Abstract

Taking its inspiration from the 21st-century protest chant, ‘This is what democracy looks like!’, this chapter explores the interrelation between theories of representation and modes of radical democracy. Drawing on Jacques Rancière, Chantal Mouffe, and others, Schmidt analyses recent political actions that refuse to adhere to what he calls ‘the politics of the count’, including demonstrations against tuition fee increases in the UK, the 2011 London riots, the actions of UK Uncut, and Occupy, all of which emerged within the same twelve months. Such actions produce a representational crisis in two interrelated meanings of the idea of representation: they challenge representational democracy, but also challenge our understandings of what counts as the political—that is to say, what politics looks like.
Everyone has their own way in. For me, the story begins shortly after 9/11 and the subsequent bombing campaign in Afghanistan, when I began to become aware that these global acts of violence have their sources much closer to home—and, indeed, could even be mapped to what was then my own home, the US state of Georgia. Feeling helpless in the face of violence that I could not prevent, and desperate to make a difference where I might be able, I travelled with others to the US Army base at Fort Benning, near the border with Alabama. This base, founded in 1918, is home to what is now called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, but which for many decades went by the name of the ‘School of the Americas’: a combat training school for Latin American soldiers, implicated in human rights atrocities through its dissemination of counter-insurgency and psychological warfare techniques that were subsequently applied against civilian populations throughout the ‘dirty wars’ in Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere. Every November since 1990, the activist organisation School of the Americas Watch organises a vigil at the gates of Fort Benning, commemorating los desaparecidos (‘the disappeared’) and others lost to state violence in the Americas and beyond.

This is where I was in 2001.¹ My memory of this, my first but not last experience as a participant in mass demonstration, is a daze of sensation and spectacle: song, imagery, dance, chanting, collective gesture. Larger-than-life puppets and figurines floating above the marching demonstrators, and also individual protestors, dressed and masked as skeletal apparitions to represent los desaparecidos—figures who would later trespass onto the military compound and handcuff themselves to trees and fences. What is the relevance of these symbolic—one might even say theatrical—aspects of the demonstration to the broader politics of the event? Do they add anything, or do they merely acquire importance from their proximity to the ‘real’ risks being taken nearby? In my own memory, the feeling of camaraderie and group-belonging figures equally with the vigil’s charged location in its significance, and it is indeed this experiential aspect that has characterised the ‘carnivalesque’ turn of post-Situationist protest: ‘Revolutionary moments are carnivals in which the individual life celebrates its unification with a regenerated society,’ as Raoul Vaneigem influentially wrote in 1967.²

Many key studies of social protest movements have focused on these experiential qualities in shaping and reshaping participants’ identities;³ but as suits the present collection, I want to focus here on its theatrical aspects, the relation between its performance and what the performance represents. As a discipline, performance studies has itself taken inspiration from the spontaneous choreography of protest, as in Richard Schechner’s appropriation and expansion of the idea of the ‘carnivalesque’ in relation to what he would call ‘public direct theatre’⁴ He argued that the symbolism of protest is not secondary to its politics, but bound up in them; but even as he does so, he retains a separation between the ‘actual’ and the ‘representational’: ‘The direct theatre is not “about” something so much as it is made “of”
something,’ Schechner writes. ‘It is actual + symbolic rather than referential/referential/representational.’\textsuperscript{5} Schechner further acknowledged an implicit distinction between these symbolic gestures and the ‘real’ of politics: ‘When armed troops arrive, the intense whorling of direct theatre stops’.\textsuperscript{6} More recently, Sophie Nield has described such a similar division between the ‘real’ on one side and the ‘symbolic’ or ‘theatrical’ on the other, where ‘[t]he term “theatrical” itself almost becomes a marker for artificiality.’\textsuperscript{7} But unlike Schechner, Nield argues against this distinction, not merely in relation to the ways in which political events obviously have a dramaturgical dimension (as Schechner had suggested with his term ‘direct theatre’); but in a more fundamental way, in which we might use the idea of the ‘theatrical’ to describe the capacity of certain kinds of spaces to enable or disable the production of appearances\textsuperscript{8}—as, for example, the appearance of ‘the people’, the \textit{demos} who are manifest at the demonstration.\textsuperscript{9}

These distinctions bring to mind one of my strongest memories of the 2001 vigil. As night-time began to close in, there was a shift in the dynamics of the demonstration. I remember, as I lingered near the fortified gates of the military base, an angry, energised group of protestors (whom in subsequent demonstrations I would learn to recognise as black bloc anarchists). They were swirling and dancing around a bonfire of placards and driftwood: drumming, shouting, exuberant, and terrifying, breaking up more and more combustable materials and adding them to the fire. Again and again they repeated their chant: ‘This is what democracy looks like. This is what democracy looks like. This is what democracy looks like.’ This phrase has haunted me, and indeed has proliferated as a frequent refrain at many demonstrations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. It rose to popularity with the 1999 alter-globalisation protests in Seattle—not least as the title given to the crowd-sourced documentary that further popularised those events;\textsuperscript{10} and it persists as a rallying cry for current movements such as Occupy Democracy in the UK Parliament Square in 2015.\textsuperscript{11} What might be made of this phrase? On the one hand it is a characteristically performative act of self-manifestation, insisting on its own coming-into-being through the simultaneous act of self-naming. But, in this instance, it is also what might be called a negative-performative, as it accompanies an act of negation and refusal: what you call democracy is \textit{not} democracy, it implies; instead, democracy is \textit{this}: dissent, antagonism, multiplicity, anarchy. But how does one represent a negation, the ‘an-’ of anarchism? Can a radical, dissensual democracy only be expressed in the negative, or might it find a positive, durable form? And what, finally, might it mean to \textit{look} like democracy? Is representation antithetical to radical politics? These questions remained with me in the years to come, and came to the forefront again, many years later, in the series of protests that occupied the streets of my later home, London. It is these questions to which I return here.
The politics of the count

For many theorists of radical democracy, the challenge for politics today is the task of making the political appear. Chantal Mouffe articulates this in terms of a distinction between politics and what she calls ‘the political’, the relations of power and antagonisms that are always present, however much a liberal consensus would seek to transcend them. But such an occlusion in the name of a rational consensus is premised on a different consensus, one that goes unstated, regarding what does and does not constitute politics. As a result, before any political discourse can be heard or made visible, there is the prior matter of the exclusion of that which is not recognised as politics. For this reason, Mouffe argues, ‘Instead of trying to erase the traces of power and exclusion, democratic politics requires us to bring them to the fore, to make them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation.’

This interrelation between radical politics and the task of making-visible recalls Hannah Arendt’s idea of ‘spaces of appearance’, in which the category of the political is not restricted to certain places or domains where politics ‘properly’ belongs, but defined by action:

The space of appearance comes into being wherever men [and women] are together in the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be organized.

Revisiting Arendt’s concept in the light of the so-called ‘movement of the squares’, Judith Butler finds it useful for its expansion of our understanding of the political beyond the spaces and procedures designated for ‘politics’ per se. However, Butler also points out that even in Arendt’s idealisation, ‘such a view disregards and devalues those forms of political agency that emerge precisely in those domains deemed prepolitical or extrapolitical and that break into the sphere of appearance as from the outside, as its outside, confounding the distinction between inside and outside.’ That is to say, if in order to have rights one must appear in the political sphere, even in an expanded sense of the political as Arendt defines it, then there is a prior matter of the right to appear. As Butler writes, ‘any conception of the political has to take into account what operation of power demarcates the political from the prepolitical.’

Jacques Rancière defines this problem as one of ‘dissensus’: more than mere disagreement about a political claim (who has wronged whom, for example), dissensus describes a failure to recognise a claim as political, or even as a claim at all—that is, it is a disagreement about what constitutes a wrong and who is a person capable of being wronged, as opposed to being merely injured. Dissensus is an interruption into what he describes as ‘the distribution of the sensible’, the apportioning of proper roles and modes of expression. For Rancière, ‘Politics, before all else, is an intervention in the visible and the sayable,’ and in this way it is
intertwined with aesthetics, the name for our capacity to recognise sounds, images, and gestures as meaningful—even to recognise them as human. To put it another way, and to return to the terms of the anarchist chant, democracy might be understood first and foremost as a matter of looking like democracy: a radical demand that insists on a change in how one looks and hears in order that an act is recognised as political in the first place.

We might understand dissensus as posing a challenge to ideas of political representation with regard to two interrelated meanings of the idea of representation. Firstly, it is a challenge to representational democracy, by which the views of all are meant to be incorporated within the regime of politics; however, in any allocation of roles there is always what Rancière calls ‘the part of those who have no part’: those who have no allocated part and nothing to offer (wealth, experience, nobility, virtue) except their own claim to equality.18 Dissensus challenges the consensual agreement around what should count as politics, and how it should be counted; as articulated by cultural activists BAVO, it occurs when someone or some group ‘steps outside of line’ and ‘makes a claim that s/he is unauthorized or unqualified to do.’19 Rancière describes dissensus as exposing ‘a fundamental miscount’;20 and the correction to this miscount is not merely a matter of inclusion into the count—giving representation to those who are not represented—but a more radical challenge to any regime of counting, which will always be insufficient. In this way, it becomes a challenge to representation in a second sense, one that might be understood as a theatrical sense, and that has to do with the signification assigned to a particular action or gesture and its recognition (or exclusion) from the category of ‘the political’. Indeed, in describing this dynamic, Rancière invokes the metaphor of the theatre by describing politics as a kind of stage of visibility: ‘Politics consists in reconfiguring the partition of the sensible, in bringing on stage new objects and subjects, in making visible that which was not visible, audible as speaking beings they who were merely heard as noisy animals’.21

These two senses of representational crisis can be seen in operation in the responses to the 2010 protests in the UK over proposed rises in student tuition fees and cuts to further education. These changes, including tripling of university tuition fees, were ultimately implemented by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government on 9 December 2010, in contravention of the pre-election campaign promises of the Liberal Democrat party to oppose any rise in tuition fees. In advance of the parliamentary vote on the issue, a number of demonstrations were called, primarily in London. The first of these demonstrations, on 10 November, was jointly organised by traditional forms of representative power, the National Union of Students (NUS) and the University and Colleges Union (UCU, representing further- and higher-education workers). The planned demonstration followed the standard format of organised protest, including a fixed route of travel agreed in advance with the police services, culminating in a rally at the end of the demonstration route in which the assembled crowd would be addressed by pre-determined
speakers selected for their representative function (e.g., the presidents and general secretaries of the major unions involved, as well as other elected officials).

However, alongside the official demonstration, a smaller group of protestors broke off from the agreed route and forced their way into the Conservative Party headquarters in Millbank Tower, smashing windows and occupying the building. Much of the commentary on this breakaway group focused on one protestors who threw a fire extinguisher from the roof of the building, and the organisers of the processual march were quick to distance themselves from these events. UCU General Secretary Sally Hunt issued a short press release, which declared:

The actions of a mindless and totally unrepresentative minority should not distract from today’s message. The overwhelming majority of staff and students on the march came here to send a clear and peaceful message to the politicians.

Even in such a compact statement, it is notable how Hunt’s comments conflate the march’s message with its form of delivery: its ‘peaceful’ quality is synonymous with the unity and singularity of the organised procession, and to deviate from the form is also to depart from the message. A similar logic is evident in NUS President Aaron Porter’s condemnation, delivered via Twitter: ‘Disgusted that the actions of a minority of idiots are trying to undermine 50,000 who came to make a peaceful protest.’ In this way, the organisers of the larger demonstration sought to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of protest, with the violence of the latter being regrettable not only in its own right, but also because it marred the image of protest they had worked to achieve.

Even in such a short format—although certainly knowing that the tweet will be circulated—Porter’s tweet conspicuously emphasises the tally of the number of protestors, and makes a contrast between that number and the ‘minority of idiots’ (similar to Hunt’s ‘mindless and totally unrepresentative minority’). Such an emphasis on numbers has become a recurrent feature of contemporary demonstrations; indeed, one might say that the number itself is the message. This tendency is epitomised by what has become remembered as the largest anti-war rally in history, the worldwide protests on 15 February 2003 against the pending invasion of Iraq. But the achievement of such a scale of mobilisation is necessarily dependent upon organisation and coherence, such that there is inevitably something curiously normative about such an event. As Jenny Hughes notes, what was being protested in 2003 was not so much war itself as the absence of United Nations sanction: ‘The demonstration affirmed the normative—it sought the maintenance of a fiction of normality and law to fix the world at a time of crisis.’ So, in the end, it is perhaps not surprising that the eruptions of violence alongside the 2010 student protests were criticised not only by the decision-makers who were the target of the demonstration, but also by the union organisers themselves. To recall the phrasing used by BAVO, those activists who ‘stepped outside the line’ not only deviated
from the agreed route of the demonstration, but also challenged the logic of the line itself. This is an illustration of what we might call the politics of the count, where what is at stake is exactly the ‘count’ in its double-sense: the various versions of the official tally of the day, but also the question of what counts as politics.

‘Criminality, pure and simple’

The remainder of 2010, leading up to the Parliamentary vote on 9 December, saw increasing challenges to the politics of the count. These included large-scale protests in London on 24 November, 30 November, and 9 December itself, as well as other protests and sit-ins throughout the UK. During this period, police services introduced the controversial technique of ‘kettling’, constructing temporary fences to contain protestors out-of-doors for extended periods of time, sometimes overnight. As a consequence, the London protests were increasingly characterised by cat-and-mouse counter-tactics, with smaller groups of protestors taking varied routes throughout the city, often running and manoeuvring in small teams, making noise and commotion, and causing disruption to the ordinary flow of the city. After the 9 December vote confirmed the tuition increases, the protests gave way to significant violence and destruction of property, particularly within Parliament Square where thousands were kettled. Other actions coalesced around the Cenotaph for the First World War on Whitehall and targeted a car containing a hapless Prince Charles and the Duchess of Cornwall as they tried to attend a West End theatre (‘First time for everything,’ joked the duchess about being caught up in the protest)25.

Many media and government responses to these actions emphasised a distinction between legitimate protest and acts of violence. Following the events that included the attack on the royal family, UK Home Secretary Theresa May declared, ‘What we are seeing in London tonight, the wanton vandalism, smashing of windows, has nothing to do with peaceful protest [...]. Attacks on police officers and property show that some of the protesters have no respect for London or its citizens’.26 May makes a distinction between the protesters and ‘citizens’, as if the protesters are no longer citizens, but her statement nevertheless appears to concede the legitimacy of the category of ‘protester’. A productive contrast can be made between these acts of protest, property destruction, and urban intervention in November and December 2010 and the riots that would engulf London and other major UK cities just six months later. Following the fatal shooting of black Londoner Mark Duggan by police officers on 4 August 2011, an initially peaceful demonstration escalated into national unrest over several days, including widespread violence, looting of shops, and several large-scale fires. As Katie Pollard and Maria Young point out, there were many similarities between the scenes from the previous winter and those in August:
The form of these protests in many ways anticipated the riots the following August: they refused to follow planned routes or to stay as one mass; property was destroyed; people fought off the police; and there was a feeling of criminality and of taking the streets. At moments the violence superseded demand making. However, they note, ‘unlike the riots, all this [student protest] took place in central London, and so the protests’ targets of destruction were largely symbols of power and state authority—the Conservative party headquarters, the Treasury, the Cenotaph and Prince Charles.’ Lacking such ‘legitimate’ (if frowned-upon) targets, the August riots were instead condemned by UK Prime Minister David Cameron as theft, not politics: ‘Young people stealing flat-screen televisions and burning shops—that was not about politics or protest, it was about theft.’ In a prepared speech a few days after the riots were quelled, Cameron again signalled that the criteria that distinguished legitimate protest was the choice of target for destructive action: ‘These riots were not about government cuts: they were directed at high street stores, not Parliament.’ In need of a term other than ‘protest’ to describe these actions, Cameron declared, ‘It is criminality, pure and simple—and there is absolutely no excuse for it.’

The abstraction ‘criminality’ would become a signifier of choice for both politicians and media, locating the source of the unrest not in specific circumstances but in more generalised moral faults. For both left and right, the actors in the unrest tended to be described as products of their social circumstances. The view from the right saw the underlying causes to be moral deficiencies endemic to particular circumstances, as typified in Cameron’s speech on 15 August 2011, which catalogued the Conservative view of the causes:

Irresponsibility. Selfishness. Behaving as if your choices have no consequences.

Children without fathers. Schools without discipline. Reward without effort.

Crime without punishment. Rights without responsibilities. Communities without control.

Cameron’s diagnosis calls for more rigorous ‘policing’ on a cultural scale, including reinstatement of father figures, discipline in schools, a state-led re-alignment of reward and punishment; but also literal policing in terms of criminological structures targeting specific populations. One way in which this approach was immediately manifested was in the criminal sentencing for those who were successfully prosecuted for their role in the acts committed during the August riots; on average, their sentences were found to be 25% longer than normal. For the oppositional left, on the other hand, the underlying sources tended to be sociological rather than individual, with cuts in social services and infrastructure identified as the primary causes. Former London mayor Ken Livingstone argued, ‘If you’re making massive cuts, there’s always the potential for this sort of revolt against that,’ and Alistair
Campbell, communications director under the previous Labour government, commented, ‘People still feel angry about the banks. [...] They feel the crisis is not their fault but they were the ones who were hit the hardest’.  

Despite their differences, both sides of this polarisation shared a tendency to reduce the rioters themselves to the role of mindless reactionaries, their actions determined either by their ‘underclass’ mentality (according to the right) or their structural exclusion (according to the left). As Pollard and Young argue, such a view denies the rioters any agency of their own; and in their view, this denial is even more pronounced in the case of the leftist argument:

The Left made an effort to identify the riots’ external ‘causes’—the closing down of youth centres, the end of EMA [the Education Maintenance Allowance], the aggression of the police, incessant advertising, and unemployment. They suggested that these causes could be ended if bankers were less greedy and politicians changed their policies. The only people who were responsible for the riots, then, were the politicians and the bankers who should put the system back in order. Not only is the Left wrong that the politicians and the bankers have the power and ability to do this, but they are wrong that the rioters have no agency or power.

Instead, Pollard and Young argue for a third view, one that appropriates Cameron’s phrase, but in order to embrace criminality as a political act in its own right: ‘The riots were not crime as a means to a message, being violent to get heard, but were criminality for criminality’s sake—criminality pure and simple.’ As they put it, the riots were ‘[n]ot breaking the law to make demands of the state, but breaking the law to break the law’. Similarly, Slavoj Žižek rejects both the de-humanising rhetoric of the right and the social determinist logic of the left; for Žižek, the violence during the riots is not a mis-directed symptom of a society’s failings but instead the violent articulation of that very society: it is ‘a moment of genuine protest, in the form of an ironic response to consumerist ideology: “You call on us to consume while simultaneously depriving us of the means to do it properly—so here we are doing it the only way we can!”’

In my accounts of both the (predominantly) student protests in the winter and the riots the following summer, I have emphasised the way in which the presence or absence of certain elements to the actions—a clear message, identifiable leaders, specific targets, the destruction of property—were used as the basis for arguments about whether certain actions are political or not. These eruptions of dissensus in London’s streets, then, exemplify the dynamic described by Mouffe and Rancière in which the designation of something as fitting the category of politics is itself the domain of the political—the distribution by which some actions are understood as representing grievances, and others are simply meaningless noise (‘criminality, pure and simple’ in Cameron’s memorable phrase). In revisiting these events, my intention is not to make a claim that one or the other set of criteria is correct:
that the student protests were political and the riots were not, for example, or the other way around. Instead my intention is to underscore the way in which what we say about such actions, how we understand and interpret them, is itself where ‘politics’ happens. That is, these actions are dissensual not because they are ways of representing challenges to existing political ideas, but because they challenge the idea of what is and isn’t political representation. They provoke us to think, listen, and see differently with regard to the function of urban spaces, the expectation of who belongs here, and the propriety and impropriety of certain actions.

**Facilitating dissensus**

In different ways, the student protests and the August riots manifest dissensus as negation or disruption, as violent rends in the fabric of the political. But is this necessarily the case? Must dissensus always be realised as refusal, as ‘stepping out of line’, or can it also be a matter of generating new forms of co-appearance? One way into thinking about this question might be seen in actions organised at the chronological midpoint between the two events described so far. On 26 March 2011, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) organised a ‘March for the Alternative’ in central London, situated as a broad protest against the planned ‘austerity’ cuts from the coalition government—cuts that would primarily affect social services, welfare, health, and education. As with the 10 November march described above, the central structure of the demonstration was a planned procession through the city, culminating in a rally at Hyde Park, where representatives of various constituencies (beginning with the TUC general secretary and followed by the head of the Labour Party) would address the crowd. Again, the politics of the count was in evidence, and the cumulative number of protestors was presented as the headline message of the day: the BBC estimated 250,000 protestors while the *Guardian* newspaper estimated 400,000, and both noted that it was the largest protest since the February 2003 march against the invasion of Iraq.38 Again, there was an explicit link between the form of the demonstration and its message: ‘We are here to send a message to the government that we are strong and united,’ said the TUC general secretary.39

Alongside the official demonstration, however, there were also breakaway groups that left the planned itinerary and instead took action in other parts of central London, most notably the main shopping area of Oxford Street. Several of these breakaway actions were organised by UK Uncut, a group that had begun to form over social networking in the autumn of the previous year, and which set out to use direct action to specifically target banks, businesses, and international subsidiaries that were alleged to have avoided their full tax responsibilities in the UK. UK Uncut’s tactics range from traditional forms of direct action, such as sit-ins and
blockades that force branches to close, to more creative forms of occupation that turn their targets into utopian mirror-images of themselves that deliver the public services that are under threat from austerity cuts. These have included using theatrical props and costumes to turn Starbucks coffee franchises into libraries, and crèches and bank branches into forests and hospitals.  

During the 26 March 2011 demonstration, UK Uncut coordinated the creative occupation of elite department store Fortnum & Mason, owned by a conglomerate alleged to have evaded over £40 million in tax. Around 400 protestors disrupted commerce by placing banners over the store shelves, convening a tea party with their own picnic baskets (in contrast to the luxury hampers for sale in the store), and organising themselves by consensus-based decision-making. The store was eventually surrounded by police, and video footage from the day shows protestors being told by police they could leave peacefully; however, they were instead kettled and many arrested on their way out of the store. Despite the protest having been described as ‘non-violent’ and ‘sensible’ by the police officers at the scene, hundreds were held overnight, and many protestors were later convicted of aggravated trespass. Evoking the distinction between protest and ‘criminality’, the chief prosecutor in these trials declared, ‘These protesters chose to disrupt a legitimate business, which is not peaceful protest and is a criminal offence’. Elsewhere in the area, numerous other shops and banks had windows smashed or were attacked with paint in actions not affiliated with UK Uncut, and some accounts claim that the harsh treatment of the non-violent protest at Fortnum’s was coloured by these events, part of a deliberate police policy to ‘draw “a line in the sand” between peaceful protest and criminal trespass’. 

As with the student protests before it and the riots after, then, a contest over what does and does not constitute legitimate political expression was foregrounded in the response to this action. On BBC’s Newsnight programme a few days after the TUC march, host Emily Maitlis attempts to enforce such a distinction in an interview with a UK Uncut organiser identified as Lucy Annson. As I will argue, this interview becomes not only the site for the representation of different political views, but a contest over the terms of representation itself. Maitlis begins her interview with the characteristically blunt, impatient style for which Newsnight is known, and throughout the interview rarely allows Annson to finish her sentences: ‘Just talk us through your position on the kind of violence at Saturday’s march. It’s noticeable that you haven’t condemned it. Do you?’ Annson’s reply attempts to refuse the role she is being asked to play:

We’re a group of people who self-organise. We don’t have a position on things. What we do is share resources to be able to plan actions against the cuts, and it’s very much about empowering the individual to go out there and take civil disobedience.
Not satisfied with this response, Maitlis keeps pressing the point

Maitlis: Okay, when the individual’s empowered, does he attack buildings? Does he think it’s wrong if other people attack buildings? That’s what I’m asking.

Annson: You might have to ask that particular individual. I mean, certainly...

Maitlis: ... Well what do you think? You’re a spokesperson for UK Uncut—what do you think?

Annson: Well, I’m a spokesperson for myself. I’ve never been involved in an action where there’s been any property damage. I like creativity. I like using art as my form of protest, which is why...

Maitlis: ... Is a smashed window creative? Is it art? I mean, do you think that’s a good way of...?

Annson: ... My interpretation is that, no, I wouldn’t choose to smash a window. But that’s actually my decision.... In terms of UK Uncut, we create alternative spaces. We have spaces inside banks where we’ve turned them into libraries, into forests, into crèches. We have children and pensioners attending our actions....

What is at stake in this insistence on the part of the media performer that distinctions be drawn between destruction, politics, and creative activity? And why does Annson refuse to make a distinction? Crucially, the activist makes it clear that her refusal is not about whether or not a distinction can be made (for her, it seems that one can), but instead a refusal to be the one to make the distinction on her part to make that distinction for others. It is a recognition that distinguishing is a political act. Here the dual aspects of representation discussed earlier are made manifest: in order to say what an action or gesture means, one must first claim the capacity to do so on behalf of another.

Annson actively refuses both roles, to the frustration of her interrogator, who keeps pressing the point: ‘Don’t you think your children and your pensioners and the unions that support you would quite like to hear you condemn the violence? It can’t be that hard, can it?’ Annson responds by describing the compulsion to ‘condemn or condone, condemn or condone’ as an ‘over-simplification’, likening it to a ‘pantomime auditorium’, but Maitlis interrupts:

Maitlis: No, if someone’s throwing things at an officer, if someone is throwing things at people in the crowd, if somebody is smashing a bank’s window or a shop’s window or whatever.... Is that a good thing or isn’t it? It’s not a pantomime question I’m asking you. Is it a bad thing to do?

Annson: It is a simplification of what happens in a demonstration. A demonstration is a space where many things are in flux. There are many people
with different opinions and different tactics. UK Uncut provides spaces which are creative and fun and inclusive....

Maitlis ... Okay, so if people infer from what you’re saying that you’re not an entirely peaceful organisation, that would be pretty fair right?

Annson: I don’t think that would be fair to say. I don’t think anyone’s in a position to make an assessment other than the people involved in the actions themselves.

Maitlis: You don’t want to condemn the violence?

Annson: I don’t think that’s a fair question to ask and I’m going to reject the premises of that question.

The invitation being made to Annson is to claim legitimacy within a particular understanding of politics. Through her willingness to appear on TV, to appear distinct from the crowd, she has been extended the right to appear as if she is a political representative. It is an invitation to claim a particular kind of voice: the voice that speaks for others. But this is not the kind of politics which is at stake, the activist keeps insisting. She is not here to use the actions of others to lend potency to her own act of speaking, but instead attempts to use her speech to testify to actions that happen elsewhere. The politics of which she speaks cannot be reduced to speech. You have to be there, she keeps saying. You have to try it yourself. As sympathetic commentator Niki Seth-Smith notes, ‘It’s not that [the UK Uncut organisers] have not taken a position on the violence on behalf of UKUncut; they have recognized that they cannot speak for the network.’

For Maitlis, this is frustrating, and she fails (or theatrically performs her failure) to recognise this kind of politics that deviates from the politics of the count. ‘What I’m trying to work out is why is it more empowering than just joining a solid march of 250,000 people who are all pretty much saying the same thing.’ Annson replies, ‘Well, I think that’s actually incorrect.’

People aren’t always saying the same thing in a march of people. I did join the march. We had a block on the march, and UK Uncut were really proud to be part of the Trade Union march on the Saturday. It was absolutely fantastic to march together. And we moved away rather than going to the rally...

Maitlis: Were you on the march?

Annson: Yeah, that’s right. And we moved away rather than go to the rally in Hyde Park. We went off into Oxford Street to hold these creative occupations where we turned a Boots [a chain pharmacy] into an NHS [National Health Service] hospital to campaign against the cuts, we had a comedy venue in Soho Square...
Maitlis: [cutting her off] Alright.

Maitlis is unwilling or incapable of recognising politics in the organising activities that are most vital and important to Annson, and cuts her off every time Annson tries to elaborate on these. Where recognition functions as both seeing and allowing to be seen, Maitlis can only recognise either the law of the count—manifested in a demonstration of numbers, a form of representation that is extra-parliamentary but which follows the same parliamentary logic—or else violence, destruction, criminality. This also means that she cannot see the extent to which politics happens elsewhere from its proper time and place; including the fact that politics is happening there, in that television studio, where a disagreement takes place not only over what certain actions might mean but whether it is even permissible to speak of them.

The art of the ‘we’

Such a refusal to see would not be possible for much longer. Later that same year, in September 2011, the movement called Occupy was born in New York; and a month later, two occupations began in London: a larger encampment in the churchyard of St Paul’s, which lasted until February 2012, and a smaller site in Finsbury Square, which was cleared in June 2012. At the time of this writing in 2015, Parliament Square has also been the site of periodic rather than permanent occupations undertaken in the name of Occupy Democracy.48 These movements popularised the performative declaration, ‘We are the 99%’, which presents an explicit challenge to the politics of the count, articulating exactly the frustration of being uncounted by existing political and economic hierarchies. Moreover, Occupy also departs from the logic of the count because it is not a petition; the strategies of encampment, organisation, and longevity are undertaken as goals in their own right, rather than oriented toward a particular outcome that will come later as the result of the actions of a different representative body. Instead, they are ‘pre-figurative’, ‘creating a vision of the sort of society you want to have in miniature,’ as David Graeber, one of the more outspoken of the original architects of the movement, articulated in its early, optimistic days.49

As a challenge to the politics of the count, the first few months of the movement were characterised by the same kind of unwillingness or refusal to ‘see’ on the part of mainstream media and commentators that was in play in the Newsnight feature on UK Uncut. Marco Deseriis and Jodi Dean describe such commentators as being ‘nearly hysterical in their demand for demands: somebody has got to say what Occupy Wall Street wants!’50 For Judith Butler, this demand for demands is also a demand to conform to a given idea of what the political must look like: according to the mainstream view, she writes, ‘political movements, if they are to qualify as “political”, must (a) be organized around a concrete and discrete list of
demands, and (b) endeavor to have those demands satisfied.

For Butler, Occupy's rejection of each of these criteria is key to its political relevance. In relation to the first criteria—‘Demands should take the form of a list’—Butler argues that no matter how long or detailed it is, such an enumeration would always be incomplete; this is because the problem is not any (or all) of the individual items on such a list, but instead the systemic causes of inequity that connect them. With regard to the second criteria, Butler notes that the insistence by the mainstream on demands being ‘possible’ reflects the way that ‘the field of the political has been constituted such that satisfiable demands become the hallmark of its intelligibility’. These ‘pre-political’ matters of legibility and intelligibility, and the regulation of what kinds of demands are recognised as belonging to the political, return us to the notion of dissensus as the refusal and reconfiguration of such frameworks, and the invention of new ones. Rather than a list, Occupy presents an assembly. Rather than the intelligible, a multiplicity of voices.

Perhaps fittingly, such a reconfiguration finds an exemplary moment in Butler’s own appearance at Occupy Wall Street, during which she both describes the performativity of the assembly and relies upon the very performative dimensions that she describes. Like all public addresses at Occupy, Butler makes use of the human microphone, by which amplification is achieved without electronic infrastructure through the repetition of the speaker’s words in unison by those near enough to hear directly. In her address, she echoes the critique, ‘So what are the demands all these people are making?’ If the demands for radical systemic change and social justice are demmed ‘impossible’, Butler offers the refrain: ‘Very well, we demand the impossible.’ The formal properties of the event mean that her reply, and the ‘we’ that she articulates, are given voice by those gathered near her—a self-reflective performance that she emphasises in her closing rhetoric:

But it is true

But it is true

that there are no demands you can submit to arbitration here

that there are no demands you can submit to arbitration here

because we’re not just demanding economic justice

because we’re not just demanding economic justice

and social equality.

and social equality.

We are assembling in public,
We are assembling in public, we are coming together as bodies in alliance, in the street and in the square. We are standing here together making democracy, Enacting the phrase, ‘We the people.’

Elsewhere, Butler emphasises the importance of the way that this demand for radical equality ‘is not directed to those institutions that reproduce inequality’, but instead to ‘the people themselves’: ‘The appeal is to ourselves, and it is this new “we” that is formed, episodically and globally, in every action and demonstration.’ This ‘we’ is fabricated in its act of articulation, to borrow Jacques Derrida’s language: the performative self-authorising of a ‘we’ articulated ‘in the name of the people’ in the US Declaration of Independence, Derrida writes, has a ‘fabulous retroactivity’. Butler’s own performance at Occupy Wall Street might be understood as an instance of this ‘we’, in which its symbolic and rhetorical dimensions are thoroughly interdependent upon its practical necessities.

Perhaps it is something like this kind of intertwining that Jean-Luc Nancy had in mind in a recent lecture in which he argued: ‘What we ask of politics is that it give form and visibility to the possibility of living together’. He continued:

Politics—the artistry of the polis, the technique, the know-how, the sleight of hand—comes about when the ‘together’—our together and, more precisely, we ourselves, must be made possible from the outset. Politics is the possibilising of a we, a we that could then not be possible, that itself lacks evidence and givenness.

These new forms of appearance—the creative occupations of UK Uncut, the encampments of Occupy, the human microphone, the widespread use of formal consensus procedures—might be understood as positive attempts to address the ‘lack’ of givenness that Nancy identifies. They are like models or theatrical stagings, both metaphorical and practical, and
their importance is as much about manifesting an image of a ‘we’ as they are an implementation of that collective force toward a stated purpose. This idea is encapsulated in David Graeber’s declaration, in the aftermath of the 1999 Seattle protests: ‘It is not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of organization are its ideology.’

But has this focus on the fabrication of forms of community been taken too far? Many critics on the left have warned of the danger of fetishizing these forms of organization at the cost of losing any commitment to action. Often this criticism is manifested as frustration with endless discussion—which is problematic not only in its own right, but also because such discussion is often predicated upon unquestioned patterns of privilege and exclusivity. Andrew Cornell gives a scathing account of one such experience in the context of 2004 protests taking place against the backdrop of the US Republican party National Convention (RNC):

> Eventually my affinity group and I formulated the theory that many people at those meetings weren’t all that concerned about how successful the actions would be at disrupting the RNC or how they might be strategically useful in creating real policy change. Why? Because the real revolution was happening right there, on the dirty floor of a warehouse in Red Hook, Brooklyn, where 75 people, nine tenths of them white and economically comfortable, were having ‘democratic’ conversations. The revolution was the process itself—assuming that every nuance of consensus procedure was followed, the facilitator ran through the ‘stack’ in the correct order, and each participant used the correct hand gesture to indicate that she wanted to make a ‘direct response.’ It didn’t matter what the outcome was, as long as we were ‘reinventing democracy’ in the process.

If these new forms of organisation are the movement’s ideology, as Graeber asserted, then for Cornell, the ideology in this instance is not only ineffective but also exclusionary. Cornell’s critique is typical in its assessment of the way in which new social movements might find themselves bogged down in procedural detail, in the minutiae of the mechanisms of representation. More pernicious is the way that exclusions are reinstated: even as these new forms attempt to counter the hierarchies of received forms of representation, the ‘democracy’ they create frequently remains open only to those who have economic and social privilege.

**For a representational pluralism**

I would suggest that one way to think through this problem of the fetishizing of form is to consider it in terms of contrasting views on representation. As Jodi Dean and Jason Jones summarize, some advocates of these social movements describe their practices as anti-
post-representation, characterised by non-hierarchical horizontality, individual self-determination, and self-authorization; these attributes are frequently cited by advocates of ‘direct democracy’ or a ‘leaderless revolution’. Indeed, in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Declaration, in which they attempt to articulate the energy and ideology of Occupy and other popular movements of 2011, ‘representation’ recurs as an obstacle to democracy: ‘representation is in itself, by definition, a mechanism that separates the population from power, the commanded from those who command,’ they write; it ‘blocks democracy rather than fosters it.’

However, Dean and Jones argue that these new forms of activism are not opposed to representational structures, but instead realise the tensions and antagonisms of representation itself. In relation to Occupy, for example, this antagonism is manifest in the act of naming—‘We are the 99 percent’—rather than the action itself. It is not that urban camping is inherently politicised, they argue, for it is easy to think of non-politicised examples. Rather, the occupation is political because it is made in the name of the 99 percent—that is, it is represents the 99 percent. And in making this representational gesture, it calls the 99 percent into being. ‘Far from being post-representation,’ they write, ‘the movement divisively asserts, repeatedly and with determination, the fundamental economic antagonism at the heart of capitalism.’ We can find a similar sentiment argued by Chantal Mouffe in her reflection on the social movements of the 2000s, in which she supports the claim that ‘far from contradicting democracy, representation is one of its very conditions’. Mouffe and Dean are in close agreement on this point: ‘A pluralist democratic society cannot exist without representation,’ argues Mouffe, and Dean makes the similar assertion, ‘Ever-changing plurality is the condition of representation, not its overcoming.’

As described at the beginning of this chapter, one of the factors at play in these various positions with regard to representation is a slippage between the procedural meaning of representation, as a form of governance, and its theatrical or mimetic meaning, as an image or semblance of the demos. This tension can be seen in Dean and Jones’s argument: even as they defend the necessity of representation, they reproduce a kind of anti-theatrical prejudice in the way they qualify their account of these forms. This occurs as they describe an abstraction or degradation of the political, which increases as the formal mechanisms of these movements become separated from their moment of dissensual rupture: ‘The more distant and dispersed an action is from that relation, the less representative it is’. Wary of the fetishizing of certain forms—such as the consensus procedure critiqued by Cornell above, or the overly procedural general assembly—they draw on Rousseau’s idea of a general will to develop the idea of an ‘active political willing’. This active political willing can be understood to be expressed through various acts of representation; however, they also imply that it has some ontological priority and exists independently of them, such that forms of representation can find themselves further or closer to this fundamental political expression:
‘For all their much celebrated inclusivity, the movement’s General Assemblies, like parliamentary bodies more broadly, distance themselves from active political willing’.70 Such a description casts these representational forms as a necessary evil, useful for giving apprehensible form to some pre-existing wrong, but only ever standing in a mimetic relationship to that wrong, and only ever a shadow of ‘real’ democracy to which they might have greater or less proximity.

But what if we were to think of the procedural and mimetic meanings of representation not in opposition, but as working together? In such a view, the capacity for ‘active political willing’ would not need to be hypothesized as existing prior to the various forms that attempt to resemble it, but instead to be generated out of these forms themselves. In a 2012 debate with Jacques Rancière, Ernesto Laclau asks whether the principle of representation is ‘a lesser evil added on to a democratic principle that would otherwise represent a homogenous popular will?’ Laclau offers his own view on this question, and, like Dean and Jones, he concerns himself with the formation of political will:

> I think that this would only be the case if popular will could be formed entirely outside of the mechanisms of representation. And that is where I would draw a line. I don’t believe that it is possible to form a democratic will, nor a popular will, except via the mechanisms of representation. [...] In other words, I don’t see that there is a democratic principle opposed to the principle of representation, but instead a political construction process which cuts across the moment of the basic formation of the popular will and the moment of representation.71

Here Laclau suggests that the generation of mechanisms of representation can be understood as a ‘political construction process’, and political will is not something prior to these structures that they conceal or reveal, but instead something generated in and through them. Indeed, the problem of fetishizing consensus-based processes and other anti-representational forms of organisation might emerge precisely as a result of the belief that one has escaped representational structures. It is worth remembering that processes such as consensus-based decision-making emerged not out of a mistrust of representational structures, but a mistrust of structurelessness. This was powerfully articulated by Jo Freeman in the context of second-wave feminism as ‘the tyranny of structurelessness’: wherever it is claimed there is an absence of structure, Freeman argued, it only means that the structures are hidden, usually preserving entrenched hierarchies based on gender, race, and economic privilege (which is exactly the point that Cornell makes in his critique). Structurelessness does not exist, Freeman wrote: ‘We cannot decide whether to have a structured or structureless group, only whether or not to have a formally structured one.’72

Formal consensus-based decision-making is one such form that emerged out of this context, and, despite its name, when closely followed it emphasises dissent as much as it is oriented toward consensus. One handbook puts it this way:
While decision making is as much about conflict as it is about agreement, Formal Consensus works best in an atmosphere in which conflict is encouraged, supported, and resolved cooperatively with respect, nonviolence, and creativity. *Conflict is desirable. It is not something to be avoided, dismissed, diminished, or denied.*

We might therefore think of formal structures such as consensus-based decision-making as being representational structures designed to produce disagreement, even dissensus; by simultaneously encouraging conflict and equality, they might be understood as giving form to what Mouffe describes as ‘conflictual consensus’. Consensus-based decision-making is one form of the art of the ‘we’, and recent years have seen a proliferation of creative forms for the facilitation of group processes and actions, catalogued in collections such as steirischer herbst’s *Truth Is Concrete*, or in the ongoing crowd-sourced project *Beautiful Trouble*.

But this is not to mistake any of these structures for forms of direct democracy or a transcendence of representation. As Mouffe clarifies elsewhere:

> Critical artistic practices [...] do not aspire to lift a supposedly false consciousness as to reveal the ‘true reality’. This would be completely at odds with the anti-essentialist premises of the theory of hegemony, which rejects the very idea of a ‘true consciousness’.

Rather than seeking to escape from representation, what these forms offer is a representational pluralism, each holding open a space in which the boundaries between what does and does not count as politics are not fixed, but negotiable. Democracy might look like a parliamentary vote or a mass of demonstrators along a fixed line, but it also might look like an encampment, a carnivalesque picnic in a luxury food shop, a decision to stand still in a public square, or anarchists chanting around a burning fire. It is these forms of signification, the care and labour put into engendering the conditions for action, and the embodied modes by which participants engage with them that give rise to the experience of active political willing, not the other way around. That is to say: without representation, no politics. This is what democracy looks like.

**Notes**

1 Although obviously in the shadow of the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania, the vigil also recalled an earlier September 11: the 1973 *coup d’état* in Chile, with which the US CIA was allegedly complicit, and after which Augusto Pinochet would rise to power.


5 Ibid., p. 89.

6 Ibid., p. 88.


9 The tension between the ideal of democracy as ‘rule by the people’ (the *demos*) and rule by disorderly mob goes back at least as far as Book VIII of Plato’s *Republic*, which famously described democracy as ‘dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike,’ and inevitably devolving into tyranny. Jacques Rancière describes this as the ‘scandal’ of democracy: ‘The democratic scandal simply consists in revealing this: there will never be, under the name of politics, a single principle of the community, legitimating the acts of governors based on laws inherent to the coming together of human communities.’ Plato. 2009 [360BC]. *The Republic*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Internet Classics Archive. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html [June 1, 2015]; Rancière, Jacques. 2006. *Hatred of Democracy*. Translated by Steve Corcoran. London and New York: Verso, p. 51.


13 Ibid., pp. 33–34.


16 Ibid., p. 205.


31 ‘Criminality’ is also arguably a racial signifier, as most of those engaging in destruction during the student protests were white, while most of those involved in the riots were not.

32 Cameron, “PM’s Speech on the Fightback after the Riots.”


35 Pollard and Young, “Criminality Pure and Simple,” p. 211.

36 Ibid., p. 212.


39 BBC News, “Anti-Cuts March.”


46 Maitlis, Emily and Lucy Annson. 2011. BBC Interview with UK Uncut on TUC M26 Demo, 28th March 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN8BI52su0c [June 1, 2015]. The text reproduced here is transcribed from this source.


48 For a further discussion of these occupations, see Pollyanna Ruiz’s contribution to the present volume.


52 Ibid., pp. 8–9.

53 Ibid., p. 10.


Ibid., p. 30.


Ibid., p. 125.


74 Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, p. 103.


77 Mouffe, *Agonistics*, p. 93.