Patronage, Bureaucratic Capacity and Electoral Coordination

Adnan Naseemullah and Pradeep Chhibber

[accepted at Comparative Politics]

May 2017

Abstract: Electoral coordination is central to the creation of national party systems under first-past-the-post rules, but there are instances where we see such coordination fail even at the district level. In this paper we argue that electoral coordination requires the control of patronage distribution by local bureaucracies. Electoral districts in which bureaucrats do not hold a monopoly over the distribution of patronage, major political parties cannot monopolize competition among themselves, leading to the persistence of local champions as viable candidates and electoral fragmentation. In districts in which the bureaucracy controls patronage we see coordination yielding Duvergerian equilibria. We formulate and test this argument through constituency- and precinct-level analysis of Pakistani elections, and additional evidence from Indian elections.
Elections in democracies represent a discrete choice for voters among a limited number of credible alternatives for office. In single-member plurality (SMP) systems, there are mechanisms that limit real competition to two credible candidates who receive most of the votes in a constituency, or what Duverger called “local bipartyism.”¹ As parties field candidates across constituencies to capture enough seats to form the government, the competition between parties in each constituency is aggregated to produce a national party system. Maximizing the chances that voters’ preferences are transmitted to the shape and direction of the government depends crucially on these mechanisms, together known as electoral coordination.²

The capacities of parties to coordinate their electoral strategies across constituencies can certainly vary. As Chhibber and Kollman have shown, candidates coordinate across districts through common party affiliation, but sometimes that coordination is limited to particular regions within a country.³ This can lead to a fragmented national party system that is still consistent with the convergent dynamics of local bipartyism, as recent elections in Canada, India and the United Kingdom have demonstrated.

Yet coordination can be absent even within a district, yielding the much more theoretically confounding outcome of constituency-level electoral fragmentation. In such cases, the mechanism of strategic entry by major parties fails to produce a list of credible, party-affiliated candidates, and the mechanism of strategic voting fails to select from this list the two (or at most three) parties most likely to prevail in a constituency election. Multiple candidates – including those unaffiliated with major parties – stay viable in the race and the successful candidate wins with a small plurality of the overall vote. What might prevent voters from consolidating their support around two or three party-affiliated competitors within a constituency?
In this article, we argue that the control of patronage by politicians can fashion the possibilities for electoral convergence. More broadly, fragmentation can occur when national and powerful regional parties are collectively unable to establish an exclusive arena of competition that drives out other contenders, and thus restricting the field of credible candidates for office to those affiliated with those parties. We contend that the potential power for office-holding aspirants to determine the distribution of politically salient goods and services through leverage over bureaucratic agents is critical for establishing the hegemony of party competition and convergence around a few candidates within a constituency.4

If candidates lack the capability to return favors to their supporters through directing bureaucrats to disburse patronage in this manner, the in-built advantages of major party affiliation, and thus a key mechanism for constituency-level convergence, disappear. The effectiveness of competition between major parties at constituency level thus requires the control of an effective bureaucratic apparatus with the authority to distribute patronage at that level, because parties can exert influence on bureaucrats in ways that unaffiliated candidates cannot. If there are alternative channels for the distribution of public resources in a constituency – ones that statutorily bypass bureaucrats – multiple ‘local champions’ can remain credible and voters are left with few signals as to which two or three candidates are most likely to win, resulting in fragmented constituency-level competition.

We demonstrate these dynamics through a within-case study of democratic national elections in Pakistan in 2008 and 2013. The average Pakistani constituency in these elections had an effective number of parties (ENP) of 2.7 and 3.1 respectively, fully consistent with theoretical expectations. But there are significant outliers. Specifically, we see substantially higher fragmentation and lower proportion of the vote for major parties in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan on the country’s northwestern and western peripheries. In these areas, enduring legacies of colonial rule have persisted in the form of quasi-formal institutions of “sub-contracted governance,” in which the central government distributes patronage resources to the population through customary tribal leadership rather than a regular bureaucracy. The statutory inability of a quotidian bureaucracy to distribute patronage at the local level allows electoral fragmentation because parties are unable to monopolize influence over the distribution of that patronage. We additionally show these dynamics in play at the constituency level in India, in the spatial variation of local state presence and the extent of electoral coordination in several parliamentary constituencies.

This article contributes several key insights to our understanding of the nature of democratic competition in developing countries. First, it provides a new explanation for failures in electoral coordination both within and across electoral districts. The literature on electoral politics posits that four major factors impact electoral coordination: 1) majoritarian electoral institutions create incentives for voters and candidates to coordinate with parties within constituencies; 2) cleavages can define the substance of disagreements that generate party competition and even shape the party system; 3) federalism and the concentration of executive power can limit or enable parties to coordinate across constituencies; and 4) the organizational effectiveness of parties might affect their capabilities to enable coordination. The first three of these factors are, however, national attributes, and thus unable to account for variations within national cases; the last has a hard time accounting for this kind of variation, as the same parties are able to coordinate in some areas and fail to do so in others. By contrast, this article provides a framework that explains why convergent party competition might be present in some constituencies and absent in others.
Second, while much has been written on how democracy can transform the state, there is comparatively little systematic study of the ways in which the state as a set of institutions – and particularly the unevenness in the operation of these institutions at the local level across national territories – might shape the nature and limits of democratic competition. Research on the state in developing countries has highlighted the ways in which state-building created legacies of geographic variation in the government’s authority and discrete, heterodox arrangements between the government and powerful actors in society. This article deploys some of these insights to help us understand puzzles of variation in electoral coordination across constituencies, and how the nature of state institutions are important for understanding the linkage between votes and representation.

Third, this article highlights the potential utility of analyzing the dynamics of cases, such as Pakistan, not normally associated with theory generation in electoral politics. In so doing, it can help us understand the nature and contexts of democratic competition that lie at some remove from the wealthy institutionalized democracies, from which most of our theories of electoral politics arise. While the dynamics discussed here are specific to countries in which there is variation in the *de facto* or even *de jure* character and role of the local bureaucracies, this limiting condition might still apply to parliamentary democracies with some form of majoritarian representation in the developing world. More broadly, however, the article highlights the importance of particular aspects of the state as usually assumed but vitally important in the operation of democratic competition.

The next section lays out the theoretical framework that links electoral coordination and fragmentation at the constituency level to the nature of the state through the structure of patronage politics. Section three lays out the mechanisms and provides evidence with regard to
variation in electoral coordination in Pakistan; section four extends the analysis beyond the Pakistani case, with some evidence on variation in state presence and fragmentation in Indian elections. The conclusion discusses the implications of this argument to theories of democratic politics and the bureaucratic state.

**Electoral Coordination, Bureaucracy and Patronage Politics**

*The Mechanisms of Electoral Coordination*

Why do constituency-level elections in SMP systems tend towards convergent competition around a small number of candidates? Two distinct mechanisms are key to explaining how voters’ preferences are translated into convergence in competition. The first and most well-known is that electoral rules create incentives for individual voters, which in turn leads to electoral competition among a limited number of parties.

Duverger’s Law posits that in elections held under first-past-the-post rules, the effective number of parties should be two: “the true effect of the simple-majority system is limited to local bipartyism… the creation of a two-party system in the individual constituency.”

6 Duverger's Law assumes that there exists a nontrivial amount of strategic voting in constituency-level elections. Following a standard definition of strategic voting – voters prefer not to waste their votes if meaningful and potentially consequential votes can be cast – its implication in SMP elections is that voters prefer to vote for a candidate that has a chance of winning the election, all else being equal. A voter may prefer party A over party B and party B over party C, but she still may vote for party B if party A has virtually no chance of winning. Voting is thus ‘strategic’ in the sense that voters do not base their decisions solely on their preference rankings, but choose based on a combination of their preference rankings and assessments of how their behavior will best affect the election outcome and thus their wellbeing. If voters are rational, then they will
take into account the likelihood that their votes will help decide election outcomes. Cox proves that under one equilibrium scenario, which he names a “Duvergerian” outcome, for \( n \) seats chosen from the electoral district, \( n + 1 \) parties will receive votes and the remainder of the candidates will receive zero votes.\(^8\) Candidates expected to finish below “first loser” position will not receive any votes from rational citizens.

One potential explanation for a higher number of parties is an application of Cox’s model consistent with Duvergerian logic. In his model, there is the possibility of a tie between the second- and third-place parties. If voters and candidates within a district dislike the frontrunner party and want to defeat it, but cannot come to a workable agreement on which candidate or party should be the challenger, then it is possible for those voters to act strategically and yet end up dividing their vote evenly, ending up with a ‘non-Duvergerian’ equilibrium of three parties contending seriously for the vote, with any candidates below second loser position will receive no votes.

A second important mechanism, “strategic entry” and candidate selection, precedes strategic voting.\(^9\) Parties choose to compete in some constituencies and not others, and they do so by putting forward candidates that could viably compete under the party’s banner at the constituency level. Candidate selection by parties competing in a constituency winnows the field: two potential candidates for a party’s ticket cannot both run as candidates of that party, once the primary or selection panel is held. Party entry and candidate selection also enables strategic voting by providing voters with valuable information on the relative standing of candidates based on their party affiliation.

The formation of modern, national party systems as a whole has involved a transition in the nature of parties from a group of elites coming together for electoral and legislative
coordination to parties organized by the articulation of broader interests in society – of business, or labor. Max Weber characterized early parties as “rule by the clique,” and argued that these would be broken by the emergence of machines and political operatives with “vocational” motivations. The development of party democracy in Europe and the Americas involved a transition from cliques to mass membership and then “catch-all” parties, increasing the power of party organizations relative to individual candidates.

Present-day competition between parties has arisen in part out of social cleavages around which political conflict is structured. Lipset and Rokkan argued that cleavages produce parties representing opposing sides; the party system produced by these cleavages at the advent of democratic competition is then institutionalized and thus ‘frozen.’ The extent of polarization between such groups influence voter preferences and can even determine the character of political institutions, and even electoral systems in extreme cases. Chandra explained the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party and the fragmentation of the party system in Uttar Pradesh through the mobilization and representation of a previously excluded group. Stoll has argued more broadly that groups with rising social and political salience, when entering a polity with significant levels of decentralized authority, can significantly influence the number of parties. Parties and party systems, then, reflect broader national or regional sets of issues and concerns that tie together the specificities of competition between candidates at the local level to competition over the control of the state among national and major regional parties driven by broader issues, cleavages and conflicts.

The contention of this article is, however, that where there is no durable link between constituency-level contests and broader regional or national competition – where national party competition has not monopolized local contests – fragmentation can occur because candidates
without major party affiliation do not drop out of the race and voters lack the information necessary to rank-order candidates in terms of viability. In these cases, in other words, credible candidates are not (only) those who represent national or major regional political concerns. What might break such a connection?

Electoral Coordination and Patronage Politics

In order to understand what might prevent national or regional political parties from monopolizing competition, we introduce a complementary mechanism for electoral coordination around a small number of national candidates at the constituency level: that of patronage.\(^{17}\)

Patronage is a central concept in electoral politics. Politicians seek votes from those in the electorate by promising the delivery of particular, discretionary goods and services, and voters can seek to punish politicians for their failure in providing them by voting for their opponents. The perceived ability to effectively deliver patronage goods might drive voters’ preferences toward certain parties, and thus establish the preference ordering implicit in strategic voting.

Scholars have located deep relationships between patronage and the character of electoral competition.\(^{18}\) Some of the most established theoretical work on this relationship focused on patronage-producing ‘machine’ politics in American and European cities, which yielded one party dominance.\(^ {19}\) Yet high levels of patronage provision are consistent with vigorous electoral competition in many developing country democracies, especially in South Asia.\(^ {20}\)

How might patronage enable electoral coordination within and across constituencies, leading to convergence toward national party systems? Medina and Stokes have posited that patronage involves ‘political monopolies’ over relevant patronage goods and services, which are controlled only when in office.\(^ {21}\) Implicit in their model is the notion that bureaucrats act as perfect agents for politicians in the delivery of these goods and services. But it is unlikely that a
single politician by herself would have the requisite influence to order bureaucrats to do her bidding. This is especially true in contexts where junior bureaucrats are hired, promoted and transferred by their superiors, rather than through the spoils system.\textsuperscript{22}

In this context, political aspirants must achieve and maintain leverage over local bureaucrats to credibly claim influence over the distribution of patronage. This leverage must ultimately come from above: orders to local bureaucrats from their superiors in national and provincial capitals. In order to secure such leverage, politicians must have vertical linkages to ministers and party elders who can issue directives to or otherwise have influence over senior bureaucrats. These linkages are normally possible only when aspirants run on national or major regional party tickets, and thus are part of a common effort to secure majority coalitions. Thus politicians, in order to secure bureaucrats’ support in the execution of patronage, must affiliate with parties with a credible chance of entering government, either with a majority or as part of a coalition. This logic reflects Cox and McCubbins’ concept of legislative cartels, in which politicians join parties to climb up organizational ladders and because parties aid in electoral mobilization at the constituency level.\textsuperscript{23} Jensenius has found empirical evidence of the need for party affiliation in India; politicians cannot credibly deliver patronage unless they are part of the government.\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, a dominant form of political mobilization and competition involves managing hierarchical relationships within parties in order to direct bureaucrats to effectively deliver goods at the local level. A constituency-level candidate and a party boss need one another; the latter needs to win seats in order to maximize their chances of forming the government, and the former needs to signal at least perceived access to the state’s distribution of resources. This nexus is likely to displace independent contenders for office, because independents cannot normally claim
as much access to influence over patronage distribution. It might invite competition from other parties with similar credibility in terms of influencing the bureaucracy, however. In this way, promises of patronage distribution can limit credible competition to candidates affiliated to major parties.

Sub-Contracted Governance, Alternative Patronage Distribution and Electoral Fragmentation

A key, but often implicit, assumption in the basic model of patron-client exchange in electoral politics is that elected patrons have the capabilities – the requisite resources and the authority to distribute them – to direct patronage to their clients. As argued above, individual politicians may not have such authority, but their superiors within legislative cartels should, thus yielding the effectiveness of competition between major parties at the local level. But the power of party-affiliated candidates, through relationships with ministers and party bosses, is predicated on the monopoly of the distribution of these goods and services by local bureaucrats susceptible to such influence. Such a monopoly accords with our expectations, following Weber, that the state controls key activities in political life and bureaucrats are its salaried agents, without access to independent means of coercion, legitimacy or authority.25 Given the unique power of the state to deploy coercion and distribute its vast resources, it is no wonder that parties would compete over its control through electoral contests.

In much of the developing world, however, the state’s authority over coercion and distribution varies significantly over national territory. Herbst argued that governments’ influence in sub-Saharan Africa is limited to major cities and international borders.26 Boone framed ‘topographies’ of the African state through different engagements between state-builders and social elites.27 Scott explored strategies of different groups that successfully resist governments’ monopolizing control.28 Naseemullah and Staniland argued that contemporary
variation in conflict and development may be a legacy of different institutions of colonial
governance. Variation in the forms of governance means that in some areas, local bureaucrats
have the statutory authority and administrative resources to monopolize the distribution of public
resources. In others, the government have used alternative channels for the distribution of
resources that effectively bypasses or precludes Weberian bureaucracy. These might include the
incorporation of figures of customary authority to perform the government’s key responsibilities
in the distribution of resources at the local level, or what we call “subcontracted governance.”

Much of the literature on non-state actors conducting governance functions has been
framed in the context of “rebel governance,” with groups seeking to supplant the authority of the
sovereign state. More recently, there have been debates about whether the provision of key
public and social goods and services by non-state actors may actually be mediating or enhancing
state authority, as with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and NGOs in Kenya. Kate Baldwin
has recently written of how traditional chiefs in Sub-Saharan Africa, as notables with political
influence, can press the state to be more responsive to client populations. But this article draws
a distinction between traditional authorities influencing or strengthening governments’
effectiveness from privileged positions as civil society actors, and traditional authorities being
formally incorporated into the governance systems emanating from the state, as Catherine Boone
has suggested in analyzing the relationship between rural chieftaincy and the administration of
collective land rights in African countries.

Such subcontracted governance, and its impact on alternative mechanisms for patronage
distribution, has a significant impact on how we think about electoral coordination and
convergent mechanisms. Absent quotidian administrative monopolies over patronage
distribution, calls to party headquarters will not yield influence over such distribution. Thus
affiliation with major parties does not provide the overwhelming advantage in electoral competition that is present elsewhere. Instead, party-affiliated candidates may have to compete on a relatively more level playing-field with “local champions:” independent candidates or those affiliated with minor parties who have achieved loyalty and support from a large enough subsection of the local electorate to be taken seriously as a contender for office.

In this context, a number of factors produce constituency-level fragmentation. Party selection mechanisms fail because major party-affiliated candidates cannot credibly claim special authority over patronage distribution, and thus are not particularly competitive compared to other candidates. Local champions stand a credible chance of winning and rewarding their supporters with minimal benefits of office, so they remain in the race. Voters lack the usual information necessary to rank-order party-affiliated candidates in terms of viability, and thus strategic voting becomes difficult; voters are thus more likely to vote for their most local candidate in the hopes of getting goods from office if elected, instead of converging on two or three most favored candidates. In the next sections, we will show some evidence of this variation.

**Electoral Convergence and Fragmentation in Pakistani Elections**

Democracy in Pakistan has been halting, but representative structures and organizations are not new. Pakistan’s first ‘constitution,’ the Government of India Act, 1935, established electoral rolls, geographically delimited single-member constituencies, reserved seats for minorities and victory to the candidate with the largest number of votes per constituency. These rules were affirmed by the 1973 Constitution, which established direct elections to non-reserved seats in the national and provincial assemblies. This constitution and these electoral rules have been in place over eight general elections.
Pakistan also has a long-established tradition of political parties. The All-India Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was responsible for the demand for Pakistan as a state for Indian Muslims. Various factions of the Muslim League dominated Pakistan’s early electoral politics, absorbing regional political groups. Throughout Pakistan’s post-independence history, powerful national and regional parties have been formed and institutionalized in response to military rule, political opportunity and regional assertion, including the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Awami National Party (ANP), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Each of these parties has compete regularly in elections and entered and left office at provincial, national and municipal levels.

*Party System Convergence?*

Even though party positions at the national level shifted dramatically between the 2008 and the 2013 elections, district-level party systems have remained largely unchanged, with only a small average increase of effective parties. The most startling characteristic of that party system, demonstrated across two elections, is significant variation in the number of parties at the constituency level. Figure 1 demonstrates substantial variation around a mode of two expected parties, which only increases in the 2013 elections.

**Figure 1: Effective Number of Parties in National Assembly Elections, 2008 and 2013**
This variation is regionally concentrated. Constituencies in the more populous provinces of Punjab and Sindh have effective parties averaging 2.7 and 2.4 respectively in 2013, whereas in Balochistan and FATA, ENP averaged 4.5 and 6.2. Why might this be the case, given that the same electoral rules are in operation throughout Pakistan and social cleavages do not usually cut across ethnically homogeneous constituencies? We argue that the ways in which different parts of Pakistan are governed and patronage is distributed can have a defining impact on electoral convergence or fragmentation.

In the populous eastern provinces of Pakistan, there is a durable link between constituency-level competition and the national and regional struggles for domination by major parties. In Punjab since the 1990s, vigorous electoral competition has become institutionalized between the PML-N and other challengers, previously the PPP and more recently the PML-Q and then the PTI. Andrew Wilder has argued that strategies of electoral mobilization by parties in Punjab have crosscut and diminished old structures of authority, such as locally dominant endogamous groups (biradaris), by parties nominating candidates from the same biradari in local contests. Shandana Mohmand has emphasized the link between patronage, brokers and electoral support for candidates in parliamentary elections. In Sindh, there is less competition than in Punjab; the PPP dominates towns and rural areas of the province and the MQM controls the cities of Hyderabad and Karachi. Yet even in this less competitive environment, mobilizing the state at the local level to deliver patronage goods – including security – are important elements of both parties’ electoral mobilization strategies.

Electoral outcomes in Punjab and Sindh show a preponderance of Duvergerian equilibria and suggesting that in a plurality of these constituencies, two parties compete effectively. Examining the ratio of the proportion of votes for the third place candidate (second loser) to
those of the second place candidate (first loser), what Cox has termed the ‘SF’ ratio, we see modal peaks of 35.27 percent and 31.8 percent of constituencies between 0 and 0.2, in the 2008 and 2013 elections respectively. Further, in most constituencies, these candidates were affiliated with major parties: candidates from parties of national standing captured, on average, 80 percent and 73 percent of the vote across Punjabi and Sindhi constituencies respectively in the 2013 elections.

In Khyber Pakhtunhwa (KP), the northwestern province bordering the tribal agencies and in which Pakhtun tribal identity remains strong, cycles of anti-incumbency have made strategic voting more challenging. This has contributed to a higher ENP – 4.13 on average in 2013. Yet constituency-level competition is among candidates from major parties: parties of national standing account for 85 percent average vote share for KP constituencies in the 2013 elections, in contrast to 36 percent for FATA constituencies. The features of electoral politics in Punjab, Sindh, and even KP suggest that candidate selection and strategic voting are creating electoral convergence and that competition between major parties has become localized, marginalizing those without party affiliation. The signal importance of the state in the provision of patronage resources in these regions has meant that parties aim to win seats and form governments in order to direct it.

Sub-Contracted Governance and Electoral Fragmentation in Pakistan’s Peripheries

Two regions in the country’s west and northwest maintain state-society relations under which the tribal leadership distributes goods and services and executes policy on behalf of the federal government. In FATA, tribal maliks maintain administrative and judicial authority within their tribal jurisdictions, in coordination with political agents acting as sole representatives of the central state. Administrative exceptionalism is supported by a legal framework – the Frontier
Crimes Legislation of 1901 – elements of which were integrated into Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution: provincial assemblies and superior courts have no jurisdiction there.\textsuperscript{45} While the central government provides FATA with developmental and administrative resources, these resources are not distributed through government servants; political agents maintain only small numbers of support staff and have been traditionally thought of as diplomats or representatives of the government rather than administrators. Rather, resources are effectively provided to the tribal leadership for distribution, which is responsible for providing the manpower and the logistics to distribute resources and execute government projects, like building roads or schools or maintaining militias to preserving public order.

Balochistan is a more intermediate case. It has a provincial government and a regular, if weak, bureaucracy. The capital, Quetta, is dominated by a major military base and is thus a regional center of state power. The influence of this regularly governed administrative state reaches the urban population in Quetta and other cities, representing around a quarter of the province’s population. In the vast rural hinterland classified ‘Area B’ by the federal government, however, law and order is statutorily administered by the Balochistan Levies, recruited from and maintained by tribal groups, providing Balochi tribal leaders or \textit{sardars} with authority normally reserved for the state and thus maintain significant influence over its functions at the local level, including the distribution of resources.\textsuperscript{46}

In these areas, customary leadership essentially controls the actual distribution of patronage. A government committee assessing governance in FATA stated that “maliks…assist in the implementation of government’s policies by acting as intermediaries between the members of individual tribes and the government. They are expected to maintain peace and ensure that roads in the region remain open.”\textsuperscript{47}
said, “there is no chance in hell to affect change without the agreement of tribal maliks or leaders in that area.”

The political calculations of tribal leaders are nuanced, reflecting informal yet durable compacts between elites and the tribal population: “patronage has to be balanced with the tribal requirements. There is a balance – in the pashtunwali [tribal honor system] context, you will not last long as a malik or influential individual if you do not look after the general welfare of the tribe and the clan.” Maliks in FATA thus do not just have the authority but also the imperative to distribute patronage. In Balochistan, while the tribal system is more hierarchical than in FATA, there is still an expectation that effective sardars speak on behalf of their communities to the government and have influence over the distribution of resources, even though tribal authority is partially contested by nationalist assertion. The dominance of tribal structures over the distribution of patronage resources forces us to rethink the politician-party-bureaucrat relationship that drives much of the electoral convergence in other areas.

The exceptional nature of administration and the overwhelming influence of patronage distribution by tribal leaders has meant that there is a significant social and political distance between them and elected representatives and political parties. Most will avoid overtly supporting national parties, because parties have strictly limited influence over the distribution of resources from the central state; they gain little strategic benefit in allying with them. Resources flow from the office of the President, through the politically insulated Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), the FATA Secretariat, and then to political agents and tribal leaders directly. Tribal leaders and their followers are, in effect, taking the place of bureaucrats at the local level. These channels of patronage almost completely bypass parliament, political parties and elected politicians; they are executed and maintained by administratively exceptional
corners of the Pakistani state, politically sustained to this point by the tribes, the military and the higher echelons of federal administration. Given this context, party affiliation cannot provide access to exclusive patronage goods in these areas, which means that many candidates – party-affiliated or not – can remain viable in these elections.  

Those running for office in FATA, and to some extent in Balochistan, are sometimes tribal leaders seeking to demonstrate their strength of their following within the wider community, but are as often those at some remove from the tribal elite. Many of these candidates represent aspirants for greater power and influence but are relatively excluded from the higher echelons of tribal leadership, such as those who might have grown wealthy through transportation or trade or through investments or employment abroad. Individual tribal leaders might run or choose to support a certain candidate as a proxy, or these candidates have built up independent – though very local – bases of support, but these candidates are unlikely to have cross-constituency appeal. Successful candidates can simply rely on resources due to them as elected officials – in Pakistan, all parliamentarians receive discretionary development funds – and doing favors for friends in the capital to reward their smaller and more concentrated base of support, without needing to control larger flows of distribution from the state. Their access to political power also enable them to participate in other rent-seeking activities that have helped some to accumulate personal resources and in turn reward their supporters: “FATA Senators and MNAs use their position to get benefits to themselves… they have looked beyond the agency, they are national and global players.”  

Individual contests bear this out. The electoral outcome in NA-45, in western Khyber Agency, reflected a contest of leadership between rival factions. Noor ul Haq Qadri, a tribal leader and the MNA elected in the 2008 elections was defeated by Shah Ji Gul Afridi, “once a
follower and right-hand man of Qadri,” after tribesmen from the Khyber Pass town of Landikotal urged him to challenge the leader. In NA-36, which covers Mohmand Agency, Malik Bilal Rehman, running as an independent candidate, won in 2008 and 2013 with 20 and 23 percent of the vote respectively. Bilal Rehman and his brother Hilal, a senator for FATA, “present themselves as the ‘real’ Maliks [leaders] of their tribe,” the powerful Halemzai clan, and their father and grandfather represented the Agency in parliament in the 1980s, continuing a long tradition of the family’s representation of the tribe to the state. In 2013, he was opposed by his uncle, Fazal Hadi, and his cousin, Malik Daud Shah, who ran on the PTI ticket, as an ultimately failed attempt to use an external electoral mandate to change the balance in internal clan politics. Thus, we see electoral contests testing the influence of individuals rather than the strength of parties, and as a result, independent candidates are viable in these elections. Numerous candidates can thus stay in the race, because they face no serious disincentives or clear signals that they would be assured of failure.

Voters, faced with a more diverse array of possible candidates and without any clear signals like party affiliation about which is the most likely to deliver on their promises, are unable to reach any consensus on the two or three most likely candidates to win. As a result, their votes might accrue to their tribal patron or their proxy, or to a local champion, on the expectation that resources might be directed towards their locality. As a result, the vote is fragmented and we see a number of candidates, including independents and representatives of small parties, receiving significant numbers of votes. Major parties are thus prevented from monopolizing electoral contests.

We see the resulting electoral fragmentation in a number of different dimensions. First, the effective number of candidates is significantly higher. In the 2013 elections, average “ENP”
for FATA constituencies and for Baloch constituencies (excluding Quetta) the average was 6.2 and 4.5 respectively; for other constituencies, the average ENP was 2.87. Second, electoral competition could enable a higher number of serious independent candidates or those affiliated to very local parties. Political parties were first allowed to campaign in the Tribal Agencies in 2011, so we focus on the 2013 election. The total vote-share for independent candidates in FATA constituencies and in Baloch constituencies outside Quetta was .578 and .217 respectively, in contrast to .108 for other constituencies. Further, the vote share of parties of national standing is generally lower. The vote-share of parties of national standing in FATA and Balochistan excluding Quetta was .360 and .339 respectively, in contrast to .793 for all others. In these areas, most of the vote goes to candidates running either fully independently or unaffiliated with major national or regional political parties.

Lastly, because of the fragmentation of the vote and support from particular tribal leaders or communities within the district, we would expect that even the winning candidate would derive most of his support from a particular locality. Voting booth level data can provide circumstantial evidence of this dynamic. Any election is the aggregate results of support for various candidates in the different precincts. We would normally see that any one candidate’s performance would vary over the different polling booths, but extreme variation could indicate that even successful candidates are drawing significant support only from certain polling booths, representing particular localities. Figure 2 represents the aggregated difference between the winning candidate’s average across the constituency and their performance at each polling booth in eight FATA constituencies (Khyber I and II, Bajaur I and II, North Waziristan, Khurram, Orakzai, and Mohmand), one Baloch constituency (Zhob-Killa Abdullah-Sherani) and an urban and a rural constituency selected at random from Punjab (Lahore XI and Mianwali I) in the 2008
elections. The FATA and Punjab groups have roughly 600 polling booths each; the Baloch constituency contains 200.

Figure 2: Difference between winner’s overall and polling-booth vote proportion over eleven constituencies, 2008 elections.

Source: Pakistan Election Commission

We see substantially greater variation in polling booth level outcomes in FATA and Baloch constituencies, signifying that when candidates win these seats, they do so with extensive support from a concentrated group of polling booths – and thus localities within the constituency – and almost no support in others.

Broadly, the difference in the distributional power of the bureaucracy at the local level, and its impact on the practice of patronage, has clear implications for the conduct of electoral competition and the extent of party system convergence to national norms. Votes are fragmented when the bureaucracy cannot direct patronage resources, and thus national party affiliation does not drive electoral convergence. In the next section, we test the power of this argument relative to other explanations of variation in the number of parties.

Empirical Analysis

In order to test the effects of these governance institutions in relation to other factors, we fit models for the effective number of parties\(^{56}\) (\(ENP\)) for national assembly constituencies using
data from the 2008 and 2013 elections and the proportion of vote share of parties of national standing\(^57\) (PNS) in the 2013 elections. In the analysis below, we use two binary variables for constituencies under some form of subcontracted governance – **FATA** and **Balochistan** (excluding Quetta) – to assess the impact of subcontracted governance institutions mentioned above. The effects of FATA and Balochistan are assessed separately because the nature and functioning of these institutions, as well as the social context, are quite different.

To control for alternative explanations, we use the following variables:

*Ethnic Diversity:* Ethnic diversity is measured using a continuous variable for district-level measures for ethnolinguistic fractionalization (**ELF**) – from 0.858 as the most diverse to 0 as the most homogenous, derived from Census Reports. We would expect that higher ELF scores would yield higher ENP and lower PNS, all else equal, as voters are less likely to converge on candidates across ethnic lines.

*Urban Politics:* Electoral mobilization in urban areas in Pakistan is quite distinct from the majority of the population in rural areas. Party offices, affiliated student and professional organizations, clubs and mobilizing rallies are more present; we would expect that these more institutionalized aspects of party organization would lead to lower ENP and higher PNS. We use a binary variable **urban**, coded 1 for constituencies representing municipal corporation wards of the cities in Pakistan above one million inhabitants: Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar and Sarghoda; we include Quetta because it is the only large city in Balochistan. All other constituencies are coded 0.

In addition, we employ the following control variables:

*Distance:* we utilize distance in hundreds of kilometers between district administrative headquarters to the provincial capital, or in the case of FATA, Islamabad, as a proxy for how
linked voters are to major national and provincial issues, and therefore the localization of national contests. We would expect that more proximate administrative jurisdictions would have lower ENP and higher PNS.58

*HDI:* we use the UNDP’s human development index by administrative district as a proxy for modernization, development and wealth. We would expect that voters in more developed districts to vote more strategically and parties to compete more actively as there are greater expectations on behalf of citizens for the distribution of goods, thus leading to lower ENP and higher PNS.

*Minister:* we utilize a binary variable indicating whether the successful candidate was included in the federal cabinet after that election; this would be associated with lower ENP and higher PNS, as party grandees standing for office directly are more assured of control over patronage distribution, all else equal.

*Log_Incidents:* During the past decade, Pakistan has experienced intense insurgent violence, which might have had an impact on how citizens view the state. We use the BFRS Political Violence in Pakistan dataset on the log numbers of incidents at the district level between 2002 and 2007 and between 2008 and 2011 control for the effects of political violence.59

*Provincial Effects:* We use binary variables for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh, with Punjab as the excluded category, to capture provincial effects for areas not under sub-contracted governance.

We estimate two models for ENP, one each for the 2008 and the 2013 elections, and one model for PNS in the 2013 elections, using OLS regressions with Huber-White robust standard errors, clustered by administrative district.
In these models, both urban and the subcontracted governance variables are statistically significant for ENP. FATA constituencies are, all else equal, associated with an increase in the difference of nearly two effective parties in 2008 and of more than three parties in 2013 compared with other constituencies. For Baloch constituencies, the effect is more modest: they are associated with more than half a party in 2008 and more and one and a half in 2013. Urban constituencies are, all else equal, associated with a decrease of more than a half of an effective party compared to non-urban constituencies in both models. Other significant results on ENP include the provincial proxies for Sindh and KP, and Minister in 2013. All of these results conform to our expectations. The statistical and substantive significance of Sindh, all else equal, suggests the electoral dominance of MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad. For KP, the volatile party system at the provincial level, with the Islamist parties, the ANP and then the PTI rapidly
succeeding one another may have led to a failure of strategic voting given the uncertainty of which party would be the ultimate victor.

FATA and particularly Balochistan is strongly and negatively associated with PNS, all other things being equal: these constituencies are associated with a 20 percent and 38 percent lower vote share for parties of national standing. Human development is positively associated with greater PNS, though with a modest substantive effect. This is expected as those districts that are more integrated into plans for national development are more likely to vote for national parties. The KP provincial dummy has a positive effect; constituencies in the province are associated with an 11 percent higher PNS vote-share, lending some credence to the idea that KP politics reflects fragmented competition between major parties, rather than the lack of penetration of national politics into constituency-wise competition.

In sum, we find that subcontracted governance arrangements, in FATA and Balochistan, has a powerful effect on fragmenting representation at the constituency level and limiting cross-district coordination, even controlling for other explanations. We argue that the specific nature of this exceptional governance, and particularly the means by which the state distributes patronage resources through tribal structures, are behind these results, rather than simply the lack of state capacity in these areas.61 Further, we believe that these results do not arise simply from coercion of local leaders subverting democratic elections.62 Thus while some of the indicators of party-institutional development seem to correlate with electoral convergence, there remains substantial variation from this norm associated with particular political geographies.

**Electoral Fragmentation in India**

This relationship might even be present in older, institutionalized democracies in the developing world, such as India, in which there is less formal administrative exceptionalism. While
Chhibber and Kollman report that the average ENP for Indian constituencies approximated the Duvergerian equilibrium,\textsuperscript{63} there is a significant minority of districts, particularly in the North of the country, where this is not the case.\textsuperscript{64} In investigating these aberrant cases through survey research, a tentative association between the absence of the everyday state and electoral fragmentation has emerged. In a national survey conducted in 2002 by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, interviewers were asked to report whether the primary sampling unit, the polling station with an average population of about one thousand, was geographically proximate to any agency of the provincial or the central government, such as a police station or a post office. The presence of this agency within the polling station jurisdiction suggests the potential for the local distribution of patronage and its capture by politicians; localities without such agencies might develop alternative channels through which resources may be distributed, and are thus less susceptible to party-affiliated political influence.

We obtained the average number of parties for each of the parliamentary constituencies, a total of 51, within which a particular polling station is located. We see significant variation in the proportion of localities with fewer state agencies across these constituencies. This is the case even in Delhi, the center of state power and thus a hard case for variation. In the Janakpuri constituency, half of the polling stations did not have a single agency of the state within its vicinity, whereas in the Malviya Nagar constituency, also in Delhi, all the polling stations have at least one state agency nearby. In that survey, respondents were also asked if there was a dominant caste in the area. We use a positive response to this question as a proxy for the presence of traditional authority.\textsuperscript{65} We find that polling station jurisdictions with one or more agencies of the state were correlated with significantly lower number of parties at the constituency level. Given that localities of state presence and absence are not uniformly
distributed across constituencies, this suggests that constituencies with a higher proportion of localities with fewer state agencies are associated with greater electoral fragmentation. The presence of a dominant caste at polling station level was associated with only a slight increase of the average number of parties for the associated constituencies, suggesting that it is the absence of state institutions, rather than the presence of traditional authority, that might influence fragmentation. This result was robust to the controlling for political knowledge – whether a respondent could identify Member of the State Assembly or the Member of Parliament from the area – and media exposure.\(^{66}\)

### Table 2: ENP associated with polling booths by state presence and traditional authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Authority</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of State Agencies</td>
<td>-0.267*</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Exposure</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(R^2\) 0.05  
\(N\) 5822

Significance: p<0.05  

The fact that we see tentative evidence for a correlation between local state absence and electoral fragmentation in India lends some credence to the external validity of the argument beyond the administrative exceptionalisms of the Pakistani periphery. At independence, India homogenized governance, at least in \textit{de jure} terms throughout its territory, with frontier agencies, princely states and chieftaincies reorganized into states, districts, tehsils and other layers of local governance. Yet there is significant variation in the \textit{de facto} presence of the administrative state throughout India’s political geography; in areas where channels of patronage distribution might not be completely controlled by bureaucrats, electoral fragmentation may occur because
powerful national or regional parties cannot claim total control over this distribution. Much more research is required to understand the dynamics in the Indian context, and to see how far this argument travels beyond South Asia. Other factors – from administrative decentralization to presidential systems to legacies of authoritarian rule to the nature of customary authority at the local level – may complicate a simple application of this argument further afield. Yet we believe that the nature of the administrative state at the local level and its related ability to monopolize the distribution of public goods serve as important and hitherto ignored conceptual tools in the study of electoral politics.

Conclusion

The extant literature on electoral politics has generally ignored variations in the administrative state at the local level and electoral coordination at the constituency level. Most scholars have assumed Duverger’s ‘local bipartyism’ to be in operation in elections under SMP rules. This article both highlights the failures of this assumption in parts of the Pakistani periphery, and suggests an explanation for why coordination succeeds in some contexts and fails in others. In particular, we focus on whether the quotidian bureaucracy maintains a monopoly over the distribution of patronage. If this is the case, candidates must gain leverage over bureaucrats in the distribution of patronage through affiliation with parties of national standing, thus establishing an exclusive arena of competition among major parties. When the bureaucracy does not maintain such a monopoly, however, the pressures for electoral coordination are absent, and thus fragmentation of the vote at the constituency level is much more likely as local champions are able to credibly compete for office.
Notes

4 For a comprehensive overview of this literature, see Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco, *Voters, Brokers and Clientelism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
6 Duverger, *Political Parties*, 224.
7 Ibid., 226.
9 Ibid., 149-178; Cox, “Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination,” 149-154.
10 LaPolombara and Weiner, “The Origin and Development of Political Parties.”
13 Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments.”
17 For the purposes of this article, patronage is defined as the allocation of favors or rewards such as public offices, jobs, contracts, subsidies or other valued benefits by a patron (usually an elected official) to a client (usually a broker or set of voters) in return for the client’s service, such as mobilizing votes or providing money for campaigns.
21 Luis Medina and Susan Stokes, “Monopoly and Monitoring,” in *Patrons, Clients and Policies*.
38 While they noted some broader challenges with Pakistan’s framework for holding elections and registering parties and voters, external observer missions felt that 2008 and particularly 2013 represented both pluralistic competition and largely fair voting and counting procedures. See *Pakistan Election Observer Mission Final Report* (Brussels: European Union, 2008 and 2013).
42 Parties of national standing are parties that meet one of two criteria: that they formed or were part of the government after the 2008 or 2013 elections, or they credibly mobilized votes by being the winner or first loser in constituencies in more than two provinces. This group includes the PML-N, the PPP, the PML-Q, the ANP, the MQM, the JI, the JUI and the PTI (in 2013).
These are indeed regions of low state capacity, but what is distinctive is the ways in which that low capacity is manifested in explicitly different forms of governance, in contrast to instances of government neglect within orthodox forms of administration, such as southern Punjab, northern Sindh and rural KP.


Author interview with former government official, Peshawar, January 3rd, 2015.

Interview, January 3rd.


This failure of major parties to monopolize competition may be why an all-party parliamentary committee on FATA reform was established, which collectively advocated the integration of FATA into the orthodox bureaucratic structures of KP. See FATA Reform Committee Report, 26.


Interview, September 23.


We do not analyze PNS for the 2008 elections because political parties were not allowed to compete in FATA until 2011.

The distance measure only indirectly addresses another alternative explanation for fragmentation: that of insufficient political knowledge and media penetration. Unfortunately, government statics does not include FATA and Malakand Division in its reporting of measures such as number of television sets per capita. But a combination of a liberalized media, significant in-country migration and easy access to new technology has meant that there is increasing political awareness even in rural areas. Moreover, strategic entry, the main mechanism of this article, does not rely on voters’ awareness.


The lower effect in 2008 may be associated with a change in governance during the Musharraf years, in which the Levies system was disbanded and rural areas of the province was theoretically brought under the remit of the provincial police. In 2010, this policy was reversed.
Sindh has significantly lower levels of state capacity than Punjab, and yet Sindhi constituencies demonstrate greater coordination, suggesting that the inherent strength of state institutions matter less than their specific roles and functions in the distribution of patronage. The customary leadership is too fragmented and responsible to tribal jirgas to exercise substantial intimidation, particularly given that the military rather than the tribal leadership wields most of the coercion in these areas. Moreover, such manipulation should lead to one-candidate dominance rather than fragmentation. Balochistan is a specific case: the widespread use of force by military and paramilitary forces has led to some evidence of support for Balochi nationalist parties, but this did not lead to convergence in the 2013 elections. On the dynamics of conflict and nationalist assertion in Balochistan, see Frederic Grare, *Balochistan: the State vs. the Nation* (Washington, DC: the Carnegie Endowment, 2013).


