the family not to serve in the Army for nearly 200 years.

Greenly, Major-General Walter Howorth "Bob" (1875-1955) 
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 12th Lancers, 1895; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1910-12; O.C. 19th Hussars, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. 9th Cavalry Brigade, 1915; B.G.G.S., XIII Corps, 1915-16; G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Division, 1916-18 (sick); retired, 1920.

Grierson, Lieutenant-General Sir James Moncrief "Jimmy" (1859-1914) 
Educated Glasgow Academy, Germany and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1877; p.s.c., 1884; Egypt, 1882; Suakin, 1885; Hazara Expedition, 1888; South Africa, 1900; China, 1900-01; C.S.O., II Corps, 1901-04; D.M.O., War Office, 1904-06; G.O.C. 1st Division, 1906-10; Eastern Command; 1912-14; II Corps, August 1914; died 17 August 1914. Expert on foreign armies. Author of War Office handbooks, Staff Duties in the Field (1891), Handbook of the Russian Army (1894), and Records of the Scottish Volunteers, 1859-1908 (1908).

Grigg, Edward William Macleay (Lord Altrincham) "Ned" or "The Scribe" (1879-1955) 
Grove, Colonel Thomas Thackeray "Tom" or "Uncle" (1879-1965) 
Bedford. Entered Royal Engineers, 1898; p.s.c.; Assistant 
Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1908-12; 
Instructor, R.M.A., 1913-14; G.S.O.3, 6th Division, 1915; 
G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 17th Division, 
1916; G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, 41st Division, 
1917; G.S.O.1, 6th Division, 1917-19; retired, 1933. His 
brother was killed in action during the war.

Guggisberg, Brigadier-General Sir (Frederick) Gordon (1869- 
1930) 
Canadian. Burney's, Hampshire, and R.M.A. Entered Royal 
Engineers, 1889; Singapore, 1893-96; Instructor, R.M.A., 
1897-1902; Gold Coast, 1902-08; Nigeria, 1910-14; O.C. 94th 
Field Company, R.E., 1914; C.R.E., 8th Division, 1915; 
C.R.E., 66th Division, U.K., 1916; G.O.C. 170th Brigade, 
1917-18; Assistant Inspector-General of Training, 1918-19; 
Governor and C.-in-C., Gold Coast, 1919-27; Governor and C.- 
in-C., British Guiana, 1928-30. Author of The Shop: The 
Story of the Royal Military Academy (1902) and (with 

Guy, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Francis (1878-1927) 
Joined Wiltshire Regiment, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02; 
Captain, 1908; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.2, IX Corps, 1917-18; 
G.S.O.1, 42nd Division, 1918-19.

Gwynn, Major-General Sir Charles William (1870-1963) 
Third son of Rev. J. Gwynn, Regius Professor of Divinity, 
Dublin University. St. Columba's College, Dublin, and 
R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1889; p.s.c.; West Africa, 
1893-94 (wounded thrice, despatches, D.S.O.); Staff Captain 
(Intelligence), War Office, 1897-1901; Egyptian Army, 1901- 
04; Director, R.M.C., Duntroon, Australia, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, 
57th Division, U.K., 1915; G.S.O.1, 2nd Australian Division, 
M.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 6th Australian Brigade, M.E.F., 1915- 
16; B.G.G.S., I ANZAC Corps, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-19; 
Commandant, Staff, College, 1926-30; retired, 1931. Author 
of Imperial Policing (1934).

Haig, Douglas (Field-Marshal Earl Haig) "D.H." (1861-1928) 
His father owned the whiskey distillers. Clifton; Brasenose 
College, Oxford; and R.M.C. Joined 7th Hussars, 1885; 
p.s.c., 1897; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 
17th Lancers, 1901-03; Inspector-General Cavalry, India, 
1903-06; D.M.T., War Office, 1905-07; D.S.D., War Office, 
1907-09; C.G.S., India, 1909-12; G.O.C. Aldershot Command, 
1912-14; I Corps, 1914; First Army, 1914-15; C.-in-C., 1915- 
19; C.-in-C., Forces in G.B., 1919-20; Field-Marshal, 1917; 
created Earl, 1919. Founded British Legion. Author of 
Cavalry Studies (1907). Cousin of Major-General H.D. de 
Pree (q.v.). Married, 1905, a Maid of Honour to Queen
Alexandra in the private chapel of Buckingham Palace. His brother-in-law, Lord Worsley, was killed in October 1914.

**Haking, General Sir Richard Cyril Byrne "Dicky" (1862-1945)**
Joined Hampshire Regiment, 1881; p.s.c., 1897; Burma, 1885-87 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); Professor, Staff College, 1901-06; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1906-08; B.G.G.S., Southern Command, 1908-11; G.O.C. 5th Brigade, 1911-14; 1st Division, 1914-15 (wounded); XI Corps, 1915-18; British Troops in Egypt, 1923-27; retired, 1927. Author of *Staff Rides and Regimental Tours* and *Company Training*.

**Haldane, General Sir (James) Aylmer Lowthrop (1862-1950)**

**Halliday, General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache (1870-1966)**
Elizabeth College, Guernsey. Joined Royal Marine Light Infantry, 1889; China, 1900 (dangerously wounded, despatches, V.C., 1901); p.s.c., 1906; Instructor (G.S.O.2), R.M.C., 1908-12; Staff of Royal Naval War College, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, Malta, 1914; G.S.O.1, Third Army, U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 39th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Canadian Training Centre, U.K., 1916-17; A.G., Royal Marines, 1927-30; retired, 1930. Affected by the wound he received in China in 1900, his health broke down in the summer of 1916 and he served the rest of the war at home.

**Hambro, Percival Otway (Major-General Sir Percy) (1870-1931)**
Eton. Joined 15th Hussars, 1892; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900; G.S.O.2, India, 1908-10; Instructor, Cavalry School, India, 1910-12; Special Employment, 1913 and 1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Cavalry Division, 1914; G.S.O.2, 1st Cavalry Division, 1914-15; A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Cavalry Division, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., III Corps, 1915-17; D.A. & Q.M.G., Fifth Army, 1917-19; G.O.C. 46th Division, 1927-31; retired, 1931.

**Hamilton, Major-General Hubert Ion Wetherall (1861-1914)**
Third son of Lieutenant-General H.M. Hamilton. United Services College. Joined 2nd Foot, 1880; p.s.c.; Burma, 1886-88; Soudan, 1897-99 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1902; Military Secretary to Lord Kitchener in South Africa, 1900-02, and India, 1902-05; G.O.C. 7th Brigade,
1906-08; M.G.G.S., Mediterranean Command, 1908-09; 11th Division, 1911-14; 3rd Division, 1914; killed in action, 14 October 1914. Brother of General Sir Bruce Hamilton and Colonel G.H.C. Hamilton.

Hanbury-Williams, Major-General Sir John (1859-1946)
Wellington. Joined 35 Foot, 1878; transferred to 43 Foot, 1878; Egypt, 1882 (despatches); Burma, 1886; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, 1901-04; Military Secretary to Governor-General, Canada, 1904-09; Brigadier-General i/c administration, Scottish Command, 1909-12; Major-General, 1912; Chief of British Military Mission to French Army, 1914-15, and to Russian Army, 1915-17; retired, 1919. Father of Sir John Hanbury-Williams, Chairman of Courtauld Ltd., 1946-62, and Director of the Bank of England, 1936-63, who served at G.H.Q. during the war.

Hankey, Brigadier-General Edward Barnard (1875-1959)

Hare, Brigadier-General Robert Hugh (1867-1950)
Hermitage School, Bath, and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1886; Chitral, 1895; p.s.c., 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, Highland Division, 1908-12; Instructor, R.M.C., 1913-14; G.S.O.2, V Corps, 1915; G.S.O.1, 28th Division, B.E.F. and M.E.F., 1915-16; G.O.C. 83th Brigade, Salonika, 1916-19; retired, 1924.

Hare, Brigadier-General Robert William (1872-1953)
Harrow. Joined Norfolk Regiment, 1892; p.s.c.; Mashonaland, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, O.b., G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 26th Division, B.E.F. and M.E.F., 1915-16 (wounded); G.S.O.1, Staff College, Cambridge, 1916-17; B.G.G.S. (Commandant), Staff School, Cambridge, 1918-19; retired, 1923.

Harington, General Sir Charles Harington "Tim" (1872-1940)
reserve for Irish hockey team. Author of Plumer of Messines (1935) and Tim Harington Looks Back (1940).

Educated privately and Militia. Joined 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1894; transferred to 2nd Dragoon Guards, 1911; O.C. 18th Hussars, 1915-16; 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1916-17; 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1917; 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1917-18; 3rd Cavalry Division, 1918-19 (despatches; D.S.O., 1916); 1st Division, 1930-34; retired, 1934.

Harper, Lieutenant-General Sir George Montague "Uncle" or "Daddy" (1865-1922)

Harrison, Brigadier Eric Fairweather (born 1880)
Australian. Sydney Church of England Grammar School; Bedford; and Trinity College, Cambridge. Royal Australian Garrison Artillery, 1903; p.s.c.; Major, 1914; D.M.T., Australia, 1914-15; Instructor, Duntroon, Australia, 1915-17; G.S.O.1, 3rd Australian Division, 1918-19; D.M.O. & I., Australia, 1920-25.

Harrison, Major-General James Murray Robert (1880-1957)
Shrewsbury and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; G.S.O.2, 11th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, XIV Corps, France, and G.H.Q., Italy, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, V Corps, France, 1918; G.S.O.1, Inspector-General of Training, 1918; G.S.O.1, 32nd Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. 2nd A.A. Division, 1936-39; Lieutenant-Governor, Jersey, 1939-40; retired, 1942.

Harvey, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Henry (1878-1960)
St. Paul's; Clifton, and R.M.C. Joined Border Regiment, 1898; transferred to the Indian Army, 1903, and East Yorkshire Regiment, 1908; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.3, 58th Division, U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 30th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 18th Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, Fifth Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1917-18; Fourth Army, 1918; Reserve Army, 1918; Fifth Army, 1918; Vladivostock, 1918-20; retired, 1925.
Harvey, Major-General Robert Napier (1868-1937)
His father owned Messrs. John Harvey & Sons, Bristol. Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888; South Africa, 1900-01; Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, B.E.F., 1914; Assistant to the Engineer-in-Chief, 1915-16; Inspector of Mines, G.H.Q., 1916-18; Chief Engineer, VI Corps, 1918-19; Engineer-in-Chief, India, 1924-28; retired, 1928.

Haskard, Brigadier-General John McDougall (1876-1967)
Blairlodge, Stirlingshire. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches); Aden, 1903; Egyptian Army, 1908-11; p.s.c., 1914; G.S.O.2, IX Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 19th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 20th Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., Tactical School, Camberley, 1918-19; G.S.O.1, Staff College, Camberley, 1919-20; retired, 1931.

Hay, Major-General Charles John Bruce (1877-1940)
Wellington and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1897; joined Indian Army (Corps of Guides), 1898; p.s.c., 1906; Tirah, 1897-98; Waziristan, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, 12th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 12th Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Mesopotamia, 1917-19; Head of British Military Mission to Iraq, 1934-37; retired, 1937.

Hayter, Brigadier Ross John Finnis (1875-1929)

Headlam, Lieutenant-Colonel Rt. Hon. Sir Cuthbert Headlam (1876-1964)

Headlam, Major-General Sir John Emerson Wharton (1864-1946)
King's College School, London, and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1883; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches);

Heard, Colonel Edward Severin "Teddy" (born 1863)
Harrow. Joined South Yorkshire Regiment, 1883; transferred to Northumberland Fusiliers, 1883; p.s.c.; Instructor, Staff College, 1897-1900; South Africa, 1900-01; Professor, Staff College, 1901-04; G.S.O.2 (D.S.D. and D.M.T.) New Zealand Forces, 1910-12; G.S.O.1 (C.G.S.), New Zealand Forces, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, H.Q., Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1915 (sacked); G.S.O.1, 61st Division, U.K., 1915; G.O.C. 67th Brigade, 1915; A.A.G. (Special Appointment), 1916-18; retired, 1919.

Heath, Major-General Sir Gerald Moore (1863-1929)
Fifth son of Admiral Sir Leopold Heath. Wimbledon and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1882; p.s.c.; Bechuanaland, 1884-85; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1902-06; G.S.O.1, India, 1910-11; C.S.O., Burma Division, 1911-12; B.G.G.S., South Africa, 1912-14; Inspector of Royal Engineers, 1915; Chief Engineer, First Army, 1915-17; Engineer-in-Chief, 1917-19; retired, 1919. Brother of Admiral Sir Herbert Heath and father of Major-General G.W.E. Heath.

Heath, Major-General Henry Newport Charles (1860-1915)

Henderson, Lieutenant-General Sir David (1862-1921)
Glasgow University and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1883; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1900 (wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); D.M.I., South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.1, Aldershot, 1907; B.G.G.S., Inspector-General, Home Forces, 1907-12; learnt to fly at the age of, 1911; D.M.T., War Office, 1912-13; Director-General of Military Aeronautics, 1913-18; G.O.C. 1st Division, 1914; R.F.C., B.E.F., 1914-15; Military Attache, Paris, 1918-19; Director-General, League of Red Cross Societies, Geneva, 1920-21. His only son was killed commanding a Squadron in
1918. As the author of Field Intelligence: its Principles and Practice (1904) and The Art of Reconnaissance (1907), Henderson was recognized as the British Army's leading authority on tactical intelligence. A thoughtful and far-sighted officer, Henderson went on to become an important and innovative figure before and during the war as the father of both the Intelligence Corps and the R.A.F.

Heneker, General Sir William Charles Giffard (1867-1939)
Canadian. Bishop's College School, Lennoxville, Canada, and R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Joined Connaught Rangers, 1888; Benin, 1899; Nigeria, 1901-03; South Africa, 1906-10; O.C. 2nd Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment, India, 1912; 1st Peshawar Brigade, 1912; Rawalpindi Brigade, 1913-14; 1st Brigade, Quetta, 1914-15; 54th Brigade, 1915 (severely wounded in left thigh by German machine-gun bullet while walking in the open, 10 December 1915); 190th Brigade, 1916; 8th Division, 1916-19; 3rd Division, 1922-26; Southern Command, India, 1928-32; retired, 1932. Author of Bush Warfare (1906). His son wrote the screenplay for the film, Oh What A Lovely War!

Henley, Hon. Anthony Morton "Chunkie" (1873-1925)
Third son of 3rd Baron Henley. Eton; Balliol College, Oxford; called to Bar, 1897; Barrister, Inner Temple, 1899. In ranks of the Imperial Yeomanry, South Africa, 1899-1900; commissioned 2nd Dragoons, 1900; transferred to 5th Lancers, 1907; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-13; Private Secretary to the Secretary-of-State for War, 1914; G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 49th Division, 1915-17; G.O.C. 127th Brigade, 1917-19; retired, 1919. Son-in-law of 4th Baron Sheffield (Liberal M.P., 1880-85). His wife, Sylvia, like her sister, Venetia Stanley (later Hon. Mrs Edwin Montagu), belonged to the Asquith circle.

Hewitt, Brigadier Charles Caulfield (1883-1949)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1902; Captain, 1914; Assistant Instructor, School of Musketry, 1913-14; Instructor, Machine Gun Training Centre, 1915-16; Chief Instructor (G.S.O.2), Machine Gun Training Centre, 1916; O.C. 11th Machine Gun Company, 1916-17; Machine Gun Officer, VI Corps, 1917; O.C. 46th Machine Gun Battalion, 1917-18; Army Machine Gun Officer (G.S.O.1), Third Army, 1918; Deputy Inspector, Machine Gun Units, Fifth Army, 1918-19 (wounded twice, D.S.O., M.C.); retired, 1938; re-employed, 1940-41; retired, 1941. Commandant, National Fire Service College, 1941-45.

Hewlett, Brigadier-General Ernest (1879-1965)
Heywood, Major-General Cecil Percival "Guffin" (1880-1936)

Hickie, Major-General Sir William Bernard (1865-1950)

Higgins, Air Marshal Sir John Frederick Andrews "Josh" or "Bum and Eyeglass" (1875-1948)

Higgins, Air Commodore Thomas Charles Reginald (1880-1953)
H.M.S. Britannia. Served in all three Services: entered Royal Navy, 1897; joined to Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1900, transferred to R.F.C., 1915, and R.A.F., 1918; South Africa, 1900-02; employed with the West African Frontier Force (Nigeria), 1904-09; Pilot's Licence (No.88), 1911; G.O.C. 6th Brigade R.F.C., 1917-18; D.M.T, Air Ministry, 1922-26; Chief of Staff, Iraq, 1926-28; A.O.C., No.10 Group, 1928; retired, 1929.

Higginson, Major-General Harold Whitla (1873-1954)

Hill, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh (1875-1916)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1895; South Africa, 1900-00; p.s.c., 1909; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1915-16; killed in action 10 September 1916. He did not know what fear was.
Hill, Major-General John (1866-1935)

Hill-Whitson, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Ernest Lynedoci (1877-1925)
Harrow and Militia. Joined 14th Hussars, 1896; South Africa, 1900-02; Adjutant, Imperial Yeomanry, 1902-05; Brigade-Major, 1st S.W. Mounted Brigade, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, 14th Division, 1918; retired, 1919.

Hoare-Nairne, Brigadier-General Edward Spencer "The Long 'un" (1869-1958)

Hobbs, Lieutenant-General Sir (Joseph John) Talbot (1864-1938)

Hobbs, Major-General Percy Eyre Francis (1865-1939)
Fettes. Entered Royal Marines Light Infantry, 1883; transferred to A.S.C., 1889; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, C.M.G.); Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport, Eastern Command, 1910-13; D.A. & Q.M.G., I Corps, 1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., First Army, 1914-17 (resigned).

Hodgson, Brigadier Walter Thornton (1880-1957)
Eton and local Militia Forces, Ceylon. Joined Middlesex Regiment, 1900; transferred to 1st Dragoons, 1902; South Africa, 1900-02; G.S.O.2, 1st Cavalry Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, O.a., G.H.Q., 1917; G.S.O.1, 5th Cavalry Division,
1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2nd Mounted Division, E.E.F., 1918-19; retired, 1934.


Holmes, Major-General William (1862-1917)

Holt, Air Vice-Marshal Felton Vesey "Tony" (1886-1931)

Home, Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Fraser "Sally" (1874-1953)
Great-grandson of Robert Home, the painter; grandson of Major-General R. Home; and son of Colonel F.J. Home. Educated Italy, France, Germany, Aldenham, and R.M.C. Joined 11th Hussars, 1895; p.s.c.; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, 1st Cavalry Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1916; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, 1916; B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1916-19; retired, 1919. Spoke French and German. From an old Army family with long associations with India.

Hopwood, Brigadier-General Herbert Reginald (1871-1938)

437
Hordern, Brigadier-General Gwyn Venables (1870-1945)

Hore-Ruthven, Brigadier-General Hon. Alexander Gore Arkwright (later 1st Earl of Gowrie) "Sandy" (1872-1955)
Second son of 8th Baron Ruthven and grandson of 4th Earl of Arran. Eton and Militia. Won V.C. while serving as Captain in 3rd (Militia) Battalion H.L.I. while attached to Egyptian Army in Soudan, 1898-99; joined Cameron Highlanders, 1899; transferred to 1st Dragoon Guards, 1908, and Welsh Guards, 1915; Somaliland, 1903-04; p.s.c., 1913; Military Secretary to Governor of Australia, 1908-10; G.S.O.2, VIII Corps, M.E.F., 1915 (severely wounded); G.S.O.1, 62nd Division, U.K. and France, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Guards Division, 1917; B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1917-18; G.O.C. 26th Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1928. Governor of South Australia, 1928-34, and New South Wales, 1934-36. Governor-General of Australia, 1936-44, and created Earl of Gowrie, 1944. President of M.C.C., 1948. Brother of Major-General Lord Ruthven and Colonel Hon. C.M. Hore-Ruthven (q.q.v.).


Hore-Ruthven, Hon. Walter Patrick (Major-General Lord Ruthven) "Jerry" (1870-1956)
Horne, General Sir Henry Sinclair (General Lord Horne of Stirkoke) (1861 - 1929)

Hoskins, Major-General Sir (Arthur) Reginald (1871-1942)
Westminster. Joined North Staffordshire Regiment, 1891; p.s.c.; Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1897-99 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); East Africa, 1902-03 (despatches); G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1913; Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, 1913-14; A.A. & Q.M.G., 8th Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. 8th Brigade, 1915; B.G.S., V Corps, 1915-16; G.O.C. 1st East African Division, East Africa, 1916-17; 3rd Indian Division, Mesopotamia and E.E.F., 1917-18; North Midlands Division, 1919-23; retired, 1920.

Howard, Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Weston "Pompey" (1876-1966)
Eton and Militia. Joined Essex Regiment, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.3, Malta, 1914; G.S.O.2, Second Army, 1916; G.S.O.2, 24th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, France and Italy, 1916-18; G.O.C. 145th Brigade, Italy, 1918-19; 5th Division, 1934-37; retired, 1938; re-employed, 1940.

Howard, Colonel Henry Cecil Lloyd (1882-1950)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 16th Lancers, 1901; South Africa, 1901-02 (wounded, despatches); p.s.c., 1911; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.3, 1st Cavalry Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.3, Cavalry Corps; Brigade-major, 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1915; G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 48th Division, France and Italy, 1917-19; retired, 1934; re-employed, 1939-41.

Howard-Vyse, Major-General Sir Richard Glanville Hylton "Wombat" (1883-1962)
Howell, Brigadier-General Philip (1877-1916)
Lancing. Entered Army, 1897; transferred to Indian Army (Corps of Guides), 1898, and 4th Hussars, 1913; p.s.c., 1907; North-West Frontier, 1908; Brigade-Major to Inspector-General of Cavalry, India, 1908; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1909-11; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1912-13; O.C. 4th Hussars, 1914; B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1915; B.G.G.S., X Corps, 1915; B.G.G.S., XII Corps, 1915; C.G.S., G.H.Q., Salonika, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., II Corps, 1916; killed in action 7 October 1916. Protege of Sir Douglas Haig (q.v.). Author of *The Campaign in Thrace 1912* (Rees, 1913). Special Correspondent of *The Times* during the Macedonian Rebellions of 1903 and the Turkish revolution of 1908.

Hudson, General Sir Havelock "Huddie" (1862-1944)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hudson. Reading School and R.M.C. Joined Northampton Regiment, 1881; transferred to Indian Army, (19th Bengal Lancers), 1885; Miranzai Expedition, 1891; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; China, 1900; Commandant, Cavalry School, Sangor, 1912; B.G.G.S., Northern Army, India, 1912-14; B.G.G.S., Indian Corps, 1914-15; G.O.C. 8th Division, 1915-16; Adjutant-General, India, 1917-20; G.O.C., Eastern Command, India, 1920-24; retired, 1924.

Hudson, Brigadier-General Thomas Roe Christopher (1866-1940)

Hull, Major-General Sir (Charles Patrick) Amyatt (1865-1920)
Charterhouse; Trinity College, Cambridge; and Militia. Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1887; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-02 (severely wounded); G.S.O.1, Staff College, 1909-12; G.O.C. 10th Brigade, 1914-16; 56th Division, 1916-17 (sick); 16th Division, 1918; 56th Division, 1918-19; died, 24 July 1920. Father of Field-Marshall Sir Richard Hull.

Hume-Spry, Lieutenant-Colonel Leighton (1871-1934)
Repton and Militia. Joined West Yorkshire Regiment, 1892; p.s.c., 1904; Ashanti, 1895-96; South Africa, 1899-02 (severely wounded twice, despatches, D.S.O., 1900); G.S.O.2, Northumbrian Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 50th (Northumbrian) Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-15 (sacked); A.A. & Q.M.G., 30th Division, 1915-16.

Humphreys, Lieutenant-General Sir (Edward) Thomas (1878-1955)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Lancashire Fusiliers, 1898; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches); G.S.O.3, 4th

Hunter-Weston, Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Gould "Hunter-Bunter" (1864-1940)

Huskisson, Major-General William (1859-1946)
Compton House, Brighton, and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1878; Professor, R.M.C., Kingston, Canada, 1890-95, and R.M.C., Sandhurst, 1898-1903; Assistant Director of Works, 1915; Chief Engineer, 1915; Chief Engineer, Third Army, 1915-16; retired, 1917.

Hutchison, Robert (Major-General Lord Hutchison) "Hutch" (1873-1950)

Ingouville-Williams, Major-General Edward Charles "Inky-Bill" (1861-1916)
Son of General Sir J.W.C. Williams. Militia; joined 3 Foot, 1881; transferred to Worcestershire Regiment, 1903; Soudan, 1884-85 and 1898-99; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); O.C. 2/Worcestershire, 1904-08; C.B., 1910; Commandant, Mounted Infantry School, Longmore, 1910-12; G.O.C. 16th Brigade, 1912-15; 34th Division, 1915-16; killed by shell-fire on the Somme, 22 July 1916. Fearless and a stern disciplinarian.

Ironside, William Edmund (Field-Marshal Lord Ironside) "Tiny" (1880-1959)
Tonbridge and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1899; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, 6th Division, 1914-15;
G.S.O.2, 6th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 4th Canadian Division, 1916-17; Commandant, Machine Gun Corps School, 1918; G.O.C. 99th Brigade, 1918; G.O.C. Allied Troops, Archangel, 1918-19; Commandant, Staff College, 1922-26; G.O.C. 2nd Division, 1926-28; Meerut District, 1928-31; Lieutenant of the Tower of London, 1931-33; Q.M.G., 1933-36; G.O.C. Eastern Command, 1936-38; Governor, Gibraltar, 1938-39; Inspector-General, Overseas Forces, 1939; C.I.G.S., 1939-40; C.-in-C., Home Forces, 1940; Field-Marshal, 1940; created Baron, 1941.

played rugby for Scotland. He spoke seven languages and was the model for John Buchan's Richard Hannay. Author of Tannenberg: The First Thirty Days in East Prussia (1925); Archangel, 1918-19 (1953); and High Road to Command (1972, posthumously). Accompanied everywhere by his bulldog.

Irwin, Major-General Sir James Murray (1858-1938)
Trinity College, Dublin. Entered Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C., 1894; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Assistant Director-General, A.M.S., 1906-10; D.D.M.S., Southern China, 1911; D.D.M.S., 1915-16; D.D.M.S., VIII Corps, 1916; D.M.S., Third Army, 1916-19; retired, 1919.

Isacke, Major-General Hubert (1872-1943)
King's School, Canterbury, and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1892; p.s.c.; Malakand Field Force, 1897-98 (severely wounded); South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-10; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1910-12; G.S.O.2, Staff College (Quetta), 1913-14; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., Meerut Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 14th Division, 1915-16; D.S.D. and D.M.T., India, 1916-17; D.M.T., India, 1917-20; G.O.C. 56th Division, 1927-31; retired, 1931.

Jack, Brigadier Evan Maclean (1873-1951)

Jackson, Colonel Claud Hugh Irving (born 1877)
Militia; joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902; Instructor, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1913-15; Assistant Commander, Machine Gun Corps Training Centre, 1915-16; G.S.O.2 (Machine Gun Officer), II Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, Army Machine Gun Officer, Second Army, 1918-19; retired, 1933.

Jackson, Major-General George Hanbury Noble (1876-1958)
Neuenheim College, Heidelberg, and R.M.C. Joined Border Regiment, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, 13th Division, U.K. and M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd Australian

Jackson, General Sir Henry Cholmondeley "Jacko" (1879-1972)

Jackson, Colonel Lambert Cameron (1875-1953)

Jacob, Field-Marshal Sir Claud William (1863-1948)
Son of Major-General W.M. Jacob. Sherborne and R.M.C. Joined Worcestershire Regiment, 1882; transferred to Indian Army (30th Bombay Infantry known as 'Jacob's Rifles'), 1884; Zhob Valley, 1890; North-West Frontier, 1901-02; G.S.O.1, India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, Meerut Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade, 1915; Meerut Division, 1915; 21st Division, 1915-16 (wounded by the shell which killed his G.S.O.1, Daniell (q.v.), March 1916); II Corps, 1916-19; C.G.S., India, 1920-24; C.-in-C., India, 1925; Secretary of Military Department, India Office, 1926-30; Field-Marshal, 1926. Brother of Major-General A. le G. Jacob and father of Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Jacob who married the daughter of Major-General Sir Francis Treherne (q.v.). His family had a long tradition of military service in India.

James, Wing Commander Sir Archibald William Henry (1894-1980)
James, Colonel Bernard Ramsden (1864-1938)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined East Surrey regiment, 1882; transferred to Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1903; p.s.c., 1893; Instructor, R.M.C., 1894-99; D.A.A.G. and Staff Captain, Intelligence Branch, War Office, 1899-1904; Military Attache, Washington and Mexico, 1907-11; Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel and retired, 1911; re-employed, 1914; i/c Military Attaches, G.H.Q., 1915-18. Uncle of Wing Commander Sir Archibald James (q.v.).

James, Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Ernest Haweis (1875-1964)

James, Major-General Sir (William) Bernard (1865-1940)
United Services College and R.M.C. Joined Derbyshire Regiment, 1886; transferred to Indian Army (2nd Lancers), 1887; S.O., Intelligence Branch, War Office, 1900-01; South Africa, 1902; O.C. 21st Cavalry, 1913-14; D.A. & Q.M.G., Indian cavalry Corps, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., Indian Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; Q.M.G., India, 1916-17; retired, 1926. President of the Delhi Horse Show for many years and founder and president of the national horse breeding and show secretary of India.

Jeffreys, George Darell (General Lord Jeffreys) "Ma" (1878-1960)
Only son of Rt. Hon. A.F. Jeffreys, Bt., P.C., M.P., D.L., J.P. Eton and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1897; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1900-02; Commandant, Guards depot, 1911-14; O.C. 2/Grenadier Guards, 1915-16; G.O.C. 58th Brigade, 1916 (severely wounded); 57th Brigade, 1916; 1st Guards Brigade, 1916-17; 19th Division, 1917-19; London District, 1920-24; 43rd (Wessex) Division, 1926-30; Southern Command, India, 1932-36; retired, 1938. Conservative M.P., 1941-51; created Baron, 1952. Ardent disciplinarian who took over a pet lion with the appointment of commanding 19th Division from General Sir Tom Bridges (q.v.) who had been wounded. His only son was killed in 1940.

Jerram, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Frederick (1882-1969)
Educated privately. Entered Royal Marines Light Infantry, 1901; Captain, 1912; G.S.O.2, 31st Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, XIII Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1929. Brother of Rear-Admiral Sir Rowland Jerram and Sir Bertrand Jerram (Foreign Office).
Jess, Lieutenant-General Sir Carl Herman (1884-1948)

Jeudwine, Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Sandham "Judy" (1862-1942)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1882; South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O., War Office, 1904-09; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1912-13; G.S.O.1, Staff College, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, I Corps, 1914; G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., V Corps, 1915; G.O.C. 41st Brigade, 1915-16; 55th Division, 1916-19; 5th Division, Ireland, 1919-22; Director-General, Territorial Army, 1923-27; retired, 1927. Fellow of the Huguenot Society of London.

Johnson, Major-General Frank Edward (1861-1945)
Entered Royal Artillery, 1880; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; China, 1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); A.Q.M.G., 2nd Division, India, 1911; B.G.R.A., Lahore Division, 1911-15; M.G.R.A., Third Army, 1915-16; Inspector, Royal Artillery, India, 1916-18; retired, 1918.

Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Henry (born 1882)

Johnson, Brigadier-General Ronald Marr (1873-1925)

Jones, Major-General Leslie Cockburn (1870-1960)
Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Bedfordshire Regiment, 1890; transferred to Indian Army (5th Cavalry; 7th Lancers), 1901; p.s.c.; Isazai Expedition, 1892; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); G.S.O.2, India, 1909-10; D.A.A.G., H.Q., India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, 1914-16; G.O.C. Meerut Cavalry Brigade, B.E.F. and Mesopotamia, 1916-17; Cavalry Division, Mesopotamia, 1917-19; retired, 1923. Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel A.N.G. Jones.
Jury, Colonel Edward Cotton (1881-1966)

Karslake, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry (1879-1942)
Harrow and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1898; p.s.c., 1913; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); Instructor, R.M.C., 1907-11; G.S.O.2, Third Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 50th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Tanks Corps, 1918; B.G.G.S., Tank Corps, 1918-19; G.O.C. Baluchistan District, 1933-35; retired, 1938; re-employed, France, 1939-40.

Kavanagh, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Toler McMurragh "Black Jack" (1864-1950)
Son of Rt. Hon. A.M. Kavanagh, P.C., M.P., J.P. Harrow. Joined 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1884; transferred, 10th Hussars, 1884; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); O.C. 10th Hussars, 1904-09; 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1909-13; a Brigade, India, 1914; 7th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915; 5th Division, 1915-16; II Corps, 1916; Cavalry Corps, 1916-19 (wounded); retired, 1920.

Kay, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Algernon Ireland (1876-1918)
Succeeded his father, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Kay, 5th Baronet, 1914. Harrow and R.M.C. Joined K.R.R.C., 1896; p.s.c.; Sierre Leone, 1998-99; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); G.S.O.3, G.H.Q. (severely wounded and awarded one of first D.S.O.s gazetted during the Great War), 1914; G.S.O.2, 24th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 24th Division, 1916-17; Commandant, Small Arms School, 1917-18; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, 1918 (wounded); 3rd Brigade, 1918; killed in action, 4 October 1918.

Kay, Major-General William Heape (1871-1929)

Kearsley, Brigadier-General (Robert) Harvey (1880-1956)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined 5th Dragoon Guards, 1899; p.s.c., 1913; South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.2, Indian Cavalry Corps, 1915; G.S.O.1, 1st Canadian Division, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., VI Corps, 1917-19; retired, 1922. His younger brother was killed in action, 1915.
Keary, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry D'Urban (1857-1937)
Marlborough. Entered Army, 1875; joined 12 Foot, 1876;
transferred to Indian Army (1st Madras Infantry), 1876;
Afghan War, 1879-80; Burma, 1887-93; China, 1900-02; O.C.
91st Punjabs, 1892-1909; 2nd (Secunderabad) Brigade, India,
1909-10; Garhwal Brigade, India and B.E.F., 1910-15; Lahore
Division, B.E.F. and Mesopotamia, 1915-17; Burmah Division,
1918-19; retired, 1920.

Keir, Lieutenant-General Sir John Lindesay (1856-1937)
Wimbledon School. Entered Royal Artillery, 1876; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches); Royal Artillery Gold
Medal for Prize Essay, 1903; G.O.C. Allahabad Brigade,
India, 1907-11; South Midland Division, 1912-14; 6th
Division, 1914-15; VI Corps, 1915-16; retired, 1918. Author
of A Soldier's Eye-view of our Armies.

Kelly, Brigadier Edward Henry (1883-1963)
Son of Major-General F.H. Kelly. R.M.A. (Sword of Honour).
Entered Royal Engineers, 1902; Mohmand Expedition, 1908;
severely wounded, November 1914; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, VII
Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1918-19; retired, 1936.

Kennedy, Major-General Alfred Alexander (1870-1926)
Harrow. Joined 3rd Hussars, 1891; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1902; G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915; G.O.C. 7th
Cavalry Brigade, 1915-16; 1st Indian (later 4th) Cavalry
Division, 1916-18; 75th Brigade, 1918; 230th Brigade, 1918-
19.

Kenyon, Major-General Edward Randolph (1854-1937)
Winchester and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1874; Civil
Employ, Cyprus, 1880-86; Assistant Instructor, School of
Military Engineering, Chatham, 1888-94; employed under
Admiralty, 1896-1901; Chief Engineer, Gibraltar, 1906-11;
retired, 1911; re-employed as Deputy Chief Engineer,
Southern Command, 1914; C.R.E., 20th Division, 1914-16;
C.R.E., IV Corps, February - July 1916; Chief Engineer,
Third Army, 1916-17 (wounded, 1917); Deputy Controller
Chemical Warfare, 1918; retired, 1918. Author of Notes on
Land and Coast Fortifications (1902), Gibraltar under Moor,
Spaniard and Briton (1911), and articles in military journals. Elder brother of Major-General L.R. Kenyon.

Ker, Major-General Charles Arthur (1875-1962)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; p.s.c.,
1911; Nigeria, 1898-99 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa,
1899-01 (despatches); Instructor, R.M.C., 1906-10; G.S.O.2,
R.M.C., Kingston, Canada, 1914; G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian
Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 63rd Division, 1916; G.S.O.1
(attached Portuguese Division, 1916-18; B.G.G.S., British
Mission to Portuguese E.F., 1918-19; retired, 1934.
Monmouthshire XI, 1897-99; Devon Hockey XI, 1903-05.
Kerr, Colonel Frederic Walter (1867-1914)

Kiggell, Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Edward "Kigge" (1862-1954)
Educated privately in Ireland and at the R.M.C. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1882; p.s.c., 1894; Instructor, R.M.C., 1897-99; South Africa, 1899-04; D.A.A.G., Staff College, 1904-07; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1907-09; Brigadier-General i/c Administration, Scottish Command, 1909; D.S.D., War Office, 1909-13; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley, 1913-14; D.M.T., War Office, 1914; Director of Home Defence, War Office, 1914-15; Assistant to C.I.G.S., 1915; C.G.S., G.H.Q., 1915-18; Lieutenant-Governor and Commanding Troops, Guernsey and Alderney, 1918; Lieutenant-Governor, Guernsey, 1918-20; retired, 1920. He revised the 6th edition of General Sir Edward Hamley's Operations of War (1866) in 1907 by replacing Hamley's outdated tactical section with three chapters on the Russo-Japanese War. An educated and erudite soldier, he suffered from poor health and lacked a dominant personality. Father of Colonel A.W. Kiggell, O.B.E.

Kirke, General Sir Walter Mervyn St. George (1877-1949)

Kirwan, Lieutenant-General Sir Bertram Kirwan (1871-1960)
Knox, General Sir Harry Hugh Sidney (1873-1971)
St. Columba's College, Dublin, and Militia. Joined
Northamptonshire Regiment, 1893; p.s.c., 1909; Tirah, 1897-
98; Uganda Rifles, 1900-02; G.S.O.3, School of Musketry,
India, 1910-11; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, 15th
Division, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., XV Corps, 1917-19; Adjutant
General to the Forces, 1935-37; retired, 1938. Brother of
Major-General Sir Alfred (W.F.) Knox and E.F.V. Knox, M.P.
(National Liberal), 1890-99. His daughter married
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye.

Lambe, Air-Vice Marshal Charles Laverock (1875-1953)
H.M.S. Britannia. Entered Royal Navy, 1889; Benin
Expedition, 1897; Commander, 1908; Captain, Royal Navy,
1916; transferred, R.N.A.S., 1916; D.S.O., 1917; O.C.
R.N.A.S. units on the Belgian Coast, 1917; 7th Brigade,
R.A.F., 1918; 5th (Operations) Group, Independent Air Force,
1918; C.M.G., 1918; Director of Equipment, Air Ministry,
1919-22; A.O.C. R.A.F. Halton, 1924-28; A.O.C. Coastal Area,
1928-31; retired, 1931.

Lambert, Colonel Thomas Stanton (1871-1921)
Charterhouse. Joined East Lancashire Regiment, 1891;
p.s.c., 1907; South Africa, 1907-09; G.S.O., War Office,
G.O.C. 69th Brigade, 1916-18; 32nd Division, 1918-19; killed
while commanding 13th Brigade in Ireland, 20 June 1921.
Keen sportsman.

Lambton, Major-General Hon. Sir William "Billy" (1863-1936)
Sixth son of 2nd Earl of Durham. Eton and R.M.C. Joined
Coldstream Guards, 1884; p.s.c., 1898; Soudan, 1898; South
Africa, 1899-02 (wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Military
Secretary to Lord Milner, 1900-04; O.C. 1/Coldstream Guards,
1909-12; Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.O.C. 4th
Division, 1915-17 (incapacitated in a riding accident);
retired, 1920. Brother of Brigadier-General Hon. C. Lambton
and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth Meux. A brother and a
nephew were killed in action, 1914. He was Groom-in-Waiting
to King George V, to whom he sent long, weekly letters
assessing the progress of the war.

Landon, Major-General Herman James Shelley (1859-1948)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1879;
Soudan, 1898 (despatches); South Africa, 1900 (despatches);
Inspector of Gymnasia, India, 1906-10; G.O.C. 3rd Brigade,
Division, 1915; 33rd Division, 1915-16; 35th Division, 1916-
17; 64th Division, U.K., 1917-18; retired, 1919.

Laskey, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Seward (1886-1972)
Merchant Taylor's School; Oriel College, Oxford. Called to
the Bar, 1913; barrister. Captain (S.R.) 4th Manchesters,


Lawford Lieutenant-General Sir Sidney Turing Barlow (1865-1953) Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1885; South Africa, 1901-02; Commandant, School of Mounted Infantry, Longmore, 1912-13; G.O.C. Essex Brigade, 1913-14; 22nd Brigade, 1914-15; 41st Division, 1915-19; retired, 1926.

Lawrence, Gen. Hon. Sir Herbert Alexander "Bertie" or "Lorenzo" (1861-1943) 4th son of the 1st Baron Lawrence. Harrow and R.M.C. Joined 17th Lancers, 1882; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); retired to the City; 1903; O.C. King Edward's Horse, 1904-09; re-employed, 1914; G.O.C. 127th Brigade, 1915; 52nd Division, Gallipoli and Egypt, 1915-16; 71st Division, U.K., 1916-17; 66th Division, 1917; B.G.G.S. (Intelligence), G.H.Q., 1917-18; C.G.S., G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired to the City, 1922. A keen sportsman, he combined the thrust of a lancer with the circumspection of a banker. Both of his sons were killed in the War.


Lawson, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Merrick (1859-1933) Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1877; Suakin Expedition, 1884; Soudan, 1884-85 and 1898 (dangerously wounded); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); D.A.A.G., Dublin District, 1889-92; D.A. & Q.M.G., War Office, 1893-98; Egyptian Army, 1898-99; A.A.G. and D.A.A.G., South Africa, 1899-1902; Brigadier General and Chief Staff Officer, South Africa, 1902-03; Director of Works, War Office, 1904; Director of Movements and Quarterings, War
Office, 1904-06; G.O.C. 13th Brigade, 1906-07; Major-General i/c Administration, Aldershot, 1907-10; G.O.C. 2nd Division, 1910-14; Lieutenant-Governor, Guernsey and Alderney, 1914; Assistant to C.I.G.S., War Office, 1914; G.O.C. Northern Command, 1915-16; Inspector-General of Communications, Italy, 1917-18; retired, 1921. Step-father to the wife of Major-General H.W. Newcome (q.v.).

Leader, Major-General Henry Peregrine (1865-1934)

Lecky, Major-General Robert St. Clair (1863-1940)

Lee, Colonel Sir Arthur Hamilton (Viscount Lee of Fareham) (1868-1947)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1888; Professor, R.M.C., Kingston, Canada, 1893-98; Military Attache, Washington, 1898-1900; Spanish-American War, Cuba, 1898; retired as Brevet Major, 1900; re-employed as Liaison Officer (Colonel), G.H.Q., 1915-16. Conservative M.P., 1900-18; Director-General of Food Production, 1917-18; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1921-22; created Baron, 1918, and Viscount, 1922.

Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Neale (1877-1954)

Lee, Major-General Sir Richard Philipps (1865-1953)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1885; China, 1900 (despatches); Staff Captain, War Office, 1902-04; C.R.E., 7th Division, 1915; Chief Engineer, I Corps, 1915-16; Chief Engineer, Fifth Army, 1916-17; G.O.C. 18th Division, 1917-19 (wounded); retired, 1923.
Lee, Colonel Reginald Tilson (1878-1940)
Rugby and Oriel College, Oxford. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1901; South Africa, 1902; p.s.c.; Captain, 1913; G.S.O.1, 25th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 55th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1933.

Legard, Brigadier-General D'Arcy (1873-1953)

Legge, Lieutenant-General James Gordon (1863-1947)
Australian. Born London. Cranleigh School, Sydney Grammar School, and University of Sidney. Barrister. Entered New South Wales Militia, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1902; Q.M.G., Australia, 1909-12; Australian Representative, War Office, 1912-14; G.O.C. 1st Australian Division, M.E.F., 1915; 2nd Australian Division, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-16; C.G.S., Australia, 1917-20; Commandant, R.M.C., Duntroon, 1920-22; retired, 1922. His youngest son was killed during the war.

Levey, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph H. (born 1881)
His father was a Pole, his mother from Aberdeen. In the ranks of the Scots Guards, 15 years 103 days; Warrant Officer, 66 days; Sergeant-Major of the Chelsea training school on the outbreak of war; commissioned into Gordon Highlanders, October 1914; training Royal Naval Division's recruits as Adjutant of the Crystal Palace Depot, 1914-15; Second i/c 2/Anson Battalion, 1916; D.S.O., 1917; Commandant, XVIII Corps School, 1917-18; Deputy Assistant Inspector-General of Training, 1918-19; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1918; retired, 1920. An expert in training infantry, a teacher of genius, and a brilliant lecturer.

Lewin, Major-General Ernest Ord (1879-1950)

Liddell, Major-General Sir William Andrew (1865-1949)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1884; Zhob Field Force, 1890; Assistant Secretary, Military Department, Government of India, 1900-06; Deputy Director of Works, B.E.F., 1915-16; Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, B.E.F., 1916-17; Chief Engineer, Third Army, 1917-19; retired, 1924.
Lindsay, Major-General George MacKintosh (1880-1956)

Lindsay, Major-General Sir Walter Fullarton Lodovic (1855-1930)

Lipsett, Major-General Louis James (1874-1918)
Bedford and R.M.C. Joined Royal Irish Regiment, 1894; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., South Africa, 1904-07; A.D.C., 6th and 2nd Divisions, 1907-08; Major, 1913; G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1911-14; O.C. 8th Canadian Battalion (Winnipeg Rifles), 1915; G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Brigade, 1915-16; 3rd Canadian Division, 1916-18; 4th Division, 1918; mortally wounded while on a reconnaissance beyond his own line, 14 October 1918, becoming the last British General to be killed in the Great War.

Lister, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Hamilton (1880-1971)

Livesay, Brigadier-General Robert O'Hara (1876-1946)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); p.s.c.; Instructor, R.M.C., 1904-08; retired, February 1914; re-employed, August 1914, and re-gazetted as Captain, October 1915; G.S.O.1, New Zealand Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, American Staff School, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 61st Division,
Lloyd, Brigadier-General John Hardress (1874-1952)

Loch, Edward Douglas (Major-General Lord Loch) (1873-1942)
Son of 1st Baron Loch. Winchester and Militia. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1893; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); G.S.O.2, War Office, 1911-14; G.S.O.2, Liaison, G.H.Q., 1914; G.S.O.1, 28th Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., VI Corps; G.O.C. 110th Brigade, 1917-18; retired, 1922.

Lomax, Lieutenant-General Samuel Holt (1855-1915)
Rugby. Joined 90 Foot, 1874; p.s.c.; Kafir and Zulu Wars, 1877-79; G.O.C. 10th Brigade, 1904-08; 1st Division, 1910-14; mortally wounded at Ypres, 31 October 1914, and died of wounds, 10 April 1915. Just prior to the outbreak of war, Lomax has been informed that he had not been selected for further employment but proved to be perhaps the best Divisional General of the early days of the war.

Longcroft, Air Vice Marshal Sir Charles Alexander Holcombe (1883-1958)

Longmore, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Moorsom (1882-1933)

Longridge, Lieutenant-Colonel James Atkinson (1875-1916)
Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment; transferred to Indian Army (43rd Infantry), 1897; p.s.c.; China, 1900 (despatches); Somaliland, 1903-04 (despatches); Assistant Secretary (G.S.O.2), C.I.D., 1912-14; Major, 1913; G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1915-16; killed in action, 18 August 1916.


Luckock, Major-General Russell Mortimer "Buckock" (1877-1950) Son of the Dean of Lichfield, an influential high churchman. Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. Joined Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1900; South Africa, 1899-1902; Assistant Instructor, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1907-11; p.s.c., 1914; G.S.O.1, Fourth and Second Armies, 1917-19; retired, 1938.


Lukin, Major-General Sir Henry Timson "Tim" (1860-1925) Nephew of Major-General W.W.A. Lukin and Colonel F.W. Lukin. Merchant Taylor's School. Emigrated to South Africa. Entered Native Cavalry, 1879; transferred to Cape Mounted Rifles, 1881; Zulu War, 1879 (severely wounded); Basutoland,

Lyall Grant, Colonel Henry Frederick (1879-1964)

Lynden-Bell, Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden "Bellinda" (1867-1943)

Lyon, Brigadier-General Francis (1867-1953)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1887; p.s.c.; Malakand, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1901; Ashanti, 1900-01; West African Frontier Force, Nigeria, 1902-05 (despatches); Assistant Secretary (G.S.O.2), C.I.D., 1906-10; special employment, War Office, 1911; Military Attache, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens, 1911-13; attached to Bulgarian Army, 1912, and Roumanian Army, 1913, during the Balkan Wars; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1915; B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., XIX Corps, 1917; employed Ministry of Munitions, 1918; retired, 1922.

Macandrew, Major-General Henry John Milnes (1866-1919)
McCay, Lieutenant-General Sir James Whiteside (1864-1930)  
Australian. Born in Ireland and educated at Scotch College, Melbourne, and Melbourne University. Barrister. Entered Australian Militia, 1886; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1903; Member of the Federal parliament and held many ministerial posts including that of Minister of State for Defence, 1904-05; O.C. Australian Intelligence Corps and Director of Intelligence, Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff, 1907-13; G.O.C. 2nd Australian Brigade, 1914-15 (wounded, May 1915; injured, July 1915); 5th Australian Division, 1916-17; G.O.C. A.I.F., U.K., 1917-18; retired, 1926.

McClintock, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Singleton (1876-1968)  
Third son of Admiral Sir Francis McClintock. Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1895; p.s.c., 1895; West Africa Frontier Force, 1898-1901; Ashanti, 1900; Northern Nigeria, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1915-16; Instructor (G.S.O.2), Staff School, Cambridge, 1917; G.S.O.1, Guards Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, L.of C., 1918; G.S.O.1, 51st Division, 1918-19 (Legion of Honour, D.S.O., and despatches); retired, 1931. Author of Napoleon and the Campaign of 1814.

McColl, Lieutenant-Colonel John Thomas (born 1877)  
Australian. Captain, Australian Military Forces, 1913; G.S.O.2, Australian Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 5th Australian Division, 1918-19.

McCracken, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick William Nicholas (1859-1949)  
Educated abroad and R.M.C. Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1880; p.s.c.; Egypt, 1882; Suakin, 1885 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); O.C. 2/Berkshire, 1901-02; G.S.O.1, India, 1907-11; B.G.G.S., Irish Command, 1911-12; G.O.C. 7th Brigade, 1912-14 (wounded, probably the first General Officer casualty of the war); Inspector of Infantry, U.K., 1914-15; G.O.C. 15th Division, 1915-17; XIII Corps, 1917-18; C.-in-C., Scottish Command, 1918-19; retired, 1922.

Macdonell, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Cameron (1864-1941)  
Canadian. Trinity College School, Port Hope, Ontario, and R.M.C, Kingston, Canada. Commissioned into the Royal Artillery but resigned without actually joining for family reasons; joined Canadian Mounted Infantry, 1888; transferred to North West Mounted Police, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1900 (dangerously wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Second in Command, 1907-12, and O.C. Canadian Mounted Rifles (Lord Strathcona's Horse), 1912-15; 7th Canadian Brigade, 1915-18 (wounded); 1st Canadian Division, 1918-19; retired, 1925. Played cricket for Canada. One of his sons was killed in action on the Somme with the R.F.C., July 1916.
Macdonogh, General Sir George Mark Watson (1865-1942)
Beaumont College and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1884; p.s.c., 1897; Barrister, Lincoln's Inn, 1897; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, Intelligence, G.H.Q., 1914; B.G.G.S., Intelligence, G.H.Q., 1914-16; D.M.I., War Office, 1916-18, A.G. to the Forces, 1918-22; retired, 1925. His only son died in 1915. He spoke Finnish and Swedish.

McDouall, Brigadier-General Robert (1871-1941)
Felsted and R.M.C. Joined East Kent Regiment, 1892; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); O.C. Battalion of the East Kent Regiment, 1915; G.S.O.2, L. of C., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, L. of C., 1915-16; G.O.C. 141st Brigade, 1916-17; 142nd Brigade, 1918; retired, 1924.

MacInnes, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Sayre (1870-1918)
Canadian. Son of Hon. D. MacInnes. H.M.S. Britannia and R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Entered Royal Engineers, 1891; p.s.c.; Ashanti, 1895-96; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); Secretary (G.S.O.3), Committee setting up the R.F.C., 1910-12; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1913-14; wounded, November 1914; G.S.O., War Office, 1915; Director of Aeronautical Equipment, War Office, 1915-17; C.R.E., 42nd Division, 1917-18; Inspector of Mines, G.H.Q., 1918; died on service, 25 May 1918.

MacIntyre, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Eberts (born 1885)

Mackenzie, Major-General Sir Colin John (1861-1956)
Son of Major-General Colin MacKenzie. Edinburgh Academy and R.M.C. Joined 16 Foot, 1881, transferred to 78 Foot, 1881; p.s.c.; Egypt, 1882; Burma, 1885-89; Hazara Expedition, 1888; operations against the Hunza Nazars, 1891-92; Waziristan, 1894-95; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; Staff Officer, 5th Division, 1902-05; O.C., 4th and 6th Brigades, 1905-10; C.G.S., Canada, 1910-13; G.O.C. Highland Division, 1914; 4th and 3rd Divisions, 1914 (wounded); 15th Division, U.K., 1914-15; D.S.D., War Office, 1915-16; G.O.C. 61st Division, 1916-18 (wounded); Inspector of Infantry, U.K., 1918; retired, 1924. At one time held the record for the highest score for the first wicket in India.

MacKenzie, Colonel John Hugh (1876-1963)
Merchiston Castle School, Edinburgh, and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots, 1896; p.s.c., 1909; Brigade-Major, India, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, First Army, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 24th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 63rd Division, 1918-19; retired, 1932.
Canterbury and R.M.C. Joined 19 Foot, 1879; transferred to Indian Army (1st Madras Infantry), 1882; Burma, 1885-87; Black Mountain, 1891; China, 1900-01; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, Secunderabad, 1907-09; Belgaum Brigade, 1909-11; Bangalore Brigade, 1911-12; 26th Division, U.K., B.E.F. and Salonika, 1914-17.

Macmullen, General Sir (Cyril) Norman (1877-1944)
Entered Army, 1897; transferred to Indian Army (15th Sikhs), 1899; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Tibet, 1903-04; G.S.O.3 and 2, H.Q., India, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd Mounted Division, M.E.F., 1915-16; B.G.G.S., XV Corps, M.E.F., 1916; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Operations, G.H.Q., 1917; B.G.G.S., XIX Corps, 1917-18; retired, 1937.

McNamara, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Edward (1877-1949)
Oratory School, Birmingham. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches); G.S.O.1, 32nd Division, 1916-18; G.O.C. 99th Brigade, 1918-19 (wounded, D.S.O.); retired, 1938.

MacPherson, Major-General Sir William Grant (1858-1927)
Fettes College; Töbingen and Leipzig Universities. Entered Army, 1883; Major, R.A.M.C., 1895; South Africa, 1902-03; Panama and Cuba, 1908; S.M.O., North China Command and attached Japanese Army, 1904-05; D.A.D.G., A.M.S. attached D.M.O., War Office, 1905-09; British Plenipotentiaries, Geneva Convention, 1906; P.M.O., Malta, 1910; A.D.M.S., 4th (Quetta) Division and lecturer, Staff College, Quetta, 1911-14; D.D.G., A.M.S., 1914; D.M.S., First Army, 1914-15; D.M.S., Salonika, 1915-16; D.D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1916-18; retired, 1918. Editor-in-Chief, Official Medical History of the War, and author of articles on military and medical subjects. Brother-in-law of Major-General B.J.C. Doran (q.v.) and Brigadier-General W.R.B. Doran.

Macready, General Rt. Hon. Sir (Cecil Frederick) Nevil (1862-1946)

Madocks, Brigadier-General William Robarts Napier (1870-1946)
Grandson of 1st Baron Napier of Magdala. R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1890; p.s.c., 1906; New Zealand Forces, 1896-01; South Africa, 1900-1901; G.S.O.2, Coast Defences,
Southern Command, 1907-10; Assistant Military Secretary to G.O.C. Mediterranean and Inspector-General of Overseas Forces, 1910-13; G.S.O.1, 20th Division, 1915-17; B.G.R.A., 35th Division, 1917-19 (wounded, C.B., D.S.O.); retired, 1927. His brother, Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. Madocks, was killed in action, 1915.

Maitland-Makgill-Crichton, Brigadier Henry Coventry "Scrappy" (1880-1953)

Makin, Major Ernest Llewellyn (born 1877)
Australian. Adelaide and Caius College, Cambridge. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1900; transferred to Wiltshire Regiment, 1906; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1917-18; retired, 1922.

Malcolm, Major-General Sir Neill (1869-1953)

Mangles, Brigadier-General Roland Henry (1874-1948)

Marden, Major-General Sir Thomas Owen (1866-1951)
Berkhamsted School and R.M.C. Joined Cheshire Regiment, 1886; transferred to Northumberland Fusiliers, 1905, and Welsh Regiment, 1908; p.s.c.; Burma, 1887-89; South Africa, 1899-1900; Staff, India, 1903-04, War Office, 1904-09, and South Africa, 1910-11; G.S.O.1, India, 1912-14; O.C. 1st
Welsh Regiment, 1914-15; 114th Brigade, 1915-17; 6th Division, 1917-19; retired, 1927.

**Marindin, Major-General Arthur Henry (1868-1947)**
Eton; New College, Oxford, and R.M.C. Joined Royal Highlanders, 1891; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); Instructor, Staff College, 1903-04; Staff Captain, War Office, 1904-05; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1905-07; G.S.O.2, Southern Command, 1908-09; Brigade-Major, 9th Brigade, 1909-12; G.S.O.2, Coastal Defence, Scottish Command, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 17th Division, 1915-16; G.O.C. 105th Brigade, 1916-18; 35th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1925. Author of *Staff Rides with hints on writing Appreciations and Reconnaissance Reports* (1905).

**Marshall, Major-General Francis James (1876-1942)**
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Seaforth Highlanders, 1895; p.s.c., 1907; Crete, 1897; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1901-02; D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.O.C. 44th Brigade, 1916-17; Commandant, Officers School, Aldershot, 1917-18; G.O.C. 150th Brigade, 1918; Assistant Inspector-General of Training, 1918; 52nd Division, 1918-19; retired, 1934.

**Matheson, General Sir Torquhil George (1871-1963)**

**Mathew, Major-General Sir Charles Massy (1866-1932)**
Educated privately and at Portsmouth Grammar School. Joined Durham Light Infantry, 1884; transferred to Army Ordnance Department, 1891; Soudan, 1885-86; Ashanti, 1895-96; Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1898 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1901; Deputy Assistant Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores, War Office, 1904-06; Assistant Director, 1906-08; A.D.O.S., Southern Command, 1910-14; D.D.O.S, G.H.Q., 1914-15; D.O.S., Salonika, 1916-17; D.O.S., Mesopotamia, 1917-18; D.O.S., G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1924.

**Maude, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stanley "Joe" (1864-1917)**
Second son of General Sir F. Maude, V.C. Eton and R.M.C. Joined Coldstream Guards, 1884; p.s.c., 1896; Soudan, 1885; Brigade-Major, Guards Brigade, 1897-1901; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches, D.S.O.; severe accident); Military Secretary to Governor-General, Canada, 1901-04; Private Secretary to the Secretary-of-State for War, 1904-05; G.S.O.2, 2nd London Division, 1908-09; Assistant, D.M.T, War Office, 1909-12; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, D.M.T., War Office, 1914; G.S.O.1, III Corps, 1914; G.O.C.
14th Brigade, 1914-15 (severely wounded); 13th Division, 1915-16; Tigris Corps, 1916; C.-in-C., Mesopotamia, 1916-17; died of virulent cholera on active service, 18 November 1917. Cousin of Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd (q.v.) and Major-General H.M. de F. Montgomery (q.v).

Maunsell, Brigadier-General Frederick Guy (1864-1929)

Maurice, Major-General Sir Frederick Barton "Freddy" (1871-1951)
Son of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice and grandson of Frederick Denison Maurice. St. Paul's and R.M.C. Joined Derbyshire Regiment, 1892; p.s.c., 1902; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); G.S.O.2, War Office, 1908-12; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, 3rd Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S. Operations, G.H.Q., 1915; D.M.O, War Office, 1915-18; retired for criticising the Government in a letter to The Times, 1918. Professor of Military Studies, London University, 1927; President, British Legion, 1932-47. Prolific author, including: The Russo-Turkish War 1877 (1905); Forty Days in 1914 (1919); The Last Four Months (1919); and The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (1928). Brother-in-law of Sir Edward Marsh, civil servant.

Maxse, General Sir (Frederick) Ivor (1862-1958)

Grandson of Vice-Admiral J.P. Grenfell. Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined 42 Foot, 1879; Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1884-86; Dongola, 1896; G.O.C. 2nd Egyptian Brigade, Soudan, 1898; G.O.C. 14th Brigade, South Africa, 1900-01; C.S.O. to

Maxwell, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles (1852-1924)
Entered Royal Engineers, 1872; Afghanistan, 1879-80; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, C.B.); A.A.G., War Office, 1902-06; Brigadier-General i/c Administration, Western Command, 1906-09; Major-General i/c Administration, Southern Command, 1909-11; G.O.C., Coast Defence, Eastern Command, 1911-14; Inspector-General of Communications, B.E.F., 1914-15; Q.M.G., B.E.F., 1915-17; retired, 1919.

Maxwell-Scott see Constable-Maxwell-Scott

May, General Sir Reginald Seaburne (1879-1958)

Meinertzhagen, Colonel Richard (1879-1967)
Son of a banker of Danish origin. Harrow and Militia. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1899; King's African Rifles, 1902-06; Nandi, 1905-06 (wounded, despatches); student at Staff College, Quetta, 1913-14; G.S.O.3, East Africa, 1914-16; G.S.O.2, H.Q., East Africa Force, 1916; Social Employment, War Office, 1917; G.S.O.2, E.F.F., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1918; G.S.O.1 (Intelligence), G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1920. Author of Kenya Diary, 1902-06 (1957); Middle East Diary (1959); Army Diary (1960); Diary of A Black Sheep (1964) and books on ornithology. A brilliant but controversial intelligence officer.

Mercer, Major-General Malcolm Smith (1859-1916)
Canadian. Barrister; joined Militia and 2nd Regiment (Queen's Own Rifles of Canada), 1885; O.C. 2nd Canadian Regiment, 1911; 1st Canadian Brigade, 1914-15; 3rd Canadian Division, 1915-16; killed in action near Mount Sorrel, 2 June 1916.

463
Mercer, Major-General Sir (Harvey) Frederick (1858-1936)
Educated in Jersey and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery,
1877; Afghan War, 1880; Burma, 1886-87 (despatches); Hazara,
1888 (despatches); Tirah, 1897 (despatches); South Africa,
1900-1902 (despatches, C.B.); A.A.G., R.A., War Office,
1907-10; Inspector of R.A., India, 1911-14; B.G.R.A., Indian
Corps, 1914-15; M.G.R.A., First Army, 1915-18; retired,
1919.

Micklem, Brigadier-General John (1889-1952)
Winchester and R.M.A. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1910; O.C.
Battalion of Gloucestershire Regiment, 1915-17, and Tank
Corps, 1917-18; Deputy Assistant Inspector-General of
Training, 1918; G.O.C. 4th Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918
(wounded twice, M.C., D.S.O.); retired, 1929. Brother of
Brigadier Ralph Micklem.

Miles, Lieutenant-General Charles George Norman (1884-1958)
Australian. Brisbane Grammar School. Entered Royal
Australian Artillery, 1904; G.S.O.1, 2nd Australian
Division, 1918-19; A.G., Australia, 1939-40; retired, 1941.

Milne, George Francis (Field-Marshal Lord Milne) "Uncle
George" (1866-1948)
Gymnasium, Aberdeen, and Aberdeen University. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1885; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-
1902; D.A. & Q.M.G., War Office, 1903-07; G.S.O.2, North
Midland Division, 1908-09; G.S.O.1, 6th Division, 1919-13;
B.G.R.A., 4th Division, 1913-15; B.G.G.S., III Corps, 1915;
M.G.G.S., Second Army, 1915; G.O.C. 27th Division, B.E.F.
and M.E.F., 1915; XVI Corps, 1915; G.O.C. Salonika, 1916-20;
C.I.G.S., 1926-33; Field-Marshal, 1928. Created Baron, 1933.

Mitchell, Brigadier-General Charles Hamilton (1872-1941)
Canadian. University of Toronto. Civil Engineer. Entered
Canadian Militia, 1899; Canadian Corps of Guides, 1903;
G.S.O., Military District No.2, Toronto, 1911-14; G.S.O.3,
1st Canadian Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1916-18; B.G.I., British
Forces in Italy, 1918-19.

Mitford, Major-General Bertram Reveley (1863-1936)
Wellington and King Edward's School, Birmingham. Joined
East Kent Regiment, 1882; transferred to East Surrey
Regiment, 1891; p.s.c.; Egyptian Army, 1886-1891; Soudan,
1886-89; Dongola, 1896-97; Soudan, 1898-99; South Africa,
1899-1902; G.O.C. 5th Division, 1906-10; retired, 1910;
G.O.C. 72nd Brigade, 1914-17; 42nd Division, 1917; retired,
1918.

Moir, Brigadier-General Alan James Gordon (1873-1940)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots, 1893; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches);

Monash, General Sir John (1865-1931)
Australian of German Jewish origin. Scotch College, Melbourne, and University of Melbourne. Civil Engineer specialising in reinforced concrete. Entered Australian Citizen Forces, 1887; Colonel, 1913; G.O.C. 4th Australian Brigade, 1914-16; 3rd Australian Division, 1916-18; Australian Corps, 1918; general and retired, 1930; Chairman, Victorian Government State Electricity Commission, 1920-31. Author of The Australian Victories in France in 1918 (1920). Able, meticulous and careful, he was one of the best corps commanders.

Montague-Stuart-Wortley, Hon. Lieutenant-General Sir (Alan) Richard (1868-1949)

Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, Major-General Hon. Edward James "Eddie" (1857-1934)
Montgomery, Archibald Armar (Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd) "Archie" (1871-1947)
Second son of Rt. Hon. Hugh de F. Montgomery, PC. Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded; despatches); Special Employment, War Office, 1905-06; G.S.O.3, Aldershot, 1908-11; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Camberley, 1914; G.S.O.2, 4th Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1915-16; M.G.G.S., Fourth Army, 1916-19; Adjutant-General, 1931-33; C.I.G.S., 1933-36; Field-Marshal, 1935. As Chief Staff Officer to Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1915-19, he rose from Major to Major-General in 2 years. Added Massingberd to his name when his wife inherited the Massingberd estates, 1926. Brother of Major-General H.M. de F. Montgomery (q.v.) and Sir Charles Montgomery, Vice-Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, 1920-33, and cousin of Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Maude (q.v.).

Montgomery, Bernard Law (Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein) "Monty" (1887-1976)

Montgomery, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Ferguson (1880-1920)
Marlborough. Entered Royal Marine Light Infantry, 1898; Naval Intelligence Department, 1911-12; Operations Division, Admiralty War Staff, 1912-15; G.S.O.1, 19th Division, 1917-19; killed by I.R.A. in Dublin in 1920. Played hockey for England. Cousin of Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (q.v.).

Montgomery, Major-General Hugh Maude de Fellenberg (1870-1954)
Montgomery, Major-General Sir Robert Arundel Kerr "Monty" (1862-1951)
Entered Royal Artillery, 1881; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Professor, Staff College, Quetta, 1905-09; G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1909-11; B.G.G.S., Southern Command, 1911-14; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1914-15; B.G.R.A., I Corps, 1915; M.G.R.A., Third Army, 1915; Commander Tyne Garrison, U.K., from 1915; retired, 1920. His son was lost with H.M.S. Good Hope in 1914.

Montgomery-Massingberd see Montgomery, Archibald Armar

Moore, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Hamilton (1876-1952)
Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902; Trinidad Local Forces, 1903-04; Special Employment, War Office, 1907-13; G.S.O.1, 29th Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, Tyne Garrison, U.K., 1918-20.

Moore, Samuel Guise (Major-General Sir Guise Guise-Moores) (1863-1942)
Cheltenham and St. Thomas' Hospital, London. Captain, R.A.M.C., 1890; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); A.D.M.S., 14th Division, 1915-16; A.D.M.S., 29th Division, 1916; A.D.M.S., Guards Division, 1916-17; D.D.M.S., XI Corps, 1917-18; D.M.S., Second Army, 1918-19; D.M.S., Royal Army Medical College, 1919-20; retired, 1934. Author of Manual of Hygiene and Sanitation (Red Cross Society) and articles.

Morland, General Sir Thomas Lethbridge Napier (1865-1925)

Mudie, Brigadier Thomas Couper (1880-1948)

Muirhead, Lieutenant-Colonel John Arthur (born 1879)
Bedford. Joined Indian Police, 1898; Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; transferred to Indian Army (1st Lancers), 1902; p.s.c.; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 3rd Cavalry Division, 1917-18 (wounded).

Mullens, Major-General Richard Lucas "Gobby-Chops" (1871-1952)
Eton and R.M.C. joined 16th Lancers, 1890; transferred to 2nd Dragoon Guards, 1893, and 4th Dragoon Guards, 1911;
p.s.c., 1905; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); Brigade-Major, 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1905-09; O.C. 4th Dragoon Guards, 1911-14; 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15 (wounded); 1st Cavalry Division, 1915-19; retired, 1920. Father of Brigadier G J de W Mullens OBE and grandfather of Lieutenant-General Sir Anthony Mullens KCB OBE.


Murray, Colonel Kenelm Digby Bold (1879-1947) Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1899; transferred to Indian Army (59th Rifles), 1903; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1901-02; North-West frontier, 1908; G.S.O.1, Second Army. 1917-18 (wounded, D.S.O.); retired, 1933. Director of Military Studies, Cambridge University, from 1933. Brother of Colonel A.D. Murray, D.S.O.

Muspratt, General Sir Sidney Frederick (1878-1972) United Service College and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1898; transferred to Indian Army (12th Cavalry), 1899; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1908; Staff Captain and G.S.O.3, H.Q., India, 1906-10; A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Cavalry Division, 1915-18; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division, 1918; retired, 1941.

Napier, Brigadier Vernon Monro Colquhoun (1881-1957) Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; South Africa, 1902; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1917-18; Assistant Director of Staff Duties, G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1935.

Nash, Major-General Sir Philip Arthur Manley (1875-1936) Radley. Engineer with Indian Railways, 1899-1914; Director, Ministry of Munitions, 1915-16; Deputy Director-General of Transportation, B.E.F., 1916; Director-General of Transportation, France, 1917; Director-General of Transportation, Western Front, 1918.

Neame, Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Neame (1888-1978) Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1908; V.C., 1914; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 30th Division, 1918;
D.C.I.G.S., 1939-40; G.O.C. Cyrenaica, 1941; Lieutenant-General and C.-in-C., Guernsey, 1945-53; retired, 1947. Gold and Bronze Medals with the British Olympic Sporting Rifle Team, 1924. Author of German Strategy in the Great War (1923), Playing With Strife (1946), and articles on big game shooting.

Neilson, Colonel Walter Gordon (1876-1927)
Merchiston Castle School, Edinburgh, and Militia. Joined Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded twice, despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.1, 63rd Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1918-19. One of four brothers who played rugby for Scotland.


Newcome, Major-General Henry William (1875-1963)
Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); Instructor, School of Gunnery, 1914; G.S.O.2 (S.O. to M.G.R.A.), First Army, 1915-16 (wounded twice); G.S.O.1 (S.O. to M.G.R.A.), G.H.Q., 1916; Instructor, Gunnery School, Salisbury Plain, 1916-17; B.G.R.A., 21st Division, 1917-18; Commandant, Chapperton Down Artillery School, 1918-22; retired, 1935. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Lawson (q.v.) was his wife's step-father.

Newland, Major-General Sir Foster Reuss (1862-1943)
Shrewsbury and Dublin University. Joined R.A.M.C., 1886; South Africa, 1900-02; A.M.S., 18th Division, 1915-16; D.D.M.S., XV Corps, 1916-17; D.D.M.S., XIV Corps, 1917; D.M.S., Italy, 1917-18; retired, 1922. Married daughter of Lieutenant-General Count Michele Salazar, Italian Army.

Newman, Major-General Charles Richard (1875-1954)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98; G.S.O.3, Coast Defence, Northern Command, 1912-14; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 35th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 62nd Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1918-19; retired, 1934. Brother-in-law of Air Chief Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond and Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Salmond (q.v.).

Nichol, Colonel Charles Edward (1859-1939)
Edinburgh Collegiate School and Edinburgh University. Entered Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; Burma, 1885-87; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Commandant,
Nicholson, Major-General Sir Cecil Lothian (1865-1933)

Nicholson, Major-General Octavius Henry Lothian (1877-1938)

Norie, Major-General Charles Edward de Manley (1866-1929)
Second son of Major-General C.E.M. Norie. Fettes. Joined Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1885; transferred to Indian Army (2nd Gurkha Rifles), 1887; p.s.c.; Manipur Expedition, 1891; Tirah, 1897-98 (severely wounded, despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.1, Meerut Division, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., Indian Corps, 1915; G.O.C. Bareilly (later 21st) Brigade, B.E.F. and Mesopotamia, 1915-17; Brigade Commander, India, 1917; retired, 1920.

Nosworthy, Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Poitiers (1887-1971)

Nugent, Major-General Sir Oliver Stewart Wood (1860-1926)
Son of Major-General St.G.M. Nugent. Harrow and Militia. Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1882; transferred to K.R.C., 1883; p.s.c.; Hazara Expedition, 1891; Miranzai Expedition, 1891; Izazai Expedition, 1892; Chitral Relief Force, 1895 (slightly wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1900 (dangerously wounded, despatches); G.O.C.

Nunn, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Henry Clayton (born 1873)
Militia; joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1894; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); Adjutant, School of Mounted Infantry, Egypt, 1902-05; Brigade-Major, Mounted Infantry Brigade, Southern Command, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1916 (invalided); G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Home Forces, 1916; G.S.O.1, 58th Division, 1916-17; O.C. Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, 1917-18; O.C. 14/Warwickshire, 1918; G.S.O.1, Humber Garrison, U.K., 1918-19.

O'Connor, Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Bernard (born 1879)
Entered Royal Engineers, 1897; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, 25th Division, 1917; Special Appointment (G.S.O.1) (Liaison Officer), G.H.Q., Italy, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, VI Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, XXII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 29th Division, 1918.

O'Donnell, Major-General Sir Thomas Joseph (1858-1947)
St. Stanislaus College, Tullabeg. Entered Army, 1881; Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; Egypt, 1881-82; Bechuanaland, 1885-86; Zululand, 1887-88; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches, D.S.O.); P.M.O., India, 1910-11; A.D.M.S., Southern Command, 1911-14; D.D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1915-16; D.M.S., India, 1916-18; retired, 1918. Fellow, Royal Institute of Public Health. Rode many winners in South Africa and India.

O'Keefe, Major-General Sir Menus William (1859-1944)
Queen's University, Ireland. Entered Army, 1884; Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; Egypt, 1882; Tirah, 1897-98; Mohmand, 1908; Inspector of Medical Services, War Office, 1910-14; D.D.M.S., Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; D.M.S., Fourth Army, 1916-19.

O'Leary, Brigadier-General Tom Evelyn (1862-1924)

Ollivant, Brigadier-General Alfred Henry (1971-1919)
Winchester. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; Somaliland, 1904; p.s.c., 1908; G.S.O.2, Colonial Office, 1909-11; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-13; G.S.O.2, Admiralty, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, Royal Naval (later 63rd) Division, Antwerp, Gallipoli, and France, 1914-16; B.G.R.A., Heavy Artillery, X
Corps, 1918-19; G.S.O.1, Supreme War Council, 1919; retired, 1919.

Onslow, Richard William Alan, 4th Earl of Onslow (1876-1945) 

Osborne, Lieutenant-General Edmund Archibald (1885-1969) 
Cheltenham. Entered Royal Engineers, 1904; Lieutenant, 1907; D.S.O., 1914; G.S.O.2, Operations, G.H.Q., 1917-18; G.S.O.2, 1918; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division, 1918-20; G.O.C. 44th Division, 1938-40; retired, 1941.

Oxley, Brigadier-General Reginald Stewart (1863-1951) 

Paget, Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Edward Sidney Louis (1879-1917) 

Pakenham, George de la Poer Beresford (1875-1960) 
United Services College and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1895; transferred to Indian Army (39th Garhwal Rifles), 1896, and Border Regiment, 1904; p.s.c., 1908; G.S.O.1, 56th Division, 1916-19; retired, 1931. His brother died of wounds in 1915.

Paley, Colonel Alan Thomas (1876-1950) 
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1897; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1900 and 1902 (dangerously wounded, despatches); Instructor, R.M.C., 1907-11; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 21st Division, 1916-17; Assistant Commandant, R.M.C., 1917-18; retired, 1925.
Panet, Brigadier-General Edouard de Bellefeuille (born 1881) Canadian. Ashbury College, Ottawa University, and R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Entered Royal Canadian Artillery, 1902; p.s.c., 1913; G.S.O.1, 4th Canadian Division, 1918-19; retired, 1919. Half-brother of Major-General H.A. Panet and Brigadier-General A.E. Panet.

Paris, Major-General Sir Archibald (1861-1937) Eton and Royal Naval College, Greenwich. Entered Royal Marine Artillery, 1879; p.s.c.; Naval Intelligence Department, Admiralty, 1899-1900; Rhodesian Field Force, 1900-02 (despatches); Professor, R.M.A., 1903-06; C.B., 1907; Inspector of Marine Recruiting, 1913-14; G.O.C. Royal Naval (later 63rd) Division, U.K., Antwerp, Gallipoli, and France, 1914-16 (severely wounded, losing his leg); he retired as a consequence of his wounds in 1917.


Parker, Brigadier-General Robert Gabbett (1875-1927) Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1896; p.s.c., 1908; South Africa, 1900-02 (wounded, despatches); Instructor, R.M.C., 1911-13; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 41st Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1926. His brother was killed in action, 1914.


Peck, Major-General Arthur Wharton (1869-1948) Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Border Regiment, 1890; transferred to Lincolnshire Regiment, 1890, and Indian Army (Sam Browne's Cavalry), 1892; Waziristan, 1894-95; South Africa, 1900; North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.2, Northern Army, India, 1908-11; G.S.O.2, India, 1914; A.Q.M.G., Indian Corps, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., Indian Corps, 1915; D.A. &
Q.M.G., XV and XVII Corps, 1915-18; D.A. & Q.M.G., First Army, 1918-19; retired, 1921.

Peck, Lieutenant-Colonel John Henry (born 1886)
Australian. Lieutenant, Australian Militia, 1912; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, I ANZAC Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, 5th Australian Division, 1917-18 (sick); C.M.G., 1918.

Peck, Major-General Sydney Capel (1871-1949)

Perceval, Major-General Sir Edward Maxwell "Perks" (1861-1955)

Percival, Lieutenant-Colonel, Arthur Jex-Blake (1870-1914)
Son of the Bishop of Hereford. Marlborough and Rugby. Joined Northumberland Fusiliers, 1892; p.s.c., 1908; Crete, 1898; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Soudan, 1905-06 (despatches); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-13; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1914; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1914; killed in action, 31 October 1914.

Percy, Major-General John Samuel Jocelyn (1871-1952)

Pereira, Major-General Sir Cecil Edward "Pinto" (1869-1942)
Peyton, General Sir William Elliot (1866-1931)
Brighton College. In the ranks, 1 year 361 days; commissioned 7th Dragoon Guards, 1887; p.s.c.; Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1897 (dangerously wounded); Soudan, 1898 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); O.C. 15th Hussars, 1903-07; Meerut Cavalry Brigade, 1908-12; Military Secretary to C.-in-C., E. Indies, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, Mounted Division, U.K., August 1914; G.O.C. 2nd Mounted Division, Central Force, Home Defence, U.K. and M.E.F., 1914-16; Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1916-18; G.O.C. Reserve Army and X Corps, 1918; 40th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1930. Brother-in-law of Brigadier-General M.F. Gage (q.v.).

Philipps, Major-General Sir Ivor (1861-1940)
Second son of Canon Sir Erasmus Philipps, 12th Baronet. Felsted and Militia. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1883; transferred to Indian Army (5th Gurkha Rifles), 1884; p.s.c.; Burma, 1887-89; Miranzai Expedition, 1891; Isazai Expedition, 1892; North-West Frontier, 1896; Tirah, 1896-97; China, 1900-01 (despatches, D.S.O.); retired as Major, 1903; Liberal M.P., 1906-22, and man of business; G.O.C. 38th Division, 1915-16 (sacked); K.C.B., 1917. Author of The Issue of Orders in the Field. Brother of Sir John Philipps, 13th Baronet (financier and Liberal M.P., 1888-94, created Baron, 1908, and then Viscount St. Davids, 1918) and O.C. Philipps, (shipowner, financier, Liberal M.P., 1906-10, and Conservative M.P., 1916-22, created Baron Kylsant, 1923), he was a political ally of Lloyd George, who was instrumental in his being given command of the 38th Division in 1915.

Piggott, Major-General Francis Stewart Gideroy (1883-1966)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1901; Japan, 1904-06 and 1910-13; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1918; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1918-19; p.s.c., 1919; retired, 1939. Interpreter in Japanese; Senior Lecturer in Japanese, London University, 1942-46. Author of The Elements of Sosho (1913) and Broken Thread (memoirs, 1950).

Pigott, Brigadier-General Sir Robert "Bob" (1882-1977)

Pike, Major-General Sir William Watson (1860-1941)
Kingstown School. Entered Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C., 1894; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); D.D.M.S., Indian Cavalry Corps, 1915; D.D.M.S., Indian
Corps, 1915; D.M.S., First Army, 1915-17; retired, 1920. Played Rugby and Hockey for Ireland.

Pilcher, Major-General Thomas David (1858-1928)
Harrow and Militia. Joined 22 Foot, 1879; transferred to 5 Foot, 1879; p.s.c.; West African Frontier Force, 1897-1900; Nigeria, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.O.C. 3rd and 5th Brigades, 1902-07; Major-General, 1907; G.O.C. Burma Division, 1912-14; 17th Division, 1915-16 (wounded, 1915; sacked on the Somme); Commander Reserve centre, U.K., 1916-18. Author of Lessons from the Boer War; The Writing on the Wall; A General's Letters to his son; A General's Letters on Minor Tactics; War According to Clausewitz (1918); and East is East.

Pincher, Major-General Reginald John (1863-1943)

Pinwill, Lieutenant-Colonel William Richard (born 1873)

Pitcher, Air Commodore Duncan le Geyt (1877-1944)
Sedburgh, Geneva University, and R.M.C. Joined South Wales Borderers, 1898; transferred to Indian Army (39th Horse), 1901, and R.F.C., 1914; Tutor to the Maharajah of Holkar, 1908; Assistant Inspector, Imperial Service Troops, Central India, 1910-11; Pilot's Certificate No.125, 1911; Central Persia, 1911-13; Assistant Commandant, Central Flying School, 1915; Commandant, C.F.S., 1915-16; G.O.C. 1st Brigade, R.F.C., 1916-17 and 1918-19; retired, 1929.

Pitman, Major-General Thomas Tait (1868-1941)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 11th Hussars, 1889; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 11th Hussars, 1912-15; 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1915-18; 2nd Cavalry Division, 1918-19; retired, 1930.

Pitt-Taylor, General Sir Walter William (1878-1950)
Eton and Militia. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1899; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Egypt, 1908-09; G.S.O.2, 37th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, XIV Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, British Mission with
Italian Forces, 1917-18; G.O.C. 145th Brigade, Italy, 1918; B.G.G.S., XIV Corps, Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1939.

Place, Colonel Charles Otley (1875-1955)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1895; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Instructor, R.M.A., 1909-10; G.S.O.3, Western Command, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, 19th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 36th Division, 1916-18; wounded and captured, 26 March 1918; retired, 1923.

Platt, General Sir William (1885-1975)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Northumberland Fusiliers, 1905; p.s.c., 1919; Mohmand Expedition, 1908 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1918-20; G.O.C. East Africa, 1941-45; retired, 1945. Dynamic personality.

Plumer, Herbert Charles Onslow (Field-Marshal Lord Plumer) "Plum" (1857-1932)
Eton. Joined 65 Foot, 1876; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1884; Matabele, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.O.C. 4th Brigade, 1902-03; 10th Division and 19th Brigade, 1903-04; Q.M.G., 1904-05; G.O.C. 5th Division, 1906-09; Northern Command, 1911-1914; G.O.C. V Corps, 1915; Second Army, 1915-17; British Forces in Italy, 1917-18; Second Army, 1918-19; Army of the Rhine, 1918-19; created Field-Marshal and Baron, 1919, and Viscount, 1929. Although the model for David Low's cartoon character, Colonel Blimp, because of his walrus moustache, beefy complexion and rotund figure, he was one of the best generals of the war.

Pollok-Morris, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Auselan (born 1877)
Harrow. Joined Highland Light Infantry, 1897; p.s.c.; Crete, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2/2nd Mounted Division, U.K., 1918-19. Assumed additional name of Morris, 1901.

Ponsonby, Major-General Sir John (1866-1952)

Porter, Major-General Sir Robert (1858-1928)
Foyle College, Londonderry; Glasgow University; and Paris. Entered Army, 1881; Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; Ashanti, 1895-96; South Africa, 1899-1902; A.M.O., Irish Command, 1908-10; P.M.O., Western Command, 1910; D.D.M.S., Malta, 1910-14; D.D.M.S., II Corps, 1914-15; D.M.S., Second Army, 1915-18; retired, 1918.
Price, Brigadier-General Thomas Rose Caradoc (1875-1949)
Melbourne and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1894; transferred to Indian Army (Probyn's Horse), 1899, and Welsh Guards, 1915; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Tibet, 1903-04; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 55th Division, 1917-18; G.O.C. 114th Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1941. A tournament polo player and winner of races in India across country.

Pritchard, Brigadier-General Clive Gordon (1871-1948)

Pryce, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Edward ap Rhys (1874-1950)
Glenalmond and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1895; transferred to Indian Army, 1896; p.s.c.; Tibet, 1903-04; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 38th Division, 1915-17; G.O.C. 113th Brigade, 1917-18; retired, 1938. Author of Transport Training Notes.

Pulteney, Lieutenant-General Sir William "Putty" (1861-1941)

Radcliffe, General Sir Percy Pollexfen de Blaquiere "P. de B." (1874-1934)

Ramsay, Major-General Frank Williams (1875-1954)
Eldest son of Brigadier-General W.A. Ramsay. Militia; joined Middlesex Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1901-02; O.C. Battalion of The Middlesex Regiment, 1915-16; D.S.O., 1916; G.O.C. 48th Brigade, 1916-18; 58th Division, 1918-19 (wounded twice); retired, 1929. Author of Polo Training, with Hints on the Game (1928). From a Scots family with a long tradition of military service. Brother of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay. His other brother was a soldier and his two
sisters married soldiers. Married the widow of Lieutenant-Colonel A. St. Leger Glyn (q.v.), 1929.

Ramsay, Major-General Sir John George (1856-1920)
Queen Elizabeth's School, Ipswich, and Stubbington House, Hampshire. Joined 14 Foot, 1875; transferred to Indian Army (24th Punjab Infantry), 1877; Afghan War, 1878-80; Hazara Expedition, 1888; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; China, 1900; Mohmand Expedition, 1908; G.O.C. 3rd Bangalore Brigade, India, 1907-11; retired, 1912; G.O.C. 24th Division, 1914-15 (resigned).

Ramsay-Fairfax, Commander William George Astell (1876-1946)
Second son of Colonel Sir William Ramsay-Fairfax, 2nd Baronet. Cornwalles, Malmesbury; The Limes, Greenwich; and H.M.S. Britannia. Entered Royal Navy, 1900; resigned, 1901; Imperial Yeomanry, South Africa, 1902; exploration of the Blue Nile, 1903; Abyssinian Army, co-operating with the British Somaliland Field Force, 1903-04; served with Royal Naval Division, Gallipoli and France (O.C. Howe Battalion), and Tank Corps, France, 1915-18; D.S.O., 1916; G.O.C. 3rd Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918-19.

Rawlins, Colonel Stuart William Hughes (1880-1927)

Rawlinson, Henry Seymour (General Lord Rawlinson) "Rawly" (1864-1925)
Succeeded his father, Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, as 2nd Baronet, 1895. Eton. Joined K.R.R.C., 1884; transferred to Coldstream Guards, 1892; p.s.c.; Burma, 1886-87; Soudan, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley, 1903-06; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, 1907-09; 3rd Division, 1910-14; 4th Division, 1914; IV Corps, 1914-15; First Army, 1915-16; Fourth Army, 1916-17; Second Army, 1917-18; Fifth Army, 1918; Fourth Army, 1918-19; created Baron, 1919; C.-in-C., India, 1920-25. Author of The Officers' Note-book.

Reed, Major-General Hamilton Lyster "Paddy" (1869-1931)
Renny, Colonel Lewis Frederick (1877-1955)
Brighton College and R.M.C. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; West African Frontier Force, 1904-08; Brigade-Major, Malta, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 6th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Machine Gun Corps Training Centre, 1917-18; B.G.G.S. (Inspector of Machine Gun Units), G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1930.

Rice, Major General Sir (Spring) Robert (1858-1929)
Entered Royal Engineers, 1877; Adjutant, School of Military Engineering, 1892-1905; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Chief Engineer, Coast Defence, Southern Command, 1909-11; Chief Engineer, Aldershot, 1911-14; Chief Engineer, I Corps, 1914-15; First Army, 1915-16; Engineer-in-Chief, France, 1916-17; Commander, Forth Garrison, U.K., 1917-18; retired, 1919.

Rimington, Major-General Sir Michael Frederick "Mike" (1858-1928)

Ritchie, Major-General Sir Archibald Buchanan (1869-1955)
Son of Major-General John Ritchie. United Services College and R.M.C. Joined Seaforth Highlanders, 1889; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); O.C. 1/Seaforth Highlanders, 1913-15; 26th Brigade, 1915-16; 11th Division, 1916-17 (wounded); 16th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1928.

Robb, Major-General Sir Frederick Spencer (1858-1948)
Harrow; Trinity Hall, Cambridge; and R.M.C. Joined 68 Foot, 1880; p.s.c., 1888-89; Soudan, 1898 (despatches); G.O.C. 6th Division, 1905-09; Major-General i/c Administration, Aldershot, 1910-14; Inspector-General of Communications, B.E.F., 1914; Assistant, C.I.G.S., 1914; Military Secretary to the Secretary-of-State for War, 1914-16; Major-General i/c Administration, Eastern Command, 1916-19; retired, 1920.

Robertson, Major-General Sir Philip Rynd (1866-1936)

Robertson, Brigadier-General William (born 1872)
Sedburgh and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1892; p.s.c.; Chitral Relief Force, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98 (despatches); G.S.O.3, 1908-10; G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1910-13; Chief Instructor, R.M.A., 1914; G.S.O.2, V Corps, 1915 (severely wounded); G.S.O.2, War Office and Second Army, 1916;
Robertson, Field-Marshal Sir William Robert "Wully" (1859-1933)
Educated at a private school. In Ranks, 16th Lancers, 1877-88; commissioned, 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1888; p.s.c., 1898; Miranzai and Black Mountain Expeditions, 1891; Chitral Relief Force, 1895 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); S.O., Intelligence Branch, Simla, 1892-96, and Intelligence Department, War Office, 1899-1900; D.A.A.G., Intelligence, H.Q., South Africa, 1900 (despatches); Assistant D.M.O., War Office, 1901-07; B.G.G.S., Aldershot, 1907-10; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley, 1910-13; D.M.T., War Office, 1913-14; Q.M.G., G.H.Q., 1914-15; C.G.S., G.H.Q., 1915; C.I.G.S., 1915-18; C.-in-C., Home Forces, U.K., 1918-19; British Army on the Rhine, 1919-20; created Baronet, 1919; Field-Marshal, 1920. Author of From Private to Field-Marshal (1921) and Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-18 (1926). He excelled at man-at-arms and Anglo-Indian sports. Without private means and renowned for dropping his "aitches", he was forced to qualify in native languages to supplement his income, gaining a reputation which led him eventually to be the first ranker to become C.I.G.S. and a Field-Marshal. Father of General Lord Robertson of Oakridge, his brother-in-law was the brother of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood (q.v.).

Romer, General Sir Cecil Francis "Romeo" (1869-1962)

Rosenthal, Major-General Sir Charles (1875-1954)
Australian architect. Son of Scandinavian migrants, born and educated in New South Wales. Entered Australian Militia, 1892; commissioned, 1903; O.C. 3rd Australian Field Artillery Brigade, Gallipoli (wounded twice) and France, 1914-16; C.R.A., 4th Australian Division, 1916-17 (wounded); G.O.C. 9th Australian Brigade, 1917-18 (gassed); D.S.O., 1918; 2nd Australian Division, May - September 1918 (wounded); A.I.F. Depots, U.K., 1919; 2nd Australian Division, N.S.W., 1921-1926 and 1932-37; retired, 1937.

**Ross, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Murray (1879-1933)**

**Ross, Major-General Charles (1864-1930)**

**Rowan, Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Stewart (1882-1931)**
Tonbridge School and Militia. Joined Wiltshire Regiment, 1901; p.s.c., 1919; wounded twice, 1914; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.2, Training, G.H.Q., 1917-18; G.S.O.2, 14th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 64th Division, U.K., 1918-19.

**Ruggles-Brise, Major-General Sir Harold Goodeve (1864-1927)**

**Russell, Brigadier-General Hon. Alexander Victor Frederick "Alick" (1874-1965)**
Fourth son of 1th Baron Ampthill and Godson of Queen Victoria and Emperor Frederick of Germany. Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1894; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-10; Military Attache, Berlin and Stockholm, 1910-14; G.S.O.1, 36th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, London District, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, Censorship and Publicity, G.H.Q., 1918; retired, 1926.
Russell, Major-General Sir Andrew Russell (1868-1960)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Border Regiment, 1889; retired, 1892, to be a sheep farmer in New Zealand; New Zealand Territorial Forces; G.O.C. Wellington Mounted Brigade, M.E.F., 1914-16; New Zealand Division, M.E.F. and France, 1916-19; retired, 1932; Inspector-General of New Zealand Forces, 1940-41. Related by marriage to Colonel E.F. St. John (q.v.).

Ryan, Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Sumner (1884-1952)

Rycroft, Major-General Sir William Henry (1861-1925)

Sackville-West, Lionel Edward, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Sackville (1867-1928)

Sackville-West, Charles John (Major-General Lord Sackville) "Tit Willow" (1870-1962)

St. John, Colonel Edmund Farquhar (1879-1945)

Salmond, Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Maitland "Jack" (1881-1968)

Sandbach, Major-General Arthur Edward (1859-1928)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1879; p.s.c.; Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1885; Burma, 1886-87; Sikkim Expedition, 1888; Hazara, 1891; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1901 (D.S.O.); C.R.E., Aldershot, 1908-10; Chief Engineer, Ireland, 1910-14; Chief Engineer, Second Army, 1915; Inspector of Royal Engineers, 1915; G.O.C. 68th Division, U.K., 1915-16; 59th Division, U.K. and France, 1916-17 (sacked). Wounded once.

Sanders, Brigadier-General Arthur Richard Careless (1877-1918)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Entered Royal Engineers, 1897; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.3, 3rd Division, 1915; G.S.O.2, Third Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1916-18; D.S.O., 1916, and Bar, 1918; O.C. 1/ Essex, March - September 1918; 50th Brigade, September 1918; killed in action, 20 September 1918.

Sandilands, Brigadier Harold Richard (1876-1961)
Harrow; Trinity College, Cambridge; and Militia. Joined Northumberland Fusiliers, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.1, 23rd Division, 1918-19 (wounded thrice); retired, 1932. Author

Sargent, Major-General Harry Neptune (1866-1946)
Educated in Ireland. Militia; joined Devonshire Regiment, 1886; transferred to A.S.C., 1890; Soudan, 1898 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport, Irish Command, 1903-05; Deputy Assistant Director of Supplies and Ransport, Irish Command, 1905-06; Colonel i/c A.S.C. Records, Woolwich Dockyard, 1912-13; Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport, Aldershot, 1913-14; A.Q.M.G., I Corps, 1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., 1914-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., Fifth Army, 1916-17; D.A. & Q.M.G., British Mission attached American Expeditionary Force, 1918-19; retired, 1919. Author of The Servant Nation (1932); This Blind World (1933); This Changing World (1935); The Marvels of Bible Prophecy (1938); The Modern World and its Delusions (1944).

Scailes, Brigadier-General George Adinston McLaren (1878-1956)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. Battalion of The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1915-17; 14th Battalion, Tank Corps, 1917-18; 1st Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1921. Author of The Historical Calendar of the 91st Highlanders (1908).

Scobell, Major-General Sir (Sanford) John Palairet (1879-1955)

Scott, Major-General Sir Arthur Binney (1862-1944)

Scott, Major-General Charles Walker (1875-1929)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1894; p.s.c.; West African Frontier Force, 1899-1900; South Africa, 1900-02; D.S.O., 1915; Member of Ordnance Committee, Ministry of Munitions, 1915-16; Assistant-Director of Artillery, G.H.Q., 1916-18 (wounded).
Scrase-Dickens, Brigadier-General Spencer William (1862-1919)

Segrave, Brigadier-General William Henry-Erik (1875-1964)

Sedburgh and R.M.C. Joined Royal Irish Regiment, 1888; transferred to Indian Army (15th Bengal Lancers), 1891; p.s.c.; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1901 (D.S.O.); Professor, Staff College, Quetta, 1906-14; G.S.O.1 (Liaison), G.H.Q., 1914; G.S.O.1, 6th Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. 151st Brigade, 1915-16; 30th Division, 1916-17 (sacked); 60th Division, E.E.F., 1917-19; retired, 1932. Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Shea and brother-in-law of General Sir Walter Congreve (q.v.).

Shephard, Brigadier-General Gordon Strachey (1885-1918)
Second son of Sir Horatio Shephard. Eton and R.M.C. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1905; transferred to R.F.C., 1912; p.s.c.; Captain, 1913; O.C. 6th Squadron, R.F.C., 1914-15; 12th (Corps) Wing, R.F.C., 1916-17; 1st Brigade, R.F.C., 1917-18; M.C., 1915; D.S.O., 1917; killed in an aeroplane accident, "stunting" a Nieuport which he kept for his own use, 19 January 1918. Interpreter in French and German. Prior to the war he did a great deal of yatching and is said to have been a model for Carruthers in Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands (1903). He was only 31 when he was given command of 1st Brigade, R.F.C., in 1917.

Sherbrooke, Colonel Nevile Hugh Cairns (1880-1944)
Grandson of 1st Earl Cairns. Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1898; p.s.c., 1914; South Africa, 1900-02; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, Australian Depots in England, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 35th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1936.

Shoubridge, Major-General (Thomas) Herbert (1871-1923)
Blundell's School, Tiverton. Joined Dorset Regiment; transferred to Northumberland Fusiliers, 1900; p.s.c.; Tirah, 1897-98 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2, West Lancashire Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, Southern Command, 1914; G.S.O.1, 18th Division, 1915; G.O.C. 54th Brigade, 1915-17; 7th Division, France and Italy, 1917-19; Commandant, R.M.C., 1923; retired, 1923.
Shute, General Sir Cameron Deane (1866-1936)

Sillem, Major-General Sir Arnold Frederick (1865-1949)

Simpson-Baikie, Brigadier Sir Hugh Archie Dundas (1871-1924)

Sinclair-Maclagen, Major-General Ewen George (1868-1948)
United Services College and Militia. Militia; joined Border Regiment, 1889; transferred to Yorkshire Regiment, 1908; Waziristan Field Force, 1894-95; South Africa, 1899-1901 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); New South Wales Military Forces, 1902-04; Director of Drill, R.M.C., Duntroon, Australia, 1911-14; G.O.C. 3rd Australian Brigade, 1914-17; Director of Training, A.I.F. Depots, U.K., 1917; G.O.C. 4th Australian Division, 1917-19; 51st (Highland) Division, 1919-23; retired, 1925. The ideal type of regimental soldier and one of the very few British officers to remain with the A.I.F. throughout the war.

Skeffington-Smyth, Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Henry Julian (1873-1939)
Skinner, Major-General Bruce Morland (1858-1932)
All Saints School, Bloxham. Entered Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C., 1894; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches); P.M.O., 6th Division, South Africa, 1900; Commandant, R.A.M.C. College, 1912-14; D.D.M.S., 1915-16; D.M.S., Fifth Army, 1916-18.

Skinner, Major-General Sir (Percy) Cyriac Burrell (1871-1955)

Sloggett, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Thomas (1857-1929)
Son of Inspector-General W.H. Sloggett. Entered Army, 1881; Lieutenant-Colonel, R.A.M.C., 1896; Indian Frontier, 1884; Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1897-98 (dangerously wounded, despatches); South Africa, 1899-1903 (despatches); P.M.O., Home and London Districts, 1903-08; P.M.O., 14th Division, India, 1908-11; D.M.S., India, 1911-14; Director-General, A.M.S., 1914-18; D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1915-18. Father of Lieutenant-Colonel A.J.H. Sloggett. He had a reputation as a womaniser.

Sloman, Brigadier-General Henry Stanhope (1861-1945)

Smith, Major-General Sir William Douglas (1865-1939)
Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1885; Burma, 1886; Tirah, 1897-98; O.C. 1/Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1911-14; 9th Brigade, 1914-16; 20th Division, 1916-17; 56th Division, 1917; 20th Division, 1917-18; retired, 1920.

Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace Lockward "S.D." (1858-1930)
Harrow. Joined Derby Regiment, 1876; p.s.c., 1888; Zulu War, 1879 (one of few survivors of Isandhlwana and was recommended for the V.C.); Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1885-86 (D.S.O.); Chitral, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98; Brigade and Divisional Commander, South Africa, 1899-1901; A.G., India, 1901-03; G.O.C. 48th Division, 1903-07; Aldershot, 1907-12; Southern Command, 1912-14; II Corps, 1914; Second Army, 1914-1915 (sacked); First Army, Home Defence, U.K., 1915; Governor, Gibraltar, 1918-23; retired, 1923. Author of

Smyth, Major-General Sir Nevill Maskelyne (1868-1941)
Educated privately and at the R.M.C.; joined 2nd Dragoon Guards, 1888; transferred to 6th Dragoon Guards, 1903; Zhob Valley, 1890; Dongola, 1896; Soudan, 1897-98 (severely wounded, despatches, V.C.); Soudan, 1899-1901; Abyssinia, 1901-02; South Africa, 1902-03; Egyptian Army, 1896-1902, and 1913-15; learnt to fly, 1913; G.O.C. 1st Australian Brigade, 1915-16; 2nd Australian Division, 1916-18; 58th Division, 1918 (sick); 59th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1924; emigrated to Australia, 1925. As a man of few words he was known to Australians as "The Sphinx". Highly regarded.

Smyth-Osbourne, Air Commodore Henry Percy (1879-1969)

Snow, General Sir Thomas D'Oyly "Snowball" (1858-1940)
Eton and Cambridge University. Joined Somerset Light Infantry, 1879; p.s.c.; Zulu War, 1879; Soudan, 1884-85 (severely wounded); Soudan, 1898 (despatches); G.O.C. 11th Brigade, 1910-11; 4th Division, 1911-14 (incapacitated); 27th Division, 1914-15; VII Corps, 1915-18; retired, 1920.

Solly-Flood, Major-General Arthur (1871-1940)

Soutry, Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor Lloyd Blunden (born 1878)
Cheltenham. Joined Royal Irish Rifles, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 63rd Division, 1918 (despatches, wounded); retired, 1920.

Spender, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Wilfred Bliss (1876-1960)
Winchester and Militia. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-10; retired to join the Ulster Volunteer Force, 1913; re-employed, 1914; G.S.O.2, 36th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1916; G.S.O.1, 31st Division, 1916-18; retired, 1919; Head of Civil Service, Northern Ireland, 1925-44; knighted, 1929.
Stephens, General Sir Reginald Byng "Stiff'un" (1869-1955)
Winchester. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1890; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches); Matabele War, 1906; Instructor, R.M.C., 1907-11; O.C. 2/Rifle Brigade, 1914-15; 25th Brigade, 1915-16; 5th Division, 1916-18; X Corps, 1918-19; Commandant, R.M.C., 1919-23; Director-General, T.A., 1927-31; retired, 1931. A good trainer of troops.

Stericker, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur William (born 1879)
Victoria College, Jersey, and Brighton College. Joined D.C.L.I., 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 20th Division, 1918-19.

Stewart, Brigadier-General Cosmo Gordon (1869-1948)
Educated Victoria College, Jersey; France and Germany. Entered Royal Artillery, 1888; p.s.c.; Kurram Expedition, 1892-93; Chitral (despatches, D.S.O.); Egyptian Army, 1897-1900; Soudan, 1897-99; Sudd Expedition, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1909-13; G.S.O.1, 24th Division, 1915-16; G.O.C. 183rd Brigade, 1916; B.G.R.A., 33rd Division, 1917-18; G.O.C. South Midland Reserve Brigade, 1918-19 (despatches, very severely wounded); retired, 1925.

Stewart, Brigadier-General Ian (1874-1941)
R.M.C. Joined Scottish Rifles, 1895; p.s.c., 1909; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.3, South Africa, 1911-12; G.S.O.2, South Africa, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, 7th Division, 1914-15; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 51st Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., XIII Corps, 1916-19; C.M.G., 1919; retired, 1921. Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel P.D. Stewart, D.S.O.

Stewart, Major-General Sir (John Henry) Keith (1872-1955)
Eldest son of Lieutenant-General J.M. Stewart. Repton and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1892; joined Indian Army (39th Garhwal Rifles), 1893; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Brigade-Major, Garhwal Brigade, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, Lahore Division, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., I and III Indian Corps, Mesopotamia, 1917-21; retired, 1929. Brother of Colonel P.A.V. Stewart (q.v.).

Stewart, Colonel Patrick Alexander Vansittart (1875-1960)

Stirling, Major Patrick Douglas (1889-1973)
Stranack, Lieutenant-Colonel Cyril Edwin (born 1882)

Strick, Major-General John Arkwright (1870-1934)
Joined Shropshire Light Infantry, 1890; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; D.S.O., 1915; A.A. & Q.M.G., B.E.F., 1915-17; Base Commandant, Italy, 1917-18; Inspector-General of Communications, Italy, 1918-19; G.O.C. British Forces in Italy, 1919-20; retired, 1926.

Strickland, General Sir Edward Peter "Strick" (1869-1951)
Warwick School and Militia. Joined Norfolk Regiment, 1888; transferred to Manchester Regiment, 1914; Burma, 1887-88; Egyptian Army, 1896-1903; Dongola Expedition, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1897-99 (despatches, D.S.O.); West African Frontier Force, 1906-13; Nigeria, 1906; O.C. Manchester Regiment, 1914-15; Jullundur Brigade, 1915; 98th Brigade, 1915-16; 1st Division, 1916-19; retired, 1931. Had a reputation of being a martinet and was known as "Hungry Face" to his men.

Stuart, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander George (1872-1916)
Shrewsbury. Joined Royal Scots, 1894; transferred Indian Army (40th Pathans), 1904; p.s.c.; Staff Captain and D.A. & Q.M.G., H.Q., India, 1905-09; Mohmand Field Force, 1908; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-12; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1914-16; G.S.O.1, 50th Division, 1916; killed in action, visiting the front-line, 4 June 1916.

Stuart, Major-General Sir Andrew Mitchell (1861-1936)
Son of General J.R. Stuart. Dulwich. Entered Royal Engineers, 1879; Soudan, 1884-86 (despatches); Colonel, 1910; Assistant Director of Fortifications and Works, War Office, 1910-14; Director of Works, B.E.F., 1914-19; retired, 1920.

Stuart-Wortley see Montague-Stuart-Wortley

Studd, Brigadier-General Herbert William (1870-1947)
Sutton, Major-General Hugh Clement "Dickie" (1867-1928)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Coldstream Guards, 1887; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); O.C. 1/Coldstream Guards,
1910-13; A.A.G., War Office, 1913-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., Fourth
Army, 1916; Assistant to Major-General i/c Administration
(Brigadier-General), Home Forces, 1916-17; Inspector-General
of Communications, Home Forces, 1917; Deputy Inspector-
General of Communications, Mesopotamia, 1917-19.

Sutton Nelthorpe, Colonel Oliver (1888-1963)
Eton and R.M.A. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1906; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1918-19; D.S.O., 1919;
retired, 1920.

Swinton, Major-General Sir Ernest Dunlop (1868-1951)
Rugby; Cheltenham; University College School, London; and
Blackheath Propriety School. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888;
G.S.O.2, Press Work, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, Secretary,
C.I.D., 1915-16; Commander, Heavy Section, Machine Gun
Corps, 1916; G.S.O.1, Assistant Secretary, C.I.D., 1916-18;
retired, 1919. Chichele Professor of Military History,
Oxford University, 1925-39. Author of The Defence of
Duffer's Drift (1904), The Green Curve (1909), The Great Tab
Dope (1915), A Year Ago (1916), The Study of War (1926);
Eye-Witness (1932), and Over My Shoulder (1951).

Sykes, Major-General Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Hugh "Bill"
(1877-1954)
Educated privately and abroad. In the Ranks, Imperial
Yeomanry Scouts, South Africa, 1900-01 (dangerously
wounded); joined 15th Hussars, 1901; transferred R.F.C.,
1912; p.s.c., 1909; West African Regiment, 1903-04;
Ballooning Certificate, 1904; Intelligence Branch, India,
1905-06; Attache, German manoeuvres, 1907; Pilot's
Certificate No.95, 1910; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-12;
Commander, R.F.C., 1912-14; G.S.O.1, R.F.C., 1914-15;
C.A.S., 1918-19; retired, 1922. Unionist M.P., 1922-28 and
1940-45. Author of Aviation in Peace and War (1922); From
Many Angles (1942), and Roads to Recovery (1944). Son-in-
law of A. Bonar Law (Unionist M.P., Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 1916-18; Prime Minister, 1922-23). Of
considerable ability, he had a knack of making himself
disliked, notably through his intrigues to have General Sir
David Henderson replaced as commander of the R.F.C. in
France by himself.

Symons, Brigadier-General Adolphe (1872-1954)
Clifton and R.M.C. Joined 13th Hussars, 1892; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); S.O., War Office, 1902-06;
G.S.O.2, Irish Command, 1908-12; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1916-17; Deputy D.S.D., War
Office, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, IV Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 51st
Division, 1918; G.O.C. 94th Brigade, 1918 (sick); retired,
1919.
Tagart, Major-General Sir Harold Arthur Lewis (1870-1930)

Tandy, Brigadier-General Ernest Napier "Napper" (1879-1953)

Tanner, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Courtney (1879-1965)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Lancashire Fusiliers, 1899; transferred to Royal Scots, 1908; p.s.c., 1912; D.S.O., 1914; Instructor, R.M.C., 1915; G.S.O.2, Staff Course, Cambridge, 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., British Forces in Italy, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1918-19; retired, 1930.

Taylor, Brigadier-General Reginald O'Bryan (1872-1949)
Marlborough. Joined Wiltshire Regiment, 1892; transferred to Indian Army (19th Lancers), 1896; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 1st Indian Cavalry Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., M.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 159th Brigade, M.E.F., 1915-16; 187th Brigade, U.K. and France, 1916-18; West Lancashire Reserve Brigade, 1918; retired, 1921.

Teck, H.H. Duke of (later Marquess of Cambridge) "Dolly" (1868-1927)


Temperley, Major-General Arthur Cecil (1877-1940)

Thesiger, Major-General George Handcock (1868-1915)

Thompson, Major-General Sir Harry Neville (1861-1925)
Royal Armagh School and Trinity College, Dublin. Entered Army, 1884; Major, R.A.M.C., 1896; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); D.D.M.S., Scottish Command, 1913-14; A.D.M.S., 2nd Division, 1914; A.D.M.S., 48th Division, 1915; D.D.M.S., VI Corps, 1915-17; D.M.S., First Army, 1917-19; D.M.S., British Army of the Rhine, 1919-20; retired, 1920.

Thomson, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Guthrie (1873-1953)
Fettes and R.M.C. Joined Northumberland Fusiliers, 1893; transferred to Indian Army (38th Rifles), 1897; North-West Frontier, 1902; G.S.O.3, H.Q., India, 1910-11; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1911-13; G.S.O.2, American Staff College, France, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 36th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 52nd Division, 1918-19; retired, 1920.

Thomson, Major-General James (1862-1953)
Thorpe, Colonel Herbert Walter Beck (1879-1934)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1898; p.s.c.; Somaliland, 1901-04 (despatches); South Africa, 1901-02; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 35th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, G.S.O.1, Tank Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1933.

Thorpe, Major-General Gervase (1877-1962)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 46th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1917-18; G.O.C. 17th Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1939.

Thuillier, Major-General Sir Henry Fleetwood (1868-1953)
Wimbledon School and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1887; Chitral, 1895; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, 1915-16; Director of Gas Services, B.E.F., 1916-17; G.O.C. 15th Division, 1917; Controller, Chemical Warfare, Ministry of Munitions, 1917-18; G.O.C. 23rd Division, Italy, 1918-19; Commandant, School of Military Engineering, 1919-23; Director of Fortifications and Works, War Office, 1924-27; retired, 1930.

Thwaites, General Sir William (1865-1947)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1887; p.s.c., 1904; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1905-06; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1906-10; G.S.O.2, 2nd London Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. 141st Brigade, 1915-16 (wounded); 46th Division, 1916-18; D.M.I., War Office, 1918-22; Director-General, T.A., 1931-33; retired, 1933.

Traill. Lieutenant-Colonel William Henry (1871-1951)
Educated privately and R.M.C. Joined East Lancashire Regiment, 1892; p.s.c.; Tirah, 1897-98; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1916-19; D.S.O., 1917; retired, 1921.

Treherne, Major-General Sir Francis Harper (1858-1955)
Godolphin School and St. Bartholomew's Hospital. Entered Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C., 1894; Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1884-5; South Africa, 1899-1901 (Surgeon on the personal staff of General Sir George White during the siege of Ladysmith, 1899-1900); North-West Frontier, 1908; A.D.M.S., India, 1911-14; D.D.M.S., Meerut Division, 1914-15; D.M.S., Third Army, 1915-16; D.M.S., Mesopotamia, 1916-17; D.D.M.S., London District, 1917-18; retired, 1918. His daughter married the son of Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob (q.v.).

Trenchard, Hugh Montague (Marshal of the R.A.F. Viscount Trenchard) "Boom" (1873-1958)
Educated privately and Militia. Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1893; transferred to R.F.C., 1912; South Africa, 1899-1902 (dangerously wounded); Nigeria, 1904-06 (despatches, D.S.O.); West African Frontier Force, 1903-10; Instructor, Central Flying School, 1912-13; Assistant

Tudor, Major-General Sir (Henry) Hugh (1871-1965)
Newton Abbott and abroad. Entered Royal Artillery, 1890; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches); B.G.R.A., 9th Division, 1916-18; G.O.C. 9th Division, 1918-19; Chief of Police, Ireland, 1920; Inspector-General of Police and Prisons, Palestine, 1922; retired, 1925. He was an innovator in the employment of gas and smoke shells. A friend of Winston Churchill.

Tulluch, Brigadier-General James Bruce Gregorie (1870-1946)

Turner, Brigadier-General Arthur Jervois (1878-1952)

Turner, Colonel John Earner (1880-1955)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined Scottish Rifles, 1900; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; Adjutant, T.F., 1910-12; G.S.O.1, 58th Division, 1917; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1925.

Turner, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Ernest William (1871-1961)
Canadian. Quebec High School and University of Bishop's College, Lennoxville. Wholesale merchant in Quebec. Joined 10th Queen's Own Canadian Hussars, 1892; South Africa, 1899-1900 (wounded, despatches, D.S.O., V.C.); O.C. 10th Queen's Own Canadian Hussars, 1905-07; 3rd Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 1907-12; retired, 1912; 3rd Canadian Brigade, 1914-15; 2nd Canadian Division, 1915-16; Canadian Overseas Military

Twining, Major-General Sir Philip Geoffrey (1862-1920)
Canadian. R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Entered Royal Engineers, 1886; A.A. & Q.M.G., Meerut Division, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., XIII Corps, 1915-16; Director of Light Railways and Roads, G.H.Q., 1916-17; Deputy Director-General of Transportation, 1917; D.A. & Q.M.G., First Army, 1917-18; Director of Fortifications and Works, War Office, 1918-20. Author of contributions to reviews and periodicals upon military and general subjects.

Twiss, Major-General Sir William Louis Oberkirch (1879-1962)
Son of Baroness Marie d'Oberkirch of Molsheim, Alsace. Bedford and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1898; transferred Indian Army (9th Gurkhas Rifles), 1899; p.s.c., 1907; China, 1900-01 (despatches); Tibet, 1903-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-12; G.S.O.2, Indian Corps, 1914-16; G.S.O.2, First Army, 1916; G.S.O.1, First Army, 1916-17; Deputy D.M.I. (G.S.O.1), India, 1917-19; retired, 1939. Founder member of Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, and Himalayan Club. Author of Some of My Memories (privately printed, 1960).

Uniacke, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Crofton Campbell (1866-1934)

Van Straubenzee, Major-General Sir Casimir Cartwright "Straw" (1867-1956)

Vaughan, Major-General John (1871-1956)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 7th Hussars, 1891; transferred to 10th Hussars, 1904; p.s.c.; Matabeleland, 1896; Mashonaland, 1897; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1901 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Commandant Cavalry School, Netheravon, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, Cavalry Division, 1914; G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; 3rd Cavalry Division, 1915-18;

Vaughan, Lieutenant-General Sir Louis Ridley "Father" (1875-1942)
Uppingham and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1896; transferred Indian Army (7th Gurkha Rifles), 1896; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, H.Q., India, 1910-12; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., XV Corps, 1916-17; M.G.G.S., Third Army, 1917-19; Commandant, Staff College, Quetta, 1919-22; retired, 1928. Like an Oxford Don in his professional manner, sweetness of speech, gentleness of voice and gesture.

Vincent, Brigadier-General Sir Berkeley (1871-1963)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; transferred to 6th Dragoon Guards, 1908; p.s.c.; China, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02; attached to Japanese Army in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1910-11; G.S.O.2, India, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, Indian Corps, 1914; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1915-17; G.O.C. 35th Brigade, 1917-19 (gassed); retired, 1924.

Vivian, Lieutenant-Colonel Valentine (1880-1948)

Wace, Brigadier-General Edward Gurth (1876-1962)

Wagstaff, Major-General Cyril Mosley (1878-1934)
United Services College and Berkhamsted School. Entered Royal Engineers, 1897; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, 5th Australian Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Liaison Officer, H.Q., American Expeditionary Force, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., British Mission to A.E.F., 1918-19; Commandant, R.M.A., 1930-34.
Wake, Major-General Sir Hereward (1876-1963)

Walcot, Lieutenant-Colonel Basil (1880-1918)

Walker, Brigadier-General Henry Alexander (1874-1953)
Militia. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1894; p.s.c.; Somaliland, 1902-04; Nandi, 1906-07 (despatches); Somaliland, 1908-10 (despatches); Central African Rifles and King's African Rifles, 1901-10; Brigade-Major, India, 1914-14; Brigade-Major, Dehra Dun Brigade, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 8th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 40th Division, 1915-17; G.S.O.1, 65th Division, U.K., 1917; G.O.C. 16th Brigade, 1917-19 (seriously wounded losing his left arm, October 1918); Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, 1927-31; retired, 1931.

Walker, Major-General Sir Harold Bridgwood 'Hooky' (1862-1934)
Shrewsbury; Jesus College, Cambridge; and Militia. Joined D.C.L.I., 1884; transferred to Border Regiment, 1904; Soudan, 1884-85; Egypt, 1885-86; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); G.S.O.1, India, 1912-14; B.G.G.S., A.N.Z.A.C. Corps, M.E.F., 1914-15; G.O.C. New Zealand and 1st Australian Brigades, Gallipoli, April - May 1915; 1st Australian Division, Gallipoli, Egypt and France, 1915-18 (wounded twice); 48th Division, Italy, 1918-19; C.-in-C., Italy, 1919; G.O.C. Southern Command, India, 1924-28; retired, 1928. Excellent trainer and widely respected.

Walker, Major-General William George (1863-1936)
Son of Deputy-Surgeon-General W.M. Walker, I.M.S. Haileybury, St. John's College, Oxford, and R.M.C. Joined Suffolk Regiment, 1885; transferred to Indian Army (4th Gurkha Rifles), 1887; Miranzai Expedition, 1891; Waziristan, 1894-95; Somaliland, 1903-04 (despatches, V.C.); O.C. 4th
Gurkha Rifles, 1910-15; Sirhind Brigade, 1915; 2nd Division, 1915-16; Assistant Censor, 1917-18; retired, 1919.

Wallace of that Ilk, Colonel Robert Francis Hurter (1880-1970)

Wanless O'Gowan, Major-General Robert (1864-1947)

Wardrop, General Sir Alexander Ernest (1872-1961)

Watkins, General Sir Henry Bulckley Burlton (1860-1931)
R.M.C. Joined 6 Foot, 1878; transferred to Indian Army (31st Bengal Infantry), 1881; Tochi Field Force, 1897-98 (despatches); Bazar Valley, 1908; G.O.C. Abbottabad and Lucknow Brigades, 1907-11; 3rd Lahore Division, 1912-15 (sacked); retired, 1919.

Watson, Brigadier-General Charles Frederic (1877-1948)

Watson, Major-General Sir David (1871-1922)
Canadian. Public School, Quebec. Journalist and managing director of the Quebec Chronicle from 1901. Commissioned into the 8th Royal Rifles of Quebec, 1900; O.C. 8th Royal Rifles, Canada, 1911-14; 2nd Canadian Battalion, 1914-15; 5th Canadian Brigade, 1915-16; 4th Canadian Division,
1916-19.

Watt, Brigadier-General Donald Munro (1871-1942)
Fettes and R.M.C. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1891; transferred to Indian Army (2nd Gurkha Rifles), 1896; p.s.c., 1907; Chitral, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98; Somaliland, 1904; G.S.O.1, 25th Division, 1915-16; O.C. T.F. Battalion of the West Riding Regiment, 1916; 145th Brigade, 1916-18 (wounded, D.S.O., 1915, and Bar, 1918); retired, 1920.

Watts, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Edward (1858-1934)
Militia; joined 20 Foot, 1880; transferred to 14 Foot, 1880; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.O.C. No. 9 District, 1910-14; retired, 1914; 21st Brigade, 1914-15; 7th Division, 1915-17; XIX Corps, 1917-19.

Weatherby, Lieutenant-Colonel James Thorpe (born 1877)
Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford. Joined Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1899; p.s.c.; Somaliland, 1903-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1916 (sick); G.S.O.1, War Office, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 61st Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1918; Assistant Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1918-19.

Webb-Bowen, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Tom Ince (1879-1956)

Webber, Brigadier-General Norman William "Squib" (1881-1950)
Bradfield College and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1899; p.s.c., 1914; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, A.A., G.H.Q., 1917-18; B.G.G.S., G.H.Q., 1918; B.G.G.S., Fifth Army, 1918; B.G.G.S., Canadian Corps, 1918; Deputy Director of Mobilisation, War Office, 1918-19; retired, 1921. His father was killed in action on the Somme, July 1916!

Weber, Colonel William Hermann Frank (1875-1936)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1894; p.s.c., 1907; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); G.S.O.2, North Midland Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, Lahore Division, 1915 (wounded); G.S.O.1, 30th Division, 1915-17 (D.S.O., sacked); retired, 1924. Author of A Field Artillery Group in Battle and A Novice on the Nile.
Western, Major-General Sir William George Balfour (1861-1936)
Victoria College, Jersey. Joined 50 Foot; Royal West Kent Regiment, 1880; Soudan, 1884-85; North-West Frontier, 1897-98 (wounded, despatches); South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, C.B.); Instructor, R.M.C., 1893-94; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1908-10; O.C. No.8 District, Southern Command, 1911-15; Commandant, Lines of Communication, M.E.F., 1915; Base Commandant, M.E.F., 1915-16; Major-General i/c Southern Command, 1916-17; D.A.G., Italy, 1917-18; D.A.G., Egypt, 1918-19; retired, 1920.

Wethered, Colonel Joseph Robert (1873-1942)
Radley and R.M.C. Joined Gloucestershire Regiment, 1893; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 57th Division, 1917-18; retired, 1926. Brother of Brigadier H.L. Wethered.

Whetherly, Lieutenant-Colonel William Stobart (1879-1955)
Uppingham and R.M.C. Joined 7th Dragoon Guards, 1898; transferred to 19th Hussars, 1916; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.1, 71st Division, U.K., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 67th Division, U.K., 1918; G.S.O.1, 61st Division, 1918-19; retired, 1921.

Whigham, General Sir Robert Dundas "Bob" or "Whigwam" (1865-1950)
Fettes and R.M.C. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment; p.s.c.; Egyptian Army, Soudan, 1898 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.1, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1914 (wounded); B.G.G.S., I Corps, 1914-15; B.G.G.S. (Sub-Chief), G.H.Q., 1915; Deputy C.I.G.S., War Office, 1915-18; G.O.C. 59th Division, 1918; 62nd Division, 1918-19; A.G. to the Forces, 1923-27; retired, 1931.

White, General Sir (Cyril) Brudenell Bingham (1876-1940)

Whitton, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Ernest (1872-1940)
Trinity College, Dublin. Joined Leinster Regiment, 1894; p.s.c., 1904; South Africa, 1902; Assistant Secretary, 1911-13, and Secretary, 1913-14, Historical Section, C.I.D. (Official History of the Russo-Japanese War); dangerously wounded, Ypres, 1914; half-pay for wounds, 1916; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1916-18; G.S.O.2, (Censorship and Publicity)
(War Workers), G.H.Q., 1918-19; G.S.O., War Office, 1919-22; retired, 1922. Author of *The Marne Campaign; History of the Leinster Regiment; History of the 40th Division.*

**Wieck, Lieutenant-Colonel George Frederick Gardells** (born 1881)
Australian. Entered Australian Army, 1912; G.S.O.1, 1st Australian Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, A.I.F. Depots, U.K., 1918.

**Wigram, General Sir Kenneth "Kitten"** (1875-1949)

**Wilkins, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry St. Clair** (born 1867)
Cheltenham. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1883; p.s.c.; attached War Office, 1904-06; G.S.O.3, Coast defence, Irish Command, 1908-12; G.S.O.2, West Riding Division, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, West Riding Division, U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 64th Division, U.K., 1916; retired, 1919.

**Wilkinson, Major-General Sir Percival Spearman** (1865-1919)

**Willcocks, General Sir James** (1857-1926)
Educated by Tutors, at Easton, Somersetshire, and R.M.C. Joined Leinster Regiment, 1878; Afghan War, 1879-80; North-West Frontier, 1881, 1891; 1897-98, and 1908; Soudan, 1885; Burma, 1886-89; Niger, 1899-1900; Ashanti, 1900; South Africa, 1902; G.O.C. Nowshera Brigade, 1902-07; Northern Army, India, 1910-14; Indian Corps, 1914-15 (sacked); Governor of Bermuda, 1917-22; retired, 1922. Author of *From Cabal to Kurnassi* (1904); *With the Indians in France* (1920); and *The Romance of Soldiering and Sport* (1925).

**Williams, Colonel Arthur Frederick Carlisle** (1876-1934)
Elizabeth College, Guernsey, and R.M.C. Joined 4th Hussars, 1896; transferred to Indian Army (31st Lancers), 1897; South Africa, 1899-1900 (dangerously wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1917 (sacked); G.S.O.1, Liaison Officer with British Force in Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1928.
Williams, Brigadier Ernest Morgan (born 1885)
Joined Permanent Australian Military Forces, 1910; G.S.O.3, Australia, 1911-14; O.C. 4th Australian Pioneer Battalion, 1916; 13th Light Horse, 1916; G.S.O.1, 1st Australian Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, 3rd Australian Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, Australian Mounted Division, E.E.F., 1918; Commandant, Cavalry Corps, School of Instruction, Jaffa, 1918; Staff College, Quetta, 1920-22; Brigadier, 1936.

Williams, Hugh Bruce (later Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-Williams) (1865-1942)

Williams, Major-General Weir de Lancey (1871-1961)

Wilson, Brigadier-General Charles Stuart (1867-1933)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1886; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); employed with the Anglo-Portuguese Boundary Commission, East Africa, 1892-93 and 1898-99; Chief Engineer, XIV Corps, B.E.F. and Italy, 1916-18; Engineer-in-Chief, Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1923. Elder brother of Colonel C.E. Wilson.

Wilson, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Fuller Maitland "Fatty" (1859-1941)
Eton. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1878; Afghanistan, 1878-79; Mahsud Waziri Expedition, 1881; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O., India, 1907-11; G.O.C. 12th Brigade, 1912-14; 4th Division, 1914-15; XII Corps, B.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-19; retired, 1921. The uncle of Field-Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya (q.v.) and married in 1884 the cousin of General Sir Hubert Gough (q.v.) and Major-General J.E. Gough (q.v.).
Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Hughes (1864-1922)
Marlborough and Militia. Joined Royal Irish Regiment, 1884; transferred to the Rifle Brigade, 1884; p.s.c.; Burma, 1885-87 (wounded) and 1887-89; South Africa, 1899-1901; Assistant D.S.D., War Office, 1904-06; Commandant, Staff College, 1907-10; D.M.O., War Office, 1910-14; M.G.G.S. (Sub-Chief), G.H.Q., 1914-15; Chief Liaison Officer with the French Army, 1915; G.O.C. IV Corps, 1915-17; Chief Liaison Officer with the French Army, 1917; G.O.C. Eastern Command, 1917; C.I.G.S., 1918-22; created Field-Marshal and Baronet, 1919. Shot dead by Sinn Feiners on the steps of his London house, 22 June 1922. An ebullient and able character whose reputation was sullied by a notoriety amongst his critics for political intrigue and his defence of Ulster against the "papists".

Wilson, Henry Maitland (Field-Marshal Lord Wilson) "Jumbo" (1873-1950)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1900; South Africa, 1900-02; Adjutant, O.T.C., 1911-14; G.S.O.1, New Zealand Division, 1917-19; C.-in-C., Middle East, 1943; Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, 1944; Head of British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, 1945-47; created Field-Marshal, 1944, and Baron, 1946. The nephew of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (q.v.). An outstanding trainer of troops and a giant in stature at 6'7".

Wilson, Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Herbert (1873-1950)
Educated privately and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1893; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1906-09; G.S.O.2, War Office; G.S.O.3, R.M.C., 1911; Secretary (G.S.O.2), Overseas Defence Committee, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, First Army, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., II Corps, 1916-18; B.G.G.S. (Secretary, Overseas Defence Committee), 1918-21; retired, 1923. Permanent-Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1925-33; retired, 1933.

Wing, Major-General Frederick Drummond Vincent (1860-1915)

Wintour, Major-General FitzGerald (1860-1949)
Rossall and R.M.C. Joined 50 Foot, 1880; Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1884-85 (despatches); North-West Frontier, 1897 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches); G.S.O.1, Northern Command, 1909-12; Brigadier-General i/c Administration, Scottish Command, 1912-14; Brigade Commander, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., Second Army, 1915-16 (sick); retired, 1918.
Wood, Brigadier-General Philip Richard (1868-1945)
Joined Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1887; Soudan, 1899 and 1901; Egyptian Army, 1899-1906; G.O.C. 43rd Brigade, 1915-17; 33rd Division, 1917 (sacked); 139th Brigade, 1918; retired, 1919.

Woodhouse, Major-General Sir (Tom) Percy (1857-1931)

Woods, Brigadier-General Hugh Kennedy (1877-1864)

Woollcombe, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Louis (1857-1934)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined 46 Foot, 1876; transferred 25 Foot, 1877; Afghan War, 1878-80; Burma, 1899-90; Chitral, 1895; North-West Frontier, 1897-98 (despatches); G.O.C. Allahabad Brigade, 1906-07; Garhwal Brigade, 1907-10; Highland Division, 1911-14; Eastern Command, 1914-15; Second Army, U.K., 1915-16; 11th Division, 1916; IV Corps, 1916-18; Eastern Command, 1918-19; retired, 1920. A son was killed in action, October 1914.

Wright, Brigadier-General Wallace Dufﬁeld (1875-1953)
Militia; joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1896; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98 (severely wounded); Nigeria, 1902-03 (wounded, V.C.); Cameroons, 1914-15; West African Frontier Force, 1901-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1909-11; Brigade-Major, 3rd Brigade, 1911-13; West African Frontier Force, 1914-16; G.S.O.2, 55th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 18th Division, 1916-18; B.G.G.S., XVII Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1927. Conservative M.P., 1928-31. Awarded the V.C. for beating off a Fulani attack by 1,000 horsemen and 2,000 foot at Kotorkwashi with little more than a platoon of Mounted Infantry in February 1903.

Wynter, Brigadier Henry Walter (1882-1959)
Yarde-Buller, Brigadier-General Hon. Sir Henry (1862-1928)  
Fourth son of 1st Baron Churston. Radley and Militia.  
Joined Leicestershire Regiment, 1884; transferred to Rifle  
Brigade, 1884; p.s.c.; Waziristan, 1894-95; Soudan, 1898;  
Crete, 1898-99; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); S.O., War  
Office, 1903-05; Military Attache, Scandinavia, 1906-10;  
Assistant Military Secretary to C.-in-C., Ireland, 1910-12;  
Military Attache, Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon, 1912-14;  
B.G.G.S., British Mission to the French Army, 1914-16;  
Military Attache, Scandinavia, 1917-19; retired, 1919.
## APPENDIX 2

### BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY OCCUPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample (700)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Serving British Army Officer</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>82.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Serving Indian Army Officer</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Retired British Army Officer</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Serving Commonwealth Officer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Serving Commonwealth Militia Officer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Serving British Territorial Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Serving Royal Marine Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 British Civilian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Serving Royal Naval Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Retired Indian Army Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>700</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3

SERVICE OF BRITISH OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Officers (655)</th>
<th>% of Sample (700)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 British Infantry</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>42.75</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Royal Artillery</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cavalry</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>9.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Royal Engineers</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9.77</td>
<td>9.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Guards</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Indian Infantry</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Indian Cavalry</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 R.A.M.C.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.595</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Royal Flying Corps</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.595</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Army Service Corps</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Household Cavalry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Royal Marines Light Infy.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Royal Marines Artillery</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Army Ordnance Department</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Army Pay Department</td>
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Total: 655 100.00

MOST POPULAR CORPS/REGIMENT OF BRITISH REGULAR OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regiment</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Officers (600)</th>
<th>% of Sample (700)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Royal Artillery</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Royal Engineers</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>9.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rifle Brigade</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 R.A.M.C.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Royal Flying Corps</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 K.R.R.C.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Grenadier Guards</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Coldstream Guards</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Gordon Highlanders</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Queen's Royal West Surrey</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total: 301 50.17 43.00
**APPENDIX 4**

**LEADING FORTY SCHOOLS**

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<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample (700)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eton College</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington College</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrow School</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough College</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Charterhouse</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clifton College</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cheltenham College</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Haileybury</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>Rugby</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>Bedford School</td>
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<td>United Services College</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>St Paul's School</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fettes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radley</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wimbledon School</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Britannia</td>
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<td>Malvern</td>
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<td>Felsted</td>
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<tr>
<td>King's, Canterbury</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shrewsbury</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton College</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherborne</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stubbington House</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaumont</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop's College, Canada</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dulwich</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastbourne College</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchiston Castle School</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repton</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Columba's College</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedburgh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria College, Jersey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh Academy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newtown College</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rossall</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal School, Armagh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonbridge</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
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</table>
### APPENDIX 5

**NUMBERS OF OFFICERS AT PUBLIC SCHOOLS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample (700)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading school (Eton)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 leading schools</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 leading schools</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 leading schools</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 leading schools</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 leading schools</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 leading schools</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 leading schools</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 leading schools</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED BY OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample (700)</th>
<th>% of Total (72)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford University</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge University</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity College, Dublin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Universities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Universities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Universities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow University</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample (700)</th>
<th>% of Total (72)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxbridge Universities</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Universities</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion Universities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Universities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Universities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Universities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>
### APPENDIX 7

#### FATHER'S OCCUPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Officer</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landed Gentry</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristocracy</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Law</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other professions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Engineer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Marine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 700 100.05%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landed Gentry</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristocracy</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional class</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
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</table>

Total: 700 100.0
APPENDIX 8

GRADUATES FROM STAFF COLLEGE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-p.s.c.</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.s.c.</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGE GROUPS OF GRADUATES FROM STAFF COLLEGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Number of Sample Officers</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
<th>Non psc</th>
<th>% of age group</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>% of age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850's</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860's</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870's</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880's</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890's</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>384</td>
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</table>
## APPENDIX 9

### STAFF EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE B.E.F., 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Sample of Officers (700)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Commonwealth Forces</td>
<td>52</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Army</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King's African Rifles</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African Frontier Force</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Office</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.Q., India</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.Q., South Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff College</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.M.C, R.M.A., etc.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Staff Experience</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Post</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior General Staff Post</td>
<td>268</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior General Staff Post</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>Corp level Commanders</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Commanders</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Commanders</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental Commanders</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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</table>

### BATTLE EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE B.E.F. IN 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>No battle experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>69.0</td>
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<td>North-West Frontier, 1897-98</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile Expedition, 1897-99</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirah Campaign, 1897-98</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitral Relief Force, 1895</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, 1882-85</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, 1900-01</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria, 1897-1904</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland, 1903-04</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan War, 1879-80</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti Wars, 1895-1900</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongola, 1896</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waziristan, 1894-95</td>
<td>14</td>
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</table>

515
APPENDIX 10

ANALYSIS OF SENIOR OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of psc</th>
<th>% of non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>% of group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE B.E.F.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of psc</th>
<th>% of non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>% of group</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**ARMY COMMANDERS OF THE B.E.F.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of psc</th>
<th>% of non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>% of group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**CORPS COMMANDERS OF THE B.E.F.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of psc</th>
<th>% of non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>% of group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

516
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of psc</th>
<th>% of non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>% of non psc</th>
<th>% of non group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>94%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>195</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
<td><strong>51%</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
<td><strong>49%</strong></td>
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</table>
APPENDIX 11

ANALYSIS OF STAFF OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>non</th>
<th>% of group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**M.G.G.S., ARMY**

**B.G.G.S., CORPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>non</th>
<th>% of group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>psc</td>
<td>% of group</td>
<td>non</td>
<td>% of group</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX 12

ANALYSIS OF STAFF AT G.H.Q.

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<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
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**C.G.S., G.H.Q.**

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<th>psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>4</td>
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**M.G.G.S., G.H.Q.**

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<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
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<td>0%</td>
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**B.G.G.S., G.H.Q.**

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<th>% of group</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>psc</td>
<td>% of group</td>
<td>non psc</td>
<td>% of group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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APPENDIX 13

AVERAGE AGES OF ARMY COMMANDERS

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<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc age</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>average age</th>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Corps/Regt.</td>
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<td>% of Total</td>
<td>psc</td>
<td>non psc</td>
<td>average age</td>
</tr>
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<td>56</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
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### APPENDIX 14

**AVERAGE AGES OF CORPS COMMANDERS**

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<th>non psc</th>
<th>average age</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
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<td>50%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Corps/Regt.</td>
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<td>psc</td>
<td>non psc</td>
<td>Average age</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>52</td>
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<td><strong>9</strong></td>
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**1 July 1916**

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<th>psc</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>Average age</th>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps/Regt.</td>
<td>Number of Officers</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>psc</td>
<td>non psc</td>
<td>average age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 15

**AVERAGE AGES OF DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total psc</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>average age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57.14%</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**5 August 1914**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total psc</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>average age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
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<td>11.11%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**10 March 1915**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total psc</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>average age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36.59%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4.88%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.07%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19.51%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
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<td>7.32%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps/Regt.</td>
<td>Number of Officers</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>psc</td>
<td>non psc</td>
<td>average age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46.66%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Marine</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
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</table>

1 July 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>average age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44.78%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.96%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17.91%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.96%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.46%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.45%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
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</table>

31 July 1917

528
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>non psc</th>
<th>average age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51.51%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.64%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>9.09%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.12%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 November 1918
**APPENDIX 16**

**SCHOOLING OF SENIOR COMMANDERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt. of Officers</th>
<th>Total of Total Officers</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>% of Public Group</th>
<th>% of Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Non-Public Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE B.E.F.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>% of Public Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARMY COMMANDERS OF THE B.E.F.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>% of Public Group</th>
<th>% of Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Non-Public Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>% of Public Group</th>
<th>% of Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Non-Public Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>% of Public Group</th>
<th>% of Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Non-Public Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>% of Public Group</th>
<th>% of Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Non-Public Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 48 100% 37 77% 23 44%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt. of Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>% of Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>19</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
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<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>60%</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.0%</td>
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<td>13%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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<td>100.0%</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>64</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 17

#### SCHOOLING OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt. of Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
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#### M.G.G.S., ARMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt. of Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
<td><strong>93%</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
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#### B.G.G.S., CORPS

<table>
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<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of Public School</th>
<th>Non-Public School</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
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</table>

532
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Regt.</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>psc</th>
<th>% of group</th>
<th>non psc</th>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>275</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21%</td>
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APPENDIX 18

CHANGES IN SENIOR COMMANDS DURING THE WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Division Comdrs</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Corps Comdrs</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Army Comdrs</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>291</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Comdrs</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Corps Comdrs</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Army Comdrs</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the thirty Divisional commanders in the B.E.F. in 1914 no less than nineteen (63%) became Corps commanders:

1914: Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, Generals Sir Charles Fergusson, Sir Charles Monro, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Major-General Sir Michael Rimington


1916: Field-Marshal Lord Byng and General Sir Aylmer Haldane

1917: General Sir Edward Bulfin (Egypt)

1918: General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle in 1918.

No less than six (20%) were killed or invalided:


Only five (17%) failed to become corps commanders, all of whom were rather elderly:


Furthermore, five (17%) became Army commanders:

Allenby and Monro in 1915; Rawlinson and Gough in 1916; and Byng in 1917.

Of the twenty-five Brigade commanders in August 1914, only four (16%), did not become divisional commanders:

while twenty-one (84%) did so in the rapid expansion of 1914, 1915 and 1916.

Of the remaining 165 British and Dominion officers who obtained command of a Division on the Western Front between 1915 and 1918 only a very few, 20 (or 12%), became Corps commanders:

**1915:** Major-General Hon. Sir Cecil Bingham, and General Sir Walter Congreve

**1916:** Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Briggs (Salonika), Field-Marshal Lord Cavan, Lord Horne, Sir Claud Jacob and General Sir Charles Kavanagh

**1917:** General Sir Arthur Currie, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Edward Fanshawe, Sir Arthur Holland, Sir Frederick McCracken, General Sir Ivor Maxse, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Herbert Watts, and Sir Charles Woolcombe

**1918:** Generals Sir George Barrow (Palestine), Sir Walter Braithwaite, Sir George Harper, Sir John Monash, Sir Reginald Stephens and Sir Cameron Shute

In other words, 145 (88%) failed to progress to Corps level.

Five (56%) of the nine corps commanders in 1914 were promoted to command of armies:

Field-Marshal Lord Allenby and Earl Haig, Generals Sir Charles Monro, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien

Of the 34 corps commanders who served between 1915 and 1918 only five (17%) rose subsequently to army command:

**1915:** Field-Marshal Lord Plumer

**1916:** General Lord Horne

**1917:** Field-Marshal Lord Byng

**1918:** Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood and Lord Cavan (Italy)
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<th>Cabinet Minutes, 1917</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Cambrai Enquiry, 1917</td>
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| CAB45/118 | Cambrai, 1917 |
| CAB45/119 | La Becque, 1918 |
| CAB45/120 | Loos, 1915 |
| CAB45/122-125 | Lys, 1918 |
| CAB45/127 | Messines, 1914 |
| CAB45/129 | Mons and Le Cateau, 1914 |
| CAB45/130 | St. Eloi, 1916 |
| CAB45/132-138 | Somme, 1916 |
| CAB45/139 | Vimy Ridge, 1916 |
| CAB45/140-145 | Ypres, 1917 |
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R.E. Committee, 1919-20
Second Army, 1917
Third Army, 1917-18
Fourth Army, 1917-18
Fifth Army, 1917
I Corps, 1915
IV Corps, 1915
XI Corps, 1915
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Blumenfeld, R.D.
Boraston, Lieutenant-Colonel J.H.
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Clifford, Captain W.C.
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Darlington, Lieutenant A.F.D.
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Dudgeon, Major-General F.A.
Dunn, K.F.W.
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Glyn, Major The Lord
Hall, Lieutenant-Colonel G.W.
Hardie, Captain M.
Hawksley, Brigadier-General R.P.T.
Hedley, Major I.M.

540
Henderson, Lieutenant-Colonel K.
Heneker, General Sir William
Henley, Brigadier-General Hon. A.M.
Hodgkin, Brigadier A.E.
Home, Brigadier-General Sir Archibald
Hore-Ruthven, Colonel C.M.
Horne, General Lord
Hotblack, Major-General F.E.
Hudson, Major-General C.E.
Hughes, Lieutenant T.McK.
Ironside, Field-Marshal Lord
Jackson, General Sir Henry
James, Wing Commander Sir Archibald
Jameson, Second Lieutenant A.M.
Jeudwine, Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh
Johnson, A.
Keary, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
Kentish, Brigadier-General R.J.
Kenyon, Major-General E.R.
Kirke, General Sir Walter
Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone
Lambert, Colonel T.S.
Lanyon, Major O.M.
Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel A.N.
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Macmillan, T.
Maxse, General Sir Ivor
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Micklem, Brigadier R.
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Repton
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<th>Chapter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>4,617</td>
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<td>Chapter 1</td>
<td>11,056</td>
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