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“Where every breeze speaks of courage and liberty”

Offshore humanism and marine xenology

or

Racism and the problem of critique at sea level.

I am very grateful to the editors of Antipode for their invitation to participate in this conference devoted to discussion of the Anthropocene. There are several reasons why I feel a little hesitant in approaching that fashionable concept. First, I am wary of repeating familiar arguments even though I know that it is often through repetition that the possibility of a political response can be generated. Second, I know that what I want to argue about the Anthropocene should be obvious. I fear that it will not be.

These anxieties are compounded because some time ago, I made a decision to resist the pressure to ascend to the altitude of theoretical sophistication that seems lately to supply the angle of vision favoured by many geographers. What can only be called high theory seems to be equally popular with other commentators who, from various disciplinary eyries, locate their scholastic concern with the articulation of the social and the spatial on the frontier between the humanities and social science. My refusal to ascend to those giddy heights is not a point against theory or verticality as such. Here, it comprises only a gentle and respectful query about the contemporary appeal of what often seems to me to be sophistry rather than sophistication and about the primrose paths taken by politically attuned metatheory after the collapse and dispersal of totalizing systems of thought—particularly, though not only, Marxism. The attendant displacement of ideology by affect is also implicated in this change. The institutional collapse of the university and its steady transformation into a corporate machine that supplies credentials rather than education is an additional complicating mechanism.

That resurgence of theoreticism has been the primary symptom of a vain determination to subdue the increasingly unruly world by means of extravagant conceptual innovations or to address it only in deeper, ever more complex codes intelligible only to the initiated. These days, key rhetorical formulations and condensed poetic “memes” get reiterated endlessly over the internet as if political gains could somehow be consolidated merely by staying
on epistemological or precognitive message. Another of the hallmarks of this change is the combative anti-humanism that is a principal target of my argument below. Like today’s popular post-humanist reflexes, that response is closely associated with contemporary invocation of the Anthropocene as a threshold in time, nature and history alike. I am sceptical about that concept for reasons I will explain below. I suspect it has its greatest significance for people who are coming late to the problems of political ecology and may not have thought deeply either about “environmentalism” or about the genealogy of western understanding of time.¹ The concept of the Anthropocene seems to be most potent and seductive where history is rendered in its thinnest forms and where the shift into a geological temporality seems unexceptional and obvious.

Before I proceed further, I would like to say that I am especially happy to begin this conversation here in the City of Exeter, once a woolopolis second only to Bristol in its economic power. The city hosted a notable seventeenth-century lobby advocating free trade with Africa². Dartmouth, just a little further south down the coast, is notable for having been one of the points of assembly for the Second Crusade in 1147.³ It is only Britain’s post-imperial melancholia that deprives this extraordinary region of its worldliness. This is Devon, the home of seafarers, explorers, imperial pioneers and slavers: Walter Raleigh, Francis Drake, John Hawkins, Humphrey Gilbert, Richard Grenville and their like. It is also the birthplace and the resting place of J. A. Froude, the Oxford historian and biographer whose influential writing on seafaring, hydrarchy and the civilizing power of English dominion in the West Indies has lately found a new place in the online curriculum of the rising, neo-reactionary “Alt-right” movement.⁴

There was a proud, but these days too little known, history of slave trading from these parts. It was often conducted in conjunction with the Dutch merchants who were so closely connected to the political economy of the area during the bloody epoch of the “triangular trade” when Devonshire’s serge cloth commanded a high price. This is therefore an ideal place from which to begin to reflect on the history and contemporary significance of what I want to call “offshore humanism” as well as to explore related matters that bear upon the conference theme.
The things I want to say in the spirit of sea-level theory may well sound vulgar. My argument begins with a note of caution. After the end of critique was announced, but before the steady rise of object ontologies reached its apogee, nobody who has been party to the urgent conversations that have reproduced and extended the “black radical tradition”'s needed to be re-acquainted with the manifold problems arising from the social life of objects or the complexities of interacting with things and nature. The slaves from many parts of Africa who were exchanged for rum, cloth, guns, salt-cod and other commodities, recoiled from their own brutal reification as labour, as capital and as brute. They asserted their own humanity and subjectivity, using that challenge to better understand themselves and their predicament. They became, as Fanon put it, objects among other objects: valuable, infrahuman commodities circulating in a complex and highly-differentiated, economic system. By now, we should all know that their various descendants—lodged inside and outside the tarnished citadels of overdevelopment—have inherited elements of a distinctive consciousness that arose from this irreducibly modern condition.

An extensive, commercial market built around the subordination of those African peoples and the exploitation of their forced labour, supplied the economic infrastructure of Atlantic modernity. Its belligerent, oceanic operations were possible only because those vulnerable people were, and often still are, judged to belong to nature rather than to history, society or culture. The contested story of their infrahuman condition can be unearthed from the archives of modern, racial slavery: “capitalism with its clothes off”.

I do not consider that repository of discomforting information as any sort of property, but I know that I have a duty to it which colours my ethical and political perspectives. That obligation deprives me of the privilege of being able to pause, stand back for a moment and then chose between the two principal tendencies in twenty-first century social thought carefully identified by Mckenzie Wark in Molecular Red, his stimulating book on theory for the Anthropocene age. Wark outlines those options in the following way: “One is a revival of a kind of revolutionary subjectivity, a psychoanalytic Leninist sublime. The other is a kind of speculative absolute, a theory purified of any merely human phenomenal dimension and set free in a hyper-chaotic or
vitalist cosmos.”8 The approach I wish to identify acknowledges those influential tendencies but seeks to work around, or perhaps burrow underneath, them. It arises with the realisation that neither vitalism nor mechanism are adequate in pursuing the racialised particularity of the imaginary infrahuman, its reflexive self-understanding or its poetic summoning. I cannot forget that, before critique fell into disrepute and variants of actor-network theory began to dominate the mood under the big, bright umbrella of the ontological turn, similar lessons might have been learned from older sources that were both more disreputable and more exhilarating.

One such trove is surely Herman Melville’s passionate planetary ontology of labouring humans, marine life, weather, capital and objects which, against the expectations of many scholastic guardians of his work, secretes in its poetics an argument about the elemental significance of racism and modern racial orders. These days, hordes of radical, young people read the land-locked Bartelby as a philosophical and political parable. However, that precarious, disenchanted constituency is usually reluctant to endow either Melville’s Moby Dick or his gnomic novella Benito Cereno with quite the same heft. The unsettling story in the latter volume turns around its protagonist’s inability to see racialised things clearly and interpret them with care. Slavery’s pelagic theatre of power reveals its hidden character in a grey, watery confrontation between the properly human and the supposedly infrahuman. The mutinied slaves enact the choreography of their submission while actually being in command of their floundering journey to freedom. However, we learn in the concluding pages, that it was the brain not the body of Babo, the Negro captain of their ship, that had “schemed and led the revolt”. In that decaying, bewilderingly racial frame, even Don Benito’s “silver-mounted sword, apparent symbol of despotic command, was not, indeed, a sword, but the ghost of one. The scabbard, artificially stiffened, was empty.”9 Identifying and classifying human beings, particularly with regard to the lowly figure of the African who has been made a Negro at the point of a sword, presents willfully innocent whiteness with a profound interpretative test.

The historian Greg Grandin, has written insightfully about Benito Cereno. He points out usefully that “What Melville is doing . . . is taking
Hegel's famous master-slave allegory—a dyad of interdependence—and adding a witness to make it a trio.”

But, if as Grandin suggests, we make Ishmael’s negative inquiry “who ain’t a slave?” into a starting point, we can acquire more than just an unusual perspective on the contested nautical boundaries of oppression and exploitation. That provocative, foundational question can help us to steer different courses. We can proceed instead towards a transformed understanding of the common human condition glimpsed in Benito Cereno’s ontologically corrosive mesh of relationality. That evasive prize is allied with Melville’s interest in the possibility that black humanity was doomed to be misrecognized in the figure of The Negro with which it had been systematically confounded by cruel, transoceanic commerce.

Obliquely acknowledged by Melville, Frederick Douglass’s 1853 novella The Heroic Slave had also examined a shipboard mutiny by slaves. Douglass’s characters discuss the rebellion of slaves on board the good ship Creole and debate the thorny problem of how the change from strictly tellurian sovereignty to maritime authority and conditions affected the personality and spirit of enslaved Africans as well as those of their captors. In answer to Mr. Williams’ complacent observation that “a nigger’s a nigger on sea or land” the ship’s first mate replies: “... all that you’ve said sounds very well here on shore, where, perhaps, you have studied negro character... I deny that the negro is, naturally, a coward or that your theory of managing slaves will stand the test of salt water... It is one thing to manage a company of slaves on a Virginia plantation, and quite another thing to quell an insurrection on the lonely billows of the Atlantic where every breeze speaks of courage and liberty.”

The venerable, libertarian Marxist from Trinidad, CLR James, is another figure that I wish to identify with this interpretative stance and the critical options it can generate. These positions need to be carefully set apart from the tendencies so usefully identified by Wark. They have appeared within and beyond the precincts of the black Atlantic. But James, whose own libertarian communism was as unwavering as it was restless, provides a good place to continue this preliminary survey. In his memorable, book-length, 1953 plea to the US immigration authorities against his deportation, James claimed that it had been Melville’s relationship to the sea and global commerce that enabled
him to see the future of capitalism more clearly than any other writer of the period in which colonial rule was being formalized as imperial conceit. The sea, and the distinctive habits it inculcated into ports and, most importantly, into the heteroglot, planetary, seafaring proletariat, the forms of inter-dependency involved in their labour and the character of leadership exercised in the wooden world of their hard, pelagic travel, elevated Melville’s insights to the greatest critical significance:

“Melville is not the only representative writer of industrial civilization. He is the only one there is. In his great book the division and antagonisms and madnesses of an outworn civilization are mercilessly dissected and cast aside. Nature, technology, the community of men, science and knowledge, literature and ideas are fused into a new humanism, opening a vast expansion of human capacity and human achievement. *Moby Dick* will either be universally burnt or be universally known in every language as the first comprehensive statement in literature of the conditions and perspectives for the survival of Western Civilization.”

In its Cold War setting, the novelty of this worldly humanism would be confirmed and conveyed by its absolute break with the racial ordering of human life. Similar aspirations towards the same end were often located rhetorically between the poles of civilization and barbarism that defined James’ critical standpoint. This intransigent approach to the horrors of the twentieth century resonated widely across the writings of black atlantic intellectuals. It re-appears in several different accents in the militant work of Du Bois, Alain Locke, Senghor, Fanon, Wright, Baldwin, Sylvia Wynter, June Jordan and a number of others, before as well as after the catastrophe of the Third Reich, inside and beyond Europe’s frontiers. An inventory of their various positions is beyond the scope of this lecture, however, keeping in mind their appeals to what Wynter has described as the “re-enchantment of humanism”, I suggest we should explore the recurrent appeal of this utopian possibility, and seek to discover not only where it has chimed with broader conversations about race, humanity and species life but also how it might now
contribute to a more refined understanding of political ecology than is possible under the flattening anxieties that have made the concept of the Anthropocene so widely appealing today.

Counterposing this demanding, antiracist goal to today’s timid eschatologies may sound parochial, but it is not. The refiguration of the human outside of raciology has enormous consequences—not least for the critique of epistemology and the politics of truth. It connects readily with conceptual and ethical resources located in the output of romantic and materialist writers who have been dismissed as pessimistic and even catastrophist in their approach to the common life of our species. A number of different local and national traditions should immediately be acknowledged. We can say, for example, that during the twentieth century, the coastal regions of the US contributed much to this recomposition. The cosmologies of indigenous, non-european peoples inspired the ecological movement. The watery interests of Rachel Carson and the rocky mysticism of the Californian poet Robinson Jeffers are two further obvious examples. The different feminist projects encapsulated in the contributions of Carolyn Merchant, Val Plumwood and Vandana Shiva might be a third. These discrepant figures might also be connected through the complex materialism that they hold in common.

During earlier stages of the romantic repudiation of enlightenment, the Mediterranean world fostered the bleak, cosmic preoccupations of the philosopher poet Giacomo Leopardi. They lent themselves to the construction of a ruthless change of scale in which the trivial antics of human beings were reduced to a negative, fluctuating or marginal presence in the recursive, tragic complexity of life. Among many “romantic” European voices, Leopardi’s is notable—though hardly alone--because his idiosyncratic philosophical outlook demanded that he develop an interest in the ethics of slavery ancient and modern. This is explicitly revealed in his aphoristic Pensieri.13 Racial slavery is one fleeting instance of the perfidy of human beings and the wholesale failure of their trifling ethical systems over which Leopardi’s cosmic pessimism about our species is erected. Here he is, in the last winter of his life, standing on the desolate, arid slopes of Vesuvius and reflecting on the unique ability of the plant broom to thrive there. He employs that meditation to weigh the worth of
human life against the other varieties with which we interact as well as to “explore the fragility and impotence of man before the inexorable power of nature”.

Let him who loves to praise our state
come to these slopes and see how well our kind
is served by loving nature.
And he can fairly judge
the power of the human race
Whom their cruel nurse
can with a slight movement,
when they fear it least,
with the slightest movement in a moment
partly destroys,
and can with movements not much greater
suddenly annihilate.
Represented on these slopes you see
The magnificent progressive destiny
of humankind.

Leopardi’s profound, pessimistic responses to the burden of living greatly influenced Melville’s writing. The extent of their impact on Melville should be apparent from more than the Italian’s appearance in the long poem Clarel. This kind of thinking may yet yield insights that we will need in order to respond to the trials that await us as a result of the toxification of our climate and the depletion of the biosphere. In my own education, these sentiments mesh with themes familiar from Schoepenhauer and Nietzsche, thinkers who had also been affected by Leopardi’s lucid pessimism. Their responses can be connected with strands of analysis that arose in later, twentieth-century ecological critiques of Marxism as a kind of productivism that had complacently proposed a triumphalist account of the relationship between human beings and nature.

Skipping over the lengthy genealogies of atheism, materialism and pessimism that would be required by a more complete argument than this, we may discover additional links between these lines of inquiry and the largely forgotten writings of the East German Rudolph Bahro on his journey from red to green, from his life as an opponent of Stalinism to his advocacy of a spiritually-infused and sustainable social life. In more conventional academic frameworks, comparable concerns surfaced in the writing of the philosophers
Kate Soper and Sebastiano Timpanaro on nature and human needs. The more sociologically minded commentary on these topics supplied by diverse figures like my ex-colleague Ted Benton, André Gorz (who was a farmer) and his anarchist scourge Murray Bookchin was similarly inspiring. This dialogue might also include the distant voices of James O’Connor, Boris Frankel and Ulrich Beck. The gloomy yet firmly cosmopolitan constellation they compose, is dominated by the decisive, luminous commentaries on capitalism, photosynthesis and entropy developed by the renegade sociologist, failed farmer and sometime food-policy researcher Robin Jenkins, author of The Road To Alto a study of his inability to farm the inhospitable land of the Sierra de Monchique in southern Portugal after the overthrow of Fascism there.\(^{17}\) Jenkins’ innovative writing in the journal Emergency\(^ {18}\) introduced me to the work of Carnot and Moleschott, taught me about entropy and the importance of Marx and Engels’ response to the second law of thermodynamics and the history of theorizing the relationship of thermodynamics to photosynthesis. I mention these authors and the lines of thought they pursued because today’s enthusiasm for the Anthropocene should not require us to pretend that such vital conversations commenced only recently, for example in the Californian provocations of Donna Haraway whose interventions always seemed to me to have been guided by the occult modernism of Jeffers, the “de-humanist” poet of Big Sur.

Much of what is most interesting and useful in this unpopular archive is seldom read because it was conducted either outside the boundaries of the university or with brazen disregard for the sanctity of its formal, scholastic disciplines. Even among professional geographers who’ve been exposed to John Agnew on political geography, to the writing of Gerard Toal, or Philip Steinberg’s compelling treatment of the social construction of the ocean, we cannot assume any familiarity with the methodological strategies or ethical standpoints of political ecology especially when they are articulated purposively as part of circum-pelagic analysis devoted to addressing culture as, and in, water.

Oceanic travel made modern port cities special places—rich environments where trans- and intercultural contacts, trading, linguistic transformation and mutual influence have been constitutive forces that
shaped government, law and the application of the science of police. Rachel Carson and John Gillis have shown why coasts and shores should be regarded as uniquely important locations. Those places mark not only the ancient epiphany of human being but become the nodal points in intersecting planetary webs of trade, information and accumulation. At the shoreline and on the quayside, land-based sovereignty confronted the unruly force of rivers and oceans as well as the distinctive habits, peregrinations and insubordinate mentalities of those who worked upon the waters. Conflicting hydrarchies counterpointed the fateful transmutation of living African people into the human cargo that catalyzed the economic magic of European capitalism: Iberian, Dutch and then English.

Using racial subordination as a compass
I began by rejecting the idea of high altitude theorizing because it is at odds with the lowly watery orientation I want to employ here. Water flows down, not up. The difference in style is worth underscoring because operating at sea level also helps to emphasise that the following argument is delivered from a limited position defined principally by my concerns as an anatomist of racial subordination, governmentality and conflict. I do not, however, see the resulting political actors, historical formations and social habits as simple products of nature or even as natural phenomena. They were made historically by the most dynamic of racialising systems. The first steps in critical analysis of these assemblages and their constitutive power always involve their de-naturing. That basic move remains for me, just as it was for Fanon and Wynter, the premise of all efforts at disalienation.

I have already said that this approach includes an obligation to the bloody archive of suffering under racial orders and their colonial nomoi. That reverence alters how we read and interpret the discourse of the Anthropocene and assess its widespread contemporary appeal as a historical marker for the end of natural evolution and the catastrophic inscription of human agency in geological time.

Recent enthusiasm for the Anthropocene has to be understood symptomatically. It must be appreciated as part of the contemporary crisis of radical thought and imagination. That chronic condition connects most
obviously and immediately to the demise of historical materialism and the attendant waning of its view of historicality. However, it is also linked to the pursuit of theoretical sophistication for its own sake in fields from which the mechanisms of determination and correspondence have been banished along with important lessons pertaining to the history of overdevelopment and what we might call the post-imperial ethics of planetarity (the challenge of inhabiting a shared present).

The current popularity of the Anthropocene also conveys how the looming catastrophes resulting from industrial and military destruction of our planet have been apprehended by the fading humanities and how the twin options described by Wark can exist happily on the same field defined by its willful deference to an apparently incorrigible scientific reason. That naïve reaction has sometimes become part of the institutional defence of the humanities in universities where they are judged disposable and marginal, but it is not something in which historically minded critics of Euro-American racial science have so far been inclined to indulge. Our view of scientific knowledge as provisional, contextual and culturally-embedded was learned the hard way by reckoning with the performative power of Blumenbach’s personal golgatha. It was confirmed by the long reach of Samuel Morton’s manipulated craniometry and the persistent substitution of the fictitious name Helen Lane for that of an African-American woman, Henrietta Lacks.

The connections between these apparently divergent examples are not difficult to establish. Critical interest in the sovereign racial orders, hierarchies and ontologies that have assembled the world in raciological and colonial patterns, connects directly with the central issue of the human—the conceptual integrity of that vexed category and the problems that link orders of domination among human beings to their various exploitative and extractive relationships with nature. That perennially unfashionable and vulgar connection is intrinsic to the possibility of any new humanism—including those that would be licensed, not by pastiches of Deleuze and Heidegger battling to end the exceptionalism/uniqueness of the human species, but by a determination to destroy the bitter stratification of that species along the lines specified by race or as it is now blandly known “human biodiversity”. How that task can be connected to the transformation of the
exploitation of external nature remains a hotly contested matter as we shall see.

I am speaking now not as a representative of infrahuman life forms who are resentful at having been pronounced as having a lower value than others, but as somebody who has been working to restore a measure of moral credibility to anti-racist critique and to explore the rehabilitation of twentieth-century humanist voices—particularly those with roots outside Europe—which might precipitate safer and more worthwhile political possibilities after the end of natural evolution. Much of my previous writing was concerned to unearth the perennially overlooked history and historicity of peoples repeatedly judged closer to nature so that they might more readily be exploited. Sometimes, they were excluded from the category of human altogether so that their lives might be disposed of with impunity. That exile from humanity is crucial and has, at different times, been considered to be both a disability and a hermeneutic opportunity, even an advantage. I do not hold a strong version of the “double consciousness” argument that can be derived from W.E.B. Du Bois’ Hegelianism, but he convinced me that there were epistemological and moral insights to be won from that painful predicament. Today, those opportunities are not confined only to those who underwent immediate traumatic experiences which involved whole, complex lives being reduced to the ambiguous condition of infrahuman brutishness.

More importantly, the position of being but not belonging, or more accurately of non-being while being-racialised, significantly complicates all the tidy, binary schemes that oppose nature to history or culture. At the risk of being boring, let me remind you that those violent, exclusionary mechanisms were and remain, in some sense, acts of inclusion. The characteristic doubling that is involved in being simultaneously inside and outside the polity and its definitions of humanity, reveals not only the signature motifs of governmental and juridical racism but also what some, in pursuit of the enhanced theoretical sophistication, now prefer to describe as the mechanisms of biopolitical governmentality.23

The aporetic predicament of those infrahuman beings is, in part, a product of the modern, European thought experiments that entangled emergent anthropological knowledge arising from the terminal points in
European trading activity, with purely theoretical analysis of universal human progress from nature to society. Those epistemological excursions would eventually yield both natural history and political anatomy. They were often conducted under the heading of “the state of nature” and it is easy to forget that, as Giorgio Agamben repeats in *Homo Sacer* “the state of nature is not a real epoch chronologically prior to the foundation of the City but a principle internal to the City, which appears at the moment the City is considered tanquam dissolute”. Here I want to acknowledge—though I by no means agree with all of his arguments—the work done recently by Alexander Weheliye.  

I would like you to hold those big problems in the background while you ask yourself why so many of today’s most influential and sophisticated theoretical perspectives are completely unwilling or unable to focus upon the cognitive, aesthetic, military, scientific, medical, moral and economic problems that are still routinely articulated together as matters of race? Why is that absence so durable and that academically respectable refusal so resilient? More than that, I would like you to speculate on how the concept of the Anthropocene might function differently if the history of racial orders and concepts could be taken fully into account. In other words, how might we become more comprehensively estranged from the Anthropos in the Anthropocene in order to salvage a different, and perhaps re-enchanted human from the rising waters and transformed climates that characterize the future of our endangered species?  

I do not want our discussion of those questions to be dominated by the issue of how a corrective or compensatory reversal of that infrahuman status might be won, or of the potential contribution to that reparation which might or might not be made by the concept of recognition. These practical issues cannot be resolved in the abstract and assessing them requires a long account of black political culture and political ontology that I do not have the space to provide here. However, before I set the thorny problem of institutionalized (mis)recognition aside, I want to suggest that the history of struggles toward the goal of admission into the human has produced a distinctive idiom of political reflection in which a particular rhetoric of species-life has repeatedly featured.
The salvaging and refiguring of the racialised human, both before and after the twentieth-century’s noisy death of Man, necessitates the adoption of unorthodox interpretative angles. It includes repeated contrasts between the significance of racial divisions and the attraction of an open category of humanity that is wholly incompatible with race and raciosity though still prone to being disfigured by racism. This faint possibility might, in the language of Fanon’s early writing, seek to instate a “real dialectic between the body and the world” in the social spaces previously colonised by racial-corporeal schemata.

Whether those attempts are discovered in the work of Frederick Douglass and Sojourner Truth or of Primo Levi and Jean Améry, they nudge us away from the category of “the political” altogether and demand a more extensive ethical sensibility than it can accommodate. Usually, (though Améry’s unqualified enthusiasm for the state of Israel as a national liberation project is an exception) they also involve dissociating the pursuit of human freedom from the governmental institutionalization of sovereign power, particularly via the compensatory establishment of palingenetic, national states.

In its religious manifestations, this sort of thinking was fundamental to modern movements for the abolition of slaving, particularly where slavery’s undoing was thought to reside in the development of newly-minted, colour-free, national citizenship in the place of sojourn or elsewhere. Similar aspirations featured heavily in the anti-racist propaganda that emerged from the abolitionist movement—think, for example, of the way in which Mr. Wedgewood’s suppliant black porcelain figures solicited alternative conceptions of kinship and friendship that could offset the appeal of citizenship, coveted yet denied. These mentalities reappeared again to guide the struggle against lynching in the US as well as to shape the battles of indigenous peoples against colonial power and rule. All these vulnerable groups involved strove to reconfigure the relationship between humanity and polity and, as I have argued elsewhere, there is a counter-history of human rights waiting to be distilled from the ways that concept was set to work by a host of long-forgotten feminists, abolitionists and suffragists.26 Today, the volume of that overlooked material provides an additional stimulus to
interrogate critically the persistent claim that reckless appeals to universal humanity were all that was required in order to incubate and nurture modern racism. There is still much work to be done to demonstrate how the rise of formal, bourgeois democracy supplied a midwife for the birth of properly scientific conceptions of racial hierarchy. However, a more detailed and extensive causal explanation is required than loudly announcing that all the blame must be laid at the door of humanism. The last work produced by Edward Said is very helpful in suggesting a direction for these future inquiries. He reminds us that in the US at least

“. . . antihumanism took hold on the . . . intellectual scene partly because of widespread revulsion with the Vietnam War. Part of that revulsion was the emergence of a resistance movement to racism, imperialism generally, and the dry-as-dust academic humanities that had for years represented an unpolitical, unworldly, and oblivious (sometimes even manipulative) attitude to the present, all the while adamantly extolling the virtues of the past, the untouchability of the canon, and the superiority of “how we used to do it”-superiority, that is, to the disquieting appearance on the intellectual and academic scene of such things as women’s, ethnic, gay, cultural, and postcolonial studies and, above all I believe, a loss of interest in and the vitiation of the core idea of the humanities.”

In tracing the a more detailed account of liberal humanism’s unfolding and of the waves of resistance against it, we discover that a language of species emerged to contest and repudiate the claims built upon racial discourse. This orientation was somewhat different in character from, on the one hand, the approaches to species that arose from Marx’s early philosophical anthropology and, on the other, from the loftier species discourse that has appeared more recently hand in glove with enthusiasm for the Anthropocene. Neither of those important contributions has been routed through what we can call the trials of racial critique. Indeed, neither of them sees any particular virtue or value in the kind of work I regard as absolutely necessary: a specific, deliberate and patient overcoming of the claims of raciology and racialised sovereignty. For
the most part, casual chat about the Anthropocene remains curiously comfortable when the startled rabbit of universal humanity is produced by the conjuring hands of science from the top hat of geological time—a gesture which, to my mind, erases not just the destructive, restless agency of capitalism as a voracious, chaotic system but obscures the particular responsibility for this catastrophe that results from the pathologies of colonialism and weaponised overdevelopment.29

So far this argument might be summed up in the proposition that the enduring critique of racial hierarchy and racialised humanity is not the minor, incidental matter that many sophisticated commentators would like it to remain. I am unsympathetic to virtual, “hashtag” politics in general and do not see the black vulnerability we associate with the workings of the US racial nomos mirrored everywhere else, however, the last few years in that country, rather like recent events in Mare Nostrum, the Mediterranean, suggest that the callous and capricious violence resulting from racial orders should not be too swiftly passed over. The frequent killing of African Americans by the police that has been revealed to the world by the mediation of the mobile phone-camera is just one more piece of evidence which makes the history of anti-racist movements worth re-constructing with the greatest possible care. It bears repetition that their energies can not only illuminate and explain important, recurring patterns in the history of statecraft, government, war and sovereign power, they can also yield resources that might guide current struggles for peace and dignity, and against war and injustice.

Race Against Time
Antiracist politics and ethics have involved consideration of nature’s relationship with time at least since Charles Darwin announced that he got many of his own ideas from the geological temporality provided by Charles Lyell who had, in turn, been inspired by his reading of James Hutton. The questions of time and nature that were pending in the idea of evolution are not remote from or marginal to the history of racial orders and hierarchies. With the Anthropocene’s geological referents in mind, I must point out that it is not just that this paradigm shift provided the temporality within which evolution—in particular human difference—could be thought, but that the
problematic of origins would, from that beginning, become something like a modernist obsession. Today, this observation sanctions a timely obligation to roam into humanism’s forbidden zones seeking a different relationship with alterity inspired by the pursuit of life outside the racial nomos and its corporeal schemata, beyond either the savage or the primitive.

That demanding act of trespass would be strengthened by the revival and extension of Europe’s battered cosmopolitan traditions particularly if they can be dilated beyond their restrictive Kantian dimensions, refreshed by vernacular energy and infused with what in other locations has been described as a “reparative humanism”. Once it has been readdressed specifically to the damage arising from the history of racial and colonial nomoi, that outlook can provide a new starting point for discussions of what we are, what we will be and what we owe each other as human beings.

The postcolonial chapters in the modern, European conversation about such matters need always to be placed carefully in relation to their antecedents not least of which is the “negative loyalty” to enlightenment articulated by earlier critiques of the relationship between racism, reason and colour-coded rationality.

While watching the presentation of the continuing Mediterranean catastrophe in the UK mediascape, I have been struck by just how far the centre of political gravity in Britain has been shifted by the populist interventions of the ultranationalist and xenophobic right. One repellent contribution compared Mediterranean refugees to Cockroaches and called for an “Australian-style” deployment of gunboats against them. That proposal was made by Katie Hopkins—another Devonian celebrity known principally for her uninhibited proclamations of her own racism. She serves as a columnist for Rupert Murdoch’s tabloid newspaper, The Sun. Hopkins’ grotesque provocations triggered a discussion about the tenor of Britain’s public debate about immigration. However, there was little comfort in the fact that an online initiative to get her dismissed from her post was rapidly clicked on by more than three hundred thousand people. Hopkins’ repeated attempts at outrage have such sinister purposes that a virtual petition seemed to be a peculiarly insubstantial weapon in this vicious disagreement about political speech and political morality. Her remarks drew condemnation from Zeid
Ra’ad Al Hussein, the UN high commissioner for Human Rights who felt that her interventions were typical of a toxic layer of material frequently found increasingly in Europe’s tabloid press as well as the online subcultures of the racist “alt-right” I referred to above.

The issue of whether Hopkins should be prosecuted under Britain’s laws governing incitement to racial hatred flickered and then evaporated. It is unlikely to have been given serious consideration and was quickly forgotten after David Cameron, then Prime Minister, in a further sign of the salience of the struggle over the human, referred to the Mediterranean refugees huddled in what we had been told was “The Jungle” settlement at Calais, as “a swarm”. This too can be interpreted as a sign of the salience of struggles over the human. Cameron glossed his rhetorical choice by saying:

I was not intending to dehumanise, I don’t think it does dehumanise people. Look at what Britain’s response has been. We have made sure that we sent the Royal Navy flagship to the Mediterranean which has rescued thousands of people, saved thousands of lives. Britain’s aid budget is helping to stabilise the countries from which these (migrants) have come.31

We should note that this wolf-whistled ethno-racial populism has been closely associated with the steady emergence of Islam as a racial signifier. It is also a key component in the wider framework of authoritarian populist nationalism and xenophobia. The resulting mixture is volatile and it is imprinted by the earlier racist discourses that had been aimed at incoming, post-1945 black settlers and, during the late nineteenth-century, at fugitive Jews. However, the hyperbolic presentation of drowning refugees and orphaned children as an elemental threat is so peculiar, so neurotic and so duplicitous that it demands uncomfortable answers to the question of what the local variety of civilization might now entail? That civilization is not, from a British perspective, in fact, a European phenomenon at all but, as recent events have shown, a narrowly national affair. It coincides only with the archipelagic geo-body of the United Kingdom. The rampart of the sea can do its grim work. The wogs do, after all, begin at Calais and the misguided efforts of the EU are themselves an alien,
de-civilising influence, leveraging boatloads of menacing jihadis into no-longer-
Great Britain’s formerly quiet and peaceful islands. This nationalist myopia is
bound to conflict not only with the economic well-being of the UK but with the
planetary risks of biomedical catastrophe and the approaching horrors of
climate-change which, as the weather changes and the seas rise, can be
expected entirely to redraw the familiar parameters of political solidarity.

As far as theory goes, a cautious, posthumanist humanism capable of
grasping the relationship between human and nonhuman is beginning to take
shape in the shadow of that apprehension. It can be distinguished from other,
previous varieties of humanism by being made, as Aimé Césaire put it while
contemplating the wreckage and waste of world war two, “to the measure of
the world”. Elsewhere, I have tentatively named this evasive possibility a
planetary humanism.

That fragile alternative is today as precious as it is elusive. My hope is
that it can excavated from the unique conceptual space in which combative
antiracist humanism has repeatedly confronted colonialism, racism and
nationalism. That contested location can be triangulated in various ways.
Efforts to map it must include the cruel rhetoric of the various Fascists who
denounced their victims as vermin in order to make them easier to humiliate
and exterminate. From there, it is only a short hop towards the idiotic white
supremacy calculatedly voiced by today’s populist political leaders in the form
of racist common-sense: as hateful as it is knowingly gleeful. This approach
does not, as some of the sillier versions of posthumanism might have it,
straightforwardly encompass any enhanced appreciation of what humans
might share with or learn from either cockroaches or swarms.

However, with the performative, infrahumanising potency of that
troubling neofascist and racist rhetoric in mind, we should be prepared to ask
what we might now imagine to distinguish ourselves, our vulnerability and
our precarious relationship with one another as human beings? Today those
have become anachronistic-sounding questions that the complacent routines
of campus anti-humanism cannot dignify with an answer. However, they are
useful in seeking a different perspective on the Europe’s refugee catastrophe
and the resulting trials of European culture in the Mediterranean.
Let us reject the nationalist visions offered to us by Cameron and Farage, Wilders, Le Pen, Petry, Pegida and their ilk. In the spirit of humanism’s re-enchantment let us consider examples of where Europe’s bewildered civilization has been able to sustain or maintain itself against the odds. We may do this as part of asking ourselves whether we are now condemned to an unholy choice between different varieties of barbarism.

Opportunities to explore the banality of good are still all around us. Here one example will suffice. Some of the more important and immediate issues can be identified through a discussion of the example provided by the bravery of Antonis Deligiorgis a burly, 34 year old soldier who had been drinking coffee in a seafront café on the island of Rhodes when a disintegrating ship, overloaded with 93 migrant fugitives who had paid enormous sums for a chance to reach Greece, struck rocks off the Zefyros beach. His selfless, Herculean efforts involved singlehandedly rescuing 20 drowning Syrians and Eritreans. These horrible circumstances won sergeant Deligiorgis a brief though memorable place in the news headlines during April 2015. I submit that he deserves more than that passing fame and that we might, in the wake of insights derived from the work of Hans Blumenberg, explore some the wider, philosophical aspects that appear to be at stake in this brave man’s profane generosity of spirit. The richness and subtlety of Blumenberg’s small, luminous essay Shipwreck With Spectator cannot be précised here. He outlines the fundamental significance of the “nautical metaphories of existence” in European cultural history and shows, among other things, how the liquidity of water and money have combined and intersected.

Long before Shakespeare’s Tempest cemented the transfer of a Mediterranean geography into the new, Atlantic world and Daniel Defoe clarified the physiognomy of white, protestant, property-owning selfhood in the Lockean paradise that Robinson Crusoe had seized from those diabolical, cannibal savages, Blumenberg suggests that “Shipwreck, as seen by a survivor, (was) the figure of an initial philosophical experience.”33 We should recall also the tragedy of the slave-ship Zong—one key source for J.M.W. Turner’s sublime 1840 painting: “Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and Dying,
Typhoon Coming On” which provided so much moral ballast for the indictment of racial capitalism.34

We should now be asking what, in the context of Europe’s postcolonial transition, the philosophical experience involved in bearing witness to shipwrecks might consist of? We may even be able to employ the experience of refugees from war to anticipate how refugees from climate change are likely to fare.35

Sergeant Deligiorgis’ actions were notable for their proximity to death from whose jaws we’re told he snatched some twenty fellow human beings. He vividly described the traumatic experience of watching one of the shipwrecked passengers die in the water: “What I do remember was seeing a man who was around 40 die. He was flailing about, he couldn’t breathe, he was choking, and though I tried was impossible to reach (sic). Anyone who could was hanging on to the wreckage.” “I’ve never seen anything like it, the terror that can haunt a human’s eyes”. It is clear too that Deligiorgis risked his own life to save the lives of others. This is not something to pass over casually, though it is important to note that the newspaper reports of these events explained that he was not alone in leaping into action once the plight of the wrecked boat’s drowning passengers was clear. We were told that “Coast guard officers, army recruits, fishermen and volunteers scrambled to help the refugees”.

In a typical, individualizing gesture, the press presented Deligiorgis primarily as the savior of Wegasi Nebiat a pregnant 24 year old Eritrean woman from Asmara who had begun her ill-fated, Mediterranean crossing in Marmaris. There was evidently pressure to reduce his action to an interpersonal transaction between them which could easily dramatise the larger political relationships involved between Southern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Indeed Deligiorgis was memorably pictured hauling Ms. Nebiat from the tempestuous waves on his broad shoulders. Once her ordeal was over, Nebiat named her newborn son Antonis in memory of her rescuer. He told The Observer’s correspondent Helena Smith:

“The boat disintegrated in a matter of minutes. It was as if it was made of paper . . . Without really giving it a second’s thought I did what I had to do. . . I had taken off my shirt and was in the water . . . the water was
full of oil from the boat and was very bitter and the rocks were slippery and sharp. I cut myself quite badly on the hands and feet, but all I could think of was saving those poor people.”

There is reason to pause and acknowledge the specific political predicament of Greece in this narrative. However, I do not accept that what is of interest in the representation of this rescue is erased or invalidated by the possibility that, given the economic circumstances, Greeks would be more likely to identify with the plight of helpless people menaced by dangerous, destructive forces operating beyond their control. They might enjoy the idea that their embattled national identity could be signified obliquely in Deligiorgis’ courageous, moral action and they might even have been inclined to speculate that his bravery could have something to teach the rest of the EU about primal, humanitarian responsibility to and for others less fortunate than oneself.

It should not be necessary to have to say that we are entitled to be suspicious about the manner in which this tale was projected via the media and cautious about the “politics of pity” that gets constituted around the representation of non-European suffering as European humanitarian catastrophe. Nonetheless, there are other things going on in this shoreline drama. Deligiorgis and the people he saved were all soaking wet. The rescuers had to battle against relentless waves that “kept coming and coming”. Their salty saturation communicates something of the way that being human is transformed when the solidity of territory is left behind. We are afforded a glimpse of vulnerable, offshore humanity that might, in turn, yield an offshore humanism.

Some of the rescuers and the shipwrecked refugees were almost naked but this was not an encounter with bare life. Deligiorgis reports that he had to dispense even with his shoes in order to do his rescuer’s work. Carrier and carried, drowned and saved, encountered one another mysteriously, in the grey zone that Edward Said repeatedly identified with Yeats’ poetic image of the “bestial floor”. In that space, carrier and carried do not have to be seen or fixed as either black or white, African and European or even male and female. Ossified identity would sink quickly in this deadly water.
The exhausted rescuer described his own reactions in detail. Faced with
the sheer difficulty of carrying Nebiat, her weight and his own fatigue, he says
he acted *instinctively*. Helena Smith reported that:

“He had been in the water for about 20 minutes when he saw Nebiat
gripping the buoy. “She was having great problems breathing,” he said.
“There were some guys from the coastguard around me who had jumped
in with all their clothes on. I was having trouble lifting her out of the sea.
They helped and then, instinctively, I put her over my shoulder.”

According to Smith, Deligiorgis was uncomfortable at being described as a
hero, preferring to emphasise the ordinariness of his bold, empathic behavior
and the impact upon his own consciousness of this fateful encounter with
vulnerable strangers.

“Deligiorgis falls silent at the mention of heroism. There was nothing
brave, he says, about fulfilling his duty “as a human, as a man”. But
recounting the moment he plucked the Eritrean from the sea, he admits
the memory will linger. “I will never forget her face,” he says. “Ever.”

Perhaps the basic philosophical kernel to be extracted from this is not the old
Levinasian lesson about how a primal relation with alterity precedes ontology,
but rather that we may, much more than we usually concede, opt to chose
whether we perceive the vital, vulnerable cargo of this and other wrecked
boats as human rather than as infrahuman. Though the idea of choice does
not apply to what Deligiorgis called *instinctive* actions, he spontaneously
recognized those Eritrean and Syrian people as imperiled fellow human
beings rather than as infrahumans or cockroaches.

This banal example can be part of the wider struggle to endow a sense
of reciprocal humanity in Europe’s proliferating encounters with vulnerable
otherness. More is indeed being recovered from the waves than wreckage and
corpses. Europe’s relationship with its own shrinking civilization is at stake in
the decision to intervene as well as in the later lives of the survivors.

The same lesson about the rhetoric of humanity and the need for new
humanisms can be learned when turn away from the horrors of the Mediterranean frontier to consider other instances in which the issues of humanity and alterity have been refigured by a bold, generous acts of solidarity. They might also be considered to have a philosophical significance discernable outside of nationality, ethnicity, faith or racial hierarchy. The recent reports of hotel staff spontaneously acting as human shields to protect tourists during the terrorist attacks in Tunisia and the endless reports of selfless generosity from the Parisian club Bataclan open up that possibility. It appears that the creative re-enchantment of the human, implicitly proposed here in abstract terms, is already underway as part of convivial interaction in everyday, heterocultural life. Taken together, these examples can provide a rare opportunity to enrich our understanding of the changes that characterize Europe’s postcolonial world. But there is even more than that at stake. Stories like these supply a valuable means to help us find out which differences will be different enough to matter in a neoliberal era that is emphatically “diverse” and indulges its voracious appetite for the exotic in inverse proportion to the ebbing of Europe’s democracies and their histories of cosmopolitan hope.

Perhaps the places in Europe that have lately declared themselves to be cities of sanctuary, can inspire us. There have been moves afoot in many towns and cities—for civil society organisations to pressurize but also to bypass government power, opposing racism and xenophobia in order to build a culture of hospitality and supportive, independent, vernacular connections with fugitives, incomers and settlers via the work of dedicated non-governmental bodies like Refugee Support as well as less formal and more fluid local coalitions and activist bodies. The criminalization of their solidary activities is already underway. How substantial and resilient those oppositional commitments might be is firmly in our hands.

I cannot claim that this way of thinking and acting has been derived even indirectly from the law of the sea or the traditions of mutuality established in the teeth of maritime jeopardy. But it seems to be congruent with the sentiments of humane reciprocity that have been traditionally expressed in the opposition of land to sea and tellurian observation of maritime perils. Gianfranco Rosi’s disturbing and richly poetic film “Fire At Sea” is a notable recent exploration of some of the exciting opportunities
arising from the re-enchantment of these ecological and ethical relationships. With these new initiatives in mind, I hope you will be prepared to join with the ongoing work of salvaging imperiled humanity from the mounting wreckage.

I wish to thank Professors Lidia Curti and Mauro Pala for their help in translating Leopardi’s poetry and evaluating the translations done by others. All the errors here are mine.

1 Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield The Discovery of Time Harper Torchbooks, 1965.


5 I am thinking of Cedric Robinson’s arguments which I encountered while he was writing Black Marxism in the Cambridgeshire village of Radwinter in 1982. Cedric presented a paper on the Black Radical Tradition at the conference on black history in Britain held at the Institute of Education in 1982. His thinking from this time can be gleaned from his essay “An Inventory of Contemporary Black Politics” in Emergency, no.2.


7 This is Orlando Patterson’s phrase. See “On Slavery and Slave Formations” New Left Review series 1, no.117, September-October 1979, p.51.


9 Herman Melville Billy Budd, Sailor and Other Stories Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, p. 306.


12 CLR James Mariners Renegades and Castaways Bewick Editions, p.105


22 See Claire Colbrook The Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction, Volume One http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/12329362.0001.001/1:9/—death-of-the-posthuman-essays-on-extinction-volume-one?rgn=div1;view=fulltext


25 Alexander Weheliye *Habeas Viscus* Duke University Press, 2014. His valuable book identifies the limits of this style of thought when it comes the intractable problems presented by institutionalized racial hierarchy and divisions.


29 There is also a significant and growing body of work that either puts the other side of the argument politically or reconstructs the whole discussion in line with cosmopolitan and planetary ethics that are distant from the Kantian defaults that have usually defined those ambitions in the “western” university context. Examples of the first type can be found in the writing of Jason Moore and Dipesh Chakrabarty. *Moore's Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital*, Verso, 2015 is a key text. See also the range of critical voices in his more recent anthology *Anthropocene or Capitalocene?*, PM Press, Oakland, 2016. Andreas Malm’s *Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam-Power and the Roots of Global Warming*, Verso, 2015, is also useful. Chakrabarty’s interventions have been fundamental to this profound reorientation of humanistic thought towards the impending global catastrophe. See, for example, his afterword to the special issue of *South Atlantic Quarterly* (116:1, January 2017) devoted to debating “climate change” and the Anthropocene. Amitav Ghosh’s pointed intervention *The Great Derangement University of Chicago Press, 2017* is a lucid illustration of the second variety of work I have in mind here.


37 All quotes are taken from Helena Smith’s report published Sunday 26 April 2015
“Migrant boat crisis: the story of the Greek hero on the beach”

38 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f8Kc5wyO Rxg